I Write by Obedience to your Lordship's Commands, with­out Reflection upon my own small Abilities, because the Chief Consideration of a Subject ought to be to obey his Prince.

Your Excellencies have com­manded me to deliver my Opini­on, [Page 2] how the Venetian Republick ought to regulate it self, to hope for a perpetual Duration. To ob­tain a true Notion of this, it will be necessary to distinguish, and first to regulate the Government of the City, in which will be compre­hended the manner of keeping the Nobles and the Citizens to their Duty; then look abroad to the rest of your Dominions: and lastly give some Form to the dealing with Fo­reign Princes.

To begin with the First, I might in short put you in mind of the Saying of St. Bernardino of Siena, to the Doge Moro, who said, That the Republick should continue so long as they should keep to the Rule of doing Exact Justice; but to come nearer to the matter, and the Condition of these Times, we must reduce under that Head of Justice, all that contributes to the Service of the State; and, to speak yet more succinctly, we will lay it [Page 3] down as a Maxim, That all is just which is any ways necessary for the maintaining of the Govern­ment.

In the particular Government of the City, 'tis an excellent Cu­stom to lay the Impositions as well upon the Nobility, as the rest of the Citizens. First, Because the Burden is less when it is general: And, Secondly, Because 'tis just when 'tis without Partiality. There is no doubt but it lessens something of the Splendor of the Nobility to see them tax'd particularly, since in many Governments the Nobi­lity and Gentry, though they are Subjects, and not part of the Go­vernment, do nevertheless enjoy a Freedom from Taxes, and contri­bute more with their Sword than Purse, towards the Publick Charge: But since the Ancient Simplicity of our Ancestors has patiently submit­ted to this Yoak; and because the Priviledges of the Sword are dan­gerous [Page 4] in a Commonwealth, I think 'tis advisable not to innovate in this Point, because such a change would give too much offence to the rest of your People, and too much Haughtiness to your own Nobility. 'Tis true, that when the Taxes are upon the Lands, so as to be unavoidable, it would be conve­nient to give the Nobility all the advantage of time for payment, and at last, if they are insolvent, it will not be amiss to neglect the ri­gorous Exaction of the Law, that so the Nobility be not ruin'd, be­cause Extreams are always dange­rous, and the Republick may suf­fer as much from having too many poor Noblemen, as from having too many rich ones; besides the Envy and Jealousie that must be in the hearts of those who shall find them­selves naked, and their Equals cloath­ed with their Garments, and that only for not having been able to pay an Imposition laid upon them [Page 5] by other Peoples Contrivance.

There are some, who not ma­king a right Judgment of things, do inveigh extreamly against a Cu­stom of this Republick, which is the having so many Offices and Pla­ces of so small Revenue, that those who enjoy them are almost necessi­tated to be corrupt; and so after they have been Judges and Go­vernours, forc'd to come under the lash of the Law, or to justifie their Integrity, if they can: This seems a notorious Abuse, and carries with it some appearance. But however, I should never advise to make these Imployments better, because there results from this another greater ad­vantage to the State, which is to keep the small Nobility under; for they may be compar'd to the Ad­der, which cannot exert its Poyson when 'tis numm'd with Cold: And if these Nobles, who are by incli­nation discontented, should once arrive but to a Mediocrity in For­tune, [Page 6] they would presently contest with the great ones, and by strength of their Numbers play some ill Trick to the Government: where­as now they are kept to their Duty, not only by Poverty, which clips the Wings of Ambition, but also by being subject to the Censure of the great ones, for having misbe­hav'd themselves in their Govern­ments. Indead I could think it pru­dent to proceed against them some­thing coldly, unless they are guilty of very great Enormities, such as scandalize the generality of your Subjects; for then 'tis necessary to shew a publick resentment: But otherwise I would have them hand­led gently, it being a kind of pu­nishment to lye open to a Prosecuti­on: And indeed I would never have any Nobleman, though never so guilty, be condemned to a Publick Infamous Death, because the Da­mage that results from thence upon the whole Order of the Nobility, [Page 7] when they are seen to pass through the Hands of an Hangman, is great­er than the Good of a Publick Ex­ample can avail. Neither on the other side would I have these No­blemen, thus guilty, to walk the Streets, and be seen in publick, be­cause then your Subjects would conceive a sinister Opinion of your Justice; but they should be kept in Prison, or, if it be necessary, be privately dispatch'd.

If these Criminals fly from Ju­stice, then you may use the utmost severity in your banishing of them; because then it appears, that if no­thing more be done, nothing more was feasible; and let the same Ri­gour be observ'd in keeping them out: for since they are, as it were, gangreen'd Members cut off from the Body, it will not be expedient to unite them again to it with defor­mity of the whole.

Here I foresee I shall be censur'd by some, as a bad Pilot, who en­deavouring [Page 8] to shun Scylla, runs upon Carybdis; that is, while I aim at keeping the small Nobility under, I forget the danger may arise from the Great, and the Rich of that Order. I see the Objection, but do not value it; and my Reason is, the long Observation I have made of the Nature of this City, by the strength of which I dare boldly affirm, that the Republick of Ve­nice will never come to its end by that which has ruin'd all other Re­publicks, to wit, when the power has been reduc'd first into a few hands, and then their Authority devolv'd upon one who has erected a Monarchy. The strange Emula­tion that reigns here among the great ones, even among those of the same Family; nay, that is be­tween Brothers themselves, does se­cure the Government from this danger; and if by a Supposition, almost impossible, all the Brothers of one Family had the power gi­ven [Page 9] them of making a Dictator, I am confident they would never agree to chuse one among them­selves, but would rather chuse to be a part of the Government, divided among a Thousand Gentlemen, than to be Princes of the Blood, and Subjects.

The Great Governments, called Governments of Expence, and so contriv'd on purpose by our prudent Ancestors, to give an occasion to those who are too rich to lessen their Riches; ought to be dis­pos'd of according to the Intenti­on of their first Institution: That is to say, not to those who have no means to sustain such a Burden, and must be forc'd by consequence to compass them per fas & nefas; and if they are Honest, must do it foolishly, because they are not wicked enough to do it knavishly, and so either acquire the Hatred of those they govern, or be laugh'd at, and contemned by them. This [Page 10] is a Point of great Importance; and he who goes through such an Im­ployment meanly, and without Ex­pence, demerits extreamly of his Countrey, because he renders the Person that represents the State contemptible; and all Rebellions of Subjects have had their first Origi­nal Rise from the Contempt of the Prince▪

The Contests that happen be­tween Nobleman and Nobleman of equal Fortunes, and are follow'd by Attempts upon one another, may be conniv'd at when they are reconcil'd; but if the thing be be­tween a Nobleman of the Better sort, and one of the Lesser, let it be chastis'd with some appearance of Severity at least, for fear the Humours of the small Nobility should be stirr'd; But if one of these shall attack a Nobleman of the First Rate, let him be punish'd with a heavy hand, lest the Party injur'd, being potent in Friends, go [Page 11] about to do himself Justice, to the great detriment of the Publick Au­thority: But if a Nobleman do commit an Enormity towards a Subject, first let there be all the en­deavour possible used to justifie him; and if that cannot be, let the pu­nishment be with more Noise than Harm; But if a Subject insults a Nobleman, let the Revenge be sharp and publick, that the Subjects may not accustom themselves to lay hands upon the Nobility, but ra­ther think them Venerable and Sa­cred.

In Civil Judicatures it would be requisite to act without Passion, to take away that ill Opinion that Men have of the Partiality of Ju­stice, in favour of the Great. This Belief must be destroyed; for a Subject that once thinks himself prejudg'd by the Quality of his Adversary, will never be capable of seeing whether his Cause has been decided according to the me­rit [Page 12] of it or no: Therefore there can never be too much diligence used in the Administration of Civil Judi­catures, which are one of the greatest Foundations of Govern­ment; for when a Subject can say to himself, That he shall have Ju­stice, if his Case deserves it, he sub­mits to a great many other Grievan­ces without repining: And on the contrary, though after an unjust Sentence, he should be indulg'd in some Criminal Matter, he will ne­ver have a Love for the Govern­ment, because the Injury re­ceiv'd, will stick in his Memory, and the Indulgence will vanish out of it.

The Quarrels between the Plebei­ans may be judged according to the common course of Justice, which may there appear in its Natural Being, there arising no Politick Grounds to disturb the Course of it; nay, rather their lit­tle Animosities are to be fomented, [Page 13] as Cato us'd to do in his Family; and for this Reason, wise Antiqui­ty permitted the Encounters and Battles that are still practis'd in this City, between several Parties of the People; But all Assemblies of numerous Bodies are to be a­voided as the Plague, because no­thing can sooner overturn the Commonwealth, than the Facility the People may meet with in getting together to confer or debate about their Grievances; Nay, this thing is so dangerous, that it is to be de­tested and abhorr'd, even in the Nobility, because that there being in all Bodies some ill Humours, if they are not united, either they do not work at all, or do not work ill; But if they once are in a Mass, and take their course one way, they not only are hard to cure, but of­ten prove mortal to the Body. Let there be a careful watch upon all Seditious Discourses, nay, upon all Speculative ones that seem any way [Page 14] to censure the Government; and set before your Eyes the Example of Heresies, which have never so much wasted the Church as when they have had their Beginnings from Curiosity and Jests.

Let the City Arsenal be kept up, though there be not present occasi­on for it, because things that de­pend upon Time, must be anticipa­ted by time. Let the Masters and Tradesmen of the place be kept sa­tisfied, and upon any Fault com­mitted, let the Punishment be Pa­ternal; that is, with seeming Ri­gour, but not such as to make them run away; for, if possible, they are to believe the Fable of the Mouse, who thought its hole to be all the World.

Let the Publick Secretaries, and all other Officers that must be in­form'd of the Publick Concerns, be chosen with care, as like to be faith­ful and diligent; but when once admitted, though they should prove [Page 15] otherwise, let them be born withal, because there is need of but a few to do well: But every single Officer can do hurt; and it's much easier to defend ones self from a Potent Foreign Enemy, than from an ill-meaning Servant.

Let the Manufactures which are peculiar to Venice, be preserv'd; and to that end let them not be loaded with many Impositions, because that Profit and Gain which has made Men venture through a Thousand Difficulties, to discover New Worlds, will still carry the Merchant, if he cannot have it at home, to seek it abroad, though he go to the Antipodes for it. Pre­serve the Artists therefore, re­membring that most Arts are a kind of Phantastick Being.

The Marriages between Noble­men and Women of the City, may be tolerated, if the Women are ve­ry rich; because it often happens that the Industry of many Years [Page 16] of the Plebeians, serves only to en­rich the House of a Nobleman; and it is a gentle Imperceptible sort of Usurpation; 'tis true, 'tis some­thing abating of the Lustre of the Noble Families; but that is only in abstract and in general, but in rea­lity it advantages the Nobility; and there need be no fear that the Children be degenerate and base, because nothing so debases a Noble­man as Poverty: Besides, there re­sults from this another great advan­tage, which is, to make the Plebei­ans concern'd by Affection for the Nobility, and bound to study their advantage by a much sweeter tye than that of Obedience.

Let the Considerable Honours of the Commonwealth be disposed of to those who may naturally pre­tend to them, for having gone through the many Employments, which are steps to the highest Dig­nities, making always an allowance for extraordinary Merit, in which [Page 17] the State can never be too prodi­gal: For otherwise to prefer those who cannot reckon themselves a­mong the Lawful Pretenders, gives just Offence to the others his E­quals, and likewise strengthens the pretensions of the unworthy, who not seeing any thing in that Fortu­nate Man that exceeds their ordi­nary Talent, cannot imagine why he should be preferr'd, and they ex­cluded from the like Dignities. The Subject on the other hand is hardly brought to pay Excessive Reve­rence where they never us'd to give but ordinary Respect; and from this argues, That the Dig­nity it self is not of so much value, since it is bestowed upon so inconsi­derable a Person.

And because it is in the Nature of all sublunary things to have a mixture of Imperfection, I must own, that the Republick of Venice has likewise its Defects; and the Chief one is, That the Body of the [Page 18] Nobility is too numerous to be A­ristocratical; therefore it will al­ways be expedient to contrive, by all Arts imaginable, that the Great Council do delegate the greatest Authority that may be to the Senate and the Council of Ten: But this must be done by secret imperceptible ways, such as shall not be discover'd till after 'tis done, because when they have once for all parted with their power, it will be a happy settlement of the deliberating part, and if the same can be composed in the Judiciary and distributive Power, it may be hop'd, that the Constitution of the State will be more vigorous: It cannot be denied but the Great Council does relish very much of the Mobile, and by consequent, subject to impetuous Deliberations, not always weigh'd in the Ballance of Prudence and Experience. And truly I admire, that wise Antiquity did not gain this Point, it being [Page 19] easie for them to take advantage of the simplicity of their times; or at least to have prolong'd the time of the great Magistratures further than from Year to Year, at the end of which they now must have a new Confirmation from the Senate; For this being design'd to prevent the falling into the Tyranny of the great ones, does unawares run the State into that of the meaner sort, so much the more odious by how much 'tis more numerous and unexperienc'd; We should see more vigorous Reso­lutions in the Senators, if they were not continually obliged to court the Favour of the Piazza.

The Office of Avogadore is to be disposed of with extream Circum­spection, and that to Persons of Eminency, such as have no need of fawning upon the Multitude of the Great Council, and then the Senate and Council of Ten might make some steps beyond their Natural [Page 20] Authority, which would be born with patience, and Time would give them Prescription: Whereas, if an Avogadore, to make himself Popular, shall carry these Delibe­rations to the Great Councils Cen­sure, immediately out of Jealousie they are annull'd, though never so expedient. Therefore if that Office of Avogadore cannot be pla­ced in the hands of one who in­clines more to the Patritian than to the Popular side, it would be well to give it to one of mean Spirit, and a quiet Temper; or if it be dispo­sed of to an unquiet bold man, let him be one who lies under some in­famous imputation of Corruption, or other Enormity, to the end that the first may not be able, nor the latter dare to affront, and try it with the Grandees of the State; Otherwise an Avogadore of Parts, Integrity and Malignity, may easily set fire to the Four Corners of the Commonwealth.

[Page 21] For the same Reasons it will al­ways be well to lessen the Authori­ty of the Quaranties, they being naturally popular. They were con­stituted numerous, to prevent the Venality of Justice; but on the o­ther hand they are subject to gather peccant Humours, and afford too much nourishment to a Feverish Temper: They may be born with in the administration of Civil Ju­stice, but in Criminals their power should be lessen'd, which may be done by the Council of Ten's taking to their Cognizance all Criminal Cases that they can any ways draw to them, and by leaving off the Custom of deliga­ting the Power of the Senate and Signoria to these Quaranties, as is now practis'd but too often. If these Quaranties were quite taken a­way, it would be better for the Go­vernment, but then it would be as necessary to provide some other way for so many necessitous and idle per­sons.

[Page 22] It were well to use all means to take from them the Authority of judging Noblemen in Criminal Ca­ses; for so by degrees they will lose many of the Priviledges affected to the Nobility, as also I could wish they were totally excluded from the Senate; But that is more to be wish'd than hop'd for.

As for the People, let them al­ways be provided for by plenty of things for sustenance, and as cheap as may be: For the Nature of the Rabble is so malicious, that even when scarcity of Provisions comes from the failing of the Crops, they nevertheless impute it to the Malice or Negligence of the Great ones: So there is no way to make them hold their peace, but to stop their Mouths. Employ as many of the People as may be in the Service of the Publick, that so drawing their Livelyhood from the Government, they may have affection for it, and the Numbers of the Necessitous [Page 23] will thereby be lessen'd: for if Hunger and Want can make strong Towns yield, it will likewise in­cite Men to venture their Lives in desperate Attempts, rather than lin­ger in misery. Yet still I would not advise to take any into Office that had not first gain'd wherewith­al to subsist in a mediocrity; for else it will be but giving him a kind of leave to cheat, to the great damage of the Publick.

As for the Married Women of the City, let there be care taken to keep them honest; and to have them so, they must be kept retir'd, remembring, that the Beginnings of all Corruption in that kind are slight, and proceed from a Look or a Sa­lute.

Let one Modern Abuse be re­form'd, which is, that the Noble­men do take upon them to force the People to make Agreements, Payments, or Marriages, and not dare to have recourse to the Publick [Page 24] Authority, upon which this is an Usurpation: If this be not remedi­ed, 'tis enough to cause another Sicilian Vespers: Besides, that it is likely to set all the Nobility together by the Ears, while each will main­tain his own Friends and Depen­dants.

In all Occurrences where the Publick Faith is engaged, let it be inviolably kept, without minding any present advantage that might accrew by the breaking of it; for that is but momentaneous: where­as the Benefit of keeping Faith is eternal; and a Prince that breaks his Word, must invent a new Reli­gion to make himself be believed another time, seeing the Oaths he made in the Religion he profes­ses have not been able to bind him.

Let the Nobles forbear all Tra­ding; for a State that will have Merchants, must not have their Governours exercise that Professi­on, [Page 25] because the Merchants will al­ways be afraid of being Brow-bea­ten in Bargains, and over-aw'd in their Dealings. The Spaniards, who have so little kindness for the Venetian Government, have not a more odious Name than to call it, A Republick of Merchants. By an Ancient Law, a Nobleman tax'd with Trading, cannot enter into a Turnament, as not being fit Company for Cavaliers. Merchan­dise may in a short time either ex­treamly enrich, or totally ruine a Family, both which are dangerous for the Commonwealth. Besides, a Merchant is of a necessity in some measure a Foreigner, while his Trade and Interest lies abroad, and a Nobleman ought to have no In­terest nor Affection but at home. If Politicians have taught, that it is not safe for a great City to have too sumptuous Palaces and Villas in its Territory, lest the fear of losing of them should incline them to [Page 26] yield the very City to a potent E­nemy: What shall we say of those Nobles, who, being engag'd in Trade, may have many Thousands of Crowns in an Enemies Coun­try? In the beginnings of a Com­monwealth, Merchandising was ne­cessary to get out of Poverty, and now 'tis dangerous, as being the Fomenter of too much Luxury. The Genoueses who have conti­nued the Trading of their Nobili­ty, have but small Respect shew'd them by other Princes, and are more valued one by one than alto­gether.

Let superfluous Pomps be forbid­den, though if they were only fol­lowed by the Rich, it would be of use to the Government, because it would bleed those who are too san­guine; but by reason of the Emu­lation which is between those of the same Degree, the permitting of them would prove ruinous to ma­ny Families, who could neither a­void [Page 27] them, nor go through with them: And whoever by a Punctilio of Honour is brought to the neces­sity of doing more than he is able, must use, to compass it, such means as he ought not to employ.

Before a Law be made and pro­mulgated, let it be well thought on and debated: but being once made, let it be observed, and the non-ob­servance of it punished; because whoever suffers Disobedience in small matters, teaches it in great­er: And that Nobleman who thinks to distinguish himself by slighting of the Laws, offends both his Country and himself by such an Example, more than by any disso­luteness he could be guilty of, be­cause he directly strikes at the Pub­lick Authority; and besides, such a Custom once taking Root in a Commonwealth, and being an in­veterate Abuse among the Nobility, it is not to be reform'd with less than the loss of the Lives of half the Bo­dy.

[Page 28] If there be an occasion of com­ing to some Resolution that may be thought unpleasing to the ge­nerality, particularly in point of Justice, let it be given out, That it was carried by a thin Majority, that at least they who were against it, may please themselves in think­ing they had many of their Opi­nion.

Let the Secrets of the Govern­ment be kept inviolably, and do not forget that Ancient Record of the Venetian Circumspection, which was, That when the general Carmagnuola was condemned, the Resolution (though taken by Three Hundred and Fifteen Senators) never took Air for Eight Months together be­fore the Execution; which is a thing that the most absolute Princes could not have met with in the Fide­lity of Three or Four State-Ministers, though bound by excessive Re­wards to Secresy. And what a wonderful thing was the deposition [Page 29] of the Doge Foscari, conceal'd by his own Brother? Certainly one cannot without Tears observe, that in our Times so great a Quality which seem'd to be proper to the Venetian Commonwealth, is some­thing altered by the inconsiderati­on of the young Nobility, who, not out of Disloyalty, but too much Freedom, do let things slip from them which ought to be conceal'd. I think every Venetian Nobleman ought to teach his Children the use of Secresie with their Catechism; but the better way were to forbid all talking of Public Concerns out of the place where they are proper­ly to be deliberated on, and much less among those who are partakers of the Secret.

Let the Honours and Dignities of the Commonwealth be dispensed regularly, and by degrees, avoid­ing all sudden Flights, because they are dangerous: To see a Cloud en­lighten'd of a sudden, is most com­monly [Page 30] a sign of a Thunderbolt to come out of it; and he that from a private man leaps in an instant to the Port of a Prince, has some­thing of the Player. Honours gi­ven by degrees keep the young No­bility from attaining them before they are ripe for them; and we may observe, that as in Physick a man moderately Learned, but well Experienc'd, is safer for the health of the Body Natural; So in the Go­vernment of the Commonwealth, a man often employed, though, perhaps of less acuteness, succeeds best. All Matters of Benefices are very properly under the Cogni­zance of the Great Council, but it would be as proper to take away all Appeals to the Quaranties, and place them in the Senate, because it often happens, that these Causes are to be decided according to rea­son of State; and those Quarantia Judges put little value upon those Politick Reasons: And besides, it [Page 31] seems a great incongruity, that a Sentence, where the Person of the Doge, and the whole Signoria, both intervene, should afterwards be ly­able to the Censure of Forty Per­sons of lesser value. I believe if it were observed to chastise rigorously, but secretly all those Lawyers and their Clients, who carry these Ap­peals to the Quarantias, the use of them would be less frequent, and in time they would be forborn, as if they were forbidden.

If it should fall out, that any of your Subjects should procure a De­cree in the Rota, or Court of Rome, you must rigorously command from him a Renunciation ab Impetratis, else all beneficiary Causes will be de­volv'd to Rome, where they are look'd upon as Sacred, and so a fourth part of all Civil Causes would be lost for your own Courts: Audi­tors of the Rota are to be with the Commonwealth, like Bishops in partibus Infidelium, a thing of [Page 32] Title, but without Subjects.

Let the Bishops of the Venetian State be always praecogniz'd in the Consistory by a Venetian Cardinal, without the Circumstance of crea­ting him Special Procurator; but as Protector, which he really ought to be as other Cardinals brag they are so, for other States. For the Court of Rome, to avoid these pro­curations to Venetian Cardinals, would perhaps desist making any of that Nation, that so they might oblige the State to have recourse to Strangers, which in time would also prejudice the pretence of being trea­ted as Crown'd Heads. If the pre­conisation be made otherwise, let the State seize the Temporalities of the Bishoprick, and stop all Pensi­ons laid upon it: 'Tis true, that if the Cardinal Nipote should make the Preconisation, and enjoy at the same time the priviledge of a Veneti­an Nobleman, it could not well be rejected.

[Page 33] If it should ever happen that there should be a Pope, I won't say a Venetian, for that would be of more danger than advantage to the Government, but a Foreigner well inclin'd to the Venetian Re­publick, then would be the time to obtain once for all the Grant of the Tenths upon the Clergy, as once it was got under Clement the Sixth, whose Bull is unfortunately lost; for 'tis troublesome to get it re­new'd every Five Year or Seven Year; and it would be a Point gain'd which still would more and more equal the Republick with Crown'd Heads; as also if in the Titles given by the Pope to the Doge, there could be gain'd the Su­perlative, as Carissimo or Dilectissi­mo, as is usual to Crown'd Heads, it would be a new lustre to the Re­publick, which for want of these things, and also because that never any Venetian Nuncio was promoted to be Cardinal, is look'd upon at [Page 34] Rome as a kind of Third Power be­tween Crown'd Heads and the Du­cal State. If, I say, all this could be gain'd by the State from a Pope, there might be some return made, by making a Law, That Church­men in Criminals should not be judged by any Tribunal but the Council of Ten, or Delegates from that Council. And now I am speak­ing of that Council, I cannot but inculcate, That all means possible should be used to hinder an Avoga­dore from daring to carry the De­crees of the Council of Ten to be re-view'd or censur'd by any other Council: but rather, if there ought to be any Change made in them, let it be by the same Power that made them; otherwise the Consequence will be a constant annihilation of their Decrees, and a manifest de­pression of the great Nobility, with an Exaltation of the lesser.

Touching the Authority of this Council, I have this more to say, [Page 35] That I could wish, that the Dele­gations of its Power were less fre­quent, with great regard to the Dignity of the Persons, as well as to the Splendor of the Government, which is always more reverenced when it is least communicated, like the Sun-beams, which in that glo­rious Body are of Gold, but com­municated to the Moon, are but of Silver. Indeed our Ancestors would have deserved well of us, if they had lengthened the time of this Magistracy: but because that which was not done in those Old Times, can hardly be hop'd in these Modern ones, the only Remedy would be to obtain a Continuation of the same persons for another year, under pretext of avoiding so many various Elections in so short a time as must be made by a Scruti­ny in the Pregadi: 'Tis true, that would exempt the persons continu­ed from the Governments of Ex­pence; but as long as that Exemp­tion [Page 36] did not extend beyond a year, there would be little Inconvenience in it: And if it be objected, That this would too much strengthen the Authority of the great ones, I an­swer, That it lasting but a few months, could not be of ill Conse­quence: and on the other side, those hands are, as it were, tied up, which ought to be at liberty to do Justice, while every week they may be canvass'd and teas'd by a Party of mean Persons, both for the Conditions of their Mind and Fortune: I have often admired how the Council of Ten (having already all the Criminal Power, and a good part of the Judiciary in Civil Causes, as well as in State-Af­fairs) have suffered themselves to be thus fetter'd, it seeming to me almost impossible that the Inferi­our sort should at the time of this Modification have so far prevail'd o­ver the middling Nobility, as to make them forget, that it is much [Page 37] better obeying a few Great Ones, than a Multitude of Inferiours. The Prudence of the Great Ones must be awak'd, to take all secret advantage to repair these past Omis­sions by means not easily penetra­ted.

Let Vertue be esteem'd where­ever it is; and if it be Eminent in one who is not Noble, let it find a Regard; for he has made himself Noble; and all Hereditary Nobility has had its beginning from some personal Eminency. And thus much for the First Head.

The Second Head, which is concerning the Government of your Subjects, may be divided into those who confine upon the Sea, and in your Islands, and those of Terra Firma.

As to the first, there needs not much Speculation; for they confi­ning only upon the Turk, and there [Page 38] being among them but few Persons of Note or Riches, there remains nothing but to shew your selves just by giving them good Rulers; and there you ought to be very careful: for if they have Justice and Plenty, they will never think of changing their Masters: Those few of Istria and Dalmatia, that confine upon the Emperour, have not in them­selves any Qualities to waken your Jealousie, and are besides well affe­ctioned to the Government of the Republick.

For your Greek Subjects of the Island of Candia, and the other Islands of the Levant, there is no doubt but there is some greater regard to be had of them, first, be­cause that the Greek Faith is never to be trusted; and perhaps they would not much stick at submit­ting to the Turk, having the Exam­ple of all the rest of their Nation before their Eyes: These therefore must be watch'd with more attenti­on, [Page 39] lest, like Wild Beasts, as they are, they should find an occasion to use their Teeth and Claws; the su­rest way is to keep good Garrisons to awe them, and not use them to Arms or Musters, in hopes of be­ing assisted by them in an Extre­mity: for they will always shew ill Inclinations proportionably to the Strength they shall be Masters of, they being of the Nature of the Gally-Slaves, who, if they were well us'd, would return the kindness, by seizing the Gally, and carry it and its Commander to Algiers: Wine and Bastonadoes ought to be their Share, and keep Good Nature for a better occa­sion.

As for the Gentlemen of those Collonies, you must be very watchful of them; for besides the Natural Ferocity of the Climate, they have the Character of Noble­men, which raises their Spirits, as the frequent Rebellions of Candia [Page 40] do sufficiently evidence. The use of Colonies was advantageous to the Roman Commonwealth, because they preserv'd even in Asia and A­frica, Roman Inclinations, and with them a kindness for their Country. If the Gentlemen of these Colonies do tyrannize over the Villages of their Dominion, the best way is not to seem to see it, that there may be no kindness between them and their Subjects; but if they of­fend in any thing else, 'twill be well to chastise them severely, that they may not brag of any Priviledges more than others: It will not be amiss likewise to dis­pute all their Pretensions to any particular Jurisdiction; and if at any time their Nobility or Title be disputed, it will do well to sell them the Confirmation of it at as dear a Rate as possible: and, in a word, remember that all the Good that can come from thence is already obtain'd, which was [...] the Ve­netian [Page 41] Dominion; and for the future there is nothing but Mischief to be expected from them.

As for the Subjects of Terra Fir­ma, there is required a more ab­struse way of governing, by di­stinguishing those who by an anci­ent Inclination are well affected to the Republick, as those of Brescia, Crema, and Bergamo, and also those of Vicenza; for to them there ought to be suitable returns of kindness made upon occasion to the others, who only have a kindness of Obedience, such as are the Veroneses, Padouans and Trevigians, it will be good to make shew of great Justice towards them, but not let slip any occasion of keeping them low: It is good to wink at the Fewds and Enmities that happen among them, for from these two be­nefits arise to the Commonwealth, to wit, Private Discord among them­selves, and good Confiscations to the Publick.

[Page 42] Let all Extortions and Oppressi­ons committed by the Gentry up­on the People, be severely punished, that the People may be affectionate to the Government, as being par­ticularly protected by it: In all oc­casions of Taxes and Impositions, suffer not any Remonstrances, re­membring how in 1606. there had like to have been a League between the Brescian and Veroneze, in order to obtain an Abolition of Imposts, and with what boldness the Bresci­an Embassadours made their Com­plaints in the Senate: It was a very previous Disposition to a Rebellion; Therefore it will be fit to let them know, That if the State think good to lay a Tax, there is no way of a­voiding it. Those who in the Councils of these Towns, are of a resolute Nature, and somewhat refractory to the Orders of the State, you must either ruin or oblige, even at the Publick Charge: For a small Leven is e­nough [Page 43] to ferment a great Mass of Bread.

The Brescians have a Priviledge which you must infringe upon all fit opportunities, which is, That no Estates of Brescians can be bought but by Brescians themselves: For if the Venetians could extend them­selves in that most fertile Coun­try, in a few years it would be as it is now with the Padouans, who have scarce a Third of their own Country left them. In the Case of a Rich Heiress, it will be well to endeavour, by all fair means, to marry her with some of the Veneti­an Nobility, to enrich them, and impoverish the others. Let their Governours be chosen among those of the highest Spirits of the Vene­tian Nobility, that they may in them venerate the Prince: for e­very man naturally gives more Credit to his Eyes than to his Ears. Observe however this Cau­tion in Taxing, That you do not [Page 44] thereby hinder Plenty: For though men may be perswaded to part with Superfluities, yet not with what is necessary for Life. As for Employ­ments, if there be room, omit not to give them to the Natives, but still in places remote from their own Dwelling, and keep them there as long as may be, that they may lose their Interest at home. If there be Heads of Factions among them, they must be Exterminated any way; but if you have them in Prison, 'tis better to use Poyson than the Hangman, because the ad­vantage will be the same, and the odium less. You must have an Ac­count of the Taxes that their Neighbours the Milaneses undergo, and still let those of the Venetian Subjects be something lighter in comparison; and moreover let them be free from quartering of Souldiers, which is in it self the heaviest of all Tyrannical Oppressi­ons.

[Page 45] Let the great Crimes be still brought before the Council of Ten, that the Veneration for the Power at distance may be greater, and likewise because the Ministers of Justice will be less subject to be corrupted, when the Criminals are in the Prisons of the State. Let the Process against them be te­dious, that so the slowness of proceedings may be some part of punishment: But for the Banditi, if they dare to appear in the State, let them be Extermi­ned with all Industry; for there cannot be a greater Demonstrati­on of Contempt in the Subject, and Weakness of the Prince, than for a Condemned Man to dare to come into the Dominions out of which he has been banished, as if one should frequent another man's House in spight of his Teeth. The Bishopricks and other Church-Preferments may be conferr'd upon the Natives, first, to avoid the Im­putation [Page 46] of too much Avarice in the Venetian Nobility, if they should take all Preferments to themselves. Secondly, In order to debase the Spirits of the Natives, and turn them off from Arms to an idle Life: Besides, it will be a kind of a Shadow of Liberty, to make them bear their Subjection the better. But as much as it may be convenient to let them attain the Degree of Bishops, so much would it be dangerous to let them arrive to that of Cardinal; for then they will be sure to abhor the Qua­lity of Subjects, since those who wear that Purple have usurp'd the Precedency even over Prin­ces.

Let every City have the ma­king of their own Gentry by their Common-Council; for that will make it so much the mea­ner; but still let them be bound to have the Confirmation from the Senate.

[Page 47] Let all those Families who ap­ply themselves to the Service of Foreign Princes, be upon all occa­sions slighted, and not at all coun­tenanced by the Government, in­timating to them by that silent no­tice, That he deserves little of his own Prince who seeks Employment with a Foreign one: And if any of these who have serv'd abroad, should be so bold, as to contend with a Venetian Nobleman, if it be at Venice, let the Punishment be se­vere, if he be in the wrong; but if it is in his own Country, let it be gentle, that the Opinion of the Publick Justice may be advanta­geously insinuated to the People; and likewise, that the Noble Ve­netians themselves may avoid Con­tests, where they are not more im­mediately protected.

Let the Citadels of the Chief Cities be well provided, as much against a Foreign Enemy, as to chastise a Rebellion at home, no­thing [Page 48] so much inclining to offend, as the hopes of Impunity: and it may indeed be said, That if Men were certain of a punishment to follow, they would never offend at all; but a Prince that is sufficient­ly provided, is sufficiently safe. Re­member, that as it is very hard to find either a Wife or a Monk, that one time or another have not re­pented the loss of their Natural Li­berty, so the same may be said of Subjects, who fancy that they have parted with more of that they were born to than was necessary for their well-being. And let this suffice for the Second Head.

Coming now to those several Princes with whom the Venetian Republick may have Concerns, we will begin with the Pope, as being the first in Dignity, if not in Power.

[Page 49] And here we must have a Two-fold Consideration, he being to be look'd upon as a Spiritual and as a Temporal Prince. There has been some Advertisements given already about his Spiritual Power: We will add here what was then omit­ted:

First, We must admire the won­derful State of that Monarchy, which from a mean and persecu­ted Condition, for the Series of many years, in which the very Exercise of Religion was punished with Death, is arriv'd to so much Greatness, that all Regal Dignities of the same Communion, pay Ho­mage to this Spiritual Monarch, by the kissing of his Feet. God Al­mighty has been pleased this way to shew the Reward of Christian Religion, by raising to the Su­preamest Greatness the Institutors and Ministers of it; but the Piety of Christian Princes has very much [Page 50] tributed to it; and the first was Constantine: This Emperor not only embrac'd the Christian Faith, but enrich'd the Church extreamly, and since his time several other Emperors and Kings have, as it were, vied with one another, who should give most: But that which is most inscrutable is, how with their Riches they came to give a­way also their Jurisdiction and Power.

For six hundred years after the coming of Christ the Popes were always confirmed by the Emperors, or in their steads, by the Exarcks of Ravenna; and in the very Pa­tent of Confirmation there was al­ways written these Words, Regnante Tali Domino Nostro. In the year 518. the Emperor Justinus sent from Constantinople his Embassadors to Pope Hormisda, to confirm the Authority of the Apostolical Sea, and to announce Peace to the Church. In 684. Constantine the [Page 51] Second gave to Benedictus the Se­cond a Concession, by which, for the future, the Election of Popes should be made by the Clergy and People of Rome, and should not need the Confirmation of the Em­perour, nor of the Exarck, not re­flecting, that the holiness of those times might come to change it self into an Interest of State. Bonifaci­us the Third obtained of the Em­perour Phocas, that all other Chri­stian Churches might be obedient to the Roman. After this, in the year 708. Justinus the Second was the first that submitted to kiss the Pope's Feet; and that Pope's Name was Constantine: But Adrian the first having received great Favours from Charles the first, King of France, did in a Council of One Hundred and Fifty Three Bishops, confer upon him the Authority of chusing the Popes, which was about the year 773. a Priviledge which his Son Lewis the Pious knew not [Page 52] how to keep, but parted with it for the imaginary Title of Pi [...]us; to which might be added that of Simple. Howsoever scandalous the Emperours were in their Lives, the Popes did use to bear with them, referring to God Almighty the pu­nishment of them: But in the year 713. Philip, Emperour of Constan­tinople, being fallen into Heresy, was Excommunicated by Pope Con­stantine, and had the Reward due for all the Honours and Priviledges given by his Predecessors to the Popes. This was the very first time that the Imperial Power was forc'd to stoop to the Papal; and yet at the same time the Church of Milan claim'd an Independency from the Roman, and maintain'd it for above Two Hundred Years, being coun­tenanc'd by the Emperours, who often came into Italy, and in their absence hy the Exarcks of Ravenna, till at last in the year 1057. it yiel­ded up the Contest to Pope Stephen [Page 53] the Ninth. In the year 1143. Cele­stin the Second was the first Pope chosen by Cardinals in Exclusion to the People.

I have made this Narration, that it may appear by what Degrees this Spiritual Monarchy has increased; and in it, the Goodness of Chri­stian Princes is not more to be ad­mired than the Dexterity of the Popes, in not omitting any occasion to gain ground.

At present the Emperour is cho­sen by a Pontifical Bull, where the Power of Election is committed to the Three Ecclesiastical, and Four Secular Electors, with an Obligati­on nevertheless in the Emperour chosen, to receive his Confirmation and Coronation from the Pope; so that the Subject is at last become Prince over his own Prince, not without some reflection of Weak­ness upon Otho the Fourth, Empe­rour of Germany, who in the year 994. agreed with Pope Gregory to [Page 54] settle the Election in this manner, for the Honour (as he thought) of the German Nation, but with great Diminution of the Imperial Digni­ty. To this Grandeur of the Pa­pacy, if we add that of having subjected to its power all the other Bishops of Christendom, and ob­tain'd to be own'd the first of all the Patriarchs, who long contested its Primacy. I say, so high a Pow­er ought to make all other well-go­vern'd States very wary in their proceedings with it, and to have a careful Eye upon all those occasi­ons wherein the pontifical Authori­ty may be still enlarged, because 'tis observed, that all Courtesies and Favours of Princes are in that Court turn'd to Debts and Claims in the space of a few years; and to obtain the possession, they do not spare for Exorcisms and Anathe­ma's.

There is one Custom, or rather Abuse introduc'd in that Court, [Page 55] which deserves great consideration from Princes, which is the power the Pope has assum'd of deposing Princes and Soveraigns, and giving their Kingdoms and States to others, under pretext of ill Government. The Prodigal Son in the Gospel did not lose his Right to his portion, though he was resolv'd to dissipate and consume it viciously, because that Title which we receive from Nature can never be lost in our whole Life. The Kings of Navar were fain to go Vagabonds about the World for the sake of a Bit of Parchment which Pope Julius the Second put out against them, whereby King John the Second lost his Kingdom, which was given to Ferdinand [...] of Arragon; and had not providence brought them to the Crown of France, there would have been no mention in the World of the Kings of Na­var.

[Page 56] From this Liberty of taking a­way Kingdoms, the Popes assume that of Erecting them Pope Paul the Fourth made Ireland a King­dom, and Pius the Fifth Erected Tuscany into a great Dutchy. Queen Elizabeth of England, was deposed by Paul the Third, and according to the usual custom, her Kingdom given to Philip the Second of Spain, who was to execute the Papal Sen­tence; but he met with the Winds and Seas, and the English Ships, which quite defeated his Armada. In France, by a priviledge of the Gallican Church, they admit of no Bulls that contain Deprivation of Kings, but keep to the Right of Succession: and indeed to depose an actual King, and give away his Kingdom, is not only to destroy a suppos'd Delinquent, but to punish an Innocent Successour, and like­wise to prejudice the Right of E­lection in those who have it.

[Page 57] On the other hand England has often thought fit to make it self Tributary to the See of Rome by the Peter-Pence, the first time un­der Pope Leo the Fourth, and more remarkably under King John, in 1214. to avoid the Invasion from France; but Henry the Eighth de­livered himself once for all, and not only refused the Tribute, but made himself amends by seizing the Church-Lands. The fresh Ex­ample of Paul the Fifth towards this Republick is never to be for­got, who charitably would have govern'd another bodies House, un­der pretext that the Master did not understand how to do it himself: And the constancy of the Venetian Republick will have given fair warning to the Court of Rome, how they undertake such Quar­rels, since they were forced to come to an agreement with very little satisfaction or Honour on their side, having been obliged ta­citely [Page 58] to give up their claim; for to demand peremptorily, and then relinquish the Demand, is a sign it was not well founded in Justice; and the Absolution refus'd, was proof enough, that the Excommu­nication was void in it self: So that the advantage that has accrew'd to the Venetian Government from the Contest, has been much grea­ter than the damage sustain'd in it.

If ever for the future, which I scarce believe, there should happen an occasion of an Interdict from the Court of Rome to the Repub­lick, I should advise presently to post up in Rome an Appellation to the future Council, which is a cruel blow to them: For first, it insinuates the Superiority of the Council over the Pope; and se­condly, it revives the memory of Councils, and lets them see they are not things quite forgot all the World over. If there be [Page 59] care taken to examine well all Bulls that come from Rome, and the Observation of what has been hitherto practis'd, be strictly con­tinued, it may be hop'd, that the Republick shall not undergo any greater Subjection than other Prin­ces, but rather shall have some Li­berty above them, particularly more than the Spaniards, who find their account in complying with the Tyranny of Rome, be­cause they receive at the same time great Favours from it, and are proud of maintaining its Authori­ty. To say truth, the Popes hi­therto have shew'd little kindness to the Republick, and except the Priviledges granted by Alexander the Third, which serve more to register to the World the Action of the Republick, in restoring and protecting him, than for any thing else: For the Doge might of him­self without the Papal Concession, have assum'd those other little Or­naments [Page 60] of the Ombrella, the Stan­dard and the Sword: So that ba­ting the Concessions of the Decimes upon the Clergy, and the Nomi­nations to the Bishopricks▪ this Country of ours feels but slender Effects of the Pontifical Kindness, which may be an advantage upon all Occurrences of Interest of State to stick the closer to that, be­cause there needs no Complements where every one desires but his own.

In considering the Secular Power of the Pope, we will do it upon Five Heads, which may serve to examine all other Princes Interests with the Republick.

First, If it be advantageous to the Republick to have the Church grow greater.

Secondly, What Title, Inclination or Facility the Popes may have to ac­quire any part of the State of the Re­publick.

[Page 61] Thirdly, What Inclination, Title or Facility the Republick may have to acquire any part of the State of the Church.

Fourthly, If the Church may u­nite with the Republick, to acquire the State of any other Princes.

Fifthly, If the Church can unite with other Princes, to hinder the progress of the Arme of the Re­publick.

To begin with the First, we will answer with a General Rule, which is, That it never is advanta­geous to a Prince, who desires to remain free and powerful, to let an­other grow great, except it be to lessen a Third, who is greater than them both; and if he that is thus agrandiz'd be a Neighbour, his ad­vancement is so much more to be feared: These Alterations indeed may not be so dangerous to a lit­tle Prince, who does not fear de­pending upon a great one, to a­void [Page 62] being molested by one who is already too strong for him.

But to come closer to the Case of the Republick, we will say, That if the Church could make it self Master of any part of the King of Spain's Dominions in Italy, where he is the greatest Prince, they might hope for the consent of the Republick, which is the Second Great Italian Potentate, because by that means the Republick might become the First; and however, the strength of the Church will al­ways give less jealousie to the Re­publick, than the Spanish Power in Italy; for the Nature of the Pon­tifical Principality is Elective and Temporary, and the Aims and Designs of that Court vary accor­ding to the Genius of the several Popes; and sometimes it is subject to long Vacancies: whereas the Monarchy of Spain is successive, and, as one may say, Eternal, and govern'd by standing lasting Max­ims.

[Page 63] But if the Church be to grow great by the Spoils of any other I­talian Prince, it would be the In­terest of the Republick to oppose it, because the Damage thence re­sulting is evident, and the Advan­tage dangerous. It ought to be well consider'd, how the State of the Church is increased in this last Century. The custom that was in the Church before, to give In­feodations upon slight Acknowledg­ments, had brought that power to be more of show than real strength; but Julius the Second, succeeding Alexander the Sixth, made Borgia, Duke of Volentine, Nephew to A­lexander, who had seiz'd upon all those Infeodations in Romania, re­fund them to the Church, and add­ed to them the conquest of Bolog­na, and got also from the Repub­lick the Cities of Cervia, Rimini, Ravenna, Faenza, Imola, and others, to which, under Clement the Eighth, was added the whole Dutchy of [Page 64] Ferrara, and lately that of Ʋrbin: So that these Acquisitions alone would make up a great Principali­ty: and the Church seems to want nothing towards the making of it the most considerable power of I­taly, than the addition of Parma and Piacenza, and some little Inde­pendent Castles in the Territories about Rome: Besides, it can never more be lessen'd by Infeodations, that being quite left off by that Court: So that to let the Church grow any greater in Italy, ge­nerally speaking, cannot be for the Interest of the Venetian Repub­lick.

To the Second Point, What Ti­tle, Inclination or Facility the Church may have to acquire any portion of the State of the Republick, we shall say, That since the Court makes profession of the Extreamest Ju­stice, and that likewise they are loth to begin the Example of Princes usurping upon one ano­ther, [Page 65] I think they can hardly set up any Title but upon the Pole­sine of Rovigo, which they say was formerly annex'd to the Dutchy of Ferrara; and in the times that the Dispute was between the Dukes of Ferrara and the Republick, the Popes always shewed themselves smart Defenders of the Dukes: Of Four Interdicts published by the Church against the Venetians, Two of them were for this very cause, the first in the year 1305. the Second in the year 1483. un­der Sixtus the Fourth, at which time indeed the Republick had ta­ken the whole Dutchy of Ferrara, by the Instigation of the Pope him­self; but he being Friends with the Duke, commanded them to restore what they had taken, which they refusing to do, he fulminated his Excommunication and Interdict; but a Peace following, the Re­publick kept by agreement the Pole­sine of Rovigo: The Third Inter­dict [Page 66] was in 1505. under Julius the Second, because the Republick had several Cities of Romania in their possessions, and the last of all was now lately under Paul the Fifth: So that if the Popes shew­ed such a concern for the thing when it was only belonging to the Dukes of Ferrara, much more would they do it now when the profit would be their own: So that we may believe that as to this they do own a Title, and have likewise inclination enough to re­gain this bit of Territory that is lopp'd off from them. We are therefore to consider what Facility they have to do it; and I do not believe that ever of themselves they will kindle the fire, but make advantage of one ready kindled by some other, as it happened under Julius the Second: Nay, if they reflect upon the great Rule of pre­serving the Liberty of Italy, they will not for so small a matter en­ter [Page 67] into a League against the Re­publick; for it is of greater con­cern to them not to break the Ballance of Dominion in Italy, lest the Tramontani should take ad­vantage of it, and subdue all.

But this very Reason was strong in Pope Julius the Second's time, and yet was without Effect in a Mind bent all upon particular In­terest; wherefore I conclude, that we are not to expect greater Tem­per in the Modern Popes, but ought to rest satisfied, that if a powerful Foreign Prince should promise them the acquisition of the State of the Republick, they would embrace the motion without delay.

To the Third Question, I say, That the Republick might have just Reason to make themselves amends for the Country they lost in Ro­magna, it not being a thing they had usurp'd from the Church, but a voluntary Dedition of those Ci­ties who were tyranniz'd over by [Page 68] little Tyrants, that had taken oc­casion from the Negligence of Popes to make themselves Masters of those places: They were yielded up by the Republick, to take off Julius the Second, who was the great Fomentour of the Fire which was kindled against the Venetians in the League of Cambray, where the Forces of all the Princes of Christendom were united against them; and without doubt, upon good circumstances the Republick might justifie the re-taking of these Towns; and I believe there is In­clination enough to do it, all Prin­ces being willing to extend their Territories; but the point is the Facility of doing it, which I think altogether remote; for all other I­talian Princes, if not out of con­science, yet out of Ostentation of Religion, would be backward to fall upon the Church; and except it should happen that some one of them should grow too powerful for [Page 69] all the others united, and so be able to right himself, I think the State of the Church need not fear being lessen'd.

To the Fourth Question, I an­swer in the Negative, and do not believe that the Church would joyn with the Republick, to ac­quire the State of any other Prince, except it were such a one as the Church had a pretence up­on, and then they would keep all, which would not please the Republick: Besides, we ought to reflect upon the Genius of the Popedom, which being Elective, most commonly the Popes have no other aim than to keep all quiet, and preserve the general Respect of Princes towards them, that in that decrepit Age they may make their Families, their thoughts being far from enlarging a Dominion which they expect to leave every day; and in the mean time, all the rea­dy Money, which else they might [Page 70] lay up, would go upon projects of a very uncertain Event: And 'tis a wonderful thing that Julius the Second, being of a very mean Birth, should have had so great a Sence of the Publick Interest of the Church, as to forego all his private concerns, and take the Empty Praises of his Courtiers in payment for the loss of such real advantages as he might have made to his Family.

The last Query depends, in a great measure, upon the others. I do not think it would be easie to concert the Union of the Pope with other Princes, in order to attack the Republick, because it will never be advantageous to the Church to increase the power of that other Prince; neither will it look like the Justice they profess, to take to themselves alone the Spoils, except it be upon a Country on which they have a pretence: 'Tis true, that in those noysie Excom­munications [Page 71] where they deprive Princes of their Dominions, and give them to others that can take them, there might be some dan­ger; but they are seldom pra­ctiz'd but in an Attempt made by a Prince upon the Church, which is never to be feared from the Piety and Moderation of the Republick. There is no doubt but the Church would enter into a League to hin­der any progress of the Republick, particularly against any Dependant of theirs; and also in case the Re­publick attack'd some small Prince, the Popes, to affect the protection of the weak, would declare; but if the Republick had to do with a strong Prince, the Church would look on, for fear of greatning too much that Prince, the ra­ther, because the Republick can lay claim to none of those Old ticklish Titles which some other Princes might set a-foot against the Church. And so much for the Pope.

[Page 72] Now let us come to the Empe­rour: The Republick must never forget that Maxim which is com­mon to all Princes bordering up­on the Empire, which is, That it is not convenient for them to see the Emperour made more powerful, lest he renew those antiquated Titles he has to most Dominions near him, and particu­larly in Italy.

The power of the Roman Com­monwealth, which extended al­most over all the known World, being at last usurp'd by Julius Cae­sar, and from him deriv'd to a long Series of succeeding Empe­rours, might give the German Em­perour a pretext to reckon with all the Princes of Europe, if he were strong enough; and perhaps many who wear Crowns, would be reduc'd to Beggary; therefore 'tis best to keep him in his cold Country of Germany, where mens Spirits are benumm'd, and less un­dertaking. The Republick has [Page 73] Reason to distrust him upon many Heads; as Emperour he has pre­tences upon the Dutchy of Frioul, and the Marca Trevisana, besides the Cities of Trevisa, Padoua, Vi­cenza and Verona: As Arch-Duke, he pretends to Istria: As King of Hungary, to Zara, and the neigh­bouring Country: So that his Ti­tles and Neighbourhood are consi­derably dangerous; all these Coun­tries are besides of greater Anti­quity than the City of Venice it self: So that their being subject to a Metropolis of a younger stand­ing, gives some suspicion of the Lawfulness of their Subjection. All these pretences were renewed in the League of Cambray; Therefore I think, without hesitation, I may pronounce, That it is the Inte­rest of the Republick that the Emperour should be kept low, both for General and Particular Reasons.

[Page 74] From these Reflections we may also conclude, that the Emperour to these Titles does not want Incli­nation to acquire a part of the Territories of the Republick; par­ticularly it being yet a complaint of that Prince, of the little Re­spect show'd him by the Repub­lick, when taking advantage of his Distractions, they Erected the For­tress of Palma Nuova just under his Nose.

There remains therefore to see what Facility he might find in such an Attempt. In the present State of his Affairs, while the Faction of the Protestants is so strong in Ger­many, I cannot think that he can quarrel with the Republick, which is as powerful in Money as he is in Men: For in length of time 'tis certain, that he who has Money may have Men, and they who have many Men must consume much Money: 'Tis true, he being so near a Borderer upon the Repub­lick, [Page 75] it may give him the more confidence, because a lesser Number will be necessary to make the In­vasion; but if the Enterprize be not in the Name of the whole Empire, in which case the whole German Nation would be a party, I believe, with the help of his own Patrimonial Dominions, he will not do any great matter, the rather, because many great Heretical Prin­ces and Cities of Germany have the same Interest to keep him low: So that as he might perhaps be pretty smart upon an Invasion or Incursi­on, at length of time he would prove as weak to hold out a War: And indeed this was the true cause of Erecting the Fortress of Palma Nuova, to obviate a sudden Incursi­on of his Forces, and provide a Re­treat for the Country-people; so to gain time, which is always as ad­vantageous to the Republick, as dangerous to such an Enemy, who if he have not some body to furnish [Page 76] him with Money, will get but little ground, tho his Army be numerous, as it was in the time of Maximi­lian.

Now whether the Republick has any Title, Inclination or Facility to acquire any part of the Empe­rour's Territories? I answer, That without doubt the Republick has pretences upon Goritia and Gradis­ca, which formerly belong'd to the Family of the Frangipani, and for a little while was under the Govern­ment of the Republick: There are likewise some Castles in Istria, and upon the Coast which the Repub­lick claims; and for an Inclination to acquire these, we need not doubt but the Republick has it, it being either the Vertue or Vice of Princes never to be without it: But still the great consideration lies in the Faci­lity of doing it; for it there be that, 'tis above half the Title; and if that is wanting, 'tis Imprudence to own any part of a pretence that [Page 77] must remain without Execution. I believe by Sea it would prove easie to take Trieste, and some other pla­ces, but it would be as hard to maintain them; and to go further into the Land, would need great preparatives on the side of the Re­publick: whereas on the Empe­rour's side, the Defence would be easie, he having a command of Men: So that except in an open War, there is no thinking of any strong Attempt that way, and then it were not amiss to put a good strength to it, that at the end of the War, which always must one time or another be succeeded by Peace, some of the Country might remain by Treaty in the Venetians Hands, for the charges of the War; for to begin a War only for the ac­quisition of these places, would not be a Deliberation befitting the Wis­dom and Gravity of the Venetian Senate: It would be better to watch the occasion of some Ex­tremity [Page 78] or Pinch of an Emperour, which often happens, and buy these places; but then be aware that if it be not a Patrimonial Estate, the con­sent of the Dyet is necessary to the purchase, to cut off all claims in time to come.

'Tis as hard, that the Emperour should unite with the Republick, to acquire the State of any other Prince in Italy, because, first, for Spain, they are the same Family with the Emperour; Against the Church he will declare as little, professing a great Zeal for it, and calling himself, The Churches Ad­vocate; Modena, Mantoua and Mi­randola are Fiefs of the Empire; Sa­voy and Florence are remote from him, and to come at them he must overcome greater Princes that are between him and them: so that this Union would prove difficult. If the Emperour should fall out with some of these Dukes, his Vassals, and depose them, it might happen [Page 79] that if Spain were busie elsewhere, and the Emperour loth to take the trouble of chastising them himself alone, he might then unite with the Republick, upon condition to have the best part of the Spoil; but if the Emperour should, as for­merly, come to a great Rupture with the Church, and employ heartily his power in the Quarrel▪ 'tis not impossible but he might be willing to engage the Republick by a promise of some part of the con­quest. I think in any other way 'tis not probable to make any ad­vantage of the Imperial Assist­ance.

The last Question is, Whether he can unite with others against the Re­publick? And of this there is no doubt: For if Maximilian, tho in­finitely oblig'd to the Republick, made no difficulty to unite in a League with Lewis the Twelfth of France, his Competitor and Enemy, whom, for Injuries received, he had [Page 80] declared a Rebel to the Sacred Em­pire (tho Lewis laugh'd at that Ima­ginary Jurisdiction): I say, if he could submit to joyn with so suspe­cted a power, much less would the Emperour now scruple the uniting either with Spain or the Pope, or a­ny other Princes of Italy, not on­ly for to acquire Territory, but e­ven for bare Money, if it were of­fer'd him. With France I believe the Union would not be so easie as it was then, because now the Em­perour, being partial for Spain, if their Interest did not concur, they would hinder him from being drawn away by any hopes or promises: But this will appear better when we come to treat of Spain: For if Spain will have a League against the Re­publick, the Emperour will never stand out.

Now let us come to France:

'Tis not above Fifty years ago that the Republick thought them­selves [Page 81] oblig'd not only to desire, but to procure the Greatness of France, because being under the phrensie of a Civil War, it threatned little less than the dissolution of that Monar­chy: The Succession of Henry the Fourth to the Crown, who had his Title from Nature, and the Possessi­on from his Sword, reviv'd it, and at last gave it such vigour, that from deserving Compassion, it came to move Envy; and if a fatal blow of a mean hand had not cut off that Prince's Life, and Designs, there would have been requisite great Dexterity, or great Force to defend the Republick from them. The Count de Fuentes, Governour of Milan, us'd to brag, that he had such Musick as should make those dance who had no mind to't: Hen­ry the Fourth might have said so with much more reason, and he us'd to affirm, That at the pass things were, the Neutrality of the Repub­lick was a Coyn that would no long­er [Page 82] be current. If he had given ca­reer to his no ill-founded Designs, half a World would not have suf­fic'd him; but we must not be frighted if we see the Raging Sea swell in Billows, and look as if it would swallow up the Earth, since a little Sand stops all its Fury. Death has a Scythe that most commonly cuts off all the Noblest Lives: If Henry the Third of France, had brought the Siege of Paris to an end; if Philip the Second had not had the Winds and Seas against him, England would have been in Chains, and Paris would have been a Vil­lage. In conclusion, the Fatality of Humane Affairs is such, that most great undertakings are disappointed by unexpected causes. At present the constitution of France is such, that there is little danger from them; for during the Minority of their King, they will have enough to do not to lose ground, there being so many Jealousies and Factions a-foot: [Page 83] 'Tis true, that the common people have open'd their Eyes, and begin to be weary of spending their blood for the ambition of the great ones; and amongst these, the chief­est are old, and at their ease, so that they will think chiefly of keeping themselves in those Posts they enjoy. The Duke of Maine, who is Head of the Catholick Party, is very ancient and very rich; wherefore if in the time of the great troubles, he either could not or would not aspire to make himself King, when even he had all but the Name of it, 'tis not to be imagined he thinks of it now; and if he will be content with the State of a Subject, he is as great as he can be. The Duke of Mercaeur, who in his Wife's right pretended to Erect Britany into a Kingdom, is at last dead in Hungary; the Duke of Epernon is more studious of good Husbandry than Soldiery; the Duke of Montpensier has always been true to the Royal Family; the Capricios [Page 84] of the Marchioness of Aumale, will hardly have any Followers; and it will be well if she can clear her self of the late King's Death: On the o­ther side, the Prince of Conde, the first Prince of the Blood, is young, and of a mild Nature; he has be­sides before his Eyes the Example of his Father, Grandfather, and Great Grandfather, who all perish'd unfor­tunately in civil Broils, and has in his own person experimented the Spa­nish Parsimony, in his Retreat from Court to Brussels: So that if he de­sires a greater Fortune, he may compass it in France, from the hands of the Queen her self, who is so ill a Politician, as to try to put out Fire with pouring Oyl upon it. The Hu­gonots are weary; the Duke of Bo­villon, their Head, well pleased with his present Fortune; and if he have a mind to be a Hugonot out of Per­swasion, and not Faction, there is no body will hinder him; but most of these great men have Religion only [Page 85] for a pretext, as 'tis reported like­wise of the Duke de Lesdiguieres, which if it be true, they will never be quiet till the King be of Age; and by consequence, there will be little protection to be hop'd for from that Kingdom. Our Speculation there­fore may more certainly conclude, that the Greatness of France is at a stand, and cannot in the space of some years make any progress, and till it come to an Excess not to be thought on for these fifty years, it can give no Jealousie to the Repub­lick.

As to the Title, Inclination and Facility that France may have to ac­quire any part of the Republick's Dominions; I say, we need not doubt of their Inclination, because Princes are like Wolves to one ano­ther, always ready for prey. As for Title, they can set up none till they have conquer'd the Dutchy of Mi­lan; and Facility they have as little, because they cannot come at the [Page 86] Republick's Territories, without first passing over those of other Princes, which they will never consent to, lest they prove the first conquest themselves: Whereupon I conclude, that for a long time the power of France can give no jealousie to the Republick.

And on the other side, the Repub­lick can have no pretences, as things stand, upon any part of the French Territories, as long as they are total­ly Excluded from Italy; and if there be no Title, there is less Inclination and Facility.

The Union of France with the Republick, to acquire the State of any other Prince, will always be ea­sie when France is in a condition to mind such acquisitions; the past Ex­amples prove that sufficiently; but they do sufficiently bear Testimony likewise of the danger of such Uni­on: Now that the French are totally excluded Italy, they would agree to very large conditions with the Re­publick, [Page 87] and allow them a great share of the Kingdom of Naples and Dutchy of Milan; but they would no sooner have made the acquisition of their share, but they would be­gin to cast their Eyes upon that of the Republick, and enter into a League against them with some o­ther Prince, just as it happened in the time of Lewis the Twelfth, when to gain Cremona, he was the first that consented to the League of Cambray, deceiving all the while the Venetian Embassador at Court, and affirming (even with Oaths), That he would never conclude any thing to the pre­judice of the Republick, tho he had sign'd the League above six weeks before the War began, which he ex­ercised likewise in a most barbarous manner, hanging up the Noble Ve­netians that were Governours of the Towns he took.

I believe France, to get footing in Italy, would engage with any other Prince against the Republick, except [Page 88] with the Spaniard; and if that should happen, it would be neces­sary to stir up the Factions of that Kingdom, and bring upon them some powerful Neighbour, such as England: The Friendship of Savoy would likewise be useful, to hinder the Passes of the Mountains, and make some diversion in Provence and Dauphine, if there could be any re­lying upon this present Duke; but he is a Proteus, that turns himself into many forms, and with his Capri­cio's and Humours, would soon em­pty the Treasures of S. Marc: But these are things so remote, that they may be left to the prudence of those who shall live in those times; for ac­cording to the Times there must be alteration of Councils. And so much for France.

Now let us turn to Spain,

A Family that from low begin­nings, is come by Marriages to the possession of Twelve Kingdoms, and several Dukedoms in Europe, besides [Page 89] what it has in the Indies, does cer­tainly evidence a great Favour of Fortune, joyn'd with great applica­tion and industry: So that if it be not stopp'd by Fatality, may bid fair for an Universal Empire: If Charles the Fifth had had as much prudence in his youth as he had in his old Age, he would not have se­parated the Empire from Spain, but would have made his Son Philip have been chosen King of the Ro­mans, instead of his Brother Ferdi­nand: He understood his Errour, and repented of it at last, trying to perswade Ferdinand to a Renun­ciation; but he shew'd as much prudence in keeping what he had got so wonderfully into his Hands, as Charles would have shew'd folly in going to deprive him of it by Force. Charles was not less unhap­py in the other Act of Moderation he shew'd, when he renounc'd all his Kingdoms to his Son, and reti­red to a private Life; For to one [Page 90] who on the Anniversary Day of that Famous Action, congratulated King Philip for his Felicity, he an­swered, That Day was likewise the Anniversary of his Father's Repen­tance: So that Actions of Modera­tion in Princes, are but like that Insect called the Ephemera, which lives and dies the same day.

The Greatness of Spain is there­fore to be suspected; it has Two Wild Beasts that follow it always close, one on one side, and the other on the other, which is the Turk by Sea, and France by Land; and be­sides that it has that Issue of Hol­land, as witty Boccalini calls it, which will sufficiently purge it of all its ill Humours; and it must be own'd, that all the Spanish Sagaci­ty has not hindered them from fol­lowing the Fable of the Dog, who forsook the Substance for the Sha­dow: For, for Forty years toge­ther, France was sufficiently taken up with their own Intestine Broils, [Page 91] during which time Spain might with great advantage have made a Truce with Holland; and ha­ving likewise humbled the Turk, by the Battle of Lepanto, they might have applied their whole Force to Italy, which had no De­fence but its own Natives, and not of them above half: So that in all probability they could have met with no considerable opposi­tion.

One might say, That it was an Effect of King Philip's Mode­ration, if he had not shew'd as great an Ambition of Dominion as possible, in endeavouring first to unite France to Spain by con­quest, then to have his Daughter chosen Queen, and lastly, seiz'd upon as many Towns as he could; Therefore we may give the Italians Joy, that half an Age of so much danger passed without the least loss of their Liberty. Now by reason of the French King's Minority, the [Page 92] Jealousies against Spain are a-foot again, but, I think, not with so much ground; For if not France, at least England, would raise their old Enemies, the Dutch particular­ly, if the Italians should help with Money: So that if Italy can but resist the first brunt, it may hope for all sort of Relief; for France has Forces, and they would soon have a will to succour Italy against Spain: Neither do I believe, that Spain would hazard the Truce with Holland, it having been compass'd with such Difficulties, even to the loss of much of their Honour and Fast. 'Tis enough, that to all o­ther Christian Princes, except the Emperour, the Greatness of Spain is of ill Consequence; And therefore to be opposed by all secret means first, and if need be, at last openly, and without a Mask.

If Spain has any Title, Inclina­tion or Facility to acquire part of [Page 93] the Republick's Dominions, there will be little Difficulty to answer: Their Title would be upon Bres­cia, Crema, and Bergamo, ancient Members of the Dutchy of Milan: And these Three Cities are so con­siderable, that with their Territo­ry, they would perhaps make up as rich a Dutchy as any in Lom­bardy, except Milan: So that we need not doubt, but the Spaniard looks upon these Cities with an A­morous Eye, and with great De­sire to enjoy them; there remains only the Facility of doing it, which is always the most important of the Three Points: Upon this Subject we must distinguish whe­ther they will make the Attempt by themselves, or in Conjunction with others: If alone, and that the Republick have any Great Prince, either Italian, or Foreign­er on their side, they will meet with little Facility in their De­signs, because the Republick's [Page 94] Money, joyn'd to the Forces of another Prince, can give check to almost any great Power, and par­ticularly to that of Spain, whose States and Possessions are large, but disunited; and they cannot but be afraid, that while they are busied in Lombardy, others would try to attack them in a more sensible part: If Spain should therefore u­nite with any other Prince, provi­ded the Republick had France on their side, they would not much hurt it, because the Inundation of the French into Lombardy, uses to be both powerful and sudden, provided they be called in by an Italian Prince of some Figure; and by that means the Spaniard being attack'd on Two sides, would go near to lose his Dutchy of Mi­lan.

But if we consider the Repub­lick united only with some Itali­an Prince, and the French to stand Spectator, as might happen in the [Page 95] Minority of a French King, parti­cularly if the Spaniard had the Pope and Emperour of his side, I doubt the Republick would be hard set; for that other Prince in League with them, cannot be of any great Force; the most useful would be Savoy; but besides, that he would be bought very dear, he would be always wavering, if the Spaniards tempted him strongly: The Richest would be Florence; but his Territories not joyning up­on those of the Republick, there is little good to be expected from his assistance. Lastly, If Spain will fall upon the Republick alone, and the Republick be likewise a­lone, I say, That as to the State of Terra Firma, it would go near to be lost; but by Sea the Re­publick would make a stout Resi­stance.

But if it be ask'd, whether the Republick have either Title, In­clination or Facility to acquire any [Page 96] part of the Spanish Dominions in Italy? I answer, the Title would be upon Cremona in Lombardy, and up­on Travi, and other Ports of La Puglia, in the Kingdom of Naples, the Republick having been in Posses­sion of all these places before ever Spain had footing in Italy: So that there wants nothing but Facility; and there is but one Case that I know in which the Republick might hope to get Possession again; and that is, in case the Republick were in League with France, and the Empe­rour busied by the Protestants of Ger­many, then some of these Expectati­ons might be fulfilled, but still with the same Jealousie, that your Friends should at last joyn with your Ene­mies to fall upon the Republick, as it happened in the League of Cambray. And this answers the other Questi­on, to wit, Whether Spain can unite with any other Power against the Re­publick? 'Tis very true, that I can hardly believe, that the Spaniards [Page 97] would, without any precedent broil, attempt a League with France against the Republick, because the Damage of one City's remaining in the French Hands, would be greater to them than the profit of taking all the Re­publick has in Terra Firma would a­mount to.

Whether the Spaniard may unite with the Republick, to acquire con­joyntly in Italy; I say, That if it be against an Italian Prince, they will not, because it is not their Interest that the Republick should be great­er, and already almost all the lesser Princes are Dependants of that Mo­narchy: and as for the Pope, they would certainly help him, rather than joyn against him, being us'd to make a great shew of their pro­tecting the Church: The only case that would make them bear patient­ly any new Acquisitions of the Re­publick, would be, if France should make any progress in Italy.

[Page 98] After all, amidst so many well-grounded suspicions, it must be confessed, that the Neighbourhood of Spain has prov'd of less distur­bance to the Republick, than that of any other Prince who had those Countries before them; for the Dukes of Milan were perpetually ei­ther quarrelling, or, finding them­selves too weak, were inciting of o­ther Powers under-hand against the Republick.

There may be an Union likewise of the Republick and Spain by Sea, against the Turk, and by Land a­gainst the Grisons, or any other He­reticks. And this is enough for Spain.

Now by reason of Vicinity, we will speak of the other Italian Prin­ces: It would be the Interest of the Republick to see them greater, if it could be done at the Expence of Spain, and by their Spoils, as also by getting from the Church: But both those Cases are next to impos­sible, [Page 99] if first the World be not turn'd topsy turvy, which can never be, but by a League with France; and then if any part of the Spaniards Dominions could be shar'd amongst them, it would not injure the Repub­lick at all: but for any of these Prin­ces to grow great by spoiling one another, I should not like it; for the advantage would be inconsiderable, and in the mean time the fire would be kindled in Italy, the property of which is to go not where you would have it, but often where you are most afraid of it.

Whether any of these Princes have Title, Inclination or Facility to ac­quire from the Republick, the con­sideration will be short, because Faci­lity will be wanting. Mantoua has some pretences upon Valesa and Pes­chiera; Modena upon the Town of Este, from whence the Family comes: But all these little Princes united without the Pope and Spain, could hardly give a disturbance to the Re­publick, [Page 100] because the Two powerful­lest of them, to wit, Savoy and Flo­rence, are not immediate Border­ers.

Whether the Republick have ei­ther Title, Inclination or Facility to acquire from them in the State they now are in; I answer, That the House of Este not having Ferrara, the Republick has no Title to either Modena or Reggio: There would in­deed be a good Inclination against Mantoua, because he lies, as it were, in the Bowels of the Republick; but there would be but an ill Title, ex­cept the Republick should bear the Charges of his Education, while they were his Guardians; and then the Facility would be small; for no sooner would the Republick have be­gun the Dance, but others would come in, and perhaps it would not end as it begun. Of the other Prin­ces I have little to say, the Republick having had no disputes with them; for the Genoueses, who formerly set [Page 101] the Republick so hard, have done as the Horse in the Fable, lost their own Liberty, in hopes of being vi­ctorious of their Enemies, and are by that means out of power to hurt the Republick.

As for Leagues these Princes will be ready to make them either with or against the Republick, because their Fortune, as Princes, being but small, they will let slip no occasion of mending it, either by acquisition of new Territory, or by receiving Subsidies and Pensions. Florence on­ly would hardly be mov'd by that last motive, because he is not needy, being at this time perhaps the Rich­est Prince in ready Money that is in Christendom; and his Riches always increase, because the Princes of that Family do yet retain their Ancestors Inclination to Merchandize, and that enriches the Prince without da­mage to the Subject. The Domini­ons of the great Duke are considera­ble, as well because they are placed [Page 102] as it were in the Navel of Italy, with a fertile Territory, all united together, as also because the States of other Princes are, as it were, a Wall and Defence to it; and it is be­sides, to be valued by the Commu­nication it has with the Sea by Leg­horn, and some other Maritime For­tresses: So that if one were to rec­kon upon any Italian Prince, I know none that deserves so well, as being exempted from the temptation of being bought, and having yet some of that punctual mercantile Faith.

If the Republick will have a League with any of the other Ita­lian Princes, there will be no diffi­culty in it, provided they pay them; but withal, one must not forget the witty Reflection of Boccalini, when the Italian Princes are willing to be taught manners out of the Galateo, provided that it may not look like ill breeding in them, to eat with both Jaws as fast as they can.

[Page 103] With Poland the Republick can have no other Concern than that of defending Christendom, and by some diversion from that Crown, bear the more easily the weight of the Ottoman Power: Therefore it would be well for the Republick to have that King and Kingdom grow more powerful. As for any thing else, the great distance that is be­tween that State and the Republick, takes away all matter of any further Consideration. The same thing may be said of the Moscovite.

England being the greatest of those powers that are separated from the Church of Rome, is a Kingdom of great strength, particularly since the Union of Scotland; and the Kings of England have nothing left to desire as to Territory: All that Island is now under the Dominion of one sole Mo­narch, and has the Sea for a Wall: So that if England be not disunited within it self, there is no power to o­vercome it: We see the Example in [Page 104] the Invasion of Philip the Second of Spain (and yet then the Union was not so great as might have been) who lost his mighty Armada that he had been so long preparing at such vast Expences. Queen Elizabeth, who has shew'd the World how far a Woman's ability can go in Govern­ment, did likewise enlarge her Do­minions by Navigations to the In­dies, and wounded Spain in that tender part; She likewise had some Ports of the Low-Countries con­sign'd to her, so that she seem'd to be hardly contain'd in that separate World of hers. The Island is fer­tile and delicious, producing all necessaries for Life, and though the Natives go abroad and buy the Products of other Countries, it is more as Superfluities, and out of Luxury, than want, and amongst the rest, they have a Trade for Grapes called Currans, which they buy in the Dominions of the Re­publick. Henry the Eighth, who [Page 105] was the King that Apostatiz'd from the Church of Rome, did use to concern himself in the Affairs of Italy, and several times the Popes have had good Protection from the ancient Kings of that Country, who were most devoted to the See of Rome; to say truth, Religion has had a great Loss, and the Court of Rome a greater, I cannot well say, whether out of the great Lust of Henry the Eighth, or the little con­sideration of Clement the Seventh, at present that King will not hear of Rome, and has but small Curio­sity for the Affairs of Italy.

If this King could grow greater, it would be advantageous to the Republick, because it might ob­tain his Alliance, and by that means a greater respect from other Crown'd Heads; but however, e­ven without this consideration, 'tis a Power to be courted, because the Nation having an ancient Antipa­thy to France, and a modern one [Page 106] to Spain, it cannot but have a good inclination for the Republick. 'Tis true that the present King is more enclin'd to Wars with his Pen, than with his Sword, having a mighty Love for Disputes, and valuing him­self upon the Character of a Nota­ble Divine; so much has the Quar­rel with Rome influenc'd that Coun­try, that even their Princes study Controversie; but however I should not think the Republick ought to mind any of those Circumstances, because where there is strength, there is always hopes of making use of it, that depending only upon raising of Passions.

The best means would be (be­sides the continuation of those Of­fices already introduc'd of mutual Embassies) strictly to command the Governours in the Levant to shew all good usage to the English Mer­chants, and particularly observe punctually all Treaties and Engage­ments with them, because there is [Page 107] no Nation that puts a greater va­lue upon their Word than the Eng­lish do, and the Kings of that Island have not yet learnt the mo­dern Policy that gives them leave to break their Faith in order to reigning more absolutely.

With the Seven United Provin­ces 'twill be good to cultivate Friendship, and to encrease it by a mutual defensive League, particu­larly at this time, that the Truce is but newly concluded with Spain; for it will be a Curb upon the Spa­niard, if he should attempt any thing against the Republick, for fear his old Wounds should be set a bleeding again, they being but just bound up, and not healed.

'Tis feasable likewise to procure something more of Trade with the Hollanders, because they are ex­tremely ingenious, and addicted that way; and moreover, since both the Republicks stand in awe of the same Power, it will not be [Page 108] difficult to unite their inclinations; and they have made on their side a sufficient Advance, by sending an Embassy to the Republick, which though of Complement, yet it has shew'd great esteem and inclination to an Union.

Besides the Advantage of a solid diversion of the Forces of Spain, there is another Essential conside­ration, which is, That from them might be had a considerable Body of well disciplin'd Soldiers, and that with admirable celerity, besides se­veral Regiments that might be rais'd in a Country so well us'd to War, if there were occasion, and all the inconveniencies of Transpor­tation are not to be valued; for the Republick will always have a greater scarcity of good Soldiers, than of good Money.

With the Princes of Germany of a different Religion, there can hardly be any Concerns, if there is no room for Quarrels. As the [Page 109] World stands now, if it be not well, they should grow greater, at least 'tis not amiss, they are alrea­dy great enough, because they are a Check upon the Emperour, who else would be a most formidable Potentate to all Princes, but more particularly to the Italians, and more to the Republick, than to the rest of Italy; but now by their means his Power is not only balanced, but almost quite oppres­sed to the common benefit of other Princes. With these Princes it will be easie for the Republick to have an Engagement: First, because they know that the Republick is not a blind Adorer of the Interests of the Court of Rome: And, Secondly, because they see the Jealousies that are between the Republick and the Emperour, from whence they con­clude, that there is no danger of a League between them and the Em­perour, and by consequence, they have not the Republick for a suspe­cted [Page 110] Power; and upon all Occur­rences, it will do well to shew an Inclination to Friendship with them, first, because they may make a po­tent diversion; and, secondly, be­cause their Country being a Nursery of Soldiers, the Republick upon oc­casion may make Levies there; and it is a point of high importance for the Republick to be certain of their Levies; for in a time of need they can hope but for small help from the Italian Militia.

I have not yet said any thing of the Duke of Bavaria; and he is not to be omitted, being so much a de­pendant of the Emperour, from whom he has received the Electoral Dignity, upon the Exclusion of the Elector Palatin: This Prince has had the boldness to contest the Prece­dency with the Republick at the Council of Trent; and therefore no good Correspondency can be be­tween him and the Republick. It [Page 111] would not be amiss to see him les­sen'd; for 'tis always to be wish'd, that he who has no good Intentions, should have as little power to offend as may be.

The Order of Malta, who are Py­rating Princes, is likewise to be minded; and their growth in Pow­er can be of no use to the Republick: They do nothing but waken the Ot­toman Power, when 'tis almost lull'd asleep; and therefore are dangerous: Their Friendship, in time of open War with the Turk, will be easily had, upon the Hopes of a good Booty.

It remains for us now to speak of the greatest Prince of this known World, formidable to all other Prin­ces, I mean the Turk; but we can­not speak of him by the Rules we have laid down for the others; for with him all Arts and Policies are vain: He makes no League with [Page 112] any, neither has he any Residing Embassadors in any Court, scorning to descend to inform himself of o­ther Princes Intrigues: He owns his Greatness, and relies upon it, like the Elephant, who by reason of his great strength, is never observed to use Cunning: Perhaps it may be an Arcanum of the Alchoran, to hinder his Subjects from contracting the Manners and Customs of other Na­tions, and bringing them home at their return: Perhaps likewise that he is unwilling their Wits should be [...] in Politicks: His is an Em­pire built upon the Ruin of all other Empires, founded in force, and scorning Titles and Claims of Ju­stice. If he can acquire a Country, he has always Right to it; and when he has conquer'd it, he assumes all the power to himself, suffering no Usurpations where he himself u­surps all: His Ministers make open profession of Ignorance, which is propagated industriously amongst [Page 113] his people, who are sufficiently learn­ed, if they know how to obey: They are told openly of their Slavery, and it is expected they learn the Obli­gations of it: not but that they will dispute with Christians for their Em­perour, and alledge, That he suc­ceeds to all the Rights of Constan­tine, whose City he has conquered. In his Religion the Prince is loose, and the Mufti, which is the High Priest, tied up, who must speak com­placently to the Ends of the Govern­ment, and in conformity to the Will of him that rules, or pay his disobe­dience with his Life. In this Monar­chy all the Qualities of the Mind, both speculative and practick, are despised and suspected, which made one of their Emperours send back the Musicians sent him by Francis the First, lest with their Harmony they should have molified the Iron Temper of those fierce Natures: They value strength of Body, and the Arts of War, in which none are [Page 114] sooner preferr'd than those who shew the greatest Fierceness and Inhuma­nity in their dispositions: They are intent upon conquering the rest of the World, and in order to it they have infinite Numbers of Men, and infinite Treasure: His yearly Reve­nue exceeds Twenty Millions of Crowns; he inherits the Estates of all his Subjects, whose Children can lay claim to nothing but their Fa­ther's Horse and Arms. In the midst of all these Riches his thirst of Gold still increases: so that often his Fury is laid with the Charms of that Me­tal: Out of that has been said, 'Tis evident that his Greatness must be the Ruine of all other Powers, and that it would be an unspeakable Felicity to see him lessen'd; but the hopes of that are so remote, that they are next to impos­sible.

As for any Title upon the Terri­tories of the Republick, he can have none; Inclination and Facility he has but too much, designing the Ru­ine [Page 115] of all Christendom; and consi­dering the Disunion of Christians, more intent upon Jealousies at home than upon an Union against a Fo­reign Invader, his Design is not a­bove his Force: He fears nothing but an Union of Christendom against him; and that he may not be negli­gent in providing against it, that cunning and wicked Mahomet has left him a Prophecy to keep him a­wake, by which, the Ruine of his Empire is to come from such an U­nion: The Turks never mention it but with Cries and Groans; and the Government strives to avoid it by being invincible, not considering, that if the Prophecy be true, 'tis un­avoidable. As for the Republick, he is a terrible Neighbour to them, al­ways encroaching, and setting no bounds to his pretences, till he has swallowed all.

The Republick, on the other side, cannot want a Title against him; for what he has taken from them, would [Page 116] make up a great Principality: Cy­prus, Negrepont, Modon, Coron, Ca­ramania, all the Archipelago, Bossina, Scutari, Albania, part of the very Imperial City of Constantinople, and in short, half his Empire in Europe has been at several times extorted from the Republick: but to get a­ny of this back is the difficulty; and 'twill be well if he is content with what he has, and that we can save what remains. The only good thing the Republick can hope for, is, that the Turk will not enter into League with any other against the Repub­lick, because he scorns all Leagues: 'Tis true, that in the time of Lodo­vico Sforza, Duke of Milan, he was by him drawn to invade the Repub­lick, and before that, by the Viscon­ti, Dukes of Milan, likewise with promise to busie the Venetians in I­taly, by a War on his side: 'Tis said also, That Lewis the Twelfth strove to draw him into the League of Cambray: But all these are rather [Page 117] Subornations than Leagues, and spurring of a Horse that's free e­nough of his own Nature.

He would easily unite with the Republick, to conquer other Prin­ces; but then the Republick must reckon, that he would take all to himself, he not understanding any Accounts of dividing: So that it would only be a madness, and by ones own Expence of Blood and Treasure, promote his Tyrannical Empire. The Turk has often offer­ed Succours to the Republick in their Wars with others; but our wise An­cestors always disliked such a Prote­ctor, but were glad he did not take the opportunity of their Troubles to fall upon them.

There is no other Politicks to be used with this Empire, than to pro­fess Friendship, and reckon upon sudden Enmity; and therefore be always provided, that the weakness of the State may not be an Invitati­on to him to use his Natural Rapaci­ty; [Page 118] for the Peace will be always the longer, when the readiness for War shall be visible.

In case of a Rupture, one should try to make a diversion by the King of Persia, the Moscovite and the Pole: but that will be a long uncertain bu­siness, and of slow benefit; to cor­rupt the Ministers of the Port in o­pen War, will be a very hard thing, they will rather suffer a temptation in time of Peace, and by that means one may penetrate their Designs, and retard their Deliberations, pro­vided the person gain'd be of the Divan, and particularly the Grand Vizier, if possible; but they often take Bribes, and deceive one; be­sides, their being subject to continual Changes, and those very sudden, ac­cording to the Emperour's Capricio, and the Calumnies of their Compe­titors, the Friendship of the Queen Mother, and of the Wife of the Grand Signior, as also of the Mufti, may help: But if the Prince himself be [Page 119] of a resolute Nature, their Offices will be but weak: And all violent sudden Resolutions of War made by the Emperour himself, are always welcome to the Janizaries, who are the Soul of that Empire: So that, as I said at first, I must conclude, That Prudence and Politicks can be of lit­tle use against Rage and Fury, and a Nation that depends not upon Rea­son, but upon Might.

I can say nothing then but what the Angel said to Gideon, Comfortare & esto Robustus; and with this good Omen that comes from Heaven, and which I offer with a most affectio­nate Mind,

I take leave, having accomplish'd the Task was imposed upon me, if not according to the full Extent of my Duty, at least in proportion to my weak Forces, and small Talent.