WHen I was last at London, you were pleased to honour me with a Dis­course about the Proposals of the Army, and particularly about their desires for a Select Senate: I pro­fesse your words have left such an Impression in me, that I am ready to cry out with Tully, Pudendum sit, honestiora esse legionum decreta, quam S [...]natus; and wish the Parliament no other Resolves than what you had Pro­posed. The Select Senate, whose very Name hath amased some, and exasperated others, was by you not onely al­layed, as to its harshnesse, but rendered plausible and to be desired by every honest heart. It was then, I saw, your Desires were not to oppresse others, but Secure your selves, [Page 2] not to overthrow a Common-Wealth, but to preserve it, not to advance an I take Oligar­chy here, as the ignorant Vul­gar mistake it; for the corrup­tion of Aristo­cracy; whereas Oligarchy is but the Govern­ment of a few, and not of the Body: And it is observed by Crag. upon the Spartan Re­publick, that Oligarchy is a word of an In­nocent, yea, a good significa­tion; and the Reigle­ment of Lace­daemon is called an Oligarchy by Isocrates, and others; though he who shall ex­amine the insti­tution of the Se­nate will say it was made up of the best, and so was an Aristo­cracy. Oligarchy, but to continue all in that Freedome whereunto the Lord hath called us, God ha­ving ceased to work any greater miracles than those where­by he dis-ingaged us from Slavery: you were not now to say to a Republick NELY, as Ioshua did to the Sun and Moon formerly: Sun stand thou still upon Gibeon, and thou Moon in the valley of Ai [...]lon; and yet, me thoughts, I saw you distracted betwixt a tendernesse for others, and a regard for your selves, and if to deny the latter, had not been to betray the good old Cause, to frustrate all your Per­formances, to forsake the returns of your Prayers, to un­dervalue Mercies, when given, which you so prised at their imploring; In fine, to make the bloud of the Saints under the Altar to cry as loud against you as it did against their Oppressours: You were so carefull for Others, as to need a Monitour to advise you to love your selves as you do men of an unkind neighbour-hood. You represented unto me the posture of affaires, amongst us, the different factions and parties, and how some did think all the Liberty, pur­chased hitherto, was, that they might depresse others. You told me, how it was not impossible, but God might dispose the result of our present Counsels to a generous and happy issue, but that it was hard to see how an absolute Power could be bound, or find security that the next Assembly should not undoe all that this could establish. You acquaint­ed me with the thoughts of many precious men, that there ought some things to be declared Fundamental, and Im­mutable hereafter. As,

• That all Power is derived from the People, and that the Assemblies, that shall be, are but the Peoples Trustees.
• That all delegated Power is for the preservation, not de­struction of the People.
• That to admit any single Person, who si meerly bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh, as endowed with the Supreme Legislative power, is absolutely destructive to the Liberties of the Nation; and, to place the Executive in One, so dan­gerous, (as Reason and late Experiences teach us) that it [Page 3] might scarce deserve a milder censure.
• That, since the men from whom this power is to be deduc­ed are men of different gifts & dispensations, their Trustees are not to intermeddle with matters of Religion; It being to be supposed, that the Delegators will not give them any such Power, upon the account mentioned, as it may be proved (and hath been
  See H. S in defense of the good old Cause
  ) that they neither could give, nor the others any way receive or execute such a Power.

These (and it may be some other) things you said were intended by you as Fundamentals for the new Government to be erected on, and which if they might be continued with­out alteration, you did not desire that any number of men should Oligarchically rule the great Assembly of the Peo­ples Representatives hereafter, and practise a Negative, which the Nation hitherto could not brook. You shewed me how, what was your care now, had been heretofore the thoughts of other Republicks; the Cretans had their ten Cos­mi, the Spartanes five Ephori, the Romans first five, and after ten Tribunes annually for the People: You acquainted me with the unapplicablenesse of those meanes to our times, not onely for the exceptions made against the two former by Aristotle, Polit. l. 2. c. 7. and others; but because that our Democracy must not be really such, but such by Representatives, and to reside in a City (of which if we may judge by the great trouble you were lately put to in Sir George Boothes Insur­rection, to keep it in peace) not so well affected to the aforesaid Fundamentals, but that they will become an Ar­my to assist, or force the Representatives (not too well affected, if chosen as intended by some) to subvert the proposed Basis when there shall be no more to shew in its behalf then a Scrole signed by Mr. St. Nicholas. If the constitution of the Tribunes were at any time effectuall for the Peoples safety and protection, it was because they made their Intercessions against the Senate and Consuls, in a place where they could raise armes in their defence with as much ease as they could interpose their Authority, and send the Consul, or Censour to Prisons, and oppose the [Page 4] Dictator, had they not been thus seconded by the People (as a standing Army) their place would have been uselesse, or prejudicial to the Republick, as serving onely to create divisions, not redresse or prevent grievances. Of this we have an instance in the case of the Gracchi, who being Tri­bunes were slain notwithstanding that the Office did render their persons sacred, Manut. de Le­gib. Sig [...]nsus de jure civ. Rom. l. 1. c. 6. and any man might kill him that should oppose them, without being punished. They were to sit at the door of the Senate constantly (after-times did place them in the Senate) and all the De­crees of the Senate were transmitted to them for their approbation; if they allowed them, then were they valid, being signed with the Letter T. but if they disliked them then did they write thereon VETO, Bodin. de re­pub. l. 2. I forbid, and they were cassated: The Tribunes could assemble the people at any time, they could call them away from any other assemblies whatever: yet could not all this secure the peoples free­dome. And if so, how can they be secure without these provisions for their Fundamental constitutions? In the beginning of the warrs betwixt Caesar and Pompey, Caes. de bel. civ. l. 1. it was one part of the pretenses of the former to uphold the Tribunes.

Sparta at first, by the constitution of Lycurgus, was a Common-wealth equally constituted of a Sanate proposing, an a popular Assembly resolving, in which posture it con­tinued about 100, or 130 years, their Kings being only the fore-men of the Senate. Then Polydorus and Theopom­pus finding that the people in their Assembly did not well re­solve upon wholesome proposals made by the Senate, these men did upon a pretended advice from the Oracle, erect an Aristocracy, Bodin. de Re­pub. l. 2. c. 1. or government of 30 Senators, in the election of whom all that I find the people did, was, that as the Candidates passed by, some were to stand, observe what applaudes they received, Bodin. Meth. Histor. c. 6. and accordingly the deceas­ed Senators places were filled up: and beyond this the [Page 5] people had no further power in the government. So that the Lacedaemonians or Spartans were for an Optimacy, or ruling by a Senate for life, consisting of 30 persons; and this government did they endeavour to introduce in all places of Greece, and upon this account did they mannage the Peloponnesiack war 20 years, the Athenians endea­vouring to plant Democracies, Bodin. de Re­pub. l. 2. c. 1. the Lacedaemonians on the contrary Aristocracies in the Cities of Greece. And since Mr. Harrington dispunges all the time after this war from the happy constitution of the Common-wealth, against Mr. Wren. p. 41. he must give me leave to think the History of Lacedaemon is a plea of Optimacie. A plea grounded upon the experience [...] of an equal Common-wealth established by the prudent Lycurgus in a Senate proposing, and people resolving, and practised for more than one generation, (that custome might inure them to it) upon such circumstances as are not to be hoped for amongst us, yet could not all this so settle the State, If any say with Polybius and others that the constitution of the Ephori made it to be alwayes a De­mocracy, since it is the general opinion that they were an­swerable to the Roman Tri­bunes: I am so far from thinking so, that I imagine the Ephori to have had no share in the Legislative power at all being erected, for ought I have hitherto informed my self out o! Plato and Plutarch as a curb to their hereditary Kings, and not to the Senate in which was the Legislative power, and not in the Kings, who had only the executive, and that there should be no error or encroachments committed therein, I suppose them to have been instituted. I find not that they sate in the Senate, or were to practise any negative, or that their consents was demanded to Laws; they every moneth made the Kings take oath that he would rule accor­ding to the Laws in being; and in time of war two of them did accompany him to the said end. Another end of their institution may have been to attend upon judicature in emer­gent controversies betwix [...] private persons, for the decision whereof Lycurgus did not pro­vide, but ra [...]her that there should none arise ( [...], Plutarch [...] in Lycurg.) and one way to de [...]erre them from strife (of the ma [...]y which he took) was that there was no judge to determine them, nor no penalties for transgressors of that kind; where none could be damaged but who was criminal to the Common-wealth. Now as the Ephori did judge in these cases, and had their Court [ [...]] to this purpose, so I guess they may have been appointed by Theopompus to this end, and ei­ther of these grounds is reconcilable to the answer of Theopompus to his wi [...]e, when she re­proved him for diminishing his power; his reply being, that his security was the greater. How they afterwards did aggrandise themselves, as the way is easily deducible from the original which I ascribe them; so it makes for another Po [...]ition of mine, if they flou­rished under so usurping an Ephorate, viz. That where the Spirit of the people is qualified for liberty (and the Spartan being once demanded what he knew, answered; to be free) there a Common-wealth under bad orders, may subsist and that long; (for as the exhorbitate­ing Tribunes did render Rome an Anarchy, so did the Ephorate Sparta) But where the people are not so qualified, there a Common-wealth cannot be in its extent setled; or if it be, will not continue. For the proof of which I refer my self, to those two great Politicians in their discourses, M [...]lv [...]zzi and Baru [...]a, where they enquire why Rome could not establish her liberty, after the death of Caesar. but tha [...] they preferred an Aristocracy before that condition, and did recommend it to others. Whilest the popular cons [...]itution of Athens presents us with very little that might endear it unto us: The multiplicity of Orators, and Philosopher [...] however they uphold their credit abroad, did not adv [...]ntage them at home; less talk and more prudence would have proved them more real be­nefits, then those that their acquests were not great, or of that durance, and their domestick postura hath been more celebrated now then by them that lived and acted in it, and who are famed in their writings.

[Page 6]But to observe one thing before I pass hence: Lacedae­mon and the Country of Laconia inhabited by the Helotes made one Common-wealth, a part only managing the Go­vernment as to Magistratical and Military commands and performances, It is very pro­bable that the Helotes were numerous in Laconia, at home since in the wars each Spartan had nine of them to attend him, as Herodo­tus saith, l. 9. Polit. l. 2. c. 9. Maximus Tyri­us, Or. 3. doth reckon for go­vernments purely Aristo­cratical or Oli­garchical that of Thessaly, Pelle­ne, and Manti­no [...], together with Lacedaemon and Crete. See the preface to H. S. in de­fence of the good Old Cause. the other being excluded all acts of government, and having subjection entailed on them as boores or peysants, yet this Common-wealth, so unequal, subsisted above 700 years; notwithstanding all that is in our dayes pleaded to evince the impossibility of such a frame, and if there did arise wars amongst them from the Helotes, yet was not that thorough defect in the constitution, but that being Seated in the main Land, their neighbours did excite and assist the Helotes: whereas in Crete (which is an Island, as ours) though there was the same constitution of government which was in Sparta (this being made a pattern for the other by Lycurgus) their Periaeci did not create them the like disturbances as Aristotle observes. So in Israel there were the Gibeonites, and other Canaanites re­maining in the Land, from natives changed by the new polity into Strangers, excluded from all Israelitish go­vernment, though they had Magistrates of their own, (from whence I may infer an inequality of fortunes) be­sides these there were the descendants of those which came out of Egypt with them, who were deprived of their liberty; in so much that in Salomons time there were numbred of [Page 7] the men able to work, an hundred and fifty thousand, and three thousand, and six hundred, 2 Chron. 2.17. besides there were the Proselytes of jus [...]ice or Converts such as em­braced the Iewish religion entirely; these, in the flou­rishing dayes of Salomon and David as Mr. Selden reports out of the Rabbies, Jur. natural. Heb. If they had been admitted to entire Prose­lyteship, they might by their number have overthrown the State, having Votes in the As­sembly of the Lord. were so numerous that they were not received to become entire proselytes (being as it was to be imagined, converted rather by a sight of the flourishing condition Israel was than in, than apprehensions of con­science) and so enjoy the priviledg of entering into the popular Assemby, termed the Congregation of the Lord: It is not to be doubted, but there were many Bastards consi­dering the politick disposition of the Iews) who were not to enter into the Congregation of the Lord even to the tenth Generation, Deut. 23.1, 2. And at all times the Proselytes of justice were excluded though not from suffrage in the Congregation of the Lord, yet from bearing any Office of Power or publick Trust, though several places of Prosit they were capable of. Notwithstanding this inequality, I do not see or read, that the ruine of that State was thereby hastened. ‘ From whence I do conclude, That the Divisions, Disturbances, and Dangers, which they who oppose an unequal Common-wealth do threaten us with, are but imaginary, (upon other ac­counts, as well as, that we are Islanders) and not of that moment, as to induce us to quit real and present Assecuration: And if they do ever actually befal us, it must be through our own Defaults; which is no prejudice to the form of Government fix­ed upon, but to them who shall ill manage good Con­trivances.’

[Page 8]After we had discoursed about these Forraign Contri­vances of the People to secure their Liberty, not against conquered Enemies, but prese [...]t Friends, whose ambition (not malice, animated with a conceit of Religion) was dreaded by them; we came to examine modern projects of our own and neighbour Nations, laid for the attaining the same end: whose circumstances might be as suitable to ours at present, as the republicks of Greece possibly may be dis­proportioned through the different temperament of the peo­ple; which is a note of so much value, that Aristotle upon that sole inducement would have given us other advise then our Politicians; Polit. l 7. c. 7. Campanella pol. c. 4. S. 19. since he makes the Europaeans, Asiaticks, and Greeks upon that ground to be incapable of a resem­bling Government; and for us, he is positive in it, that we are not capable of a right Common-welth. [...]. So that we ought not to be discouraged if such a model be proposed, as hath some inconveniences in it, as examined by the rules of the Grecian Politicks; it being no less evident that all the in­conveniencies which ensued upon such constitutions in Greece are not to be feared amongst us; which I could e­vince to the most refractory person, if I had leisure.

Here I instanced, that it was not altogether unusual up­on a Civil War, for the Party prevailing against their op­pressing Rulers, to assign them a certain number of persons (with power to arm upon occasion) for the Securing un­to them those Liberties and Priviledges, which they had fought for; however Sylla, Mar [...]us, Augustus Caesar, took more severe wayes: In France we find that Lewis 11. upon the prevalence of the league for the publick good, had 36. appointed him out of the three Estates by a general Assem­bly of them, to be Curators of the publick, and to see justice administred duly: as Hottoman informs us out of Monstrel­letus, Lamar [...]ius and other Historians. Franco Gal. p. 211, 212, 213. In England, up­on the Barons Wars with K. Iohn, the like was practised: They having caused him to sign the Magna Charta, and Charta Forrestae, to secure themselves in the aforesaid Li­berties, they gave him a check in the Government, Speed Hist. of K. Iohn S. 56. viz. Twenty five selected Peers, to whose commands all the other [Page 9] Barons were bound by oath to be obsequious. Had they not taken this course, all their Grants, though subscribed by never so many hands, and authenticated by never so many Seals, would upon any emergency have been as un­serviceable as Muncer's Cloak, which he perswaded the German Boores (whom he had seduced into a rising) if spread abroad, Sle [...]dan [...] com­ment: lib. 5. would in the day of Battail secure them from all the small and great shot of their enemies. If it be ob­jected that neither the French nor English project did pro­cure the effects designed. What it was that ruined them, it is ra­ther unsafe, then difficult to ex­plain. It is easily answered that the Contrivance was not therefore bad, because frustrated by their subtil enemies; and we ought rather to seek how to prevent their mistakes, and the errors they committed, then fall into greater by acquiescing in single votes, and Resolves, or such like paper ware.

After a reflection upon the condition of our affairs, I concluded that a Parchment Law, though never so fairly engrossed, could not satisfie them that were engaged in the Cause of Liberty. ‘When the Ligue called the Common­weale was on foot against Lewis 11. the Duke of Mil­lain sent to his aid five hundred men at Arms, W. H's. Ob­servations upon History. with three thousand Foot, and with this power he presents his ad­vice, That he should yield to any conditions to divide his Enemies, and be careful still to preserve his men. This Counsel was of more advantage to Lewis than all the Armies he could have Levyed in his Dutchy: for by this he kept his Majesty entire, and referred nothing to the uncertainty of Fortune. But the former part of his ad­vice was a stronger battery against the Enemies design, than all the Artillery that Age could make. For to di­vide their Forces, ☜ was to destroy them, and to bring them into jealousie of each other, was to make each the others executioner. By which he was secure, at the Enemies cost and danger, to work his own triumph. Then for yielding to conditions, it was safer for Lewis to descend one step beneath Soveraign Command, then to be enfor­ced to fall down all the stairs: and having both wit and [Page 10] courage he could not doubt but occasion would present him with meanes to recover, if not transcend his former height.’ Hereupon at the first overture he entertaines a treaty, which suddainly took effect; No demand of the Princes receiving the least deniall: Whereat they dissol­ved their Forces and Ligue, retiring to take possession of what none did enjoy long. Methinks we may learn from these, and a thousand more such like passages in History, how unsafe it is to rest in a bare Declaration, and there­upon to close and unite into an equall Common-wealth, with our inveterate enemies. It was not an hasty attempt of Sir G. Booth to make an Insurrection, no it was an uni­versall engagement, if not by active correspondencies, at least in mind. The Forces which went upon the Northern expedition with the Lord Lambert, bear witnesse to the generall disaffection, and neutrality of all that were not (as they commonly call them) Sectaries. And I do verily believe, that the quarrel was Toleration, or no Toleration, rather then Monarchy and the Stuartian interest.

Having here mentioned Sir G. Booth, and his Insurrecti­on, I shal desire you to inform me, What was the intent of his rebellion? It is to be presumed, that his aimes were fur­ther then to leave things in the posture they were in before his arming. His Declaration was against Anabaptists, Quakers, and (by which having expressed the two former he can mean the Independents onely) Sectaries; and to subvert them without fighting, since that was his Promise to those of Cheshire, it must have been effected by a suddain Massacre of the Army at least. If that was not his intent, (as it is discretion in his Partizans not to own it now) yet that it would have been as outragious an issue, is not to be doubted, since it would not have been prudentiall, or in­deed possible for him and his confederates (especially in Lon­don) to have restrained the affectionate ardours of an incen­sed rabble. But suppose we, Sir G. Booth to be Victor, how many would have been found, the House as filled up, and free to vote against you, being disarmed, would have plead­ed for your Toleration, since there are so few will do it [Page 11] now that you (and they in part) are in a different condi­tion? To secure themselves they must have outed you out of all commands, and places of Trust, yea, and purged you from serving under them; and having performed thus much, as they could have no security that you would not have resented this procedure, so they could not but endea­vour to prevent the dangers imminent from such provocati­on. As for the dis-banded Souldiery, it would have been but an easie instruction for the Iustices to oppresse, and the Iudges to hang them, the sense of their former actings making that Iustice, which otherwise would be Barbarousnesse, and the general voyce wil cry out, that all is a Iudgement upon such persons, though never so repugnant to Iustice. It is recorded by a great Courtier and States-man, ‘That, if it was not given in charge to them, it was the practise of the Iudges after the Irish warrs to hang Souldiers for faults, which o­thers did scape or obtained pardon for.’ And for others who may by the thoughts of a competent estate repute themselves more secure, I must tell them that it is but a vain imagina­tion, if they understand who are likely to rule, and have the Militia, by the Carisbrook-Castle-Treaty: I would ra­ther bid them read their doome in the Spanish procedure against the Iewes, when K. Sisebutus did not onely banish them all from Spain, but by threats and torments enforced some to the profession of Christianity: (though even Mariana the Iesuite say, that It was never esteemed con­sonant to Christian behaviour to compell any to the pro­fession of true piety. Marian. de reb. Hispan. l. 6. c. 3.) and after that under K. Egica, such as had concealed them­selves were made slaves for ever, and their goods confisca­ted. So Ferdinandus and Issabella, having conquered Granada, (and so become safe from neighbouring dangers) did banish all the Iewes, giving them four moneths time to sell their goods in, after which time it should not be law­full for any to buy or sell, entertaine, or assist them any way. If the Heretick, or he who falls under the cen­sure of the Church conti­nue impenitent, after admoniti­on by the Mini­ster reiterated three times, on three Sundays, then he is to be declared Excom­municated from God, and from the society of the Church. After which Sentence no person may have any kind of Conversation with him, (his Wife and Family excepted) in eating, drinking, buying, selling, saluting, or conforming with him, unlesse the same be licensed by the Ministery: That he finding himself abhorred by the faithfull and godly, may take occasion to repent, and so be saved. And intimation of this sentence is to be given through the Realm, least any should pretend ignorance of the same. I have set down their own words (and what is the practise of Scotland as Col.— told me) out of Spots­woods History of Scotland, p. 166. that so all that are or may be guilty of Presbyteri [...]ll Censures, for any opinions they have, may, or do hold, and for what they have already done or may do, and find themselves not likely to retreat, may know what to expect from their prevailing. You have been in Scotland and seen how great an Affinity their proceedings have with this demeanour of the Papists: You know the dismall effects of their great Ex­communication, [Page 12] which if it leave a man Life, yet it is not as an effect of their tendernesse, but cruelty, since he is not onely incapacitated as to all preferments, but deprived of all that might render his life a comfort, to be tormented by so much Charity as will not let him dye: Besides all the contumelies and indignities that will be put upon them by the multitude, you need not to question but that these He­reticks and Sectaries, (who are now so maligned, regret­ted and occasionally disgraced) will be represented in their Memories to Posterity, as so vile, that it will be lesse igno­minious to be recorded in the Annals of Tiburne.

What affyance can you put in those whom your Victory and Successe, not proper inclinations gain you? Whoso­ever he be whose judgement disallowes a Tolleration, his compliance is but temporising; and though Conveniency or necessity bend him down to such conditions as he o­therwise regrets, yet do they seldome oblige the Conscience longer than Fortune restrains the Power. To assent unto a mixture of the Army with men of an un-army spirit, though there be a Select Senate of the best affected men on earth, is a presage of ruine, unlesse your Select Senate be made up of Davids Worthies, each whereof could at­taque whole Armies, 2 Sam. 22. with assurance of Victory. They who to alienate our care for Self-preservation, tell us, that the men we resent are honest godly men; create us no security and do in effect tell us, that we are villanous caytiffes, and that to endeavour our extirpation is consistant with godli­nesse and honesty. To let you a little more see how little trust is to be placed in the combinations with those men, [Page 13] behold the Character which K. Iames doth give of them, and after the testimony of one who was from his cradle educated amongst them, & experimented what he averrs (besides what you cannot but have fresh upon your own thoughts) joyn in an equal Common-Wealth with them if you dare.

If the Declarations of the whole world besides prevaile not with you, at least, but learn of your enemies what to do. If some body must be trusted, (and give me leave to tell you that to erect an equall Common-wealth, is to trust some body, since you are not likely in such a constitu­tion to be the Majority) why do they not trust you? May not you, (I hope you do so) have as good opinion of your selves, as they of themselves? And setting aside the con­sideration of personal uprightnesse and sincerity, is it not equity and Prudence, that they rather be trusted whose sense and interest it is to preserve a Toleration, then they [Page 14] who for the subverting of it lie under the greatest motives that flesh and blood can be tempted with, I mean PROFIT, REVENGE, RELIGION, HONOVR? Were the case insisted on, a small thing, I should not thus debate it: but it is no less than your whole fortunes, and your judg­ments, and those of your posterity, freedome as to purse, as to mind, all is engaged in this question: and a power hangs over your heads (like a cloude out of the North) much more dreadful to tender consciencs (if all my reading and intelligence yield me any insight in things) then the Romish inquisition, & in comparison whereof the return of Charles Stuart with his Bishops, would prove a moderate de­sire.

But you perhaps will say that you are no Heretick your self, whatsoever others may be: you are an Orthodox Inde­pendent of the Savoyards confession; you agree with them in all fundamentals, it is but a small circumstance you dif­fer about contained in a leaf or two, all the rest is not dissonant, but that there is a perfect Harmony betwixt the two Assemblies of Savoy, and Westminster, Sr. give me leave to undeceive you a little in this point, for that which you alledge as a ground of your security, will aggra­vate your fault, and that wherein you differ is sufficient for your extirpation, since it is the main cause why others are to be persecuted. Are you so shallow as to think it is conscience and not interest rules them? And do you not know that it is worse to withhold a Tythe-pigg, then to deny Christ to be come in the flesh. It is an old complaint, quis Iovinianis, quis Pelagianis diem dixit? The abet­tours of free-will; they who thought it unlawful to eat Rabbets because strangled, or who did not concur about the Doctrine of the Trinity (I mention things little and great) as the Greek and Latine Churches, could retain com­munion together, whilest the Aerians, the Waldenses, the Erastians of late were not to be endured? Search the Books of Martyrs, you will find more die for opposing the in­terest of the Clergy, under the Romanists; than for pro­fessing Christ under the Heathen Emperours. Iohn Huss [Page 15] suffered for writeing false Latine, and opposing the Popes and Clergies revenues, as you may see in the Council of Constance. But Sr. do you think the difference that a­mounts to 3 or 4 Pages in quarto to be so inconsiderable? I have heard a dappled Presbyterian highly commend A­thanasius, that he would not grant the Arians one iota, (I use his own words) this being all the differance between them; and where are you now, Sr? Besides, if you exa­mine the differences betwixt you, Sr. G. Booth makes you Sectaries. as D. Cawdrey and o­thers state it, you are Schismaticks, you deny (at least in effect) their Churches to be Churches, and their Mi­nisters to be Ministers of Christ, (and this is true) you make them Antichristian, and then shake hands of fellow­ship with them; either condemn your selves for this, or approve them. But I will tell you a greater exception a­gainst you than this, and for which you must into the stool of Repentance, and whither they will urge you to repent in the short, or the more tedious way, I know not; but I believe the latter, since you are not like to be a great person, when you come to this tryal; They say, if you be Orthodox in judgment, yet you have been false in your practice: you defeated the holy Synod in their consultations by your contests and contrivances, until that Tares had over-run the field of Christ, and Heresies too deeply rooted them­selves in the land; that you pleaded for a Toleration first, and now that it is clear you would give none, it is too late: that you procured you a Sub-committee, to enform your con­sciences, and would not tell them nor the world perfectly what you thought, until you published an Apologetical nar­ration, that you were not to be convinced, having studied as unpartially and unprejudicially as men made of flesh & blood are ever like to do, the ( God knows what, for you explain­ed it not) points in controversy; and for the Sub-commit­tee, having dallyed with it so long as you thought it conve­nient, you gave it over sultenly. If you differed so little, say they, why did you raise so great stirrs? why did you speak so darkly, that we could-never come to an agreement in opinion, until we come to agree in one single person? [Page 16] And after you had agreed in your confession, and respects to a single person; when he who assured you of his heart, did begin to make the like, or greater professions in the behalf of your reconciled brethren, did not you (say they) pull him down because he would destroy your Hopes, not your Churches? I know not, nor do I hear of any who converse with the Presbyterians unvailed, but sayes, the person who drew up the Savoy confession, is the Pest of this nation, that he either shall receive, or merits an halter: and in the heat of the rising (which is infinitely more a Pres­byterian-plot, then that of the Powder-treason ascribable to the Papists) did not — picture a Gallows on his Lodgings with this inscription—'s fortune? How do you intend to subsist together, and how is it imaginable you should, if it be tolerated that you impale in your assem­blies the chief persons in their parishes? With what face can you think to invite a man from a way which you will not say is bad, unto one which you dare not say is better? But let us imagine that you are allowed to say your way of Assembling is Christs way, and that yours is the instituted, and incorrupt way, (from whence the inference is clear [...] that what is not instituted is to be forsaken, what is not of Christ, ought not to be owned as his; what is corrupted (and you must say if you condemn not your selves, that in what you differ, the corruption is on their side) must be redressed.) Supposing this I say, how will you perswade the same men that they ought to pay Tythes to their Pa­rish-Minister, whose pastorage they are not under, and at the same time to pay for the maintenance of their elect Teacher, how shall an Independent Father call to account his Presbyterial Family? though you agree never so in Doctrinals, yet it will be a very great censure, that each is not under the discipline of Christ. Is any refractory? you teach them to reject Synods and their Anathema's, as insignificant, humane, ungospel combinations; how will you then complot that the Nation may be in peace, and unity? believe them not; who profer you a Society that is not dura­ble; flie from their embraces if you love your selves, [Page 17] (and they say you do) as from the hugges of Mil [...]ch where­with that Idol received the children that were to perish be­twixt his armes. As for the Estates you have got, are not they the divisions of Deane and Chapter-lands? And is it not a decree in the Scotch Discipline, that all Tythes, Rents, Lands, Oblations, yea whatsoever hath been given in former times, or should be given in future times to the service of God, was the patrimony of the Church; and ought to be collected and distributed by the Deacons as the word of God appoints. That to convert any of this to their particular, or profane use of any person, is detestable Sacri­ledge before God. And else-where, Gentle-men, Barons, Earls, Lords, and others, must be content to live on their j [...]st rents, and suffer the Kyrke to be restored to her liberty. What this liberty is follows in the same place, All things given in hospitality, all rents pertaining to Priests and Chanteries, Colledges, Chappelries, Fryeries of all orders, the sisters of the Seynes, all which ought to be retained still in the use of the Kyrk. Give them but leave to take their breath, and expect the rest: The whole revenues of the temporalties of the Bishops, Deans, and Arch-deans lands, and all rents pertaining to Cathedral Kyrks. Then sup­posing an objection that the possessours had leases and e­states, they answer, that those who made them were thieves and murtherers, and had no power to alienate the common good of the Kyrk. That this is their judgment, it is pro­ved by the Author of the Warning, to beware of Scotch Dis­cipline, who transcribes what I have set down out of their very Book of Discipline. And with his assertions does a­gree what Spots-wood in his History of Scotland, out of Au­thentick acts, doth relate. Pag. 164. It is true, that in the same declaration they wish recompense to be made to such as have debursed sums of money to those unjust possess­ours: but they do declare, that it is to be but a reasonable re­compense, into which the profits of the years past are to be reckoned. And there is another proviso, that the same have not been bought of late, in prejudice of the Church, and no conllusion used. This you may see in Spots-wood, [Page 18] P. 164. So that if they prevail, however they may stroak you, they will not want pretenses to undoe you upon the principles aforesaid, when explained and improved by a preval [...]nt authority, which is to be wholly at the devotion of their Synods. Nor ought they now to cajol you into a complyance, since to my knowledg under Richard, it was all their talk, to make you degorge, and that you should repute it a favour in extraordinary, if you were repayd what you disbursed, without being questioned for past profits and dilapidations. No, it is not in the power of a few men of complying principles or pretenses to assure you of an after-reckoning, where the Emolument is so great, the means so facile and plausible, and if the injury be any, it is but offered to the Egyptians. Let the present partisans (of whose minds you are uncertain, because prosperity and power infuses new thoughts) speak you never so fair in a Convention of Presbyters, it is in vain to mention pru­dence, especially where it is ballaned with the cause of God, and interest of the Kingdome of Iesus: not the most meek and moderate, but the most fierce sway there, and the most zealous & hot is the better Christian: So that it is not to be doubted, but an assembly in England as well as Edinburgh (in 1647) may constitute, that the next Parliament, the Church should be fully restored to its patrimony, & that no­thing should be past in Parliament till that be done. Behold, I give you a fair warning: These inconveniences will befal you, when you will have nothing left you in your power but an unprofitable repentance, when the sense of your being deceived will be an additional to those miseries, which are otherwise unimaginable. A thousand things also more will be objected unto you Savoyards, whose princi­ples all Sects go upon, and differ from you in Superstru­cture, not foundation: I shall not urge you any more in a case so ticklish, and wherein I doubt not but you under­stand your adversaries: if they have not written hi­therto against your confession, it is because your Deaths or exile will be more beneficial to them, and they will not spoil this opportunity, by a previous Alarm. I had inten­ded to present you with a Sermon (such as assuredly will [Page 19] be made against the Army, when scattered) at the first Presbyterian Cruzada that shall be, but I find my self to en­large too much: I shall therefore omit it this time, and resume our discourse about the Select Senate.

After we had debated the fore-going examples of a pow­er established for the securing a people in their Liberties, I mentioned one more concerning the Iustitia of Aragon, out of the constitution of which Kingdome (it being made up of men not much different in temper from the English, rough-hewen, and sturdy Mountaneers) much might be drawn for modelling of us into a Settlement: I shall now give you a more full account thereof.

About the year of our Lord, DCCCXLII. when Sanctius Carsias IV. King of Suprarbia was slain by Muza Abenhea­zin and the Moors, the Suprarbians and Aragoneses ( who were ligued with them under an Earl) which escaped out of the Battaile, This following whilest as discourse is most extract­ed out of Hieronymo de Blancas native of Saragossa, Cronologer of Aragon, who wrote whilest as ye [...] the Iusti­tiate was in be­ing, and made it principal bu­sinsinesse, to discover the nature of that Office out of the most anci­ent and authen­tick Records, and dedicated his Commenta­ries to the eight Deputies of A­ragon, Prote­ctors of the Iustitia. fled into the Mountaines together with their Wives and Children, and did there imbody and forti­fy themselves, living upon the spoiles which they got from the Moores who then possessed Spaine. Being destitute of a King, they at first chose twelve Men, (Sennores) to rule them, such as were of the greatest prudence, as well as gravi­ty and age. And thus they continued a long time, enlarg­ing their bounds by little and little. But finding that the aforesaid Reiglement was not very suitable to the posture of their affaires, which required a quicker dispatch of Counsels, then was to be found in the joynt-Government, of so many men, they being to make excursions upon, and to expect Inroades continually from the Moores. Hereupon they resolve to erect such a Government, as might redresse the present Inconveniences, and yet not destroy their own Liber­ty. They dispatched Embassadors to Pope Adrian II. and to the Lombards, ( whose Empire was indeed overthrown then, but many eminent persons of that People were in being, and the memory of their well-founded Governments as to Lawes and Civil Liberties was renowned every where) who advised them, That they should first of all agree upon some FVNDAMENTAL LAWES, ☜ Righs and Liberties to [Page 20] be inviolably observed; and then choose them a King (no Forreigner, but such as for whose good inclinations they might have the security, his birth and allyances, and educa­tion, amongst them could yield) of such extraction as not to disgrace the dignity, nor yet of that power and meanes as to be able to subvert their Foundation-Lawes. Whereupon the Suprarbians and Aragoneses did agree upon the Fueros or Forum Suprarbiense, being certain Lawes to be preserved immutably, however the King with the Cort-General, or General Convention of Estates might make a further provision of Lawes, as they should see occasion, without retrenching upon what was the Foundation and Basis of the Government instituted. I shall not trouble you with all the particulars that were for ever, to be incapable of Alteration; Of the nature of fundamentals in reference to their mutability by the people, I shall speak more in the close of the let­ter. Apud nos pri­us leges candi­tas, quam reges creatos fuisse. [...]0 Blanca. they being for ought I can judge, not very ma­teriall to our affaires or my purpose; Though it be well worth your Observation (in opposition to some that are excellently versed in Politicks, and use high Rodomontado's to decry even the possibility, much lesse the plausibility of such Acts) That by the advise of as wise men as ever the world pro­duced, upon many yeares mature deliberation, the Ara­goneses did in the erection of their new Government, previously agree upon some things that were to be immu­tably preserved by their Trustees. And it is registered for an everlasting Memoriall in the Proeme to their Fueros, or Lawes; That their Lawes were first made, and afterwards their Kings. However I shall repeat some of them.

IVRA DICERE REGI NEFAS ESTO, NISI ADHIBITO SVBDITORVM CONSILIO.

It shall not be lawfull for the King (who was to do no­thing of moment but by the advise of his Council) to en­act any Law, but by the advice of his Subjects in Cort general.

BELLVM AGGREDI, PACEM INIRE, IN­DVCIAS AGERE, REMVE ALIAM MAGNI MOMENTI PERTRACT ARE CAVETO REX, PRAETERQVAM SENIORVM ANNVENTE CONSENSV.

[Page 21]Let the King take heed how he make War, conclude a Peace, or Cessation and Truce, or intermeddle with any businesse of great moment, otherwise than by the Advice and consent of his Sennores, that are to be of his Councill.

For the securing of them in these (and other) Funda­mental Constitutions, it was agreed upon, that there should be a Magistrate ordained, who should make it his duty and businesse to see that their Lawes and Liberties were no way infringed, unto whom there should lye an Appeale, or any o­ther Officer, if any private man were wronged, and who should defend the Republick, if the King did oppresse, or go about to oppresse that.

NE QVID AVTEM DAMNI DETRIMEN­TIVE LEGES AVT LIBERTATES NOSTRAE PA­TIANTVR, IVDEX QVIDAM MEDIVS AD­ESTO AD QVEM A REGE PROVOCARE, SI ALIQVEM LESERIT, INIVRIAS Q. ARCERE, SI QVAS FORSAN REIPVB. INTVLERIT, IVS FAS Q. ESTO.

And least we should suffer any detriment or diminution in our Lawes, and Liberties, let there be an intermediate Judge appointed, unto whom there may lie an appeale from the King, if he wrong any man, and by whom the State may be righted, if it be any way injured.

After they had long debated these Fundamentals, and agreed on them, they took a long time to elect a King, and at last Anno Dom. DCCCLXVIII. They fixed upon Innicus Arista King of Navarre to be their King, who being to swear to the observation of all these Fundamental Lawes, before that they would make Oath of Fealty to him; Innicus was at first surprized at the Office of IVSTITIA, as think­ing it a very hard condition for a King, to have another to Iudge of his Actions, and watch him, being

But after a serious debate with the Suprarbians and Ara­goneses ( whom I shall henceforward call by the name of A­ragoneses [Page 22] in generall) having heard their reasons, how Monarchy was of that nature as even to debauch the best men; and though the King should not infringe their priviledges, yet could they find no satisfaction therein, since he might if he would; another procedure than what they had taken would reduce all to a dependance upon the goodnesse of the King, and not their prudent contrivance; That if they should hereafter fall into slavery, having been perfectly free, the regret would be insupportable, being at once to lament their misery and folly, which had precipitated them into it, and mourn, that being likely for ever to desire Freedom, they did not provide for the perpetuation thereof. That for a King to be bound to what was good and just, was not to be in Fetters, or wear Manacles; That he might be as sure of not being affronted by the Justitia, as he was of his good de­portment.

That such a Magistrate could not create any Disturban­ces, but to which he must give cause, and if the Nation did happen to fall into any Division and Warre; though it be true that all Commotions are grievous, yet some are neces­sary, and honest, and to be preferred (as Physick to distem­pered bodies) before a peaceable yielding to Oppres­sours.

His hominibus diligenter per­pensis omnes ad unum Scriptores testantur, non p [...]tuisse eundem Innicum Aristam Regem vehementer non probare praecliram illam, quiete vivendi, apertamque, simplicem, ac directam viam a nostris omnibus constitutam, adhibitamque ab ipsis omnium, incommodo, rum cautionem. 80 Blanca. In fine, Innius Arista having weighed these Discourses, it is the universall assertion of all Writers, that he did high­ly approve of the Constitution, as Innocent and Prudentiall, and of his own accord did add to their primitive Fueros, this Law or Priviledge.

SI CONTRA FOROS AVT LIBERTATES RE­GNVM A SE PREMI IN FVTVRVM CON­TINGERET, AD ALIVM, SIVE FIDELEM, SIVE INFIDELEM, REGEM ADSCISCEN­DVM LIBER IPSI REGNO ADITVS PATE­RET.

[Page 23]If he should any way oppresse the Kingdome hereafter, contrary to the Laws and Liberties thereof, then it should be free unto the People to choose or call in another King either Christian, or Infidell.

The Aragoneses refused the Liberty of recurring to an Infidell for Aide or Protection, but engrossed the rest as a Fundamentall Law, and so it was accounted in the time of Philip II. King of Spaine, 1592. when they took up Armes against that King under Joannes Nuca, the Justitia, in de­fence of their Priviledges.

The Justitia of Aragon ( I shall constantly terme him so, though he be, not so named in the Fueros, and was called some­times Justitia Major, and Justitia Regis, or Justitia per manum Regis, and the Justitia of Saragossa, but the most u [...]iversal Title given him for several hundreds of yeares in the Aragonian Histories and Records, is Justiciado de Ara­gon). He was to be elected by the King [ and his Council which was made up of twelve Sennores or Ricos Hombres at first; and afterwards of eight Deputies of the Cort ge­neral] but being once Elected he held it for Life, unlesse the Cort general ( before whom he might be accused, which practise was afterwards commuted into a Committee of Sea­venteen, styled Forus inquisitionis Officii Justitiae Arago­num, or, Inquisitors into the deportment of the Justitia of Aragon) did think fit to depose, or punish him; which latter was performed according to the injury he had done any body either in life, limbe, or estate, he being to suffer the same, but his Sentence was never to be reversed.

The Justitia was to reside about the Kings person, whose Court being commonly at Saragossa ( after it was taken from the Moores) the Justitia was there too.

He was to be present at the Kings Council when he plea­sed, and I find his name often at the Regal Charters, Deeds and Conveyances.

He was not to be one of the principal Nobility, such as they called Ricos hombres de natura, and Ricos hombres de mesnada, because they could not be punished with death, or a­ny corporal punishment, unto which the Justitia was lyable, [Page 24] if ye were found to merit it: though in all the Aragonian History, I do not read of any complaint made against him by the people, or that any of them was ever punished in any manner for injustice by the Cort General, or Inquisitors.

The Justitia was not to be an inferiour person, nor a practitioner at Law ( though many of them were excellent Lawyers, as Salanova, Cerdanus, &c.) but he was to be Miles, a Cavallero, and his way of proceeding was not by way of tedious process, Lawyer like, with nice debates and critical disputes, but breviter, Summarie, et de plano, sine strepitu, et figura judicij, by a brief proposal of the case, and collation with the positive Letter of the Law. If he had been one of the Ricos Hombres, he might have made use of the justitiate to his own designs, having an army at command constantly of his own creatures; and if he had been sordidly educated, or accustomed to receive fees, protract cases, and countenance the most notorious corruptions, the Office would soon have become prejudicial to the publick. But I observe the Aragoneses were no such friends to Law­yers in practice, As the Iustitia was not to pro­ceed in his de­cisions by juri­dical debates, and tedicus contests upon strained inter­pretations of the Fueros: but di­ligently to re­gard the tenour of the Law, and observances or usages of the Nation. And in all their Courts that people made it their rule, that the Laws should not be extended by the Magistrate, but that he as well as the people should be obliged by them: So that it is truly sa [...]d by Blanca, It is our laws that speak, and the judges are but dumb Executers of them. Unde vere dici potest, leges nobis esse loquentes; mutos autem earum Ministr [...]s Magistratus. And at the conquest of Valentia, when Laws were to be made by the Aragoneses under Iacobus 1. who subdued that Kingdome: though it was moved, that the new Lawes might be penned in Latine, or Aragonese, it was resolved they should be written in the language of the countrey, which though conquered was to be ruled by them, the Aragonese and others their Auxiliaries, being principal Lords, the re [...]son of which is given by Bernardinus Gomesius in Vit: reg. Jacob. l. 12. Rex plebiscita & municipales leges Valentinis dedit vulgari conscriptas sermo­ne, ut populo melius innotescerent; ut (que) perspi [...]uitate, a vari [...] eas, confusa saepe, interpretati­one juris, et captionibus essereret: whatever might be said for the elega [...]cy or antiquity of the Aragonian language, or for the Majesty of the chief conquerours, that [...]he Laws should not only be given by them, but in their language, yet he thought that it would be more for the convenience and unity of the Realme, that a few should learn the vulgar tongue, [which was not the Saracen but Aqui [...]an, whom he plan [...]ed there as the people] then that all should study the dialect of the nobess: that it would alleviate the sense of their sub­jection, and also be for their benefit, since the Laws hereupon were perspicu [...]us, and freed from variety and confusion in intempretations, and captiousness. ‘He made the utility of the people his design, and not the in [...]rest of a few, or his own glory: he thought those Laws to be elegant enough, which were plain and intelligible unto th [...]se who were to be ruled by them. He did not propose unto himself the advantage of a sort of men to be bred up as Assessours or advocates, wi [...]hout which the Country should be at a stand, and not know how to determine any thing. No, this was far from that Kings intention, who did therefore contrive Laws in the vulgar tongue, that he might exterminate out of the Land the veri [...]us, subtile, spiny and difficult interpretations, the unavoidable consequen­ces of Laws being written in a forraign tongue, together with their interpreters them­selves: and if there happened any doubt in Law, which might retard the Judges in their decision, it was not remitted to them, but to the judgment of a certain number of honest and plain men, who were to inquire into the true and naked state of the case, and pronounce accordingly. There being nothing more popular than that when doubtful cases arise amongst the people, they be determined by some of their own degree and rank: for they will think well of them, but as for professours of Law they will suspect and hate them, as being to live by the litigiousness of the people’ This is the account which Bernardinus Gomesius a native of Valentia gives of their Laws original: In favour of my Aragoneses, I shall observe cut of Bodin a famous Lawyer, that the good govern­ment of the Ethiopians, (civil rights are no where better preserved) subsists without Law­yers And Ferdinand K. of Spain prohibited any Lawyers to go into the Indies, least they should instruct the people in the way of contention. The same man condemns Matthias Corvinus, K. of Hungary, for inviting by large Salaries several professours and Practitio­ners of the Law out of Italy, to teach a people ignorant of those arts the intrigues of con­tention; the issue of which project of the King's was, that in a general convention of the States, he was desired to banish again all Lawyers. He saith that it is natural for the French to be lit [...]gious, and that he would destroy that countrey who should bring the Lawyers practise into di [...]use; but as for more northern nations, and particularly England, it is but an introduced custome, not founded on the natural inclination and genius of the people, whereunto it is altogether unsuitable, and is no other then a French fashion, Gallia ca [...]sidicos docuit facunda Britannos. And this is the judgment of Bodin, (de repub. L. 5. C. 1.) then whom I think the world never yet produced a more solid and judicious writer, one who had studled men as well as books, and had been particularly in England, and honoured with the familiarity of Q. Elizabeth, and others of the Nobility. as to prefer them to any place of trust and power, for they were not only excluded the Justitiate, but they could not be of the Inquisitors into the Justitia's actings, though the Inquisitors were to advise with them, and then to dismiss them before they came to definitive sentence. The Iustitia had several notorious Lawyers, and two De­puties, Lugartenimentes del justitia de Aragon, of the same profession, to assist him in Court, and preserve a forme of dispatch and management of things.

[Page 25] What Salary he had I cannot inform my self, it not being expressed, but only in general: but doubtless his Revenue and Maintenance was with convenient Port and State: though it was not so great as that he should over-ballance af­fairs. At such time as he did not act as Justitia, but Coun­sellour [Page 26] to the King, I find him seated by Petrus de Luna, ( be­ing Pope) below the Ricos hombres, though i [...] is to be gran­ted they lived in a pomp not much inferiour to Kings; which made Alphonsus 3. say, quando havia en el Regno tantos Reges, como Ricos hombres. And in subsignations of Charters, &c. wherein he acted only as Counsellour or Wit­ness, I find him ranked after the Ricos hombres, and Bi­shops, yea and Zalmetina or Chancellour of Saragossa.

As for his Power, if any Judge, yea or the King himself with his Council, or otherwise, were passing or executing a Sentence upon any Man, or Men, he might inhibite upon complaint, (i. e.) help, help, force, force. Ju­ra nostra pleni­ssime vetant ut quicquam fiat nisi ad illius, cujus principa­l [...]ter intersit, instantiam: nempe qula majores nostri voluerunt, sui quimque jurls & retinendi & dimitendi esse dominium, id­que nervos esse atque artus li­bertatis. Blanca. Avi, Avi, fuerza, fuerza, ( for without com­plaint he was not to intermeddle) the process or execution, until he was satisfied that all was legally done. He had a particular prison called la carcel de los manifestados, whi­ther he did remove Prisoners if they implored his help, and to prevent all inconveniences and dangers eminent, he could issue out a Writ called Jurisfirma. He was Supreme inter­preter of the Laws, and therein Paramount to the King. He did determine of the Kings Letters mandates, ( yea and the Results of the Cort general, which were managed by him Segūt fuero, e Segūt antiquamēt fue a cossubrado.) whe­ther they were repugnant to the Laws and Observances ( so they call their usages, they having but few written Laws) or not; and whether they were to be obeyed, or not. He had power to issue out his Inhibitions unto the greatest persons, ( yea Cities and Kingdomes not subject to Aragon, though under the same King, if the King failed; and take exem­plary punishment of them) and the King himself was upon appeals subordinate to him, and to obey him, though his Writs did run (even to the King himself) in the King's name.

Before he came to any definitive Sentence, he was to sum­mon all the Lawyers in Saragossa, or (if he were any where else) that could well be procured, excepting those that were de partida, retained by the persons concerned; and to take their advice, and according to the majority of their Votes, he was afterwards in his own Court to pronounce Sentence: [Page 27] and the Sentence so given was called, Determinatio consilii Justitiae Aragonum, and was of as much validity as if it were a written Law. Afterwards in Criminal Causes it was thought sufficient that he should have seven Lawyers to advise with, which were called Los Siete de la Rota.

To make his [...]udgment significant, and that it's Executi­on might not be ended, and his Authority thereby become contemptible and unserviceable to the preserving of the fun­damental constitutions, and other Laws in being; he had from the beginning of that Kingdome unto Petrus 4. King of Aragon, sirnamed the Ceremonious, in 1348. a power to call together (without any pretense for refusal) all the Ri­cos hombres, and to arm City and Country immediately for the effecting thereof, without long temporising. This was cal­led the priviledge of Union, it being thereby according to the Fundamental Constitution Lawful, and no way to be accoun­ted Ignominious and Rebellion, for the whole Country, Los quatro Brac, os del Regno, to arm against the King in the behalf of the Justitia, or (as sometimes happened) in favour of the King against the Nobles or Ricos hombres.

But to preserve the constant repute of the Justitia; At the Cort general de Aragoneses, or general Assembly of the States, the King sate upon thrones to an heighth more than ordinary above the rest, then at his feet, yet higher than the rest, was placed the Justitia of Aragon in great Majesty, and though the King were there, yet was he President of the Cenvention, and ordered every thing according to his Fue­ros; he adjourned, or prolonged the Assembly, even the King being present, but in the Kings name. This Cort general was held at first every two years, and afterwards every three or four years, to enquire into the national constitution, the Exchequer, the deportment of the Justitia, and the like; as also to recognize the power of the Cort general and Justitiae according to the fundamental Fueros. It is very remarkable that was done in this Cort. Whensoever the new King was to be enstalled, or rather made ( for though the primogenito or eldest Son, or next heir, did succeed, yet did not he come to it by way of inheritance, being not to exercise the power or [Page 28] own the title of King, untill his enstalment in the Cort gene­ral) a general Assembly of the States was summoned, and after that the Corte was opened by a speech of the primogeni­to ( as general Governour by place after the decease of his Father: at other times the Kings did it) to the States, and an answer of theirs returned by the Bishop of Saragossa, then the Justitia, being desired thereto, made an enquiry i [...]to the Legality of the Corte, and what Members were absent, whom after three dayes expectation (summoning them formally each day) on the fourth he fixed a Mulct on them, and decla­red that their absence did not impair that Authority of the Cort general. Then the Justitia in his habiliments, and ha­ving written on his breast, Hattoman: Francogal: P. 123. Junius Brutus in vin­dic. contra Tyr. qu. 3. Answer to mis­led Dr. Fern. P. 18. IVS ARAGONICVM, or The Laws of Aragon, ( after some consultation with the Corte) tendred him an oath, that he will inviolably preserve the Fue­ros or Laws & Observances of Aragon; having first accosted him with this address, NOS QVI VALEMOS TAN­TO COME VOS, Y PODEMOS MAS QVE VOS, VOS ELEGIMOS REY: CON EST AS Y EST AS CONDITIONES: INTRA VOS Y NOS, VN QVEMANDA MASQVE VOS. That is, We that are as great as you are, and are of more power than you, have chosen you our King, upon these and these conditi­ons; betwixt you and us, there is one that is of more power than you; After that the King had made Oath to the Justitia, then the Justitia and rest of the Assembly sware fealty to the King. And this Ceremony was reiterated every Cort gene­ral, with as much solemnity as at the first inauguration; and the last day of the Session, when all things that were agreed upon to be passed, were ratified and sworn to by the King first, and then the Justitia, ( all running in this form, El Sēnor Rey de voluntad de la Corte estatuesce y ordena) from this ceremony, that day is called, El dia de la celebra­cion del Solio, or the day of celebrating of the inaugurati­on.

And indeed, before I pass any further, I cannot choose but reflect upon the admirable contrivance of this Govern­ment, [Page 29] that each Officer might know his duty, the King his power, and the Iustitia his, and the Peoples Soveraignty stated, so as they who were most willing to forget, could not; and the People were hereby so animated, as no per­swasions should work upon them to think or assent to, that where the word of a King is, there is more power, then he saw biennially attributed to him. God in the Iewish polity seems to evince the utility of these recognisances, that the Magistrates may be put in mind of their original and duty, whilest he enjoyns, So the Ephori of Sparta did swear their King every moneth solemn­ly, that they should rule ac­cording to Law, and after their Kings had sworn, then did they in the name of the people recipro­cally swear, that if so, they would preserve them safe. that the King when he sitteth upon the Throne of his Kingdome, that he shall write him a copy of the regal Law, or that according to which he was particularly to demean himself, in a book, out of that which is before the Priests and the Levites; and it shall be with him, and he shall read therein all the dayes of his life, that he may learn to fear the Lord his God, to keep all the words of this Law, and these Statues to do them; that his heart be not lifted up above his brethren, and that he turn not aside from the commandment to the right hand, or to the left, Deut. 17.18, 19, 20.

I shall now give you some account of the deportment of this Justitia, that you may see it was no insignificant constitution, but that it did merit that commendation which is universal­ly given it, to have been the preservation of their Laws, and Liberties. Petrus 2. laid on the people an unusual tax cal­led Monedage: the Justitia being appealed to by some that refused to pay it, gave sentence concerning its illegality, and immediately cites the Ricos hombres, Cities, Universities, and Corpo [...]tions to prosecute his sentence by way of Union. Whereby the King was forced to ease the People, and to re­cognise particularly in Cort general the Law or Priviledge of Union.

Jacobus 1. sirnamed the Conquerour had, by reason of dangers imminent from the Moores, Monetaticum. procured the grant of a Tax from the Catalonians, termed Bovaticum, to be rais­ed upon every head of Cattel; he desired the like concession from the Aragoneses in Cort general, the Nobility refused to pay, and all were upon so high terms that the Corte broke [Page 30] up tumultuarily, Gom [...]z. In Vit. Jacob. 1. lib. 16. and not by a legal dissolution: Since nei­ther King nor People did recur to the Justitia, he could not interpose, nor did he. Things came to an open War, and after some skirmishes and conflicts, the Nobility did invoke the Justitia, ( in the constitution of which Office this King by long Wars attended with conquest and plantations of ad­ditional forraign strengths, had introduced some corrupti­on) who forthwith took cognisance of the business, issued out an Inhibition or Jurisfirma to the King, to stop the pro­ceedings of his potent and victorious Army, and in a peace­able manner determined the whole controversie, and so dispo­sed the King that a Cortgeneral was called, and all abuses or inconveniences in the Justitiate were redressed.

Alphonsus 3. the Munificent, having disgusted the Ara­goneses by assuming the title of King, before his acknowledg­ment and oath made to the People in Cort general; they be­gan to be jealous of their Liberties, and fear that additio­nal conquests would be more dangerous to them in the end, than they were at present beneficial: upon this account in the first Cort general at Saragossa they began to debate upon some Laws whereby to prevent future perils: The King re­sented their actings, though they pleaded their Fueros, and disorderly withdrew from the Corte. This last departure of his being also contrary to the Fueros, they in Corte appeal­ed to the Justitia, who takes cognisance of the thing as a vio­lation of Priviledges and Laws, and puts in force the Union against the King. Alphonsus to allay this storm, being at Osca, by the advice of some Counsellours that were with him, makes and publishes several extraordinary good and plau­sible Laws, and such as would have quieted all mens minds, had they been passed in Corte, and not by the King and a few Counsellours. The dreadfulness of this President made them more vigorously prosecute the Union, that in a little time, they so humbled the King, as to assent to their desires and recognise the priviledge of the Union solemnly. After this all was quiet, and never was any King more revered and beloved than he after that passage.

Vnder Jacobus 2. the Cavalleros murmured at the King [Page 31] for depriving some of them of their Cavallerias, or Lands which they held in Knights-Fee, and disposing of them, and others, It was no V­nion, but a com­bination, unless made by the Iu­stitia. contrary to the Fueros of Suprarbia: and hereupon they combined together unanimously against the King to right themselves without ever troubling the Justitia. The King being in some strait, protests he had not wronged them, at least not wittingly, and appeals to the Justitia, ac­cording to the Fundamental Costitutions of the Land. Eximinus Petri Salanova being Justitia, issues out a Ju­risfirma to inhibite the Cavalleros from all violent act­ings; The Cavalleros protested against his Authority; for being that they charged the King with breach of his Co­ronation-oath, they said the business was not to be decided by a Secular, but Ecclesiastical Iudge and Arbitrator. But the Justitia peremptorily decides the Controversie; declares their combination to be illegal, though to Unite were not, and consequently that the Oaths they had mutually taken, and the Hostages they had given to each other, the former to be null, and the latter to be restored again. And further resolves it, that the Cavallerias were in the Kings disposal, though their Lives & other fortues were not. So he determi­ned this great Controversie, and dissolved as great and firm­ly made a League as one shall read of; desiring the King to deal favourably with them ( being so numerous and potent a part of the Aragoneses) and neither punish them with a total confiscation, perpetual imprisonment, or exile.

Vnder Petrus 4. the Ceremonious, when his brother Ja­cobus was put by the General-governourship ( which ap­pertained to him by Law, as next Heir to the Crown) by that King, the Justitia put in practise the Union against him, after the usual manner, whereby they vindicated their Priviledges. But the King having Catalaunia and Valen­tia ( being not subordinate in Government, though they seve­ral. times made up a Cort general with Aragon) to assist him, besides the Kingdomes of the Baleares, &c. and ha­ving bought off many Lawyers and others, Noble Men and Cavalleros by Gifts, Honores and Cavallerias collated, he did not value the Justitia and Union, especially since the Ju­stitia, Garfias Ferdinandi Castrus, had been his Counsellour [Page 32] and Governour in his Father's time, and afterwards one of his Mesnadero's or domestique creatures, and alwayes ex­pressed a particular inclination for him. So things came to open War, to the utter ruine of the Union. For the King was resolute and fierce, and set to destroy the Priviledges of the Ricos hombres, and their way of Uniting; and the Ju­titia did faintly prosecute him out of natural weakness as well as personal regards; and at last being not able to reduce the King by fair means to equitable terms, and being loath to see either his friend, or his Country ruined (and possibly not able to endure the contumelies and affronts put on him by such as he ought to have protected) he died, and thereby en­damaged them more than by his life. For the Election of the Justitia being in the King, he deferred to make one till he had subdued the Union, which now was become of no Au­thority ( though they did choose Conservators of the Union) by reason there was no Justitia in being. This consideration made both sides hasten to a Battail, wherein after a bloody conflict, the Union was dissipated, and the King absolute Conquerour, who thereupon made one Galacianus Tarba to be Justitia, who had been instrumental in betraying the U­nion to which he first adhered; and he did publickly with his sword cut in pieces the Writings containing the Privi­ledge of Union, and destroyed all the memorials thereof which he could come by, and enacted, that it should never be revi­ved again. As for the Justitiate, it was weakened (though not frustrated) by being turned into a Court of Judicature, and to be managed accordingly, eight men (of the great Personages) being enjoyned in each Cort general to help him in the executing of his Sentence. And it did prove a great protection to the Aragoneses as to criminal Causes, and things of lesser moment, but though the old Solemnities were upheld, yet did not that restrain their Kings from re­trenching upon their Fueros, there being no standing Mili­tia under the Ricos hombres to assist him. This happened in the year, 1348. After this it continued in manner afore­said, (doing sometimes notable service) to the great satis­faction of the n [...]w effeminated and degenerating Aragoneses, [Page 33] until the reign of Philip 2. King of Spain, at what time the Justitia having interposed in the case of Antonius Perez a prisoner whom the King would have executed out of reason of State, Philip was hereat so angry that he sent an Army under Alphonsus Vargas to deprive them of their priviled­ges, who pretended he was to march against France, and not them, and so temporised with them until it was too late for them to arm, and advance the Standard of the Union: there was no standing trained Army, nothing but effeminacy and luxury in the great men, whom the Gold of the Church had debauched, their Counsels were tedious, being first to be re­solved on by the eight (which were the Kings Officers too) and then to be referred to the Cort general, which was to be summoned by the King, or Vice-Roy; so that though the Nation did at last Arm, and the Clergy preach up Liberty, yet the tediousness of the dspatch, and their intestine weak­nesses concurring, they were not able to bear up against a King so potent as Philip, who was Lord of all the Kingdomes about them, so that there was no hope of Forraign aid.

Thus fell the Iustitiate of Aragon, having continued [...]24. years, longer than most Common-weaths ever did, yielding more Peace, Security, and universal Satisfaction to the People, than any Government I have read of. Hie­ronymus Blanca (who lived when it was in being, only de­prived of that quick prosecution which the Vnion afford­ed, 1588.) gives it this commendation, after a diligent en­quiry into the Nature and History of it; That by the means of the Iustitiate, Jure affirmare possumus, in hoc uno, e [...] re [...]g [...]bus & regno civilis tuendae concordia sum­mam ext [...]isse. the Majesty of their Kings, and the Li­berties of the People, both had been preserved still, and that in a peaceable manner: for the prosecution of the Vnion was a thing of sudden dispatch, and never came to much Blood-shed, but under Petrus 4. This is the Govern­ment so long debated of, and set on foot by so many emi­nent men who devised it: celebrated by all that mention it; even Ferdinand (who married Issabella) when the Castilian Counsellours exhorted him to overthrow it as being inconsistent with the Majesty and Grandeur regal: [Page 34] He did not onely refuse to subvert it, Thuanus Hist. lib. 104. Ac vel ex eo maxime prae­stans, magni­quesemper ha­bita, quod in tanto sibi jure, ac praesidendi potestate colla­ta nulli fuit unquam Ty­rannldi, neque perturbationi rerum obnoxia Gomez. l. 16. but (though he had experimented an absolute Monarchy, and its pleasures in Castile) did infinitely praise it. Bernardinas Gomezius of Valentia, writing the Life of Iacobus 1. amongst other Elogies, saith of it, that Notwithstanding the greatnesse of its Power, the Iustitiate was never obnoxious to raise a ty­ranny, or create disturbances. That it was so far from fomenting divisions, that it appeased or prevented them; so far from debasing the King, that it preserved him; — and that it was by this meanes that the Kings of Spain did receive fewer complaints from Aragon then any of their o­ther Dominions. In fine, as Blanca observes, they con­tinued in the enjoyment of their Fueros, when Navarre (which refused to erect a Iustitia, being destitute of a King at the same time that the Suprarbians were) had lost theirs, So true it is that the same Author observes, ‘ Our Ance­stors did secure our Liberties at first unto us by three most sure Guards: viz. The Iustitia: The great power of the Ricos Hombres; And the Priviledge of Vnion. The first was a Civil and Forensical curbe: The second, a Domestick, and more pinching one: The third, Popu­lar and Warlike. Nor indeed could there have been less provision made for it, that it might continue to our times.’ It fell not to the prejudice of the Dignity, or out of any evils it did in it self draw upon the Nation; but when no­thing but arrogancy and ambition would overthrow it, and nothing but basenesse and malice could speak ill of it, when it might have subsisted longer by its intrinsick constitution, and when the People, Laiety and Clergy, were ready to ex­pose their lives for its continuance.

I should now accommodate my discourse to our present times, and deduce something from the Constitutions of A­ragon, that might be advantageous to England. But as my own disabilities and unexperiencednesse makes it im­possible for me to serve you herein, so the sence of your actings make me unwilling to attempt it. If Scripture had not prohibited me to meddle with them that are given to change; common discretion would me better to engage [Page 35] my self by advise with persons so irresolute. Consider your dealings; I am loath to give a Name to some of them; but loe! are you not become as Mungrel Samaritans, who by the dictate of their own inclinations, and the de­lusions of intermixing Priests were brought to divide their service betwixt the true and false God? Do not you now caresse the honest party, yet comply effectually with— Give me leave to be free with you for once, I know not whe­ther your inadvertency, and the active malice of your ene­mies may not reduce you to such a streight as not to re­ceive a second Application from me. The good things you speak and make semblance of to do, I know not whether they are your Raptures, or your Reason; your lucid In­tervals, or your Phrenzies: You are too Mercenary to be reputed publick spirits, you are too publick-spirited to be Mercenaries: Nay it may be (so usuall it is for the most Victorious to be outwitted) it may be that there is not such a man as Collonel —, it may be you are ignomini­ously Cashiered, and excommunicated the Society of all the faithfull and godly! ☜ not to receive a good word from them, who never intended you more, nor had given you that, but to overthrow you: or it may be you are not so stubborne but to expiate your former actings against the [ Presbyterial] Church of God by some moneths Repentance, solemnly per­formed in Margarets Westminster; It being a thousand pitties that since you agree in Fundamentals, and make one common profession of Faith, that such a Ceremony as the standing in the Stoole of Repentance (by which they recon­ciled themselves to their King Charles Stuart in Scotland, and you must not expect more favour) and the giving up of one thousand pound per annum, given you for the Ar­rearage of Services against your gude Brethren, should create any strife. It may be too, that you are now in Prison, voted to the Tower, shipped for the Barbadoes, or flying in­to Holland, and what I have already writ shall never come to your hands. However, since I believe that God will dis­pose of all things for the Salvation of his dear ones, and bring your Freakes to a better issue then your Counsels, [Page 36] I shall deposite with you an hasty essay towards that Settle­ment which is expected. Things are brought to that passe as if God by his Providence had left you no more to do, then Moses, had to secure Israel after the passage through the Red-Sea, he did but stretch out his hands, and the waters returned and covered the Egyptians, and they were seen no more. Do but dare to be honest; and be other­wise at your perill. But though you do ruine your selves, yet will not we despaire: For He who is the Hope of Israel is mighty to save: and His Word failes not, though you re­cede from yours. He that we trust in, is the same in the Mountaiues and Valleys, in our Highest, in our Lowest con­dition, and howsoever you put men to a losse or stand in their purposes, you but carry on His still.

I shall not particularize any thing further, by reason of the small insight I have in our national constitution [...] I shall not touch upon the regulation of the Law, Mi­nistry, Elections and qualifications of Parlament men, or the like: whereof none can judge, but they who are thoroughly acquainted with circumstances whereto, I could never attain. If I favour the perpetuation of the Army, it is because I think it necessary that there be an alteration of quarters in the forces of Scotland and Ireland, which if they be relieved by fresh Forces out [Page 64] of England, the Governours there will be able to fasten the lesse interest in the Soldatesque, and the people less imbue them in principles of disaffection. ☞ Besides, I am of the mind that all Government is by an Army; and that the Signiory of Venice is no lesse a military Go­vernment then the Empire of Turkey. The difference (as to the execution of lawes) lying in this; in Turkey lawes are enforced by a standing Army, and in Venice the Ar­my is not in pay, but he who shall refuse to submit to the lawes will soon discover this truth, that the foundation of all jurisdiction is an Army. I have already shewed the small assurance that a Parlamentary vote gives, or a select Senate not backed with an Army, in the good discipline whereof the Conservatours of the liberties of England will be so much concerned as to look thereto, for otherwise their condition will be unsafe. When Tiberi [...]s Gracchus endeavoured to establish the Licinian law, the nobility slew him, though a Tribune of the people, aud dearly loved of them; at whose death they who should have defended him, were so astonished, as they moved not to revenge it. In like manner was Cajus Gracchus slain, and his death not resented: so little trust is there to be put in an establisht Senate which may be thus overthrown when the people (as not in a constant Military posture) are their security. But it is obvious to any one, whose will be the Army, if the present forces be disbanded: I am sure they who are concerned in a Toleration will not be able to bear up. The Iustitia of Aragon lost his authority when the standing Army of the Ricos hombres was put down; though his power were ra­ther greatned in legal con­cessions. Yea, any popular tumult in that unruly City of London may destroy them irrevocably. Thus a stand­ing Army is at present necessary, and will hereafter be prudential by reason of the City of London, which without such a counterpoise is able to give lawes to the Nation, and make the authoritity of the Nation precarious. As to what inconveniences ma [...] arise from the standing Army; the provinces being their enemies, & they being subjected to the Senate, who are likewise to have a care of the Countrey Militia, I think there needs no further corrective.

[Page 73]I should end my discourse here, but that some reflections upon the whole precedent discourse do now come into my mind, without an hastie solution of which difficulties I think uncivil to break of. I confesse to any Objector, that all our debate concerning the Ephori of Sparta, the Roman Tribunes, the Select Council appointed Lewis of France, or K Iohn of England, as far as they purely are alledged, for proofe of a Power to be constituted for the preservation of Fundamental Liberties against a popular Assembly, so far they are impertinent unto our affaires, who doubt not but there may be a way to restrain the exorbitancy of Kings, though not of Parliaments. How this later may be done is our Inquiry now, and a President for that is demanded, as wel as contrivance by model. I say hereupon that the Iustitia of Aragon was a Check to the Parliamentary Assembly of that Kingdome: For he might not onely suppresse any Party as the Ricos Hombres, or Cavalleros, or Cities, upon any emergency by the priviledge of Vnion; but also fru­strate all the Decrees of the Cort general, if they did not proceed according to his Fueros. I have given you an in­stance hereof in my relation of the Iustitia's actings under Iacobus 1. nor do I doubt but if his ayde had been implor­ed by the Commonalty, he might have advanced the Stan­dard of the Vnion, and by the People themselves have pro­secuted even the Cort general, if they infringed his Iusti­tiate. So that it is clear that though there be no ballance for the people themselves, if they fixe upon the overthrow of fun­damentals, yet there may be a counter-poyse for the representa­tives of the people. This truth will much more appear from the Constitution of Rome, in which I find the People bal­lanced by the Order of their Classes and Centuries in their great Assembly, or Comitia centuriata. The whole Peo­ple were divided into six Classes, and each Classis into Cen­turies of a very unequal proportion. The Patricians, Se­nators, Noblemen, Knights, and Gentlemen of Rome, made up the first Classis, and Ninety eight Centuries. All the poorest sort of People made up but one Classis a [...]d Century, whereas upon a due proportion of number, they should have made up a thousand Centuries. Here you have a bal­lance [Page 74] for the People by the Original design of the Common-wealth: For if 98. Centuries of the Gentry, and first Clas­sis, or 97. agreed, (things carried not by Poll, but number of Centuries concurring) then were not the other Centu­ries called to suffrage, being a Political Minority. So that it is possible you see by an Original contrivance to limit the Legislating People themselves. But to give you a further and very material instance for a select Senate, I aver that the Se­nate of Rome was in its Constitution until I. Caesar's time, such a coordinate Senate as many now cry up. That the Executive power was in them is not doubted: That they were con­cluded by the Laws enacted by the People, is unquestionable. They had moreover a dormant Power to secure the Funda­mental Lawes and Frame of the Common-wealth, even a­gainst the Representatives of the People, viz. the Tribunes, or even the People themselves: And of such emergencies they themselves were Iudges. This appears by the power they had to create a Dictator Paramount to all patrician or popular Magistrates, who might arbitrarily dispose of the Life and Fortunes of any Roman Citizen, or parties. Se­condly they had upon cases of intestine dangers from the Tribunes or populace: A Power to make that extream and ultimate Vote, of Viderint Consules nequid Resp. detrimenti capiat. Let the Consuls take care that the Republick be not prejudiced. And when this Vote was made, the Con­suls might fall on any mutinous Citizens, and slay them without triall: by such a Decree were the Tribunes of the Gracchi slain, and those in the time of Caesar forced to fly Rome, as any one may read in Caesars Commentaries of the Civil war, Lib. 1. Thirdly, this Senate (which was for life, unlesse the Censor outed any for misdemeanours) had a power to annul Lawes made by the People, as Manutius in his Book de Senatu, shewes out of Tully. So that it is manifest, that as all the good government of that Republick, and all the grandeur was derived from the Senate, so the aforesaid Senate was a power in some cases co-ordinate, or rather Supreme to the People. And I will evidence it, that such a power in that Senate was not the cause of the subver­sion of that Common-wealth, but other male-constitutions, [Page 75] which if they had not been, this Frame had not been ruined.

Having mentioned unto you Fundamental Constituti­ons of the Roman Common-wealth: you may possibly de­mand of me, if they had any such? Sir, you will not be the first who make this enquiry, but I assure you they had, and that they were not only unalterable, but never altered. The People in their Secession to the Mons Sacer did ordain them, Manut [...] de leg [...] Rom. p. 190. and the Senate (without such demurs as we are now troubled with) did assent to them, and they were called Leges Sacratae, or Sacred Laws. All other Laws might be abrogated, Manut. de leg. Rom. P. 351. but not these: the Executive Magistracy might be new modelled and varied, but not these Laws. Nor do I find that the having such Fundamentals was account­ed by any judicious man heretofore an imprudent act; or found in practise detrimentitious to the People or State.

But further, it is a ridiculous argument, The People ge­nerally assembled, can lie under no restrictions of their power [...] (which is false; for their way of assembling may be so con­trived, and a party so ordered as to be able to check the more numerous, if they should, who are morally inhabilita­ted to such a design, conspire to subvert the Fundamen­tals.) Therefore the Peoples Representatives can lie under no restrictions. The People personally assembled are an Ar­my, and so the Power as well as Authority visible: but their Representatives are not so; and therefore may be checked by the Senate, impowered to that end with their Guards.

This last discourse suggests unto me another Model, which I shall exhibite to you, leaving circumstances to fur­ther contrivance.

Let there be a Select Senate for the securing of the Fundamentals, with the standing Army for their Guards, and a power to curb the Trustees of the whole Nation in Parliament, if they go about to subvert the Fundamentals. Let them have the Executive power, and the Parliament in ordinary the Legislative.

I have not time now to discriminate their powers, but if the posture of the people in a Militia be setled according to my other model, according to this all parties may receive a fair establishment. There may be Censors [Page 76] contrived, or Inquisitors; to enquire into the deportment of the Senate, and supply their number. And if it be thought meet to fix an extraordinary cha­racter upon any person amongst us; He may be as in the Roman Senate, princeps Senatus, or Prince of the Senate, a Title which hath nothing of pow­er, or of a single person, but only Honour; for the power was in the Consuls and Senate, the prince was only reputed the best and ablest man in the republick, and who had signalised himself by his actings formerly, and was first to give his suffrage, or deliver his mind by speech, [...]f he thought it meet.

I have been the longer herein, not only because I take an infinite plea­sure in entertaining you, but because possibly your negligence may be­reave me of any opportunity of writing to you more. It is not now a time to dally; hitherto your neighbours were not at leasure to attend your acti­ons, or contrive your ruin, now they are not only vacant to wa [...]ch all ad­vantages, but it is become their interest to effect it [...] Thus your Dangers multiply from abroad, and your Friends decrease: a league with you is like an Egytian Reed, which is likely either to fail, or wound him that loans thereon: none can build any certainty upon your promises, yea it is dubious whether they may ever come to be ratified. How then can your En­voyes abroad treat, or how can you expect but that all should desert you, since it will become their prudence to do so? If you defer your Settlement some moneths (for I shall not suspend my thought till May) all your confederates must fix upon other designes then you would wish. And at home, how do you think they who are called Sectaries shall support you, upon no other, nor more advantagious terms than of bleeding for insen­sible and discurteous Friends? I at present call you Friends, though your deportment shews that you are, or would be even their Masters? If their hands are weakned, how will others be enraged who have not fastened the like obligations upon you, that you have received from them. If they who met you in the Wilderness, who refreshed you in your distress be thus dis­gusted by you, what fears will seise upon them who might justly dread what God awarded to Amalek? But to conclude; Be more suspicious of your enemies, and less jealous of your friends: nothing can secure you of the former but an utter impossibility of hurting you, and of the latter you have the assurance not only of their affection, but incapacity of prejudicing you. Regulate the —erect —destroy the established intrest of—let them shift for their livings, who plot to take away your lives: when ye have done thus let him be a Monarch that will. The most wise cannot effect a regality, nor a fool keep it. You may commit a thousand errours in the go­vernment you establish, but the greatest you can possibly fall into is the leaving us in unsettlement. I beseech you to excuse the freedome I make use of in this address; the smitings of a friend are faithful, & if I have let fall any thing that may give you cause to entertain other thoughts of me, I shall upon any op­portunity evince unto you, how I am with the greatest inclinations possible.