A DISCOURSE Concerning the POWER OF EXCOMMUNICATION IN A Christian Church▪ By way of Appendix to the IRENICUM.

BY EDWARD STILLINGFLEET, Rector of Sutton in Bedfordshire.

LONDON, Printed for Henry Mortlock, at the sign of the Phoe­nix in St. Pauls Church-yard, neer the Little North-door. 1662.

A DISCOURSE Concerning The Power of Excommunication IN A Christian Church.

IT is a matter of daily observation and experi­ence in the world, §. 1. how hard it is to keep the eyes of the understanding clear in its judge­ment of things, when it is too far engaged in the dust of controversie. It being so very difficult to well manage an impetuous pursuit after any opi­nion, nothing being more common then to see men outrun their mark, and through the force of their speed to bee carryed as farr beyond it, as others in their opinion fall short of it. There is, certainly, a kind of ebriety of the mind, as well as of the body, which makes it so unstable and pendulous, that it oft times reeles from one extream unto the quite contrary. This, as it is obvious in most eager controvertists of all ages, so especially in such, who have discovered the falsity of an [Page] [Page 1] [...] [Page 2] opinion they were once confident of, which they think they can never after run farr enough from: So that while they start at an apparition they so much dread, they run into those untroden paths, wherein they lose both themselves and the truth they sought for.

§. 2.Thus wee find it to be in the present controversie, for many out of their just zeal against the extravagancies of those who scrued up Church power to so high a peg, that it was thought to make perpetuall dis [...]ord with the Common-wealth, could never think themselves free from so great an inconvenience, till they had melted down all Spiritual power into the Civil State, and dissolved the Church into the Common-wealth. But that the world may see I have not been more forward to assert the just power of the Magistrate in Ecclesiasticalls, as well as Ci­vills, then to defend the fundamental Rights of the Church, I have taken this opportunity, more fully to explain and vin­dicate that part of the Churches power, which lies in reference to offenders? It being the main thing struck at by those who are the followers of that noted Physitian, who handled the Church so ill, as to deprive her of her expulsive faculty of Noxious humours, and so left her under a miserere mei.

I shall therefore endeavour to give the Church her due, as well as Caesar his, §. 3. by making good this following principle or hypothesis, upon which the whole hinge of this controversie turnes, viz. that the power of inflicting censures upon offenders in a Christian Church, is a fundamentall right, resulting from the constitution of the Church, as a society by Jesus Christ, and that the seat of this power is in those Officers of the Church, who have derived their power originally from the Founder of this society, and act by vertue of the Laws of it.

§. 4.For the cleare stating of this controversie, it will bee necessary to explain, what that Power is, which I attribute to the Church, and in what notion the Church is to be conside­red as it Exerciseth this Power. First, concerning the pro­per notion of Power, by it I cannot see any thing else to bee understood, then a right of Governing, or ordering things which belong to a Society. And so Power implies only a moral faculty in the person enjoying it, to take care ne quid civitas detrimenti capiat, whereby it is evident that every well con­stituted [Page 3] Society must suppose a Power within its self of ordering things belonging to its welfare, or else it were impossible, either the being or the rights and priviledges of a Society could bee long preserved. Power then in its general and abstracted notion, doth not necessarily import either meer authority, or proper coaction, for these to any impartial judgement, will appear to bee rather the severall modes where­by power is exercised, then any proper ingredients of the specifick nature of it; which in generall, imports no more then a right to Govern a constituted Society, but how that right shall bee exercised, must bee resolved not from the notion of Power, but from the nature and constitution of that particular Society in which it is lodged and inherent.

It appears then from hence to bee a great mistake and abuse of well natured readers, §. 5. when all Power is necessarily restrained, either to that which is properly coercive, or to that which is meerly arbitrary and onely from consent. The originall of which mistake is, the stating the notion of Power from the use of the Word, either in ancient Roman authors, or else in the Civil Laws, both which are freely acknowledged to bee strangers to the exercise of any other Power, then that which is meerly authoritative and perswasive, or that which is Coactive and Penal. The ground of which is, because they were ignorant of any other way of conveyance of Power, besides external force and arbitrary consent, the one in those called Legal Societies or Civitates, the other Collegia and hetaeriae. But to us that do acknow­ledge that God hath a right of commanding men to what du­ty hee please himself, and appointing a Society upon what terms best please him, and giving a Power to particular per­sons to govern that Society, in what way shall tend most to advance the honour of such a Society, may easily bee made appear, that there is a kind of power neither properly coactive nor meerly arbitrary, viz. such a one as immediately results from Divine institution, and doth suppose consent to submit to it as a necessary Duty in all the members of this Society.

This Power, it is evident, §. 6. is not meerly arbitrary either in the Governours or members, for the Governours derive their Power, or right of Governing from the institution of Christ [Page 4] and are to bee regulated by his Laws in the execution of it, and the members, though their Consent bee necessarily sup­posed, yet that consent is a Duty in them, and that duty doth imply their submission to the Rulers of this Society: neither can this power bee called coactive, in the sense it is commonly taken, for coactive power, and external force are necessary cor­relates to each other, but wee suppose no such thing as a power of outward force to bee given to the Church as such, for that properly belongs to a Common-wealth. But the power which I suppose to bee lodged in the Church, is such a power as depends upon a Law of a superiour, giving right to Govern, to particular persons over such a Society, and making it the Duty of all members of it to submit unto it, upon no other pe­nalties, then the exclusion of them from the priviledges, which that Society enjoys. So that supposing such a Society, as the Church is, to bee of Divine institution, and that Christ hath appointed Officers to rule it, it necessarily follows, that those Officers must derive their Power, i. e. their right of Governing this Society, not meerly from consent and confederation of parties, but from that Divine institution, on which the Society depends. The want of understanding the right notion of power in the sense here set down, is certainiy the [...] of Erastianisme, and that which hath given occasion to so many to question any such thing as Power in the Church, especially, when the more zealous then judicious defenders of it have rather chosen to hang it upon some doubtful places of Scripture, then on the very nature and constitution of the Christian Church, as a Society instituted by Jesus Christ.

This being then the nature of power in general, it is, I sup­pose clear, §. 7. that an outward coactive force is not necessary in order to it; for if some may have a right to govern, and o­thers may bee obliged to obedience to those persons antece­dently, to any civil constitution; then such persons have a just power, to inflict censures upon such as transgress the rules of the society, without any outward force. It is here very impertinent to dispute, what effects such censures can have up­on wilful persons without a coactive power; if I can prove, that there is a right to inflict them in Church officers, and an obli­gation to submit to them in all offenders, I am not to trou­ble [Page 5] my self with the event of such things as depend upon di­vine institutions. I know it is the great objection of the fol­lowers of Erastus, that Church censures are inflicted upon persons unwilling to receive them, and therefore must imply external and coactive force, which is repugnant to the nature of a Church. But this admits (according to the principles here established) of a very easie solution; for I deny not, that Churchpower goes upon consent, but then its very plain here was an antecedent consent to submit to censures in the very entrance into this Society, which is sufficient to denominate it a volun­tary act of the persons undergoing it; and my reason is this, every person entring into a Society, parts with his own free­dome and liberty, as to matters concerning the governing of it, and professeth submission to the rules and orders of it: now a man having parted with his freedome already, cannot re­assume it when hee please, for then hee is under an obligation to stand to the Covenants made at his entrance; and conse­quently his undergoing what shall bee laid upon him by the Laws of this society, must bee supposed to bee voluntary as depending upon his consent at first entrance, which in all soci­eties must bee supposed to hold still, else there would follow nothing but confusion in all Societies in the world, if every man were at liberty to break his Covenants when any thing comes to lye upon him according to the rules of the Society, which hee out of some private design would bee unwilling to undergo. Thus much may serve to settle aright the notion of power; the want of understanding which, hath caused all the confusion of this controversie.

The next thing is, §. 8. in what notion wee are to consider the Church, which is made the subject of this power? As to which wee are to consider; This power either as to it's right or in actu primo, or as to it's exercise, or in actu secundo: Now if wee take this power as to the fundamental right of it, then it belongs to that universal Church of Christ, which subsists as a visible Society, by vertue of that Law of Christ, which makes an owning the profession of Christianity the duty of all Church members. If wee consider this power in the exer­cise of it then (it being impossible that the universal Church should perform the executive part of this power relating to of­fences) [Page 6] I suppose it lodged in that particular Society of Chri­stians, which are united together in one body in the commu­nity of the same Government; but yet, so as, that the admi­nistration of this power, doth not belong to the body of the so­ciety considered complexly, but to those officers in it, whose care and charge it is, to have a peculiar oversight and inspecti­on over the Church, and to redress all disorders in it. Thus the visive faculty is fundamentally lodged in the soul, yet all exterior acts of sight are performed by the eyes, which are the [...] Overseers of the body, as the other are of the Church, so that the exercise and administration of this power, belongs to the special Officers and Governours of the Church, none else being capable of exercising this power of the Church as such, but they on whom it is setled by the founder of the Church it's self.

§. 9.This Society of the Church may bee again considered, ei­ther as subsisting without any influence from the civil power, or as it is owned by, and incorporated into a Christian state. I therefore demand, whether it bee absolutely necessary for the subsistence of this Christian society, to bee upheld by the civil power or no? And certainly none who consider the first and purest ages of the Christian Church, can give any entertainment to the Affirmative, because then the Church flourished in it's greatest purity, not only when not upheld, but when most violently opposed by the civil power; if so, then it's being united with the civil state is only accidental, as to the constitu­tion of a Church; and if this bee only accidental, then it must bee supposed furnished with every thing requisite to it's well ordering, antecedenty to any such union, and abstractly from it. For can wee imagine our Blessed Saviour should institute a so­ciety, and leave it destitute of means to uphold it's self, unless it fell into the hands of the civil power? or that hee left every thing tending thereto, meerly to prudence, and the arbritra­ry constitutions of the persons joyning together in this society? Did our Saviour take care there should bee a society, and not provide for means to uphold it? Nay, it is evident, hee not only appointed a society, but officers to rule it; had those officers then a Right to Govern it or no, by vertue of Christs institution of them? if not, they were rather Bibuli than [Page 7] Caesares, Cyphers than Consuls in the Church of God. If they had a power to govern, doth not that necessarily imply a Right to inflict censures on offenders? unless [...] will suppose that either there can bee no offenders in a Christian Church, or that those offenders do not violate the Laws of the society, or there bee some prohibition for them to exercise their power over them (which is to give power with one hand, and take it away with the other) or that this power cannot extend so far as to exclude any from the priviledges of the Church, which is the thing to bee discussed.

Having thus cleared our way, §. 10. I now come to the resolution of the question its self, in order to which I shall endeavour to demonstrate with what evidence the subject is capable of these following things. First that the Church is a peculiar Society in its own Nature, distinct from the Common-wealth. Secondly, that the power of the Church over its members doth not arise from meer confederation or consent of parties. Thirdly, That this power of the Church doth extend to the exclusion of offenders from the priviledges of it. Fourthly, That the fundamental rights of the Church do not escheat to the Com­mon-wealth upon their being united in a Christian State. If these principles bee established, the Churches power will stand upon them, as on a firm and unmoveable basis.

I begin with the first. §. 11. That the Church is a peculiar Society in its own nature, distinct from the Common-wealth, which I prove by these arguments.

1 Those Societies, which are capable of subsisting apart from each other, are really, and in their own nature, distinct from one another, but so it is with the Church and Com­mon-wealth. For there can bee no greater evidence of a reall distinction than mutual separation; and I think the proving the possibility of the souls existing, separate from the body, is one of the strongest arguments to prove it to bee a substance really distinct from the body, to which it is united; although wee are often fain to go the other way to work, and to prove possibility of separation from other arguments evinc­ing the soul to bee a distinct substance; but the reason of that is for want of evidence as to the state of separate souls, and their visible existence which is repugnant to the imma­teriality [Page 8] of their natures. But now, as to the matter in hand, wee have all evidence desirable, for wee are not put to prove possibil [...]y of separation, meerly from the different constitution of the things united, but wee have evidence to sense of it, that the Churh hath subsisted when it hath been not onely separated from but persecuted by all civil power. It is with many men as to the union of Church and State, as it is with others, as to the union of the Soul and Body, when they ob­serve how close the union is, and how much the Soul makes use of the Animal Spirits in most of its operations, and how great a sympathy there is between them, that, like Hyppocrates his Twins, they laugh and weep 'together, they are shrewdly put to it, how to fancy the Soul to bee any thing else then a more vigorous mode of matter; so these observing how close an Union and Dependence there is between the Church and State in a Christian Common-wealth, and how much the Church is beholding to the civil power in the Administration of its functions, are apt to think that the Church is nothing but a higher mode of a Common-wealth, considered as Christian. But when it is so evident that the Church hath, and may sub­sist supposing it abstracted from all Civil Power, it may bee a sufficient demonstration that however neer they may be when united, yet they are really and in their own nature, distinct from each other. Which was the thing to bee proved.

§. 12.2 Those are distinct societies, which have every thing distinct in their nature from each other, which belong to the consti­tution or government of them; but this is evident, as to the Church and Common-wealth, which will appear, because their Charter is distinct, or that which gives them their being as a society: Civil societies are founded upon the necessity of parti­cular mens parting with their peculiar Rights, for the pre­servation of themselves, which was the impulsive cause of their entring into societies, but that which actually speaks them to bee a society, is the mutual consent of the several parties joyning together, whereby they make themselves to bee one Body; and to have one common interest. Apud. Agust. de Civit. de l. 2. c. 21. So Cicero de Repub. defines populus, to bee caetus multitudinis, juris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatus. There is no doubt, but Gods general providence, is as evidently seen in bringing the World into [Page 9] societies and making them live under Government, as in dis­posing all particular events which happen in those societies; but yet the way, which providence useth in the constitution of these societies, is by inclining men to consent to associate for their mu­tual benefit and advantage: So that natural reason consulting for the good of mankinde, as to those Rights which men enjoy in common with each other, was the main foundation upon which all civil societies were erected. Wee finde no positive Law enacting the beeing of civil societies, because nature it's self would prompt men for their own conveniencies to enter into them. But the ground and foundation of that society, which we call a Church, is a matter which natural reason and common notions can never reach to; and therefore an associating for the preserving of such, may bee a Philosophical Society, but a Christian it cannot bee: And that would make a Christian Church to bee nothing else but a society of Essens or an [...] of Pythagorians, who do either not understand or not consi­der whereon this Christian society is founded; for it is evident they look on it as a meerly voluntary thing, that is not at all setled by any Divine positive Law.

The truth is, §. 13. there is no principle more consistent with the o­pinion of those who deny any Church power in a Christian state, then this is, and it is that, which every one, who will make good his ground must bee driven to; for it is evident, that in matters meerly voluntary, and depending only on consideration, such things being lyable to a Magistrates power, there can be no plea from mutual consent to justifie any opposition to supream authority in a Common-Wealth. But then, how such persons can bee Christians, when the Magistrates would have them to bee otherwise, I cannot understand; nor how the primi­tive Martyrs were any other then a company of Fools or Mad­men, who would hazard their lives, for that which was a meer arbritrary thing, and which they had no necessary obliga­tion upon them to profess. Mistake mee not, I speak not here of meer acts of discipline, but of the duty of outward professing Christianity; if this bee a duty, then a Christian society is set­led by a positive Law, if it bee not a duty, then they are fools who suffer for it: So that this question resolved into it's princi­ples, leads us higher than wee think for, and the main thing [Page 10] in debate must bee, whether there bee an obligation upon con­science for men to associate in the profession of Christianity or no? If there bee, then the Church, which is nothing else but such an association, is established upon a positive Law of Christ; if there bee not, then those inconveniencies follow, which are already mentioned.

§. 14.Wee are told indeed by the Leviathan with confidence e­nough, that no precepts of the Gospel are Law, till enacted by civil authority; but it is little wonder, that hee, who thinks an immaterial substance implies a contradiction, should think as much of calling any thing a Law, but what hath a civil san­ction. But I suppose all those, who dare freely own a supreme and infinite essence to have been the Creator, and to bee the ru­ler of the World, will acknowledge his Power to oblige consci­ence, without being beholding to his own creature to enact his Laws, that men might bee bound to obey them. Was the great God fain to bee beholding to the civil authority hee had over the Jewish Common-Wealth (their government being a [...]) to make his Laws obligatory to the consciences of the Jews? What, had not they their beings from God? and can there bee any greater ground of obligation to obedience, than from thence? Whence comes civil power to have any Right to oblige men more, than God, considered as Governour of the World, can have? Can there bee indeed no other Laws accor­ding to the Leviathans Hypothesis, but only the Law of na­ture and civil Laws? But I pray whence comes the obligation to either of these, that these are not as arbitrary, as all other agreements are? And is it not as strong a dictate of nature as any can bee (supposing that there is a God) that a creature which receives it's being from another, should bee bound to obey him, not only in the resultancies of his own nature, but with the arbitrary constitutions of his will: Was Adam bound to obey God or no, as to that positive precept of eating the forbid­en fruit, if no civil Sanction had been added to that Law? The truth is, such Hypotheses as these are, when they are follow­ed close home, will bee found to Kennel in that black Den, from whence they are loath to bee thought to have proceed­ed.

§. 15.And now, supposing, that every full Declaration of the Will of Christ, as to any positive institution, hath the force and pow­er [Page 11] of a Law upon the consciences of all, to whom it is suffici­ently proposed: I proceed to make appear, that such a divine positive Law there is, for the existence of a Church, as a vi­sible body and society in the World; by which I am far from meaning such a conspicuous society, that must continue in a perpetual visibility in the same place; I finde not the least inti­mation of any such thing in Scripture; but that there shall alwaies bee some where or other, in the world, a society owning and professing Christianity, may bee easily deduced from thence; and especially on this account, that our Saviour hath required this, as one of the conditions in order to eternal felicity, that all those who beleeve in their hearts, that Jesus is the Christ, must likewise confess him with their mouths to the world: and therefore, as long as there are men to beleeve in Christ, there must bee men that will not bee ashamed to associate, on the account of the Doctrine hee hath promulged to the world. That one Phrase in the New Testament, so frequently used by our blessed Saviour, of the Kingdome of Heaven (importing a Go­spel state) doth evidently declare a society, which was consti­tuted by him, on the principles of the Gospel Covenant. Where­fore should our Saviour call Disciples, and make Apostles, and send them abroad with full commission to gather and ini­tiate Disciples by Baptism; did hee not intend a visible society for his Church? Had it not been enough for men to have cor­dially beleeved the truth of the Gospel, but they must bee en­ter'd in a solemn visible way, and joyn in participation of visi­ble Symbols of bread and wine, but that our Saviour required external profession and society in the Gospel as a necessary duty, in order to obtaining the priviledges conveyed by his Magna Charta in the Gospel. I would fain know, by what argument wee can prove, that any humane Legislator, did ever intend a Com­mon-wealth to bee governed according to his mode, by which wee cannot prove that Christ by a positive Law, did command such a society, as should be governed in a visible manner, as other societies are? Did he not appoint officers himself in the Church, and that of many ranks and degrees? Did hee not invest those officers with authority to rule his Church? Is it not laid as a charge on them, to take heed to that flock over which God had made them Overseers? Are there not Rules laid down for [Page 21] the peculiar exercise of their Government over the Church in all the parts of it? Were not these officers admitted into their function by a most solemn visible rite of imposition of hands? And are all these solemn transactions a meer peece of sacred Pageantry? and they will appear to bee little more, if the Society of the Church bee a meer arbitrary thing, depending onely upon consent and confederation, and not subsisting by vertue of any Charter from Christ, or some positive Law, requi­ring all Christians to joyn in Church Society together.

But if now from hence it appears (as certainly it cannot but appear) that this Society of the Church doth subsist by vertue of a Divine positive Law, §. 16. then it must of necessity be distinct from any civil Society, and that on these accounts, First because there is an antecedent obligation on conscience to associate on the account of Christianity, whether Humane Laws prohibit or command it. From whence, of necessity it follows, that the constitution of the Church is really different from that of the Common-wealth; because whether the Com­mon-wealth bee for, or against this Society, all that own ir are bound to profess it openly, and declare themselves mem­bers of it. Whereas were the Church and Common-wealth really and formally the same, all obligation to Church Society would arise meerly from the Legislative Power of the Com­mon-wealth. But now there being a Divine Law, binding in conscience, whose obligation cannot bee superseded by any Hu­mane Law, it is plain and evident, where are such vastly dif­ferent obligations, there are different Powers; and in this sense I know no incongruity in admitting imperium in imperio, if by it wee understand no external coactive power, but an inter­nal power laying obligation on conscience, distinct from the po­wer lodged in a Common-wealth considered as such. An out­ward coactive power was alwayes disowned by Christ, but certainly not an internall Power over Conscience to oblige all his Disciples to what Duties hee thought fit.

Secondly I argue from those Officers, whose rights to govern this Society are founded on that Charter, whereby the Society its self subsists. Now I would willingly know why, when our Saviour disowned all outward power in the world, yet he should constitute a Society and appoint Officers in it, did hee [Page 13] not intend a peculiar distinct Society from the other Societies of the world. And therefore the argument frequently used against Church-power, because it hath no outward force with it by the constitution of Christ, is a strong argument to mee of the peculiarity of a Christian Society from a Common-wealth, because Christ so instituted it, as not to have it Ruled at first by any outward force or power. When Christ saith his Kingdome was not of this world; hee implies, that hee had a Society that was governed by his Laws in the world, yet distinct from all mundane Societies: had not our Saviour intended his Church to have been a peculiar Society, distinct from a Common-wealth, why our Saviour should interdict the Apostles the use of a civil coactive power: Or why instead of sending abroad Apostles to preach the Gospel, hee did not imploy the Governours of Common-wealths to have inforced Christianity by Laws and temporal edicts, and the several Magistrates to have impow­red several persons under them to preach the Gospel in their several Territories? And can any thing bee more plain, by our Saviours taking a contrary course, then that hee intended a Church Society to bee distinct from civil, and the power be­longing to it, (as well as the Officers) to bee of a different na­ture from that which is settled in a Common-wealth. I here suppose, that Christ hath by a positive Law established the Government of his Church upon Officers of his own appoint­ment; which I have largely proved elsewhere, Iren. p. 2. c. 3. and there­fore suppose it now. Thirdly, I argue from the peculiar rights belonging to these Societies. For if every one born in the Com­mon-wealth, have not thereby a right to the priviledges of the Church; nor every one by being of the Church, any right to the benefits of the Common-wealth; it must necessarily fol­low, that these are distinct from one another. If any one by being of the Common-wealth, hath right to Church priviledges, then every one born in a Common-wealth may challenge a right to the Lords Supper without Baptism or open professing Chri­stianity, which I cannot think any will bee very ready to grant. Now there being by Divine appointment the several rights of Baptisme and the Lords Supper, as peculiar badges of the Church as a visible Society, it is evident, Christ did intend it a Society distinct from the Common-wealth.

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[Page 14] Fourthly, I argue from the different ends of these societies, a Common-Wealth is constituted for civil ends, and the Church for spiritual: for ends are to be judged by the primary constitu­tion, but now it is plain, the end of civil society is for preserva­tion of mens rights as men (therefore Magistracy is called by St. Peter [...]) but this Christian society doth not re­spect men under the connotation of men but as Christians. The answer given to this is very short, and insufficient when it is said, that every man in a Common-Wealth, is to act upon spiri­tual accounts and ends: For there is a great deal of difference between Christianities having an influence upon mens actings in a Common-Wealth, and making a society the same with a Common-Wealth. To argue therefore from one to another, is a shortness of discourse I cannot but wonder at: unless it could bee proved, that Christianity aimed at nothing else but regulating men in the affairs of a Common-Wealth, which is a taske I suppose will not bee undertaken.

Lastly, I argue from the peculiar offences against this so­ciety, which are, or may bee distinct from those against a Com­mon-Wealth, I deny not, but most times they are the same; but frequently they differ, and when they are the same, yet the consideration of them is different in the Church and Com­mon-Wealth, for which I shall suppose the six arguments pro­duced in the last Chapter of the first part to stand good, Iren. p. 1. c. 8. §. 4. which will strongly hold to excommunication in the Christian Church, though there produced only for the Jewish. I would fain know what is to bee done in many offences, known to bee a­gainst the Laws of Christ, and which tend to the dishonour of the Christian society, which the civil and Municipal Laws, either do not, or may not take cognizance of? Thus much may serve, as I think to make evident, that the Church in it's own nature is a peculiar society distinct from a Common-Wealth, which was the first proposition to bee proved.

The second is, That the power of the Church over it's mem­bers in case of offences, §. 17. doth not arise meerly from confederation and consent, though it doth suppose it. This Church power may bee considered two waies. Either, first, as it implies the right in some of inflicting censures. Or secondly, as it implies in o­thers, the duty of submitting to censures inflicted; now as to [Page 15] both these, I shall prove that their original is higher than meer confederation.

1. As to the right of inflicting censures, on these accounts. First, what ever society doth subsist by vertue of a divine con­stitution, doth by vertue thereof derive all power for it's preservation, in peace, unity, and purity; but it is plain, that a power of censuring offenders, is necessary for the Church­es preservation in peace and purity; and it is already proved, that the Church hath it's Charter from Christ, and therefore from him it hath a power to inflict punishments on offenders, suitable to the nature of the society they are of. I am very prone to think that the ground of all the mistakes on this sub­ject have risen from hence, that some, imprudently enough, have fixt the original of this power on some ambiguous places of Scripture, which may, and it may bee, ought to bee taken in a different sense; and their adversaries, finding those places weak and insufficient proofes of such a power, have from thence rejected any such kinde of power at all; But certainly if wee should reject every truth that is weakly proved by some who have undertaken it, I know no opinion would bid so fair for acceptance as Scepticisme, and that in reference to many weighty & important truths; for how weakly have some proved the existence of a Deity, the immortality of the soul, and the truth of the Scriptures, by such arguments, that if it were enough to overthrow an opinion to bee able to answer some arguments brought for it, Atheism it's self would become plausible. It can bee then no evidence, that a thing is not true, because some arguments will not prove it; and truly, as to the matter in hand, I am fully of the opinion of the excellent H. Grotius, in Luk. 6.22 speaking of excommunication in the Christian Church: Neque ad eam rem peculiare praeceptum desideratur, cum ecclesiae caetu, a Christo semel constituto, omnia illa impera­ta censeri debent, sine quibus ejus caetûs puritas retineri non po­test. And therefore men spend needless pains to prove an institution of this power by some positive precept, when Christs founding his Church, as a particular society, is sufficient proof hee hath endowed it with this fundamental Right, with­out which the society, were arena sine calce, a company of persons without any common tye of union among them; for if [Page 16] there bee any such union, it must depend on some conditions, to bee performed by the members of that society, which how could they require from them, if they have not power to ex­clude them upon non-performance?

2. I prove the divine original of this power from the special appointment and designation of particular officers by Jesus Christ, for the ruling this society. Now I say, that Law which provides there shall bee officers to govern, doth give them power to govern, suitable to the nature of their society: Either then you must deny, that Christ hath by an unalterable institution appointed a Gospel Ministry, or that this Mini­stry hath no Power in the Church, or that their Power extends not to excommunication. The first I have already proved, the second follows from their appointment, for by all the titles given to Church Officers in Scripture; it appears they had a Power over the Church, (as [...].) all which as you well know, do import a right to govern the Society over which they are set. And that this power should not extend to a Power to exclude, convict offenders, seems ve­ry strange, when no other punishment can bee more suitable to the nature of the Society than this is; which is a debarring him from the priviledges of that Society, which the offender hath so much dishonoured. Can there bee any punishment less imagined towards contumacious offenders then this is, or that carries in it less of outward and coactive force, it implying nothing but what the offender himself freely yeilded to at his entrance into this Society?

All that I can find replyed by any of the Adversaryes of the opinion I here assert, §. 18. to the argument drawn from the insti­tution and titles of the Officers of the Church, is, that all those titles which are given to the Ministers of the Gospel in the New Testament, that do import rule and government, are all to bee taken in a spirituall sense, as they are Christs Ministers and Ambassadors to preach his Word and declare his will to his Church. So that all power such persons conceive to lye in those titles, is onely Doctrinal and declarative; but how true that is, let any one judge, that considers these things.

1. That there was certainly a power of discipline then in the Churches constituted by the Apostles, which is most evident [Page 17] not only from the passages relating to offendors in Saint Pauls Epistles, especially to the Corinthians and Thessaloni­ans, but from the continued practice of succeeding ages, ma­nifested by Tertullian, Cyprian, and many others. There be­ing then a power of discipline in Apostolical Churches, there was a necessity it should be administred by some persons who had the care of those Churches; and who were they but the several Pastors of them? It being then evident that there was such a power, doth it not stand to common sense it should be implyed in such titles which in their natural im­portance do signifie a right to govern, as the names of Pa­stors and Rulers do?

2. There is a diversity in Scripture made between Pastors and Teachers, Ephes. 4.11. Though this may not (as it doth not) imply a necessity of two distinct offices in the Church, yet it doth a different respect and connotation in the same person▪ and so imports that ruling carries in it some­what more then meer teaching, and so the power implyed in Pastors to be more then meerly doctrinal, which is all I con­tend for, viz. A right to govern the flock committed to their charge.

3. What possible difference can be assigned between the Elders that rule well, and those which labour in Word and Doctrine, (1 Tim. 5.17.) if all their ruling were meerly labouring in the Word and Doctrine? and all their governing nothing but teaching? I intend not to prove an office of rulers distinct from teachers from hence (which I know nei­ther this place, nor any other will do) but that the formal conception of ruling, is different from that of teach­ing.

4. I argue from the Analogy between the primitive Churches and the Synagogues, that as many of the names were taken from thence where they carried a power of Dis­cipline with them, so they must do in some proportion in the Church; or it were not easie understanding them. It is most certain the Presbyters of the Synagogue had a power of ruling; and can you conceive the Bishops and Presbyters of the Church had none, when the Societies were much of the same constitution, and the Government of the one was [Page 18] transcribed from the other, as hath been already largely proved?

5. The acts attributed to Pastors in Scripture, imply a power of Governing, distinct from meer Teaching; such are [...], used for a right to govern, Matth. 2.6. Revel. 12.5. — 19.15. which word is attributed to Pastors of Churches in reference to their flocks. Acts 20.28. 1 Pet. 5.2. and [...], is applyed to Ministers, when they are so frequently called [...], which notes praesidentiam eum potestate; for Hesychius renders is by [...]; and the [...] at Athens had certainly a power of Government in them.

6. The very word [...], is attributed to those who have over-sight of Churches, 1 Cor. 12.8. by which it is certainly evident, that a power more then doctrinal is un­derstood, as that it could not then be understood of a power meerly civil. And this I suppose may suffice to vindicate this argument from the titles of Church-officers in the New Testa­ment, that they are not insignificant things, but the persons who enjoyed them had a right to govern the Society over which the Holy-Ghost hath made them Over-seers.

§. 19.3. I argue that Church power ariseth not meerly from consent, because the Church may exercise her power on such who have not actually confederated with her; which is in ad­mitting members into the Church: For if the Church-officers have power to judge whether persons are fit to be admitted, they have power to exclude from admission such whom they judge unfit, and so their power is exercised on those who are not confederated. To this it may be answered, That the con­sent to be judged, gives the Church power over the person suing for admission. I grant it doth, as to that particular person, but the right in general of judging concerning admission, doth argue an antecedent power to an actual confederation. For I will suppose that Christ should now appoint some Officers to found a Church, and gather a Society of Christians together, where there hath been none before: I now ask, Whether these Officers have power to admit any into the Church or no? This I suppose cannot be denyed, for to what end else were they appointed? If it be granted they have power to admit persons, and thereby make a Church, then they had power antecedently to [Page 19] any confederation; for the confederation was subsequent to their admission; and therefore they who had power to admit, could not derive their power from confederation. This argument, to me, puts the case out of dispute, that all Church-power cannot arise from meer confederation.

And that which further evidenceth that the power of the Church doth not arise from meer consent, is that Deed of Gift whereby our Blessed Saviour did confer the Power of the Keyes on the Apostle Peter, as the representative in that action of the whole Colledge of the Apostles and Governours of the Church, of which power all the Apostles were actually infeoffed, John 20.23. By which Power of the Keyes is cer­tainly meant some administration in the Church, which doth respect it as a visible society, in which sense the Church is so frequently called, as in that place, the Kingdom of Heaven; Matth. 16.19. and in all probability the administration intended here by the Power of the Keyes, is that we are now discoursing of, viz. the Power of Admission into the Church of Christ in order to the pardon of the sins of all penitent believers, and the shutting out of such who were manifestly unworthy of so holy a communion. So that the Power of the Keyes doth not primarily respect exclusion out of the Church, and receiving into it again upon absolution, but it chiefly respects the Power of Admission into the Church, though by way of connotation and Analogy of reason it will carry the other along with it. For if the Apostles as Governours of the Church were invested with a power of judging of mens fitness for admission into the Church as members of it, it stands to the highest reason that they should have thereby likewise a power conveyed to them, of excluding such as are unworthy after their admission, to maintain communion with the Church. So that this interpre­tation of the power of the Keyes, is far from invalidating the power of the Church, as to its censuring offendors; all that it pretends to, is only giving a more natural and genuine sense of the power of the Keyes, which will appear so to be, if we consider these things. 1. That this power was given to Saint Peter before any Christian Church was actually formed, which (as I have elsewhere made manifest) was not done till after Christs resurrection; Iren. p. 2. ch 5. §. 5. p. 212. when Christ had given the Apostles their [Page 20] commission to go preach and baptize, &c. Matth. 28.19. Is it not therefore far more rational that the power of the Keyes here given, should respect the founding of a Church and ad­mission into it, then ejection out of it (before it was in being) and receiving into it again? And this we find likewise re­markably fulfilled in the person of the Apostle Peter, who opened the door of admission into the Christian Church, both to Jews and Gentiles. So the Jews by his Sermon at Pente­cost, Acts 2.41. when about 3000. souls were brought into the Church of Christ. So the Gentiles, as is most evident in the story of Cornelius, Acts 10.28. who was the first fruits of the Gen­tiles. So that if we should yield so far to the great inhancers of Saint Peters power, that something was intended peculiar to his person in the Keyes given him by our Saviour, we here­by see how rationally it may be understood without the least advantage to the extravagant pretensions of Saint Peters pre­tended successors. 2. The pardon of sin in Scripture is most annexed to Baptism and Admission into the Church, and thence it seems evident that the loosing of sin should be by admitting into the Church by Baptism, 1 Pet. 3.21. Tit. 3.5. in the same sense by which Baptism is said to save us, and it is called the washing of regeneration, respecting the spiritual advantages which come by admission into the Church of Christ; and so they are said to have their sins bound upon them, who continue re­fractory in their sins, Acts 8.33. as Simon Magus is said to be in the bonds of iniquity. 3. The Metaphor of the Keyes referrs most to admission into the house, and excluding out of it, rather then ejecting any out of it, and re-admitting them. Thus when Eliakim is said to have the Keyes of the house of David, it was in regard of his power to open and shut upon whom he pleased. Isa. 22.20. Cypr. Ep. 73. sect. 6. And thus Cyprian, as our learned Mr. Thorndike ob­serves, understands the power of binding and loosing in this sense, in his Epistle to John, where speaking of the re­mission of sins in Baptism, he brings these very words of our Saviour to Peter as the evidence of it; That what he should loose on earth should be loosed in heaven; and concludes with this sentence. Vnde intelligimus non nisi in Ecclesiâ praepositis & in Evangelicâ lege ac Dominicâ ordinati [...]ne fundatis licere baptizare, & remissam peccatorum dare; foris autem nec ligari [Page 21] aliquid posse nec solvi, ubi non sit qui ligare possit aut solvere. That which I now inferr from this discourse is, that the power of the Church doth not arise from meer consent and confede­ration, both because this power doth respect those who have not actually consented to it, and because it is settled upon the Governours of the Church by divine institution. Thus it appears that the right of inflicting censures doth not result meerly ex confederatâ disciplinâ, which was the thing to be proved.

The like evidence may be given, §. 20. for the duty of submitting to penalties or Church-censures in the members of the Church: (2.) which that it ariseth not from meer consent of parties, will appear on these accounts.

1. Every person who enters this Society, is bound to consent, before he doth it, because of the obligation lying upon con­science to an open profession of Christianity, presently upon conviction of the understanding of the truth and certainty of Christian Religion. For when once the mind of any rational man is so far wrought upon by the influence of the Divine Spirit, as to discover the most rational and undoubted evi­dences which there are of the truth of Christianity, he is presently obliged to profess Christ openly, to worship him so­lemnly, to assemble with others for instruction and participa­tion of Gospel-Ordinances; and thence it follows that there is an antecedent obligation upon conscience to associate with others, and consequently to consent to be governed by the rulers of the Society which he enters into. So that this sub­mission to the power of Church-officers in the exercise of Dis­cipline upon offendors, is implyed in the very conditions of Christianity, and the solemn professing and undertaking of it. 2. It were impossible any Society should be upheld, if it be not laid by the founder of the Society as the necessary duty of all members to undergo the penalties which shall be inflicted by those who have the care of governing that Society, so they be not contrary to the Laws, nature, and constitution of it. Else there would be no provision made for preventing divisi­ons and confusions which will happen upon any breach made upon the Laws of the Society. Now this obligation to sub­mission to censures, doth speak something antecedently to the [Page 22] confederation, although the expression of it lies in the confede­ration its self. By this I hope we have made it evident that it is nothing else but a mistake in those otherwise learned per­sons, who make the power of censures in the Christian-Church to be nothing else but a lex cenfederatae disciplinae, whereas this power hath been made appear to be derived from a higher original then the meer arbitrary consent of the several mem­bers of the Church associating together: And how far the examples of the Synagogues under the Law, are from reach­ing that of Christian Churches in reference to this, because in these the power is conveyed by the founder of the Society, and not left to any arbitrary Constitutions, as it was among the Jews in their Synagogues. It cannot be denyed but con­sent is supposed, and confederation necessary, in order to Church power, but that is rather in regard of the exercise, then the original of it; for although I affirm the original of this power to be of Divine institution, yet in order to the exercise of it in reference to particular persons (who are not men­tioned in the charter of the power its self) it is necessary that the persons on whom it is exerted, should declare their consent and submission either by words or actions, to the rules and or­ders of this Society.

§. 21.Having now proved that the power of the Church doth not arise from meer consent of parties, the next grand inquiry is concerning the extent of this power, Whether it doth reach so far as to excommunication? For some men who will not seem wholly to deny all power in the Church over offendors, nor that the Church doth subsist by divine institution, yet do wholly deny any such power as that of excommunication, and seem rather to say that Church officers may far more congru­ously to their office inflict any other mulct upon offendors, then exclude them from participation of Communion with others in the Ordinances and Sacraments of the Gospel: In order therefore to the clearing of this, I come to the third Pro­position.

That the power which Christ hath given to the officers of his Church, doth extend to the exclusion of contumacious offendors from the priviledges which this Society enjoyes. In these terms I rather choose to fix it, then in those crude expressions, [Page 23] wherein Erastus and some of his followers would state the question, and some of their imprudent adversaries have ac­cepted it, viz. Whether Church-officers have power to ex­clude any from the Eucharist, Ob moralem impuritatem? And the reasons why I wave those terms, are,

1. I must confess my self yet unsatisfied as to any convin­cing argument, whereby it can be proved that any were de­nyed 1 admission to the Lords Supper, who were admitted to all other parts of Church-society, and owned as members in them. I cannot yet see any particular reason drawn from the nature of the Lords Supper above all other parts of divine worship, which should confine the censures of the Church meerly to that ordinance; and so to make the Eucharist bear the same office in the body of the Church, which our new Anatomists tell us the parenchyme of the liver doth in the na­tural body, viz. to be colum sanguinis, to serve as a kind of strainer to separate the more gross and faeculent parts of the blood from the more pure and spirituous; so the Lords Supper to strain out the more impure members of the Church from the more Holy and Spiritual. My judgement then is, that excommunication relates immediately to the cutting a person off from communion with the Churches visible society, constituted upon the ends it is; but because communion is not visibly discerned but in administration and participation of Gospel ordinances, therefore exclusion doth chiefly refer to these, and because the Lords Supper is one of the highest priviledges which the Church enjoyes, therefore it stands to reason that censures should begin there. And in that sense suspension from the Lords Supper of persons apparently un­worthy, may be embraced as a prudent, lawful and convenient abatement of the greater penalty of excommunication, and so to stand on the same general grounds that the other doth; for qui potest majus, potest etiam minus, which will hold as well in moral as natural power, if there be no prohibition to the contrary, nor peculiar reason as to the one more then to the other.

2. I dislike the terms ob moralem impuritatem, on this 2 account, because I suppose they were taken up by Erastus ▪ and from him by others as the controversie was managed [Page 24] concerning excommunication among the Jews, viz. whe­ther it were meerly because of ceremonial, or else likewise because of moral impurity. As to which I must ingenuously acknowledge Erastus hath very much the advantage of his adversaries, clearly proving that no persons under the Law were excluded the Temple-worship because of moral impurity. But then withall I think he hath gained little advantage to his cause by the great and successful pains he hath taken in the proving of that; my reason is, because the Temple-worship or the sacrifices under the Law were in some sense propitiatory, as they were the adumbrations of that grand sacrifice which was to be offered up for the appeasing of Gods wrath, viz. the blood of Christ; therefore to have ex­cluded any from participation of them, had been to exclude them from the visible way of obtaining pardon of sin (which was not to be had without shedding of blood, as the Apostle tells us) and from testifying their faith towards God, Heb. 9.22. and repen­tance from dead works. But now under the Gospel those ordinances, which suppose admission into the Church by baptism, do thereby suppose an alsufficient sacrifice offered for the expiation of sin, and consequently the subsequent priviledges do not immediately relate to the obtaining of that, but a grateful comemmoration of the death of Christ, and a celebration of the infinite mercy and goodness of God in the way of redemption found out by the death of his Son. And therefore it stands to great reason that such persons, who by their profane and unworthy lives dishonour so holy a pro­fession, should not be owned to be as good and sound members of the society founded on so sacred a foundation, as the most Christian and religious persons. To this, I know nothing can be objected, but that first, the passeover was commemo­rative among the Jews; and secondly, That the priviledges of that people were then very great above other people, and therefore if God had intended any such thing as excommuni­cation among his people, it would have been in use then. To these I answer.

1. I grant the passeover was commemorative as to the occasion of its institution; but then it was withall typical and annunciative of that Lamb of God who was to take away the [Page 25] sins of the world, and therefore no person who desired ex­piation of sins, was to be debard from it; but the Lords Sup­per under the Gospel hath nothing in it propitiatory, but is intended as a Feast upon a sacrifice and a Federal rite, as hath been fully cleared by a very learned person in his discourse about the true notion of the Lords Supper.

2. I grant the Jews had very many priviledges above other Nations: Nay so far, that the whole body of the people were looked upon as Gods chosen, and peculiar and holy people; and from thence I justly infer that whatever exclusion was among the people of the Jews from their society, will far better hold as an argument for excommunication under the Christian Church, then if it had been a meer debarring from their Levitical Worship. And that I should far sooner insist up­on, from the reason assigned, as the ground of excommuni­cation, then the other infirm and profligated argument; and so the exclusion out of the Camp of Israel and the Ce­rith among the Jews (whatever we understand by it) may à pari hold to a ground of exclusion from the Christian So­ciety: In imitation of which, I rather suppose that exclusi­on out of the Synagogues was after taken up, rather then as a meer Out-lawry, when they were deprived of Civill power.

The question then being thus clearly stated, it amounts to this, Whether under the Gospel, §. 22. there be any power in the Offi­cers of the Church by vertue of divine institution to exclude any offenders out of the Christian society, for transgressing the Laws of it? And according to our former propositions, I sup­pose it will be sufficient to prove that power to be of divine institution, if I prove it to be fundamentally and intrinse­cally resident in the society its self. For what ever doth im­mediately result from the society it self, must have the same original which the subject hath, because this hath the nature of an inseparable property resulting from its constitution. For the clearing of which, I shall lay down my thoughts of it as clearly and methodically as I can; and that in these following hypotheses.

1. Where there is a power of declaring any person to be no true member of the society he is in, there is a formal power [Page 26] of excommunication: for this is all which I intend by it, viz. an authoritative pronouncing virtute officii, any convict offen­der to have forfeited his interest in the Church as a Christian society: and to lose all the priviledges of i [...]: So that if this power be lodged in any Church officer, then he hath power formally to excommunicate.

2. Where the enjoyment of the priviledges of a society is not absolute and necessary, but depends upon conditions to be per­formed by every member, of which the society is judge, there is a power in the rulers of that society to debarr any person from such priviledges, upon non-performance of the conditions. As supposing the jus civitatis to depend upon defending the rights of the City; upon a failing in referente to this in any person admitted to Citizen-ship, the Rulers of the City have the same power to take that right away, which they had at first to give it; because that right was never absolutely given, but upon supposition that the person did not overthrow the ends for which it was bestowed upon him.

3. The Church is such a society in which communion is not absolute and necessary, but it doth depend on the performance of some conditions, of which the Governours of it are the com­petent Judges: And that appears,

1. Because the admission into the Church, depends upon conditions to be judged by Pastors, as in case of adult persons requiring Baptism, and the Children of Infidels being bap­tized: in both which cases it is evident that conditions are pre­requisite, of which the Pastors are Judges.

2. Because the priviledges of this Society do require a se­paration from other Societies in the world, and calls for great­er holiness and purity of life; and those very priviledges are pledges of greater benefits which belong only to persons qualified with suitable conditions; it would therefore be a very great dishonour to this Society, if it lay as common and open as other Societies in the world do, and no more qualifi­cations required from the members of it.

3. We have instances in the sacred Records of Apostolical times, of such scandals which have been the ground of the exclusion of the persons guilty of them from the priviledges of the Christian Society. And here I suppose we may (not­withstanding [Page 27] all the little evasions which have been found out) fix on the incestuous person in the Church of Corinth. As to which I lay not the force of the argument upon the manner of execution of the censure then, viz. by delegati­on from an Apostle, or the Apostolical rod, or delivering to Satan; for I freely grant that these did then import an ex­traordinary power in the Apostles over offenders; but I say the ground and reason of the exercise of that power in such an extraordinary manner at that time, doth still continue, al­though not in that visible extraordinary effect which it then had. And whatever practice is founded upon grounds perpe­tual and common, that practice must continue as long as the grounds of it do, and the Churches capacity will admit; (which hypothesis is the only rational foundation on which Episcopal Government in the Church doth stand firm and un­shaken, and which in the former discourse I am far from un­dermining of, as any intelligent Reader may perceive) now I say that it is evident that the reasons of the Apostles censure of that person, are not fetched from the want of Christian Magistrates, but from such things which will hold as long as any Christian Church: which are the dishonour of the Socie­ty. 1 Corinth. 5, 1. the spreading of such corruptions further, if they pass uncensured. 1 Corinth. 5.6. and amendment of the person, 1 Cor. 5.5. Upon these pillars the power of cen­sures rests it self in the Church of God, which are the main grounds of penalties in all Societies whatsoever, viz. the pre­servation of the honour of them, and preventing of further mischief, and doing good to the offending party. And that which seems to add a great deal of weight to this instance, is, that the Apostle checks the Corinthians that before the exer­cise of the Apostolical rod, they were not of themselves sensible of so great a dishonour to the Church as that was, and had not used some means for the removing such a person from their Society. And ye are puffed up, and have not rather mourned that he that hath done this deed may be taken away from among you, 1 Corinth. 5.2. Therein implying, that whether there had been such a thing in the Church, or no, as the Apostolical rod, it had been the duty of a Christian So­ciety to have done their endeavour in order to the removing [Page 28] such a person from their number. But further, I cannot un­derstand, how it should be a duty in Christians to withdraw from every brother who walketh disorderly, 1 Cor. 5.11. 2 Thess. 3.14. and Church-officers not to have power to pronounce such a person to be withdrawn from, which amounts to excommunication. It is not to me at all material, whether they did immediately relate to Civil or Sacred converse, (concerning which there is so much dispute) for in which soever we place it, if Church-officers have a power to pronounce such a person to be withdrawn from, they have a power of excommunication; so we consider this penalty as in­flicted on the person in his relation to the Society as a Christian; and withall, how nearly conjoyned their civil and spiritual eating were together, 1 Corinth, 11.20, 21. and how strong­ly the argument will hold from Civil to Sacred, viz. à remo­tione unius ad remotionem alterius, not from any fancyed pollution in Sacris from the company of wicked men, but from the dishonour reflecting on the Society from such unwor­thy persons partaking of the highest priviledges of it. Thus from these three Hypotheses this Corollary follows, that where any persons in a Church do by their open and contumacious offences, declare to the world that they are far from being the persons they were supposed to be in their admission into the Church, there is a power resident in the Pastors of the Church to debar such persons from the priviledges of it, and conse­quently from Communion in the Lords Supper. 1. Because this expresseth the nearest union and closest confederation, as the [...] among the Grecian Common-wealths did. 2. Be­cause this hath been alwayes looked on with greatest venera­tion in the Church of God; and therefore it is least of all fit those persons should be admitted to the highest priviledges of the Church, which are unworthy of the lowest of them.

§. 23.There remain only some few objections which are levelled against this opinion concerning the power of excommunicati­on, which from the Question being thus stated and proved, will be soon removed. The first is that this excommunication is an outward punishment, and therefore belongs not to Church-officers, but to the Magistrate. 2. Because it neither is nor ever was in the power of any Church-officer to debar any offending [Page 29] member from publick worship, because any heathens may come to it. 3. It cannot lie as to exclusion from the Lords Supper, because Christ is offered as spiritual food, as well in the Word Preached as in the Sacrament. To these I answer. 1. I do not well understand what the Objectors mean by an outward pu­nishment; for there can be no punishment belonging to a vi­sible Society, (such as the Church is here considered to be) but it must be visible, i. e. outward, or a thing to be taken notice of in the world; and in this sense I deny that all visi­ble punishment belongs only to the Magistrate; but if by out­ward, be meant forcible punishment, then I grant that all coactive power belongs to the Magistrate; but I deny that excommunication formally considered, is a forcible punish­ment. 1. Because every person at his entrance into this So­ciety, is supposed to declare his submission to the rules of the Society; and therefore whatever he after undergoes by way of penalty in this Society, doth depend upon that consent. 2. A person stands excommunicate legally and de jure, who is declared authoritativly to be no member of the Society, though he may be present at the acts of it; as a defranchised person may be at those of a Corporation. 3. A person falling into those offences which merit excommunication, is supposed in so doing, voluntarily to renounce his interest in those prvi­ledges, the enjoyment of which doth depend upon abstaining from those offences which he wilfully falls into; especially if contumacy be joyned with them, as it is before excommuni­cation; for then nothing is done forcibly towards him; for he first relinquisheth his right, before the Church-Governour declares him excluded the Society. So that the offendor doth meritoriously excommunicate himself, the Pastor doth it form­ally, by declaring that he hath made himself no member by his offences and contumacy joyned with them. To the second I answer, That I do not place the formality of excommuni­cation in exclusion from hearing the Word, but in debarring the person from hearing tanquam pars eoclesiae, as a member of the Church, and so his hearing may be well joined with that of Heathens and Infidels, and not of members of the Church. To the third I answer, That exclusion from the Lords Supper is not on the accounts mentioned in the obje­ction, [Page 30] but because it is one of the chiefest priviledges of the Church, as it is a visible Society.

Having thus cleared and asserted the power of excommu­nication in a Christian Church, there remains only one en­quiry more, which is, Whether this power doth remain formal­ly in the Church, after its being incorporated into the Common-wealth, or else doth it then escheate wholly into the Civil power? The resolution of which question mainly depends on another spoken to already; viz. Whether this power was only a kind of Widows estate, which belonged to it only during its separa­tion from the Civil power, or was the Church absolutely in­feoffed of it as its perpetual right, belonging to it in all con­ditions whatsoever it should be in? Now that must appear by the Tenure of it, and the grounds on which it was con­veyed, which having been proved already to be perpetual and universal, it from thence appears that no accession to the Church can invalidate its former title. But then as in case of marriage, the right of disposal and well management of the estate coming by the wife, belongs to the husband; so after the Church is married into the Common wealth, the right of supream management of this power in an external way doth fall into the Magistrates hands. Which may consist in these following things. 1. A right of prescribing Laws for the due management of Church-censures. 2 A right of bound­ing the manner of proceeding in censures, that in a settled Christian State, matters of so great weight be not left to the arbitrary pleasure of any Church-officers, nor such censures inflicted but upon an evident conviction of such great offences which tend to the dishonour of the Christian Church, and that in order to the amendment of the offendors life. 3. The right of adding temporal and civil sanctions to Church-censures and so enforcing the spiritual weapons of the Church, with the more keen and sharp ones of the Civil state. Thus I assert the force and efficacy of all Church-censures in foro humano to flow from the Civil power, and that there is no proper effect following any of them as to Civil rights, but from the Magistrates sanction. 4. To the Magistrate belongs the right of appeals in case of unjust cen­sures; not that the Magistrate can repeal a just censure in [Page 31] the Church, as to its spiritual effects; but he may suspend the temporal effect of it: in which case it is the duty of Pastors to discharge their office and acquiesce. But this power of the Magistrate in the supream ordering of Ecclesiastical as well as Civil Causes, I have fully asserted and cleared already. Iren. p. 1. c. 2. sect. 7. From which it follows, That as to any outward effects of the power of excommunication, the person of the Supream Magistrate must be exempted, both because the force of these censures doth flow from him in a Christian State, and that there otherwise would be a progress in infinitum, to know whether the cen­sure of the Magistrate were just or no. I conclude then, that though the Magistrate hath the main care of ordering things in the Church, yet (the Magistrates power in the Church being cumulative, and not privative) the Church and her officers retain the fundamental right of inflicting cen­sures on offenders: Which was the thing to be proved.

Dedit Deus his quoque Finem.

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