YOurs of July 2. I yesterday July the 6. received. In Answer to the Contents whereof (de­siring that my Services may withal be most humbly presen­ted to my very much Honoured Lord) I re­turn you what my present thoughts are con­cerning the particulars therein proposed. First, for Marrying a Daughter to a professed Papist (considered in Thesi, and as to the point of Lawfulness only) I am so far from think­ing the thing in it self to be simply, and toto genere, unlawful; that I dare not condemn the Marriage of a Christian with a Pagan (much less with any other Christian, of how different Persuasion soever) as simply evil and unlawful, in as much as there be Causes imaginable, wherein it may seem not only lawful, but expedient also, and (as the exi­gence of Circumstances may be supposed) [Page 2] little less then necessary so to inter-marry. But since things lawful in the General, and in Thesi, may become (by reason of their in­expediency) unlawful pro hic & nunc, and in Hypothesi to particular persons; and that the expediency or inexpediency of any acti­on to be done, is to measured by the wor­thiness of the end, the conjuncture of pre­sent Circumstances, and the probability of good or evil consequents and effects, pru­dentially laid together, and weighed one against another. I conceive it altogether unsafe for a Conscientious person (especial­ly in a business of so great concernment, as the Marrying of a Child) to proceed upon the General Lawfulness of the thing, with­out due consideration of circumstances, and other requisites for the warranting of par­ticular Actions. Now, as for the Marriage of a daughter with one of so different Per­suasion (in point of Religion) as that they cannot joyn together in the same way of God's Worship, which is the case of a Pro­testant and a Papist, it is very rare to find such a concurrence of Circumstances, as that a man can thence be clearly satisfied in his Judgment (without just cause of doubt­ing the contrary) that it can be expedient to [Page 3] conclude upon such a Marriage; and how dangerous a thing it is to do any thing with a doubting Conscience, we may learn from Rom. 14. 13. For the evil consequents pro­bably to ensue upon such Marriages, are so many and great, that the conveniences which men may promise to themselves from the same (if they should answer expectati­on, as seldom they do to the full) laid in an equal ballance there-against, would not turn the scale; and in one respect the dan­ger is greater to marry with a Papist, than with one of a worse Religion; for that the main Principle of his Religion, (as a Papist) is more destructive of the comfort of a Con­jugal Society, than are the Principles of most Hereticks; yea, than those of Pagans, or Atheists; for holding that there is no Sal­vability but in the Church; and that none is in the Church, but such as acknowledge Subjection to the See of Rome; it is not possi­ble, but that the Husband must needs con­clude his Wife to be in the state of Damna­tion, so long as she continueth Protestant: whence one of these two great inconveni­ences will unavoidably follow; that either he will use all endeavours, engins, and arti­fices, to draw her to the Church of Rome, [Page 4] (as indeed who can blame him to bring his Wife into a capacity of everlasting Sal­vation?) the restless importunity whereof (together with the ill advantages they of that party can make from the sad Confusi­ons that are amongst us in these times) it will be very hard for one of the weaker sex perpetually to resist; or else in case she stand firm in her Religion against all As­saults and Attempts to the contrary, what­soever he may be towards her in outward carriage, he cannot but in his inmost thoughts, pass judgment upon her, as an obstinate and desperate Heretick, and (so living and dying) an accursed and damned Creature. These are sad things both; and it is not conceivable how a Woman so matched should live with any comfort, or ever hope to see a good day, wherein she shall not either be tempted from her Reli­gion, or censured for it; what assurance can she have of his good affections towards her, who is bound not to permit any better opi­nion of her, than of a Reprobate and Cast­away? Is it possible there may be so much good nature in the Husband, as to take off somewhat from that rigidness, which o­therwise the Principles of his Religion [Page 5] would bind him to, or so much discretion, sweetness, and obligingness in the Wives demeanor towards him, as to preserve a good measure of Conjugal Affection be­tween them, notwithstanding their diffe­rent Persuasions: This I say, is possible; and where it happeneth so to be, it rendreth the condition of the Parties so much the less uncomfortable; and that is the utmost of the happiness that is to be hoped for from such Marriages: and I think there cannot be produced many examples thereof; yet even there, there cannot be that cordial Af­fection, and fulness of Complacency (where­in yet the chiefest happiness of Conjugal Society consisteth) that would be, if the same Parties (supposed to be of the same Qualifications otherwise) were also of the same Religion. I omit other oeconomical differences, that may, and very frequently do (occasionally) arise, betwixt Husband and Wife from this difference in Religion, as concerning the entertainment of Friends, the choice of Servants, the education of Children (very considerable things all) be­sides sundry other perhaps of less moment; yet such as are apt to breed Discontents and Jealousies, and sometimes break out [Page 6] into great Distempers in the Family: Such Marriages thereof I should utterly dis­suade; especially in the Nobility, Gentry, and Commonalty, where there is choice enough otherwise to be had of Persons of equal Degree, Estate, and Education of the same Religion to match withal: Kings and Pri­ces for reasons of State, and because there is little choice of Persons of equal Dig­nity with themselves, are therefore often­times by a kind of necessity, put upon such Marriages; yet even there, where they are certainly the most excusable, it hath been observed, that such Marriages have proved for the most part unfortunate.

The other Particular proposed in your Letter, is concerning the Marriage of a Daughter to one that professeth the Protestant Religion, but having had Popish Parents, may be suspected (though he deny it) to be that way inclined. The resolution whereof (as of most other Cases, and Practical Questions) will depend very much upon the conside­ration of Circumstances, whereunto being altogether a stranger, I am less able to give Judgment in the Case with any certain­ty; only in order to the resolution of the question, these (to my understanding) seem [Page 7] to be the most proper and important En­quiries.

First, whether the Parents of the young Person be living or no, one or both? if both be dead, the Temptations from them (which in such Cases are wont to prevail very much) are by their Death clearly superseded; and then the danger is by so much less: but if either be living, there can be little security of the Sons continuance in the Protestants Be­lief, (notwithstanding his present Professi­on thereof) when he shall be assaulted with the whole Authority of them, to whom he oweth Reverence.

Secondly, with what degree of Confidence, and with what kind of asseverations he pro­fesseth the one, and denieth the other Religion; for although they out of design put on a counterfeit vizor, use all the art they can to dissemble it; yet very seldom can it be done so cunningly, warily, and constantly, but that at some time or other, the dissimulation will unawares bewray it self to the eye of a curious observer.

Thirdly, what measure of understanding the young Person (who is, you say, of great Abilities for his Age) hath in the Fundamen­tal Articles of the Christian Religion; those I [Page 8] mean, wherein the English and Romish Chur­ches are at agreement, for in those the substance of Christianity consisteth; he that rightly un­derstands those Catholick Truths taught in the Catechisms of both Churches, and con­cerning which all Christendom (in a manner) are at perfect accord; and then will but suf­fer himself to consider, that the Church of England doth not impose upon the judgments and consciences of her Members, any thing to be believed, or received, as of necessity to Salvation, than what is truly Catholick, and by her Adversaries confessed so to be; and consequently, that the difference betwixt her and the Romish Party, is wholly about those Additionals or Superstructures, which they of the Roman Faith require to be believed, and received with like necessity as the former; but appear to us of this Church respectively, either evidently false, or of doubtful truth, or not of absolute necessity to be believed: I say, who­soever well considereth this, may rest satis­fied in his judgment and conscience, that the Faith taught and professed in the Church of England, is a plain and safe way to lead a Christian Believer to Eternal Salvation, if he withal lend his life and conversation an­swerable thereunto.

[Page 9] To the last particular in your Letter, all the return I have to make, is no more but an humble acknowledgement and sense of his Lordships noble favors towards me, in entertaining an opinion of me more suita­ble to his own goodness and ingenuity, than to my merit: I know not, nor desire to know of any occasions likely to draw me into those parts so distant from me (being grown into years, and infirmities, that ren­der me very unfit for long Journeys) unless the business of my Sons Marriage, which oc­casion'd my late Journey to London, require a second thither in Michaelmas Term. But I am so sensible both of the trouble and charge of such Journeys (besides some in­conveniences to my affairs at home, whilst I am long absent) that I will avoid it, unless there be no other remedy. I shall not wil­lingly decline any employment (within my low and narrow sphere, both of outward condition and parts) wherein my service may be any ways useful, or but acceptable, to that noble and excellent Person: but truly Sir, I conceive there will be little need of my further endeavours, as to that particular ex­pressed in yours, whether what I have writ­ten now, give satisfaction, or not; there are [Page 10] persons nearer hand, whom I know to be much fitter for an employment of that nature, than my self, who have ever studied Peace more than Controversies; and namely, one at the next door to Hatton-House, whose sufficiecny and readiness in that kind is well known to Mr. Geoffery Palmer. Sir, I wish you Happiness, desire your Prayers, and rest,

TWO Gentlemen who were very good Friends, and both of them Married, used [...]o converse together familiarly; one of these [...]ook a special liking in the company and conver­ [...]ation of the others Wife, and she answerably in is; which afterwards proceeded to some degree [...]f Love, which, though ever restrained, and reserved without any violation of Chastity, [...]rew yet in the end to this issue, that they mu­ [...]ually vowed either to other; that if happily [...]ther of them should at any time be freed from [...]he Bond of Matrimony (either be by the death [...]f his Wife, or she by the death of her Husband) [...]at party so freed should continue afterwards [...]nmarried, and stay for the other, till the other [...]ould be freed also, though it were during life: [...]ow so it is, that the Gentlewomans Husband [...]ed, and her affections and resolution so alter­ [...]d, that gladly she would Marry, if she might released of the Engagement of that Vow; or [...]rsuaded of the unlawfulness or nullity there-

[Page 12] Concerning the present Case, as it is pro­pounded, sundry Points are needful to be resolved, that so we give a right judgment de praeterito, of what is already done for the time past, in respect of the Gentlewoman former promise, and sound direction also d [...] suturo, what is further to be done for the time to come, in respect of her present di­stresses.

IN referring over your friend to me, you have pitched upon one of the unfittest persons in the World, to be consulted in ca­ses of that nature, who am altogether a stranger to the Publick Affairs of Christen­dom, and understand nothing at all of the mutual Interests, Relations, or Transactions of Forein Princes or States; yea, so little curious have I been to inform my self, so much as where the Stages lay of the chiefest Actions of these latter times abroad, or what persons were engaged therein; that I have something pleased my self (perhaps too much) with my own ignorance in our home Af­fairs, accounting it among the happinesses of my privacy and retiredness, in these unhappy times; that amidst so much fury and blood­shed on every side, it was never my hap to be within the view of any Battle or Skirmish; nor did I ever see so much as a Pistol dis­charged, or a Sword drawn against any single [Page 41] person, since the beginning of the War. I could have wished therefore, since my opi­nion herein is desired, that I had had the op­portunity to have advised with some more knowing Men, & of greater experience and judgment than my self in these matters; or at least, that you had sent me, together with the two inclosed Letters, a transcript of your Answer (whose judgment I do with great reason very much value) unto the former of them; for there I assure my self, I should have met with such Materials as would have served me for a good foundation to work up­on; yet to satisfie your desire, so far as in me lieth, and the rather for the Gentlemans sake your friend, (who though unknown to me by face, or till the receipt of your Letter, so much as by Name; yet by his Letters ap­peareth to be a person of Piety and Inge­nuity, and a great Master both of Reason and Language) I have endeavoured (with reser­vation of place for second thoughts, and submission to other Judgments) to declare what my present apprehensions are concerning the whole business; wherein the resolution of such doubts, as in point of Conscience may arise, or of the most and chiefest of them, will (as I conceive) very much depend upon [Page 42] the consideration and right application of these Four things, viz.

I. The different sorts of Mens imployments in general.

II. The nature of the Souldiers imployments in particular.

III. The end that Men may propose to them­selves in following the War; or what it is that chiefly induceth them thereto.

IV. The condition of the Person so imployed, or to be imployed.

1. IN judging of Cases of Scandal, we are not so much to look at the event, what that is, or may be; as at the cause whence it cometh; for sometimes there is given just cause of Scandal, and yet no Scandal fol­loweth, because it is not taken: sometimes Scandal is taken, and yet no just cause given; and sometimes there is both cause of Scan­dalgiven, and Scandal thereat taken; but no man is concerned in any Scandal that hap­peneth to another, by occasion of any thing done by him; neither is chargeable with it, farther than he is guilty of having given it, If then we give Scandal to others, and they take it not, we are to bear a share in the blame as well as they, and that a deeper share too, (Vae homini, Wo to the man by whom the Offence cometh, Matth. 8. 7.) but if they take Offence when we give none, it is a thing we cannot help, therefore the whole blame must lie upon them; wherefore if at any time any doubt shall arise in the Case of Scandal, [Page 76] how far forth the danger thereof may, or may not oblige us to the doing or not doing any thing proposed, the Resolution will come on much the easier; if we shall but rightly under­stand, what it is to give Scandal, or how many ways a man may become guilty of scandalizing another by his example. The ways (as I conceive) are but these four.

2. The first is, when a man doth some­thing before another man, which is in it self evil, unlawful, and sinful, in which Case, nei­ther the intention of him that doth it, nor the event, as to him that seeth it done, is of any consideration; for it mattereth not whether the doer had an intention to draw the other into sin thereby, or not: neither doth it matter whether the other were thereby induced to commit sin or not: the matter or substance of the action being evil, and done before others, is sufficient to ren­der the doer guilty of having given Scandal, though he had neither any intention him­self so to do; nor were any person actually scandalized thereby; because wha tsoever is in it self, and in its own nature evil, is also of it self, and in its own nature scandalous, and of evil example. Thus did Hophni and Phi­neas the Sons of Eli, give Scandal by their [Page 77] wretched Prophaness and greediness about the Sacrifices of the Lord, and their vile and shameless abusing the Women, 1 Sam. 2. 17. 22. And so did David also give great Scandal in the matter of Uriah, 2 Sam. 12. 14. Here the Rule is, Do nothing that is evil, for fear of giving Scandal.

3. The second way, when a man doth something before another with a direct in­tention and formal purpose of drawing him thereby to commit sin; in which Case, neither the matter of the action, nor the event is of any consideration, for it maketh no difference (as to the sin of giving Scan­dal) whether any man be effectually enticed thereby to commit sin, or not; neither doth it make any difference, whether the thing done were in it self unlawful or not, so as it had but an appearance of evil; and from thence an aptitude to draw another to do that (by imitation) which should be really & intrinsecally evil, the wicked intention alone, (whatsoever the effect should be, or what means soever should be used to promote it) sufficeth to induce the guilt of giving Scan­dal upon the doer: This was Jeroboam's sin, in setting up the Calves with a formal purpose and intention thereby (for his own secular [Page 78] and ambitious ends) to corrupt the purity of Religion, and to draw the people to an Idola­trous Worship, for which cause he is so often stigmatized with it, as with a note of Infamy, to stick by him whilst the World lasteth, be­ing scarce ever mentioned but with this ad­dition, Jeroboam the son of Nebat that made Israel to sin. Here the Rule is, Do nothing (good or evil) with an intention to give Scan­dal.

4. The third way is, when a Man doth something before another, which in it self is not evil, but indifferent, and so according to the Rule of Christian Liberty, lawful for him to do, or not to do, as he shall see cause (yea, and perhaps otherwise commodious and con­venient for him to do) yet whereat he pro­bably foreseeth the other will take Scandal, and be occasioned thereby to do evil. In such Case, if the thing to be done, be not in some degree (at least prudentially) necessa­ry for him to do; but that he might, with­out great inconvenience and prejudice to him­self, and any third person, leave it undone, he is bound in Charity and Compassion to his Brothers Soul, (for whom Christ died) and for the avoiding of Scandal to abridge himself in the exercise of his Christian Liber­ty [Page 79] for that time so far, as rather to suffer some inconvenience himself by the not doing of it, than by doing of it to cause his Brother to offend; the very Case which is so often, and so largely, and so earnestly insisted up­on by St. Paul, Rom. 14. 13, 21. and 15. 1, 3. 1 Cor. 8. 7, 13. and 9. 12, 22. and 10. 23, 33. Here the Rule is, Do nothing that may be reasonably forborn, whereat it is like Scandal will be taken.

5. The last way is, when a man doth some­thing before another, which is not only law­ful, but (according to the exigencies of pre­sent circumstances pro hic & nunc) very be­hoveful, and in some sort (prudentially) ne­cessary for him to do; but foreseeth in the beholder a propension to make an ill use of it, and to take encouragement thereby to com­mit sin; if there be not withal a great care had to prevent, as much as is possible, the Scandal that might be taken thereat: for, Qui non prohibet peccare cum potest, jubet. In such case the bare neglect of his Brother, and not using his utmost endeavour to prevent the evil that might ensue, making him guilty, upon which Consideration standeth the equity of the Judicial Law given to the Jews, Exod. 21. 33, 34. which ordereth, that in [Page 78] case a man dig a Pit or Well for the use of his Family, and (looking no farther than his own conveniency) put no cover on it, but leave it open, whereby it happeneth his Neighbours Beast do fall therein, and perish, the owner of the Pit is to make it good, in­asmuch as he was the occasioner of that loss unto his neighbour, which he might and ought to have prevented: In this last Case the thing is not (for the danger of the Scan­dal) to be left undone, supposing it (as we now do) otherwise behoveful to be done; but the action is to be ordered, and carried, on by us, for the manner of doing, and in all Respects and Circumstances thereunto be­longing, with so much clearness, tenderness, and moderation, and wisdom, that so many as are willing to take notice of it may be sa­tisfied that there was on our part a reason of just necessity that the thing should be done; and that such persons as would be willing to make use of our example, without the like necessity, may do it upon their own score, and not be able to vouch our practice for their excuse; even as the Jew that stood in need to sink a Pit for the service of his House and Grounds, was not (for fear his Neighbours Beasts should fall into it, and be drowned) [Page 81] bound by the Law, to forbear the making of it, but only to provide a sufficient cover for it, when he had made it. Here the Rule is, Order the doing of that which may not well be left undone, in such sort, that no Scandal may, through your default, be taken thereat.

6. I do not readily remember any doubt that can occur about the reason of Scandal, which may not be brought within the com­pass of these four Rules; and then the right applying some or other of these Rules, will give some furtherance towards the resolution of these doubts.

R. C. was seized in Fee of certain Houses of small Value, with the Appurtenances; and in the Year 1635. whiles Owner of the said Houses he intreated A. B. to be his Surety for One Hundred Pounds; and continued the same at Interest till 1639. At which time he requested A. B. to discharge that Bond, and in consideration thereof, sel­leth the said Houses to A. B. and his Heirs for ever; the said R. C. also buyeth of a Mer­chant a parcel of Goods; the Merchant being a Receiver of some part of the late Kings Revenue, and under pretence of a priviledge thereby, taketh a Bond of the said R. C. for the payment of Two hundred pounds to himself, but in the Name of the late King, as if indebted to the King; and under that pre­tence, [Page 83] procureth an Extent upon the Houses sold to A. B. and make seizure thereof: was R. C. seized of the same, when he entred into that Bond.

The said King, 1640. published a Procla­mation, wherein he declared, That the taking of such Bonds was contrary to His Intention, and an abuse of his Prerogative, and prohi­bited all such crafty Courses, as tending to the Oppression of his Subjects; and it is to be no­ted, that the said Proclamation was published two years before the Extent was executed upon the Houses, which nevertheless have been held under that Extent about fourteen years, which is beyond the value of the Houses.

The said R. C. died poor, the Merchant is dead also, without any Child, leaving as Estate behind him of Twenty thousand Pounds, as is supposed; a great part visible in Lands, as appeareth by his last Will upon Record.

Advice of Counsel at Law being taken, have the said A. B. may be most readily relieved; he is directed to Petition the present Supreme Power to pardon the Debt, because taken only in the Kings Name, when there is no Debt due to him from R. C.

I Have hitherto been very sparing in de­livering my opinion concerning the point now most in agitation, viz. Of the lafwulness or unlawfulness of Subscribing the Engagement: considering the mischiefs that must needs have followed, if it should be once noised abroad, that I had given forth any determi­nation in so tickle a point. I could not but foresee on the one side, if I should condemn it as utterly unlawful, how I should be look­ed upon by those that have all power in their hands, not as a refuser only, but a dis­suader also of what they have thought fit to require: and on the other side, if I should allow it in any case lawful, what ill use would certainly be made thereof by mul­titudes of people, apt to be so far scandali­zed thereby, as either to swallow it whole without chewing, (that is, resting them­selves upon the general determination of the lawfulness to take it hand over head, [Page 89] without due consideration, either of the true meaning of it, or of other requisite cautions and circumstances) or else to con­ceive themselves by so engaging, to be for ever discharged from the bond of their for­mer Allegiance.

Yet since by your Letter, and by sending your servant therewith on purpose so many days journey, through unknown ways, and at this season of the year (especially as the weather hath proved since his coming forth) scarce passable, you have shewn your earnest desire to understand what my opinion is in this point; so great, both for difficulty and concernment; I could not think it fit, nor consistent with that civility which is to be used, especially towards Strangers, to send back your messenger without the return of some kind of answer: Wherein, albeit I shall not come up to the full, of what your Letter declareth to be your desire, viz. In giving a particular Judgment and estimate of the Eight several Arguments therein proposed, and the additional Quaere in the Postscript: yet you shall find something tending towards your satisfaction therein, by touching upon those points (so far as the straits of time would suffer) wherein the difficulty of the [Page 90] whole business seemeth chiefly to consist.

First, then, it is to be considered, that Allegiance is a duty that every Subject, un­der what form of Government soever, by the Law of Nature, oweth to his Country, and consequently to the Sovereign Power thereof. For the very same Law (which we may call the Law of Nature, at least in a large acceptation) which inclineth particu­lar men to grow into one civil body of a Common-wealth, must necessarily withal, imprint a sense, and tacite acknowledgment of such a duty of Allegiance in every infe­rior member of the body, unto the Caput Communitatis, or Sovereign Power, by which that Common-wealth is governed, as is necessary for the preservation of the whole body. So that the bond of Allegiance doth not arise originally from the Oath of Alle­giance; as if those that had not taken the Oath, had a greater liberty to act contrary to the Allegiance specified in the Oath, than those that have taken it, have: or as if, in case the Oath should be quite laid aside, there should be no Allegiance due. But it is so intrinsecal proper, and essential a duty, and (as it were) fundamental, to the relation of a Subject, quâ talis, as that the very name [Page 11] of a Subject doth, after a sort, import it; insomuch, that it hath thereupon gained, in common usage of speech, the stile of Natu­ral Allegiance: Whence all these inferences will follow.

1. That the bond of Allegiance, (whether sworn or not sworn) is in the nature of it it perpetual and indispensable.

2. That it is so inseparable from the re­lation of a Subject, that although the exer­cise of it may be suspended by reason of a prevailing force, whilest the Subject is under such force, (viz. where it cannot be ima­gined, how the endeavour of exercising it can be effectually serviceable to restore the Sovereign Power to the right owner, for the establishment of that Publick Justice and Peace wherein the happiness of Common­wealths consisteth) yet no outward force can so absolutely take it away, or remove it, but that still it remaineth virtually in the sub­ject, and obligeth to an endeavour (so soon as the force that hindred it is over) of actu­ally exercising of it, for the advantage of the party, to whom of right it is due, and the advancement of the common good thereby, upon all fit occasions.

3. That no Subject of England, that [Page 92] either hath, by taking the Oaths of Suprema­cy, or Allegiance, acknowledged; or that not having taken either Oath, yet otherwise knoweth, or believeth, that the Soveraign Power in England, to whom his Natural Al­legiance is due, is the King, his Heirs, and law­ful Successors, can without sinning against his Conscience, enter into any Covenant, Promise, or Engagement, or do any other Act or Acts whatsoever, whereby either to transfer his Allegiance to any other party, to whom it is not of right due, or to put him­self into an incapacity of performing the duties of his bounden Allegiance to his lawful Sovereign, when it may appear to be use­ful and serviceable to him.

4. That therefore the taking of the late Solemn League and Covenant, by any Sub­ject of England (notwithstanding the Pro­testation in the Preface, that therein he had the Honour of the King before his eyes; and that express clause in one of the Articles of it, wherein he swore, The Preservation of the Kings Person and Honour) was an act as clear contrary to the Oath of Allegiance, and the Natural Duty of every Subject of Eng­land; as the Assisting of the King to the ut­most of ones power (which is a branch of the [Page 93] Oaths) and the assisting against any person whatsoever, with his utmost power, those that were actually in Arms against the King (which was the very end for which that Covenant was set on foot) are contrary the one unto the other.

5. And that also for the same reason, no Subject of England, that hath taken the Oaths, and understandeth them, or is per­suaded that the Sovereignty of this Realm doth of right belong to the King, his Heirs, and lawful Successors, can without sinning in like manner against his Conscence, take the Engagement now offered: if he so under­stand the words, wherein it is expressed, as if they did contain in them, and require of the Promiser, an acknowledgment that the Supream Power of this Realm, whereunto the Subjects owe their bounden Allegiance, is rightly vested in those persons that now ex­ercise it; or as if they did import an utter Abjuration, or renouncing of that Allegiance which was formerly held due to the King.

II. This being cleared, the next enquiry must be, Whether or no the words of the En­gagement will reasonably bear such a con­struction, as to the understanding of a ra­tional [Page 94] and conscientious man, may seem consistent with his bounden duty and Allegi­ance to his lawful Soveraign? Whereof (I think) there need be no great question made, if it be well considered,

1. That all expressions by words, are subject to such ambiguities, that scarce any thing can be said or expressed in any words, how cautelously soever chosen, which will not render the whole speech capable of more constructions than one.

2. That very many men, known to be well affected to the King and his Party, and reputed otherways both learned and con­scientious (not to mention the Presbyterians, most of whom, truly for my own part, when we speak of learning and conscience, I hold to be very little considerable) have sub­scribed the Engagement; who in the judg­ment of Charity, we are to prefume, would not so have done, if they had not been persuaded the words might be understood in some such qualified sense, as might stand with the duty of Allegiance to the King.

3. That (as you write) it is strongly re­ported and believed, that the King hath given way to the taking of the Engage­ment, [Page 95] rather than that his good Subjects should lose their Estates for refusing the same. Which, as it is a clear evidence, that the King, and they who are about him, to advise him, do not so conceive of the words of this Engagement, as if they did necessarily import an abandoning of the Allegiance due to him: so 'tis (if true) a matter of great consideration towards the satisfaction of so many, as out of that fear only, have scrupled the taking of it. For the doing of that cannot be reasonably thought to destroy the Subjects Allegiance; which the King, who expecteth Allegiance from all his Subjects, advisedly, and up­on mature deliberation alloweth them to do.

III. But all this being granted, that the words of the Engagement are capable of such construction; yet is not the Conscience thereby sufficiently secured, from justly scrupling at the taking thereof, unless it may yet further appear, that the Subject hath the liberty to make use of such a con­struction; which is in effect the Quaere con­tained in your Postscript, viz. Whether up­on supposition, that the words of the En­gagement [Page 96] will bear more constructions than one, the subscriber may take it in his own sense, or is bound to take it in the impo­sers sense? or, Whether it be necessary or expedient before he subscribe, to ask those that require his subscription, in what sense they require him to subscribe it? Upon the resolution of which Quaere, since (as I conceive) the last resolution of the Judg­ment, wherein the Conscience is to acqui­esce, doth principally depend; I shall en­deavour to give you my thoughts therein, (wherein I acknowledge to have received much light and satisfaction from a Dis­course written by a Learned, Judicious, and Pious friend, whereof I lately had the perusal, but for some reasons, not thought fit to be published) as distinctly, and clearly, as the time I have to do it in, will suffer.

1. First, then, for a man that is required of another to give Faith by some Oath, Pro­mise, or other Engagement, to take it in a sense of his own, manifestly different (e­ven in his own apprehension) from the o­thers meaning, sufficiently expressed by words, according to the common custom of speech, and the nature of the business which it concerneth, is so gross a conceit, [Page 97] that had not the impudence of the Jesuits, in maintaining the lawfulness of their e­quivocations, and the sad experience of these late times, (wherein thousands have cheated themselves into perjury, by think­ing to avoid it) evidenced the contrary, it might well have been thought a thing in­credible, that any man of common under­standing, should suffer his reason to be so infatuated by his affections, as to be de­ceived thereby. For if such latitude of construction should be admitted in Promi­ses, and other Obligations of that nature, intended for the Preservation of Faith amongst mankind, there would not re­main any possible means, whereby for men to have assurance of one anothers mean­ings. Wherefore I take that for a clear truth, That all Promises, and Assurances, wherein Faith is required to be given to another, ought to be understood, ad men­tem imponentis, according to the mind and meaning of him to whom the Faith is to be given; so far forth as the meaning may reasonably appear, by the nature of the matter about which it is conversant, and such signification of the words, where­by it is expressed, as according to the or­dinary [Page 98] use of speech amongst men, a­greeth best thereunto. The reason where­of is, because the Faith so required to be given, is intended to the behoof, and for the interest of him that requireth it; namely, to the end he may have the better assu­rance from him that giveth the faith, that what is promised shall be accordingly per­formed: which assurance he cannot have, if after his meaning, sufficiently declared by the words, it should yet be at the liberty of the Promiser to reserve another secret meaning in his own breast, differing there­from.

2. But Secondly, what if the intention of the Imposer be not so fully declared by the words and the nature of the business; but that the same words may in fair con­struction be still capable of a double mean­ing, so as taken in one sense, they shall bind to More, and in another to Less. I conceive in such case it is not necessary, nor always expedient, (but rather for the most part otherwise) for the Promiser, be­fore he give faith, to demand of the Impo­ser, whether of the two is his meaning. But he may by the rule of Prudence, and that (for ought I see) without the violation [Page 99] of any Law of Conscience, make his just advantage of that ambiguity, and take it in the same sense which shall bind to the Less. And this I ground upon the very same reason as before; For sith the Faith to be given, is intended to the behoof of him, to whom it is given, it concerneth him to take care that his meaning be expressed in such words as will sufficiently manifest the same to the understanding of a reasona­ble man. Which if he neglect to do, no Law of Equity or Prudence bindeth the Promiser by an over-scrupulous diligence to make it out, whereby to lay a greater obligation upon himself than he need to do.

3. But then Thirdly, if it shall happen (as often it cometh to pass, when we have to deal with cunning men, and may possi­bly be the Case now, and undoubtedly was so in the business of the Protestation, when the time was) That he that requireth the faith to be given, do of purpose so con­trive words, that there may be left an ambiguity and latitude of sense therein; yea, and that it be very probable, and in a manner apparent, (upon the consideration of the point of interest, or other strong [Page 100] presumptions arising from circumstances or otherwise) even to the apprehension of the Promiser himself, that he hath some farther reach in requiring that pro­mise from him, some more remote and se­cret intention than he is willing to disco­ver. In that case what is to be done? I answer, That the Promiser in such case is no ways obliged in giving his Faith, to take notice of any such secret intention, but is at liberty to make use of that Lati­tude of sense, which the other did rather chuse to leave undetermined, than to re­strain, and so to turn the others cunning dealing to his own best advantage, by ta­king it in the more favourable constructi­on; and that which bindeth to less. For it is the declared intention only, (viz. That which the words, according to the com­mon use of speech, do in relation to the nature of the subject, most naturally and properly represent to the understand­ing of reasonable men, when they hear them) and not to the remote, secret, and reserved intent, which the Promiser is ob­liged unto. The reason whereof is mani­fest; because he that requireth Faith to be given from another, by words of his [Page 101] own contriving, is ever presumed so to have determined the sense thereof, in the contrivance of the words, as may suffici­ently declare what he intendeth the Pro­miser should assure him to perform. If therefore he have not so determined the words, as to signifie the More; it is in all reason to be presumed, that he intended to oblige him but to the Less. For being at liberty to make his own choice of words, whereby to express his own meaning; who can think otherwise, but that he would make the choice with respect to his own Interest? And therefore, though he might have a secret desire, which he is loth to discover, that the Promiser should be bound to the More, and would be mar­vellously well pleased, that he should so understand the words, as if they intend­ded to bind him to the More: Yet since it had been so easie a matter for him, by ad­ding or altering a few words, to have de­clared that intent, if he had thought it conducible to his own ends; it will be presumed also, that it was out of respect of self-interest, that he forbare so to do, and chose rather to leave his meaning, in such general words, as will not exclude [Page 102] the sense, which bindeth but to the Less; and consequently that his declared in­tent obligeth to no more but to the Less only.

IV. To bring the matter yet closer, and to put it up to the present Cases, there are yet two things more to be done.

First, To shew what different constru­ctions (the highest, I mean, and the lowest) the words of the Engagement are fairly capable of.

And Secondly, to find as well as we can, whether of two is more probably the meaning intended by the Imposers, to be declared by the words.

The words are these:

Wherein there are sundry ambiguities.

1. First, In the words true and faithful; by which may be intended, either the pro­mise of that Fidelity and Allegiance (which was formerly acknowledged to be due to [Page 103] the King, &c.) to be now performed to those that are presently possessed of the Su­pream Power, as their right and due. Or else that promise of such a kind of fidelity, as Captives taken in the War, promise to their Enemies, when they fall under their power; viz. to remain true Prisoners of War, and so long as they are in their pow­er, not to attempt any thing to their de­struction.

2. Secondly, In the word Common-wealth, by which may either be meant, those per­sons who are the prevalent party in this Kingdom, and now are possessed of, and do exercise the Supreme Power therein, as if the right of Soveraignity were vest­ed in them: Or else, the whole entire Body of the English Nation, as it is a Civil Society or State within it self, distinguish­ed from all other Foreign Estates. Taken in the former sense, the fidelity promised to the Common-wealth, relateth directly to the upholding of that party who are the present Governors de facto, and imports subjection to them as de jure: But taken in the latter, it relateth the safety of the Nation, and importeth no more as to the [Page 104] present Governours, but to live peaceably under them de facto, and to yield obedi­ence to them in things absolutely necessa­ry for the upholding Civil Society with­in the Realm; such as are the defence of the Nation against Forainers, the fur­therance of Publick Justice, and the main­tenance of Trade.

3. In the words as it is now established, &c. which may be understood either by way of approbation of what hath been done by way of abolishing Kingly Government, and the House of Peers, and placing all Authority and Power within this Realm, in the House of Commons. Or else [...] only, as a clause simply and barely reciting what manner of Govern­ment it is that this Nation de facto, is now under; viz. a Government by the Commons only, without either King or House of Lords.

‘Which Ambiguities considered, The highest construction that can be reasonably made of the words, is to this effect. I acknowledge the Soveraign Power of this Nation, whereunto I owe Allegi­ance and Subjection to be rightly stated in the House of Commons, wherein [Page 105] neither King nor Lords (as such) have, or henceforth ought to have any share; And I promise that I will perform all Allegiance and Subjection thereun­to, and maintain the same with my fortunes and life to the utmost of my power.’

And the lowest construction that can be rea­sonably made of the same words, is to this effect: ‘Whereas for the present, the Su­preme Power in England, under which Power I now am, is actually possessed and exercised by the House of Commons, without either King or Lords; I promise that so long as I live under that power and protection, I will not contrive or at­tempt any act of hostility against them: but living quietly and peaceably under them, will endeavor my self faithfully in my place and calling, to do what e­very good member of a Common-wealth ought to do for the safety of my Coun­try, and preservation of Civil Society therein.’

V. Now cometh in to be considered in the last place the great Question, whether of the two constructions it is, (That which bindeth to the Most, or This which obligeth [Page 106] to the Least, the words can well bear) that the formers of the Engagement did rather intend to declare by these words. They that think the former, want not probabi­lity of reason to ground their persuasions upon. For they consider, that those who are presently possessed of the Supreme Power, are not minded to part with it if they can hold it. And that the likeliest way to hold it is, if they can possibly bring the whole people of England, or at least the far greatest part thereof, to acknow­ledge that they are rightly possessed of it, and to promise Subjection and Allegi­ance to them as such. And that there­fore the Engagement, being purposely de­vised and set on foot, as the fittest engine to expedite that work, must in all reason intend to oblige so far. Which being so contrary to their Judgement and persua­sion, concerning the duty and Oath of Al­legiance, I cannot blame those that so un­derstand the words of the Engagement, if they abominate the very thought of ta­king it.

But there wanteth not great probability of Reason on the other side, to induce us to believe that the latter and lower sense [Page 107] is rather to be deemed the immediate, and declared intent of the Imposers, whatsoe­ver cause of suspition there may be, that the former meaning may be more agreea­ble to their secret, reserved, and ultimate intent; between which two, if there be any difference (as it is not impossible but there may be) the Engager is not concerned in it, or not yet: the Equivocation, if there be any in that, must be put upon the Im­posers, not on the Promisers score. For thus believing there are amongst others these Probabilities.

1. That many prudent and conscienci­ous men of the Royal Party, as well Di­vines and Lawyers, as others, have thus understood it, who we presume would not for any outward respect in the world have taken it, if they conceived any more to have been intended in it.

2. That it hath often been affirmed, both publickly and privately in several parts of the Kingdom (if we may believe either common fame, or the reports of sundry credible particular persons) by those that have persuaded or pressed others to subscribe; that the same is the very true intent and meaning of it, and no other.

[Page 108] 3. That if the Imposers had been minded to have declared an intent of binding to more they might easily have framed the words so as not to be capable of a constru­ction binding to Less.

4. That (as is also credibly reported) whilst the form of the words was under debate, the opinion of those that would have had it set higher, was not followed, as held unseasonable; and the vote carried, for the more moderate expression wherein it now standeth.

5. That the Imposers, intending by the Engagement to secure themselves, especially against the designs and attempts of those men, who they knew (well e­nough) held them for no other than Usur­pers, must be in reason supposed to re­quire no more assurance of them by the Engagement, than such as may and is usually given to Usurpers; which is, not an acknowledgment of their title, and a promise of Allegiance, but meerly a promise of living quietly, so long as they are under their power, and enjoy their protection.

6. That it is a received Maxim of Poli­tical prudence, for all new Governours, [Page 109] (especially those that either introduce a new form of Government, or come in upon a questionable title) to abstain from all harsh proceedings, even against those whom they know to be evil affected to their power, and not so much as to ex­asperate them (though it be in the power of their hands to destry them) especially in the beginning of their Government; but rather to sweeten them into a better opinion of their persons, and to win up­on them by Acts of Grace and Oblivion (for Remissiùs imperanti meliús paretur.) So as they may have Senec. 1. D [...] Clem. 24. but any tolerable kind of assu­rance from them in the mean time, of living quietly and peaceably under them. We have no reason therefore to believe that the Imposers of this Engagement, who have acted the parts of the greatest Politicians, so perfectly and successfully hitherto, as to possess themseves so fully of the Supreme Power of so great and flourishing a Kingdom, in so few years, would be so impolitick as not to proceed by the same rules, that all wise and success­ful persons have ever practised in the mana­ging, and for the establishing of an acquired power.

[Page 110] VI. Out of all these premises together (weighing my Positive conclusion, either Affirmative or Negative, touching the Lawfulness or Unlawfulness of subscri­bing in universali) I shall declare my opi­nion only in these few following particu­lars.

1. That it is not lawful for any man to take the Engagement with a resolution to break it.

2. That therefore, whosoever thinketh the words of the Engagement do contain a promise of any thing which is not lawful for him to perform, cannot take it with a good conscience.

3. That whosoever so understandeth the words of the Engagement, as if they did oblige him to any thing contrary to his Allegiance, or render him unable to act according thereunto, upon any seasonable emerging occasion, cannot with a good conscience take it.

4. That if any man for any temporal benefit, or avoiding any temporal da­mage, shall take the Engagement with a doubting conscience (that is, before he be persuaded in his Judgement, upon some probable ground of reason, that it [Page 111] is lawful for him so to do) he sinneth therein.

5. That if any man after a serious de­sire of informing himself as rightly as he can, what are the duties of his Allegiance on the one side, and what is most probably the meaning intended by the words of the Engagement on the other side, shall find himself well satisfied in this persuasion, that the performance in the mean time of what is required by the Engagement so understood, is no way contrary (for any thing he can discern for the present) to his bounden Allegiance, so long as he is un­der such a force, as that he cannot exercise it; and likewise, that whensoever that force is so removed from him, or he from under it, as that he hath power to act according to his Allegiance, the Obliga­tion of the Engagement of it self deter­mineth and expireth: and out of these considerations, rather than suffer extreme prejudice in his Person, Estate, or necessary Relations, shall subscribe the Engagement, since his own heart condemneth him not, neither will I.

Sir, I have now two requests to you, which I doubt not but you will think rea­sonable. [Page 112] The one, that whatsoever use you shall please to make of these papers, or any thing therein contained, for your own, or any friends satisfaction; yet you would not deliver any Copies abroad, lest they should come to be printed, as some other papers of mine, written in this manner, have been without my know­ledg. This I desire, both in respect of the danger I might incur from the displeasure of the Potent Party, if any such thing should come abroad; as also lest upon the consideration of some things here hinted, they might think the words of the En­gagement too light, and might thence take occasion to lay some heavier Obli­gation upon us, in words that should ob­lige to More. The other request is, that since I have not any other perfect Copy of what now I send you, you would pro­cure it to be transcribed for me; and ei­ther the Copy so transcribed, or these very papers rather, when you have transcribed them, transmit inclosed in a Letter, or by some Friend that will be sure to deliver them safe, with his own hands, to my Son—in London, to whom I shall write shortly, that he may expect them.

[Page 113] Sir, I desire that my best respects may be presented, &c.—God endue us all with Grace and Wisdom fit for these evil times; to whose Mercy and Blessing commend us all, I rest,

WHen by your former Letter, you desired my present Resolution in two Questions therein proposed concerning the Sabbath, although I might not then sa­tisfie your whole desire (being loth to give in my opinion before I had well weighed it) yet that I might not seem altogether to decline the task imposed on me by you, I engaged my self by promise, within short time, to send you what upon further con­sideration, I should conceive thereof. Which promise, so far as my many distra­ctions and occasions would permit, I endea­voured to perform by perusing the Books you sent me, (in the one whereof, I found written on the spare paper with your hand, a Note moving a third Question, about, the Name of the Sabbath also;) and by looking up and reviewing such scattered [Page 138] Notes as I had touching that Subject. But then I met with difficulties so many and great (whereof the more I considered, the more still I found them to increase) that I saw it would be a long work, and take up far more time than I could spare, to digest and enlarge what seemed needful to be said in the three Questions in such sort as was requisite, to give any tolerable satisfacti­on either to my self or others. Wherefore I was estsoons minded to have excused my self by Letter to you, and farther medling with these Questions, and to have remit­ted you over for better satisfaction to those men, that have both better leisure to go about such a business, and better abilities to go through with i [...] than I have; for to questions of importance, better nothing be said, than not enough: And the rather was I mided so to do, when I perceived there were rumors spread in these parts, (occasioned, as I verily suppose, by some speeches of your good friend Mr. Tho. A.) as if I were writing a Treatise of the mora­lity of the Sabbath. Which besides that, it might raise an expectation of some great matters which I could in no wise answer; it might also expose that little I should [Page 139] have done to the mis-censures of men wed­ded to their own opinions, if after I had laid mine open, it should have happened in any thing (as in some things like enough it would) to have disagreed from theirs. Yet because by your late kind Letters, (where­in, whilst I was slack in making it, you have prevented mine excuse,) I perceive the continuance of your former desire; I have therefore since resolved to do some­what, though not so much as I first intend­ed, hoping that you will in friendly manner interpret my purpose therein. I have there­fore now sent you but a naked summary of my thoughts concerning the three Questi­ons, abstracted from all those Explanati­ons, Reasons, Testimonies of Authors, removals of objections, and other such Enlargements as have might have given further both lustre and strength there­unto.

Howsoever, by what I presently send, you may sufficiently see what my opinion is; which I shall be ready to clear, so far as my understanding will serve, in any par­ticular wherein you shall remain doubtful; and as ready to alter when any man shall instruct me better, if he bring good evidence [Page 140] either of Reason or of Scripture-Text for what he affirmeth: The Questions are,

1. Which is the fittest Name where­by to call the day of our Christian weekly-rest? whether the Sabbath, the Lord's-day, or Sunday?

2. What is the meaning of that Prayer appointed to be used in our Church; [Lord have Mercy upon us, and intline, &c] as it is repeated after, and applied to the words of the fourth Commandment?

3. Whether it be lawful to use any bodily recreation upon the Lord's-day? and if so, then what kind of Recreations may be used?

I. Concerning the Name Sabbatum, or Sabbath, I thus conceive;

1. That in Scripture, Antiquity, and all Ecclesiastical Writers, it is constantly ap­propriated to the day of the Jews Sabbath, or Saturday; and not at all (till of late years) used to signifie our Lord's-day, or Sunday.

2. That to call Sunday, by the name of the Sabboth-day, (rebus sic slantibus) may for sundry respects be allowed in the Chri­stian [Page 141] Church without any great inconve­niency: and that therefore men (other­wise sober and moderate) ought not to be censured with too much severity, neither charged with Judaism, if sometimes they so speak.

3. That yet for sundry other respects it were perhaps much more expedient, if the word Sabbath (in that motion) were either not at all, or else more sparing­ly used.

II. Concerning the name Dominica, or the Lord's-day:

1. That it was taken up in memory of our Lord Christ's Resurrection, and the great work of our Redemption accompli­shed therein.

2. That it hath warrant from the Scrip­ture, (Apoc. 1. 10) and hath been of long continued use in the Christian Church, to signifie the first day of the week, or Sun­day.

III. Concerning the name Dies Solis, or Sunday.

1. That it is taken from the courses of the Planets, as the names of the other days are: the reason whereof is to be learned from Astronomers.

[Page 142] 2. That it hath been used generally, and of long time, in most parts of the World.

3. That it is not justly chargeable with Heathenism; and that it proceedeth from much weakness at the least, (if not rather superstition) that some men condemn the use of it, as prophane, heathenish or un­lawful,

IV. Of the fitness of the aforesaid three names compared one with another.

1. That according to the several matter or occasions of speech, each of the three may be fitter in some respect, and more proper to be used than either of the other two; As, viz.

1. The Name Sabbath: when we speak of a time of rest indeterminate, and in ge­neral, without reference to any parti­cular day: and the other two, when we speak determinately of that day which is observed in the Christian Church. Of which two again.

2. That of the Lord's-day is fitter, in in the Theological and Ecclesiastical; and,

3. That of Sunday, in the civil, popu­lar, and common use.

[Page 143] 2. Yet so as that none of the three be condemned as utterly unlawful, whatso­ever the matter or occasion be, but that every man be left to his Christian liberty herein, so long as superior Authority doth not restrain it. Provided ever, that what he doth herein, he do it with­out vanity or affectation in himself, or without uncharitable judging or despising his Brother that doth otherwise than him­self doth.

WHereas you are desirous to know what my Judgment and Practice is concerning the using or forbearing of the established Liturgy, (either in whole or in part) in the public Service of God, and Offices of the Church, if that may be any satisfaction to your self or Friend: I shall fully acquaint you with my practice, is (whereunto if my Judgment be not con­form'd I am without all escape mine own Condemner) and upon what consideration, I have according to the variation of times, varied my self therein.

So long as my Congregation continued unmixt with Souldiers, (as well after as be­fore the promulgation of the Ordinance of the two Houses, for the abolishing of Com­mon Prayer) I continued the use of it, as I had ever formerly done in the most peaceable and orderly times, not omitting those very [Page 158] Prayers, the silencing whereof I could not but know to have been chiefly aimed in the Ordinance, viz. Those for the King, the Queen, and the Bishops. And so I did also, though some Souldiers were casually present, till such time as a Troop coming to quar­ter in the Town (who on purpose to continue a kind of Garrison among us or Head quar­ter) were so enraged at my reading of it the first Sunday after they came, that immedi­ately after Morning Service, they seized on the Book and tore it all to pieces.

Thence forward, during their continu­ance here for full six Months and upwards, (viz. from the beginning of November, till they were called away to Naseby-fight in May following,) besides that for want of a Book, of necessity I must; I saw it also be­hoved me, for the preventing farther out­rage, to wave the use of the Book for the time, at least in the ordinary Service; on­ly I read the Confession, the Lords Prayer, with the Versicles and the Psalms for the day; then after the first Lesson in the Forenoon, Benedictus or Iubilate, and in the Afternoon Cantate. After the second Les­son also in the Forenoon, sometimes the Creed, and sometimes the ten Command­ments, [Page 159] and sometimes neither, but only sang a Psalm, and so to Sermon: But all that while in the Administration of the Sacraments, the Solemnization of Matri­mony, Burial of the Dead, and Church­ing of Women, I constantly used the anci­ent forms and rites to every of them re­spectively belonging, according to the ap­pointment in the Book. Only I was care­ful in all the rest to make choice of such times and opportunities, as I might do them with most secresie and without disturbance of the Souldiers; But at the celebration of the Eucharist I was the more secure to do it publickly, because I was assured none of the Souldiers would be present.

After their departure I took the liberty to use the whole Liturgy, or but some part of it, omitting sometimes more, some­times less upon occasion, as I judged it most expedient, in reference to the Auditory, especially if any Souldiers or other un­known persons happened to be present. But all the while the substance of what I omitted I contrived into my Prayer before Sermon, the phrase and order only varied; which, yet I endeavoured to temper in such sort, as that any person of ordinary [Page 160] capacity might easily perceive what my meaning was, and yet the words left as lit­tle liable to exception or cavil as might be.

About nigh two years ago, I was adver­tised (but in a very friendly manner) by a Parliament-man of note in these parts, that at a public meeting in Grantham, great complaint was made by some Ministers (of the Presbyterian-gang, as I afterwards found) of my refractoriness to obey the Parlia­ments Order in that behalf: The Gentle­man told me withal, that although they knew long before what my judgment and practice was, yet they were not forward to take notice of it before complaint made, which being now done in so public manner, if they should not take knowledge of it, the blame would lie upon them; he also advised me to consider well what I had to do; for I must resolve either to adven­ture the loss of my living, or to lay aside Common-Prayer, which if I should con­tinue, (after complaint and admonition) it would not be in his power, nor in the power of any friend I had to preserve me. The effect of my then answer was, that if the case was so, the deliberation was not [Page 161] hard: I having long ago considered the Case, and resolved what I might with a good conscience do, and what were fittest for me in prudence to do, if I should ever be put to it, viz. to forbear the use of the Common Prayer-book, so far as might sa­tisfie the Letter of the Ordinance rather than forsake my station.

My next business then was, to bethink my self of such a course to be thencefor­ward held in the public worship in my own Parish, as might be likeliest neither to bring danger to my self by the use, nor to bring scandal to my Brethren by the disuse of the established Liturgy. And the course was this, to which I have held me ever since.

I begin the Service with a Preface of Scripture, and an exhortation inferred thence to make Confession of sins; which Exhortation I have framed out of the Ex­hortation, and Absolution in the Book con­tracted and put together, and expressed for the most part in the very same words and phrases, but purposely here and there transplaced, that it might appear not to be, and yet be the same.

Then followeth the Confession it self in the same Order it was inlarged, only with [Page 162] the addition of some words, whereby it is rather explained than altered; the whole Form whereof both for your fuller satis­faction in that particular, and that you may partly conjecture what manner of ad­dition or change I have made proportiona­bly hereunto, (yet none so large) in other parts of the holy Office, I have here under­written.

O Almighty God and merciful Father, we thy unworthy servants do with shame and sorrow confess, that we have all our life long gone astray out of thy ways like lost Sheep, and that by fol­lowing too much the devices and desires of our own hearts. We have grievously offended against thy holy Laws, both in thought, word, and deed. We have many times left undone those good things which we might and ought to have done; and we have many times done those evils when we might have avoided them, which we ought not to have done: we confess, O Lord, that there is no health at all in us, nor help in any Creature to relieve us; But all our hope is in thy mercy, whose justice we have by our sins so far provoked. Have mercy upon us therefore, O Lord, have mercy upon us miserable offenders: Spare us, Good Lord, which confess our faults that we perish not: But according to thy gracious promises declared unto [Page 163] mankind in Christ Jesus our Lord; Restore us, upon our true Repentance, to thy grace and favour. And grant, O most merciful Father for his sake, that we may henceforth study to serve and please thee, by leading a godly, righteous, and sober life, to the glory of thy holy Name and the eternal comfort of our own souls, through Jesus Christ our Lord, Amen.

After this Confession, the Lords Prayer, with the Versicles, and Gloria Patri, and then the Psalms for the day and the first Lesson; after which in the Afternoon sometimes Te Deum (but then only when I think the Auditory will bear it) and some­times an Hymn of my own composing, gathered out of the Psalms and the Church Collects, as a general Form of thanks-giving (which I did the rather, because some have noted the want of such a Form as the only thing wherein our Li­turgy seemed to be defective) and in the Afternoon, after the first Lesson, the 98 or the 67 Psalm; Then the second Lesson with Benedictus or Jubilate, after it in the Forenoon, and in the Afternoon a singing Psalm; then followeth the Creed with Do­minus Vobiscum, and sometimes the Ver­sicles in the end of the Litany, (From [Page 164] our Enemies defend us, &c.) If I like my Au­ditory, otherwise I omit these Versicles.

After the Creed, &c. instead of the Leta­ny and the other Prayers appointed in the Book, I have taken the substance of the Prayer I was wont to use before Sermon, and disposed it into several Collects or Prayers, some longer, and some shorter, but new modelled into the Language of the Common-Prayer-Book, much more than it was before: And in the Pulpit be­fore Sermon, I use only a short Prayer in reference to the hearing of the Word and no more, so that upon the matter in these Prayers, I do but the same thing I did before, save that what before I spake without Book, and in a continued Form and in the Pulpit, I now read out of a written Book broken into parcels, and in the reading Desk or Pew.

Between which Prayers and the singing Psalm before the Sermon, I do also daily use one other Collect, of which sort I have for the purpose composed sundry made up as the former for the most part out of the Church Collects, with some little inlarge­ment or variation, as namely Collects, Adventual, Quadragesimal, Paschal, and [Page 165] Pentecostal for their proper seasons, and at other times Collects of a more general na­ture, as for Pardon, Repentance, Grace, &c. And after one or more of them in the forenoon I usually repeat the ten Com­mandments with a short Collect after for Grace to enable us to keep them.

This hath been my practice, and is like still to be, unless some happy change of affairs restore us the liberty of using the old way again; or it be made appear to my understanding by some able charitable Friend, that I have therein done otherwise than I ought to have done; for I may say truly, I have not yet met with any thing in discourse either with my own reason or with others of sufficient strength to con­vince me, that I have herein done any thing but what may stand with the Principles as well of Christian Simplicity as Prudence.

There are but three things that I know of, that are of consideration opposed, viz.

1. The Obligation of the Laws.

2. The Scandal of the Example.

3. An unseemly symbolizing (at least) with Schismaticks, if not partaking with them in the Schism.