CHAP. I.

HE that imposeth any matter of Opinion upon the § 1. belief of others, without giving Evidence of Rea­son for it, proportionable to the confidence of his Assertion, must either suppose the thing pro­pounded, to carry such unquestionable Credenti­als of Truth and Reason with it, that none who know what [Page 2] they mean can deny it entertainment; or else that his own understanding hath attained to so great perfection, as to have authority sufficient to oblige all others to follow it. This latter cannot be presumed among any who have asserted the freedom of their own understandings, from the dictates of an Infallible Chair: but if any should forget themselves so far as to think so, there needs no other argument to prove them not to be Infallible in their Assertions, then this one Asser­tion, that they are infallible; it being an undoubted Evidence that they are actually deceived▪ who know so little the measure of their own understandings. The former can never be pretend­ed in any thing which is a matter of Controversie among men, who have not wholly forgot they are Reasonable Creatures, by their bringing probable arguments for the maintaining one part of an opinion as well as another. In which case, though the Arguments brought be not convincing for the necessary enter­taining either part to an unbiassed understanding, yet the dif­ference of their Opinions is Argument sufficient, that the thing contended for is not so clear as both parties would make it to be on their own side; and if it be not a thing of necessity to sal­vation, it gives men ground to think, that a final decision of the matter in controversie, was never intended as a necessary means for the Peace and Unity of the Church of God. For we cannot with any shew of reason imagine, that our Supreme Law giver and Saviour, who hath made it a necessary duty in all true mem­bers of his Church, to endeavour after the Peace and Unity of it, should suspend the performance of that duty upon a matter of Opinion, which when men have used their utmost endeavors to satisfie themselves about, they yet find, that those very grounds which they are most inclinable to build their Judge­ments upon, are either wholly rejected by others, as wise and able as themselves; or else, it may be, they erect a far different Fabrick upon the very same foundations. It is no ways con­sistent with the Wisdom of Christ in founding his Church, and providing for the Peace and Settlement of it, to leave it at the mercy of mens private judgments, and apprehensions of things, than which nothing more uncertain, and thereby make it to depend upon a condition never like to be attained in this world, which is the agreement and Uniformity of mens Opini­ons. [Page 3] For as long as mens faces differ, their judgements will. And until there be an Intellectus Averroisticus, the same un­derstanding in all persons, we have little ground to hope for such an Universal Harmony in the Intellectual World; and yet even then the Soul might pass a different judgement upon the colours of things, according to the different tincture of the several Optick-Glasses in particular bodies, which it takes a prospect of things through. Reason and Experience then give us little hopes of any peace in the Church, if the unity of mens judgements be supposed the condition of it: the next inquiry then is, how the Peace of the Church shall be attained or preserved, when men are under such different perswasions; especially if they respect the means, in order to a Peace and Settlement. For the ways to Peace, like the fertile soils of Greece, have been oft-times the occasion of the greatest quar­rels. And no sickness is so dangerous as that when men are sick of their remedy, and nauseate that most which tends to their recovery. But while Physitians quarrel about the Method of Cure, the Patient languisheth under their hands; and when men increase Contentions in the behalf of Peace, while they seem to Court it, they destroy it. The only way left for the Churches Settlement and Peace under such variety of apprehensions concerning the Means and Method, in order to it, is to pitch upon such a foundation, if possible to be found out, whereon the different Parties retaining their private ap­prehensions, may yet be agreed to carry on the same work in common, in order to the Peace and Tranquillity of the Church of God. Which cannot be by leaving all absolutely to follow their own ways; for that were to build a Babel instead of Salem, Confusion instead of Peace; it must be then by convincing men, that neither of those ways to peace and order, which they contend about, is necessary by way of Divine Command, (though some be as a means to an end) but which particular way or form it must be, is wholly left to the prudence of those in whose Power and Trust it is to see the Peace of the Church be secured on lasting Foundations. How neerly this concerns the present Debate about the Govern­ment of the Church, any one may quickly discern. The main Plea for Forms of Government in the Church, is their [Page 4] necessity, in order to its Peace and Order, and yet nothing hath produced more disorder and confusion then our Disputes about it have done. And our sad experience still tells us, that, after all our Debates, and the Evidences brought on either side, men yet continue under very different apprehensions concerning it. But if we more strictly enquire into the causes of the great Distances and Animosities which have risen upon this Controversie, we shall find it hath not been so much the difference of Judgements concerning the Primitive Form of Government, which hath divided men so much from one another, as the prevalency of Faction and Interest in those whose Revenues have come from the Rents of the Church, and among others of greater Integrity it hath been the Prin­ciple or Hypothesis which men are apt to take for granted, without proving it; viz. that it is in no case lawful to vary from that Form, which by obscure and uncertain conjectures, they conceive to have been the Primitive Practice. For here­by men look upon themselves as obliged by an unalterable Law, to endeavour the Establishment of that Idea of Govern­ment, which oft-times Affection and Interest, more then Reason and Judgement, hath formed within them; and so likewise bound to over throw any other Form not suitable to those Cor­respondencies which they are already engaged to maintain. If this then were the Cause of the Wounds and Breaches this day among us, the most successful Weapon-salve to heal them, will be, to anoint the Sword which hath given the Wound, by a seasonable inquiry into the Nature and Obligation of par­ticular Forms of Government in the Church. The main Sub­ject then of our present Debate will be, Whether any one par­ticular Form of Church Government be setled upon an unal­terable Divine Right; by virtue whereof all Churches are bound perpetually to observe that Individual Form? or, whe­ther it be left to the Prudence of every particular Church to agree upon that Form of Government which it judgeth most conducible within its self to attain the end of Government, the Peace, Order, Tranquillity, and Settlement of the Church. If this latter be made fully appear, it is then evident that, how­ever mens judgements may differ concerning the Primitive Form of Government, there is yet a sure ground for [Page 5] men to proceed on in order to the Churches Peace. Which one Consideration will be motive sufficient to justifie an attempt of this Nature, it being a Design of so great Importance, as the recovery of an advantagious piece of ground, whereon Dif­ferent Parties may with safety not only treat, but agree in or­der to a speedy Accommodation.

We come therefore closely to the business in hand, and, for §. 2. the better clearing of our passage, we shall first discuss the Nature of a Divine Right, and shew whereon an unalterable Divine Right must be founded, and then proceed to shew how far any Form of Government in the Church is setled upon such a Right. Right in the general is a relative thing, and the signi­fication [...] Arist E­thic. l. 5. c. 6▪ and import of it must be taken from the respect it bears to the Law which gives it. For although in common acception it be often understood to be the same with the Law its self, as it is the rule of actions (in which sense Ius naturae, genti­um, civile, is taken for the several Laws of Nature, Nations, and particular States) yet I say Ius, and so Right, is properly some­thing accruing to a person by virtue of that Law which is made, and so jus naturae is that right which every man is invested in by the Law of Nature, which is properly jus personae, and is by some call'd jus activum, which is defined by Grotius to be Qualitas moralis personae competens ad aliquid juste habendum aut agendum▪ by Lessius to be Potestas Legitima ad rem ali­quam Grot. de ju­re b [...]lli & pac. lib. 1. cap. 1. Sect. 4. L [...]ss. de justit. & jure l. 2. c. 2. Dub. 1. Etymol. Philol. voc. jus. obtinendam, &c. So that by these descriptions, Right is that Power which a man hath by Law to do, have, or obtain any thing. But the most full description of it is given by Martinius, that it is adhaerens personae necessitas vel potestas recta ad aliquid agendum, omittendum, aut permittendum, that where­by any person lies under a necessity of doing, omitting or suf­fering a thing to be, or else hath a lawful authority of do­ing, &c. For we are to consider that there is a two-fold Right, either such whereby a man hath Liberty and Freedom by the Law to do any thing; or such whereby it becomes a mans necessary duty to do any thing. The opening of the diffe­rence Etymol. l. 5. cap. 3. of these two, and the different influences they have upon persons and things, is very useful to our present purpose: Ius then is first that which is justum; so Isidore, Ius dictum quia justum est. So what ever is just, men have right to do it: [Page 6] Now a thing may be said to be just either more generally, as it signifies any thing which is lawful, or in a more restrained sense, when it implies something that is equal and due to ano­ther. So Aristotle distributes [...] into [...]. Ethic. l. 5. cap. 2. The former sense of it is here only pertinent, as it implies any thing which may be done according to Law, that is, done jure, because a man hath right to do it. In order to this we are to observe, that an express Positive Command is not ne­cessary to make a thing lawful, but a non-prohibition by a Law is sufficient for that. For it being the Nature of Laws to bound up mens Rights, what is not forbidden by the Law is thereby supposed to be left in mens power still to do it. So that it is to little purpose for men to seek for Positive Commands for every particular action to make it lawful; it sufficeth to make any action lawful, if there be no Bar made by any direct or consequential prohibition; unless it be in such things whose lawfulness and goodness depend upon a meer Positive Com­mand. For in those things which are therefore only good, because commanded, a Command is necessary to make them lawful, as in immediate positive acts of Worship towards God; in which nothing is lawful any further then it is found­ed upon a Divine Command. I speak not of Circumstances belonging to the Acts of Worship, but whatever is looked upon as a part of Divine Worship, if it be not commanded by God himself, it is no ways acceptable to him, and therefore not law­ful. Mat. 15 9. Isa. 29. 11. So our Saviour cites that out of the Prophet▪ In vain do they worship me, teaching for Doctrines the commandments of men, which the Chaldee Paraphrast and Syriack version render thus, Reverentia quam mihi exhibent est ex praecepto & documento humano, plainly imputing the reason of Gods re­jecting their worship, to the want of a Divine Command for Tertull. de Orat. cap. 12 v. Herald. digress. lib. 2. cap. 2. in Tertull. what they did. And therefore Tertullian condemns all those things to be vacuae observationis & superstitioni deputanda, as superstitious, which are done sine ulli [...]s Dominici a [...]t Aposto­lici praecepti autoritate, without the Warrant of Divine Com­mand. Although even here we may say too, that it is not meerly the want of a Divine Precept which makes any part of Divine Worship uncommanded by God unlawful, but the General Prohibition, that nothing should be done in the imme­diate [Page 7] Worship of God, but what we have a Divine Command for. However, in matters of meer Dece [...]cy and Order in the Church of God, or in any other civil action of the lives of men, it is enough to make things lawful, if they are not for­bidden. But against this, that a Non-prohibition is warrant enough to make any thing lawful, this Objection will be soon leavied, that it is an Argument ab authoritate negativè, and therefore is of no force: To which I answer▪ that the Rule, if taken without limitation, upon which this Objection is found­ed, is not true; for although an Argument ab authoritate nega­tivè, as to matter of Fact avails not, yet the Negative, from Au­thority, as to matter of Law and Command, is of great force and strength. I grant the Argument holds not here; we do not read that ever Christ or his Apostles did such a thing, therefore it is not to be done; but this, we read of no Law or Precept commanding us to do it, therefore it is not unlawful not to do it; and we read of no Prohibition forbidding us to do it, there­fore it may be lawfully done; this holds true and good, and that upon this two-fold Reason. First, From Gods Intention in making known his Will; which was not to record every particular fact done by himself, or Christ, or his Apostles, but it was to lay down those general and standing Laws, whereby his Church in all Ages should be guided and ruled: And in order to a perpetual obligation upon the Consciences, there must be a sufficient promulgation of those Laws which must bind men. Thus in the case of Infant-Baptism, it is a very weak unconcluding Argument to say that Infants must not be baptized, because we never read that Christ or his Apostles did it; for this is a Negative in matter of Fact; but on the other side, it is an Evidence that Infants are not to be excluded from Baptism, because there is no Divine Law which doth prohibit their admission into the Church by it; for this is the Negative of a Law; and if it had been Christs intention to have excluded any from admissi­on into the Church, who were admitted before as In­sants were, there must have been some positive Law whereby such an Intention of Christ should have been expressed; For nothing can make that unlawful which was a duty before, but a direct and express Prohibition from the Legislator himself▪ [Page 8] who alone hath power to re [...]cind as well as to make Laws. And therefore Antipaedobaptists must, instead of requiring a Positive Command for baptizing Infants, themselves produce an express Prohibition excluding them, or there can be no ap­pearance of Reason given, why the Gospel should exclude any from those priviledges, which the Law admitted them to. Secondly, I argue from the intention and end of Laws, which is to circumscribe and restrain the Natural Liberty of man, by binding him to the observation of some particular Precepts. And therefore where there is not a particular Command and Prohibition, it is in Nature and Reason supposed that men are left to their Natural freedom; as is plain in Positive Hu­mane Laws; wherein men by compact and agreement for their mutual good in Societies, were willing to restrain them­selves from those things which should prejudice the good of the Community; this being the ground of mens first inclosing their Rights and common Priviledges, it must be supposed, that what is not so inclosed, is left common to all as their just Right and Priviledge still. So it is in Divine Positive Laws, God intending to bring some of Mankind to happiness, by con­ditions of his own appointing, hath laid down many Positive Precepts, binding men to the practise of those things as duties which are commanded by him. But where we find no Com­mand for performance, we cannot look upon that as an imme­diate duty, because of the necessary relation between Duty and Law; and so where we find no Prohibition, there we can have no ground to think that men are debarred from the liberty of doing things not forbidden. For as we say of Exceptions, as to General Laws and Rules, that an Exception expressed firmat regulam in non exceptis, makes the Rule stronger in things not expressed as excepted; so it is as to Divine Prohibitions; as to the Positives, that those Prohibitions we read in Scripture make other things not-prohibited to be therefore lawful, because not expresly forbidden. As Gods forbidding Adam to taste of the fruit of one Tree, did give him a liberty to taste of all the rest. Indeed, had not God at all revealed his Will and Laws to us by his Word, there might have been some Plea why men should have waited for particular Revelati­ons to dictate the goodness or evil of particular actions, not [Page 9] determined by the law of nature; but since God hath re­vealed his will, there can be no reason given why those things should not be lawful to do, which God hath not thought fit to forbid men the doing of. Further we are to observe, that in these things which are thus undetermined in reference to an obligation to duty, but left to our natural liberty as things lawful, the contrary to that which is thus lawful, is not there­by made unlawful. But both parts are left in mens power to do, or not to do them; as is evident in all those things which carry a general equity with them, and are therefore consonant to the Law of Nature, but have no particular obli­gation, as not flowing immediately from any dictate of the natural Law. Thus community of goods is lawful by the law and principles of nature; yet every man hath a lawful right to his goods by dominion and propriety. And in a state of Commu­nity it was the right of every man to impropriate upon a just equality, supposing a preceding compact and mutual agree­ment. Whence it is that some of the School-men say, that although the Law of Nature be immutable, as to its precepts and prohibitions, yet not as to its demonstrations (as they call them;) as, Do as you would be done to, binds always indispen­sably; but, that in a state of nature all things are common to all, This is true, but it binds not men to the necessary observance Alex. A­lensis. part. 3. q. 27. m. 3. of it. These which they call Demonstrations are only such things as are agreeable to nature, but not particularly com­manded by any indispensable precept of it. Thus likewise it is agreeable to nature, that the next of the kindred should be heir to him who dies intestate; but he may lawfully wave his interest if he please. Now to apply this to our present case; According to this sense of jus for that which is law­ful, those things may be said to be jure divino, which are not determined one way or other by any positive Law of God, but are left wholly, as things lawful, to the prudence of men to determine them, in a way agreeable to natural light, and the general Rules of the Word of God. In which sense I assert any particular form of Government agreed on by the Gover­nours of the Church, consonant to the general Rules of Scripture, to be by Divine Right, i. e. God by his own Laws hath given men a power and liberty to determine the particu­lar [Page 10] form of Church-Government among them. And hence it may appear, that though one form of Government be agree­able to the Word, it doth not follow that another is not; or, because one is lawful, another is unlawful: but one form may be more agreeable to some parts, places, people and times, then others are. In which case that form of Government is to be setled which is most agreeable to the present state of a place, and is most advantagiously conducible to the promo­ting the ends of Church-Government in that place or Nation. I conclude then according to this sense of jus, that the Ratio regiminis Ecclesiastici is juris divini naturalis, that is, that the reason of Church-Government is immutable, and holds in all times and places, which is the preservation of the peace and unity of the Church; but the modus regiminis Ecclesiastici, the particular form of that Government is juris divini permissivi, that both the Laws of God and Nature have left it to the Pru­dence of particular Churches to determine it. This may be cleared by a parallel Instance. The reason and the Science of Physick is immutable, but the particular prescriptions of that Science are much varied, according to the different tempers of Patients. And the very same reason in Physick which pre­scribes one sort of Physick to one, doth prescribe a different sort to another, because the temper or disease of the one calls for a different method of cure; yet the ground and end of both prescriptions was the very same, to recover the Patient from his distemper. So I say in our present case; the ground and reason of Government in the Church is unalterable by divine right; yea, and that very reason which determines the particu­lar forms: but yet, these particular forms flowing from that immutable reason, may be very different in themselves, and may alter according to the several circumstances of times, and places, and persons, for the more commodious advan­cing the main end of Government. As in morality there can be but one thing to a man in genere summi boni, as the chief good, quò tendit & in quod dirigit aroum—to which he re­fers all other things; yet there may be many things in genere boni conducentis, as means in order to attaining that end. So though Church-Government vary not as to the ground, end, and reason of it; yet it may, as to the particular forms of it: [Page 11] As is further evident, as to forms of Civil Government: though the end of all be the same; yet Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy, are in themselves lawful means for the attaining the same common end. And as Alensis determines it, in the case of Community of goods by the Law of Nature, that the same reason of the Law of Nature which did dictate Commu­nity of goods to be most suitable to man in the state of Inno­cency, did in his faln estate prescribe a propriety of goods, as most agreeable to it; so that herein the modus observanti [...] dissered, but the ratio praecepti was the same still; which was mans comfortable enjoyment of the Accommodations of life: which in Innocency might have been best done by Community; but in mans degenerate condition, must be by a Propriety. So the same reason of Church-Government may call for an Equality in the persons, acting as Governours of the Church in one place, which may call for Superiority and subordina­tion in another.

Having now dispatched the first sense of a Divine Right, §. 3. I come to the other, which is the main seat of the Controversie, and therefore will require a longer debate. And so jus is that which makes a thing to become a duty: so jus quasi jussum, and jussa jura, as Festus explains it, i. e. that whereby a thing is not only licitum, in mens lawful power to do it or no, but is made d [...]bitum, and is constituted a duty by the force and virtue of a Divine Command. Now mans obligation to any thing as a duty, doth suppose on the part of him from whose authority he derives his obligation, both legislation and promulgation. First there must be a Legislative Power commanding it; which if it respects only the outward actions of a man in a Nation imbodied by Laws, is the supreme Magistrate; but if the obli­gation respect the consciences of all men directly and im­mediately, then none have the power to settle any thing by way of an universal standing Law, but God himself: Who by being sole Creator and Governour of the World, hath alone absolute and independent Dominion and Authority over the souls of men. But besides Legislation, another thing necessary to mans obligation to duty, is, a sufficient promulgation of the Law made; Because though before this there be the ground of obedience on mans part to all Gods Commands, yet there [Page 12] must be a particular Declaration of the Laws, whereby man is bound in order to the determination of Mans duty. Which in Positives is so absolutely necessary, that unless there be a sufficient promulgation and declaration of the will of the Law-giver, mans ignorance is excusable in reference to them; and so frees from guilt and the obligation to punishment. But it is otherwise in reference to the dictates of the natural Law, wherein though man be at a loss for them, yet his own con­tracted pravity being the cause of his blindness, leaves him without excuse. Hence it is said with good reason, that though man under the Moral Law, was bound to obey Go­spel-precepts, as to the reason and substance of the duties by them commanded, as Faith, Repentance from dead works, and New Obedience; yet a more full and particular revelati­on by the Gospel was necessary, for the particular determina­tion of the general acts of obedience, to particular objects under their several Modifications expressed in the Gospel. And therefore Faith and Repentance under the Moral Law, taken as a transcript of the Law of Nature, were required under their general notion as acts of obedience, but not in that particular relation which those acts have under the Co­venant of Grace. Which particular determination of the general acts to special objects under different respects, some call New Precepts of the Gospel, others New Light; but taking that light as it hath an influence upon the consciences of men, the difference is so small, that it deserves not to be named a Controversie.

But that which I am now clearing is this, that whatsoever binds Christians as an universal standing Law, must be clearly revealed as such, and laid down in Scripture in such evident terms, as all who have their senses exercised therein, may discern it to have been the will of Christ, that it should per­petually oblige all believers to the Worlds end, as is clear in the case of Baptism, and the Lords Supper. But here I shall add one thing by way of caution; That there is not the same necessity for a particular and clear revelation in the alterati­on of a Law unrepealed in some circumstances of it, as there is for the establishing of a New Law. As to the former, viz. the change of a standing Law as to some particular cir­cumstance, [Page 13] a different practice by persons guided by an infal­lible spirit is sufficient; which is the case as to the observati­on of the Lords day under the Gospel: For the fourth Com­mand standing in force as to the Morality of it, a different practice by the Apostles may be sufficient for the particular determination of the more ritual and occasional part of it, which was the limitation of the observation of it to that cer­tain day. So likewise that other Law standing in force, that persons taken into Covenant with God should be admitted by some visible sign, Apostolical practice, clearly manifested, may be sufficient ground to conclude what the mind of Christ was, as to the application of it to particular persons; and what qualifications are requisite in such as are capable of ad­mission, as in the case of Infants. Whereby it is clear why there is no particular Law or command in reference to them under the Gospel, because it was only the application of a Law in force already to particular persons, which might be ga­thered sufficiently from the Apostles practice, the Analogy of the dispensation, the equal reason of exclusion under the Law, and yet notwithstanding the continual admission of them then into the same Gospel-Govenant; Circumcision being Rom. 4. 8. the Seal of the Righteousness of Faith. But this by the way, to prevent mistakes. We must now by parity of reason say, that either the former Law, in those things wherein it was not typical, must hold in reference to the form of. Government in the Church of Christ; or else that Christ by an universal Law hath setled all order in Church Government among the Pastors themselves; or else that he hath left it to the prudence of every particular Church, to determine its own form of Government, which I conceive is the direct state of the Que­stion about Divine Right, viz. Whether the particular form of Government in the Church be setled by an universal bind­ing Law or no?

But for a further clearing the state of the Question, we §. 4. must consider what it is that makes an unalterable Divine Right, or a standing Law in the Church of God: for those who found forms of Government upon a Divine Right, do not plead a Law in express terms, but such things from whence a Divine Right by Law may be inferred. Which I [Page 14] now come to examine; and that which I lay down as a Postu­latum, or a certain conclusion according to which I shall ex­amine others [...]ssertions concerning Divine Right, is, That nothing is founded upon a Divine Right, nor can bind Chri­stians directly or consequentially as a positive Law, but what may be certainly known to have come from God, with an in­tention to oblige Believers to the worlds end. For either we must say, it binds Christians as a Law when God did not intend it should; or else Gods intentions to bind all Believers by it, must be clearly manifested. Now then, so many ways and no more as a thing may be known to come from God with an intention to oblige all perpetually, a thing may be said to be of an unalterable Divine Right; and those can be no more then these two; Either by the Law of Nature, or by some positive Law of God: Nothing else can bind universally and perpetually but one of these two, or by virtue of them, as shall be made appear. I begin with the Law of Nature. The Law of Nature binds indispensably, as it depends not upon any arbitrary constitutions, but is founded upon the in­trinsecal nature of good and evil in the things themselves, antecedently to any positive Declaration of Gods Will. So that till the nature of good and evil be changed, that Law is unalterable as to its obligation. When, I say, the Law of Nature is indispensable, my meaning is, that in those things which immediately flow from that Law by way of precept, as the three first Commands of the Moral Law, no man can by any positive Law be exempted from his obligation to do them; neither by any abrogation of the Laws themselves, nor by de­rogation from them, nor interpretation of them, nor change in the object, matter, or circumstance, whatsoever it be. Now although the formal reason of mans obedience to the pre­cepts of this Law, be the conformity▪ which the things com­manded have to the Divine Nature and goodness, yet I con­ceive the efficient cause of mans obligation to these things, is to be fetched from the Will, Command, and Pleasure of God: Not as it is taken for an arbitrary positive will, but as it is exe­cutive of Divine purposes, and as it ingraves such a Law up­on the hearts of men. For notwithstanding mans Reason, con­sidered in it self, be the chiefest instrument of discovery what [Page 15] are these necessary duties of humane nature (in which sense Aristotle defines a Natural Law to be that which [...], hath every where the same force and strength, Ethic. l. 5. cap. 10. i. e. as Andronicus Rhodius very well interprets it, [...], among all that have the free use of their reason and facul­ties) yet I say, it is not bare Reason which binds men to the doing of those things commanded in that Law, but as it is expressive of an Eternal Law, and deduceth its obligation from thence. And so this Law, if we respect the rise, extent, and immutability of it, may be call'd deservedly the Law of V. Selden. de jure Nat. apud▪ Eb [...]ae lib. 1. c. 7 & 8. Mol. de just & Iur. p. 1 disp. 3. Alphons. de leg. pur▪ l. 2. c. 14. Nature; but if we look at the emanation, efflux, and origi­nal of it, it is a Divine Law, and so it is call'd by Molina, Al­phonsus à Castr [...], and others. For the sanction of this Law of Nature, as well as others, depends upon the Will of God, and therefore the obligation must come from him, it being in the power of no other to punish for the breach of a Law, but those who had the Legislative Power to cause the obligation to it. It appears then from hence, that whatever by just con­sequence can be deduced from the preceptive Law of Nature, is of Divine Right, because from the very nature of that Law (it being indispensable) it appears that God had an intent to oblige all persons in the world by it.

The second way whereby we may know what is of Divine §. 5. Right, is by Gods positive Laws; for God being the Su­preme Governour of the World, hath the Legislative Power in his hands, to bind to the performance of what duties be please, which carry no repugnancy in them to his Divine Na­ture and Goodness. Hence arise all those positive Laws of God which we have in Scripture; for God's end in his writ­ten Law was, that man should have a Copy of all Divine con­stitutions by him, that he might therein read what his duty was toward his Maker. The Precepts of the Law of Nature, are by the Jews call'd▪ [...] and [...] absolutely, with­out any addition; because they are of such things as do per­petually bind, which because they are known to all by natu­ral light, they sometimes call them [...] praecepta scientia; and being that their righteousness is so evident and apparent, they call them [...] verba rectitudinis: [Page 16] but the clearest difference between the precepts of the Law of Nature, and other positive commands, is that which the fa­mous Is. Casaubon takes notice of out of the Jewish Doctors. Exercit. Eccles. ad­vers. Ba [...]. exer. 16. sect. 43. Observant doctissimi è Rabbinis, inter [...] & [...] han [...] esse differentiam, quod Mitsvoth, sive pr [...]ceptorum ratio aperta est, ut, Deum cole, Honora patrem & matrem; at Chukim, statu­ta sive decreta earum rerum esse dicunt quarum [...] ratio soli Deo sit nota, ut Circumcisionis & similium. The reason of the Laws of Nature is evident, but of positive Laws there is no reason to be given [...] non est alia S [...]id. de jure Nat. apud Ebr. l. 1. cap. 10. praeter decretum regis, no other account to be given of them but the will of God. The Laws of Nature are by the LXX. often call'd [...], and so used, Rom. 2. 16. by Iustin Martyr, [...]. by Iosephus, [...] Colloq. [...]um Tryph. Ju­d [...]o. Ori­gin. lib. 16. cap. 10. V. G [...]ot. in Luc. 1. 6. but Gods positive Laws are call'd [...]: thence we read of Zachary and Elizabeth, Luke 1. 6. [...], &c. walking in all the Ordi­nances and Commandments of God blameless, and those are call'd [...], by S. Paul, Ephes. 2. 15. the Law of Commandments in Ordinances. Now although this diffe­rence be not always observed in the words in Scripture, yet there is a vast difference between the things themselves, though both equally commanded by God. That which is most to our present purpose to observe, is, that Positives being mutable and alterable in themselves, a bare Divine Command is not sufficient to make them immutable, unless there be likewise expressed, that it is the Will of God that they should always continue. This was that which the Jews stumbled at so much, and do to this day; because they are assured their Law came once from God, therefore it must of necessity have a perpetual obligation: as may be seen in their two great Doctors Maimonides and Abarbinel, who both of Maimon. de fundam. legis, cap. 9. sect. 1. Abarb. de Capit. fidei. cap. 8. p. 29. Ed. Vorstii. them make the Eternity of the Law one of the Fundamental Articles of their Creed. But Abarbinel splits this Article in­to two; whereof the first is, that the Law of Moses shall never be changed; the other, that no other Law shall come instead of it. The original of which grand errour is from want of observing the difference between things com­manded by God, some of which are good, and therefore [Page 17] commanded; others commanded, and therefore good. In which latter, if the reason of the Command ceaseth, the Com­mand its self obligeth no longer. As the Ceremonial Law was to be their [...], which is not meant in re­gard of the sharp severe nature of the Law to drive them Gal. 3. 24. unto Christ, as it is by many interpreted; but the Law is a Pae­dagogue in regard of its tutorage and conduct, as it signifi­ed him whose office it was to conduct Noblemens Children to the School (as a learned man observes.) This being then the office of the Law, when the Church was now entred into Christs School, the office of this Paedagogue then ceased. And so the Ceremonial Law needed no abrogation at all▪ exspiring of its self at Christs coming, as Laws made for the times of war do when peace comes. Only because the Jews were so hardly perswaded that it should exspire (the believing Jews conceiving at first the Gospel came rather to help them to obey the Law of Moses then to cancel the ob­ligation of it) therefore it was necessary that a more ho­nourable burial should be given to it, and the Apostles should pro rostris declare more fully that believers were freed from that yoke of Ceremonies, under which the neck of their fore-fathers had groaned so long. It appears then that a posi­tive Law coming from God doth not meerly by virtue of its being enacted by God, bind perpetually all persons, unless there be a Declaration of Gods Will adjoyned, that it should do so.

It will be here then well worth our inquiry to find out §. 6. some [...] or notes of difference whereby to know when positive laws bind immutably, when not; I shall [...]ay down these following. First, when the same reason of the Com­mand continues still, then we cannot conceive how that which was instituted upon such an account as remains still, should not have the same force now which it had at first. That po­sitive Law under which Adam was in his state of Innocency touching the forbidden fruit, did not bind any longer then his fall; because the reason of the Command ceased, which was the tryal of mans obedience: For which, God made choice of a very facile and easie Command, according to that rule of Politicians In minimis obedientiae periculum faciunt Legislato­res, of which they give this rational account, Quia legislato­ris [Page 18] ad obedientiam obligantis potius habenda est ratio, quàm rei de quâ lex est lata: thence arose that Law of the Ephori at Spar­ta, barbam tondere, to which no other reason was annexed but this, obtemperare legibus, to learn them to obey the Laws. This was Gods aim in that easie Command given to Adam, to make thereon an experiment of mans willingness to obey his Maker, and wherein man soon lost that Obsequii gloria, as he in Tacttus calls it, which, as Pliny saith, is in to major quod quis minus velit. But had this Law been a standing Law for all mankind, it would have continued its obligation still; but since, we see that it was only a personal, temporary, probative pre­cept; for no sooner was man fallen but its obligation ceased. So likewise those precepts of the Judicial Law which imme­diately respected the Commonwealth of the Jews as such, their obligation reacheth not to Christians at all, nor (as it is generally conceived) to the Jews themselves, when out of the Consines of their own Countrey, because the reason of those Laws doth neither descend to Christians, nor did travel abroad with the Jews. But those judicial Laws which are founded upon common equity to bind still, not by virtue of that San­ction, but by virtue of common principles of equity, which certainly in the present shortness of humane reason cannot be fetched from a clearer Fountain then those Laws which once came from the Fountain of Goodness: none of whose consti­tutions can any ways be supposed to deviate from the exactest rules of Justice and Equity. And upon this very ground too, some part of the fourth Commandment is abrogated, and the other continues to bind still; For the reason of the Ceremo­nial and occasional part is ceased, and the reason of what was Moral, continues. Therefore the School-men say right of the Sabbath day, Cultus est à naturâ, modus à lege, virtu [...] à Gra­tiâ. Nature dictates that God should be worshipped, the Law informs what day and time to spend in his worship, Grace must enable us to perform that worship on that day in a right manner. And because the same reason for Gods Worship continue [...] still, therefore it is a Precept of the Natural Law, that God should be worshipped. What time precisely must be spent in Gods Worship (as one day in seven) though the reason be evident to nature of it when it is made known; yet [Page 19] it is hard to conceive that Nature could have found out the precise determination of the time. Although I must confess the general consent of Nations, as to the seventh part, (if it were fully cleared) would speak fair to be the voice of Nature, or at least a tradition received from the Sons of Noah, which, if so, will be an evidence of the observation of the Sabbath before the Children of Israels being in the Wilderness. But granting that the seventh part of time was a positive Law of God, yet I say it binds immutably, because there is as strong a reason for it now as ever, and Ratio immutabilis praecepti, facit praeceptum immutabile. This I take to be the sense of those who distinguish between morale positivum, and morale natu­rale, i. e. that some things are so moral, that even Nature its self can discover them, as that God should be worshipped. Other things are so moral, that though the reason of them be found­ed in Nature, yet there wants Divine Revelation to discover them to us; but when once discovered, are discerned to be very agreeable to common principles of reason: And these when thus discovered, are as immutably obligatory as the other, because the reason of them is immutable. And of this nature, is the determination of the particular time for Gods worship, and limitation of it to one day in seven. But what was in that Precept meerly occasional, as the first and origi­nal ground of its limitation to the seventh in order, Gods resting on that day from the work of Creation, and the further Gen. 22. Deut. 5. 15 ground of its inforcement to the Jews, viz. their deliverance out of Egypt; these being not immut [...]ble, but temporary and occa­sional, may upon as great ground given, and approved of God for that end (as is evident by the Apostles practice) be sufficient reason of the alteration of the seventh day to the first day of the week. By this may briefly be seen how irrationally those speak, who say we have no further ground for our observation of the Lords day now, then for other arbitrary Festivals in the Church, viz. The Tradition of the Church of God. I grant, the Tradition of the Church doth acquaint us with Apostolical practice, but the ground of our observation of the Lords day, is not the Churches Tradition, but that Apostolical practice conveyed by Universal Tradition (which setting aside the Festivals observed upon the Lords days, can very hardly be [...]ound for any other.) But supposing Universal Tradition [Page 20] for other Festivals; I say, here Tradition is not only used as a testimony and instrument of conveyance, as in the other case of the Lords day; but is it self the only argument, and the very ground of the original observation: Between which two, what a wide difference there is, let any rational man judge. But for a further clearing this observation, we must consider, that the reason of the Command, which we say is the measure of its obligation, must not be fetched from mens uncertain conjectures (among whom dreams often pass for reasons) but it must be either expressed in the Law its self, or deducible by apparent and easie collection from it; as is plain in the Decrees of the Apostles about things strangled, Act 15. 29. and offered to Idols, where the reason of the Command is plainly implied, to wit, for present compliance with the Jews; and therefore no sooner did the reason of the Command cease, but the obligation of it ceased too: but of this more afterwards. This is one way then to discern the difference between positive Laws, as to the obligation of them, by the ground and reason of the Command. And therefore it is well observed by Divines (which further confirms what I now prove) that no Command doth bind against the reason of the Command; because it is not the words, but the sense and reason of a Command which hath the greatest obligatory force. Therefore Tully tells us, that the ratio juris & legislatoris con­silium, Ora [...]. [...] [...]. Cae [...]iu. is the best Interpreter of any Law; who excellently and largely proves, that the reason of the Law is the Law, and not the words. So much for the first Rule.

Secondly, Another way to know when Positive Laws are §. 7. immutable, is, when Gods Will is expresly declared that such Laws shall bind immutably. For it being granted on all hands, that God may bind us to those things which are left indifferent by the Law of Nature, and likewise for what term he please; the only inquiry left, is to see in his Word whether he hath so bound us or no; and, if he hath, whether he hath left it in mans power to revoke his Laws. For as to Positive Laws expresly laid down in Scripture, the ground of which is only as the Jews speak [...] the will of the King, i. e. Gods own pleasure, without any reason or occasi­on of it else expressed, or necessarily implied; these do bind immutably, unless the same Power which commanded them, [Page 21] doth again revoke them. For we cannot in any wise con­ceive that the wise God should after the declaring his own will, leave it in the power of any corrupt fallible▪ Being to de­termine, or dispence with the obligation of his own Laws. Which to do, and instead of them to enforce others imme­diately upon the Consciences of men, as standing Laws, is an attempt beyond that of the Gyants against heaven (or the men at Babel▪) that being only an affectation of reach­ing heaven, but this an actual usurpation of Gods supreme and legislative power and authority. But though man hath nor, God alwayes reserves to himself a power to relax, interpret, and dispence with his own positive Laws, which imply no repugnancy to his own nature. And this power is alwayes to be understood in all Laws to be reserved to God, where he hath not himself declared that he will not use it▪ which is done either by the annexing an Oath on a Promise, which the Apostle calls the two immutable things in which it is impossible Heb. 6. 1 [...]. for God to lie. For though God be free to promise, yet when he hath promised, his own nature and faithfulness binds him to performance; in which sense I understand those who say, God in making promises is bound only to himself, and not to men; that is, that the ground of performance ariseth from Gods faithfulness. For else if we respect the right coming by the promise, that must immediately respect the person to whom it is made, and in respect of which we commonly say that the promiser is bound to performance. But the case is otherwise in penal Laws, which though [...] never so strict; do imply a power of relaxation in the Legislator: because pe­nall Laws do only constitute the debstum poenae▪ and bind the sinner over to punishment, but do not bind the Legislator to an actual execution upon the debt. Which is the ground that the person of a Mediator was admittable in the place of faln man, because it was a penal Law, and therefore relaxable. But because the debt of punishment is immedi­ately contracted upon the breach of the Law, therefore satis­faction was necessary to God as Law-giver, either by the per­son himself, or another for him; because it was not consistent with the holiness of Gods nature and his wisdom as Governor, to relax an established Law, without valuable consideration▪ [Page 22] Now for the third kind of Gods Laws, besides promissory and penall, viz such as are meerly positive respecting duties, which become such by vertue of an express command: these, though they be revocable in themselves, yet being revocable only by God himself, and his own power, since he hath already in his Word fully revealed his Will, unlesse therein he hath declared when their obligation shall cease, they continue irreversible. This is the case as to the Sacraments of the New Testament, which being commands meerly positive, yet Christ command­ing Christians as Christians to observe them, and not as Chri­stians of the first and second Ages of the Church, his mind can be no otherwise interpreted concerning them, then that he did intend immutably to bind all Christians to the obser­vance of them. For al though the Socinians say, that Baptism Catech. Ra­cov. cap. 4. was only a Rite instituted by Christ for the passing men from Judaism and Gentilism to Christianity, yet we are not bound to look upon all as reason that comes from those who professe themselves the admirers of it. For Christs Command no­where implying such a limitation; and an outward visible profession of Christianity being a duty now, and the Cove­nant entred into by that Rite of initiation, as obligatory as ever, we have no reason to think that Christs command doth not reach us now, especially the promise being made to as many as God shall call, and consequently the same duty re­quired Acts 3. 38. which was then in order to the obtaining of the same ends. A third way to discern the immutability of positive Laws, is, when the things commanded in particular are ne­cessary to the being, succession, and continuance of such a Society of men professing the Gospel, as is instituted and ap­proved by Christ himself. For Christ must be supposed to have the power himself to order what Society he please, and appoint what Orders he please to be observed by them; what Rites and Ceremonies to be used in admission of Members in­to his Church, in their continuing in it; in the way, means, manner of ejection out of it; in the preserving the succession of his Church, and the administration of Ordinances of his appointment. These being thus necessary for the maintaining and upholding this Society, they are thereby of a nature as unalterable, as the duty of observing what Christ hath com­manded [Page 23] is. How much these things concern the resolution of the Question proposed, will appear afterwards. Thus we have gained a resolution of the second thing, whereon an un­alterable Divine Right is founded; viz, either upon the di­ctates of the Law of Nature, concurring with the rules of the written word; or upon express positive Laws of God, whose reason is immutable, or which God hath declared shall conti­nue, as necessary to the being of the Church.

The next thing is to examine the other pretences which are § 8 [...] brought for a Divine Right; which are either Scripture▪ ex­amples, or Divine acts, or Divine approbation. For Scripture­examples: First; I take it for granted on all hands, that all Scripture examples do not bind us to follow them; such are the Mediatory acts of Christ, the Heroical acts of extraor­dinary persons, all accidentall and occasionall actions. Ex­ample doth not bind us as an example; for then all examples are to be followed, and so we shall of necessity go, quà itur, non quà eundum, walk by the most examples, and not by rule. There is then no obligatory force in example it self. Secondly, there must be then some rule fixed to know when examples bind, and when not; for otherwise there can be no discrimi­nation put between examples which we are to follow, and which to avoid. This rule must be either immediately obliga­tory, making it a duty to follow such examples, or else directive, declaring what examples are to be [...]ollowed: And yet even this latter doth imply, as well as the former, that the follow­ing these examples thus declared, is become a duty. There can be no duty without a Law making it to be a duty, and con­sequently, it is the Law making it to be a duty to follow such example, which gives a Divine Right to those examples, and not barely the examples themselves. We are bound to fol­low Christs example, not barely because he did such and such things, (for many things he did we are not bound to follow him in) but because he himself hath by a command made it our duty to follow him in his humility, patience, self-denyal, Matth. 11. 21. 1 John 2. 6. 1 Pe [...]. 2 [...] ▪ 22. &c. and in whatever things are set out in Scripture for our imitation. When men speak then with so much confidence, that Scripture-examples do bind us unalterably, they either mean that the example it self makes it a duty, which I have [Page 24] shewn already to be absurd; or else that the morall nature of the action done in that example, or else the Law making it our duty to follow the example, though in its self it be of no morall nature. If the former of these two, then it is the morality of the action binds us, without its being incarnate in the example: For the example in actions not morall, binds not at all, and therefore the example binds only by vertue of the morality of it; and consequently, it is the morality of the action which binds, and not the example. If the latter, the rule making it our duty, then it it is more apparent that it is not the example which binds necessarily, but that rule which makes it a duty to follow it; for examples in indifferent things do not bind without a Law making it to be a duty: And so it evidently appears, that all obligatory force is taken off from the examples themselves, and resolved into one of the two former, the morall nature of the action, or a positive Law. And therefore those who plead the obligatory nature of Scripture-examples, must either produce the morall na­ture of these examples, or else a rule binding us to follow those examples. Especially, when these examples are brought to found a New positive Law, obliging all Christians necessa­rily to the end of the world. Concerning the binding na­ture of Apostolicall practice, I shall discourse largely after­wards. The next thing pleaded for a Divine Right, is by Divine Acts. As to this▪ [...]t is again evident that all Divine Acts do not constitute such a Right; therefore there must be something expressed in those Acts when such a Divine Right follows them; whence we may infallibly gather, it was Gods intention they should perpetually oblige: as is plain in the cases instanced in the most for this purpose; as Gods resting on the seventh day making the Sabbath perpetual: For it Gen. 2. 2. was not Gods resting that made it the Sabbath, for that is on­ly expressed as the occasion of its institution; but it was Gods sanctifying the day, that is, by a Law setting it apart for his own service, which made it a duty. And so Christs resur­rection was not it which made the Lords day a Sabbath of Di­vine Right; but Christs resurrection was the occasion of the Apostles altering only a circumstantiall part of a morall duty already; which being done upon so great reasons, and by [Page 25] persons indued with an insallible spirit, thereby it becomes our duty to observe that morall command in this limitation of time. But here it is further necessary to distinguish be­tween acts meerly positive, and acts donative or legall. The former con [...]er no right at all, but the latter do; not barely as acts, but as legall acts, that is, by some declaration that those acts do conserr right. And so it is in all donations, and there­fore in Law the bare delivery of a thing to another doth not give a legall title to it, without express transferring of domi­nion and propriety with it. Thus in Christs delivering the Keys to Peter and therest of the Apostles, by that act I grant Matth. 16. 19. 18. 18. the Apostles had the power of the Keyes by Divine Right; but then it was not any bare act of Christ which did it, but it was only the declaration of Christs will conferring that au­thority upon them. Again, we must distinguish between a right confer [...]'d by a donative act, and the unalterable nature of that Right; for it is plain there may be a Right personall as well as successive, derivative, and perpetuall. And there­fore it is not enough to prove that a Right was given by any act of Christ, unless it be made appear it was Christs intention that Right should be perpetuall if it oblige still. For other­wise the extent of the Apostolical Commission the power of work­ing miracles, as well as the power of the Keyes (whether by it we mean a power declarative of duty, or a power authorita­tive and penall) must continue still, if a difference be not made between these two; and some rule sound out to know when the Right conferr'd by Divine Acts is personall, when successive. Which rule thus found out, must make the Right unalterable, and so concerning us, and not the bare donative act of Christ▪ For it is evident, they were all equally conferr'd upon the Apostles by an act of Christ: and if some con­tinue still, and others do not, then the bare act of Christ doth not make an unalterable Divine Right. And so though it be proved that the Apostles had superiority of order and jurisdiction over the Pastors of the Church by an act of Christ; yet it must further be proved, that it was Christs intention that superiority should continue in their successors, or it makes nothing to the purpose. But this argument I con­fess, I see not how those who make a necessary Divine Right [Page 26] to follow upon the acts of Christ, can possibly avoid the force of. The last thing pleaded for Divine Right, is Divine approbation; but this least of all constitutes a Divine Right: For if the actions be extraordinary, Gods approbation of them as such, cannot make them an ordinary duty. In all other actions which are good, and therefore only commend­able, they must be so, either because done in conformity to Gods revealed Will, or to the nature of things good in themselves. In the one, it is the positive Law of God, in the other the Law of Nature, which made the action good, and so approved by God, and on that account we are bound to do it. For God will certainly approve of nothing but what is done according to his Will revealed, or natural; which Will and Law of his, is that which makes any thing to be of Divine Right, i. e. perpetually binding, as to the observation of it. But for acts of meerly positive nature, which we read Gods approbation of in Scripture, by vertue of which approbation those actions do oblige us; in this case, I say, it is not Gods meer approbation that makes the obligation, but as that ap­probation, so recorded in Scripture, is a sufficient testimony and declaration of Gods intention to oblige men: And so it comes to be a positive Law, which is nothing else but a suffi­cient declaration of the Legislators will and intention, to bind in particular actions and cases. Thus now we have cleared whereon a necessary and unalterable Divine Right must be founded; either upon the Law of Nature, or some positive Law of God, sufficiently declared to be perpetually binding.

CHAP. II.

HAving shewed what a Divine Right is, and whereon it is § 1. founded; our next great inquiry will be, How far Church-Government is founded upon Divine Right, taken either of these two wayes. But for our more distinct, clear, and rationa [...] proceeding, I shall lay down some things, as so many Postulata or generall Principles and Hypotheses, which will be as the basis and foundation of the following Discourse; which all of them concern the obligation of Laws, wherein I shall proceed gra­dually, beginning with the Law of Nature, and so to Divine positive Laws; and lastly, to speak to humane positive Laws. The first Principle or Hypothesis which I lay down, is, Hypoth. 1.

That where the Law of Nature doth determine any thing by way of duty, as flowing from the principles of it, there no positive Law can be supposed to take off the obligation of it. Which I prove, both as to humane positive Laws and Divine: First as to humane. For first, the things commanded in the Law of Nature, being just and righteous in themselves, there can be no obligatory Law made against such things. Nemo tenetur [Page 28] ad impossibile, is true in the sense of the Civil Law, as well as in Philosophy; as impossibile is taken for turpe, and turpe for that which is contrary to the dictates of Nature. A man may be as well bound not to be a man, as not to act according to principles of reason▪ For the Law of Nature is nothing else but the dictate of right reason, discovering the good or Grot. de jure bell [...], &c. lib 1. c [...]p. 1. s. 10. evil of particular actions, from their conformity or repug­nancy to natural light. Whatever positive Law is then made directly infringing and violating natural principles, is thereby of no force at all. And that which hath no obligation in it self, cannot dissolve a former obligation. Secondly, the indispensablenesse of the obligation of the Law of Nature, appears from the end of all other Laws, which are agreed upon by mutual compact, which is, the better to preserve men in their rights and priviledges. Now the greatest rights of men, are such as flow from Nature its self, and therefore, as no Law binds against the reason of it, so neither can it against the common end of Laws. Therefore, if a humane positive Law should be made, that God should not be worshipped, it cannot bind, being against the main end of Laws, which is to make men live together as reasonable creature [...], which they cannot do, without doing what Nature requires, which is, to serve God who made it. Again, it overturns the very foundation of all Government, and dissolves the tye to all hu­mane Laws, if the Law of Nature doth not bind indispensa­bly: for otherwise, upon what ground must men yield obe­dience to any Laws that are made? Is it not by vertue of this Law of Nature, that men must stand to all compacts and agreements made? If Laws take their force among men from hence, they can bind no further then those comp [...]cts did ex­tend; which cannot be supposed to be, to violate and destroy their own natures. Positive Laws may restrain much of what is only of the permissive Law of Nature (for the intent of positive Laws, was to make men abate so much of their naturall freedom, as should be judged necessary for the pre­servation of humane Societies) but against the obligatory Law of Nature, as to its precepts, no after-Law can derogate from the obligation of it. And therefore it is otherwise be­tween the Law of Nature and positive Laws, then between [Page 29] Laws meerly civil: for as to these the rule is, that posterior dero­gat priori, the latter Law cassats and nulls the obligation of the former; but as to natural Laws and positive, prior derogat posteriori, the Law o [...] Nature, which is first [...], takes away the obligation of a positive Law, if it be contrary to it. As Iustellus observe it was in the primitive Church,—in reference to the obligation of the Canons of the Councils, that such as Pr [...]sat. in Cod. Canon. Eccl. A [...]ric. p. 14. were inserted in the Codex Canonum, being of the more an­cient Councils, did render the obligation of later Canons in­valid, which were contrary to them, unlesse it were in m [...]tte [...]s of small moment. We see then, that supposing the Law of Nature doth not continue obligatory, the obligation of all humane positive Laws will fall with it, (as the superstru­cture needs must when the foundation is removed) for if any other Law of Nature may be dissolved, why not that whereby men are bound to stand to Covenants and contracts made? and if that be dissolved, How can the obligation to humane Laws remain, which is founded upon that basis? And so all civil Societies are thereby overturned. Thirdly, it appears from the nature of that obligation which follows the Law of Nature, so that thereby no humane Law can bind against this; for humane Laws bind only outward humane act [...]ons directly, and internall acts only by vertue of their necessary connexion with, and influence upon outward actions, and not otherwise; but the Law of N [...]ture immediately binds the soul and conscience of man: And therefore obligatio na­turalis, and nexus conscientiae, are made to be the same by Lessius, Suar [...]z, and others. For Lessius d [...]sputing, Whether Less. de just. & ju­re l. 2. c. 19. d [...]b. 3. n. 12. Suarez de leg. lib. 2: cap. 9. sect. 6. a Will made without solemnity of Law, doth bind in consci­ence or no? He proves it do [...]h by [...]his argument, from the opinion of the Lawyers, that without those solemnities there doth arise from it a natural obligation, and the hresae ab Inte­stato, who is the next of Kin, is bound to make it good; there­fore it doth bind in conscience. So then there ariseth a neces­sary obllgation upon conscience, from the dict [...]tes of the Law of Nature, which cannot be removed by any positive Law. For although there lye no action in the civil Law against the breach of a meerly natural Law, as in the former case of suc­cession to a Will not legally made; in covenants made without [Page 30] conditions expressed, in recovery of debt [...] from a person to whom money was lent in his Pupillage without consent of his Tutor; in these cases though no action lie against the persons, yet this proves not that these have no obligation upon a man, but only that he is not responsible for the breach of morall honesty in them before civil Courts. In which sense those Lawyers are to be understood, which deny the obligation of the Law of Nature. But however conscience binds the offender over to answer at a higher tribunal, before which all such of­fences shall be punished. Thus then we see no positive hu­mane Law can dispence with, or dissolve the obligation of th [...] Law of nature. Much lesse; Secondly, can we suppose any positive Divine Law should. For although Gods power be im­mense and infinite to do what pleaseth him, yet we must always suppose this power to be conjoyned with goodnesse, else it is no divine power: and therefore posse malum, non est posse, it is no power, but weakness to do evil; and without this posse malum, there can be no alteration made in the nature of good and evil; which must be supposed, if the obligation of the natural Law be dispensed with. Therefore it was well said by Origen, when C [...]lsus objected it as the common speech of the Orig. lib. 3. C. Celsum. p. 154. ed. Co [...]. [...] Christians, That with God all things are possible, that he nei­ther understood how it was spoken, nor what these all-things are, nor how God could do them: and concludes with this excellent speech, [...], We say, saith he, that God can do all things, which are reconcilable with his Deity, Goodnesse, and Wisdom. And after adds, That as it is impossible for honey to make things bitter, and light to make things obscure, so it is for God to do any thing that is unjust. [...]. For the power of doing evil is directly contrary to the Divine Nature, and that Omnipotency which is consistent with it. To the same purpose he speaks elswhere, [...], C. Celsum l. 5. p. 147. God wills nothing unbecoming himself: And again, [...]. We affirm that God cannot do evil actions: for if he could, he might as well be no God. For if God should do evil, he would be no God. So then [Page 31] though God be omnipotent, yet it follows not that he can therefore dissolve the obligation of the preceptive Law of nature, or change the natures of good and evil. God may indeed alter the properties of those things from whence the respects of good and evil do result, as in Abrahams offering Isaac, the Israelites taking away the Aegyptians Jewels; which God may justly do by vertue of his absolute dominion; but the change here, is not in the obligation of the Law, but in the things themselves. Murther would be an intrinsecal evil still; but that which was done by immediate and explicit command from God, would have been no murther. Theft had been a sin still, but taking things aliena [...]ed from their properties by God himself, was not Theft. We conclude then, what comes immediately from the Law of nature by way of com­mand binds immutably and indispensably. Which is the first Hypothesis or Principle laid down.

The second Hypothesis is, That things which are either dedu­cible § 2. from the Law of Nature, or by the light of Nature disco­vered to be very agreeable to it, may be lawfully practised in the Church of God, if they be not otherwise determined by the posi­tive Laws of God, or of lawfull humane authority. We shall first inquire into the nature of these things, and then shew the lawfulnesse of doing them. For the nature of these things: we must consider what things may be said to be of the Law of nature. They may be reduced to two heads, which must be accurately distinguished. They are either such thing [...] which Nature dictates to be done, or not to be done necessa­rily and immutably; or else such things as are judged to be ve­ry agreeable to natural light, but are subject to positive deter­minations. The former are called by some jus naturae obliga­tivum; by others jus naturae proprium, whereby things are made necessarily duties or sins; the latter jus naturae permissivum, and reductivum, for which it is sufficient if there be no repugnancy to natural light. From these two arise a different obligation up­on Covarr. c. 10. de te­si [...]m [...]n. 11 [...]. men; either strict, and is called by Covarr [...]vias, obligatio ex▪ justitiâ, an obligation of duty and justice; the other larger, obli­gatio ex communi aequitate, or ex honestate morali; an obligation from common equity, that is, according to the agreeablenesse of things to natural light, The former I have shewn alrea­dy [Page 32] to bind indispensably, but these latter are subject to positive Laws. For our better understanding the obligation of these (which is more intricate then the former) we shall consider men under a double notion, either in a state of absolute liberty, which some call a state of Nature; or else in a state wherein they have restrained their own liberty by mutual compacts, or are determined by a higher Law. These things premised, I lay down these Propositions.

1. In a state of absolute liberty, before any positive Laws were superadded to the naturall, Whatsoever was not necessarily determined by the obligatory Law of Nature, was wholly left to mens power to do it or not, and belongs to the permissive Law of Nature. And thus all those things which are since determined by positive Laws, were in such a supposed state, left to the free choyce of a mans own will. Thus it was in mens power to joyn in civil Society with whom they pleased, to recover things, or vindicate injuries in what way they judged best, to submit to what constitutions alone they would themselves, to choose what form of Government among them they pleased, to determine how far they would be bound to any Autho­rity chosen by themselves, to lodge the legislative and coercive Power in what persons they thought fit, to agree upon punish­ments answerable to the nature of offences. And so in all other things not repugnant to the common light of reason, and the dictates of the preceptive part of the Law of Na­ture.

2. A state of absolute liberty, not agreeing to the nature of man considered in relation to others; it was in mens power to restrain their own liberty upon compacts so far as should be judged ne­cessary for the ends of their mutuall Society. A state of Na­ture I look upon only as an imaginary state, for better under­standing the nature and obligation of Laws. For it is confes­sed by the greatest Assertors of it, that the relation of Parents and Children cannot be conceived in a state of natural liber­ty, Hobs de civ. cap. 1▪ s. 11. Ann. because Children assoon as born are actually under the power and authority of their Parents. But for our clearer apprehending the matter in hand, we shall proceed with it. Supposing then all those former rights were in their own power, it is most agreeable to natural reason, that every man [Page 33] may part with his right so far as he please for his own advan­tage. Here now, men finding a necessity to part with some of their Rights, to defend and secure their most considerable Ones, they begin to think of Compacts one with another (taking this as a Principle of the Natural Law, and the Foun­dation of Society, That all Covenants are to be performed:) When they are thus far agreed, they then consider the terms upon which they should enter into Society one with another. And here men devest themselves of their original liberty, and agree upon an Inclosure of Properties, and the Fences of those Properties; I mean, upon living together in a civil state, and of the Laws they must be ruled by. This is apparently agree­able to Natural Reason, the things being in their own power, which they agree to part with.

Men entring upon Societies by Mutual Compacts, things §. 3. thereby become good and evil, which were not so before. Thus Prop. 3. he who was free before to do what and how he pleased, is now bound to obey what Laws he hath consented to; or else he breaks not only a Positive Law, but that Law of Nature, which commands Man to stand to Covenants once made, though he be free to make them. And therefore it is observable, that the doing of things that were lawful be­fore Covenants made, and things thereby determined, may be so far from being lawful after, that the doing of them may con­tradict a Principle of the Obligatory Law of Nature. Thus in a state of liberty, every one had right to what he thought fit for his use; but Propriety and Dominion being introduced, which was a free voluntary act, by mens determining Rights, it now becomes an offence against the Law of Nature, to take away Paulus l. 1. D. de [...]urtis. V [...] ­pian. lib. Post. D. de verb sig. that which is another mans. In which sense alone it is, that Theft is said to be forbidden by the Law of Nature. And by the same reason, he that resists and opposeth the lawful Autho­rity, under which he is born, doth not only offend against the Municipal Laws of the place wherein he lives, but against that Original and Fundamental Law of Societies, viz standing to Covenants once made. For it is a gross mistake, as well as dan­gerous, for men to imagine, That every man is born in a state of Absolute Liberty, to chuse what Laws and Governours he please▪ but every one being now born a Subject to that Au­thority [Page 34] he lives under, he is bound to preserve it as much as in him lies: Thence Augustus had some reason to say, He was the best Citizen, qui praesentem reipublicae statum mutari [...] vult, That doth not disturb the present state of the Commonwealth; and who, as Alcibiades saith in Thucydides, [...] V. Grot. de jure belli. &c. lib. 2. cap. 4▪ sect. 8. endeavours to preserve that form of Go­vernment he was born under. And the reason of it is, that in Contracts and Covenants made for Government, men look not only at themselves, but at the benefit of Posterity; if then one Party be bound to maintain the Rights of the others Posterity, as well as of his person, the other party must be supposed to oblige his Posterity in his Covenant to perform Obedience; which every man hath power to do, because Children are at their Parents disposal; And Equity requires, that the Cove­nant entred should be of equal extent to both parties: And if a man doth expect Protection for his Posterity, he must en­gage for the Obedience of his Posterity too, to the Governor [...] who do legally protect them. But the further prosecution of these things belongs to another place to consider of; my pur­pose being to treat of Government in the Church, and not in the State. The sum of this is, that the Obligation to the per­formance of what things are determined (which are of the per­missive Law of Nature) by Positive Laws, doth arise from the Obligatory Law of Nature. As the Demonstration of the particular Problemes in the Mathematicks, doth depend upon the Principles of the Theoremes themselves; and so whoever denies the truth of the Probleme, deduced by just Consequence from the Theoreme, must consequentially deny the truth of the Theoreme its self: So those who violate the particular Determinations of the Permissive Law of Nature, do violate the Obligation of the Preceptive part of that Law: Obedience to the other being grounded on the Principles of this.

4. God hath Power by his Positive Laws to take in and deter­mine as much of the Permissive Law of Nature as he please, which being once so determined by an Universal Law, is so far from be­ing lawful to be done, that the doing of them by those under an Obligation to his Positive Laws, is an offence against the Im­mutable Law of Nature. That God may restrain mans Natu­ral Liberty, I suppose none who own Gods Legislative Power [Page 35] over the world can deny: especially considering that men have power to restrain themselves; much more then hath God, who is the Rector and Governor of the World. That a breach of his positive Laws is an offence against the common Law of Nature, appears hence; because man being Gods creature, is not only bound to do what is in general sui­table to the principles of reason in flying evil, and choosing good; but to submit to the determinations of Gods will, as to the distinction of good from evil. For being bound univer­sally to obey God, it is implyed that man should obey him in all things which he discovers to be his will: whose determinati­on must make a thing not only good, but necessary to be done, by vertue of his supreme authority over men. This then needs no further proof, being so clear in its self.

5. Lastly, What things are left undetermined by divine posi­tive Laws, are in the Churches power to use, and practise according as it judgeth them most agreeable to the rule of the Word. That things undetermin'd by the Word are still lawfull, evidently ap­pears: because what was once lawfull, must have some posi­tive Law to make it unlawfull, which if there be none, it re­mains lawfull still. And that the Church of God should be debarr'd of any priviledge of any other Societies, I understand not; especially if it belong to it as a Society considered in its self, and not as a particular Society constituted upon such accounts as the Church is. For I doubt not but to make it evident afterwards, that many parts of Government in the Church belong not to it as such in a restrained sense, but in the general notion of it, as a Society of men imbodyed to­gether by some Laws proper to its self; Although it subsist upon a higher foundation, viz. of divine institution, and upon higher grounds, reasons, principles, ends; and be dire­cted by other Laws immediately then any other Societies in the World are. §. 4.

The third Hypothesis is this; Where the Law of Nature de­termines the thing, and the Divine Law determines the manner and circumstances of the thing, there we are bound to obey the divine Law in its particular determinations, by vertue of the Law of Nature in its general obligation. As for instance, the Law of Nature bindeth man to worship God; but for the [Page 36] way, manner, and circumstances of Worship, we are to follow the positive Laws of God: because as we are bound by Nature to worship him, so we are bound by vertue of the same Law to worship him in the manner best pleasing to himself. For the light of Nature, though it determine the duty of worship, yet it doth not the way and manner, and though acts of pure obedience be in themselves acceptable unto God, yet as to the manner of those acts, and the positives of worship, they are no further acceptable unto God then commanded by him. Because in things not necessarily determined by the Law of Nature, the goodnesse or evill of them lying in reference to Gods acceptance, it must depend upon his Command, suppo­sing positive Laws to be at all given by God to direct men in their worship of him. For supposing God had not at all revealed himself in order to his worship; doubtlesse it had been lawfull for men not only to pray to God, & express their sense of their dependance upon him; but to appoint waies, times and places for the doing it, as they should judge most convenient & agreeable to natural light. Which is evident from the Scripture its self as to places: for as far as we can find, sacrificing in high places, Judg. 6. 18 1 Sam. 7. 1, 4. 16. 9. 10. 3. 2 Sam. 15. 18, &c. (that is, such as were of mens own appointment) was lawful, till the Temple was built by Solomon; as appears by the several ex­amples of Gedeon, Samuel, David, and others. Indeed after the place was setled by Gods own Law, it became wholly sinfull: but if so before, we should not have read of Gods accepting sacrifices in such places as he did Gedeons, nor of the Prophets do­ing it, as Samuel and David did. It is a disputable case a­bout Sacrifices, Whether the offering of them came only from natural light, or from some express command: the latter seems far more probable to me, because I cannot see how naturall light should any wise dictate that God would accept of the blood of other creatures as a token of mans obedience to him­self. Exerci [...] ▪ in Gen. 42. And Rivet gives this very good reason why the destru­ction of any thing in sacrifice cannot belong to the Law of Nature, because it is only acceptable as a sign, and token of obedience, and not simply as an act of obedience; and this sign signifying ex instituto (for mans destroying the life of a beast can never naturally signifie mans obedience to God) and therefore it must have some positive Law; for those which sig­nifie [Page 37] only by institution, and not naturally, cannot be referred to a dictate of the Law of Nature. To which purpose it is further observable, that God doth so often in Scrip [...]ure slight the offering of Sacrifices, in respect of any inherent vertue or goodnesse in the action its self, or acceptablenesse to God up­on the account of the thing done. In which sense God saith, He that killeth a bullock, is as if he slew a man; and he that Isa. 66. 3. Sacrificeth a sheep, as if he cut off a dogs neck, &c. For what is there more in the one then in the other, but only Gods ap­pointment, which makes one acceptable and not the other? So that it is no wayes probable that God would have accepted Abels sacrifice rather then Cains, had there been no command for their sacrificing. For as to meer natural light, Cains Sa­crifice Gen. 4 3, 4. seems more agreeable to that then Abels; Cains being an Eucharistical offering without hurt to other creatures, but Abels was cruentum Sacrificium a Sacrifice of blood. But the chief ground of Abels acceptance, was his offering in faith, as the Apostle to the Hebrews tells us: Now saith is a Heb. 1 [...]. 4. higher principle then natural light, and must suppose divine Revelation, and so a divine Command as the Principle and ground of his action. Moses his silence in reference to a Com­mand, is no argument there was none, it not being his design to write at large all the particular precepts of the Orall Law, but to deduce the Genealogy of the Patriarchs down from Adam and the Creation. But, supposing a Command given from God determining modes and circumstances of such [...]hings of which the substance depends on a natural Law, men are as well bound to the observation of them after their reve­lation, as the other before. The one being a Testimony of their obedience to God as clear and full as the other; yes, and so much the clearer evidence of obedience, in that there could be no argument for the performing of those things but a divine Command. And even in doing things intrinsecally good, the ground of purely religious obedience is, because God commands men to do those things more then that they are good in themselves: Doing a thing because most suitable to nature, speaking morality; but doing because God commands it, speaks true Religion and the obedience of Faith. For as the formal reason of the act of Faith is a divine Testimony discovered to our understandings, so the formal principle [Page 38] of an act of spiritual obedience is a divine Command inclining the will, and awing it to performance. So far then as divine Law determines things, we are bound to observe them from the dictates of the natural Law.

The fourth Hypothesis: In things which are determined both §. 5. by the Law of Nature, and divine positive Laws, as to the sub­stance and morality of them, but not determined as to all circum­stances belonging to them; it is in the power of Lawful autho­rity in the Church of God to determine them, so far as they judge them tend to the promoting the performance of them in due man­ner. So that not only matters wholly left at liberty as to the substance of them are subject to humane Laws and Constitu­tions, but even things commanded in the divine Law, in refe­rence to the manner of performance, if undetermined by the same Law, which enforce the duty. Thus the setting apart some time for Gods Worship, is a dictate of the natural Law: that the first day of the week be that time, is determin'd under the Gospel; but in what places, at what hours, in what or­der, decency and solemnity this Worship shall be then per­formed, are circumstances not determined in Scripture, but only by general Rules; as to these then so they be done in con­formity to those Rules, they are subject to humane positive determinations. But this is not an hypothesis in the Age we live in to be taken for granted without proving it: some de­nying the Magistrate any power at all in matters of Religion; others granting a defensive, protective power of that Religion which is professed according to the Laws of Christ, but denying any determining power in the Magistrate concerning things left undetermin'd by the Scripture. This Hypothesis then hath landed me into a Field of Controversie, wherein I shall not so much strive to make my way through any opposite par­ty, as endeavour to beget a right understanding between the adverse parties, in order to a mutual compliance; which I shall the rather do, because if any Controversie hath been an in­creaser and fomenter of heart-burnings and divisions among us, it hath been about the determination of indifferent things. And, which seems strange, the things men can least bear with one another in, are matters of liberty: and those things men have divided most upon, have been matters of uniformity, and wherein they have differed most, have been pretended [Page 39] things of Indifferency. In order then to laying a foundation for peace and union. I shall calmly debate what power the Ma­gistrate hath in matters of Religion, and how far that power doth extend in determining things left undetermin'd by the Word. For the clear understanding the first of these, we shall make our passage open to it by the laying down several necess [...] ­ry distinctions about it, the want of considering which hath been the ground of the great confusion in the handling this Controversie. First then, we must distinguish between a power respecting Religion in its self, and a power concerning Religion as it is the publick owned and professed Religion of a Nation. For although the Magistrate hath no proper power over Religion in its self, either taking it abstractly for the Rule of Wor­ship, or concretely for the internal acts of Worship; for he can neither add to that Rule nor dissolve the obligation of it; nor yet can he force the consciences of men, (the chief seat of Religion) it being both contrary to the nature of Religion its self, which is a matter of the greatest freedom and inter­nal liberty, and it being quite out of the reach of the Ma­gistrates Laws, which respect only external actions as their proper object; for the obligation of any Law can extend no further then the jurisdiction and authority of the Legislator, which among men is only to the outward actions. But then, if we consider Religion as it is publikely owned and professed by a Nation, the supreme Magistrate is bound by vertue of his office and authority, not only to defend and protect it, but to restrain men from acting any thing publikely tending to the subversion of it, So that the plea for liberty of conscience, as it tends to restrain the Magistrates power, i [...] both irratio­nall and impertinent; because liberty of conscience is the li­berty of mens judgements, which the Magistrate cannot de­prive them of. For men may hold what opinions they will in their minds, the Law takes no cognizance of them: but it is the liberty of practice and venting and broaching those opi­nions which the Magistrates power extends to the restraint of. And he that hath the care of the publike good, may give li­berty to, and restrain liberty from men, as they act in order to the promoting of that good; And as a liberty of all opi­nions tends manifestly to the subverting a Nations peace, and to the embroyling it into continual confusions, a Magistrate can­not [Page 40] discharge his office unlesse he hath power to restrain such a liberty. Therefore we find plainly in Scripture that God imputes the increase and impunity of Idolatry as well as other vices to the want of a lawful Magistracy, Iudges 17. 5, 6. where the account given of Micahs Idolatry was, because there was no King in Israel; which implies it to be the care and duty of Magistrates to punish and restrain whatever tends to the opposing and subverting the true Religion. Be­sides, I cannot find any reason pleaded against the Magistrates power now, which would not have held under David, Solomon, Asa, Iehosophat, Hezekias, Iosias, or other Kings of the Jews, who asserted the publike profession, to the extirpation to what opposed it. For the plea of Conscience (taken for mens judgements going contrary to what is publikely owned as Religion) it is indifferently calculated for all Meridians, and will serve for a Religion of any elevation. Nay, stiff and con­tumacious Infidels or Idolaters may plead as highly (though not so truly) as any, that it goes against their judgements or their conscience to own that Religion which is established by authority. If it be lawfull then to restrain such notwithstand­ing this pretence, why not others, whose doctrine and princi­ples the Magistrate judgeth to tend in their degree (though not so highly) to the dishonouring God, and subverting the profession entertained in a Nation? For, a mans own cer­tainty and confidence that he is in the right, can have no influ­ence upon the Magistrate judging otherwise; only if it be true, it wil afford him the greater comfort and patience under his restraint; which was the case of the primitive Christians under persecutions: The Magistrate then is bound to de­fend, protect, and maintain the Religion he owns as true, and that by vertue of his office, as he is Custos utriusque tabulae; The maintainer of the honour of Gods Laws, which cannot be if he suffer those of the first Table to be broken without any notice taken of them. Were it not for this power of Magistrates under the Gospel, how could that promise be ever made good, that Kings shall be nursing Fathers to the Church of God? un­lesse Isa. 49. 23. they mean such Nursing Fathers as Astyages was to Cyrus, or Amulius to Romulus and Remus, who exposed their nurs­lings to the Fury of wild Beasts to be devoured by them. For so must a Magistrate do the Church, unlesse he secure it from [Page 41] the incursion of Hereticks, and the inundation of Seducers. But so much for that which is more largely asserted and pro­ved by others. The Magistrate then hath power concerning Religion, as owned in a Nation.

Secondly, We must distinguish between an external and objective power, about matters of Religion; and an internal formal power, which some call an Imperative and Elicitive power, others a power of Order, and a power of Jurisdiction, others potestas Ecclesiastica, and potestas circa Ecclesiastica, or, in the old distinction of Constantine, [...], Euseb. vit: Constant. l. 4. c. 24. a power of things within and without the Church; the sense of all is the same, though the terms differ. The in­ternal, formal, Elicitive power of Order, concerning things in the Church, lies in authoritative exercise of the Ministeri­al Function, in preaching the Word, and administration of Sa­craments; but the external, objective, Imperative power of Jurisdiction, concerning the matters of the Church, lies in a due care and provision, for the defence, protection, and pro­pagation of Religion. The former is only proper to the Mi­nistry, the latter to the Supreme Magistracy: For, though the Magistrate hath so much power about Religion, yet he is not to usurp the Ministerial Function, nor to do any proper acts belonging to it. To which the instance of Uzzias is perti­nently applied. But then this takes nothing off from the Ma­gistrates power; for it belongs not to the Magistrate impera­ta facere, but imperare facienda, as Grotius truly observes, De Imp. sum▪ Potest. cap. 2. l. 1. not to do the things commanded, but to command the things to be done. From this distinction we may easily understand, and resolve that so much vexed and intricate Question, con­cerning the mutual subordination of the Civil and Ecclesiasti­cal In Iud. c. 19. power: For, as Peter Martyr well observes, these two powers are some wayes [...], are conversant several wayes about the same thing; but the Functions of both of them must be distinguished: For the Pastors of the Church are not to administer Justice, but it is their duty to declare how Justice should be rightly administred, without partiality, or oppression. So, on the other side, the Magistrate must not preach the Gospel, nor administer Sacraments; but however, must take care that these be duly done by [...]hose to whose [Page 42] Function it belongs: But for a clearer making it appear, these things are to be considered; both in a Magistrate, and Minister of the Gospel. In a Magistrate, the Power it self, and the Person bearing that Power: The power it self of the Magistrate is no ways subordinate to the Power of the Ministry: Indeed, if we consider both Powers, in reference to their objects, and ends, there may be an inferiority of Dignity, as Chamier calls Panstrat. Cath. Tom. 2. l 15. cap. 6. it, in the civil power to the other, considered abstractly; but considering it concretely, as lodged in the persons, there is an inferiority of Subjection in the Ecclesiastical to the Civil. But still the person of the Magistrate, though he is not subject to the power of the Ministers, yet both as a Christian, and as a Magistrate, he is subject to the Word of God, and is to be guided by that in the Administration of his Function. So on the other side, in a Minister of the Gospel, there are these things considerable; the Object of his Function, the Function its self, the Liberty of exercising it, and the Person who doth exercise it. As for the Object of this Function, the Word and Sacraments, these are not subject to the Civil Power, being setled by a Law of Christ; but then for the Function its self, that may be considered, either in the Derivation of it, or in the Administration of it. As for the derivation of the power and authority of the Function, that is from Christ, who hath setled and provided by Law, that there shall be such a stand­ing Function to the end of the world, with such authority belonging to it: But for the Administration of the Function, two things belong to the Magistrate: First, to provide and take care for due administration of it; an [...] to see that the Mi­nisters preach the true Doctrine, though he cannot lawfully forbid the true Doctrine to be taught; and that they duly ad­minister the Sacraments, though he cannot command them to administer them otherwise then Christ hath delivered them down to us: This for due Administration. Secondly, in case of male-administration of his Function, or scandal rendring him unfit for it, it is in the Magistrates power, if not formally to depose, yet to deprive them of the liberty of ever exer­cising their Function within his Dominions; as Solom [...]n did Abiathar, and Iustinian Sylverius, as Constantius did Vigilius: For the liberty of exercise of the Function is in the Magi­strates [Page 43] power, though a right to exercise it be derived from the same power from which the Authority belonging to the Function was conveyed. And then lastly, as to the persons exercising this Function, it is evident, As they are members of a Civil Society as well as others, so they are subject to the same Civil Laws as others are. Which as it is expresly affirmed by Chrysostom, on Rom. 13. 1. Let every Soul be subject to the Higher Powers; that is, saith he, [...], Be he an Apostle, Evangelist, Prophet, In loc. To. 3. Ed. Ae [...]on. p. 189. Ed. 1607. Priest, Monk, be he who he will: So it is fully, largely, irre­fragably proved by our Writers against the Papists; especial­ly by the learned Is. Casaubon in his piece de libertate Ecclesi­asticâ. So then we see what a fair, amicable, and mutual aspect these two powers have one upon another, when right­ly understood, being far from clashing one with the other; either by a subjection of the Civil Power to the Ecclesiasti­cal, or the Civil powers swallowing up and devouring the pe­culiarity of the Ministerial Function. And upon these grounds, I suppose, Beza and Erastus may, as to this, shake hands; So that the Magistrate do not usurp the Ministerial Function, De Episcop. Const. Magn. which Videlius calls Papatus politicus; nor the Ministers sub­ject the Civil power to them, which is Papatus Ecclesiasti­cus.

Thirdly, we distinguish between an absolute Architectoni­cal § 7. and Nomothetical Power, independent upon any other Law, and a Legislative Power, absolute as to persons, but regu­lated by a Higher Law. The former we attribute to none but God; the latter belongs to a Supreme Magistrate, in reference to things belonging to his power, either in Church or Com­monwealth. By an Architectonical, Nomothetical Power, we mean that power which is distinguished from that which is properly call'd Political. The former lies in the making Laws Aristot. Ethic. lib. 6. c. 6. for the good of the Commonwealth; the latter in a due exe­cution and administration of those Laws for the Common Good. This we have asserted to the Magistrate already: We now come to assert the other; where we shall first set down the bounds of this power, and then see to whom it belongs. First, then we say not, that the Magistrate hath a power to revoke, rep [...]al, or alter any Divine positive Law; which we [Page 44] have already shewn. Secondly, we say not, that the Magi­strate by his own will may constitute what new Laws he please for the Worship of God. This was the fault of Ieroboam who made Israel to sin, and therefore by the Rule of Reason must be supposed to sin more himself: So likewise Ahab, Ahaz, and others. Religion is a thing setled by a Divine Law; and as it is taken for the Doctrine and Worship of God, so it is contained in the Word of God, and must be fetched wholly from thence. But then thirdly, The Magistrate by his power, may make that which is a Divine Law already, become the Law of the Land. Thus Religion may be incorporated a­mong our Laws, and the Bible become our Magna Charta. So the first Law in the Codex Theod. is about the believing the Trinity, and many others about Religion are inserted in­to it. Now as to these things clearly revealed in the Word of God, and withall commanded by the Civil Magistrate, al­though the primary obligation to the doing them, is from the former determination by a Divine Law; yet the Sanction of them by the Civil Magistrate, may cause a further obligation upon Conscience then was before, and may add punishments and rewards not expressed before. For although when two Laws are contrary the one to the other, the obligation to the Higher Law takes away the obligation to the other; yet when they are of the same Nature, or subordinate one to the other, there may a New Obligation arise from the same Law, enacted by a New Authority. As the Commands of the Deca­logue brought a New Obligation upon the Consciences of the Jews, though the things contained in them, were commanded before in the Law of Nature: And as a Vow made by a man, adds a new [...]ye to his Conscience, when the matter of his Vow is the same with what the Word of God commands; and re­newing our Covenant with God after Baptism, renews our Obligation: So when the Faith of the Gospel becomes the Law of a Nation, men are bound by a double Cord of duty to entertain and profess that Faith. Fourthly, in matters un­determined by the Word, concerning the External Polity of the Church of God, the Magistrate hath the power of deter­mining things, so they be agreeable to the Word of God. This last Clause is that which binds the Magistrates power, that it is [Page 45] not absolutely Architectonicall, because all his Laws must be regulated by the generall rules of the Divine Law- But though it be not as to Laws, yet I say it is as to persons; that is, that no other persons have any power to make Laws, binding men to obedience, but only the civil Magistrate. This is another part of the Controversie between the Civil and Ec­clesiastical Power, about the power of determining matters be­longing to the Churches Government: But there is here no such breach between those two, but what may be made up with a distinction or two▪ We distinguish then between a power de­clarative, of the obligation of former Laws; and a power autho­ritative, determining a New Obligation; between the office of counselling and advising what is fit to be done, and a power determining what shall be done; between the Magistrates duty of consulting, in order to the doing it, and his deriving his authority for the doing it. These things premised, I say: First, that the power of declaring the obligation of former Laws, and of consulting and advising the Magistrate for setling of New Laws, for the Policy of the Church, belongs to the Pa­stors and Governours of the Church of God. This belongs to them, as they are commanded to teach what Christ hath com­manded Matth. 28. 18. them; but no authority thereby given to make new Laws to bind the Church; but rather a tying them up to the commands of Christ already laid down in his Word. For a power to bind mens consciences to their determinations; lodged in the Officers of the Church, must be derived either from a Law of God giving them this right, or else only from the consent of parties. For any Law of God, there is none Heb. 13. 17. produced with any probability of reason, but that, Obey those that are over you in the Lord. But that implies no more then submitting to the Doctrine and Discipline of the Gospel, and to those whom Christ hath constituted as Pastors of his Church, wherein the Law of Christ doth require obedience to them, that is, in looking upon them, and owning them in their relation to them as Pastors. But that gives them no au­thority to make any new Laws or Constitutions, binding mens consciences any more then a Command from the Supreme au­thority that inferiour Magistrates should be obeyed, doth im­ply any power in them to make new Laws to bind them. But [Page 46] thus far I acknowledge a binding power in Ecclesiastical Con­stitutions, though they neither bind by virtue of the matter, nor of the authority commanding (there being no legislative power lodged in the Church) yet in respect of the circum­stances and the end, they should be obey'd, unlesse I judge the thing unlawfull that is commanded, rather then manifest open contempt of the Pastors of the Church, or being a scandall V. Pe [...], Ma [...]tyr. in 1 Sam. 14. Whitaker, [...] cont. 4. q. 7. Cameron. de Eccles. p. 386. To. 1. op. to others by it. But as to the other power, arising from mu­tual compact and consent of Parties, I acknowledge a power to bind all included under that compact, not by vertue of any Supream binding power in them, but from the free consent of the parties submitting; which is most agreeable to the Na­ture of Church-power, being not coactive but directive; and such was the confederate discipline of the primitive Church, before they had any Christian Magistrate: And thence the decrees of Councils were call'd Canons, and not Laws. Se­condly, Though it be the Magistrates duty to consult with the Pastors of the Church, to know what is most agreeable to the Word of God, for the settlement of the Church; yet the Ma­gistrate doth not derive his authority in commanding things from their sentence, decree, and judgement; but doth by ver­tue of his own power cause the obligation of men to what is so determin'd, by his own enacting what shall be done in the Church. The great use of Synods, and Assemblies of Pa­stors of Churches, is to be as the Council of the Church un­to the King, in matters belonging to the Church, as the Par­liament is for matters of civil concernment. And as the King, for the settling civil Laws, doth take advice of such persons who are most versed in matters of Law; so by proportion of reason, in matters concerning the Church, they are the fit­test Council, who have been the most versed in matters imme­diately belonging to the Church: In the management of which affairs, as much, if not more prudence, experience, judgement, moderation, is requisite, as in the greatest affairs of State. For we have found by dolefull experience, that if a fire once catch the Church, and Aarons Bells ring backward, what a Combustion the whole State is suddenly put into, and how hardly the Churches Instruments for quenching such fires, lachrymae & preces Ecclesiae, do attain their end. The [Page 47] least peg serued up too high in the Church soon causeth a great deal of discord in the State, and quickly puts mens spirits out of Tune. Whereas many irregularities may happen in the State, and men live in quietnesse and peace. But if Pha [...]tons d [...]ive the Chariot of the Sun, the World wil be soon on fire. I mean such in the Church whose brains like the Unicorns run out into the length of the Horn▪ Such who have more fury then zeal, and yet more zeal then knowledge or Moderation. Per­sons therefore whose calling, [...]temper, office, and experi­ence, hath best acquainted them with the State-actions▪ Policy of the primitive Church, and the incomparable Prudence and Moderation then Used, are fittest to debate, consult, delibe­rate, and determine about the safest expedients for repairing breaches in a divided, broken, distracted Church. But yet, I say, when such men thus assembled have gravely and mature­ly advised and deliberated what is best and fitted to te done▪ the force, strength, and obligation of the things so determin'd doth depend upon the power and authority of the Civil Ma­gistrate: for taking the Church as incorporated into the civill Lib. 2. c. Parmen. state, as Ecclesia est in republicâ, non respublica in Ecclesia, ac­cording to that known speech of Optatus Milivetanus, so, though the object of these constitutions, and the persons determining them, and the matter of them be Ecclesiasticall, yet the force and ground of the obligation of them is wholly civill. So Peter Martyr expresly; Nam, quod ad potestatem [...]a 1 Sam. 8. Loc. Com. Class. 4. c. 5 [...] ▪ sect. 11. Ecclesiasticam attinet, satis est civilis Magistratus: is enim [...]urare debet ut omnes officium faciant. (But for the judgement of the reformed Divines about this, see Vedelius de Episcopatis Constant. M— & Officium Magistratus Christiani, an­nexed to Grotius de Imper. &c.) I therefore proceed to lay down the reason of it. First, That whereby we are bound either to obedience, or penalty upon disobedience, is the ground of the obligation; but it is upon the account of the Magistrates power that we are either bound to obedience, or to submit to penalties upon disobedience. For it is upon the account of our general obligation to the Magistrate, that we are bound to obey any particular Laws or Constitutions: Because it is [Page 48] not the particular determinations made by the civil Magi­strate, which do immediately bind Conscience, but the general Law of Scripture requires it as a duty from us, to obey the Magistrate in all things lawfull. Obedience to the Magistrate is due immediately from Conscience; but obedience to the Laws of the Magistrate comes not directly from Con­science but by vertue of the general obligation. And there­fore disobedience to the Magistrates Laws is an immediate sin against Conscience, because it is against the general obligati­on; but obedience to particular Laws ariseth not immediately from the obligation of Conscience to them in particular, but to the Magistrate in general. So that in things left lawfull and undetermin'd by the Word, where there ariseth no obligation from the matter, it must arise from our subjection and relation to the Magistrate; and what is the ground of obedience, is the cause of the obligation. Secondly, He hath only the power of obligations who hath the power of making Sanctions to those Laws. By Sanctions, I mean here, in the sense of the civil Law, eas legum partes, quibus poenas constituimus adversus eos qui contra leges fecerint; those parts of the Law which determine the punishments of the violaters of it. Now it is evident that he only hath power to oblige who hath power Papin. l. 41 D. de poe­nis Hot [...]o­man. Com. v. juris v: sanct. Cice­ro ad Ar­ [...]ic. l. 3. ep. 23. to punish upon disobedience. And it is as evident, that none hath power to punish but the civill Magistrate; I speak of le­gall penalties which are annexed to such Laws as concern the Church. Now there being no coercive or coactive power be­longing to the Church as such, all the force of such Laws as respect the outward Polity of the Church, must be derived from the civill Magistrate. Thirdly, He who can null and declare all other obligations void, done without his power, hath the only power to oblige. For whatsoever destroys a former obligation, must of necessity imply a power to oblige, because I am bound to obey him in the abstaining from that I was formerly obliged to: But this power belongs to the Magistrate. For suppose, in some indifferent Rites and Ceremo­nies, the Church representative, that is, the Governors of it pro tempore, do prescribe them to be observed by all, the Su­preme power f [...]rbids the doing of those things, if this doth [Page 49] not null the former supposed obligation, I must inevitably run upon these absurdities. First, that there are two supreme powers in a Nation at the same time. Secondly, that a man may lie under two different Obligations as to the same thing; he is bound to do it by one power, and not to do it by the other. Thirdly, the same action may be a duty and a sin; a du­ty in obeying the one power, a sin in disobeying the other. Therefore there can be but one power to oblige, which is that of the Supreme Magistrate.

Having thus far asserted the Magistrates due power and §. 8. Authority, as to matters of Religion; we proceed to examine the extent of this power, in determining things left at liberty by the Word of God, in order to the Peace and Government of the Church. For our clear and distinct proceeding, I shall ascend by these three steps: First, to shew that there are some things left undetermined by the Word. Secondly, that these things are capable of positive Determinations and Restraint. Thirdly, that there are some bounds and limits to be observed in the stating and determining these things. First, That there are some things left undetermined by the Word: By Determining here, I do not mean determining whether things be lawful or no; for so there is no Rit [...] or Ceremony whatsoever, but is determined by the Scri­pture in that sense, or may be gathered from the appli­cation of particular actions, to the general Rules of Scri­pture: but by Determining, I mean, whether all things con­cerning the Churches Polity and Order be determined as Duties or no: viz. that this we are bound to observe, and the other not. As for instance, what time, manner, method, gesture, habit, be used in preaching the Word; whether Bap­tism must be by dipping or sprinkling; at what day, time, place, the Child shall be baptized, and other things of a like Nature with these. Those who assert any of these as duties, must produce necessarily the Command making them to be so: For Duty and Command have a necessary respect and relation to one another. If no Command be brought, it necessarily fol­lows, that they are left at liberty. So as to the Lords Supper Calvin saith, whether the Communicants take the Bread them­selves, [Page 50] or receive it being given them; whether they should Institut. l. 4. cap. 17. s. 43. & cap. 15. s. 19. give the Cup into the hands of the Deacon, or to their next Neighbour; whether the Bread be leavened or not, the Wine red or white, nihil refert, it matters not; Haec indifferentia sunt & in Ecclesiae libertate posita; they are matters of indifferency, and are left to the Churches liberty. But this matter of Indifferency is not yet so clear as it is generally thought to be; we shall therefore bare the ground a little by some necessary distincti­ons to see where the root of indifferency lies: Which we shall the rather do, because it is strongly asserted by an Honourable person, that there is no Indifferency in the things themselves, which are still either unlawful or necessary, (if lawful at this time, in these circumstances) but all indifferency lies in the darkness and shortness of our understandings, which may Nature of Episc. chap. 5. make some things seem so to us. But that Honourable person clearly runs upon a double mistake. First, that Indifferency is a medium participationis of both extremes, and not only negationis, viz. that, as intermediate colours partake both of black and white, and yet are neither; so in morality, be­tween good and bad, there is an intermediate entity, which is neither, but indifferent to either: Whereas the Nature of Indifferency lies not in any thing intermediate between good and bad, but in some thing undetermined by Divine Laws, as to the necessity of it; so that if we speak as to the extremes of it, it is something lying between a necessary duty, and an in­trinsecal evil. The other mistake, is, that throughout that Discourse he takes Indifferency as Circumstantiated in Indivi­dual actions, and as the morality of the action is determined by its Circumstances; whereas the proper notion of Indifferency lies in the Nature of the action, considered in its self abstractly; and so these things are implyed in an indifferent action. First, absolute undetermination; as to the general nature of the act by a Divine Law, that God hath left it free for men to do it or no. Secondly, that one part hath not more propension to the Rule then the other; for if the doing of it comes near­er to the rule then the omission; or on the contrary, this action is not wholly indifferent. Thirdly, that neither part hath any repugnancy to the Rule; for that which hath so, is so [Page 51] far from being indifferent, that it becomes unlawful: So that an indifferent action is therein like the Iron accosted by two Loadstones on either side of equal virtue, and so hovers in medio, inclining to neither; but, supposing any degree of virtue added to the one above the other, it then inclines to­wards it: or as the Magnetical Needle about the Azores, keeps its self directly parallel to the Axis of the world with­out variation, because it is supposed then to be at an equal distance from the two Great Magnets, the Continents of Eu­rope and America: But no sooner is it removed from thence, but it hath its variations. So indifferency, taken in specie, as to the Nature of the act, inclines neither way; but supposing it lye under Positive Determinations, either by Laws or Circum­stances, it then necessarily inclines either to the Nature of Good or E [...]il.

Neither yet are we come to a full understanding of the Na­ture of indifferent actions; we must therefore distinguish be­tween indifferency, as to goodness, necessitating an action to be done; and as to goodness, necessary to an action to make it good: For there is one kind of goodness propter quam fit actio, in order to which the action must necessarily be done; and there is another kind of goodness sine quâ non benè fit actio, necessary to make an action good when it is done. As following after peace hath such a goodness in it, as necessitates the action, and makes it a necessary duty: but handling a particular Controversie is such an action, as a man may let alone without sin in his course of studies; yet when he doth it, there is a goodness necessary to make his doing it a good action, viz. his referring his study of it to a right end, for the obtaining of truth and peace. This latter goodness is two­fold, either bonitas directionis, as some call it, which is, refer­ring the action to its true end; in reference to which, the great Controversie among the Schoolmen, is about the indiffe­rency of particular actions, viz. Whether a particular dire­ction of a mans intention to the ultimate end, be not so ne­cessary to particular actions, as that, without that, the action is of necessity evil, and with it good; or whether without that an V. Forbes. Iren. lib. 1. cap. 13. action may be indifferent to good or evil, which is the state of the Question between Thomas and Scotus, Bonaventure and [Page 52] Durandus; but we assert the necessity of at least an habitual direction, to make the action in individuo good, and yet the act in its self may notwithstanding be indifferent, even in indi­viduo, as there is no antecedent necessity lying upon mens Consciences for the doing of it; because men may omit it, and break no Law of God. Besides this, to make an action good, there is necessary a bonitas Originis, or rather Principii, [...] good Principle, out of which the action must flow; which must be that Faith, which whatsoever is not of, is sin; as the Apostle tells us. Which we must not so understand, as though in Rom 14. 23. every action a man goes about, he must have a full perswasion that it is a necessary duty he goes about; but in many actions that Faith is sufficient, whereby he is perswaded upon good ground, that the thing he goes about is lawful; although he may as lawfully omit that action; and do either another, or the contrary to it. There may be then the necessity of some things in an action when it is done to make it good, and yet the action its self be no ways necessary, but indifferent, and a matter of Liberty. This may be easily understood by what is usually said of Gods particular Actions, that God is free in himself either to do or not to do that action (as suppose the Creation of the World) but when he doth it, he must neces­sarily do it with that goodness, holiness, and wisdom, which is suitable to his Nature: So may many actions of men be in themselves indifferent, and yet there must be a concomitant necessity of good intention and Principle to make the action good. But this concomitant necessity doth not destroy the Radical Indifferency of the action it self; it is only an antece­dent necessity from the obligation of the Law, is that which destroys indifferency. So likewise it is as to evil; there is such an evil in an action, which not only spoils the action, but hinders the person from the liberty of doing it, that is, in all such acti­ons as are intrinsecally evil; and there is such a kind of evil in actions, which though it spoils the goodness of the action, yet keeps not from performance; which is such as ariseth from the manner of performance, as praying in hypocrisie, &c. doing a thing lawful with a scrupulous or erring Con­science. We see then what good and evil is consistent with indifferency in actions, and what is not. And that the Nature [Page 53] of Actions, even in individuo, may be indifferent, when as to their Circumstances they may be necessarily determin'd to be either good or evil. As Marrying, or not Marrying, as to the Law of God, is left at liberty, not making it in its self a necessary duty, one way or other; but, supposing particular Circumstances make it necessary, pro hîc & nunc, yet the Na­ture of it remains indifferent st [...]ll; and supposing Marriage, it is necessary it should be in the Lord, and yet it is not ne­cessary to make choice of this person rather then of that, so that not only the absolute indifferency of the action is consi­stent with this concomitant necessity, but the full liberty, both of contradiction, and contrariety. Again, we must distinguish between an Indifferency, as to its Nature, and Indifferency, as to its use and end; or between an indifferency as to a Law, and indifferency as to order and peace: Here I say, that in things wholly indifferent in both respects, that is, in a thing neither commanded nor forbidden by God, nor that hath any apparent respect to the Peace and Order of the Church of God, there can be no rational account given, why the Na­ture of such indifferencies should be alter'd by any Humane Laws and Constitutions. But matters that are only indifferent as to a Command, but are much conducing to the Peace and Order of a Church, such things as these, are the proper mat­ter of Humane Constitutions concerning the Churches Polity: Or rather, to keep to the words of the Hypothesis it self, where any things are determin'd in general by the Word of God, but left at Liberty, as to manner and Circumstances, it is in the power of Lawful Authority in the Church of God to determine such things, as far as they tend to the promoting the good of the Church.

And so I rise to the second step, which is, That matters of §. 9. this Nature may be determin'd and restrained. Or, that there is no necessity, that all matters of Liberty should remain in their primary indifferency. This I know is asserted by some of great Note and Learning; that in things which God hath left to our Christian Liberty, man may not restrain us of it, by subjecting those things to Positive Laws; but I come to exa­mine, with what strength of reason this is said, that so we may see, whether men may not yield in some lawful things [Page 54] to a restraint of their Christian Liberty, in order to the Peace of the Church of God: Which I now prove by these Argu­ments. First, What may be lawfully done when it is com­manded, may be so far lawfully commanded, as it is a thing in it self lawful; but matters of Christian Liberty may be law­fully done when they are commanded to be done, though it were lawful not to do them before that Command. The truth of the Proposition appears, because Lawful Authority may command any thing that may be lawfully done. Because no­thing can exempt from obedience to a lawful Magistrate, but the unlawfulness of the thing commanded; and therefore nothing can debar the Magistrate from commanding these things; for nothing can hinder him from Commanding, but what may hinder the Subject from Obedience. I grant in many cases it may be lawful to obey, when it is very inconveni­ent for the Magistrate to command: but inconveniency and unlawfulness are two things; nay, and in some cases a man may lawfully obey when he is unlawfully commanded; but then the matter of the Command it self is unlawful. As in exe­cuting an unjust Sentence, granting that a Princes Servants may lawfully do it, especially when they know it not; yet in that case, the ground of their lawful obedience, is the ground of the Magistrates lawful Command, which is the supposed Justice of the Execution. But that which makes the Magi­strates Command unlawful, is the intrinsecal evil of the thing its self. So for unlawful Wars, though the Subjects may law­fully obey, yet the Prince sins in commanding, not but that he hath right to command so far as they are bound to obey, which is only in things lawful: but that which in this case alters the matter, is, the Princes knowing his cause to be un­just. So that however the Proposition holds in things not ma­nifestly unjust. But however this be, it is hereby granted, that the things may be lawfully done, when they are restrained by the Magistrates Command: and by that it appears, that li­berty may be restrained, else it could not be lawful to act un­der that restraint, not as it respects the things themselves, but under that formality, as they are the restraint of that which ought to be left free. The Restraint however then is lawful, as to the persons acting under Authority, who are the Sub­jects [Page 55] of this liberty, though it were granted unlawfull as to the authority doing it. Which former is sufficient for my pur­pose, viz. that Christian liberty, as to the subjects of it, may be lawfully restrained. Secondly, A lesser duty ceaseth to be a duty, when it hinders from the performance of greater; but the preserving Christian liberty is a lesser duty, which may hinder the peace of the Church, which is a greater; there­fore in that case it may be restrained. The Major is granted by Divines and Casuists; when duties stand in competition, the lesser ceaseth to bind, as is evident, in that God will have mercy rather then sacrifice. Positives yield to morals and na­turals. Thence the obligation of an Oath ceaseth, when it hinders from a natural duty; as the Corban among the Jews Grat. de jure belli & pacis. lib. 2. cap 13. sect. 7. from relief of Parents. And therefore Grotius saith, that an Oath taken concerning a thing lawfull, if it doth hinder majus bonum morale, the obligation of that Oath ceaseth. Now that preserving-liberty is a lesser duty then the looking after the peace of the Church, is evident, because the one is only a matter of liberty, and left undetermin'd by the Word; and the other a matter of necessity, and absolutely, and expresly required of all, as a duty as much as possibly lyes in them to endeavour after. Thirdly, If an occasional offence of weaker Brethren may be a ground for restraining Christian liberty; then much more may commands from lawfull authority do it; but the offence of weaker Brethren may restrain Christian li­berty, as to the exercise of it, as appears by the Apostles dis­course, Rom. 14. 21. The reason of the consequence lies here, that a case of meer offence, which is here pleaded towards weak Brethren, cannot have that obligation upon Conscience, which a known duty of obeying lawfull Authority, in things in themselves lawfull, hath▪ Nay further, insisting only on the Law of scandall, I would fain know, whether it be a greater offence and scandall to Christians consciences, to in­fringe the lawfull authority of the Magistrate, and to deny obedience to his commands, in things undetermin'd by the Law of God; or else to offend the Consciences, that is, go against the judgements of some well-meaning, but less-know­ing Christians. Or thus, whether in the matter of scandall, it be a greater offence to go against the judgements of the [Page 56] weaker and more ignorant, or the more knowing and able; when the one have only their own weak apprehension to by­asse them, the other are backed by and grounded upon an established Law. And whether it be not a greater scandall to Religion to disobey a Christian Magistrate, then it is to of­fend some private Christians. Let these things be examined, and then let us see whether the argument will not hold à ma­jori; if the Law of scandall as to private Christians may re­strain liberty, then may a command from the Magistrate do it. Fourthly, I argue thus, If the nature of Christian-liberty may be preserved under the restraint of the exercise of it, then it is not against the nature of Christian-liberty to have the exer­cise restrained; but the former is true; and therefore the lat­ter. Now that the nature of Christian-liberty may be preser­ved under the restraint of its exercise, I prove by these argu­ments.

First, Because the nature of Christian-liberty is founded §. 10. upon the freedom of judgement, and not the freedom of pra­ctice. The case is the same in moral and natural liberty as in Christian. Now we say truly, that the radical liberty of the soul is preserved, though it be determined to a par­ticular action. For the liberty of the Will lying in the power of determining its self either way (as it is generally thought) the actuall determination of the Will doth not take away the internal power in the soul; and in that respect there may be a potentia faciendi where there is not possi­bilit as effectûs, a power of doing when there is no possibi­lity the thing should be done, when the event is otherwise determined by a divine decree, as in breaking the bones of Christ upon the Crosse. So it is in reference to Christian li­berty; though the exercise of it be restrained, yet the liber­ty remains: because Christian-liberty lyes in the freedom of judgement; that is, in judging those things to be free which are so; so that if any thing that is in its self free, be done by a man with an opinion of the necessity of doing it ante­cedent to the Law commanding it, or without any Law pre­scribing it, thereby his Christian liberty is destroyed; but if it be done with an opinion of the freedom and indifferency of the thing it self, but only with a consequential necessity of [Page 57] doing it, supposing the Magistrates command, he retains the power of his Christian-liberty still, though under the restraint of the exercise of it. And therefore it would be well obser­ved, that the opinion of the necessity of any one thing un­determined by Scripture, destroys Christian-liberty more then a Magistrates command doth. And by this reason, they that hold any one posture at receiving the Lords Supper necessary (as sitting, leaning, kneeling) do all equally destroy their own Christian-liberty as to these things which are undetermined by the Word. So a Magistrate when commanding matters of Christian-liberty, if in the preface to the Law he declares the thing necessary to be done in its self, and therefore he com­mands it, he takes away as much as in him lyes our Christian­liberty. And in that case we ought to hold to that excel­lent Rule of the Apostle, Stand fast therefore in the liberty Gal. 5. 1. wherewith Christ hath set you free, and be not intangled again with the yoke of bondage. But if the Magistrate declare the things to be in themselves indifferent, but only upon some pru­dent considerations for peace and order, he requires persons to observe them, though this brings a necessity of obedience to us, yet it takes not away our Christian-liberty. For an ante­cedent D. Sander­son. de ob­lig. cons. prael. 6. s. 5. necessity expressed in the Law (as a learned and excellent Casuist of our own observes) doth not necessarily require the assent of the practical judgement to it; which takes away our liberty of judgement, or our judgement of the liberty of the things; but a consequentiall necessity upon a command supposed, doth only imply an act of the Will, where­by the freedom of judgement and conscience remaining, it is inclined to obedience to the commands of a superior Law. Now that liberty doth lye in the freedom of Judgement, and not in the freedom of Practise, and so is consistent with the restraint of the exercise of it; appears both in the former case of scandall, and in the actions of the Apostles and primi­tive Christians complying with the Jews in matters of liberty; yea which is a great deal more, in such ceremonies of which the Apostle expresly saith, that if they observed them, Christ Gal. 5. 2. would profit them Nothing; and yet we find Paul himself circumcising Timothy because of the Jews. Certainly then Acts 16. 3. however these ceremonies are supposed to be not only [Page 58] mortuae but mortiferae now the Gospel was preached, and the Law of Christian-liberty promulged; yet Paul did not look upon it, as the taking away his liberty, at any time when it would prevent scandall among the Jews, and tend to the furtherance of the Gospel, to use any of them. It was there­fore the opinion of the necessity of them was it which de­stroyed Christian-liberty; and therefore it is observable, that where the opinion of the necessity of observing the Judai­call Rites and Ceremonies was entertained, the Apostle sets himself with his whole strength to oppose them, as he doth Gal. 4. 9, 10, 11. Coloss. 2. 16, 18, 19. in his Epistles to the Galatians and Colossians. Whom yet we find in other places, and to other Churches, not leaven'd with this doctrine of the necessity of Judaicall Rites, very ready to comply with weak Brethren, as in his Epistles to the Ro­mans and Corinthians. From which we plainly see, that it was Rom. 14. 3, 6, 21. 1 Cor. 10. 24. not the bare doing of the things, but the doing them with an opinion of the necessity of them, is that which infringeth Christian-liberty, and not the determination of one part above the other by the Supream Magistrate, when it is decla­red not to be for any opinion of the things themselves as ne­cessary, but to be only in order to the Churches peace and unity. Secondly, It appears that Liberty is consistent with the restraint of the exercise of it; because the very power of restraining the exercise of it, doth suppose it to be a matter of liberty, and that both antecedently and consequentially to that restraint. Antecedently, so it is apparent to be a matter of liberty, else it was not capable of being restrained: Con­sequentially, in that the ground of observance of those things when restrained, is not any necessity of the matter, or the things themselves; but only the necessity of obeying the Magistrate in things lawfull and undertermin'd by the Word: which leads to another argument. Thirdly, Mens obligation to these things, as to the ground of it, being only in point of contempt and scandall, argues that the things are matter of liberty still. I grant the Magistrates authority is the ground of obedience, but the ground of the Magistrates command is only in point of contempt and scandall, and for preserving order in the Church: For I have already shewed it to be un­lawfull, either to command or obey; in reference to these [Page 59] things, from any opinion of the necessity of them, and there­fore the only ground of observing them, is to shew that we are not guilty of contempt of the power commanding them, nor of scandall to others that are offended at our not obser­ving them. Tota igitur religio est in fugiendo scandalo & vi­tando Controv. 4. quaest. 7. cap. 2. contemptu, saith our learned Whitaker: All our ground of obedience is the avoiding scandall and contempt of autho­rity. To the same purpose Pet. Martyr, speaking of the ob­ligation of Ecclesiasticall Laws: Non obstringunt si removea­tur In 1 Sam. 14. contemptus & scandalum: So that non-observance of indifferent things commanded, when there there is no apparent contempt or scandall, do not involve a man in the guilt of sin: as suppose a Law made that all publike prayer be performed kneeling, if any thing lies in a mans way to hinder him from that posture, in this case the man offends not; because there is no contempt or scandall: So if a Law were made that all should receive the Lords Supper fasting, if a mans health calls for somwhat to refresh him before, he sins not in the breach of that Law. And therefore it is observable which Whitaker takes notice of in the Canons of the Councils of the primi­tive Church, that though they did determine many things be­longing to the externall Polity of the Church, yet they ob­served this difference in their Censures or Anathema's; That in matte [...]s of meer order and decency they never pronounced an Anathema, but with the supposition of [...]pp [...]rent contempt; and inserted, Si quis contrà praesumpserit, si quis contumaciter contrà fecerit: but in matters of Doctrine or Life, fully deter­min'd by the Law of God, they pronounced a simple Ana­thema, without any such clause inserted. Now from this, we may take notice of a difference between Laws concerning in­differencies in civill and Ecclesiastical matters: That in civils the Laws bind to indifferencies without the case of contempt or scandall, because in these the publike good is aimed a [...], of which every private person is not fit to judge, and therefore it is our duty either to obey or suffer; but in Ecclesiasticall constitution, only peace and order is that which is looked at, and therefore, Si nihil contra [...] feceris, non teneris illis, is the rule here. If nothing tending to apparent disorder be done, men break not those Laws: For the end and reason [Page 60] of a Law is the measure of its obligation. Fourthly, Mens being left free to do the things forbidden, either upon a repeal of the former Laws, or when a man is from under obligation to that authority which commands them, argues them still to be matters of liberty, and not matters of necessity. That Laws respecting indifferent things may be repealed, I cannot imagine that any have so little reason as to deny, upon a diffe­rent state of affairs from what it was when they were first en­acted; or when they cannot attain the ends they are designed for, the peace and order of the Church, but rather tend to imbroil it in trouble and confusion: And that when men are from under the authority imposing them, men are at their own liberty again, must necessarily be granted, because the ground of restraint of that liberty was the authority they were under; and therefore the cause being taken away, the effects follows. Therefore for men to do them when autho­rity doth not impose them, must imply an opinion of the ne­cessity of the things themselves, which destroyes Christian­liberty. Aug. e [...]. 118. ad Ianuar. Whence▪ it was resolved by Augustine in the case of Rites, that every one should observe those of that Church which he was in: which he saith, he took from Ambrose. His words are these, Nec disciplina ulla ▪in his melior gravi pru­dentique Christiano, quàm ut eo modo agat, quo agere viderit Ecclesiam, ad quamcunque forte devenerit. Quod enim neque contra fidem, neque contra bonos mores injungitur, indifferenter est habendum, & pro corum inter quos vivitur societate servan­dum est. He tells us, He knew no better course for a serious prudent Christian to take in matters of Rites and Customes, then to follow the Churches example where he is: for whatsoever is observed neither against faith or manners, is a matter in its self indifferent, and to be observed according to the custome of those he lives among. And after, acquaints us that his Mother coming to Milan after him, and finding the Church there not observe the Saturday-fast as the Church of Rome did, was much perplexed and troubled in her mind at it (as tender, but weak consciences are apt to be troubled at any thing con­trary to their own practice); she for her own satisfaction sends her Son to Ambrose, then Bishop of the Church there, who told him he would give him no other answer but what [Page 61] he did himself, and if he knew any thing better, he would do it. Augustine presently expects a command from him to leave off Saturday fasts: instead of that; Ambrose tells him; Cum Romam veni [...], jejuno sabbato; cum hic sum, non jejuno. Sic etiam tu ad quam forte Ecclesiam veneris, ejus morem serva; si cui­quam non vis esse scandalo, n [...] quenquam▪ tibi. When I am at Rome I fast on the Sabbath, but at Milan I do not. So thou like­wise, when thou comest to any Church, observe its custome, if thou wouldst neither be an offence to them, nor have them be so to thee. A rare and excellent example of the piety, prudence, and moderation of the primitive Church: far from rigid im­posing indifferent customs on the one side; from contumacy in opposing meer indifferencies on the other. Which judge­ment of Ambrose, Augustine saith, he alwayes looked on as often as he thought of it, tanquam caeleste oraculum, as an Oracle come from Heaven; and concludes with this excellent Speech, which if ever God intend peace to his Church, he will make men understand: Sensi enim saepe dolens & ge­mens, mult as infirmorum perturbationes fieri per quorundam fr [...] ­trum contentiosam obstinationem, & superstitiosam timidi­tatem; qui in rebus hujusmodi, quae neque Scripturae san­ctae autoritate, neque universal is Ecclesiae traditione, neque vitae corrigendae utilitate ad certum possunt terminum pervenire (per­ducere▪) tantum quia subest quàliscunque ratiocinatio cogitantis, aut quia in suâ patriâ sic ipse consuevit, aut quia ibi vidis ubi peregrinationem suam quò remotiorem à suis, eò doctiorem factam putat, tam litigiosas excitant qu estiones ut nisi quod ipsi faciunt, nihil rectum existiment. I have often, saith he, found it to my grief and sorrow, that the troubles of weaker Christian [...], have been caused by the contentious obstinacy of some on the one hand, and the superstitious fearfulnesse of others on the other▪ in things which are neither determin'd by the authority of the holy Scriptures, nor by the custome of the universall Church, nor yet by any usefulnesse of the things themselves, in order to the making mens lives better; only for some petty reason in a mans own mind, or because it hath been the custome of their Countrey [...] or because they have found in those Churches, which they have thought to be the nearer to truth, the further they have been from home, they are continually raising such quarrels and con­tentions, [Page 62] that they think nothing is right and lawfull, but what they do themselves. Had that blessed Saint lived in our age, he could not have utter'd any thing more true, nor more perti­nent to our present state: which methinks admirers of anti­quity should embrace for its authority, and others for the great truth and reason of it. Did we but set up those three things as Judges between us in our matters of Ceremonies, The Authority of the Scriptures, the practise of the Primitive U­niversal Church, and the tendency of them to the reforming mens lives; how soon might we shake hands, and our controver­sies be at an end! But as long as contentious obstinacy remains on one side, and a superstitious fearfulnesse on the other (for superstition may as well lye in the imagined necessity of avoid­ing things indifferent, as in the necessary observing of things which are not) we may find our storms increase, but we are not like to see any Land of Peace. How happy might we be, did men but once understand that it was their duty to mind the things of peace! How little of that Dust might still and quiet our most contentious frayes!

But in order to so happy and desireable an Union and ac­commodation, I shall not need to plead much from the nature of the things we differ about; the lownesse of them in com­parison of the great things we are agreed in, the fewnesse of them in comparison of the multitude of those weighty things we ought most to look after, the benefits of union, the mise­ries of division, which if our lamentable experience doth not tell us of, yet our Consciences may; I shall crave leave humbly to present to serious consideration some proposalls for accommodation: which is an attempt which nothing but an earnest desire of peace can justifie, and I hope that will: which here falls in [...]s the third step of my designed Discourse, about the bounds to be set in the restraint of Chri­stian-liberty,

The first is, that nothing be imposed as necessary, but §. 11. what is clearly revealed in the Word of God. This there is the highest reason and equity for, since none can have [Page 63] command immediately over Conscience, but God himself, and what ever is imposed as necessary, doth immediately bind Con­science. And whatever binds mens conscience [...] with an opi­nion of the necessity of it, doth immediately destroy that Christian-liberty which men are necessarily bound to stand fast in, and not be intangled with any yoke of bondage. Not on­ly the yoke of Jewish Ceremonies, but whatever yoke pinch­eth, Gal. 5. 2. and galls as that did, with an opinion of the necessity of doing the thing commanded by any but the Word of God. Which the Apostle calls Dogmatizing, Coloss. 2. 20 and v. 16. Let no man judge you in meat and drink; nè Praepositi quidem vestri, saith Whitaker; these impositions he calls v. 22. the commandments and doctrines of men. And such he calls a Snare, 1 Corinth. 7. 23. which was the making an indifferent thing, as Coelibate, necessary. Laqueus est quicquid praecipi­tur ut necessarium, quod liberum esse debet. So that though obedience be necessary to ind [...]fferent things when commanded; yet it must alwayes be liber â conscientiâ, quoad res ipsas legum, no obligation to be laid upon Conscience to look upon the things as necessary.

Secondly, That nothing be required, nor determin'd, but what is sufficiently known to be indifferent in its own nature. The former proposall was in reference to the manner of impo­sing, this respects the nature of the things themselves. The only difficulty here is, How a thing may be sufficiently known to be indifferent; because one man looks upon that as indiffe­rent, which another doth not. The most equal way to de­cide this Controversie, is to make choyce of such Judges as are not interested in the quarrel: And those are the sense of the Primitive Church in the first 4 Centuries, who were best able to judge whether they looked upon themselves as bound by any command of Scripture or no; and withall the Judgement of the Reformed Churches: So that what shall be made ap­pear to be left indifferent, by both the sense of the Primitive Church, and the Churches of the Reformation, may be a mat­ter determinable by Law, and which all may be required to conform in obedience to.

Thirdly, That whatever is thus determined be in order only to a due performance of what is in general required in the [Page 64] Word of God, and not to be looked on as any part of Divine Worship or Service. This is that which gives the greatest occasion of offence to mens Consciences, when any thing is either required; or if not, yet generally used and looked on as a necessary part or concomitant of Gods Worship, so that without it the Worship is deemed imperfect. And there is great difference to be made between things indifferent in their own nature, and indifferent as to their use and practise. And when the generality of those who use them do not use them as Indifferent, but as necessary things, it ought to be con­sidered, whether in this case such a use be allowable till men be better informed of the nature of the things they do. As in the case of the Papists about Image-worship, their Divines say, that the Images are only as high teners of Devotion, but the worship is fixed on God; but we find, it is quite otherwise in the general pract [...]se of people who look at nothing beyond the Image. So it may be, bating the degrees of the offence, when matters of in­differency in themselves are by the generality of people not looked on as such, but used as a necessary part of divine Service. And it would be considered whether such an abuse of matters supposed indifferent being known, it be not scandalum datum to continue their use without an effectual remedy for the abuse of them.

Fourthly, That no Sanctions be made, nor mulcts or penalties be inflicted on such who only dissent from the use of some things whose lawfulnesse they at present scruple, till sufficient time and means be used for their information of the nature and indifferency of the things, that it may be seen whether it be out of wilfull contempt and obstinacy of spirit, or only weaknesse of Conscience and dissatisfaction concerning the things themselves that they disobey. And if it be made evi­dent to be out of contempt, that only such penalties be in­flicted as answers to the nature of the offence; I am sure it is contrary to the Primitive practise, and the Moderation then used, to suspend or deprive men of their ministerial function for not conforming in Habits, Gestures, or the like. Concern­ing Habits, Walafridus Strabo expresly tells us, There was no De rebus Eccles. cap. 14. distinction of Habits used in the Church in the Primitive times. Vestes sacerdotales per incrementa ad eum▪ qui nunc habetur, [Page 65] aucta sunt ornatum. Nam primis temporibus communi vesti­mento induti, Missas agebant, sicut & hactenus quidam Orienta­lium facere perhibentur. And therefore the Concilium Gangrense condemned Eustathius Sebastenus for making a necessity of di­versity of habits among Christians for their profession, [...], Can. 14 in Cod. Can. in V [...]n. Eccles. can. 71. Salm. Not. in Tertul. de Pall o. 76. Ant. Cer­cocthius in Salmas. p. 11. Eus [...]b. lib. 6. cap. 20. it being acknowledged both by Salma sius and his great Adversary Petavius, that in the Primitive times the Presbyters did not necessarily wear any distinct habit from the people, although the former endeavours to prove, that commonly they did in Tertullians time; but yet that not all the Presby­ters, nor they only did use a distinct habit, viz. the Pallium Philosophicum, but all the Christians who did [...], as Socrates said of Sylvanus Rhet [...]r, all that were [...] among them, stricter Professors of Christianity; among which most of the Presbyters were. And Origen in Eusebius expresly speaks of Heraclas a Presbyter of Alexan­dria, that for a long time [...], he used only the common Garment belonging to Christians, and put on the Pallium Philosophicum for the study of the Grecian Learning, after that Christianity began to lose in height what it got in breadth: instead of the former simplicity of their gar­ments as well as manners, and their [...] came in the use of the byrri, Penulae Dalmaticae, and so daily increasing, as Stra­bo saith. I say not this in the least to condemn any distinction of habit for meer decency and order, but to shew it was not the custome of the Primitive times to impose any necessity of these things upon men, nor to censure them for bare disuse of them. He must be a great stranger in the Primitive Church that takes not notice of the great diversity of Rites and Cu­stoms used in particular Churches, without any censuring those who differed from them; or if any by inconsiderate zeal did proceed so far, how ill it was resented by other Christians. As Victor's excommunicating the Quarto-decimani, for which he Euseb. l. 5. So [...]rat. hist. Eccles. l. 5. c. 23. is so sharply reproved by Irenaeus, who tells him, that the Pri­mitive Christians who differed in such things, did not use to abstain from one anothers communion for them; [...]; as Socrates tells us; Those that agree in the same Faith, may differ among themselves in their Rites and Customs, as he largely shews in a [Page 66] whole Chapter to that purpose; as, in the observation of Easter, some on the fourteenth day of April, others only upon the Lords Day, but some of the more Eastern Churches differed from both. In their Fasts, some observed Lent but for one day, some two, some three weeks, some six weeks, other seven: and in their Fasts some abstained from all kind of living crea­tures, others only from fresh, eating fish, and others [...]oul: o­thers abstained from fruit and eggs: others eat only dry bread, others not that neither. And so for their publick Assemblies; Some communicating every Lords day, others not. The Church of Alexandria had its publick Meetings and Sermons every fourth day of the week, as he tells us. The same Church made the publick Readers and Interpreters, either of the Cate­chumeni, or of the baptized, differing therein from all other Churches. Several Customes were used about Digamy, and the Marriage of Ministers in several Churches. So about the time of Baptism, some having only one set time in the year for it, as at Easter in T [...]h [...]ssaly; others two, Easter, and Dominica in Albis, so call'd from the white garments of the baptized. Some Churches in Baptism used three dippings, others only one. Great differences about the time of their being Catechumeni, in some places longer, in others a shorter time. So about the Excommunicate, and degrees of penance (as they are call'd) their Flentes, audientes, succumbentes, consistentes, the Com­munio peregrinae, the several Chrismes in vertice, in pectore, in some places at Baptism, in some after. So for placing the Altar (as they Metaphorically called the Communion Table) it was not constantly towards the East; for Socrates affirms, that Cap. 23. l. 5. in the great Church at Antiochia, it stood to the West end of the Church; and therefore it had [...], a different Eccles. hist. l. 10. cap. 4. positure from other Churches. And Eusebius saith out of the Panegyrist, that in the New Church built by Paulinus at Tyre, the Altar stood [...] in the middle. These things may suffice for a taste at present, of which more largely elsewhere (God willing) in due time. We see the Primi­tive Christians did not make so much of any Uniformity in Rites and Ceremonies; nay I scarce think any Churches in the Primitive times can be produced, that did exactly in all things observe the same customes: Which might especially be an [Page 67] argument of moderation in all, as to these things, but especi­ally in pretended Admirers of the Primitive Church. I con­clude with a known saying of Austin, Indignum est ut propter ea quae nos Deo neque digniores, neque indigniores possunt facere, alii alios vel condemnemus, vel judicemus. It is an unworthy thing for Christians to condemn and judge one another for those things which do not further us at all in our way to Heaven.

Lastly, That Religion be not clogg'd with Ceremonies. They when multiplied too much, if lawful, yet strangely eat out the heart, heat, life, vigour of Christianity. Chri­stian Religion is a plain, simple, easie thing. Christ com­mends his Yoke to us by the easiness of it, and his bur­den by the lightness of it. It was an excellent testimony which Amm. Marcellinus a Heathen gave to Christianity, when speaking of Constantius, Religionem Christianam rem absolutam & simplicem a [...]li superstitione confudit, That he spoiled the beauty of Christianity, by musting it up in Superstiti­ous observations. And it is as true which Erasmus said in an­swer Eras. in declar. ad Cens. Paris. art. 14. to the Sorbonists, Quò magis in corporalibus ceremoniis haeremus, hoc magis vergimus ad Iudaismum. External Cere­monies teach us backward, and bring us back from Christ to Moses; which is fully proved as to the Papists, by our Learned Rainolds and Mr. De Croy: But we need no further Evidence Cons. with Hart. chap. 8. Div. 8. De Croy 3. Confor­mity, part. 2 then a bare perusal of Durandus Mimatensis his Rationale Divinorum officiorum. By Ceremonies, I mean not here mat­ters of meer decency and order, for order sake; which doubtless are lawful (if the measure of that order be not the pomp and glory of the world, but the gravity, composure, sobriety, which becomes Christianity) for when the Jews were the most strictly tyed up by a Ceremonial Law, they did in­troduce many things upon the account of order and decency: ás the building Synagogues, their hours of Prayer, their Pa­rashoth and Haphtaroth, the Sections of the Law and Pro­phets; the continuation of the Passover fourteen days by He­zekiah, when the Law required but seven: the Feast of Purim by Esther and Mordecai: the Fasts of the 4. 5. 10 moneth un­der the Captivity; the Feast of Dedication by the Maccabees. The use of Baptism in Proselyting, washing the feet before the Passeover, imitated and practised by our Saviour: So that [Page 68] matters of Order and Decency are allowable and fitting; but Ceremonies properly taken for actions significative, and therefore appointed because significative, their lawfulness may with better ground be scrupled. Or, taking Ceremo­ny, in Bellarmines description of it, to be actio externa, quae De Sacram. lib. 2. c. 29. non aliunde est bona & laudabilis, nisi quia fit ad Deum co­lendum: And in this sense it will be hard to manifest any thing to be lawful, but what is founded upon a Divine Pre­cept; if it be not a matter of Order, and so no Ceremony. And as for significative Ceremonies, concerning matter of Doctrine or Fact, a learned Dr. puts us in mind of the old Rule, Dr. Ham. of Super­stition, sect. 39. that they be paucae & salubres, and the fewer, the more whole­some: for, as he observes from Aristotle in Insect [...]le Animals, the want of blood was the cause they run out into so many legs. I shall conclude this whole Discourse with another Speech of S. Austin, very pertinen [...] to our present purpose. Ep. 119. ad Ian. cap. 19. Omnia itaque talia quae neque sanctarum Scripturarum autorita­tibus continentur, nec in Con [...]iliis Episcoporum statuta inveniun­tur, nec consuetudine universae Ecclesiae roborata sunt, sed diver­sorum locorum diversis moribus innumerabiliter variantur, ita ut vix aut omnino nunquam inveniri possint causae, quas in eis instituendis secuti sunt homines, ubi facultas tribuitur, sine ul­la dubitatione resecanda existimo. All such things which are neither founded on the authority of the Scriptures, nor deter­mined by General Councils (for so he must be understood) nor practised by the Catholick Church, but vary according to the customes of places, of which no rational account can be given; [...]ssoon as men have power to do it, I judge them to be cut off with­out any scruple: For which definitive sentence of his, he gives this most sufficient Reason; Quamvis enim neque hoc inveniri possit, quomodo contra fidem sint; ipsam tamen religionem (quam paucissimis & manifestissimis celebrationem sacramentis miseri­cordia. Dei liberam esse voluit) servilibus oneribus premunt, ut tolerabilior sit conditio. Iudaeorum, qui etiamsi tempus libertatis non agnoverint, legalibus tamen sarcinis, non humanis praesump­tionibus subjiciuntur: For although we cannot positively say, how such things as these do manifestly i [...]pugn our Faith, yet in that they load our Religion with such servile burdens, (which the mercy of God hath left free for all other observations, but [Page 69] the celebration of some few and most clear Sacraments) that they make our condition worse then that of the Iews; for they, al­though strangers to Gospel Liberty, had no burdens charged upon them by the Constitutions of men, but only by the Law and Com­mands of God: Which Sentence and Reason of his, I leave to the most Impartial Judgement of every true sober▪ minded Christian. And thus I am at last come through this Field of Thorns and Thistles; I hope now to find my way more plain and easie. So much for the fourth Hypothesis. The two next will be discharged with lesser trouble.

Hypoth. 5. What is left undetermined both by Divine Positive §. 12. Laws, and by Principles deduced from the Natural Law, if it be determined by lawful Authority in the Church of God, doth bind the Conscience of those who are subject to that Authority, to Obe­dience to those Determinations. I here suppose, that the matter of the Law be something not predetermined▪ either by the Law of Nature, or Divine Positive Law [...]; for against either of these no Humane Law can bind the Conscience: For if there be any moral evil in the thing Commanded, we are bound to obey God rather than men; in which case, we do not formal­ly and directly disobey the Magistrate, but we chuse to obey God before him. And, as we have already observed, a former Obligation from God or Nature destroys a latter; because God hath a greater Power and Authority over mens Consci­ences, then any Humane Authority can have: And my Obedi­ence to the Magistrate being founded upon a Divine Law, it must be supposed my duty to obey him first, by virtue of whose Authority I obey another; then, the other whom I obey, because the former hath commanded me. If I am bound to obey an Inferiour Magistrate, because the Supreme requires it; if the Inferiour command me any thing contrary to the Will and Law of the Supreme, I am not bound to obey him in it, because both the derives his Power of Commanding, and I my Obligation to Obedience, from the Authority of the Su­preme, which must be supposed to do nothing against it self. So it is between God and the Supreme Magistrate; By him Kings reign; God when he gives them a Legislative Power, doth it cumulativè non privativè, not so as to deprive himself of it, nor his own Laws of a binding force against his; So that no [Page 70] Law of a Magistrate can in reason bind against a Positive Law of God. But what is enacted by a Lawful Magistrate, in things left undetermined by Gods Laws, doth even by virtue of them bind men to Obedience, which require Subjection to the Rom. 13. 5. Higher Powers for Conscience sake. So that whatsoever is left indifferent, Obedience to the Magistrate in things indifferent is not: And if we are not bound to obey in things undeter­min'd by the Word, I would [...]ain know wherein we are bound to obey them? or what distinct Power of Obligation belongs to the Authority the Magistrate hath over men? For all other things we are bound to already by former Laws; therefore either there must be a distinct Authority without Power to oblige, or else we are effectually bound to whatsoever the Ma­gistrate doth determine in lawful things. And if it be so in general, it must be so as to all particulars contained in that general, and so in reference to matters of the Church, un­less we suppose all things concerning it to be already deter­mined in Scripture: which is the thing in Question, and shall be largely discussed in its due place.

Sixthly. Hypoth. 6. Things undetermined by the Divine §. 13. Law, Natural and Positive, and actually determined by lawful Authority, are not thereby made unalterable, but may be revoked, limited, and changed, according to the different ages, tempers, in­clinations of men, by the same Power which did determine them. All Humane Constitutions are reversible by the same Power which made them: For the Obligation of them, not arising from the matter of them, but from the Authority of the Per­son binding, are consequently alterable, as shall be judged by that Power most sutable to the ends of its first promulgation. Things may so much alter, and times change, that what was a likely way to keep men in Unity and Obedience at one time, may only inrage them at another: The same Physick which may at one time cure, may at another only inrage the distem­per more. As therefore the Skill of a Physitian lies most in the application of Physick to the several tempers of his Pa­tients: So a wise Magistrate, who is, as Nicias said in Thucy­dides, [...], The Physitian to cure the Hist. lib. 6. Spartian. in Adriano. distempers of the body Politick; and considers (as Spartian tells us Adrian used to say in the Senate, Ita se Rempub. gestu­rum, [Page 71] ut sciret populirem esse, non propriam) that the Peoples Interest is the main care of the Prince, will see a necessity of altering, reforming, varying many Humane Constitutions, ac­cording as they shall tend most to the ends of Government, either in Church or State. Thence it is said of the several Laws of Nature, Divine, and Humane; that Lex naturae potest poni, sed non deponi, Lex divina nec poni nec deponi, Lex humana & poni & deponi. The Law of Nature may be laid down (as in case of Marriage with Sisters in the beginning of the world) but not laid aside; the Law of God can neither be laid down, nor laid aside; but Humane Laws, both may be laid down, and laid aside. Indeed, the Laws of the Medes and Persians, are said to be unalterable, but (if it be meant in the sense it is commonly Dan. 6. 8. understood in) yet that very Law which made them unalter­able (for they were not so of their own Nature) was an al­terable Law, and so was whatever did depend upon it. I con­clude then, whatever is the subject of Humane Determination, may lawfully be alter'd and changed, according to the wis­dome and prudence of those in whose hands the care of the Publick is. Thus then, as those things which are either of Natural or Christian Liberty, are subjected to Humane Laws and restraints, so those Laws are not irreversible; but if the Fences be thrown down by the same Authority which set them up, whatever was thereby inclosed, returns to the Community of Natural Right again. So much for these Hypotheses, which I have been the longer in explaining and establishing, be­cause of the great influence they may have upon our present Peace, and the neer concernment they have to this whole Dis­course, the whole Fabrick of which is erected upon these Foundations.

CHAP. III.

HAving now laid our Foundation, we proceed to raise §. 1. a superstructure upon it. And we now come closely to inquire how far Government in the Church is founded upon an unalterable Divine Right? That we have found to be built upon a double Foundation, the Dictates of the Law of Nature, and Divine Positive Laws. We shall impartially inquire into both of them, and see how far Church-Government is setled upon either of these two. I begin then with the Law of Nature. Two general things, I conceive, are of an unalter­able Divine Right in reference to this: First, That there be a So­ciety and joyning together of men for the Worship of God: Second­ly, That this Society be governed, preserved, and maintained in a most convenient manner. First, That there must be a Society of men joyning together for the Worship of God. For the Dictate of Nature being common to all, that God must be ser­ved, Nature requires some kind of Mutual Society for the joynt performance of their common duties. An Evidence of which Dictate of Nature, appears in the first mention we find of any Publick Society; so that a Society for Religious Worship was as ancient as the first Civil Societies we have any Records of. Nay, the very first Publick Society we read of, was gathered upon [Page 73] this account. For we read in the early days of the world that the Charter for this Society was soon made use of, Gen. 4. 26. In the days of Enosh men began to call upon the Name of the Lord. Now Enosh was Seths Son, whom Adam had given to him in the place of Abel; and assoon as the number of men did increase, that men grew into Socie­ties, they then had their publike societies for Gods Worship. For we cannot understand that place absolutely, as though God had not been called on before, but now he was called on more signally and solemnly; when men were increased that they began to imbody themselves into Societies, Coepit congre­gare populum ad tractandum simul Dei cu [...]tum, saith Pererius. Tunc coeptum est populariter coli Deus, Mariana. Invocare, i. e. palam colere, Emanuel Sa. relating all to the publike socie­ties being then gathered for the worship of the true God. From which time in all probability did commence that Title of those who joyned in those societies that they were called [...] The sons of God which we read of soon after. Gen. 6. 2. as they are distinguished from the [...] sons of men: which Titles as I am far from under­standing in the sense of the Fathers taking them for the Angels, (which in likely-hood they took from that supposititious piece going under the name of Enochs Prophesie); so I cannot un­derstand them as commonly they are taken, for meer discretive Titles of the posterity of Seth and Cain; as though all that came of Seth were the Sons of God, and all of Cain were the sons of men. For as there certainly were many bad of Seths Posterity, because the flood destroyed all of them, Noah only and his Family excepted: so there might be some good of the other, vice being no more enta [...]ld then vertue is; and Jewels may sometimes lye in a heap of dung: and so this name of the sons of God might be appropriated to those who joyned themselves to those Societies for Gods worship. In which sense some understand the very words of the Text [...] then began men to be called by the Not in Maim. de Idol c. 1. sect. 1. Name of the Lord: which I suppose is the sense of Aquila who thus renders the place, [...], although it be brought by Dionys. Vossius to justifie the former interpretation of the words. This sense, if the construction [Page 74] of the words will bear it (which Drusius questions, but others V Chamier: Panstrat. Cath. To. 2. l. 9. c. 9. s. 9. Amam. An. tib. Bibl. l. 2. p. 228. are much for it, and Theodoret, The French, and Piscator so render it) seems most genuine and natural; and not at all impugning what I have formerly gathered from the words, but implying it; For this distinction of Names and Titles did argue a distinction of Societies among them. I am not igno­rant that the generality of Jewish Expositors and many of their followers, do carry the sense of the words quite another way, from the ambiguity of the signification of [...] which V. Selden. de Diis Sy­ris Proleg. p. 28. & 44. Abodazara cap. 1. may be interpreted as well to Prophane as Begin, and so they read it, tunc prophanatum est ad invocandum nomen Domini, Then men prophaned the Name of the Lord: And accordingly Maimonides begins Idolatry [...] from the dayes of Enosh. But the words will scarce bear this construction, as Vossius upon him observes; and besides, there is no mention at all of the name of any false Gods, but only of the true one. So much then for the first originall of this Society for Religi­on, which we see began assoon as there was matter for a Socie­ty to be gathered up of. Some indeed derive this Society Birtram. de Polit. Iud. cap. 2. p. 12. Franz. Sch. Sacrif. disp. 2. Coppenb. Sch. Sacrif. p. 14. a great deal higher; and because we read that Abel and Cain brought their sacrifices, they thence infer, that it was to Adam, who was the publike Priest then, and performed all publike duties of worship in his own person, and so was indeed Occumenicall Bishop of the whole world, and yet had but four persons or but few more for his Charge. Such a Diocess we might be content to allow him that pleads for the same Office, and derives his Title somewhat higher then Adam; For Pope Boniface the eighth proved there must be but one chief Priest, and so one Pope, because it is said, Gen. 1. 1. That God created the world in Principio, not in Principiis; mark the number; therefore there must be but one beginning, and so one Bishop, and not many. What excellent Disputants an In­fallible▪ Chair makes men! Much good may his argument do him.

As a further evidence, How much Nature dictates that such a Society there should be for Divine Worship, we shall §. 2. inquire into the practise of men in their dispersion after the Flood. And what we find unanimously continued among them, under such gross Idolatry as they were given to, and [Page 75] which did arise not from their Idolatry as such, but from the general nature of it as a kind of Worship, we have reason to look upon as one of those planks which hath escaped the common shipwrack of humane nature by the fall of man. And so though that argument from the generall consent of Nations owning a way of Worship though a false one, in order to the proving the existence of God be slighted by some, yet Socinus prael. cap. 2. there is this double evidence in it to prove it, more then is generally taken notice of, and beyond the bare testimony its self given by that consent. First, From mens being so easily imposed upon by false Religions, in that they are so soon gull'd into Idolatry; it argues there are some Jewels in the World, or else men would never be deceived with counterfeits; It argues that a Child hath a Father, who is ready to call every one that comes to him, Father; So it argues there is some naturall instinct in men towards the Worship of God, when men are so easily brought to worship other things instead of God. We see no other creatures can be so imposed upon; we read of no Idolatry among the Brutes, nor that the Bees though they have a King and honour him, did ever bow their Knees to Baal, or worship the Hive instead of him. If men had no journeys to go, others need not be sworn as the Athe­nians were, not to put them out of their way. If there were no inclinableness to Religion, all cautions against Idolatry were superfluous: there is then from mens proness to error, as to the person and object of Worship, an evidence of naturall [...], an instinct within towards the act of Worship; And as when I see sheep flock together, even in their wandrings, I may easily gather that though they are out of their proper pastures, yet they are of a tame and sociable nature; So when we see Socie­ties for Worship were preserved among men after they were degenerated into Idolatry; it is an evident argument that such associating together for the generall nature of the act, doth flow from the nature of man. Secondly▪ All mens agreeing in some kind of Worship, though differing as to the object and manner of it, is an evidence it comes from Nature, because it plainly evinces it could be nothing taken up out of design, received by custome, nor convey'd by tradition, because even among those whose interests and designs have been con­trary [Page 76] to one another, and could have no mutuall compacts to deceive their people, have all agreed in this thing, though al­most in all other things they have strangely differ'd. All o­ther Customs and Traditions, are either changed, or lost among severall Nations; as the rude barbarous Northern Na­tions, that in their inrodes and incursions upon other places, have left in process of time, almost all other customs but only their Religion behind them. This sticks closer then Saladines black shirt, or the old Monks cloathes, which they put not off till they dyed, Nay even those Nations, who openly, and as by a Law, violate the other received dictates of Nature, do yet maintain and hold up this. Those that have had the least of commerce and converse with civilized people, have yet had their societies for worship: And when they could find no gods to worship, they would rather make then want them. The Egyptians would rather spoyl their Sallets then be with­out gods; and they that whipt their gods, yet had them still. They who had no sense of another life, yet would pray to their gods for the good things of this: and they that would not pray that the gods would do them good, yet would that they might do them no hurt: So that in the most prodigious Idolatry, we have an argument for Religion; and in the strange diversities of the wayes of worship, we have an evidence how naturall a society for worship is. This, to shew the vali­dity and force of the Argument drawn from Consent of Na­tions, even in their Idolatry.

Three things I shall evidence these Societies for Worship § 3. among the Heathens by; the solemnity of their Sacrifices, their publick Festivals, and their secret Mysteries, all which were instituted peculiarly in honour of their gods: It being necessary in such Societies for Worship to have some particu­lar Rites, whereby to testifie the end of such Societies to be for the honour of their Deity; and to distinguish those so­lemnities from all other. First then for Sacrifices; Paulus Scrutin. Scrip. part. 2. dist. 3. cap. 11. Burgensis observing how this custome spread all the World over, concludes from thence that it was naturall to men. In qualibet aetate, & apud quaslibet hominum nationes, semper fuit aliqua sacrificiorum oblatio. Quod autem est apud omnes, na­turale est. Thus far I confesse sacrificing naturall, as it was [Page 77] a solemn and sensible Rite of Worship; but if he meant by V. Porphyr. [...]. En [...]ytlop. ad [...]ram Nonarii Terrig. c. 9. p. 96. that, the destroying of some living creatures to be offered up to God, I both deny the universall practice of it, and its being from the dictate of Nature: and I rather believe with Fortu­nius Licetus, that it was continued down by Tradition, from the sacrifices of Cain and Abel before the flood, or rather from Noahs after; which might the easier be, because Na­ture dictating there must be some way of worship, and it be­ing very agreeable to Nature it should be by sensible signs, all Nations having no other Rule to direct them, were willing to observe that Rite and Custome in it, which was conveyed down to them from their Progenitors; But let us see what reason Burgensis gives; Ratio naturalis dictat, ut secundum naturalem inclinationem, homines ei quod est supra omnes, sub­jectionem exhibeant, secundum modum homini convenientem. Qui quidem modus est, ut sensibilibus signis utatur, ad expri­mendum interiorem conceptum, sicut ex sensibilibus cognitionem accipit invisibilium. Unde ex naturali ratione procedit, quod homo sensibilibus signis utatur, offerens eas Deo in signum sub­jectionis & honoris ad similitudinem eorum qui Dominis suis ali­quid offerunt in recognitionem Dominii. But all this will extend no further, then that it is very agreeable to naturall reason, that as man attains the knowledge of invisible things by visible, so he should expresse his sense of invisible things by some visible signs, thereby declaring subjection to God as his Lord and Master; as Tenants expresse their Homage to their Lord by offering something to them. And I withall acknowledge, that as to oblations without blood, they seem indeed very naturall: Whence we shall somewhat largely discover the antiquity of the Feasts of first-fruits, which were the clearest acknowledge­ment of their dependance upon God, and receiving these things from him. Aristotle tells us, [...]. Nicomach. l. 8. That the most ancient sacrifices and Assemblies appear to have been upon the in-gathering of fruits, such as the sacrifices of first-fruits to the gods were. To the same purpose Porphyrius, De Abstin. lib. 2. s. 27. [...]. The first sacrifices were of first-fruits. And Horace,

Although he be not so expresse for offering the very fruits of the earth; yet it is evident from him, that their great festivals in honour of their gods; were immediately after Harvest, and that they had great Assemblies for that purpose, and did then solemnly sacrifice. And from these solemnities came the ori­ginal of Tragedies and Comedies, as Horace intimates, and is largely shewed by Isaac Casaubon in his Treatise de Satyricâ Lib. 1. c. 1. Poesi. But to fetch this yet a little higher, and so bring it downwards; The first sacrifice we read of in Scripture, was this of the fruits of the earth (unlesse the skins which Adam cloathed himself with, were of the beasts sacrificed, as some conjecture:) Cains sacrifice was [...] an oblation of the Gen. 4. 2. fruits of the earth: in all probability the first-fruits, as Abel offered the first-born of the Cattel to the Lord: This seems to have been at some solemn time of sacrificing, which is im­plyed in [...] At the end of dayes. In process of time we render it; but the Jews understand it at the end of the V. Ains­worth, in loc. year: Dayes in Scripture being often put for Years; which Interpretation if we follow, we find a very early observation of the Anniversary Festival of First-fruits; But however this be, we have by unquestionable tradition, that no Festival was more anciently, nor more universally observed, then this of offering the First fruits to God of their increase. The Jews were bound up so strictly to it by their Law, Leviticus 23. 14. that they were to eat nothing of their crop till the offering of first-fruits was made. And Porphyrius tells us out of Her­mippus, De abstin. l. 4. s. 22. that one of the Laws made for the Athenians by Triptolemus, was, [...], To feast the gods with their fruits: Of which Xenocrates there gives a twofold reason; sense of gratitude to the gods, and the easiness at all times to offer up these; by which he supposed the custome would con­tinue longer. Draco afterwards puts this among his [...], V. petit. ad Log, Act. p. 3. his unalterable Laws, [...] To worship their gods with their first-fruits. Besides which, for [Page 79] other Greeks we have the testimony of Plutarch, [...]. Quaest. Grac. q. 6 The most of the Grecians, saith he, in their most ancient sacrifices did use barley, the first fruits being of­fered by the Citizens: and therefore the Opuntii called their chief Priest [...], because he gathered in the first-fruits. The manner of offering the first-fruits among them, was much of the same nature with the Mincha among the Jews, which Levit. 3▪ 13. was of fine flower mingled with oyl for a burnt-offering to the Lord: The word there used implyes the bruising the ears of Corn in a Morter, because they were as yet moist, and could not be ground hard as Corn was. Whence, because it was not all brought to flower, the Cake was call'd [...] and [...]. It is called by the Sept [...]agint [...]. So I suppose it should be read, which in our great Bibles is [...], and it is call'd by the Greeks [...], which word is frequent­ly used by Homer, and Apollonius Rhodius, whom I forbear to transcribe; it being so obvious; which is expounded both by the excellent Scholiast on Apollonius, and by Eustathius and the short Scholiast on Homer, to be [...]. Iliad. [...] 449 A [...]g. 1. v. 409, &c▪ Barley and Salt mixed together. To which among the Ro­mans the Mola salsa answered, of which Festus: Est far tostum & sale conspersum, as the Mincha under the Law, was alwayes salted with salt, Levit. 2. 13. This Mola salsa among the Romans, had originally relation to the first-fruits: For the custome of offering up first-fruits among them, was as ancient as their institution of religious Rites; as Pliny fully Hist. Na­tur. lib. 18. c. 2. informs us, Numa instituit Deos fruge colere, & molâ salsâ supplicare; atque ut autor est Hemina, far torrere: which likewise answers to the Jewish Mincha, which was to be [...] tosta in igne, parched in the fire: For which pur­pose Levit. 2. 14. Numa instituted the Fornacalia, which were farris tor­rendi feriae, the feasts of first-fruits among them, the parching the Corn being in order thereto, For as Pliny adds, ac ne [...]e­gustabant novas fruges, aut vina antequam sacerdotes primitias libassent: which may be exactly rendred in the very words of the Law, Leviticus 23. 14. But though the Mola salsa came V. Sauber­tum de sa­cris. c. 19. originally from hence, it afterwards came to be used in most sacrifices, thence the word immolare to sacrifice, again Paral­lel [Page 80] to the Mincha accessorium, as some call it among the Jews, which was used in other sacrifices; and was distinct from the Mincha per se, which of it self was an oblation to the Lord. From this offering up bruised Corn, some derive the name of Ceres from [...] which signifies as much, and was Vossius de 1 [...]ol, l 2. cap. 59. required, Leviticus 2. 14. thence Ovid l. 8 Met. Primitias frugum Cereri, sua vina [...]yaeo. But besides Ceres, they offered their first fruits among the Greeks to Hora, Diana, Apollo, Gr [...]c. Fer. Vesta, as may be seen in Meursius in [...]. Thus we see how these three Nations did agree not only in the observation of the Feast of First-fruits, but very much in the ceremonies of their offering too. Only this difference may be observed between them, The Romans did mix their Mo­la salsa with water, the Jews their Mincha with oyl only; The Greeks did not bruise the Corn in their [...], but only mixed salt with the grains of Corn. But the Jews and Romans bo [...]h brui [...]ed and parched it, before they offered it up for the first-fruits. Thus much to shew the antiquity and observati­on of the offering up of the first-fruits among the most anci­ent and civilized Nations. Which though it may seem a Di­gression, yet I hope not wholly unacceptable, it being likewise the offering of my First-fruits, and therefore the more seaso­nable.

Proceed we now to other Festivall-solemnities to see what §. 4. evidences of a Society for worship we find in them. And for this, it is apparent that the first originall of Festivals among the Heathen was for the honour of the Gods. Upon which account a grave and prudent Author accounts the observation of some Festivalls naturall; because Nature doth dictate the necessity of some Society for the worship of God. For thus Strabo [...]. Geogr. l. 10. It was the custome of all Nations (who are compre­hended under his words) to have Festival days for the honour of their Gods, which Nature its self dictates. Hence the Greeks, as Athenaeus observes, [...], used to say, that their Gods beg'd them all their play­days. After telling us of the mirth and jollity used after their sa­crifices, Deipnosoph. lib. 9. which was alwayes the second course at these Festivalls, [Page 81] thence the Jews called their High Festival days [...] good days, or days of Mirth. We read of few Nations but had these Festival Solemnities for the honour of their Gods. The Persians had theirs for their God Mithras: The Babylonians, Deipnos. l▪ 14. cap. 10. V. Meursi [...] Graec. Arist. Castellon. [...]. Hospin. de Festis. M [...]h Ben­ther de Fa­stis. saith Athenaeus out of Berosus, had their Feast Sacaea, which Casaubon would have called Sesacaea, because Babylon in Scripture is called [...] Sesac, as the Ludi Romani were from Rome. It is to no purpose to mention the Festivals observed by the Greeks and Romans in honour of their Gods, being so many, that whole books have been composed of them. That which I observe from hence, is, that Societies for the Worship of God are Natural; because of their solemn resting from their ordi­nary labour upon days appointed for the honour of their Gods: Thereby shewing, they looked upon those as peculiar days, and themselves as peculiar Societies upon those days, from what they were at other times. One thing more evi­denceth this among them; their solemn and secret Mysteries, which were Societies on purpose, as pretended, for this very end, in honor of their Gods. Their [...], as they were wont to call them, preserved with the greatest secrecy by the [...]. Their great and lesser Eleusinian, Sa­mothracian, Cotyttian, Mithriacal Mysteries, to which none were admitted without passing through many degrees, [...], before they came to be [...] perfectly initi­ated. Wherein they were much imitated by the Christians Exercit. in Bar. 16. s. 42. sed vi­de Gotho­fred. in Tim. 3. 16. S [...]lmas. in hist. Aug. p. 31. 33. Suidas inv. Mithras. No [...]us in Naz▪ S [...]clit. p. 132. M [...]rsium in Eleusi [...]is. in the Celebration of the Lords Supper, about the fourth or fifth Century, as is largely showed by Casaubon in a most learned Diutriba on this Subject in his Exercitations; to which I refer the Reader. We see what strict Rules they had for Ad­mission of any into these pretendedly Sacred, but truly most impious Societies. In those of Mithras, as Suidas and Nonnus tell us, they passed through eighty degrees, before they were throughly initiated, and seldome escaped with life. However, we may gain from them this general notion, that they looked on a peculiar distinct Society, as necessary for the worship and honor of the Deity they served. Thus we see à posteriori how a distinct Society for Gods Worship appears to be a Dictate of Nature.

We shall now see if we can evidence à priori, that it is [Page 82] a Dictate of Nature, that there must be some Society for the Worship of God. Three things will make that appear. First, The sociableness of Mans Nature. Man is [...], a Crea­ture that loves to herd it self with those of his own kind, [...]. Aristol. Ni­com. l. 8. c. 1. If a man had all other comforts of life, and wanted Society, he would not think his life worth leading, as Aristotle observes, who further takes notice of the sociableness of mans Nature, [...], from the general commendation that is given to courteous and affable men. I deny not, but in the entring into a Civil State or Society, either fear, or profit, might be a main inducement to it; but though it be an in­ducement, yet there must be supposed an inclinableness to a Society; or a Commonwealth might be assoon set up among Tygers, as Men. So that they have very little ground of Rea­son, who from the external inducements of fear, or profit, in entring into Civil Societies, do conclude against the sociable­ness of Mans Nature. If then Mans Nature be sociable in all other things, then Nature will tell men, they ought to be so in things of common concernment to them all, and which is every ones work or duty, as Religion is; if in other things men are sociable, much more in this: For Secondly, Religion gives a great improvement to mans sociable Nature; and therefore Plutarch well calls Religion [...]. A Foundation that knits and joynts Societies Moral. ad­vers. Colotem. together. And thence wisely observes, that in the Constitution of Laws, [...]: the first and greatest thing to be looked at, is, the Religion established, or the Opinions men entertain of the Gods. To which he sub­joyns this excellent reason, [...]: That it is more impossible for a Commonwealth either to be formed or subsist without Religion, then a City to si and without Foundations. Thence, a prudent States-man called Reli­gion, Lord Bacon Essay of a King. the best Reason of State. It appears then evidently both from reason and experience, that Religion hath a great influ­ence upon the modelling and ordering Civil Societies, whence, as the same Moralist observes, Lycurgus did, as it were, conse­crate the Lacedaemonians with Religious Rites, as Numa the Ro­mans, [Page 83] Ion the Athenians, and Deucalion the Hellens. Whence some half-witted men (but I know not whether more defective in wit, or grace) have (observing the great influence Religion hath to keep men in order) been ready to look upon it as on­ly a Politick device, to awe men with greater ease. It is not here a place largely to Examine and Refute this unworthy pretence. Only I adjure them by their onely Goddess, Rea­son, to tell me whence come men to be [...], as Plutarch expresseth it, To be so easily awed by the hopes and fears of another life more then other creatures are? Why are they at all affected with the discourse of them? Why cannot they shake off the thoughts of these things when they please? Are not men hereby made the most miserable of creatures? For no other creature can be perswa­ded that it shall ever quench its thirst in those Rivers of plea­sures, nor make its bed in everlasting flames. The beasts of Sar­dinia that have their only refreshment by the Dew of Heaven, yet have never any hopes to [...]ome there. The Lyon never keeps from his prey by the thoughts and fears of a great Tribunal. But suppose onely mankind of all creatures should be liable to be thus imposed on, as is pretended: How comes it to pass that in no age of the world this Imposture hath not been discover­ed, confuted, and shaken off by some people as wise as them­selves? Or have there never been any such in the world? But whence come some men then to be wiser then others? Whence come some to know things which all the Reason in the World could never finde out, without Revelation? Whence comes a power to doe any thing above the course of Nature, if there be nothing but Nature? Or are all men deceived that believe such things? If so, then there must be somewhat that must deceive men; men would not deceive themselves, and they could not be so long imposed upon by other men; there must be then some evil spirit must do it; and whence should that come? from Nature too? but then whence comes Nature its self? from its self too, or some thing 'else. Did it make it self, or was it made by a greater Power then it? if it made its self, it must be and not be at the same time; it must be as pro­ducing, and not be as produced by that Act. And what is become of our Reason now? There must be then a Supream, [Page 84] Eternal, Infinite Being, which made the world and all in it; which hath given Nature such a Touch of its own immortality and dependance upon God, that Reason capable of Religion is the most proper distinctive Character of man from all Inferior beings. And this Touch and Sense being common to the whole Nature; they therefore incline more to one anothers Society in the joynt performance of the common Duties, due from them to their Maker. And so Religion not onely makes all other Bonds firm (which without it are nothing, as Oaths, Covenants, Promises, and the like, without which no civill So­ciety can be upheld) but must of its self be supposed especially to tye men in a nearer Society to one another▪ in reference to the proper Acts belonging to its self. Thirdly, it appears from the greater honour which redounds to God by a sociable way of Worship. Nature that dictates that God should be wor­shipped, doth likewise dictate that worship should be perform­ed in a way most for the honour and glory of God. Now this tends more to promote Gods honour, when his service is own'd a [...] a publike thing, and men do openly declare and profess themselves his Subjects. If the honour of a King lies in the pub­likely professed and avowed obedience of a multitude of Sub­jects; it must proportionably promote and advance Gods ho­nour more to have a fixed, stated Worship, whereby men may in a Community and publike Society declare and manifest their homage and fealty to the supream Governour of the World. Thus then we see the light of Nature dictates there should be a society and joyning together of men for and in the Worship of God.

CHAP. IV.

THe second thing which the Light of Nature dictates, in §. 3. reference to Church-Government, is, That the Society in which men joyn for the Worship of God, be preserved, man­tained, and governed in the most convenient manner. Nature, which requires Society, doth require Government in that So­ciety, or else it is no Society. Now we shall inquire what par­ticular Orders for Government of this Society established for the Worship of God, do flow from the light of Nature, which I conceive are these following.

First, To the maintaining of a Society, there i [...] requisite a Distinction of Persons, and a Superiority of Power and Order, in some over the other. If all be Rulers, every man is sui juris, and so there can be no Society, or each man must have power over the other, and that brings confusion. There must be some [Page 86] then invested with Power and Authority over others, to rule them in such things wherein they are to be subordinate to them; that is, in all things concerning that Society they are entered into. Two things are implyed in this: First Power: Secondly Order. By Power, I mean a right to Govern; by Order, the Superiority of some as Rulers, the Subordina­tion of others as ruled. These two are so necessary, that no Civil Society in the World can be without them: For if there be no Power, how can men Rule? If no Order, how can men be ruled, or be subject to others as their Governours? Here several things must be heedfully distinguished. The Power from the Application of that Power, which we call the Title to Government. The Order it self from the form or manner of Government. Some of these I Assert as absolutely neces­sary to all Government of a Society, and consequently of the Church, considered without positive Laws; but others to be accidentall, and therefore variable. I say then that there be a Governing Power in the Church of God, is immutable, not onely by Vertue of Gods own Constitution, but as a necessary result from the dictate of Nature, supposing a So­ciety: But whether this Power must be derived by Succession, or by a free Choice, is not at all determined by the Light of Nature; because it may be a lawful Power, and derived ei­ther way: And the Law of Nature as binding, onely deter­mines of necessaries. Now in Civil Government, we see that a lawfull Title is by Succession in some places, as by Election in other. So in the Church under the Law, the Power went by lineal Descent, and yet a lawful Power: And on the other side, none deny (setting aside positive Lawes) but it might be as lawful by choice and free Election. The main Reason of this is, that the Title or Manner of conveying Authority to particular Persons, is no part of the preceptive Obligatory Law of Nature, but onely of the permissive; and consequent­ly is not immutable, but is subject to Divine or Humane posi­tive Determinations, and thereby made alterable▪ And sup­posing a Determination, either by Scripture or lawful Autho­rity, the exercise of that Natural Right is so far restrained as to become sinful, according to the third Proposition under the 2. Hypoth. and the 5. Hypoth. So that granting at present, [Page 87] that people have the Right of choosing their own Pastors; this Right being only a part of the Permissive Law of Nature, may be lawfully restrained and otherwise determined, by those that have lawfull authority over the people, as a Civil Society, ac­cording to the 5. Hypoth. If it be pleaded that they have a right by divine positive law, that law must be produced it being already proved, that no bare Example, without a Declaration by God that such an Example binds, doth constitute a Divine Right which is unalterable. We say then, that the manner of investing Church-Governours in their Authority, is not De­termined by the Law of Nature; but that there should be a Power Governing, is (supposing a Society) of the immutable Law of Nature, because it is that without which no Society can be maintained. And this is one of those things which are of the Law of Nature, not in an abs [...]lute state of Liberty; but supposing some Acts of Men which (once supposed) be­come immutable, and indispensable. As supposing Propriety, every Man is bound to abstain from what is in anothers Possessi­on, without his consent, by an immutable Law of Nature; which yet supposeth some Act of Man, viz. the voluntary in­troducing of Propriety by consent: So supposing a Society in being, it is an immutable dictate of the Law of Nature, that a Power of Government should be maintained and preserved in it.

So I say for the second thing, Order. This, as it implies the §. 2. Subordination of some in a Society to others as their Rulers, is immutable and indispensable; but as to the Form whereby that Order should be preserved, that is, whether the Govern­ment should be in the hands of one or more, is no wise Deter­mined by the Obligatory Law of Nature; because either of them may be lawfull and usefull for the ends of Government, and so neither necessary by that Law: For as to the Law of Nature, the Case is the same in Civil and Religious Societies; Now who will say, that according to the Law of Nature, any form of Government, Monarchy, Aristocracy, Democracy, is unlawfull. These things are then matters of Naturall Liber­ty, and not of Naturall necessity, and therefore must be exa­mined according to positive Determinations of Divine and Humane Lawes, where we shall speak of it. This then is clear [Page 88] as to our purpose, That a power in the Church must be con­stantly upheld and preserved, fitly qualified for the ends of Government, is an immutable Law; so that this power be lodged in some particular Persons to act as Governours, and so distinct from others, as subordinate to them; but whether the Power of Government come from People by Election, or from Pastors by Ordination, or from Magistrates by Commis­sion and Delegation; whether one, two, or all these wayes, is not determined by Naturall Law, but must be looked for in Gods positive Laws; if not there neither to be found, we must acquiesce in what is determined by lawful Authority. The same I say again, as to forms of Government, whether the Power of sole Jurisdiction, and Ordination, be invested in one person above the rank of Presbyters, or be lodged in a Colledge acting in a p [...]rity of Power, is a plea must be remo­ved from the Court of common Law of Nature, to the Kings Bench; I mean to the positive Lawes of God, or the Supream power in a Common-wealth: There being no Statutes in the Law of Nature to determine it: it must be therefore Placitum Regis, some positive Law must end the controversie. We therefore traverse the Suit here, and shall enter it at the other Court.

The second thing dictated by the Law of Nature, is, That the persons imployed in the immediate Service of God, and en­trusted with the Power of governing the Society appointed for that end, should have respect paid them answerable to the Nature of their imployment. This appears to have foundation in the Law of Nature, being easily deducible from one of the first princi­ples of that Law, that God is to be worshipped; if so, then those whose imployment is chiefly to attend upon himself, ought to have greater Reverence then others. By the same Reason in Nature, that if we do honour the King himself, the nearer any are to the Kings Person in attendance and imploy­ment, the greater honour is to be shewed them. The ground of which is, that the honour given to servants as such, is not given to their persons, but to their Relation, or to the one on­ly upon the account of the other; and so it doth not fix and terminate upon themselves, but rebounds back, and reflects upon the Original and Fountain of that Honour, the Prince [Page 89] himself: So if any be honoured upon the account of their immediate imployment in the service of God, it is God who is chiefly honour'd, and not they; it being the way men have to expresse their honour to God, by shewing it proportionably and respectively to those who either represent him, or are im­ployed by him. [...] as Chry­sostome speaks in this very case. The honour p [...]sseth through Homil. 65. in Gen. [...]7. 26. Tom. 1. p. 506. Ed. Savil. them to God himself. Where he largely proves this very thing from the Egyptians sparing the Lands of their Priests; and argues at least for an equality of honour, from reason, to be given to those who serve the true God. Nay, he is so far from looking upon it as part of their superstition, that he mounts his argument à pari, to one à minori ad majus, [...], that is, As much as truth exceeds errour, and the servants of God do the Idol-priests; so much let the honour we give to them, exceed that which was given by the Heathen to theirs: But we have a further evidence of the honourablenesse of this imployment, by the light of Nature, from the persons imployed in this work, before any positive Laws did restrain it: For I say not, that the Law of Nature doth dictate, that the function of those imployed in this work should be differenced from all other; that is done by Divine positive Laws; but the honour of those in that function is from the Law of Nature: which appears hence, in that in the eldest times, those who had the greatest authority civil, had likewise the sacred conjoyned with it. For as Aristotle rightly observes, that the originall Politic. lib. 1. cap. 2. of civil Government was from private families: so in those families, before they came to associate for more publike wor­ship, the Master of the family was the Priest of it. Thence Gen. 8. 20. 18. 19. [...]2. 2. 31. 54. Job 4 [...] 8. we read of Noahs sacrificing, Abrahams duty to instruct his family, and his own command for offering up his Son: we read of Iacobs sacrificing, and Iobs, and so of others. Every Ma­ster of the family then was the High Priest too, and go­verned his family, not only as such, but as a religious So­ciety.

Afterwards (from what institution we know not; but cer­tainly §. 4. the reason of it, if it were so, was to put the greater [Page 90] honour upon the eldest son) it is generally conceived, that the first-born had the Priesthood of the Family in their pos­session, till the time of the Leviticall Law. The Jewish Do­ctors V. Selden. de success. ad leo. Heb. cap. 5. Origin cap. 15. p. 69. think that was the Birthright which Iacob procured from his Father, and which Abraham gave to Isaac, when it is said, that he gave him [...] all that he had: For saith Postel­lus, if it be meant in a literall sense, how could he give those gifts to his other Sons which are mentioned before? Where­fore he conjectures, by that All, is meant the spiritual know­ledge of Christ, which he calls Intellectus generalis; which might be more proper to him as Priest of the family. But the plain meaning is no more, than, when Abraham had bestowed Legacies on his other Children, he left Isaac haredem ex asse, his lawfull heir: I am unwilling to deny a Tradition so gene­rally received, among both Jewish and Christian Writers, as the Priesthood of the first-born before the Law; but this I say, I cannot yet find any other ground for it but Tradition▪ no place of Scripture giving us sufficient evidence for it, and many against it. That which serves sufficiently for the con­sutation of it, is that observation of Theodoret, [...] ▪ It is to be obser­ved, Qu. 108. in Gen. that the younger are alwayes preferred before the first-born. Which he takes notice of from the case he there speaks to of Ephraim and Manasses; and so runs it up to Abel preferr'd before Cain, Seth before Iapheth, Abraham before his elder brethren, Isaac before Ismael, Iacob before Esau, Iudas and Ioseph before Reuben, Moses before Aaron; and David before V. Isidor. Pel. lib. 2. ep. 47. & 48. ad fi [...] ▪ the rest of his Brethren; (although that was after the Law). That place which gives the greatest countenanc [...] to the opini­on is, Numbers 3. 41. And thou shalt take the Levites for me instead of the first-born: where it seems, that the first-born were formerly the Priests, in whose room the Levites were taken. But with submission to better judgements, I can see nothing implyed in this place, but only that God having deli­vered their first-born in Egypt, Exodus 12. 23. and calling for them to be sanctified to him, Exodus 13. 2. upon the account of the propriety he had in them, in a peculiar manner, by that deliverance (and not on the account of any speciall ser­vice, for many were very unfit for that by reason of age▪ and [Page 91] which is observable, God requires as well the first-born of beasts both to be sanctified and redeemed, Numbers 3 41.) therefore God now setling a way of Worship, he gave the Israe­lites liberty to redeem them, and instead of them pitched on the Tribe of Levi for his own service. Another plac [...] is Exodus V. Selden. de success. ad Pontis. ebr. cap. 1. sed & V. eum de Sy­ned. lib. [...]. cap. 16. 24. 5. where the young men are mentioned that offered burnt­offering. It is confessed that the Chaldee Paraphrast and Ara­bick Version understand here the First-born; but howe­ver the place implyes no more then that they were employed to bring the sacrifices, for so the Septuagint render it. [...], or else that they were employed as the Popae only to kill the Sacrifi­ces; for we see the sprinkling of the blood which was the main thing intended here as a foederal rite, was done by Moses himself, who was the High, priest of the people as well as Prince, till Aaron and his sons were set a part, which was not till Exodus 28. 1, 2. and yet Aaron was three years elder then Moses, Exod. 7. 7. which is an evidence that Aaron as first-born was not the Priest; for till his consecration, Moses and not Aaron performed the offices of Priesthood. Thence we read, Psalm 99. 6. Moses and Aaron among his Priests. For although the word [...] be sometimes attributed to those in civill authority, 1 as 2 Samuel. 8. 18. compared with 1 Chron. 18. 17. and 2 Sam. 26. 26. Gen. 41. 50. Exodus 2. 16. Iob 12. 19. yet there is no▪ reason so to understand it of Moses: And further, the ground why [...] was attributed to both Prince and Priest before the Law, was, because the same person might be both; as the Priests of Egypt were Princes too, Gen. 41. 50. But for Moses, we read not only of the V. Selden de Syned. l 2. cap. 2. s. 3. title, but the proper offices of Priests attributed to him, as sa­crificing, Exodus 24. 5. consecrating Aaron and his sons, Exodus 29. 35. and therefore Aben Ezra upon that Psalm forecited, calls him [...] the High Priest.

This Priest-hood of Moses leads us to another evidence of §. 5. the honour of those who were employed in the service of God, which is that when Families encreased and many associated into a Common-wealth, though the private service might belong to the master of the Family, yet the publike, before positive Laws restraining it, was most commonly joyned with the civill [Page 92] power. That Melchizedek was both King and Priest in Sa­lem; if with the Jews we conclude he was Som (which we have little reason for) it will be a greater evidence, Sem being then the greatest Potentate Living. But we passe from him to other Nations after the dispersion, to see where the power over religious Societies was generally held. In Egypt we find Plut. de I [...]. & Osi [...]id. Str. Geog. l 17. Quest. Rom. 110. Politic. l. 3. cap. 10. 11. l. 6. cap. 8. lib. 3. c. 4. Herod. l. 6. V. C [...]ag. de rep Laced. lib. 2. c. 2. that their Priests were often made Kings, as Plutarch observes out of Hecataeus, and is confessed by Strabo, Diodorus, and others. Of the Greeks the same Plutarch gives us a large testimony, that among them [...], the Priesthood was accounted of equal dignity with the Kingdom. The same doth Aristotle in seve­rall places of his Politicks: and particularly of the Spartans, of whom Herodotus adds, that the Priest-hood of Iupiter Coe­lestis and Lacedaemonius did alwayes belong to the Kings own person. For the old Latins, Virgils Anius is sufficient: and among the Romans after the powers were separated, the Pon­tifex Max. had royal state, his cella'curulis and Lictores, as the Consuls had, only their Priests medled not in civill affairs, of which Plutarch gives a double reason; the impossibility of mind­ing both imployments as they should do, and so must either Qu. Rom. 110. [...], neglect the Worship of the Gods, or else [...], wrong the people with the neglect of the administration of justice. The other reason is, because those that were imployed in civill affairs, were put upon execution of justice; and it was no wayes fit a man should come reeking from the blood of Citizens, to go and sacrifice to the Gods: This conjunction of civill and sacred power is attested by Strom. l. 7. ep. 121. Geog. l. 14. S [...]eton. in Aug. c. 31. V. Casaub. in l. & Seld. de Syned l. 1. [...]. 10. Clemens Alexandrinus of the most civilized Heathens; so like­wise by Synesius of the most ancient Nations, by Strabo of the Ephesians, by the Roman Historians of the Roman Emperours, who from Augustus to Gratian, and some say after, continued the title of Pontifex Maximus among the rest of the Imperi­all Honours. Thus much then may serve to manifest how the Honour of those persons who are im [...]e service of God, and the Governme [...] is a dictate of the Law of [...]

CHAP. V.

THe next thing in reference to religious Societies which § 1. Nature dictates, is, That all things, either pertaining to the immediate worship of God, or belonging to the Government of that Society, be performed with the greatest solemnity and de­cency that may be. Which dictate ariseth from the nature of the things themselves; which being most grave and serious, do require the greatest gravity and seriousnesse in the doing of them. And therefore any Ceremonies, Actions, or Ge­stures, which tend to the discomposing mens Spirits, are up­on that account to be exploded out of any religious Societies, as being so directly repugnant to the Nature, design, and per­formance of religious duties. Wherefore that is the standing Rule of all instituted Ceremonies, by the Law of Nature in the Worship of God, that they be such as tend immediately to the advancing the serenity, tranquillity, and composure of their minds who observe them; and not such which in their own nature, or by continuall custome of the users of them, do either rarifie mens spirits too much into a superfici­all lightnesse and vanity of spirit; or el [...]e sink them too much below the command of reason, into the power of unruly pas­sions. A clear and composed spirit, is only fit for converse with things of so high a Nature. That Region which is near­est Heaven, is the freest from clouds and vapours, as well as [Page 94] those dancing Meteors, which hover about in a light uncer­tain motion. It strangely unbecomes the Majesty of religious worship to have any thing vulgar, triviall, much more ridicu­lous in it. The Worship of God is [...], a rationall Rom. 13. 1. worship, as well in regard of that real on which should mode­rate and govern the manner of service, as in regard of those faculties which should be most [...]mployed in it; or the founda­tion which the service hath upon the dictates of mens naturall reason.

And as Nature tells us, there should be nothing too light or §. 2. superficiall, so neither any thing whereby men are carried be­yond the bounds of their own reason: For what men do at such a time, is not their own proper act, but is more properly to be ascribed to the power, strength, and excess of a Melan­choly fancy, or else to a higher Enthusiasticall spirit, which then actuates and informs their sancies: And therefore it hath been well observed, as a Characteristicall difference be­tween the true Propheticall spirit, and the false and coun­terfeit; that the one leaves men in the free use of their reason and faculties; the other alienates them by Panick fears, tremblings, and consternations both of body and mind. To which purpose many evidences are brought by a late lear­ned Mr. Smiths dis. 6. of Prophecy, chap. 4. Writer, in his Discourse of Prophecy out of the Heathen and Christian Authors. These latter discovering the vanity of the Montanisticall spirit by this one observation: which besides the Authors there cited, ( viz. Clemens Alexandri­nus, Strom. [...]. Eccl. hist. l. 5. 17▪ praes. in I [...]. Nahum. Habak. Ch [...]ys. in 1. Cor. Hom. 29. Epiph. hae­res. 48. Ezek. 4. 14. Miltiades in Eusebius, Ierom and Chrysostome) may ap­pear from Epiphanius, who largely and excellently discourseth on this Subject, when he discovers the folly of Montanus and his followers: And gives this reason why they could be no true Prophets; for those that were so, had [...]. A great consistency of sense, reason, and discourse; and instanceth in Isaiah and Eze­kiel: for saith he, [...]. A true Prophet had alwayes the free use of his reason and faculties, and spake from the spirit of God with consistency and coherence of Discourse. But it was quite otherwise with the M [...]ntanists, [...] [Page 95] [...]. They were alwayes trembling both in body and mind; used no consequence of reason in discourse; their words had no proper sense, but were all dark, intricate and obscure. An exact description of a late prevailing Sect among us, who have their names from those consternations they were wont to fall into, and whose language carries as much obscurity with it, as any of the followers of Montanus could wrap up theirs into. Only, instead of Montanus his Paraclete, they tell us of a Light within, whose office is much of the same nature with the other; And one of the great errours of Montanus was, the adhering to Enthusiasms and revelations beyond and be­side the written Word; which is the Helena of our late Opi­nionists, because it gives a liberty for venting any concepti­ons of their own brains, under the pretence and disguise of a Light within. But we see hence, how far such tremblings and consternations of body and mind are from a true, sober, Prophetick spirit: and how those Christians who lived in the time when the Spirit of Prophe [...]y had not yet left the Church of Christ (as appears by Origen, Tertullian, and others:) Orig. c. Cel­sum, lib. 2. p. 62. l. 3. p. 124. Tertull. de an. c. 9. yet they alwayes looked upon any violent extasie, or fury, as an evidence of a false Prophet. And therefore Tertullian, when grown a Proselyte of Montanus, endeavours strongly to remove that apprehension of the exstaticall fury of Monta­nus, and Prisca, and Maximilla, granting, if it were true, that it was a mark of a false and counterfeit prophetical spi­rit. The true Prophets I grant of old, were by the strength of the impression of their visions upon their Animal spirits, sometimes thrown into a fit of trembling; but then it was not continually so, and when it was, it might be rather a pre­fent astonishment from so strange and unwonted sight (as is Dan. 10. 11. Habak 3. 16. Procop. Gaz. in 1 Reg. 1 [...]. Ed. Meur­sii. common in such cases) or else from the strong apprehension they had of the dismall judgements God threatned to the peo­ple▪ but however, it never took from them the free use of their reason and faculties, which were alwayes conversant about the matters reveased unto them. But as Proo [...]pius Gaz [...] ­ [...] observes of the false Prophets, [...], they were acted like mad m [...] ▪ Which he takes notice of upon oc­cassion o [...] Sa [...] prophe [...]ying when the evil spirit came upon [Page 96] him; and interprets with the Jewish Writers, of a madnesse rather then true Prophecy. Such as that of Cassandra when she is brought in by Lycophron,

[...], saith Tz [...]tzes, that is [...], which is fully described by Lucan, of one pretending Enthusiasm:

And soon after,

Whereby he discovers her, not to be a true Enthusiast, because she used not such a strange confused voice and tremblings as they did who were their proper Enthusiasts, as the Sybils and the Pythian prophetess. By this we see, that these Earthquakes of violent passions are caused by the Prince of the ayr, and not by the gentle breathings of the Divine Spirit: That these convulsions of mens spirits, are not the consequents of the inhabitation of the good Spirit, but of the violent intrusion of the evil one: That that temper of mind is most suitable to Religion, which is as well free from the bleaknesse and tur­bulency of passion, as the saint gleams of Lightnesse and Vanity.

But a further solemnity then this is required by the dictates of Nature too, which lyes in the circumstantiating of time and place, and a dedication of both to the end of Worship. That these are very consonant to natural Reason, appears by the universall consent of all Nations agreeing: in any form of the Worship of a Deity: who have all had their set-times, [Page 97] and fixed places to perform this Worship in. I shall not insist as some have done, that the Seventh day hath been particu­larly and solemnly observed for the worship of God by the consent of Nations: Although there be many probable ar­guments and plausible testimonies brought for a peculiarity of honour to, if not service on, the Seventh-day, out of Io­sephus, Ioseph. c. App. l. 2. Euseb. Praep. l. 13. cap. 12. Tertul. A­pol. c. 16. c. Notion. l. 1. c. 13. Lamprid. vit. Alex. Sever. Seneca ep. 95. Tibullus. eleg. 3. l. 1. Lucian. Pseudol. p. 893. ed. Paris. Aristobulus, Iudaeus (and by him from Linus, Hesiod, Homer) Clemens Alexandrinus, Tertullian, Lampridius, Se­neca, Tibullus, and many others. From which Testimonies, it appears that some kind of reverence and honour was given to the Seventh-day; but whether that day was the seventh of the week, or the seventh of the month; (which was con­secrated among the Greeks to Apollo, upon which the [...] and [...], and the seventh of every month were observed in honour of him;) whether the title of [...] did belong to the seventh as one of the [...] or [...], Festivall or inauspicious dayes (for it was common to both)? Whether observed by any publike religious custome, or by some private superstition, are things too large to inquire into, too difficult now to determine, and not necessary for my present purpose; It being sufficient in order to that, if they had any set times at all for worship, which shews how solemn the wor­ship of God ought to be. And this is not denyed by any; it being so necessary a consectary from the duty of Worship that there must be a time for performance of it. And not only in generall that there must be some time, but a sufficient propor­tion of time to be consecrated to the publike exercise of piety, both from the consideration of mans obligation to divine ser­vice from his nature, from the weight and concernment of the things that time is imployed in, and the inward sense of im­mortality upon the soul of man. But then what this propor­tion of time must exactly be, I see not how meer natural light could determine it, but it would rather suggest it to be highly reasonable to wait for and expect such a determination from the supream Rector and Governour of the world. It being far more fit for the Master to prescribe unto the servant what proportion of service he expects from him, then that the servant should both divide and choose his own time, and the proportion of service which he owes to his Master. Nay it [Page 98] being so much more reasonable for us to wait for Gods order, then for a servant for his Masters, as Gods power and Domi­nion over the creature is greater then that of a Master over his servant; as it is the voyce and sense of nature that Gods commands cannot otherwise be but just, holy, reasonable and good: which may be otherwise from men; as the acceptance of our persons with God, lies not barely in the work done; but in the doing it out of obedience to the commands of God; which is otherwise with men▪ as, God can give strength to perform what he commands, which man cannot: which things considered make it evident to be highly reasonable that God himself should prescribe the proportion of time, and not mans nature. But when God hath thus determined it, nature can­not but assent to that particular determination, that in conside­ration of the works of God, it is most reasonable that rather one day in a week, then one in a month, should be dedicated to Gods service; that the seventh day of the week upon Gods resting on that day and sanctifying it, should be the precise day, unlesse some reason equivalent to that of the first institution, and approved by God for that end, be the ground of its altera­tion to another of the seven, which is the reason of the change under the Gospel.

As an evidence of the solemnity of times for worship, the §. 4. Romans as well as other Nations had their several feriae; their dayes set apart for the honour of their Gods. In which Ma­crobius tells us the Priests held them polluted, si indictis con­ceptisque Macrob. Saturnal. l. 1. c. 16. opus aliquod fieret; praetereâ regem sacrorum flami­nes que non licebat videre feriis opus fieri, & ideò per praeconem denuntiabatur nè quid tale ageretur, & praecepti negligens multabatur. If any work were done upon those dayes of Rest, the day was polluted; and the person punished, unlesse it were as Umbro there affirms, in order to the honour of their Gods, or for necessaries of life. To which purpose Scae­vola answered him that asked, what work must be done upon the Feria: Quod pratermissum noceret, What would be spoiled by letting alone; as taking an Ox out of a ditch, strengthen­ing a beam like to fall and ruine men; and thence Maro allow­ed it lawfull to wash sheep if it were to cure, and not only to cleanse them.

By which last word, Macrobius saith it was only lawfull to do it for healing them, and not in order to gain. Servius in­forms Servius Honor. in Virgil. Ge­orgic. 1. us likewise that the Priests when they went to sacrifice, sent their servants before to bid all Tradesmen leave working, nè pro negotio suo & ipsorum oculos & Deorum ceremonias atta­minent; Feria enim operae Deorum creditae sunt; Lest by fol­lowing their work they both offend them and the Gods too: For these Holy-dayes are devoted to the service of the Gods. Festus saith that upon their dies religiosi, nisi quod necesse est, Festus V. religios. nefas habetur facere; nothing but works of pure necessity were to be done, But by dies religiosi, probably he means the dies atr [...] & nefasti; their ominous unlucky dayes, as they accounted them. But however, Macrobius distinguisheth the dayes among the Romans into Dies festi, profesti, & intercisi. The Festi were dedicated to the Gods, the Profesti to their own works, the Intercisi were divided between both, at some hours of which it was lawfull to follow their civill employments, at others not. Nam cum hostiacaeditur, fari nefas est; inter caesa & porrecta, fari licet; rursus cum adoletur, non licet. While the sacrifice was killing no Courts of Judicature were opened (in which the Praetor might fari tria verba solemnia, Do, dico; addico, thence called dies fasti) but between the killing the sacrifice and offering up the entrails (called Porrecta from porricere, which was verbum sacrificale pervetustum, saith Tur­nebus, Advers. l. 24. c. 13. an old word belonging to sacrificing, exta Di [...]s cum da­bant, porricere dicebant, Varro) then it was lawfull to open the Courts; but again when the sacrifice was offered, it was not. By which we see as from the light of Nature, that what dayes and times, whether weekly, monthly or Anniversary, were de­signed De Re Rust. l. 1. c 29. and appointed as dies Festi, for the service of God, were to be spent wholly in order to that end, and not to give some part to God, and take others to themselves: as they were wont to do in their sacrifices, to offer up some part to the Gods, and feast upon the rest themselves, as Athenaeus tells us that Conon and Alcibiades offered such Hecatombs to the Gods, that they entertained the people upon the remainders Dei [...]nos. l. 1. of them. And from hence we may see how far short of natural [Page 100] light their Religion falls, who make no scruple of spending a great part of the dayes devoted to Gods worship in follow­ing either their imployments or recreations: Which latter seem more directly to impugne the end of such time appointed then the other, in as much as recreations tend more to the ratifying mens spirits; and evaporating them into lightnesse and vanity, and so discomposing them for the duties of spiri­tuall worship, then mens serious and lawfull callings do. But further, we observe, among the Romans severall sorts of dayes appointed for publike worship. Macrobius reckons up Saturn. l. 1. c. 16. four sorts of them, Stative, Conceptivae, Imperativae, & Nun­dinae. Stativae, were the set festivall dayes observed every year by the whole people, and marked for that end in their Fasti. Such were the Agonalia, Carmentalia, Lupercalia, which are marked with red Letters in the Fasti consulares, or De jure Nat. apud Heb. l. 3. cap. 15. De Idolol. c. 14. the Calendarium Romanum, by Ios. Scaliger call'd Calenda­rium Colotianum, which may be seen at large in Mr. Selden: besides which, their other anniversary festivals are there set down: which Tertullian saith, being all put together, Pen­tecostem implere non poterunt, make not up the number of fifty; and so not so many as our Lords Dayes in a year are. Concep­tivae, were such festivals as were annually observed, but the dayes of the keeping them were every year determined by the Magistrates of the Priests, as Latinae, Sementivae, Pagana­lia, Compitalia. Imperativa, were such as the Consuls or Prae­tors did command at their own pleasure. Such were their so­lemn supplications in times of trouble, and their dayes of Tri­umph and Thanksgiving for Victories. The Nundinae were those which returned every ninth day, and therefore the Letter by which they observed the return of the ninth day, was H. as among us Christians G. which because it notes the return of the Lords Dayes, we call the Dominical Letter. These Nundinae were the days when the Country people brought in their wares into the City to be sold, which were anciently observed as festi­val dayes, sacred to Iupiter, but by the Lex Hortensia were made Dies fasti, for determining the Controversies that might arise among the people in their dealings; as the Court of Pye­powder was instituted among us upon the same account. So much for the solemnity of time used in the service of God.

[Page 101]Another evidence of the solemnity of Wo [...]ship, was the ex­traordinary §. 5. care of the Heathens in preparing themselves for it, by cleansing and purifying themselves with water, for which Hom. Iliad. Apoll. Ar­gon. l. 1. Casaub. ad Th [...]o. [...]. Saub de sacri. cap. 12. Paus. l. 2. Matth. 27. 24. Casaub. ad Bar. exer. 16. s. 75. [...]aro [...]. ad An. Christi 34 M [...]nta­cutius Orig. Eccles. 10. 1. l. 2. p. 388. Vossius Harm. Evang. l. [...]. cap. 5. V. M [...]ye­rum de P [...] ­patu, Rom. l. 1. c. 32. 5 De Croy. Conf. 1. c. 33. Ov [...]d. Fast. lib. 2. purpose they had their [...] for cleansing their hands, and their [...] and [...] standing at the porch of their Temples for their whole bodies, which custome was generally observed by the Heathens, as is very obvious in the severall Writers of their Customs in sacrificing; besides which they observed likewise this washing with water, by way of lustra­tion and expiation of their faults, as Triclinius the Sholiast on Sophocles tells us, it was an antient custome when men had murthered others, [...], to wash their hands in expiation of their guilt; as Orestes did in Pausanias after the killing his mother, and some think Pilate in the Gospel did so for the same end; but his was only to declare his innocency, and not to expiate his sin, as is observed by many upon that place. But however, from hence we may take notice of the Spring and Fountain of the Popes Holy-water: which was consecrated by Numa long before Alexander 1. to whom Polydore Virgil and others at­tribute the first use of it in the Christian Church: And as the use of it, and the manner of sprinkling it is the same among the Papists, as it was among the Heathen; so likewise the end of it: witness the old Rime,

Which may be sufficiently answered with the Ce [...]sure of a Heathen;

But from this I pass to the solemnity in their Worship it self, evidenced by the generall silence commanded in it; which [Page 102] appears by Horace's Favete, linguis, Ovids Ore favent populi nunc cum venit aurea pompa; Virgils fida silentia sacris; Festus' s V. Brisson. de sormulis lib. 1. p. 8. Linguam pascito, i. e. coerceto; The Egyptians setting Harpocra­tes his Image in the entrance to their Temples, and the Ro­mans placing the Statue of Angerona on the Altar of Volupia. The Greeks had their [...] which did [...], as Iulius Pollux tells us, which Plautus calls fa­cere O [...]omist. c. lib. [...]. c. 12. audientiam, to command silence: much as the Deacons afterwards did in the Primitive Church, who were wont to command silence by their Orarium, and were thence call'd [...] among the Christians (for though [...], as applyed to the Bishop and Presbyters, did signifie [...] and [...], to preach; yet as it was applyed to the Deacons, it im­plyed V. Leon. 5. Allatium de Mar­thece, vet. Eccles. p. 45, &c. only their commanding silence in order to the prayers of the Catechumeni, call'd [...], as Aristenus observes on Concil. Carthag. can. 106. But this by the way.) The formula used by the Greeks in commanding silence was, [...] to which Aristonicus the Fidler alluded when in the Market place of Mylassa, a Town in Caria, he saw many Temples, and but few Citizens, he cryed out [...] instead of [...] Athenaeus Deipnos. l. 8. c. 8. But I passe these things over, as being commonly known, only observing from them the solemnity of their publick devoti­ons; which is further seen in their solemn excluding unfit per­sons from partaking with them in their sacrifices. Of which Virgil, Ovid, Statius, Silius Italicus, and others among the V. Apud Briss. de sormulis, l. 1. & apud Seld. de Sy­ned. lib. 1. cap. 10. Romans speak; and the Lictor in some Sacrifices stood up, saith Festus, and cryed aloud, Hostis, mulier, vinctus, exesto, i. e. extra esto: and to keep unfit persons the better ff, the Fla­mines had a Commentaculum, a kind of Rod in their hands. Among the Greeks the old form continued from Orpheus or Onomacritus his Orphaica, [...]. and those that sacrifice, asked [...], the other answered [...]. From Suidas in [...]. all these things laid together, we see the great solemnity used by them in their worship, which considered in its self, was not the product of superstition, but a dictate of the Law of Nature. And it seems most naturall to the acts of disci­pline, that they should be performed in the most publick so­lemn manner, and not in any private C [...]andestine way: which being so done, oft times lose the designed effect of them, in [Page 103] making men sensible and ashamed of those miscarriages which made them deserve so sharp and severe a censure. Thence among the Jews, their solemn sentence of the greater excom­munication was pronounced by the sound of a Trumpet; and so they say Meroz was excommunicated with 400. Trumpets: Ioh. Coch. Excerpt. Gen Sau­bed. cap 1. p. 146. Vostius in Pir [...]e Elic­sest p 2. 6. Selden de Syned. l. 1. cap. 7. and the same number they report was used in excommunica­ting Iesus of Nazareth, which was usually done by the Ma­gistrate, or the Rector of the University: as they tell us a story of a man coming to buy flesh at Pombeditha (which was one of the three Universities of the remaining Jews in Chaldea after the return from Captivity, the other were Sora and Neharda) but offering some opprobrious language to R. Iehuda then Governour of the University, he makes no more to do, but prolatus tubis hominem excommunicavit, brings out his Trumpets and excommunicates him. And as the use of Bells, since their invention, did supply the former use of Trumpets in calling the Congregation together (which I sup­pose was the account of using Trumpets in excommunicating from the Congregation) so it seems the Bells were sometimes used to ring men out of, as well as into the Church; thence the solemn Monkish curse, cursing men with Bell, Book and Candle, which can have no other sense but from this practice. So much shall suffice to shew the soundation which the so­lemnity of Worship, and the acts belonging to it, have in the dictates of Nature manifested by the voyce and consent of Na­tions, for herein vox Populi is vox Naturae, as at other times it is Vox Dei.

CHAP. VI.

THe fourth thing which Nature dictates in reference to a §. 1. Church-society, is, That there must be a way agreed upon to determine and decide all those Controversies arising in this Society, which immediately tend to the breaking the peace and unity of it. We have seen already that natural reason requires a disparity between persons in a society: To form and constitute a Society, there must be order and power in some, there must be inferi­ority and subjection in others answering to the former; And by these we suppose a Society to be now modeld. But Nature must either be supposed defective in its designs and contrive­ments as to the necessaries required for the management of them; or else there must likewise be implyed a sufficient provision for the maintenance and preservation of the Socie­ties thus entred into. It is no wise agreeable to the wisdom of Nature to erect a Fabrick with such materials, which though they may lye one upon the other, yet if not fitly compacted together, will fall in pieces again assoon as it is set up: nor yet to frame a body with meer flesh and bones, and the supe­riority of some members above the other; for unlesse there be joints and sinews and ligatures to hold the parts together, [Page 105] the dissolution (will immediately) follow the formation of it. The end and design of Nature is, preservation and continuance, and therefore things necessary in order to that, must be imply­ed in the first design of the being of the thing; so that at least, as to its self, there be no defect in order to that. This must in reason be supposed in all Societies, that when they are first entred, it must be upon such terms as may be sufficient to maintain and keep up those Societies in that peace and order which is requisite in order to the continuance of them. For what diseases are to bodies, Age and fire are to buildings, that divisions and animosities are to Societies, all equally tending to the ruine and destruction of the things they seize upon. And as bodies are furnished by Nature, not only with a re­ceptive and concoctive faculty, of what tends to their nourish­ment, but with an expulsive faculty of what would tend to the ruine of it. So all civill bodies must not only have ways to strengthen them, but must have likewise a power to expell and disperse those noxions humours and qualities which tend to dissolve the frame, compages and constitution of them. A power then to prevent mischiefs is as necessary in a Society, as a power to settle things in order to the advancement of the common good of Society. This therefore the Church as a religious Society must likewise he endowed with, viz. a power to maintain its self, and keep up peace and unity within its self: which cannot otherwise be supposed (considering the bilious humour in mens natures, not wholly purged out by Christianity) without some way to decide Controversies which will arise, disturbing the peace of it. For the clearing of this, which much concerns the power and government of the Church, we shall consider what the controversies are which tend to break the Churches peace: and what way the Law of nature finds out for the ending of them, Which we are the more necessitated to speak to, because nothing hath begotten contro­versies more then the power of determining them hath done.

The Controversies then which tend to break the peace of §. 2. a religious Society, are either matter of different practice, or matter of different opinion. The former, if it comes from no just and necessary cause, and ends in a totall separation from that Society the person guilty of it was joyned with, [Page 106] is justly call'd Schism; which (as [...] it▪) is an Ecclefi­asticall sedition, as Sedition i [...] a Lay Schism; both being di­rectly contrary to that communion and friendlinesse which should be preserved in all Societies. The latter, if impugning somewhat fundamentall, in order to the end of constituting religious Societies, or being a lesser matter, if wilfully taken up, and obstinately maintained, is call'd Here sit; which two are seldom seen out of each others company., and when they are together, are like the blind and same man in the Fable, the one lent the other eyes, and the other lent him feet: one to find out what they desired, the other to run away with it when they had it. The Heretick he useth his eyes to spy out some cause or pretence of deserting Communion▪ the Schismatick he helps him with his leg [...] to run away from it; but between them both, they rob the Church of its peace and unity. But in order to the making clear what the Churches power is in re­ference to these, we are to take notice of these things. First, That the Church hath no direct immediate power over mens opinions: So that a matter of meer different opinion lyes not properly within the cognizance of any Church power; the reason of it is this, because the end of power lodged in the Church, is to preserve the peace and unity of its self: now a meer different opinion doth not violate the bonds of Society; for, Opinionum di [...]er sitas & opinantium unitas non sunt [...], Men may preserve communion under different apprehensions. So long then▪ as diversity of opinion tends not to the breaking the quiet and tranquillity of the Church of God, a man may safely enjoy his own private apprehensions, as to any danger of molestation from Church▪Governours; That is, so long as a man keeps his opinion to himself, and hath the power of being his own Counsellor. It is not the difference of opinion formally considered when it is divulged abroad that is punishable, but the tendency to Schism, which lyes in the div [...]lging of it, and drawing others away from the received Truths: For the opinion its self is an internall act of the mind, and therefore is punishable by no externall power, as that of the Magistrate or Church is; as no internall action is under the jurisdiction or au­thority of a Magistrate, any further then as necessarily [Page 107] conjoyned with the outward action, or as it hath a direct in­fluence upon it. The case of blasphemy, which is a thing of the highest nature in this kind, is not punishable by men, as blasphemy implyes low and undervaluing thoughts of God; but as being a thing divulged (else no formal blaspemy) it tends apparently to the dishonour of God, and consequently to the breaking in pieces all such Societies, whose great foun­dation is the belief of the Majesty and glory of God. So Idolatry under the Law was punished, as it was immediately destructive of that obedience which men did owe to the true God. And under the Gospel, it is not meer difference of opi­nion, judgement, and apprehension, which layes men open to the Censures of that power which moderates and rules a reli­gious Society; but the endeavour by difference of opinion to alienate mens spirits one from another, and thereby to break the Society into fractions and divisions, is that which makes men liable to restraint and punishment. From whence it fol­lows, that where the peace and unity of the Church may be preserved, and yet men keep up different apprehensions of things, there is nothing deserving any severe animadversion from the Rulers of that Society: For a power corrective, and vindictive, must suppose something acted contrary to the Laws and Rules of the Society, and the end of committing that power into the hands of Governours: now here is nothing of that nature; for the Laws of mutual Society are observed; and the end of Church-Government is to see nè quid Ecclesia detrimenti capiat, lest the Church as a Society be any wayes prejudiced: which cannot be while men maintain that love, affection, and communion which becomes the members of such a Society. The unity then required in the Church, is not an unity of judgement and apprehension among the members of it, which though it be their duty to endeavour after, yet it is no further attainable by mens endeavours then perfection is; and Unio Christianorum in this sense, is one of the Jewels belonging to the Crown of Heaven. There, is no necessity then of inquiring after an infallible Judge of Controversies, unlesse we had some promise and assurance from Christ, that the members of his Church should never differ in their judge­ments from one another, and then what need of an infallible [Page 108] Judge? and if Christ had appointed an infallible Judg, he would infallibly have discovered it to the minds of all sober men; or else his infallibility could never attain its end: For while I question whether my Judge be infallible or no, I cannot in­fallibly assent to any of his determinations. And where there is no ground for an infallible Judge, for any to pretend to it, is the worst of supposable errours, because it renders all others incurable by that apprehension, and takes away all possibility of repentance while men are under that perswa­sion. The Unity then of the Church, is that of Communion, and not that of Apprehension; and different opinions are no further lyable to censures, then as men by the broaching of them, do endeavour to disturb the peace of the Church of God.

That then which seems most lyable to censures in a Church, § 3. is Schism, as being immediately destructive of that commu­nion which should be maintained in a religious Society. But as to this too, we must observe something further, and not to think and judge every thing to deserve the name, which is by many call'd Schism; it being well observed by a very learned and judicious Divine; that Heresie and Schism, as they are com­monly used, are two Theologicall scare-crows, with which, they Tract of Schism, 1642. who use to uphold a party in Religion, use to fright away such, as making enquiry into it, are ready to relinquish and oppose it, if it appear either erroneous or suspitious. For as Plutarch reports of a Painter, who having unskilfully painted a Cock, chased away all Cocks and Hens, that so the imperfection of his Art might not appear by comparison with nature; so men willing for ends, to admit of no fancy but their own, endeavour to hinder an en­quiry into it, by way of comparison of somewhat with it, perad­venture truer, that so the deformity of their own might not ap­pear. Thus he▪ Schism then, as it imports a separation from communion with a Church-society, is not a thing intrinsecally and formally evil in it self, but is capable of the differences of good and evil according to the grounds, reasons, ends, and circumstances inducing to such a separation. The with­drawing from Society, is but the materiality of Schism; the formality of it must be fetched from the grounds on which that is built. It is therefore a subject which deserve a strict [Page 109] inquiry, what things those are which may make a withdraw­ing from a religious Society, to which a man is joyned, to be lawfull: For as it is a great sin on the one hand, unnecessarily to divide and separate from Church-society; so it is an offence on the other side, to continue communion when it is a duty to withdraw it. For the resolving this knotty and intricate Question, I shall lay down some things by way of premisall, and come closely to the resolution of it.

First, Every Christian is under an obligation to joyn in Church-society with others, because it is his duty to professe himself a Christian, and to own his Religion publickly, and to partake of the Ordinances and Sacraments of the Gospel, which cannot be without society with some Church or other. Every Christian as such, is bound to look upon himself as the member of a body, viz. the visible Church of Christ; and how can he be known to be a member, who is not united with other parts of the body? There is then an obligation upon all Christian [...] ▪ to engage in a religious Society with others, for partaking of the Ordinances of the Gospel. It hath been a case disputed by some (particularly by Grotius the supposed Author of a little Tract, An semper sit communicandum per symbolu? when he designed the Syncretism with the Church of Rome) whether in a time when Churches are divided, it be a Christians duty to communicate with any of those parties which divide the Church, and not rather to suspend commu­nion from all of them. A case not hard to be decided; for either the person questioning it, doth suppose the Churches divided to remain true Churches, but some to be more pure then others, in which case, by vertue of his generall obliga­tion to communion, he is bound to adhere to that Church which appears most to retain its Evangelicall purity; Or else he must suppose one to be a true Church, and the other not; in which the case is clearer, that he is bound to communicate with the true Church: or he must judge them alike impure, which is a case hard to be found; but supposing it is so, either he hath joyned formerly with one of them, or he is now to choose which to joyn with; if he be joyned already with that Church, and sees no other but as impure as that, he is bound to declare against the impurity of the Church, and [Page 110] to continue his communion with it; if he be to choose com­munion, he may so long suspend till he be satisfied, which Church comes nearest to the primitive constitution, and no longer. And therefore I know not whether Chrysostomes act were to be commended, who after being made a Deacon in the Church of Antioch by Meletius, upon his death, because Flavianus came in irregularly as Bishop of the So [...]at. hist. Eccles. lib. 6, cap. 3. Church, would neither communicate with him, nor with Pau­linus another Bishop at that time in the City, nor with the Meletians, but for three years time withdrew himself from communion with any of them. Much lesse were the [...] or the Haesitantes as the Latins called them, to be com­mended, who after the determination of the Council of Chal­cedou against Entyches, because of great differences remaining V. Petavii. Diotrib. de Po [...]est. Consa, & com. usurp. cap. 4 in Egypt and the Eastern Churches, followed Zenoes Henoti­cum, and would communicate neither with the Orthodox Churches, nor Eutychians. But I see not what censure J [...]ome could in [...]urr, who going into the Diocesse of Antioeh, and finding the Churches there under great divisions, there be­ing besides the Arian Bishop, three others in the Church of Antioch, Meletius, Paulinus, and Vitalis, did so long suspend communion with any of them, till he had satisfied himself about the occasion of the Schism, and the innocency of the persons and Churches engaged in it. But if he had with­drawn longer, he had offended against his obligation to joyn in Church-society with others, for participation of Gospel-Ordinances; which is the necessary duty of every Christian.

Secondly, Every Christian actually joyned in Church-society §. 4. with others, is so long bound to maintain society with them, till his communion with them becomes sin. For nothing else can justifie withdrawing from such a Society, but the unlawful­ness of continuing any longer in it. Supposing a Church then to remain true, as to its constitution and essentials, but there be many corruptions crept into that Church; whether is it the duty of a Christian to withdraw from that Church because of those corruptions, and to gather new Churches only for purer administration, or to joyn with them only for that end? This, as far as I understand it, is the state of the Controversie [Page 111] between our Parochiall Churches, and the Congregationall. The resolution of this great Question must depend on this; Whether is it a sin to communicate with Churches true as to essentialls, but supposed corrupt in the exercise of disci­pline? For Parochiall Churches are not denyed to have the essentialls of true Churches by any sober Congregational men. For there is in them the true Word of God preached, the true Sacraments administred, and an implicite Covenant between Pastor and People, in their joyning together. All that is pleaded then, is corruption, and defect in the exercise and administration of Church order and Discipline. Now that it is lawfull for Christians to joyn with Churches so defective, is not only acknowledged by Reverend Mr. Norton in his answer to Apollius, but largely and fully proved. For Respons. ad Syllog. Quest. cap. 16. which he layes down five Propositions which deserve to be seriously considered, by all which make that a plea for with­drawing from society with other Churches. First, A Belie­ver may lawfully joyn himself in communion with such a Church, where he cannot enjoy all the Ordinances of God; a [...] in the Jewish Church, in our Saviours time, which refused the Gospel of Christ, and the baptism of Iohn; and yet our Saviour bids us hear the Scribes and Pharisees sitting in Moses Chair, which hearing, saith he, doth imply conjunctio­nem Ecclesiae Iudaicae, a joyning with the Iewish Church: and so with Churches rejecting an article of faith; in the Church of Corinth the doctrine of the Re [...]rection, in the Churches of Galatia the doctrine of Ju [...]ion by faith; but the Apostle no-where requires separation on that account from them. Secondly▪ A Believer may lawfully joyn in com­munion with such a Church, in which some corruption in the worship of God is tolerated without Reformation. As the offering on High-places from Solomon to Hez [...]kiah in the Church of Iuda, observation of Circumc [...]sion, and the necessi­ty of keeping the Ceremonial Law in the Churches of Gala [...]ia. Thirdly, A Believer may lawfully joyn himself in commu­nion with such a Church in which such are admitted to Sacra­ments, who give no evident signs of grace, but seem to be Lovers of this World; which he proves, because it is every ones main duty to examine himself, and because ano­thers [Page 112] sin is no hurt to him, and therefore cannot keep him from his duty; and then by mens coming unworthily, non pollui­tur communio, licet minuitur consolatio, the communion i [...] not defiled, though the comfort of it be diminished. He brings instance from the Church of Corinth, among whom were many scandalous, and had not repented, 2 Cor. 12. 20, 21. So in the Jewish Church which lay under great corruptions, when 1 Cor. 14. 34. 1 Cor. 6. 4.—15. our Saviour and his Apostles communicated with it. Fourthly, Although a Believer joyn with such a Church, he is not there­fore bound with the guilt, nor defiled with the pollutions of others; which he proves, because it is lawfull to do it, and so he contract: no guilt by it. Fifthly, A Believer that hath joyned himself to such a Church, is not bound to withdraw, and separate from such a Church under pain of guilt if he doth it not, because it implyes a contradiction to be lawfull to joyn to such a Church, and yet unlawfull to continue in its communion; for that speaks it to be a Church, and this lat­ter to be no Church; and by that he doth imply it to be unlawfull to separate from any Society which is acknowledged to be a true Church, Thus for that learned and Reverend man, by whom we see that the received Principles of the sober and moderate part of those of that perswasion, are not at such a distance from others, as many imagine. We see then that communicating with a Church not so pure as we desire, i [...] no sin by the arguments by him produced. And how it should be then lawfull to withdraw from such a Church, meerly for purer communion, I [...]stand not. This I am sure was not the case of our Churches in their separation from the Church of Rome: the main ground of which was the sin of communi­cating with that Church in her Idolatry and Superstition, and the impossibility of communicating with her, and not partaking of her sins, because she required a profession of her errours, and the practise of her Idolatry as the neces­sary conditions of her communion; in which case it is a sin to communicate with her.

And this leads me now to a closer resolution of the case of § 5. withdrawing from Churches in which men have formerly been associated, and the grounds which may make such a with­drawing lawfull. In order to that we must distinguish [Page 113] between these things. First, Between corruptions in the do­ctrine of a Church, and corruptions in the practice of a Church. Secondly, Between corruptions whether in doctrine, or pra­ctise, professed and avowed by a Church, and required as conditi­ons of communion in all members of it, and corruptions crept in, and only tolerated in a Church. Thirdly, Between non-Com­munion as to the abuses of a Church, and a positive and totall separation from a Church, as it is such. From these things I lay down these following Propositions.

First, Where any Church is guilty of corruptions, both in doctrine and practice, which it avoweth and professeth, and re­quireth the owning them as necessary conditions of communion with her, there a non-communion with that Church is necessary, and a totall and positive separation is lawfull and convenient. I have said already that the necessity and lawfulnesse of this departing from communion with any Church is wholly to be resolved by an inquiry into the grounds and reasons of the action it self. So that the matter of fact must of necessity be discussed, before the matter of Law as to separation from the Church be brought into debate. If there be a just and necessary cause for separation, it must needs be just and ne­cessary; therefore the cause must be the ground of resolving the nature of the [...]ction. Schism then is a separation from any Church upon any slight, triviall, unnecessary cause; but if the cause be great and important, a Departure it may be, Schism it cannot be. They who define Schism to be a volun­tary separation from the Church of God; if by voluntary, they mean that where the will is the cause of it: the defini­tion stands good and true; for that must needs be groundless and unnecessary as to the Church it self: but if by voluntary be meant a spontaneous departing from communion with a Church, which was caused by the corruptions of that Church, then a separation may be so voluntary, and yet no Schism: for though it be voluntary, as to the act of departing, yet that is only consequentially, supposing a cause suffici­ent to take such a resolution; but what is voluntary antece­dently, that it hath no other Motive but faction and humour, that is properly Schism, and ought so to be looked upon. But in our present case, three things are supposed as the causes and motives to such a forsaking communion. First, Cor­ruption [Page 114] in Doctrine; the main ligature of a religious Society is the consent of it in Doctrine with the rule of Religion, the Word of God. Therefore any thing which tends to subvert and overthrow the foundation of the gathering such a Society (which is the profession and practice of the true Religion) yields sufficient ground to withdraw from communion with those who professe and maintain it. Not that every small errour is a just ground of separation, for then there would be no end of separation, and men must separate from one another, till knowledge comes to its perfection, which will only be in glory; but any thing which either di­rectly or consequentially doth destroy any fundamental article of Christian faith. Which may be as well done by adding to fundamental articles, as by plain denying them. And my reason is this: because the very ratio of a fundamentall ar­ticle doth imply, not only its necessity to be believed and pra­ctised (and the former in reference to the latter, for things are therefore necessary to be known, because necessary to be done, and not è contrà) but likewise its sufficiency as to the end for which it is called Fundamentall. So that the articles of faith called Fundamentall, are not only such as are necessary to be believed, but if they be, are sufficient for salvation to all that do believe them. Now he that adds any thing to be believed or done as fundamentall, that is necessary to salvation, doth thereby destroy the sufficiency of those former articles in order to salvation; for if they were sufficient, how can new ones be necessary. The case wil be clear by an Instance. Who assert the satisfaction of Christ for sinners to be a fun­damentall article, and thereby do imply the sufficiency of the belief of that in order to salvation; now if a Pope or any other command me to believe the meritoriousnesse of good works with the satisfaction of Christ as necessary to salvation, by adding this he destroyes the former as a fundamentall ar­ticle: for if Christs satisfaction be sufficient, how can good works be meritorious? and if this latter be necessary, the other was not; for if it were, what need this be added! Which is a thing the Papists with their new Creed of Pius the fourth would do well to consider: and others too, who so confi­dently assert that none of their errours touch the founda­tion of faith. Where there is now such corruption in Do­ctrine [Page 115] supposed in a Church; withdrawing and separation from such a Church, is as necessary as the avoiding of her errours, and not partaking of her sins is. Thence we read in Scripture, of rejecting such as are hereticks, and withdrawing from their society, which will as well hold, to Churches as to persons, and so much the more, as the corruption is more dangerous, and the relation nearer of a member to a Church, then of one man to another: And from the reason of that command, we read in Ecclesiasticall History, that when Eulalius, Eu­phronius, and Placentius were constituted Bishops of Anti­och, being Arrians, many both of the Clergy and people, Theodoret. lib. 1. c. 22. who resolved to adhere to the true faith, withdrew from the publike meetings, and had private Assemblies of their own. And after, when Leontius was made Bishop of Antioch, who Id. l, 2. cap. 24. favour'd the Arrians, Flavianus and Diodorus, not only pub­likely reproved him for deserting the Orthodox faith, but withdrew the people from communion with him, and under­took Lib. 2. c. 17. Advers. the charge of them themselves: So when Foelix was made Bishop of Rome, none of the Church of Rome would enter into the Church while he was there. And Vincentius haeres. cap. 16. Lyrinensis tells us a remarkable story of Photinus Bishop of Syrmium in Pannonia, a man of great abilities and same, who suddenly turned from the true faith, and though his people both loved and admired him, yet when they discerned his er­rours, Quem antea quasi arietem gregis sequebantur, eundem deinceps veluti lupum fugere coeperunt, Whom they followed before as the leader of the flock, they now run away from as a de­vouring woolf. This is the first thing which makes separation, and withdrawment of communion, lawfull and necessary, viz. corruption of Doctrine. The second is Corruption of pra­ctice: I speak not of practice, as relating to the civil conver­sation of men, but as it takes in the Agenda of Religion. When Idolatrous customs, and superstitious practices are not only crept into a Church, but are the prescribed devotion of it: Such as the adoration of the Eucharist (chiefly insisted on by Mr. Daillé in his Apology, as a cause of separation from the Church of Rome) invocation of Saints and Angels, wor­shipping Images, and others of a like nature, used among the Papists, which are of themselves sufficient to make our separa­tion [Page 116] from them necessary. But then thirdly, as an accession to these two, is the publike owning and professing them, and requiring them, as necessary conditions of communion, from all the members of their Church which makes our withdraw­ing from them unavoidably necessary, as long as we judge them to be such corruptions as indeed they are. For men not to forsake the belief of errours, supposing them to be such, is impossible: and not to forsake the practice and profession of them upon such belief, were the highest hypocrisie: and to do so, and not to forsake the communion of that Church where these are owned, is apparently contradictious (as Mr. Chilling worth well observes) seeing the condition of com­munion Answ. to the Pref. p. 16. s. 22. with it is, that we must professe to believe all the do­ctrines of that Church, not only not to be errours, but to be certain and necessary truths: So that on this account, to be­lieve there are any errours in the Church of Rome, is actual­ly, and ipso facto, to forsake the communion of that Church; because the condition of its communion is the belief that there are none: And so that learned and rationall Author there fully proves, that those who require unlawfull and un­necessary conditions of communion, must take the imputa­tion of Schism upon themselves, by making separation from them just and necessary. In this case, when corruptions in opinion or practice are thus required, as conditions of com­munion, it is impossible for one to communicate with such a Church without sin; both materially, as the things are unlaw­full which he joyns with them in; and formally, as he judgeth them so. This is the first Proposition.

The second is, Where a Church retains the purity of doctrine §. 6. in its publick profession, but hath a mixture of some corrupti­ons, as to practice, which are only tolerated and not imposed, it is not lawfull to withdraw communion from such a Church, much lesse to run into totall separation from it: For here is no just and lawfull cause given of withdrawing; here is no owned corruption of doctrine or practice, nor any thing required as a condition of communion, but what is in its self necessa­ry; and therefore there can be no plea, but only pollution from such a communion, which cannot be to any who do not own any such supposed corruptions in the Church. Men may [Page 117] communicate with a Church, and not communicate with the abuses of a Church; for the ground of his communicating is, its being a Church, and not a corrupt or defective Church. And that men are not themselves▪ guilty, by partaking with those who are guilty of corruptions in a Church, might be easily and largely proved, both from the Church of the Jews in the case of Elies sons, and the Christian Churches of As [...], and Corinth, where we read of many corruptions reproved, yet nothing spoken of the duty of the members of those Churches to separate from them, which would have been, had it been a sin to communicate with those Churches when such corruptions were in it. Besides, what reason is there that one mans sins should defile another, more then anothers graces sanctifie another? and why corruption in another should defile him more then in himself, and so keep him from communica­ting with himself? and what security any one can have in the most refined Churches, but that there is some scandalous; or at least unworthy person among them? and whether then it is not his duty to try and examine all himself particularly, with whom he communicates? and why his presence at one Ordi­nance should defile it more then at another? and why at any more then in wordly converse, and so turn at last to make men Anchorets, as it hath done some? Many other rea­sons See Mr. Durham, Tract of Scandal, part. 2. ch. 12. might be produced against this, which I forbear, it being fully spoke to by others. And so I come to the Third Propositi­on, which is,

Where any Church, retaining the purity of doctrine, doth require the owning of, and conforming to, any unlawfull or suspected pra­ctice, men may lawfully deny conformity to, and communion with that Church in such things, without incurring the guilt of Schism. I say not, men may proceed to positive Schism as it is call'd, that is, erecting of new Churches, which from Cypri­an is call'd erigere Altare contra Altare; but only that with­drawing communion from a Church in unlawfull or suspected things, doth not lay men under the guilt of Schism: which because I know it may meet with some opposition from those men, who will sooner call men Schismaticks then prove them so, I shall offer this reason for it to consideration. If our separation from the Church of Rome. was therefore lawfull, [Page 118] because she required unlawfull things, as conditions of her communion; then where-ever such things are required by any Church; non-communion with that Church in those things will be lawfull too; and where non-communion is lawfull, there can be no Schism in it. Whatever difference will be thought of, as to the things imposed by the Church of Rome and others, will be soon answered by the proportion­able difference between bare non-conformity, and totall and positive separation. What was in its self lawfull and necessa­ry then, how comes it to be unlawfull and unnecessary now? Did that justifie our withdrawing from them, because they re­quired things unlawfull, as conditions of communion; and will not the same justifie other mens non-conformity, in things supposed by them unlawfull? If it be said here, that the Popes power was an usurpation, which is not in lawfull Governours of Churches; it is soon replyed, That the Popes usurpation mainly lyes in imposing things upon mens consciences as ne­cessary, which are doubtfull, or unlawfull; and where-ever the same thing is done, there is an usurpation of the same nature, though not in so high a degree; and it may be as lawfull to withdraw communion from one as well as the other. If it be said, that men are bound to be ruled by their Gover­nours, in determining what things are lawfull, and what not? To this it is answered: first, no true Protestant can swear blind obedience to Church-Governours in all things. It is the high­est usurpation to rob men of the liberty of their judgements: That which we plead for against the Papists, is, that all men have eyes in their heads as well as the Pope, that every one hath a judicium privata discretionis, which is the rule of pra­ctice, as to himself; and though we freely allow a ministeriall power, under Christ, in the Government of the Church, yet that extends not to an obligation upon men, to go against the dictates of their own reason and conscience. Their power is only directive and declarative, and in matters of duty can bind no more then reason and evidence brought from Scrip­ture by them doth. A man hath not the power over his own understanding, much l [...]sse can others have it. Nullus credit Picus Mi-? ra [...]d. Apol. p. 225. 226. aliquid esse verum, quia vult credere id esse verum; non est enim in potestate hominis facere aliquid apparere intellectui suo verum [Page 119] quando voluerit. Either therefore men are bound to obey Church-Governours in all things absolutely, without any re­striction or limitation; (which if it be not usurpation and do­minion over others faith in them, and the worst of implicite faith in others, it is hard to define what either of them is,) or else if they be bound to obey only in lawfull things; I then enquire who must be judge what things are lawfull in this case, what not? if the Governours still, then the power will be absolute again; for to be sure, whatever they command, they will say is lawfull, either in it self, or as they command it: if every private person must judge what is lawfull, and what not, which is commanded (as when all is said, every man will be his owd judge in this case, in things concerning his own welfare) then he is no further bound to obey then he judgeth the thing to be lawfull which is commanded. The plea of an erroneous conscience, takes not off the obligation to follow the dictates of it; for as he is bound to lay it down, supposing it erroneous, so he is bound not to go against it, while it is not laid down. But then again, if men are bound to submit to Governours in the determination of lawfull things, what plea could our Reformers have to withdraw themselves from the Popes yoke? it might have still held true, Boves arabant & Iob 1 14. Summ. 2. 2. q. 2. art. 6. Asina Pascebantur simul, which is Aquinas his argument for the submission of inferiours in the Church to their superi­ours: for did not the Pope plead to be a lawfull Governour, and if men are bound to submit to the determination of Church-Governours, as to the lawfulnesse of things; they were bound to believe him in that as well as other things, and so separation from that Church was unlawfull then: So that let men turn and wind themselves which way they will, by the very same arguments that any will prove separation from the Church of Rome lawfull, because she required unlawfull things, as conditions of her communion, it will be proved lawfull, not to conform to any suspected or unlawfull practice, required by any Church-Governours upon the same terms; if the thing so required, be after serious and [...]ober inquiry, judged unwarrantable by a mans own conscience. And with­all it would be further considered, whether when our best Writers against the Papists, do lay the imputation o [...] Schism, [Page 120] not on those who withdraw communion, but on them for requiring such conditions of communion (whereby they did rather eject men out of their communion, than the others separate from them) they do not by the same arguments, lay the imputation of Schism on all who require such condi­tions of communion, and take it wholly off from those who refuse to conform for conscience sake. To this I shall subjoyn the judgement of as learned and judicious a Divine, as most our Nation hath bred, in his excellent (though little). Tract concerning Schism. ‘In those Schisms, saith he, which con­cern Mr. Hales of Schism, p. 8. fact, nothing can be a just cause of refusing communi­on, but only to require the execution of some unlawfull or suspected act; for not only in reason, but in Religion too, that Maxim admits of no release, Cantissimi cujusque prae­ceptum; Quod dubitas, nè feceris. And after instanceth in the Schism about Image-worship, determin'd by the second Council of Nice, in which he pronounceth the Schismatical party to be the Synod its self, and that on these grounds: First, because it is acknowledged by all, that it is a thing un­necessary. Secondly, it is by most suspected. Thirdly, it is by many held utterly unlawfull: Can then (saith he) the enjoyning of such a thing be ought else but abuse? Or can the refusall of communion here, be thought any other thing then duty? Here, or upon the like occasion, to separate, may per­adventure bring personal trouble or danger (against which it concerns any honest man to have pectus praeparatum); fur­ther harm it cannot do, so that in these cases you cannot be to seek what to think, or what you have to do. And after­wards propounds it as a remedy to prevent Schism, to have all Liturgies and publike forms of service so framed, as that they admit not of particular and private fancies, but con­tain only such things, in which all Christians do agree. For, saith he, consider of all the Liturgies that are, and ever have been, and remove from them whatever is scandalous to any party, and leave nothing but what all agree on▪ and the evil shall be, that the publike service and honour of God shall no wayes suffer: Whereas, to load our publike forms, with the private fancies upon which we differ, is the most soveraign way to perpetuate Schism unto the [Page 121] Worlds end. Prayer, Confession, Thanksgiving, Reading of Scriptures in the plainest and simplest manner, were mat­ter enough to furnish out a sufficient Liturgy, though no­thing either of private Opinion, or of Church Pomp, of Garments or prescribed Gestures, of Imagenary, of Musick, of matter concerning the dead, of many Superfluities, which creep into the Church, under the name of Order and Decency, did interpose it self. To charge Churches and Liturgies with things unnecessary, was the first beginning of all Superstition; and when scruple of conscience began to be made or pretended, then Schism began to break in; if the special Guides and Fathers of the Church, would be a little sparing of incumbring Churches with Superfluities, or not over-rigid, either in reviving obsolete customes, or im­posing new, there would be far less cause of Schism or Su­perstition; and all the inconvenience were likely to ensue, would be but this, they should in so doing yield a little to the imbecillity of their inferiours, a thing which Saint Paul would never have refused to do: mean while, wheresoever false or suspected Opinions are made a piece of Church-Li­turgy, he that separates is not the Schismatick; for it is alike unlawful, to make profession of known or suspected falshood, as to put in practice unlawful or suspected actions.’

Thus far that excellent person, whose words I have taken the pains to transcribe, because of that great wisdome, judge­ment, and moderation, contained in them; and the seasonable­ness of his Counsel and Advice, to the present posture of affairs among us. Were we so happy but to take off things granted unnecessary by all, and suspected by many, and judged unlawful by some; and to make nothing the bonds of our Communion but what Christ hath done, viz. one Faith, one Baptism, &c. Allowing a liberty for matters of indifferency, and bearing with the weakeness of those who cannot bear things which others account lawfull, we might indeed be re­stored to a true Primitive luster far sooner, then by furbishing up some antiquated ceremonies, which can derive their pede­gree no higher, then from some ancient Custome and Tradi­tion. God will one day convince men, that the Unnion of the Church lies more in the Unity of Faith and Affection, then in [Page 122] uniformity of doubtful Rites and Ceremonies. The bond of Church-communion should be somthing common to strong and weak Christians, as S. Austin saith of the rule of faith, that it is pusillis magnis (que) communis; and certainly the Primitive Church, Ep. 57. that did not charge mens faith with such a load of Articles, as now in these latter ages men are charged with, would much less burden men with imposing doubtful practices upon them, as the ground of Church-communion. And for publick forms of Divine Service, such of all things certainly should be so com­posed, as to be the least subject to any scruple from any per­sons whatsoever; being on purpose composed for the declaring mens unity and consent in their publick worship: and those who are the most addicted to any one form, can never plead it unlawful to amend it; whereas others may, that it is not lawful or convenient at least, to use it without such alterations. And therefore, were there that spirit of mutual condescention, which was most certainly in Ecclesiâ primo-primitivâ, as Gratian som­where speaks, in the first and truly primitive Church in the Apostles time; our breaches as to this thing too, might soon be closed up, and the voice of Schism be heard among us no more. It argued very much the prudence and temper of the French-Churches, in composing their publick forms of prayer, that they were so far from inserting any thing controversiall into them, that Amyraldus tels us, the Papists themselves De secess. ab Eccl. Rom. & pace inter Evang. const. p. 225. would use them. Et quod vix credibile esset nisi publicè visere­tur, eas inseruerunt in eos libros in quos congesserunt varias pre­cationum formulas, And that which men would scarce believe unless they saw it, they inserted them into their own Prayer­books. The same temper was used by our Reformers in the composing our Liturgy, in reference to the Papists, to whom they had then an especial eye, as being the only party then ap­pearing, whom they desired to draw into their communion, by coming as near them as they well and safely could: And cer­tainly those Holy men, who did seek by any means to draw in others, at such a distance from their principles as the Papists were, did never intend by what they did for that end, to ex­clude any truly tender consciences from their Communion. That which they laid as a bait for them, was never intended by them as a hook for those of their own profession, But the [Page 123] same or greater reason which made them seek so much at that time (before the rent between the Papists and us was grown to that height it is now at; they being then in hopes by a fair complyance to have brought the whole Kingdom to joyn with them) I say the same reason which at that time made them yield so far to them then, would now have perswaded them to alter and lay aside those things which yield matter of offence, to any of the same profession with themselves now. For surely none will be so uncharitable toward those of his own professi­on, as not to think there is as much reason to yield in com­plyance with them, as with the Papists. And it cannot but be looked upon as a Token of Gods severe displeasure against us, if any, though unreasonable Proposals of Peace between us and the Papists should meet with such entertainment among many; and yet any fair Offers of Union and Accommoda­tion among our selves, be so coldly embraced and enter­tained.

Having thus far shewed how far the Obligation to keep in §. 7. a Church Society doth reach to the several Members of it: I now proceed to shew what way the light of nature directs men to, for the quieting and composing any differences which may arise in such a Society tending to break the Peace of it. But be­fore I come to the particular wayes directed to by the Law of Nature, for ending Controversies in the Church, I shall lay down some things by way of caution, for the right un­derstanding of what is already spoken, lest I should be thought, instead of pleading for peace, to leave a door open for an universal liberty, and so pave a new cawse-way towards Babel. First, That though it be lawful not to con­form to unlawful or suspected practises in a Church: yet it is not therefore lawful to erect new Churches. For all other essentials supposed in a Church, a meer requiring conformity in some suspected rites, doth not make it to be no true or sound Church, as to other things, from which it is lawful to make a to­tal divorce and separation. A total separation is, when a new and distinct society for worship is entered into, under distinct and peculiar officers governing by Laws and Church-rules different from that form which they separate from. This I do not assert to be therefore lawfull, because some things are required, [Page 124] which mens consciences are unsatisfied in: unless others pro­ceed to eject and cast them wholly out of communion on that account, in which case their separation is necessary, and their Schism unavoidable. Secondly, therefore I assert, that as to things in the judgement of the Primitive and Reformed Churches left undetermined by the Law of God, and in matters of meer order and decency, and wholly as to the form of Go­vernment, every one notwithstanding what his private judge­ment may be of them, is bound for the Peace of the Church of God to submit to the determination of the lawful Gover­nours of the Church. And this is that power of ending Controversies, which I suppose to be lodged in a Church-Society; not such a one as whereto every man is bound to conform his private judgement; but whereto every private person is bound to submit in Order to the Churches Peace. That is, that in any Controversies arising in a Church, there is such a power supposed, that may give such an authorita­tive Decision of the controversie in which both parties are bound to acquiesce, so as to act nothing contrary to that Decision. For as it is supposed that in all Contracts and A­greements for mutuall Society, men are content to part with their own Liberties for the good of the whole: so likewise to part with the Authority of their own judgements, and to submit to the Determination of things by the Rulers of the Society constituted by them. For there must be a diffe­rence made between the Liberty and freedom of a mans own judgment, and the Authority of it: for supposing men out of all Society, every man hath both; but Societies being en­tred, and Contracts made, though men can never part with the freedom of their Judgements (Men not having a De­potical power over their own understandings) yet they must part with the Authority of their Judgements; i. e. in matters concerning the Government of the Society, they must be ruled by Persons in Authority over them. Else there can be nothing imagined but confusion, and disorder, in stead of Peace and Unity in every civil State and Society. The case is the same in a religious Society too, in which men must be supposed to part with the Authority of their own judgements in matters concerning the Government of the Church, and to [Page 125] submit to what is constituted and appointed by those who are intrusted with the care and welfare of it. Else it is impossible there should be Unity and Peace in a Church considered as a Society; which is as much as to say, there neither is, nor can be such a Society. And that God hath commanded that which is Naturally impossible; I mean, freedom from divisi­ons, and the Unity and Peace of his Church: Which will ap­pear from hence, because it can never be expected that all men should be exactly of one mind: Either then men retaining their private apprehensions, are bound to acquiesce in what is publikely determined, or there is a necessity of perpetuall confusions in the Church of God. For the main inlet of all disturbances and divisions in the Church, is from hence that Men consider themselves absolutely, and not as Members of a governed Society, and so that they may follow their own own private judgements, and are bound so to doe in mat­ters belonging to the Government of the Church, and not to acquiesce for the Churches Peace in what is established in Order to the ruling of this so constituted Society, by lawfull Authority.

These things premised, the way is now fully cleared for the §. 8. discovering what wayes are prescribed by the light of Nature for ending controversies in the Church; which will appear to be these two.

1. In societies wherein persons act with an equality of Power, for the ending differences arising, the less number must alwayes acquiesce in the determination of the greater. And therefore it i [...] a generally received Axiom, that in all Societies pars major [...]ut habet universitatis, the greater part hath the power of the whole: And it is a standing Rule in the Civil Law, Refertur ad universos quod publice fit per majorem partem, which is de­termined by the Lawyers to hold, not of the persons in power, C. de decu­rion. lib. 10. l. nominati­onem Pet. Fabri. Com­ment. ad tit. de d [...]versis Reg. juris Lampridi­us in Alex. Severo. but of the persons present at the Determination; as when Alexander Severus made fourteen of the Viri Consulares to be Curatores urbis, joyned with the Praefectis urbis, to Determine cases brought before them, what was determined by the greater part of those present, was looked upon as binding, as if the whole number had been there. And this Aristotle layes down as one of the fundamental Lawes of a Democratical Government. [...] [Page 126] [...]. That must be looked on as a just Politic l. 6. cap. 2. and final decision of a Case debated, which the major part deter­mines. And therefore rationally infers, that in a Democracy the poorer sort (and so likewise the worse) must alwayes bear the greatest sway, because they are the most. Which is an un­avoydable inconvenience in that form of Government whe­ther in Church or State. The same he elsewhere applyes to other forms of Government which have a multitude of Rulers, as Aristocracy and Oligarchy: That which seems good to the most obtains as a Law amongst all, Which Appian thus briefly expresseth, [...] and Dionys. Halicarnasseus, V. Grotium de jure bel. &c. lib. [...]. cap. 5. sect. [...]7. [...], the one speaking of matter of Fact, that it doth obtain, the other of matter of Law that it should do so. It appears then from the Law and light of na­ture, that where ever any multitude acts in an equality of Power, the greater part have the power of the whole; not from any right which the major part hath as superiour over the less; but from the Law of nature, which will have every part ordered for the good of the whole; which good cannot oft times be obtained without a special determination on one side or other; nor that determination have its effect, if the Act of the major part may be rescinded by the less. So that in every thing requiring special determination, this is to be esteemed the most just and final decision which is done by the major part: For it would be manifestly unjust for the lesser part to deter­mine the greater, and therefore by the Law of nature, the greater part hath the right of the whole.

2. In a society consisting of many particular Companies or Congregations, there must be a subordination of Powers by the Law of nature, which grants a right of Appeal to an injured person from the lower and subordinate Power to the higher and superiour. Appealing is defined by the Lawyers to be Pro­vocatio iniquae sententiae querelam contineus. An address to a V. Iac. Omphalium de usurp. Leg l. 7. c. 2 Ulp. l. 1. D. de Appel. H [...]ttom. com. V. Juris. higher Power with complaint of wrong: and so in gene­all it is defined by Ulpian to be ab Inferioris Iudicis sen­tentiâ ad superiorem provocatio: but, as Hottoman observes, appeals may sometimes be made to a co-ordinate power upon complaint of injustice done. As one Praetor, Consul, Tribune might be appealed to, from the sentence of another. The ori­ginall of Appeals then is, that injuries may be redressed, and [Page 127] in order to that, nature dictates that there ought to be a subor­dination of Powers one to another, lest any injury done through corruption or ignorance of the immediate Judges, prove irremediable. To which purpose our learned Whitaker saith, that Appeals are juris divini & naturalis, & in omni so­cietate Controv. 4. qu. 4. c. 2. admodum necessariae; propter multorum judicum vel ini­quitatem, vel ignorantiam; alioqui actum esset de innocente, si non liceret ab iniqua sententia appestare: So that appeals are founded upon natural right, lest men should be injured in any determination of a case by those that have the cognizance of it. And in order to a redress of wrongs, and ending contro­versies, Nature tells us that Appeals must not be infinite, but there must be some Power, from whence Appeals must not be made: What that should be, must be determined in the same manner that it is in Civils; not that every Controversie in the Church must be determined by an Oecumenical Council, but that it is in the Power of the Supream Magistrate, as Supream head in causes Ecclesiastical, to limit and fix this Subordina­tion, and determine how far it shall go, and no further. The Determination being in order to the Peace of the Church, which Christian Magistrates are bound to look after, and see that causes hang not perpetually without Decision: And so we find the Christian Emperours constituting to whom Ap­peals should be made, and where they should be fixed, as Iu­stinian Iust. auth. diss. epis. collat. 9. Theod. cod. de S. S. Ec­cl. c. omni. and Theodostus did. For when the Church is incorpo­rated into the Common-wealth, the chief Authority in a Common-wealth as Christian, belongs to the same to which it doth as a Common-wealth: But of that already. It is then against the Law and Light of Nature, and the natural right of every man, for any particular company of men, calling them­selves a Church, to ingross all Ecclesiastical Power so into their hands, that no liberty of Appeals for redress can be made from it. Which (to speak within compass) is a very high usurpation made upon the Civil and Religious rights of Christians; be­cause it leaves men under a causeless censure, without any au­thoritative vindication of them from it. As for that way of elective Synods, substituted in the place of authoritative Power to determine Controversies, it is a [...], which will never be soveraign enough to cure the distemper it is brought [Page 128] for: For elective Synods are but like that which the Lawyers call arbitrium boni viri, which they distinguish from arbitrium G [...]ot. de [...]ure belli a [...] p [...]cis, l. 3. cap. 20. sect 46. ex compromisso, and binds no further then the party concern­ed doth judge the Sentence equall and just. So that this helps us with no way to end controversies in the Church, any further then the persons engaged are willing to account that just which shall be judged in their Case. Taking then a coer­cive Power, onely for such a one as may authoritatively decide a controv [...]rsie, we see what great Reason there is for what the Historian observes: Arbitriis ii se debent interponere, qui Vellei. Pa­terc. hist. lib. 2. non parente [...] coercere possunt: That all Power of Arbitration should have some juridicall power going along with it, to make a finall end of quarrels. But that which seems yet more strange to me, is this, that by those who assert the Indepen­dency of particular Congregation [...], it is so hotly pleaded, that Christ hath given every particular Congregation a Power over its own Members, to determine controversies arising be­tween them: but, that if one, or many of these particular Congregations should erre, or break the Rule, he hath left no power Authoritatively to decide what should be done in such cases. Can we conceive that Christ should provide more for the Cases of particular Persons, then of particular Churches? And that he should give Authority for Deter­mining one, and not the other? Is there any more coactive Power given by any to Synods, or greater Officers, then there is by them to particular Churches? which power is onely de­clarative as to the Rule, though Authoritative as to persons where-ever it is lodged. Is there not more danger to Gods People, by the scandals of Churches, then Persons? Or did Christs Power of governing his People reach to them onely as particular Congregations? Doth not this too strongly sa­vour of the Pars Donati? only the Meridies must be rendred a particular Congregationall Church, where Christ causeth his Flock to rest? But supposing the Scripture not expresly to lay down a Rule for governing many Churches, are men out­lawed of their natural Rights? that supposing a wrong Sen­tence passed in the Congregation, there is no hopes, way, or means to redress his injury, and make his innocency known? Doth this look like an Institution of Christ? But that which I [Page 129] conceive is the [...]; and the Original of this mistake, is, that the Churches we read of first Planted in Scripture, were onely particular Congregations; and therefore there is no proper Church-power beyond them, or above them. I meddle not with the Ant [...]cedent now, which is largely dis­cussed by others; but the extream weakness of the conse­quence, is that I am here obliged to discover. For what a strange shortness of Discourse is it to Argue thus; If when there was but one Congregation, that Congregation had all Power within its self; then when there are more particular congregations, it must be so; and yet this is the very Foun­dation of all those Kingdomes of Yvetos, as one calls them, those sole self-governing congregations. When there was but one congregation in a Church, it was necessary if it had any Church-power, that it must be lodged in that one congrega­tion: But when this congregation was multiplyed into many more, is it not as necessary for their mutual Government, there should be a common power governing them together, as a joynt-society? Besides, the first congregational Church in the New Testament, viz. that of Ierusalem, could be no particu­lar Organical Church; for it had many, if not all, Universall Officers in it; and if they were the fixed Pastours of that Church, they could not, according to the Principles of those who thus speak, Preach to any other congregation but their own, by vertue of their Office: And so, either their Aposto­licall Office and Commission must be destroyed, if they▪ were Pastors of particular Organical Churches; or if their Aposto­licall Office be asserted, their Pastorship of particular Orga­nicall Churches is destroyed by their own Principles, who [...]ssert, that the Pastor of a Church can do no Pastorall Office out. of his own congregation. The case is the same, as to other Churches planted by the Apostles, and govern'd by them­selves; which two, as far as I can find in the New Testament, were of an equal extent; viz. That all the Churches planted by Apostles, were chiefly governed by themselves, though they had subordinate officers under them. These first Churches then were not such particular Organized Churches, but they were as the first matter of many congregations to be propa­gated out of them; which after made one Society, consisting [Page 130] of those several congregations imbodyed together, and ru­led by one common Government. As in a Colledge, every Tutor hath his own Pupils, wich he rules; and if we sup­pose but one Tutor at first in the Colledge, with his Pupils, all the power, both common to the Society, and peculiar to his Flock, is joyned together; but when there are many more Tu­tors, having Pupils under their charge, all these, for their better ordering as a Society, must be governed by the common Government of the Colledge, to which the particular Govern­ment of every Tutor is and must be subordinate: But this will be more fully made appear in the Original of Civil Go­vernment. It is far more evident, that all Civil power lay at first in Adam and his Family, and afterwards in particular Families, than that all Church-power lay in particular con­gregations at first. We may then with as good Reason say, that there is no lawfull civil: Government now, but that of particular Families; and that no Nationall Government hath any right or power over particular Families, because Fami­lies had once all civil Power within themselves; as because it [...] supposed, that all Church-power lay first in particular con­gregations, therefore there must be no Church-power above them; nor that particular congregations are subject to such Government as is requisite for the Regulating of the Society in common, as comprehending in it many particular congre­gations. Let them shew then, how any Government in the State is lawfull, when Families had the first power, and by what right now those Families are subordinate to the civill Magistrate, and what necessity there is for it; and by the very same Reasons will we shew the lawfulness▪ of Government in the Church over many Congregations, and that those are by the same right, and upon the same necessity, to subordinate themselves to the Government of the Church, considere [...] a Society taking in many particular Congregations. The Paral­lel runs on further and clearer still: For as the heads of the severall Families after the Flood, had the command over all dwelling under their Roofs, while they remained in one Fami­ly; and when that increased into more, there power was ex­tended over them too; which was the first Original of Mo­narchy in the World: So the Planters of the first Churches, [Page 131] that while the Church was but one Congregation, had power over it, when this Congregation was multiplyed into more, their Power equally extended over them all. And as after­wards, several heads of Families upon their increase, did con­stitute distinct Civil Governments, wherein were subordinate Officers, but those Governments themselves were co-ordinate one with another: So in the Church, so many Congregati­ons as make up one Provincial, or National Society (as suc­cession and prudence doth order the bounds of them) do make up several particular Churches, enjoying their Officers ruling them, but subordinare to the Governours of the Church in common: Which Society, National or Provincial, is subordinate to none beyond its self, but enjoyes a free Pow­er within its self of ordering things for its own Government, as it judgeth most convenient, and agreeable to the Rules of Scripture. The summe then of what I say, concerning subordination of Officers and Powers in the Society of the Church, is this, That by the light and Law of Nature it ap­pears, that no individuall company or Congregation, hath an absolute, independent power within its self, but that, for the redressing grievances happening in them, appeals are [...] to the parties aggrieved, and a subordination of that particu [...] Congregation, to the Government of the Society in com­mon. [...]at, the right of Appealing, and Originall of Subordination, is from Nature; the particular manner and form of subordinate and superiour Courts, is to be fetched Grot. de Imp. summ. Potest. . cap. 7. s. 14, 15, &c. c. 8. s. 13. Chamier: To. 2. l. 13. c. 12. Whitaker Co [...]tr. 3 q. 2. C [...]is. de Lib. Eccles. cap. 2. M [...]r [...]. c. hist. Papa­ [...]us passim. from positive Lawes; the limitation of Appeals, extent of jurisdiction, the binding power of Sentence, so far as concerns external Unity in the Church, is to be fetched from the power of the Magistrate, and civil Sanctions and Constitutions. The Churches power, as to Divine Law, being onely directive and declarative; but being confirmed by a civil Sanction, is juri­dicall and obligatory. Concerning the Magistrates power to call, confirm, alter, repeal the Decrees of Synods; see Gro­tius, Chamier, Whitaker, Casaubon, Mornay, and others, who fully and largely handle it; To whom having nothing to add, I will take nothing at all from them: As for that time when the Church was without Magistrates ruling in it, in those things left undetermined by the Rule of the Word, they acted out [Page 132] of Principles of Christian Prudence agreeable to the Rules of Scripture, and from the Principles of the Law of nature; One of which we come in the next place to speak to. So much for the Churches Power, considered as a Society for ending con­troversies, arising within its self, tending to break the Peace and Unity of it.

CHAP. VII.

THe Law of Nature dictates, That all who are admitted into §. 1. this Society, must consent to be governed by the Laws and Rules of that Society, according to its Constitution. For none can be looked upon as a Member of a Society, but such a one as submits to the Rules and Laws of the Society, as constituted at the time of his entrance into it. That all civil Societies are founded upon voluntary consent and agreement of parties, and do depend upon Contracts and Covenants made between them, is evident to any that consider that men are not bound by the Law of Nature to associate themselves with any but whom they shall judge fit; that Dominion and Propriety was [Page 133] introduced by free consent of men: and so there must be Laws and Bonds fit, agreement made, and submission acknow­ledged to those Lawes, else Men might plead their Naturall Right and Freedom still, which would be destructive to the ve­ry Nature of these Societies. When men then did first part with their natural Liberties, two things were necessary in the most express terms to be declared: First, a free and volun­tary consent to part with so much of their Natural Rights as was not consistent with the well being of the Society: Se­condly, a free submission to all Laws, which should be agreed upon at their entrance into Society, or afterwards as they see cause. But when Societies were already entred, and Children born under them, no such express consent was required in them, being bound by vertue of the Protection they find from Authority to submit to it, and an implicite consent is supposed in all such as are born under that Authority. But for their more full understanding of this Obligation of theirs, and to lay the greater tye of Obedience upon them, when they come to understanding, it hath been conceived very requisite by most States to have an explicite Declaration of their consent, either by some formal Oath of Allegiance, or some other way suffici­ently expressing their fidelity, in standing to the Covenants long since supposed to be made. To apply this now to the Church.

We have all along hitherto considered the Church in gene­ral, as a Society or Corporation which was necessary in order to our discovering what is in it from the light of nature with­out Positive Laws.

But here we must take notice of what was observed by Fa­ther §. 2. Laynez the Jesuit at the Council of Trent, That it is not with the Church as with other Societies, which are first them­selves, Hist. Coun­cil of Trent, l. 7. p. 61 [...]. and then constitute the Governours. But the Go­vernour of this Society was first himself, and he appointed what Orders, Rules, and Lawes should govern this Society; and wherein he hath determined any thing, we are bound to look upon that, as necessary to the maintaining of that Society which is built upon his Constitution of it. And in many of those Orders which Christ hath settled in his Church, the Founda­tion of them is in the Law of nature; but the particular de­termination [Page 134] of the manner of them is from himself. Thus it is in the case we now are upon; Nature requires that every one entring into a Society, should consent to the Rules of it. Our Saviour hath determined how this Consent should be expres­sed, viz. by receiving Baptism from those who have the power to dispense it: which is the federal Rite whereby our consent is expressed to own all the Laws and submit to them, whereby this Society is governed: Which at the first entring of men in­to this Society of the Church was requisite to be done by the express and explicite consent of the parties themselves, being of sufficient capacity to declare it, but the Covenant being once entred into by themselves, not onely in their own name, but in the name of their Posterity (a thing implyed in all Co­venants Deut. 29. 15. Acts 2. 38. wherein benefits do redound to Posterity, that the Obligation should reach them to; but more particular in this, it having been alwayes the T [...]nour of Gods Covenants with men, to enter the seed as well as the persons themselves, as to outward Priviledges) an implicite consent as to the children in Covenant, is sufficient to enter them upon the priviledges of it by Baptism, although withal it be highly rational for their better understanding the Engagement they entred into, that when they come to age, they should explicitely declare their own voluntary consent to submit to the Lawes of Christ, and to conform their lives to the Profession of Christianity, which might be a more then probable way, and certainly most agreeable both to Reason and Scripture to advance the credit of Christianity once more in the World, which at this day so much suffers by so many professing it without understanding the terms of it; who swallow down a profession of Christiani­ty, as boyes do pills, without knowing what it is compounded of, which is the great Reason it works so little alteration upon their spirits.

The one great cause of the great flourishing of Religion in §. 3. the Primitive times, was certainly the strictness used by them in their admission of members into Church-Societies, which is fully described by Origen against Celsus, who tells us they did [...], enquire into their Dib. 3. p. 142, 143, & 147. lives and carriages, to discern their seriousness in the profession of Christianity during their being Catechumeni: Who after [Page 135] tells us they did require [...], true Repentance and Reformation of Life, [...], then we ad­mit them to the participation of our Mysteries. I confess the Discipline of the Primitive Church hath been very much mis­represented to us, by mens looking upon it through the glass of the modern practices and customs obtaining among us: as though all this onely concerned the Admission to the Lords Supper: though that was alwayes in chiefest veneration in the Church of God, as being the chief of Gospel-Mysteries (as Tertul. Apol. c. 39, describes exclusion to be à commu­nicatione Orationis & conven­tus, & om­nis sancti commercii: they loved to speak) yet I cannot find that any were admit­ted to all other Ordinances freely with them who were debar­red from this: but their admission to one, did include an ad­mission to all▪ so on the contrary, I finde none admitted to Baptism, who were not to the Lords Supper; and if Catechu­meni, presently after, onely confirmation intervening (which will hardly be ever found separate from Baptism, till the distin­ction of the double Chrism in vertice & pectore came up, which was about Ieroms time.)

The thing then which the Primitive Church required in ad­mitting §. 4. persons adult to Baptism, and so to the Lords Supper, was a serious visible profession of Christianity; which was looked upon by them as the greatest Evidence of their real consent to the Rules of the Gospel. For that purpose it will be worth our taking notice what is set down by Iustin Mar­tyr, Apolog. 2. speaking of the celebration of the Lords Supper; P. 97▪ ed. Paris. 1636: [...]. Where we see what was required before Admission to the Lords Supper, A Profession of Faith in the truths of the Gospel, and answerable Life to the Gospel, without which it was not lawful to participate of the Lords Supper. And further we see by Pliny, that the Christians of those times did make use of some solemn Engagements among themselves which he calls Sacramenta; they did se Sacramento obstringere nè fun­ta, nè latrocinia, nè adulteria committerent, nè fidem fallerent, &c. and Tertullian reports it out of Pliny, that he found no­thing Lib. 10▪ e [...] ▪ 97▪ de Sacramentis eorum (as Iunius first reads it out of [Page 136] M. S. for de Sacris, after him Heraldus, and as it is now read in Rigaltius Edition) besides cautelam & ad confoederandam disci­plinam, &c. scelera prohibentes, which Eusebius calls [...], pacta, Covenants between them; and so Master Selden inter­prets the place of Origen in the beginning of his Book against Hist. Eccl. lib. 3. cap. 33. Selden. de Sy [...]ed. l. 1. cap. 9. V. Heral­dum in Tertul. A­pologet. cap. 39. Celsus, where Celsus begins his charge against the Christi­ans, [...]: where he takes [...] not, as Gelenius ren­ders it, conventus, but in its proper sense for contracts or covenants that were made by the Christians as by other Soci­eties, onely permitted, and tolerated by the Common-wealth. And we find by Pliny, that when the hetaeriae were forbidden, he brought the Christians in under that Law; the ground of those Societies was onely a mutual compact and agreement among the persons of it: Such as among the Essens of the Jewes, and the Schools of Philosophers among the Greeks. Iosephus mentions the [...] of those who were admit­ted into the Society of the Essens, And so in all other Socie­ties Ioseph. Hales. p. 2. cap. 12. which subsist onely from mutuall confederation in a Com­mon-wealth. Thus I acknowledge it to be in Christianity, that there must be such a supposed contract or voluntary consent in the persons engaged in such Societies. But with this ob­servable difference, that although there must be a consent in both, yet the one is wholly free, as to any pre-engagement or obligation to it, as well as to the act its self; but in religious soci­eties, though the Act of consent be free, yet there is an ante­cedent Obligation upon men, binding them to this volunta­ry consent. The want of the understanding this Difference, is the very Foundation of that Opinion men call Erastianism; For the followers of Erastus, when they finde that Chri­stians did act ex confoederatâ disciplinâ, they presently con­clude all Church-power lay onely in mutuall consent. It is granted, Church-power doth suppose consent; but then all Christians are under an Obligation from the Nature of Chri­stianity to express this consent, and to submit to all censures Legally inflicted. About the hetaeriae and Societies among the Romans, we may take notice of the Law of Twelve Tables. So in the collection of Lud. Charondus, Sodalibus qui ejus­dem Collegii sunt, & jus cotundi habent, potestas esto pactionis [Page 137] quam volent inter se ineunda dum nè quid ex publicâ lege cor­rumpant. Ex Caio c. 4. D. de Collec. & corp.

I confesse, when persons are entred into a visible Church-So §. 4. ciety by Baptism, if they will own that profession they were baptized into, and are not guilty either of plain ignorance of it, or manifest scandall, and demand as their right the other Or­dinances of the Gospel; I see not by what power they may be ex­cluded. If we fix not in a serious visible prosession as the ground of giving right, but require positive evidences of grace in every one to be admitted to Ordinances as the only thing giving right, for my part, setting aside the many inconveniences be­sides which attend that in reference to the persons to be ad­mitted, I see not how with a safe and good conscience Ordinan­ces can be administred by any. My reason is this: Every one, especially a Minister, in that case ought to proceed upon certain grounds that the person admitted hath right to the Ordinance to be administred; but if positive signs of grace be required, a mans conscience cannot proceed upon any certainty, without infallible knowledge of anothers spiritual state, which I suppose none will pretend to. My meaning is, that which gives right, must be something evident to the person admitting into it, if it be his duty to enquire after it; but if only positive signs of grace be looked on, as giving right, the ground of right can never be so evident to another person, as to proceed with a good conscience, i. e. with a full perswasion of another right to the administration of any Ordinance to him. If it be said, that these are required only as tokens of a true visible professi­on, and it is that which gives the right; I reply, Our knowledge of, and assent to the conclusion▪ can be no stronger, nor more certain then to the premisses from when [...] it is inferred; if there­fore true profession gives right, and our knowledge of that proceeds upon our knowledge of the work of grace, we are left at the same uncertainty we were at before. But if we say, that an outward profession of the Gospel (where there is no­thing rendring men uncapable of owning it, which is ignorance, nor declaring they do not own it, which is s [...]andall) is that which gives a visible right to the Ordinances of the Church as visible, we have something to fix our selves upon, and to bot­tom a perswasion of the right of persons to Ordinances.

[Page 140]Christ when he instituted Churches, did institute them as visible Societies, that is, to have marks whereby to be known and distinguished, as other Societies in the world are; now that which puts a difference between this and other Societies, is an open profession of Christianity, which profession is looked upon as the outward expression of the internal consent of the soul to the Doctrine and Laws of the Gospel. Which outward evidence of consent, where there is nothing evident­ly and directly oppugning it, is that which the Church of God in admission of visible members is to proceed upon. I no­where find that ever Christ or his Apostles in making disciples, or admitting to Church-membership, did exact any more then a professed willingnesse to adhere to the Doctrine which they preached; nor that they refused any who did declare their desire to joyn with them. An owning Christianity is all we read of antecedent to admission of Church-members. And if any thing else be further required as necessary, we must either say, the Word of God is defective in institutions of necessity to the Church, which I suppose the assertors of it will not be so inconsistent to their own principles, as to do; or else must produce, where any thing further is required by the Word of God.

By this we may see what to answer those who require an §. 7. explicite Covenant from all members of the Church, as that which gives the form and being to a Church. If they mean only in the first constitution of a visible Church, an ex­presse owning of the Gospel-covenant; there is none will deny that to be necessary to make one a member of the visible Church of Christ. If they further mean, that there must be a real confederation between those who joyn together in Go­spel-Ordinances in order to their being a Church, I know none will question it that know what it is that makes a Society to be so; which is such a real confederation with one another: If they mean further, that though Christians be bound by vertue of their Gospel-covenant to joyn with some Church▪Society, yet not being determined by Scripture to what particular Church they should joyn; therefore for Christians better understanding what their mutuall duty is to one another; and who that Pastor is to whom they owe the relation of mem­ber, [Page 137] that there should be some significant declaration either by words or actions of their willingnesse to joyn with such a particular Society in Gospel-Ordinances; I shall grant this to be necessary too. But if beyond this their meaning be, that a formal explicite covenant be absolutely necessary to make any one a member of a Church, I see no reason for it. For,

1. If there may be a real confederation without this; then this is not necessary; but there may be a real confe­deration without this explicite covenant: as appears in those Churches of Christ, both in the primitive times, and since the Reformation, who have never used it, which none I suppose who maintain this opinion will deny to have been true visible Churches of Christ.

2. If the Gospel-covenant entred into by any gives a right to Gospel-Ordinances by its self, then an explicite co­venant is not that which makes one a member of a Church; but the Gospel-covenant gives that right to all Gospel-Ordi­nances. If by Baptism, the person baptized have a legal title to all Gospel-Ordinances, then, &c. The Minor appears, in that they are admitted Church-members by Baptism; and how can any be a Member of a Church, and not have right to all Ordinances in it, supposing capacity to receive them? A right once received, continues till it be forfeited, especially when it is such a right as is not limited to any particular priviledges, but to all the priviledges of that Society into which they are entred.

3. The reality of consent may be sufficiently manifested without an explicite covenant; as in the joyning with those who are under the same profession in the common acts of the Society and acceptance of, and submission to the Rulers of that Society, which implicitely is that Covenant which they would have expressed; and actions in this case, are as declarative and significative as words.

4. If a Church may cease to be a true Church, without explicite disowning such a Covenant, then it is not explicite covenanting which makes a Church; but a Church may cease to be a true Church without explicite disowning it; as in case of universall corruption, as to Word and Sacraments; as in the Church of Rome, that still owns her self for a Church. [Page 140] The ground of the consequence, is from the parity of reason as to contraries.

But though I see no reason at all, why an explicite Covenant §. 8. should be so necessary to a Church, that we cannot suppose a true Church without it; yet I no wayes deny the lawfulnesse or expediency, in many cases, of having a personal profession from all baptized in Infancy, when they come to age (which we may, if we please, call Confirmation) and the necessity of of desiring admission, in order to participation of all Ordinan­ces: which desire of admission, doth necessarily imply mens consenting to the Laws of that Society, and walking according to the duties of it; and so they are consequentially and virtually, though not expresly and formally, bound to all the duties requi­red from them in that relation. When Churches are over-run with loosnesse, ignorance, and prophanesse, or when Christians are under persecution, an externall profession of the Gospel­covenant, and declaring their owning the Society they are entred into, and submitting to the Laws of it, may be, if not wholly necessary, yet very usefull and expedient: And indeed, at all times we see people understand so little of their duty or engagements, and are so hardly brought under the exercise of Gospel-discipline, that an open profession of their submission to the Rules of the Gospel, seems the most likely way to ad­vance the practise, Power, and purity of Religion: But of this much is spoken by others lately, and therefore I supersede. From all this we see, that every Society implying a joyning together in some common duties, Nature tells us there must be a reall consenting together, explicite, or implicite in all per­sons, who enter into such a Society.

CHAP. VIII.

NAture dictates further, that in a well-ordered Society, every § 1. offender against the Rules of that Society, must give an account of his actions to the Governours of that Society, and sub­mit to the censures of it, according to the judgement of the Ru­lers of it. In all Societies subsisting by Laws, men being more ruled by hopes and fears, then by a sense of duty, or love of goodness, it is necessary for maintaining a Society, that there must be not only a declaration of what men ought to do, but a setting forth the penalties which they must undergo upon vi­olation of the Laws whereon the Society doth subsist: And as there must be penalties annexed, as the sanction of the Law, so it must of necessity be implyed in a well-ordered So­ciety, that every person, as he doth promise obedience to the Law, so by the same obligation he is bound to submit to the penalties upon disobedience: For whatever Laws binds to du­ty where there is a penalty threatned, doth bind likewise to punishment upon neglect of duty: for no sooner is the Law broken, but the offender lyes under the penall sanction of that Law, and is thereby bound to give an account of him­self and actions, to those Governours who are bound to see the Laws obeyed, or offenders punished. Guilt follows im­mediately upon the breach of the Law, which is nothing else but the offenders obligation to punishment. From this obli­gation [Page 144] on the offenders part, ariseth a new relation between the Governour of the Society and the offender. On the Go­vernours part a right to punish, vindictive justice supposing offences committed, and on the offender [...] part, an obligation to undergo what shall be inflicted upon him for his offence: Punishment being nothing else, but malum passionis ob malum actionis. There must be then these things supposed in any well ordered Society; Laws to be governed by, Rulers to see the Laws kept, or offenders punished, penalties made known for offenders, submission of the persons in the Societies to the penalties, if they deserve them. But now of what kind, nature, and degree the penalties must be, must be resolved according to the nature, end, and design of the constitution of the Society If it be a Society for preservation of the rights of Bodies, or Estates, the penalties must be either pe­cuniary or corporal: And the ground is, because the end of legall punishment is not properly revenge, but the preservati­on of the Society, which without punishments could not be: A threefold end is therefore assigned to punishments; the re­formation of the offending person, the prevention of further Gellius Noct. Attic. l. 6. c. 16. V. Grotium de jure bel­li, l. 2. c. 20. s. 6, 7, 8. Matth. 1. 19. offences in the Society of the same kind, and the being a ter­rour and example to others; the first is called [...] or [...]. The second [...], being for the preservation of the honour of the Magistrate: the third [...], when the punishment is inflicted upon one, that others should take notice of it; which must be alwayes done in a publike man­ner: So [...] ▪ in Matthew, is opposed to [...].

These things being thus in general considered, come we § 2. now to apply it to the Church considered as a Society. That it hath peculiar Laws to be governed by, appears by the distinct nature, end, and design of the constitution of it; which is not to preserve any outward Rights, but to maintain and keep up a religious Society for the service of God; and therefore the penall sanctions of these Laws cannot properly be any cor­porall or pecuniary mulct, but somewhat answerable to the nature of the Society. It must be then somewhat which im­plyes the deprivation of that which is the chiefest benefit of that Society. The benefits of it are the priviledges and ho­nour [Page 141] which men enjoy by thus associating themselves for so high an employment: That punishment then must be the loss of those priviledges which the Corporation enjoyes, which must be by exclusion of the offending person from communi­on with the Society. Hence we see it is evident, that which we call Excommunication is the greatest penalty which the Church, as a Society, can inflict upon the members of it, con­sidered as such. And hence it is likewise clear, that as the So­ciety of the Church is distinct from others, the Laws, ends, Governours of a different nature; so the punishment must be a punishment distinct from civill, and ordained wholly in order to the peculiar ends of this Society; which they do not well consider, who deny any such power as that of Excom­munication peculiar to the Church, which is as much as to deny that the Laws whereby the Church is ruled, are different from the civil Laws, or the end of this Society from the ends of civil Societies: for the punishment must be proportioned to the Laws, and referred immediately to its proper ends. It were no wayes difficult to answer the pretences brought against this: For although I acknowledge a subordination of this religious Society to the Supream Authority in the Com­monwealth, and that the Rules concerning the Government of the Society in common must have their sanction from thence; yet this no wayes implyes but it may have its peculiar penalties and power to inflict them, any more then any Compa­ny of Tradesmen have not power to exclude any from their Company for breaking the Rules of the Company, because they are subordinate to the Supream Authority: or any Colledge to expell any from thence, for breaking the locall Statutes of it, which are distinct from the Common-Laws. Nor is it any argument, that because Christians had mutuall confede­rations in times of persecution for the exercise of censures, therefore these censures were only arbitrary and humane; unless it be proved, that it was not a duty in them so to confederate & joyn together, nor was there any antecedent obligation to in­flict those censures upon offenders. Much lesse, thirdly, because their jurisdiction is not civil and coactive, therefore they have none at all; which is as much as to say, the Laws of Scripture are not our common-Laws, therefore they are none at all.

[Page 144]I shall not here insist upon the divine Right of power to §. 3. excommunicate offenders, founded upon the positive Laws of Chist, it being my only businesse now to shew what founda­tion such a power hath in the Law of Nature, which we have seen doth follow upon the Churches being a distinct Society ruled by other Laws, acting on other ends, subsisting upon different grounds from any other Society. A further evi­dence we have of this, how consonant it is to the light of Na­ture, from the practice of all Societies pretending to be for the Worship of God, who have looked upon this as the proper penalty of offenders among them, to be excluded out of those Societies. Thus we find among the Druids, whose great office was to take care of the worship of their gods, and to instruct Caesar de bello Galli­co. l. 6. V. Nicola­um Damas­cenum de moribus gentium de cercetis, [...]. the people in Religion, as Caesar relates, Illi rebus divinis in­tersunt, sacrificia publica ac privata procurant, religiones in­terpretantur; and accordingly the punishment of disobedience among them was excommunication from their sacrifices, which they looked upon as the greatest punishment could be inflicted upon them, as Caesar at large describes it; Si quis aut privatus aut pubicus eorum decreto non stetit, sacrificiis interdicunt: haec poena apud eos est gravissima: quibus ita est interdictum, ii numero impiorū & sceleratorum habentur; iis omnes decedunt, aditū eorū sermonem (que) defugiunt, nè quid ex contagione incommodi accipi­ant, ne (que) iis petentibus jus redditur, ne (que) honos ullus communicatur.

The practice of Excommunication among the Jews is not questioned by any, but the right ground and orignall of that practice, with the effect and extent of it. Some con­ceive it to have been only taken up among the Jews, after the power of capitall punishments was taken from them; and that it was used by them, wholly upon a civill account, not extending to the exclusion of men from their worship in the Temple or Synagogues, but only to be a note of insamy upon offending persons. This opinion though entertained by persons of much skill and learning in the Jewish antiquities, yet carries not that evidence with it to gain my assent to it. For first, the causes of excommunication were not such as were ex­pressed by their Law to deserve such civil punishments as might have been inflicted by them upon offenders, nor were they generally matters of a civill nature, but matters of offence and [Page 145] scandall, as will appear to any that shall peruse the twenty four causes of Excommunication, related out of the Jewish Wri­ters by Selden and Ioh. Coch. Such were the neglecting the Pre­cepts of the Scribes, the vain pronouncing the Name of God, bearing witness against a Iew before Heathen tribunals, doing Selden de jure natur &c. l. 4. cap. 8. Excerpt. Gem. Sanh. pag. 147. any common work in the afternoon of the day before the Passover, with others of a like Nature. If Excommunication had been then taken up among them onely ex confoederatâ disciplinâ, to supply the defect of civil Judicatories, at least all Capitall offen­ders must have lain under the Sentence of Excommunication. But here we read not of any being Excommunicated for those, but for other lesser matters, which were looked upon as mat­ters of scandal among them: and though some of them were matters of civil injuries, yet it follows not that men were Ex­communicated for them as such, but for the scandall which at­tended them. As, in the Christian Church, men are Excom­municated for matters which are punishable by the civil Ma­gistrate, but not under that notion, but as they are offences to that Christian Society which they live among. Secondly, It ap­pears that Excommunication was not a meer civil Penalty, be­cause the increasing or abatement of that Penalty did depend upon the person's Repentance, and desire of Absolution. Now civil Penalties do not regard the intention and mind of the Per­son, but the quality and desert of the Action; the Reason is, because Humane Lawes do respect immediately actionem ipsam, and not animum agentis, unless it be onely so far as the mind hath influence upon the Action. But now it is otherwise in such Lawes which take immediate Notice of the intention of the minde, and onely of outward Actions as they are signifi­cative and expressive of the inward intention: for in these, though the ground of proceeding to Penalties be from the no­tice taken of the outward Action, yet that outward Action be­ing subject to Penalty, as expressive of the minds intention; where there may be sufficient evidence given of the Integri­ty and Uprightness of the Intention afterwards, there may be proportionably a Relaxation of the penalty; because the end of the Penalty inflicted was not to be an Act of Justice excluded from Mercy in the end of Administration as in Civil Judicatories, but an Act of Justice whose end was [Page 146] mercy, that is, the regaining and recovering the offenders soul from sin, by inflicting such a penalty upon him, as might humble him under the sense of it. Hence appears the great reason­ablenesse of their proceedings in the managery of Discipline in the primitive times, who did not fix a certain time as a standing Law for all offenders, but did encrease, or lessen both the time and weight of their penance, according to the evidences given of their submission and true repentance for their miscarriages. That it was thus now in reference to Epist. Hebr. I [...]stitut. p. 55. excommunication among the Jews, appears from what is as­serted by the learned Buxtorf concerning the time of the lesser excommunication, called [...] Niddui, which remained thirty dayes usually, but were shortned by confession and de­sire of absolution; durat 30. dies qui tamen poenitentiâ & de­precatione decurtantur. But if after thirty dayes past, he con­tinue impenitent, the Judge as he sees sit, encreaseth the pu­nishment, so as to double or treble the time, or extend it to his whole life: if he dyed without repentance, a stone is laid upon his Bier, to shew he deserved lapidation; they wept not for him, nor buryed him in the common place of buriall. Fur­ther, V. Selden de jure nat. &c. lib. 4. cap. 8. p. 516. Shulchan. A ru [...]h chosen. hammisch­pat. s. 100. Excerpt. Gen. Sam. bed. p. 141. n. 11. 12. Buxtorf there alledgeth this constitution of their Law: that if he that was under Niddui, and desired not absolution, was the second time under it, if that did no good on him, then he was excommunicated with the higher sort of ex­communication, called [...] which is likewise observed by Ioh. Coch. Mr. Selden, and others. From whence it is evident that this was an Ecclesiasticall censure, and not meerly Civill, because the main end of it was not satisfaction to the Law, but the repentance of the person who lay under the fault; and according to the evidence given of it, the penalty was relaxed or encreased, which argument not yet taken notice of nor improved by Writers on this subject, seems to make the case clear, that excommunication among the Jews was not a meer out-lawry, as some conceive it to have been.

Thirdly, I argue, If it was not the breach of the Law, but the §, 5. publikeness of the offence, or the scandall of it which was the ground of excommunication; then it was not a meer civil penalty, but an Ecclesiasticall censure: for civill penalties do [Page 147] proceed upon the breach of the Law, and alter not as to the publikeness or privateness of the offence; but here it is evi­dent that the same offence deserving excommunication if done in publike, did not if done in private, or was left at the per­sons liberty to have the offender excommunicated or not. That which is reckoned as the first cause of excom­munication, is affront or contempt put upon a wise man, or Rabbi, or one that was [...] a Student in the Law; now it is determined by them in this case, that if it were done in private, the Rabbi might pardon him: but if in publike, he could not. For as Ioh. Coch. gives the reason, publicum p. 146. Doctoris ludibrium in legis contemptum redundas: the con­tempt of publike Teachers of the Law, redounds to the disho­nour of the Law its self. Thus it was the scandall of the fault. and not the bare offence which made excommunication necessary among them; and not as that scandall was a meer de­famation of the person, but as it redounded to the contempt of the Law. Fourthly, I argue from the form used in ex­communication by them. There are two▪ forms produced of their excommunications, the one by Buxtorf out of an old Lex Rabbi­nic. p. 828. Hebrew Manuscript, the beginning of which is, Ex sententiâ Domini Dominorum, sit in Anathemate Plo [...]i filius Ploni, in utra­que domo judicii, superiorum, sc. & inferiorum, &c. where two things evidence, it was accounted a sacred and no civill action, doing it immediately in the name and authority of the Lord of lords; and pronouncing him excommunicate both in Heaven and Earth. So R. Elieser, speaking of the Excom­munication Pirk. R. Elieser c. 38. p. 101. of the Cuthites or Samaritans, Atque anathemate devovebant Cuthaos mysterio nominis Amphorasch, & Scriptura exarata in tabulis, & anathemate domus judicii superioris, atque anathemate curia inferioris, as it is translated by Guli. Vorstius, who in his Notes upon that Book produceth a most dreadfull sentence of Excommunication used to this day in many▪ Synagogues, which they call Cherem Col Bo. from the book whence it is taken, which runs most solemnly in p. 226. ad 230. the several names of God, whereby they do Chamatize, curse and devote the persons against whom it is pronounced. Fifthly, It appears not to be a meerly civil thing instead of civill power, because they use it against those over whom they have no [Page 148] civill Jurisdiction, as appears by their Schamatizing the Chri­stians in their Liturgies, as Buxtorf observes. Sixthly, I argue from the Effects of it, because they who lay under it were excluded from publike Worship, which is averred by Buxtorf, Goc [...]. and others in the places forecited. It is ac­knowledged that he that was onely under Niddui, might be present at publike Worship; but even there he was under his Separation too, of four Cubits from any other Israe­lite.

And hence in probability might the mistake arise, because §. 6. those under Niddui might appear at the Temple or Synagogue, therefore Excommunication was no prohibition à Sacris. But he that was under Cherem, Non docet, non docetur, Neither teacheth others, nor is taught himself, saith Ioh. Cocceius; and Buxtorf of one under Cherem, omninò à coetu sacro excluditur: Ep. institut. pag. 56. and in this sense Buxtorf expresly takes the turning out of the Synagogue, Ioh. 9. 22—12. 42. which, saith he, is done by Cherem. But against this it is strongly pleaded by our Learned Mr. Selden, that putting out of the Synagogue is De Syne­d [...]iis lib. 1. cap. 7. nothing else but Excommunicating [...] to separate from the Congregation, taking [...] and so [...] in the civil and not sacred sense, as it denotes an excluding them from common Society; but though it be freely granted that that is sometimes the signification of [...] and [...] as Mat. 10. 17. yet those particulars being considered, which are already laid down, I shall leave it to consideration whether it be more probable to take the word Synagogue here in a Civil or Sacred Sense; when the occasion expressed is meerly a matter of Do­ctrine and Opinion, and not any thing condemned by their Law. Another thing which hath been, I believe a great ground of mistaking in this matter, is, that excluding from the civill Society among them was alwayes consequent upon Excommu­nication; the Reason whereof was, because the Church and Common-wealth were not distinct among the Jews; and the same persons who took care of Sacred, did likewise of Civil things (there being no distinct Sanhedrins among them as some imagine:) but from hence it no wayes follows, but their Excommunication might be an exclusion from Sacred Worship as well as Civil Society. However, were it as they pretend, that [Page 149] it was from civill commerce, yet the whole people of the Jews being [...] Gods peculiar people, and his only Church in being before the times of the Gospel, an exclusion in that respect from the common Society of them, might deservedly be looked upon as a sacred action, and not meerly civill, it being a separation from a people whose main ligature was their be­ing a Church of God, or a Community gathered together for Gods worship and service. Thus we see the Church of the Jews had this power among them; and for the Christian Church, the practice of Discipline upon offenders was never questioned, though the right hath been; so that from hence we gather, in that it hath been the practice of Societies consti­tuted for the Worship of God, to call offenders to an account for their offences, and if upon examination they be found guilty, to exclude them their Society; that it is a dictate of the Law of Nature, That every offender against the Laws of a Society must give an account of his actions to the Rulers of it, and submit to the Censures inflicted on him by them. Thus I am now come to the end of my first stage, to shew how far Church-Government is founded upon the Law and Light of Nature,

CHAP. I.

I Now come to the second way, whereby any §. 1. thing comes to be of unalterable Divine Right, which is, by the positive Laws of God, which do bind universally to obe­dience. In the entrance into this Dis­course, it is necessary to lay down the ways, whereby we find out a Divine posi­tive Law determining an unalterable Obligation: which must be either by express words of Scripture, or by some other certain way, whereby to gather from thence, that it was Gods intention to bind men. For the main thing requisite to make a standing universal positive Law, is Gods declaring his mind, that the thing enquired into, should unalterably bind men to the practice of it. Now whatever doth sufficiently manifest Gods intention, is a medium to find out such a Law by, and no­thing [Page 151] else: But it must be such a manifestation as gives a mans mind sufficient evidence and testimony whereon to build a true, certain, and divine assent to the thing, as re­vealed: So that whatsoever binds the conscience as a Law, must first be entertained by the understanding as a matter of faith; not as it imports something meerly doctrinall and dog­maticall, but as it implyes the matter of a Divine Revelation, and the object of an assent upon the credibility of a Testimony. For God having the only immediate authority over the con­sciences of men, nothing can bind immediately the consci­ence but a Divine Law, neither can any thing bind as such, but what the understanding assents unto, as revealed by God himself. Now the Word of God being the only Codex and Digests of Divine Laws, whatever Law we look for, must ei­ther be found there in express terms, or at least so couched therein, that every one by the exercise of his understanding, may by a certain and easie collection, gather the universall ob­ligation of the thing enquired after. In this case then, what­soever is not immediately founded upon a Divine Testimony, cannot be made use of as a Medium to infer an universally binding Law by: So that all Traditions and Historicall evi­dence will be unserviceable to us, when we enquire into Gods intentions in binding mens consciences. Matters of fact, and meer Apostolicall practice, may I freely grant, receive much light from the Records of succeeding ages; but they can never give a mans understanding sufficient ground to inferr any Di­vine Law, arising from those facts attested to be the practice or Records of succeeding ages.

For first, The foundation and ground of our assent in this § 2. case, is not the bare testimony of Antiquity; but the assu­rance which we have, either that their practice did not vary from what was Apostolicall; or in their Writings, that they could not mistake concerning what they deliver unto us: And therefore those who would inferr the necessary obligation of men to any form of Government, because that was practised by the Apostles, and then prove the Apostolicall practice from that of the ages succeeding, or from their Writings, must first of all prove, that what was done then, was certainly the Apostles practice, and so prove the same thing by its self, or [Page 152] that it was impossible they should vary from it, or that they should mistake in judging of it: For here something more is required then a meer matter of fact, in which I confess their nearnesse to the Apostles times doth give them an advantage above the ages following, to discern what it was; but such a practice is required, as inferrs an universall obligation upon all places, times, and persons. Therefore these things must be manifested, that such things were unquestionably the practice of those ages and persons; that their practice was the same with the Apostles; that what they did, was not from any prudential motives, but by vertue of a Law which did bind them to that practice. Which things are easily passed over by the most eager Dispu­ters of the controversie about Church-Government, but how necessary they are to be proved before any form of Govern­ment be asserted, so necessary, that without it there can be no true Church, any weak understanding may discern.

Secondly, Supposing that Apostolicall practice be sufficiently attested by the following ages, yet unless it be cleared from Scripture, that it was Gods intention that the Apostles actions should continually bind the Church, there can be nothing in­ferred that doth concern us in point of Conscience. I say, that though the matter of fact be evidenced by Posterity, yet the obligatory nature of that fact must depend on Scripture: and the Apostles intentions must not be built upon mens bare [...]urmises, nor upon after-practices, especially if different from the constitution of things during the Apostles times. And here those have somewhat whereon to exercise their understand­ings, who assert an obligation upon men to any form of Go­vernment, by vertue of an Apostolicall practice, which must of necessity suppose a different state of things from what they were when the Apostles first established Governours over Churches. As how those who were appointed Gover­nours over particular Congregations by the Apostles, come to be by vertue of that Ordination, Governours over many Congregations of like nature and extent with that over which they were set: And whether, if it were the Apostles intention that such Governours should be alwayes in the Church, is it not necessary that that intention of theirs be declared by a standing Law, that such there must be; for [Page 153] here matter of fact and practice can be no evidence, when it is supposed to be different from the constitution of Churches afterward: But of this more hereafter.

Thirdly, Supposing any form of Government in its self necessary, and that necessity not determined by a Law in the Word of God, the Scripture is thereby apparently argued to be insufficient for its end; for then deficit in necessariis; some things are necessary for the Church of God which the Scrip­ture is wholly silent in. I say not, that every thing about Church-Government must be written in Scripture; but sup­posing any one form necessary, it must be there commanded, or the Scripture is an imperfect Rule, which contains not all things necessary by way of Precept: For there can be no other necessity universall, but either by way of means to an end, or by way of Divine Command: I know none will say, that any particular form of Government is necessary abso­lutely, by way of means to an end; for certainly, supposing no obligation from Scripture, Government by an equality of power in the Officers of the Church, or by superiority of one order above another, are indifferent in order to the generall ends of Government, and one not more necessary then the other. If any one form then be necessary, it must be by that of command; and if there be a command universally binding, whose footsteps cannot be traced in the Word of God, how can the Scriptures be a perfect Rule, if it fails in determining binding Laws? So that we must, if we own the Scriptures sufficiency as a binding Rule, appeal to that about any thing pleaded as necessary, by vertue of any Divine command: and if such a Law cannot be met with in Scripture, which deter­mines the case in hand one way or other by way of necessary obligation, I have ground to look upon that which is thus left undetermined by Gods positive Laws, to be a matter of Christian-liberty; and that neither part is to be looked upon as necessary for the Church of God, as exclusive of the other.

This I suppose is the case, as to particular forms of Go­vernment §. 3. in the Church of God: but that I may not only suppose but prove it, I now come to the stating of the Que­stion, which if ever necessary to be done any where, it is in [Page 154] the Controversie of Church-Government, the most of mens heats in this matter arising from want of right understanding the thing in question between them. In the stating the Que­stion, I shall proceed by degrees, and shew how far we ac­knowledge any thing belonging to Government in the Church to be of an unalterable Divine Right. First, That there must be a form of Government in the Church of God, is necessary by vertue, not only of that Law of Nature which provides for the preservation of Societies, but likewise by vertue of that Divine Law, which takes care for the Churches preserva­tion in peace and unity. I engage not here in the Controver­sie, Whether a particular Congregation be the first Political Church or no; it sufficeth for my purpose, that there are other Churches besides particular Congregations: I mean, not only the Catholick visible Church, which is the first, not only in order of consideration, but nature too, as a totum Integrale be­fore the similar parts of it, but in respect of all other acci­dentall modifications of Churches, from the severall wayes of their combination together. They who define a Church by stated worshipping Congregations, do handsomely beg the thing they desire, by placing that in their definition of a Church, which is the thing in question: which is, Whether there be no other Church but such particular Congregations? Which is as if one should go about to prove, that there were no civil Societies but in particular Corporations, and to prove it, should give such a definition of civill Society, that it is, A company of men joyned together in a Corporation, for the preservation of their Rights and Priviledges, under the Gover­nours of such a place. It must be first proved, that no other company of men can be call'd a civill Society besides a Corpo­ration: and so that no other society of men joyning together in the profession of the true Religion, can be call'd a Church, but such as joyn in particular Congregations.

To which purpose it is very observable, That particular [...] ▪ 4. Congregations are not de primariâ intentione divinâ; for if the whole world could joyn together in the publike Worship of God, no doubt that would be most properly a Church, but particular Congregations are only accidental, in refe­rence to Gods intention of having a Church, because of the [Page 155] impossibility of all mens joyning together for the convenient distribution of Church-priviledges, and administration of Gospel-Ordinances. For it is evident, that the Priviledges and Ordinances, do immediately and primarily belong to the Catholick visible Church, in which Christ to that end hath set Officers, as the Apostle clearly expresseth, 1 Corinth. 12. 28. (for how Apostles should be set as Officers over particular Congregations, whose Commission extended to the whole World, is, I think, somewhat hard to understand) but for the more convenient participation of Priviledges and Ordinances, particular Congregations are necessary: This will be best il­lustrated by Examples. We read that ( Esther 1. 3.) King Aha­shuerus made a feast for all his Princes and Servants: Doubt­lesse the King did equally respect them all as a Body in the feasting of them, and did bestow his entertainment upon them all as considered together; but by reason of the great multitude of them, it was impossible that they should all be feasted together in the same Room; and therefore for more convenient participation of the Kings bounty, it was necessary to divide themselves into particular companies, and to asso­ciate as many as conveniently could in order to that end. So it is in the Church, Christ in donation of priviledges equal­ly respects the whole Church; but because men cannot all meet together to participate of these priviledges, a more par­ticular distribution was necessary for that end. But a clearer example of this kind we have yet in Scripture, which is Mark 6. 39. in our Saviours feeding the multitude with five loaves and two fishes; where we see our Saviours primary in­tention, was to feed the whole multitude; but for their more convenient partaking of this food, our Saviour commands them to sit down [...], according to the He­braism of ingeminating the words, to note the distribution of them, and therefore the Vulg. Lat. renders it secundum con­tubernia, that is [...], as Camerarius expounds it, according to so many companies and divisions as might con­veniently sit together, as at a Table: Where we plainly see this distribution was only accidentall, as to Christs prima­ry intention of feeding the multitude, but was only ne­cessary for their own conveniency. Thus the case is evident, [Page 156] as to the Church of God, it is our necessity and conveniency which makes severall Congregations of the Catholike visible Church, and not Gods primary intention, when he bestowed such priviledges upon the Church, that it should be understood of particular Congregations.

If then particular Congregations be only accidentall for our §. 5. conveniency, it evidently follows that the primary notion of a Church, doth not belong to these; nor that these are the first subject of Government which belongs to a Church as such, and not as crumbled into particular Congregations; although the actual exercise of Government be most visible and discernable there; Because the joyning together for parti­cipation of Gospel-Ordinances must be in some particular com­pany or other associated together for that end. Where ever then we find the notion of a Church particular, there must be government in that Church; and why a National Society in­corporated into one civil Government, joyning in the professi­on of Christianity, and having a right thereby to participate of Gospel-Ordinances in the convenient distributions of them in particular congregations, should not be called a Church; I confesse I can see no reason. The main thing objected against it, is, that a Church implyes an actual joyning together for participation of all Gospel-Ordinances; but as this, as I said before, is only a begging the Question, so I say now, that actual communion with any particular Congregation, is not absolutely necessary to a member of a Church; for supposing one baptized at Sea, where no setled Congregation is (nor any more Society then that which Aristotle calls [...]) yet such a one is thereby a member of the Church of God, though not of any Congregation; so likewise a Church then may con­sist of such as have a right to Ordinances, without the inserting their actual participation of them in fixed Congregations. A particular Church then I would describe thus, That it is, A society of men joyning together in the visible profession of the true Faith; having a right to, and enjoying among them the Ordi­nances of the Gospel. That a whole Nation professing Chri­stianity, in which the Ordinances of the Gospel are duly administred in particular Congregations, is such a Society, is plain and evident. A clear instance of such a National consti­tution [Page 157] of a Church under the Gospel, we have in the Prophesie of the Conversion of Egypt and Assyria in Gospel-times. Isaiah 19. 19, 21, 24, 25. We have Egypts professing the true Faith, and enjoying Gospel Ordinances, vers. 19. 21. which, ac­cording to the Prophetical stile are set down under the repre­sentation of such things as were then in use among the Jewes: by an Altar in the midst of the Land, ver. 19. The Altar noting the true worship of God; and being in the midst of the Land, the universal owning of this worship by all the people of the land. God owns them for a Church, v. 25. Whom the Lord of hosts shall bless, saying, Blessed be Egypt my people. The very name whereby Israel was called while it was a Church. [...] Hosea, 2. 1. And when God unchurched them, it was under this name, [...] Ye are not my people. As much then as Israel was a Church when God owned it for his People: so should Egypt be upon their conversion to the Faith of Christ, which was done upon Marks preaching at Alexandria not long after the death of Christ.

This then we have now briefly cleared, that a Nation joyn­ing §. 6. in profession of Christianity, is a true Church of God: whence it evidently follows, that there must be a Form of Ecclesiastical Government over a Nation as a Church, as well as of Civil Government, over it, as a Society governed by the same Lawes. Therefore some make this necessary to a Natio­nall Hudson of the Church cap. 1. sect. 3. Church, National Union in one Ecclesiasticall body in the same Community of Ecclesiasticall Government. For every So­ciety must have its Government belonging to it as such a So­ciety; and the same Reason that makes Government necessary in any particular Congregation, will make it necessary for all the particular Congregations joyning together in one visible society as a particular National Church. For the unity and peace of that Church, ought much more to be looked after then of any one particular Congregation, in as much as the Peace of all the particular combinations of men for participation of Ordi­nances doth depend upon, and is comprehended in the Peace of the whole. But though I say from hence that some form of pub­like Government by the subordination of particular Assemblies to the Government of the whole body of them is necessary, yet I am far from asserting the necessity of any one form of [Page 158] that Government, much more, from saying that no Nati­onall Church can subsist without one Nationall Officer, as the High-Priest under the Law, or one Nationall place of Wor­ship, as the Temple was. The want of considering of which, viz that Nationall Churches may subsist without that Form of them under the Jewes, is doubtless the great Ground of Mens quarrelling against them; but with what Reason, let Men impartially judge. This then we agree, that some from of Government is necessary in every particular Church, and so that Government in the Church of Divine and unalterable Right; and that not onely of particular Congregations, but of all Societies which may be called Churches, whether Provinciall, or Nationall.

CHAP. II.

SEcondly, That the Government of the Church ought to be §. 1. Administred by Officers of Divine appointment, is ano­ther thing I will yield to be of Divine Right▪ but the Church here, I take not in that latitude which I did in the former Con­cession, but I take it chiefly here for the Members of the Church, as distinct from Officers, as it is taken in Acts 15. 22. So that my meaning is, that there must be a standing perpetu­all Ministry in the Church of God, whose care and imploy­ment must be, to oversee and Govern the People of God, and to administer Gospel-Ordinances among them, and this is of [Page 159] Divine and perpetuall Right. That Officers were appointed by Christ in the Church for these ends at first, is evident from the direct affirmation of Scripture, God hath set in the Church, first Apostles, secondly Prophets, thirdly Teachers, &c. 1 Co­rinth. 12. 28. Eph. 4. 8, 11. and other places to the same pur­pose. This being then a thing acknowledged, that they were at first of Divine Institution, and so were appointed by a Di­vine positive Law, which herein determines and restrains the Law of Nature (which doth not prescribe the certain quali­fications of the persons to govern this Society, nor the instal­ment or admission of them into this employment, viz by Or­dination.) The only enquiry then left, is, Whether a standing Gospel-ministry be such a positive Law, as is to remain per­petually in the Church, or no? which I shall make appear by those things which I laid down in the entrance of this Trea­tise, as the Notes whereby to know when positive Laws are unalterable.

The first was, when the same reason of the command con­tinues § 2. still; and what reason is there why Christ should ap­point Officers to rule his Church then, which will not hold now? Did the people of God need Ministers then to be as Stars (as they are call'd in Scripture) to lead them unto Rev. 1. 16. Christ, and do they not as well need them now? Had people Heb. 13. 7. Heb. 2. 3. need of guides then, when the doctrine of the Gospel was confirmed to them by miracles, and have they not much more now? Must there be some then to oppose gainsayers, and must Titus 1. 9. 2 Tim. 3. 1. they have an absolute liberty of prophecying now, when it is foretold what times of seduction the last shall be? Must there be some then to rule over their charge, as they that must give an Heb. 13. 17. account, and is not the same required still? Were there some then▪ to reprove, rebuke, exhort, to preach in season, out 2 Tim. 4. 2. of season, and is there not the same necessity of these things still? Was it not enough then, that there were so many in all Churches that had extraordinary gifts of tongues, prophecy­ing, 1 Cor. 14. praying, interpretation of tongues, but besides those there were some Pastors by office, whose duty it was to give atten­dance 1 Tim. 4. 13. to reading, to be wholly in these things; and now when these extraordinary gifts are ceased, is not there a much greater necessity then there was then, for some to be set [Page 160] apart and wholly designed for this work? Were Ordinances Matth 28. 18. only then administred by those whom Christ commissioned, and such as derived their authority from them; and what reason is there that men should arrogate and take this imployment up­on themselves now? If Christ had so pleased, could he not have left it wholly at liberty for all believers to have gone about preaching the Gospel? or why did he make choice of 12. Apostles chiefly for that work, were it not his Will to have some particularly to dispense the Gospel? and if Christ did then separate some for that work, what Reason is there why that Office should be thrown common now, which Christ him­self inclosed by his own appointment?

There can be no possible Reason imagined, why a Gospel-Ministry §. 3. should not continue still, unless it be that Fanatick pretence of a Seculum Spiritus Sancti, a Dispensation of the Spirit, which shall evacuate the use of all means of Instructi­on, and the use of all Gospel-Ordinances; which pretence is not so Novell as most imagine it to be; for setting aside the Montanistical spirit in the Primitive Times, which acted upon Principles much of the same Nature with these we now speak of: The first rise of this Ignis fatuus was from the bogs of Popery, viz. from the Orders of the Dominicans and Fran­ciscans, about the middle of the twelfth Century. For no sooner did the Pauperes de Lugduno, or the Waldenses appear, making use of the Word of God to confute the whole Army of Popish Traditions, but they finding themselves worsted at every turn while they disputed that ground, found out a Stratagem whereby to recover their own Credit, and to beat their ad­versaries quite out of the field. Which was, that the Gospel which they adhered to so much, was now out of date, and in­stead Matthaeus Paris. hist. Angl. in Hen. 3. A. 1257. p. 939. Ed. Vatsi [...]i Cap. 8. apud Balaeum. App de vit. Pontif. p. 480. of that they broached another Gospel out of the Wri­tings of the Abbot Ioachim, and Cyrils visions, which they blasphemously named Evangelium Spiritus Sancti, Evangeli­um Novum, and Evangelium Aeternum, as Gulielmus de San­cto Amore, their great Antagonist, relates in his Book de peri­culis noviss. temporum, purposely designed against the Impo­stures of the Mendicant Friers, who then like Locusts, rose in multitudes with their shaven crowns out of the bottomless pit. This Gospel of the Spirit they so much magnified above [Page 161] the Gospel of Christ, that the same Author relates these words of theirs concerning it; Quod comparatum ad Evan­gelium Christi, tanto plus perfectionis ac dignitatis habet, quantum Sol ad Lunam comparatus, aut ad nucleum testa; that it exceed­ed it as much as the kernell doth the shell, or the Light of the Sun doth that of the Moon. We see then from what quarter of the World this new Light began to rise: but so much for this digression. To the thing it self.

If there be such a dispensation of the Spirit which takes §. 4. away the use of Ministry and Ordinances, it did either com­mence from the time of the effusion of the Spirit upon the Apostles, or some time since. Not then; for even of those who had the most large portion of the Spirit poured upon them, we read that they continued in all Gospel ordinances, Acts 2. 42, and among the chief, [...], un­der the Apostles Ministry, it may be better rendred than in the Apostles Doctrine: And which is most observable, the Prophecy of Ioel about the Spirit, is then said to be fulfilled, Acts 2. 17. Besides, if either that place of Ioel, or that of Ieremy, cited Heb. 8. 11. or the Unction of the Spirit, 1 John 2. 20, 27. did take away the use of preaching, how did the Apo­stles themselves understand their meaning, when they were so diligent in preaching and instructing others: Iohn writes to those, to try the Spirits, of whom he saith, They have an 1 Joh. 4. 1. 1 Joh. 2. 20. Unction to know all things: and those to whom the Apostle writes, that they need not teach every one his Neighbour; of them he saith, that they had need to be taught the first principles of the Heb. 5. 12. Oracles of God. And even in that very Chapter where he seems to say, they that are under the New Covenant, need not be taught, he brings that very Speech in as an argument, that the old dispensation of the Law was done away: And so goes about to teach, when he seems to take away the use of it. These Speeches then must not be understood in their abso­lute and literal sense, but with a reflection upon, and com­parison with, the state of things in the times wherein those Prophecies were utter'd: For God to heighten the Jews ap­prehensions of the great blessings of the Gospel, doth set Calvin. in Joel. 2. 28. them forth under a kind of Hyperbolical expressions, that the dull capacity of the Jews might at least apprehend the just [Page 162] weight and magnitude of them, which they would not other­wise have done. So in that place of Ieremy, God to make Jer. 31. 31. them understand how much the knowledge of the Gospel ex­ceeded that under the Law, doth as it were set it down in this Hyperbolicall way, that it will exceed it as much, as one that needs no teaching at all, doth one that is yet but in his rudi­ments of learning. So that the place doth not deny the use of teaching under the Gospel, but because Teaching doth commonly suppose ignorance, to shew the great mea­sure of knowledge, he doth it in that way, as though the knowledge should be so great, that men should not need be taught in such a way of Rudiments as the Jews were, viz by Types and Ceremonies, and such things. We see then no such dispensation was in the Apostles times; for the same Apostle after this in Chapt. 10. 25. bids them not to for­sake the Assembling themselves together as some did; Wherefore were these Assemblies, but for Instruction? and in the last Heb. 10. 25. Chapter, bids them obey their Rulers. What need Rulers, if no need of Teaching? But so sensless a dream will be too much Heb. 13. 7. honour'd with any longer confutation. In the Apostles times then, there was no such dispensation of the Spirit, which did take away the use of Ministry and Ordinances. If it be ex­pected since their times, I would know whence it appears, that any have a greater measure of the Spirit then was poured out in the Apostles times; for then the Ministry was joyned with the Spirit: and what Prophecies are fulfilled now, which were not then? Or if they pretend to a Doctrine distinct from, and above what the Apostles taught, let them produce their evidences, and work those miracles which may induce men to believe them: Or let them shew what obligation any have to believe pretended new Revelations, without a power of miracles, attesting that those Revelations come from God? Or whereon men must build their faith, if it be left to the dictates of a pretended Spirit of Revelation? Or what way is left to discern the good Spirit from the bad, in its actings upon mens minds, if the Word of God be not our Rule still? Or how God is said to have spoken in the last dayes by his Son, if a Heb. 1. 1. further speaking be yet expected? For the Gospel-dispensa­tion [Page 361] is therefore called the Last dayes, because no other is to be expected: Times being differenced in Scripture according to Gods wayes of revealing himself to men. But so much for this.

The second way whereby to know when Positive Lawes are §. 5. unalterable, is when God hath declared that such Lawes shall bind still. Two wayes whereby God doth express his own Will concerning the perpetuity of an Office founded on his own Institution. First, if such things be the work belonging to it, which are of necessary and perpetual use. Secondly, if God hath promised to assist them in it perpetually, in the do­ing of their work. First, the Object of the Ministerial Office are such things which are of necessary and perpetual use; I mean the Administration of Gospel-Ordinances. viz. the Word and Sacraments, which were appointed by Christ for a perpetual Use. The Word as a means of Conversion and Edi­fication; the Sacraments not onely as notes of distinction of Professors of the true faith from others, but as Seals to confirm the Truth of the Covenant on Gods part towards us, and as Instruments to convey the blessings sealed in the Covenant to the hearts of Believers. Now the very Nature of these things doth imply their perpetuity and continuance in the world, as long as there shall be any Church of God in it. For these things are not typi rerum futurarum, only Ceremonies to re­present somthing to come, but they are symbola rerum invisi­bilium, signs to represent to our Senses things invisible in their own Nature: and between these two there is a great difference, as to the perpetuity of them: For Types of things as to come, must of necessity expire when the thing typified appears; but representation of invisible things cannot expire on that account, because the thing represented as invisible, cannot be supposed to be made visible, and so to evacuate the use of the Signes which represents them to us. Types represent a thing which is at present invisible; but under the Notion of it as fu­ture. Symbols represent a thing at present invisible, but as present; and therefore Symbols are designed by Gods Insti­tution for a perpetuall help to the weakness of our Faith. And therefore the Lords Supper is appointed to set forth the Lords 1 Cor. 11: 26. Death, till he come: whereby the continuance of it in the [Page 164] Church of God is necessarily implied. Now then, if these things which are the proper object of the Ministerial Function be of a perpetual Nature; when these things are declared to be of an abiding Nature, it necessarily follows, that that Function to which it belongs to administer these things, must be of a per­petual Nature.

Especially if we consider in the second place, that Christ §. 6. hath promised to be with them continually in the administra­tion of these things: For that, notwithstanding the dust late­ly thrown upon it, we have a clear place, Matth. 28. 19. Go teach and baptize, &c. Loe I am with you alwayes to the end of the World. If [...], did not signifie perpetuity, yet certainly the latter words do; for how could Christ be with the Apostles themselves personally to the end of the World? It must be therefore with them, and all that succeed them in the Office of Teaching and Baptizing, to the Worlds end: For that I assert to be the meaning of [...]. I insist not barely on the signification of the word [...], ei­ther as to its supposed Etymology, or as it Answers the Hebrew [...] knowing how fallible the Arguments drawn from thence are, when in the Dispute of the Eternity of the Law of Moses with the Jewes, it is confessed that [...] re­lates onely to a long continuance of Time. But however, I suppose that it will hardly be found in Scripture, that either [...] or [...] doth barely relate to the time of Life of any in­dividuall persons, especially, if absolutely put as it is here. One great signification of [...] in the New Testament (which we are to inquire into, and not how it is used among Greek Authours) is that wherein [...] is taken for the world its self Philolog. Sacr. de Hebr. N. T. cap. 2. which Vorstius reckons among the Hebraisms of the New Test. in which sense the Jewes call God [...] and great per­sons [...] Magnates mundi in which Sense, in the New Testament, the Devil is called [...]. Ioh. 12. 31.—14. 31. and [...], 2 Cor. 4. 4. And so God is said to create [...], the worlds, Heb. 1. 2.—11. 3. If we take it in this Sense, Christs promise must of ne­cessity relate to the dissolution of the Fabrick of the World, and that he would be with his Servants in the Gospel, till all things be dissolved. Against this it is pleaded, that the [...] [Page 165] here relates to the destruction of Ierusalem, and that [...] im­plies the state of things under the Law, which would continue till Ierusalem were destroyed, from which time a new [...] would commence. But to this I answer, first; I absolutely deny, that [...], doth ever in Scripture relate to the destruction of the Jewish State. This will be best made out by a particular view of the places wherein this Phrase oc­curres. The first time we meet with this phrase is in Matth. 13. where we have it thrice, ver. 39. [...]: Now can any be so senslesse, as to imagine that the Harvest wherein the Tares shall be gathered, and cast into unquenchable fire, when the Angels are said to be the Rea­pers, and to gather out of Christs Kingdome every thing that offends, should be attributed to the destruction of Ierusalem? and so ver. 40. and ver. 49. where the same phrase expresseth the same time, [...], where the Antecedents and Consequents fully Declare, what the time there is meant, which is the general Judgement of the world. The onely place pleaded for this sense, is Matthew 24. 3. where the Disciples inquire of Christ what should be the sign, [...], where granting, that the former Christs coming may respect his coming to alter the present state of things, according to the Jewes appre­hension of the Messias; yet I deny that the latter doth, but it respects the generall Destruction of the World, consequent upon that alteration: For the Jewes not onely expected an alteration of the present state of things among them, but a consequent Destruction of the World, after the coming of the Messias, according to that speech of theirs cited by Doctor Lightfoot. [...] This World shall be Horae hebr. in Matth. 24. 3. p. 262. destroyed for a 1000. years, and after that [...] there should be the State of Eternity. So that the Disciples, speak­ing in the Sense of the Jewes, doe not onely inquire of the signs of his altering the present state of things among them, but likewise of the Destruction of the whole World too. Ac­cordingly it is observable, that throughout that Chapter, our Saviour intermixeth his answers to these 2 Questions. Some­times speaking in reference to the Jewish State, as it is plain he doth, verse 15, 16. and so on; and when he saith, that [Page 166] this Generation shall not pass, till all these things be fulfilled, ver. 34. But then it is as evident, that some places must relate to the destruction of the World, as when he saith, Of that day and hour knoweth no Man, no not the Angels of Heaven, but the Father onely, ver. 36. which will appear more plainly, by com­paring it with Mark 13. 32. Where the Son is excluded from knowing that hour too; But how can any say, that the Son did not know the time of the Destruction of Ierusalem, which he himself foretold when it should be? And those words Heaven and Earth shall pass away, ver. 35. seem to be our Saviours Transition to the Answer of the other Question, about the final destruction of all things. However that be, as we see no reason at all why [...], should onely respect the subversion of the Jewish State: But supposing it should, yet there is far less reason why it should be so meant, in the place whose sense we are inquiring into. For if by Christs coming to destroy Ierusalem, the old Sate and Dispensation should be taken away, we must suppose a new state [...]nder the messi­as to begin from thence. And how Rationall doth this sound, that Christ should promise his peculiar Presence with his own Apostles, whom he imployed in erecting the Gospel State, onely till the Old Jewish State be subverted; but his Promise not at all to extend to that Time, wherein the State of the Kingdome of the Messias should be set up in stead of it: And how could any of the Apostles, for example, Saint Iohn, who survived the Destruction of Ierusalem, expect Christs Presence with him, by vertue of this Promise, if it extended no further then to the Destruction of the Jewish State? Besides, it is a meer groundlesse fancy, and favours of the Jewish appre­hensions of the State of the Messias Kingdome, to imagine that the Temporall State of Ierusalem must be first subverted before that [...] or Dispensation of things was at an end. For the Jewish State and Dispensation did not lie in the Iewish Po­lity, but in Obligation to the Law of Moses, which expired together with Christ. And so the Gospel-tate, which is cal­led the Kingdome of Heaven, and the Regeneration, began Matth. 19. 28. upon Christs Resurrection and Ascension, when he was so­lemnly (as it were) inaugurated in his Mediatory Kingdome. And presently after sends down his Vice-Roy upon the day of [Page 167] Pentecost, in the effusion of the Spirit upon the Apostles, making Acts 2. 11 good his Promise of the Paracle [...]e to supply his absence: Whereby the Apostles were more signally impowered for the advancing of the Gospel state.

The [...] then of the Gospel commenceth from Christs §. 7. Resurrection, and to this [...] I am very inclinable to think that our Saviour hath reference in these words, when he saith, he will be with his Disciples to the end of that [...], if we take it for a state of things, or the Gospel-dispensation; that is, as long as the Evangelical Church shall continue: For that in Scripture is sometime called The World to come, and that Heb. 2. [...]. Lightfoot Horae. Hebr. in Matth. 12. 32. p. 173. Heb. 6. 5. Phrase among the Jews of [...] the world to come, is set to express the times of the Messias; and it may be the Apostle may referr to this, when he speaks of Apostales tasting [...], that is, the force and energy of the Gospel preached; whence the Kingdom of God is said to be not [...], but [...], not in word, but in power, which is the [...], spoken of by the Apostle else­where, 1. Cor. 4. 20. the powerfull demonstration of the Spirit accompanying the preaching of the Gospel. When Christ is called by the Prophet [...] the everlasting Father, the Septuagint ren­ders it by [...], and so the Vulgar, Latin. 1 Cor. 24. Pater futuri saeculi, the Father of the World to Come: that is, the Gospel State, and to this sense Christ is said to be Isai. 9. 5. Heb. 9. 11. made an High Priest, [...], and the Law to be a shadow [...], of good things which should be under the new state of the Gospel. And which is more plain to the Heb. 10. 1. purpose, the Apostle expresseth what was come to passe in Eph. 2. 7. the dayes of the Gospel, [...], in the Ages to come, where the very word [...] is used to this sense. And Matth 12. 32. according to this importance of the word [...], some very probably interpret that place of our Saviour concerning the sin against the Holy Ghost, that it should not be forgiven [...], neither in the present D Reynolds on Hosea 14. 3. state of the Iewish Church, wherein there is no sacrifice of expia­tion for contumacious sinners, but they that despised Moses Law dyed without mercy; so neither shall there be, any under the World to come, that is the dispensation of Gospel Grace, any par­don Heb 10. 26, 27, 28. proclaimed to any such sinners who [...]ample under foot [Page 168] the blood of the Covenant, and offer despight to the Spirit of grace. Thus we see how properly the word [...] may agree here to the Gospel-State, and so Christs promise of his Pre­sence doth imply the perpetuity of that Office as long as the Evangelical state shall remain, which will be to the Worlds end.

The third thing, whereby to know when positive instituti­ons §. 8. are unalterable, is, when they are necessary to the being, succession, and continuance of the Church of God. Now this yields a further evidence of the perpetuity of Officers in the Church of God, seeing the Church its self cannot be preserved without the Government; and there can be no Go­vernment without some to Rule the members of the Church of God, and to take care for a due administration of Church­priviledges, and to inflict censures upon offenders, which is the power they are invested in by the same authority which was the ground of their institution at first. It is not concei­vable how any Society, as the Church is, can be preserved with­out the continuance of Church-Officers among them. As long as the Body of Christ must be edified, there must be some [...], fitted for the work of the Mi­nistry, which is appointed in order to that end; For that I suppose is the Apostles meaning in Ephes. 4. 12. [...]. following the Complutensian copy, leaving out the comma be­tween [...] and [...], which makes as though it were a di­stinct thing from the former; whereas the Original carryes the sense on; for otherwise it should have been [...], &c. and those who follow the ordinary reading, are much at a loss how to explain that [...] coming in so in the midst without dependance upon the former. Therefore the vulg. Latin best renders it, ad consumma­tionem sanctorum ad opus ministerii; for the compleating of the Saints for the work of the ministry, in order to the building up of the body of Christ; and to this purpose Musculus informs us, the German version renders it. And so we understand the enumeration in the verse before of Apostles, Prophets, Evan­gelists, Eph. 4. 11 Pastors and Teachers, not for the persons themselves, but for the gifts of those persons, the office of Apostles, Evan­gelists, [Page 169] Pastors, &c. which is most suitable to the [...] in the eighth verse. He gave gifts to men; now these gifts, saith he, Christ gave to men [...], for the fitting the Saints for the work of the Ministry. Not as a late Democratical Writer would perswade us, as though all the Saints were thereby fitted for this Work of the Ministry; (for that the Apostle excludes by the former enumeration); for, are all the Saints fitted for Apostles? are all Prophets, are all Evangelists, are all Pastors and Teachers? as the Apostle 1 Cor. 12. 29, 8, 9, 10, 11. himself elsewhere argues. And in the 8 v. of that chapter, he particularly mentions the several gifts qualifying men for several usefull employments in the Church of God, the Spirit dividing to every man severally as he will. Therefore it cannot be that all the Saints are hereby fitted for this Work; but God hath scattered these gifts among the Saints, that those who have them might be fitted, [...], because God would not leave his Church without persons qualified for the service of himself in the work of the Ministry, in order to the building up of the Body of Christ. And by the [...], here may be meant no other then those he speaks of in the chapter before, when he speaks of the Revelation made [...], Eph. 3. 5. to his holy Apostles and Prophets, and so God gave these gifts for the fiitting the holy Apostles, &c. for the work of the Ministry. It cannot be meant of all, so as to destroy a peculiar function of the Ministry; for Gods very giving these gifts to some and not to others, is an evidence that the function is peculiar. For else had the gifts been common to all, every Saint had been an Apostle, every believer a Pastor, and Teacher, and then where had the People been that must have been ruled and governed? So that this very place doth strongly assert both the peculiarity of the Function, from the peculiarity of gifts in order to fitting men for it; and the perpetuity of the Function from the end of it, the building up of the Body of Christ. Thus I have now asserted the perpetual divine Right of a Gospel-Ministry, not only for teaching the Word, but administration of Ordinances, and governing the Church as a Society: which work belongs to none but such as are appointed for it, who are the same with the dispencers of the Word, as appears from the titles of [...], [Page 170] Governours, Rulers, Pastors, all which necessarily imply a Heb. 13. 7, 17. 1 Tim. 5. 17. Eph. 4. 11. Governing power, which having been largely proved by others, and yeelded by me, I pass over.

CHAP. III.

ANd now I come to the main Subject of the present Con­troversie, § 1. which is acknowledging a form of Government necessary, and the Governours of the Church perpetuall; Whether the particular form whereby the Church must be governed, be determined by any positive Law of God, which unalterably binds all Christians to the observation of it. By Church here, I mean not a particular Congregation, but such a Society which comprehends in it many of these lesser Congregations united together in one body under a form of Government. The forms of Government in controversie, the Question being thus stated, are only these two▪ the par­ticular officers of several Churches, acting in an equality of Power, which are commonly called a Colledge of Presbyters; or a Superiour Order above the standing Ministry, having the Power of Jurisdiction and Ordination belonging to it by vertue of a Divine Institution. Which order is by an Anto­nomasia called Episcopacy. The Question now, is not, which of these two doth come the nearest to Apostolical practice, and the first Institution, which hath hitherto been the controversie so hotly debated among us; but whether either of these two forms be so setled by a jus divinum, that is, be so determined by a positive Law of God, that all the Churches of Christ are bound to observe that one form so determined, without varia­tion from it: or whether Christ hath not in setling of his Church [Page 171] (provided there be some form of Government, and a setled Ministry for the exercise of it,) left it to the prudence of every particular Church, consisting of many Congrega­tions, to agree upon its own form which it judgdeth most conducing to the end of Government in that particular Church. [...]. Here now we fix our selves, and the first thing we do, is to agree upon our wayes of resolution of this Question, whereby to come to an end of this debate. And the most probable way to come to an issue in it, is, to go through all the wayes whereon men do fix an unalterable divine Right, and to see whether any of these do evince a divine Right setled upon a positive Law or no, for one of these forms. The pleas then for such a divine Right are these: Either some formal Law standing in force under the Gospel, or some plain Institution of a New Law by Christ in forming his Church, or the obligatory nature of Apostolical practice, or the general sense of the Primitive Church, to which we shall add by way of Appendix, the Judgement of the chief Divines and Churches since the Reformation; if we go happily through these, we may content our selves with having obtain­ed the thing we aim at.

The first inquiry then is, Whether any formal Law of God § 2. concerning a form of government for his Church, either by persons acting in an equality of Power, or subordination of one Order to another, under the Gospel, doth remain in force or no, binding Christians to the observing of it. The Reason why I begin with this, is, because I observe the Dispu­tants on both sides make use of the Pattern under the Law to establish their form by. B. Bilson Perpet. Go­vern. cap. 2. B. Andrews Form of Govern­ment in the old T. B. Usher. Original of Episc. Those who are for Superiority of one Order above another in the government of the Church, derive commonly their first argument from the Pat­tern under the Law. Herl of Indep. p. 4. Apol. Span­bem. omnes. Those who are for an equality of Power in the persons acting in government, yet being for a subordination of Courts, they bring their first argument for that, from the Jewish Pattern. So that these latter are bound by their own argument, though used in another case, to be ruled in this Controversie by the Jewish Pattern. For why should it be more obligatory as to subordination of Courts, then as to the superiority of Orders? If it holds in one case: [Page 172] it must in the other. And if there be such a Law for Su­periority standing unrepealed, there needs no New Law to inforce it under the Gospel. We shall therefore first enquire what foundation there is for either form in that Pat­tern, and how far the argument drawn from thence is obliga­tory to us now. For the practice then in the Jewish Church, That there was no universal equality in the Tribe of Levi which God singled out from the rest for his own service, is obvious in Scripture. For there we find Priests above the Levites; the family of Aaron being chosen out from the other families of Cohath (one of the three sons of Levi) to be employed in a nearer attendance upon Gods Service then any of the other families. And it must be acknow­ledged, that among both Priests and Levites there was a Superiority; For God placed Eleazar over the Priests, Numb. 3. v. 30, 34, 35. Elizaphan over the Cohathites, Eliasaph over the Gersho­nites; Zuriel over the Merarites, and these are called [...] the Rulers over their several families; for it is said of every one of them [...] he was Ruler over the house of his Father. Neither were these equal; for over Numb. 4. 28. 32. Numb. 4. 19. Eliasaph and Zuriel God placed Ithamar, over Elisaphan and his own family God set Eleazar, who by reason of his authority over all the rest, is called [...] the Ruler of the Rulers of Levi, and besides these there were under these Rulers [...] the chief Fathers of the several distinct families, as they are called Exodus 6. 25. Thus we briefly see the subordination that there was in the Tribe of Levi; the Levites first, over them the heads of the Families, over them the Rulers, or the chief of the heads, over them Ithamar, over both Priests and Levites, Eleazar; Over all, Aaron the High Priest.

There being then so manifest an inequality among them, §. 3. proceed we to shew how obligatory this is under the Go­spel. For that end it will be necessary to consider, whether this imparity and Superiority were peculiarly appointed by God for the Ecclesiastical government of the Tribe of Levi, as it consisted of persons to be employed in the service of God, or it was only such an inequality and Superiority as was in any other Tribe. If only common with other Tribes, [Page 173] nothing can be inferred from thence peculiar to Ecclesiasti­call government under the Gospel, any more then from the government of other Tribes to the same kind of go­vernment in all civil States. We must then take notice that Levi was a particular distinct Tribe of it self, and so not in subordination to any other Tribe; for they had the heads of their Fathers as well as others, Exodus 6. 25. and although when they were setled in Canaan, their habitations were intermixt with other Tribes in their forty eight Cities, yet they were not under the government of those Tribes among whom they lived, but preserved their authority and govern­ment intire among themselves. And therefore it was necessa­ry there should be the same form of government among them, which there was among the rest. The whole body of the Nation then was divided into thirteen Tribes; these Tribes into their several families; some say seventy, which they called [...], these Families were divided into so many Hous­holds [...], their Housholds into persons [...]; over the several persons were the several Masters of Families; over the several Housholds were the Captains of 1000 and 100, 50—10. Over the Families, I suppose, were the heads of the Fathers. And over the thirteen Tribes were the [...] the chief Fathers of the Tribes of the Children of Israel, Numb. 32. 28. and we have the names of them set down, Numb. 34. 17, &c. So that hitherto, we find no­thing peculiar to this Tribe, nor proper to it as employed in the service of God. For their several Families had their several Heads, and Eleazar over them as chief of the Tribe. And so we find throughout Numbers 2. all the Heads of the several Tribes are named and appointed by God as Eleazar was.

The only things then which seem proper to this Tribe, were § 5. the superiority of the Priests over the Levites in the service of God, and the supereminent power of the High Priest, as the type of Christ. So that nothing can be inferred from the order under the Law to that under the Gospel, but from one of these two. And from the first there can be nothing deduced but this, that as there was a superiority of Officers under the Law, so likewise should there be under the Gospel; which is granted by all in the superiority of Priests over Dea­cons, [Page 174] to whom these two answer in the Church of God, in the judgement of those who contend for a higher order by divine Institution above Presbyters. And withall we must consider, that there was under that order no power of ju­risdiction invested in the Priests over the Levites, but that was in the heads of the Families; and ordination there could not be, because their office descended by succession in their several Families. Those who would argue from Aarons power, must either bring too little, or too much from thence; Too little, if we consider his office was typical and ceremonial, and as High Priest had more immediate respect to God then men, Heb. 5. 1. and therefore Eleazar was appointed over the several Families during Aarons life-time; and under Eleazar, his son Phinehas. Too much, If a necessity be urged for the continuance of the same authority in the Church of God; which is the argument of the Papists, deriving the Popes Supremacy from thence. Which was acutely done by Pope Innocentius the third, the Father of the Lateran Council, who proved, that the Pope may exercise temporall jurisdiction from that place in Deuteronomy 17. 8. and that by this reason, because Deuteronomy did imply the second Law, and therefore what was there written, in Novo Testamento debet observari, must be observed under the Gospel, which according to them is a new Law.

All that can be inferred then from the Jewish pattern, § 5. cannot amount to any obligation upon Christians, it being at the best but a judicial Law, and therefore binds us not up as a positive Law; but only declares the equity of the thing in use then. I conclude then, That the Jewish pattern is no standing Law for Church-Government now, either in its common or peculiar form of Government; but because there was some superiority of order then, and subordination of some persons to others under that government, that such a superiority and subordination is no wayes unlawfull under the Gospel; for that would destroy the equity of the Law. And though the form of Government was the same with that of other Tribes, yet we see God did not bind them to an equality, because they were for his immediate service, but continued the same way as in other Tribes; thence I inferr, [Page 175] that as there is no necessary obligation upon Christians to con­tinue that form under the Jews, because their Laws do not bind us now; so neither is there any repugnancy to this Law in such a subordination, but it is very agreeable with the equity of it, it being instituted for peace and order, and therefore ought not to be condemned for Antichristian. The Jewish pattern then of Government, neither makes equality unlawfull, because their Laws do not oblige now; nor doth it make superiority unlawfull, because it was practised then. So that notwithstand­ing the Jewish pattern, the Church of Christ is left to its own liberty for the choyce of its form of Government, whether by an equality of power in some persons, or superiority and sub­ordination of one order to another.

CHAP. IV.

VVE come then from the Type to the Antitype, from §. 1. the Rod of Aaron to the Root of Iess [...] ▪ from the Pattern [Page 176] of the Jewish Church, to the Founder of the Christian: To see whether our Lord & Saviour hath determined this controver­sie, or any one form of government for his Church, by any uni­versally binding act or Law of his. And here it is pleaded more hotly by many that Christ must do it, than that he hath done it. And therefore I shall first examine the pretences of the necessity of Christs determining the particular form; and then the arguments that are brought that he hath done it. The main pleas that there must be a perfect form of Church­government laid down by Christ for the Church of God, are from the comparison of Christ with Moses, from the equal neces­sity of forms of Government now which there is for other Heb. 1. 2, 5, 6. Societies, from the perfection and sufficiency of the Scriptures; all other arguments are reducible to these three Heads. Of these in their order.

First, From the comparison of Christ with Moses, they argue Arg. 1. thus: If Moses was faithfull in his house as a servant, much more Christ as a Son; now Moses appointed a particular form of Government for the Church under the old Testament; therefore Christ did certainly lay down a form of Church Government for the New Testament.

To this I answer: first, Faithfulnesse implyes the discharge Answ. 1. of a trust reposed in one by another: so that it is said vers. 2. he was faithful to him that appointed him: Christs faithfulnesse then lay in discharging the Work which his Father laid upon him, which was the Work of mediation between God and us; and therefore the comparison is here Instituted be­tween Moses as typical Mediator, and Christ as the true Me­diator; that as Moses was faithfull in his Work, so was Christ in his. Now Moses his faithfulnesse lay in keeping close to the Pattern received in the Mount, that is, observing the commands of God; Now therefore if Christs being faith­full in his office, doth imply the setling any one form of Go­verment in the Church, it must be made appear that the ser­ling of this form was part of Christs Mediatory Work, and that which the Father commanded him to do as Mediator▪ and that Christ received such a form from the Father for the Chri­stian Church, as Moses did for the Jewish. To this it is said, That the Government is laid upon Christs shoulders, and all [Page 177] power in his hands; and therefore it belongs to him as Media­tour. Isa. 9. 6. Matth 28. 18. Christ I grant is the King of the Church, and doth govern it outwardly by his Laws, and inwardly by the conduct of his Spirit: but shall we say, that therefore any one form of Go­vernment is necessary, which is neither contained in his Laws, nor dictated by his Spirit? the main original of mistakes here, is, the confounding the external and internal Government of the Church of Christ, and thence whensoever men read of Christs power, authority and government, they fancy it refers to the outward Government of the Church of God, which is intended of his internal Mediatory power over the hearts and consciences of men. But withall I acknowledge, that Christ for the better government of his Church and people, hath appointed Officers in his Church, invested them by ver­tue of his own power with an authority to preach and bap­tize, and administer all Gospel-Ordinances in his own Name, Matth. 28. 18. 19. that is, by his authority, for it is clearly made known to us in the Word of God, that Christ hath appointed these things. But then, whether any shall succeed the Apostles in superiority of power over Presbyters, or all remain governing the Church in an equality of power, is nowhere determined by the Will of Christ in Scripture, which contains his Royal Law: and therefore we have no reason to look upon it as any thing flowing from the power and authority of Christ as Mediator; and so not necessarily binding Christians.

Secondly, I answer; If the correspondency between Christ § 2. and Moses in their work, doth imply an equal exactnesse in Christs disposing of every thing in his Church, as Moses did among the Jews; then the Church of Christ must be equally bound to all circumstances of Worship as the Jews were. For there was nothing appertaining in the least to the Worship of God, but was fully set down even to the pins of the Taber­nacle in the Law of Moses; but we find no such thing in the Gospel. The main Duties and Ordinances are prescribed indeed, but their circumstances and manner of performance are left as matters of Christian-liberty, and only couched under some general Rules: which is a great difference be­tween the legal and Gospel-state. Under the Law all Cere­monies and Circumstances are exactly prescribed: but in the [Page 178] Gospel we read of some general Rules of direction for Christi­ans carriage in all circumstantial things. These four especi­ally contain all the directions of Scripture concerning Circum­stantials. 1 Cor. 14. 40. All things to be done decently and in order. All to be done for edification. Give no offence. Do all to the glory 1 Cor. 14. 26. of God. So that the particular circumstances are left to Chri­stian-liberty with the observation of general Rules. It is evi­dent 1 Cor. 10. 32. as to Baptism and the Lords Supper, which are unquestio­nably 1 Cor. 10. 31. of divine Institution, yet as to the circumstances of the administration of them, how much lesse circumstantial is Christ Rom. 14. 6, 7. then Moses was! As to circumcision and the pass-over under the Law, the age, time, persons, manner, place, form, all fully set down; but nothing so under the Gospel: Whether Baptism shall be administred to Infants or no, is not set down in ex­presse words, but left to be gathered by Analogy and conse­quences; what manner it shall be administred in, whether by dipping or sprinkling, is not absolutely determined; what form of words to be used, whether in the name of all three persons, or sometimes in the Name of Christ only, as in the Acts Acts 2. 38. 8. 12, 19, 5. we read (if that be the sense, and not rather in Christs Name, i. e. by Christs authority). Whether▪sprinkling or dipping shall be thrice as some Churches use it, or only once as others. These things we see relating to an Ordinance of Divine Insti­tution, are yet past over without any expresse command deter­mining either way in Scripture. So as to the Lords Supper; What persons to be admitted to it, whether all visible pro­fessors, or only sincere Christians: upon what terms, whether by previous examination of Church-officers, or by an open pro­fession of their faith, or else only by their own tryal of themselves, required of them as their duty by their Ministers; whether it should be alwayes after Supper as Christ himself did it; whether taking fasting, or after meat; whether kneeling, or sitting, or leaning? Whether to be consecrated in one form of words, or several? These things are not thought fit to be▪determined by any positive command of Christ, but left to the exercise of Christian-liberty; the like is as to preaching the Word, publike Prayer, singing of Psalmes; the duties are required, but the particular Modes are left undetermined. The case is the same as to Church-governwent. That the [Page 179] Church be governed, and that it be governed by its proper Officers, are things of Divine appointment: but whether the Church should be governed by many joyning together in an equality, or by Subordination of some persons to others, is left to the same liberty which all other Circumstances are; this being not the Substance of the thing it self, but onely the man­ner of performance of it.

3. I answer, That there is a manifest disparity between the §. 3. Gospel and Jewish state: and therefore Reasons may be given why all Punctilioes were determined then which are not now: as

1. The perfection and liberty of the Gospel-state above the Jewish. The Law was onely as a Paedagogy, the Church then in her Infancy and Nonage, and therefore wanted the Fes­cues of Ceremonies to direct her, and every part of her lesson set her, to bring her by degrees to skill and exactness in her Understanding the mystery of the things represented to her. But must the Church now grown up under Christ be still sub ferula, and not dare to vary in any Circumstance, which doth not concern the thing it self! A Boy at School hath his Lesson set him, and the manner of learning it pre­scribed him in every mode and circumstance. But at the Uni­versity hath his Lectures read him, and his work set, and ge­neral Directions given, but he is left to his own liberty how to perform his work, and what manner to use in the doing of it. So it was with the Church under age: Every mode and circumstance was Determined; but when the fulnesse of Time was come, the Church then being grown up, the main Offices themselves were appointed, and generall Di­rections given; but a liberty left how to apply and make use of them, as to every particular case and occasion. Things Morall remain still in their full force, but circumstantials are left more at liberty by the Gospel-liberty; as a Son that is taught by his Father, while he is under his instruction, must observe every particular direction for him in his Learning: but when he comes to age, though he observes not those things as formerly, yet his Son▪ship continues, and he must obey his Father as a Childe still, though not in the same manner. The similitude is the Apostles, Galat. 4. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. 10. which [Page 180] he there largely amplifies to this very purpose of freeing Chri­stians from Judaical ceremonies.

2. The Form of Government among the Jewes in the tribe of Levi, was agreeable to the Form of Government among the other Tribes; and so Moses was not more exact in Reference to that, then to any other; and those persons in that Tribe who were the chief before the Institution of the A [...]ronicall Priest-hood, were so after; but now under the Gospel, peo­ple are not under the same Restrictions for civil Government by a Judicial Law, as they were then. For the Form of Ec­clesiastical Government then took place among them as one of their Judicial Laws; And therefore if the Argument hold, Christ must as well Prescribe a Form for civil Government as Ecclesiastical; if Christ in the Gospel must by his Faithful­nesse follow the Pattern of Moses. But if Christ be not bound to follow Moses Pattern as to Judicial Law, for his Church and People; neither is he as to a Form of Ecclesiastical Go­vernment, because that was a part of their Civil and Judicial Law.

3. The people of the Jewes was a whole and entire people, subsisting by themselves when one set Form of Government was prescribed them; but it is otherwise now under the Go­spel. The Church of Christ was but Forming in Christs own time, nor the Apostles, in whose time we reade of but some Cities and no whole Nations converted to the Faith; and therefore the same Form of Government would not serve a Church in its first constitution, which is necessary for it when it is actually formed. A Pastour and Deacons might serve the Church of a City while believers were few, but can­not when they are increased into many Congregations. And so proportionably when the Church is enlarged to a whole Nation, there must be another Form of Government then. Therefore they who call for a National Church under the Gospel, let them first shew a Nation Converted to the Faith, and we will undertake to shew the other. And this is the chief Reason why the Churches Polity is so little described in the New Testament, because it was onely growing then: and it doth not stand to Reason, that the coat which was cut out for one in his Infancy, must of necessity serve him when [Page 181] grown a man; which is the argument of those who will have nothing observed in the Church, but what is expressed in Scripture. The Apostles looked at the present state of a Church in appointing Officers, and ordered things according to the circumstances of them, which was necessary to be done in the founding of a Church; and the reason of Apostolical practice binds still, though not the individual action, that as they Re­gulated Churches for the best conveniency of Governing them, so should the Pastours of Churches now. But of this largely afterwards.

4. Another difference is, that the People of the Jewes lived all under one civil Government; but it is otherwise with Chri­stians who live under different Forms of civil Government. And then by the same reason that in the first institution of their Ecclesiastical Government it was formed according to the civil, by the same reason, must Christians doe under the Go­spel, if the argument holds that Christ must be faithful as Mo­ses was. And then because Christians do live under several and distinct Forms of civil Government, they must be bound by the Law of Christ, to contemperate the Government of the Church to that of the State. And what they have gained by this for their cause, who assert the necessity of any one Form from this Argument, I see not; but on the contrary this is evident, that they have evidently destroyed their own princi­ple by it. For if Moses did prescribe a Form of Government for Levi agreeable to the Form of the Common-wealth, and Christ be as faithfull as Moses was, then Christ must likewise order the Government of Christian Churches, according to that of the State, and so must have different Forms as the other hath. Thus much will serve abundantly to shew the weakness of the argument drawn from the agreement of Christ and Moses, for the proving any one form of Government necessa­ry; but this shall not suffice. I now shall ex abundanti from the answers to this argument, lay down several arguments that Christ did never intend to institute any one Form of Govern­ment in his Church.

1. Whatever binds the Church of God as an institution of § 4. Christ, must bind as an universal standing Law; but one form of Government in the Church cannot bind it as a standing [Page 182] Law. For whatever binds as a standing [...]aw, must either be expressed in direct terms as such a Law; or deduced by a ne­cessary Consequence from his Lawes, as of an universally bind­ing Nature; but any one particular form of Government in the Church, is neither expressed in any direct terms by Christ, nor can be deduced by just Consequence; therefore no such form of Government is instituted by Christ. If there be any such Law, it must be produced, whereby it is determined in Scripture, either that there must be Superiority or Equali­ty among Church Officers, as such, after the Apostles decease. And though the Negative of a Fact holds not, yet the Nega­tive of a Law doth, else no superstition. I have not yet met with any such produced, and therefore shall see what consequences can be made of a binding Nature. To this I say, that no con­sequences can be deduced to make an institution, but onely to apply one to particular Cases: because Positives are in them­selves indifferent without Institution and Divine appointment; and therefore that must be directly brought for the making a Positive universally binding, which it doth not in its own Na­ture do. Now here must be an Institution of something meer­ly Positive supposed, which in its self is of an indifferent Na­ture; and therefore no consequence drawn can suffice to make it unalterably binding, without express Declaration that such a thing shall so bind; for what is not in its own Nature moral, binds only by vertue of a command, which command must be made known by the Will of Christ, so that we may understand its Obligatory nature. So that both a consequence must be ne­cessarily drawn, and the Obligation of what shall be so drawn must be expressed in Scripture: which I despair of ever find­ing in reference to any one Form of Government in the Church.

2. If the standing Laws for Church-Government be equally applyable to several distinct Forms, then no one Form is pre­scribed in Scripture; but all the standing Lawes respecting Church-Government, are equally applyable to several Forms: All the Lawes occurring in Scripture respecting Church Go­vernment, may be referred to these three heads. Such as set down the Qualifications of the Persons for the Office of Govern­ment, such as require a right management of their Office, and [Page 183] such as lay down Rules for the management of their Office. Now all these are equally applyable to either of these two forms we now discourse of. We begin then with those which set down the qualifications of persons employed in Government, those we have largely and fully set down by St. Paul in his Order to 1 Tim. 3. 1. to the 8. Timothy and Titus, prescribing what manner of persons those Titus 1. 5. to the 10. should be who are to be employed in the Government of the Church. A Bishop must be blamelesse as the Steward of God, not self-willed, not soon angry, not given to wine, no striker, &c. All these, and the rest of the Qualifications mentioned, are equally required as necessary in a Bishop, whether taken for one of a Superiour Order above Presbyters, or else only for a single Presbyter; however that be, if he hath a hand in Church­government, he must be such a one as the Apostle prescribes; And so these commands to Timothy and Titus given by Paul, do equally respect and concern them, whether we consider them as Evangelists acting by an extraordinary Commission, or as fixed Pastors over all the Churches in their several pre­cincts; so that from the Commands themselves nothing can be inferred either way to determine the Question; only one place is pleaded for the perpetuity of the Office Timothy was employed in, which must now be examined: The place is 1 Tim. 6. 13, 14. I give thee charge in the sight of God, &c. that thou keep this commandement without spot, unrebukable, untill the appearing of our Lord Iesus Christ. From hence it is argued thus: The Commandment here was the Charge which Timothy had of governing the Church; this Timothy could not keep personally till Christs second coming; there­fore there must be a Succession of Officers in the same kind till the second coming of Christ. But this is easily answered. For first, it is no wayes certain what this Command was which St. Paul speaks of; Some understand it of fighting the good fight of Faith, others of the precept of Love, others most probably the sum of all contained in this Epistle, which I con­fesse implies in it (as being one great part of the Epistle) Pauls direction of Timothy for the right discharging of his Office; but, granting that the command respects Timothy's Office, yet I answer, Secondly, It manifestly appears to be something personal, and not successive; or at least nothing can be inferr'd [Page 184] for the necessity of such a Succession from this place which it was brought for: Nothing being more evident then that this command related to Timothy's personal observance of it. And therefore thirdly, Christs appearing here, is not meant of his second coming to judgement, but it only imports the Hom. 18. in 1 Tim. To. 4. time of Timothy's decease; So Chrysostome, [...]. So Estius understands it, usque ad exitum vitae; Epistol. 80. [...]ad Hesych. and for that end brings that Speech of Augustine, Tun [...] uni­cuique veniet dies adventûs Domini, cum venerit ei dies, ut talis hinc exeat, qualis▪judicandus est illo die. And the reason why the time of his death is set out by the coming of Christ, is, [...], as Chrysostome, and from him Theo­phylact observes, to incite him the more, both to diligence in his work and patience under sufferings, from the consideration of Christs appearance. The plain meaning of the words then is the same with that, Revel. 2. 10. Be thou faithful unto death, and I will give thee a Crown of life. Nothing then can be hence inferred as to the necessary succession of some in Timothy's Office, whatever it is supposed to be.

Secondly, The precepts of the Gospel requiring a right §. 5. management of the work, are equally applyable to either form. Taking heed to the flock over which God hath made them over­seers, is equally a duty; whether by flock we understand either the particular Church of Ephesus, or the adjacent Churches of Asia; Whether by Overseers we understand some acting over others, or all joyning together in an equality. So exhorting, reproving, preaching in season and out of season, doing Acts 20. 28. all things [...], without rash censures and partia­lity; 2 Tim. 4. 2. watching over the flock as they that must give an ac­count: 1 Tim. 5. 21. Laying hands suddenly on no man: rebuking not an El­der, but under two or three witnesses. And whatever precepts Heb. 13. 17. of this nature we read in the Epistles of Timothy and Titus, 1 Tim. 5. 22. may be equally applyable to men acting in either of these two forms of Government: There being no precept occurring 1 Tim. 5. 19. in all those Epistles prescribing to Timothy, whether he must act only as a Consul in Senatu with the consent of the Pres­bytery, or whether by his sole power he should determine what was the common interest, and concern of those Churches he was the Superintendent over. Neither doth [Page 185] the Apostle determine at all in those Epistles chiefly concerning Church-government, whether upon the removal of Timothy or Titus thence as Evangelists, as some pretend, or upon their death as fixed Pastors and Bishops, as others, any should succeed them in the power they enjoyed, or no: nor in what manner the Pastors of the several Churches should order things of common concernment, Which would seem to be a strange omission, were either of these two forms so necessary, taken exclusively of the other, as both parties seem to affirm. For we cannot conceive but if the being and right constitu­tion of a Church did depend upon the manner of the Gover­nours acting in it, but that care which Paul had over all the Churches would have prompted him (especially being assisted and guided by an infallible Spirit in the penning those Epistles) to have laid down some certain Rules for the acting of the Pastors of the Churches after the departure of Timothy and Titus. Considering especially that the Epistles then writ­ten by him, were to be of standing perpetual use in the Church of God; and by which the Churches in after-ages were to be guided as well as those that were then in being. The Apostle in both Epistles takes care for a succession of Pastors in those Churches: Timothy is charged to commit the things he had 2 Tim. 2. 2. heard of Paul to faithful men; who shall be fit to teach others. Had it not been as requisite to have charged him to have com­mitted his power of Government to men fit for that, had the Apostles looked on the form of Government to be as ne­cessary as the office of preaching? Paul saith, he left Titus in Creete on purpose to settle the Churches and ordain Presbyters Titus 1. 5. in every City: had it not been as necessary to have shewed in what order the Churches must be setled, and what power did belong to those Presbyters, and how they should act in the go­verning their Churches, had he thought the constitution of the Churches did depend upon the form of their acting? We see here then, that St. Paul doth not expresse any thing ne­cessarily inferring any one constant form to be used in the Church of God, And whence can we inferr any necessity of it, but from the Scriptures laying it down as a duty that such a form and no other there must be used in the Church of God? For all that we can see then by Pauls direction for Church-Government, [Page 186] (when if ever, this should have been expres­sed) it was left to the Christian wisdome and prudence of the Churches of Ephesus and Creet to consult and determine in what manner the government of their Churches should be provided for, upon the departure of Timothy and Titus from them.

But here it will be soon replyed, That though nothing be §. 6. expressed in Pauls Epistles to Timothy and Titus, yet Pauls appointing Timothy and Titus over those Churches, did deter­mine the form of Government, and they were entrusted with a power to provide for future Governours after them.

To this [...]answer: First, The superiority which Timothy and Titus had over those Churches, doth not prove that form of Government necessary in all Churches; I dispute not whe­ther they were Evangelists or no, or acted as such in that Su­periority (of that afterwards) it is evident they might be so; there being no convincing argument to the contrary. And the bare possibility of the truth of the Negative, destroys the necessity of the Affirmative of a Proposition. As, Si posi­bile est, hominem non esse animal, then that Proposition is false, Necesse est hominem esse animal. For, Necesse est esse, and Non possibile est non esse, being [...]quipollents on the one side; and Possibile est non esse, Et non necesse est esse, being [...]quipollents on the other; Possibile est non esse, must be contradictory to Necesse est esse, as Non possibile est non esse, is to Non necesse est esse. So that if only the possibility of their acting as Evangelists, that is, by an extraordinary Commission, be evicted, which I know none will deny; the necessity of their acting as fixed Bishops is destroyed, and consequently the necessity of the continu­ance of their office too, which depends upon the former. For if they acted not as Bishops, nothing can be drawn from their example necessarily inforcing the continuance of the Superiority which they enjoyed. But though nothing can be inferred from hence as to the necessity of that office to continue in the Church, which Timothy and Titus were in­vested in; yet from the Superiority of that power which they enjoyed over those Churches, whether as Evangelists, or as fixed Bishops, These two things may be inferred. First, That the superiority of some Church-Officers over others, is [Page 187] not contrary to the Rule of the Gospel: for all parties ac­knowledge the superiority of their power above the Presby­ters of the several Cityes; only the continuance of this pow­er [...] disputed by many. But if they had any such power at all, it is enough for my present design, viz. that such a superiority is not contrary to the Gospel-Rule: or that the nature of the Government of the Church doth not imply a necessary equality among the Governours of it. Secondly, Hence I infer, that it is not repugnant to the constitution of Churches in Apostolical times, for men to have power over more than one particular Congregation. For such a power Ti­mothy and Titus had, which had it been contrary to the nature of the regiment of Churches, we should never have read of in the first planted Churches. So that if those popular arguments of a necessary relation between a Pastor and particular peo­ple, of personal knowledge, care and inspection, did destroy the lawfulnesse of extending that care and charge to many par­ticular Congregations, they would likewise overthrow the nature, end and design of the office which Timothy and Titus acted in: which had a relation to a multitude of particular and Congregational Churches. Whether their power was extraordinary or no, I now dispute not; but whether such a power be repugnant to the Gospel or no; which from their practice is evident that it is not. But then others who would make this office necessary, urge further, that Timothy or Titus might ordain and appoint others to succeed them in their places and care over all those Churches under their charge. To which I answer, First, What they might do is not the question, but what they did, as they might do it; so they might not do it, if no other evidence be brought to prove it: for, Quod possi­bile est esse, possibile [...]st non esse. Secondly, Neither what they did, is the whole question, but what they did with an opinion of the necessity of doing it, whether they were bound to do it or no? and if so, whether by any Law extant in Scripture, and given them by Paul in his Epistles, or some private com­mand and particular instructions when he deputed them to their several charges: If the former, that Law and command must be produced, which will hardly be, if we embrace only the received Canon of the Scripture. If the latter▪ we must [Page 188] then fetch some standing Rule and Law from unwritten Tra­ditions: for no other evidence can be given of the Instructions by word of mouth, given by Paul to Timothy and Titus at the taking their charges upon them. But yet Thirdly, Were it only the matter of fact that was disputed, that would hold a Controversie still, viz. Whether any did succeed Timothy and Titus in their Offices: but this I shall leave to its pro­per place to be discussed, when I come to examine the argu­ment from Apostolical Succession. Thus we see then that neither the qualification of the persons, nor the commands for a right exercise of the office committed to them, nor the whole Epistles to Timothy and Titus, do determine any one form of Government to be necessary in the Church of God.

Thirdly, Let us see whether the general Rules do require §. 7. any one form; which rules in that they are general, can de­termine nothing of the authority it self as to its particular mode, being intended only for the regulation of the exercise of the authority in which men are placed. And it is an evi­dence that nothing is particularly determined in this case, when the Spirit of God only lays down such Rules for govern­ment which are applyable to distinct forms. Otherwise, cer­tainly some Rule would have been laid down, which could Heb. 5. 2. Rom. 10. 14. have been applyed to nothing but to that one form. That none take the office of preaching without a Call, nor go without sending, will equally hold whether the power of Ordinati­on lye in a Bishop with Presbyters, or in Presbyters acting with equality of power, That offenders be censured, and com­plaints made to the Church in case of scandal, determines nothing to whom the power of Jurisdiction doth solely belong, nor what that Church is which must receive these complaints. That all things be done with decency and order, doth prescribe nothing wherein that Decency lyes, nor how far that Order may extend; nor yet who must be the Judges of that Decency and Order. That all be done for edification, and the common benefit of the Church, doth no wayes restrain his Churches free­dom in disposing of its self as to the form of its government, so the aym of the Church be for the better edification of the body of the Church, and to promote the benefit of it. But [Page 189] methinks, these general Orders and Rules for Discipline do im­ply the particular manner of government to be left at liberty to the Church of God, so that in all the several forms these general Rules be observed. Whereas had Christ appointed a superiour Order to govern other subordinate Officers and the Church together; Christs command for governing the Church would have been particularly addressed to them: and again, had it been the will of Christ there should be no supe­rior Order above the Pastours of particular Churches, there would have been some expresse and direct prohibition of it; which because we no where read; it seems evident that Christ hath left both the one and the other to the freedom and liberty of his Church. So much shall serve in this place, to shew how improbable it is that Christ did ever prescribe any one form of Government in his Church, since he hath only laid down general Rules for the management of Church go­vernment.

But this will not yet suffice those, who plead that Christ §. 8. must determine one immutable form of Government in his Church: but although it be a high presumption to determine first what Christ must do, before we examine what he hath done, yet we shall still proceed and examine all the pretences that are brought for this opinion. The next thing then which is generally urged for it, is, the equal necessity of Christs institu­ting a certain form as for any other Legislator who models a Com­mon-wealth. Now for answer to this, I say first, That Christ hath instituted such an immutable government in his Church, as is sufficient for the succession and continuance of it, which is all which Founders of Common-wealths do look after, viz. that there be such an Order and distinction of persons, and subordination of one to the other, that a Society may still be preserved among them; now this is sufficiently provided for by Christs appointing Officers continually to rule his Church, and establishing Laws for the perpetuating of such Officers; so what­soever is necessary in order to the general ends of Govern­ment is acknowledged to be appointed by Jesus Christ. Un­till then that it be proved that one form of government is in it self absolutely necessary for the being of a Church, this argument can prove nothing▪ for what is drawn from ne­cessity, [Page 190] will prove nothing but in a case of necessity. Secondly, I answer, That those things which are not absolutely necessary to the being of a Church, are left to Christs liberty, whether he will determine them or no; and are no further to be looked on as necessary then as he hath determined by his Laws whether they shall be or no, in his Church. The thing will be thus cleared. When I read that Zaleucus, Lycurgus, or Numa, did form a Common-wealth and make Laws for it; I pre­sently conclude that there must be some order or distinction of persons in this Common wealth; and some rules whereby persons must be governed, and whereby others must Rule: But I cannot hence inferr that Zaleucus, or Lycurgus did institute Monarchical, Aristocratical, or Democratical Government, because any of these forms might be agreeable to their design; and therefore what kind of government they did appoint, can no otherwise be known then by taking a view of the Laws which they made in order thereto. So it is in reference to Christ, when we read that Christ hath instituted a Church alwayes to continue in the World, we presently apprehend that there must be some power and order in the members of that Society, and Laws for the governing it: but we cannot hence gather that he hath bound up his Officers to act in any one form, because several forms might in them­selves equally tend to the promoting the end of Government in his Church. And therefore what Christ hath expresly de­termined in his positive Laws, must be our Rule of judging in this case, and not any presumption of our own, that such a form was necessary, and therefore Christ must institute and Ecclesiast. Polity lib. 3. sect. 11. appoint it, Which is fully expressed by judicious Mr. Hooker, whose words will serve as a sufficient answer to this Objection. As for those marvellous Discourses, whereby they adventure to argue, that God must needs have done the thing which they imagine was to be done; I must confesse, I have often wondred at their ex­ceeding boldnesse herein. When the question is, Whether God have delivered in Scripture (as they affirm he hath) a compleat parti­cular immutable form of Church-Polity: why take they that other, both presumptuous and superfluous labour, to prove he should have done it: there being no way in this case to prove the deed of God, saving only by producing that evidence wherein he [Page 191] hath done it? But if there be no such thing apparent upon record, they do as if one should demand a Legacy, by force and vertue of some written Testament, wherein there being no such thing specified, he pleadeth that there it must needs be, and bringeth arguments from the Love and good will which alwayes the Te­stator bore, imagining that these or the like proofs will convict a Testament to have that in it, which other men can no where by reading find. In matters which concern the actions of God, the most dutiful way on our part, is, to search what God hath done, and with meekness to admire that, rather then to dispute what he in congru [...]ty of reason ought to do. Thus he, with more to the same purpose. The sum then of the answer to this Argument, is this, That nothing can be inferred of what Christ must do, from his relation to his Church, but what is absolutely necessary to the being of it; as for all other things, they being arbitrary constitutions, we can judge no more of the necessity of them, then as we find them clearly revealed in the Word of God. And therefore the Plea must be removed from what Christ must do, to what he hath done, in order to the deter­mining the particular form of Government in his Church.

But still it is argued for the necessity of a particular form §. 9. of Government in the Church from the similitudes the Church is set out by in Scripture; It is called a Vine, and there­fore Parker de Polit. Ec­cles. lib. 2. c. 40. must have Keepers: an House, and therefore must have Government; a City, and therefore must have a Polity; a Body, and therefore must have Parts. I answer, First, All these Similitudes prove only that which none deny, that there must be Order, Power, and Government in the Church of God; we take not away the Keepers from the Vine, nor the Go­vernment from▪ the House, nor Polity from the City, nor distinction of parts from the Body; we assert all these things as necessary in the Church of God. The keepers of the Vine to defend and prune it; the Governours of the House to rule and order it; the Polity of the City to guide and direct it; the parts of the Body to compleat and adorn it. But Secondly; None of these Similitudes prove what they are brought for; viz. that any one immutable form of Government is deter­mined. For may not the Keepers of the Vine use their own [Page 192] discretion in looking to it, so the flourishing of the Vine be that they aym at? and if there be many of them, may there not be different orders among them, and some as Supervisors of the others work? The House must have Governours; but those that are so, are entrusted with the power of ordering things in the House according to their own discretion; and where there is a multitude, is there not diversity of Offices among them? and is it necessary that every House must have Offices of the same kind? In great and large Families there must be more particular distinct Orders and Offices, than in a small and little one. The City must have its Polity; but all Cities have not the like; some have one form, and some ano­ther, and yet there is a City still and a Polity too. A body must have all its parts; but are all the parts of the body equal one to another? it sufficeth that there be a proportion, though not equality in them: the several parts of the body have their several offices, and yet we see the head is superin­tendent over them all: and thus if we make every particular Church a Body, yet it follows not that the form of cloathing that Body must alwayes be the same▪ for the manner of Go­vernment is rather the cloathing to the Body than the parts of it, the Governours indeed are parts of the Body; but their manner of governing is not, that may alter according to the proportion and growth of the Body, and its fashion change for better conveniency.

But if these Similitudes prove nothing; yet certainly, say §. 10. they, the difference as to Civil and Ecclesiastical Government will; for though there may be different forms in civil Government, which are therefore call'd an Ordinance of man; yet there must be but one in Church-Government, which is an Ordinance of God, [...] Pet. 2. 13. and Christ hath appointed Officers to rule it. I answer, first, We grant and acknowledge a difference between the Church and the Common-wealth, they are constituted for other ends; the one Political, the other Spiritual; one temporal, the other eternal; they subsist by different Charters; the one given to men as men, the other to men as Christians: They act upon different principles; the one to preserve civil Rights, the other to promote an eternal Interest; nay, their formal constitution is different; for a man by being a member of a Common-wealth [Page 193] doth not become a Member of the Church, and by being ex­communicated out of the Church▪ doth not cease to be a Member of the Common-wealth: The Officers of the one are clearly distinct from the other, the one deriving their power from the Law of Christ, the other from Gods general Pro­vidence: the Magistrate hath no power to Excommunicate formally out of the Church any more then to admit into it, nor have the Church-officers any power to cast men out of the common-wealth. We see then there is a difference between Civil and Ecclesiastical Government: But then I answer, Secondly, The power of the Magistrate is not therefore called an Ordinance of man, because of the mutability of its Form, and as distinguished from the Form of Church-government. For First, The Apostle speaks not of the Form of Govern­ment, but of the Power; Submit to every Ordinance of man, &c. the ground of Submission is not the form, but the power of civil government; and therefore there can be no opposition expressed here between the Forms of Civil and Ecclesiastical government: but if any such opposition be, it must be between the powers; and if this be said as to civils, that the power is an Ordinance of Man in that sense, (whereas Paul saith it is of God) yet as to the Church it is freely acknowledged Rom. 13. 1▪ that the Power is derived from God. Secondly, The civil power is not called [...], because it is a creature of mans making, and so subject to mens power; but the ground of that Speech is, because all civil power respects men as men, without any further connotation. Humana dicitur, non quod ab hominibus sit excogitata, sed quod hominum sit pro­pria, saith Beza. And to the same purpose Calvin, Humana dicitur Ordinatio, non quod humanitùs inventa fuerit; sed quod propria hominum est digesta & ordinata vivendi ratio. Pisca­tor, Humanam appellat, non quod magistratus homines autho­res habeat, sed quod Homines eam gerant. So then the civil power is not called an Ordinance of man, as it is of mans set­ting up, but as it is proper to man; and so if there be any op­position between the civil and Church power, it is onely this, that the one belongs to men as men, the other to men as Christians. Thirdly, Although it be granted that Christ hath appointed and set up his own Officers in his Church; yet [Page 194] it doth not thence follow that he hath determined in what manner they shall Rule his Church. It is true, Christ hath set up in his Church, some Apostles, some Evangelists, and Eph. 4. 12. some Pastours and Teachers: but it doth not thence follow, that Christ hath determined, whether the Power of Apostles and Evangelists should continue in his Church or no, as it implied Superiority over the ordinary Pastors of the Churches; nor whether the Pastors of the Church should act in an equali­ty in their Governing Churches. I grant, that all Church-Government must be performed by Officers of Christs appoint­ing; but that which I say is not determined in Scripture, is, the way and manner whereby they shall Govern Churches in com­mon.

It is yet further argued, That if the Form of Church Govern­ment §. 11. be not immutably determined in Scripture, then it is in the Parker▪ Polit. Eccles. l. 2. cap. 45. s. c. Churches Power, to make new Officers which Christ never made, which must be a plain addition to the Lawes of Christ, and must argue the Scripture of Imperfection. This being one of the main Arguments, I have reserved it to the place of the Triarii, and shall now examine what strength there lies in it. To this therefore I answer, First, Those Officers are onely said to be new, which were never appointed by Christ, and are contrary to the first appointments of Christ for the Regulating of his Church; such it is granted the Church hath no power to in­stitute: but if by new Officers be meant onely such as have a charge over more then one particular congregation by the consent of the Pastours themselves; then it is evident, such an Office cannot be said to be new. For, besides the general pra­ctice of the Church of God, from the first Primitive times which have all consented in the use of such Officers; we finde the Foundation of this Power laid by Christ himself in the Power which the Apostles were invested in, which was extended over many, both Churches and Pastours. But if it be said, The Apostolical Power being extraordinary, must cease with the persons which enjoyed it: I answer: First, What was extraordinary did cease; but all the Dispute is, what was extraordinary, and what not; some things were ordinary in them, as Preach­ing, Baptizing, Ordaining, Ruling Churches; some things were again extraordinary, as immediate mission from Christ [Page 195] (the main distinguishing Note of an Apostle) a Power of working Miracles to confirm the Truth of what they Preached. Now the Question is, whether the power which they enjoyed over Presbyters and Churches, be to be reckoned in the first or the second number. It must therefore be proved to be ex­traordinary, before it can be said to cease with them, and that must be done by some Arguments proper to their persons; for if the Arguments brought be of a common and moral Nature, it will prove the Office to be so too. Secondly, By ceasing may be meant either ceasing as to its necessity, or ceasing as to its lawfulness: I say not, but that the necessity of the Office, as in their persons, for the first Preaching and propagating the Gospel, did cease with them; but, that after their death it became unlawful for any particular persons to take the care and charge of Diocesan Churches, I deny. For to make a thing unlawfull which was before lawfull, there must be some expresse prohibition forbidding any further use of such a power, which I suppose men will not easily produce in the Word of God.

I answer therefore Secondly, That the extending of any §. 12. Ministerial power, is not the appointing of any New Office; because every Minister of the Gospel hath a Relation in actu primo to the whole Church of God: the restraint and inlarge­ment of which power is subject to Positive Determinations of prudence and conveniency in actu secundo; and therefore if the Church see it fit for some men to have this power enlar­ged for better government in some, and restrained in others, that inlargement is the appointing no new Office, but the making use of a power already enjoyed for the benefit of the Church of God. This being a Foundation tending so fully to clear the lawfulnesse of that Government in the Church which implies a superiority and subordination of the Officers of the Church to one another: and the Churches using her prudence in ordering the bounds of her Officers, I shall do these two things. First, Shew that the power of every Minister of the Gospel doth primarily and habitually respect the Church in common. Secondly, that the Church may in a peculiar manner single out some of its Officers for the due Administra­tion of Ecclesiastical power. First, that every Minister of the [Page 196] Gospel hath a power respecting the Church in common: This I find fully and largely proved by those who assert the equality of the power of Ministers; First, from Christs bestowing the several Offices of the Church, for the use of the whole Church, Ephesians, 4. 12, 13. Christ hath set Apostles, &c. Pastours and Teachers in his Church; now this Church must needs be 1 Cor. 12. 28, 29. the catholicke visible Church, because indisputably the Apostles Office did relate thereto, and consequently so must that of Pastours and Teachers too: Again, the end of these Offices is the building up the Body of Christ, which cannot otherwise be understood then of his whole Church: else Christ must have as many Bodies as the Church hath parti­ticular congregations. Which is a new way of Consubstantiation. Secondly, The Ministerial Office was in being before any par­ticular congregations were gathered: For Christ upon his Ascension to Glory gave these Gifts to men; and the Apostles Eph. 4. 8. were impowered by Christ before his Ascension, Either then Matth. 28. 19. they were no Church Officers, or if they were so, they could have no other Correlate, but the whole body of the Church of God then lying under the power of Darkness, a few persons excepted. Thirdly, Because the main Designe of appointing a Gospel Ministry was the conversion of Heathens and Infidels: and if these be the proper Object of the Mini­sterial Function, then the Office must have reference to the whole Church of Christ; else there could be no part of that Office performed towards those who are not yet converted. Fourthly, Else a Minister can perform no office belonging to him as such beyond the bounds of his particular con­gregation, and so can neither Preach nor Administer the Sacraments to any other but within the Bounds of his own particular place and people. Fifthly, Because Ministers by Baptizing do admit men into the catholike visible Church, (else a man must be baptized again every time he removes from one Church to another) and none can admit beyond what their office doth extend to; therefore it is evident that every parti­cular Pastor of a Church hath a Relation to the whole Church; To which purpose our former observation is of great use; viz. That particular congregations are not of Gods primary intention, but for mens conveniency, and so consequently is the [Page 197] fixedness of particular Pastors to their several places for the greater conveniency of the Church; every Pastor of a Church then hath a Relation to the whole Church; and that which hinders him from the exercise of this power, is not any un­lawfulnesse in the thing, but the preserving of order and conveniency in the Church of God. This being premised, I say, Secondly, That the officers of the Church may in a peculiar manner attribute a larger and more extensive power to some particular persons for the more convenient exercise of their common power. We have seen already that their power extends to the care of the Churches in common, that the restraint of this power is a matter of order and decency in the Church of God; Now in matters of common concernment, without all question it is not unlawful when the Church judgeth it most for Edification, to grant to some the executive part of that power, which is Originally and Funda­mentally common to them all. For our better understanding of this, we must consider a twofold power belonging to Church-Officers, a power of Order, and a power of jurisdicti­on; for in every Presbyter, there are some things inseparably joyned to his Function, and belonging to every one in his personal capacity, both in actu primo, and in actu secundo, both as to the right and power to do it, and the exercise and execution of that power; such are preaching the Word, visiting the sick, administring Sacraments. &c. But there are other things which every Presbyter hath an aptitude, and a jus to, in actu primo, but the limitation and exercise of that power doth belong to the Church in common, and belong not to any one personally, but by a further power of choice or delegation to it, such is the power of visiting Churches, taking care that particular Pastors discharge their duty; such is the power of ordination and Church censures, and making Rules for decen­cy in the Church; this is that we call the power of jurisdiction. Now this latter power, though it belongs habitually and in actu primo to every Presbyter; yet being about matters of publike and common concernment, some further Authority in a Church constituted is necessary, besides the power of order; and when this power, either by consent of the Pastors of the Church, or by the appointment of a Christian Magi­strate, [Page 198] or both, is devolved to some particular persons, though quoad aptitudinem the power remain in every Presbyter, yet quoad executionem it belongs to those who are so appointed. And therefore Camero determins that, Ordinatio non fit à pa­store De Ecclesia in Mat. 18. 15. Tom. 1. op. in 40. p. 27. quatenus pastor est, sed quatenus ad tempus singularem authoritatem obtinet, i. e. That Ordination doth not belong to the Power of Order but to the Power of Jurisdiction, and therefore is subject to Positive restraints, by Prudential De­terminations. By this we may understand how lawfull the Exercise of an Episcopal Power may be in the Church of God, supposing an equality in all Church-Officers as to the Power of Order. And how incongruously they speak, who suppo­sing an equality in the Presbyters of Churches at first, do cry out, that the Church takes upon her the Office of Christ, if she delegates any to a more peculiar Exercise of the power of Jurisdiction.

The last thing pleaded why an immutable Form of Church-Government §. 13. must be laid down in Scripture, is, from the per­fection and sufficiency of the Scriptures; because otherwise the Scriptures would be condemned of imperfection. But this will receive an easie dispatch: For, First, The Controversie about the perfection of the Scriptures, is not concerning an essential or integral Perfection, but a perfection ratione finis & effectuum in order to its end; now the end of it, is to be an Rivet. Isagog. ad Script. sacr. cap. 24. s. 3. adaequate Rule of Faith and Manners, and sufficient to bring men to salvation; which it is sufficiently acknowledged to be, if all things necessary to be believed or practised be con­tained in the Word of God: now that which we assert not to be fully laid down in Scripture, is not pleaded to be any wayes necessary, nor to be a matter of Faith, but something left to the Churches Liberty; but here it is said by some, that this is adding to the Law of God, which destroyes the Scriptures perfection; therefore I answer: Secondly, Whatever is done with an Opinion of the necessity of doing it, destroyes the Scriptures perfection if it be not contained in it: for that were to make it an imperfect Rule; and in this sense every additio perficiens is additio corrumpens, because it takes away from the perfection of the Rule which it is added to: and thus Popish Traditions are destructive of the Scriptures sufficiency. [Page 199] But the doing of any thing not positively determined in Scri­pture, not looking upon it as a thing we are bound to do from the necessity of the thing, and observing the general Rules of Scripture in the doing it, is far from destroying the perfection or sufficiency of the Word of God. Thirdly, All essentials of Church-Government are contained clearly in Scripture: The essentials of Church-Government, are such as are necessary to the preservation of such a Society as the Church is: Now all these things have been not only granted, but proved to be contained in Scripture; but whatever is not so necessary in its self, can only become necessary by vertue of Gods express com­mand; and what is not so commanded, is accidental, and cir­cumstantial, and a matter of Christian liberty, and such we assert the Form of Church-Government to be. It is not our work to enquire, why God hath determined some things that might seem more circumstantial than this, and left other things at liberty; but whether God hath determined these things or no. Which determination being once cleared, makes the thing so commanded necessary as to our observance of it; but if no such thing be made appear, the thing remains a matter of liberty, and so the Scriptures perfection as to necessaries in order to Salvation, is no wayes impeached by it. So much now for the necessity of Christs determining the particular form of Government: We now proceed to the consideration of Christs Actions, whether by them the form of Church-Government is determined or no?

CHAP. V.

HAving considered and answered the Arguments which §. 1. are brought, why Christ must determine the particular Form of Government: Our next task will be to enquire into those Actions of our Saviour which are conceived to have any plausible aspect towards the setling the Form of Government in his Church. And were it not that men are generally so wedded to an hypothesis they have once drunk in by the preva­lency of interest or education, we might have been superseded from our former labour, but that men are so ready to think that Opinion to be most necessary, which they are most in love with, and have appeared most zealous for. Men are loth to be perswaded that they have spent so much breath to so little purpose, and have been so hot and eager for some­what, which at last appears to be a matter of Christian liberty. Therefore we finde very few that have been ever very earnest in the maintaining or promoting any matter of opinion, but have laid more weight upon it, than it would really bear; lest men should think, that with all their sweat and toile, they only [Page 201] beat the ayr, and break their Teeth in cracking a Nut, with a hole in it; which if they had been so wise as to discern before, they might have saved their pains for somewhat which would have better recompenced them. But thus it generally fares with men; they suck in principles according as interest and education disposeth them, which being once in, have the advantage of insinuating themselves into the understanding, and thereby raise a prejudice against whatever comes to di­sturb them; which prejudice being the Yellow-jaundise of the Soul, leaves such a tincture upon the eyes of the Under­standing, that till it be cured of that Icterism, it cannot discern things in their proper colours. Now this prejudice is raised by nothing more strongly, than when the opinion received is entertained, upon a presumption that there is a Divine stamp and Impress upon it, though no such Effigies be discernable there. Hence come all the several contending parties about Church-Government, equally to plead an interest in this Ius Divinum, and whatever opinion they have espoused, they pre­sently conceive it to be of no lesse than Divine extract and Original, And as it sometimes was with great personages among the Heathens, when their miscarriages were discern­able to the eye of the World, the better to palliate them among the vulgar, they gave themselves out to be impreguated by some of their adored Deities; so I fear it hath been among some whose Religion should have taught them better things, when either faction, design, or interest, hath formed some conceptions within them suitable thereunto, to make them the more passable to the World, they are brought forth under the pretence of Divine Truths. Far be it from me to charge any sincere, humble, sober Christians with an offence of so high a nature, who yet may be possessed with some mistakes and apprehensions of this nature; but these are only wrought on by the Masters of parties, who know, unlesse they fly so high, they shall never hit the game they aym at. This is most discernable in the Factors for the Roman Omnipotency (as Paulus the fifth was call'd Omnipotentiae Pontifici [...] Conserva­ton); they who see not that Interest and Faction upholds that Court rather then Church, may well be presumed to be hood­winked with more then an implicite Faith; and yet if we be­lieve [Page 202] the great supporters of that Interest, the power they plead for is plainly given them from Christ him­self; and not only offer to prove that it was so, but that it was not consistent with the Wisdom of Christ that it should be otherwise. Lest I should seem to wrong those of any Re­ligion, hear what the Author of the Gloss upon the Extrava­gants Extravag. unum san­ctum. (so they may be well called) saith to this purpose, ap­plying that place of our Saviour, all power is given to me in heaven and earth, Matthew 28. 18. to the Pope, adds these words, Non videretur Dominus discretas fuisse, ut cum reve­rentia ejus loquar; nisi unicum post se talem Vicarium reliquisset, qui hac omnia posset. We see by this, what blasphemies men may run into, when they argue from their private fancies and opinions, to what must be done by the Law of Christ. It therefore becomes all sober Christians impartially to enquire what Christ hath done, and to ground their opinions only upon that, without any such presumptuous intrusions into the Counsels of Heaven. We here therefore take our leave of the Dispute, Why it was necessary a form of Government should be established, and now enter upon a survey of those grounds which are taken from any passages of our Saviour, commonly produced as a Foundation for any particular Forms.

I shall not stand to prove, that Christ as Mediator hath all §. 2. the power over the Church in his own hands, it being a thing so evident from Scripture, and so beyond all dispute with Matth. 28. 18. those whom I have to deal with. In which respect he is the only Head of the Church, and from whom all divine Right Isa. 9. 6. for authority in the church must be derived. Which Right can arise only from some actions or Laws of Christ, which we therefore now search into. The first publike action of Christ after his solemn entrance upon his Office, which can be con­ceived to have any reference to the Government of his Church, was, the calling the Apostles. In whom for our bet­ter methodizing this Discourse, we shall observe these three [...]everal steps. First, When they were called to be Christs Disciples. Secondly, When Christ sent them out with a power of Miracles. Thirdly, When he gave them their full commission of acting with Apostolical power all the world over. [Page 203] These three seasons are accurately to be distinguished; for [...]he Apostles did not enjoy so great power when they were [...]isciples, as when they were sent abroad by Christ; neither had [...]hey any proper power of Church-government after that [...]nding forth, till after Christs Resurrection, when Christ told [...]hem, All power was put into his hands, and therefore gave them Matth. 2 [...]. 18, 19. [...]ll commission to go and preach the Gospel to all Nations. The first step then we observe in the Apostles towards their power of Church-government, was in their first calling to be Disci­ples. Two several calls are observed in Scripture concern­ing the Apostles: The first was more general, when they were called only to follow Christ; The second more special, when Christ told them what he called them to, and specified and described their Office to them, by telling them he would make them Fishers of Men. We shall endeavour to di­gest the Order of their calling as clearly and as briefly as we [...]an. Our blessed Saviour about the thirtieth year of his age, solemnly entering upon the discharge of his prophetical Office, Luk. 5. 32. in making known himself to be the true Messias to the World, to make his appearance more publike, goes to Iordan, and is Mat. 3. 23. Mat. 4. 1. there baptized of Iohn; presently after he is led up by the Spirit into the Wildernesse, where he continued forty dayes. In this space of time Iohn removes from Iordan, and comes on the other side to Bethabara; thither Christ comes to Iohn; John 1. 29. Iohn not only owns Christ himself, but tells his disciples, This was he into whose Name he had baptized them. Upon this, two John 1. 37. of Iohn's disciples leave their Master and follow Christ. These two are the first Disciples we ever read our Saviour had; whereof the one was Andrew, Peters brother, and the other probably conceived to be Iohn (it being his custom to con­ceal his name when he speaks of himself) Andrew calls his brother Peter; Christ next day calls Philip, Philip he finds Nathaniel; and this, as far as we read, was the first number of Christs Disciples. Here we find two or three gathered to­gether in the Name of Christ, and Christ (truly) in the John 2. 2. John 2. 17, 23. midst of them. These disciples it appears staid with Christ sometime, for they went with him to the marriage in Cana: and after went up with him to Ierusalem, when many pro­fessed to be his Disciples; from thence he goes into Iudea, [Page 204] where he gathers many Disciples, and baptizeth them. After John 3▪ 22. John 4. 1. this he returns with his Disciples by the way of Samaria into Galilee: and these Disciples being now again at home, in proba­bility did return for their livelyhood to their old employments for some small time, Christ having not yet commanded them to forsake all and follow him. Not long after (about a years space from the first calling them) Iesus being in Galilee, goes to the lake of Genezareth, there he finds Andrew and Peter Luke 5. 1. Matth. 4. 18, 19. Mark 1. 16, 17. fishing: after the miracle there wrought, he then in a more solemn manner calls them to leave their employment, for he had▪ designed them for a greater, which was to be Fishers of Men. Whereby our Saviour expresseth the care, pains, diligence, design and end of the Ministerial Function he had appointed them for. Andrew and Peter presently leave all and follow Christ; the like do Iames and Iohn whom they met with, a little further upon the shore. And now those who were before but as common Disciples, are admitted into a high­er Order, and bred up by Christ as persons designed for an em­ployment of so high a Nature. We see here a necessity of making a double call of the Apostles; else it were impossible to reconcile the Narration of Iohn with the other Evangelists. Therefore Augustine thinks their first being with Christ in Iohn, De Consen­su Evang. l. 2. cap. 17. was only for present satisfaction who he was, which assoon as they understood and admired, they returned to their own Ha­bitations. Thomas, he makes three several callings of them; the first ad agnitionem & familiaritatem, which is that in Iohn; the second ad Discipulatum, that spoken of in Luke 5. 1. the V. Casaub. exer. in Bar. 13. s. 11. Montacut. Grig. Eccles. To. 1. p. 2. p. 41. Chemnitium Harm. Evan [...]c. 36. third ad adh [...]sionem, Matth. 4. 18. Mark 1. 16. But I see no reason to make the story in Luke to be different from that of Matthew and Mark; the former some say, was vocatio ad fidem, a general preparatory call to the latter; the latter was vocatio ad munus Apostolicum, although they were not chosen to be Apostles till afterwards, yet now Christ made them Can­didores of the Apostleship, & amicos interioris admissionis, in or­der to that great employment he had designed them for. Fur­ther, we must take notice that from the time of the Baptism of Iohn, the Apostles did generally continue with Christ, which appears from the qualification of an Apostle given by Peter at the choyce of Matthias; Of those men which have com­panied [Page 205] with us all the time that the Lord Iesus went in and out Acts 1. 21▪ 22. among us, beginning from the baptism of John, unto that same day he was taken up from us. The strength of which Tehimony is impregnable, for proving that the Apostles did generally con­tinue with Christ after their being called to follow him; but that time from the baptism of Iohn must not be taken strictly; for many of the Apostles, as Matthew, &c. were not called till some time after. About four moneths after Christs more Harmon. cap. 50. solemn calling of the Apostles, at the time▪ of Pentecost, as Chemnitius conjectures, our Saviour proceeds to a solemn choyce of them into their Office, which is described by Luk. 6. Mark 3. 14, 15. 13. after he had prayed the whole night before v. 12. Mark▪ he acquaints us with the ends of Christs choosing them. First, That they might continually attend upon him, the better to be fitted for their employment afterwards; which he expresseth, when he adds, That he might send them out to preach, and to give them power over Devils and Diseases, to cast out the one, and to cure the other. Their actual sending out was not (say some) till half a year after, which is the story related by Mat. 10. 1. near a twelve-moneth (say others) but presently upon their choyce Christ makes the Sermon in the Mount, as appears by comparing Luk. 6. 17, 20. with Mat. 5. 1. wherein among other things, our Saviour takes occasion▪ to declare their duty to them, telling them, They were the Light of the World, &c. Which he doth, the more to fit them for the discharge of their employment.

Having thus laid these things together about the Apostles, §. 3. from their first calling to the time of their mission, we shall take notice of those things from them which may relate to the Office which the Apostles were called to, and to the Govern­ment of the Church by them. First, We here observe, that our Saviour no sooner began to preach the Gospel himself, but he made choyce of some persons as a peculiar Order of men for the propagation of the Gospel in the World. The peculiarity of the Function of a Gospel-Ministry under Christ was, we see, designed from Christs first publike appea­rance in his Office: he might have left the Apostles in the common order of Disciples, had he not intended an office in his Church distinct and peculiar from all other employments; and therefore it is observable, that Christ did not call the▪ Apo­stles [Page 206] off from their other employments, till he designed to make them Apostles; before, when they were only private Disciples, they did follow their employments at some times still; but when he calls them to be Fishers of men, be bids them leave all and follow him. Secondly, We take notice of the admirable wisdom of our Saviour in the choice he made of the Persons for first founding his Church▪ and the means he used to fit them for it. The persons were such as were most suitable to his design; the means such as were most suitable to the persons. The persons were such, who by reason of the known meanness of their condition, and supposed weakness of abilities, were the fittest to convince the World, that the Doctrine which they preached was not the product of humane wisdom, but the express Image and Character of Divine truth; whose nakednesse and simplicity would gain more upon mens belief by the power which accompanied the Preaching of it, then the most refined and sublimated Notions of their wise men should do, managed with the greatest subtilty and prudence by the maintainers of them. Christ would make men see that his Doctrine stood not in need either of the wisdom or power of men, to defend or propagate it▪ and therefore made choice of the most unlikely Instruments for that end, that mens faith should not stand in the wisdom of men, but in the power of 1 Cor. 2. 5. God. But withall, we are to take notice of Christs admirable wis­dom in the means he used to fit and qualifie them for the first builders of his Church; for although the power and efficacy of their preaching was wholly from God, and not from them­selves, yet our Saviour doth not ▪presenly upon his calling them, place them in the highest Office he intended them for, but proceeds gradually with them, and keeps them a long time under his own eye and instruction, before he sends them abroad: and that for two ends chiefly: First, To be witnesses of his actions. Secondly, To be Auditors of his Doctrine. First, To be witnesses of his actions, which was looked on by the Apostles, as the most necessary qualification for an Apostle in the place fore-cited, Acts 1. 21, 22. Peter calls himself a witnesse of the sufferings of Christ, 1 Pet. 5. 1. Iohn saith, That which was from the beginning, which we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which we have looked upon, [Page 207] and our h [...]ds have handled of the Word of Life; that which we have seen and heard, declare we unto you, 1 John 1. 1, 3. where­by the credibility of the Gospel was sufficiently evidenced to the World, when the chief Preachers of it spoke nothing but what their own senses were witnesses of, both as to the Do­ctrine and actions of Christ; and therefore it is no wayes cre­dible, they should be deceived themselves in what they spoke; and more improbable they would deceive others, whose in­terest lay wholly upon the truth of the Doctrine which they Preoched▪ for by the very Preaching of that Doctrine they rob'd themselves of all the comforts of Life, and exposed them­selves to a thousand miseries in this Life; so that unlesse their Doctrine was true in order to another Life, they were guilty of the greatest folly this World ever heard of. We see what care our Saviour took to satisfie the reasons of men concern­ing the credibility of his Doctrine, when the persons he em­ployed in the founding a Church upon it, were only such as were intimately conversant with the whole Life, Doctrine, and Works of him from whom they received it; and thereby we cannot suppose any ignorance in them concerning the things they spoke▪ and lest men should mistrust they might have a design to impose on others, he made their faithfulness appear, by their exposing themselves to any hazards to make good the truth of what they preached. Especially, having such a Divine Power accompanying them in the Miracles wrought by them, which were enough to perswade any rational men that they came upon a true Embassie, who carryed such Credentials along with them. Another end of our Saviours training up his Apostles so long in his School before he sent them abroad, was, that they might be Auditors of his Do­ctrine, and so might learn themselves before they taught others. Christ was no friend to those hasty births which run abroad with the shell on their heads; no, although it was in his power to conferr the gifts of the Holy Ghost, as well at their first entrance into Discipleship as afterwards, yet we see he nu [...]tures and trains them up gradually, teaching them as Quintilian would have Masters do, guttatim, acquainting them now with one, then with another of the Mysteries of the Gospel. Christ doth not overwhelm them with floods and [Page 208] torrents of Discourses, but gently drops now one thing into them, then another, by which way such narrow-mouthed Vessels would be the soonest filled. Yea our Saviour useth such [...]n [...] as the Greek Fathers call it, such a prudent temper in instructing them, that it is matter of just admiration to consider under how great and stupendious ignorance of the main points of Redemption (Christs Death and Resur­rection, and the nature of Christs Kingdom) they discovered, after they had been some years under Christs Tutorage. And we see what industry and diligence was used in the training up of those for the Apostleship, who were in an immediate way sent out by Christ. And it is very probable that upon their first sending abroad they taught not by immediate Revelation, but only what they had learned from Christ during their being with him. Whence we see what a subordination there is in acquired parts, labour, and industry to the Teachings and Inspirations of the Divine Spirit; our Saviour looked not on his labour as lost, although afterwards the Unction from the Holy One should teach them all things. It was Christs design to have them go [...] from strength to strength, à domo sanctuarii in domum doctrinae, as the Chaldee Paraphrast Psal. 84. 7. renders that place, from one School of learning to another. As under the Law even those that waited for the R [...]ach hakkodesh, the inspiration of the Divine Spirit, were brought up in the Schools of the Prophets under instruction there; which was the place where they lay expecting the gentle gale of the Holy Spirit to carry them forth; which was the ground of Amos his complaint. that he was neither a Prophet, nor the son Amos 7. 14. of a Prophet; by which it seems evident, that Gods ordinary course was to take some of the Sons of the Prophets out of the Colledges where they lived, and employ them in the Pro­phetical Office. But of this largely elsewhere. Such a School of the Prophets did our Saviour now erect, wherein he entred his Disciples as Schollars, and educated them in order to the Office he intended them for.

The next thing we take notice of, is, the name and nature §. 4. of that Office which Christ call'd them to. They who derive the use of the name of Apostles as applyed by Christ to his Disciples, either from the [...] at Athens, by which name [Page 209] the Masters of some ships were called as the ships [...], or Suidas in v. Digest. l. 50. tir. 16. leg. 106. Cont. Ebionitas. from Hesychius his [...], which he interprets [...], or from the [...] in the Sense of the Civil Law, which signifie the dim [...]ssory Letters granted for appeals; or from the Jewish [...] as thereby were understood those [...] as Epiphanius calls them, who were as Assessours and Counsel­lours to the Patriarch of the Jewes at Tiberias; or those Officers who were sent up and down by the Patriarch to gather up tenths, first fruits, and such other things; who are called thence Apostoli in the Codex. Theod. tit. de Iudaeis; all Lib. 16. tit. 8. these I say do equally lose their labour▪ and run far to fetch that which might be found much nearer home: Our Saviour taking the word from common use, but applying it in a special manner to a peculiar Sense, which is the custome of the Scrip­tures: The Original of the Word properly imports such as are imployed by Commission from another for the dispatch of some businesse in his Name. So Casaubon (who was suffi­ciently Exercit. 14 Sect. 4. able to judg of the use of a Greek word) In communi Graecorum usu [...] dicebantur certi homines, qui negotii gerendi gratiâ, magis quam deferendi nuntii aliquò mittebantur. And so it is taken, Iohn 13. 16. [...], He that is sent is not greater then he that sent him. Thence Epaphroditus when imployed upon a special message to Paul in the Name of the Churches, is called [...], Philippians, 2. 25. which we Translate your Messenger. And so Titus and the two other sent to the Church of Corinth to gather their Charity▪ are called [...], the 2 Cor. 8. 23. Messengers of the Churches. Thence Paul fully renders the Import and Sense of the word Apostle by [...], 2 Co­rinth. 5. 20. We act as Ambassaduors for Christ. To which purpose it is observable that the Septuagint (whose Greek is most followed by the New Testament) doe render the word [...] when it signifies to imploy a Messenger upon special Service, by [...], as 1 King. 21. 11.—1 King. 12. 18. Exod 4. 30. and the very word [...] is used in this Sense, 1 King. 14. 6. where Ahijah saith, I am [...], A sad Messenger to thee; for, thus saith the Lord, &c. Whereby the full Sense and Importance of the word Apostle appears to be, one that is imployed by a peculiar Commission [Page 210] from him that hath authority over him for the doing some special service. Thus were Christs disciples called Apostles from the immediate commission which they had from Christ for the discharge of that work which he imployed them in. Thence our Saviour makes use of the word sending in the proper and peculiar sense when he gives the Apostles their commission, in those remarkable words of Christ to them; As the Father hath sent me, even so send I you. John 20. 21. Where­by our Saviour delegates his power and authority which he had as Doctour of the Church, to his Apostles upon his lea­ving the World, not in a privative way, so as to destroy his own authority over the Church, but in a cumulative way, investing them with that authority which they had not before, for both Teaching and Governing the Church. No Argu­ment then can be drawn for the Right or Form of Church-Government from Christs actions towards his Disciples be­fore the last and full Commission was given unto them; be­cause they had no power of Church-government before that time.

Which will be further cleared if we consider their first §. 5. sending out, spoken of Matth. 10. 1. Mark 6. 7. Luke 9. 1. Several things lie in our way to be observed in reference to this Mission of the Apostles. First, that though the Apostles had been now for some competent time, not onely called to their Office, but solemnly chosen to it; yet we no where read that they did ever exercise that Office till now they were sent forh by Christ. They remained still at Christs feet, learning for their own instruction, and fitting themselves for their future imployment, and thought it no inconvenience while they lay for a wind, to lay in sufficient lading and provision for their voyage. Baptize indeed they did before, Ioh. 4. 2. but that I suppose was done by them by an immediate present Order from Christ himself, being by as the chief in the action, thence Christ in one place is said to baptize, Ioh. 3. 22. and yet he is said not to baptize, but his Disciples, Ioh. 4. 2. Christ did it authoritatively, the Disciples ministerially. Yet if we should grant the Disciples did then baptize as private men after the received custome of the Jews, (among whom onely a Confessus trium was requisite to Baptize a prose­lyte) [Page 211] this doth not at all take off from the peculiarity of a Fun­ction both to Preach and Baptize, because as yet the Gospel-Ministry was not instituted; and therefore what might be lawfull before restraint, doth not follow it should be so after▪ when all those scattered rayes and beam, which were disper­sed abroad before, were gathered into the Ministerial Office upon Christs appointing it, as that great Hemisphere of Light in the creation, was after swallowed up in the body of the Sun. But now were the Apostles first sent out to Preach, and now God first begins to null the Jewish Ministry, and set up another instead of it, and makes good that threatning: That he was against the Shepherds, and would require the flock at their hand, and cause them to cease to feed the Flock, &c. Here Ezek. 34. 10. then we have the first Exercise of the Apostles Ministry, for which we see, besides their former call and choice, particular mission was after necessary. Secondly, we observe that the imployment Christ sent them upon now, was onely a Tem­porary imployment, confined as to work and place, and not the full Apostolicall work. The want of considering and understanding this, hath been the ground of very many mistakes among Men, when they argue from the Occasional Precepts here given the Apostles, as from a standing perpetual Rule for a Gospel-Ministry: Whereas our Sa­viour onely suited these instructions to the present case, and the nature and condition of the Apostles present imployment, which was, not to preach the Gospel up and down themselves, but to be as so many Iohn Baptists to call people to the hear­ing of Christ himself; and therefore the Doctrine they were to Preach was the same with his, The Kingdome of Heaven is at Matth. 10. 7▪ hand, whereby it appears their Doctrine was only preparatory to Christ; it being onely to raise up higher expectations of the Gospel-state under the Messias; and these were they whom the King now sent into the high-wayes to invite men to the mar­riage Matth. 22. [...]. Feast, and to bid them to come in to him. This was the only present imployment of the Apostles in their first mission: in which they were confined to the Cities of Iudea, that they might have the first refusal of the Gospel-Offers. This mission then being occasional, limited, and temporary, can yield no Foundation for any thing perpetual to be built upon it. [Page 212] Thirdly, we observe that those whom Christ imploied in the first dispersing of the Gospel abroad, were furnished with ar­guments sufficient to evince not onely the credibility, but the certain truth of what they preached. Therefore Christ when he now sent them out, gave them [...], not only a meer power to work miracles, but a right conferrèd on them to Mat. 10. 2. do it as the Apostles of Christ. These were the Credentials which the Apostles carried along with them to shew from whom they derived their power, and by whose authority they acted. And these were the most suitable to them, as making it appear that a Divine presence went along with them, and therefore they could not salsifie to the world in what they Declared unto them; which was the best way for them to evidence the Truth of their Doctrine, because it was not to be discovered by the Evidence of the things themselves, but it depended upon the Testimony of the Authour; and therefore the onely way to confirm the truth of the Doctrine, was to confirm the credi­bility of the Authour, which was best done by doing some­thing above what the power of nature could reach unto. And this was the prerogative of the Apostles in their first mission above Iohn the Baptist: For of him it is said that he did no miracle. Fourthly, we observe that the Apostles in this mission were invested in no power over the Church, nor in any Su­periority of Order one over another. The first is evident, be­cause Christ did not now send them abroad to gather Chur­ches, but onely to call persons to the Doctrine of the Messias; and while Christ was in the World among them, he retained all Church power and authority in his own hand. When this temporary mission expired, the Apostles lived as private per­sons still under Christs Tutorage, and we never read them acting in the least as Church-Officers all that while. Which may appear from this one argument, because all the time of our Saviours being in the World, he never made a total sepa­ration from the Iewish Church, but frequented with his Disci­ples the Temple worship and Service to the last; although he super-added many Gospel Observations to those of the Law. And therefore when no Churches were gathered, the Apostles could have no Church power over them. All that can be pleaded then in order to Church-Government from the con­sideration [Page 213] of the Form of Government as setled by our Savi­our, must be either from a supposed inequality among the Apostles themselves, or their superiority over the LXX. Dis­ciples; or from some Rules laid down by Christ in order to the Government of his Church: of which two are the most insisted on, Matthew 20. 25. Matth. 18. 17. Of these in their Order.

The first argument drawn for an established form of Go­vernment §. 6. in the Church, from the state of the Apostles under Christ, is, from a supposed inequality among the Apostles, and the superiority of one as Monarch of the Church; which is the Papists Plea from Saint Peter, as the chief and head of the Apo­stles. Whose loud Exclamations for Saint Peters authority a [...] much of the same nature with those of Demetrius the Silver-Smith at Ephesus, with his fellow craftsmen, who cried up, Great is Diana of the Ephesians, not from the honor they bore to her as Diana, but from the gain which came to them from her worship at Ephesus. But I dispute not now the entail of Saint Peters power, what ever it was to the Roman Bishop: but I onely inquire into the Pleas drawn for his authority from the Scriptures, which are written in so small a character, that without the spectacles of an implicite Faith, they will scarce appear legible to the Eyes of men. For what though Christ changed Saint Peters name? must it therefore follow that Christ baptized him Monarch of his Church? Were not Iohn and Iames called by Christ Boanerges? and yet who thinks that those sons of Thunder must therefore overturn all other power but their own? Christ gave them new names, to shew his own authority over them, and not their authority over others; to be as Monitors of their Duty, and not as Instruments to con­vey power. So Chrysostome speaks of the very name Peter, gi­ven to Simon; it was to shew him his duty of being fixed and stable in the Faith of Christ, [...], Tom. 8. ed. Savil. p. 105. this name might be (as a string up­on his finger) a continual remembrancer of his duty. And likewise, I conceive, as an incouragement to him after his fall, that he should recover his former stability again; else it should seem strange that he alone of the Apostles should have his name from firmness and stability, who fell the soonest, and the foulest of any [Page 214] of the Apostles; unlesse it were [...], which would be worse Divinity, then Rhetorick. The change then of St Peters name imports no such Universall Power, neither from the change, nor from the name. But why then hath Saint Peter the honour to be named first of all the Apostles? First, it seems to be implyed as an honour given to Peter above the rest. But doth all honour carry an Universal power along with it? there may be order certainly among equals; and there may be first, second, and third, &c. where there is no imparity and jurisdiction in the first over all the rest. Primacy of Order as among equals, I know none will deny Saint Peter: A Primacy of Power as over Inferiours, I know none will grant, but such as have subdued their Reason to their Passion and Interest. Nay, a further Order then of m [...]er place may without danger be attributed to him: A Primacy in Order of Time, as being of the first called, and it may be the first who adhered to Christ, in Order of Age; of which Ierome, aetati delatum quia Petrus senior erat, speaking of Peter and Iohn; nay yet higher, some Order of Dignity too; in regard of his Lib. 1. c. Iovin. [...] which the Greek Fathers speak so much of; the ser­vency and heat of his spirit, whence by Eusebius he is called Hist. Eccle­siast. lib. 2. c. 14. [...] The Prolocutor among the Apostles, who was therefore most forward to inquire, most ready to answer, which Chrysostome elegantly calls [...] alluding to the name [...] and [...], which are frequently given to Peter by Chrysost. in Matth. 6. 16. the Fathers, which import no more then praesultor in choreâ, he that that led the dance among the Disciples: but his be­ing [...] implies no Superiority of Power. For Dyonys. Hist. Rom. lib. 11. Haliarnass. calls Appius Cla [...]dius [...], whereas all know that the Decemviri had an equality of power among themselves. Neither doth his being as the mouth of the Disciples imply his power; For Aaron was a mouth to Moses, but Moses was Aarons Master. Neither yet doth this Primacy of Order alwayes hold in reference to Peter: For although generally he is named first of the Aposties, as Mat­thew, 10. 2. Mark 3. 16. Acts 1. 13. Mark 1. 36. Luk 8. 45. Acts 2. 14.—37. Yet in other places of Scripture we finde other Apostles set in Order before him as Iames, Galat. 2. 9. Paul and Apollos, and others, 1 Cor. 3. 22. [Page 215] 1 Cor. 1. 12.—9. 5. No Argument then can be drawn hence, if it would hold but onely a Primacy of Order; and yet even that fails too in the Scriptures changing of the Order so often. But, say they, whatever becomes of this Order, we have a strong Foundation for Saint Peters Power, because Christ said, he would build his Church upon him, Matth. 16. 17. This were something indeed, if it were proved; but I fear this Rock will not hold water, as it is brought by them; nor Saint Peter prove to be that Rock. For indeed, Was the Church built upon Saint Peter? then he must be the chief Foundation stone, and Peter must build upon himself, and not upon Christ, and all the Apostles upon him; and thus in exalting the Servant, we depress the Master; and in setting a new Foundation, we take 1 Cor. 3. 12. away the only Foundation, Iesus Christ. If by being built upon Peter, they mean no more then being built by him as the chief Instrument; it is both a very incongruous Speech, and im­plies nothing more then what was common to him, and the rest of the Apostles, who were all Master-builders in the Church of Christ, as Paul calls himself; and in that respect are Rev, 21. 19. set forth as the twelve Foundation stones, in the walls of the New Ierusalem.

The Rock then spoken of by Christ, in his Speech to Peter, if taken Doctrinally, was Saint Peters Confession, as many of the Fathers interpret it; if taken personally, it was none other but Christ himself, who used a like Speech to this, when he John 2. 19. said, Destroy this Temple, and in three dayes I will raise it up. Which words, though spoken by occasion of the material Temple (as those were of Peters name) yet Christ understood them of the Temple of his Body, (as here likewise he doth of his person.) But still they urge, Christ put the Keyes into Saint Peters hands, Matthew, 16. 19. Now the power of the Keyes doth denote Regal Authority. I answer, First, The Keyes may be given two wayes, either from a Prince to a Subject, or from a City to a Prince. In this latter acception, they denote principality in the Receiver, but withall inferiority and sub­jection in the Given: and in this sense, I am so charitable, as to think they will not say that Christ gave the Keyes to Peter; it must be then as a Prince to a Subject; and when they are so given, it doth not imply an universal power in the persons [Page 216] to whom they are given, but an investing them in that parti­cular place he hath appointed them to; the Office which the power of the Keyes implies, is Ministerial, and not Authori­tative; Delarative, and not Iuridical; over persons commit­ted to their charge, and not over Officers joyned in [...]equality of power with them. For so were the rest of the Apostles with Peter in the same power of the Keyes, Matth. 18. 18. Iohn 20. 23. This-power of the Keyes then was given to Peter in a peculiar manner, but nothing peculiar to him given thereby. But still there remains another Ward in Saint Peters Keyes, and the last foot to the Popes Chair which is Pasce oves, Feed my sheep; a charge given particularly to Peter, Iohn 21. 15. Thence they infer his Power over the whole Church. But this foot hath neither joynts nor sinews in it, and is as infirm as any of the rest: sor neither did this Command rather then Commission belong onely to Peter; for Christ had before given them all their general Commission: As the Father hath sent me, even so send I you, John 20 21. whereby is implied an investing all the Apostles equally, with the power and authority of Go­verning the Church of God; although this charge be pecu­liarly renewed to Peter, because as he had particularly faln, so he should be particularly restored; neither yet did we grant this: doth the word, [...] imply such a Power and autho­rity as they plead for, viz. A Supream power over the Church of God: for this even by Peter himself is attributed to the fixed Presbyters of the Churches, who by this argument have as much authority conveyed them, as Saint Peter had, 1 Pet. 5. 2. and yet should we grant this, it would not infer what they desire; for these sheep were not the whole Church of Christ, taken absolutely, but Indefinitely. For all the Apostles had a command to preach to every Creature, Matth. 28. 18. which was as to the words larger, as to the Sense the same with that to Saint Peter here. And afterwards we find Peter called the Apostle of Circumcision, and the Apostles sending him Gal. 2. 7. Acts 8. 14, Gal. 2. 9. to Samaria, and Paul in the right hand of fellowship with Peter; which had been certainly dishonourable to Peter, had he been invested with such an Universal Supream Power over the Apostles and the whole Church. Such pretences then as these are for such an Extravagant power in the Church of God, [Page 217] from such miserably weak Foundations, for the upholding a corrupt Interest, have given the occasion to that tart Sarcasm, In Papatu sub Petri nudo nomine Satan non amplius Larva. But that which would seem sufficient to awaken any out of this dream of Saint Peters power over the rest of the Apostles, Mat. 18. 1. Mat. 9. 34. Luk. 9. 46. is, the frequent contendings of the twelve Apostles, one among another, Who should be the greatest; and that even after that Christ had said, Upon this Rock will I build my Church, as we may see Matthew 20 24. If Christ had conferred such a power on Saint Peter, what little ground had there been for the request of Iames and Iohn? and would not our Saviour rather have told them, the chiefest place was conserred on Peter already, then have curbed their ambition in seeking who should be greatest; and would have bid them be subject to Peter as their Head and Ruler. We see not then the least foundation for an universal Monarchy in the Church of God; and so this form of Government is not determined by any actions or commands of Christ.

We come now to consider the pleas of others, who joyn in §. 7. renouncing any Supream power under Christ, over the Church of God; but differ as to the particular forms of Govern­ment in the Church; those who are for an inequality, usually fix on the imparity between the Apostles and the LXX. Those that are for a parity upon Matth. 20. 25. and Matth. 18. 17. I shall here proceed in the former method, to shew that none of those can prove the Form they contend for as only neces­sary, nor their adversaries prove it unlawful. First then for the inequality between the Apostles and the LXX. Disciples; by that inequality is meant, either only an inequality of order; or else, an inequality carrying superiority and subordination. It is evident that the LXX. disciples were not of the same Order with the twelve Apostles, whom Christ had designed for the chief Government of his Church, after his Ascension; and in this respect the comparison of the twelve heads of the Tribes, and the seventy Elders, seems parallel with the twelve Apostles; and the LXX. disciples; but if by imparity, be meant, that the twelve Apostles had a superiority of power and jurisdiction over the LXX. disciples; there is not the least evidence or foundation, in Reason or Scripture for it. For [Page 218] the LXX. did not derive their power from the Apostles, but immediately from Christ; they enjoyed the same privi­ledges, were sent upon the same message, (making way for Luke 10. 1. Christs entertainment in the several Cities they went to) yea, all things were parallel between them and the Apostles in their mission (unlesse any difference be made in the Cities they went to, and their number). So that there is no superiority of office in the Apostles, above the LXX. nor of power and jurisdiction over them; their Commissions being the same: And it seems most probable that both their missions were only temporary, and after this the LXX. remained in the nature of private Disciples, till they were sent abroad by a new Commission after the Resurrection, for preaching the Gospel, and planting Churches. For we see that the A­postles themselves were only Probationers, till Christ solemn­ly authorized them for their Apostolical employment, Matth. 28. 18. Iohn 20. 21. when their full Commissions were granted to them, and then indeed they acted with a plenitude of power, as Governours of the Church, but not before. Nothing can be inferred then for any necessary standing Rule for Church-government, from any comparison between the Apostles and the LXX. during the life of Christ, because both their missiors were temporary and occasional. Only we see, that because Christ did keep up the number of the twelve so strictly, that as the LXX. were a distinct number from them, so when one was dead, another was to be chosen in his stead (which had been needlesse, if they had not been a distinct Order and Colledge by themselves), it is thence evi­dent that the Apostolical power, was a superiour power to any in the Church; and that such an inequality in Church-Officers as was between them and particular Pastors of Churches, is not contrary to what our Saviour saith, when he forbids that dominion and authority in his Disciples, which was exercised by the Kings of the earth, Matthew 20. 25. Luke 22. 25. which places, because they are brought by some, to take away all inequality among Church-Officers, I shall so far examine the meaning of them, as they are conceived to have any in­fluence thereupon. First then, I say, that it is not only the abuse of civil power, which our Saviour forbids his Disciples, [Page 219] but the exercise of any such power as that is. And therefore the Papists are mistaken, when from the words of Luke, Vos autem non sic, they conclude, All power is not forbidden, but only such a tyrannical power, as is there spoken of. For those words are not a limitation and modification of the power spo­ken of, but a total prohibition of it; for first, the comparison is not between the Apostles and Tyrants, but between them and Princes, yea such as Luke c [...]lls [...]. Indeed, had Christ Luke▪ 12, 25. said, The Kings of the earth abuse their authority; vos autem non sic; then it would have been onely a limitation of the exercise of power; but the meer exercise of civil authority being spoken of before, and then it being subjoyned, but you not so; it plainly implyes a forbidding of the power spoken of, in the persons spoken to. But, say they, the words used in Matthew, are [...] and [...], which import the abuse of their power, which is forbidden. But I answer, first, in Luke it is otherwise; for there it is the simple [...] and [...], when it follows, [...]. So that if the abuse be forbidden in one, the use is in the other: but secondly, [...], by the LXX. is used fre­quently for [...], and [...] is often rendred by that word; as Psalm 72. 7. He shall have dominion, [...], Psalm 110. 2. [...], Rule thou in the midst of thine ene­mies; v. Psal. 109. Jer. 3. Numb. 23.—32. in both which places, it is spoken of christs Kingdom. So in Genesis 1. 28. [...]. Replenish the earth, and have dominion over it. In all which places, it is used simply for Dominion, and not for Tyrannical Power.

It is not then the abuse of civil Power, but the use of it, which is here forbidden: which will be more evident secondly, from the importance of the phrase [...]; which answers to the Hebrew [...] and simply denyes what went before; as when Cain expresseth his fear of being kill'd, Genesis 4. 14. The Septuagint render Gods answer by [...], whereby is not denyed, only the manner of his death to be as Abels was, but it is simply denyed; and so Psalm 1. 4. the LXX. render [...] by [...], the wick­ed are not so. So, when Christ saith, Matthew 19. 8. [...], from the beginning it was not so; it imports [Page 220] an absolute denyal of giving bills of divorce from the begin­ning. Thirdly; This no wayes answers to the scope of the Apostles contention, which was meerly about Primacy and Power, and not at all about the abuse of this Power. So that by this place, all affectation and use of a civil, co▪active, ex­ternal power is forbidden to the Officers of the Church; the power of the Church being only a directive, voluntary power; and is rather a Ministry then a Power, as our Saviour expresseth there, Matthew 20. 26. Luke 22. 26. But having thus excluded all Civil Power from the Governours of the Church, as such: I say, secondly, That this place doth no wayes imply a prohibition of all inequality among the Governours of the Church; which is abundantly cleared by this reason, be­cause by the acknowledgement of all parties, the Apostles had a Superiour power over the ordinary Pastors of Churches; Now if the exercise of all Superiority had been forbidden, this must have been forbidden too; as implying plainly an exercise of authority in some over others in the Church. And therefore Musculus thus explains the place: Non exigit hoc Christus ut omnes in regno suo sint aequales, sed nè quispiam cupiat magnus & primus haberi & videri. It is not an inequality of Order, but ambition which Christ forbids; and therefore he observes that Christ saith not. Let none be great among you, and none first; which should have been, if all Primacy and Superiority had been forbidden, and a necessity of an equality among Church-Officers: but he that will be great among you, let him be your Minister. Let those that are above others, look upon themselves as the servants of others, and not as their masters. For God never bestows any power on any, for the sake of those that have it, but for the sake of those for whom they are employed: When men seek then their own greatnesse, and not the service of the Church, they flatly contradict this Precept of Christ, But with you it shall not be so. But however an inequality of Power and Order for the Churches good is not thereby prohibited: Which is sufficient for my purpose.

The next place to be considered, is, that in Matthew 18. 15, §. 8. 16, 17. If thy brother shall trespass against thee▪ go and tell him [Page 221] his fault between thee and him alone; if he shall hear thee, thou hast gained thy brother. But if he will not hear thee, then take with thee one or two more, that in the mouth of two or three wit­nesses every word may be established. And if he shall neglect to hear them, tell it to the Church; but if he neglect to hear the Church, let him be unto thee as an heathen man and a Publican. It seems a very strange thing to consider, that this one place hath been pressed by all parties to serve under them, for the maintenance of their own particular form of Government: so that (as the Iews fable of the Manna), it hath had a dif­ferent taste, according to the diversity of the palats of men. Those that are for a Congregational Church, being the first re­ceptacle of Church power, set this place in the front of their arguments; Those who plead for Standing Presbyteries, Lay-Elders, subordination of Courts, fetch all these out of this place; Those that are for a Power of Church Discipline to be only lodged in a higher Order of Chur [...] Officers succeeding the Apostles, derive the succession of that power from this place; nay lest quidlibet should not be proved èquolibet, the Papists despair not of proving the constant visibility of the Church, the subordination of all to the Pope, the infallibility of general Councils, all out of this place. Methinks then it might be argument enough of the incompetency of this place to de­termine any one particular form, when it is with equal con­fidence on all sides brought to prove so many; especially if it be made appear that the general Rule laid down in these words, may be observed under a diversity of forms of Go­vernment. For whether by the Church, we mean the com­munity of the faithful in a particular Congregation, or the standing Officers of such a Church, or a Consistorial Court, or Synodical Assembly, or higher Church-Officers, it is still the duty of men in case of offences, to tell the Church for redresse of grievances, or vindication of the person himself, that he hath discharged his duty.

This place then determines not what this Church is, nor what the form of it [...] Government should be, when the sense of it holds good and true under such diversity of forms. But we shall further enquire what influence this place can have upon the modelling the Government in the Church of God. Fo [...] [Page 222] Chamier tells us, the prima Politia Ecclesiasticae origo is to be To. 2. l. 10. c. 5. s. 2. found in these words; it will be then worth our enquiry to see what foundation for Church government can be drawn out of these words. In which the variety of Expositions (like a mul­titude of Physitians to a distempered Patient) have left it worse then they found it; I mean more difficult and obscure. We shall therefore endeavour to lay aside all pre-conceptions by other mens judgements and opinions, and see what innate Light there is in the Text it self to direct us to the full sense and meaning of it. Two things the great difficulty of the place lyes in, What the offences are here spoken of? What the Church is which must b [...] spoken to? For the First, I conceive it evi­dent to any unprejudicated mind, that the matter our Saviour speaks of, is a matter of private offence and injury, and not a matter of scandal, as such considered in a Church-Society, which I make appear thus First, From the parallel place to this Luke 17. 3. [...]y Brother trespasse against thee, rebuke him; and if he repent, forgive him. This can be nothing else but a matter of private injury, because it is in the power of every private person to forgive it; which it was not in his power to do, were it a matter of scandal to the whole Church; un­lesse we make it among Christians (as it was among the Jews) that every private person might excommunicate another, and to release him afterward. Secondly, It manifestly appears from St. Peters words next after this Paragraph, Matth. 18. 20. Lord, how often shall my brother sin against me, and I forgive him, till seven times? &c. Christ answers him, till seventy times seven, that is, as often as he doth it. And thence Christ brings the parable of the King forgiving his Servants, v. 23. Thirdly, Were it meant of any scandalous sin committed with the privacy of any particular person (as many understand trespassing against thee, that is, te conscio) then this inconve­nience must necessarily follow, that matters of scandal must be brought to the Churches cognizance when there can be no way to decide them; that is, when one offends, and only one person knows it; here will be a single affirmation on one side, and denyal on the other side, and so there can be no way to decide it; the matter here spoken of then is somewhat only relating to the offence or injury of some particular per­son, [Page 223] and not a matter of scandal to the whole Church. The Question then as propounded to be spoken to by our Saviour, is, What is to be done in case of private offences between man and man? and not in case of secret sins against God, and scanda­lous to the Church? Now to this our Saviour layes down his answer gradually: first, there must be private admonition; if that succeed not, admonition before witnesses; if not that, telling the Church; if not that neither, reputing him as a Heathen and Publican. Now in this answer, we must conceive our Saviour speaks as to an ordinary case, so in a way easie to be under­stood by all that heard him: and therefore he must speak in allusion to what was at that time among the Jews in such cases, which is freely acknowledged both by Calvin and Beza Beza in loc. upon the place. Nam certè tanquam de Iudais haec dici apparet, saltem ex eo quod addit, Sit tibi sicut Ethnicus & Publicanus. We must then see what the custom was among the Jews in such cases, and how far our Saviour doth either approve the custome received, or appoint new. The Law was very strict in case of offences, for every man in any wise to rebuke his Lev. 19. 17. Neighbour, and not to suffer sin upon him, Arguendo argues, our old Translation renders it, Thou shalt plainly rebuke thy Neighbour. Now this piece of necessary Discipline our Sa­viour endeavours to recover among them, which it seems was grown much out of use with them. For Rabbi Chanina, as De Syned. l. 1. c. 9. in Gemar. Babyl. ad tit. Rhab­bath. c. 16. fo. 119. Mr. Selden observes, gave this as one reason of the destruction of Ierusalem, because they left off reproving one another: Non excisa fuissent Hierosolyma, nisi quoniam alter alterum non coarguebat. Our Saviour therefore inforceth this Law upon them in case of offences; first, to deal plainly with their Neigh­bour in reproving him: but our Saviour rests not here, but being himself a pattern of Meeknesse and Charity, he would not have them to rest in a bare private admonition, but to shew their own readinesse to be reconciled, and willingnesse to do good to the Soul of the offending party thereby, he adviseth further to take two or three witnesses with them, hoping thereby to work more upon him: but if still he continues re­fractory, and is not sensible of his miscarriage, Tell it the Church. What the Church here is, is the great Controversie; Some, as Beza and his followers, understand an Ecclesiastical [Page 224] Sanhedrin among the Jews▪ which had the proper cognizance of Ecclesiastical causes; but it will be hard to prove any such V. Grotium in Matth. 5. 22. Selden de Syned. l. 2. c. 8. Sanhedrin in use among them▪ the Priests and Levites indeed were very often chosen into the Sanhedrin, (which it may be is the ground of the mistake, but there was no such Sanhedrin among them, which did not respect matters criminal and civil: So we must understand what Iosephus speaks of the Priests among the Jews: [...] Ioseph. l. 2, cont. Appi­on.. The Priests were alwayes very studious of the Law, and other matters of concernment. These were appointed as the Overseers of all things, Iudges of Controversies, and the punishers of con­demned persons. Thus we see, he is so far from attributing a distinct Ecclesiastical Court to them, that he seems to make them the only Judges in civil and criminal causes. Others▪ by the Church, understand the Christian▪Church; but herein they are divided; some understanding by it only the Officers of the Church: so Chrysostome, [...]. Euthemius Eccle­siam nunc vocat prasides fidelium Ecclesiae. Others understand it not in its representative notion, but in its diffusive capacity, as taking in all the members. But our Saviour speaking to a present case, must be supposed to lay down a present remedy, which could not be, if he gave only Rules for governing his Church which was not as yet gathered nor formed, there be­ing then no Court Ecclesiastical for them to appeal unto. Suppose then this case to have fallen out immediately after our Saviours speaking it, that one brother should trespasse against another, either then notwithstanding our Saviours Speech (which speaks to the present time, Go and tell the Church) the offended brother is left without a power of redresse, or he must understand it in some sense of the word Church, which was then in use among the Jews. And these, who tell us, That unless [...] be understood for a Church as we un­derstand Gelespy Aaron's Rod, l. 3. c. 2. p. 552. l. 2. c. 9. p. 296. it, it would be no easie matter for us now to conceive what the Holy Ghost meant by it, would do well withall to con­sider how those to whom Christ spoke, should apprehend his meaning if he spoke in a sense they never heard of before. And certainly, our best way to understand the meaning of [Page 225] Scripture is to consider what, of whom, to whom the Scripture speaks; for although the Scripture, as a Rule of Faith for us, be supposed to be so written, as to be easily understood by us, yet as the parcels of it were spoken upon several Occasions, they must be supposed to be so spoken, as to be apprehended by them to whom they were spoken in the common senss of the words, if nothing peculiar be expressed in the Speech, whereby to restrain them to another sense. And therefore the Church must be understood in the same sense wherein the word [...] or the Syriack answering to it, was apprehended among the Jewes in our Saviours time. Which could not be for any new Consistory or Sanhedrin to be erected under the Gospel. Thence others conceiving that Christ did speak ac­cording to the Custome of the Jewes▪ by the Church▪ understand nothing else but the Sanhedrin, and so make the sense of the words to be this. The Case our Saviour speaks to is that of private Quarrels, wherein our Saviour layes down two Di­rections in a way of Charity, private admonition, and before witnesses; but if the party continues refractory, then it may be lawful to convent him before the Courts of Judicature among them, the Triumvirate, the 23. or the great Sanhe­drin▪ for although the Romans had taken away the power of the Iewes in Capital matters, yet they allowed them liberty of judgeing in the case of private quarrels: but if he neglect to hear the Sanhedrin, then it may be lawful to implead him before the Governour of the Province in his Court of Judi­cature, by which Heathens and Publicans were to be judged; which is meant by Let him be to thee, not as a brother Jew, but as a Heathen and a Publican. This Exposition is said to be first Broached by Erastus; but much improved and enlarged by Reverend Bishop Bilson, who spends a whole Thes▪ 41▪ Perpetual Govern­ment. c. 4. Chapter upon it. But this Exposition though it seems fair and plausible, yet there are several things in it which keep me from imbracing it; as First, It seems not very probable that our Saviour should send his Disciples to whom he speaks, to the Jewish Sanhedrin for the ending any Controversies ari­sing among themselves; knowing how bitter Enemies they wer to all who were the followers of Christ. Secondly, it seems not very agreeable with the scope of our Saviours Speech▪ [Page 226] which was to take up differences as much as may be among his Disciples, and to make them shew all lenity and forherance towards those that had offended them, and to do good to the Souls of those that had injured and provoked them; whereas this command of telling the Sanhedrin, and inpleading offen­dors before Heathen Courts, tends apparently to heighten the bitterness and animosities of Mens spirits one against another: and layes Religion so open to Obloquies, which makes Paul so severely reprove the Christians at Corinth, for going to Law 1 Cor. 6. 1.—6▪ before Heathen Magistrates; therefore to say that Christ al­lows there going to Law before Heathens, and Paul to forbid it, were, instead of finding a way to end the differences among Christians, to make one between Christ and Paul. Thirdly, the thing chiefly aimed at by Christ, is not a mans Vindication of himself, or recovering losses by injuries received, but the recovering and gaining the offending brother; which evidently appears by what our Saviour adds to the using admonition in private, If he shall hear thee, thou hast gained thy brother. Now [...] in the New Testament is used for the Conversion and turning others from sin. That I might gain them that are under the Law, 1 Corinth. 9. 19, 20, &c. So 1 Pet. 3. 1. explained by Iames 5. 20. Our Saviour then speaks not to the manner of proceeding as to civil injuries, which call for Restitution, but to such as call for Reconciliation. And so the Case I conceive is that of private Differences and Quarrels between men, and not Law-Suites nor civil Causes: I mean such Differences as respect persons and not things, which our Saviour layes down these Rules for the ending of. And therefore I cannot but wonder to see some men insist so much on that place against such an Exposition of this Luke 12. 14. where Christ saith, Who made me a Iudge, and a Divider among you? For doth it any wayes follow, Because Christ would not take upon him to be a temporal Judge among the Jewes, therefore he should take no course for the ending differences among his Disciples, and the taking away all animosities from among them? Nay on the contrary doth not our Saviour very often designedly speak to this very purpose, to root out all bitterness, malice, envy, and rancour from mens spirits, and to perswade them to forgive injuries, even to pray for persecutours, and by any [Page 227] means to be reconciled to their Brethren. Which he makes to be a Duty of so great necessity, that if a man had brought his gift Matth. 5. 23, 24. to the Altar, and remembred his brother had ought against him, he bids him leave his gift there, and go, be reconciled to his Brother, and then offer up the Gift. We see hereby how suitable it was to our Saviours Doctrine and Design to lay down Rules for the ending of any differences arising among his Disciples; and this being now cleared to be the state of the Case, it will not be difficult to resolve what is meant by telling the Church. Which I make not to be any appeal to a juridical court, acting authoritatively over the persons brought before it, but the third and highest step of Charity in a man towards a person that hath offended him, viz. That when neither private admonition, nor before two or three wit­nesses would serve to reclaim the offendor, then to call a select company together (which is the Natural importance of the word [...]) and before them all to lay open the cause of the breach and difference between them, and to refer it to their Arbitration to compose and end it. Which Sense of the place, I humbly conceive to have the least force in it, and in every part of it to be most genuine and natural, and fully agreeable to the received practice among the Jewes: which the Author of the Book Musar cited by Drusius fully acquaints Praeterit▪ lib. 1. p. 43. us with, whose words I shall Transcribe, as being a plain Pa­raphrase on these of our Saviour. Qui arguit socium suum, debet primum hoc facere placide inter se, & ipsum solum, verbis mollibus, ita ut non pudefaciat eum. Si resipiscit, bene est; sin, debet eum acritèr arguere & pudefacere inter se & ipsum. Si non resipiscit, debet adhibere socios, ipsumque coram illis pudore afficere; si nec modo quicquam proficit, debet eum pudefacere coram multis, ejusque delictum publicare. Nam certe detegendi sunt hypocritae. That which this Authour calls pudefacere eum coram multis, is that which our Saviour means when he bids him tell the Church, or the Congregation, as our Old Translation renders it. This the Jews called reproving of men [...] before a multitude, as the Vulg. Latin though falsly renders that place L [...]viticus 19. 17. publicè argue eum: and to this the Apostle may allude when he speaks of the [...], 2 Corinth. 2. 6. censure of many; and [Page 228] the reproof [...] before all, 1 Tim. 5. 20. which was to be in matters of publike scandal upon Religion, [...] as the Jewes call them; but in case the offendor should still [...] slight this overture of Reconciliation, before the company selected for hearing the Case▪ then saith our Savi­our, look upon him as an obstinate refractory creature, and have no more to do with him, then with a Heathen and a Publican; by which terms the most wilful obstinate sinners were set out among the Jewes, and by which our Saviour means a mans withdrawing himself, as much as in him lies, from all familiar society with such a person. And thus saith Christ, Whatsoever you bind in Earth, shall be bound in Heaven, and whatsoever you loose on Earth shall be loosed in Heaven, v. 18. that is, If after all your endeavours of Reconciliation, the offender will hearken to no agreement, it is an evidence and token that mars sin is bound upon him, (that is, shall not be pardoned so long as he continues impenitent,) but if he repent of his offence, and you be reconciled, as the offence is removed V. Rainolds Conf. with Hart. cap. 2. div. 3. Grot. in Mat. 16. on Earth thereby, so the sin is loosed in Heaven, that is, for­given. The guilt of sin that binds, it being an Obligation to punishment; and so the pardon of sin that looseth, as it can­cels that Obligation. And so Grotius observes, that [...] is the same with [...], and [...] with [...], what is called retain­ing in one place, is binding in another: and what is loosing in one place, is remitting in the other. But now although I assert this to be the true, proper, genuine meaning of this difficult place, yet I deny not but that this place hath influence upon Church-Government; but I say the in­fluence it hath, is onely by way of Accommodation, and by Analogy deduced from it. According to which, these things I conceive have Foundation in these words; First, gradual appeals from the Method here laid down by our Sa­viour. Secondly, Church▪censures, and the Duty of submit­ting to Church-authority; For although before any Church Power was actually set up, (as when our Saviour spake these words then there was none,) yet after that Church-Govern­ment was fixed and set up, it must in Reason be supposed that all matters of the Nature of scandals to the Church must be decided there. Thirdly, The lawfulness of the Use of [Page 229] excommunication in Christian Churches; for if every particular person might withdraw from the Society of such a one as con­tinues refractory in his Offences, then much more may a whole Society, and the Officers of it declare such a one to be avoided both in religious and familiar civil Society, which is the for­mal Nature of Excommunication. Herein we see the wisdom of our Saviour, who in speaking to a particular case, hath laid down such general Rules as are of perpetual use in the Church of God for accommodating differences arising therein. Thus have we hitherto cleared that our Saviour hath determined no more of Church-Govern-ment then what is appliable to a diversity of particular Forms, and so hath not by any Law or practice of his own determined the necessity of any one form.

CHAP. VI.

HAving found nothing, either in our Saviours practice, or in §. 1. the rules laid down by him (conceived to respect Church-Government) which determines any necessity of one parti­cular Form; the onely argument remaining which can be con­ceived of sufficient strength to found the necessity of any one form of Government, is, the practice of the Apostles, who were by their imployment and commission entrusted with the Government of the Church of God. For our Saviour after his Resurrection taking care for the Planting and Governing of his Church after his Ascension to Glory, doth at two se­veral [Page 231] times call his Apostles together, and gives now their full Charter and Commission to them; the first▪ containing chief­ly the power it self conferred upon them, Iohn 20. 21. The other, the Extent of that power, Matth. 28. 19. In the former our Saviour tells them, As the Father had sent him, so did he send them▪ Which we must not understand of a parity and equality of Power, but in a similitude of the mission: that as Christ before had managed the great affairs of his Church in his own Person; so now (having according to the Pro­phecies made of him at the end of seventy weeks, made Recon­ciliation for iniquity by his Death, and brought in everlasting Righteousness by his Resurrection) He dispatcheth abroad his Gospel Heralds to proclaim the Iubilee now begun, and the Dan. 9. 24. with Rom. 4. 15▪ Act of Indempnity now past upon all penitent Offendors; which is the Sense of the other part of their Commission; Whosoever sins ye remit, they are remitted; and whosoever sins ye retain, they are retained, John 20. 23. i. e. as many as upon the Preaching the Gospel by you, shall come in and yield up themselves to the tenders of Grace proclaimed therein, shall have their former Rebellions pardoned; but such as will still continue obstinate, their former guilt shall still continue to bind them over to deserved punishment. And to the end the Apostles might have some Evidence of the power thus conferred upon them, He breathes the Holy Ghost on them, and Joh. 20. 12 said, Receive ye the Holy Ghost; which we are not to under­stand of the Extraordinary gifts of the Holy Ghost, which were not received till the day of Pentecost, Act. 2. 1. but of the Authoritative power of preaching the Gospel, which was now conferred upon them, by the solemn Rite of breathing the Holy Ghost on the Apostles. In which Sense the Church of England understands that Expression in the Ordination of Ministers, as it implies onely the conferring thereby an au­thority for the preaching of the Gospel, which being con­veyed by Ordination, is fitly expressed by the same word [...] which our Saviour used in the conferring the same Power upon his Apostles at his sending them forth to be Gospel-Preachers.

After this comes the solemn appointed meeting of Christ with his Disciples at the mountain of Galilee, (where in pro­bability, Mat. 28. 16 [Page 232] besides the eleven, were present the five hundered 1 Cor. 15. 6 Brethren at once.) And here Christ more solemnly inaugurates the Apostles in their Office, declaring all power to be in his hands; and therefore appoints the Apostles to preach the Gospel to every creature, that is, to all men indefinitely, Gentiles Mark 16. 15. as well as Jewes, which Matthew fully expresseth by all Nati­ons. Mat. 18. 19 Now are the Apostles left as chief Governours of the Church under Christ; and in this last Commission wherein the extent of the Apostles power is more fully expressed, there is nothing mentioned of any order for the Government of the Church under them, not what course should be taken by the Church after their decease. All that remains then to be inqui­red into, is what the Apostles practice was, and how far they acted for the determining any one form of Government as ne­cessary for the Church.

The Apostles being thus invested in their authority, we proceed to consider the Exercise of this authority for the Go­verning of the Church. And here we are to consider, that the Apostles did not presently upon their last Commission from Christ goe forth abroad in the World to Preach, but were commanded by Christ to go first to Ierusalem, and there to expect the coming of the Holy Ghost according to our Savi­ours own appointment, Luke 24. 49. And therefore what Mark adds, Mark 16. 20. that after Christs appearance to them, the Apostles▪ went abroad and preached every where, working Miracles, must either be understood of what they did onely in their way returning from Galile oo Ierusalem: or else more probably of what they did indefinitely afterwarps. For presently after we find them met together at Ierusalem, whence they came from Mount Olivet where Christs Ascension was. Here we find them imployed [...], saith Saint Luke Luk. 24 52 Acts 1. 12. Luk. 14. 53 in his Gospel, which we render the Temple; but I understand it rather as referring to the action than the place, and is best explained by what Luke saith in Acts 1. 14. they were [...], continuing in Prayer and Supplication. And that it cannot be meant of the Temple, appears by the mention of the [...], an upper room, where Acts 1. 13. they continued together. For that it should be meant of any of the [...], about the Temple, is most improbable to [Page 233] conceive, because not only those ninty Cells about the Tem­ple were destined and appointed for the Priests in their several V. L. Em­por. in Cod▪ Midd [...]th. c. 4. Sect. 5. [...], or times of Ministration; and it is most unlikely the chief Priests and Masters of the Temple should suffer those whom they hated so much, to continue [...]o near them without any molestation or disturbance. While the Apostles continue here, they proceed to the choice of a new Apostle instead of Iudas, thereby making it appear now necessary that number was to the first forming of Churches, when the vacant place must be supplyed with so great solemnity. Which office of Apostleship (which Iudas once had, and Matthias was now chosen into) is call'd by Peter [...], Acts 3. 24. which a Learned Interpreter [...]enders, the portion of his Apostolacy, or the Province which fell to Iudas his lot in the distribution of them among the Apostles, which saith he, is Annot. in loc. Dissert. 3. c. 4. Schism. c. 4▪ Sect. 13. Answ. to the Cath. c. 4. s. 2. Schism disarm'd. Ans. c. 3. s. 4 call'd [...], into which Matthias did [...] go, and from which Judas fell by his sin. This Exposition is very often suggested by that learned Author: but (with all due reverence to his name and memory); I cannot see any such evidence either from Scripture or reason, to enforce any such Exposition of either phrase, yielding us sufficient ground to for sake the received sense of both of them. For [...] is plainly nothing else but that office of the Apostleship which be­longed to Iudas, without any relation to a Province; and [...], is that proper place which belonged to Iudas, as he is call'd [...], the Son of perdition, and no other. But the very foundation of this mistake▪ is, that the several Provinces, into which the Apostles were to go for preaching the Gospel, were distributed among them before they were filled with the Holy Ghost, which is an Hypothesis will not easily be granted by any one that doth but impartially con­sider these things. That if the Provinces were so distributed among them, it must be either before the death of Christ, or after; and it must be before, if Iudas had a peculiar Province assigned to him, which this Exposition necessarily implyes; but how Provinces could be divided among them before they had their Commission given them to preach to all Nations, is somewhat hard to understand. It must be then immediately after Christ had bid them preach to every creature, that they [Page 234] thus distributed the Provinces among them; but several things make this very improbable. First, The grosse mistake of the Apostles concerning the very nature of Christs King­dom▪ which we read, Acts 1. 6▪ when they jointly ask Christ, Lord, wilt thou at this time restore the Kingdom to Israel? They dream [...] still of a temporal Kingdom, according to the com­mon opinion of the Jews; and, Is it probable they should di­stribute among themselves the several Provinces for Preaching the Gospel, who thought that Christs Kingdom would have been established by other means then going up and down the World? They looked that Christ himself should do it by his own power, Wilt thou at this time, &c. and did not think it must be done by their means; much lesse by their single going into such vast parts of the World, as the twelve divisions of the World would be. Secondly, It appears very improbable any such division of Provinces should be made then, when they were commanded to stay at Ierùsalem, and not to stir thence till the promise of the Spirit was fulfilled upon them. Tarry ye in the City of Jerusalem till ye be endued with power from on high, Luke 24. 49. And being assembled together with them, be commanded them not to depart from Jerusalem, but wait for the promise of the Father, Acts 1. 4. Is it likely, when the Apostles were thus straightly charged not to leave Ierusalem, till they were endued with the power of the Holy Ghost, they should contrive the dispersing themselves abroad all over the World? especially when Christ told them, that it should be after the coming of the Spirit that they should go abroad, Acts 1. 8. and that the Spirit should fit them for their work, ( Iohn 15. 26, 27. Iohn 16. 13.) by teaching them, and testi­fying of Christ. Thirdly, If such a distribution of Provinces had been made so early among the Apostles, how comes it to passe, that after they were endued with the Holy Ghost, they did not every one betake himself to his several Province? there could have been then no plea nor excuse made for their stay any longer at Ierusalem after the promise of the Spirit was fulfilled upon them. And yet after the persecution raised at Ierusalem, when most of the Church were dispersed abroad, we find the Apostles remaining still at Ierusalem, Acts 8. 1, 14. Would they have been so long absent from their charge, if [Page 235] any such distribution had been made among themselves? Fourthly, The Apostles occasional going to places as they did, argues there was no such set division of Provinces among them. The first departure of any of the Apostles from Ieru­salem, was that of Peter and Iohn, who were sent by common order of the Apostles to Samaria, after they heard that by Philips preaching, they had received the Word of God. Acts 8. 14. Not the least mention of any peculiar Province of theirs which they were sent to. So Peters going from Ioppa to Casarea, was occasioned by Cornelius his sending for him. Acts 10. 5, 32. Fifthly, That Provinces were not divided, appears, because of so frequent reading of many of the Apostles being to­gether in one place: first the whole twelve at Ierusalem, after that Peter and Iohn together at Samaria; about four years after Pauls conversion, we met with Iames and Peter toge­ther Gal. 1. 18, 19. at Ierusalem; fourteen years after this, we find Iames, Peter▪ and Iohn there. Is it any wayes probable, if all Gal. 2. 1, 9. these had their distinct Provinces assigned then, they should be so often found together at Ierusalem, which certainly must belong but to the Province of one of them? Sixthly, It seems evident that they divided not the World into Provinces among them, because it was so long before they thought it to be their duty to preach unto the Gentiles; Peter must have a Vision first before he will go to Cornelius, Acts 10. 11. and as yet we see they retained that perswasion, that it is un­lawful for a Iew to keep company, or come unto one that is of another Nation, Acts 10. 28. Nay more then this, Peter is ac­cused for this very action▪ before the Apostles at Ierusalem, Acts 11. 2, 3. and they laid this a [...] the ground of their quarrel, that he went in to men uncircumcised, and did eat with them: how this is reconcilable with the whole Worlds being divided into Provinces so early among the Apostles, is not easie to con­ceive: unlesse some of them thought it unlawful to go to their own Provinces, which certainly must be of the Gen­tiles, most of them. Seventhly, Another evidence that Provinces were not divided so soon, is, that Peters province so much spoken of, viz. That of the circumcision, fell not to his share, till near twenty years after this time we now speak of, upon the agreement between Paul and Peter at Ierusalem. [Page 236] If Province had been so soon divided, how comes the Apostle­ship Gal. 2. 7, 8, 9. of the Circumcision to be now at last attributed to Pe­ter? Answ. to Cathol. Gentl. chap. 4. s. 3. numb 7. Was it not known what Peters Province was before this time? and if it was▪ how come Paul and he now to agree about dividing their Provinces? Nay further: Eighthly, These Provinces after all this time were not so divided, as to exclude one from anothers Province, which is requisite for a distribution of them, much lesse were they so at first; for as to this division of the Jews and Gentiles between Paul and Peter, it cannot be understood exclusively of others; for, what work then had the rest of the Apostles to do? neither ta­king them distributively, was Paul excluded from preaching to [...]he Iews, or Peter to the Gentiles? We see Paul was at first chosen to be a Vessel to bear Christs name before the Gentiles and Acts 9. 15. Kings, and the children of Israel. We see hereby he was ap­pointed Acts 9. 20, 22, an Apostle as well to Jews as Gentiles: and accord­ingly we find him presently preaching Christ in the Synagogues, and confounding the Iews. So in all places where Paul came, he first preached to the Jew [...] in the Synayogues, and when Acts 13. 5, 14. they would not hearken to him, then he turned to the Gen­tiles. Neither was this done only before the Apostles meeting at Ierusalem, supposed to be that spoken of Acts 15▪ but after at Ephesus, we find him entring into the Sy­nagogues there, and preaching to the Jews. So likewise he Acts 19. 8. did at Corinth, Acts 18. 4. And he reasoned in the Syna­gogue every Sabbath, and perswaded the Iews and the Greeks. Act. 18. 19 Paul then we see thought not himself excluded from preach­ing to the Jews, because they were St. Peters Province. Nei­ther did Peter think himself excluded from the Gentiles, he Acts 10. 28. was the first that opened the door of Faith to them by preach­ing to them; in which respect it is not altogether improbably Matth. 16. 19. conceived by some, that the power of the Keys was peculiarly given to him. And afterwards in the open Council at Ieru­salem, he owns himself as the Apostle to the Gentiles: God made choyce among us, that the Gentiles by my mouth should hear Acts 15. 7. the word of the Gospel and believe. This then evidently de­stroys any such early distinction of Provinces; when Peter, whose Province seems most expresse in Scripture, viz. the Circumcision, yet we find him acting as an Apostle to the [Page 237] Gentiles too. I deny not but at the meeting of Paul and Peter at Ierusalem, when they observed how God did blesse the one most in the circumcision, the other in the uncircumcision, there was an agreement between them, for the one to lay out his pains chiefly upon the Iews, and the other upon the Gen­tiles; and in probability where they met in any City, the one gathered a Church of the Iews, and the other of the Gentiles; but this makes no such distinction of Provinces, as to exclude the one from the others charge: and further, this agreement between Paul and Peter then after both had preached so ma­ny years, makes it fully clear, that the pretended division of Provinces so early among the Apostles, is only the wind-egge of a working Fancy, that wants a shell of Reason to cover it. As for the division of Provinces mentioned in Ecclesiastical Writers, though as to some few they generally agree; as that Thomas went to Parthia, Andrew to Scythia, Iohn to the Euseb. lib. 3. cap. 1. lesser Asia, &c. yet as to the most they are at a losse where to find their Province [...], and contradict one another in reference to them; and many of them seem to have their first ori­ginal from the Fable of Dorotheus, Nicephorus, and such Writers.

Having shewed that the Apostles observed no set-order §. 3. for distributing Provinces, we come to shew what course they took for the setling of Churches in the places they went to. In the clearing of which, nothing is more necessary then to free our judgements of those prejudices and prepossessions, which the practice either of the former ages of the Church, or our own have caused within us. For it is easie to observe, that nothing hath been a more fruitful mother of mistakes and errours, then the looking-upon the practice of the primitive Church through the glass of our own customs. Especially when under the same name, (as it is very often seen) something far different from what was primarily intended by the use of the word, is set forth to us. It were no difficult task to multiply examples in this kind, wherein men meeting with the same names, do apprehend the same things by them, which they now through custome signifie, without taking notice of any alteration in the things themselves signified by those names. Thus since the name Missa was appropriated by [Page 238] the Papists to that which they call the Sacrifice of the Altar, wherever they meet among ancient Writers with that Name, they presently conceive the same thing was understood by it then. Whereas it was then only taken for the publike Service of the Church, so called from the dismission of the people after V. Picherel­lum de Missa, cap. 1. Casaub. Exercit. 16. sect. 58. it, with an Ite, Missa est; and from the different forms of Chri­stians, they had two several Services, the one called Missa Ca­techumenorum, because at the end of that the Catechumeni were dismissed out of the Assembly; the other Missa fidelium, at which they received the Lords Supper; which afterwards (the former discipline of the Church decaying) ingrossed the name Missa to its self; and when the Sacrifice of the Altar came up among the Papists, it was appropriated to that. For though they innovated things never so much, yet it hath been alwayes the Policy of that Church not to innovate names, that so the incautelous might be better deceived with a pre­tence of antiquity; and thus under the anciently simple name of Missa, lyes at this day couched a Masse of errours. So after the word [...] was applyed by them to that Sacrifice, wherever they meet that word in Scripture, they interpret it in that sense; and hence when we only read of the Teachers at Antioch, [...], no other rendring of the words will be taken but Sacrificantibus illis, although it be not only Acts 13. 2. contrary to the sense of the word in the New Testament, but to the Exposition of Chrysostome, Theophylact, and Oecumeni­us, who expound it by [...]. Thus when publike Liturgies were grown into use in the Church after the decay of the gifts of the first primitive Church, Eusebius his bare calling S. Iames [...] (though he relates only to his Ministry in the Church of Jerusalem) is enough to entitle him Father to a Liturgy, which soon crept forth under his name: by an argu­ment much of the same strength with that which some have brought for reading Homilies, because it is said of St. Paul, Acts 20. 11. [...]. Of the same stamp is Bellarmin [...]s argument for Invocation of Saints, because of Iacobs saying, Invocetur super eos nomen meum. But we need not go far for examples of this kind. The businesse we are upon, will acquaint [...]s with some of them. As the argument for popular Election of Pastors, from the Grammatical sense of [Page 239] the word [...], for L [...]y-Elders from the name [...], and modern Episcopacy from the use of the word [...] in Scriptures. Names and Things must then be accurately di­stinguished, and the sense of the names must neither be fetched from the custome now used, nor from the Etymologie of the word, but from the undoubted practice of Apostolical times, if that can be made appear what it was. Which will be best done, if we can once find out what course and order the Apo­stles took in the forming and modelling the Churches by them planted.

That which we lay then as a foundation, whereby to clear §. 4. what Apostolical practice was, is, that the Apostles in the forming Churches did observe the customes of the Jewish Synagogues. Totum regimen Ecclesiarum Christi conformatum V. Bezam, in Acts 13. 15. in Acts 11. 30.—6. 3—14. 12.—20. 28. fuit ad Synagogarum exemplar, saith Grotius truly. Praesides & curatores Ecclesiarum ad instar Presbyterorum Synagogae Iudaicae constitutos fuisse constat, as Salmasius often affirms. In which sense we understand that famous speech of the Author of the Commentary on St. Pauls Epistles, which goes under the name of Ambrose, but now judged by most to be Apparat. ad lib. de Prim. Papae. p. 151. 220. In 1 Tim. 5. 1. v. eti­am in 1 Cor. 12. 28. Aug. lib. 4. ad Boni [...]. cap. 4. done by Hilary a Deacon of the Church of Rome, under which name St. Augustine quotes some words on the fifth to the Romanes, which are found still in those Commentaries. Nam apud omnes utique gentes honorabilis est senectus, unde & Synagoga & postea Ecclesia Seniores habuit, sine quorum con­silio nihil agebatur in Ecclesiâ, which words are not to be un­derstood of a distinct sort of Presbyters from such as were employed in preaching the Word, but of such Presbyters as were the common Council of the Church, for the moderating and ruling the affairs of it; which the Church of Christ had constituted among them, as the Jewish Synagogue had be­fore. And from hence we observe that the Ebionites, who blended Judaism and Christianity together (whence Ierome Ep. ad Aug saith of them, Dum volent & Iudai esse & Christiani, nec Iudaei sunt nec Christiani, they made a Linsey-woolsey Religi­on, C. Ebion. which was neither Iudaism nor Christianity). These, as Epiphanius tells us, called their publike Meeting-place [...], and the Pastors of their Churches [...]. Thereby implying the resemblance and Analogy between the form of [Page 240] Government in both of them. But this will best be made ap­pear by comparing them both together. For which we are to take notice, how much our Saviour in the New Testament did delight to take up the received practices among the Jews only, with such alterations of them as were suitable to the Nature and Doctrine of Christianity, as hath been abun­dantly manifested by many learned men, about the Rites of the Lords Supper, taken from the post-coenium among V. Soaliger. de Emend. temp. l. 6. & Lud. Capelli vind. c. Buxtor [...]ii diss. Selden. Com. in Eu­tychium. p. 25. the Jews; the use of Baptism, from the Baptism used in ini­tiating Proselytes; Excommunication from their putting out of the Synagogue. As to which things, it may be observed, that those Rites which our Saviour transplanted into the Go­spel-soyl, were not such as were originally founded on Moses his Law, but were introduced by a confederate Discipline among themselves. And thus it was in reference to the government of the Synagogues among them; for although the reason of erecting them was grounded on a command in the Levitical Law, Levit. 23. 3. where holy Convocations are required upon the Sabbath-dayes; yet the building of Sy­nagogues in the Land, was not, as far as we can find, till a great while after. For although Moses require the duty of assem­bling, yet he prescribes no orders for the place of meeting, nor for the manner of spending those dayes in Gods service, nor for the persons who were to super-intend the publike worship performed at that time. These being duties of a moral nature, are left more undetermined by Moses his Law, which is most punctual in the Ceremonial part of Divine Ser­vice. And therefore even then when God did determine the positives of Worship, we see how much he left the perform­ance of morals to the wisdom and discretion of Gods people, to order them in a way agreeable to the mind and will of God. We shall not here discourse of the more elder Customs and observations of the Synagogues, but take the draught of them by the best light we can about our Saviours time, when the Apostles copyed out the Government of Christian-Churches by them.

About the time of Christ, we find Synagogues in very great request among the Jews; God so disposing it, that the moral part of his service should be more frequented now the Cere­monial [Page 241] was expiring; and by those places so erected, it might be more facile and easie for the Apostles to disperse the Gospel by preaching it in those places, to which it was the custome for the people to resort. And as Paul at Athens observing the Altar inscribed [...], To the unknown God, takes his Text from thence, and begins to preach God and Christ Acts 17. 23▪ to them; so the Apostles in every Synagogue meet with a Copy of the Law, from whence they might better take their rise to discover▪ him who was the end of the Law for Righte­ousness to all that believe. For Moses of old time hath in every City them that Preach him, being read in the Synagogues every Acts 15. 21 Sabbath day. It was their constant custome then every Sab­bath day to have the Law publickly read; for which every Synagogue was furnished with a most exact Copy; which was V. Buxtorf. Synag Iud. c. 9. p. 216. looked upon as the great Treasure and Glory of their Syna­gogue; in the Copying out of which, the greatest care and diligence was used. In their Synagogues they read onely the Law and the Prophets, the [...] or Hagiographa were not V. Lud. de Dieu in Acts 13. 15 ordinarily read in publick; the Law, for the more convenient reading it, was distributed into fifty four Sections, which they called [...], every week one Section being read (joyning twice two lesser Sections together) the whole Law was read through once every year.

But here I cannot say that the Jews were absolutely bound up to read the several Sections appointed for the dayes, as it is commonly thought (from which Paraschae and the times prefixed of reading them, Cloppenburgh fetched a new Inter­pretation V. Clop­penb. tract▪ de Sabb. deuteropr [...] ­to & Lud. Capelli [...]p. ad Clopp. p. 74. eum resp. Clopp. p. 143. Luke 4. 17▪ of the [...], which is, that the first Sabbath was that of the civil year which began with the Secti­on [...] upon the twenty fourth of the month Tisri; but the second Sabbath after the first, was the first Sabbath of the sacred Year, which began with the Section [...] upon the Calends of Nisan) but I doe not see any such Evi­dence of so exact and curious a Division of the several Sections, so long since as the time of our Saviour is, which appears by our Saviours reading in the Synagogue at Nazareth where it seems he read after the Synagogue custome, as one of the seven called out by the [...] to read before the people, but we find no Section assigned him by him that delivered the [Page 242] book to him (the Office of the [...]) but it is said of him [...], when he had unfolded the book he found out that place in Isaiah. So that then it seems there was no such Precise Observation of the several Sections to be read. And our Saviours reading the book of the Prophets in the Synagogue, puts us in mind of the [...] the Sections of the Prophets answerable to those of the Law; which Elias In Thisbi v. [...] Levita tells us came up after the time of Antiochu [...] Epiphanes, who so severely prohibited the Jewes the reading of their Law, but from that time hath been observed ever since: of Acts 1. 3. 27. which we read in Pauls Sermon at Antioch in Pisidia speak­ing of Christ; For they that dwell at Jerusalem and their Rulers, because they knew him not, nor the voyces of the Pro­phets Itiner. p. 114. ed. L'▪ Emper. which are read every Sabbath day. Benjamin Tudelensis in his Itinerary, tells us, that the same Custome was not ob­served among all the Jewes for the reading the Sections of the Law. For in Mitsraim (which he there takes not for V. L'Emper. in Not. p. 220. Egypt it self, as it is commonly taken, but for Grand Cairo) where there were near two thousand Jewes, there were two Synagogues, the one of Syrian, the other of Babylonian Iewes. The latter read over every week an entire Section of the Law (as the Jewes in Spain in his time did) and so finished the Law in a years space. The Syrian Jews, or those that were born in Iudea, divided every Section into three parts, and read not the Law through, but in three years time. These Syna­gogues were very much multiplyed, both in Ierusalem and elsewhere, about the time of our Saviours being in the world. When the common Tradition of the Jewes is, that in Ie­rusalem V. Serrari­um. Rabb. prior. cap. 32. its self, there were foure hundred and eighty one Synagogues, which they ridiculously observe by their Gematry, from the word [...] used Isa. 1. 20. whose numeral Matth. 4. 9. Letters being put together, amount to that Number; but [...] Mark 1. 23 clearer Evidence of the multitude of Synagogues is our Savi­ours Luke 4. 17. so often appearing in them; and so likewise the Apostles John 6. 59. 18. 20. when they went abroad to preach the Gospel, we find in most Acts 13▪ 14▪ 14▪ 1. 17. 10. 18. 4▪ 19. 8. places that they first entred into the Synagogues which were, by the liberty given to the Jews, allowed them in all the Ci­ties where they inhabited by the Roman Governours. And so in all their Dispersions both in Babylon, Egypt, and the [Page 243] Western parts, we read of the Synagogues which the Jewes enjoyed, and the liberty they had therein for exercise of their own way of Worship and Discipline. And therefore even at Rome we read of their Proseuchae,

Which by the old Scholiast upon Iuvenal is said to be the place ad quem convenire solebant mendici ad stipem petendam, of which Turnebus gives this account, Proseuchae fana Iudaeorum erant, ut Alexandriae & Romae, alibique; sic nomen adeptae quòd Oracula quaedam essent, vel (ut Christiani loquuntur) Orato­ria. Advers. l. 1 cap. 19. Cum autem ad Eleemosynam Iudaei dandam essent propen­sissimi, eò ceu mendicorum conventus coibat; sed & Iudaei & ipsi mendici, invisi erant omnibus, & mendici ea loca quod domicilia non haberent, diversores interdum occupabant, in iis­que cubabant, ideoque Proseuches nomen in contemptum abie­rat. Scaliger thinks that the Proseucha differed from the Not. in Frag. Graeca p. 25. in Mat. 4, 23. Leg. ad Ca [...]um. Synagogue; for which he is checked by Grotius from that place of Philo, where he speaks of Augustus giving the Jews the liberty of their Proseucha for the learning the Religion of their Countrey, [...], which in brief is that the Pro­seuchae were the Schools of all Religion and Learning, by which words he seems to confound not onely the Synagogue and the Proseucha together, but the Synagogue and the [...] too, which was their Divinity-School, whither they used to re­pair after dinner upon Sabbath dayes, and where the Questi­ons about their Law were discussed; but though I cannot say these were alwayes distinguished, yet in some places they were. Such seems the School of Tyrannus to be, where Paul Acts 19. 9▪ taught, having withdrawn himself from the Synagogue. And so sometimes the Proseuchae were distinguished from the Synagogues, as Grotius himself elsewhere acknowledeth, viz▪ Annot, in Acts 16, 13 either▪ where there was not a competent number of Jewes (for ten Students in the Law were required to make a Sy­nagogue) or else where the Magistrate would not permit the use of them, in which Case the poor Jewes were fain [Page 244] to content themselves with a place remote from the City, either by some River, as that [...], mentioned, Acts 16. 13, or by some grove or wood, whence that of Iuvenal,

Which Fountain, as Vossius observs was extra portam Cape­nam De Idol. l. 2. cap. 80. p. 715. In Fragm▪ G [...]. p. 25. in luco quem medium irrigabat; and from hence Scaliger gathers, Iudaeos in nemoribus proseuchas collocâsse. Thus it ap­pears now what priviledges the Jews generally enjoyed in their dispersion for their Synagogues and publike places to meet, pray, and discourse in.

We now come to inquire after what manner the govern­ment §. 6. of the Synagogue was model'd. Wherein we must first in­quire whether there were any peculiar Government belong­ing to the Synagogue distinct from the civil Consistories which were in use among them. This is often left untouched by learned men in their discourse of Synagogues; some indeed D. Light­foot Horae Hebr. in Mat. 2. 23. p. 70. make the least Consistory or Sanhedrin in use among the Jews, viz. the Triumvirate, to be the Rulers of the Synagogue, and part of the Ten who were to be where ever there was a Sy­nagogue. But although I cannot see sufficient evidence for a great Ecclesiastical Sanhedrin founded by Moses, answering to the great Sanhedrin of LXXI. yet I conceive it probable, that when Synagogues were so multiplied both at home and abroad, there was a distinct Bench of Officers who did parti­cularly belong to the Synagogue to superintend the affairs of that, which I shall now endeavour to make out by these fol­lowing Reasons. First, because the Ten required for the Sy­nagogue are set down by the Jewish Writers as distinct from the number required for the civil Consistory. For in the Gema­ra Babylonia (cited by Selden) the account given why there De Syned. l. 2. c. 5. s. 4. must be 120. inhabitants where there was to be a Sanhedrin of twenty three, is this; There must be twenty three to màke up the Sanhedrin, and three orders of twenty three, (who sat in a hemicycle under the Sanhedrin in the same Form as they [Page 245] sat) and besides these the ten who were to be imployed wholly in the affairs of the Synagogue (for the Gloss there explains them to be [...] decem filii ho­minis vacantes ab omni opere, ut parati sint [...] [...] domui Synagogae manè & vesperi, and there adds, that every City, though it be wall'd, where ten such persons are wanting, is looked on onely as a Village, and thought unworthy to have a Sanhedrin of twenty three;) So that by this it appears the number of the Decemvirate for the Synagogue, was distinct from the persons imployed in the civil Courts. To the same purpose Maimonides gives the 1 [...] I [...]d▪ tit: Sanhed. c. 1. sect. 5. account of the number of 120. who likewise requires the ten for the Synagogue as a distinct and peculiar number. Atque hi erant viri qui vacabant tantum rebus divinis, nimirum lectioni Ad Mis [...]. tit. Sanhed. c. 1. sect. 6. legit & sessioni in Synagogis, as Mr. Selden quotes it from another place in him. Whereby it is evident that those who were imployed in the Synagogue, did make a peculiar Bench and Consistory, distinct from the civil Judicature of the place▪ And therefore the [...] are not the civil Rulers, but some peculiar Officers belonging to the service of the Syna­gogue: And thence when all civil Power and government was taken from the Jews, yet they retained their Archisynagogues still. Whence we read of Archisynagogues, Patriarchs and Cod. Theod. l. 16. tit. 8. l. 13. & 14. Presbyters among the Jewes in the time of Arcadius and Honorius, when all civil Power and Jurisdiction was taken from them. The Second Reason is from the peculiar Ordination of those who were the Rulers of the Synagogues. This I know is denyed by many: because, say they, Ordination was proper onely to the Presbyters among the Jewes, who were thereby made capable of being members of the Sanhedrin, thence it was called [...] Ordinatio Presbyterorum, i. e. Impo­sitio manuum quâ Presbyteri fiunt. This Ordination was I grant primarily used in order to the making men Members of the great Sanhedrin, and therefore the Jewes derive the custome of ordaining them, from Moses his first constituting the LXX Elders, which say they, was done by imposition of Numb. 13. Numb. 37. 18. hands: which was seconded by the example of Moses laying his hands on Ioshua, from whence the custome was continu­ed down among them till the time of Adrian, who severely [Page 246] prohibited it by an Edict, that whosoever should ordain ano­ther Gem. Babyl. ad tit. San­hed. c. 1. s. 13. 14. Scaliger Elench. Triher. c. 10. Tzemach. David. p. 1. m l. 4. A [...] ▪ 880. should forfeit his life, and so every one that was so or­dained. Thence the Jewes tell us that R. Iehuda Ben Baba is called [...] the Ordainer, because in the time of that Edict he ordained five Presbyters, without which they had wholly lost their succession of Presbyters for Courts of Judicature. But though it be thus evident that their Ordination was chiefly used in Order to the fitting men to be members of the San­hedrin, yet that besides this there was a peculiar Ordination for persons not imployed in civil matters, will appear; First, from the different Forms of their Ordination; some were ge­neral without any restriction or limitation at all: which power was conferred in words to this purpose; Ordinatus jam sis, & sit tibi facultas judicandi etiam causas poenales. He that was thus ordained, was [...]it for any Court of Judicature; but there Selden. id Eutych. p. 19. de Sy­ned. l. 2. c. 7. s. 2. was another Form of Ordination which was more particular and restrained; a Form limiting the general power, either to pecuniary Cases, or criminal, or onely to the power of bind­ing and loosing, without any judiciary power at all. Now those that were thus Ordained, were the Jewish Casuists, resolving men onely in for [...] conscientiae of the lawfulness and unlawfulness of things propounded to them. This they called [...] Facultas decernendi circa liga­tum & solutum; that is, a power of Decreeing what was law­ful or unlawfull. For in that sense binding and loosing is used by the Jewish Writers. In which sense they tell us commonly that one School, as that of Hille [...] [...] binds, that is, judgeth V. Light. foot Horae Hebr. in Matth. 16. 19. a thing unlawful; another [...] looseth (as that of Scham­mai) that is, judgeth it lawful and free to be done. Now the persons thus ordained with this power onely, were thereby no Members of any civil Court of Judicature, nor thereby made capable of it: it appears then that this Ordination was peculiar to a particular function, which exactly answers to the Ministerial Office under the Gospel. And that those who were thus ordained, either might not, or did not exercise that Office of theirs in the Synagogue, I can see no reason; I am sure it was most suitable to that place, or at least to the [...] where there was such a one distinct from the Sy­nagogue.

[Page 247]But a clearer evidence of the particular ordination of those imployed in the Synagogue, we have from Benjamin in his Itinerary; for granting his palpable mistakes about the civil power of the Jewes in his time (which was about the middle of the twelfth Century) sufficiently discovered by the Learned L'Empereur, yet as to the ordaining of persons for the seve­rall Dissertat. ad Lecto­rem & in not. 193. &c. Synagogues, we have no ground to suspect his Testimony, which is very plain and evident. For speaking of R. Daniel Ben Hasdai, who was the [...] or the [...], the Head of the Captivity then residing at Bagdad: He tells us, the Synagogues of Babylon, Persia, Choresan, Sheba, Mesopotamia and many other places, derived power from P. 73. ed. L'Emper. Heb. Lat. him [...] of ordaining a Rabbi and Preacher over every Synagogue, which he tells us was done by laying on his hands upon them. These two, the Rabbi and the [...] he makes to be the fixed Officers of every Synagogue, and the Office of the latter lay chiefly in expounding the Scrip­tures. The like he hath of R. Nathaniel the [...] in Egypt, to whose Office it belonged to ordain in all the P. 115. Synagogues in Egypt, [...] th [...]bbies and Lectu­rers of the Synagogue: by which we see [...]arly▪ that there was a peculiar Ordination for the Ministers belonging to the Synagogue. Thence Scaliger wonders how Christ at twelve Elench. Triherc. 10▪ years old should be permitted to sit among the Doctours asking Questions when he was no ordained Rabbi, to whom that place belonged. But although [...] Luke 2. 46 may possibly mean no more then sitting on one of the lower seats belonging to those who were yet in their [...] or Minority, where they sat at the feet of their Teachers, which was not within the Temple its self; but, as Arias Montanus In Appar. de Templo. thinks, was at the East-gate of the Temple where the Doctors sat; yet this is evident by Scaliger, that he looked on an Or­dination for that end, as necessary to those who sat in the Sy­nagogues, as the Doctors there: which is likewise affirmed by Grotius, who tell us, that among the Jews, not onely all pub­lick civil Offices were confer'd by imposition of hands, Sed & in Archisynagogis & senioribus Synagogae, idem observatum; Annot. in Evang. p. 32. unde mos [...] ad Christianos transiit: But likewise all the Rulers and Elders of the Synagogue were so ordained, from [Page 248] whence the custome was translated into Christianity (of which afterwards.) Thus now we have cleared that there was a pe­culiar Government belonging to the Synagogue, distinct from the civil Judicatures.

Having thus far proceeded in clearing that there was a pecu­liar §. 7. Form of Government in the Synagogue; we now inquire what that was, and by what Law and Rule it was observed. The Government of the Synagogue, either relates to the Publick Service of God in it, or the publick Rule of it as a society. As for the Service of God to be performed in it, as there were many parts of it, so there were many Officers peculiarly appointed for it. The main part of publick service lay in the Reading and Expounding the Scriptures: For both, the known place of Philo will give us light for understanding them. [...]. Lib. omnem probum li­berum esse. Com­ing to their Holy places called Synagogues, they sit down in convenient order ac [...]ding to their several Forms, ready to hear, the young under [...]der; then one taketh the Book and readeth, another of those best skilled comes after, and expounds it. For so Grotius reads it [...] for [...], out of Eusebius. In Luc. 4. 16: We see two several Offices here, the one of the Reader in the Synagogue, the other of him that did interpret what was read. Great difference I find among Learned men about the [...] of the Synagogue: some by him understand the [...], called sometimes in Scripture [...], and so make him the under. Reader in the Synagogue; and hence I suppose it is Luke 4. 20. (and not from looking to the poor, which was the Office of the Parnasim) that the Office of Deacons in the Primitive Church is supposed to be answerable to the [...] among the Jewes; for the Deacons Office in the Church, was the pub­lick Reading of the Scriptures: And hence Epiphanius parallels the [...], and [...] among C. Ebeonites the Jewes, to the Bishop, Presbyters, and Deacons among the Christians. But others make the Office of the [...] to be of a higher nature not to be taken for the Reader himself, (for that was no office; but upon every Sabbath day seven were [Page 249] call'd out to do that work, as Buxtorf tells us; first a Priest, Synag. Iud. lib. 1 [...]. then a Levite, and after, any five of the people; and these had every one their set-parts in every Section to read, which are still marked by the numbers in some Bibles.) But the [...] was he that did call out every one of these in their order to read, and did observe their reading, whether they did it exact­ly Lex Rabb. ad verb. or no. So Buxtorf speaking of the [...], Hic maximè ora­tione sive precibus & cantu Ecclesi [...] praeibat, praeerat lectioni legali, docens quod & quomodo legendum, & similibus quae ad sacra pertinebant. So that according to him the [...] was the Superintendent of all the publick service, thence others make him parallel to him they call'd [...] the Angel of the Church, Legatus Ecclesiae. L'Empereur renders it, as though In Benjam, not p. 149. the name were imposed on him as acting in the name of the Church, which could only be in offering up publick prayers; but he was Angelus Dei, as he was inspector Ecclesiae, because the Angels are supposed to be more immediately present in, and Supervisors over the publick place, and duties of worship; see 1 Cor. 11. 10. this [...] is by L'Empereur often rendred Concionator Synagogae, as though it belonged to him to ex­pound the meaning of what was read in the Synagogue, but he that did that was call'd [...] from [...] to enquire; thence [...], the enquirer, or disputer of this world, i Cor 1. 20 [...] thence R. Moses Haddarsan; but it is in vain to seek for several Offices from several Names; nay, it seems not evident, that there was any set-Officers in the Jewish Church for ex­pounding Scriptures in all Synagogues, or at least not so fixed, but that any one that enjoyed any repute for Religion or knowledge in the Law, was allowed a free liberty of speaking for the instruction of the people; as we see in Christ and his Apostles; for the Rulers of the Synagogue sent to Paul and Act. 13. 15. Barnabas after the reading of the Law, that if they had any word of exhortation, they should speak on. From hence it is evident, there were more then one who had rule over the Synagogues, they being call'd Rulers here. It seems very probable, that in every City where there were ten wise men, (as there were supposed to be in every place, where there was a Synagogue) that they did all jointly concurr for the ruling the affairs of the Synagogue. But what the distinct Offices [Page 250] of all these were, it is hard to make out, but all joyning to­gether seem to make the Consistory, or Bench as some call it, which did unanimously moderate the affairs of the Syna­gogue, whose manner of sitting in the Synagogues, is thus described by Mr. Thorndike out of Maimonides, whose words Service of God at Rel. Ass c. 3. p, 56. are these: How sit the people in the Synagogue? The Elders sit with their faces towards the people, and their backs towards the He [...]all (the place where they lay the Copy of the Law) and all the people sit rank before rank, the face of every rank to­wards the back of the rank before it, so the faces of all the people are towards the Sanctuary, and towards the Elders, and towards the Ark; and when the Minister of the Synagogue standeth up to prayer, he standeth on the ground before the Ark with his face to the Sanctuary, as the rest of the people. Several things are observable to our purpose in this Testimony of Maimonides: First, That there were so many Elders in the Synagogue, as to make a Bench or Consistory, and therefore had a place by themselves, as the Governours of the Synagogue. And the truth is, after their dispersion we shall find little Government among them, but what was in their Synagogues, unlesse it was where they had liberty for erecting Schools of Learning. Besides this Colledge of Presbyters, we here see the publick Minister of the Synagogue, the [...] i. e. Episcopus con­gregationis, the Superintendent over the Congregation, whose peculiar office it was to pray for, and to blesse the people. We are here further to take notice of the form of their sitting in the Synagogues; The Presbyters sat together upon a Bench by themselves, with their faces towards the people, which was in an Hemicycle, the form wherein all the Courts of Judicature among them sat; which is fully described by Mr. Selden, and De Syned. l. 2. c. 6. s. 2. Thorndike Rel. Assem. cap. 3. Mr. Thorndike in the places above-cited. This was afterwards the form wherein the Bishops and Presbyters used to sit in the primitive Church, as the last named learned Author largely observes and proves. Besides this Colledge of Presbyters, there seems to be one particularly call'd the Ruler of the Syna­gogue, Mark 5. 35 Luke 8. 49 13. 14. [...], in the Scriptures [...], or [...], which in the importance of the New Testament Greek (following that of the Alexandrian Iews in the version of the Old Testament) implyes no more then a primacy of [Page 251] order in him above the rest he was joyned with. And thence sometimes we read of them in the Plural number, [...], Acts 13. 15. implying thereby an equality of power Mark 2. 25 in many; but by reason of the necessary primacy of one in order above the rest, the name may be appropriated to the President of the Colledge. Acts 18. 8, 17. we read of two, viz. Crispus and Sosthenes, and either of them is call'd [...], which could not be, did the name import any peculiar power of Jurisdiction lodged in one exclusive of the rest, unlesse we make them to be of two Synagogues, which we have no evidence at all for; I confesse, Beza his Annot. in Luc. 13. 14 argument from [...], Mark 5. 22. for a multitude of those so call'd in the same Synagogue, is of no great force, where we may probably suppose there were many Synagogues. But where there is no evidence of more then one in a place, and we find the name attri­buted to more then one, we have ground to think that there is nothing of power or Jurisdiction in that one, which is not common to more besides himself. But granting some peculiarity of honour belonging to one above the rest in a Synagogue, which in some places, I see no great reason to to deny, yet that implyes not any power over and above the Bench of which he was a Member, though the first in order; Much as the [...] the Prince of the Sanhedrin, whose place imported no power peculiar to himself, but only a Priority of dignity in himself above his fellow Senators: as the Princeps Senatûs in the Roman Republick answering to the [...] in the great Sanhedrin, who was next to the Nasi, as the Princeps Senatûs to the Consuls, which was only a Honorary Dignity and nothing else: Under which disguise that Politick Prince Augustus ravished the Roman Commonwealth of its former liberty. The name [...], may I suppose in propriety of speech be rendred in Latin Magister ordinis, he being by his Office Praesul, a name not originally importing any power, but only dignity; Those whom the Greeks call In Caligulâ. Lampr. vit. Alex. Se­ver. Vopis­cus in Sa­turn. [...], the Latins render Magistros sui ordinis, and so Suetonius interprets [...] by Magisterium sacerdotii. They who meet then with the name Archisynagogues, either in Lampridius, Vopiscus, Codex Theodosii, Iustinians Novels, in [Page 252] all whom it occurs, and in some places as distinct from Presby­ters, Cod de Iud▪ Colic. & Eam. l. 13. Cod. Iud▪ l. 17. c. de Iudaeis. will learn to understand thereby only the highest ho­nour in the Synagogue; considering how little, yea nothing of power the Jews enjoyed under either the Heathen, or Christian Emperours.

One thing more we add, touching this honour of the Ru­lers of the Synagogue among the Jews, that whatever ho­nour, title, power or dignity is imported by that name, it came not from any Law enforcing or commanding it, but from mutual con [...]oederation and agreement among the persons im­ployed in the Synagogue, whose natural reason did dictate, that where many have an equality of power, it is most con­venient (by way of accumulation upon that person, of a power more then he had, but not by deprivation of themselves of that inherent power which they enjoyed) to entrust the ma­nagement of the executive part of affairs of common concern­ment to one person specially chosen and deputed thereunto. So it was in all the Sanhedrins among the Jews, and in all well-ordered Senates and Councils in the World. And it would be very strange, that any Officers of a religious Society, should upon that account be out-Lawed of those natural Li­berties, which are the results and products of the free act­ings of Reason. Which things, as I have already observed, God hath looked on to be so natural to man, as when he was most strict and punctual in ceremonial Commands, he yet left these things wholly at liberty. For we read not of any com­mand, that in the Sanhedrin one should have some peculiarity of honour above the rest; this mens natural reason would prompt them to, by reason of a necessary priority of Order in some above others; which the very instinct of Nature hath taught irrational creatures, much more should the Light of Reason direct men to. But yet all order is not power, nor all power juridical, nor all juridical power a sole power; therefore it is a meer Paralogism in any from Order to inferr power, or from a delegated power by consent, to inferr a juridical power by Divine Right; or lastly, from a power in common with others, to deduce a power excluding others. All which they are guilty of, who meerly from the name of an Archisynagogue, would fetch a perpetual necessity of juris­diction [Page 253] in one above the Elders joyned with him, or from the [...] in the Sanhedrin, a power of a sole Ordina­tion in one without the consent of his fellow Senators. But of these afterwards. Thus much may suffice for a draught in little of the Government of the Jewish Syna­gogue.

Having thus far represented the Jewish Synagogue, that §. 8. the Idea of its government may be formed in our understand­ings, we now come to consider how far, and in what the Apostles in forming Christian▪ Churches did follow the pat­tern of the Jewish Synagogue. Which is a notion not yet so far improved as I conceive it may be, and I know no one more conducible to the happy end of composing our diffe­rences, touching the government of the Church then this is. I shall therefore for the full clearing of it, premise some gene­ral considerations to make way for the entertainment of this hypothesis in mens minds, at least as probable; and then endea­vour particularly to shew how the Apostles did observe the model of the Synagogue; in its publike service, in ordination of Church Officers, in forming Presbyteries in the several Chur­ches, in ruling and governing those Presbyteries▪ The general consideration I premise, to shew the probability of what I am asserting, shall be from these things: from the community of name and customs between the believing Iews and others, at the first forming of Churches: from the Apostles forming Churches out of Synagogues in their travelling abroad; from the agree­ablenesse of that model of Government to the State of the Chri­stian Churches at that time. I begin with the first, From the community of names and customs between the believing and un­believing Iews at the first forming Churches. All the while our blessed Saviour was living in the World, Christ and his Disciples went still under the name of Jews; they neither renounced the name, nor the customs in use among them. Our Saviour goes up to the Feasts at Ierusalem, conforms to all the Rites and Customs in use then; not only those com­manded by God himself, but those taken up by the Jews them­selves, if not contrary to Gods commands, as in observing the feast of Dedication, in going into their Synagogues, and teaching so often there, in washing the Feet of the Disciples, [Page 254] (a custome used by them before the Passeover) in using baptism, for the proselyting men to the profession of Chri­stianity, &c. In these and other things our Saviour con­formed to the received practice among them, though the things themselves were no wayes commanded by the Law of Moses. And after his Resurrection, when he took care for the forming of a Church upon the doctrine he had delivered, yet we find not the Apostles withdrawing from communion with the Jews, but on the contrary, we find the Disciples fre­quenting the Temple, Act. 2. 46. Act. 3. 1. Act. 5. 20, 21, 26. Whereby it appears how they owned themselves as Jews still, observing the same both time and place for publike Worship which were in use among the Jews. We find Paul presently after his conversion in the Synagogues, preaching Acts 9. 20. that Christ whom he had before persecuted; and where ever he goes abroad afterwards, we find him still entering into the Synagogues to preach; where we cannot conceive he should have so free and easie admission, unlesse the Jews did look upon him as one of their own Religion, and observing the same customs in the Synagogues with themselves, only Acts 13. 5, 14. 17. 10. 18. 4. 19. 8. differing in the point of the coming of the Messias, and the obligation of the ceremonial Law, the least footsteps of which were seen in the Synagogue-worship. But that which yet further clears this, is the general prejudice of the Disciples against the Gentiles, even after the giving of the Holy Ghost, as appears by their contending with Peter for going in to men Acts 11. 3. uncircumcised. It is evident, that then the Apostles themselves did not clearly apprehend the extent of their Commission; for else what made Peter so shy of going to Corn [...]lius? but by every creature, and all nations, they only apprehended the Jews in their dispersions abroad, or at least, that all others who were to be Act. 10. 28. saved, must be by being proselyted to the Jews, and observing the Law of Moses, together with the Gospel of Christ. And therefore we see the necessity of circumcision much pressed by the believing Jews which came down from Ierusalem, which raised so high a Dispute, that a Convention of the Apostles Acts 15. 1. together at Ierusalem was called for the ending of it; And even there we find great heats before the businesse could be decided, [...], After there had been much 15. 7. [Page 255] disputing. Nay after this Council, and the determination of the Apostles therein, all the ease and release that was grant­ed, was only to the Gentile-converts; but the Jews stick close to their old Principles still, and are as zealous of the customes of the Jews as ever before. For which we have a pregnant testimony in Act. 21. 20, 21, 22. Where the Elders of the Church of Ierusalem tell Paul there were many myriads [...] of believing Iews, who were [...], all very zealous for the Law still, and therefore had conceived a sinister opinion of Paul, as one that taught a defection from the Law of Moses, saying, they might not circumcise their Chil­dren, nor walk after the customs. One copy reads it as Beza tells us, [...], to follow the custome of their Fathers. We see how equally zealous they are for the customes obtaining among them, as for the Law its self. And is it then any wayes probable that these who continued such Zealots for the customs among them, should not observe those customs in use in the Synagogues for the Government of the Church? Might not they have been charged as well as Paul with relinquishing the customs, if they had thrown off the model of the Jewish Synagogue, and take up some customes different from that? And that which further confirms this, is, that this Church of Ierusalem continued still in its zeal for the Law, till after the destruction of the Temple; and all the Euseb. hist. l. 4. c. 6. & Chronic. Hist. sacr. l. 2. p 381. ed. Horn. several Pastors of that Church (whom Ecclesiastical Writers call Bishops) were of the circumcision. For both we have the testimony of Sulpitius Severus, speaking of the time of Adri­an. Et quia Christiani ex Iudaeis potissimum putabantur ( namque tum Hierosolymae, non nisi ex circumcisione habebat Ecclesia sacerdotem) militum cohortem custodias in perpetuum agitare jussit, quae Iudaeos omnes Hierosolymae aditu arceret. Quod quidem Christiana fidei proficiebat; quia tum pene om­nes Christum Deum, sub legis observatione, credebant. We see hereby that the Christians observed still the Law with the Gospel; and that the Jews and Christians were both reckoned as one body, which must imply an observation of the same Rites and Customes among them: For those are the things whereby Societies are distinguished most. Now it is evident, that the Romans made no distinction at first between [Page 256] the Jews and Christians. Thence we read in the time of Clau­dius, when the Edict came out against the Jews, Aquila and Acts 18. 2, Priscilla, though converted to Christianity, were forced to leave Italy upon that account, being still looked on as Jews; yet these are called by Paul, his helpers in Christ Iesus. For Rom. 16. 3. which Onuphrius gives this reason, Nullum adhuc inter Iudaeos & Christianos discrimen noscebatur, which account is likewise Annot. in vit. Petri. ap. Platin. in vit. Petri. given by Alphonsus Ciaconius; Congeneres & comprofessores ejusdem religionis gentilibus censebantur (Christiani pariter ac Iudaei). The Edict of Claudius we may read still in Suetonius, Iudaeos impulsore Christo assiduè tumultuantes Roma expulit. In Claud. cap. 25. We find here the Edict fully expressed for banishing the Jews, and the occasion set down; which most interpret of the Do­ctrine of Christ, as the occasion of the stirs between the Jews and Christians. For the Romans called Christ Chrestus, Lactant. l. 4. c. 7. Tertul. Apolog. cap. 3. V. Pet. Pithaeum Hor. subse­civ. l. 2. c. 3. Donatus Dilucid. in Sueton. in Claud. c. 25. and Christians, Chrestiani, as the authors of the Christians Apologies against the Heathens often tell us. But Marcellus Donatus conjectures this Christus to have been some seditious Jew called by that name; for which he brings many Inscrip­tions wherein the name occurrs, but none wherein it is given to a Jew; which should be first produced, before we leave the received interpretation of it. However that be, we see the Jews and Christians equally undergo the punishment without any difference observed in them; and therefore when Paul was brought before Gallio the Proconsul of Achaia, he looked upon the difference between the Jews and Paul to be only a Question of words and names, and of their Law, and there­upon Act. 18. 15. Apud. Orig. lib. 3. cont. Cels. refused to meddle with it. And so Celsus upbraids both Jews and Christians, as though their contentions were about a matter of nothing. By all this we may now consider, how little the Christians did vary from the customs and practice of the Jews, when they were thought by those who were equally enemies to both, to be of the same body and community. Which consideration will make the thing I aim at, seem more probable, when withall we observe that the Jewish customs in their Synagogues, were those whereby they were most known among the Romans; and therefore when they looked on the Christians as of the same Religion with the Jews, it is evident they observed no difference as to their publick pra­ctises [Page 257] in their religious Societies. Which is the first conside­ration, to shew how probable it is that Christians observed the same form in Government with what they found in the Synagogues.

To which I add a second Consideration; which is the §. 9. Apostles forming Christian Churches out of Jewish Syna­gogues. We have already shewed how much their resort was to them in their preaching from the constant practice of Paul, although he was in a more peculiar manner the Apostle of the uncircumcision; much more then is it probable that the others, especially Peter, Iames, and Iohn did resort to the Cir­cumcision. And in the setling things at first, we see how fearful the Apostles were of giving offence to the Jews, how ready to condescend to them in any thing they lawfully might. And can we think that Paul would yield so far to the Jews as to circumcise Timothy, rather then give offence to the Jews in Acts 16 3. those parts where he was, (and that in a thing which seemed most immediately to thwart the design of the Gospel, as cir­cumcision Gal. 5. 2. did, witness the Apostle himself;) that yet he would scruple the retaining the old model of the Synagogue, when there was nothing in it at all repugnant to the Doctrine of the Gospel, or the nature and constitution of Christian Churches? When the Apostles then, did not only gather Churches out of Synagogues, but at some places in probability whole Synagogues were converted as well as whole Churches formed, What shew of reason can be given why the Apostles should flight the con­stitution of the Jewish Synagogues, which had no dependance on the Jewish Hierarchy, and subsisted not by any command of the ceremonial Law? The work of the Synagogue not belong­ing to the Priest as such, but as persons qualified for instruct­ing others, and the first model of the Synagogue government is with a great deal of probability derived from the Schools of the Prophets and the Government thereof. This consideration would be further improved, if the notion of distinct coetus of the Jewish and Gentile Christians in the same places could be made out by any irrefragable Testimony of Antiquity, or clear evidence of reason drawn from Scripture: Because the same reason which would ground the distinction of the Jewish Church from the Gentile, would likewise hold for the Jewish [Page 258] Church to retain her old form of Government in the Syna­gogue way. For it must be some kind of peculiarity supposed by the Jews in themselves as distinct from the Gentiles, which did make them form a distinct Congregation from them; which peculiarity did imply the observing those customes among them still, by which that peculiarity was known to others; among which those of the Synagogue were not the least known or taken notice of. But I must freely confesse, I find not any thing brought by that learned Person, who hath managed this Hypothesis with the greatest dexterity, to have Dr. Ham. of Schism ch. 4. sect. 6, 7, &c. that evidence in it which will command assent from an unpre­judicated mind. And it is pitty that such infirm Hypotheses should be made use of for the justifying our separation from Rome, which was built upon reasons of greater strength and evidence, then those which have been of late pleaded by some assertors of the Protestant Cause, though men of excellent abilities and learning. For there are many reasons convictive enough, that Peter had no universal power over the Church, supposing that there was no such thing as a di­stinction between the Jewish and Gentile Coetus. I deny not but at first, before the Jews were fully satisfied of the Gentiles right to Gospel priviledges, they were very shy of commu­nicating with them, especially the believing Jews of the Church of Ierusalem,: Upon the occasion of some of whom coming down to Antioch from Iames, it was, that Peter with­drew and separated himself from the Gentiles, with whom be­fore Gal. 2. 12. he familiarly conversed. Which action of his is so far from being an argument of the setling any distinct Church Schism sect. 8. of the Jews from the Gentiles there, that it yields many rea­sons against it. For first, Peters withdrawing was only occa­sional, and not out of design; whereas, had it been part of his commission to do it, we cannot conceive Peter so mindlesse of his Office, as to let it alone till some Jews came down from Ierusalem to tell him of it. Secondly, It was not for the sake of the Jews at Antioch that he withdrew, but for the Jews which came down from Ierusalem; whereas, had he intended a distinct Church of the Jews, he would before have setled and fixed them as members of another body; but now it evidently appears, that not only Peter him­self, [Page 259] but the Jews with him, did before those Jews coming to Antioch associate with the Gentiles, which is evident by v. 13. And other Iews dissembled likewise with him, in so much that Barnabas also was carryed away with their dissimulation. Whereby it is clear, that these Jews did before joyn with the Gentile-Christians, or else they could not be said to be led away with the dissimulation of Peter. Thirdly, St. Paul is so far from looking upon this withdrawing of Peter, and the Iews from the Gentiles society to be a part of St. Peters Office, that he openly and sharply reproves him for it. What then, was Paul so ignorant, that there must be two distinct Churches of Iews and Gentiles there, that he calls this action of his dissimulation? In all reason then, supposing this Notion to be true, the blame lights on Paul, and not on Peter: as not understanding, that the Jews were to be formed into distinct bodies from the Gentile-Christians. And therefore it is ob­servable that the same Author who is produced, as asserting, Answ. to S [...]his. Dis. ch 2. s. 5. Hieronym. in Gal. 1. 22. that seorsim quae ex Iudais erant Ecclesiae habebantur, nec his quae [...]rant ex Gentibus miscebantur, is he, who makes this reproo [...] of Peter by Paul, to be a meer matter of dissimulation between them both; which sense of that action whoever will be so fa­vourable to it as to embrace it, (as some seem inclinable to do it) will never be able to answer the arguments brought by St. Au­gustine Reply to Cath. Gent. ch 4. s. 6. n. 6. Aug. ep. 8. 9, 19. Hier. against it. This place then was unhappily light upon to ground a distinction of the several Coeius, or distinct Chur­ches of Jews and Christians at Antioch. But, it may be, more evidence for it may be seen in the Rescript of the Council of Ierusalem, which is directed [...], To the Brethren of Antioch, those of the Gentiles. Act. 15. 23. Schism. p. 75. But. lest some hidden mysteries should lye in this curtailing the words, let us see them at large. Unto the Brethren which are of the Gentiles in Antioch, and Syria, and Cilicia. There was nothing then peculiar to those of the Gentiles at Anti­och more then in Syria and Cilicia; and if those words [...] imply a Coetus distinct of Gentile-Christians, from the Jews at Antioch, it must do so through all Syria, and Cilicia, Act. 15. 41. 18. 18. 21. 3. which was Pauls Province, and not Peters, as appears by his travels in the Acts. E [...]the [...] then the Apostle of the uncircum­cision must form distinct: Churches of Iews and Gentiles in [Page 260] his preaching through Syria and Silicia▪ (which is irrecon­cilable with the former pretence of distinct Provinces, assert­ed by the same Author, who pleads for distinct Coetus) or the [...], can imply no such thing as a distinct Church of Gentiles to whomsover it is spoken; and so not at Antioch more then through all Syria and Silicia. The plain ground then of the Apostles inscribing the order of the Council to the Brethren of the Gentiles, was, because the matter of that Order did particularly concern them, and not the Jews, as is obvious to any that will but cast an eye upon the 23, 24, 29. verses of the 15. of the Acts. As well might then an order supposed from the Apostles to the several Pa­stors of the Churches in things concerning them as such, imply that they make distinct Churches from their people, as this order concerning the Gentile Brethren, being therefore di­rected to them, doth imply their making distinct Churches from the Jewish Brethren in the Cities where they lived to­gether. What is further produced out of Antiquity to this purpose, hath neither evidence nor pertinency enough, to stop the passage of one who is returning from this digression to his former matter. Although then we grant not any such distinct Coetus of the Jews from the Christians, yet that hinders not, but that both Jews and Christians joyning together in one Church, might retain still the Synagogue form of Go­vernment among them; which there was no reason at all, why the Christians should scruple the using of, either as Jews or Gentiles, because it imported nothing either Typical and Ceremonial, or heavy and burdensome, which were the grounds, why former customs in use among the Jews were laid aside by the Christians. But instead of that, it was most suitable and agreeable to the state of the Churches in Aposto­lical times, which was the third consideration to make it pro­bable, that the Synagogue form of Government was used by the Christians. And the suitablenesse of this Government to the Churches, lay in the conveniency of it for the attaining all ends of Government in that condition wherein the Churches were at that time. For Church Officers acting then either in gathering or governing Churches▪ without any authority from Magistrates, such a way of Government was [Page 261] most suitable to their several Churches, as whereby the Churches might be governed, and yet have no dependancy upon the secular power, which the way of Government in the Synagogues was most convenient for; for the Jews, though they enjoyed a bare permission from the civil state where they lived, yet by the exercise of their Synagogue Government▪ they were able to order all affairs belonging to the service of God, and to keep all members belonging to their several Synagogues in unity and peace among themselves. The case was the same as to Synagogues and Churches; these subsisted by the same permission which the others enjoyed; the end of these was the service of God, and preserving that order a­mong them which might best become societies so constituted; there can be no reason then assigned, why the Apostles in set­ling particular Churches should not follow the Synagogue in its model of Government. These things may suffice to make it appear probable that they did so, which is all these considera­tions tend to.

Having thus prepared the way by making it probable, I §. 10. now further enquire into the particular part of Government, and what orders in the Synagogue were, which there is any evidence for, that the Apostles did take up and follow. Here I begin with the thing first propounded, The orders of publick Worship, which did much resemble those of the Synagogue; Only with those alterations which did arise from the ad­vancing of Christianity. That the Christians had their pub­lick and set▪meetings for the service of God, is evident from the first rising of a society constituted upon the account of Christianity. We read of the three thousand converted by Peters Sermon, That they continued in the Apostles doctrine and Acts 2. 42. fellowship, and breaking of bread, and prayers. Where we have all that was observed in the Synagogue, and somewhat more; here there is publick joyning together, implyed in the word [...], their solemn prayers expressed, which were constant­ly observed in the Synagogue; instead of reading the Sections of the Law and Prophets, we have the Apostles teaching by immediate inspiration; and to all these as the proper service of Christianity, is set down the celebration of the Lords-sup­per, which we shall seldome or ever in the Primitive Church, [Page 262] read the publick service on Lords Dayes performed without. During the Apostolical times, in which there was such a Land­flood of extraordinary gifts overflowing the Church, in the publick meeting we find those persons who were indued with those gifts, to be much in exercising them (as to the custom, agreeing with the Synagogue; but, as to the gifts, ex­ceeding it) concerning the ordering of which for the publick edification of the Church, the Apostle Paul layes down so many Rules in the fourteenth Chapter to the Corinthians; but assoon as this flood began to abate, which was then ne­cessary for the quicker softening the World for receiving Christianity, the publick service began to run in its former channel, as is apparent from the unquestionable testimonies of Iustin Martyr and Tertullian, who most fully relate to us, the order of publick Worship used among the Christians at that time. Iustin Martyr, the most ancient next to Cle­mens (whose Epistle is lately recovered to the Christian World) of the unquestionable Writers of the Primitive Church, gives us a clear Narration of the publick Orders observed by the Church in his time: [...] Iust. Mart. Apol. 2 p. 98. ed. Par.. Upon the Day call'd Sunday, all the Christians whether in Town or Country assemble in the same place, wherein the Memoires or Commentaries of the Apo­stles and the writings of the Prophets are read as long as the time will permit; Then the Reader sitting down, the President of the Assembly stands up and makes a Sermon of Instruction and Ex­hortation to the following so good Examples. After this is ended, we all stand up to prayers; prayers ended, the Bread, Wine and Water are all brought forth; then the President again praying and praising to his utmost ability, the people testifie their consent by saying Amen.

What could have been spoken with greater congruity or [Page 263] correspondency to the Synagogue, abating the necessary ob­servation of the Bucharist as proper to Christianity?

Here we have the Scriptures read by one appointed for that purpose, as it was in the Synagogue; after which follows the word of Exhortation in use among them by the President of the Assembly, answering to the Ruler of the Synagogue; after this, the publick prayers performed by the same President, as among the Jews by the publick Minister of the Synagogue (as is already observed out of Maimoni), then the solemn acclamation of Amen by the people, the undoubted practice of the Synagogue. To the same purpose Tertullian, who, if he had been to set forth the practice of the Synagogue, could scarce have made choyce of words more accommodated to that purpose. Coimus (saith he) in coetum & congregationem, ut ad Deum quasi manu factà precationibus ambiamus or antes—Cogimur ad divinarum literarum Commemorationem, si quid praesentium temporum qualitas aut praemonere cogit aut recog­noscere. Certè fidem sanctis vocibus pascimus, spem erigimus, fi [...]uciam figimus, disciplinam praeceptorum nihilominus incul­cationibus densamus; ibidem etiam exhortationes, castigationes, & censura divina. Nam & judicatur magno cum pondere, ut Apologe [...]. cap. 3 [...]. apud certos de Dei conspectu, summumque futuri judicii prae judicium est, siquis ita deliquerit, ut à communicatione orati­onis & conventûs & omnis sancti commercii relegetur. Pra­sident probati quique seniores, honorem istum non pretio sed testi­monio adepti. Where we have the same orders for Prayers, reading the Scriptures according to occasions, and Sermons made out of them for increase of faith, raising hope, strengthening con­fidence. We have the Discipline of the Church answering the admonitions, and excommunication of the Synagogue; and last of all, we have the Bench of Elders sitting in these Assem­blies, and ordering the things belonging to them.

Thus much for the general correspondency between the publick service of the Church and Synagogue; they that would see more particulars, may read our Learned Mr. Thorndikes Discourse of the service of God in Religious Assemblies. Whose design throughout is to make this out more at large; But we must only touch at these things by the way; as it were, look into the Synagogue, and go on our way.

[Page 264]We therefore proceed from their service, to their custom of §. 11. Ordination, which was evidently taken up by the Christians from a correspondency to the Synagogue. For which we are first to take notice, that the Rulers of the Church under the Gospel, do not properly succeed the Priests and Levites under the Law, who [...]e Office was Ceremonial, and who were not admitted by any solemn Ordination into their Function, but succeeded by birth into their places; only the great Sanhedrin did judge of their fitnesse, as to birth and body, before their entrance upon their Function. So the Jewish Doctors tell us [...] Cod. Mid­doth. c. 5. s. 3. i. e. In the stone Par­lour, the great Sanhedrin of Israel sat, and did there judge the Priests. The Priest that was found defective, put on mourning garments, and so went forth▪ he that was not, put on white, and went in and ministred with the Priests his Brethren. And when no fault was found in the sons of Aaron, they observed a festi­val solemnity for it. Three things are observable in this Testimony: First, That the inquiry that was made concern­ing V. Selden. de succes. ad Pontif. Ebre. l. 2. c. 2, 3, 5, & 6. the Priests, was chiefly concerning the purity of their birth, and the freedom of their bodies from those defects which the Law mentions, unlesse in the case of grosser and more scandalous sins, as Idolatry, Murther, &c. by which they were excluded from the Priestly Office. The second, is, That the great Sanhedrin had this inspection over, and ex­amination of the Priests before their admission; For what that Learned man Const. L'Empereur there conjectures, That there was an Ecclesiastical Sanhedrin which did passe judge­ment Not in Cod. Middoth. p. 187, 188. on these things, is overthrown by the very words of the Talmudists already cited. The last thing observable, is, The garments which the Priests put on, viz. white rayment upon his approbation by the Sanhedrin, and soon after they were admitted into the Temple with great joy; to which our saviour manifestly alludes, Revel. 3. 4. 5. Thou hast a few names even in Sardis which have not defiled their garments, and they shall walk with me in white, for they are worthy. He that overcometh, the same shall be cloathed in white Rayment. But the Priests under the Law, were never ordained by im­position of hands, as the Elders and Rulers of the Synagogue [Page 265] were; and if any of them came to that Office, they as well as others had peculiar designation and appointment to it. It is then a common mistake to think that the Ministers of the Go­spel succeed by way of correspondence and Analogy to the Priests under the Law; which mistake hath been the founda­tion and original of many Errors. For when in the Primi­tive Church, the name of Priests came to be attributed to Gospel-Ministers from a fair Complyance (as was thought then) of the Christians onely to the name used both among Jewes and Gentiles; in process of time, corruptions increa­sing in the Church, those names that were used by the Chri­stians by way of Analogy and Accommodation, brought in the things themselves primarily intended by those names; so by the Metaphorical names of Priests and Altars, at last came up the sacrifice of the Mass; without which, they thought the names of Priests and Altar were insignificant. This mistake we see run all along through the Writers of the Church, assoon as the name Priests was applyed to the Elders of the Church, that they derived their succession from the Priests of Aarons Isid Hisp. de Ecclesia offic. l. 2. c. 7 Ive Carnot. decret. p. 6. c. 11. Ep. 85. order, Presbyterorum ordo exordium sumpsit à filiis Aaron. Qui enim sacerdotes vocabantur in v [...]teri Testamento, hi sunt qui nunc appestantur Presbyteri: & qui nuncupabantur prin­cipes sacerdotum, nuno Episcopi nominantur; as Isidorus; and Ivo tell us. So before them both, Ierome in his known Epistle to Evagrius. Et ut sciamus traditiones Apostolicas sumptas de veteri Testamento, Quod Aaron & filii ejus atque Levitae Dissert. 2. cap. 28. in Temple fuerunt: hoc sibi Episcopi & Presbyteri atque Diaconi vendicent in Ecclesia. From which words a leo [...]ned Doctor, and strenuous assertor of the jus divinum of Pre­lacy, questions not but to make Ierome, either apparently contradictious to himself, or else to assert, that the superiority of Bishops above Presbyters was by his Confession an Apo­stolical Tradition. For saith he, Nihil manifestius dici potuit; and S. 2. Quid ad hoc responderi possit, aut quo [...] artificio deliniri aut deludi tam diserta affirmatio, fateor ego [...]e divinando assequi non posse; sed è contra exiis quae D. Blondellus, quae Walo, quae Ludov. Capellus h [...]c in re praestiterunt, mihi persuasissimum esse, Nihil uspiam contra aperta [...] lucem ob­tendi posse. In a case then so desperate as poor Ierome lies in, by [Page 266] a wound he is supposed to have given himself, when the priest and the Levite hath passed him by, it will be a piece of Charity in our passing by the way a little to consider his Case, to see whether there be any hopes of recovery. We take it then for granted, that Ierome hath already said, that Aposto­lus perspi [...]uè docet, eosdem esse Presbytsros quos & Episcopos, in the same Epistle which he proves there at large; and in another place; Si [...]t ergo Presbyteri sciunt se ex Ecclesiae consuetudi­ne, ei qui sibi praeposi [...]us fuerit, esse subjectos; it a Episcopi noverint se magis consuetudine, quam disposition is Dominicae Comment. in 1. Tit. veritate Presbyteris esse majores, & in commune debere Ecclesiam regere. The difficulty now lyes in the reconciling this with what is before c [...]ted out of the same Author; Some solve it by saying, that, in Ieroms sense Apostolical Tradition and Eccle­siaestical Custome are the same, as ad Marcellum, he saith the observation of Lent is Apostolica traditio, and advers. Luciferian, shith, it is Ecclesiae consu [...]tudo; so that by Apo­stolical Tradition, he meant not an Apostolical Institution, but an Ecclesiastical Custome. And if Ierome speak accord­ing to the general Vogue, this Solution may be sufficient notwithstanding what is said against it: for, according to that common rule of Austin, Things that were generally in use, and no certain Author assigned of them, were attributed to the Apostles. Two things therefore I shall lay down for reconciling Ierome to himself: The first is, the difference between Traditio Apostolica, and Traditio Apostolorum; this latter doth indeed imply the thing spoken of to have pro­ceeded from the Apostles themselves; but the former may be applyed to what was in practice after the Apostles times; and the reason of it is▪ that what ever was done in the Primitive Church, supposed to be agreeable to Apostolical practice, was called Apostolical. Thence the Bishops See was called Sedes De prae­scrip. adv. h [...]ret. c. 32. Epist. lib. 6. Ep. 1. Apostolic [...], as Tertullian tells us, ob consang [...]i [...]itatem doctrinae. So Sidonius Apollinaris calls the See of L [...]p [...]s the Bishop of Tricassium in France, Sedem Apostolicam. And the Bishops of the Church were called Viri Apostolici, and thence the Constitutions which goe under the Apostles names, were so called, saith▪ Albaspinaeus, ab antiquitate: [...]nam cum corum Observat. lib. 1 c. 13. aliquot ab Apostolorum successoribus (qui teste Tertullian [...] ▪ Apo­stolici [Page 267] viri [...]omi [...]ahantur.) facti essent, Apostolicorum primù [...] Canones, deinde nonnullorum Latinorum ignorantia, aliquot literarum detractione, Apostolorum dicti sunt. By which we see what ever was conceived to be of any great antiquity in the Church, though it was not thought to have come from the Apostles themselves, yet it was called Apostolioal▪ so that in this sense, Traditio Apostolica, is no more then Traditio au­tiqua, or ab Apostolicis viris profecta, which was meant rather of those that were conceived to succeed the Apostles, then of the Apostles themselves. But I answer, Secondly, that granting Traditio Apostolica to mean Traditio Apostolorum, yet Ierome is far from contradicting himself, which is obvious to any that will read the words before, and consider their coherence. The scope and drift of his Epistle, is to cha­stise the arrogance of one who made Deacons superiour to Presbyters. Audio quendam in tantam erupisse vecordiam ut Diaconos Presbyteris, id est, Episcopis anteferret, and so spends a great part of the Epistle, to prove that a Bishop and Presbyter are the same; and at last brings in these words; giving the account, Why Paul to Timothy and Titus mentions no Presbyters; Quia in Episcopo & Presbyter continetur. Aut igitur ex Presbytero ordinetur Diaconus, ut Presbyter minor Diacono comprobetur, in quem crescat ex parv [...]; aut si ex Diacono ordinatur Presbyter, noverit se lucris minorem, Sacerdo [...]i [...] esse majorem. And then presently adds, Et ut sciamus traditiones Apostolicas sumptas de veteri Testamento, Quod Aaron & Filii ejus atq▪ Levitae in Templo fuerunt, hoc sibi Episcopi & Presbyteri at­que Diaconi vendicent in Ecclesiâ. It it imaginable that a man who had been proving all along the superiority of a Presbyter above a Deacon, because of his Identity with a Bishop in the Aposties times, should at the same time say, that a Bishop was above a Presbyter by the Apostles institu­tion, and so directly overthrow all he had been saying before? Much as if one should go about to prove that the Pr [...]fectus urbis, and the Curatores urbis in Alexander Severus his time [...] ▪ were the same Office, and to that end should make use of the Constitution of that Emperour whereby he appointed 14. [Page 268] Curatores urbis, and set the Praefectus in an Office above them. Such an incongruity is scarce incident to a man of very ordi­nary esteem for intellectuals, much less to such a one as Ierome is reputed to be. The plain meaning then of Ierome is no more but this, that as Aaron and his sons in the order of Priesthood were above the Levites under the Law: So the Bishops and Presbyters in the order of the Evangelical Priest­hood are above the Deacons under the Gospel. For the compa­rison runs not between Aaron and his sons under the Law, and Bishops and Presbyters under the Gospel; but between Aaron and his sonnes as one part of the comparison under the Law, and the Levites under them as the other; so under the Gospel, Bishops and Presbyters make one part of the comparison, answering to Aaron and his Sonnes in that wherein they all agree; viz. The Or­der of Priest hood; and the other part under the Gospel is that of Deacons answering to the Levites under the Law. The Opposition is not then in the power of jurisdiction be­tween Bishops and Priests, but between the same power of Order, which is alike both in Bishops and Presbyters (accor­ding to the acknowledgement of all) to the Office of Deacons which stood in Competition with them. Thus I hope we have left Ierome at perfect Harmony with himself, not­withstanding the attempt made to make him so palpably con­tradict himself; which having thus done, we are at liberty to proceed in our former course; onely hereby we see how unhappily those arguments succeed which are brought from the Analogy between the Aaronical Priest hood, to endeavour the setting up of a Ius Divinum of a parallel superiority under the Gospel. All which arguments are taken off by this one thing we are now upon, viz. that the orders and degrees under the Gospel, were not taken up from Analogy to the Temple, but to the Synagogue: Which we now make out as to Ordination, in three things; the manner of conferring it, the persons authorized to do it, the remaining effect of it upon the person receiving it.

First▪ For the manner of conferring it; that under the §. 12. Synagogue was done by laying on of hands: Which was taken up among the Jewes as a significative rite in the ordain­ing the Elders among them, and thereby qualifying them ei­ther [Page 269] to be members of their Sanhedrins, or Teachers of the Law. A [...] twofold use I find of this Symbolical Rite, beside the solemn designation of the person on whom the hands are laid. The first is to denote the delivery of the person or thing thus laid hands upon, for the right, use, and peculiar service of God, And that I suppose was the reason of lay­ing Levit. 16. 21. hands upon the Beast under the Law, which was to be sa­crificed, thereby noting their own parting with any right in it, and giving it up to be the Lords for a sacrifice to him. Thus in the Civill Law this delivery is requisite in the trans­ferring Dominion, which they call translatio de manu in ma­num. The second end of laying on of hands was the solemn Iuvocation of the Divine presence and assistance to be upon, and with the person upon whom the hands are thus laid. For the hands with us being the instruments of action, they did by stretching out their hands upon the person, represent the efficacy of Divine Power which they implored in behalf of the Ep ad Gal­los▪ ep. 154. &. 166. Ioh. Cord. & V. in Mat. 9. 19: per [...]on thus designed. Tunc enim [...]rabant ut sic Dei efficacia esset super illum, sicut manus efficaciae symbolum, ei imponebatur as Grotius observes. Thence in all solemn Prayers, wherein any person was particularly designed, they made use of this Custome of imposition of Hands: from which Custome, Augustine speaks, Quid aliud est manuum impositio nisi oratio Gen. 48. 14▪ super hominem? Thence when Iacob prayed over Iosephs Children, he laid his hands upon them; so when Moses Numb. 27. 23. prayed over Ioshua. The practice likewise our Saviour used in blessing Children, healing the Sick, and the Apostles in conferring the Gifts of the Holy-Ghost; and from thence it was conveyed into the practice of the Primitive Church▪ who used it in any more solemn invocation of the name of God in behalf of any particular persons, As over the sick upon Repentance and Reconciliation to the Church, in Confirmation, and in Matrimony; which (as Grotius observes) is to this day used in the Abissine Churches. But the most solemn and peculiar use of this Imposition of hands among the Jews was in the designing of any Persons for any publike imployment among them: Not as though the bare Imposition of hands, did conferre any power upon the Person, (no more then the bare delivery of a thing in Law gives a legall Title to it, [Page 270] without express transferring Dominion with it) but with that Ceremony they joyned those words whereby they did confer that Authority upon them: Which were to this purpose [...] Ecce sis tu Ordinatus, or [...] ego ordino te, or [...] sis ordinatus, to which they added according to the authority they ordained them to, some thing peculiarly expressing it, whether it was for causes fina­ble, or pecuniary, or binding and loosing, or ruling in the Synagogue. Which is a thing deserving consideration by those who use the rite of imposing hands in Ordination, without any thing expressing that authority they convey by that Ordina­tion. This custome being so generally in use among the Jews in the time when the Apostles were sent forth with Authority for gathering and setling Churches, we find them accordingly making use of this, according to the former practice, either in any more solemn invocation of the presence of God upon any persons, or designation and appointing them for any pe­culiar service or function: For we have no ground to think that the Apostles had any peculiar command for laying on their hands upon persons in Prayer over them, or Ordination of them: But the thing its self being enjoyned them, viz. the setting apart some persons for the peculiar work of attendance upon the necessities of the Churches by them planted, they took up and made use of a laudable Rite and Custome then in use upon such occasions. And so we find the Apostles using it in the solemn designation of some persons to the Office of Deacons, answering to the [...] in the Synagogue, whose Acts 6. 6. Office was to collect the moneys for the poor, and to distribute it among them. Afterwards we read it used upon an occasion not heard of in the Synagogue, which was for the conferring the gifts of the Holy-Ghost; but although the occasion was Acts [...]: 17. extraordinary, yet supposing the occasion, the use of that rite in it, was very suitable, in as much as those gifts did so much answer to the [...] and the [...] which the Jewes conceived did rest upon those who were so ordained by imposi­tion of hands. The next time we meet with this rite, was upon a peculiar Designation to a particular service of persons al­ready Acts 13. 3. appointed by God for the work of the Ministry, which is of Paul and Barnabas by the Prophets and Teachers at [Page 271] Antioch▪ whereby God doth set forth the use of that Rite of Ordination to the Christian Churches▪ Accordingly we find it after practised in the Church▪ Timothy being ordained by the laying on of the hands of the Presbytery. And Timothy hath direction given him for the right management of it afterwards, [...] 14. Lay hands suddenly on no man. For they that would interpret that of reconciling men to the Church by that Rite, must [...] 5▪ [...] ▪ first give us Evidence of so early an use of that Custome, which doth not yet appear. But there is one place commonly brought to prove that the Apostles in Ordaining Elders in the Christian Churches, did not observe the Jewish Form of laying on of hands, but observed a way quite different from the Jewish practice, viz. appointing them by the choice consent and suffrages of the people. Which place is Acts 14▪ 23. where it is said of Paul and Barnabas [...]: We render it Ordaining them Elders in every Church. But others from the signi­fication of the word [...] would have it rendered▪ When they had appointed Elders by the suffrages of the peo­ple. But how little the peoples power of Ordination can be inferred from these words, will be evident to any one that shall but consider these things. First, that though [...] did originally signifie the choosing by way of suffrage among the Greeks, yet before the time of Lukes writing this, the word was used for simple designation without that Ceremo­ny. So Hesychius interprets it by [...], the word used Titus 1. 5. V. Demost. Phil. 1. & advers. Si­mon. & Ulpian in Schol. of Titus for ordaining Elders in every City; and in De­mosthenes and others it occurs for [...], and [...], to decree and appoint; and that sense of the word appears in Saint Luke himself, Acts 10. 41. [...], Witnesses foreappointed of God. Many examples of this signification are brought by Learned men of Writers, before, and about the time when Luke Writ, from Philo Iudaeus, Iosephus, Appian, Lucian and others. But Secondly▪ V. Selden. de Syned. l. 1. cap. 14▪ Grot. de Imp. Sum. Potest. c. 10. s. 5. granting it used in the primary signification of the word, yet it cannot be applied to the people, but to Paul and Bar­nabas; for it is not said that the people did [...], but that Paul and Barnabas did [...]: now where ever that word is used in its first signification, it is implyed to be the [Page 272] action of the persons themselves giving suffrages, and not for other persons appointing by the suffrages of others. Third­ly, [...] may import no more then [...], in that laying on of the hands must suppose the stretching them out: Which is onely a common figure in Scripture for the Antece­dent to be put for the Consequent, or one part for the whole action; and concerning this sense of the word in Ecclesiasti­cal Writers, see the large quotations in Bishop Bilson to this purpose. Fourthly, It seems strangely improbable that Perpet. Govern. of Christs Church. c. 7. the Apostles should put the choice at that time into the hands of the people, when there were none fitted for the work the Apostles designed them for; but whom the Apo­stles did lay their hands on, by which the Holy Ghost sell up­on them, whereby they were fitted and qualified for that work. The people then could no wayes choose men for their abilities when their abilities were consequen [...] to their ordina­tion. So much to clear the manner of Ordination to have been from the Synagogue.

The second thing we consider, is, The persons authorized to do it: whom we consider under a double respect, before their liberties were bound up by compact among themselves; and after. First, Before they had restrained themselves of their own Tract. San. cap. 4. s. 5. Ad tit. San­hed c. 1. De Syned. l. 2. c. 7. s. [...]. liberty, then the general rule for Ordinations among them was [...] every one regularly ordained, himself had the power of Ordaining his Disciples, as Maimo­nides affirms. To the same purpose is that Testimony of the Gemara Babylonia in Master Selden [...] Rabbi Abba Bar Ionah said, that in times of old, every one was wont to ordain his own Disciples: to which purpose many instances are there brought. But it is generally agreed among them, that in the time of Hillel this course was altered, and they were restrain­ed from their former liberty; in probability finding the many inconveniences of so common Ordinations; or, as they say, out of their great reverence to the house of Hillel, they then agreed that none should ordain others without the pre­sence of the [...] the Prince of the Sanhedrin, or a license obtained from him for that end; and it was determined that all Ordinations without the consent of the Prince of the San­hedrin [Page 273] should be looked upon as null and void; which is at­tested by the former Authors. The same distinct on may be observed under the Gospel in reference to the fixed Officers of the Church; for we may consider them in their first state and period, as the Presbyters did rule the Churches in common, as Hierom tells us, communi Presbyterorum conci [...]io Ecclesi [...] Hierony n. in 1. Tit. gubernabantur: before the jurisdiction of Presbyters was restrained by mutual consent, in this instant doubtlesse, the Presbyters enjoyed the same liberty that the Presbyters among the Jews did, of ordaining other Presbyters by that power they were invested in at their own ordination. To which purpose we shall only at present take notice of the Confession of two Canonists, who are the h [...]ghest among the Papists, for defence of a distinct order of Episcopacy. Yet Gratian himself confesseth, Sacros ordines dicimus Diaconatum Dist. 60. c. Mull. ex urb. Pay. & Presbyteratum; hos quidem solos Ecclesia primitiva habuisse dicitur. And Iohannes Semeca in his Gloss upon the Canon Law; Dicunt quidem quod in Ecclesia prima-primitiva com­mune erat officium Episcoporum & Sacerdotum, & nomina erant communia.—Sed in secundâ primitivâ coeperunt Dist. 95. Gloss. distingui & nomina & officia. Here we have a distinction of the Primitive Church very agreeable both to the opinion of Hierom, and the matter we are now upon; in the first Primi­tive Church, the Presbyters all acted in common for the wel­fare of the Church, and either did or might ordain others to the same authority with themselves; because the intrinse­cal power of order is equally in them, and in those who were after appointed Governours over Presbyteries. And the collation of orders doth come from the power of order, and not mee [...]ly from the power of jurisdiction. It being V. Francis Masons de­fence of Or­dination of Presbyters. likewise fully acknowledged by the Schoolmen, that Bishops are not superiour above Presbyters, as to the power of order. But the clearest evidence of this, is in the Church of Alexan­dria, of which Hierom speaks; Nam & Alexandria à Marco Evangelistâ us (que) ad Heraclam & Dionysium Episcopos, Pres­byteri semper unum ex se electum, in excelsiori gradu coll [...]ca­tum, Episcopum nominabant; quomodo si exercitus Imperato­rem Ep. 85. ad Evagrium. faciat, aut Diaconi eligant de se quem industrium noverint, & Archidiaconum vocent. That learned Doctor who would [Page 274] perswade us that the Presbyters did only make choice of the person, but the ordination was performed by other Bishops, would do well first to tell us, who and where those Bishops in Aegypt were, who did consecrate or ordain the Bishop of V. Selden. ad E [...]tych. n. 22. p. 143. Alexandria after his election by the Presbyters; especially, while Aegypt remained but one Province, under the Govern­ment of the Praefectus Augustalis. Secondly, how had this been in the least pertinent to Hieroms purpose to have made a particular instance in the Church of Alexandria, for that which was common to all other Churches besides? For the Dist. 6 [...]. sect. h [...]r. old Rule of the Canon-Law for Bishops was, Electio clerico­rum est, consensus principis, petitio plebis. Thirdly, this el­ection in Hierom must imply the conferring the power and authority whereby the Bishop acted. For first, the first setting up of his power is by Hierom attributed to this choice, as ap­pears Advers. Lucil. by his words. Quod autem postea unus electus est qui cae­teris praeponeretur, in schismatis remedium factum est, ne unus­quisque ad se trahens Christi Ecclesiam rumperet. Whereby it is evident Hierom attributes the first original of that Ex­sors potestas, as he calls it elsewhere in the Bishop above Presby­ters, not to any Apostolical institution, but to the free choice of the Presbyters themselves: which doth fully explain what he means by consuetudo Ecclesiae before spoken of, viz. that which came up by a voluntary act of the Governours of Churches themselves. Secondly, it appears that by election, he means conferring authority, by the instances he brings to that purpose; As the Roman Armies choosing their Empe­rours, who had then no other power but what they received by the length of the sword; and the Deacons choosing their Arch­deacon, who had no other power but what was meerly con [...]er­red by the choice of the Co [...]ledge of Deacons. To which we may add what Eutychius, the Patriarch of Alexandria, saith in his Origines Ecclesiae Alexandrinae published in Arabick by our Origin. p. 29, 30. mo [...] learned Selden, who expresly affirms, that the twelve Presbyters constituted by Mark upon the vacancy of the See, did choose out of their number one to be head over the rest, and the other eleven did lay their hands upon him, and blessed him, and made him Patriarch. Neither is the authority of Eutychius so much to be sleighted in this case, coming so near to Hierom [Page 275] as he doth, who doubtless, had he told us that Mark and Anianus, &c. did all there without any Presbyters, might have had the good fortune to have been quoted with as much frequency and authority as the Anonymous Author of the martyrdome of Timothy in Photius (who there unhappi­ly B [...]blioth. Cod. 254. follows the story of the seven sleepers) or the Author of the Apostolical Constitutions, whose credit is everlasting­ly blasted by the excellent Mr. Duille De Pseudepigraphis Apo­stolorum; so much doth mens interest [...]tend to the inhancing or abating the esteem and credit both of the dead and the living. By these we see, that where no positive restraints from consent and choice, for the unity and peace of the Church, have restrained mens liberty as to their external exercise of the power of order or jurisdiction, every one being himself advanced into the authority of a Church. Governour, hath an internal power of conferring the same upon persons fit for 1 Tim. 4. 14. it. To which purpose the laying on of the hands of the Pres­bytery, is no wayes impertinently alledged, although we sup­pose St. Paul to concur in the action, (as it is most probable he did) because, if the Presbytery had nothing to do in the ordination, to what purpose were their hands laid up­on him? Was it only to be witnesses of the fact, or to sig­nifie their consent? both those might have been done with­out their use of that ceremony; which will scarce be in­stanced in, to be done by any but such as had power to con­fer what was signified by that ceremony. We come there­fore to the second period or state of the Church, when the former liberty was restrained, by some act of the Church it self▪ for preventing the inconveniences which might follow the too common use of the former liberty of ordinations, So Antonius de Rosellis fully expresseth my meaning in this; Rosellis de po [...]. Imper. & Papae. p. 4. c. 18 Quilibet Presbyter & Presbyteri ordinabant indiscretè, & schis­mata oriebantur. Every Presbyter and Presbyters did ordain indifferently, and thence arose schisms: thence the liberty was restrained and reserved peculiarly to some persons who did act in the several Presbyteries, as the [...] or Prince of the Sanhedrin, without whose presence no ordination by the Church was to be looked on as regular. The main con­troversie is, when this restraint began, and by whose act; [Page 276] whether by any act of the Apostles, or only by the pru­dence of the Church its self, as it was with the Sanhedrin. But in order to our peace, I see no such necessity of deci­ding it, both parties granting that in the Church such a re­straint was laid upon the liberty of ordaining Presbyters: and the exercise of that power may be restrained still, granting it to be radically and intrinsically in them. So that this con­troversie is not such as should divide the Church. For those that are for ordinations only by a Superiour order in the Church, acknowledging a radical power for ordination in Presbyters, which may be exercised in case of necessity, do thereby make it evident, that none who grant that, do think that any positive Law of God hath forbidden Presbyters the power of ordination; for then it must be wholly unlaw­ful, and so in case of necessity it cannot be valid. Which Doctrine I dare with some confidence assert to be a stranger to our Church of England, as shall be largely made appear afterwards. On the other side, those who hold ordinations by Presbyters lawful, do not therefore hold them necessary, but it being a matter of liberty, and not of necessity (Christ having no where said that none but Presbyters shall ordain) this power then may be restrained by those who have the care of the Churches Peace; and matters of liberty being restrained, ought to be submitted to, in order to the Churches Peace. And therefore some have well observed the difference between the opinions of Hierom and Aerius. For as to the matter it self, I believe upon the strictest enquiry Medina's Mich Me­dinas de s [...] [...]. hom. [...] [...]rig. & contin. l. 1. cap. 5. judgement will prove true, that Hierom, Austin, Ambrose, Sedulius, Primasius, Chrysostome, Theodores, Theophylact, were all of Aerius his judgement, as to the Identity of both name and order of Bishops and Presbyters in the Primitive Church: but here lay the difference▪ Aerius from hence pro­ceeded to separation from Bishops and their Churches, because they were Bishops. And Blondell well observes that the main ground why Aerius was condemned, was for unnecessary sepa­ration Praes. p. 58. from the Church of Sebastia, and those Bishops too who agreed with him in other things, as Eustathius the Bishop did: Whereas, had his meer opinion about Bishops been the ground of his being condemned, there can be no reason [Page 277] assigned, why this heresie, if it were then thought so, was not mentioned either by Socrates, Theodoret; Sozomen, or Evagrius, before whose time he lived; when yet they men­tion the Eustathiani, who were co-temporaries with him. But for Epiphanius and Augustine, who have listed him in the roul of Hereticks, it either was for the other heretical opinions maintained by him, or they took the name Heretick (as it is evident they often did) for one, who, upon a matter of diffe­rent opinion from the present sense of the Church, did pro­ceed to make separation from the Unity of the Catholick Church; which I take to be the truest account of the reputed Heresie of Aerius. For otherwise it is likely that Ierome, who maintained so great correspondency and familiarity with Epi­phanius, and thereby could not but know what was the cause why Aerius was condemned for Heresie, should himself run into the same Heresie, and endeavour not only to assert it, but to avouch and maintain it against the Judgement of the whole Church? Ierome therefore was not ranked with Aerius, be­cause, though he held the same opinion as to Bishops and Presbyters, yet he was far from the consequence of Aerius, that therefore all Bishops were to be separated from; nay, he was so far from thinking it necessary to cause a schism in the Church, by separating from Bishops, that his opinion is clear, that the first institution of them, was for preventing schisms, and therefore for peace and unity he thought their institution very useful in the Church of God. And among all those fifteen testimonies produced by a learned Writer ou [...] of Ierome for the superiority of Bishop [...] above Presbyters, I cannot find one that doth found it upon any Divine Right, but only upon the conveniency of such an order for the peace and unity of the Church of God: Which is his meaning in that place most produced to this purpose; Ecclesiae salus in summi sacerdotis dignitate pendet, cui si non exsors quaedam Dial. ad Lucifer. & ab omnibus eminens detur potestas, tot in Ecclesiis efficien­tur schismata, quot sacerdotes. Where nothing can be more evident than that he would have some supereminent power attributed to the Bishop for preventing schisms in the Church. But granting some passages may have a more favourable aspect towards the superiority of Bishops over Presbyters in [Page 278] his other writings, I would fain know whether a mans judgment must be taken, from occasional and incidental passages, or from designed and set discourses; which is as much as to ask, whether the lively representation of a man by pi­cture, may be best taken, when in haste of other business he passeth by us, giving only a glance of his Countenance, or when he purposely and designedly sits, in order to that end that his countenance may be truly represented? Besides, it is well known that Hierom in his Commentaries on Scripture, (where he doth not expresly declare his own opinion) doth often transcribe what he finds in others, without setting down the name of any Authour he had it from. For which we have his ingenuous confession in his Epistle to Augustine, Ep. August. ep. 11 Itaque ut simpliciter fatear, legi haec omnia (speaking of for­mer Commentaries) & in mente mea plurima conservans; accito notario, vel mea vel aliena dictavi, nec ordinis, nec ver­borum interdum, nec sensuum memor. A strange way of writing Commentaries on Scripture, wherein a man having jumbled other mens notions together in his brain, by a kind of lottery draws out what next comes to hand, without any choice: yet this we see was his practice, and therefore he puts Austin to this hard task of examining what all other men had writ before him, and whether he had not transcribed out of them, before he would have him charge him with any thing which he finds in his Commentaries. How angry then would that hasty Adversary have been, if men had told him he had contradicted himself in what he writes on the forty fifth Psalm about Bishops, if it be compared with his Com­mentaries on Titus, where he professeth to declare his opi­nion, or his Epistles to Evagrius and Oceanus! But yet some thing is pleaded even from those places in Hierom, wherein he declares his opinion more fully, as though his opinion was only, that Christ himself did not appoint Episcopacy, which (they say) he means by Dominica dispositio, but that the Apostles did it, which, in opposition to the former, he calls Ecclesiae consuetudo, but elsewhere explains it by traditio Apostolica; and this they prove by two things; First, The occasion of the institution of Episcopacy, which is thus set down by him, antequam Diaboli instinctu, studia in religione [Page 279] fierent, & diceretur in populis; Ego sum▪ Pauli, ego Apollo, ego autem Cephae, communi Presbyterorum consilio Ecclesiae guber▪ nabantur. Thence it is argued, that the time of this Institu­tion of Bishops was when it was said at Corinth, I am of Paul, I of Apollos, and I of Cephas; which was certainly in Apo­stol cal times. But to this it is answered; First, That it is im­possible Hieroms meaning should be restrained to that indivi­dual time, because the arguments which Hierom brings that the name and office of Bishops and Presbyters were the same, were from things done after this time. Pauls first Epistle to the Corinthians, wherein he reproves their schisms, was writ­ten according to Ludovicus Cappellus in the twe [...]fth year of Hist. Apo­stolica. p. 7 [...] Claudius, of Christ fifty one, after which Paul writ his Epi­stle to Titus, from whose words Hierom grounds his discourse▪ but most certainly Pauls Epistle to the Philippians was not written, till Paul was prisoner at Rome; the time of the wri­ting of it is placed by Cappellus in the third of Nero; of Christ 56. by Blondell 57. by our Lightfoot 59. by all, long after the former to the Corinthians; yet from the first verse of this Epistle, Hierom fetcheth one of his arguments. So Pauls charge to the Elders at Miletus, Peters Epistle to the di­spersed Jews, were after that time too, yet from these are fetched two more of Hieroms arguments. Had he then so little common sense, as to say, that Episcopacy was instituted upon the schism at Corinth, and yet bring all his arguments for parity, after the time that he s [...]s for the Institution of Episcopacy? But secondly, Hierom doth not say, cum dicere­tur apud Corinthios, Ego sum Pauli, &c. but cum diceretur in populis, Ego sum Pauli, &c: so that he speaks not of that particular schism, but of a general and universal schism abroad among most people, which was the occasion of appointing Bishops; and so speaks of others imitating the schism and language of the Corinthians. Thirdly, had Episcopacy been instituted on the occasion of the schism at Corinth, certainly of all places, we should the soonest have heard of a Bishop at Corinth for the remedying of it; and yet almost of all places, those Heralds that derive the succession of Bishops from the Apostles times, are the most plunged, whom to fix on at Co­rinth. And they that can find any one single Bishop at Co­rinth [Page 280] at the time when Clemens writ his Epistle to them (about another schism as great as the former, which certainly had not been according to their opinion, if a Bishop had been there before) must have better eyes and judgement, than the deservedly admired Grotius, who brings this in his Epistle to Bignonius as one argument of the undoubted antiquity of that Ep. ad Gal. ep. 162. Epistle: Quod nusquam meminit exsortis illius Episcoporum auctoritatis, quae Ecclesiae consuetudine, post Marci mortem Alexandriae, at (que) eo exemplo alibi, introduci coepit; sed planè, ut Paulus Apostolus ostendit, Ecclesias communi Presbyterorum, qui iidem omnes & Episcopi ipsi Paulo (que) dicuntur consilio fu­isse gubernatas. What could be said with greater freedom, that there was no such Episcopacy then at Corinth? Fourthly, They who use this argument, are greater strangers to St. Ierom's language than they would seem to be: whose custome it is upon incidental occasions to accommodate the phrase and language of Scripture to them: as when he speaks of Chry­sostom's fall, Cecidit Babylon, cecidit; of the Bishops of Palestine, Multi utroque claudicant pede; of the Roman Clergy, Pha­risaeorum conclamavit Senatus; but which is most clear to our purpose, he applyes this very speech to the men of his own time; Quando non id ipsum omnes loquimur, & alius dicit, Ego sum Pauli, ego Apollo, ego Cephae, dividimus spiritûs uni­tatem, & eam in partes & membra discerpimus. All which instances are produced by Blondell, but have the good for­tune Apol. p. 4. to be past over without being taken notice of. But sup­posing, say they, that it was not till after the schism at Corinth, yet it must needs be done by the Apostles; else how could it be said to be toto orbe decretum, ut unus de Presbyteris electus superponeretur caeteris? Quomodo enim (saith a learned man) fieri po [...]uit, ut toto hoc orbe decerneretur, nullo jam Oecume­nico Concilio ad illud decernendum congrega [...]o, si non ab Apo­stolis ipsis, fidem toto orbe promulgantibiss, & cum fide hanc regendi Ecclesias formam constituentibus factum sit? So that he conceives, so general an order could not be made, unless the Apostles themselves at that time were the authors of it.

But First, Ieroms In toto orbe dicret [...]m est, relates not to an antecedent order, which was the ground of the institution of Episcopacy, but to the universal establishment of that or­der [Page 281] which came up upon the occasion of so many schisms; it is something therefore consequent upon the first setting up Episcopacy, which is the general obtaining of it in the Churches of Christ, when they saw its usefulness in order to the Churches peace; therefore the Emphasis lies not in decre­tum est, but in toto orbe; noting how suddenly this order met with universal acceptance when it first was brought up in the Church after the Apostles death. Which that it was Ieroms meaning, appears by what he saith after, Paulatim verò (ut dissensionum plantaria evellerentur) ad unum omnem solicitudi­nem esse delatam: Where he notes the gradual obtaining of it: which I suppose was thus, according to his opinion; first in the Colledge of Presbyters appointed by the Apostles, there being a necessity of order, there was a President among them who had [...] ▪ as the President of the Senate, i. e. did moderate the affairs of the Assembly, by proposing matters to it, gathering voices, being the first in all matters of concernment, but he had not [...], as Casaubon very well distinguisheth them, i. e. had no po­wer Exercit. ad Annal. Ec­cles. 15. s. 12. over his fellow-Presbyters, but that still resided in the Colledge or body of them. After this when the Apostles were taken out of the way, who kept the main power in their own hands of ruling the several Presbyteries, or delegated some to do it (who had a main hand in the planting Churches with the Apostles, and thence are called in Scripture some­times Fellow-labourers in the Lord, and sometimes Evange­lists, and by Theodoret Apostles, but of a second order) af­ter I say, these were deceased, and the main power left in the Presbyteries, the several Presbyters enjoying an equal power among themselves, especially being many in one City, thereby great occasion was given to many schisms, partly by the bandying of the Presbyters one against another, partly by the sidings of the people with some against the rest, part­ly by the too common use of the power of ordinations in Presbyters, by which they were more able to increase their own party, by ordaining those who would joyn with them, and by this means to perpetuate schisms in the Church; up­on this, when the wiser and graver sort considered the abuses following the promiscuous use of this power of ordination; [Page 282] and withall having in their minds the excellent frame of the Government of the Church under the Apostles, and their Deputies, and for preventing of future schisms and divisions among themselves, they unanimously agreed to choose one out of their number, who was best qualified for the manage­ment of so great a trust, and to devolve the exercise of the power of ordination and jurisdiction to him▪ yet so as that he [...]ct nothing of importance, without the consent and con­currence of the Presbyters, who were still to be as the Com­mon Council to the Bishop. This I take to be the true and just account of the Original of Episcopacy in the Primitive Church according to Ierome: Which model of Government thus contrived and framed, sets forth to us a most lively cha­racter of that great Wisdom and Moderation, which then ruled the heads and hearts of the Primitive Christians; and which, when men have searched and studyed all other wayes, (the abuses incident to this Government, through the cor­ruptions of men and times being retrenched) will be found the most agreeable to the Primitive form, both as asserting the due interest of the Presbyteries, and allowing the due ho­nour of Episcopacy, and by the joynt harmony of both car­rying on the affairs of the Church with the greatest Unity, Concord, and Peace. Which form of Government I cannot see how any possible reason can be produced by either party, why they may not with chearfulness embrace it.

Secondly, another evidence that Ierome by decretum est did not mean an order of the Apostles themselves, is by the words which follow the matter of the decree, viz. Ut unus de Presbyteris electus superponeretur caeteris, one chosen not only out of, but by the Presbyters, should be set above the rest; for so Ierome must be understood; for the Apostles could not themselves choose out of all Presbyteries one person to be set above the rest; and withall the instance brought of the Church of Alexandria makes it evident to be meant of the choosing by the Presbyters, and not by the Apostles. Besides, did Ie­rome mean choosing by the Apostles, he would have given some intimations of the hand the Apostles had in it: which we see not in him the least ground for. And as for that pre­tence, that Ecclesiae consuetudo is Apostolica traditio, I have [Page 283] already made it appear that Apostolica traditio in Ierome, is nothing else but Consuetudo Ecclesiae, which I shall now con­firm by a pregnant and unanswerable testimony out of Ierome himself. Unaquaeque provincia abundet in sensu suo, & prae­cepta Hieron. ep. 20. ad Lucinum. majorum leges Apostolicas arbitretur. Let every Pro­vince abound in its own sense, and account of the ordinances of their Ancestors as of Apostolical Laws. Nothing could have been spoken more fully to open to us what Ierome means by Apostolical traditions, viz the practice of the Church in former ages, though not coming from the Apostles them­selves. Thus we have once more cleared Ierome and the truth together; I only wish all that are of his judgement for the practice of the primitive Church, were of his temper for the practice of their own; and while they own not Epis­copacy as necessary by a divine right, yet (being duly mo­derated, and joyned with Presbyteries) they may embrace it, as not only a lawful, but very useful constitution in the Church of God. By which we may see what an excellent temper may be found out, most fully consonant to the primitive Church for the management of ordinations, and Church power, viz. by the Presidency of the Bishop and the concurrence of the Presbyterie. For the Top-gallant of Episcopacy can never be so well managed for the right steer­ing the ship of the Church, as when it is joyned with the un­der-sails of a Moderate Presbyterie. So much shall suffice to speak here as to the power of ordination, which we have found to be derived from the Synagogue, and the customes observed in it, transplanted into the Church.

There are yet some things remaining as to Ordination, §. 14. wherein the Church did imitate the Synagogue, which will admit of a quick dispatch, as the number of the persons, which under the Synagogue were alwaies to be at least three. This being a fundamental constitution among the Misna & Gemar. tit. Sanhedr. c. [...]. Tic. Sanhed. cap. 4. s 3. Arcan. Cath. Viri­tat. l. 4. cap. 6. Jews, as appears by their writings, [...] Ordination of Presbyters by laying on of hands must be done. by three at the least. To the same purpose Maimonides [...] They did not ordain any by imposition of hands into a power of judicature without the number of three. Which number Peter Galatinus and Postellus conceive necessary to be all ordained [Page 284] themselves; but Master Selden thinks it was sufficient if there De Concord. orbis p. 377 were but one of that number so ordained, who was to be as principal in the action; whose opinion is favoured by Maimo­nides, who adds to the words last cited out of him; Of which Three, one at the least must be ordained himself. Let us now see the Parallel in the Church of God. The first solemn Ordina­tion of Elders under the Gospel, which some think to be set down as a Pattern for the Church to follow, is that we read of, Acts 13. 1, 2, 3. Which was performed by three; for we read in the first verse, that there were in the Church at Antioch, five Prophets and Teachers, Barnabas, Simeon, Lu­cius, Manaen, and Saul; of these five, the Holy-Ghost said, that two must be separated for the work whereto God had called them, which were, Barnabas and Saul; there remain onely the other three, Simeon, Lucius and Manaen to lay their hands on them, and ordain them to their work. According­ly Euseb. hist. Eccles. lib. 2. cap. 1. those who tell us that Iames was ordained Bishop of Ierusalem, do mention the three Apostles who concurred in the ordaining of him. But most remarkable for this purpose is the Canon of the Nicene Council, wherein this number is set down as the regular number for the Ordination of Bishops, without which it was not accounted Canonical. The words are these, [...], Can. 4. [...] i. e. The Ordination of a Bishop should; if possible, be performed by all the Bishops of the Province, which if it cannot easily be done, either through some urgent necessity, or the tediousness of the way, three Bishops at least must be there for the doing it, which may be sufficient for the Ordination, if those that are absent do express their consent, and by Letters ap­prove Hist Eccles lib. 5. c. 23. of the doing of it. To the same purpose Theodoret, [...]. V. Iustell. not. in Ca­non. Uni­versae Eccles. p. 140. The Canons injoyn all the Bishops of the Province to be present at the Ordination of one: and forbid the Ordination of any without three being present at it. Thus we see how the Constitution of the Synagogue was exactly observed in the Church, as to the number of the persons concurring to a [Page 285] regular Ordination. The last thing as to Ordination bearing Analogy to the Synagogue, is the effect of this Ordination upon the person: It was the Custom of the Jews, to speak of all that were legally Ordained among them, [...] and the Divine Presence or Schecinah rested upon them, which sometimes they called [...] the Holy Spirit supposed to be in a peculiar manner present after this solemn Separation of them from others in the world, and Dedication of them unto God. Answerable to this may that of our Saviour be, when he gives his Apostles authority to preach the Gospel, he doth it in that Form of words, Receive ye the Holy Ghost, and Joh. 20. 21▪ then gives them the power of binding and loosing, usually conveyed in the Jewish Ordinations. Whose sins ye remit, they v. 29. are remitted; and whose sins ye retain, they are retained. So that as under the Law, they by their Ordination received a moral Faculty or Right to exercise that power they were Or­dained to; so under the Gospel, all who are Ordained ac­cording to Gospel Rules, have a right, authority and power conveyed thereby for the dispensing of the Word and Sacra­ments. Which right and power must not be conceived to be an internal indelible Character, as the Papists groundlesly conceive, but a moral legal Right, according to the Lawes of Christ, because the persons Ordaining do not act in it in a natu­ral, but a moral Capacity, and so the effect must be moral and not physical, which they must suppose it to be, who make it a Character, and that indelible. Thus much may serve to clear how Ordination in all its circumstances was derived from the Jewish Synagogue.

The other thing remaining to be spoken to, as to the corre­spondence §. 15. of the Church with the Synagogue in its constitution is, what order the Apostles did settle in the several Churches of their Plantation for the Ruling and Ordering the Affairs of them. Before I come to speak so much to it as will be pertinent to our present purpose and design, we may take notice of the same name for Church-Rulers under the Gospel, which there was under the Synagogue, viz. that of Presbyters. The name Presbyter, as the Hebr. [...] though it Originally import Age, yet by way of connotation it hath been looked on as a name both of Dignity and Power. Because Wisdome was supposed to dwell with a multitude of years; therefore persons of age [Page 286] and experience were commonly chosen to places of honour and trust, and thence the name importing age doth likewise cary dignity along with it. Thence we read in the time of Moses how often the Elders were gathered together. Thence Exod 3. 16. 18. 4. 29. 12. 21. 17. 5. [...]8 12. &c. Eliezer is called [...] Gen. 24. 2. which the Greek renders [...] the Seignior Domo, the chief Officer in his house; and so we read Gen. 50. 6. [...] the El­ders of the Land of Egypt. So the Elders of M [...]dian, the Elders of Israel, the Elders of the Cities; so among the Greeks [...] for their Council of State; and among the Latines Senatus, and our Saxon Aldermen, in all importing both age and ho­nour and power together. But among the Jewes, in the times of the Apostles, it is most evident that the name [...] ▪ im­ported not only dignity but power; the Presbyters among the Jewes, having a power both of judgeing and teaching given them by their Semicha or Ordination. Now under the Gospel the Apostles retaining the name and the manner of Ordinati­on, but not conferring that judiciary power by it, which was in use among the Jewes, to shew the difference between the Law and the Gospel, it was requisite some other name should be given to the Governours of the Church, which should qua­lifie the importance of the word Presbyters to a sense proper to a Gospel State; Which was the Original of giving the name [...] to the Governours of the Church under the Gospel: A name importing Duty more then Honour, and not a title above Presbyter, but rather used by way of diminution and qualification of the power implyed in the name of Presbyter. Therefore to shew what kind of power and Duty the name Presbyter imported in the Church, the Office conveyed by that name is called [...], and Presbyters are said [...], 1 Pet. 5▪ 2. where it is opposed to that [...], Lording it over the people, as was the custome of the Presbyters among the Jews. So that if we determine things by importance of words and things signified by them, the power of Ordina­tion was proper to the name [...] and not [...], be­cause the former name did then import that power, and not the latter. We come therefore from the names to the things then implyed by them; and the Offices established by the Apo­stles for the ruling of Churches. But my design being not to dispute the arguments of either party ( viz. those who con­ceive [Page 287] the Apostles setled the Government of the Church in an absolute parity; or else by Superiority and Subordination among the setled Officers of the Church,) but to lay down those principles which may equally concern both, in Order to accommodation▪ I find not my self at present concerned to debate what is brought on either side for the maintaining their particular Opinion any further then thereby the Apostles in­tentions are brought to have been to bind all future Churches to observe that individual Form they conceived was in pra­ctice then. All that [...] have to say then concerning the course taken by the Apostles in setling the Government of the Churches, (under which will be contained the full Resolution of what I promised, as to the correspondency to the Syna­gogue in the Government of Churches) lies in these three Propositions, which I now shall endeavour to clear, viz. That neither can we have that certainty of Apostolical practice which is necessary to Constitute a Divine right; nor Second­ly, Is it probable that the Apostles did tye themselves up to any one fixed course in modelling Churches; nor thirdly, if they did, doth it necessarily follow that we must observe the same. If these three considerations be fully cleared, we may see to how little purpose it is to Dispute the Significancy and Impor­tance of words and names as used in Scripture, which hither­to the main quarrel hath been about. I therefore begin with the first of these, That we cannot arrive to such an absolute certainty what course the Apostles took in Governing Churches as to inferr from thence the only Divine Right of that one Form which the several parties imagine comes the nearest to it. This I shall make out from these following arguments. First, from the equivalency of the names, and the doubtfulness of their signification from which the Form of Government used in the New Testament should be determined. That the Form of Government must be derived from the Importance of the names of Bishop and Presbyter, is hotly pleaded on both sides. But if there can be no certain way sound out whereby to come to a Determination of what the certain Sense of those names is in Scripture, we are never like to come to any certain Knowledge of the things signifi­ed by those names. Now there is a fourfold equivalency [Page 288] of the names Bishop and Presbyter taken notice of 1. That Dissert. de jure Epis. 3. o 6. Vind cat. cap. [...]. s. 1. both should signifie the same thing, viz. a Presbyter, in the modern Notion, i. e. one acting in a parity with others for the Government of the Church. And this Sense is evidently asserted by Theodoret, [...]. The Apostle Theodoret. in 1 Tim. 3. 1. Acts 20. 28. Philip. 1. 1. Titus 1. 5. 1 Tim. 3. 1. doth by Bishops mean nothing else but Presbyters; otherwise it were impossible for more Bishops to govern one City. 2. That both of them should signifie promiscuously sometimes a Bishop, and sometimes a Presbyter: so Chrysostome, and after him Occumenius and Theophylact in Phil. 1. [...] ▪ and in Acts 20. 28. [...]. Where they assert the Community and promiscuous use of the names in Scripture; so that a Bishop is sometimes called a Presbyter, and a Presby­ter sometimes called a Bishop. 3. That the name Bishop, alwayes imports a singular Bishop; but the name Presbyter is taken promiscuously both for Bishop and Presbyter. 4. That both the names Bishop and Presbyter, doe import onely one thing in Scripture, viz. the Office of a singular Bishop in eve­ry Church [...]; which Sense, though a stranger to antiquity, is above all other embraced by a late very Learned Man, who hath endeavoured by set Discourses to reconcile all the places of Scripture where the names occur to this sense; but with what success it is not here a place to examine. By this variety of Interpretation of the Equivalency of the names of Bishop and Presbyter, we may see how far the argument from the promiscuous use of the names is from the Contro­versie in hand; unless some evident arguments be withall brought, that the Equivalency of the words cannot possibly be meant in any other Sense, then that which they contend for. Equivocal words can never of themselves determine what Sense they are to be taken in, because they are Equi­vocal, and so admit of different Senses. And he that from the use of an Equivocal word would inferr the necessity onely [Page 289] of one sense, when the word is common to many, unless some other argument be brought inforcing that necessity, will be so far from perswading others to the same belief, that he will only betray the weakness and shortness of his own reason. When Augustus would be called only Princeps Tacitus hist. lib. 1. Senatus, could any one inferr from thence, that certainly he was onely the [...] in the Senate, or else that he had superiority of power over the Senate, when that Title might be indifferent to either of those senses? All that can be infer'd from the promiscuous sense of the words, is, that they may be understood only in this sense; but it must be proved that they can be understood in no other sense, before any one particular form of Government as necess [...]ry can be inferred from the use of them. If notwithstanding the promiscuous use of the name Bishop and Presbyter, either that Presbyter may mean a Bishop; or that Bishop may mean a Presbyter, or be sometimes used for one, sometimes for the other; what ground can there be laid in the equivalency of the words, which can inferr the only Divine Right of the form of Go­vernment couched in any one of those senses? So like­wise, it is in the Titles of Angels of the Churches; If the name Angel imports no incongruity, though taken only for the [...] in the Jewish Synagogue, the publick Minister of the Synagogue, called the Angel of the Congregation, what power can be inferred from thence, any more then such an Officer was invested with? Again, if the [...] or Presi­dent of the assembly of Presbyters, might be so called: what superiority can be deduced thence, any more then such a one enjoys? Nay, if in the Prophetical style, an unity may be set down by way of representation of a multitude: what evi­dence can be brought from the name, that by it some one particular person must be understood? And by this means Rev. 2. 4. Timothy may avoid being charged with leaving his first Love, which he must of necessity be, by those that make him the Angel of the Church of Ephesus at the time of writing these Epistles. Neither is this any wayes solved by the Answer given, that the name Angel is representative of the whole Church, and so there is no necessity, the Angel should be personally guilty of it. For first, it seems strange that the [Page 290] whole diffusive body of the Church should be charged with a crime by the name of the Angel, and he that is particularly meant by that name should be free from it. As if a Prince should charge the Maior of a Corporation as guilty of rebel­lion, and by it should only mean that the Corporation was guilty, but the Maior was innocent himself. Secondly, If ma­dy things in the Epistles be directed to the Angel, but yet so as to concern the whole body, then of necessity the Angel must be taken as Representative of the Body; and then, why may not the word Angel be taken only by way of re­presentation of the body its self, either of the whole Church, or which is far more probable, of the Consessus or Order of Presbyters in that Church? We see what miserably uncon­cluding arguments those are, which are brought for any form of Government from Metaphorical or Ambiguous expressi­ons, or names promiscuously used, which may be interpre­ted to different senses. What certainty then can any rational man find what the form of Government was in the Primitive times, when onely those arguments are used which may be equally accommodated to different forms? And without such a certainty, with what confidence can men speak of a Divine Right of any one particular form? Secondly, The uncertainty of the Primitive form is argued, from the places most in controversie about the form of Government; be­cause that without any apparent incongruity they may be understood of either of the different forms. Which I shall make out by going through the several places. The Con­troversie then on foot is this, (as it is of late stated), Whe­ther the Churches in the Primitive times were governed by a Bishop only and Deacons, or by a Colledge of Presbyters acting in a parity of power? The places insisted on, on both sides are these, Acts 11. 30. Acts 14. 23. Acts 28. 17 1 Tim. 3. 1. Titus 1. 5. The thing in controversie, is, Whether Bishops with Deacons or Presbyters in a parity of power, are understood in these places? I begin then in order with Acts 11. 30. The first place wherein the name [...] occurrs, as applyed to the Officers of the Christian Church, Those that are for a Colledge of Presbyters, understand by these Elders, those of the Church of Ierusalem, who did govern the affairs of [Page 291] that Church: those that are for a solitary Episcopacy, by these Elders understand not the local Elders of Ierusalem, but the several Bishops of the Churches of Iudea. Let us now see whether there be any evidence from the place to deter­mine which of these two must necessarily be understood. There is nothing at all mentioned in the place, but only that upon the occasion of the Famine, they sent relief to the Brethren of Judea, and sent it to the Elders by the hands of Barnabas and Paul; Which might either be to the Elders of the Church at Ierusalem, to be distributed to the several Churches of Iudea, or else to the several Pastors of those Churches, either collectively as met together at Ierusalem to receive this con­tribution, or distributively as they were in their several Churches. The relief might be sent to all the Brethren of Iudea, and yet either be conveyed to the particular Elders of Ierusalem to send it abroad, or to the several Elders of the Churches within the circuit of Iudea. But other places are brought by both parties for their particular sense in this, As Acts 15. 6. here indeed mention is made of the Apostles and Elders together at Ierusalem, but nothing expressed whereby we may know whether the fixed Elders of that Church, or else the Elders of all the Churches of Iudea assem­bled upon this solemn occasion of the Council of the Apostles there. So Acts 21. 11. when Paul went in to Iames, it is said, That All the Elders were present. No more certainty here neither; for, either they might be the fixed Officers of that Church, meeting with Iames upon Pauls coming; or else they might be the Elders of the several Churches of Iudea met together, not to take account of Pauls Ministry (as some improbably conjecture,) but assembled together there at the Feast of Pentecost, at which Paul came to Ierusalem, which is more probable upon the account of what we read, v. 20. of the many thousand believing Iews then at Jerusalem, who were zealous of the Law: who in all probability were the believing Jews of Iudea, who did yet observe the annual Festivals of Ierusalem, and so most likely their several El­ders might go up together with them, and there be with Iames at Pauls coming in to him. No certainty then of the Church of Ierusalem how that was governed; whether by [Page 292] Apostles themselves, or other unfixed Elders, or onely by Iames who exercised his Apostleship most there, and thence afterward [...] called the Bishop of Ierusalem. We proceed therefore to the government of other Churches; and the next place is, Acts 14. 23. And when they had or­dained them Elders in every Church. Here some plead for a plurality of Elders as fixed in every Church; but it is most evident, that the words hold true if there was but one in each Church. For [...] here, and [...] Titus 1. 5. (for both places will admit of the same answer) doth signifie no more then oppidatim, or Ecclesiatim, as [...] gradatim, [...], viritim, [...] particulatim, [...] vi­catim. No more then is imported than that Elders were or­dained, City by City, or Church by Church, as we would ren­der i [...], and thereby nothing is expressed, but that no Church wanted an Elder, but not that every Church had more El­ders then one. But the place most controverted is, Acts 20. 17. And from Miletus, Paul sent to Ephesus, and called the Elders of the Church. Those that say, these Elders were those only of the Church of Ephesus, seem to be most favoured by the article [...], as seeming to apply it to that par­ticular Church of Ephesus, and by the Syriack version which renders it, Venire fecit Presbyteros Ecclesiae Ephesi; to the same purpose likewise Hierome understands it. On the con­trary those that say, that these Elders were those of the seve­ral Churches of Asia, are favoured by v. 18. that from the first day he came into Asia, he had been with them at all seasons. Now Paul did not remain all the time at Ephesus, as appears by Acts 19▪ 10, 22, 26. where he is said to preach the Word abroad in Asia, and so in probability Churches were planted, and Rulers setled in them; and that these were at this time called to Miletus by Paul, is the expresse affirmation of Irenae­us; Advers. [...]aeres. l. 1. c, 14. In Mileto enim convocatis Episcopis & Presbyteris qui era [...]t ab Epheso & à reliquis proximis civitatibus, quoniam ipse festi­navit Hierosolymis Pentecostem agere. Here is nothing then either in the Text or Antiquity, that doth ab­solutely determine whence these Elders came; but there may be a probability on either side; and so no certainty or necessity of understanding it either way. And [Page 293] so for the other places in Timothy and Titus, it is certain the care of those persons did extend to many places, and there­fore the Elders or Bishops made by them, are not necessarily to be understood of a Plurality of Elders in one place. Thus we see, that there is no incongruity in applying either of these two forms to the sense of the places in Question. I dispute not which is the true, or at least more probable sense, but that we can find nothing in the several places which doth necessari­ly determine, how they are to be understood as to one par­ticular form of Government, which is the thing I now ayme at the proving of. And if neither form be repugnant to the sense of these places, how can any one be necessarily inferred from them? As if the several motions and phaenomena of the Heavens may be with equal probability explained according to the Ptolemaick or Copernican Hypothesis, viz. about the rest or motion of the earth; then it necessarily follows, that from those Phaenomena no argument can be drawn evincing the necessity of the one Hypothesis, and overturning the pro­bability of the other. If that great wonder of Nature the flux and reflux of the Sea, might with equal congruity be solved according to the different opinions, of its being caused by Subterraneous fires, or from the motion of the Moon, or the depression of the Lunar vortex, or (which to me is far the most probable) by a motion of consent of the Sea with all the other great bodies of the World; we should find no necessity at all of entertaining one opinion above another, but to look upon all as probable, and none as certain. So likewise for the composition and motion of all Natural Bo­dyes, the several Hypotheses of the old and new Philosophy, implying no apparent incongruity to Nature, do make it ap­pear that all or any of them, may be embraced as Ingenious Romances in Philosophy (as they are no more) but that none of them are the certain truth; or can be made appear so to be to the minds of men. So it is in Controversies in Theology, If the matter propounded to be believed, may as to the truth and substance of it be equally believed under different wayes of explication, then there is no necessity as to the believing the truth of the thing, to believe it under such an explication [Page 294] of it, more then under another. As for instance, in the case of Christs Descent [...] [...], if I may truly believe that Christ did Descend [...], whether by that we understand the state of the Dead, or a local Descent to Hell, then there is no necessity in order to the belief of the substance of that article of the ancient Creed (called, The Apostles) under that restriction of a local Descent. By this time I suppose it is clear, that if these places of Scripture may be understood in these two different senses of the word Elders, viz. either taken collectively in one City, or distributively in many, then there is no certainty which of these two senses must be em­braced, and so the form of Church-government, which must be thence derived, is left still at as great uncertainty as ever, notwithstanding these places of Scripture brought to demon­strate it; [...].

Thirdly, The uncertainty of the Primitive Form of Go­vernment §. 16. will be made appear from the Defectivenesse, Am­biguity, Partiality and Repugnancy of the Records of the succeeding Ages which should inform us what Apostolical practice was. When men are by the force of the former arguments driven off from Scripture, then they presently run to take Sanctuary in the Records of succeeding ages to the Apostles. Thus Estius, no mean School-man, handling this very Question of the difference of Bishops and Presbyters, very fairly quits the Scriptures, and betakes himself to other Weapons. Quod autem jure divino sint Episcopi Presbyteris superiores, et si non ita clarum est è sacris Literis, aliunde tamen In Sentent. lib. 4. dist. 4. sect. 25. satis efficaciter probari potest. Ingenuously said, however; but all the difficulty is, how a Ius divinum should be proved when men leave the Scriptures, which makes others so loth to leave this hold; although they do it in effect, when they call in the help of succeeding Ages to make the Scripture speak plain for them. We follow therefore the scent of the Game into this wood of Antiquity, wherein it will be easier to lose our selves, then to find that which we are upon the pursuit of, a Ius Divinum of any one particular form of Government. I handle now only the Testimony of Antiquity (for the practice of it will call for a particular Discourse afterwards) [Page 295] and herein I shall endeavour to shew the incompetency of this Testimony, as to the shewing what certain form of Church-government was practised by the Apostles; for that, I shall make use of this four fold Argument; From the de­fectivenesse of this Testimony, from the Ambiguity of it, from the Partiality of it, and from the Repugnancy of it to its self. First, then, for the defectivenesse of the Testimony of antiquity, in reference to the shewing what certain form the Apostles observed in setling the Government of Churches; A threefold defectivenesse I observe in it, as to places, as to times, as to persons. First, defectivenesse as to places; for him that would be satisfied, what course the Apostles took for governing Churches, it would be very requisite to observe the uniformity of the Apostles practice in all Churches of their plantation. And if but one place varied, it were enough to overthrow the necessity of any one form of Go­vernment, because thereby it would be evident, that they observed no certain or constant course, nor did they look upon themselves as obliged so to do. Now the ground of the necessity of such an universal Testimony as to places, is this; We have already made it appear, that there is no Law of Christ absolutely commanding one form, and forbidding all other. We have no way then left to know, whether the Apostles did look upon themselves as bound to settle one form, but by their practice; this practice must be certain and uniform in them; this uniformity must be made known to us by some unquestionable way: the Scrip­tures they are very silent in it, mentioning very little more then Pauls practice, nor that fully and clearly; there­fore we must gather it from Antiquity, and the Records of following ages; if these now fall short of our expectati­on, and cannot give us an account of what was done by the Apostles in their several Churches planted by them, how is it possible we should attain any certainty of what the A­postles practice was? Now that antiquity is so defective as to Places, will appear from the general silence as to the Churches planted by many of the Apostles. Granting the truth of what Eusebius tells us, That Thomas went into [Page 296] Parthia, Andrew into Scythia, Iohn into the lesser Asia, Peter to the Jews in Pontus, Galatia, Bithynia, Cappadocia, Hist. Eccles. tib. 3. c. 1. Asia; besides what we read in Scripture of Paul, what a pit­tiful short account have we here given in, of all the Apostles Travels, and their several fellow-labourers! And for all these, little or nothing spoke of the way they took in setling the Churches by them planted, Who is it will undertake to tell us what course Andrew took in Scythiae, in governing Chur­ches? If we believe the Records of after-ages, there was but one Bishop, viz. of Tomis for the whole Countrey; how dif­ferent is this from the pretended course of Paul, setting up a single Bishop in every City? Where do we read of the Presbyteries setled by Thomas in Parthia or the Indies? what course Philip, Bartholomew, Matthew, Simon Zelotes, Matthias took. Might not they for any thing we know, settle ano­ther kind of Government from what we read Paul, Peter, or Iohn did, unlesse we had some evidence that they were all bound to observe the same? Nay, what evidence have we what course Peter took in the Churches of the Circumcision? Whether he left them to their Synagogue▪way, or altered it, and how or wherein? These things should be made appear, to give men a certainty of the way and course the Apostles did observe in the setling Churches by them planted. But instead of this, we have a general silence in antiquity, and nothing but the forgeries of latter ages to supply the vacui­ty: whereby they filled up empty places as Plutarch Plut. in Theseo. expresseth it, as Geographers do Maps with some fabu­lous creatures of their own invention. Here is work now for a Nicephorus Callisthus, a Simeon Metaphrastes, the very Iacobus de Voragine of the Greek Church (as one well calls him) those Historical Tinkers, that think to mend a hole where they find it, and make three instead of it. This is the first defect in Antiquity as to places. The second is as observable as to times; and what is most conside­rable: Antiquity is most defective where it is most useful, viz. in the time immediately after the Apostles, which must have been most helpfull to us in this inquiry. For, who dare with confidence believe the conjectures of Eusebius at three hun­dred [Page 297] years distance from Apostolical times, when he hath no other Testimony to vouch, but the Hypotyposes of an uncer­tain Clement (certainly not he of Alexandria, if Ios. Scaliger may be credited) and the Commentaries of Hegesippus, whose Relations and Authority are as questionable as many of the reports of Eusebius himself are in reference to those elder times: For which I need no other Testimony but Eusebius in a place enough of its self to blast the whole credit of antiquity, as to the matter now in debate. For speaking of Paul and Peter, and the Churches by them planted, and coming to enquire after their Successours, he makes this very ingenu­ous Confession. [...]. Hist. Eccl. l. 3. c. 4. Say you so? Is it so hard a matter to find out who succeeded the Apostles in the Churches planted by them, unless it be those men­tioned in the writings of Paul? What becomes then of our unquestionable Line of Succession of the Bishops of several Churches, and the large Diagramms made of the Apostolical Churches with every ones name set down in his Order, as if the Writer had been Clarenceaulx to the Apostles themselves? Is it come to this at last that we have nothing certain, but what we have in Scriptures? And must then the Tradition of the Church be our rule to interpret Scriptures by? An excel­lent way to find out the Truth doubtless, to bend the Rule to the crooked Stick, to make the Judge stand to the Opinion of his Lacquey, what sentence he shall pass upon the Cause in question; to make Scripture stand cap in hand to Tra­dition, to know whether it may have leave to speak or no! Are all the great outcries of Apostolical Tradition, of personal Succession, of unquestionable Records resolved at last into the Scripture its self by him from whom all these long pede­grees are fetched? then let Succession know its place, and learn to vaile Bonnet to the Scriptures? And withall let men take heed of over- [...]eaching themselves when they would bring down so large a Catalogue of single Bishops from the first and purest times of the Church for it will be hard for others to believe them, when Eusebius professeth it is so hard to find them. Well might Scaliger then complain that the Intervall from the last Chapter of the Acts to the middle [Page 298] of Trajan, in which time Quadratus and Ignatius began to Proleg in Chron. Eusebii. flourish, was tempus [...], as Varro speaks, a meer Chaos of time filled up with the rude concept ons of Papias, Hermes, and others, who like Hann ibal, when they could not find a way through, would make one either by force or fraud. But yet Thirdly, here is another defect consequent to that of Time, which is that of Persons; arising not onely from a defect of Records, the Diptychs of the Church being lost, which would have acquainted us with the times of suffering of the severall Martyrs (by them called their Natalitia) at which times their several names were inrolled in these Martyrologies, which some, as Iunius observes, have ignorantly mistaken for the time of their being made Bishops of the places wherein their Cont. 3. l. 2. c. 5. not. 18. names were entered, as Anacletus, Clytus and Clemens at Rome; I say the defect as to Persons, not only ariseth hence, but be­cause the Christians were so much harassed with persecutions, that they could not have that leisure then to write those things, which the leisure and peace of our ages have made us so eagerly inquisitive after. Hence even the Martyrologies are so full stuffed with Fables, witness one for all, the famous Legend of Catharina who suffered, say they, in Diocletian's V. Chamier. Tom. 1. l. 2. cap. 16. time. And truly the story of Ignatius (as much as it is de­fended with his Epistles) doth not seem to be any of the most probable. For, wherefore should Ignatius of all others be brought to Rome to suffer, when the Proconsuls and the Prae­sides provinciarum did every where in time of persecution ex­ecute their power in punishing Christians at their own Tribu­nals, without sending them so long a journey to Rome to be martyred there? And how came Ignatius to make so many and such strange excursions, as he did by the story, if the Soul­diers that were his Guard were so cruel to him, as he complains they were? Now all those uncertain and fabulous Narrations as to Persons then, arising from want of sufficient Records made at those times, make it more evident how incompetent a Judge antiquity is as to the certainty of things done in A­postolical times. If we should onely speak of the Fabulous Legends of the first Planters of Churches in these Western parts, we need no further evidence of the great defect of an­tiquity as to persons. Not to goe out of our own Nation; [Page 299] Whence come the stories of Peter, Iames, Paul, Simon, Ari­stobulus, besides Ioseph of Arimathea, and his company; all being Preachers of the Gospel, and planters of Churches here, but onely from the great defect in Antiquity, as to the Re­cords of persons imployed in the several places for preaching the Gospell? Thus much to shew the defectiveness as to the Records of antiquity, and thereby the incompetency of them for being a way to find out the certain course the A­postles took in Setling and Governing Churches by them Planted.

The next thing shewing the incompetency of the Records §. 17. of the Church for deciding the certain Form of Church-Go­vernment in the Apostles times, is, the ambiguity of the Te­stimony given by those Records. A Testimony sufficient to­decide a Controversie, must be plain and evident, and must speak full and home to the Case under debate. Now if I make it appear that antiquity doth not so; nothing then can be evident from thence, but that we are left to as great uncertain­ties as before. The matter in Controversie is, whether any in a Superiour Order to Presbyters were instituted by the Apo­stles themselves for the Regulating of the Churches by them planted? For the proving of which, three things are the most insisted on: First, the Personal succession of some persons to the Apostles in Churches by them planted: Secondly, the appropriating the name [...] to Bishops in a Superiour Order to Presbyters, after the Apostles decease: Thirdly, the Churches owning the Order of Episcopacy, as of Divine Institution. If now we can make these three things evident: First, That personall Succession might be without such supe­riority of Order: Secondly, That the names of Bishop and Presbyters were common after the Distinction between them was introduced: and Thirdly, That the Church did not own Episcopacy as a Divine Institution, but Ecclesiasticall; and those who seem to speak most of it, do mean no more: I shall suppose enough done to invalidate the Testimony of anti­quity as to the matter in hand. First, Then for the matter of Succession in Apostolical Churches▪ I shall lay down these four things, to evince that the argument drawn from thence, cannot fully clear the certain course which the Apostles [Page 300] took in setling the Government of Churches. First, That the Succession might be onely as to different Degree, and not as to a different Order; where the Succession is clear, no­thing possibly can be inferred from it beyond this. For bare Succession implies no more then that there was one in those Churches succeeding the Apostles, from whom afterwards the succession was derived. Now then suppo­sing onely at present, that it was the Custome, in all the Churches at that time to be ruled by a Colledge of Presby­ters acting in a parity of Power, and among these, one to sit as the Nasi in the Sanhedrin, having a priority of Order above the rest in place, without any superiory of Power over his Colleagues; will not the matter of Succession be clear and evident enough notwithstanding this? Succession of Persons was the thing inquired for, and not a Succession of Power; if therefore those that would prove a Succession of Apostolical Power, can onely produce a List and Catalogue▪ of names in Apostolical Churches, without any evidence of what power they had, they apparently fail of proving the thing in que­stion, which is not, whether there might not be found out a List of persons in many Churches derived from the Apostles times; but whether those persons did enjoy by way of pecu­liarity and appropriation to themselves, that power which the Apostles had over many Churches while they lived? Now this, the meer Succession will never prove which will best appear by some Parallel instances. At Athens, after they grew weary of their ten yeares [...]; the people chose nine every year to Govern the affairs of the Common-wealth: These nine enjoyed a parity of power among themselves, and therefore had a place where they consulted together about the matters of State which was cal­led [...], as Demosth. in Midiam. Plut. in Pe­ril. & vit. Niciae▪ V. Meursi­ [...]m de A [...]chont. Athen. l. 1. c. 9. Ennium de Ep. Ath. Demosthenes, Plutarch, and others tell us: Now although they enjoyed this equality of power, yet One of them had greater Dignity then the rest, and therefore was called [...] by way of excellency, and his name was onely set in the publike Records of that year, and therefore was called [...] and the year was recko­ned from him, as Paus. in Lacon▪ Pol­lux. Onom. lib. 8. c. 9. Pausanias, and Iulius Pollux inform us. Here we see now the Sccession clear in one single person [Page 301] and yet no superiority of power in him over his Colleagues The like may be observed among the Ephori and Bidiaej at Sparta; the number of the Ephori was alwayes five from their first institution by Lycurgus, and not nine (as the Greek Ety­mologist imagines): these enjoyed likewise a parity of power among them; but among these to give name to the year, they made choice of one who was called [...] here too, [...]s the [...] at Athens, and him they called [...], as Plutarch tells us. Where we have the very name [...] at­tributed Pans. La­con V. Nic. [...]ragium de Rep. L [...]ced. lib. 2. c. 4. to him that had only his primacy of order without any superiority of power, which is used by Iustin Martyr of the President of assemblies among the Christians.

Now from hence we may evidently see that meer succession of some single persons named above the rest, in the successions in Apostolicall Churches, cannot inforce any superiority of power in the persons so named, above others supposed to be as joynt▪Governours of the Churches with them. I dispute not whether it were so or no; whether according to Blon­del the Succession was from the [...], or whether by choice, as at Alexandria; but I onely now shew that this argument from Succession is weak, and proves not at all the certainty of the power those persons enjoyed. Secondly▪ This Succession is not so evident and convincing in all places as it ought to be, to demonstrate the thing intended. It is not enough to shew a List of some persons in the great Churches of Ierusalem, Antioch, Rome, and Alexandria, (although none of these be unquestionable) but it should be produced at Philippi, Corinth, Caesarea, and in all the seven Churches of Asia (and not onely at Ephesus) and so likewise in Creet, some succeeding Titus; and not think Men will be satisfied with the naming a Bishop of Gortyna so long after him. But, as I said before, in none of the Churches most spoken of is the Succession so clear as is necessary. For at Ierusalem it seems somewhat strange how fifteen Bishops of the Circum­cision should be crouded into so narrow a room as they are; so that many of them could not have above two years time to rule in the Church. And it would bear an inquiry where the Seat of the Bishops of Ierusalem was from the time of the Destruction of the City by Titus, when the Walls [Page 302] were laid even wih the Ground by Musonius) till the time of Adrian; for till that time the succession of the Bishops of the Circumcision continued. For Antioch, it is far from being agreed, whether Evodius or Ignatius succeeded Peter, or Paul; or the one Peter, and the other Paul; much less at Rome, whether Cletus, Anacletus, or Clemens are to be reckoned first; (but of these afterwards). At Alexandria where the succession runs clearest, the Originall of the power is imputedito the choice of Presbyters, and to no Divine Institution. But at Ephesus the succession of Bishops from Timothy is pleaded with the greatest Confidence; and the Testimony brought Conc▪ Chal­ce [...]o [...]ens. Part. 2. Act. 11. apud [...]in. Concil. Gr. La To 3. p. 410. for it, is from Leontius Bishop of Magnesia in the Council of Chalcedon, whose words are these, [...] From Timothy to this day there hath been a succession of seven and twenty Bishops, all of them ordained in Ephesus. I shall not insist so much on the incompetency of this single witness to pass a judgement upon a thing of that Nature, at the distance of four hundred Years, in which time Records being lost, and Bishops being after settled there, no doubt they would begin their account from Timothy, because of his im­ployment there once for setling the Churches thereabout. And to that end we may observe that in the after-times of the Church, they never met with any of the Apostles, or Evange­lists in any place, but they presently made them Bishops of that place. So, Philip is made Bishop of Trallis, Ananias Bi­shop of Damascus, Nicolaus Bishop of Samaria, Barnabas Bishop of Milan, Silas Bishop of Corinth, Sylvanus of Thessa­lonica, Crescens of Chalcedon, Andreas of Byzantium▪ and upon the same grounds Peter Bishop of Rome. No wonder then if Leontius make Timothy Bishop of Ephesus, and derive the suc­cession down from him. But again, this was not an act of the Council its self, but onely of one single person delivering his private opinion in it; and that which is most observable, is, that in the thing mainly insisted on by Leontius, he was contra­dicted in the face of the whole Council, by Philip a Presby­ter of Constantinople. For the case of B [...]ssianus and Stephen, about their violent intrusion into the Bishoprick of Ephesus, being discussed before the Council; A question was pro­pounded [Page 303] by the Council where the Bishop of Ephesus was to be regularly ordained, according to the Canons. Leontius Bi­shop of Magnesia saith, that there had been twenty seven Bishops of Ephesus from Timothy, and all of them ordained in the place. His business was not to derive exactly the suc­cession of Bishops, but speaking according to vulgar tradi­tion, he insists that all had been ordained there. Now if he be convicted of the crimen falsi in his [...], no wonder if we meet with a mistake in his [...] i. e. if he were out in his al­legation, no wonder if he were deceived in his tradition. Now as to the Ordination of the Bishops in Ephesus, Philip, a Presbyter of Constantinople, convicts him of falsehood in that; for, saith he, Iohn Bishop of Constantinople going into Asia, deposed fifteen Bishops there, and ordained others in their room. And Aetius Archdeacon of Constantinople instanceth in Castinus, Heraclides, Basilius Bishop of Ephesus, all ordained by the Bishop of Constantinople. If then the certainty of suc­cession relyes upon the credit of this Leontius, let them thank the Council of Chalcedon, who have sufficiently blasted it, by determining the cause against him in the main evidence produced by him. So much to shew how far the clearest evi­dence for succession of Bishops from Apostolical times is from being convincing to any rationall Man. Thirdly, the suc­cession so much pleaded by the Writers of the Primitive Church, was not a succession of Persons in Apostolicall Power, but a succession in Apostolical Doctrine; Which will be seen by a view of the places produced to that purpose. The first is that of Irenaeus. Quoniam valdè longum est in hoc tali Advers. haeres. l. 3. cap. 3. volumine omnium Ecclesiarum enumerare successiones, maximae & antiquissimae, & omnibus cognitae à gloriossimis duobus Apo­stolis Petro & Paulo, Romae fundatae & constitutae Ecclesiae, eam quam habet ab Apostolis traditionem, & annunciatam hominibus fidem, per successiones Episcoporum perveni [...]n [...]es usque ad nos. indicantes, confundimus omnes eos, &c. Where we see Irenaeus doth the least of all aim at the making out of a Succession of Apostolical power in the Bishops he speaks of, but a convey­ing of the Doctrine of the Apostles down to them by their hands: (which Doctrine is here called Tradition, not as that word is abused by the Papists to signifie something distinct [Page 304] from the Scriptures, but as it signifies the conveyance of the Doctrine of the Scripture it self.) Which is cleared by the beginning of that Chapter. Traditionem itaque Apostolorum in toto mundo manifestatam in Ecclesia adest perspic [...]re omnibus qui vera v [...]lint audire; & habemus annumerare eos qui ab A­postolis instituti sunt Episcopi in Ecclesiis, & successores eorum usque ad nos qui nihil tale docuerunt n [...]que cognoverunt, quale ab his deliratur. His plain meaning is, that those persons who were appointed by the Apostles to oversee and govern Church­es, being sufficient witnesses themselves of the Apostles Do­ctrine, have conveyed it down to us by their successours, and we cannot learn any such thing of them, as Valentinus and his followers broached. We see it is the Doctrine still he speaks of, and not a word what power and superiority these Bishops had over Presbyters in their several Churches. To the same purpose Tertullian in that known speech of his; Edant Origines Ecclesiarum suarum, evolvant ordinem Episcoporum suorum, ita per successiones ab initio decurrentem, ut primu [...] De prae­script. ad­vers. haere [...]. cap. 32. ille Episcopus aliquem ex Apostolis aut Apostolicis viris ha­buerit authorem & antecessorem. Hoc modo Ecclesiae Apostolicae census suos deferunt; sicut Smyrnaeorum Ecclesia habens Poly­carpum à Johanne conlocatum refert, sicut Romanorum Cle­mentem à Petro ordinatum edit; Proinde utique & caeterae exhibent, quos ab Apostolis in Episcopatum constitutos Apostolici seminis traduces habeant. A succession I grant is proved in Apo­stolical Churches by these words of Tertullian, and this successi­on of persons, and those persons Bishops too▪ but then it is only said that these persons derived their office from the Apostles, but nothing expressed what relation they had to the Church any more then is implyed in the general name of Episcopi; nor what power they had over Presbyters: only that there were such persons, was sufficient to his purpose, which was to pre­scribe against heretickes, i. e. to Non-suit them, or to give in general reasons why they were not to be proceeded with as to the particular debate of the things in question between them. For praescribere in the civil Law (whence Tertullian transplanted that word as many other into the Church) is, cum quis adversa­rium certis exceptionibus removet à lite contestandâ, ita ut de sum­ma rei neget agendum, eamve causam ex juris praescripto judicandā: [Page 305] three sorts of these prescriptions Tertullian elsewere men­tions; De Virgin. veland. c. 1. Hoc exigere veritatem cui nemo praescribere potest, non spatium temporum, non patrocinia personarum, non privilegi­um regionum. Here he stands upon the first which is a pre­scription of time, because the Doctrine which was contrary to that of the Hereticks was delivered by the Apostles, and conveyed down by their successors, which was requisite to be shewed in order to the making his prescription good. Which he thus further explains; Age jam qui voles curiositatem Dap. 37. de pr [...]scrip [...]. melius exercere in negotio salutis tuae; percurre Ecclesias Apo­stolicas, apud quas ipsae adhuc Cathedrae Apostolorum suis locis praesidentur, apud quas▪ ipsae authenticae eorum literae recitantur, sonantes vocem & praesentantes faciem uniuscujusque. Proximè est tibi Achaia? habes Corinthum. Si non longe es à Macedonia, habes Philippos, habes Thessalonicenses. Si potes in Asiam ten­dere, habes Ephesum. S [...] autem Italiae adjaces, habes Romam, unde nobis quoque auctoritas praestò est. What he spoke before of the persons, he now speaks of the Churches themselves planted by the Apostles, which by retaining the authentick Epistles of the Apostles sent to them, did thereby sufficiently prescribe to all the novell opinions of the Hereticks. We see then evidently that it is the Doctrine which they speak of as to succession, and the persons no further then as they are the conveyers of that Doctrine; either then it must be proved that a succession of some persons in Apostolical power is ne­cessary for the conveying of this Doctrine to men, or no ar­gument at all can be inferred from hence for their succeeding the Apostles in their power, because they are said to convey down the Apostolical Doctrine to succeeding ages. Which Aug. Ep. 42. is Austins meaning in that speech of his, Radix Christianae societatis per sedes Apostolorum & successiones Episcoporum, certa per orbem propagatione diffunditur▪ The root of Chri­stian society, (i. e. the Doctrine of the Gospel) is spread abroad the world through the channels of the Apostolical Sees, and the continued successions of Bishops therein. And yet if we may Aug [...] Ep. 29. believe the same Austin, Secundum honorum vocabula quae jam Ecclesiae usus obtinuit, Episcopatus Presbyterio major est. The difference between Episcopacy and Presbyterie rise from the custome of the Church, attributing a name of greater honour [Page 306] to those it had set above others. And as for Tertullian, I believe neither party will stand to his judgement as to the original of Church power: For he saith expresly, Differenti [...]m Exhort. [...]asil. c. 7. inter ordinem & plebem constituit Ecclesia auctoritas; all the dif­ference between Ministers and people comes from the Churches au­thority; unless he mean something more by the following words, & honor per Ordinis concessum sanctificatus à Deo, viz. that the honour which is received by ordination from the Bench of Church-Officers, is sanctified by God, i. e. by his appointment as well as blessing. For otherwise I know not how to understand him. But however, we see here he makes the Government of the Church to lye in a Concessus ordinis, which I know not otherwise to render, than by a Bench of Presbyters▪ because only they were said in ordinem cooptari, who were made Presbyters, and not those who were promoted to any higher degree in the Church. By the way we may observe the original of the name of Holy Orders in the Church, not as the Papists, and others following them, as though it noted any thing inherent by way of (I know not what) character in the person; but because the persons ordained were thereby admitted in Ordinem among the number of Church-officers. So there was Ordo Senatorum, V. Selden in Eutych. p. 28, &c. Ordo Equestris, Ordo Decurionum, and Ordo Sacerdotum among the Romans, as in this Inscription.

From hence the use of the word came into the Church; and thence Ordination, ex vi vocis, imports no more than so­lemn admission into this order of Presbyters; and therefore it is observable, that laying on of hands never made men Priests under the Law, but only admitted them into publike Office. So much for Tertullians Concessus ordinis, which hath thus f [...]r drawn us▪ out of our way, but we now return. And therefore Fourthly, This personal suceession so much spoken of, [...] sometimes attributed to Presbyters, even after the distinction came into use between Bishops and them. And that even by those Adver. hae­res. l. 3. c. 2. Authors who before had told us the succession was by Bishops, as Irenaeus. Cum autem ad eam iterum traditionem, qu [...] est [Page 307] ab Apostolis, qu [...] per successiones Presbyterorum in Ecclesiis custoditur, provocamus eos qui adversantur traditioni; dicent, se non solum Presbyteris sed etiam Apostolis existentes sapien­tiores, &c. Here he attributes the keeping of the Pradition of Apostolical Doctrine to the succession of Presbyters, which before he had done to Bishops. And more fully after­wards, Quapropter iis qui in Ecclesiâ sunt Presbyteris obau­dire Lib. 4. cap. 43. oportet, his qui successionem habent ab Apostolis, sicut ostendimus, qui cum Episcopatus successione, charisma verita­tis certum secundum placitum patris acceperunt. In this place he not only asserts the succession of Presbyters to the Apo­stles, but likewise attributes the successio Episcopatus to these very Presbyters. What strange confusion must this raise in any ones mind, that seeks for a succession of Episcopal power above Presbyters from the Apostles, by the Testimony of Irenaeus, when he so plainly attributes both the succession to Presbyters, and the Episcopacy too, which he speaks of? And in the next chapter adds, Tales Presbyteros nutrit Eccle­sia, Cap. 44. de quibus & Propheta ait, & dabo principes tuos in pace, & Episcopos tuos in justitiâ. Did Irenaeus think that Bishops in a superiour order to Presbyters were derived by an imme­diate succession from the Apostles, and yet call the Presbyters by the name of Bishops? It is said, indeed that in the Apostles times the names, Bishop and Presbyter were com­man, although the Office was distinct, but that was only during the Apostles life, say some, when after the name Bishop was appropriated to that order that was in the Apostles (so called before); but, say others, it was only till subject Presbyters was constituted, and then grew the difference be­tween the names. But neither of these [...] can draw forth the difficulty in these places of Irenaeus; for now both the Apostles were dead, and subject Presbyters certain­ly in some of these Apostolical Churches were then consti­tuted, whence comes then the community of names still, that those who are said to succeed the Apostles, are called Bishops in one place, but Presbyters in another, and the very succession of Episcopacy attributed to Presbyters? Can we then possibly conceive that these testimonies of Irenaeus can determine the point of succession, so as to make clear [Page 308] to us what that power was which those persons enjoyed, whom he sometimes calls Bishops, and sometimes Presbyters. But it is not Irenaeus alone; who tells us that Presbyters succeed the Apostles; even Cyprian who pleads so much for obedience to the Bishops as they were then constituted in the Church, yet speaks often of his compresbyteri▪ and in his Epistles to Flo­rentius E [...] 69. ed. Pamel s. 4. Pupianus, who had reproached him, speaking of those words of Christ, He that heareth you, heareth me, &c. Qui dicit ad Apostoles, a [...] per hoc ad omnes praepositos qui Apostolis vicariâ ordinatione succedunt▪ where he attr [...]butes Apostolical succession to all that were praepositi, which name implies not the relation to Presbyters as over them, but to the people, and is therefore common both to Bishops and Presbyters; V. Cypri­an. ep. 3. à Cler▪ Rom. ep. 62. & 65. in Mich. 2. epist. 1. Ep▪ ad M [...]g. p. 33. [...]d. [...]s. Vossi p. 31. Vedel▪ p. 50. for so afterwards he speaks, nec fraternitas habuerit Episcopum, nec pl [...]bs Praepositum, &c. Ierome saith, that Presbyters are loco A­postolorum, and that they do Apostolico gradui succeders; and the so much magnified Ignatius, [...], that the Presbyters succeeded in the place of the Bench of Apostles; and elsewhere of Sotion the Deacon [...], as it is read in the Florentine copy set out by Vossius; but in the former Editions, both by Vedelius and the most learned Primate of Armagh it is read [...] but that Usser. p. 49. of Vossius seems to be the true reading, to which the old Latin version in Bishop Usher fully agrees; Quoniam subjectus est Episcopo ut grati [...] Dei, & Presbyterio ut legi Jesu Chri­sti. It might be no improbable conjecture to guess from hence at Ignatius his opinion concerning the original both of Episcopacy and Presbyterie. The former he looks on as an excellent gift of God to the Church; so a learned Doctor Ep. 69. paraphraseth Grati [...] Dei, i. e. Dono à Deo Ecclesiae [...]ndulto; so Cyprian often Divina dignatione, speaking of Bishops; i. e. that they looked on it as an act of Gods special favour to the Church to find out that means for unity in the Church, to pitch upon one among the Presbyters who should have the chief Rule in every particular Church▪ but then for Pres­byterie, he looks on that as [...], an institution and Law of Iesus Christ, which must on that account al­wayes [Page 309] continue in the Church. And [...]o Sotion did commen­dably in submitting to the Bishop as a Favour of God to the Church for preventing schism [...] ▪ on which account it is, and not upon the account of divine institution, that Ignatius is so earnest in requiring obedience to the Bishop, because, as Cyprian faith, Ecclesia est plebs Episcopo coad [...]na­ta, & grex Pastori adhaerens▪ and the Bishops then being Orthodox, he layes such a charge upon the people to adher [...] to them, (for it is to the people, and not to the Presbyters he speaks most) which was as much as to bid them hold to the unity of the faith, and avoid those pernicious heresies which were then abroad; and so Ignatius and Ierome may easily be reconciled to one another; both owning the Coun­cil of Presbyters as of divine institution, and both requiring obedience to Bishops as a singular priviledge granted to the Church, for preventing schisms, and preserving unity in the Faith. And in all those thirty five Testimonies produced out of Ignatius his Epistles for Episcopacy, I can meet but with one which is brought to prove the least femblance of an Institution of Christ for Episcopacy▪ and if I be not much deceived, the sense of that place is clearly mistaken too. the place is Ep. ad Ephesios; He is exhorting the Ephesians [...] ▪ which I suppose may be rendred P. 19. Voss [...]. to fulfill the will of God; so [...] signifies Apoca­lyps. 17. 17. and adds [...]. He begins to exhort them to concur with the will of God, and concludes his Exhortation to concur with the will or counsel of the Bishop; and in the middle he shews the ground of the connexion of these two toge­ther; for Christ, saith he, who is our inseparable life is the counsel of the Father: and the Bishops who are scattered abroad to the ends of the earth, are the counsel of Iesus Christ, i. e. do concur with the will of Christ; therefore follow the counsel of your Bishop, which also you do. Every thing is plain and obvious in the sense here, and very coherent to the expres­sions both before and after; only the [...] must be left out as plainly redundant, and [...] must not be rendred de­terminati, [Page 310] but rather disterminati, because it refers to a place here, and so it notes their being dispersed into several places, and separated from one another, thereby implying the unity of their faith, and the coagulum fidei, notwithstanding their distance from one another as to place in the World, which in Cyprians words is, Ecclesiae universae per totum mun­dum unitatis vinculo copulatae. And certainly a stronger ar­gument then this could not have been given for the Ephesians chearfull obedience to their Bishop (which is the thing be­aims at) then the universal consent of all the Bishops in the Christian World in the unity of the faith of Christ; so that as Christ is the will and counsel of the Father, because of that Harmony and consent which is between their wills; so the Bishops are the will and counsel of Christ, as chearfully uni­ting in the profession of his Faith. So that we see Ignatius himself cannot give a doubting mind satisfaction of the Di­vine institution of Bishops, when in the only place brought to that purpose, his sense is quite different from what it is brought for. So that the Records of the Church are far from deciding this controversie as to the certainty of the form of Government instituted by Christ, because of the Ambiguity of those Records as to the point of succession to the Apostles▪ in that this succession might be only of a different degree, in that it is not clear and convincing in all places: in that where it is clearest, it is meant of a successi­on of Doctrine, and not of persons; in that if it were of persons, yet Presbyters are said to succeed the Apostles as well as Bishops, by the same persons who speak of these. By which last thing we have likewise cleared the Second thing propounded, to shew the ambiguity of the Testimony of An­tiquity, which was the promiscuous use of the names of Bishop and Presbyters, after the distinction between their office was brought in by the Church. For we have made it appear that the names are promiscuously used, when that succession which is sometimes attributed to Bishops, is at other times given to Presbyters. Other instances might be brought of that na­ture▪ as, first, that of Clemens Romanus in his excellent Epist [...]e, which like the River Alp [...]eus had run under ground for so many centuries of years▪ but hath now in these [Page 311] last times of the world appeared publikely to the view of the World, to make it appear how true that is which he saith the Apostles did foresee, [...], Ep. gr. lat. p. 57. that there would be great contentions about the name of Episcopacy▪ and so there are still and that from his Epistle too. For when in one place he tells us that the Apostles ordained their first fruits to be Bishops and Deacons, [...] Page 54. of those that should believe: afterwards he makes no scruple of calling those Bishops Presbyters in several places, [...], Page 57. &c. and speaking of the pre­sent schism at Corinth, he saith, it was a most shamefull thing and unworthy of Christians, [...]. To hear the firm and ancient Church of Corinth, for the sake of one or two persons to raise a sedition against the Presbyters▪ and afterwards, [...]; Pag. 69. & p. 73. p. 2, 3. Only l [...]t the flock of Christ enjoy its peace with the Presbyters which are set over it. But because this is said to be spoken before the time of distinction between Bishops and Presbyters, it being supposed that there were no subject Presbyters then (although no reason can be as­signed why the Apostles should ordain Bishops [...] of those that should believe, and should not likewise ordain Presbyters for them) yet to take away all scruple, we shall go farther; when subject Presbyters, as they are called, are acknowledged to be, and yet Bishops are call'd Presbyters then too▪ For which we have the clear testimony of the Martyrs of the Gallican Church in their Epistle to Eleutherius Bishop of Rome, who call Irenaeus [...], when as Blondell observes he had been nine years Apol▪ p. 3 [...]. Bishop of Lyons in the place of Pothinus; neither doth Blon­dels argument lye here, that because they call him the Pres­byter Euseb. l. 5. cap. 3. of the Church, therefore he was no Bishop, as his An­tagonist supposeth; but he freely acknowledgeth him to have succeeded Pothinus there in his Bishoprick; but because after the difference arose between Bishop and Presbyters, yet they called him by the name of Presbyter, it seems very improbable that when they were commending one to the [Page 312] Bishop of another Church, they should make use of the lowest name of honour then appropriated to subject Presbyters, which instead of commending, were a great debasing of him, if they had looked on a superiour order above those Presby­ters, as of divine institution, and thought there had been so great a distance between a Bishop and subject Presbyters, as we are made to believe there was. Which is, as if the Master of a Colledge in one University should be sent by the Fellows of his Society to the Heads of the other, and should in his Commendatory letters to them, be styled a Senior Fellow of that House▪ Would not any one that read this, imagine that there was no difference between a Senior Fellow and a Master, but only a primacy of order, that he was the first of the number without any power over the rest? This was the case of Irenaeus: he is supposed to be Bishop of the Church of Lyons; he is sent by the Church of Lyons on a Message to the Bishop of Rome; when notwithstanding his being Bishop they call him Presbyter of that Church, (when there were other Presbyters who were not Bishops,) what could any one imagine by the reading of it, but that the Bishop was nothing else but the Seniour Presbyter, or one that had a primacy of order among, but no divine Right to a power of jurisdiction over his Fellow Presbyters? More instances of this nature are brought there by that learned Author, which the Reader may compare with the answers, and then let him judge whether the Testimony of Antiquity have not too much ambiguity in it to decide the Controversie clearly on either side. But that which seems yet more mate­rial, is, that which we observed in the third place, that those who acknowledge the superiority of Bishops over Presbyters, do impute it to an act of the Church, and not ascribe it to any divine institution. The testimony of Ierome to this purpose is well known, and hath been produced already; that of the counterfeit Ambiose, but true Hilary, is in every ones mouth upon this Controversie; Quia primum Presbyteri Episcopi In Eph. 4. appellabantur, ut recedente uno sequensti succederet; sed quia coeperunt sequentes Presbyteri indigni inveniri ad primatus tenendos, immutata est ratio, prospiciente Co [...]cilio, ut non ordo, sed meritum crearet Episcopum multorum Sacerdotum judicio con­stitutum, [Page 313] ne indignus temer [...] Usurparet & esset multis scanda­lum▪ Very strange that an opinion so directly contrary to the Divine right of Episcop [...]cy should be published by a Deacon of the Church of Rome, and these Commentaries cited by Austin, with applause of the person, without stigmatizing him for a heretick with Aerius, if it had been the opinion of the Church, that Bishops in their power over Presbyters did suc­ceed the Apostles by a Divine Right. Nothing more clear, then that he asserts all the difference between a Bishop, and Presbyters to arise from an act of the Church choosing men for their deserts, when before they succeeded in order of place; It is a mistake of Blundels, to attribute this to the Nicene Coun­cil; doub less he means no more then that Hierom calls Con­cilium Presbyterorum, or which he himself means by judicium Sacerdotum. The testimony of Austin hath been already mentioned. Secundum honorum vocabula quae jam Ecclesiae usus obtinuit, Episcopatus Presbyterio major est. Thereby im­plying it was not so alwayes: else to what purpose serves that jam obtinuit, and that the original of the difference was from the Church? But more express and full is Isidore himself the De Eccles. Officiis l. 7. cap. 7. Bishop of Sevill in Spain speaking of Presbyters. His sicut Episcopis dispensatio mysteriorum Dei commissa est; praesunt eni [...] Ecclesiis Christi, & in confectione corporis & sanguinis consortes cum Episcopis sunt; similiter & in doctrina populi & in Officio praedicandi, sed sola propter auctoritatem sum­mo sacerdoti Clericorum Ordinatio reservata est, ne à multis Ecclesiae Disciplina vindicatae, concordiam solueret, scandala generaret. What could be spoken more to our purpose then this is? he asserts the identity of power as well as name, in both Bishops and Presbyters in governing the Church, in celebrating the Eucharist, in the Office of preaching to the people, onely for the greater Honour of the Bishop, and for preventing Schisms in the Church, the power of Ordination was reserved to the Bishop; by those words propter Aucto­ritatem, he cannot possibly mean the Authority of a Di­vine Command, for that his following words contradict, that it was to prevent Schisms and Scandals, and after produceth the whole place of Ierome to that purpose. Agree­able to this, is the judgment of the second Council of Sevil [Page 314] in Spain, upon the occasion of the irregular proceeding of some Conc. His­pal. secun­dum decret. 7. apud Bin. T. 4. p. 560. Presbyters ordained by Agapius Bishop of Corduba. Their words are these: Nam quamvis cum Episcopis plurima illis Ministeriorum communis sit dispensatio, quaedam novellis & Ecclesiasticis regulis sibi prohibita noverint, sicut Presbytero­rorum & Diaconorum & Virginum consecratio▪ &c. Haec enim omnia illicita esse Presbyteris, quia Pontificatus apicem non ha­bent, quem solis deberi Episcopis authoritate Canonum praecipi­tur: ut per hoc & discretio graduum, & dignitatis fastigium summi Pontificis demonstretur. How much are we beholding to the ingenuity of a Spanish Council, that doth so plainly disavow the pretence of any divine right to the Episcopacy by them so strenuously asserted? All the right they plead for, is from the novellae & Ecclesiasticae regula, which import quite another thing from Divine institution; and he that hath not learnt to distinguish between the authority of the Canons of the Church, and that of the Scriptures, will hardly ever understand the matter under debate with us: and certainly it is another thing to preserve the honour of the different Degrees of the Clergy, but especially of the chief among them, viz. the Bishop, than to observe a thing meerly out of O­bedience to the command of Christ; and upon the account of Divine institution. That which is rejoyned in answer to these Testimonies, as far as I can learn, is onely this, that the Council and Isidore followed Jerome, and so all make up but one single Testimony. But might it not as well be said, that all that are for Episcopacy did follow Ignatius or Epipha­nius, and so all those did make up but one single Testimony on the other side? Ye [...] I do as yet despair of finding any one single Testimony in all Antiquity, which doth in plain terms assert Episcopacy, as it was setled by the practice of the Primi­tive Church in the ages following the Apostles, to be of an unalterable Divine right. Some expressions I grant in some of them seem to extoll Episcopacy very high; but then it is in Order to the Peace and Unity of the Church, and in that Sense they may sometimes be admitted to call it Divine and Apostolical, not in regard of its institution, but of its end, in that it did in their Opinion tend as much to preserve the Unity of the Church, as the Apostles Power did over the [Page 315] Churches while they were living. If any shall meet with ex­pressions seeming to carry the Fountain of Episcopal power higher, let them remember to distinguish between the power it self, and the restrained Exercise of that power; the former was from the Apostles, but common to all Dispensers of the Word; the latter was appropriated to some, but by an Act of the Church, whereby an eminency of power was attributed to one, for the safety of the whole. And withall let them con­sider, that every Hyperbolical expression of a Father will not bear the weight of an Argument: and how common it was to call things Divine, which were conceived to be of excellent use, or did come from persons in authority in the Church. One would think that should meet with [...] in the Conc. Chal. Part. 2. Act. 11. Acts of the Council of Chalcedon, it could be rendred by no­thing short of the Scriptures: whereas they mean no more by it, but onely the Emperours Letters to the Council. It hath been already observed how ready they were to call any custome of the Church before their times an Apostolical Tradition. And as the Heathens when they had any thing which they knew not whence it came, they usually called it [...], as though it came immediately from Heaven; So the Fathers when Traditions were convey'd to them without the names of the Authors, they conclude they could have no other Fountain but the Apostles. And thus we see, many Traditions in several Churches directly contrary to one another, were looked on as Apostolical, onely from the pre­valency of this perswasion, that whatever they derived from their Fathers, was of that nature. But then for that an­swer to the Council, and Isidore, and Ierome, that they make but one testimony: I say, that although the words be of the same Sense, yet they have the nature of a different testimo­ny, upon these accounts. First as produced by persons of different condition in the Church; some think they are even with Ierome, when they tell us what a pique there was between him and Iohn Bishop of Ierusalem; and, that he might have the better advantage of his adversary, when he could not raise himself up to the Honour of Episcopacy, he would bring that down to the State of Presbytery; but as such entertain too unworthy thoughts of one of those Fathers, [Page 316] whom they profess themselves admirers of; so this prejudice cannot possibly lie against Isidore, or the Council: For the first was himself a Bishop of no mean account in the Church of God; and the Council was composed of such; it could be no biass then of that nature could draw them to this Opinion: and no doubt they would have been as forward to maintain their own authority in the Church, as the Truth and Consci­ence would give them leave. Therefore on this account one Testimony of a single Bishop, much more of a whole Council of them, against their acting by Divine Authority in the Church, is of more validity then ten for it; in as much as it cannot but be in Reason supposed that none will speak any thing against the authority they are in, or what may tend in the least to diminish it, but such as make more Conscience of the Truth, then of their own Credit and Esteem in the World. Secondly, in that it was done in different ages of the Church: Ierome flourished about 380. Isidore succeeded Leander in Sevill, 600. The Council sat, 619. The Council of Aquen which tanscribes Isidore, and owns his Doctrine, 816. So that certainly supposing the words of all to be the same, yet the Testimony is of greater force, as it was owned in several Ages of the Church, by whole Councils, without any the least controul that we read of. And if this then must not be looked on as the Sense of the Church at that time, I know not how we can come to understand it: if what is positively maintained by different persons in different ages of the Church, and in different places without any op­posing it by Writers of those ages, or condemning it by Councils, may not be conceived to be the Sense of the Church at that time. So that laying all these things together, we may have enough to conclude the Ambiguity at least, and thereby incompetency of the Testimony of Antiquity for finding out the certain form which the Apostles observed in planting Churches.

We proceed to the third thing to shew the incompetency §. [...]8. of Antiquity for deciding this Controversie, which will be from the Partiality of the Testimony brought from thence. Two things will sufficiently manifest the Partiality of the judgment of Antiquity in this Case. First their apparent [Page 317] judging of the practice of the first Primitive Church, accord­ing to the Customes of their own. Secondly, their stiffe and pertinacious adhering to private traditions contrary to one another, and both sides maintaining theirs as Apostolical. First, judging the practice of the Apostles by that of their own times; as is evident by Theodoret, and the rest of the Greek Commentators, assigning that as the Reason why the Presby­ters spoken of in the Epistles to Timothy and Titus, were not Bishops in the Sense of their age, because there could be but one Bishop in a City, whereas there are more expressed in those places, as being in the several Cities: whereas this is denyed of Apostolical times by the late pleaders for Episco­pacy; and it is said of them, that they spoke according to the custome of their own time. And it is now thought there were two Bishops in Apostolical times in several Cities: the one the head of the Jewish Coetus, and the other of the Gen­tile. I enter not the Dispute again here, whether it were so or no, onely I hence manifest, how farr those persons themselves who plead for the judgement of the Fathers as deciding this Controversie, are from thinking them impar­tial Judges, when as to the grounds of their Sentence they are confessed to speak onely of the practice of their own time. Who can imagine any force in Chrysostomes argu­ment, That the Presbyters who laid hands on Timothy must needs be Bishops, because none do Ordain in the Church, but Bishops, unless he makes this the medium of his argument. That whatever was the practice of the Church in his dayes, was so in Apostolical times. There is, I know not what strange influence in a received custome, if generally embra­ced, that doth possess men with a [...]ancy, it was never other­wise then it is with them; nay▪ when they imagine the ne­cessity of such a custome at present in the Church, they presently think it could never be otherwise then it is. But of this I have spoken somewhat already. Secondly, that which makes it appear how partial the judgement of Anti­quity is, in adhering to their particular Traditions, and calling them Apostolical, though contrary to one another. How can we then fix upon the Testimony of Antiquity as any thing certain or impartial in this Case? when it hath been found so [Page 318] evidently partial in a Case of less concernment then this is. A witness that hath once betrayed his faithfulness in the open Court, will hardly have his Evidence taken in a Case of moment, especially when the Cause must stand or fall accord­ing to his single Testimony. For my part, I see not how any man that would see Reason for what he doth, can adhere to the Church for an unquestionable Tradition received from the Apostles; when in the case of keeping Easter, whether with the Jewes on the fourteenth Moon, or only on the Lords day, there was so much unreasonable heat shewed on both sides, and such confidence, that on either side their Tradition was Apostolical. The Story of which is related by Eusebius, and Socrates, and many others. They had herein all the ad­vantages Eccles. Hist. l. 5. c. 25. So­crat. l. [...]5. c. 21. imaginable in order to the knowing the certainty of the thing then in question among them. As their nearness to Apostolical times, being but one remove from them: yea the persons contending pleaded personal acquaintance with some of the Apostles themselves, as Polycarp with Iohn, and Anicetus of Rome, that he had his Tradition from Saint Peter; and yet so great were the heats, so irreconcilable the Controversie, that they proceeded to dart the Thunderbolt of excommunication in one anothers faces; as Victor with more zeal then piery, threw presently the Asiatick Churches all out of Communion, onely for differing as to this Tradition. The small coals of this fire kindled a whole Aetna of con­tention in the Christian world, the smoak and ashes, nay the flames of which, by the help of the Prince of the Aire were blown over into the bosome of the then almost Infant Nor­thern Churches of Brittain, where a solemn dispute was caused upon this quarrel between Colmannus on one side, and Wilfride on the other. The like contest was upon this Occasion between Augustine the Monk, and the Brittish Bi­shops. The Observation of this strange combustion in the Primitive Church upon the account of so vain, frivolous, unnecessary a thing as this was, drew this note from a Learned and Judicious Man, formerly quoted, in his Tract of Schism; By this we may plainly see the danger of our appeal to Antiquity, for resolution in controverted points of Faith. O how small relief are we to expect from thence! For if [Page 319] the discretion of the chiefest Guides and Directors of the Church did in a point so trivial, so inconsiderable, so mainly fail them, as not to see the Truth in a Subject, wherein it is the greater marvel how they could avoid the fight of it; Can we, without the imputation of great grossness and folly, think so poor-spirited persons, competent Iudges of the questions now on foot betwixt the Churches? Thus that person, as able to make the best improvement of the Fathers as any of those who profess themselves the most superstitious admirers of Antiquity. But if we must stand to the judgement of the Fathers, let us stand to it in this, that no Tradition is any fur­ther to be imbraced, then as it is founded on the Word of GOD. For which purpose those words of Cyprian are very Cyprian ep. 47. n. 13. observable; In compendio est autem apud religios as & simpli­ces mentes, & errorem deponere, & invenire atque eruere ve­ritatem: Nam si ad Divinae Traditionis caput & Originem revertamur, cessat error humanus. He asserts it an easie mat­ter, for truly religious and plain-hearted men to lay aside their Errour, and to find out the Truth, which is by return­ing to the head and spring of Divine Tradition, viz. the Scri­ptures; Which he expresseth further, with an elegant simili­tude: Si Canalis aquam ducens, qui copiose prius & largi­ter profluebat, subito deficiat, nonne ad fontem pergitur ut illic Ib. n. 14. defectionis ratio noscatur, utrumne arescentibus venis, in capite unda siccaverit; an verò integra deinde & plena procurrens, in medio itinere destiterit? ut si vitio interrupti aut bibuli canalis effectum est, quò minus aqua continua perseveranter & jugiter flueret, refecto & confirmato canali ad usum atque ad potum civi­tatis aqua collecta eadem ubertate atque integritate repraesenta­retur, qua de fonte proficiscitur. Quod & nunc facere oportet Dei sacerdotes praecepta divina servantes, ut si in aliquo muta­verit (l. nutaverit) & vacillaverit veritas, ad originem Domi­nicam, & Evangelicam▪ & Apostolicam Traditionem reverta­mur, & inde surgat actus nostri ratio, unde & ordo & origo surrexit. His meaning is; That as when a channel suddenly fails, we presently inquire where and how the breach was made, and look to the Spring and Fountain, to see the waters be fully conveyed from thence, as formerly: so upon any failure in the Tradition of the Church, our onely recourse must be to [Page 320] the true Fountain of Tradition the Word of God, and ground the Reason of our Actions upon that which was the Founda­tion of our profession. And when Stephen the Bishop of Rome would tedder him to tradition, Cyprian keeps his liberty by this close question, Unde illa Traditio [...] utrumne de Dominica & Evangelica auctoritate descendens, an de Apostolorum manda­tis atque Epistolis veniens,—Si ergo aut Evangelio praecipitur, aut in Apostolorum Epistolis, aut Actibus continetur—observetur Divina haec & Sancta traditio. We see this good man would not baulk his way on foot for the great bug­bear of Tradition, unless it did bear the Character of a Di­vine Truth in it, and could produce the credentials of Scripture to testifie its authority to him. To the same purpose that stout Bishop of Cappadocia, Firmilian, whose unhappiness with Cyprians, was onely that of Iobs Friends, that they ex­cellently managed a bad Cause, and with far more of the Spirit of Christianity, then Stephen did, who was to be justified in nothing but the Truth he defended. Eos autem, saith Fir­milian, Firmil. ep. inter ep. Cyprian. 75. [...]. 5. qui Roma sunt, non ea in omnibus observare quae sint ab origine tradita, & frustra Apostolorum auctoritatem pr [...] ­tendere, which he there makes out at large, viz. That the Church of Rome had gathered corruption betimes, which after broke out into an Impostume in the head of it. Where then must we find the certain way of resolving the Controversie we are upon? The Scriptures determine it not, the Fathers tell us there is no believing tradition any further then it is founded in Scripture; thus are we sent back from one to the other, till at last we conclude there is no certain way at all left to find out a decision of it. Not that we are left at such uncertain­ties as to matters of Faith (I would not be so mistaken) We have Archimedes his Postulatum granted us for that, a place to fix our Faith on, though the World be moved out of its place, I mean the undoubted Word of God: but as to mat­ters of Fact not clearly revealed in Scripture, no certainty can be had of them, from the hovering light of unconstant Tradition. Neither is it onely unconstant, but in many things Repugnant to its self, which was the last Considera­tion to be spoke to, in reference to the shewing the incom­petency of Antiquity for deciding our Controversie. Well [Page 321] then, suppose we our selves now waiting for the final Verdict of Church-Tradition to determine our present cause; If the Iury cannot agree, we are as far from satisfaction as ever; and this is certainly the Case we are now in. The main difficulty lyes in the immediate succession to the Apostles: if that were but once cleared, we might bear with interruptions afterwards: but the main seat of the controversie lies there, whether the Apostles upon their withdrawing from the Government of Churches did substitute single persons to succeed them or no: so that u [...]less that be cleared, the very Deed of Gift is que­stioned: and if that could be made appear, all other things would speedily follow. Yes, say some, that is clear: For at Ierusalem, Antioch, and Rome, it is evident that single persons were entrusted with the Government of Churches.

In Ierusalem, say they, Iames the brother of our LORD, was made Bishop by the Apostles: But whence doth that Hist. Eccl. l. 2. cap. 22. appear? It is said from Hegesippus in Eusebius. But what if he say no such thing? his words are these [...], which is there interpreted, Ecclesiae ad­ministrationem una cum caeteris Apostolis suscepit. And no more is thereby meant, but that this Iames who is by the Antients conceived to be onely a Disciple before, is now taken into a higher charge; and invested in a power of governing the Church as the Apostles were. His power, it is plain, was of the same nature, with that of the Apostles themselves: And who will go about to degrade them so much as to reduce them to the Office of Ordinary Bishops? Iames in proba­bility did exercise his Apostleship the most at Ierusalem, where by the Scriptures we find him Resident, and from hence the Church afterwards, because of his not travelling abroad as the other Apostles did, according to the Language of their own times, they fixed the Title of Bishop upon him. But greater difference we shall find in those who are pleaded to be successours of the Apostles. At Antioch some, as Ori­gen and Eusebius, make Ignatius to succeed Peter. Ierome makes him the third Bishop, and placeth Evodius before him. Others therefore to solve that, make them cotemporary Bishops; the one of the Church of the Jewes, the other of the Gentiles: [Page 322] with what congruity to their Hypothesis of a single Bishop and Deacons placed in every City, I know not: but that Salvo hath been discussed before. Come we therefore to Rome, and V. M [...]gde­burg, Cent. 1. l. 2. c. 10. here the succession is as muddy as the Tiber it self; for here Tertullian, Rufinus, and several others place Clement next to Peter. Irenaeus and Eusebius set Anacletus before him: Epi­phanius and Optatus both Anacletus and Cletus; Augustinus and Damasus with others, make Anacletus, Cletus, and Linus, all to precede him. What way shall we find to extrica e our selves out of this Labyrinth, so as to reconcile it with the certainty of the Form of Government in the Apostles times? Certainly, if the Line of Succession fail us here, when we most need it, we have little cause to pin our Faith upon it as to the certainty of any particular Form of Church-Government setled in the Apostles times, which can be drawn from the help of the Records of the Primitive Church: which must be first cleared of all Defectiveness, Ambiguity, Partiality, and Confu­sion; before the thing we inquire for, can be extracted out of them.