CHAP. I.

ALthough the Letter I receiv'd from your hands contained in it so many mistakes of my meaning and design, that [Page 260] it seemed to be the greatest civility to the Writer of it, to give no answer at all to it; because that could not be done, without the discovery of far more weak­nesses in him, than he pretends to finde in my discourse: Yet the weight and im­portance of the matter may require a fur­ther account from me, concerning the true reason of the sufferings of Christ. Wherein my design was so far from representing old Errors to the best advantage, or to rack my wits to defend them, as that person seems to suggest; that I aimed at nothing more than to give a true account of what upon a serious enquiry, I judged to be the most natural and genuine meaning of the Chri­stian Doctrine contained in the Writings of the New Testament.

For finding therein such multitudes of expressions which to an unprejudiced mind attribute all the mighty effects of the Love of God to us, to the obedience and sufferings of Christ. I began to consider what reason there was why the plain and easie sense of those places must be forsa­ken, and a remote and Metaphorical mean­ing put upon them. Which I thought my self the more obliged to doe, because I could not conceive if it had been the de­sign of the Scripture, to have delivered [Page 261] the received Doctrine of the Christian Church, concerning the reason of the sufferings of Christ, that it could have been more clearly and fully expressed than it is already. So that supposing that to have been the true meaning of the several places of Scripture which we con­tend for; yet the same arts and subtil­ties might have been used to pervert it, which are imploy'd to perswade men that is not the true meaning of them. And what is equally serviceable to truth and falshood, can of it self, have no power on the minds of men to convince them it must be one, and not the other. Nay, if every unusual and improper acception of words in the Scripture, shall be thought sufficient to take away the natural and ge­nuine sense, where the matter is capable of it; I know scarce any article of Faith can be long secure; and by these arts men may declare that they believe the Scriptures, and yet believe nothing of the Christian Faith. For if the impro­per, though unusual acception of those expressions of Christs dying for us, of re­demption, propitiation, reconciliation by his blood, of his bearing our iniquities, and being made sin and a curse for us, shall be enough to invalidate all the arguments taken from [Page 262] them to prove that which the proper sense of them doth imply; why may not the improper use of the terms of Crea­tion and Resurrection, as well take away the natural sense of them in the great Articles of the Creation of the World, and Resurrection after death. For if it be enough to prove that Christs dying for us, doth not imply dying in our stead; be­cause sometimes dying for others imports no more than dying for some advantage to come to them; if redemption being some­times used for meer deliverance, shall make our redemption by Christ, wholly Meta­phorical; if the terms of propitiation, recon­ciliation, &c. shall lose their force because they are sometimes used where all things cannot be supposed parallel with the sense we contend for: why shall I be bound to believe that the World was ever created in a proper sense, since those persons against whom I argue, so earnestly con­tend that in those places in which it seems as proper as any, it is to be understood only in a metaphorical. If when the World and all things are said to be made by Christ, Joh. 1. 3. 10. we are not to understand the production but the reformation of the World and all things in it, although the natural sense of the Words be quite otherwise; what ar­gument [Page 263] can make it necessary for me not to understand the Creation of the World in a metaphorical sense, when Moses de­livers to us the history of it? Why may not I understand in the beginning, Gen. 1. for the beginning of the Mosaical Dispen­sation, as well as Socinus doth in the begin­ning, John 1. for the beginning of the Evangelical? and that from the very same argument used by him, viz. that in the beginning is to be understood of the main subject concerning which the author in­tends to write, and that I am as sure it was in Moses concerning the Law given by him, as it was in S. John, concerning the Gospel deliver'd by Christ. Why may not the Creation of the Heavens and the Earth, be no more than the erection of the Jewish Polity? since it is acknowledged, that by New Heavens and new Earth wherein dwelleth righteousness, no more is understood than a new state of things under the Go­spel? Why may not the confused Chaos im­port no more than the state of Ignorance and darkness under which the World was before the Law of Moses? since it is con­fessed that it signifies in the New Testa­ment such a state of the World before the Gospel appeared? and consequently, why may not the light which made the first day [Page 264] be the first tendencies to the Doctrine of Moses, which being at first divided and scattered, was united afterwards in one great Body of Laws, which was call'd the Sun, because it was the great Director of the Jewish Nation, and therefore said to rule the day; as the less considerable Laws of other Nations are called the Moon, be­cause they were to govern those who were yet under the night of Ignorance? Why may not the Firmament being in the midst of the Waters, imply the erection of the Jewish State in the midst of a great deal of trouble, since it is confessed, that Wa­ters are often taken in Scripture in a Me­taphorical sense for troubles and afflicti­ons? and the Earth appearing out of the Wa­ters, be no more but the settlement of that State after its troubles; and particularly with great elegancy after their passage through the Red Sea? And the production of Herbs and living Creatures, be the great encrease of the People of all sorts, as well those of a meaner rank (and therefore call'd herbs) as those of a higher, that were to live upon the other, and sometimes trample upon them, and therefore by way of excellency call'd the living Creatures? And when these were multiplyed and brought into order, (which being done [Page 265] by steps and degrees, is said to be finished in several dayes) then the State and the Church flourished, and enjoy'd a great deal of pleasure, which was the producti­on of Man and Woman, and their being placed in Paradise (for a perfect Man, notes a high degree of perfection, and a Woman is taken for the Church in the Revelations): But when they followed the Customs of other Nations which were as a forbidden tree to them, than they lost all their happiness and pleasure, and were expelled out of their own Countrey, and lived in great slavery and misery, which was the Curse pronounced against them, for violating the rules of Policy established among them. Thus you see how small a measure of wit, by the advantage of those wayes of interpreting Scripture, which the subtilest of our ad­versaries make use of, will serve to pervert the clearest expressions of Scripture to quite another sense than was ever intend­ed by the Writer of them. And I assure you, if that rule of interpreting Scripture be once allowed, that where words are ever used in a Metaphorical sense, there can be no necessity of understanding them in a proper; there is scarce any thing which you look on as the most necessary to be believed in Scripture, but it may [Page 266] be made appear not to be so upon those terms: for by reason of the paucity and therefore the ambiguity of the Original words of the Hebrew language, the strange Idioms of it, the different senses of the same word in several Conjugations, the want of several modes of expression which are used in other Languages, and above all the lofty and Metaphorical way of speaking used in all Eastern Countreys, and the imitation of the Hebrew Idioms in the Greek translation of the Old Testa­ment, and Original of the New, you can hardly affix a sense upon any words used therein, but a man who will be at the pains to search all possible significations and uses of those words, will put you hard to it, to make good that which you took to be the proper meaning of them. Wherefore although I will not deny to our adversa­ries the praise of subtilty and diligence, I cannot give them that, (which is much more praise worthy) viz. of discretion and sound judgement. For while they use their utmost industry to search all the most re­mote and Metaphorical senses of words, with a design to take off the genuine and proper meaning of them, they do not at­tend to the ill consequence that may be made of this to the overthrowing those [Page 267] things, the belief of which themselves make necessary to salvation. For by this way the whole Gospel may be made an Alle­gory, and the Resurrection of Christ be thought as metaphorical as the Redempti­on by his Death, and the force of all the Precepts of the Gospel avoided by some unusual signification of the words where­in they are delivered. So that nothing can be more unreasonable than such a method of proceeding, unless it be first sufficiently proved that the matter is not capable of the proper sense, and therefore of necessity the improper only is to be allowed. And this is that which Socinus seems after all his pains to pervert the meaning of the places in controversie, to rely on most; viz. That the Doctrine of sa­tisfaction Socin. de Servat. Part 2. Cap. 4 doth imply an impossibility in the thing it self, and therefore must needs be false; nay, he saith the infallibility of the Revealer had not been enough in this Case, supposing that Christ had said it, and risen from the dead, to declare his own Veracity; unless he had de­clared it by its proper causes and effects, and so shewed the possibility of the thing it self. And the reason, he saith, why they believe their Doctrine true, is not barely because God hath said it, but they believe certainly that God hath said it, because they know it to be true; [Page 268] by knowing the contrary Doctrine to be impossible. The controversie then, concern­ing the meaning of the places in dispute is to be resolved from the nature and rea­sonableness of the matter contained in them: for if Socinus his reason were an­swerable to his confidence, if the account we give of the sufferings of Christ, were repugnant not only to the Justice, Good­ness and Grace of God, but to the nature of the thing; if it appear impossible, that mankinde should be redeemed in a proper sense, or that God should be propitiated by the Death of his Son as a Sacrifice for sin; if it enervate all the Precepts of Obe­dience, and tends rather to justifie sins than those who do repent of them, I shall then agree, that no industry can be too great in searching Authors, comparing places, examining Versions, to finde out such a sense as may be agreeable to the nature of things, the Attributes of God, and the design of Christian Religion. But if on the contrary, the Scripture doth plainly assert those things from whence our Doctrine follows, and without which no reasonable account can be given either of the expressions used therein, or of the sufferings of Christ; if Christs death did immediately respect God as a sacrifice, and [Page 269] were paid as a price for our Redemption; if such a design of his death be so far from being repugnant to the nature of God, that it highly manifests his Wisdom, Ju­stice and Mercy; if it assert nothing but what is so far from being impossible, that it is very reconcileable to the common principles of Reason, as well as the Free-Grace of God in the pardon of sin; if, be­ing truely understood, it is so far from ener­vating, that it advances highly all the pur­poses of Christian Religion, then it can be no less than a betraying one of the grand Truths of the Christian Doctrine, not to believe ours to be the true sense of the places in controversie. And this is that which I now take upon me to maintain.

For our clearer proceeding herein, no­thing §. 2. The state of the Con­troversie in general. will be more necessary, than to un­derstand the true state of the Controversie; which hath been rendred more obscure by the mistakes of some, who have managed it with greater zeal than judgement; who have asserted more than they needed to have done, and made our Adversaries assert much less than they do: And by this means have shot over their Ad­versaries heads, and laid their own more open to assaults. It is easie to observe, that most of Socinus his Arguments are le­vell'd [Page 270] against an opinion, which few who have considered these things do maintain, and none need to think themselves obliged to do it; which is, That Christ paid a pro­per and rigid satisfaction for the sins of men, considered under the notion of debts, and that he paid the very same, which we ought to have done; which in the sense of the Law, is never call'd Satisfaction, but strict payment. Against this, Socinus disputes from the impossibility of Christs paying the very same that we were to have paid; because our penalty was Eternal death, and that as the consequent of inherent guilt, which Christ neither did nor could under­go. Neither is it enough to say, That Christ had undergone Eternal death, unless he had been able to free himself from it; for the ad­mission of one to pay for another, who could discharge the debt in much less time than the offenders could, was not the same which the Law required. For that takes no notice of any other than the persons who had sinned; and if a Mediator could have paid the same, the Original Law must have been disjunctive; viz. That either the Offender must suffer, or another for him; but then the Gospel had not been the bringing in of a better Covenant, but a per­formance of the old. But if there be a re­laxation [Page 271] or dispensation of the first Law, then it necessarily follows, that what Christ paid, was not the very same which the first Law required; for what need of that, when the very same was paid that was in the obligation? But if it be said, That the Dignity of the person makes up, what wanted in the kind or degree of punishment: This is a plain confession that it is not the same, but some thing equivalent, which answers the ends of the Sanction, as much as the same would have done, which is the thing we contend for. Besides, if the very same had been paid in the strict sense, there would have followed a deliverance ipso facto; for the release immediately follows the payment of the same: and it had been in­justice to have required any thing further, in order to the discharge of the Offender, when strict and full payment had been made of what was in the obligation. But we see that Faith and Repentance, and the con­sequences of those two, are made conditi­ons on our parts, in order to the enjoying the benefit of what Christ hath procured: So that the release is not immediate upon the payment, but depends on a new con­tract, made in consideration of what Christ hath done and suffered for us. If it be said, That by Christs payment we become his, and he [Page 272] requires these conditions of us; besides the contrariety of it to the Scriptures, which make the conditions to be required by him to whom the payment was made; we are to consider, that these very persons assert, that Christ paid all for us, and in our name and stead; so that the payment by Christ, was by a substitution in our room; and if he paid the same which the Law required, the benefit must immediately accrue to those in whose name the debt was paid: For what was done in the name of another, is all one to the Creditor, as if it had been done by the Debtor himself. But above all things, it is impossible to reconcile the freeness of remission, with the full payment of the ve­ry same which was in the obligation. Nei­ther will it serve to say, That though it was not free to Christ, yet it was to us: For the satisfaction and remission must respect the same person; for Christ did not pay for himself, but for us, neither could the re­mission be to him: Christ therefore is not considered in his own name, but as acting in our stead; so that what was free to him, must be to us; what was exactly paid by him, it is all one as if it had been done by us, so that it is impossible the same debt should be fully paid and freely forgiven. Much less will it avoid the difficulty in this [Page 273] case to say, That it was a refusable payment; for it being supposed to be the very same, it was not in justice refusable; and however not in equity, if it answer the intention of the Law, as much as the suffering of the offenders had done; and the more it doth that, the less refusable it is. And although God himself found out the way, that doth not make the pardon free, but the designation of the person who was to pay the debt. Thus when our Adversaries dispute against this opinion, no wonder if they do it suc­cessfully; but this whole opinion is built upon a mistake, that satisfaction must be the payment of the very same; which while they contend for, they give our Ad­versaries too great an advantage, and make them think they triumph over the Faith of the Church, when they do it onely over the mistake of some particular persons. But the foundation of this mistake, lies in the consideration of punishment, under the no­tion of debts, and that satisfaction there­fore must be by strict payment in rigor of Law; but how great that mistake is, will appear in the subsequent discourse: but it cannot but be wondred at, that the very same persons who consider sins, as debts which must be strictly satisfied for, do withal contend for the absolute necessity [Page 274] of this satisfaction; whereas Socinus his Arguments would hold good, if sins were onely considered as debts, and God as the meer Creditor of punishment, he might as freely part with his own right without satisfaction, as any Creditor may forgive what sum he pleases, to a person indebted to him; and no reason can be brought to the contrary, from that no­tion of sins, why he may not do it. But if they be considered with a respect to Gods Government of the world, and the honour of his Laws, then some further account may be given, why it may not be consistent with that, to pass by the sins of men, with­out satisfaction made to them.

And because the mistake in this matter, hath been the foundation of most of the sub­sequent §. 3. Of the dif­ference of debts and punish­ments. mistakes on both sides, and the dis­covery of the cause of errours, doth far more to the cure of them, than any Argu­ments brought against them; and withall, the true understanding of the whole Do­ctrine of satisfaction depends upon it, I shall endeavour to make clear the notion under which our sins are considered; for upon that, depends the nature of the satis­faction which is to be made for them. For while our Adversaries suppose, that sins are to be looked on under the notion of debts in this debate, they assert it to be [Page 275] wholly free for God to remit them, without any satisfaction. They make the right of punishment meerly to depend on Gods ab­solute Dominion; and that all satisfaction must be considered under the notion of compensation, for the injuries done to him, to whom it is to be made. But if we can clearly shew a considerable difference be­tween the notion of debts and punishments, if the right of punishment doth not depend upon meer Dominion, and that satisfaction by way of punishment, is not primarily in­tended for compensation, but for other ends, we shall make not onely the state of the Controversie much clearer, but offer something considerable towards the resolu­tion of it. The way I shall take for the proof of the difference between debts and punishments, shall be using the other for the Arguments for it. For besides, that those things are just in matter of debts, which are not so in the case of punishments; as, that it is lawful for a man to forgive all the debts which are owing him by all persons, though they never so contu­maciously refuse payment, but our Ad­versaries will not say so in the case of sins; for although they assert, That the justice of God doth never require punishment in case of Repentance, but [Page 276] withall they assert, That in case of Im­penitency, it is not onely agreeable, but due to the nature and decrees; and there­fore to the rectitude and equity of Non resipiscentibus veniam non concedere, id d [...]mum na­turae divinae, & dec [...]etis e­jus & propterea rectitudini & aequitati debitum est ac consentaneum. Socin. de Ser­vat. l. 1. c. 1. Non resipiscentes poenâ non liberare tum per se aequitati est admodum, consentaneum & positis quibusdam finibus quos Deus sibi in regendis hominibus praefixit, facto ne­cessarium. Crell. c. Grot. c. 2. §. 29. God not to give pardon. But if this be true, then there is an appa­rent difference between the no­tion of debts and punishments; for the Impenitency doth but add to the greatness of the debt: And will they say, it is onely in Gods power to remit small debts, but he must punish the greatest? what becomes then of Gods ab­solute liberty to part with his own right? will not this shew more of his kindness to pardon the greater, rather than lesser of­fenders? But if there be something in the nature of the thing, which makes it not onely just, but necessary for impenitent sin­ners to be punished, as Crellius after Soci­nus frequently acknowledges; then it is plain, that sins are not to be considered meerly as debts; for that obstinacy and impenitency is onely punished as a greater degree of sin, and therefore as a greater debt. And withall, those things are law­ful in the remission of debts, which are un­just in the matter of punishments; as it is lawful for a Creditor, when two persons [Page 277] are considered in equal circumstances, to remit one, and not the other; nay, to re­mit the greater debt, without any satisfacti­on, and to exact the lesser to the greatest extremity; but it is unjust in matter of pu­nishments, where the reason and circum­stances are the same, for a person who hath committed a crime of very dangerous con­sequence, to escape unpunished, and ano­ther who hath been guilty of far less to be severely executed. Besides these con­siderations, I say I shall now prove the dif­ference of debts and punishments, from those two things whereby things are best differenced from each other; viz. The dif­ferent Reason, and the different End of them.

The different Reason of debts and pu­nishments: The reason of debts is domini­on §. 4. The reason of humane punish­ment is the publick interest. and property, and the obligation of of them, depends upon voluntary contracts between parties; but the reason of punish­ments is Justice and Government, and de­pends not upon meer contracts, but the re­lation the person stands in to that Autho­rity he is accountable for his actions to. For if the obligation to punishment, did depend upon meer contract, than none could justly be punished, but such who have consented to it by an antecedent con­tract: [Page 278] If it be said, That a contract is im­plied, by their being in society with others; that is as much as I desire to make the dif­ference appear, for in case of debts, the obligation depends upon the voluntary con­tract of the person; but in case of punish­ments, the very relation to Government, and living under Laws doth imply it. And the right of punishment depends up­on the obligation of Laws, where the rea­son of them holds, without any express contract, or superiority of one over ano­ther; as in the case of violation of the Law of Nations, that gives right to ano­ther Nation to punish the infringers of it. Otherwise Wars could never be lawful between two Nations, and none could be warrantable, but those of a Prince against his rebellious subjects, who have broken the Laws themselves consented expresly to. Besides, in case of debts, every man is bound to pay, whether he be call'd upon or no; but in case of punishments, no man is bound to betray or accuse himself. For the obligation to payment in case of debt, ariseth from the injury sustained by that particular person, if another detains what is his own from him; but the obligation to punishment, arises from the injury the Publick sustains by the impunity of crimes, [Page 279] of which the Magistrates are to take care; who by the dispensing of punishments, do shew that to be true which Grotius asserts, that if there be any Creditor to be assign­ed in punishment, it is the publick good: Which appears by this, that all punishments are proportioned, according to the influ­ence the offences have upon the publick interest; for the reason of punishment is not because a Law is broken, but because the breach of a Law tends to dissolve the community, by infringing the Authority of the Laws, and the honour of those who are to take care of them. For if we con­sider it, the measure of punishments is in a well ordered State, taken from the influ­ence which crimes have upon the peace and interest of the community. No man questions', but that Malice, Pride and Avarice, are things really as bad as many faults, that are severely punished by hu­mane Laws; but the reason these are not punished is, because they do not so much injury to the publick interest, as Theft and Robbery do. Besides, in those things wherein the Laws of a Nation are con­cerned, the utmost rigor is not used in the preventing of crimes, or the execution of them when committed, if such an execu­tion may endanger the publick more, than [Page 280] the impunity of the offenders may do. And there are some things which are thought fit to be forbidden, where the utmost means are not used to prevent them; as Merchants are forbidden to steal customs, but they are not put under an Oath not to do it. And when penalties have been deserved, the execution of them hath been deferred, till it may be most for the advantage of the publick: as Joabs punish­ment till Solomons Reign, though he de­served it as much in Davids. So that the rule commonly talked of, Fiat justitia & pereat mundus, is a piece of Pedantry, ra­ther than true Wisdom; for whatever pen­alty inflicted, brings a far greater detri­ment to the publick, than the forbearance of it, is no piece of Justice to the State, but the contrary; the greatest Law, being the safety and preservation of the whole body. By which it appears, that in hu­mane Laws, the reason of punishment is not, that such an action is done, but be­cause the impunity in doing it, may have a bad influence on the publick interest; but in debts, the right of Restitution de­pends upon the injury received by a par­ticular person, who looks at no more than the reparation of his loss by it.

[Page 281] We are now to consider, how far these things will hold in Divine Laws, and §. 5. The right of Divine punish­ment not meer Do­minion. Crell. Re­spons. ad Grot. cap. 2 sect. 1. &c. what the right of punishment doth result from there. For Crellius, the subtillest of our Adversaries, knowing how great con­sequence the resolution of this is, in the whole Controversie of Satisfaction, vehe­mently contends, That the right of punish­ment doth result from Gods absolute Dominion, and therefore he is to be considered as the offend­ed party, and not as Governor in the right of inflicting punishment; for which his first Ar­gument is, That our obedience is due to Gods p. 144. Law, on the account of his Dominion; but when that is not performed, the penalty suc­ceeds in its room, and therefore that doth be­long to God on the same account: His other Arguments are, from the compensation of injuries due to the offended party, and from Gods anger against sin, in which he is to be considered as the offended party: These two latter will be answered under the next head; the first I am to examine here. He therefore tells us, that the right of punish­ment belongs to Gods Dominion, because the reason of his Government of mankind is, because he is the Lord of them. But, for our better understanding this, we are to consider, although the original right of Government doth result from Gods Do­minion; [Page 282] for therefore our obedience is due, because of his Soveraignty over us; yet when God takes upon him the notion of a Governor, he enters into a new re­lation with his creatures, distinct from the first as meer Lord. For he is equally Lord of all to whom he gives a being, but he doth not require obedience upon equal terms, nor governs them by the same Laws: Dominion is properly shewed in the exer­cise of power; but when God gives Laws according to which he will reward and punish, he so far restrains the exercise of his Dominion to a subserviency to the ends of Government. If we should suppose, that God governs the world meerly by his Do­minion, we must take away all rewards and punishments; for then the actions of men, would be the meer effects of irre­sistable power, and so not capable of re­wards and punishments; for there could be neither of these, where mens actions are not capable of the differences of good and evil, and that they cannot be, if they be the acts of Gods Dominion, and not of their own. But if God doth not exercise his full Dominion over rational creatures, it is apparent that he doth govern them under another notion than as meer Lord, and the reason of punishment is not to be [Page 283] taken from an absolute right which God doth not make use of, but from the ends and designs of Government, which are his own Honour, the Authority of his Laws, and the good of those whom he doth govern. And Crellius is greatly mistaken, when he makes punishment to succeed in the place of the right of obedience; for it is onely the desert of punishment, which follows upon the violation of that right; and as we assert, that the right of obedi­ence is derived from Gods Soveraignty, so we deny not, but the desert of punish­ment is from the violation of it; but with­all we say, that the obligation to punish­ment depends upon the Laws, and Gods right to inflict punishment (Laws being sup­posed) is immediately from that Govern­ment which he hath over mankinde: For otherwise, if the whole right of punish­ment did still depend upon Gods Domini­on, and the first right of Soveraignty, then all sins must have equal punishments, be­cause they are all equal violations of the fundamental right of obedience; then it were at liberty for God to punish a greater sin, with a less punishment; and a lesser sin, with a greater: And lastly, this would make the punishment of sin, a meer Arbi­trary thing in God; for there would be no [Page 284] reason of punishment, but what depended upon Gods meer will; whereas the reason of punishment in Scripture is drawn from a repugnancy of sin to the divine purity and holyness, and not meerly from Gods power or will to punish; but if that were all the reason of it, there would be no repugnancy in the nature of the thing for the most vitious person to be rewarded, and the most pious to be made everlast­ingly miserable. But who ever yet durst say or think so? From whence it appears that the relation between sin and punish­ment is no result of Gods arbitrary will; but it is founded in the nature of the things, so that as it is just for God to punish offenders, so it would be unjust to punish the most innocent person without any respect to sin. But if the right of punishment depends meerly on Gods do­minion, I cannot understand why God may not punish when, and whom, and in what manner he pleaseth; without any impeachment of his Justice, and therefore it is to be wonder'd at, that the same persons who assert the right of punish­ment to be meerly in Gods dominion, should yet cry out of the unjustice of one person being punished for anothers faults; for why may not God exercise his domi­nion [Page 285] in this case? yes say they, he may his dominion, but he cannot punish, because pu­nishment supposes guilt, and cannot be just without it; how far that reaches, will be examined afterwards; at present, we take notice of the contradiction to themselves which our Adversaries are guilty of, that they may serve their own hypothesis, for when we dispute with them, against abso­lute remission without satisfaction, then they contend that the right of punish­ment is a meer act of dominion, and God may part with his right, if he please; but when they dispute with us against the translation of punishment from one to ano­ther, then they no longer say that the right of punishment is an act of dominion, but that it is a necessary consequent of inherent guilt, and cannot be removed from one to another. And then they ut­terly deny that punishment is of the nature of debts; for one mans money, they say, may become anothers, but one mans punishment Soc. de Ser­vat. l. 3. c. 3. Praelect. c. 18. §. 6. 2. The end of punish­ments not bare com­pensation as it is in debts. cannot become anothers: Thus they give and take, deny and grant, as it serves for their present purposes.

The different end of debts and punishments, make it appear that there is a difference in the nature of them; for the intention of the obligation to payment in case of [Page 286] debt, is the compensation of the damage which the Creditor sustains; but the in­tention of punishment, is not bare com­pensation, but it is designed for greater and further ends. For which we are to consider the different nature of punish­ments, as they are inflicted by way of re­paration of some injury done to private persons, and as they do respect the pub­lick good. I grant, that private persons in case of injuries, seek for compensation of the damage they sustain, and so far they bear the nature of debts; but if we consider them as inflicted by those who have a care of the publick, though they are to see that no private person suffers injury by another, yet the reason of that is not meerly that he might enjoy his own, but because the doing injuries to others tends to the subversion of the ends of Government. Therefore, I can by no means admit that Position of Crellius, that a Magistrate only punishes as he assumes the Crell. c. Grot. cap. 2. Sect. 2. p. 147. Sect. 17. p. 162. person of the particular men who have re­ceived injuries from others; for he aims at other ends than meerly the compensation of those injured persons. Their great end is according to the old Roman Formula, nè quid Resp. detrimenti capiat: the reason of exacting penalties upon private men is [Page 287] still with a regard to the publick safety. Supposing men in a. state of nature no pu­nishment is due to the injured person, but restitution of damage, and compensation of the loss that accrues to him by the in­jury sustained; and whatever goes beyond this, is the effect of Government, which constitutes penalties for preservation of the Society which is under Laws. But herein Crellius is our adversary, but with no advantage at all to his Cause; for he offers to prove against Grotius, that some­thing more is due by an injury beyond bare compensation for what the other is supposed to lose by the right of nature; for saith he, in every injury there is not only the reall damage which the person sustains, but there is a con­tempt of the person implyed in it, for which as well as the former, he ought to have compen­sation. To which I answer, 1. That this doth not prove what he designs, viz. that punishment doth belong to the injured person in a state of Nature, beyond bare restitution, but that it is necessary, that men should not continue in such a state, that so they may be vindicated from that contempt, and others compelled to resti­tution. Both which, as they are punish­ments, are not in the power of the offend­ed party as such, but shew that it is very [Page 288] reasonable there should be Laws and Go­vernours, that private persons may be pre­served in their just rights, and offenders punished for the vindication not only of their honour, but of the Laws too. And Laws being established, the injured person hath right to no more, than the compen­sation of his loss; for that being forced upon the offending party, is a sufficient vindication of his honour. 2. If the con­tempt of a private person makes a compen­sation necessary, how much more will this hold in a publick Magistrate; whose contempt by disobedience is of far worse consequence than that of a private person. And by this argument Crellius overthrows his main hypothesis, viz. that God may par­don sin without satisfaction; for if it be not only necessary, that the loss be com­pensated but the dishonour too; then so much greater as the dishonour is; so much higher as the person is; so much more be­neficial to the world as his Laws are; so much more necessary is it that in order to pardon there must be a satisfaction made to him, for the affronts he hath received from men. And if the greatness of the injury be to be measured as Crellius asserts, Crell. c. Grot. cap. 2. p. 174. from the worth and value of the thing, from the dignity and honour of the person, from the [Page 289] displicency of the fact to him, which he makes the measure of punishment; this makes it still far more reasonable, that God should have satisfaction for the sins of men, than that men should have for the injuries done them by one another; especially consider­ing what the same Author doth assert afterwards, that it is sometime repugnant to Sect. 29. p. 198. justice, for one to part with his own right in case of injuries, and that either from the na­ture and circumstances of the things them­selves, or a decree or determination to the con­trary, for the first he instanceth in case of notorious defamation; in which he saith, it is a dishonest and unlawfull thing for a man, not to make use of his own right for his vin­dication, and for the other, in case of great obstinacy and malice. By both which, it is most apparent, that Crellius puts a mighty difference between the nature of debts; and punishments, since in all cases he allows it lawfull for a person free, to remit his debts; but in some cases he makes it utterly unlawfull for a person not to make use of his right for punishment. And withall if a private person may not part with his own right in such cases, how unreasonable is it not to assert the same of the great Go­vernour of the world? and that there may be a necessity for him upon supposition of the contempt of himself and his Laws, to [Page 290] vindicate himself and his honour to the world, by some remarkable testimony of his severity against sin.

But Crellius yet urgeth another end of §. 7. Of C [...]llius his great m [...]stake about the end of pu­nishments. punishment, which though the most un­reasonable of all others, yet sufficiently proves from himself the difference of debts and punishments, which is, the delight which the injured person takes in seeing the offender punished. This he so much insists Crell. cap 2. sect. 2. sect. 28. upon, as though he made it the most natu­ral end of punishment, for, saith he, among the Punishments which a Prince or any other free Person can inflict, revenge is in the first place, and the more there is of that in any thing, the more properly it is call'd a punish­ment; and he tells what he means by this ultio; viz. solatium ex alieno dolore, the con­tentment P. 191. taken in anothers pain. But saith he, no man must object, that this is a thing evil in it self; for although it be forbidden us under the New Testament, yet in it self it is not unlawfull for one that hath suffered pain from another to seek for the ease of his own pain, by the miseries of him that injured him: and for this purpose, saith he, we have the Passion of Anger in us, which being a desire of returning injuries, is then satisfied when it apprehends it done. But how absurd and unreasonable this doctrine is, will be easi­ly discovered, for this would make the [Page 291] primary intendment of punishment to be the evil of him that suffers it. Whereas the right of punishment is derived from an injury received, and therefore that which gives that right, is some damage sustained, the reparation of which is the first thing designed by the offended party: Though it take not up the whole nature of punishment. And on this account no man can justly propose any end to himself in anothers evil, but what comes under the notion of restitution. For the evil of another is only intended in punishment as it respects the good of him for whose sake that evil is undergone. When that good may be obtained without anothers evil, the desire of it is unjust and unreasonable: and therefore all that contentment that any one takes in the evil another under­goes, as it is evil to him, is a thing repug­nant to humane nature, and which all per­sons condemn in others when they allow themselves in it. It will be hard for Crel­lius to make any difference between this end of punishment which he assigns, and the greatest cruelty; for what can that be worse than taking delight in making others miserable, and seeing them so when he hath made them. If it be replyed, that cruelty is without any cause, but here a just [Page 292] cause is supposed, I answer, a just cause is only supposed for the punishment, but there can be no just cause for any to de­light in the miseries of others, and to comfort themselves by inflicting or be­holding them. For the evil of another is never intended, but when it is the only means left for compensation; and he must be guilty of great inhumanity, who desires anothers evil any further than that tends to his own good, i. e. the reparati­on of the damage sustained; which if it may be had without anothers evil, then that comes not by the right of nature within the reason of punishment; and con­sequently where it doth not serve for that end, the comfort that men take in it is no part of justice, but cruelty. For there can be no reason at all assigned for it; for that lenimentum doloris which Crellius insists on is meerly imaginary, and no other than the Dog hath in gnawing the stone that is thrown at him; and for all that I know, that propension in nature to the retribution of evil for evil any further than it tends to our security, and preservation for the future, is one of the most unreasonable Passions in hu­mane Nature.

[Page 293] And if we examine the nature of Anger, §. 8. Of the na­ture of an­ger and re­venge in men, and whether punish­ments are designed to satisfie them. either considered Naturally or Morally, the intention of it is, not the returning evil to another, for the evil received, but the security and preservation of our selves, w ^ch we should not have so great a care of, unless we had a quick sense of injuries, and our blood were apt to be heated at the apprehension of them. But when this pas­sion vents it self, in doing others injury to alleviate its own grief, it is a violent and unreasonable perturbation; but being go­verned by reason, it aims at no more, than the great end of our beings; viz. Self-Preservation. But when that cannot be ob­tained without anothers evil, so far the intendment of it is lawful, but no fur­ther. And I cannot therefore think those Philosophers, who have defined Anger to be [...], by whose Authority Crel­lius defends himself, when he makes anger to be a desire of revenge, did throughly Crell. c. 2. sect. 22. p. 177. consider what was just and reasonable in it, but barely what was natural, and would be the effect of that passion, if not govern­ed by reason. For otherwise Jul. Scaligers definition is much more true and justifi­able, that it is appetitus depulsionis; viz. that Exerc. 313. whereby we are stirred up to drive away from us, any thing that is injurious [Page 294] to us. But because Crellius alledgeth a say­ing of Seneca, that would make vindicta of the nature of punishment, duabus de causis punire princeps solet, si aut se vindicet Seneca de Clem. l 1. c. 20. aut alium: We shall oppose to this the sense of the same Author in this matter, which may sufficiently clear the other pas­sage: For, saith he, Inhumanum verbum est, De Irâ. l. 2. c 32. & quidem pro justo receptum, ultio, & à con­tumelia non differt nisi ordine: qui dolo­rem regerit, tantum excusatius peccat. And no man speaks with greater vehemency a­gainst the delight in others punishments than he doth; for he always asserts, the onely reason of punishment, to be some ad­vantage which is to come by it, and not meerly to satisfie anger, or to allay their own griefs, by seeing anothers: For, saith he, the punishment is inflicted, Non quia de­lectetur ullius poena (procul est enim à sapiente tam inhumana feritas) sed ut documentum De Irâ. l. 1. c. 6. omnium sint: So that it is onely the useful­ness of punishment according to him, which makes it become any wise man; and so far from a satisfaction of his grief by anothers punishment, that he makes that a piece of inhumanity, not incident to any who pretend to wisdom. Nay, he denies, that a just punishment doth flow from anger; for he that inflicts that, doth it, non ipsius [Page 295] poenae avidus sed quia oportet, not as desiring De Irâ. l. 1. c. 9. the punishment, but because there are great reasons for it: And elsewhere, Ex­sequar quia oportet, non quia dolet: he is Cap. 12. far enough then from approving, that imaginary compensation of one mans grief by anothers. And he shews at large, that the weakest natures, and the least guided by reason, are the most subject to this an­ger and revenge. And although other things be pretended, the general cause of it is, a great infirmity of humane nature; and Cap. 13. thence it is, that children, and old men, and sick persons, are the most subject to it; and the better any are, the more they are freed from it:

He makes Cruelty to be nothing else, but the intemperace of the mind in exacting punish­ment; De Clem. l. 2. c. 4. and the difference between a Prince and a Tyrant to lye in this, That one de­lights in punishing, the other never does it but De Clem. l. 1. c. 11, 12. in case of necessity, when the publick good requires it. And this throughout his dis­course, he makes the measure of punish­ment; who then could imagine, that he should speak so contradictory to himself, as to allow punishment for meer revenge, [Page 296] or the easing ones own griefs, by the pains of another? In the places cited by Crellius, (if taken in his sense) he speaks what com­monly is, not what ought to be in the world; for he disputes against it in that very place, therefore that cannot be the meaning which he contends for. The common design of punishments by a Prince, saith he, is either to vindicate himself or others. I so ren­der his words, because vindicare, when it is joyned with the person injured, as here, vindicare se aut alium, doth properly relate to the end of punishment, which is assert­ing the right of the injured person; but when it is joyned with the persons who have done the injury, or the crimes where­by they did it, then it properly signifies to punish. Thus Salust useth, Vindica­tum in eos; and Cicero, In milites no­stros vehementer vindicatum, and for Salust. in Catilin. Cicero 7. v. the fact very frequently in him, male­ficia vindicare: but when it relates to the injured person, as here it doth, it cannot signifie meerly to punish; for then se vindicare would be to punish ones self, but to assert his own right in case of injury, though it be with the pun­ishment of another: For Vindicatio, as Cicero defines it, est per quam vis & injuris & omnino quod obfuturum est defendendo aut Cicero de Invent. 2. [Page 297] ulciscendo propulsatur. So that the security of our selves in case of force or injury, is [...]hat which is called Vindication; which [...]ometimes may be done by defence, and [...]thertimes by punishment. And that Se­ [...]eca doth mean no more here, is apparent [...]y what follows; for in case of private in­ [...]uries, he saith, poenamsi tutò poterit donet, [...]he would have the Prince forgive the punishment, if it may be done with safety; so that he would not have any one punish­ed, to satisfie anothers desire of revenge, but to preserve his own safety: And af­terwards he saith, It is much beneath a Princes condition, to need that satisfaction which a­rises De Irâ. l. 1. c. 21. from anothers sufferings: But for the punishments of others, he saith, The Law hath established three ends, the amendment of the persons, or making others better by their punishments, or the publick security, by taking away such evil members out of the body: So that in publick punishments, he never so much as supposes, that contentment which revenge fancies in others punishments, but makes them wholly designed for the pub­lick advantage. For the Laws in punishment do not look backward, but forward; for as Plato saith, No wise man ever punished, meerly Non prae­terita sed futura in­tuebitur; nam ut Plato ait, nemo prudens punit quia peccatum est, sed ne peccetur. Sen. de Irâ. l. 1. c. 16. [Page 298] because men had offended, but least they should: For past things cannot be recall'd, but futu [...] are, therefore forbidden, that they may be pre­vented. So to the same purpose is the say­ing of Lactantius, produced by Grotius, Lact. de ira Dei, c. 17. Surgimus ad vindictam non quia laesi sumus sed ut disciplina servetur, mores corrigantur, licentia comprimatur: haec est ira justa. To which Crellius answers, That this signifies no­thing, unless it can be proved, that no ma [...] may justly punish another, meerly because he is Cap. 2. sect. [...]3. wronged. If he means of the right to punish, we deny not that to be, because the per­son is wronged; but if he understands it of the design and end of punishment, then we deny, that it is an allowable end of punishments, any further than it can come under the notion of restitution, of which we have spoken already. When a Master (which is the instance he produceth) punish­eth his servants, because they have disobey'd him: The reason of that punishment, is not the bare disobedience, but the inju­ry which comes to him by it; the repara­tion of which he seeks by punishment, ei­ther as to his authority, security or pro­fit. But he addes, That where punishment is designed, for preservation of discipline, and amendment of manners, and keeping per­sons in order, which are the ends mention­ed [Page 299] by Lactantius) it is where the interest of the person lies, in the preservation of these, and is therefore offended at the neg­lect of them. To which I answer, That the interest of such a one, is not barely the interest of an offended party, as such, but the interest of a Governor; and no body denies, but such a one may be an offended party: but the question is, Whe­ther the design of punishment be meerly to satisfie him as the offended party, or to answer the ends of Government? For Crellius hath already told us, what it is to satisfie one as an offended party, that is, to ease himself by the punishment of others; but what ever is designed for the great ends of Government, is not to be consi­dered under that notion, although the Go­vernor may be justly offended at the neg­lect of them. And there is this conside­rable difference between the punishment made to an offended party, as such, and that which is for the ends of Govern­ment, that the former is a satisfaction to Anger, and the latter to Laws and the pub­lick interest. For Crellius disputes much for the right of Anger in exacting punish­ments; Cap. 2. sect. 1. p. 143. Sect. 13. p. 161. the satisfaction of which, in case of real injury, he never makes unlawful, but in case that it be prohibited us by one, whose [Page 300] power is above our own: nay he makes it other­wise the primary end of punishment. So that anger is the main thing upon these terms to be respected in punishment: but where it is designed for the ends before mention'd, there is no necessity of any such passion a [...] anger to be satisfied, the ends of pu­nishment may be attained wholly without it: And publick punishment, according to Seneca, non ira sed ratio est, is no effect of anger, but reason; for, saith he, nihil Sen. de ira, l. 1. c. 14. & 15. minus quam irasci punientem decet: nothing less becomes one that punisheth, than an­ger doth; for all punishments being con­sidered as Medicines, no man ought to give Physick in anger, or to let himself blood in a fury: A Magistrate, saith he, when he goes to punish, ought to appear only Cap. 16. vultu legis quae non irascitur, sed constituit, with the countenance of the Law, which appoints punishments without passion: The reason of which is, because the Law aims not primarily at the evil of the man that suffers punishment, but at the good which comes to the publick by such sufferings. For the first design of the Law was to pre­vent any evil being done, and punish­ment coming in by way of Sanction to the force of the Law, must have the same primary end which the Law it self had; [Page 301] which is not to satisfie barely the offend­ed party for the breach, any further than that satisfaction tends to the security of the Law, and preventing the violation of it for the future. The substance of what I have said upon this subject, may be thus briefly comprized, That antecedently to Laws, the offended party hath right to no more than bare reparation of the da­mage sustained by the injury; that the proper notion of punishment is consequent to Laws, and the inflicting of it is an act of Government, which is not designed for meer satisfaction of the anger of the in­jured person, but for the publick good, which lies in preserving the authority of the Laws, the preventing all injuries by the security of mens just rights, and the vindication of the dignity and honor of him, who is to take care of the publick good. For these Crellius himself acknow­ledgeth, to be the just ends of punishments, onely he would have the satisfaction a Quibus (sc. solatio & securi­tati) addi possunt ho­noris ac dignitatis, per injuriam violatae, & aliquâ ratione imminutae vindiciae, ass [...]rtio (que) juris nostri. Crell. cap. 2. sect. 28. p. 191. man takes in anothers evil, to come in the first place; wherein how much he is mista­ken, I hope we have already manifested. Because the proper nature of punishment depending upon Laws, the Laws do not [Page 302] primarily design the benefit of private per­sons (supposing that were so) but the ad­vantage of that community which they are made for.

And in those cases wherein the Magi­strate §. 9. The Inte­rest of the Magistrate in punish­ment di­stinct from that of private persons. doth right to particular persons in the punishment of those who have inju­red them, he doth it not as taking their person upon him, for he aims at other things than they doe; they look at a bare compensation for the injury received; but the Magistrate at the ill consequence the impunity of injuries may be of to the publick: they, it may be at the satisfacti­on of their displeasure; but he at the sa­tisfaction of the Laws; they at their own private damage; he at the violation of the publick peace. And from hence among those Nations who valued all crimes at a certain rate, in matters of injury between De morib. German. c. 12. Grot. de leg. Goth. in Proleg. ad hist. Goth. p. 67. Lindenbrog. Gloss. ad Cod. Leo Antiq. v. Freda. Spelman. Gloss. v. Freda. man and man, the injured person was not only to receive compensation for his wrong; but a considerable fine was to be paid to the Exchequer for the viola­tion of the publick peace. This Tacitus observes among the old Germans, Grotius of the old Gothick Laws, and from them (as most of our modern Laws and Customs are derived) Lindenbrogius of the Salick, Ale­mannick, Lombardick, Spelman of the Saxon, [Page 303] who tells us in case of murder there were three payments, one to the Kindred, which was call'd Megbote; the second to the Lord, call'd Manbote, the third to the King, call'd Freda from the German Frid, which signifies peace, it being the consideration paid to the King for the breach of the publick peace. And this, saith he, in all actions, was [...]nei­ciently paid to the King, because the peace was supposed to be broken, not by meer force, but by any injuries; and if the action was unjust, the Plaintiffe paid it; if just, the defendant. And the measure of it, saith Bignonius, was the tenth part of the value of the Bignon. not. in Marcul­phi form. cap. 20. [...] thing as estimated by Law; which by the Customs of the ancient Romans was de­posited at the commencing of a suit by both, and only taken up again by him who overcame; and was by them call'd Sacra­mentum, Varro de L. L. lib. 4. as Varro tells us. And the same custome was observed among the Greeks too, as appears by Julius Pollux, who tells Jal. Pollux. l. 8. us it was call'd [...] among them, and in publick actions was the fifth part, in private the tenth. But that which was paid to the publick in case of murder, was among the Greeks call'd [...], the same with poena, for Hesychius tells us that is [...], and to the same purpose the Scholiast on Homer on those words [Page 304] Iliad. 1. [...], by which the Original of the name poena, comes from a payment made to the publick, ac­cording to that known rule, interest reip. delicta puniri, that persons may see how much the publick safety is concerned, that crimes be punished. From which and ma­ny other things which might be insisted on, Crellius his Hypothesis will appear to be false, viz. that when the Magistrate doth judge in the affairs of particular men, he doth it only as assuming the person of those men; whereas it appears from the reason of the thing, and the Custom of Nations, that the interest of the Magistrate is consider'd as distinct from that of private persons, when he doth most appear in vindication of injuries. But all this is managed with a respect to the grand hypothesis, viz. that the right of punishing doth belong only to the offended party as such, that the pu­nishment is of the nature of debts, and the satisfaction by compensation to the anger of him who is offended. The falsity of which this discourse was designed to dis­cover.

Having thus considered the nature of punishments among men, we come more closely to our matter, by examining how far this will hold in the punishments [Page 305] which God inflicts on the account of sin. For which two things must be inquired in­to, 1. In what sense we attribute anger to God. 2. What are the great ends of those punishments God inflicts on men on the account of sin.

For the first, though our Adversaries §. 10. Of the nature of Anger in God; the satisfacti­on to be made to it. are very unwilling to allow the term of punitive justice, yet they contend for a pu­nitive anger in God, and that in the worst sense as it is appetitus vindictae: for after Crellius hath contended that this is the proper notion of anger in general; neither ought any one to say, he adds, that anger as C [...] ll. cap. 2. [...]. 1. p. 145. [...]. 177. other passions is attributed improperly to God; for setting aside the imperfections, which those passions are subject to in us, all the rest is to be attributed to him; taking away then that perturbation, and pain, and grief we find in our selves in anger, to which the abhorrency of sin answers in God, all the rest doth agree to him. I would he had a little more plainly told us what he means by all the rest, but we are to ghesse at his meaning by what went before, where he allows of Cice­ro, and Aristotles definition of Anger, where­of the one is, that it is libido, or (as Crel­lius would rather have it,) cupiditas pu­niendi, Ci [...]r. Tas­c [...] l. 4. Arist. K [...] [...]. l. 2. c. 2. the other, [...], &c. and himself calls it poenae appetitio, and [Page 306] in another place, that it may be as pro­perly defined cupiditas vindictae as cupidi­tas Crell. c. 2. sect. 22. p. 177. poenae, or affectus vindicandi, as well as puniendi: in all which places, he doth assert such an anger in God as supposes such a motion, or desire, or inclination to punish sin when it is committed, as there is in us when an injury is done us, only the per­turbation and pain excluded. But he hath not thought fit to explain how such new motions or inclinations in the divine na­ture every time sin is committed, are con­sistent with the immutability and perfecti­on of it; nor what such a kind of desire to punish in God imports, whether a meer inclination without the effect, or an incli­nation with the effect following: if with­out the effect, than either because the sin was not great enough, or Gods honour was not concerned to do it, and in this case the same reasons which make the ef­fect not to follow, make the desire of it inconsistent with the divine wisdom and perfection: or else because the effect is hindred by the repentance of the person, or some other way which may make it not necessary to do it; than upon the same reason the effect is suspended, the inclina­tion to do it should be so too; for that must be supposed to be governed by an [Page 307] eternal reason and counsel as well as his actions; unless some natural passions in God be supposed antecedent to his own wisdom and counsel, which is derogatory to the infinite perfection of God, since those are judged imperfections in our selves: If it be taken only with the effect following it, than God can never be said to be angry but when he doth punish, whereas his wrath is said to be kindled in Scripture, where the effect hath not fol­lowed; which if it implyes any more than the high provocation of God to pu­nish (as I suppose it doth not) then this in­clination to punish is to be conceived di­stinct from the effect following it. But that conception of anger in God seems most agreeable to the divine nature, as well as to the Scriptures, which makes it either Crell. de [...] Relig. l. 1. c. 30. the punishment it self, as Crellius elsewhere acknowledges it is often taken so; or Gods declaration of his will to punish, which is call'd the revelation of the wrath of God against all unrighteousness of men, God there­by discovering the just displeasure he hath against sin; or the great provocation of God to punish, by the sins of men; as when his wrath is said, to be kindled, &c. By this sense we may easily reconcile all that the Scripture saith concerning the wrath of [Page 308] God; we make it agreeable to infinite per­fection, we make no such alterations in God, as the appeasing of his anger must imply, if that imply any kinde of commo­tion in him. And thus the grand difficul­ty of Crellius appears to be none at all, against all those passages of Scripture [...]. cap. [...]l. 3. p. 350. which speak of appeasing God, of attonement, and reconciliation, viz. that if they prove sa­tisfaction, they must prove that God being actually angry with mankind before the suf­ferings of his Son, he must be presently ap­peased upon his undergoing them. For no more need to be said, than that God be­ing justly provoked to punish the sins of mankinde, was pleased to accept of the sufferings of his Son, as a sufficient sacri­fice of Attonement for the sins of the world, on consideration of which he was pleased to offer those terms of pardon, which upon mens performance of the con­ditions required on their part, shall be sufficient to discharge them from that obligation to punishment which they were under by their sins. And what absurdity, or incongruity there is in this to any prin­ciple of reason, I cannot imagine. But our Adversaries first make opinions for us, and then shew they are unreasonable. They first suppose that anger in God is to [Page 309] be consider'd as a passion, and that passion a desire of revenge for satisfaction of it; and then tell us, that if we do not prove, that this desire of revenge can be satis­fied by the sufferings of Christ, then we can never prove the doctrine of satisfaction to be true; whereas we do not mean by Gods anger any such passion, but the just decla­ration of Gods will to punish upon our provocation of him by our sins; we do not make the design of satisfaction to be, that God may please himself in the re­venging the sins of the guilty upon the most innocent person; because we make the design of punishment, not to be the satisfaction of anger as a desire of revenge, but to be the vindication of the honour and rights of the injured person, by such a way as himself shall judge most satisfa­ctory to the ends of his Government.

2. Which is the next thing we are to §. 11. Of the ends of di­vine pu­nishments. Crell. c. 2. sect. 29. p. 129. clear: For which end we shall make use of the Concession of Crellius, That God hath prefixed some ends to himself in the Go­vernment of mankind; which being supposed, it is necessary, that impenitent sinners should be punished. What these ends of God are, he before tells us, when he enquires into the ends of Divine punishments, which he makes to be, security for the future, by mens P. 195. [Page 310] avoding sins, and a kind of [...], or plea­sure which God takes in the destruction of his implacable enemies, and the asserting and vin­dicating his own right by punishing, and shew­ing men thereby, with what care and fear they ought to serve him; and so attains the ends of punishment proposed by Lactantius, and mani­festation of the Divine Honor and Majestie, which hath been violated by the sins of men. All these we accept of, with this caution, That the delight which God takes in the punishing his implacable enemies, be not understood of any pleasure in their mise­ry, as such, by way of meer revenge; but as it tends to the vindication of his Right, and Honor, and Majestie; which is an end suitable to the Divine Nature: but the other cannot in it self, have the notion of an end; for an end doth suppose some­thing desirable for it self; which surely the miseries of others cannot have to us, much less to the Divine Nature. And that place which Crellius insists on to prove the contrary, Deut. 28. 63. The Lord will rejoyce over you, to destroy you; imports no more, than the satisfaction God takes in the execution of his Justice, when it makes most for his honor, as certainly it doth in the punishment of his greatest enemies. And this is to be understood in a sense [Page 311] agreeable to those other places, where God is said not to delight in the death of sinners; Ezek. 18. v. 23. 32. c. 33. 11. which doth not (as Crellius would have it) meerly express Gods benignity and mer­cy, but such an agreeableness of the exer­cise of those attributes to Gods nature, that he neither doth nor can delight in the miseries of his creatures in themselves, but as they are subservient to the ends of his Government; and yet such is his kindness in that rspect too, that he useth all means agreeable thereto, to make them avoid being miserable, to advanee his own glory. And I cannot but wonder that Grotius, who Grot. de sa­tisfact. c. 2. p. 43. Ed. 1617. Grot. de [...]ur [...] belli, &c. l. 2. c. 20. sect. 4. had asserted the contrary in his book of Satisfaction, should in his books De Jure belli ac pacis, assert, That when God punisheth wicked men, he doth it for no other end, but that he might punish them: For which he makes use of no other arguments, than those which Crellius had objected against him; viz. The delight God takes in punishing, and the judgements of the life to come, when no amendment can be expected; the former hath been already answered, the latter is objected by Crellius against him, when he makes the ends of punishment, meerly to respect the community, which cannot be as­serted of the punishments of another life, which must chiefly respect the vindication [Page 312] of Gods glory, in the punishment of un­reclaimable sinners. And this we do not deny to be a just punishment, since our Adversaries themselves, as well as we, make it necessary. But we are not so to under­stand, that the end of Divine punishments doth so respect the community, as though God himself were to be excluded out of it; for we are so to understand it, as made up of God as the Governor, and mankind as the persons governed; what­ever then tends to the vindication of the rights of Gods Honor and Soveraignty, tends to the good of the whole, because the manifestation of that end is so great an end of the whole.

But withall, though we assert in the life to come, the ends of punishment not §. 12. The ends of Divine punish­ments dif­ferent in this and the future state. to be the reclaiming of sinners, who had never undergone them, unless they had been unreclaimable; yet a vast difference must be made between the ends of punish­ments in that, and in this present state. For the other is the Reserve, when no­thing else will do, and therefore was not primarily intended; but the proper ends of punishment, as a part of Government, are to be taken from the design of them in this life. And here we assert, that Gods end in punishing, is the advancing [Page 313] his honor, not by the meer miseries of his creatures, but that men by behold­ing his severity against sin, should break off the practice of it, that they may escape the punishments of the furture state. So that the ends of punishment here, are quite of another kinde, from those of another life; for those are inflicted, be­cause persons have been unreclaimable by either the mercies or punishments of this life; but these are intended, that men should so far take notice of this severity of God, as to avoid the sins which will expose them to the wrath to come. And from hence it follows, That whatsoever sufferings, do answer all these ends of Di­vine punishments, and are inflicted on the account of sin, have the proper notion of punishments in them, and God may accept of the undergoing them as a full satisfacti­on to his Law, if they be such as tend to break men off from sin, and assert Gods right, and vindicate his honor to the world; which are the ends assigned by Crellius, and will be of great consequence to us in the following Discourse.

CHAP. II.

THese things being thus far cleared §. 1. The parti­cular state of the con­troversie concerning the suffer­ings of Christ for us. concerning the nature and ends of punishments, and how far they are of the nature of debts, and consequently what kind of satisfaction is due for them, the resolution of the grand Question concern­ing the sufferings of Christ will appear much more easie; but that we may pro­ceed with all possible cleerness in a de­bate of this consequence, we must yet a little more narrowly examine the diffe­rence between our Adversaries and us in this matter; for their concessions are in terms sometimes so fair, as though the dif­ference were meerly about words with­out [Page 316] any considerable difference in the thing it self. If we charge them with de­nying satisfaction, Crellius answers in the name of them, that we do it unjustly; for Crell. praes. p. 7. they do acknowledge a satisfaction worthy of God, and agreeable to the Scriptures. If we charge them with denying that our salva­tion is obtained by the death of Christ, they assert the contrary, as appears by the same Authour. Nay, Ruarus attributes Rua [...]us in Epistol. merit to the death of Christ too. They ac­knowledge, that Christ dyed for us, nay, that there was a commutation between Christ Crell. cap. 9. sect. 2. and us, both of one person for another, and of a price for a person; and that the death of Christ may be said to move God to redeem Cap. 10. sect. 10. us; they acknowledge reconciliation, and expiation of sins to be by the death of Christ. Cap. 7, 8, &c. Nay, they assert, that Christs death was by reason of our sins, and that God designed by that to shew his severity against sin. And Cap. 1. sect. 57. what could we desire more, if they meant the same thing by these words, which we do? They assert a satisfaction, but it is such a one as is meerly fulfilling the desire of another; in which sense all that obey God may be said to satisfie him. They attri­bute our salvation to the death of Christ, but only as a condition intervening, upon the performance of which the Covenant [Page 317] was confirmed, and himself taken into Glory, that he might free men from the pu­nishment of their sins. They attribute merit to Christs death but in the same sense that we may merit too, when we do what is pleasing to God. They acknowledge, that Christ dyed for us, but not in our stead, but for our advantage; that there was a commu­tation; but not such a one, as that the Son of God did lay down his blood as a proper price in order to our redemption as the purchase of it; when they speak of a moving cause, they tell us, they mean no more than the performance of any condition may be said to move, or as our prayers and repen­tance do. The reconciliation they speak of, doth not at all respect God but us; they assert an expiation of sins consequent upon the death of Christ, but not depending upon it any otherwise than as a condition necessary for his admission to the office of a High Priest in Heaven there to expiate our sins by his power, and not by his blood; but they utterly deny, that the death of Christ is to be considered as a proper expi­atory sacrifice for sin; or that it hath any further influence upon it, than as it is con­sidered as a means of the confirmation of the truth of his Doctrine, and particu­larly the promise of remission of sins, on [Page 318] which, and not on the death of Christ they say our remission depends; but so far as the death of Christ may be an argument to us to believe his Doctrine, and that faith may incline us to obedience, and that obedience being the condition in order to pardon, at so many removes they make the death of Christ to have influence on the remission of our sins. They as­sert that God took occasion by the sins of men to exercise an act of dominion upon Christ in his sufferings, and that the sufferings of Christ were intended for the taking away the sins of men; but they utterly deny, that the suffer­ings of Christ were to be considered as a pu­nishment for sin, or that Christ did suffer in our place and stead; nay, they contend with great vehemency, that it is wholly inconsi­stent with the justice of God to make one mans sins the meritorious cause of anothers punish­ment; especially one wholly innocent, and so that the guilty shall be free [...] on the account of his sufferings. Thus I have endeavoured to give the true state of the controversie with all clearness and brevity. And the substance of it will be reduced to these two debates.

1. Whether the sufferings of Christ in general are to be considered as a pu­nishment of sin, or as a meer act of domi­nion?

[Page 319] 2. Whether the death of Christ in par­ticular were a proper expiatory sacrifice for sin, or only an antecedent condition to his exercise of the Office of Priesthood in Hea­ven?

1. Whether the sufferings of Christ in §. 2. Whether the suffer­ings of Christ are to be con­sidered as a punish­ment of sin. general are to be consider'd as a punish­ment of sin, or as a meer act of domini­on? for that it must be one or the other of these two, cannot be denyed by our Adversaries; for the inflicting those suf­ferings upon Christ, must either proceed from an antecedent meritorious cause, or not. If they doe, they are then punish­ments; if not, they are meer exercises of power and dominion; whatever ends they are intended for, and whatever recom­ [...]ce be made for them. So Crellius as­serts, Crell. cap. 2. sect. 1. p. 142. that God as absolute Lord of all, had a right of absolute dominion upon the life and body of Christ, and therefore might justly de­liver him up to death, and give his body to the Crosse; and although Christ by the ordi­nary force of the Law of Moses, had a right to escape so painfull and accursed death, yet God by the right of dominion had the power of disposal of him, because he intended to com­pensate his torments with a reward infinitely greater than they were: but because he saith, for great ends the consent of Christ was ne­cessary, [Page 320] therefore God did not use his utmost dominion in delivering him up by force as he might have done, but he dealt with him by way of command, and rewards proposed for obedience, and in this sense he did act as a righteous Governour, and indulgent Father, who encouraged his Son to undergoe hard, but great things. In which we see, that he makes the sufferings of Christ an act of meer dominion in God, without any ante­cedent cause as the reason of them; only he qualifies this act of dominion with the proposal of a reward for it. But we must yet fu [...]ther enquire into their meaning, for though here Crellius attributes the suf­ferings of Christ meerly to Gods dominion, without any respect to sin, yet elsewhere he will allow a respect that was had to [...] antecedently to the sufferings of Christ, and that the sins of men were the impul­sive Crell. cap. 1. sect. 7. &c. cause of them. And although Soci­nus in one place utterly denyes any lawfull Socin. de Christo ser­vat. l. 3. [...]. 10. antecedent cause of the death of Christ, besides the will of God and Christ, yet Crellius in his Vindication saith, by lawfull cause, he meant meritorious, or such upon supposi­tion Crell. cap. 1. sect. 16. of which he ought to dye; for else­where he makes Christ to dye for the cause, Socin. l. 2. [...]. 7. or by the occasion of our sins; which is the same that Crellius means by an impulsive, [Page 321] or procatartick cause. Which he thus ex­plains, We are now to suppose a decree of God Crell. c. 1. §. 11. not only to give salvation to Mankinde, but to give us a firm hope of it in this present state, now our sins by deserving eternal punishment, do hinder the effect of that decree upon us, and therefore they were an impulsive cause of the death of Christ, by which it was effected, that this decree should obtain notwithstand­ing our sins. But we are not to understand as though this were done by any expiation of the guilt of sin by the death of Christ; but this effect is hindred by three things, by taking away their sins, by assuring men that their former sins, and present infirmities upon their sincere obedience shall not be imputed to them, and that the effect of that decree shall obtain, all which, saith he, is effected morte Christi interveniente, the death of Christ interventing, but not as the procuring cause. So that after all these words he means no more by ma­king our sins an impulsive cause of the death of Christ, but that the death of Christ was an argument to confirm to us the truth of his Doctrine, which doctrine of his doth give us assurance of these things: and that our sins when they are said to be the impulsive cause, are not to be considered with a respect to their guilt, but to that distrust of God which our sins do raise in [Page 322] us; which distrust is in truth according to this sense of Crellius the impulsive cause, and not the sins which were the cause or oc­casion of it. For that was it which the doctrine was designed to remove, and our sins only as the causes of that. But if it be said, that he speaks not only of the distrust, but of the punishment of sin as an impediment which must be removed too, and therefore may be call'd an impulsive cause, we are to con­sider that the removal of this is not attri­buted to the death of Christ, but to the leaving of our sins by the belief of his Doctrine; therefore the punishment of our sins cannot unless in a very remote sense be said to be an impulsive cause of that, which for all that we can observe by Crellius, might as well have been done without it; if any other way could be thought sufficient to confirm his doctrine, and Christ, without dying, might have had power to save all them that obey him. But we understand not an impulsive cause in so remote a sense, as though our sins were a meer occasion of Christs dying, because the death of Christ was one ar­gument among many others to believe his Doctrine, the belief of which would make men leave their sins; but we con­tend for a neerer and more proper sense, [Page 323] viz. that the death of Christ was pri­marily intended for the expiation of our sins, with a respect to God and not to us, and therefore our sins as an impulsive cause are to be considered as they are so dis­pleasing to God; that it was necessary for the Vindication of Gods Honour, and the deterring the world from sin, that no less a Sacrifice of Attonement should be offe­red, than the blood of the Son of God. So that we understand an impulsive cause here in the same sense, that the sins of the peo­ple were, under the Law, the cause of the offering up those Sacrifices, which were appointed for the expiation of them. And as in those Sacrifices there were two things to be considered, viz. the mactation, and the oblation of them, the former as a punish­ment by a substitution of them in place of the persons who had offended; the latter as the proper Sacrifice of attone­ment, although the mactation it self, con­sidered with the design of it, was a Sa­crificial act too: So we consider the suffe­rings of Christ with a twofold respect, ei­ther as to our sins, as the impulsive cause of them, so they are to be considered as a punishment, or as to God, with a design to expiate the guilt of them, so they are a Sacrifice of Attonement. The first conside­ration [Page 324] is, that we are now upon, and up­on which the present debate depends, for if the sufferings of Christ be to be taken under the notion of punishment, then our Adversaries grant, that our sins must be an impulsive cause of them in another sense than they understand it. For the clearing of this, I shall prove these two things.

1. That no other sense ought to be ad­mitted of the places of Scripture which speak of the sufferings of Christ with a respect to sin, but this.

2. That this Account of the sufferings of Christ, is no wayes repugnant to the Ju­stice of God.

That no other sense ought to be admit­ted §. 3. The suffer­ings of Christ pro­ved to be a punish­ment from Scripture. 1 Pet. 2. 24. Isa. 53. 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11. 2 Cor. 5. 21. Gal. 3. 13. Rom. 4. 25. of the places of Scripture, which speak of the sufferings of Christ with a respect to our sins, but that they are to be con­sidered as a punishment for them. Such are those which speak of Christs bearing our sins, of our iniquities being laid upon him, of his making himself an offering for sin, and being made sin and a curse for us, and of his dying for our sins. All which I shall so far consider, as to vindicate them from all the exceptions which Socinus and Crel­lius have offered against them.

1. Those which speak of Christs bearing [Page 325] our sins. As to which we shall consider, First,. The importance of the phrase in general of bearing sin, and then the cir­cumstances of the particular places in di­spute. For the importance of the phrase, Socinus acknowledges, that it generally sig­nifies Soc. de servat. l. 2. cap. 4. bearing the punishment of sin in Scri­pture: but that sometimes it signifies taking away. The same is confessed by Crellius, Crell. cap. 1. Sect. 32. but he saith, it doth not alwayes signifie bear­ing proper punishment, but it is enough (he sayes) that one bears something burdensome on the occasion of others sins: and so Christ by undergoing his sufferings by occasion of sins, may be said to bear our sins. And for this sense he quotes Numb. 14. 33. And your Children shall wander in the Wilderness forty years, and bear your whoredoms, untill your carcasses be wasted in the Wilderness. Where­by, saith he, it is not meant that God would punish the Children of the Israelites, but that by the occasion of their parents sins, they should undergoe that trouble, in wandering in the Wilderness, and being deprived of the posses­sion of the promised Land. But could Crel­lius think that any thing else could have been imagined, (setting aside a total de­struction) a greater instance of Gods se­verity, than that was to the Children of Israel all their circumstances being consi­dered? [Page 326] Is it not said, that God did swear in his wrath, they should not enter into his Psal. 95. 11. Heb. 3. 11. rest? Surely then the debarring them so long of that rest, was an instance of Gods wrath, and so according to his own prin­ciples must have something of Vindicta in it, and therefore be a proper punishment. The truth is, our Adversaries allow them­selves in speaking things most repugnant to Humane Nature in this matter of pu­nishments, that they may justifie their own hypothesis. For a whole Nation to be for forty years debarred from the great­est blessings were ever promised them; and instead of enjoying them, to endure the miseries and hardships of forty years travells in a barren wilderness, must not be thought a punishment, and only because occasioned by their Parents sins. But what­ever is inflicted on the account of sin, and with a design to shew Gods severity against it, and thereby to deterr others from the practice of it, hath the proper notion of punishment in it; and all these things did concurr in this instance, besides the ge­neral sense of mankind in the matter of their punishment, which was such, that supposing them preserved in their liberty, could not have been imagined greater. And therefore Vatablus, whom Socinus [Page 327] and Crellius highly commend, thus renders those words, dabunt poenas pro fornicatio­nibus Doctissimè & elegan­tissi [...] Va­tablus ut f [...]rè soi [...]t. So [...]. deserv. l. 1. c. 8. Crell. cap. 1. Sect. 31. vestris quibus defecistis a Deo vestro: they shall suffer the punishment of your fornications. And that bearing the sins of Parents doth imply properly bearing the punishment of them, methinks they should not so earnestly deny, who contend that to be the meaning of the words in Eze­kiel, The Son shall not bear the iniquity of the Ezekiel 18. 20. Father; viz. that he shall not bear the punish­ment of his Fathers sins. Where in bearing iniquity with a respect to their Parents sins, by their own confession must be taken for the proper punishment; for other­wise Crell. cap. 4. Sect. 15. they do not deny, but Children not­withstanding that sentence, may undergo much affliction on the occasion of their Parents sins.

But Socinus further objects, that bearing §. 4. Of the Scape-Goats bear­ing away the sins of the people. Soc. l. 2. c. 4. sins doth not imply the punishment of them, because the Scape-Goat under the Law, is said to bear upon him the iniquities of the people, and yet could not be said to be punished for them. To which Grotius answers, that Socinus takes it for granted without reason, Lev. 16. 22. that the Scape-Goat could not be said to be punished for the sins of the people; for punish­ment Grot. de sat. c. 1. in general, may fall upon beasts for the sins of men, Gen. 9. 5. Exod. 21. 28. [Page 328] Lev. 20. 15. Gen. 8. 21. and Socinus hath no cause to say, that the Scape-Goat was not slain; for the Jewish Interpreters do all agree that he was, and however the sending him in­to the Wilderness was intended as a punish­ment, and most probably by an unnatural death. To which Crellius replies, That i [...] the general, he denyes not but punishment may Crell. c. 1. Sect. 56. fall upon beasts as well as men; but (that he might shew himself true to his principle, that one cannot be punished for anothe [...] faults,) he falls into a very pleasant dis­course, That the Beasts are not said to be pu­nished for mens sins, but for their own, and therefore when it is said, before the flood, that all flesh had corrupted his way; he will by n [...] Gen. 6. 12. means have it understood only of men, b [...] that the sins of the beasts at that time, were greater than ordinary, as well as mens. But he hath not told us what they were, whe­ther by eating some forbidden herbs, or entring into conspiracies against man­kind their lawful Soveraigns, or unlawful mixtures; and therefore we have yet rea­son to believe that when God saith, the ground was cursed for mans sake, that the Gen. 8. 21. beasts were punished for mans sin. And if all flesh, must comprehend beasts in this place, why shall not all flesh seeing the glory of the Lord, take in the beasts there too: Isa. 40. 5. [Page 329] for Vatablus parallels this place with the [...]ther. But if, saith Crellius any shall contend [...]hat some beasts at least were innocent, then [...]e saith, that those though they were destroy­ [...]d by the flood, yet did not suffer punishment, [...]ut only a calamity by occasion of the sins of [...]en. I wonder he did not rather say, that the innocent beasts were taken into the Ark, for the propagation of a better kind afterwards. But by this solemn di­stiuction of calamities and punishments, there is nothing so miserable, that either men or beasts can undergo, but when it serves their turn, it shall be only a calamity and no punishment, though it be said to be on purpose to shew Gods severity against the sins of the world. And this excellent no­tion of the beasts being punished for their own sins, is improved by him to the vindication of the Scape-Goat from being punished; because then, saith he, the most wicked and corrupt Goat should have been made choice off. As though all the design of that great day of expiation had been only to call the Children of Israel toge­ther with great solemnity, to let them see, how a poor Goat must be punished for breaking the Laws which we do not know were ever made for them. I had thought our Adversaries had maintained that the [Page 330] Sacrifices (on the day of expiation [...] least) had represented and typified th [...] Sacrifice which was to be offered up b [...] Christ; and so Socinus and Crellius else where contend: he need not therefor [...] have troubled himself concerning the si [...] of the Goat, when it is expresly said, Th [...] Lev. 16 21. the sins of the people were put on the he [...] of the Goat; Whatever then the punish­ment were, it was on the account of the sins of the people, and not his own. Bu [...] Crellius urgeth against Grotius, that if the Scape-Goat had been punished for the expiation of the sins of the people, that should have bee [...] particularly expressed in Scripture, where [...] nothing is said there at all of it, and that the throwing down the Scape-Goat from the top [...] the rock, was no part of the Primitive Insti­tution, but one of the superstitions taken up by the Jewes in after-times, because of the ominousness of the return of it; and although we should suppose (which is not probable) that it should dye by famine in the Wilderness, yet this was not the death for expiation, which was to be by the shedding of blood. To this therefore I answer. 1. I do not insist on the customs of the later Jewes to prove from thence any punishment designed by the primitive institution. For I shall ea­sily yield, that many superstitions obtained [Page 331] among them afterwards about the Scape-Goat; as the stories of the red list turning white upon the head of it, the booths and he causey made on purpose, and several other things mentioned in the Rabbinical Cod. Joma. tit. 6. Writers do manifest. But yet it seems very probable from the Text it self, that the Scape-Goat was not carried into the Wilderness at large, but to a steep moun­tain there. For although we have com­monly rendered Azazel by the Scape-Goat, yet according to the best of the Jewish Writers, as P. Fagius tells us, [...] doth not come from [...] a Goat, and [...] abiit; but is the name of a Mountain very steep and rocky near Mount Sinai, and therefore probably called by the later Jews, [...] the name of a Rock: and to this purpose, it is observable that where we render it, and let him go for a Scape-Goat into the Wilderness Lev. 16. 10. in the Hebrew it is, [...] to send him to Azazel in the Wilderness: as the joyning the preposition [...] doth import, and the Arabick Version whereever Azazel is mentioned, renders it by Mount Azaz: and the Chaldee and Syriack to Azazel; so that from hence, a carrying the Scape-Goat to a certain place may be inferred; but I see no foundation in the Text for the throwing it down from the rock when it was there; [Page 332] and therefore I cannot think, but that [...] the punishment intended did lye in tha [...] it would have been expresly mention [...] in the solemnities of that day, which h [...] so great an influence on the expiation [...] the sins of the people. 2. I answer, th [...] the Scape-Goat was to denote rather t [...] effect of the expiation, than the mann [...] of obtaining it. For the proper expiatio [...] was by the shedding of blood, as the Apos [...] tells us; and thence the live Goat was no [...] Heb. 9. 22. to have the sins of the people to bear aw [...] into the desart, till the High Priest had made [...] Lev. 16. 20. end of reconciling the Holy Place, and the T [...] bernacle of the Congregation, and the Altar; an [...] by the sprinkling of the blood of the other God which was the sin-offering for the people; which being done, he was to bring the live Goat, and to lay his hands upon the head of it, and con­fess V. 15. over it all the iniquities of the children of Israel, and all their transgressions in [...] their sins, putting them upon the head of the Goat, and shall send him away by the hand of a fit man into the Wilderness; and so the Go [...] V. 21. shall bear upon him all their iniquities un­to a land not inhabited, and he shall let go the Goat in the Wilderness. So that V. 22. the former Goat noted the way of ex­piation by the shedding of blood, and the latter the effect of it, viz. that the [Page 333] sins of the people were declared to be ex­piated by the sending the Goat charged with their sins into a desart place; and that their sins would not appear in the presence of God against them, any more than they expected, that the Goat which was sent into the Wilderness should return among them. Which was the reason that afterwards they took so much care that it should not, by causing it to be thrown off from a steep rock; which was no sooner done, but notice was given of it very suddenly by the sounding of horns all over the Land. But the force of Socinus his ar­gument from the Scape-Goats bearing the sins of the people, that therefore that phrase doth not alwayes imply the bear­ing of punishment, is taken off by Crellius himself, who tells us that the Scape-Goat is not said to bear the sins of the people in the Crell. c. 1. Sect. 56. Wilderness; but only that it carried the sins of the people into the Wilderness, which is a phrase of another importance from that we are now discoursing off. As will now further appear from the places where it is spoken of concerning our Saviour, which we now come particularly to examine.

The first place insisted on by Grotius §. 5. Grotius his sense of 1 Pet. 2. 24. vindicated. with a respect to Christ, is 1 Pet. 2. 24. Who his own self bare our sins in his own body [Page 334] on the tree, which, saith Crellius, is so far from proving that Christ did bear the punish­ment Crell. c. 1. §. 35. of our sins, that it doth not imply any sufferings that he underwent on the occasion of them. He grants that [...] doth signifie to carry up, but withall (he saith) it signifies to take away; because that which is taken up, is taken away from the place where it was. Besides, he observes, that [...] doth an­swer to the Hebrew [...] he hath made to as­cend, which is frequently rendred by it in the LXX. and sometimes by [...]; but that He­brew word doth often signifie to take away, where it is rendred in the Greek by one of those two words, 2 Sam. 21. 13. Josh. 24. 32. Psal. 102. 25. Ezra 1. 11. To which I answer, 1. That the signification of [...] in this place, must not be taken from every sense the word is ever used for, but in that which the words out of which these are taken do imply; and in Isa. 53. 11. it doth not answer [...] but to [...] a word which by the confession of all is never properly used for taking away, but for bearing of a burden, and is used with a respect to the punishment of sin, Lament. 5. 7. Our fathers have sinned, and are not, and we have born their iniquities, where the same word is used; so that the significa­tion of the word [...] here, must depend [Page 335] upon that in Isaiah, of which more after­ward. 2. Granting that [...] doth an­swer sometimes to the Hebr. [...] yet it makes nothing to Crellius his purpose, un­less he can prove that [...] doth ever signifie the taking away a thing by the destruction of it; for where it answers to that word, it is either for the offering up of a Sacrifice, in which sense [...] is very frequently used, as is confessed by Crellius; and in that sense it is no prejudice at all to our cause; for then it must be granted, that Christ upon the Cross is to be considered as a sacrifice for the sins of men; and so our sins were laid upon him as they were supposed to be on the Sacrifices under the Law, in order to the expiation of them, by the shedding their blood; and if our Adversaries would acknowledge this, the difference would not be so great between us; or else it is used for the re­moval of a thing from one place to ano­ther, the thing it self still remaining in being, as 2 Sam. 21. 13. And he made Sauls bones to ascend, [...], he took them away, saith Crellius; true, but it is such a taking away, as is a bare removal; the thing still remaining; the same is to be said of Joseph's bones, Josh. 24. 32. which are all the places where [...] [Page 336] is used; and although [...] may be sometimes taken in another sense, as Psal. 102. 25. yet nothing can be more unreasonable than such a way of arguing as this is; [...] saith Crellius signifies ta­king away; we demand his proof of it; is it that the word signifies so much of it self? No; that he grants it doth not. Is it that it is frequently used in the Greek Version to render a word that properly doth signifie so? No; nor that neither. But how is it then? Crellius tells us, that it sometimes answers to a word that signi­fies to make to ascend: well, but doth that word signifie taking away? No; not constantly, for it is frequently used for a sacrifice: but doth it at any time signifie so? Yes; it signifies the removal of a thing from one place to another. Is that the sense then he contends for here? No, but how then? why [...] is used to render the same word that [...] doth, and [...] though it signifies too a bare removal, as Ezra 1. 11. yet Psal. 102. 25. it is used for cutting off, [...], the Hebr. is, make me not to ascend in the midst of my dayes. But doth it here signifie utter de­struction? I suppose not; but grant it, what is this to [...], when the LXX. useth not that word here, which for all [Page 337] that we know was purposely alter'd; so that at last [...] is far enough from any such signification as Crellius would fix up­on it, unless he will assert, that Christs taking away our sins, was only a removal of them from Earth to Heaven. But here Grotius comes in to the relief of Crellius against himself; for in his Notes upon this place, though he had before said, that the word was never used in the New Te­stament in that sense, yet he there saith, [...] is abstulit, for which he referrs us to Heb. 9. 28. where he proceeds altoge­ther as subtilly as Crellius had done before him, for he tells us [...] is put for [...] Numb. 14. 33. Deut. 14. 24. Isa. 53. 12. but [...], i. e. [...] is put for [...], Lev. 10. 17. Numb. 14. 18. A most excellent way of interpreting Scripture! consider­ing the various significations of the He­brew words; and above all of that [...] which is here mention'd. For according to this way of arguing, [...] shall signi­fie the same with [...], and [...], for [...] signifies all these, and is ren­dred by them in the Greek Version, so that by the same way that Grotius proves that [...] signifies [...], we can prove that [...] doth not signifie to take away, but to bear punishment; nay, [...] signifies the [Page 338] bearing punishment in the strictest sense, Ezek. 16. 52, 54. and bearing sin in that sense, Ezek. 16. 58. Thou hast born thy lewd­ness, and thy abominations, [...] So that when [...] is more frequently used in this than in the other sense, why shall its sig­nifying [...] at any time make [...] be taken in the same sense with that? Nay, I do not remember in any place where [...] is joyned with sin, but it signifies the punishment of it, so [...], Levit. 19. 8. to bear his iniquity, Levit. 20. 17. [...], bearing their iniquity in one verse is explained by being cut off from among their people, in the next. And in the places cited by Grotius, that Numb. 14. 33. hath been already shewed to sig­nifie bearing the punishment of sin, and that Deut. 14. 24. is plainly understood of a Sacrifice, the other, Isa. 53. 12. will be afterwards made appear by other places in the same Chapter, to signifie nothing to this purpose. So that for all we can yet see, [...] must be taken either for bearing our sins as a sacrifice did under the Law, or the punishment of them; in either sense it serves our purpose, but is far enough from our Adversaries mean­ing.

[Page 339] But supposing we should grant them, that [...] may signifie to take away, let us see §. 6. Crellius his se [...] ex­am [...]n [...]d. what excellent sense they make of these words of S. Peter. Do they then say, that Christ did take away our sins upon the Cross? No, they have a great care of that, for that would make the expiation of sins to have been performed there; which they utterly deny, and say, that Christ only took the Cross in his way to his As­cension to Heaven, that there he might expiate sins. But doth not S. Peter say, that what was done by him here, was in his body on the tree: and they will not say, he carryed that with him to Heaven too. Well, but what then was the taking away of sin which belong'd to Christ upon the Cross? is it only to perswade men to live vertuously, and leave off their sins? ‘This Socinus would have, and Crellius is con­tented Soc. deserv l. 2. c. 6. Crell. c. 1. §. 39. that it should be understood barely of taking away sins, and not of the punishment of them, but only by way of accession and consequence: but if it be taken (which he inclines more to) for the punishment, then (he saith) it is to be understood not of the vertue and efficacy of the death of Christ, but of the effect: and yet a little after he saith, Sect. [...]4. those words of Christs bearing our sins, [Page 340] are to be understood of the force and efficacy of Christs death to do it, not in­cluding the effect of it in us; not as though Christ did deliver us from sins by his death, but that he did that by dy­ing, upon which the taking away of sin would follow, or which had a great power for the doing it.’ So uncertain are our Adversaries, in affixing any sense upon these words, which may attribute any ef­fect at all, to the death of Christ up­on the Cross. For if they be under­stood of taking away sins, then they are onely to be meant of the power that was in the death of Christ, to perswade men to leave their sins; which we must have a care of understanding so, as to attribute any effect to the death of Christ in order to it; but onely that the death of Christ was an argument for us to believe what he said, and the believing what he said would incline us to obey him, and if we obey him, we shall leave off our sins, whether Christ had dyed or no: sup­posing his miracles had the same effect on us, which those of Moses had upon the Jews, which were sufficient to perswade them to believe and obey without his death. But if this be all that was meant by Christs bearing our sins in his body on the tree; why [Page 341] might not S. Peter himself be said to bear them upon his cross too? for his death was an excellent example of patience, and a great argument to perswade men he spake truth, and that doctrine which he preach­ed, was repentance and remission of sins: So that by this sense, there is nothing pe­culiar attributed to the death of Christ. But taking the other sense for the taking away the punishment of sins, we must see how this belongs to the death of Christ: Do they then attribute our delivery from the punishment to sin, to the death of Christ on the Cross? yes, just as we may attribute Caesars subduing Rome, to his pas­sing over Rubicon, because he took that in his way to the doing of it: so they make the death of Christ onely as a passage, in order to expiation of sins, by taking away the punishment of them. For that shall not be actually perfected, they say, till his full deliverance of all those that obey him, from hell and the grave, which will not be till his second coming. So that if we onely take the body of Christ for his se­cond coming, and the cross of Christ, or the tree, for his Throne of Glory, then they will acknowledge, that Christ may very well be said, to take away sins in his own body on the tree: but if you take it in any sense that [Page 342] doth imply any peculiar efficacy to the death of Christ, for all the plainness of S. Peters words, they by no means will ad­mit of it.

But because Crellius urgeth Grotius with §. 7. Isa. 53. 11. vindicated. Crell. c. 1. sect. 35. the sense of that place, Isa. 53. 11. out of which he contends these words are taken, and Crellius conceives he can prove there, that bearing is the same with taking away sin: We now come to consider, what force he can find from thence, for the justifying his assertion, That the bearing of sins, when at­tributed to Christ, doth not imply the punish­ment of them, but the taking them away. The words are, for he shall bear their iniquities. As to which Grotius observes, that the word [...] which signifies iniquity, is sometimes taken for the punishment of sin, 2 Kings 7. 9. and the verb [...] is to bear, and when ever it is joyned with sin or iniquity, in all Languages, and especially the Hebrew, it signifies to suffer punishment; for although [...] may sometimes signifie to take away, [...] never does: so that this phrase can receive no other interpretation. Notwithstanding all which, Crellius attempts to prove, that [...] here, must be taken in a Crell. c. 1. sect. 44. sense contrary to the natural and perpetual use of the word; for which his first argument is very infirm, viz. because it is mentioned after the death of Christ, and is therefore to be [Page 343] considered as the reward of the other. Where­as it appears: 1. By the Prophets discourse, that he doth not insist on an exact metho­dical order, but dilates and amplifies things as he sees occasion: for Vers. 9. he saith, He made his grave with the wicked, and with the rich in his death; and Vers. 10. he saith, Yet it pleased the Lord to bruise him, he hath put him to grief: Will Crellius therefore say, that this must be consequent to his death and burial? 2. The particle, may be here taken causally, as we render it, very agree­ably to the sense; and so it gives an ac­count of the fore-going clause, By his know­ledge, shall my righteous servant justifie many, for he shall bear their iniquities. And that this is no unusual acception of that parti­cle, might be easily cleared from many places of Scripture if it were necessary; and from this very Prophet, as Isa. 39. 1. where [...] is the same with [...] 2 King. 20. 12. and Isa. 64. 5. Thou art wroth, for we have sinned [...] where the same particle is made the causal of what went before. But we need not insist upon this to answer Crellius, who elsewhere makes use of it him­self, and says, They must be very ignorant of the Hebrew Tongue, who do not know, that the Crell. c. 9. §. 7. p. 463. Soc. Prael. c. 14. sect. 6. conjunction copulative is often taken causally; and so much is confessed by Socinus also, [Page 344] where he explains, that particle in one sens [...] in the beginning, and causally in the middl [...] of the verse: And the Lords anger was kindle [...] against Israel, [...] for he moved, &c. But i [...] 2 Sam. 24. 1. this will not do, he attempts to prove [...] That [...] in this very Chapter, hath the signi­fication of taking away, v. 4. For he hath bor [...] our griefs, and carried our sorrows, which i [...] applied by S. Matth. 8. 17. to bodily diseases, which our Saviour did not bear, but took away, as it is said in the foregoing verse, he healed all that were sick on which those words come in, That it might be fulfilled which was spoken by Esaias, &c. To which I answer: 1. It is granted by our Adversaries, that S. Matthew in those words, doth not give the full sense of the Prophet, but onely applies that by way of accommodation, to bodily diseases, which was chiefly intended for the sins of men. And in a way of accommodation it is not unusual to strain words beyond their genuine and natural signification, or what was intended primarily by the person who spake them. Would it be reasonable for any to say that [...] signifies to give, because that place Psal. 68. 18. where the word by all is acknowledged to signifie to receive, is ren­dred to give, Eph. 4. 8. so that admitting another sense of the word here, as applied to the cure of bodily diseases, it doth [Page 345] not from thence follow, that this should be [...]he meaning of the word in the primary [...]ense intended by the Prophet. 2. The word as used by S. Matthew, is very capable of the primary and natural sense; for S. Matthew retains words of the same signi­fication, with that which we contend for, [...] and [...], neither of which doth signifie taking away, by causing a thing not to be. So that all that is implied hereby, is the pains and trouble which our Saviour took in the healing of the sick. For to that end, as Grotius well observes upon that place, the circumstances are mentioned, That it was at even, and multitudes were brought to him in S. Matthew, that after Sun­set Mat. 8. 16. all that were diseased were brought, and all the City was gathered together at the door; in Mark 1. 32, 33. Luke 4. 42. S. Mark, That he departed not till it was day, in S. Luke; that we might the better un­derstand how our Saviour did bear our griefs, because the pains he took in healing them were so great. And here I cannot but ob­serve, that Grotius in his notes on that place, continued still in the same minde he was in, when he writ against Socinus; for he saith, ‘Those words may either refer to the diseases of the body, and so they note the pains he took in the cure of them; or to our sins, and so they were [Page 346] fulfilled when Christ by suffering upon t [...] cross, did obtain remission of sins for [...] as S. Peter saith, 1 Pet. 2. 24.’ But upon what reason the Annotations on that pla [...] come to be so different from his sense e [...] pressed here, long after Crellius his answe [...] I do not understand. But we are sure [...] declared his mind, as to the main of th [...] Controversie, to be the same, that it w [...] when he writ his Book which Crellius an­swered; as appears by two Letters of h [...] to Vossius, not long since published; an [...] he utterly disowns the charge of Socinianisa, Epist. Eccl [...]. p. 747, 748 Discuss. p. 16. 17. as a calumny in his discussion, the last book he ever writ.

But we are no further obliged to vindi­cate §. 8. Isa. 53. 5, 6, 7. vindica­ted. Grotius, than he did the truth; which we are sure he did in the vindication of the 53 of Isaiah, from Socinus his interpre­tations, notwithstanding what Crellius hath objected against him. We therefore pro­ceed to other Verses in the same Chapter insisted on by Grotius, to prove That Christ did bear the punishment of our sins, v. 6, 7. The Lord hath laid on him the iniquities of us all: It is required, and he was afflicted, as Grotius renders those words. Socinus makes D [...] Servat. l. 2. c. 5. a twofold sense of the former clause; the first is, That God by or with Christ did meet with our iniquities; the latter, That God did [Page 347] make our iniquities to meet with Christ. The [...]ords saith Grotius, will not bear the for­ [...]er interpretation; for the verb [...] be­ [...]g in Hiphil, must import a double action, [...]nd so it must not be, That God by him did [...]eet with our sins, but that God did make our [...]s to meet upon him. To which Crellius [...]eplies, That words in Hiphil are somtimes Crell. c. 1. sect. 52. [...]sed intransitively; but can he produce any [...]nstance in Scripture, where this word [...]oyned with [...] and [...] is so taken? for in the last verse of the Chapter, the constructi­on is different: And what an uncertain way of interpreting Scripture will this be, if eve­ry Anomalous signification, and rare use of a word, shall be made use of to take a­way such a sense as is most agreeable to the design of the place. For that sense we con­tend for, is not onely enforced upon the most natural importance of these words, but upon the agreeableness of them with so many other expressions of this Chapter, that Christ did bear our iniquities, and was wound­ed for our transgressions, and that his soul was made an offering for sin: to which it is very suitable, that as the iniquities of the people were (as it were) laid upon the head of the Sacrifice; so it should be said of Christ, who was to offer up himself for the sins of the world. And the Jews themselves by [Page 348] this phrase do understand the punishme [...] either for the sins of the people, wh [...] Josias underwent, or which the people the [...] selves suffered, by those who interpret [...] prophecy of them. To which purpos [...] Aben Ezra observes, that iniquity is here [...] for the punishment of it, as 1 Sam. 28. 10. Lam. 4. 6. But Socinus mistrusting the i [...] congruity of this Interpretation, flies [...] another; viz. That God did make our i [...] quities to meet with Christ: and this we [...] willing to admit of, if by that they me [...] That Christ underwent the punishment [...] them; as that phrase must naturally i [...] port, for what otherwise can our iniqui [...] meeting with him signifie? For the word [...] taken properly (as Socinus acknowledg [...] it ought to be, when he rejects Pagni [...] Interpretation of making Christ to int [...] cede for our iniquities) signifies eith [...] to meet with one by chance, or out [...] kindeness, or else for an encounter, wi [...] an intention to destroy that which it me [...] with. So Judg. 8. 21. Rise thou [...] LXX irrue in nos, fall upon [...] i. e. run upon us with thy sword, and ki [...] us, Judg. 15. 12. Swear unto me, that [...] will not fall upon me your selves; where th [...] same word is used, and they explain th [...] meaning of it in the next words, v. 1 [...] [Page 349] we will not kill thee, Amos 5. 19. as if a man [...]dia flee from a Lyon, and a Bear met him, [...] i. e. with a design to kill him. Now I suppose they will not say that our sins met with Christ by chance, since it is said, that God laid on him, &c. nor out of kindness; it must be therefore out of enmity, and with a design to destroy him, and so our sins cannot be understood as Socinus and Crellius would have them, as the meer occasions of Christs death: but as the proper impulsive cause of it. Whe­ther the following word [...] be taken with a respect to sin, and so it properly signifies It is required, or with a respect to the person, and so it may signifie he was op­pressed, is not a matter of that conse­quence, which we ought to contend about; if it be proved that Christs ex­pression had only a respect to sin, as the punishment of it. Which will yet further appear from another expression in the same Chapter, ver. 5. The chastisement of our peace was upon him, and by his stripes we are healed. In which Grotius saith ‘the word [...] doth not signifie any kind of affliction, but such as hath the nature of punishment, either for example or instruction; but since the latter cannot be intended in Christ, the former must.’ [Page 350] Crellius thinks to escape from this, by ac­knowledging Crell. c. 1. Sect. 57. that the sufferings of Christ have some respect to sin; but if it be such a re­spect to sin, which makes what Christ un­derwent a punishment (which is only pro­per in this case) it is as much as we con­tend for. This therefore he is loth to abide by; and saith, that chastisement im­ports no more than bare affliction without any respect to sin, which he thinks to prove from St. Pauls words, 2 Cor. 6. 9. We are chastised, but not given over to death; but how far this is from proving his purpose will easily appear, 1. Because those by whom they were said to be chastened, did not think they did it without any respect to a fault; but they supposed them to be justly punished; and this is that we plead for, that the chastisement considered with a respect to him that inflicts it, doth sup­pose some fault as the reason of inflicting it. 2. This is far from the present purpose, for the chastisement there mentioned is op­posed to death, as chastened, but not killed; whereas Grotius expresly speaks of such chastisements as include death, that these cannot be supposed to be meerly designed for instruction, and therefore must be conceived under the notion of punish­ment. The other place Psal. 73. 14. is yet [Page 351] more remote from the business; for though the Psalmist accounts himself innocent in re­spect of the great enormities of others; yet he could not account himself so inno­cent with a respect to God, as not to de­serve chastisement from him.

But Crellius offers further to prove that §. 9. Whether Christs death be a proper [...], and whe­ther that doth imply that it was a punish­ment of sin? Christs death must be considered as a bare affliction, and not as a [...], or exem­plary punishment, because ‘in such a pu­nishment the guilty themselves are to be punished, and the benefit comes to those who were not guilty, but in Christs sufferings it was quite contrary, for the innocent was punished, and the guilty have the benefit of it: and yet (he saith) if we should grant that Christs sufferings were a [...], that will not prove that his death was a pro­per punishment.’ To which I answer, That whatever answers to the ends of an exemplary punishment, may properly be called so: but supposing that Christ suffered the punishment of our sins, those sufferings will answer to all the ends of an exem­plary punishment. For the ends of such a punishment assigned by Crellius himself, are, ‘That others observing such a pu­nishment, may abstain from those sins [Page 352] which have brought it upon the person who suffers.’ Now the question is, whe­ther supposing Christ did suffer on the account of our sins, these sufferings of his may deterr us from the practice of sin or no? And therefore in opposition to Crellius, I shall prove these two things: 1. That supposing Christ suffered for our sins, there was a sufficient argument to deterr us from the practice of sin. 2. Sup­posing that his sufferings had no respect to our sins, they could not have that force to deterr men from the practice of it: for he after asserts, That Christs sufferings might be a [...] to us, though they were no pu­nishment of sin. 1. That the death of Christ considered as a punishment of sin, is a proper [...] or hath a great force to deterr men from the practice of sin: and that because the same reason of pu­nishment is supposed in Christ and in our selves, and because the example is much more considerable, than if we had suffered our selves. 1. The same reason of punish­ment is supposed. For why are men de­terred from sin, by seeing others punished; but because they look upon the sin as the reason of the punishment; and therefore where the same reason holds, the same ends may be as properly obtained. If we [Page 353] said that Christ suffered death meerly as an innocent person out of Gods dominion over his life; what imaginable force could this have to deterr men from sin, which is asserted to have no relation to it as the cause of it? But when we say, that God laid our iniquities upon him, that he suf­fered not upon his own account but ours, that the sins we commit against God were the cause of all those bitter Agonies which the Son of God underwent, what argument can be more proper to deter men from sin than this is? For hereby they see the great abhorrency of sin which is in God, that he will not pardon the sins of men without a compensation made to his Ho­nour, and a demonstration to the world of his hatred of it. Hereby they see what a value God hath for his Laws, which he will not relax as to the punish­ment of offenders, without so valuable a consideration as the blood of his own Son. Hereby they see, that the punishment of sin is no meer arbitrary thing depending barely upon the will of God; but that there is such a connexion between sin and punishment as to the ends of Government, that unless the Honor and Majesty of God, as to his Laws and Government may be preserved, the violation of his Laws must [Page 354] expect a just recompence of reward. Here­by they see what those are to expect who neglect or despise these sufferings of the Son of God for them; for nothing can then remain, but a certain fearful looking for of judgement and fiery indignation which shall devour the Adversaries. So that, here all the weighty arguments concurr which may be most apt to prevail upon men to deterr them from their sins. For if God did thus by the green tree, what will he do by the dry? If he who was so innocent in himself, so perfectly holy, suffered so much on the account of our sins; what then may those expect to suffer, who have no innocency at all to plead, and add wilfulness and im­penitency to their sins? But if it be re­plyed by Crellius, that it is otherwise among men: I answer, that we do not pretend in all things to parallel the sufferings of Christ for us, with any sufferings of men for one another. But yet we add, that even among men the punishments inflicted on those who were themselves innocent as to the cause of them, may be as exempla­ry as any other. And the greater appearance of severity there is in them, the great­er terror they strike into all offenders. As Childrens losing their estates and ho­nors, or being banished for their Parents [Page 355] treasons in which they had no part them­selves. Which is a proper punishment on them of their Fathers faults, whether they be guilty or no; and if this may be just in men, why not in God? If any say, that the Parents are only punished in the Chil­dren, he speaks that which is contradicto­ry to the common sense of mankind; for punishment doth suppose sense or feeling of it; and in this case the Parents are said to be punished, who are supposed to be dead and past feeling of it, and the Chil­dren who undergo the smart of it must not be said to be punished; though all things are so like it, that no person can imagine himself in that condition, but would think himself punished, and severe­ly too. If it be said, that these are calami­ties indeed, but they are no proper punish­ments, it may easily be shewed that di­stinction will not hold here. Because these punishments were within the design of the Law, and were intended for all the ends of punishments, and therefore must have the nature of them. For therefore the Children are involved in the Fathers pu­nishment on purpose to deterr others from the like actions. There are some things indeed that Children may fall into by oc­casion of their Fathers guilt, which may [Page 356] be only calamities to them, because they are necessary consequents in the nature of the thing, and not purposely designed as a punishment to them. Thus, being deprived of the comfort and assistance of their Parents, when the Law hath taken them off by the hand of justice: this was designed by the Law as a punishment to the Parents, and as to the Children it is on­ly a necessary consequent of their punish­ment. For otherwise the Parents would have been punished for the Childrens faults, and not the Children only involv­ed in that which unavoidably follows up­on the Parents punishment. So that Crellius is very much mistaken either in the pre­sent case of our Saviours punishment, or in the general reason of exemplary pu­nishments, as among men. But the case of our Saviour is more exemplary, when we consider the excellency of his person, though appearing in our nature, when no meaner sufferings would satisfie, than of so transcendent a nature as he under­went, though he were the Eternal Son of God, this must make the punishment much more exemplary, than if he were considered only as our Adversaries do, as a meer man. So that the dignity of his person under all his sufferings may justly [Page 357] add a greater consideration to deterr us from the practice of sin, which was so severely punished in him, when he was pleased to be a Sacrifice for our sins. From whence we see that the ends of a [...] are very agreeable with the suf­ferings of Christ considered as a punish­ment for sin.

We now consider whether as Crellius §. 10. Gods ha­tred of sin could not be seen in the suffe­rings of Christ, if they were no punish­ment of sin. Crell. c. 1. p. 69. asserts, supposing Christs death were no punishment, it could have these effects upon mens minds or no? Yes, he saith, it might, because by his sufferings we might see how severely God would punish wicked and obstinate persons. Which being a strange riddle at the first hearing it, viz. that by the sufferings of an innocent person with­out any respect to sin as the cause of them: we should discern Gods severity against those who are obstinate in sin; we ought the more diligently to attend to what is said for the clearing of it. ‘ First, saith he, If God spared not his own most innocent and holy and only Son, than whom no­thing was more dear to him in Heaven or Earth, but exposed him to so cruel and ignominious a death; how great and severe sufferings may we think God will inflict on wicked men, who are at open defiance with him?’ I confess my [Page 358] self not subtle enough to apprehend the force of this argument, viz. If God dealt so severely with him who had no sin ei­ther of his own or others to answer for [...] therefore he will deal much more severe­ly with those that have. For Gods se­verity consider'd without any respect t [...] sin, gives rather encouragement to sin­ners, than any argument to deterre them from it. For the natural consequence of it is, that God doth act arbitrarily, without any regard to the good or evi [...] of mens actions; and therefore it is to no purpose to be sollicitous about them. For upon the same account that the most innocent person suffers most severely from him, for all that we know, the more we strive to be innocent, the more severely we may be dealt with, and let men sin, they can be but dealt severely with, all the difference then is, one shall be call'd punishments, and the other calamities, but the severity may be the same in both. And who would leave off his sins meerly to change the name of punishments into that of calamities? And from hence it will fol­low, that the differences of good and evil, and the respects of them to punishment and reward, are but aiery and empty things; but that God really in the dispen­sation [Page 359] of things to men, hath no regard to what men are or do, but acts therein according to his own Dominion, whereby he may dispose of men how or which way he pleases. If a Prince had many of his Subjects in open rebellion against him, and he should at that time make his most obe­dient and beloved Son to be publickly ex­posed to all manner of indignities, and be dishonoured and put to death by the hands of those rebells; could any one imagine that this was designed as an exem­plary punishment to all rebels, to let them see the danger of rebellion? No, but would it not rather make them think him a cruel Prince, one that would punish innocency as much as rebellion; and that it was rather better to stand at defiance, and become desperate, for it was more dangerous to be beloved than hated by him, to be his Son than his declared Ene­my? So that insisting on the death of Christ as it is considered as a [...], (for of that we speak now) there is no comparison between our Adversaries hy­pothesis and ours; but, saith Crellius, the con­sequence is not good on our side, if Christ suf­fered the punishment of our sins, therefore they shall suffer much more who continue in sin, for Christ suffered for the sins of the whole world; [Page 360] but they suffer only for their own, and what they have deserved themselves. To which I answer, that the argument is of very good force upon our hypothesis, though it would not be upon theirs. For if we suppose him to be a meer man that suffer'd, then there could be no argument drawn from his sufferings to ours, but according to the exact proportion of sins and punishments: but supposing that he had a divine as well as humane nature, there may not be so great a proportion of the sins of the world to the sufferings of Christ, as of the sins of a particular person to his own sufferings; and therefore the argument from one to the other doth still hold. For the mea­sure of punishments must be taken with a proportion to the dignity of the person who suffers them. And Crellius himself confesseth elsewhere, that the dignity of the person is to be considered in exemplary punish­ment, Crell. c. 8. Sect. 43. and that a lesser punishment of one that is very great, may do much more to deterre men from sin, than a greater punishment of one much less. But he yet further urgeth, that the severity of God against sinners may be discovered in the sufferings of Christ, because Crell. c. 1. sect. 57, 70. Gods hatred against sin is discovered therein. But if we ask how Gods hatred against sin, is seen in the sufferings of one perfectly [Page 361] innocent and free from sin, and not rather his hatred of innocency, if no respect to sin were had therein? he answers, that Gods hatred against sin was manifested, in that he would not spare his only Son to draw men off from sin. For answer to which, we are to consider the sufferings of Christ as an innocent person, designed as an exem­plary cause to draw men off from sin; and let any one tell me, what hatred of sin can possibly be discover'd, in proposing the sufferings of a most innocent person to them without any consideration of sin as the cause of those sufferings? If it be said, that the doctrine of Christ was designed to draw men off from sin; and that God suf­fered his Son to dye to confirm this doctrine, and thereby shewed his hatred to sin. I an­swer, 1. This is carrying the dispute off from the present business, for we are not now arguing about the design of Christs doctrine, nor the death of Christ as a means to confirm that, but as a [...], and what power that hath without re­spect to our sins as the cause of them, to draw us from sin, by discovering Gods hatred to it. 2. The doctrine of Christ according to their hypothesis, discovers much less of Gods hatred to sin than ours doth. For if God may pardon sin with­out [Page 362] any compensation made to his Laws or Honour, if repentance be in its own nature a sufficient satisfaction for all the sins past of our Lives; if there be no such thing as such a Justice in God which re­quires punishment of sin committed; if the punishment of sin depend barely up­on Gods will; and the most innocent per­son may suffer as much from God with­out respect to sin as the cause of suffer­ing, as the most guilty; let any rational man judge whether this Doctrine disco­vers as much Gods abhorrency of sin, as asserting the necessity of vindicating Gods honour to the World, by the breach of his Laws, if not by the suffering of the offen­ders themselves, yet of the Son of God as a Sacrifice for the expiation of sin, by undergoing the punishment of our iniqui­ties, so as upon consideration of his suffer­ings, he is pleased to accept of repen­tance and sincere obedience, as the condi­tions upon which he will grant remission of sins, and eternal life. So that if the discovery of Gods hatred to sin be the means to reclaim men from it, we assert upon the former reasons, that much more is done upon our Doctrine concerning the sufferings of Christ, than can be upon theirs. So much shall suffice to manifest [Page 363] in what sense Christs death may be a [...], and that this doth imply, that his sufferings are to be considered as a punish­ment of sin.

The next Series of places which makes §. 11. Grotius his arguments from Christs being made sin and a curse for us defined against Crellius. Christs sufferings to be a punishment for sin, are those which assert Christ to be made sin and a curse for us: which we now de­sign to make clear, ought to be understood in no other sense; for as Grotius saith, ‘As the Jews sometimes use sin, for the pu­nishment of sin; as appears, besides other places, by Zach. 14. 19. Gen. 4. 13. so they call him that suffers the punishment of sin, by the name of sin; as the Latins use the word Piaculum, both for the fault, and for him that suffers for it. Thence un­der the Law, an expiatory Sacrifice for sin, was called sin, Levit. 4. 3, 29—5. 6. Psal. 40. 7. Which way of speaking Esaias followed, speaking of Christ, Esai. 53. 10. [...] he made his soul sin, i. e. liable to the punishment of it. To the same purpose S. Paul, 2 Cor. 5. 21. He made him to be sin for us, who knew no sin, that we might be made the righteous­ness of God in him.’ To which Crellius Crel. c. 1. §. 60. replies, ‘That as there is no necessity, that by the name of sin, when applied to suf­ferings, any more should be implied, than [Page 364] that those sufferings were occasioned by sin, no more is there when it is applied to the person;’ nay, much less, for he saith, ‘No more is required to this, but that he should be handled as sinners use to be, and undergo the matter of punish­ment, without any respect to sin, either as the cause or occasion of it.’ So he saith, ‘The name Sinner is used, 1 King. 1. 21. and in S. Paul, the name of sin in the first clause is to be understood, as of righte­ousness in the latter; and as we are said to be righteousness in him, when God deals with us as with righteous persons, so Christ was said to be sin for us, when he was dealt with as a sinner. And the Sacri­fices for sin under the Law were so call'd, not with a respect to the punishment of sin, but because they were offered upon the account of sin, and were used for taking away the guilt of it; or because men were bound to offer them, so that they sinned if they neglected it. So that all that is meant by Esaias and S. Paul is, That Christ was made an expiatory Sa­crifice, or that he exposed himself for those afflictions which sinners onely by right undergo.’ But let Crellius or any others of them tell me, if the Scripture had intended to express, that the sufferings of [Page 365] Christ were a punishment of our sins, how was it possible to do it more Emphatically than it is done by these expressions (the custom of the Hebrew Language being con­sidered) not onely by saying, that Christ did bear our sins, but, that himself was made sin for us? those phrases being so commonly used for the punishment of sin. Let them produce any one instance in Scripture, where those expressions are applied to any without the consideration of sin? that place 1 King. 1. 21. is very far from it; for in all probability, the design of Bathsheba in ma­king Solomon King was already discovered, which was the reason that Adonijah his elder Brother declaring himself King, in­vited not him with the rest of the Kings sons: All that she had for Solomons succes­sion, was a secret promise and oath of Da­vid; and therefore she urgeth him now to declare the succession, v. [...]0. Otherwise, she saith, when David should dye, I and my son Solomon shall be accounted offenders; i. e. saith Crel [...]. We shall be handled as offenders, we shall be destroyed: But surely not with­out the supposition of a fault, by them which should inflict that punishment upon them: The plain meaning is, they should be accused of Tr [...]a [...]n, and then punished ac­cordingly. But we are to consider, that [Page 366] still with a respect to them, who were the inflicters, a fault or sin is supposed as the reason of their punishment, either of their own or others. But of our Saviour it is not said, That he should be counted as an offender by the Jews; for although that doth not take away his innocency, yet it sup­poseth an accusation of something, which in it self deserves punishment. But in Esai. 53. 10. it is said, He made his soul sin; and 2 Cor. 5. 21. That God made him sin for us, which must therefore imply, not being dealt with by men onely as a sinner, but that with a respect to him who inflicted the punishment, there was a consideration of sin as the reason of it. We do not deny but Gods suffering him to be dealt with as a sinner by men, is implied in it, for that was the method of his punishment designed; but we say further, that the reason of that permission in God, doth suppose some antecedent cause of it: For God would never have suffered his onely Son, to be so dealt with by the hands of cruel men, unless he had made himself an offering for sin; being willing to undergo those sufferings, that he might be an ex­piatory Sacrifice for the sins of the world. And although Socinus will not yield, That by being made sin for us, should be understood Soc. l. 1. c. 8. [Page 367] Christs being an Expiatory Sacrifice for sin; yet Crellius is contented it should be so taken in both places: Which if he will grant, so as by virtue of that Sacrifice, the guilt of sin is expiated, we shall not contend with him about the reasons, why those Sacrifices were call'd sins, although the most proper and genuine must needs be that, which is assigned by the Law, that the sins of the people were supposed to be laid upon them, and therefore they were intended for the expiation of them: But it is very unrea­sonable to say, That Expiatory Sacrifices were called sins, because it would have been a sin to neglect them: For on the same account, all the other Sacrifices must have been call'd so too; for it was a sin to neglect any where God required them, and so there had been no difference between Sacrifices for sin and others. To that reason of Crellius, from our being made righteous, because dealt with as such, to Christs being made sin onely, because dealt with as a sinner, we need no more than what this parallel will afford us; For as Crellius would never say, that any are dealt with as righteous persons, who are not antecedently supposed to be so; so by his own Argument, Christs being dealt with as a sinner, must suppose guilt ante­cedent to it; and since the Apostle de­clares [Page 368] it was not his own, in those words, Who knew no sin, it follows that it must be the consideration of ours, which must make him be dealt with as a sinner by him, who made him to be sin for us. But to suppose that Christ should be said to be made sin, without any respect to sin, is as much as if the Latins should call any one Scelus, and mean thereby a very honest man; or a Piaculum, without any supposition of his own or others guilt. But we are to consider, that the sufferings of Christ, seeming at first so inconsistent with that relation to God as his onely Son, which the Apostles assert concerning him, they were obliged to vin­dicate his innocency as to men, and yet withal to shew, that with a respect to God, there was sufficient reason for his permission of his undergoing these suffer­ings. That he knew no sin, was enough to clear his innocency as to men; but then the question will be asked, If he were so innocent, why did God suffer all those things to come upon him? Did not Abra­ham plead of old with God, That he would not slay the righteous with the wicked, be­cause Gen. 18. 25. it was repugnant to the righteousness of his nature to do so; That be far from thee to do after this manner, to slay the righteous with the wicked, and that the righteous should [Page 369] be as the wicked, that be far from thee; shall not the Judge of all the earth do right? How then comes God to suffer the most per­fect innocency to be dealt with so, as the greatest sins could not have deserved worse from men? Was not his righteousness the same still? And Abraham did not think the distinction of calamities and punishments, e­nough to vindicate Gods proceedings, if the righteous should have been dealt with­all as the wicked. And if that would hold for such a measure of righteousness as might be supposed in such who were not guilty of the great abominations of those places, that it should be enough, not onely to de­liver themselves, but the wicked too; how comes it that the most perfect obedience of the Son of God, is not sufficient to excuse him from the greatest sufferings of Male­factors? But if his sufferings had been meerly from men, God been accountable onely for the bare permission; but it is said, that he fore-ordained and determined these things to be, that Christ himself com­plained, that God had forsaken him; and here, that he made him sin for us: and can we imagine all this to be without any respect to the guilt of sin, as the cause of it? Why should such an expression be used of being made sin? might not many others [Page 370] have served sufficiently to declare the in­dignities and sufferings he underwent, with­out such a phrase as seems to reflect upon Christs innocency? If there had been no more in these expressions than our Adver­saries imagine, the Apostles were so care­ful of Christs honour, they would have avoided such ill-sounding expressions as these were; and not have affected Hebraisms, and uncouth forms of speech, to the dis­paragement of their Religion. But this is all which our Adversaries have to say, where words are used by them out of their proper sense, that the Prophets and Apostles affected tricks of wit, playing with words, using them sometimes in one sense, and pre­sently quite in another. So Crellius saith of Esaiah, That he affects little elegancies of words and verbal allusions, which makes him use Crel. c. 1. §. 57. words sometimes out of their proper and natu­ral sense; thence he tells us, The sufferings of Christ are called chastisement, though they have nothing of the nature of chastisements in them: And from this liberty of interpret­ing, they make words (without any other reason, than that they serve for their pur­pose) be taken in several senses in the same verse: For Socinus in one verse of Socin. ex­plicat. 1. cap. Joh. v. 10. S. Johns Gospel, makes the World be taken in three several senses: He was in the world, [Page 371] there it is taken, saith he, for the men of the world in general: The world was made by him, there it must be understood onely of the reformation of things by the Go­spel; and, the world knew him not, there it must be taken in neither of the former senses, but for the wicked of the world: What may not one make of the Scripture, by such a way of interpreting it? But by this we have the less reason to wonder, that Socinus should put such an Interpreta­tion upon Gal. 3. 13. Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the Law, being made a curse for us; for it is written, Cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree: In which he doth ac­knowledge by the curse, in the first clause to be meant, the punishment of sin, but not in the second: And the reason he gives for it is, amavit enim Paulus in execrationis verbo ar­gutus esse. S. Paul affected playing with the Socin. de Christo servat. l. 2. c. 1. word curse, understanding it first in a proper, and then a Metaphorical sense. But it is plain, that the design of S. Paul and Socinus are very different in these words: Socinus thinks he speaks onely Metaphorically, when he saith, that Christ was made a curse for us; i. e. by a bare allusion of the name, without a correspondency in the thing it self; and so that the death of Christ might be called a curse, but was not so: but S. Paul [Page 372] speaks of this not by way of extenuation, but to set forth the greatness and weight of the punishment he underwent for us. He therefore tells us, what it was which Christ did redeem us from, The curse of the Law; and how he did it, by being not onely made a curse, but a curse for us; i. e. not by being hateful to God, or undergoing the very same curse, which we should have done; which are the two things objected by Crellius against our sense; but that the death of Christ was to be considered, not as a bare separation of soul and body, but as properly poenal, being such a kind of death, which none but Malefactors by the Law were to suffer; by the undergoing of which punishment in our stead, he redeemed us from that curse which we were liable to by the violation of the Law of God. And there can be no reason to appropriate this onely to the Jews, unless the death of Christ did extend onely to the deliverance of them from the punishment of their sins; or because the curse of the Law did make that death poenal, therefore the intention of the punishment, could reach no further than the Law did; but the Apostle in the very next words speaks of the farther ex­tension of the great blessing promised to Abra­ham, That it should come upon the Gentiles also; [Page 373] and withall those whom the Apostle speaks to, were not Jews, but such as thought they ought to joyn the Law & Gospel together: that St. Paul doth not mean as Crellius Cr [...]l. Annot in loc. would have it, that Christ by his death did con­firm the New Covenant, and so take away the obligation of the Law; (for to what end was the curse mentioned for that? What did the accursedness of his death add to the con­firmation of the truth of his Doctrine? and when was ever the curse taken for the continuance of the Law of Moses?) but that Christ by the efficacy of his death as a punishment for sin hat re­deemed all that believe and obey him from the curse deserved by their sins, whe­ther inforced by the Law of Moses, or the Law written in their hearts, which tells the consciences of sinners, that such who violate the Laws of God are worthy of death, and therefore under the curse of the Law.

We come now to the force of the particles which being joyned with our sins as refer­ring §. 12. to the death of Christ, do imply that The parti­cles [...] being joyned to sins, and relating to susterings, do imply those sufferings to be the punishment of sin. his death is to be considered as a punish­ment of sin. Not that we insist on the force of those particles [...] and [...], as though of themselves they did imply this [Page 374] (for we know they are of various signi­fications according to the nature of the matter they are joyned with) but that these being joyned with sins and suffer­ings together, do signifie that those suf­ferings are the punishment of those sins. Thus it is said of Christ, that he dyed, [...] for our sins, [...] Rom. 4. 25. [...], that he suffered once [...] 1 Cor. 15. 3. that he gave himself, [...], that he offered 1 Pet. 3. 18. a Sacrifice [...]. To which Crellius He. 10. 12. Crell. c. 1. Sect. 6. replyes, ‘That if the force of these par­ticles not being joyned with sufferings, may be taken for the final and not for the impulsive cause, they may retain the same sense when joyned with sufferings, if those sufferings may be designed in order to an end; but if it should be granted, that those phrases being Sect. 1 [...]. p. 17. joyned with sufferings, do alwayes im­ply a meritorious cause, yet it doth not follow, it should not be here so under­stood because the matter will not bear it.’ To this a short answer will at pre­sent serve: for, It is not possible a me­ritorious cause can be expressed more emphatically than by these words being joyned to sufferings: so that we have as clear a testimony from these expressions as words can give; and by the same arts [Page 375] by which these may be avoided any other might; so that it had not been possible for our Doctrine to have been expressed such a manner, but such kind of answers might have been given as our Adversa­ries now give. If it had been said in the plainest terms, that Christs death was a pu­nishment for our sins, they would as easily have avoided the force of them as they do of these; they would have told us ‘the Apostles delighted in an Antanacla­sis, and had expressed things different from the natural use of the words by them; and though punishment were sometimes used properly, yet here it must be used only metaphorically because the matter would bear no other sense.’ And therefore I commend the ingenuity of So­cinus after all the pains he had taken to enervate the force of those places which are brought against his Doctrine; he tells us plainly, ‘That if our Doctrine were not only once, but frequently Socin. de servat. l. 3. c. 6. mentioned in Scripture; yet he would not therefore believe the thing to be so as we suppose. For, saith he, seeing the thing it self cannot be, I take the least inconvenient interpretation of the words; and draw forth such a sense [Page 376] from them, as is most consistent with it self and the tenour of the Scripture.’ But for all his talking of the tenour of the Scripture, by the same reason he interprets one place upon these terms, he will do many, and so the tenour of the Scripture shall be never against him: and by this we find, that the main strength of our Adversaries is not pretended to lye in the Scriptures; all the care they have of them is only to reconcile them if possible with their hypothesis; for they do not deny but that the natural force of the words doth imply what we contend for; but because they say the Doctrine we assert is incon­sistent with reason, therefore all their design is to find out any other possible meaning, which they therefore assert to be true, because more agreeable to the common reason of mankind. This there­fore is enough for our present purpose, that if it had been the design of Scripture to have expressed our sense, it could not have done it in plainer expressions than it hath done, that no expressions could have been used, but the same arts of our Ad­versaries might have been used to take off their force, which they have used to those we now urge against them, and that setting [Page 377] aside the possibility of the thing, the Scri­pture doth very fairly deliver the Do­ctrine we contend for; or, supposing in point of reason there may be arguments enough to make it appear possible, there are Scriptures enough to make it appear true.

CHAP. III.

HAving gained so considerable conces­sions §. 1. The mat­ter debated in point of reason. from our Adversaries concerning the places of Scripture, we come now to de­bate the matter in point of reason. And if there appear to be nothing repugnant in the Nature of the thing, or to the justice of God, then all their loud clamours will come to nothing; for on that they fix, when they talk the most of our Doctrine being contrary to reason. This therefore we now come more closely to examine, in order to which we must carefully en­quire what it is, they lay the charge of injustice in God upon, according to our belief of Christs sufferings being a pu­nishment for our sins.

[Page 380] 1. It is not, That the offenders themselve [...] do not undergo the full punishment of the [...] sins. For they assert, that there is no ne­cessity at all that the offenders should be punished from any punitive justice in God: for they eagerly contend that God may freely pardon the sins of men: if so, then it can be no injustice in God not to punish the offenders according to the full desert of their sins.

2. It is not, that God upon the sufferings of Christ doth pardon the sins of men: for they yield that God may do this without any charge of injustice, and with the greatest demonstration of his kindness. For they acknowledge, that the sufferings of Christ are not to be considered as a bare ante­cedent condition to pardon, but that they were a moving cause as far as the obedience of Christ in suffering was very acceptable to God.

3. It is not, in the greatness or matter of Certum est Christum innocentis­simum à Deo gravis­simis cruci­atibus, ipsaque mor­te fuissè affectum; cum non in materiâ poenae absolute & per se considera [...], ad [...]oque etiam in eâ afflictione à quâ poenae forma a [...]est, injuria residere à no [...] dicatur. Crel. c. 4. Sect. 3. Potuit autem id Deus facere, atque adeo fecit, jure dominii, quod in Christi vitam ac corpus habebat; a [...]dente praeserti [...] ipsius Christi consensu. Id. Ib. Sect. 4. the sufferings of Christ. For they assert the same which we do. And therefore I can­not but wonder to meet sometimes with those strange out-cries of our making God [Page 381] cruel in the punishing of his Son for us: for what do we assert that Christ suffered, which they do not assert too? Nay doth it not look much more like cruelty in God to lay those sufferings upon him with­out any consideration of sin? as upon their hypothesis he doth; than to do it sup­posing he bears the punishment of our iniquities, which is the thing we plead for. They assert all those sufferings to be lawful on the account of Gods domini­on, which according to them must cease to be so on the supposition of a meritorious cause. But however from this it appears, that it was not unjust that Christ should suffer those things which he did for us: the question then is, whether it were unjust that he should suffer the same things, which he might lawfully do on the account of dominion with a re­spect to our sins as the cause of them?

4. As to this, they acknowledge, that it is not, that the sufferings of Christ were occasioned by our sins, or that our sins were the bare impulsive cause of those sufferings. For they both confess in ge­neral, that one mans sins may be the oc­casion of anothers punishment, so far that he might have escaped punishment, if the others sins had not been the impulsive [Page 382] cause of it. And therefore Crellius in t [...] general state of this question, would no [...] have it, whether it be unjust to punish o [...] for anothers sins; for that he acknowledge [...] Quod si ex thesi speci­ali facere velis gene­ralem, [...]a haec erit, injustum esse punire i [...]o­centem, qua­cunque tan­dem de causâ id fiat; non vero simplicit [...]r, punire quempiam ob ali [...]na d [...]lict [...]; id enim concedi potest non semper esse injustum. Crell. c. 4. Sect. 3. it is not, but whether, for any cause what­soever it be just to punish an innocent person? And likewise in particular of Christ, they confess, that our sins were the impulsive cause, and the occasion of his sufferings.

5. It is not, that there is so necessary [...] relation, between guilt and punishment, that i [...] cannot be call'd a punishment which is in­flicted on an innocent person. For Crellius, after a long discourse of the difference of afflictions and punishments, doth acknow­ledge, ‘That it is not of the nature of Cum ne illud quidem ad naturam poenae requi­ratur, ut is ipse, qui puniendus est, poenam reverà fue­rit comme­ritus. Id. Sect. 5. punishment, that the person who is to be punished, should really deserve the punishment;’ and afterwards when Gro­tius urgeth, ‘that though it be essential to punishment, that it be inflicted for sin, yet it is not, that it be inflicted upon him who hath himself sinned, which he shews, by the similitude of rewards, which though necessary to be given in consideration of service, may yet be given to others besides the person him­self [Page 383] upon his account.’ All this Crellius acknowledgeth; who saith, ‘They do not make it necessary to the nature, but to the justice of punishment, that it be inflicted upon none but the person who hath offended. So by his own Confession, it is not against the nature of pu­nishment, Poena qui­dem simpli­citer in in­nocentem cadit, justae non cadit. Crell. c. 4. Sect. 28. that one man suffer for ano­thers faults.’ From whence it follows, that all Socinus his arguments signifie no­thing, which are drawn from the impossi­bility of the thing, that one man should be punished for anothers faults; for Crellius grants the thing to be possible, but denies it to be just; yet not absolutely neither, but with some restrictions and limitations. For,

6. It is not, but that there may be suffici­ent §. 2. In what cases Crel­lius grants some may be lawful­ly punish­ed for the sins of others. causes assigned in some particular cases; wherein it may be just for God to punish some for the sins of others. For Crellius himself hath assigned divers. ‘When there is such a neer conjunction between them, that one may be said to be punished in the punishment of another: as Parents in their Children and Posterity, Kings Quia Deus hunc puni­endo illum quoque alte­rum ob cujus peccati eum dicitur punire, simul punire possit, ob arctiorem quae inter ill [...]s intercedat conjunctionem. Crell. ib. sect. 5. in their Subjects, or the body of a State [Page 384] in its Members, either in the most, or the most principal, though the fewest:’ but we are to consider, how far he doth extend this way of punishment of some in others. 1. At the greatest distance of time, if they have been of the same Nation; for he extends it to the utmost degree of Gods patience towards a people; ‘For, saith he, God doth not presently punish as soon as they have sin'd; but spares for a great while, and forbears, in expectation of their repentance, in the mean while a great many guilty persons dye, and seem Crell. p. 242. to have escaped punishment. But at last the time of Gods patience being past, he punisheth their Posterity by exact­ing the full punishment of their sins up­on them, and by this means punisheth their Ancestors too, and punisheth their sins in their punishment; for, saith he, all that people are reckon'd for one man of several Ages, and that punishment which is taken of the last, may be for the sins of the first, for the conjunction and succession of them: of which we have an example, saith he, in the de­struction of Hierusalem.’ By which we see a very remote conjunction, and a meer si­militude in comparing a succession of Ages in a people with those in a man, may [Page 385] (when occasion serves) be made use of to justifie Gods punishing one Generation of men for the sins of others that have been long before. 2. When sins are more secret, or less remarkable, which God might not punish, unless an occasion were given from others sins impelling him to it; but because God would punish one very near them, he therefore punisheth them, that in their punishment he might punish the other: Or in case sins spread through a Family, or a people, or they are committed by di­vers persons at sundry times, which God doth not severally punish, but sometimes then, when the Head of a People or Fa­mily hath done something which remark­ably deserves punishment, whom he will punish in those he is related to, and there­fore generally punisheth the whole Fami­ly or people. 3. That which may be a meer exercise of dominion as to some, may be a pro­per punishment to others; as in the case of Infants, being taken away for their Pa­rents sins; For God, as to the Children, he saith, useth only an act of dominion, but the punishment only redounds to the Parents, who loose them; and though this be done for the very end of punishment, yet he denyes, that it hath the nature of Punishment in any but the Parents. 4. That Punishment may be in­tended [Page 386] for those who can have no sense at all of it; as Crellius asserts in the case of Crell. ib. sect. 11. sect. 19. Sauls sons, 2 Sam. 21. 8. 14. that the pu­nishment was mainly intended for Saul, who was already dead. From these con­cessions of Crellius in this case, we may take notice, 1. That a remote conjun­ction may be sufficient for a translation of penalty, viz. from one Generation to another. 2. That sins may be truly said to be punished in others, when the offen­ders themselves may escape punishment, thus the sins of Parents in their Children, and Princes in their Subjects. 3. That an act of dominion in some may be de­signed as a proper punishment to others. 4. That the nature of punishment is not to be measured by the sense of it. Now upon these concessions, though our Ad­versaries will not grant, that Christ was properly punished for our sins, yet they cannot deny but that we may very pro­perly be said to be punished for our sins in Christ, and if they will yield us this, the other may be a strife about words. For surely there may be easily imagined as great a conjunction between Christ and us, as between the several Generations of the Jews, and that last which was punish­ed in the destruction of Hierusalem: and [Page 387] though we escape that punishment which Christ did undergo, yet we might have our sins punished in him, as well as Prin­ces theirs in their Subjects, when they escape themselves; or rather as Subjects in an innocent Prince, who may suffer for the faults of his people; if it be said, that these are acts of meer dominion as to such a one, that nothing hinders but grant­ing it, yet our sins may be said to be pu­nished in him; as well as Parents sins are punished properly in meer acts of domi­nion upon their Children; if it be said, that can be no punishment where there is no sense at all of it, that is fully taken off by Crellius; for surely we have as great a sense of the sufferings of Christ, as the first Generation of the Jews had of the suffering of the last, before the fatal de­struction of the City, or as Saul had of the punishment of his Sons after his death. So that from Crellius his own concessions, we have proved, that our sins may very proper­ly be said to be punished in Christ, although he will not say, that Christ could be pro­perly punished for our sins; nay he and the rest of our Adversaries not only deny it, but earnestly contend, that it is very unjust to suppose it, and repugnant to the recti­tude of Gods nature to do it.

[Page 388] And so we come to consider the mighty §. 3. Crellius his arguments propound­ed. arguments that are insisted on for the proof of this, which may be reduced to these three; viz. 1. That there can be no punish­ment but what is deserved, but no man can deserve that another should be punished. 2. That punishment flows from revenge, but there can be no revenge where there hath been no fault. 3. That the punishment of one, cannot any ways be made the punishment of another; and in case it be supposed possible, then those in whose stead the other is punished, must be actually delivered upon the payment of that debt which was owing to God.

1. That one man cannot deserve anothers punishment, and therefore one cannot be punished for another; for there is no just punishment, but what is deserved. This being the main Argument insisted on by Crellius, must be more carefully considered; but before an answer be made to it, it is necessary that a clear account be given in what sense it is he understands it, which will be best done, by laying down his princi­ples, as to the justice of punishments, in a more distinct method than himself hath done; which are these following: 1. That no person can be justly punished, either for his own or anothers faults, but he that hath deserved to be punished by some sin, [Page 389] of his own: For he still asserts, ‘That the justice of punishment ariseth from a Crell. c. 4. s [...]ct. 3. p. 239, 240. mans own fault, though the actual punish­ment may be from anothers: But he that is punished without respect to his own guilt, is punished undeservedly; and he that is punished undeservedly, is punish­ed unjustly.’ 2. That personal guilt be­ing, supposed one mans sin may be the im­pulsive cause of anothers punishment, but they cannot be the meritorious. The diffe­rence between them he thus explains, ‘The cause, is that which makes a thing to be; the impulsive, that which moves one to do a thing, without any consideration of right that one hath to do it: Merit, is that which makes a man worthy of a thing, either good or bad, and so gives a right to it; if it be good, to himself; if bad, to him at whose hands he hath deserved it.’ Now he tells us, that it is impossible, ‘That one mans sins should make any other deserve punishment, but the person who committed them; but they may impel one to punish another, and that justly, if the person hath otherwise deserved to be punished, unjustly if he hath not.’ The reason he gives of it is, ‘That the vitiosity of the act, which is the proper cause of punishment, can­not [Page 390] go beyond the person of the of­fender; and therefore can oblige none to punishment, but him that hath com­mitted the fault. And therefore he as­serts, That no man can be justly punish­ed beyond the desert of his own sins, but there may sometimes be a double impul­sive cause of that punishment; viz. His own and other mens, whereof one made Crell. ib. sect. 18. that they might be justly punished, the other that they should be actually: but the latter, he saith, always supposeth the former, as the foundation of just punish­ment; so that no part of punishment could be executed upon him, wherein his own sins were not supposed as the meritori­ous cause of it.’ These are his two main principles which we must now throughly examine, the main force of his book lying in them. But if we can prove, that it hath been generally received by the consent of mankind, that a person may be punished beyond the desert of his own actions; if God hath justly punished some for the sins of others, and there be no injustice in one mans suffering by his own consent for an­other, then these principles of Crellius will be found not so firm as he imagines them.

[Page 391] 1. That it hath been generally received [...]y the consent of mankind, that a person §. 4. That a per­son by his own con­sent may be punish­ed beyond the desert of his own actions. Grot. de Satisf. c. 4. may be justly punished beyond the desert of his own actions. For which purpose Grotius objected against Socinus (who ap­pealed to the consent of Nations, about one being punished for anothers fault) ‘That the Heathens did agree, that Children might be punished for their Parents faults, and people for their Princes, and that corporal punishment might be born by one for another, did appear by the Persians punishing the whole family for the fault of one. The Macedonians the neer kindred in the case of Treason, some Cities of Greece, destroying the children of Tyrants together with them; in all which, the meer conjunction was sup­posed a sufficient reason without consent; but in case of consent, he saith, They all agreed in the justice of some being punished for the faults of others. Thence the right of killing hostages among the most civilized nations; and of sureties being punished in capital matters, if the guilty appear not, who were thence cal­ed [...] who were bound to answer body for body.’ In which cases, the punishment did extend beyond the desert of the person who suffered it; for no other [Page 392] reason is assigned of these sufferings, be­sides the conjunction of the person, or h [...] consent; but no antecedent guilt is sup­posed as necessary, to make the punishment just. We are now to consider what Crel­lius doth answer to this: 1. As to their ac­knowledgements of Gods punishing chil­dren for their Parents faults, he gives the same answer which he doth to the exam­ples recorded in Scripture to that purpose, That either they were punished for the sins [...] others, but their own sins deserved the punish­ment; or that the Parents were punished i [...] the children, but the Children were not pro­perly punished. 2. As to punishments among men, he answers two things; 1. ‘That such persons were truly punished, but not justly: for he acknowledges, That Crell. c. 4. sect. 5. p. 244. in such a case it is a proper punishment and that it is enough in order to that that any fault be charged upon a person, whether his own or anothers, whether true or false, on the account of which he is supposed worthy to be punished: And that such a conjunction is sufficient f [...] cruel, angry, or imprudent men; for wher [...] ever there is a place, saith he, for ange [...] there is likewise for punishment.’ So that he confesseth, there may be a tr [...] punishment, and that which answers all th [...] [Page 393] reason and ends of punishment assigned by him, where there is no desert at all of it in the person who undergoes it. But then he adds, that this is an unjust punishment, to which I reply, That then the reason of punishment assigned by Crellius before is insufficient; for if this answers all the ends of punishments assigned by him, and yet be unjust, then it necessarily follows, that those ends of punishment are con­sistent with the greatest injustice. For he before made punishment to have a natu­ral respect to anger, and makes the ordi­nary end of punishment to be a satisfaction of the desire of revenge in men, yet now grants, that these may be in an unjust pu­nishment. Neither can it be said, that he consider'd punishment only naturally, and not morally; for he tells us, that this is the na­ture of divine punishments, which are there­fore just, because designed for these ends; but in case there be no supposal of a fault at all, then he denyes that it is a punish­ment, but only an affliction, and an exer­cise of dominion. So that according to him, where-ever there is a proper punish­ment, it must be just, when-ever God doth punish men: and the only difference between God and man supposable in this case is, that we have assurance God will [Page 394] never use his dominion unjustly; but that men do so when they make one to suffer for anothers fault, notwithstanding a con­sent and conjunction between the man that committed the fault, and the person that suffers for him. But this is begging the thing in question, for we are debating, whether it be an unlawfull exercise of power or no? for we have this presumpti­on, that it is not unlawfull, because it may answer all the ends of punishments, and what way can we better judge, w [...]e­ther a punishment be just or no, than by that?

But we are to consider, that we do not §. 5. Objections answered. here take the person we speak of, ab­stractly as an innocent person, for then there is no question, but anger and punishment of one as such is unjust; but of an inno­cent person as supposed under an obliga­tion by his own consent to suffer for ano­ther. And in this case we assert, since ac­cording to Crellius the natural and proper ends of punishments may be obtained, and the consent of the person takes away the wrong done to him in the matter of his sufferings, so far as he hath power over himself, that such a punishment is not unjust. For if it be, it must suppose some injury to be done; but in this case [Page 395] let them assign where the injury lyes; it cannot be to the publick, if the ends of punishments may be obtained by such a suffering of one for another, by a valid consent of the suffering party; it cannot be to the person in whose room the other suffers, for what injury is that to escape punishment by anothers suffering; it can­not be to the suffering person, supposing that to be true, which the Heathens still sup­posed, viz. that every man had a power over his own life. If it be said still, that the unjustice lyes in this, that such a one suffers Immerito quenquam punire est injustè pu­nire. Crell. p. 240. undeservedly, and therefore unjustly. I answer; if be meant by undeservedly without suffici­ent cause or reason of punishment, then we deny that such a one doth suffer unde­servedly. Immerito in the Greek Glosses is rendred by [...], and Merito by [...] and [...], and in Cicero, jure & merito are most commonly joyned together. So that where there is a right to punish, and suffi­cient reason for it, such a one doth not suffer immerito, i. e. undeservedly. If it be said, that such a one is not dignus poena, that implyes no more than the other, for dig­nus, or as the Ancients writ it dicnus, comes from the Greek [...] jus as Vossius tells us, ut dignus sit cui tribui aliquid aquum est: so that where there is an equi­ty [...] [Page 396] [...] [Page 397] [...] [Page 394] [...] [Page 395] [Page 396] in the thing, there is a dignity in the person, or he may be said to be worthy to undergo it. But doth not this lay open the greatest innocency to as great a desert of suf­ferings, as the highest guilt? By no means. For we make a lyableness to punishment, the natural consequent of guilt: and he that hath committed a fault, cannot but deserve to be punished, so that no suffer­ings of others can take away the natu­ral consequence of a bad action, which is a desert of punishment; So that as we say, a wicked action cannot but deserve to be punished, i. e. there is an agreeableness in reason and nature, that he who hath done ill, should suffer ill; so we say like­wise there is no necessity in nature and reason, that he that hath thus deserved it, must unavoidably suffer it. And on the other side, we say, no man by his innocency can deserve to be punished, i. e. no mans in­nocency makes him by vertue of that ob­noxious to punishment; but yet we add, that notwithstanding his innocency, the cir­cumstances may be such that he may be justly punished, and in that sense deservedly. So that the Question is strangely mistaken, when it is thus put, Whether an innocent person consider'd as such, may be justly punish­ed; for no one asserts that, or is bound [Page 397] to do it; but the true question is, whe­ther a person notwithstanding his innocency may not by some act of his own will oblige him­self to undergo that punishment which other­wise he did not deserve? which punishment, in that case is just and agreeable to reason: And this is that which we assert and plead for. So that innocency here is not con­sidered any other ways, than whether that alone makes it an unlawfull punishment, which otherwise would be lawfull, i. e. whether the Magistrate in such cases, where substitution is admittable by the Laws of Nations (as in the cases we are now upon) be bound to regard any more than that the obligation to punishment now lyes upon the person, who by his own act hath substituted himself in the others room; and if he proceeds upon this, his action is justifyable and agree­able to reason. If it be said, that the sub­stitution is unjust, unless the substituted per­son hath before hand deserved to be punished; it is easily answered, that this makes not the matter at all clearer; for either the person is punished for the former fault, and then there is no substitution; or if he be punished by way of substitution, then there is no regard at all had to his former fault, and so it is all one as if he were perfectly innocent.

[Page 398] And by this Crellius his answer to the instances both in Scripture and else­where §. 6. The in­stances of Scripture considered. concerning Childrens being pu­nished for their Parents faults, will appear to be insufficient, Viz. ‘That God doth never punish them for their Parents faults beyond the desert of their own sins, and therefore no argument can be drawn from thence, that God may pu­nish an innocent person for the sins of others, because he hath punished some for what they were innocent:’ For the force of the argument doth not lye in the supposition of their innocency, as to the ground of punishment in general, for we do not deny, but that they may deserve to be punished for their own faults: but the argument lyes in this, whether their own guilt were then considered as the reason of punishment, when God did punish them for their fathers faults? And whether they by their own sins did deserve to be pu­nished not only with the punishment due to their own miscarriages, but with the punishment due to their fathers too? If not, then some persons are justly punished, who have not deserved that punishment they undergo; if they did deserve it, then one person may deserve to be pu­nished for anothers sins. If it be said, as it is by Crellius, That his own sins make him [Page 399] capable of punishment, and God by occasion of others sins doth execute that punishment, which he might not have done for his own. I answer, we are not enquiring into the bare capacity of punishing, but into the reason of it: was the reason of punishment his own or his fathers sins? If his own, then he was punished only for his own sins; if his fathers, then the punishment may be just which is inflicted without considera­tion of proper desert of it; for no man (say they) can deserve to be punished, but for his own sins. But it's said, that the sins of Fathers are only an impulsive cause for God to punish the Children according to the desert of their own sins, which he might otherwise have forborn to punish. Then, the sins of the Fathers are no reason why the Children should be punished; but their own sins are the reason, and their Fathers the bare occasion of being punished for them. But in Scripture, the reason of punishment is drawn from the Fathers sins: and not from the Childrens: For then the words would have run thus, if the Children sin, and deserve punishment by their own iniqui­ties, then I will take occasion from their Fa­thers sins, to visit their own iniquities upon them: Whereas the words referre to the fathers sins as the reason of the Childrens punishment. So in the words of the Law, [Page 400] wherein the reason of punishment ought to be most expresly assigned, it is not, I will certainly punish the children, if they continue in the Idolatry of their Fathers; but, I will visit the sins of the Fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth Gene­ration Exod. 20. 3. of them that hate me: If it were onely because of imitation of the Fathers sins by the Children, there could be no reason for the limitation to the third and fourth Ge­neration; for then the reason of punish­ment would be as long as the imitation continued, whether to the fourth or tenth Generation: And as Alphonsus à Castro ob­serves, ‘If the reason of punishment were Alph. à Ca­stro de just â haeret. punit. l. 2. c. 10. the imitation of their Fathers sins, then the Children were not punished for their Fathers sins, but for their own; for that imitation was a sin of their own, and not of their Fathers.’ Be­sides, if the proper reason of punish­ment were the sins of the children, and the Fathers sins onely the occasion of it, then where it is mentioned that children are punished for their Parents sins, the chil­drens sins should have been particularly expressed, as the proper cause of the punish­ment: But no other reason is assigned in the Law, but the sins of the Fathers, no other cause mentioned of Canaans punish­ment, but his Fathers sin; nor of the pu­nishment Gen. 9. 25. [Page 401] of the people in Davids time, but his own sin; Lo, I have sinned, and I have 2 Sam. 24. 17. done wickedly, but these sheep, what have they done? Which is no hyperbolical expressi­on, but the assigning the proper cause of that judgement to have been his own sin, as the whole Chapter declares: Nor, of the hanging up of Sauls sons by the Gibeonites, Sam. 21. 5. but, that Saul their Father had plotted their destruction. And in an instance more re­markable than any of those which Crellius answers; viz. the punishment of the people of Judah, for the sins of Manasses in the time of Josias; when a through Reforma­tion was designed among them, the Prince being very good, and all the places of Idolatry destroyed, such a Passover kept 2 Kings 23. v. 4. to v. 21 as had not been kept before in the time of any King in Israel, yet it then follows, Vers. 22. Notwithstanding the Lord turned not from the fierceness of his great wrath, wherewith his an­ger Vers. 26. was kindled against Judah, because of all the provocations wherewith Manasses had pro­voked him withal. Who can say here, that the sins of Manasseh were only the occasion of Gods punishing the people in the time of Josias for their own sins, when their sins were much less in the time of Josias, than in any time mentioned before, after their lapse into Idolatry? Nay, it is expresly said, [Page 402] That Josiah took away all the abominations out of all the countreys that pertained to the chil­dren 2 Chron. 34. 33. of Israel, and made all that were present in Israel to serve, even to serve the Lord their God. And all his days they departed not from following the Lord God of their Fathers: To say, that this was done in hypocrisie, and bare outward compliance, is to speak without book; and if the reason of so severe punish­ments had been their hypocrisie, that ought to have been mentioned; but not onely here, but afterwards it is said, that the rea­son of Gods destroying Judah, was for the sins of Manasseh; viz. his Idolatries and 2 Sam. 24. 3, 4. Murther, which it is said, the Lord will not pardon. And if he would not pardon, then he did punish for those sins, not barely as the occasion, but as the meritorious cause of that punishment. What shall we say then? Did the people in Josiah's time, deserve to be punished for the sins of Manasseh, Grand­father to Josiah? Or was God so highly provoked with those sins, that although he did not punish Manasseh himself upon his repentance, yet he would let the world see, how much he abhorred them, by pu­nishing those sins upon the people after­wards; although according to the usual proportion of sins and punishments, the sins of the people in that age did not exceed [Page 403] the sins of other ages, as much as the pu­nishments they suffered, did exceed the punishments of other ages: which is neces­sary according to Crellius his Doctrine; for if God never punisheth by occasion of their Fathers sins, the children beyond the desert of their own sins; then it is neces­sary, that where judgements are remark­ably greater, the sins must be so too; the contrary to which is plain in this instance. By which we see, that it is not contrary to the Justice of God in punishing, to make the punishment of some on the account of others sins, to exceed the desert of their own; measuring that desert, not in a way common to all sin, but when the desert of some sins is compared with the desert of others: For it is of this latter we speak of, and of the method which God useth in punishing sin here, for the demonstration of his hatred of it, according to which the greatest pu­nishments must suppose the greatest sins, either of their own, or others which they suffer for.

But hath not God declared, That he will §. 7. E [...]k. 18. 20 exp [...]ain­ [...]d E [...]k. 18. 4, 20. never punish the children for the Fathers sins? for the soul that sinneth it shall dye; the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, &c. To which I answer, These words are to be considered, as an answer to a complaint [Page 404] made by the Jews, soon after their going into Captivity, which they imputed to Gods severity in punishing them for their Fathers sins. Now the complaint was either true or false; if it were true, then though this was looked upon as great severity in God, yet it was no injustice in him; for though God may act severely, he cannot act unjustly: If it was false, then the an­swer had been an absolute denial of it, as a thing repugnant to the Justice of God. Which we do not find here, but that God saith unto them, v. 3. Ye shall not have occa­sion any more to use this Proverb in Israel: if the thing had been plainly unjust, which they complained of, he would have told them, they never had occasion to use it. But we finde the Prophets telling them be­fore hand, that they should suffer for their Fathers sins, Jerem. 15. 3, 4. where he threatens them with destruction and banish­ment, because of the sins of Manasseh in Je­rusalem; and in the beginning of the capti­vity they complain of this, Lam. 5. 7. Our Fathers have sinned, and are not, and we have born their iniquities. And Jerem. 31. 28. God saith by the Prophet, that he had watch­ed over them to pluck up, and to pull down, and to destroy, and to afflict: but that he would watch over them to build, and to plant, [Page 405] and in those days they shall say no more, The Jer. 31. 29, 30. Fathers have eaten sowre grapes, and the chil­drens teeth are set on edge; but every one shall dye for his own iniquity. Which place is exactly parallel with this in Ezekiel, and gives us a clear account of it, which is, that now indeed God had dealt very se­verely with them, by making them suffer beyond, what in the ordinary course of his providence their sins had deserved; but he punished them not onely for their own sins, but the sins of their Fathers: But lest they should think, they should be utterly consumed for their iniquities, and be no longer a people enjoying the Land which God had promised them, he tells them by the Prophets, though they had smarted so much, by reason of their Fathers sins, this severity should not always continue upon them; but that God would visit them with his kindeness again, and would plant them in their own Land, then they should see no reason to continue this Proverb among them; for they would then find, Though their fathers had eaten sowre grapes, their teeth should not be always set on edge with it. And if we observe it, the occasion of the Pro­verb, was concerning the Land of Israel, [...] super terra Israel, as the Chaldee Ezek. 18. 2. Paraphrast renders it more agreeable to the [Page 406] Hebrew, than the other Versions do. So that the Land of Israel was the occasion of the Proverb, by their being banished out of it for their Fathers sins: Now God tells them, they should have no more occasion to use this Proverb concerning the Land of Israel; for they, notwithstanding their Fathers sins, should return into their own Land. And even during the continuance of their captivity, they should not under­go such great severities for the future, but they should find their condition much more tolerable than they imagined; onely, if any were guilty of greater sins than others, they should themselves suffer for their own faults, but he would not punish the whole Nation for them, or their own posterity. This I take to be the genuine meaning of this place; and I the rather embrace it, because I find such insuperable difficulties in other Interpretations that are given of it: For to say as our Adversaries do, That what God saith, should not be for the future, was repugnant to his nature and justice ever to do, is to charge God plainly with injustice in what he had done: For the Prophets told them they should suffer for the sins of their Fathers: Which sufferings were the ground of their complaint now, and the answer here given must relate to [Page 407] the occasion of the complaint; for God saith, They should not have occasion to use that Proverb: Wherein is implied, they should not have the same reason to complain which they had then. I demand then, Do not these words imply, That God would not do for the future with them, what he had done before? if not, the proper an­swer had been a plain denial, and not a promise for the future he would not; if they do, then either God properly punish­ed them for the sins of their Fathers, and then God must be unjust in doing so; or it was just with God to do it, and so this place instead of overthrowing will prove, that some may be justly punished, beyond the desert of their own sins: or else, God did onely take occasion by their Fathers sins, to punish them according to the desert of their own iniquities: But then they had no cause to complain, that they were punished for any more than their own iniquities; and withal, then God doth oblige himself by his promise here, never to punish men for the future by the occasion of others sins: which is not onely contrary to their own Doctrine, but to what is plainly seen after­wards in the punishment of the Jew [...] for their Fathers sins, mentioned by our Saviour Matth. 23. 35. after this: And if this be a certain rule of [Page 408] equity which God here saith, that he would never vary from, then the punishing of some on the occasion of others sins, would be as unjust, as our Adversaries suppose the punishing any beyond the desert of their own sins to be. But is it not implyed, that Gods ways would be unequal, if he ever did Ezek. 18. 25. otherwise than he there said he would do? No, it is not, if by equal he meant just, for his ways never were, or can be so unequal; but here if it be taken with a respect to the main dispute of the Chapter, no more is implied in them, but that they judged amiss concerning Gods actions, and that they were just, when they thought them not to be so: or ifat least, they thought his ways very severe, though just, God by remit­ting of this severity, would shew that he was not onely just, but kinde; and so they would finde his ways equal, that is, always agreeable to themselves, and ending in kindeness to them, though they hitherto were so severe towards them in their ba­nishment and captivity. Or if they be taken with a respect to the immediate oc­casion of them both, Ezek. 18.—33. They do not relate to this dispute about Childrens suffering for their Fathers sins; but to another, which was concerning a righ­teous Ezek. 33. 20. mans sinning and dying in his sins, [Page 409] and a wicked mans repenting, and living in his righteousness; which were directly contrary to the common opinion of the Jews to this day, which is, that God will judge men according to the greatest num­ber of their actions good or bad: as ap­pears by Maimonides and others. Now they thought it a very hard case, for a man who had been righteous the far great­est part of his time, if he did at last com­mit iniquity, that his former righteous­ness should signifie nothing, but he must dye in his iniquity. To this therefore God answers, that it was only the inequality of their own ways, which made them think Gods ways in doing so unequal. This then doth not make it unequal, for God either to punish men, upon the occasion, or by the desert of other mens sins, sup­posing such a conjunction between them, as there is in the same body of people, to those who went before them. And Crellius himself grants, ‘That Socinus ne­ver Crell. c. 4. sect. 15. intended to prove, that one mans suffering for anothers sins was unjust in it self, from this place: no, not though we take it in the strictest sense, for one suffering in the stead of another.’

[Page 410] Having thus far cleared, how far it is agreeable to Gods Justice, to punish any §. 8. The deli­verance of the guilty by the suf­ferings of an innocent person by his own consent, makes not the punish­ment un­just. persons either by reason of his dominion, or the conjunction of persons, for the sins of others, and consequently whether any punishment may be undergone justly be­yond the proper desert of their own sins, I now return to the consent of Mankinde in it, on supposition either of a neer con­junction, or a valid consent which must make up the want of dominion in men without it. And the question still pro­ceeds upon the supposition of those things, that there be a proper dominion in men over that which they part with for others sakes, and that they do it by their free consent; and then we justifie it not to be repugnant to the principles of Rea­son and Justice for any to suffer beyond the desert of their own actions. And Crel­lius his saying, that such a punishment is true punishment, but not just; is no an­swer at all to the consent of Nations that it is so. And therefore finding this answer insufficient; he relyes upon another, viz. ‘That it was never receiv'd by the con­sent Crell. c. 4. sect. 30. 32, 34, &c. of Nations, that one man should suffer in the stead of another, so as the guilty should be freed by the others suffering. For he saith, neither Socinus [Page 411] nor he do deny that one man may be pu­nished for anothers sins; but that which they deny is, that ever the innocent were punished so as the guilty were freed by it, and so he answers, in the case of Hostages and Sureties, their punishment did never excuse the offenders them­selves. And to this purpose he saith, Socinus his argument doth hold good, that though one mans money may be­come anothers, yet one mans sufferings cannot become anothers: For, saith he, if it could, then it would be all one who suffered, as it is who pays the money due: And then the offender must be pre­sently released, as the Debtor is upon payment of the debt.’ This is the sub­stance of what is said by him upon this Ar­gument. To which I reply; 1. That this gives up the matter in dispute at present between us; for the present question is, Whether it be unjust for any one to suffer beyond the desert of his own actions? Yes, saith Crellius, it is, in case he suffers so, as that the guilty be freed by his sufferings. But we are not enquiring, Whether it be just for another person to be freed for a mans suffering for him? but whether it be just for that man to suffer by his own con­sent, more than his own actions, without [Page 412] that consent deserved? The release of an­other person by virtue of his sufferings, is a matter of another consideration. Doth the freeing or not freeing of another by suffering, add any thing to the desert of suf­fering? He that being wholly innocent, and doth suffer on the account of anothers fault, doth he not suffer as undeservedly, though another be not freed, as if he were? As in the case of Hostages or Sureties, doth it make them at all the more guilty, be­cause the persons they are concerned for, will be punished notwithstanding, if they come under the power of those who ex­acted the punishment upon them, who suf­fered for them? Nay, is not their desert of punishment so much the less, in as much as the guilty are still bound to answer for their own offences? If we could suppose the guilty to be freed by the others suffer­ings, it would be by supposing their guilt more fully translated upon those who suf­fer, and consequently, a greater obliga­tion to punishment following that guilt. From whence it follows, that if it be just to punish, when the person is not deliver­ed from whom the other suffers, it is more just when he is; for the translation of the penalty is much less in the former case, than in the latter; and what is just upon [Page 413] less grounds of punishment, must be more just upon greater. I look on this there­fore but as a shift of Crellius, hoping thereby to avoid the consent of mankind in one mans suffering for another, without attend­ing to the main argument he was upon; viz. The justice of one person suffering for another. 2. It is a very unreasonable thing, to make an action unjust for that, which of it self is acknowledged by our Adversaries to be very just; viz. The par­doning the offenders themselves. If it were just to suffer, if the other were not par­doned, and it were just to pardon, whe­ther the other were punished or no, how comes this suffering to be unjust, meerly by the others being pardoned by it: nay, is it not rather an Argument, that those sufferings are the most just, which do so fully answer all the ends of punishments; that there is then no necessity that the offender should suffer; but that the Su­preme Governor having obtained the ends of Government, by the suffering of one for the rest, declares himself so well pleased with it, that he is willing to pardon the offenders themselves. 3. Many of those persons who have had their sins punished in others, have themselves escaped the punishment due to the desert of their sins. [Page 413] As is plain in the case of Ahab, whose punishment was not so great as his sins de­served, because the full punishment of them was reserved to his posterity. If it be said, as it is by Crellius, That Ahab was not wholly Crell. c. 4. sect. 25. 1 King. 21. 19. freed, his life being taken away, for his own sins: That gives no sufficient answer; for if some part of the punishment was deferr'd, that part he was delivered from; and the same reason in this case will hold for the whole as the part. As is plain in the case of Manasseh, and several others, the guilt of whose sins were punished on their poste­rity, themselves escaping it. 4. Our Ad­versaries confess, that in some cases it is lawful and just for some to suffer, with a design that others may be freed by their suffering for them. Thus they assert, That one Christian, not onely may, but ought to lay down his life for another, if there be any danger of his denying the truth, or he judges him far more useful and considerable Crell. c. 6. sect. 39. than himself: so likewise a son for his Father, one Brother for another, or a Friend, or any, whose life he thinks more useful than his own. Now I ask, whether a man can be bound to a thing that is in its own nature unjust? if not, as it is plain he cannot, then such an obli­gation of one man to suffer for the de­livery of another cannot be unjust, and [Page 415] consequently the suffering it self cannot be so. But Crellius saith, The injustice in this case lyes wholly upon the Magistrate who admits it: but I ask wherefore is it unjust in the Magistrate to admit it? is it be­cause the thing is in it self unjust? if so, there can be no obligation to do it; and it would be as great a sin to undergo it, as in the Magistrate to permit it; but if it be just in it self, we have obtained what we contend for; viz. that it may be just for a man to suffer beyond the desert of his own actions; for he that layes down his life for his Brethren, doth not deserve by his own actions that very punishment which he undergoes. And if the thing be in it self just, how comes it to be un­just in him that permits it? 5. The rea­son why among men the offenders them­selves are punished, is because those were not the terms, upon which the persons suffered. For if they had suffer'd upon these terms that the other might be freed, and their suffering was admitted of by the Magistrate on that consideration, then in all reason and justice the offenders ought to be freed on the account of the others suffering for them. But among men the chief reason of the obligation to punishment of one man for another, is not, [Page 416] that the other might be freed, but that there may be security given to the pub­lick, that the offender shall be punish [...] and the reason of the sureties suffering is not to deliver the offender, but to satis­fie the Law, by declaring that all care is taken that the offender should be punish­ed, when in case of his escape, the surety suffers for him. But it is quite another thing when the person suffers purposely that others might be freed by his suffer­ing; for then in case the suffering be ad­mitted, the release of the other is not only not unjust, but becomes due to him that suffer'd, on his own terms. Not as though it follow'd ipso facto as Crellius fan­sies, but the manner of release doth de­pend upon the terms which he who suf­fer'd for them, shall make in order to it. For upon this suffering of one for ano­ther upon such terms, the immediate con­sequent of the suffering is not the actual discharge but the right to it which he hath purchased; and which he may dispense upon what terms he shall judge most for his honour. 6. Although one persons sufferings cannot become anothers so as one mans Money may; yet one mans suf­ferings may be a sufficient consideration on which a benefit may accrue to another. [Page 417] For to that end a donation, or such a trans­ferring right from one to another as is in Money, is not necessary, but the accepta­tion which it hath from him who hath the power to pardon. If he declare that he is so well pleased with the sufferings of one for another, that in consideration of them, he will pardon those from whom he suffer'd; where lies the impossibility or unreasonableness of the thing? For Crellius grants, that rewards may be given to others than the persons who did the actions Crell. ib. s [...]ct. 28. in consideration of those actions; and why may not the sufferings of one for others, being purposely undertaken for this end, be available for the pardon of those whom he suffer'd for? For a man can no more transferre the right of his good actions, than of his sufferings. From all which it follows, that one person may by his own consent, and being admitted thereto by him to whom the right of punishing be­longs, suffer justly; though it be beyond the desert of his own actions; and the guilty may be pardoned on the account of his sufferings. Which was the first thing we designed to prove from Crellius, in order to the overthrowing his own hypo­thesis. For it being confessed by him that such sufferings have all that belongs to the [Page 418] nature of punishments, and since God hath justly punished some for the sins which they have not committed; since all Na­tions have allowed it just for one man by his own consent to suffer for another; since it cannot be unjust for the offender to be released by anothers sufferings, if he were admitted to suffer for that end, it evidently follows, contrary to Crellius his main Principle, that a person may be justly punished beyond the desert of his own actions: And so that first argument of Crellius cannot hold, that one man cannot by his own consent suffer for another, because no man can deserve anothers punishment, and no punishment is just but what is deserved. His second argument from the nature of anger and revenge hath been already an­swered in the first Discourse about the nature and ends of punishments, and his third argument, that one mans punishment cannot become anothers, immediately be­fore. And so we have finished our first consideration of the sufferings of Christ in general, as a punishment of our sins, which we have shewed to be agreeable both to Scripture and Reason.

CHAP. IV.

WE come now to consider the death of Christ, as an Expiatory Sacrifice §. 1. The death of Christ considered as an Ex­piatory Sa­crifice for sin. for the sins of mankinde: Which is as much denied by our Adversaries, as that it was a punishment for our sins. For though they do not deny, That Christ as a Priest did offer up a Sacrifice of Expiation for the sins of men; yet they utterly deny, That this was performed on earth, or that the Expiation of sins did respect God, but onely us; or, that the death of Christ, had any proper efficacy to­wards the expiation of sin, any further than as it comprehends in it all the consequences of his death, by a strange Catechresis. I shall now therefore prove, that all things which do belong to a proper Expiatory Sacrifice, do agree to the death of Christ. There are three things especially considerable in it: 1. A Substitution in the place of the Of­fenders. 2. An Oblation of it to God. 3. An Expiation of sin consequent upon it. Now these three, I shall make appear to a­gree fully to the death of Christ for us.

1. A Substitution in the place of the Os­fenders. That we are to prove, was design­ed in the Expiatory Sacrifices under the Law, and that Christ in his death for us, was sub­stituted [Page 421] in our place. 1. That in the Ex­piatory Sacrifices under the Law, there was a Substitution of them in the place of the Offenders. This our Adversaries are not willing to yield us, because of the corre­spondency which is so plain in the Epistle to the Hebrews, between those Sacrifices, and that which was offered up by Christ. We now speak onely of those Sacrifices, which we are sure were appointed of old for the expiation of sin, by God him­self. As to which the great rule assign­ed by the Apostle was, That without Heb. 9. 22. shedding of blood there was no remission. If we yield Crellius what he so often urgeth; viz. That these words are to be C [...]ll. c. 10. sect. 14. understood, of what was done under the Law: They will not be the less serviceable to our purpose; for thereby it will appear, that the means of Expiation lay in the shedding of blood: Which shews, that the very mactation of the beast to be sacrificed, was designed in order to the expiation of sin. To an inquisitive person, the reason of the slaying such multitudes of beasts in the Sacrifices appointed by God himself among the Jews, would have appeared far less evident than now it doth, since the Author of the Epistle to the Hebrews hath given us so full an account of them. For [Page 422] it had been very unreasonable to have thought, that they had been meerly insti­tuted out of compliance with the customs of other Nations, since the whole design of their Religion, was to separate them from them: and on such a supposition the great design of the Epistle to the Hebrews signifies very little; which doth far more explain to us the nature and tendency of all the Sacrifices in use among them, that had any respect to the expiation of sins, than all the customs of the Egyptians, or the Commentaries of the latter Jews. But I intend not now to discourse at large, up­on this subject of Sacrifices, either as to the nature and institution of them in general, or with a particular respect to the Sacri­fice of Christ, since a learned person of our Church, hath already undertaken Crellius up­on this Argument, and we hope ere long will oblige the world with the benefit of his pains. I shall therefore onely insist on those things which are necessary for our purpose, in order to the clearing the Substitution of Christ in our stead, for the expiation of our sins by his death; and this we say was represented in the Ex­piatory Sacrifices, which were instituted among the Jews. If we yield Crellius what he Crell. c. 10. sect. 13. after Socinus contends for; viz. That the Sa­crifice [Page 423] of Christ was onely represented in the [...]ublick and solemn Expiatory Sacrifices for the [...]eople, and especially those on the day of Atone­ [...]ent: We may have enough from them to indicate all that we assert, concerning [...]he Expiatory Sacrifice of the blood of Christ.

For that those were designed by way of §. 2. What the expiation of sin was by the sa­crifices un­der the Law. [...]bstitution in the place of the offenders, will [...]pear from the circumstances and reason [...]f their Institution: But before we come [...] that, it will be necessary to shew what [...]at Expiation was, which the Sacrifices [...]der the Law were designed for; the [...]ot understanding of which, gives a greater [...]rce to our Adversaries Arguments, than [...]therwise they would have. For while [...]en assert, that the expiation was wholly [...]pical, and of the same nature with that [...]piation which is really obtained by the [...]eath of Christ, they easily prove, That all [...]e expiation then, was onely declarative, and [...]d no more depend on the sacrifices offered, [...]an on a condition required by God, the neg­ [...]t of which would be an act of disobedience in [...]em; and by this means it could represent, [...]y they, no more than such an expiation to by Christ; viz. Gods declaring that sins [...]e expiated by him, on the performance of such condition required in order thereto, as laying [Page 424] down his life was. But we assert anoth [...] kind of expiation of sin, by virtue of t [...] Sacrifice being slain and offered; wh [...] was real, and depended upon the Sacrifi [...] And this was twofold, a Civil, and a Ri [...] expiation, according to the double [...] pacity in which the people of the I [...] may be considered, either as members o [...] Society, subsisting by a body of L [...] which according to the strictest Sanction [...] it, makes death the penalty of disobed [...] ence, Deut. 27. 26. but by the will of [...] Legislator, did admit of a relaxation [...] many cases, allowed by himself; in whi [...] he declares, That the death of the be [...] designed for a sacrifice should be [...] cepted, instead of the death of the offe [...] der; and so the offence should be fu [...] expiated, as to the execution of the pe [...] Law upon him. And thus far, I freely [...] mit what Grotius asserts upon this subje [...] Grot. de Sa­tus. c. 10. and do yield that no other offence co [...] be expiated in this manner, but such whi [...] God himself did particularly declare sho [...] be so. And therefore no sin which [...] to be punished by cutting off, was to [...] expiated by Sacrifice; as wilful Idola [...] Murther, &c. Which it is impossible f [...] those to give an account of, who make [...] expiation wholly typical; for why th [...] [Page 425] should not the greatest sins much rather [...]ave had sacrifices of expiation appointed [...]or them: because the Consciences of [...]en would be more solicitous for the [...]ardon of greater than lesser sins; and the [...]lood of Christ represented by them, was designed for the expiation of all. From whence it is evident, that it was not a meer typical expiation; but it did relate [...]o the civil constitution among them. But [...]esides this, we are to consider the people with a respect to that mode of Divine Worship which was among them; by rea­son of which, the people were to be purified from the legal impurities which they contracted, which hindred them from joyning with others in the publick Worship of God, and many Sacrifices were appointed purposely for the expiating this legal guilt, as particularly, the ashes of the red heifer, Numb. 19. 9. which is there call'd a purification for sin. And the Apostle puts the blood of Bulls and of Goats, Heb. 9. 12, 13. and the ashes of a heifer sprinkling the unclean, together; and the effect of both of them, he saith, was to sanctifie to the purifying of the flesh; which implyes, that there was some proper and immediate effect of these sacrifices upon the people at that time; though infinitely short of the effect of [Page 426] the blood of Christ upon the Conscien [...] of men. By which it is plain, the Apost [...] doth not speak of the same kind of expi [...] ­tion in those sacrifices, which was in the S [...] ­crifice of Christ, and that the one w [...] barely typical of the other; but of a di [...] ­ferent kind of expiation, as far as purify­ing the flesh is from purging the Conscien [...] But we do not deny, that the whole dis­pensation was typical, and that the Law [...] a shadow of good things to come, and not [...] Heb. 10. 1. very image of the things, i. e. a dark a [...] obscure representation, and not the per­fect resemblance of them. There are tw [...] things which the Apostle asserts conce [...] ­ing the Sacrifices of the Law: First, th [...] they had an effect upon the Bodies of m [...] which he calls purifying the flesh; the oth [...] is, that they had no power to expiate fo [...] the sins of the Soul, considered with a re­spect to the punishment of another lif [...] which he calls purging the Conscience fr [...] dead works; and therefore he saith, that [...] the gifts and sacrifices under the Law, co [...] Heb. 9 9. 10. 4. not make him that did the service perfect, [...] pertaining to the Conscience, and that it [...] impossible that the blood of Bulls and Go [...] should take away sin. So that the prop [...] expiation which was made by them, [...] civil and ritual, relating either to cor­poral [Page 427] punishment, or to legal uncleanness, [...]rom whence the Apostle well proves the [...]ecessity of a higher Sacrifice to make [...]xpiation for sins, as pertaining to the Con­ [...]ience: But that expiation among the Jews [...]id relate to that Polity which was esta­ [...]lished among them, as they were a Peo­ [...]le under the Government of a body of [...]aws distinct from the rest of the world. [...]nd they being consider'd as such, it is [...]ain to enquire, whether they had only [...]mporal or eternal promises; for it was im­ [...]ossible they should have any other than [...]emporal, unless we imagine, that God [...]ould own them for a distinct people in [...]other World as he did in this. For what [...]romises relate to a People as such, must [...]onsider them as a People, and in that [...]pacity they must the blessings of a Socie­ [...], viz. peace, plenty, number of People, [...]ngth of dayes, &c. But we are far from [...]enying that the general Principles of [...]eligion did remain among them, viz. that [...]re is a God, and a rewarder of them that [...]k him; and all the Promises God made [...] the Patriarchs, did continue in force as another Countrey, and were continually [...]proved by the Prophetical instructions [...]ong them. But we are now speaking what did respect the people in general, [Page 428] by vertue of that Law which was giv [...] them by Moses, and in that respect [...] punishment of faults being either death [...] exclusion from the publick Worship, t [...] expiation of them, was taking away t [...] obligation to either of these, whi [...] was the guilt of them in that consider [...] ­tion.

But doth not this take away the typi [...] nature of these sacrifices? No, but it mu [...] rather establisheth it. For as Socinus ar­gues, ‘If the expiation was only typi [...] Socin. de servat. l. 2. c. 10. Praelect. Th [...]olog. cap. 22. there must be something in the typ [...] correspondent to that which is typif [...] by it. As the Brazen Serpent typifi [...] Christ, and the benefit which was to co [...] by him, because as many as looked up [...] it were healed. And Noahs Ark is s [...] to be a type of Baptism, because as [...] ­ny as enter'd into that were saved fro [...] the deluge. So Corinth. 10. the Apost [...] saith, that those things happen'd to th [...] in types, v. 11. because the events whi [...] happen'd to them, did represent tho [...] which would fall upon disobedient Ch [...] ­stians.’ So that to make good the the notion of a Type, we must assert an exp [...] ­tion that was real then, and agreeable [...] that dispensation, which doth repres [...] an expiation of a far higher nature, whi [...] [Page 429] was to be by the Sacrifice of the Blood of Christ.

Which being premised, I now come to [...]rove, that there was a substitution design­ed §. 3. A substi­tution proved from Levit. 17. 11. &c. of the Beast to be slain and sacrificed [...] stead of the offenders themselves. Which will appear from Leviticus 17. 11. For the life of the flesh is in the blood, and I have given it to you upon the Altar, to make an Atonement for your Souls; for it is the blood that maketh an Atonement for the Soul. The utmost that Crellius would have meant by this place is, that there is a double reason Crell. c. 10. sect. 9. assigned of the prohibition of eating blood, viz. that the life was in the blood, and that the blood was designed for expiation; but he makes these wholly independent upon each other. But we say, that the proper reason assigned against the eating of the blood, is that which is elswhere given, when this Precept is men­tion'd, viz. that the blood was the life, as we may see Gen. 9. 4. Levit. 17. 14. but to confirm the reason given, that the blood was the life; he addes, that God had given them that upon the Altar for an Atonement for their Souls; So the Arabick Version renders it, and therefore have I given it you upon the Altar, viz. because the blood is the life. And hereby a sufficient reason is given, why God did make choice of the [Page 430] blood for atonement, for that is expre [...] in the latter clause, for it is the blood [...] maketh an atonement for the Soul; w [...] should this be mention'd here, if no [...] were intended but to give barely anoth [...] reason why they should not eat the bloo [...] what force is there more in this cla [...] to that end, than in the foregoing? [...] therein God had said, that he had given them for an Atonement. If no more h [...] been intended, but the bare prohibit [...] of common use of the blood, on the [...] count of its being consecrated to sac [...] use, it had been enough to have said, th [...] the blood was holy unto the Lord, as [...] is in the other instances mention'd b [...] Crellius, of the holy Oyntment and Perfu [...] Exod. 30. 32, 33. 37. 38. for no other reason is there given, why [...] should not be profaned to common [...] but that it should be holy for the Lord; therefore the blood had been forbidd [...] upon that account, there had been no [...] ­cessity at all of adding, that the blood [...] it that made atonement for the Soul: whi [...] gives no peculiar reason why they sho [...] not eat the blood, beyond that of b [...] consecration of it to a sacred use; but we consider it as respecting the first claus [...] viz. For the life of the flesh is in the bloo [...] then there is a particular reason why th [...] [Page 431] blood should be for atonement, viz. be­cause the life was in that; and therefore when the blood was offer'd, the life of the Beast was supposed to be given instead of the life of the offender. According to that of Ovid,

This will be yet made clearer by another instance produced by Crellius to explain this, which is the forbidding the eating of fat, which, saith he, is joyned with this of blood, Levit. 3. 17. It shall be a perpetual Statute for your Generations, throughout all your dwellings, that ye eat neither fat, nor blood. To the same purpose, Levit. 7. 23, 25, 26. Now no other reason is given of the prohibition of the fat, but this, All the fat is the Lords. Which was enough Lev. 3. 16. to keep them from eating it; but we see here in the case of blood somewhat fur­ther is assigned, viz. that it was the life; and therefore was the most proper for ex­piation, the life of the beast being substi­tuted in the place of the offenders. Which was therefore call'd animalis hostia among the Romans, as Grotius observes upon this place, and was distinguished from those whose entrails were observed; for in [Page 432] those Sacrifices as Servius saith, sola ani­ma Servius ad AEneid. 4. Deo sacratur, the main of the Sacri­fice lay in shedding of the blood, which was call'd the Soul; and so it is [...] in this place. From whence it appears that such a sacrifice was properly [...] for the same word [...] is used, both re­lating to the blood and the soul, that is ex­piated by it: and the LXX. do accord­ingly render it, [...], and in the last clause, [...]. From whence Eusebius calls Euseb. de­moust. Evang. l. 1. c. 10. these Sacrifices of living Creatures, [...], and afterwards saith they were [...]. And Crellius elsewhere grants, that Crell. cap. 8. §. 23. De­notat enim vox [...] eos quorum alter pro altero ani­mam ponat aut devo­v [...]at, & sic id malum quod alteri sub [...]ndum erat ejus lo­co subire non d [...]treclet. where [...] is joyned with [...] it doth imply, that one doth undergo the punishment which another was to have undergone, which is all we mean by substitution, it being done in the place of another. From whence it follows, that the Sacrifices under the Law being said to be [...] doth necessarily inferr a substitution of them in the place of the offenders. And from hence may be understood, what is meant by the Goat of the Sin-offering, bearing the iniquity of the Congregation, to make atonement for them before the Lord, Levit. 10. 17. for Crellius his saying, That [Page 433] bearing is as much as taking away, or declaring that they are taken away, hath been already disproved: And his other answer hath as little weight in it; viz. That it is not said, that the sacrifice did bear their iniquities, but the Priest: For, 1. The Chaldee Paraphrast, and the Syriack Version, understand it wholly of the Sacrifice. 2. Socinus himself grants, Socia. de servat. l. 2. c. [...] 11. That if it were said, the Priest did expiate by the sacrifices, it were all one as if it were said, that the sacrifices themselves did expiate; be­cause the expiation of the Priest was by the sa­crifice. Thus it is plain in the case of un­certain murther, mentioned Deut. 21. from the first to the tenth; If a murther were com­mitted in the Land, and the person not known who did it, a heifer was to have her head cut off by the Elders of the next City, and by this means they were to put away the guilt of innocent blood from among them: The reason of which was, because God had said before, That blood defiled the land, and the land can­not be cleansed of the blood that is shed therein, Numb. 35. 33. but by the blood of him that shed it. From whence it appears, that upon the shedding of blood, there was a guilt contracted upon the whole Land wherein it was shed, and in case the Murtherer was not found to expiate that guilt by his own blood, then it was to be done by the cutting off the [Page 434] head of a heifer instead of him: In which case, the death of the heifer was to do as much towards the expiating the Land, as the death of the Murtherer if he had been found: And we do not contend, that this was designed to expiate the Murtherers guilt (which is the Objection of Crellius against [...]ll. c. 10. sect. 9. this instance) but that a substitution here was appointed by God himself, for the ex­piation of the people: For what Crellius adds, That the people did not deserve punish­ment, and therefore needed no expiation; it is a flat contradiction to the Text: For the prayer appointed in that case is, Be merci­ful, O Lord, unto thy people Israel, whom thou hast redeemed, and lay not innocent blood un­to thy people Israels charge; and the blood shall Deut. 21. 8. be expiated; for the same word [...] is used here, which is in the other places where Expiation is spoken of. So that here must be some guilt supposed, where there was to be an expiation, and this expiation was performed by the substitution of a sacrifice in the place of the offender. Which may be enough at present to shew, that a substitu­tion was admitted by the Law, of a sacri­fice instead of the offender, in order to the expiation of guilt; but whether the offender himself was to be freed by that Sacrifice, depends upon the terms on which [Page 435] the sacrifice was offered; for we say still, that so much guilt was expiated, as the sacrifice was designed to expiate; if the sacrifice was designed to expiate the guilt of the offender, his sin was expiated by it; if not his, in case no sacrifice was allowed by the Law, as in that of murther, then the guilt which lay upon the Land was expiated, although the offender himself were never discovered.

I now come to prove, that in correspon­dency §. 4. A substitu­tion of Christ in our room proved by his dy­ing for us. to such a substitution of the sacrifices for sin under the Law, Christ was substi­tuted in our room for the expiation of our guilt; and that from his being said to dye for us, and his death being call'd a price of Redemption for us.

1. From Christs being said to dye for us. By S. Peter, For Christ hath also once suffered 1 Pet. 3. 18. 2. 21. 4. 1. for sins, the just for the unjust; by whom he is also said, to suffer [...], for us, and, for us in the flesh: By S. Paul, he is said to dye [...], for all, and [...], for the ungodly, and to give himself [...], 2 Cor. 5. 14. Rom. 5. 6. 1 Tim. 2. 6. Heb. 2. 9. Joh. 11. 50. Luke 22. 19, 20. a ransome for all, and, to taste death [...], for every man: By Caiaphas, speaking by in­spiration, he is said to dye [...], for the people. So Christ himself instituting his last Supper said, This is my body which was given, and my blood which was shed [...], [Page 436] for you; and before he had said, That the Math. 20. 28. Son of man came to give his life [...], a ransome for many. We are now to con­sider, what arts our Adversaries have made use of to pervert the meaning of these places, so as not to imply a substitution of Christ in our room: 1. They say, That all these phrases do imply no more, than a final cause; viz. That Christ died for the good of mankind; for the Apostle tells us, We are bound to lay down our lives for the Brethren, and 1 John 3. 16. S. Paul is said to suffer for the Church. To Coloss. 1. 24. which I answer; 1. This doth not at all destroy that which we now plead for; viz. That these phrases do imply a substitution of Christ in our room: For when we are bid to lay down our lives for our brethren, a substitution is implied therein; and sup­posing that dying for another, doth signi­fie dying for some benefit to come to him, yet what doth this hinder substitution, un­less it be proved, that one cannot obtain any benefit for another, by being substi­tuted in his room. Nay, it is observable, that although we produce so many places of Scripture, implying such a substitution, they do not offer to produce one that is inconsistent with Christs suffering in our stead; all that they say is, That [...] doth not always signifie so, which we never said it [Page 437] did, who say, that Christ suffered [...] not instead of our sins, but by rea­son of them; but we assert, that when one person is said to dye for others, as in the places mentioned, no other sense can be so proper and agreeable, as dying in the stead of the other. 2. Socinus himself grants, ‘That there is a peculiarity implied in Soc. de ser­vat. l. 2. c. 8. those phrases, when attributed to Christ, above what they have when attributed to any other. And therefore he saith, It cannot be properly said, That one Brother dyes for another, or that Paul suffer'd for the Colossians, or for the Church, as Christ may truly and pro­perly be said to suffer and to dye for us. And from hence, saith he, S. Paul saith, was Paul crucified for you? implying thereby, that there never was, or could 1 Cor. 1. 13. be any, who truely and properly could be said to dye for men but Christ alone.’ How unreasonable then is it, from the use of a particle as applyed to others, to in­ferr, that it ought to be so understood, when applyed to Christ? when a pecu­liarity is acknowledged in the death of Christ for us, more than ever was or could be in one mans dying for another. 3. It is not the bare force of the particle [...] that we insist upon; but that a substitu­tion [Page 438] could not be more properly expressed, than it is in Scripture, by this and other particles, for not only [...] is used, but [...] too: which Socinus saith, Although it may Socin. ib. signifie something else besides in the stead of another, yet in such places, where it is spoken of a ransom, or price, it signifies the payment of something which was owing before, as Mat. 17. 27. [...], and so he acknowledges, that where redemption is spoken of, there [...] doth imply a commutation, because the price is given, and the person received, which, he saith, holds in Christ only metaphorical y: for the redemption according to him being only Metaphorical, the commutation must be supposed to be so too.

And this mow leads us to the larger Answer of Crellius upon this argument. §. 5. In what sense a sur­rogation of Christ in our room is asserted by us. Crell. c. 9. sect. 3. Wherein we shall consider, what he yields, what he denyes, and upon what reasons. 1. He yields, and so he saith, doth Socinus very freely, a commutation: but it is ne­cessary that we should throughly under­stand what he means by it: to that end he tells us, That they acknowledge a twofold I [...]. s [...]ct. 2. commutation; one of the person suffering, the kind of suffering being changed, not actually but intentionally, because we were not actually freed by Christ dying for us, but only Christ dyed for that end, that we might be freed. [Page 439] And this commutation, he saith, that Soci­nus doth not deny to be implyed in the par­ticle [...], in the places where Christ is said to dye for us. Another commutation, which he acknowledges, is, that which is between a price, and the thing or person which is bought or redeemed by it; where the price is paid, and the thing or person is received upon it. And this kind of commutation, he saith, is to be understood in the places where [...] is mention'd; which price, he saith, by accident may be a person; and because the person is not presently delivered, he therefore saith, that the commutation is rather imperfect than Ib. sect. 6. metaphorical; and although, he saith, [...] doth not of it self imply a commutation, yet he grants, that the circumstances of the places do imply it. 2. He denyes, that there is any proper surrogation in Christs dying for us, Ib. sect. 7. which, he saith, is such a commutation of per­sons, that the substituted person is in all re­spects to be in the same place and state where­in the other was; and if it refers to suffer­ings; then it is when one suffers the very same which the other was to suffer, he being immediately delivered by the others sufferings. And against this kind of surrogation, Crel­lius needed not to have produced any reasons; for Grotius never asserted it; neither do we say, that Christ suffer'd [Page 440] eternal death for us, or that we were im­mediately freed by his sufferings. But that which Grotius asserts that he meant by substitution was this, that unless Christ had ayed for us, we must have dyed our selves, and because Christ hath dyed, we shall not dye eternally. But if this be all, saith Crellius, he meant by it, we grant the whole thing, and Ib. sect. 3. he complains of it as an injury for any to think otherwise of them. If so, they cannot de­ny but that there was a sufficient capacity in the death of Christ to be made an ex­piatory Sacrifice for the sins of the world. But notwithstanding all these fair words, Crellius means no more than Socinus did; and though he would allow the words which Grotius used, yet not in the sense he understood them in; for Crellius means no more by all this, but that the death of Christ was an antecedent condition to the expiation of sins in Heaven, Grotius understands by them, that Christ did expiate sins by becoming a Sacrifice for them in his death. Howe­ver, from hence it appears, that our Ad­versaries can have no plea against the death of Christs being an expiatory Sa­crifice (from want of a substitution in our room) since they profess themselves so willing to own such a substitution. But if they say, that there could be no proper [Page 441] substitution, because the death of Christ was a bare condition, and no punishment, they then express their minds more freely; and if these places be allowed to prove a substitution, I hope the former discourse will prove that it was by way of punish­ment. Neither is it necessary, that the very same kinde of punishment be undergone in order to surrogation, but that it be suffi­cient in order to the accomplishing the end for which it was designed. For this kind of substitution being in order to the delivery of another by it, whatever is sufficient for that end, doth make a proper surrogation. For no more is necessary to the delivery of another person than the satisfying the ends of the Law and Go­vernment, and if that may be done by an aequivalent suffering, though not the same in all respects, then it may be a proper surrogation. If David had obtained his wish, that he had dyed himself for his Son Absolom, it had not been necessary in order to his Sons escape, that he had hanged by the hair of his head, as his Son did; but his death, though in other circum­stances, had been sufficient. And there­fore, when the Lawyers say, subrogatum, sapit naturam ejus in cujus locum subrogatur: Covarru. To. 1. p. 1. sect. 4. [...]. 3. Covarruvias tells us, it is to be understood [Page 442] secundum primordialem naturam non secun­dum accidentalem; from whence it appears, that all circumstances are not necessary to be the same in surrogation; but that the nature of the punishment remain the same. Thus Christ dying for us, to deliver us from death, and the curse of the Law, he un­derwent an accursed death for that end; although not the very same which we were to have undergone, yet sufficient to shew, that he underwent the punishment of our iniquities in order to the delivering us from it. And if our Adversaries will yield us this, we shall not much contend with them about the name of a proper sur­rogation.

But in the matter of Redemption, or where §. 6. Our Re­demption by Christ proves a substitu­tion. [...] is used, Crellius will by no means yield that there was a commutation of persons be­tween Christ and us, but all the commutation he will allow here is only a commutation be­tween a thing, or a price, and a person. Which he therefore asserts, that so there may be no necessity of Christs undergoing Crell. c. 9. s [...]ct. 2. the punishment of sin in order to redempti­on, because the price that is to be paid, is not supposed to undergo the condition of the per­son deliver'd by it. Which will evidently appear to have no force at all, in case we can prove, that a proper redemption may [Page 443] be obtained by the punishment of one in the room of another; for that punishment then comes to be the [...] or price of re­demption; and he that payes this, must be supposed to undergo punishment for it. So that the commutation being between the punishment of one, and the other re­deemed by it, here is a proper commuta­tion of persons implyed in the payment of the price. But hereby we may see that the great subtilty of our Adversaries is de­signed on purpose to avoid the force of the places of Scripture, which are so plain against them: For when these places where [...] and [...] are joyned together, are so clear for a substitution, that they cannot deny it; then they say, by it is meant only a commutation of a price for a per­son; but when the word [...] is urged to prove a redemption purchased by Christ, by the payment of a price for it, then they deny that [...] doth signifie a proper price, but is only taken metaphorically; and yet if it be so taken, then there can be no force in what Crellius saith, for a bare me­taphorical price may be a real punishment. Two things I shall then prove against Crellius. 1. That the [...] as applyed to Christ, is to be taken in a proper sense. 2. That although it be taken in a proper [Page 444] sense, yet it doth not imply a bare com­mutation of a price and a person, but a substitution of one person in the room of another.

Both these will be cleared from the §. 7. Of the true notion of Re­demption. right stating the notion of redemption be­tween our Adversaries and us. For they will not by any means have any other proper notion of redemption but from cap­tivity, and that by the payment of a price to him that did hold in captivity, and therefore because Christ did not pay the price to the Devil, there could be no proper sense either of the redemption, or the price which was payd for it. This is the main strength of all the arguments used by Socinus and Crellius, to Socin. de servat. l. 2. c. 1, 2. Crell. c. 8. s [...]ct. 11. enervate the force of those places of Scri­pture which speak of our redemption by Christ, and of the price which he payd in or­der to it. But how weak these exceptions are, will appear upon a true examination of the proper notion of Redemption, which in its primary importance signifies no more, than the obtaining of one thing by another as a valuable consideration for it. Thence re­dimere anciently among the Latins signi­fied barely to purchase by a valuable price, for the thing which they had a right to by it; and sometimes to purchase that which a man hath sold before, thence the pactum [Page 445] redimendi in contracts: still in whatever sense it was used by the Lawyers or others, the main regard was, to the con­sideration upon which the thing was ob­tained, thence redimere delatorem pecunia, Ulpian. l. 29. D. de jure sisci. h. e. eum à delatione deducere; so redimere litem; and redemptor litis was one that upon certain consideration took the whole charge of a suit upon himself: and those who undertook the farming of customs at certain rates, were call'd redemptores ve­ctigalium, Budaeus ad Pa [...]dect. p. 189. Liv. l 23. qui redempturis auxissent vectiga­lia, saith Livy. And all those who un­dertook any publick work at a certain price, redemptores antiquitus dicebantur, saith Festus. v. red. Ulpian. l. 39. D. de rei vend. Festus and Ulpian. From hence it was ap­plyed to the delivery of any person from any inconvenience that he lay under, by something which was supposed a valuable consideration for it. And that it doth not only relate to captivity, but to any other great calamity, the freedom from which is obtained by what another suffers; is ap­parent from these two remarkable expres­sions of Cicero to this purpose. Quam qui­dem Cic [...]r. ep. famil. l. 2. ep. 16. ego (saith he, speaking of the sharp­ness of the time) a rep. meis privat is & domesticis incommodis libentissimè redemissem. And more expresly elsewhere, Ego vitam Orat. pr [...] Syllâ. omnium civium, statum orbis terrae, urbem [Page 446] hanc deni (que) &c. quinque hominum amenti [...] ac perditorum poena redemi. Where it i [...] plain, that redemption is used for th [...] delivery of some by the punishment o [...] others; not from meer captivity, but from a great calamity which they might have fallen into, without such a punishment of those persons. So vain is that assertion of Socinus, redimere, nihil aliud proprie sig­nificat, quam eum captivum e manibus illi­us, So [...]. de ser­vat l. 2. c. 1. qui eum detinet, pretio illi dato libe­rare.

And yet supposing we should grant that §. 8. No neces­sity of pay­ing the price to him that detains captive. redemption as used in sacred Authors doth properly relate to captivity, there is no necessity at all of that which our Adver­saries contend so earnestly for, viz. That the price must be payd to him that detains captive. For we may very easily conceive a double sort of captivity, from whence a redemption may be obtained; the one by force, when a Captive is detained purpose­ly for advantage to be made by his re­demption; and the other in a judicial manner, when the Law condemns a person to captivity, and the thing designed by the Law is not a meer price, but satisfacti­on to be made to the Law, upon which a redemption may be obtained; now in the former case it is necessary, that the [Page 447] price be paid to the person who detains, because the reason of his detaining, was the expectation of the price to be paid; but in the latter, the detainer is meerly the instrument for execution of the Law, and the price of redemption is not to be paid to him; but to those who are most con­cerned in the honour of the Law. But Crellius objects, that the price can never be said to be paid to God, because our redempti­on Cr [...]ll. c. 8. sect. 11. is attributed to God as the author of it, and because we are said to be redeemed for his use and service, now, saith he, the price can ne­ver be paid to him for whose service the per­son is redeemed. But all this depends upon the former mistake, as though we spake all this while of such a redemption, as that is of a Captive by force; in whom the de­tainer is no further concerned, than for the advantage to be made by him; and in that case the price must be paid to him who detains, because it would otherwise be unsuccessfull for his deliverance: but in case of captivity by Law, as the effect of disobedience, the Magistrate who is con­cerned in the life of the person, and his future obedience, may himself take care that satisfaction may be given to the Law for his redemption, in order to his future service ableness. From hence we see both [Page 448] that the [...] is proper in this case of our redemption, and that it is not a meer commutation of a price for a person, but a commutation of one persons suffering for others, which suffering being a punishment in order to satisfaction, is a valuable con­sideration, and therefore a price for the redemption of others by it. Which price in this sense doth imply a proper substi­tution; which was the thing to be proved. Which was the first thing to be made good concerning the death of Christ being a sacrifice for sin, viz. that there was a sub­stitution of Christ in our stead as of the sacrifices of old under the Law; and in this sense the death of Christ was a pro­per [...], or price of redemption for us. Nothing then can be more vain, than the way of our Adversaries, to take away the force of all this, because [...] is some­times taken for a meer deliverance without any price, which we deny not; but the main force of our argument is from the importance of [...], where the [...] is mention'd; and then we say that [...] when applyed to sins, signifies expiation, (as Heb. 9.. 15. [...],) but when applyed to persons, it signifies the deliverance purchased by the [...], which is not to be consider'd as a bare [Page 449] price, or a thing given, but as a thing undergone in order to that deliverance: and is therefore not only call'd [...], but [...] too, which Crellius confesseth doth imply a commutation, and we have shewed, doth prove a substitution of Christ in our place.

CHAP. V.

THE Second thing to prove the death §. 1. Of the Oblation made by Christ un­to God. of Christ a Sacrifice for sin, is the Oblation of it to God for that end. ‘ Gro­tius towards the conclusion of his book, makes a twofold Oblation of Christ, pa­rallel to that of the Sacrifices under the Law, the first of Mactation, the second [Page 452] of Representation; whereof the first was done in the Temple, the second in the Holy of Holies; so the first of Christ was on Earth, the second in Heaven; the first is not a bare preparation to a Sacrifice, but a Sacrifice: the latter not so much a Sacrifice, as the commemo­ration of one already past. Wherefore, since appearing and interceding are not properly sacerdotal acts, any further than they depend on the efficacy of a sacri­fice already offer'd, he that takes away that Sacrifice, doth not leave to Christ any proper Priesthood, against the plain authority of the Scripture, which as­signs to Christ the office of a Priest di­stinct from that of a Prophet and a King.’ To which Crellius replyes: That the expia­tion Crell. c. 10. sect. 45. of sin doth properly belong to what Christ doth in Heaven; and may be applyed to the death of Christ onely, as the condition by which he was to enjoy that power in Heaven, where­by Ib. sect. 55. he doth expiate sins; but the Priest was never said to expiate sins when he kill'd the beast, but when the blood was sprinkled or car­ried into the Holy of Holyes, to which the Oblation of Christ in Heaven doth answer: but the mactation, saith he, was not proper to the Priests, but did belong to the Levites also. Ib. sect. 47. And Christ was not truly a Priest, while he [Page 453] was on Earth, but only prepared by his suf­ferings Ib. sect. 53. to be one in Heaven, where by the per­petual care he takes of his People, and exerci­sing Ib. sect. 54. Sect. 56. his Power for them, he is said to offer up himself, and intercede for them, and by that means he dischargeth the Office of a High-Priest for them. For his Priestly Office, he saith, is never in Scripture mention'd as di­stinct from his Kingly, but is comprehended under it; and the great difference between them is, that one is of a larger extension than the other is, the Kingly Office extending to punishing, and the Priestly only to expiation. This is the substance of what Crellius more at large discourseth upon this subject. Wherein he asserts these things. 1. That the Priestly Office of Christ doth not in reference to the expiation of sins respect God but us; his Intercession and Oblation wherein he makes the sacerdotal function of Christ to consist, being the exercise of his power for the good of his People. 2. That Christ did offer up no Sacrifice of expiation to God upon Earth, because the mactation had no reference to expia­tion, any other than as a preparation for it; and Christ not yet being constituted a High-Priest till after his Resurrection from the dead. Against these two asser­tions I shall direct my following discourse, [Page 454] by proving; 1. That the Priestly Office of Christ had a primary respect to God, and not to us, 2. That Christ did exer­cise this Priestly Office in the Oblation of himself to God upon the Cross.

1. That the Priestly Office of Christ had §. 2. That the Priestly Office of Christ had a primary respect to God, and not us. Crell. in Heb. 5. 1. a primary respect to God, and not to us; which appears from the first Institution of a High-Priest, mentioned by the Apostle, Hebr. 5. 1. For every High-Priest taken from among men, is ordained for men in things per­taining to God, that he may offer both gifts and sacrifices for sins: Id est, saith Crellius else­where, ut procuret & peragat ea quae ad co­lendum ac propitiandum numen pertinent; i. e. That he may perform the things which ap­pertain to the worshipping and propitiating God: We desire no more, but that the propitiating God, may as immediately be said to respect him, as the worshipping of God doth; or let Crellius tell us, what sense the propitiating God will bear; if all that the High-Priest had to do, did immediately re­spect the people: nay, he saith not long af­ter, ‘That it was the chief Office of a High-Priest, to plead the cause of sinners with God, and to take care, that they may find him kind and propitious, and not an­gry or displeased.’ In what sense God was said to be moved by the Expiatory Sa­crifices, [Page 455] is not here our business to discuss; it is sufficient for our purpose, that they were instituted with a respect to God, so as to procure his favour, and divert his wrath. In which sense, the Priest is so often in the Levitical Law said, by the offering up of Sacrifices, to expiate the sins of the people. But Crellius saith, ‘This ought not Crell. c. 10. sect. 3. so to be understood, as though God by Expiatory Sacrifices, were diverted from his anger, and inclined to pardon;’ which is a plain contradiction, not onely to the words of the Law, but to the instances that are recorded therein; as when Aaron was bid in the time of the Plague, to make an Numb. 16. 46. Atonement for the people, for there is wrath gone out from the Lord: and he stood between Vers. 48. the living and the dead, and the plague was stayed. Was not Gods anger then diverted here, by the making this Atonement? The like instance we read in Davids time, that by the offering burnt-offerings, &c. the Lord 2 Sam. 24. 25. was intreated for the Land, and the plague was stayed from Israel: By which nothing can be more plain, than that the primary intention of such Sacrifices, and conse­quently of the Office of the Priest who of­fered them, did immediately respect the Atoning God: But yet Crellius urgeth, ‘This cannot be said of all, or of the most pro­per [Page 456] Expiatory Sacrifices:’ but we see it said of more than the meer Sacrifices f [...] sin, as appointed by the Law; viz. of burnt­offerings, and peace-offerings, and incense, i [...] the examples mentioned. So that these Levitical Sacrifices did all respect the atoning God; although in some particu­lar cases, different Sacrifices were to be offered; for it is said, the burnt-offering wa [...] to make atonement for them, as well as th [...] Lev. 1. 4. 4. 20. 5. 7. sin and trespass-offerings (excepting those sa­crifices which were instituted in acknow­ledgement of Gods Soveraignty over them and presence among them, as the daily Sa­crifices, the meat and drink offerings, o [...] such as were meerly occasional, &c.) Thus it is said, that Aaron and his sons wer [...] appointed to make an Atonement for Israel 1 Chron. 6. 49. So that as Grotius observes out of Phil [...] ‘The High-Priest was a Mediator betwee [...] God and man, by whom men might pro­pitiate Grot. in Heb. 5. 1. God, and God dispense his fa­vours to men.’ But the means whereby he did procure favours to men, was by atoning God by the Sacrifices, which h [...] was by his Office to offer to him. W [...] are now to consider, how far this hol [...] in reference to Christ, for whose sake t [...] Apostle brings in these words; and su [...] would not have mentioned this as the pr [...] [Page 457] mary Office of a High-Priest, in order to [...]he proving Christ to be our High-Priest, [...]fter a more excellent manner than the [...]ronical was, unless he had agreed with [...]im in the nature of his Office, and ex­ [...]eeded him in the manner of perform­ [...]nce.

For the Apostle both proves, that he was § 3. Christ no barely me­taphorical High-Priest. [...] true and proper, and not a bare Meta­ [...]horical High-Priest, and that in such a capa­ [...]ity, he very far exceeded the Priests after the order of Aaron. But how could that possibly be, if he failed in the primary Of­fice of a High-Priest; viz. In offering up gifts and sacrifices to God? If his Office as High-Priest did primarily respect men, when the Office of the Aaronical Priest did respect God? To avoid this, Crellius makes these words to be ‘onely an allusion to the Legal Priesthood, and some kinde of Crell. c. 10. s [...]ct. 3. similitude between Christ and the Aaroni­cal Priests;’ but it is such a kinde of allu­sion, that the Apostle designs to prove, Christ to be an High-Priest by it; and which is of the greatest force, he proves the ne­cessity of Christs having somewhat to of­fer from hence: For every High-Priest is ordained to offer gifts, and sacrifices; where­fore Hebr. 8. 3. it is of necessity, that this man have some­what also to offer. This is that which he [Page 458] looks at as the peculiar and distinguishi [...] character of a High-Priest; for intercedi [...] for others, and having compassion upo [...] them, might be done by others besides th [...] High-Priest; but this was that, witho [...] which he could not make good his name what order soever he were of. If Chri [...] then had no proper sacrifice to offer upto God, to what purpose doth the Apostle s [...] industriously set himself to prove, that h [...] is our High-Priest? when he must needs fai [...] in the main thing, according to his own assertion? How easie had it been for the Jews, to have answered all the Apostles Ar­guments concerning the Priesthood of Christ, if he had been such a Priest, and made no [...] other Oblation than Crellius allows him? When the Apostle proves against the Jews, that there was no necessity, that they should still retain the Mosaical Dispensati­on, because now they had a more excellent High-Priest than the Aaronical were; and makes use of that character of a High-Priest, that he was one taken out from among men, [...] things pertaining to God to offer gifts and sa­crifices for sins: ‘Well, say the Jews, we ac­cept of this character, but how do yo [...] prove concerning Christ, that he was such a one? Did he offer up a sacrifice fo [...] sin to God upon earth, as our High-Priest [Page 459] do?’ No, saith Crellius, his sufferings were [...]ely a preparation for his Priesthood in Hea­ [...]n: ‘But did he then offer up such a Sacrifice to God in Heaven?’ Yes, saith Crellius, He made an Oblation there. ‘But is that Oblation such a Sacrifice to God for sin, as our High-Priest offers?’ Yes, [...]aith Crellius, it may be called so by way of [...]llusion. ‘Well then, say they, you grant that your Jesus is onely a High-Priest by way of allusion, which was against your first design to prove; viz. That he was a true High-Priest, and more excellent than ours. But suppose it be by way of allusion, doth he make any Oblation to God in Heaven or not?’ No, saith Crellius, really and truly he doth not; for all his Office doth respect us, but the benefits we enjoy coming [...]iginally from the kindness of God, you may all it an Oblation to God if you please. ‘But how is it possible then, say the Jews, you can ever convince us, that he is any High-Priest, or Priest at all, much less, that he should ever exceed the Aaronical High-Priests in their Office? for we are assured, that they do offer Sacrifices for sin, and that God is atoned by them: but if your High-Priest make no atonement for sin, he falls far short of ours, and there­fore we will still hold to our Levitical [Page 460] Priesthood, and not forsake that for o [...] barely Metaphorical, and having nothin [...] really answering the name of a High Priest.’ Thus the force of all the Apostl [...] Arguments is plainly taken away, by wh [...] Crellius and his Brethren assert concernin [...] the Priesthood of Christ. But Crelli [...] thinks to make it good by saying, Th [...] Crell. c. 10. sect. 3. Id. sect. 56. p. 547. things that are improper and figurative, ma [...] be far more excellent than the things that ar [...] proper, to which they are opposed; so [...] Christs Priesthood may be far more excelle [...] than the Aaronical, although his be onely figura­tive, and the other proper. But the questio [...] is not, Whether Christs Priesthood by any other adventitious considerations, as o [...] greater Power and Authority than the Aaronical Priests had, may be said to be far more excellent than theirs was; but, Whether in the notion of Priesthood, it doth exceed theirs? Which it is impossible to make good, unless he had some proper ob­lation to make unto God, which in it sel [...] did far exceed all the Sacrifices and Offer­ings under the Law.

But what that oblation of Christ in Hea­ven was, which had any correspondency §. 4. Crellius de­stroys the Priesthood of Christ. with the Sacrifices under the Law, our Ad­versaries can never assign; nay, when they go about it, they speak of it in such a man­ner, [Page 461] as makes it very evident they could heartily have wished the Epistle to the Hebrews had said as little of the Priesthood of Christ, as they say, any other part of the New Testament doth. Thence Smalcius Smalc. c. Smiglec. Crell. c. 10. p. 544. and Crellius insist so much upon the Priest­hood of Christ, being distinctly mentioned by none but the Author to the Hebrews; which, say they, had surely been done, if Christ had been a proper Priest, or that Office in him distinct from his Kingly. Which sufficiently dis­covers what they would be at; viz. That the testimony of the Author to the Hebrews, is but a single testimony in this matter; and in truth, they do (as far as is consistent with not doing it in express words) wholly take away the Priesthood of Christ: For what is there which they say his Priesthood implies, which he might not have had, sup­posing he had never been call'd a Priest? His being in Heaven, doth not imply that he is a Priest, unless it be impossible for any but Priests ever to come there: His Power and Authority over the Church, doth not im­ply it; for that power is by themselves confessed to be a Regal power: his readi­ness to use that power, cannot imply it, which is the thing Smalcius insists on; for his being a King of the Church, doth neces­sarily imply his readiness to make use of [Page 462] his power for the good of his Church. H [...] receiving his power from God, doth not i [...] ­ply that he was a Priest, although Crelli [...] insists on that, unless all the Kings of th [...] Earth are Priests by that means too, an [...] Christ could not have had a subordinat [...] power as King, as well as Priest. But hi [...] death is more implied, saith Crellius, in th [...] name of a Priest, than of a King; true, if his death be considered as a Sacrifice, but not otherwise: For what is there of a Priest in bare dying, do not others so too? But this represents greater tenderness and care in Christ, than the meer title of a King: What kind of King do they imagine Christ the mean while, if his being so, did not give the greatest encouragement to all his subjects? nay, it is plain, the name of a King must yield greater comfort to his people, be­cause that implies his power to defend them, which the bare name of a Priest doth not. So that there could be no reason at all given, why the name of a High-Priest should be at all given to Christ, if no more were implied in it, than the exercise of his power, with respect to us, without any proper ob­lation to God: For here is no proper Sa­cerdotal act at all attributed to him; so that upon their hypothesis, the name of High-Priest, is a meer insignificant title used [Page 463] by the author to the Hebrews, without any foundation at all for it. By no means, saith Crellius, for his expiation of sin is im­plyed by it, which is not implyed in the name of King: True, if the expiation of sin were done by him in the way of a Priest by an oblation to God, which they deny; but though they call it Expiation, they mean no more than the exercise of his divine pow­er in the delivering his people. But what parallel was there to this in the expiation of sins by the Levitical Priesthood? that was certainly done by a Sacrifice offered to God by the Priest, who was thereby said to expiate the sins of the people: how Levit. 4. 26. v. 31. 35. comes it now to be taken quite in ano­ther sense, and yet still call'd by the same name?

But this being the main thing insisted §. 5. No proper expiation of sin be­longs to Christ in Heaven, if Cr [...] his doctrine be true. on by them, I shall prove from their own Principles, that no expiation of sin in their own sense can belong to Christ in Heaven, by vertue of his Oblation of himself there, and consequently that they must unavoid­ably overthrow the whole notion of the Priesthood of Christ. For this we are to consider, what their notion of the expia­tion of sins is, which is set down briefly by Crellius in the beginning of his discourse of Sacrifices, ‘There is a twofold pow­er, Crell. c. 10. sect. 2. [Page 464] saith he, of the sacrifice of Christ to­wards the expiation of sin, one taking away the guilt and the punishment of sin, and that partly by declaring, that God will do it, and giving us a right to it, partly by actual deliverance from punishment; the other is by beg [...]tting Faith in us, and so drawing us off from the practice of sin:’ Now the first and last Crellius and Socinus attribute to the death of Christ, as that was a confirma­tion of the Covenant God made for the remission of sin; and as it was an argu­ment to perswade us to believe the truth of his doctrine; and the other, viz. the actual deliverance from punishment, is by themselves attributed to the second coming of Christ; for then only, they say, the just shall be actually deliver'd from the punishment of sin, viz. eternal death; and what expiation is there now left to the Oblation of Christ in Heaven? Doth Christ in Heaven declare the pardon of sin any other way than it was declared by him up­on Earth? What efficacy hath his Obla­tion in Heaven upon perswading men to believe? or is his second coming, when he shall sit as Judge, the main part of his Priesthood; for then the expiation of sins in our Adversaries sense is most proper? [Page 465] And yet nothing can be more remote from the notion of Christs Priesthood, than that is; so that expiation of sins according to them can have no respect at all to the Oblation of Christ in Heaven, or (which is all one in their sense) his continuance in Heaven to his second coming. Yes, saith Crellius, his continuance there, is a con­dition Crell. c. 10. sect. 3. p. 476. in order to the expiation by actual de­liverance, and therefore it may be said, that God is as it were moved by it to expiate sins. The utmost then, that is attributed to Christs being in Heaven, in order to the expiation of sins, is that he must continue there without doing any thing in order to it; for if he does, it must either respect God or us: but they deny (though con­trary to the importance of the words, and the design of the places where they are used) that the terms of Christs interceding Heb. 7. 25. Rom 8. 3 [...] 1 John 2. 1. for us, or being an Advocate with the Father for us, doth note any respect to God, but only to us; if he does any thing with re­spect to us in expiation of sin, it must be either declaring, perswading, or actual deliverance; but it is none of these by their own assertions; and therefore that which they call Christs Oblation, or his being in Hea­ven, signifies nothing as to the expiation of sin: and it is unreasonable to suppose that a [Page 466] thing, which hath no influence at all upon it, should be looked on as a condition in order to it. From whence it appears, that while our Adversaries do make the exer­cise of Christs Priesthood to respect us and not God, they destroy the very nature of it, and leave Christ only an empty name without any thing answering to it: But if Christ be truly a High-Priest, as the Apo­stle asserts that he is, from thence it fol­lows that he must have a respect to God in offering up gifts and sacrifices for sin: which was the thing to be proved.

2. That Christ did exercise this Priestly-Office §. 6. Ephes. 5. 2. proves the death of Christ an Expiatory Sacrifice and an oblation to God. in the Oblation of himself to God upon the Cross. Which I shall prove by two things, 1. Because the death of Christ is said in Scripture to be an Offer­ing, and a Sacrifice to God. 2. Because Christ is said to offer up himself antece­dently to his entrance into Heaven. 1. Be­cause the death of Christ is said to be an offering, and a sacrifice to God, which is plain Ephes. 5. 2. from the words of S. Paul, as Christ also hath loved us, and given himself for us, an offering and a sacrifice to God, for a sweet-smelling savour. Our Adversaries do not deny that the death of Christ is here call'd an Oblation, but they deny, ‘That it is Crell. c. 10. sect. 47. meant of an Expiatory Sacrifice, but of [Page 467] a free-will offering; and the reason Crel­lius gives is, because that phrase of a sweet-smelling savour is generally and almost alwayes used of sacrifices which are not expiatory; but if ever they be used of an Expiatory Sacrifice, they are not applyed to that which was properly expiatory in it, viz. the offering up of the blood, for no smell, saith he, went up from thence, but to the burning of the fat, and the kidneys, which although required to perfect the expiation, yet not being done till the High-Priest re­turned out of the Holy of Holies, hath nothing correspondent to the expiatory Sacrifice of Christ, where all things are perfected before Christ the High-Priest goes forth of his Sanctuary.’ How in­consistent these last words are with what they assert concerning the expiation of sin by actual deliverance at the great day, the former discourse hath already disco­ver'd. For what can be more absurd, than to say, that all things which pertain to the expiation of sin are perfected before Christ goes forth from his Sanctuary, and yet to make the most proper expiation of sin to lye in that act of Christ which is consequent to his going forth of the Sanctuary, viz. when he proceeds to judge the quick and the [Page 468] dead. But of that already. We now come to a punctual and direct answer, as to which two things must be enquired in­to. 1. What the importance of the phrase of a sweet-smelling savour is? 2. What the Sacrifices are to which that phrase is ap­plyed. 1. For the importance of the phrase. The first time we read it used in Scripture was upon the occasion of Noahs sacrifice after the flood, of which it is said, that he offer'd burnt-offerings on the Altar, Gen. 8. 20. 21. and the Lord smelled a savour of rest, or a sweet savour. Which we are not to imagine in a gross corporeal manner, as Crellius seems to understand it, when he saith, the blood could not make such a savour as the fat and the kidneys; for surely, none ever thought the smell of flesh burnt was a sweet smelling savour of it self, and we must least of all imagine that of God, which Por­phyry saith, was the property only of the worst of Daemons to be pleased, and as it were, to grow fat, [...], with the smell and vapours of blood, Porphyr. de abstinent. l. 2. sect. 42. and flesh, (by which testimony, it withall appears, that the same steams in sacrifices were supposed to arise from the blood as the flesh:) But we are to understand that phrase in a sense agreeable to the divine nature, which we may easily doe, if we [Page 469] take it in the sense the Syriack Version takes it in, when it calls it, Odorem placabili­tatis, or the savour of rest, as the word properly signifies; for [...] is the word formed from the Verb [...] which is used for the resting of the Ark, v. 4. of the same Chapter, and so it imports a rest after some commotion, and in that sense is very proper to Atonement, or that whereby God makes his anger to rest; so Aben Ezra upon that place expounds the Savour of rest, to be such a one which makes God cease from his anger: Thence in Hiphil [...] signifies to appeal, or to make peace; in which sense it is used by R. Solom. upon Isa. 27. 5. Munster tells us the sense is, Deus nunc quievit ab ira & placatus suit, and to the same purpose Vatablus: which sense is most agreeable to the design of the fol­lowing words, in which God expresseth his great kindness, and the Lord said in his heart, I will not again curse the ground any more for mans sake; which are words highly expressing, how much God was propitiated by the Sacrifice which Noah offered, and therefore Josephus doth well interpret this Joseph. An­tiq. Jud. l. 1. c. 4. to be a proper Expiatory Sacrifice; that God would now be atoned, and send no more such a deluge upon the world; which he saith, was the substance of Noahs prayer, when he offered this Burnt-offering, and that God would receive his Sacrifice [...] [Page 470] [...], That he would no more receive such displeasure against the earth: So that the first time ever this expression was used, it is taken in the proper sense of an Expiatory Sacrifice.

And by that the second enquiry may be easily resolved; viz. What kind of Sa­crifices §. 7. Crellius his mistakes about the kinds of sa­crifices. it doth belong to, which we see in the first place is, to expiatory; which Crellius denies by a great mistake, of the sense of the phrase, and of the nature of the Offerings, concerning which this expression is most used; viz. Holocausts, as though those were not Expiatory Sacri­fices: But if we can make it appear, that the Holocausts were Expiatory Sacrifices, then it will follow, that this phrase doth most properly agree to a Sacrifice design­ed for expiation. But Crellius here speaks very confusedly concerning Sacrifices, op­posing Holocausts and Freewil-offerings to Ex­piatory Sacrifices; whereas the Freewill-offerings might be Expiatory, as well as Eu­charistical; that denomination not respect­ing the end the Sacrifices were designed for, but that the precise time of offering them was not determined by the Law, as in the stated and solemn Sacrifices. For the gene­ral distribution of Sacrifices, seems most proper into Propitiatory and Eucharistical; [Page 471] which distinction is thought by some to [...]old from the first time we read of Sacri­ [...]ces in Scripture; because the Sacrifice of [...]in was of the fruits of the ground, and of Gen. 4. 3, 4. [...]bel, of the Firstlings of his flock. Although [...]here seems to be nothing meant by this difference of Sacrifices, but the diversity of their imployments, either of them sa­crificing according to them; and I cannot [...]ay what some do, that the reason of Gods rejecting Cains Sacrifice, was because it was not designed for expiation. But the pra­ctice of after ages, wherein we have a ful­ler account of the grounds of the several Sacrifices, makes it appear, that the Ex­piatory Sacrifices before the Law, were all Burnt-offerings; and of all those who were not under the particular obligation of that Law: As is plain in the Expiato­ry Sacrifices of Job for his sons, and for his friends, which were Burnt-offerings; and among the Jews, all the Sacrifices that Job 1. 5. 42. 8. were offered up before the Levitical Law, were, as the Jews themselves tell us, onely Burnt-offerings: And after the setling of their Worship among themselves, they did re­ceive Burnt-offerings for expiation from Selden. de jure nat. & gent. apud Ebrae. l. 3. c. 2. &c. 6. strangers, as Mr. Selden at large proves from the Jewish Writers. It seems then very strange, that since Burnt-offerings be­fore [Page 472] the Law were expiatory, and unde [...] the Law they continued so for strangers they should be of another nature for th [...] Jews themselves. But what reason is ther [...] for it in the text? not the least that I ca [...] find, but expresly the contrary. For i [...] the beginning of Leviticus, where the La [...] for Burnt-offerings is delivered, the word [...] are, And he shall put his hand upon the hea [...] Levit. 1. 4. of the Burnt-offering, and it shall be accepte [...] for him, to make atonement for him; which is as much as is ever said of any Expiatory Sacrifices: And in the Verse before, where we render [...] of his own voluntary will; i [...] is by the vulgar Latin rendred, Ad plac [...] ­dum sibi Dominum; by the Syriack Version, Ad placationem sibi obtinendam a Domino; and to the same purpose by the Chald [...] Paraphrast; but no one Version considera­ble that so renders it, as to make Burnt-offerings to be Freewill-offerings here, which are spoken of distinctly, and by Levit. 7 16. 22. 18, &c. Lev. 6. 7. themselves afterwards: And the Chald [...] Paraphrast, Jonathan thus explains, This is the Law of the burnt-offering; i. e. Quod ve [...] ad expiandum pro cogitationibus cordis; bu [...] although the Jews be not fully agreed what the Burnt-offerings were designed to expiate, yet they consent that they were of an expiatory nature. Which might [Page 473] make us the more wonder, that Crellius Crell. [...]c. 10. p. 530. [...]d others should exclude them from it, [...]t the onely reason given by him is, be­ [...]se they are distinguished from Sacrifices for [...], as though no Sacrifices were of an [...]piatory nature but they, and then the [...]spass-offerings must be excluded too, for [...]ey are distinguished from Sin-offerings as [...]ell as the other. The ignorance of the [...]s in the reason of their own customs, [...]th been an occasion of great mistakes [...]ong Christians, concerning the nature [...] them; when they judge of them accord­ing to the blind or uncertain conjectures [...]hich they make concerning them: So that [...]e Text is oftimes far clearer than their Commentaries are. Setting aside then the [...]tricate and unsatisfactory niceties of the [...]ewish Writers, about the several reasons [...]f the Burnt-offerings and Sin and Trespass- [...]fferings, and the differences they make be­ [...]ween them, which are so various and in­ [...]oherent, I shall propose this conjecture [...]oncerning the different reasons of them, [...]iz. That some Sacrifices were assumed into [...]he Jewish Religion, which had been long [...]n use in the world before, and were com­mon to them with the Patriarchs, and all those who in that age of the world did fear and serve God, and such were the Burnt-offerings [Page 474] for expiation of sin, and the frui [...] of the earth by way of gratitude to Go [...] Other Sacrifices were instituted amo [...] them, with a particular respect to the [...] selves, as a people governed by the Law [...] of God: And these were of several sorts 1. Symbolical, of Gods presence amo [...] them, such was the daily Sacrifice, institute as a testimony of Gods presence, Exod. 29 [...] from v. 38. to the end. 2. Occasional, fo [...] some great mercies vouchsafed to them, a [...] the Passover and the Solemn Festivals, &c▪ 3. Expiatory, for the sins [...]mmitted agains [...] their Law: And th [...]se were of three sorts 1. Such as were wholly consumed to th [...] honor of God, which were the Burnt-offer­ings. 2. Such, of which some part wa [...] consumed upon the Altar, and some par [...] fell to the share of the Priests; and thes [...] were either sins particularly enumerated by God himself, under the [...], or else ge­nerally comprehended under the [...] being allowed to be expiated, becaus [...] committed through inadvertency. 3. Such whereof a less part was consumed, as in th [...] Peace-offerings of the Congregation, mention­ed Levit. 23. 19. whereof the blood [...] sprinkled, onely the inwards burnt, and [...] flesh not eaten by the persons that offered them, [...] it was in the Peace-offerings of particular per­sons [Page 475] (of which as being private Sacrifices, have here no occasion to speak) but [...]ely by the Priests in the Court; and these [...]ad something of expiation in them: For [...]ence, saith Vatablus, the Peace-offering was [...]all'd by the Greeks [...], i. e. Expiato­ [...]m, and the LXX. commonly render it, [...]lae [...], and several of the Jews think [...]he reason of the name was, That it made [...]ace between God and him that offered it: [...]ut the great reason I insist on, is, Because [...]ll the things which were used in an Expia­ [...]ory Sacrifice, were in this too; the slay­ [...]ng of the Beast, the sprinkling of the blood, and the consumption of some part of it upon the Altar, as an Oblation to God, which are the three ingredients of [...]n Expiatory Sacrifice, for the shedding of [...]e blood, noted the bearing the punish­ment of our iniquity; and, the sprinkling of [...] on the Altar, and the consuming of the part [...]f the sacrifice, or the whole there, that it was designed for the expiation of sin. From whence it follows, that the phrase of a sweet-smelling savour, being applied under the Law to Expiatory Sacrifices, is very proper­ [...]y used by S. Paul, concerning Christs giving up himself for us: [...]o that from this phrase, nothing can be inferred contrary [...]o the Expiatory nature of the death of [Page 476] Christ, but rather it is fully agreea [...] to it.

But Crellius hath yet a further Argume [...] §. 8. What in­fluence the mactation of the sa­crifice had on expiati­on. Crell. c. 10. p. 533. to prove that Christs death cannot be [...] meant as the Expiatory Sacrifice; viz. [...] the notion of a sacrifice, doth consist in the [...] ­lation whereby the thing is consecrated to [...] honour and service of God, to which the ma [...] ­tion is but a bare preparation; which [...] proves, Because the slaying the sacrifice [...] belong to others besides the Priests, Ezek. [...] 10, 11. but the oblation only to the Prie [...] To this I answer, 1. The mactation may [...] considered two ways, either with a resp [...] to the bare instrument of taking away t [...] life, or to the design of the Offerer of th [...] which was to be sacrificed: As the mac [...] ­tion hath a respect only to the instrume [...] so it is no otherways to be considered th [...] as a punishment; but as it hath a respect [...] him that designs it for a Sacrifice, so t [...] shedding of the blood, hath an immedi [...] influence on the expiation of sin. A [...] that by this clear Argument, The blood [...] said to make an Atonement for the soul; [...] the reason given is, because the life of [...] Levit. 17. 11. flesh is in the blood: So that which was [...] life, is the great thing which makes [...] atonement; and when the blood was sh [...] the life was then given; from whence [Page 477] follows, that the great efficacy of the sa­crifice for atonement lay in the shedding of [...]he blood for that end. Thence the Apostle [...]ttributes remission of sins to the [...], the shedding of the blood; and not to the bare Heb. 9. 22. Oblation of it on the Altar, or the carrying it into the Holy of Holies, both which seem to be nothing else but a more so­lemn representation of that blood before God, which was already shed for the ex­piation of sins, which was therefore ne­cessary to be performed, that the con­currence of the Priest might be seen with the sacrifice in order to expiation. For if no more had been necessary but the bare slaying of the Beasts, which was the meanest part of the service, the people would ne­ver have thought the institution of the Priesthood necessary, and least of all that of the High-Priest, unless some solemn acti­on of his had been performed, such as the entring into the Holy of Holies, on the day of expiation, and carrying it, and sprinkling the blood of the sin-offering in order to the expiation of the sins of the people. And it is observable, that al­though the Levitical Law be silent in the common Sacrifices, who were to kill them whether the Priests or the Levites; yet on that day whereon the High-Priest was to [Page 478] appear himself for the expiation of sin, [...] is expressely said, that he should not o [...] kill, the bullock of the sin-offering, which [...] for himself, but the goat of the sin-offeri [...] Levit. 16. 11, 15. which is for the people. And although th [...] Talmudists dispute from their Traditio [...] on both sides, whether any one else migh [...] on the day of expiation, slay the sin-of­ferings besides the High-Priest; yet it i [...] no news for them to dispute against th [...] Text: and the Talmud it self is clear, tha [...] Codex Jo­ma. cap. 4. sect. 3. c. 5. sect. 4. the High-Priest did it. From whence i [...] appears, there was something peculiar o [...] that day as to the slaying of the sin-offer­ings; and if our Adversaries opinion hold good, that the Sacrifices on the day of expi­ation did, if not alone, yet chiefly represent th [...] sacrifice of Christ, no greater argument can be brought against themselves than this is, for the office of the High-Priest did not be­gin at his carrying the blood into the ho­ly of holies, but the slaying the sacrifice did belong to him too: from whence it will unavoidably follow, that Christ did not enter upon his Office of High-Priest, when he enter'd into Heaven, but when the Sacrifice was to be slain which was designed for the expiation of sins. It is then to no purpose at all, if Crelli [...] could prove that sometimes in ordinary [Page 479] Sacrifices, (which he will not say, the Sa­crifice of Christ was represented by) the Levites might kill the beasts for sacrifice; for it appears, that in those sacrifices, wherein themselves contend that Christs was represented, the office of the High-Priest did not begin with entring into the Sanctuary, but with the mactation of that Sacrifice whose blood was to be carried in thither. Therefore if we speak of the bare instruments of mactation in the death of Christ, those were the Jews, and we make not them Priests in it, for they aimed at no more than taking away his life (as the Popae among the Romans, and those whose bare office it was to kill the beasts for Sacrifice among the Jews did:) but if we consider it with a respect to him that offer'd up his life to God, then we say, that Christ was the High-Priest in doing it; it being designed for the expiation of sin; and by vertue of this blood-shed for that end, he enters into Heaven as the Holy of Holies, there ever living to make inter­cession for us. But the vertue of the con­sequent acts, depends upon the efficacy of the blood shed for expiation; otherwise the High-Priest might have enter'd with the same effect into the Holy of Holies with any other blood besides that which was [Page 480] shed on purpose as a sin-offering, for expia­tion of the sins of the people; which it was unlawfull for him to doe. And from hence it is, that the Apostle to the Hebrews insists so much on the comparison between the blood of Christ, and the blood of the legal sacrifices, and the efficacy of the one Heb. 9. 13, 14. 10. 4, 10. far above the other, in its power of ex­piation; which he needed not to have done, if the shedding of his blood, had been only a preparation for his entrance on his Priesthood in Heaven. So that the proper notion of a Sacrifice for sin, as it notes the giving the life of one for the expiation of the sins of another, doth properly lye in the mactation, though other sacrificial acts may be consequent upon it. So it was in the animales hostiae among the Romans, in which, saith Macrobius, Sola anima Deo sa­cratur: Ma [...]h. [...]. l. 3. c. 5. of which he tells us Virgil properly speaks in those words,

And that we may the better understand what he means by the anima here, he saith elsewhere (as Macrobius and Servius ob­serve out of his excellent skill and accu­racy in the Pontifical rites)

Which shews, that the expiation was sup­posed to lye in the blood which they call'd the Soul, as the Scripture doth. And the Persians as Strabo tells us, looked upon the bare mactation as the Sacrifice, for they did not porricere as the Romans call'd it, they laid none of the parts of the Sacrifice up­on the Altar to be consumed there, [...]. Stra [...]o l. 15. for God regarded nothing but the Soul in the sacrifice: which words Eustathius likewise [...]. in Hom. Iliad. 1. useth upon Homer, of the Sacrifices of the Magi. And Strabo affirms of the ancient Lusitani, that they cut off nothing of the St [...]o l. 3. Sacrifice: but consumed the entrails whole; but though such sacrifices which were for divination were not thought expiatory, and therefore different from the animales hostiae, yet among the Persians, every sacri­fice had a respect to expiation of the whole people. For Herodotus tells us, that eve­ry one that offers Sacrifice among them, [...], Herod. l. 1. prayes for good to all Persians and the King. [Page 482] But thus much may serve to prove against Crellius, that the mactation in an Expiato­ry Sacrifice, was not a meer preparation to a Sacrifice, but that it was a proper sa­crificial act, and consequently that Christ acted as High-Priest, when he gave himself for us, an offering and a Sacrifice to God for a sweet-smelling savour.

But this will further appear from those places wherein Christ is said to offer up §. 9. Whether Christs Oblation of himself once to God, were in Hea­ven or on Earth. himself once to God: the places to this pur­pose are. Heb. 7. 27. Who needeth not dai­ly as those High-Priests to offer up sacrifice, first for his own sins, and then for the Peoples, for this he did once, when he offer'd up him­self. Heb. 9. 14. How much more shall the blood of Christ, who through the eternal Spi­rit offer'd himself without spot to God, purge your Conscience from dead works, to serve the living God. V. 25, 26, 27, 28. Nor yet that he should offer himself often, as the High-Priest entreth into the holy place every year with the blood of others; for then must he often have suffered since the foundation of the World: but now once in the end of the World hath he appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice of him­self. And as it is appointed to men once to dye, but after this the Judgement: so Christ was once offered to bear the sins of many, and unto them that look for him shall he appear [Page 483] the second time without sin unto salvation. Heb. 10. 10, 11, 12. By the which will we are sanctified through the offering of the Body of Jesus Christ once for all. And every High-Priest, standeth daily ministring and offering oftentimes the same sacrifices, which can ne­ver take away sins: but this man after he had offer'd one sacrifice for sins for ever sate down on the right hand of God. To these places Crellius gives this answer, ‘That the Crell. c. 10. sect. 54. name of Oblation as applyed to Christ, primarily signifies Christs first entrance into Heaven, and appearance before the face of God there, but consequently the continuance of that appearance; so that when a thing is once actually ex­hibited and presented, it is said to be once offer'd, although being offer'd, it alwayes remains in the same place, and so may be said to be a continual Oblati­on. But this first appearance, saith he, hath a peculiar agreement with the legal Oblation; and therefore the name of Oblation doth most properly belong to that, because Christ by this means ob­tained that power on which the perfect remission of our sins depends: but al­though the continuance of that appear­ance, seems only consequentially to have the name of Oblation belonging to it, yet [Page 484] in its own nature, it hath a nearer con­junction with the effect of the Oblation, viz. the remission of sins, or deliver­ance from punishment, and doth of it self conferre more to it than the other doth. And therefore in regard of that, Christ is said most perfectly to exercise his Priesthood, and to offer and inter­cede for us, from the time he is said to sit down at the right hand of God.’ Against this answer, I shall prove these two things, 1. That it is incoherent, and repugnant to it self. 2. That it by no means agrees to the places before men­tion'd. 1. That it is incoherent and re­pugnant to it self in two things. 1. In making that to be the proper Oblation in correspondency to the Oblations of the Law, which hath no immediate respect to the expiation of sins. 2. In making that to have the most immediate respect to the expiation of sins, which can in no tole­rable sense be call'd an Oblation. For the first, since Crellius saith, that the proper notion of Oblation is to be taken from the Oblations in the Levitical Law, we must consider what it was there, and whether Christs first entrance into Heaven can have any correspondency with it. An Oblation under the Law was in generall, any thing [Page 485] which was immediately dedicated to God, but in a more limited sense it was proper to what was dedicated to him by way of Sacrifice according to the appointments of the Levitical Law. We are not now en­quiring what was properly call'd an Obla­tion in other Sacrifices, but in those which then were for expiation of sin; And in the Oblation was, first of the per­sons for whom the Sacrifice was offer'd. So in the Burnt-offering, the person who brought it, was to offer it at the door of the Tabernacle of the Congregation: i. e. as the Lev. 1. 3. Jewes expound it at the entrance of the Court of the Priests, and there he was to lay his hands upon the head of it, and it shall be accepted for him to make atonement for V. 4. him. This Offering was made before the Beast was slain; after the killing the beast, then the Priests were to make an Offering of the blood, by sprinkling it round about the Altar of Burnt-offerings, the rest of the blood, say the Jewes, was poured out by the Priests, at the South-side of the Altar up­on the foundation, where the two holes were for the passage into the Channel which convey'd the blood into the valley of Kidron: thus the blood being offered, the parts of the beast, were by the Priests to be laid upon the Altar, and there they were all to be consumed by fire; and then it was [Page 486] call'd an Offering made by fire, of a sweet sa­vour unto the Lord. The same rites were used in the Peace-offerings, and Trespass-of­ferings, as to the laying on of hands, and the sprinkling the blood, and consuming some part by fire: and in the sin-offerings, there was to be the same imposition of hands: but concerning the sprinkling of the blood, and the way of consuming the remainders of the Sacrifice, there was this considera­ble difference; that in the common sin­offerings for particular persons, the blood was sprinkled upon the horns of the Altar of Lev. 4. 25. 30. burnt-offerings, but in the sin-offerings for the High-Priest and the Congregation, or all the People, he was to carry the blood within the Sanctuary, and to sprinkle of it seven times before the Vail of the Sanctuary; and some of the blood was to be put upon the horns of the V. 6. Altar of Incense; but the remainder of the blood, and the same things (which were offered by fire in Peace-Offerings) were to be disposed of accordingly, on the Altar of Burnt-offerings. And withall, there was this great difference, that in other sin-of­ferings the Priests were to eat the remainder of the sacrifice in the Holy place; but in Lev. 6. 26. these there was nothing to be eaten by them; for the whole Bullock was to be carried forth without the Camp, and there he was to be burned [Page 487] till all were consumed. For it was an ex­ [...]ress Lev. 4. 11, 12. Law, That no sin-offering, whereof any [...] the blood is brought into the tabernacle of [...]he Congregation, to reconcile withall in the Levit. 6. 30. Holy-place, shall be eaten: it shall be burnt in [...]e fire. All the difference that was on the great day of Atonement, was this, that the High-Priest himself was to slay the Sin-offer­ings, and then to carry the blood of them into the Holy of Holies, and there was to sprinkle Levit. 16. 14, 15. [...]he blood with his finger towards the Mercy­ [...]at seven times: after which, and the send­ing away the scape-goat, the ceremonies were the same for the Atonement of the people, which were at other solemn sin-offerings, for the Priest or the people.

From all which being thus laid toge­ther, §. 10. All things necessary to a legal oblation concur in the death of Christ. we shall observe several things, which are very material to our purpose: 1. That in the oblations which were made for ex­piation of sins, the difference between the mactation and the oblation, did arise from the difference between the Priest and the Sacrifice. For the Priests Office was to atone, but he was to atone by the Sacrifice; on which account, although the Priest were to offer the Sacrifice for himself, yet the ob­lation did not lie in the bare presenting himself before God, but in the presenting the blood of that Sacrifice, which was [Page 488] shed in order to expiation. If we coul [...] have supposed, that the High-Priest unde [...] the Law, instead of offering a Goat for [...] Sin-offering for the people, on the day o [...] Atonement, should have made an oblatio [...] of himself to God, by dying for the ex­piation of their sins: In this case, his death being the Sacrifice, and himself the Priest, the mactation, as it relates to his own act, and his oblation had been one and the same thing. For his death had been nothing else, but the offering up himself to God, in or­der to the expiation of the sins of the people; and there can be no reason, why the oblation must be of necessity something consequent to his death, since all things ne­cessary to a perfect oblation do concur in it. For where there is something solemn­ly devoted to God, and in order to the expiation of sins, and by the hand of a Priest, there are all things concurring to a legal oblation; but in this case, all these things do concur, and therefore there can be no imaginable necessity of making the oblation of Christ, onely consequent to his Ascension, since in his death all things concur to a proper oblation. In the Law, we grant that the oblation made by the Priest, was consequent to the death of the beast for Sacrifice; but the reason of that [Page 489] was, because the beast could not offer up [...] self to God, and God had made it neces­ [...]ry, that the Priest should expiate sins, [...]ot by himself, but by those Sacrifices, [...]nd therefore the oblation of the blood [...]as after the Sacrifice was slain; neither [...]ould this have been solved barely by the [...]riests slaying of the Sacrifices; for this being [...] act of violence towards the beasts that [...]ere thus kill'd, could not be a proper ob­ [...]ation, which must suppose a consent ante­ [...]edent to it. All which shewed the great imperfection of the Levitical Law, in which so many several things were to concur, to make up a sacrifice for sin; viz. The first offering made by the party concerned, of what was under his dominion; viz. The beast to be sacrificed at the door of the ta­bernacle of the Congregation: but the beast not being able to offer up it self, it was ne­cessary for the offering up its blood, that it must be slain by others; and for the better understanding, not onely of the efficacy of the blood, but the concurrence of the Priest for expiation, he was to take the blood, and sprinkle some of it on the Altar, and pour out the rest at the foundation of it. But since we assert a far more noble and excellent Sacrifice, by the Son of God freely offer­ing up himself, to be made a Sacrifice for [Page 490] the sins of the world, why may not this b [...] as proper an oblation made unto God, [...] any was under the Law, and far more ex­cellent, both in regard of the Priest and th [...] Sacrifice: why should his oblation of him­self then be made onely consequent to hi [...] death and resurrection? Which latter, be­ing by our Adversaries made not his own act, but Gods upon him, and his entrance into Heaven, being given him (as they as­sert) as a reward of his sufferings, in what tolerable sense can that be call'd an obla­tion of himself, which was conferred up­on him as a reward of his former suffer­ings? From whence it follows, that upon our Adversaries own grounds, the death of Christ may far more properly be call'd the oblation of himself, than his entrance into Heaven; and that there is no necessity of making the oblation of Christ consequent to his death, there being so great a differ­ence between the Sacrifice of Christ, and that of the Sacrifices for sin under the Le­vitical Law.

2. We observe, That the oblation as performed by the Priest, did not depend upon his presenting himself before God, but upon the presenting the blood of a Sacrifice, which had been already slain for the expiation of sins. If the Priest had gone [Page 491] into the Holy of Holies, and there onely [...]esented himself before the Mercy-seat, [...]d that had been all required in order [...] the expiation of sins, there had been [...]me pretence for our Adversaries mak­ [...]g Christs presenting himself in Heaven, [...] be the oblation of himself to God; but [...]nder the Law, the efficacy of the High- [...]iests entrance into the Holy of Holies, did [...]epend upon the blood which he carried in [...]ither, which was the blood of the Sin­ [...]ring, which was already slain for the expiation of sins: And in correspondency [...]o this, Christs efficacy in his entrance in­ [...] Heaven, as it respects our expiation, must [...]ave a respect to that Sacrifice which was [...]ffered up to God antecedent to it. And [...] wonder our Adversaries do so much in­sist on the High Priests entring into the most [...]oly place once a year, as though all the ex­ [...]iation had depended upon that; whereas all the promise of expiation, was not upon his bare entrance into it; but upon the blood which he carried along with him, and sprinkled there: In correspondency to which, our Saviour is not barely said, to enter into Heaven, and present himself to God, but that he did this by his own blood, having obtained Eternal Redemption for Heb. 9. 12. [...].

[Page 492] 3. We observe, That there was som [...] ­thing correspondent in the death of Chris [...] to somewhat consequent to the oblatio [...] under the Law, and therefore there c [...] be no reason to suppose, that the oblatio [...] of Christ must be consequent to his death for that destroys the correspondency be­tween them. Now this appears in thi [...] particular, in the solemn sacrifices for sin [...] after the sprinkling of the blood, which wa [...] carried into the Holy place to reconcile with all, all the remainder of the Sacrifice wa [...] to be burnt without the Camp, and this held on the day of Atonement, as well as in other Sin-offerings for the Congregation. Now the Author to the Hebrews tells us, That in correspondency to this, Jesus that h [...] Heb. 13. [...]2. might sanctifie the people with his, own blood, suffered without the gate: What force i [...] there in this, unless the blood of Christ did answer to the Sin-offerings for the people, and his oblation was supposed to be made before; and therefore that he might have all things agreeable to those Sin-offerings, the last part was to be com­pleated too; viz. That he was to suffer with­out the gate; which after the peoples set­tlement in Jerusalem, answered to the being burnt without the Camp in the Wilder­ness.

[Page 493] 4. We observe, That the Oblation in Ex­ [...]iatory Sacrifices under the Law, by the Priest, had always relation to the consumption of what was offered: Thus the offering of [...]he blood, in token of the destruction of the [...]ife of the beast, whose blood was offered; for no blood was to be offered of a living creature, nor of one kill'd upon any other ac­count, but for that end to be a sacrifice for sin, and after the sprinkling and pouring out of the blood, the inwards of some, and all of the other, were to be consumed by fire. And it is observable, that the greater the Sacrifice for sin was, always the more was consumed of it; as appears plainly by the fore­mentioned difference of the Sin-offerings for private persons, and for the people; of the former, the Priests were allowed to eat, but not at all of the latter. And so it was observed among the Egyptians, in the most solemn Sacrifices for expiation, nothing was allowed to be eaten of that part which was designed for that end. For Herodotus gives us an account why the Egyptians never eat the head of any living [...]. Herodot. l. 2. c. 39. Creature; which is, That when they offer up a sacrifice, they make a solemn execration up­on it, that if any evil were to fall upon the [Page 494] the persons who sacrificed, or upon all Egypt▪ it might be turned upon the head of that beast And Plutarch addes, that after this sole [...] execration, They cut off th [...] head, and of old, threw it i [...] ­to [...]. Plutarch. de Fide. the River, but then g [...] it to strangers. From which custom we observe, that in a solemn Sacrifice for expiation, the guilt of the offenders, was by this rite of execration supposed to be transferred up­on the head of the Sacrifice, as it was in the Sacrifices among the Jews, by the lay­ing on of hands; and that nothing was to be eaten of what was supposed to have that guilt transferred upon it. From hence all Expiatory Sacrifices were at first whole Burnt-offerings, as appears by the Patri­archal Sacrifices, and the customs of other Xenoph. Cyropaed. l. 7, 8. Strab. l. 4. Plutarch. Symp. l. 6. probl. 8. Nations, and among the Jews themselves, as we have already proved in all solemn offerings for the people. And although in the sacrifices of private persons, some parts were allowed to be eaten by the Priests; yet those which were designed for expiation were consumed. So that the greater the offering was to God, the more it implied the Consumption of the thing which was so offered: How strange­ly improbable then is it, That the Oblation [Page 495] of Christ should not (as under the Law) have respect to his death and sufferings; but to his entrance into Heaven, wherein nothing is supposed to be consumed, but all things given him with far greater pow­er, as our Adversaries suppose, than ever he had before. But we see the Apostle pa­rallels Christs suffering with the burning of the sacrifices, and his blood with the blood of them, and consequently his offering up himself, must relate not to his entrance in­to Heaven, but to that act of his where­by he suffer'd for sins, and offer'd up his blood as a Sacrifice for the sins of the world.

From all which it appears; how far §. 11. Christs en­trance in­to Heaven could not be the Oblation of himself mention'd. more agreeably to the Oblations under the Law, Christ is said to offer up himself for the expiation of sins by his death and suf­ferings, than by his entrance into Heaven; For it is apparent, that the Oblations in expiatory Sacrifices under the Law, were such upon which the expiation of sin did chiefly depend; but by our Adversaries own confession, Christs oblation of him­self by his entrance into Heaven, hath no immediate respect at all to the expiation of sin: only as the way whereby he was to enjoy that power by which he did expiate sins, as Crellius saith; now, let us consider, [Page 496] what more propriety there is in making this presenting of Christ in Heaven to have a correspondency with the legal Ob­lations, than the offering up himself upon the Cross. For 1. on the very same rea­son that his entrance into Heaven is made an Oblation, his death is so too; viz. Be­cause it was the way whereby he obtained the power of expiation; and far more properly so than the other, since they make Christs entrance and power the reward of his suf­ferings, but they never make his sitting at the right hand of God, the reward of his entrance into Heaven. 2. His offering up himself to God upon the Cross, was his own act, but his entrance into Heaven was Gods, as themselves acknowledge, and therefore could not in any propriety of speech be call'd Christs offering up himself. 3. If it were his own act, it could not have that respect to the expiation of sins, which his death had; for our Adversaries say, that his death was by reason of our sins, and that he suffer'd to purge us from sin; but his entrance into Heaven was upon his own account, to enjoy that power and autho­rity, which he was to have at the right hand of God. 4. How could Christs en­trance into Heaven, be the way for his en­joying that power which was necessary [Page 497] for the expiation of sin, when Christ be­fore his entrance into Heaven, saith, that Matth. 28. 18. all power was given to him in Heaven and Earth: and the reason assigned in Scripture of that power and authority which God gave him is, because he humbled himself, and became obedient to death, even the death of Phil. 2. 8, 9. [...] Cross: So that the entrance of Christ in­ [...] Heaven, could not be the means of ob­taining that power which was conferred before; but the death of Christ is menti­on'd on that account in Scripture. 5. If the death of Christ were no expiatory Sa­crifice, the entrance of Christ into Hea­ven could be no Oblation proper to a High-Priest; for his entrance into the Holy of Ho­lies, was on the account of the blood of the [...]n-offering which he carried in with him. [...]f there were then no Expiatory Sacrifice before, that was slain for the sins of men; Christ could not be said to make any Obla­ [...]ion in Heaven, for the Oblation had re­spect to a Sacrifice already slain; so that [...]f men deny that Christs death was a pro­ [...]er Sacrifice for sin, he could make no Oblation at all in Heaven, and Christ [...]ould not be said to enter thither, as [...]he High-Priest entred into the Holy of Holies with the blood of the Sacri­ [...]ce; which is the thing which the Au­thor [Page 498] to the Hebrews, asserts concerning Christ.

2. There is as great an inconsistency i [...] making § 12. Christs ex­ercise of power in Heaven in no sense an Obla­tion to God. the exercise of Christs power i [...] Heaven, an Oblation in any sense, as in ma­king Christs entrance into Heaven, to [...] the Oblation which had corresponde [...] with the Oblations of the Law. For what is there which hath the least resemblance with an Oblation in it? Hath it any respect to God, as all the legal Oblations had? no [...] for his intercession and power, Crellius, saith, respects us, and not God. Was there any Sa­crifice at all in it for expiation? how is it possible, that the meer exercise of power should be call'd a sacrifice? What analo­gy is there at all between them? And how could he be then said most perfectly to ex­ercise his Priesthood, when there was no consideration at all of any sacrifice offer'd up to God? so that upon these suppositi­ons the Author to the Hebrews must argu [...] upon strange similitudes, and fancy resem­blances to himself, which it was impossible for the Jews to understand him in, who were to judge of the nature of Priesthoo [...] and Oblations in a way agreeable to t [...] Institutions among themselves. But was [...] possible for them to understand such Obl [...] ­tions and a Priesthood which had no respec [...] [Page 499] at all to God, but wholly to the People; and such an entrance into the Holy of Holies [...]ithout the blood of an expiatory Sacrifice [...]or the sins of the people? But such ab­s [...]dities do men betray themselves into, when they are forced to strain express pla­ [...]es of Scripture to serve an hypothesis, which they think themselves obliged to [...]intain.

We now come to shew that this inter­pretation §. 13. Crellius his sense re­pugnant to the cir­cumstances of the pla­ces. of Crellius doth not agree with the circumstances of the places before mention'd, which will easily appear by these brief considerations. 1. That the apostle alwayes speaks of the offering of Christ as a thing past and once done, so as not Heb. 7. 27. 9. 26. 10. 10. [...] be done again; which had been very im­proper, if by the Oblation of Christ, he had meant the continual appearance of Christ in Heaven for us, which yet is, and will never cease to be till all his ene­mies be made his foot-stool. 2. That he Heb. 9. 12, 13. 10. 4, 5. [...]ill speaks in allusion to the Sacrifices which were in use among the Jews, and [...]herefore the Oblation of Christ must be [...] such a way as was agreeable to what [...]as used in the Levitical Sacrifices, which [...]e have already at large proved he could [...]ot do in our Adversaries sense. 3. That [...]e Apostle speaks of such a sacrifice for sins [Page 500] to which the sitting at the right hand of God was consequent; so that the Oblati­on Heb. 10. 12. antecedent to it must be properly that Sacrifice for sins which he offer'd to God; and therefore the exercise of his power for expiation of sins, which they say is meant by sitting at the right hand of God, cannot be that Sacrifice for sins: Neither can his entrance into Heaven be it, which in what sense it can be call'd a Sacrifice for sins, since themselves acknowledge it had no immediate relation to the expiation of them, I cannot understand. 4. The Apostle speaks of such an Offering of Christ once, which if it had been repeated, doth imply, that Christs sufferings must have been repeated too. For then must he often have suffered since the foundation of the World: but the Heb. 9. 26. repeated exercise of Christs power in Hea­ven doth imply no necessity at all of Christs frequent suffering, nor his frequent en­trance into Heaven; which might have been done without suffering, therefore it must be meant of such an offering up him­self as was implyed in his death and suf­ferings. 5. He speaks of the offering up of that body which God gave him wh [...] he came into the World; but our Adversa­ries Heb. 10. 5. 10. deny, that he carried the same Body in­to Heaven, and therefore he must speak not [Page 501] of an offering of Christ in Heaven, but what was performed here on Earth. But here, our Adversaries have shewn us a tryal of their skill, when they tell us with much confidence that the World in­to which Christ is here said to come, is Crell. c. 10. sec [...]. 53. not to be understood of this World, but of that to come; which is not only con­trary to the general acceptation of the word when taken absolutely as it is here; but to the whole scope and design of the place. For he speaks of that World, wherein Sacrifices and Burnt-offerings were [...]ed, and the Levitical Law was observed, although not sufficient for perfect ex­piation, and so rejected for that end, and withall he speaks of that World where­in the chearfull obedience of Christ to the will of his Father was seen, for he saith, Lo I come to do thy will O God, Heb. 10. 7, 9. which is repeated afterwards; but will they say, that this World was not the place into which Christ came to obey the Will of his Father? and how could it he so properly said of the future World, Lo I come to do thy will; when they make the design of his ascension to be the re­ceiving the reward of his doing and suffer­ing the will of God upon Earth?

[Page 502] But yet they attempt to prove from the same Author to the Hebrews, that Christs §. 14. Objections answered. entrance into Heaven, was necessary to his being a perfect High-Priest; for he was to be made higher then the heavens; and if he were on earth, he should not be a Priest; but Heb. 7. 26. 8. 4. 7. 16. he was a Priest after the power of an e [...]lless life: Neither could he, say they, be a perfect High-Priest, till those words were spoken to him, Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee; which as appears by other places, was af­ter 5. 5. the Resurrection: But all the sufferings he underwent in the world, were onely to qualifie him for this Office in Heaven; therefore it is said, That in all things it behoved him to be made 2. 17. like unto his brethren, that he might be a mer­ciful and faithful High-Priest, &c. This is the substance of what is produced by Crellius and his Brethren, to prove that Christ did not be­come Crell. c. 10. sect. 53. a perfect High-Priest, till he entred into heaven: But it were worth the know­ing, what they mean by a perfect High-Priest; Is it that Christ did then begin the Office of a High-Priest, and that he made no offering at all before? No, that they dare not assert at last, but that there was no perfect sacrifice offered for sin, otherwise Socinus contends, That Christ did offer upon Socin. prae­lect. c. [...]t. earth, and that for himself too: So that all kind of offering is not excluded by them­selves, [Page 503] before Christs entrance into Hea­ven: But if they mean by perfect High-Priest in Heaven, that his Office of High-Priest was not consummated by what he did on earth, but that a very considerable part of the Priesthood of Christ was still remain­ing to be performed in Heaven; it is no more than we do freely acknowledge, and this is all we say is meant by those places: For the Apostles design is to prove, the ex­cellency of the Priesthood of Christ above the Aaronical; which he doth, not onely from the excellency of the Sacrifice which he offered, above the blood of Bulls and Goats; but from the excellency of the Priest, who did excel the Aaronical Priests; both in re­gard of his calling from God, which is all the Apostle designs, Heb. 5. 5. not at all in­tending to determine the time when he was made, but by whom he was made High-Priest, even by him that had said, Thou art my Son, &c. and in regard of the excellency of the Sanctuary which he entred into, which was not an earthly, but a heavenly Sanctuary; and in regard of the perpetuity of his fun­ction there, Not going in once a year, as the High-Priests under the Law did, but there ever living to make intercession for us: Now this being the Apostles design, we may ea­sily understand why he saith, That he was [Page 504] to be a heavenly High-Priest, and if he, had been on earth, he could not have been a Priest: The meaning of which is only this, that if Christs Office had ended in what he did on earth, he would not have had such an excellency as he was speaking of; for then he had ceased to be at all such a High-Priest, having no Holy of holies to go into, which should as much transcend the earth­ly Sanctuary, as his Sacrifice did the blood of Bulls and Goats: Therefore in correspon­dency to that Priesthood, which he did so far excell in all the parts of it, he was not to end his Priesthood meerly with the blood which was shed for a Sacrifice, but he was to carry it into Heaven, and present it before God, and to be a perpetual Inter­cessor in the behalf of his people: And so was in regard of the perpetuity of his Of­fice, a Priest after the Law of an endless life: But lest the people should imagine, that so great and excellent a High-Priest, being so far exalted above them, should have no sense or compassion upon the infirmities of his people, therefore to encourage them to adhere to him, he tells them, That he was made like to his Brethren; and there­fore they need not doubt, but by the sense which he had of the infirmities of humane nature, he will have pity on the weak­nesses [Page 505] of his people; which is all the Apo­stle means by those expressions. So that none of these places do destroy the Priest­hood of Christ on earth, but only assert the excellency, and the continuance of it in hea­ven: Which latter, we are as far from de­nying, as our Adversaries are from grant­ing the former. And thus much may suf­fice for the second thing, to prove the death of Christ a proper sacrifice for sin; viz. The Oblation which Christ made of him­self to God by it.

CHAP. VI.

THE last thing to prove the death of §. 1. Of the true notion of Expiati­on, as attri­buted to Sacrifices. Christ a proper Expiatory Sacrifice, is, That the effects of a proper Sacrifice for sin are attributed to it. Which do ei­ther respect the sins committed, and are then call'd Expiation and Remission, or the persons who were guilty of them, as they stand obnoxious to the displeasure of God, and so the effect of them is Atonement and Reconci­liation. Now these we shall prove do most properly and immediately refer to the death of Christ, and are attributed to it, as the procuring cause of them; and not as a bare condition of Christs entrance into Heaven, or as comprehending in it the consequents [Page 508] of it. I begin with the Expiation and Re­mission of sins; as to which Socinus doth ac­knowledge, That the great correspondency doth lie between Christs and the Legal Sacrifices. Socia. de Christo ser­vat. p. 2. l. 13. Crell. c. 10. sect. 26. We are therefore to enquire: 1. What re­spect the Expiation of sins had to the Sacri­fices under the Law. 2. In what sense the Expiation of sins is attributed to the Sacri­fice of Christ: For the due explication of the respect which Expiation of sins had to the Legal Sacrifices, we are to consider in what sense Expiation is understood, and in what respect it is attributed to them. For this we are to enquire into the importance of the several phrases it is set forth by, which are [...] and [...] in the Old Testament, [...] in the New; all which are acknowledged by our Adversaries to have a peculiar respect to the Expiation made by a Sacrifice. We shall begin with the former, because Crellius objects this a­gainst Grotius, That he imployed his greatest di­ligence Crell. c. 10. sect. 38. in the explication of the Greek and La­tin words for Expiation of sin, and was con­tented only to say, that the Hebrew words would bear the same signification: Whereas, saith he, he ought to have proved, that the Hebrew words do require that sense which he takes them in. But by Crellius his leave, Grotius took the best course was to be taken in words, [Page 509] whose signification is so obscure as those are in the Hebrew Language. For [...] being so very rarely used in Scripture in that which Socinus, and Crellius contend to be the pro­per and natural signification of it; viz. To hide or cover, and so frequently in the sense of Expiation, what better way could be taken for determining the sense of it, as ap­plied to Sacrifices, than by insisting upon those words which are used in the New-Testament, to the very same purpose that [...] is used in the old? For they cannot pre­tend that which they say is the most proper sense, can be applied to this subject; viz. To cover with pitch, or a bituminous matter, which is call'd [...] Gen. 6. 14. Therefore it must of necessity be taken in another sense here. But Socinus contends, That it ought to be taken in a sense most agreeable to that, which Socia. de Servat. p. 2. c. 11. is, saith he, that the Expiation of sin be nothing else, but the covering of it, by Gods grace and benignity. Thence, saith he, David saith, Psal. 32. 1. Blessed is the man whose iniquity is covered. But how can this prove, that the proper signifi­cation of [...] as applied to sin, is covering by Gods Grace, when neither the word [...] is here used, nor is there any respect at all mentioned of an Expiation by Sacrifice, which is the thing we are discoursing of? And is the covering of sin such an easie and [Page 510] intelligible phrase, that this should be made choice of to explain the difficulty of [...] by? What is it that they would have us under­stand by the covering sin? surely not to make it stronger and more lasting, as the ark was covered, with that bituminous matter for that end, and yet this would come the near­est to the proper sense of [...]. So that from their own interpretation it appears, that [...] as applied to the expiation of sin by Sacri­fices, cannot be taken so much as in allusion to that other sense; for their sense of Ex­piation, is either by the destruction of sin, or deliverance of the sinner from the punish­ment of it, but what resemblance is there between the covering of a thing, in order to its preservation, and the making it not to be, or at least destroying all the power of it? But supposing we should grant that it hath some allusion to the sense of covering, why must it necessarily be supposed to be done by the meer Grace of God, as excluding all antecedent causes which should move to it? would not the propriety of the sense remain as well, sup­posing a moving cause, as excluding it? What should hinder, but that God may be said as well to cover sin upon a Sacrifice as to forgive it, and this is very frequently used Lev. 4. 26. Ver. 31. 35. upon a Sacrifice, That the sin shall be forgiven? [Page 511] But yet themselves acknowledge, that the Sacrifices were conditions required in or­der to expiation; if then [...] hath an im­mediate respect to Gods immediate favour and benignity, how comes it to be used where a condition is necessarily supposed in order to it? Had it not been more agree­able to this benignity of God to have par­don'd sin without requiring any sacrifice for it, than so strictly insisting upon the offering up Sacrifice in order to it, and then declaring that the sin is expiated, and it should be forgiven? from hence we see that there is no necessity why [...] should be used as applyed to sacrifices in a sense most agreeable to that of covering with pitch, nor that it is not possible it should have such a sense when applyed to sins; and withall that it is very consistent with an antecedent condition to it, and therefore can by no means destroy satisfaction.

Yes, saith Crellius, it doth, for expiation is Crellius his Objections answered. explained in the Law by non-imputation, Deut. 21. 8. Be mercifull, O Lord unto thy §. 2. Crell. c. 10. sect. 9. people Israel whom thou hast redeemed, and lay not innocent blood unto thy people of Israels charge; and the blood shall be forgiven them. But not to impute, saith he, and to receive true and full satisfaction overthrow each other: and so expiation being the same with that, will [Page 512] overthrow it too. To this I answer, 1. I grant that [...] is here used both as apply­ed to God, and to the sin, and that the sense of it is used as to the people, when the prayer is, that God would not lay it to their charge, which is the same with expiating of it. 2. We are to consider, what the foun­dation of this Prayer was, viz. the slaying of the Heifer for expiation of the uncertain murder; and when the Elders had washed their hands over the head of the Heifer, then they were to protest their own inno­cency, and to use this prayer. [...] Expiate thy people Israel, &c. i. e. accept of this Sacrifice as an expiation for them, and so charge not on them the innocent blood, &c. and upon doing of this it is said, [...] and the blood shall be expiated, i. e. as the Vulgar Latin explain it, the guilt of the blood shall be taken from them. But how then should the expiating sin upon a Sacrifice slain in order thereto, destroy that satisfaction which we assert by the blood of Christ being shed in order to the expiation of our sins? Nay, it much rather sheweth the consistency and agree­ableness of these one with another. For we have before proved, that the Sacrifice here did expiate the sin by a substitution, and bearing the guilt which could not [Page 513] have been expiated without it. But Crel­lius further urgeth, that God himself is here said to expiate, and therefore to expiate can­not signifie to atone or satisfie; in which sense Christ may be said to expiate too, not by atoning or satisfying, but by not imputing sins, or taking away the punishment of them by his power. To which we need no other answer than what Crellius himself elsewhere gives, viz. that Socinus never denyes but that [...] doth signifie to appease or atone; which is most evi­dently C [...] n [...] neget [...] n [...]s ho [...] b [...]m [...] di sig [...] tio [...]m [...] b [...]re. [...]. c. 10. [...]. 38. proved from the place mention'd by Grotius, Gen. 32. 20. [...] Expiabo faciem ejus in munere, saith the in­terlineary Version, placabo illum muneribus, the Vulg. Lat. [...], the LXX. and all the circumstances of the place make it appear to be meant in the proper sense of appeasing the anger of a person by something which may move him to shew favour. And if Crellius will yield this to be the sense of expiation as applyed to the Sacrifice of Christ, he need not quarrel with the word satisfaction. But why should he rather attribute that sense of expiati­on to Christ, which is alone given to God, wherein the expiation is attributed to him that receives the Sacrifice: rather than to him that offers the sacrifice in order to the atonement of another? since it is acknow­ledged [Page 514] that Christ did offer a sacrifice; and therefore there can be no reason why that sense of expiation should not belong to him, which was most peculiar to that; which we shall now shew to be of the same kind with what is here mentioned, viz. an ap­peasing by a gift offered up to God. So we find the word used to the same sense, 2 Sam. 21. 3. [...], and wherewith shall I make the Atonement, i. e. wherewith shall I satisfie you for all the wrong which Saul hath done unto you? and we see afterwards it was by the death of Sauls sons. In which place it cannot be denyed but that [...] not only signifies to appease, but such a kind of satisfaction as is by the death of some for the faults of others; and so comes home, not only to the importance of the expiation belonging to a Sacrifice in general; but to such a kind of expiation as is by the suffering of some in the place of others. Which though it be more clear and distinct, where one man suffers for others, yet this was suffi­ciently represented in the sacrifices under the Law, in which we have already proved that there was a substitution of them in the place of the offenders. § 3. The Jews rotion of [...]

And in this sense the Jews themselves do understand [...] viz. such an expiation [Page 515] as is made by the substitution of one in the place of another. Of which many instan­ces Buxtorf. Lexic. Tal­mud. v. [...] are collected by Buxtorf, wherein [...] is taken by the Rabbinical Writers for such an expiation, whereby one was to undergo a punishment in the place of another. So when in the title Sanhedrin the people say to the High-Priest [...] simus nos expiatio tua, let us be for an expiation for you, the Glosse explains it thus, hoc est, in nobis fiat expiatio tua, nos (que) subeamus tuo loco quic­quid tibi evenire debet. And when they tell us how Children ought to honour their Pa­rents after their death, they say when they recite any memorable speech of their Fa­thers, they are not barely to say, My fa­ther said so: but my Lord and Father said so, would I had been the expiation of his death: i. e. as they explain it themselves, would I had undergone what he did, and they give this general rule, Where ever it is said, behold I am for expiation, it is to be understood, be­hold I am in the place of another to bear his iniquities. So that this signifies the same with [...] or a price of redemption for others. Hence [...] is taken for a price of re­demption of the life of another, and rendred by [...], Exod. 21. 30.—30. 12. Numb. 35. 31, 32. where we render it satisfacti­on, and by [...], Psal. 48. 7. and there­by [Page 516] we fully understand, what our Saviour meant when he said, that he gave his Soul, [...], a ransome for many, and to this day the Jews call the Cock which they [...] [...]. kill for Expiation on the day of Atone­ment, by the name of Cappara; and when they beat the Cock against their heads thrice, they every time use words to this purpose, Let this Cock be an exchange for me, let him be in my room, and be made an Expiati­on for me; let death come to him, but to me and all Israel life and happiness. I insist on these things, only to let us understand, that the Jews never understood [...] in the sense our Adversaries contend for, when applied to an Expiatory Sacrifice, but as implying a Commutation, and a Substitution of one in the place of another, so as by the punish­ment of that, the other in whose room he suffers, may obtain deliverance. Which is the sense we plead for. But the utmost which Socinus and Crellius will allow to the Sacrifices in order to Expiation, is bare­ly Socia. l. 2. c. 11. [...]o [...]t Soci­ [...]s victi­ [...]m ob­ [...] [...]tiam [...] ac­ [...] [...]quam l [...]vem continuisse, quam ex promisso Dei l [...]vi [...] quorundam er­ [...] ac peccatorum venia consequeretur. Crell. c. 10. sect. 10. this, That the offering of them is to be con­sidered as a meer condition (that hath no other respect to the expiation of sins, than the paring a mans nails would have had, if God had required it) upon which slight obe­dience, [Page 517] the pardon of some light sins might be obtained. But can any one imagine, that this was all that was designed by the Sacri­fices of old, who considers the antiquity and universality of them in the world in those elder times before the Law, the great severity by which they were required un­der the Law, the punctual prescriptions that were made in all circumstances for them, the vast and almost inestimable expence the people were at about them, but above all, the reason that God himself assigns in the Law, That the blood was given for expiation, because it was the life, and the correspon­dency so clearly expressed in the New Testament, between the Sacrifice of Christ and those Levitical Sacrifices? Can any one, I say, imagine upon these considera­tions, that the Sacrifices had no other re­spect to the expiation of sin, than as they were a slight testimony of their obedience to God? Why were not an inward sor­row for sin, and tears and prayers rather made the only conditions of Expiation, than such a burthensome and chargeable service imposed upon them, which at last signified nothing, but that a command be­ing supposed, they would have sinned if they had broken it? But upon our sup­position, a reasonable account is given of [Page 518] all the expiatory Sacrifices; viz. That God would have them see, how highly he esteemed his Laws, because an expiation was not to be made for the breach of them, but by the sacrificing of the life of some Creature which he should appoint in stead of the death of the Offender; and if the breach of those Laws which he had given them must require such an expiation, what might they then think would the sins of the whole world do, which must be expiated by a Sacrifice infinitely greater than all those put together were; viz. The death and sufferings of the Son of God for the sins of men? But if the offering Sacrifice had been a bare condition required of the person who committed the fault, in order to ex­piation; Why is it never said, That the person who offered it, did expiate his own fault thereby? For that had been the most proper sense; for if the expiation did de­pend on the offering the Sacrifice, as on the condition of it, then the performing the condition, gave him an immediate right to the benefit of the promise. If it be said, That his own act was, not only necessary in bringing the Sacrifice, but the Priests also in offering up the blood: This will not make it at all the more reasonable; because the pardon of sin should not only depend upon a [...] [...] [Page 519] mans own act, but upon the act of ano­ther, which he could not in reason be ac­countable for, if he miscarried in it. If the Priest should refuse to do his part, or be unfit to do it, or break some Law in the doing of it, how hard would it seem, that a mans sins could not be expiated, when he had done all that lay in his own power in order to the expiation of them, but that another person, whose actions he had no command over, neglected the doing his duty? So that if the Sacrifice had no other influence on expiation, but as a part of obedience, in all reason the expiation [...]hould have depended on no other conditi­ons but such as were under the power of him, whose sins were to be expiated by [...].

But Crellius urgeth against our sense of §. 4. Gods expi­ating sin, destroys not expia­tion by sa­crifices. Crell. ib. sect. 39. Expiation, That if it were by Substitution, [...]hen the Expiation would be most properly attri­ [...]ted to the Sacrifices themselves; whereas it is [...]ly said, that by the Sacrifices the Expiation is [...]btained, but that God or the Priest do expiate; [...]d to God it belongs properly, because he takes [...]ay the guilt and punishment of sin; which is, [...]aith he, all meant by expiation; to the Priest [...]ly consequently, as doing what God requires [...] order to it; and to the Sacrifices only as the [...]nditions by which it was obtained. But if [Page 520] the Expiation doth properly belong to God, and implies no more than bare pardon, it is hard to conceive that it should have any ne­cessary relation to the blood of the Sacri­fice: but the Apostle to the Hebrews tells us, that Remission had a necessary respect to the shedding of blood, so that without that Heb. 9. 22. there was no remission. How improperly doth the Apostle discourse throughout that Chap­ter, wherein he speaks so much concerning the blood of the Sacrifices purifying, and in correspondency to that, the blood of Christ Ver. 13, 14. purging our Consciences; and that all things under the Law, were purified with blood; Had Ver. 18, 19, 20, 21, 23. all this no other signification, but that this was a bare condition that had no other importance, but as a meer act of obedience when God had required it? why doth not the Apostle rather say, without Gods favour there is no remission, than without the shed­ing of blood; if all the expiation did pro­perly belong to that, and only very re­motely to the blood of the Sacrifice? What imaginable necessity was there, that Christ must shed his blood in order to the expiation of our sins, if all that blood of the Legal Sacrifices did signifie no more than a bare condition of pardon, though a slight part of obedience in it self? Why must Christ lay down his life in correspondency to [Page 521] these Levitical Sacrifices? for that was surely no slight part of his obedience. Why might not this condition have been dispensed with in him, since our Adversaries say, that in it self it hath no proper efficacy on the expia­tion of sin? And doth not this speak the greatest repugnancy to the kindness and Grace of God in the Gospel, that he would not dispense with the ignominious death of his Son, although he knew it could have no influence of it self on the expiation of the sins of the world? But upon this supposition, that the blood of Sacrifices under the Law had no proper influence upon Expiation, the Apostles discourse proceeds upon weak and insufficient grounds. For what necessity in the thing was there, because the blood of the Sacrifices was made a condition of pardon under the Law, therefore the blood of Christ must be so now; although in it self it hath no proper efficacy for that end? But the Apostles words and way of Argumentation doth imply, that there was a peculiar ef­ficacy both in the one and the other, in or­der to Expiation; although a far greater in the blood of Christ, than could be in the o­ther; as the thing typified, ought to exceed that which was the representation of it. From hence we see, that the Apostle attri­butes [Page 522] what Expiation there was under the Law, not immediately to God, as belonging properly to him, but to the blood of bulls and goats, and the ashes of an heifer, sprinkling the un­clean. Which he had very great reason to do, since God expresly saith to the Jews, that the blood was given them [...] ad expiandum, to expiate for their souls, for the blood [...] shall expiate the soul. Than which words, no­thing Jev. 17. 11. could have been more plainly said to overthrow Crellius his assertion, that Ex­piation is not properly or chiefly attribu­ted to the Sacrifices, but primarily to God, and consequentially to the Priest: who is never said to expiate, but by the Sacrifice which he offered, so that his Office was barely Ministerial in it. But from this we may easily understand, in what sense God is said to expiate sins, where it hath respect to a Sacrifice (which is that we are now dis­coursing of, and not in any larger or more improper use of the word) for since God himself hath declared, that the blood was given for Expiation, the Expiation which belongs to God, must imply his acceptance of it for that end, for which it was offered. For the execution or discharge of the pu­nishment belonging to him, he may be said in that sense to expiate, because it is only in his power to discharge the sinner from [Page 523] that obligation to punishment he lies under by his sins. And we do not say, that where expiating is attributed to him that accepts the Atonement, that it doth imply his undergo­ing any punishment which is impossible to suppose; but that where it is attributed to a Sacrifice, as the means of Atonement, there we say it doth not imply a bare condition, but such a Substitution of one in the place of another, that on the account of that, the fault of the offender himself is expiated thereby.

And to this sense the other word [...] doth very well agree; for Socinus and Crel­lius §. 5. The im­portance of [...], and [...], relating to sacrifices. cannot deny, but that Gen. 31. 39. it properly signifies Luere, or to bear punishment; although they say, it no where else signifies so, and the reason is, because it is applied to the Al­tar, and such other things, which are not ca­pable of it; but doth it hence follow, that it should not retain that signification where the matter will bear it, as in the case of Sa­crifices. And although it be frequently ren­dred by [...], yet that will be no prejudice to the sense we plead for in respect of Sacrifices, because those words when used concerning them, do sig­nifie Expiation too. ‘ Grotius proves, that they do from their own nature and con­stant use in Greek Authors, not only signi­fie [Page 524] an antecedency of order, but a peculiar efficacy in order to Expiation. Thence expiatory Sacrifices among the Greeks were called [...], and [...], frequently in Homer, applied to Sacrifices, [...] in Plu­tarch, and [...] used in the same sense; an Expiatory Sacrifice in Herodotus is call'd [...], and to the same purpose it is used in Hermogenes, Plato and Plutarch: as among the Latins, placare, purgare, pu­rificare, conciliare, lustrare in the same sense, and piare when used in Sacrifices, he proves to signifie Luere per successionem rei alterius in locum poenae debitae. Thence piaculum used for an Expiatory Sacrifice: and expiare is to appease by such a Sa­crifice, so Cereris numen expiare is used in Cicero; filium expiare in Livy. So that all these Sacrifices among them, were sup­posed still to pertain to the atoning the Deity, and obtaining a remission of sins committed by them. And from hence (because where there was a greater equality and neerness, there might be the greater efficacy of the Sacrifice for expiation) came the custom of sacrificing men, which Grotius at large shews to have almost universally obtained before the coming of Christ.’ We are now to con­sider [Page 525] what Crellius answers to this; the substance of which lies in these two things, 1. He denies not but that [...] and [...] do in their proper use in the Greek Crell. c. 10. sect. 23, & 24. Tongue signifie the purging of guilt, and the aversion of the wrath of God and punishment, but that those and such other words are attri­buted to Sacrifices, because those were supposed to be the effects of them among the Heathens; but the attributing such effects to them, did arise from their superstition, whereby greater things were attributed to Sacrifices, than God would have given to them, either before or under the Law. 2. He denies not, but that those words, [...] and [...], being used by the Author to the Hebrews more than once Ita (que) quod ad votes Graecas [...] atti­net, qui­bus in hoc argumento non semel utitur D. scriptor ad Heb. eae ad Christi Sacrificium & Sacer­dotii functionem relatae to etiam sensu usurpantur, quem Graeca lingua receperat, h. e. de expurgatione rea­ [...]s & aversione irae numinis aut poenae. Crell. c. 10. p. 499. with respect to the Sacrifices and Priesthood of Christ, were taken in the same sense in which they are used in the Greek Tongue; viz. For the purging of guilt, and the aversion of the wrath of God, and the punishment consequent upon it: But all that he contends for is, That there is a difference in the manner of ef­fecting it, which he acknowledges the words themselves do not imply; and the reasons he gives for it are, That the other were proper, but Christs an improper Sacrifice; and that the other Sacrifices were offered by men to God, [Page 526] but the Sacrifice of Christ was given by God to men, and therefore he must be supposed to be reconciled before. From whence he would at least have other senses of these words joyned together with the former; viz. Either for purging away the filth of sin, or for a delaration of a deliverance from guilt and punishment, in imitation of the Idiome of the Hebrew, in which many words are used in the New Testament. From hence it follows, that Crellius doth yield the main cause, if it appear, that Christ did offer up an Expiatory Sacrifice to God in his death, for then he grants that [...] and [...] being applied to the Sacrifice of Christ, are to be taken for the purging away of guilt, and the aversion of the wrath of God, and the punishment of sin. And it is to no purpose to say, that it is not a proper Sacrifice, for if the effects of a proper Sacrifice do be­long to it, that proves that it is so; for these words being acknowledged to be applied to the Sacrifice of Christ by the Author to the Hebrews, what could more evince that Christs was a proper Sacrifice, then that those things are attributed to it, which by the consent of all Nations, are said to belong to proper Sacrifices, and that in the very same sense in which they are used by those who understood them in [Page 527] the most proper sense. And what rea­son could Crellius have to say, that it was only the superstition of the Heathens, which made them attribute such effects to sacrifices; when himself acknowledges that the very same sense doth belong to the Sacrifice of Christ under that notion? and as to the Jews we have already proved that the sense of expiation among them was by vertue of the Law to be taken in as proper a sense as among the Hea­thens, for the purging of guilt, and the aversion of the wrath of God. And why should Crellius deny that effect of the Sacrifice of Christ as to the atone­ment of God, because Gods love was seen in giving him who was to offer the sacri­fice? since that effect is attributed to those sacrifices under the Law which God him­self appointed to be offer'd, and shew­ed his great kindness to the people in the Institution of such a way, whereby their sins might be expiated, and they deliver'd from the punishment of them. But of the consistency of these two, I shall speak more afterwards, in the ef­fect of the Sacrifices as relating to Per­sons.

[Page 528] We now come to consider in what sense §. 6. Expiation attributed to the Sa­crifice of Christ in the same sense that it was to other Sa­crifices. the expiation of sins is in Scripture attribu­ted to the Sacrifice of Christ, and therein I shall prove these two things. 1. That the expiation is attributed to the Sacrifice of Christ in the same sense that is attribu­ted to other Sacrifices, and as the words in themselves do signifie. 2. That what is so attributed doth belong to the Sacri­fice of Christ in his death, antecedent to his entrance into Heaven. 1. That the expiation is to be taken in a proper sense, when it is attributed to the Sacrifice of Christ. Crellius tells us, the controversie Crell. c. 10. sect. 24. is not about the thing, viz. whether expia­tion in the sense we take it in for purging away guilt, and aversion of the wrath of God, doth belong to the Sacrifice of Christ, for he acknowledges it doth; but all the question is about the manner of it: which in the next Section he thus explains: There are three senses in which Christ may be said to expi­ate sins; either by begetting Faith in us, whereby we are drawn off from the practice of sin, in which sense, he saith, it is a remo­ter antecedent to it; or as it relates to the expiation by actual deliverance from punish­ment, so he saith, it is an immediate ante­cedent to it; or as he declares that they are [Page 529] expiated, but this, he saith, doth not so pro­perly relate to Christ as a Sacrifice, but as a Priest. But never a one of these senses comes near to that which Crellius grants to be the proper importance of [...] and [...], as applyed to a Sacrifice, viz. the purging away guilt, and the aversion of the wrath of God, and punishment, not any way, but by the means of the Sacrifice offer'd. For in the Legal Sacrifices nothing can be more plain than that the expiation was to be by the Sacrifice offer'd for Atonement: supposing then that in some other way (which could be by no means proper to those Sacrifices) Christ may be said to ex­piate sins, what doth this prove that there was an expiation belonging to his Sacri­fice agreeable to the Sacrifices of old? But as I urged before in the case of Christs being High-Priest, that by their assertions the Jews might utterly deny the force of any argument used by the author to the Hebrews to prove it: so I say as to the ex­piation by Christs Sacrifice, that it hath no analogy or correspondency at all with any Sacrifice that was ever offer'd for the expiation of sins. For by that they al­ways understood something which was im­mediately offer'd to God for that end, upon which they obtained remission of sins; but [Page 530] here is nothing answerable to it in their sense of Christs Sacrifice; for here is no Oblation at all made unto God for this end; all the efficacy of the Sacrifice of Christ, in order to expiation doth wholly and im­mediately respect us; so that if it be a proper Sacrifice to any, it must be a sacri­fice to us, and not to God: for a Sacrifice is always said to be made to him whom it doth immediately respect; but Christ in the planting Faith, in actual deliverance, in declaring to us this deliverance, doth wholly respect us, and therefore his Sacri­fice must be made to men, and not to God. Which is in it self a gross absurdity, and repugnant to the nature and design of Sa­crifices from the first institution of them; which were always esteemed such immedi­ate parts of divine Worship, that they ought to respect none else but God, as the object to which they were directed, though for the benefit and advantage of Mankinde. As well then might Christ be said to pray for us, and by that no more be meant but that he doth teach us to under­stand our duty; as be made an expiatory Sacrifice for us, and all the effect of it only respect us and not God. And this is so far from adding to the perfection of Christs Sacrifice above the Legal (which is the thing [Page 531] pleaded by Crellius) that it destroyes the Crell. c. 10. sect. 26. very nature of a sacrifice, if such a way of expiation be attributed to it (which though conceived to be more excellent in it self) yet is wholly incongruous to the end and design of a sacrifice for ex­piation. And the excellency of the man­ner of expiation ought to be in the same kind, and not quite of another nature; for, will any one say, that a General of an Army hath a more excellent conduct than all that went before him, because he can make finer speeches; or that the Assomanaean Fami­ly discharged the Office of Priesthood best, because they had a greater power over the people; or that Nero was the most excel­lent Emperour of Rome because he excelled the rest in Musick and Poetr [...] by which we see that to assert an excellency of one above another, we must not go to another kind, but shew its excellency in that wherein the comparison lyes: So that this doth not prove the excellency of the Sa­crifice of Christ, because he hath a greater power to perswade, deliver and govern, than any Sacrifice under the Law; for these are things quite of another nature from the consideration of a sacrifice: But therein the excellency of a sacrifice is to be demonstrated, that it excells all other [Page 532] in the proper end and design of a Sacri­fice, i. e. if it be more effectual towards God for obtaining the expiation of sin; which was alwayes thought to be the proper end of all Sacrifices for expiation. Although then Christ may be allowed to excell all other sacrifices in all imagina­ble respects but that which is the proper intention of a Sacrifice; it may prove far greater excellency in Christ, but it doth withall prove a greater imperfecti­on in his Sacrifice, if it fail in that which is the proper end of it. So that if we should grant that the expiation at­tributed to Christs Sacrifice signified no more than reclaiming men from their sins, or their deliverance by his power, or a declara [...]n of Gods decree to par­don, this may prove that there are bet­ter arguments to believe the remission of sins now under the Gospel; but they do not in the least prove that Christ is to be considered as a Sacrifice; much less that he doth far excell in the no­tion of an Expiatory Sacrifice all those which were offered up to God for that end under the Law.

[Page 533] But we must now further consider, whe­ther this be all attributed to Christ in or­der §. 7. Expiation by Christ not meerly declara­tive. to expiation in Scripture; i. e. Whe­ther those words which of themselves do imply the aversion of the wrath of God, when used concerning other Sacrifices, when ap­plied to the Sacrifice of Christ, do only im­ply the begetting faith in us, or a declara­tion of pardon. The words which are used to this purpose, are [...], which are all applied to the blood of Christ, and the dispute is, whether they signifie no more but a declaration of par­don, or a means to beget faith in us. The first words [...] and [...] Crellius acknow­ledgeth do frequently signifie deliverance from guilt and punishment; but, he saith, they may Crell. c. 10. sect. 28. p. 506. likewise signifie a declaration of that delive­rance, as decreed by God, or a purging from the sins themselves, or from the custom of sin­ning. So that by Crellius his own confession, the sense we contend for is most proper and usual, the other are more remote, and onely possible; why then should we forsake the former sense, which doth most perfect­ly agree to the nature of a Sacrifice, which the other senses have no such relation to, as that hath? For these being the words made use of in the New Testament, to im­ply the force and efficacy of a Sacrifice, [Page 534] why should they not be understood in the same sense which the Hebrew words were taken in, when they are applied to the Sacrifices under the Law? We are not en­quiring into all possible senses of words, but into the most natural and agreeable to the scope of them that use them: and that we shall make it appear to be the same, we plead for in the places in dispute be­tween us; as, 1 John 1. 7. The blood of Jesus Christ his Son, [...], purgeth us from all sin, Heb. 9. 13, 14. If the blood of bulls, and of goats, and the ashes of an heifer, sprinkling the unclean, [...], sanctifieth to the purifying of the flesh: How much more shall the blood of Christ purge your consciences from dead works, [...], Heb. 1. 3. [...], when he had by himself purged our sins. So, [...] and [...] are used with a respect to the blood of Christ, Heb. 10. 22. Apocalip. 1. 5. And because remission of sin was looked on as the consequent of expiati­on by Sacrifice under the Law; therefore that is likewise attributed to the blood of Christ, Matth. 26. 28. This is the blood of the New Testament which was shed for many, [...], for the remission of sins, Eph. 1. 7. In whom we have redemption through [Page 535] his blood, the remission of sins, and to the same purpose, Coloss. 1. 14. And from hence we are said to be justified by his blood, Rom. 5. 9. and Christ is said to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, Rom. 3. 25. The substance of all that Crellius replies to these places is, That those words which do Crell. c. 10. sect. 28. properly signifie the thing it self, may very con­veniently be taken only for the declaration of it, when the performance of the thing doth follow by virtue of that declaration: which then happens, when the declaration is made of the thing decreed by another, and that in the name and by the command of him who did decree it. And in this sense, Christ by his blood may be said to deliver us from the punishment of our sins, by declaring or testify­ing to us the will and decree of God for that purpose. But this answer is by no means sufficient, upon these considerations; 1. Be­cause it doth not reach the proper and natural sense of the words, as Crellius him­self confesseth; and yet he assigns no rea­son at all, why we ought to depart from it, unless the bare possibility of another meaning be sufficient. But how had it been possible for the efficacy of the blood of Christ for purging away the guilt of our sins, to have been expressed in clearer and plainer terms than these, which are acknow­ledged [Page 536] of themselves to signifie as much as we assert? If the most proper expressi­ons for this purpose, are not of force enough to perswade our Adversaries, none else could ever do it; so that it had been impossible for our Doctrine to have been delivered in such terms, but they would have found out ways to evade the mean­ing of them. It seems very strange, that so great an efficacy should not only once or twice, but so frequently be attributed to the blood of Christ for expiation of sin, if nothing else were meant by it, but that Christ by his death did only declare that God was willing to pardon sin? If there were danger in understanding the words in their proper sense, why are they so fre­quently used to this purpose? why are there no other places of Scripture that might help to undeceive us, and tell us plainly, that Christ dyed only to declare his Fathers will? but what ever other words might signifie, this was the only true meaning of them. But what miserable shifts are these, when men are forced to put off such Texts which are confessed to express our Doctrine, only by saying that they may be otherwise understood? which destroys all kind of certainty in words; which by reason of the various use of them, [Page 537] may be interpreted to so many several senses, that if this liberty be allowed, up­on no other pretence, but that another meaning is possible, men will never agree about the intention of any person in speak­ing. For upon the same reason, if it had been said, That Christ declared by his death Gods readiness to pardon, it might have been interpreted, That the blood of Christ was therefore the declaration of Gods readi­ness to pardon, because it was the consideration upon which God would do it: So that if the words had been as express for them, as they are now against them, according to their way of answering places, they would have been reconcileable to our opinion. 2. The Scripture in these expressions, doth attribute something peculiar to the blood of Christ; but if all that were meant by it were no more, than the declaring Gods will to pardon, this could in no sense be said to be peculiar to it. For this was the design of the Doctrine of Christ, and all his mi­racles were wrought to confirm the truth of that part of his Doctrine, which con­cerned remission of sins as well as any other: but how absurd would it have been to say, that the miracles of Christ purge us from all sin, that through Christ healing the sick, raising the dead, &c. we have re­demption, [Page 538] even the forgiveness of sins, which are attributed to the blood of Christ? but if in no other respect, than as a testimony to the truth of the Doctrine of Remission of sins, they were equally applicable to one as to the other. Besides, if this had been all intended in these expressions, they were the most incongruously applied to the blood of Christ; nothing seeming more repugnant to the Doctrine of the Re­mission of sins, which was declared by it, than that very thing by which it was de­clared, if no more were intended by it: For how unsuitable a way was it to de­clare the pardon of the guilty persons, by such severities used towards the most Innocent! Who could believe, that God should declare his willingness to pardon others, by the death of his own Son; un­less that death of his be considered as the Meritorious cause for procuring it? And in that sense we acknowledge, That the death of Christ was a declaration of Gods will and decree to pardon, but not meerly as it gave testimony to the truth of his Do­ctrine (for in that sense the blood of the Apostles and Martyrs might be said to purge us from sin, as well as the blood of Christ) but because it was the consideration upon which God had decreed to pardon. And [Page 539] so as the acceptance of the condition required, or the price paid, may be said to declare or manifest, the intention of a person to release or deliver a Captive: So Gods acceptance of what Christ did suffer for our sakes, may be said to declare his readiness to pardon us upon his account. But then this declaration doth not belong pro­perly to the act of Christ in suffering; but to the act of God in accepting: and it can be no other ways known, than Gods ac­ceptance is known; which was not by the Sufferings, but by the Resurrection of Christ. And therefore the declaring Gods will and decree to pardon, doth properly belong to that: and if that had been all which the Scripture had meant, by purging of sin by the blood of Christ, it had been very in­congruously applied to that, but most pro­perly to his Resurrection. But these phrases being never attributed to that which most properly might be said to declare the will of God; and being peculiarly attributed to the death of Christ, which cannot be said properly to do it; nothing can be more plain, than that these expressions ought to be taken in that which is confessed to be their proper sense; viz. That Ex­piation of sin, which doth belong to the death of Christ, as a Sacrifice for the sins of the world.

[Page 540] But yet Socinus and Crellius have ano­ther §. 8. The death of Christ not taken Metonymi­cally for all the conse­quents of it. subterfuge. (For therein lies their great art, in seeking rather by any means to escape their enemies, than to overcome them.) For being sensible, that the main scope and design of the Scripture is against them, they seldom, and but very weakly assault: but shew all their subtilty in avoiding by all imaginable arts, the force of what is brought against them. And the Scripture being so plain in attributing such great effects to the death of Christ, when no other answer will serve turn, then they tell us, That the death of Christ is taken Me­tonymically Crell. c. 1. sect. 103. Sect. 119. c. 10. Sect. 45. p. 527. for all the consequents of his death; viz. His Resurrection, Exaltation, and the Power and Authority which he hath at the right hand of his Father. But how is it possible to convince those, who by death, can understand life; by sufferings, can mean glory; and by the shedding of blood, sitting at the right hand of God? And that the Scripture is very far from giving any countenance to these bold Interpreta­tions, will appear by these considerations; 1. because the effect of Expiation of our sins, is attributed to the death of Christ, as di­stinct from his Resurrection; viz. Our recon­ciliation with God, Rom. 5. 10. For if when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by [Page 541] the death of his Son; much more being reconci­led, we shall be saved by his life. To which Crel­lius Crell. c. 1. sect. 112. answers, That the Apostle doth not speak of the death of Christ alone, or as it is con­sidered distinct from the consequences of it; but only that our Reconciliation was effected [...] by the death of Christ intervening. But no­thing can be more evident to any one, who considers the design of the Apostles discourse, than that he speaks of what was peculiar to the death of Christ: for there­fore it is said, that Christ dyed for the ungod­ly. Rom. 5. v. 6. For scarcely for a righteous man will one dye: but God commendeth his love towards 7. us, in that while we were yet sinners, Christ 8. dyed for us. Much more then being now 9. justified by his blood, we shall be saved through him; upon which those words follow, For if when we were enemies, we were recon­ciled 10. to God by the death of his Son, &c. The Reconciliation here mentioned, is attribu­ted to the death of Christ in the same sense, that it is mentioned before; but there it is not mentioned as a. bare con­dition intervening in order to some thing farther; but as the great instance of the love both of God and Christ; of God, in sending his Son; of Christ, in laying down his life for sinners, in order to their being justified by his blood. But where is it [Page 542] that St. Paul saith, that the death of Christ had no other influence on the ex­piation of our sins, but as a bare con­dition intervening in order to that pow­er and authority whereby he should ex­piate sins? what makes him attribute so much to the death of Christ, if all the benefits we enjoy depend upon the con­sequences of it; and no otherwise upon that, than meerly as a preparation for it? what peculiar emphasis were there in Christs dying for sinners, and for the ungodly; un­less his death had a particular relation to the expiation of their sins? Why are men said to be justified by his blood, and not much rather by his glorious resurrection, if the blood of Christ be only considered as an antecedent to the other? And that would have been the great demonstrati­on of the love of God which had the most immediate influence upon our advan­tage: which could not have been the death in this sense, but the life and glory of Christ. But nothing can be more ab­surd than what Crellius would have to be the meaning of this place, viz. that the Apostle doth not speak of the proper force of the death of Christ distinct from his life; but that two things are opposed to each other for the effecting of one of which the death of [Page 543] Christ did intervene, but it should not inter­vene for the other; viz. it did intervene for our reconciliation, but it should not for our life. For did not the death of Christ equally intervene for our life as for our reconciliation? was not our eternal deli­verance the great thing designed by Christ, and our reconciliation in order to that end? what opposition then can be imagin­ed, that it should be necessary for the death of Christ to intervene in order to the one than in order to the other? But he means, that the death of Christ should not intervene any more; what need that, when it is acknowledged by themselves, that Christ dyed only for this end before, that he might have power to bestow eter­nal life on them that obey him? But the main force of the Apostles argument lyes in the comparison between the death of Christ having respect to us as enemies in order to reconciliation, and the life of Christ to us considered as reconciled; so that if he had so much kindness for enemies, to dye for their reconciliation, we may much more presume that he now living in Hea­ven will accomplish the end of that recon­ciliation, in the eternal salvation of them that obey him. By which it is apparent [Page 544] that he speaks of the death of Christ in a notion proper to it self, having influence upon our reconciliation; and doth not consider it metonymically as comprehending in it, the consequents of it.

2. Because the expiation of sins is at­tributed to Christ antecedently to the great § 9. Expiation attributed to Christ antece­dently to his en­trance in­to heaven. consequents of his death, viz. his sitting at the right hand of God. Heb. 1. 3. When he had by himself purged our sins, sate down on the right hand of his Majesty on high. Heb. 9. 12. But by his own blood he entred in once into the Holy Place, having obtained eternal redemption for us. To these places Crellius gives a double answer. 1. That indefinite particles ( [...] and [...]) being joyned with Verbs of the praeter­perfect Crell. c. 10. sect. 50. tense do not alwayes require that the action expressed by them, should precede that which is designed in the Verbs to which they are joyned; but they have sometimes the force of particles of the present or imperfect tense; which sometimes happens in particles of the praeter-perfect tense, as Matth. 10. 5. [...], so [...]; and se­veral other instances produced by him: according to which manner of interpreta­tion the sense he puts upon those words, [Page 545] Heb. 9. 12. is, Christ by the shedding of his blood entred into the Holy of Holies, and in so doing he found eternal redemption, or the expiation of sins. But not to dispute with Crellius concerning the importance of the Aorist being joyned with a Verb of the prae­terperfect tense, which in all reason and common acceptation doth imply the action past by him who writes the words ante­cedent to his writing of it, as is plain in the instances produced by Crellius; but according to his sense of Christs expiati­on of sin, it was yet to come after Christs entrance into Heaven, and so it should have been more properly [...], than [...]; not I say to insist upon that, the Apostle manifests, that he had a respect to the death of Christ in the obtaining this eternal redemption, by his following dis­course: for v. 14. he compares the blood of Christ in point of efficacy for expiati­on of sin, with the blood of the Legal Sa­crifices: whereas if the expiation meant by him had been found by Christs Obla­tion of himself in Heaven, he would have compared Christs entrance into Heaven in order to it, with the entrance of the High-Priest into the Holy of Holies, and his argu­ment had run thus. For if the High-Priest [Page 546] under the Law did expiate sins by entring into the Holy of Holies; How much more shall the Son of God entring into Heaven expiate the sins of Mankind: but we see the Apostle had no sooner mention'd the redemption obtained for us; but he pre­sently speaks of the efficacy of the blood of Christ in order to it, and as plainly asserts the same, v. 15. And for this cause he is the Mediator of the New Testament that by means of death, for the redemption of the transgressions which were under the first Testa­ment, they which are called might receive the promise of eternal inheritance. Why doth the Apostle here speak of the [...], the expiation of sins by the means of death; if he had so lately asserted be­fore that the redemption or expiation was found not by his death, but by his entrance into Heaven? and withall the Apostle here doth not speak of such a kind of expia­tion as wholly respects the future, but of sins that were under the first Testament, not barely such as could not be expiated by vertue of it, but such as were committed during the time of it, although the Levi­tical Law allowed no expiation for them. And to confirm this sense, the Apostle doth not go on to prove the necessity of Christs [Page 547] entrance into Heaven; but of his dying, v. 16, 17, 18. But granting that he doth allude to the High-Priests entring into the Holy of holies, yet that was but the representati­on of a Sacrifice already offer'd, and he could not be said to find expiation by his entrance; but that was already found by the blood of the Sacrifice, and his entrance was only to accomplish the end for which the blood was offer'd up in sacrifice. And the benefit which came to men is attribu­ted to the Sacrifice, and not to the sprink­ling of the blood before the Mercy-seat: and whatever effect was consequent upon his entrance into the Sanctuary, was by ver­tue of the blood which he carried in with him, and was before shed at the Al­tar. Neither can it with any reason be said, that if the redemption were obtain­ed by the blood of Christ, there could be no need of his entrance into Heaven; since we do not make the Priesthood of Christ to expire at his death; but that he is in Heaven a mercifull High-Priest in nego­tiating the affairs of his People with God, and there ever lives to make interces­sion for them.

[Page 548] Crellius answers, That granting the Aorist being put before the Verb [...] should im­ply §. 10. No distin­ction in Scripture of the ef­fects of Christs en­trance in­to Heaven from his sitting at the right hand of God. such an action which was antecedent to Christs sitting at the right hand of God, yet it is not there said, that the expiation of sins was made before Christs entrance into Heaven; for those, saith he, are to be con­sidered as two different things; for a Prince first enters into his Palace, before he sits upon his throne. And therefore, saith he, Christ may be said to have made expiation of sins before he sate down at the right hand of his Father, not that it was done by his death, but by his entrance into Heaven, and offer­ing Crell. c. 10. sect. 50. p. 537. himself to God there, by which means he obtained his sitting on the right hand of the Majesty on high, and thereby the full pow­er of remission of sins, and giving eternal life. To which I answer, 1. That the Scripture never makes such a distinction between Christs entrance into Heaven, and sitting at the right hand of God; which latter imply­ing no more but the glorious state of Christ in Heaven, his entrance into Heaven doth imply it: For therefore God exalted him to be a Prince and a Saviour; and the rea­son of the power and authority given him in Heaven is no where attributed to [Page 549] his entrance into it as the means of it; but our Saviour before that tells us that all power and authority was committed to Matth. 28. 18. him; and his very entrance into Heaven was a part of his glory; and given him in consideration of his sufferings; as the Apostle plainly asserts; and he became obe­dient to death, even the death of the Cross, Phil. 2. 8, 9. wherefore God hath highly exalted him, &c. There can be then no imaginable reason to make the entrance of Christ into Hea­ven, and presenting himself to God there, a condition or means of obtaining that power and authority which is implyed in his sitting at the right hand of God. 2. Sup­posing, we should look on these as distinct, there is as little reason to attribute the expiation of sin to his entrance, consi­dered as distinct from the other: For the expiation of sins in Heaven being by Crel­lius himself confessed to be by the exer­cise of Christs power, and this being only the means to that power, how could Christ expiate sins by that power which he had not? But of this I have spoken before, and shewed that in no sense allow­ed by themselves the expiation of sins can be attributed to the entrance of Christ into Heaven as distinct from his sitting at [Page 550] the right hand of God. Thus much may suffice to prove, that those effects of an Expiatory Sacrifice, which do respect the sins committed, do properly agree to the death of Christ.

I now come to that which respects the person, considered as obnoxious to the §. 11. Of the Atone­ment made by Christs death. wrath of God by reason of his sins; and so the effect of an Expiatory Sacrifice is Atonement and Reconciliation. By the wrath of God, I mean, the reason which God hath from the holiness and justice of his nature, to punish sin in those who com­mit it: by the means of Atonement and Re­conciliation, I mean, that in consideration of which, God is willing to release the sinner from the obligation to punishment he lies under by the Law of God, and to receive him into favour, upon the terms which are declared by the Doctrine of Christ. And that the death of Christ was such a means of Atonement and Reconcilia­tion for us, I shall prove by those places of Scripture which speak of it. But Crel­lius would seem to acknowledge, That if Grotius seem to contend for no more, than Crell. c. 7. sect. 3. that Christ did avert that wrath of God which men had deserved by their sins, they [Page 551] would willingly yield him all that he pleads for: but then he adds, That this deliverance from the wrath to come, is not by the death, but by the power of Christ. So that the que­stion is, Whether the death of Christ were the means of Atonement and Reconcilia­tion between God and us? and yet Crel­lius would seem willing to yield too, that the death of Christ may be said to avert the wrath of God from us, as it was a conditi­on in order to it; for in that sense it had no more influence upon it than his birth had: but we have already seen, that the Scri­pture attributes much more to the death and blood of Christ, in order to the expia­tion of sin. We do not deny, that the death of Christ may be called a condition, as the performance of any thing in order to an end, may be called the condition upon which that thing is to be obtained; but we say, that it is not a bare condition, but such a one as implies a consideration, upon which the thing is obtained, being such as answers the end of him that grants it: by which means it doth propitiate or atone him, who had before just reason to punish, but is now willing to forgive and be reconciled to them, who have so high­ly offended him. And in this sense we [Page 552] assert, that Christ is said to be [...], a propitiation for our sins, 1 John 2. 2.—4. 10. which we take in the same sense that [...] is saken for the Sin-offering for Atone­ment. Ezek. 44. 27. [...], they shall offer a sin-offering; for so [...] there signi­fies: and in the same sense [...] is taken, Ezek. 45. 19. and the Ram for Atonement is call'd [...], Numb. 5. 8. And thence the High-Priest when he made an Atone­ment, is said [...], 2 Maccab. 3. 33. which is of the greater consequence to us, because Crellius would not have the sense Crell 7. sect. 10. either of [...] or [...], to be taken from the common use of the word in the Greek Tongue; but from that which some call the Helle­nistical use of it; viz. That which is used in the Greek of the New Testament, out of the LXX. and the Apocryphal Greek; in both which we have found the word [...] in a sense fully correspondent to what we plead for. But he yet urges, and takes a great deal of pains to prove, that [...] and [...] do not always signifie to be appeased by another; but sometimes signifies to be propi­tious and merciful in pardoning; and some­times to expiate, and then signifies the same with [...] and [...]: which if it be granted, proves nothing against us, having [Page 553] already proved, that those words do sig­ [...]ifie the aversion of the wrath of God by a [...]crifice, and that there is no reason to [...]cede from that signification, when they [...]e applied to the blood of Christ. And [...]e do not contend, that when the word [...] or [...] is applied to him that [...]oth forgive, it doth imply appeasing; [...]t the effect of it, which is pardoning; [...]ut that which we assert, is, that when [...] is applied to a third person, or a thing [...]ade use of in order to forgiveness, then [...]e say it signifies the propitiating him that as justly displeased: so as by what was [...]one or suffered for that end, he is wil­ [...]g to pardon what he had just reason to [...]nish. So Moses is said, to make Atone­ [...]ent for the people by his prayers, [...], Exod. 34. 14. and we [...]ay see Vers. 11. how much God was [...]spleased before. And Moses besought the [...]ord his God, and said, Why doth thy wrath [...]x hot against thy people: and Vers. 12. [...]rn from thy fierce wrath, and repent of [...]is evil against thy people: and then it is [...]id, Vers. 14. The Lord was atoned for the [...]il which he thought to do unto his people. would therefore willingly know, why [...]oses might not here properly be said, [Page 554] [...], as it is said, [...], and therefore since it i [...] so very often said in the Levitical Law [...] and [...], as [...], and the accusative cas [...] scarce ever put but in two cases; (viz When these words are applied to i [...] animate things, as the Altar, &c. or whe [...] to God himself, implying forgiveness) wh [...] reason can we assign more probable fo [...] this different construction, then that whe [...] [...] is used, the verb hath a respect t [...] the offended party as the accusative u [...] derstood? as Christ is said in the place mentioned to be [...], whic [...] ought in reason to be understood as thos [...] words after Moses his intercession, [...]. But Crellius asks, W [...] then do we never read once concerning t [...] Priest, that he did, [...] or [...], but we read that he did [...], and God is sai [...] [...]. To this I answer 1. That the reason why the person pr [...] pitiated, is not expressed, is, because [...] was so much taken for granted, that th [...] whole Institution of Sacrifices did im­mediately respect God, and therefore the [...] was no danger of mistaking, concernin [...] [Page 555] the person who was to be atoned. 2. I [...]onder Crellius can himself produce no [...]stance where [...] is used [...]ith respect to the Sacrifices, and the person whose offences are remitted by the Atonement; but where [...] hath a [...]elation to that, it is still joyned with a Preposition relating, either to the person [...] to the offences; if no more were un­derstood when it is so used, then when God [...]imself is said to do it, why is not the phrase [...], as well said of the Priest, as it is of God? From whence Grotius his sense of Hebr. 2. 17. [...] for [...], is far more agreeable to the use of the phrase in the Old Testament, than that which Crellius would put upon it. Therefore since the [...] is attributed to Christ, we ought to take it in the sense pro­per to a Propitiatory Sacrifice: so it is said by Moses, where God is left out, but is necessarily understood, after the people had provoked God by their Ido­latry; Ye have sinned'a great sin: And now I will go up unto the Lord, [...], That I may make an Atonement for your sin: What way could Moses be said to make this Atonement, but by propitiating [Page 556] God; yet his name is not there expressed, but necessarily understood. So [...] is used in the most proper sense for appeasing the anger of a person, Gen 32. 20. and [...], 2 Sam. 21. 3 which places have been already insisted on, in the signification of the word [...]. And that those places wherein Christ is said to be a propitiation for our sins, are ca­pable of no other sense, will appear from the consideration of Christ, as a middle person between God and us; and there­fore his being [...], cannot be parallel with that phrase, where God himself is said, [...], for Christ is here considered as interposing be­tween God and us, as Moses and the Priests under the Law did between God and the people, in order to the averting his wrath from them. And when one doth thus interpose in order to the Atone­ment of the offended party, something is always supposed to be done or suffered by him, as the means of that Atonement. As Jacob supposed the present he made to his Brother would propitiate him; and David appeased the Gibeonites by the death of Sauls Sons, both which are said [...]. So the shedding of the blood of Sacrifices be­fore [Page 557] and under the Law, was the means of atoning God for the sins they commit­ted. What reason can there be then why so receiv'd a sense of Atonement, both among the Jews, and all other Nations at that time when these words were writ­ten, must be forsaken; and any other sense be embraced, which neither agrees with the propriety of the expression, nor with so many other places of Scripture, which make the blood of Christ to be a Sacrifice for the Expiation of sin?