THE HISTORY OF PHILO …

THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY, In Eight Parts.

By THOMAS STANLEY.

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LONDON, Printed for Humphrey Moseley, and Thomas Dring; and are to be sold at the Princes Armes in Saint Paul's Church-Yard, and at the George in Fleet-street neer Cliffords-Inne, 1656.

THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY, The First Part.

Containing those on whom the Attribue of VVISE was conferred.

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LONDON, Printed for Humphrey Moseley, and Thomas Dring; and are to be sold at the Princes Armes in Saint Paul's Church-Yard, and at the George in Fleet-street neer Cliffords-Inne, 1656.

TO MY HONOVRED VNCLE IOHN MARSHAM, Esq

SIR,

I Send this Booke to you, because you first directed me to this de­signe; The learned Gassendus was my precedent; whom neverthe­lesse I have not followed in his partiality: For he, though limited to a single person, yet giveth himselfe liberty of enlarge­ment, and taketh occasion from his subject to make the world acquainted with many ex­cellent disquisitions of his owne. Our scope be­ing of a greater latitude, affords lesse opportu­nity to favour any particular; whilst there is due to every one the commendation of their owne deserts. This benefit I hope to have received from the variety of the subject; but far more are those I owe to your encourage­ment, which if I could wish lesse, I should upon this occasion, that there might seeme to have [Page] been expressed something of choice and incli­nation in this action, which is now but an in­considerable effect of the gratitude of,

Dear Vncle,
Your most affectionate Nephew and humble servant THOMAS STANLEY.

PREFACE.

HIstory (which by expounding actions past teacheth to regulate the future, and fur­nisheth us with wisdom at the cost of other mens experience) is not unlike Painting: their scope is the same; and as in the latter it argues want of skill to look upon the whole draught with an indifferent eye, but to select and insist upon some chiefe particular is proper to an Artist; so he who rests satisfied with the generall relation of affairs, (not fixing upon some eminent Actour in that story) loseth it greatest benefit; since what is most particular, by its nearer affinity with us, hath greatest influence upon us.

Hence it is that there are two kinds of History; One re­presents generall affairs of State; The other gives account ef particular persons, whose lives have rendred them emi­nent. Homer hath given an essay of each; of the first in his Iliads, a relation of a war betwixt different Nations; of the second in his Odysses, confined to the person of Ulysses.

Now the life of man being either practick, busied in civill affairs of peace and war, or Contemplative, retir'd from publick businesse to speculation and study of wisdome, divine or humane, it followes that this personall history bee twofold likewise, describing either the actions of such per­sons as are wholly interested in affairs of state (properly compar'd to the persons of a drammaticall designe, whose single Characters and parts serve one onely to make up one joint plot. Such are most of those whose lives are related by Plutarch, & the twelve Caesars of Sueronius) Or the lives of such as have been excellent in some kind of learn­ing; [Page] Thus Antipho writ of Poets; Eudemus of Astrolo­gers; Cicero and Plutarch of Oratours, Suetonius of Grammarians. They who writ of Philosophers exceeded the rest far in number, of whom to give a particular accompt will be unnecessary, because their workes are not extant, and therefore we shall onely name them, Aetius, Ana [...]ilides, Antigonus, Antisthenes, Aristocles, Aristoxenus, Cal­limachus, Clitomachus, Diocles, Diogenes La [...]rtius, Eunapius, Heraclides, Hermippus, Hesychius, Hippobo­tus, son, Idomeneus, Nicander, Nicias, Panaetius, Por­rius, Plutarch, Sotion and Theodorus.

Of almost all these (which is much to be deplored) there remaine not any footsteps; the onely Author in this kind for the more antient Philosophers is Diogenes La­ertius, for the later Eunapius And to make the misfortune the great [...]r, that which Laertius gives us is so far short of what he might have done, that there is much more to be found of the same persons dispersed amongst other authors, which I have here collected and digested, with what diligence I could.

Nor is it unseasonable at this time to examine the tenents of old Philosophers, when so great variety of opinions daily spring up; some of which are but raked out of the ruines of antiquity, which ought to be restored to their first owners; others being of late invention will receive addition, when advanced to such height wee look down to the bottom from which Philosophy took her first rise, and see how great a progresse she hath made, whose beginnings are almost inscrutable.

Although some Grecians have challenged to their Nation the Originall of Philosophy, yet the more learned of them have acknowledged it derived from the East. To omit the dark traditions of the Athenians concerning Musa [...]us, of the Thebans concerning Linus, and of the Thracians about [Page] Orpheus, it is manifest that the original of the Greek Philoso­phy is to be deriv'd from Thales, who travelling into the East, first brought Naturall learning, Geometry, and Astrology, thence into Greece, for which reason the attribute of wise was conferred upon him, and at the same time upon six others for their eminence in morality & politicks Thus learning in the antientest times was by the Greeks called Sophia (wisdom) and the prafessour thereof, who raised his soul to an [...] degree of knowledge, Sophos (wise) Pythagoras first na­med it Philosophy (love of wisdom) and himself a Phi­losopher, affirming that no man is wise; but onely God.

Laert. vi [...]. Thalet. As concerning those who were honoured with this attri­bute of wise, Damon the Cyrenaean undervalues them all, especially the seven. Anaximenes saith, they were all ad­dicted to Poetry; Dicaearchus, that they were neither wise men, nor Philosophers, but upright men and Law givers: Archetimus the Syracusian wrote concerning their meeting with Cypselus (Father to Periander) whereat he saith himself was present. Ephorus affirms they all met with Croesus, Thales onely excepted. Some say they met also at the Panionian feast, and at Corinth with Periander at Delphi.

There is some controversy concerning their sentences, of which some are ascribed to severall persons, as that,

Lacedaemonian Chilon this profest,
Nothing too much; a mean in all is best.

There is no lesse dissent concerning their number. Leandri­us for Cleobulus and Myson, inserts Leophantus Son of Not Leophan­tum Gorsiadem as the Interpre­ters render. Gorsiades a Lebedion, or Ephesian, and Epimenides the Cretan. Plato (in his Protagoras) substitutes Myson for Periander: Ephorus, Anacharsis for Myson. Some adde Pythagoras. Dicaearchus alledgeth four, acknow­ledg'd [Page] by all Thales, Bias, Pittacus and Solon: then names six more, out of which are to be selected three, Aristode­mus, Pamphilus, Chilon, the Lacedaemonian, Cleobulus, Anacharsis, Periander; some adde Se Suidas [...]: by which Laertius is ex­plain'd contra­ry to the inter­preters. Acusilaus Son of Ca­ba or Scabra an Argive. Hermippus in his Treatise of the seven wise men saith, they were in all seven­teen, of which seven were variously named, which were Solon, Thales, Pittacus, Bias, Chilon, Cleobulus, Pe­riander, Anacharsis, Acusilaus, Epimenides, Leophan­tus, Pherecydes, Aristodemus, Pythagoras, Lasus of Hermionea, Son of Charmantides, or (according to Aristoxenus) of Simbrinus, Anaxagoras. Hippobotus in his commentary of Philosophers reckons Linus, Orphe­us, Solon, Periander, Anacharsis, Cleobulus, Myson, Thales, Bias, Pittacus, Epicharmus, Pythagoras.

Laertius reckons them thus, Thales, Solon, Chilon, Pittacus, Bias, Cleobulus, Periander; whereto he addes Anacharsis, Myson, Epimenides, and Pherecydes. These saith he were called the wise men, to whom some annex Pi­sistratus the Tyrant.

Amongst the Romans also three had the sirname of Sapi­ens, M. Cato, C. Laelius, and L. Acilius.

THALES.

THALES.

CHAP. I.
The Country and Parents of Thales.

GReat wits, which have been happy in benefi­ting Posterity by their excellent inventions, have not alwaies had the fortune to enjoy the just reward, their glory being intercepted of­tentimes by some later disguise of alteration or addition. It were therefore gratitude in us, who find our selves instructed by the Anti­ents, to vindicate the memory of our masters by enquiring dili­gently the Authors of those labours whereof wee reap the Har­vest. This kind of injury hath happened very considerably to THALES the wise man of Miletus, who first introduc'd Na­turall and Mathematicall Learning into Greece, from whence it derived into us; but the honour of so noble a design, the ambiti­ous opposition of some, the industry of others hath so ob­scur'd that there is little of the reputation left to the deserving Author. I have therefore esteemed it worth my pains, to digest what I could collect or observe of a person, to whom all lovers of Learning are so much oblig'd.

The Original of Thales is very obscurely delivered. Some con­ceive he was a Phoenician by birth, whose opinion seeming to be strongly founded upon Laertius, and the Authorities by him alledged, it is necessary that we begin with a disquisition upon his words, which are, as commonly rendred, these.

Now Thales was born, as Herodotus, Duris and Democritus affirm, his Father being Examius, his Mother Cleobulina, of the Thelidae, who were Phoenicians, the most illustrious of all from Cad­mus and Agenor, as Plato also saith] The Testimony of Hero­dotus, though Astronom. Na­tione fuit Phoe­nix, ut Herodo­tus Milesius di­cit. VVhich doubtlesse is corrupt (for what Herodo­tus is that?) and to be re­stored to this effect, Natione fuit Phoenix ut Herodotus, Mi­lesius ut alij dicunt. Higynus and * Suidas seem to understand it ac­cording to the common errour, as if hee were born in Phoenicia, expressely confirmes the contrary, being thus; Thales a Milesian, a farre off by descent a Phoenician; Whence we may gather, that the other two Authorities of Duris and Democritus imported little more, or at least nothing to a contrary sense. So likewise that of Leander, which is by * Clemens Alexandrinus cited jointly with Herodotus, to prove him of a Phoenician extract.

He was made free of Miletus when he went with Neleus who was ba­nish'd out of Phoenicia] The learned In Voce Thales. Casaubon to reconcile this [Page 2] story with that of Neleus, who was not banish'd out of Phoenicia, when he built, Miletus for [...], as if Thales being banish'd out of Phoenicia had gone with Neleus to Miletus; which alteration begetteth a very strange Anacronism, for this Thales was above four hundred years later then that Neleus. Therefore if Laertius meant the same Neleus, either he was strangely mistaken, or his text is cor­rupt, and ought to be understood of the Ancestors of Thales, to which sense it may bee reduc'd with little alteration, thus, [...], as if they being Phoenicians, went into ( arta, and became Citizen [...] of Miletus, at what time Neleus Son of Codrus, being put beside the Kingdom of Athens by his younger brother Me [...]on, lead th [...]ther the Ionian Colonies, whereof Miletus (which he built) was the chief City. Of this Colony see Herodotus, [...] and Aelian.

But as most say he was born there, at Miletus, and of noble race] So they render [...] but in oposition to the first opinion which onely mentions his Family, not Country, it may per­haps be understood here in the same relation: Some (saith he) think, he was of a Phoenician extract, of those who were incor­porated at Miletus; others that he was of a Grecian Family, and that noble. Of this latter opinion is De Herod. [...]nalign. Plutarch who reproves Herodotus for making Thales descended afar off from a Barbarian stock, and Laert. vit. Thal. Hermtppus, who ascribes that saying to him, that he thanked the Gods he was a Grecian, not a Barbarian.

CHAP. II.
Of the time of his birth.

Apollodorus saith, that Thales was born the first year of the thirty fift Olympiad; Laert. Demetrius Phalereus saith, that he was honoured with the title of wise, when Damasias was Archon. Damasias was Ar­chon according to Laert. Dionysius Halycarnassaeus the second year of the thirty fift Olympiad, Lib. 3. when Ancus Martius the fourth King of Rome began his reign.

Hereupon an anachronism of one year is supposed by very learned men, who would have Thales to be born the same year that Damasias was Archon. Whence De Atheniens tempor. Sigonius, De sctent. ma­themat. 32. 8. Vossius, and o­thers bring drown the birth of Thales to the second year of this Olympiad; In Euseb. Scaliger, Archont. 1. 11. Meursius. Rationar. temp. 2. 12. Petavius and others raise Da­masias to the first year, that they may make his Magistracy agree with Thales's birth; neither rightly; for the office of Dama­sias relateth not to the birth of Thales. For the clearing whereof we must take notice, that Damasias in the Athenian Fasti is twice [Page 3] said to be Archon, first in the second year of the thirty fift Olym­piad, the next year after the birth of Thales, and again the fourth year of the forty eighth Olympiad, when he obtained the title of Wise; The latter we cannot mention without acknowledge­ment of the great light Chronology hath received by Mr S [...]lden's Marmora Arundeliana.

It will be also worth observance, that there was another of this name, whom Eusebius placeth at the eighth Olympiad, and Lae [...]tius and Vita Lycurg. Plutarch make contemporary with Homer, Hesiod and Lycurgus. In Euseb. Scaliger, who perceived the inconsistency of this accompt, perceived not the reason of it; for Phlegon fragm. Lycurgus and Iphi­tus instituted the Olympick games twenty seven Olympiads before Coraebus was victor, who according to Eusebius is the first. These two Thales are by some confounded, Eusebius calls the first a natural Philosopher, wheras it is certain that kind of Learning was first introduc'd into Greece by the 2d. In voce Thales. Suidas cites Phlegon, that the latter Thales flourish'd in the seventh Olympiad, which [...]hi [...]gon doubtlesse meant of the first. See St. Au­gustin. de civit. dei, lib▪ [...] cap. 24. & 27. They who place Thales about the seventh Olympiad, and make him contemporary with Romulus, confound the latter Thales with the first, and the true Epoche of the Olympiads with the vulgar. For the first Thales lived in the seventh Olympiad from the first of Iphitus; Romulus liv'd about the same distance from the Olympi­ad of Coraebus.

This time is mistaken by that learned Father Clemens Alex­andrinus, to prove Thales younger then the later Prophets. Stromat. 1. Thus (saith he) It is demonstrated that they who propheci'd in the time of Darius Hystaspes in the second year of his reign, that is to say, Aggaeus, Zacharias, and Malachy, who was one of the twelve seeing that they prophecied in the first year of the forty eight Olympiad, were more antient then Pythagoras, who is said to have been in the sixty second Olympiad; and then Thales eldest of the Greek Sages, who was about the fiftieth Olympiad; as if this were not rather an argument to prove these Prophets contemporary with Thales, which Eusebius allows. Praepar. E­vangel. 10. 4. About the time (saith he) of Cyrus King of Persia, the seven wise men flourished; this was the time in which the last of the He­brew Prophets prophesied, since Troy, above six hundred years, after Mo­ses, no lesse then fifteen hundred years. But if with Clemens Alexan­drinus we account these Prophets coaetaneous with Darius Hy­stas [...]es, they will appear much younger then Thales, for Darius begun his reigne in the last yeare of the sixty fourth Olympiad.

CHAP. III.
His Travells.

HE employ'd the first and greatest part of his time to Creet, to inform himself of the Mysteries of their Religion (for that Island was famous for the birth of Iupiter) as is acknow­ledg'd by himself in an Laert. Epistle to Pherecydes.

That he travell'd also into Asia is affirmed in the same Epistle; some say into Phoenicia, arguing from his Astrology which he is thought to have learned of the Phoenicians, Masters of that Science; and particularly because he is said to have first obser­ved the constellation of the Lesser Bear by which the Phoenicians sayled. D [...] Scient. Mathemat. cap. 32. Vossius essaies to prove the word Cynosura to be Phoeni­cian, not as deriv'd from [...], but from [...] and [...] as being a Collection of light; or [...] Umbilicus igneus.

His last journey (being Plut. de plac. phil. 1. in years) was into Aegypt, to con­ferre (as he acknowledgeth in his Epistle to Pherecydes) with Priests and Astronomers. There he was instructed by the Priests at Memphis, particularly (saith Vit. Pythag. 1. 2. Iamblicus) by those of Iupiter. Laertius affirms he learnt Geometry of them; * Plutarch implies as much of his Philosophy.

He was there in the reign of Plutarch. Symp. sept. s [...]p. conviv. Amasis, by whom much favour'd and admir'd for many things, especially for measuring the height of the Pyramids by the shadow; untill at last accused to him of dis-affection to Monarchs and that kind of Government, to which effect many bitter say­ings of his were alledged concerning Tyrants. As when Molpagoras an eminent person of Ionia demanded what was the strangest sight he ever saw, he answered, a Tyrant old. Another time being at a feast where a question arose, what beasts were most dangerous; of wild, saith he, a Ty­rant, of tame, a Flatterer; and Princes ( saith Plutarch) however they professe themselves far different from Tyrants, yet take no pleasure in such Apothegmes: hereupon he lost the favour of Amasis. Thus having studied Philosophy in Aegypt he returned to Miletus, and Cyril. transported that vast stock of Learning which he had there collected into his own Country.

CHAP. IV.
How he lived at Miletus.

His life at Miletus (as Laert. Heraclides affirmes) was retir'd and private; some report hee married and had a Son named Cybissus, but the truer opinion is of those who say he lived un­married, [Page 5] and made his Laert. Suid in [...]. Sister's Son (whom Vitâ Solon. Plutarch calls Cy­bisthus) his Heir. Laert. Plut. Sympsiac. 3. 6. Stob. Serm. 66. Hee put off his Mother when she first moved him to marry, by telling her it was not yet time, and when hee was more in years, being again sollicited by her, hee answered, nor is it now time, meaning it was then too late. Being deman­ded why he took not some course to have issue, he answer'd [...], which is the same in pronouncing with [...], and may be taken either because he loved children, or di [...] not love them, as In Laertium. Casaubon conjectures; but perhaps his meaning may better bee gather'd out of another answer of his to the same question, Stob. serm. 66. that he did not mean to draw voluntary cares upon his life, and disturb the quiet thereof; or from this story related by Vita Solon. Plutarch.

Solon coming to Miletus to visit him, told him that he wondred hee wholly neglected marriage and issue. Thales at that time answered no­thing, but some few daies after suborned a stranger to pretend that he came within ten daies from Athens; Solon demanded what newes from thence; nothing (answered the other as he was instructed) but the buriall of a young man attended by the whole City, being as was said Son of the most eminent person of the City, who at the same time was abroad in travell. Unhappy man (cries Solon) what was his name? I heard it answered the other, but have forgot, onely I remember he was very famous for Wisdom and Iustice. Solon's fear encreasing upon every answer, he at last asked him if the Fathers name were not Solon, which the other affirming, he beat his own head, and did other actions accompanied with speeches proper to such as are transported with grief; whereupon Thales similing, and interrupting him; These things, Solon said he, deterr'd me from marri­age, which thus disorder even thee a most constant person, but be not trou­bl'd at this newes, it is counterfeit.

In this privacy of life he was follicited and sent unto by ma­ny Princes, whose invitations and amities, ( Plutarch Sept. sap con­viv. saith) he refused; visited by many eminent persons.

Laert. He is said to have cohabited some time with Thrasibulus (a man of excellent wit and judgement) who was King, or (according to the Greek word) Tyrant of Miletus, Arist. pol. 5. Iultim. though his reign con­tinued but eleven months; Herodot. 1. about the time that the Milesians enter'd into a League with Alyates the second then King of Lydia.

CHAP. V.
The attribute of wise conferred on him.

THE attribute of Wise, as Vit. Solon. de civit. d [...]i. 8. 2 Plutarch and Saint Augustine observe, was conferr'd upon the rest in respect of their morall rules and practise, but upon Thales particularly for his [Page 6] speculative Learning. It was first bestow'd on Thales, at what time Damasias was Archon, under whom (according to Laert. Deme­trius Phalareus) all the seven were called wise. The second Damasias was Archon in the third year of the 49th. Olympiad, which Exercitat. Pli [...]ian. pag. 843. Salmasius knew not, when to make the words of Laertius agree with the first Damasias, he misinterpreted Eusebius and Clemens Alexandrinus, and subverted all other accounts of the birth and death of Thales, whereas this fortunately complies with the times of all the seven.

The first was Thales justly preferr'd before the rest in respect of his great Learning, which he owed not to any master; The time when this honour was conferred on him, falls upon the fif­ty ninth year of his age.

The second, Pittacus of Mitylene who flourished in the forty second Olympiad, and died in the third year of the fifty second.

The third, Bias of Priene contemporary with Pittacus, living under Alyattes and Croesus.

The fourth, Solon, who was Archon at Athens the third year of the forty sixt Olympiad. He died Olymp. 55.

The fift, Cleobulus of Lindus, coetanoeus with Solon.

The sixt, Myson of Chene.

The seventh, Chilon of Lacedaemon, who was Ephorus O­lymp. 56.

The credit and glory of these seven, was much encreased ( saith Plu­tarch) by a Tripod sent round from one to another, by a mutual, noble and modest concession: the occasion related thus by Laertius and Valerius Maximus.

Laert. Some young men of Ionia having bought a draught of the Milesian fishermen, when the net was drawn up, there was found in it a Tripod, [ Valer. Maxim. 4. 1. a golden Delphick Table of great weight.] Laert. Hereupon arose a dispute, [ Val. Max. those affirming they had bargain'd onely for the fish, the others that they bought the draught at a venturs; by reason of the strangenesse of the case, and value of the Tripod it was delivered to the City Miletus;] Laert. The Milesians sent to the Oracle at Delphi about it, and received this answer.

Com'st thou Milesian to consult my shrine?
The Tripod to the wisest I assigne.

Hereupon the Milesians by agreement presented it to Thales, he sent it to Bias, Bias to Pittacus, he to another, till it past through all the se­ven, coming at last to Solon, who affirming God to be the wisest, sent it back to Delphi [ Val. Max. giving him at once the title and reward of greatest wisdom.]

But Callimachus in his Iambicks, ( continueth Laertius) relates it otherwise; that Bathycles an Arcadian left a cup, with order that it [Page 7] should be given to the wisest, whereupon it was presented to Thales, and past about in course till it came to him again, who then dedicated it to A­pollo Didymaeus, with these verses, according to Callimachus.

Thales to him that rules th' Ionian State
This twice obtained prize doth consecrate.

In prose thus, Thales the Milesian, Son of Examius, to Delphian Apollo of the Grecians offers this twice received prize of eminence. He that carried the Cup from one to another, was Thyrion Son to Bathy­cles,] whither allude these Verses of Athen. deipn. Phoenix Colophonius.

Thales, whose birth his Country blest,
Esteem'd of all men the best,
Was of the golden Cup possest.

Eudoxius of Gnidus, and Euanthes of Miletus, report that a friend of Croesus having receiv'd from him a golden Cup to be given to the wisest of the Grecians, deliver'd it to Thales, and that at last it came to Solon, who sending to the Phythian Oracle to know who was the wisest, was answer'd Myson; whom Eudoxius substitutes for Cleobulus, Pla­to for Periander; the Oracle concerning Myson was this.

Octoean Myson I declare
Wiser then those that wisest are.

He that was sent upon the enquiry was Anacharsis. Daedacus the Platonist, and Clearchus affirm, that the Cup was sent by Croesus to Pittacus, and so carried about. Andron in Tripode, (which seems to have been a discourse wholy upon this subject, and is likewise cited by Clemens Alexandrinus, to prove that Thales and the other six flourish'd about the fiftieth Olympiad) writes, that the Argi [...]es proposed this Trypod as a prize to the wisest of the Greeks, and that it was adjudged to Aristodemus a Spartan, who resigned it to Chilon; A­ristodemus is mentioned by Alchaeus.

This speech we to Aristodemus owe,
Money's the man, none's poor and honest too.

There are who report that a ship richly laden, sent by Periande [...] to Thrasibulus Tyrant of Miletus, was cast away in the Coan Sea, and the [...] ripod taken up by some Fishermen. Phanodius affirms it was lost in the Athenian Sea, and afterwards brought to the City, and upon consultd­tion voted to be sent to Bias. Others say this Tripod was made by Vulcan, who gave it to Pelops as his wives Portion; from him it came to Mene­laus, and afterwards being taken away with Hellen by Paris, was by the Lacedaemonian [ Hellen] thrown into the Sea, Plut. vit. sol. calling to mind [Page 8] [ Plut. vit. sol. an old Oracle] that it would prove in time to come the ground of many contentions. After this some Lebeaians fishing thereabouts drew it up, and quarrelling with the fishermen about it, it was brought to Coos, but the controversie not decided, the businesse was told to those of Miletus which is the chief City of that Country, they sent sent a messenger to de­mand it, and finding themselves slighted, made war upon the Coans, in which many being slain on both sides, the Oracle declared that the Tripod should be given to the wisest, whereupon both parties with joint consent pre­sented it to Thales [ Plut. vit. sol. The Coans being willing to grant that to a private person, for which they before contested with all the Milesians] who dedicated it to Apollo Didyma [...]us; the effect of the Oracle to the Coans was this.

This Contestation shall continue till
The golden Tripod into th' Ocean cast
By Vulcan, you present to one whose skill
Extends to things to come, present and past.

To the Milesians,

Comest thou Milesian to consult my shrine? as before. Thus [...]aertius. Vit. sol. Plutarch addes, that Thales said, Bias was wiser then himself, whereupon it past to him, from him to another, as wiser; so passing in a circle from one to another, it came at last to Thales the second time. Finally it was sent from Miletus to Thebes, and dedicated to Ismenian Apollo. Theophrastus saith it was first sent to Bias at Priene, then by Bias to Thales at Mile­tus, so passing through all, it came again to Bias; and finally was sent to Delphi. This is most generally reported, saving instead of a Tripod, some say it was a Cup sent from Croesus, others that it was left there by Bathycles

Thus was the Priority of Thales confirmed by the Oracle, for which reason he is by Cicero and Strabo stiled Prince of the wise men, to whom the rest yielded the preheminence.

CHAP. VI.
Of his Philosophy.

THales ( saith Laertius) is by many affirm'd to be the first that made disquisitions upon Nature. Apud Lactant. & de Natura Deor. 1. Cicero (who taught the Greek Philosophy first to speak Latine,) acknowledges Thales to be the first Author thereof. Lib. 14. Strabo saith, that he first of the Grecians made enquiry into naturall Causes and the Ma [...]hematicks. De plac. phil. 1. 3. Plutarch calls him Inventor of Philosophy; Iustine Martyr, Paraenes. ad. Graec. The most anti­ent of Philosophers; Tertullian, first of Naturall Philosophers; Apologet. Lactan­tius, De fals. rel. 1. 5. the first that made enquiry after Naturall Causes.

Sect. 1. That Water is the Principle of all things.

IN his disquisition of the naturall Causes of things, he concei­ved Water to be the first Principle of all naturall Bodies, whereof they consist, and into which they resolve. His reasons (as deliver'd by Placit. philot. 1. 3. Plutarch, and repeated by Eclog. phys. 1. 13. Stobaeus) these.

First, because naturall Seed, the Principle of all living creatures, is humid; whence it is probable that humidity is also the principle of all other things.

Secondly, because all kinds of Plants are nourish'd by moisture; wanting which, they wither and decay.

Thirdly, because Fire, even the Sun it self and the stars are nourish'd and maintain'd by vapours proceeding from Water, and consequently the whole world consists of the same. Whence Homer supposing all things to be engendred of water, saith,

[...]
The Ocean whence all things receive their birth.

In pursuit ( Metaph. 1. 3. as Aristotle saith) of this opinion, he assign'd water the lowest place, holding ( according to Natur. quast. 6. 6. Seneca) that the whole Earth [...]oats, and is carried above the water, whether that we call the Oce­an or great Sea, or any simple moisture of another nature, or a moist ele­ment. By this water ( saith he) the earth is sustained as a great ship, which presseth upon the water that bears it up, because the most weighty part of the world cannot be upheld by the Air, which is subtle and light. Thus is Metaphys. 1. 3 Aristotle to be explain'd, who saith, Thales held, that the Earth being capable of swimming, resteth as wood or the like; now of such things, none suim upon Air, but upon Water.

Upon this ground it was that he held Water ( as Laertius saith) to be the cause of Earthquakes. Thus Nac. quaest. 3. 13. Seneca; He holds that the Globe of the Earth is upheld by water, and carried as a bark, and floateth by the mobility thereof, at such time as it is said to quake. One of his rea­sons alledged by Nat. quaest. 6. Seneca, is this, because in all extraordinary moti­ons thereof some new Fountains commonly issued, which if they incline to one side, and shew their keel asidelong, gather water, which, if it chance the burden they bear be overweighty, raiseth it selfe higher towards the right or left side.

From the testimony of Homer, by which Thales (according to Pluta [...]ch and Iustine Martyr) defended this Tenet (that water is the principle of all things) it is manifest it was deliver'd, (though imperfectly) by other Grecians before Thales; Plutarch Ignis an aqu [...] [...]tilior? else where producing this Authority of Theogon. Hesiod.

[...]
Of all things Chaos was the first—

[Page 10] addeth, the greater part of antient Philosophers called water Chaos [...] from dissusion. The Scholiast of Argonant. 4. Apollonius upon these words.

[...]
The Earth of slime was made,

affirms (citing Zeno) that the Chaos whereof all things were made according to Hesiod was water, which setling became slime, the slime con­dens'd into solid Earth, to which adde this testimony of Cited by A­thenog [...]ras. Orpheus.

[...]
Of Water slime was made:

This opinion they borrow'd from the Phoenicians, with whom the Grecians had a very antient correspondence. Linus came from thence; Orpheus had his learning from thence; as Thales is conceived to have done likewise, which appears clearly in Porphyr. de antro. Nymph. Numenius, an antient Philosopher, who cites the very words of Moses for this opinion, The spirit of God moved on the face of the wa­ters. There is an eminent place in Prae [...]ar. Evangel. 1. 10. Eusebius to prove this; the divi­nity of the Phoenicians asserts the principle of this world to be a dark spi­rituall air, or the spirit of dark air, and Chaos troubled and involv'd in darknesse; that this was infinite and a long time had no bound, but (say they) the spirit being moved with the love of his own principles, there was made a mixtion, which nexure was called love; this was the begin­ning of the production of all things; but the spirit it self had no generati­on, and from this connexion of the spirit was begotten [...], which some call slime, others corruption of watery mistion, and of this was made the seed of all creatures, and the generation of all things.

Nor were the Indians ignorant of this, as Megasthenes delivers their opinion. Strab. lib. 15. They are of the same mind in many things with the Grecians, as that the world had beginning, and shall have end; that God its Maker and Governour goes quite through it; that all things had diffe­rent beginnings, but that of which the world was made was water.

The word [...], Principle, because with Philosophers it in­cludes the efficient cause, and consequently understood singly excludes the rest, that being the most noble, hath given occasion to some to mistake Thales, as is by acknowledging no other prin­ciple, he consequently accounted Water to be God; but that Thales understands by Principle only the material Cause, we may easily gather from Plutarch, De placit. philot. 1. 2. who condemneth Thales for confounding a Principle with an Element, and for holding them to be both one; Wheras (saith he) there is great difference; Elements are cōpounded, Prin­ciples are neither compounded, nor are any compleat substance, & truly water, air, earth, fire we term elements, but principles we call other natures, in this respect that there is nothing precedent [...]to them, wherof they are engendred. [Page 11] For otherwise, if they were not the first, they would not be Principles, but that rather should be so termed whereof they were made. Now certaine things there are precedent whereof Earth and water are compounded, viz. The first informe matter, and the forme it selfe and privation. Thales therefore erres, affirming Water to be both Element and principle of all things. Thus we see by Plutarch, that the objection can, onely be as to the name, not to reason of the name; for the distinction of principle and element being not used in that time, Thales by principle, meant nothing of the efficient cause which is most certaine from Aristotle. Metaphys. 1. [...]. Thales, saith, he affirmes water to be the prin­ciple: wherefore he held the earth to be above the water; perhaps hee conceived so, because he saw that the nutriment of all things is humid, that heat it selfe consists thereof, and that every creature lives thereby; He held that of which things are made to be the principls of all things, for these reasons he was of this opinion, as also because the seeds of all things are of a humid nature, and water is the principle of things humid.

Sect. 2. Of God.

TErtullian saith, Ap [...]loge [...]. [...]. gent. [...] that Thales to Croesus, enquiring concerning the Deity, gave no certaine accompt, but desired severall times of de­liberating to no effect. He seemes to reflect upon the same or a like story to that which is reported of Simonides and Hieron.

But what the opinion of Thales was concerning God, may bee gather'd from two Apothegmes cited by Laertius, repeated with this glosse by Stromat. 5. Clemens Alexandrinus; And what are not those the sayings of Thales that are derived from hence, That God is glorifi'd for ever and ever, and he openly confesseth that he is called [...], hee who knoweth Hearts. For Thales being demanded what God was, that (saith he) which hath neither beginning nor end. Another asking of a man might doe ill and conceale it from God. How saith he, when a man that thinkes it cannot? Men ought to think (sayes De legib. 2. Cicero in his name) that the Gods see all things.

He acknowledged God the first of beings, and Author of the world, asserting (according to Laertius) that the most antient of all things is God, [...]or he is not begotten; that the fairest is the world, for it is his work. This is confirmed by Cicero. De natur. de or [...] Thales the Mile [...]ian (saith he) who first enquired into these things, said, that water was the principle of things, but that God was that mind which formed all things of water. If Gods may be without sence and mind, why did he joyn the mind to water [...] why water to the mind, if the mind can subsist without a body? Thus Cice­ro who understands Thales to intend the materiall principle to be co-eternall with the efficient; which Thales himselfe seems not to mean, when he declared God to be the first of Beings. But that the Mens of [...]naxagoras, for the annexing of which to mat­ter, he was so much famed, was no more then what he borrowed from Thales, the words of Cicero make good.

[Page 12] He affirmed that God by the immutable decree of his provi­dence governs the world. Thales (saith Stobaeus) being demanded what was most strong, answered Necessity, for it rules all the world. Neces­sity is the firm judgment and immutable power of providence. Hither we must likewise referre what is cited under his name by the same Stobaeus, that the first mover is immovable, which Physic. [...]. 7. Aristotle hath bor­row'd from him, not owning the Author.

Something imperfectly was before delivered by Orpheus, con­cerning God, alledged by Admonit. ad gent. Clemens Alexandrinus and others; but as Cicero saith; Thales was the first among the Grecians, who made any search into these things; and that he brought it out of Aegypt, the Grecians themselves deny not, Herodot. lib. 2. for they acknowledge, that they received the names of their Gods from thence, and beleeved the Aegyptians to be the first, who looking up to the world a­bove them, and admiring the nature of the universe, reflected upon the Deity.

Sect. 3. Of Daemons.

THales ( saith Placit. Phi­los. 1. 8. Plutarch) with Pythagoras, Plato, and the Sto­icks hold, that Daemons are spirituall substances, and the He­ro's souls separated from the bodies, of which sort, there are two, good, and bad, the good Hero's are the good souls, the bad, the bad. The same or­der Apolog. Athenagoras attests to be observed by Thales, ranking the three degrees thus: First, that of the immortall Gods, next Dae­mons, thirdly Heroes: This was followed by Pythagoras, that the Gods were to be prefered in reverence before Daemons, Hero's before men.

He affirm'd (as Stobaeus saith) the world to be full of these Daemons. This is thought the meaning of that of De anim [...]. 1. 8. Aristotle, repeated by Cicero, Thales thought that all things were full of Gods. The same assertion Laertius ascribes to Pythagoras, [...] legib. 2. that all the aire is full of souls, Vit. Pythag. which are Hero's and Daemons.

This opinion was asserted by the Greeks, before the time of Thales, particularly by Hesiod; but whether that be argument enough, to deny, that Thales had it from the Aegyptians, I que­stion; that they held it in the same manner, we may learn by De myster. Egypt. sub initi [...] Iamblichus. Besides, Pythagoras and Plato (whom Plutarch joynes in this Tenet with Thales) drew their learning from the same fountain.

Sect. 4. Of the Soul.

PLutarch and Stobaeus say, that Thales first affirm'd the soul to be [...], a selfe moving nature. De plac. Phil. 4. 2. Aristotle that he calls it [...] in respect to the motion it gives to other things, De anima. 1. 2. in which are included both parts of the definition of the Plato in timae. Platonists, a sub­stance, [Page 13] having within it selfe a power to move it selfe and other things: which Plato argues to this effect: The first of motions is that whereby a thing moves it self [...]; the second, that whereby it moves another: every thing that moves it selfe, lives; every living thing lives, because it moves it selfe, the resore the power of selfe motion is the essence of that substance which we call the soul, which soul is the cause of the first generation and motion of things which are, nere, and shall be; and of all their contraries, as of all transmutation, the principall of motion, and therefore more antient than the body, which it moves by a second motion. And afterwards declares these to be the names of the souls motion, to will, to consider, to take care, to consult, to judge rightly, and not rightly, to joy, to grieve, to dare, to fear, to hate, to love, and the like. These which are the first mo­tions, and suscipient of the second corporall, bring all things into aug­mention, and d [...]cre [...]se, conversion, or cond [...]mnation, and descretion, or rarefaction. This opinion first raised by Thales, was entertained in the schooles with the assent of Stob. Ecl. phys. lib. 1. Pythagoras, Anaxagoras, Socrates, and Plato, till exploded by Aristotle, Arist. de anima. l. 2. whose chief arguments a­gainst it were these. 1. That nothing is moved but what is in place, nothing in place but what hath quantity, which because the soul wants, none of the foure kinds of motion ( viz. Lation, Alteration, diminution, accretion) are competible ( perse) to her. Secondly, that selfe motion is not essentiall to the Soul, because she is moved accidentally, by externall objects. The first, if un­derstood of Circumscription, not only denies the motion of all things, that are definitively in place, as spirits, but of the high­est sphear, if compared with Aristotles definition of place; yet that some of these species of motion, though in a different ex­traordinary manner, are competent to the soul, and not acci­dentally, may be argued 1. From the further diffusion of the soul, according to the augmentation of the body. 2. From intel­lection, which is acknowledg'd a perfection, and consequently a kind of alteration, which that Thales understood to be one of the soul's motions, is clear from that Apothegme ascribed to him by L [...]ertius, the swiftest of things is the mind, for it over-runs all things: Whence Tuscul. quast. [...]. Cicero (confessing almost in the very words of Thales, that nothing is swifter then the mind, that no swiftnesse may compare with the swiftnesse of the mind) would interpret the [...] of Aristotle, a continued and perpetuall motion.

The second reason may be questioned by comparing the acts of the memory, and reminiscence; the first occasion'd by exterior things, yet objective only, so that the motion is within her selfe; but by the other she moves her selfe, from a privation to a habit, without the help of any exterior.

It is worth notice, that among these and other reasons al­ledg'd by De anima. 1. 3. Aristotle to destroy this assertion, one is the possi­bility of the resurrection of the body; but this [...].

From the second part of the difference in the definition ( viz. [Page 14] from moving other things) Thales argued, that the Load-stone, and Amber had soules; the first because it drawes Iron, the second Straw. He further (saith Laertius) asserted those things we count inoni­mate, to have souls, arguing it from the loadstone and Amber: the reason of which latter example, In Laert. Aldobrandinu [...] falsely interprets its change of colour, and jarring as it were at poison: But De anima. 1. 2 Aristotle more plainly, for of those whom we mentioned, Thales seems to have taken the soul to be something [...], apt to move, since he affirmed a stone to have a soul, because it moved Iron.

He asserted likewise the soul (of man) to be immortall, and ac­cording to Laert. Cherilus, was the first that held so. Tusc. quaest. 1. Cicero ascribes the originall of this opinion to Pherecydes, but it rather seems to have been brought by Thales from the Egyptians; that they held so Lib. 2. Herodotus attests.

Sect. 5. Of the World.

THales held, Plutarch. de plac. phil. 2. 1. that there was but one world, and that Laert. made by God; which truth was follow'd by all Philosophers, as De Coclo. 1. 1 [...]. 12. Ari­stotle confesseth, untill he rejected it, to defend, by the cont [...]a­rie an assertion equally false, that the world is everlasting, which could not be, saith he, if it had beginning.

That Laert. the world being Gods work, is the fairest of things, whatsoever disposed in lively order, being a part thereof, for which reason Pytha­goras (according to De plac. phil. 2. 1. Plutarch) called it first [...].

That night is elder then day. This circumstance of the creation was held likewise by Timoth. Orpheus, and Hesiod, who had it from the Phoenicians: for this reason the Damascen. Numidians, Tacit. de mor. Germ. Germans, Caesar de bell [...] Gail. [...]. and * Gaules reckoned by nights.

That the Laert. world is animated, and that Plut. de plac. phil. God is the soul thereof, dif­fus'd through every part, whose divine moving vertue penetrats through the element of water. Thus explain'd by the Hermetick Philosophers; [...]he divine spirit who produc'd this world out of the first water, being infus'd as it were, by a continuall inspiration into the works of nature, and diffus'd largely through, by a certain secret, and continuall act, moving the whole, and every parti­cular according to its kind, is the soul of the world.

That the Laert. Plut. s [...]pt. sap. conviv. World is contained in place. This agrees with the de­finition of place by space; but they who with Aristotle define place a superficies, though they hold the parts of the world to be in place, are forced to deny the whole to be so.

That in the world there is no vacuum, Plut de plac. phil. 1. 18. in which (as Plut [...]rch ob­serves) all Philosophers agree, who affirm the world to be ani­mated, and govern'd by providence; the contrary defended by those who maintain that it consisteth of Atomes, is inanimate, not governed by providence.

That Plut. de plac. phil. 1. 9. matter is fluid and variable.

[Page 15] That Plut. de pla phil. 1. 16. Bodies are passible and divisible, in infinitum, and continuous as are also a line, supers [...]cies, place, and time.

That Plut. de plat. phil. 2. 13. Achill. Ta [...]. [...] in Arat. mistion is made by composition of the elements.

That * the starrs are earthly, yet fiery; De c [...]el [...]. 2. 7. [...] de plac. phil. 2. 28. the Sun earthly. They who affirm the starres to be fiery, saith * Aristotle, hold so, as conceiving the whole superiour body to be fire.

That the Moon is of the same nature with the Sun, that she is illu­minat [...]d by him. Plutarch, and Stobaeus affirm this to be first held by Thales, though Eudemus cited by Theon ascribe it to Anaximan­der.

That the monthly occulations of the Moon are caused by the neer­ness of the Sun shining round her.

That there is but Plut. de plac. phil. 3. 9. one earth, Plut. de plac. phil. 3. 10. round, in fashion of a Globe, Plut. de plac. phil. 3. 11. seated in the midst of the world, to which relates that speech ascribed to him by Cleodemus, that, if the earth were taken out of the world, there must of necessity follow a confusion of all things.

That Sept. sap. conviv the overflowing of Nilus is caused by the Etesian (yearly) winds, which rise with the Dog star, Laert. after the summer solstice, and beginning to b [...]ow from the North, spread (as Meteor. 2. 6. Aristotle de­scribes them) into remote quarters. These (saith De plac. phil. Pluta [...]ch) blowing directly against Aegypt, cause the water so to swell, that the sea driven by these winds, entereth within the mouth of that River, and hindereth it, that it cannot discharge it selfe freely into the Sea, but is repulsed. Where­upon (addes Lib. 1. Diodorus Siculus) it overflowes Aegypt, which lyeth low and levell. But this reason, though it seem plausible, is easily disproved; for if this were true, all the Rivers which are discharged into the Sea, opposite to the Etesian winds, should have the same overflowing. Thus Diodorus in his excellent discourse upon this subject, which concludes with the opinion of Agatharchides, that it is occasion'd by rain, coming from the mountaines of Ethiopia.

CHAP. VII.
Of his Geometry.

APuleius, who calls Thales the inventer of Geometry amongst the Grecians, Florid. lib. 4. Laert. vit. Pythag. is more just to his memory then Anticlides and o­thers, who ascribe the honour thereof to Moeris, or to Pythago­ras, who by the acknowledgment of De vita. Pythag. 1. 2. Iamblichus, a Pythagorean, learnt Mathematicks of Thales. The originall and progresse of this science, In Eucli [...]. 2. 4. to the perfection it received from Pythagoras (which gave occasion to that mistake) is thus delivered by [...]roclus.

Geometry was invented by the Egyptians, taking [...]is beginning from measuring fields, it being necessary for them, by reason of the inundation of Nilus, which washed away the bounds of their severalls. Nor is it to be wondered at, that as well this, as other sciences, should have their begin­ning from commodiousnesse, and opportunity; since, as is said in generation, [Page 16] it proceeds from imperfect to perfect; therefore not without reason is the transition from sense to consideration, Supply the breach in the text, [...] &c. so Ba­rocius translates and from consideration to the mind. As therefore among the Phaenicians, by reason of merchandise and traffick, the certain knowledge of numbers had its beginning; so likewise among the Aegyptians, Geometry was found out upon the foresaid occasion; and Thales going to Egypt, first brought over this science in [...]o Greece: and many things he found out himselfe, and taught his followers the principles of many things, declaring some more generally, other things more plainly. Next him Ameristus, brother to Stesichorus the Poet, is remembred, Reade, [...]. as having touched Geometry, of whon Hippias the Elean makes men­tion, as eminent in that knowledge: After these Pythagoras considering the principles thereof more highly, advanced it into a liberall science.

Sect. 1. Propositions invented by him.

THat he improved (as Proclus implies) the Geometry which he learnt of the Aegyptians with many propositions of his own, is confirmed by Laertius, who saith, that he much advanced those things, the invention whereof Callimachus in his Iambicks, as­scribes to Euphorbus the Phrygian, as scalenous triangles, and others. Nor is it to be doubted, but that many of them are of those, which Euclid hath reduced into his Elements; whose design it was to collect and digest those that were invented by others, accurately demonstrating such as were more negligently pro­ved, but of them only, these are known to be his.

[1. Every Diameter divides its circle into two equall parts. Lib. 1. def. 17.] This proposition which Euclid makes part of the definition of a Dia­meter, in Euclid lib. 2. com. 14. Proclus affirmes to have been first demonstrated by Thales.

2. [ Euclid. lib. 1. prop. 5. In all Isosceles triangles, the angles at the base are equall the one to the other, and those right lines being produced, the angles under the base are equall.] lib. 3. com. 9. Proclus saith, that for the invention of this like­wise, as of many other propositions, we are beholding to Thales, for he first observed and said, that of every Isosceles, the angels at the base are equall, and according to the antients called equall like. These are three passages in the demonstration, which infer nothing toward the conclusion, of which kind there are many in Euclid, and seem to confirm the antiquity thereof, and that it was lesse curiously reformed by him.

3. [If two lines cut one the other, the verticle angles shall equall the one the other.] Euclid. lib. 1. prop. 15. Eudemus attests this theorem to have been invented by Thales, Procl. lib. 3. com. 19. but first demonstrated by Euclid. Euclid lib. 1. prop. 26.

4. [ Procl. lib. 3. com. 31. If two triangles have two angles equall to two angles the one to the other, and one side equall to one side, either that which is adjacent to the equall angles, or that which subtendeth one of the equall angles, they shall likewise have the other sides, equall to the other sides, both to both, and the remaining angle equall to the remaining angle] * Eudemus [Page 17] attributes this theorem (saith Proclus) to Thales, for showing the distance of ships upon the Sea, in that manner as he is said to do, it is necessary that he perform it by this.

Pamphila (saith Laertius) affirmes, that he first described the rectangle triangle of a circle.] Geom. Ramus attributes to Thales (upon this authority of Laertius) the second, third, fourth, and fifth pro­positions of the fourth book of Euclid, which are concerning the adscription of a triangle and a circle, and consequently takes [...] here to include both inscription, and circumscrip­tion; whereas in all those propositions, there is nothing proper to a rectangle triangle; so that if the word [...] be retain'd, it must relate to the 31 proposition of the third book, whence may be deduced the description of a rectangle triangle in a circle. But because there is no such proposition in Euclid, and this hath but an obscure reference to part of that theorem; it is to be doubted that the Text of Laertius is corrupt, and the word (or mark) [...] insered by accident, without which these words [...] exactly correspond with those of Lib. 10. cap. 11. Vitru [...]ius, [...]ythagoricum trigonum orthogonium descri­bere: by which he means (as he at large expresseth Lib. 9. cap. 2. elsewhere,) the forty fifth proposition of the first book of Euclid, that in rect­angle triangles, the square of the hypotenuse, is equall to the square of the sides containing the right angle. That Vitruvius, Proclus, and others, attribute this invention to Pythagoras, confirmes it to be the same here meant by Laertius; who addes, that Thales, for the invention hereof, sacrificed an Oxe, though others (saith he) among whom is Apollodorus, ascribe it to Pythagoras. And in the life of Pythagoras, he cites the same Apollodorus, that Pythagoras sacrificed a Hecatomb, having foundout, that the hypotenuse of a right angled triangle, is of equall power to the two sides, including the right angle according to the Epigram

That noble scheme Pythagoras devis'd,
For which a Hecatomb he sacrific'd.

Cicero, though he differ in the Author, agrees in the quantity of the offering with Laertius; affirming, that Pythagoras upon any new invention, used to sacrifice an Ox: Which kind of gratitude begun by Thales, was imitated by others also, as by Perseus.

Procl in Euclid. lib. 2. def. 4. where the words perhaps are inverted, and for [...].
Finding three spirall lines, in sections five,
Perseus an offering to the Gods did give.

Sect. 2. Of his taking the height of the Pyramids.

THe Pyramids of Egypt are supposed by Polyhist. cap. 25. Solinus, Idyll. 2. Auso­nius, Lib. 22. Ammianus, Var. 7. form. 16. Marcellinus, and * Cassiodorus, to cast no shadow at all, which (as Master Greaves hath observed in his excellent discourse upon this subject) must be meant either of the summer time, or, which is neerer the truth, that for three quarters of the year, they have none at mid-day.

For, that Thales by the shadow measured their height, is ac­knowledged. Laert. Hieronymus saith, he measured the Pyramids by the shadow, observing when they are of equall bignesse. Lib. 36. cap. 12. Pliny affirmes, he found out a way to take the height of them, and all such like, by measuring the shadow, at what time it is equall to the body. But Plutarch hath gi­ven a more regular and exact account of his manner of opera­tion, by erecting a staffe perpendicular upon the end of the shadow of the Pyramid, and by two triangles made by the beams of the Sun, he demon­strated, that what proportion there was between the shadows, the same was betwixt the Pyramid and the staffe: A demonstration so ratio­nall, that it is the ordinary way of taking heights by shadowes, founded upon this theorem.

Euclid. lib. 6. prop. 4. Of equiangle triangles, the sides that are about equall angles are proportionall, and the sides that subtend the equall angles are homolo­gous.

Which if Proclus had proceeded as far as the sixth book of Euclid, we should in all likelyhood have found ascribed to Thales; for the same argument wherewith Eudemus proves him inventor of the fourth theorem in the foregoing Section, where­by he took distances, is of equall force in this, whereby he took altitudes.

The height of the great Pyramid (which Thales measured) is by its perpendicular (according to Mr. Greaves) 499 feet, by its inclining ascent, 693 feet.

CHAP. VIII.
Of his Astronomy.

OMitting the fable of Orpheus's Harp, alluding to the seven Planets, and the observations of Hesiod, which were little more then of the rising and setting of some principall Starres, (so imperfect, that Plato calls all those who satisfie themselves with such superficiall knowledge, Astronomers according to Hesi­od) we may with Eudemus and others affirme, that Thales was the first of the Grecians that was skilfull in Astronomy. Which Science, lib. 5. Cap. 17. Pliny asserts to have been brought out of Phaenicia; de Caelo. 2. 12. Aristotle that the Grecians owe much of it to the Aegyptians, where it [Page 19] had been of a long time practised: Thither indeed Epist. [...] pherecyd. Thales ac­knowledgeth that he travelled to confer with Astronomers.

Sect. 1. Of the Celestiall Sphears.

THales, Pythagoras ( saith De plac. phil. Plutarch, repeated by * Sto [...]aeus) with his followers affirm, that the Celestiall sphear is divided into five Circles (which they call Zones) whereof one is call, [...] Artick, and is al­waies in view to us; one the summer Tropick, one the Equinoctiall, one the winter Tropick, one the Antartick circle, never seen by us. The oblique Circle called the Zodiack, lyeth under the three middle circles, it [...] them all three as it passeth, and each of them is cut in right angles by the Meridian, which goeth from Pole to Pole. Unjustly therefore is the in­vention of the Zones ascribed by Strab. lib. 2. Posidonius to Parmenides; and that of the obliquity of the Zodiack by Plin. 2. 8. others to Anaximander, Pytha­goras, or Aenipodes.

Laert. Eudemus saith, that he first observ'd the Tropicks; Laertius, that he first found out the accession of the Sun from Tropick to Tropick. The word [...] signifies not only the Solstices, but the Equinoxes likewise: Advers. ma­them. 5. 2. Sextus Empiricus. The Tropick signes are those into which the Sun comming, changeth and maketh conversions of the air; such a sign is Aries, and the opposite to it Libra; so also Capricorn and Cancer: for in Aries is made the vernall conversion, in Capricorn the winter, in Cancer the Summer, in Libra the autumnall. This exposition La [...]tius confirmes, when he saith that Thales composed only two treatises, one of the Tropicks, the other of the Equinoctialls; and that he distinguished the seasons of the year.

Sect. 2. Of the Sun, Moon, and Starres.

HE first observed the Apparent diameter of the Sun, which is the angle made in the eye, to be the 720 part of his orbe: This doubtlesse is the meaning of Laertius, his words these, [...] Then which reading, which implies the Sun to be 720 times lesser then the Moon, nothing is more ridiculous; for knowing (as is granted by all) the cause of Eclipses, he must likewise know the Sun to be greater then the Moon nor is it much mended by those who read [...] The text seems rather to require [...] or some­thing to that effect, of which, thus in Arenarie. Archimedes, this we suppose when Aristarchus saith the Sun appeareth, as being the 720 part of the circle of the Zodiack; for he considered how he might by instruments take the angle made in the eye by the Suns apparent diameter: but to take any such thing exactly is not easie; for ne then the sight, nor the hand, nor the instruments wherewith the observation is made, are of credit sufficient to demonstrate it exactly. This correction Apuletus thus confirmes, [Page 20] In his declining age he made an excellent demonstration of the propor­tion of the Sun, which I have not only learned (saith Apuleius) but con­firmed by practise, how many times the Suns magnitude is comprehended in the circle which his motion makes. This, as soon as he found out, Thales shew'd to Mandraytus of Priene, who being infin [...]tely delight­ed with this new and unexpected knowledge, bad him ask what he would in recompence for such an excellent invention: It will be reward enough for me, said Thales, if what you have learned of me, whensoever you communicate it to others, you professe me to be the Inventor.

He first found out the constellation of the lesser Bear, Eaert. & A­chill. Tat. Isag. in Arat. Cal­limachus

He to Miletus sail'd, invited
By Thales glory, who quick-sighted
Is said t' have mark'd the lesser Bear,
The starre by which Phoenicians steer.

Higynus affirmes that he first called it [...] the Bear.

Sect. 3. Of Eclipses.

HE was the first (saith Laertius) that foretold Eclipses, as Eudemus affirmes in his Astrologick history; for which Zenophanes and Herodotus admire him; attested also by Heraclitus and Democri­tus. Theon, Smyrnaeus, and Clemens Alexandrinus cite the same place of Eudemus; the scope of whose book was the History of Astrologers, and what every one found out. Thus likewise Pliny, Amongst the Grecians, the first that search'd into Eclipses, was Thales, the Milesian.

De placit. phil. 2. [...]. Plutarch affirmes, that he was the first that observed the Eclipse of of the Sun, and said, that it was occasion'd by the Moon, comming in a direct line underneath him, which may be seen in a bason of water, or loo­king glass. Plut. de plac. phil. 2. 28. That the Eclipse of the Moon is caused by the shadow of the earth, which being placed betwixt these two starres, darkens the lesser.

The testimony of Herodotus, alledg'd by Laertius is this: Lib. 1. A five years war was raised between the Ly [...]ians and the Medes, in which, sometimes the Medes had the better of the Lydians, sometimes the Lydians of the Medes, and one battle was fought by night: The war being thus equall on both sides, in the sixth year, the Armies being joyned, it hap­ned that as they were [...]ighting, the day on a sudden became night; which alteration of that day, Thales a Milesian had fortold the Ionians, designing the year wherein it should happen. The Lydians and Mea [...]s seeing the day turned to night, left off fighting, and laboured to conclude a mutuall peace, which by the mediation of Syennenses King of Cilicia, and Labnitus King of Babylon ( whom Scaliger conceives to be Nebuchadnezzar) was concluded, with the marriage of Ary­aena daughter of Alyattes, with Astyages, son of Cyaxares, rati­fi'd by drinking blood.

[Page 21] This is the story of that memorable Eclipse, the time where­of is uncertain: Lib. [...]. cap. 12. Pliny placeth it in the fourth year of the for­tie eight Olympiad, before the building of Rome 170 years: cap. 20. Solinus in the 49 Olympiad, the 604 year after the destruction of [...]roy; which falls upon the first year of that Olympiad. Strom. 1. Cle­mens Alexandrinus (citing Eudemus) about the fiftieth Olympi­ad, at what time Cyaxares father of Astyages raigned in Media: Alyattes father of C [...]oesus in Lydia. Eusebius in the second year of the fortie eight Olympiad, 1430 years after Abraham. Cleomedes saith, it was totall in Hellespont in Alexandria, but of ten digits.

Lib. 6. [...] the M. S. pre­pared for the Presse in the hands of my honoured friend Edward Byshe Esq. Iohannes Antiochenus saith, it continued many hours; but they could, not exceed three.

Of latter writers differing accounts thereof are delivered by these.

Ricciolus placeth it before the incarnation 585 years, May 28. about 6 a clock in the afternoon, the digits eclipsed 12. 56.

Calvisius before the incarnation 607 years. Olymp. 43. 4. dif­fering from Pliny 18. years.

The learned Bishop of Armagh, in the raign of Cyaxares O­lymp. 44. 4. the 147 year of Nabonassar, the fourth day of the Egyptian Month Pachon, according to the Julian accompt Sep­temb. 20. feria 1. begining after Sun-rise 1 [...]. 3 [...]. 25 [...]. digits e­clipsed 9. continuing almost two howers.

Petavius Olympiad 45. 4. Julian period 4117. before the in­carnation 597, after the building of Rome 157. Iuly 9. feria 3 beginning after midnight 4 [...] 45 [...] digits eclipsed 9. 22 [...]. con­tinuance full two howers.

Kocca confutes Petavius, because that eclips suits not with the circumstances of the story, as beginning too early in the morn­ing, and being defective as to the quantity in Pontus and lesser Asia.

Lansbergius, Olympiad 48. 3. the 163 year of Nabonassar, the 12 day of Tybi, which is May 28. digits eclipsed 12. 2 [...] in Hel­lespont: 10. 12 [...] in Alexandria.

Kepler, Scaliger, Buntingus, and Salianus, follow Pliny: digits eclipsed (according to Buntingus) 11. 30 [...].

Neither is it easie to determine whether this variety arise from the incertainty of the Astronomers, or of the Chrono­logers.

Sect. 4. Of the Year.

Laertius saith, that he distinguished the seasons of the year, that he first called the last day of every month [...] the thirtieth day: that he divided the year into three hundred sixtie five daies.

This calculation of the year he seem'd to have learned in Egypt, where it was in use, thus explained and commended by lib. 2. Herodotus, the Egyptians were of all men the first that found out the year, distinguishing it into twelve months; this they gathered from the starres, and more iudiciously (in my opinion) then the Grecians, for as much as the Grecians every third year, intercalate a month to make up the time; but the Aegyptians to the number of 360 daies, which twelve months make, adde yearly five daies, whereby the accompt of the circle of time returning into its selfe is made good.

This was called in latter times, the Egyptian year (perhaps be­cause used by Ptolomy, who lived in Aegypt) in distinction from the Iulian year, which was then used in all the western parts, and hath the addition of six howers: The most perfect is the Gregorian, consisting of three hundred sixty five daies, five houres, forty nine Minutes, twelve seconds.

Sect. 5. His Astrologicall Praedictions.

Thales being earnestly addicted to Astrologie, became ob­noxious to the censure of some persons. As he was led abroad one night by an old woman, his Maid (a Plat. Thracian) to look upon the Starres, he fell into a ditch ( wherein she purposely led him) to whom as he complained, Thales, said she, do you think, when you cannot see those things that are at your feet, that you can understand the heavens?

He was also, for preferring this study before wealth, reproved by some friends, not without reproach to the Science, as con­ferring no advantage on its professors; whereupon he thus vin­dicated himselfe and the art from that aspersion. When they up­braid him, saith Pol. 1. 7. Aristotle, with his proverty, as if Philosophy were unpro­fitable, it is said, that he by Astrology, foreseeing the plenty of Olives that would be that year, before the winter was gone (antequam florere cae­pissent, saith De divinat. 1. Cicero) gave earnest, and bought up all the places for oyle at Miletus, and Chios, which he did with little mony, there being no o­ther chapman at that time to raise the price; and when the time came that many were sought for in hast, he setting what rates on them he pleas'd, by this means got together much money, and then shew'd, that it was ea­sie for Philosophers to be rich, if they would themselves, but that wealth was not their aim. To this Plutarch alludes, when he said, that Thales is reported to have practised Merchandise.

CHAP. IX.
His Morall Sentences.

Of his Morall Sentences those are first to bee remembred which Sept. sap. conv. Plutarch mentions upon this occasion.

Amasis King of Egypt entring into contestation with the King of Aethiopia concerning wisedome, propounded these questions to be resolved by him; what is oldest of all things, what fairest, what greatest, what wisest, what most common, what most profitable, what most hurtfull, what most powerfull, what most easie?

The answers of the Aethiopian were these, the oldest of things is time, the wisest Truth, the fairest Light, the most common Death, the most profitable God, the most hurtfull the Devill, the most powerfull Fortune, the most easie that which plea­seth. Thales demanded of Niloxenus, whether Amasis approved these solutions? Niloxenus, who was sent by Amasis into Greece with these other questions to be resolved by the Sages, answered that with some he was satisfied, with others not; and yet, replyes Thales, there is not one but is erroneus and betrayes ignorance. As for the first, how can it be defended that Time is the oldest of things, when one part of it is past, the other present, the third yet to come, for that which is to come must in reason be esteemed younger then all men or things? Next to to affirme the truth is wisedome, is as much as if we should say, that the Light and seeing are all one. Againe, if he esteeme Light faire, why doth he forget the Sunne? His answers concerning God and the Devill are bold and dangerous, but that of Fortune most improbable, for if she be so powerfull, how comes it that she is so easily changed. Nor is Death the most common, for it is not common to the Living. The most ancient of things is God, for he never had beginning or birth, the greatest place of the world containeth all other things, place containes the world; the fairest the world, for whatsoever is order dispos'd, is part thereof. The wisest is time, for it hath found out all things already devis'd, and will find out all that shall be; the most common hope, for that remaines with such as have no­thing else; the most profitable, vertue, for it muketh all things usefull & commodious Etiam apud Stob. serm. 109. the most hurtfull vice, for it destroyeth all good things; the most powerfull Necessity, for that onely is invincible; Etiam apud. Stob. serm. 46. the most easie, that which agreeth with nature, for even pleasures are many times given over and cloy us.

To which Apothegmes these are added by Laertius, The swiftest of things is the mind, for it over-runs all. Hee affirmed that there is no difference betwixt life and death; being there upon asked why hee did not die; because saith he, there is no difference; to one who asked which was el­dest, night or day; he answered night by a day; Another enquiring whe­ther a man might do ill and conceale it from the Gods; not think it, said he. To an Adulterer questioning him if hee might not cleare himselfe by [Page 24] oath, [...]: not as counselling the latter but repro­ving the former. perjury, saies he, is no worse then Adultery: Being demanded what was difficult, he answered, To know ones selfe; what easie, to bee ruled by another; what sweet, to follow ones owne will; what divine, that which hath neither beginning nor end. At his returne from travell, being demanded what was the strangest thing he had seen, hee answered, a Tyrant old. What will helpe to beare ill fortune? to behold our enemies in worse. How shall a man live iustly? by avoiding what he blames in o­thers. Who is happy? he who hath a sound body, a rich fortune, and a docile nature.

Sympos. sept. sap. Plutarch adds these; we may well report probable newes, but impro­bable should not be related. We ought not to beleeve our enemies incre­dible things, nor to distrust our friends in incredible. Periander being much troubled at a monster which a youth brought him, born of a Mare with the head onely of a horse, the rest resembling a man, he advised him not to take care for expiation of what the prodigy portended, [...] (saith he) [...].

Stobaeus these; Serm 61. Being demanded how far falshood was distant from truth, Serm. 104. as far saith he as the eyes from the eares. It is hard but good to know ourselves, for that is to live according to nature.

His morall precepts are thus delivered by Demetrius Phalereus; S [...]ob. serm. 28. if thou art a surety, losse is nigh; Be equally mindfull of friends present and absent; study not to beautifie thy face but they mind: enrich not thy selfe by unjust meanes. i. e. be true to thy trust. Let not any words fall from thee which may accuse thee to him who hath committed anything in trust to thee. Cherish thy parents. Entertaine not evill. What thou bestowest on thy Parents thou shalt re­ceive from thy children in thy old age. It is hard to understand well. The sweetest thing is to enjoy our desire. Idlenesse is troublesome. Intemperance hurtfull. Ignorance intolerable. Learne and teach better things. Be not idle though rich. Conceale thy domestick ills. To avoid envie be not pitia­ble. Use moderation. Beleeve not all. If a Governer, rule thyselfe. I follow those copies of Stobaeus, that ascribe these to Thales ra­ther then to Pittacus, because the greater part are confirmed by Laertius.

Ausonius hath reduced these into verse under his name.

Feare ere thou sin, thy selfe though none elsenigh,
Life fades, a glorious death can never die.
Let not thy tongue discover thy intent,
Tis misery to dread, and not prevent.
He helps his foes that justly reprehends.
He that unjustly praiseth, harmes his friends.
That's not enough that to excesse extends.

His Motto was according to Laertius, Know thyselfe; accor­ding to Clem. Alex. Didymus and Fab. 221. Higynus, if thou be a surety, losse is nigh: By Laert. Hermippus, this is ascribed to him, though by others to Socrates: He gave thanks to fortune for three things: first, that he was [Page 25] born rationall, not a beast; secondly, that a man, not a woman; thirdly, that a Grecian, not a Barbarian.

There are besides cited by Laertius, under the name of [...] or loose verses, these sentences.

Not many words much wisdome signifie,
Choose one thing excellent, to which apply
Thy mind, and stop the mouth of calumny.

CHAP. 10.
His judgment in Civill affaires.

POliticks was, according to Laertius, his first study, in which his advice was of great Authority, though he were the only person (as Cicero observes) of the seven wisemen, that was not ruler of the City wherein he lived.

Of his judgment herein we have two instances; the first from Lib. 1. [...], which Val­la readers thus; Caeteras au­tem civitates habitatas nihi­lominus hule parituras, qua aliarum civi­tatum tribus legibus pare­rent. Stephanui thus; nihilo­ninus eodem loco haberi quo tribus; both (I conceive) amiss. Herodotus; Good also, even before the destruction of Ionia, was the ad­vice of Thales, a Milesian, a farre off by descent Phoenician, who com­manded the Ionians to build one common Councell Hall, and that in Teos, for that Teos is in the midst of Ionia, and the rest of the inhabited Ci­ties, neverthelesse to be in repute, according as the Citizens were.

The other cited by Laertius (with no lesse applause) is this, In the first year of the fifty eight Olympiad, Croesus King of Lydia, fearing the greatnesse of Cyrus, and encourag'd thereunto, as he conceiv'd, by the Oracle, sent Ambassadours and presents to the most considerable of the Grecians, perswading them to joyne with him in an expedition against Cyrus, which the La­cedaemonians with many others did: but Thales forbad the Mi­lesians to enter into league with him. It appears (addes Laertius) that his advice in civil affairs was excellent; for this thing (Cyrus geuing the better) preserv'd the Citty.

Yet did he afford Croesus his particular assistance in passing his Army over Halys, as the Grecians affirme, though Herodotus be of a contrary opinion, who gives this account of both. When Croesus was come to the River Halys, then, I beleeve, by bridges that were there, he passed over his Army; but the common report of the Gre­cians is, that Thales the Milesian was he who conveigh'd it over: For Croesus being doubtfull over what part of the River his Army should passe, there being in those daies no Bridges, Thales, who was in the sield with him, is said to have caused the River that did run on the left hand of the Army, to run also on the right, which he brought to pass thus. Be­ginning above the trench, he digged a deep trench, and brought it in the fashion of a halfe Moon, that the River being turned into the trench from the former channell at the back of the Army, and passing by the camp, came into the old channell again, so that assoon as the River was thus di­vided, [Page 26] (which In Hippia Lucian saith, was done in one night) it became forda­ble on either side: Some say that the old channell was quite made up, but that I do not beleeve, for then, how could they in their return passe over. That this is the meaning of Herodotus, mistaken by Who renders [...], in quam cum introdux­isset ex pristino alveo sluvium, iterum cum ubi exercitus tra­jectus esset in suum alveum resundere [...] Valla, will appear from the In Nubes. scholiast of Aristophanes, who relates it in the same manner, not without applauding Thales for his excellency in Mechanicks.

He was a great enemy to Tyrants, and accounted all Monar­chy little better, as appears by Plutarch, who makes him speak thus: As for taking one for the other, (viz. a Monarch for a Ty­rant) I am of the same mind with the young man, who throwing a stone at a Dog, hit his step-Mother; it is no matter, said he, for even so, it lights not amisse, Truly I alwaies esteemed Solon very wise, for refusing to be King of his own Country: and Pittacus, if he had not taken upon him a Monarchy, would never have said, how hard it is to be a good man: and Periander being seiz'd (as it were an hereditary disease derived from his father) by the same Tyranny, did very well to endeavour as much as he could to disengage himselfe from it, by frequenting the conversation of the best men, inviting Sages, and Philosophers, and being invited by them, not approving the dangerous counsell of Thrasibulus, my country­man, who perswaded him to take off the heads of the chiefest. For a Tyrant, who chooseth rather to command slaves then free-men, is like a husband­man, who preferreth the gathering of locusts, and catching of foul, before reaping of good corn. These soveraign authorities have only this good, in recompense of many evills, a kind of honour and glory, if men be so hap­py, that in ruling good men, they themselves prove betterj as for such, who in their office aim at nothing but security, without respect of honour or honesty, they are fitter to be set over beasts then men.

In the same Symposion, he gives this account of Monarchy, Democracy, and Oeconomicks. That Prince is happy, Stob. serm. 147. who lives till he is old, Stob. serm. 141. and dies a naturall death. That common-wealth is best ordered, Stob. serm. 43. where the citizens are neither too rich, nor too poor. That house is best, wherein the Master may live most at ease.

CHAP. XI.
Of his writings.

Some a [...]irme ( saith laertius) that he lest nothing behind him in wri­ting. Others that he writ,

Of naturall Philosophy: Saint De civi [...]. dei. Augustine saith, that Thales, to pro­pagate his doctrine to succession, searched into the secrets of nature, and committing his opinions to monuments and Letters, grew famous.

Of Nautick Astrology (mentioned by Laert: Simplicius) which is by some ascribed to Phocus, a Samian.

Of the Tropicks and Aequinoctialls: which two treatises Laertius, saith, he composed, as judging the rest easie to be understood. These [Page 27] seem to be those Astrologicall writings which * Lobon, an Ar­give, who writ concerning the Poets, affirmeth to have exten­ded to two hundred verses.

Of Meteors: a treatise in verse, mentioned by Suidas.

The history of his own times: if we may give credit to Lib. 6. [...] Iohannes Antiochenus, who saith, These things Thales, Castor, and Polybi­us most wise Authors, committed to writing, and after them Herodotus the historian: but perhaps this may be no more probable, then that Polybiu [...] and Castor should precede Herodotus.

[...], of which those that are cited by Laertius, we have in­serted among his morall sentences, for such they were, tending to the instruction of the common people, a kind of loose verse, comming nere prose, whence Demosthenes makes two kinds of Poets, [...] (as Casaubon observes) those that write in meeter, and (if we may so tearm it) those that write in blank verse. Whatsoever Latertius in the lives of the seven wise­men produceth in this kind, seemeth not to be taken out of any Poet, but to have been written by the wise-men themselves: Epistles, of which two only are extant, preserved by Laertius.

Thales to Pherecydes.

I Hear, that you first of the Ionians, are about to publish a discourse to the Greeks concerning Religion, and * But the inter­preters render this to another effect. iustly you conceive that your worke ought rather to be laid in a publick library, then transmitted to un­certain persons: if therefore it may any way pleasure you, I will willingly conser with you about that which you have written, and if you desire, will visite you at Syrus; for neither myselfe, nor Solon the Athentan should deserve the titles of wise-men, if we, who said to Creet to informe our selves of matters there, and into Aegypt, to conser with Priests and A­stronomers, should not likewise make a journey to you: Solon also, if you think fit, will come. You who affect home seldome passe into Ionia, nor care to enioy the society of strangers; we, who write nothing, spend our time in travelling through Greece and Asia.

Thales to Solon.

IF you leave Athens, you may, in my opinion, settle your selfe (with those you take along with you) at Miletus, for here is nothing to trouble you. If you dislike that we Milesians are governed by a [...]yrant (for you are averse to all Monarchs, even elective) yet may you please your selfe in the society and conversation of me your friend. Bias likewise hath sent to in­vite you to Priene; if to abide at Priene please you better, we will also come and dwell there with you.

CHAP. XII.
His Auditors and Schollers.

THe first eminent person of those who heard Thales and pro­fess'd his Philosophy, was Anaximander sonne of [...]raxi­des a Milesian, who flourish'd in the time of Polycrates Tyrant of Samos.

Next is Anaximenes a Milesian also, sonne of Euristratus, (who according to Eusebius) flourished in the second yeare of the 56 th. Olympiad. He was Scholler to Anaximander and Parmenides; But that he heard Thales also, he acknowledgeth in an [...]ert. vit. Anax. Epistle to Pythagoras.

We may (as in that Epistle Anaximenes doth) amongst the dis­ciples of Thales reckon Pythagoras the Samian, institutor of the Italick Sect, who being from his youth particularly addicted to investigation of Religious mysteries, addrest his first journey to Thales at Miletus, as to one that best could further his designe, being (according to De vita Py­thag 1. 2. Iamblichus) not fully 18. yeares old; which if we follow the accompt of Euseb. us for his birth (the fourth yeare of the seventieth Olympiad) and that of Sosicrates for his age eighty yeares (for the rest, the farther they exceed that time, are so much the more incapable of reconcilement) will fall about the second yeare of the fifty fourth Olympiad,) which is the 82. of Thales. From Thales he received the Rudiments of that Ex­cellence which he afterwards attained. This is acknowledged by Vit. [...]ythag. 1. 2. Iamblichus. Thales, saith he, entertaind him very kindly, admiring the difference between him and other youths, which exceeded the fame hee had receiv'd of him. After that he had instructed him as well as he was able in the Mathematicks, alledging for excuse his old age and infirmity, be advis'd him to goe to Aegypt, and to converse with the Memphian Priests, especially those of Iupiter, of whom he himselfe had in his Travells learned those things, for which by many he was esteem'd wises and Vit. Pythag. 1. 3. again, among other things Thales chiefely advis'd him to husband his time well, in respect whereof he a [...]tain'd from wine and flesh, onely eating such things as are light of digestion, by which meanes he procured shortnesse of sleepe, wakefulnesse, purity of minde, and constant health of body.

CHAP. XIII.
of his Death.

THales having now liv'd to a great age, being full of honour and wisedome, Laert. died in the first yeare of the fifty eight Olympiad (when according to Pausanias Erxyclides was Archon) as he was beholding the Olympick games, opprest with heate, thirst and the burden of his yeares which amounted to ninty two. Laertius under-reckons him to have lived but eighty seven yeares, having before acknowledged his birth to have beene in the first of the 35. Olympiad. Rationar. temp. 1. 12. Petavius over-reckons, who makes him live to the end of the 58. which could not be, because he died spectator of the Olympick Games. De long [...]vis. Lucian and Chron [...]l. Sin­cellus more, who say he lived 100 yeares. Sosicrates comes nearest to the truth, who allowes him to have lived 90. yeares, and to have died in the 58. Olympiad; for from the first of the 58. is 23. entyre Olympiads.

The manner of his death gave Laertius occasion to favour him with this Epigram.

Vewing th' Olympick games Elean Jove
Thou didst wise Thales from that his race remove
Nigher thy selfe; and 'twas well done, now old
He could not well from Earth the Starrs behold.

He was buried according to his owne appointment in a poore obscure part of the Milesian field, Plut. vit. S [...]lon. where he presag'd that in fu­ture times their Forum should be; upon his Tomb this distich,

Narrow the Tomb, the fame then heaven more wide
Of wisest Thales, whom this earth doth hide.

There was also a statue erected in honour of him bearing this subscription.

Milesian Thales this doth represent,
Who all in wise Astrology outwent.

Le [...]t. There were five more of this name mentioned by Demetrius the Magnesi [...]a, an orator of Calatis, an affected imitator. A Painter of Sicyonia, of a great spirit. The third very antient, contempo­rary with Hesiod, Homer and Lycurgus; The fourth mentioned by Duris: the fift of later times, by Dionysius in Criticis. Vit. S [...]crat. Laer­tius names Pherecydes as a detractour from Thales the Philosopher.

SOLON.

CHAP. I.
Solon his Parents, Country, and Condition.

PHilocles, cited by Didymus affirmes, that Solon's father was named Euphorion, but by the unani­mous consent of all other writers, he was cal­led Execestides, a person though of small for­tune and account among the Citizens, yet of the most noble family in Athens, descended from Codrus, Plut. Solon deriving himselfe from Ne­leus, son of Codrus, and from Neptune: L [...]ert: Plut. His Mother neer of kin to the Mother of Pisistratus; Laert. vit. Proclus in Ti­ma [...]m: his Parents had another Son named Dropides, Archon, the year after Solon, from him was Plato descend­ed.

Solon was born (according to La [...]rtius) at Salamis, for which reason he desired at his death that his body might be carried thither; but from his Parents and the place of his residence, he was sirnamed Athenian

Plut. His father by munificence and liberality brought his estate so low, as to want even necessaries: Solon (ashamed to receive from any, being of a house which used to maintain others) betook himselfe to Merchandise: others say, he travelled rather to im­prove his knowledge and experience, for he was a professed lover of wisdome, and even to his last used to say, I grow old learn­ing; riches he esteemed not much, but to grow rich like

—him who abounds.
In heaps of gold, as in rank corn his grounds
In Mules and Horses, whilst his numerous wealth
Made pleasing by uninterrupted health;
If to compleat these joyes, he be possest
Of wife and children, he is truly blest.

And elsewhere.

Riches I wish, not riches that are plac'd
In unjust means, for vengeance comes at last.

That he was profuse and delicate, and more luxurious in his verses then beseemes a Philosopher, is attributed to his practi­sing Merchandise, such persons requiring more then ordinary

[Page]
SOLON.

[Page] [Page 31] delicacies and freedomes in recompense of their many and great dangers. That he was rather in the number of the poor then of the rich, is apparent from these his verses.

Many unjust grow rich, and pious poor,
We would not change our virtue for their store.
For constant virtue is a solid base:
Riches from man to man uncertain pass.

Polit. 4. 11. Aristotle ranks Solon amongst the inferior sort of Citizens, whi [...]h (saith he) is manifest from his Elegies, meaning perhaps, some of these which Plutarch cites. In Scytha. Lucian saith, he was extreamly poor: Orat. [...]. Palaeologus, that he neither had nor valued wealth.

CHAP. II.
How by his means the Athenians took Salamis, Cyrrha, and the Thracian Chersonesus.

MAny ( saith Orat. de falsa legat. Demosthenes) of obscure and contemp [...]ible have become illustrious by profession of wisdome. Solon both living and dead flourish'd in extraordinary glory, to whom the utmost honours were not denyed, for he left a monument of his valour, the Megaraean Trophie, and of his wisdome, the recovery of Salamis; the occasions these.

Pausan. The Island Salamis revolted from the Athenians to the Mega­renses; Plut. the Athenians having had a long troublesome war with the Magarenses for its recovery, grew at length so weary, that giving it over, they made a Law, forbidding any upon pain of death to speak or write any thing to perswade the City to re­attempt it: Solon brooking with much reluctance this ignominy, & seeing many young men in the City desirous to renew the war, (though not daring to move it, by reason of the Edict) coun­terfeited himselfe mad, which he caused to be given out through the City, and having privately composed some elegiack verses and got them by heart, came skipping into the [...]orum with his Cap (or as Laertius saith, a Garland) on; the people flocking about him, he went up into the place of the Cryer, and sung his Elegy beginning thus,

A crier I, from Salamis the fair,
Am come in verse this message to declare:

Pausan. The lines wherewith they were most excited were these.

Rather then Athens would, I ow'd my birth
To Pholegondrian, or Sicinian earth:
For men where ere I goe will say this is
One of the Athenians that lost Salamis.

[Page 32] And,

Then lets to Salamis, renew our claime,
And with the Isle recover our lost same.

Plut. This Poem was intituled Salamis, it consisted of a hun­dred verses, very elegant: when he had made an end of singing, it was much applauded by his friends, particularly by Pisistratus, who excited the Citizens to follow his advice: By this means the law was repealed, the war recommenced, wherein Solon was made Generall: the common report is, that taking Pisistratus along with him ( whence it is, that some ascribe the whole glory of the action to Pisistratus, of whom are Frontinus, Aeneas, and Justine) he sailed to Colias, where finding all the women celebrating the festivall of Ceres, he sent a trusty messenger to Salamis, who pre­tending to be a runnagate, told the Megarenses, that if they would surprise the principall women of Athens, they should go immediately with him to Colias: The Megarenses believing what he said, manned a ship, and sent it along with him; Solon, assoon as he saw the ship come from the Island, comman­ded the women to retire, and as many beardlesse young men to put on their gownes, head-tyre, and shoes, hiding daggers under their Garments, and so danced and plaid by the Sea-side, till the enemy were landed, & their ship at [...]achor: By this time the Megarenses, deceived by their outward appearance, landed in great hast, and came upon them, thinking to take them away by force, Poly [...]n lib. 1. but they suddenly drawing their swords, shew'd themselves to be men, not women; Plut. the Megarenses were all slain, not one esca­ping, the Athenians going immediately to the Island took it.

Plut. Others deny it was taken in this manner, but that first re­ceiving this answer from the Delphian Oracle,

Let sacrifice be to those Hero's paid,
Who under the Asopian ground are laid,
And dead, are by the setting Sun survey'd.

Solon by night sailed to the Island, and sacrificed burnt offe­rings to the Heroes, Periphemus, and Cichris; then he received five hundred men of the Athenians, with condition, that if they gained the Island, the supream government thereof should be in them: Shipping his men in fisher boats, attended by one ship of thirty Oars, they cast anchor by Salamis, near a point opposite to Euboea: The Megarenses who were in Salamis hearing an un­certain rumor hereof, betook themselves confusedly to armes, sending forth a ship to bring them more certain intelligence from the enemy, which Solon, as soon as it came neer, took, and killing the Megarenses, manned with choice Athenians, whom he commanded to make directly for the Citty, with all possible secrecy; in the mean time, he, with the rest of the A [...]henians, [Page 33] assaulted the Megarenses by Land, and whilst they were in sight, they who were in the ship, making hast, possest themselves of the Town. This relation is confirmed by their solemnitie, an Athenian ship comes thither first in silence, then falling on with cries and shouts, an armed man leaps forth, and runs directly towards the Scirradian Promontory, against those that come from the Land: hard by is the Temple of Mars built by Solon, for he overcame the Megarenses, and let go ransomelesse all those that escaped the misery of the war: V [...]r. hist. 7. 19. Aelian saith, he took two ships of the Megarenses, whereinto he put Athenian Officers, and Souldiers, bidding them put on the armour of the enemy, whereby de­ceiving the Megarenses, he slew many of them unarmed.

Plut. But the Megaren ses persisting in obstinacy, to the losse of many lives on both sides, the businesse was referred to the La­cedaemonians to be decided; many affirme Solon alledg'd the authority of Homer, inserting a verse into his catalogue of ships, which he thus recited at the triall.

Ajax twelve vessell▪ brought to Salamis,
And where the Athenian men had stood, rank'd his.

( By which second verse of his own making and addition he [...]vinc'd, that Salamis of old belonged to the Athenians.) But the Athenians esteem this relation fabulous, affirming, Solon demonstrated to the Judges, that Phylaeus and Eurisaces, sons of Ajax, being made free denizons by the Athenians, delivered this Island to them, and dwelt, one at Branco, in Attica, the other in Melita, whence there is a Tribe named Philaidae, from Philaeus, of which was Pisistratus. Elian. var. hist. 7. 19. He ov [...]rcame the Megarenses in an oration, getting the better of them, not with specious words, but weight of argument: Plut. more cleerly to convince them, he instanced in the buriall of the dead, and in­scription of the names of townes, used by those of Salamis, Laert. as he shew­ed, by digging up some graves, after the manner of the Athenians, not of the Megarenses, for in Megara they buried their dead with their faces to the east, in Athens, to the west. But Hereas of Megara denying this, affirmes, the Megarenses buried also with their faces toward the west; for further confirmation, Solon al­ledg'd, that the Athenians had for each man a severall Co [...]in, the Megarenses buried three or foure in the same. It is said al­so, that Solon was much helped by certain Oracles of Apollo, wherein he calls Salamis Ionia. This cause was decided by five Spartans, Critolaidas, Amomphoretus, Hypsechidas, Anaxilas, and Cleomenes.

Plut. By this action, Solon grew into great esteem and honour, but he became [ not long after] much more admired and cried up by the Greeks, P [...]usan. in phoc. for speaking concerning the Temple at Delphi. The Cyrrhaeans committed many impieties against Apollo, Pausan in phoc. and cut off [Page 34] part of the land belonging to him.] Plu [...]. Solon declared, that it behoved them to relieve it, and not to suffer the Cyrrhaeans to prophane the Oracle, but that they should vindicate the Gods cause. The Amphictions thus instigated by him, undertook the war with much eagernesse, as Aristotle a [...]irms, ascribing to Solon the honour of that Enterprise. Aeschines saith, the motion made by Solon was confirmed by the Oracle. Some affirme he was made Gene­rall, others Alcmaeon: But the whole Army of the Greeks was (according to In Phoc: Pausanias) led by Clisthenes, [...]yrant of Sycionia, along with whom they sent Solon from Athens to be his counsellor. In voce Solon. Suidas saith, he was chosen counsellor by those, who were pickt out for the service of that war. Polyaen. lib. 3. Whilst Clisthenes besieged Cirrha, Pausan. they enquired concerning the victory, and from the Pythian Oracle, received this Answer.

This Cities fort you shall not take before
Blew Amphitrites swelling billowes roare
Against my water wash't grove, and hallow'd shore.

Where upon Solon advis'd to consecrate the Cyrrhaean field to Apollo, by which means the sea should touch sacred land. Pausan. ibid. He used also another stratagem against the Cirrhaeans; the River Plistus which ran through the Cittie, he diverted another way, the Town holding out against the besiegers, some drunk well-water, others rain, which they saved in Cisterns. He caused roots of Hellebore to be thrown into Plistus, and when he found it was fully poison'd, turned the River again into its proper channell: The Cyrrhaeans drinking greedily of that water, were taken with a conti­nuall flux, and forced thereby to give over the defence of their works: the Amphictions being possest of the Citty, punished the Cirrhaeans, and a­veng'd the Gods. These two stratagems were ascribed to Clisthenes, the first by Lib. 3. Poliaenus, the second by Lib. 3. cap. 7: Frontinus, but the reason is apparent, he doing them by the direction of Solon

[...]aert. Solon perswaded also the Athenians to reduce into their power the Thracian Chersonesus.

CHAP. III.
How he composed differences and seditions at home, and was made Archon.

Plut. THe Cylonian impiety had for a long time vexed the Ci­ty, ever since the complices of Cylon, having taken san­ctuary, were perswaded by Megacles the Archon to put them­selves upon a tryall, they laying hold of a threed which was tyed to the image of [...]allas, when they came neer the images of the furies, the threed broke of it selfe, whereupon Megacles with the other Archons fell upon them, as persons disown'd by the Goddesse; those that were without the Temple they stoned, [Page 35] those who run to the Altars, they were murdered; they only escaped who sued to their wives, whence being called impious they were accounted odious: those that remained of the Cylo­nians were grown very rich, and had perpetuall enmity with the family of Megacles; at what time this di [...]ention was highest, and the people thereby divided into factions, Solon being of much authority amongst them, taking with him the chiefest of the City interposed betwixt them, and with intreatles and ad­vice perswaded those who were called impious to submit to the judgment of three hundred of the chief Citizens: Miro was their accuser, they were condemned, the living to be banished, the bones of the dead to be digged up, and thrown beyond the confines of the country.

During these commotions, the Megarenses took Nysaea, and recovered [...] from the Athenians; the City was full of su­perstitious terrors and apparitions; the Priests declared, that the entralls of the sacrificed beasts imported great crimes and impieties, which required exp [...]ation. Laert. There was also a great plague; Plut. the Oracle advis'd them to lustrate the City; to this end they sent ( Laert. Nicias, son of Niceratus with a ship) Plut. to fetch Epi­menides out of Creet, who comming to Athens, was [...]ntertained by Solon as a guest, [...]onversed with him as a friend, instructed him in many things, and set him in the way of making Lawes. This lustration of the Citty Eusebius under-reckons, placing it in the second year of the fortie seventh Olympiad, whereas Solons being Ar­chon, which certainly happened after this, was in the third of the [...]ortie sixt. Suidas seems to over-reckon, ranking it in the fortie fourth: the opinion of In Epim [...]nid. Laertius agrees best with the circumstances of the story, that it was in the fortie sixt.

Plut. The commotions of the Cylonei, being thus appeased, and the offendors extirpated, the people fell into their old diffe­rence about the government of the commonwealth, whereby they were divided into as many factions, as the Province con­tained distinctions of people; the Citizens were Democraticall, the countrymen affected Olygarchy, the maritimes stood for a mixt kind of government, and hindred both the other parties from having the rule; at the same time the City was in a dange­rous condition, by reason of a dissension betwixt the rich and the poor, arising from their inequality, the businesse seemed impossible to be composed, but by a Monarchy; the commons were generally oppressed by the mony which they had borrow­ed of the rich, and either had tilled their land, paying to them the sixth part of the crop, whence they were called Hectemoru, and Thetes, or ingaged their bodies to their creditors, whereof some served at home, others were sold abroad, many also (there being no law to the contrary) were necessitated to sell their children, and leave the City, through the cruelty of these usu­rers, [Page 36] the greatest part (such as had most courage amongst them) assembling together, mutually exhorted one another not to indure these things any longer, but choosing some trusty man to be their leader, to discharge those that paid not their mony at the set day, to share the land, and quite invert the State of the comwon-wealth. The discreetest amongst the Athenians looking upon Solon as a person free from any crime, (neither in­gaged in the oppressions of the rich, nor involved in the neces­sities of the poor) intreated him to take charge of the common­wealth, and to compose the differences of the people. Phanias the Lesbian affirmeth, that for preservation of the State, he deceived both parties, promising under-hand to the poor, a division of the land; the rich, to make good their contracts; but that he first made scruples of undertaking the businesse, de­terred by the avarice of the one, and insolence of the other; he was chosen Archon, next after Cleombrotus ( [...]aern. ( in the third year of the forty sixt Olympiad) at what time he made his lawes also, being at once a peace-maker, and a law-giver, acceptable to the rich, as rich, and to the poor, as good; the people had often in their mouths this saying of his, equality breeds no strife, which pleased alike both parties, one side understanding it of number and measure, the other of worth and vertue; upon which hope, the most powerfull of both factions courted him much, and desired him to take upon him the tyranny of that common­wealth, which he had now in his power, offering themselves to his assistance: Many also of the moderate part seeing how laborious and difficult it would be to reform the state by reason and law, were not unwilling to have a Prince created, such an one as were most prudent and just: some affirme he received this Oracle from Apollo,

Sit at the helm of state, their Pilot be,
The common-wealth's glad to be steer'd by thee.

But he was most of all reproved by his familiar friends, for being deterred by the name of a Tyrannie, as if the virtue of a King were not diffus'd through the Kingdome, instancing in Tynondas long since Tyrant of Euboea, and Pittacus at present of Mytelene: nothing they alledg'd could move him, he told them a Tyranny was a faire possession, but it had no passage out: to Phocus writing thus in verse,

That I preserved free my native soile,
Nor did with bloody Tyranny desile
My honour, I not blush at by this deed,
All that was done by others I exceed.

[Page 37] Whereby it appears, he was of great authority before he writ his Lawes. The contumelies of such as reproved him for de [...]lining the government, he thus exprest in verse:

Nor wise is Solon, nor good counsell knowes,
For he resists the good that God bestowes,
The prey within his power he did behold,
But would not draw the Net; thoughts meanly cold:
Had but his soul with noble aims been [...]ir'd,
The Kingdome for one day he had desir'd,
Then split, and all his family expir'd.

CHAP. IIII.
What alterations he made during his government, and first of the Sisacthia.

Plut. THough he refused the tyranny, yet he behaved not him­selfe remissely in the government, not complying with the powerfull, nor making lawes to please those who had cho­sen him, where things were tollerable, he corrected nor altered nothing; fearing, lest if he should change and confound the common-wealth in every particular, he should want strength to settle it again, and to temper it with the best reason; but such things unto which he conceived he might perswade the obse­quious, and compell the refractory, those he enacted; joyning (as he said) force and justice, whence, being afterwards deman­ded if he had given the A [...]henians the best lawes, the best (saith he) they would receive.

Plut. The first change he made in the Government was this, hee ( Laert. introduced the Sisachthia which was a discharge of bodies and goods, or as as Hesychius defines it, a law for remission of private and publick debts, so called from shaking off the oppression of usury: Laert. for at that time they engaged their bodies for payment, and many through want were constrain­ed to serve their creditors, he therefor ordained) that for the time past, all debts should be acquitted, and for the future, no security should be taken upon the body of any; this by a moderate term he called Sisachthia; there want not (of whom is Androtion) who affirmed he contented the poor, not by an absolute discharge of the debt, but by moderating the interest, which he called Sy­sacthia; whereto he added the increase of measures, and valua­tion of mony; for the Mina which was before 73 drachmes, he made a hundred: by this means the poorer sort paid a greater summe in lesse coyne, which was a great ease to the debtor, and no wrong to the creditor. but the greater part hold it was an absolute discharge, which agreeth best with the verses of Solon, wherein he boasteth he had removed the bounds throug [...]out the land▪ [Page 38] f [...]eed such as were under oppression, called home those, who being forced to travail, had forgotten their native language, and others that were at home under [...]ondage, set at liberty. The same Law, Lib. 1. Diodorus Siculus observes to be among the Egyptians, conceiving Solon (though as yet he had not been there) derived it from them.

Plut. But in this design a great misfortune befell him, whilst he endeavoured to redresse the oppression of usury, and was stu­dying how to begin an oration suitable to the thing, he acquain­ted his intimate friends in whom he reposed most confidence, Conori, Clinias, and Hipponicus, that he meant not to meddle with land, but to cut off all debts; they (preventing the Edict) bor­rowed of the rich great summes of money, wherewith they pur­chased much land; the Edict being published, they enjoyed their purchase, without satisfying their creditours: Solon was much blamed, as not defrauded with the rest, but as being a defrau­der with those, and a partaker of their cousenage; but this im­putation was imediately washed away with [...]ive Talents, so much he had forth at interrest, which he first, according to the law, blotted out, ( Laertius saith six, perswading others to do the like) others, of whom is Polyz [...]lus the Rhodian, fifteen; but his friends were ever after called [...].

Plut. This pleased neither parts; he discontented the rich by can­celling their [...]onds, the poor more, not making good a parity of estates, which they expected, as Lycurgus had done, he being the eleventh from Hercules, having raigned many years in Lacedae­mon, great in authority, friends, and wealth, whereby he was able to make good what he thought convenient for the state, rather by force then perswasion, even to the losse of his eye, effected as a thing most expedient to the preservation and peace of the common-wealth, that none of the Citizens were either rich or poor: but Solon attained not this in the common-wealth, he was one of the people, and of a mean degree; yet he omit­ed nothing within his power, carried on by his own judgment, and the faith which the Citizens had in him; that he displeased many, who expected other things, is thus acknowledged by him­selfe.

Before they look'd vpon me kindly, now
With eyes severe, and a contracted brow:
Had any else my power, he would exact
Their riches, and their fattest milk extract.

But both parties soon found how much this conduced to the generall good, and laying aside their private differences, sacri­ficed together, calling the sacrifice [...].

CHAP. 5.
How he divid [...]d the people into Classes, and [...]rected Courts of Iudicatory.

HEreupon they chose So [...]on reformer and Law giver of the Commonwealth, Plut. not limitting him to any thing, but sub­mitting all to his power, Magistracies, Convocations, Judge­ments, Courts to take an accompt of them, to prescribe what number and times he pleased; to disanull or rati [...]ie of the present law what he thought good.

Plut. First, then he quite abolished all the Lawes of Draco, except for murther, because of their rigidnesse and severity, for he pu­nished almost all offences with death; as that they who were surprised in Idlenesse should be put to death; they who stole hearbs or apples should undergoe the same punishment with such as had committed murther, or sacriledge; whence Demades wittily said, Dreco writt his lawes not in inke, but blood; he being asked why he punished all offences with death, answe­red, he conceived the leas [...] deserved so much, and he knew no more for the greatest; Arist. Rbe [...]. 2. 23. Herodicus [...]lluding to his name, said his lawes were not of a man, but of a Dragon, they were so rigid; And Aristotle saith, there was nothing in them extraordinary and worthy of memory, but that sove­rity and grea [...]nesse of penalty which was so excessive, that Agell. 11. 18. not by any edict or command, but by a silent and expressed consent amongst the Athe­nians they were laid aside; afterwards they used the milder lawes made by Solon, differing even in name, the first being called [...] ▪ the latter [...]. Tetian. Cl [...]m. Alex. Suid. Those of Draco were made in the 39 th Olympiad, 47 yeares (as In demost. Timocr. Vlpian accompts) before these of Solon.

Plut. Next, Solon (being desirous that all offices might continue as they were, in the hands of the rich, but that other priviledges of the Common-welth, from which the people were excluded, might be promiscuously disposed,) tooke an accompt and valu­ation of the people [ [...]ollux. and divided them into foure orders] those whose stock of dry and liquid fruits amounted to 500. measures he ranked in the first place, and called Pentacosiomedimni, [ Pollux. these paid a talent to the publique treasury.] In the second classe were those who were able to maintaine a horse, or received 300. mea­sures, these he called [ Pollux. for that reason] horsemen; they paid hal [...]e a talent. The third classe were Zengitae ( Pollux. so called because) they had 200. measures of both sorts, Pollux. these paid 10. minae, the rest were all called Th [...]tes, whom he suffered not to be capable of any Ma­gistracy, neither did they pay any thing, but onely had so far interest in the common wealth, as to have a suffrage in the publique Convocation, & at Judgements, which at first seemed nothing, but afterwards appeared to be of great consequence; [Page 40] for in whatsoever was brought before the Judges, he gave them leave (if they would) to appeale to the common forum; more­over writing his lawes obscurely and perplexedly, he increased the power of the forum, for not being able to determine con­troversies by the Law, they were forced to have recourse to the Judges, as Masters of the law; this equality he himselfe thus expresseth,

The Commons I sufficient power allow
Honour from none I tooke, on none bestowd,
Those who in power or wealth the rest outshin'd▪
In bounds of moderation I confin'd;
To either part I was a [...]irme defence,
And neither did allow preheminence.

Hither Epist. 90. Seneca alluding saith, Solon founded Athens upon equall right and Lib. 2. Justine he carried himselfe with such temper between the com­mons and the Senate, that he attracted equall favour from both, he suffe­red no man (saith In Theophrast. Aeneus Gazeus) to have a peculiar law, but made all men subject to the same.

Plut. He likewise ( continues Plutarch) constituted the court of the Areopagus, consisting of the yearely Archons, whereof himselfe (being the chiefe) was one; perceiving the people to be much exalted and enboldened by the remission of their debts, he or­dained a second Court of Judicature, selecting out of each tribe (which were in all foure) a hundred persons, who should re­solve upon all decrees before they were reported to the people; nor should any thing be brought to them, untill it had first past the Senate: the supreame Senate he appointed Judge and pre­server of the lawes, conceiving the City would be lesse apt to float up and downe, and the people become more setled, rely­ing upon these two Courts, as on two Anchors; thus the greater part of writers make Solon institutor of the Court of Areopagus, ( of whom also is De Offic. l. 1. Cicero) whichseems to be confirmed, in that Draco never mentions the Areopagites, but in criminall causes alwaies names the Ephetae; but the eighth law of the thirtieth table of Solon hath these words, Those who were branded with infamy before Solon was Archon, let them be restored to their fame, except such as were condemned by the Areopagites or by the Ephetae, &c. And it is certaine, that the Court of Areopagus was long before Solons time, untill then consisting promiscuously of such persons as were eminent for Nobility, power, or riches, but Solon reformed it, ordaining none should be thereof, but such as had first undergone the office of Archon. See Meursius Areop. cap. 3.

Lib. 8. cap. 6. Pollux saith, that Solon ordained a thousand men to [...]udge all accu­sations; Schol. Arefloh. in Nub. Demetrius Phalereus, that he constituted the Demarci, first called Nauclari.

CHAP. VI.
His Lawes.

HAving thus disposed the common-wealth, and Courts of Judicature, he in the next place applyed himselfe to ma­king lawes, which he performed so excellently, that he is gene­rally remembered under that notion, which Minos of Creet, and Lycurgus of Lacedaemon, whose lawes those of Solon exceeded, ( as Annal. 3. Tacitus saith) both in exquisitenesse and number: Man. [...]o­log. in protreptr. a [...] doctr. of how much greater esteem they were then all before them, may be computed from this, that they were the last, and continued alwaies in the Ci [...]ty: They, for whom they were made, thought them more illustrious then their publick orna­ments, which transcended those of all other Cities, more impregnable then their Tower, which they accounted the strongest of all upon earth, and far better then th [...]se things wherein they gloried most: * nor were they of lesse esteem among forraign nations, insomuch that the Ro­mans Liv. lib. 3. agreeing concerning lawes in generall, but differing about the law-giver, sent Embassadours to Athens, Sp. Posthumius Albus, A. Manlius, P. Sulpitius Camerinus, commanding them to transcribe the renowned lawes of Solon: Aurel. Vict. de Vir. illust. c. 21. which transferred out of the books of Solon the D [...]cemviri expounded in the twelve Tables. Hence Lib. 22. Ammi­anus Ma [...]cellinus saith, that Solon assisted by the sentences of the Aegyp­tian Priests, having with just moderation framed lawes, added also to the Roman state the greatest foundation.

Of his lawes, these have been preserved by Plutarch, and others.

Plut. If any man were beaten, hurt, or violently treated, whosoever had the means and will, might sue the offendour. Thus (saith Plutarch) he wisely brought the Citizens to a mutuall sence of one anothers hurts, as if done to a limb of their own body.

Plut. Of infamous persons, let all such as were infamous before the go­vernment of Solon, be restored to their fame, excepting whosoever were condemned by the Ephetae, or in the [...]rytanaeum by the Magistrates, ba­nished for murder, theft, or aspiring to tyrannie. This was the eight Law of the thirteenth Table. There were two kinds of infamy, by the lesser a man was degraded and made uncapable of all ho­nour or office in the common-wealth; by the greater, he and his children were lyable to be killed by any man, and he not to be questioned for it.

Plut. Of his lawes, those seem most singular and paradoxall, which declare him infamous, who in a sedition takes neither part: it is cited out of Aristotle by Lib. 2. cap. 12. Agellius in these words: If through discord and dissention, any sedition and difference divided the people into two factions, whereupon with exasperated minds both parties take up armes and fight; he, who at that time, and upon that occasion of civill [Page 42] discord shall not engage himselfe on either side, but solitary and separated from the common evill of the Citty [...]ithdraw himselfe, let him be deprived of house, country and goods by banishment. Plut. He would not that any one saving himselfe harmlesse, should he insensible of the com­mon calamity, or boast himselfe to have no share in the publick grief, but that instantly applying himselfe to the better and ju­ster side he should interest himselfe in the common danger, and assist, rather then out of all hazard, expect which side should get the better. When we did read (saith Agellius) this law of Solon, a person indued with singular wisdome, at first were mained in great suspence and admiration, enquiring for what reason he judged those worthie of punishment, who withdrew themselves from sedition and civill war; then one whose sight pierced more deeply into the use and meaning of the law, af­firmed, the intent thereof was not to encrease, but appease se­dition; and so indeed it is, for if all good persons, who in the beginning are too few to restrain a sedition, should not deterre the distracted raging people, but dividing themselves, adhere to either side, it would follow, that they being separated as partakers of both factions, the parties might be temper'd and govern'd by them, as being persons of greatest authority; by which means they might restore them to peace, and reconcile them, governing and moderating that side whereof they are, and desiring much rather the adverse party should be preserved then destroyed. ad [...]. 10. 1. Cicero citing this law, averreth the punishment to have been capitall, perhaps understanding infamy here of the more severe kind.

Absurd & ridiculous (saith Plutarch) seemeth that Law which alloweth an inheritrix, if he who possesseth her by law as her Lord and Master be impotem, to admit any of her husbands neerest kindred. But some averre it is just, as to those, who though they are impo­tent, yet will marry rich heires for their mony, and by the priviledge of law wrong nature; for when they see it lawfull for the heir to admit whom she pleaseth, either they will refrain from such marriages, or undergoe them with the reproach of avarice and dishonesty: It is well ordered also, that she may not admit any one, but only whom she will of her husbands kin­dred, whereby the issue may be of his family and race. Plut. Hither likewise it tends, that the Bride be shut up in a room with the Bride­groom, and eat a Quince with him. (Intimating, according to In pracept. conjugial: [...]lu­tarchs interpretation, that the first grace of her lips and voyce should be agreeable and sweet) and that he who marrieth an heir, be obliged to visit her thrice a month at the least: For though they have not children, this argues a respect due to a chast wife, and pre­vents or reconciles unkindnesse and dissention.

Those words of the former law, He who possesseth her by law as her Lord and Master, have reference to another Law of his, [Page 43] mentioned by Lib. 11. Diodorus Siculus, that the next of kin to an heir might by law require ho [...] in marriage, and she likewise might require him that was next of kin who was obliged to marry her, though never so poor, or to pay 500 Drachms for her dowry. Hereto Hec. Act 1. Scen. 2. Terence alludes.

The Law commands an heir to marry with
Her Husbands next of kin, and him to take her.

And to the putting her off without a dowry of 500 drachms, (that is five minae) Phorm. act. 2. scon. 3. elsewhere.

Though I be injur'd thus, yet rather then
[...]le be contentious, or bound still to hear thee,
Since she's my kinswoman, take hence with her
The Domen the law enjoynes me, heres five pound.

Plut. In all other marriages he forbad dowries, ordaining that a Bride should bring with her no more then three gowns, and some slight houshold-stuffe, of small vale [...], the particulars whereof were expres­sed, as 1. 12. 15. Pollux seemes to imply, for he would not that marriage should be m [...]cenary or vendible, but that the man and woman should co-habit for issue, love, and friendship. Hither Lib. 3. Epist. 243. Isidor alludes, amongst the Athenians legall marriage was said to be contracted, in respect of issue.

That Law of his also was comm [...]nded, as Orat. in Leptin. Demosthenes and [...]lutarch attest, which forbad to revile the dead, Let no man re­vile any dead person, though provoked by the revilings of his children. Plut. To esteem the deceased holy is pious, to spare the absent just, to take away the eternity of hatred civill.

Plut. He forbad to revile any living person at sacred solemnities, Courts of Iudicature, and publick spectacles, upon penalty of three drach [...] to be paid to the reviled person, two more to the common treasury. To moderate anger no where he accounted rude and disorder­ly, every where difficult, to some impossible. A law must be accommodated to what is possible, intending to punish some few, to advantage not many to no purpose.

Plut. His law concerning testaments is much approved; for be­fore, no man had power to make a will, but his goods and lands continued in the family of the deceased person: Solon made it lawfull for him that had no children to give his estate to whom he pleased. he preferred friendship before kindred, and favour before ne­cessity, and ordered, that wealth should be at the disposall of him in whose hands it was: yet he permitted not this rashly, or absolutely, but conditionally, If he were not wrought upon by sick­ness, potions, bondage, or the blandishments of a wife. Justly he estee­med it all one whether a man be seduced by indirect means, or violently constrained, thus comparing deceit with force, and [Page 44] pleasure with pain, as being of equall power to put a man out of his right mind. This Law is mentioned likewise by Orat. in Lept. Demo­sthenes.

* He also limited the visits▪ mournings, and feasts of women, by a law which curbed their former licentiousnesse. Her who went abroad, he permitted not to carry with her above three gownes, nor more meat and drink then might be bought with an obolus, nor a basket above a cubit in bignesse, nor to travell by night, unlesse in a chariot, and with torch-light: He [...]orbad them to tear their cheeks to procure mourn­ing and lamentation, at the funeralls of those, to whom they have no re­ [...]ion. He forbad to sacrifice an Ox at funeralls, and to bury more then three garments with the dead body; not to approach the monuments of stran­gers unlesse at their exequies. Of which (saith Plutarch) our lawes are full: De leg. lib. 2. Cicero also affirmes, that the lawes of the twelve Ta­bles for contracting the pomp of funerals, and concerning mourning, are transferred from those of Solon, who (as Phalere­us writes) assoon as funeralls began to be solemnised with pomp and lamentation, took them away: which Law the Decemviri put into the tenth table, almost in the very same words, for that of 3 neighbourhoods and most of the rest are Solons, that of mourning in his expresse words, Let not women tear their cheeks, nor make lamentation at a funerall.

Plut. Considering that the City grew very populous, many re­curring thither from all parts of Attica, for liberty and security, that the country was for the most part barren and bad, that such as trade by sea import nothing for those, that have not wherewith to batter or exchange with them, he addicted the Citizens to arts, and made a law, that the son should n [...]t be obliged to maintain his father, if he had not brought him up to a trade (menti­oned also by Prafat. lib. 6. Vit [...]uvius, Exhort. Vrat. ad artes. Galen, Epist. 7. Theophylact, and others) and commanded the court of A [...]eopagus to examine by what gain every man maintained himselfe, and to punish idle persons, whom he made liable to the action of every man, and at the third conviction punished with infamy. This law, Lib. 7. Herodotus, and Lib. 1. Diodorus Siculus affirme to have been in use amongst the Aegyptians, made by Amasis, and from them divided by Solon to the Athenians.

Plut. Yet more severe was that mentioned by Heraclides of Pontus, which disengaged the sons of concubines from maintaining their fathers. He who transgresseth the bounds of marriage, professeth he doth it not out of desire of issue, but for pleasure, and therefore already hath his reward, and can expect to have no further tye upon those he begets, whose birth is their shame.

Plut. Most incongruous seem those laws of Solon which concern women, for he permitted that, whosoever surprised an adulterer (with the wife or [...]ysias in Orat. de [...] Era­tusth. concubine of any) might kill him, (or exact mony of him) he that ravished a free woman was fined 100 Drachmes, he that plaid the pandor, 20 ( Orat. in I l' [...]arch. Aeschines saith to die) except to such [Page 45] women as were common. He also forbad any man to give his sister or daughter to that profession, unlesse himselfe first surprise her with a man. This (saith Plutarch) seemes absurd, to punish the same of­fence sometimes severely with death, sometimes with a pecu­niary mulct, unlesse, because at that time mony was very rare in Athens, the scarcity thereof aggravated the punishment.

Plut. He assigned five hundred drachmes to the victor of the Isthmian games, a hundred to the Victor of the Olympick: attested also by La­ertius, who saith, he contracted the rewards of the Athletas, judging them dangerous victors, and that they were crowned rather against, then for their country.

Plut. Whosover brought a hee-wolfe was to receive five drachms, for a shee­wolfe[?] one; according to Demetreus Phalereus, this being the price of a sheep, that of an Ox. It is customary with the Athenians, that such as have grounds fitter for pasture then plowing, make war with the wolves.

Plut. For asmuch as there is such scarcity of Rivers, Lakes, and Springs in the country, that they are constrained to dig wells, he made a Law, where there was a common well within a Hippicon, they should make use of it. (A Hippicon is the distance of foure furlongs) they that lived further off should procure water of their own, and if when they have digged ten fathom deep, they find not any, they might be allowed to fill a pitcher of six gallons twice a day at their neigh­bours well.

Plut. These exact rules he prescribed for planting: Whosoever plan­ted any young Tree in his ground, should set it five foot distant from his neighbours, who a Fig-tree or Olive-tree, nine: Because the roots of these spread far, nor is their neighbourhood harmlesse to all, but sucks away the nourishment, and to some their blatt[?] is prejudiciall.

Plut. Whosoever diggeth any hole or ditch must make it so far distant from his, neighbours, as it is deep. These are confirmed by lib. 4. ad leg. 12. tab. Caius, adding; whosoever makes a hedge to divide himselfe from his neighbour, must not exceed his own bounds; if a wall, he must leave the space of a foot, if a house, two feet, if a well, a fathom.

Whosoever placeth a hive of bees, should observe the distance of thirtie feet, from those that were before placed by his neighbour.

Plut. He commanded the Archons to curse him who exported any thing ou [...] of the Country, or that he should pay a hundred Drachmes to the pub­like treasury, whereby they are not to be rejected, who say, that of old the exportation of figgs was prohibited, and that he, who discover'd exporter, was called a Sycophant.

Plut. He made a law concerning such as should be hurt by a dog, wherein he ordained, the dog that bit to be bound in a chaine foure cubits long.

Plut. This law concerning Denization is difficult, That none should be made free of the City, except such as were banished for ever out of their o [...]ne Country, or came to Athens with their whole families to exercise some [Page 46] trade; this he did not to drive away forraigners, but to invite them to Athens by certainty of admittance into the City, conceiving such would be faithfull, those out of necessity, these out of good-will.

Plut. Likewise to be feasted in the publike hall was the peculiar institution of Solon, which he called [...] not permitting the same person to eat there frequently: but if he who were in­vited, would not accept of it, he was punished, conceiving this a contempt of the publique honour, that an inordinate appetite.

Hitherto Plutarch: these following are recited by Laertius.

Laert. If any one maintain not his Parents, let him be infamous, as likewise he that devours his patrimony. Hither Orat [...] in Timarch. Aeschines alludes; in the fourth place with whom hath he to do? If any man by prodi­gality hath consumed his patrimony or hereditary goods; for he conceived, he who had ordered his own family ill, would in the same manner take care of the common-wealth; neither did the law-giver imagine it possible, that the same person should be privately wicked, and publickly good, or that it were fitting such a one should go up into the chair, who took more care to frame an oration, then to compose his life.

Laert. He forbad such as haunted common women to plead; confirmed by Aeschines. In Timarch. In the third place with whom hath he to do? If any man (saith he) be a haunter of common women, or procure mony by such means; for he conceived, such a one as sold his own fame for mony, would easily sell the businesse of the state. And In Androt. Demosthenes, it is worth inquiry and consideration, Athe­niens, how great care, Solon, the author of this law, had in the common-wealth in all those which he made, and how particu­larly solicitous he was herein above all other things, which as it is evident by many other lawes, so also by this, which forbids those qui s [...] prostituerunt, either to plead or judge in publick.

Laert. He augmented the rewards of such as should die in war, whose sons he ordered to be brought up and instructed at the publick charge. In Panathen. Aristides, thou alone of all men didst ordain these three things by law, that such as died for their country should be annually praised publickly at their sepulchers, their children, till grown men, maintained at the publick charge, then sent back to their fathers house with compleat armes; likewise that infirm Citizens should be maintain'd at the publick charge. Menexen. Plato adds that the same indulgence was allowed to the parents; you know the care of the common wealth, which in the lawes concerning the children and parents of such as died in the war, commands the supream Mag [...]strate to take care, that the parents of those that died in the war, above all other Citizens should not receive any injury. The state brings up the children also: Hereby, saith Laertius, they became eager of [...]ame and honour in war, as Polyzelus, as Cyne­girus, as all those in the Marathonian fight: to whom may be ad­ed Harmodius, Aristogiton, Miltiades, and infinite others.

[Page 47] Lae [...]t. Let not a guardian marry the mother of his ward, nor let not any one be ward to him, who, if he die, shall inherit his estate; confirm'd by In Hermog; Syrianus, In Herm [...]g. Marcellinus, and others, who adde, that the same law forbad the ward to marry her guardians son.

L [...]rt. Let not a graver keep the impression of any seal after he h [...]th sold it.

Laert. If any man put out the eye of another, who had but one, he shall lose both his own.

His law concerning theft, Laer [...]ius expresseth thus; What thou laidst no [...] down, take not up, otherwise the punishment death. Orat in Timarch. Aes­chines addes, if they confessed themselves guilty: others affirm the punishment was only to pay double the value, of whom is Lib. 11. c. 18. Agellius and Parth. [...] 4. Hermogenes, who affirme, the law made that distinction betwixt sacriledge and theft, punishing the first with death, the latter with double restitution. Orat. in Timo [...]r. Dem [...]sthenes cleers this, reciting this law exactly in these words, If any man steal in the day time above fiftie drachms, he may be carried to the eleven officers, if he ste [...]l any thing by night, it shall be lawfull for any to kill him, or in the pursuit to wound him, and to carry him to the eleven officers. Whosoever is convict of such offences, as are liable to chaines, shall not be capable of giving bail for his theft, but his punishment shall be death, and if any one steal out of the Lyceum, or the Academy, or Cynosarges, a garment or a small vessell of wine, or any other thing of little value, or some vesell out of the Gymnasia, or havens, he shall be punished with death; but if any man shall be convict privately of theft, it shall be lawfull for him to pay a double value, and it shall be also at the pleasure of the convictor, besides payment of mony, to put him in chaines five daies, and as many nights, so as all men may see him bound. Schol. Ari­stoph. [...]. Even those who stole dung, were by Solon 's law liable to punishment.

Laert. That if an Archon were taken drunk, he should be punisht with death.

To those recited by Laertius, adde these collected from o­thers.

He allowed brothers & sisters by the same father to marry, & prohibited only brothers & sisters of the same venter; Whereas contrariwise (saith De leg. spec Tib. 2. Philo) the Lacedaemonian law-giver allowed these, and pro­hibited those. Hence In Praem. & in Cimoni [...] vita Cornelius Nepos affirmes, Cimon married his sister Elpinice, invited, not more by love, then the Athenian custom, which allowes to marry a sister by the same father.

Eschin. orat. in Timarch. He writ according to the manner of the antients, severally concerning the discipline of Matrons, for a woman taken in A­dultery he permi [...]ted not to weare ornaments, nor to come into publick Temples, lest by her presence she should corrupt modest women; if she came into a temple, or adorned her selfe, he commanded every one to rend her garments, to tear off her ornaments, and to beat her, but not to kill, or maim her; By this means depriving such a woman of all honour, and giving her a life more bitter then death. This is also [...] ­firmed by in Nearam. Demosthenes, who addes, If any man surprise an Adul­terer [Page 48] it shall not be lawfull for him who took them to have the woman in marriage, if he continue to keep her as his wise, let him be infa­mous.

Demosth. Orat. in Macartat. Let the dead bodie be laid out within the house, according as he gave order, and the day following before Sun-rise carried forth; whilst the body is carrying to the grave, let the men go before, the women follow; it shall not be lawfull for any woman to enter upon the goods of the dead, and to follow the body to the grave, under threescore years of age, excepting those within the degree of cosens, nor shall any woman enter upon the goods of the deceased after the body is carried forth, excepting those who are within the degree of cosens.

Clcer. de leg. 2. Concerning sepulchers, he saith no more, then that no man shall demolish them, or bring any new thing into them; and he shall be punished, whosoever violates, casts down, or breaks any tomb, monument, or columne.

Elian. var. hist. 2 [...] 42. &c. 5. 14. If any one light upon the dead body of a man un [...]uried, let him throw earth upon it.

Demost. in Lipton. Whosoever shall dislike a received Law, let him first accuse it, then if it be abrogated, substitute another: The manner whereof is largely expressed by Demosthen [...]s.

He ordained (according to Declam. 18. Libanius) that Children should be obliged to persorm all due offices to their parents. Pyrrh. Hipp. 3. 24. Sextus saith, he made a Law of indemnity, whereby he allowed any man to kill his son; but Lib. 2. Dionysius Halicarnassaeus affirmes, he permitted them to turn their children out of dores, and to disenherit them, but nothing more.

Eschin. in Cres [...]ph. He ordained that all such as d [...]clined to be engaged in war, or for­sook the Army, or was a Coward, should have all one punishment, to be driven out of the bounds of the forum, not permitted to wear a garland, or to enter into publick Temples.

Demosth. Orat. in Timocr. If any one be seized on, for having abused his parents, or forsaken his colours, or being forbidden by law, hath gone into places where he ought not, let the eleven officers take and bind him, and carry him into the Heliaea, it shall be lawfull for any one that will to accuse him, and if he be cast, it shall be at the judgment of the Heliaea to impose what punishment or fine they should think sit, if a fine, let him be kept in setters till it be paid.

Athen [...]us de­ipu. lib. 15. He permitted not a man to sell unguents, as being an effeminate office.

Eschin. in Ctesiph. As concerning Orators, he ordered, that the Eldest of the citi­zens should goe up first into the pleaders chaire modestly without tumult and perturbation to move, he out of experience should conceive best for the commonwealth; then that every Citizen according to his age should se­verally and in order declare his judgement.

Liban. declam. 13. He ordered that a Citizen of Athens should be tried no where bu [...] at Athens.

Stob. 112. He commanded that no young man should beare the office of a Magi­strate, nor be admitted to counsell, though he were esteemed exceeding wise.

[Page 49] Demost. in Aristogit. For the common people he ordained slow punishments, for Magistrates and Rulers of the people sodaine, conceiving those might be punished at any time, but that the correction of these would admit no delay.

Maxim. Tyr. 39. As for the Gods and their worship, hee decreed nothing, Cicer. [...]rat. pro S. Rosc. Amer. & Laert. nor against Parricides, answering those who questioned him about it, he did not thinke any could be so wicked.

CHAP. VII.
Of the Axes and Cyrbes, Senators Oath, and other institutions of Solon.

Plut. THese Lawes he ratified for a hundred yeares; They were Agyll. 2. 12. [...] in different tables; Plut. Etymol. Those which concerned private actions, in oblong quadrangular tables of wood, with cases, which reached from the ground and turned about upon a pin like a wheele, whence they were called [...] Pollux. 8. 10. placed first in the tower, then brought into the Prytanaeum that al might see them, where there were some remaines of them in Plutarch's time. Those which concerned Suid. publike orders and sacrifices, in * tri­angular tables of stone called [...] either from Ammon. de differ vec. Cyrbus who tooke the accompt of every mans estate, or [...] or [...] or [...] or from the Corybantes, Suid. to whom the invention thereof is by some ascribed. Schol. Aristot. in Ares. These were placed in the Porticus regia; Didym. apud. Harp. & Suid. Both the Axes and Cyrbes were written after the same manner as oxen to turne in ploughing ( [...]) whence Demosthenes calls that law the lowest which beginneth on the left side.

Flud. The Senate tooke one common oath to make good the lawes of Solon for a hundred yeares, each of the Thesmothetae sworne in the Forum at the Criers stone, if he violated them, to dedicate a golden statute of equall weight with himselfe at Delphi.

Some particulars of the oath imposed by Solon mentioned by severall Authors (as, not to abrogate his lawes, by Plutarch, to ad­mit no young man to be judge, by Serm. 112. Stobaeu; [...]o heare impartially bot [...] the plaintiffe and defendant, by Orat. de co­ron [...]. Demosthenes;) argue it to bee the same which the same Dem [...]st. Author delivers in these words.

‘I will declare my opinion according to the lawes of the Athenians, and five hundred Senators. By no assistance from me shall Tyranny or oligarchy bee admitted, I will ne­ver side with him who hath corrupted the people or intends or indevors it. I will never suffer any new tables or any divi­sion of those already received, or a parity of lands or goods. I will never call home any banished or confined person, I will consent that he be expelled the City who denies these lawes decreed by the Senate, confirmed by the people, I will never [Page 50] permit any to be injured; I will never constitute any Magistrate before he hath given account of his last Magistracy. I will ne­ver permit the same man to be chosen twice in one yeare, or at once to hold two offices. I will neither take, nor suffer any to take bribes or rewards. I am thirty yeares old, I will heare impartially both plaintiffe and defendant, & condemne with­out excuse those that deserve it. I sweare by Jove, by Neptune and by Ceres, may they destroy me, my house and children, If I observe not all these particulars.’ Hence perhaps it is that [...]. Hesychius affimes Solon in his lawes to have ordained an oath by three Gods.

Considering the irregularity of moneths, and the course of the Moone, which agreed not alwaies with the rising and setting of the Sun, but some times overtooke and went past him in one day, he called that day the [...] last and first, attributing that part which precedes the conjunction to the last moneth, the rest to the beginning of the next. Thus La [...]rt. he taught the Athenians to ac­commodate the reckoning of their dayes to the motion of the Moone: Plut: and was (as it appeares) the first who understood rightly that of Homer.

When one moneth ended and the next began:

The day following he called [...], The new moone: from the twentieth day to the thirtieth he reckon'd not by addition but by substraction, in respect of the moones decrease: of this see The clouds, act. 4. scen. 2. Aristophanes.

Laert. He ordered the verses of Homer to be recited successively, that where the first ended the next should begin; whence Diu­chides saith, he illustrated Homer more then Pisistratus (by whom the Rhapsodies were first collected) the principall verses were ‘They who inhabit Athens, &c.

Athen. deipn. 13. He first tollerated common Curtesans, and with the money they paid to the State erected a Temple to Venus [...].

Sect. Empiric advers Mathem. 6. Hee first taught Souldiers to march by the sound of Fifes and Harpes, observing a kinde of measure in their pace.

CHAP. VIII.
How he entertained Anacharsis, his Travells to Aegypt, Cyprus, Miletus, Delphi, Corinth, and Creet.

Laert. IN the forty seventh Olympiad (according to [...] Sosicrates) Ana­charsis came to Athens; Eucrates being Archon, Plut. he went im­mediately to the house of Solon, and knocking at the doore, said he was a stranger desirous of his friendship and Hospitali­ty: Solon answered, it is better to contract friendship at home; then you [Page 51] that are at home, (replies Anacharsis) make me your friend and g [...]ist. Solon admiring his acutenesse, entertained him kindly, and kept him sometime with him▪ whilst he was imployed about pub­lick affairs, and ordering his lawes; which Anacharsis under­standing, smiled, that he undertook to curb the injustice and covetousnesse of [...]itizens by written ordinances, nothing dif­fering from cobwebs, holding fast the weak and poor, whilst the powerfull and rich break through them; whereto Solon answe­red, that men stand fast to those covenants, which it is not convement for [...]ither party to break: He gave the Citizens such lawes, as it was evident to all, that to keep, were better then to transgresse; but the event agreed more with the conjecture of Anacharsis, then the expectation of Solon.

Plut. After his lawes were promulgated, some or other comming daily to him, either to praise, or dispraise them, or to advise him to put in or out whatsoever came into their minds, the greater part to have the meaning explained, questioning how every thing was to be understood, and intreating him to unfold the sence; he (considering, that not to satisfie them, would ar­gue pride, to satisfie them would make him lyable to censure) determined to avoid ambiguities, importunities, and occasions of blame; (for as he said

In things that are not small
'Tis hard to sing to all.)

Colouring his travail with being Master of a Ship, and having obtained leave of the Athenians to be absent ten years, he put to sea, hoping in that time his lawes would become fa­miliar to them.

Plut. The first place of his arrivall was Aegypt, where he dwelt, as himselfe saith.

At Nilus mouth, neer the Canobian shore.

He studied Philosophy awhile with Psenophis, of Heliopolis, and Sonches of Sais, the most learned of those Priests, by whom, Plato affirmes, he was taught the Atlantick language, which he afterward began to explain in verse; when he questioned them in antiquities, the elder said to him, O Solon, Solon, you Greeks are alwaies children, there is not one Greek an old man.

Plut. Thence he went to Cyprus, where he was much favoured by P [...]ioc [...]prus, one of the Kings of that country, who had a little Town built by D [...]mophoon, son of Theseus, upon the River Clari­us, in a strong place, but rugged and barren: Solon perswading him, there lying a pleasant plain underneath it, to transferre the Town thither, making it more spacious and delightfull: Solon being present at the doing hereof, took care it might be peopled, and assisted the King to contrive it, as well for health as [Page 52] strength; whereupon many came into Philocyprus, whom other Kings aemulated; for this reason he ascribed the honour there­of unto Solon naming the Citie (which before was called Aepea) from him, Soli. This foundation he mentions in his Elegies, ad­dressing his speech to Philocyprus.

Maist thou in Cyprus long as King abide,
And ore this people and this Town preside;
In a fleet vessell from this haven may
Cythera crownd with violets me convey.
Her kind aspect and happinesse may she
Grant to this Town, a safe return to me.

He visited Thales also at Miletus, whose imposture towards him (related already in Plutarchs words) receive from Tzetzes.

Solon's friend Thales lead a single life,
By Solon often mov'd to take a wife;
These a Milesian (Thales so contriv'd)
Meeting, pretends from Athens late ariv'd:
Solon asks curiously what newes was there;
One that's abroad, saith he, hath lost his heir,
The Cittie waited on his obsequies.
was it not Solon 's son, Solon replies?
To this the stranger (as suborn'd) assents:
He with torn hair in cries his passion vents;
whom Thales (tenderly embracing) leave
This grief, saith he, I did thee but deceive;
' [...]is for these reasons Marriage I decline,
which can deject so great a soule as thine.

Whether it belong to this deceit, or to a real loss Laert. Diosco­rides, and Serm. 121. Stobaeus report, that weeping for the death of his Son, one told him, but this helps nothing, he answered, and therefore I weep.

Laert. At Delphi he met with the rest of the wise men, and the year following at Corinth, by Perianders invitation, which was as Plutarch implies, long before Pisistratus came to raign; nor doth Orat. 37. Dion Chrysostom intend the contrary, though so interpre­ted by 1 Meursius. a learned person, his words importing only this; Solon fled not the Tyranny of Periander, though he did that of Pisistratus.

That he went also to Creet (perhaps to visit Epimenides) is e­vident, from an ad [...]herecyd. Epistle of Thales.

CHAP. IX.
The attribute of wise conferred on him: his morall Sentences.

Laert. WHen Damasius (the second) was Archon, (in the yeare of the 49. Olympaid) all the seven received the attri­bute of wise: of these was Solon, upon whom ( Orat. 4. Themistius saith) it was conferr'd as ‘an honorable title full of dignity:’ Vit. Sol. Plutarch avers that ‘all of them (except Thales) were so called from their skill in civill affaires.’ And againe, Vit. Sol. ‘In Philosophy Solon chiefly affected (as did likewise most of the wise men) that part of morality which concerns politicks; Vit. Themist. and speaking of Mu [...]sip [...]ilus, ‘he was not (saith he) an orator of those Philo­sophers who are called naturall, but embraced that wisedome which teacheth government of a State, and prudence in pub­lique actions, which he retained as a Sect delivered by succes­sion from Solon. Whence Somn. Scip. 2. 17. Macrobius instanceth Solon, as ‘skil­full in that kind of learning which draweth Philosophy dee­per, and establisheth a state.’

Hereto may bee added his morall learning, for which (though Socrates reduced it first to a Science, and was there upon honored as the inventor thereof) the seven were so famous, that some affirme the title of wise was given them only for excelling others in a laudable course of life, and comprehending some morall rules in short sentences; of these they had three sorts, Apothegmes, Precepts and [...].

Of his Apothegmes Laertiu [...] recites these, ‘Speech is the I­mage of Action; He is a King who hath power. Lawes are like cob-webs which entangle the lesser sort, the greater breake through: Those who are in favour with Princes resemble counters used in casting accompts, which sometimes stand for a great number, sometimes for a lesser; so those are some­times honored, sometimes cast downe. Being demanded how men might be brought to doe no wrong, if saith he, they who have received none, and those who are wronged be alike concern'd Satiety comes of riches, contumely of Satiety.’

Vit. Sol. Plutarch and others, these; ‘He conceived that City to be best govern'd, where the people as eagerly prosecute wrongs done to others as to themselves. Sympos. Sept. Sapi. Being demanded how a City might be best ordered, he answered if the Citizens obey'd the Magistrates, the Magistrates the lawes, hee affirmed that King and Tyrant should become most glorious, who would convert his Monarchy to Democracy. He esteemed that Fa­mily best, wherein wealth is gotten not unjustly, kept not un­faithfully, expended not with repentance.’

[Page 54] Arist. Ethic. 10. 8. Hee defined ‘the happie those who are competently furnished with outward things, act honestly, and live tempe­rately;’ which definition Aristotle approves.

Cicer. Epist. 15. ad Brut. He said, ‘a commonwealth consists of two things, reward and punishment.’

Val▪ Max. 7. 2. ‘Seeing one of his friends much grieved, he carried him to the Tower, and desired him to view all the buildings below, which observing, the other to have done, now saith he, think with your selfe, how many sorrowes have heretofore and do [...] at present dwell under those roofes, and shall in future ages: and forbeare to be troubled at the inconveniencies of morta­lity as they were only yours. He said also, that if all men should bring their misfortunes together in one place, every one would carry his owne home againe, rather then take an equall share out of the common stock.’

Stob. Serm. 34 ‘Being in drinking, demanded by Periander, whether hee were silent through want of discourse, or through folly, an­swered, no fool can be silent amidst his cups. Stob. Serm. 41 He said, that City was best ordered, wherein the good were rewarded, the bad punished.’

Iohan. Salisb. Polier. [...]. 14. ‘He said, a man ought to fear nothing, but that his end exclude not Philosophy.’

Orat. in Yi­mocrat. Demosthenes recites a discourse which he used to the Judges, in accusing one who had moved a pernicious law, to this effect; ‘It is a Law generally received in all Citties, that he who makes false mony should be put to death. Then he demanded of the Judges, whether that Law seemed to them just and commendable, whereunto they assenting, he added, that he conceived mony to be used amongst Citizens, in respect of private contracts; but that lawes were the mony of the com­mon-wealth: therefore Judges ought to punish those, who embased the mony of the cōmon-wealth much more severe­ly, then those who embase that of private persons: and that they might better understand it to be a farre greater offence to corrupt lawes, then adulterate coyne, he added, that many Citties use mony of silver allaid with brasse or lead, without any prejudice to themselves; but whosoever should use lawes so adulterated, could not escape ruine and death.’

Laert. Mimnermus writing thus,

From trouble and diseases free,
At threescore years let death take me.

He reproved him, saying,

By my advice, that wish extend,
Nor for his counsell sleight thy friend.
Alter thy song, and let it be,
At fourescore years let death take me.

[Page 55] His morall precepts are thus delivered by * Demetrius Phale­reus, Stob. serm. 3. some whereof are cited by Laertius. ‘Nothing too much, Sit not as judge, if thou dost, the condemned will esteem thee an enemy. Fly pleasure, for it brings forth sorrow. Observe honesty in thy conversation more strictly then an oath. Seal words with silence, silence with opportunity. Lie not, but speak the truth. Consider on serious things. Say not ought is juster then thy Parents. Procure not friends in hast, nor procur'd, part with in hast. By learning to obey, you shall know how to command. What forfeiture you impose on o­thers, undergoe your selfe. Advise not Citizens what is most pleasant, but what is best. Be not arrogant. Converse not with wicked persons. Consult the Gods. Cherish thy friend. Re­verence thy Parents. Make reason thy guid. What thou seest speak not. What thou knowest conceal. Be mild to those that belong to thee. Conjecture hidden things from apparent.’

His particular sentence according to Clem. Alex. Strom. 1. Didymus and Laertius was, Nothing too much; according to Ausonius, Know thy selfe, who ascribes these also to him;

Him I dare happy call whose end I see,
Match with thy like, unequalls not agree.
By fortune guided, none to honour raise,
A friend in private, chide, in publick praise;
Honours atchiev'd created far exceed;
If fates be sure, what helps it to take heed?
And if unsure, there is of fear lesse need.

Of his [...] Laertius mentions these.

Of every man be carefull, lest he hear
A sword conceald within his breast, a cleer
Aspect, a double tongue, a mind severe.

CHAP. X.
How be opposed Pisistratus, and reprehended Thespis.

Plut. DUring the absence of Solon, the former dissention broke forth again in the City: Lycurgus was head of the country men, Megacle [...] of the Maritimes, Pisistratus of the Townsmen, who were most violent against the rich; Solon's lawes were still observed in the City, but the people aimed at novelty and change, not as thinking it most just, but in hopes to be Masters of other mens goods, and to suppresse the adverse party. Solon, whilst things stood thus, returned to Athens, where he was [Page 56] much reverenced and honoured by all, but could not speak or act in publick, through the weaknesse of his body and spirits, yet privately taking every one of the Commanders apart, he endeavoured to reconcile their differences, wherein Pisistratus seemed the most ready to be perswaded, with whom he had a very antient friendship, grounded aswell upon their kindred, as upon the good qualities of Pisistratus, then whom (as Solon u­sed to say) there could not be a person of more worth, if he were cured of his ambition.

Plut. About this time (according to Plutarch) which was in the fiftieth Olympiad, Thespis began to present Tragedies (which Suidas erroneously accounts ten Olympiads latter, as is observed by Meursius) the people were much taken with the novelty of the thing, for as yet there were no contentions therein. Solon naturally desirous to hear and learn, and by reason of his age indulging more to ease and pleasure, feasting and musick, went to see Thespis himself act, as was then the manner; the Play ended, he went to Thespis, and asked him, if he were not ashamed to speak so many lies before so great an auditory? Thespis answe­red, it was no shame to act or say such things in jest. Solon stri­king the ground hard with his staffe, replyed, but in a short time, we who approve this kind of jest shall use it in earnest, in our contracts and transactions. Laert. In fine, he absolutely forbad him to teach or act tragedies, conceiving their falsity unprofitable, whereto he dissimulated the deceit of Pisistratus, who soon after, Plut. having wounded himselfe, came into the Forum in a Chariot, preten­ding to have been so used by his enemies in the behalfe of the common-wealth, and inflamed the people with much rage. Solon comming near to him, son of Hippocra [...]es (saith he) you act Homers Vlysses ill in using the same means to deceive the Citizens, wherewith he (whipping himself) deluded the enemie. Immediately the people flocked in to defend Pisistratus: Aristo mov'd he might be allowed a standing guard of fiftie men: Solon rose up to oppose it, using speeches, the effect whereof, he af­terwards thus exprest in verse.

If evill your impieties befall,
Gods not the Author of those mischiefs call,
Your selves the causes, have given power to those,
Who in requitall, servitude impose.
Lion whom the footsteps of the fox pursue,
Whose souls deceit and Vanity endue.
The mans smooth tongue and speech you only heed,
But never penetrate into the deed.

He also foretold them the aimes of Pi [...]istratus, in an elegy to this effect.

[Page 57]
Vapours condens' dingender hail and snow,
And thunder doth from radiant lightning flow.
The sea is troubled by the raging wind,
When not disturb'd by that, nothing more kind.
A Citty by great persons is orethrown,
And taught beneath a Monarchy to groan.

But seeing the poorer sort much addicted to Pisistratus, and tumultuous, the richer afraid, consulting their safetie by flight, he retired, saying, Athenians, I am wiser then some, valianter then others, wiser then those who understand not the deceit of Pisistratus, valianter then those, who understand it, yet hold their peace, through fear. The Senate being of the same faction with Pis [...]stratus, said he was mad, whereto he answered,

A little time will to the people cleer
My madnesse, when 'th 'midst truth shall appear.

The people having granted Pisistratus his request concerning a guard, question'd not the number of them, but conniv'd so long at his pressing and maintaining as many souldiers as he pleased, that at last he possest himselfe of the Tower; where­upon the Citty being in a tumult, Megacles, with the rest of the Alcmaeonidae fled. Solon now very old, and destitute of those that might back him, went into the Forum, Laert. armed with a spear and shield, and made an oration to the people, partly accusing them of folly and cowardise, partly inciting them not to for­sake their libertie, using this celebrious speech, ‘It had been far easier to have supprest this tyranny in the grouth, but much more noble to cut it off now it is at the height.’ No man da­ring to hear him, he went home, and taking his armes, set them in the street before his door ( Laertius saith, before the Magaz [...]n) saying, ‘I have helped my Country and the Law as much as lay in me; or as Laertius,O Country, I have assisted thee both in word and deed.’ Plutarch addes, that from that time he li­ved retired, addicted to his study; and told by many the Ty­rant would put him to death, and demanded wherein the con­fided so much, he answered, in his age: but Laertius affirmes (which seemes truer) that assoon as he had laid down his armes, he forsook the Country: and Lib. 17. cap. 21. Agellius, that in the raign of Scovius Tullius, Pisist [...]atus was Tyrant of Athens, Solon going first away into voluntary exile.

CHAP. XI.
How he travelled to Lydia, and Cilicia.

SOlon at his departure from Athens received invitations from many; by Thales desired to come to Miletus, by Bias, to Priene, by Epimenides, to Creet, by Cleobulus to Lindus, as is evident from their severall letters to that effect: even Pisistratus pressed him to return home by this Epistle.

Pisistratus to Solon.

‘Neither am I the only person of the Greeks, nor am I without right to the Kingdome I possesse, as being descended from Codrus: that which the Athenians having sworn to give to Codrus and his heirs, took away, I have re­covered; no otherwise do I offend either God or man; I take care that the common-wealth be governed according to the lawes you ordained for the Athenians, and that better then by a Democratie: I suffer none to do wrong, neither do I enjoy any priviledges of a Tyrant, more then honour and dignity, such rewards only as were conferr'd upon the antient Kings; every man paies the tenth of his estate, not to me, but to the maintenance of publick sacrifices, or other charges of the common-wealth, or against time of war. You I blame not for discovering my intents, you did it more in love to the state, then in hate to me; besides, you knew not what go­vernment I meant to establish, which if you had, perhaps you would have brooked my rule, and not banisht your selfe; returne therefore home, and believe me without an oath: Solon shall never receive any displeasure from Pisistratus, you know my very enemies have not, and if you will vouch­safe to be of my friends, you shall be of the first, for I never saw anything in you deceitfull or false; if otherwise, you will live with the Athenians, use your freedome, only deprive not your selfe of your country for my sake.’

Solon returned this answer.

Solon to Pisistratus.

‘I Beleeve I shall not suffer any harm by you, for before you were Tyrant, I was your friend, and at present am no more your enemie, then any other Athenian who dislikes Tyrannie: whether it be better they be governed by a single person, or by a Democratie, let both parties determine. I [Page 59] pronounce you the best of Tyrants; but to returne to A­thens I think not sitting, lest I incur blame, who setled an e­quality in the Athenian common-wealth, and would not ac­cept of the Tyranny; by returning, I shall comply with thy actions.’

Croesus also sent to invite him, to whom he thus answered.

Solon to Croesus.

‘I Love your humanity towards us, and by Pallas▪ but that I affect above all things to live under a Democratie, I should much sooner choose to live in your Kingdome, then at A­thens, whilst Pisistratus rules there by force; but it is most plea­sing to me to live where all things are just and equall; yet will I come over to you, being desirous to become your guest.’

Solon upon this invitation went to Sandys, where Croesus (saith Herodo [...]us) received him kindly: after the third or fourth day the Officers at Croesus appointment lead him into the treasu­ries, to shew him all their greatnesse and riches; when he had beheld all, Croesus spoke thus unto him. ‘Athenian guest, be­cause we have heard much fame of your wisdome and expe­rience, having out of love to Philosophy travelled into many Countries, I have a desire to enquire of you if ever you saw any man whom you could call most happy.’ This he deman­ded, hoping himselfe to be esteemed such▪ Solon nothing flatte­ring him, answered according to the truth, saying, ‘O King, Tellus the Athenian.’ At which speech Croesus wondering. Why do you judge Tellus the most happy? Because (replied Solon) in a well ordered state, he had children honest and good, and saw every one of those have children all living; thus having passed his life as well as is possible for man, he ended it gloriously: a fight happening between the Athenians and their neighbours in Eleusis, he came in to their succour, and and putting the enemy to flight, died nobly; the Athenians buried him in the place where he fell, with much honour. Whilst Solon recounted the happinesse of Tellus, Croesus being mov'd, demanded to whom he assign'd the next place, making no question but himselfe should be named a second. Cleobis (saith he) and Bito, they were Argives by birth, they had sufficient wherewithall to maintain themselves; and withall, so great strength of body, that both were alike victors in the publick games, of whom it is thus reported; the Argives celebrating the feastivall of Iuno, it was necessary their Mother should be drawn to the▪ Tem­ple by a pair of Oxen, there being no Oxen in the field ready, these young men, streitned in time, under went [Page 60] the yoke, and drew the chariot of their Mother fortie five stadia, till they came to the Temple; when they had so done, in the sight of all the people, they obtain'd the happiest end of their daies, whereby the God declared it better for a man to die then to live; the Argive, pressing about them, the men applauding the piety of the Sons, the Women the happinesse of the Mother, the Mother her selfe infinitely joyed with the action, and the glory thereof, standing before the image, pray­ed the Goddesse to give her sons, Cleobis and Bito the best thing that could happen to man; after this prayer, having sacri­ficed and feasted, they lay down to sleep in the Temple, and never waked more, but so ended their daies: their Images (as of most excellent persons) were made by the Argives, and set up at Delphi. These Solon ranked in the second degree. Here­at Croesus growing angry; stranger (said he) doth our happi­nesse seem so despicable, that you will not rank us equall with private persons? He answered, do you enquire Croesus concerning human affairs of me, who know, that divine pro­dence is severe and full of alteration? In processe of time we see many things we would not, we suffer many things we would not; let us propose seventy yeers, as the term of mans life, which yeares consist of twenty five thousand and two hundred daies, besides the additionall month, if we make one year longer then another by that Month, to make the time accord the additionall months, belonging to those seventy years, will be thirty five, the daies of those months a thou­sand and fiftie, whereof one is not in all things like another: so that every man, O Croesus, is miserable! you appear to me very rich, and are King over many, but the question you de­mand I cannot resolve, untill I hear you have ended your daies happily; he who hath much wealth is not happier, then he who gets his living from day to day, unlesse fortune continuing all those good things to him, grant that he die well. There are many men very rich, yet unfortunate, many of moderate estates, fortunate, of whom, he who abounds in wealth, and is not happy, exceeds the fortunate only in two things, the other him in many; the rich is more able to satisfie his desires, and to overcome great injuries; yet the fortunate excells him, he cannot indeed inflict hurt on others, and sa­tisfie his own desires, his good fortune debarres him of these: but he is free from ills, healthfull, happy in his children, and beautifull, if to this a man dies well, that is he whom you seek, who deserves to be called happy; before death he can­not be stil'd happy, but fortunate; yet for one man to obtain all this is impossible, as one country cannot furnish it selfe with all things, some it hath, others it wants, that which hath most is best; so in men, no one is perfect, what one hath, [Page 61] the other wants; he who hath constantly most, and at last quietly departs this life, in opinion, O King, deserves to bear that name. In every thing we must have regard to the end, whether it tends for many, to whom God dispenceth all good fortunes, he at last utterly subverts. This story is related by Plutarch, also mentioned by Laertius, who addes, that Croesus being magnificently adorned and seated on his Throne, asked him, whether he had ever seen any thing more glorious? who answe­red, C [...]ks, Pheasants, & Peacocks, who are much more beautiful in their naturall power. Herodot. Solon after this discourse with Croesus, not soothing him, or making any esteem of him, was dismissed, and ac­counted unwise, for neglecting the present good in regard to the future. Plut. Aesope, the writter of fables was at that time at Sardis, sent for thither by Croesus, with whom he was much in favour▪ he was grieved to see Solon so unthankfully dismist, and said to him, Solon, we must either tell Kings nothing at all, or what may please them. No, saith Solon, either nothing at all, or what is best for them. Thus was Solon much despised by Croesus.

Herod. ‘Afterwards Croesus being taken prisoner by Cyrus was at his command fettered and set upon a great pile of wood to be burned: as he was in this posture, it came into his minde what Solon had divinely said to him, that no living man is happy; as soone as he remembred those words, he fell into a great de­fection of Spirit, and sighing deeply, named Solon thrice, which Cyrus hearing, commanded the interpreters to aske upon whom he called, they went to him and asked, he was silent, at last pressing him further he answered, upon him who I desire above all wealth, might have spoken with all tyrants; not understan­ing, after much pressure and importunity, he told them, Solon an Athenian came long since to him, and beholdi [...]g all his wealth, valu­ed it at nothing moreover that all which he told him had come to passe, nor did it more belong to him then to all mankind, especially to those who think themselves happy. Whilst Croesus said this, the fire began to kin­dle, and the outward parts thereof to be seized by the flame. Cyrus being informed by an interpreter of all that Croesus said, began to relent, knowing himselfe to be but a man, who de­livered another man, nothing inferiour to him in wealth, to be burned alive, fearing to be punished for that act, and con­sidering that nothing was certain in human affairs, he com­manded the fire to be instantly quenched, and Croesus, and those that were with him to be brought off, Plut. whom [...] ever after as long as he lived, he had in esteem. Thus Solon gained praise, that of two Kings, his speech preserved one, and instru­cted the other.’

Plutarch relates this done in the former ten years travail of Solon, upon the finishing of his lawes, whence he maketh an A­pology for the incongruity thereof, with the rules of Chrono­logy, [Page 62] which had lesse needed, if with Laertius, he had placed it after Pisistratus his usurpation of the tyranny.

Laertius saith, he went from hence to Cilicia, and built there a Gitty, called after him Soleis, whither he brought also some few Athenians, whose language growing corrupt by that of the country, they were said to solaecise; of this is the Etymolo­gist doubtlesse to be understood, who derives [...] (so read we, not [...].) This is also attested by Suidas, as a distinct relation from that of Cyprus, in confirmation whereof Laertius add [...]s, the Cilicians were called Solenses, the Cyprians Solii.

CHAP. XII.
His death.

Plut. HEraclides affirmes, Solon lived long after Pisistratus began to raign; De longavis. Lucian that his life extended to a hundred years; with whom those best agree, who say (as Suidas relates) he lived in the fiftie six Olympiad; Plaut. but according to Phanias, Pisistratus took the Tyranny upon him, when Comias was Archon, and Solon died, Hegestratus being Archon, who s [...]cceeded Comias, which was in the first year of the fiftie [...]ift Olympiad. If this latter opinion had not every where taken place of the other, the disagreement betwixt the time of Solon's death, and Croesus raign had not been urged by many, as an argument against the story of their mee­ting.

He dyed (according to Laertius) aged eighty years (being as Var. hist. 8. 16. Elian saith, very decrepit) in Cyprus, (as is like wise attested by lib. 5. cap. 3. Valerius Maximus, and Laert. Suidas) [...] and left order with his friends that they should carry his bones to Salamis, & there causing them to be burnt, s [...]atter the ashes all over the country; which story Plutarch (though he counts it fabulous) acknowledgeth to be attested by many Authors of credit, particularly Aristotle.

Laertius confirms it by the testimony of Cra [...]inus, who makes him speak thus;

The Island I inhabit, sown
As fame reports, in Ajax Town:

That desire of knowledge which he usually profest continu­ed with him to his end, Val. Max. 8. 7. confirmed the last day of his life; his friends sitting about him, and falling into some discourse, he raised his weary head, and being demanded why he did so, he answered, that when I have learnt that, whatsoever it be, whereon you dispute, I may die: Stob. 29. His brothers son singing an ode of Sappho, he delighted therewith, bad him teach him it, and being de­manded [Page 63] why, that, said he, I may learn whilst I [...] out of this life.

After his death, the Athenians erected his statute in brasse, before Pausan. Attic. the checker'd cloister'd Demosth. in Aristog. 2. Eli­an. var. hist. 8. 16. in the forum: Another was set up at Salamis, hiding (as Demosthenes and Eschines describe it) the hand within the garment, in the same habit wherein he used to make speeches to the Athenians; perhaps the same that carri­ed this inscription,

[...]am'd Salamis, the Persian pride cast down,
And gave to Solon birth, the lawes renown.

Laertius bestowes this Epigram upon him.

A sorraign Cyprian fire burn'd Solon, yet
Salamis keeps his bones, their ashes wheat;
His Soul to heaven mounts with his lawes, so light
A burthen, they not clog, but help his flight.

CHAP. XIII.
His writinngly [...]

HIs excellency both in Rhetoratie, [...]nd Poetry is attested by many; Cicero, In Bruto. ‘before Solo [...] [...] no man is recorded for eloquence. De orat, lib. 1. And again, Lycurgus and Solon we place in the number of the eloquent. Orat. 21. Dion, Chrysostome, Aristides, Lycurgus, Solon, Epaminondas, and if there be any other in the same kind, ought to be esteemed Philosophers in the common-wealth, or Oratours, according to ingenious true Rhetorick. Orat. Plat. 2. Ari­stides, Solon is said to have sung those things which concern the Megarenses, but neither his Lawes nor Orations, which sometimes he made for the rich to the commons, sometimes for the commons to the rich, did he sing or comprise in verse, but used a rhetoricall form, excellently demonstrating in all these, that he deserved to be esteemed an Oratour and a Wise-man, having attained both those titles and faculties.’

As to Poetry, Plu [...]rch averres, ‘he addicted himselfe thereto from the beginning, not in serious matters, but ludicrous, used (as it seemes) for his exercise and pastime; afterwards he included many Philosophicall sentences in verse, and many affaires of state, not in relation to history, but to vindicate his own actions, sometimes also to correct and reprove the Athenians. Plato saith,’ In Tim [...]eo. 1. crit. ‘that at the Apaturian feast, the boyes used to repeat his poems; and that if he had applyed himselfe to nothing but Poetry as others did, and had finished the history he brought out of Egypt, and had not been con­strained [Page 64] by seditions and other distractions to lay aside that study, neither Hesiod, Homer, nor any of the Poets would have been more famous.’

Of his writings in Prose, we must with Laertius name in the first place his

Lawes, of which already.

Orations to the people.

His Poems are cited under that generall title by Eclig. dict. Attic. Phrynicus, their particular subjects and titles these.

Exhortations to himselfe, mentioned by Laertius, In Orat. [...]. Aristides, and Suidas.

Elegies:

Salamis, of which Chap. 2.

of the Athenian common-wealth, which Laertius affirmes to have extended to two thousand verses, according to Attic. Pausanias, and [...]. Philo, Elegiack.

Iambicks, mentioned by La [...]rtius, cited by Athenaeus and Ari­stides.

Epodes, mentioned by Laertius.

Elegies to King Cypranor, cited by the author of Aratus, his life. [...], cited by Laertius.

Some (saith Plutarch [...]in [...]irme, he began to reduce his own Lawes into verse. fiftie si

The last work he urken plok was concerning the Atlantick speech or fable, which beginning late, he was deterred by the greatnesse of the work, as Plutarch saith, and prevented by death.

Besides those Epistles already alledged, these are preserved also by Laertius.

Solon to Periander.

‘YOu send me word, there are many who plot against you; if you should put them all to death, it would advan­tage you nothing; some one there may be of those, whom you suspect not, who plotts against you, either fearing himselfe, or disdaining you, or desirous to ingratiate himselfe with the City, though you have done him no injury; it is best, if you would be free from jealousie, to acquit your selfe of the cause, but if you will continue in Tyranny, take care to provide a greater strength of strangers then is in your own City; so shall you need to fear no man, nor to put any to death.’

Solon to Epimenides.

‘NEither are my lawes likely to benefit the Athenians long, nor have you advantaged the City by lustration; for divine right and law [...]givers cannot alone benefit Cities; it importeth much of what mind they are who lead the com­mon people; divine rights and lawes, if they direct them well, are profitable, if they direct them ill, profit nothing; neither are those lawes I gave in any better condition; they who had charge of the common-wealth, not preventing Pisistratus his usurpation of the tyranny, lost the City, of which, when I foretold them, I could not be believed; the Athenians would rather credit his flatteries, then my truth; wherefore laying down my armes before the Magazin, I said, that I was wiser then those who did not see Pisistratus aimed at the Tyranny; and stouter then those who durst not resist him: they repu­ted Solon a mad man. Lastly, I made this profession, O coun­try! behold Solon ready to vindicate thee in word and deed: they again esteem'd me mad. Thus I beeing the only person that oppos'd Pisistratus, I came away from them; let them guard him with their armes if they please; for know (dear friend) the man came very cunningly by the Kingdome, he complyed at first with the Democratie, afterwards wounding himselfe, came into Elioea, crying out, he had received those hurts from his enemies, and required a guard of foure hun­dred young men, which they (not harkening to me) granted; these carried halberds: after this, he dissolved the popular government; truly I laboured in vain to free the poorer sort from mercenary slavery, when they all now serve one Pisistra­tus.

Such fragments of his Poems as have been hitherto preser­ved are thus collected.

Out of his Elegies.
Sprung from Mnemosyne and Joves great line,
Pierian Muses, to my prayer encline,
Grant that my life and actions may call down
Blessings from heaven, and raise on earth renown:
Sweet to my friends, and bitter to my foes,
To these my sight bring terror, joy to those.
Riches I wish, not riches that are plac't
In unjust means, for vengeance comes at last.
Riches dispenc'd by heavens more bounteous hand,
A base on which we may unshaken stand.
But that which men by injuries obtain,
[Page 66] That which by arts and deeds unjust they gain
Comes slowly, swiftly by reveng'd pursued,
And miserie like a close spark include,
Which soon to a devouring flame dilates,
Wrong is a weak foundation for estates.
Jove doth the end of every thing survey:
As sodain vernall blasts chase clouds away.
Ransack the bottom of the roaring main,
Then swiftly overrun the fertile plain,
Ruffling the wealthy ears; at last they rise
To Joves high seat, a [...]calm then smooths the skies.
The Sun's rich lustre mildly gilds the green
Enamell of the meads, no clouds are seen,
Such is Joves heavie anger diff'ring far
From men, whose every trifle leads to war:
They are not hid for ever, who offend
In secret, judgment finds them in the end.
Some in the act are punisht, others late,
Even he who thinks he hath deluded fate;
At last resents it in just miseries,
Which Nephewes for their Ancestors chastise.
We think it fares alike with good and bad;
Glory and selfe-conceit our fancies glad
Till suffering comes, then their griev'd spirits bleed,
Who did before their soules with vain hope feed.
He whom incurable diseases seize,
Sooths his deluded thoughts, with hopes of ease.
The coward's valiant in his own esteem,
And to themselves, faire the deformed seem.
They who want means, by poverty opprest
Beleeve themselves of full estates possest.
All is attempted, some new seas explore
To bring home riches from a forraign shore:
Seas, on whose boisterous back secur'd they ride,
And in the mercy of the winds confide:
Others to crooked ploughes their Oxen yoke,
And Autumn with their plants and setts provoke.
Some Vulcan's and Minerva's arts admire,
And by their hands, their livelyhoods acquire.
Others the fair Olympian muses trace,
And lovely learning studiously embrace.
One by Apollo is prophetick made,
And tells what mischiefs others shall invade;
With him the Gods converse, but all the skill
In birds or victimes cannot hinder ill.
Some to Peonian knowledge are inclin'd,
Nor is the power of simples unconfin'd.
[Page 67] The smallest hurts sometimes increase and rage,
More then all art of physick can asswage;
Sometimes the fury of the worst disease.
The hand by gentle stroking will appease.
Thus good or bad arives as fates design,
Man cannot what the Gods dispenc'd decline.
All actions are uncertain, no man knowes
When he begins a work, how it shall close.
Some, who their businesse weigh with prudent care,
Oft of the issue intercepted are:
Whilst others who have rashly ought design'd,
An end successfull of their labours find.
There is no bound to those who wealth acquire,
For they who are possest of most, desire
As much again, and who can all content,
Even those full blessings which the Gods have lent,
Man variously to his own harm applies,
Whom Jove by means as various doth chastice.
Again.
OUr City never can subverted be
By Jove, or any other Deitie;
For Pallas eye surveyes with pious care
The wals, which by her hand protected are:
Yet the inhabitants of this great Town,
Fondly inclin'd to wealth, will throw it down;
And those unjust great persons who are bent
Others to wrong, themselves to discontent;
For their insatiate fancies have not power
T [...]enjoy the sweetnesse of the instant hower;
But by all wicked means, intent on gain,
From hallowed, nor from publick things refrain.
Riches by theft and cozenage to possesse,
The sacred bounds of justice they transgresse.
Who silent sees the present, knowes the past,
And will revenge these injuries at last:
Causing a cureless rupture in the state,
And all our liberties shall captivate.
Rouse war from his long slumber, who the flower
Of all our youths shall bloodily devour.
For Cities which injuriously oppose
Their friends, are soon invaded by their foes.
These are the common evills; of the poor
Many transported to a forraign shore,
To bondage there, and fetters shall be sold.
[Page 68] Each private house thus shares the publick fate,
Nor can exclude it with a ban'd-up gate;
For scaling furiously the higher walls,
On those whom beds or corners hides, it falls.
My soule, Athenians, prompts me to relate
What miseries upon injustice wait:
But justice all things orderly designes,
And in strict fetters the unjust confines.
What's soure, she sweetens, and allaies what cloyes.
Wrong she repells, ill in the grouth destroyes,
Softens the stubborn, the unjust reformes,
And in the state calmes all seditious stormes:
Bitter dissention by her raign supprest,
Who wisely governes all things for the best.
Another.
NO man is blessed, bad is every one
That feeles the warmth of the all-seeing S [...]n.
Another.
LEt me not die unpitti'd, every friend
With sighes and tears my latest hower attend.
CHILO.

CHILON.

CHAP. I.
Chilon his life.

Laert. CHILON was a Lacedaemonian, son of Dama­getus, corruptly termed in Serm. 28. Stobaeus, Page 6. He was eminent amongst the Greeks for two pre­dictions.

The first to Hippocrates, Herodot. lib. 1. Laert. to whom (being a private person) hapned a great prodigie at the Olym­pick games: having prepared an offering, and filled a Cauldron with flesh and water, it boiled over without fire: This portent Chilon (accidentally present) beholding, advised him that he should not take a wise by whom he might have issue; that if he had one, he should put her away, and if a son, turn him out of dores: Hippocrates not following this advice, brought up his son Pisistratus, who in the sedition of the Maritimes and country­men at Athens, those led by Megacles, these by Lycurgus, stirred up a third faction, and gained the tyranny.

Laert. He was much renowwed also for his prediction concerning Cythera a Lacedaemonian Island; examining the Scituation thereof, would to God (said he) it had never been; or since it is, it might be swallowed up by the sea, and wisely did he foresee. Damaratus, a Laecedaemonian exile, counselled▪ Xerxes to seize upon that Island, which advice if he had fol­lowed, would have ruined all Greece. His words (according to Lib. 7. 235: He­rodotus) were these. You may effect your desires, if you send three hundred ships to the Lacedaemonian coast; there lies an Island, named Cythera, of which Chilon, a person of greatest wisdome amongst us, said, it were better for the Lacedaemonians that it were under water then above: he, it seemes, expected from it some such thing as I am now going to declare, not that he foresaw your Navy, but doubting any in the same kind; Let your men issue out of this Island upon the Lacedaemonians, to strike them into terror. Laert. Afterwards, in the time of the Peloponesian war, Nicias taking the Island, placed some Athenians therein, who much infested the Lacedaemonians.

Laertius saith, that he was old in the fifty two Olympiad, at what time Aesop flourish'd: that he was Ep [...]orus in the fiftie sixt. (Casaubon reads the fiftie five) but Pamphila (continueth Laertius) saith in the sixt. He was first Ephorus, when Euthydemus was Archon, as Sosicrates also affirmes, and first appointed the Ephori to be joyned with Kings, which Satyrus saith, was the institution of Lycurgus. Hence it is doubtfull [Page 70] whether Chilon was Ephorus in the sixt Olympiad, or in the fiftie sixt; the latter is more probable, in as much as he bore that office when Euthydemus was Archon at Athens, which was in the fiftie sixt Olympiad, as appeares by the Marmor Arunde li­anum, where for [...] is corruptly read [...] rendred Archonte populo. But it is likewise true, that the Ephori were first created about the sixt Olympiad, when Polydorus and Theopompus were Kings of Lacedaemon, a hundred and thirty yeares after [...]ycurgus, as Plutarch (in his life) affirmes, from which time there were five annuall Ephori chosen in Lacedaemon, whereof the first is called [...], because the year had its denomination from him: the first of the first election was Plut. vit. Ly­cur. Elatus; Chilon in the fiftie sixt Olympiad was the first of the five of his year; which might perhaps give the occasion of the mistake to them, who take him to be the first of that institution, of whom is * Sca­liger.

In Euseb. p. 67: How he behav'd himself in this office, may be gathered from his speech▪ Laert. to his brother, displeased that himselfe was not Ephorus at the same time: I can bear injuries, saith he, you cannot.

He was so just in all his actions, Laert. that in his old age he pro­fessed, he never had done any thing contrary to the conscience of an upright man, only that of one thing he was doubtfull; ha­ving given sentence against his friend according to law, he ad­vised his friend to appeal from him (his Judge) so to preserve both his friend and the law: Lib. 1. cap. 3: Agellius relates it thus; ‘When his life drew towards an end, ready to be seized by death, he spoke thus to his friends about him: My words and actions in this long term of years, have been (almost all) such as I need not repent of, which perhaps you also know; truly even at this time I am certain, I never committed any thing, the remembrance whereof begets any trouble in me, unlesse this one thing only, which whether it were done amisse or not, I am uncertain: I sat with two others as Judge upon the life of my friend; the law was such, as the person must of necessity be condemned; so that either my friend must lose his life, or some deceit be used towards the Law: revolving many things in my mind for relief of a condition so despeate, I conceived that which I put in practise to be of all other the most easie to be born: Silently I condemned him, and perswaded those others who judged to absolve him: Thus preserved (in so great a businesse) the dutie both of a judge and friend; but from that act I receive this trouble, that I fear it is not free from perfidiousnesse and guilt, in the same businesse, at the same time, and in a publick affair, to perswade others, contra­ry to what was in my own judgment best.’

CHAP. II.
His morall sentences, precepts, and verses.

OF his Apothegmes, these are remembered by Laertius; he said, providence of future things collected by reason, is the vertue of a man. Being demanded wherein the learned differ from the unlearn­ed? he answered in a good hope? What is hard? to conceal secrets, to dis­pose of leasure well; and to be able to bear an injury.

Plutarch. Simpos. sept. sap Being invited to a feast by Periander, (with the rest of the wise-men,) he would not promise to come before he knew what other company would be there, saying, a man is necessita­ted to brook an ill companion in a ship at sea, or in a tent in a camp; but to mix indifferently with all sorts of people at a feast is indiscretion. Up­on the same occasion Plutarch recites these sentences of his; A Prince must not think upon any transitory mortall things, but only upon the eternall, and immortall. That common-wealth is best where the people minde the Law, more then the Lawyers. A family must resemble as much as possible a Citty governed by a King. Plut. de ani­ma. Hearing a man say he had no ene­mie, he asked him if he had any friend; conceiving love and hate necessarily must follow one ano [...]her.

His morall precepts are thus delivered by Stob. serm. 28. Demetrius Phalereus. Kn [...]w thy selfe. Speak not much in thy drink, for thou wilt transgresse. ( or as Laertius, rule thy tongue, especially at a feast) Threaten not free persons, for it is not just. (Laertius, threaten none, for that is like a woman) Speak not ill of thy neighbour, if thou dost, thou shalt hear what will trouble thee. Go slowly to the feasts of thy friends, swiftly to their misfortunes. (Laertius, go more readily to a friend in adversity then in prosperity.) Celebrate marriage frugally. Speak well of the dead. Reverence thy elder (Laertius, honour age) Hate him who is in­quisitive into the businesse of others. Preferre losse before unjust gain ( for that (addes Laertius) brings grief but once, this for ever) Deride not the unfortunate. If thou art strong, behave thy selfe mildely, that thou maist rather be resp [...]cted then fear'd (Laertius, of thy neighbours. Learn to) Order thy house well. Let not thy tongue run before thy mind. Bridle thy anger. Covet not impossibilities. In the way hasten not forward. Shake not thy hand, (Laertius, in discourse) for it is like a mad-man. Obey the Lawes. Be reconciled to those who have wrong'd you, but revenge contumelies. To which Laertius addes these, To preserve thy selfe. Not to hate divination, make use of quietnesse.

Lib. 7. cap. 32. Pliny speaking of authority, saith, that men ranked Chilon a­mongst Oracles, consecrating three precepts of his at Delphil, in golden letters, which are these: Eve [...]y man to know himselfe, and to desire no [...]hing too much; the companion of anothers mony and strife is misery.

Agell. He only kept within bounds the two most fierce affections of the soule, Love, and Hate, saying, Love with such limitation, as if hereafter you might chance to hate: hate so farre, as that perhaps you might hereafter love.

[Page 72] Ausonius ascribes to him the effect of these verses.

Me, may the mean not fear, nor great despise,
Have death and health alike before thy eyes.
The benefits thou givest, remember never,
Of those thou dost receive, be mindfull ever.
Learn of thy selfe and friend t'orecome crosse fate,
Age, youth resembling, is a light estate,
Youth, age resembling, is a greater weight.

His particular sentence was, To a surety, losse is near.

Of his [...], Laertius mentions this, as most eminent.

Gold's worth we by the touchstone find,
Gold is the touchstone of the mind.

Laert. He asked Aesop what Iupiter was doing, who answered, pulling down the high, and raising the low.

CHAP. III.
His death, and writings.

HE died (according to Laert. Hermippus) at Pisa, embracing his son, victor in the Olympic games, of the caestus, the weaknesse of his age overcome with excesse of joy; all who were present at that great assembly attended on his funeralls, as is affirmed by Lib. 7. cap. 32▪ Pliny and Laertius, who hath this Epigram up­on him,

To thee illustrious Pollux thanks I pay,
That Chilons son the Olive bore away:
The father died ore-joy'd his child to see
So crown'd: a happy death! such befall me:

Upon his statue, this inscription.

The birth of Chilon warlick Sparta grac'd,
Who of the seven, in the first rank was plac'd.

Laert. He was short in speech; whence Aristagoras calls that man­ner of speaking Chilonian: Lud. sept. sap. Ausonius also alludes hereto in the speech he makes under his name.

Laert. He writ Elegies extending almost to two hundred verses: there is likewise an Epistle of his extant to this effect.

Chilon to Periander.

‘YOu send me word of an expedition you are preparing a­gainst forraigners, intending to go in person with your Army: a monarch, I think, hath little safetie, even at home. That Tyrant I esteem happy who dies at home a naturall death.’

PITTACVS

PITTACVS.

CHAP. I.
Pittacus his life.

Laert. & Suid. PITTACUS was of Mitelene (the chief City of Lesbos) son of Caicus, So the varican M. S: of Sui­das, [...] better then the printed editions, which read [...], or (rather) Hyr [...]ha­dius, a Thracian, his Mother a Lesbian, born in the thirtie two Olympiad.

Laertius saith, he flourished in the fortie two Olympiad; Suid. at that time he gave testi­mony of his great courage and love to his Country, in killing (assisted by the brethren of Alcaeus the Po­et) Melanchrus, tyrant of Lesbos and Mitelene.

Laert. Pittacus grown eminent by this action, was by the Mitele­naeans made [...]enerall, and Strab. sent with a fleet against the A [...]henians, with whom they had a long contest concerning the Achillaean field; the ground of their difference this: Herod. 5. 94. Pisistratus took Sige­um by force from the Mitelaeans, and setled there (as King) Hegesistra­tus his naturall Son, by an Argive woman, who kept it, not without much dispute; for betwixt the Mitelenaeans and Athenians there was a long war, those sallying out of the Achillaean Town, these out of Sigae­um: Strab. lib. 13. those lay claim to the Town, as built by Archaeanactes of Mitelene, of the stones of old Troy (for the Lesbians challenged the greatest part of Troas as their hereditary right, where they had built many houses, some, saith Strabo, standing at this day, others demolished) Herod. conti­nues. these opposed their claim; alledging the Aeolians had no more right to this Ilian country, then themselves or any other of the Greeks, who assisted Menelaus in the recovery of Hellen. Strab. Laert. The Athenians sent thither as Generall Phryno, a tall robust person, who had been victor in all the Olympick exercises; perhaps the same whom Eusebius names in the thirtie six Olympiad. Strab. Laert. Pitta­cus having been severall times worsted in ba [...]tle, at last challenged Phryno to single combat, and met him, being armed [...]ith the [...]eapons of a fisherman, hiding a net under his s [...]ield, wherewith catching Phryno suddenly, he sle [...] him with his trident and [...]agger, and by his dea [...]h re­covered the field. From this stratagem of Pittacus, was derived the like kind of fighting amongst the Roman gladiatours, called Retiarii (described by Saturnal. Lipsius) as is expresly observed by Polyaenus and [...] Retiario: Festus.

Strab. Laert. But this war ended not so; untill at last both parties refer­red [Page 74] themselves to Periander, Herod. 5. 95: choosing him Umpire; he awar­ded that each side should keep what they were in possession of, whereby Sigeum fell to the Athenians. Strab. Demetrius argues Ti­maeus of falshood, for affirming Periander built Achilleum ( a small town, where was the tomb of Achilles) in opposition to the Athenians, of Ilian stones, and thereby to have aided Pittacus: but neither was it built of such stones (saith Strabo) nor was Periander the founder: how could he be chosen arbitratour, whose actions had declared him an enemie?

Laert. Hereupon Pittacus was highly honoured by the Mitelenae­ans, who ( Aristot. polit. 3. 14. being infested by banished persons, under the leading of Antimenides, and Alcaeus the Poet) Val. Max. 6. 5 either in obligation to his merit, or confidence in his equity, by their free votes ( Plut. amator. though Alcaeus denie it) instated him in the Tyrannie; Aristot. pol. 3. 14. with many accla­mations of praise, and a great concourse of people (as is manifest from Alcaeus, who for that reason reprehends them.) Plut. de [...]a­ligd. Herod. Laert. Suid. They also with generall consent offered him great gifts, and bad him take of that field which he recovered from the Citizens as much as he would. He darting his spear, demanded only so much as that had passed over, which he dedicated to Apollo, called (even to the time of Plutarch, and Laertius) the Pittacaean field: Laert. Sosicrates averres, he took part of it for himselfe, saying, the halfe was more then the whole: Val. Max. 6. 5 Thus he diverted his mind from the gift, con­ceiving it not fitting to diminish the glory of the vertue, by the greatnesse of the reward.

Being possest of this power, he shewed the moderation wherewith his breast was furnished, towards Alcaeus the Poet, who had behaved himselfe pertinaciously against him, with bitter hate and scurrilous wit ( whereof see many instances in Laertius) Pittacus only inform'd him how able he was to oppresse him.

During his government, he made many Lawes, one whereof is mentioned by De legib. 2. Cicero, forbidding any man to go to the funerall of such as he was not of kin to. Another by F [...]lit. 2. 12. Aristotle, that whosoever being drunk, should strike any man, should pay double as much as if he had been sober; or as Laertius delivers it, whosoever offended, being drunk, should pay a double forfeit; which he did to restrain the Mi­telenaens from drunkennesse, because their Island abounded in wine. His usuall exercise, even whilst he was King, (as Cle. archus affirmes) was to grind corn, esteeming it a healthfull ex­ercise, much commending a mill, that in so little room, it affor­ded exercise to many. There was a song, Pollux. called for that reason [...], of which Thales Plut. Sympos. sept. sap. affirmes he heard a she-slave in Lesbos sing the beginning as the ground, which was thus.

Grind, grind my Mill amain,
For Pittacus the Lesbian King
To grind doth not disdain.

[Page 75] Being well in years, he was constrained to take upon himself the leading of an Army, whereupon he said, it is hard to be good; which Hence correct Suidas, who saith Simon. Simonides mentions, saying,

Hard to be truly honest, this
The Pittaceian sentence is.

Plato also remembers it in his Protagoras (where Simonides re­proves Pittacus for saying, it is hard to continue good, which he affirmes to be easie, but to become good, hard; wherein he differs from Laertius his expression of it.

Laert. He continued in the government of the Kingdom ten years, 6. 5. Valerius Maximus saith, only as long as the war with the Athenians concerning Sigeum lasted, but afterwards assoon as peace was obtained by victory ( having in this time setled the affairs of the common­wealth) he laid it down, notwithstanding the Mitelenaeans cried out to the contrary, lest he should continue Lord of the Citizens longer then the necessities of the Kingdome required, and lived ten years after a pri­vate person.

He went to Sardis at what time (as some say, though others apply it to Bias) Croesus having made the Grecians in Asia tributary, had given order for the building of a Navy to invade the Islanders: as soon as he came thither, Croesus asked him what newes from Greece? He by his answer, diverted the King from going forward with his building ships: the Islanders, saith he, have bought a world of horses, intending an expedition against Sardis; and Croesus thinking he had spoken truth, answered, I wish the Gods would put it in their minds to come against the Lydians on horse-back; he replyed, it is not without reason, great King, that you wish and hope to catch the Islanders on horse-back in the conti­nent; and what think you the Islanders wish more, then (hearing your preparation to set out a Navie against them) that they may catch the Lydians upon the Sea, and revenge the cause of those inland Grecians whom you have reduc'd to servitude. Croesus much delighted with this speech, and disswaded (for it seemed to him he spoke very ingeniously) from building a Navy, gave it over, and contracted amity with the Ionian Islands.

CHAP. II.
His morall sentences, precepts, and verses.

OF his Apothegmes, Laertius recites these. The Gods themselves cannot resist necessity. Power showes the man. Being on a time de­manded what is best, he answered, to do the present well. To Croesus, who asked which was the greatest government, that of various (wood saith he) meaning the Law, (carved) in wooden tables. To a Phocaean, who said, I must seek an honest man: though you seek much, (saith he) you shall not [Page 76] find him. To some who demanded what was most pleasing, he answered, Time. He said it was the part of wise men to foresee inconveniencies and prevent them before they came, of valiant men to order them well when they come.

Add these from Symp [...]s. sept. sap. Plutarch, That Prince is happy, who can make his subject afraid, not of him, but for him. That commonwealth is best or­dered, where the wicked have no command, and the good have. That house is best ordered, which needs nothing either of ornament or necessity.

Athen. deipn. [...]ib. 10. He counselled Periander to shun drunkennesse and excesse in feasting, least he should be known to be what he was, not what he seemed.

Laert. To a young man asking his advice concerning marriage, what directions he gave, is thus exprest by Callimachus.

An Acarnaean stranger Pittacus
Hyrrhadius son of Lesbos question'd thus;
Father a double match is offered me;
The birth and meanes of one with mine agree;
The other far exceeds me, which is best?
By your advice my aime shall be addrest.
Lifting his staffe (his ages sole defence)
He poynting said, go fetch advice from thence.
(There he espi'd some boyes by chance at play,
As they were whipping topps along the way)
Follow their steps saith he. When nigh he drew,
He heard them say, an equall take to you;
By which direction guided, he forsook
The richer fortune, and the equall took;
Be you (as he) by this wise counsell lead,
And take an equall to your Mariage bed.

Whither Aeschylus (as is observ'd by his Scholiast) alluded saying, From. vinct.

Wise, truly wife was he
Who first sententiouslie
His judgement thus exprest,
An equall match is best.

His Moral precepts are thus collected by St [...]b. 28. Demetrius Phalereus. ‘Know opportunity; What thou intendest, speake not before thou dost it, for being frustrate of thy hope, thou will be de­rided. Use thy friends. What thou tak'st ill in thy neigh­bour, doe not thy selfe. Reproach not the unhappie, for the hand of God is on them. Restore what is committed to thy trust. Beare with thy neighbour. I ove thy neighbour. Re­proach not thy friend, though he recede from thee a little; nor wish well to thy enemy, it is against reason. It is hard to fore­see [Page 77] the future, what is past is certaine, what is to come ob­scure. The earth is faithfull, the sea faithlesse; Gaine insati­able. Acquire, honesty, Seeke Obsequiousnesse, Love Disci­pline, Temperance, Prudence, Truth, Faith, Experience, Dexterity, Society, Diligence, Oeconomy and Piety.’

Ausonius cites these as his;
None know to speak who know not to refraine,
One goodmans praise 'fore many ill mens gaine.
He's mad who envies in the happy, pride;
Or grief in the unhappie doth deride.
Who makes a law must not that law transgresse,
Pu [...]chase all friends thou caust in happinesse,
And to the fewest trust in thy distresse.

Laert. Of his [...], these were most celebrious,

Who hath a quiver and a bow
Against a wicked man should go
Whose doubtfull tongue never exprest
The faithlesse meaning of his breast.

His particular sentence was, Know opportunity.

CHAP. III.
His Death; Brother, Wife, Son, Writings.

Laert. HE lived to a full age, above seventy yeares, or (following the accompt of Suidas for his birth) eighty. Long [...]v. Lucian ex­ceeds, who reckons him amongst those who lived 100. yeares; for he Laert. dyed when Aristomenes was Archon, in the third yeare of the 52. Olympiad, upon his Monument this Epitaph,

Weepe citizens as sacred Lesbos weeps
For Pittacus; this Tombe his ashes keeps.

He had a brother who dying without issue, his estate de­volved to Pittacus; whereupon refusing the wealth Croesus offerd him, he said, he had more by halfe then he desired.

He married a wife of birth higher then himself, sister to Draco son of Penthilus; she behaved her self imperiously towards him, whereof De anim. tranquil. Plutarch gives this instance; Having invited some friends, she came in and overthrew the table; he seeing his guests troubled said, Each of you hath some misfortune, he is happiest who hath no more then this. Laertius saith, the advice he gave concerning equall marri­age (chap. 2.) was out of a resentment of his own troubles.’

[Page 78] Laert. He had a son named Tyrrheus, who at Cuma sitting in a Barbers shop (as was used amongst the antients by such as loved to discourse of newes) was casually killed by a brasier with a blow of a hat­chet; The Cumeans tooke the offendor and sent him to Pittacus, He being informed of the accident, set him at liberty saying, pardon is better then penitence.

Of his writings Laertius mentions

[...], already cited,
Elegies amounting to 600 verses.
Of lawes in prose; directed to his own Countrymen.

Epistles of which this is preserved;

Pittacus to Croesus.

‘You command me to come to Lydia to behold your wealth; without sight whereof I can easily beleeve the son of Alyattes, to be the richest of Kings, and therefore need not in that re­spect go to Sardis; for I want not gold, but have enough even for my friends also; yet I will come to you to enjoy your con­versation as a Guest.’

Laert. There was another Pittacus called the Lesser, a Lawgiver; mentioned by Phavorinus and Demetrius.

BIAS.

BIAS.

CHAP. I.
Bias his life.

Laert. BIAS was of Priene, sone of Tutamis; some affirm he was rich, others, that he had no estate, but lived as an inmate. Sa [...]yrus [...]an­keth him first of the seven wise-men; the occasion whereby that title was conferred on him, was this; he redeemed some cap­tive Messenian virgins, brought them up as his daughters, gave them portions, and so sent them back to their Parents: a Tripod being afterwards found at Athens (as was related in the life of [...]hales, the place only different) with this inscription in gold, To the wise. These virgins (as Satyrus affirmes) or (as Phanodicus) their father came into the congrega­tion, and pronounced Bias wise, declaring what he had done for them: hereupon the Tripod was sent to him, which Bias be­holding, averred Apollo to be the most wise, and would not ac­cept it; some affirm he dedicated it to Hercules at Thebes, as be­ing descended from the Theban Colony, sent to Priene.

That he made good this attribute, there are many instances; Laert. Alyattes besieging Priene, Bias turned out of the Town two ex­ceeding fat mules, which coming to the camp, Croesus wondered to see Laert [...]read [...]. their plenty extended to the very beasts, and desirous, of reconcilement, sent a messenger to them. Bias causing many heaps of sand to be made, and covered over with wheat, shew­ed them to the messenger; whereof Alyattes informed, was more eager of peace then before, and sent immediately to desire Bias to come to him; but I (answered he) wish Allyattes may feed on onyons, meaning to weep.

Herod. 2. 7. Some ascribe it to Bias, the diversion of Croesus his expedi­tion against the Greek Islands, by others imputed to Pittacus related in his life.

Herod. 1. 170. Cyrus having taken Croesus, sent an Army against the Greci­ans; the Ionians much troubled, assembled at the Panionium, where Bias gave them wise advice, which had they followed (saith Herodotus) they might have been the happiest of all the Greeks: He counselled them to joyne together in one fleet, to saile to Sardinia, and there build one City common to all the [Page 80] Ionians; whereby they might preserve themselves from bon­dage, happy in possessing an Island far greater then all the rest, and commanding them; but if they continued in Ionia, there was no apparent hope of liberty. This advice was justified, the Ionians being subdued.

Val. Max. 7. 2. Bias (his country Priene invaded by enemies, all, whom the cruelty of war suffered to escape, flying away laden with the most precious of their wealth) being demanded why he carried none of his goods with him. I (saith he) carry my goods with me: He bore them ( addes Valerius Maximus) in his breast, not to be seen by the eye, but prised by the soul; enclosed in the narrow dwelling of the mind, not to be demolished by mortall hands, present with those who are setled, and not forsaking such as flie.

Plut. conv. sept. sap. He refused not the amity of Kings, (as Thales did) particu­larly, that of Amasis, King of Aegypt, who sent him a victim, commanding him to take from it the best and worst part. Bias sent him the tongue, for which ingenuity, he was much ad­mired.

Plut. ibid. Another question of Amasis he resolved, whilst he was at Corinth (invited thither with the rest of the wise-men by Peri­ander) where Niloxenus brought him this letter.

Amasis King of Aegypt saith thus to Bias, wisest of the Greeks: the King of Aethiopia contendeth with me for preheminence in wisdome; master'd in other things, he in conclusion requires an absurd strange thing, that I drink up the sea; this proposition if I resolue, I shall have many of his Townes and Citties; if I resolve not, I must lose all those which are about Elephantina. Ponder it, and send Niloxenus back with all speed; what euer we can do for your friends and Country, shall not be wan­ting.

Having read the Letter, Bias with a short pause, recollecting himselfe, and having whispered to Cleobub [...]s who sat next him. ‘What (saith he) Naucratites, Amasis, who commands so many men, and possesseth so excellent a Country, will he, for a few obscure contemptible villages, drink up the sea? Bias (saith Niloxenus smiling) consider, as if he meant to do it, how it might be effected. Bid the Aethiopian (replyed Bias) withold the rivers from running into the sea, untill he hath drunk off that which is now sea; for the imposition concernes that only which is such at present, not what shall be hereafter.’ Niloxenus embraced him with joy, the rest applauding his solution.

CHAP. II.
His morall sentence, precepts, and verses.

HIs Apothegmes are thus delivered by Laertius and o­thers. He is unfortunate, who cannot bear misfortune. It is a disease of the mind to desire such things as cannot be obtained, and to be unmindfull of the miseries of others. To one that asked what is hard, he answered, to bear couragiously a change to the worse. Being at sea in com­pany with wicked, who, a storm arising, called upon the Gods; hold your peace, saith he, lest they know you are here. To a wicked man enquiring what was piety, he was silent, the other asking the reason of his silence: I answer not, saith he, because you enquire after that which nothing con­cernes you. Being demanded what is sweet to mankind, he answered, Hope. It is better to decide a difference betwixt our enemies then friends, for one of the friends will certainly become an enemie, one of the enemies, a friend. Being asked what a man did with delight, he answered, gain by labour. We should so live, as though our life would be both long and short: So love, as if hereafter we might hate, conversing in friendship with cau­tion, remembring that it may possibly convert to enmity.

Agel. 5. 11. To one demanding whether he should take a wife; she must be (saith he) either fair or foul; if fair, she will be common, if foule, a pennance.

Flut. That Tyrant shall gain most glory, who first himselfe obeyes the lawes of his country: That common-wealth is best ordered, wherein every man fears the Law more then a Tyrant. That family is best ordered, where the Master behaves himselfe voluntarily within dores, as he doth without by constraint of the Law.

Stob. serm. 28 Those who busie themselves in vain knowledge, resemble an Owle, which seeth only in the night, but is blind in the light; so is their mind sharp-sighted in vanity, dark at the approach of true light.

Ausonius hath these under his name.
What is our chiefest good? a conscience free,
Our greatest ill? mans, mans worst enemie.
Poor? th'avaricious. Rich? who nought desires.
A wifes best dower? the fame chast life acquires.
Chast? she of whom report dare speak no ill.
Wise? who hath power to hurt, but wants the will.
A fool? who wants the power, and yet would kill.

His morall precepts, according to Stob. serm [...]3. Demetrius Phalereus these. ‘Most men are evill,. ( Laert. His particular sentence) Before you do any thing, behold your face in a glasse; if it seem handsome, do handsome things; if deformed, suply the defects of nature. [Page 82] Practise honesty. Undertake deliberately, but having once begun, go through. Abhor to speak hastily. [ Laert. It is mad­nesse] lest thou sin, for repentance followes. Be neither sim­ple nor subtle. Admit not imprudence. Love prudence. Eve­ry where professe there are Gods. Weigh what is to be done. Hear much. Speak seasonably. If poor, reprove not the rich, unless great advantage may arise thereby. Praise not an unwor­thy person for his wealth. Acquire by perswasion, not by vi­olence. When thou dost good, impute it not to thy selfe, but to the Gods. In thy youth, gain wealth, in thy age wisdome. [or as Laertius, from thy youth to thy age, gain wisdome, for it will be more sure to thee, then all other possessions] Pre­serve in thy actions remembrance; in opportunity, caution; in thy manners, ingenuity; in labour, patience; in fear, wari­nesse; in wealth, love; in discourse, perswasion; in silence, a decorum; in sentence, justice; in boldnesse, fortitude; in action, power; in glory, eminence; in thy nature, generosity.’

Laert. Of his [...] these were most esteemed.

To all the City where thou liv'st be kind,
They who most favour show, most favour find:
But pride is often with destruction joyn'd.

And

Strength is a gift, which natures hand bestowes.
Rhetorick and policy the wise soule knowes,
Riches a present that from fortune flowes.

CHAP. III.
His death, and writings.

Laert. HE was much addicted to pleading, very earnest therein, but alwaies employed in just causes; which Laert. [...]: perhaps it should be [...]. Demodicus the Alerian implies, saying, If thou chance to be a Iudge, giue, sentence on the Prienaean side; and Hipponax, to plead a cause better then Bias the Prienaean. And in that manner he died, being very old, as he was pleading, having ended his speech, he reposed his head in the bosom of his sisters son; his adversary having ended his de­fence; the Judges gave sentence on Bias his side; the Court dis­mist he was found dead in his Nephews bosome: the City bestowed a magnificent monument upon him, with this in­scription;

[Page 83]
Bias of Prienaean fam'd descent
Lies here, Ionia's greatest ornament.

They also dedicated a Temple to him, called the Tuta­mian:

Laertius bestowes upon him this Epigram.

Bias lies hidden here, whom Hermes lead
To th'grave, when age had snow'd upon his head.
His head, which (pleading for his friend) enclind
Upon his Nephew to long sleep resign'd.

He writ concerning Ionia, by what means it might be most happy (perhaps that counsell already mentioned) two thousand verses.

CLEOBVLE

CLEOBVLVS.

CHAP. I.
Cleobulus his life, death, and writings.

Laert. CLEOBULUS was of Lindus, (a City of Rhodes) or according to Duris, of Caria, son of Evag [...] ­ras, lineally descended from Hercules; excel­lent both in wisdome, outward beauty, and Suid. strength beyond all those of his time; learned in the Philosophy of the Egyptians. That he was Tyrant of Lindus, is manifest from De [...] delph. Plutarch. * He re-edified the Temple of Minerva, founded by Danaus.

He had a daughter Plut. con [...]iv sept. sap. whom he named Eumetis, but was called commonly from her father Cleobulina: she composed verses and riddles, in Hexameters, famous for her wisdome and acute­nesse in those riddles, some of her questions having spread as far as Egypt, which she used jocularly, like dice upon occasions, only contesting with such as provoked her; she was also indu­ed with an admirable height of mind, and a wit both Politick, and full of humanity, causing her father to govern his people with more mildnesse. Cratinus, also mentions her in a Comedy named from her Cleobulae, often cited by Athenaeus.

Laert. He died full of years, which extended to seventy, his tomb carried this inscription,

Wise Cleobulus death, the Lindian shore,
To which his birth was owing, doth deplore.

Laert. He composed Verses and Riddles to the number of three thousand, of which was this Riddle concerning the Year, (by Suidas ascribed to his daughter Cleobulina.)

One fire, twelve sons, from every one a race
Of thirty daughters with a double face:
Their looks are black and white successively;
Immortall they are all, and yet all die.

Laert. Some assert him the Author of this Epigram upon Midas (not Ho­mer, who, as they account, lived long before Midas, though Herodotus otherwise.)

[Page 86]
A brazen virgin stretcht on Mida's tomb,
To last whilst water runs, and Trees shall bloom;
Whilst Sun and Moon dart their successive beams,
And the rough sea supplied by gentle streams.
I dwell upon this dismal sepulcher,
To tell all those that passe, Midas lies here.

There is likewise extant under his name this Epistle.

Cleobulus to Solon.

‘YOu have many friends, and a habitation every where; but I dare affirme, Lindus would be most pleasing to Solon, being governed by a Democracy; an Island where there is no fear of Pisistratus, thither your friends will come to you from all parts.’

CHAP. II.
His morall sentences, precepts, and verses.

Laert. OF his morall saying are these. Employ thy selfe in something excellent. Be not vain and ungratefull. Bestow your daughters, Virgins in years, Matrons in discretion: implying, that the Virgins also should be instructed, which the Greeks used not, the Romans brought them up in the liberall sciences. Do good to your friend that he may be more your friend, your enemy that he may become your friend: for we should beware of the calumny of friends, of the treachery of nemies: When any man goeth forth, let him consider what he is to do, when he returnes, examine what he hath done.

Plut. sympos. sept. sap. A Prince may be happy, if he trust none that are about him. That common-wealth is best ordered, wherein the Citizens fear reproach more then Law. That family is best, wherein more loue then fear the Master.

His precepts thus collected by Stob. serm. 28 Demetrius Phalereus, A mean is best. ( Laert. His particular sentence) To reuerence thy father is dutie. [...] care of thy bodie and soul. Hear willingly, but trust not hastily. ( o [...] as Laertius, 'tis better to love to hear, then to love to speak.) [...] better to know many things, (Laertius, to love knowledge) then [...] be ignorant of all. Teach your tongue to speak well. It is proper to [...], and contrary to vice, to hate injustice. (Laertius, be a friend to ver­tue, a stranger to vice.) Preserve thy pietie. Advise thy country [...] what is best. Govern thy tongue. (Laertius, pleasure.) Do nothing by violence. Instruct thy children. Pray to fortune. Forgoe enmitie. The Enemy to thy conntry, esteem thy own. Fight not, nor be kind [...] wife in the presence of others, one argues folly, the other madnesse, Corect not your servants when they are drunk, it showes as if you were drunk your [Page 87] selfe. Marry with your equall, for by matching into a higher family, you procure Masters, not kinsmen. Laugh not in compliance with him who derides, others, for you will be hated by those he derides. Rich, be not ex­alted; poor, be not dejected: (Laertius addes, learn to bear the chan­ges of fortune.

Ausonius ascribes these to him,

The more is in thy power, desire the lesse;
Not to be envi'dis unhappinesse.
None long in his impieties can thrive,
In other much, nought in thy selfe forgive.
All men would spare the good, the bad cast down,
We share not in our ancestors renown:
But their inglorious actions often own.

Of his [...] these were most noted. * Laert.

By ignorence most deeds are swaid,
In many specious words arraid;
But all things shall by time be weigh'd.
PERIANDER

PERIANDER.

CHAP. I.
The Country, Ancestors, and Parents of Periander.

Laert. PEriander was sonne of Cypselus Tyrant of Co­rinh, his mother Cratea, his Ancestors the He­raclidae, ( Herod. 1. 7. descended from Hercules and Iar­dana) raigned Kings of Lydia five hundred five yeares, the son continually succeeding the father for two and twenty generations. The originall of Cypselus, and the manner of his ob­taining the Kingdome receive thus from Lib. 5. 92. Herodotus.

When Corinth was governed by an Oligarchy, inhabited by the Bacchiadae, who never would marry out of their own family, one of them (called Amphion) had a lame daughter (by name Labda) whom when none of the Bacchiadae would take to wife, Eetion married (son of Eche [...]rates of the Betraean tribe, but de­sended afar off from Lapithe and Caenis) having no children, he consulted the Delphian Oracle about it; as soone as he en­tred, the Prophetesse spake thus to him.

Eetion none will thee though great respect
A stone from Labdas fruitfull wombe expect,
Which shall the people crush, Corinth correct.

This Oracle to Eetion agreed with another deliver'd to the Bacchiadae (though by them not understood) to this effect.

A Lyon by an Eagle shall be laid
Upon a rock, fierce, making all afraid.
Corinthians, what I say consider well,
Who in tall Corinth and Pir [...]ne dwell.

The Bacchiadae who could not comprehend the meaning of this Oracle, when they heard that to Eetion, understood their owne by the affinity it had with the other, and thereupon se­cretly design'd amongst themselves to kill Eetions child. His wife being delivered, they sent ten men of their owne to the tribe wherein Eetion dwelt, that they should murder the Infant; when thy came to Petra to Eetions house, they demanded the child. Labda (not knowing their intent, but thinking they came [Page 90] to congratulate with the Father,) brings her sonne, and gives him into the hands of one of them: they had agreed (upon the way) that he into whose hands the child were delivered should dash out its braines against the ground, but by divine provi­dence, the child smiling upon him to whom Labda had given it, he was moved therewith to such compassion, that he could not finde in his heart to kill it, but delivered it to another, he to a third, untill at last it past through the hands of all the ten; None of them having power to kill it, they restored it to the mother. Then going forth and standing before the doore, they began to finde fault with one another, but chiefly with him who tooke the child first, for not performing the agreement; after some debate, they agreed to goe in all and bee equall sharers in the murther; but it was decreed that Eetions child should bee the oppressour of Corinth, for Labda standing at the doore heard all their discourse, and fearing lest their mindes changing, they should murther it, carried away the child, and hid it in a mea­sure of corne (called Cypsela) a place which she conceived they could never search if they returned, and so it fell out: They came back and sought all about; when they could not finde him, they agreed amongst themselves to tell those who sent them, they had done what they required, and returning home, did so. Eetions son growing up was called Cypselus from the dan­ger he had escaped in the corne-measure; when he came to mans estate, he consulted with the Delphian Oracle, and received a doubtfull answer, in confidence whereof he attempted Corinth and tooke it, the Oracle was this,

Happy is Cypselus, who to my fane
This visit makes; he Corinth's crowne shall gain;
He and his Sons (but not their sons) shall raign.

Being possest of the Kingdome, he persecuted the Corinthians, depriving many of their estates, more (by far) of their lives; ha­ving reigned thirty yeares, he dyed and was succeeded by his Son Periander, whose reigne compleated this Tyranny, which lasted according to* Aristotle 73. yeares and sixe moneths: So that Cypselus began to reigne in the second yeare of the thirtieth Olympiad.

CHAP. II.
The time of his birth, his raign, and the change of his disposition.

PEriander (by computation from his death, which, according to Laertius was in the eightieth year of his age, the last of the fortie eight Olympiad) was born in the last year of the twenty ninth Olympiad. His raign (according to Politic. 5. Aristotles account, la­sting fortie foure years) begun in the fourth year of the thirty seventh Olympiad. Suidas saith, he succeeded in the Kingdome, Excerpt. Nicol. Damasc. Suid. as being his fathers eldest son, which Plutarch calls, a disease hereditary to him, Conviv. sept. sap. flourished in the thirtie eight Olympiad.

Laert suid. He was at first of a mild gentle disposition, but afterwards grew very rigid upon this occasion. His mother, whilst he was very young, kept him much in her company, when he grew more in years, fell in love with him; with time, her passion en­creased to such extremity, that she could no longer suppresse it; assuming confidence, she told her son, there was a beautifull Lady fallen in love with him, and advised him not to slight her affection. He answer'd, he would not transgresse law and ver­tue, by touching a married woman. His mother pressed him with intreaties; at last he consented; she appointed a night, ad­vising him not to have any light in his chamber, nor to constrain the Lady to speak, but to excuse her for modestie's sake. Peri­ander engaged himself to do all she directed. She, attired as rich­ly as she could, went to his chamber, and departed again before day-break: on the morrow she enquired if he were pleased, and if the Lady should come again to him. Periander said, it was his chiefest desire, and that he affected her excessively. From that time she visited her son often: he, at last, was moved with a great curiosity to know who she was, and solicited his mother very importunately that he might have some discourse and ac­quaintance with her, seeing he was so much taken with love of her, affirming it was unreasonable, he should be denyed the sight of one, with whom he had so often a neerer acquaintance. His mother affirm'd it could not be done, in respect to the mo­desty of the Lady. Hereupon he gave one of his servants order to hide a light in his chamber: she came as she used, and when she was asleep, Periander rose, took the light, and seeing it was his mother, was about to have killed her, but with-held by some genius or apparition, forebore: From that time forward he was troubled in mind, grew cruell, and killed many of his subjects. His mother, much accusing her unhappy genius, slew her selfe. Laertius saith, they were both conscious hereof, [Page 92] and that being discovered, he grew cruell to euery one.

Herod. In the beginning of his raign, he was much more mercifull then his father, but keeping correspondence by messengers with Thrasibulus Tyrant of Miletus ( Laert. to whom in times past he had been a guest, before he arived to the government) he be­came at last much more bloody then his father. He sent an ex­presse to Thrasibulus, to know what course he should take to set­tle himselfe, and to govern the Citty in the best manner. Thra­sibulus led the messenger out of town, and as they walked to­gether in a corn field, question'd him concerning his comming from Corinth, and in the mean time lopped off all the heads of corn that grew higher then the rest, and threw them away; in this manner he went over the whole field, not speaking one word to the messenger, and so sent him home; where being returned, Periander greedily enquired what instructions he had brought; he answered, Thrasibulus had given him none, and that he wondered he would send him to a mad-man, who destroy­ed his own goods. Periander enquired what Thrasibulus did, and immediately apprehended that he advised him to put the most eminent in the City to death. Laertius recites a Letter to that effect, which if not, suppositions must have been sent at another time after this messenger departed.

Thrasibulus to Periander.

I Gave your messenger no answer, but carying him into a field of Corn, lopped off with my stick such ears as grew higher then the rest, whilst he followed me; if you enquire, he will relate all to you that he hath heard or seen: Do you so likewise, if you mean to settle your selfe in the government, take off the heads of the chiefest Citizens, whether your professed enemies, or others. A Tyrant must suspect every friend.

Though Sept. sap. conviv. Plutarch deny he followed this advice, Herodotus averres, that from thence forward Periander exercised all cruelty upon his subjects, dispatching those that had escaped the rigour and persecutions of his father. Laert. He first ap­pointed a guard of Halberdiers to secure his person, Suid. which con­sisted of three hundred, and converted the government to a Ty­rannie ( Excert. Nicol. Damascen, and Suidas from him. through his cruelty and violence) He forbad the Ci­tizens to keep any servants, or to be idle, alwaies finding some employment for them: If any man sat in the Forum, he was fined, for he feared lest they should plot against him. Laert. The Ci­tizens being desirous to live [...] he would not suffer them, Suid. He was alwaies in war, being of a martiall disposition. He made ships with three banks of Oares, which he used in both seas. Laert. He attempted to dig the Isthmus off from the continent.

Of his friendship and correspondence with Thrasibulus, Lib. 1. 20. He­rodotus gives another instance, affirming he sent to inform him [Page 93] of the Oracles answer to Alyattes King of Lydia, concerning the re-edifying of the Temple of Minerva, and advised him to pro­vide before-hand for his own security.

Laert. He made a vow, if he were victor in the chariot-race at the Olympick games, to erect a statue of gold: He chanced to be victorious, and wanting gold, beholding upon a festivall of that country the women richly adorned, he took off all their ornaments, and so sent them home.

CHAP. III.
Of his being placed in the number of the seven Sages. His sentences and writings.

PEriander (saith Sept. sap. conv. Plutarch) being become a Tyrant by a he­reditary disease derived to him by his father, endeavoured to purge himselfe thereof as much as possible, by using the sound conversation of good persons, and invited wise-men to come to him; Laert. to which purpose he sent this Epistle to those of Greece, at such time as they met at Delphi.

Periander to the wise men.

I Give Pythian and Apollo many thanks that you being met together, there will also by my letters be brought to Corinth, I will entertain you as you well know very kindly. I here that last yeer met at the Lydian Kings in Sardis: delay not now to come to me, Tyrant of Corinth, for the Corinthians will look kindly upon you, if you come to the house of Pe­riander.

Upon this invitation they went to him, not seven, but twice as many, of whom was Diocles, Perianders friend, in whose name Plutarch makes a large description of their entertainment, which was not in the City, but at the Port Lecheon, in a great hall, appropriated to solemn feasts, joyning to the Temple of Venus, to whom he had not sacrificed since the unhappy death of his mother untill that time, the particulars of the feast, by reason of the largenesse of the discourse, we referre to Plutarch.

He was also himselfe put into the number of these wisemen, who, De [...] Delph. Plutarch saith, were originally but five, but that after­wards Cleobulus Tyrant of Lindus, and Periander Tyrant of Co­rinth, who had neither vertue nor wisdome, by the greatnesse of their power, the multitude of their friends, and the obliga­tions they conferred upon those that adhered to them, forced a reputation, and thrust themselves violently into the usurped name of wise-men; to which end, they spread abroad sentences and remarkable sayings throughout all Greec, the very same [Page 94] which others had said before, whereat the other first sages were much displeased, yet would not discover or convince their vanity, nor have any publick controversie about that title with persons of so much wealth and power, but meeting toge­ther at Delphi, after some private debate, they consecrated there the Letter [...] the fift in the Alphabet, and in numeration, to te­stifie to the God of that Temple they were no more then five, and that they rejected and excluded from their company, the sixt and the seventh, as having no right thereto.

Of those Suid. who excluded him put of the number of the seven, some (as Protag [...]r. Plato) substitute in his roome Myso: Laert. others say there were two of this name, cozens, one the Tyrant, the other of Ambracia: but Aristotle and others, assert him of Corinth to be the wise, which attribute seems conferred upon him, not in respect to his actions, but morall sayings and writings, which were these.

Do nothing for gain, that is proper to trades-men. They who will rule safely, must be guarded with love, not armes. Being demanded why he con­tinued King, because (saith he) it is dangerous willingly to refrain, or un­willingly to be deposed.

Plut. sept. sap. conv. When the other six had given their opinions concerning Tyranny (at the feast to which he invited them) he being de­sired to adde his, answered with a troubled countenance, E­nough hath been said to de [...]erre any man of sound judgment from rule. When they had in like manner declared their opinions, con­cerning a common-wealth, he added, the result of all which had been said, commended that Democracy most, which came neerest an Aristocracy.

Stob. 28. Being demanded what was the greatest in the least, he answered, a good mind in a human body.

His precepts (according to Stob. ibid. Demetrius Phalereus) were these, Consideration is all ( Laert. which was his particular sentence) Quiet is good, temerity dangerous. Gain sordid, the accusation of nature. A demo­cracy is better then a Tyrannie. Pleasures are mortall, vertues immortall. In good fortune be moderate, in bad prudent. It is better to die then to want. Study to be worthy of your Parents. Be praised living, beatified dead. To your friends in prosperity and adversitie be the same. What thou hast promised amisse, perform not. [Laert. Keep thy word.] Betray not secrets. So reproach, as if thou shouldst ere long be a friend. Use new diet, but old lawes. Punish those who haue sinned: restrain those that are about to sin. Conceal thy misfortune that it may not glad thy enemies.

Ausonius ascribes these to him.

Pleasure and profit never disagree.
As more solicitous, more happy be.
'Tis ill to wish, but worse to fear to die,
With what necessity enjoynes, comply.
If thou art fear'd of many, many fear.
[Page 95] Be not exalted when thy fortunes cleer,
Nor be dejected if a storm appear.

Laert. He writ two thousand verses of morall instructions.

CHAP. IIII.
The story of Arion.

DUring the feast we mentioned (by Plutarchs account) or ra­ther according to Eusebius, in the fortieth Olympiad, there happened a strange accident, which (because Herodotus calls it a miracle shewed to Periander) we shall relate in his words.

Lib. 1. See also Agel­lius who tran­slates this of Plutarch, Lu­cian, and others [...]rion the most famous Lutinist of that time, having lived a long time with Periander, took a voyage to Italy and Sicily, th [...]re having gotten together much wealth, he designed to return to ( orinth: at Tarentum he hired a Corinthian vessell, confiding above any in Corinthians; they, when they were at Sea, plotted to cast Arion over-board, that they might be Masters of his wealth, which he understanding, offered to give them all so they would save his life; they refusing, bad him lay violent hands upon himselfe, if he would be buried in his own Country, other­wise to leap immediately into the sea. Arion reduced to this extremity, intreated them to give him leave to put on his richest ornaments, and so standing upon the poop of the ship, to play a tune, promising, assoon as he had done, to deliver himselfe into their hands. The men moved with a great desire to hear the most excellent Lutinist in the world, retired from the poop to the middle of the ship: he puts on his best orna­ments, and standing upon the poop, began that tune which they call the morning hymne, assoon as he had ended it, he threw himselfe into the Sea, with his ornaments and Lute; the ship sailed on to Corinth. It is reported a Dolphin took him upon his back, and caryed him to Taenarus, where he lan­ded, and took shipping again for Corinth; he arived there in the same habit, and related all that passed; which Periander not beleeving, committed him to close custody, not permitting him to go any whither, and in the mean time sent for the Ma­riners; when they came, he asked them newes of Arion: They answered, he was very well in Italy, and that they left him safe at Tarentum: immediately Arion appeared, attired, as when he he leaped out of the ship, whereat they were so confounded, they could not say any thing in their own defence. This is at­tested both by the Corinthians and Lesbians. At Taenarus there is a little Image given as an offering of a man fitting upon a Dolphins back: that Periander caused such a one to be made, is evident from this Epigram of Bianor.

[Page 96]
This statue of Arion ore the main
Sailing upon a Dolphin's back was carv'd
By Perianders order. See, men slain
By cruell men, by fishes kind preserv'd.

CHAP. V.
Of his Wife.

Laert. HIs wife was named Lysis, by him called Melissa, daughter to Procleus, Tyrant of Epidaurus and Eristhenea, the daugh­ter of Aristacrates, by the sister of Aristomedes, which persons ruled over the greatest part of Arcadia. Athen. Deipn. He fell in love with her, seeing her in a Peloponnessian dresse, in her petticote, without a gown, giving drink to her fathers workmen: Laert. Long after he kil'd her in his fury, big with child, with a stool, or a blow of his foot, being wrought upon by the accusations of his concubines, whom he afterward burned.

Herod. 5. He sent one day to Threspotos upon the River Acheron, to en­quire by Necromancy concerning a depositum. Melissa appear­ing, said, she would not tell them in what place it was laid, be­cause she was cold and naked, the clothes wherein she was bu­ried doing her no good, for they were not burned, confirming the truth whereof by Perianders puting bread into a cold o­ven; which answer carried to Periander, made good the suspi­tion that ( Suid. through excesse of love) [...]. Hereupon he caused proclamation to be made that all the Corinthian wo­men should come to Iuno's Temple to celebrate a festivall, at­tyred in their richest ornaments, when they came, having pla­ced a guard of souldiers in ambush, he striped them all, with­out any distinction (free women and servants) of their clothes, which he carried to Melissas grave, and having praid, burn'd them to her▪ This done, he sent messengers to enquire the se­cond time, to whom Melissa's Ghost appeared, and told them where the depositum was laid.

CHAP. VI.
Of his Children.

Herod. lib. 3. 49. HEe had by Melissa two sons Cypsalus and Lycophron the younger ingenious, the elder a foole; he had likewise a daughter; his elder sonne at the time of his mothers death was eighteen yeares old, the younger seventeen. These their Grand­father by the mothers side Procleus (Tyrant of Epidaurus) sent for over to him, and loved them much as in reason he ought, being the children of his owne daughter; when he was to send [Page 97] them back, he said to them, doe you know children who slew your mother? the elder tooke no heede to that speech, but Ly­cophron the younger was so troubled at it, that when he came to Corinth, he neither spoke to his father, nor would make him any answer, looking upon him as the murderer of his mother, where [...]at Periander at length became so incensed, that he turned him out of doores. He being gone, Periander questioned the Elder what discourse his Grandfather had with him; hee related to him how kindly he used him, but told nothing of that which Procleus had said to t [...]em at their departure, for he had not taken any notice of it ▪ Periander said, it was not possible but that hee should say something more, and pressed him more strictly; at last he calling it to mind, told him this also, which Periander re­senting, and not willing to use his son more mildly, sent to the people with whom he lived in his ejection, forbidding them to receive him into any of their houses. Turned out of that wher­in he was, he sought to goe into another, but was denied; Peri­ander having threatned those that should entertaine him, and commanded all to drive him away: expelled thence, he went to another of his acquaintance, who knowing him the sonne of Periander entertained him though with feare: at length Perian­der proclaimed that whosoever received him into their house, or spoke to him, should pay what fine to Apollo, he should im­pose: from that time none durst venture to entertaine him or speake to him; nor would he himselfe make tryall of a thing which he knew to be desperate, but passed his time in the com­mon walkes: Foure dayes after, Periander seeing him poore and extenuated with fasting, tooke compassion of him, and lay­ing aside his anger, drew nigh to him and said, ‘Son which is bet­ter, to undergoe what you now suffer, or by obeying your father to enjoy my wealth and kingdome? you being my son and next heire to the Kingdome of fruitful Corinth, have made choice of the life of a Vagabond, angerly opposing him whom you ought not to oppose; if any unhappinesse befell in those things whereof you suspect me, it befell me, and I have so much the greater share therein, in being the instrument thereof; heare how much better it is to be envied then to bee pittied, and what it is to be angry with our parents or betters.’ In these words Periander reproved his son, who made him no other answer then ‘That he ought to pay a fine to the God for speaking to him.’ Periander perceiving the evill of his sonne to be incurable, removed him out of his fight, and sending him by ship to Corcyra, of which he was also Tyrant: having thus disposed of him, he made war with his father in Law Procleus as the chiefe cause of all that happened. Laertius mentions an Epistle which he sent him to this effect.

Periander to Procleus.

Wee committed unwillingly that crime upon your Daughter, but you if willingly, you alienate my Sons minde from me, you doe unjustly▪ there­fore either so [...]ten his minde towards me, or I shall revenge this injury; I have satisfied your daughter by burning in her honour the garments of all the women of Corinth.

Herod. ibid. In fine he tooke Epidaurus and Proclus therein, whom he pre­served alive.

Herod. ibid. In processe of time Periander growi [...]g old, and knowing himselfe to bee no longer fit for the charge of the common­wealth, sent to Corcyra to invite Lycophron to the government of the Kingdome; conceiving his eldest son uncapeable of that of­fice by reason of his stupidity. Lycophron would not vouchsafe so much as to speake to the messenger. Periander (affectionate to him) sent the second time his sons sister, his owne daughter, hoping he would be sooner perswaded by her; shee comming said to him, ‘Brother, had you rather the Kingdome should fall into the hands of others, and our fathers house be disper­sed then goe home and have it your selfe? returne to your owne house, injure your selfe no longer; obstinacy is an un­happy inheritance: oure not one evill with another; many prefer compliance before justice, many in pursuit of their mo­thers right lose their fathers Kingdome: a Kingdome is a slippery thing, coveted by many, our father is old and feeble, give not your owne goods to others:’ thus she pleaded to him as her father had instructed her; he answered he would n [...]ver come to Corinth whilst his father lived there▪ which as soone as Periander understood, he sent a messenger the third time, to let him know, hee would remove to Corcyra, and to command him to come to Corinth to take the government upon him; to thi [...] the sonne assented. Periander prepared for Corcyra, his sonne for Corinth: the people of Corcyra informed hereof, that Periander might not come into their country, kill'd his son▪ in revenge of which fact Periander sent three hundred boyes of the chiefe of the Corcyraeans to Sardis to Allyates King of Lydia there to be guelt, the Corinthians who had charge of them, were driven upon Sa­mos, the Samians understanding to what end they were sent to Sardis, advised them to take Sanctuary in the Temple of Diana, and would not suffer them as being suppliants to bee pulled away: The Corinthians not permitting any food to be given them, the Samians celebrated a festivall, which is observed (saith He­rodotus) at this day; when night was come, the company of youths and maides danced whilst the children were pr [...]ing▪ and in their dance having made cakes of meale and honey, flung them amongst the children, whereby they were sustained alive, this they did so long till the Samians who had charge of the [Page 99] children, were faine to goe away and leave them; then the Sa­mians conveyed the children home to Corcyra. Plutarch. de malign. Herodot. Antenor and Dio­nysius affirme the Gnidians came to Samos with a fleet, drove away Perianders Guard from the Temple, and carried the children to Corcyra; for which reason the Corcyraeans allowed the Gnidians many honours and immunities, which they gave not (even) to the Samians.

CHAP. 7.
His Death.

Laert. EXcessive melancholy (amidst these crosses) occasioned his death, in the last yeare of the 48 Olympiad, the eightieth of his age, being desirous none should know where he was buried, he thus contriv'd it. He commanded two men to goe to a cer­taine place at night, and to kill whom they first met, and bury him. After them he sent fower to kill & bury the two; after the fower, more: They obeyed his order, the first killed him. The Co [...]inthians erected for him an empty monument with this in­scription.

Periander lies within Corinthian Ground,
For power and wisedome above all renownd.
Laertius hath this Epigram upon him.
At whatsoere shall happen be not sad:
Alike for all that God dispenseth glad.
VVise Periander did through griefe expire,
Because events not ioynd with his desire.
[...]

AUSONII LUDUS septem Sapientum.
The Prologue.

THe seven wise-men, (that name times past apply'd
To them, nor hath posteritie deny'd)
Themselves this day unto your view present.
Why dost thou blush Gown'd Roman? discontent
That such grave men should on the stage be brought!
Is't shame to us? 'twas none to Athens thought:
Whose Councell-Chamber was their Theater.
True; here for businesse severall places are
Assign'd, the Cirque for meetings, Courts to take
Enrolements, Forums in which pleas to make:
But in old Athens, and all Greece was known
No other place for businesse but this one.
[Viz. the Theater
Which latter Luxury in Rome did raise.
The Aedile heretofore did build for plaies
A Scaffold-stage, no work of Carved stone;
So Gallius and Murena, 'tis well known.
But after, when great Men not sparing Cost,
Thought it the highest glory they could boast,
To build for Playes a Scene more eminent,
The Theater grew to this vast extent;
Which Pompey, Balbus, Caesar did enlarge;
Vying which should exceed for state and charge.
But to what end all this? we came not here
To tell you who first built the Theater,
Forum, or City Gates, but t'usher in
Grave sages, who by Gods approv'd have been.
Such as in pleasing and instructive verse,
Their own judicious sentences rehearse,
Known to the learned, and perhaps to you:
But if your Mem'ries cannot well renue
Things spoke so long since; the Comedian shall,
Who better then I knowes them, tell you all.
[Page 104] Enter Comedian.
AThenian Solon, Fame sings, wrot at Delphis
[...]; whose sense Know thy selfe, is:
But this to Spartan Chilon most assign.
Some question Chilon, whether this be thine,
[...], The close
Of a long life regard: but most suppose
That Solon this to Lydian Croesus spake.
From Lesbian Pittacus this motto take,
[...]; that's Know time: But he
By [...] here means opportunity.
[...], Bias, did proceed
From thee; that is, Most men are ill. Take heed
You not mistake him; for by ill men here
He means the ignorant: The next you hear
Is Periander's [...];
That is, Thought's All in All; a Thoughtfull Man!
But Lyndian Cleobulus does protest
[...];Mean in All is best.
Thales, [...] cries.
Upon a Surety present damage lies.
But this, 'for those who gain by it, to tell,
May 'chance displease: Now Solon comes farewell.
Exit.
Enter Solon.
LO! Solon in his Greeks dresse treads the stage,
To whom (as of the seven the greatest Sage)
Fame gave the prize of wisdome from the rest;
But fame is not of Censure the strict Test.
Nor first nor last I take my selfe to be,
For there's no order in Equalitie.
Well did the Delphick Prophet sport with him
Who ask'd, which first of the Wise-men might seem,
Saying; if on a Globe their names he writ,
None first or lowest he should find in it.
From midst of that learn'd Round come I; that so
What once I spake to Croesus, All here now
Might take as spoken to themselves; 'tis this:
[...] which is,
Mark the end of a long life; till when forbear
To say, these wretched, or those happy are:
For All till then are in a doubtfull state,
The proofe of this wee'l in few words relate.
[Page 105] Croesus the King or Tyrant (choose you which)
Of Lydia, happy thought, and strangely rich;
Who to his Gods did gold-wall'd Temples build,
Invites me ore, I to his summons yeeld.
His royall summons went to Lydia,
Willing his subjects by our means might find
Their King improv'd, and better'd in his mind.
He asks me whom I thought the happiest Man?
I said Telana, the Athenian,
Who his life nobly for his Country gave;
He pishes at it, will another have.
I told him then Aglaus, who the Bounds
Nere past in all his life of his own grounds.
Smiling, he saies▪ what think you then of Me
Esteem'd the happyest in the whole world? We
Reply'd, his End could only make that known,
He takes this ill: I, willing to be gon,
Kisse his hand, and so leave him: For some ends
Meantime, 'gainst Persia he a war intends▪
And all things ready, does in person go.
How speeds? he's vanquish'd, Prisoner to his foe,
And ready now to yeeld his latest breath,
(For by the Victor he was doom'd to death)
Upon the funerall Pile, rounded with Flames
And smoake, he thus with a loud voice exclaimes
O Solon! Solon! now I plainly see.
Th'art a true Prophet! Thrice thus naming me
Mov'd with which words, Cyrus, (the Conquerour)
Commands the Fire be quencht, which, by a shower
Of Rain then falling, happily was laid.
Thence to the King, by a choice Guard convay'd,
And question'd who that Solon was? and why
He call'd so on his Name? He, for reply,
In Order all declares: Pitty at this
The Heart of Cyrus moves; and Croesus is
Receiv'd to grace, who in a Princely Port
Liv'd after, honor'd in the Persian Court.
Both Kings approv'd, and prais'd Me, but what I
Said then to one, let each man here apply
As spoke t'himselfe, 'twas for that end I came.
Farewell: your liking let your hands proclaim.
[Exit.
[Page 106] Enter Chilon.
MY Hips with sitting, Eyes with seeing ake,
Expecting when Solon an End would make.
How little and how long your Atticks prate!
Scarce in three-hundred lines one word of weight,
Or a grave sentence, how he lookt on me
At going off?—Now Spartan Chilon see!
Who with Laconian Brevity commends
To you the Knowledge of your selves, kind Friend [...]!
[...] carv'd in a Delphos Fane.
'Tis a hard Work, but recompenc'd with Gain.
Try your own strength; examine what 'tis you
Have done already, what you ought to do.
All Duties of our life, as Modestie,
Honour and Constancie included be
In this, and glory, which we yet despise.
Farewell, your claps I not respect nor prize.
[Exit.
Enter Cleobulus.
I Cleobulus, though my Native Seat
Be a small Isle, am Author of a great
And glorious Sentence; [...];
A man is best: You Sirs that sit upon
The fourteen middle Benches next unto
Th' Orchestra, best may judge if this be true.
Your Nodd showes your assent: We thank you; but
We shall proceed in Order: Was it not
One Afer (who a man of your own Clime is)
That said once in this place, Ut ne quid Nimis?
And hither does our [...] aime.
The Dorick and the Latine mean the same.
In speaking being silent, or in sleep.
In good Turns, or in bad, a mean still keep,
In study, or what ever you intend.
I've said, and that I mean, I keep here end.
[Exit.
Enter Thales.
I'M Thales, who maintain (as Pindar sings)
Water to be the best and first of things.
To whom by Phoebus Mandate, fishers brought
A golden Tripod, which they fishing caught,
By him as present to the wisest meant,
Which I refus'd, and unto others sent
[Page 107] In knowledge my superiors as I thought.
From one to th'other of the Sages brought
By them again return'd, to me it came,
Who to Apollo consecrate the same.
For Since to seek the wisest, he enjoyn'd,
I Judge no man but God by that design'd.
Now on the stage (as those before) I come
T' assert the truth of my own Axiom.
Perhaps by some t'may be offensive thought:
But not by those by sad experience taught.
[...], say we.
Be Surety, and be sure a loser be.
A thousand Instances I could produce
To prove Repentance is the only use
That can be made of it, but that we here
Examples by their Names to cite, forbear.
Make your own Application, and conceive
The Damage, Men by this sole act receive.
Nor this our good intention take amisse,
You that like, clap, you that dislike it, hisse.
Enter Bias.
I Am Priaenean Bias, who once taught
[...], That most men are naught.
I wish't had been unspoke; for Truth gains Hate.
But by bad men I mean illiterate,
And those who barbarously all Lawes confound,
Religion, Justice; for within this Round
I see none but are good: believe all those
Whom I proclaim for bad amongst your Foes:
Yet there is none so partially apply'd
To favour Vice, but with the good will side:
Whether he truly be such, or would fain
Of a good man the Reputation gain:
The hated name of an ill man all shun.
Then ( most good Men) your praise, and I ha' done.
Enter Pittacus.
I'M Pittacus, who once this Maxime penn'd,
[...] That's, time apprehend.
But by Time we meant Time in Season, as
In tempore veni is your Roman Phrase.
And your own Comick Poet Terence, he,
Chief of all things makes opportunity,
Where Dromo comes unto Antiphila.
[Page 108] I'th nick of Time; consider what I say,
And mark how great an inconvenience
Most suffer through this want of providence.
But now 'tis more then time we should be gon;
Farewell, and give your Aprobation.
[Exit.
Enter Periander.
NOw on the Stage see Periander move!
He who once said, and what he said will prove
[...]. Thought is all in all.
Since him a perfect Agent we may call,
Who first considers what he undergoes;
For we should still forecast, as Terence showes,
Th'event of businesse, whether good or bad,
E'r w'undertake it: where may best be had
Conveniency for planting, where to build,
When to wage War, and when to pitch a Field:
Nor inconsiderately take in hand
Or great, or small Things, for that makes a stand
In the free progresse of all new designes;
In which there's nothing policy enjoynes
Like consultation; hence we see it cleer,
Who use it not, by chance, not counsell steer,
But I retire, whilst you with better Fate
Imploy your Thoughts how to uphold your State:

ANACHARSIS.

CHAP. I.
Anacharsis his life and writings.

THose Nations (saith Lib. 4▪ 46▪ Herodotus) which border upon the Euxine Sea, are of all most illiterate, the Scythians onely excepted; we can alledge nothing relating to learning of any people within the compass of that Sea, neither know we any person learned but the Scythi­ans Ana [...]harsis; Strab. lib. 7. Amongst these, notwithstan­ding the roughnesse of their education, (for they fed upon mares milke and dwelt in wagons) were some who far exceed­ed all in iustice.

Such was Anacharsis, Laert. son of Gnurus brother of Cadovides King of Scythia; his mother a Grecian, by which meanes he had the advantage of two languages, but was owner of no other house then the custome of that country allow'd, a Chariot, whence Plut. conviv. sept. sap. he compared his dwel­ling to that of the sun, carri'd in that manner round the heavens.

Elian. var. hist. lib. 5. The Scythians never travell beyond their own confines, but Anacharsis as a person endued with more then ordinary wise­dome extended his journey further, Herod. 4. 46. being sent by the King of Scythia to Greece, Laert. He came to Athens in the first yeare of the 47. Olympiad, Eucrates being Archon: and Lucian. Scyth. first met with Toxaris one of his owne country, by whom, as the most compendious way to take a survey of Athens and Greece, he was addrest to Solon: how Solon received and entertained him is already related in his life: he instructed him in the best disciplines, recommended him to the favour of noblest persons, and sought all means of giving him respect and honour. Anacharsis admired his wis­dome, continually followed him, in a short space learnt all things of him, and was kindly received by every one for his sake; being (as Theoxenus attests) the only stranger whom they incorporated into their City.

Strab. lib. 7. Thus was he much honoured by the Grecians for his per­fection, Clem. Alex. Strom. 1. wisdome, temperance, wherein he excelled many of their Philosophers, Clem. Alex. Strom. 5. whereupon they conferred the attribute of wise upon him, Elian. lib. 2. some accompting him one of the seven: Peri­ander invited him with the rest to Corinth; the feast is largely de­scribed by Plutarch: There Anacharsis carrying with him Chaplets of Flowers, Ivy, and Laurell, drunk, as the Scythians use, to great [Page 110] excesse, Athen. deipn. 10. and required the prize of drinking to be given him, because he was first drunk: In a race (saith he) he wins, who comes first at the [...]ost, in drinking, he who comes first to the end deserves the r [...]ward.

Herod. 4. 76. Having seen much of the world, and improved his knowledge, he re­turned to Scythia (as Lucian conjectures, not untill Solon were dead) As he sailed along the Hellespont, he put in at Cyricum, and finding the people celebrating a festivall to the Mother of the Gods, with much splendor and muni [...]icence; he made a vow, if he got safe home, to sa­crifice in the same manner as he had seen those of Cyricum, and to insti­tute a Vigill. When he came into Scythia, he withdrew himselfe privately to Hylaea, near the Achillean course, a place abounding with [...] ▪ and performed the Rites of the Goddesse with a Timbrell (and Cymball Clem. Alex. admonit adgent. about his Neck) A Scythian espying him, carried word to Sauli [...]s the King, who went immediately thither, and being an eye-witnesse thereof, shot him through with an Arrow ( Clem. Aleu. ibid. to punish his effeminacy, and prevent the infection thereof in others) Herodot. con­tinues. And now if any en­quire concerning Anacharsis, the Scythians deny they knew him, because he travelled into Greece, and affected the customes of that Country. As I am informed by Timnes, tutor of Spargapithes, he was uncle to Inda­thyrsus, King of Scythia, son of Gnurus, son of Lycus, son of Spar­gapithes: Now Anacharsis being of his family, it is manifest he was For [...] read [...]. Spargapitbes. 1. slain by his brother, (that his brother was King of Scythia, and slew him, is confirmed by Laertius, though he differ in the name) for Indathyrsus was son of Saulius, Saulius was he who slew Anachar­sis, Lycus. 1. and consequently is the same whom Laertius calls Cadovides, adding, Gnutus. 1. some report that he shot him in hunting; for being addicted to the Greek customes, and endeavouring to alter the lawes of Scythia; whereupon he dying, Anacharsis. Saulius, or Caduida. 1. said, he returned safe out of Greece, guarded by his own wis­dome, but was slain at home by the envy of others. Upon him Laertius hath this Epigram, Indathyrsus.

From travell Anacharsis came at last,
And Scythia in a Grecian mould would cast▪
Whilst he was teaching how, by the surprize
Of a wing'd arrow carried to the skies.

Laert. Plut. conviv. sept. sap. There were many statues erected in honour of him by the Grecians, upon which was writ, [...] Laert. Plut. con [...]iv. sept [...] sap. He was temperate and skilfull in many things; he freely and largely dis­coursed of the manner of diet & medicine, which the Scythians used in curing the sick. Laert. From the plain freedome he used in speech, arose a Proverb, The Scythian phrase. He writ eight hun­dred verses of orders for the Scythians and Greeks, concerning frugall living, and martiall affairs. There are also two Epistles of his extant.

Anacharsis to Croesus.

KIng of the Lydians, I came into Greece to be informed of their manners and studies; I need not mony, it is enough if I can return into Scythia bettered: but [...] will come to Sardys, because I highly esteem your favour.

Cic. Tuscul. quaest. 5. Anacharsis to Hanno, health.

Clem▪ Alex. cites this frag­m [...]nt, doubtlesse out of the same Epistle, [...]&c. Strom. 1. MY apparell is a Scythian rug, my shooes the hardnesse of my feet, my bed, the earth, my sauce hunger; I feed on milk, cheese, and flesh: you may come to me as to one that's contented: but those gif [...]s which you so much esteem, bestow either on your Citizens, or the immortall Gods.

Strab. lib. 7. He is said to have invented tinder, Laert. Suid. the anchor, and the Potters wheele; but this latter is by Strabo evinc'd cleerly to be false, because mentioned by Homer, who lived long before him, Anacharsis being in the time of Croesus. Suidas.

CHAP. II.
His Apophthegmes.

HIs apothegmes are these, Laert▪ He said a vine bare three grapes, the first of pleasure, the second of drunkennesse, the third of repen­tance. He wondered, that amongst the Greeks, Artists contended, and they who were no Artists determined. Being demanded by what meanes a man might be brought not to love wine, he said, by s [...]tting before his eyes the unseemly actions of drunken persons. He wondered the Grecions who punished injuries by law, rewarded the Athletae a [...] publick exercises for beating one another. Being told a ship is four inches thick, so far from death said he are they who sail. He said oile was a receipt procuring mad­nesse, because the Athletae, the more they were annointed therewith, the more fierce they were against one another. How comes it, said he, that they who forbid lying, themselves lye openly, when they put off th [...]ir wares? He wondered that the Greeks in the beginning of a feast drunk in little cups, and when they were full in great. Plut. conviv. sept. sap. Strab. 15. Being demanded (by Arda­lus) whether there were any Flutes in Scythia, he answered, not so much as vines (which Analyt. post. 1. 13. Aristotle calls a demonstration [...], by the re­mote cause) Plut. conviv. sept. sap. Ardalus adding, are there not Gods amongst the Scythi­ans? yes, replyed he, which understand all languages. Laert. Being asked what ship was safest, he answered, that which is in the Haven. He affirm'd the most remarkable thing he had seen among the Grecians to be this, that they left the smoak upon the mountains, and carried the wood into their Cities. Being demanded whether the number of the dead or of the living were grea [...]est, amongst which, saith he, do you account those who are at sea? To an Athenian, who reproached him for being a Scythian, my country, [Page 112] (saith he) is a disgrace to me, but you are a disgrace to your country. Be­ing demanded what in man is both good and bad, he answered the tongue. He affirm'd it is better to have one friend worth much, then many worth nothing. He said the Forum was the proper place for c [...]eating and unjust gain. To a young man who reproached him at a feast; youth, saith he, if at these yeeres you cannot bear wine, when you grow old, you will not be able to bear water.

Herod. 4. 46. When he returned to Scythia, he told the King who sent him, the Greeks were busied in all kinds of wisdome, except the Lacedaemonians, who only knew how to give and receive prudently.

Plut. de pro­fect. virtut. sent. He said the Greeks made no other use of mony but to accompt with it.

Plut. vit. Sol. At a publick assembly in Athens, he said, he wondered, why in the Greek convocations, wise men propounded businesse, and fooles determined it.

Plut. conv. sept. sap. That Prince is happy who is wise. That City is best, wherein (all things eise being equall) vertue hath the better condition, vice the worse.

Stob. serm. 16. To one who, as they were drinking, said, beholding his wife, Anacharsis, you have married one who is nothing handsome: I am (answered he) of that opinion also; but put less water in my wine, that I may make her hand­some.

Relating the qualities of the Vine to the King of Scythia, and show­ing him some slips thereof, he added, and by this time it would have reached into Scythia, if the Greeks did not every yeer cut off its branches.

Athen. deipn. lib. 10. At a feast, such being sent for, as might procure mirth, he alone smiled not; afterwards, an Ape being brought in; he laughed, saying, that beast is ridiculous by nature, man by art and study. Athen. deipn. lib. 10.

Whilst he slept, Athen. deipn. lib. 14. he used [...], implying, that a man ought to take great care to govern both, but that it is harder to restrain our pleasure then our tongue. Clem. Alex. strom. lib. 5. He said that to him all the Grecians were Scythians. Clem. strom. 1.

MYSON.

Laert. MY SON was (according to Hermippus) son of Stremon, born at Chene, a Village either of Oetaea, or Lacedaemonia, his father A Tyrant. Anacharsis demanding of the Oracle, if any were wiser, was answered (as was in the life of Thales mentioned of Chilon)

Oetaean Myson I declare
Wiser then those who wisest are.

His curiosity encreasing by this answer, he went to the vil­lage, and finding him fitting a plow-share to the plow, said, Myso, it is not yet time to plow: But it is (answered he) to prepare. Others affirme the Oracle called him Etean, about which there is much difference: Parmenides saith, that Etea is a Lacedaemonian Village, whereof Myson was. Sosicrates, that he was Oetaean by his father, Chenean by his mother. Euthyphron, that he was a Cretan, Etea a City of Creet. Anaxilaus an Arcadian. Hipponax mentions him in these words, And Myso, whom Apollo declared wisest of all men. Aristomenus affirmes, he was of the same humor as Timon and Apemantus, a Man-hater. He retired from Lacedaemon into the desert, and was there surprized all alone, smiling; being demanded why he smiled, no man being pre­sent, he answered, for that reason. Aristoxenus saith, he was of no account, because not of the City, but of an obscure village; whence some ascribe his sayings to Pisistratus, but others reckon him one of the seaven; Plato puts him in the room of Periander. he said, we must not seek things from words, but words from things; things were not made for words, but words for things. He dyed 97. yeers old.

EPIMENIDES.

EPimenides is by all acknowledged a Cretan (though contrary to the custome of that place he wore long haire;) but in the Town where he was borne they agree not. Laertius follow­ing the greater part of writers saith it was Val. Max. 8. 13. Cnossus, Strabo, Phaestus. There is no lesse diffe­rence about the names of his Parents; some call his father Phaestius, or Phaestus, other Dosiades, his Mother Blasta, others Agasiarchus; Apollonius, Bolus, Laertius, and Suidas, name Plutarch One of these names perhaps is corrupt. Balta, a supposed Nymph.

It is reported, that when he was a youth, being sent by his father and brethren to their field to fetch home a sheep to the City, tir'd with the heat and travell in search thereof, he with­drew himselfe at noon (or as Apollonius, at night) from the com­mon way into a private Cave, where he slept (according to [...]pollo [...]. hist. com. cap. 1. Plin. 7. 52. Laert. Theopompus fiftie seven years, according to De ling. lat. 6. Varro, An seni sit gerenda resp. Plutarch, and de anima. 46. Tertullian, fiftie, Attic. the number in Sui­das seems false, as also in the Vatican appen­dix of adages; one hath 6. the other 7. Pausanas fortie, in which intervall of time, most of his kindred died; at the end hereof awaking, he betook himselfe again to the search of his sheep, thinking it the same, or the next day to that wherein he lay down, and that he had slept but a little while; not finding it, he returned to the field where he saw all things changed, and a stranger in possession thereof: thence to the City much amazed; going into his own house, they question'd who he was; at last he met with his younger brother, now grown old, by whom he was informed of all that passed, and the time of his absence. Plutarch saith, he waked an old man; Plin. 7. 52. Pliny and Laertius, that he grew old in as many daies as he had slept yeers: Laert. Suid. some affirme he slept not, but retired a while, employing himselfe in cutting up roots.

Many (other) wonders are reported of him; Apollon. some say, he received food of the Nymphs, which he kept in an Oxes hoofe, and took thereof a little every day, requiring no other suste­nance, never being seen to eat: Laert. he often counterfeited resur­rection from death to life; his Suid. soule going out of his body when­soever he pleased, and returning again.

Laert: He is reported the first that lustrated houses and fields, Strab. which he performed by verse. To this end the Athenians in the fortie sixt Olympiad, visited with a Plague, and command­ed by the Oracle to lustrate the City, sent Nicias, son of Nice­ratus [Page 115] with a ship to Creet, to desire Epimenides to come to them, which he did, and there contracted acquaintance with Solon, whom he privately instructed, setting him in the way of ma­king Lawes. He reduced the divine rites to a lesser charge; he moderated the mournings of the Citizens, he added some sa­crifices to the ceremonies of funeralls, taking away barbarous customes which the women used upon those occasions: and (which was of greatest concernment) by propitiations, procu­rations, and offerings, he lustrated and expiated the City, ren­dring the people more obsequious to justice and unity, Laert. and staied the Pestilence in this manner: He took sheep, black and white, and brought them into the Areopagus; there he let them loose, to go whither they would, giving order to those who followed them, that whensoever any of them lay down, they should sacrifice in that place to the proper Deitie, whereby the Plague ceased. Hence it is, that at this day, (saith Laertius) are to be seen in many Athenian Villages, namelesse Altars, monu­ments of that expiation. Some affirm he imputed it to the Cylo­nian impiety (of which already in the life of Solon) and asswaged it, by putting to death two young men, Cratinus and Ctesibius.

Laert. He is supposed first to have built Temples; one he erected in Athens to the Eumenides; another he intended to consecrate to the Nymphs, but a voice from Heaven was heard in these words, Epimenides, not to the Nymphs, but to Jupiter.

Plut. vit. Sole Beholding the haven Munychia, he said to those who stood by, how blind is man to the future! The Athenians would tear this haven in pieces with their teeth, if they foresaw how much it will infest the City: This he foretold many yeeres before it came to passe, which was in the second yeer of the 114 Olym­piad, when Antipater put a garison of Macedonians into the Munychia.

The Athenians being affraid of the Persian Navy, he told them, it would not invade them for many yeers, and when it did, the Persians should not effect the least of their hopes, but depart home with greater losse to themselves then they had given their adversaries: which was fulfilled in the sights at Ma­rathon and Salamis.

He foretold the Lacedaemonians, (and Cretans also) the o­verthrow they should receive by the Arcadians, which happen­ed when Euricrates and Archidamus raigned in Lacaedemon.

These predictions (for which the Laert. Grecians esteemed him ( Plat. divine) beloved of the Gods, Plut. Sol.& put him in the number of their Sophists; the Laert. Cretans, (whose Prophet he is stiled by Tit. 1. Paul) sacrificed to him as a God) were either not known, or not credited by Aristotle, who averres, he used not to Pro­phecy of future things, but only such as were past and ob­scure.

[Page 118] For his lustration of the City and other things he was much honoured by the Athenians who offered him many gifts, would have rewarded him with a Talent, and appointed a ship to transport him back to Creet: he refused their gift and money, nor would accept of any thing but a little branch of sacred O­live, out of the Tower, wherewith (having procured a league betwixt the Cnossians and Athenians) he returned home; and soon after died Laert. citing Phlegm; Plin. 1. 52. 157. years old, or according to Apollon. Hist. com. 1. citing Phlegon. Suid. others 150. the Cretans say he wanted but one of 300. Xenophanes affirmes he heard him when he was 154 years of age. His body the Lace­demonians kept by direction of the Oracle. It was taken up ma­ny years after, marked all over with Characters, whence arose a proverb, concerning abstruse things, the skin of Epi­menides; He called himselfe Aeacus, others named him Cur [...]s.

He was a great Suid. Poet, and writ many things in verse; the subjects of his writings were these,

Initations, Lustrations, and other obscure matters in verse.

The generation and Theogony of the Curetes and Corybantes, 5000, verses.

The building of Argo, and expedition of Jason to Colchos, 6500▪ verses.

Of sacrifices, in prose

Of the Cretan Common-wealth.

Of Minos and Rhadamanthus.

D. Hieronym. in Epistol. ad Titam. see the place. Of Oracles and responses, out of which Saint Paul cites this verse,

[...].
The Cretans are alwaies liers, evill beasts slow bellies.

There is extant under his name (saith Laertius) an Epistle to Solon concerning the orders of Government given by Minos to the Cretans: which Demetrius conceives of later date, not written in the Cretan but Athenian language; but I have met with ano­ther to this effect. Tit. [...]1 2.

Epimenides to Solon.

Be of comfort friend; for if Pisitratus were ruler of Athenians, in­ured to servitude and void of discipline, his way perhaps might con­tinue for ever. But now he subjects not base people, but such as are mind­full of Solons instructions, who ashamed of their bondage will not brook his Tyranny. And though he should settle himself in the government un­moveable, yet I hope it will not devolve to his children; for it is hard for free persons, brought up under excellent lawes, to suffer bondage. As for you, wander not, but come to Creet to me, where you will find no oppres­sive Monarch. If in travailing up and down you should light upon some of his friends, I fear you may suffer some mischief.

Laert. There were two more of this name, one a Genealogist; the other writ in the Dorick dialect concerning Rhodes.

PHERECYDES.

PHerecydes. was of Syrus (one of the Cyclades near Delus) son of Badys, or as others, Babis; born ac­cording to Suidas in the 46. Olympiad; he li­ved in the time of Alyaltes King of Lydia; con­temporary with the seven Sophists by some accompted one of them. Laertius saith, he was in the fifty ninth Olympiad, Tusc. quaest. 1. Cice [...]o in the time of Servius Tullus.

There are who affirm he heard Pittacu [...]; others say he had no Master, but procured and studied by himself the abstruse books of the Phoenicians.

Laert. Many strange things are related of him; Apollon. hist. comment. cap. 5. In Syrus being thirsty, he required water of one of his Scholers, which ( Laert. be­ing drawn out of a well) he drank, and thereupon declared there would be an Earthquake within three daies in that Island; which happening as he foretold, gained him much credit: though ascribed by Cicero not to a divine but naturall cause.

Apollon. ibid Laert. Again, going to Iuno's Temple in Ianus, he beheld a ship with full sail entring the Harbour, he said to those that were present, it would never come into the Haven, whilst he was speaking, a storm arose and the ship sunk in their sight.

Laert. Going by Messana to Olympia, he advised Perilaus, at whose house he lay, to remove thence with all his Family; which hee obey'd not: Messana was soon after taken.

Laert. He bad the Lacedaemonians not to esteem gold or silver. Her­cules having so commanded him in a dream: who appeared like­wise to the Kings, and bad them obey Pherecydes: this some ascribe to Pythagoras.

He held opinions contrary to Thales, but Achil. Tat. Isag. in Art. agreed with him in that of water, that it is principle of all things. Hee said the Gods called a Table [...] Cicer. Tusc. quast. 1. He first asserted [...]he immortality of the soul, according to some. [...]biliad. Tzetzes affirms he was Master to Thales, but that suits with their times: That he in structed Pythagoras is generally acknowledg'd.

The manner of his death is variously related. Laert. Hermippus saith, in a war betwixt the Ephesians & Magnesians, he desirous the Ephesians might be victors, demanded of one present, whence he was, who answered of Ephesus: draw me then, saith he, by the leggs into the Magnesian Territory, and bid your country men, after they have gained the battle, bury me. I am [Page 120] Pherecydes. This message he delivered; they overcame the Mag­nesians and finding Pherecydes dead, buried him honourably: some affirm he went to Delphi and threw himself from the Cory­cean Mountain; But the more generall opinion is that Aelian. 4. 28. see alsa 5. 2. he died most miserably, his whole body eaten up with lice ( Pliny saith, with Serpents which broke out of his skin) whereby when his face became deform'd, he avoided and refused the sight of his acquaintance; when any one came to visit him (as Pytha­goras did) and demanded how he did, he putting out his fin­ger at the key hole, consumed by his disease showed them the condition of his whole body: Saying [...], the skin showeth: which words the Philosophers take in an ill sense: The Delians affirm the God of that place sent this disease to him out of an­ger, because he boasted much of his own wisdom to his disci­ples, saying if he should never sacrifice to any God, he should lead a life no lesse pleasant then those that offered hecatombs. Pythagoras buried him; his tomb carried this inscription,

Of wisdom I comprise the utmost bound;
Who further would be satisfied, must sound
Pythagoras, of Greeks the most renown'd.

Some affirm he was the first that writ in prose, which others ascribe to Cadmus: He writ Heptamuchos or Thocrasia; perhaps the same with his Theology, ten books containing the origine and succession of the Gods (if not mistaken for the Theogony of the younger Phere­cydes) an obscure dark work, the allegories whereof Isidore cited by Clemens Alexandrinus conceives taken from the prophecy of Cham.

Concerning this Book there is extant an Epistle under the name of Pherecydes, but may well be suspected to be spurious.

Pherecydes to Thales.

WEll may you die when ever your fatall hower arrives; as soon as I received your letter I fell sick, was overrun with lice, and had a feavour: whereupon I gave order to my servants, that as soon as I were buried they should carry the Book to you; if you with the rest of the wise men approve it, publish it; if you approve it not, publish it not, for me it doth not please; there is no certainty in it: whatsoever the Theologist saith, you must understand otherwise; for I write in fables. Constrain'd by my dis­ease, I have not admitted of any Physician or friend, but when they came to the door, and asked how it was with me, putting my finger out at the key­hole, I shewed them how desperately ill I was, and bespoke them to come on the morrow to the funerall of Pherecydes.

There was another of this name of the same Island, an Astro­loger: there are more mentioned by Suidas▪

FINIS.
THE HISTORY OF PHILO …

THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

The Second Part.

Containing the Ionick Philosophers.

[figure]

LONDON, Printed for Humphrey Moseley, and are to be sold at his Shop at the Princes Armes in St. Pauls Church-yard, and by Thomas Dring, at the George in Fleetstreet neere Cliffords Inne. 1655.

ANAXIMANDER.

CHAP. I.
Of his life.

Laert. praes. PHilosophy had a twofold beginning, one from Anaximander, another from Py­thagoras. Anaximander was Disciple to Thales; whence that Philosophy was called Ionick; Thales being an Jonian, for he was of Miletus. Pythagoras was Disciple to Phere­cydes; that king of Philosophy called, from the place where he taught, Italick. Thales was succeeded by A­naximander, Anaximander by Anaximenes, Anaximenes by Anax­agoras, Anaxagoras by Arceolans, in whom (as Plutarch, Laertius and others affirm) it ended, Socrates (the scholer of Archelans) introducing Morality.

Anaximander a Milesian, Cic. acad. quaest. 4. [...]ountryman, companion and Suid. Kinsman of Thales was his Disciple also, and Strab. lib. 1. & 4. successor in the propagation of his Doctrine; son of Praxiades (corruptly called by Clem. Alex▪ Strom. 1. some Praxidamus) born the third year of the 42 O­lympiad. Laert. He flourished most in the time of Polycrates Tyrant of Samos.

Suid. He demonstrated the compendium of Geometry; Strab. lib. 1. being next Homer the first Master of that science; hee first set forth a Geographick table, of which Laertius is to be understood who affirms, he designed the circumference of the Sea and land.

Plin. 2. 8. In the 50. Olympiad he found out the obliquity of the Zodiack, that is (saith Pliny) he opened the gates of things. Laert. He in­vented the Gnomon, & set up the first in an open place at Lacedae­mon. Suid. He found out the Aequinoctiall Solstices and Horologies; Laert. He framed Horoscopes to denote the Tropicks and Aequinoxes; whence Plinian. Ex­cit. Salmasius conceives the use of his diall was onely to delineate the Tropick and Aequinoctiall points, that they did not serve to distinguish the hours or twelve parts of the day, he proveth, because the very name [...] in that sence or the division of the day into twelve equall parts, was not known a long time after.

Cicer. divinat: [...]lin. 2. 79. He advised the Lacedaemonians to quit their City and houses, and to lie armed in the open field, foretelling an Earth­quake which threw down the whole City, and tore away piece of the Mountain Taygetus.

[Page 2] Laert: As he sung, the boyes used to deride him, whereupon hee said, we must learn to sing better for the boyes.

Of his Auditors are remembred Anaximenes and Parmenides. Of his writings these.

Suid. [...], Of Nature. This treatise perhaps Laertius meanes, who saith he digested his opinions into Commentaries, which Book fell into the hands of Apollodorus the Athenian.

[...].
[...].
Of the Sphear, with other things.

He was according to Apollodorus 64 years old the second yeare of the 58. Olympiad, and died soon after.

CHAP. 2.
Of his Opinions.

Sect. 1. That Infinity is the principle of all things.

THales (saith Acad. quaest. 4. Cicero) who held that all things consist of water, could not perswade his Countryman and Companion Anaximan­der thereto, for he asserted That infinity is that whereof all things were made; or (according to De plac. phil. 1. 3. Plutarch, Laertius, and Paran. ad Graec. Iustine Martyr) that it is the principle and element of things (for these two he con­founded, as was observ'd of his Master Thales) Laert. but not declared what this infinity is, whether Air, Water, Earth, or any other body, for which condemned by Plutarch.

That it is Symplic. in phys. 1. 2. phis. 1. 5. one, infinite in magnitude (not number) whence Plut. plac. phil. 1. 3. Aristotle reprehends him for imagining contrarieties can pro­ceed from the same principle. Laert. That it is for that reason infinite that it may not fail.

Cap. 6. That the parts thereof are changed; the whole is immutable ( Cicer. Acad. quaest. 4. Sym­plicius saith moveable) Plut. plac. phil. 1. 3. Iust. Mart. paraen That out of it all things proceed, and re­solve into it.

That there are infinite worlds generated which corrupt into that whereof they were generated.

Sect. 2. Of the Heavens.

HIs opinion (according to De nat. deor. 1. Cicero) was, that the Gods are na­tive (having a beginning) rising and setting by long intervalls, and that there are innumerable worlds: This Plac. Phil. 1. 7. Plutarch and Stobaeus apply to the Heavens and Stars. But how can we (addes Cicero) understand a God that is not eternall. Stob. That Heaven consists of cold and heat mixed.

[Page 3] That the starrs are globous instances▪ consisting of air full of fire, respiring flames at some certain part: Stob. moved by the circles and sphears wherein they inhere; which assertion Aristotle borrowed from hence.

That the Sun is seated highest, the moon next, Stob. then the sixed starres and Planets.

That the circle of the Sun is Plut. plac. phil. 2. 20. 28. times (Theodoret saith 27.) greater then the earth, having a hollow circle about it like a Chariot wheel, full of fire; in one part whereof there is a mouth, Plut plac. phil. 2. 21▪ at which the fire is seen as out of the hole of a [...]lute, which is the Sun Laert. equall in bignesse with the Earth.

Plut. plac. phil. 2. 24 Stob. That the cause of the Sunn's Eclipse is the stopping that hole in the midst, out of which the fire issues.

Plut. plac. phil. 2. 25. That the circle of the Moon is 29. times greater then the Earth, like a Chariot wheel, having a hollow or be in the midst full of fire (like the Sun) and oblique, breathing fire out at one part as out of a tunnel. Plut. plac. phil. 2. 29. Stob.

Plut. plac. phil. 2. 28. That the Eclipse of the Moon happens according to her conversions, when the mouth out of which the [...]ire issueth, is stopped.

Laert. That the Mooon hath a light of her own: but very thin; As a learned person concei­ves, upon those words of Laert. that she shineth in the light she borroweth from the Sun; which two assertions are so far See Erasm. Reinholdus in Theoricas pur­bachii pag. 164 from being inconsistent, that it is the common opi­nion [...] both are true.

Sect. 3. Of Meteors.

Plut. plac. phil. 3. 7. THat wind is a fluxion of the air, when the most subtle and liquid parts thereof are either stirr'd or resolved by the Sun.

Plut. plac. phil. 3. 3. That Thunders, lightnings, presters, and whirlewinds are caused by the wind enclosed in a thick cloud, which by reason of its lightnesse breaketh forth violently; the rupture of the cloud maketh a crack; and the divulsion by reason of the blacknesse causeth a slashing light. Nat. quaest. 2. 18 Seneca more expressely, He ascribed all to wind. Thunder (saith he) is the sound of a breaking cloud: why unequall? because the breakings are un­equall. Why doth it thunder in a clear day? Because even then the wind breaks through the thick and dry air. Why sometimes doth it thunder and not lighten? Because the thinner and weaker spirit is able to make a flame but not a sound. What is lightning? The agitation of the air seve­ring it self and rushing down, disclosing a faint fire. What is Thunder? The motion of a piercing thick spirit.

Sen. nat. quaest. 2. 19. All things are so ordered, that some influence descend from the Aether upon inferiour things; so fire sounds, forced upon cold clouds: When it breaks them it shines; the fewer flames beget lightnings, the greater, thunder: a great part, the rest was altered from its naturall kind by his excessive heat.

Plut▪ plac. phil▪ That the first creatures were bred in humidity, and enclosed within sharp thorny barks, but as they grew older they became dryer, and at last the bark being broken round about them, they lived some little time after it.

ANAXIMENES.

CHAP. I.
His life.

Laert. ANaximenes was a Milesian, Son of Euristratus, Simplic. friend, Cic. acad. quaest. plin. 2. 76 Disciple and Suid. sucessour to A­naximander. According to Eusebius he flou­rish'd in the second hear of the 56. Olympi­ad, Suidas saith he liv'd in the 55. Olympiad at the taking of Sardys, when Cyrus over­threw Croesus. So that the acompt of Laert. Apol­lodorus, (who affirms he was born in the 63. Olympiad) is cor­rupt. He heard also, as some affirm, Parmenides. He used the Jo­nick Dialect, plain and incomposed. Lib. 2. Pliny calls him the inven­tour of Gnomonicks▪ but perhaps it is a mistake for Anaximander. Of his auditors were Anaxagoras and Diogenes Apolloniates.

These two Epistles of his are preserved by Laertius.

Anaximenes to Pyt [...]agoras.

THales having lived happily even to old age, ended his daies un­fortunately. One night going out of his house (as he used) with his maid to contemplate the starrs, gazing and not taking heed to the place, [...]elighted upon a precipice and fell down. This was the fate of the Milesi­on Astronomer. But let us who were his Auditors, preserve the memory of the person, and our sons and auditors after us. Let us still retain his sayings, and begin all our discourses with Thales.

Anaximenes to Pythagoras.

YOu are more advised then we, who leaving Samos for Crotona live there in quiet, the Aeacides prove in [...]urious to others, and the Mi­lesians want not Tyrants of their own choosing. The King of Media is likewise terrible to us, but would not be so, should we pay him tribute. The Ionians are resolved to war with the Medes for the g [...]neral liberty, & [Page 6] if they sight we have no hope of safety. How then can Anaximene▪ [...]erplexed with fear of death and slavery apply his mind to celestial spe­culations. But you are coveted by the Crotonians, and all Italians; Au­ditors come to you as far as from Sicily.

CHAP. II.
His opinions.

Sect. 1. That the Air is the principle of all things.

HE held that the Air is the principle of the Universe, Plut de plac. Iustin Mar­tyr. paraen. 1. 3. phil. of which all things are ingendred, and into which they resolve; Our soules by which we live are air, so spirit and air contain in being all the world; for spirit and air are two names signifying one thing.

That Cic. de nat. deor. 1. the air is God, begotten, immense, infinite, ever in motion; Cic. [...]cad. quaest. 4. but that those things which arise out of it are finite. First is be­gotten, earth, water, fire, then of these all things. That the air is God understands of the faculties penetrating through the Elements or bodies.

Sect. 2. Of the Heavens.

THat Plut. plac. phil. 2. 11. the outward super [...]icies of Heaven is earthly.

That the starrs are of a fiery substance, invisible earthly bo­dies intermixt with them; that they are inherent, as nailes in Chrystall.

That Plut. plac. phil. 2. 23. they are forced back by the thick resisting air, Laert. and move not above (or under) but about the earth.

Plut plac. phil. That the sun is [...]lat as a plate, of s [...]ery substance.

That Plut. plac. phil. 2. 19. the signes of summe and winter come not by the moon, but by the sun onely.

That Plut. plac. phil. 2. 24. the sun is eclipsed when the mouth out of which issueth his beat is closed.

That the Moon is likewise of a fiery nature. Plut.

That the Moon is eclipsed when the mouth out of which issueth her heat, is closed.

Sect. 3. Of Meteors.

That the clouds are made by condensation of air, rain by conden­sation of the clouds, Plut. plac. phil. 3. 4. out of which it is squeezed; snow of rain con­geal'd in falling, and hail of the same contracted by a cold wind.

Concerning Thunder, Stob. lightning, &c. to the assertion of A­naximander he added the comparison of the Sea, which being bro­ken with Oares shineth. Plut. de plac. phil. 3. 5.

That the rainbow is made by reflection of the Sunns beams upon a [Page 7] thick cloud, which, not able to pierce it, are refracted upon it.

That Earthqu [...]kes proceed from the rarity and drynesse of the Earth, Plutarch, deplac [...] 3. 15. one being caus'd by excessive heat, the other by excecessive cold. Further explained by Meteor. 2. 7. Senec nat. quaest. 6. [...]0. Aristotle thus; He held that the Earth, as well when it is moist as when it is dry, breaketh, and by these great pieces thereof which use to fall upon it, is shaken: Hence it is that Earthquakes happen either in droughts or great raines: by droughts it is broken, and by great showers excessively moistned parts likewise in sunder.

He called the contraction and condensation of matter, cold; the lax­ation and rarity thereof, heat: whence a man breaths out of his mouth both hot and cold; his breath comprest by his lips, and condens'd is cold; but breathed forth with an open mouth is hot by reason of the rarity.

ANAXAGORAS.

CHAP. I.
Anaxagoras Country, time, and study of Philosophy.

ANaxagoras was of Clazomenae, son of Hegesibu­lus or Eubulus, born in the 70th. Olympiad according to Apollodorus; in the first yeare thereof; Eminent for his noble birth and wealthy fortunes, but more for his magna­nimous contempt of them. Plut. contra usar. Lysand Hee left his lands and patrimony, (saith Tusc. quaest. S. Cicero,) to learn and obtain the divine delight of Philosophy: and De orator. 3. converted himselfe from civill affairs to the knowledge of things. Sutdas affirms he left his grounds to sheep and Camells to be eaten up; and therefore Apollonius Tyaneas said, he read Philosophy to beasts rather then to men. Hipp. ma [...]. Plato, derides him for quitting his estate; Laertius reports he assign'd it to his friends; whereupon being by them accused of improvidence; why (answered he) do not you take care of it? To one who reproved him as taking no care of his Coun­try, wrong me not, said he, my greatest care is my Country, pointing to the Heavens. To another asking for what end he was born, he answered, to contempla [...]e the Sun, Moon and Heavens. Laert. In fine, he withdrew himself to contemplation of naturall Philosophy not regarding civill affairs. In this study Anaximenes was his Master Cicer. de Na. deor 1. from whom he received his learning.

La [...]rt. In the twentieth year of his age the first of the 75. Olym­piad, Colliades being Archon (whom Laertius corruptly calls Callias) at the time of Xerxes expedition into Greece he went to Athens to study Philosophy, where he continued thirty yeares, and was honored with the title of [...] the Mind, ad being the first that added that principle to matter, so Amon.

Where [...]wells fam'd Anaxagoras, the mind,
Laert. per­haps [...] [...]
For he that agent first to matter joyn'd
Which things confused orderly design'd.

CHAP. II.
Of his opinions.

Sect. 1. Of the first principles, and beginning of things.

HE held that the materiall principle of all things is one and ma­ny ( [...]) par [...]s in [...]inite, similar, and contrary, continuous to the touch, [...]lut. plac. phil. 1. 3. sustaining themselves, Arist. phys. 3. 4 not contain'd by any other. Arist. phys. 3. 7 His grounds these: First, because, according to the common rule of naturall Philosophers, of nothing proceeds nothing, it is not possible any thing can be made of that which is not; or that which hath a being can be resolved into that which hath none, Secondly, because contraries are made mutually of each other, therefore they were in each other before; for if it be necessary, that whatsoever is made, be made of that which is, or is not, but that it should be made of that which is not impossible, wherein all agree, that ever discoursed upon nature, it followes necessarily, that they be made of things that are, and are with­in these very things, though by reason of their smallnesse, not discernable by us: Hence is it that they say, every thing is mixt with every thing; because they see any thing made of any thing: but things seem different, and are called diverse in re­spect to one another, by reason that the multitude of infinites which are within aboundeth in the mistion; for the whole is neither quite white nor black, flesh nor bone, but every thing seemeth to be of the nature of that whereof it hath most Plut. of simple nourishment, as bread, water, and the like, are bred the hair, veines, arteries, nerves, bones, and other parts of the bo­dy, all things are therefore in this food, as nerves, bones, and the like, discernable by reason, though not by sense: Of these Atomes the whole world consisteth, Laert. as gold of grains; these homogeneall parts are the matter of all things▪ his opinion is thus exprest by Lib. 1. Lucretius.

Next Anaxagoras we must pursue,
And his Homoiomeria review;
A term that's no where mention'd but among
The Greeks; too copious for our na [...]row tongue:
Yet may the sense be in more words arraid;
The principle of all things, entrailes made
Of smallest entrails, bone of smallest bone,
Blood of small sanguine drops reduc'd to one;
Gold of small graines, earth of small sands compacted,
Small drops to water, sparks to fire contracted;
The like in every thing suppos'd, yet he
[Page 11] Nature asserted from all vacuum free;
And held that each corporeall being might
Be subdivided into infinite.

That Lactan. fals. rel. 1. 5. God is an infinite selfe-moving mind, that this di­vine Cic. nat. deor. 1 infinite mind, not inclosed in any body, August. cir. de [...]. 8. 2. is the efficient cause of all things; out of the infinite matter consisting of simi­lar parts, every thing being made according to its species by the divine minde, who, when all things were at first con­fusedly mingled together, came and reduced them to order.

Sect 2. Of the Heavens.

That the higher parts of the world are full office, the power that is there he called aether, and that properly, saith Aristotle, Aristot. Met. 1. 3. for the body, which is continually in quick motion, is conceived to be divine by nature, for that reason called aether, none of those that are here below being of that kind.

That Plut. plac. phil. 2. 13. the ambient aether being of a fiery nature by the swiftnesse of its motion, snatcheth up stones from the earth, which being set on fire, become starres, Plut. plac. phil. 2. 16. all carried from East to West.’

That plut, plac. phil. 2. 23. ‘the Startes are impelled by the condensation of the aire about the Poles, which the Sun makes more strong by compressing.’

That ‘the starres are earthly, and that after the first secreti­on of the Elements, the fire separating it selfe, drew some parts of the earth to its own nature, and made them like fire: Whereupon he farther affirmed’

Plut. plac. phil. 2. 20. La­ert. Achil. Tat. Isag. in Arat. The Sun is a burning plate or stone, Plut. plac. phil. 2. 21. many times bigger ‘then Peloponnesus, whose conversionn is made by the repulse of the Northern aire, which he, by compressing, makes more strong.’

Plut. plac. phil. 2. 25. ‘the Moon is a dark body, enlightned by the Sun, habitable, having plaines, hills and waters; that Plut. plac. phil. 2. 30. Laert. the ine­quality in her face proceeds from a mixture, cold and earth­ly, for there is darknesse mixt with her fiery nature, whence she is called a star of false light.’ In Cratylo. Plato saith, that the Moon was occasion of dishonour to him, because he assumed the ori­ginall of this opinion of her borrowing light to himselfe, where­as it was much moreantient.

That Plut. plac. phil. the milky way is the shadow of the earth upon that part of heaven, when the Sun, being underneath, enlightens not all:’ Mei [...]eor. 1. 8. Or as Aristotle, that ‘the Milkie way is the light of some starres, for the Sun being under the earth, looks not upon some starres, the light of those on whom he looks is not seen, being swallowed up in his; the proper light of those [Page 12] which are hindred by the earth from the Suns illumination, is the Galaxy; Laertius saith, ‘he held the Galaxy to be the re­flection of the light of the Sun.’

Sect. 3. Of Meteors.

THat ‘Comets are the co [...]apparition of wandring starres,’ Arist. Meteor. 1. 6. which approach so near each other, as that they seem to touch one another: Or as Laertius; ‘the concourse of Planets, emitting flames.’

That ‘falling starres are shot down from the aether, as spar­kles, and therefore soon extinguished.’

That Laert. Thunder is the collision of Clouds, lightning their mutuall attrition:’ Or as Plutarch; ‘the cold falling upon the hot, or the aetheriall, Plut. plac. phil. 3. 3. upon the aeriall, the noise which it makes is Thunder: of the blacknesse of the cloud is caused lightning, of the greatnesse of the light Thunderbolts, of the more corporeall fire whirle-winds, of the more cloudy Pre­sters.’

That ‘lightning distills from the aether;’ and that ‘from that great heat of Heaven many things fall down, which the clouds preserve a long time enclosed.’

That the ‘Rain-bow is a refraction of the Suns light upon a thick dark cloud,’ Plut. plac. phil. 3. 5. opposite to him as a looking glasse; by the same reason (faith he) appeared chiefly in Pontus, two, or more Suns.

That ‘Earth quakes are caused by the aire or aether, which being of its own nature apt to ascend, Arist. Meteor. 2. 7. Plut. plac▪ phil. 3. 15. Se­nec. nat. quaest. 6. when it gets into the veines and cavernes of the earth, finding difficulty in the getting out, causeth that shaking; for the upper parts of the earth contract themselves by the benefit of rain, Na­ture having made the whole body thereof alike, laxe and spungy, the parts, as in a Ball, superiour, and inferiour, the superiour, that which is inhabited by us, the inferiour, the other: This wind getting into the inferiour parts, breaks the condensed aire, with the same force as we see clouds broken, when, upon the collision of them, and motion of the agitated aire, sire breaks forth: this aire falls upon that which is next, seeking to get out, and tears in pieces whatsoever it meets, untill through those narrow passages, it either finds a way to Heaven, or forceth one: which Laer [...]ius obscurely expresseth, the repulsion of the air upon the earth.’

THat ‘Snow is not white, Cic. Acad. qu [...]st. 4. but black, nor did it seem white to him, because he knew the water whereof it is congealed to be black.’

Sect 4. Of the Earth.

THat ‘the begining of motion proceeding from the mind,’ Laert. the heavie bodies obtained the lowest place, as the earth; ‘the light the highest, as the fire; those betwixt both, the middle, as the aire and water: thus the sea subsists upon the superficies of the earth, which is flat, the humidity being ratified by the Sun.’

That ‘the primitive humidity being diffused, Plut. plac. phil. 3. 16. as a pool was burned by the motion of the Sun about it, and the unctuous part bring exhaled, the remainder became salt.’

That ‘assoon as the world was made, Plut. plac. phil. 2. 8. and living creatures produced out of the world, the world enclined of it selfe to­wards the south, according to divine providence; that some parts thereof might be habitable, others not habitable, by reason of the extremities of heat and cold.’

That ‘the mistion of the Elements is by apposition. Plut. plac. phil. 1. 17.

That ‘the inundation of Nilus is caused by the snow of Ae­thiopia, which is dissolved in summer, Plut. plac. phil. 4. 1. and congealed in win­ter.’

Sect 5. Of living Creatures.

THat ‘Creatures were first generated of humidity, calidity, Laert. and earthly matter, afterwards mutually of one another, males on the right side, females on the left.’

That ‘the soule is that which moveth, Plu▪ plac. phil. 4. [...]. that it is aeriall, and hath a body of the nature of aire.’

plut plac. phil. 5. 24. That there is a death of the soule likewise, which is separa­tion from the body.

That all Animalls have active reason.

Plut. plac. phil. 5. 25. That sleep is an action of the body, not of the soul.

Plut. plac. phil. 5. 25. That in the hand of man consists all his skill.

Plut. de am [...] ­re frat. That ‘the voice is made by the wind, hitting against firm resisting air, returning the counter-blow to our ears, which is the manner whereby also the repercussion of the air is formed, called Eccho.’

That ‘the Gall is the cause of acute diseases, which over­flowing, is dispersed into the lungs, veines, and costs.’

CHAP. III.
His predictions.

SUidas saith, he foretold many things: of those, two instances onely have been hitherto preserved. The first thus related by Pliny, The Grecians celebrate Anaxagoras of the Clozomenian, and for foretelling by his learning and Science in the second yeare of the 78. Olympiad, on what day a stone would fall from the Sun, which hap­pen'd in the day time in a part of Thrace at the river Agos which stone is at this day shewne about the bignesse of a became of an adust colour, a Comet also burning in those nights.

Vit. Ly [...]and. Plutarch adds, that it was in his time not onely shewen, but reverenced by the Peloponnesians. Eusebius reckons the fall of this stone upon the fourth yeare of the 78. Olympiad, which is two yeares after Pliny accompts of the prediction. Silenus cited by Laertius, saith, it fell when Dimylus was Archon, which if it be to be red Dyphilus (for the other name is not to be found neere these times) will be the first yeare of the 84 Olympiad. But the marble at Arundell House (graven about the 129. Olympiad to be preferred before any other chronologicall accompt) expressly names the fall upon the 4 th yeare upon the 77. Olympiad, when Theagenides was Archon, two yeares before. Pliny saith it was foretold. It was beleeved to have portended (as Plutarch testi­fies) the great defeat given to the Athenians by Lysander at the river Agos 62. yeares after, viz. the fourth yeare of the 39. O­lympiad.

Of the wonder Meteor. 1. 7. Aristotle gives a very slight accompt, affir­ming ‘It was a stone snatched up by the wind, and fell in the day time,’ a Comet happening in those nights, which is dispro­ved by Vit. Lysand. Plutarch, who hath this large discourse upon it: ‘It is said that Anaxagoras did prognosticate that one of the bodies included the Heavens it should be loosed by shaking, & fall to the ground, the Stars are not in place where they were first cre­ated, they are heavie bodies, of the nature of stone, shining by reflection of the aether, being drawn up by force, & kept there by the violence of that circular motion, as at the beginning in the first separation of things, cold & heavie they were restrai­ned. There is another opinion more probable which saith, those which we call falling starres are not fluxions of the ae­ther extinguisht in the aire almost as soon as lighted, nor in­flammations or combustions of any part of the aire, which by it spreadeth upwards, but they are coelestiall bodies failing of their retention by the ordinary course of heaven throwne downe, not upon the habitable earth, but into the Sea, which is the cause we doe not see them; yet the assertion of Anax­agoras [Page 15] is confirmed by Damachus, who writeth in his book of Religion, that 75. daies together before this stone fell, they saw a great body of fire in the Air like a cloud enflamed, which tarried not in one place, but went and came uncer­tainly removing, from the driving whereof issued flashes of fire that fell in many places like falling starrs; when this great body of fire fell in that part of the Earth, the Inhabitants em­boldned, came to the place to see what it was, and found no appearance of fire but a great stone on the ground, nothing, in comparison of that body of fire. Herein Damachus had need of favourable hearers: But if what he saith be true, he confu­seth those Arguments who maintain it was a piece of a Rock by the force of a boistrous wind torn from the top of a Moun­tain, and carried in the air so long as this whirlwind continu­ed, but so soon as that was laid, the stone fell immediately; unlesse this lightning body which appeared so many daies was fire indeed, which coming to dissolve, and to be put out did beget this violent storm of force to tear off the stone, and cast it down.’

This it is likely Senec. nat. quaest. 7. 5. Charimander meant, who in his book of Co­mets saith, Anaxagoras observed in the Heavens a great unac­customed light of the greatnesse of a huge pillar, and that it shined for many daies.

The other memorable prediction of Anaxagoras was Suid. of a storm, which hee signified by going to the Olympick games, when the weather was fair in a shaggy gown, the rain powring down all the Graecians (saith Aelian) saw and gloried, that hee knew more divinely then according to humane Nature.

CHAP. IV.
His Scholers and Auditors.

THese are remembred as his Scholars and Auditors. Cicer. Pericles Son of Xantippas being instructed by Anaxagoras, could easily reduce the exercise of his mind from secret obstru­sive things to publick popular causes▪ Plut. vit. Pericl. Pericles much esteemed him, was by him instructed in natural Philosophy, and besides o­ther virtues fre'd from superstitious fears arising from ignorance of physicall causes; whereof there is this instance; the head of a Ram with but one horn being brought to Pericles, was by the South sayers interpreted prodigious: Anaxagoras opening it, showed that the brain filled not its naturall place, but contract­ed by degrees in an ovall form toward that part where the horn grew. Afterwards Anaxagoras neglected and decrepit with age in a melancholy resentment thereof lay down and co­ver'd his face, resolving to starve himself, which▪ Pericles hea­ring, [Page 16] came immediately to him bewailing, not Anaxagoras, but himself, who should lose so excellent a Counsellor: Anaxago­ras uncovering his face said, They, Pericles, who would use a Lamp, must apply it with oil.

Archela [...]s Son of Apollodorus was Disciple to Anaxagoras, and, as Laertius affirms, called the naturall Philosopher for first bring­ing that kind of learning to Athens, but how that consists with his relation to Anaxagoras, who, as he acknowledgeth, studied naturall Philosophy thirty years in Athens, Casaubone justly questions.

Euripides, His words (because never published) these: [...] [...], [...] as the writer of his life affirms, son of Mnesar­chus, born at the first time of Xe [...]xes's expedition into Greece, the same day that the Grecians overthrew the Persians, was first a Painter, then an Auditor of Anaxagoras; but seeing him perse­cuted for his opin [...]ons, lastly converted himself to Tragick poesy.

Socrates, Son of Sophroniscus, was according to Aristoxenus an Auditor of Anaxagoras till he left the City, and thereupon ap­plyed himself to Archelaus, which Porphyrius reckons above the 17th. year of his age, or rather the ninteenth.

Democritus also is by some affirmed, being younger then Anax­agoras forty years, to have applyed himself to him, but Laertius affirms he could not endure Democritus, & shunn'd his conversa­tion; Phavorinus likewise attests, that because he would not ad­mit him, Democritus profess'd himself his Enemy, and denyed his opinions of the Sun and Moon, but said they were ancient, and that he stole them, as likewise his description of the world, and assertion concerning the mind.

Me [...]rodorus of Lampsacum is likewise mentioned by Laertius as friend to Anaxagoras.

CHAP. V.
OF his triall, Death sentences and writings.

Of his tryal saith Laertius there are several reports Sotion in his treatise of the succession of Philosophers saith, he was accused by Cleon of impiety, for asserting the Sun to be a burning plate, but being defended by Pericles his Scholar, hee was fined five Talents and banish'd.

Satyrus, that he was cited to the Court by Thucydides, who was of the contrary faction of Pericles, Laert. accused not onely of impie­ty, but of holding intelligence with the Persians, and in his ab­sence condemned to death; when news was brought him at the same time both of the death of his Sons, which (according to Aelian) were two, Cic. Tus [...]. qu [...]st. 3. Plut. de ira cohib. all that he had, and his own condemnation of the latter he said, Varr. hist. 3. Nature long since condemned both them & me [Page 17] to death; of his Plut. consol. ad Apol [...]on. Sons ( Simplic. in Epiclet. with a calm look) Val. Max. 5. 10. You tell me nothing new or unexpected; I knew that I beget them mortall, which some [...] ­scribe to Solon, others to Xenophon, Demetrius Phalereus saith, hee buried them with his own hands.

Laert. Hermippus, he was imprison'd to be put to death, but Peri­cles appearing before the Judges, asked if they knew any thing in his life that they could accuse, to which they answered no­thing, but I, saith he, am his disciple, then be not tansported by Calumnies to kill the man, but believe me and set him at liber­ty, so he was dismissed, but not able to brook the disgrace, hee kill'd himself.

Laert. Hieronymus saith, that Pericles brought him into the Court in poor garments extenuated with sicknesse, an object [...]itter for compassion then Justice. And thus much saith Laertius of his Tryall.

Suidas, that he was cast into Prison by the Athenians for in­troducing a new opinion concerning God, and banish'd the Ci­ty, though Pericles undertook to plead his cause, and that going to Lampsacum he there starv'd himself to death.

Iosephus, that the Athenians believing the Sun to be God, which he affirm'd to be without sense and Knowledge, hee was by the votes of a few of them condemned to death.

But if we credit Vit. Pericl▪ Plutarch, he was neither condemned nor ac­cused but by Pericles, who fear'd the Ordinance of Diopithes, which cited those that held prophane or sublime Opinions sent out of the City. De superstit. Yet else-where hee confesseth he was accused.

His departure from Athens, being 30. years after his coming thither, falls the third year of the 82. Olimpiad the 63. of his age. Thence he went to Lampsacum, where he continued the rest of his age, which extended to 22. years more, so little mind­full of A [...]hens, or of his Country, as to one, who told him that he was deprived of the Athenians, he answered, no, but they of me; and Cic Tus [...]. quaest. 1. to his friends, who when hee fell sick, asked, if hee would be carried to Clazomonae his Country, no said he, there is no need, the way to the grave is alike every where. Plut. instruct. polit. Before he died the Magistrates of the City asked him, if he would they should do any thing for him, hee answered, that his onely re­quest was that the boyes might have leave to play yearly on that day of the month, whereon he died; which custom (saith Laertius) is continued to this time. Those of Lampsacum buried him magnificently with this Epitaph.

Here lies, who through the truest paths did passe
O'th world Celestiall, Anaxagoras.

Aelian mentions two altars erected to him, one inscribed to [Page 18] the mind, the other to truth; Laertius concludes his life with this Epigram.

Fam'd Anaxagoras the Sun defin'd
A burning plate, 'for which to die design'd,
Sav'd by his Scholar Pericles; But he
Aelian.
Abandon'd life to seek Philosophie.

Laert. He is observed never to have been seen either to laugh or smile.

Lacrt. Being demanded if the Mountains of Lampsacum would in time become Sea, he answered, yes, if time fail not first.

Laert. Beholding the tomb of Mausolus, he said, a sumptuous Mo­nument was a sign the substance was turned into stone.

Laert. He first affirmed the poesy of Homer to consist of virtue and Justice, to which Metrodorus added, that the Poet was skil­full in naturall Philosophy.

Stob. He conceived that there are two lessons of death, the time before our birth, and sleep.

Laertius and Clemens Alexandrinus assert him first of the Philo­sophers that put forth a Book. He writ.

Of Natural Philosophy, out of which Aristotle cites these fragments, All these things were together: which was the beginning of the book: and, [...]o be such is to be changed. Phys. 1. 5. Plut. Georg. Plato this, The mind is the disposer and cause of all things. Hip. mai. Athenaeus this, what is commonly called the milk of the hen, is the white of the egge. Lib. 2. Plato censures the book as not using the mind at all, nor assiging any cause of the order of things, but aeriall, aetheriall and aquatick Natures, and the like incredible things for causes.

The quadrature of the Circle: which treatise De exsul. Plutarch saith hee composed during his imprisonment.

Laert. There were three more of the same name; the first an Ora­tour, follower of Isocrates: the second a statuary, mentioned by Antigonus; the last a Grammarian, Scholar to Zenodotus.

ARCHELAVS.

ARchelaus was either an Athenian, or a Milesi­an; his Father Apollodorus, Laert. or according to some, Mylon; he was Scholer to Anaxagoras, Master to Socrates. He first transferr'd natu­rall Philosophy out of Ionia to Athens, (But how that can be, when Anaxagoras his Master taught there thirty years, Casau­bone justly questions) and therefore was called the Natural Phi­losopher: in him naturall Philosophy ended, Socrates his Scholer introducing morality; but hee seemeth also to have touched morall Philosophy, for he treated of lawes, of things honest and just; from whom Socrates receiving his learning, because he increased it, is therefore thought to have invented it; wheras as Gassendus observes, morall Philosophy was far more antient, that being the principle ground of the attribute of wise con­ferred upon the Seven, whose learning lay chiefly that way: but Socrates is called the Author thereof, because he first redu­ced it to a science. Archelaus asserted

That the principles of all things are twofold, one incorpore all, Stob▪ the mind, (not maker of the world) the other corporeall, infinite in number, and dissimilar Plut. plac. phil. 1. 3. which is the air, and its rarefaction and condensation, whereof one is fire, the other water.

That the universe is insinite.

That the causes of generation are two; heat and cold.

That the starrs are burning iron plates.

That the Sun is the greatest of stars.

That the Sea is made by percolation of the hollow parts of the Earth.

That living Creatures are generated of slime c [...]warm Earth, emit­ting a milky kind of slime like the chile; that this humid matter being dissolved by the fire, that of it which settles into a fiery substance is earth, that which evaporates is air.

That the winds getting into the hollow places of the Earth, Sen. Nat. quaest. 6. 12▪ filling all the spaces, the air condensed as much as possible, the wind that comes next presseth the first, forcing and disturbing it by frequent impulsions. This wind seeking a room through the narrow places, endeavoureth to break prison, whereby it happens the wind strugling for passage, that the earth is moved.

Of the definition of the Voice, by Plutarch attributed to Anaxa­goras, Laertius makes Archelaus the Author, describing it a per­cusion of the air.

That what is just, or dishonest is defined by Law, not by Nature.

Plut. Laert. These five, Anaximander, Anaximenes Thales, Anaxagoras, Arche­laus, by continuall desent succeding one another, compleat the Ionick sect▪

FINIS
THE HISTORY OF PHILO …

THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

The Third Part.

Containing the Socratick Philosophers.

[figure]

LONDON, Printed for Humphrey Moseley, and Thomas Dring, and are to be sold at their shops at the Princes Armes in St. Pauls Church-yard, and at the George in Fleetstreet neere Cliffords Inne. 1655.

SOCRATES

SOCRATES.

CHAP. I.
Socrates, his Country, Parents, and time of birth.

SOcrates was by Country an Athenian, borne at Alopece, Laert. a towne, according to Suidas and Pha­vorinus, belonging to the Antiochian tribe. This was one of those small villages scattered through Attica, before These [...]s reduc'd the people into the walls of a City, which not­withstanding his decree, were not deserted, but continued and preserved by their Inhabitants.

His Parents were very meane; Laert. [...]lat. The [...]at. Alcib. Sophroniscus (an Liban. Athenian) his Father, Laert. [...] [...]. Val. Max. marmorarius. a statuary, or carver of Images in stone, Phaenareta his mother a Midwife, a woman of a bold, generous & quick spi­rit, as is implyd by the character Thea [...]tet. Plato gives her (though wrested by Deipnos. 5. Athenaeus) of which professions of his Parents, he is Liban. Apol. obser­ved to have been so farre from being asham'd, that hee often tooke occasion to mention them.

Apol [...]g. Apollodorus, Laertius and Suidas affirme he was borne in the fourth yeare of the 77. Olympiad, which may likewise be col­lected from the marble at [...]rundel Ho [...]se, which saith, he dyed when Laches was Arc [...]on, and reckons 70. yeares of his life, which was compleat, because Laert. Plato sayes [...], and from Lib. 11. Dome­trius Phalereus (who was himselfe archon the fourth yeare of the 117. Olympiad,) who saith, he dyed the first yeare of the 95. Olym­piad, when he had lived 76 yeares, the 70. yeare inclusively upwards, is the fourth of the 77 Olympiad, when Apsephion, (or, as some call him Aphepsion) was Archon, of whose name in Archont. 2. 7▪ Diodorus Siculus no more is left then Dialog. de script. Socr. [...], which should be [...], but hath been incuriously alter'd into [...], which if * Meursius had observed, he had not corrected Laertius with­out cause, nor he and * Allatius follow'd the mistake of Sca­liger (whom they terme Anonymus) in placing Aphepsion in the fourth yeare of the 74. Olympiad.

The day of Socra [...]es birth, was Laert. according to Apollodorus, the sixt of the month Thargelion, memorable (saith Laertius) for the birth of Diana according to the traditions of the Delians; upon which day the Athenians did yearely lustrate the [...] City. Many other good fortunes happening to the A [...]henians upon this day are recorded by Var. hist. 2. Aelian. The day following, viz. the seventh [Page 2] of this month was the birthday of Pla [...]o, both which were kept with much solemnity by the Greek Philosophers, ( Porphyr. vit. Plut. even to the time of Plotinus) as is affirmed by Sympos. 8. 1 Plutarch, who thereupon observes it as the effect rather of Providence, then of chance, that their birth-daies should be so near, and that of the Master precede the Scholer's.

To accommodate this time with our accompt, is neither ea­sie nor certain, yet in respect it may give some satisfaction by way of conjecture, we shall found it upon these hypotheses, ta­king that order of months which Petavius gives.

1. That after the Olympiads the beginning of the Grecian year was alwaies on the first of Hecatombaeon, and Olympick games on the 15th.

2. That the Neomenia of Hecatombaeon, did (at least in the times wherein we enquire) never precede the solstice, being then about the Calends, or pridie Calendarum Iulij, they supposing them in octavis signorum, it did not precede the ninth of Iuly. This postulatum, though it be doubly question'd by Petavius, yet none of his Argumen ts pretend beyond Meton's time.

3. That upon that supposition, if Scaliger hath rightly order'd the Neomenia in his Olympick period (against which Petavius brings no one sufficient Argument) and consequently the rest, the Olympick period doth certainly exhibi [...]t the Neomenia of Hecatombaeon. It is true that Petavius disputes the period of 76 years, as having never been used till Calippus his time, but we take it here onely proleptically, as the Julian year, to which we would accomodate it.

4. That this being after Solon's time, the Civill year was Luna­ry (and consisted of months, which were alternately of 29. and 30. daies,) at Athens, though diverse places of Greece, especially the more remote from thence, did not for a long time after part with their tricenary months.

These things supposed the sixt of Thargelion, (will according to the Julian accompt taken proleptically) fall upon Tuesday the twentieth of May: according to the Gregorian, upon Tuesday the thirtieth of May, in the year of the Julian period, 4247. before the Incarnation 467. years, the fourth year of the 77. Olympiad, at what time Socrates was born.

CHAP. II.
His first Education.

De Gen. Socr [...] PLutarch saith, that as soon as he was born, Sophroniscus his Father consulting the Oracle, was by it advis'd to suffer his Son to do what hee pleas'd, never compelling him to doe what he disliked, nor diverting him from that whereto he was enclined; to give thanks for him by Sacrifice to Iupiter Agoraeus and the Muses; to be no further sollicitous for him, he had one guide of his life within him, better then five hundred masters.

But his Father not observant of the Oracle's direction, apply'd him to his own trade of carving Statues, contrary to his inclina­tion, whereupon Aristoxenus apud Theodoret. de Graec. affect. cur lib. 12. some have argu'd him of disobedience, re­porting that often times, when his Father bad him work, he re­fused, and went away following his own will.

His Father dying, left him (according to Apol. Soc. Libanius) four score minae, which being entrusted with a friend for im­provement, they miscarried. This losse (though it were of all his stock, and he thereby reduc'd to incredible poverty) Socrates past over with silence, but was thereupon necessitated to con­tinue his trade for ordinary subsistence. Laert. This Suidas intimates when he saith he was first a Statuary. Lib. 9. Duris, In nub. Pausanias, and the * Scholiast of Ar [...]stophanes affirm three statues of the Graces cloathed, (for so they were most antiently made, not naked) set up before the entrance into the Tower at Athens, were his work. Pausanias implieth as much of a statue of Mercury in the same place; which 36. 5. Pliny seems not to have understood, who saith, they were made by a certain person named Socrates, but not the painter. Hence Timon,

From these the fluent statuary came
Honour'd through Greece, who did against the name
Of Oratour abusiv [...]y declaim.

But being naturally averse from this profession, [...]ee onely follow'd it when necessity enforc'd him: Aristoxenus saith, he wrought for money, and laid up what he got till it came to a little stock, which being spent, hee betook himself again to the same course.

These intermissions of his Trade were bestowed upon Phi­losophy; whereunto he was naturally addicted, which being observed by Crito a rich Philosopher of Athens, Laert. hee took him from his shop, being much in love with his candor and ingenu­ity, and instructed, or rather gave him the means▪ to be in­structed by others; taking Laert. vit. Crit. so much care of him, that he never [Page 4] suffer'd him to want necessaries. And though his poverty were at first so great as to be brought by AElian. var. hist. 2. Plut. de util. virtut. some into a Proverb, yet he became at last, as Plutarch. comparat. vit. Aristid. & Ca­ton. Demetrius affirms, Master of a house, and fourscore minae, which Crito put out to interest: But his mind (saith Apolog. Libanius) was raised far above his fortune, and more to the advantage of his Country; not aiming at wealth, or the acquisition there­of by sordid arts, he considered that of all things which man can call his, the soul is the chief; That he onely is truly happy who purifies that from vice; That the onely means, conducing thereto is wisdom, in pursuit whereof he neglecteth all other waies of profit and pleasure.

CHAP. I.
His Master.

THE first Master of Socrates was Laert. Anaxagoras, whereby a­mongst other circumstances it is demonstrable, that the accompt of Laertius is corrupt, Anaxagoras not dying in the 78. but 88. Olympiad.

Aristoneus saith, that as soon as Anaxagoras left the City, he ap­plyed himself to Cic. Tusc. quaest. 5. Archelaus, which according to Porphyrius was in the 17. year of his age. Laert. Of him he was much belov'd, and travell'd with him to Samos, to Pytho, and to the Istmus.

He was Scholar likewise to Damon, whom Plato calls a most pleasing teacher of Musick, and all other things that he would teach himself, to young men. Damon was Scholar to Agathocles, Master to Pericles, Clinias and others; intimate with Prodicus. He was banish'd by the unjust Plut. Ostracism of the Athenians for his excellence in Musick.

He heard also ( Plat. Men. as he acknowledgeth) Prodicus the Sophist a Cian, whom Eusebius rankes in the 86. Olympiad, contempo­rary with Gorgias, Hippias, and Hippocrates the Physician.

To these adde Diotyma and Aspasia, women excellently learn­ed, the first suppos'd to have been inspir'd with a propheticall spirit. By her hee affirmeth that he was instructed concerning love, by corporeall Beauty to find out that of the soul; of the Angelicall mind; of God. See Plato's Phaedrus, and that long dis­course in his Symposium upon this subject, which Socrates con­fesseth to be owing to her.

Aspasia was a famous Milesian woman, not onely excellent her self in Rhetorick, but brought many Scholers to great per­fection in it, of whom were Pericles the Athenian, and ( Plat. menex. as himself acknowledgeth) Socrates.

Maxim. Tyr. Of Euenus he learn'd Poetry, of Ichomachas, Husbandry, of Plat: Theaetet. Theodorus Geometry.

Schol. A­ristoph in Nub. Aristagoras a Melian, is named likewise as his Master.

Last in his Catalogue is Connus, [...]pist. 9. 22. nobilissimus fidicen[?], as [Page 5] Cice­ro termes him, which art Socrates learn'd of him in his Quintil. 1. 10. old age, Plat. Euthy [...]. for which the boyes derided Connus, and called him the old mans Master.

CHAP. IV.
Of his School, and manner of Teaching.

THat Socrates had a proper School, may be argu'd from Nub. A­ristophanes, who derides some particulars in it, and calls it his Phron [...]ist [...]rium.

Phaedr. Plato and Epist. Socratic. Phaedrus mention as places frequented by him and his Auditors, the Academy, Lycaeum, and a pleasant meadow without the Ci [...]y on the side of the River Ilissus, where grew a very fair plane-t [...]e [...]. Thence according to the fable, Boreas s [...]atch'd away Ori­thia, to whom three farlongs from thence there was a Temple, and another to Diana.

Memor. 1. Xenophon affirms he was continually abroad, that in the morning be visi [...]ed the places of publick walking and exercise; when it was full, the Forum; and the rest of the day he sought out the most populous meetings, where he d [...]sputed [...]penly for every one to hear that would.

He did not onely teach, saith Vtrum. sen. ger. vesp. Plutarch when the benches were pre­par'd, and himself in the Chair, or in set hours of reading and dis [...]ourse, or appointments of walking with his friends, but even when he played, when [...]e eat or drank, when he was in the camp or market, finally when he was in prison, thus he made every place a school of vertue.

His manner of teaching was answerable to his opinion, that the soul praeexistent to the body, in her first separate con­dition, endewed with perfect knowledge, by immersion into matter, became stupified, and in a manner lost, untill awak­ned by discourse from sensible objects; whereby by degrees she recovers her first knowledge, for this reason he taught onely by Irony and Induction: the first Lib. 9. cap. 2. Quintilian defines an absolute dissimulation of the will more apparent then confest, so as in that, the words are different from the words, in this, the sense from the speech, whilest the whole confirmation of the cause, even the whole life seems to carry an Irony, such was the life of Socrates, who was for that reason called [...]; that is, one that personates an un­learned man, and is an admirer of others as wise. De orat. 2. In this Irony (saith Cicero) and dissimulation he far exceeded all men in pleasantnesse & urbanity; it is a very elegant, sweet and facete kind of speech, acute with gravity, accommodated with Rhetorick words, and pleasant speeches; Cicer. Ac [...]d. quast. 4. He detracted from himself in dispute, and attributed more to those hee meant to confute, so that when he said, or thought another thing, he freely used that dissimulation which the Greeks call Irony, which Annius also saith, was in Africanus.

Induction by De invent. 1. Cicero desin'd a manner of disco [...]rse, which gaines the assent of him with whom it is held, to things not doubtfull, by which [Page 6] assents it causeth that he y [...]eld to a doubtfull thing, by reason of the like­nesse it hath to those things whereunto he assented: this kind of speech Socrates most used, because he would not himselfe use any argument of perswasion, but rather chose to work something out of that which he granted him with whom he disputed, which he, by reason of that which he already yeelded unto, must necessarily approve; of which he gives a large example in Plato's Plat. Lach. Meno. Thus, whosoever disputed with him of what subject soever ( Liban. Apol. his end being only to promote vertue) was at last brought round about to give an account of his life past and present, where­into being once entered, he never gave him over till he had sufficiently examined those things, and never let them go ( Plat. Euthy­phr. Proteus like) till they came at last to themselves.

For this reason [...]lat. Theaetet. Plutarch. quaest. Platon. 1. he used to say, his skill had some affinity with that of his mother, he being like a Midwife, though bar­ren (as he modestly affirms) in himselfe, endeavoured with a particular gift in assisting others, to bring forth what they had within themselves; Schol. Aristoph. in nub. p. 129. and this was one reason why he refused to take mony, affirming, that he knew nothing himselfe, and that Plat. Apol. he was never Master to any.

These disputes of Socrates were committed to writing by his Schollers, wherein Laert. vit. Xenoph. Xenophon gave example to the rest, in do­ing it first, as also with most punctualnesse, as Plato with most liberty, intermixing so much of his own, as it is not easie to distinguish the Master from the Scholar; Laert. vit. [...]lat. whence Socrates hea­ring him recite his Lysis, said, how many things doth this young man feign of me? And Epist. ad Aeschin. Xenophon denying Socrates ever disputed of heaven, or of naturall causes, or the other disciplines which the Greeks call [...] saith, they, who ascribe such disserta [...]ions to him, lye falsely, wherein (as 14. 3. Agellius observes) he intends Plato, in whose books Socrates discourseth of Naturall Philosophy, Musick, and Geome­try.

CHAP. V.
Of his Philosophy.

POrphyrius (who was so abusive, as Histor. eccles. 10. 36. Nicephorus observes, that hetraduced Socrates with no lesse bitternesse, then as if he endeavoured to outdoe his accusers, Anytus and Melitus) af­firmes; Theodoret. He was ingenious in nothing, unlearned in all, scarce able to write, which when upon any occasion he did, it was to derision, and that he could read no better then a stammering schoole-boy: To which we shall oppose these Authorities: Xenophon who attests he was excellent in all kinds of learning, instanceth in Arithmetick, Geometry, and Astrology; Plato, in Naturall Philosophy; Id [...] ­meneus, in Rhetorick; Laertius, in Medicine: In a word, Cicero averres, that by the testimony of learned men, and the judgment of all [Page 7] Greece, as well in wisdome, acutenesse, politenesse, and sultlety, as in eloquence, [...]a [...]ietie, and copiousnesse, to wha soever part he gave himselfe, he was without exception Prince of all.

Having searched into all kinds of Science, he observed these inconveniences and imperfections: Xen. mem. 1. pag. 710. First, That it was impro­per to leave those affaires which concern mankind, to enquire into things without us. Secondly, That these things are above the reach of man, whence are occasioned all disputes and op­positions, some acknowledging no God, others worshipping stocks and stones; some asserting one simple being, others in­finite; some that all things are moved, others, that all things are immovable. And Thirdly, that these things, if attained, could not be practised, for he who contemplating divine myste­ries, enquires by what necessity things were made, cannot himselfe make any thing, or upon occasion produce winds, wa­ters, seasons, or the like.

Thus esteeming speculative knowledge as far only as it con­duceth to practice, he cut off in all sciences what he concei­ved of least use: Xenoph. mem. 4. In Arithmetick, he approved only as much as was necessary ( Deleg. Plato instanceth in Merchandise and Tacticks) but to proceed to uselesse operations he disallowed. In Geome­try he allowed that part which teacheth measuring, as no lesse easie then usefull; but to proceed to infinite propositions and demonstrations he disallowed, as wholly unprofitable. In Astrology he approved the knowledge of the Starres, and obser­vation of the night, months, and seasons, as being easily learn­ed, and very beneficiall in Navigation, and to those who hunt by night; but to examine the difference of sphears, distance of starres from the earth, and their circles, he disswaded as uselesse.

Laert. Finally, noting how little ad [...]ant [...]ge speculation brought to the life and conversation of mankind, he reduced [...]er to action. He first, saith Acad. quoest. 1. Cicero, called Philosophy away from things involved by nature in se­crecy, wherein, untill his time, all Philosophers had been employed, and brought her to common life, to enquire of [...]ertues and [...]ices, good and evill.

Man, who was the sole subject of his Philosophy, having a twofold relation of divine speculation, and human conversa­tion, his Doctrines were in the former respect Metaphysicall, in the latter Morall.

Sect. 1. Metaphysicks.

His Metaphysicall opinions are thus collected and abridged out of Plato, Xenophon, Plutarch, and others:

‘Philosophy is the way to true happinesse, the offices where­of are two, [...]lat. Phaed. to contemplate God, and to abstract the soul from corporeall sense.’

‘There are three principles of all things, God, matter, and Ideas, Plutarch. plac. phil. 1. 3. God is the universall intellect, matter the first subject of generation and corruption; Idea an incorporeall substance, the intellect of God; God the intellect of the world.’

‘God is one [...]; Plat. Phaed. per­fect in himselfe, giving the being, and well being of every creature; what he is (saith he) I know not, what he is not I know.’

Xen. memor. 1. That ‘God, not chance, made the world, and all creatures, is demonstrable from the reasonable disposition of their parts, as well for use as defence, from their care to preserve themselves, and continue their species, that he particularly regards man in his body, from the excellent uprigh [...] form thereof, from the gift of speech, from allowance [...] in his soule, from the excellency thereof above others; in both for divinations, predicting dan­gers; that he regards particulars, from his care of the whole species; that he will reward such as please him, and punish such as displease him from his power to do it, from the belief he hath imprinted in a man that he will do it; profest by the most wise and civilized Cities and ages; that he at once seeth all things, from the instances of the eye, which at once over-runs many miles; and of the mind, which at once considereth things done in the most distant places. Finally, that he is such, and so great, as that he at once sees all, hears all, is every where, and orders all.’ This is the sum of his discourse with Aristodemus, to which we may annex what is cited under his name (if not mistaken) by Stobaeus,

Care, if by care ought may effected be,
If not, why ca [...]'st thou, when God cares for thee?

Xen. mem [...]r. 1: page 711. He held, that ‘the Gods knew all things, said, done, or silently desired.’

Xen. memor. 4. That ‘God takes care of all creatures, is demonstrable from the benefits he gives them of light, water, and fire, sea­sonable production of fruits of the earth; that he hath parti­cular care of man, from the nourishment of all plants and creatures for mans service, from their subjection to man, [Page 9] though they excused him never so much in strength, from the variety of mans sense, accommodated to the variety of objects, for necessity, use, and pleasure; from reason, where­by he discoursed through reminiscence, from sensible ob­jects, from speech, whereby he communicates all that he knows, gives lawes, & governs states; that God, notwithstan­ding he is invisible, hath a being from the instances of his Ministers, invisible also, as thunder and wind, from the soule of man which hath something with the divine nature in go­verning those that cannot see it.’ This is the effect of his dis­course with E [...]thid [...]mus.

‘The Soule is immortall, Schol. Aristoph. in nub. p. 128. for what is alwaies moveable is immortall; but that which moveth another, or is moved by an other, hath a cessation of motion and life.’

‘The soule is praeexistent to the body, endued with know­ledge of eternall Ideas, which in her union to the body she loseth, as stupisied, untill awakened by discourse from sen­sible objects. Thus is all her learning only reminiscence, a re­covery of her first knowledge.’

‘The body being compounded is dissolved by death, Plat. Phaed. the soule being simple, passeth into another life, incapable of corruption.’

‘The soules of men are divine, to whom, when they go out of the body, Cic. de amicit. the way of their return to heaven is open, which to the best and most just is the most expedite.’

‘The soules of the good after death, Plat. Phaed. are in a happy estate, united to God in a blessed inaccessible place; the bad, in con­venient places, suffer condign punishment; but to define what those places are, is hominis [...]; whence being demanded what things were in the other world, Stob. Eth. 269. he answe­red, neither was I ever there, nor ever did I speak with any that came from thence.’

Sect. 2. Ethicks.

HIs moralls, consider a man either as a single person, or as the father of a family, or as a member of the common­wealth; In the first respect are his Ethicks, wherein such sen­tences as have been preserved by Xenophon, Diogenes Laertius, Stobaeus, and others, are thus collected.

Of vertue and vice.

HE exhorted his friends to ‘Endeavour to be the most wise and beneficiall, Xen: mem. 1: p. 720. because, what wants reason, wants respect, as the bodies of dead friends, and hair, nailes, and the like, which are cut off and cast away.’

[Page 10] ‘To be employed is good and beneficiall, to be idle hurtfull and evill: Xen mem. 1. p. 720. they that do good are imployed, they that spend their time in vain recreations are idle.’

‘He that hath most advantage by gifts of nature, Xen. mem. 3. p. 778. as well as he that hath least, must learn and meditate on those things wherein he would be excellent.’

‘He only is idle who might be better imployed. Xen. mem. 3. p. 779.

‘To do good, Xen. mem. 3. p. 78. is the best course of life, therein fortune hath share.’

‘They are best, Xen. mem. 3. p. 780. and best pleasing to God, who do any thing, with any art or calling; who followeth none, is uselesse to the publick, and hated of God.’

Clem. Alex. Strom. 2. 417. He taught every where, ‘that a just man and a happy were all one,’ and used ‘to curse him who first by opinion divided honesty and profit’ ( Cicer. de. offic. 3. & de leg. 1. which are coherent by Na­ture) as having done an impious act, for they are truly wicked who separate profitable and just, which depends on law. The Stoicks have followed him so far, that whatsoever is honest, the same they esteem profitable.

He asked Memnon, a Thessalian, who thought himselfe ve­ry learned, Plut. de. amicor. multit. p. 93. and that he had reached (as Empedocles saith) the top of wisdome, ‘what is vertue’? He answered readily and boldly, that ‘there is one vertue of a child,’ another of an old ‘Man, one of a Man, another of a Woman, one of a Magi­strate, another of a private Person, one of a Master, another of a Servant.’ Very good, replies Socra [...]es: I ask for one vertue, and you give us a whole swarm; truly conceiving, that he knew not one vertue, who named so many.

Being demanded by Gorgias ‘If he accounted not the great King of Persia happy? Plut. de lib. educ. I know not, answered he, how he is furnished with learning and vertue: as conceiving that true happinesse consisteth in these two, not in the frail gifts of for­tune.’

Euripides in his Auge saying of vertue; Laert. ‘It is best carelessely to part with these; he rose up and went away, saying, It was ridiculous to seek a lost servant, or to suffer vertue so to go away. La [...]rt.

He said, ‘he wondered at those who carve Images of stone, that they take such care to make stones resemble men, Laert. whilst they neglect, Laert. and suffer themselves to resemble stones.’

He advised ‘young men to behold themselves every day in a glass, What [...] means, is explained by Aristotle, polit. 5. 3. & physic. 5. 4. that if they were beautifull, they might study to deserve it; if deformed, to supply or hide it by learning.’

He said, ‘to begin well is not a small thing, Clem. Alex. strom. 5. but depen­ding on a small moment.’

He said, ‘vertue was the beautie, vice the deformity of the soul.’

[Page 11] He said, Nonn in Greg. Stelicut. ‘outward beauty was a sign of inward beauty, and therefore chose such Auditors.’

‘In that life of man as in an Image every part ought be beautifull. Stob. Ech. serm. 1.

‘Incense to God, praise is due to good men. Stob. 1.

‘Who are undeservedly accused ought to be defended, Stob. 1. who excell others in any good quality to be praised,’

‘A Horse is not known to be good by his furniture, Stob. 1: but qualities, a man by his mind, not wealth.’

‘It is not possible to cover fire with a garment, Stob. 37. sinne with time.’

Being demanded who live without pe [...]turbation? hee answered, Stob. 46. th [...]y who are conscious to themselves of no ill.

To one who demanded what Nobility is, Stob. 218. he answered, a good temper of soul and body.

Of affections, Love, Envy, Grief, Hope, &c.

THat ‘two brothers God meant should be more helpfull to each other then two hands, Xenep. mem. 2. feet, eyes, or whatsoever nature hath formed; doubtlesse because if they love, they may great distance mutually help one another is the scope of his discourse with Chaeracrates.

That ‘all things are good and fair to those things where with they agree, Xen. mem. 3. but ill and deformed in respect of those things with which they agree not, is the conclusion of his se­cond discourse with Aristippus.

‘Envy is a grief, not at the adversity of friends, Xen. mem. 3. nor the prosperity of Enemies, but at the prosperity of friends; for many are so foolishly enclined as to maligne those in good fortune, whom in misfortune they pittied.’

‘A ship ought not to trust to one Anchor, Stob 1. nor life to one hope.’

‘To ground hopes on an ill opinion is to trust a ship to a slight anchor. Stob. 16.

‘The beauty of fame is blasted by envy as by a sicknesse. Stob. 139.

‘Many adorn the tombes of t [...]ose, whom living, they perse­cuted with envy. Stob. 139.

‘Envy is the saw of the soul. Stob. 139.

‘Nothing is pleasant or unpleasant by nature but by custom. Stob. 144.

‘Unseasonable love is like hate. Stob. 215.

Being demanded, ‘what is grievous to the good, he answe­red, the prosperity of the wicked. Stob. 240.

Being demanded ‘how a man might live without trouble, Stob. 240. he answered, it was not possible but that he who lives in a City or a Family must sometimes be afflicted.’

[Page 12] ‘Wicked hopes like ill guides deceive a man and lead him into sin. Stob. 258.

‘A woman cannot conceive without a man, Stob. 261. nor a good hope produce any benefit without labour.’

‘Winter had need of garments, Stob. 269. old age of disingagement from grief.’

‘In life as in a Theater, Stob. 892. wee should continue so long as the sight of things, and actions of life seem delightfull.’

‘The mad should be bound, Xen. mem. 1. p. 7. 9. the ignorant instructed.’

That ‘we should endeavour to shun the censorious, Xen. men. 2. and to apply our selves to such as are candid, that wee should un­dertake onely such things as we can perform, and decline such as we cannot; that whensoever we undertake any thing, we should employ therein our utmost study and en­deavour, is the sum of his advise to Eutherus.

He said, Xen. mem. 3. ‘the office of a wise man is to discern what is good and honest, and to shun that which is dishonest.’

‘They who know what they ought to do, Xen. mem. 3. and do it not, are not wise and temperate, but fooles and stupid.’

‘Justice and every other virtue is wisdom. Xen. mem. 3.

‘To be ignorant of our selves, Xen. mem. 3. to seem to know those things wherof we are ignorant, is next to madnesse.’

That ‘a pious person is rightly defined, Xen. mem. 4. such a one as knows what is lawfull as to the gods; a just, he that knowes what is lawfull as to men; that a man is wise as far as he knows; that what is profitable is fair to that whereto it is profitable; that they who know how to use terrible things and dangerous are valiant, the contrary timerous, is the sum of his discourse with Euthydamus.

He conceived ‘the onely wisdom of man to consist in not thinking he understands those things which he doth not understand. Cicer.

To one that complained he had not benefited himself by travell, Senec. Epist. 1. 103 and not without reason saith he, because thou didest travell with thy self.

He affirmed ‘there is but one good thing, Laert. knowledge; one ill, ignorance; but that riches and nobility had nothing in them of worth, but on the contrary all evills.’

‘When a wise man openeth his mouth the virtues of his are manifested as Images in a Temple. Stob. 1.

‘In navigation wee ought to be guided by the Pilot; Stob. 28. & 42. in the course of life by those of better judgement.’

Being demanded what wisdom was, Stob. 28. he answered, the com­posure of the Soul, being demanded who were wise, they saith he, who not easily erre.

‘The souls reason augmenteth it self as in a play, Stob. 28. the wisest [Page 13] not the richest ought to bear the prize.’

‘Fugitives fear though not pursued, Stob. 32. fooles though not in adversity are troubled.’

Seeing a young man rich and unlearned, a Stob. 31. behold (saith he) golden slave.

‘The luxurious is hardly cured in sicknesse, Stob. 32. the fool in ad­versity.’

‘The coward useth armes against himself, Stob. 32. the fool money.’

Ac [...]illes armour sits not Thersiles, Stob. 32. nor the good habits of the soul a fool.’

‘Be not forward in speech, Stob. 87. for many times the tongue hath cut off the head.’

‘In war, steel is better then gold, Stob. 211. in life, wisdom excelleth wealth.’

Of Piety and Obedience.

THat the ‘greatest of vices is ingratitude, Xen. mom. 2. of obligations that to Parents, that a disobedient Son the Gods will not blesse: nor men love as doubting his return of either, knowing he doth it not where so much is due; is the sum of his discourse with Apiles

‘Our prayers should be for blessings in generall, Xen. mem. 1. 722. 4. 804. for God knows best what is good for us, our offerings proportioned to our abilities, for he considers integrity, not munificence.’

He said (with the Pythian Oracle) that ‘the Gods are to be worshipped according to the Law of the City where a man lives, Xen. mem. 1. 722. they who do otherwise, he thought superstitious and vain.’

‘The best way of worshipping God, Xen. mem. 4. 803. is to do what he com­mands.’

‘Superstition is obedient to pride as its parent. Stob. 43.

‘A harsh Father like a severe law, must not withstanding be obeyed. Stob. 193.

‘The reproof of a Father is a kind remedy; Stob. 201. it brings more ease then pain.’

Of fortitude and imbecillity.

THat ‘a man ought to inure himself to voluntary labour & sufferance, Xen. mem. 1. so as what shall be imposed by necessity may appear in him not compulsive but free, that soft waies of li­ving, in pleasures beget no good constitution of body, nor knowledge of the mind; That tolerance raiseth us to high attempts is the effect of his discourse with Aristip­pus.

[Page 14] To one who was fearfull to go so far on foot as Olympia, Xen. mem. 3. he de­monstrated (to make the journey seem easie) that it was no more then his daily walk within doors, if extended at length, would ea­sily reach.

Xen. mem. 3. One that complained he was weary of a journey, ‘he reproved hi [...] for being more weary then his servant that fol­lowed him laden.’

He said, Plut. consol. ad Apollon. ‘death resembled either a deep sleep, or a long jour­ney out of our Native Country, or an absolute annihilation of soul and body, examining all which he affirmed, death to be in none of those respects evill; as to the first, saith Plutarch, it is not ill with those that sleep, and wee esteem that sleep sweetest which is deepest; as if we look on it as a journey, it is rather a blessing, for thereby we are freed from the slavery and affections of the flesh which possesse and infatuate the mind; in the last respect, it makes us insensible of ill and pain, as well as of good and pleasure.’

‘A statue stands firm on its base, Stob. 1. & 296. a vertuous man on firm re­solutions.’

‘Voluntary labours are delighted with assurance of ease; Stob. 5. idlenesse, and transitory pleasures beget neither a good con­stitution of body, nor any good habit in the Soule.’

Stob. 48. Being demanded ‘what is strength? he answered, the motion of the soul with the body.’

‘Seeing the gates of Corinth strongly barr'd, Stob. 49. he asked,’ ‘dwell women here?’

‘An honest death, Stob. 269. is better then a dishonest life.’

He used to say, ‘liberty is sister to sloth, Aelian. var. hist. instancing in the Indians and Persians, both lazy; the Phrygians and Lydians very industrious, as being under servitude.’

Of Temperance, Continence, and Contentednesse.

HE advised ‘to shun all occasions of incontinence, Xen. mem. 1. affirm­ing that such as conversed much with fair women could not easily be continent.’

‘That’ ‘the sight and kisses of the fair, Xen. mem. 1. infuse a poison more dangerous then that of Scorpions and Spiders, is the sum of his discourse to Xenophon and Critobulus.

That ‘a free man ought not to entertain a servant addicted to pleasures, that he which is slave to pleasures, Xen. mem. 1. should pray to the gods for better Masters, is the conclusion of his dis­course de continentia.

That ‘happinesse consists not in luxury and pride, Xen. mem. 1. that to want nothing is divine, to want the least next to divine, is the the conclusion of his discourse with Antipho.

[Page 15] ‘He advised such as could not easily abstain at feasts, Xen. mem. 3. to take heed of such things as perswade those that are not hungry to eat, and those that are not thirsty to drink, for they de­stroyed the appetite, the head, and the soul. He used to say merrily,’ Circ [...] turned men into Swine, by feasting them with such meats, but that ulysses, partly through Minerva's advice, partly through his own temperance, refraining from such things, remained unchanged.’

That ‘health of body ought diligently to be preserved, Xen. mem. 3. as that whereon all knowledge of the soule dependes. Is the summe of his discourse with Epigenes.

He advised one that complained, Xen. mem. 3. he took no delight in his meat, ‘to refrain from eating, whereby his diet would become more pleasant, cheap, and wholesome.’

In the word [...] (to feast) the particle [...] implies, Xen. mem. 3. ‘that we should eat only such things as will not hurt the mind nor the body, and are easie to be gotten.’

That ‘only temperate persons, Xen. mem. 4. that discern and choose the best things, refraining from the worst; that by temperance men become the most excellent, and most happy, sittest for discourse: is the summe of his discourse with Euthidemus.

Hearing one of his friends say, ‘this Town is exceeding deer, Plut. de anim. tranquill. Chian wine costs a Mina, purple three, a pint of honey five Denaries; he carried him to the Meal-men, hear, saith he, a pint is sold for an obolus; it is cheap living in this Town: then to those that sold Olives, a Chaenix two far­things; thence to the frippery, a Suit ten Drachmes: things are cheap in this Town.’

He said, ‘the hungry wanted no sauce, Laert. the thirsty no choice of wines.’

He commended ‘quiet and leasure above all things. Laert.

He said, ‘they who buy early fruits at dear rates, Laert. believe they will not come in their due season.’

Being asked what was a young mans vertue? he answered, Laert. ‘to do nothing too much.’

Seeing one eate broth very greedily, he said, Laert. ‘Which of you here present useth bread for broth, and broth for bread?’

‘Of which, see more at large, Xenophon his Memorab. Lib.

One saying, that it was a great matter to abstain from what a man desires, he answered, Aelian. var. hist. 9. ‘but it is much a greater not to desire at all.’

‘A cleer fire becomes the chimney, serenity the mind. Stob. 28.

He said, Stob. 37. ‘We ought not to seek pleasures in others, but in our selves, the body being predisposed according as it ought.’

He said, Stob. 37. ‘It is the property of God to need nothing, to need least, nighest to God.’

[Page 16] Being demanded from what things we ought to refrain most, Stob. 37. he answered, ‘from sordid unjust pleasures.’

‘Contentednesse is like a short and pleasant way, Stob. 37. it hath much delight, little toile.’

‘He that would see vertue as his Country, must passe by pleasures, as Syrens. Stob. 37.

Being demanded whom he thought richest, he answered, Stob. 40. ‘him who is contented with least; for content is the riches of Nature.’

Being demanded what continence is, he answered, Stob. 84. ‘govern­ment of corporeall pleasures.’

He said, Stob. 8 ‘the wicked live to eat, but the good eat to live.’

‘When a woman saith she loveth thee, Stob. 183. take heed of those words, more then when she revileth thee.’

Of Liberality, Prodigality, and Covetousnesse.

HE conceived, Xen. mem. 1. that ‘they who took mony of any, owned them for their Masters in the meanest degree of servi­tude.’

That ‘wisdome is prostituted as well as beauty, Xen. mem. 1. by taking mony for it; that he who meets with an ingenious person, ought to acquaint him with all the good he can gratis, where­by he acquires a friend, and doth the part of a good member of the common-wealth; is the summe of his second discourse with Antipho.

He said, D. Basil hom. 24. de legand. lib gentil. if a rich man be proud of his wealth, that ‘he could not praise him, till he knew how he would employ it.’

‘None can safely manage a horse without a bit, Stob. 28. nor riches without reason.’

He compared ‘covetous persons to birds, Stob. 54. one devoures what ever it meets till it choakes it selfe, the rest falling upon what the first left, are one after another choaked also.’

‘The wealth of covetous persons is like the Sun after he is set, Stob. 55. delights none.’

‘He that gives to a rich man throwes water into the Sea. Stob. 77.

‘The life of a covetous person is like the feasts made for the dead, Stob. 78. he hath all, but enjoyes nothing.’

He compared ‘the wealth of prodigalls to fig-trees, Stob. 230. grow­ing on a precipice, for these, none are the better, but Kites, and Crowes; for those only harlots and flatterers.’

Being demanded who were covetous, he answered, Stob. 230. ‘such as seek after sordid gain, and neglect their necessary friends.’

‘Wine changeth with the Vessell, Stob. 231. riches follow the man­ners of the owner.’

Of Magnanimity and Pride.

TO one angry for having saluted a man that returned not his salutations; Xen. mem. 1. ‘It is ridiculous, saith he, if you are not angry with every one you meet of worse shape or for [...] then your self, to be angry with any for having leste manners.’

‘Pride like an ill potter or statuary represents the forms of things inverted. Stob. 43.

‘Wind puffes up empty bladders, opinion fooles. Stob. 43.

‘To be exalted with good fortune, is to runne in a slippe­ry way. Stob. 246.

Of Patience.

‘THere is lesse danger in drinking intemperately of trou­bled water, Plut. de his qui sero a num. Fun. then with a troubled mind full of wrath, before it be allayed and purified to satisfie thy anger in the punishment of a kinsman or countryman.’

‘If every one should bring his misfortunes into a publick stock to be shar'd alike amongst all men, Plut. de con­sol. ad Apollon. the greater part of those that now complain so much, would be contented and glad to keep their own.’

‘It is all one if a man being overcome in any gymnick sports should sue his adversary, Stob. 256. as for a man over master'd by Fortune to accuse her; not knowing upon what conditi­ons we entered into the contests of life.’

Of Veracity and Flattery.

‘THere is no better way to glory then to endeavour to be good, Xen. memor. 1. as well as to seem such.’

‘The kindnesse of flatterers is chased away by adversity. Stob. 64.

‘Hunters take hares with hounds, Stob. 64. many take fooles with their own praises.’

‘Wolves resemble dogs, Stob. 64. and flatterers friends, but their aimes are quite contrary.’

‘Flattery is like a painted armour, only for show, not use. Stob. 64.

‘Think not those faithfull who praise all thy words and actions, Stob. 69. but those who reprove thy faults.’

‘Suffer not a talker and slanderer, Stob. 71. for he tells not thee any thing out of good will; but as he discourseth the secrets of others, so will he thine to others.’

‘Good men must let the world see that their manners are more firme then an oath. Stob. 114.

Of Vrbanity and Conversation.

‘A Little Hall will serve to dance in, Plut. de sanit­tuend. and every place and posture to speak.’

‘Wind kindles fire, Stob. 37. conversation Love.’

‘Freedome of discourse like the seasons of the year, Stob. 67. is best in its proper time.’

‘Its arrogance to speak all, Stob. 134. and to be unwilling to hear any thing.’

‘Converse at distance, Stob. 296. and softly with those that are in Authority.’

Of Iustice.

THat ‘the Gods prescribe just things by law, Xen. mem. 4. and that just and lawfull is to them the same thing, is the summe of his discourse with Hippias.

‘They who convert goods ill gotten to good uses in a com­mon-wealth, Stob. 52. do like those who make religious use of sacri­ledge.’

Of Friendship.

THat ‘a discreet vertuous friend is of all possessions the most fertile, Xen. mem. 2. and ought chiefly to be regarded, is the scope of his discourse, de amici [...]ia.

That ‘every man should examine himselfe of what value he is to his friend, Xen. mem. 2. and endeavour to be of the most worth he can to him, is the effect of his discourse with Antis [...]henes:

That ‘wicked men cannot be friends, Xen. mem. 2. either amongst themselves, or with the good: That the way to pro­cure friends is, first, to endeavour to be good, wherein he would seem good; that all vertues may be augmented by study and learning, is the scope of his discourse with Critobu­lus.

That ‘we ought to our utmost abilities to relieve the ne­cessities of our friends, Xen. mem. 2. is the effect of his discourse with A­ristarchus.

He said, Plut. de srat. amore. ‘he had rather have Darius to his friend, then his Daricks, a coyne so named from him.’

He wondered that ‘every man kept an inventory of his goods, Laert. none of his friends.’

‘They who violate friendship, Stob. 213. though they escape the pu­nishment of their friends, shall not escape the vengeance of God.’

‘They who forsake their own brethren to seek out other [Page 17] friends are like those who let their own grounds lie fallow to till anothers. Stob. 213.

‘Fear not a friend in adversity. Stob. 213.

‘We esteem not that corn best which growes on the fairest ground, Stob. 218. but that which nourisheth best, nor him a good per­so [...] or friend who is of highest birth, but most noble in quali­ties.’

‘Physicians must relieve the sick, Stob. 258. friends the afflicted.’

‘Its pleasant to grow old with a good friend and sound sense. Stob. 263.

Sect. 3. Oeconomicks.

IN the second respect are his Oeconomicks, which he learned of Ischomachus, by Xenophon expresly delivered in a treatise up­on that subject, to which adde these few sentences.

So ‘contrive the building of your house, Xen. mem. 3. as that those parts which are towards the South may be highest, that the winter Sun be not excluded; those towards the North lowest; that they may be lesse subject to wind; In fine, so order it, that a man may live in every quarter thereof with most delight and safety: Pictures and colours take away more pleasantness then they afford.’

To one who beat his servant for gluttonous, Xen. mem. 3. p. 7. 88. see more there. covetous, and idle, he said, did you at any time consider whether you deserve not more to be beaten your self? Laert.

To one that asked his advice about taking a wife, Stob 183. whether you do or do no: saith he, you will [...]pent it.

To others that asked his opinion concerning marriage, Stob. 183. hee said, As fishes in a net would fain get out, and those without wo [...]ld get in, take heed young men it be not so with you.

Men must o [...]y the lawes of their Country, Stob. 193. wives their husbands.

Sect. 4. Politicks.

IN the 3d. respect are his politicks, w ch. Hesychius Illus [...]ius makes to be the same which Plato hath delivered under this name, where you may have them though disguised with the language and additions of Plato, to which may be annexed those senten­ces of his in that kind out of Xenophon, Stobaeus, and others.

‘They who cannot upon occasion be usefull either to an Ar­my, Xen. mem. [...]. a City, or a Common-wealth; yet have confidence of themselves, ought, though never so rich, to be under re­straint.’

Antipho demanding ‘how hee might make others skilfull in Politicks whilest himself medled not therein, Xen. mem. 1. although hee knew that he could manage them, which way saith he; Antipho, [Page 19] I do most act the businesse of the Common-wealth, if I practise it onely, or if I endeavour to make many able to act therein.’

‘That place is fittest for Temples and Altars which is most open, Xen. mem. 3. and yet retired; for it is fitting that they who pray see, and no lesse fitting that they come thither pure.’

‘They are not Kings, Xen. mem. 3. 779. who are in possession of a Throne, or come unjustly by it, but they who know how to govern.’

‘A King is a ruler of willing Subjects according to the Lawes, Xenop. mem. 4. 813. a Tyrant is a ruler of subjects against their will, not according to the Lawes, but arbitrary; an Aristocracy is that govern­ment wherein the Magistrates are.’

‘The offices of a good Citizen are in peace to enrich the Common-wealth, Xen. mem. 4. in War to subdue the Enemies thereof, in Embassy to make friends of foes, insedition to appease the people by eloquence.’

‘Of common people he said, Laert. they were as if a man should ex­cept against one piece of bad money, and except a great sum of the same.’

He said, Clem. Alex. strom. 4. ‘the Law was not made for the good.’

‘Deserving persons ought to bee sharers in the good fortunes of the Common-wealth. Stob. 141.

Being demanded what City is strongest? Stob. 141. he said, that which hath good men.

Being demanded what City is best ordered? Stob. 141. he said, that wherein the Magistrates friendly agree.

Being demanded what City is best? Stob. 141. he said, that wherein are propo­sed most rewards for virtue.

Being demanded what City lives best, Stob. 141. he said, that which liveth according to law, and punisheth the unjust.

CHAP. VI.
Of his Daemon.

THat Socrates had an attendant spirit (meant as Plutarch conceives by the Sup. cap. 2. Oracles answer to his Father) which diverted him from dangers, is impugned by Athenaeus, not without much prejudice, which the bitternesse of the discourse betraies, soules that are not candid, and think ill of the best, saith Origen, never refrain from Calumny, seeing that they mock even the Genius of Socrates as a feigned thing. On the contrary, we have the testimony of Plato, Xenophon and Apud. Athe­naeum. [...] Antisthe­nes contemporary with him, confirmed by Laertius, Plu [...]arch, Maximus Tyrius, Dion Chrysostomus, Cicero, Apuleius, by Fathers, Te [...]tullian, Origen, Clemens Alexandrinus and others, whereof a great many instances (as Cicero saith) were collected by Anti­pater: these onely preserv'd by other Authors. De divinat. ib. 1

[Page 20] Theocritus going to consult Euthyphron a Sooth-sayer, Plut. de Gen. Socr. found him with much company walking in the streets, amongst whom were Simias and Socrates, who was very busie, asking him many questions. In the midst of his discourse he maue a suddain stop, and after some pause, turned back and went down another street, calling out to the rest of the company to return and follow him, as being warned by the Daemon. The greater part did so, the rest went forward, on purpose to confute the Daemon, and drew along with them one Charillus that played on the flute; but in the way which was so narrow, as not to give them room to passe by, they were met and overturn'd in the dirt by a great herd of swine; by repetition of which accident, Charillus often afterwards defended the Daemon.

Nor did the advice of this spirituall attendant onely respect the good of Socra [...]es, but extended to such friends as conversed with him, whereof him self gives these instances.

Plato. Theag. Aelian var. hist. 8. 1. Charmides Son of Glauco, going to exercise in the Nemean race, as he was discoursing with Socrates, was by him upon notice of the voice dissuaded from going, to which he answered, that perhaps the voice onely meant that he should not get the victory, but, said he, however I shall advantage myself by exercising at this time, which said, he went to the Games; where he met with some accident, which though it be not re­lated, is acknowledg'd to have iustified the counsell given him by the Daemon.

Tymarchus and Philemon Son of Philemonides having plotted together to murther Nicias, Plat. Theag. Son of Hircoscomander, were at the same time drinking with Socrates. Timarchus with intention to execute what they had determin'd, offer'd to rise from the table, saying to Socra­tes, well Socrates, drink you on, I will but step a little way and re­turn immediately. Rise not said Socrates, ( hearing the Daemon as soon as he spake) for the Daemon hath given me the accustomed sign; whereupon he sate stil, presently after he offer'd again to be gone; Socra­tes hearing the voice withheld him. At last, as Socrates was diverted by something, and did not mind him, he stole away and committed the murther, for which being brought to execution, his last words to his brother Glitomachus were, that he was come to that untimely end for not obeying Socrates.

Another time, seeing his friend Crito's eie ti'd up, Cic. de divinat. 3. he asked him the reason, who answering, that as he walked in the field, one pulling a bough, it gave a jerk back, and hit him in the eye; Then you did not take my advise, replies Socrates, for I call'd you back, making use, as I have accustomed of divine presage.

That it had likewise a great influence upon the soules of those who conversed with him, and liv'd with him, Plat. Theag. he alledgeth as examples Aristides Son of Lysimachus, and Thucydi­des Son of Melissus. The first leaving Socrates to go to the wars, lost, with his company, the habit of learning, which he ac­knowledg'd to have gained, not by any verball instructions, of [Page 22] which he had none from him, but by being neer him, seeing him, and sitting in the same room with him: The second as easily, by the same means attained the same habit.

And not only to particular persons, but to generall affairs did these predictions extend: He foretold some friends the de­feat of the Athenian Army in Sicily, as is attested by Plutarch, and mentioned by himself in Plato, where he gives another fair example, or rather tryall of the truth of the Daemons predicti­ons, speaking of a businesse, whereof the event was at that time doubtfull: Plat. Theag. You will hear, saith he, from many in Sicily, to whom it is known what I foretold concerning the destruction of the Army, and we may now have an experiment if the Daemon speak true. Samionus, son of Calus is gone in an expedition, the sign came to me: he goes with Thrasylus to war against Ephesus and Jonia: my opinion is, that he will either be slain, or at least, in much danger, I greatly fear the whole design. These are his words in Plato, delivered as before, the event of that action, which fell out according to his predicti­on; for Xenoph. hist. Graec. 1. Thrasylus was repulsed, and beaten by the Ephesians, the Athenians put to flight, with the losse of foure hundred men; of which Victory the Ephesians erected two trophies. this was in the twentie one year of the Peloponnesian war.

We have alledg'd the universall consent of Authors, that Socrates had such a spirituall attendant; yet is there some dis­agreement concerning the name, more concerning the nature of it.

It is commonly named his Daemon, by which title, he him­selfe owned it: Plato sometimes calls it his Guardian, Apuleius his God, because (saith Saint De civ. dei. 8. 4. Augustine) the name of Daemon at last grew odious. But we must observe, that he did not account it a God, but sent from God, and in that sence affirmed the signes to come from God, to wit, by mediation of this spirit. This, besides other places we may argue from his first Epistle, where he speaks of the sign it selfe; he useth the word Daemon, when of the advise, whereof that sign was the instrument, he names God. Thus are we to understand these, and all other places of the same nature in Plato, where Socrates speaking of the Daemon saith, if it please God, you shall learn much, and the sign from God did not offer to stay me.

As for the signe or manner of the prediction, Plutarch. de gen. Socr. some affirme it was by sneezing, either of himselfe or others; if any chanced to sneeze standing before him, behind him, or on his right hand, he went immedi­ately about that which he intended; if on the left hand, he refrained or desisted: if he sneezed himselfe before the enterprise, it was applausive, if in the action, disswasive. There needs not much argument to prove this opinion. If this sternutation proceeded either from chance, or his naturall constitution, it could not have that pro­vident supernaturall effect; if it proceeded from some more ex­cellent [Page 23] outward cause, we recurre to the Genius.

Others confine this prescience within the soule of Socrates himself, that he said, his Genius advised him, they interpret it, as we usually say, his mind gave him, or so inclined him: In this sense indeed Daemon is not seldome taken; but this is inconsistent with the description which Socrates gives of a voice and signes, ab exteriore, besides this knowledge is not above humane na­ture.

Plutarch having exploded the opinion of Terpsion concerning sneezing, conjectured first, that it might be some apparition; but at last concludes, that it was his observation of some inar [...]culate unaccustomed sound (or voice) conveighed to him by some extraordinary way, as we see in dreams. This avoids not the inconvenience of the former; if Socrates did first of him­selfe interpret this sound, it is the same with the last opinion, that his soule had a Prophetick inspiration, if by any help, it will come at last to the Genius.

Some conceive it to be one of those spirits which have the particular care of men; which Maximus Tyrius, and Apuleius describe in such manner, that they want only the name of a good Angell.

But there want not those who give it that appellation: De Orig. error. 2. 15. Lactanius having proved that God sends Angells to guard mankind, addes, and Socrates affirmed that there was a Daemon constantly neer him, which kept him company from a child, by whose beck and instruction he guided his life. Eusebius upon these words of the Psalmist, He hath given his Angells charge over thee, In Psal. 91. that they should keep thee in all thy waies. We learn out of Scripture (saith he) that every man hath a Guardian appointed him from above; and Plato doubteth not to write in this manner: All soules having chosen a condition of living, they proceed in order thereunto, being moved by the Daemon, which is proper to every one, and is sent along with them to preserve them in this life, and to perfect those things whereof they have made choice. And immediately after; You may beleeve, saith he, that Socrates meant this, when he often affirmed that he was go­verned by a Daemon. More plainly De perenn. philos. 25. Eugubinus, The Daemon of Socrates, saith he, mentioned so often by Plato ( seeing that Socrates was a good man, and exhor [...]ed all men to vertue, and by the Daemon was alwaies excited to that which was good) may perhaps not unjustly be thought his Angell, as that which appeared to Balaam the Prophet, and diverted him from his wickednesse. Argum. ad Apol. Soc. But Ficinus expresly; If you are not pleased, saith he, speaking of this spirit, to call the familiar guide of a man his spirit, call it, if you please, his good Angell.

The chiefest argument of De anim. pa­gan. 5. 14. Collius, who opposeth this opi­nion, and endeavours to prove it was an evill spirit, is, that the Daemon never disswaded or diverted from vice, but only from outward danger, whereas the contrary is evident enough [Page 24] from the foregoing story of Tim [...]us and Philemon.

True it is, that the advice of the Daemon was alwaies disswa­sive, never, as De divinat. 1. Cicero saith, impulsive, often coercive. Apuleius flatters Socrates with this reason; Socrates, saith he, as being a man absolute and perfect of himselfe, ready in all offices that concerned him, never needed any exhorter, but sometimes a prohibitour, if it hap­pened there were any danger in that which he went about, that being forwarned he might take beed, and decline the undertaking for that time; which afterwards he might reassume, or attempt some other way.

CHAP. VII.
His military Actions.

Eaert. IT is observed by many, that Socrates little affected travell, his life being wholly spent at home, saving when he went out in military service.

In the second year of the eighty sixt Olympiad broke forth a war, the greatest that ever happened amongst the Grecians, betwixt the Lacaedemonians and the Athenians, the occasions and pretexts of it arising from the controversies of the Atheni­ans with the Corinthians, concerning Corcyra, and Polydaea, both which being revolted from the Athenians, to whom they had been tributary, sought for aid from the Lacedaemonians, who sent forces to the relief of Polidaea.

In this war was Socrates thrice personally engaged; first, at the siege of Polidaea, in the year of the Olympiad, against which the Athenians sent one thousand six hundred choice men of armes, under the conduct of Phormis, who besieged it from the Sea by his Gallyes, and on the land side by a wall: amongst these were Socrates and Alcibiades: Laertius saith, they were on the sea side, and that there was no means to come on the land side further. Sympos. Plato, that they served both a-foot, which disagrees not with the other; for there was not any set battle during all the time of the siege, only sallies and skirmishes. Here as Plut. Sympos. Alci­biades his comerade, attests, Socrates outwent all souldiers in har­dinesse; and if at any time, saith he, as it often happens in war, the provisions failed, there was none could bear the want of meat and drink like him, yet on the other side in times of feasting, he only seem'd to enjoy them, and though of himselfe he would not drink, yet being invited, he far out-drank all others, and which is strangest of all, never any man saw him drunk. The excesses of cold in the winter, which in that Country are extraordinary, he as wonderfull endured, when the frost was so sharp, that very few durst go out of their Tents, and those wrapping their legs and thighes in skins and furrs, he went along with them, having no more cloths then those he usually wore: He walked bare footed upon the Ice with lesse tendernesse, then others in shoo [...]s, to the wonder of the soul­diers [Page 25] who thought themselves reproached by his hardinesse. His contem­plative raptu [...]e at the same time was no less worthy admiration; he fell into a deep contemplation one morning, and continued all the while standing in the same posture, at noon it was taken notice of by the souldi­ers, who told it from one to another, that Socrates had stood still in the same place all that morning: In the evening some Ionian souldiers wrapping themselves warm, came, and lay down by him in the open field, to watch if he would continue all night in the same posture, which he did, untill the morning, and assoon as the Sun arose, saluted it, [...] retir'd. Of these kind of raptures Agellius saith he had many. Lib. 2. cap. 1. We must not omit how he behaved himself there in fight; Plut. Symp. Athen. deipnos. citing Antisthe­nes. seeing his friend Alcibiades deeply engaged, and much wounded, he stepped before him, defended him and his armes from the ene­mie, and brought him safely off. Nor was his modesty inferi­our to his love or courage, for whereas after the battle the generalls were to bestow an honourable reward upon him that had fought best, the Judges assigning it to Socrates, he declin'd it, and by his earnest intercession, procur'd that it might be conferred upon Alci [...]iades.

The second action of Socrates was in the first year of the eighty ninth Olympiad at Delium, a Town in Boetia, which the Atheni­ans took. The Boetians (saith Thucydides) led by Pagondas, followed them, & bid them battle, the left wing of the Boetians to the very middle of the Army was overthrown by the Athenians, and fled to the other parts, where they were yet in sight: but the right had the better of the Atheni­ans, and by little and little forced them to give ground, and followed them from the veryfirst. Pagondas, whilst the left wing of his Army was in distresse, sent two companies of horse secretly about the hill, where­by that wing of the Athenians which was victorious, apprehending upon their sudden appearing that they had been a fresh Army, was put into a fright, and the whole Army of the Athenians, now doubly terrified by this accident, and by the Thaebans that continually won ground, and broke their ranks, betook themselves to flight, somefled towards Deli­um and the sea, others the Mountain Parnes, and others other waies, as to each appeared hope of safety. The Boetians, especially their horse, and those Locrians that came in, after the enemy was defeated, followed killing them. Socrates in this engagement behaved himselfe with his accustomed valour (so well, that Apud. Plac [...]n. La [...]hes confesseth, if the rest had fought like him, they had not lost the day) and care of his friends; Strab. lib. 9. for seeing Xenophon unhorsed in the flight, and thrown down on the ground (himselfe likewise having had his horse slain under him, Laert. sought on too) he took him upon his shoulders, and carried him many a fladia, and desended him untill they gave ever the pursuit. And being thus at the losse of the day with other dispersed in flight (a­mongst whom was Laches the Archon, and Alcibiades) Plat. in the constant slownesse of his retreat expressed a courage far above Lache's, frequently looking back and round about, as greedy to be reveng'd of the [Page 26] enemy if any should pursue them; which was the means that brought him off more safely, for they who expresse least fear in thrir retreat, are lesse subject to be assaulted, then such as repose their confidence in flying.

Plut. de dae­mon. Socr. & Socrat. Epist. 1. As they came to a way that was divided into two, Socrates made a stand, and advis'd those that were with him not to take that way which they were going into, along the Mountain Parne, but the other by the way Retiste, for saith he, I heard the Dae­mons voice. The greater part were angry, as if he had trifled at a time so serious; some few were perswaded to go along, amongst whom were Laches and Alcibiades, and got safely home; the rest were met by some horsemen, who returning from the pursuit, fell upon them; they at first resisted, but at last enclosed by the Enemy who exceeded them in number; they gave back, and were in the end opprest, and all killed except one, who by the help of his shield getting away, brought the newes to Athens, and Pyrilampes Son of Antiphon, who being wounded by a Jave­lin, was taken Prisoner; and when hee heard by those that were sent from Athens to Thehes to treat of peace, that Socrates & the rest with him got safe home; he openly profest to the Thebans, that Socrates had often called him and others of his company back, who not following the advice of his Genius were slain.

The last military engagement was the same year at Plat. Apol. Laert. Am­phipolis, Thucyd. 4. which was then taken by Brasidas the Lacedaemonian Generall.

CHAP. IX.
How he carried himself in the Democracy & the Oligarchy.

SOcrates forbore to accept any office in the Common-wealth, (except in his later years that of Senatour) either (as Var. hist. 3. Ae­lian saith) because hee saw the Athenian government, though under the form of a democracy, was yet nearer to a Tyranny or Monarchy, or Plat. Apol. as himself professeth▪ being disswaded by his Genius from medling in publick affairs, which advice was his preservation, being too honest to comply with the injustices of the Common-wealth, and to oppose them was extreamly dangerous, as he found experimentally in that short time.

Plat. Apol. Gorg. He was chosen to the Senate for the Antiochian tribe, wher­unto ( Chap. 1. as we have said) Alopece the Town were he was born be­longed, and Xen. memor. 1. p. 711. in order thereto took the oath which Solon ap­pointed to be given to every Senatour, to give sentence accor­ding to the Lawes, not biassed either by favour, hatred, or any other pretext: In the third year of the 93. Olimpiad ( Plat. Apol. the pre­heminence coming in course to the Antiochian tribe, and So­crates thereupon becoming President of the people,) hee had [Page 27] this occasion of manifesting his constancy. Xenoph. hist. Graec. 1. There happen'd a Sea fight between the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians at Arginusae: The Athenian Commanders were ten; the Lacedae­monians Commander in chief, Callic, atidas; the Lacedaemoni­ans were overthrown, their Adm [...]al sunk; the Athenians went back to Arg [...]uae with the losse of 25 ships, and all the men in them except some few that escaped to land; The ten Com­manders order'd Theramenes and Thrasilulus (Captains of the Galleyes) to look out after the vessells that were shipwrackt, which as they were going to do, a suddain tempest arose and hindred them; Six of these Commanders returned to Athens where they no sooner came, but upon the account they gave of the fight, the Senate committed them to prison; Theramenes was their accuser, who urged that they might be question'd for not relieving those that were lost by shipwrack; The Commanders just [...]y answer'd, that they had given order for their relief, and that Theramenes and Thrasibulus, on whom that charge was imposed, were (if any) to be condemned; but that they would not retort the fault on their accusers, for the Tempest sufficiently excused them. This satisfied the Senate for that time, but at the next feast being the Apaturia, some friends of Theramenes, by his instigation shaving their hair, and putting on mourning apparell, pretending to be kinsmen of those that were drowned, came in that habit to the Senate, and causing the charge against the ten Commanders to be renewed, so much incensed the people, that they by menaces contrary to all law, enforced the Senate to condemn them. Socrates being order'd to write the decree against them, avoided it by pre­tending he could not write; and knew not the form, which oc­casion'd laughter in the Senate (and perhaps that aspersion of Porphyrius, that he was scarce able to write, which when he did, it was to derision) but the true reason is by Athenaeus acknow­ledg'd to be his constant fortitude, in that he would not vio­late the lawes of the Common-wealth contrary to the Oath he had taken, Xenoph. me­mor. 1. to which he took more heed then to the violence wherewith he was threatned; For when the Senate proceeded to their condemnation, he Laert [...]per­haps [...] alone opposed it with his suffrage, whereupon many Oratours prepared to accuse him, and the people cried out with loud clamours, that he might be brought to answer for it: but he chose rather to hazard himself for Law and Justice, then through fear of imprisonment and death to consent to injustice, as the death of these men was afterwards known to be, even to the Athenians themselves: and was soon after punished in Theramenes by the like, wherein Socrates gave the same testimony of his Courage upon this occasion.

Athens after a long war with the Lacedaemonians of 27. years, being taken at last by Lysander, the Lacedaemonian Ge­nerall [Page 28] in the first year of the 94th Olympiad, there grew some debate concerning the alteration of the Government, from a democracy to an Oligarchy; Theramenes stood for the continu­ance of the democracy, but being oveswai'd by the power and threats of Lysander, yielded to the constitution of thirty per­sons, Diod. Sic. lib 14. by title Governours, in effect Tyrants, of which num­ber was Theramenes (whom they took, in regard of his known moderation and equity, to bridle the rapine and avarice of others) Critias, (first a friend, but now a great enemy to So­crates for reproving his love of Euridamus) Charicles and others, whose names are set down by Xenophon, as are also their murders unjust sequestrations of lands, and confiscations of goods; They began with punishment of the worst persons, proceeded to the richest, and ended with the best. Never (saith Seneca) was any City more miserable; 1300. ( Aechines saith 1500.) of the best persons they put to death without any legall trial, nor was their fury thereby asswaged, but more exasperated; That City where was the Areopagus, the most religious Court of Judica­ture, where the Senate and people like the Senate used to assemble, was daily made a sad Colledge of Executioners, an un­happy Court too narrow for the Tyrants without rest from oppression, without hope of liberty or remedy. All fled the City but Socrates, who all this while set not his foot out of the gates; he was continually amongst the people, comforted the lamenting Fa­thers, encourag'd those that despair'd of the state, reproached to the rich, that had lived in fear to lose their wealth, the late re­pentance of their dangerous avarice, and to those that would imitate him, gave great examples, whilst he walked free amidst the thirty oppressours.

Theramenes opposing this cruelty and injustice, was accused by Critias for betraying the trust of the Common-wealth, whereof he acquitted himself to the satisfaction of the Senate; But Critias and his faction fearing he might overthrow the Oli­garchy, seized upon him with a troop of souldiers; Theramenes run to the Altar, but being dragg'd from thence by the officers, he behaved himself like (saith Diodorus) the Disciple of Socrates; the people pittied him, but none of them durst offer to help him, because he was compass'd in by the souldiers, ex­cept Socrates and two of his companions, who ran to him and endeavoured to rescue him out of the hands of the officers; The­ramenes desired them to forbear, telling them that he much loved and commended their kindnesse and virtue, but that it would be the greatest misfortune he could have, if their love to him should occasion their deaths; whereupon Socrates and his com­panions seeing none come in to join with them in his aid, and that the contrary party was too strong for them, gave over: [Page 29] Theramenes was carried to prison, and there (being sentenced to drink hemlock) died.

These outrages of the thirty Tyrants Socrates did not for­bear to censure. Aelian. var. hist. 2. Seeing many eminent persons put to death, and the rich circumvented & betray'd to excessive punishments, he said to Antist­henes, doth it repent thee that we have done nothing in our whole lives great & remarkable, as those Monarchs who are described in Tragedies, Atreus's, Thyestes's Agamemnon's and Aegisthus's? they are in those playes beheaded, teasted with their own flesh, and generally destroyed; Bu [...] no P [...]et was ever so bold and impudent as to bring a hog killed upon the stage.

Laert. To another who murmur'd b [...]cause he was not looked upon since they began to rule, are you sorry for it said he? Hee said likewise, Xenoph. memor. 1. that it were strange if a Neatherd who diminished and impoverished his herd, should not confesse himself an ill Neatherd; but more strange that one who being set over a City, made the Citizens worse, and their number less, should not confesse himself an ill Governour. This came to their know­ledge, whereupon Critias and Charicles sent for him, and forbad him strictly to teach or discourse with any of the young men. Socrates asked them, if in a [...]s of prohibition he might be permitted to question what hee understood n [...]t, which they granting; Then (continues he) I am ready to obey the Lawes, but lest I transgresse them through ignorance, I desire to be informed, whether when you forbid me the act of speaking, this act be to be understood of things spoken rightly or not rightly; if of the first, I must abstain from speaking what is right; if of the second, I must take care to speak nothing but what is right; Hereupon Charicles being displeased, said, Since you understood not that Socrates, we command you what is easier to be understood, that hence forward you speak not at all with any of the young men; To take away all ambiguity replies Socra­tes, that I may not exceed my limitation; let me know expresly at what years you call a man young: so long saith Charicles, as he is uncapa­ble of being Senatour, and bath not attained to the height of his judge­men; you are not to speak with any under thirty; May I not buy, answers Socrates, of any under that age, nor ask them the price of any thing? That you may, saith Charicles, but your custom is to ask questions of things which you know very well; forbear those: and shall I not then, replies Socrates, make answer if anyone ask me where Charicles dwells, or where Critias is? To such questions saith Charicles you may. You must (continues Critias) refrain from the artisicers, whose ears you have sufficiently grated with your impertinent discourse; I must then obstain (saith Socrates) from justice, piety, and the like; Even from the very Neatherds replies Charicles, which unlesse you do, take heed your head come not short home.

This ill will and jealousie w ch they had conceived against So­crates was increased by the secret departure of some friends of his out of the City, which was reported to be done by his con­trivement, to give intelligence to the Thebans: nor was that [Page 30] suspicion without reason, as is manifest by his last Epistle: here­upon they sumon'd him into the Court, where some complaints were brought against him, of which having acquitted himselfe, they (to get a better cause of quarrel against him) gave order to him and four more to go to the Pyraeum, and to apprehend Leon, whom they meant to put to death, that they might possesse his estate: But Socrates refused, adding, that he would never willing­ly assist an unjust act; whereupon Cha [...]icles said, dost thou think Socrates to talk thus peremptorily, and not to suffer? A thousand ills, answered Socrates, but none so grievous as to do unjustly. Charicles made no reply, nor any of the rest; the other foure went for Leon, Socrates directly to his house; but from thence forward, the jealousie they had of him was so much encreased, that Plat. Apol. if their power had not been soon dissolved, they would have gone neer to have taken away his life.

CHAP. XI.
His falling out with the Sophists, and with Anytus.

THe Sophists, Masters of language in those [...]imes, saith Brut: Ci­cero, (whereof were Gorgias of Leontium, Thrasymachus of Chalcedon, Protagoras o [...] Abdera, Prodicus a Cian, Hippias an Elian, and many others) who profest in arrogant words to teach, how an inferiour cause (such was their phrase) might by speaking, be made superiour, Cic. Orator. and used a sweet fluent kind of Rhetorick, argute in sen­tences, loftie in words, sitter for ostentation then pleading, for the Schooles and Academies, rather then the Forum) were so highly esteem'd, that Liban. Apol. wheresoev [...]r they came, they could perswade the young men to forsake all other conversation for theirs. Cie. But. These Socrates opposed, and often by his subtlety of disputing, refelling their principles Liban. Apol. with his accustomed interrogatories, demonstrated, that they were indeed much be­neath the esteem they had gained, [...]hat they themselves understood nothing of that which they undertook to teach others; he withdrew the young men from their empty conversation: These, who till then had been looked upon as Angels for wit and Eloquence, he proved to be vain affecters of words, ignorant of those things which they profest, and had more need to give mony to be taught, then to take (as they used) mony for teaching. The Athenians taken with these reproof's which Socrates gave them, derided them, and excited their children to the study of solid vertue.

Another quarrell Socrates had of long continuance, for it was the occasion of his death, but begun many years before, with Anytus, an Oratour by profession, privately maintained and enriched by Leather-sellers: He had put two of his sons to Socrates to be taught, but not being pleased, that whilst they were in that way, they had not learned so much, as to be able [Page 31] thereby to get their living; he took them from Socrates, and put them to that trade which himselfe was ashamed to own; wherewith Socrates being much displeased in respect of the two youths, whose ruine he presaged, (and truly, for they fell af­terwards into debaucheries which occasion'd it) spared not to reproach Anytus in discoursing to his Schollars, Socratic. Epist. telling them, ‘That the Trade of dressing Leather was not sit to be spoken of amongst young men; for they who benefit themselves by any art, cherish and professe it, as Acumenus Physick, Damon and Connus Musl [...]ck; even Any us whilst his sons were his schol­lars, was not ashamed of that which they learn'd, though it were not sufficient to maintain them by pleading; but for himselfe he gloryed that he walked invisible with Pluto's Helmet, or Giges Ring, concealing from the people the true means of his subsistence, which indeed was by dressing Lea­ther, which was not just, to be ashamed of the trade, and not of the profit; for he ought to owne this, or to disclaim that.’

Anytus (saith Var. hist. Aelian) to answer this reproach, studied all occasions and waies of revenge; but feared the Atheni­ans, doubting if he should accuse Socrates, how they would take it, his name being in high esteem for many respects, chiefly for opposing the Sophists, who neither taught nor knew any solid learning. He Schol. Ari­stoph. adviseth with Melitus, a young man, an Oratour, unknown to Socrates, described by * Plato, with long plain hair, a high nose, and a thin beard, Liban. one that for a drachine might be bought into any thing, by whose coun­sell Aelian. He begins, by making tryall in lesser things, to sound how the At [...]enians would entertain a charge against his life; for to have accused him upon the very first, he conceived unsafe, as well for the reason already mentioned, as lest the friends and followers of Socrates should divert the anger of the Judges upon himselfe, for falsely accusing a person so far from being guilty of any wrong to the State, that he was the only ornament thereof. To this end he subbornes Aristophanes, a Comick Poet, whose only businesse was to raise mirth, to bring Socrates upon the Stage, taxing him with crimes which most men knew him free from, impertinent discourse, making an ill cause by argument seem good, intro­ducing new and strange deities, whilst himselfe believed and reverenced none; hereby to insinuate an ill opinion of him, even into those who most frequented him. Aristophanes taking this Theme, interweaves it with much abusive mirth; the best of the Grecians was his subject, not Cleon the Lace­daemonians, the Thebans, or Pericles himselfe, but a person dear to all the Gods, especially Apollo. At first (by reason of the novelty of the thing, the unusuall personating of Socrates [Page 32] upon the Stage) the Athenians, who expected nothing lesse, were struck with wonder: Then, (being naturally envious apt to detract from the best persons, not only of such as bore office in the common-wealth, but any that were emi­nent for learning or vertue) they begun to be taken with the Clouds, (so was the play named) and cried up the actour that personated Socrates with more applause, then ever any before, giving him with many shouts the victory, and sending word to the Judges that they should set down no name but that of Aristophanes. Socrates came seldome to the Theater, unlesse when Euripides contested with any new Tragaedian, there, or in the Pyraeum, then he went, for he affected the wisdome, goodnesse, and sweetnesse of his verse; sometimes Alcibiades and Critias would invite him to a Comedy, and in a manner compell him; for he was so far from esteeming Comedians, that he contemned them, as lying, abusive, and unprofitable; whereat they were much displeased: These (with other things suggested by Anytus and Melitus) were the ground of Aristophanes his Comaedy, who, it is likely, got a great summe of money by it, they being eager in prosecution of their de­sign, and he prepared by want, and malice to receive their impression: In fine, the play got extraordinary credit, that of Cratinus being verified,’

The Theater was then
Fill'd with malitious men.

‘It being at that time the feast of Bacchus, a multitude of Grecians went to see the play: Socrates being personated on the Stage and often named, (nor was it much the Players should represent him, for the Potters frequently did it upon their stone-jugs) the strangers that were present (not know­ing whom the Comedy abused) raised a humme and whis­per, every one asking who that Socrates was? which he ob­serving (for he came not thither by chance, but because he knew himselfe should be abused in the play, had chosen the most conspicuous seat in the Theater) to put the strangers out of doubt, he rose up, and all the while the play lasted, continued in that posture, ( Aelian. var. hist. 5. laughing) Plut. de edu­cand. lib. One that was pre­sent asked him, if it did not vex him to see himselfe brought upon the Stage?’ Not at all, (answered he) me thinks I am at a feast, where every one enjoyes me. Schol. Aristoph This comedy was first acted when Isarchus was Archon, Cratinus victor in the first year of the eighty ninth Olympiad: Aristophanes being by some reprehen­ded for it, to vindicate himselfe, caused it to be acted again the year following, Amintas being Archon, but with worse order then at first.

[Page 33] Lacrt. Amipsias also (another comick Poet) derided him thus in Tribone.

O Socrates, the best of few, the vainest
Of many men; and art thou come amongst us?
Where is thy gown? did not this great misfortune
Befall thee by the leather-dresser's help.

CHAP. X.
His Triall.

Plat. Apul. Liban. Apol. MAny years past since the first falling out betwixt Socra­tes and Anyt [...]us, during which time one continued open­ly reproving the other, secretly undermining, untill at length Anytus seeing the time sute with his design, procur'd Melitus to prefer a bill against him to the Senate, in these termes.

Melitus Son of Melitus, a Pythean, accuseth Socrates Son of So­phroniscus an Alopecian. Socrates violates the Law, not believing the [...]ities which this City beliveth, but introducing other new Gods. He violates the law likewise in corrupting youth; the punishment death.

This bill being preferr'd upon oath ( Plato See Suidas upon that word. [...]) Crito be­came bound to the Judges for his appearance at the day of tri­all. Liban. Apol. p. 644. Soon after Anytus sent privately to him, desiring him to forbear the mention of his Trade, and assuring him that he would thereupon withdraw his action; but Socrates return'd him answer, that he would never forbear speaking truth as long as he lived, that he would alwaies use the same speeches concerning him; that his accusation was not of force enough to make him refrain from speaking those things which he thought himself before obliged to say.

Xenoph. Apol▪ & memor. 4. The intervall of time betwixt his accusation and triall, he imploi'd in his usual Philosophical exercises, not taking any care to provide his defence, for which being observ'd & questioned by Hermogenes son of Hipponicus, ‘I provide apology enough (saith he) in considering & pursuing the constant course of my life; Hermogenes demanding how that could be? because (saith he) I never did any unjust act, which I conceive the best apologie: but we often see Judges (saith Hermogenes) over­swai'd by Rhetorick, to condemne the innocent and acquit the guilty: the truth is, (replyed Socrates) going about to make my apology, I was twice withheld by the Daemon, whereat Hermogenes wondring, is it strange (continues hee) that God should think it fit for me to dy at this time? hither­to no man hath lived more uprightly, which as it is now my greatest comfort, so it was the greatest delight to my selfe [Page 34] and friends; if I live longer, I know I mustundergoe what is proper to old age, defects of hearing and sight, slownesse to apprehend, aptness to forget, how can I then be pleased to live longer and grow worse: It is likely God in his love to mee hath ordained that I should die in the most convenient age, and by the gentlest meanes, for if I die by sentence, I am al­lowed the benefit of the most easie kind of death; I shall give my friends the least trouble, I shall doe nothing unseemely before those that are present, and shall depart sound in body and soule; is not this very desirable? God with much reason forbids me to make any defence; If I could effect it, I should onely stay longer to be taken away by the torment of diseases and imperfections of age, which truly Hermogenes I desire not; If when I give an accompt of my actions towards God and men, the Judges think fit to condemne me, I will rather chufe to die then to beg of them a life worse then death. Other friends used the same perswasions to him with assurance of victory, Cicer. de Oral. 1. Laeart. Lycias an excellent Oratour offered him an Oration, which he had written in his defence, desiring him if he thought good to make use of it at his tryall; Socrates perused it, and told him, ‘that it was a good one, but not fit for him. Lysias asking how that could be? why (saith he) may not a garment or shooes be rich, yet not fit for me? if you should bring me Sicyoni­an shooes, I would not weare them though they were fit for my feet, because they are effeminate: he conceived the Oration to be ingenious and eloquent, but not stout and manly, Plut. for though it were very bitter against the Judges, yet Laert. was it more rhetoricall then became a Philosopher.’

The day of tryall being come, Plat. Apol. Anytus, Lyco, and Melitus pre­pared to accuse him, one in behalfe of the people, the second of the Oratours, the last of the Poets: Melitus first went up into the chaire proper for that purpose, and there spoke an Oration which was in it felt mean enough, but withall deliver'd so un­happily and school-boy-like, that sometimes he was out with fear, and turned about to be prompted like a player, enough to beget laughter, even in those that were most concern'd in so serious a caufe: Part of the effect whereof seems to be the same which is thus by Xenophon dispersedly deliver'd, some par­ticulars whereof are confirmed by Libanius.

‘That Socrates perswaded his auditors to contemn the re­ceived Lawes, saying, it was sit onely for fooles to bee govern'd by a bean, (meaning the suffrages of the Senate so gather'd.)’

‘That he was intimately conversant with Critias and Alcibi­ades, one most covetous and violent in the Oligarchy, the o­ther ambitious of Tyranny.’

[Page 35] ‘That he taught direspect and obedience to Parents, telling his scholers hee would make them wiser than their Fathers, and that it was lawfull for any one to bind his Father if hee were mad, and for those that were the more wise to do as much to those that were lesse wise.’

‘That he taught also direspect of all other kinsmen, saying they were not usefull to the sick, or to the accused, the first be­ing in more need of a Physician, the latter of an Oratour; that the good will of unable friends was nothing worth: that one­ly the most knowing persons were most worthy of ho­nour, by which means he would arrogate all respect to himself.’

That he selected out of the Poets some ill places, and per­verted others that were not so, to excite his friends to impi­ous actions; as that of Hesiod,
There is no work pursued shame;
'Tis idleness, hat merits blame.
He expounded, as if the Poet meant all acts might be commit­ted for gain.

‘That he often repeated and misinterpreted tese words of Homer, as if the poet allowed the poor to be beaten.’

When he a Prince or some great person meets,
Such with soft language kindly thus he greets;
Happy above the reach of fear are you;
Sit down, and bid your followers do so too.
But of the lower fort when any speaks,
Forth these words with blows his anger breaks:
Be quiet; to shy betters wretch submit;
For action and advice alike unsit.

Melitus (his oration ended) came down; Liban. Apol. next him came Anytus with a long malicious speech, and last of all Lyco with all the artisice of Rhetorick concluded the accusation.

Socrates Cic. T [...]c. would not (as was the custom) procure an Ad­vocate to plead for him; all the while his accusers were speaking, he seemed to employ his mind about nothing lesse: as soon as they had done, quest. 1. he went up into the chair, ( Cic. de divi­nat. 1. in which action he observed that the Daemon did, not withhold him) an [...] with Socratic. Epist. 14. an angry smile begun this Plat. Apol. unpremeditated answer, Cic. Tusc. quest. 1. not as a suppliant or guilty person, but as if Master of the Judges themselves, with a free contumacy proceeding not from pride, but the greatnesse of his mind.

Xenoph. But I wonder first ( Athenians) how Melitus came by [Page 36] this knowledge, that (as he saith) I do not worship those Gods the City worships? Others have seen me (and to might Melitus if he had pleas'd) sacrifice at common festivalls on the publick Altars; How do I introduce new deities when I professe to be directed in all my actions by the voice of God? they who observe the notes of birds, or answers of men, are guided by the voice: none doubts of thunder whether it bee loud or oraculous; Doth not the Priestesse on the Tripod con­vey to us by voice what the God delivers to her▪ and that he foreknowes events, communicating them to whom plea­seth him, all men (as well as I) believe and professe: others call those that foretell events, Augurs, Soothsayers and Divi­ners, I the Daemon, and (I conceive) more religiously then they who ascribe a Divine power to birds: That I am no im­postor, herein many can attest, who have asked my advice, and never found it fail.’(Here there arose a murmur in the Senate, some not believing, others envying what he said, that he should surpasse them in such a particular favour of the de­ity;) ‘Let such as are incredulous hear this also to confirm their opinion that I am not favour'd of the Gods; when Chae­rephon in the presence of many witnesses question'd the Del­phian Oracle concerning me, Apollo answered, that no man was more free, more just, or more wise;’ (here another mur­mur arose amongst the Judges: he proceeded) ‘Yet the same God faid more of Lycurgus the Lacedaemonian Lawgiver, that he knew not whether to call him a God or a man; me he com­pared not with the Gods, though he gave me the priority a­mongst men. But trust not the God herein, consider me ex­actly your selves; whom know you lesse a servant to corpo­reall pleasures? whom more free? I accept not either rewards or gifts? who more just then he who so conformes himself to the present time, as he needs not help of any other? who will say he deserves not the title of wife, who since he was able, never desisted to learn by enquiry all good possible▪ and that I took not this pains in vain, is evident in that, many Citizens and strangers studious of virtue, prefer my conver­sation above all others: what is the reason that though all men know I have no wealth to require them, so many desire to oblige me by gifts? that I require no return from any, yet engage so many? that when the City being besieged, every one lamented his condition, I was no more mov'd then when It was most flourishing? That whilst others lay out money on outward things to please themselves, I furnish my self from within, my self with things that please me better? If none can disprove what I have said, deserve I not the commendati­ons both of Gods and men? and yet you Melitus pretend that [Page 37] with these instructions I corrupt youth; Every one knowes what it is to corrupt youth; Can you name but one that I of religious have made impious, of modest impu­dent, of frugal, prodigall, of sober, debauch'd, of hardy effe­minate, or the like? But I know those answer'd Melitus whom you have perswaded to be more obedient to you then to their own Parents. That as far as concernes instruction, re­plied Socrates, I confesse; this they know to be my proper care; for their health men obey Physicians before their Pa­rents, in Law-suits Counsellors before their kindred; do you not in war prefer the most experienced souldiers to com­mand before your own allies? yes answers Melitus, 'tis fit we should; and do you think it reason then, replies Socrates, if others are preferr'd for such things as they are excellent in, that, because in in the opinion of some, I have an advantage beyond others in educating youth, which is the greatest be­nefit amongst men, I ought therefore to die? Plut de tranqu. anim. Anytus and Melitus (saith he, addressing himself to the Judges) may pro­cure my death, hurt me they cannot: Plut. de consol. ad Apol. To fear death is to seem wise, and not to be so; for it is to pretend to understand that which we understand not: no man knows what death is, whether it be not the greatest happinesse that can arrive to a man, and yet all fear, and shun it as if they were sure it were the greatest misfortune.’

This and more (saith Xenophon) was said both by himselfe and his friends, but the Judges were so little pleased with his unusuall manner of pleading, that Leart: as Plato went up into the Chair and began a speech in these words; Though I Athenians am the youngest of those that come up in this place, they all cried out, of those that go down, which he thereupon was constrained to do, and they proceeding to vote, Socrates was cast by 281▪ voices; It was the custom of Athens, as Cicero observes, when any one was cast, if the fault were not capitall, to impose a pecuniary muict; when the Judges had voted in that manner, the guilty person was asked the highest rate whereat he aestimated his offence; The Judges willing to favour Socrates, propounded that demand to him, Hee answered 25. (or as Eubulides saith, 100.) drachmes, nor would he suffer Xenoph. his friends, Plat Apol. Plato, Crito, Critobulus, and Apollodorus (who desired him to aestimate it at 50. minae, promising to undertake the sum) to pay any thing for him, saying, that to pay a penalty was to own an offence, and telling the Judges that (for what he stood accused) hee deserved the highest honours and rewards, and daily suste­nance at the publick charge out of the Prytanaeum, which was the greatest honour that was amongst the Graecians; with this answer, the Iudges were so exasperated, that they condemned him to death by 80. votes more.

[Page 38] Xenoph. Apol. The sentence being past, he could not forbear smiling, and turning to his friends, said thus, they who have suborned false witnesses against me, and they who have born such testi­monies, are, doubtlesse conscious to themselves of great impi­ety and injustice; but as for me, what should more deject me now then before I was condemned, being nothing the more guilty: They could not prove I named any new Gods for Iupi­tr, Iuno, and the rest, or swore by such: How did I corrupt young men by inuring them to sufferance and frugality? of ca­pitall offences, as Sacriledge, Theft, and Treason, my very adversaries acquit me; which makes me wonder how I come to be condemned to dye; yet that I dey unjustly will not trou­ble me, it is not a reproach to me, but to those who condem­ned me; I am much satisfied with the example of Palamedes, who suffered death in the like manner; he is much more com­mended then vlysses the procurer of his death; I know, both future and past times will witnesse, I never hurt, or injur'd a­ny, but on the contrary have advantaged all that coversed with me to my utmost ability, communicating what good I could, gratis. This said, he went away, his carriage answera­ble to his words, his eyes, gesture, and gate expressing much cheerfulnesse.

CHAP. XI.
His imprisonment.

Socrates (saith Consol. ad Melv. Seneca) with the same resolved look, wherewith he singly oppos'd the thirty Tyran [...]s, entered the prison, and took away all ignominy from the place, which could not be a prifon whilst he was there: Here ( Maxim. Tyr. being fettered by the eleven Officers) he con­tinued Xenoph. memor. 4. thirty daies after he was condemned upon this occasi­on: Plat. Phad. The ship which carried Theseus and fourteen more persons into Creet; he vowed if they got safe home (as it fortuned they did) to dedicate to Apollo, and to send it every yeer with a present to Delos, which custome the Alhenians religiously ob­served; before the solemnity, they used to lustrate their City, and all condenmed persons were reprieved till it returned from Delos, which sometimes, the wind not serving, was a long time. The Priest of Apollo began the solemnity, by crown­ing the Poop of the ship, which happening the day before Socrates was condemned, occasioned his lying in prison so long after.

In this intervall he was visited by his friends, with whom he past the time in dispute after his usuall manner: he was of­ten solicited by them to an escape, some of them offered to carry him away by force, which he not only refused, but deri­ded, [Page 39] asking, if they knew any place out of Attica whither death could not come? Plat. Crit. Crito, two daies before his death, came very early in the morning to him, to the same purpose, having by his frequent visits and gifts gained some interest in the jaylour, but finding him asleep, sat still by him, admiring in the soundnesse of his sleep, the happy equality of his mind; as­soon as he waked, he told him, that he came to bring sad newes, if not such to him, yet to all his friends, that the ship would certainly be at home to morrow at furthest (some that came from Sunium affirming they had left it there) but that in all likelyhood it would come that day, and he should dye the next. In good timebe it, answered Socrates, but I do not be­leeve it will come to day; for the day following I must dye, as they say, who have the power in their hands; but that I shall not dye to morrow but the day after, I guesse by a dream I had this night, that a woman very beautifull in a white gar­ment, saluted me by my name, saying,

Thou, e▪ e three daies are told,
Rich Pthya shalt behold.

(The same relation, according to Laertius, he made to Aeschi­nes) This occasion Crito took to perswade him to save himselfe [...], which he prest with many arguments; ‘That his friends, would be accused of covetousnesse, as more desirous to spare their wealth, then to redeem him; that it might be effected with little trouble and expence to them who were provided for it; that himselfe was rich enough to do it, or if not, Simmi­as, Cebes and others, would joyne with him; that he ought not voluntarily to thrust himselfe into destruction, when he might avoid it; that he should leave his children in an un­certain mean estate; that it would not be construed constan­cy but want of courage. Consider well these reasons, saith he, or rather (for it is now no time to stand considering) be perswaded, what is to be done, must be done this night [...] or it will be too late. Socrates answered, that his cheerfull readinesse to relieve him was much to be esteemed, if agreea­ble to justice, otherwise, the lesse just, the more blamable: that opinion and censure ought not to be regarded, but truth and equity; that wrong must not be requi [...]ed with wrong; that faith should be kept more strictly with a City then with private persons; that he had voluntarily subjected himselfe to the lawes of his Country, by living under their government, and to violate them at last, were great in justice: that by breaking Prison, he should not only draw his friends into many inconveniences, but himselfe also into many dangers, only to live and dye in exile; that it such a [Page 40] condition, he should be nothing more capable to bring up his children well, but dying honestly, his friends would take the more care of them: That whatsoever inconvenience might ensue, nothing was to be preferred before justice; that it he should escape by treachery, the remainder of his life would be never the more happy, nor himselfe after death better en­tertain'd in the next world. These things (saith he) I hear like the Corybantian pipes, the sound of these words makes me dease to every thing else; therefore whatever you shall say to the contrary, will be to no purpose; but if you have any other businesse, speak. Crito answering, he had not any else, as for this then (concludes he) speak no more of it, let us go the way which God points out to us.’

CHAP. XII.
THe time and manner of his death.

The time of Socrates death, is formerly touch'd; the Marble at Arundell-House saith, he died when Laches was Archon, aged seventy yeers, which (according to Plato) were compleat, for he saith [...] Leart Demetrus Phalerius saith, he dyed the first year of the nintie fifth Olympiad, having lived seven­ty years. Lib. 14. Dioclorus Siculus averres, it was done in that yeare Baches being Archon.

Although there be not any thing in the Greek story settled by better authority, then the years of Socrates; Leo Ailaius with much confidence, and little reason, controverts the re­ceived Chronology of his life and death, the occasion is this; the fourteenth of the Socratick Epistles publisht by him, menti­oneth an oration of Polycrates, as spoken at the arraignment of Socraes; but the Walls of Athens repaired by Conon six years after the death of Socrates, being spoken of in that Oration, the Epistle is thereby rendred suspicious, the truth seems to be this: After the death of Socrates, it became an ordinary Theme in the Schooles of Rhetorick (which was at that time much studied at Athens) to speak for and against Socrates: Poly­craes, a Sophister, to exercise his wit, wrote an invective: Ly [...]ias, a famous Oratour, who died about the 100 Olympiad, had written (as we have already said) an Apologetick, which is by the Scholiast of Aristides cited in answer to Polycrates. Apologies were in like manner written by Plato, Memorab. lib. 1. Xenophon, and (long af­ter by) Libanius; although Isocrates admonished Polycrates of certain errors in his Oration against Socrates, yet the Anachro­nism continued, for Chronology was not yet studied in Athens; and thence it is that Plato himself is in that respect so much re­prehended by A [...]henaeus, Aristides, Macrobius, and other: the [Page 41] writer of the Socraticall Epistle admits [...]olycrates as the accuser at the triall, and oration as then, and there spoken, so also doth Hermippus whom Laertius cites to the same effect; But Phavorinus a Critick of later times, when Chronology was more exact, detects the errour by computation of times: Allatius will by no means have the criticism of Phavortnus allowed, and labours to introduce an uncertainty of the time, to the end hee may perswade that Socrates lived beyond the repa­ration of the walls of Athens: the great Engine where with he labours to demolish all that hath been afferted by the antients, is the testimony of Suidas, who (I know not upon what autho­rity) saith he lived 80. years: his smaller artillery are the groundlesse emendation of Meursius, and the mistake of Scal [...]ger before noted; the absurd Metachronism of the Chronicum A­lexandrinum, which makes Socrates die in the 104th Olympiad, and in the 90th year of his age; the anistoresie of the unknown writer of Aristoles life, who supposeth him in the 17th. year of his age to have heard Socrates three years, and which is most ridiculous, the notorious anachronisms of Plato must serve asirrefragable arguments to impugne the truth. With these proofes in the sophisticall disguise of a Dialogue, hee endea­vours to puzzle the unwary reader.

The manner of his death receive from Plato in the person of Phaedo an Eye-witnesse; ‘Every day (saith he) I went with o­ther friends of his to visit him; we met in the Court where he was tried, it being near the prison; where we entertain'd our selves with discourse till the prison was open'd, then went in unto him and spent many times the whole day with him: But that day we met sooner then ordinary, for the evening be­fore as we came out of the Prison, we heard the ship was come from Delos, and thereupon we appointed to meet early the next morning at the usuall place, where being come, the Porter came out to us, and told us that that we must stay a while before we could be admitted, for the eleven Officers were there taking off his fetters, having brought him word that he must die to day: not long after he came out again, and told us we might go in, where when we came, we found Socrates his fetters newly taken off, and Xantippe sitting by him with a child in her armes: She as soon as she saw us burst forth into tears, and cried out ah, Socrates, this is the last time thy friends shall ever speak to thee, or thou to them, Crito (saith Socrates, addressing himself to him) let some body ca­ry her home; whereupon some of Crito's servants lead her a­way exclaiming, and beating her brest. Socrates who was sit­ting upon the bed, drew up his leg and rubb'd it, saying the whilst, How strange a thing, friends, is that which men call [Page 42] pleasure, how near a kin to pain to which it seems so contrary? they arrive not indeed together, but hee that takes one, is immediately overtaken by the other, as if they were tied together▪ If Aesop had observ'd this, certainly hee would have made some fable of it, as if God willing to compose their difference, had joined them by the end, not being able to make them absolutely one; so that whosoever hath one, must strait have the other also; As it happens to me at this time, the pain my [...]etters even now gave me, is now turned to a kind of pleasure, and tickles me. You have opportunely (said Cebes) put me in mind to ask, why since your imprisonment (which you never did before) you have writ Poems, a hymnne to Apollo, and Aesops Fables render'd into verse; ma­ny have question'd me about it, particularly E [...]nus, if hee repeat this demand, what answer shall I give him? Tell him (answers Socrates that truly I did it not to to contend with him and his verses, but to comply with a dream (which I have had more then once) enjoyning me to practise Musick; in obedience whereunto I first made verses in honour of the God whose feast this was; Then, conceiving it essential to a Poet to write sictions, which of my self, I use not, I made use of some of Aesops which I had in memory, as they first came into my fancy; Tell Euenus this, and bid him from me farewell, and if he be wise, follow me, for it seems I must go hence to day, the Athenians have so order'd it. What is that said Stmmtas which you bid Euemus do, I have often conversed with him, but as far as I understand him, hee will not be at all ready to be rul'd by you; what, saith he, is he not a Philosopher? he seem so, answers S [...]mmias, then he will (replyed Socrates) and so will all who deserve that name; but perhaps he will not lay violent hands upon himself, that is not lawfull: and as he was speaking thus, he set down his leg again to the ground, and sitting so, continued all the rest of the dispute. Then Ce [...]es asking why, how it could be that it should be prohibited to ones self, yet that a Philosopher ought to desire to follow a dying person? he answered, men are the possessions of God, would you not be angry if your slave should kill himself against your will, and if it were in your power punish him? we must expect a suinmons from God, an inevitable necessity (such as I have at this time) to take us hence. This is truth, replied Ceb [...]s, but what you asser­ted even now is inconsistent with it; God taking care of us as his possessions, can a wise man desire to be out of his pro­tection? he cannot think to mend his condition by freeing himself from so excellent a government Socrates seemed much pleased with the subtlety of Ceb [...]s, and turning to us said, Ce­bes is alwaies inquisitive, nor will easily admit any thing; to [Page 43] me said Simmtas what he hath said seem [...], reason, how can wise men endure, much lesse endeavour to part with those that are so much better then themselves? but Co [...]es herein reflects upon you, who are so ready to leave us, and the Gods whom you acknowledge good Governours▪ you say well, answers Socrates, I suppose your would have me answer as in a Court of Judicature; by all meanes saith Simmias [...] well then replies he, I will endeavour to defend my self better a­gainst you then I did before the Judges: Truly did I not be­lieve I should go to just Gods, and to men better then any li­ving, I were inexcusable for contemning death; but I am sure to go to the Gods, very good Masters, and hope to meet with good men, and am of good courage, hoping that something of man subsists after death, and that it is then much better with the good then with the bad. Here Crito interrupting him, told him that he who was to administer the poison, advis'd him to speak little, & not heat himself with dispute; for it agreed not with that kind of poison, which some neglecting, had bin con­strained to take it two or three times: mind him not said So­crates, let him provide as much as may serve twice or thrice if need be;’ Then he proceeded in a large discourse to declare that the chief office of a Philosopher is to meditate on death; therefore he ought not to fear the approach of it; That as death is the solution of the Soul from the Body, so is it the office of a Philosopher to free the soul from corporeall affections; That if we understand the better, the more the soul is disengaged from sense, we shall understand most perfectly when she is wholly freed from the body by death, which perfection of knowledge is the sole end of Philosophy.

This part of the discourse ended, Cebes occasions the renew­ing of it by the desiring him to prove the immortality of the soule, which he doth first from the necessary succession of gene­ration & corruption as contraries, the ground of the Pythagorean transmigration; next from the Soules manner of reasoning, which being only by reminiscence argues it had a being before the body (when it had perfect knowledge of those Ideas which upon occasion of sensible objects it recovers) and consequently shall subsist after it; much more is spoken by Plato under his name, whereof almost all is manisestly Plato owne, nor is it possible to select that which is not from the rest; the conclusi­on of his discourse (as contracted by Cicero was, Tusc. quast. pag. 127. ‘That there are two waies, and a twofold course of Soules when they goe out of the body: for such as have defiled themselves with hu­mane vices given over to pleasures where with they are blin­ded, according as they are polluted with domestick sins, or have used inexpiable deceits to wrong the publike, take a by [Page 44] way secluded from the Councell of the Gods: But they who have preserved themselves intire & chast from the least con­tagion of their bodyies, having alwaies withdrawne them­selves from them, and in humane slesh imitated the lives of Gods, find a ready way open for them, leading them to those from whom they came: and as swans are (not without rea­son) sacred to Apollo, because they seeme to have learnt di­vination from him, whereby foreseeing the good that is in death they dye with songs and delight, so ought all good and knowing persons to doe: Plat. Let every one therefore prepare for this journey against the time that fate shall call him away; You Simmtas, Cebes and the rest here present shall goe at your appointed hower, me sate now summons (as the Fragedian saith) and perhaps it is time that I goe into the Bath, for I think it best to wash before I take the poison, that I may save the women the labour of washing me when I am dead.’

‘When hee had made an end of speaking [...] asked him what directions he would leave concerning his Sonnes and other affaires, and if they could doe any thing that might bee acceptable to him? I desire no more (saith he) then what I have often told you, if you take care of your selves, whatsoe­ver you doe will be acceptable to me and mine, though you promise nothing, if you neglect yourselves and vertue, you can doe nothing acceptable to us though you promise never so much; that answered Crito we shall observe; but how will you be buried? as you think good saith he, if you can catch me, and that I give you not the slip then with a smile apply­ing himselfe to us, I cannot perswade Crito saith he, that I am any thing more then the carkasse you will anon behold, and therefore he takes this care for my enterment; it seems that what even no I told him that as soon as I have taken the poyson I shall go to the joyes of the blessed, hath been to little purpose; He was my bail, bound to the Iudges for my appearance, you must now be my sureties to him that I am departed; let him not say that Socrates is carried to the grave, or laid underground, for know dear Crito such a mistake were a wrong to my soul; be not dejected; tell the world my body onely is buried, and that after what manner thou pleasest. This said, heearose and retir'd into an inner room, taking Crito with him, leaving us discoursing upon our own misery, shortly to be deprived like Orphans of so dear a Father. After his bathing, came his wife and the other women of his Family with his Sons, two of them children, one a youth; when he had taken order with these about his do­mestick affairs, hee dismist them and came out to us.’

[Page 45] ‘It was now Sun-set (for he [...] staid long within) when the officer entrid, and after a little pause [...] not So­crates observ [...]d that carriage in you which I have found in o­thers, but as I thought you the most genero [...]s over the [...] and best of all men that ever came into this [...] so I how see you hate me▪ not for that wh [...] of other are the cause▪ you know the message I bring, farewell, bear what you cannot remedy, with that he departed weeping; and fare the [...] well. (said Socrates) I will: How civil is this man? [...] found him the same all the time of my imprisonment, hee would often [...] me, discourse with me, used me alwaies curt cously, and now see how kindly he weeps for me: but come Cri [...]o, let us do as he bids us, if the poison be ready, let it be brought in The Sun is yet scarce set answers Crito▪ others take it late after a plen­tifull supper and full cups▪ make not so much hast, there is time enough; he replies, they who do so think they gain time, but what shall I gain by drinking it late, onely deceive my self as covetous of life, and sparing of that which is no longer mine; pray let it be as I say; Then Crito sent one of the atten­dants, who immediately returned, and with him the man that was to administer the poison, bringing a cup in his hand, to whom Socrates, prethee honest friend (for thou art well verst in these businesses) what must I do? nothing said hee, but as soon as you have drunk, walk till you find your leggs begin to fail? then lie down, and in so saying, he gave him the Cup; Socrates took it cheerfully, not changing either counte­nance, or colour; and looking pleasantly upon him, deman­ded whether he might spill any of it in libation, who answe­red, he had made no more then would just serve; yet saith Socrates I may pray to God, and will, that my passage hence may be happy, which I beseech him to grant, and in the same instant drank it off easily without any disturbance; many of us who till now had refrained from tears, when we saw him put the cup to his mouth and drink off the poison, were not able to contain any longer; which Socrates observing, friends (saith he) what mean you? for this reason I sent away the wo­men left they should be so unquiet: I have heard we should die with gra­tulation and applause, be quiet then and take it patiently; These words made us with shame suppresse our tears; when he had walked a while, perceiving his leggs to fail, he lay down on his back as the Executioner directed him; who looking on his feet pinched them hard, asking him if he felt it, he answered no; he did the like to his leggs, and showing us how every part successively grew cold and sti [...]e, told us when that chil­nesse came at his heart he would die; not long after liee spake these his last words, O Crito I owe Aesculapius a Cock, pay it, neg­glect [Page 46] it not. It shall be done, said Crito; will you have any thing else? He made no answer, lay still a while, then stretched himselfe forth; with that the executioner uncovered him, his eyes were set, Crito closed them. This (saith Plato) was the end of the best, the wisest, and most just of men: A story, which Cicero professeth, he never read without tears.’

Aristole saith, that a Magus comming from Syria to Athens, not only reprehended Socrates for many things, but foretold him also that he should die a violent death. Laertius closeth his life with this Epigram,

Drink Socrates with Jove, next whom enthron'd,
By Gods and wisdom's selfe as wisest own'd.
Thee, the Athenians gave a pois' nous draught,
But first same they from thy lips had quast.

CHAP. XIIII.
What happened after his death.

HE was buried with tears and much solemnity (contrary to his own direction) by his friends, amongst whom, Plut. de virt. mor. the excessive grief of Plato is observed by Plutarch, Plut. vit. dec. Orat. and the mourning habit of Isocrates: As soon as they had performed that last service, fearing the cruelty of the Tyrants, they stole out of the City, the greater part to Megara to Euclid, where they were kindly received, Liban. the rest to other parts.

Socrat. Epist. Soon after, I Lacaedemonian youth, who had never more acquaintance with Socrates then what fame gave him, took a journey to Athens, intending to become his disciple; being come as far as the City-gates, & ready to enter, with joy to be neer the end at which he aimed, instead of Socrates, he meets there the newes of his death, whereat he was so troubled, that he would not go within the City-gates, but enquiring the place where he was buried, went thither, and breaks forth into a passionate discourse, accompanyed with many tears, to the enclosed dead body; when night was come, he fell asleep upon the Sepulcher; the next morning, affectionately kissing the dust that lay upon it; and with much passion taking leave of the place, he returned to Megara.

Suidas tells a like story (for that there were more examples then one in this kind, Libanius implies) of a Chain, named Cyrsas, who comming to Athens to hear Socrates, went to his Tomb, and slept there, to whom Socrates appeared in a dream, and discoursed with him; with which only satisfaction he went directly home again.

Socrat. Epist. By these accidents the Athenians were awakened into a [Page 47] sense of their injustice, considering they were obnoxious to the censure of the Lacedaemonians by extraordinary crimes whose children were so affectionate to the Philosophers whom they had murdered, as to take such long journeys to see Socra­tes, whom they would not keep when he was with them; here­at they became so exasperated, that they were ready to tear those wicked men, that were the occasion of his death, peece­meal with their teeth, the whole City cried out, they dis­claimed the act, and that the authors thereof ought to be put to death, Antisth [...]nes furthered their rage by this means Laert [...] Antisth. Some young men of Pontus invited. o Athens by the same of Socra­tes, met with Antisthenes, who carried them to Anytus, telling them, he was much wiser then Socrates; whereupon those tha [...] [...] present, with much indignation, turned Anytus out of the City: thence he went to Heraclea, where some say the Citizens also expelled him, Themist. Orat. 2. others that they stoned him to death: Mlius was by the Athenians condemned and put to death, Laert. others affirme the like of all his accusers without tryall, Diod Sic. 14. Socratic. Epist. Platarch, that they so much ha [...]d them, De invid. & [...]. as they would not suffer them to kindle [...]ire at their houses, they would not answer them any question, they would not wash with them, but threw away the water they had touch'd, as impure, until una­ble to b [...]ook this hatred, they hanged themselves.

In further testimony of their penitence, they called home his friends to their former liberty of meeting, they forbad publick spectacles of games and wrestling for a time, they caused his Statue, made in bras [...]e by Lysippus, to be set up in the Pompeum, and (a Plague ensuing, which they imputed to the injustice of this act) they made an order, that no man should mention Socrates publickly, or on the Theater, that so they might so, get what they had done: Euripides (restrained by this order from doing it directly) reproached them covertly in a Tragedy, named Palamedes (in whom he alluded to Socra­tes) particularly in these verses,

A Philomele neer mischiefe knew,
Is stain (alasse) is slain by you.

At which words, all the spectators understanding they were meant of Socrates, fell a weeping.

The death of this sole person (saith [...]. For [...] seems to have been some glosse to explain [...]. So Callimach. Epigr. As [...] [...]. Eunapius) brought a generall calamity upon the Citty; for it may easily be collected by computation of times, In Aedes: that from thence forward the Athenians did nothing conside­rable, but the Citty by degrees decayed, and with it all Greece.

CHAP. XV.
Of his person and vertues.

AS to his person, he was Plat. Phaedr. Theaetet. very unhandsome, of a melan­choly complexion, Schol Ari­sloph. bald, Flat. Phaedr. Theaeter. a flat nose, eyes sticking out, a severe down-cast look, difficult in speech, and Flat. Protagor. too concise, his language rough and carelesse, but more efficacious then all the eloquence of Themistocles, Pericles, or any other; so acute, that he could maintain either side in any question, and there­fore is reproached by Aristophanes, as having two languages, whereof one was to defend wrong; fervent in dispute, often so transported, that he would beat himselfe, and tear his beard, to the derision of the standers by, which he took quietly: Patient to be redargued; Plut. Phaedr. sometimes he covered his face in discourse, that he might not be diverted by any object of sight: Sen. Epist. 1. 103. His constitution strong and hardy, Xenoph. mem. 1. Laert. which he preserved such, by taking diligent care of his health; Plat. Sympos. well bearing cold, hunger, and upon occasions, excesse of wine without distur­bance: Socrat. Epist. Liban. His habit the same in winter as in summer, having but one garment a year; Plat. Phaedr. no shooes, his diet sparing. In fine, his countenance promised so little, that Cicer. Tusc. quaest. 5. & de fato. Zopyr [...]s a Physiognomist who undertook to discover the dispositions of men by their lookes, said, he was stupid, because there were obstructions in his jugular parts; adding, he was given to women and ma­ny other vices; whereat Alcibiades, and other friends of his that were present, knowing him free from those imputations, fell a laughing; but Socrates justified his skill, answering, he was by nature prone to those vices, but supprest his inclinati­ons by reasons, whence Plat. conviv. Alcibiades used to say, he resembled the image of Silenus ( Schol. Ari­stoph. p. 136. as he did indeed in his countenance, baldnesse, and flat-nose) carved on the outside of little boxes, sitting, and playing on a Pipe, for as those boxes within held images of the Gods, so was he adorned with chastity, integri­ty, and all inward beauty, revished as Advers. Colos. Plutarch saith, with a divine zeal to vertue, in all kinds whereof, Xenophon, Laertius, and others, assert these instances.

Xenoph. He was so wise, that he never erred in judging betwixt better and worse, nor thereto needed any others help: Yet he constantly professed, that he only knew that he knew nothing; Plut. [...]duers. Colo [...]. Liban. Apolog. for which reason he was by the Oracle of Apollo at Delphi, declared of all men the most wise, in this manner to Charephon, many witnesses being pre­sent;

Schol. Ari­stoph.
Wise Sophocles, wiser Euripides,
But wisest of all men is Socrates.

[Page 49] Academ. quaest. 1. Apollo (saith Cicero) conceiving the only wisdome of man­kind to consist in not thinking themselves to know those things whereof they are ignorant. Laert. This Oracle, though he were nothing exalted with it himselfe, procured him much envy.

Xen memor. 4. p. 818. He was so rligious, that he never did any bing, without advising first with the Gods, Xen. mem. 1. p. 710. never was known to attempt or speak any impiety. Pl [...]t Philib. He bare a reverence to the Gods, not human, but such as tran­scended the greatest fear: Suid Some say it was out of his great reverence to the Divinity that he used to swear by ( Schol. Ari­sloph. a Cock) a Dog and a Plane-Tree, (under which they used to sit) though it were imerpreted Atheisme.

Laert. He was constant, and a lover of the publick good, as appears in his acquitting the ten Captains, in his denying the thirty Tyrants to fetch Leon in, his resusing to escape out a Prison, and r [...]proving such as grived for his dath. Aelian. 9. Cic. Tusc. quaest. 3. offic. 1. Xantippe used to say, that when the State was opprest with a thousand miseries, he alwaies went abroad and came home with the same look, ( Plin. 7. 19. never more cheerfull, or more troubled) for he bore a mind smooth and cheerfull upon all occasions, far remote from grief, and above all feat. In his declining age, falling sick, he was asked by one that came to visit him, how he did? Very well (saith he) either way▪ if I live, I shall have more aemulation, if I dy, more praise.

Xenoph. mem. 4. p. 818. He was so temperate, that he never preferred that which is pleasant before that which is wholsome. He never did eat more than appe­tite (which was his sauce) made delightfull; all drink was pleasing to him, because he never drank but when he was thristy, and then with such temperate caution, that Plut. he powred out the first draught of water upon the ground, and if he were at any time invited to a feast, he which to others is very difficult, with much ease took care not to eate more then consisted with his health, Xen. mem. 1. p. 712. whereof he was very carefull, because the exercises of the soule depend thereon; and in or­der thereto, used to walk constantly before meals; whereupon being asked by one that observed it, what he did? I get broth, saith he, *Aelian. 13. for my supper. To this temperance it is imputed, though Athens were often in his time visited with the pestilence, he alone escaped it.

Xenop [...]. me mor. 1. p. [...]11. He was so strugall, that how little so ever he had, it was alwaies e­nough. Liban. wanting the means to live splendidly, he sought not anxiously how to acquire more, but how to accomodate his manner of life to that which he had, Laert. wherewith he was so contented, that he affirmed himselfe to come neerest the Gods, because he wanted least. Seeing the great variety of things exposed to sale, he would say to himselfe, how many things there are that I need not; and often had in his mouth these verses,

[Page 50]
Purple, which Gold and Gems adorn,
Is by [...]ragaedians to be worn.

Alcibiades ambitiously munisicent, Aelian. 9. sent him many great pre­sents; Xantippe admiring their value, desired him to accept them: We (answered Socrates) will contest in liberality with Alcibiades, not accepting, by a kind of munificence what he hath sent us.

Laert. To the same, who offered him a large plot of ground to build a house upon: And if I wanted shoes, (saith he) would you give me leather to make them? but deserve I not to be de­rided if I accepted it?

Laert. He slighted Archelaus, King of Macedonia, and Scopas, son of Cranomas, and Eurilocus, son of Larisaeus, not accepting their money, nor going to them, Senee, de benefic. 5. 6. Archelons sending to him to desire his company; He said, he would not go to one, from whom he should receive benefits, which he could not equall with returne. Antonin. vit. lib 11. To Perdicas, who demanded why he would not come to him, he answered, lest I die the most ignoble death; that is, lest I receive a benefit I cannot requi [...]e.

Coming home late one night from a feast, Aelian. 9. some wild young men knowing of his return, lay in wait for him, attined like furies, with vizards and torches, whereby they used to affright such as they met: Socrates, assoon as he saw them, nothing trou­bled, made a stand, and fell to question them, according to his usuall manner, as if he had been in the Lyceum, or Acauemy.

Laert. He despised those that cavilled at him. S [...]b. 71. Being told, that such a one had reviled him behind his back. Laert. Let him beat me, saith he, whilst I am not by; and that another spoke ill of him: He hath not yet learnt, saith he, to speak well.

[...]lut. de educ. liber. Being kicked by an insolent young fellow, and seeing those that were with him much incensed, ready to pursue him; he said, what if an Asse kick me, would you have me kick again, or sue him? but the fellow escaped not unpunished, for every one reproached him for this insolence, and called him the re­viler, so that at last, for vexation, he hanged himselfe.

Another striking him a box on the ear, Seneca de ira. 3 he said no more, but that it was hard a man knew not when to go abroad with a helmet.

Another fell upon him with much violence, D. Basil. which he en­dured without the least disturbance, suffering him to vent his anger, which he did so long, till he made his face all swelled and bruised.

Whensoever he perceived himselfe to grow incensed with any of his friends, [...]lut. de ira cohib

[Page 51]
Before the storm arose,
He to a harbour goes.

He used to moderate his voice, to look smilingly and mode­rately upon them, reserving himselfe untainted with passion, by recourse to the contrary.

Xenoph. me­mor. pag. [...]12. He taught not such as conversed with him to be covetous, for he took no mony of his Schollars, therein expressing his own liberality.

Laert. Hunger or want could never force him to flatter any: Yet was he very compleasant and facete in company: as he one day openly at dinner reproved one of his friends something harshly, Plato said to him, had not this been better told in private? Socrates immediately answered, and had not you done better, if you had told me so in private. Plut. de exsul. Being demanded what country­man he was? He answered, neither of Athens, nor Greece. but of the World. Sometimes he would feast in a fine Robe, as Plato describes him, and when the time allowed; learned to sing, saying, it was not shame to learn any thing which one knew not: He also danced everyday, conceiving that exercise healthfull; Sence. de tranquill. nor was he ashamed to play with little children.

X [...]nopb me­mor 4. p [...] [...]. He was so just, that he never in the least wronged anyman, but on the contrary, benfited all such as conversed with him, as much as he could.

Quinil. 8. 4. His continence was invincible: He despiesed the beauty of Al­cibiades, derided Theodota and Calliste, two eminent Curtesans of that time.

Xen. memor. 1. p. 731. He took great delight in the conversation of good men; to such he communicated whatsoever he knew; with them he studied the writings of the antient wisemen, selecting what was good out of them (which con­firmes what was said before in the life of Solon, that morall Philosophy was commenc'd by the Sophoi) and esteemed this mu­tuall friendship which he contracted with them above all treasure. Xenoph: me­mor. 2. p. 752. Towards this his outward endeavour was so affected and desired by them, as much as he affected and desired them.

CHAP. XVI.
His Wives and Children.

HE had two wives, the first Xantippe, a Citizens daughter of Athens, as Theodoret affirmes, who addes, that she was dishonest before he married her, even with himselfe, besides others: Athenaeus also saith, that after he was married, he lent her to a friend, and that Alcibiades lay with her: But Aristoke­nus and Porphyrius, from whom these as persons are derived, have been noted of too much malignity, to be of any autho­rity.

[Page 52] She was (according to the Character 1. 17. Agellius gives her) curst, froward, chiding, and [...]colding alwaies both day and night, L [...]n. and for that reason he chose her, as he profest to Antisthenes, from observing, that they who would be excel­lent in horse-manship, chose the roughest horses, knowing, if they are able to manage them, they may easily rule others: He, desirous to use much coversation with men, took her to wife; knowing, if he could bear with her, he might easily con­verse with all men. To Alcibiades, who said, her scolding was intollerable, he profest it was nothing to him, being used to it like such as live in the continuall noise of a mill. Besides, saith he, cannot you endure the cackling of hens; but they answered Alcibiades, bring me Eggs and chickens; and my Xan­tippe, replies Socrates, children.

Of her impatience, and his sufferance, there are severall in­stances; Laert. one day before some of his friends, she fell into the usuall extravagance of her passion, whereupon he not answe­ring anything, went forth with them, but was no sooner out of the doore, when she running up into the chamber, threw down water upon his head, whereat turning to his friends, did I not tell you, saith he, that after so much thunder we should have rain.

Another time she pulled his Cloak off from his shoulders in the open Forum; Laert. some friends present counselled him to beat her. Yes, saith he, that whilst we two fight, you may all stand by, and cry, Well done Socrates, to him Xantippe.

To some other story in the same kind▪ Lib. 2. 26. Antoninus alludes in these words; how Socrates looked when he was sain to gird himselfe with askin, Xantippe having taken his cloths away, and carried them forth with her, and what he said to his friends, who out of a modest re­spectsulnesse, went back, secing him so attired.

Having brought Euthydemus from the Palaestrae to dine with him, Plut. de ira cahib. Xantippe running to the table, angry, and scolding, over­turned it; Euthydemus much troubled, rose up, and would have gone away, when Socrates did not: a Hen, saith he, the other day did the very samething at your house, yet I was not angry thereat.

Alcibiades having sent him a crious march-pane, Aelian v [...]r. hist. 11. 12. Xantippe furiously (as her manner was) threw it our of the basket, and trode upon it; whereat Socrates laughing, and shall not you (saith he) lose your share in it.

Another time she offered to go to a publick show attired undecently; Aellan. 7. 10. Laert. Stob. take heed, saith he, you be not rather the spectacle then the spectatour.

With reason therefore he said, Stob. 188. I had three evills, Grammer, Poesy, and an ill wife; two I have shaken off, but my ill wife I cannot.

[Page 53] His other wife was named Myrto, Theodoret. Niece to Lystmachus daughter of [...], not the just, as Laertius, and from him Suidas affirm; but another of that name, the 3d. from him as is observed by A­the [...]aeus, for the two daughters of Aristides the just, could not but be of great age before the 77. Olympiad, wherein Socrates was born, long before, which time Aristides died an old man in Exile; for that Themistocles died the second year of the 77. O­lympiad is certain. and as Aemilius Probus affirms, Aristides dyed four years before Themistocles was banished Athens, here­upon Plutarch more cautio [...]sly calls her not the daughter, but Niece of Aristides.

Some because Xantippe(as is manifest from Plato outlived him, believe he was first married to Myrto, but that he had both these wives at the same time, which is attested by Demetrius Pholereus, Aristoxenus (to whom Athenaeus saith, that Aristotle gave the ground) Callisthenes and Porphyrius: whence Aristippus in his Socratic. Epist. Epistle to his daughter Myrto, adviseth her to go to Athens, and above all to honour Xantippe and Myrto, and to live with them as he with Socrates.

The occasion, whereupon the Athe [...]ans, who from the time of Cecrops had strictly observed single marriage, allowed bigamy, in the time of Socrates was this; In the second year of the 87 O­lympiad, and the third of the 88. Athens was visited extreamly with the pestilence, which attended by war and famine, occa­sioned to great a searcity of men, that they made in edict it might to be lawfull for any that would to take two wives, Euripi­des made use of this indulgence, and that Socrates also did so, is attested by Satyrus the peripatetick, and Hieronymus the Rho­dian, who recorded the order; to which Athenaeus imputes the silence of the Comick Poets in this particular, who omitted no grounds of reproach. Plutarch implies, that he took her out of charity, for she was a widdow ( Laert. without any portion or dow­er) extreamly in want.

Theo [...]oret. Perphyrius reports, that these two ( Xantippe and Myr­to) quarrell'd they would at last fall both upon Socrates. and beat him, because he stood by and never parted them, but laughed as well when they fought with him, as with one anto­ther.

By Xantippe hee had a son named Lamprocles, who could not brook her impatience so well as his Father, and being [...] by her into disobedience, was reclaimed by Socrates; Hee died young, as may be gathered from Plutarch, who saith, Tim [...]chus of Chaero [...]ca dying very young, desired earnestly of Socrates that he might be buried near his son Lamprocles, who died but few daies before, being his dear friend, and of the same age. It ap­pears from Plato, that he had more sons by her for in his Apolo­gy he mentions three, two grown men, the other child, [Page 54] which seems to be the same, brought by Xantippe to him in pri­son the day of his death, and as Plato describes it, held in her lap.

By Myrto he had two sons, the eldest Sophroniscus, the young­est Menedemus or Menexenus, though some say he had Menede­mus by Xantippe.

CHAP. XVII.
His Scholers and Auditors.

WHeras (saith De oratore. lib. 3. Cicero) many springing from Socrates by reason that out of his severall various disputes diffused every where, one many servrall Families differing amongst themselves much disioyned and disagreeing; yet all these Philosophers would be called, and conceived themselves to be Socraticks: of these were

Plato, from whom came Aristotle and Xenocrates, the first taking the name of Peripatetick the other of Academick.

Antisthenes, who chiesly affected the patience and bardinesse in So­crates his discourse, from whom came first the Cynicks, then the Stoicks.

Aristippus, who was more delighted with his more volupuous dispu­tations, from him sprung the cyrenaick Philosophy.

Others there were who likewise called themselves Socraticks, but their sects by the strength and arguments of the former are broken and quite extinxct: such were.

Phaedo an Elean, who instituted a particular school, from him called Eliack, which a [...]terwards was called Eretriack, from Menedemus who taught at Eretia, from him Pyrrho, thence the Pyrrhonians.

Euclid of Megara, Institutor of the Magarick school of named from him, from Clinomachus his Disciple called the Diatectick, ending in Zeno the Cittiean, who introduced the stoick.

The Herillians are named also as a Scot that would be called Socra­tick. To these recited by Cicero, Suidas addes.

Bryso of Heraclea, who together with Euclid invented dispu­tative logick.

Theodorus sirnamed the Atheist, who invented a peculi­ar sect called Theodorean, the opinion which hee taught was [...] indifference.

Other Disciples of Socrates there were, who followed his Phi­losophy, not appropriating out of it any particular sect, and therefore most properly deserve the title of Socraticks, such are Crito, Chaerephon, Xenophon, Aeschines, Simmias, Cebes, Glauco and Terpsion.

The last kind of his auditours were those who made no pro­fession of Philosophy, of whom were

[Page 55] Critias and Alcibiades, who afterwards proved the most ambitious spirits of the Athenians, but it was discovered in nei­ther whilst they covers'd with Socrates, either that their youth was not capable of expressing that vice, or that they cunning­ly complled (as Xenophon conjectures) with Socrates, in hopes of being by his conversation enabled to manage their forward designes, which as soon as they attempted they left off their friendship with Socrates, Critias fell from him and converted his affection into hate, because he reproved his love to Euthydenius; Alcibiades naturally dissolute, was reclaim'd by Socrates and continued such whilist he conversed with him; He was of form so exquisite as gave occasion to some to calumniate the friend­ship betwixt him and Socrates, to which effect Aristoxenus is cited by Laertius and Athenaeus, and some verses of Aspasia by the latter, his vindication we refer to Plato and Xenophon.

Of Socrates, his instructions to Alti [...]iades there are these instances.

Cicer. Tusc. quaest. Pl [...]t conviv. Plutarch. He told him that he was nothing of what a man ought to be; that he had no advantage by the greatnesse of his birth a­bove an ordinary Porter, whereat Alcibiades much troubled with tears, besought him to instruct him in virtu [...], and to re­form his vices.

Aelian. 3. 28. Perceiving Alcibiades to be exceeding proud of his riches and lands; he showed him a Map of the world, and bad him find Attica therein; which done, he desired that he would show him his own lands; he answered, they were not there. Do you boast replies Socrates of that which you see is no (considerable) part of the Earth?

Aelian. 2. 1. Alcibiades being by reason of his youth bashfull and fear­full to make an Oration to the people, Socrates thus encouraged, him, do you not esteem (saith he) that shoomaker (naming him) an inconsiderable fellow? Alcibiades assenting, and so likewise (continues he) that crier and that tent-maker? Alci­biades granting this, doth not saith he, the Athenian Common-wealth consist of these? if you contemn them single, fear them not in assembly. To these adde.

Laert. vit. Crit. The four sons of Crito the Philosopher; The oldest Critobu­lus. Macrob. Sa­turn. 7. 3. exceeding handsom and rich, but by Socrates (who valued his own estate at five minae) Xenoph mem. demonstrated to be poorer then himself.

The second Hermogenes, Xenoph. mem. whom falling into poverty, Socra­tes perswaded Diodorus his friend to entertain.

The third Epigenes, Xenoph. mem. 4. p. 786. a young man of an infirm body whom Socrates advised to study his own health, as that wherein con­sisted the well-being and knowledge of his mind.

The youngest Ctesippus.

[Page 56] Of Poets, [...]. Euripides (as the writer of his life affirmes) and Euenus.

Of Oratous Lysias, eminent in that kind [...]. (read [...] to which effect also Plutarch) [...] Dion. Halicarn. in Critic. easie to be under­stood, hard to be imitated; hee came to Athens in the second year of the 82. Olympiad. Lysis, whom of refractory he made pliant, and Isocrates, of whom when very young Socrates presa­ged great things. In the number of his Scholars and Auditors were also.

Plat. Apol. Adimantus and Xenop. mem. 3. p. 772. & p. 774. Lecrt. Glauco sons to Aristo, brothers to Plato: and Charmides son of Glauco. Glauco before hee was 20. years old had taken upon him to be an Oratour, and aimed at some great office in the Common-wealth, not to be wrought off from this fancy which made him every where appear ridi­culous, untill adrest by some friends to Socrates, who made him acknowledge his own errour & ignorance of that which he had undertaken. On the contrary his son Glauco of excellent parts, fit for any office in the Common-wealth, yet timerously shun­ning all publick affairs, was by Socrates induced to undertake the Magistracy.

Plat. Apol. Nicostrastus son of Theodotides and his brother Theodotus.

Plat. ibid. Aeantodorus, and his brother Apollodorus.

Lysanias, Father of Aeschines.

Xenoph. mem. 2. p. 743. Chaerecrates, brother to Chaerephon, betwixt whom there was a great quarrel, but reconciled by Socrates.

Plat. Apol. Paralus, son of Demodocus whose brother was Theages.

Plat. Apol. An [...]ipho a Cephisiean, Father of Epigenes: with whom hee discourses of self-sufficience, teaching gratis, and of veracity in Memor. 1. p. 729. 731. 732. Xenophon.

Eumares a Phliasian, and Xenomedes, an Athenian.

Besides these, there are with whom Socrates discoursed and instructed.

Xen. mem. 1. p. 725. Aristodemus sirnamed the little, who would not sacrifice, pray, or use divination, but derided all such as did, was by So­crates convinc'd.

Xen. mem. 2. Aristarchus troubled that he had a charge of kindred lying upon him, by Socrates converted to a willing liberality towards them.

Xen. mem. 2. Eutherus, who returning from travell, his lands taken away, his Father having left him nothing, chose rather to follow a trade then to apply himself to friends; but diverted by Socrates, Diodorus, Xen. mem. 2. whom Socrates perswaded to take Hermogenes.

Euthydemus, Xen. mem. 4. who had collected many sentences of Poets and Sophists, thought he excelled all his equalls, and hoped no lesse [Page 57] of his superiours, was by Socrates constrained to acknowledge his own errour and ignorance and departed much troubled.

Hippias an Elean, Xen. memt 4. with whom Socrates discoursed of Justice.

Xenoph. Nicomedes; Pericles and [...]phtcrates, with whom he discoursed concerning the office of a General. Laert. Into the last he infused courage by showing him the Cocks of Midas [...] est quod gallinas Indicas facere videmus aliquando tumentes & caudam pandentes. brustling against those of Callias.

Plat. Laert. Theaetetus disputing of knowledge, he dismist, inspired as it were with divine wisdom.

Plat. Laert. Euthyphron who intended to accuse his own Father, hee disswaded.

With Parrhasius a painter, Clito a Statuary, and Pistias an ar­mourer; hee disputes in mem. 3. Xenophon concerning their severall arts.

CHAP. XVII.
His writings.

THey who affirm that Socrates writ nothing (as Cicero, Plu­tarch, Dion Chrysostom, Aristides, Origen, and others) mean inrespect to his Philosophy, in which kind he never wrote any thing himself, but what he discoursed was committed to wri­ting by Xenophon, Plato and others of his Scholers. Hence the works of Plato (particularly Phaedo,) went under the name of Socrates, and are so cited by Aristotle; But that some things were written by Socrates himself, is evident from those who affirm.

Laert. He writ together with Euripides, and aided him in making Tragedies, whence Mnesilochus.

The Phrygians is Euripides new play.
But Socrates gave it the best aray.

And again, Euripides is steer'd by Socrates and Callias.

Now thou with pride and self-conceit ore'stowest,
But all the cause to Socrates thou ou'est.

Hither refer wee that of Tusc. quest. 4 Cicero, who saith, when Euripides made his play Orestes, Socrates revoked the three first verses. He writ also

Some Fables of Aesop inverse, not very elegant, mentioned by Plato, Plutarch, and Laertius, beginning thus:

[Page 58]
To those who dwelt in Corinth, Aesop said,
Vertue with vulgar wisdome be not weigh'd.

A Paean or hymne in honour of Apollo and Diana: One that went under his name beginning thus.

Daelian Apollo, and thou fair
Diana, hail; immortall pair.

is by Dionysidorus denyed to be his: This is mentioned also by Plato, to which some adde

Laert. vit. Xenoph. The Encomium of Gryllus, son of Xenophon, slain in the Man­tinean sight, which the disagreement of times will not allow; more certain it is he framed

Laert. vit. Aeschin. Dialogues, which he gave to Aeschines, seeing him in want, that he might get mony by them; to these adde

Epistles, some whereof are published by Leo Allatius; that he write more is implyed by Arrian and Athenaeus

Socrates his Epistles.

Epist. I.

YOu seem unacquainted with my resolutions, els you would not have sent the second time, and enlarged your offers; but you believe Socrates, as well as the Sophists, mercenary of his counsell, Allatius otherwise: and that what I write before was not reall, but only to draw greater vertues from you: therefore now you pro­mise wonders, in confidence to oblige me by your many pre­sents to quit my interest and commerce with the Athenians, and to come over with you: I think it most unbeseeming a Philosopher to sell his advice, and extreamly contrary to my practise; for ever since by Gods command I first entered into Philosophy, I was never known to take any thing, but keep my exercises in publick, [...] In this sense the words are passable (so is not the inter­pretation of Allatius, aeque omnihus audi­endi etiam si nolint potestate factâ.) But I conceive the words of Socra­tes were [...]. for every one to hear that will; I neither lock the door when I teach, as is reported of Pythagoras, nor go abroad to the multitude, and exact money of the hearers, as some heretofore have done, and some in our times yet do; I have enough from within my selfe, should I accept of more from others, I know not where to deposit it, nor whom to trust better then the givers themselves, whose faith, if I suspect, I shall be thought improvident to confide in, if honest, I can receive from them, though I lay up nothing with them; for they that would be faithfull keepers of mony, will not be unfaithfull preservers of their own gratitude, & they wil never go about to defraud me of what they would have given, but receiving that of me gratis, for which others take mony, they will Allatius otherwise. consider me when I want. In a word, if friends, they will, For [...] reading [...]. like you, impart of their own to us, if not friends, they will seek to deprive us of what is ours.

Besides, I have not leasure to hoard up mony, but wonder at them that say, they get riches This inter­pretation seemes to be confirmed by the particle [...], before [...]. for their own sake, and have a high opinion of themselves for their means, who ne­glect learning to addict themselves to gain, and so become ad­mired for their riches, derided for their ignorance, esteemed for all things except themselves. otherwaies Allatius. But if we so much abhorre to have recourse to friends, reading [...]. to depend on others to eat their bread, how comes it that we are not ashamed to suffer the same from mony? do we not know that these men are respected only for their wealth, and if fortune turne, they live in all disre­spect? they are not fully contented when they are in esteem, because it is not for their own sakes, but in disesteem are much [Page 60] more discontented, being themselves the cause of their own dishonour.

First, therefore you were mistaken, if you did imagine Socra­tes would do that for mony which he would not without, not knowing that many occasions, but chiefly the necessities of my country detain me: wonder not that I say I discharge my coun­tries businesse, being not imployed either in Army or Court, every one ought to apply himselfe to that which he is capable of, [...]; by which we may have some light to finde perhaps the true rea­ding, [...]. things above his reach he must leave to others, and per­form those that are within his compasse: and in such Cities as this, not only counsellors or commanders for sea or land are requisite, but some likewise, that may Allatius otherwise. admonish others in their offices; for it is Perhaps [...]. nothing strange, that they fall as it were, asleep, under the weight of their charge, and need a goad to waken them: Over these God hath placed me, for which I be­come, and not without cause, odious to them.

But he, in whom I most confide, will not suffer me to go, he knowes better then my selfe what is good for me; when I re­solved to come to thee, he with-held me, and when thou sentest the second time, forbid me, I dare not disobey him; Pindar taught this wisdome, saying, when God points out the be­ginning of any work, it is the direct way to obtain to obtain vertue, the end glo­rious: The verses are much to this purpose. Other Poets have said as much of the Gods, that what is undertaken with their advice, succeeds well, but what without God, is unprofitable to the undertakers. The wisest Cities of Greec [...] consult the Oracle of Delphi,, and as many as follow it have good successe, who do not most commonly receive prejudice.

Yet I not wonder, if you give no faith to what I deliver of the Daemon, for I have met with not a few alike incredulous; most of those that were in the Delian fight did not believe me; I was then in armes, and fallied forth the City with the peo­ple to skirmish, many of us were dispersed in flight, and as we came to a certain way, the accustomed sign came upon me; I stopt, and said, in my opinion, friends, we should not go this way, for I heard the Daemons voice: the greater part were angry, as if I had trifled at a time so serious; some few were perswaded to go along with me another way, and got safe home; one that came from the others brought word they were all slain, some horsemen returning from the pursuit, had fallen upon them, whom they at first resisted, but being at last enclosed by them, who were more in number, they gave back, and were in the end oppressed and killed; he that brought this newes was dangerously wounded, and escaped only by help of his shield. I have also by instructions from God, foretold many events to particular persons.

You offer part of your Kingdome, and invite me to it, not [Page 61] as to a changed government, but to rule both your subjects and your selfe: but I confesse, I have not learned to command, and would no more undertake to rule, not knowing how then to play at dice, having never been taught: And doubtlesse if other men were of the same mind, there would be fewer troubles in life; whereas now the confidence of such as are ig­norant, undertaking things they do not understand, occasions these many disturbances: Hence is it, they make fortune greater then she is, and by their own folly, increase her power. Besides, I am not ignorant, that a King ought to be more honoured and admired then a private person, and as I would not un­dertake to be a horseman having no [...] in Horsemanship, but had much rather be a footman, though the charge be lesse honourable: the same is my opinion as touching Kings and private persons, nor puffed up by ambition will I desire more glorious afflictions: they who invented the fable of Bellerophon seemed to imply something to this purpose, for he was opprest with misfortunes, not because he sought to rise higher in place, but for aiming at things above him, and being thrown down from his hopes, led the rest of his life poorly and ignominious­ly, driven by mocks out of Cities into the Wildernesse, and shunning path-waies, not what we commonly call so, but the freedome wherewith every one orders his life. But let this be taken how the Poets please, my resolution you now hear a­gain, that I will not change this place for that, [...] Other, [...] Perhaps [...] Or [...]. conceiving this fittest for me: nor is God willing I should, who hath been ever untill now, my counsellor and guide.

Epist. II.

YOu are not ignorant how great esteem we have of Chaere­phon, who being chosen Ambassadour by the City to the Peloponnesians, will perhaps come to you; a Philosopher is en­tertained with small trouble, but the journey is dangerous, especially, because of the tumults that are there at this time, from which, if thou protect him, thou wilt preserve our friend, and infinitely engage us.

Epist. III.

ANeso of Amphipolis was commended to me at Potidaea, he is now coming to Athens, being thrown out of his house by the people; for at present, affairs are much embroiled and clouded there, but I believe within a little while they will cleer up. In assisting you will oblige a deserving person, and benefit both the [...]ities; Amphipolis, lest by rebelling it incurre irreme­diable danger: Ours, lest we be involved in their troubles [Page 62] as at this present we are reduced almost to extremity for Potidaea.

Epist. IIII.

MEeting with Critobulus, I perswaded him to study Philo­sophy, but I think he is of another mind, and more ad­dicted to affairs of State, in which he intends to make choice of the fittest method, and best instructor for the most excellent so journe now in Athens, and with many of them we are inti­mate. Thus much concerning him; as for us, Xantippe and the children are well, and I continue to do, as when you were with me.

Epist. V.

WE hear you are at Thebes, and Read [...]. Proxenus gone into Asia, to take part with Cyrus; whether your designes will prosper God knowes, they are here condemned by many, for it is conceived unfit the Athenians should assist Cyrus, through whose means they were deprived of command by the Lacedae­monians and fight for him, who fought against them. It is not therefore strange if the state being altered, some be ready of themselves to accuse you of temporising, and the better your successe is, the greater will be their calumnies; for I am well acquainted with the dispositions of some of them: But since we have undertaken this, let us prove our selves honest men, and call to mind what we use to say of vertue, accounting this one of the best sentences of the Poet, Our Fathers house must not be discredited. Know therefore, that to war, these two are requisite, Courage an Bounty, for this, we are loved of our friends, for that, feared of our enemies, of both, thou hast domestick precedents.

Epist. VI.

I Have taken such care of your strangers as you desired, & re­tained one to plead their cause before the people, Perhaps Lysias. a friend of ours, who profest himselfe the readier to undertake it, out of his desire to serve thee.

As for that which you write in jest concerning wealth, and such as are sollicitous for it, perhaps it is not unreasonable. First, because whilst others study to be rich, I choose to live meanly. Then though I might receive many gifts and legacies from living and dead friends; yet I freely disclaim them, and for a man thus enclined to be by others judged mad, is nothing strange: But we must examine not this onely, but the rest of [Page 63] our life; and since we disagree in the use, no wonder that wee differ in the acquisition of [...] [...] read [...]. Riches; my diet is very sparing, my habit the same in winter as in summer: I never wear shoes, I am not taken with Popular applause, but with the study of wisdom and integrity. But they who are intemperarate, Luxu­rious in meat, not every year, but every day putting on new apparell are transported with unlawfull delights, and as they who lose their naturall complexion have recourse to paint. So these losing the true glory of virtue which every one ought to have, flie to that which depends upon complaisance with o­thers, courting vulgar applause with Largesses and feasts. Hence I suppose it comes, that they need much wealth; They themselves cannot live upon a little, nor will others adm [...] them into their society, unlesse they receive a salary for com­mending them.

But my life is well as to both these, I will not deny but in some things I may fail, I know that wisest men prefer those, most men these; Reflecting sometimes within my selfe upon God; I find that he exceeds us, in that he hath need of nothing; it is the property of a most excellent nature not to want any thing, and to comprehend within himself all that he enjoyes. Thus is he wiser then others, who imitates the most wise [...] and happier, who resembles the most happy. If riches could do this, riches were to be preferr'd; but since vertue only can obtain it, it were folly to forsake the reall good to pursue the seeming. Hence I cannot easily be perswaded but that my Condition is better then the [...]rs.

As for children, who as you say ought to be provided for, the care that I take for them all men may see, I know but one ground of hapinesse, wisdom. The fool who reposeth his trust in gold, possesseth not that which he hath, and is withall so much more miserable then others, in that they who are opprest with poverty may grow wise hereafter. But he out of an opi­nion of his own happinesse, neglecting true gain corrupted with plenty. [...] [...]. Besides that he never yet obtained, mans essenti­all good is depriv'd of hope thereof for the future. Nor is it possible that such a man can go on securely to virtue, who is entangled in the slatteries of those who are Masters in all in­sinuating Arts, and in the Charms of pleasures which glide in­to the soul through every sense, and drive out all sound and wise judgement. How then can hee choose but give his Chil­dre occasion of folly rather then instruction, [...]&c. which [...], reading immediately after for [...]. who not only in words but actions expresseth that in these things she hath placed his hope, who not proving good, their subsistence fails, and they die miserably for want of food: Justly punish'd for their idle­nesse; Parents are by Law enjoyned to bring up their children till they are men. But you, perhaps some Citizen may say to his [Page 64] Sonnes greedy to inherit, spare me not dying, and whilst you live relie for maintenance upon me, though dead not ashamed to lead a life more lazy then death; you expect that my for­tunes should extend to others even after my decease, but your own are not competent for your selves whilest you are yet a­live. Such rough speeches happily he will use to his Children, taking the libery both of a Father and a Patriot. My fortunes in the estimate of other men are mean, but in the effect nothing inferior to the Rich. I will not leave my Children money, but a more honorable heritage, discreet friends, whom as long as they keep they can want as necessaries, and if they use them ill, doubtlesse they would use their money worse.

But if to you, who know the negligence of friends, I seem to give ill advice; I answer, that all men are not alike affected to their friends, for some take care of them after they are dead, and it is likely that ours are not of a neglectfull humour, but pleas'd with the past advantage they have received by us, no lesse then with the present of a short benefit, the requitall is short; lasting benefits produce a return equall to their profit, and I foresee that what is mine, will hereafter appear more gracious to my friends, and therefore I exact no rewards of them. I account nothing of equal value in exchange with Phi­losophy but friendship, nor like the Sophists have I any diffi­dence of those things that are mine, for being old they renew, and in their decaying age Pe [...]haps [...]. So Allatius seems to read. flourish, which makes them more acceptable to the Disciples, and their Father more esteemed; For [...] reading [...]. Living he obtains honour, dead is thought worthy of memory, and if he leave an Kinsman behind him, they will respect him like his Nephewes and Brethren, and show him all kindnesse, as being allied to him by more then a Naturall affinity; Neither if they would, can they neglect him in misfortunes, no more then we can slight them, who are near to us in blood; for affinity in soul forceth them to relieve the Son of the dead as if he were their own brother; when they call to mind his Father, whose dishonour they account their own.

Now judge if I order my affairs ill, or take no care for my Children, so as when I die they shall be destitue of necessaries, who leave them not wealth but such Guardians as will have a care of them and wealth No History makes mention of any man that hath been made better by riches; A tried friend in this is to be preferr'd before tried gold, that he is not beneficiall to every one who desires him, but to those he lovse best. Nor doth he supply onely the necessities of life, but is serviceable as well to the soul of him that hath him, and is most conducing to vir­tue, without which nothing profieth; but we will consider more exactly upon these things when we meet; thus much serve as a cursory answer to your demand.

Epist VII.

I Wonder not at what you write, that you do suspect the Thirty continue the same mind to us since your departure, which they had when you were here. As soon as you were gone, they began to have a jealousie of me, and there past amongst them a murmure that these things were not done without So­crates; within few daies they cited me to the Court, where some complaints were preferr'd against me, and when I defen­ded my self, they commanded me to go to the Pyraeum to ap­prehend Leon, their intention was to put him to death, that they might enjoy his estate, and make me partner in their in­justice; when I refused, and said something to this effect that I would never willingly subscribe to an unjust act; Charicles was present, and inwardly vext, Socrates saith he, dost thou think to talk thus peremptorily, and not suffer ten thousand ills? Charicles, said I, but none so hainous as to do unjustly. Hee answered not a word, nor any of the rest, but ever since they have liked me the worse.

As for you, some that were then present, reported that your affairs succeed to your wish, that the Thebans in your exile received you kindly, and will assist your return to their utmost. Some were troubled at this news, and the more because it lessen'd their hopes of supply from Lacedaemon, for they who came along with the Ambassadours, affirmed, that the Lacedae­monians were engaged in a great war, and the Ephori hearing of those troubles, were discontented, and said, that the Lace­daemonians had not intrusted with the City to see it destroy'd; Perhaps. [...] &c. for if they would have done so, it were most easie for them who had the Command, being withall instigated therunto by the Corinthians and Thebans, and that the City might be better govern'd under an Oligarchy then a Democracy. If all this be true, and your affairs succeed as they report, there is great likely hood that upon you, coming in with the Thebans, the Lacedaemonians not aiding these, all things here may be easily composed. Besides, many of the Natives who now are quiet through fear, if they perceived never so little that you were firme, will readily forsake this party, because in this go­vernment of the City, nothing is left them entire, but through many and continuall enormities all is in confusion; the greater part is revolted as well as you, the rest if they had the least encouragement from abroad would suffer the same that you have. So that if no other, yet this example would manifest that [Page 66] the greatest unhappinesse of Cities is the wickednesse of their Rulers, for they are so blinded with self interest that they will not desist, though they see all things go to ruine, but with what they first troubled, think to settle affairs, continuing banish­ments, sequestrations, and unjust deaths; not considering he is an ill Physician who prescribes for a Remedy the cause of the disease. But those are incurable; you shall doe well to have a care of your self, for all that are here have but this hope left, if you act wisely to be freed from a heavy and grievous Tyranny.

THE CLOVDS of Aristophanes.
Added (not as a Comicall divertisement for the Reader, who can expect little in that kind from a subject so antient, and particular, but) as a necessary supplement to the life of Socrates.

Act. I.

Scen. I.

Strepsiades, Phidippides, Servant.
Streps.
OH, oh,
Great Iove, how long a night is this, how endlesse!
Will't neer be day? I heard the Cock again,
Yet still my servants snore; 'tis but of late
They durst do thus:
The Atheni­ans in time of war with the Lacedaemonians made an Edict, that no man should beat his servants, lest they should go over to the enemy. Schol.
curse o' this war that awes me,
And will not suffer me to beat the Rogues.
My good Son sleeps too, wrapt ore head and ears:
Well, let me try to bear them company;
Alasse, I cannot, so perplext and tortur'd
With charges, bills for Horse-meat, interest:
All for this hopefull Son, who in's curl'd locks,
Aides matches, keeps his Coach, and dreames of Horses,
Whilst I (unhappy!) see th' unwelcome Moon
Bring on the Quarter day, and threaten use-mony.
Boy, snuffe the light, bring my account book hither,
That I may summe my debts and interest:
Let's see, twelve pound to Pasia; ha! twelve pound
To Pasia, how laid out? to buy
Their horses were named from the marks they had; if a K. Ceppatia; if an an S, Sampho­r [...]. Schol.
Coppatia:
Would I had paid this eye for him.
Phid.
Hold Philo,
You'r out of the way, begin again.
Streps.
I this,
This is the misery that ruines me;
His very sleeps are taken up with Horses.
Phid.
How many courses will the manage hold.
Streps.
Many a weary course thou leads thy Father:
But how much more owe I then this to Pasia?
[Page 68] Three pound t' Amynias for Chariot wheeles.
Phid.
Go sirrah, take that horse and turn him out.
Streps.
I thou hast turned me out of all my means,
Charges at Law will eat me up, my Creditours
Threaten to sue me to an execution.
Phid.
Why do you wake all night, and tosse so Father?
Streps.
I cannot sleep, the Scrivener doth so bite me.
Phid.
Yet let me rest a little longer.
Streps.
Do so.
All these will one day light upon thy head,
Curs'd be the houre when I first saw thy Mother,
I liv'd before most sweetly in the Country,
Well stock't with Sheep and Bees, Olives and Grapes,
Till from the Megaclean house I took
This Neece of Megacles out of the City,
Well fashion'd, highly bred, and richly cloathed;
We married, as I said: and lay together:
I sinelling strong of Drugs and greasie Wool;
But she of Unguents, Crocus wanton Kisses,
Of vain expence, dainties, and luxury;
I will not tell the idle life she led,
And yet she spun that I have often told her,
Showing this Coat,
[...] Sch. MS.
you spin a fair thread woman.
Serv.
Sir, all the Oyle ith' Lamp is wasted.
Streps.
Ha?
Why didst thou put in such a Drunken week?
If thou wert neer me I would beat thee.
Ser.
Why Sir?
Streps.
Because the week is thicker then the oyl.
Well, at last my good Wife and I betwixt us got
At last this Son; about his name we differ'd;
Shee'd have it something that belong'd to horses,
Callippides, Xanthippus, or Charippus;
I from his Grandfather) Phidontdes.
Long time we wrangled thus, at last agreed
He should be called Phidippides; this Son
She takes, and stroaking kindly, thus instructs him,
"When thou art grown a man, frequent the City,
"Follow the fashion, keep a Coach and Horses,
"Like Megacles thy Uncle. No, said I,
"Go in a homely Coat, and drive thy Goats
"Into
A stony craggy place in Attica, in such Goats delight most. Soli. M. S:
Phelleus, as they father doth.
But my advice prevailed so little on him,
That now he wasts my means in keeping horses,
Which all this night I have been thinking how
To remedy, and now have found the way;
To which could I perswade him, I were happy.
[Page 69] Phidippides, Phidippides,
Phid.
Your will Sir.
Streps.
Kisse me, give me thy hand.
Phid.
Here Sir.
Streps.
Dost love me?
Phid.
By Neptune God of Horses.
Streps.
Do not name
That God, for 'tis from him springs all my sorrow:
But if thou lov'st me truly, heartily,
O son be rul'd.
Phid.
In what should I be rul'd?
Streps.
Change without more delay thy course of life,
And do [...]as I would have thee.
Phid.
What is that?
Streps.
But wilt thou do it?
Phid.
Yes by Bacchus will I.
Streps.
Come hither then, seest thou that little dore?
That is the
[...] Schol. M. S.
Ph [...]ontistherium of wise soules,
Of learned men, that tell us Heaven's an Oven,
And we the Coles inclosed in the wide arch:
They, if we give 'em but a little mony,
Will teach us gain all causes, right or wrong.
Phid.
Who can these be?
Streps.
Their names I know not; good
They are, and busied in continuall study.
Phid.
Oh now I know the wretches that you mean,
The meager, wan, proud, bare-foot, begging fellowes,
Whose evill Geniuss's are Socrates
And Chaerephon.
Streps.
Peace, talk no more so idly;
If you'l obey a father, let me see you
Give ore your horses, and turn one of these.
Phid.
Not I, by Bacchus, no though you should tempt me
With all
[...] Schol. M. [...].
Leogoras his breed of Racers.
Streps.
Dear son be rul'd and learn.
Phid.
What should I learn?
Streps.
'Tis said they have two tongues, and one of them
Able to prove any injustice reason;
Couldst thou but learn that language, we were made,
And might dispute our stubborn Creditours
Out of the debts I have incurr'd for thee;
They get not then a penny more then words.
Phid.
I cannot do't, were I so lean and Pale,
I durst not look a Jocky in the face.
Streps.
By Ceres then you stay with me no longer,
You, nor your Coach-horse, nor your Samphoras,
[Page 70] But all together pack out of my dores.
My Uncle Megacles will neither see
Me nor my horses want, so long I care not.

Scene 2.

Strepsiades, Scholar.
Streps.
THough I have fail'd, i'l not give over thus,
But say my prayers, and go my self to school
To learn this Art: but how can I, by Age
Dull and forget full, reach such subtleties?
Yet on I will, why should I doubt? ho, friend.
Sc [...]ol.
A mischief on you, who's that knocks at dore?
Streps.
Strepsiades, Cecinnian Phaedo's Son.
Schol.
'T was rudely done to knock so hard, y'have made
My labouring brain miscarry of a Notion.
Streps.
Forgive me, I was bred far off ith' Country:
But pray what notion was't that prov'd abortive?
Schol.
'Tis lawfull to discover that tonone
But fellow-scholars.
Streps.
Then you may tell me,
For I come hither to be one of you.
Schol.
I will; so will value't as a mysterie.
Socrates t'other day ask'd Chaerephons eyebrow,
And leap'd from thence upon the head of Socrates.
Streps.
How could he measure this?
Schol.
Most dexterously.
Both feet oth' flea he dipt in melting wax,
Which strait congeals to shooes; these he plucks off,
And with them most exactly measures it.
Streps.
Great Iupiter, how subtle are these wits!
Schol.
If you shouldst hear their other speculations,
You would say so indeed.
Streps.
Pray what was that?
Schol.
This Charaephon the Sphettian ask'd him once,
If a Gnat sounded from her mouth or tail.
Streps.
And what said he?
It had a strait thin gut,
At end of it a bladder, into which
The air being forc'd, sounded in breaking forth.
Streps.
Then I perceive that a gnat's tail's a Trumpet;
How blest is this Anatomist of Gnats!
Sure he can hide himself from purblind justice,
That knows so well these dark intestine waies.
[Page 71] Why should we cry up Thales any longer?
Come open me your Phrontisterium,
And quickly let me see this Socrates,
I long to learn, open the dore—
The School discovered; the Schollars in se­verall postures: Socrates hang­ing in a basket.
O Hercules
What strange beasts have we here!
Schol.
Why do you wonder?
Whom do they look like think you?
Streps.
Like the poor
Lacedaemonian Captives tane at
Suid. lib.
Pylus.
Why look they so intently on the ground?
These seek out things that appertain to Earth!
Oh they seek leeks; trouble your selves no more friends,
For I know better where are good and great ones.
Schol.
Come let's go in.
Streps.
Let's stay a while and talk with 'em.
Schol.
No, no, they cannot long endure the air.
Streps.
What's this, for Heavens sake say?
Schol.
This is Astronomy.
Streps.
And this?
Schol.
Geometry.
Strop.
But what is't good for?
Schol.
To measure land.
Streps.
What, arable or pasture?
Schol.
No, the whole Earth.
Streps.
A pretty jest indeed.
That were a mighty help to husbandmen.
Schol.
Here's all the world, and this is Athens.
Streps.
How?
I'l scarce believe that, what's become oth' Judges?
Where the Cicynians my Countymen?
Schol.
Here; this Eubaea; see how far 'tis stretch'd.
Streps.
I, almost stretch'd in pieces betwixt us,
And Pericles; and where is Lacedaemon?
Schol.
Here.
Strepss.
'Tis too nigh us, why, with all your skill
Do you not help to thrust it farther off.
Schol.
It is not possible.
Streps.
No? you will rue't then.
But what man's that hangs yonder in the basket?
Schol.
That's he.
Streps.
He, what he?
Schol.
Socrates.
Streps.
How, Socrates?
Call him.
Schol.
Call him your self, I'm not at leasure.

Scene. 3.

Strepsiades, Socrates.
Streps.
HO Socrates
Socr.
The words of Silenus (whom Socrates resem­bled for defor­mity) in Pin­dar. Schol.
Why dost thou call me mortall?
Streps.
First I would gladly know what thou dost there?
Socr.
I walk ith' aire, and gaze upon the Sun.
Streps.
Why in a basket dost thou view the Gods,
Not from the ground?
Socr.
I could not elevate
My thoughts to contemplation of these mysteries,
Unlesse my Intellect were thus suspended,
Where my thin thoughts melt into air (their likeness)
Stood I upon the ground, I should find nothing,
Though I sought nere so strictly up and down,
For the magnetick vertue of the Earth
Would draw away the humour of my brain,
Just as we see in nose-smart.
Streps.
How, hows that?
Doth the brain draw the humour out of nose-smart?
Come down sweet Socrates, and teach me quickly
The knowledge of those things for which I came.
Socr.
What camest thou for?
Streps.
To learn the art of speaking,
With debts and usury I'm torn in pieces
Tost up and down; forc'd to pawn all my goods:
Socr.
On what occasion did you run in debt?
Streps.
By horses eaten into this consumption;
And I would learn of you your other language
Which teacheth men to pay nothing: for which
By all the Gods i'l give you what you'l ask.
Socr.
By all what Gods? we do not here allow
Those Gods the City worships.
Streps.
How then swear you,
By copper farthings like the Byzantines?
Socr.
Wouldst thou be skilfull in divine affairs.
Streps.
By Iovr (if any such there be) I would.
Socr.
You must be then acquainted with the Clouds,
Our reverend Goddesses.
Streps.
With all my heart.
Socr.
Sit down upon this Couch then
Streps.
Well.
Socr.
Now take
This Garland.
Streps.
Why a garland? alasse Socrates,
[Page 73] D'ee mean (like Athamas) to sacrifice me?
Socr.
No, these are rites that every one performes
At his admission.
Streps.
But what shall I gain by't?
Socr.
Thou shallt be made most voluble in speech,
A very rattle, bolting words as fine
As flower.
Streps.
Th'art right by Iove, I shall be powderd.
Socr.
silenced old man, and listen to our prayer.
"Great King, unbounded air, whose armes are hurld
"About the surface of this pendant world,
"Bright Aether, reverend Clouds, that from your Sphear
"Thunder and lightning dart, rise and appear.
Streps.
Not yet, not yet, till I have wrapt my selfe
Close in my Cloak, lest I be wet: twas ill
That I forgat to bring my Riding hood.
Socr.
"Your power, great Clouds, make to this suppliant known
"Whether now seated on Olympus Throne,
"Or whether you your sacred revells keep
"In the wide Gardens of your Sire the deep:
"Or of his flowing Christall seaven-mouth'd Nile,
"In golden Ewers wantonly beguile:
"Or in Mauritian marshes keep your Court;
"Or on the snowy top of Mimas sport.
"Come, to our servant vowes propitious be;
"Grace with your presence our solemnitie.
"We humid fleeting Deities,
"The bright unbounded clouds thus rise
"From our old Sire, the grumbling Flood,
Chorus of clouds.
"Above the tallest hill or wood,
"To those high watch-towers, whence we may
"The hallowed fruitfull-ground survey;
"Rivers that in soft murmurs glide,
"And the lowd sea's rebellious tide;
"From thence heavens restlesse eye displaies
"The splendour of his glorious raies,
"Chasing all dusky mists, that we
"In shapes divine may mortalls see.
Socr.
Thanks reverend Clouds for favouring thus our prayer.
Did you not hear 'm speak in Thunder to us?
Streps.
Great Clouds, I worship too, but am so frighted,
I scarce can hold from answering your Thunder.
Socr.
Jest not profanely in such sacred rites:
Peace, for the swarm of Goddesses come singing.
Chor.
"Come virgin Mistresses of showers,
"Let's visit Pallas pregnant bowers,
[Page 74] "The far renowned Cecropian plain
"Where shines the
[...]. at Eleusis in Attica were celebrated the my [...]eries of Ce­res, to which Athenians only were admitted, not strangers; if any one dis covered them to a person not ini­tiated, they were both put to death. Schol. M. S▪
Eleusinian Fane,
"Where are the most retir'd aboads,
"Statues and Temples of the Gods:
"Where Altars blaze with Incense, where
"The holy-day lasts all the year;
"Where the brisk Craces every spring,
"And youths with virgins dance and sing.
Str [...]pe.
Tell me good Socrates, what things are these
That speak so sinely? are they Ladies?
Socr.
No,
They're Clouds, the Deities of idle men;
From these we have our sense, discourse, and reason,
Our high Capriccio's, and elaborate whimseys.
Streps.
My soul, me thought, did leap, while they were spea­king,
And now most subtly would dispute of smoak,
Sharply confute opinion with opinion:
Oh how I long to see them once again.
Socr.
Look yonder towards Parnes, look how gently
They glide to earth.
Stre [...]s.
Where? show me.
Socr.
See in sholes
They creep into the Caverns of the Mountain.
Streps.
What things are these? I cannot yet behold'em.
Socr.
There in the entrance look.
Streps.
Yet I scarce see them.
Socr.
Either thou seest them now, or thou art blind.
Streps.
I do by Iove, great Clouds, for you hold all [...]
Socr.
Didst thou not know these Deities before?
Streps.
Not I, I thought them only mists and vapours:
Socr.
Thou knewest not then those who maintain the Sophists.
Streps.
If these be Clouds, how comes it that they look
Like women? for the Clouds have no such shape.
Srce.
No, what shape have they then?
Streps.
I know not justly;
They look like flying fleeces, but by Iove,
Nothing at all like women; these have noses.
Socr.
The Socratick way of dispute by question.
Answer to what I ask.
Streps.
Ask me quickly.
Socr.
Didst ere behold a Cloud shap'd like a Centaure,
A Leopard, Bull, or Wolfe?
Streps.
I have, what then?
Socr.
The Clouds can take what form they list, as when
They see a hairy fellow curl'd like Clitus,
They mock his madnesse in a Centaures shape.
Streps.
And when they see one that defrauds or plunders
The Common-wealth, like Sinon, what then do they?
Socr.
[Page 75]
They do resemble him, turn ravenous wolves,
This was the reason yesterday, when they
Beheld
Coward.
Cleonymus, they fled like deer:
And seeing
E [...]eminately attired.
Clisth [...]nes are now turn'd women.
Streps.
Great Queens, if you ere design to speak to mortalls,
Make me acquainted with your rumbling voice.
Chor.
"All hail old man, who dost on wisdome prey,
"And thou the Priest of subtle trifles say,
"What wouldst thou have with us, to none but thee,
"Of all the Meteor Sophists thus stoop we;
"Save [...]rodicus, to him as grave and wise,
"To thee, because thou walkst upright, thy eye [...]
"Rowling on every side, thy look severe
"And barefoot many miseries dost bear.
Streps.
Good heavens, what voice is this, how strange & stately.
Socr.
These are our Goddesses▪ the rest are toyes.
Streps,
Is then Olympian Iove no Deity?
Socr.
What Iove? there's no such thing; meer fancy.
Streps.
How?
Whence then proceeds all
Whereof Iupi­ter was the par­ticular Deity; thence sirnamed [...]
rain?
Socr.
Only from these.
Didst thou ere see a shower without them? take
The Clouds away, and heaven must rain fair weather.
Streps.
By Phoebus thou hast cleer'd it well, till now
I thought Iove made water through a [...]ive.
But whence comes thunder? when I'me sick, that frights me,
These thunder as they tumble up and down.
How can that be?
Socr.
Deriding So­crates as igno­rant in Naturall Philosophy.
When they are full of water,
By their won weight, driven upon one another,
They roar and break.
Streps.
But who is it that drives them,
Is not that Iove?
Socr.
No, an aetheriall whirlewind.
Streps.
A whirle-wind, hum! I knew not that til now.
But whence comes lightning then, that glittering fire
Which terrifies and burns us? Iupiter
Useth to dart this down on perjur'd men.
Socr.
And how (thou phlegmatick, dull Saturnine,)
If darted on the perjur'd, how comes Sinon,
Theorus, and Cleonymus to scapeit?
No, his own Temple, or the Sunian Promontory,
Or sturdy Oakes he strikes, did they ere wrong him?
Did the Oak ere forswear it selfe?
Streps.
I know not:
That which you say seems reason; but what then
Is lightning?
Socr.
[Page 76]
When the winds are shut up close,
They swell the clouds like bladders, and at last
Break out with violence and horrid noises;
And by contrition kindle one another.
But thou who searchest amongst us for wisdom,
How happy wilt thou be above all Graecians
If thou conceive well, and remember, and
Canst suffer much, and never wilt be tir'd
Standing or walking, nor have sense of frost,
Nor care for dyning, and refrain from wine,
From exercises, and all other toyes.
Streps.
O for a solid soul restlesse with cares,
Sparing, self-torturing, one that can feast
Upon a dish of herbes, you never could
Be better [...]itted; a meer an vile I.
Socr.
Dost thou believe no Gods but those we teach,
The Chaos, Clouds and Tongue, onely these three.
Streps.
I'l not so much as speak of any other,
Much lesse bestow an offering on their Altars.
Chor.
"Say boldy then, say what is thy request,
"For if thou honour us thou shalt be blest.
Streps.
Great Queens I sue for a small matter, that
I may out-talk all Greeks a hundred furlongs.
Chor.
To thee alone this gift we will allow,
None speak such mighty sentences as Thou.
Streps.
I do not care for mighty sentences,
But subtle ones to cheat my Creditours.
Chor.
It is not much thou askst, and shalt obtain it,
‘Learn of our Ministers and thou shalt gain it.’
Streps.
I shall, relying on your promise; forc'd
By want, Co [...]patia and a lucklesse match.
Now let'em use me as they list, beat, starve me,
Burn, freeze, or flea me, so I scape my debts:
I care not though men call me impudent,
Smooth-tongu'd, audacious, petulant▪ abhominable,
Forger of words and lie, contentious Barretour,
Old, winding, bragging, testy, crafty fox.
Socr.
Said like a man of courage; if thou learn
Of me, thy fame shall spread wide as the Heavens▪
Streps.
What shall I do?
Socr.
Thou shalt spend all thy time
With me; a life the happiest in the world.
Streps.
I long to see that day.
Socr.
Thy dore shall alwaies
Be throng'd with Clients that will come to thee
For Counsell, and discourse of cases worth
The wealth of kingdoms, to thy h [...]arts desire.
Chor.
[Page 77]
"Try this old man; first see if he be sit;
"Put him toth' test, and sound the depth of's wit.
Socr.
Come tell me now your disposition,
That when I know it I may sit my Machines
Accordingly.
Streps.
You will not undermine me.
Socr.
No, I would know if you have any memory.
Streps.
Yes, when another owes me any thing,
I can remember very well, but what
I owe my self, i'm ready to forget.
Socr.
Hast thou a naturall faculty in speaking
Streps.
No, I can mar words sooner far then make'em.
Socr.
How wilt thou learn then?
Streps.
Fear me not, I tell you
Wel, when I make some learned deep discourse.
Socr.
As the Schol­lers of Socrates used, especially Xenephon and Plato.
You must be sure to catch't up presently.
Streps.
What must I snap at learning like a dog?
Socr.
This is a very fool, an unknown Clown;
I am afraid old man thou wilt need whipping.
What if thou shouldst be beaten?
Streps.
Then i'm beaten.
Socr.
But what wouldst do?
Streps.
I would take witnesse on't
And sue them on an action of Battery.
Socr.
Off with your Cloak.
Streps.
Why, how have I offended?
Socr.
No; but our orders admit none but naked.
Streps.
I came not hither to steal any thing.
Socr.
Down with your Cloak, why dost thou trifle.
Streps.
Now
Tell me if I prove apt and diligent,
Of all your schollars who shall I come nighest?
Socr.
Thou maist perhaps be like our Chaerephon.
Streps.
Alasse, alasse! what an Anatomy?
Socr.
No, no: but if thou wilt be any thing,
Follow me without more delay.
Streps.
I want
A Cake for your Cerberus; I go me thinks
As if 'twere into the Trophonian Cave.
Socr.
On, on, why stayst thou gazing at the dore.
Chor.
"Go, for thy courage blest whose aged mind
"To wisdom soars, and leaves the young behind.

Act. 2.

Socrates, Strepsiades.
Socr.
BY Chaos, and this air I breath, I never
Met any thing so stupid as this fellow,
So clownish and oblivious; easie toyes
He learns, not half so fast as he forgets'em,
I'l call him forth; what, ho, Strepsiades;
Come out and bring your bed along with you.
Str.
The fleas will hardly let me bring my self.
So.
Quick, down with't there; and mark what I say to you.
Str.
I'm ready.
So.
What have you most mind to learn,
Measures, or Verse, or Rhyme?
Str.
By all means measures;
For I was cheated by a Meal-man lately
Two pecks.
So.
That's not the thing I demand;
I'de know [...]which you conceive the fairest measure.
The Trimeter or the Tetrameter.
Str.
The fairest measure in my mind's a Bushell.
So.
'Tis nothing that you say.
Str.
What will you lay
That your Tetrameter holds not a Bushell.
So.
Away, away, how dull thou art, and blockish,
But thou wilt be perhaps more apt at Rime.
Str.
What help can rimes afford me in my meal.
So.
First they wil make thee pleasant in all company.
Then thou shalt know which suits with Anapaestick,
And which with Dactyles.
Str.
Dactiles? I know that sure.
So.
Why what's a Dactyle.
Str.
What but this same [...]inger,
[...]Thas been a Dactyle ere since I was a child.
So.
Th'art an unprofitable Dunce.
Str.
I care not
For learning these devices.
So.
What then wouldst thou?
Str.
That, that unjust and cheating Sophistry.
So.
But there are things that must be learnt before
You come to that; what Creatures are there Masculine.
Str.
Sure I know that or I were mad indeed.
A Ram, a Bull, a Goat, a Dog, a Pigeon.
So.
[Page 79]
Deriding So­crates a [...] igno­rant in Gram­mer.
See how thou err'st, that call'st both male and female
A Pigeon.
Str.
Right, by Neptune, how then must I?
So.
Call this a Cock-Pigeon, and that a Hen.
Str.
A Pigeon, Cock and Hen, ha! by this air,
For this sole document, I will replenish
Your
A meal-trough the Greek word hath a Mascu­line termination but feminine article.
Cardopus with meal.
So.
Again th'art wrong;
Thou call'st it Cardopus, but 'tis haec Cardopus,
And therefore henceforth call it Cardopa.
Next it is fit you know which names are Masculine,
And which are feminine.
Str.
I know well which
Are feminine, I'me sure.
So.
Lets hear.
Str.
Philina,
Cletagora, Demetria, and Lystha.
So.
And which are Masculine?
Str.
A world, Philoxenus,
Milesias, and Amynias.
So.
Thou art out.
Str.
Are not these Masculine with you?
So.
Esseminate Cowards.
By no means.
How if you saw Amynias, would you call him?
Str.
Amynia, ho!
So.
What, make a woman of him.
Str.
And reason good, h'has thrown away his armes,
And will not [...]ight, But to what purpose learn I
These common trifles.
So.
Not so common neither,
But come, lie down.
Str.
What must I do?
So.
Consider
With your selfe the businesse that concernes you.
Str.
Not in this bed, I thank you, if I must
Lie down, Ile meditate upon the ground.
So.
But heres no room besides.
Str.
Wretch that I am.
How I shall be tormented with these [...]leas!
So.
Now think into the depth of thy affairs,
Try every turn and winding, every double;
And if you stick at any thing: give't ore,
And to some other; but be sure you sleep not,
Str.
Oh, oh.
So.
How now the matter?
Str.
I am kill'd
By these blood-suckers, these Corinthians.
So.
[Page 80]
Do not torment your selfe.
Str.
How can I choose
When I have neither mony left, nor colour,
Scarce life, no shooes, grown almost to a Ghost
With watching?
So.
Now what think y'on, nothing?
Str.
Yes
By Neptune.
So.
What?
Str.
I'me thinking if the fleas
Will leave a piece of me or not.
So.
Death on thee.
Str.
You might have spar'd your curse, I'm dead already.
So.
Fy, fy, you must not be so tender,
So Socrates disputes in [...]la­to's Phadrus, that exteriour objects might not divert him; which Aristo­phanes here de­rides.
cover
Your face, and study for some subtle cheat.
Str.
Would I could learn to cheat these wicked fleas.
So.
Let's see what does he? what, asleep, ha'ye thought
Of nothing yet?
Str.
What would you have me think on?
So.
What would you learn?
Str.
I've told you that already
A thousand times; I'd learn to pay no use-mony.
So.
Come then, cover your self, and subtilize
Your thoughts, dissect your businesse into Atomes.
Str.
Alasse.
So.
Ly still; and if you stick at any thing,
Passe by't a while, and come to it again.
Str.
Ho, my dear Socrates.
So.
What is't old man?
Str.
I have found out that will do't.
So.
As how.
Str.
First tell me
Where I may meet with some Thessalian witch;
For I would steal the Moon one of these nights,
And having got her, lock her in a chest
As charily, as I would keep a glasse.
So.
What wilt thou get by that?
Str.
What, if the Moon
Ne'r rise again, I'me bound to pay no use.
So.
How so?
Str.
'Cause use you know is paid by th'Month,
So.
'Tis well, but I'le propound another businesse;
Suppose that you were tyed upon a statute
To pay five Talents, could you rase figures?
Str.
I know not, but I'le try.
So.
You must not limit
Your thoughts so narrowly within your selfe,
[Page 81] But like a beetle fetter'd in a thread,
Allow them play and flutter in the air;
Str.
I ha't, I ha't, the rarest way to cancell
A deed, as you'l confesse when you have heard it.
So.
What iis't?
Str.
Did you nere see at any Grocers
A clear transparant stone, with which they use
To kindle fire?
So.
You mean a burning-glasse.
Stro.
The very same.
So.
What wouldst thou do with it?
Str.
Whilst that the Scrivener writes the deed, d'ee mark,
Thus standing by him with my burning glasse
Against the Sun, I'l burn out every letter.
So.
Wisely by all the Graces.
Str.
How I long
To cancell thus a bond of fifty pound.
So.
'Tis well, now tell me if thy adversary
Sue thee, and thou art like to be orethrown
For want of witnesses, how wilt thou 'void
His suit.
Str.
Most easily.
So.
Which way?
Str.
Before
It comes to judgement, I would hang my self.
So.
Push, thou sayst nothing.
Str.
Yes, by love there's none
Will prosecute a suit against the dead.
So.
Away, thou fool'st; i'l teach no more.
Str.
Why dear Socrates,
Why?
So.
Thou forget'st as fast as thou canst learn.
Tell me the first thing thou wert taught to day:
Str.
The first, stay let me see; the first thing say you?
How call you that we use to put our meal in?
Wretch, Iv'e forget it!
So.
See, deserv'st thou not
Forget full to be punish'd for a dunce.
Str.
Alasse what shall I do? for if I learn not
The cheating language, I am quite undone:
Good Clouds advise me what course I shall take.
Cho.
"If an ingenious son thou hast at home,
"Thou hadst best send him hither in thy room.
Str.
I have a son, and he's ingenious too;
But will not learn, the more my misery.
Cho.
And wilt thou suffer't?
Str.
Of a promising person
[Page 82] His mother is a woman of great spirit;
Once more Ile try; if he refuse, i'I make
No more adoe but turn him out of dores;
Stay but a while, I will be quickly back.

Act. 3.

Strepsi [...]des, Phidippides, Socrates.
Str.
NOw by the Clouds thou staist no longer here?
Hence, and go feed in Megacles his stable.
Ph.
Alasse what fury hath possest you Father?
By Iove I think you are besides your self.
Str.
See, see, he swears by Iove, art thou not mad
At these years to believe there is a Iove?
Ph.
Is truth to be derided?
Str.
Well I see
Th'art still a Child and credit'st old wives tales.
But come I will tell thee that shall make thee
A man, so you be sure to tell it no body.
Ph.
Pretty; what is't?
Str.
Thou swor'st e'en now by Iove.
Ph.
I did so.
Str.
See how good it is to learn;
There's no such thing as Iove.
Ph.
What then?
Str.
A whirlwind
Hath blown Iove quite away and rules all Heaven.
Ph.
What fooleries are these?
Str.
They're serious truth son.
Ph.
Who tells you so?
Str.
Our Socrates the
A [...] if he should say, the Atheist: for the Melians were infamous for Atheism for Diagoras who profest it: So­crates was Scholar to A­ristoras a Melian. See chap. 3.
Melian,
And Chaerephon, that trace the steps of fleas.
Ph.
How, are you grown to such a height of madness,
As to believe such melancholy dreamers.
Str.
Good words: defame not men of such deep wisdom
And subtle spirits; these live sparingly,
Are never at the charges of of a Barber,
Unguents, or Baths, whereas thou wasts my means
As freely as if I were dead already.
Come then, and be their scholler in my room.
Ph.
What can be learnt that's good of such as they are?
Str.
All things that are accompted wisdom Boy;
And first to know thy self, and what a dunce
Thou art, how blockish, rustick and forgetfull.
But stay a little, cover thy face a while.
Ph.
[Page 83]
Alasse my fathers mad, what shall I do,
Accuse him to the Court of folly,
Be speak a Coffin for him, for he talks
Idly, as he were drawing on?
Str.
Come on now.
Let's see, what that?
Ph.
A Pigeon.
Str.
Good; and that?
Ph.
A Pigeon.
Str.
Both the same? ridiculous.
Take heed you make not such mistakes hereafter.
This you must call a Cock, and that a Hen.
Ph.
A Hen? Is this the goodly learning Father
You got since your admission 'mongst these earth-wormes?
Str.
This and a great deal more; but being old,
I soon forget what I am taught.
Ph.
I think
'Twas want of memory made you lose your cloak.
Str.
No, 'tis hung up upon the arts and sciences;
Ph.
And where your shooes?
Str.
Lost for the common good,
Like Pericles: But lets be gone and see
You learn t'obey me, and to wrong all else.
Remember that I bought thee, when thou wert
But six yeers old, a little Cart to play with.
Ph.
Alasse you'l be the first that will repent this.
Str.
Take you no care for that; do as I bid you.
Ho, Socrates, I've brought my son at last,
Though much against his will.
So.
I, that's because
He's rude, untaught, a child of ignorance,
And unacquainted with our hungry baskets.
Ph.
Go hang your self in one of them.
Str.
How impudence; dost thou talk thus to thy Master?
Socr.
So go hang, with what a seeming grace was that pro­nounc'd!
How do you think that he should ever learn
To overthrow a nimble adversary,
Or win a Judges heart with Rhetorick?
Str.
Fear not, but teach him; he's ingenious
By Nature; for when he was but a little one,
Hee'd build you houses, and make leather Coaches,
And ships, and cut frogs out of apple parings.
What's your opinion then? do you not think
Hee's capable to learn both languages?
Or if not both, be sure he learn the worse.
Socr.
Well, we shall try what may be done with him,
Str.
Farewell, and so remember that in all
I say that's just, you learn to contradict me.

Act. 3.

Scoen. 1.

Strepsiades.
Streps.
THe
From the twentieth day of the month they reckon'd back­ward, see the life of Solons Chap.
fift, the fourth, the third, the seconds, hum.
The most abhord and dreadfull day's at hand,
The old and new; all I ow money to
Threaten to sue and vow my utter ruine;
Yet I require nothing but what is just reason:
My friend forbear me till some other times;
But they all answer me, words are no payment,
Revile me, swear they'l put their bonds in suit,
And let'em, what care I, so my Phidippides
Have learnt the art of cheating: I shall know straight;
It is but knocking at the school, ho son.

Scoen. 2.

Strepsiades, Socrates.
Socr.
SAve you Strepsiades.
Streps.
The like to you.
Such guif [...]s Socrates some­times accepted, though not mo­ney. See Chap.
First take this bag of meal, for it is fit
We pay our duty to our reverend Master,
Now tell me, has my son attain'd the art
For which I plac'd him with you.
Socr.
Yes exactly.
Streps.
Thanks to deceit, the Queen that governs all things.
Socr.
Now you may overthrow all adversaries.
Streps.
What though a witnesse swear that I have borrowed.
Socr.
I though a thousand swear't.
Streps.
Iò. Iò.
Triumph my boyes, wo to you money-mongers,
You and your bonds, your use on use may hang now,
You'l trouble me no more! O what a son
Have I, that senceth with a two-edg'd tongue,
My Houses prop and Guardian, my foes terrour,
Quickly come forth, and meet my glad embraces,
Come forth and hear thy Father.
Socr.
See the man.
Streps.
O my dear boy!
Socr.
Away and take him with you.

Scoene. 3.

Strepsiades, Phidippides.
Streps.
IO my son! O how I joy to see
Thy chang'd complexion! Thou lookst now me thinks
As if thou wert inspir'd with contradiction
I read, [...] erosse questions in thy very face,
Thy very eyes me thinks say, how, how's that?
Thou canst perswade the world that thou art wrong'd,
When thou art, he that does the wrong. I see't,
I plainly see't; a very
[...] Schol. M. S.
Attick mine;
Now let it be thy study to recover
Him, whom thou almost hast undone,
Phid.
Why, what
Is that you fear?
Streps.
The old and the new day.
Phid.
Can one and the same day be old and new?
Streps.
I know that: I'm sure my Creditors
By joint consent that day threaten to sue me.
Phi [...].
They'l loose by it if they do: for 'tis impossible
To make two daies of one.
Streps.
How is't impossible?
Phil.
As for a woman to be old and young
At once.
Streps.
But law has so determined it
Phil.
But these men know not what the law doth mean.
Streps.
Why what's the meaning of it.
See the life of Solon. Ch [...]p.
Phil.
Antient Solon
Was naturally a lover of the people.
Streps.
What's that to this?
Phid.
He did appoint two daies,
The last day of the old month for citation,
The first oth' new for payment of the money.
Streps.
But why the last day for citations?
Phil.
That
The debtor having thus one day of warning
Might fly and shun the trouble of the next.
So.
Why do the Magistrates then take all forfeits
Upon the old and new day?
Ph.
They are hungry,
And tast their meat before they should fall too.
Str.
We the fools that sit still and do nothing,
We that are wise and quick have done the businesse;
Ye blocks, ye stones, ye sheep, ye empty bubbles;
Let me congratulate this son of min
[Page 86] My selfe and my good fortune in a song.
Now Strepsiades th'art blest
Of the most discreet the best,
What a Son thou hast, now may
All my aemulous neighbours say,
When they hear that he alone
Hath my creditours orethrown.
But come my boy, now thou shalt feast with me,

Sect. 4.

Pasias, Strepsiades, Witnesse.
Pas.
ANd must a man be outed of his own thus?
Better take any course then suffer this.
You must assist me in this businesse neighbour,
That I may call my debtor to accompt;
There's one friend made a foe; yet I'le not shame
My country, ere I do't, I'le give him warning.
Strepsiades.
Streps.
How now, what would you have?
Pas.
The old and new daies come.
Streps.
Bear witnesse friend,
He nam'd two daies. What summe is't you demand.
Pas.
Twelve pounds you borrow'd when you bought your
Son
A Race-horse; with the interest.
Streps.
A race-horse,
You know I neer car'd for'em in my life.
Pas.
And swor'st by Iove and all the Gods to pay it.
Streps.
By Iove? 'twas then before my son had learn't
The all-convincing speech.
Pas.
You'l not deny't.
Streps.
What have I got but that, for all this learning?
Pas.
Darst thou deny't, if I should put thee to
Thy oath, and make thee call the Gods to witness it?
Streps.
What Gods de'e mean?
Pas.
Iove, Mercury, and Neptune.
Streps.
By Iove? yes that I will I hold thee three pence.
Pas.
Curse on thee for this impudence.
Streps.
If thou wert rubb'd with salt, 'twould make thy wit
the quicker.
Pas.
De'laugh at me?
Streps.
Thou wilt take up six bushells.
Pas.
So help me Iupiter, and all the Gods,
I will even be with you for this scorn.
Streps.
I am extreamly taken with your Gods,
And this same Iupiter [...] you swear by, they
Are excellent pastime to a knowing man.
Pas.
[Page 87]
Well, you will one day answer for these words.
But tell me, whether I shall have my money
Or not, give my answer, and I'me gone.
Streps.
Stay but a little, I will answer presently,
And plainly.
Pas.
Sure hee's gone to fetch the mony
Streps.
Where is the Man that comes to ask me mony?
Tell me, what's this?
Pas.
That which it is, a Cardopus.
Streps.
You ask for mony, and so very a dunce;
I'le never whilst I live pay him a penny.
That calls a Cardopa a Cardopus.
Pas.
You will not pay then?
Streps.
Not for ought I know:
You'l stay no longer, pray about your businesse.
Pas.
Yes, I'le be gone, but in the mean time know
I'le have my mony, if I live this day.
Streps.
You may chance go without it; yet I'm sorry
You should be punish'd so for a mistake.
For saying Cardopus for Cardopa.

Scoen. 8.

Amynias, Strepsiades, Witnesse.
Amyn.
OH, oh, alasse.
Streps.
Who's that keeps such a bawling?
What art thou? one of
Which were Xenocles, Xe­notimus, and D [...]motimus, [...]agick [...]oets and Actors.
Carkinus his sons?
Amyn.
'Tis I unhappy!
Streps.
Keep it to thy selfe.
Amyn.
Unlucky chance, oh cruell destiny,
To spoil at once my Cart and all my Horses [...]
This and the following line are takes from Xenocles the Tragadian, which is the reason of Strep­siades his an­swer.
Oh Pallas, how unkindly hast thou us'd me?
Streps.
What hurt did ere Tlepolemus do thee?
Amyn.
Deride me not, but rather bid your son
Pay me the mony which he had of me,
For I was never in more need of it.
Streps.
What mony man?
Amyn.
That which he borrowed of me.
Streps.
Then I perceive you're in a sad condition.
Am.
I had a scurvy fall driving my horses.
Streps.
Thou dost but jest, 'twas driving an Asse rather.
Amyn.
I do not jest when I demand my mony.
Streps.
Upon my word thou art not right.
Amyn.
How so?
Streps.
Thy brain me thinks is troubled.
Amyn.
E [...]ther pay me
[Page 88] My money strait, or I will trouble you.
Streps.
Tell me, doth Iove beget and send down rain.
Or doth the Sun exhale it from the sea?
Amyn.
I neither know nor care.
Streps.
What? are you sit
To receive mony, and so ignorant
Of these sublime and subtle mysteries?
Amyn.
Well, if you cannot let me have the principal,
Pay me the interest.
Streps.
Interest, what kind
Of creature's that?
Amyn.
What, but th'encrease of mony
By months, and daies, as time runs on.
Streps.
'Tis well.
And do you think the sea is fuller now
Then 'twas at first?
Amyn.
No, not a drop, it is
Not fit it should.
Streps.
The sea by your confession
Is nothing grown; then with what conscience
Can you desire your mony should encrease.
Go get you from my doores, fetch me a whip there.
Witn.
Well, I'le bear witnesse for him.
Streps.
Why de'e not go, will you move
The Horses name which he bought of him.
Samphoras?
Amyn.
Is not this riotous?
Streps.
Will you be gone?
Or shall I lead you in a chain, and make you
Shew tricks? if you but stay a little longer,
I'le send you, and your Cart and Horses packing.
Chor.
"Now observe what 'tis to bend
"Studies to an evill end
"This old man, that is intent
"Creditours to circumvent,
"Foolishly himselfe hath crost,
"And will find so to his cost;
"That in this false Art his son
"Hath attain'd perfection:
"Justice cunning to refute)
"That at last hee'l wish him mute.

Act. 5.

Scene. 1.

Strepsiades, Phidippides.
Streps.
O Neighbours, Kinsmen, Countrymen, help, help,
I'm beat all all over: oh my head, my back [...]
Thou strik'st thy Father Rogue.
Phid.
I do so father.
Streps.
See, see, he stands in't too.
Phid.
I do indeed.
Streps.
Thief, villain, Patricide.
Phid.
More I beseech you,
I am much taken with these pretty Titles.
Streps.
Rascall,
Phid.
Pray stick me fuller of these roses:
Streps.
Dost beat thy Father?
Phid.
Yes, by Iove, and justly.
Streps.
Oh' rogue what justice can there be in that.
Phid.
I will demonstrate it by argument.
Streps.
By argument?
Phid.
Most easily, which language
Shall I dispute in.
Streps.
Language?
Phid.
Yes the greater
Or lesser?
Streps.
I have bred thee well indeed
If thou canst make this good, that any son
May beat his Father.
Phid.
You'l confesse as much
If I so prove it, that you cannot answer't.
Streps.
Well, I will hear for once what you can say.

Scoen. 2.

Chorus, Streps, Phidip.
Cho.
"OLd man it much concerns you to confute
"Your son, whose confidence appears to suit
"With a just cause; how happen'd this dispute?
Str.
I shall relate it from the first; as soon
As we had din'd, I took a lute and bid him
Sing the sheep-shearing of Simonides,
He told me 'twas an old and ugly fashio [...]
[Page 90] To sing at dinner like a millers wife.
Phi.
And was not this sufficient to deserve
A beating; when you'd make men chirp like
At noon Virg­ecl. 2.
Grasse-hoppers?
Str.
Just so he said within; and added that
Simonides was an unpleasant Poet.
I must confesse I hardly could forbear him;
But then I bid him take a Myrtle, branch,
And act some piece of Aeschylus, that Aechylus
Saith he, is of all Poets the absurdest,
The harshest, most disorderly and bumbast.
Did not my heart pant at this language think you?
Yet I represt it; Then said I, rehearse
A learned speech out of some modern wit;
He strait repeats out of Euripides
A tedious long Oration, how the Brother
(Good Heavens) did violate his sisters bed.
Here I confesse I could contain no longer
But chid him sharply; to dispute we went,
Words upon words till he at last to blowes,
To strike, to pull, to tear me.
Phi.
And not justly?
You that would discommend Euripides,
The wisest of all Poets.
Str.
Wisest? ah
What did I say, I shall be beat agen.
Ph.
By Iove, and you deserve't.
Str.
How, deserve it?
Ungratefull wretch, have I not brought thee up,
Fed and maintain'd thee from a little one,
Supplied thy wants? how then can I deserve it?
Chor.
"Now I believe each youthfull breast
"With expectation possest,
"That if the glory of the day
"Be from the Plantiffe born away,
"By this example they may all
"Upon the old men heavy fall;
"What you have done with utmost art,
"To justifie is now your part.
Phid.
How sweet it is to study, sage new things;
And to contemn all fundamental lawes!
When I applied my mind to Horse-coursing
I could not speak three words but I was out;
Now since I gave it one, I am acquainted
With ponderous sentences and subtle reasons,
Able to prove I ought to beat my Father.
Str.
Nay, follow racing still, for I had rather
Maintain thy horses then be beaten thus.
Phid.
[Page 91]
I will begin where you did interrupt me,
And first will ask, did you not beat me when
I was a child?
Streps.
But that was out of love.
Phid.
'Tis very right, tell me then, ought not I
To recompence your love with equall love;
If to be beaten be to be belov'd,
Why should I suffer stripes, and you have none?
I am by nature born as free as you;
Nor is it fit the sons should be chastiz'd,
and not their parents.
Str.
Why?
Phid.
You urge the Law,
That doth allow all children to be beaten:
To which I answer, Old men are twice children.
And therefore ought, when they offend, be punish'd
As well as we,
Str.
But there's no Law that saies
The Parents should be punished.
Phid.
Was not he
Who made that Law, a man as you and I,
He form'd a Law, which all the old men follow'd;
Why may not I as well prescribe another,
And all the young men follow my advice:
But all the blowes before this Law was made
Must be forgiven wihtout all dispute.
Besides, mark how the Cocks and other creatures
Fight with their sires, who differ not at all
From us, save only that they make no lawes.
Streps.
Why then if you will imitate the Cocks,
Do you not dine upon a Dunghill, and
Lodge in a hen-roost?
Phid.
'Tis not all one case,
Our Socrates doth not approve so far.
Streps.
Approve not then their sighting, but in this
Thou plead'st against thy selfe.
Phid.
How so?
Streps.
Because
Th'authority I exercise o're thee
Will be thine own, when ere thou hast a son.
Phid.
But if I ne'r have any, then I never
Shall have authority, and you will go
To th'grave deriding me.
Streps.
'Tis too much reason.
Phid.
Hear now another argument.
Streps.
I'me lost.
Phid.
And then perhaps you'l take the blowes I gave you
[Page 92] Not halfe so ill.
Streps.
What good shall I get by them?
Phid.
I'le bent my mother too.
Streps.
What sayest thou, thou?
Why this is worse then t'other.
Phid.
What if I
Prove by the second language that I ought?
Streps.
Why then you will have nothing more to do
But prove that you, and your wise Socrates,
And wiser language may hang all together.
O Clouds, all this I suffer through your means,
For I in you wholly repos'd my trust.
Chor.
"Thy selfe art author of this misery,
"Because to ill thou didst thy mind apply.
Streps.
Why did you then give me no warning of it?
You know I was a rude and aged man.
Chor.
"This is our custome, whensoere we find
"Any to malice or deceit enclin'd,
"Into some dreadful mischief such we thrust,
"That they may fear the Gods, and learn what's just.
Streps.
Alasse, this is a mischief, and a just one,
For I ought not, when I had borrow'd mony,
To seek out wayes t'avoid restoring it.
Come then my son, let us be reveng'd
Upon that wicked Socrates and Ch [...]raephon,
Who have abus'd us both.
Phid.
I will not wrong
My Masters.
Streps.
Reverence Celestiall Iove.
Phid.
Celestiall Iove, see how you rave now father▪
There's no such thing as Iove.
Streps.
There is.
Phid.
Act. 3.
A whirle-wind
Hath blown Iove quite away, and rules all.
Streps.
No son, he's not expell'd, I was but fool'd
To worhip in his room a fictile deity.
Phid.
Nay if you will needs be mad, be mad alone.

Scoen. 3.

Strepsiades.
Streps.
MAd that I was to trust in Socrates,
And cast off all our Gods; good Mercury
Be not displeas'd or punish, but forgive me.
That took such paines, and studied to talk idly;
And tell me what I'de best do with these fellowes.
[Page 93] Sue them or punish'em some other way—
Th'art in the right, I will not sue them then,
But as thou bidst me set their Nest on fire;
Come Xanthias, come, a fork and ladder quickly.
Get up and pluck the house about their Ears,
Quick if thou lovest thy master; one of you
Go light a torch, and bring it hither strait:
Proud as they are I mean to bring'em lower,

Scoen. 4.

Scholar, Strepsiades, Socrates, Chaerephon.
Schol.
OH, oh!
Strep.
Torch to thy work, set fire apace.
Schol.
What art thou doing man?
Streps.
That which I'm doing;
Disputing somewhat hotly with your school here.
Schol.
Alasse, who's this that sets our house on fire?
Streps.
He whom you cosen'd of his cloak.
Schol.
Thou kill'st,
Thou kil'lst us man.
Streps.
That is the thing I mean,
If my fork hold and ladder, do not fail me.
So.
How now, what do you make on our house-ridge.
Streps.
Act. 2. [...]. 3.
I walk i'th air and gaze upon the Sun.
So.
Alasse I'm choak'd.
Streps.
Why dost thou scorn the Gods then?
Chaer.
Oh me I burn;
Streps.
Now you may [...] calculate
The motions of the Moon; tear, pluck, beat, burn'em.
For many reasons they deserve the flame,
But most because they did the Gods disclaim.
XENOPHON

XENOPHON.

CHAP. I.
Xenophon, his Country Parents, and follow­ing of Socrates.

Xenophon was an Atheni [...]n, Lae [...]. son of Cryllus, of the Erchiean Tribe: The time of his birth is no where expressely delivered: Laert. Stesiclides affirms he died the first year of the 105. Olympiad. de Longave. Lucian that he outlived 90. years: whence it is evident that hee was born at or before the first year of the 82. Olympiad, which if the learned Causabone had observed, he had not Anima [...]. [...]. 12. alter'd Athenaeus upon supposition, that he was but ten years old, the fourth year of the 89. Olympiad (the time of his Symposium) where­as he was then no lesse then 36. years of age. Laertius saith, he flourished the fourth year of the 94. Olympiad. (Suidas reads, of the 98.) Or, according to others, that he flourished in the 89. Olympi­ad with the rest of the Socratick Philosophers; of whom he became one upon this accident.

Laert. Meeting Socrates in a narrow lane, hee stopt him with his staffe, and asked him where all kind of meats were to be sold; to which Socrates made a serious answer: and then demanded of him, where it was that men were made good and virtuous! whereat Xenophon pausing, follow me then, saith he, and learn; from thence forward he became a Disciple of Socrates.

In the time of that great war betwixt the Lacedaemonians and Athenians, called the Peloponnesian war (the naturall for­wardnesse of his spirit being perhaps excited by the example of his Master Socrates) hee was personally engaged in the fight before Delium, the first year of the 89. Olympiad [...] wherein the Boeotians overcame the Athenians; in which defeat Strab. 9. Laert. Xenophon in the flight unhorsed and thrown, down, Socrates (who his horse being likewise slain under him, fought on foot) took him upon his shoulders and and carried him many furlongs, untill the Enemy gave over the pursuit. This was the first essay of his military profession, which he afterward resum'd upon this occasion.

CHAP. 2.
Vpon what occasion he followed Cyrus into Asia.

Xenoph. expe­dit cyr. lib. 1. ARtaxerxes succeeded Darius his Father in the Kingdom of Persia, Cyrus his younger brother having been sent for out of his Government of Lyd [...]a upon his fathers sicknesse, which is that first [...] placed by the Arundelian stone in the second year of the 93. Olympiad, confounded by Ad Gre [...]. Epoch. c [...]n. Chron. pag. 113. a learned person with the latter, six years after) was imprison'd by his brother upon the accusation of Tissaphernes, but released by the mediation of his Mother Parysa [...]is. Being returned to his Government, he used all secret means to strengthen himselfe. the Ionian Cities were delivered to Tissaphernes by Artaxer­xes, but revolted to him, all except Myletus. His pretences for levying forces were, the Garrisoning of those Cities, and his opposing Tissaphernes: Clearchus likewise raised for him many in Chersonesus, upon pretence of warring against the Thracians. He privately also kept an Army on foot in Thessaly under A­ristippus: and Proxenus of Boeotia brought him forces as against the Pisidians; this Proxenus (who had been scholar to Gorgias the Leontine, and Xen. lib. 3. guest to Xenophon) sent to invite him to Cyrus, assuring him he should be of more esteem with him then of his own Country: Xenophon consulted with Socrates about this let­ter, who doubting that if he took part with Cyrus, the Athenians would be disples'd with him ( Cyrus having before aided the Lacedemonians against them) counsell'd him to ask the advice of the Delphian Oracle. Xenophon went thither, and demanded of Apollo to which of the Gods he should address his vowes and sacrifice for the good successe of his intended journey. Hee was answer'd, that he should sacrifice to those Gods to whom it was due: Returning to Athens, he imparted this Oracle to So­crates, who blam'd him, because he had not demanded whether it was best to stay or no, but (as already determined to goe) how he might best perform his journey; Neverthelesse (saith he) since you have so proposed your demand, you must do as the Gods command: Xenophon having sacrificed according to the Oracles direction, took shipping, and at Sardis found Prox­enus and Cyrus ready for their expedition into Asia, and was immediately recommended to Cyrus, being by both earnestly intreated to stay: hee continued with him Xen. lib. 3. not in any com­mand, but as a volunteer, Chio. Epist. ad Metrid. In which condition he did not any thing misbeseeming a souldier, whereupon he was in the num­ber of those whom Cyrus esteem'd most.

Xenoph. lib. 1. Cyrus having drawn all his forces together, marched up and [Page 97] gave battle to Artax [...]rxes (in the beginning of the fourth year Laert. of the nintie fourth Olympiad, when Xenenetus was Archon) at Cunaxa, five hundred Stadia from Babylon, by the River Eu­phrates. Whilst he was viewing both Armies, he told Xenophon, who rode up to him, that the sacrifices were auspicious; then Xenophon gave him the Grecians word, Iupiter the pres [...]ruer. The Greeks prevailed against Tissaphernes; but Cyrus assaulting, the King, was through his too much forwardnesse [...]lain; the Grecians thinking themselves Masters of the field, and Cyrus to be alive, returned to their Camp, which they found rif [...]ed by the enemy. Xenoph. lib. 2. The next day the King sending Phalinus to them, to deliver their armes, Xenophon answered, ‘That they had [...] nothing left but their armes and valour; as long as they kept their armes, they might use their valour, sur­rendring them, they were not Masters of themselves; It were indiscretion (saith he) to surrender what we have left, since thereby perhaps we may make our selves Masters of what you have.’ Phalinus smiling, replyed; ‘Young man, you look and speak like a Philosopher; but assure your selfe, your valour will not over-master the Kings power.’ Clearchus re­turned this answer for the whole Army, ‘If we be esteemed friends, it will be better for him that we are armed, if ene­mies, better for our selves.’ Tissaphernes having made a Truce with Clearchus, perfidiously got him with foure other Com­manders, Proxenus, Menon, ( Laert. with whom Xenophon had parti­cular enmity) Agias, and Socrates, twenty Captains of Cohorts, and two hundred common souldiers into his power; and de­livering them up to the King, they were beheaded. The Greeks being summoned to lay down their armes, pretending that Clearchus was executed for treason discovered by Menon and Proxenus, who were very highly rewarded. Xenophon required to have them sent, who were fittest to direct them, being friends to both; whereto the Persians not able to answer, de­parted.

CHAP. III.
How he brought off the Grecian Army.

Xe [...]ph. lib. 3; THe Greeks finding themselves in such a strait, were in despair ever to see their Country again. Xenophon cal­ling together the Officers of Proxenus, told them, ‘They were not to expect any mercy from the King, who had shewen none to the body of his dead brother, having fastned his head and hand to a Gibbet, and that they must reslove to put their safetie in their armes.’ Apollonides a B [...]eotian al­ledg'd, that there was no means of safety but in the Kings fa­vour [Page 98] and began to reckon the dangers wherewith they were surrounded. Xenophon answered. ‘That when upon the death of Cyrus, they marched up to the Kings armies, he laboured for a cessation, but when their Captains went to him unarm­ed, he abused them; and that Apollonides deserved to be ca­shierd, as the dishonour of his Nation.’ Agasthias replyed, (which words Laertius ascribes to Xenophon) ‘he was an incon­siderable fellow, whose ears were boared as the slaves of Ly­dia: So they turned him out.’ Having called together all the Commanders, Xenophon advised them to chuse new in the room of those that were lost, of whom he was elected in the place of Proxenus: Hereupon he put on his richest habit, as fittest either for death or victory, for Aelian. var. hist. 3. 24. his greatest delight was in fair polished armes, affirming, that if he overcame, he deserved such, if he were overcome and died in the field, they would decently expresse his quality, and were the fittest sepulchrall ornaments of a valiant man. His shield was of Argos, his breast­plate of Altica, his helmet of B [...]eotia, his horse of Epidaurium; whereby Aelian argued the elegance of the person, in choosing such things as were fair, and esteeming him worthy of such. Thus adorned, he made an oration to the Army, advising them (from the examples of their late commanders) not to trust the enemy, but in order to their return, to burn their Cariages, and Tents: this advice was put in execution; Cherisophus a Lacedae­monian had charge of the Van, Xenophon of the Reer, chosen (saith) Chio as well for his courage as wisdome, being in both excellent: betwixt these two there grew so great a friendship, that in all the time of the retreat they never had but one diffe­rence; their march was directed towards the heads of those great rivers which lay in their way, that they might passe them where they were fordable; having crost the River Zathe, Mi­thridates came up to them, and galled the Reer with shot, which the Greeks not able to requite, Xenophon provided two hun­dred slings, and finding fifty horses fit for service, imployed among the Carriage, mounted men upon them, whereby ha­ving frustrated the second attempt of Mithridates, they mar­ched to Larissa, seated upon Tigris, thence to Mespila; in their march from thence, Tissaphernes overtook them with a great Army, but was twice worsted; whereupon (as the securest course) he seized on a Mountain, under which they must of necessity passe; Xenophon with a party gained by another way the top of that Mountain, not without much difficulty of pas­sage and trouble; and to animate his souldiers, one of them, named Soteridas, murmured that he was on horse-back, where­as himselfe marched on foot, opprest with the weight of his shield; which Xenophon hearing, alighted, took his shield from him, and thrusting him out of his rank, marched (notwith­standing [Page 99] he had also a horse-man Cuirasse) in his room: But the souldiers beat and reviled Soteridas, till they constrained him to take again his shield and place. When they had gained the top, the enemy, being prevented fled, and set fire on the villages. Xenoph. lib. 4. The Grecians, (intercepted by the River Tigris) marched over the mountains into the Country of the Carduchi, a people enemy to the Persians, rough and warlike, from whom they found such opposition, that in seven daies march through their country, they were put to continuall fights, and suffe­red more distresses then the Persian had put them to, Fording the River K [...]ntrites, which bounds that country, they passed into Armenia, where having put to flight some troops of horse raised by the Kings deputies in these parts to oppose their pas­sage, they marched without disturbance to the heads of Tigris, which they passed; thence to the River of Tele [...]od in west Ar­menia, molested with extream snowes, losing many by extre­mity of cold, till they came to the River Phasis, neer which li­ved the Phasiani, Tacc [...]i, and the Chalybes; the Tacchi into whose country they first came, conveying their provision into strong holds, reduced the Greeks to great want, untill with much paines they forced one of them, where they took as much Cattle as maintained them in their passage through the coun­try of the Chalybes, a stout Nation, of whom they could get nothing but blowes: thence they marched to the River Har­pasus, so to the Scy [...]hini, where the Lord of Gymnias, a town in those parts, led them through the enemies country (which he willed them to burn as they went) to the Mountain Theches [...], from whence they might behold the sea, to the great joy of the souldiers. Passing friendly through the country of the Ma­crones, to the Colchian Mountains, discom [...]iting the Colchi, who opposed them, they arived at T [...]aprezond, a City upon the Eu­xine sea, where was a Greek Colony; here they sacrificed and celebrated games: Xenoph. lib. [...]. Cherisophus they sent to Anaxibius, the Lace­daemonian Admirall, (with whom he was intimate) to procure ships for their transportation home. Whilest they stayed in ex­pectation of his return, they maintained themselves by incur­sions upon the Colchi and Dryla [...]; but he not coming, and their provision failing, Xenophon perswaded the Cities adjoyning to cleer them a passage by Land, which they took to Cerasus a Greek City, where mustering their men, they found but eight thousand six hundred left of ten thousand that went up with Cyrus; the rest consumed by enemies, snow, and sicknesse: They shared the mony that had been made by the sale of Captives, reserving a tenth for a offering to Apollo and Diana: Xenophon reserved his to be disposed at Delphi and Ephesus, From Cerasus they passed through the Country of the Mosyna [...]ci, a barbarous people, divided into factions; the stronger part despising their [Page 100] friendship, they joyned with the weaker, whom they left Ma­ster of all: Then they marched to the Chalybes, thence to the Tibarenes, passing quietly through their Country to Cotyora, a Greek Town and Colony of the Sinopians Thus far the Ar­my marched on foot; the distance of the place where they fought with Artax [...]rxes to Cotyora, being one hundred twenty two encampings, six hundred twenty parasangs, ten thousand eight hundred twenty furlongs, the time eight Months.

Those of Cotyora refusing to afford them a Market or enter­tainment for their sick, they entered the Town by force, and took provision, partly out of Pap [...]lagonia, partly out of the Ter­ritory of the Cotyonites; whereupon the City of S [...]nope to which Cotyora was tributary, sent Ambassadours to them, complain­ing of this dealing, and threating to joyne with Corylas and the Paphlagonians; whereto Xenophon answered, ‘that they fear­ed not, if need were, to war against them both, but could, if they pleased, gain the friendship of Corylas and the Paphla­gonians as well as they.’ Upon which answer, the Ambassa­dours growing calm, promised them all friendship from the State of Sinope, and to assist them with shipping for the whole Army, it being impossible to go by Land, by reason of the Ri­vers [...]hermod [...], Halys, [...]is and Parthenius.

Xenophon had designed to plant a Colony there, but his in­tention being divulg'd by Silanus, a Sooth-sayer, those of Sinope, and Heraclea sent to the Grecians, promising them not only a sufficient fleet, but desiring under hand Timasion a Greek Commander to promise the Army a good summe of mony to convey them to Tro [...]; which offers Xenophon (who only desired the common good) perswaded them to accept, and to engage mutually, not to forsake one another till they were all in safe­tie: those of Heraclea sent shipping, but not the mony; whereupon Timasion and other commanders fearing the soul­diers, desired Zenophon the Army might go to Phasis, which he refused, but thereby was occasion'd a suspition that he should plot to deceive the Army and to bring them back to Phasis, whereof he acquitted himselfe. Here a generall inquisition was made of all offences since the death of Cyrus, and they were punished; some accused Xenophon for beating them, all which proved for just causes, one for offering to bury his sick com­panion alive; some for forsaking their ranks; others for lying on the ground in the snow, or lingring behind. Thus were all things quietly setled.

CAAP. IV.
End of the Retreat.

THe Greeks, assoon as their fleet was ready, Xenoph. lib. 6. set sail for Harmond, the Port of Stnope, when Chirisophus met them with some Galleyes from Anaxibius, who promised them pay as soon as they should come into Greece. The Army desirous of a Generall, intreated Xenophon (with extraordinary testimony of affection) to accept that command: Xen [...]phon refused, either disswaded by inauspicious sacrifice, or unwilling to displease the Lacedaemonians, in putting by Chir sophus, who was there­upon chosen, but soon after deposed, for refusing to ex­tort a great summe from Heraclea, a Greek City, their friends: Xenophon also denying to be employed therein the Army thereupon became divided; they chose ten Captains out of themselves, with Chirisophus remained two thousand one hundred, with Xenophon two thousand foot and forty horse; Chirisophus went by land to meet Cleander Governour of Bizan­ti [...]m, at the mouth of the River Calphas▪ leaving such shipping as he had to Xenophon who landing in the confines of Thrace, and of the Heraclean Country, marched quietly through the midst of the land: the Mutineers landing at Calphas, surprised and spoyled the country thereabout; the Thracians rising up against them, cut off two Regiments, and besieged the hill where the rest encamped, Xenophon on the way being inform­ed of the desperate condition of these Greeks, went directly to the place, setting on fire as he went all that was combusti­ble; the enemy fearing to be set upon in the night, stole away, as did the Greeks also, whom Xenophon overtaking in the way to the Port of Calphas, they embraced him with great joy, and ariving at the Haven, made a decree, that it should be death for any man to propound to divide the Army, and that they should depart the Country in their first order. The former Commanders being restored in the room of Chi­risophus who died, they substituted Neon, who going forth with two thousand men to pillage the Country, was discomfitted by Pharnabazus Lievtenant to the King of Persia, and lost five hundred men; rest rescued by Xenophon, the Army by his encouragement marched through a large Forest defeating Pharnabazus, who opposed their passage there. Cleander came over to them, and having expressed much kindnesse to Xeno­phon, and contracted hospitality with him, departed. The Ar­my marched through Bythinia to Chrysopolis in the territories of Chalcedon. Xenoph. lib. 7. Thence Anaxibius the Lacedemonian▪ Admirall transported them to Byzantium, where hee had promised they [Page 102] should as soon as they arrived receive pay, without which hee sent them out of the City, whereat the souldiers incensed, returned and entred the City by force, intending to spoil it: but Xenophon thrusting himself amongst the croud, disswaded them, and appeased the tumult, as it particularly attested by In [...]pis [...]ola ad [...]. Chio an eye-witnesse. By this means they were brought to depart the City quietly, which as soon as they had done, Xenophon de­sirous to go home, took leave of the Army, and returned to By­zantium with Cleander. Anaxibius being put out of the Admiral­ship, and thereupon slighted by Pharnabazus (at whose instiga­tion he had treated the Greeks so hardly) desired Xenophon to return to the Army to lead them to Perinthus, whence they should be transported into Asia; The Army received him with much joy: when they came to Perinthus, Aristarchus the Gover­nour would not suffer them to be transported: Seuth [...]s King of Thrace had invited them to aid him against Medocus, usurper of his Kingdom, with large offers of money to every souldier, of his daughter to Xenophon: to him therefore not knowing where to winter they went. At supper every one (according to the custom) drunk to the King, and made him a present: Xeno­phon, who sate next him, rising up, and taking the cup, told him, ‘he gave him himself & all his Companions to be his faithful friends, and ready servants in the recovery of his Kingdom:’ Herin their assistance did much advantage Seuthes: the Army wanting pay, Xenophon reproved Heraclides for not taking order about it; who threupon endeavoured to work him out of favour with Seuthes, to whom he brought the rest of the Com­manders, counselling them to say, that if need were, they could lead the Army upon service as well as Xenophon; but they joint­ly protested unto Seuthes, they would not serve at all without him: So he sent for Xenophon also, and being agreed to proceed, they march'd towards the Country of the Melinophagi as far as Salmydesson: which places having reduced, they returend to the plaines of Selybria: thither came Chaminus a Lacedemonian, Polinicus sent from Thymbro▪ who told them that the Lacedemo­nians had designed war against T [...]ssaphernes, the charge thereof was committed to Thymbro, who desir'd this Army of Greeks to assist them, promising them good pay. Seuthes willingly yielded the Army into their hands; they sent Xenophon to demand their areares, which not without much importunity hee obtained. Thence they failed to Lampsacus, where Euclides a soothsayer of Xenophons acquaintance asked him, how much Gold he had brought? Xenophon protested hee had not had enough to carry him home, but that he sold his horse and other things which he had about him. The next day they marched to Ophryn [...]um, whither came Bito and Euclides to pay the Army; they being Xenophons friends, restored (refusing the price of redempti­on) [Page 103] his horse which he much loved, and had pawned at Lamp­sa [...]us. Then marching forward by A [...]ra [...]yttium, and Kertonium; not Far from A [...]arna to the plain of C [...]ious, they reached Per­gamus a Citty of Lydia. Here Hellas wife of Gongylus an Eretrian; mother of Gorgion, and Gongylus entertained Xenophon: By her information Xenophon surprised Asidates a rich Persian, with his wife and children, and all his goods: Returning to Pergamus, the Lacedaemonians, Captains ans Souldiers, by agreement gave him also an extraordinary share of horses, oxen, and other things; then came Thymbro, and taking the Army, joyn'd it to the rest of the Grecian forces, wherewith he made war against Tissapher [...]s.

Of the Kings Provinces, through which they passed, the Go­vernours were these; A [...]tim [...]s of Lydia, Artacam [...]s of Phrygia, Mi­ [...]ridates of Lacaonia, and Cappodocia; of Cilicia; Which per­haps was a common name to the Kings of that Country, as Ptolomy to those of Aepypt▪ see Thales chap. Syennesis: of Phaenicia and Arabia, Dernes; of Syria and Assyria, Belesis: of Baby­lonia, Roparas: of Media, Arbacas, of the Phasiani and Hesperitae, Te [...]ibazus, the Carduchi, Chalybes, Chaldaeans, Macrones, Colch [...], Mo­synaechi, Coeti, and Tibareni are free Nations; Paphlagonia gover­ned by Coryla; the Bithynians by Pharnabazus, the Europaean Thracians by Senthes; The totall number of the Ascent and De­scent is two hundred & fifteen encampings, one thousand one hundred & fifty parasangs, thirty four thousand two hundred fifty five furlongs; the time of the Ascent and Descent one year and three months.

CHAP. V.
His following of Agesilaus, and banishment.

Laert. AF [...]er this expedition the defeat in Pontus, and breach of pro­mise of Senthes King of the Odrysians; Xenophon went into Asia with Agesilaus King of the Lacedaemonians, to whom he delivered for a sum of money the souldiers of Cyrus, and beloved infinitely, [...]as [...] Aemilius Probus saith, he conversed intimately with him: [...]lcero, that he instructed him. Plutarch affirms, that by his advice Agesilaus sent his sonns to be educated at Sparta, to learn and art them, which none was more excellent how to obey and command. Agesilaus. passed into Asia the first year of 96▪ Olympiad; He warred successefully with the Persian, but the year following was call­ed home by the Lacedaemonians to help his Country invaded by the Thebans, and their allies, whom the Persian had corrup­ted, thereby to withdraw the war out of his Country. Xenophon in his returning with Agesilaus out of Asia into Boeotia, appre­hending the danger of the war they were entring into, when he came to Ephesus left one half of the gold Supr. chap. 36. which he had re­served for an offring out of his share (of [...] the money which the [Page 104] Army divided at Cerasunt in their return the expedition of Cyrus,) with Megabyzus Diana's Priest, willing that if he esca­ped the danger of that war, it should be restored to him, if he miscarried, consecrated to Diana, and either made into an Image dedicated to the goddesse, or disposed some way that he should conceive nmost acceptable to her: the other half hee sent an offring to the Athenian treasury at Delphi, Xenoph. lib. 5. inscribing thereon both his own name, and that of Proxenus, his prede­cessor in the command of that Regiment. Agesilaus returning, wasted Boeotia, and overcame the Thebans and their allies in a great battell at Coronea Agesil particualrly described by Xenophon, who was there present.

During the absence of Xenophon out of his own Country, the Athenians (because he took part against the King of Persia, their friend, & followed Cyrus,, who had assisted the Lacedemonians a­gainst them, [...] supplying Lysander their General with mony for a Navy) proclaimed a decree of bainshment against him: Laert. Ister saith, he was banished by the decree of Eubulus, and called home by the same; Laertius, that he was banish'd for Laconism, upon his going to Agesilaus; Some place this decree in the third year of the 96. Olimpiad, but the writer of the History of Cyrus, his ex­pedition inplyeth, that it was before his first return out of Asia, affirming that before the delivery of the Army to Thymbro, Xe­nophon ignorant of this decree, intended to have gone home.

CHAP. VI.
How [...]e lived at Scilluns, and at Cotinth.

THe Lacedemonians to requite him for suffring in their cause, Laert. Paus [...]n. Eliac. maintained him at the publique charge, and pur­chasing Scilluns of the Eleans, built a Town there, and bestow­ed a fair house and land upon Xenophon, whereupon hee left Agesilaus and went thither, carrying with him his wife named Philesia, and his two sons which he had by Suid. her, Diodorus and Gryllus, called the Dioscuri. Laert. Pelop [...]das a Spartan [...] sent him Captives for slaves from Dardanus for a present, to dispose of them as should please him.

Scilluns was near Olympia, Xenoph. de ex­ped. Cyr. 5. Laert. eminent for celebration of the Games, which Megabyzus coming to see restored to Xenophon the money which he had left in his custody, wherewith [...]trab. 8. by ad­vice of the Oracle he purchased a portion of land, and conse­crated it to Diana in a place designed by Apollo, through which ran the River Selinus, of the same name with that at Ephesus, running by Diana's Temple; the River was stored as well with shell-fish as others, the land with all kind of beasts for game; [Page 105] he built also a Temple, and after with the consecrated money offering the tithes of the fruits of the land to Diana, all the Ci­tzens and Neighbours, men and women, were invited to the feast, where they had from the Goddesses allowance, bread, wine, and part of the flesh of such beasts as was either taken out of the consecrated ground, and sacrificed, or killed in hunt­ing with the Sons of Xenophon and other Citizens exercised a­gainst the time of the feast out of the sacred ground, and out of Phaloe were taken wild Boars, Goats, and Staggs; the place lies in the way betwixt Lacedaemonia and Olympia, twenty Sta­dia from the Temple of Olympian Iupiter. In the sacred ground were woods and hills, stored with trees sufficient to maintain swine, Goats and sheep, whereby the beasts of carri­age of such Merchants as come to the feast are maintained plentifully: about the Temple a Grove of fruit-trees of all sorts. The Temple was an imitation in little of that at Ephesus: an image of Cypresse here resembling that of Gold there: A Pillar near the Temble bare this inscription, GROUNDS A­CRED DIANA. HE WHO POSSESSETH IT LET HIM PAY THE TITHE OF HIS YEARLY ENCREASE, AND WITH THE SURPLUS AGE MAINI AIN THE TEMPLE, IF HE NEGLECT, THE GODDESSE WILL TAKE ORDER FOR IT. Laert. At this place. of retirement Xenophon employed his time in hunting, and writing Histories, inviting his friends thither. Epist. Socra­tic. 1 [...]. of whom a­mongst others came Phaedo and Aristippus, much delighted with the situation, building, and trees planted by the hand of the owner.

Laert. At length a war arising betwixt the Eleans and Lacedae­monians, the Eleans invaded Scilluns with a great Army, and before the Lacedemonians came to their reliefe, seized on the house & lands of Xenophon; His sons with some few servants got away privately to Lepreum; Xenophon first to Elis, then to Lepre­um to his sons, and lastly with them to Corinth, where he took a house and continued the rest of his life. During this time the Argives, Arcadians, and Thebans, jointly opposed the Lace­demonians, and had almost opprest them, when the Athenians made a publique decree ( G [...]c. [...]. mentioned by a Xenophon) to suc­cour them; Xenophon sent his Sonns upon the expedition to A­thens, to fight for the Lacedemonians; for (as Diocles affirms) they had been educated at Sparta in the discipline of that place.

This enmity ended in a great battle at Mantinea in the se­cond year of the hundreth and fourth Olympiad: Diodorus without acting any thing memorable, gave off safe, and had afterwards a son of his brothers name. Gryllus was ranked op­posite to the Theban horse-men: the Thebans having by the valour of their Generall Ep [...]minondas got the better of the day, a resolute company of Spartan horse-men broke in upon him, [Page 106] of whom was Gryllus, who slew Epaminondas with his own hand, as Pausanias affirmes to have been attested both by the Athenians, and the Thebans, adding, that he had seen at Ahtens a picture of the battle at Mantinea, confirming the same; and that at Mantin [...]a was erected a Pillar with the statue of Gryllus on horseback. In this noble action Gryllus lost his life, the newes of whose death came to Xenophon at Corinth, as he was sacrificing, Laert. Aelian. var. hist. 3. 3. D. [...] [...]pi­taph. Nepot. ad Heliod. Stob. Serm. 106. Crowned with a Garland; as soon as he heard his son was slain, he took off his Garland, and laid it aside; then demanding after what manner he died, it was answered, sigh­ting stoutly in the midst of his enemies, of whom, having slain many, he fell at last himselfe: Hereupon Xenophon took again his Garland, and putting it upon his head, proceeded to sa­crifice, not so much as shedding one tear, only saying I knew that I had begot a mortall; Val. Max. 5. 10. and calling the Gods to whom he sa­crificed to witnesse, that the vertue of his son gave him more cōtent, then his death sorrow. Laert. citing Aristotle Innumerable were the Epitaphs and Encomiums that were written upon Gryllus, to please Xe­nophon whence may be collected in how great esteem he was.

That he made a visit to Dionysius Tyrant of Sicily (but at what time is uncertain) is implied by Deipnos. lib. 10. Athenaeus, who relateth, that being at a feast of his, compelled by the Cup-bearer to drink, he called the Tyrant by name: ‘What is the matter Dyonysius (saith he) your Cook though excellent in that art doth not enforce us to eat against our inclination?’

CHAP. VII.
His Death, Person, Vertues.

Xenophon being Laert. full of years (which according to De long [...]v. Lucian ex­ceeded ninety) died at Corinth, in the first of the hundreth and fifth Olympiad, Callidemus, or Callimedes being Archon, at what time Philip son of Amintas began his raign in Macedonia. He had an ingenious modest look, long, thick hair, handsome (to use the words of Laertius) beyond expression, Adroit in eve­ry thing, particularly addicted to horses and hunting skilfull in Tacticks, as his writings attest; devout, a great lo [...]er of sacrifices, skilfull in in­terpreting them; an exact imitatour of Socrates, temperate, as ap­pears from his saying that Athen. de­ip [...]. 4. It is pleasant: hungry, to eat herbs; thirsty, to drink water. So candid and ingenious, that Laert. when he might have stollen the writings of Thucydides which lay con­cealed, he chose rather to publish them with honour.

In a word, he was a person every was absolute, as well for action, as contemplation. Xenophon.(saith Pro [...]m. Eunapius) was the only man of all the Philosophers who adorned Philosophy with his words [Page 107] and actions; he describes morall [...] in his discourses and writings: in his ac [...]ions he was singular; as to his conduct, a most excellen [...] Gene­rall. Alexander had not be [...]n great, i [...] Xenophon had not said, even the perfunctory actions of valtant persons ought to be recorded.

Laert He was the first that committed the disputes of Socrates his Master to writing, and that with much sidelity, not inserting excursions of his own, as Plato did, whom for that reason, as Lib. 14. [...]gellius observes, he argueth of falsehood; that there was a great enmity betwixt these two is affirmed by the same Au­thor; who, as a proof thereof alledgeth, that neither of them, names the other in any of their writings: De Histor. Graec. 1. 5. only observes, that Xenophon mentions Plato once in his [...], over­seen by Agellius. This enmity is further acknowledged by Lib. 3. Athenaeus and Laertius, confirmed by the Epistle of Xeno [...]hon to Aeschines, wherein he condemnes Plato, that not being satis­fied with the Doctrine of Socra [...]es, he went to the Pythagore­ans in Italy, and to the Aegyptian Priests; arguments of a mind not constant to Socrates. That he was at difference with Laert. vit. Aristipp. Ari­stippus also, argued from his writings.

Laertius hath two Epigrams concerning him, the first upon his going with Cyrus into upper Asia.

Great Xenophon at once made two ascents,
To Asia in person, and to Heaven by fame:
His stile and action (lasting Monuments)
Lay to Soc [...]atic-wisdome equall claime.

The other upon his banishment.

Thee the Cecropians, noble Xenophon,
Banish'd the [...]r land, 'cause Cyrus [...]hou didst aid;
But strangers prov'd far kinder then thy own:
What Athens ow'd thee, was by Corinth paid

Laerti [...]s reckons seven Xenophons, this the first, the second and Athenian, brother to Nicostratus, Author of the Theses; besides many other things, he writ the lives of Pelo [...]idas and Epaminon­das; the third, a Physician of Coos; the fourth writer of the History of Hannibal: the fifth, writer of fabulous Monsters: the sixt, of Paros a statuary: the seventh, an old Comick Poet: Suidas reckons three more; one of Antioch, the second of Ephe­sus, the third of Cyprus: Historians, or rather writers of Ro­mances; that of the first called Babylonica, of the second Ephesi­ica in ten books; of the third Cypriaca: the story of Cynaras, Myrrha, and Adonis.

CHAP. VIII.
His writings.

DIonysius Halicarnassaeus saith, that Xenophon was a studious aemulatour of Herodotus, both in words and language: His stile (according to Cicero) Brut. & de oratore. lib. 2. soft and Orator. sw [...]et (melle dulcior) s [...] [...]ffering from the noise of Oratours in the Forum: in his voice, Cic Orat. the Mu­ses seem to speak, whence he was sirnamed the Attick Muse; or according to others, the Attick Bee, a Title formerly conferr'd on Vit. Sophocl. Sophocles. His stile and manner of writting isat large discoursed upon by Aristides, Adrianensis in an expresse tract, erroneously ascribed to Hermogenes.

The Books of Xenophon (which Cicer. Tusc. quaest. 3. Scipio Africanus had alwaies in his hand, and De senect. Cicero adviseth to read, as very profitable in many things) were (as reckoned by La [...]rtius) fortie, which seve­rall persons distinguish severally; hte generall titles these.

[...] the li [...]e and discipline of Cyrus (as Cicero renders it) in eight books, written non ad historiae [...]idem (though Lib. 15. Diodorus Siculus seems to take it in that quality) sed ad effigiem justi imper [...]i; no [...] as a faithfull History, but the description of an exact Prince: Whence Grat. act. Ausonius saith, in relating the vertues of Cyrus, he hath given rather a wish then a history, describing, not what he was, but what he ought to have been.

[...]; the going up of Cyrus the younger into Asia, in se­ven Books; each of which (as Laertius observes) hath a Pro­oem, the whole none: Masius suspects that Xenophon was not the Author of this book; the Bishop of Annal. Armach ascribes it to The­mistogenes, though owned as Xenophons by Plutarch, Cicero, Diony­sius Halycarnaessuus, Hermogenes, Laertius, Athenaeus, and others.

[...]; the Greek History, in seven books, continuing where Thucydides left; the same was done by Theopompus, but he went nor further then sixteen yeers, Xenophon to fortie eight.

Agesilaus, of which piece Cicero saith, that Agesilaus would not suffer his picture or statue to be made, this book alone surpasseth all pi­ctures or images in his praise.

The Republick of the Lacedaemonians, and the Republick of the Athe­nians, which Laert. denieth to be Xenophons.

The defence of Socrates, and them emorialls of Socrates, which perhaps is that history of Philosophers mentioned by Suidas.

Oeconomicks, the last book of the memorable discourses, wherewith Office. 2. Cicero was so much delighted, that in his younger yeers he translated it.

Symposium, accommodated to the fourth yeer of the eighty [Page 109] ninth Olympiad, for which reason reprehended by Athenae­us, as erroneous in Chronology; vindicated by the learned Casaubon.

Hie [...]ro, Or, of a Kingdome.

The accompts of revenues.

Of Horses.

Of Horsemanship.

Of Hunting.

Epistles.

Besides these which are extant, Xenophon seemes to have written other things; 8. 13. Valerius Maximus and 7. 48. Pliny cite his Per [...]plus.

There is a treatise of Aequivokes under Xenophon's name, but made and imposed upon the world by Annius.

XENOPHONS EPISTLES.

stob. se [...]. To Aeschines. Epist. 1.

MEeting with Hermogenes, amongst other things I asked him what Philosophy you followed, he answered, the same as Socrates. For this inclination I admired you, when you lived at Athens, and now continue the same admiration for your constancy above other students of wisdom; The great­est argument to me of your virtue is, your being taken with that man, if we may call the life of Socrates mortall. That there are divine beings over us all know: wee worship them as ex­ceeding us in power; what they are is neither easie to find, nor lawfull to enquire. It concerns not servants to examine the Nature and actions of their Masters, their duty is onely to obey them; and which is most considerable, the more admira­tion they deserve who busie themselves in those things which belong to man; the more trouble this brings them, who affect glory in vain unseasonable objects: For when ( Aeschines) did any man hear Socrates discourse of the Heavens, or advise his Schollers to Mathematicall Demonstrations? we know he un­derstood Musick no further then the Ear: But was alwaies dis­coursing to his friends of some thing excellent; what is forti­tude and justice and other virtues. These he called the proper good of mankind; other things he said men could not arrive at; or they were of kin to fables, such ridiculous things as are taught by the supercilious professours of wisdom. Nor did hee onely teach this; his practice was answerable; of which I have written at large elsewhere, what I hope will not be unpleasing to you, (though you know it already) to peruse. Let Meaning Pla­to, who added much of his own to the discour ses of Socrates and went to Aegypt, Italy, and Sicily. those who are not satisfied with what Socrates delivered, give over upon this conviction, or confine themselves to what is proba­ble. Living, hee was attested wise by the Deity; Dead, his Murtherers could find no expiation by repentance: But these extraordinary persons affect Aegypt and the prodigious learn­ing of Pythago [...]as, which unnecessary study argueth them of inconstancy towards Socrates, as doth also their love of Ty­rants, and preferring the luxury of a Sicilian table before a fru­gal life.

To Crito. Epist. 2.

Socrates often told us, Stob. serm. 201. that they who provide mcuh wealth for their Children, but neglect to improve them by vertue, do like those who feed their horses high, and never train them to the manage: by this means their horses are the better in case, but the worse for service, whereas the commendations of a horse consists not in his being fat, but serviceable in war. In the same kind erre they who purchase Lands for their Children, but neglect their persons; Their possessions will be of great va­lue, themsleves of none, whereas the owner ought to be more honourable then his estate. Whosoevever therefore breeds his Son well, though he leave him little, gives him much: It is the mind which makes him great or small: whatsoever they have to the good seems sufficient, to the rude too little. You leave your Children no more then necessitie requires, which they being well educated will esteem plentifull. The ignorant though free from present trouble, have nothing the lesse fear for the future.

To Sotira. Epist. 3.

Stob. serm. 892. DEath in my opinion is neither good nor ill, but the end of the life, not alike to all, for as stronger or weaker from their birth, their years are unequall; sometimes death is hastned by good or evill causes: and again? Stob. serm. 278. Neither is it fitting to grieve so much for death, knowing that birth is the begin­ning of mans Pilgrimage, death the end. Hee died, as all men (though never so unwilling) must do: but to die well, is the part of a willing and well educated' person. Happy was Gryllus, and whosoever else chooseth not the longest life, but the most virtuous; though his (it pleased God) was short.

To Lamprocles. Epist. 4.

You must first approve the excellent assertion of Socrates, Stob. that Riches are to he measured by their use. He called not large possessions riches, but so much onely as is necessary; in the judgement whereof he advised us not to be deceived, these he called truly rich, the rest poor, labouring under an incurable poverty of mind, not estate.

Epist. Socra­tic. 18. Epist. 5.

THey who Allatius o­therwis [...]. write in praise of my Son Gryllus, did as they ought; and you likewise do well in writing to us the acti­ons of Socrates; wee ought not onely to endeavour to be good our selves, but to praise him who lived chastly, piously, and justly; and to blame fortune, and those who plotted against him, who ere long will receive the punishment thereof. The Lacedaemonians are much incensed at it, (for the ill newes is come hither already) and reproach our people, saying, they are mad again, in that they could be wrought upon to put him to death whom Pythia declared the wisest of men. If any of Socrates friends want those things which I sent, give me notice, and I will help them, for it is just and honest; you do well in in keeping Aeschines with you, as you send me word. I have a design to collect the sayings and actions of S [...]crates, which will be his best apology, both now and for the future, not in the Court where the Athenians are Judges, but to all who consider the virtue of the man. If we should not write this freely, it were a sin against friendship and the truth. Even now there fell into my hands a piece of Plato's to that effect, wherein is the name of Socrates, and some discourse of his not unpleasant. *But we must professe that we heard not, nor can commit to writing any thing in that kind, for we are not Poets as hee is, though he renounce Poetry; for amidst his entertainments with beautiful persons, he affirmed that there was not any Po­em of his extant, but one of Socrates, young and handsome: Farewell, both dearest to me.

Epist. Socra­tick▪ 21. Epist. 6.

INtending to celebrate the feast of Diana, to whom we have erected a Temple, we sent to invite you hither; If all of you would come, it were much the best, otherwise if you send such as you can conveniently spare to assist at our sacrifice, you will do us a favour. A [...]istippus was here, and (before him) Phaedo, who were much pleased with the scituation and stru­cture, but above all, with the plantation which I have made with my own hands. The place is stored with beasts, conveni­ent for hunting, which the Goddesse affects; Let us rejoice and give thanks to her who preserved me from the King of the Barbarians, and afterwards in Pontus and Thrace from greater evills, even when we thought wee were out of the Enemies reach. Though you come not, yet am I obliged to write to you. I have composed some memorialls of Socrates, when they are [Page 113] perfect you shall have them. Aristippus and Phaedo did not disap­prove of them; Salute in my name Simon▪ the leather-dresser, and commend him that hee continueth Socratick discourses, not diverted by want, or his trade from Philosophy, as some others, who decline to know and admire such discourses and their effects.

Epist. Socra­tic. 19. Epist. 7.

COme to us dear friend, for we have now finished the Tem­ple of Diana, a magnificent structure, the place set with trees and consecrated, what remains will be sufficient to main­tain us; for as Socrates said, if they are not fit for us, we will fit our selves to them; I writ to Gryllus my son and your friend to supply your occasions, I writ to Gryllus, because of a little one you have profest a kindnesse for him.

To Xantippe. Epist. Socratic. 21. Epist. 8.

TO Euphron of Megara I delivered six measures of meale, eight drachmes, and a new rayment for your use this winter: accept them and know that Euclid and Terpsion are ex­ceeding good, honest persons, very affectionate to you and So­cra [...]es; If your sons have a desire to come to me, hinder them not, for the journey to Mega [...]a is neither long nor incommodi­ous: Pray forbear to weep any more, it may do hurt, but can­not help. Remember what Socrates said, follow his practise and precepts; In grieving you will but wrong your self and chil­dren; They are the young ones of Socra [...]es, whom we are obli­ged not onely to maintain, but to preserve our selves for their sakes: lest if you or I, or any other, who after the death of Socra­crates ought to look to his Children, should fail, they might want a Guardian to maintain and protect them. I study to live for them, which you will not do unlesse you cherish your self. Grief is one of those things which are opposite to life, for by it the living are prejudiced. Apollodorus The reason manifest from Xenophon and Laertius, who describe him such; Xenophon calls him [...], Apologe Socrat.) in all things but his affection to Socrates▪ Leo Allatius is much perplext concerning this appellation. sirnamed the soft, and Di­on praise you, that you will accept nothing from any, professing you are rich; it is well done; for as long as I and other friends are able to maintain you, you shall need none else. Be of good courage Xantippe, lose nothing of Socrates, knowing how great that man was; think upon his life, not upon his death; yet that to those who consider it will appear noble and excel­lent. Farewell.

Epist. Socratic. 22. To Cebes and Simmias Epist. 9.

IT is commonly said, nothing is richer then a poor man, this I find true in my self, who have not so much, but whilest you my friends take care of me, seem to possesse much: and it is well done of you to supply me as often as I write: As concerning my Commentaries, there is none of them but I fear should be seen by any in my absence, as I profest in your hearing at the house where Euclid lay. I know dear friends a writing once communi­cated to many is irrecoverable. Plato, though absent, is much admired throughout Italy and Sicily for his treatises; but wee cannot be perswaded they deserve any study; I am not onely carefull of losing the honour due to learning, but tender also of Socrates, lest his virtue should incur any prejudice by my ill relation of it. I conceive it the same thing to calumniate, or not praise to the full those of whom we write; This is my fear ( Cebes and Simmias) at present, untill my judgement shall be otherwise inform'd. Fare ye well.

AESCHINES.

CHAP I.
His life.

Laert. AESCHINES was son of Charinus [...], or, as Plato and others, of Lysanias, an Athe­nian, of the Sphet [...]ian Tribe: He was from his childhood very industrious; addressing himselfe to Socrates, he said to him, I am poor, and have nothing to give you but my selfe: Do you not know, answered So­crates, that you have made me a rich present? He was the most diligent of all his Schollers, and never quitted him; whereup­on [...] said, that he only▪ [...] valued him: He was not beloved of Plato, nor Aristippus: I domeneus saith, it was he who counselled Socrates to escape out of Prison, which Plato ascribes to Crito. Being very poor, Socrates bad him take some of his Dialogues and make mony of them, which Aristippus suspecting when he read them at Megara, derided him, saying, how came you by these Plagiary? Another time Flut. de ira cohib. Aristippus falling out with him, was question'd what became of his [...]iendship, he answered, it is asleep, but I will wake it; and meeting Aeschines, do I seem so inconsiderable to you, saith he, and unfortunate, as not to de­serve correction? It is no wonder, answers Aeschines, if your nature ex­ceeding mine in every thing, find out first what is expedient. Laert. Philo­strat. vit. Apol­lon; and from him Suidas. Insti­gated by poverty, he went to Sicily, to Dionysius the Tyran [...], at what time Pla [...]o and Aristippus were there: Plato being out of favour with the Tyrant, took occasion, by presenting Aes­chines, to ingratiate himselfe: Plutarch. de adulat. & ami­ci discrim. He desired he might be admitted to speak with him, which the [...]yrant granted, supposing [...]e would alledge something in defence of himselfe; as soon as he came into his presence, he began thus: If you knew Dionysius, ofiany that came with a ho­stile intent to do you hurt, though he fail'd of the [...]ccasion, would you suf­fer him to depart unpunished? No [...]hing lesse, answered Dionysius; for not only the ill actions, but designes of enemies deserve to be cha­stized. Then (replies Plato) if any man should come hither out of an intent to do you a good office, and you not [...] him leave, ought you to neglect and despise him? Dionysius demanded whom be meant. Aeschi­nes ( saith he) a person of as [...] of Socrates his friends, [Page 116] able to reform those with whom be converseth, who having undertaken a great voyage by sea to come hither, and discourse Philosophically with you, is neglected. Dionysius was so pleased at this, that he embraced Plato, admiring his candor and greatnesse of spirit, and entertained Aeschines bountifully and magnificently. Thus Plutarch; but Luer­tius saith, that Aeschines comming thither, was despised by Plato, and recommended by Aristippus, the latter, the Socra­tick Epistle confirmes: to Dionysius he imparted some Dia­logues, and was gratified by him, with whom he lived untill he was deposed, and Dion brought into the Kingdome; then returned to Athens, where not daring to professe his Philoso­phy, because the names of Plato and Aristippus were so great, he taught and [...]r [...]. He [...]yc [...]. Illustr. took mony privately, at last applyed himselfe to framing orations for the Forum, in which Timon saith, he was very perswasive: Ly [...]as wrote one Oration in answer to him, in­tituled [...], or according to Athenaeus [...], wherein he asperseth him for many things, which are not any way probable, as (besides patronizing an unjust cause, and borrowing without intent to restore) for pretending to sell unguents, contrarie to the lawes of Solon, and precepts of Socrates, and for injuring Hermaeus, his wife and children; see Athenaeus. Aristole sirnamed [...] was his intimate friend. Laertius reckons eight of this name; the first, this Aeschines the Philosopher; the second wrot of Rhetorick; the third an Ora­tour, contemporary with Demosthenes; the fourth an Arcadian, scholler to Isocrates; the fifth of Mitelene, sirnamed Rhetoroma­stix; the sixt a Neopolitan, an Academick Philosopher, disci­ple to Melanth [...]us a Rhodian; the seventh a Milesian, who wrot Politicks, friend to Cicero; the eight a statuary.

CHAP. II.
His writings.

HE wrot Dialogues, Orations, and Epistles; by the first Athe­naeus affirms, he gained a great esteem of temperance, hu­manity, and integrity: Menedemus accuseth him of owning many Dialogues of Socrates, which he had of Xantippe; Panaetius believes them to be his own, not counterseit: those (saith La­ertius) Leart. Athen. which expresse the Socratick habit, are seven; the first, Miltiades, written in a lower stile: the second, Callias, wherein he is blamed by Athenaeus for treating of the enmity betwixt Calli­as & his fathers, and for deriding Anaxagoras & Prodicus in their scholars Theramenes, Philoxenus, and Ariphrades, The third, Rhinon; the fourth, Aspasia, cited by Athenaus and Harpocration: the fifth Alcibiades, cited also by Lib. 14. Athenaeus: The sixth Axiochus, wherein (saith Lib. 5: Athenaeus) he traduceth Alcibiades as given to Wine and women; which particular not being to be found in that [Page 117] Axiochus, extant amongst the spurious Platonick Dialogues, argues (contrary to the opinion of Vossius) that it is not the same. The last, Telauges, the scope whereof was a Satyricall de­rision of the vices of that person, as appeareth from Demetri [...]s Phalereus, and Lib. 5. upon which see C [...] ­saubon, cap. 20. Athenaeus.

Laert. There were seven other Dialogues, stiled [...], which went under the name of Aeschines, very loose, and not ex­pressing enough the Socratick severity; whence Pisistratus the Athenian, denyed that they were his; and Perseus saith, the greatest part were written by Pasiphon of Eretria, falsely mingled with the Dialogues of Aeschines: their names (according to Suidas) were Phaedon, polyanus, Dracon, Eryxias, (perhaps that which is extant) of Vertue, Erasistratus, the Scythians.

Laert. His O [...]a [...]ions gave full testimony of his perfection in Rhe­torick, in confirmation whereof, Laertius instanceth, that in defence of the father of Phaeacus the Generall, and those wherein he thiefly imitated Gorgias the Leontine; of which Epist. ad Iul▪ August. Philostratus cites that concerning Thar gelia.

Of his Epistles, one to Dionysius the Tyrant is mentioned by Laer [...]ius, as extant in his time: another there is under his name amongst the Epist. 23. Socratick Epistles in these words;

Assoon as I arived at Syracuse, Aristippus met me in the Forum, and taking me by the hand, carried me immediately to Dionysius, to whom he said, Dionysius, if a man should come hither to insinuate folly into you, did he not aim at your hurt? to which Dionysius consenting, what then, continues Aristippus, would you do to him? the worst, an­sw [...]rs Dionysius, that could be: But if anyone, saith he, should come to improve you in wisdome, did he not aim at your good? which Dionysius acknowledging: Behold then (continues he) Aeschines, one of Socra­tes his disciples, come hither to instruct you; he aimes at your good, there­fore on him confer the benefits you confesse due to such. Dyonisius ( said I, interrup [...]ing him) Aristippus expresseth an admirable friendship in this addresse; but we are owners only of so much wisdome, as restrains us from abusing those with whom we converse. Dionysius hereat pleased, commended Aristippus, and promised to make good what he had con­ [...]est due to me: He heard our Alcibiades, and delighted it seemes there­with, desiredif we had any other Dialogues, that we would send them to him, which we promised to do, and therefore dear friends we intend to be shortly with you. Whilst I read, Plato was present (which I had almost forgot to tell you) and whispered something in my behalfe privately to Di­onysius, by reason of Aristippus; for as soon as he was gone out, he told me that he never spoke freely when that man (naming Aristippus) was present; but for what I said to Dionysius concerning you, I referre my selfe to him; The next day, Dionysius in the Garden confirmed his speech as said of me, with many sportive sayings (for they were no better) I advised Aristippus and plato to cease their aemulation, because of their generall fame; for we shall be most ridiculous, if our actions corre­spond not with our profession.

CRITO.

CRITO was an Athenian Suid. scholler to Socrates: whom he loved so entirely that he never suffered him to want ne­cessaries, of which more hath been already said in the life of Socrates: Xen. Being much troubled and sued by those who had not received any injury from him, but abus'd the quitnesse of his disposition, which would sooner part with money upon no ground then go to law, Socrates advised him to entertain one of the same busie, troublesome humour, to keep off the rest; Crito in pursuit of this counsell made choice of Archide­mus, an excellent Lawyer, but poor, who being obliged by his guifts and kindnesse, persecuted eagerly all such as molested not him only, but any of his friends: Crito wrote seventeen dia­logues comprised in one volume, thus reckon'd by Laertius. That the good are not made such by learning. Of having most. What is expedient, or the Politician. Of lon [...]sty, of wickednesse, of security, of Law, of Divinity, of arts, of conversation, of wisdom; Protagoras or the Politick. Of letters, Of Poetry, of what is honest, of learning, of knowing or science, what it is to know. He writ also an Apology for Socrates.

Suid. He had four sons, Critobulus, Hermogenes, Epigenes, and Clesippus, all auditors of Socra [...]es; of whom already.

Suidas reckons three more of this name: One wrot Getick stories; the second was of Pieria a City in Macedonia; the third of Naxus, both Historians.

SIMON.

L [...]rt. SIMON was an Athenian, a leather-dresser. Socrates coming to his shop, and disputing there, he committed to writing all that he remembred thereof; whence his dialogues were called [...]. They were three and thirty, all in one vo­lume: of Gods, of good, of honest, what is honest. Of just, the first, the 2d. Ofvirtue, that it cannot be taught. Of fortitude, the first, second, third. Of law, of Popularity, of honour, of Poetry, of health, of love, of Philosophy, of knowledge, of musick, of Poetry; what is honest. Of doctrine, of disputation, of judgement, of that which is, of number, of diligence, of la­bour, of avarice, of boasting, of honesty, or according to o­thers, of Counsel, of discourse, of expedients, of doing ill. He is reported the first that used the Socratick discourses. Pericles promising that if hee would come to him, he should want no­thing, hee answered, that he would not sell his freedom of speech. There is extant amongst the Socratick Epistles, this un­der his name, as in answer to Aristippus.

THE HISTORY OF PHILO …

THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

The Fourth Part.

Containing the

Cyrenaick Sects.
Megarick
Eleack
Eretriack
[figure]

LONDON, Printed for Humphrey Moseley, and Tho▪ Dring. An. Dom. 1656.

ARISTIPPVS.

THE CYRENAICK SECT. ARISTIPPVS.

CHAP. I.
Aristippus, his Country and Parents.

THE estimation which Philosophers had daily gain'd among the Grecians about this time caused it exceedingly to multiply, whilst eve­ry Professour ambitious to be held wiser then his Master, and reaching somthing new, desi­red to have the honour to bee Author of a Sect.

The Succession of the Ionick Philosophy, which before Socrates was single; after him was divided into many Schooles, whereof some were but of short continuance, others had longer succession. Of the lesse durable were the

  • Cyrenaick,
  • Megarick,
  • Eleack,
  • Eretriack,

so called from the places where the Professours flourished. Others of longer succession, the

Academick, out of which came the Peripatetick,
Cynick, Stoick.

We shall first dispatch those which were of shortest con­tinuance, whether that they were founded upon lesse reason, and were in short time broken, as De Oratore lib. 3. Cicero saith, and quite extinct by the strength and Arguments of the others; or that being instituted and founded in more obscure parts; they were not so lasting as those which were profess'd in the most flourishing City of Athens.

Aristippus a Disciple of Socrates, after his death, returned home into his Country at Cyrene in Africa, from whence the Doctrine which his Scholers retained had the name of Cyrenaick. Suid. He was Son of Aretades, Laer [...]. of Cyrene.

CHAP. II.
How he went to Athens, and heard Socra tes.

FRom Cyrene Aristippus went first to Athens, invited by the fame of Flut. de cu­riosit. Socrates, concerning whom he fell into discourse with Ischomachus, meeting him casually at the Olympick Games, and enqui­ring what manner of disputes they were wherewith Socrates prevail'd so much upon the young men, hee received from him some little seeds and scatterings thereof, wherewith he was so passionately affected, that he grew pale and lean, untill to asswage his servent thirst, he took a voyage to A­thens, and there drunk at the Fountain, satisfying himself with the Per­son, his discourse and Philosophy, the end whereof was to know our own e [...]ils, and to acquit our selves of them. But as Cic. de Nat. Deor. Aristo said, Philosophy doth harm to those who misinterpret things well said. Aristippus Cic. de Orat. 3. chiefly delighted with the more voluptuous disputes of Socrates, asserted Plea­sure to be the ultimate end wherein all happinesse doth consist. Athen. deipn. 12. His life was agreeable to the opinion, which he employed in Luxury, Sweet unguents, rich garments, Wine and Women; maintained by a course as different from the precepts and practise of Socrates as the things themselves were. For, notwithstanding he had a good Estate (and three Country-Seats) Laert. he first of the Socratick Dis­ciples, took Money for teaching. Which Socrates observing, asked him how he came to have so much? he replyed, how come you to have so little? A further dislike of this course Socrates express'd, when A­ristippus sending him twenty minae, he return'd it, saying, his Daemon would not suffer him to take it.

CHAP. III.
How he went to Aegina.

LEaving Socrates, Athen. deipn. 12. he went to Aegina, where he lived with more freedom and luxury then before: Socrates sent exhorta­tions to reclaim him, frequent but fruitless, and to the same end published that discourse which we find in Xenophon. Here he be­came acquainted with Lais the famous Corinthian Curtezan, Athen. deipn. [...]2. who came thither yearly at the Feast of Neptune, and was as con­stantly frequented by Aristippus, for whose sake Athen. deipn. 13. Hermesianax saith, hee took a voyage to Corinth (mention'd among his Apo­thegmes)

To Corinth Love the Cyrenean lead,
where he enjoy'd Thessalian Lais bed;
[Page 3] No Art the subtle Aristippus knew
By which the power of Love he might eschew.

Laert. Whilst he was upon his voyage to Corinth, a great Tempest arose, whereat he was much troubled: one of the Passengers say­ing unto him, we ordinary people are not afraid, but you Philosopher [...] fear (or as Var. Hist. 9. 20. Aelian, are you asraid like other people?) Agel. 19. 1. our Souls answe­red he, are not of equall value, Aelian. ibid. you hazard a wicked and unhappy life, I Felicity and Beatitude.

Laert. To those who blamed him for frequenting Lais; I p [...]ssesse [...]er saith he, not she me. Athen. Deipn. 13. Lais in emulation of Phryne gave admittance to all sorts of people, rich and poor, whereupon Aristippus repre­hended by his servant for bestowing so much on her, who enter­tained Diogones the Cynick gratis, I give her money saith he, that I may enjoy her, not that others may not. Athen. Deipn. 13. Diogenes reproached him for frequenting the company of Lais, saying, Aristippus, you and I con­verse with the same woman, either give over, or be like me a Cynic; Do you think it absurd, saith he, to awell in a house, wherein others lived be­fore, or to sail in a Ship that hath carried other Passengers? It is no more absurd to affect a woman whom others have enjoyd.

At Aegina he continued till the death of Socrates, as (besides the testimony of In Phaedone. Plato) appeareth by this Socratic. Epist. 16. Epistle of his written upon that occasion.

Of the death of Socrates, I and Cleombrot [...]s have received infor­mation, and that when he might have escaped from the eleaven Officers, he said he would not, unless he was acquitted by Law; for that were as much as in him lay to betray his Country. My opinion is, that being un­justly committed, he might have got his Liberty any way, conceiving that all which he could do ill or inconsiderately must be just. From whence again I blame him not, as if he had done ill even in this. You write me word that all the friends and Disciples of Socrates have left Athens, out of fear the like should befall any of you; it is well done; and we being at present at Aegina wil continue here a while, then come to you, and wherein we are a­bl [...], serve you.

CHAP. IV.
His Institution of a Sect.

ARistippus returning at length to his own Country, Cyrene, pro­fessed P [...]ilosophy there, and instituted a Sect called Eaert. Cyrena­ick from the Place, by some Galen. Hist. Phil. Hedonick, or voluptuous from the Do­ctrine. Laert. They who followed the institution of Aristippus, and were called Cyrenaick, held thus.

[Page] They rejected Physick and natural disquisitions from the seeming incomprehensibility thereof. Logick they handled because of its great usefulnesse. But Meleager and Clitomachus affirm they despi­sed both Physick and Dialectick alike, as unusefull, for that with­out these, a man who hath learned what things are good, what cvil, and able to discourse wel, and to shake off superstition and the fear of death.

Sect. 1. Of Iudgement und Iudicatories.

Laert. THey held that the Senses inform not alwaies truly, Cicer. Acad. Quest. lib. 4. that nothing extrinsecall can be perceived, those things only can be perceived, which are felt by inward touch, as grief and pleasure, neither know wee what colour any thing is, nor what sound it makes, but only that we feele our selves affected after such a manner; that Laert. Passions are comprehensive; that objects not comprehensi [...]e. That Cic. nothing judgeth but by interi­our permotion, and the judgement of true and false consisteth in inward touch.

advers. Mathom. Sextus Empericus more fully. They assert that passions or af­fections are the Judges and the only things that may comprehend, & not fallacious; but of those things which cause passions, there is nothing which is comprehensible, or that may not deceive us. For, that we are made white or affected with sweet, may be said ex­pressly and firmly, but that the thing which causeth this affection is white or sweet, cannot in like manner be asserted. For it is po­ssible that we be affected with whiten [...]sse from a thing that is not white, and with sweetnesse from a thing that is not sweet; as to him who is dimsighted or hath the yellow jaundies, all things seem yellow to one, duskish to the other, and he who pincheth his eye, thinketh he sees things double, he who is mad fancies two Thebes's, two Suns; in all these, they that are so affected, to wit, with yellownesse or duskishnesse, or duplicity, is true, but that the thing which moveth them is yellow or duskish, or double, is conceived to be false: So it is most consonant to reason, that wee comprehend nothing more then our own passions. For we must hold that the things seen are either the passions themselves, or the causes of those passions; if we say our passions are the things seen, we must likewise affirm all things seen, to be true and compre­hensive; if we say the things seen are the causes of those passions, we must confesse all things seen to be false and incomprehensible. For that passion which happeneth to us, showeth us its self and nothing more, so that to speak truly, the passion or affection it self is the only thing that is apparent to us, and for that reason, in their proper affections none erre, but in the externall object, all. The first are comprehensive, the second incomprehensive, the [Page 4] soul being weak in the discernment thereof, by reason of places, intervalls, motions, mutations, and many other causes.

Hence they assert, that there is not in man any one common thing which judgeth, but they impose common names on the judgments; all commonly name white and sweet, but somthing common that is white and sweet they have not, for evey man apprehends his own affection. Now whether the same affection happeneth to any one, and to him that is next him from white, neither is he able to say, as not receiving the affection of the o­ther, neither can the other that is next him say, as not receiving his affection. There being therefore no common affection in us, it were a rash thing to assert, that whatsoever seemeth such to me, seemeth also such to him that is next me; for perhaps my constitution is such as to be whitened from that which externally incurreth, another hath his sense so ordered, as that he is affe­cted otherwise. That therefore which is seen and appeareth is not common.

That by reason of the differing constitutions of the sense we are not moved alike nor in the same manner, is manifest from those who have the Iaundies, and those that are purblinde, and those that are affected according to Nature. For as from the same object, some are so affected as to be black, others red, others white; so is it likewise consonant to reason, that they who are affected according to nature, by reason of the different constitution of senses, are not moved alike by the same things, but one way the white, another way the black, another way he whose eyes are blew, another way he whose eyes are black, whence we impose common names on things, having our selves proper and particu­lar affections.

Sect. 2. Of the End, or chief Good.

TO these assertions (continueth Sextus Empericus) concerning the Judicatories, agreeth what they assert concerning Ends. Of Affections, some are pleasant, some harsh and troublesome, some mean; the harsh and troublesome are ill, whose end is griefe; the pleasant, good, whose end, which cannot be deceived, is plea­sure; The mean are neither good nor ill, whose end is neither good nor ill, which is an affection between pleasure and griefe. Affections therefore are the judges and ends of all things, and we live say they, observing evidence and liking, evidence in the rest of the affections, liking, in pleasure.

Laertius saith, they assert two passions or affections, Griefe and Pleasure; pleasure, a soft smooth motion; griefe, a harsh motion. One pleasure differeth not from another pleasure, nor is one pleasure sweeter then another pleasure; this pleasure is coveted by all living creatures, the other shunned.

[Page] They assert corporeall pleasure to be our ultimate end, as Panaetius saith in his book of Sects, not catastematick permanent pleasure, which consisteth in privation of griefe, and a quiet void of all disturbance, which Epicure held.

The End differeth from Beatitude; for the End is some particu­lar pleasure; Beatitude is that which consisteth of all particular pleasures, wherein are included both the past and future. Again, particular pl [...]asure is expetible in it selfe, felicity, not in it selfe, but for particular pleasures.

That pleasure is our chiefe end is manifest, in that from our first infancy, without any instruction of others, we naturally aime thereat, and having obtain'd it, seek nothing else. Moreover, we avoide not any thing so much as its contrary, griefe.

Pleasure is good, though proceeding from the most sordid dis­honest thing, as Hippobotus in his Book of Sects; for, although the action be dishonest, yet the pleasure thereof is expetible in it selfe, and good.

Indolence, which Ep [...]cure held, they esteem not pleasure, nor want of pleasure, griefe, for both these consist in motion; but In­dolence and want of pleasure consists not in motion, for Indolence is like the state of a sleeping man.

They hold, that some men may not desire pleasure, through perversity of minde.

All spirituall pleasures and pains arise not from corporeall pleasures and pains; for from the simple prosperity of our Coun­try or our selfe, we are affected with joy.

But neither the remembrance of past goods, nor expectation of future compleat pleasure, as Epicure thought; for by time and expectation the motion of the soul is dissolved. Athen. deipn. 12. Pleasure, accor­ding to Aristippus, is [...], consisteth only in one part of time, the present; for the remembrance of past pleasures, or expectati­on of the future, is vain and frivolous, and nothing appertaineth to beatitude; but that only is good which is present. With those pleasures which he received heretofore, or shall receive hereaf­ter, Aristippus said, he was nothing at all moved, the first being gone, the other not yet come, and what it will prove when it is come, is uncertain. Hence Ael. var. Hist. lib. 14. 6. he argued, that men ought not to be folicitous either about things past or future, and that not to be troubled at such things is a signe of a constant clear spirit. He also advised to take care only for the present day, and in that day, only of the present part thereof, wherein something was done or thought; for he said, the present only is in our power, not the past or [...]uture, the one being gone, the other uncertain whether ever it will come.

Neither do pleasures consist meerly in simple sight or hearing, for we hear with delight those who counterfeit lamentation, and those who lament truely, we hear with displeasure. This priva­tion of pleasure and griefe they called mean states.

[Page 5] The pleasures of the body are much better then those of the soule, and the pains or griefs thereof much worse; for which reason those who offend actually, are most grievously punished.

To grieve, is more unnaturall to us, to delight, more naturall; for which reason, much more care is requisite for the ordering of one then of the other; yet, many times we reject things which effect pleasure, as being grievous; so that the concurrence of pleasures which effecteth beatitude, is very difficult.

Moreover they hold, that every wise man doth not live plea­santly, nor every wicked man unpleasantly, but so for the most part; for it is enough that a man be affected and reduced by inci­dence of one single pleasure.

They held, that Cic. Tusc. quaest. 4. Griefe is the greatest ill; that griefe is not ef­fected by every ill, but by the unexpected and unforeseen; that one man is more grieved then another.

They assert, that Riches are efficient causes of pleasure; yet, not expetible in themselves.

Sect. 3. Of Vertue.

Cic. de. Offic. 3. ALL good consisteth in Pleasure, Vertue it selfe is only lau­dable, as being an efficient cause of pleasure.

Laert. Nothing is just, honest, or dishonest by Nature, but by Law and Custome; yet a good man will do nothing that is evill, be­cause of the censure or esteem which would fall upon his acti­ons, and So Casaubon reads, but doubt­lesse there is a def [...]ct in the Text. that such a one is wise.

Prudence is a good, yet not expetible in it selfe, but for the sake of those things which proceed from it.

A friend is to be embraced for the use we may have of him, as the body cherisheth every part thereof as long as it remaineth found.

Of Vertues, some are in the unwis [...]e. Corporeall exercise conduceth to the acquisition of Vertue. A wise man is not subject to En [...]y, Love, or Superstition, for all these proceed from the vanity of Opinion; but, he is subject to Griefe or Fear, as being Naturall accidents.

CHAP. V.
How he went to Dionysius his Court.

ABout this time Dionysius, the Sicilian Tyrant, flourished, Philostr. vit. Apoll. to whom resorted many Philosophers, amongst the rest Aristip­pus, invited by his sumptuous magnificence. Laert. Dionysius asked him the reason of his comming; he answer'd, to give what I have, and to receive what I ha [...]e not; or, as others, when I wanted wisdome, I went to Socrates; now I want mony, I come to you. He soon insinuated into the [Page] favour of Dionysius; for he could conform himself to every place time, and person, act any part, construe whatsoever happened to the best: and thus enjoying present pleasure, never troubled him­self for the absent, as Horace.

Every condition, habit, and event
with Aristippus suits with all content.

Of his compliance with Dionysius's humour, there are these instances. Laert. Dionysius at a Feast commanded, that all should put on purple robes: Plato refused, saying,

I will not with a female robe disgrace
My self, who am a man of manly race.

But Aristippus took it, and beginning to dance, said,

If it come pure, a mirthfull Feast
Never corrupts a modest breast.

Laert. Another time suing to Dionysius in the behalf of his friend; hee would not hear him; at last he threw himself at his feet, and his petition was granted; for which being reprehended, Blame not me, saith he, but Dionysius, Whose ears are in his seet.

Laert. Dionysius shewed him three Curtezans, bidding him take his choice; he leading them all three away, said, Paris was punish'd jor preserring one before the other two. But, having brought them to the dore, he dismist them, as ready to contemn as accept: where­upon Strato (or as others Plato) told him, You only can wear old gar­ments and raggs; for which likewise they admired him, that he would wear a thread-bare, and a rich Milesian Cloak with equal decorum, accommodating himself to both.

When Dionysius did spit upon him, he took it patiently; fcr which being reproved, Fishermen saith he, suffer themselves to be wet all over that they may catch [ [...]] a Gudgeon, and shall I be trou­bled at a little spitle, who mean to take VVhich being pronounced is e­quiv [...]call: for, [...] signifieth a [...]ish like a Gudgeon, and [...] Tyrant: as I find in a M. S. Lexcion communicated by [...] learned friend Mr. John Pearson, [...] o [...] and again B [...] [...] (read [...]) [...] confirmed by Atha [...]neus, deipn. 7. 10. [...]?

Laert. He begged Money of Dionysius, who said to him, You told me, a wise man wanted nothing; Give me, and we will talk of this afterward. When Dionysius had given it him; Now saith he, you set I do not want.

By this complaisance, he gained so much upon Dionysius, that he had a greater esteem for him, then all the rest of the Philoso­phers, [Page 4] though sometimes he spoke so freely to Dionysius, that he in­curred his displeasure.

Laert. To Dionysius asking, why Philosophers haunted the gates of rich men, but rich men not those of Philosophers: Because, saith he, the one knowes what he wants, the other not.

Laert. To Dionysius, urging him to treat of Philosophy: It is ridicu­lous, said he, if you learn of me what it is, to teach me when it should be said. Whereat Dionysius displeased, bad him take the lowest place, which he did quietly, saying, You have a minde to make this seat more honourable. Athen. deipn. 12. citing He­gesander▪ The next day the Tyrant asked him what he thought of that place wherein he then sat, in respect of that wherein he sat the night before: He answered, they were alike to him; to day, saith he, because I left it, it is contemn'd, what yesterday was esteem'd the most honourable; that where I sit to day esteemed most honourable, which yesterday, without me, was accounted the lowest.

Laert. Being asked why Dionysius fell out with him, he answered, for the same reason he falleth out with others.

Laert. Dionysius saying, (out of Sophocles, as Plutarch affirmes, who ascribes this to Zeno.)

Who ere goes to a Tyrant, he
A servant is, though he came free.

He immediately answered, ‘No servant is if he came free.’

Dionysius offering Plato a great summe of money, which he re­fused; Aristippus being at the same time in the Court of Dionysius said, Dionysius bestowes his liberality upon sure grounds, to us who ask much, he giveth little; to Plato, who requireth nothing, he offereth much.

Plut. vit. Dion. Another time Helicon of Cyzicus, one of Plato's friends, having foretold an Eclipse of the Sun, which when it fell out according­ly, he was much honouored for it: Aristippus jesting with other Philosophers, said, he could foretell a stranger thing; They de­manding what it was: I prognosticate, saith he, that Plato and Dionysius will ere long be at variance, and so it happened.

CHAP. VI.
His A [...]mulators.

THis favour which he found with Dionysius, was perhaps the occasion, for which he was maligned by the rest of the Philosophers, amongst whom was.

[Page] Laert. Xenophon, who out of ill will to him, published the Memorab. lib. 2. discourse between him and [...] about Pleasure.

Laert. Plato likewise, through the same disaffection tacitely repre­hends him, in Phaedone; for being in Aegina at the time of Socra­tes's death. Laert. Plato being in Dionysius's Court, when he was there, reproved his sumptuous life: Whereupon Aristippus asked him, whether he thought Dionysius a good man or not: Plato affirmed, he thought him good: Yet he, replyed Aristippus, liveth much more sumptuously; therefore it is not incompetible with good­nesse.

Laert. Phaedo likewise seemed to deride him, demanding who it was that smelt so strong of Unguents: It is I, unhappy man that I am, answered Aristippus, and the Persian King, who is more unhappy then I; but, as other things are not the worse for this, neither is a man. Senec. de ben [...] ­fic. Clem. Alex. A curse on those effeminate persons, who brought a scan­dall upon so good a thing.

Laert. Aeschines also and he were sometimes at difference: Once after some falling out betwixt them, Aristippus said to him, Shall we not be friends, shall we not give over fooling? or, do you ex­pect some body should kick us into kindnesse? Willingly, an­swered Aeschines. Now, saith, Aristippus, remember, that though I am the elder, yet I yielded first. Aeschines replyed, and justly, for you are better then I; I begun the enmity, you the reconcile­ment. L [...] ir a Cohib. Plutarch relates it thus; Being fallen out with Aeschines, he met one who asked him, Where is now your old friendship, Ari­stippus? It is asleep, saith he; but I will awake it: and going straight to Aeschines, Am I so unhappy, saith he, and so inconsiderable in your esteem, as not to deserve correction. Aeschines answered, It is nothing strange, that exceeding by nature in all things, you should first know what is [...]it to be done.

Antisthenes is to be numbered also amongst those, who were displeased at his manner of life, as appeareth by an Epistle of his to that effect, extant amongst the Socratick Epistles, to which Aristippus returned this answer.

Socratic. Epist. 9. Aristippus to Antisthenes.

WE are Aristippus, Irenically an­swering a for­mer letter of Antisthenes. unhappy beyond measure; how can we be otherwise, living with a Tyrant, daily eating and drinking de­liciously, persumed with choicest [...] nguents, attired in rich loose Gar­ments brought from Tarentum: and none will deliver me from the cru­elty of Dionysius, who detains me, not as a rude person, but one that is verst in Socratick learning; supplying me (as I said) with Meat, Un­guents, Garments, and the like; fearing neither the judgments of Gods nor men. And now the misfortune is much encreased; He hath bestowed on me three Sicilian Virgins of extraordinary beauty, and many Utensils of silver; and when this man will give over doing such things I know [Page 7] not; you do well therefore to be concern'd for the miseries of others; in requitall whereof I rejoice in your happiness, and return you thanks; Farewell.

The figs which you have, lay up against Winter, and the Cretan meal; for these things seem to be better then For [...] ros [...] [...] insiead of [...] the last word of the following Epistle, [...] [...] [...] sceptic [...] riches; wash and drink of the Fountain of Enneacrunus; wear the same garment in Winter as in Summer, and that sordid, as becomes a free person living under the A­thenian Democracy: As for me, I knew as soon as I came into a City and Island govern'd by a Monarch, I should suffer those ills of which you write to me; Now the Syracusians, Agrigentines, Geloans, and the rest of the Sicilians Make a point at [...] and read [...] Dorice; a ridi­culous and a­cute irony; for [...] signifieth to look on a thing with admi [...]ation, which is not proper to com­passion. compassionately admire me; But Re [...] [...] [...]ps, [...] for my madness in coming inconsiderately to these unseemly things, I wish this curse to sall upon me, that I may never be quit of these evills; [...] because being of years of dis­cretion, and pretending to wisdom, I would not undergo hunger and cold, nor contemn glory, nor wear a long beard; I will send you some great white Lupines to eat, after you have acted Hercules to the boyes; of which things it is reported you esteem it not absurd to discourse and write: but if any man should speak of Lupines to Dionyf [...]us, I think it were against the rules of Tyranny: of the rest go and discourse with Si­mon the Leather-dresser, then whom you esteem nothing more wise; for I am not allowed familiarity with Artificers, because I live under o­bedience to others.

Notwithstanding, this jarring betwixt them, Aristippus was nothing backward in employing the Interest he had at Court, for some friends of Antisthenes; to preserve them from death; as this Letter of his to Antisthenes doth manifest.

Socratic. E­pist. 11. The Locrian young men of whom you write to me, will be set at liber­ly, neither put to death, nor fined, though they were very near death. The Letter seems to be written to An­tithenes; and this meant iro­nically. Let not Antisthenes know I have saved his friends, for he loves not to converse with Tyrants, but with meal-men, and Victualers, such as sell meat and drink at Athens without fraud, and such as sell thick cloaths in cold weather, and such as serve The Leather-dresser. Simon, these are not Riches.

Diogenes followed the example of his Master Antisthenes in de­riding Aristippus, Laert. calling him the Court-Spaniel. As Aristippus passed by, Diogenes busied about washing Herbes, called to him, saying, If you had learned to do thus, you needed not have followed the Courts of Princes; and you, said he, if you had known how to converse with men, needed not to have washed Herbes; thus expressed by Epist [...]. 17. Horace.

Diog.
On Herbs if Aristippus could have din'd,
The company of Kings he had declin'd.
Arist.
He who derides me, had he wit to use
The company of Kings, would Herbs refuse;
[Page 8] I mine own jeaster; thou the People's art,
My choice is of the better, nobler part,
I by a King maintain'd, on horseback ride,
Thou by the meanest people art supply'd,
Then those that do maintain thee thou art less;
Yet to want nothing vainly dost profess.

Eaert. Theodorus in his Book of Sects, reproached Aristippus; and Athen. Deipn. 12. Alexis the Comick Poet, in his Galatea bringeth in a servant speaking thus of one of his Disciples;

My Master young on Rhetorick first intent,
Next to Philosophy his study bent:
A Cyrenaean liv'd at Athens then,
Nam'd Aristippus, justly first of men,
Esteem'd for subtlety and Luxury,
A Talent him my Master gave to be
His Scholer, but of Arts be none was taught,
Save only Cookery; that away be brought.

CHAP. VI.
His Apothegms.

OF Apothegms, (in Suid. which kinde hee was conceived to have an acutenesse beyond all the other Philosophers,) these are remembred.

Laert. He once gave fifty drachms for a Partridge, for which being reproved by another; you would have given a penny for it saith he, which the other granting; so much, saith he, are fifty drachmes to me.

Being demanded what was the greatest benefit he had re­ceived by Philosophy; he answered, To converse freely with all men.

Being reproached for living high; if Magnificence were a sinne saith, he, it would not be practised upon daies of Festivall to the Gods.

To one who asked wherein Philosophers excelled other men; Though all Laws were abolished saith he, we should lead the same lives.

Being demanded how the Learned differ from the unlearned, he answered, as Horses unback'd from such as are well manag'd.

Going into the house of a Courtezan, a young man of the Com­pany blushed, to whom he said, It is not ill to go in, but not to be a­ble to come out.

To one who defired him to resolve a Riddle, Thou fool, saith [Page 9] he, why wouldst thou have me resolve that which unresolved [...]inds us such entertainment?

He said, it is better to be a Beggar then unlearned, for one wants only Riches, the other Humanity.

Being reviled, he went aloof off; he that reviled, asked why he fted; Because saith he, to speak ill is in your power, not to hear is not in mine.

One saying he saw Philosophers at the gates of rich men, and Physittans saith he, at the gates of the sick; but no man would for that reason choose to be sick rather then a Physitian.

To one who boasted he learned much; as they saith he, who eat and exercise much, are not better then those who eat only to satisfie Na­ture, neither are they learned who make large but profitable collections.

An Oratour pleading for him, and gaining the Cause, asked him, what are you the better for Socrates? so much saith he, as that I make good those things which you alledged in my defence.

He instructed his Daughter Arete to contemn all that is too much.

To one who demanded what his Son would be the better for Learning; if innothing else, in this saith he, that in the Theater one stone shall not sit upon another.

Of one who would have preferr'd his Son to him, he deman­ded 500. Drachmes, For so much saith the other I can buy a slave; Do so, answered he, and then you will have two ( Plut. de puet. educ. your Son, and him you buy.)

He said he took money of his friends, not to make use of it him­self, but to let them know the right use of it.

Being reproached for entertaining an Oratour to plead his Cause; and when I would feast, saith he, I hire a Cook.

To one who boasted of his swimming, are you not ashamed said he, to glory in the property of a Dolphin.

Being demanded wherein the learned differed from the un­learned; send them naked to strangers, saith he, and you shall see.

To one who boasted he could drink much without being drunk; So, saith he, can a Mule.

Being blamed that he took money being the Disciple of Socra­tes; and justly, saith he, For Socrates when they sent him wheat and Wine, took a little for his present use, and sent back the rest, the chief of all the Athenians were his Purveyors, mine Eutichydes, a mercenary Ser [...]ant.

Being reproved by Plato for buying a great quantity of fish; they cost me, saith he, but an obolus, would not you have given so much for them? to which Plato assenting, It is not that I am prosuse then, saith he, but that you are covetous.

Simon Pantler to Dionysius, a Phrygian, a man of ill conditions, brought him to his house paved curiously with marble; Aristip­pus spits in his face, whereat the other growing angry, I could not find saith he a fitter place.

[Page 10] Being demanded how Socrates dyed; as I would wish to doe, saith he.

Polixenus the Sophist comming to his house, and seeing there women and a great feast, reproved him, Aristippus gave him way, and after a little pause, will you dine with me, saith he? where­to he consenting: Why then, continues he, do you reprove me? 'tis not the feast but the cost which you condemn.

His servant being upon a journey, weary with carrying of mony; throw away, saith he, what is too much, and carry as much as you can.

Horat. sat. 2. 3.
He bad his slaves away his mony throw,
Because ore-charg'd with weight they went too slow.

Laert. Cic. de invent. Being at Sea, and understanding the owners of the Vessell were Pirats, he took his Mony and counted it, then let it fall into the Sea, as unwillingly, and sighed: some affirm that he said, It is better these perish for Aristippus, then Aristippus, for them.

He reproved men for looking upon goods exposed to sale, and ta­king no care to furnish their minds. Others ascribe this to Diogenes.

Living in Asia, he was seized by Antaphernes, the King's Liev­tenant, whereupon one saying to him, And where is now your confidence? When, said he, you fool, should I be confident, if not now, when I shall meet with Antaphernes.

Those who forsook Philosophy, to apply themselves to Mecha­nicall Sciences, he compared to the Suitors of Penelope; they could get the good wills of Melantho, Polydora, and others of the servants, but could not obtain the Mistress in Marriage. Not unlike is that of Aristo, who said, that Ulysses, when he went to Hell, saw all the dead, and spoke to them, but could not come so much as to the sight of the Queen.

Being demanded what Boyes ought to learn? That, saith he, which they ought to practice when they are men.

To one who accused him for going from Socrates to Dionysius: To Socrates, saith he, I went for [...], education; to Dionysius for [...] recreation.

To a Curtezan, who told him she was with child by him: You know that no more, said he, then if passing through a bush, you should say, this thorn pricked you.

To one, who blamed him, that he took Mony of Dionysius, Pla­to a Book; he answered, I want Mony, Plato Books.

Plut. de tranq. anim. Having lost a great Farm, he said to one, who seemed exces­sively to compassionate his losse, You have but one field, I have three left; why should not I rather grieve for you. It is madnesse (addes Plutarch) to lament for what is lost, and not rejoyce for what is left.

Stob. Eth. 46. When one told him, the land is lost for your sake; Better, saith [Page 11] he, is it, that the land be lost for me, then I for the land.

St. Eth. 99. Seeing one angry vent his passion in words; Let us not, saith he, suit words to our anger, but appease our anger with words.

St. Eth. 12. [...] Seeing a little Woman exceeding fair; This, saith he, is a little evill, but a great beauty. They who invert these words, and read, a little fair one, but great evill, mistake the meaning of Aristippus, who plaies upon that ordinary saying, applying the inversion to his own luxurious humour.

St. Eth. 18 [...]. To one, who demanded his advice whether he should mar­ry or no: he said no, If you take a fair a wife, saith he, she will be com­mon, if foul, a fury.

St. Eth. 210. He used to advise young men to carry such provision, as in a shipwrack they might swim away withall.

St. Eth. 229. As a shoo that is too big is unsit for use, so is a great estate; the bignesse of the shoe troubles the wearer; wealth may be used upon occasi­on, either wholly or in part.

CHAP. VIII.
His writings.

Laert. SOme affirme (of whom is So [...]icrates) that he wrot nothing at all: others that he wrot.

The Lybian History, three Books dedicated to Dionysius.

Dialogues twenty five (or rather twenty three; for, the number seemes corrupt) in one Book; some in the Attick dialect, others in the Dorick: their Titles these: 1. Artabazus. 2. To the shirwrackt. 3. To Exiles. 4. To a poor man. 5. To Lais. 6. To Porus. 7. To Lais concerning a Looking-glass. 8. Hermias. 9. The Dream. 10. To the Cup-bearer. 11. Philomelus. 12. To servants. 13. To those who repro­ved him for using old wine and common women. 14. To those who repro­ved him for feasting. 15. An Epistle to Arete. 16. To the Olympick exerciser. 17. An Interrogation. 18. Another Interrogation. 19. A Chria is a short commemo­ration, aptly re­lating the speech or action of some person. The third of these (viz. to Dionysius his Daughter) Vossius inserts amongst the Greek Histories; if that were Historicall, it is likely this to Dionysius was of the saine Nature. A Chria to Dionysius. 20. Another on an image. 21. Another on Dio­nysius his Daughter. 22. To one who conceived himselfe dishonoured. 23. To one who endeavoured to give advice.

Exercitations [...]ix Bookes.

Laert. Of pleasure, mention'd by Laertius in the life of Epicure. Of Physiology, ont of which Laertius cites, that Pythagoras was so named, because he spake no less truth then Pythius.

Of the luxury of the Antients, four Books, containing examples of those who indulged to love and pleasure; as, the love of Laert. in vit. Emped. Peri­and. Ar [...]stot. &c. Em­pedocles to Pausanias, in the first Book; of Cratea to her son Perian­der: [Page 12] of Aristotle to the Concubine of Hermias, in the fourth, of Socrates to Alcibiades, Xenophon to Clinias, plato to Aster, Xenocrates to Polemo. But, these latter instances show, that these Books were not write by this Aristippus.

Epistles. four are extant under his name, in the Socratick col lection, put forth by Leo Allatius.

Laert. Socion and Panaetius reckon his treatises thus,

  • Of discipline.
  • Of vertue, an Exhortation.
  • Artabazus.
  • The shipwrackt.
  • The banish'd.
  • Exercitations six
  • Chria three.
  • To Lais.
  • To Porus.
  • To Socrates.
  • Of Fortune.

CHAP. VIII.
His death.

HAving lived long with Dionysius, at last his daughter Arete sent to him, to desire him that he would come to Cyrene to her, to order her affairs; for, that she was in danger of oppression by the Magistrates. Aristippus hereupon took leave of Dionysius, and being on his voyage, fell sick by the way, and was forced to put in at Lipara, an Aeolian Island, where he dyed, as may be ga­thered from this Epistle, which he then sent to his Daughter.

Socr. Epist. 27. Aristippus to So supply'd by Leo Allatius. Arete.

I Received your Letter by Teleus, Wherein you desire me to make all possible hast to Cyrenc, because your businesse with the Praefects goeth not to your minde, and your Husband is unsit to manage your domestick affairs, by reason of his bashsulness, and being accustomed to a retir [...] life, remote from the publick. Wherefore assoon as I got leave of Dio­nysius, I sailed towards you, and being upon my journey, fell sick by the way at Lipara, where the friends of Sonicus provide carefully for me, with such humanity, as is needfull for one neer death. As for your de­mand, what respect you should give those whom I manumised, who pro­sess they will never desert Aristippus whilst they have strength; but, ever serve him and you; trust them in all things, they have learned from me not to be salfe. For your selfe, I advise you to apply your selfe to the Magistrates, which counsell will pro [...]it you, if you affect not rather to [Page 13] have much: You will live most at ease if you contemn excess; for, they cannot be so unjust as to leave you in want. You have two Orchards left sufficient to maintain you plentifully: and that possession in Bernicia▪ if alone left you; were suffici [...]nt to supply you fully. I do not counsell you to neglect small things [...] but, not to be troubled for small things, since vexation is not good even for great. If when I am dead, you [...] my advice for the education of young Aristippus, go to Athens, and above all, esteem Xantippe and Myrto, who have often spoke to me to bring you to the Eleusin [...]an Festivalls. Whilst you lead this pleasant life with these, let the Cyrenaean Praefects be as unjust as they please, in your na­turall Pleasure. end they cannot prejudice you. Endeavour to live with Xan­tippe and Myrto, as I did hereto fore with Socrates, composing your selfe to their conversation; for, pride is not proper in that place. If Leo Allati­us reads Lam. procles; but, that cannot be; for Lamprocles was dead long before; see life Socratic. Chap. 16. Ty­rocles, the son of Socrates, who lived with me at M [...]gara, come to Cy­rene, it will be well done to supply him, and to respet as your own son. If you will not nurse a daughter; because of the great trouble it gives you, send for the daughter of Eubois, to whom you have heretofore ex­pressed so much kindness, and named after my Mother, and I also have often called her my friend. Above all, take care of little Aristippus, that he may be worthy of us and of Philosophy: Eor, this I leave him as his true inheritance, the rest of his estate finds the Cyrenaean Magistrates adversaries. But, you writ me not word that any offered to take that away from you. Rejoyce, dear daughter, in the possession of those riches which are in your power, and make your son possess them likewise: I wish he were my son; but, being disappointed of that hope, I depart with this as­surance, that you will lead him in the pa hs trodden by good men. Fare­well, and grieve not for us.

Stob. Eth. 195. Of his Children, besides this Arete his Daughter, whom he educated in Philosophy, is remembered also a Son, whom for his stupidity he disenherited, and turned out of dores; for which, being reproved by his Wife, who alledged, that he came from himselfe; He, spitting, said, This comes from me too, but profiteth me nothing. Or, as Laertius, We cast [...], all unnecessa­ry things as far as we can from us.

Arete had a Son named from his Grandfather Aristippus, and from his Mothers instructing him in Philosophy, surnamed [...].

Besides these two ( Aristippus the Grandfather and the Grand­son) Laertius reckons two more of the same name. One writ the History of Arcadia: the Other was of the new Academy.

CHAP. IX.
His Disciples and Successors.

Of the Auditors of Aristippus, besides his daughter Arete, (whom he taught with much care, and brought up to great perfection in Philosophy) are remembred Aethiops of Ptolemais, and Antipater of Cyrene.

Arete communicated the Philosophy she received from her Father, to her Son Aristippus the younger: Aristippus transmitted it to Theodorus the Atheist, who instituted a Sect, called Theo­dorean.

Antipater communicated the Philosophy of Aristippus to Epi­timides his Disciple; Epitimides to Paraebates; Paraebates to Hegesias and Anniceris: These two last improving it by some additions of their own, obtained the honour each of them, to have a Sect na­med after them, Hegesiack and Annicerick.

HEGESIAS.

CHAP. I.
His Life.

HEGESIAS, Disciple to Paraebates, was sur­named [...], Death's Oratour, from a Cic. Tusc. qu. 1. book he writ, entituled [...], upon occasion of one who had famish'd himself nigh to death, but was called back to life by his friends, in an­swer to whom, hee in this Book demonstrated that death takes us away from ill things, not from good, and reckon'd up the incommodities of life, and re­presented the evills thereof Val. Max. 8. 9. with so much Rhetorick, that the sad impression thereof penetrated so far into the breasts of many hearers, that it begot in them a desire of dying voluntarily, and many laid violent hands upon themselves. Whereupon hee was prohibited by Ptolomy the King to discourse any more upon this Subject in the Schools.

CHAP. II.
His Philosophy.

HIS Disciples were from him called Hegesians. Laert. They held the same chief good and Evill with the Cyreneans; further asserting;

That Kindnesse, Friendship, and Benevolence are in themselves no­thing; not expetible, but in respect of those benesits which cannot consist without those persons.

That Perfect Felicity is absolutely impossible, because the body is dis­ordered by many troubles, in which the Soul shares, and most of those things which we hope are prevented by chance.

That Life and Death are in our choice.

That nothing is by nature pleasant or unpleasant, but by the ra [...]ity and unusuallness of things, or satiety, some are delighted therewith, o­thers not.

[Page 16] That Poverty and Wealth conferre nothing to Pleasure, neither are the rich poor affected with Pleasure severall waies. Servitude and Li­berty, Nobility and Meanness, Glory and ignominy differ nothing in this respect.

That to live is advantageous for a fool, indifferent to a wise man.

That a wise man ought to do all things in consideration of himself, and preferre none before himself, for though possibly he may receive be­nefits from others very great in outward appearance; yet are they nothing in comparison of those which he dispenseth.

That Sense conferrs nothing to certain knowledge, for all act by the rules of t [...]eir own reason.

That offences ought to be pardon'd, for no man offends willingly, but compelled by some affection.

That we should hate no man, but instruct him better.

That a wise man should not insist so much upon choice of good things, as upon evill, making it his scope and end to live neither in Labour nor Grief; which they do, who are inclined neither way to the objects of Plea­sure.

ANNICERIS.

CHAP. I.
His Life.

Laert. ANNICERIS was of Cyrene, Disciple to Pa­raebates, yet Suidas saith he was an Epicurean, and that he lived in the time of Alexander. Ael. var. hist 2. 27. He was excellent in Chariot-racing, of which one day he gave a testimony before Plato, and drove many courses round the A­cademy, so exactly, that his wheeles never went out of the track, to the admiration of all that were present, except Plato, who reprehended his too much industry, saying, it was not possible but that he, who employed so much paines about things of no value, must neglect those of greater concernment, which are truly worth admiration.

Laert. vit. Plat. When Plato, by the command of Dionysius, was sold as a slave in Aegina, Anniceris fortuned to be present, who redeemed him for 20. or according to others 30. minae, and sent him to Athens to his friends, who presently returned the mony to Anniceris, but he refused it, saying, they were not the only persons that deser­ved to take care of Plato.

Suid. He had a Brother named Nicoteles, a Philosopher; hee had likewise the famous Posidonius to be his Disciple.

CHAP. II.
His Philosophy▪

HIS Disciples were called Annicerians; Cic. de offic. 3. They as the rest pla­ced all good in Pleasure, and conceived virtue to be only commendable as far as it produced Pleasure. Laert. They agreed in all things with the Hegesians, but they abolished not friendship, good will, duty to parents, and actions done for our Country. They held,

[Page 18] That although a wise man suffer trouble for those things, yet he will lead a life nothing the lesse happy, though he enjoy but few Pleasures.

That the Felicity of a friend is not expetible in it self; for to agree in judgement with another, or to be raised above and fortified against the generall opinion, is not enough to satisfie reason, but wee must accustom our selves to the best things; because of our innate vicious inclinations.

That a friend is not to be entertained only out of usefull or necessary Ends, nor when such fail, is to be cast off, but out of an intimate good­will, for which we must also undergo trouble. For though they placed (as the rest) the chief end and good in pleasure, and professed to be grieved at the loss thereof, yet they affirm that we ought to undergo voluntarily labours, out of love to a friend.

THEODORVS.

CHAP. I.
His Life.

Laer [...]. THEODORUS heard Anniceris, Dionysius the Logician, Suid. Zeno the Cittiean, and Pyrrho the Ephectick. He was called the Atheist, because [...]lut. plac. Phil. 17. Cic­de nat. deor. 1. he held there was no God, & wrote a treatise ( Suidas saith many) wherein he endeavoured to refell all arguments to the contrary, out of of which Epicurus borrow'd much. Afterwards he was abusively called [...], upon occasion of a dispute with Stil­po to this effect, Do you believe saith Stilpo, you are whatsoever you affirm your self to be? Theodorus granting; then continues Stilpo, if you should say you were a God, were you so? To which Theodorus assent­ing, Stilpo reply'd; Then impious man you are a Bird, or any thing else by the same reason.

He was ejected out of Cyrene by the Citizens, whereupon hee said pleasantly; You do not well Cyreneans to thrust me out of Lybia into Greece. Thence he went to Athens, where he should have been cited to the Court of Areopagus, and lost his life, but that he was freed by Demetrius Phalereus. Being likewise banished thence, he went to Ptolomy the Son of Lagus, with whom he li­ved, and was by him sent on Embassy to Lysimachus, to whom speaking Atheistically; Lysimachus said, Are not you that Theodo­rus that was banished Athens, he answered, it is true, the Athenians when they could bear me no longer, as Semele Bacchus, cast me out. Lysimachus reply'd, see that you come no more to me; No answered he, unless Ptolomy send me. My [...]hro Son of Ly­simachus being present, said, you seem not only ignorant of the Gods but of Kings. How saith he, am I ignorant of the Gods, who believe you an Enemy to them? Lysimachus threatned them with Death; Sen de tranq. anim. 6. Cic. Iuse. qu. 1. [...]lut. an vitios. ad infel. suff. you glory [...]aith he in a great matter, a Cantharides can do as much. Or as Stobaeus, I knew not that you had not the power of a King but of poisor. Hereat incensed, he commanded he should be crucified; Threate [...] saith he, those things I pray to your purple Nobles; it is all o [...]e so The­odorus whether he rot above or under ground.

Finally he went to Cyrene, and lived with Marius in much re­pute, in that City out of which he was first ejected.

[Page 20] Disputing wit [...] Euryclides a Priest, he asked, what persons those were who de [...]ile mysteries: Euryclides answered, Those who communicate them to persons not initiated. Then, replyed he, you do impiously, in declaring them to such.

What o [...]ers ascribe to Aristipp [...]s and Diogene [...] s [...]ime [...] [...]ttri [...]te to Theodorus and Metrocleus, a Cynick, who saying, You would not want Disciples if you washed Herbs: Theodorus an [...]wer'd, Neither would you wash Herbs, if you knew how to converse with Men.

He said of Hipparchia the Wife of Crates; This is she who hath gi­ven over the Shuttle to put on a Cloak.

CHAP. II.
His Philosophy.

HE taught all manner of Learning, and instituted a Sect, called Theodorean. Suid. in So­crate. He asserted Indifference, that there is no difference of things.

Laert. That our end, or chiefe good and greatest ill, are joy and sorrow; one consisting in prudence, the other inimprudence.

That prudence and justice are good things, the contrary habits ill, the mean, pleasure and grief.

He took away Friendship, because it is neither in fooles nor wise-men; those being uncapable to make use of it, the thing it selfe vanisheth; these not needing it, as being sufficient to themselves.

That it is reasonable that a wise man expose not himselfe to danger for his Country; Wisdome ought not to be lost for the preservation of fooles.

That the World is our Country.

That a man upon occasion may commit theft, adultery, and sacriledge, there being nothing in these naturally evill, if that opinion were taken away which is built upon the agreement of fooles.

That a wise man may publi [...]kly without shame [...].

He used such inductions as these: Is not a woman that is skilfull in Grammar, prositable in that respect as a Grammarian? Yea; is not the same of a youth? Yes. Is not a beautifull woman then profitable, as being handsome? Yes: Then she who makes right use of it doth not amisse. In these kinds of Questions he was very subtle.

CHAP. III.
His death, writings, &c.

Laert. AMphicrates saith, that he was condemned by the Law for Atheism, and drunk Hemlock.

He wrot, besides that which appertained to his sect, many o­ther things.

Laertius reckons twenty of this name: The first a Samian, son of Rhaecus, who advised to lay the foundation of the Temple at Ephesus upon Embers: For, the place being wet, he said, that Coales, when they forsake the nature of Wood, acquire a soli­dity not to be violated by moysture.

The second of Cyrene, a Geometrician, whose Disciple Plato was.

The third this Philosopher.

The fourth writ of exercising the voice, a famous Book.

The fifth writ of Law-givers, beginning with Terpander.

The sixth a Stoick.

The seventh writ the Roman History.

The eight, a Syracusian, writ Tacticks.

The ninth a Byzantine, a Sophist, Suid. eminent for civill Pleas.

The tenth of the same Country, mention'd by Aristotle in his Epitome of Oratours.

The eleventh of Thebes, a Statuary.

The twelfth a painter, mention'd by Polemon.

The thirteenth of Athens, a Painter, of whom writes Menodotus.

The fourteenth of Ephesus, a painter, of whom Theophanes in his treatise of painting.

The fifteenth a Poet, who wrote Epigrams.

The sixtee [...]th wrot of Poets.

The seventeenth a Physician, Disciple to Athenaeus.

The eighteenth of Chios, a Stoick.

The ninteenth of Miletus, a Stoick.

The twentieth, a Tragick Poet.

BION.

CHAP. I.
Bion his life.

OF the Theodorean Sect was BION, Laert. Beristhe­nite. What his Parents were, and what his employments, he diverted himselfe to Phi­losophy, he related to Antigonus, King of Macedonia, in this manner. Antigonus asked Whence art thou? Who thy Parents? What thy Town? Bion perceiving himselfe to be re­proached, answered thus, my Father was a freeman, [...], implying, he was a seller of salt-fish, a Boristhenite; he had not a face, but instead thereof a brand mark, which de­clared the ill disposition of the owner: My Mother he married out of a common Brothel-house; [ Athen. deipn. a Lacedemonian Curtezan, na­med Olympia,] being such a Woman as such a man could get. My Father, for couzening the State, was sold, and all our Family for slaves. I being a young likely youth, was bought by an Ora­tour, who dyed, and left me all he had. I tore and burnt his Papers, went to Athens, and there applyed my selfe to Philo­sophy.

This is the blood and race I boast to own. Thus much concerning my selfe: Let Perseus therefore, and Philonides forbear to enquire after these things, and look you upon me, as I am in my selfe. You do not use, O King, when you send for Archers, to enquire of what Parentage they are; but, set them up a mark to shoot at: Even so of friends, you should not examine whence, but what they are.

Bion indeed, setting this aside, was of a versatile wit, a subtle Sophist, and gave many furtherances to the exercisers of P [...]ilo­phy: in some things he was—

He first heard Crates the Academick; but, despising that Sect, rook a [...]ordid Cloak and Scrip, and became a Cynick: to which Laertius ascribes his constancy, expert of perturbation. Then he followed Theodorus the Atheist, who profest all manner of lear­ning; to whose opinions he addicted himselfe, and was called a T [...]odorea [...]: Afterwards he heard Theophrastus the P [...]ripatetick.

CHAP. II.
His Apophthegms.

HE left many memorialls, and profitable Apophthegmes; as, Being reproved for not endeavouring to Catch a young man; new Cheese saith he, will not stick to the hook.

Being demanded what man is most perplexed, he saith, he who aimes at the highest Content.

To one who asked his advice whether he should marry or not, (for this some ascribe to Bion, which Agellius to Bias, the mistake perhaps grounded upon the nearnesse of their Names) he answe­red, if you take a fowl Wife, she will be a Torment; if a fair, Common.

He said, that Age is the Haven to which all ills have recourse; That Glory is the Mother of years; That beauty is a good which concerns others, not our selves; That Riches are the Sinewes of Things.

To one who had consumed his Patrimony, Earth, saith he, de­voured Amphiaraus, but you devour Earth.

He said, it is a great ill, not to be able to bear ill.

He reproved those who burn men, as having no Sense, and a­gain burn them as having Sense.

He used to say, it is better to yeeld our own youth and Beauty to others, then to attempt anothers; for he that doth so, injures both his body and Soul.

He vilified Socrates, saying, if he could enjoy Alcibiades, and did not, he was a fool, if he could not, he did no great matter.

He said, the way to the next World is easie, for we find it blind­fold.

He condemned Alcibiades, saying, when he was a boy, he drew away Husbands from their Wives, when a man, Wives from their Husbands.

At Rhodes, whilst the Athenians exercised Rhetorick, he taught Philosophy; for which being reproved, I bought Wheat saith he, and shall I fell Barley?

He said, they who are punished below would be more tor­mented if they carried Water in whole Vessells, then in Vessells full of holes.

One that was extreamly talkative, desiring his assistance in a businesse, I will doe what I can for you saith he, if you send a Messenger to me, and come not your self.

Travelling with very ill Company, they fell amongst theeves; we shall be undone saith he, unlesse we be known.

He said, Arrogance is the obstruction of Virtue.

Of a rich man Covetous, he hath not money saith he, but mo­ney him.

[Page 24] He said Covetous persons keep their Wealth so strictly, that they have no more use of their own then of anothers.

He said, when we are young, wee use Courage, when old, Wisdom. Wisdom excells other Vertues as the Sight the other Senses.

He said no man should be reproached for old age, that being a Condition all pray they may arive at it.

To an envious man sad, I know not saith he whether some ill hath befaln you, or some good another.

He said impiety is an ill companion to bold language;

For though his Speech he free,
To Bondage yield must hee.

That friends whatsoever they prove ought to be retained: lest we seem to have conversed with wicked persons, or to shunne Good.

Being Demanded if there were any Gods, he said, Old man, wilt thou not drive this [...]roud away.

He conceived that he might make a Field fertile sooner by praising then by manuring it.

He said, they who love to be flattered, are like Pots carried by the ear.

To one who asked him what folly is, he said the Obstruction of Knowledge.

He said good men, though Slaves are free, but wicked men though free are slaves to many Pleasures.

He said Grammarians whilst they enquire after the Errors of Ulysses, mind not their own, nor see that they themselves go astray as well as he, in taking pains about uselesse things.

He said Avarice is the Metropolis of all Evill.

Athen. Seeing a Statue of Persaeus, under which was written, [...], Persaeus of Zeno a Cit­tiean, he said, the writer mistook; for it should be, [...], Zeno's servant; as indeed he was.

CHAP. III.
His Death.

AT last falling sick (as those of Chalcis say▪ Laert. for he died there) he was perswaded to suffer ligatures (by way of charme) hee recanted and profest repentance for all hee had said of­fensive to the Gods. Hee was reduced to extream want of such things as are most necessary to sick persons, untill Antigonus [Page 25] sent to him two servants; and himself followed in a litter, as Phavorinus affirms in his various History, of that sicknesse he dyed; on whose death thus Laertius;

Bion the Boristhenite,
By his Birth to Scythia known,
Did religious duties slight,
Gods affirming there were none.
If to what he then profest,
Firm he had continued still,
Then his tongue had spoke his breast,
And been constant though in ill.
But the same who Gods deni'd,
He who sacred fanes despis'd,
He who mortalls did deride,
When to Gods they sacrific'd;
Tortur'd by a long disease,
And of deaths pursuit afraid,
Guifts their anger to appease
On their hearths and Altars laid.
Thus with smoak and incense tries
To delight their sacred scent;
I have sinn'd, not only cries,
And what I profest repent.
But unto an old wives charms
Did his willing neck submit,
And about his feeble armes
Caus'd them leather thongs to knit.
And a youthfull sprig of bayes
Did set up before his gate:
Every means and way essaies
To divert approaching fate.
Fool to think the Gods might be
Brib'd with gifts, their favours bought,
Or the sacred Deitie
Were, and were not as he thought.
But his wisdoms titles (now
Tum'd to ashes) not avail
With stretch'd arms, I know not how,
Hail he cried, great Pluto hail.

[Page 26] Of this name Laertius reckons ten; The first contemporary with Pherecydes the Syrian, of Proconnesus; who writ two Books extant in his time.

The second a Syracusian wrote of the Art of Rhetorick.

The third this Philosopher.

The fourth an Abderite of the Family of Democritus; a Mathe­matician: he wrote in the Attick and Ionick Dialect: He first said there were some habitable parts of the earth, where it was six months day and six months night.

The fift of Soleis; he wrote the Aethiopick History.

The sixt, an Oratour, who wrote nine Books entitled by the names of the Muses.

The seventh a Lyrick Poet.

The eight a Milesian Statuary; mention'd by Polemon.

The ninth a Tragick Poet, one of those who were called Tar­ [...]ici.

The tenth a Statuary of Clazomene or Chios, mentioned by Hip­ [...]nax.

THE MEGARICK SECT. EVCLID.

CHAP. I.
His Country and Masters.

Laer [...]. EUCLID (instituter of the Megarick Sect) was born at Megara, Town adjacent up­on the Isthmus; though others say at Geta, a City of Sicilie.

He first studied the writings of Parmeni­des, then went to Athens to hear Socrates: Afterwards the Agell. 6. 10. Athenians made an order, that if any Citizen of Megara came into the City of Athens, he should be put to death: So great was the hatred the Athenians bore to the Megarenses. Lib. 1. Thucydides mentions this Decree, whereby the Megarenses were prohibited to make use of any Lawes within the Athenian jurisdiction, or the Attick Forum: Which Order the Lacedemonians requiring to be repealed, and not prevailing, the Peloponnesian War ensued thereupon, the cruellest and longest that ever was amongst the Grecians.

Agell. 6. 10. Euclid, who was of Megara, and before that Decree used to go to Athens, and hear Socrates, after it was promulgated, came by night in a long womans Gown, and Cloak of severall co­lours, his head attired in a womans Vail (so Varro expounds Rica) from his house in Megara to Athens, to Socrates, that he might be in that time partaker of his counsell and instructions, and went back again before that day in the same habit, above twenty thousand paces.

Laer [...]. Upon the death of Socrates, Plato and the rest of the Philoso­phers, fearing the cruelty of the Tyrants, went to Megara to him, who entertained them kindly.

CHAP. II.
His institution of a Sect.

Laert HE affected litigious disputes, and Laert. vit. Soc [...]. was therefore told by So­crates, that he knew how to conte [...]d with Sophists, but not with me [...] [Page 28] Suitable to this contentious humour, he instituted a Sect, Laert. first called Megarick from the place, afterwards Eristick, from the li­tigious sophisticall nature thereo [...], Whence Laert. vit. Diog. Diogene [...] said▪ it was not [...] a School, but [...] anger: Laert. thus reproved by Timon,

O [...] all these triflles, I not value ou [...]ht,
W [...]ich [...] Phaedo nor litigious Euc [...]d caught [...]
Who the Megareans mad contention taught.

Lastly, it was called Dialectick; which name Dionysius, a Car­thaginian first gave them, because their discourses consisted of question and answer.

He affirmed, that there is but one good, which is called by severall names; sometimes Prudence, sometimes God, sometimes the Minde, and the like: He took away all things opposite to good, saying, there was no such thing.

He used arguments not by assumption, but by inference.

He took away disputation by similitude, saying, that it con­sisted either of like or unlike; if of like, it were better to examine the things themselves to which they are like: if of unlike, the comparison is to no purpose.

CHAP. III.
His Apothegmes, Writings.

HE was famous in the Schooles (saith De fraterno amore. Plutarch) for as much as hearing his Brother in in a wild rage, say, Let me perish, if I be not revenged: he answered, and I, unlesse I perswade you to lay aside your anger, and love me as at first. If Stob. serm. 32. Hierocles (who relates the same story) for [...] writ not as Plutarch [...], [...]hat epithite occasion'd the mistake.

Stob. Eth. 38. He said, [...] there is one kinde of sleep, a young pliant Deity, easie to be driven away; the other gray and aged, chiefly frequenting old men: Pertinacious and inexorable, from this God, if he once come, it is hard to get loose; words avail nothing, for he is deafe; nor can you shew him any thing that may move him, for he is blinde.

Stob. Eth. 47. Being demanded what the Gods are, and wherein they de­light: Of all things else concerning them, saith he, I am ignorant but of this, I know they hate curious persons.

Laert. He wrot (besides other things) six Dialogues ( Laert. vit. Aes [...]hin. Panaetius doubts whether they were genuine or spurious) their Titles these,

  • Lamprias.
  • Aeschines.
  • Phaenix; or (as Suidas) the Phoenixes.
    In voce Eu­clides.
  • [Page 29] Crito.
  • Alcibiades.
  • The Erotick.

Of the same names are numbered

Euclid the Mathematician, a Megarean also, whence confoun­ded by Lib. [...]. cap. 13. Valerius Maximus with the Philosopher: Plato (saith he) [...]ent the undertakers of the sacred Altar (who came to confer with him concerning the manner and form thereof) to Euclid the Geometr [...]cian, yielding to his skill and pr [...]ession: That these undertakers came to Plato, is evident from the testimony of many others; but, that he remitted them to Euclid the Geometrician; or, that Euclid the Philosopher own'd that profession, is no where to be proved. Oh the contrary, In Euclid. lib. 2. Cap. 4. Proclus affirms, that Euclid the Mathematician was of the Platonick Sect; and that The Text is imperfect, read Ka [...] [...], &c. and so (well nigh) Barocius. Ptolomy King of Aegypt ask­ing if there were any shorter way to Geometry, he answered, Not any Kings-high-way. From the death of Socrates to the first of the Ptolomies are 95 years. So that Euclid the Mathematician was much latter then the Philosopher.

Euclid the Archon in the second year of the 88 th Olympiad, ac­cording to Lib. Diodorus Siculus; but, Meteor. 1. 6. Aristotle names the Archon for that year Euclees, confirmed by his Commentators, and by [...]. Suidas, who only erres a little in the distance of years betwixt him and Euclid the other Archon. Inscript. p. 235. Salmasius not knowing the name Euclees to be any where found amongst the Archontes, and expresly affirming the contrary, endeavours to corrupt the Text of Suidas reading Diocles.

Euclid the Archon, in the second year of the 94 th Olympiad.

Euclid the Soothsayer, friend to Xenophon, who Expedit. cyr. lib. 7. mentions him.

Euclid the Stone-cutter, named in Plato's Will.

EVBVLIDES.

Laert. EUBULIDES a Mile [...]ian succeeded Euclid. some affirm, that Demosthenes the Oratour was his Scholler, and that Demost­henes not being able to pronounce the Letter R, he taught him by continuall exercise to do it. He was a great enemy to Aristotle, and much aspersed him.

In Dialectick he invented many kinds of Interrogation or argu­ment, [...], the Lying; [...], the occult; [...], Electra; [...], the Vailed; [...], Sorites; [...], the horned; [...], the bald: Of which thus Demosthenes.

[Page 30] The Oratours sharp Eubulides knowes
With subtle forked questions how to pose,
Speech from Demosthenes not sweeter flowes.

These are severall kinds of Sophisms, which Yop. [...]. 4. Aristotle in gene­rall defines Eristick Syllogismes: from this School borrowed and enlarged afterwards by the Stoicks.

[...], termed by Deipn. 8. Athenaeus [...], by Divinat. 2. Cicero mentiens, is a captious reasoning not to be dissolved; named, as most of the rest, not from the form, but matter; the ordinary example being this: Cic. L [...]cull. If you say that you lye when you speak truth, you lye: But, you say that you lye when you speak truth; therefore you lye. Such is that in Lib. 5. quest. Africanus, A man having foure hundred (Crownes) disposeth in Le­gacies three hundred; next he bequeaths to you a piece of ground worth one hundred Crownes; provided, his Will be not lyable to the Falcidian Law, [by which all Legacies are made void, if the surplusage remaining for the Heires, amount not at the least to the fourth part of the Goods] The Question is, what right you have. I say, the question is not to be resolved, being of that kind which the Dialecticks call [...], what part soever we take for true will prove false. If we say the Legacies are valid, the Will comes within compasse of the Falci­dian Law, whereby the condition being defective, the Legacy is invalid. Again, if because the condition being defective, the Legacies are not valid, it is not lyable to the Falcidian Law; and if the Law take not place upon the condition, you are not to have what was bequeathed you. So much was this Sophisme esteemed, that Epist. 6. 45. Seneca affirmes, many Books to have been written upon it: Vit. Chrysip. Laertius reckons six distinct Trea­tises of Chrysippus. Deipn. 8. Athenaeus and Suidas averr, that Philetus a Choan dyed of a Consumption, occasion'd by excessive study up­this Question only.

Electra, named (likewise) from the chiefe Examples; of which thus Lucian: Electra the illustrious Daughter of Agamemnon, knew and knew not the same thing. Orestes unknown standing by her, she knew that Orestes was her Brother, but she knew not that he was Orestes.

[...]the vailed; named also from the matter, thus in­stanc'd by Lucian. CHR. Answer me, Do you know your Father? MERC. Yes. CHR. What if I should bring one unto you vailed, what would you say, that you knew him or not? MERC. That I did not know him. CHR. And yet that man proves to be your Father; therefore if you `knew not the man, you knew not your Father. MERC. No truly; but, [...]pul off his vail, and I shal discover the truth. Of the same kinde is that of the Sophists, which Analy. poster. 1. 1. Aristotle affirmes, Socrates (in Plato's Meno) vainly labours to resolve; Do you know all Paires are even or not? The other answering he knew it. The Sophist brings forth a pair of some thing which he had held hidden under his Cloak, and askes, Did [Page 31] you know that I had this Even pair or not? the other confessing he knew not, Then saith he, you know and know not the same thing.

Sorites, By Cicero termed Divin. 2. a Cervalis, who defines it to be Cic. Luc [...]l. when any thing by degrees is added or taken away: as a Heap ( [...]) is made by adding a grain, or rather as Digest. lib. 1 [...] Iulianus, when from things Evidently true, by very short Mutations the Dispute is led to such things as are Evidently false; the same, Lib. 48. ad Sabin. in tit­de verbor. & rer. sig [...]ifit. ulpian, The Common ex­ample mentioned by In Lucullo. Cicero, In Chrysip. Laertius, Adv. L [...]gic. Sextus Empiricus, and others in this: are not two a few? are not three so likewise? Are not four the same? So on to ten. But two are a few, and therefore ten.

[...] the horned; Denominated as the rest from the Exam­ple, what you lost not you have, you lost not Hornes, therefore you have Horns. Repeated by Seneca, Agellius and others. Of this kind Lib. 5. i [...] Mat. St. Hierome observes that to bee which the Pharisees objected to our Saviour. He came (saith he) from Galilee to Judea, wherfore the faction of Scribes and Pharisees asked him whether it were lawfull for a man to put away his Wife for any cause, that they might Entrap him by a Horned Syllogisme, whatsoever he would answer being liable to excepti­on: if he should say a Wife might be put away for any cause, and ano­ther taken; he being a Professor of modesty should contradict himself; but if he should answer, a Wife ought not to be put away for any cause, he should be accounted guilty of Sacriledge, & judged to do contrary to the Doctrine of Moses, and by Moses of God. Our Lord therefore so tempers his an­swer, that he passeth by their trap, alledging for Testimony the sacred Scripture and Naturall Law, opposing the first Sentence of God to the second, which was granted not from the will of God, but Necessity of Sin. The same Father instanceth another of the same kind proposed to him, Epist. 83. I was assaulted at Rome by a very Eloquent person, with that which they call a Horned Syllogism, so as which way soever I turned I was more entangled. To marry a Wife saith he, is it a sin or not? I plain­ly, not thinking to avoid his ambush, said, it is not a sin; He then pro­pounded another Question, in Baptism are good works remitted or Evill? I with the like simplicity answered, sins are remitted: when I thought my self secure, Hornes began to bud out on each side on me, and the hidden forces to discover themselves, if saith he to marry a Wife be not a sin, and that Baptisme remitteth Sinnes, whatsoever is not remitted is re­served.

ALEXINUS.

Laert. Amongst the many Disciples of Eubulides was Alexinus an Elean; a great lover of Contention, and therefore called [...] from redarguing; He most opposed Zeno.

Herm [...]ppus saith, he went to Olympia, and there profest Philo­sophy; his Disciples questioning why he lived there, he answe­red, he meant to institute a Sect, and call it Olympick, but his Dis­ciples [Page 32] wanting subsistence, and disliking the Air departed, he continued there solitary with one servant only, and swimming in the River Alphaeus, was hurt with a Reed, whereof he dyed.

He wrote against other Philosophers besides Zeno. And against Ephorus the Historian.

EUPHANTVS.

Laert. From Alexinus came Euphantus an Olinthian, Master to King Antigonus, Father of Demetrius, Grandfather of Antigonus Gonatus; He died of Age; He writ

The History of that time.

Tragedies many, which upon their publique representations were much applauded.

An Oration upon a Kingdom, to Antigonus, very Celebrious.

APOLLONIVS CRONVS.

Laert. OF the Disciples of Eubulides, was Apollonius Cronus; Lib. 14. Stra­bo saith, he was Cyrenaean by birth, and calls him Cronus Apollonius, implying the latter to be a sirname from Apollonia a Town of Cyrene.

DIODORVS.

CHAP. I.
His Life.

Laert. DIodorus was of Iossus a City of Caria; Son of Ameinias; La­ertius saith, he heard Eubulides; Lib. 14. & 17. Strabo that he heard Apol­lonius Cronus, after whom he was called Cronus; the name of the Master being transmitted to the Disciple, by reason of the obscurity of the true Cronus; Laert. of Diodorus thus Callimachus;

—ev'n Momus writ
Upon the Walls, Cronus hath wit.

He lived with Ptolomeus Soter, in whose presence being questi­oned by Stilpo, in such things as upon the sudden he could not answer; he was not only punished by the King, but reproached with the name of Cronus: whereupon he went from the Feast, and having written an Oration upon that question, died of grief.

CHAP. II.
His Philosophy.

Lib. STrabo and Laertius affirm he was a Dialectick; The Dialecticks (saith Lucul. Cicero) teach in their Elements to judge whether a [...]on­nex (a proposition which hath the conjunction if) be true or false; as this, if it be day, it is light, how much is it controverted; Diodo­rus is of one opinion, Philo of another, Chrysippus of a third, That Dio­dorus laboured much herein, appears from an Epigram of Callima­chus, cited and explained by Advers. Gram. Sextus Empiricus.

Concerning these propositions, the Disagreement of Diodorus from Philo and Chrysippus (already mentioned by Cicero) is thus ex­plained by Fyrrh. Hyp. 2. Sextus Empiricus; But when saith he, or how it followeth they disagree among themselves, and those things whereby they deter­mine a consequence to be judged, oppugn one another [...] as Philo said, it is a true Connex, when it beginneth not from true, and endeth [...]n false. So that according to his opinion, a true Connex may be three severall wa [...]es, a false only one way. For when it beginneth from true, and endeth in true, it is true; as this, if it be day, it is light. Again, when it be­ginneth from false, and endeth in false, it is true: as this, if the Earth flies, the Earth hath wings. Likewise that which beginneth from false, and endeth in true is true; as this, if the Earth flies it is Earth: that only is true which beginneth from true, and endeth in false. Such is this, if it be day it is night. For if it be day, that it is day is true, which is the Antecedent. But that it is night is false, which was the Consequent. Di­odorus saith, that is a true Connex which is not contingent, beginning from true, and ending in false. This is contrary to the opinion of Philo, for such a Connex as this, if it be day I discourse, and if at present it be day, and I discourse is according to Philo's opinion a true Connex: for it begins from true, it is day, and ends in true, I discourse. But accor­ding to the opinion of Diodorus it is false: for it may so happen, that though it begin from true, to wit, it is day, yet it may end in false, to wit, that I discourse when I am silent. Thus by Contingencie it may be­gin in true, and end in false; for before I began to discourse it began from true, to wit, it is day: but ended in false, to wit, I dis­course.

And again, Cap. codem: for that we examine not many opinions concerning a Connex, let us say that Connex is in it self right, which beginneth not from true, and endeth in false. This, if there be motion, there is Va [...]uity according to Epicures Opinion, beginning from true, to wit, there is motion, and ending in true, will be true. According to the Peripateticks, beginning from true, to wit, there is motion, and ending in false, to wit, there is Vacuity, will be false: according to Diodorus, beginning from [Page 34] false; to wit, there is motion, and ending in false, to wit, there is vacuity, will be true, for the assumption, to wit, there is motion, he denies as false.

Laert. Some affirme, he invented the vailed and horned arguments (of which already in the life of Eubulides) In lib. 1: Pri­ [...]r. Alexander Aphrodiseus, saith he, used [...], the dominative argument: Of whose originall and efficacy thus lib. 2. cap. 19. Epictetus; The Dominative argument seemes to have been interrogated and collected upon such like occasions as these: for, there being a common [...]ight amongst these three propositions to one another: The first, that every thing past is necessarily true. The second, that possibility followes not impossibility. The third, that what is not possible, neither is nor shall be true. This fight Diodorus observing, made use of the two first, to prove, that nothing is possible, which is not, nor shall be. And In lib. [...]. Prior. Alexander, For that I be at Corinth is possible, if that I have been, or ever shall be there; but, if neither, it is not possible. It is possible, that a child to be made a Grammarian, if he be made such, in confirmation hereof Diodorus interrogated by the Dominative ar­gument.

He held, that nothing is moved, Sext. Empir. [...]yrrhon. hyp. 3. 8. arguing thus: If a thing be moved, it is either moved in the place wherein it is, or in the place wherein it is not: but not in that wherein it is; for it resteth in the place wherein it is: nor in that wherein it is not; for where a thing is not, there it can neither act nor suffer. Therefore nothing is moved: and Sext. Empir. advers. Gram. conse­quently nothing is corrupted or perisheth.

Sext. Empir. Pyrrh. hyp. 3. 4. He asserted, that the principles of things are least indivisible bodies, Stob. Eclog. [...]bys. 13. in number infinite, in magnitude finite.

ICHTHYAS.

[...] ICHYHYAS son of Metallus, an eminent person, is remember­ed amongst these Philosophers that are derived from Euclid: To him Diogenes the Cynick dedicated a Dialogue.

CLINOMACHVS.

Laert. AMongst these descended from Euclid, was likewise CLINO­MACHUS, a Thurian: He first wrot concerning Axiomes, [Propositions] Categorems, [that part of a Proposition which is praedicated of the other] and the like.

STILPO.

CHAP. I.
Stilpo his life.

Laert. STILPO was of Megara in Hellas; he lived in time of the first Ptolomy: Of the Masters which he heard are reckoned Euclid the founder of this School: but, this agrees not with his time, as was before observed.

Some followers of Euclid,

Thrasymachus of Corinth, friend to Ichthyas: So Heraclides atte­steth.

Laert. vi [...]. Diogenis. Diogenes the Cynick.

Pasicles, a Theban, who heard Crates the Cynick, his own Brother.

Dioclides of Megara.

Cicero saith; he was very acute, much approved by those times: his friends (saith he) writ, he was much inclined to wine and women, yet relate not this in his dispraise; but, rather in his commendations, that he by Learning so subdued and represt his vicious nature, that none ever saw him drunk, none ever dis­covered any lasciviousnesse in him. Plutarch magnifies his height of courage, mixed with meeknesse and temperance.

He was much addicted to civill affairs. Besides his Wife, he kept company with Nicareta, a Curtezan: He had a daughter of ill fame, whom Simmias, a Syracusian, his intimate friend, mar­ried; she living incontinently, one told Stilpo she was a disho­nour to him: No more, saith he, then I am an honour to her.

Ptolemeus Soter much esteemed him, and when he took possessi­on of Megara by conquest, gave him mony, and invited him along with him to Aegypt: Of the mony he took a little, but absolutely refused the journey: Going to Aegina stayed there, till Ptolomies returne. Dem [...]trius son of Antigonus, upon the taking of Megara, gave order, that his house might be preserved, and whatsoever belong'd to him restored; and bidding him give them an inventory of such things as he had lost, he said, that he had lost nothing that belonged to him, for none had taken away his learning; his lear­ning and knowledge were both left.

With Demetrius he disputed of Humanity so efficaciously, that he became a studious Auditor of him.

Concerning Minerva's Statue, carved by Phidias, he asked a man, whether Minerva Daughter of Iove were a God? He af­firmed she was: But this, saith he, is not of Iove, but of Phidias; [Page 36] to which the other assented: Then, saith he, she is not a God. Hereupon being cited to the Court of Areopagus, he denyed it not, but justified it, [...] she was not a God, but a Goddesse. But, the Areopagites nothing satisfied with this evasion, orde­red that he should depart the City. Hereupon Theodorus sirnamed [...], said in derision, How came Stilpo to know this, did he put a­side her vail, and look upon her breast? Theodorus was bold of speech; but, Stilpo reserved, in so much, as being demanded by Crates, whether the Gods delighted in bent knees and prayers: Thou fool, saith he, do not question me in publick, but when we are alone together.

He was sincere and plain, void of all artifice: Crates the Cynick not answering him, but [...], I knew, saith he, you would speak any thing rather then that which is decent.

Crates in propounding a question delivered a fig to him, which he took and eat: Crates presently cryed out, that he had lost his fig: Yes, saith he, and your question also, of which that was in earnest.

Seeing Crates halfe frozen in cold weather, Crates, saith he, me thinks you want [...], (which one way implies a new gar­ment, another way both a garment and wit) Crates ashamed, answe­red thus;

Stilpo at Megara I saw opprest,
Where vast Typhocus lies with weight opprest.
To hear him wrangle, many Schollers came;
Fair truth to chace away was all their aime.

At Athens he wrought so much upon the people, that they would run out of their shops to see him: They wonder at thee Stilpo (said one to him) as a monster: No, saith he, but as a true man.

As he was speaking with Crates, in the midst of their discourse he went away to buy fish; Crates pursued him, crying out, that he gave over the discourse: No, saith he, I carry along the dis­course with me; but, I leave you, the discourse will stay, the fish must be bought.

Being asked, Stob. what is harder then a stone, he answered, a fool.

CHAP. II.
His Philosophy.

Laert. HE was Master of the Megarick School, excellent in Eristick Disputes, by his subtle Tenents and Discourses, beautifying himselfe, his Country and friends.

He took away all Species (Universalls) affirming, that he who [Page 37] saith, a man, denotes not any man, the Terme being not proper to this or that person, for why to one rather then to another, there­fore not to this; and again, that which we see is not an Herbe, for an Herb was many years ago, Therefore this was not an Herbe.

Plut. He likewise denyed one thing to be praedicated of another argu­ing thus; if running be praedicated of an Horse, the subject is not the [...] with the praedicate; the definition of man is one thing, that o [...] good another, so an horse is a di [...]ering thing from running, for upon [...], we give severall Definitions of each; for if a man, and good, or a horse, and run­ing were the same, how could good be praedicated of Food or Physick, and running of a horse, which are things so different. Thus he admitted no conjunction with the subject, in things which are in a subject, or praedicated of a subject, but conceived that both these, unlesse they be the very same with the subject, cannot be praedicated of it, even not as an Accident. This, though it were one of those little sayings which Stilpo sportively used to cast out amongst the So­phisters, Colotes the Epicurean opposed so eagerly, that he fra­med a large discourse against Stilpo, grounded only upon this assertion, (which yet he neither re [...]elled nor resolved) affirming that by holding one thing is not praedicated of another, he takes away good life; But that Stilpo (saith Plutarch) was offended only at some words, and opposed the manner of speaking, but took not away the course of life, or abolished things, is most evident.

Senec. Epist. 9 He asserted the chief good to be a mind not subject to passion.

CHAP. III.
His Disciples.

Laert. He so far exceeded others in fluent discourse and learning, that he converted almost all Greece to the Megarick Sect, Philippus of Megara saith, he drew Metrodorus sirnamed the Theoretick, and Timagoras the Gelo­an from Theophrastus.

[...] and Simmias from Aristotle the Cyrenaean.

Of Dialecticks, Paeonius, from Aristides.

Diphilus Son of Euphantus, and Myrmex Son of Exenaetus coming to dispute against him, became both followers of him: Thus far Philipp [...]s: he likewise attracted

Phaesidemus the Peripatetick, excellent in Natural Philosophy.

Alcimus, the most eminent Oratour at that time in Greece.

Ze [...]o the Phaenician, an Epicurean Philosopher.

Crates, and others; in a word, whomsoever he would himself.

Heraclides saith, that Zeno the Citican founder of the Stoicall Sect was his Disciple.

CHAP. IV.
His Death, Writings.

HErmippus affirmeth that he died of age; but drank a draught of wine to hasten his end.

Suidas saith, he wrote 20. Dialogues; Laertius but nine; and those not very efficacious; their Titles these

  • Moschus,
  • Aristippus or Callias,
  • Ptolemaeus,
  • Chaerecrates,
  • Mitrocles,
  • Anaximenes,
  • Epigenes,
  • To his Daughter,
  • Aristotle,

He had a Son named Dryso, a Philosopher also.

THE ELEACK & ERETRIACK SECTS. PHAEDO.

Laert. THe Eleack Sect was instituted by Phaedo, an Ele­an of a noble Family; It chanced that he was taken by Thieves or Pyrates, and sold to a House of common dishonest resort; where being forced to sit at the door, he was obser­ved by Socrates in passing, who noting the in­genuity of his countenance (which was extra­ordinary) perswaded (as Laertius saith) Alcibiades or Plato, or (as Agellius,) Cebes, to buy him, from which time he addicted himself diligently to Philosophy, and was a constant Disciple of Socrates; so much affected by Plato, that he called that most ex­cellent discourse of the immortality of the Soul, after him, Phaedo.

He instituted a Sect called from him Eleack; The Dialogues ascribed to him were

  • Zopyrus,
  • Medus,
  • Simon,
  • Antimachus, or the old man,
  • Nicias,
  • Simmias,
  • Alcibiades,
  • Critolaus.

Laert. vit. A [...]sch. Panaetius doubts whether any of these were written by Phaedo; Medus is by some ascribed to Aeschines, by others to Poliaenus as are also Antimachus and the Scythian discourses.

PLISTHENES.

Laert. THe Eleack Sect was continued by Plisthenes an Elean; suc­cessour to Phaedo; Plisthenes was succeeded by Menedemus and Asclepiades.

MENEDEMVS.

CHAP. I.
His Country, Parents, Teachers.

Laert. MEnedemus was one of those Philosophers that continued the School of Phaedo, which hitherto was called Eleack, but from Menedemus was termed Eretriack: he was an Eretrian, Son of Clisthenes; Clisthenes was of the Family of the Theopropi­dae; yet though noble by descent, Mechanick by profession and indigent; some affirm he was a maker of Tents ( Hesychius Illustris terms him an Architect) adding that he taught both Arts to his son Menedemus, so that when Menedemus wrote a decree, an Alexinian Philosopher reproved him, saying, it becomes not a wise man to frame both Tents and decrees.

Menedemus being sent by the Eretrians with a command of Souldiers, to Megara, went from thence to Athens to hear Plato at the Academy, with whom he was so taken, that he gave over his Military employment.

By Asclepiades a Phlyasian, his intimate friend, he was carried to Stilpo at Megara, whom they both heard; Thence taking a journey to Elis, they met with Anchypillus and Moschus, who be­longed to the School of Phaedo.

Some affirm he despised Plato and Xenocrates, and Paraebates the Cyrenaean; but admired Stilpo; concerning whom, being deman­ded his opinion, he only answered that he was free.

CHAP. II.
His School and Philosophy.

BEing returned home to Eretria, he set up a School, and taught Philosophy there: the Elia. Laert. School being thus trans­fer'd to Eretria, was from thence forward called Eretriack.

In his School there was no order of place, no seats round a­bout it; but, as every man chanced to be sitting, or standing, or walking, in the same postures they heard him.

He held, that there was but one vertue and good, reprehen­ding those who asserted more; whence of one who held there were many Gods, he demanded ironically how many? and whe­ther he thought there were more then a hundred?

He was of a versatile wit, and in composure of his speech a difficult adversary; he turned himselfe every way, and found something to say for every thing: He was very litigious, as An­tisthenes in his successions affirmes, and used this question, What is not the same, is different from that with which it is not the same? Yes, To benefit is not the same with good, therefore good doth not benefit. He took away negative propositions, leaving only the affirmative; and of these he admitted the simple only; but rejected those which were not simple, calling them conjoyn­ed and complexe.

Heraclides saith, he was a Platonick, and derided Dialectick. Hexinus asking, whether he had given over beating his Father? I neither did beat him, saith he, nor have given over. The other replyed, Either say yes or no, to dissolve the ambiguity. It is ridiculous, saith he, to follow your Lawes, when a man may withstand them in the very entrance.

He writ not, or composed any thing, because (saith Antigonus Carystius) he was of no certain opinion: yet, in dispute he was so vehement, that he many times went away with black and blew eyes.

CHAP. III.
His manner of living.

Laert. HE contracted a strict friendship with Asclepiades, nothing inferiour to that of Pilades to Orestes: Asclepiades was the el­der, whence there went a common saying, that he was the Poet, Menede [...]us the Player.

Athe [...]. Dei [...]n. When they were yet both young Philosophers, and indi­gent, they were cited to the Court of Areopagus, to give account [Page 42] ( See life Solon. according to Solon's Law) by what means (spending the whole day amongst Philosophers without any labour, and having no estate) they subsisted, and were in so good a condition: They de­sired, that one of the Masters of the common Prison might be sent for; who, when he came, attested, that they went down every night into the Prison, where the common malefactours grownde, and did there grinde, and in pay of their labour, re­ceived two drachmes: at which the Areopagites much wonder­ing, bestowed as an honourable reward upon them two hun­dred drachmes.

They had other Patrons that bestowed gifts upon them; Ar­chepolides gave them three thousand pieces of silver; they both contended which should receive last, and in conclusion, neither accepted it. The chief persons that received them were Hippo­nicus a Macedonian, and Aegetor a Lamiean: Aegetor gave each of them thirty Minae. Hipponicus gave Menedemus two thousand drachmes towards the marriage of his Daughters, which, as Heraclides saith, were three, by his Wife Oropia.

For Asclepiades and Menedemus took each of them a Wife; Asclepiades married the daughter, Menedemus the Mother: Asclepiades, his Wife dying, took the Wife of Menedemus; Me­nedemus being made a chiefe Magistrate, married a rich Wife; notwithstanding, he allowed his first Wife an equall interest in the government of the House. Asclepiades having lived with Me­nedemus in great plenty; yet, with great temperance, died old at Eretria. At that time, one, whom Asclepiades much loved, com­ing late at night, intending to have feasted with him, the ser­vants shut him out of dores: but, Menedemus bad them let him in, saying, Asclepiades would admit him even under ground.

Menedemus was much given to entertainments, and, because the Country was unwholesome, made many Feasts: what order he observed therein is thus delivered by Antigonus Carystius, and out of him (though not cited) by Laertius. He dined but with one or two companions at the most; if any came to him, they were admitted after dinner was ended; if they came sooner then the set time, they walked short turnes before the doore, and deman­ded of the servants what course was carried in; if they told them fish-broth (with which they begun their dinner) they went a­way; if any flesh, they went into a room prepared for that pur­pose. In Summer time, Menedemus had the Couches or Beds of his Dining-room covered with flags and rushes, in Winter with sheep-skinns. Every guest brought a Cushion; the Cup they had was no bigger then a large spoon: instead of sweet-meats they had Lupines and Beanes: sometimes such fruit as the season afforded; in Summer, Pomgranats, in Springe, Pulse, in Winter, Figs. This Lycophron the Chalcidian confirmes in his satyricall Comedy upon Menedemus, where Silenus speaks thus to the Satires.

[Page 43]
Sons impious of a pious Father, I
(You see) with your delights and sports comply:
But never by the Gods at such a Feast
In Caria, Rhodes, or Lydia was a guest.
How plentifull!

And not long after,

A little pot halfe full of water clear,
Rated at farthings five, a boy did bear
To every guest; about vile Lupines went,
With which the beggar's table's scarce content.

Whilst they drank (after the feast) Menedemus proposed que­stions, and instead of a desert gave them discourse, which excited all to temperance and continence: these continued sometimes till the crowing of the Cock broke them off, much against the will of his guests, who never thought they had enough of them.

CHAP. IV.
His civill employments.

Laert. HE was first contemned by his Country-men, and called dog and fool; but at last so much honoured by them, that they committed the government of the Common-wealth to his charge, Laert. and paid him yearly two hundred Talents, whereof he sent back fifty.

After he applyed himselfe to civill businesse, he was so thoughtfull, that going to put Incense into a Censer, he put it besides. Crates reproaching him for undertaking publick employ­ments, he sent him to Prison; whereupon as he chanced to pass by, Crates rose up, and saluted him with the title of Agamemnonian, leader of the City.

He was sent Ambassadour from the Eretrians to Ptolomy, and to Lysimachus (much honoured wheresoever he came) and to Deme­trius, Euseb. all three Kings of Macedonia, of whom, Demetrius first raign­ed, then Lysimachus, and after him ( Pyrrhus intervening) Ptolomy.

Some accused him to Demetrius, that he would betray his City to Ptolomy, of which charge he acquitted himselfe by an Epistle, beginning thus, Menedemus to king Demetrius, health. I hear that you are informed many things concerning us, &c. advising him to take heed of one of those that were his enemies, named Aeschylus. When he was on Embassy to Demetrius, he spoke very earnestly and effectually concerning Oropus.

[Page 44] Antigonus also, King of Macedonia, loved him exceedingly, and profest himselfe his Disciple: In his behalfe he made a De­cree, clear and void of assentation, beginning thus; For as much as King Antigonus, having overcome the Barbarians in fight, retur­neth into his own Country, having good successe in all his undertakings: The Senate and people have thought good, &c.

CHAP. V.
His Vertues and Apothegmes.

MENEDEMUS was of exceeding gravity, for which Crates deriding him, said,

Asclepiad the Phliasian, and the proud Eretrian, and Timon.

He supercilious bumbast speech begins. In this severity he was so awfull, that Eurylochus being invited by Antigonus, together with Clippides, a youth of Cyzicum, refused to go, fearing Mene­demus should know it.

In reproof he was bitter and bold, of which Laertius instanceth his sayings to a young man over-confident, to Hierocles, &c. to an Adulterer boasting, &c. to a young man crying, &c.

Antigonus asking his advice, whether he should go to a luxu­rious banquet; not speaking whether he should go or not, he bad him send them word, that he was a Kings son.

One who intruded himselfe upon him, and discoursed very absurdly, he asked, if he had a farm; he answered, many: Go then, saith he, and look after them, le [...]t in losing you rusticity you lose them also.

To one asking, whether a good Man may take a Wife, he said, Do you think I am good or not? The other assenting; But, I (saith he) have taken one.

Not able to limit the prodigality of one who invited him to supper, he silently reproved him, eating nothing but Olives.

This freedome brought him into danger when he was in Cy­prus with Nicocreon, together with his friend Asclepiades; for, the King having invited him with the rest of the Philosophers to a Monthly feast, Menedemus said, this convention if it be good, ought to be every day; if otherwise, this day is too much: The Tyrant answered, that he had set apart that day to converse with Philosophers. Menedemus persisting in his assertion, demon­strated from what he had said of the sacrifice, that Philosophers ought to be heard at all times. Whereupon if one of the Musi­cians had not helped them to escape, they had been put to death, whence the Ship being endangered by a storm, Asclepiades said, that the humanity of the Musician preserved them, the rough­nesse of Menedemus had undone them.

[Page 45] He was negligent, and (as we said) carelesse in every thing that concerned the order of his School; likewise high-minded, and covetous of glory: insomuch that when he and Asclepiades first exercised the trade of building, Asclepiades was seen upon the house top carrying clay; but Menedemus, if he espied any man passing by, hid himselfe.

He was somewhat enclined to superstition; having eaten [...]n a Cookes shope the flesh of something that had died of it selfe ig­norantly with Asclepiades, as soon as he knew it, he grew sick, and looked pale, till Asclepiades reproved him, saying, He was not sick of the meat, but of phancy.

In all other respects he was a person of a great and free soul▪ in strength even in his old age equall to those who wrastled in exercise, strong made, swarthy of complexion, sat and corpulent; but of indifferent stature, as appears (saith Laertius) by his sta­tue in Eretria, in the old Stadium, so exactly carved, that it ex­presseth the naked proportion of his limbs.

He loved Aratus and Lycophron the Tragick Poet, and Antago­ras the Rhodian, but above all he was studious of Homer; next of the Lyricks; then of Sophocles: In Satyres he assigned the second place to Achaeus; the first to Aeschylus, whence to those in the state who defended the contrary part, he said thus,

The swift in time outstript are by the slow,
A Tortoise thus an Eagle may outgo.

These are verses of Achaeus; they therefore are mistaken, who say he read nothing but the Medea of Euripides, which is put a­mong the Poems of Neophron the Sicyonian.

Of Bion, who spoke with much diligence against Prophets, he said, he murthered the dead.

To one who said, the greatest good is to enjoy those things which we desire; it is a much greater saith he, to desire those things which are fitting.

He was violent (as we said) in controversie, but most affable in conversation and action: Alexinus, whom in dispute he had of­ten circumvented and bitterly derided, hee gratified in deed; taking care for the safe conduct of his Wife from Delphi to Chal­cis, the way being much infested with Theeves.

He was an excellent friend, as is manifest from his affection to Asclepiades, of which we have already spoken, only to Persaeus, he was constantly a profest enemy, for it was known that when Antigonus for Menedemus his sake would have restored the Eretrians to their first liberty, Persaeus withstood it, whereupon at a Feast Menedemus openly enveigh'd against him, using amongst many others this expression; he is indeed a Philosopher, but of all men that are, were, or ever shall be the most wicked.

CHAP. VI.
His departure from Eretria, and Death.

THe friendship he held with Antigonus, made him suspect­ed by his own Countrymen, as if he meant to betray the City to him; of which being accused by Aristodemus, he fled, and lived a while at Oropus in the Temple of Amphiaraus: thence some golden Cups chancing to be stoln, he was by a publick de­cree of the Boeotians forbidden to stay there any longer, where­upon he returned privately into his Country, and taking his Wife and Children along with him, went from thence to Anti­gonus, where he died of grief.

But Heraclides on the contrary affirmeth, that whilst he was praefect of Eretrians, he often defended his Country against those who would have made Demetrius Tyrant thereof; Neither would he therefore have betray'd it to Antigonus; but that was falsly laid to his charge; he afterwards went to Antigonus, petitioning that he would restore his Country to their liberties; which An­tigonus denying he out of grief fasted seven daies, and so died; The same relation is delivered by Antigonus Carystius. Heraclides saith, he lived 84. years.

FINIS.
THE HISTORY OF PHILO …

THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

The Fift Part.

Containing the Academick Philosophers.

IN DOMINO CONFIDO[?]

LONDON, Printed for Humphrey Mosely, and Tho: Dring. An. Dom. 1656.

PLATO.

PLATO.

CHAP. I.
The Country, Parents, and Time of PLATO.

THE most eminent of all the Sects derived from Socrates was the Academick, so called from the Academy, a place in Athens, where the Pro­fessors thereof taught: This Sect was instituted by Plato, continued by Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemon, Crates, Crantor, thus farre called the first or old Academy. Arcesilaus, succeeding Cran­tor, instituted the middle Academy, continued by Lacydes, Telecles, Euander, and Hegesinus. Carneades founded the new Academy, of which was also ( [...]litomachus: Some reckon a fourth Academy, insti­tuted by Philo and Charmidas: a fifth by Antiochus.

Laert. Plato was out of doubt an Athenian, nor are they to be cre­dited who relate him Tzetz. Chili­ad. 11. 390. a Theban, born at Cynocephalus; Laert. An­tileon affirmes his Parents to bee of Colly [...]tus. Laert. Suid. Hee was born (according to Phavorinus) in the Island Aegina, in the house of Phidiades, son of Thales; his Father sent with others thither at the division of the Land (upon their defection from, and subjection by the Athenians, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War) and returned to Athens, at what time those Athenians were ejected by the Lacedemonians, in aid of the Aeginetae.

Laert. Apul. Suid. He was of an eminent Family; his Father Aristo (Son of Aristoteles) of the race of Codrus, Son of Melanthus, who (as Thra­sylus affirmes) derived themselves from Neptune. Melanthus fly­ing Messena, came to Athens, where afterwards by a Strata­gem killing Xanthus, he was made King after Thymocles, the last of the Theseidae. His Mother Perictione, by some called Potone, whose Kindred with Solon is thus described by Laertius and In Timaeum. Proclus. Execestides had two Sons, Solon and Dropides: Dropides had Critias, mentioned by Solon in his Poems.

[Page 2]
Bid fair-haird Critias his Sire observe;
A wandring minde will from his leader swerve.

Critias had Callaeschrus, Callaeschrus had Critias, one of the thirty Tyrants, and Glaucon (whom Apuleius calls Glaucus) Glaucon had Charmides and Perictione; Perictione by Aristo had Plato, the sixt from Solon; Solon was descended from Neptune and Neleus, [Father of Nestor.] Thus Laertius, from whom Proclus dissents only in that, that he makes Glaucon Son of the first Critias, Bro­ther to Callaesch [...]us, which Critias manifestly (saith he) in Plat. Charmides confirmes, calling Glauco (Father of Charmides) his Uncle. Thus was Plato descended both waies from Neptune.

[...]here are (saith D [...]gm. Plat. Apuleius) who assert Plato of a more sublime race: Aristander, followed by many Platonists, thinks, he was begotten on his Mother by some Spectrum in the shape of Apollo: Laert [...]: perh. [...]. it shou'd be [...] amongst the wri­tings of [...]peusip­pus is mentioned [...] Speusippus in his Treatise, entitl'd Plato, or [...], Clearchus in his Eulogie of Plato; Anaxili [...]es in his second Book of Philosophers; Sympos. 8. 1. Plu­tarch, Suidas, and others, affirm it to have been commonly re­ported at Athens, that he was the Son of Apollo, who appearing in vision to her (being a woman of extraordinary Beautie) Apul. d [...]gm. Plat. Perictionae se miscuit, she thereupon conceived: Aristo (her Husband) having often attempted to enjoy her, but in vaine; at last Apollo appearing to him in a vision or dream, and a voice commanding him to refrain the company of his Wife for ten Months, untill her delivery were past, he forbore; whence Tyndarus

He did not issue from a mortall bed;
A God his Sire; a God-like life he led.

Some thereupon (as Advers. Iul. Saint Hierom saith) affirmed, he was born of a Virgin, and Laert. it was a common speech among the Athenians, that Phoebus begat Aesculapius and Plato, one to cure Bodies, the other Soules.

Laert. Suid. Aristo had afterwards by Perictione, two Sons, Adimaretus and Glauco, and a Daughter Potone, Mother to Speusippus: These relations of Plato will be more conspicuous in this Genealogicall Table.

[Page 3]

[figure]

For the Year of his Birth, (to omit the mistakes of Eusebius, who placeth it in the fourth year of the eightie eight Olympiad, in the Archonship of Stratocles, and of the Chronicon Alexan­drinum, that placeth it the year following) Laertius saith, He was born, according to the Chronologie of Apollodorus, in the eightie eight Olympiad, which seemes to be towards the beginning of the first year, whilst Aminias was yet Archon. For Laertius else­where saith, that he was six years younger then Isocrates; for Iso­crates (saith he) was born, when Lysimachus, Plato, when Aminias [Page 4] was Archon, under whom Pericles dyed: in the third year of the Peloponesian War. This Aminias is by the Argum. Hip­pol. Scholiast of Euripi­des called Ameinon, by Deipn. 5. Athenaeus, Epameinon, by Lib. Diodorus Siculus, Epaminondas. The various reading, occasion'd either by addition or detraction of the Preposition [...], but by which of these two cannot easily be evinc'd. Plin. Exercit. p. 157. Salmasius endevouring to prove the name to be [...], positively affirms, that the Greeks never name an Archon without the Preposition [...], but that errour Doctr. temp. Pe [...] avius confutes, whose opinion is confirmed by the antient Marble at Arundell-house, which addeth not the Pre­position to the names of the Archons.

Neither is the opinion of Deipn. 5. Athenaeus much different, who affirmes, Plato was born (the Year before) Apollodorus being Archon, who succeeded Euthydemus, who was Archon the third Year of the eightie seventh Olympiad, and that under Euphe­mus, in the fourth year of the nintieth Olympiad, he was fourteen years old. For both Laertius and Athenaeus agree in the Year of his death, viz. the first of the hundred and eight Olympiad, when Theophilus, the successor of Callimachus, was Archon; Athenaeus only differeth in this, that, computing eightie two Archons, he attributes so many years to Plato's life, whereas it is certain, that he lived but exactly eightie one.

The day of his birth, Laert. according to Apollodorus, was the seventh of Thargelion, at which time the Delians did celebrate the Feast of Apollo. So likewise Florus, cited by Sympos. 8. 1. Plutarch, who addes, that the Priests and Prophets call Apollo [...], as being born upon this seventh day; whence perhaps was occasion'd the fiction, that he was Son of Apollo, which Plutarch esteemes no disparagement to his Deity. In the first year of the eighty eight Olympiad, the Neomenia of Hecatombaeon fell upon the second of August, and (upon those Hypotheses which we laid down formerly in the Cap. 1. life of Socrates) the Dominicall Letter for that Year being E. the seventh of Thargelion will (according to the Julian accompt taken proleptically) fall upon Friday, the thirtieth of May; according to the Gregorian, upon Friday the ninth of Iune, in the year of the Julian period, 4286.

This is according to the faith of the Historians, with whom the Astrologers do not agree; for Astron. Iulius Firmicus hath erected the Scheme of his Nativity after this manner.

[Page 5]

[figure]

If the Ascendent saith he shall be [...] and [...] therein posited; and if [...] then be placed in the seventh, having [...] for his signe, and in the second the [...] in [...] and the [...] in [...] in the fifth house beholding the Ascendent with a [...] aspect, and [...] in the ninth from the Ascendent in [...]. This Geniture renders a man Interpreter of Divine and heavenly Instituti [...]ns, who endued with instructive speech, and the power of divine wit, and formed in a manner by a celestiall Inst [...]tion, by the true license of disputations shall arrive at all the secrets of Divinity. Thus Firmicus, whose Scheme agreeth not with the other Calculation, as being betwixt the midst of February and of March, during which time the [...] is in [...].

Hence will appear the great Anachronisme of those, who affirm, that Plato went to Aegypt in the time of the Prophet Hieremie (whom Eusebius placeth in the thirtie sixt Olympiad) and heard him there. Hieremie at the captivity of the Jewes into Babylon, was carried by Iohanan son of Caree into Aegypt: The Jewes were carried away by Nebuchadnezzar, at what time Tarquinius Priscus reign'd at Rome, Vaphres in Aegypt, to whom the rest of the Jewes fled, which was in the fortie seventh Olympi­ade, 160 years before Plato was born. This opinion De Doc [...]r. Christ. 2. 28. once held, was afterwards retracted by Saint Augustine, in his Book of Retractations, and confuted, de Civit. Dei. 8. 11.

CHAP. II.
His first Education, Exercises, and Studies.

Aelian. var. hist. 10. 21. WHilst Plato was yet an Infant carried in the armes of his Mother P [...]rictione, Aristo, his Father went to Hymettus (a mountaine in Attica, eminent for abundance of Bees and Honey) to sacrifice to the Muses or Nymphs, taking his Wife and child along with him; as they were busied in the divine rights, she laid the Child in a thicket of Mirtles hard by; to whom, as he slept ( Cic. divinat. lib. 1. in cunis dormients) came a swarm of Bees, artists of Hymettian Hony, flying and buzzing about him, and (as it is reported) made a honey-combe in his mouth. This was taken for a pre [...]age of the singular sweetnesse of his discourse; his future eloquence fore­seen in his Infancy.

His Parents (saith Laert. Alexander) named him after his Grand­father, Aristocles: Apul. dogm. Plat. Speusippus ( instituted in his domestick docu­ments) extolleth his sharpnesse of apprehension, whilst yet a Child, and the admirable modesty of his disposition ( Laert. which was such, that he was never, even all those years, seen to laugh immoderately) affirming, that the beginnings of his youth were season'd with labour and love of Study; which Vertues encreased and met with all the rest; when he came to mans estate.

Laert. Of Dionysius the Grammarian (mentioned in his [...]) he received the first [...]udiments of Learning. Of Aristo, an Argive, he learned the Art of Wrestling (at that time much in esteem, as being one of the Olympick Exercises) wherein he became so great a Proficient, that some affirm, he wrastled at the Isthmus, in the Pythian Games.

Laert. As in years and vertue, so likewise he encreased extraordi­narily in outward proportion and shape, insomuch, that Aristo named him Plato (which implyeth Latitude) in allusion to the largenesse of his person; others say, to the widenesse of his shoul­ders; Neanthes of his forehead: some, to his large Eloquence. Whatsoever the occasion were, this name wore out and displa­ced the other. That he was called also Sarapis, is affirmed by In verbo [...]. [...]esychius. There was not any imperfection throughout his person, except a gibbosity in the hinder part of his head, and (as Timotheus affirms) a kind of Laert. [...]. which (besides [...] smalness of voice, in which sence it is here taken by [...] he Interpre­ters and Fi­cinus signifieth an imperfecti on of speech by stammering: Arist. Pr [...]b. 11. 30. unless there and here [...]e sh [...]uld read [...]. Hesitation in his speech.

[...]aert. Suid. He learned also (as Dicearchus relates) to Paint: He addicted himselfe much to Poetry, and wrote many Poems: First, Dithy­rambs; then Epick Poetry, which comparing with Homer, and finding far short of him, he burned. Then he betook himselfe to writing Tragedies: He made a compleat Tetralogie (four Drama's, as the manner was, when they contested, to be pre­sented at four severall Festivalls, Lenaean, Panathenaean, Chy­traean, [Page 7] the fourth Satyricall) and gave it to the Players to be acted, intending to contest for the Palm upon the Olympick Theater: but the day before it should have been presented, chan­cing to hear Socrates discourse at the Olympick Theat [...]r ( Aesian. var. Hist. 2. 20. before the Bacchanals) he was so taken with that Syren, that he not only forbore to contest at that time, but wholly gave over all Tra­gick Poesy, and burned all his Poems, saying that of Homes, ‘Vulcan come hither, Plato needs thy aid.

From that time (the twentieth year of his age, which falls about the 4 th of the 92 Olympiad) he became a follower of So­crates, and studied Philosophy.

Some affirm (of the truth of which report, Var. Hist. Aelian justly doubts) he was driven by poverty to betake himselfe to the Warres, but intercepted by Socrates, and instructed in that which concerns M [...]n­kind, he sold his armes, and through his perswasion, addicted himselfe to Philosophy.

That he fought for his Country is certain, express'd in his answer to Afterwards, cap. 11. Crobylus the Sycophant: Laert. Aristoxenus and Aelian af­firm, he was engaged thrice: First, at Tanagra; the second time at Corinth; and lastly at D [...]lium, where he fought best of all the Souldi­ers. Thus Aristoxenus. But that this is false, may be easily evinced by computation of times. The first fight of the Athenians at Ta­nag [...]a, was in the 4 t year of the 80 [...] Olympiad, 17 years before Plato was born: The second, in the first of the 89 [...] when he was but six years old. The fight at D [...]lium, was in the first of the 89 th, at what time [...] was [...] but foure years old; from the last words of Aristoxenus, [...] (implying, that at Delium he had the prize for sigh [...]ing best) may be conjectured, that this was meant of Socrates, who was thrice personally engag'd, and at See Socrates life, cap. Delium should have had the prize for fighting best, but that his modesty procured it to be conferr'd upon Alcibiades.

CHAP. III.
His Masters in Philosophy, and his Travells to that end.

Apul. dogm. Plat. Laer [...]. Suid. Socrates, the night before Plato was recommended to him, dreamed, that a young Swan fled from Cupid's Altar in the Academy, and sat in his lap, thence flying up to Heaven, it de­lighted both Gods and Men with its Musick. As Socrates [the next day] was relating this to some of his Auditors, Aristo came at the same time, and presented his Son Plato to him, to be his Disciple. As soon as Socrates saw him, reading in his looks his ingenuity; Friends, saith he, this is the Swan of Cupid's Academy.

Eight years he lived with Socrates, in which time, he commit­ted [Page 8] (as others of his Disciples) the effect of his Masters discourse to writing: hereof he composed Dialogues, but with so great additions of his own, that Laert. Socrates hearing him recite his Lysis, cry'd out, Oh! Hercules, how many things doth this young man feigne of me? For not a few things (addes Laertius) of those which he writ, Socrates never spoke.

At the time of Socrates's arraignment, the first year of the 95 th Olympiad, he was one of the Senate, the youngest of that Con­vention. That he was a Senator, implies he was full thirty years old at that time, according to Solon's Law. This argues Laert. Hermo­dorus of a mistake, who saith, he was twenty eight years old when he fled to Megara, upon the death of Socrates; and subverts the accounts of those who under-reckon his birth. Laert. vit. Socr. The Judges being much displeas'd at Socrates, Plato went up into the Ora­tour's Chair, intending to plead in his defence, and began thus; Though I (Athenians) am the youngest of those who come up into this place. But all the Senate crying ou [...] of those who go down, he was thereupon constrained to do so. Socrates being condemned, Plato offer'd him to procure so much mony as might purchase his li­berty, but Socrates refused the offer. Athen. deipn. lib. About that time, Socrates his friends being met together to condole his death, Plato encourag'd them, and bid them not despair, for that himself was capable to govern the School: and in so saying, drunk to Apollodorus, who answer'd, he would sooner take up the cup of poyson from the hand of Socrates, then pledge him upon that condition. Upon the death of Socrates, Plato (whose excessive grief upon that occasion is observed by De virtu [...]. moral. Plu­tarch) with others of his Disciples, fearing the Tyranny of those persons, who put their Master to death, Laert. [...]ed to Euclid at Megara, who friendly entertained them, till the storm was blown over.

Dogm. Plat. Apuleius saith, that before he came to Socrates, he was initiated in the Sect of Heraclitus. But more likely is that which is affirmed by Laertius, that after Socrates's death, he applyed himselfe to Cra [...]ylus, a follower of Heraclitus, and to Hermogenes. He conceived, saith De Civ. dei. lib. 8. cap. Saint Augustine, that his own invention, and Socrates' s in­structions came short of the true aime of Philosophy: He considered with himselfe what course he should take to benefit himselfe most, for this pur­pose he determined to travell to any place, where report told him he might drink of the spring of Learning, even to the farthest parts of the Earth, saith De finih. 5. Cicero: Apul. dog [...]. Plat. First, to Italy, where he addicted himselfe to the discipline of Pythagoras, which, though he saw replenished with curious and high reason, yet, he chiefly affected to imitate the continence and chastity thereof; though the Porphyr. vit. [...]ythag. Pythagoreans themselves affirme he had all his naturall Philosophy from thence.

Apul. Perceiving the knowledge of the Pythagoreans to be assisted with other disciplines, he went to Cyrene, to learn Geometry of Theodorus the Mathematician: thence to Aegypt (which was then [Page 9] under the Empire of Artaxerxes Mnemon) Plut. in Solon under pretence of selling Oyle, but the scope of his journey was to fetch Astrology from thence: To learn Arithmetick and Celestiall Speculations of the Barbarians, (saith De finib. 5. Cicero) Apul. and to be instructed in the rites of the Prophets. Val. Max. 8. 7. He travelled over the Country, in [...]orming himselfe all the way by their Priests, of the multiplicious proportions of Geometry, and the observation of Celestiall motions. At what time the young Students at Athens [...]ere enquiring for Plato to instruct them, he was busied in sur­veying the inexplicable banks of Nilus, the vast extent of a barbarous Country, and the winding compasse of their trenches, a Disciple to the Aegyptian old men. Epist. Socratic. 26. Having taken a full survey of all the Country, he at last setled himselfe in the Province of Sais, Learning of the Wise men there, what they held concerning the Vniverse, whether it had a beginning, and whether it is moved at present, wholly, or in part, ac­cording to Reason. From these, Messen. Pausanias affirmes, he learn'd the Immortality of the Soul, which that they held, as likewise the transmigration thereof into severall bodies, is affirmed by Lib. 2. He­rodotus. Laert. Some say, that Euripides followed him to Aegypt, and falling sick, was cured by the Priests with Sea-water, where­upon he said, ‘The Sea doth wash away all ills of Man.’

But this agrees not with the time of his death, which was be­fore that of Socrates, viz. in the 93 d Olympiad.

From Aegypt Plato returned to Tarentum in Italy, at what time L. Camillus and P. Claudius were Consuls at Rome, as Cat. Major. Cicero af­firmeth. What Fasti he used, I know not, for in those which are now with us received as authentick, there are no such Consuls during the whole life of Plato. And indeed, in those times, Rome was, for the most part, govern'd by Tribunes. Cic. Apul. Here he conver­sed with Eurytus of Tarentum, the Elder; Archytas the Elder (at whose discourse concerning Pleasure he was present) and with the rest of the Pythagoreans, Echecrates, Timaeus, Acrio (corruptly in 8. 7. Valerius Maximus, Ario) and Coetus Locrians. Thus to the lear­ning of Socrates he added that of Pythagoras, and informed him­selfe in those things which Socrates neglected: He would have gone also to the Indians, and to the Magi, but that the Warres which at that time were in Asia hindred him.

CHAP. IV.
What Authors he follow'd.

Peren. Philos. 1. 27. & 5. 2. EUgubinus affirmes, that Plato borrow'd the mystick part of his Philosophy from Hermes Trismegistus; particularly, that concerning the Divine Goodnesse: which, I suppose, he rather asserts from his own conjecture, in regard Pla [...]o had been long in Aegypt, then from any good Authority. He was induced there­unto by those Books, which are now commonly, but falsely, vented under the name of Hermes Trismegistus; whereas, the lear­ned Casaubon, in his Exercit. 1. num. 18. Exercitations upon Baronius, hath suffici­ently taught us the forgery of those Books, which seem by some Impostor, to have been compiled out of the works of Plato, and the Divine Scripture.

That Plato received some light from Moses, is affirmed with much greater Authorities of severall Nations and Religions: Of Iewes by Euseb. praep. Evang. Aristobulus, Plato (saith he) followed our Law in many things, his various allegations evince him a curious observer thereof: for the Volumes of Moses were translated before Alexander's time. And Contra. Apion. lib. 2. Iosephus, Plato chiefly followed our Law-giver. Of Philosophers, by Clem. Alex. Strom. 1 Suid. Numenius, what is Plato, (saith he) but Moses speaking Greek? Of Fathers, by Paraen. Iustine Martyr, Strom 1. Clement Alexandrinus, Praepar. Evan. lib. 11. Eusebius, Theodoret, Civ. Dei. 8. 11. Saint Augustine, &c.

Laert. and a­gain in Philola [...] When Plato went to Sicily, he bought the Books of Philolaus, a Pythagorean, which were three, of N [...]turall Philosophy, the first that ever were published out of that School: Some say, he had them of Dionysius's friends, for four Alexandrian Minae: Others, that Dionysius had them of a young Man, one of Philolaus's Dis­ciples, and gave them to Plato. Others, that he sent to Dion at Syracuse to buy them for him, which he did for 100 Minae: 3. 17. A­gellius saith, ten thousand Denaries: For, having received of Dionysius above eighty Talents, he was very full of mony. Out of these, he is said (as Agellius and Laertius affirm) to have taken a great part of his Timaeus; for which derided by Timon, (in Sil­lis) thus:

You ( Plato) with the same affections caught,
With a great Summ a little Treatise bought,
Where all the knowledge, which you own, was taught.

Laert. Alcimus in his four Books to Amintas, affirmes, that Plato borrow'd much from the writings of Epicharmus, the Comick Poet, in the first Book he hath these words: In Sensibles (saith Plato) neither magnitude nor quality is permanent, but in continuall fluxion and mutation; as if we should substract number from them, [Page 11] which are neither equall, nor certain, nor quantitative, nor qualita­tive; these are they where generation is alwaies, their essence never. To Insensibles nothing can be added, nothing taken away. This is the nature of Eternall Beings, the like and same ever. Thus Plato cited by Alcimus. Indeed, he teacheth this in many places, particularly in Timaeo, where he at large explaineth what is that which never is, and never had beginning, and that which hath beginning, but no being. He concludes the first comprehensible, by the Intellect with Reason, the other by sence and opinion. But the citation of Alcimus seems to refer to Plato's Theaetetus, the subject of which Dialogue is Science: there he examines some Definitions of Sci­ence by the Antients, amongst the rest, the assertion of Protago­ras, that Science is Sence; against which he disputes largely, the summe this. That the Soul apprehends some things by medi­ation of the Body, others without; of the first kind are things warm, light, dry, sweet, &c. of the other, Essence and not being, similitude and dissimilitude, identitie and diversity, uni [...]e and number. Hence it followes, that Sence apprehends not Essences, and con­sequently not Truths, for Essence and Truth are convertible. This assertion of Plato Laert. Alcimus deduceth from Epicharmus, who (saith he) hath plainly spoken of things subject to Sence and Reason, in these words:

Gods alwaies were, to be, desisted never,
Like them Eternall, still the same persever.
Chaos the first begotten Deitie
Is stil'd: of something how can nothing be?
Thence nor the first nor second nothings are,
How we [...]steem of those we thus declare:
If we an even or uneven summe
Alter, by adding or substracting one,
Seems it to you the same? to me not so;
If a continu'd measure shrink or grow,
It is not the same measure: such the lives
Of Men are, one decayes, another thrives;
That Nature, which new being ever takes
Is different from the being it forsakes,
Not yesterday the same were I and you,
Nor shall tomorrow be what we are now.

Laert. Again, Alcimus, The wise say, that the soul apprehends some things by mediation of the body, as when she hears or sees; others, she conceiveth within her selfe, without using the body, whence of beings, some are sub­ject to sence, others, c [...]mprehensible by the Intellect. Therefore Plato saith, that they who desire to know the principles of the Universe, must first distinguish the Ideas in themselves, as similitude, unity, mul­titude, magnitude, restauration. Secondly, add in it selfe, honest, [Page 12] good, just, and the like; thirdly, examines what Idaea's cohaere mutually with one another, as Science, Magnitude, Power: and withall, to think that those who are amongst us, because they participate of them, should be called by the same name, as for instance, just things are those which participate of Iust, Honest, which of honest: one of every Species is eter­nall, perceptible by the mind, and consequently free from perturbation. Wherefore, he asserts Idaea's in nature as Exemplars, after whose likenesse other things are made. Thus Alcimus; the first part whereof seems to be taken out of Plato's Theaetetus, the latter out of his Parmeni­des. The words of Epicharmus concerning Gods and Idea's, to which Alcimus referrs this of Plato, are these:

Is Musick then a thing? It is; the man
Musick? no: what then? a Musician
A man or not? he is the same of good,
Good from the thing apart is understood:
whoever learns good by t [...]at art is made,
who Musick a Musitian: of each trade
As dancing, weaving, and the like the same,
The Art and Artist have a different name.

Laert. Again, Alcimus: Plato in his opinion of Idea's saith thus; if there is memory, there must be also Idea's, for memory is of a quiet permanent thing, but nothing is permanent except Idea's, for how, saith he, could living creatures be preserved unlesse by their Idea and receiving a naturall mind; Now they remember Similitude and their nourishment: showing that all Creatures have an innate understanding of their own similitude, and therefore perceive things belonging to their kind. Thus Alcimus: What place of Plato he means I know not, In Arist. de animal. Scaliger reads, [...], &c. omit­ting [...], as if he made a doubt whether that both of the opini­ons of Idea's were Plato's; but I rather think Alcimus meant not the title of any Book, having named none in the rest of his citati­ons, but what himself abstracts out of Plato's opinion concern­ing Idea's. Plato in Philedo, teacheth this concerning memory, that sence is a motion common to the Soul and Body; this suffering from externall Senses, the other acting and dijudicating; that memory is a conservatory or repository of the Senses. For the Soul, as oft as she in her self, or by assistance of the Body, calls to mind what she hath suffer'd, she is said to remember. To Pla­to's assertion, Alcimus applyeth this of Epicharmus:

Eumaeus Wisdome's not to one consin'd;
Various in every living knowing mind.
The Hen first doth not living things beget,
But sits and hatcheth with enliv'ning heat:
[Page 13] This Wisdom only Nature's friend discerns,
Of whom (her Mistresse) she this lesson learns.

And again,

This is not strange for every thing we find
Is to its proper species most enclin'd;
To Dogs a Bitch seems fairest, and to kine
A Bull, an Asse to Asses, swine to swine.

These things Laertius cites out of Alcimus, adding that there are more of the same kind in those four Books, whereby he intimates the help that Plato receiv'd by the writings of Epicharmus; neither was Epi­charmus himself ignorant of his own wisdom, as may be collected from these Verses, predicting that he should have a follower:

This I assert, and what I now maintain,
Shall Monuments to future times remain,
Some one hereafter will my verse review,
And cloathing it in language rich and new
Invincible himself, others subdue.

Laer [...] Moreover Phavorinus alledgeth the whole form of Plato's Common-wealth in Protagoras's Antilogicks, others say, he bor­rowed his Politicks from Socrates.

Laert. Lastly, it is related, that much of Plato's morality was in the Books of Sophron the Mimographe, which having been long neg­lected, were by him first brought to Athens, and were found lying under his head, when he was dead.

CHAP. V.
His School.

Laert. BEing return'd to Athens from his Journey to Aegypt, he set­led himself in the Academy, a Gymnasium or place of Exer­cise in the Suburbs of that City, beset with woods, taking name from Ecademus one of the Hero's, as Eupolis, ‘In sacred Hecademus shady walks.’

And Timon,

The fluent sweet-tongu'd Sage first led the way,
Who writes as smoothly as from some green spray
Of Hecademe, Grashoppers chirp their lay.

Hence it was first called Ecademy, the occasion of his living here, was, that he was poor and had nothing but one Orchard in [Page 14] or adjoyning to the Academy, which was the least part of his Successours. This Orchard at first yeelded but three aurei nummi of yearly rent to the Owners, afterwards the whole Revenue a­mounted to a thousand or more. It was in processe of time much enlarged by well-willers, and studious persons, who dying, be­queathed by will something to the Professours of Philosophy, their riches to maintain the quiet and tranquillity of a Philosophicall life. Plato (the Academy being said to be a sickly place, and Phy­sicians advising him to transfer his School to the Lyceum, would not be perswaded, but answered, I would not live on the top of Athos to linger my life. The unwholsomnesse of the place brought him to a Quartan ague, which lasted eighteen months, but at length by sobriety and care he master'd it, and recover'd his strength more perfect then before.

First, he taught Philosophy in the Academy, and after in the Gardens of Colonus. At the entrance of his School in the Acade­my was written, LET NONE IGNORANT OF GEOME­TRY ENTER HERE, meant, not only of the measure and proportion of lines, but also of the inward Affections.

CHAP. VI.
How he instituted a Sect.

HAving thus setled himself in the Academy, he began out of the Collection he had made from others, and his own in­vention to institute a Sect, called from the place where he taught Academick. Laert. He mixed the Heraclitian discourses, with the So­cratick and Pythagorick, following in sensibles Heraclitus, in Intel­ligibles Pythagoras, in Politicks Socrates. Whereas Philosophy, saith, Civil. dei. lib. 8. St. Augustine, concerns either action or contemplation (thence assuming two names, Contemplative and Active) the Active consisting in practise of morall Actions, the contemplative, in penetration of abstruse Physi­call causes, and the nature of the Divinity, Socrates excelled in the Active, Pythagoras in the Contemplative. But Plato join'd them into one perfec [...] kind, which he subdivided into three severall parts; Morall, consisting chiefly in Action, Naturall in Contemplation, Rationall in Distinction of true and false, which though usefull in both the other, yet belongeth more particularly to Contemplation. So that this Trichotomy con­tradicts not the other Dichotomy, which includeth all within Action and Contemplation. Laert. And as of old in a Tragedy, the Chorus acted a­lone, then Thespis making some intermissions of the Chorus intro­duc'd one Actour, Aeschylus a second, Sophocles a Third, in like manner Philosophy was at first but of one kind, Physick, then Socrates added Ethick, thirdly, Plato inventing Dialectick, made it perfect.

Of these three parts as they were held by Plato, and the rest [Page 15] of the old Academy, we cannot have a generall better accompt then this of Acad. quaest. 1. Cicero.

Sect. 1.
Ethick.

The first, concerning well living they sought in Nature, affirming that she ought to be obeyed: and that in nothing else but Nature was to be had that chief good whereto all things should be referr'd, that the ulti­mate being of desirable things, and end of all good in the mind, body and life were acquir'd by Nature. Those of the body they placed in the whole, and in the parts: Health, Strength, Beauty in the whole, in the parts, sound Sence, and a certain Excell [...]nce of particular parts, as in the feet swiftnesse, strength in the hands, clearnesse in the voice, in the Tongue, plainnesse of expression. Of the mind were those which are pro­per to comprehend the power of wit, which they divided into Nature and Manners. To Nature they ascribed quickness of apprehension, and memo­ry both proper to the mind and wit; To manners belonged study and a kind of wisdom formed partly by continuall exercise, partly by reason, in which consisted Philosophy it self, wherein that is begun and not perfected, is called progression to vertue, what is perfected, Virtue; perfection of Nature of all things in the mind, the most excellent. Thus of Min [...]s: The Adjuncts of life, that was the third, they asserted such things as conduced to the practise of Vertue.

Sect. 2.
Physick.

Of Nature (for that was next) they so treated as to divide it into two things: One the efficient, the other giving it self to this, that, thereof might be made somthing. In that they conceived to be a power, in this a certain matter to be effected: in both, matter could not cohere, unlesse contained by some power, nor the power without some matter, for there is nothing which is not enforced to be some where: that which consists of both, they called Body and Qualitie: Of Qualities, some are primary, others arising from these: the primary are uniform and simple; hose which arise from these are various, and as it were multiform. Air, Fire, Water, and Earth are Primary, of these arise formes of living Creatures, and of those, things which are made of the Earth. These principles are called Elements, of which, Air and Fire have a faculty to move and effect; the other parts, Water and Earth to suffer. To all these there is subjected a certain matter without form, destitute of quality, out of which all things are expressed and formed; It is capable of admitting all; and of changing all manner of waies, in the whole, and in every part: This resolves nothing to nothing, but into its own parts, which are divisible into infinite, there being in na [...]ure no least which cannot be divided. Those which are moved, are all moved by intervalls, which intervalls likewise may be divided in­finitely, and that power which we call quality, being moved and agitated every way, they conceive the whole matter to be throughly changed, and by [Page 16] that means those things, which they call qualitative, to be produced, of which, in all coherent nature continued with all its parts, was effected the World, beyond which there is not any part of matter or body: The parts of the World are all things therein, kept together by a Sensitive nature, wherein is likewise perfect reason; It is also sempiternall, for there is no­thing more strong whereby it may be dissolved: This power they call the Soul of the World, God, a certain providence over all things sub [...]ected to him, regarding in the first place heavenly things, next on the Earth those thing which appertain to man. The same they somtimes call Necessity, because nothing can be otherwise then is by him ordained; a fa­tall immutable continuation of eternall order; somtimes Fortune, as producing many things not foreseen or expected by us, by reason of the ob­scurity and our ignorance of the Causes.

Sect. 3. Dialectick.

Of the third part of Philosophy, consisting in reason and dissertation, they treated thus. Though Iudgment arise from the Sense, yet the Iudgment of truth is not in the Senses. The mind they affirmed to be Iudge of things, conceiving her only sit to be credited, because she alone seeth that which is simple, and uniform, and certain; This they called Idea. All sense they conceived to be obtuse and slow, and no way able to perceive those things which seem subject to sense, which are so little, as that they cannot fall un­der sense, so moveable and various, that nothing is one, constant, nor the same, because all things are in continuall alteration and fluxion. All this part of things they called Opimative; Science they affirmed to be no where but in the Reasons and Notions of mind, whence they approved definitions of things, and applyed them to all whereon they discoursed. They approved likewise explications of words by Etymologies: They used Arguments and marks for things, to prove and conclude what they meant to explain; In this consisted all the discipline of Dialectick, that is, of Speech concluded by Reason.

This accompt in generall Cicero gives of the old Academy; Plutarch, Laertius, Apuleius, and others have made collections more particular: we shall make choice of that of Alcinous, as most full and perfect, which by reason of the length is referred as an Appendix to Plato's life.

CHAP. VII.
His Inventions.

HE added much to learning and language by many inventi­ons, as well of things as of words. To omit Dialectick, of which we treated last, L [...]rt. Phavorinus attributes to his invention, discoursing by way of Question; but Aristotle ascribes it to Alexame­nus, a Styrian or Teian, and it appears by the Dialogues of Plato, that Socrates also used that form of arguing. Laertius informes us, that Zeno Ele [...]tes was the first composer of Dialogues; yet in my opinion, saith he, Pla [...]o hath so much refined the form thereof, that he deserves to be preferr'd before all others, as well for invention as reformation.

More properly may be attributed to him the invention of Laert. Procl. in Euclid. lib. 3. Ana­lyticall Method, which reduceth the thing sought unto its principle, the best of Methods. He taught it to Leodamas, and by it found out ma­ny things in Geometry: Analysis, as defined by the Lib. 13. Scholiast up­on Euclid, is a sumption of the thing sought, by the consequents, (as if it were already known) to find out the truth. Examples thereof we find in the five first propositions of the 13 t• Book of Euclid, besides se­verall others, that occurre in Apollonius Pergaeus, and Pappus Alexandrinus.

Amongst his Geometricall Inventions also must be remembred the duplication of a Cube, the occasion and manner whereof is rela­ted by de [...] delph. Plutarch and In Anal. post. lib. 1. cap. 7. Philoponus. The Delians afflicted with the Pestilence, consulted the Oracle of Apollo; he answer'd, the Plague would cease if they doubled their [...] Altar, which was of a Cubick figure. Plu [...]arch saith, that hereupon the Overseers of the Altar made all the four sides double to what they were before, & so in­stead of doubling the Altar, they made it octuple to what it was. Philoponus saith, they caused another Cube of the same bignesse with the former to be set upon it, whereby they changed the fi­gure of the Altar, which was no longer a Cube, but [...], a qua­drilaterall Pillar. The first way, it was Cubicall, but not double, the second way double, but not Cubicall. The Plague not cea­sing, they consulted the Oracle again. Apollo answer'd, they had not fulfilled his Command, which was to build a Cubicall Al­tar as big again as the former. Hereupon they went to Plato, as most skilfull in Geometry, to learn of him the Oracle's meaning, and how they should find out the way of doubling a Cube, re­taining the Cubick figure. Plato answered, that the God mocked the Grecians for their neglect of Philosophy and Learning, in­sulting over their ignorance, that he commanded them seri­ously, to addict themselves to Geometry, that this could not be done any other way, then by finding out two mean proportio­nalls between two right lines in a Duple proportion ( Plato's par­ticular [Page 18] method herein is delivered, Eutocius in his comment upon the first proposition of the second Book of Archimedes de Sphaera & Cylindro.) He added that Eudoxus the Gnidian, or Helico the Ci­zycene would do it for them, That the God needed not this dupli­cation of his Altar, but commanded all the Grceians, that avoy­ding war and the miseries wherewith it is attended, they should apply themselves to the Muses; and having setled the turbulent commotions of their minds, converse harmlessly and beneficially with one another. Philoponus addes, that Plato expounded this Pro­blem to his Disciples, who writ much upon this subject, though nothing thereof be extant. Of the Antients, labour'd in this Problem be­sides Plato, Archytas the Tarentine, Menaechmus, Eratosthenes, Philo of Byzantium, Hero, Apollonius Pergaeus; Nicomedes, Diocles and Spo­rus. 8. 13. Valerius Maximus saith, that Plato remitted the Overseers of the sacred Altar to Euclid the Geometrician, as submitting to his Science and Profession; but this is an Errour, because Euclid the Geome­trician was much later then Plato, and the other Euclid, Plato's contemporary, nothing eminent in Mathematicks, as hath been before me observed by Praele [...]. 1. Sir Henry Savile.

That Plato invented many other things in the Mathematicks, (more then appears from those writings of his that are extant) and was most eminent therein, may be argued from the three Books of Theon Smyrnaeus, the first Arithmetick, the second Harmo­nicks, the last, (not yet publish'd) Astronomy. Those Books contain­ed many things, singular and choice, not to be met elsewhere. The design is acknowledg'd by the Author, to be as an introduction necessary to the understanding of Plato's writings.

There are also divers words of which he is esteemed to be the first Author, as Laert. Antipodes, a word by him first introduced into Philosophy, to signifie those people whose feet are diametrically opposite.

Laert. [...], Element, untill his time was confounded with [...], Principle, by all Philosophers from Thales. Plato distinguish'd them thus, [...], principle is that which hath nothing before it whereof it might be generated; [...], Elements are com­pounded.

Laert. The word Poem also, though since very triviall, was not u­sed by any before him.

Laert. He first used this term, [...], oblong number, [in Theaeteto] thereby signifying the product of a greater number multiplyed by a lesser.

Laert. He also first introduced the word [...], Superficies, for which before was used [...] a Plane. Thus Laertius, though In Euclid. lib. 2. Proclus implies, that neither Plato nor Aristotle use the word, but for it [...]. Divine Plato, saith he, calls Geometry the Contem­platrix of Planes, opposing it to Stereometry, as if Plane and Superficies w [...]re the same. So likewise doth Aristotle. But Euclid and those who [Page 19] succeed him, make Superficies the genus, plane a species thereof.

Laert. [...], Divine Providence, a word since much used by Christians, was first the expression of Plato.

Laert. He first of Philosophers wrote against Lysias, Son of Cephaluo, in Phaedro.

Laert. He first considered the force and efficacy of Grammar.

Laert. He first wrote against all that were before him, whence it is wondred at that he never mentions Democritus.

CHAP. VIII.
His Distinctions.

OF his Distinctions Aristotle made this Collection in some piece not extant, cited by Laertius.

Good is threefold,
in the Soul, as Justice, Prudence, Fortitude, Tempe­rance, and the like.
In the Body, as Beauty, good habit, strength.
Externall, as friends; prosperity of our Country; Wealth.
Friendship is three­fold.
Naturall, which Parents bear to their Children, and kindred to one another; which kind is also amongst beasts.
Sociable, begotten by conversation, without any relati­on of kindred; such was that betwixt Pylades and Orestes.
Hospitable, towards Guests, or wherewith we affect strangers even upon letters of recommendation.
Some adde a fourth kind, amatory.
Govern­ment is of five kinds.
Democraticall; a Democracy is that wherein the peo­ple rules and hath power to make Magistrates and Laws.
Aristocraticall; an Aristocracy is that wherein neither rich nor poor nor Nobles govern, but the best per­sons of the whole City.
Oligarchicall; an Oligarchy is when Governours are e­lected by the votes of Magistrates, for they are fewer then the poore.
Regall:
Elective by Law; as that of the Carthagini­ans; for it is civill.
Successive in a Family; as that of the Lace­daemonians and Macedonians, who confine themseves to a certain race.
Tyrannicall, Tyranny is that wherein men are brought to subjection either by fraud or force.

[Page 20]

Iustice is threefold
Towards the Gods; they who sacrifice as the Law re­quires, a [...]d perform the Divine rites, are just to­wards the Gods.
Towards men: They who restore what was lent or committed to their trust, are just towards men.
Towwards the dead: They who take care of Sepulchers are just towards the dead.
Science is threefold.
Practick, as playing on the flute, lute, and the like; which effect nothing visible.
Mechanick, as architecture of Houses, Ships, or the like, which produceth a visible effect.
Theoretick, as Geometry, Harmonick, Astronomy, which act not, neither produce any thing. The Geometrician considers the proportion of lines to one another; Harmonick sounds: Astronomy stars and the World.
Medicine is of five kinds.
Pharmaceutick, cureth diseases by application of Me­dicine.
Chirurgick by incision or cauterising.
Diaetetick, by diet.
Nosognomonick discernes diseases.
Boethetick removeth diseases.
Law is twofold.
Written; such are those by which states are governed.
Not written, grounded upon custom; as that no man shall go naked into the forum, or habited like a woman, is not forb [...]dden by any written law, but forborn because of the unwritten.
Speech is of five kinds.
Politicall, used in Orations by such as govern States.
Rhetoricall, used by Lawyers in pleading either to confirm, praise, dispraise or accuse.
Vulgar, used by people in common discourse.
Dialecticall, used by such as discourse in short questi­ons and answers.
Artificiall, used by Tradesmen in their severall professions.
Musick is threefold.
Of the Voice onely.
Of the Voice and hands, as singing to the Lute.
Of the Hand only, as the Harp.

[Page 21]

Nobility is of four kinds.
If the Predecessors were upright, just, and honest.
If the Predecessours were rulers of Princes.
If the Predecessours acquired honours, as the com­mand of an Army, or were crown'd in publick games: those who are descended from such we call Noble.
If a man be endued with a generous mind; this is the best kind of Nobility.
Beauty is threefold.
Commendable, as a fair form.
Usefull, as an instrument, house, or the like.
Beneficiall, as all that belongs to institution of Laws.
The Soule hath three parts, the
Rationall, the principle whereby we judge, discourse, and the like.
Concupiscible, whereby we desire meat, coition, and the like.
Irascible, whereby we are emboldned, joyned, grie­ved, enraged.
Perfect vir­tue hath four kinds.
Wisdom, the principle of doing things aright.
Justice, the principle of doing things equally in pri­vate conversation and publick affairs.
Fortitude, the principle of not flying danger through fear, but meeting it.
Temperance, the principle of subduing desires, and yielding to no pleasures, but living mode­rately.
Govern­ment is of five kinds.
By Law: Those who are chosen Magistrates in a City govern by Law.
By Nature: the males not only of mankind, but of most other creatures are predominant over the Females by nature.
By Custome, as that which Masters have over their Dis­ciples.
By Descent, as the Lacedaemonian Kings, who succeed out of one Family: and in Macedonia they use the same custome.
By force, as those who rule a Kingdom against the will of the people.
Of Rhetorick are six kinds.
Adhortation, as when we perswade to war against any.
Dehortation, as when we disswade from War.
Accusation, when we declare that we have been in­jured by one whom we prove cause of our mis­fortune.
[Page 22] Defence, when a man proves he did not an injury or offence.
En [...]omium, when we speak well of another.
Vituperation, when we declare a man to be wicked.
Of Right speaking are four kinds; when wee speak
What is requisite; those things which will benefit both the hearer and speaker.
As much as is requisite, if we speak neither more nor lesse then concerns the businesse.
To those to whom it is requisite; as when we speak to old men that have done amisse in such terms as are fit for old men, or to young as becomes young.
When it is requisite, neither too soon nor too late; for if that be not observed, nothing can be spoken aright.
Benificence is of four kinds.
In Wealth, when we relieve the wants of any accor­ding to our means.
In Body, when we succour those who are beaten.
In Knowledge, when we instruct, cure, teach any good.
In Speech, he, who pleadeth in defence of another, helpeth him in words.
The end of things is of four kinds
Legall, imposing an end to things by decree.
Naturall, such as dayes, years, and houres have.
Artificiall, as the building of a house.
Accidentall, by chance unexpected.
Of powers are four kinds
One in the minde, to think and conjecture.
Another of the body, to walk, give, receive, and the like.
A third, consisting in a multitude of Souldiers, and store of wealth, in which respect, Princes are called Powerfull.
The fourth, as to suffer good or evill to be done to us; as to be capable of Sicknesse, Learning, health, or the like.
Of Huma­nity are three kinds.
In calling, as those who call all they meet, and salute them, taking them by the hand.
In relieving, in relieving the misfortunes of another willingly.
In feasting and conversation.

[Page 23]

Felicity is divided into five parts.
Prudent Counsell, acquired by learning and experi­ence.
Soundnesse of senses, consisting in the parts of the bo­dy, as to see with the eyes, to hear with the ears, to smell and tast.
Prosperity of affairs, when those things which a man intendeth, he performeth fully.
Good reputation amongst men, when a man is well spoken of.
Plenty of riches, and things necessary to life, so as to be able to supply friends, and perform works of publick magnificence: He who hath all these five kinds is perfectly happy.
Arts are of three kinds.
The first diggeth out mettalls, and fells wood.
The second gives varietie of shape to things, as Wood­work and Iron-work.
The third maketh use of these, as horsemanship of bridles, Soldiery, of arms, musick of instruments.
Good is of four kinds.
One, as wen wee call a man good from his proper goodnesse.
A second, as we call Virtue and Justice it self good.
A third, as we say, food, exercise and medicines are beneficiall.
The fourth good we call the act of playing on musick, or acting in a play.
Of things some are
Ill, alwaies capable to do hurt, as ignorance, impru­dence, injustice, and the like.
Good, the contrary to the former;
Indifferent, which somtimes may benefit, sometimes hurt, as walking, sitting, eating, or cannot do hurt at all, being neither good nor bad.
Good Go­vernment is threefold.
If the Laws be good.
If the Laws be well kept.
If without Laws the people live orderly by custome.
Ill Govern­ment is threefold.
If the Laws be bad for Natives and Forainers.
If the Laws in being are not observed.
If there are no laws at all.
Contraries are of three kinds.
Good to ill, as justice to injustice, wisdom to impru­dence, and the like.
Ill to ill, as prodigality to avarice, unjust torments to just.
Neither to neither, as heavy to light, swift to flow, black to white.

[Page 24]

Good is of three kinds.
Some we have, as Justice and Health.
Of some we participate, as good it self cannot be had, but may be participated.
Some are sixt, which we can neither have, nor parti­cipate as to be virtuous and just.
Consultati­on is three­fold.
From the Past, by example; as what befell the Lace­daemonians through overmuch confidence.
From the present, as considering the timerousnesse of men, weakness of walls, scarcity of provision, and the like.
From the Future, as that Ambassadours should not be injured upon suspicion, least it cast infamy upon all Greece.
Voice is
Animate, of living creatures.
Articulate of men.
Inarticulate of Beasts.
I [...]animate, sounds and noise.
Tings are
Divisible, compoun­ded as Syllables, Symphonies, li­ving creatures, water, Gold.
Homogeneous, consist of similar parts, differing from the whole onely in number, as water, gold, and all liquid things.
Heterogeneous, consist of dissi­milar parts.
Indivisible, com­pounded of no­thing, as a point, sound.
Things are
Absolute, requiring nothing else to expresse them, as a man, a horse and other creatures.
Relatives, which imply another thing, as greater (then others) swifter, fairer, and the like, for what is greater relates to somthing lesser, and the like.

These according to Aristotle were Plato's divisions of first things.

CHAP. IX.
His three voyages to Sicily.

Laert▪ Apul: PLato made three voyages to Sicily; the first to see the f [...]ery [...]bullitions of Aetna Plat. [...]pist. and to improve the knowledge of States, and Philosophy, which he got by his other travells; This was about the 40 th year of his age, Laert. at what time Dionysius the elder, Son of Hermocrates, reigned in Syracuse; In Di [...]ne. Plutarch saith, hee was led thither by providence, not fortune, and that some good Genius, designing a far off the liberty of the people of Syracuse, brought him acquainted with Dion then very young, who entertained him as his Plat. Epist. 3. & 7. guest: He much disliked the luxury of that place, feasting, nocturnal lucubrations and the like; Con­versed frequently with Dion, discoursed with him of those things which were best in man, and with his best arguments exhorted him thereto; by which he seemed to lay grounds for the subver­sion of that Tyranny, which afterwards hapned; Plut. in Dione. Dion though young, was the most ingenious of all Plato's followers, and most eager in pursuit of Virtue, as appears as well by the testimony of Plato, as his own actions. Though he had been brought up by the King in an effeminate luxurious kind of life; yet as soon as he tasted of Philosophy the guide to Virtue, his soul was enflamed with love thereof, and from his own [...]andour and ingenuity was perswaded that Dionysius would be no lesse affected therewith: And therefore desired him when hee was at leasure to admit and hear Plato: Hereupon the Tyrant sent for him; at that meet­ing all their discourse was concerning fortitude; Plato affirmed none was further from that Virtue then a Tyrant, and, proceed­ing to speak of Justice, asserted the life of the Just to be happy, of the unjust miserable. Dionysius was displeased at this discourse (as reflecting upon himself) and with the standers by for approving it, at last much exasperated, he asked Plato why he came into Sicily? Plato answered, to seek a good man: it seems, replyed Dyonisius, you have not yet found him. Laertius saith, Plato disputed with him con­cerning Tyranny, affirming, that is not best which benefits our selves, unlesse it be excellent also in Virtue; whereat Dyonisius incensed, said to him, your discourse favours of old age; and yours, answered Plato, of Tyranny. Dionysius, enraged, comman­ded him to be put to death; I will have, saith he, your head taken off; at which words Xenocrates being present, answered, He that doth it must begin with mine: but Dion and Aristomen [...]s wrought with him to revoke that sentence. Dion thinking his an­ger would have proceeded no further, sent Plato away at his own request in a Ship which carried Pollis (whom Laertius calls Polis, Aelian Pôlis,) a Lacedaemonian Captain (who at that time had been sent Embassadour to Dionysius) back to Greece: Dionsiyus [Page 26] secretly desired Pollis to kill him whilst he was on Shipboard; or if not, by all means to sell him, alledging, it would be no injury to Plato, for he would be as happy in bondage as at liberty, as be­ing a just man. Some affirm the occasion of Dionysius his anger was, because, that when he asked what was the best brasse, Plato answered, that whereof the Statues of Wh [...]s s [...]ew Hip­parchus, bro­ther of Hippi­as the Tyrant of Athens; up­on which the Pisistratidae were expelled. Aristogiton and Harmodius were made. Others, that it was because he was over-mastered in learning. But Tzetzes rejecting these, as idle fictions of Philosophers, & falsifiers, affirms the true reason to have been, that he perceived, he advised Dion to possesse himselfe of the Kingdome: Pollis tran­sported him to Aegina; there Charmander, son of Charmandrites, accused him, as meriting death by a Law they had made, that the first Athenian that should come to that Island, should, with­out being suffered to speak for himselfe, be put to death: Which Law, as Phavorinus affirms, he himselfe made. One that was pre­sent, saying in sport, he is a Philosopher, they set him at liberty: Some say, they brought him to the publick assembly, to plead for himselfe, where he would not speak a word, but underwent all with a great courage. Then they altered their intent of putting him to death, and agreed to sell him for a slave. Plutarch saith, that upon a decree of the Aeginetae, that all Athenians taken in that Island, should be sold for Slaves; Pollis sold him there: Anniceris, a Cyrenaick Philosopher, being accidentally present, redeemed him for twenty, or as others thirty Minae, and sent him to Athens to his friends; they immediately returned the mony to Anniceris, but he refused it, saying, they were not the only per­sons concerned in Plato's welfare: Some say, Dion sent the mony, which he would not accept, but bought therewith a little Or­chard in the Academy. Pollis was defeated by Chabrias, and after­wards drowned in Elice. The report goes, that an apparition told him, he suffered those things for the Philosophers sake. Dio­nysius understanding what had happened, writ to Plato, to desire him not to speak ill of him; Plato returned answer, that he had not so much time vacant from Philosophy, as to remember Diony­sius. To some detractours who upbraided him, saying, Dionysius hath cast off Plato; no, saith he, but Plato Dionysius.

Dion continued to live, not according to the ordinary luxury of the Sicilians and Italians, but in vertue, untill Dionysius died, for which maligned by those who lived after Tyrannicall insti­tutions. Then considering, that these documents were not practi­sed by himselfe alone, but by some others, though few, he enter­tained a hope, that Dionysius the younger, who succeeded his Father in the Government, might become one of those, to the extraordinary happinesse of himselfe, and the rest of the Sicili­ans: To this end, he used many exhortations to invite him to vertue, intermixed with some sentences of Plato, with whom Dionysius, upon this occasion, became extreamly desirous to be [Page 27] acquainted: To that effect, many Letters were sent to Athens to him, some from Dionysius, others from Pythagoreans in Italy, de­siring Plato to go to Syracuse, who, by prudent Counsell, might govern the young man, transported by his own power to luxury. Plato, as himselfe affirmeth, fearing to be thought a Person only of words, and not willing to engage in action, and withall ho­ping, by purging one principall part, to cure the disease of all Sicily, yielded; Laertius saith, upon a promise made to him by Dionysius, of a Place and People that should live according to the rules of his Common-wealth; which he made not good. Hence Athenaeus accuseth Plato of Ambition. In the mean time, the ene­mies of Dion, fearing a change in Dionysius, perswaded him to call home from banishment Phil [...]stus (a person very rationall, but educated in Tyrannicall principles) as an Antidote against Pla­to's Philosophy; but Dion hoped, the comming of Plato would regulate the licentious Tyranny of Dionysius.

Plato at his arrivall in Sicily (placed by Agellius, betwixt the beginning of Philips raigne, foure hundred years from the buil­ding of Rome, and the Chaeronean fight) was received by Dio­nysius with much respect: One of the Kings magnificent Chariots stood ready to receive him assoon as he landed, and carried him to the Court. The King offered Sacrifice to the Gods for his comming, as a great blessing upon his government. The tempe­rance of their Feasts, alteration of the Court, meeknesse of the King, gave the Siracusians great hopes of reformation: The Cour­tiers addicted themselves to Philosophy so much, that the Palace was full of Sand (wherein they drew Geometricall figures.) Not long after Plato's comming, at a Sacrifice in the Castle, the He­rauld, according to the usuall manner, made a solemn Prayer, that the Gods would long preserve the Kingly Government: Dion standing by, said, Will you never give over praying against me? This troubled Philistus and his friends, who feared Plato would insinuate into the favour of Dionysius so much, as that they should not be able to oppose him, since in so short time, he had effected so great an alteration in him: Hereupon they all joyntly accused Dion, that he wrought upon Dionysius, by the eloquence of Plato, to resigne his Government, that it might be transferred to the Children of his Sister, to quit his command for the Academy, where he should be made happy by Geometry, resigning his pre­sent happinesse to Dion and his Nephews. With these and the like instigations, Dionysius was so incensed, that he caused Dion to be unexpectedly carried on Ship-board in a little bark, giving the marriners order to land him in Italy. This happened four months after Plato's comming. Plat. Epist. Plato, and the rest of Dion's friends, feared to be put to some punishment, as partakers of his offence. A report was raised, that Plato was put to death by Dio­nysius, as author of all that happened: but, on the contrary, Dio­nysius, [Page 28] doubting, lest something worse might happen from their fear, treated them all kindly, comforted Plato, bid him be of good cheer, and intreated him to stay with him: Plutarch. He caused him to be lodged in his Castle, Plat. Epist. 7. in the Orchards adjoyning to his Palace, where not the Porter himselfe could go out without Dionysius his leave; thus cunningly, under pretence of kindnesse, he watched him, that he might not return into Greece, to give Dion notice of the wrong done to him. Dionysius by frequent conversation with Plato (as wild Beasts are tamed by use) fell into so great liking of his discourse, that he became in love with him; but, it was a Tyrannicall affection, for, he would not that Plato should love any but him, offering to put the power of the Kingdome into his hands, if he would value him above Dion. With this passion, troublesome to Plato, Dionysius was sometimes so farre transported, as men jealous of their Mistresses, that he would upon the suddain fall out with him, and as suddainly be reconciled, and ask him pardon. He had indeed a great desire of Plato's Philosophy, but a great respect likewise on the other side for those who disswaded him from it, telling him, that it would ruine him to be too far ingaged therein. Plat. Epist. In the mean time, there happening a War, he sent Plato home, promising, that the next spring (as soon as there was peace) he would send back for him and Dion to Syracuse: but he kept not his promise, for which he desired Plato to excuse him, protesting the War to be the occasion thereof, and that assoon as it were ended, he would send for Dion, whom he desired in the mean time to rest satisfied, and not attempt any thing against him, not to speak ill of him to the Grecians. This Plato endeavoured to effect; he in­structed Dion in Philosophy, in the Academy: Dion lay in the City at the house of Calippus, with whom he had been long ac­quainted. He purchased a Country house for pleasure, whither [...]e sometimes went; this he bestowed afterward, at his return to Sicily, upon Speusi [...]pus, with whom he conversed most intimately, as being so advised by Plato, who knew the cheerfull humour of Speusippus to be a fit divertisement for the reserved disposition of Dion. Plato had undertaken the expence of some Playes and Dances by some youths; Dion took the pains to teach them, and paid the whole charge: By this liberality which Plato suffered him to confer upon the Athenians, he gained more love then Plato honour.

In the mean time, Dionysius, to acquit himselfe of the disesteem he had gained amongst Philosophers in Plato's cause, invited ma­ny learned men, and in a vain ostentation of Wisdome, applyed improperly the sentences he had learned of Plato: Hereupon he began to wish for Plato again, and to blame himselfe, for not knowing how to use him well when he had him, and that he had not learned so much of him as he might: and being like a Tyrant [Page 29] transported with uncertain passions and changes, a suddain ve­hement desire came upon him of seeing Plato again. Plat Epist. 3. The peace being now concluded, he sent to Plato to come to him (but not (as he had promised) to Dion) writing to him, that he would have him to come immediately, and that afterwards he would send for Dion. Hereupon Plato refused to go, notwithstanding the in­treaties of Dion; alledging for excuse his old age, and that no­thing was done according to their agreement. In the mean time, Archytas, whom, with others of Tarentum, Plato, before his de­parture, had brought into the acquaintance of Dionysius, came to Dionysius; there were also others there, Auditors of Dion. Dionysius being refused upon a second invitation, thought his honour deep­ly concerned, and thereupon sent the third time a Galley of three banks of Oares ( [...]li [...]. trimmed with Fillets) and other Ships, and with them Archidemus, whom he conceived Plato most affected of all his friends in Sicily, and some Sicilian Noblemen: Plut. He had by all means obliged Archytas the Pythagorean, to let Plato know, he might come without danger, and that he would engage his word on it. Plat. Epist. 7. As soon as they came to Plato, they all protested, that Dionysius was much inclined to Philosophy, and delivered an Epistle from him to this effect.

Dionysius to Plato.

(AFter the accustomed way of Preface) nothing (saith he) should you do sooner, then come to Sicily at my request. First, as conc [...]rning Dion, all shall be done as you will; for, I think you will only moderate things, and I will condescend: But, unlesse you come, you shall not obtain any thing which you desire for Dion, nor in anything else, not in those which chiefly concern your own particular.

Plat Epist. Other Epistles were sent from Archytas, and other Italians and Tarentines, praising Dionysius for his love of learning; adding, that if Plato came not, it would reflect upon his friends, as well as on himselfe. Plutarch. Many Letters and intreaties were sent to Dion, from his Wife and Sister: Plat. Epist. to these were joyned the importuni­ties of some friends of Plato's at Athens, Plut. insomuch that Dion brought it to passe, that Plato ( Plat. lest he should desert him and the Tarentines) yielded to Dionysius, without any excuse; and, as he writeth himselfe, was driven the third time to the Sicilian straits.

Once more Charybdis dangers to essay.

At his arrivall in Sicily, Dionysius met him with a Chariot, drawn by four white horses, Aelian. var. Hist. [...]. 18. whereinto he took him, and made him sit, whilst himselfe plaid the Coachman: whereupon a facete [Page 30] Syracusian, well vers'd in Homer, pleased with the sight, spoke these verses out of the Iliads, with a little alteration:

The Chariot groan'd beneath its waight,
Proud that the best of men there sat.

And as Dionysius was much joy'd at his comming, so were the Sicilians put in great hopes, being all desirous, and endeavou­ring, that Plato might supplant Philistus, and subvert Tyranny by Philosophy: The Ladies of the Court entertained Plato with all civility; but above all, Dionysius seemed to repose more confi­dence in him, then in any of his friends; for, whereas he was jealous of all others, he had so great respect for Plato, that he suf­fered him only to come to him unsearched ( Aelian. var. Hist. 4. 18. though he knew him to be Dions intimate friend) and offered him great summs of mo­ny, but Plato would not accept any: (yet Laert. Onetor saith, he recei­ved eighty Talents of him, wherewith enriched, he purchased the Books of Philolaus) whence Aristippus the Cyrenaean, who was at the same time in the Court, said, Dionysius bestoweth his bounty on sure grounds; he gives little to us who require much, and much to Plato who requireth nothing. And being blamed, that he received mony of Dionysius, Plato books, I want mony, saith he, Plato books. So untrue it is, as Epist. ad Aeschin. Xenophon asperseth him, that he went thither to share in the Sicilian luxury: or as Chillad. Tzetzes, that he studied the art of Cookery, and lived with Dionysius as his pensioner and parasite. So far was he from any sordid compliance, that at a Feast, Laert. vit. Aristip. Di­onysius commanding every one to put on a purple Gown, and dance, he refused, saying,

I will not with a female robe disgrace
My selfe, who am a man of manly race.

Some likewise ascribe this to him, which others to Aristippus, that Dionysius saying,

Who ere comes to a Tyrant, he
A servant is, though he came free.

He answered immediately, ‘No servant is, if he came free.’

Plat. Epist. Plut. Plato, after a while, began to put Dionysius in minde of the City he had promised him to be governed by his rules; but Dio­nysius retracted his promise: He moved him also in the behalfe of Dion; Dionysius at the first delay'd him, afterwards fell out with him, but so secretly, that none saw it, for he continued to confer as much honour on him, as he could possibly, thereby to make [Page 31] him forsake his friendship to Dion? Plato from the beginning perceived there was no trust to be reposed in what he said or did, but that all was deceit; yet concealed that thought, and pa­tiently suffered all; p [...]etending to believe him. Thus they dissem­bled with each other, thinking they deceived the eyes of all men besides; Helicon of Cyzicum, a friend of Plato, foretold an Eclipse of the Sun, which falling out according to his prediction, the Ty­rant much honoured him, and gave him a Talent of Silver: then Aristippus jesting with other Philosophers, said, he could tell them of a stranger thing that would happen; they desiring to know what that was, I foretel, saith he, Plato and Dionysius will be at difference ere long; and it came to passe. Plat. Epist. Dionysius detain'd Dion's Rent which he used to send yearly to him to Peloponnesus, pretending he kept it for his Nephew, Dion's Son. Plato discon­tented hereat, desired he might go home, saying, he could not stay, Dion being used so ignominously: Dionysius spoke kindly to him, desiring him to stay: He thought it not convenient to let Plato go so soon to divulge his actions: but being not able to pre­vail with him; hee told him he would provide a means for his Passage; Plato had designed to go with the Passage [...]boates; Dionysius seeing him bent upon his voyage, the next spoke thus kindly to him; that the differences betwixt Dion and me may be composed, I will for your sake condescend thus far, Di­on, shall receive his revenewes living in Peloponnesus not as a banish­ed person, but as one that may come hither when he and I, and you his friends shall think convenient. The Trustees for this businesse shall be your self, and your and his friends who live here; Dion shall receive his Rents, but through your hands, otherwise I shall not dare to trust him ▪ in you and yours I have more confidence; stay for this reason a year here; and then you shall carry along with you his money, wherein you will do Dion a great courtesie. To this Plato after a daies deliberation con­sented; and writ to that effect to Dion; but as soon as the Shippes were gone, that Dionysius saw he had no means to away, forgeting his promise; he made sale of Dions Estate.

Plat. Epis [...]: At this time hapned a mutiny amongst the Souldiers of Diony­sius, of which Heraclides a friend of Plato's was reported the Au­thor: Dionysius laid out to take him, but could not light on him: Walking in his Garden he called Theodot [...]s to him; Plato being accidently walking there at the same time; after some private discourse with Dionysius, Theodotes, turning to Plato, Plato saith he, I perswade Dionysius that I may bring Heraclides to him to answer the crimes wherewith he is charged, and then if Dionysius will not suffer him to live in Sicily, that he at least permit him to take his Wise and Children along with him to Peloponnesus, and live there, and, whilst he shall not plot any thing against Dionysius, that he may there enjoy his Revenewes. With this ussurance I have sent to Heraclides, and will send again to him to come hither; but if he come either upon the first or second notice, I have made an agreement with Dionysius, and [Page 32] obtained a promise from him that he shall receive no harm, either in or without the Citty; but, if he be so resolved, that he send him away beyond the con [...]ines of this Country, untill he shall be better satisfied with him: Do not you Dionysius consent hereto saith he, I do, answered Dio­nysius, neither if he be in your house shall he receive any prejudice; The next day (about 20. daies before Plato left Sicily) came Eurybi­us and Theodotes to Plato in so much hast and trouble; Plato, said Theodotes, you were yesterday present at the agreement betwixt Dio­nysius and me, concerning Heraclides. I was so, answered Plato, but since continues Theodotes, he hath sent out Officers to apprehend him, and I fear he is somewhere very nigh; therefore go along with us to Di­onysius, and let us use our utmost endeavour with him: They went, when they came before him, Plato (the rest standing silent by, and weeping) began thus, [...]hese men, Dionysius, are afraid lest you should do somthing against Heraclides contrary to the agreement you made yesterday, for I suppose he is come near here abouts, Dionysius at this grew angry, his colour often changed with rage; Theodotes fell at his feet, and taking him by the hand, besought him not to do any such thing: Plato continuing his speech; Be of good chear, saith he, Theodotes, for Dionysius wil [...] not do any thing contrary to the promise he made yesterday. Dionysius looking severely upon Plato, to you, saith he, I made no promise; yes by the God's answered Plato, you promi­sed not to do those things which Theodotes now beseecheth you not to do. Archedemus and Aristocritus being present; he told Plato (as hee had done once before, when he interceded for Heraclides,) That he cared for Heraclides and others more then for him: and asked him before them, whether he remembred that when he came first to Syracuse, he counselled him to restore the Graecian Cities: Plato answered, he did remember it, and that he still thought it his best course, and withall asked Dionysius whether that were the only counsell he had given him. Dionysius returned an angry contumelious reply, and asked him, laughing scornfully, whether he taught him those things as a School boy; to which Plato answe­red, you well remember, what replies he, as a Master in Geometry, or how? Pla [...]o forbore to reply, fearing it might occasion a stop of his Voyage; But immediately went away; Dionysius resolved to lay wait for Heraclides; but hee escaped to the Carthaginian Territories.

From this displeasure against Plato, Dionysius took occasion to forbear to send to Dion his money; and first sent Plato out of his Castle, where, til then, he had lain next the Palace, pretending that the women were to Celebrate a Feast ten daies in the Gar­dens where he dwelt; For that time he commanded Plato to live without the Castle with Archedemus; during which time T [...]eo­dotes sent for him, and complained to him of Dionysius his proceed­ings. Dionysius, receiving information that Plato had gone to The­odotes, took a new occasion of displeasure against him, and sent [Page 33] one to him, who asked him whether he had gone to Theodotes. Plato acknowledged that he had, then saith the Messenger, Dio­nysius bad me [...]ell you; you do not well to preferre Dion and his friends before him. Never from that time did he send for Pl [...]to to the Court, looking upon him as a profest friend to Theodotes and Heraclides and his profest enemy: Plut. Plato lived without the Castle amongst the Souldiers of the Guard▪ who, as Dionysius well knew, had born him ill will long, and sought to murtler him, because he counsel'd Dionysius to giv [...] over the Tyranny, and live with­out a Guard. Pl [...]t. Epist. Some, who came to visit him, gave him notice that calumnies were spread against him amongst the Souldiers, Laert. as if he excited Dion and Theondas to restore the Island to liberty, and that some of them threatned, when they could light upon him to kill him. Hereupon Plato began to think of some means of Escape, which he effected in this manner; He sent to Arobytas at Tarentum, and to other friends advertising them of the danger wherein he was; They, under pretence of an Embassy in the name of the Country, sent Lamascus (whom Laertius calls Lamis­cus) one of their party with a Galley of three banks of Oares to redemand Plato, declaring that his comming to Syracuse upon the engagement of Archytas: His letter was to this effect.

Architas to Dionysius, health.

WE all Plato's friends have sent Lamiscus and Photides to re­demand the man according to your agreement with us: You will do well to consider with what importunity you prevail'd with us to invite Plato to you, promising to yeeld to all things, and to give him liberty to go and come at his pleasure; remember how much you prized his comming, and pre [...]erred him before all others: if there hath hapned any difference betwixt you, it will be [...]it you to treat him courteously, and restore him safe to us. This if you do, you will do justly, and oblige us.

Plutarch. vit. Dion. Dionysius to excuse himselfe, and to shew he was not angry with Plato, feasted him magnificently, and then sent him home with great testimonies of affection: One day amongst the rest he said to him, I am afraid Plato you will speak ill of me when you are amongst your friends. The Gods forbid, answered, Plato, smiling, they should have such scarcity of matter in the Academy, as to be constrained to discourse of you. Dionysius at his departure, desired him to find out whether Dion would be much displeased if he should dispose of his Wife to another; there being at that time a report that he did not like his match, and could not live quietly with his Wi [...]e. Plato in his return, came to Peloponnesus at what time the Olym­pick games were celebrated; where the eyes of all the Grecians were taken off from the sports and fixed upon him as the more worthy object: Here he found Dion beholding the exercises, To [Page 34] whom hee related what had happened. Dion protested to revenge the discourtesie of Dionysius towards Plato, from which Plato earnestly disswaded him: Being come home to Athens, hee wrote to Dionysius, and gave him a plain accompt of every thing, but that concerning Dion's Wife, he set it down so darkly, that hee alone to whom the letter was directed could understand him; letting him know that he had spoken with Dion [...] about the busi­nesse which he knew, and that he would be very much displeased if Dionysius did it: so that at that time, because there was great hopes of reconciliation between them, the Tyrant forbore a while to dispose of his Sister Arete, Dions Wife, as, soon after, when he saw the breach irreconcilable, he did, marrying her a­gainst her will to one of his friends named Timocrates. Dion thence forward prepared for War against Plato's advice, who endeavoured to disswade him from it, as well for respect of Dio­onysius his good reception of him, as for that Dion was well in years; though Aelian saith, he put Dion upon that war; which Plu­tarch imputes to the instigations of Speusippus.

CHAP. X.
His Authority in Civill Affairs.

AT home he lived quietly in the Academy, Laert. not engaging himself in publick Affairs; (though he were a person very knowing therein as his writings manifest,) because the Atheni­ans were accustomed to Laws different from his sense.

Aelian. var. hist. 2. 41. His fame spreading to the Arcadians, and Thebans, they sent Embassadours earnestly to request him to come over to them, not noly to instruct their young men in Philosophy, but, which was of higher concernment, to ordain Laws for Megalopolis a Citty then newly built by the Arcadians, upon occasion of the great de­feat given them by the Lacedaemonians, in the first year of the 103. Olympiad. Plato was not a little pleased at this invitation, but asking the Ambassadours how they stood affected to a parity of Estates, and finding them so averse from it, as not to be by any means induced thereto, he refused to go: but sent Aristonimus his familiar friend.

The Cyrenaeans likewise sent to him, Plutarch. ad princip. in [...]rudit. desiring him to send them Laws for their City, but he refused, saying, it was difficult to to prescribe Laws to men in prosperity.

Yet to severall people upon their importunities he condescen­ded.

To the Syracusians he gave Laws upon the ejection of their King.

[Page 37] To the Cretans, upon their building of Magnesia, he sent Laws digested into twelve Books.

To the Ilians he sent Phormio; to the Pyrrheans, Mededimus (his familiar friends) upon the same designe.

This is enough to justifie him against those who Athen▪ accuse him, of having written a form of Government, which he could not perswade any to practise, because it was so severe: and that the Athenians, who accepted the Laws of Draco and Solon, derided his.

CHAP. XI.
His Vertues and Morall Sentences.

Laert. HE lived single, yet soberly and Suid. chastly, insomuch as in his old age (in compliance with the vulgar opinion) he sacri­ficed to Nature, to expiate the crime of his continence. So con­stant in his composure and gravity, that a Youth brought up un­der him, returning to his Parents, and hearing his Father speak aloud, said, I never found this in Plato. He ate but once a day, or, if the second time, very sparingly; he slept alone, and much dis­commended the contrary manner of living. Of his Prudence, Pa­tience, Magnanimity, and other Vertues, there are these in­stances.

Plut. Antimachus a Colophonian, and Niceratus a Heracleot, con­tending in a Poetick Panegyrick of Lysander, the prize was be­stowed upon Niceratus: Antimachus in anger tore his Poem; Plato, who at that time was young, and much esteemed Antimachus for his poetry, comforted him, saying, Ignorance is a disease proper to the ignorant, as blindnesse to the blind.

Senec. de ira. 3. 1 [...]. His servant having offended him, he bad him put off his coat, and expose his shoulders to be beaten, intending to have corrected him with his own hand; but perceiving himselfe to be angry, he stopt his hand, and stood fixt in that posture; a friend comming in, asked him what he was doing, Punishing an angry man, saith he.

Senec. de ira. 3. 12. Another time, being displeased at his servant for some of­fence, do you (saith he to Speusippus (or as Laertius to Xenocrates) accidentally comming in) beat this fellow, for I am angry. And ano­ther time to his servant he said, I would beat thee, if I were not angry. Val. Max. Fearing to exceed the limits of correction, and thinking it unfit the Master and servant should be alike faulty.

Laert. Chabrias the generall being arraigned for his life, he alone shewed himselfe on his side, not one of the Citizens else appea­ring for him. Crobulus the Sycophant met him, accompanying Chabrias to the Tower, and said unto him, Do you come to help o­thers, [Page 38] you know not that the poyson of Socrates is reserved for you? Plato answered, When I fought for my Count [...]y I hazarded my life, and will now in duty to my friend.

Aelian. var. hist. 4. At the Olympick Games, he fell into company with some strangers, who knew him not, upon whose affections he gained much by his affable conversation, Dining and spending the whole day with them, not mentioning either the Academy or Socrates, only saying, his Name was Plato. When they came to Athens, he entertained them curteously. Come Plato, said the strangers, shew us your namesake, Socrates his Disciple; bring us to the Academy; recommend us to him, that we may know him. He smiling a little, as he used, said, I am the man: Whereat they were much amazed, ha­ving conversed so familiarly with a person of that eminence, who used no boasting or ostentation; and shewed, that besides his Philosophicall discourse, his ordinary conversation was extreamly winning.

When he went out of the School, he alwaies said, See (Youths) that you imploy your idle houres usefully.

At a Feast he blamed those that brought in Musicians to hin­der discourse.

Seeing a young man play at Dice, reproved him, he answe­red, What, Laert. for so small a matter? Custome (replies Plato) is no small thing.

Being demanded, Laert. whether there should be any record to po­sterity of his actions or sayings, as of others before him: First, saith he, we must get a Name, then many things will follow.

Getting on Horse-back, Laert. he immediately lighted again, saying, He feared lest he should be carried away [...] by a high wil­full conceit, a metaphor taken from a Horse.

He advised drunken and angry men to look in a Glasse, Laert. and it would make them refrain from those vices.

He affirmed, that to drink to the excesse of drunkennesse was not allowable at any time, Laert. unlesse upon the festivall of that God who gives Wine.

Sleep also much displeased him, whence he saith in his Lawes, Laert. No man sleeping is worth anything.

That truth is more pleasing to all, then any feign'd story, Laert. so of truth he saith, de legibus: Truth, O guest, is an excellent thing, and durable, but to this we are not easily perswaded.

Being told, Val. Max. 4. 1. that Xenocrates had spoken many unjust things against him, he presently rejected the accusation; the informer persisted, asked, why he would not believe him? He added, it was not probable, that he whom he loved so much, should not love him again. Finally, the other swearing it was thus; he, not to argue him of perjury, affirmed, that Xenocrates would never have said so, but that there was reason for it.

He said, Senec. de ira. 1. 16. No wise man punisheth in respect of the fault past, but in prevention of the future.

[Page 39] Seeing the Agrigentines magnificent in Building, Aelian. luxurious in Feasting, These people (saith he) Build, as if they were to live for ever, and Eat, as if they were to die instantly.

Hearing a wicked person speak in the defence of another, Stob. This man, saith he, carries his heart in his tongue.

Being told, Stob. that some spoke ill of him, he answer'd, Tis no matter, I will live so that none shall believe them.

Seeing a young man of a good family, Stob. who had wasted all his means, [...]itting at the door of an Inn, feeding upon bread and water, he told him, If you had dined so temperately, you would never have needed to sup so.

To Antistenes, Stob. making a long oration, You know not, saith he, that discourse is to be measured by the hearer, not the speaker.

Seeing a youth over-bold with his Father, Stob. Young man, saith he, will you under-value him, who is the cause you over-value your selfe?

To one of his Disciples, who took too much care of his body, he said, Why do you labour so much in building your own prison?

Of a prisoner fettered, he said, That man is dead in his own bo­dy, he lives in another.

He said, that whosoever neglected himselfe for another, was the most happy of all persons, for he enjoyed neither.

One Leo, an eminent Citizen, being blamed for loud and im­moderate clamour in the Senate, That is, saith he, to be a Lyon indeed.

His Disciples wondring, that Xenocrates, severe all his life time, had said something that was pleasant, Do you wonder (saith he) that Roses and Lillies grow among Thorns?

Xenocrates by reason of his severe conversation, Laert. vit. Xen. he advised to sacrifice to the Graces.

He used to say, Prefer labour before idlenesse, unlesse you esteem rust above brightnesse.

He exhorted the young men to good life, thus; Observe the different nature of vertue and pleasure; the momentary sweet­nesse of the world is immediately followed by eternall sorrow and repentance, the short pain of the other by eternall pleasure.

He said, that it was a great matter in the education of youth, to accustome them to take delight in good things; other waies, he affirmed pleasure to be the bait of evill.

He affirmeth Philosophy to be the true help of the Soul, the rest ornaments; that nothing is more pleasing to a sound minde, then to speak and hear truth, then which nothing is better or more lasting.

To some, who demanded what kinde of possessions were best to be provided for Children: Those (saith he) which fear nei­ther stormes, nor violence of men, nor Iove himselfe.

To Demonicus, asking his advice concerning the education of his Son: The same care (saith he) that we have of Plants, we [Page 40] must take of our Children; The one is Labour, the other Plea­sure. But we must take heed that in this we be not too secure, in that too vigilant.

To Thiledonus, who blamed him that he was as Studious to learn as to teach, and asked him how long he meant to be a Disciple? as long saith he, as I am not ashamed of growing better and wi­ser.

Being demanded what difference there is between a learned Man and an unlearned, the same saith he, as Betwixt a Physitian and a Patient.

He said, Princes had no better Possessions then the familiarities of such men who could not [...]latter, that Wisdom is as necessary to a Prince, as the Soul to the Body. That Kingdoms would be most happy, if either Philosophers Rule, or the Rulers were inspired with Philosophy, for no­thing is more pernicious then power and arrogance accompanied with ig­norance. That Subjects ought to be such as Princes seem to be. That a Magistrate is to be esteemed a Publick not a private good. That not a part of the Common-wealth, but the whole ought to be principally regarded.

Being desirous to take off Timotheus Son of Conon, Plut. Sympos. 6. praefat. Aelian. var. hist. Generall of the Athenians, from sumptuous Military Feasts; he invited him into the Academy to a plaine moderate Supper, such as quiet pleasing sleeps succeed with a good temper of body. The next day Timotheus observing the difference, said, They who feasted with Plato were the better for it the next day; and meet­ing Plato, said unto him; Your Supper, Plato, is as pleasant the next morning as overnight, alluding to the excellent discourse, that had past at that time.

Hence apears the truth of that Poet's saying, who being de­rided for acting a Tragedy, none being present but Plato, answered, but this one person is more then all the Athenians besides.

CHAP. XII.
His Will and Death.

THus continuing a single life to his end, not having any Heirs of his own, he bequeathed his Estate to young Adi­mantus, (probably the Son of Adimantus, his second Brother) by his will; thus recited by Laertius.

These things Plato hath Bequeathed and disposed, The Eniphistidaean grounds bordering North, on the high way from the Cephisian Temple, South on the Heracleum of the Eniphistiades, East on Archestratus the Phrearian, West Philip the Cholidian, this let it not be lawfull for any man to sell or alienate, but let young Adimantus be possessour thereof in [Page 41] as full and ample manner as is possible. And likewise the Enerisiadaean Farm which I bought of Callimachus, adjoyning on the North to Eu­rymedon the Myrrinusian, on the South to Demostratus Xypeteron, on the East to Eurymedon the Myrrinusian, on the West to Cephissus; Three minae of Silver; a Golden Cup weighing 160. a ring of Gold, and an earing of Gold, both together weighing four drachmes and three aboli; Euclid the Stone-Cutter oweth me three Minae, Diana I remit freely, I leave Servants, Ticho, Bictas Apolloniades, Dionysius Goods, whereof Demetrius keepeth an Inventory. I ow no man any thing, Executors, Sosthenes, Speusippus, Demetrius, Hegias, Eu­rimedon, Callimachus, Thrasippus.

If this Will be not forged, that of Apuleius is false, Dogn [...]. who a­verrs the Patrimony he left was a little Orchard adjoyning to the Acade­my, two servants, and a Cup wherein he supplicated to the Gods; Gold no more then he wore in his ear when he was a boy, an Emblem of his Nobility.

He died in the 13 t• year of the Reign of Philip King of Macedon, Laert. in the first of the 108. Olympiad; the 81. (according to Hermip­pus, Cicero, Seneca, and others) of his age (not as Athenaeus the 82.) which number he compleated exactly, dying that very day whereon he was born; For which reason the Magi at Athens sa­crificed to him, as conceiving him more than man, who fulfilled the most perfect number, nine multiplyed into it self.

He died only of age, Epist. 1. 5 [...]. which Seneca ascribes to his temperance and diligence; Hermippus saith, at a Nuptiall Feast; Cicero saith, as he was writing; they therefore who affirm he dyed (as Phere­cydes) of lice, do him much injury; Laert. upon his Tomb these Epitaphs.

The first.
Whose Temperance and Iustice all envies,
The fam'd Aristocles here buried lies;
If Wisdom any with renown indued,
Here was it most, by envy not pursued.
The second.
Earth in her bosom Plato's body hides,
His Soul amongst the deathlesse Gods resides
Aristo's Son; whose fame to strangers spread,
Made them admire the sacred life he lead.
Another later.
Eagle, why art thou pearcht upon this stone,
And gaz [...]st thence on some Gods starry throne?
I Plato's Soul to Heaven flownrepresent,
His body buried in this Monument.

[Page 42] Phavorinus saith, that Mithridates the Persian set up Plato's statue in the Academy with this Inscription;

MITHRIDATES SON OF RHODOBATES, THE PERSIAN, DEDICATED THIS I­MAGE OF PLATO, MADE BY SILANION TO THE MUSES.

CHAP. XIII.
His Disciples and Friends.

THE Fame of this Scool attracted Disciples from all parts: of whom were

Speusippus an Athenian, Plato's Sisters Son, whom he said he re­formed by the example of his own life.

Xenocrates a Chalcedonian, Plato's beloved Disciple, an imita­tour of his gravity and magnanimity: Athenaeus saith, hee was first the onely Disciple of Aeschines, and relief of his poverty, se­duced from him by Plato.

Aristotle a Stagirite, whom Plato used to call a Colt, foresee­ing that he would ungratefully oppose him, as a Colt having suckt, kicks at his Dam: Xenocrates was slow, Aristotle quick in extremity, whence Plato said of them, what an Asse have I, and what a horse to yoak together.

Philippus an Opuntian, who transcribed Plato's Laws in wax; to him some ascribe Epinomis.

Hestiaeus a Perinthian.

Dion a Syracusian; whom Plato exceedingly affected, as is evi­dent from his Epigrams; seeing him in the height of honour, all mens eyes fixt upon his noble actions, hee advised him to take heed of that vice, which makes men care onely to please them­selves; a consequent of solitude.

Amyclus (or as Aelian, Amyclas) a Heracleote. See also S [...]ob. lib. 13. Erastus and Coriscus Scepsians.

Temolaus a Cyzicene.

Euaemon a Lampsacene.

Pithon, whom Aristotle calls Paron, and Heraclides Aenians.

Hippothales and Callippus, Athenians.

Demetrius of Amphipolis.

Heraclides of Pontus.

Two women, Lasthenia a Mantinean, and Axiothia a Phliasi­an, who went habited like a man.

Theophrastus, as some affirm.

Oratours, Hyperides, Lycurgus, Demosthenes. Lycurgus (saith [Page 43] Philistus) was a person of great parts, and did many remarkable things, which none could perform, who had not been Plato's auditor. Demosthenes, when he fled from Antipater, said to Archi­as, who counsell'd him to put himselfe into his hands, upon pro­mise to save his life; Far be it from me to choose rather to live ill, than to die well, having heard Xenocrates and Plato dispute of the Soules immortality.

Mnesistratus a Thasian.

To these reckoned by Laertius, add Aristides a Locrian.

Eudoxus a Gnidian, who at a great Feast made by Plato, first found out the manner of sitting in a circular form.

Hermodorus, of whom the Proverb, Hermodorus traffiques in words. Zenob.

Heracleodorus, to whom Demosthenes writing, reprehends him, that having heard Plato, he neglected good arts, and lived disor­derly.

Athen. delp [...]. lib. 11: Euphratus, who lived with Perdiccas King of Macedonia, in so great favour, that he in a manner shared command with him.

Euagon of Lampsacum. Athen. Ibid.

Timaeus of Cyzicum. Athen. Ibid.

Chaeron of Pellene. Athen. Ibid.

Laert. Isocrates the Oratour, with whom Plato was very intimate▪ Praxiphanes published a discourse they had together, in a field of Plato's, who at that time entertained Isocrates as a Guest.

Aster, P [...]aedrus, Alexis, Agatho, young men, whom Plato parti­cularly affected, as appears by his Epigrams.

Chap. 10. Aristonymus, Phormio, Mededimus, his familiar friends, already mentioned.

CHAP. XIV.
His Aemulatours and Detractours.

AS Plato's eminent learning gained on one side many Disci­ples and admirers, so on the other side, it procured him ma­ny emulators, especially amongst his fellow Disciples, the fol­lowers of Socrates; amongst these,

Xenophon was exceedingly disaffected towards him; they emu­lated each other, and writ both upon one subject; a Symposium, Socrates his Apologie, morall commentaries: One writ of a Commonwealth, the other, the Institution of Cyrus: which book In Logib. Plato notes as commentitious, affirming Cyrus not to have been such a person as is there exprest. Though both writ much con­cerning Socrates, yet neither makes mention of the other, except Xenophon once of Plato, in the third of his Commentaries.

Antisthenes being about to recite something that he had writ­ten, [Page 44] desired Plato to be present; Plato demanding what he meant to recite, he answered, that to contradict is not lawfull. How come your, saith Plato, to write upon that subject? And thereupon demonstrating that he contradicted himselfe, Antisthenes writ a Dialogue against him, intituled Satho.

Aristippus was at difference with him, for which reason (in Phaedone) he covertly reproves Aristippus, that being near at Ae­gina when Socrates died, he came not to him. He writ a book of the luxury of the antients; some ascribe the amatory Epigrams to his invention, his designe in that treatise being to detract from eminent persons, amongst the rest from Socrates his Master, and Plato and Xenophon his fellow Disciples.

Aeschines and Plato also disagreed: some affirme, that when Plato was in favour with Dionysius, Aeschines came thither very poor, and was despised by Plato, but kindly entertained by Ari­stippus: But the Epistle of Aeschines put forth by Allatius, expres­seth the contrary. The discourse which Plato relates, betwixt Crito and Socrates in Prison, Idomeneus saith, was betwixt Socrates and Aeschines; by Plato, out of ill will to Aeschines, attributed to Crito. But of Aeschines he makes not any mention in all his works, except twice slightly; once in Phaedone, where he names him a­mongst the persons present at Socrates his death; and again in his Apology speaking of Lysanias his Father.

Phaedo, if we credit the detractions of Athenaeus, was so much maligned by Plato, as that he was about to frame an indictment against him, to reduce him to that condition of servitude, out of which, by the procurement of Socrates, he had been redeemed; but his designe being discovered, he gave it over. Besides his condisciples.

Diogenes the Cynick derided his Laws, and assertion of Ideas; concerning the first, he asked if he were writing Lawes? Plato assented. Have you not written already a Commonwealth, saith Diogenes? Yes, answered Plato. Had that Commonwealth Lawes, saith Diogenes? Plato affirmed it had. Then, replyed Diogenes, what need you write new? Laert. vit. Diog. Another time, Diogenes saying, he could see the things of the world, but not Ideas: Plato answered, that is no wonder, for you have, and use those eyes, which be­hold such things: but the minde, which only can see the other, you use not.

Laert. Molon, in detraction from him, said, It was not strange Dio­nysius should be at Corinth, but that Plato should be at Sicily.

From these private differences, arose many scandalous impu­tations, forged and spread abroad by such as envyed or maligned him: as, Seneca. That he profest one thing, and practised another: Laert. that he loved inordinately Aster, Dion, Phaedrus, Alexis, Agatho, and Archeanassa, a Curtesan of Colopho: Athen. That he was a calumnia­tour, envious, proud, a gluttonous lover of Figgs: Tzetz. Chiliad. that he was [Page 45] the worst of Philosophers a parasite to Tyrants, and many other accusations alike improbable: from these the Comick Poets and others took liberty to abuse him; Laert. Theopompus in Autochare.

—for one is none,
And two (as Plato holds) is hardly one.

Anaxandrides in Theseo; ‘When Olives he (like Plato) doth devour;’ Timon, ‘As Plato feignes, in framing Su. wonders skill'd;’ Alexis in Meropide,

Aptly thou comest, I walking round could meet
(Like Plato) nothing wise; but tir'd my feet.

And in Anchilione,

Thou speak'st of things thou understands not, go
To Plato, thence Nile and onyons know:

Amph in Amp hicrate,

What good from hence you may expect to rise,
I can no more then Plato's good comprise;

And in Dexidemide,

Plato thou nothing knowst, but how
To look severe and knit the brow.

Cratylus in Pseudobolymaeo,

A man thou art, and hast a soul, but this
With Plato not sure, but opinion is.

Alexis in Olympiodoro.

My body mortall is grown dry,
My soul turn'd air that cannot dy▪
Taught Plato this Philosophy?

And in Parasito. ‘Or thou with Plato rav'st alone.’

Athe [...]. lib. 11. Ephippus in Naufrago, objects to Plato and some friends of his, that corrupted with money they detracted from many persons; that they went proudly habited, and they took more care of their outward beau­ty, then the most luxurious: See Athenaeus, lib. 11.

CHAP. XV.
His Writings.

THE writings of Plato are by way of Dialogue; of the In­vention of Dialogue we have Chap. already spoken; now of the Nature thereof.

A Dialogue is composed of puestions and answers Philosophical [Page 46] or Politicall, aptly expressing the Characters of those persons that are the speakers in an elegant stile; Dialectick is the art of discourse, whereby we confirm or confute any thing by questions and answers of the disputants.

Of Platonick discourse there are two kinds, Hyphegetick and Exe­getick, subscribed thus,

Hyphegetick Theoretick. Logick.
Physick.
Practick. Ethick:
Politick.
Exegetick Gymnastick, Majeutick▪
Physick.
Agonistick, Endeitick.
Anatreptick.

we know where there are other divisions of Dialogues; as into dramatick Narrative mixt: but that division is more proper to Tragedy then to Philosophy.

Of Plato's Dialogues are
Physick, Timaeus.
Logick,
The Politick.
Cratylus.
Parmenides.
The Sophist.
Ethick,
Apology of Socrates.
Crito.
Phaedo.
Phaedrus.
Symposium▪
Menexemus.
Clitophon.
Epistles.
Philebus.
Hipparchus.
The Rivalls.

[Page 47]

Politick,
The Common-wealth.
The Lawes.
Minos.
Epinomis.
The Atlantick.
Maieutick,
Alcibiades.
Theages.
Lysis.
Laches.
Pirastick,
Euthyphron.
Menon.
Ion.
Charmides.
Theaetetus.
Endeictick, Protagoras.
Anatrep­tick,
Euthydemus.
Hippias 1.
Hippias 2.
Gorgias 1.
Gorgias 2.

It being much controverted (continueth Laertius) whether Plato doth dogmatize, some affirming, others denying it, it will be necessary to say somthing thereupon, [...] to dogma­tise is to impose a Doctrine, as [...] to impose a Law; A Doctrine is taken two waies, either [...]or that which is Decreed, or the Decree it self; That which is Decreed is a proposition, the Decree it self an imposition. Plato expounds those things which he conceiveth true: Confutes those which are false, sus­pends his opinion in those which are doubtfull. He asserts what he conceiveth true under one of these four persons, Socrates, Ti­maeus an Athenian Guest, an Aelian Guest; The Guests are not, as some conceive, Plato and Parmenides, but imagined namelesse persons, as what Socrates, Timaeus speak, are the Decrees of Plato. Those whom he argueth of falsehood are Thrasymach [...]s, Callicles, Polus, Gorgias, Protagoras, Hippias, Euthydemus, and the like.

In Argument he often used induction of both Sorts. Induction is a discourse, which from certain truths Collects, and inferreth a truth like to those: Of Induction there are two kinds, one from Contraries, another from Consequents: From Contraries, as when he who is questioned, answereth in all things contrary to himself, as thus; My Father is either the same with yours, or [Page 48] not the same, if therefore thy Father be not the same with mine, he is not my Father: and again, if a man be not a living crea­ture, he is stone, wood, or the like, but he is neither stone nor wood, for he hath a soul, and moveth himselfe, therefore he is a living creature; if a living creature, a dog and an Ox. This kind of induction by contraries, serves not for assertion, but confuta­tion: Induction by consequents is two-fold; one, when a singu­lar being sought, is concluded from a singular, the first proper to Oratours, the second to Logicians; as in the first, the question is, Whether such an one were a murtherer, it is proved from his being bloody at the same time. This induction is Rhetoricall, for Rhetorick is conversant in Singulars, not in universalls; it inquireth not after justice, but after the severall parts thereof: the other is Dialectick, whereby Universalls are concluded from Singulars, as in this question; Whether the Soule be immortall, and whether the living are of the dead, which is demonstrated in his Book of the Soul, by a generall Maxime, that contraries proceed from contraries, this being generall, is proved by sin­gulars, as, waking succeeds sleeping, the greater the lesser, and so on the contrary. Thus he useth to confirm what he asserts.

Thrasylus saith, he published his Dialogues according to the tragick Tetralogie: His genuine Dialogues are fiftie six, his Common-wealth divided into ten, they make nine Tetralogies, reckoning his Commonwealth one Book, his Lawes another. The first Tetralogie hath a common subject, declaring what is the proper life of a Philosopher: every Book hath a two-fold title; one from the principall person, the other from the subject.

The first.
Euthyphron; or of Piety: Pirastick.
Socrates his Apologie: Ethick.
Crito, or of that which is to be done: Ethick.
Phaedo, or of the soul: Ethick.
The se­cond.
Cratylus; or, of right naming: Logick.
Theaetetus; or, of Science: Pirastick.
The Sophist; or, of Ens: Logick.
The Politick; or, of a Kingdome: Logick.
The third.
Parmenides; or, of Idaea's: Logick.
Philebus; or, of Pleasure: Ethick.
The Symposium; or, of Good [...]Ethick.
Phaedrus; or of Love: Ethick.
The fourth.
Alcibiades 1. or, of human Nature: Majeutick.
Alcibiades 2. or, of Prayer: Majeutick.
Hipparchus; or, the Covetous: Ethick.
The Rivalls; or, of Philosophy: Ethick.

[Page 49]

The fift
Theages; or of Philosophy: Majeutick.
Charmides; or, of Temperance: Pirastick.
Laches; or, of Fortitude: Majeutick.
Lysis; or, of Friendship: Majeutick.
The sixt
Euthydemus; or, the Litigious: Anatreptick.
Protagoras; or, the Sophist: Endeictick.
Gorgias; or, of Rhetorick: A [...]atreptick.
Menon; or, of Vertue: Pirastick.
The seventh
Hippias first; or, of Honest: Anatreptick.
Hippias second; or, of Fal [...]: Anatreptick.
Io; or of Ilias: Pirastick.
Menexenus; or, the funerall Oration: Ethick.
The eight
Clitophon; or the Exhortation: Morall.
The Commonwealth; or, of Just: Politick.
Timaeus; or, of Nature: Physick.
Critias; or, the Atlantick: Ethick.
The ninth
Minos; or, of Law: Politick.
Lawes; or, of Legislation: Politick.
Epinomis; or, the Nocturnall convention; or, the Philosophers Politick.
Epistles thirteen, Ethick, in the inscriptions whereof he useth [...]. Cleon [...]. to Aristodemus one; to Architas two; to Dionysius foure; to Hermias, Era­stus, and Coriscus one; to Leodamas one; to Dion one; to Dions friends two. Thus Thrasilaus.

Others, of whom is Aristophanes the Grammarian, reduce his Dialogues to Trilogies, placing in

The first
The Common-wealth.
Timaeus.
Critias.
The se­cond
The Sophister.
The Politick.
Cratylus.
The third
Lawes.
Minos.
Epinomis.
The fourth
Theaetetus.
Euthyphron.
Apology.

[Page 50]

The fift.
Crito.
Phaedo.
Epistles. The rest single without order.

Some, as we said, begin with Alcibiades major, others from Theages, others from Euthyphron, others from Clitiphon, others from Timaeus, others from Phaedrus (which they say was the first Dialogue he wrot, as the subject it selfe seemeth to confirme, which savours of youth; and therefore Dicearchus condemnes it as too light: to which censure Cicero agreeth, as conceiving, he ascribeth too great a power to Love) others begin with Theaete­tus, many with his Apologie.

He mentions not himselfe in all his writings, except once in his Phaedo, and another time in his Apologie for Socrates. At the recitall of his Phaedo, all, but Aristotle rose, and went away. The efficacy of that Dialogue (which treats of the immortality of the Soule) is evident from Cleombrotus of Ambracia, who, assoon as he had read it, was so disaffected to life, that he threw him­selfe from a high wall into the Sea; Cicer. Tusc. quaest. 2. upon whom thus Callima­chus, Epigr.

Cleombrotus cries out, farewell this light,
And headlong throwes himselfe int'endlesse night:
Not that he ought had done, deserving death,
But Plato read, and weary grew of breath.

The Dialogues generally noted as spurious (not to say any thing of his Epinomis, though some ascribe it to Philippus the O­puntian) are these,

  • Midon, or the Horse-courser.
  • Erixias, or Erasistratus.
  • Alcyon.
  • Acephali, or the Sisyphi.
  • Axiochus.
  • Phaeaces.
  • Demodochus.
  • Chelidon.
  • The seventh,
  • Epimenides.

Of these Alcion is ascribed by Phavorinus to Leon.

His stile, Aristotle saith, is betwixt Prose and Verse. He useth variety of names, that his work may not easily be understood by the unlearned. He conceiveth wisdome properly to be of intel­lectuall things, Knowledge of reall Beings conversant about God, [Page 51] and the soul separate from the body. Properly, he calleth Philoso­phy Wisdome, being the appetition of divine Knowledge; but, com­monly he calleth all skill knowledge, as an Artificer, a wise man. He likewise used the same names in divers significations; [...], which properly signifies Evill, he useth for Simple, as Euripides in his Lycimnius of Hercules, [...].’

The same word Plato sometimes takes for honest, sometimes for little. He likewise useth [...] names to signifie the same thing: Idaea he useth both for species and genus; Exemplar, both princi­ple and cause. Sometimes he useth contrary expressions to signi­fie the same thing; Sensible he calleth a being and no being; a be­ing, as having been produced; no being, in respect of its conti­nuall mutation. Idaea, neither moveable nor permanent, the same both one and many. The like he useth often in other things.

The method of his discourse is three-fold: first, to declare what that is which is taught; then for what reason it is asserted, whether as a principall cause, or as a comparison, and whether to defend the Tenent, or oppugne the contrary. Thirdly, whether it be rightly said.

The marks, which he usually affixed to his writtings, are these.

[...] denotes Platonick words and figures.

[...], Doctrines and opinions proper to Plato;

[...], Choice expressions.

[...], Corrections.

[...], Things superfluous.

[...], Double signification or use.

[...], Philosophicall institution.

[...], agreement of opinions.

[...], Improbation. Hitherto Laertius.

There are two Epistles under Plato's name, besides those in his works, already mentioned, one in Laertius his life of Architas.

Plato to Architas, [...].

THe Commentaries which came from you, we received with extra­ordinary content, infinitely admiring the writer, who appears to us a person worthy of those antient predecessors; for those men are said to be Myraeans of those Trojans, which were banished in the time of Laome­don, good men, as Tradition speaks them. Those Commentaries of mine, concerning which you write, are not yet polished; however as they are, I have sent them to you, in the keeping of them we agree both, so as I n [...]ed not give you any directions. Farewell.

Another published by Leo Allatius amongst the Socratick Epistles.

[Page 52] I had not any of those things to send to Syracuse which Archytas desired to receive by you; as soon as possible I will send to you. Philosophy hath wrought in me I know not whether good or bad, a hatred of con­versing with many persons, justly, I think, since they erre in all kind of folly as well in private as publick affairs; but if unjustly, yet know I can hardly live and breath otherwise. For this reason I have fled out of the City, as out of a Den of wild Beasts, living not far from the Ephestia­des, and the places thereabouts. I now see, that Timon hated not men, he could not affect Beasts, therefore lived [...] alone by himself, perhaps not without danger. Take this as you please; my resolution is to live far from the City, now and for ever hereafter, as long as God shall grant me life.

In Poesy he writ,

Dithyrambs.

An Epick Poem,

Four Tragedies, all which (as we said) he burned.

The Atlantick story, of which thus Plutarch; Solon begun the At­lantick story (which he had learnt of the Priests of Sais, very proper for the Athenians) but gave it over by reason of his old age, and the large­nesse of the work. Plato took the same argument, as a wast piece of fer­tile ground fallen to him by hereditary right; He manured it, refined it, enclosed it with large Walls, Porches and Galleries, such as never any Fable, or Poem had before; but because he undertook it late, he was prevented by Death. The more things written delight, the more their not being perfected is For as the Athenian City left the Temple of Jupiter; so Plato's Wisdom, amongst many ex [...]llent wri­tings, left the Atlantick argument alone imperfect.

Epigrams, of which these are extant in Laertius, and the Anthologie.

Upon one named After.
La [...]rt. An­thol. 3. 6. 27.
The Stars, my Star, thou view'st; Heav'n I would be,
That I with thousand eyes might gaze on Thee.
Upon his Death.
Laert.
A Phosphor 'mongst the living late wert thou,
But shin'st among the dead a Hesper now.
Epitaph on Dion, engrav'd on his Tomb at Siracuse.
Laert. Anthol. 4. 33. 26.
Old Hecuba the Trojan Matron's years
Were interwoven by the Fates with Tears;
But thee with blooming hopes my Dion deckt,
Gods did a Trophy of their pow'r erect.
Thy honour'd reliques in their Country rest,
Ah Dion! whose love rages in my breast.
On Alexis.
Laert. An­thol. 3. 33. 44.
Fair is Alexis, I no sooner said,
When every one his eyes that way convey'd:
My soul (as when some dog a bone we show,
Who snatcheth it) lost we not Phaedrus so?
On Archaeanassa.
Laert.
To Archae'nassa, on whose furrow'd brow
Love sits in triumph, I my service vow;
If her declining Graces shine so bright,
What flames felt you▪ who saw her noon of light?
On Agathon.
My Soul, when I kiss'd Agathon, did start
Up to my lip, just ready to depart.
To Xantippe.
Laer [...].
An Apple I (Love's emblem) at the throw,
Thou in exchange thy Virgin-zone bestow.
If thou refuse my suite, yet read in this,
How short thy years, how frail thy Beauty is.
I cast the apple, loving those love thee,
Anthol.
Xantippe yeeld. for soon both old will be.
On the Eretrians vanquish'd by the Persians.
Laert.
We in Eubaea born Eretrians are
Buried in Susa from our Country far.
Venus and the Muses.
Laert.
Virgins (said Venus to the Muses) pay
Homage to us, or, Love shall wound your Hearts:
The Muses answer'd, take these toyes away,
Our Breasts are proof against his childish darts.
Fortune exchang'd.
Laert. Anthol. 84. 1.
One finding Gold, in change, the halter quits,
Missing his Gold, 'tother the halter knits.
On Sappho.
Anth. 1. 67. 13.
He, who believes the Muses Nine, mistakes,
For Lesbian Sappho ten their number makes.
Time.
Anth. 1. 1 [...].
Time all things bring to passe, a change creates
In Names, in Formes, in Nations and in S [...]ates.
Death.
Anthol. 3. 22. 3.
That is a Plough-man's grave, a Sailor's this;
To Sea and Land alike Death common is.
On one Shipwrack'd.
Anth. [...]. 22. 6.
The cruell Sea, which took my life away,
Forbore to strip me of my last array:
From this a covetous man did not refrain,
Acting a crime so great for so small gain;
But let him wear it to the shades, and there
Before great Pluto in my cloaths appear.
Another.
Anth. 3. 22. 7.
Safely (O Saylors) presse the Land, and wave,
Yet know, ye passe a Shipwrack'd persons grave.
On the Statue of Venus.
Anth. 4. 12. 8.
Paphian Cythera, swimming crosse the Main,
To Guidas came her Statue there to see,
And from on high, surveying round the plain
Where could Praxiteles me spy? (saith shee)
He saw not what's forbidden mortall Eyes,
'Twas Mars's Steel that Venus did incize.
Another.
Anth. 4. 1 [...]. 9.
Not carv'd by Steel, or Praxitele's fam'd hand:
Thus nak'd before the Iudges did'st thou stand.
Love sleeping.
Anth. 4. 12. 19
Within the Covert of a shady Grove,
We saw the little red-check'd God of Love.
He had nor Row nor Quiver, those among
The neighb'ring Trees upon a bough were hung:
Upon a Bank of tender Rose-buds laid
He, (smiling) slept; Bees with their noise invade
His rest, and on his lips their honey made.
Pan Piping.
Anth. 4. 12. [...]4.
Dwell awfull Silence on the shady Hills
Among the bleating flocks, and purling rills,
When Pan the Reed doth to his lip apply,
Inspiring it with sacred Harmony,
Hydriads, and Hamadryads at that sound
In a well order'd measure beat the ground.
On the Image of a Satyre in a Fountain and Love sleeping.
Anth. 4. 12. 96.
A skilfull hand this Satyre made so near
To life, that only Breath is wanting here:
I am attendant to the Nymphs; before
I fill'd out purple wine, now water powre▪
Who ere thou art com'st nigh, tread softly, lest
You waken Love out of his pleasing rest.
Another.
Anth. 4. 12. 97.
On horn'd Lyaeus I attend,
And powre the streams these Nayads lend,
Whose noise Lov's slumber doth befriend.
Another.
Anth. 4. 1 [...]. 102.
This Satyre Diodorus did not make,
But charme asleep; if prick'd he will awake.
On a Seal.
Anth. 4. 1 [...]. [...]
Five Oxen grazing in a flow'ry Mead,
A Iasper seal done to the life doth hold,
The little herd away long since had fled,
We'rt not inclos'd within [...] pale of Gold.

THE DOCTRINE OF PLATO delivered by ALCINOVS.

CHAP. I.
Of PHITOSOPHY, and how a Philosopher must be qualified.

Such a Summary as this may be given of the Doctrine of Plato. Philosophy is the desire of Wisdom, or solution of the soul from the body, and a conversion to those things, which are true and perceptible by Intellect. Wisdom, [...], is the Science of things Divine and Humane. A Philosopher is he who takes denomination from Philosophy, as a Musician from Musick. He who is to be a Philosopher, must be thus qualified; First, he must have a natu­rall capacity of all such Learning as is able to fit and bring him to the knowledge of that essence which is perceptible by Intel­lect, not of that which is in continual fluxion or mutation. Then he must have a naturall affection to Truth, and an aversion from receiving falshood, and besides this, temperate in a manner by Nature; for those parts which use to be transported with passi­ons, he must have reduced to obedience by Nature. For whoso­ever hath once embraced those disciplines which are conversant in consideration of such things as truly exist, and hath addicted all his study thereunto, little valueth corporeall pleasure. More­over a Philosopher must have a liberall mind, for the estimation of mean things is contrary to a man who intended to contem­plate the truth of things. Likewise he must naturally love Justice, for he must be studious of Truth, Temperance and Liberality. He must also have an acute apprehension, and a good memory, for these inform a Philosopher, those gifts of Nature, if improved by Discipline and Education, make a man perfect in Vertue, but neglected are the cause of the worst ills. These Plato useth to call by the same names with the Vertues, Temperance, Fortitude and Iustice.

CHAP. II.
That Contemplation is to be preferred before Action.

WHereas Life is twofold, Contemplative and Active, the chief Office of the Contemplative consisteth in the knowledge of truth, as of the Active, in the practice of those things which are dictated by Reason. Hence the Contemplative life is first, af­ter which as necessary followeth the Active. That it is so, may easily be proved thus. Contemplation is an Office of the intellect in the understanding of Intelligibles: Action is an operation of the rationall Soul, performed by meditation and service of the body. For the Soul, when it contemplateth the Divinity and the notions thereof, is said to be best affected. This affection is called [...], Wisdom, which is nothing else but an assimilation to the Deity. This therefore ought to be esteemed the first and princi­pall, as being most expetible and proper to man; for there are no impediments that can hinder it from being within our power, and it is cause of our proposed end. But Active life, and the pra­ctise thereof, chiefly making use of the mediation of the body, are many times obstructed; Wherefore those things which the Contemplative life considers in order to the reformation of the manners of men, a Philosopher, as often as necessity requireth, shall transferr to Action. Then shall a good man apply himselfe to the administration of Civill Affairs, when he seeth them ill managed by others. He must look upon the leading of an Army, administration of Justice and Embassies, as things necessary. The institution of Laws, ordering the Common-wealth, the compres­sure of Seditions, education of youth in Discipline, are the chiefest, and, among those things which relate to Action, of greatest consequence. Hence is it manifest, that a Philosopher must not onely be perseverant in Contemplation, but also cherish and increase it, sometimes giving himself to Action as an atten­dant upon Contemplation.

CHAP III.
The three parts of Philosophy.

THe study of a Philosopher seemeth according to Plato to be conversant chiefly in three things, in the Contemplation and knowledge of things, in the Practice of Vertue, and in Disputation. The Science of things that are, is called Theoretick, of [Page 58] those which pertain to Action, Practick; the disputative part, Di­alectick.

Dialectick is divided into Division, Definition, Induction and Syl­logisme; Syllogisme into the Apodeictick, which concerneth necessa­ry ratiocination; and Rhetoricall, which concerneth Enthymeme, called an imperfect ratiocination; and lastly into Sophismes. This the Philosopher must look upon, not as the chiefest but a necessa­ry part.

Of Practick Philosophy, one part is conversant about Manners, another orders Families, the last takes care of a Commonwealth. The first called Ethick, the second, Oeconomick, the third, Politick.

Of Theoretick Philosophy, one part enquires into things immu­table and divine, and the first causes of things; this is called Theologie; another the motion of the stars, the revolution and resti­tution of Celestial Bodies, and the constitution of the world. This is called Physick. That whereby we enquire Geometrically, and those other disciplines which are called [...], is termed Mathematick.

Philosophy being thus divided, wee must first according to Plato speak of the Dialectick part, and in that, first of the Iudi­ciarie.

CHAP. IV.
DIALECTICK.
Of the Iudiciary part.

WHereas there is somthing that judgeth, somthing which is judged, it is necessary also that there be somthing which is made of both these, properly called Iudgement. This Judgement may not unfitly be termed Judiciary, but more commonly that which judgeth. This is twofold; one, from which; another by which judgement is made. That is intellect; this the naturall Organ ac­commodated for judgement; primarily of true things; seconda­rily of false; neither is it any thing but naturall reason. To explain this more fully, of things which are, a Philosopher who judgeth the things themselves, may be called a Iudge; reason likewise is a Iudge, by which truth is judged, which even now we called an Organ.

Reason is twofold, one incomprehensible and true; the other is never deceived in the knowledge of those things which are. The first is in the power of God, not of man, the second in that of man also. This likewise is twofold, the first Science, and scientifick reason; the second Opinion. The first hath certitude, [Page 59] and stability, as being conversant in things certain and stable. The second, similitude of truth and opinion, as being conversant in things subject to mutation. Of science in Intelligibles, and opini­on in sensibles, the principles are Intellection and Sense.

Sense is a passion of the soul by the mediation of the body, first, declaring a passive faculty; When through the Organs of sense, the species of things are impress'd in the soul, so, as they are not defac'd by time, but remain firm and lasting, the conservation thereof is called Memory.

Opinion is the conjunction of memory and sense; for, when some object occurreth, which can first move the sense, thereby sense is effected in us, and by sense memory. Then again is the same thing objected to our sense, we joyne the precedent with the consequent sense, and now say within our selves, Socrates, a Horse, Fire, and the like: This is termed opinion, when we joyne the precedent memory with the late sense; when these agree within themselves, it is a true opinion, if they disagree, a false; for, if a man, having the species of Socrates in his memory, meet with Plato, and think, by reason of some likenesse betwixt them, he hath met Socrates again, and afterwards joyne the sense of Plato, which he took, as it were, from Socrates, with the memory which he preserved of Socrates, there will arise a false opinion.

That wherein sense and memory are formed, Plato compareth to a tablet of wax, but when the soul by cogitation reforming these things, which are conceived in opinion by memory and sense, soo­keth upon these as things from which the other are derived: Plato sometimes calleth this a picture and phantasie. Cogitation he calleth the soules discourse within her selfe: Speech, that which [...]loweth from the Cogitation through the mouth by voice. Intel­lection is an operation of the Intellect, contemplating first Intelli­gibles. It is two-fold, one of the soul, beholding Intelligibles be­fore she cometh into the body; the other of the same, after she is immers'd in the body: The first is properly called Intellection; the other, whilst she is in the body, is termed naturall knowledge, which is nothing but an intellection of the soul consined to the body. When we say, Intellection is the principle of Science, we mean not this latter, but the other, which is competible to the soul in her separate state, and, as we said, is then called Intellection, now naturall Knowledge. The same Plato termeth simple Know­ledge, the wing of the soul; sometimes Reminiscence.

Of these simple Sciences consisteth Reason, which is born with us, the efficient of naturall Science; and as reason is two-fold, Scientifick, and opinionative, so Intellection and Sense. It is like­wise necessary that they have their objects, which are Intelligibles and Sensibles: And for asmuch as of Intelligibles, some are Primary, as Idaeas, others Secondary, as the Species, that are in matter, and cannot be separated from it. Intellection likewise, must be two-fold, [Page 60] one of Primaries, the other of S [...]condaries. Again, foras­much as in Sensibles, some are Primary, as qualities, colour, whitenesse, others by accident, as white coloured, and that which is concrete, as fire: in the same manner is Sense, first, of Primaries, second, of Secondaries. Intellection judgeth primary Intelligibles, not with­out Scientifick knowledge, by a certain comprehension without discourse. Secondaries the same scientifick reason judgeth, but not without Intellection. Sensibles, as well Primary as Seconda­ry sense, judgeth, but not without opinionative reason. That which is concrete, the same reason judgeth, but not without sense. And since the Intelligible world is the Primary Intelligi­ble, the sensible something concrete, the first Intellection judgeth with reason, that is, not without reason: The other opinionative reason not without sense, whereas there is both contemplation and action; right reason discerneth not in the same manner those which are subject to contemplation, and those which are sub­ject to action: In contemplation it considereth what is true, what false; in things that belong to action, what is proper, what im­proper, what that is which is done. For, having an innate know­ledge of that which is good and honest, by using reason, and ap­plying it to those naturall notions, as to certain rules, we judge whether every thing be good or bad.

CHAP. V.
The Elements and Office of Dialectick.

OF Dialectick, the first and chiefest Element according to Plato, is, first, to consider the essence of every thing; next, the accidents thereof. What a thing is, it considers, either from its superiors, by division and definition, or contrariwise by Analysis. Accidents which adhere to substances, are considered, either from those things which are contained by induction, or from those which do contain by Syllogisme.

Hence the parts of Dialectick are these, Division, Definition, Ana­lysis, Induction, Syllogisme.

Of Divisions, one is a distribution of the Genus into Species, and of the whole into parts; as when we divide the Soule into the rationall part, and the irrationall; and the latter, into the concupiscible and the irascible. Another is of a world into divers significations, when the same may be taken severall waies. A third of accidents, according to their subjects; as when we say of good, some belong to the soul, some to the body, some are externall. The fourth of subjects, according to their accidents; as of men, some are good, some ill, some indifferent. Division of the Genus into its Species, is first to be used, when we examine the essence [Page 61] of a thing, this cannot be done but by definitions.

Definition is made by Division in this manner, we must take the Genus of the thing to be defined, as that of man, living crea­ture; that we must divide by the next differences, descending to its species, as rationall, and irrationall, mortall, and immortall. Thus by adding the first difference to the Genus, is made the de­finition of man.

Of Analysis there are three kinds, one by which we ascend from Sensibles to primary Intelligibles, another whereby we ascend by demonstrates and subdemonstrates, to indemonstrable imme­diate propositions. The last, which from supposition proceedeth to those principles which are taken without supposition.

The first kind is thus, as if from that Beauty which is in the body, we should proceed to that of the minde, from that to an­other conversant in the offices of life, thence to that of Lawes, and so at last to the vast ocean of Beauty, that by these steps, as it were, we may arrive at the sight of the supream Beauty.

The second kind of Analysis is thus; We must suppose that which we seek, and consider those which are precedent, demon­strating them by progression, from inferiours to superiours, untill we arrive at that which is first and generally granted: From which, beginning anew, we return synthetically to that which was sought. As for example, I enquire whether the Soul be im­mortall, and supposing it to be so, I enquire whether it be al­waies moved. This being demonstrated, I again enquire, whe­ther that which is alwaies moved, is moved by its selfe, which being again demonstrated, we examine, whether that which is moved by its selfe, be the principall of motion. Lastly, whether a principall is ingenerate; this, as most certain, is admitted by all. That which is ingenerate, is also incorruptible; whence, as from a thing most certain, we collect this demonstration. If a Principle be ingenerate and incorruptible, that which is moved by its selfe is the principle of motion; but the soul is moved by its selfe, therefore the soul is incorruptible, ingenerate, and im­mortall.

The third kind of Analysis upon supposition is this; He who enquireth after a thing, first, supposeth that thing, then observes what will follow upon that supposition. If a reason for the sup­position be required, assuming another supposition, he enquireth, whether that which was first supposed, follow again upon an­other supposition: This he alwaies observeth; untill he come at last to that principle, which is not taken upon supposition.

Induction is every method by reason, which proceedeth either from like to like, or from Singulars to Universalls: It is of great efficacy to excite naturall notions.

CHAP. VI.
Of Propositions and Argumentations.

OF that speech which we call a Proposition, there are two kinds, Affirmation and Negation; Affirmation, as Socrates walketh; Negation, as Socrates walketh not.

Of Affirmative and Negative Propositions, some are Univer­sall, others Particular: A particular affirmative is thus, Some plea­sure is good; a particular negative is, some pleasure is not good. An universall affirmative, all dishonest things are ill; an universall negative, no dishonest thing is good.

Of Propositions, some are Categoricall, some Hypotheticall: the Categoricall are simple, as every just thing is good: Hypotheti­call import consequence or repugnance.

Syllogismes are used by Plato, either to consute or demonstrate; to consute, what is false by interrogation, to demonstrate, what is true by declaration. Syllogism is a speech, wherein somethings being laid down, another thing besides those which are laid down, is necessarily inferred from them.

Of Syllogismes some are Categoricall, some Hypotheticall, some Mixt: Categoricall are those whose sumptions and conclusions are simple propositions. Hypotheticall are those which consist of Hy­potheticall Propositions: Mixt, which conclude both.

Plato useth demonstrative arguments in those Dialogues, where­in he explaineth his own doctrine; Probable against Sophists and young men; Latigious against those who are properly called Eri­stick, as Eut [...]ydemus and Hippias.

Of Categoricall Syllogismes there are three figures; the first is, that wherein the common extream is first the praedicate, then the subject. The second, when the common extream is praedicate in both: the third, wherein the common extream is subject in both. Extreams are the parts of a Proposition, as in this, A man is a living creature, man and living creature are the extreams. Plato often argueth in the first, second, and third figures; in the first, as in Alcibiade;

Iust things are honest,
Honest things are good,
Therefore just things are good.

In the second, as in Parmenide; as,

That which hath no parts is neither straight nor crooked,
But whatsoever hath figure is either straight or crooked,
Therefore, whatsoever hath not parts, hath not figure.

[Page 63] In the third thus, in the same book,

Whatsoever hath figure is qualitative,
Whatsoever hath figure is finite,
Therefore whatsoever is qualitative is finite.

Likewise by Hypotheticall Syllogisme Plato often disputeth, chiefly in Parmenide thus,

If one hath not parts, it hath neither beginning, end, nor middle,
But if it have neither beginning, end, nor middle, it hath no bound, and if no bound, no figure,
Therefore if one hath no parts, it hath no figure.

In the Second Hypotheticall figure, ordinarily called the third, wherein the common extream is subject in both, he argueth thus,

If one hath not parts, it is neither straight nor crooked,
If it hath a figure, it is either straight or crooked,
Therefore if it hath no parts, it hath no figure.

In the Third figure by some called the second, wherein the common extream twice precedes the other two, he thus argues, in Phaedone,

If having the Knowledge of Equality we forget it not, we know, but if we forget it, we have recourse to Reminiscence, &c.

Mixt Syllogismes which conclude by consequence, he useth thus;

If one is whole and finite, that is, having beginning, middle and end; it hath figure also;

But the Antecedent is true,
Therefore the Consequent.

Of those also which overthrow by consequence, the differences may be gathered out of Plato.

Thus when a man hath diligently understood the faculties of the mind, the various differences of men, the severall kinds of reasoning which may be accommodated to this or that, and to what persons such and such reasons are to be used, he, meeting with an opportunity suiting with his purpose, will become a per­fect Orator.

The reasons of Sophismes and captious arguments are, if we ob­serve narrowly, expressed by Plato in Euthydemo, for there is de­clared which are in words, which in things, and how they are to be solved.

The ten Praedicaments are touched by Plato in Parmenide, and [Page 64] in his other Dialogues; the place of Etymologies is fully set down in Cratylo. To conclude, hee was singularly admirable for divisi­on and definition, wherein the greatest force of Dialectick con­sisteth.

The Summe of that which he faith in Cratylo, is this; Hee en­quireth whether Names are by the power and reason of Nature, or by imposition. He concludeth that the rectitude of names is by a certain imposition, not temerarious or casuall, but seeming to fol­low the nature of the things themselves; for rectitude of names is nothing but an imposition consonant to the nature of the thing: Hence every imposition of names is not sufficient for rectitude, neither the nature nor first found of the voice, but that which is composed of both; so as every name is conveniently and pro­perly applyed to the thing. For any name applyed to any thing will not signifie rightly, as if wee should im­pose the name of horse upon man. To speak is a kind of Acti­on; Not he that speaketh any way speaketh rightly, but he who speaketh so as the nature of the thing requireth. And for as much as expression of names is a part of speaking, as Noun is a part of Speech, to name rightly, or not rightly, cannot be done by any imposition of names, but by a naturall affinity of the name with the thing it self. So that he is a right imposer of names, who can expresse the Nature of the things in their names; for a name is an Instrument of the thing, not every inconsiderate name, but that which agreeth with its nature. By this benefit we communi­cate things to one another, whence it followeth, that it is no­thing else but an instrument accommodated to the teaching and discerning of a thing, as a weavers shuttle to his Webbe. It be­longeth therefore to a Dialectick to use names aright; for as a Weaver useth a shuttle rightly, knowing the proper use thereof after it hath been made by the Carpenter; so the Dialectick rightly useth that name which another hath made. And as to make a Helm, is the effice of a Shipwright, but to use it rightly of a Pilot; so he who frameth names, shall impose them rightly, if he do it as if a Dialectick were present, who understandeth the nature of those things which are signified by the names. Thus much for Dialectick.

CAAP. VII.
Of THEORETICK Philosophy.

WE come next to Theoretick Philosophy, whereof one part is Theologick, another Physick, a third Metaphysick. The end of Theologie is the knowledge of primary Causes: Of Physick, to understand the nature of the Universe, what kinde of creature man is, what place he holdeth in the world, whether there be a [Page 65] divine Providence over all things, to which there are other Gods subordinate, how men are in respect of them. The end of Mathe­matick is, to know the nature of a superficies and a solid, and to consider the motion and revolution of celestiall bodies, the con­templation whereof must first be proposed in briefe. Thus Plato useth to confirm the acutenesse of the minde, for it sharpeneth the understanding, and rendreth it more ready towards the con­templation of divine things. That which considereth Numbers, being likewise a part of Mathematicks, conferreth not a little to the understanding of things that are; It frees us from the errour and ignorance which attend sensible things, and condu­ceth to the right knowledge of the essence of things: It likewise renders a man expert in military affairs, especially towards the ordering of an Army by the science of Tacticks. Geometry also conferteth much towards the understanding of good it selfe, if a man pursue it not only for mechanicall dimension, but that he may by the helps thereof ascend to things which are not, busying himselfe about those which are in continuall generation and motion. Stereometry likewise is exceeding usefull, for after the second accretion followeth this contemplation, which holdeth the third room. Astronomy also is usefull as a fourth discipline, whereby we consider the motions of Heaven and the Starres, and the author of night and day, months and years. Thus by a familiar kinde of way, finding out him who made all these, and by these disciplines, as from certain rudiments or elements pro­ceeding to things more sublime. Likewise Musick is to be learnt, which relateth to hearing; for, as the eyes are created for Astro­nomy, so are the ears for Harmony: and as when we apply our selves to Astronomy, we are led from visible things, to the divine invisible [...]ffence; so when we receive the Harmony of voice in at our ears, from audible things, we ascend by degrees to those which are perceived by Intellect, unlesse we pursue Mathema­ticall disciplines to this end, the contemplation thereof will be imperfect, unprofitable, and of no value. We must therefore pre­sently proceed from those things which are perceived by the eyes and ears, to those which reason only discerneth; for, Mathe­matick is only a preface to divine things. They who addict them­selves to Arithmetick and Geometry, desire to arrive at the knowledge of that which is, which knowledge they obtain no otherwise then as by a dream, but really they cannot attain it, because they know not the principles themselves, nor those things which are compounded of the principles: neverthelesse, they conduce to those things which we mentioned; wherefore Plato will not have such disciplines to be called Sciences. Dia­lectick method proceeds in such manner, that by Geometricall Hypotheses, it ascendeth to first principles, which are not taken upon Hypotheses. For this reason he calleth Dialectick a Science; [Page 66] but, Mathematick, neither opinion, because it is more perspicu­ous then sensible things; nor a Science, because it is more obscure then first Intelligibles: But, the opinion of Bodies, the science of Primaries, the contemplation of Mathematicks.

He likewise asserteth Faith and Imagination: Faith, of things subject to sense; Imagination of Images and Species.

Because Dialectick is more efficacious then Mathematick, as being conversant about divine eternall things, therefore it is put before all Mathematicks, as a wall and fortification of the rest.

CHAP. VIII.
Of first matter.

VVE must next give a brief account of Principles, and those things which belong to Theologie, beginning at the first, and from thence descending to the creation of the world, and contemplation thereof, whereby at last we come to the crea­tion and nature of man.

To begin with matter; this he calleth the receptacle, nurse, mo­ther, place, and subject of all Images, affirming that it is touched with­out sense, and comprehended by an adulterate kinde of reason. The pro­perty thereof is to undergo the generation of all things, and to cherish them like a Nurse, and to admit all formes, being of her own nature expert of all form, quality, and specie [...]: These things are imprinted and formed in her as in a Table, and she admitteth their figures, not having of her selfe any figure or qualitie. For, she could not be fit to receive the impressions of severall forms, unlesse she were wholly void of all quality, and of those formes which she is about to receive. They who make sweet Unguents of Oyle, make choice of that oyle which hath the least sent; they who would imprint any figures in wax, first smooth and polish the matter, defacing all former figures. It is requisite that mat­ter capable of all things, if it must receive all formes, must not have the nature of any one of them, but must be subjected to all formes, without any qualitie or figure; and being such, it is nei­ther a body nor incorporeall, but a body potentially, as Brasse is potentially a Statue, because then it becomes a Statue, when it puts on the form thereof.

CHAP. IX.
Of Ideas.

WHereas matter is a Principle, Plato likewise introduceth other principles besides matter. One as an exemplar, Idaeas; another Paternall, God, the Father and Author of all things. Idaea, as to God, is the notion of God, as to us, the primary Intelli­gible, as to matter, a manner, as to this sensible world an Exem­plar, as to it selfe, Essence. For whatsoever is made with under­standing, must necessarily be referred to something, as if some­thing be made from another, as my picture from me, the exem­plar thereof must be presupposed, and if there be nothing eter­nall, every Artist conceiveth it first within himselfe, then trans­ferreth the formes thereof into matter.

They define Idaea an eternall exemplar of things which are according to Nature; for, the greater part of Platonists will not allow an Idaea to be of things that are made by Art, as of a Shield, or Lute, nor of things which are praeternaturall, as of a Feavour, or unnaturall Choler; nor of singulars, as of Socrates or Plato; nor of vile abject things, as of silth or strawes; nor of relatives, as of greater and longer: For Idaeas are the eternall notions of God, perfect in themselves.

That there are Idaeas, they prove thus: Whether God be Intel­lect or something Intelligent, he must have his Intelligibles, and those eternall and immovable; if so, there are Idaeas. For, if mat­ter it selfe be in it selfe void of measure, it is necessary that it re­ceive measure from some superiour, that is wholly remote from matter: But the Antecedent is true, therefore the consequent; and if so, there are Idaeas, certain measures void of matter. A­gain, if the world were not made by chance, it must only be made of something, but by something, and not only so, but after the likenesse of something; but, that after whose likenesse it was made, what is it but an Idaea? whence it followeth, that there are Ideas. Again, if intellect differ from true opinion, that which is intelligible differeth from that which is opinionable; and if so, there are intelligibles distinct from opinionables, wherefore there are first Intelligibles, as well as first Sensibles, whence we conclude there are Idaeas.

CHAP. X.
Of God.

VVE come next to speak of the third principle, which Plato, though he think it almost ineffable, conceiveth may bee express'd in this manner. If there are intelligibles, and those nei­ther sensibles, nor coherent with sensibles; but adherent to first Intelligibles, then are there first simple Intelligibles, as there are first sensibles; the Antecedent is true, therefore the consequent. But men subject to perturbation of sence, when they would con­template somthing intelligible, presently fall upon the thought of somthing sensible, whereby at the same time they imagine magnitude, or figure, or colour, and therefore cannot understand this sincerely: But the Gods being void of corporeall mixtion understand purely and sincerely. Now because the Intellect is better then the Soul, and that Intellect which is alwaies in act, and at once understandeth all things, is better then that Intellect which is in power, and of these, that is most excellent which is the cause ef the other, and superiour to all; This can be nothing else but God, whom we call the first, as being the Cause that the Intellect of the Word alwaies acteth. He, being himself immove­able, acteth upon the Intellect of the World, as the Sun upon the Eye, when it turn eth towards him. And as that which is desired moveth the Appetite it self remaining immoveable; so doth this Intellect move the Intellect of all Heaven. Now this first Intel­lect being most fair, must have the most fair Intelligible; but no­thing is fairer then it self, therefore it alwaies understandeth it self, and its own notions, which Act is called Operation.

Moreover, God is first, eternall ineffable, perfect in himself; that is, needing none, and ever perfect, that is, absolute in all times, and eve­ry way perfect, that is, absolute in every part, Divinity, Essence, Truth, Harmony, good. Neither do we so name these, to distinguish one from the other, but rather by them all to understand one. He is said to be Good, because he bestoweth his benefits upon all according to their severall capacities, and so is the cause of all goods. Fair, because he is in his essence both more and equall. Truth because, he is the principle of all truth, as the Sun of all light. And Father, as being cause of all things, and adorning the mind of Heaven and Soule of the World after his own exemplar and notions. For accor­ding to his own will hee filled all things with himself, exciting the Soul of the World, and converting it to himself, for hee is cause of that Intellect, which being adorned by the Father, a­dorneth also the Nature of all this World. He is likewise ineffa­ble, and as we said, can only be perceived by the mind, for he is neither genus nor species, nor difference, neither can any acci­dent [Page 69] be applyed to him. He is not ill, for that it were impiety to affirm; nor good, for so he should be termed if he were meanly or highly participant of goodnesse. Nor difference, for that cannot be made according to the notion of him, nor qualited, for he is not made that which he is by quality, nor perfected thereby. Nor void of quality, for he is not deprived of any quality that apper­taineth to him. Nor part of any thing, nor as a whole constituted of parts; nor as the same or divers, for nothing can happen to him whereby he may be distinguished from others; Neither doth he move, or is he moved.

Hence the first apprehension of him is by abstraction from these things, as wee understand a point by abstraction from sensi­bles, considering first a superficies: then a line, then a point. The second is by Analogie in this manner. As the Sun is to sight and visible things, himself not being sight, yet affording the one to see the other to be seen, so is the first Intellect to that Intellect, which is in our Soule, and to those things which it un­derstandeth. For, it self is not the Intellect, yet it perfecteth in these the Act of Intellection; to those it affordeth that they are understood, enlightning that truth which is in them. The third way to understand him is thus: when a man behold­eth that Beauty which is in Bodies, hee proceedeth to that which is in the Soul, then to that which is in Offices and Lawes: Lastly, to the vast Ocean of Beauty, after which, he considereth that which is good it self, amiable it self, expetible it self, which shineth like a light, and meeteth the Soul, that which ascends un­to it by these degrees. By this he comprehendeth God himself through reason of that excellence, which consisteth in adoration of him. He considereth God void of parts, for nothing was before him a part, and that of which something consisteth is precedent to that whereof it is a part, for a superficies is before a body, and a line before a superficies. Moreover God not having many parts, can neither be locally moved, nor altered by qualities. For if hee be altered, it must be done by himself, or some other; if by some other, that other must be of greater power then he; if by himself, it must be either to better or to worse, both which are absurd.

From all these it followeth that God is incorporeal, which may likewise be proved thus. If God were a body, he should consist of matter and form; for every body consisteth of matter, and its form joynes to that matter, which is made like unto the Idaea's, a [...]d in an ineffable manner participant of them; But that should consist of matter and form is absurd; for then he could not bee either simple or a Principle; therefore he is incorporeall. Again, if he be a body, he consisteth of matter, and consequently is either fire or air, or earth, or water, or somthing made out of these; but none of these is principle by it selfe; besides, he must then bee later then matter, as consisting of it, which being absurd, it is ne­cessary [Page 70] that God be incorporeall. Moreover, if he were a body, it would follow that he must be generable, corruptible, mutable, which to affirm of God were intollerable.

CHAP. XI.
Of Qualities.

THat Qualities are incorporeall, may be proved thus: every bo­dy is a Subject, quality is not a Subject but an accident, there­fore quality is not a body. Again, no body is in a subject; every quality is in a Subject, therefore quality is not a body. Again, quality is contrary to quality, but no body as no body is contrary to a body; therefore qualities are not bodies. To omit, that it is most agreeable to reason, that as matter is void of quality, so quality should be void of matter, aud if quality be void of matter, it must likewise be void of corporeity, for if qualities were bo­dies, two or three bodies might be together in the same place, which is absurd.

Qualities being incorporeal, the maker of them must be incorpo­reall also; moreover there can be no efficients, but in corporeals, for bodies naturally suffer and are in mutation, not continuing alwaies in manner nor persevering in the same state. For when­soever they seem to effect any thing, we shall find that they suffer it long before. Whence as there is something which wholly suffe­reth, so must there bee somthing which wholly acteth; but such only is incorporeall.

Thus much concerning principles as far they relate to Theolo­gy; we proceed next to Physicall contemplations.

CHAP XII.
Of the Causes, Generation, Elements, and Order of the World.

FOrasmuch as of sensible and singular things there must of ne­cessity be some examplars, viz. Idea's, of which are Sciences and Definitions (for besides all particular men, we con­ceive a man in our mind, and besides all particular horses a horse, and likewise besides all living creatures a living creature immortall and unbegotten: as from one seale are made many prints, and of one man there may be many Pictures, of all which, the Idaea it self is cause that they are such as it self is) it is ne­cessary [Page 71] that this Universe, the fairest Fabrick of Gods making, be so made by God, that in the making thereof, he look'd upon an Idaea as its exemplar, whilst by a wonderfull providence and most excellent design God applyed himselfe to the building of this frame, because he was good.

God therefore made it of all matter, which being before the generation of Heaven, disorderly scattered; he from a deformed confusion reduced to beautifull order, and adorned every way the parts thereof with sit numbers and figures, untill at last he so distinguish'd them as now they are, Fire and Earth to Air and Water, of which there were then only the footsteps, and a certain aptitude to admit the power of Elements, and so without any reason or order, they justled matter, and were justled again by matter.

Thus God framed the World of four entire Elements, of whole Fire and Earth, Water and Air, omitting no power or part of any of them. For he saith, it must be corporeall and ge­nerated, and subject to touch and sight; but without Fire and Earth nothing can be touched or seen; Wherefore justly he fra­med it of Fire and Earth, and because it was requisite, there should be some chain to unite these, there is a Divine chain, which according to the proportion of reason maketh one of it self, and those things which are united to it, and the World could not be plain (for then one medium would have served) but sphae­ricall, therefore there was need of two mediums to the consti­tution thereof. Betwixt Fire and Earth by the prescription of this reason is interposed Air and Water, that as Fire is to Air, so is Air to Water, and as Air is to Water, so is Water to Earth; and again, as Earth is to Water, so is Water to Air, and as Water is to Air, so is Air to Fire.

There being nothing remaining beyond the World, God made the World one, conformable to this Idaea, which is one. He like­wise made it such, as that is uncapable of sicknesse or age. For, be­sides that nothing can befall it whereby it may be corrupted, it is so sufficient to it self, that it hath not need of any exteriour thing. He bestowed upon it a Sphaericall figure, as being the fairest, the most capacious and aptest to motion, and because it needeth not hearing or sight, or the rest of the senses, he gave it not any Or­gans of sense. He denied all kinds of motion to be competible to it, except the circular, which is proper to the mind and to Wis­dom.

CHAP XIII.
Of the convenience of figures with the Elements and World.

THe world thus consisteth of two parts, a Soul and a Body; this visible and corruptible, that neither subject to sight nor touch: The power and constitution of each is different, the body consisteth of Fire, Earth, Water, and Aire; which foure, the maker of the Universe (there being untill then nothing more confused then the Elements) formed in a Pyramid, a Cube, an Octaedron, and an Icosaedron; but chiefly in a Dodecaedron. Matter, as far as it put on the figure of a Pyramid, became Fire, and moun­ted upward: For, that figure is the most apt to cut and to divide, as consisting of fewest triangles, and therefore is the rarest of all figures. As far as it is an Octaedron, it took the qualitie of Aire: VVhere it took that of an Icosaedron, it became Water; The figure of a Cube Earth, as being the most solid and staple of all the Ele­ments. The figure of a Dodecaedron, he used in the fabrick of the Universe. Superficies come nigher the nature of Principles then all these, for they are before solids. Of its nature, the two Parents (as it were) are two Triangles, most fair and rectangular; one a Scalenum, the other an Isosceles; a Scalenum is a triangle having one right angle, the other of two thirds, the last of one third. A Scalenum therefore is the element of a Pyramid, and an Octae­dron, and an Icosaedron. A Pyramid consisteth of foure triangles, having all sides equall to one another, each whereof is divided as we said, into six scalenous triangles. The Octaedors consist of eight like sides, whereof each is divided into six Scalenums. The Icosaeders of twenty in the same manner; but the element of a Cube is an Isosceles triangle, for foure such triangles concurring make a square, and six squares a Cube. God made use of a Do­decaedron in the construction of the Universe, whence there are twelve figures of living creatures in the Zodiack, whereof each is divided into thirty parts. Likewise in a Dodecaedron, which consisteth of twelve Pentagones, if each be divided into five tri­angles, there are in every one six triangles, so that in the whole Dodecaedron, there will be 360 triangles, as many as there are d [...] ­grees in the Zodiack.

When matter was put into those figures by God, first it was moved rudely without order, untill at last he reduced it to or­der, each being conjoyned to one another, and composed in due proportion: Neither are these distinct in place, but are in perpe­tuall motion, which they give likewise into matter. For, being straitned by the compasse of the world, and agitated by mutu­all [Page 73] justlings, they are driven, the rare alwaies into the region of the solid, whence nothing is left vacuous, nothing void of body. The inequality which remaineth amongst them causeth con­vulsion, for matter is agitated amongst them, and they recipro­cally by matter.

CHAP. XIV.
Of the Soul of the World, the Sphears and Stars.

FRom Bodies hee alloweth that we collect the powers of the Soul, for seeing that we discern all things by the Soul, hee justly placed the principles of all things therein, that whatsoever should occur, we might contemplate it by that which is of kin and neighbour unto it, and attribute an essence thereunto consonant to the functions. Then therefore he called one substance intelli­gible and indivisible; he placed another divisible amongst bodies, to signifie that the knowledge as well of the one as of the other may be had by Intellect. And knowing that in things intelligi­ble and sensible, there is identity and diversity, he fitly composed the Soul out of all these. For, either the like is known by the like, as the Pythagoreans hold, or, as Heraclitus the Naturalist, unlike al­waies by unlike.

That he would that the World should be generate, we must not so understand, as if there shall be any time wherein the world is not, but in as much as it alwaies perisheth in generation, and declareth, that there is some more excellent and principall cause of its essence.

The soul of the world which was from all eternity, was not made by God, but only adorned by him, in which respect he is some­times said to have made it, for that he exciteth it, and converteth the mind thereof, as out of a profound sleep unto himself, that beholding his intelligibles and affecting his notions, it should from thence receive Species and form; whence it is manifest, that the World was endued by God, both with a Soul and mind. For, in­tending it to be the best, he must have made it animate and in­telligent, since an animate thing is more excellent then an inani­mate, and an intelligent then an unintelligent; perhaps the mind also could not subsist without a Soul.

This Soul, being diffused from the Centre of the world to the extreams, compre [...]endeth the whole body of the World, so as it is extended throughout the Universe, and in that manner joyneth and conserveth the whole. The externall preside over the internall, for they are not divided, but these are divided into seven Circles; from the first distributed according to duple and [Page 74] triple Intervalls. That which is comprehended by the indivisible sphear, is correspondent to it, that which is divided to the other. For the motion of Heaven which comprehendeth all things, be­ing not uncertain, is one and ordinate, but that of the things within it, is changeable, varied by rising and setting, whence called Planetary. The outermost sphear moveth to the right hand from East to West, the innermost contrariwise, to the left hand from West to East, meeting the World.

God framed also the Stars and constellations; some fixed for the Ornament of Heaven and might, very many in number. The Erratick are seaven, serving for number and time, and the illumi­nation of all things; for time is an intervall of the motion of the World as an image of eternity, which is the measure of the state of the eternall World. The Planets are not of equall power, the Sun is the leader of all, who illuminateth and sheweth all things to the eye. Next the Moon, which in respect of her power hath the second place. The rest of the Planets, each according to their severall proportions. The Moon maketh the measure of a Month, in that space compleating its circle, and overtaking the Sun. The Sun measureth the Year, for running through the circle of the Zodiack, he compleateth the seasons of the year. Of the other starrs each hath its proper revolution, with which all men are not acquainted but only the Learned. By all those revolutions the absolute number of time is compleated, when coming all to the same point, they are in such order, as if we should imagine a right line to be drawn from the sphear of fixed stars to the Earth; the Centers of them all would be seen in that line.

There being seven Orbes in the Planetary sphear, the maker of the World, framed in them seven conspicuous bodies of matter for the most part fiery, and inserted them into the sphears belong­ing to the other Erratick Circle. The Moon he placed in that Circle which is next the Earth, the Sun in the second, the Mor­ning-star, and the sacred Star of Mercury, in that Orbe which is equall in swiftnesse with the Sun. The rest higher, each in his proper sphear. That of Saturn the slowest of all, he placed in that Orbe which is next to the sixed stars. Second to this is that which they call the sphear of Iupiter, next that of Mars; the eighth which is the Supream power includeth all. These are all living intel­ligent Creatures, and Gods endued with a sphericall figure.

CAAP. XV.
Of Daemons and Elements.

THere are other Daemons also which we may call Intelligent Gods, in each of the Elements partly visible, partly invisi­ble, in the aether, fire, air and water, that there be not any part of the World void of Soul, or of an animate creature more ex­cellent then humane nature. Below these are all earthly subluna­ry things; God is maker of the World, of all Gods and Daemons. This Universe by his Divine Wil shall not be dissolved. Over the rest his Sons preside, who by his command and example order whatsoever they do. By these lo [...]s, nocturnall visions, dreams, Ora­cles, and whatsoever men referre to divination is artificially wrought.

The Earth is fixed in the midst of all, round about the Axle­tree which passeth through the midst of the World. It is the ob­server of night and day, the most antient of all Gods in Heaven. Next the Soul of the World it affordeth us most nutriture; about it the Heavens move, and it self is a kind of Starre: It remaineth in its proper place, which by reason of its even weight is the Centre; the aether ext [...]riour is divided into the sphear of fixed Starrs, and that of Planets. Next to these is the Air; in the midst the Earth with its humidity.

CHAP. XVI.
Of the younger Gods makers of men.

AFter that all these were framed, there remained three kinds of living Creatures which were to be mortall, Volatile, Aqua­tile, and Terrestriall; the generation whereof he committed to his Son, left if he himself had begotten them, they should have been immortall as well as the rest. They borrowing some little parts from first matter for a certain time, formed mortall living Crea­tures, and because of Mankind, as being next to the Gods, both the Father of all things, and his Sons likewise have a particular care, the Maker of all things sent down himself their Soules into the earth equall in number to the Starrs, & having imposed each one his proper Star as a vehiculum, like a Law-giver, he pronounced decrees unto them, that he himself might be inculpable, which [Page 76] was that there should arise mortall affections from the body, first senses, next pleasure, then grief, and fear, and anger, which those soules that should overcome, and not suffer themselves to be transported by them, should justly be accounted Victors, and at the last return to their proper Star, though they which should be transported by injustice, should in the second generation under­goe the lives of women, wherein if they ceased not from their wickednesse, they should at last transmigrate into the Nature of brute Beasts, the end of these Labours shall then be, when they have overcome the innate affections of the body, and then return to their proper habit.

CHAP. XVII.
Of the Body, and parts of man, and Powers of the Soul.

THe Gods first formed man of Earth, Fire, Air, and Water, borrowing some parts from matter, (to be restored in their due time) which they so connected to one another by secret ties, as that of all these they framed one body. The most excellent part of the soul that was sent down from Heaven, they placed in the Head, for which as a manured Field they prepared the Brain. About the face they disposed Organs proper for sense; Marrow they made of smooth straight triangles, of which the E­lements were formed, that it should be the Origine of prolifick seed. Benes they formed of Marrow and Earth, the Earth moist­ned, and often dipt in Water and Fire. Flesh is compounded of salt and sharpe, as of a kind of ferment. Marrow they enclosed with bones, bones with sinewes instead of chaines, that by these in­flexions the knitting of the joints might be plyant. Over these as a cover is extended the Skin, partly white, partly black, for beauty and use. Of these likewise consist the internall bowells, and the belly, and the intestines, every where rolled about it. And from the mouth above the aspera arteria, and the oesophagus, of which one commeth down to the stomack, the other to the Lungs. Meat is digested in the belly by spirit and heat, and thence distributed to the whole body according to their severall consti­tutions. The two veines passing along the spine of the Back, meet and crosse at the head, where they spread into many parts.

Thus when the Gods had made man, and given him a soul as the Mistresse of his body, they placed the principall part of that soul to which Reason appertaineth, in the head. Whence is de­rived marrow and sinewes, and by the different affection of this, [Page 77] the minde likewise is altered. Moreover they gave him senses, as the attendants of Reason, and the power of judging and contemplating with Reason. Those parts of the soul, which are moved by meaner affections, they seated in lower places; the ira­scible part in the heart, the concupiscible about the belly, and the parts next to the Navell, of which hereafter.

CHAP. XVIII.
Of sight.

AFter that the Gods had placed the eyes (conduits of light) in the face, they included in them a fiery light, which being smooth and in some manner thick, they conceived of kin to diur­nall light. This breaketh forth every where at the Eyes, but chief­ly through the Eye-balls, as being there most pure and clear. This agreeing with the externall light, as like with like affordeth the sense of sight, whence in the night, when the light vanisheth and is obscured, this ray of ours no longer mingleth with the im­mediate air; but, on the contrary, withdrawing it self inwards, smooths and diffuses the motions that are in us, and so bringeth on sleep, whereby the eyelids are shut. If it bring much rest, the sleep is little disturb'd with dreams, but if there remain any moti­ons behind, we are troubled with many illusions. In this manner phantasies, whether true or false, arise. Of the same Nature are images, which we see in glasses, or other smooth pellucid bodies, which exist only by reflection. For, as the glasse is concave or convex, or oblong, the object is differently represented to the be­holder. The light being reflected to other parts, those which are dispersed in convex meet in the concave, for in some, the right and left sides seem quite inverted, in others alike; in others, those which are upwards seem downwards, and on the contrary, those which are downwards, upwards.

CHAP. XIX.
Of the rest of the Senses.

HEaring is given for the perception of voice, it ariseth from a motion made about the head, and setteth in the liver. Voice is that which passeth through the ears, brain, and bloud to the [Page 78] Soul. A sharp voice is that which is moved swiftly, deep which slowly, great which much, small which little.

Next followeth the sense proper to the Nostrills, perceptible of odour. Odour is an affection which passeth from the veines of the Nostrills to the parts of the Navell. The Species thereof have no name, except the two that are most common, pleasant, and unpleasant, commonly called sweet and stinking. All Odour is more thick then Air, more thin then Water; for Odour is pro­perly said to be of those things which have not yet received per­fect mutation, but consist of a communion of Air and Water, as smoke and mists. For, by the resolution of these into one another, the sense of smelling is made.

Tast was made by the Gods to be the judge of different sa­vours. Hence are veines extended to the Heart, by whcih several [...]avours are examined. These Veins by dilating or contracting themselves severally according to the Sapors presented to them, discern their differences. The differences of Sapours are seven; sweet, sharp, sowre, picqueant, salt, acid, bitter; the Nature of sweet Sapour is contrary to all the rest, for by its power it sooth­eth and pleaseth the moisture of the tongue, whereas of the rest. some disturb and [...]dispell it, as acute Sapors, some heat, and fly upwards, as the hot; others being abstersive, dissolve it, as the bit­ter; others are by degrees purgative and abstersive, as the salt. Of these some contract the passages; they which do it more roughly, are called acid, they which more gently, austere.

The sense of touching was formed by the Gods to discern hot and cold, soft and hard, light and heavy, smooth and rough, and to iudge the differences of each of these; Yielding bodies, we call those which yield to the touch, resisting those which yield not; this proceedeth from the bases of bodies, those which have large bases are firm and solid, these which have narrow bases are yielding, soft, and easily changed. Rough is that which is uneven and hard, smooth that which is plain and thick: As warm and cold qualities are most opposite, so they proceed from the most different causes. That which cutteth by the acutenesse and rough­nesse of its parts, begetteth a hot affection, that which is more thick, in penetration, a cold, whilst the more rare are expelled, and the more dense compelled to penetrate into their room. Thence ariseth a concussion and trepidation, and (an affection which is from hence begotten in bodies,) rigor.

CHAP. XX.
Of Heavy and Light.

HEavy and light ought not to be defined by higher or lower place, nothing is high or low; for Heaven being absolutely round, and its convexe extremity even, we cannot term any thing higher or lower; yet may we call that heavy, which is hardly drawn to a place different from its Nature, light which easily; or, heavy is that which consisteth of most parts, light of fewest.

CHAP. XXI.
Of Respiration.

WE breath after this manner. The externall Air compasseth us round about, and passeth in at our mouth, nostrills, and invisible Pores of the body, where being warmed, it floweth back again to the externall Air, by that part out of which it flowed, it again thrusteth the externall Air to the interiour. Thus there is an unintermitted succession of inspiration and expiration.

CHAP. XXII.
Of the Causes of Diseases.

OF Diseases Plato alledgeth many causes. The first is defect or excesse of the Elements, and a change into places which agree not with their Nature. The second a preposterous genera­tion of homogeneall parts, as when of flesh is made blood, or choler, or flegme; for all these are nothing but colliquation, or putrefaction. [...]legm is a new coll [...]quation of flesh; sweat and tears, are a kind of Serum of flegm. Flegm intercepted in the outward parts, begetteth Scurse and Leprosie, in the inward being mingled with Melancholy, it causeth the falling-sicknesse. Sharp, and salt flegme engender those affections which consist in rigour, for all bodies that are inflamed with choler must suffer that. A world of various diseases are engendred by choler and [Page 80] flegm. As concerning feavours; Plato conceiveth that a continu­all feavour proceedeth from excesse of fire, a quotidian from excesse of air, a tertian from excesse of water, a quartan from ex­cesse of Earth. It remaineth that we here begin to speak of the Soul, though not without some danger, of repeating the same things.

CHAP. XXIII.
Of the three principall powers of the Soul.

THE Gods, the makers of mortall Creatures, having received from the first God the Soul of Man immortall, added unto it two mortall parts; yet left the immortall divine part might be infected with mortall extravagances, they seated as Prince of all in the tower, as it were of the body, the Head, in figure resem­bling the Universe. The rest of the body they appointed as a ve­hiculum to serve this. To each mortall part they assigned its pro­per habitation, placing the irascible in the heart, the concupisci­ble in the midst betwixt the Navell and the Diaphragme, bind­ing it there as a furious savage Beast. They framed the Lungs in respect of the heart, soft, bloodlesse, hollow, and spungy, that the heart being somthing heated with anger, might thereby be refrigerated and asswaged; the Liver to excite and allay the con­cupiscible part, having both sweetnesse and bitternesse, as likewise for the clearing of divinations which are given by dreams: for as much as in it by reason of its smoothnesse, shining and brightnesse, the power which proceedeth from the mind doth shine forth. The Spleen was made for the benefit of the Liver, to purge and cleanse it; so that those corruptions, which by some diseases, are contracted about the Liver, retire thither.

CHAP. XXIV.
Of the distinction of the parts of the Soul.

THat the Soul and parts thereof according to their proper faculties are threefold; every part appointed by reason their severall places, is manifest from hence. Those things which are separated by Nature, are divers; passionate and reasonable are separate by nature; this being conversant in Intelligibles, that [Page 81] in things sad or joyful, to omit the passive part which is common likewise to bruit Beasts. Now these two being distinct by Nature, must likewise be distinguished by place, because for the most part they disagree, and are repugnant to one another; but no­thing can be repugnant to it self, neither can those things which are contrary to one another consist together in the same. In Me­dea anger seemeth to contest thus with reason;

I know what I intend is ill,
But anger over-rules my will.

In Laius, when he ravished Chrysippus, concupiscence contested with Reason; for so he saith;

Men to this crime the Gods confine,
To know the ill that they decline.

That the rationall power is different from the Passive, is evi­dent from this, that they ordered by severall means, one by disci­pline, the other by habituall practice.

CHAP. XXV.
Of the Immortality of the Soul.

THat the Soul is immortall Plato proveth by these Arguments. The Soul to every thing, wherein it is, conferreth life, as be­ing naturally innate in her self, but that which conferreth life to others never admitteth death, but what is such is immortall.

The Soul being immortall, is likewise incorruptible, for it is an incorporeall essence which cannot be changed substantially, and is only perceptible by the Intellect, not by the eyes, and is uniform. Hence it must be simple, neither can be at any time dissolved or corrupted. The body is contrary, for it is subject to sight and other senses, and as it is compounded, so shall it again be dissolved, and it is multiform. When the Soul adhereth to those things which are preceptible by Intellect, it acquieseeth; Now to that by whose presence she is disturbed, she cannot possi­bly be like, wherefore she is more like to those things which are perceptible by Intellect; but what is such is by nature incorrup­tible and perishable.

Again, the Soul naturally doth preside over the body, not the body over the Soul, but that which by nature ruleth and com­mandeth is of kin to Divinity, wherefore the Soul being next un­to God, must be immortall, not subject to corruption.

[Page 82] Again, Contraries which have no medium, not by themselves, but by some accident are so ordered by Nature, that they may be mutually made of one another. But that which men call life is contrary to that which they call death; as therefore Death is a separation of the Soul from the body; so islife a conjuncti­on of the Soul with the body, praeexistent to the Body. But if she be praeexistent, and shall subsist after the body, it followeth that she be sempiternall, for there cannot any thing be imagined whereby she may be corrupted.

Again, if learning be Reminiscence, the Soul must be immor­tall, but that it is reminiscence we prove thus: Learning cannot otherwise consist then by remembrance of those things we for­merly know. For, if from Singulars we understand Universalls, how could we discourse by singulars which are infinite? or how from a few perceive Universalls? we should therefore necessarily be deceived, as if we judged that only to be a living Creature which breatheth; or how could the notions themselves have the reason of principles. By reminiscence therefore, from some few which we have conceived in our mind, we understand the rest, and from some occurrent particulars we remember those which we knew long before, but were then given over to oblivion, when the Soul first descended into the Body.

Again, if the Soul be not corrupted by its own proper ill, nei­ther can it be destroy'd by that or any other, nor simply by any ill, and being such, shall remain uncorrupted.

Again, that which is moved in it self, as being the principle of motion in those things which are moved, is alwaies moved; that which is such is immortall; but the Soul is moved of it self, that which is moved of it self is the principle of all motion and gene­ration; and a principle is expert of generation and corruption, wherefore the Soules of men and of the Universe it self are such, for both partake of the same mistion. He affirmeth the Soul to be moveable in her self, because it hath an innate life, alwaies ope­rating by its power.

That rationall Soules are immortall, may clearly be asserted out of Plato; but whether the irrationall be such seemeth doubt­full; yet is it probable that being guided only by Phantasie, not endued with reason or judgement, neither do they contem­plate any thing, or discern, or collect from it, nor can they dis­cern ills, but generally understand nothing, nor are of the same nature with those Soules which have Intellect and Reason, but are capable of dying and being corrupted. For as much as they are immortall, it followeth that they are put into bodies, being planted into the formed Nature of Embrio's, and transmigrate into severall bodies as well humane as others, either according to some certain numbers which they expect, or by the wil of the Gods, or for intemperance of life, or for love of the Body. For [Page 83] the Body and Soul have a kind of affinity, as Fire and Brimstone.

Moreover the Souls of the Gods have a dijudicative faculty, called Gnostick, and impulsive to some action, called Pa­rastatick, which faculties being likewise in humane Soules, be­come changed as soon as they come into the bodie, the assistent into the concupiscible, the impulsive into the Irascible.

CHAP. XXVI.
Of Fate and Free-will.

Concerning Fate Plato held thus. All things are in fate, yet all things are not decreed by Fate. For Fate, though it be like a Law, yet it useth not to speak in this manner, that this man shall do thus, and to that man, that shall befall (which were to pro­ceed into infinite, there being an infinite generation of men, and infinite accidents happening daily to them; besides that, this would take away our free-will, our praise or dispraise, and whatsoever is of that kind) but rather thus; Whatsoever Soul chooseth such a life, and doth such things, these shall follow, the Soul therefore is free, and it is left within its power to do or not to do, without any compulsion or necessity. But that which followeth the action is performed by Fate. As from Paris's ra­vishing of Helena, (which it is within his power to do or not to do) shall follow that the Grecians contend with the Trojans a­bout Helena. Thus Apollo foretold Laius; ‘If thou beget a Son, that Son shall kill thee.’

In the Oracle are comprehended both Laius and the begetting of a Son, that which shall follow upon the begetting of the Son depends on Plato.

That which may be done is of a middle kind betwixt true and false, and being so indefinite by Nature: that which is in our power, is carried on as it were unto it. That which is done by our election, is presently either true or false; that which is in power, is different from that which is said to be in habit and act. That which is in power declareth an aptitude in that thing, wherein the habit is not yet perfect. So a boy may be said to be a Gramma­rian, a Musician, a Carpenter in power. He is in habit of one or more of these when he hath acquired that habit. He is said to be in act, when he operateth according to that acquired habit. That which we call possible to be done is none of these. Indeterminate is that which is in our power, and to which part soever it incli­neth, will be true or false.

CHAP. XXVII.
ETHICK.
Of the chief Good, and of Virtues.

WE must next give a short account of Plato's Ethicks. That which is worthy of all honour, and is the Supreame good, he conceived not easie to be found, and if found, not safe to be declared. For this reason, he communicated the contempla­tion of the chief good to very few, and those of his most intimate acquaintance, of whom his judgement made choice for this pur­pose. But our good, if we examine his books dillgently, we shall find he placed in the knowledge of the first good, which may rightly be called God, and the first mind. For all things which men call good, he conceiveth to be called good in this respect, for as much as they derive somthing from that good, as all sweet and hot things are termed such from some participation of the first sweet, and first hot. Of those things which are in us, only the mind and reason have a similitude of the first good. Wherefore he calleth our good, Fair, Venerable, Amiable, Proporti­onate, and lastly Beatitude. Of those which are commonly call­ed good, as health, beauty, strength, there is none good, unlesse it be employed towards the practise of Vertue. For being separa­ted from Vertue, they are like matter only, and to those who make ill use of them only ill. Yet these Plato sometimes calleth mortal goods. Beatitude he reckoneth not amongst humane goods, but amongst the divine and immortall. Whence he asserteth that the souls of true Philosophers are replenish'd with vast admirable goods, and after the dissolution of their mortall body, are admit­ted to the table of the Gods, and with them walk over and sur­vey the field of Truth, because they did see they used the utmost endeavours of their Soules to know it, and esteemed it the most precious of all things, by the benefit whereof they illustrated and excited their mind as a lost or blinded sight, preferring the con­servation thereof before many corporeall eyes. Foolish men are like those who lead all their life in some Cave under ground, where they never saw the light of the Sun, but only some empty thin shadows of such bodies as are with us upon the Earth, which seeing, they think they see true bodies. As these, if ever they should be brought out of darknesse into the clear light, would questionlesse despise all things which they saw before, and them­selves much more, as having been absolutely deceived; So they who rise up out of the darknesse of this life to those things which are divine and fair, in all likelyhood will contemn what be­fore they most esteemed, and love more vehemently this contem­plation. [Page 85] Thus it appeareth, that only what is good is honest, and that Vertue sufficeth to Felicity,

Moreover, that good and fair consist in knowledge of the first good, he declareth in whole volumes. As concerning those which are good by participation, he speaketh thus in his first Book of Laws. Good is twofold, Humane and Divine, &c. If anything be disjoyned from the first good, and void of the essence thereof, that is called good by the foolish, which in Euthydemo, he affirm­eth to be a greater ill to the Possessor.

That he conceiveth the Vertues to be eligible in themsel [...]es, is manifest, in as much as he affirmeth that only to be good which is honest, which he demonstrateth in many Dialogues, particu­ly in those of the Common-wealth.

Hence he conceiveth that man to be most happy and blessed, who hath attained the Science we mentioned; yet not in respect of the honours which attend such a person, nor of any other re­ward; for though he be unknown to all men, and such things, as are commonly accounted Ills, as, dishonour, banishment and death happen unto him; he is notwithstanding happy. On the contrary, a man who wants this knowledge, though he possesse all things commonly esteemed good, riches, power, health, strength, and Beauty, he is nothing the more happy.

He asserteth an ultimate end, conformable to all these which is to be made like unto God, as far as Humanity is capable of be­ing such. This he expounds variously, somtimes as in Theaeteto) he affirms our resemblance to God to consist in being prudent, just, and holy; wherefore we must endeavour to fly with all possible celerity from hence to those. This flight is the resem­blance to God, as much as is possible: The similitude consisteth in Prudence, Justice, and Sanctity; somtimes in Justice only, as in his last Book of the Common-wealth. For a man is never deser­ted by God, whilst he endeavoureth to be just, and by the very act of Vertue, as much as man is capable of, he is rendred like unto God. In Phaedone he asserteth, that this resemblance to God is acquired by Temperance and Justice, thus. Are not they blessed and happy, and from hence shall go into the best place, who have practised the popular civill Vertue which they call Temperance and Iustice? A­gain, somtimes he affirmed, that the end of life is to be like unto God, somtimes to follow God, as when hee saith, God indeed according to the old saying, containing the beginning, midale and end of all things, &c. Somtimes he joyneth both toge­ther, as when he saith, The Soul following God, and being rendred like unto him, &c. The principle of Utility is good it self; but this is said of God, therefore the end conformable to the principle, is to become like unto God, to the Celestiall, or rather supercelestiall God, who hath not Vertue, but is more excellent then all Ver­tue. Wherefore it is rightly said, that [...]; misery, is a per­versity [Page 86] of the Genius, [...], Beatitude is a good habit of the Genius.

This similitude to God we shall obtain, if we enjoy convenient nature; in our manner, education and sense, according to Law, and chiefly by reason, and discipline, and institution of wisdom, withdrawing our selves as much as possible from humane affairs, and being conversant in those things only which are understood by contemplation: the way to prepare, and, as it were, to cleanse the Demon that is in us, is to initiate our selves into higher disciplines, which is done by Musick, Arithmetick, Astronomy and Geome­try, not without some respect of the body by Gymnastick, where­by it is made more ready for the actions both of Warre and Peace.

CHAP. XXVIII.
The definition and kinds of Virtue.

VErtue being divine, is the perfect and best affection of the Soul, which adorneth a man, and rendreth him more excel­lent and ready, as well for speech as action, whether he do it a­lone or with others.

Of the Vertues, some are placed in the rationall part, some in the irrationall. For whereas the Nature of the rationall part is one, that of the irascible another, that of the concupiscible ano­ther, the perfection of these must likewise be different. That of the rationall is Prudence, of the irascible, Fortitude, of the concupis­cible, Temperance.

Prudence is the Science of things, Good, Bad, and betwixt both.

Temperance is an apt moderation of desires and appetites; when when we call Temperance a moderation and obedience, we mean only this, that it is a faculty causing all appetites to be subjected unto it, in decent order, and submisse obedience to be comman­ded by nature. This is the rationall part.

Fortitude is a lawfull observation of a command difficult, or not difficult, that is, it is a faculty which keepeth a lawfull precept.

Iustices is an agreement amongst all these, which causeth that the three parts of the Soul agree with one another, and that each be worthily conversant in those things which are proper, and be­long unto it.

Thus it is a common intire perfection of these three Vertues, Prudence, Fortitude and Temperance, in such manner that reason commandeth, and the rest of the parts, each according to its se­verall [Page 87] property, are restrained by Reason, and obey it.

Hence it followeth, that the Vertues are mutally consequent to one another; Fortitude being the conservation of a lawfull precept, is likewise conservative of right reason. Right reason proceedeth from Prudence; Prudence cohereth with Fortitude, for it is the knowledge of good things, but no man can discern that which is good, if he be distracted by fear, or involved in the like troubles. In like manner, neither can any man be wise, and intemperate, for then he is overcome by affections. If a man do somthing contrary to reason, Plato affirmeth he doth through ig­norance and imprudence, so that can be prudent that is intempe­rate or fearfull. Whence it followeth, that the perfect Vertues cohere to one another, and are inseparable.

CHAP. XXIX.
Of Virtues, Vices, and their differences.

THe gifts of Nature and progress in them are called Vertues also, by reason of their similitude with the perfect Vertues, assuming the same name. In this sence we call all souldiers stout, and sometimes call imprudent and rash persons stout, when we speak not of the perfect Vertues, for the perfect neither increase nor decrease; but Vices are intended and remitted. One man is more imprudent and more unjust then another, neither do all the vices follow one another, for they are certain contraries which are not competible to the same. Such is fury to Cowar­dice, and prodigality to covetousnesse, nor can there be any man at once possessed of all Vices, no more then a body tormented by all diseases.

Moreover, there is a mean affection which inclineth not plainly either to Vice or Vertue; for it is not necessary that all men must be good or bad; they are such, who have arrived at the height of these; for it is not easie to passe suddenly from Vertue to Vice, because betwixt extreames there is a great intervall and distance.

Of Vertues some are principall, others concomitant; princi­pall are those which are in the rationall part of the Soul, and by which the other Vertues are perfected. Concomitant are those which are in the other part which are subject to Affections. These act honest things according to Reason, not that which is in them, for they have none, but that which they receive from Prudence, which is confirmed in them by custom and exercise.

Now for as much as neither science nor art consisteth in any [Page 88] part of the soul, but in the rationall, those vertues which are in the other part, that is subject to affections, cannot be taught, be­cause they are neither Arts nor Sciences, neither have they a pe­culiar Doctrine. Prudence is a Science, which prescribeth unto every one what is proper to him, as a Pilot, or Master of a Ship, to inferiour ignorant Sailors. The like in a common Souldier and a Generall.

For as much as Ills are intended and remitted, offences cannot be equall, but some must be greater, others lesser, for which rea­son, they, who make Lawes, punish some more gently, other more severely. And though Vertues are certain Heights, as being per­fect, and like unto that which is right, yet in another respect they are called mediocrities, because all or the most of them are placed betwixt two Vices, whereof one sinneth in excesse, the other in defect; as on the one side of Liberality is Covetousnesse, on the other Prodigality. For in affections we recede from the mean, when we relinquish that which is placed in Vertue, either by excesse or defect. But neither he, who beholding his Parents wronged is no­thing moved thereat, nor he who is incens'd at the smallest mat­ters void of passion or moderate, but the quite contrary. He who at the death of his Parents grieveth not, is void of passion; He who destroyeth himself with grieving, is overpassionate and im­moderate; he who grieveth moderately, is moderately passio­nate. In like manner, he, who feareth upon all occasions, and more then needs, is timerous; he who feareth nothing is rash; He only is stout that can keep a mean betwixt fear and rashnesse; the like in all the rest. And for as much as that which is mean in af­fections is likewise best, and mediocrity is nothing but a mean betwixt excesse and defect, there are these Vertues termed Medi­ocrities, because in humane perturbations and passions they affect us a middle kind of way.

CHAP. XXX.
That Vertue is voluntary, Vice involuntary.

VErtue being chiefly of those things which are in our power, not compulsive (for it could not deserve praise, if it came either by nature or divine decree) it followeth, that Vertue is voluntary, begotten by a servent, generous, and firm impulsion.

From this, that Vertue is voluntary, it followeth that Vice is involuntary. For, who, in the most excellent part of himselfe, would ever voluntarily choose that which is the greatest of all Ills? When a man is carried on to Vice, he first inclineth to it, not as if it were ill, but good, and if he fall into ill, doubtlesse, he [Page 89] is deceived with thinking, that this way by a lesser ill, he may arrive at a greater good, and goeth in this manner unwillingly to it. For, it is not possible, a man should pursue ill as it is ill, without any hope of good, or, fear of a greater ill. All ill things therefore, which an ill man doth, are involuntary; for, injustice being involuntary, to act unjustly is so much more involuntary, as the action of Vice is beyond the idle habit thereof. Yet, though wicked actions are involuntary, the wicked neverthelesse ought to be punished, and that not after one manner; but, according to the variety of hurt which they do to those they wrong. That which is involuntary consisteth in ignorance of perturbations, all which may be diverted, either by reason, or civill custome, or diligence.

CHAP. XXXI.
Of Love and Friendship.

FRiendship, properly so termed, is made by a mutuall recipro­call benevolence. This is, when either is as much concerned for the happinesse of the ot [...]er, as of his own, which equality is preserved only by similitude of manners: For, the like is friend to its like, if they be both moderate; but, the intemperate cannot agree, either with themselves, or the moderate.

There are other things which are thought friendships, but are are not such, in which there appeareth some shew of vertue. Of these, is the naturall goodwill of Parents to their Children, and of Kindred one to another, as also that which is called civill and sociable: These are not alwaies accompanyed with mutual be­nevolence. Likewise, the amatory art is a kind of friendship. That which is honest is proper to a generous soul, dishonest, to a per­verse; mean, to one meanly affected. For, as the habit of the ra­tionall soul is three-fold, right, dishonest, and mean; so many different kinds are there of love, which appeareth most clearly in the difference of the ends they propose unto themselves. The dishonest aimes only at corporeall pleasure, and therefore is ab­solutely bruitish. The honest considereth the minde only, as far as vertue appeareth in it. The mean desireth both the beauty of the soul and of the body; of which love, he who is worthy, is mean likewise; that is, neither absolutely honest nor dishonest. Hence that love which aimeth only at the body, ought to be tearmed a Demon (rather then a Deity, which never descendeth to an human bodie) transmitting divine things to men, and human to God.

Of the three kinds of love, that which is proper to a good man, [Page 90] being remote from vicious affections, is artificiall, whence it is placed in the rationall part of the soul. The contemplations thereof are these, to discern who is worthy of love, and to con­tract friendship with him, and enjoy it: This discernment is made from his aimes or desires, whether they are generous, and dire­cted to a good end, or violent and servent. The contraction, or acquisition of friendship, is made, not by wanton excessive praise, but rather by reprehension, shewing him, that it is not conveni­ent he should live in that manner he doth; when he enjoyeth the love of him whom he affects, he must alwaies exhort him to those things, by exercise whereof, he may arrive at perfect habit. Their end is that of lover and beloved, they may at last become friends.

CHAP. XXXII.
Of Passions.

IN justice is so great an ill, that it is better to suffer wrong then to do wrong; for one belongeth to a wicked man, the other to a weak man: both are dishonest, but to do wrong is worse, by how much it is more dishonest. It is as expedient that a wicked man be punished, as that a sick man should be cured by a Physici­an; for all chastisement is a kind of medicine for an offending Soul.

Since the greater part of Vertues are conversant about passi­ons, it is necessary that we define passion. Passion is an irratio­nall motion of the Soul, arising out of some good or ill; it is call­ed an irrationall motion, because neither judgments nor opini­ons are passions; but motions of the irrationall parts of the Soul. For in the irrationall part of the Soul, there are motions, which though they are done by us, are yet nothing the more in our pow­er. They are often done therefore contrary to our inclination and will; for somtimes it falleth out, that though we know things to be neither pleasing nor unpleasing, expetible nor avoidable, yet we are drawn by them, which could never be if such passions were the same with Judgement. For we reject judgement when we disapprove it whether it ought to be so or otherwise. In the definition is added, arising from some good or some ill, because of that which is mean or indifferent betwixt these, no passion is ever excited in us. All passions arise from that which seemeth good or ill. If we see good present, we rejoice, if future, we de­sire. On the conrrary, if ill be present, we grieve, if imminent, we fear.

The simple affections, and, as it were, elements of the rest are [Page 91] two; Pleasure and Grief; the rest consist of these. Neither are fear and desire to be numbred among the principall passions, for he who feareth, is not wholly deprived of pleasure, nor can a man live the least moment, who despaireth to be freed or eased of some ill. But it is more conversant in grief and sorrow, and therefore he, who feareth, sorroweth. But he who desireth, like all those who desire or expect somthing, is delighted; insomuch as he is not absolutely confident; and hath not a firm hope he is grieved. And if desire and fear are not principall passions, it will doubtlesse follow, that none of the other affections are simple; as anger, love, emulation and the like; for in these, Pleasure and Grief are manifest, as consisting of them.

Moreover of Passions, some are rough, others mild, the mild are those, which are naturally in men, and if kept within their bounds, are necessary and proper to man, if they exceed, vitious. Such are Pleasure, Grief, Anger, Pitty, Modesty; for it is proper to man to delight in those things which are according to Nature, and to be grieved at their contraries. Anger is necessary to repell and punish an injury. Mercy agreeth with Humanity. Modesty teacheth us to decline sordid things. Other passions are rough, and praeternaturall, arising from some depraved or perverse custom. Such are excessive laughter, joy in the misfortunes of others, ha­tred of Mankind. These, whether intense or remisse, after what manner soever they are, are alwaies erroneous, and admit not a­ny laudable mediocrity.

As concerning Pleasure and Grief, Plato writeth thus. These passions are excited in us by Nature. Grief and sorrow happen to those who are moved contrary to Nature; Pleasure to those who are restored to the proper constitution of their Nature. For he conceiveth the naturall state of man to consist in a mean betwixt Pleasure and Grief, not moved by either, in which state we live longest. He asserteth severall kinds of Pleasure, whereof some re­late to the Body, others to the Soul. Again, of Pleasures some are mix'd with grief, some are pure. Again, some proceed from the remembrance of things past, others from hope of things to come. A­gain, some are dishonest, as being intemperate and unjust; others moderate, and joyned with good, as joy for good things, and the Pleasure that followeth Vertue. Now because most Pleasures are naturally dishonest, he thinks it not to be disputed whether Pleasure can be simply and absolutely a good, that being to be accounted poor and of no value, which is raised out of another, and hath not a principall primary essence. For Pleasure cohereth even with its contrary Grief, and is joyned with it, which could not be, if one were simply good, the other simply ill.

CHAP. XXXIII.
Of the formes of Common-wealths.

OF the formes of Common-wealth, some are supposed only, and conceived by abstract from the rest. These he delivers in his book of a Commonwealth, wherein he describeth the first con­cordant, the second discordant, enquiring which of these is the most excellent, and how they may be constituted. He also di­videth a Commonwealth like the Soul into three parts, Keepers, Defenders, and Artisicers. The office of the first is to Counsel, to ad­vise, to command; of the second, to defend the Commonwealth, upon occasion, by armes, which answereth to the irascible pow­er; To the last belong Arts and other services. He will have Prin­ces to be Philosophers, and to contemplate the first good, affirm­ing that so only they shall govern rightly. For Mankind can never be freed from ill, unlesse either Philosophers govern, or they who govern be inspired with Philosophy after a divine manner. A Commonwealth is then governed best, and according to Justice, when each part of the City performeth its proper Office. So that the Princes give Laws to the People; the Defenders obey them, and sight for them, the rest willingly submit to their Superiours.

Of a Commonwealth he asserteth five kinds, the first, Aristo­cracy, when the best rule; the second, Timocracy, when the ambi­tious; the third Democracy, when the people; the fourth, Oligar­chy, when a few; the last, Tyranny, which is the worst of all.

He describeth likewise other supposed formes of Common­wealth, as that in his Book of Laws; and, that which reformeth others, in his Epistles, which he useth for those Cities that in his Books of Laws he saith are sick. These have a distinct place, and select men out of every age, as according to the diversity of their nature and place, they require different institution, education and armes. The Maritime people are to study Navigation and Sea­sight; the Iland fighting on foot; those in mountanous Countries to use light armour, those on the shore heavy. Some of these to ex­ercise fighting on horseback. In this City he alloweth not a Com­munity of women. Thus is Politick a Verue conversant both in Action and Contemplation; the end wherof is to constitute a City, good, happy, and convenient to it self. It considers a great many things, amongst the rest, whether War be to be waged or not.

CHAP. XXXIV.
Of a Sophist.

HItherto we have spoken of a Philosopher, from whom a So­phist differeth; In Manners, because he teacheth young men for gain, and desireth rather to seem then to be good. In matter, for a Philosopher is conversant in those things which alwaies are, and continually remain in the same manner; but a Sophist in that which is not, for which reason he seeketh darknesse, that he may not be known to be what he is. To things that are, that which is not, is not opposed as contrary, for it neither existeth, nor is par­ticipant of any essence, nor can be understood. So that if any man endeavour to expresse it in words, or comprehend it by thought; he is deceived, because he putteth together things contrary and repugnant. Yet that which is not, as far as it is spoken, is not a pure negation of that which is, but implyeth a relation to ano­ther, which in some manner is joined to Ens. So that unlesse we assume somthing from that which is to that which is not, it cannot be distinguished from other things, but thus, as many kinds as they are of Ens, so many are there of Non-Ens, because that which is not an Ens is a Non-Ens.

Thus much may serve for an introduction into Plato's Philo­sophy: Some things perhaps are said orderly, others dispersedly, or confusedly; yet is all so laid down, that by those which we have delivered, the rest of his Assertions may be found out and contemplated.

After so serious a Discourse, it will not be amisse to give the Reader a Poeticall entertainment upon the same Subject, being A PLATONICK DISCOURSE, Written in Italian by IOHN PICUS Earl of MIRANDULA, In explication of a Sonnet by HIERONIMO BENIVIENI.

The first PART.

Sect. I.

IT is a principle of the Platonists, That every created thing hath a threefold being; Causal, Formal, Participated. In the Sun there is no heat, that being but an elementary quality, not of Celestiall nature: yet is the Sun the cause and Fountain of all hear. Fire is hot by nature, and its proper form: Wood is not hot of its self, yet is capable of receiving that quality by Fire. Thus hath heat its Causall being in the Sun, its Formall in the Fire, its Participated in the Fuel. The most noble and perfect of these is the Causal: and therefore Platonists assert, That all excellencies are in God after this manner of being; That in God is nothing, but from him all things; That Intellect is not in him, but that he is the original spring of every Intellect. Such is Plotinus's meaning, when he affirms, Ennead. 6. lib. 7. 37. God neither understands nor knows; that is to say, after a formall way, As Dionysius Areopagita, God is neither an In­tellectuall nor Intelligent nature, but unspeakably exalted above all In­tellect and Knowledge.

Sect. II.

PLatonists distinguish Creatures into three degrees. The first comprehends the corporeall and visible; as Heaven, Elements, and all compounded of them: The last the invisible, incorporeal, absolutely free from bodies, which properly are called Intel­lectual (by Divines, Angelicall) Natures. Betwixt these is a middle nature, which though incorporeall, invisible, immortall, yet moveth bodies, as being obliged to that Office; called, the [Page 95] rationall Soul; inferiour to Angells, superiour to Bodies; subject to those, regent of these: Above which is God himselfe, author and principle of every Creature, in whom Divinity hath a ca­suall being; from whom, proceeding to Angells, it hath a for­mall being, and thence is derived into the rationall Soul by participation of their lustre: below which, no nature can assume the Title of Divine.

Sect. III.

THat the first of these three Natures cannot be multiplyed, who is but one, the principle and cause of all other Divini­ty, is evidently proved by Platonists, Peripateticks, and our Di­vines. About the second ( viz.) The Angelick and Intellectuall, Platonists disagree. Some (as Proclus, Hermias, Syrianus, and ma­ny others) betwixt God and the rationall Soul place a great number of creatures; part of these they call [...], Intelligi­ble, part intellectuall; which termes, Plato sometimes confoun­deth, as in his Phaedo. Plotinus, Porphyrius, and generally the most refined Platonists, betwixt God and the Soul of the World, as­signe only one Creature, which they call the Son of God, be­cause immediately produced by him. The first opinion complies most with Dionysius Areopagita, and Christian Divines, who as­sert the number of Angells to be in a manner infinite. The second is the more Philosophick, best suiting with Aristotle and Plato, whose sense we only purpose to expresse; and therefore will de­cline the first path (though that only be the right) to pursue the latter.

Sect. IV.

VVE therefore, according to the opinion of Plotinus, con­firmed not only by the best Platonists, but, even by Aristotle, and all the Arabians, especially Avicenna, affirm, That God from eternity produced a creature of incorporeall and in­tellectuall nature, as perfect as is possible for a created being, beyond which, he produced nothing; for, of the most perfect cause, the effect must be most perfect, and the most perfect can be but one; for, of two or more, it is not possible but one should be more or lesse perfect than the rest, otherwise they would not be two, but the same. This reason for our opinion I rather choose, then that which Avicen alledges, founded upon this principle, That from one cause, as one, can proceed but one ef­fect. We conclude therefore, that no creature but this first minde proceeds immediately from God: for, of all other effects issuing from this minde, and all other second causes, God is only the mediate efficient. This by Plato, Hermes, and Zoroaster, is called the Daughter of God, the Minde, Wisdome, Divine Reason, by some interpreted the Word; not meaning (with our Divines) the Son of [Page 96] God, he not being a creature, but one essence coequall with the Creator.

Sect. V.

ALL understanding agents have in themselves the form of that which they design to effect: as an Architect hath in his minde a figure of the building he undertakes, which as his pat­tern he exactly strives to imitate: This Platonists call the Idea or Exemplar, believing it more perfect, then that which is made after it: and this manner of Being, Ideal, or Intelligible, the o­ther Materiall and Sensible: So that when a Man builds a house, they affirm there are two, one Intellectuall in the Workmans mind; the other sensible, which he makes in Stone, Wood, or the like; expressing in that matter the form he hath conceiv'd: to this Dante alludes.

[...]None any work can frame,
Unless himself become the same.

Hereupon they say, though God produced only one creature, yet he produced all, because in it he produced the Ideas and forms of all, and that in their most perfect being, that is the Ideal, for which reason they call this Mind, the Intelligible World.

Sect. VI.

AFter the pattern of that Mind they affirm this sensible World was made, and the exemplar being the most perfect of all created things, it must follow that this Image thereof be as perfect as its nature will bear. And since animate things are more perfect then the inanimate; and of those the rational then the irrationall, we must grant, this World hath a Soul perfect above all others. This is the first rationall Soul, which, though incorpo­reall, and immateriall, is destin'd to the function of governing and moving corporeall Nature: not free from the body as that mind whence from Eternity it was deriv'd, as was the mind from God. Hence Platonists argue the World is eternall; its soul being such, and not capable of being without a body, that also must be from eternity; as likewise the motion of the Hea­vens, because the Soul cannot be without moving.

Sect. VII.

THe antient Ethnick Theologians, who cast Poeticall vails over the face of their mysteries, expresse these three natures by other names. Coelum they call God himself; he produc'd the first Mind, Saturn: Saturn the Soul of the World, Iupiter. Coelum imples Priority, and excellence, as in the Firmament, the first Heaven. Saturn signifies Intellectuall nature, wholly imploy'd in [Page 97] contemplation; Iupiter active life, consisting in moving and go­verning all subordinate to it. The properties of the two latter a­gree with their Planets: Saturn makes Men Contemplative, Iu­piter Imperious. The Speculative busied about things above them; the Practick beneath them.

Sect. VIII.

WHich three names are promiscuously used upon these grounds: In God we understand first his Excellence, which as Cause, he hath above all his effects; for this he is called Coelus. Secondly, the production of those effects, which denotes conversion towards inferiours; in this respect he is sometimes called Iupiter, but with an addition, Optimus, Maximus. The first Angelick nature hath more names, as more diversity. Every crea­ture consists of Power and Act: the first, Plato in Philebo, calls In­finite: the second, Finite: all imperfections in the Mind are by reason of the first; all perfections, from the latter. Her operati­ons are threefold. About Superiours, the contemplation of God; about the knowledge of herself; about inferiours, the production and care of this sensible World: these three proceed from Act. By Power she descends to make inferiour things; but in either re­spect is firm within her self. In the two first, because contempla­tive, she is called Saturn: in the third, Iupiter, a name principally applyed to her power, as that part from whence is derived the act of Production of things. For the same reason is the soul of the World, as she contemplates her self or superiours, termed Sa­turn; as she is imployed in ordering worldly things, Iupiter: and since the government of the World belongs properly to her; the contemplation to the Mind; therefore is the one absolutely called Iupiter, the other Saturn.

Sect. IX.

THis World therefore (as all other creatures) consisteth of a Soul and Body: the Body is all that we behold, compoun­ded of the four Elements. These have their casuall being in the Heavens, (which consist not of them, as sublunary things; for then it would follow that these inferiour parts were made before the Celestiall, the Elements in themselves being simple, by con­course causing such things as are compounded of them:) Their formal being from the Moon down to the Earth: Their partici­pate and imperfect under the Earth, evident in the Fire, Air, and Water, experience daily finds there; evinc'd by naturall Philo­sophers: to which the antient Theologians aenigmatically allude by their four infernall Rivers, Acheron, Cocytus, Styx, and Phlegeton.

We may divide the body of the World into three parts: Ce­lestiall, Mundane, Infernall: The ground why the Poets [...]eign [Page 98] the Kingdom of Saturn to be shar'd betwixt his three Sons, Iupi­ter, Neptune, and Pluto: implying only the three-fold variation of this corporeall World; which as long as it remains under Sa­turn, that is, in its Ideal Intellectual being, is one and undivided; and so more firm and potent: but falling into the hands of his Sons, that is, chang'd to this material Being, and by them divided into three parts, according to the triple existence of bodies, is more infirm and lesse potent, degenerating from a spiritual to a corporeal estate. The first part, the heavenly, they attribute to Iupiter; the last and lowest to Pluto; the middle to Neptune. And because in this principality is all generation and corruption, the Theologians express it by the Ocean, ebbing or flowing continual­ly: by Neptune understanding the Power or deity that presides over Generation. Yet we must not imagine these to be different souls, distinctly informing these three parts: the World her self being one, can have but one Soul; which as it animates the subterrane­all parts, is called Pluto; the sublunary Neptune; the celestiall, Iupiter. Thus Plato in Philebo averrs by Jove is understood a regall soul, meaning the principall part of the World which governs the other. This opinion, though only my ow [...], I suppose is more true then the expositions of the Grecians.

Sect. X.

NExt that of the World, Platonists assign many other rational souls. The eight principall are those of the heavenly Spheres; which according to their opinion exceeded not that number; con­sisting of the seven Planets, and the starry Orb. These are the nine Muses of the Poets: Calliope (the universall soul of the World) is first, the other eight are distributed to their severall Spheres.

Sect. XI.

PLato asserts, In [...]imaco. That the Author of the World made the mundane, and all other rationall souls, in one Cup, and of the same Elements; the universall soul being most perfect, ours least: whose parts we may observe by this division: Man, the chain that ties the World to­gether, is placed in the midst: and as all mediums participate of their extreams, his parts correspond with the whole World; thence called Microcosmus. In the World is first Corporeall Na­ture, eternall in the Heavens; corruptible in the Elements, and their compounds, as Stones, Mettals, &c. Then Plants. The third degree is of Beasts. The fourth rationall souls. The fifth Angeli­call minds. Above these is God, their origine. In man are likewise two bodies; one eternall, the Platonists Vehiculum coeleste, imme­diately inform'd by the rational soul: The other corruptible, sub­ject to sight, consisting of the Elements: Then the vegetative fa­culty, by which generated and nourished. The third part is Sensitive and motive. The fourth Rational; by the [Page 99] Latine Peripateticks believ'd the last and most noble part of the Soul: yet, above that is the Intellectuall and Angelick; the most excellent part whereof, we call the Souls Union, immediately joyning it to God, in a manner resembling him; as in the other Angels, Beasts, and Plants. About th [...]se Platonists differ, Pro [...]lus and Porphyrius only allow the rationall part to be Immortall▪ Zenocrates and Speusippus the sensitive also; Numenius and Plo­tinus the whole Soul.

Sect. XII.

IDeas have their casuall being in God, their formall in the first Minde, their participated in the rationall Soul. In God they are not, but produced by him in the Angelick nature, through this communicated to the Soul, by whom illuminated, when she re­flects on her intellectuall parts, she receives the true formes of things, Ideas. Thus differ the Souls of Men from the Celestiall: these in their bodily functions recede not from the Intellectuall, at once contemplating and governing. Bodies ascend to them, they descend not. Those employ'd in corporeall office are de­priv'd of contemplation, borrowing science from sence, to this wholly enclin'd, full of errors: Their only means of release from this bondage, is, the amatory life; which by sensible beauties, exciting in the soul a remembrance of the Intellectuall, raiseth her from this terrene life, to the eternall; by the flame of love re­fined into an Angell.

The Second PART.

Sect. I.

THE apprehensive faculties of the Soul are em­ploy'd about truth and falshood; assenting to one, dissenting from the other. The first is af­firmation, the second negation. The deside­rative converse in good and ill, inclining to this, declining to that. The first is Love, the se­cond Hate. Love is distinguish'd by its objects; if of riches, termed covetousnesse; of honour, ambition; of hea­venly things, piety; of equalls, friendship: these we exclude, and admit no other signification, but, the desire to possesse what in it selfe, or, at least in our esteem, is fair: of a different nature from the love of God to his Creatures, who comprehending all, cannot de­sire or want the beauty and perfections of another: and from that of friends which must be reciprocall. We therefore with Plato define it, * [...]* The desire of beauty. Desire is an inclina­tion [Page 100] to reall or apparent good. As there are divers kinds of good, so of desire. Love is a species of desire, Beauty of good. Desire is Naturall or Knowing. All creatures have a particular perfe­ction by participation of the divine goodnesse. This is their end, including that degree of felicity whereof they are capable, to which center they tend. This desire we call Naturall; a great te­stimony of Divine Providence, by which they are unwittingly (as an Arrow by the Archer) directed to their mark. With this, all Creatures desire. God, as being the Originall good imprinted and participated in every particular. This is in every Nature, as more or lesse capable; addressed to ends more or lesse noble; yet, is the ultimate end of all the same, to enjoy God, as far as they may: Thus as the Psalmist, Every thing worships and praiseth God; like suppliants, turning and offering themselves up to him, saith Theodoret.

Sect. II.

THe other Species of Desire is employed only about things known, given by Nature, that to every apprehensive facul­ty, there might be a desiderative; to embrace what it judgeth good, to refuse what it esteemeth evill; in its own nature en­clin'd to good: None ever desires to be miserable; but, the ap­prehensive Vertue many times mistaking Evill for Good, it oft falls out that the desiderative (in its selfe blind) desires evill. This in some sence may be said voluntary, for none can force it; in another sence, not voluntary, deceived by the judgment of its Companion. This is Plato's meaning, when he saith, In Timaeo [...]. No man sins willingly.

Sect. III.

IT is the Property of every desiderative Vertue, that He who desires, possesseth in part the thing he desires, in part not: for, if he were wholly deprived of its Possession, he would never de­sire it: this is verified two waies. First, nothing is desired unlesse it be known; and to know a thing is in some part to possesse it. So Aristotle, De Anima, 3. 9. The Soul is all, because it knowes all. And in the Psalmist God saith, All things are mine, I know them. Secondly, there is al­waies some convenience and resemblance betwixt the desirer and desired: Every thing delights and preserves it selfe by that, which by naturall affinity is most conformable to it; by its con­trary is grieved and consum'd. Love is not betwixt things un­like; Repugnance of two opposite natures is naturall hate. Hate is a repugnance with knowledge. Hence it followeth, that the na­ture of the desired, is in some manner in the desirer; otherwise, there would be no similitude betwixt them: yet imperfectly; else it were vain for it to seek what it entirely possesseth.

Sect. IV.

AS desire generally followes knowledge, so severall knowing are annexed to severall desiring Powers: We distinguish the knowing into three degrees; Sence, Reason, Intellect; atten­ded by three desiderative Vertues, Appetite, Election, Will▪ Appetite is in Bruits, Election in Men, Will in Angels. The sense knowes only corporeall things, the Appetite only desires such; the Angelick Intellect is wholly intent on Contemplation of spirituall Conceptions, not inclining to Materiall Things, but when divested of matter, and spiritualiz'd, their Will is only fed with intemporall spirituall Good. Rationall Nature is the Mean betwixt these Extreams; sometimes descending to Sense, sometimes elevated to Intellect; by its own Election complying with the desires of which she pleaseth. Thus it appears, that cor­poreall Objects are desired, either by Sensuall Appetite, or Ele­ction of Reason inclining to Sense: Incorporeall by Angelick Will, or, the Election of Reason, elevated to Intellectuall Height.

Sect. V.

BEauty in generall, is a Harmony resulting from severall things, proportionably concurring to constitute a third: In respect of which temperament, and mixture of various Natures, agreeing in the composition of one, every Creature is Fair; and in this sence no simple being is Beautifull, not God himselfe; this Beauty begins after him, arising from contrariety, without which is no com­position; it being the union of contraries, a friendly enmity, a disagreeing concord; whence Empedocles makes discord and con­cord the principles of all things; by the first, understanding the varietie of the Natures compounding; by the second, their Uni­on: adding, that in God only there is no Discord, He not being the Union of severall Natures; but, a pure uncompounded Uni­ty. In these compositions the Union necessarily predominates over the contrariety, otherwise the Fabrick would be dissolved. Thus in the fictions of Poets, Venus loves Mars: this Beauty can­not subsist without contrariety; she curbs and moderates him, this temperament allaies the strife betwixt these contraries. And in Astrologie, Venus is plac'd next Mars, to check his destructive influence; as Iupiter next Saturn, to abate his malignancy. If Mars were alwaies subject to Venus (the contrariety of principles to their due temper) nothing would ever be dissolved.

Sect. VI.

THis is Beauty in the largest sence, the same with Harmony; whence God is said to have framed the World with musicall harmonious temperament. But Harmony properly implies a [Page 102] melodious agreement of Voices; and Beauty in a restrict accep­tion relates to a proportionable concord in visible things, as Har­mony in audible. The desire of this Beauty is Love; arising only from one knowing faculty, the Sight; and that gaye Plotonius, (En [...]ead. 3. lib. 5. 3.) occasion to deprive [...] Love, from [...] Sight. Here the Platonist may object; If Love be only of visible things, how can it be applyed to Ideas, invisible natures? We answer, Sight is twofold, corporeal and spirituall; the first is that of Sense, the other the Intellectuall faculty, by which we agree with Angels; this Platonists call Sight, the corporeall being only an Image of this. So Aristotle, Intellect is that to the Soul which sight is to the Body: Hence is Minerva (Wisdom) by Homer call'd [...], Bright-ey'd. With this sight Moses, Saint Paul, and other Saints, beheld the face of God: this Divines call Intellectuall, [...]tuitive cognition, the Be [...]tificall vision, the Reward of the Righteous.

Sect. VII.

AS Sight, so Beauty (it [...]object) is twofold (the two Venus [...] celebrated by Plato, [Sympos.] and our Poet) Sensible, called Vulgar Venus. Intellectuall in Ideas (which are the object of the Intellect, as colour of sight) nam'd Celestiall Venus, Love also is twofold, Vulgar, and Celestial▪ for as Plato saith Sympos: There must ne­cessarily be as many Loves as Venus's.

Sect. VIII.

VEnus then is Beauty, whereof Love is generated: properly his Mother, because Beauty is the cause of Love, not as pro­ductive principle of this act, to Love, but as its object: the Soul, being the efficient cause of it as of all his acts; Beauty the mate­riall: For in Philosophy the efficient is assimilated to the Father, the material to the Mother.

Sect. IX.

CElestiall Love is an Intellectuall desire of Ideall Beauty: I­deas, (as we said before) are the Patterns of things in God▪ as in their Fountain; in the Angelick Mind, Essentiall; in the Soul by Participation, which with the Substance partakes of the Ideas and Beauty of the first Mind: Hence it follows, that Love of Celestial Beauty in the Soul, is not Celestiall Love perfectly, but the nearest Image of it. Its truest being is with the desire of Ideal Beauty in the first Mind, which God immediately adorns with Ideas.

Sect. X.

LOve (saith Plato) was begot on Penia, by Porus (the Son of Metis) in Iupiters Orchard, being drunk with Nectar, when the Gods met to celebrate Venus Birth. Nature in it self inform, when it receives form from God is the Angelick Mind; this form is Ideas, the first Beauty; which in this descent from their divine Fountain, mixing with a different nature, become imperfect. The first mind, by its opacousness eclipsing their lustre, desires, that Beauty which they have lost; this desire is love▪ begot when Porus the affluence of Ideas mixeth with Penia the indigence of that informe nature we termed Iupiter (1. 8.) in whose Garden the Ideas are planted, with those the first Mind adorned, was by the Antients named Paradise; to which contemplative life and eternall felici­ty Zoroastres inviting us, saith, seek, Seek Paradis [...]: our Divines trans­fer it to the Coelum Empyraeum, the seat of the happy Souls, whose blessednesse consists in contemplation and perfection of the In­tellect, according to Plato. This Love begot on Venus birth-day, that is, when the Ideal Beauty, though imperfectly, is infused into the Angelick Mind; Venus yet as a Child, not grown to perfection. All the Gods assembled at this Feast, that is their Ideas, (as by Saturn we understand both the Planet and his Idea) an expression bor­rowed from Parmenides. These Gods then are those Ideas that precede Venus (She is the beauty and Grace resulting from their variety▪) Invited to a Banquet of Nectar and Ambrosia: those whom God feasts with Nectar and Ambrosia are eternall beings, the rest not; These Idea's of the Angelick Mind are the first eter­nals; Porus was drunk with Nectar, this Ideal affluence fill'd with Eternity; other Idea's were not admitted to the Feast, nor indu­ed with Immortality.

Orpheus upon the same grounds saith, Love was born before all other Gods, in the bosom of Chaos: Because Nature full of indistinct imperfect forms (the Mind replenished with confused Ideas) desires their perfection.

Sect. XI.

THe Angelick Mind desires to make these Idea's perfect; which can onely be done by means opposite to the causes of their imperfection, these are Recession from their Principle, and mixti­on with a contrary Nature: Their Remedy, separation from the unlike Nature, and return and conjunction (as far as possible) with God. Love, the desire of this Beauty, excites the Mind to conversion and re-union with him. Every thing is more perfect as nearer its Principle; This is the first Circle. The Angelick Mind, proceeding from the Union of God, by revolution of intrinsecall knowledge returneth to him. Which with the Antients is Venus adulta, grown to perfection. Every Nature that may have this [Page 104] conversion, is a Circle; such alone are the Intellectuall and Rati­onall, and therefore only capable of felicity, the obtaining their first Principle, their ultimate end and highest good. This is pecu­liar to Immortall Substances, for the Materiall (as both Plato­nists and Peripateticks grant) have not this reflection upon them­selves, or their Principle. These, (the Angelick Mind and Rati­onall Soul) are the two intelligible Circles; answerable to which in the corporeall World are two more; the tenth Heaven immoveable, image of the first Circle; the Celestiall Bodies, that are moveable, image of the second. The first Plato mentions no [...], as wholly different and irrepresentable by corpo­reall Nature: of the second in Timaeo he saith, That all the Cir [...]les of this visible Heaven (by him distinguished into the fixed sphere and seven Planets) represent as many Circles in the Rationall Soul.

Some attribute the name of Circle to God; by the antient Theologists called Coelus; being a Sphear which comprehends all; as the outmost Heaven includes the World.

In one respect this agrees with God, in another not; the property of beginning from a point and returning to it, is repugnant to him; who hath no beginning▪ but is himself that indivisible point from which all Circles begin, and to which they return: And in this sence it is likewise inconsistent with materiall things, they have a beginning, but cannot return to it.

In many other Properties it agrees with God; He is the most perfect of beings; this of figures; neither admit addition: The last Sphear is the place of all bodies, God of all Spirits: the Soul (say Platonists) is not in the Body, but the body is in the Soul, the Soul in the Mind, the Mind in God, the outmost Place; who is there­fore named by the Cabalists [...].

Sect. XII.

THe three Graces are Handmaids to Venus, Thalid, Euphrosyne, Aglaia; Viridity, Gladnesse, Splendour; properties attend­ing Ideal Beauty. Thalia, is the permanence of every thing in its entire being; thus is Youth called green, Man being then in his perfect state; which decaies as his years encrease, into his last dissolution. Venus, is proportion, uniting all things. Viridity, the duration of it; In the Ideall World, where is the first Venus, is al­so the first Viridity; for no Intelligible Nature recedes from its being by growing old. It communicates this property to sensible things as far as they are capable of this Venus, that is, as long as their due proportion continues. The two other properties of Ideal Beauty are Illustration of the Intellect, Aglaia, Repletion of the wil with desire and joy, Euphrosyne.

Of the Graces one is painted looking toward us; The conti­nuation of our being is no reflex act. The other two with their [Page 105] faces from us, seeming to return; the operations of the Intellect and Will are reflexive; What comes from God to us, returnes from us to God.

Sect. XIII.

VEnus is said to be born of the Sea; Matter, the Inform Nature whereof every Creature is compounded, is represented by Water, continually flowing, easily receptable of any form. This being first [...]n the Angelick Minde, Angells are many times ex­prest by Water, as in the Psalms, The Waters above the Heavens praise God continually, so interpreted by Origen; and some Plato­nists expound the Ocean (stil'd by Homer Father of Gods and Men) this Angelick Minde, Principle and Fountain of all other Creatures; Gemistius, Neptune; as Commander of all Waters, of all Mindes Angelicall and Humane. This is that living Fountain, whereof he that drinketh shall never thirst: These are the Wa­ters whereon ( David saith) God hath founded the World.

Sect. XIV.

POrus (the Affluence of Ideas proceeding from God) is stiled by Plato the Son of Metis (Counsell,) in Imitation of the Scrip­ture: whence our Saviour by Dionysius Areop. is termed the Angel of Counsell, that is, the Messenger of God the Father; so Avicen calls the first Cause conciliative, the Minde not having Ideas from it selfe but from God, by whose Counsell she recei­veth Knowledge and Art to frame this visible World.

Sect. XV.

LOve, Sympos. according to Plato, is Youngest and Oldest of the Gods; They, as all other things, have a two-fold Being, Ideal and Naturall. The first God in his Naturall Being was Love, who dispenc'd theirs to all the rest, the last in his Ideal. Love was born in the Descent of the Ideas into the Angelick Minde, which could not be perfect till they, its Essence, were made so, by loves conversion to God. The Angelick Minde owing its na­turall being to Love, the other Gods who succeeded this Minde, necessarily are younger then He in their naturall Being, though they precede him in their Ideal, as not born till these Ideas, though imperfectly, were joyn'd to the inform'd Nature.

Sect. XVI.

THe Kingdome of Necessity is said to be before that of Love. Plat. Sympos. Every Creature consists of two Natures, Materiall, the imperfect, (which we here understand by Necessity) and Formall, the oc­casion of perfection. That whereof it most partakes is said to be predominant, and the Creature to be subject to it. Hence is Ne­cessity (matter) suppos'd to raigne when the Ideas were imper­fect, [Page 106] and all imperfections to happen during that time; all per­fections after Love began his reign; for, when the Minde was by him converted to God; that which before was imperfect in her, was perfected.

Sect. XVII.

Plat. Sympos. VEnus is said to commend Fate. The order and concatenation of causes and effects in this sensible World, called Fate, de­pends on the order of the Intelligible World, Providence. Hence Platonists place Providence (the ordering of Ideas) in the first Minde, depending upon God, its ultimate end, to which it leads all other things. Thus Venus, being the order of those Ideas, whereon Fate, the Worlds order, depends, commands it.

Fate is divided into three parts, Clotho, Lachesis, and Atropos: That which is one in Providence, indivisible in Eternity, when it comes into Time and Fate is divisible, into Past, Present, and Future. Others apply Atropos to the fixed Sphear, Clotho to the seven Planets, Lachesis to sublunary things.

Temporall corporeall things only are subjected to Fate; the Rationall Soul being incorporeall, predominates over it; but, is subjected to Providence, to serve which is true liberty. By whom the Will (obeying its Lawes) is led to the Acquisition of her de­sired end. And as often as she endeavours to loose her selfe from this Servitude, of Free she becomes a Servant and Slave to Fate, of whom before she was the Mistresse. To deviate from the Laws of Providence, is, to forsake Reason, to follow Sense and Irrati­onall Appetite, which being corporeall, are under Fate; he that serves these, is much more a servant then those he serves.

Sect. XVIII.

AS from God Ideas descend into the Angelick Mind, by which the Love of Intellectuall Beauty is begot in her, called Divine Love; so the same Ideas descend from the Ange­lick Minde into the Rationall Soul, so much the more imperfect in her, as she wants of Angelicall Perfection: From these springs Human Love. Plato discourseth of the first, Plotinus of the latter▪ who by the same Argument, whereby he proves Ideas not[?] acci­dentall, but substantiall in the Angelick Minde, evinceth like­wise the specificall Reasons, the Ideas in the Soul, to be substan­tiall, terming the Soul Venus, as having a specious splendid Love, in respect of these specificall Reasons.

Sect. XIX.

VUlgar Love is the Appetite of sensible Beauty, through corporeall sight. The cause of this Beauty is the visible Heaven by its moving power. As our motive faculty consists in Muscles and Nerves (the Instruments of its Operation,) so the [Page 107] motive faculty of Heaven is fitted with a Body proper for cir­cular sempiternall motion: Through which Body the Soul (as a Painter with his Pencill changeth this inferiour matter into va­rious[?] Forms. Thus vulgar Venus (the beauty of materiall forms) hath her casuall being from the moving power of the Heavens, her formall from colour, enlightned by the visible Sun as Ideas by the invisible; her participate in the Figure and just order of parts communicated to sight by mediation of light and colour, by whose Interest only it procures love.

Sect. XX.

AS when the Ideas descend into the Minde, there ariseth a desire of enjoying that, from whence this Ideall Beauty comes; so when the species of sensible Beauty flow into the Eye, there springs a two-fold Appetite of Union with that, whence this Beauty is derived; one Sensuall, the other Rationall; the principles of Bestiall and Human Love. If We follow Sense, We Judge the Body wherein We behold this Beauty, to be its Foun­tain; whence proceedes a desire of Coition, the most intimate union with it: This is the Love of irrationall Creatures. But Reason knowes, that the Body is so far from being its Originall, that it is destructive to it, and the more it is sever'd from the Bo­dy, the more it enjoyes its own Nature and Dignity: We must not fix with the species of Sense in the Body, but refine that spe­cies from all reliques of corporeall infection.

And because Man may be understood by the Rationall Soul, either considered apart, or, in its union to the Body; in the first sence, human Love is the Image of the Celestiall; in the second, Desire of sensible Beauty; this being by the Soul abstracted from matter, and (as much as its nature will allow) made Intellectu­all. The greater part of men reach no higher than this; others more perfect, remembring that more perfect Beauty which the Soul (before immers'd in the Body) beheld, are inflam'd with an incredible desire of reviewing it, in pursuit whereof, they sepa­rate themselves as much as possible from the Body, of which the Soul (returning to its first dignity) becomes absolute Mistresse. This is the Image of Celestiall Love, by which man ariseth from one perfection to another, till his Soul (wholly united to the Intellect) is made an Angell. Purged from materiall drosse, and transformed into spirituall flame by this Divine Power, he mounts up to the Intelligible Heaven, and happily rests in his Fathers bosome.

Sect. XXI.

VUlgar Love is only in Souls immerst in Matter, and over­come by it, or at least hindred by perturbations and passi­ons. Angelick Love is in the Intellect, eternall as it. Yet but [Page 108] inferr'd, the greater part turning from the Intellect to sensible things, and corporeall cares. But so perfect are these Celestiall Souls, that they can discharge both Functions, rule the Body; yet not be taken off from Contemplation of Superiours: These the Poets signifie by Ianus with two faces, one looking forward upon Sensible things, the other on intelligible: lesse perfect Souls have but one face, and when they turn that to the Body, cannot see the Intellect, being depriv'd of their contemplation; when to the Intellect, cannot see the Body, neglecting the Care thereof. Hence those Souls that must forsake the Intellect, to apply them­selves to Corporeall Government, are by Divine Providence confin'd to caduque, corruptible Bodies, loosed from which▪ they may in a short time, if they fail not themselves, return to their Intellectuall felicity. Other Soules not hindred from Spe­culation, are tyed to eternall incorruptible Bodies.

Celestial Souls then (design'd by Ianus, as the Principles of Time, motion intervening) behold the Ideal Beauty in the Intel­lect, to love it perpetually; and inferiour sensible things, not to desire their Beauty; but, to communicate this other to them. Our Souls before united to the Body, are in like manner double­fac'd; but, are then as it were, cleft asunder, retaining but one; which as they turn to either object, Sensuall or Intellectuall, is deprived of the other.

Thus is vulgar love inconsistent with the Celestiall; and many ravish'd at the sight of Intellectuall Beauty, become blinde to sensible; imply'd by Callimachus, Hymn. 5. in the Fable of Tyresias, who viewing Pallas naked, lost his sight; yet by her was made a Prophet, closing the eyes of his Body, she open'd those of his Minde, by which he beheld both the Present and Future. The Ghost of Achilles which inspir'd Homer with all Intellectuall Contemplations in Poetry, deprived him of corporeal sight.

Though Celestiall Love liveth eternally in the Intellect of every Soul; yet, only those few make use of it, who declining the Care of the Body, can with Saint Paul say, Whether in the Body, or out of the Body they know not. To which state a Man sometimes ar­rives; but, continues there but a while, as we see in Extasies.

Sect. XXII.

THus in our Soul (naturally indifferent to sensible or intel­ligible Beauty) there may be three Loves; one in the In­tellect, Angelicall; the second Human; the third Sensuall: the two latter are conversant about the same object, Corporeall Beauty; the sensuall fixeth its Intention wholly in it; the hu­man separates it from matter. The greater part of mankind go no further then these two; but they whose understandings are purified by Philosophy, knowing sensible Beauty to be but the Image of another more perfect, leave it, and desire to see the Ce­lestial, [Page 109] of which they have already a Tast in their Remembrance, if they persevere in this Mental Elevation, they finally obtain it; and recover that, which though in them from the beginning, yet they were not sensible of, being diverted by other Objects.

The Sonnet.
I.
LOve, (whose hand guides my Hearts strict Reins
Nor, though he govern it, disdains
To feed the fire with pious care
Which first himself enkindled there)
Commands my backward Soul to tell
What Flames within her Bosom dwell;
Fear would perswade her to decline
The charge of such a high design;
But all her weak reluctance fails,
'Gainst greater Force no Force avails.
Love to advance her flight will lend
Those wings by which he did descend
Into my Heart, where he to rest
For ever, long since built his Nest:
I what from thence he dictates write,
And draw him thus by his own Light.
II.
LOve, flowing from the sacred spring
Of uncreated Good, I sing:
When born; how Heaven he moves; the soul
Informs; and doth the World controwl;
How closely lurking in the heart,
With his sharp weapons subtle art
From heavy earth he Man unites,
Enforcing him to reach the skies.
How kindled, how he flames, how burns;
By what laws guided now he turns
To Heaven, now to the Earth descends,
Now rests 'twixt both, to neither bends.
Apollo, Thee I invocate,
Bowing beneath so great a weight.
Love, guide me through this dark design,
And imp my shorter wings with thine.
III.
WHen from true Heav'n the sacred Sun
Into th' Angelick Mind did run,
And with enliv'ned Leaves adorn,
Bestowing form on his first-born;
Enflamed by innate Desires,
She to her chiefest good aspires;
By which reversion her rich Brest
With various Figures is imprest;
And by this love exalted, turns
Into the Sun for whom she burns.
This flame, rais'd by the Light that shin'd
From Heav'n into th' Angelick Mind,
Is eldest Loves religious Ray,
By Wealth and Want begot that Day,
When Heav'n brought forth the Queen, whose Hand
The Cyprian Scepter doth Command.
IV.
THis born in amorous Cypris arms,
The Sun of her bright Beauty warms.
From this our first desire accrues,
Which in new fetters caught, pursues
The honourable path that guides
Where our eternall good resides.
By this the fire, through whose fair beams
Life from above to Mankind streams,
Is kindled in our hearts, which glow
Dying, yet dying greater grow;
By this th' immortal Fountain flows,
Which all Heaven forms below, bestows;
By this descends that shower of light
Which upwards doth our minds invite;
By this th' Eternall Sun inspires
And souls with sacred lustre fires.
V.
AS God doth to the Mind dispence
Its Being, Life, Intelligence,
So doth the Mind the soul acquaint
How't understand, to move, to paint;
She thus prepar'd, the Sun that shines
In the Eternal Breast designs,
And here what she includes diffuses,
Exciting every thing that uses
[Page 111] Motion and sense (beneath her state)
To live, to know, to operate.
Inferiour Venus hence took Birth;
Who shines in heav'n, but lives on earth,
And o're the world her shadow spreads:
The elder in the Suns Glass reads
Her Face, through the confused skreen
Of a dark shade obscurely seen;
She Lustre from the Sun receives,
And to the Other Lustre gives;
Celestiall Love on this depends,
The younger, vulgar Love attends.
VI.
FOrm'd by th' eternal Look of God,
From the Suns most sublime abode,
The Soul descends into Mans Heart,
Imprinting there with wondrous Art
What worth she borowed of her star,
And brought in her Celestiall Carre;
As well as humane Matter yields,
She thus her curious Mansion builds;
Yet all those fames from the divine
Impression differently decline:
The Sun, who's figu'rd here, his Beams
Into anothers Bosom streams;
In whose agreeing soul he staies,
And guilds it with its virtuous Raies,
The heart in which Affection's bred,
Is thus by pleasing Errour fed.
VII.
THe heart where pleasing Errour raigns,
This object as her Child maintains,
By the fair light that in her shines
(A rare Celestiall Gift,) refines;
And by degrees at last doth bring
To her first splendours sacred spring,
From this divine Look, one Sun passes
Through three refulgent Burning-glasses,
Kindling all Beauty, which the Spirit,
The Body, and the Mind inherit.
These rich spoiles, by th' eye first caught,
Are to the Souls next Handmaid brought,
Who there resides: She to the brest
Sends them; reform'd, but not exprest:
The heart, from Matter Beauty takes,
[Page 112] Of many one Conception makes;
And what were meant by Natures Laws,
Distinct, She in one Picture draws▪
VIII.
THe heart by Love allur'd to see
Within her self her Progeny;
This, like the Suns reflecting Rayes
Upon the Waters face, survaies;
Yet some divine, though clouded light
Seems here to twinckle, and invite
The pious Soul, a Beauty more
Sublime, and perfect to adore.
Who sees no longer his dim shade
Upon the earths vast Globe display'd,
But certain Lustre, of the true
Suns truest Image, now in view.
The Soul thus entring in the Mind,
There such uncertainty doth find,
That she to clearer Light applies
Her aimes, and near the first Sun flies:
She by his splendour beautious grows,
By loving whom all Beauty flows
Upon the Mind, Soul, World, and All
Included in this spacious Ball.
IX.
BUt hold! Love stops the forward Course
That me beyond my scope would force.
Great Power! if any Soul appears
Who not alone the blossoms wears,
But of the rich Fruit is possest,
Lend him thy Light, deny the rest.

The Third PART.

TO treat of both Loves belongs to different Scien­ences; Vulgar Love to Naturall or Morall Philosophy; Divine, to Theology or Meta­physicks. Solomon discourseth excellently of the first in Ecclesiastes, as a Naturall Philoso­pher, in his Proverbs as a Morall: Of the se­cond in his Canticles, esteemed the most Di­vine of all the Songs in Scripture.

S [...]anza I.

The chief order established by Divine Wisdom in created things, is, that every inferiour Nature be immediately governed by the superiour; whom whilst it obeys, it is guarded from all ill, and lead without any obstruction to its determinate felicity; but, if through too much affection to its own liberty, and desire to prefer the licentious life before the profitable, it rebell from the superiour Nature, it falls into a double inconvenience. First, like a Ship given over by the Pilot, it lights sometimes on one Rock, sometimes on another, without hope of reaching the Port. Se­condly, it loseth the command it had over the Natures subjected to it, as it hath deprived its superiour of his. Irrationall Nature is ruled by another, un [...]it for its Imperfection to rule any. God by his ineffable Excellence provides for every thing, himselfe needs not the providence of any other▪ Betwixt the two ex­treams, God and Bruits, are Angells and Rationall Souls, gover­ning others, and governed by others. The first Hierarchy of An­gells immediately illuminated by God, enlighten the next un­der them; the last (by Platonists termed Daemons, by the He­brewes [...], as Guardians of Men) are set over us as We o­ver Irrationalls. So Psalm 8. Whilest the Angells continued sub­ject to the Divine Power, they retained their Authority over o­ther Creatures; but when Luciser and his Companions, through inordinate love of their own Excellence, aspir'd to be equall with God, and to be conserved, as He, by their own strength, they fell from Glory to extream Misery; and when they lost the Priviledge they had over others, seeing us freed from their Em­pire, enviovsly every hour insidiate our good. The same order is in the l [...]sser World, our Soul: the inferiour faculties are directed by the superiour, whom following they erre not. The imagina­tive corrects the mistakes of outward sense; Reason is illumina­ted by the Intellect, nor do we at any time miscarry, but when the Imaginative will not give credit to Reason, or Reason con­fident of it selfe, resists the Intellect. In the desiderative the Ap­petite [Page 114] is govern'd by the Rationall, the Rationall by the Intelle­ctuall, which our Poet implies, saying, ‘[Love whose hand guides my hearts strict reins.]’

The cognoscitive powers are seated in the Head, the desidera­tive in the Heart: In every well order'd Soul, the Appetite is go­vern'd by Intellectuall Love; implyed by the Metaphor of Reins, borrowed from Plato in his Phaedrus.

[Love to advance my flight, will lend
The wings by which he did ascend
Into my heart—]

When any superiour vertue is said to descend, we imply not, that it leaves its own height to come down to us, but drawes us up to it selfe; its descending to us, is our ascending to it; other­wise such conjuction would be the imperfection of the vertue, not the perfection of him who receives it.

II.

[Love [...]lowing from the sacred Spring
Of uncreated good—]

From the Fountain of divine goodnesse into our Souls, in which that influx is terminated.

[When born, &c.]

The order, participation, conversion of Ideas, see Part 2. Sect.

[—how Heaven he moves, the Soul
Informs, and doth the World controul.]

Of these three properties, Love is not the efficient: God pro­duceth the Ideas in the Angelick Minde, the Minde illustrates the Soul with Ideal Beauty; Heaven is moved by its proper Soul: But, without Love, these principles do not operate: He is cause of the Mindes conversion to God, and of the Souls to the Minde; without which, the Ideas would not descend into the one, nor the Specifick reasons into the other: the Soul not illuminated by these, could not elicite this sensible form out of matter, by the motion of Heaven.

III.

WHen the [...]irst emanation from God (the plenty of Ideas) descended into the Angelick Minde, she, desiring their perfection, reverts to God, obtaining of him what she covets; which the more fully she possesseth, the more fervently she loves. This desire, (Celestiall Love,) born of the obscure Minde and Ideas, is explain'd in this Stanza: ‘[—true Heaven—]’

God who includes all created beings, as Heaven all sensible, [Page 115] lib. 2. Sect. Only Spirituall things, according to Platonists, are true and reall, the rest but shadowes and images of these.

[—the sacred Sun]

The light of Ideas streaming from God.

[—enlivened leaves—]

The Metaphore of Leaves relates to the Orchard of Iupiter, where these Ideas were planted 2. 10. Enlivened, as having in themselves the principle of their operation, Intellection, the no­blest life, as the Psalmist, Give me understanding, and I shall live. So the Cabalist to the second Sephirah, which is Wisdome, attributes the name of Life.

[—adorn bestowing form—]

To adorn denotes no more then accidentall perfection, but I­deas are the Substance of the Minde, and therefore he adds, bestowing form; which though they come to her from without, she receives not as accidents, but as her first intrinsecall act: which our Author implies, terming her desires innate.

[And by this love exalted, turns
Into the Sun, for whom she burns.]

Love transformes the Lover into the thing loved.

[—Wealth and Want—]

Porus and Penia, 2. 10.

IV.

The properties of Celestiall Love are in this Stanza discovered.

[—in new fetters caught—]

The Soul being opprest by the Body, her desire of Intellectuall Beauty sleeps; but, awakened by Love, is by the sensible Beauty of the body, led at last to their Fountain, God.

[—which glow
Dying, yet glowing greater grow.]

Motion and Operation are the signes of life, their privation of death: in him who applies himselfe to the Intellectuall part, the rationall and the sensitive fail; by the Rationall he is Man, by the Intellectuall communicates with Angels: As Man he dies, re­viv'd an Angell. Thus the Heart dies in the flames of Intellectu­all Love; yet, consumes not, but by this death growes greater, re­ceives a new and more sublime life. See in Plato the Fables of Al­cestes and Orpheus.

V.

This Stanza is a description of sensible Beauty.

[The elder in the Suns glasse reads
Her face, through the confused skreen
Of a dark shade obscurely seen.]

[Page 116] Sensible light is the act and efficacy of Corporeall, spirituall light of Intelligible Beauty. Ideas in their descent into the in­form Angelick Minde, were as colours and figures in the Night: As he who by Moon-light seeth some fair object, desires to view and enjoy it more fully in the day; so the Minde, weakly behol­ding in her selfe the Ideal Beauty dim and opacous (whch our Author calls the skreen of a dark shade) by reason of the Night of her imperfection, turns like the Moon) to the eternall Sun, to perfect her Beauty by him; to whom addressing her selfe, she be­comes Intelligible light; clearing the Beauty of Celestiall Venus▪ and rendring it visible to the eye of the first Minde.

In sensible Beauty we consider first the object in it selfe, the same at Midnight as at Moon: Secondly, the light, in a manner the Soul thereof: the Author supposeth, that as the first part of sensible Beauty (corporeall forms) proceeds from the first part of Intellectual Beauty (Ideal forms) so sensible light flowes from the intelligible, descending upon Ideas.

VI. VII. VIII.

Corporeall Beauty implies, first, the materiall disposition of the Body, consisting of quantity in the proportion and distance of parts, of quality in figure and colour: Secondly, a certain qua­lity which cannot be exprest by any term better then Graceful­nesse,, shining in all that is fair: This is properly Venus, Beauty, which kindles the fire of Love in Mankinde: They who affirm it results from the disposition of the Body, the sight, figure, and co­lour of features, are easily confuted by experience. We s [...]e many persons exact, and unaccustomable in every part, destitute of this grace and comlinesse; others lesse perfect in those particular con­ditions, excellently gracefull and comely; Thus Catullus,

Many think Quintia beau [...]ious, fair, and tall,
And s [...]reight she is, apart I grant her all:
But altogether beautious I deny;
For, not one grace doth that large shape supply.

He grants her perfection of quality, figure, and quantity; yet not allowes her handsome, as wanting this Grace. This then must by consequence be ascribed to the Soul, which when per­fect and lucid, transfuseth even into the Body some Beams of its Splendour. When Moses came from the divine Vision in the Mount, his face did shine so exceedingly, that the people could not behold it unlesse vail'd. Porphyrius relates, that when Ploti­nus his soul was elevated by divine Contemplation, an extraor­dinary brightnesse appeared in his looks; plotinus himselfe a­verres, that there was never any beautifull Person wicked, that this Gracefulnesse in the Body, is a certain sign of perfection in the Soul, Proverbs 17. 24. Wisdome shineth in the countenance of the Wise.

[Page 117] From materiall beauty wee ascend to the first Fountain by six Degrees: the Soule through the sight represents to her self the Beauty of some particular person, inclines to it, is pleased with it, and while she rests here, is in the first, the most imperfect mate­rial degree. 2. She reforms by her imagination the Image she hath received, making it more perfect as more spirituall; and separa­ting it from Matter, brings it a little nearer Ideal Beauty. 3. By the light of the agent Intellect abstracting this Form from all sin­gularity, she considers the universall Nature of Corporeal Beau­ty by it self: This is the highest degree the Soul can reach whilst she goes no further then Sense. 4. Reflecting upon her own Ope­ration, the knowledge of universall Beauty, and considering that every thing founded in matter is particular, shee concludes this universality proceeds not from the outward Object, but her In­trinsecal Power: and reasons thus: If in the dimme Glasse of Ma­teriall Phantasmes this Beauty is represented by vertue of my Light, it follows, that beholding it in the clear Mirrour of my sub­stance divested of those Clouds, it will appear more perspicuous: thus turning into her self, shee findes the Image of Ideal Beauty communicated to her by the Intellect, the Object of Celestiall Love. 5. Shee ascends from this Idea in her self, to the place where Celestiall Venus is, in her proper form; Who in ful­ness of her beauty not being comprehensible, by any particular Intellect, she, as much as in her lies, endeavours to be united to the first Mind, the chiefest of Creatures, and general Habitation of Ideal Beauty, obtaining this, she terminates, and sixeth her jour­ney: this is the sixt and last degree: They are all imply'd in the 6, 7, and 8 Stanza's.

[Form'd by th' Eternal look, &c.]

Platonists affirm some Souls are of the nature of Saturn, others of Iupiter, or some other Planet; meaning, one Soul hath more Conformity in its Nature with the Soul of the Heaven of Saturn, then with that of Iupiter, and so on the contrary; of which there can be no internal Cause assigned; the External is God, who (as Plato in his Tim [...]eus) Soweth and scattereth Souls, some in the Moon, others in other Planets and Stars, the Instruments of Time.

Many imagine the Rational Soul descending from her Star, in her Vehiculum Coeleste, of her self forms the Body, to which by that Medium she is united: Our Author upon these grounds suppo­seth, that into the Vehiculum of the Soul, by her endued with Pow­er to form the Body, is infused from her Star a particular forma­tive vertue, distinct according to that Star; thus the aspect of one is Saturnine, of another Joviall, &c. in their looks wee read the nature of their Souls.

But because inferiour matter is not ever obedient to the Stamp, the vertue of the Soul is not alwaies equally exprest in the visible Effigies: hence it happens that two of the same Nature are un­like; [Page 118] like; the matter whereof the one consists, being lesse dispo­sed to receive that Figure then the other; what in that is com­pleat is in this imperfect; our Author infers, that the figures of two Bodies being formed by vertue of the same Star, this Conformity begets Love.

[From the Suns most sulime aboad]

The Tropick of Cancer: by which Soules according to Platonists descend, ascending by Capricorn. Cancer is the House of the Moon, who predominates over the vitall parts, Capricorn of Saturn presiding over Contemplation.

[The Heart in which affection's bred
Is thus by pleasing Errour fed.]

Frequently, if not alwaies, the Lover believes that which hee loves more beautious then it is, he beholds it in the Image his Soul hath formed of it; so much fairer as more separate from Matter, the Principle of Deformity; besides, the Soul is more In­dulgent in her Affection to this Species, considering it is her own Child produc'd in her Imagination.

[—one Sun passes
Through three re [...]ulgent Burning-glasses.]

One Light flowing from God, beautifies the Angelick, the Ra­tional Nature, and the Sensible World.

[—the Souls next Hand-maid—]

The Imaginative ‘[—to the Breast]’

The Breast and Heart here taken for the Soul because her nearest Lodging; the Fountain of Life and Heat.

[—reform'd but not exprest.]

Reform'd by the Imagination form the deformity of Matter; yet not reduc'd to perfect Immateriality, without which true Beauty is not Exprest.

SPVSIPPVS.

SPEVSIPPVS.

CHAP. I.
His Life.

L [...]ert. SPEUSIPPUS was an Athenian, born at Myr­rhinus [which belonged to the Pandionian Tribe] his Father named Eurymedon, his Mother Po [...]one, Sister to Plato.

Apul. dogm. Plat. He was brought up in the domestick documents of his Uncle Plato, Plut. de adu­lat. & amici. discrim. who (as he used to say) reformed Speusippus's life, after the pattern of his own.

Chio. Epist. ad Matri [...]. Plato had foure Kins-women, Daughters of his Neeces; the eldest of these he married to Speusippus, with a small portion, thirty Minae, which Dionysius had sent him: To this summe Chio, glad of the occasion, added a Talent, which Speusippus earnestly refused, untill at last he was overcome by the just importunities of the other to receive it, alledging that he gave it not as mony, but as kindnesse▪ that such gifts were to be entertained, for they encreased honour, the rest were dishonourable; that he ought to accept of the good-will, though he despised the mony. The rest of those Virgins were Married richly to Athenians, only Speusippus, who best deserved, was poor. With these arguments Speusippus was induced to accept of Chio's gift; whereat Chio much congratulated his own good fortune, as having laid hold of an occasion, such, as perhaps, saith he, I shall not meet again in all my life.

When Dion came to Athens, Plut. vit. Dion▪ Speusippus was continually in company with him, more then any other friend there, by Plato's advice, to soften and divert Dion's humour, with a facile com­panion, such as he knew Speusippus to be; and that withall, he knew discreetly how to observe time and place in his mirth: whence Timon (in Sillis) calls him, a good Ieaster.

The last time that Plato, upon the importunity of Dionysius, went to Sicily, Speusippus accompany'd him. Whilest they lived at Syracuse, Speusippus kept more company with the Citizens then Plato did, and insinuating more into their mindes, at first they were afraid to speak freely to him, mistrusting him to be one of Dionysius's spies: But within a while they began to con [...]ide in [Page 120] him, and all agreed in this, to pray Dion to come to them, and not to take care for ships, men, or horses, but to hire a ship for his own passage; for the Sicilians desired no more, then that he would lend them his name and person against the Tyrant.

Speusippus at his return to Athens, perswaded Dion to warre against Dionysius, and deliver Sicily from the bondage of Tyran­ny, assuring him the Country would receive him gladly. Dion upon this information received such encouragement, that he be­gan secretly to levie men: The Philosophers much advanced his designe. When he went to Sicily, he bestowed a Country­house, which he had purchased since his comming to Athens, upon Speusippus.

CHAP. II.
His profession of Philosophy.

Laert. PLato dying in the first year of the 108th Olympiad, Theophilus being Archon, Speusippus succeeded him in the School of the Academy, Laert. whom he followed also in his Doctrine.

He first, as Theodorus affirmes, looked into the community and mutuall assistance of Mathematicall Disciplines, as Plato did into that of the Philosophicall.

Laert. He first, according to Cenaeus, declared those things, which Isocrates conceived not to be divulged, the same perhaps which Epist. ad. At. 2. 1. Cicero calls the [...] of Isocrates.

Stob. Phys. 1. 1. He affirmed, that the minde was not the same, either with Good or One; but of a peculiar nature proper to it selfe.

Laert. He set up in the School which Plato had built the Images of the Graces.

He exacted mony of his Disciples, contrary to the custome of Plato.

The two Women who were Plato's Auditors, Lasthenia the Mantinean, and Axiothea the Phliasian, heard Speusippus like­wise.

Having continued Master of the School eight years, he at last, by reason of his infirm disposition, much debilitated by the Palsie, sent to Xenocrates, desiring him to come and take from him the government of the School, which Xenocrates did.

CHAP. III.
His wrrtings.

HE wrote [...]aert. Suid. many things, chiefly in Philosophy, Commenta­ries and Dialogues, of which were

  • Aristippus the Cyrenaick.
  • Of Riches 1.
  • Of Pleasure 1.
  • Of Iustice 1.
  • Of Philosophy 1.
  • Of Friendship 1.
  • Of the Gods 1.
  • The Philosopher 1.
  • To Cephalus 1.
  • Cephalus 1.
  • Clinomachus, or Lysias 1.
  • The Cittizen 1.
  • Of the Soul 1.
  • To Gryllus 1.
  • Aristippus 1.
  • The confutation of Arts 1.
  • Commentary Dialogues.
  • Artificiall 1.
  • Dialogues of likenesse in things 10.
  • Divisions and arguments to things like.
  • Of the genus's and species of Examples.
  • To Amartyrus.
  • Encomium of Plato.
  • Epistles to Dion, Dionysius, Philip.
  • Of Law.
  • The Mathematician.
  • Mandrobulus.
  • Lysias.
  • De [...]n [...]tions, of all these writings the only extant
  • Orders of Commentaries.
  • Verses.

Lae [...]. Phavorinus, in the second of his Commentaries, saith, that Aristotle paid three Talents for his Books.

CHAP. IV.
His Death.

HE was (as Laert. Timotheus saith) very infirme of body, Laert. insomuch that he was fain to be carried up and down the Academy in a kinde of a running chair: Riding in this manner, he one day met Diogenes, whom saluting, he said, Joy be with you: But, not with you, answered Diogenes, who can endure to live being in that condition. At length he dyed willingly through griefe, as Laertius affirmes, who elsewhere citing Plutarch in the lives of Ly­sander and Scylla, saith, he dyed of the Phthiriasis; but there is no such thing extant in Plutarch.

Laert. Though he followed Plato in his opinions; yet, he did not i­mitate his temper, for he was austeer, cholerick, and had not so great command over his pleasures. In anger he threw a Dog in­to a Well, and indulging to pleasure, he went to the marriage of Cassander in Macedonia: He was also so great a Lover of mo­ny, that some Poems which he had written, not very good, he sung publickly for gain: for which vices, Dionysius writing to him, thus derides him: And we may learn Philosophy from our Arca­dian she-Scholler. Plato took no mony of his Schollers, you exact it whe­ther they are willing or not. Deipn. lib. Athenaeus cites the same Epistle, after he had reproached him for avarice and voluptuousnesse, he ob­jects his collections of mony from many persons; his love to Lasthenia, the Sardian Curtezan; after all this adding, Why do you accuse us of avarice, who your selfe omit not any sordid way of gain? Did not you after Hermias's debt was satisfied, make collections in his name amongst his friends, to your own use?

To a rich man in love with a deformed person; What need you her, Laert. saith he, for ten Talents you may have a handsomer.

To him Simonides wrot Histories, wherein he related the acti­ons of Dion and Bion.

There was another Speusippus, a Physitian of Alexandria.

XENOCRATES.

CHAP. I.
His Country, Parents, living with Plato.

Laert. XEnocrates was of Chalcedon, Son of Suid. Agatho, or Agathenor. From the years of his life 82. which in all probability ended when Polemo succeeded in the School, the first year of the 116. Olympiad, it may be gathered that he was born in the fourth year of the 95. Olympiad. He heard Plato from his Childhood. He was dull of apprehension, whence Plato comparing him with Aristotle, said, one needs a spur, the other a bridle; what an ass & what an horse have I to yoke together! He was severe, and had a sad look, for which reason Plato oft said to him, Xenocrates, sacrifice to the Graces, which was an usuall phrase to me [...]ancholy people. Aelian. 14. 9. Another time Plato sharply reprehended the roughnesse of his disposition, which hee took quietly, and unmoved; saying to one that instigated him to reply in his own defence, No, this is an advantage to me.

Laert. He accompanied Plato in his voyage to Sicily, Ath. Deipn. where at a drinking Feast, with Dionysius, being honoured with a wreath of Gold, instead of a Garland of flowers, which were bestow'd up­on the guests upon such occasions, when he went away, he put it upon the Statue of Mercury, where they used to leave their ordi­nary Garments.

Laert. When Dionysius fell out with Plato, and threatned to find one that should cut off his head, Xenocrates made answer, not be­fore he hath cut off this, shewing his own.

Va [...] ▪ hist. 3. 19. Aelian saith, that Xenocrates having taken a journey into his own Country, Aristotle with his Disciples came to Plato. S [...]eusip­pus was at that time sick, and therefore could not be with Plato. Plato being fourscore years old, (which falls upon the fourth year of the 107. Olympiad, the year before his death) his memory through age much decay'd, Aristotle fell upon him with subtle sophisticall questions, whereupon Plato gave over walking in publick, and retired with his friends to his own house. At the end of the three months Xenocrates returning from his travel, finds Aristotle walking where he had left Plato, and seeing that he and [Page 124] his friends when they went out of the School went not to Plato, but to some other part of the City, hee asked one there present, what was become of Plato, thinking he had been sick, the other an­swer'd, he is not sick, but Aristotle hath molested him, & driven him out of the School, so that now he teacheth Philosophy in his own Garden. Xenocrates hearing this, went immediately to Plato, whom he found discoursing to his Disciples, persons of great worth and eminence. As soon as he had ended his discourse, he saluted Xeno­crates, as he used, very kindly, and Xenocrates him. When the company was dismiss'd, Xenocrates, without speaking a word of it to Plato, getting his friends together, after he had chid Speusip­pus for permitting Aristotle to possesse the School, made a head against Aristotle, and opposed him with his utmost force, untill at last he reinstated him in the School. Thus Aelian. But this story, which he acknowledgeth to have taken up on no better autho­rity then vulgar report, disagrees with many circumstances of Aristotle's life, supported by far more credible Testimonies.

CHAP. II.
His Profession of Philosophie.

AFter Speusippus had held the School eight years, finding him­self not able to continue that charge any longer, hee sent to Xenocrates intreating him to take it upon him, which Xenocrates did, Laert. in the second year of the 110. Olympiad, Lysimachides be­ing Archon, not without emulation and dissension with the Pe­ripat [...]ticks, for Laert. vit. Arist. Aristotle, at his return out of Macedonia, finding Xenocrates possess'd of the Academy, instituted a School, in oppo­sition to him, in the Lycaeum, saying,

Silent to be now most disgracefull were,
And see Xenocrates possess the Chair.

Laert. vit. Arist. Some affirm, that Alexander falling out with Aristotle, to vex him, sent a present to Xenocrates Laert. vit. Xen. of 50. Talents, where of Xeno­crates took but 3000. Atticks, and sent back the rest, saying, that he needed it most that was to maintain so many. Or, as Ethic. Serm. 37. Stobaeus relates it, having entertained the Messenger, after his usuall fashion, go and tell Alexander, saith he, that after the rate I live, I shall not need 50. Talents in all my life. Stob. Eth. Serm. 77. The money being brought back to Alexander, he asked, if Xenocrates had not any friend, adding that as for his own friends, the wealth of Darius was too little for them.

[Page 125] Stob. Ec. [...]hys. 1. 3. He asserted Unity and Duality to be Gods; the first as it were Masculine, in the nature of a Father, raigning in Heaven, whom he called also Iupiter, the Odd, and the M [...]de. The other, as it were Female, and the Mother, commanding all things un­der Heaven. This he called the Minde of the Universe. He like­wise asserts Heaven to be divine, and the fiery starrs to be Olym­pian Gods, the rest sublunary invisible Deities, which permeate through the elements of matter, whereof that which passeth through the air is called Iuno, that which through the water Neptune, that which through the earth Ceres. This the Stoicks borrowed from him, as he the former from Plato.

Laert. He continued Master of the School twenty five years, untill the first year of the hundred and sixt Olympiad; then his Disci­ple Polemo succeeded him, During that time, he lived very reti­red in the Academy [...] and if at any time he went into the City, all the trades men and other people thronged to see him.

CHAP. III.
His Vertues and Apophthegmes.

Laert. Vai. Max. 4. 3. AMongst his other Vertues; he was very remarkable for his Continence, of which there is this instance: Phryne, a fa­mous Athenian Curtezan, having laid a wager with some young men his Disciples, that he could not resist her enticements, stole privately into his bed: The next morning being question'd and [...]aught at by his Disciples, she said, The wager they laid was of a man, not of a stone. To this end he used to mortifie him­selfe by incision, and cauterising of his flesh.

Val. Max. 2. 10. Cic. pro. Balbo. Laert. His wisdome and Sanctity was much reverenced by the A­thenians; for being to give his testimony, and to swear, as the custome was, that he spoke nothing but truth, the Judges all rose up, and cryed out, that he should not swear, indulging that to his sincerity, which they did not allow to one another.

Laert. Being sent with others to Philip on an Embassy, the rest re­ceived gifts from him, and went to treat in private with him; Xenocrates did neither, and for that part was not invited by him: The Ambassadours returning to Athens, said, that Xenocrates went along with them to no purpose: whereupon the Athenians were ready to impose a mulct upon him; but when they understood by him, that they were at that time to consider cheifly concer­ning the Common-wealth, Philip having corrupted the rest with gifts, and that he would not accept any, they bestowed double honours upon him. Philip said afterwards, that of those who came to him, only Xenocrates would not take any gifts.

Being sent in the time of the Lan [...]ack war (which was about [Page 126] the second year of the 104th Olympiad) Ambassadour to Anti­pater, about the redemption of some Athenian Prisoners, Anti­pater invited him to sit down to supper, whereto he answer'd in the words of Ulysses in Homer,

O Circe, what man is there that is good,
Before his friends are freed can think of food?

Antipater was so pleased with the ingenious application of these Verses, that he caused the Prisoners immediately to be set at liberty.

Ael. var. hist. 30. 3. Laert. His clemency, saith Aelian, extended not only to men, but, often to irrationall creatures, as once, when a Sparrow, pursued by a Hawk, flew to his bosome, he took it, much pleased, and hid it till the enemy were out of sight; and when he thought it was out of fear and danger, opening his bosome, he let it go, saying, that he had not betrayed a supplyant.

Laert. Bion deriding him, he refused to make any answer in his own defence; for, a Tragedy, saith he, being mocked by a Comedy, needs not a reply.

To one, who though he had neither learn'd Musick, Geome­try, nor Astronomy; yet, desired to be his Disciple: Away, saith he, you have not the handles of Philosophy. Some affirm he said, I teach not to card wool.

Antipater comming to Athens met and saluted him; which sa­lute he returned not, untill he had made an end of the discourse he was about.

Laert. Stob. Eth. 126. He was nothing proud; he assigned a particular businesse to every part of the day, a great part thereof to meditation, one part to silence.

Stob. Ser. 39. Whensoever he pierc'd a vessell of Wine, it was sower'd before he spent it, and the broaths that were made for him were often thrown away the next day; whence proverbially was used, the Cheese of Xenocrates, of things that last well, and are not easi­ly consumed.

Val. Max. 7. 2. Holding his peace at some detractive discourse, they asked him why he spoke not? Because, saith he, I have sometimes re­pented of speaking, but never of holding my peace.

Yet, this man, saith Laertius, because he could not pay the sine imposed upon Aliens, the Athenians sold: Demetrius Phale­veus bought him, contenting both parties, the Athenians with their Tribute, Xenocrates with his liberty.

CHAP. IV.
His Writings.

[...]. HE left many Writings, Verses, Exhortations, and Orati­ons, their Titles these,

  • Of Nature 6 Bookes.
  • Of Wisdome 6.
  • Of Riches 1.
  • Arias 1.
  • Of Indefinite 1.
  • Of a Child 1.
  • Of Continence 1.
  • Of Profitable 1.
  • Of Free 1.
  • Of Death 1. which some conceive to be the same with that which is extant amongst the spurious Platonick Dialogues, under the title of Axiochus.
  • Of Voluntary 1.
  • Of Friendship 2.
  • Of equity 1.
  • Of Contrary 2.
  • Of Beatitude 2.
  • Of writing 1.
  • Of Memory 1.
  • Of False 1.
  • Callicles 1.
  • Of Prudence 2.
  • Oeconomick 1.
  • Of Temperance 1.
  • Of the power of Law 1.
  • Of a Common-wealth 1.
  • Of Sancti [...]y 1.
  • That vertue may be taught 1.
  • O [...] E [...]s 1.
  • Of Fate 1.
  • Of passions 1.
  • Of Lives 1.
  • Of concord 1.
  • Of Disciples 2.
  • Of Iustice 1.
  • Of Vertue 2.
  • Of species 1.
  • Of Pleasure 2.
  • Of Life 1.
  • Of Fortitude 1.
  • [Page 128] Of One 1.
  • Of Idaeas 1.
  • Of Art 1.
  • Of Gods 2.
  • Of the Soul 2.
  • Of Science 1.
  • Politick 1.
  • Of Scientificks 1.
  • Of Philosophy 1.
  • Of Parmenides opinions 1.
  • Archidemus, or of Iustice 1.
  • Of Good 1.
  • Of things which pertain to Intellect 8.
  • Solutions concerning Speech 1.
  • Physicall auscultation 6.
  • A summary 1.
  • Of Genus's and Species 1.
  • Pythagorean assertions 1.
  • Solutions 2.
  • Divisions 8.
  • Positions 3.
  • Of Dialectick 14, & 15, & 16.
  • Of Disciplines, concerning distinctions 9.
  • Concerning Ra [...]iocination 9.
  • Concerning Intelligence 4.
  • Of Disciplines 6.
  • Concerning Intelligence 2.
  • Of Geometry 5.
  • Commentaries 1.
  • Contraries 1.
  • Of Numbers 1.
  • Theory of Arithmetick 1.
  • Of Intervalls 1.
  • Astrologick 6.
  • Elements, to Alexander concerning a Kingdom 4.
  • To Arybas
  • To Hephaestion.
  • Of Geometry 2.
  • Verses 345.

CHAP. V.
His Death.

HE died in the 82 year of his age by a fall in the night into a Basin, Laert. (wherein he was drown'd) probably in the first yeare of the 116. Olympiad, for in that year Polemo his Successour took upon him the School.

Laertius saith, there were six more of this name, but mentions only five. One, very antient, skilfull in Tacticks; another of the same City and Family with this Philosopher, Author of the O­ration upon the death of Arsinoe; the fourth, saith he, a Philoso­pher, who writ in Elegiack verse, but not happily, perhaps the same, who, Suidas saith, was nothing inferiour to this Xenocrates for Continence; the fist a Statuary, the [...]ixt, a writer of Songs, as Aristoxenus affirm.

POLEMO.

Laert. POLEMO was an Athenian of OEa [a Towne belonging to the Oenian Tribe,] his Father Philostratus (who according to Laert: Antigonus Ca­rystius) was a Citizen of great account, and kept a Chariot and horses.

Polemo in his youth was very intemperate, Laert. and dissolute; he frequently took a sum of money, and hid it in a private corner of some street, to sup­ply his extravagances upon occasion. Even in the Academy were found three oboli, which he had hid under a Pillar, upon the same account. This wildnesse caused discontent betwixt him and his wife, who, thinking her self not wel used by him, accused him [...].

6. 9. Neither did he delight (saith Valerius Maximus,) in Luxury onely, but even in the infamy thereof. On a time, coming from a Feast, not after the setting but rising of the Sun; and seeing the door of Xenocrates the Philosopher open, full of Wine, smelling sweet of unguents, crown'd with Garlands, richly attir'd, hee rush'd into his School, which was filled with a croud of learned persons. Nor contented with so rude an intrusion, he [...]ate down also, intending to make sport at his excellent [...]loquence and pru­dent precepts. Hereupon all were offended as the affront deser­ved, onely Xenocrates, continuing the same Countenance and [Page 130] gesture, fell from the discourse in which he was, and began to speak of modesty and temperance, with the gravity of whose dis­course, Polemo being reduced to repentance, first took his Gar­land off from his head, and flung it on the ground; soon after he withdrew his arme within his Cloake; Next hee laid aside the cheerfulnesse of that look which he had formerly, when he affected feasting; lastly, he wholly devested himselfe of Luxury, and being thus cured by the wholsom Medicine of one discourse, he, from an infamous Prodigall became a most excel­lent Philosopher, being Laert. from that time forward so addicted to study, that he surpass'd all the rest, and succeeded Xenocrates in the government of the School, which he began in the first year of the 116. Olympiad.

After he began to study Philosophy, he had such a constant be­haviour, that he retain'd alwaies the same Countenance, and kept the same tone in all his speech, whereby Crantor was taken with him. A mad dog having bit him by the Knee, he alone of all the Company seem'd to be unconcern'd in it, and a tumult happening thereupon in the City, he asked without any distur­bance, what was the matter? In the Theatres also, he was nothing moved. When Nicostratus the Poet, sirnamed Clytemnestra, recited somthing to him and Crates, Crates was much taken therwith, but hee made no more show then as if he had heard nothing, and was altogether such as Melanthius the Painter in his Books of Picture [...]hath describ'd him, for hesaith in his actions was express­ed a stubbornnesse and hardnesse.

Polemo used to say, we ought to exercise our selves in things, not in Dialectick Disciplines, lest, satisfying our selves with the tast and meditation of the superficiall parts of Science, we become admired for subtlety in discourse, but contradict our selves in the practise of our life.

He was facete and ingenious, shunning that which Aristopha­nes imputes to Euripides, sowernesse and harshnesse. He taught, not sitting, but, walking. The Athenians much honour'd him for his great Integrity, hee tooke great delight in Solitude, whence for the most part he dwelt in a Garden, about which his Disci­ples built themselves little lodges, near to his School. He was a studious imitatour of Xe [...]ocrates (who, Aristippus saith, much loved him) alwaies remembring his innocence, severity and gra­vity, to which, like a Dorick measure, he conformed his owne steps.

Antigonus Carystius saith, Ath. Deipn. lib. 2. that from the thirtieth year of his age to his death he drunk nothing but water.

He held that the World is God.

He much affected Sophocles, Stob. Phys. 1. 3. chiefly in those places where (to use the phrase of the Comick Poet) a Molossian dog seemeth to have writ­ten together with him. And whereas Phrynicus saith, he was

[Page 131] Not sweet, nor flat, but gently smooth; he said, that Homer was an Epick Sop [...]ocles, Sophocles a Tragick Homer.

He died very old of a consumption, and left behind him many writings. Laertius hath this Epigram upon him;

Wert thou not told, that Polemo lies here,
On whom slow sickness (man's worst passion) prey'd?
No, 'tis the robe of flesh he us'd to wear,
Which ere to Heav'n he mounted down he laid.

Of his Disciples are remembred Crates, Zeno the Stoick, and Arcesilaus.

CRATES.

CRATES was a Thriasian, Son of Antigenes; he was an Auditor of Polemo, Laert. and loved by him; He succeeded him in the government of his School. They both profited so much by one another, that living they onely fol­low'd the same institutes, but even to their last ends were alike, and being dead, were buried in the same Sepulchre. Upon which occasion Antagoras writ thus upon them both,

Who ere thou art, say ere thou passest by,
Crates and Polemo here buried lie;
Both for their mutual love no less admir'd,
Then for their eloquence, by which inspir'd,
O th' wisdom they profess'd, the age was proud,
Yet gladly to their sacred precepts bow'd.

Hence Arcesilaus, when he went from Theophrastus, and ap­ply'd himself to them, said, they were Gods, or certain reliques of the golden age.

They were nothing popular, but what Dionysiodorus an antient Musician was wont to say, may be apply'd to these, when he boasted; that none had ever heard him sing, as they had Ismenius, nor had ever seen him in a Ship, or at the Fountains.

Antigonus saith, that, he sojourn'd at Crantors, when he & Arcesi­laus lived most friendly, and that Arcesilaus dwelt with Crantor, Po­lemo with Crates, together with Lysic [...]es, who was one of the Citi­zens, and truly, Polemo, as is before mention'd, loved Crates, Crantor, Arcesilaus. But Crates dying, as Apollodorus in the third of his [Page 132] Chronicle, left Books which he had written, partly of Philoso­phy, partly of Comedy; Orations suited for publick pleading, or Embassie.

He had many eminent disciples, of whom was Arcesilaus, & Bi­ [...]n the Boristhenite, afterwards called a Theodorean from that Sect.

There were ten of this name. The First an antient Comick Poet.

The Second, an Oratour of the Family of Isocrates.

The Third, an Ingeneer, that went along with Alexander in his expeditions.

The Fourth, a Cynick.

The Fift, a Peripatetick.

The Sixt, this Academick.

The Seventh, a Grammarian.

The Eighth, writ of Geometry.

The Ninth, an Epigrammatick Poet.

The Tenth, of Tarsis, an Academick Philosopher.

CRANTOR.

CRantor was of Soli, Laert. much admired in his own Country. He came to Athens where hee heard Xenocrates, and studied with Poleomo.

He writ Commentaries, 3000. Verses, whereof some ascribe part to Arcesilaus.

Being asked how he came to be taken with Pole­mo, but answer'd, from the tone of his speech [...], never exalted nor depress'd.

Falling sick, he went to the Temple of Aesculapius, and walked there; where many resorted to him from severall parts, not thinking he stai'd in respect of his sicknesse, but that he meant to erect a School in that place; amongst the rest came Arcesilaus, whom, though he lov'd him very much, he recommended to Po­lemo, whom he himself after his recovery heard also, and was ex­treamly taken with him.

He bequeath'd his estate, amounting to 12. Talents to Arce­silaus, who asking him where he would be buried, he answer'd,

In Earth's kind bosom happy 'tis to lie.

He is said to have written Poems, and to have deposited them, sealed up in his own Country, in the Temple of Minerva; of him thus Theaetetus,

Pleasing to men, but to the Muses more.
Crantor too soon of life was dispossest,
Earth his cold body we to thee restore
That in thy arms he peacefully may rest.

[Page 133] Crantor above all admired Homer and Euripides, saying, it was hard in proper language to speak at once tragically and passionately, and quoted this verse out of his Bellerophon.

Alas, yet why alas,
Through such fate mortals passe.

Antagoras the Poet alledgeth these verses, as written by him.

Read' [...], &c. as Cal­limachus hymn▪ 1. 'Ev [...]. One doubt­lesse imitating the other, which both the inter­preters not ob­serving, have str [...]ngely rendred this place.
My Soul's in doubt, for doubtlesse is his race,
Whether I love first of all Gods shall place,
Which drew from Erebus their old descent,
And Night beyond the Oceans vast extent;
Or whether to bright Venus, or to Earth,
Thou owest thy double form and sacred birth.

He was very ingenious in imposing apt names.

He said of an ill Poet, that his verses were full of moths; and of T [...]eophrastus, that his Theses were written in a shell.

He wrote a Treatise concerning Griefe, which was generally much admired, as Cicero and Laertius attest.

He died before Polemo and Crates of the dropsy.

ARCESILAVS.

CHAP. I.
His Country, Parents, Teachers.

ARcesilaus (whom Cicero calls Arcesilas) was a Pi­tanean of Aeolis; his Father, according to Apollo [...]orus, in the third of his Chronolo­gicks, named Seuthus, or as others Scythus. He was the youngest of foure brethren, two by the same Father, only the other by the same Mother; the eldest was named Pylades: of those who had the same Father, the eldest was Maereas, Guardi­an to his Brother Arcesilaus.

He was born by computation from his death (which was in the fourth year of the Aldobrandi­nus his edition reads the 1 [...]0. hundred thirty and fourth Olympiad, the seventy fift of his age) in the first year of the hundred and sixteenth Olympiad.

[Page 134] He first heard Autolychus the Mathematician, his Country­man, before he came to Athens, with whom he travelled to Sardis.

Next he heard Xanthus an Athenian, a Master of Musick.

He heard also Hippo [...]icus the Geometrician, who, excepting his skill in that Art, was otherwise a gaping dull fellow, for which Arcesilaus deriding him, said, Geometry flew into his mouth as he gaped. Of Hipponicus falling mad, he took so great care, that he brought him to his own house, and kept him there untill he were quite cured.

He likewise, by the compulsion of his Brother, studied Rhe­torick, and being by nature vehement in discourse, and of inde­fatigable industry, he addicted himselfe likewise to Poetry. There is an Epigram of his extant upon Attalus, to this effect;

For armes and horses oft hath been the name
Of Pergamus through Pisa spread by fame:
But, now shall (if a mortall may divine)
To future times with greater glory shine.

There is another Epigram of his upon Menodorus [...] son of Eu­demus.

Far hence is Thyatire, far phrygian earth,
Whence Menodore thou didst derive thy birth.
But down to Acheron unpierc'd by day,
From any place thou knew'st the ready way.
To thee this T [...]mb Eudemus dedicates,
Whom Love hath wealthy made, though poor the Fates.

Although his Brother Maereas would have had him prof [...]ssed Rhetorick, yet was he naturally more enclined to Philosophy; to which end, he first became a hearer of Theophrastus, in which time Crantor being much taken with him, spoke that verse of Euripides to him, out of his Andromeda: ‘Mayd, if I save thee, wilt thou thankfull be?’ He answer'd in the following verse, ‘Stranger, for wife or slave accept of me.’ From thence forward they lived in intimate friendship, wherea [...] Theophrastus troubled, said, He had lost a youth of extraordinary wit, and quicknesse of apprehension.

He emulated Pyrrho as some affirm, and studied Dialectick▪ and the Eretriack Philosophy, whence Aristo said of him,

[Page 135]
Pyrrho behinde, Plato before,
And in the middle Diodore.

And Timon,

Next leaden Menedemus he pursues,
And Pyrrho doth, or Diodorus choose.

And soon after maketh him say thus; ‘Ile swim to Pyrrho, and crook'd Diodore.

He was a great admirer of Plato; whose Bookes he had.

CHAP. II.
Vpon what occasion he constituted the middle Academy.

Laert. CRates dying, Arcesilaus took upon him the government of the School, which was yielded to him by Socratides. Being possessed of that place, he altered the Doctrine and manner of Teaching, which had been observed by Plato and his successors, upon this occasion.

Plato and his followers down to Arcesilaus, held, (as was said) That there are two kinds of things, some perceptible by Sence, others perceptible only by Intellect: Aca [...]. qu [...]st. lib. 1. That from the latter ariseth Science, from the former Opinion: That the Minde only seeth that which alwaies is simple, and in the same manner, and such as it is; that is, Ideas. But, that the Senses are all dull and slow, neither can they perceive those things which seem subje­cted to Sense, because either they are so little, that they cannot fall beneath sense, or so movable and transient; that not one of them is constant or the same; but, all are in continuall lapse and fluxion. Hence they called all this part of things Opi [...]onable, af­firming that Science is no where, but, in the notions and reasons of the minde.

[...]. Acad. quaest. 4. Yet, did they professe against those, who said, the Academy took away all sence; for, they affirmed not, that there was no such thing as colour, or tast, or sapor, or sound; but; only main­tained, there was no proper mark of true and certain in the senses, there being no such any where.

Plut. cont. [...]olot. Hence they allowed, that we make use of the senses in acti­ons, from the reason that appeareth our of them; but, to trust them as absolutely true and infallible, they allowed not.

Thus held the Academicks down to Poleme, Cic. Acad. quaest. 1. of whom Arce­silaus and Zen [...] were constant Auditors; but Zeno being older then Arcesilaus, and a very subtle disputant, endeavoured to correct his doctrine, not that, as Theophrastus saith, he did ener­vate vertue; but, on the contrary, he placed all things that are reckon'd among the good, in vertue only: and this he called [Page 136] honest, as being simple, sole, one good: Of the rest, though neither good nor evill, he held, that some were according to Nature, o­thers contrary to Nature, others Mediate: Those which are ac­cording to Nature, he held to be worthy estimation, the contrary contrary; the neuter he left betwixt both, in which he placed no value. Of those which were eligible, some were of more esti­mation, some of lesse; those which were of more he called pre­serred, those of lesse rejected. And as in these, he did not change so much the things themselves as the words, so betwixt a recti­tude and a sin, an office and a praeterossice: he placed some things mediate, holding that Rectitudes consisted only in good acti­ons, sins in evill; but, offices either performed or omitted, he conceived mediate things. And whereas the Philosophers of the old Academy did not hold all Vertue to consist in Reason, but some vertues to be perfected by nature or custome▪ Zeno on the contrary placed all Vertue in Reason; and whereas the Aca­demicks held, as we said [in the life of Plato,] that all those ver­tues may be separated, Zeno maintained that could not be, a­verring, that not only the use of vertue (as the Academicks held) but the habit thereof was excellent in it selfe, neither had any one vertue, who did not alwaies make use of it. And whereas the Academicks took not away passion from man, affirming that we are subject to compassion, desire, fear, and joy by nature; but, only contracted them, and reduced them within narrower limits; Zeno affirmed, that from all these, as from so many dis­eases, a wise man must be free. And whereas they held, that all passions were naturall and irrationall, and placed in one part of the Soule Concupiscence, in the other Reason: Neither did Zeno herein agree with them, for he asserted, that passions are vo­luntary, that opinions are taken up by judgment, that immode­rate intemperance is the Mother of all passion. Thus much for Ethicks.

Cic. ibid. As for Physick, He did not allow that fift nature besides the foure Elements, of which the Academicks held Sence and Minde to be effected; for, He asserted Fire to be that nature which be­getteth every thing, both Minde and Sence. He likewise dissen­ted from them, in that he held, nothing can be made by a thing which hath no body, (of which nature, Xenocrates, and the old Academicks thought the soule to be) and that whatsoever made any thing, or was it selfe made, must of necessity be a Body▪

Cic. ibid. He likewise asserted many things in the third part of Philoso­phy, wherein He asserted some things new of the Senses them­selves, which he conceived to be joyned by a certain extrinse­call impulsion, which he called Phantasie. To these phantasies received by the Senses, He added Assent of the mind, which he held to be placed in us, and voluntary. He [...] did not allow all phantasies to be faithfull and worthy [...]redit [...] but, only those [Page 137] which have a proper declaration of those things which they seem, which phantasie when it is seen, is called comprehensible, when received and approved, he calleth it comprehension. That which was comprehended by sense, he calleth Sense, and, if it were so comprehended, that it could not be pulled away by rea­son, Science, if otherwise, Ignorance, of which kinde was opinion, infirme, and common to false or unknown things. Betwixt Sci­ence and Ignorance he placed that comprehension we mentio­ned, not reckoning it among the good nor the bad▪ [...]ut affirming that only was to be credited, whence he likewise attributed faith to the Senses, for as much as he conceived the comprehen­sion made by the Senses to be true and faithfull, not that it com­prehended all things that are in being; but that it omits nothing that can fall beneath it, as also, because nature hath given it as a rule of Science and principle of it selfe, whence notions are afterwards imprinted in the minde, from which not only prin­ciples, but certain larger waies towards the invention of reason, are found out. Errour, temerity, ignorance, opination, suspicion, and in a word, whatsoever is not of firme and constant assent, he took away from Vertue and Wisdome. In these things con­sisteth almost all the change and dissention of Zeno from the old Academicks.

Zeno thus maintaining many things contrary to Plato, as that the Soul is mortall, and that there is no other World but this, which is subject to Sense, Arcesilaus perceiving this Doctrine to spread and take much, prudently concealed the doctrine of the Academy, lest the mysteries of Plato being divulg'd and made too common, should become despicable: and therefore (saith Contra Aca­demic. [...]ib. St. Augustine) he thought it fitter to unteach the man that was not well taught, then to teach those, whom by experience he found not to be do­cile enough.

Cic. Acad. quaest. 1. Hereupon Arcesilaus undertook to oppose and contest with Zeno, not out of any pertinacity or desire of glory, but led there­unto by that obscurity of things, which had brought Socrates to a confession of his own ignorance; as likewise Democritus, Anaxa­goras, Empedocle [...], and almost all the antient Philosophers, who affirmed, That nothing could be understood, nothing perceived, nothing known: That the senses are narrow, our mindes weak, our lives short, and truth (as Democritus saith) drown'd in an abysse. That all things are held by opinion and institution, nothing left to Truth: and finally, That all things are involved in darknesse.

Cic. ibid. Thus Arcesilaus denyed there is any thing that can be known, not so much as that which Socrates reserv'd, [ that he knew nothing] conceiving all things to be hid in such darknesse, that there is nothing which can be seen or understood. For these rea­sons we ought not to professe or affirm any thing, or to approve any thing by assent; but, alwaies to restrain and withhold our [Page 138] hastinesse from errour, which then proveth great, when it ap­proveth a thing false or unknown. Neither is there any thing more vile, then by assent and approbation to prevent knowledge and perception.

Cic. ibid. He did, as was agreeable to this tenent, dispute against all assertions and doctrines; and having found, that in the same thing the reasons of two opinions directly opposite, were of equall weight, he thence inferr'd, that we ought to with-hold our as­sents ( Euseb. [...]) from both: [This Laertius means, when he saith, that he took away propositions, by reason of the repugnance of speech, and was the first that taught to argue on both sides.] Euseb. praepar. Evang. And that neither the senses nor reason are to be credited. He therefore praised that Apophthegm of Hesiod; ‘The Gods all knowledge have conceal'd from men.’

But this Contra A [...]a­dem. lib. 3. Saint Augustine affirmes was only done, to conceal mysteriously the meaning of Pla [...]o; but, they neverthelesse had and held his doctrines and decrees, which they used to unfold to those who lived with them till they were old.

He likewise, as Laertius saith, first al [...]er'd the manner of dispu­ting which Plato deliver'd, and made it more litigious by question and answer, of which, thus De [...]inib. l. 2. Cicero: Socrates used to finde out by que­stion and answer, the opinions of those with whom he discour­sed, that, if there were occasion, he might say something upon that which they answer'd: This custome not retained by his successors, was taken up by Arcesilaus, who instituted, that they who would learn of him should not question him; but, them­selves tell him what they thought, which when they had done, he disputed against it; but, his Auditors were to maintain their own opinion as much as they could possibly. This course took Arcesilaus, contrary to all other Philosophers, amongst whom, he that would learn held his peace; which courle, saith Cicero, is at this time held in the [...]Academy, where he that will learn, speaks in this manner, Pleasure seems to be the chiefe good, whereupon in a long Oration it is disputed against it, where­by may easily be understood, that they who say, a thing seemeth to me to be so, are not really of that opinion, but desire to hear the contrary maintained.

This School constituted by Arcesilaus, was called the second Academy, in relation to its descent from Plato; or, the middle Aca­demy, in respect of the new one which was afterwards set up by Carneades; though Acad. quaest. [...]. Cicero seemeth to make no distinction be­tween this and that, but calleth this the new Academy: But, though 'tis likely, that it was not at first so called; yet, upon the introduction of a newer, it was afterwards more generally known by the title of the middle, or, second Academy.

These Academicks differ from the Scepticks, in as much, as, [Page 139] though they affirmed that nothing can be comprehended; yet they took not away true or false from things: On the contrary, they held that some Phantasies were true, others false; but the Scep [...]icks hold that they are both indifferent; alike defensible by reason. The Academicks assert some things to be wholly improba­ble, some more probable then others, and that a wise man▪ when any of these occur, Euseb. praep. evang. lib. 1 [...]. may answer yes, or no, following the probability, provided that he withold from assenting. But the Scepticks hold all things to be alike indifferent, not admitting Judgement, nor allowing that either our senses or opinions can perceive true or false, and therefore no faith is to be given to them, but we ought to persist firm and unmoveable without opi­nion, not saying of any thing that it is, any more then that it is not.

CHAP. III.
His Vertues and Apopthegms.

Laer [...]. HE preferred Homer above all Writers, of whom he constant­ly read some piece before he went to bed, and as soon as he rose in the morning. When he went to read any thing in him, he said, he went to his Mistress.

[...]indar also he said was proper to raise the voice, and give us supply of words.

Hee was sententious and succinct in speech, often using ex­pressions of doubtfull meaning. He used to reprehend and chide sharply, and freely, whence Timon saith of him, ‘When thou chidst young men, think thou once wer [...] young.’

In this kind, Laertius instances his sayings to a young man, speaking confidently, &c. to an immodest young man, &c.

Emo a Chian, who though very deformed, thought himself ve­ry handsom, asking him as he put on a rich Cloak, whether hee thought a wise man might not love, Arcesilaus answered, do you mean if he be as handsom and as fine as you?

To an effeminate person, who upbraiding him as it were of pride, spoke this verse, ‘Shall we demand, great Sir, or silent be?’ He immediately answered, ‘Woman, why speak'st thou these harsh words to me?’

Being troubled with the talk of an inconsiderable mean person, he said, [Page 140] The Sons of slaves intemperately speak.’

Of another, who talk'd impertinently, and loudly, he said, he had a peevish nurse. For some he would make no answer at all.

To an Usurer, who said there was somthing he knew not, hee answer'd in these verses out of Sophocles's OEnomaus,

The course of storms hid from the bird doth lie,
Untill the time that she must lay draw nigh.

To a Dialectick Philosopher of Alexinus's School, who was not able to say any thing worthy Alexinus, he related what Phi­loxenus did to a maker of Bricks, who overhearing him sing his verses false, trod upon his bricks and broke them, saying, as you spoil mine, so I yours.

He was angry at those who learned not the liberall Sciences in due time.

In dispute, he used this word, I say, and will not such a one, (naming the person) assent to this, which many of his Dis­ciples affected to imitate, as also his manner of speaking and gesture.

He was most acute in answering appositely, and converting his discourse to the present subject, and fitting it for every time.

He was very efficacious in perswasion? whence many Disci­ples resorted to him, though sometimes he sharply touched them, which they took patiently.

He was very good, and much excited hope in his Auditors.

As to the necessaries of life, he was very liberall and commu­nicative, ready to do good, and much endeavouring to conceal it, avoiding all that kind of vain-glory. Visiting C [...]esibius, who was sick, and perceiving him to be poor, he privately put a purse un­der his pillow, which when he found, this, saith he, is the sport of Arcesilaus. Another time he sent him 1000. drachms. Quom. discern. [...]. ab. amic. Plutarch relates this as done to Apelles the Chian Painter, whom Arcesilaus besides many other testimonies of kindnesse coming to visit as he lay sick, and perceiving how poor he was, departed, and return­ing soon after, bringing twenty drachmes with him, then sitting close to Apelles's bed side, Here is nothing saies he, besides Empedo­ [...]le's four Elements,

Fire, Water, Earth, and Aether mounting high, but me thinks you lie not at your ease, and with that taking occasion to remove his pillow, he convey'd the purse privately under it, which when the old woman that tended him found, and wondring, shew'd to A­pelles, he laughing, said, This is one of Arcesilaus's thefts.

La [...]rt. He recommended Archias, an Arcadian to Eumenes King of Pergamus, by whom he was exalted to great dignity.

[Page 141] He was very liberall and free from covetousnesse, as appea­red by his Utensills of silver, and vying with Archecrates and Callicrates. He had many vessells of gold, which he lent unto many upon occasion of feasting. These silver vessells a certain man borrowed to entertain his friends withall; Arcesilaus know­ing him to be poor, would never send for them back: Others re­port he lent them to him on purpose, and when he brought them back, because he was poor, he freely bestowed them on him.

He had a fair estate at Pitane, from which Pylades his brother continually supplyed him. Eumenes also, son of Phileterus gave him many large presents, whence to him only of all Kings he applyed himselfe.

When Antigonus was much followed, and many persons thronged to his house, he forbore, declining his acquaintance. He was intimate with Hierocles, the Governour of Munichia and Pireum, and constantly, on holidaies, went thither to visit him: Hierocles often entreated him to visit Antigonus, but he refused, and went along with him as far as the dore, and there parted with him. After Antigonus's fight at Sea, many writing consola­tory Epistles to him, Arcesilaus was silent. Being sent by his Country on an Embassy to Antigonus at Demetrias, he returned frustrate of his designe.

He lived the greatest part of his time in the Academy, avoi­ding to meddle with publick businesse; but sometimes went to the Pireum, as we said, out of love to Hierocles; for which some reproved him.

He was very magnificent (indeed a second Aristippus) in the entertainment of his friends. He openly professed love to Theodote and Phileta, Curtezans of Elis, for which being reprehended, he rehearsed the Chria's of Aristippus. He was very amarous, and much affected the company of young men, whence Aristo of Chi­os, a Stoick, called him a corrupter of youth, temerarious, and impudent. Of those whom he affected are mentioned Demetrius and Leochares; Demochares son of Laches, and Pythocles son of Bu­gerus, much affected him.

For these things he was much inveighed against at the house of Hieronimus the Peripatetick, who had invited his friends to celebrate the birth day of Alcyoneus, son of Antigonus, for the keeping of which Feast, Antigonus sent yearly much mony. At this Feast Arcesilaus would not dispute amidst the cups; and when Aridelus propounded a question to him, requiring that he would say something to it, he answer'd, it is the best property of a Phi­losopher to know the seasons of all things.

But, he was so free from pride, that he counselled his Disci­ples to go and hear other Masters; and when a certain Chian youth of his School declared, that he was not pleased with what he said so much as with the discourses of Hieronimus, he took [Page 142] him by the hand and led him to the Philosopher, desiring him to cherish him according to his quality.

To one that asked why men went from other Sects to the Epi­cureans, but never from the Epicureans to other Sects: Because, saith he, of men, some are made Eunuchs, but of Eunuchs never any are made men.

Stob▪ Ser. 143. He said, where there are many medicines, and many Phy­sicians, there are most diseases; and where there are many Lawes, there is most iniquity.

Stob. Ser. [...] 12. He advised to shun Dialectick, because it turneth all things upside down.

Stob. Ser. 212. He compared Logicians to Gamsters that play at Dice, who take delight whilst they are cosen'd.

Stob. Ser. 235. He affirmed, that poverty is rugged as Ithaca, but good to bring up a child, in that it enureth to frugality and abstinence, and is generally a good School of vertue.

CHAP. IV.
His death.

Laert. WHen he drew nigh the end of his life, he bequeathed all his estate to his brother Pylades; to which end, Moereas not knowing it, he sent him first to Chios, and from thence sent for him back again to Athens. He sent three Copies of his Will, one to Amphicritus at Eretria, an other to some friends of his at Athens, the third to Thaumasias his neer kinsman, to be kept by them; with the last he sent this Letter.

Arcesilaus to Thaumasias, health.

I Gave Diogenes my Will to bring to you, for being often sick and in­firm of body, I thought fit to make my Will, lest if any suddain acci­dent should befall me, I should depart this life with some in [...]urie done to you, whom I have found so bountifull towards me. I desire that you, the most faithfull of all my friends, will take it into your custody. Ap­prove your selfe iust to that extraordinary trust which I have reposed in you, that it may appear I have made a right choice.

He died, as Hermippus saith, in a kinde of phrenzy, after he had drunk much Wine, 75 years old, in the fourth year of the 134 th Olympiad, as may be conjectured from the succession of Lacydes, in the School which began at that time. The Athenians buried him with such solemnity as never any was before.

He took not any women into the house with him, neither [Page 143] had he any children. He flourish'd according to Apollodorus in the 120. Olympiad.

There were three more of this name, one an antient Comick Poet, the second an Elegiack Poet, the third a Statuary.

LACYDES.

LAcydes succeeded Arcesilaus; Laert: he was a Cyrenean, (his Father named Alexander) a person of much gravity, and had many Aemulators. He was from his youth much given to study, poor, but pleasing to all company, and of a delightfull conversation.

As concerning his managing his houshold affairs, it is reported that when he took any thing out of the place where he kept his Provisions, he locked the dore, and threw the key in at a hole that none might steal ought from him; which his servants obser­ving, frequently took it, and, opening the dore, carried away what they thought good, and then put it in the same place again, in which fact they were never discover'd.

But the most pleasant part of the story, is, that (as Euseb. pra [...]: evaag. lib. 14. Numenius af­firms) he was thereby perswaded to be of the opinion of the mid­dle Academicks; that nothing is comprehended by sense, arguing thus; why should I think that sense can comprehend any thing cer­tainly, when I know that my own senses are so often deceived; for when I go abroad, I think that I see with my eies those things which I leave in my storehouse; when I return I find none of them; which could not be unlesse our senses were fallible and uncertain.

Lacydes upon the death of Arcesilaus, being made master of the School in the 4 th year of the 134. Olympiad, taught in the Academy, in the Gardens which were made by Attalus the King, which from him were called the Lacydean Gardens. Laertius, and, from him, Suidas, make him Institutor of the new Academy; but erroneously. He continued this charge 26 years, at the end whereof he resigned it, whilst he was yet alive, to Telecles and Euander, Phocians, his Disciples, in the second year of the 141. O­lympiad.

Attalus sending for him to come to him, returned him an­swer, that Pictures make the best shew at a distance.

Studying Geometry in his old age, one said to him, is it now time? he answered, when, if not now?

Athenaeus saith, that Lacydes and Timon Philosophers, being in­vited by one of their friends to an entertainment of two daies, and desirous to suit themselves to the company, drunk very free­ly▪ Lacyd [...]s went away first, 11. [...] half drunk, and perceiving Timon to [...] away too, said out of Homer.

[Page 144] To our great glory Hector we have slain.

The next day meeting Timon again at the same place, and seeing him, not able to take off his cups at once, make a pause, when he put it to his mouth the second time, he said out of another place of Homer, [...]. ‘Those are unhappy who contest with me.’ Aelian likewise numbers these two amongst the great drinkers, V [...]r. hist. and perhaps not unjustly; for by excesse of Wine he fell into the palsie, of which hee died in the second year of the 141. O­lympiad.

He wrote Philosophicks and of Nature.

In the School, he was succeeded, as are said, by EUAN­DER, Euander, by his Disciple, EGESINUS, whom Clemens Alexandrinus calleth Hegesi [...]aus, of Pergamus, Egesinus, by CAR­NEADES.

CARNEADES.

CARNEADES.

CHAP. I.
His Country, Parents, Time, Masters.

CARNEADES (successour of Egesinus) was of L [...]ert. Cyrene, whence Acad. qu [...]t. 4. Cicero saith, he was an acute person, as being an African. Hee was sonne of Epicomus, or Philocomus. Apollo­dorus, as cited by Laertius, affirmeth he died in the 162. Olympiad; but there is a mi­stake in the Text; for the words of Apollodo­rus relate doubtlesse to the time of his birth, which upon that Authority, we may affirm to have been in the first year of 162. Olympiad. Florus (cited by Sympo [...]. quapot [...]. 1. Plutarch) addes, he was born on the 7 th day of Tharlegion, at what time the Car­nean Festivalls were celebrated at Cyrene, whence perhaps he took his name.

This time falling after the Callippical period, we shall compute it according to Do [...]tr. [...] ▪ p. Petavius his method, which although it be not exempt from question, yet is better then that of Scaliger, whose method is not reconcileable to Ptolomy's observations.

The fourth of the 164. Olympiad, was

Of the Julian period 4585.
Epoche of the Callippick period 4383.
Which subducted, there remains 202.
Subduct two perionods more 152.
remains 50.

The year propounded therefore is the 50 th of the third peri­od. The Neomenia of He [...]atombaeon, Iune 26. which is the 177 th day of the Iulian year; the 7 th of Thargelion (according to Petavius) at that time was the 302. of the Attick year.

To 177.
adde 302.
Summe 479.
Subduct 365
Remains 114.

The 114 th day of the Julian year is the 24 th of April, on which fell the 7 th of Thargelion; which, the Dominicall Letter being B. fell on Sunday, Proleptically taken.

Laert. He was Disciple to Egesinus the Academick, and Cic. Acad. quaest. 4. learned Lo­gick of Diogenes the Stoick, whence in arguing he would many▪ times say, If I have concluded right, the cause is my own; if not right, Diogenes must return the [...]ina he had of me; which was the price the Dialectick Philosophers took.

CHAP. II.
How he constituted the new Academy.

HE succeeded Egesinus in the School, and is by Cicero reckon'd the fourth from Arcesilaus, (who constituted the middle Aca­demy, introducing a suspension of Assent, grounded upon the un­certainty of things:) Carneades, constituted the new Academy, maintaining the same kind of suspension, with no lesse eagerness; yet upon more moderate grounds: Numen. apud. Euseb. for he held that the incompre­hensibility of things, proceeded not from the nature of the things themselves, as Arcesilaus maintained; for as much as every thing really existeth in it self, and if any thing be affirmed or denied of another, it is true or false, as to the thing it self; but the things themselves remaining firm, we derive from them a Phantasia and similitude, which for the most part like false messengers lie and deceive us. To all true things there some false adjoined, and those so like, that, there is no certain note of Judication and assent, wherefore we cannot perceive any thing to be true.

But he was nothing lesse rigid as to the Academicall suspen­sion, for Cic. Acad. quaest. 4. he denied that any thing could be perceived, not so much as that very maxime; Nothing can be perceived, arguing thus. All Phantasmes are of two kinds; the first included the perceptible, and imperceptible; the second kind, the probable; and the improbable. Those which are contrary to sense and evi­dence, [Page 147] pertain to the former division; against the latter we ought not to say any thing. Wherefore there is no Phantasie fol­lowed by perception, but by approbation many; for it were con­trary to nature that nothing should be probable.

More fully Adv. Mathem. Sextus Empericus. Carneades, saith he, did not on­ly oppose the Stoicks, but all that went before him, as to judg­ment. His first and common argument against all, is, that, by which he showeth absolutely, that there is nothing from which truth can be judged; not reason, not sense, not phantasy, nor any things, for all these in a word deceive us. His second argument is that whereby he shewes, that although there be something that doth judge, yet it cannot exist without an affection from evidence. For an animall differeth from inanimate things by the sensitive faculty, it apprehendeth thereby both it selfe and ex­ternall things; but sense remaining immovable, impassible, and immutable, is not sense, nor apprehendeth any thing, but being changed, and after some manner affected by incursion of evi­dents, then it declareth things. In that affection therefore of the soul which ariseth from evidence, we are to seek that which judgeth. This affection is declared when that appeareth from which it proceedeth, which affection is nothing else but phan­tasy. Phantasy therefore is a certain affection in an animall, which sheweth both it selfe and some others, as when we see any thing, our sight is affected in some manner, so, as it was not before that act of seeing. By this alteration we apprehend two things: First, the alteration it selfe, that is the phantasy. Second­ly, that from which this alteration proceeds, the things visible. The like in the rest of the senses. As therefore light manifesteth it selfe and all things in it, so phantasy being the chiefe guide of knowledge in an animall, must like unto Light, manifest both it selfe, and that evident object which effecteth it. But because it doth not alwaies shew that which is true, but often erreth and differeth from the thing whence it proceedeth, like ill messen­gers, it necessarily followeth that all phantasies cannot leave a judgment of truth, but only if it be true. Again, because there is no phantasie so true, but it may be false; and of all phantasies that seem true there are some false, which differ little from them, that which judgeth must consist in common phantasy of true and false. But the common phantasy of these comprehen­deth not, and if it comprehendeth not, neither is there any thing that judgeth. And if phantasy have not a judicative power, neither can reason judge, for that is derived from phantasy, and justly: For, that whereof it judgeth, ought first to appear unto it; but nothing can appear but through sense void of reason; therefore neither sense void of reason; nor reason it selfe is that which judgeth.

[Page 148] Thus disputed Carneades against all other Philosophers, to shew there is not any thing that judgeth. But, being demanded what judgeth, as to the leading of life and acquisition of beati­tude, he hath recourse to probable phantasy; and together with probable, undistracted and circumcurrent, their differences these. Phantasy is the phantasy of somthing, viz. of that of which it is made, and of that in which it is made: That of which it is made is the externall sensible object; that in which, the Man. It hath two relations, one to the object phancyed, the other to the phan­tasm derived from that object. From the relation to the object it is either true or false; true, when it agreeth with the object; false, when it disagreeth: From its relation to the phantasme, there is one which seemeth true, another false. That which see­meth true is by the Academicks called Emphasis, and probability, and probable phantasie; that which seemeth not true is called Apemphasis, improbability, and not-p [...]obable phantasy. For, neither that which seemeth false, and is such; nor that which is true, and seemeth not such, have any thing in their nature perswasive. But, of these phantasies, that which is manifestly false, and seemeth not true, limiteth the judicatory, but is not that which judgeth, as likewise produceth from that which is, but differs from it, such as was that of the fury proceeding from Electra to Orestes. Of that which seemeth true, one kinde is tenuious, as that which is in a thing so little, as that it is not visible, either because it takes not up room enough, or by reason of the weak­nesse of sight, which receiveth things confusedly, and not di­stinctly. The other is that which hath this common property with the true, that it seemeth to be very true. Now of these, the tenuious, loose, remisse phantasy cannot be that which judgeth; for that which cannot clearly manifest it selfe, nor the thing that effected it, cannot attract us, nor invite assent; but that which seemeth true and is manifest enough, that, according to Carneades, is the judge of truth.

This being that which judgeth, it hath a great latitude, and being extended into another species, hath a more probable and vehemently effective phantasy. Probable is taken three waies; first, for that which is true, and seemeth true; secondly, for that which is false, and seemeth true; thirdly, for that which is true, common to both. Whence that which judgeth must be that phantasy which seemeth true, which the Academicks call pro­bable. Sometimes the false incurreth; so that it is necessary to use the common phantasy of true and false; yet, not because that more seldome incurreth, I mean that which imitateth the truth, we are not to give credit to that which is for the greater part true, whereby it happeneth our judgment and actions are for the most part directed.

[Page 149] That which first and commonly judgeth, Carneades held to be this. But forasmuch as phantasy sometimes is not of one kinde, but like a chain, one dependeth on another, there must therefore be a second judge, which is probable and undistracted phantasy. As he who receiveth the phantasy of a man, necessarily receiveth the phantasy of such things as are about him, and without him; of the things about him, as colour, magnitude, figure, motion, speech, cloathing, shooes; of things without him, as aire, light, day, heaven, earth, companions, and the like. When therefore none of these phantasies seems false, but all agree in seeming true, we credit it the more. That such a one is Socrates we be­lieve, because he hath all those things which Socrates useth to have, as colour, magnitude, figure, gesture, cloak, in none of these disagreeing with it self. And as some Physitians argue a man to be in a feaver, not from one symptome, as from a high pulse, or great heat, but from the concurrence of that heat with the pulse, as also from ulcerous touch, rednesse, thirst, and the like, all agreeing together. So the Academick maketh a judgment of truth, from a concurrence of phantasies, and when none of all the phantasies that joyne in the concurrence retract him as false, he saith, that which incurreth is true.

That there is a credible undistracted concurrence, is manifest from Menelaus: Having left in his ship an image of Helene which he had brought from [...]roy, as if it had been Helene her selfe, lan­ding at the Island Pharos, he there met with the true Helene, and from her attracted a true phantasy, but would not believe that phantasy, being distracted by the other, which told him, that he had left Helene in the Ship. Such is undistracted phantasy there­fore, which likewise seemeth erroneous, for as much as there are some more undistracted then others. Of undistracted phanta­sies, that is most credible and perfect which maketh a judg­ment.

Moreover, there is a circumcurrent phantasy, the form where­of is next to be declared. In the undistracted we only enquire whether none of those phantasies which joyne in concurrence, attract us as false, but that they all seem true, and not impro­bable. But in that which is made by concurse, which useth cir­cumcurrence, strictly examines every phantasy which is in that concurrence, as in Assemblies, when the people take account of every particular person that stands for the Magistracy, whe­ther they deserve that power and right of judging. In the place of Judgment, there is that which judgeth, and that by which the judgment is made, the distance and intervall, figure, time, manner, affection, and operation, each of which we examine strictly. That which judgeth, whether the sight be dimme, for if it be, it is too weak for judgment; that which is judged, [Page 150] whether it be not too little; that through which, whether the air be obscure; the distance, whether it too great; the medium, whether confused; the place, whether too wide and vast; the time, whether too suddain; the affection, whether not phrene­tick; the operation, whether not unfit to be admitted. For if all these be in one, that which judgeth is probable phantasy, and to­gether, probable, undistracted, and circumcurrent. Wherefore as when in life we enquire concerning some little thing, we exa­mine one witnesse; when we enquire into somthing of greater consequence, we examine more; but when of a thing most ne­cessary, we examine each of the witnesses by the joynt testimony of all. So saith Carneades, in light, inconsiderable matters, we make use of probable phantasy, only for judgment; in things of some moment, of undistracted phantasy; in things that concern well and happy living, circumcurrent phantasy.

And as in things of great moment they take diverse phanta­sies, so in different circumstances they never follow the same; for they say, they attend only probable phantasy in such things wherein the circumstance of time alloweth not a strict exami­nation: As for instance. The enemy pursues a man; he comming to a Cave, takes a phantasy, that there are some enemies there lying in wait: transported by this phantasy as probable, he shunneth and flyeth from the Cave, following the probability of that phantasy, before he accuratly and diligently examine, whe­ther there really be any enemies in ambush in that Cave or no. Probable phantasy is followed by circumcurrent, in those things in which time allowes a curious examination of each particu­lar, to use judgment upon the incurrent thing. As a man com­ing into a dark room, and seeing a rope rolled up, thinking it to be a serpent, he flies away; but afterwards returning, he exa­mines the truth, and perceiving it not to stir, begins to think it is not a serpent; but withall considering, that serpents are somtimes frozen or nummed with the cold, he strikes it with his staffe: and having thus by circumcurrence examined the phan­tasy which incurred to him, he assenteth, that the phantasy he had taken of that body as a serpent is false. And again, as I said, when we manifestly behold, we assent that this is true, having first over-run in our thoughts that our senses are all entire, and that we behold this waking, not in a dream; that the air is per­spicuous, and a convenient distance from the object. Hereby we receive a creditable phantasy, when we have time enough to examine the particulars concerning the thing seen. It is the same in undistracted phantasy, which they admit, when there is nothing that can retract us, as we said of Menelaus. Hitherto Sextus.

Yet, Cic. Acad. quaest. 4. though nothing can be perceived, a wise man may assent [Page 151] to that which is not perceived; that is, he may opini [...]nate; but so as he knoweth himself to opinionate, and that there is nothing which can be comprehended and perceived.

He asserted the ultimate end to be the enjoyment of naturall principles, De [...]in. lib. 2. which, saith Cicero, he maintained, not that he really thought so, but in opposition to the Stoicks.

He read the Books of the Stoicks very diligently, Laert. and disputed against them with so good successe, that it gave him occasion to say; If Chrysippus had not been, I had not been.

Clitomachus used to say of him, he could never understand what he really held; Cic. Acad. quaest. 4. for he would somtimes argue on one side, some­times on the other; and by the calumny of his wit, saith Cicero, many times deride the best causes. Of the Sorites used by him, see Sextus Empiricus.

CHAP. III.
Vpon what occasion he was sent on an Embassy to Rome

Plut vit. Cat. Agel. 7. 14. Ma [...]r. Satur. 1. 5. THE Athenians being fined by the Romans about 500. Ta­lents, at the suit of the Or [...]pians and Sicyonians, for destroy­ing Oropus a City of Baeotia, sent three Philosophers on an Embassie to the Romane Senate, to procure a mitigation of this fine, which had been imposed upon them without hearing their defence; Carneades the Academick, Diogenes the Stoick, and Critolaus the Pe­ripatetick. About the time of this Embassy there is much disagree­ment amongst Authors. Agellius saith, they came after the second Punick War, and maketh Ennius later then their coming; which Petavius justly conceiveth to be false, for as much as Enni­us died in the 585 th year from the building of the City. But Cice­ro affirmeth this Embassy to have been when P. Scipio and M. Marcellus were Consuls, which was the 599 th year. Pausanias reckoneth it upon the 603 d year of the City, which Casaubone approveth.

Each of these Philosophers, to shew his learning, made choice of severall eminent parts of the City, where they discoursed be­fore great multitudes of people to the admiration of all. The E­loquence of Carneades was violent and rapid; that of Critolaus, neat and smooth, that of Diogenes modest and sober. Carneades one day disputed copiously concerning justice before Galba and Cato, Lactant. de Inst. lib. 51▪ the greatest Orators of that time. The next day he subverted all he had said before by contrary Arguments, a [...]d took away that Justice which he had so much commended. This he did the bet­ter [Page 152] to confute those, that asserted any thing. That dispute where­by he overthrew Justice is recorded in Cicero by L. Furius.

To these three Philosophers resorted all the studious young men, Plut. and frequently heard and praised them. chiefly the sweetnesse of Carneades, which was of greatest power and no lesse fame then power, attracting eminent and benigne hearers, filled the City with noise like a great wind; and it was reported that a Grecian person qualified to admiration, attracting all, had infu­sed a serious affection into the young men, whereby forgetting other divertisements and pleasures, they were carried on as it were with a kind of madnesse to Philosophy. This pleased all the Romans, who gladly beheld their Sonns instructed in Greek learning by such excellent men. Onely Cato at the first noise of Admiration of the Greek Learning, was troubled, fearing the young men should apply themselves that way, and so preferre the glory of eloquence before Action and Military discipline. The fame of Philosophers encreasing in the City, and C. Acilius, (whom Agellius and Macrobius call Caecilius) an eminent person, having at his own request been the Interpreter of their first Ora­tion to the Senate; Cato (who was then very old) under a fair pretence, moved, that these Philosophers might be sent out of the City, and coming into the Senate-house, blamed the Magi­strates, that they had so long suffered such Ambassadors to con­tinue amongst them without any answer, who were able to per­swade them to any thing: wherefore he first desired that some­thing might be determined concerning their Embassie, that they might be sent back again to their own Schools, and instruct the Sons of Graecians, and that the Romane youth might, as they did before, apply themselves to the observance of their own Laws and Magistrates. This he did not out of anger to Carneades, as some thought, but out of an ambitious aemulation of the Greek huma­nity and Literature.

CHAP. IV.
His Vertues and Apophthegmes.

HE was a person infinitely industrious, lesse conversant in Physick then Ethick, Lib. 8. c. 7. and so studious that he neglected to cut his hair and nailes. Valerius Maximus saith, hee was so studious, that when he lay down at meales, his thoughts were so fixt, that he forgot to put his hand to the Table, and that Melissa, who lived with him as a wife, was fain to put him in mind thereof, and help him.

[Page 153] He was so e [...]inent for Philosophy, that the Oratours them­selves would many times break up their schools and come and hear him.

He had a great and loud-voice, whereupon the Gymnasiarch sent to him not to speak so loud, whereto he answering, send me the measure by which I should speak; the other wisely and appositely repli'd, you have a measure, your Hearers.

He was sharply invective, and in argument almost invincible. He avoided feasting, out of the reason we mentioned, his great studiousnesse.

One named Mentor a Bythinian, as Phavorinus saith, who had endeavoured to seduce a Mistris that he kept, coming into the school, he presently jeasted at him, in turning these words of Homer,

Hither comes one oppress'd with hoary years,
Like Mentor in his voice and looks appears,
Who from the School I charge you turn away.

The other rising up, reply'd, ‘He thus proclaim'd, the rest did streight obey.’

Being to dispute with Chrysippus, he purg'd himself by white Hellebore to sharpen his wit, lest any corrupt humours in his stomach might oppresse the vigour and constancy of his mind.

He compared Dialectick to the fish Polypus, Stob. Ser. 212. which when its claws grow long, bites them off; so Logicians, growing subtle, confute their own assertions.

He advised men in their greatest prosperity to be mindfull of a change, Plut. de tranp. anim. for that which is unexpected is most grievous.

He said the Sons of rich men and Kings learn nothing well but Riding, Plut de adul. & Am. dis. for their Masters flatter them; they who contest with them, willingly yield to them; but a horse considers not whether a private man or a Prince, a poor man or a rich bee on his back, but if he cannot rule him, he throws his Rider.

He seemed to be extreamly averse from death, Laert. whence he of­ten said, the same Nature which hath put us together will dissolve us; and hearing that Antipater dyed by drinking poison, he was a litle animated by his constancy in death, and said, then give me too, they asking what, VVine, saith he,

In the midst of the night he was struck blind, Laer [...]. and knew not of it, but waking, bid his servant bring a light; the servant did so, telling him he had brought one, then, said he, read you.

CHAP. V.
His Death and Writings.

HE lived according to Laertius 85. years, or according to Cice­cero. 90. The words of Lae [...]. Apollodorus that he died in the fourth year of the 162 d Olympiad, which falleth upon the 626 th year from the building of Rome, may easily be evinced to be false, by the greatest part of the Circumstances of his life; particularly from this; that Antonius in Cicero saith, when hee went Pro­Consull into Asia, he found Carneades the Academick at Athens, who opposed all in dispute, according to the manner of his Sect. The year of Antonius's Pro-Consulship was the 652. year from the building of Rome. But this account as we said before, is to be applyed to the time of his birth, from which the 85 th falleth upon the first year of the 184 th Olympiad, the 90 th upon the 2 d of the 185 th.

Laertius saith, at his death there was a great Eclipse of the Moon, which some interpreted to proceed from a Sympathy with his losse. Upon this Eclipse I conceive Petavius grounded his computation of Carneades's death, when he saith, Doct. temp. it was upon the first year of the 163. Olympiad. May 2. [...]er: 2. hora. 5. 46. at A­thens. But there being a mistake of the year, there is consequent­ly a greater in the account of the feria and hour.

Carneades, as Cicero saith, wrote four Books of Suspension of Assent. He wrote likewise▪ Epistles to Ariarathes King of Cappado­cia, the only monument left behind him, extant in Laertius's time. Whatsoever else went under his name, Laer [...]ius saith, was writ­ten by his Disciples, of whom hee had many, the most eminent Clitomachus.

There are remembred two more of this name, one a Philoso­pher, Disciple to Anaxagoras, mentioned by Suidas; the other an Epigrammatick Poet, mentioned by Laertius.

CLITOMACHVS.

Laert. CLITOMACHUS was a Carthaginian, son of Stephan. Diognetus. He was first called Asdrubal, as Plutarch and Laertius af­firm, L [...]er [...] and profess'd Philosophy in his own Country, and native Language. Being forty years old, he went to Athens, and heard Carneades, who being much taken with his industry, instructed and exercised him in Philosophy. With Carneades, Cicero saith, he lived untill he was old, and succeeded him in the School, and chiefly illustrated his Doctrines by his writings, the number of which bookes being above foure hundred, were a sufficient testi­mony of his Ci [...]. Acad. Qu. l. 4. Laert. industry, and that he had no lesse of wit, then Carneades of eloquence. He was well vers'd in three Sects, the Academick, Peripatetick, and Stoick.

Of his books are remembered by Cicero, one Cic. Tusc. Qu. 4. of Consolation to his captive Country-men, Carthage being then subdued by the Romans; another to Cic. Acad. Qu. 4. Caius Lucilius the Poet, wherein he explained and defended the Academick suspension of Assent, having written before of the same things to L. Censorinus, who was Consul with M. Manilius, the summe of which discourse was this.

Cic. Acad. 4. The Academicks hold there are such dissimilitudes of things, that some seem probable, others on the contrary. But this is not ground enough to say that some things may be perceived, others cannot, because there are many false that are probable, but no false can be perceived and known. Those therefore ex­treamly erre, who affirme the Academicks to take away sense; for they say not, there is no colour, sapor, or sound; but dispute, that there is not any proper inherent note in these of true and certain: (which having expounded, he adds) A wise man sus­pends assent two waies; one, when [as we know] he absolutely refuseth to assent to any thing; another, when he with­holds from answering, either in approbation or improbation of somthing, so that he neither denyeth nor asserteth it. In the first way he assents to nothing, in the second he will follow probability, and according as he finds it or not, answers yes or no. He who withholdeth his assent from all things, is yet moved, and acteth somthing. He reserves therefore these phantasies by which we are excited to action, and those of which being que­stion'd, we may answer on either part, only as of a thing that [Page 156] seemeth to us so, but without assent; neither are all such phan­tasies approved, but only those which are not obstructed by any thing.

Cic. Tusc. quaest. 5. In asserting good, he joyned pleasure with honesty, as Cal­lipho also did.

Sext. Empir. adv. Math. He was a great enemy to Rhetorick, as Critolaus the Peripate­tick, and Charmidas were also. Arts they did not expell out of Cities, knowing them to be very profitable to life, no more then they would drive Oeconomick out of Houses, or Shepheards from their Flocks; but they all persecuted, and every where ejected the art of speaking, as a most dangerous enemy.

Stob. Ser. 212. He compared Dialectick to the Moon, which is in continu­all increase or decrease.

Slob. Ser. 48. Falling sick, he was taken with a fit of a Lethargie, out of which he no sooner came, but he said, Love of life shall flatter me no longer; and thereupon with his own hands ended his life.

PHILO.

Stob. Eclog. Ethic. PHILO was of Larissa, he heard Clitomachus many years, and is named by Sextus Empericus, as Constitutor of a fourth Academy; but Cicero affirmes, he dissallowed the di­stinction of Academies, and wrote expressely to prove the first and the new Academy to be both one. Cicer. Whilst he lived, the Academy wanted not a Patron. Plut. vit. Cic. The Romans admired him, as Plutarch affirms, above all Clitomachus's Schollers, for his excellent discourse, and loved him for the sweetnesse of his disposition. Cicero no sooner went out of the first schooles and rudiments of learning, but he became an auditor of Philo, as he acknowledgeth himselfe.

Amongst other excellent things (saith Eclog. Ethic. Stobaeus) he gave this Division of Philosophy. He compared Philosophy to a Physician: As the office of a Physician is first to perswade the sick person to permit himselfe to be cured; next to confute the reasons of his adversary: So is it of a Philosopher, both which consist in exhortation. Exhortation is a discourse inciting to vertue; whereof one part explaineth its great use, the other refelleth adversaries, or such as any way calumniate Philosophy. The comparison holds in a second manner, thus: As the part of a Physitian, after he hath perswaded the Patient to admit of cure, is, to apply the means thereof, as well to remove the causes of the disease, as to induce and settle health; so is it in this Science. After exhortation, he endeavoureth to apply the cure, by re­moving false opinions wherewith the soul is infected, and by substituting true. In the second place therefore it treats of good and evill, for the sake of which the exhortation was made. Thirdly, the comparison holds thus: As all Medicines refer to one end, health; so all Philosophy to Beatitude. That part which treats of ends is joyned with another which treats of life. For as in Medicine, it is not sufficient to restore health, unlesse it likewise deliver rules by which it may be preserved; so in life, some precepts are required for conservation of the end: And this part also is twofold; private, or common: One considers the affairs of particular persons, as, whether a wise man should mannage a Common-wealth, whether he may live with Princes, whether he may marry: The other considers [Page 158] the businesse of all in generall; as, what Commonwealth is best, how Magistrates are to be chosen. This common part is called Politick, and is treated of distinctly by it selfe, as being of greatest latitude. Now is fall were wise men, there would be no need of more places, for the more subtle divisions would emerge from the precedent. But because there must likewise be a care of the middle sort of men, who cannot apply them­selves to long disputations, either through want of time, or diversion of businesse, there must not be omitted a treating of precepts, which delivereth short rules concerning the use of each.

As to the Stoicall judicatory, Sex. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. 1. 33. comprehensive phantasy, he held all things to be incomprehensible; as to the nature of the things themselves, comprehensible. Thus he took away the comprehen­sive phantasy asserted by Zeno.

He held that to be a good connex; Sex. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. 2. 11. which beginneth from true and endeth in false, as (if it be day, and I dispute) this, If it is day, I dispute: According to which tenet there may be true axioms three waies, a false only one way: For, when it begin­neth from true, and endeth in true, it is true; as, If it is day, it is light: And when it beginneth from false, and endeth in false, it is true; as, If the earth flies, the earth hath wings. Likewise if it beginneth from false and endeth in true, it is true; as, If the earth flies, it is earth. That which is false, is that which beginneth from true, and endeth in false; as, If it is day, it is night; for, the antecedent, it is day, is true; but the consequent, it is night, is false.

He appointed, Tusc. Qu. l. 2. that the precepts of Oratours should be deli­vered at one time, those of Philosophers at another.

ANTIOCHVS.

Plut. vit▪ Cicer. ANTIOCHUS was an Ascalonite, Cic. Ac. qu. 1. brother of Aristus, Disciple of Philo. He lived with L. Acad. Qu. 4. Lucullus, the Quae­stor and Generall; he was also a great friend to cio. de Leg. lib. 2. Atticus, whom he invited to the Academy. He is named by Sextus Empericus, as Constitutor of a fifth Academy: For, as Vit. Cicer. Plutarch saith, he fell off from the Sect of Carneades, either moved by the evidence of sense, or, as some thought, by ambition, and dissention with the Disciples of Clitomachus and Philo. So that with some little [Page 159] alteration, he made use of the Doctrines of the Stoicks; and Cic. Acad. Quaest. 4. though he were called an Academick, he had been, but for some alterations, an absolute Stoick; Sext. Empir. Pyrrh. Hypot. 1. 33. whence it was said of him, He taught the Stoicall Philosophy in the Academy; for he mani­fested, that the Doctrines of the Stoicks were in [...]lato. In his old age, saith Acad. Quaest. 4. Cicero, he betook himselfe to the old Academicks, for­saking the new, Cic. de finib. lib. 5. and diligently enquiring into the opinion of the Antients, Acad. Quaest. 4. endeavoured to follow Aristotle and Xenocrates, Cic. de nat. Deor. l. 1. professing, that the Stoicks and Peripateticks agreed in the thing, and differed only in words. To which effect Cicero mentions a Book which he sent to Balbus: He wrote also Cic. Acad. Quaest. 4. another against his Master Philo, entituled Sosus. Flut. vit. Cicer. Cicero being at Athens heard him, and was much taken with the eloquence and volubility of his discourse, ( Cic. Acad. Quaest. 4. declaring him to be the most polite and acute of all Philosophers in his time) [...]lut. but not with the new Doctrine which he introduced.

Thus far there is a continued series of the Academick Phi­losophers.

FINIS.
THE HISTORY OF PHILO …

THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

The Sixt Part, Containing the Peripatetick Philosophers.

[figure]

LONDON, Printed for Humphrey Moseley, and Tho▪ Dring. An. Dom. 1656.

ARISTOTELES.

ARISTOTELES.

CHAP. I.
His Country, Parents, and time of his Birth.

UPon the death of Plato his Disciples separated themselves into two Sects. The first continu­ed in the same school, where he taught, the Academy; the other possess'd the Lyceum. The first was known by the generall name of Academicks, or Am [...]n [...]n. Sub. finem [...]comme [...]. in pr [...]am. Por­phyr. Peripateticks of the Academy; the the other by the generall name of Peripate­ticks, or more particularly, Peripateticks of the Lyceum. Of the first we have discoursed already; we come now to the other, of which Aristotle was the Head.

Laert. Aristotle was born at Stagira, a City of Thrace, according to Polymn. Herodotus, Lib. 4. & [...]. Thucydides, Eliac. Pausanias and Suidas, by others placed in Macedonia, to take from him the imputation of a Barbarian. It was seated upon Strymon a River which parts those two Coun­tries, having a Haven called [...], and a little Island of the same name belonging to it. This place, to which Aristotle ow'd his birth, he afterwards requited with extraordinary Gratitude.

Laert. [...]m [...]n. His Father was named Nicomachus, descended from Nicoma­chus Son of Machaon (whose skill in Medicine is celebrated by Homer) Son of Aes [...]ulapius, from whom Nicomachus, Aristotle's Father, derived not only his Pedigree, but his art also, for he was a Physician. Suidas saith, he wrote six Books of Medicine, and one of Physick. De compos. medicam. Galen alledgeth a Plaister of one Nicomachus; ei­ther this or the elder. This Nicomachus ( Bassus. whom some affirm to have been grandson to Hipp [...]crates the Physician) lived in the time of Amyntas King of Macedonia, (Father of Philip) a Prince (as Iustine witnesseth) eminent for all Royall Vertues. To him Nicomachus was not only Physician, but friend and favourite. Chilia [...]. Tzetzes forgot these relations of Aristotle (as Nunnesius observes) when he affirmed that he was called an Aesculapian figuratively, in respect of his skill in Medicine, though it be true also that hee did professe that Art.

His Mother Laertius and Suidas name Phaestias, Epist. [...]d Am­maum. Dionysius Hali­carnassaeus, and Ammonius, Phaestis. Vit. Arist. if he were the Author. Ammonius saith, she also was [Page 2] descended from Aesculapius, alledging in testimony thereof this Epigram,

His Mother Phaesis, Sire Nicomachus,
Descended both from Aesculapius.

But Dionysius Halicarnassaeus saith, she was daughter a Chalci­dian, one of the Colony which was sent from Chalcis to Stagira. Her Picture, Aristotle, in piety to her memory, caused to be made by Protogenes an eminent Painter of that time, which Picture Lib. 35. cap. 9. Pliny reckons amongst the choicest pieces of that Master.

Aristotle (as Suidas affirms) had a Brother named Arimnestus, and Sister Arimneste. His Brother died before him, without issue, as appears by his will.

Aristotle was born, according to the testimonies of Laert. Apollodo­rus, Epist. ad Ammaeum. Dionysius Halicarnassaeus and others, in the first year of the 99 t• Olimpiad, at what time Diotrephes was Archon at Athens, 44. years after the Birth of Plato, as Deipn. lib. Athenaeus accounts, more justly then Ammonius and Suidas, who reckon but 42. before the birth of Demosthenes, three years. Lib. 17. cap. 21. Agellius affirms, he was born the seventh year after the recovery of the City of Rome from the Gaules by Camillus; Nunnes. in vit. Aristot. repeated by Schottus in vit. compar at. A­rist. & demosth. but because (as Plutarch saith) it is hard to find out on what year the City was taken, it will be hard also to find upon what year it was recovered. The recovery was seven months after its taking, but, in the following year, for it was ta­ken in Iuly, recover'd in February. If therefore as Valerius Flaccus, Agellius, and Cassius Hemina account, the taking of the City was in the 363 d year from the building thereof, it was recover'd in the 364 th. Thus Aristotle was born in the first year of the 99 th O­lympiad, the 370 th from the building of Rome.

But, if a Livy affirms, the taking of Rome was in the 365 th year from the building thereof, and its recovery in the 366 th, Aristotle according to that account must have been born in the third year of the 99 th Olympiad, in the 372 d year from the building of the City. Again, if the City were taken, in the 364 th year after the building thereof, and recover'd in the 365 th year, as Varro, Pliny, Dionysius Halicarnassaeus account, whom Scaliger followeth, A­ristotle must have been born in the second year of the 99 th Olym­piad, the 371. from the building of the City, reckoning alwaies ten months for a year, and not casting them off, as Pliny and o­thers seem to do, and beginning immediately the next year, which months being reckoned, the account will agree with ours; hi­therto Nunnesius.

CHAP. II.
His first Education and Studies.

Ammon. N Icomachus and Phaestis the Parents of Aristotle being both dead, he was brought up by Proxenus an Atarnean, during which time being yet very young, he learned the Liberall Scien­ces, as appeareth, saith Ammonius, from those writings of his which partly concern Poetry, partly the Poets themselves, as likewise from his Homericall questions, and severall Books of the Art of Rhetorick.

Ammon. In gratitude for this care taken by Proxenus in his education, Aristotle afterwards, not only bred up in like manner Nica [...]or, the Son of Proxenus, in all kinds of Learning, but adopted him his Son, and with his Estate bequeathed his Daughter to him. Laert. in Testa [...], Arist. He likewise caused the Statues of Proxenus and his wife, to be made and set up in honour of them, as is manifest by his Will.

Deipn. lib. 8. Athenaeus (citing an Epistle of Epicure) and Var. hist. 5. 9. Aelian relate, that having consumed the inheritance left by his Father in prodi­gality and luxury; he betook himself to the Warres, wherein having ill successe, he profess'd Medicine, and by chance, coming into Plato's School, and hearing their disputes, being of a wit far beyond the rest, he addicted himself to Philosophy, and became famous therin. But this agrees not wel with the circumstances of his story, as related by Authors of greater credit and lesse pre­judice.

CHAP. III.
How he heard Plato.

Ammon. HAving attained the age of 17. years, he went (in obedience to the Pythian Oracle, which advised him to addict himself to Philosophy) to Athens, Laertius saith (out of Apollodorus) that he was then but seventeen years old, in which year▪ Nausigenes was Archon; Dionysius Halicar [...]assaeus saith, it was the year fol­lowing, at what time Polyzelus was Archon, perhaps it was upon Nausigenes's going out of his Office, whom Polyzelus succeeded. But Laert. Eumenus is much mistaken, who saith, he was thirty years old when hee came first to Plato, perhaps (as Nunnesius con­jectures) because he had read in Plato, that Dialectick ought not to be studied till the thirtieth year. And no lesse erre Ammonius, (if he be Author of that Life) and Olympiodorus, who affirm, that [Page 4] Aristotle coming to Athens in the seventeenth year of his age, heard Socrates three years, whereas Socrates was put to death when Laches was Archon, thirty two years before Nausigenes, under whom Aristotle was seventeen years old.

Being recommended to Plato, he became his Disciple, and so continued twenty years, as an Epistle of his to Philip (cited by the old Interpreter of his life) did testifie.

Plato much loved him, and admired his acutenesse of appre­hension, and diligence in study; for which ( De mundi aternit. Philoponus saith) Plato used to call him the Minde of the Schoole; and when Vet. Interp. he was not at his Lectures, he would say, The Intellect is not here, or, as Rhodiginus, The Philosopher of truth is absent. And compa­ring his acutenesse with the dulnesse of Xenocrates, Plato was wont to say, Laert. What an horse, and what an asse have I to yoke toge­ther: Xenocrates needs a spur, Aristotle a bit.

Ammon. Whilst he lived with Plato, he was extreamly studious, and given to reading, insomuch that Plato called his house, the house of the great Reader, and would often say, Interp. Let us go to the great Readers house. This may be confirmed by that great number of antient Authors which are cited in his works. And though Vit. Epic. La­ertius (either in his own, or Carneades's words) saith, that Ari­stotle hath thrust in as many sentences of old Authors in his writings, as both Zeno and Chrysippus; yet, every one that is ac­quainted with the writings of Aristotle, knoweth how judici­ously and concisely he giveth an account of their opinions, not for ostentation, but disquisition.

Some report there was a great enmity betwixt Plato and Aristotle, Aelian. 3. 19. which first arose from Plato's dislike of his manner of habit: For, Aristotle wore rich garments, and rich shooes, and contrary to Plato's rule, cut his hair short, and wore rings. He had likewise (say they) a scornfull derision in his look, and te­nacious contradiction in his discourse, which Plato not appro­ving, preferred before him Xenocrates, Speusippus, Amyclas, and others, to whom he communicated his Doctrine and many fa­vours; but repudiated Aristotle, who thereupon, Laert. whilst Plato was yet alive, set up a School in opposition to him, in the Lyce­um: at which ingratitude, [...]lato much troubled, said, Aristotle kicks at us as young Colis at the damme that foaled them, when they have sucked their sill, and Aelian. var. hist. 4. 9. Hel­ladius, apud pho­tium, in bibli­oth. for that reason, usually called Aristotle the Colt.

Aelian. They add, that Xenocrates being gone into his Country, and Speusippus not well, Aristotle came into Plato's School with some of his followers, and circumvented him with fallacious argu­ments, whereupon Plato retired to his own house, and there taught privately, leaving Aristotle in possession of the Schoole, which he kept, till Xenocrates returning, ejected him, and rein­stated Plato. The chiefe author of this report seemes to have [Page 5] been Aristoxenus, cited by Fraep. E [...]ang. lib. 15. Eusebius, who as In Aristoxeno. Suidas observes, assoon as Aristotle was dead, cast many aspersions upon him, out of a malitious revenge, because Aristotle preferred Theophra­stus before him in the succession of the School, notwithstanding that Aristoxenus had gained a great name and credit among the Disciples.

But as Ammonius argues; it is not likely that Aristotle, if he would, could have ejected Plato out of the School, or have ob­tained licence to erect a new one in opposition to him; for as much as at the same time, Cha [...]rias and Timotheus, Plato's kins­men, were in great power, and Generalls of the Athenian for­ces. Yet, some there are who affirm this, grounding it only on Aristotles contradicting of Plato in many things; to which Ammo­nius answers, that Aristotle doth not simply contradict Plato▪ but those who misinterpret his writings. For, if he do sometimes contradict Plato, what wonder? seeing that therein he followeth Plato his Author, whose saying it was, that Truth ought to be preferred before all things; as also that saying, Socrates indeed is dear, but Truth most dear: And elsewhere, What Socrates saith, we must not so much regard, as we ought to be solicitous concerning Truth. The same course Aristotle took, if at any time he confuted Plato's assertion, therein obeying him, by fol­lowing the Truth, and it is observed by Licetus de piet. Aristot. some, that he is very sparing in naming him, where he opposeth his doctrine, and that thrice he makes honourable mention of him in his Lib. 1. cap. 15. Rheto­rick, his Book of the World, (if that be his) and his Probl. 1. [...]0. Problems.

True therefore it is, (as Laert. Apollodorus, Dionysius Halicarnassaeus, but especially Aristotle himselfe, in his Vet. Interp. Epistle to Philip, af­firm,) that he was a constant, sedulous hearer of Plato twenty years, Vet. Interp. unto the thirty seventh of his age, even untill Plato died, and then was so great an honourer of his memory, that in te­stimony of his extraordinary affection, he erected an Altar to him, bearing this inscription:

Ammon.
This Altar Aristotle's hand did raise
To Plato, whom the impious must not praise.

Comment. in Gorg. [...]lat. Olympiodorus speaking of the honour which Aristotle gave to his Master, confirmeth it by this argument, that he writ a whole oration in commendation of Plato, wherein he first made a relation of his life, then praised him. He adds, that Aristotle in his Elegies to Eudemus, extolls him thus:

And coming to the fam'd Cecropian Town,
In signe of friendship did an Altar raise
To him, whom impious persons must not praise:
Who straying man to vertue did restore
Much by his precept, by example more.
[Page 6] One to the Gods so pious, good to men,
No future age must think to see again.

Athen. deipn. 8. Aelian. 9. 22. &▪ 5. 9. Some affirm, that whilst he lived with Plato, he profess'd Medicine, and kept a shop: but those Euseb. prae. par. Evang. Aristocles confutes.

CHAP. IV.
How he lived with Hermias.

Laert. Suid. P Lato dying in the first year of the 108 th Olympiad, and Speusippus his Nephew succeeding in the School, Aristotle went to Hermias the Eunuch, King of Atarna, a City of Mysia in Asia, who heretofore had been his fellow Disciple under Plato, and had a particular kindness for him. Hermias received him with great testimonies of love and respect. With him he lived three years, [ Suid. instructing him in Philosophy,] at the end whereof, Hermias was (as Lib. 13. Strabo saith) surprised by Memnon, a Rhodian, and sent to Artaxerxes; King of Persia, who put him to death. Pythai [...] his sister, a woman of extraordinary vertue, (whom Hermias, having no children, had design'd his heir) being upon this accident reduced to great extremities and afflictions, Ari­stotle, in a pious gratitude to the memory of his friend, (as his own Euseb. cont. Philos. Letter to Antipater attesteth) took her to wife, and Laert. set up the statue of Hermias in the Temple at Delphi, with this In­scription.

This man the Persian King against all right
A sacrifice to his fierce anger made,
Not like a foe by martiall armes in fight;
But as a friend by show of love b [...]tray'd.

He wrote likewise a Hymne to Vertue, in memory of his Friend, to this effect.

Vertue, whom we all obtain
With much labour, but more gain,
For your sake to dy would please,
Toyle and torments were but ease.
You direct men in pursuit
Of immortall sacred fruit,
Richer far then gold refin'd,
Soft as sleep, as parents kinde.
Great Alcides for your sake
Labours vast did undertake.
[Page 7] Leda's valiant twins made known
More your glories then their own;
Ajax and Achilles too
Only dy'd for love of you;
Ah! for you Atarna's pride,
Hermias untimely dy'd.
But his name we will revive;
That our Muse shal keep alive,
Paying hospitable Jove
Pious thanks for a friends love.

There wanted not those who cast many aspersions and calum­nies upon this Vertuous friendship: some affirm'd that Hermias lov'd Aristotle inordinately (an imputation not well suiting with an Eunuch) and that for this Reason, he gave him Pythais to wife, whom Suidas and the Greek Etymologist affirm to have been his Daughter either by Nature or Adoption, Demetrius Magnesi­us his Neece, Aristippus his Concubine, so little do they agree in their relation. They adde that Aristotle was so passionately in Love with her, that he sacrificed to her after the same manner; as the Athenians to Ceres at Eleusis. This Laertius relates as done whilst she was alive; But Lyco first Author of this calumny, that it was after her death. Moreover, that Aristotle in a thankfull ac­knowledgement of his Bounty, wrote a Paean in praise of Hermi­as, meaning the Hymn last mentioned, which Deipn. lib. 1 [...]. Athenaeus, proveth against the calumniations of Demophilus not to be a sacred hymne or Paean, but a Scolion or Festivall Song. Hence Theocritus the Chian derides him in this Epigram.

To the slave Eunuch who Atarne swai'd
An empty tombe empty Aristotle made,
Who from the Academy did retire
To wallow in vain pleasures faithless mire.

In answer to these calumnies (first raised by Lyco, dispersed further by Aristippus, and continued by those that maligne the memory of Aristotle) Apellieo writ certain Books, wherein he ac­curately confutes those who durst in this manner impudently blaspheme (such are his words) the name of Aristotle; so much prejudice and malice being in the accusation, as might easily ar­gue the falsenesse thereof.

Laert. Upon the death of Hermias, Aristotle ( Strab. lib. 13. and with Xenocrates) fled from Atarna to Mitylene, as Apollodorus and Dionysius Halicar­nassaeus affirm in the fourth year of the 108. Olympiad, Eubulus being Archon.

CHAP. V.
How he lived with Philip and Alexander.

ABout this time Philip King of Macedonia, Father of Alexan­der, taking care for the Education of his Son, now growing towards mans estate, and unwilling (saith Vit. Alexan [...]. Plutarch) to com­mit his Education to Professors of Musick, or any other of the liberall Sciences, as knowing him fit for higher designes, sent to Aristotle the most famous and learned of Philosophers, to come and instruct him. Lib. 9. cap. 3. Agellius recites his Epistle, which was to this effect.

Philip to Aristotle, health.

KNow that I have a Son, I render the Gods many thanks; not so much for his birth, as that he was born in your time, for I hope that being educated and instructed by you, he will become worthy both of us, and the Kingdom which he shall inherit.

Aristotle at this request of Philip, went to Macedonia to him, in the 4 th year of the 108. Olympiad, as Laert. Apollodorus and Dio [...]ystus Halicarnassaeus affirm, at what time Alexander was fifteen yeares old.

Ammon. He lived there infinitely esteem'd and beloved of Philip and O­lympia his Wife, Alexander's Mother, Vet. Interp. They caused his Statue to be made and set up in honour of him. Philip had a kindnesse to particular for him that he allo'wd him in manner an equal share in the Government of the Kingdom, which interest, Ammo­nius saith, he employed to the advantage as well of private per­sons, as of the publick, as appeareth (saith the Latine Interpre­ter of his life) by his Epistles to Philip. Vit. Alexand. Plutarch affirm [...]s, that Phi­lip as a recompence to Aristotle, reedified the Town where hee was born, Stagira, which he had before laid wast. He likewise assign'd him a School and study, near Mieza a Town of Macedo­nia not far from thence, where, unto this day (saith Plu [...]arch) they shew the stony seats and shady walks of Aristotle.

Plut. He instructed Alexander in the deepest parts of Learning, not only in Ethick and Politicks, but his most reserved and solid Doctrines call'd Acroatick and Epoptick; never communicated to the Vulgar.

That he taught him likewise the Art of Medicine, Plutarch ar­gueth, for as much as Alexander was not only exceedingly de­lighted with the Theory thereof, but practised it successfully up­on many of his friends, to whom he prescribed Receipts and diets, as appeareth, saith he, by his Epistle.

[Page 9] Plut. Perceiving Alexander to be much taken with Homer's Iliads, as conceiving, and calling it the best [...]stitution of military Vertue, he took much pains in correcting and restoring the text, and then gave it to Alexander, which copy [...]he infinitely prised.

He writ a Book to Alexander, intituled; Of a Kingdom, menti­oned by Laertius and Ammonius, wherein he instructed him how to rule.

Vet. Interp. So much did he incline the mind of Alexander to do good [...], that he used to say, if any day pass'd wherein he had not con­ferred some benefit, I have not reign'd to day.

Plut. vit. Alex. Alexander so much affected him, that he professed he admi­red and loved him no lesse then his Father, because his Father, he said, only gave him being, but Aristotle well-being.

The love which Philip and Alexander bore him was so great, that Theocritus the Chian cast the same aspersion upon it, as he did on his friendship with Hermias.

In the first year of the 111th Olympiad; Pythodorus being Archon, Philip dyed, and was succeeded by his Son Alexander, whose active spirit, soon after his coming to the Crown, designed an expediti­on against the King of Persia. Hereupon Aristotle having now lived with Alexander eight years, (though Justine saith but five, which some interpret of the time before Philips death, but not without some violence, for that was above seven) preferring the quiet of a Contemplative life before the troubles of War, took leave of him, returned to Athens, leaving in his room Callisthenes an O­lynthian, his Kinsman (Son of his Cozen Hero) and Disciple; Laert. whom before his departure observing to speak with too much liberty and obstinacy to the King, he reproved in these words,

Son, if thou thus employ thy tongue,
Thy thread of life cannot be long.

And so it came to passe not long after upon this occasion. Hermo­laus Son of Sopolis, a youth of a noble Family that studied Philoso­phy under Callisthenes, hunting the Wild Bore with Alexander, prevented the King by casting his dart first at him, for which he was by the Kings command punished with many stripes. Trou­bled at the ignominy thereof, he conspired with Sostratus, Anti­pater, and some other companions of his to murther Alexander▪ which treason being discovered by Epimenes one of the Conspi­rators, they were all put to death. Aristobulus and Ptolemaeus Son of Lagus affirms they accused Callisthenes, as him who instigated them to this attempt. Hereupon Callisthenes was put into an iron Cage, and so carried up and down in a miserable fordid conditi­on, and at last, as Laertius relates (though others otherwise) thrown to Lyons and devoured.

CHAP. VI.
His School and manner of Teaching.

THus Aristotle having lived eight years with Alexander, returned to Athens, as Laert. Apollodorus and Epist. ad A [...]m. Dionysius Halicar­nassaeus affirm, in the second year of the hundred and eleventh Olympiad, Pythodorus being Archon, where he found Xenocrates teaching in the Academy, which place was resigned unto him by Speusippus, in the fourth year of the hundred and ninth Olym­piad.

Hence it appeareth, that Laert. Hermippus erreth, in affirming, that Xenocrates took upon him the School of Plato, at what time Ari­stotle was sent by the Athenians on an Embassy to Philip. For as Discuss. Perip. Patricius hath observed, it can no way agree in time, it being certain, as Laertius attests, that Speusippus succeeded Plato in the School in the first year of the hundred and eight Olympiad, im­mediately upon Plato's death, and continued therein eight years, that is, to the end of the hundred and ninth Olympiad; in the second year of which Olympiad, Aristotle, as we said, went to Philip, not on an Embassy, but upon his invitation to educate Alexander.

Neither is the Author of Aristotles life lesse mistaken, who saith, that upon the death of Speusippus, the Athenians sent to Aristotle, and that both of them, Aristotle and Xenocrates, took upon them Plato's School, Xenocrates in the Academy, Aristotle in the Lyceum. But this errour is easily detected by the same com­putation; for at the time of Spe [...]sippus's death, Aristotle was with Alexander, nor did he leave him untill six years after, all which time Xenocrates profess'd Philosophy in the Academy.

Laert. The Academy being prepossess'd by Xenocrates, Aristotle made choice of the Lyceum, ( Suid. a place in the suburbs of Athens, built by Pericles for the exercising of Souldiers.) Here he taught and discoursed of Philosophy, to such as came to him, walking con­stantly every day till the houre of anointing, which the Greeks usually did before meals, whence he and his followers are called [...], from walking Peripateticks. Others say, he was cal­led Per [...]pa [...]et [...]ck from walking with Alexander, newly recovered of a sicknesse, in which manner he used to discourse of Philoso­phy with him.

Laert. The number of his auditors encreasing very much, he gave over walking, and taught sitting, saying,

Now to be silent most disgracefull were,
And see Xenocrates possesse the chair.

[Page 11] Though Cicero and Quintilian affirm, he used this verse against Isocrates, in emulation of whom, he taught Rhetorick to his Disciples every morning. Laert. So many Disciples resorted to him, that he made Lawes in his School, as Xenocrates did in the A [...]a­demy, creating Archons that ruled ten daies.

Agell. lib. 21. cap. 5. The discourse and doctrine which he delivered to his Dis­ciples was of two kinds. One he called Exoterick, the other Acro­atick. Exoterick were those which conduced to Rhetorick, medi­tation, nice disputes, and the knowledge of civill things. Acro­atick those in which more remote and subtile Philosophy was handled, and such things as pertain to the contemplation of na­ture, and Dialectick disceptations. Acroatick Discipline he taught in the Lyceum in the morning, not admitting every one to come and hear them, but those only, of whose wit and prin­ciples of Learning, and diligence in study, he had before made tryall. His Exoterick Lectures were in the afternoon and even­ings; these he communicated to all young men without any distinction, calling the latter his evening walk, the former, his morning walk.

CHAP. VII.
His Philosophy.

IN Philosophy (saith Vit. Ar. Ammonius) he seemeth to have done more then Man, for there is not any part of Philosophy whereof he treated, but he doth it most accurately, and many things he himselfe (such was his sagacity and acutenesse) finding out, com­pleated and finished.

Ammon. v [...]. Ar. In Logick it was his invention, that he separated the precepts of Disputation from the things themselves of which we dis­pute, and taught the manner and reason of disputation. For they who went before, though they could demonstrate, yet they knew not how to make a demonstration; as they who cannot make shooes, but only wear them. Alexander Aphrodisaeus af­firmes, that he first reduced Syllogismes to Mood and Figure. Philoponus, that he invented all Dialectick Method, whence Theo­dorus calls him, both inventer and perfecter of Logick, which he indeed in a manner challengeth (but modestly) to himselfe, in the last Chapter of his Elenchs, affirming nothing had been done in that kinde before, but what the Eristicks and Sophists taught. As for the Categories, the invention whereof some as­cribe to the Pythagoreans, it is much more probable that they were wholly his own; for those books entituled [...], under the name of Archytas, from which some conceive Aristotle to have borrowed much, the particulars whereof are instanced by [Page 12] Dissertat. Pe­ripat. Patricius, The [...]istius affirmes, to have been written, not by the Pythagorean (neither hath Laertius made mention of any writings of his, for the Pythagoreans at that time wrote but little, the first that wrote any thing being Philolaus) but by some Pe [...]ipate­tick, who thought his work might passe with greater credit, if published in the name of so antient a Philosopher.

In Physick the [...]ift essence, whereof celestiall bodies consist, di­stinct from the foure Elements, is generally ascribed to his in­vention, only Simplicius citeth the authority of Xenocrates, in his book of the life of Plato, that Plato constituted five simple bo­dies, Heaven, and the foure Elements asserting they differ no lesse in nature then in figure, for which reason he as­signed the figure of a Dodecaedron to Heaven, differing from the figure of the foure Elements. But these, as the learned Nunnesius observes, seem to be rather Symbolicall, and Pytha­goricall, then the true meaning of Plato. For Plato in his Timae­us expressely averrs, that the Heavens are of their own nature dissolute, but by the divine Will, are kept together, as it were, by a Tye from being dissolved. Xenarchus, a Philosopher, wrote against the fift Essence, introduced by Aristotle, whom Alexander Aphrodisaeus exactly answereth. Theodorus calleth Aristotle, the Perfecter of Physick, adding, [...]that only his writings upon that subject were approved by following ages, who rejected whatso­ever others had written in the same kinde, as appeareth by their losse. What Epicure and others have objected against him as a fault, that he enquired with such diligence into the minute, and mean­est things of nature, is a sufficient testimony of his excellence and exactnesse in this study.

Vet. Interpr. In Ethick, whereas Polyaenus placed Felicity in externall goods, Plato in those of the soule only, Aristotle placed it chiefly in the soul; but affirmed it to be de [...]led and straigh [...]ned if it want exteriour goods, properly using these terms. For those things which are de [...]iled have the same beauty within, but their super­ficies only is hidden; and those which are straightned have the same reall magnitude.

Ammon. In Metaphysick, which he calleth First-Philosophy, and Wis­dome, and (as the more antient Philosophers before him) Theolo­gie, Ammon. though there be not any invention of his extant, yet, he per­fectly went through all the parts thereof. For he was not only acquainted, as some falsely imagine, with terrestriall things, and those which belong to this World; but even with those things which are above this World, as may appear from the eight book of his Physick, where he saith, that the first cause is not subject to motion, neither in it sel [...]e, nor by accident, in which words he declareth, that God is not a body, nor any way passible. And in his 12 th book of Wisdome, or Metaphysicks, he discourseth accu­rately of God and Intelligences, in a rationall clear way, not in­ [...]olv'd in Fables, or Pythagoricall Symbols; but, founding his [Page 13] assertion upon reason and demonstration, as much as the sub­ject, and human reason alloweth. Dissert. [...]eri­pat. Patricius labours much to prove that whatsoever he had in this kind excellent, he borrow'd from Hermes Trismegistus. But ( In the life of Plato. cap. as we have already said,) Mr. Casaubon hath fully evin [...]'d that Book to have been imposed upon the World by some later writer.

What is added by the antient Latine Interpreter concerning Aristotle's sentence of that visuall Hexagonall Pyramid, (which Nunncus in Vit. Arist. a learned person hath observed to be chosen as a midle way be­twixt the sentence of those who made the optick penicill a pyra­mid of a quadratick base, and those who made it of a Conick fi­gure,) is very obs [...]ure, and hardly admits of an Interpretation worthy so great an Author.

CHAP. VIII.
His correspondence with Alexander.

WHilst Aristotle taught Philosophy at Athens, his Disciple Alexander was employed in an Expedition to Asia a­gainst Darius King of Persia, incited thereunto by the principles of Honour, which were infused into him by Aristotle, particularly from the Presidents of Achilles, Ajax, and other Heroes celebra­ted by Homer, whose Iliads Aristotle had so c [...]refully recomm [...]n­ded unto him. He began this expedition in the third year of the 11 th Olympiad, at which time Ctesicles was Archon at Athens, im­mediately after the departure of Aristotle, who (it is probable) came only for this reason from him, as preferring a quiet and stu­dious life before the troubles of War.

The first thing that Alexander did, was to visit the Tombe of Achilles in the Sigaeum, at the sight whereof he broke forth into these words; O fortunate young man, that hadst a Homer to celebrate thy praise [...] for had it not been for his Iliads, addes In Licin. Cicero, in the same Tombe where Achilles's his body lay, his name also would have been buried. He took with him the Iliads of Homer, corrected by Aristotle, and made it his constant companion, insomuch that hee put it every night with his dagger, under his pillow. And in a Victory over Darius, having taken a Casket of Unguents of ex­traordinary value amongst the spoiles of Darius, beset with Pearles and precious stones, (as Lib. 29. Pliny describes it,) his friends telling him how many uses it might be put to, because Unguents did not become a Souldier; Yes, saith he, it shall serve to keep the Books of Homer, that the most precious work may be kept in the richest case; hence was this correct copy called, as Plutarch saith, [...].

Whilst he was in Asia, engaged in the Warrs against Darius, [Page 14] in the midst of his continuall Victories and businesse, hearing that Aristotle had published his Acroatick books of naturall Philo­sophy, he sent this Letter to him;

Agell. 20. 5. [...]lut. vit. Alex. Alexander to Aristotle, Health.

YOu have not done well in publishing your Acroatick discourses, for wherein shall we excell others, if this Learning, wheri [...] we have been instituted, be made common to all? As for me, I had rather excell others in knowledge then in power. Farewell.

To which Aristotle returned this answer.

Agel. 20. 5. Epist. Grac. Aristotle to Alexander, health.

YOu wrote to me concerning my Acroatick Discourses, that they ought not to have been communicated; but kept secret. Know, that they are made publick, and not publick, for none but they who have heard us can understand them. Farewel.

Thus, notwithstanding Alexander were busied in the Warres, yet he forgot not his Master Aristotle, but kept a friendly corre­spondence with him. So constant was he in his love to Learning, and particularly so much enflam'd (as Lib. 8. 16. Pliny saith) with a curious desire of understanding the natures of living Creatures, that he sent thousands of men, throughout all Asia and Greece to procure all kinds of living Creatures, birds, beasts and fishes, at an ex­cessive charge; Lib. 9. Athenaeus saith, 800. Talents, which according to De [...]sse. lib. 2. 19. Budaeus's account is 840000▪ crowns: these men he sent with what they took to Aristotle, that he might not be ignorant of any thing that any Nation afforded; by which information, he composed, as Pliny affirmeth, 50. excellent Volumes, of Li [...]ing Creatures, of which ten are only left, unlesse we put into the same number, those Books of his which have some near relation to this subject; as Of the going of living Creatures, 1. Of the parts of living Crea­tures and their causes, 4. Of the Generation of living Creatures, 5. If this were done by Alexander, as Pliny and Athenaeus attest (though Lib. 4. 19. Aelian ascribe it to Philip) it must necessarily have been whilst he was in his Asiatick expedition. For Aristotle, as hath been al­ready proved, staid but a very short time with him after the death of his Father.

Aristotle made the same use of this correspondence with Alex­ander, as he had done of the Interest he before had with Philip, the advantage not only of particular person, but of whole Cities.

This City of Stagira, the place of his Birth, did acknowledge, which, at the suit of Aristotle, Alexander caused to be reedified, [Page 15] and repeopled, and restored to its former state, having before by Philip been laid levell with the ground, For, though Plutarch relate this as done in the time of Philip, Laertius, Ammonius, Dion, Chrysostome, Aelian, and others hold▪ that it was done by Alexander, to which Valerius Maximus addes, that it was not long before Aristotles death. In memory of which Benefit, the people of Stagira used to celebrate a yearly Festivall, which they called the Aristotelean Feast, naming the month in which it fell Stagirites.

Ammon. Erestus likewise, the Country of Theop [...]rastus, which Ale­xander determined to punish very severely; by the mediation of Aristotle was pardoned.

That he benefited many particular persons is evident, saith Ammonius, from his Epistles to the King, yet extant, wherein he recommends severall persons to him.

Hence it is manifest, that the Author of his life is mistaken, when he affirmes, that in Alexanders Asiatick expedition, Aristotle accompanyed him to the Brachmanes, where he writ that noble piece of the Lawes and institutions of 255 Cities. That likewise he travelled over all Persia with Alexander, where during the War, Alexander died, and Aristotle returned into his own Country. This relation a­grees not with the other circumstances of Aristotles life. Alex­ander died in the fourth year of the hundred and thirteenth Olympiad, two years before Aristotle's departure from Athens.

But as it is apparent, that this mistake proceeded only from ignorance (yet that so great, that Disser [...]. Pe­ripat. 1. 1. Patricius argues from thence, neither Ammonius not Philoponus to be the Authors of his life) so are there some other errours, which no lesse manifestly ap­pear to have proceeded from malice, raised, it is likely, by the Authors of the other scandalls and imputations, wherewith they sought to blast his memory.

Laert. Some affirm, that Alexander upon the treason of Callisthenes, took a great displeasure against Aristotle, for having recommen­ded him to him. For though at first, writing to Criterus, Attalus, and Alcetas, immediately upon this accident, he sent them word, that the youths had confessed, the plot proceeded only from themselves, not by the instigation of any other. Plut. vi [...] Alex. [...] Yet afterwards, in an Epistle to Antipater, he imputes the same crime to Calli­sthenes, not without this sharp reflection upon Aristotle: The youths, saith he, were stoned to death by the Macedonians; but, as for the Sophist, I will punish him my selfe, and those who sent him, and those who entertain in their Cities such as are Traitors to me. Here­upon they interpret the bounty of Alexander to Xenocrates, and favour to Anaximenes, as not proceeding from the magnificence of his disposition, Laert. but from the displeasure he had conceived against Aristotle, whom he endeavoured to vex, by obliging his adversaries and aemulators.

[Page 16] Upon this supposed displeasure was grounded another re­port, that Plut. Alex: Aristotle conspiring with Cassander against Alexander, sent him, by Antipater, some of the water of Styx, wherewith he poisoned Alexander. But the Relators hereof differ not a little amongst themselves: Diodorus Siculus and Suidas affirme, that Alexander was poisoned by Cassander son of Antipater; Arianus by Iolla his younger son: Porphyrius saith, that nothing but the horn of an Asse, such as the Asses of Scythia had, would contain the poyson: Iustine and Pausanias, the hoofe of a Horse; Pliny and Arrian of a Mule; Plutarch and Zonaras, of an Asse. They differ no lesse about the place whence the water was fetch'd. Neither indeed can it be expected there should be a better har­mony amongst the Relators of this Fable, when there is so great dissention, and variety of relations, concerning the occasion and manner of his death. But the most creditable is that of Ephip­pus ( D [...]ipn. 10. 11. cited by Athenaeus) Lib. 3. cap. 21. Orosius, Lib. 12. Iustine, and others, who averr, that Alexander died of a Feaver, caused by excesse of drink­ing.

CHAP. IX.
Vpon what occasion he left Athens, and went to Chalcis.

Laert. TWelve years Aristo [...]le professed Philosophy in the Lyceum, not molested by any; for though his eminence in Learning procured him many Aemulators and enemies, yet, the favour he had with Alexander, whilst he lived, awed them so much, that they durst not make any discovery of the ill will they bore him. No sooner was Alexander dead (according to Di [...]nysius Ha­licarnassaeus) but some of them conspired against his life. To which end, Eurymedon, a Priest, or (according to Pha [...]orinus) Demophilus, accused him of impiety; that he introduced some Phi­losophicall assertions, contrary to the Religion of the Athenians; that he celebrated Hermias as a God, with a hymne, and had caused his statue to be set up in the Delphian Temple, with an honourable inscrip­tion. Some affirm hereupon he made an Oration in defence of himselfe, at the Court of Areopa [...]us, wherein he openly pro­nounced this verse, made out of two in Odyss. [...]. Homer.

Peares upon pears, and figs on figs grow here;

By [...], ( figs on figs) reflecting upon the multitude of Sycop [...]a [...]ts which sprung up every day in the City. Hence Pha­vor [...]nus saith, he was the first Philosopher that pleaded for him­selfe, and there was an Oration to that purpose went about ma­ny years after under his name. But, of the truth hereof, Athenae­us maketh question.

[Page 17] Laert. Others affirm, that Aristotle perceiving the conspiracy that was against his life, stole privately out of Athens, and went to Chalcis, where he spent the rest of his daies, returning to his friends, who demanded the reason of his going, this answer, Aelian. va [...]. hist. We left Athens, that we might not give the Athenians occasion to commit again the same wickednesse Origen. contr: Celsum li [...]. [...]. they committed against Socrates, that they mi [...]ht not be guilty of a double crime against Philosophy. To Antipater he wrote the fore-mentioned verse, ‘Pears upon pears, and figs on figs grow here;’ Giving him to understand how dangerous it was for him to live in Athens, since the Athenians were wholly addicted to Syco­phantisme and calumny. This departure of Aristotle from Athens, Dionysius Halicarn [...]ssaeus placeth in the second year of the hundred and fourteenth Olympiad, Apollodorus a yeer latter, perhaps lesse rightly.

Agell. 13. 6. Being neer sixtie two yeers of age, very sickly, and without hope of living much longer, the whole company of his follow­ers came to him, and besought him to make choice of a Succes­sor, whom after his death they might look upon as the perfe­cter of those studies whereinto he had brought them. There were at that time many excellent Scholars in his School, but especially two, Theophrastus and Menedemus, or rather as Pa­tricius reads, Eudemus. These excelled the rest in Wit and Lear­ning. The first was of Lesbos, Eudemus of Rhodes. Aristotle an­swered them, he would do as they requested, when he saw it convenient. Soon after, the same persons being present who had made this request to him, he complained, the wine which he then drank did not agree with his health, but was unwhol­some and harsh; and therefore desired they would send for other sorts, both R [...]odian and Lesbian, saying, he would make use of that which he should finde best for him. They go, seek, finde, bring. Aristotle first calls for the Rhodian, tasts it, a strong wine, saith he, and pleasant: then calls for the Lesbian, which having tasted, both, saith he, are good, but [...], the Lesbian is the sweeter; whereby every one understood that his choice was not of the wine, but of his successour, which was Theophrastus of Lesbos, a man of extraordinary sweetnesse in discourse and con­versation: Whence not long after, assoon as Aristotle was dead, all his Disciples applyed themselves to Theophrastus.

CHAP. X.
His Apophthegms.

Laert. OF his Apophthegmes are remembered these.

Being demanded what a man got by lying, he answe­red, not to be believed when he spoke truth.

Being reproved for giving mony to a wicked man: I, saith he, gave it compassionating, not [...], the condition; but, [...]: or as Stobaeus, not to the man, but to humanity.

He used this saying frequently amongst his disciples and friends, the eye rec [...]ives light from the air, the soul [...]rom learning.

Inveighing against the Athenians, he said, They had invented two things, Corn and Law; but made use only of one, the Corn.

He said, The root of learning is bitter, the fruit sweet.

Being demanded what growes old soonest, he answered, a Benefit.

Being demanded what is Hope, he answered, a waking Dream.

Diogenes the Cynick offered him a fig: Aristotle [...] that Diogenes had prepared some sharp saying, in case he should have refused it, took the fig, telling Diogenes, he had lost both his figg and his conceit. Then throwing it up into the aire, and catching it, as boyes use to do, O worthy Dioge [...]es, said he, and re­stored it.

He said, to Learning three things are requisite, Nature, Institution, Exercise.

Being told, that one had reviled him: When I am absent, said he, let him beat me too.

He said, Beauty was a better recommendation then any Letter. Others ascribe this to Diogenes, adding, that Ar [...]stotle called beauty, the gift of a specious [...]orm.

He called Socrates a short-liv'd Tyranny; Plato, Natures Pre­rogative; Theophrastus silent [...]raud; Theocri [...]us, specious hurt; Meant per haps of that Carn [...]ades wh [...] was Disci­ple to Anaxa­go [...]as. Carneades, a guardlesse Kingdome.

Being demanded what difference there is betwixt the learned and unlearned, he answered, as much as between the living and the dead.

He said, Learning in prosperity is an ornament, in adversity a refuge.

He said, they who educated children well, are more to be honoured, then they who beget them; for these only gave them life, others well-living.

To one, boasting of the greatnesse of his Country: That, saith he, is [...]ot to be considered, but whether a man deserve to be of a great Country.

He said, Friends are one soul in two bodies.

[Page 19] He said, some men lived so sparingly as if they were to live alwaies, others so prodigally, as if they were to die to morrow.

To one that asked why we love the company of those that are fair; That, saith he, is a question for a blind man to ask.

Being asked what he had gotten by Philosophy, hee an­swer'd, to do those things voluntar [...]ly, which others do for fear of the Law.

Being demanded how Disciples should profit most; he an­swer'd, if they follow those that are before them, and stay not for those behind them.

To a foolish talker, who after a long Discourse said to him, I am afraid I have been tedious to you; not at all, answer'd he, for I did not mind you.

Being asked how we should behave our selves towards our Friends, he answer'd, as we would have them do towards us.

He said, Iustice is the vertue of giving to every one according to his desert.

He said, Learning was the best provision against old age.

He used, as Phavorinus relate [...] in the second of his Commen­taries, to say frequently, he who hath many friends hath none; which is [...]wise extant in the seventh book of his Ethicks.

[...] said, Stob. ser. 28. when things happen not as we would, we must will as they happen.

Seeing a youth very self-conceited, Ser. 45. and withall ignorant; young man, saith he, I wish I were what you think your self, and my enemies what you are.

Seeing a young man proud of a fine Cloak, Ibid. why boast you, saith he, of a Sheeps Fleece?

He said, Ser. 46. they who demonstrate plain things, light a candle to see the Sun.

Being reviled by an impudent person; Thou, Ser. 101. saith he, who art vers'd to bear all things, speakest them with delight, I who am not used to speak them, take no delight in hearing them.

Being demanded why he who taught others to speak, Ser. 128. himselfe held his tongue, a whetstone, saith he, cannot cut, yet it sets an edge upon swords.

Being asked who can keep a secret, Ibid. He, saith he, that can hold a glowing coal in his mouth.

Seeing a young man very neatly dress'd, Ser. 161. are you not asham'd, saith he, when Nature made you a man, to make your self a woman.

A handsome young man, Ibid. much courted, said to him, If I were hated of the Citizens as you are, I would hang my self; And I, reply'd he, would hang my self if I were lov'd by them as you are.

Being demanded how a man should come to be rich, Serm. he an­swer'd; by being poor in desire.

It repented him of three things; Ser. 305. that he had ever committed a se­cret [Page 20] to a Woman; that he had rid when he might have gone a foot; that he had lived one day not having his Will made.

CHAP. XI.
His will and Death.

FRom that speech of Aristotle last mentioned, may be gathered how carefull he was to make his Will, but more from the exact form thereof which was thus:

Laert. BE all well; but if it happen otherwise, thus Aristo­tle maketh his Will Be Antipater my sole Executor during the Minority of Nicanor. Let Aristomenes, Timarchus, Hipparchus, Dioteles, (and if he please, and have leisure) Theophrastus, be Guardians of the children & of Herpylis, and all that I leave. I will that my Daughter, assoon as she shall be marriageable be given Nicanor, for Wife. If any thing happen otherwise (which God forbid) before she be married, or, after she be married before she hath any Children, let Nicanor have the ordering of my Sonne, and the disposall of all other things, for his reputation and mine. Let therefore Nicanor take care of the Maid Py­thais, and my Son Nicomachus, and order their Estates ac­cording to their condition, as a Father and a Brother. If in the mean time any thing shall happen to Nicanor (which God forbid) either before my Daughter be married, or, if married, before she hath any Children, if he make any Will, as he appointeth, so let it be. Otherwise, if Theophrastus approve of it, let him marry the Maid, and have the same power, that Nicanor should have had. Otherwise let the Estates as well of the Maid as the Boy be disposed with the joint consent of the Guardians, and Antipater, as they shall think fit. Let likewise the Executors of Nicanor take care to remember us and Herpylis, since that she hath been faith­full to me, and, if she will take a husband, that such a one be given unto her as may be no disparagement unto us. Let them give her out of my Estate, besides what is already [Page 21] mentioned, a Talent of Silver, three Maid-servants, if shee so please, and the handmaid which she hath, and the boy Pyrrhaeus. And moreover, if she will dwell at Chalcis, let her have that habitation which joyneth to the Garden, if at Stagira, our Patrimoniall seat; which, howsoever Herpy­lis shall choose, let the Executors furnish it, as they shall think convenient and proper for Herpylis. Let likewise Nicanor take charge of the Boy Mirmax, that he may be re­stored honourably, as becommeth us, unto his own, with all his goods which we delivered to our Trust. Let likewise Ambracis be a free woman, and have bestowed upon her, at her marriage, fifty Drachmes, and the Girle which she hath. I will likewise that to Thales, be given, besides the Handmaid he hath bought, a thousand Drachmes, and ano­ther Handmaid. Likewise to Simo, besides that money which he hath already received to buy a Servant; let ano­ther Servant be bought, or the like Sum be given again, wherewith he may purchase one. As soon as my Daughter shall be married, let Tycho, Philo, Olympias and his Son be free men Of those boyes which served me, let none be sold, but let my Heirs make use of their service, and when they come to age, as they deserve let them be manumitted. Let the Executors take care to those Statues of Nicanor, and his Mother, and Proxenus, which I gave order for to Gryllius, as soon as they are perfected, be set up Let like­wise the Statue of Arimnestus be set up, that this monu­ment may remain of him; since he died without Children. I will likewise that the Statue of my Mother be consecrated to Ceres in the Nemaean Temple, or where else shall be thought fitting. Wheresoever my Body is buried by the Ex­ecutors, thither let the bones of [...]ythais, according as she desired, be brought, and laid with mine. Let likewise Nica­nor, if he continue well in health, dedicate at Stagira, to Ju­piter Soter, and Minerva Sotira, Statues of Beasts, of stone, of four cubits, in performance of the vow which wee vowed for him.

[Page 22] He died at Chalcis, in the third year of the 114 th Olympiad, Philocles being Archon, in the 63. the great Climactericall year, of his age (not as Laert. Eumelus, 70. years old) as appeareth by the computation of Apollodorus and Dionysius Halicarn [...]ssaeus; thus,

  y.
He came to Athens at 18.
Heard Plato 20.
Lived with Hermias 3.
With Philip and Alexander 8.
Taught in the Lyceum 12.
Lived at Chalcis 2.
in all 63.

The manner of his life is variously related, Lib. 1. Strabo, H [...]sychius Illu­stris, and from him Suidas relate, that he drunk Hemlock, either being condemn'd thereunto by the Athenians, as Socrates was▪ or to prevent their Judgement.

Paraen. ad gent Iustine Martyr, Stelieut. 1. Gregory Nazianzene, Ant. lect. 19. 8. Coelius Rhodoginus, the Greek Etymologist, Nonnus, and oth [...]rs follow the common report, that a question was propos'd to him of the wonderfull nature of Euripus, an arm of the Sea, coming into Chalcis (as Lucian averr [...]) which ebbeth and floweth seven times in 24. hours. Not being able to resolve it, he died of shame and anxiety. Some affirm that as he sate on the bank, having considered long upon it, he at last threw himself headlong into the River, saying, si [...]ce Aristotle could not take Euripus, Euripus take thou Aristotle.

But the Authors of greatest credit, Laert. Apollodorus, Epist. ad Amm. Dionysius Ha­licarnassaeus, De die. na [...]ali▪ Ce [...]sori [...]us, Laer ius and others affirm, that he died of a pain in his stomach, caused by over-watching, and excesse of study. For Laertius affirms he was a most indefatigable student, and when he went to bed, he held a brazen ball in his hand, that when he fell asleep, the noise of it falling into a Basin set under it for that purpose, might awake him, which Alexan [...]er his Dis­ciple imitated. To this pain of the stomach he was very subject, and somtimes asswaged it by applying a bottle of hot oile to his Breast. Notwithst [...]nding this naturall infirmity of his stomach, saith Censorinus, and the frequent indisposition of a sickly constitution, hee preserved himself a Long time through his Vertue and Temperance, for it is much more strange that he attained the a [...]e of 63. years, then that he lived no longer.

The Author of the book de Pomo, affirmeth, that when he was dying, he said to his Disciples standing about him, it was not without reason that Homer said, the Gods came down to earth to relieve mankinde. Antiq. lect. [...]8. 31. Coelius Rhod [...]ginus adds from the same Author, that when he felt the pangs of death to come upon him, weeping between griefe and hope, he often repeated these [Page 23] words, Thou Cause of Causes, have mercy on me: And his Disciples, when they saw he was departing, said, He who receiveth the souls of Philosophers, may [...]e take thine likewise, and lay it up in his own Treasury, as the soul o [...] a right and perfect man, as we have known thee to be. Of this, there is no testimony more antient, then that of the Author of the book de Pomo, who (as Patricius clearly ob­serves from his writings) was a Christian.

Vet. I [...]erp. The Stagirites fetch'd his body from Chalcis to Stagira, where they buried it with much solemnity, building a magnificent Tombe for him, and erecting an Altar to his memory.

CHAP. XII.
His Person and Vertues.

Laert. AS concerning his person, he was slender, having little eyes, and a small voice. When he was young, Laertius and Plu­tarch affirm, he had a great hesitation in his speech. Aelian. var. hist. He went in a rich habit, and wore rings: his beard was shaven, his hair cut short; he had a high nose, if we credit the head put up by Ful­vius Ursinus, found at Rome, at the bottome of the Quirinall hill. He was of a sickly constitution, troubled with a naturall weaknesse of stomack, and frequent indispositions, which he over-mastered by his Temperance.

Saint Hierome affirmeth, he was the Prince of Philosophers, an absolute Prodigie, and great miracle in nature, into whom seemeth to have been infused whatsoever mankinde is capable of.

He was extreamly pious towards God and Man, upon which subject, Fortunius Licetus hath lately written two books.

Eusebius, Cassiodorus, and others affirm, that many persons, emi­nent for sanctity, especially followers of School-learning, have, through the means of Aristotles Philosophy, been carried on to Inspection into the highest doctrines of true Faith; as, that there is one God, &c.

As concerning his gratitude to men, besides those instances already mentioned to Pro [...]enus and his sonne, to Hermias and his sister, to his Master Plato, to his own Mother, Brother, and Coun­try, and infinite others; many Philosophers, whose opinion he takes occasion to alledge, he mentions with their due praise: of which were his Master Plato (of whom we have already spoken) whom, as we have said, he sometimes mentioned honourably, and sometimes concealeth his name, where he preferreth his own opinion. Amongst others, of whom he maketh honourable mention, are observed Democritus, in his first book de Generatione; Diogenes Apolloniates in the same book, Anaxag [...]ras, in the first of his Metaphysicks.

[Page 24] For that he was very moderate, the Interpreter of his life con­firmes, instancing in his book of Ca [...]egorems, where he saith, We ought not to de [...]ermine any thing hastily, but to consider often, and to doubt o [...] e [...]ery thing, is not unusefull. And again, in his book of Good, We mu [...] remember, being men, not only that we are happy, but that we ought to be able to prove it by firm reason. And again, in his Ethicks to Nicomachus: Man is our friend, Truth our friend; but above all, we ought to honour Truth. And in his Meteorologicks: As concerning th [...]se, we doub [...] of some of them, others we touch superficially. And in the same, not once or twice, but infinite times, Men do happen upon the same opinions, therefore we ought not to be proud of our owne wisdome, in any thing whereof we conceive our selves to be [...]he Inven­tors.

The common report therefore (grounded upon no authority) that he collected the books of the antient Philosophers, and ha­ving taken out of them what he intended to confute, burnt them, is manifestly false; for any one that reads Cicero, will finde, they were most of them extant in his time.

CHAP. XIII.
His Wives and Children.

HE had two wives, the first Pythais, sister to Hermias, the Eu­nuch, Tyrant of Atarna, and his adopted heir. Of the scan­dals that were cast upon him by this marriage, Aristotle fully acquits himselfe in his Epistles to An ipater, where he profes­seth, that he married her only out of t [...]e good will which he bore unto Hermias, and out of a compassion, for the great mis­fortunes that had happened to her Brother; adding, that she was a woman endowed with extraordinary modesty, and all other vertues.

His second wife was named Herpylis, a woman of Stagira, whom Apellico (cited by Eusebius) and (per [...]aps from him) [...]u [...] ­das affirm, he married after the death of Pythais: With her he lived to his end, as Hermippus, cited by Athenaeus, and [...]imothaeus, by Laertius affirm. Timaeus, a profess'd calumniator of Aristotle, saith, she was his Concubine, and that Aristo [...]le lived with her, following the counsell of Hesiod in his Georgi [...]ks; from which calumny, Hesiod is fully vindicated by Proclus.

By Herpylis he had one son, as Enseb. praepar. Evang. Apellico affirmeth, whom he named after his own Father Nicomachus: To him he dedicated his great Moralls, which De [...]in. l. 5. Cicero thinks to have been written by Nicomachus himselfe: For I see not, saith he, why the son might not be like the Father.

Euseb. This Nicomachus was a disciple of Theophrastus, and much be­loved [Page 25] by him; under whom he profited exceedingly in Philoso­phy, and arrived at much eminence therein. Suidas saith, he writ eight Books of Physick, four of Ethick. Cicero compares him both with his Tutor and Father. Aristocles cited by Eusebius affirmeth he was bred up an Orphan, by Theophrastus, afterwards died young in the Warrs, which relation agrees not with Aristotle's Will, nor with Suidas or Cicero, who averr that he writ Books, out of which Laertius brings a citation, in Eudoxo.

He had a Daughter also called Pythais, who as Sextus Empericus affirmes, was thrice married. First to Nicanor the Stagirite, friend to Aristotle. Secondly, to Procles, who derived his pedigree from Demaratus King of Lacedemonia. By him she had two Sons, Procles, & Demaratus, who studied Philosophy under Theophrastus. Her last husband was Metrodorus, Disciple of Chrysippus the Gnidian, Ma­ster of Erastratus. By him she had a son named, after her Father, Aristotle. Of this Aristotle there is mention in the Will of Theo­phrastus, where he is called the Son of Midias, not Metrodorus. Suidas affirmeth, he died before his Grandfather.

CHAP. XIV.
His Disciples and Friends.

THe Disciples of Aristotle were so many and so eminent, that Nicander of Alexandria, wrote an expresse Book upon that subject, which, had it been extant, would doubtlesse have given us an exact account of them, whereas now we must rest satisfied with an imperfect Catalogue.

To omit the three Princes that were his Disciple, Hermias, A­lexander (of whom already) and Antip [...]ter, Successor to Alexan­ander in Macedonia (who amongst other things wrote two books of Epistles, in one whereof he related the death of Aristotle) in the first place is mentioned,

Theophrastus of Eressus a City of Leshos, the most eloquent of his Disciples. Him he appointed to succced him in the School.

Phanias of Eressus also. He wrote many Books often cited by Athenaeus; amongst the rest, Ammonius cites his Categories, Analyticks, and of Interpretation.

Eudemus of Rhodes, esteemed by Aristotle in the second place next to Theophrastus. His life was written by Damias, as Simplici­us affirmes, who often mentions him. He wrote Analyticks, and a Geometricall History (both cited by Simplicius) and some other Histories cited by Laertius, wherein hee said the Magi were of opinion, that men should rise again after death. He survived Aristotle.

[Page 26] Eudemus of Cyprus, who died in Sicily where he took Dion's part, as appeareth from Plutarch. Aristotle in honour of him, called his Dialogue of the Soul after his name.

Pasicrates, Brother of Eudemus the Rhodian. To him some ascribe the first lesser Book of Metaphysicks, as Philoponus affirmeth.

Theodectes; To him Arist [...]le dedicated some Books of Rheto­rick, mentioned by Valerius Maximus, which hee afterward re­tracted. Patricius conceives hee was rather a companion then a Disciple of Aristotle, because he mentions him seven times in his Rhetorick, which he is never observed to have done of any Disciple.

Clearchus, of Soli. He wrote many Books often cited by Athe­ [...]aeus.

Dicaearchus, Son of Phidias of M [...]ssena in Sicily, a Philosopher, Oratour and Geometri [...]ian, as Sui [...]as affirmeth. He is cited by Cicero, mention'd often by Plutarch amongst the best Philo­p [...]ers.

Arisloxenus, Son of M [...]esias a Musician of Tarentum in Italy, who going to Ma [...]tinia there studied Philosophy and Musick. He heard his Father; and Lamprus an Erythraean, and Xenopholus a Pythagorean, and last of all Aristo [...]le, whom after his death he calumniated and wronged much, because he had left Theophra­stus his successour in the School, whereas himimself was in great esteem amongst the Dis [...]iples. Thus Suidas.

Nicanor, mentioned in his Will.

Philo, who wrote against one Sophocles, who caused the Philo­sophers to be voted out of Attica.

Plato, In Platone. the younger, mentioned by Laerti [...]s and Phil [...]p [...]nus.

Socrates In Socrate. a Bithynian, mentioned by La [...]r [...]ius.

M [...]ason, a Phocian, mentioned by Aelian as one of hose who assisted Aristotle in the ejection of Pla [...]o out of the Academy, Galen likewise mentions him as Author of some m [...]dicinall writings ascribed to Aristotle.

Phrasidemus, a Phocian, mentioned by Laertius as a Peripatetick Philosopher. It is likely he was a Dis [...]iple of A [...]st [...]le, for he was contemporary with Theop [...]rastus.

Palaephatus, of Abydas, an Historian much beloved of Aristotle.

Callisthenes an Olynthian, Aristotles Sisters Sonne, of whom already.

Hipparchus, a Stagirite; of kin to Aristotle. He wrote, as Suidas affirmeth, o [...] the distinctions of Sexes amongst the Gods, of mariage, and the like.

Leo [...], a Byzantine, a Peripatetick Philosopher and Sophist. Some a [...]fir [...] he was a Dis [...]iple of Aristo [...]les. He was so excessively fat, that coming to Athens, upon an Embassy, the people laught [Page 27] at him; to whom he said, do you laugh to see me thus fat, I have a wife a great deal [...] ▪ yet, when we agree, one bed will hold us both, but when we disagree, not the whole house. The people suspecting him of con [...]ederacy with [...], upon a [...] of his, came in a tumult to his house, whereupon fearing to be stoned, he strangled himselfe.

Aeschrion of Mitylene, a heroick Poet, loved much by Aristotle, as Suidas saith.

Callippus an Athenian, who also heard Plato.

Satyrus, whose books of lives and characters are cited by Athe­naeus.

Hieronimus the Rhodia [...], eminent in Philosophy. That he was Aristotle's disciple is acknowledged by Athenaeus.

Heraclides of Pontus, a great Philologist.

To these add of lesse note, Echecratides a Methymnaean, and Adrastus a Macedonian, both mentioned by Stephanus. Euxithius, mentioned by Plutarch: Clitus a Milesian: Menon the Historian; Di [...]teles and Timarchus.

CHAP. XV.
His Detractours.

AS the friends and followers of Aristotle were more in num­ber then those of any other Philosopher, so were also his detractours, of whom having already had occasion to make some mention, we shall not need to give any further account then this of Aristotles, alledged by Prepar. E­vang. lib. 15. Eusebius.

How then is it possible, that what Epicure relates of Aristotle can be true, that when he was a young man, he wasted prodi­gally all the means his father left him, whereby he was necessi­tated to betake himselfe to the Warres; but therein being un­fortunate, he set up an Apothecaries shop, and Plato keeping open School, amongst the rest admitted him?

And who will credit Timaeus the Tauromenite, who writes, that being come to riper years, he shut up his poor shop, and gave over his mercenary profession?

Who can be perswaded to believe what Aristoxenus the Mu­sician saith in the life of Plato, that when he was from home, some strangers rose up, and set up a School in opposition to him? which words some interpret of Aristotle, but erroneously; for Aristoxenus alwaies commendeth Aristotle; [yet Suidas, as we said, averrs the contrary.]

Who does not esteem the Commentaries of Alexinus ridicu­lous? for he bringeth in Alexander as a youth talking with his Father Philip, sleghting the instructions of Aristotle, but appro­ving those of Nicagoras, surnamed Hermes.

[Page 28] E [...]bulides manifestly falsifies in the book he wrote against Aristo [...]le: For first, he bringeth in some dull Poems as written by others, upon his marriage and affinity with Hermias: then he saith, that he injured Philip, that he was not present with Plato at his death, and that he corrupted his writings.

As for the accusation of Demochares against Philosophers, it is not worth the mention; for he asperseth not only Aristotle, but all the rest; and whosoever looks upon his calumnies, will say they are triviall; for he affirmes, that some Letters of Aristotle's, against the Citty of Athens were intercepted and discovered; that he betrayed his own Country Stagira to the Macedonians; that when Olynthus was taken, he informed Philip upon the sale and ransome of the goods and prisoners, which were the most wealthy of the Olynthians.

No lesse foolishly doth Cephisodorus, disciple of Isocrates, ca­lumniate him as an effeminate person, and a glutton, with ma­ny other aspersions of the same kinde.

But of all, the most foolish is that of Lyco, who professed himselfe a Pythagorean, for he saith, that Aristotle sacrificed to his w [...]fe after she was dead, as the Athenians to Ceres; and that using to bath himselfe in warme oyle, he afterwards sold it; and that when he went to Chalcis, those who bought his goods, found in one bark 75 brasse pots. Indeed neer so many were the first calumniators of Aristotle, from whom sprung up others, some in the same age, others little after, all Sophists, Litigious persons, and Orators; of whose names and bookes no more remains then of their bodies.

As for those who flourished after these, some repeat only what these had said before, and therefore we need not take any notice of them; much lesse of those, who not lighting upon those books, have fram'd some inventions of their own, such as they, who affirm, he had 300 pots, for there was not any Author of that time who made mention thereof, but Lyco, and he saith, there were found only 75 pots.

And not only from computation of time, and from the per­sons who assert these calumnies, may any man perceive all they say to be but false, but also from this, that not any two of them lay the same thing to his charge, but every one hath a par­ticular calumny different from the rest. But, if any one of these had been true, Aristotle should have heard of it, not only once from them, but a thousand times.

It is manifest therefore, the same thing befell Aristotle which happened to many others, that as well for the respect and friend­ship he had with Princes, as for the excellency of his Disserta­tions, the envy of the Sophists of that age persecuted him. But such as are ingenious ought not to minde calumni [...]tors, but [Page 29] those who have praised and imitated him, whom they will finde to fall nothing short of the others, either for number or worth. Hitherto Aristocles.

CAP. XVI.
His writings.

LAertius hath given a large Catalogue of his Writings, as a testimony of his excellency in all kinds of learning. Their Titles, as reduced to their severall heads by Patricius, are these.

LOGICK.
  • THe Sophist 1.
  • Of Sciences 1.
  • Sophistick distinctions 4.
  • Of Eristick 2.
  • Eristick solutions 4.
  • Of Genus and Species 1.
  • Of Proprium 1.
  • Epichirematick Commentaries 1.
  • Instances 1.
  • Of those which are said many waies, as according to the propo­situm 1.
  • For Science 1.
  • Distinctions 17.
  • Diaereticks 1.
  • Of interrogation and answer 2.
  • Propositions 1.
  • Eristick Propositions 4.
  • Syllogismes 1.
  • First Analyticks 9.
  • Second Analyticks 2.
  • Of Problems 1.
  • Methodicks 8.
  • Termes Antetopical 7.
  • Syllogismes 2.
  • Syllogistick and Termes. 1.
  • Ante-Topicks 1.
  • Topicks to Termes 1.
  • Diaeretick 1.
  • Definitions 13
  • Argumentations 2.
  • Propositions 1.
  • Epichiretick Theses 25.
  • Methodick 1.
  • [Page 30] Of Speech 1.
  • Categories 1.
  • Of Interpretation 1.
  • In all 123.
PHYSICK.
  • OF the Soul 1.
  • Of suffering and being passive 1.
  • Of Elements 3.
  • Of motion 1.
  • Theses of the Soul 1.
  • Of Nature 3.
  • Physick 1.
  • Of Animals 9.
  • Anatomy 7.
  • Anatomick selections 1.
  • Of compound Animals 1.
  • Upon not Generating 1.
  • Of Plants 2.
  • Physiognomick 1.
  • Signes of Tempest. 1.
  • Physicks by Elements 38.
  • Perspective Problems 2.
  • Of Stone 1.
  • In all, 75.
ETHICK.
  • OF Iustice 4.
  • Of Philosophy 3.
  • Politick 2.
  • Of Riches 1.
  • Of Nobility 1.
  • Of Pleasure 1.
  • Alexander; or, os Colonies 1.
  • Of a Kingdome 1.
  • Of Education 1.
  • Of Good 3.
  • Oeconomick 1.
  • Of friendship 1.
  • Propositions concerning Vertue 3.
  • Of the passions of anger 1.
  • Ethicks 4.
  • Of the Better 1.
  • Of Elegible and Accident 1.
  • Of Pleasure 1.
  • Of Voluntary 1.
  • Of Faire 1.
  • [Page 31] Ami [...]able Theses, 2.
  • Politicks 2.
  • Laws 4.
  • Constitutive Law 1.
  • Politick Auscultation 8.
  • Of Iust 2.
  • Of Consultation 1.
  • Iurisdictions 1.
  • Passions 1.
  • Governments of Cities 158.
  • Proper Democracies,
  • Oligarchicks.
  • Aristocraticks.
  • Tyrannicks.
  • In all 217.
METAPHYSICK.
  • OF Contraries 1.
  • Of Principle 1.
  • Of Idaea 1.
  • In all 3.
MATHEMATICK.
  • MAthematicks 1.
  • Of Magnitude 1
  • Of Unity 1.
  • Astronomick 1.
  • Optick 1.
  • Of Musick 1.
  • Mechanicks 1.
  • In all 7.
PHILOLOGICK.
  • OF Poets 3.
  • Gryllus, of Rhetorick
  • Works of Rhetorical art 2.
  • Collection of the Theodectick art, 1
  • Rhetoricall Enthymemes 1.
  • Homericall Difficulties 6.
  • Poeticks 1.
  • Comparisons 1.
  • The Olympionicae 1.
  • Phythionick Musick.
  • Pythick 1.
  • Pythionick Elenchs 1.
  • The Dyonysiack Victories 1.
  • Of Tragedies 1.
  • [Page 32] Poems, 3. So Hermias, to Democritus, Elegies.
  • In all 27.
UNCERTAIN, or EX­TRAORDINARY.
  • NErinthus 1.
  • Menexenus 1.
  • Erotick 1.
  • Symposium 1.
  • Protreptick 1.
  • Of prayer 1.
  • Collection of arts 12.
  • Art 1.
  • Another art 1.
  • Collection. 2.
  • Of fabulous living creatures 1.
  • Medicine 2.
  • Memorialls 1.
  • Encyclicks 2.
  • Inordinate 12.
  • Expounded by their Genus 14.
  • Doctrines 1.
  • Proverbs 1.
  • In all 46.
EPISTLES.
  • TO Philip and Alexander 4.
  • To Antipater 9.
  • To Mentor 1.
  • To Aristo 1.
  • To Olympias 1.
  • To Hephaestion 1.
  • To Themistagoras 1.
  • To Philoxenus 1.
  • In all 19.
AGAINST THE ANCIENT PHILO­SOPHERS.
  • OVt of Plato's Laws 2.
  • Out of Plato's Commonwealth 2.
  • Out of Timaeus and Archytas their writings 1.
  • Problems out of Democritus 2.
  • Against Melissus 1.
  • Against Alcmaeon 1.
  • Against Gorgias 1.
  • Against Xenophanes 1.
  • Against Zeno 1.
  • [Page 33] Of the Philosophy of Archytas 3.
  • Of the Philosophy of Sp [...]usipppus and Xenocrates 1.
  • In all 19.

The Sum of all these Books, excepting the Epistles, is 513. Laer­tius reckons them to be, near 400. perhaps accounting the seve­rall Books that are upon the same subject for one. But of these the greatest part is lost, and of many that are extant, the Titles altered; of the extant there are only these:

LOGICK.
  • CAtegories 1.
  • Of Interpretation 1.
  • First Analyticks 2.
  • Second Analyticks 2.
  • Topicks 8.
  • Elenchs 1.
PHYSICK.
  • OF natural Auscultation 8.
  • Of Heaven 4.
  • Of Generation and Corruption 2.
  • Of Meteors 4.
  • Of the World 1. Suspected.
  • Of the Soul 3▪
  • Of Sense and Sensibles 1.
  • Of memory and Reminiscence 1.
  • Of sleep and waking 1.
  • Of Dream 1.
  • Divination by dreams 1.
  • Of the motion of living Creatures 1.
  • Of the length and shortnesse of life 1.
  • Of youth and age, life and death 1.
  • Of Respiration 1.
  • Of the going of Animals 1.
  • Of Breath 1.
  • Of the generation of Animals 5.
  • Of the parts of Animals 4.
  • The Historie of Animals 10.
  • Of Colours 1
  • Of Physiognomy 1.
  • Sp [...]rious 2
ETHICK.
  • EThick, to Nicomachus 10.
  • Great Ethick 2.
  • Ethick to Eudemus 7.
  • [Page 34] Of vertues 1.
  • Oeconomick 2.
  • Poli [...]ick 8.
METAPHYSICK.
  • MEtaphysick 14.
  • Of the abstruse part of Divine Wisdom according to
  • the Ae [...]yptians, translated out of Arabick; but sus­pected
  • to be spurious 14.
MATHEMATICKS.
  • MAthematick 2.
  • Mechanick 1.
  • Of insecable lines 1.
PHILOLOGICK.
  • RHetorick 3.
  • Rhetorick to Alexander 1.
  • Poetick 1.
EXTRAORDINARY.
  • PRoblems 38.
  • Wonders 1.
  • Of Zenophanes; Zeno and Gorgias 1.

Besides these, there are many other Books [...]ited for his, under these Titles.

  • Magick, Laert. Prooem.
  • Epitome of Oratours, Laert. Aris [...]p.
  • Of Beanes, Laert. Pythag.
  • Of Mixtion, Aristot. de sensu. cap. 3.
  • Of Sapors, Arist. de sensu cap. 4.
  • Physical History, Arist. de incess Animal. cap. 2.
  • Of Nutriment, Arist. de Somno, cap. 3.
  • Selection of Contraries, Arist. Metaph. lib. 3. cap. 2.
  • Division of Contraries, Arist. Metaph. lib. 10. cap. 3.
  • Of Opposites, Simplic. in cap. de Opposit. Comm. 8.
  • Collection of Pythagorick Opinions; Simplic. in lib. 2. de Coelo. Com. 4.
  • Of Idea's, Alexand. in lib. 1. Metaphy [...]. Comm. 59. where he cites the fourth Book, though Laertius, but one, as if there were no more.
  • Of Enunciation, Alexand. in lib. 4. Metaphys. Com. 25. & 44.
  • Of Affirmation, Alexand. in lib. 4. M [...]aphys. Com. 62.
  • [Page 35] Of Platonick assertions, Plut. contra Colo [...].
  • Eudemas, Plut. Consol. ad Apollon.
  • Of Drunkennesse, Plut. Symposiac. 3. Athenaeus cites the tenth book hereof.
  • Animal, or of Fishes, Athen. De [...]p [...]. 7.
  • Of living Creatures▪ and of things pertaining to living Crea­ [...]res, At [...]en.
  • Of the manners of living Creatures, Athen.
  • Of Pheasants, Athen.
  • Of Consanguinity, Athen.
  • Of wonderful luxury, Athen.
  • Apologie, Athen.
  • Histories, Athen.
  • Barbarous Iurisdictions.
  • Of Audibles, Porphyr. Comm. in Ptol. M [...]s. Proclus in Timaeum Plat.
  • The Cohabitant, P [...]oclus. Proaem. in Repub. Platon.
  • [...], Macrob. Saturnal. lib. 1.
  • Of Nature. Clem. Alexandrin. Strom. lib. 6.

We shall not add the Pepl [...]s cited by Nicephorus, and the Chriae by Stobaeus, under his name, since it is manifest they belong not to the same Aristotle, as [...] hath evinced.

These Books Aristotle gave to Theophrastus, when he made him his successor in the School, as Strab [...] affirmeth; adding, that Aristotle was the first, we know of, that made a Library, which the Aegyptian Kings learned of him to do. Theophrastus bequea­thed all his books to Nelius a Scepsian, who carried them to S [...]epsis, and dying, left them to his heirs, men of no Learning, who only kept them confusedly locked up: And when they un­derstood what care was taken by the A [...]alick Kings (in whose jurisdiction Scepsis was) to make a Library in Pergamus, they [...] them in a hole under ground [where they continued about 130 years,] by which means they received some injury by the wet and worms. At last, some that were descended from Ari­sto [...]l [...] and Theophrastus, sold them to Apellico a Te [...]an, [who, ac­cording to Athenaeus, was made free of the City of Athens, a person very rich, who, besides many other Libraries, bought this of Aristotle, being himselfe a lover of Peripatetick Philoso­phy,] for a great summe of mony. This Apellico was more a lover of Books, then of Learning, so that, because they had re­ceived some injury, he caused them to be transcribed, supplying the defects not rightly, and by that means put them forth full of faults. The antient Peripateticks that succeeded Theophrastus, wanting Books, as having but very few, and those Exoterick, could not treat exactly upon any part of Philosophy. They that lived latter, after that these books were published, had much greater helps to Philosophy, and the imitation of Aristotle, al­though [Page 36] by reason of the infinite faults, they were forced to say many things by guesse. Hereunto Rome conduced not a little; for, (soon after the death of Apellico; Sylla taking Athens, in the fourth year of the 173 Olympiad, seised upon his Library, and causing it to be carried to Rome, Tyrannio, a Grammarian, a person studious of Aristotle, ob [...]ained leave of the Library-Kee­per to be permitted the use of them) the Book-sellers not ha­ving good writers, and not comparing well the Copies, it oc­casion'd many faults, as well in those Books that were at Rome, as in those transcribed and sold into Alexandria, Plutarch adds, that from this Tyrannio, Andronicus the Rhodian had them, who first made them publick, setting forth those volumes, which, saith he, we have.

Thus Strabo and Plutarch; Athenaeus saith, that Nelius sold them to Ptolemaeus Ph [...]ladelphius, by whom they were translated to Alexandria, where how long they lay hid is uncertain, which Library was afterwards burn'd by Iulius Cesar.

CHAP. XVII.
His Commentatours.

NO sooner were the writings of Aristotle communicated to the world, but they were entertained with generall ap­probation, which some expressed, by employing themselves in Commenting upon them, whose example was [...]ollowed by ma­ny in all following ages. To omit Pasicrates the Rhodian, brother of Eudemus, who wrote, as Galen affirmeth, upon the book of Categories, we shall name in the first place,

Andronicus the Rhodian; who first published Aristotles writings, put f [...]rth a Paraphrase or Comment upon the greatest part of them.

Next, his Disciple Boethus, a Sidonian, took much pains in the exposition of Aristotle, whence he is often mentioned honoura­bly by Ammonius [...]nd Simplicius.

Aristo a Coan, Disciple also to Andronicus, as Geogr. lib. 14. Strabo affirms▪ living in the time of Nicias, Tyrant of Coos, is reckoned by Sim­plicius amongst the old Commentatours upon Aristotles Catego­ries.

Nicolaus Damascenus, who lived in the time of Augustus, by whom much loved, is cited by Simplicius and Averroes, as an Expositor of Aristotle.

A [...]henodorus of Tarsis, a Stoick, who lived also under Augustus, as Plutarch affirms, is cited by Simplicius, as having written up­on Aristotle's Categories; but, rather by way of confutation then interpretation, as did likewise Alexander Aegeus Nero's Tutor, [Page 37] mention'd Simplicius; Cornutus, who lived at the same time; ci­ted by Porphyrius and Simplicius; Lucius and Nicostratus a Macedo­man, who lived under Antonius.

Sotion of Alexandria, and Achacius, seem to have written upon the Categories, being often cited by Simplicius upon that subject.

Taurus the Ber [...]an, a Platonick Philosopher, living under Anto­nius, wrote first concerning the difference between the Doctrines of Plato and Aristotle.

Adrastus the Aphrodisaean, wrote a Comment on Aristotle's Ca­gories, and of his Physicks, and a Book concerning the Method of his Philosophy.

Aspasius, wrote a Comment on all Aristotle's Works, taking par­ticular care to restore the Text, to which end he is often quoted by Simplicius and Boetius. There is a Comment upon some books of the Ethicks extant under his name.

Herminus, somwhat later, seems to have written upon all, or the greatest part of Aristotle's works, cited by all the Greek Commentatours that are extant, and by Boetius.

Alexander the Aphrodisaean, who lived under Antonius and Se­verus, wrote upon the Analyticks, Topicks and Elenchs, whence stiled by the latter Interpreters, [...] the Expositor.

Galen, who lived at the same time, wrote three Books upon Aristotle of Interpretation, four Books upon the first of the first Analytick, four upon the second of the first, six upon the first of the second Analytick, five upon the second.

Suid. Atticus a Platonick Philosopher, besides seven Books wherein he proved Plato and Aristotle to be of the same Sect, contrary to the assertion of Taurus, he wrote also a Dialogue upon the Cate­gories extant, seven Books upon the Categories cited by Simplicius, a Comment upon the Book of Interpretation, cited by Boetius. Not to mention what he wrote upon Aristotle de Anima, since it ap­pears from Suidas, that it was rather by way of opposition then exposition, which Grae. affec. l. 12. Theodoret likewise confirmes.

Iamblicus of Chalcis in Coelosyria, Master to Iulian the Emperour, wrote in an abstruse way upon the Book of Categories.

Dexippus, by some thought to be sonne of Iamblicus, wrote a Dialogue on the Categories, extant.

Maximus a Byzantine, Disciple of Iamblicus, wrote Commen­taries on the Categories, and other Books of Aristotle, as Simpli­cus and Suidas affirm.

Plutarch the younger Son of Nestorius flourishing under Valen­tinian the first, Gratian and Theodosius the first, according to Suidas and Philoponus, wrote Commentaries upon some Books of Aristotle.

Syrianus, surnamed the great, of Alexandria, a Philosopher, who flourished under Arcadius, Honorius, Theodosius the second, and Valentini [...]n the second, wrote Commentaries upon Ari­stotle's [Page 38] Books of Nature, of Motion, of Heaven, and upon the Cate­gories, cited by Simplicius and Philoponus. Likewise upon the 2 d. 5. and 6. Book of Metaphysicks, which are extant.

Olympiodorus, an Alexandrian, who derived himself from Am­mon [...]us Saccus, and was contemporary to Plutarch and Syrianus, wrote upon Aristotle's Meteors, extant. He was later then that Olympiodorus, who writ upon Plato.

Themistius, living, according to Suidas, under Iulian and Iovi­nian, wrote a Paraphrase upon Aristotle's Physick, 8. Books; a Pa­raphrase on the Analyticks, 2. Books; upon his Books of the Soul, 7. Books. Of the scope and title of the Book of Categories, one Book.

Proclus, Disciple of Syrianus, wrote two Books concerning Motions, wherein he made an abstract of Aristotle's second Book of Motion. That he wrote also upon his book of Heaven, and the E­lements may be conjectured from the frequent citations of Simpli­cius.

Marinus, who succeeded Proclus in the School, seemeth to have written somthing upon Aristotles Book of the Soul, being of­ten cited upon that subject by Philoponus.

Ammonius Hermaeus wrote upon Aristotle's Categories, and up­on his Book of Interpretation, both which are extant; as likewise upon his Books of the Soul, cited by Philoponus.

Damascius, a Platonick Philosopher, Disciple to Ammonius, besides what he wrote in confutation of Aristotle concerning Time, epi­tomiz'd the four first, and the eight Book of his Physick, and the first Book of Heaven. To these adde

Ph [...]loponus and Simplicius, and Asclepius, Disciples to Ammonius. Iohannes Damascenus, whose compendium of Aristotles Logick and P [...]ysick are extant; he lived about the year 770.

Eustathius wrote upon some of the Nicomachian Ethicks; and Eustratius upon his book concerning Demonstration.

Michael Psellus, about the year 800. and Michael Ephesius, upon the parva naturalia.

Magentinus upon the Categories and the book of Interpretation.

Nicephorus Blemmydes, (under Iohannes duca,) upon the Logick and Physick.

Georgius Plachymerius and Theodorus Metochita lived about the year 1080. and wrote Epitoms extant.

Of Arabick Commentatours were Avicenna and Averroes; about the year 1216.

The later writers it wil be unnecessary to mention, there being a Catalogue of them annexed to Aristotles works of the Paris Edi­tion.

ARISTOTLES EPISTLES. Epist Graecan▪

To Philip 1

THey who undertake a Command for the good of their Subjects, not preferred there unto either by Fortune or Nature; trust not in their own power, which they know subject to chance, but grow great in Vertue, whereby they order the Commonwealth wisely. For there is nothing amongst men so firm, and solid, but the rapid motion of the Sun changeth it ere the Evening. Nature, if we enquire into the truth, varieth all lives, interweaving them like the Action of a Tragedy with mis­fortunes. Men, like flowers, have a set time wherein they flou­rish and excell others. Wherefore behave not your self towards Greece tyrannically or loosely, for one argues petulance[?], the other temerity. Wise Princes ought not to be admired for their Go­vernment, but Governance; so that though Fortune change, they shall have the same praise. As for the rest, do all things well, pre­ferring the health of your Soul, by Philosophy, that of your bo­dy by exercise.

To Philip 2.

MOst Philosophers assert beneficence to be somthing equall to God. To speak the truth, the whole life of Mankind is comprised in conferring and returning Benefits, So as, some bestow, others receive, others return. Hence is it just to commise­rate all that are in adversity, for pitty is the signe of a mild Soul▪ sternness of a rude, it being dishonest & impious to neglect vertue in misfortunes. For this I commend our disciple Theophrastus, who saith, we never repent of doing good, it brings forth good fruit the prayers and praises of the obliged. Wise men therefore must study to oblige many, thinking that, beside the praise, there may some advantage accrew from hence in the change of Affaires, and if not all, at least some one of those to whom he hath done good, may be in a capacity to requite him. For this reason, en­deavour to be ready in doing good, but give not way to your passions, for that is kingly and civill, this barbarous and odious. As you see occasion, practise and neglect not this usefull advise.

To Philip. 3.

THE most excellent Princes, whose honour toucheth the Starrs, have conferred most benefits, and not accommoda­ting their sway only to the present, but considering the instabili­ty of Fortune, have treasured up good deeds as usefull in either condition. In prosperity it procures them Honour, for Honour is proper to Vertue, in advers [...]ty Relief, for friends, are much better try'd in bad fortune then in good. The sight of benevolent per­sons is like to that of Land to men in a storme. All Fortune apt to desert us, is the true scope which they propose to themselves who war, on do unjustly, or comply dishonestly, only the clear­nesse of Vertuous persons is not unacquainted with the instability of Fortune, but, by reason, sustaining all accidents, and being, as Plato saith, above them, they are never disordered. Take heed therefore of the rapid motion of things; look upon them as a Circle which reverts into it self; cast up the accounts of life, for chance imposeth many things upon life, and maketh our inclina­tions follow it. Pardon those that offend ignorantly; be ready to acquite those that do good. This if you perform not once, but continually, your Court will be secure from all danger. This, con­sidering the greatnesse of the things, I have said is but little, but, considering the person to whom I write, All.

To Alexander. 4.

I Am in doubt how to begin, for upon whatsoever I reflect, all seems great and wonderfull, nor fit to be forgotten, but pro­per for remembrance, and exhortation, not to be defaced by Time. Good precepts and exhortations of Masters have Eternity for their Spectator. Endeavour to make use of your power, not to oppresse, but to oblige others, then which nothing can bee greater in Man's life. Mortall Nature, which often yieldeth and is overcome by Fate, obtaineth eternall memory by the greatnesse of such works. Consider this well; you are not unrea­sonable as some are, who think good advice ridiculous. Your descent is honourable, your Kingdome hereditary, your Learn­ing sound, your glory admirable; and as much as you exceed o­thers in the Goods of Fortune, so ought you to be excellent a­mongst the good in Vertue. In fine, do that which is profitable, and finish what you designe.

To Theophrastus 5.

A Sudden Injury is better then a slow benefit, for the remem­brance and harme of that lasts but a little while, but this groweth old, as if it hated to build a work to perpetuity, and many times deferring what we intend to bestow upon another, he meets with a calm else-where which allaies the tempest of his mind. Wherefore I say, mutuall society ought not onely to do no wrong, but, if any be received, to be ready to forgive it; for perhaps to do no wrong is above the power of Man. As for him who hath erred, to make use of reproof, is the property of a good well-seated Judgement.

THE DOCTRINE OF ARISTOTLE.
THE First PART.

CHAP. I.
Of Philosophy in generall, and particularly of DIALECTICK.

THE Philosophy of Aristotle is well known, many abstracts thereof have been published, many are read daly in Universities by pub­lick Professours; yet, will it be requisite to our designe, to give, a short account thereof, that it may appear wherein the doctrine and method of the Peripateticks is different from that of the Academicks and Stoicks.

[...]aert. Philosophy, according to Aristotle, is two-fold, Practick and Theo­relick. To the Practick belongs Ethick and Politick; this, concerning the well ordering of a City, that of a House. To the Theoretick belongs Physick and Logick; but Logick is not properly a part thereof, but a most expedient I [...]strument.

Of Logick he asserted two ends, probable and true; for each he makes use of two faculties, Dialectick and Rhetorick for the probable; Analy­tick and Philosophy for the true, omitting nothing towards Invention, Iudgment, and Use. For Invention, his Topicks and Methodicks afford a plentifull supply, out of which may be taken problems for probable ar­guments. For Iudgment, his first and second Analyticks: in the first, propositions are examined; in the second, he treats exactly of their com­position, and the [...]orm of Syllogisme. To Use belongs his Agonisticks, and his Books concerning Interrogation, and his Eristicks, and his So­phistick Elenchs, and of Syllogismes, and the like. Hitherto Laertius.

Of his Logick we have only these books remaining, Of Catego­ries, of Interrogation, Analyticks, Topicks, and So [...]histick Elenchs.

The first considers simple terms: The second Propositions: The [Page 43] rest Syllogismes, Demonstrative, Dialectick, and Sophistick. The Cate­gories are placed first by the generall consent of all Interpreters, neither is it to be doubted, but that the rest are disposed accor­ding to the genuine method of Aristotle. For, in the beginning of his Lib. 1. cap. 2. Analyticks, he saith, We must speak of Syllogism before we come to speak of Demonstration, because Syllogisme is the more generall. And in his Cap. [...]. Elenchs, Of Didascalick and demonstrative Syllogismes, we have spoken already in the Analyticks, of the Dialectick and Pirastick in the book immediately preceding these: We come not to speak of the Agonistick and Eristick.

CHAP. II.
Of Termes.

Categ. cap. 1. TErmes are of three kindes, Homonymous, Synonymous, and Pa­ronymous. Homonymous, whose name only is common, their essence divers: Synonymous, whose name and definition are com­mon to either: Paronymous have denomination from the same thing, but differ in case or termination.

Synonymous, (or Univocall) termes, are reduced to ten generall heads, called Categories.

1. Cap. 5. Substance, of two kinds: First, which is most properly sub­stance, is neither praedicated of, nor inherent in a subject. Se­cond substances are species and genus's, which subsist in the first. The properties of first-substances are, 1. Neither to be in, nor praedicated of a subject. 2. To be all substances equally. 3. To signifie this particular thing. 4. To have no contrary. 5. To admit no degrees of more or lesse. 6. To be susceptible of con­traries.

2. Cap. 6. Quantity, of two kinds; Discrete, as Number; Continuous, as a Line. Their properties, 1. To have no contraries. 2. To ad­mit no degrees of more or lesse. 3. To denominate things equall or unequall.

3. Cap. 7. Relatives, whose whole being is in some manner affected towards one another; their properties, 1. To have contraries, as Father and Son. 2. To admit degrees of more and lesse, as in kindred. 3. To follow one another mutually. 4. To be natural­ly together.

Cap. 8. 4. Quality, from which things are denominated qualited: it hath foure kinds: 1. Habit and disposition. 2. Naturall power and impotence. 3. Passible qualities and passions. 4. Form and figure. The properties, 1. To have contraries, as black and white. 2. To admit intension or remission. 3. To denominate things, like or unlike.

Cap 9. 5. Action. 6. Passion. Their properties are, to admit contra­ries, [Page 44] to admit degrees of intension and remission.

7. When. 8. Where. 9. Position. 10. Habit. These admit not con­traries, nor degrees of intension or remission.

Of those which cannot be reduced to any certain Category, are 1. Opposites. 2. Precedents. 3. Coaequals. 4. Motion. 5. Posses­sion.

Cap. 10. Of Opposites there are foure kinds, Relatives, Contraries, ex­treams in the same kinde, as black and white: Privatives, as pri­vation and habit, light and darknesse: Contradictories, which affirm and deny, as learned, not learned.

CHAP. III.
Of Proposition.

De Interpret cap. 1. VOice is a signe of the notions of the minde; as, in the minde are two kinds of Intellection, one simple, expert of truth and falsitie, the other either true or false: So in voice, some is simple, some complexe.

Cap. 2. A noun is a voice signifying according to institution, where­of no part is significant by it selfe.

Cap. 3. A Verb is a voice implying time, whereof no part is signifi­cant by it selfe.

Cap. 4. A Speech, [...], is a voice signifying according to instituti­on, whose parts are significant separate.

Of Speech, the enunciative only (called proposition) belongs to Philosophy, the precatory and imperative, to Rhetorick, Po­etry, &c.

Cap. 5. &c. Propositions are divided foure waies; into simple and com­plex; into affirmative and negative; into universall, particular, inde­finite and singular; into pure and modall; the modall is either ne­cessary, possible, contingent, or impossible.

Cap. 12. Propositions have three accidents, opposition, consectation, con­version.

Opposition is either contradictory of a particular to an uni­versall; or contrary, of an universall to an universall; or sub­contrary, of a particular negative to a particular affirmative.

Consectation, ( [...]) or aequipollence, is the consideration of those affections of a proposition, in respect whereof, two propo­sitions signify together the same thing, and are together true or false.

Conversion is a transposition of the termes, preserving the af­firmation, negation, and verity of the proposition: it is either ab­solute, which reserves the same quantity, but alters the quality; or partiall, which reserves not the same quantity.

CHAP. IV.
Of Syllogisme.

Analy [...]. pri [...]r. lib. 1. cap. 1. SYllogisme is a speech, in which some things being laid down, another necessarily followes. Perfect Syllogisme is that which requireth no other to shew its power, clearnesse, and efficacy. Imperfect requires another to that purpose, by conversion, or transposition of the propositions.

Cap. 4. The matter of Syllogisme is three termes, the form is the right disposition of the matter, according to figure and mood.

Figure is an apt disposition of the medium with the ex­treams, apt for concluding aright. Mood is a disposition of pro­positions, according to quantity and quality. There are three figures.

The first, when the medium is first subject, then praedicate. It hath nine moods, 4. usefull, 5. uselesse and illegitimate: of the usefull, two are universall, two particular.

The first.
  • Every A is B.
  • Every C is A.
  • Therefore every C is B.
The second.
  • No A is B.
  • Every C is A.
  • Therefore no C is B.
The third.
  • Every A is B
  • Some C is A.
  • Therfore some C is B.
The fourth.
  • No A is B.
  • Some C is A.
  • Therfore some C is B.

Cap. 5. In the second figure, the medium is praedicated of both the extreams. It hath 16 Moods, 4 true, 12 false and illegitimate. Of the true, two are universall, two particular.

The first.
  • No M is N.
  • Every O is N.
  • Therfore no O is M.
The second.
  • Every M is N.
  • No O is N.
  • Therfore no O is M.
The third.
  • No M is N.
  • Some O is N.
  • Therefore some O is not M.
The fourth.
  • [Page 46] Every M is N.
  • Some O is not N.
  • Therfore some O is not M.

Cap. 6. In the third figure, the medium is subjected to both ex­treams. It hath 16 Moods, 10 false and illegitimate; 6. legiti­mate, which conclude particularly.

The first.
  • Every P is R.
  • Every P is S.
  • Therfore some S is R.
The second.
  • No P is R.
  • Every P is S.
  • Therefore some S is not R.
The third.
  • Some P is R.
  • Every P is S.
  • Therfore some S is R.
The fourth.
  • Every P is R.
  • Some P is S.
  • Therfore some S is R.
The fift.
  • Some P is not R.
  • Every P is S.
  • Therefore some S is not R.
The sixt.
  • No P is R.
  • Some P is S.
  • Therfore some S is not R.

Cap. 23. Every Syllogisme ought to be framed in one of these three Figures; but those of the second and third being imperfect, ought to be reduced to the first, which is the most absolute and perfect.

Anal. Prior. lib. 2. cap. 22. &c. There are six other formes of argument, Conversion of Termes, Induction, Example, abduction, Instance, Enthymem. All these have their effi [...]cy from the power of Syllogisme, and are reducible to Syllogisme.

As concerning the invention, power, and conversion of Syllo­gisme, he is exact and curious to admiration.

CHAP. V
Of Apodeictick (or demonstrative) Syllogisme.

Analyt. pos [...]er. lib▪ 1. cap. 1. ALL discursive knowledge is made by a praenotion of the things themselves whereof we discourse; for ratiocination is not concerning things unknown. Demonstration is a discursive [Page 47] knowledge, and therefore requireth three praecognitions. First, that the subject is, and what it is in a rude confused manner. Secondly, what the praedicate is, and what it signifieth. Thirdly, that the principles are true.

Cap. 2. To know is to understand that a thing is, that this is cause thereof, and that it cannot be otherwise. Demonstration is a sci­entifick Syllogisme. Demonstrative Science is from true, first, im­mediate, more known, causes of the conclusion. First, as having none precedent, and being adaequate to, and convertible with the effect. Immediate or consectaneous, as having no terme be­twixt to joyne them. More known, as being praensises to the con­clusion, not to be demonstrated by any thing.

Cap. 4. Demonstrative Science is of a thing necessary, whence the de­monstration it selfe consists of necessary propositions; which necessity requireth explication of that which is praedicated, of all by it selfe, and which is universall.

Of all, is that which is attributed to every one and at all times, as a living creature to man.

By it selfe, as being of essence, proper, competible perse, and competible to it selfe, for it selfe.

An universall attribute is that which is in every one by it selfe, in as much as it is it selfe.

Cap. 8. Demonstration is of conclusions of eternall truth, for they are universall propositions; whence it followeth, that neither de­monstration nor Science are of perishable things; neither are de­finitions of such, which are the principles of demonstration.

That there is demonstration, it is not necessary to have re­course to Plato's Idaeas, separate from singulars; it is enough that there are common natures which are in singulars, and are prae­dicated of them.

Cap. 11. It is one thing to know that a thing is so, another to know why it is so. Hence there are two kinds of demonstration, [...], and [...], the first is the true and most perfect, of which hitherto.

Cap. 13. The other kinde of demonstration, viz. [...], is more im­perfect; it is made two waies in the same Science: First, when the cause is demonstrated by the effect thus, Starres which do not twinkle are nearest to the earth; but, the Planets do not twinkle, therefore they are nearest to the earth. Secondly, when the effect is proved by a cause remote, and not reciprocall, or by an effect of the remote cause; as this, Every thing that breatheth is a living creature; but no Wall breaths, therefore no Wall is a living creature.

To know [...], is proper to subalternat principle Sciences, as Geometry and Arithmetick, which contemplate the first proper causes; to know [...], is of the subalternate and inferiour, as Op­tick and Musick.

Cap. 14. Of all figures, the first is most accommodate to knowledge, for that only concludes with an universall affirmative, and [Page 48] therefore in that only is a demonstrative [...].

Cap. 15. &c. Thus far concerning Science; the opposite to Science is Igno­rance, which is two-fold: One of pure negation, as when a boy or ignorant fellow knowes not that the Sun is greater then the Earth, because he is ignorant of Astrologie. The other, of depra­ved disposition, as when an Astrologer or ignorant Optick be­lieves, that things are as they seem: this is errour, which erro­neous ignorance is in false propositions, or in a Syllogisme through a false medium.

Defect of sense causeth ignorance of pure negation, for if any sense be wanting, it is necessary, that some science of sensibles be likewise wanting; for, we learn all things either by induction or demonstration. Induction is made of singulars perceived by sense. Demonstration is of universals, which are declared by induction; wherefore the beginning of Science is from singulars, which are sensibles. Hence it is impossible for a man born blinde to have the Science of colours. Yet no science is next and immediately from sense, for sense is of singulars, which are here and now; but sci­ence and demonstration is of universals, which are every where and ever, not subject to sense. Yet, sense conduceth to science and demonstration, for as much as an universall is collected from particulars, known by sense.

CHAP. VI.
Of Dialectick Syllogisme.

Topic. lib. 1. cap. 1. DIalectick Syllogisme is that which concludes from probables; probables are those things which appear such to all, or to most, or only to the wise and most eminent.

Cap. 3. Dialectick is a conjecturall Art, as Rhetorick and Medicine; ther [...]fore (like those) it attaineth not alwaies its end; it is enough for a Dialectick, that he omit nothing of his Art for conclu­ding probably.

Cap. 4. All disputation is of things controverted, either by Pro­blem or proposition. A Problem questions both parts, as, a living Creature, is it the genus of man or not? A proposition questions but one part, as, Is not living creature the genus of man? Every propo­sition and problem is either genus, (under which is contained the difference) definition, proprium, or accident.

Cap. 5. &c. Definition is a speech, signifying what a thing is. Proprium is that which declareth, not what a thing is, but is in it only, and reciprocall with it. Genus is that which is praedicated, in quid, of many that differ specifically. Accident is that which is neither definition, nor genus, nor proprium, and may be, or not be, in its subject.

[Page 49] Cap. 10. Dialectick proposition is a probable interrogation, received by all or many, or the most excellent, yet so as it is not wholly alie­nate from the common opinion.

Cap. 11. Dialectick problem is threefold; practick or Morall, pertaining to election or repulse; Theoretick, pertaining to Science, neutrall, which conduceth to the rest, viz. Logick.

Thesis is a paradoxall sentence of some eminent Philosopher, contrary to the vulgar opinion.

Cap. 12. Dialectick Arguments is twofold; Induction and Syllogism.

Cap. 13. &c. Arguments are gained by four instruments, 1. Choice of propo­sitions. 2. Distinction of Aequivoques. 3. Invention of differences. 4. Consideration of Similitudes.

Problems are either universall or particular; the same places which confirm or confute one, confirm or confute the other. From proprium, genus, and definition is immediately and simply made Demonstration, but not from Accident, because that is exter­nall, not necessarily and intimately inhaerent in the Subject. Wee shall not here say any thing of the multitude of places he hath invented, which are more necessary to those that will learn the Art, then suitable to this abridgement.

The Disputant must first find out a place (or medium) second­ly, dispose and question it within himself; thirdly, propose it to his adversary.

In disputation against the learned, Syllogism is to be used, a­gainst the vulgar induction.

Lib. 8. Cap. 4. The office of the opponent is to compell his respondent to this incredible and absurd consequent from his Thesis; of the Respon­dent to take care, that nothing absurd bee collected from his The­sis.

CHAP. VII.
Of Sophistick Syllogism.

Sophist. elench cap. 1. AN Elench is a Syllogism which contradicts the conclusion asserted by the respondent. Of Elenchs some are true, some false; that proper to a Sophos, whose office is to pursue and defend truth, and to discover and confute falshood; this to a Sophist, who from seeming wisdom acquireth gain, and had rather seem then be.

Cap. 1. A Sophist hath five ends, whereto he endeavoureth to reduce his adversary; the first is Elench, or redargution, Cap. 3. of which there are two kinds; one in the word, the other out of the word.

Sophisms in the word, are six. 1. By Homonymie, as that Ill is good, for [...] are good, but Ills are [...]. The fallacy con­sists [Page 50] in the word [...], which signifies sometimes necessarily inevitable, sometimes beneficiall.

2. By Amphibolie, as [...]; which signifies ei­ther that the Enemies would take me, or that I would take the Enemies.

3. By composition, as [...], that he who sits can walk, which is true in a divided sense, not in a compounded.

4. By Division; as five are two and three, therefore even and odde.

5. By accent, which is not so easily done in Logick as in Poetry.

6. By figure of the word, when things which are not the same, are interpreted in the same manner as a male for a female.

Cap. 4. Sophisms out of the word are seven. 1. From accident, when that which is demanded is equally competent to the thing, and to the accident; for whereas many things are competent to the same, it is not necessary that they be all in the subject and praedicate, as, if Coriscus differs from a man, he differs from himself, for he is a man.

2. From that which is simply, or [...], when that which is said in part is taken as of all, as, if that which is not, is imaginative, that which is not, is.

3. From ignorance of the Elench, when not understanding the true Nature of a contradiction, they think that to be an absolute con­tradiction which is none, omitting either the same respect in the thing, or the same respect of the same thing; or the simplicity, or the time. To this all Sophismes may bee reduced.

4. Of the consequent; when we allow those to be true reciprocall consequences which are not such, as, it is yellow, therefore it is ho­ney, and the contrary, it is not yellow, therefore it is not honey.

5. Of petition of the principle, neither by requiring that to bee granted, which was to be proved, or proving the same by the same, the termes only changed; as the Soul is immortall because it is not subject to death.

6. Of a not-cause as a Cause, as when that is taken to be the cause of the thing or conclusion, which is cause of neither; as Arms disturb peace, therefore they are to be taken away.

7. Of Plurality of Interrogations as one, when many things are asked in one; as Iustice and Impiety, are they Vertues or not?

Hitherto of Elenchs; the four other Ends whereto a Sophist endeavours to reduce his adversary, are, Falsitie, Paradox, Soloecism, and Tautologie.

Sophismes are solved either by distinction or negation.

Thus much may serve for a slight view of his Logick, whereof we have but few Books left, in respect of the many which he wrote upon that part of Philosophy.

THE SECOND PART.

CHAP. I.
Of PHYSICK.

NOt to question the Method of Aristotle's Books of Physick, much lesse their titles (as some, to make them better agree with Laertius's Catalogue, have done) and least of all their Au­thority, with Patricius; we shall take them in that order which is generally received; according to which, next Logick is placed Physick.

Metaphys. 5. 1. Physick is a science concerning that substance which hath the principle of motion and rest within it self.

The Physicall Books of Aristotle, that are extant, treat of these nine generall heads. Of the principles of naturall things; of the Com­mon affections of naturall things; of Heaven; of Elements; of the acti­on and passion of Elements; of Exhalation; of Plants; of Animals; of the Soul.

CHAP. II.
Of the Principles of Naturall Bodies.

Physic lib. 1. cap. 3. 4. THe Principles of naturall Bodies are not one, as Parmenides and Melissus held; nor Homoiomeria's, as Anaxagoras; nor A­tomes, as Leucippus and Democritus; nor sensible Elements, as Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Empedocles; nor numbers, or figures, as the Pythagoreans; nor Idaea's, as Plato.

Cap. 5. That the Principles of things are Contrary (privately oppo­site) was the joint opinion of the Ancients, and is manifest in Reason. For Principles are those which neither are mutually of one another, nor of others, but of them are all things. Such are first contraries; as being first, they are not of any other; as contrary, not of another.

Cap. 6. Hence it follows, that being contrary they must be more then one, but not infinite; for then naturall things would not be comprensible by Reason: yet more then two; for of contraries only nothing would be produced, but that they would rather de­stroy one another.

[Page 52] Cap. 7. There are therefore three Principles of naturall bodies; two contrary; privation and form, and one common subject of both, Matter. The constitutive Principles are matter and form; of privation, bodies consist not, but accidentally, as it is competent to Matter.

Cap. 8. Things are made of that which is Ens potentially, Materia pri­ma, not of that which is Ens actually, nor of that which is non­ens potentially, which is pure nothing. Cap. 9. Matter is neither gene­rated nor corrupted. It is the first insite subject of every thing, whereof it is framed primarily, in it self and not by accident, and into which it at last resolveth. To treat of forme in generall is proper to Metaphysicks.

CHAP. III.
Of Nature and the Causes of Naturall bodies.

Phys. lib. 2. cap. 1. OF Beings, some are by Nature, as Plants, others from o­ther causes; those have in themselves the principle of their motion; these have not. Nature is a Principle and Cause of the motion and rest of that thing wherein it is, primarily, by it self; and not by accident. Materiall substances have nature; Natural properties are according to Nature; Nature is twofold, Matter and Form, but Form is most Nature, because it is in act.

Cap. 3. Of Causes are four kinds; the Material, of which a thing is made; the Formall, by which a thing is made, or reason of its essence; The efficient, whence is the first principle of its mutation or rest as a Father; the Finall, for which end it is made; as health is to walking. Causes are immediate or remote, principall or acci­dentall; actuall or potentiall; particular or universall.

Cap. 4. &c. Fortune and Chance are Causes of many effects; Fortune is an accidentall Cause in those things which are done by election for some end; Chance is larger; an accidentall cause in things which are done for some end at least that of Nature. They are both efficient.

Cap. 8. Nature acts for some end; not temerariously, or casually; for those things which are done by nature, are alwaies or for the most part done in the same manner, yet somtimes she is frustrated of her end, as in Monsters, which she intends not.

Cap. 9. Necessity is twofold; absolute, which is from Matter, conditional, which is from the end or form; both kinds are in naturall things.

CHAP. IV.
Of the affections of naturall Bodies, Motion, Place, Time.

Physic. lib. 3. cap. 2. MOtion is of a thing which is not such, but may be such, the way or act by which it becommeth such, as curing of a body which is not in health, but may be in health, is the way and act by which it is brought to health. Neither is it absurd, that the same thing should be both in act and power, as to diffe­rent respects; for the thing moved, as water in warming is in act, as to the heat which it hath, in power, as to the greater heat which it is capable of.

Cap. 7. Infinite is that which is pertransible without end, such an infinite in act there is not: not amongst simple bodies, for the elements are confined to certain number and place; neither amongst mixt bodies, for they consist of the elements which are finite. But, there are things infinite potentially; as, in addition, Number which may be augmented infinitely; in division, Mag­nitude, which may be divided infinitely; in time, and continu­ed succession of generation.

Lib. 4. cap. 3. The properties of place are, that it containes the thing pla­ced; that it is equall to, and separable from the thing placed; that the place and thing placed are together; that it hath upwards or downwards, and the like differences; that every Physicall body tends naturally to its proper place, and there resteth.

Place is the immediate immovable superficies of a continent body. Those things which are contained by another body are in place; but those which have not any other body above or be­yond them are not properly in place. Bodies rest in their naturall places, because they tend thither as a part torn off from the whole.

Cap. 8. Vacuum is place void of body: such a vacuum there is not in nature, for that would destroy all motion, seeing that in vacuum there is neither upwards nor downwards, backwards nor forwards. Nor would there be any reason, why motion should be to one part more then to another. Moreover it would follow, that it were impossible for one body to make another to recede, if the triple dimension, which bodies divide, were vacuous. Neither is the motion of rare bodies upwards caused by vacuity, for that motion is as naturall to light bodies, as to move downwards is to heavy.

Cap. 10. 11. Time is the number of motion by before and after. Those two parts of time are conjoyned by ( [...]) the present, as the parts of a line are by a point. Time is the measure of rest as well as of motion; for the same measure which serves for the pri­vation, serves for the habit. All motion and mutation is in time; [Page 54] for in every motion there is a swiftnesse or slownesse, which is defined by time. The Heavens, Earth, Sea, and other sensibles, are in time, for they are movable.

Cap. 14. Time being a numerate number, exists not without a numerant, which is the Soule. The measure of time and other things, is that which measureth the first, and most equall motion; this is the motion of the primum mobile, for the first in every kinde is the measure of the rest.

CHAP. V.
Of the kinds and properties of Motion.

Phys. lib. 5. cap. 2. MOtion appertaines to three Categories, to Quantity, ac­cretion and diminution; to Quality, alteration; to Where, lecall motion.

Rest is a privation of motion in a body, when, where, and how it is apt for motion.

Lib. 6. cap. 1. As all Magnitude is primarily, and perse, continuous and divisible into infinite, so is all motion, by reason of magnitude, and time it selfe. For whatsoever is not composed of indivisi­bles, is divisible into infinite; but no continuous thing is compo­sed of indivisible things, for it is quantitative, whereas indivisi­bles having no extreams or parts, can neither be conjoyned by continuous nor contiguous motion.

Cap. 2. Yet it followeth not, that if there be infinite magnitude, there can be no motion, for it is not infinite in act, but in power, as are likewise time and motion.

Cap. 3. Neither is there any motion in the instant, [...], for nothing is moved or resteth, but in time.

Cap. 4. Motion therefore is divisible, as well in respect to the time wherein it is made, as in respect to the thing wherein it inheres; as both these are alwaies divisible, so may motion it selfe be di­vided according to these.

Cap. 5. Whatsoever is changed, assoon as it is changed, must neces­sarily be in the (next) terme to which, for it leaveth the state or form in which it was, and assumeth that to which it tendeth: yet though in motion, there is a first motion of perfection, wherein we may truly say, the mutation is made, yet there is no first motion of inception.

Cap. 6. Whatsoever is moved in any whole time, is necessarily mo­ved in every part of that time.

Cap. 7. All motion is finite, for it is in time, which is finite.

Whatsoever is thus proper to motion, is to be applyed also to rest and quiescence.

CHAP. V.
Of the first Mover.

Lib. 7. cap. 1, 2, 5, 6, 7. WHatsoever is moved must necessarily be moved by ano­ther, either externall or internall. But lest this pro­gression be into infinite, we must of necessity at last come to one first mover, which is not moved by another. This first mover, the cause and origine of all motion, is immovable, one, eternall, and indivisible, void of all quantity.

Lib. 8. cap. 6. Immovable, for whatsoever things are moved, are either immediately moved by a first immovable mover, or by some other which is likewise moved by another, untill at last we come to some first mover, for nothing can move it selfe, unlesse there be a first mover: but of infinites there is no first.

Cap. 6. One, for he is most perfect, as being Author of the most per­fect and most simple motion, that of the primum mobile. Besides, the best in every kinde is one; for good is simple, ill multipli­cious.

Cap. 7. Eternall, for motion it selfe is eternall, as appear▪ thus: The mover and the movable must either be from eternity, or have had beginning in some time; if they began at any time, it must have been by motion, and consequently before the first motion there was another, by which the mover and movable began, which were absurd. Again, if they were eternall, yet without motion, it must be either by reason of the inaptitude of the mo­vable, or of its remotenesse from the mover. But neither could the movable be made more apt, or brought nigher to the mover, except by motion, whence would follow, that there was a mo­tion before the first motion. Again, Time, the measure of moti­on is eternall, therefore motion it selfe is such. That Time is eternall (besides that it is the generall agreement of Philoso­phers) is thus proved; it cannot be conceived without [...], the instant, which is intermediate betwixt the past and future, both the end of one, and the beginning of the other▪ but, if time had a beginning, this [...] would have been only a beginning, not end; if time should have an end, this instant would be only an end, not a beginning, both which are repugnant to the nature of a moment.

Lib. 8. cap. 10. Indivisible, void of quantity, the proof whereof is grounded up­on three Theoremes: 1. That no finite mover can move in infi­nite time; therefore the first mover is infinite. 2. That there can­not be infinite power in finite quantity; therefore the first mover is incorporeall. 3. That there cannot be finite power in that which is infinite; therefore the first mover is infinite in power. Hence may be collected, that it is impossible the first mover [Page 56] should be divisible, corporeall, or affected with quantity; for if he had any, it would either be infinite, of which kinde actuall there is none; or finite, wherein could not consist his infinite power.

CHAP. VI.
Of Heaven.

HAving treated of the principles, causes, and affections of [...]aturall bodies in generall, he proceeds next to particulars.

De Coelo lib. 1. cap. 1. The World is perfect, because it consists of bodies which are perfect, and comprehendeth all perfection, it selfe not being comprehended by any other.

Cap. 2. Of Bodies, some are simple, others compounded of the simple. All naturall bodies are movable locally per [...]se. There is a two­fold locall motion, simple, which is competible to simple bodies; and mixt, which to the mixt. Hence it followeth, that there are so many kinds of simple bodies, as variations of simple motion; for of one simple body, there is one proper motion. Simple locall motion is two-fold: circular, about the center, and right: the right is either upwards from the center, or downwards to the center, and both these either simply, or [...]. This foure-fold variation of right motion, evinceth that there are foure simple bodies called Elements; circular motion must be proper to some other fift essence, different from the constitutions of the other foure simple bodies, more divine and precedent to all the rest: This is Heaven.

Cap. 3. Heaven hath neither gravity nor levity; this is manifest from its motion which is circular, not from the center which is pro­per to light things, nor to the center, as is proper to heavy, but about the center.

Heaven is void of generation and corruption, and consequently of accretion, diminution, and alteration, for it hath no contrary; it is therefore the first body, not to be consumed by time and age.

Cap. 5, 7. No body can be infinite, therefore the world it selfe is not infinite; neither is there any body beyond it infinite, not intelli­gible or mathematicall.

Cap. [...]. There is but one world, for if there were more, the Earth of one would move to the Earth of the other (as being of one kind) and ascend out of its proper place.

Cap. 12. The world is eternall; whatsoever is eternall is ingenerate and incorruptible. Plato therefore erred, in affirming the world to be generated, but incorruptible. If he meant that as it was ge­nerated, it is by nature corruptible, yet, shall never be actually [Page 57] dissolved, because of the eternall cause of its conservation, God, he erreth also, for then there would be somthing that should be alwaies, and yet could not be alwaies.

Lib. 2. cap. 1. Heaven is void of labour ( [...]) for it hath no contrary to retard its motion.

Cap. 2. Heaven hath the threefold difference of position, upwards and downwards, backwards, right and left; for these are proper to all animate things which have the principle of motion within themselves. The right side of Heaven is the East, for from thence begins its motion; the left side the West; and consequently the Ar­tick pole is lowermost, the Antartick uppermost; forwards our Hemisphear, backwards the other.

Cap. 3. Heaven naturally moveth circularly, but this circular motion is not uniform throughout all Heaven, for there are other Orbs which move contrary to the primum mobile; that there may be a vicissitude in sublunary things, and generation and corrup­tion.

Cap. 4. Heaven is Sphaericall, for to the first body the first figure is most proper. If it were quadrangular, triangular, or the like; the angles would somtimes leave a space without a body, and occu­pate another space without a body. The motion of Heaven is cir­cular, as being the measure of all others, therefore most compen­dious and swiftest.

Cap. 6. The motion of the primum mobile is aequable and uniform, for it hath neither beginning, middle nor end; the primum mobile and first mover being eternall both, and subject to no va­riation.

Cap. 7. Starres are of the same body with that wherein they are car­ried, but more thick and compact; they produce warmth and light in inferiour things through frication of the Air by their motion, for swift motion fires wood, and melts lead; yet the spheares themselves are not heated, but the Air only, and that chiefly by the sphear of the Sun, which by his accession towards us increaseth the heat, his beams falling more directly, and with double force upon us.

Cap. 8. The Starres being infixed in the Heavens are moved not by themselves with a proper motion, as fishes in the water, and Birds in the Air, but according to the motion of their Orbes. O­therwise those in the eight Sphear would not be alwaies aequi­distant from one another; neither would the stars have alwaies the same side turned towards us, as we see the Moon hath.

Cap. 10. The primum mobile is carried about with the swiftest motion; the seven Orbes of Planets under it, as they are nearer to it, are carried so much the more swiftly about by the motion thereof; and as they are further distant, more slowly. Whence by how much the nigher they are to the primum mobile, so much the slow­er is their proper motion, because it is contrary to that of the pri­mum mobile, as being from East to West.

[Page 58] Cap. 11. The Starres are round, for that figure is most unapt for self­motion: wee see the Moon is round by her orbicular sections; therefore the other Starres are so likewise, for the reason is the same in all.

Cap. 13. 14. The Centre of Heaven is the Earth, round, seated immove­able in the midst; which together with the Sea makes up one Globe.

CHAP. VII.
Of Elements.

De Coelo. lib. 3. cap 3. THe Element of Bodies is a simple Body, into which other Bodies are divided, in which it is either actually or potentially; as in flesh, wood, and the like; there is fire and earth potentially, for into these they are segregated; but actually they are not; for then should the flesh and wood bee segre­gated.

Whereas every naturall Body hath a proper motion; motions are partly simple, partly mixt; the mixt proper to mixt bodies, the simple to simple; it is manifest that there are simple bodies, for there are simple motions; the circular proper to Heaven, the right to the Elements.

Cap. 5. The Elements are not eternall; for they are dissolved with reciprocall mutations, and perish, and are mutually generated of one another.

Lib. 4. cap. 1. The motive qualities of the Elements are gravity and levity. Heavy is that which is apt to be carried downwards to the Cen­tre or midst of Heaven; light is that which is apt to be carried up­wards towards the extremities of Heaven. These are either simple or comparative. Simply heavy is that which is below all, as the Earth; Simply light is that which is above, as all the fire; Com­paratively heavy and light are those in which are both these; above some, below others; as Air and Water. From these have mixt things, gravity and levity; the heavy are carried downwards; to a definite medium; the light upwards to a definite extream, for nothing tends to infinite. Whence it followeth that two Ele­ments are extreamly contrary, simply heavy, and simply light, Fire and Earth; which tend to contrary places. Betwixt these are two means, participating of the nature of each extream, Air and Water. Those Elements which are highest and lightest are most perfect, and have the nature of forms in respect of the infe­riour, because these are contained by those; to be contained, is the property of matter, to contain, of form.

Cap. 5. Hence it followeth that there are four kinds of particular se­cond [Page 59] matter, differing by the accidentall differe [...]ces of heat, cold, humidity, siccity, levity and gravity, (simple and comparative) though there be but one common matter of them all; for they are made mutually of one another. The mean Elements are heavy in their proper places; for Earth being taken away, Water tending downwards, succeeds in its room; Air descends into the place of Water, but not contrariwise; for Water ascends not in­to its place of Air, unlesse by force. In the extream it is other­wise; for the Air being taken away, the fire will not descend into its place, nor the Earth ascend into the place of Water or Air; for Fire is not heavy, nor Earth light, in their naturall place; because they are extream Elements.

Cap. 6. Figure conduceth to the swiftnesse or slownesse of motion either upwards or downwards, but is not simply, and in it self the cause of motion; so an acute figure cuts the medium swiftly, a broad obtuse figure slowly. Hence a thin plate of Lead or Iron will swim on water, because it comprehends much of the subjected body, which it cannot easily divide or penetrate.

CHAP. VIII.
Of generation, Corruption, Alteration, Augmentation and Diminution.

De gener. & corrup. lib. 1. cap. 3. THere is a perpetuall succession of generation, as well sim­ple as accidentall, which proceeds from two causes, Effici­ent, the first mover, and the Heavens, alwaies moving, and all­waies moved, and Materiall, the first matter, of which, being non-ens actually, ens potentially, all things generable and corrupti­ble consist. This is incorruptible in its self, susceptible of all forms, whereby the corruption of one natural substance, becometh the generation of another, whatsoever matter remaineth upon the corruption, being assumed towards the generation of another.

Generation and Corruption are twofold, simple, of a substance, [...], of an accident, generation of the lesse noble substance is called generation, [...] in respect of the more noble, as that of Earth in respect of fire.

Corruption alwaies succeedeth generation, because the terme, to which of corruption ( viz. non-ens) is the terme from which of generation; and the terme, to which of generation ( viz. ens in act) is the terme from which of corruption. The matter of that which is generated, and that which is corrupted is the same, for as much as they are, or may be made reciprocally of one another, as Air, of Water, water of Air; but differenly dis­posed.

[Page 60] Cap. 4. Alteration and generation are different mutations; in altera­tion the subject remaineth entire, the affections only are chan­ged, as of sick sound; in generation the whole is changed, not any sensible subject remaining. Alteration is a mutation accor­ding to quality; augmentation and diminution, according to quan­tity; locall motion according to place.

Cap. 5. Augmentation and diminution differ from other mutations; first, in the object, generation and corruption concernes sub­stances; alteration, quality, lation, place, augmentation and diminution, quantity. Again, in the manner, that which is ge­nerated, or corrupted, or altered, not necessarily changeth place, but that which augments or diminisheth, in some manner chan­geth place, for it is bigger or lesser.

Augmentation is an addition to praeexistent quantity; diminu­tion a detraction. Whatsoever is augmented or decreased, is augmented or decreased according to every part thereof, by reception of something throughout all parts; decretion on the contrary. The animate body encreaseth, but not the aliment, for the living creature remaineth, the aliment is converted into the substance of the living creature. Hereupon that which is augmented is like unto that which is altered, for both of these remain. All parts of a living creature are augmented; the similar first, as bones and flesh; then the dissimilar, as consisting of the others.

Augmentation is made by accession of something according to form, not according to matter; for by it the whole is augmented, and made more such. Accession of parts, according to matter, is not augmentation, for by materialls only (destitute of that form, which the parts to be augmented have) the whole living crea­tures cannot encrease. Aliment therefore, whereby the living creature is augmented, must be the same potentially which the things augmented is in act. At first, it is contrary, and dissimi­lar, being in power the part of a living creature, in act some­thing else: at last it becommeth assimilate to the living creature, taking the form of a part (by aggeneration) through the dige­stive power of the animate body, which changeth the aliment into its own substance.

For this reason augmentation presupposeth nutrition. Nutri­tion is, when the aliment as substance is converted into the sub­stance of the living creature. Augmentation, when the same ali­ment as quantitative, is added to the quantity of the living creature. Hence a living creature as long as it is sound is alwaies nourished, but not alwaies augmented. As that which is added is potentially quantitative flesh, so it can augment flesh; as it is potentially flesh only, so it nourisheth; which when it can only do (as when so much wine is poured into water that it turnes all into water) then there is a diminution of the quantity, but the form remaineth.

CHAP. IX.
Of Action and Passion.

De gener. & corrupt. lib. 1. cap. 6. COntact is of severall kinds, Mathematicall, by contiguity; Physicall, when the extreams of severall bodies meet, and mutually act and suffer; virtuall, by power and metaphoricall.

Cap. 7. The mutuall action and passion of Physicall contact is be­twixt things, partly unlike as to their form, partly like as to their genus (for they are contraries) matter; each endeavouring to reduce the patient to his own likenesse, as fire, wood.

Every Physicall agent in acting, suffers from the patient, for both the agent and patient are active, endued with formes ele­mentary, susceptible of contraries. But as the first mover is im­movable, so is the first agent impassible.

Cap. 9. Every things acts, as it is such, actually; suffers, as it is such, potentially. The conditions of action and passion are five: 1. What the agent is in act, the patient is in power. 2. The patient is such according to each part. 3. That which is more disposed suffers more, and so on the contrary. 4. Every patient is conti­nuous, and not actually divided. 5. The agent must necessarily touch the patient, either immediatly or mediately.

CHAP. X.
Of Mixtion and Temperament.

De gener. & corrupt. lib. 1. cap. 10. MIxtion is not generation, for the matter is not mixt with the forme; nor alteration, for the quality is not mixed with the subject; nor augmentation, for aliment, the matter of augmentation, is not mixed with, but converted into the ani­mate body. Conjunction of small bodies is not true mixtion, but coacervation, for those bodies remain actually the same ac­cording to their forms, not composing one third according to every part. Things which have not the same matter are not mixt, because they cannot be active and passive rec [...] ­procally.

Those things which are properly said to be mixed must have one common matter, they must mutually act upon, and suffer one from another, they must be easily divisible; yet so, as that one be not excessive in respect of the other, for then it is not mixtion, but mutation into the more predominant, as a drop of wine into a great quantity of water.

De gener. & corrupt. lib. 2. cap. [...]. The principles and differences of Elements (sensible tactile bodies) are tactile qualities, in as much as by such qualities, [Page 62] sensible bodies, as such, are constituted and differ. Of tactile qua­lities there are seven orders, hot, cold, moist, dry, heavy, light, hard, soft, viscous, arid, rugged, smooth, thick, thin. From the two first orders, are derived the differences of Elements, for by heat and cold, humidity and siccity they act and suffer, and are mutually changed by alterative passions. Of these first qualities two are active, heat and cold, two passive, humidity and siccity. Heat is that which congregates homogeneous things; cold that which congregates heterogeneous things; humid that which is not easily contained in its own bounds, dry the contrary.

Cap. 3. As there are four Elements, there must be four conjunctions of the primary qualities, from each of which the Elements are severally collected. The first conjunction is of hot and dry, whence proceedeth fire; the second of hot and moist, whence Air; the third of moist and cold, whence Water; the fourth of cold and dry, whence Earth. In each of these one quality is prae­dominant; Earth is more dry then cold, water more cold then moist, Air more moist then hot, Fire more hot then dry.

All these Elements may be mutually transmutated into one a­nother; the Symbolicall which agree in one primary quality are more easily transmutated into one another then the asymbolical, because it is lesse difficult to change one then many. This trans­mutation is not a generation, but a kind of alteration, whence it is manifest one Element cannot be the principle of another.

Cap. 7. Mixtion, whereby the Elements concur to the composition of a mixt body, is made by coacervation, as Emped [...]cles held, but af­ter such a manner that their contrary qualities remain in the mixt; not potentially only, nor simply actually in their height, but in a mean kind of way, their extremities being reduced to some temper. From this contemperation come mixt bodies, differing according to the various proportion of the tempera­ment; and as they are compounded of the Elements, so they re­solve into the same.

All these mixt bodies consist of all the Elements; of Earth, Cap. 8. for every things participates of the nature of that thing wherein it is produced; of water, because every mixt thing must be concrete and terminated; which properties Water best affordeth to Earth; of Air and Fire, because every perfect mixt body is made by temperament of contraries, such is Air to Earth, Fire to Water. Again, the nature of all mixt bodies as well animate as inani­mate, as to mixture, is the same, but that the animate consist of all the Element, is manifest in that they are nourished by them.

Cap. 9. The causes and common principles of mixt bodies are three; materiall, fomall, efficient. The Materiall is the power to be and not to be, by which elementary things are generated and corrup­ted. [Page 63] The formall is the reason of the essence of every thing; Cap. 10. the universall efficient is the circular motion of Heaven, not onely as being eternall, continuall and before generation, but chiefly be­cause it bringeth nigh to us, and carrieth far from us that which hath the generative power of all things, that is, the Sun, and the other Stars, which by their accession and recession are the causes of generation and corruption.

Cap. 11. All these are so disposed according to the order of Nature, that because no naturall being can be permanent in the same in­dividuall state, they may be at lest preserved by a continuall succession of many individuum's of the same species. Whence the naturall cause of generation is onely conservation of the species.

CHAP. XI.
Of imperfect mixt bodies.

Meteor. lib. 1 [...] cap. 1. MIxt bodies are twofold, imperfect and perfect: Meteors are imperfect mixt bodies produced according to Nature, but after a lesse orderly and constant manner. Cap. 2. The generall matter thereof are the Elements; the efficient, the celestiall bodies which act upon inferiours by a kind of coherence. Cap. 3. Heaven is highest; next Heaven the Element of fire; next fire, air, under air, water and earth. Clouds are not generated in the sphear of fire, nor in the region of the air, partly by reason of the heat which is there, partly because of the motion of the Heavens which carrieth a­long with it the element of fire, and the upper region of the air, by which motion heat is produced in inferiour bodies; for the air being carried along by the Heaven, is heated by that motion, and by the proximity of the Sunne and of the Element of fire.

Cap. 4. Flames that appear in the upper part of the air are made thus; The Sun by his warmth extracteth a kind of breath out of the Earth, which, if hot and dry, is called exhalation, and if hot and moist, vapour. Exhalation ascends higher, as being higher, and being got into the upper region of the air, is there enkindled by the motion of the air, and proximity of the fire. Hence come those they call fire-brands, goates, falling-starres and the like. Cap. 5. Hence are also Phasmes, such as are called gulses, chasmes, bloody colours, and the like; the exhalation being variously colour'd by re­flection of the light, but chiefly seeming purple, which colour ari­seth from the mixture of fire and white.

Cap. 6, 7. The efficient cause of Comets are the Sun and stars; the ma­teriall an exhalation, hot, dry, condensed, and combustible; [Page 64] so as it burnes not much, nor is soon extinguished. It is called a Comet, or airy starre, when it is a like on every side; a pogoneia or bearded starre, when it hath a long train. That it consists of fire is manifest, because at the same time, there is commonly great winde and drought. It appears seldome, and then single, and beyond the Tropicks, because starres, especially the Sun, dissi­pate the matter whereof it consists.

Cap. 8. The Galaxie is not the light of many starrs together, as Anaxagoras held, but an exhalation hot and dry, kindled by the motion of many great starrs, which are in that part where the Galaxie appeareth.

Cap. 9. We come next to those meteors which are in the middle and lower region of the air. When the Sun and other Starres draw up vapours out of waterish places, into the middle region of the air, they are there kept so long, untill they are con­densed by the cold of that place into drops of water, which if they come down very small, are called misling, if greater, rain. This thick vapour, which is seen suspended in the aire and changeth from air to water, is a Cloud. Mist is the superfluity of a cloud, condensed into water.

Cap. 10. Vapour attracted by a small heat not much above the earth, and descending more condensed by the nocturnall cold, becom­eth either dew or frost: Frost when it congealeth before it resolves into water; Dew, when it turnes into water, so as the warmth cannot dry it up, nor the cold freez it.

Cap. 11. Snow is a congealed cloud; rain, dew, frost, and snow differ al­most only in bignesse and smalnesse.

Cap. 12. Haile, though it be of the same nature as ice, yet is seldome produced in winter, as being caused by Antiperistasis.

Cap. 13. As the air above the earth condensed, becommeth vapour, and vapour by cold becommeth water, so doth it also in the ca­verns and receptacles of the earth, by a continuall mutation; first it turnes into little drops, then those little into greater. Hence comes all springs, and heads of rivers, abundantly flow­ing out at one part of the earth. Hence great Rivers and Foun­tains commonly flow from great hills, which have greatest ca­verns.

Cap. 14. The parts of the earth are in continuall mutation, some­times humid, sometimes dry, sometimes fertile, sometimes de­sert, by new eruptions or defections of rivers, or accesse or re­cesse of the sea, according to certain periods of time. Thus have the parts of the earth their youth and age, as well as plants and living creatures, by the heat and conversion of the Sun. Time and the World are eternall; but Nilus and Tanais were not al­waies, for those places whence they first issued, were once dry grounds.

Lib. 2. cap. 2. The proper place of water is the concave superficies of the [Page 65] aire: This place the Sea, compassing the earth, possesseth; for the swift and more rare water is drawn upwards by the heat of the Sun; the salt, more thick and terrene setleth downwards. For this reason all waters tend to the sea, as to their proper place▪ yet, hereby the Sea is not enlarged, for the sun draweth out of it, by reason of its expansion, as great a quantity of water, as it re­ceiveth from rivers. Cap. 3. The sea is, as the world, eternall, the saltnesse thereof proceedeth from admixtion of some terrene, adust, exhalation. From the top of the Sea is drawn up a fresh vapour; from the bottom, heated by the Sun, an exhalation, which passeth through the Sea, and commeth up with the va­pour; but falling back into the Sea, bringeth that saltnesse with it, as water passed often through ashes.

Cap. 4. Winds are produced by the Sun and Starrs, of a hot, dry ex­halation, which ascending, is driven down again by the cold­nesse of the middle region of the air, and by reason of the light­nesse of its nature, cannot go directly to the bottom, but is car­ried by the air up and down. We call it a hot and dry exhalati­on, as being more dry then humid. Winde is weakest in the beginning, but gaineth strength, by taking along with it other light exhalations, which it meets with by the way.

Cap. 5. Winds are laid by heat and cold, excessive heat consumeth the exhalations, as soon as it commeth out of the earth; excessive cold binds up the pores of the earth, so as it cannot passe.

Cap. 8. Earthquake is a trembling of the earth, caused by an exhala­tion hot and dry, inclosed in the bowells of the earth, which striving to get forth, as its nature requireth, and not able, by reason of the solidity of the earth, to passe, maketh the earth shake, forcing a way through it, and bearing down whatsoever opposeth it. The more hot this included spirit is, the more vehe­ment.

Of the same nature is lightning, thunder, and the like. Thunder is when an exhalation enclosed in a thick cold cloud, rolleth it up and down, and at last breaketh through it with more or lesse noise, according to the thicknesse of the cloud. By this eruption it acquireth a rare kinde of heat and light, which is lightning, subsequent to the noise of the eruption; yet, seen before the other is heard, by reason of the quicknesse of the sight beyond the hearing.

Cap. 9. As of dry exhalations, the rare and dispersed produce thun­der and lightning; so of the great and condensed is made [...], and thunder-bolts.

Lib. 3. cap. 1. Of lucid Meteors appearing in the clouds, are Haloes, Rain­bowes, Parelies, and Streaks: All these are caused by refraction, but differ according to the objects from which they are refle­cted. A Halo appeareth about some starre, when there happeneth a cloud to be, the middle part whereof, by reason of its rarity, [Page 66] being dissipated, the rest of the parts about, by reflection, repre­sent the colour of the star. Rainbow is a refraction of the Suns beam upon a humid cloud, ready to dissolve into rain. In like manner are caused Parelies and Streaks.

Cap. 7. There are likewise imperfect mixt bodies, under, or with­in the earth, and these also of two kinds; some caused by exha­lation, called Mineralls; others by vapour, called Metalls, fusile or ductile.

CHAP. XII.
Of perfect mixt bodies.

Meteor. lib. 4. cap. 1. THe common affections of perfect mixt bodies, are those which proceed from the primary qualities of the Ele­ments, whereof two are active, heat and cold, two passive, hu­midity, and siccity. The naturall effect of these is Generation, when heat and cold overcome the matter; otherwise it is inqui­nation and inconcoction. The opposite to simple generation is Pu­tre [...]action; every thing unlesse violently dissolved putrifieth. Hence those things that putrifie, become first humid, then dry; for the externall heat expelleth the internall, and at last consu­meth it. All things therefore putrifie except fire, for putrefacti­on is the corruption of the naturall heat in every humid body, by the externall. For this reason, things are lesse subject to putri­fie in cold or in motion, and the hotter or greater they are, as a part of the sea may putrifie, the whole cannot.

Out of putrid things are bred living creatures; for the natu­rall, heat whilst it is separating, endeavoureth as much as possi­ble, that what is taken asunder and segregated by corruption, may gather together in some small parts, which afterwards, by help of the Sun, receive life. Thus are wormes, beetles, gnats, and other insects bred.

Cap. 2. Concoction is the effect of heat, inconcoction of cold. Conco­ction is a perfection caused by naturall heat of the opposite pas­sive qualities, which are mixed with the matter, as being pas­sive. The end of concoction in some things is mutation of the essence, as when food is converted into flesh or blood; in others only a mutation according to quantity or quality, as in fruites that ripen. Inconcoction is an imperfection in the opposite pas­sive qualities, proceeding from defect of heat.

Concoction is three-fold, [...]. Inconcoction is also three-fold, [...].

Cap. 3. [...] is the concoction of that Element which is in fruits; it is perfect, when the seeds that are within the fruit are capa­ble of producing their like, hereto is opposite [...], the incon­coction [Page 67] of fruits not able through want of heat to overcome the humidity.

[...] is a concoction of an humid interminate by externall humidity and heat▪ Hereto is opposite [...], the inconcoction of a humid interminate, caused by defect of externall humidity and heat.

[...] is a concoction by dry and externall heat, yet not ex­cessive, for then it were adustion: to this is opposed [...], an in­coction caused through defect of heat and fire, or excess of humi­dity in the subject.

Cap. 4. As concerning the two passive qualities; things are humid and dry, either actually, or potentially. Those things which are mixt of humid and dry, are terminate, for these qualities mutu­ally terminate one another, whence bodies consist not without earth and water, this humid, that dry. And for this reason Ani­mals can onely live in Earth and Water, which are their matter.

The first affections of terminate bodies are hardnesse and soft­nesse; hard is that which yields not to the touch, soft the contra­ry. Both these are such, either absolutely, or relatively. They are made such by concretion, which is a kind of exiccation.

Cap. 6. Exiccation is of things that are water, or of the Nature of water, or have water in them, either naturally insite, or adven­titious. It is done principally by heat, accidentally by cold. Hu­mectation (its contrary) is the concretion of a vapour into wa­ter, or liquefaction of a solid body, as Metall. Concretion is, when the humidity being removed, the dry is reduced together and condensed, either by cold, as in generation of stones, or by heat, as in segregation of salt from water. To concretion is opposite, resolution, which is effected by its contraries. Those things which are condensed by heat only, are resolved by cold only, and so on the contrary.

Cap. 8. Besides these principall affections, there are others seconda­ry, chiefly competent to homogeneous bodies, some passive, some active.

Of passive qualities in mixt bodies, there are 18. differences, Concretile, Eliquabile, Mollisicable, Humectable, Flexible, Frangible, Impressible, Formable, Compressible, Tractile, Ductile, Fissile, Sectile, Unctious, Friable, Condensable, Combustible, exhalable, and their contraries. From these are thus denominated, homiomerious mixt bodies, as Metalls, Gold, Brass, Silver, Stone and the like; and whatsoever is made out of these; as likewise similar parts in A­nimals and in Plants, as flesh and bone, whereof some are more cold, which consist most of water, others more hot, which most of earth and air.

CHAP. XIII.
Of Plants and Animals.

AT the end of his meteors he proposeth to speak of Similar parts; as Blood, and the like; what they are, and to what end, their matter and reason, but especially whence they have their moti­on; next to proceed to dissimilar parts, and lastly to speak of those which consist therof, as men, Plants, and the like. Hence Patricius conjectures that his Books of the parts of living Creatures did im­mediately succeed those of the Meteors, wherein he treateth (as he proposeth) of Similar parts unto the tenth Chapter, of the se­cond Book, and from thence of the dissimilar. But to reduce his Books of living Creatures to this method is the lesse certain, for as much as many of these (besides those which treated particular­ly of Anatomy) have been lost, of which perhaps were some which might better have cleared the series, for in the Books themselves concerning Animals, there is nothing to ground it upon.

For the same reason, it is uncertain where his Books of Plants ought to have been placed, which are lost. Perhaps they might precede those of Animals; for he asserts that Plants have souls, (contrary to the Stoicks) endued with vegetative power; that they live even though cut asunder, as insects, whereby two or more are made of one; that the substance they receive by aliment and the ambient air is sufficient for the preservation of their naturall heat.

As concerning Animals, we have, Of their Going, one Book. Of their History, ten Books. Of their parts, four Books; Of their Gene­ration, five Books. So exquisitely hath he treated upon this sub­ject, as cannot well be expressed by an abridgement, and there­fore we shall omit it; the rather because little or nothing was done herein by the Academicks or Stoicks, a collation with whom is the principall design of this summary.

CHAP. XIV.
Of the Soul.

De anima lib. 1. cap. 1. THe knowledge of the Soul conduceth much to all Truth, and especially to Physick, for the Soul is as it were the princi­ple of animate things. Animate things differ from inanimate chiefly by motion and sense.

Cap. 2. Whence the antient Philosophers defined the Soul by these; [Page 69] Democritus the Pythagoreans, Anaxagoras by motion; Empedocles and Plato by knowledge; others by both; others by incorporeity, or a rare body; Thales something that moveth; Diogenes, air; Heraclitus, exhalation, an immortall substance; Hippo▪ water; Critias, blood.

Cap. 3. The soule doth not move it selfe, as Democritus held, for whatsoever is moved, is moved by another. Again, if the soul were moved perse, it would be in place, and it were capable of being moved violently, and it would be of the same nature with the body, and might return into the body after the separation. Neither is the soul moved by it selfe, but from its objects; for if it were moved essentially, it might recede from its essence. The soul therefore is not moved perse, but by accident only, accor­ding to the motion of the body.

Cap. 4. The soul is not Harmony, (a proportionate mixture of con­traries) for then there must be more souls in the same body, ac­cording to the different constitution of its parts. But though we commonly say, the soul grieveth, hopeth, feareth, &c. we are not to understand that the soul is moved, but only that these are from the soul in the body, that is moved; some by locall motion of the Organs, others by alteration of them. To say, the soul is angry is no more proper then to say she builds; for it is the man that is angry by the soul, otherwise the soul were liable to age, decay, and infirmity, as well as the organs of the body.

Cap. 5. Neither is the soul a rare body, consisting of elements, for then it would understand nothing more then the elements them­selves; neither is there a soul diffused through all things, as Thales held, for we see there are many things inanimate.

Some from the different functions of the soul argue, that there are more souls then one in man, or that the soul is divisible, the supream intellectuall part placed in the head, the irascible in the heart, concupiscible in the liver: But this is false, for the Intellect is not confined to any part of the body, as not being corporeall, nor organicall, but immateriall and immortall.

Lib. 2. Cap. [...] The soul is the first intelechie of a naturall organicall body, having life potentially. First, Entelechie.] Entelechie is two-fold, the first is the principle of operation, as Science; the second, the Act it selfe. Of a Naturall,] Laert. not of an artificiall body, as a Tower or Ship. Organicall body,] that is, endued with instru­ments for operation, as the eye for seeing, the ear for hearing; even plants have simple Organs. Having life potentially,] as it were in it selfe, for potentially is lesse then actually; actually, as in him that wakes; potentially, as in him that is asleep.

The soul is otherwise defined, that by which we first live, feel, and understand; whence appeareth, there are three facul­ties of the soul, nutritive, sensitive, intellective; the inferiour com­prehended by the superiour potentially, as a triangle by a qua­drangle.

CHAP. XV.
Of the Nutritive faculty.

Cap. 4. THe first and most common faculty of the Soul is the Nutri­tive; by which life is in all things, the acts and operation thereof are to be generated, and to take nourishment.

Nutriment is received either towards Nutrition or augmen­tation. Nutrition is the operation of the Nutritive faculty con­ducing to the substance it self of the animate being. Augmenta­tion is the operation of the Nutritive faculty, whereby the a­nimate body encreaseth to perfect Magnitude. In nutrition are considered, the Soul nourishing, the body nourished, and the food by which the nourishment is made; hereto is required a Naturall heat, which is in all living creatures. The aliment is both contrary, or unlike, and like, to the body nourished: as it is undigested, we say nourishment is by the contrary; as altered by digestion, like is nourished by its like.

CHAP. XVI.
Of the Sensitive Faculty.

Cap. 5. THE Sensitive faculty of the Soul is that by which sence is primarily in Animals. Sense is a mutation in the Organ caused by some sensible Object. It is not sensible of it self, nor of its Organ, not of any interiour thing. To reduce it to act, is re­quisite some externall sensible object, for sense cannot move it self being a passive power, as that which is combustible cannot burn it self.

Cap. 6. Of sensible Objects there are three kinds; proper, which is perceived by one sense, without errour, as colour in respect of sight. Common; which is not proper to any one, but percei­ved by all. Accidentall; which, as such, doth not affect the sense.

Sense is either Externall or Internall, the externall are five, Seeing, Hearing, Smelling, Touching, Tasting.

Cap. 7. The object of Seeing is Colour, and some thing without a name that glisters in the dark, as the scales of fish, glow-worms and the like. Colour is the motive of that which is actually per­spicuous; nothing therefore is visible, without light. Perspicuous is that which is visible, not by it self, but by some other colour or light, as Air, Water, Glasse. Light is the act of a perspicuous thing, as it is perspicuous. It is not fire, not a body, [Page 71] for then two bodies would be in the same place.

To sight and all other senses is requisite a medium and conve­nient distance. The object first affects the medium, then the organ.

Cap. 8. The object of hearing is sound. Sound is made by collision of two bodies, hard, smooth, and hollow, in a medium, as air or water, swiftly and vehemently before the medium be dissipated.

Echo is a reflex sound, when the air, gathered together and forced into a vessell, or some place which hindereth its diffusion and progresse, reverts as a base against a wall. Sound is alwaies reflected, though not alwaies perceptibly, as light also, other­wise all places would be dark, which were not directly oppo­site to the Sun, or some lucid body.

Sound is made by that which moveth the air; and continu­ally stirreth it, till it arive at the organ, wherein there is an insite, connaturall, animate, immovable air, which being moved by the externall air, yeeldeth the sense of hearing. Hence it com­meth that we can hear under water, for the water cannot get into this air, because of the winding narrow passages of the ear: If it do get in, or the membrance which containeth this air be otherwise broken, it causeth deafnesse.

Voice is the impulsion of air attracted by respiration, and forced against the vocall artery by the soul, which is in the lungs, with some intent of signification. Voice therefore is not proper to all animals, but to such only as have blood and breath. Fishes therefore have not voice.

Cap. 9. The object of smelling is Odor. This sense is not so perfect in men as in other creatures, whence men perceive not odors, un­lesse with delight or dislike, when they are so strong, as to ex­cite one of these. This defect proceedeth from the organ of smel­ling, which in us is more obtuse. The medium of smelling is air and water, for fishes smell. Hence all living creatures smell not after the same manner; they which breath smell by drawing in the air, the rest not so, because of the different accommodation of the Organ. Those therefore which smell by drawing in the air, cannot smell under water. Odor consists chiefly in dry, as sapor in humid. The organ of smelling is dry potentially, as the object is actually.

Cap. 10. The object of Tast is sapor. Whatsoever is gustable is tacti­ble, and humid, either actually, or at least potentially. Dry things are subject to tast as they are potentially humid, and melt as salt. The tast perceiveth that which is gustable, and that which is ingustable, as the sight darknesse, the hearing silence; for every sence perceiveth the presence and absence of its object. That which is potable is perceived by the touch, as humid by the tast, as having sapor. The tongue tasts not that which is dry, because the organ of tast must be such potentially, as the object is actually; but, without humidity nothing is gustable. The [Page 72] kinds of sapors are sweet and bitter; to sweet are referred unctious, to bitter salt. The mean are sharp, piccant, acid, acute; gustable is that which moveth the tast, and reduceth it to act.

Cap. 11. The objects of Touch are the primary qualities, organ is that part which is potentially that which the object is in act; for that which is like cannot suffer from its like. We feel not things of equall heat, cold, hardnesse, or softnesse. The flesh is the medium; the first sensory is something more internall. Here­in touch and tast differ from the other senses, whose objects are at greater distance. Touch perceiveth things tactile and not tactile.

Cap. 12. All these senses receive sensible species without matter, as wax the impression of a seal without the gold. The organ or sensory is that in which the sensitive faculty primarily exists; a vehement object destroyeth the organ.

Lib. 3. Cap. 1. That there are no more externall senses then these five, is manifest, in that there are no more in perfect animals; neither is there any need of a sixt sense to perceive common objects, which every sense discernes by accident, as motion figure.

The act of the object, and the act of the sense it selfe, as So­nation and Audition, are really the same, differ only intentio­nally. This act is generally in the sensitive, not in the object.

De Sensu. cap. 6. Sensible qualities are finite, as being bounded by extreams and their contraries, but divisible by accident into infinite, ac­cording to the division of their continuous subject.

Ibid. In sensibles, some are potentially sensible, as a part joyned to the whole; others actually, as the whole it selfe, or a part se­parated from the whole. But of separate parts some are so little, that sense cannot actually perceive them, by reason of their want of due magnitude.

Ibid. Sounds and odors are successively generated in the medium, and by degrees deduced to the organ; but light is produced in an instant in the medium, not carried through it by locall mo­tion.

CHAP. XVII.
Of Common sense.

Lib. 3. cap. 2. EVery externall sense perceiveth the differences of its own object, as sight judgeth of black and white; but the diffe­rences of divers objects cannot be perceived by the same sense; there is therefore a common sense, which judgeth the actions of externall sense, and the differences of all sensible objects. The judgment being of a sensible object, must be done by sense, and [Page 73] by one sense only; for, if there were more, one would object one object apart, the other another, and consequently could not judge between them. For, that which judgeth must have know­ledge of all that whereof it judgeth, which no exteriour sense can afford, as being consined to its proper object.

Common sense judgeth contrary or different sensibles in the same instant, for it discerneth togther sweet and black, bitter and sweet. Hence it is like the center of a circle, which in diverse respects is called one and many. It is one; as all the externall senses are united in it; many, as it is the fountain and judge of them.

De anima, lib. 3. cap. 3. Sense differs from Intellect; for sense is in all living crea­tures, intellect in few. Sense erreth not about its proper object, but is alwaies true; intellect often erreth by false opinions and habits.

CHAP. XVIII.
Of Phantasy and Cogitation.

Cap. [...]. FRom Sense is derived Phantasy and Cogitation. Phantasy differs from sense and intellect, though it exist not without a previous knowledge of sense, as neither doth cogitation, which is in action of the Intellect, comprehending science, opinion, and prudence.

The act of Phantasy differs from Cogitation, for we phansy things false and at our own pleasure; but, we think only what is true, and like unto truth, and that not as we please our selves, but as the thing seemeth. Moreover, when we think that things are ill or good, we are moved with fear, joy, hope; but when we phansy only without application of judgment, we are not moved no more then we are frighted at a picture.

Phantasy is not properly Sense, phantasy acteth in him that sleepeth, sense doth not. Sense was with us from our birth, phantasy not. Sense is in all animals, phantasy is not. Sense is true, phantasy often false. Sense is only of things present, phan­tasy of the absent likewise.

Phantasy is not Science or Intellect, for that is alwaies of things true and reall, phantasy often is of things false. Phantasy is not opinion, for opinion is follow'd by faith, phantasy is not.

Phantasy is a motion in animals from sense in act, by which motion they are variously affected, and conceive things some­times true, and sometimes false. The errour of phantasy ariseth from the errour of the senses: Phantasy therefore is of neer affi­nity with sense; for though it be not sense, yet it exists not without sense, or in things that have no sense. It is de­rived [Page 74] [...] from light, for sight the most excellent of senses cannot act without light.

Many things are done by Animals according to phantasie, ei­ther because they have not Intellect as Beasts, or that intellect is obscured in them.

CHAP. XIX.
Of Memory and Reminiscence.

Lib. de Me­mor. & Rem. cap. 1. FRom Phantasy proceeds Memory, which is of things past, as sense is of the present, opinion of the future. Sense and Intel­lection are necessarily previous to memory. Hence those Animals only which have sense of time, remember, as horses and dogs; yet memory is not without phantasm, even not that memory which is of Intelligible things, for he that remembreth, is sensible that he first saw, heard, or learn'd what he remembreth. Memory therefore is reducible per se to phantasie, as being of Phantasmes, to intellect only by accident. Hence in the same part of the Soul, wherein Phantasie exists, resideth likewise memory; for if it were placed only in the intellectual faculty, it would not be competent to Beasts, which we see it is.

Memory is made by impression of some image by the sense upon the Soul. Hence they who retain not the image and figure of sense, either by continuall motion, or excessive humidity, as children, or drought, as old men, remember not. To memory therefore is required a moderate temperature of the brain; yet more inclined to dry.

Cap. 2. Reminiscence is not a resumption or assumption of memory, but differs specifically from both these, for Beasts have not Remi­niscence though they have memory, Reminiscence being made by discourse and diligent disquisition, collecting one thing from another by a continued series and order, untill at last we cal that to mind which we had forgotten.

CHAP. XX.
Of Sleep and Waking.

Lib. de Som. & Vigil. cap. 1. TO Sense belongeth Sleep and Waking; for those animate things which want sense, neither sleep nor wake, as Plants. Sleep is an immobility, and band as it were of sense; waking is a solution and remission of sense.

Cap. 2. The chief seat of sleep is the common sense, which being [Page 75] bound up by sleep, all the exteriour senses, whereof this is the common Centre, are bound up likewise and restrained, for the rest and health of the Animal; which is the end of waking also.

Cap. 3. Every impotence of sense is not sleep, but only that which is caused by evaporation of the Aliment. Hence we are most sub­ject to sleep after meat; for then much humid vapour ascends, which first maketh the head heavy by consistence there, then de­scends and repells the heat, whereby is induced sleep. That sleep is made in this manner, is evident from all soporiferous things, as poppy, which causeth heaviness in the head by sending up vapours. Labour produceth sleep, by dispersing the humours, whence produceth vapour. Drunken men & Children are subject to sleep much, melancholy persons little, for they are so cold within, that the vapour exhaleth not, especially they being of a dry constitution. Sleep therefore is a recession of the heat inward with a naturall kind of circumobsistence.

CHAP. XXI.
Of Dreams.

Lib de in­som. DReaming is an affection of the sensory part, in as much as it is phantastick. A Dream is an apparition or phantasme seen in sleep.

After the functions of the externall senses, there remain their motions and similitudes induced by their objects into their Or­gans. These occurring in sleep cause dreams, but not at all times, nor at every age, for their species show not themselves but upon cessation of the humours. Hence Dreams are not immediatly after sleep, nor in infants soon after their birth, for then there is too great commotion by reason of the alimentary heat. As there­fore in troubled water no image appeareth, or if any, much dis­torted, but when it is calm, the image is rendred clearly; so when there is a tumult and agitation of the humours, there are no images presented, or those dreadfull, such as are the Dreams of melancholly and sick persons; but when the blood passeth smoothly, and the humours are setled, we have pure and plea­sing Dreams; A Dream therefore is a phantasm caused by mo­tion of sensibles already perceived by sense, occurring to Animals in sleep.

CHAP. XXII.
Of the Intellective Faculty.

De Anim. lib. 3. cap. 4. THe third faculty of the Soul is the Intellective, proper to man. Intellect is that part of the Soul whereby it knoweth and understandeth. It is twofold, Patient and Agent. Patient In­tellect is that by which Intellect becometh all things, for Intel­ [...]ection is like sense; Sense is by passion from a sensible object, in­tellect from an intellectuall. The properties of patient Intellect are these; it is void of corruptive passion; it is apt for reception of species; it is that species potentially; it is not mixt with the bo­dy; it hath no corporeall Organs; it is the place of species.

Cap. 5. That there is also an agent Intellect is manifest; for in what­soever kind, there is somthing that is potentially all of that kind, there is somthing likewise which is the efficient cause of all in that kind; this is the agent Intellect, a cognoscitive power which enlightneth phantasms and the patient Intellect. The pro­perties thereof are, that it is separable from the body, immortall and eternall; that it is not mixt with the body; that it is void of passion; that it is ever in act; but the patient Intellect is mortall, which is the cause of Forgetfulness.

Cap. 6. The action of the Intellect is twofold, one, Intellection of indi­visibles, in which is neither truth nor falshood, as all simple appre­hensions; the other complex, when we compound and unite notions by affirmation or negation. This is alwaies either true or false, the other neither. The simple is precedent to the complex.

Cap. 8. Intellect in act is either Practick or Theoretick. As a sensible object reduceth the sensible faculty from power to act, so doth an intellectuall object the intellectuall faculty; and as the ope­ration of sense is threefold, simple apprehension, judgment if it be good or ill, and lastly, appetition or aversion according to that perception: So likewise is the operation of the practick intel­lect threefold: First, it is moved by phanta [...]mes, as sense is by externall sensibles. Secondly, it judgeth the object to be good or ill, by affirmation or negation. Thirdly, it moveth the will to pursue or shun it, whence it is called practick. This practick intellect is moved as well when the sensible object is absent, as when it is present, only excited by the phantasy. The object of the Theoretick Intellect, is, true or false; of the practick, good or ill.

Ibid. The rationall soul in some manner is every thing; for that which actually knoweth, is in some maner the same with the thing known.

CHAP. XXIII.
Of the Motive faculty.

Cap. 9. BEsides the nutritive, sensitive, and intellective faculties, there is also a motive faculty in animate creatures. That it is not the same with the nutritive is manifest, in as much as it proceeds from imagination and apprehension, which plants have not, neither have they organs fit for motion, which nature would have given them if they had this power. That it is not the same with the sensitive, appears, in that some animals which have sense have not the power, as Zoophytes, which have not the organs fit for this motion. Neither is it the same with the The­oretick Intellect, for that judgeth not as to action; but progres­sive motion is the action of an animal flying ill, or pursuing good.

Cap. 10. The principles of locall motion in animals, are the practick Intellect (under which is comprehended phantasy) and appetite. These two direct and impell the motive faculty to action; intel­lect and phantasy by directing what is to be shunned, what to be embraced, appetite by shunning or embracing it. Appetite is the chief principle thereof, for that may move without intel­lect, as in beasts, and many times in men, who desert their rea­son to follow their pleasure: But intellect never moveth with­out appetite, that is, will; for appetite is the principle of all mo­tion, honest and dishonest, intellect only of honest motion.

In man, appetite is two-fold; Will, which followeth the judg­ment of reason; and sensuall appetite, irascible or concupiscible, which followeth sense and phantasy.

In the motion of animals, three things are considered: First, that which moveth, and that is two-fold; the appetible object, which moveth the appetite as a finall cause, not as an efficient; and the appetite it selfe, which being moved by the appetible object, moveth the animall. Secondly, by what it moves, which is the heart of the animal, by which instrument the appetible object moveth it. Thirdly, that which is moved, the animall it selfe, perfect.

Cap. 11. Insects are moved locally, as perfect animals are, and conse­quently by the same principles, appetite and phantasy; but this phantasy is imperfect, diffused through the whole body, as ap­peareth by their uncertain motion, only towards present oc­current objects. That they have appetite is manifest, in as much as they are sensible of pain and pleasure.

Beasts have sensitive phantasie only; rationall creatures, deli­berative, which compareth many things conducing to some fore­known end, and chooseth the most expedient. Yet somtimes [Page 78] the sensitive appetite in man overswayeth the rationall, but by the order of nature, the will, which is the rationall, ought, as being the superiour to it, to oversway the sensitive. Thus there are three motions, one of the will commanding, another of the sensitive appetite resisting, and a third of the body obeying. But when the sensitive overruleth, there are only two motions, for the will resists not, but is deceived.

CHAP. XIV.
Of Life and Death.

De vit. & Mort. cap. 23. GEneration and dissolution are common to all living Crea­tures, though all are not produced and dissolved in the same manner.

Cap. 24. The generation of a living Creature is the first conjunction of the nutritive Soul with the naturall heat.

Life is the permanence of that Soul with the said heat.

Youth is the encrease of the first refrigerative part, age the decrease thereof, [...], the constant and perfect life which is be­twixt both.

As long as an animate Creature liveth, it hath naturall heat within it self, and as soon as that faileth, dieth. The principle of this heat is in the heart. If it be extinguish'd in any other part, the Animal may live, but if in the heart, it cannot.

This heat is extinguish'd two waies; first by consumption, when it faileth of it self; secondly, by extinction, from some contrary, as in violent death; the cause is the same in both, defect of aliment, which in the living Creature is its vital moisture, as fire want­ing refrigeration, groweth more violent, and soone consumeth the humidity, which being gone, it self must of necessity go out.

Refrigeration therefore is necessary to the conservation of the naturall heat. Plants are refrigerated by the ambient air, and by aliment: their naturall heat is extinguish'd by excessive cold, and dry'd up by excessive heat. Animals which live in the air, or in the water, are refrigerated by the air or water, some by breath­ing, others without.

Cap. 23, 24. Death, according to the extinction of naturall heat, is two-fold, violent or naturall; violent, when the cause is extrinsecall; naturall, when the principle thereof is in the animate Creature. For that part wheron life dependeth (the Lungs) is so ordered by nature that its cannot perform its office for ever. Death there­fore cometh from defect of heat, when through want of refrige­ration the radicall humidity is consumed and dry'd up. Refri­geration faileth naturally, when by progresse of time the lungs [Page 79] in Creat [...]res that have breath, the gils in fishes grow so hard, that they are unapt for motion.

Cap. 23. Old men die easily, as having but little naturall heat, and without pain, because his dissolution comes not from any violent affection.

Lib. de l [...]n. & brerit. cap. 4 The lives of living Creatures, as well of the same, as of divers species differ in length; the longest life, most commonly, is that of some Plants, as the Palm and Cypresse; that of Creatures which have blood rather then the bloodlesse; that of terrestriall creatures rather then the aquatile; that of those which have great bodies, as of Elephants, rather then those of little.

Cap. [...]. The causes of long life are first the quantity and quality of the vitall moisture, if it be much and fat, not easily dry'd up nor congealed. Secondly, natural hear, which suffereth not that hu­mour to be congealed. Thirdly, a due proportion betwixt this heat and that moisture. Fourthly, fewnesse of excrements, for ex­crements are contrary to Nature, and somtimes corrupt nature it self, somtimes a part.

Salacious creatures, or laborious grow soon old by reason of exiccation. For the same reason men are shorter liv'd then wo­men, but more active.

In hot Countries, animate creatures are larger, and live longer then in cold. Those animals which have little or no blood, either are not at all produced in the Northern parts, or soon dye.

Both Plants and Animals, [...]f they take not aliment, die, for the naturall heat, when the aliment faileth, consumeth the matter it self, wherein it is, the vitall moisture.

Aquatile creatures are shorter liv'd then the terrestriall, and the bloodlesse then those that have blood, because their hu­midity is more waterish, and consequently more apt to be con­gealed and corrupted.

Cap. 6. Plants live long, as having lesse of waterish moisture, which therefore is not so apt to be congealed. The largenesse of the up­per parts, as well in Plants as Animals, is a signe of long life, be­cause it argues much naturall heat. The upper part of a Plant is the root, not the boughes.

THE THIRD PART.

CHAP. I.
ETHICK.

WE come next to the Morall part of Philosophy, including Ethick, OEconomick and Politick. Of the first, we have ten Books of Aristotles, written to (his Son) Nicomachus, two Bookes called his Great Ethick; one of Vertues Of OEconemick, two Books; of▪ Politick eight. We shall not have recourse to these for an ac­count of his Doctrine in this kind, being furnished by Stobaeus with a summary of what he and the rest of the Peripateticks asser­ted in Morality.

Ethick ( Eclog. Ethic. saith he) is so called, [...], from Custome; for those things, the principles and seeds whereof we receive from Na­ture, are to be perfected by Custom and right institution. Hence E­thick pertaineth only to living Creatures, and particularly to man, for the rest acquire Custom, not by Reason, but Necessity, man by Reason.

Of the Soul, one part is Rationall, the other Irrationall; the ra­tionall part is Iudicative, the irrationall Appetitive; of the ratio­nall, that which is Theoretick, conversant in divine things, is called Science; that which is Practick, conversant in humane Actions, is called Counsell. Of the latter, one part is concupiscible, another irascible.

In like manner Vertue is twofold, rationall and irrationall, con­sisting in Theory and practise. Ethick Vertue consisteth not in Science, but in election of Goods.

Vertue is perfected by three things; Nature, Custom and Rea­son. For man differing from other Creatures both in body and mind, as being a species placed between divine essences and ir­rationall Creatures, hath some affinity to both; in what is ratio­nall, and agrees with the Soul, he is ally'd to the Divinity; in what is irrationall, proper to the body, he agrees with the irra­tionall. Both these desire perfection by Reason; and first, he de­sireth to be, for this is naturally insite in him. Hence he affecteth things that are according to his Nature, and is averse from things [Page 81] contrary to his nature. He endeavoureth to preserve health, plea­sure, life, these being according to nature, expetible in them­selves and good. On the contrary, he shunneth sicknesse, pain, and death, as being repugnant to nature, and therefore ill, and to be avoided. We love our own bodies, we love our own soules, their parts, their faculties, their acts: the principle of appetite, office, and vertue is a providentiall care of these. If errour did not happen concerning things expetible and avoidable, but that we lived continually participant of good, and vold of ill, we should not enquire in these for a true election. But being in things expetible and avoidable, through ignorance often decei­ved, sometimes rejecting the good, sometimes admitting the ill for good, we necessarily have recourse to constancy of Iudgment, which having obtain'd convenient to nature, we call it, from the excellency of its function, Vertue, admiring and honouring it above all things. For actions, and those which are called Offices, proceed from election of things according to nature, and reje­ction of things▪ repugnant to nature. Herein consist right actions and sinnes; even on these dependeth almost the whole reason of Election; as we shall briefly demonstrate.

That Children are expetible to parents, not only for use of be­nefit, but also in themselues, is most evident. There is no man so cruell and savage, who doth not rather desire his children after his death should live happily and well, then otherwise: By this affection dying persons make Wills, providing even for the un­born, choosing Tutors and Guardians to assist them. And as Chil­dren are loved for themselves, so likewise we love Parents, Bre­thren, Wife, Kindred, Acquaintance, Country-men, for themselves, as having some interest in them by nature. For, man is a sociable communicative creature; and though of Friendships, some are more remote then others, it is nothing to the purpo [...]e, for all friendship is for its own sake, and not for use only. And if friend­ship with Country-men be expetible in it selfe, it will likewise be expetible in it selfe with all men; for all those who benefit others, are so affected towards them, that they do most actions for the office sake. Who will not free any man from a wilde beast, if he be in his power? Who will not direct a man that is out of his way? Who will not relieve a man that is ready to starve, or direct a man in a desart to a spring? Who desires not to be well spoken of after death? Who abhorrs not these spee­ches as unnaturall?

When I am dead, let earth be mix'd with fire,
I care not, so I now have my desire.

It is manifest therefore, that we have a naturall goodwill [Page 82] and friendship towards all mankinde, as being a thing expetible in it selfe, and consonant to reason.

The race of Gods and Men is one,
From Nature both alike begun.

Love of all mankinde being thus common to us, much more evidently it is expetible in it selfe towards those, whom conver­sation hath made our friends. A Friend, Friendship, and Good­will are expetible in themselves.

In like manner praise is expetible in it selfe; for we contract so­ciety with those who praise us: And if praise, glory likewise, which is nothing but the praise of many persons.

Now seeing that externall Goods are expetible in themselves, much more are the goods of the soul and body expetible in them­selves. For, if man be expetible in himselfe, the parts of man must likewise be expetible in himselves. The parts of man in generall are Soul and Body; the body therefore is expetible in it selfe. Why should the body of another person be dear to us, and not our own? Or, why should our body be dear to us, and not the parts and functions thereof? Health therefore, strength, beauty, swiftnesse, sound sense, and the rest, are expetible in them­selves; for none of ordinary capacity would choose to be defor­med or maimed, though no inconvenience would happen there­upon; so that deformity, even without any inconvenience, see­meth justly avoidable. And if deformity be avoidable in it selfe, beauty is expetible, not for use only, but in it selfe. For, that beau­ty pleaseth, is manifest, in as much as all have a naturall incli­nation (besides that of conversation) to such as are beautifull, and endeavour to confer benefits on them, so as it seemeth to procure benevolence. In this respect therefore, beauty is judged expetible in it selfe, deformity avoidable in it selfe. It is the same in health and sicknesse, strength and weaknesse, activity and heavinesse, sense and privation of sense.

And if Corporeall goods are expetible in themselves, and their contrary evills avoidable, the parts and vertues of the soul must necessarily be expetible also. For, vertue, beginning, as we said, from the body, and externall goods, and reflecting upon it selfe, and considering how much more neer relation it hath to the soul, contracteth a neerer affinity with it. So that the vertues of the soul are much to be preferred before those of the body, which is easily collected from what hath been said. For, if cor­poreall health be expetible in it selfe, much more is Temperance, which freeth us from the fury of the passions. And if corporeall strength ought to be numbered amongst goods, much more ought magnanimity, by which the soul is strengthened. And if▪ corporeall Beauty be expetible in it selfe, much more is that of the soul, Iustice.

[Page 83] In like manner is it with the vertues. For, there are three kinds of Goods, which though different, have some kinde of ana­logie. That which in the body is called Health, in the soul is called Temperance, and in externals, Riches. What in the body is Strength, in the soul is Magnanimity, in externals, Power. What in the body is Vigour of Sense, in the soul is Prudence, in externals, Felicity. What in the body is Beauty, in the soul is Iustice, in ex­ternals, Friendship.

There are three kinds of Goods expetible in themselves, those concerning the soule, those concerning the body, and the externall▪ but, especially those of the soul, for the soul is more excellent then the body.

Yet though corporeall and externall vertues be inferiour to those of the soul, they are not to be neglected, partly, as being expetible in themselves; partly, as conducing to civill, sociable, and contemplative life, for life is defined by civill, sociable, and contemplative actions; Vertue (according to this Sect) not being a lover of it selfe, but communicative and civill. For when we say, vertue is neerest ally'd to it selfe, the desire of the know­ledge of truth necessarily followeth it, so as wise men may right­ly part with their life, and fools rightly preserve theirs; since that to those who are perfect, it is an equall thing to depart this life or not.

The excellency of vertue is much encreased by corporeall and externall goods; yet, the end cannot any way be compleated by them. The function therefore of vertue is Beatitude, by suc­cessefull actions. Corporeall and externall goods are said to be efficient of beatitude, for as much as they confer something thereto, not that they compleat it, for Beatitude is life. Life con­sists of actions, but those can neither be reckoned amongst actions nor functions.

Hereupon comes in Beneficence, grace, humanity, love of Children and Brethren, of our Country, Parents, Benevolence, of Kinsfolk, Friendship, Equality, and the whole company of Vertues; which who neglect, manifestly sin, as to expetible goods, and avoidable evills; and also in the acquisition and use of Goods, they sin in election, by judgment; in acquisition, by the manners in use, by ignorance. In election they sin, as desiring that which is not good, or preferring the lesser good, as most prefer Pleasant before P [...]ofitable, profitable before Honest. In acquisition, as not conside­ring whence, nor in what manner, nor how far it ought to be ac­quired: In use, for as much as all use being referred either to it selfe or some other, in the former they observe no moderation, in the latter no decency.

In these things, though the wicked sin, yet do the just behave themselves uprightly, following vertue as their leader.

In all vertues, there is Iudgment, Election, and A [...]tion; there is [Page 84] no Vertue without these; Prudence hath the first place, the rest follow.

Vertue is called the best affection, which may be collected from Induction. The Vertue of a shoemaker is that by which he know­eth how to make shoes, and of an Archit [...]ct, that by which he knoweth how to build a handsom house. Vertue therefore is the best of Affections.

Of Vertue there are two principles as it were, Reason and Passi­on, which somtimes agree, somtimes disagree; for Pleasure or grief, when Reason gets the Mastery, it is called Temperance; when passion, Intemperance; The Harmony and Concord of both is Vertue, one rightly commanding, the other obeying.

Expetible is that which attracteth the appetite to it self, avoida­dable that which repelleth it, reason consenting thereto. Expe [...]i­ble and good were by the Ancients esteemed the same, for they affirmed Good to be that which all desire.

Of Goods, they say some are expetible for themselves, some, for others; the first are either honest or necessary. Honest are the Vertues and their functions; necessary Life, and those things which pertain unto it, as the body with its parts and uses, and those which are called externall goods, as riches, peace, glory, Liberty, friendship, for each of these conferreth to the use of Vertue.

Beatitude consisteth of Good and successful actions; wherefore it is wholly good, as playing upon pipes is wholly Artificial; for the use of the matter doth not take away the goodnesse from Beatitude; as the use of Instruments taketh not away from the Art of Medicine. Such things as are made use of towards this perfection, are not to be reckoned as parts; for they; without which the action cannot be, are not rightly parts thereof; for parts conduce to the whole, the rest conduce to the end.

Good is divided into honest, profitable and pleasant; these are the scopes of all actions. Beatitude consists of all these. It is the use of perfect Vertue, in perfect life, with prosperous successe; and the function of perfect life according to Vertue; and the use of Vertue according to nature without any impediment.

Though some assert, that the End, is to be happy, and Beatitude the scope, as, Riches are Good, and to be rich that which is be­hovefull; yet is it better to follow the Antients, who assert the End to be that for whose sake all things are, it self not being for the sake of any other; or the ultimate of things expetible; or Life according to Vertue, in corporeall and externall goods, either in all or the most principall.

This being the greatest Good, useth the Ministry of the rest; for as those things which conferr hereunto are to be esteemed Goods, so those things which resist it are Indifferents, for every good action doth not effect Beatitude.

[Page 85] They assert Beatitude to be the use of perfect Vertue, as holding some Vertues to be perfect, others imperfect. The perfect are Iu­stice and Integrity; the imperfect are Ingenuity and Progression. The perfect agreeth with the perfect, so as the end thereof is the function of that Vertue, whereof no part is wanting.

They added perfect life, to shew that Beatitude is in men of full age, for a young man is imperfect, and so is his life. Beati­tude therefore is in perfect time, the longest that is appointed for us by the Gods. As one Verse makes not a Poem; nor one step a dance, nor one swallow a Summer; so neither doth a short time conferre Beatitude, for Beatitude is perfect, and requireth a perfect Man and Time.

They added successefull Function of Vertue, because the Goods of Nature are necessarily requisite to Beatitude; for a good man may exercise Vertue in misery, but cannot be happy. For as Ver­tue is the only efficient of honest actions, so is Beatitude of honest, good, and excellent. Neither doth it abide amongst ill or unhappy things, but enjoyeth the Good, nor is deprived of the contem­plation of good, or the conveniences of life.

Beatitude being the most pleasant & fairest of things, increaseth like an Art by the multitude of its Instruments. It is not the same in God and Man, neither is it equall amongst good men, for it may somtimes be taken away by oppression of miseries. Hence it is to be doubted whether a man may be termed happy as long as he is alive, considering the uncertainty of Fortune, whence Solon said, Consider the end of a long life, whether it be happy.

Those who sleep are not participant of Beatitude, but after some manner, as the function of the Soule is capable of a­waking.

Lastly, they added, Nature, because every waking of good men is not the use of perfect Vertue, but only that which is ac­cording to Nature, that is free from madnesse, for madnesse as well as sleep depriveth men of use, and of this Reason, and ma­keth them like Brutes.

As Beatitude is said to be the use of Vertue, so is misery of Vice, yet not so, that as this sufficeth to misery, so that doth to Beatitude.

Life is made four and unpleasant to the Good by excessive ad­versity, to the ill even in prosperity, because they sin more, nor can rightly be termed happy.

Having asserted Beatitude to be the chief Good, it followeth that we expound how many waies it is taken.

Good is understood three waies. First, for that which is the cause of preservation to all beings; next for that which is predicated of every good thing; Lastly, for that which is expetible in it self. The first is God; the second the Genus of Goods; the third, the end, to which all are referred, Beatitude.

[Page 86] That which is expetible in it selfe, is said three waies, either that for which something is done; or, for which all things are done; or, some part of these.

Again, of these, some are finall, some efficient: finall, are the actions proceeding, according to vertue; efficient, the materials of expetible things.

Of goods, some are honourable, some laudable, some faculties, some profitable. Honourable, as God, our Prince, Parent: Laudable, as Riches, Empire, Liberty: Profitable, the efficient, as Health.

Again, of things good and expetible, some are expetible in themselves, some for others; in themselves, as the honourable, lau­dable, and faculties; for others, as the Profitable, which effect and conserve other things.

Again, of things good in themselves, some are ends, others, not ends: Ends, as Iustice, Vertue, Health, and whatsoever consi­steth of these; Not ends, as Ingenuity, Memory, Learning.

Again, of Goods, some are wholly perfect, others not; of the first are Vertue and Prudence, which benefit all; of the latter, Riches and Power, which require to be used by a good man. The same things whereof a good man maketh right use, a wicked man abuseth, as the same which a good Musician useth well, he who is ignorant of Musick useth amisse. Whosoever maketh ill use of any thing is hurt thereby; as, a good horse, which is a help to him that knoweth how to ride, hurts the unskilfull rider.

Again, of Goods, some are in the soul, some in the body, some externall: In the soul are ingenuity, art, vertue, wisdome, prudence, pleasure; in the body, health, soundnesse of sense, beauty, strength, soundnesse of limbs, and all parts, with their faculties and functions. Externall are riches, glory, nobility, power, friend [...] ▪ kindred, coun­try. The goods of the soul are either conferred by na [...]ure, as Wit and Memory; or acquired by diligence, as the Liberall Sciences; or fall into perfection, as Prudence, Iustice, and lastly, Wisdome.

Again, of Goods, some may be both obtained and lost, as Riches; some obtained, but not lost, as Felicity and Immortality; some lost, but not obtained, as Sense and Life; some neither obtained nor lost, as Nobility.

Again, of Goods, some are only expetible in themselves, as Pleasure and Indolence; some efficient only, as Riches; some both efficient and expetible in themselves, as Vertue, Friends, Health.

Goods are divided more waies then these, as not belonging all to one Genus, but to all the ten Categories.

These things laid down, we come next to speak more accu­rately concerning Vertue, which they place in both parts of the soul: In the rationall part, Integrity, Prudence, Wisdome, Memory, and the like: In the irrationall part, Temperance, Iustice, Fortitude, [Page 87] and other vertues. These (say they) may be extinguished by ex­cesse, which they prove by testimony of the senses, as things ob­scure by manifest. For, as by excesse or defect of exercise, health is corrupted, but by moderate exercise is preserved: In like man­ner is it in Temperance, Fortitude, and other vertues. For, as we do call him who feareth the Thunder, mad, not valiant; so on the contrary, he who feareth shadowes is a coward; but, he is valiant, who neither feareth all things, nor nothing. These things encrease or extinguish vertue; being moderate, they en­crease courage; being too great, or too little, they extinguish it. In like manner are all other vertues extinguished by excesse or defect, increased by mediocrity.

Neither is vertue only limited by these, but by pleasure and griefe likewise, in as much as for pleasure we commit wicked­nesse, and for griefe shun good. To explain this more fully, they un [...]old the nature of the soul, wherein are seen three things, passions, faculties, habits: Passions, as, anger, fear, hate, love, emulati­on, pitty, and the like; to which is subsequent pleasure, or griefe. Faculties, by which we make use of passions, and are angry, do emulate, and the like. Habits are those from which the functions of these proceedeth rightly, or otherwise. If any man be so dis­posed, that he is angry upon any occasion, he hath the habit of anger; if so, as to be angry upon no occasion, he hath the habit of stupidity, both which are blamable. The laudable habit is that of meeknesse, by which we are angry in due time and place. Vertues therefore are habits, by which the functions of passions become laudable.

All vertue consisteth in action; all action is continuous. Whatsoever things are continuous, like magnitude, have ex­cesse, defect, and mediocrity, either in relation to one another, or to us. The mean, relating to us, is in all the best, (this is not quantitative, but qualitative, and therefore is perfect; whereas the extreams, excesse and defect, being contrary, are repugnant to one another, and to the mean. But, the mean is to both ex­treams as equality is to inequality, greater then the least, lesse then the greatest.) Vertue therefore is a deliberative habite, consisting in mediocrity, relating to our selves.

Theophrastus having laid down some qualities, (following his Ma­ster) endeavoureth to conclude from each of them: The examples he alledgeth are these; Temperance, Intemperance, Stupidity, Meekness, Wrath, Indolence, Fortitude, Boldnesse, Timidity, Ju­sti [...]e, Liberality, Prodigality, Avarice, Magnanimity, Pusillani­mity, Arrogance, Magnificence, Ostentation. For of these ha­bits, some are ill, through excesse or defect, others good through mediocrity. He is not temperate who desireth nothing, nor he who desireth all things; one like a stone, desireth not even natu­rall expetibles; the other, through excessive desire, becommeth [Page 88] intemperate. He only is temperate, who desireth honest things with reason, in due time and measure. He is not meek who is angry upon all occasions, nor he who is angry upon none; but, he who is endued with the mean habit. He is not valiant who feareth nothing, not God himselfe; nor he who feareth all things, even his own shadow. Nor just, who either assumeth or deroga­teth too much from himselfe, but who observeth equality. He is not liberall who giveth away all, nor he who giveth nothing; nor magnanimous, who esteemeth himselfe worthy all great things, nor he who esteemeth himselfe worthy none; but he who observeth a decorum. He is not magnificent who is splendid eve­ry where, nor he who no where; but who observes due time and place.

Thus the Genus of vertues is placed in Mediocrity, and mutu­ally consequent in it selfe; yet, not alike in all, for prudence is consequent to the rest in its own proper nature; the rest are con­sequent to it by accession, for he who is just, must necessarily be wise, but not on the contrary.

Of passions and appetites, some are good, some bad, some mean; the good are friendship, benevolenee, indignation, shame, confidence, compassion; the bad, envy, malevolence, contumely; the mean, griefe, fear, anger, pleasure, desire.

Every passion is conversant in pleasure and griefe, for which reason, the vertues depend upon them; but, love of mony, love of pleasure, love-melancholy, and the like, are habits distinct from vices.

Of Love, one kinde is of Friendship, another of Conjunction, the third of both. The first is good, the second bad▪ the third mean.

Of Friendship there are foure kinds: Sodality, Affinity, Hospita­lity, Erotick: whether that of Beneficence, and that of Admiration be to be added to these, is doubtfull. The first is derived from conversation; the second from nature; the third from cohabitation; the fourth from affection; the fift from good-will; the last from some facultie. Of all these, there are in generall three ends, ho­nest, profitable, and pleasant: All persons that are studious of friendship aim at one or more of these ends. The first friendship is that, which every man hath to himselfe; the next, to his pa­rent; the rest, to his friends and neighbours. Whence excesse in the first, and defect in the rest ought to be avoided; that being esteemed selfe-love, this reservednesse.

[...] is taken three waies, for a profitable benefit, or for the profitable return of a benefit, or for the remembrance of a bene­fit. It is placed likewise in the face and speech, whence a man is termed gracious, [...], or [...].

A good man must lead a life conjoyned with vertue, whether according to th [...] necessity of the times, he execute the office of a Magistrate, or cohabit with Princes, or impose Lawes, or go­vern [Page 89] some other part of the Common-wealth. If he be not busied in any of these, he must addict himself to a popular life, either by contemplation, or action, or (which is between both) Instru­ction. For though he ought to follow the action and contempla­tion of excellent things; yet if the time will not allow him to use both, he may make choice of one, and preferre the contem­plative life, yet not neglecting the Common-wealth. He shall therefore marry▪ to the end he may have issue, and addict him­self to chast love, and as occasion requireth, drink wine freely, and finally mantain his life by due observance of Vertue, and bee ready to resign it, if there be a necessity, taking care to be buried in his own Country, according to the rites thereof.

Thus there are three kinds of life, the Active and Contempla­tive, and that which consists of both. As the voluptuous is esteemed beneath the dignity of a man, so is the contemplative preferred before the rest. A good man shall addict himself to the Govern­ment of the Common-wealth, by choice, not chance; for the active life is conversant in civill affairs. That life is best which is led according to Vertue and Nature; the next is that which is a mean condition, as to both; these are both expetible. But the life which is conjoined with Vice is to be avoided. A happy life differs from a Good in this. The happy is alwaies consonant to Nature, the good somtimes repugnant to Nature. To the first, Vertue onely is not requis [...]te; to the other, it is requisite. A mean life is that which is placed in mediocrity, not destitute of offices. Rectitudes in life are according to Vertue, sins according to Vice; Offices in the mean kind of life.

To these things thus declared we must adde, that Vertue is a habit desiring mean pleasures and griefs, pursuing that which is honest, as it is honest; Vice is the opposite hereto.

Wisdom is the Science of the first Causes.

Prudence, a habit examining and acting good things, as they are good.

Fortitude, a habit betwixt boldnesse and Fear.

Meekness is a mean betwixt wrath and stupidity.

Liberality is the mean betwixt Prodigal [...]y and Penuriousnesse.

Magnanimity is the mean betwixt Arrogance and Pusillanimity.

For the text doubtlesse is de­fective, and thus to be supplyed. [...] ▪ See [...]rist. Nicom. 4. 2. and M [...]g. mor. 1. 28. Magnificence is the mean betwixt ostentation and sordidness.

Indignation is the mean betwixt envy and malevolence.

Gravity is the mean betwixt assentation and contradiction.

Modesty is the mean betwixt impudence and Bashfulnesse.

Urbanity is the mean betwixt Scurrility and Rusticity.

But Arist. o­therwise, pla­cing Friendship betwixt Arro­gation and De­rogation. Friendship is the mean betwixt dotage and enmity.

Truth is the mean betwixt detraction and boasting.

[Page 90] Iustice is the mean betwixt excesse and defect.

There are other Vertues, part ranked by themselves, part un­der the former. As under Justice are, [...], under Temperance [...], defined thus.

[...], is a habit of worshpping the Gods and Demons, a mean betwixt Atheism and [...]

[...], a habit of observing right towards the Gods and the dead, a mean betwixt [...], and somthing that wants a name.

[...], a habit of doing well voluntarily for their own sakes; a mean betwixt [...], and somthing that wants a name.

[...], a habit, rendring men gratefull in Society, a mean betwixt [...], and somthing that wants a name.

[...], a habit avoiding injustice in Contracts; a mean be­twixt [...], and somthing that wants a name, which per­taineth to extream right.

[...], a habit of observing order, a mean between [...], and somthing that wants a name.

[...], a habit liberally content with the present, a mean be­twixt [...] and [...].

[...], a habit of sustaining grievous things unconquer'd, a mean betwixt [...], and [...] ▪.

[...], a habit performing excellent things indefatigably▪ a mean betwixt [...], and▪ [...].

Lastly, Frobity is a vertue consisting of all the rest; it is perfect, as well because it rendreth good things honest and profitable. as, for that it desireth honest things, for their own sake.

CHAP. II.
OECONOMICK.

HAving thus explained the Vertues and the chief Heads of Ethick, it remaineth that we speak of OEconomick and Poli­tick, for as much as Man is by Nature a Civill Creature. The first Common-wealth is the lawfull congression of man and woman, for procreation of children, and society of life. This is called [...], a Family, it is the ground and beginning of a City. A Fa­mily seemeth to be a little City, for marriage being contracted, and children growing up one under another, and join'd one to an­other, there is deduced another family, and so a third, and a fourth. Of these is constituted Neighbourhood and a City, for many Neighbourhoods make us up a City. Th [...]s as a Family hath in it the seeds of a City, so likewise of a Com­monwealth, for in a Family there are the prints of Monarchy, an Aristo [...]racy, and a Democracy. The Society between Parents and [Page 91] children represents a Monarchy; that betwixt man and woman an Aristocracy, as being contracted for issue, mutuall comfort and assistance. To these is added a servant, appointed to be such by nature, able for service; but not to live of himselfe, requirin [...] therefore a Master to govern him. Of all these reduced to a com­munity, is constituted a Family.

The government of a Family is by nature given to Men, fo [...] the counsell of Women is weaker, Children are not yet arived to it, Servants never can. The whole ordering therefore of a family depends upon the Man; the whole prudence of Oeconomy there­fore is in Man: This is partly Paternall, partly Nuptiall, partly Herile, partly Acquisitive. For, as an Army requireth Provision, a City, Merchandise, Art, Instruments; so a Family Necessaries, as well for common life as convenience. Of these the Master of the Family takes the first care, how honestly to encrease his reve­nues, and moderate his expenses. He, as being the head of the Family, ought to be skilfull in many things, as in Agriculture, Grasing, Metals, whereby he may advantage himselfe without doing injury to others. Of Acquisition there are two kinds, one better then the other; that by Nature, this by Art.

CHAP. III.
POLITICK.

THus much concerning Oeconomick; we come next to speak in short of Politick.

First then, Cities are constituted as well for the naturall pro­pensity of man to society, as for utility. A City is the most per­fect society. A Citizen is he who is concern'd in the Magistracy. A City is a compleat number of such persons, which proceedeth so far, as that it be not disagreeing within it selfe, nor contemp­tible, but may conveniently provide for life, and defend it selfe against enemies.

Oeconomicall prudence is one kinde, Legislative another, Poli­tick a third, Military a fourth.

A City is govern'd either by one man, or some few, or all; and each of these either rightly, or unjustly: Rightly, when the Princes respect the common good; unjustly, when they consider their own private interest. The right are Monarchy, Aristocracy, Democracy: the unjust, Tyranny, Oligarchy, Ochlocracy. There is al­so a mixt Government, consisting of the good kinds. And where­as a Common-wealth is often changed into better or worse; that is best which is guided according to Vertue; that worst, which according to Vice.

They who command, or advise, or judge in Democracy, are ta­ken [Page 92] out of all, either by suffrage, or lot: In Oligarchy, out of the Richer; in Aristocracy, out of the Best.

Sedition in Cities is either according to Reason or Interest; the first, when equalls are reduced to unequall extremities; the second, for honour, power, or gain.

Common-wealths are overthrown either by force or fraud. They last longest which respect the publick utility.

Courts of Iudicature, Processes, Pleas, and Magistracies, are or­dered according to the formes of every Common-wealth. The most generall commands are Priesthood, Generalship, Admiralty, [...], whereof some relate to Citi [...]s, others to Havens and Traffick.

The office of a Commonwealths-man is to reform a Com­monwealth; which is much harder then to erect one; and to di­vide the common-people into two parts, one for necessary offi­ces; the other for convenient: Mechanicks, Husband-men, and Merchants are for the necessary sort, continually serving the Commonwealth; but Souldiers and Counsellours, who are servants for vertue, and performe noble things, are the more ex­cellent.

Old men are most proper to be Counsellours, and also Priests, to perform the sacred rites; young men for Warre. This order is exceeding antient, first constituted by the Aegyptians, who, amongst other things excellently disposed, appointed the Tem­ples of the Gods to be built in the highest places, and the lands of private persons to be disposed, partly at the confines of the Country, partly neer the City, whereby both parts of the Coun­try should meet in Tribute and Tax. They likewise well or­dered the institution of Sodalities, and a publick care for the edu­cation of children, and that those who are too young or too old should not marry, to prevent their having weak children. Like­wise, that nothing mixt be taken away, nothing perfect expo­sed, abortion not procured. Thus much of Politick.

THE FOVRTH PART.

CHAP. I.
Of METAPHYSICK.

THE fourth and last part of Philosophy, which treateth of Ens in generall, is by Aristotle termed sometimes, First, Philo­sophy, sometimes Wisdome, sometimes Theologie, by his followers and Interpreters called Metaphysick, from the order thereof, as Alexander Aphrodisaeus and Philoponus affirm, being placed after Physick, as treating of a lesse known, and more noble object.

Upon this subject, there are fourteen bookes of Aristotle ex­tant, which, saith Alexander Aphrodisaeus, by the method of the discourse and stile, are easily evinced to be his.

Metaphys. lib. 6. cap. 1. Metaphysick considereth Ens as it is Ens, and the primary cause thereof. Lib. 4. cap. 2. Ens is Analogous, praedicated primarily of sub­stance, which is one essence; of Accidents, not simply, but in re­gard of their common attribution to substance. Ens thus being one analogically, the science therof is one likewise; but it treateth chiefly of substance, because that is the first essence upon which the rest depend, and from which they are deno­minated.

CHAP. II.
Of the first Principle.

THe first most common axiom, Cap. 3. or complex principle, is this▪ It is impossible that the same thing should be and not be in the same, and according to the same respect.

To this principle, Cap. 4. 5. all demonstrations and opinions are redu­ced. It is it selfe indemonstrable, as being the first; otherwise there would be an infinite progression in demonstration, and consequently no demonstration. There is nothing more known by which it may be proved, no greater absurdity then the deny­all of it, that an adversary can be reduced to.

With the first negative principle, Cap. 7. the first affirmative hath a near affinity. It is necessary that every thing be predicated affirmatively or negatively of another. It is not true in matter of a future contin­gent determinately, but only indeterminately. This affirmative [Page 94] principle therefore is not absolutely the first, yet is it true, nei­ther can there be a medium betwixt contradictory propositions, no more then betwixt even and uneven numbers: Every propo­sition either affirms or denies, therefore every proposition is ei­ther true or false; between these there is no medium.

CHAP. III.
Of Substance and Accident.

Lib. 6. c. 2. OF Ens in generall there are three divisions, first, by accident and per se; secondly, Potentiall and active; thirdly, intentionall and reall.

Of Ens by accident there is no Science, for it is in a manner non­ens, it hath no cause per se; it is not generated or corrupted per se; it is not alwaies, nor for the most part, not necessary, whereas Science is of things contrary to these.

Lib. 7. c. 1. Ens per se is divided into ten Categories. The first is substance, and the first Ens, and consequently the first Category, for it is predicated in quids of the first subject, whereas Accidents are predicated in quale or quantum. Again, substance only is Ens per se, accidents are Ens as they are affections of substance. Substance is the first Ens, by Reason or definition, because accidents are defi­ned by Substance. By knowledge, because the knowledge of acci­dents, depends on the knowledge of substance. By time, for there is some substance without accident, as God and Intelligences, but there is no accident without a substance. Likewise material sub­stances are precedent in Time, at least to some accidents, which arrive unto them after they have some time generated. And lastly, by Nature, for the subject is, by Nature, before that which inhereth in it. Hence this part of Physick treateth onely of substance.

Cap. 3. Subject or substance is threefold; matter, form, compositum. The two latter are more Ens then matter, though matter be truly sub­stance, as being the first and last subject which remaineth, though all the affections of a body be taken away. This is first matter, which in it self is neither compleat substance nor quantitative, nor in any other Category. Neither is it first substance, for that is separable, and may exist by its own power without others. That is likewise a determinate, perfect, singular substance; but matter cannot be separated from form, neither is it singular or determinable.

Cap. 4. Form is that which the thing it selfe is said to be, per se, [...], the being of a thing what it was, the whole common na­ture and essence of a thing, answerable to the definition. Com­pound [Page 95] sensible substances have a proper definition; but ens by accident, consisting of subject and accident, hath not, though it may be by accident described and explained. Even Categoricall accidents being one per se, and of one nature, have a quiddity and definition, not simply as substances, but after their owne manner.

Cap. 8. Matter and form are not properly generated, but the whole Compositum, whereto Ideas [separate substances,] confer nothing, neither as efficient, nor exemplary Causes.

Cap. 10. The common substantiall, or formall parts of the thing de­fined, are to be put into the definition of the whole; but the materiall parts of the Individuum it selfe, must not.

CHAP. IV.
Of Power and Act.

Lib. 9. c. 1. NExt Substance we come to Power and Act. Power is either active or passive: Active power is the principle of changing other things, or acting on another, in as much as it is another. Passive power is in a manner the same with active, for the motion of passion and action is really the same, neither can one be without the other, though simply they are diverse, being in different sub­jects, passive in the Patient, active in the Agent.

Cap. 2. Of powers, some are void of Reason, as the power of war­ming; some rationall, as Arts: The rationall are of contraries, as Medicine is of health and sick; the irrationall of one only, as heat produceth heat.

Cap. 3. The power (contrary to the Megarick Philosophers, followers of Zeno) remains; althogh not reduced to act; for we call a man Architect, though he be not actually employed in building. Again, Animals have sense, even when they are not in act. Thirdly, it were impossible any thing could be which were not actually. Possible is that whose power, if it were reduced to act, would not imply any impossibility.

Cap. 4. They are mistaken, who think there is any thing possible which shall never actually be, or that there are powers whose acts are impossible; for hence it would follow, that all things should be possible, nothing impossible. Possible is that which doth or may follow from some power; if it never followeth, or com­meth out of that power, it is impossible. That which is possible therefore, must at some time or other be in act.

Cap. 5. Of powers there are three kinds, some naturall, as Senses; some acquired by custome, as playing on a Pipes; some by discipline, as Arts. The two last require previous operations, the naturall do not. Naturall and irrationall powers are necessarily reduced [Page 96] to act, when the Agent and Patient are at a due distance, and there is nothing betwixt to hinder them. The rationall powers are not so, for they are free to act or not to act as they please.

Cap. 6. Act is, when the thing that was in power is otherwise then when it was in power.

Cap. 8. All act is before power, and before all nature which is con­tained under power, by reason, [...]ssence, and time. By reason, because power is defined by act. By time, because though power be tem­porall before act in the same numericall object, for a man may first be learned before he actually be such; yet, in different things of the same species, act is ever before power in time; for nothing can be made or reduced from power, unlesse by an agent actually existent.

Lastly, act is before power in essence; first, because it is later in generation, for generation beginneth from the imperfect state of a thing, and proceedeth to the perfect. Now all generation proceedeth from power to act. Secondly, act is the end of power; but the end, as it is later in generation, so is it more perfect by nature, and first in intention.

CHAP. V.
Of True and False.

Lib. 6. c. 2. THe first division of Ens is into intentionall and reall. Lib. 9. c. 10. The intentionall is either true or false. The intellect asserteth truly, if its judgment be conformable to the thing; falsely, if not conformable, for there is composition and division in the things themselves, as well as in the intellect. Whence if the intellect compound things by affirmation, as they are really compounded, or divide them by negation, as they are really divided, it asser­teth truly, otherwise falsely. True and false are in the simple apprehension of things, but simply, not enunciatively, so as that truth is nothing, but a simple perception of the object; falshood a non-perception or ignorance thereof, though ignorance be not properly falsity. Whence simple apprehension may be true in it selfe, false it cannot be, for falsity requireth composition.

Complex truth and falshood may be of the same separate sub­stances.

He cannot be deceived in the knowledge of things immovable, whosoever hath once conceived them immutable; for either he will judge alwaies truth, or alwaies erre, because things im­movable are alwaies in the same manner. The vicissitude and deception, and true and false judgment, is only in things contin­gent and mutable.

CHAP. VI.
Of one, the same, and diverse.

Cap. 2. ONe is an affection of Ens, not a substance as Pythagoras and Plato affirmed, but a Categoreme, predicated of every thing as it is Ens. To one is opposite many; by privative oppositi­on, and therefore one is manifested by many, as indivisible by divisible, the privation by the habit. For divisible is more known to sense then indivisible, and multitude then unity. To one are re­ferred the same, equall, like; to many, di [...]ers, [...]equall, unlike.

Cap. 3. Things are d [...]verse, either by Genus or species; by genus those which have not the same matter, nor a mutuall generation; or whereof one pertaines to corruptible substance, the other to incor­ruptible. By species, those which have the same genus. Genus is that wherein those things that are diverse are said to be the same according to substance.

CHAP. VII.
Of immortall, eternall and immoveable substances.

Lib. 12. [...] 14. cap. 6. SUbstance is threefold; two kinds naturall, whereof one is corruptible, as Animal, the other sempiternall, as Heaven. The third is immoveable.

That there is a perpetuall immoveable substance, is proved thus. Substances are first Ens, therefore if all substances are cor­ruptible, all things likewise must be corruptible, which is false; for there is an eternall locall motion, circular, proper to Heaven, which it is not possible should have had a beginning, or shall have a dissolution, no more then time. If therefore Time be eternall as motion, there must necessarily be some incorruptible and eternal substance, not only that wherein that eternall motion exists, the Heaven it self; but one substance, which so moveth, that though it remain its self moveable, yet it moveth others from eternity to eternity, not having only the power of moving, but being conti­nually in the act of motion. For Plato and the rest, who concei­ved God to have done nothing for a great while, erre, because that power were frustraneous which were not reduced to act. Besides, motion would not have been eternall, unlesse the moving substance were not only eternall, and in perpetuall actuall moti­tion; but such likewise, that it could not but it must move all­waies, as being a pure act void of power.

Hence the substances which cause eternall motion are void of [Page 98] matter, for they move from an eternall act, and are void of all power.

In things that somtimes are, somtimes are not, power is pre­cedent to act; but simply and absolutely act is precedent to pow­er. For, neither things naturall nor artificiall are reduced from power to act, but by somthing that actually exists. Now if the same thing alwaies return by a circular motion, it necessarily followeth, that there is somthing eternall which remaineth ever the same, and operateth in the same manner. Such an eternall first moving substance is the first Heaven. The vicissitude of Gene­ration and corruption is not caused by the first Heaven, for that moveth alwaies in the same manner, but by the inferiour Orbes, especially the Sun, which by his accession bringeth life, by his re­cession death to all things mortall.

Thus is the first Heaven eternall, for it is moved with eternall motion; besides which there is somthing which alwaies moveth, and is never moved it self, and is eternall, and substance, and act.

CHAP. VIII.
Of Gods.

Cap. 7. THis first mover, moveth in the same manner as things appe­tible and intelligible, that is, it so moveth others, as it self remaineth immoveable. The motion of the first Agent, as it is the first efficient cause, consisteth in that influence thereof, whereby it concurreth effectively with the inferiour Intelligences in mo­ving its own orb. Wherefore the efficience of the first mover is an application of the powers of the inferiour movers to their pro­per works, wherein he concurreth with them actively, and inde­pendently. Thus the Intelligences move the Heavens, not for the generation of inferiour things (for the end must be more noble then the means) but for that chief and amiable good, whereunto they endeavour to be like, as their ultimate end.

The first mover is void of mutation, an ens, wholly and simply necessary, and consequently the principle of all. Upon this first principle depend Heaven and nature, because without him, their ultimate end and first efficient, nothing can be, or be operated.

This first mover, God, enjoyeth the most perfect life, perpetual and most pleasant, which absolute felicity is proper to him; for as much as he understandeth and contemplateth himself with infinite delight. For, as we are happy in contemplation that lasts but a little while, so is God most happy, in the infinite and most perfect contemplation of himself, who is of all things most admi­rable.

[Page 99] God is an eternall living being, the best of beings, an immoveable substance, separate from sensible things, void of corporeall quantity, without parts and indivisible; for such must that principle or sub­stance be which moveth in infinite time. Nothing finite hath in­finite power. All magnitude must be either finite or infinite. Fi­nite magnitude cannot move in infinite time; infinite magnitude there is not, as we proved in the Physick.

God is impossible, not subject to alteration; the first locall motion▪ which is the circular, not being competible to God, because he is immoveable, it followeth that other motions that induce passion or alteration, and are later then locall motion cannot likewise be competent to him.

CHAP. IX.
Of Intelligences.

Cap. 8. BEsides this first Substance the mover of the first Heaven, th [...]re must likewise be other substances separate from matter, e­ternall and immoveable, president over the motions of the in­feriour orbes; so that after what number and order those orbes are disposed, according to the same are these eternall moving, and immoveable substances ordered.

From the number of the motions may be collected the number of the Sphears, and consequently of the substances moving, which according to Aristotle are 47.

Heaven is numerically one; because the first mover is one. It is an ancient Tradition that these first substances that move the Heavens are Gods. This opinion is truly divine; but what is ad­ded, that they had the shape of men, or some other Animal, was only invented for perswasion of the common people, for use of Laws, and the convenience of Life. Thus much may serve for a short view of his Metaphysicks.

THEOPHRASTVS.

CHAP. I.
His Country, Parents, Masters.

THEOPHRASTUS succeeded Aristotle, he was born at Erestus, (as De exil. Plutarch, Laertius, and others affirme) a Sea-town of Les [...]os, sea­ted upon a hill, as Lib. 13. Strabo describes it, distant from Sigrium 18 Stadia.

His Father was named Melantes, as Laert. Athe­nodorus affirmeth, according to Suid. others, Leo, by profession a Fuller. Theophrastus was first called Tyrtamus. He heard Leucippus in his own Country, afterwards went to Plato, and lastly became an auditor of Aristotle, who changing the roughnesse of his name, called him, as Suidas saith, first Euphra­stus, afterwards Theophrastus, from the divine eloquence of his speech, wherein (as Cicero, Fr [...]s. Lib. 1. Pliny, Laertius, Lib. 13. Strabo, and others aver) he excelled all the rest of his Disciples.

Laert. He was likewise so quick of apprehension, that what Plato had said of Aristotle and Xenocrates, Aristotle apply'd to him and Callisthenes. Theophrastus was acute to admiration, ready to ap­prehend every thing that he taught; Callisthenes was dull: so that one needed a bridle, the other a spur.

CHAP. II.
His Profession of Philosophy, and Disciples.

ARistotle retiring to Chal [...]is, in the 2 d year of the 114 th Olym­piad, Laert. Suid. being importuned by his Disciples to appoint a suc­cessour, made choice of Theophrastus (as hath been already rela­ted in the life of Aristotle) who thereupon undertook the go­vernment of the School, and, Aristotle dying, lived in his Gar­den, [...]Demetrius Phalerius cohabiting with him. This time where­in Theophrastus flourished, is reckoned by Lib. 15. c. 1. Pliny to be about the 440 th year from the building of Rome; Plin. 19. 2. 390 years, as Exercit. Pli­nian. pag. 350. Sal­masius rightly reads, before that time wherein Pliny wrote.

Athen. lib. 1. saith, he went at certain houres to the School, [Page 101] neatly dressed, and there sitting down, discoursed in such man­ner, that he omitted no gesture suitable to the argument where­upon he treated, so that once to expresse a Glutton, he licked his lips.

Laert. [...] deipn. In the fourth year of the 118 th Olympiad, Xenippus being Archon, Sophocles, son of Amphiclides, procured a Law to be made, forbidding all Philosophers to keep publick Schooles, unlesse such only, as the Senate and people should think fit to license; if any did otherwise, he should be put to death. By this decree, saith Athenaeus, he banished all the Philosophers out of the City, amongst the rest Theophrastus, who the year follow­ing returned, when as Philo, a Disciple of Aristotle, accused So­phocles for having done contrary to Law: Whereupon the Athe­nians revers'd the decree, [...]ined Sophocles five Talents, and cal­led home the Philosophers; by which means, Theophrastus re­turning, was reinstated in the School.

Laertius saith, there came to hear him 2000 Disciples; Sui­das saith (if there be no mistake in the number) 4470. of whom were Strato, his Successor, Demetrius Phalereus, Nichomachus son of Aristotle, whom Aristippus saith, he much affected; Erasistratus the Physician, as some affirme, and Menander the Comick Poet.

CHAP. III.
His Vertues and Apophthegmes.

Laert. HE was exceeding learned and studious, as Pamphila affir­meth.

Laert. He was very liberall in conferring benefits, and a great cherisher of learning.

Athen. lib. 5. He made collections of mony for the conventions of Philo­sophers, not for luxury, but for temperance, and learned dis­courses.

Plut. adv. Colot. He twice freed his Country, being under the oppression of Tyrants.

Laert. Cassander son of Antipa [...]er much esteemed him, and Ptolomy the first wrote Letters to him.

Laert. He was so much honoured by the Athenians, that Agnonides accusing him of Impiety, very hardly escaped from being fined himselfe.

Laert. Of his Apophthegmes are remembered these. He said, it is more safe trusting to an unbridled horse, then intemperate speech.

Laert. To a young man at a Feast silent; If you hold your peace, saith he, because you are foolish, then you are wise; but, if [Page 102] you are wise, you do foolishly in holding your peace.

Laert. Stob. He used to say, of all things that are spent, time is the most precious.

Plut. vit. Demost. Being demanded, as Aristo saith, what he thought of De­mosthenes; he answer'd, he is worthy of this City; of Demades; he is above the City.

Sy [...]p. lib. 2. To Philip Son of Cassander he said, I wonder your eyes do not make musick, the pipe of your nose coming so directly upon them.

Plut. de. Anar. To prove that riches are not to be lov'd and admir'd hee in­stanced Callias, a rich Athenian, and Ismenias a Theban; these saith he, use the same things, as Socrates and Epaminondas.

Plut. de frat. amor. He said we must not love strangers, to the end we may make tryall of them, but make tryall of them to the end we may love them.

Plut. de sa­nit. tuend. He said the Soul paid a dear rent for her habitation in the body.

Stob. He said Falshood raised from Calumny and Envy, endu­reth a little while, but soon perisheth.

Stob. Ser. 101. Seeing a young man blush, be of good comfort saith he, that is the complexion of Vertue.

Ser. 121. He used to say, stand in awe of thy self, and thou shalt not be ashamed before other.

Ser. 136. He said the good need but few Laws, for things are not ac­commodated to Laws, but, Laws to things.

Ser. 139. The envious are more unhappy then others in this respect, that they are troubled not only at their misfortunes, but also at the good fortunes of others.

Ser. 141. Being demanded what preserved humane life, he said, bene­ficence, reward, and punishment.

Ser. 162. He said, Honours are to be acquired, not by conversation and favour, but by action.

Ser. 185. Being demanded what Love is, he answered, the passion of an idle soul.

Ser. 193. He said a woman ought not to be seen her self, nor behold o­thers richly attired, for both are inticements to dishonesty.

Ser. 297. He said, Love is an excessive desire of somthing irrational, the entrance thereof easie, the disingagement difficult.

CHAP. IV.
His Will and Death.

Laert His Will is thus delivered by Laertius.

BE all well; but if any thing happen otherwise, thus we give order. All those goods which belong to the House, I bequeath to Melantes and Pancreon Sonnes of Leo; Those which are set apart for Hipparchus, I will be thus disposed. First, that the study and Ornaments belong­ing thereunto be perfected, and if any thing may be added more to beautifie them, that it be done. Next, that the statue of Aristotle be set up in the Temple, and the other Dona­ries which were before in the Temple. Moreover that the little walk which is near the School be built new, not worse then it was before, and that the Maps of the World be pla­ced in the lower Walk. That an Altar likewise be built, wanting nothing of perfection and splendor. I will that the statue of Nicomachus as big as the life be finished; it is in Praxitele's hands; let him go on with it. Let it be placed wheresoever they shall think good, who have the disposall of the rest, and are named in my Will. Thus much for the Temple and Donaries. My Land at Stagira I bequeath to Callinus, all my Books to Neleus. The Garden and Walk, and all the houses belonging to the Garden I bequeath to my Friends hereafter named, that they may exercise themselves and study Philosophy therein, for men cannot alwaies be a­broad. But with condition, that they do not alienate it, nor pretend any propriety thereto, but esteem it a thing sacred in common possession, making use of all things therein as be­cometh just and loving Friends. The persons to whom I wil that this be in common, are, Hipparchus, Neleus, Strato, Callinus, Demotimus, Demaratus, Callisthenes, Me­lantes, Pancreon, and Nicippus. Let also Aristotle, sonne of Midias and Pythias, if he desire to study Philosophy, [Page 104] partake likewise of the same priviledge, and let the most an­tient of the Overseers take great care of him, that he be in­structed as well as is possible in Philosophy. Let us be buri­ed in that part of the Garden, which they shall think most convenient, not erecting a Monument, or any thing that is sumptuous over our Graves. Thus let all things be ordered according as is said; the Temple, Monument, Garden, and walk repaired; let Pompylus, who dwelleth in them, take charge of them, and of other things as he did heretofore, for whose pains therein, let the Possessors thereof consider him. As for Pompylus and Threpta, who have been long since manumitted, and done us good service, if there be any thing which we have bestowed upon them, or they them­selves have required, as also the 2000 Drachmes which I appointed to be given to them and Hipparchus, let them firmly possess it all, as I have often expressed to Melantes, & Pancreon, who assented thereunto. Moreover I bestow on them Somatales and the Girle. Of my servants, I manumit Molon, and Cimon, and Parmenon; as for Manes and Callias, when they shall have lived four years in the Gar­dens, discharging their Office unblamably, I will they be set at liberty. Of the Domestick Vtensills, let the Oversee [...] bestow on Pompylus as many as they think fit, and sell the rest. To Demotimus I give Cario, to Neleus, Donax; let Eubius be sold. Let Hipparchus give to Callinus 3000 drachms. And for M [...]lantes & Fancreon, if we did not look upon Hipparchus, as having heretofore been very beneficial to us, and now quite shipwrack'd in his Fortunes, wee should have appointed him a joint-estate with Melantes and Pancreon. But because I conceive it were not easie for them to be joined in the ordering of one Family with him, and that it would be more to their advantage to receive somthing certain from Hipparchus, for these reasons, let Hippar­chus give to each of them, Melantes and [...]ancreon, a Ta­lent. Let him likewise duly furnish the Overseers with all charges necessary for the performance of the forementioned [Page 105] works; which done, let Hipparchus be free and discharged from all debts and Covenants to me. If any benefit come to Hipparchus from Chalcis on my behalf, let him wholly enjoy it as his own. Be these the Overseers of those things con­tained in my Will; Hipparchus, Neleus, Strabo, Calli­nus, Demotimus, Callisthenes, Ctesarchus.

Copies of the Will of Theophrastus, signed with his Ring, are kept; the first by Heg [...]sias son of Hipparchus. witnesses; Callippus a Pela­nean; Philomelus, an Euonymean; Lysander an Hybaean; Philion, an Alopecian. The second Olympiodorus hath attested by the same persons. The third is in the hands of Adimantus, delivered to his son Androsthenes. Witnesses, Aimnestus, son of Cleobulus; Lysi­stratus son of Phidion, a Thasian; Strato, son of Arcesilaus, a Lamp­sacene; Thesippus, son of Thesippus, of the Potters street; Dioscori­des, son of Dionysius, an Epicephisian. Thus (saith Laertius) was his Will.

He died old, having lived eighty five years, Laert. his spirits being wasted, as Suidas affirmes, with continuall writing; and, upon the marriage of one of his Disciples, giving himselfe some inter­mission and rest, it occasion'd his end.

As he lay upon his death-bed, Tuscul. lib. 4. Cicero saith, He blamed Nature for giving Harts and Crowes so long life that could do no good thereby, and to Man, who could do most good, so short; whereas if man had been allowed longer time, his life might have been adorned with the perfe­ction of arts and learning. Thus he complained, that assoon as he came within the view of these, he was taken away.

His Disciples came to him, Laert. and asked him if he had any thing to say to them; Nothing; saith he, but that the life of man loseth many pleasures only for glory. When we begin to live, then we die; nothing is more unprofitable then the desire of glory. But be happy, and either give over study, for it is very laborious, or go perseverantly through it, for it is of great glory. The vanity of life is much greater then the benefit thereof. But, I have not time to advise you what to do; do you consider at leisure what is best for you: In saying which words he expired. The whole people of Athens followed his body on foot to the grave.

CHAP. V.
His writings.

HE left many Writings, whereof, saith Laer [...]ius, because they are full of all kinde of learning, I thought good to give this Catalogue.

  • [Page 106]First Analyticks 3.
  • Latter Analyticks 7.
  • Of the Analysis of Syllogisms, 1.
  • Epitome of Analyticks 1.
  • Places of Deduction 2.
  • Agonisticks, concerning the Theory of Eristick argu­ments.
  • Of the Senses 1.
  • To Anaxagoras 1.
  • Of Anaxagoras 1.
  • Of Anaximenes 1.
  • Of Archelaus 1.
  • Of salt, nitre, allom 1.
  • Of Combustibles; or, as the other Edition, of things that may be petrified 2.
  • Of indivisible lines 1.
  • Of Auscultation 2.
  • Of Winds 1.
  • The differences of Vertue 1.
  • Of a Kingdome 1.
  • Of the Discipline of a King 1.
  • Of Lives 3.
  • Of old age 1.
  • Of the Astrology of Democritus 1.
  • Of sublime things 1.
  • Of Apparitions 1.
  • Of humor, colour, flesh 1.
  • Of the Description of the world 1.
  • Of Man 1.
  • A collection of the Doctrines of Diogenes 1.
  • Of Definitions 3.
  • Erotick 1.
  • Another of Love 1.
  • Of Felicity 1.
  • Of Species 2.
  • Of the Epilepsie 1.
  • Of Divine inspiration 1.
  • Of Empedocles 1.
  • Epichirems 18.
  • Instances 3.
  • Of Voluntary 1.
  • Epitome of Plato's Commonwealth 2.
  • Of the diversity of voice in Creatures of the same kinde 1.
  • Of Subitaneous apparitions 1.
  • Of biting and blowes 1.
  • Of Animals that are said to have wisdome 7.
  • Of those which dwell in dry places 1.
  • [Page 107] Of those which change colour 1.
  • Of those which dwell in caves 1.
  • Of Animals 7.
  • Of Pleasure according to Aristotle 1.
  • Of Pleasure, another, 1.
  • Theses 24.
  • Of hot and cold 1.
  • Of dizzinesse and dimnesse 1.
  • Of Sweat 1.
  • Of Affirmation and Negation 1.
  • Callisthenes, or of Griefe 1.
  • Of Labours 1.
  • Of Motion 3.
  • Of Stones 1.
  • Of Pestilence 1.
  • Of Fainting 1.
  • Megarick 1.
  • Of Melancholy 1.
  • Of Metals 1.
  • Of Honey 1.
  • Of the collections of Metrodorus 1.
  • Sublime discourses 2.
  • Of Drunkennesse 1.
  • Of Lawes alphabetically 24.
  • Epitome of Lawes 10.
  • To Definitions 1.
  • Of Odors 1.
  • Of Wine and Oyle.
  • First propositions, 18.
  • Legislative 3.
  • Politicks 6.
  • Politick according to severall occasions 4.
  • Politick Customes 4.
  • Of the best Commonwealth 1.
  • Collection of Problems 5.
  • Of Proverbs 1.
  • Of Congelation and Liquefaction 1.
  • Of Fire 2.
  • Of Winds 1.
  • Of the Palsey 1.
  • Of Suffocation 1.
  • Of Madnesse 1.
  • Of Passions 1.
  • Of Signes 1.
  • Soph [...]smes 2.
  • Of the solution of Syllogism [...] 1.
  • Topicks 2.
  • [Page 108] Of punishment 2.
  • Of Haire 1.
  • Of Tyranny 1.
  • Of Water 3.
  • Of sleep and dreams 1.
  • Of friendship 3.
  • Of Ambition 2.
  • Of Nature 3.
  • Of Physick 17.
  • Of the Epitome of Physicks, 2.
  • Physicks 8.
  • To Naturall Philosophers, 1.
  • Of Naturall Histories 10.
  • Of Naturall Causes 8.
  • Of Chyles 5.
  • Of false Pleasure 1.
  • Of the Soul 1. Thesis
  • Of undoubted Faith 1.
  • Of simple dubitations 1.
  • Harmonicks 1.
  • Of Vertue, 1.
  • Occasions or Contradictions 1.
  • Of Sentence 1.
  • Of Ridiculous 1.
  • Meridians 2.
  • Divisions 2.
  • Of Differences 1.
  • Of Injuries 1.
  • Of Calumny 1.
  • Of praise 1.
  • Of Experience 1.
  • Epistles 3.
  • Of casuall Animals 1.
  • Of Selection 1.
  • Encomiums of the Gods 1.
  • Of Festivals 1.
  • Of Prosperity 1.
  • Of Enthymemes 1.
  • Of inventions 2.
  • Morall disputes 1.
  • Morall descriptions 1.
  • Of Tumult 1.
  • Of History 1.
  • Of the iudgment of Syllo gismes 1.
  • Of flattery 1.
  • Of the Sea 1.
  • To Cassander, of a Kingdome 1.
  • [Page 109] Of Comedy 1.
  • Of Meteors 1.
  • Of Speech 1.
  • Collection of words 1.
  • Solutions 1.
  • Of Musick 3.
  • Of Meteors 1.
  • Megacles 1.
  • Of Laws 1.
  • Of things contrary to Law 1.
  • A Collection of the Doctrines of Xenocrates 1.
  • Confabulations 1.
  • Of an Oath 1.
  • Rhetorical Precepts 1.
  • Of riches 1.
  • Of Poësy 1.
  • Problems, Politick, Ethick, Physick, Erotick 1.
  • Proverbs 1.
  • Collection of Problems 1.
  • Of Physicall Pr [...]blems 1.
  • Of Example 1.
  • Of Proposition and Narration 1.
  • Of Poësy, another, 1.
  • Of the wise men 1.
  • Of Advice 1.
  • Of Soloecismes 1.
  • Of the Art of Rhetorick 1.
  • Of Rhetoricall Arts, 71 kinds.
  • Of Hypocrisy 1.
  • Aristotelick, or Theophrastick Commentaries 6.
  • Naturall Sentences 16.
  • Epitome of Physicks 1.
  • Of Gratitude 1.
  • Ethick-Characters
  • Of Falshood and Truth 1.
  • Of the History of Divinity 6.
  • Of the Gods 3.
  • Geometricall Histories 4.
  • Epitome of Aristotle, concerning Animals 6.
  • Epichirems 2.
  • Thes [...]s 3.
  • Of a Kingdom 2.
  • Of Causes 1.
  • Of Democritus 1.
  • Of Calumny 1.
  • Of Generation 1.
  • Of the Prudence and Manners of Animals 1.
  • [Page 110] Of Motion 2.
  • Of Sight 4.
  • To definitions 2.
  • Of being Given 1.
  • Of Greater and Lesser 1.
  • Of Musick 1.
  • Of the divine Beatitude 1.
  • To those of the Academy 1.
  • Protreptick 1.
  • How a City may be best inhabited 1.
  • Commentaries 1.
  • Of the fiery ebullition in Sicily 1.
  • Of Things granted 1.
  • Of the waies of Knowing 1.
  • Of the Lying Argument 3.
  • Ante-Topick 1.
  • To Aeschylus 1.
  • Astrological History 6.
  • Arithmeticall Histories of Encrease 1.
  • Acicharus 1.
  • Of Iudicial Orations 1.
  • Epistles concerning Astycreon to Phanias and Nicanor.
  • Of Piety 1.
  • Euias 1.
  • Of opportunities 2.
  • Of seasonable discourses 1.
  • Of the Institution of Children 1.
  • Another, different 1.
  • Of Institution, or, of Vertues, or, of Temperance 1.
  • Protreptick 1.
  • Of numbers 1.
  • Definitions of syllogistick speech 1.
  • Of Heaven 1.
  • Politick 2.
  • Of Nature 1.
  • Of Fruits and Animals.

All which, saith Laertius, amount to 1182. Divisions. These Books, as Theophrastus had ordered in his Will, were delivered to Neleus. What afterwards became of them, hath been related in the life of Aristotle

STRATO.

CHAP. I.
His Life.

STrato was successour to Theophrastus. Laert. He was of Cicer. Laert. Suid. Lampsacum, his Father Laert. Suid. Arcesilaus, or, as some, Suid. Arcesius, mentioned in his Will. Laert. He was a person of great worth, eminent saith Laer­tius, in all kinds of Philosophy, but especially in that which is called Physick, the most antient and solid part, Cic. de fini [...]. 5. wherein he introduced many things new, Plut. adv. N [...]t. Colot. dissenting not only from Plato, but from his Master Aristo­tle. Cic. de. Nat. deor. From his excellency herein he was called the Naturall Philo­sopher: Cic. de. N [...]t. [...] cor. 1. Laert. He prescribed all divine power to Nature. Cic. de finib. [...]. Ethick hee touched but little. Laert. He took upon him the government of the School, according to Apollodorus, in the [third year of the] 123 Olympiad, and continued therein 18. years. He instructed Ptolomy the son of Philadelphus, who bestowed 80 Talents upon him.

CHAP. II.
His Will and Death.
His Will, saith Laerthus, was to this effect.

THus I order, against the time that I shall die. All those things which are in my house I bequeath to Lampyri­on and Arcesilaus. Out of the money which I have at Athens, let my Executors first defray the charges of my Funeral, and the solemn rites after my enterrement, doing nothing superfluously, nor niggardly. The Executors of these things I appoint in my Will be these; Olympicus, Aristi­des, Mnesigenes, Hippocrates, Epicrates, Gorgylus, [Page 112] Diocles, Lyco, Athanes. I leave the School to Lyco, for the rest are either too old, or otherwise employed. All the rest shall do well if they confirm this choice that I have made. I bequeath likewise all my Books unto him, except those which are written by our own hand, besides all Vtensills, Carpets, and Cups for Feasting. Let the Executors give 500. Drachmes to Epicrates and one of the servants, which Arcesilaus shall think good. Let Lampyrion and Arcesi­laus discharge all the debts, which Daippus undertook for Hiraeus. Let nothing be owing either to Lampyrion or to the heirs of Lampyrion, but let him be discharged of all, and the Executors bestow on him 500. Drachmes, and one of the servants, as Arcesilaus shall think good; that having taken much paines with us, he may have sufficient for food and rayment. I ma [...]mit Diophantus, and Diocles, and Abus. I give Simmias to Arcesilaus. I manumit Dromo. When Arcesilaus shall come, let Hiraeus with Olympicus and Epicrates, and the rest of the Executors cast up the Accounts of the charges of my Funerall and other things; whatsoever is over and above, let Arcesilaus take it of O­lympicus, not pressing him upon the day of payment. Let Arcesilaus discharge the Covenants which Strato made with Olympicus, and Aminias, which are in the hands of Philocrates Son of Tisamenus. As for my Tombe, let it be ordered as Arcesilaus, and Olympicus, and Lyco shall think good.

This was his Will, preserved by Aristo the Chia [...]. He was of so thin and low a constitution, that he felt not any pain at his death.

Of this name Laertius reckons eight.

The [...]irst a Disciple of Isocrates.

The second, this Philosopher.

The third a Physician, Disciple of Erasistratus.

The Fourth an Historian, who wrote the Wars of Philip and Persaeus with the Romanes.

The fift, is wanting.

The sixt, an Epigrammatick Poet.

The seventh, an antient Physician.

The eighth, a Peripatetick, who lived at Alexand [...]a.

CHAP. III.
His Writings.

SUidas saith, he wrote many Books: Laertius gives this Cata­logue of them.

  • Of a Kingdom 3.
  • Of Iustice 3.
  • Of Good 3.
  • Of God 3.
  • Of Principles 3.
  • Of Lives.
  • Of Felicity.
  • Of Philosophy.
  • Of Fortitude.
  • Of Vacuum.
  • Of Heaven.
  • Of Breath.
  • Of humane Nature.
  • Of the generation of Animals.
  • Of mixtion.
  • Of Sleep.
  • Of Dreams.
  • Of Sight.
  • Of Sense.
  • Of Pleasure.
  • Of Colours.
  • Of Diseases.
  • Of Iudgements.
  • Of Faculties.
  • Of Metallick Machines:
  • Of Hunger and Offuscation.
  • Of Light and Heavy.
  • Of divine inspiration.
  • Of Time.
  • Of Aliment and augmentation.
  • Of uncertain Animals.
  • Of fabulous Animals.
  • Of Causes.
  • Solutions of Questions.
  • [Page 114] Proems of Places.
  • Of Accident.
  • Of More and lesse.
  • Of Unjust.
  • Of Priority and Posteriority.
  • Of Priority of Genus.
  • Of Proprium.
  • Of Future.
  • Confutations of Inventions.
  • Commentaries, which are suspected.
  • Epistles; beginning thus, Strato to Arsinoe, Health:

LYCO.

CHAP. I.
His Life.

STrato, saith Laertius was succeeded by Lyco, Son of Astyanax of Troas, an eloquent per­son, and excellent for the education of Children. He heard also Panthaedus the Dialectick.

He said, that as Horses need both bridle spur, so in Children there must joined both modesty and ambition. Of his florid ex­pression is alledged this instance. Of a poor Maid hee said, [...] A maid is a heavy burden to her Parent when she outruns the flowry season of her youth for want of [...] dower. Whence An­tigonus said of him, that as the fragrancy and pleasantnesse of an excellent apple will not admit Transplantation; so whatsoever he said was to be heard only from himself. For this sweetnesse of discourse some added the letter [...] to his name, calling him [...], which implyeth sweetnesse: so De exsulio. Plutarch.

In stile he was very different from himself.

Upon those who were sorry they had not learned when time was, and wished it might be recalled, he jested thus. He said, that they who endeavoured to make amends by a late penitence for their past negligence, were conscious of the impossibility of their wishes; and of those that sought to bring it to passe, he said, they had lost all reason, in applying the nature of a straight line to a crooked ruler, or beholding their face in troubled water, or a confused mirrour.

He said, that to the wreath of publick games in the Forum, ma­ny aspired; to the Olympick, few or none.

He many times by his Counsell much advantaged the Athe­nians.

In his garments he affected neatnesse so much, that, as Her­mippus saith, he wore an upper garment very precious and fine.

[Page 116] He was very expert in all exercises, active and well made for a Wrestler, being thin-ear'd and well set, as Antigonus Caryslius affirmeth: Whence in his own Country he practised the Elean Games, and played at Ball.

He was intimate with Eumenus and Attalus beyond all men, who supply'd him with many things. Antiochus also would have had him lived with him, but could not get him.

He was so great an enemy to Hieronymus the Peripatetick, that upon a solemn day (of which already in the life of Arcesilaus) he only forbore to come to him.

He compared Orators to Frogs; these, saith he, croak in the water, those by the water of an houre-glasse.

He was Master of the School forty years, succeeding Strato in the hundred twenty seventh Olympiad; as he had given order by his Will.

CHAP. II.
His Will and Death.

Laertius produceth a Will of his to this effect.

THVS I dispose of my estate, if I shall not recover of this sicknesse. All that is in my house I bequeath to the Brethren, Astyanax and Lyco, out of which is to be paid whatsoever I owe at Athens to any man, as also the charges of my Funerall and Exequies. What is in the City and Aegina, I bestow upon Lyco, because he is of our name, and hath lived long with us, to our great content, as one that deserved the place of a Son. The Peripatum I leave to those friends that will make use of it, as Bulo, Callinus, Aristo, Amphio, Lyco, Pytho, Aristomachus, Heracli­us, Lycomedes, Lyco my Kinsman. Let them put him in that place who they conceive will persevere in it, and dis­charge it best, which let the rest of my friends confirm for my sake and the places. My Funerall and the burning of my Body be so ordered by Bulo and Callinus, that it be not prodigall nor niggardly. Out of my [...]state at Aegina, let Lyco after my death give to the young men as much Oyle as shall serve their turnes, that hereby the memory of me and him that honours me may be justly preserved. Let them set up my For VVrast [...]ling and other Exercises. Statue, [Page 117] and choose a fit place for the setting up of it, wherein let Dio­phantus and Heraclides, son of Demetrius assist them. Out of my Rents in the City, let Lyco pay all that I have named after his departure; in the next place let Bu [...]o and Callinus and the expenses of my funerall be discharged. Let that houshold stuffe be taken away which I have left as common betwixt them. Let likewise the Physicians Pasithe­mis and Midas be honoured and rewarded for their care of me, and for their skill. To the son of Callinus I leave a couple of Thericlean Pots, and to his Wife, a couple of Goblets, and a fine Carpet, and a shaggy Carpet, and a Coverlet, and two Couch beds, the best that are left, that we may not seem unmindfull of their due respect towards us. As for those that served me, I order thus: Demetrius, who hath been long a Free man, I forgive the price of his redemption; and bestow upon him five Minae, and a Cloak and a Coat; and, as having undergone many labours with me, let him be de­cently supplyed with necessaries. Crito, the Chalcidonian, I forgive the price of his redemption, and bestow further on him foure Minae Micrus also I manumit, whom let Lyco bring up, and six years hence let him instruct him. In like manner I manumit Chares, whom let Lyco also bring up; I give him two Minae, and my bookes, that have been published: The rest that have not been published, let them be given to Callinus, and let him take diligent care for the publishing of them. To Syrus the Free-man I give foure Minae, and Menodora, and if he owe me any thing, I for­give it him. To Hilara I give five Minae, a shaggy C [...]ver­let, two Couch-beds, a Carpet, and which bed he shall choose. I manumit likewise the Mother of Micrus, and Noe­mones, and Dion, and Theon, and Euphranor, and Hermias; as also Agatho, after he hath served two years more; as also Ophelio and Possidonius, the bearers of my Litter, after they have served four years more, I will that they be set at liberty. I give moreover to Demetrius, Crito, and Syrus, to each a Bed and Coverlet, such as Lyco shall think sit. This I bestow on them, for as much as they have [Page 118] express'd themselves faithfull in the performance of such things as were committed to their charge. As for my buriall, whether Lyco will have it here or at home, let it be as he will; for I perswade my selfe, he will do what is fitting no lesse then if I had done it my selfe. When he shall have faith­fully performed thes [...] things, let the bequests of my Will re­main firm. Witnesses, Callinus, an Hermione [...]n, Aristo, the Chian, Euphronius, a Poeaniean.

Thus, saith Laertius, having wisely managed all things ap­pertaining to Learning and Humanity, his prudence and dili­gence extended even to the making of his Will; so that in that respect also he deserveth studiously to be imitated.

He died 74 years old of the Gout.

There were foure of this name.

The first, a Pythagor [...]an, mentioned in the life of Aristotle.

The second, this Peripatetick.

The third, an Epick Poet.

The fourth, an Epigrammatick Poet.

ARISTO.

ARisto succeeded Lyco. He was of the Island Strab. lib. 1 [...]. Ceos, famous for a Law, that whosoever exceeded 60. years of age should be put to death, that there might be no want of Provision for those that were more serviceable. In former time saith Strabo, it had four Citties, now there re­main but two, Iulis and Carthaea, into which the rest were transferr'd Poecessa into Carthaea, Caressus into Iulis. In Iulis Aristo was born. He was an Auditor of Lyco, and succee­ded him in the Government of the Peripatetick School, as Cicero, Plutarch, and Clemens Alexandrinus affirm.

He was a great imitator of Bion the Boristenite. Cicero saith, hee was neat and elegant. He wrote a Treatise of Nilus, cited by Stra­bo, and Amatory Similies, frequently cited by Athenaeus.

In the second Book of his Athen. d [...]ip. 10. Amatory Similies, he saith, that Pole­mo the Academick advised to provide such entertainment at Feasts, as should be pleasant not only at the present, but also on the mor­row.

Athen. deipn. [...] 12. In the same Book of his Amatory Similies, of an Athenian well in years, named Dorus, who would be thought handsom, he apply'd the words of Ulysses to Dolo,

Rich presents sure may lead away,
And thy too easie Soul betray.

Deipn. lib. 15. In the second of his Amatory Similies, he saith, the antients first bound their heads, conceiving it good against the pain caused by the vapours of the wine; afterwards for more ornament they used Garlands.

Laertius upon the testimony of Panaetius and Sosicrates affirmeth, that all the writings ascribed to Aristo of Chios the Stoick (except the Epistles) belong to Aristo the Peripatetick, their Titles, these,

  • Protrepticks 2.
  • Of Zeno's Doctrine: Scholastick Dialogues 6.
  • Of Wisdom, Dissertations 7.
  • [Page 120] Erotick Dissertations.
  • Commentaries upon vain-glory.
  • Commentaries 15.
  • Memorialls 3.
  • Chrya's 11.
  • Against Orators.
  • Against Alexinus's oppositions.
  • To the Dialecticks 3.
  • To Cleanthes, Epistles 4.

CRITOLAUS.

CRitolaus was, according to Plutarch, of Phaselis, an eminent Sea-Town of Lycia; described by Lib. 16. Strabo to have three Ha­vens, and a Lake belonging to it. He was an Auditor of Aristo, and succeeded him in the School, as Cicero, Plutarch, and Clemens A­lexandrinus affirm.

Hee went to Rome on an Embassy from the Athenians in the 534 th year, from the building of the City, which falleth upon 2 d year of the 140 th Olympiad.

Sext. Emper. He condemned Rhetorick, as being used rather as an Artifice, then an Art.

DIODORUS.

DIodorus was Disciple to Crito aus, and succeeded him in the School, as is manifest from Clemens Alexandrinus, who adds, that in his assertion concerning our chief end, he joyned Indolence with honesty. He is mention'd by Cicero; how long he taught, or who succeeded him is unknown. Thus far we have an unintermitted account of the Peripatetick School.

FINIS.
THE HISTORY OF PHILO …

THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

The Seventh Part, Containing the Cynick Philosophers.

[figure]

LONDON. Printed for Humphrey Moseley, and Thomas Dring: An. Dom. 1656.

ANTISTHENES

ANTISTHENES.

CHAP. I.
His Life.

THe Cynicks are derived from Antisthenes; Disciple of Socrates, who, being most pleased with those discourses of his Master, which treated of To­lerance and Laboriousnesse, instituted this Sect. Laert. He was born at Athens, his Father an Athenian named Antisthenes also; his Mother a Thracian, or, as Plutarch, a Phrygian, in whose defence, to those who reproached him that she was a Forreigner, he answer'd Cibele the Mother of the Gods was a Phrygian. He likewise derided the Athenians for boasting of their being Natives, saying, they were nothing more noble then snailes and Locusts. Laert. vi [...]. Soc [...]. Neither did Socrates the lesse esteem him; but on the contrary, hearing that he had behav'd himself valiantly at the Fight at Tanagra, he said of him, I knew two Parents both Athenians could not beget so excellent a Person. He first heard Gorgias the Orator, whence his Dialogues are written in a Rhetoricall stile, consisting chiefly in verity and exhortation. Hermippus saith, at the Istmian meeting, he used to make Orations in praise and dispraise of the Athenians, Thebans and Lacedemonians, before all the assembly; But seeing many of the Citizens come thither he refrained.

Next he applyed himself to Socrates, and profited so much un­der him, that he counselled his Scholers, to become his fellow-di [...] ­ciples under that Master. He lived in the Piraeum, and went every day 40. Stadia, to hear Socrates.

He affected even whilst he was Disciple to Socrates to go in poor habit, and Laert. Aelian. once having turned the torn part of his garment outer­most, Socrates spying it, said, I see vain-glory through a hole; or, as Aelian, do you use this ostentation before us also?

Laert. Upon the death of Socrates he was the occasion of banishment to Anytus, and of death to Melitus; for Melitus meeting with some young men of Pontus, invited to Athens by the same of Socrates, he brought them to Anytus, telling them he was wiset then Socrates, whereupon the standers by in indignation, turned them both ou [...] of the Citty; of which already in the life of Socrates.

CHAP. II.
His institution of a Sect.

Laert. S. Ocrates being dead, of whom he learned tolerance and apa­thy, he made choice of Cynosarges, a Gymnasium at Athens just without the gates, as of the fittest place in which he might dis­course of Philosophy. Suid. It was so called upon this occasion. Didy­mus the Athenian sacrificing in his own house, a white dog that was by, snatcht the Victim, and running away with it, laid it down in another place; Didymus much troubled thereat, consult­ed the Oracle, which enjoined him to erect a Temple in that place where the Dog had laid down the Victim, and to dedicate it to Hercules, which was called Cynosarges, [...], The Tem­ple of the white Dog. Laert. Hence Antisthenes & his follo [...]ers were call­ed Cynicks, and, by those that disapproved their institution, Dogs; Antisthenes himself being termed [...], the sincere Dog.

He first doubled his old fordid Cloak, and wore it alone [with­out a Coat] as Diocles affirmeth; he carried likewise a staffe and fatchell. Neanthes saith, he first used a single Cloak. Sosicrates in the third of his Successions, saith, Diodorus the Aspendian wore a long beard, and carried a staffe and Wallet.

Laert. His assertions were these, that Vertue may be acquired by teach­ing; that those persons are noble, who are Vertuous; That Vertue was self­sufficient to Felicity, not needing any thing but a Socratick Courage; That Vertue consisteth in Actions, not requiring many words nor much learning, and is self-sufficient to wisdom, for all other things have a re­ference thereto; That insamy is good and equall to labour, and that a wise man ought not to govern the Commonwealth according to the Laws in force, but according to Vertue; That a wise man, to have issue, may make choice of beautifull women, and love, for a wise man only knoweth what ought to be loved.

Diocles addeth these; That nothing is new to a wise man; That a good man deserveth love, that vertuous persons are friends; that wee ought to get assistance in War, valiant and just; that vertue is an Ar­mour never can be taken from us; That it is better with some few good men to oppose all the wicked, then with many wicked men to contend with few good; Observe your Enemies, for they first find out your faults; Esteem a just man more then a neighbour; The same vertue belongeth to man and to woman; those things are good wh [...]ch are honest, ill which are dishonest; All things esteem strange; Wisdom is the safest fortification, for [...] neither fall away, nor can be betray'd; In these inexpugnable things we ought to build Forts, by meditation.

Lib. 9. c 5. Agellius saith, he esteemed Pleasure the greatest ill, whence hee used to say, I had rather be mad, then be addicted to pleasure.

[Page 3] Laert. vit. Menedem. As to the opinion of the Cynicks in generall (not esteeming them, saith Laertius, a meer form and institution of life, but a true Sect of Philosophy) they were these.

They took away, with Aristo the Chian, Dialectick and Physick, and only admitted Ethick; whence, what some said of Socrates, Diocles applyed to Diogenes, affirming he used the same expressions, that we ought to enquire,

What good and ill
Our [...]ouses fill.

They likewise reject the liberall Sciences, whence Antisthenes said, those who have acquired Temperance, ought not to study any learning, left by other things they be diverted. Geometry like­wise, Musick, and the like, they wholly took away. Whence Diogenes, to one that shew'd him a Watch, It is an excellent inven­tion, saith he, against supping too late. And to one that entertain'd him with Musick;

Wisdome the greatest Citties doth protect;
But Musick cannot one poor house direct.

They likewise, as the Stoicks, affirmed to be happy to live ac­cording to Vertue, as Antisthenes, in his Hercules; for there is a kinde of affinity betwixt these two Sects, whence the Stoicks as­serted Cynisme to be the neerest way to Vertue, and so lived Zeno the Cittiean.

Their diet was slender, their food only such as might satisfie Nature, their Cloakes sordid; they despised riches, glory, and nobility: Some of them fed only on hearbs and cold water, living under such shelters as they could finde, or in Tubbs, as Diogenes did, who affirmed, it was proper to the Gods to want nothing, and that those who stand in need of fewest things, come neerest to the Gods.

They held also, according to Antisthenes in his Hercules, that Vertue may be acquired by Learning, and that it cannot be lost; that a wise man deserves to be loved, and never sinneth, and is a friend to such as are like him, and trusteth nothing to Fortune.

They took away with Aristo the Chian, all things between Vertue and Vice.

CHAP. III.
His Apophthegmes.

OF his Apophthegmes are remembered these. Laert.

He proved Labour to be good, by the examples of Her­cules and Cyrus, one a Grecian, the other a Barbarian.

He first defined Speech thus, Speech is that which declareth that which is or was.

To a young man of Pontus that came to be his Disciple, and asked him what he must bring with him, he answered, [...], a new Book, a new pen, and a new tablet, where the word [...] is equivocall, and signifieth (divided [...]) Wit.

To one, demanding what kinde of Wife he should take; If a fair one, saith he, she will be common; if foul, a torment.

Hearing that Plato spoke ill of him; it is King-like, saith he, to do well, and be ill spoken of.

Being initiated into the Orphick solemnities, the Priest telling him, that they who were initiated into those rites, were made partakers of many excellent things in the next world: Why then, saith he, do you not die?

To one that reproached him that both his Parents were not free, Neither, saith he, were they both wrastlers, and yet I am a wrastler.

Being demanded why he had few Disciples, I beat them away, saith he, with a silver staffe.

Being demanded why he rebuked his Disciples so sharply; So, saith he, do Physicians the sick.

Seeing an Adulterer running away, Unhappy man, saith he, how much danger might you have escaped for one halfe penny.

He said according to Hecaton, It is better to fall among Crowes then flatterers; for those only devour the dead, these the living.

Being demanded what was most happy for man, he answered, To die in prosperity.

To a friend, complaining he had lost his notes; You should have writ them in your minde, saith he, and not in your book.

As rust consumeth iron, so envy, saith he, consumeth the envious man.

Those who would never die, saith he, must live piously and justly.

He said, Citties were then perishing, when they could not distinguish the good from the bad.

Being commended by some wicked men; Laert. Stob. I am troubled, saith he, to think what ill I have done.

He said, the cohabitation of concording Brethren is firmer then any wall.

He said, we ought to carry such provision along with us, as if [Page 5] we should happen to be shipwra [...]k'd, we might swimme away with.

To those who reproached him for conversing with wicked per­sons; So do Physicians with the sick, saith he, yet are not sick them­selves.

He said, It is absurd to separate corn from the weeds, and in way to reject the unserviceable person; [...], in a Common-wealth, not to extirpa [...]e the wicked.

Being demanded what he had gain'd by Philosophy, he an­swer'd, that I can converse with myselfe.

At a Feast, to one that said to him, [...]; he reply'd, Do you then pipe.

Diogenes demanding a Coat, he bad him double his Cloak.

Being demanded what learning is most necessary; That, saith he, which unlearneth ill.

He advised those who were provoked by revilings, to bear it with greater Fortitude, then if stones were cast at them.

He derided Plato, as being proud, and seeing at a show a horse going loftily, turning to Plato, Me thinks, saith he, you would have acted the part of this horse very well. This he said, because Plato at the same time had commended the horse.

Another time visiting Plato, as he lay sick, and looking into the basin whereinto he had vomited, I see here, saith he, the choler, but not the pride.

He advised the Athenians to love Asses as well as Horses, which they conceiving absurd; and yet, saith he, you choose those for Generalls, who know nothing, but how to stretch out the hand.

To one that said to him, many praise thee; Why, saith he, what ill have I done?

To one that demanded (as Phanias saith) what he should do to be a good and an honest man: if you learn, saith he, of knowing persons, that the vices which you have are to be avoided.

To one that praised a life full of delicacies; Let the sons of my enemies, saith he, live delicatly.

To a young man, who desired his statue might be made hand­somer then himselfe; Tell me, saith he, if the brasse it selfe could speak, what you think it would boast of; the other answer'd, of its handsome figure: Are you not ashamed then, replies he, to be proud of the same that an inanimate creature would be?

A young man of Pontus promised to supply him, as soon as his ship came home laden with saltfish; hereupon he took him to a meal-woman, and filling his satchell departed; she calling to him for mony: This young man, saith he, will pay you as soon as his ship comes home.

When at any time he saw a woman richly dress'd, he went to her house, and bad her husband bring out his horse and armes, that [Page 6] if he were so provided, he might allow her those freedomes, be­ing better able to justifie the injuries it occasion'd; otherwise, that he should take off her rich habit.

He said, Stob. Ser. 1. Neither a feast is pleasant without company, nor riches with­out Vertue.

He said, Stob. Ser. 38. Those pleasures which come not in at the dore, must not go out by the dore, but by incision or purging with Hellebor, or by Ser. 44. star­ving, so to punish those sur [...]eits which we have incurred for a short plea­sure.

He said, Ser. 50. Whosoever seareth others is a slave, though he know it not himselfe.

He said, Ser. 53. No covetous man can be a good man, or a King, or a free­man.

Being demanded what a feast is, Ser. 87. he answered, The occasion of surfeits.

He said, Ser. 117. We ought to aim at such pleasures as follow labour, not at those which go before labour.

He said, Ser. 148. Common Executioners are better then Tyrants; those p [...]t on­ly guilty men to death, Tyrants, the innocent.

He said, Ser. 171. We ought to wish our enemies all good things but Fortitude, for that they possesse would fall into the hands of the Victor, not the Owner.

Him that contradicteth, he said, Ser. 212. he said, we must not again contradict, but instruct; for a mad-man is not cured by anothers growing mad also.

He said, Plut. rep. Stoic. Plut. vit. Lyc. A man should alwaies have in readinesse his wits or a rope.

Seeing the Thebans much exalted with their successe at the Luctrian sight, he said, They were like boyes that triumph when they have beaten the. Masters.

To some that commended a Piper; Plut. vit. Per. But, saith he, he is an ill man, for else he would never have been so good a Piper.

CHAP. IV.
His Writings.

OF his Bookes saith Laertius, there are ten Tomes.

The first containeth these.
  • Of speech, or of Characters.
  • Ajax, of the speech of Ajax.
  • Ulysses, or of Ulysses.
  • An apology for Orestes.
  • Of Lawyers.
  • Isographe, or Desias, or Isocrates.
  • Against Isocrates' s [...].
The second Tome.
  • Of the Nature of Animals.
  • [Page 7] Of Procreation of children, or of Marriage, Brotick.
  • Of Sophists, Physiognomick.
  • Of Iustice and Fortitude Protreptick 1, 2, 3,
  • Of Theognis.
The third Tome.
  • Of Good.
  • Of Fortitude.
  • Of Law, or of Policy.
  • Of Law, or of Fair and Iust.
  • Of Freedom and Servitude.
  • Of Faith.
  • Of a Guardian, or of Trusting.
  • Of Victory, Oeconomick.
The fourth Tome,
  • Cyrus.
  • Hercules the Greater, or of Strength.
The fift Tome.
  • Cyrus, or of a Kingdom.
  • Aspasia.
The sixt Tome.
  • Truth.
  • Of Dissertation, Anti-logick.
  • Sathon, of Contradiction 3.
  • Of Dialectick.
The seventh Tome.
  • Of Discipline, or of names, 5.
  • Of dying.
  • Of Life and Death.
  • Of things after death.
  • Of the use of names, or Eristick.
  • Of Interrogation and answer.
  • Of Opinion and Science 4.
  • Of Nature 2.
  • Interrogation concerning Nature 2.
  • Opinions, or the Eristick.
  • Problems concerning Learning
The eighth Tome.
  • Of Musick.
  • Of Interpreters.
  • Of Homer.
  • Of Injustice and impiety.
  • [Page 8] Of Chalcas.
  • Of the spie.
  • Of Pleasure.
The ninth Tome.
  • Of the Odysseis.
  • Of Minerva's wand, or of Telemachus, Helena, and Pe­nelope.
  • Of Proteus
  • The Cyclops, or of Ulysses.
  • Of the use of Wine, or of Drunkenesse, or of the Cyclops.
  • Of Circe.
  • Of Amphiaraus.
  • Of Ulysses and Penelope.
  • Of the Dog.
The tenth Tome.
  • Hercules, or Midas.
  • Hercules, or of Prudence, or of strength.
  • The Master, or Lover.
  • The Masters, or spies.
  • Menexenus, or of Ruling.
  • Alcibiades.
  • Archelaus, or of a Kingdom.

These saith Laertius, were his writings, the great number where­of Timon derides, calling him an ingenious Trifler.

There is also among the Socratick Epistles one under his name to this effect.

Antisthenes to Aristippus.

IT is not the part of a Philosopher to live with Tyrants, and to wast time at Sicilian Feasts, but rather to be content with a little in his own Country; but you esteem it the greatest excellence of a Vertuous per­son, to be able to acquire much wealth, and to have powerfull friends. Riches are not good; neither if they were in themselves good, are they such, being thus obtained, nor can a multitude of unlearned persons, espe­cially Tyrants, be true friends. Wherefore I would co [...]nsell you to leave Syracuse and Sicily; but if, as some report, you are in love with Plea­sure, and aim at such things, as beseem not wise persons, go to Anticyra and cure your self by drinking Hellebore, for that is much better for you then the Wine of Dionysius; this causeth madnesse, that asswageth it. So that as health and discretion differ from sicknesse and [...]olly, so [Page 9] much shall you be better then you are in these things which you now enjoy Farewell.

The Answer to this Epistle, see in the life of Aristippus.

CHAP. V.
His Death.

HE died saith Laertius of sicknesse. As he lay on his death-bed, Diogenes came to him and asked him if he wanted a friend. Another time he came to him with a dagger; Antisthenes crying out, who will free me from this pain, he shewed him the dagger, saying, This shall, Antisthenes reply'd, I say from my pain, not from my life; for he bore his sicknesse somwhat impatiently through love of life.

Theopompus commends him above all the Disciples of Socrates, as being of such acute and sweet discourse, that he could lead any man to what he would.

There were three more of this name, one a Heraclitean Philo­sopher; the second of Ephesus, the third of Rhodes a Historian.

DIOGENES.

CHAP. I.
His Country, Parents, Time, Banishment.

Laert. DIOGENES was of Sinopis, a City of Pontus, his Father named Icesius, or, as others, Icetes; by profession a mony-changer.

He was born (as appears by computation from his death, which was in the 90 t year of his age, in the first year of the 114 t Olym­piad, Hegesias being Archon) about the third year of the 91 st Olympiad. Suidas saith, he was first called Cleon.

Diocles saith, his Father trading publickly in exchange of mo­ny, was surprised, coining false mony, and thereupon fled: But Eubulides saith, Diogenes himselfe did it, and fled together with his Father; even Diogenes in his Podalus, acknowledgeth as much. Some affirme, that being made overseer, he was perswaded by the work-men to go to Delphi, or Delus, the Country of Apollo, to en­quire of the Oracle if he should do that whereto he was advised, [...], which is of ambiguous signification, implying, to alter the course of life, and to coine false mony. The Oracle assented: Diogenes not understanding it in the Civill sense, betook himselfe to coyning, and being taken in the act, was banished, or, as others say, fled for fear. Some affirme, he adulterated the mony he received from his Father, for which the Father was cast in prison, and there dyed; the Son fled, and coming to Delphi, enquired of the Oracle by what means he should become emi­nent, whereupon he received that answer.

Aelian. var. Hist. 13. 28. When he left his Country, one of his servants followed him, named Manes, who not enduring his conversation ran away from him; some perswaded Diogenes to enquire after him, who answer'd, Were it not a shame, since Manes doth not need Dioge­nes, that Diogenes should need Manes. The fellow wandring up and down came at last to Delphi, where he was torn in pieces by doggs.

[Page]

DIOGENES.

CHAP. II.
How he lived at Athens.

COming to Athens, saith Laertius, he apply'd himselfe to An­tisthenes, following the Cynicall Philosophy instituted by him. Aelian. var. Hist. 10. 16. Antisthenes having invited many to hear him, and but few coming, at last in anger would not suffer any to come to him, and therefore bad Diogenes be gone also. Diogenes continuing to come frequently, he chid and threatned him, and at last struck him with his staffe: Diogenes would not go back, but persisting still in his desire of hearing him, said, Strike if you will, here is my head, you cannot [...]inde a staffe hard enough to drive me from you, untill you have instructed me. Antisthenes overcome with his perseverance, admitted him, and made him his intimate friend. From that time forward he heard him.

Some affirm, saith Laertius, he first wore a double Cloak, upon which he used to lie [at night:] He likewise carried a wallet, wherein was his meat. He made use of all places for all things, dining, sleeping and discoursing in any place, insomuch that pointing to Iupiter's walke, and the Pompaeum, two publick places at Athens, he said, the Athenians built them for his dwelling. Falling once sick, he walked with a staffe, which afterwards he continually used, as likewise a wallet, not in the City, but when he travelled. He wrote to one to build him a little house, which the other not doing so soon as he required, he made use of a Tub in the Metroum to live in, as he declareth in his Epistles. In Sum­mer he used to roule in the burning Sand, in Winter, to embrace statues covered with Snow, accustoming himselfe continually to sufferance. Plut▪ A Lacedaemonian seeing him in this posture in the depth of Winter, asked him if he were not a cold; Diogenes said, he was not: What you do then, reply'd the other, is no great matter.

At first he used to beg, of which there are many instances: He one time begged of a man thus, If you have given to others, give also to me? if to none, begin with me?

Laert. Another time he begged of a Statue, whereof being deman­ded the reason, That I may the better, saith he, bear a refusall.

He requested something of a covetous person, who delaying to give; Man, saith he, I ask you [...], not [...], food, not a grave.

He requested something of a person very obdurate, who an­swered yes, if you can perswade me to it; Nay, replyed he, if I were able to perswade you to any thing, it should have been to have hang'd your selfe.

Of a Prodigall he begged a Mina; the other asked why he [Page 12] begged a Mina of him, and of others but an Obolus: Because, saith he, I hope to receive of others again; but whether I shall ever have any more of you, the Gods know.

Being reproach'd that Plato begged not, but he begged: Yes, saith he, he beggeth too; but,

Close in your ear,
Lest others hear.

Aelian. var. Hist. 4. 27. Having received some little mony from Dionysius the Cary­sian, he said,

The Gods afford thee thy desire,
A man and house—

Alluding to his effeminacy.

Laert. For this reason he said, the imprecations of Tragedians concur­red in him, for he was without any City, without a house, de­priv'd of his Country, a begger, a vagabond, having his lively­hood only from day to day. And yet, addes Var. hist. 3. 29. Aelian, he was more pleased with this condition, then Alexander with the command of the whole world, when having conquer'd the Indians, he re­turned to Babylon.

Laert. Seeing a Mouse, as Theophrastus saith, running up and down, he thence took occasion of comfort, considering it a creature that looked not for lodging, and was not displeased with darknesse, nor nice, as to diet.

He walked in the snow bare-foot, and tri'd to eat raw flesh, but could not.

He said, he imitated singing-Masters, who raise their voice too high, thereby to teach others the just tone.

The Athenians loved him much, for a youth having bor'd holes in his Tubbe, they punish'd him, and gave Diogenes a new one.

He used to perform the offices of Ceres and Venus in publick, arguing thus; if it be not absurd to dine, it is not absurd to dine even in the market-place; but, it is not absurd to dine, therefore it is not absurd to dine even in the market-place.

Laert. It is explained by Plutarch, de rep. Stoic. [...] in the publick Forum; I would, saith he, I could as easily satisfie my hunger.

Laert. As he dined in the Forum, some that were present called him Dog; Nay, saith he, you are Dogs that stand about me when I am at dinner.

Being reproached for feeding in the open Forum; In the Forum, saith he, I grew hungry,

Being reproached that he drunk in a victualling house; And in a Barbers shop, saith he, I am shaved.

[Page 13] He lived without any servant; Being demanded by one whether he would have a maid-servant, or a man, he said▪ neither; who then, answer'd the other, shall carry you out to your grave when you die? Diogenes reply'd, hee that wants a house?

CAHP. II.
How he lived at Corinth.

Laert. IN his old age he took a voyage to Aegina, but was by the way taken by some pirates, the name of whose captain was Scirpalus. They carried him to Creet, & there exposed him to sale, they ask­ed him what he could do, he answered, he could command men, and to the Cryer, he said, if any man want a Master let him buy me. Offe­ring to sit down, they would not suffer him, (it being the custom of such as were to be sold for slaves, to leap up and down) tis no matter for that, saith he, Fishes are sold which way soever they lie, add­ing, hee wondred that men being to buy a pot or vessel, examine it curiously on the inside, but if a man, they are satisfied with his look and outside. Pointing to a Corinthian richly attir'd that passed by, named Xeniades, sel me saith he, to that man, for he wants, a Master. To Xeniades as soon as he had bought him, he said, Be sure you do as I command you, he answer'd in the common prover­bial verse. ‘The springs of Rivers upwards run.’

Diogenes reply'd [...], if being sick you had bought a Physician would you obey his advice, or would you say as before, The springs of Rivers upwards run.

His friends, according to Cleomenes, offered to redeem him, but he told them they were fools, for Lyons were not slaves to their Keepers, but the Keepers to the Lyons, for the property of ser­vitude is to fear, and men fear Beasts.

Laert. Xeniades having bought him, carried him to Corinth, Laert. asking him what he could do, he answered, he knew how to command free persons. Xeniades wondring at his answer, set him at Liber­ty, and delivered his Sons to his charge, saying, take then my Chil­dren and command them. Gell. He put the Government of his family also into his hands, p Lan [...]. which he acquitted himself of excellently well in every thing, in so much that Xeniades said, he had brought a Good Genius into his House.

He did not suffer the young men that were under his charge, to exercise themselves as Wrastlers, but only till they were warm, and for their health sake. He taught them many sayings of Poets [Page 14] by heart, and some of his own, and that they might more easily remember the full sum of Learning, he made a brief Collection thereof. He taught them at home to minister, using thin diet, and drinking water, to go negligently in habit, shaven, without coats, without shooes, and silent, looking upon themselves as they went. He brought them up likewise to Hunting. On the other side, they took great care of Diogenes, and recommended him to their Parents.

Plut. vit. Alex. When Alexander was upon expedition against the Persian, many Philosophers came to salute him, the same duty he expected from Diogenes, who was at that time at the Craneum, a Gymnasi­um in Corinth, where he lived idly, not minding Alexander. Alex­ander therefore went and found him out sitting in the Sun, hee rose a little to look upon the great crowd of people that came a­long with Alexander, who saluting him, asked Diognes what he would desire of him, he answer'd, that you would stand aside a little from betwixt me and the Sun. Hereat Alexander was so surpris'd, and so much admir'd his high mind, that his Attendants in re­turning, laughing thereat, but I, saith he, were I not Alexander, would choose to be Diogenes.

CHAP. IV.
His Philosophy.

Laert. ANd concerning Opinions, he said, there is a twofold Exerci­tation, one spirituall, the other corporeall; If in the first of these we employ our selves constantly, frequent phantasies wil occurre, which facilitate the performance of Vertue; the one can­not be without the other, a good habit and strengh being necessa­ry both in respect of the soul and the body.

That Vertue is easily acquired by exercitation he argued, in as much as in the Mechanick Arts and others, that Artists by pra­ctise quickly arrive at an extraordinary readinesse therein, and Wrastlers and Musicians excell one another according to the con­tinuall pames they take therein one more then another, and if they should have taken the same pains about their souls, it would not have been unprofitably and imperfectly employ'd.

He said nothing in life can be rightly done without exercitati­on, and that exercitation could master any thing, for whereas men should choose Naturall Labours, whereby they might live happily; they on the contrary make choice of the unprofitable, and through their own folly, are in continuall misery. For even the contempt of Pleasure, if we accustome our selves thereto will be most pleasant; and as they, who inure themselves to a volup­tuous [Page 15] life cannot be taken off it without much trouble and grief; so they who exercise themselves in a contrary manner with as great ease contemn even the pleasures themselves.

He ascribed not so much to Law as to Nature; Hee affirmed that he followed the same course of life with Hercules, preferring nothing before Liberty.

He asserted that all things belong to the wise, arguing thus; all things belong to the Gods, the Gods are friends to wise persons; all things are common amongst friends; therefore all things belong to the wise.

As concerning Law, he held that without it a Commonwealth could not be ordered, for, saith he, without a City there cannot be a­ny profit of Civill things; a City is a Civill thing; of Law without a City there is no profit, therefore Law is Civil.

He derided Nobility, glory, and the like, saying, they were the Ornaments, or veiles of wickednesse, and that only a right Com­monwealth ought to be honour'd.

He held that there ought to be a Community of women, con­ceiving marriage to be nothing, and that every man and woman might enjoy one another as they pleased themselves, and conse­quently that all Children should be in common.

Hee held that it was not unlawfull to take any thing out of a Temple, or to feed upon living Creatures, neither was it impious to eat mans flesh, as appeared by the practise of other Nations, adding that all things are in all and by all; in bread there is flesh, in flesh bread; the remainders of flesh and bread being insinuated by occult passages into other bodies, and evaporating in like man­ner. This Laertius cites out of a Tragedy of his named Thyestes, if saith he, that Tragedy belong to him, and not rather to Philiscus, or Pasiphon.

Musick, Geometry, Astronomy and the like he rejected as unpro­fitable and unnecessary.

CHAP. V.
His Apophthegms.

Laert. HE was very acute saith Laertius in deriding others. Hee said Euclides school was not [...], but [...], not a School, but Anger, for the Dialecticks affected Litigious dispute. He said Plato's school was not [...], but [...], not an exercitation, but Consumption.

He said, when he look'd upon Pilots, Physicians and Philosophers, Man was the wisest of all Creatures; but when he looked upon Interpreters of Dreams, Prophets or persons puff'd up with wealth or honours, nothing is more foolish then man.

Hee said that he often sound it convenient in life to have ready an answer or a rope.

[Page 16] At a great Feast, seeing Plato eat Olives; Why, saith he, you being a wise man, and going to Sicily for such entertainments, did you not enjoy them: He answer'd, by the Gods Diogenes, I fed upon Olives there likewise as well as upon other things. Di­ogenes replyed, why then needed you to have gone to Syracuse, were there no Olives at that time in Attica? This Phavorinus as­cribes to Aristippus, adding, that as he was eating figges, he met him, and said, tast: the other taking and eating; I bad you, saith he, tast, and not devour.

In the presence of some friends of Plato sent to him by Dionysi­us, Diogenes trod under foot Plato's robe, saying, I tread under foot Plato's pride: But Diogenes, answer'd Plato, how proud are you your selfe, when you think you contemn pride? Sotion relates this as said to the Cynick by Plato.

St [...]b. Ser. 133 Diogenes sent to Plato for wine and figgs, he sent him a large vessell of wine and figs; whereupon Diogenes, as you, saith he, being demanded how much 2. and 2. are, answer 20. so you neither grant what I request, nor answer what I demand; thus censuring his verbosity.

Being demanded in what part of Greece he had seen good men; Men, saith he, no where, but good boyes at Lacedaemon.

Making a serious discourse, and perceiving that no man came to hear him, he began to sing, whereat a great many gather'd to­gether, whom he reproached for coming to trifles, being so back­ward to serious things.

He said, men contested in undermining or kicking, but none about goodnesse.

He wondred at Grammarians, who enquiring after the mis­fortunes of Ulysses, forgot their own; and at Musicians, who whilst they tune their instruments, have discordant affections in their souls; and at the Mathematicians, that gazing upon the Sun and Moon, neglected what was just at their feet; and at Stob. 296. Oratours, who studyed to speak just things, and neglected to act them; and lastly at covetous persons, for dispraising mony, which they loved above all things.

He reprehended those, who though they commended just men for thinking themselves to be above mony, yet esteemed the rich happy.

He was angry at those, who when they sacrificed to the Gods for their health, feasted at the same time contrary to their health.

He wondered at Servants, who seeing their Masters eat exces­sively, did not take away their meat.

He praised those, who being about to marry, would not mar­ry; who being about to go sea, would not go to sea; who being a­bout to undertake some publick office, would not undertake it; and who being about to bring up children, forbore to bring them up; and who could compose themselves to live with great men, [Page 17] yet never went to them.

He said, when we stretch out our hand to our friend, we should never clutch our fist.

One bringing him into a new house, and forbidding him to spit, he spat in his face, saying, he could not finde a worse place. Some ascribe this to Aristippus.

Crying out upon a time, Men come hither, a great many flocked about him, whom he fell upon with his stick, and beat them, saying, I called men, not varlets. This Hecaton in his Chr [...]ae relates.

Alexander said, if he had not been born Alexander, he would have desired to have been born Diogenes.

He said, they were not maimed who were dumb and blinde, but they who had not a wallet.

Going once halfe shaven to a feast of young men, as Metrocles relates, they beat him, whereupon he took their names, and set­ting them down in a parchment roll, he wore it at his breast, whereby being known, they were reviled and beaten.

He said, he was the Dog of the praised, but none of the praisers durst go a hunting with him.

To one saying, at the Pythian Games I overcame men; No, saith he, I the men, you the slaves.

To those who said to him, you are now old, take your ease; what, saith he, if I were to run a race, should I give over when I were almost at the end, or rather contest with greater courage?

Finding Demosthenes the Orator at dinner in a common victu­alling house, who ashamed, would have stollen away; nay, saith he, you are now the more popular. Aelian relates it thus, Diogenes being at dinner in a common victualling house, and seeing De­mosthenes passe by, invited him in, Demosthenes refusing; do you think it, saith Diogenes, a disparagement to dine here, when your Master dines here every day? meaning the common people, to whom Oratours are but servants.

To some strangers who were desirous to see Demosthenes, poin­ting to him with his middle finger; this, saith he, is he that leads the Athenians.

In reproofe to one who had throwne away his bread, and was ashamed to take it up again, he tyed a string about the neck of a bottle, and dragg'd it after him through the Ceramick.

He said, most men were mad Praeter digitum, all but the finger; if any man should walk pointing with his middle finger, he will be thought mad; if his fore-finger, not so.

He said, the most precious things were sold cheapest, and so on the contrary; for a Statue will cost 3000 pieces of silver, a peck of wheat, two pieces of brasse.

To one, who came to him to study Philosophy, he gave a fish, and bid him follow him, the other ashamed, threw it away and departed: not long after, meeting the same person, he laughing, [Page 18] said, The friendship betwixt you and me was broke off by a Fish. Diocl [...]s relates it thus; One saying to him, command me Diogenes, he gave him a penny worth of cheese to bring after him; the other refu­sing to carry it, our friendship, saith he, a pennyworth of cheese hath dissolved.

Seeing a boy drink water in the hollow of his hand, he took his little cup out of his wallet and threw it away, saying, The boy out-went him in srugality. He threw away his dish also, seeing a Boy that had broken his, supping up his broth in the same manner.

Seeing a woman prostrate her selfe unhandsomely in prayer, and desirous to reprove her superstition, as Zoilus the Pergaean re­ports, came to her, and said, Are you not ashamed, woman, that God who stands behinde you (for all things are full of him) should see you in this undecent posture.

He said, such as beat others ought to be consecrated to Aescu­lapius, the God of Chirurgery.

He said, against Fortune we must oppose courage; against Nature, Law, against Passion, Reason.

In the Craneum, Alexander standing by him, as the Sun shone, said to him, ask of me what thou wilt; he answer'd, Do not stand between me and the Sun.

One reading a long tedious discourse, and coming at last neer a blank leafe at the end of the book, Be of good courage friends, saith he, I see land.

To one, proving by the horned Syllogisme that he had hornes, he feeling of his forehead, but I, saith he, feel none. In like manner another maintaining there was no such thing as motion, he rose up and walked. To one disputing concerning Meteors, How long is it, saith he, since you came from heaven?

A wicked man having written over the dore of his house, Let no ill thing enter here: Which way then, saith he, must the Master come in?

He anointed his feet with sweet Unguents, saying, the scent went from the crown of his head into the air; but from his feet to his nostrills.

To some Athenians, that perswaded him to be initiated into some Religious Mysteries, alledging, that such as were initiated had the chiefest places in the other World: It is ridiculous, saith he, if Agesilaus and Epaminondas live there amongst bogges, and the common people that are initiated live in the blessed Islands. Or as Plutarch, hearing these verses of Socrates:

—Thrice happy they
Who do these Mysteries survey;
They only after death are bless,
All miseries pursue the rest;

What, saith he, shall Patoecion the thie [...]e be in better condition (be­cause he was initiated) then Epaminondas.

[Page 19] Mice comming to him as he was at dinner; See, saith he, Dio­genes also maintaineth Parasites.

Aelian. var. hist. 14. [...]3. Diogenes being present at a discourse of Plato's▪ would not minde it, whereat Plato angry, said, Thou dogge, why mind'st thou not: Diogenes unmoved, answered, Yet I never return to the place where I was sold, as doggs do, alluding to Pl [...]to's voyage to Sicily.

Returning from a Bath, one asked him, if there were many men there; he said, no: The other asking if there were much com­pany; he said, there was.

Plato defining Man a two-footed Animall without wings, and this definition being approved, Diogenes took a Cock, and plucking off all its feathers, turned it into Plato's School, saying, This is Plato's Man▪ whereupon to the definition was added, having broad nailes.

To one demanding at what time he should dine, if thou art rich, saith he, when thou wilt, if poor, when thou canst.

At Megara, seeing their sheep with thick fleeces, and their children almost naked; It is better, saith he, to be the sheep of a Me­garaean, then his son.

To one, who hitting him with the end of a long pole, bad him him take heed, Why, saith he, do you mean to hit me again?

He said, the Oratours were the servants of the multitude; Crownes, the biles of glory.

Stab. Ser. 4. He lighted a candle at noon, saying, I look for a man.

He stood in the rain without any shelter, some that were pre­sent pittying him; Plato, who was there likewise, said, if you will shew your selves pittifull to him, go away, reflecting upon his vain­glory.

One giving him a box on the eare, O Hercules, saith he, I knew not that I should have walked with a Helmet.

Medias giving him many blowes with his fist, saying, there are 3000 drachmes [alluding to the fines imposed upon such out­rages] ready counted for you upon the table: The next day he got a Caes [...]us, and beat him with it, saying, There are three thousand drachmes ready counted for you.

Lysias an Apothecary asking him, if he thought there were many Gods: How, saith he, can I think otherwise, when I take you to be their enemy. Others ascribe this to Theodorus.

Seeing one that had besprinkled himselfe with water: O unhap­py man, saith he, dost thou not know, that the errors of life are no more to be washed away by water, then errours in grammer.

He rebuked those who complained of Fortune, saying, They did not request what was good, but that which seemed good to them.

Of those, who are terrified with dreams, he said: You never are concern'd for the things you do waking, but what you fancy in your sleep you make your greatest businesse.

Et Plut. [...] curiositate. At the Olympick Games the Cryer proclaiming Dioxippus [Page 20] hath overcome men; he slaves, saith he, but I men.

Alexander sending an Epistle to Antipater at Athens, by one whose name was Athlias, Diogenes being present said, Ath­lias from Athlias, by Athlias to Athlias, alluding to the name, which implyeth misery.

Perdiccas threatning him with death unlesse he would come to him; that is no great matter, saith he, for a Cantharides or spider may do as much; you should rather have threatned, that you would have liv'd well without me.

He often said the Gods had given to men an easie life, but that it was hidden from those who used choice diet, unguents and the like; whence to one whose servant put on his cloaths, you will not be truly happy, saith he, untill he wipe your nose also, that is, when you have lost the use of your hands.

Seeing some that had the charge of the things belonging to the Temple, leading a man to Prison, who had stoln a Cup out of the Treasury, the great theeves, saith he, lead Prisoner the lesser.

To a young man that throwing stones at a Gibbet, well done, saith he, you will be sure to hit the mark.

To some young men that coming about him, said, take heed you do not bite us: fear not boies, said he, Diogenes eat not Beetes [for so he termed effeminate persons.]

To one feasting, cloath'd in a Lyons skin, do not saith he, defile vertues Livery.

To one extolling the happinesse of Callis [...]henes, in that living with Alexander he had plenty of all things; nay, saith he, he is not happy, for he dines and suppes when Alexander pleases.

When he wanted money, he said, he went to redemand, not borrow it of his friends.

Seeing a young man going along with some great persons to a Feast, he took him from them, and carried him to his own friends, bidding them to look to him better.

To one neatly dressed, who had asked him some question, I cannot answer you, saith he, unlesse▪ I knew whether you were a man or a wo­man.

Vit. Athenae. Of a young man playing at Cattabus in a Bath, by how much the better, saith he, so much the worse.

At a Feast one threw a bone to him as to a dog, which he like a dog took up, and lifting his legge [...],

Orators, and all such as sought glory by speaking, hee called [...], thrice men, instead of [...], thrice wretched.

Hee called an unlearned rich man a sheep with a golden Fleece.

Seeing written upon the Gates of a Prodigall's house, TO BE SOLD; I knew, saith he, being so overcharg'd with wine, it would vo­mit up the owner.

To a young man professing himself much displeased at the ma­ny [Page 21] persons that courted him, let him see, saith he, that you are dis­pleased by casting off your effeminacy.

Of a foul Bath, where, saith he, shall they be washed that wash here?

A big fellow that plaid on the harp, though by all others dis­commended for playing ill, he praised, being asked why, because, saith he, being an able fellow, he chooseth rather to play on the harp then to steal.

A certain harper who plaid so ill, that the company alwaies went away and left him, he saluted thus, Good morrow cock, the o­ther asking why, because, saith he, your Musick maketh every one rise.

Seeing a young man doing somthing; which though it were or­dinary, he conceived to be unseemly, hee filled his bosome with beans, and in that manner walked through the people, to whom gazing upon him, I wonder, saith he, you look at one and not a [...] him.

Hegesias desiring him to lend him some of his writings, you are a fool, saith he, Hegesias, who eat figgs not painted but reall; yet neglec [...] true exercitation, and seek after the written.

Seeing one that had won the Victory at the Olympick Exer­cises feeding sheep; you have made hast, saith he, good man, from the O­lympick Exercises to the Nemaean, the word alluding to feeding of sheep.

Being demanded how it cometh to passe that Wrastlers are for the most part stupid fellows, he answer'd, because they are made chiefly of the skins of Oxen and swine.

To a Tyrant, demanding of him what brasse was best, he an­swer'd that whereof, the Statues of Harmodius and Aristogiton were made. This others ascribe to Plato.

Being asked how Dionysius useth his friends, as vessells, saith he, emptying the full, and throwing away the empty.

A young man newly married, having written upon his house, the Son of Jupiter, Hercules, Callinicus dwelleth here let nothing ill enter, hee added, Assistance after a defeat, implying it was too late, he being already married.

He said Covetousness is the Metropolis of all evill.

Seeing one, that had wasted all his means, eating Olives, if you had used to dine so, said he, you would not have supp'd so.

He said, Good men are the Images of the Gods, love is the businesse of idle persons.

Being asked what is the most miserable thing in life, he said, an old man in want.

Et. Stob. ser. 65 Being demanded, the bitings of what beasts were most dan­gerous, Of Wild Beasts, saith hee, a Detractor, of Tame, a Flatterer.

Beholding a picture of two Centaures very ill painted, hee [Page 22] said, which of these is Chiron; the jeast consisteth in the Greek word, which signifieth worse, and was also the name of a Cen­taur, tutor to Achilles.

He said, the discourse of flatterers is a rope of honey. He called the belly the Charybdis of life.

Hearing that Didymo, an Adulterer, was taken; he deserves, saith he; to be put out of his name (meaning emasculated)

Stob. Ser. 55. Being asked why gold lookes pale; because, saith he, many lie in wait for it.

Seeing a woman carried in a Litter; that is not, saith he, a fit cage for such a Beast.

Seeing a Servant that had run away from his Master, sitting up­on the brink of a well: Young man, saith he, take heed you do not fall in: alluding to the punishment of fugitive servants.

Seeing one that used to steal garments in the bath, he said, [...], Do you come for unguents, or for another garment?

Seeing some women hang'd upon an Olive-tree; I would, saith he, all trees bore the same fruit.

Seeing a thiefe that used to rob Tombes, he spoke to him in that verse of Homer,

—What now of men the best,
Com'st thou to plunder the deceas't?

Seeing a handsome youth all alone asleep, he awaked him, saying in the words of Homer, Awake, [...]

To one that feasted sumptuously, he said that verse of Homer. ‘Son, thou hast but a little time to live.’

Plato discoursing concerning Idaeas, and naming [...], and [...], as if he should say, Tabletty and Cuppeity, he said, I see Plato, the table and the cup, but not the tableity and cuppeity. Plato answered, it is true indeed, you have eyes by which the table and cup are seen; but not an Intellect, by which tableity and cuppeity are seen.

Being demanded what he thought Socrates; he answered, mad. Being demanded at what time a man should marry; a young man, saith he, not yet; an old man not at all.

To one that asked, what he should give him to let him strike him, he answered, a Helmet.

Stob. Ser. 161 To a young man dressing himselfe neatly if this, saith he, be for the sake of men, you are unhappy; if for women, you are unjust.

Seeing a young man blush; take courage, saith he, that is the co­lour of Vertue.

[Page 23] Hearing two men plead against one another, he condemned both, saying, one had stollen, and the other had not lost.

Being demanded what wine he thought most pleasant, he an­swer'd, that which is drunk at anothers cost.

To one that said, many deride thee; he answer'd, but I am not derided: as conceiving, saith Vit. Fab. Max. Plutarch, those only to be derided, who are troubled at such things.

To one who said, Life is an ill thing: Life, saith he, is not an ill thing, but an ill life is an ill thing▪

Stob. Ser. 39. As he was dining upon Olives, they caused Tart to be set before him, which he threw away, saying, ‘Stranger, when Kings approach, withdraw.’ The words of Laius's Officers to Oedipus.

Being asked what kinde of dogge he was, he answer'd, When he was hungry, a Spaniel, when his belly was full, a Mastiffe; one of those which many commend, but d [...]re not take abroad with them a hun­ting.

Being demanded whether wise men might eat dainties; all things, saith he, as well as others.

Stob Ser. 77. Being demanded why men gave to Beggers; and not to Philo­sophers; because, saith he, they are afraid they may be lame or blinde, but are not afraid they may be Philosophers.

To one that reproached him as having counterfeited mony; indeed, saith he, there was a time when I was such a one as you are; but the time will never come that you will be as I am.

Coming to Mindus, and seeing the Gates very large, the City small; Mindinians, saith he, shut your Gates, left your City run out at them.

Seeing a thiefe that was taken stealing purple, he apply'd that verse of Homer to him, ‘The purple death, and potent fate have seiz'd.’

To Craterus, who invited him to come to him, he returned an­swer, I had rather lick salt at Athens, then enjoy the greatest delicacies with Craterus.

Meeting Anaximenes the Oratour, who was very fat; Give us, saith he, some of your flesh, it will ease you, and help us.

The same Anaximenes being in the midst of a discourse, Dioge­nes shewing a piece of salt-fish, diverted the attention of his Au­ditors; whereat Anaximenes growing angry, See, saith he, a hard penny-worth of salt-fish hath broke off Anaximenes's discourse.

Some ascribe this to him. Plato seeing him wash herbs, came and whisper'd thus to him, If you had followed Dionysius, you would not have needed to wash herbs; to whom he returned this answer in his ear, if you had washed herbs, you needed not to have fol­lowed Dionyfius.

[Page 24] To one that said to him, many laugh at you and Asses perhaps at them, saith he; but they care not for Asses, nor I for them.

Seeing a young man studying Philosophy: Well done, saith he, you will teach those, who love your outward beauty, to ad­mire your soul.

To one that admired the multitude of votive offerings in Samo­thracia, given by such as had escaped shipwrack: There would have been far more, saith he, if those who perished had presented theirs. Others ascribe this to Diagoras the Melian.

To a young man going to a feast, he said, You will come back Chiron: (alluding to the word which implyeth worse) the young man came to him the next day, saying, I went and returned not Chiron: No, saith he, not Chiron, but Eurylion.

Returning from Lacedaemon to Athens, to one that asked him, from whence he came, and whither he went: From men, saith he, to women.

Returning from the Olympick Games, to one that asked if there were much people there; Much people, saith he, but few men.

He compared Prodigalls to fig-trees growing on a precipice, whose fruit men tast not, but crowes and vultures devoure.

Phryne the Curtezan, having set up a golden Statue of Venus at Delphi, he wrot on it, From the iatemperance of the Grecians.

Alexander coming to him, and saying, I am Alexander the great King: And I, saith he, am Diogenes the Dogg.

Being asked why he was called Dogg: I fawn on those that give, saith he, I bark at those that will not give, and I bite the wicked.

As he was gathering figgs, the keeper of the Orchard spying him, told him, it is not long since a man was hang'd upon that Tree: And for that reasou, saith he, I will clense it.

Ael. 12. 58. Observing Dioxippus the Olympick victor, to cast many glan­ces upon a Curtezan: See, saith he, a common Woman leads the mar­tiall Ramm by the neck.

To two infamous persons stealing away from him: Fear not, saith he, doggs eat not thistles.

To one that asked him concerning a youth taken in adultery, whence he was; he answer'd, of Tegea, Tegea ( a City of Arcadia) whereto he alluded, is a publick Brothell.

Seeing one, that in former times had been an ill Wrastler, pro­fesse Medicine; What is the matter, saith he, have you a designe to cast those down that have thrown you?

Seeing the Son of a common woman throw stones amongst a croud: [...]ake heed, saith he, you do not hit your Father.

To a youth, shewing him a sword, given him by one that loved him, he said, [...].

To some that extolled one who had bestowed something on him: But you do not praise me, saith he, who deserved to receive it.

[Page 25] To one that redemanded an old Cloak of him, if you gave it me, saith he, I must keep it, if you lent it me, I must make use of it.

To a suppositi tious person that said to him, you have gold in your Cloak, Yes, saith he, and for that reason I lay it The jeast con­sisteth in the al­lusion betwixt those two Greek words. [...] under mee when I go to sleep.

Being demanded what he had gained by Philosophy, if nothing else saith hee, at least this, to be preapred for all fortunes.

Being demanded of what Country he was, he answered, a Citi­zen of the World.

To one that sacrific'd, praying he might have a child, you pray for a child, saith he, but never trouble your self what kind of child it may prove.

At an ordinary, being demanded mony, he answered the Ma­ster in that verse of Homer,

Ask others, but from Hector hold thy hand.

Et Stob. ser. He said the Mistresses of Kings were Queens; for the Kings did whatsoever they would have them.

The Athenians having decreed to stile Alexander Bacchus, and make me, saith he, Serapts.

To one reproaching him for living in filthy places, the Sun, saith he, visits Kennells, yet is not defiled.

Being at supper in the Temple, they brought him course bread, he threw it away, saying, nothing but what is pure must come within a Temple.

To one that said, why do you, who know nothing, professe Phi­losophy? he answer'd, though I should but pretend to study Philosophy, yet that were a profession thereof.

To one that recommended his Son to him, saying, hee was very ingenious, and exceeding well educated, he answered, why then doth he need me?

Those who speak good things, but do them not, differ nothing from a Lute, for that neither hears nor hath sense.

Hee went to the Theatre, as all the people were going out, being asked why he did so, This, saith he, is that I study all my life time.

Seeing an effeminate young man, are you not ashamed, saith hee, to use your self worse then Nature hath done? she hath made you a man, but you will force your self to be a woman.

Stob. ser. 104. Seeing an ignorant man tuning a Lute, are you not ashamed, saith he, to try to make a Lute sound harmoniously, and yet suffer your life to be so full of discord.

To one that said he was unfit for Philosophy, why do you live, saith he, if you care not for living honestly.

To one who despised his own Father, are you not ashamed, saith he, to despise him who is the cause you are so proud?

Hearing a handsome youth speak foolishly, are you not ashamed, saith he, to draw a leaden dagger out of an ivory sheath.

[Page 26] Being reproached for accepting a Cloak from Antipater, he an­swered in those words of Homer,

The gifts of Gods must not be thrown away.

One that hit him with a pole, and then bid him take heed, hee struck with his staffe, and said, and take you heed.

To one that sued to a Curtezan, What mean you wretch saith he, to sue for that which is much better to misse.

To one that smelled sweet of Unguents, take heed, saith he, this perfume make not your life stink.

He said, Slaves serve their Masters, but wicked men their passions.

Being demanded why slaves are called [...] Footmen, because saith he, they have feet like men, but such minds, as you that ask the question.

Seeing an unskilfull Archer going to shoot, he sate down at the mark, lest, saith he, he should hit me.

He said lovers are unhappy in pleasure.

Being demanded whether death be ill, how, saith he, can that be ill, whereof when it cometh we have no sense.

Alexander coming to him, and saying, do you not fear me? what saith he, are you good or ill, he answered good: who, replies Dio­genes, fears that which is good?

He said, Learning is a regulation to young men, a comfort to old men, wealth to poor men, and an Ornament to rich men.

To Didymo an Adulterer curing a maids eye, take heed, saith he, least in curing the eie, you hurt not the ball, [the word [...], signifying both the eye-ball and Virginity.]

To one that said his friends lay in wait for him, what then is to be done, saith he, if friends and enemies must be used alike.

Being demanded what is best amongst men, he answered, free­dom of speech.

Coming into a school, and seeing there many statues of the Mu­ses, but few Auditors, by the help of the Gods, Master, saith he, you have many Auditors.

To one that asked him how he might order himself best, St [...]b. Eth. ser. 1. by re­prehending, saith hee, those things in your self which you blame in others.

He gave good counsell to a person very dissolute, Ser. being deman­ded what he was doing, he answer'd, washing an Aethiop.

He went backwards into the School of the Stoicks, Ser. 3 [...]. whereat some laughing, are you not ashamed, saith he, to do that in the whole course of your life, for which you deride me in walking.

Hee said, Ibid. men provide for their living, but not for their well living.

He said, Ser. 37, § 84. it was a shame to see Wrastlers and Singing-Masters observe temperate dyet, and moderate their pleasures, one for ex­ercise, the other for his voice, and yet no man would do so much for Vertue's sake.

[Page 27] He said, Ser. 45. Pride, like a shepheard, driveth men whither it plea­seth.

Seeing the high walls of Megara, Ser. 48. he said, Unhappy people, minde not the height of your walls, but the height of their courages who are to stand on the walls.

He compared covetous men to such as have the dropsy, Ser. 53. those are full of mony, yet desire more; these of water, yet thirst after more: Passions grow more intense by enjoyment of what they desire.

Seeing a man make love to old rich widowes: Ser. 53. This love, saith he, is not blinde, but toothlesse.

Being demanded what beasts were the worst: Ser. 54. in the field, saith he, Bears and Lyons, in the City, Usurers and Sycophants.

He compared flattery to an empty tombe, Ser. 64. on which Friendship was inscribed.

Blaming Antisthenes for being too remisse in discourse, Ser. 66. in regard that when he spoke loudest he could hardly be heard, and calling himselfe the Trumpet of reproofe: Antisthenes reply'd, he was like a Bee, that makes no great noise, yet stings sharply.

He said, Ibid. reproof is the good of others.

A certain Athenian asking him why he lived not with the La­cedaemonians, Ibid. whom he praised so much: Physicians, saith he, though they study health, converse with the sick.

He said, Ibid. other doggs bark at their enemies, I, my friends, that I may preserve them.

He asked Plato if he were writing Lawes: Ibid. Plato affirmed he was. Did you not write a Common-wealth before, said Diogenes? I did, answers Plato. And had not that Common-wealth Lawes▪ saith he? The other answering it had: To what end, reply'd Dioge­nes, do you write new Lawes?

He said, Ser. 6 [...]. To give Physick to a dead body, or advise an old man, is the same thing?

To a bald man that reviled him, Ser. 71. I will not return your reproaches, saith he, yet cannot but commend your hair, for leaving so bad a head.

To an Informer that fell out with him; I am glad, Ibid. saith he, of the enmity betwixt us, for you hurt not your foes, but your friends.

To one that reviled him; Ser. 72. No man, saith he, will believe you when you speak ill of me, no more then they would me, if I should speak well of you.

Alexander sent him a dish full of bones, Ser. 71. with this message, It was meat for doggs; he answer'd, Yea, but not sit for a King to send.

He said, Ibid. it was the same fault to give to them that deserved nothing, as not to give to them that do.

He said, Ser. 87. As houses, where there is plenty of meat, are full of mice, so the bodies of such as eat much are full of diseases.

[Page 28] At a Feast, Ser. 88. one giving him a great cup full of wine, he threw it away; for which being blamed, If I had drunk it, saith he, not only the wine would have been lost, but I also.

Being demanded what was hardest, Ser. 105. he answer'd, To know our selves, for we construe most things according to our own partiality.

He said, Ser. 117. Medea was a wise woman, not a Witch, who by la­bour and exercise corroborated the bodies of effeminate persons, whence arose the fable, that she could renew age.

To one that profest himselfe a Philosopher, Ser. 126. but argued litigious­ly, he said, Why do you spoile the best part of Philosophy, yet would be thought a Philosopher?

Questioning one of those young men that followed him, Ser. 133. he was silent; whereupon Diogenes, Do you not think, saith he, it be­belongs to the same man to know when to speak, and when to hold his peace?

Being demanded how a man should live under the authority of superiours; Ser. 149. & 153. as we do by fire, saith he, not too near, lest it burn, not too far off, lest we freez.

Seeing some women talking privately together: Ser. 183. Behold, saith he, the Asp borrowes poyson from the Viper.

Being demanded what was the heaviest burthen the earth bears, Ser. 210. he answered, an ignorant man.

An Astrologer in the Forum discoursing to the people, Ser. 211. and shewing them in a tablet the erratick Starrs: No, saith Diogenes, it is not the Starres that erre, but these, pointing to the people.

Being demanded what men are the most noble: Ser. 216. They, saith he, who contemn wealth, glory, and pleasure, and over-master the contraries to these, poverty, ignominy, pain, death.

Seeing the servants of Anaximenes carrying many goods, Ser. 230. he demanded to whom they belong'd; they answer'd, to Anaxime­nes. Is he not ashamed, reply'd Diogenes, to have so much houshold stuffe, and yet not be master of himselfe.

He said, Ser. 233. Vertue dwelleth neither in a rich City, nor a private House.

He said, Ser. 235. Poverty is a selfe-taught help to Philosophy, for what Philosophy endeavours to perswade by words, poverty enforceth in practise.

To a wicked man reproaching him for his poverty; Ibid. I never knew, saith he, any man punished for poverty, but many for wickednesse.

He called Poverty a selfe-instructing vertue. Ibid.

To one that reproached him with poverty: Ser. 23 [...]. What mean you, saith he; poverty never made a Tyrant, riches many.

Alexander seeing him asleep in his Tubb, Ser. 148. said, O Tubb full of wisdome: The Philosopher rising up, answer'd, Great King,

[Page 29]
One drop of Fortune's better far
Then Tubbs repleat with wisdom are.

To whom a stander by reply'd,

One drop of Wisdom Fortune's Seas excells;
In unwise soules misfortune ever dwells.

Seeing an old woman painted, Ser. 270. if this he for the living, you are de­ceived, saith he, if for the dead, make hast to them.

To one bewailing his own misfortune, Ser. 271. as that he should not die in his own Country, be of comfort, saith he▪ the way to the next World is alike in every place.

Having a great pain in his shoulder which troubled him much, Ael. var. hist. 10, 11. one said to him in derision, why dost thou not die Diogenes, and free thy self from this misery, he answer'd, it is sit they should live who know how to order their life, for you who know not what to do or say, it is a convenient time to die.

He used to say, Plut. de [...]xul. Aristotle dineth when Philip pleaseth, but Dioge­nes when it pleaseth Diogenes.

At Cori [...]th, Plut. quom. ger. Resp. seeing Dionysius the younger, who was deposed from the Kingdom of Sicily, This is a life, saith he, you deserve not, you merit rather not to live here freely and without fear, but at home in per­petuall imprisonment.

To some who commended Plato, Pl. de virt. Moral. he said, what hath hee done wor­thy commendation, having professed Philosophy so long, yet never moved any to grief.

To one demanding how he might take the greatest revenge upon his Enemy, Pl. de aud. Poet. he answered, by being good and vertuous your self.

In commending his Master Antisthenes, Macrob. Sat. 7. 3. he would say of him, of rich he made me poor, and instead of a fair house, made me live in a Tubb.

CHAP. VI.
His Writings.

  • OF the Writings ascribed to him are these,
  • Dialogues.
  • Ichthyas
  • The Geay.
  • The Leopard.
  • [Page 30] The Athenian people.
  • Policy.
  • Ethick art.
  • Of Riches.
  • Erotick.
  • Theodorus.
  • Hypsias.
  • Aristarchus
  • Of Death.
  • Epistles.
  • Tragedies 7.
  • Helena.
  • Thyestes.
  • Hercules.
  • Achilles.
  • Medea.
  • Chrysippus.
  • OEdipus.

Sosicrates and Satyrus affirm that none of these were written by Diogenes; the Tragedies Satyrus ascribes to Philischus of Aegina. Sotion affirmeth these only to have been written by Diogenes.

  • Of Vertue.
  • Of Good.
  • Erotick.
  • The poor.
  • The Tolerant.
  • The Leopard,
  • Cassander.
  • Cephalio.
  • Philiscus.
  • Aristarchus.
  • Sisiphus.
  • Ganymede.
  • Chria's, &
  • Epistles.

CHAP. VII.
His Death.

HE died, as Demetrius saith, at Corinth about 90. years old, the same day that Alexander died at Babylon, Laert. which according to Aelian was the seventh of Thargelion in the first year of 114 t• Olympiad.

The manner of his death is variously related. Eubulus saith, he lived to his end with Xeniades, and was buried by his Sons. As he lay sick, Xeniades asked him how he would be buried, he an­swer'd, with his face downwards; Xeniades demanding the rea­son, because, saith he, all things will be turned upside-down, alluding, saith Laertius, to the greatnesse of the Macedonians, who not long before were a poor inconsiderable people. Some report that be­ing near death, he gave order that his body should be left un­buried, that the wild Beasts might partake of him, or be thrown into a ditch, and a little dust be cast over it, or thrown upon a dung-hill, that he might benefit his Brethren.

Aelian ar. hist. 8. 14. saith, that being sick to death, he threw himself down from a bridge which was near the Gymnasium, and ordered the Keeper of the Palaestra to take his body and throw it into the River Ilissus.

Others affirm he died of a surfet of raw flesh, others that he stopp'd his own breath, others, that cutting a Cuttle-fish, in pieces to throw it to dogs, it bit asunder a Nerve in his foot, whereof he died.

Others affirm he died as he was going to the Olympick Games: being taken with a Feaver, he lay down by the way, and would not suffer his friends to carry him, but sitting under the shade of the next tree, spoke thus to them; This night I shall be a Victor or vanquished, if I overcome the Feaver, I will come to the Games, if not, I must go to the other World, and drive it away by death.

Antisthenes saith, his Friends were of opinion he stopp'd his own breath, for coming as they constantly used to visit him in the Cranaeum where he lived, they found him covered; they did not imagine it was sleep, by reason of his great wakefulnesse; but im­mediately putting back his Cloak perceived he was dead. Here­upon there arose a contention amongst them who should bury him; they fell from words to blows, but the Magistrates and great ones of the City came themselves and buried him, by the gate which leads to Isthmus. Over the Sepulchre they placed a Column, and upon it a Dog cut out of Parian stone. Afterwards his own Countrymen honoured him with many brazen Statues, bearing this Inscription;

[Page 32]
Time doth the strongest Brasse decay
Diogenes, thou ne're canst dy,
Who to content the ready way
To following Ages didst descry.

Laertius reckons five of this name, the first of Apollonia, a natural Philosopher.

  • The second a Sicionian.
  • The third this.
  • The fourth a Stoick of Seleucia.
  • The fift of Tarsis.

MONIMUS.

Laert. MOnimus was a Syracusian, Disciple to Diogenes, he was first servant to a Mony-changer, to whom Xeniades who bought Diogenes, often coming, he was so taken with the worth and Ver­tue of the person, that he counterfeited himself mad, and threw all the mony from off the Table, whereupon his Master turning him away, he betook himself to Diogenes. He followed likewise Crates the Cynick, and others of that Sect, which confirm'd his Master in the opinion that he was mad. He was a person eloquent and learned, mention'd by Menander in his Hippocomus, of so great constancy, that he contemned all glory for vertues sake. He wrote some things, which at first appearance seemed Ludicrous, but con­tained deep serious sense; as of Appetites, two Books, and a Pro­treptick.

ONESICRITUS.

Laert. Onesicritus was of Aegina, or according to Demetrius an Asty­palaean; he had two Sons. He sent the younger named An­drosthenes to Athens, who hearing Diogenes would not depart [Page 33] thence. Hereupon he sent the elder, named Philiscus, who stayed there likewise for the same reason. Lastly, the Father himselfe went, and was so much taken with Diogenes, that he became a sedulous Auditor of him, as his two sons were.

He was esteemed amongst the most eminent Disciples of Dioge­nes; Laertius compares him with Xenophon; one fought under Cy­rus, the other under Alexander: One wrote the institution of Cyrus, the other, the praise of Alexander: Their styles also were very like.

CRATES.

Crates was a Theban, Laert. Son of Ascandas: He was likewise reckon'd amongst the most eminent of Diogenes's Disciples; yet Hippobotus saith, he was not a Disciple of Diogenes, but of Bry­so the Achaean.

He flourished about the 113 th Olympiad. Antisthenes, in his successions, saith, that being at a Tragedy where Telephus was re­presented, carrying a Basket in a sordid condition, he betook himselfe to the Cynicall Philosophy, and selling all his estate, (for he was very rich, having gotten together above two hundred talents) he distributed it amongst the Citizens, and was so con­stant a Professor of this Philosophy, that Philemon, the Comick Poet, takes notice thereof in these words,

By him in Summer a thick Coat was worn,
In Winter-time ( so temperate) a torn.

Diocles saith, Diogenes perswaded him to part with his estate, and to throw all the mony he had left into the Sea: and that the house of Crates was from Alexander, that of Hipparchia his Wife, from Philip. Some of his neer friends that came to him to dis­swade him from this course of life, he beat away, for he was of a resolute spirit.

Demetrius the Magnesian saith, he deposited some mony in the hands of a Banquier, with this condition, that if his sonnes be­took themselves to any Civill employment, it should be repaid again; but, if to Philosophy, it should be distributed amongst the people, for as much as a Philosopher stands in need of nothing.

[Page 34] Eratosthenes relates, that having a son named Pasicles, by his Wife Hipparchia, assoon as he arrived at mans estate, he brought him to the house of a young maid that was his slave, saying, This is a hereditary matrimony to you: but those who commit adultery, are, according to the Tragedians punished with banish­ment or death; Those who keep Concubines were, according to the Comedians, by luxury and drunkennesse, transported to madnesse.

Pasicles, the Disciple to Euclid, was his brother.

He said, 'tis not possible to finde a man without a fault, for, in every Pomgranat there is at least one grain corrupt.

Having displeased Nicodromus a Lutinist, he beat him black and blew; whereupon he pasted a piece of paper on his forehead, wherein was written, Nicodromus did this.

He was exceedingly invective against common women.

He reproved Demetreus Phalerius for sending bread and wine to him, saying, I wish the fountains also produc'd bread; intimating that he lived with water.

The Athenian Magistrates blamed him for wearing a long robe; I will shew you Theophrastus, saith he, in the same attire; which they not believing, he brought them to a Barbers shop, where he was sitting to be trimm'd.

At Thebes, being beaten by the Master of the Gymnasium; or, as others, at Corinth by Euthicrates, he laughed, saying,

He by the foot him drew,
And o're the threshold threw.

Zeno in his Chrias saith, he sowed a sheep-skinn upon his cloak, to appear the more deformed. He was of a very unhandsome look, and whilst he discoursed, laughed.

He used to lift up his hands and say, Be of good courage, Grecians, both for the eyes and all other parts, for you shall soon see these deriders surprised by sicknesse, and proclaiming you happy, blame their owne slothfulnesse.

He said, we ought so long to study Philosophy, untill the lea­ders of the Army seem to be Horse-drivers.

He said, they who lived with flatterers were forsaken persons, living like sheep amidst wolves, not with those who wish'd them well.

Perceiving he drew nigh to death, he looked upon himselfe, saying,

—And dost thou go, old friend,
To the next world, thou whom old age doth bend.
For he was crooked through age.

[Page 35] To Alexander, asking whether he would that his Country should be restored or not: To what end, saith he, seeing there will come perhaps another Alexander, and depopulate it. He said, con­tempt of glory and want were his Country, which were not sub­ject to Fortune; and that he was Countryman to Diogenes, not fearing any body.

Coming into the Forum, Sub. Ser. 37. where he beheld some buying, others selling: These, saith he, think themselves happy in employments contra­ry to one another; but I think my selfe happy, in having nothing to do either way.

To a young man, Ser. 6 [...]. followed by a great many Parasites: Young man, saith he, I am sorry to see you so much alone.

He said, Ser. 77. we ought not to accept gifts from all men, for vertue ought not to be maintained by vice.

Seeing at Delphi a golden Image of Phryne the Curtezan, Ser. 87. he cryed out, This is a Trophy of the Grecian intemperance.

Seeing a young man highly fed and fat: Unhappy youth, saith he, Ibid. do not [...]ortifie your prison.

He said, Ser. 237. He gained glory, not by his riches, but his poverty.

To one, Ibid. demanding what he should get by Philosophy: You will learn, saith he, to open your purse easily, and to give readily, not as you do now, turaing away, delaying and trembling, as if you had the palsey.

He said, Ibid. Men know not how much a Wallet, a measure of Lupines, and security of minde is worth.

The Epistles of Crates are extant, wherein, saith Laertius, he writes excellent Philosophy, in style resembling Plato. He wrote Tragedies likewise, full of deep Philosophy.

He died old, and was buried in Baeotia.

METROCLES.

Laert. METROCLES was Disciple of Crates, Brother to Hipparchia. He first heard Theophrastus the Peripatetick, &c. afterwards apply'd himselfe to Crates, and became an eminent Philosopher.

He burnt, as Hecaton saith, his writings, saying, ‘These are the dreams of wilde phantastick youth.’

He burnt likewise the dictates of his Master Theophrastus. ‘Vulcan come hither, Venus needs thy aid.

[Page 36] He said, Of things, some are purchased by mony, as Houses; some by time and diligence, as Learning: Riches is hurtfull, if not rightly apply'd.

He died old: he strangled himselfe.

Of his Disciples are remembered Theombrotus and Cloemenes. Demetrius of Alexandria was Auditor of Theombrotus: Timarchus of Alexandria, and Echicles of Ephesus were Disciples of Cleome­nes. Echicles heard also Theombrotus, from whom came Menedemus; of whom hereafter. Amongst these was also Menippus, of Sinopis.

HIPPARCHIA.

HIpparchia was likewise taken with the Discourses of those Cynicks, she was Sister to Metrocles; they were both Maro­nites. She fell in love with Crates, as well for his discourse as man­ner of life, from which none of her Suitors by their Wealth, Nobility or Beauty, could divert her, but that she would bestow her self upon Crates, threatning her Parents, if they would not suffer her to marry him, she would kill her self. Hereupon her Pa­rents went to Crates, desiring him to disswade her from this reso­lution which he endeavoured but not prevailing went away, and brought all the little furniture of his house and shew'd her, this saith he, is your husband, that the furniture of your house, consider upon it, for you cannot be mine unlesse you follow the same course of life. She immediately took him, and went up and down with him, and in publick, [...], and went along with him to Feasts.

At a Feast of Lysimachus she met Theodorus the Atheist, with whom she argued thus; If that, which if Theodorus do be not un­justly done, neither is it unjustly done if Hipparchia do the same; But Theodorus if he strike himself doth not unjustly; therefore Hipparchia doth not unjustly if she strike Theodorus; Theodorus an­swer'd nothing, onely pluck'd her by the Coat, which she wore not like a woman, but after the manner of the Cynicks, whereat Hipparchia was nothing moved, whereupon he said,

Her Webbe and Loome
She left at home.

I did saith she, Theodorus, and I think have not erred in choosing to bestow that time which I should have spent in weaving on Phi­losophy.

Much more saith Laertius is ascribed to her.

MENIPPVS.

MEnippus was a Cynick, a Phoenician by birth, Servant by con­dition, as Achaicus affirms. Diocles saith, his Father was of Pontus called Bato. Menippus for acquisition of riches wentto Thebes and was made free of that City. He wrote nothing serious, all his books being full of mirth, not unlike the writings of Meleager. Hermippus saith, he was named Hemerodanista, the dayly Usurer, for he put out mony to Merchants upon Interest, and took pawns; at last being cheated of all his goods, he hanged himself.

Some say the Bokes that are ascribed to him were writ by Di­onysius and Zopyrus, Colophonians, which being ludicrous, they gave to him as a person disposed that way; they are reckoned, thir­teen.

  • Naenia's.
  • Testaments.
  • Epistles, in the persons of the Gods.
  • Two natural Philosophers, Mathematicians & Grammarians.
  • Of Epicure.

Laertius reckons six of this name; the first wrote the Lydian sto­ry, and epitomiz'd Xanthus.

  • The second this.
  • The third a Sophist, of Caria.
  • The fourth a Graver.
  • The fifth and sixth Painters, both mention'd by Apollodorus.

MENEDEMVS.

MEnedemus was Disciple of Colotes, of Lampsacum; hee procee­ded as Hippobotus relates, to so great extravagance that hee went up and down in the habit of the Furies, declaring he was come from the World below to take notice of such as offended, and that he was to return thither to give an account of them.

He went thus attir'd, a dark Gown to his heels, girt with a purple girdle, upon his head an Arcadian hat, on which were woven the twelve signes, tragick buskins, a long beard, in his hand an ashen staffe. Hither­therto of the Cynicks.

FINIS.
THE HISTORY OF PHILO …

THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

The Eighth Part, Containing the Stoick Philosophers.

[figure]

LONDON, Printed for Humphrey Moseley, and Tho: Dring. An. Dom. 1656.

ZENON▪ [...]

ZENO.

CHAP. I.
His Country, Parents, and first Studies.

THE Sect of Stoicks had its originall from the Cynicks, Zeno was the Author thereof, who having first been a Scholer of Crates, and af­terwards a hearer of other Philosophers, at last instituted this new Sect. Laert. Hee was born at Cittium, a Greek Sea-Town in the Isle of Cyprus, Strab. lib. with a lock'd Haven, inhabited by Phoenicians, Suid. whence he somtimes was ter­med the Phoenician. His Father was called Mnaseas, by some Deme­as, a Merchant, whence was objected to Zeno, the obscurity of his Birth and Country, as being Cic. de fin. a stranger; and of mean Paren­tage, whereof he was so far from being ashamed, that P lut. de rep. Stoic. he refu­sed to be made a Citizen of Athens, as conceiving it an undervalu­ing of his own Country; in so much as Laert. when he contributed to a Bath in Athens, and his name was inscribed upon a Pillar with the Title of Philosopher, he desired they would adde a Cittiean.

Laert. Zeno (as Hecaton and Apollonius Tyrius relate,) enquiring of the Oracle what course he should take to lead the best kind of life, was answer'd, that he should converse with the dead, where­upon he addicted himself to the reading of antient Authors.

Laert. Herein he was not a little furthered by his Father, who, as Demetrius saith, trading frequently to Athens, brought him as yet but very young, many Socraticall Books, which excited in him a great affection to learning.

Laert. Being now 17. (or as Persaeus 22) years old, hee took a voy­age to Athens, carried thither as well by his particular inclinati­on to Philosophy, as by his businesse, which was to fell some Purple that he had brought out of Phoenicia. He took along with him a hundred Talents, and having sold his Merchandise, apply­ed himself to Philosophy, yet continued to lend his money out to Merchants upon interest, so to improve his stock.

Some affirm his Ship was cast away in the Piraeum, which news being brought him to Athens, he seemed nothing at all moved, [Page 2] but only said, Thou dost well Fortune; Plut. de util. cap. ex inimic. to drive me into a Gown, or as Seneca, Fortune commands me to study Philosophy more ear­nestly.

Laer. Others say, that being troubled at the losse of his Ship, hee went up to the City of Athens, and sitting in a Booksellers shop, read a piece of Xenophon's Commentaries, where with being much pleas'd, he asked the Bookseller where, such men lived, Crates by chance passing by, the Bookseller pointed to him, saying, fol­low that man; which he did, and from that time forward, became a Disciple of Crates.

CHAP. II.
Of his Masters.

ZEno thus changing the course of his life, applyed himselfe to Crates, Laert. being apt to Philosophy, but more modest then suited with the Cynicall Sect. Which Crates to remedy, gave him a pot full of pottage to carry through the Ceramick, and per­ceiving him to hide it, as ashamed, with his Coat, he struck the pot with his stick and broke it. Zeno running away, all wet, what, said he, are you running away little Phoenician, no body hurt you? Hee made a litle hollow cover of a pot, in which he carried the mo­ney of his Master Crates, that it might be in readinesse when hee went to buy meat. Thus hee lived a while with Crates, during which time he writ his Book of the Common-wealth, whence some jeasting, said, it was written under the Dog's tail.

At last deserting, Crates he apply'd himself to Laert. Stilpo the Me­garick Philosopher. Apollonius Tyrius saith, that taking hold of his Cloak to pluck him away from Stilpo, he said, O Crates, the han­dles by which the Philosophers are to be taken hold of, are their ears; Lead me by those your way, or else though you constrain my body to be with you, my mind will be with Stilpo. With Stilpo he remained ten years.

From Stilpo he went to Xenocrates, being so well satisfied with the instruction of these two Masters, that he said, he made a very good voyage when he was shipwrack'd, though others apply it to his living with Crates.

Laert. He afterwards apply'd himself to Diodorus Cronus, as Hippo­ [...]otus avers, under whom he studied Dial [...]ctick, to which Science he was so much addicted, that Laert. when a certain Philosopher of that Sect had informed him of seven species of Dialectick, in that sallacy which is called the Mower, he asked him what he was to give him for his reward, the Philosopher demanded a hundred pieces of Silver, Zeno (so much was he affected to Learning) gave him two hundred.

Laert. Suid. Lastly, notwithstanding, that he had made a great progresse [Page 3] in Philosophy, he heard Polemon, whose Doctrine was against Pride; whereupon Polemon told him, Zeno, I am not ignorant, that you lie in ambush, and come slily into my Garden (as the Phoenicians use) to steal away Learning.

CHAP. III.
His School and institution of a Sect.

HAving been long a hearer of others, he at last thought fit to communicate the Learning which he had received and im­proved. To this Laert. end he made choice of the [...] the painted walk, so named from the pictures of Polygnotus, otherwise called Pisianactia. Here he constantly walked and discoursed, resolving to settle there, and make the place as full of tranquillity as it had been before of trouble: For, in the time of the thirty Ty­rants, neer 1400 Citizens were there put to death.

Hither resorted a great many Disciples to him, who were at first called Zenonians, as Epicure affirmeth, from their Master; afterwards from the place where he taught, Stoicks, as Erato­sthenes in his eight Book of antient Comedy; adding, that not long before, some Poets that lived there were called Stoicks also, upon which occasion the name was very well known.

He was subtle in disquisition and dispute.

He disputed earnestly with Philo the Dialectick, and exercised himselfe together with him: so that Zeno the younger admired him no lesse, then his Master Diodorus.

He first seemeth (saith Laertius) to have set a bound to the loosnesse and extravagance of propositions: But, of this more, when we come to speak of his Philosophy, which by reason of its largenesse, we remit to the end of his life.

CHAP. IV.
What honours were conferr'd upon him.

ZENO by the Philosophy which he taught, and the practise of his life conformable to that doctrine, gained so high an estimation amongst the Athenians, that Laert. they deposited the keyes of the City in his hands, as the only person fit to be entrusted with their liberties. His name was likewise much honoured by his own Country-men, as well those at Cyprus, as those who lived at Sidon.

Amongst those who honoured and favoured Zeno, was Anti­gonus Gonotus King of Macedonia, a Prince no lesse eminent for his [Page 4] Vertue then his Greatnesse, much esteemed him, and, as often as he went to Athens, heard him. He sent many times to invite him to come to him, amongst the rest, one Letter to this effect, alledged by Apollonius Tyrius.

King Antigonus to Zeno the Philosopher, health.

I Think that I exceed you in Fortune and Glory; but, in Learning and Discipline, and that perfect felicity which you have attained, I am exceeded by you: Wherefore I thought it expedient to write to you, that you will come to me, assuring my selfe you will not deny it. Use all means therefore to come to us, and know, you are not to instruct me only, but all the Macedonians. For, he who teacheth the King of Macedo­nia, and guideth him to Vertue, it is evident, that he doth likewise in­struct all his Subjects in Vertue. For such as is the Prince, such for the most part are those who live under his Government.

Zeno answered thus:

To King Antigonus Zeno, health.

I Much esteem your earnest desire of Learning, in that you aime at Philosophy, not popular, which perverteth manners, but that true dis­cipline which conferreth profit, avoiding that generally commended pleasure which effeminates the soules of some young men. It is manifest, that you are enclined to Generosity, not only by nature, but by choice. A generous nature, with indifferent exercise, assisted by a Master, may easily attain to perfect Vertue. But, I am very infirm of body by reason of my age, for I am fourescore years old, and therefore not able to come to you. Yet, I will send you some of my con-Disciples, who, in those things that concern the Soul, are nothing inferiour to me; in those of the Body are much superiour to me, of whom, if you make use, you will want no­thing conducing to perfect Beatitude.

Thus Zeno absolutely refused to go to Antigonus, but sent him his Disciple Persaeus son of Demetrius, a Cittiean (who flourish'd in the 130 th Olympiad, Zeno being then very old) and Philonides a Theban, both mentioned by Epicurus in his Epistle to Aristobu­lus, as having been with Antigonus.

CHAP. V.
His Apophthegmes.

OF his Apophthegmes are remembered these: Of a man very finely drest, stepping lightly over a Kennell; He doth not care [Page 5] for the dirt, Laert. saith he, because he cannot see his face in it.

A certain Cynick came to him to borrow Oyle, saying, he had none left: Zeno deny'd him, and as he was going away; Now, saith he, consider, which of us two are the more impudent.

Cremonides, Laert. whom he much affected, and Cleanthes sitting down beside him, he arose; whereat Cleanthes wondring, I have heard good Physicians say, saith he, that the best remedy for tum [...]urs is rest.

Two sitting by him at a Feast, he that was next him hit the other with his foot: Zeno hit him that was next him with his knee, and turning him to him, What then think you, saith he, that you have done to him that sits below you.

To one that loved the company of boyes, Neither have those Masters, saith he, any wit, who converse [...]l [...]ies with the boyes, nor the boyes themselves.

He said that elegant speeches were like Alexandrian silver, fair to the eye, and figur'd like mony, but not a whit of the more value. Speeches which are otherwise, he likened to Attick Te­tradrachmes, which had a rough stamp, but, were of greater value.

Aristo his Disciple discoursing many things foolishly, some petulantly, others confidently, It cannot be, saith he, but your Fa­ther was drunk when you were begot: whereupon himselfe being ve­ry concise of speech, he called him the [...]alker.

To a great eater, Laert. Athen. deipn. who left nothing for those that eat with him, he caused a great fish to be set before him, and immediately to be taken away; the other looking upon him, What, said he, do you think your companions suffer every day, seeing that you cannot suffer my greedinesse once?

A young man, Laert. who question'd something more curiously then suited with his age, he brought to a Glasse, and bad him look in it, and then asked him, whether he thought that question agreed with that face.

To one that said, he disliked many things of Antisthenes wri­ting, he brought his Chria of Sophocles, and asked him, if there were any thing therein excellent: The other answered, he knew not: Are you not ashamed then (replyed Zeno) if Antisthe [...]es have said any thing ill, you select and remember that: but if any thing ex­cellent, you are so far from remembring, as not to minile it?

To one that said, the speeches of Philosophers were short You say very true, saith he, so should t [...]eir very syllables be, as much as is possible.

One saying of Polemon, that he proposed some things, and said others: He frowning, said, What rate do you set upon things that are given?

He said, that a Disputant should have the voice and lungs of a Co­median, but not the loudnesse.

[Page 6] To those that speak well, he said, we should allow a place to hear, as to skilfull Artificers to see; on the other side, the hearer must so attend to what is spoken, that he take no time to censure.

To a young man that spoke much; your ears, saith he, are fallen into your tongue.

To a handsome youth who said, that he thought that in his opinion, a wise man ought not to love: Nothing, saith he, will be more unhappy to you that are handsome.

He said, that most Philosophers are in many things fooles, in trivi­all and vulgar things ingnorant.

He pronounced that of Capecia, who when one of his Disciples began to grow high, beating him, he said, Right is not placed in great, but great in right.

To a young man discoursing with much confidence; Young man, saith he, I should be loath to tell you my thoughts.

A youth of Rhodes handsome and rich, but refractory to him, not enduring, he bad him first fit in a dirty seat, that he might dirt his Gown, next placed him amongst the beggars, that he might converse with them and their raggs, untill at last the young man went away.

He said, that nothing is more unseemly then pride, especially in young men.

He said, that we must not only commit to memory speeches and words, as those who make ready some dish of meat, but apply it, and make use of it in our minds.

He said, that young men must use all modesty in their walking, in their behaviour, and in their garments; often repeating those verses of Euripides concerning Capaneus,

He was not pust up with his store,
Nor thought himself above the poor.

He said, nothing was more alienate from the comprehension of Sci­ences then Poetry: and, that we need nothing more then Time.

Being asked who is a friend, he answered, My other selfe.

Having taken his servant in a theft, he beat him; the fellow said, it was his destiny to steal, and to be beaten, said he.

He said, that Beauty is the sweetnesse of the voice; or, according to some, he called it, the flower of Beauty.

Seeing the servant of one of his companions black and blew with stripes; I see, saith he, the fruits of your anger.

To one that smelt sweet of oyntments; Who is it, saith he, that smells so esseminately.

To Dionysius sirnamed [...] the retractor, who asked him, why he corrected all but himselfe; because, saith he, I do not be­lieve you.

To a young man who spoke too freely, for this reason, saith he, [Page 7] we have two ears and but one tongue, that we should hear much and speak little.

He was invited to a Feast with other Philosophers by the Am­bassadors of Antigonus (according to Laertius of Ptolomy) and whilst of the rest every one amidst their cups made ostentation of their Learning, Laert. Stob. serm. 126. he alone sate silent, whereupon the Ambassadors asking him what they should say of him to Antigonus; That which you see, saith he, for of all things, it is hardest to contain speech.

Being demanded how he behaved himself when reviled, hee said, as an Ambassador dismiss'd without answer.

He changed the Verses of Hesiod, thus;

Who good advice obeyes, of men is best,
Next, he who ponders all in his own brest.

For that man (saith he) is better who can obey good advice, and make good use thereof, then he who finds out al things of himself; for the latter hath only understanding, but the other practise also.

Being demanded how it came to passe that being very austere, Laer. Athen. Deipn. he notwithstanding was very cheerfull, and merry at a Feast, he answer'd, Lupins, [...]hough in themselves bitter, being sleep'd, grow sweet.

He said it was better to slip with the foot then with the tongue. He said, that to do well is no small matter, to begin well depended on a small moment.

This some ascribe to Socrates.

One of the young men in the Academy speaking of foolish studies, Stob. ser. 33. If you do not dip your tongue in your mind, saith Zeno, you will speak many other foolish things.

He accused many, Stob. ser. 38. saying, when they might take pleasure in la­bour, they would rather go to the Cooks shop for it.

He said, Stob. ser. 39. ci­ting Mulonius. Stob. ser. 52. that we should no affect delicacy of diet, not even in sickness.

Being demanded by one of his friends, what course hee should take to do no wrong, Imagine, reply'd he, that I am alwaies with you.

Being demanded whether a man that doth wrong, Stob. ser. 52. may con­ceal it from God, no, saith he, nor he who thinketh it.

To some that excused their prodigality, Stob. ser. 7. 74. saying, that they had plenty, out of which they did it; will you excuse a Cook, saith he, that should oversalt his meat because he hath store of salt.

He said that of his Disciples, some were [...], Stob. ser. 133. lovers of Know­ledge, others, [...], lovers of speaking.

He compared the Arts of Dialectick to just measures filled, not with Wheat or any thing of value, Stob. ser. 212. but with chaffe and straw.

He said, Stob. ser. 217. we ought not to enquire, whether men belonged to great Ci­ties, but whether they deserved a great City.

Seeing a friend of his too much taken up with the businesse of his Land, Stob. ser. 222. unlesse you lose your Land, saith hee, it will lose you.

[Page 8] He said, Stob. ser. 297. a man must live not only to eat and drink, but to use this life for the obtaining of a happy life.

Antigonus being full of wine, Aelian, var. hist. 9. 26. went to visit him, and kissing and embracing him as a drunken man, bad him demand, whatsoever he would, swearing that he would give it him; Zeno answered, [...], at once reproving his vice, and taking care of his health.

Stretching out the fingers of his right hand, he said, such is phan­tasie, then contracting them a little, Cic. Acad. quast. 4. such is assent; then closing them quite, and shutting his fist, such is comprehension; then put­ting to it his left hand and shutting it close and hard, such (saith he) is science, of which none is capable but a wise man.

CHAP. VI.
His Death.

ZEno having continued according to Laert. Apollonius Master of his School fifty eight years, and attained to the ninety eighth of his age, by the computation of Laertius and De long [...]v. the numericall l [...]tter in Suid [...]s is corrupt. Lucian (for that he lived but seventy two years, as some affirm upon the testimony of Laert. Persaeus, seems to be a mistake, seeing that his Letter to Antigo­nus was written in his 80 [...] year) Laert. in all which time he was never molested by any sicknesse, died upon this occasion. Going out of the School, he fell and broke his finger, whereupon striking the Ground with his hand, he said, as Nio [...]e in the Tragedy, I come, why do you call me? or as others, why do you drive me? and going out, Laert. some say, he immediately strangled himself; Suid. others, that by little and little he famish'd himself.

Laert. When the news of his death came to Antig [...]nus, he broke forth into these words, What a spectacle have I lost! and being de­manded why he so much admired him, because, said he, though I best owed many great things upon him, he was never therewith exalted nor dejected. He sent immediately Thraso on Embassie to the A­thenians, requesting, that they would build him a Tomb in the Ceramick, which the Athenians performed, honouring him with this Decree.

A DECREE.

ARrhenides being Archon, the Tribe of Acamantis having the first place in the Phrytanae [...]m, the tenth day of Maimacterion, the three and twentieth of the sitting of the Phrytanaeum, the Congregation of Presidents [Page 9] decreed thus, Hippo Son of Cratistoteles a Xympetean, and the rest of the Presidents, Thraso Son of Thraso, an Anacaean; declared;

Whereas Zeno Son of Mnaseas a Cittiean, hath professed Philosophy many years in this City, and in all other things performed the office of a good man, encouraging those young men, who applyed themselves to him, to Vertue and Tempe­rance, leading himself a life suitable to the Doctrine which he professed, a Pattern to the best to imitate; The People have thought fit (good Fortune go along with it) to do ho­nour to Zeno Son of Mnaseas the Cittiean, and to crown him with a Crown of Gold according to the Law, in reward of his Vertue and Temperance, and to build a Tomb for him publickly in the Ceramick. For, the making of which Crown, and building of the Tomb, the People shall make choice of five men of the Athenians to take charge thereof. This De­cree the Scribe of the People shall write upon two Pillars, one whereof shall be placed in the Academy, the other in the Lyceum. The charge of the Pillars, he who is Overseer of the Publick works shall undertake to defray, by way of rate, that all may know, the Athenian People honour good men both alive and dead. To take care of the building are ap­pointed, Thraso an Anacaean, Philocles, a Pyrean, Phae­drus, an Anaphistian, Medon, an Acarnean, Micythus a Sympalletean.

The Athenians caused likewise his Satue in Brasse to be set up, as did also the Cittieans his Countrymen. Antipater the Sidonian bestow'd this Epitaph upon him.

Here Zeno lies, who tall Olympus s [...]al'd,
Not heaping Pelion on Ossa's head,
Nor by Herculean labours so prevail'd,
But found out Vertue's path which thither led.

Another Epigram was written upon him by Xenodotus the Sto­ick, disciple of Diogenes.

Zeno thy years to hoary age were spent;
Not with vain riches, but with self-content:
[Page 10] A stout and constant Sect deriv'd from thee
The Mother of nought-dreading liberty:
Phoenicia, whence thou issuedst who can slight?
Thence Cadmus too, who first taught Greece to write.

CHAP. VII.
His Person and Vertues.

AS concerning his Person, Laert. Timotheus saith, he was wry­neck'd: Apollonius Tyrius, that he was lean, tall, and of a swarthy complexion, whence stil'd by some (as Chrysippus) the Aegyptian sprigge. Laert. His look was sad, grave, severe and frowning; his constitution not strong, for which reason Persaeus saith, he forbore to feast much. His ordinary diet consisted in raw food, especially Figgs, both new and dryed, bread and hony which he eate moderately, and a little sweet Wine.

His continence was such, Laert. that when Persaeus, who cohabited with him, brought a she-Minstrell to him, he immediately sent her back.

Notwithstanding his severity, Laert. he was very complaisant, and often feasted with King Antigonus, and meeting him sometimes drunk, went along with him to Aristocles the Musician, to nightly banquets and plaies.

Popular oftentation he avoided by sitting in the lowest place, Laert. whereby he freed himselfe from the troublesome importunity of the other part.

He never walked with more than two or three at once: Cl [...]anthes saith, Laert. he many times gave mony to people that they would not trouble him, & throng about him. Being on a certain time encom­passed by a great croud, he shewed them a wooden ball on the top of the cloyster, which formerly belonged to an Altar: This, saith he, was once placed in the niddle; but, because it is trou­blesome, it is now laid aside: I desire you would in like manner withdraw your selves, that you may be lesse troublesome.

He was so free from being corrupted by gifts, that Laert. De­mocharis son of Laches, desiring him to let him know what businesse he would have to Antigonus, promising to write about it, and assuring him, that Antigonus would furnish him with whatsoever he desired; he turned away from him, and would never after converse with him.

He was so humble, Laert. that he conversed with mean and ragged persons, whence Timon;

[Page 11]
And for companions gets of servants store,
Of all men the most empty and most poor.

He was most patient and frugall in his houshold expences, something enclining to the sordidnesse of the Barbarians. Laerti­us mentions one servant that he had, Seneca averrs he had none.

Whensoever he reprehended any, Laert. it was covertly and afar off, as may appear by many of his Apophthegms.

His habit was very mean, Laert. whence it was said of him,

Him nor the Winters rigid frost or rain,
The scorching Sun or sharp disease can pain:
Not like the common sort of people he;
But, day and night bent on Philosophy.

The Comick Poets unwittingly, intending to discommend him, praise him, as Philemon, in his Comedy of Philosophers,

He Water drinks, then Broth and Herbs doth eat▪
To live, his Schollers teaching, without meat.

This some ascribe to Posidippus.

His vertues were so eminent, that they grew at last into a Pro­verb, More continent then Zeno the Philosopher, whence Possidippus;

—He ere ten daies were spent,
Zeno in Continence out-went.

Indeed he excelled all men in this kind of Vertue, and in Gra­vity, and, by Iove (addeth Laertius) in Felicity likewise.

CHAP. VIII.
His Writings.

HE wrote many Bookes, wherein (faith Laertius) he so dis­coursed, as no Stoick after him: their Titles are these: Of Common-wealth, Laert. writen whilst he was an auditor of Crates, and (as De vit. Alex Orat. 1. Plutarch saith) much applauded, the scope whereof was this, That we should not live in severall Citties and Townes by distinct Lawes; but, that we should own all men as our Country-men and fellow-Cittisens: that there should be one manner of life and one order, as of one flock which grazeth by equall right in one pasture.

  • Of Appetite; or, Of human Nature.
  • Of Passions.
  • Of Office.
  • Of Law.
  • [Page 12] Of the Discipline of the Grecians.
  • Of sight.
  • Of the Universe.
  • Of signes.
  • Pythagor [...]cks.
  • Universalls.
  • Of words.
  • Homericall Problems 5.
  • Of hearing Poetry.
  • The Art.
  • Solutions.
  • Confutations.
  • Memorialls.
  • The Moralls of Crates.

Laert. Some, amongst whom is Casius a Sceptian, reprehended ma­ny things in the writings of Zeno: First, that in the beginning of his Common-wealth, he affirmeth the liberall Sciences to be of no use.

Again, that all wicked men are enemies among themselves, and slaves and strangers, as well Fathers to their Children, as Brethren to Brethren. Again, that only good men are Citisens, and Friends, and Kindred, and Children, as he affirmeth in his Book of the Common-wealth. So that according to the Stoicks, Parents should be ene­mies to their Children, because they are not wise.

That in his Common-wealth he would have Women to be in common.

That no Temples, Courts of Iudicature, nor publick Schooles, should be built in a Common-wealth.

That Mony is not necessary, neither for exchange nor traffick.

That Women should go in the same habit as men.

CHAP. IX.
His Disciples.

ZENO (saith Laertius) had many Disciples; the most emi­nent these:

PERSAEUS Son of Demetrius, Laert. a Cittiean; some affirm hee was Zeno's Scholer, others that he was one of the servants which were sent by Antigonus to Zeno to transcribe his writings; Athen: whence Bion seeing this inscription on his Statue, PERSEAEUS OF ZENO A CITTIEAN said, the Graver mistook, for instead of [...] he should have put [...], a servant.

Afterwards he returned to Antigonus King of Macedonia; An­tigonus to make a tryall of him caused a false report to be brought him, that his lands were spoiled by the Enemy; whereat [Page 13] ap­pearing troubl'd, Do you not see, saith Antigonus, that riches are not to be reckon'd amongst indifferent things?

Antigonus so much favour'd him, that he preferr'd him to the government of Acrocorinthus; on which Fort depended not only Corinth, but all Peloponnesus; in this charge he was unfortunate; for the Castle was taken by the cunning of Aratus a Sicyonian ( Deipn. Athenaeus saith, whilst Perfaeus was feasting) who turned out Persaeus, whereupon afterwards to one that maintained onely a wise man is a Governour: and I saith he, was once of the same mind, being so taught by Zeno, but now am of another opinion; the Sicyonian young man (meaning Aratus) hath taught me otherwise; Thus Plu­tarch; But Pausanias saith, that Aratus upon taking of the Fort, amongst others put Persaeus the Governour to death.

He said, C [...]. that those were esteemed Gods who had invented some things very usefull to humane life.

He wrote these Books; Of a Kingdom; The Lacedaemonian Com­monwealth; of marriage; of impiety; Thyestes; Of Love, Protrepticks, Exercitations; Chryas, 4. Commentaries; against Plato's Laws 7. Athen. Deipn. Symposiack Dialogues.

ARISTO Son of Miltiades, a Chian, sirnamed the Siren: when Zeno fell into a long sicknesse, he left him, and went (as Diocles saith) to Polemo: He was also a follower of Persaeus, whom he flatter'd much, because of his favour with Antigonus; for hee was much given to pleasure even unto his end; Thus revolting from his Master Zeno, he asserted,

That the end consists in those mean things which are betwixt virtue and vice, that is, in indifference; not to be moved on either side, nor to imagine the least difference to be in these things, but that they are all alike; For a wise man is like a good Player, who whether he personate Agamemnon or Thersides, Cic. Acad. quast. 4. will act either part very well: Thus he took away the dignity which Zeno held to be in these mean things betwixt virtue and vice; Cic. de finib. 4. holding that there is no difference in them.

He took away Physick and Logick, affirming that one is above us, the other appertaines nothing to us; Ethick onely appertaines to us; he compared Dialectick reason to cobwebs, which though they seem artificiall, yet are of no use.

He introduced not on any virtues as Zeno, nor one called by severall names as the Megarick Philosophers, but affirmed they have a quodammodotative relation to one another.

Professing these tene [...]s, and disputing in Cunosarges, he came to be called Author of a Sect; whence Milciades and Diphilus were called Aristonians.

He was very perswasive, and wrought much upon the com­mon people, whence Timon in Sillis,

One of Aristo's smooth perswasive race.

He defended eagerly this Paradox of the Stoicks, that a wise [Page 14] man doth not opinionate, but know, which Persaeus opposing, caused of two like twins, first, one to give a depositum to him, then the other to come and redemand it, and by his doubting, if it were the same person, convinced him.

He inveigh'd against Arcesilaus, [ Laert: vit. Arces. calling him a corrupter of youth.] On a time, seeing a Monster like a Bull, but of both sex­es, he said, Alas! here is an argument for Arcesilaus against ener­gy. To an Academick who said, he comprehended nothing, Do you not see (saith he) him who sitteth next you? which he denying,

Who struck you blinde, saith he, or took your light away?

He wrote these Treatises, Protrepticks 2. of Zeno's Doctrine Scholastick Dialogues 6. of Wisdome dissertations 7. Erotick dissertations: Commentaries upon vain-glory: Commentaries 15. Memorialls 3. Chrias 11. against Oratours: against Alexinus his oppositions: to the Dialecticks 3. to Cleanthes Epistles 4. But Panaetius and Sosicrates affirm the Epistles only to be his, the rest to be Aristo's the Peri­patetick.

The Sun striking hot upon his head (which was bald) occasi­on'd his death. There was another of the same name, a Juliite, a Peripatetick; another an Athenian, a Musician; a fourth a Tra­gick Poet; a fift an Alaean, who writ the Rhetoricall art; a sixt of Alexandria, a Peripatetick.

ERILLUS (or as Cicero, Laert. Herillus) was a Carthaginian: when he was a boy, he was loved and courted by many, which Zeno, by causing him to be shaved, diverted.

He held, that the end is science, which is to live so, as to re­fer all things to Science, joyned with life: That Science is a habit susceptive of phantasies, falling under reason.

Yet, sometimes he said, there is no end; but, that the end it selfe is changed by the things, and those which are joyned to the things, as Brasse, of which the Statues of Alexander or Socra­tes is made.

That [...] the end, and [...] differ; one is objected to un­wise persons as well as wise, the other to wise only.

Those things which are betwixt vertue and vice are indiffe­rents.

His Bookes are written in a short stile, consisting of few words, but very efficacious, wherein is contain'd what he held contrary to Zeno.

His writings these, of Exercitation, of Passion, of Suspition, the Law-giver, Majeutick, Antipheron, the Master, the Prepa­rative, the Directive, Hermes, Medea, Dialogues, morall Theses.

His Disciples were called Herilians, named by Cicero as a par­ticular Sect amongst the Socraticks.

DIONYSIUS, son of Theophantus, Laert. an Heracleot, from the change of his opinion sirnamed [...], the retractor. He was [Page 15] from the beginning studiously addicted to learning, and writ Poems of all kinds; then betook himselfe to Aratus, being much pleased with him. Of Philosophers he first heard, as Diocles af­firmes, Heraclides his country-man; then Alexinus, and Menede­mus; after these Zeno.

Revolting from Zeno, he addicted himselfe to the Cyrenaeans; he went to common houses, and addicted himselfe to other pleasures.

He asserted the end to be pleasure, and that by reason of his own purblindnesse; for being much grieved thereat, he durst not affirm griefe to be one of the indifferents.

He died eighty years old, starved.

His writings are thus intitled, Of apathy 2. of riches and favour and punishment, of the use of men, of good fortune, of the Kings of the antients, of things that are praised, of the customes of the Barbarians.

SPHAERUS was of Bosphorus, he first heard Zeno, then Cleanthes, and having made a sufficient progresse in learning, went to A­lexandria to Ptolomy Philopater, where there arising a dispute, whether a wise man doth opinionate, and Sphaerus maintaining that he doth not, the King commanded some Quinces, Athenaeus saith Birds, of wax to be set before him, wherewith Sphaerus being cosen'd, the King cried out, that he assented to a false phantasy: Sphaerus presently answered, that he assented not that they were quinces, but that it was probable they were quinces: but comprehensive phantasie differs from probable; Athen. for that is never false, but in probable matters sometimes a thing falleth out otherwise than we imagined.

Laert. Mnesistratus accusing him, that he denyed Ptolomy to be King, he answered, that he thought Ptolomy, or such a one was King.

His writings are these: Of the world, of the seed of Elements, of fortune, of leasts, against atomes and apparitions, of the organs of sense, upon Heraclitus five dissertations; of morall description, of office, of appetite, of passions 2. dissertations of a Kingdome; of the Lacedemoni­an Common-wealth, of Lycurgus and Socrates 3. of Law, of Divina­tion, Erotick Dialogues, of the Eretriack Philosophers, of things like, of definitions, of habit, of contraries 3. of reason, of riches, of glory, of death, of the art of Dialectick 2. of categorems, of ambiguities, Epistles.

CLEANTHES, whom Zeno compared to writing tables, that are so hard, they will not easily admit an impression; but ha­ving once received it, keep it long. He succeeded Zeno, of him therefore apart.

Philon, a Theban.

Callippus, a Corinthian.

Possidonius, an Alexandrian.

Athenodorus of Soli; there were two more of the same name, Stoicks.

Zeno, a S [...]donian.

Last in the Catalogue of his Disciples must be remembred [Page 16] an Eretrian youth (mention'd by Ethic. Serm. 198. Stobaeus) who heard Zeno till he came to be a man; then returning to Eretria, his Father asked him what he had learn'd all that time, he answered, he would shortly let him see, and did so; for, not long after his Father in anger did beat him, which he took quietly, saying, This I have learn'd, to bear with the anger of a Father, and not to oppose it.

In the life of Zeno (for as much as he is author of that Sect) it will be requisite to give account of the Doctrine of the Stoicks in generall; wherein, if the terms seem harshly rendred, it will easily be forgiven by those, who consider, the Stoicks were no lesse particular in their words, then in their doctrines.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE STOICKS.
The First PART.

CHAP. I.
Of PHILOSOPHY in generall, and particularly of DIALECTICK.

Plut. de plac. Phil. 1. 1. WISDOME is the Science of things divine and humane; Philosophy is the exercitation of convenient Art: Conve­nient is only and supream vertue. Of Vertues in the most generall sence there are three kinds, Naturall, Morall, Rationall; for which cause Philosophy likewise hath three parts, Physick, E­thick, Logick: Physick, when we enquire concerning the World, and the things in the world: Ethick is employ'd about humane life: Logick is that part which concerns reason, which is also called Dialectick. Laert. Thus Zeno the Cittiean first divided it in his book of Speech, and Chrysippus in his first book of Speech, and in his first of Physicks; and Apollodorus Ephillus in his first book of Introductions into Doctrines; and Eudromus in his morall Institutions; and Diogenes the Babylonian, and Possidonius. These parts Apol­lodorus calleth Places; C [...]rysippus and Eudromus species, others ge­nus's.

That Logick is a part of Philosophy distinct from the rest, [Page 17] (wherein all the Stoicks agree) is proved by two arguments [...] the first this: Ammonius in Categ. Every thing which useth another; if that which the thing using, useth, be neither part nor particle, nor part of part of any other, it must be part or particle of the thing using; as medicine useth the art of prescribing diet, which art being neither part nor particle of any other, is consequently a part or particle of Medicine; of part, as to the cure, of particle, as to the practise.

Philop. in lib. 1. Anal. prior. Philosophy; is conversant about Logick; Logick therefore is either a part or particle of Philosophy; but, a particle it is not, for it is not a part either of the Contemplative or the Active. That which is a particle of any thing, ought to have the same matter and scope, with that whereof it is a part: Logick hath neither of these common with Active Philosophy; the matter whereof is humane things, and moderation of Appetite, the common scope, what in them is to be embraced or shunned: but, the matter of Logick is propositions, the scope, to demonstrate by a composure of propositions, that which necessarily falls out upon the collection. Neither is Logick a part of the Contem­plative, the matter whereof is things divine, the end, contem­plation of them: now, if it be not a part, either of the Contem­plative or the Active, it is not a particle of Philosophy, but e­qually separate from both these, and consequently it must be a part of it.

Ammonius in Categor. The second Argument is thus. No Art frameth its own In­struments, if therefore Philosophy make Logick, it is not its In­strument, but part thereof.

Sext. Empir. adv. Log. 1. Philosophy, is by some compared to a field which produceth all manner of fruit; Physick to the soil and tall trees, Ethick to to the mature pleasant fruit, Logick to the strong fence. Others liken it to an Egge; Ethick to the yolk, which some affirm to bee the Chicken; Physick to the white, which is the nourishment of the Chicken; Logick to the outside or shell, Possidonius, (because the parts of Philosophy are inseparable from one another, but plants are distinct from the fruits, as walls from hedges) chuseth rather to compare Philosophy to a living creature, Physick to blood and flesh, Logick, to bones and nerves, Ethick to the soul. (Thus Sextus Empiricus, by whom, perhaps, Laertius is to be corrected, who saith, They likened Ethick to the Flesh, Physick to the Soul) Lastly, they compare Philosophy to a City, well fortified and govern'd according to Reason.

Laert. Some affirm, that none of these parts are distinct from the rest, but, all intermingled with one another, for which reason, they deliver them confusedly. The greater part place Logick first, Ethick next, Physick last; because the minde ought first to be fortified for the keeping of those things which are committed to it; so, as it be not easily expugnable. The Dialectick place is [Page 18] a fortification for the minde. Secondly, to describe the contem­plation of manners, that they may be reformed, which is safely undertaken, when the Logicall power is first laid down. Lastly, to induce the contemplation of Nature, for that is more divine, and requireth a more profound attention. This method De plac. Phil. Pit­tarch affirmes to have been observed by Chrysippus, adding that of Physick, the last part, is that which treateth of God; for which reason they call the precepts of Religion [...] It seemes therefore, that there is some mistake in Laertius, who of those who place Logick first, Physick next, and Ethick next, and Ethick last, citeth Zeno in his Book of Speech, and Chrysippus, and Archedemus, and Ea­dromus. But Diogenes the Ptolemaean (continueth he) begins with Ethick: Apollodorus puts Ethick in the second place; Panaetius and Possidonius begin with Physick, as Phanias, companion of Possidonius affirms, in his first of Possidonius's dissertations.

Laert. Of Logick, Cleanthes assigneth six parts, Dialectick, Rhetorick, Ethick, Politick, Physick, Theologick: Some affirm, these are not parts of Logick, but of Philosophy it selfe: so Zeno of Tursis. The Logicall part is by some divided into two Sciences, Rhetorick and Dialectick; some add the definitive part, some divide the definitive part into that which concernes invention of truth (by which the differences of Phantasies are directed) and that which concernes knowledge of truth; for things are comprehended by notions.

Laert. Rhetorick is the science of well speaking, by dilating upon the thing comprehended. Dialectick is the science of well speaking, (that is true and consentaneous) or well disputing by question and answer. It is defined by Possidonius, the science of true, false, and neuter.

Laert. Rhetorick is of three kinds, deliberative, judiciall, demonstra­tive: The parts of Rhetorick are Invention, Stile, Disposition, Pro­nunciation: Rhetoricall Speech is divided into Proem, Narration, Confutation, Epilogue.

Laert. Dialectick is necessary, and a virtue within its species, con­taining other vertues; [...], a Science whereby we are taught when to assent, and when not; [...], a firm reason, whereby we resist appearances, and are not led away by them: [...], a fortitude of reason, which keeps us from being tran­sported with the adverse opinion: [...], a habit directing phantasies to right reason.

Laert. Dialectick is a Science or certain comprehension, or a habit, not erring by reason in reception of phantasies; but, without Dialectick, a wise man cannot be infallible in reason; for by this, we discern the true, false, and probable, and distinguish the ambiguous.

CHAP. II.
Of the Instruments and rules of Iudgment.

Laert. IN the first place, they put the discourse concerning phanta­sies and sence, as a Judicatory, whereby the truth of things is discerned.

Cic. Acad. 1. The Senses (according to Zeno, who made many alterations in Dialectick, and asserted many things of the Sences that were wholly new) are joyned by a certain kinde of extrinsecall impul­sion, termed Phantasy. To these phantasies received by the senses, is added an assention of the minde, which is placed in us volunta­ry. The phantasie, when seen, is comprehensible; when received and approved, comprehension, and, if so comprehended, as that it cannot be plucked away by reason, Science.

Galen. hist. phil. Judgment is a perspection which discerneth a thing.

Sen. Empir. adv. log. That which judgeth is taken two waies: 1. By which we say, somethings are, others are not, these are true, those are false. 2. Of Essence only; and this is understood three waies, commonly, properly, and most properly. Commonly, for every measure of comprehension, in which sense, even those things which judge naturally, have this appellation, as sight, hearing, tast. Properly, for every artificiall measure of comprehension; thus a cubit, a ballance, a ruler, a pair of compasses, are called things that judge; but sight, and hearing, and the other common instruments of sense, are not. Most properly, for every measure of comprehension of a thing, uncertain, and not evident. In which sence, those things which belong to the actions of life, are not said to be things judging, but the logicall only, and those which dogmaticall Philosophers alledge for the invention of truth.

The Logicall is subdivided into that from which, that by which, and the application or habitude. From which, the man; by which, the sense: the third is the application of phantasie or sight. For as in the Staticks, there are three things which judge, the weigh­er, the ballance, and position of the ballance: The weigher is the judge from which, the ballance the judge by which, the position of the ballance, as it were a habitude. And again, as to discern right or oblique things is required, an Artificer, a Ruler, and the application thereof; in like manner in Philosophy are required those three things mentioned to the discernment of true and false: the man from whom the judgment is made, is like the weigher or artificer; to the ballance and ruler answer sense and cogitation, by which the judgment is made; to the habitude of the forenamed instruments, the application of phantasy, by which a man commeth to judge.

Laert. The Iudge of truth, they affirm to be comprehensive phantasy, [Page 20] that is, proceeding from that which is: so Chrysippus in the 12 th of his Physicks, and Antipator, and Apollodorus. But Boethus holds many judicatories, the minde, and sence, and appetite, and science; from whom Chrysippus dissenting in his first Book of Reason, af­firmeth the Judicatories to be Sense and Anticipation. Anticipa­tion is a naturall notion of Universalls. Others of the more anti­ent Stoicks (as Possidonius saith in his Book of Iudgments) assert right reason to be the Judicatory.

CHAP. III.
Of Sense.

St. Aug. Civil. dci. 8. 7. DIalectick is derived from corporeall senses; for, from thence, the soul conceiveth notions ( [...]) of those things which are explained by definition, and from thence is propaga­ted and connexed the whole reason of Learning and Teaching.

Laert. Sense is a spirit, proceeding from the supream part of the Soul, and permeating to the Organs.

Origen contra. Cels. lib. 7. Whatsoever things are comprehended, are manifestly com­prehended by sense; all conceptions of the minde depend upon sense.

Cic. Acad. qu [...]st. 1. Comprehension made by the senses is true and faithfull, (ac­cording to Zeno) for as much as nature hath given it as a rule for science, and principle of her selfe.

Cic. Acad. qu [...]st. 4. Nothing is more clear then this [...] evidence; there can­not be any speech more perspicuous.

Sext. Empir. pyrrh. hyp. 2. 8. Of Sensibles and Intelligibles, some are true, but, not dire­ctly sensible; but, by relation to those things which are next, as falling under Intelligence.

CHAP. IV.
Of Phantasy.

In the first place (saith Laert. Diocles the Magnesian) they put the reason concerning Phantasie and Sense, as a judgment, whereby the truth of things is discerned. It is phantasie as to its genus, and likewise in as much as the reason of assent, comprehension, and intelligence (which is more excellent then the rest) consists not without Phantasy; for phantasy goeth first, then the minde endued with elocution, declareth by words what it suffers from the phantasy.

Plut. plac. Phil. 4. 12. Phantasy is so called from [...], light; for as light sheweth it selfe, and with it selfe all those things which are contained [Page 21] within it; so phantasy sheweth it selfe, and that which maketh it.

Sext. Empir. Pyrrh. hyp. lib. 2. Phantasy is an impression in the Soul: Cleanthes addes, an im­pression by depression and eminence, as that impression, which is made in Wax by a Seal.

Chrysippus conceives this to be absurd; for 1. saith he, When the soule first apprehends a triangle and a square, it will follow, that the same body, at the same time, must have in it selfe seve­rall figures, which is absurd. Again, whereas many phantasies are together consistent in us, the Soul must have divers figures, which is worse then the former: He therefore conceived, that Zeno used the word Impression, for Alteration, meaning thus: Fantasy is an alteration of the Soul, whereby it is no longer ab­surd, that the same body (many severall phantasies being at the same time consistent in us) should receive severall alterations. For, as the aire receiving at once innumerable different percus­sions, hath presently many alterations; so the supream part of the soule, receiving various phantasies, doth something which hath proportion and conformity thereto.

Some object that this exposition is not right; because, though every phantasy is an impression and alteration in the Soul; yet, every impression or alteration of the Soul is not phantasy: as when the finger smarts or itches, and the hand is rubbed, there is then an impression and alteration in the soul; but it is not phantasy, because it is not in the supream part of the soul.

They answer, That in saying, an impression in the Soul, is im­plyed as in the Soul as fully, as if we should say, phantasy is an impression in the Soul as in the Soul; as when we say, the white in the eye, we imply, as in the eye; that is, the white is in a cer­tain part of the eye, which all men have so by nature. So when we say, Phantasy is an impression in the Soul, we imply the im­pression to be made in the supream part thereof.

Others more elegantly answer, that the word Soul is taken two waies, either for the whole, or for the principall part: when we say, man consists of soul and body; or, that death is a separa­tion of the soul from the body, we mean properly the supream part, wherein properly consists the motion and goods of the Soul. When Ze [...]o therefore calleth Phantasy an impression in the Soul, he is not to be understood of the whole Soul, but, of part thereof; as if he should say, Phantasy is an alteration of the supream part of the Soul.

To this interpretation, some object thus: Appetition, Assen­tion, and Comprehension are alterations in the supream part of the soul; but, these differ from phantasy, that being a certain kinde of perswasion and affection, whereas this is more operati­on then appetition, therefore the definition is not good, being competible to many other things.

[Page 22] They answer by recourse to [...] ( impliances) that a defi­nition is understood to be in all. As he who saith, Love is an application of the Soul towards procurement of Friendship, im­plyeth amongst young people; so when we say, that phantasy is an alteration in the supream part of the soul, we imply by per­swasion; for, alteration is not made by operation.

Laert. Of Phantasies there are many kinds, some are sensible, others not-sensible. Sensible are those which are received through one or more of the sences: Not-sensible are those which are received through the minde, as of incorporealls, and other things com­prehended by reason. The sensible formed from things that are, are made with concession and assent. There are also apparitions of phantasies, proceeding from things which are.

Again, some are rationall, others irrationall; rationall, those of reasonable creatures; irrationall, those of unreasonable. The ra­tionall are intelligence, the irrationall have no name.

Again, some are artificiall, others in-artificiall; for, an Image is considered by an Artist one way, by him that is not an artist ano­ther way.

Sext. Empir. Pyrrh. hyp. lib. 2. Again, some are probable, some improbable: The probable are those which make an easie motion in the soul; as, It is now day, I discourse, and the like. The Improbable are of a contrary na­ture, averting us from assent; as, it is day, the Sun is not above the earth; if it is dark, it is day. Both probable and improbable are those, which, by relation to other things, are sometimes such, as in doubtfull speeches, neither probable nor improbable are such, as these, The staires are even, the staires are odd.

Of probable and improbable Phantasies, some are true, some are false, some are neither true nor false. True are those, whose predication is true, as, It is day, 'tis light: False, whose predica­tion is false; Both true and false, as happened to Orestes in his mad­nesse, meeting Electra; that he met something, it was true, for it was Electra; but, that it was a fury, was false. Neither true nor false are those which are taken from the Genus; for the Genus is not such as the Species in all respects: as, of men, some are Grecians, some are Barbarous; but, man in generall is not Gre­cian, for then all men must be Grecians, neither barbarous, for the same reason.

Of true Phantasies, some are comprehensive, others are not-comprehensive. Not-comprehensive are those which happen through sicknesse, or perturbation of minde; many being troubled with frenzie or melancholly, attract a true phantasy which is not comprehensive, even from that which extrinsecally occurrs ca­sually, for which reason, they neither assert it often, nor assent unto it. Comprehensive phantasie is that which is impressed and signed by that which is, and conformable to that which is, so as it cannot be of that which is not.

[Page 23] To comprehensive phantasie three conditions are requisite▪ 1. That it arise from that which is; for many phantasies arise from that which is not, as in mad men. 2. That it be conforma­ble to that which is; for some phantasies are from that which is, but represents the similitude of that which is not: as Orestes de­rived a phantasie from that which was, viz. from Electra, but not according to that which was; for he thought her to be one of the furies. Comprehensive phantasie must be conformable to that which is, and so impressed and signed, as that it may im­print artificially all the properties of the thing phancied, as Gravers touch all the parts of those things which they imitate, and the impression made by a Seal on Wax exactly and per­fectly beareth all its characters. Lastly, that it be without im­pediment; for sometimes comprehensive phantasie is not credi­table, by reason of outward circumstances; as when Hercules brought Alcestis taken out of the Earth, to Admetus, Admetus drew from Alcestis a comprehensive phantasie, but did not cre­dit it; for, he consider'd, that she was dead, and therefore could not rise again, but, that sometimes Spirits appear in the shape of the deceased.

Plut. plac. Phil. 4. 12. Phantasy, Phantaston, Phantasticon, and Phantasme, according to Chrysippus, differ thus: Phantasy is a passion made in the Soul, which sheweth it selfe, and that which made it; as, when with our eyes we see white, it is a passion engendred by sight in the Soul, and we may call this a passion, because the object thereof is a white thing which moveth us: the like of smelling and touching.

Phantaston is that which maketh phantasie; as the white and the cold, and whatsoever is able to move the Soul, that is phan­taston.

Phantasticon is a frustaneous attraction, a passion in the Soul proceeding from nothing; as in those who sight with shadowes, or extend their hands in vain: for, to phantasy is objected phan­taston, but phantasticon hath no object.

Phantasme is that, to which we are attracted by that frustra­neous attraction, which happens in melancholy, or mad persons; as Orestes in the Tragedy, when he saith,

Bring hither, Mother, I implore,
These snakie bloodie Maids no more,
Whose very lookes wound me all o're.

This he saith in his madnesse, for he saw nothing: wherefore Electra answers him,

Ah quiet in thy bed (unhappy) lie:
Thou seest not what thou thinkst before thy eye.

CHAP. V.
Of True and Truth.

St. Aug. con­tra Acad. lib. 2. TRUE (according to Zeno) is that which is impressed in the minde from that whence it is, in such manner, as it cannot be from that which is not: or, as others, Sext. Empir. Pyrrh. hyp. 2. 8. True is that which is, and is opposed to something: False is that which is not; yet, is opposed to something also.

Truth and true differ three waies, by Essence, by Constitution, by Power. By Essence, for truth is a body; but, true is incorporeall, for it is a dicible [...], and therefore incorporeall. On the con­trary, Truth is a body, as being the enunciative Science of all true things. All Science is in some measure the supream part of the Soul, which supream part is a body: therefore truth in ge­nerall is corporeall.

By Constitution; True is conceived to be something uniforme and simple by nature; as, It is day, I discourse. Truth, as being a Science, consisteth of many things, by a kinde of conservation. Wherefore as a People is one thing, a Citizen another; a Peo­ple is a multitude consisting of many Citizens; but, a Citizen is no more then one. In the same manner differeth truth from true. Truth resembleth a People, true a Cittizen; for, truth consisteth of many things collected, true is simple.

By Power; for true doth not absolutely adhere to truth: A fool, a child, a mad-man, may speak something true, but, cannot have the Science of that which is true. Truth considers things with Science, insomuch that he who hath it is wise; for, he hath the Science of true things, and is never deceived, nor lyeth, although he speak false, because it proceedeth not from an ill, but, good affection.

CHAP. VI.
Of Comprehension.

Cic. Acad. quaest. 1. COmprehension ( [...]) was first used in this sence by Zeno, by a metaphor taken from things apprehended by the hand; Cicer. Acad. quaest 4. which allusion he exprest by action. For, shewing his hand with the fingers stretched forth, he said, such was Phantasy: then bending them a little, said, such was Assent; then compressing them, and clutching his fist, such was Comprehen­sion.

Galen. Hist. phil. Comprehension is a firm and true knowledge, non-compre­hension the contrary; for some things we only think that we [Page 25] see, hear, or feel, as in dreams and frenzies; other things we not only think, but, truly do see, or hear, or feel. These latter, all (but the Academicks and Scepticks) conceive to fall under firm knowledge, the other, which we imagine in dreams or frenzy are false.

Sext. Empir. adv. Geom. cap. 19. Whatsoever is understood, is comprehended by the minde, one of these two waies, either by evident incursion (which Laer­tius calls by sense) or by transition from evidence (Laertius, collecti­on by demonstration) of which latter there are three kinds, by Assimilation, by Composition, by Analogy.

By incurrent evidence is understood white and black, sweet and soure.

By Transition, from evidents: by Assimilation is understood So­crates by his Picture: by Composition, as of a horse and a man is made a Centaure; for putting together the limbes proper to both species, we comprehend by phantasy that which was neither horse nor man, but a Centaur compounded of both.

By Analogy, things are understood two waies; either by aug­mentation; or, when from common ordinary men, we by aug­mentation phansy a Cyclops, who not like

Men that with Cares gifts are fed:
But, some tall hill erects his head.

Or by Diminution, as a Pigmey. Laert. Likewise the Center of the earth is understood by analogy from lesser Globes.

To these kinds add, Laert. Comprehension by transference, as eyes in the breast; by contrariety, as death; by transference, as dicibles and place; by privation, as a man without hands; just and good are understood naturally.

CHAP. VII.
Of Assent.

Cic. Acad. qu [...]st. 4. THese things being enough known, which we have already explained, let us now speake a little of Assent, and appro­bation, termed [...], not that is not a large place, but the grounds thereof have been already laid: For when we explai­ned the power that was in the senses, we likewise declared, that many things were comprehended and perceived by the senses, which cannot be done without Assent. Moreover, seeing that be­twixt an inanimate and an animate being, the greatest difference is, that the inanimate doth nothing, the animate doth something, we must either take away sense from it, or allow it assent, which is within our power. When we will not have a thing either to [Page 26] perceive or assent, we in a manner take away the soule from it; for as it is necessary, that the scale of ballance which is laden should tend downwards; so is it that the soule should yeeld to things that are perspicuous.

Cic. lib. d. Fa­to. Although assent cannot bee made unlesse it bee moved by Phantasie, yet when that phantasy hath an immediate cause, it hath not (according to Chrysippus) this principall reason, not that it can be made without any extrinsecall excitation (for it is ne­cessary that assent be moved by phantasie) but it returnes to its Cylinder and Cone, which move not by impulsion, then of their owne nature, the Cylinder seemes to rowle, and the Cone to turne round. As therefore he who thrust the Cylinder gave it the beginning of motion, but did not give it volubility; so the objected phantasy imprinteth, and as it were sealeth in the soule its species, yet the assent is in our power, and that (as we said in a Cylinder) extrinsecally impelled, the motion is conti­nued by its own power and nature.

Agell. 19. 9. and from him St. August. Ci­vit. dei. 9. 4. Phantasies, wherewith the mind of man is presently affected, are not voluntary or in our own power, but inferre themselves by a kind of violence, approbations ( [...]) by which these phantasies are knowne and judged, are voluntary, and made ac­cording to our arbitrement. So as upon any dreadfull noyse from heaven, or by the fall of any thing, or sudden newes of some dan­ger or the like; it is necessary that the minde of a wise man bee a little moved, and contracted, and appalled, not through op­nion perceived of any ill, but certaine rapid and inconsiderate motions, which praevert the office of the mind and reason. But presently the same wise man approveth not [...], those dreadfull phantasies, that is, [...]. but rejects and refuses them, nor is there any thing in these which seemeth to him dreadfull. Thus differs the soules of wise and unwise men: The unwise, when phantasies appeare cruell and difficult at the first impulsion of the mind, thinke them to be tru­ly such as they appeare, and receiving them as if they were just­ly to be feared, approve them by their assent, [...], (this word the Stoicks use vpon this occasion:) But a wise man sudden­ly changing colour and countenance, [...], assents not, but retaineth the state and vigour of his judgment, which he al­waies had of these phantasies, as nothing dreadfull, but terrify­ing only with a false shew, and vain fear.

CHAP. VIII.
Of Notions.

Cic. Acad. 1. FRom Sense, the rule of Science, Notions are imprinted in the Soul, by which, not only principles, but larger waies to reason are found out.

Plut. de plac. Phil. 4. 11. A man when he is born, hath the supream part of his Soul, like unto clean paper, upon which every notion is inscribed. The first manner of inscription is by the Senses; as for example: They who perceive a thing that is white, after it is taken away, retain the memory thereof; but, when they have conceived ma­ny remembrances of one species, then they say, they have ex­perience, for experience is a multitude of similitudes.

Of Notions, some are naturall, which are in such manner as we we have said, and without Art: Others gained by learning and industry: These are properly called Notions, the other Anticipa­tions. The reason for which we are called rationall, is said to be perfected by anticipations in the first seven years.

Intelligence is the phantasme of the intellect of a rationall creature; for phantasm, when it lighteth upon a rationall Soul, is then called [...], Intelligence, a word taken from the In­tellect. For, to other Creatures there happen not phantasmes, to the Gods only and to us these are incident. Those which belong to us, are Phantasmes, as to their genus, Notions, as to their species; as denaries and staters, when paid for transportation, are called Naula.

Arrian. 1. 22. Common notions are planted in all men, (in which they all agree together) one is not repugnant to another; for, who holds not, that good is profitable, and ought to be chosen with ut­most endeavours? Who holds not, that what is just, is fair and well-beseeming? Whence then proceed contentions and diffe­rences? to wit, from the application of first notions to singular things.

Simp. in Epict. These Notions, and whatsoever is of this kinde, which right reason conformeth in us, being long examined, are true, and suitable to the natures of things.

CHAP. IX.
Of Science and Opinion;

Cicer. Acad. qu [...]st. 1. THat which is comprehended by Sense, Zeno call'd Sense, and if so comprehended, as not to be plucked away by reason, Science, otherwise Ignorance; from which proceedeth [Page 28] Opinion, which is weak and common, to the false and unknown.

Sext. Emp. adv. Logic. 1. These three are joyned together, Science, Opinion, and Comprehension, which borders upon the other two. Science is a firme, stable, immutable comprehension with reason: Opinion, an infirm, weak, assent: Comprehension, which commeth be­tween both, is an assent to comprehensive phantasy. Compre­hensive phantasy is true, in such manner, that it cannot be false. Therefore Science is in wise men only, Opinion in fooles, Com­prehension is common to both, as being that by which truth is judged; Cicer. Acad. quaest. 1. and is for this reason reckon'd by Zeno, neither a­mongst the right ( [...]) nor amongst the bad ( [...]) but betwixt science and ignorance, affirming, that this only is to be credited.

CHAP. X.
Of Voice, Speech, and Words.

Sext. Emp. adv. L [...]g. cap. de vero. These three are joyned to one another; that which is sig­nified, that which signifieth, and the contingent. That which signifieth is the voice, as Dion: That which is signified, is the thing it selfe declared by the voice; it is that which we ap­prehend, and is present in our cogitation. The contingent is the outward subject, as, Dion himselfe.

Laert. Dialectick being conversant about that which signifieth, and that which is signified, Laert. is divided into two places: one, of Significats; the other of Voice. The place of significats is divided into phantasies, and subsistents on phantasie, dicibles, axioms, &c.

In the other place, concerning Voice, is declared literall Voice, the parts of speech, the nature of Solaecisms and Barbarisms, Poems, Ambiguities, Song, Musick, and (according to some) definitions and divisions.

Laert. The phantasies of the minde precede speech, ( Of these there­fore we have already treated) then the minde endued with the faculty of speaking, declareth by speech what it receiveth from the phantasie; For this reason, Laert. the consideration of Dialectick, by the joynt consent of all, seemes as if it ought to be first taken from the place of voice.

Laert. Voice is aire percussed, the proper sensible object of hearing, (as Diogenes the Babylonian, in his Art of Voyce.) The voice of a living sensitive creature, is aire percussed with appetite; the voice of man is articulate, proceeding from the minde: at his four teenth year it is perfected.

Speech (as Laert. Diogenes saith) is a literate voice; as, It is day. Word is a significative voice, proceeding from the minde. Lan­guage is a speech according to the variety of Nations, whereof [Page 29] each useth its peculiar dialect; as the Attick saith, [...], the Ionick [...] Voice and Speech differ, in that voice is a sound, but speech articulate only. Speech and Word differ; for word is al­waies significative; but, speech sometimes signifieth nothing, as Blitri, which is no word. To speak and to pronounce differ: voices are pronounced, but things only are spoken: Sext. Emp. adv. Leg. cap. de vero. for, to speak is to pronounce a significant voice of a thing that is said.

Varro de ling. lat. lib. 5. Hence Chrysippus saith, that he who beginneth to speak and pronounce words, before he can put them in their right place, doth not speak, but thinketh that he speaks; as, the Image of a man is not a man: so in Crowes, Dawes, and Children, when they first begin to speak, the words which they say are not words. He only speaketh, who knoweth to put a word in the right place.

They (particularly Cicero. Zeno) Dionys. Halic. took much pains in the invention and expli [...]ation of words, Hieronym. wherein they distinguished very subtlely. Hence Cicero calleth the Stoicks Architects of words. Ammonius, the Grammarians, followers of the Stoicks.

Laert. The Elemen [...]s of speech are the 24 Letters. Letter is taken three waies: First, for the character of figure which is formed. Secondly, for the element or power: Thirdly, for the name, as A. Of the Elements, seven are Vowels [...] six Mutes, [...]

Laert. Of speech there are five parts, as Diogenes saith in his Book of Voice, and Chrysippus ( Dionys. Halic. at first they reckon'd but foure, separa­ting the Articles from the Conjunctions, afterwards the latter Stoicks, dividing the Appellatives from the Nounes, made them five) Noun, Appellation, Verb, Conjunction, Article. (Antipater in his Book of Speech added the medium) Appellation (as Diogenes saith) is a part of speech signifying a common quality; as, Man, Horse. Noune a part of speech denoting a proper quality; as Di­ogenes, Socrates. Verbe (as Diogenes saith) a part of speech signi­fying a thing, which is predicated of one or more things, in­composed; or, as some say, an Element of speech without cases, whereby the parts of speech are connected; as, I write, I speak. Conjunction is a part of speech without cases, conjoyning the parts of speech. Article is an element of speech, having cases; distinguishing the kinds and numbers of Nounes; as, [...]

S. August [...] de Dialect. cap. 6. Every word, by reason of that which it signifieth, calleth foure necessary things into question, its origine, power, declination, ordination.

As concerning the first, which the Greeks call [...], they conceived, that names were given by nature: the first pronoun­ced voices, imitating the things themselves, from which the names were afterwards imposed, by wh [...]ch reason, they derive Etymologies, conceiving that there is not any word, for which [Page 30] there cannot be given a certain reason. They therefore studious­ly enquired whence words are deduced, much pains was taken, first, by Zeno, then by Cleanthes, afterwards by Chrysippus, to give a reason of commentitious fables, and to explain the causes of words, why they are called so and so.

This beginning is to be sought, untill we arrive so far, as that the thing agree in some similitude with the sound of the word, as when we say, tinkling of brasse, the neighing of horses, the bleating of sheep, the gingling of chains: These words by their sound, expresse the things which are signified by them.

But, for as much as there are things which found not, in these the similitude of touching hath the same power: As, they touch the sense smoothly or harshly, the smoothnesse or harshnesse of letters in like manner touch the hearing, and thereby occasio­neth their names. As when we say smooth, it sounds smoothly: so, who will not judge harshnesse to be harsh by the very word? It is smooth to the ear when we say pleasure; harsh, when we say crux, a crosse: the things themselves make good the sound of the words. Honey, as sweetly as the thing it selfe affects our tast, so sweetly doth the name touch our hearing: Soure, as harsh in both. Wool and Bryars, as the words are to the hearing, the things are to the touch. These are conceived to be the infancy, as it were, of words, when the sense of the thing concords with the sense of the sound.

From hence proceeded the licence of naming, according to the similitude of the things among themselves: as when, for ex­ample, crux, a crosse, is therefore so called, because the harsh­nesse of the word concords with the harshnesse of the pain which the crosse affecteth. But, Crura, thighes, are so called, not from harshnesse of pain; but, because in length and hardnesse, they are, in respect of the other limbs, like unto the wood of a crosse. Hence it comes to abuse, that the name usurped, not of a like thing, but, as it were neer: for what likenesse is there be­tween the signification of little and minute, when as that may be little, which not only is nothing minute, but is somewhat grown; yet, by reason of a certain neernesse, we say minute for little. But, this abuse of the word is in the power of the spea­ker; for, he may use the word little, and not minute. This ex­ample belongs to that which we will shew, when we call that a fish-pond which hath no fish in it, nor any thing like a fish: It is denominated from fishes, by reason of the water, wherein fishes live. So the word is used by translation, not from similitude, but a certain kinde of vicinity. And if any one should say, that men in swimming resemble fishes, and that from thence a fish-pond is so named, it were foolish to refuse it, since that neither is repugnant to the nature of the thing, and both are occult. But, this is to the purpose, which we cannot dilucidate by one [Page 31] ex­ample, how much the origine of the word, which is taken from vicinity, differs from that which is derived from similitude.

From hence there is a progression to the contrary. Lucus is thought to be so named, quod minime luceat; and bellum, quòd res bella non sit; and soedus, quòd res foeda non sit. But, if we derive p [...]rcus, as some do, à soeditate, it returnes to that vicinity, when that which is made, is named from that by which it is made.

For this vicinity is very large, and divided into many parts, either by efficience, as this word procus à foeditate; from which likewise foedus: or by effect, as puteus, so named, because the ef­fect thereof is potatio: or by that it containeth, as urbs ab orbe, be­cause in a place which they liked, they first made a track about it with a plough, as Virgil saith of Aeneas, ‘—Urbem designat Aratro.’ Or by that which is contained, as if horreum were derived from hordeum; or by abuse, as hordeum for wheat, or the whole from a part, as mucro, which is the point for the whole sword; or a part from the whole; as capillus quasi capitis pilus. What need we go a­ny further? whatsoever else can be reckoned, we may see the origin of the word contained, either in the similitude betwixt things and sounds, or in the similitude betwixt things them­selves, or in vicinity, or contrariety, which origine we cannot pursue beyond similitude.

But this we cannot do alwaies, for there are innumerable words, the reasons of which ly [...]hid. To the infancy, or rather stock and seed of such words, beyond which, no origine is to be sought, neither if a man do enquire can he finde any, they proceed in this manner: The syllables, in which v hath the place of consonant, as in these words, venter, vafer, velum, vinum, vo­mis, vulnus, have a thick, and as it were, a strong sound, which the very custome of speaking confirmeth, when from some words we take them away, lest they should burden the eare; for which reason we say amâsti, rather then amavisti, and abiit, not abi [...]it, and innumerable of the same kinde. Therefore when we say Vis, the sound of the word having, as we said, a kinde of force, suiteth with the thing which it signifieth. Now from this vicinity, by that which they affect, that is, because they are vi­olent, vincula seem to be named, and vimen, quo aliquid vincia­tur. Thence vites, because they claspe about those things by which they grow. Hence also by similitude, Terence calls a crooked old man vietum. Hence the Earth, worn into winding paths by the feet of passengers, is called via; but if via be so named, quasi vi pedum trita, the origine returnes to the vicinity: But let us sup­pose it derived from the similitude it hath with vitis, or vimen, that is, from its winding, one asketh me why it is called via? [Page 32] I answer, from the windings and crookednesse thereof, which the antients called vietum; thence the rounds of a wheel vietos. He demands, how vietum comes to signifie winding? I answer, from the similitude of vitis, a Vine: He requires whence vitis is so named? I say, because it doth vincere those things which it comprehends. He questions whence vincere is derived? We say, à vi: He asks, whence vis? We give this reason, because the word in its robust and forcible sound agreeth to the thing which it signifieth. He hath nothing more to demand.

Galen. de de­cret. Hipp. & Plat. lib. 2. In like manner, in this word Ego, as Chrysippus observes, in pronouncing the first syllable, we depresse the under-lip, as if it were to point to our selves, then by motion of the beard we point to our own breasts: of which Agell. 10. 5. Nigidius hath given more instances, in his Grammaticall Commentaries.

The second question concerning words, is of their power, [...], of significants; whence Laert. Chrysippus divided Diale­ctick into two parts, [...], of significants and significats. Here they enquire, how many waies every thing may be said, and how many waies a thing said may signifie.

Here is examined the ambiguity of words: Laert. Ambiguity (or amphiboly) is a word signifying two or more things, naturally, and properly, according to the language of the Nation, in such manner, that many senses may be collected from the same words, as [...], which one way signifies, the pot fell thrice, another way, the she-minstrell fell.

Agell. 9. 12. Every word (according to Chrysippus) is by nature ambigu­ous, for the same may be taken two or more waies: D. August. de dialect. Neither is that any thing to the purpose which Hortensius calumniates in Cicero, thus, They affirm that they hear ambiguities acutely, ex­plain them clearly. The same persons hold, that every word is ambiguous; how then can they explain the ambiguous by the ambiguous, that were to bring a candle not lighted into the dark. This is ingeniously and subtlely said, but like that of Scaevola to Antonius, you seem to the wise to speak acutely, to fooles truly: for what else doth Hortensius in that place, but by his ingenuity and facetiousnesse, as an intoxicating cup, bring darknesse upon the unlearned. For, when they say, every word is ambiguous, it is understood of single words. Ambiguities are explain'd by disputation; no man disputeth by single words, none therefore explaineth ambiguous words by ambiguous words. And yet seeing that every word is ambiguous, no man can ex­plain the ambiguity of words, except by words, but those con­joyned and not ambiguous. As when we say, every Souldier hath two feet, it doth not follow, that a whole Regiment of Souldiers that have two feet, should have in all but two feet. So when I say, every word is ambiguous, I do not say, a sen­tence, nor a disputation, although they are woven of words. [Page 33] E­very ambiguous word therefore may be explained by inambi­guous disputation.

The third question is concerning Declination, [...] and [...] Agell. 2. 25. Some follow Analogie, others Anomaly: Analogie is a like declination of like, in Latine proportio. Anomaly is an inequa­lity, following the customes of declinations. Varr [...]. de ling. lat. Chrysippus wrote six bookes [...], shewing, that like things are noted with unlike words, and unlike things with like words.

The last question is concerning Ordination, [...] Dionys. Ha [...] ­carn. de compos. verb. Upon this subject Chrysippus wrote two bookes ( Laertius reckons more) whose scope is not Rhetoricall, but Dialectick, as will easily appear to the Reader: Of the Syntax of Axiomes: of true and false Axiomes: of possible and impossible: of contingent, and transient, and ambiguous, and the like, which confer nothing to single speech, or pleasure, or grace to elocution.

Laert. There are five excellencies of speech, Propriety, Perspicuity, Succinctnesse, Decorum, Elegance. Propriety is a proper phrase, ac­cording to Art, not after the common expression.

Perspicuity is, when that which is intended is delivered clear­ly.

Succinctnesse is, when that only is comprised which is necessa­ry to the thing.

Decorum, is a conformity to the thing.

Elegance is an avoiding of vulgar phrase.

Laert. Amongst the faults of speech is Barbarisme, a phrase not in use with the best persons; and Sol [...]ecisme, a speech incoherently framed.

CHAP. XI.
Of Definition and Division.

Laert. DEfinition (according to Antipater in his book of Definitions) is speech by Analysis pronounced adaequately; or (as Chrysippus in his book of Definitions) an answer to this Question, what a thing is.

Sext. Empi [...]. adv. Log. Those definitions are vicious which include any of those things which are not in the things defined, or not in all, or not in some; so as if we should say, A man is a rationall creature, or, a mortall grammaticall creature; seeing that no man is immortall, and some men are not Grammarians, the definition is faulty.

Cicer. Topic. We must therefore, when we take those things which are common to the things we would define, and others prosecute them so far, untill it becomes proper, so as not to be transferrible to any other thing; as this. An inheritance is riches, adde which by the death of some person falleth to another, it is not yet a definition, [Page 34] for riches may be held many other waies, as well as by Inheri­tance; adde one word, by right of Law; now the thing will seeme disjoyned from community; so that the definition is thus explained. Inheritance is riches, which by the death of some person fal­leth to another by right of law: It is not yet enough, therefore adde, neither bequeathed by will, nor detained by possession, and it is perfect.

Cic. Topic. Of definition there are two kinds; one of things which are; the other of things which are understood. Those things which are, we call such as may be seen or touched, as a field, house, a wall, and the like. On the other side, we say those things are not, which cannot bee touched or shewn, as possession, gardianship, nation, kindred, which have not any body, yet there is some conformity in the understanding which we call notionall, whereby in argu­mentation they may be explained by definition. This latter kind is rather called Description, a speech, which by the exterior fi­gure of the things bringeth us to the things themselves, or a Definition simply expressing the power of a definition.

Cic. Topic. Againe, of definitions, some are of partitions, others of divi­sions. Of partitions, when the thing proposed is torne (as it were) into pieces, as if we should say the Civill Law is that which con­sisteth in Lawes, Senators, things judged, the authority of Law­yers, Edicts of Magistrates, manners and Equity.

The definition of divisions comprehendeth all species which are under the genus defined, thus. Abalienation is of that thing which is in our power, or a deliverance of it into the power of another, or a concession by Law, amongst whom those things may be done by civill right.

Laert. Division is a section of the genus into its immediate species; as, of living creatures, some are rationall, some irrationall. Sext. Empir. adv. Math. 10. 2. This therefore is an ill division, of men, some are Grecians, some Egyptians, some Persians, some Indians; for the next species are not disparate, but opposite, we must therefore say thus; Of men, some are Greci­ans, some Barbarians, and again, by subdivision of Barbarians, some are Aegyptians, some Persians, some Indians, which likewise is in the division of things that are. For those which are good and bad are different to us, those who are intermediate betwixt good and bad are indifferent to us. The division therefore ought not to be so, but rather thus: Of things that are, some are indifferent, others different, of the different, some are good, some are ill; For this division is like unto that which saith, of men, some are Grecians, others Barbarians; of Barbarians, some are Aegyptians, some Persians, some Indians; the other is likewise; Of men, some Graecians, some Aegyptians, some Persians, some Indians.

Hence it followeth, that Sext. Empir. adv. Moral. 10. perfect division hath an universall power; for he who divideth thus; Of men, some are Grecians, others Barbarians, saith as much as this, if there are any men, they are either Grecians or Barbarians, for if there be any man, [Page 35] who is neither Greek nor Barbarian, the division must necessa­rily be ill, the universall false. Wherefore when we say, of things that are, some are good, some ill, some intermediate, it is as much (according to Chrysippus) as this universall: if there be any things that are, they are either good, or ill, or indifferent. But this universall is false, if any thing false be subjected to it: For, if two things be subjected, one good, the other ill; or, one good, the other indifferent, in this expression of those things which are, one kinde is good, that is true, but this, these are good, is false, for they are not good, for one is good, the other ill. And again, these are ill, is false, for they are not ill, but only one of them. The like in indifferents; for, it is false that these are indifferents, as that these are good or ill.

Laert. There are three forms of division, anti-division, sub-division, partition. Anti-division is a distribution of the genus into species by the contrary; as for example, by negation, as of things that are, some are good, others not good.

Sub-division is division upon a division: as, of things that are, some are good, others not good; of the not-good, some are ill, o­thers indifferent.

Partition, is a distribution of the genus into places (according to Crinis) as of goods, some belong to the Soule, others to the Body.

CHAP. XII.
Of Genus, Species, &c.

Laert. GENUS is a comprehension of many Notions referred to one, as, a living creature, for this includes all living crea­tures. Notion is a phantasie of the minde, not any thing existent or qualitative, but, as it were, something existent, and qualita­tive; as the notion of a horse, no horse being present.

Species is that which is contained under the Genus; as, under living creature is contained man.

Most generall, is that which is a Genus, but hath no Genus: Most speciall, that which is a Species, but hath no Species.

To this place of Voice belong likewise, as we said, the consi­deration of Poem and Poesy. Poem (according to Possidonius, in his introduction to Speech) is a speech in meeter or rhithme, not prose, as [...], and [...], Poesy is a significant Poem, with designe, containing the imitation of things divine and human.

CHAP. XIII.
Of Things.

NOtions, words, and things, as we have said, are conjoyned together. From notions we came to words, from words we come now to the things themselves: By Notions Things are per­ceived. Laert. Those are said to be Things which are dicible. Philop. in A­nalyt. prior. The Stoicks by a new name call things [...], Contingents, because we desire that things might befall us, and that we might obtain them. Sext. Empir. adv. Log. Contigents therefore is the subject it selfe, beyond the no­tion or word, as Dion.

Alexand. A­phrod. in Top. 4. They comprehend all things under one common Genus, [...], somewhat; Senec. Epist. 19. placing this Genus above all, the reason this: In nature somethings are, somethings are not. For, those things which are not, but only incur in the minde, as Centaurs, Gy­ants, and whatsoever else is formed by false cogitation, hath some image, although it hath no substance. Even Negatives are in being. Somewhat therefore is more generall then Ens, which is understood only of Corporealls.

Simplic. in Categ. Things are subdivided into foure Genus's, Subjects, and qua­litatives, & quodammodotatives in themselves, and quodammodotatives as to others. Simplic. ibid. Thus the Stoicks treating more strictly and subtilly of these things, contract the Predicaments into a lesser number, taking some of those things which they diminished, but with some alteration.

CHAP. XIV.
Of Subjects.

Simplic. in Categ. THere is not any thing besides [...], Subject: The dif­ferences concerning this are nonsubsistent.

Simplic. ibid [...] Subject is two-fold; one, which is called the first subject, such is matter, expert of all qualities, which Aristotle calleth a body potentially. The other, that which is affected with quality, as Brasse, and Socrates, with those things which are in them, or praedicated by them.

CHAP. XV.
Of Qualitatives.

Dexipp. in ca­teg. 2. 22. QUalitatives have a subsistence, and are separate from their subjects. For qualities (as all other accidents) are bodies, seeing that according to Zeno, nothing can be effected by that which is incorporeall, nor can that which is incorporeall effect any thing; whatsoever effecteth is a body. Effective quality therefore is a body. Matter is expert of quality, but qualities are not expert of matter.

Simplic. in ca­teg [...] Quality is the habit of that which is qualitative. Qualitative is taken three waies: First, for whatsoever hath difference, whe­ther it be motion or habit, and whether hardly or easily separa­able. In this sence, not only he who is wise, but he who stretch­eth out his hand are qualitative. The second signification in­cludes not motions but habits only, which they define qualita­tive, that is, which hath a difference endued with habit, as a wise man, or an armed man. Of these, some are adaequate, to the measure of their pronunciation and consideration; others not adaequate. These they omit, those which are adaequate, equall, and permanent, they call qualitative; as, a Grammarian, and a wise man; neither of these exceeds, or falls short of his quality. Likewise a lover of meat, and a lover of wine, being in act such, as a glutton, and a drunkard, because they make use of those parts which serve to this end, are so called: so that if any man be a glutton, he is consequently a lover of meat; but, if he be a lo­ver of meat, he is not therefore immediately a glutton; for, being destitute of those parts which he useth in eating, he wanteth the act, but not the habit. Quality is adaequated to qualitative in this last sence.

Bursius in dia­lect. Cicer. 4. 3. All qualities are either causes, and then they are called formes; or effects, and then they are generally called [...], habitu­alls, which word Antipater extends as large, as the common ac­cident, both of things corporeall and incorporeall, [...], some­what. Of habitualls there are foure kinds, [...], that is, [...], when they reside in the minde; [...], that is, [...], when they fall from the minde into the voice; [...] ▪ when by the mo­tion of the minde, they are praedicated of any thing; [...], or, [...], when they happen to subjects.

Simplic. in Categ. Habits are only things united, but those which are conjoyned by contiguity, as a Ship; or by distance, as an Army; in these there can be no habit, nor one thing spirituall above all, nor one reason, whereby they may come to subsist within one habit.

It is common to quality of corporeall things to be the diffe­rence of their substance, Ibid. no [...] taken severally, but contracted into one notion and property of the minde, nor by time or strength [Page 38] reduced to form, but by its own tality, according to which the generation of the qualitative subsists.

Power (a species of quality) is that which hath and giveth the faculty of exercising many accidents, Ibid. as prudence giveth the faculty of walking prudently, and discoursing prudently: or, ac­cording to some, Power is that which giveth the faculty of ex­ercising many accidents, and which ruleth and governeth the acts subjected unto it. What Aristotle called naturall Power, Ibid. they name Aptitude.

Habits are intended and remitted, Ibid. dispositions cannot be in­tended or remitted. Thus the straightnesse of a wand, although it may easily be discomposed and bent, is a disposition, for straightnesse cannot be intended or remitted. Likewise the ver­tues are dispositions, not in respect of their firmnesse and con­stancy, but because they cannot admit of degrees of more and lesse: but, Arts must either have firmnesse, or not be dispositions. Thus habitude is taken in the latitude of the species, disposition in the chief perfection of the species, and in that which is the most it can be, whether it be easily alter'd (as the straightnesse of a wand) or not.

CHAP. XVI.
Of Quodammodotatives.

THe third kinde of things are [...], Quodammodotatives. Plotin. [...]. 30. They differ from Qualitatives, because matter is other­wise affected by habits, otherwise by Quodammodotatives, in this or that manner. Moreover Qualitatives are Quodammodotatives as to matter, and conversant therein; but properly, quodammo­dotatives are conversant in qualitatives. Simplic. in Categ. Again, as habitualls may be said to extend further then habits, so quodammodota­tives are larger then qualitatives: for quodammodotatives extend even to those things which are quodammodotatives as to others, and include them; but qualitatives consist only in those which make a difference.

Simplic. ibid. This place Boethius conceives to have the power of habit. Habit chiefly and universally is taken three waies: First, to be to it selfe, and according to it selfe: Secondly, in respect to another: Thirdly, of another to it. That which is considered as to it selfe, pertaines to quodammodotatives; as, armed, for it is a habit of ones selfe to ones selfe. That which is to another, pertaines to relati­on; for, a Father, or a right hand, are said, according to a ha­bit, not of themselves to themselves, but of them to another. But that which is of another to us, as of an armed man, being the habit of another to us, pertaines to habit.

To this head they reduce quantitatives and quantity, and their [Page 39] species, place, time, and some species (according to Aristotle) of quality, figure and form; as also action, passion, site, habit.

CHAP. XVII.
Of Quodammodotatives as to others.

THe last genus of things is [...], quodammodotatives as to others. Simplic, in Cat [...]g. Of these there are two kinds, Relatives, and quo­dammodotative-Relatives. The Relatives are opposed and distingui­shed from those which are by themselves, and absolute. The quodammodotative-relatives are opposed to those which have a dif­ference, as for example, Sweet and Sowre, and whatsoever is of the like kinde, are relatives; but quodammodotative-relatives, are as the right side, father, and the like; for, they have a difference, in that they are characteriz'd by differences, according to some species. As therefore there is one notion of those which are by themselves, and absolute, another of those which are conside­red with difference: so some things are relatives; others quo­dammodotative-relatives. The consequence of conjunctions in these is contrary; for, with those which are by themselves, co­exist those which have a difference; for, those which are by themselves have some differences, as white and black. But, those which are by themselves, coexist not with those which have a difference. Sweet and bitter have differences, whereby they are characterized; yet, they are not absolute, but relatives. But, those which are quodammodotative-relatives, being contrary to those which have differences, are likewise relatives. For, the right side, and a Father, besides that they are quodammodota­tive, are likewise relatives: but, sweet and bitter being rela­tives, have a difference, whereby they are contrary, being quo­dammodotative relatives. Those which are quodammodotative relatives, it is impossible should be by themselves, and absolute, or by difference; for they depend solely upon relative habit. Relatives therefore are not by themselves, for they are not ab­solute; yet, are they according to difference, because they are distinguished by some character. To expresse this more clearly, Relatives are those, which by their proper character respect an­other; quodammodotative-relatives are those which use to hap­pen to another, but not without mutation and alteration of those things which are about them; yet, with respect of some­thing externall. If therefore any thing with difference respect another, it is only relative, as, habit, science, and sence: but, if it respect another, not out of inherent difference, but in pure ha­bit, it is quodammodotative-relative. For, a Father, and right side, to their consistence, require some externall things, for as [Page 40] much as there being no mutation made in them, he is no longer a Father, his Son being dead, and the right side is no longer so, after he is risen, in respect of whom it was said to be such; but, sweet and bitter will not alter, unlesse their power be likewise changed. If therefore quodammodotative are changed in habit to another, although they receive no passion in themselves, it is manifest they have their being in the habit alone, not in diffe­rence.

Laert. vit. Aristoni [...]. This genus was first introduced by Aristo, Simplic. in Categ. who defined quodammodotative relatives to be those, whose being is the same with their quodammodotative being to one another: And so also An­dronicus defines them.

CHAP. XVIII.
Of Dicibles.

TO the place concerning things and significats, belongeth that concerning Dicibles, [...], to which true and false is common. Laert. Dicible is that which con [...]isteth according to ratio­nall phantasy. Sext. Empir. adv. log. Rationall phantasy is that, by which what is com­prehended by phantasy, may be expressed by speech. Every thing that may be said, ought to be said, for from thence is de­rived the denomination.

Ammon. in pro [...] Arist. [...] Dicible is a mean betwixt notion and thing. Dicibles are notions, that is, [...], but not meerly and simply notions, Burs. in dial. Cic. 5. 1. which in as much as they are the principles of science, and are intelligences, are called [...], and [...] ▪ but, in asmuch as they reside in the minde, are called [...], and are genus's and species, in which manner, being ready for expression, they are called dicibles, and pertain to the enunciative faculty of the soule. For, whatsoever is said, if it be so considered as it is said of something, they are Categorems; if so, as it breaketh forth in­to voice, and with voice, they are words, if retained in the minde, ready to break forth, they are dicibles. Dicible therefore is a word, and yet signifies not a word, but that which is un­derstood in the word, and is contained in the minde.

Laert. Of Dicibles there are two kinds, the defective, and the per­fect. The defective are those which an imperfect enunciation, not compleating the sentence, but requiring something to fol­low; as writeth, for we ask, who? To this kinde belongeth Ca­tegorems, which are praedicated of other things.

The perfect are such as have a perfect enunciation: Of these there are two kinds: The first peculiarly called perfect, which though they compleat the sentence, yet, signifie neither true nor false. Of these there are many kinds, as Interrogation, percontati­on, [Page 41] imperative, adjurative, optative, imprecative, or execrative, substitutive, hypotheticall, compellative, like to, or transcending an axiome, and dubitative.

Interrogation is that which is a perfect sentence, but requireth an answer, as, Is it day? for this is neither true nor false; so that it is day, is an axiom, is it day? an interrogation.

Percontation is a thing for which we cannot answer significant­ly, as in Interrogation, yes: but as thus, he dwelleth in such a place.

Imperative is a thing, in speaking whereof, wee command, as,

Go thou to the Inachian stood.
Ammom, in lib. [...].
Adjurative, as witness thou Earth.

Optative, which he we speak wishing, as,

Great Iove who dost in Ida reign,
The Victory let Ajax gain.

Imprecative, or execrative, as,

As on the ground this wine I poure,
So may the Earth his blood devour.

Substitutive, or expositive, as, let this be a right line.

Hypotheticall, as, supposing the Earth to be the Centre of the Globe of the Sun.

Compellative is a thing in speaking which we call another, Laert. as, ‘Atrides, Agamemnon, King of men.’

Like to, or transcending an axiom, is that which hath an axio­maticall manner of speaking; but because it superabounds in some particle or affection, it is not ranked amongst axioms, as,

How beautious is thy Virgin-Train!
How like to Priam's Son, that swaine!

Dubitative is a thing different from an axiom, which, whoso­ver speaks, maketh a doubt, as,

Then are not life and grief of kin? all these are neither true nor false.

The other kind of perfect dicibles which compleat the Sen­tence▪ affirmeth or denyeth, and is either true or false. It is call­ed axtom.

CHAP. XIX
Of Categoremes.

Laert. CAtegoreme is that which is praedicated of another, or a thing construed with one or more, or (as Apollodorus) a de­fective dicible, construed with the right case, to make an axiom.

Ammon. in Arist. [...]. Whatsoever is praedicated of another, is praedicated of the name of the case; and both these are either perfect, as that which is praedicated, and together with the subject sufficient to make an Axiom. Or they are de [...]ective, and require some addition, to make thereof a perfect praedicate.

If that which is praedicated of a name, make an axiom, it is a Categorem, or [...], a congruity, as walke [...]h, for example, So­crates walketh.

But if it be predicated of the case, (whereby transitions are made from one person to another, wherein it is necessary, that some oblique case, be likewise pronounced with the right, they are called [...], as an addition to the [...], (or as Lib. 3. Pris­cian renders it, lesse then congruities) as, Cicero saved his Country.

Again, if that which is praedicated of some nown, require a case of some other nown to be added to make up the axiom, so as the construction bee made of two oblique cases, they are [...], incongruities, or, according to Ammonius, lesse then [...], as, it pleases me to come to thee; whether the nounes onely or the words require it.

Laert, Again, of Categoremes, there are four kinds, right, supine, neuter, and reciprocally active and passive. Right are those which have a motion tending to another, and are construed with one of the oblique cases, for the making of a Categorem, as heareth, seeth, discourseth.

Supine are those which are consider'd from habit to an agent, and is construed with a passive particle, as, I am heard, I am seen.

Neuter, as those which are neither way, as, to be wise, to walk.

Reciprocally, active and passive are those, which seem supines but are not, for they are acts, as [...], for therein is included [...].

The right (or nominative) case, is so called by the Stoicks, whom the Grammarians follow, because it falleth directly from the no­tion which is in the mind. Oblique cases are the Genitive, Dative and Accusative.

CHAP. XX.
Of simple Axioms.

Laert. AXiom is that which is either true or false, or a thing perfect by it selfe, negative, or affirmative, as far as it extends; or, (according to Chrysippus, in his dialectick definitions) Axiom is that which affirmeth or denyeth as far as it extends; as, Dion walketh. It is called Axiom [...], because assent is either given to it or not: for he who saith, it is day, assenteth thereunto. If it be day, the axiom is true, if it be not, false.

Laert. Of Axioms, the first and most proper difference is of the simple and not simple (thus divided by Chrysippus, and Archidemus and Athenodorus, and Antipater, and Crinis.)

Laert, Sext. Empir adv. Log. cap de ver [...]. Simple axioms are those which consist neither of one axiom twice taken, nor of different axioms, neither by one or more con­junctions; as, It is day, 'tis at night, Socrates disputes. Laert. Of simple axioms there are many kinds, Apophatick, or negative, arnetick, or universally negative; steretick, or privative; categorick, or prae­dicative; categoreutick, or indicative; indefinit and mediate.

Laert. [...]pul. [...]. N [...]gative axioms are those, in which a negatiue particle is proposed; as, If this is, that is not. But if the negation be of the lat­ter part of the Axiom, the other part not being negative, then the axiom is not negative, but praeicative; as, It happeneth to some pleasure not to be good. This therefore declareth what happeneth to the thing, and therefore is praedicative. Boes. in Ci [...] Top. A species of nega­tive axiom, is the supernegative, when, between the parts con­nected and copulated by two affirmations, a praeposition with a negation is interposed, and that very negation denyed; as, If it is day, it is not light. Of the same kinde are all those, wherein nega­tion is proposed to negation; as, It is not both day, and not light.

Laert. Uni [...]ersally negative axioms are those, which consist of an u­niversall negative particle, and a Categorem; as, no man walketh.

Laert. Privative are those which consist of a privative particle, and an axiom in power, as, he is inhuman.

Laert. Praedicative are those, which consist of a right ca [...]e and a Ca­tegorem; as, Dien walketh.

Laert. Indicative, or S [...]xt. Empi [...]. definitive is that which consists of a demon­strative right case, and a Categorem; as, this man walketh.

Laert. Sext. Empir. Indefinit is that, which consists of one or more indefinit par­ticles; as, a certain man walketh, he is moved.

Sext. Empit. Intermediate are of this kinde, a man si [...]teth, or a man walketh; a certain man walketh is indefinite, for it determines no single per­son; that man sitteth is definite, Socrates sitteth is intermediate; for it is not indefinite, because it determines the species, nor de­finite, [Page 44] because it is not pronounced with demonstration, but it is intermediate betwixt both.

Sext. Emp. An indefinite axiom, as, some one sitteth, is true, when the thing definite is true; as, he sitteth; but, if none of the singulars do sit, the indefinite axiom is not true, that some one sitteth.

CHAP. XXI.
Of not-simple Axioms.

Laert. Sext▪ Emp. adv. Log. de vero. NOt-simple axioms are those, which are in a manner double, consisting of one axiom diversified, or of axioms: of one axiom dversified; as, if it be day, it is day: of axioms, as, if it be day, 'tis light.

Sext. Emp. adv. Log. cap. de vero. In not-simple axioms, that which immediately followeth the conjunction if, or whereas, is called the Antecedent, the first, or the beginning; the rest is called the ending, or Consequence, or second. Notwithstanding that the axiom be pronounced by inversion; as, It is light, if it be day; for in this, the ending or consequence, is, it is light, although it be spoken first; the antecedent, it is day, although it be put in the second place; for it immediately followeth the conjunction if.

The Lawes and rules of Consequents are these: 1. Laert. From true followeth true; as, if it be day, it followeth that it is light. 2. From false followeth false; as, if this be false that it is night, this is likewise false, it is dark. 3. From false followeth true, as from this, the Earth flyeth, followeth, the Earth is. 4. From true doth not follow false; for from this, the Earth is, it follow­eth not, that the earth flies.

Laert. Of not-simple propositions there are many kinds, Connex, Adnex, Conjunct, Causall, Declarative of the more, and Declarative of the lesse.

Laert. Connex (according to Chrysippus in his Dialectick, and Diogenes in his Dialectick Art) is that which consists of the connective conjunction, if; which conjunction declareth, that the consequent is second to the first; as, if it be day, it is light. Of a diversified axiom, and the conjunction if, consisteth this connex, If it be day, it is day, these are properly right axioms. Of different axioms, and the conjunction whereas, this, if it is day, 'tis light. Philop. in A­nal. prior. Connex axioms are called also tropicall, because they turn from the antecedent to the consequent.

The rules of connex axioms are these: Laert. That is a true connex, wherein the contrary of the consequent is repugnant to the an­tecedent, as, if it is day, 'tis light; for, that it is not light, the con­trary to the consequent, is repugnant to, it is day, the antece­dent. A false connex is that wherein the contrary to the conse­quent [Page 45] is not repugnant to the Antecedent; as this, if it is day, Dion walks; for, that Dion walketh not, is not repugnant to, it is day.

Laert. Adnex (which some reckon as a species of the connex) ac­cording to Crinis, in his Dialectick, is an axiom connected by the conjunction whereas, beginning with an axiom, and ending with an axiom; as, whereas it is day, it is light, the conjunction sheweth, that the second is a consequent of the first, and that the first is subsistent.

The rules of adnex axioms are these: Laert. That is a true adnex, which beginneth from true, endeth in that which is consequent; as, whereas it is day, the Sun is over the earth. False is that, which beginneth from false, or endeth not consequently; as, whereas it is day, Dion walketh, if this be said when it is not day.

Laert. A conjunct axiom is that, which is knit together by Con­junctions copulative; as, it is both day, and it is light. The rules thereof are these: That is a right conjunction wherein all things are true; as it is day, and it is light. That is false, which hath something false. An axiom which hath neither conjunction nor disjunction, is to be taken in the sense of the speaker; for con­junction is sometimes taken for disjunction; as, to me, and my heir.

A disjunct axiom is that which is disjoyned, Laert. by a disjunctive conjunction; as, either it is day, or it is night. This conjunction sheweth, that one of the axioms is false.

All things that are disjoyned, Agell. 16. 8. are repugnant to one another, and their opposites likewise are repugnant. Of all things that are disjoyned, one must be true, the rest false, otherwise nothing at all is true, or all, or more then one are true, either those which are disjunct, will not be repugnant, or those which are opposite to them will not be contrary to one another, then the disjunct will be false, and is called [...], as this is, in which the opposites are not contrary; either thou runnest, or walkest, or standest, for they are repugnant to one another, but their opposites are not repugnant, because not to walk, and not to stand, and not to run, are not contrary in themselves; for, those things are said to be contrary, which cannot be true to­gether. But you may at the same time neither walk, nor run, nor stand. Every disjunction therefore is not only true, but ne­cessary; for if of contraries there could be a false conjunction, no disjunction could be true.

A Causall axiom is that which is connected by this conjuncti­on, because, as because it is day, 'tis light; for the first is, as it were cause of the second. The rules thereof are these: A causall conjunction is true, when beginning from true, it endeth in the consequent, and cannot have the antecedent for its consequent; as because it is day, 'tis light: but this axiom, it is light, doth not follow from the other, it is day.

[Page 46] A false causall is that which either beginneth from false, or endeth in that which is not consequent, or whose antecedent may be the consequent, as, because it is night, Dion walkes.

An Axiom declarative of the morel, is that which is construed with this conjunction, more, as it is more day then night. Declara­tive of the less, is contrary to the former, as, it is less day then night.

CHAP. XXII.
Of contrary Axioms.

COntrary Axioms are those which are repugnant to one ano­ther, Laert. according to truth and falsehood, whereof one affirm­eth, the other denyeth, as, it is day, it is not day. Only Negatives are contrary, [...], and opposite, and repugnant, for onely in contraries one proposition is true, the other false. The other three kinds of contraries alledged by Arist [...]tle, are pronounced without a conjunction. Whatsoever is pronounced without a conjunction, is neither true nor false, for true and false belongeth to axiom. Axiom is a speech which consisteth in the conjunction of some thing, wheras of Aristotle's other three kinds of contraries, none are conjunct but simple, as black and white, double and sin­gle, sight and blindness.

Adverse are (as likewise defined by Aristotle) those which in the same kind are most distant. Nothing that is pronounced by negation is adverse, ( [...]) to another, for then the adverse to Vertue will be not Vertue, and to Vice not Vice, and under not Vertue will be included many other things beside vice, even, a stone, a horse, and whatsover is beside Vertue; under not vice, will be found Vertue and all other things. Thus all things would be adverse to one, and the same the adverse to Vertue and Vice. Moreover if Vertue were not adverse to Vice, but to not-vice, the intermediate will be adverse both to good and bad, which is absurd.

The rules of contraries are these. 1. Simplic. Contrariety is princi­pally in acts, habits, and the like. 2. Categorems and qualitatives are called as it were contrary. Prudently and imprudently in some manner lead to things contrary, but contraries absolutely are in things: and prudence is so immediately contrary to impru­dence, not this to that:

Contraries are either distunctive or sul disjunctive, disjunctive as when wee say, it is either day or night. Sul disjunctive are of two kinds, either in whole, betwixt universalls, as every living creature either doth or suffereth, no living Creature either doth or suffereth; or in part, betwixt particulars; as he either sitteth or walketh; he nei­ther sitteth nor walketh.

[Page 47] The rules of contraries are these; of Disjunctives one being asserted, the other is necessarily taken away; one being taken a­way, the other is necessarily asserted.

Of subdisjunctives in whole, both cannot be true, both may be false; both cannot be affirmative, both cannot be negative.

Of subdisjunctives in part, both may be true, because they are taken in part.

CHAP. XXIII.
Of Possible and Impossible, Necessary and Vnnecessary, Probable, Paradoxall and Reasonable axioms.

Laert. MOreover of axioms some are possible, others impossible; some necessary, others not unnecessary. A possible Axiom is that which is susceptible of a true praedication, without obstruction from those things, which, though externall, are yet contingent with the thing it self; as Diocles lives. Impossible is that which can never be susceptible of truth, externalls oppugning it, as, the Earth flies. Necessary is that which is so true, as that it cannot any way receive a false praedication, or, may receive it, but those things which are extrinsecall, will not permit that it be true, as Vertue profiteth. Not-necessary is that which may be either true or false, exteriour things not obstructing it, as Dion walks.

Simplic. in lib. Arist. de opposit. These future repugnants and their parts are according to the same manner, as the present and the past. For, if it be true that the thing either shall be or shall not be, it must be either true or false, because futures are determined according to these; as, if a Navy is built to morrow, it is true to say that it shall be built, but if it be not, it is false to say that it shall be built, because it will not be, therefore it will either be or not be, and consequently one of the two is false.

Concerning possibles and necessaries, there is great difference betwixt Diodorus and Chrysippus. Iohan▪ Gram­mat. in Arist. de opposit. Diodorus holds that only to be possible which either is, or will hereafter bee. That which neither is, not ever shall be is impossible. As for me to be at Corinth is possible, if I ever were there, or ever shall be there, but if I never was there, nor ever shall be there, it is impossible. That a Boy shall be a Grammarian is not possible, unlesse here­after he come to be one.

Cic. de fa [...]. On the contrary, Chrysippus held, that those things which nei­ther are nor ever shall be, are yet possible to be, as, to break a gemme, though it never come to be broken. Alexand. A­phrod in anal▪ prior. Moreover that from possibles an impossible may follow, as in this Axiom, which is a true connex: If Dion be dead, He (pointing to Dion) is dead: The [Page 48] antecedent, if Dion be dead is possible, because it may at some time be true that he shall be dead; but this Axiom, he is dead, is impossible: for Dion being dead, the Axiom likewise is abolish­ed, that he is dead, seeing he is no longer that man, capable of be­ing demonstrated by the pronoune, He, for, he, is a demonstrati­on of a living creature. If therefore Dion being not yet dead, this word, He, may be said of him, being dead, it cannot be said, he is dead. So that in this place, he is dead, is impossible. For it were not impossible, if, some time after the death of Dion, of whom it was before praedicated in the connex whilst he lived, it might be again praedicated, he is dead; but because that cannot be, it is im­possible, that, he is dead, should be praedicated of him.

To conclude, Epictet. 11. 19. some held with Diodorus, that whatsoever is past, is true of necessity. That to impossible there followeth not a possible, and that what cannot be done, neither is nor shall bee true. Others (as Cleanthes and Antipater) that somthing is possi­ble that neither is nor shall be; that to possible followeth not im­possible, and that which is past, is not true of necessity. Others, that somthing is possible which is not true; that whatsoever is past, is true of necessity, and that to possible followeth also im­possible.

Furthermore of Axioms, some are Laert. probable, some paradoxall, some reasonable. A probable Axiom is that which perswadeth us by a specious show to assent unto it; as, whatsoever bringeth forth another is a mother; which is falfe, for the hen is not the mother of the egge.

Laert. Paradoxall Axioms are those which seem true onely to the wise, Cic. Parad. contrary to the opinon of all others. Epictet. 1. 25 These are likewise in other Arts, besides Philosophy; for what is stranger then to prick the eyes for the recovery of sight? If we say this to one ig­norant of Chirurgery, will he not laugh at it? It is not there­fore strange, that such things as are true in Philosophy should seem paradoxes to the unlearned.

Laert. A reasonable Axiom, is that which hath many conditions re­quisite to the truth thereof, as, I shall live to morrow.

CHAP. XXIV.
Of Reciprocall Axioms.

HItherto of the contrariety and repugnance of Axioms. Now of their consent and agreement, whereby one followeth and is correspondent to another, either according to truth or falshood, by [...], reciprocation.

Of Reciprocation there are three kinds: the first [...], [Page 49] perversion, a migration into false; the second [...], conversion, a migration into true; the third [...], equipollence, into the same.

CHAP. XXV.
Of Signes.

TO the place of Axioms appertain likewise Signes. Sext. Emp. hypot. 2. 1. Signe is an axiom antecedent, in a true connex, and having power to detect the consequent.

Sext. adv. log. c [...]p. de signo. Signe is taken two waies: Commonly, for whatsoever fal­leth under any sence, and signifieth something that proceedeth from it: and Properly, for that which declareth a thing, which is not manifest.

Things which are certain require no signe, Sext. Empir. ibid. & Pyr [...]h. hyp. 2. 10. for they are com­prehended of themselves; neither those which are wholly un­certain, for they can no way be comprehended; Galen. Hist. Philos. but, those only, which are uncertain in time, or by nature, may be comprehen­ded by signes, but not by the same. Things that are uncertain in time, are comprehended by commemorative signes; things un­certain by nature, are comprehended by demonstrative.

Of signes therefore, some are demonstrative, others communi­cative. A communicative signe is that which is so neer to the thing, that together with the signe the thing it selfe appeareth, into the knowledge whereof the signe bringeth us, as smoak, which when we see, we know it proceeds from fire. A demon­strative signe is that, which not being observed before with an evident signe, leads us by that to the knowledge of the thing; as when a female hath milk, we presently know that she hath brought forth.

CHAP. XXVI.
Of Reasons or Arguments.

DIalectick is the discipline of speech, concluded by reason. Reason, [...], sometimes called also Argument, and Interro­gation, is, according to Laert. Crinis, that which consists of one or more sumptions, and an assumption, and an inference; as,

If it be day, it is light.
But it is day:
Therefore it is light.
  • Sumption.
  • Assumption.
  • Inserence.

[Page 50] The Reason of the Stoicks differs from the Syllogismes of Aristo­tle in three respects: Alexand. A­phrod. in anal. prior. First, a Syllogisme, according to Aristotle, cannot have lesse then two propositions, a reason may have but one; as, Thou livest, theresore thou breathest: which kinde Antipa­ter calls [...]. Secondly, in Syllogismes, something besides that which is granted in the premises; but in Reasons, the con­clusion may be the same with both, or either of the sumptions. The first are called [...], as,

If it is day, it is day.
But it is day:
Therefore it is day.

Alex. Aphrod. in anal. pr. The second are called [...], as,

It is either day, or not day.
But, it is not day,
Therefore it is not day.

Alex. Aphrod. in anal. prior. Lastly, in Syllogismes, the conclusion must necessarily fol­low, by reason of the premises, whereas there are three kinds of reasons which have not this property: The first, [...], al­ready mentioned: The second [...], not methodically conclusive reasons; as

The first is greater then the second.
The second is greater then the third:
Therefore the first is greater then the third.

This concludes necessarily, but not Syllogistically, unlesse this proposition be put in the first place: What is greater then another, is greater also then that which is lesse then that other. Of the same kinde is that Theorem in the first of Euclid's Elements, This line is equall to that, therefore this line is likewise equall to that, which is true indeed; but to conclude syllogistically, requires this univer­sall proposition, Those which are equall to a third, are equall to one another.

The third kinde of reasons, from which Syllogism differeth by this property, are Alex. Aphod. in anal prior. & in Topic. 1. [...], redundant reasons, and those of two kinds: The first are such as have a superfluous sumption; as,

Every just thing is honest,
Every honest thing is good,
Every good thing is expetible in it self;
Therefore every just thing is good.

[Page 51] The second are those in which the proper conclusion is not in­ferr'd, but something consequent, or accident, as that argument of Epicure:

Whatsoever is dissolved hath not sence,
Whatsoever hath not sense pertaineth not to us:
Therefore death pertaineth not to us.

Whereas to conclude syllogistically, we should say, Therefore whatsoever is dissolved pertaineth to us.

In a reason or argument, the sumption [...], and the assumption Not [...], as the learned Bursius hath observed, dia [...]. Cic. 6. 2. [...], (termed by Aristotle [...]), are axioms received by consent of the adversary, for construction of that which is cal­led Inference [...] (by Aristotle [...], conclusion) because it is inferr'd from the rest.

Galen. de D [...]ctrina Hippo [...]. & Plat. lib. 2. Of sumption and assumption according to Chrysippus, there are foure differences: The first Scientifick: The second Exercitative, or (as Aristotle calls it) Dialectick: The third Probable and Rhetori­call: The fourth Sophistick.

CHAP. XXVII.
Of conclusive Reasons.

Laert. Sext. Empir. OF Reasons there are two kinds, conclusive, and not-conclusive. Conclusive reasons are those, in which the Sumptions being granted, from the concession thereof, the Inference seemeth to follow.

Conclusive reasons, in respect of their matter, are of two kinds, true and false. True are those, which from true sumptions collect a true inference. Not-true the contrary.

The Lawes and rules of true and false reasons, are these: 1. Truth is consequent to truth: as, If it is day, it is light. 2. False is consequent to false: as, If it be false that it is night, it is likewise false that it is dark. 3. False is consequent to true: as, Earth, if it flies is earth. 4. False is not consequent to true: for, because it is earth, it is not therefore consequent that it flies.

Again, of true reasons, some are demonstrati [...]e, others not-demonstrative. A demonstrative reason is that, which by things that are certain, or perspicuous, collecteth that which is uncertain and lesse perspicuous: as, If sweat issue through the skin, we may un­derstand pores; but sweat issues through the skin, therefore we may un­derstand pores.

Not-demonstrative are contrary: as, If it is day, it is light; but it is day, therefore it is light. Herein the inference, it is light, is certain.

CHAP. XXVIII.
Of Syllogistick Conclusive Reasons, or Syllogisms.

COnclusive reasons, as to their from likewise, are of two kinds; Syllogistically conclusive, and not Syllogistically conclusive. Laert. Syllogistically-conclusive Reasons (or Syllogismes) are those which either cannot be more concluded, or whereof one or more of the sumptions are reduced to those which cannot be concluded again; as, if Dion walks, he is moved.

Syllogismes (by which the Stoicks understand only the tro­picall, or hypotheticall,) are of three kinds, connex, disjunct, con­junct.

Simplic. in Epictet. A connex Syllogism is, when two are so connected in them­selves, that one is the antecedent, the other the consequent, in such manner, as, if the antecedent be asserted, the consequent follow­eth, and the consequent being taken away, the antecedent is like­wise taken away, as, if it be day, it is not night, this antecedent is true, therefore it followeth, it is night. This kind of Syllogisme pertains to the first and second moods. In the first it is called from Position of the antecedent, to Position of the consequent; in the second, from negation of the antecedent, to negation of the consequent. The Lawes concerning the truth, or falshood of these Syllogismes are the same with those of connex axioms.

Of connex Syllogismes there are two kinds; connex in them­selves, as, if it is light, it is ligh [...], but it is light, therefore it is light; and connex by others; as, if it is day, it is light, but it is day, therefore it is light.

A conjunct Syllogisme, is, Cic. Topic. 1. when we deny somthing conjunct, and to these adde another negation, and of these take the first, that what remains be taken away, as, Cic. ibid. it cannot be that a Lega­cy is money, and money not a Legacy; but a Legacy is money, therefore money is a Legacy.

Simpl [...]c. A disjunct Syllogism is that in which there cannot be more then one thing true, or, that in which if one be, the other is not, or, if one be not, the other is, as, It is either day or night, but it not night, therefore it is day; for one being asserted, the other is taken away, and so on the contrary. Sext. Hypotyp. Pyrrh. cap. 14. The evidence of this Syllogisme Chrysippus conceives to be so great, that even dogs have knowledge thereof. For coming to a place where there are three waies, if by the sent they find that the Beast hath not gone in two of them, they run directly to the third without senting, as if they argued thus, the Beast went either this way, or that way, or that way, but neither this way nor that way, therefore that way: The Laws of disjunct Syllogismes are the same as those of disjunct Axioms.

CHAP. XXIX.
Of Moods.

Laert. SYllogistick, conclusive Reasons are disposed into Moods. Of Moods there are two kinds, the first simple, properly called a Mood, [...], defined a kind of figure of the Reason, as thus,

If the first is, the second is,
But the first is,
Therefore the second is.

(It is observable by the way, that the Stoicks for letters used numbers.) The other compounded, called [...], as being con­sistent of both reason and Mood, as,

If Plato liveth, Plato breatheth,
But the first,
Therefore the second.

This is used in a long Syntax, that it be not necessary to speak a long assumption, or a long inference, but they abbreviate them thus, but the first, therefore the second.

Of Moods or Tropes there are two kinds, one of indemonstra­bles, so termed, not that they cannot be demonstrated, but be­cause they conclude so evidently, that they need not be repr [...] ­ved; the other of demonstrables.

Of Indemonstrable Moods, there are (according to Chrysippus) five, according to Cic Topic. Martian C [...]p [...]l. others more or lesse.

The first, wherein every reason consists of a connex, and an an­tecedent from which beginneth the connex, and the consequent is inferred, as,

If the first, then the second,
But the first,
Therefore the second.

The second indemonstrable is, which, by the consequent of the connex, and the contrary of the consequent, hath a conclusion contrary to the antecedent, as,

If it is day, 'tis light,
But it is night,
Therefore, it is not day.

[Page 54] The third is, that which by a negative complication, and one of those which are in the complication, inferrs the contrary to that which remains, as,

Plato is not both dead and alive,
But Plato is dead,
Therefore Plato is not alive.

The fourth is that which by a disjunctive, and one of those which is in the disjunctive, concludeth the contrary to that which remains, as,

Either it is the first or second,
But it is the first,
Therefore it is not the second.

The fift is that wherein the whole reason is connected by a disjunctive, and one of those which are in the disjunctive of the contrary, inferreth the rest, as,

Either it is night, or it is day,
But it is not night.
Therefore it is day.

CHAP. XXXI.
Of not-Syllogistick-conclusive Reasons.

Laert. REasons not-syllogistically-conclusive (which are likewise especi­ally called (as their genus) conclusive in opposition to Syllo­gismes) are those which conclude not by way of Syllogisme, as,

It is false, that it is both night and day,
But it is day,
Therefore it is not night.

And this of Chrysippus.

Whatsoever is good is laudable,
Whatsoever is laudable is honest,
Therefore whatsoever is good is honest.

These not-syllogistick, or categorick-conclusives, are frequently used by the Stoicks (as by Zeno in Cicero) but immethodically, [Page 55] not reduced to Mood and figure. Those they applyed onely to tropicall reasons [...] as in which consisteth the sole way and order of inference. The Categoricall are not Syllogi [...]ines, because in them somthing is ever omitted, and therefore they are [...], immethodically conclusive; as in that argument of Chrysippus last mentioned, two assumptions, and an inference are omitted, for it ought to be thus,

If it be good, it is laudable,
But it is good,
Therefore it is laudable.

And again,

If it be laudable, it is honest,
But it is laudable,
Therefore it is honest.

Hence are derived those reasons which are called [...], and [...], adjic [...]ent and adject, consisting of propositions con­tinually assumed without conclusions. Adject are those whose conclusion is omitted; Adjicient, those whose d [...]monstrative pro­position is omitted, as,

The first of every second,
The second of every third,
The third of every fourth,
Therefore the first of every [...]ourth.

In this adject, the conclusion is omitted, which is, therefore the first of every third

CHAP. XXXI.
Of not-conclusive Reasons.

Laert. NOt-conclusive Reasons are those, whose opposite to the infe­rence is repugnant to the connexion of the sumptions: Sext. Empir. adv. Logic. They are of four kinds. 1. By incoherence. 2. By redundance. 3. By being in an ill figure. 4. By defect.

By incoherence, when the propositions have no conjunction or communion with one another, nor with the inference, as,

If it is day, it is light,
But corn is sold,
Therefore it is light.

[Page 56] For neither, it is day, hath any communion with, Corn is sold. nor both of them together, with, it is light; but each dependeth upon somthing else.

By redundance, when somthing is assumed to the proposition extrinsecall and superfluous, as,

If it is day, it is light,
But it is day, and Vertue profiteth,
Therefore it is light.

For Vertue profiteth is superfluously assumed with the other pro­position, the inference depending upon the other two.

By being in an ill figure, as, this is a right figure,

If the first, the second,
But the first is,
Therefore the second.

But this,

If the first, the second,
But not the second,—

Is not conclusive, not that in this figure, there cannot be reason which may collect truth from truth, for that it may do as thus,

If there are four, six are eight,
But three are not four,
Therefore six are not eight.

But because there may be some ill reasons in it, as this,

If it be day, 'tis light,
But it is not day,
Therefore it is not light.

By defect, when there want one of the collective propositions, as,

Riches are either ill or good,
But riches are not good;
Therefore they are ill.

For in the disjunct there wanteth this, or indifferent, so that to be perfect the sumption should be thus, Riches are ill, or good, or indifferent.

CHAP. XXXII.
Of fallacious Reasons or Sophismes.

BY Dialectick are discerned true and false reasons: the latter are Sophismes, proper to Sophists, who dispute for vain-glory, or gain; as true reasons are to Logicians, whose end is only to finde out truth.

Of fallacious reasons there are many kinds; the Quiescent rea­son, or Sorites, the Lying, the Inexplicable, the Sluggish, the Do­minative, the Vailed, Electra, the Horned, the Crocodilite, the Reci­procall, the Nullity, the Defective, the Mower, the Bald, the Occult, the Negative.

Suid. Sorites, named from [...], a heap, is, Vlpian. 48. ad Sabin. when from things evident­ly true, by short mutations, the dispute is brought to things evi­dently false: Laert. though the example be falsely applyed, as Bursius and Casaubon have observed. as, Are not two few? are not three so likewise? and four, and so on to ten? But, two are a few, therefore ten. Laert. in Chrysip. It is called also [...], the quiescent reason, Cic. Acad. qu [...]st. 4. because the way to withstand it is by stopping, and witholding the assent.

The lying reason, [...], is a captious argument, not to be dissolved. Of this, see the life of Eubulides.

Agel. 9. 15. The inexplicable reason, [...], so called, from the intri­cate nature thereof, not to be dissolved, wherefore it seems to be the same with the lying, and perhaps the genus to most of those which follow.

The sluggish reason, [...], is manifested by this exam­ple: Cicer▪ de [...]at [...], If it be decreed that you shall recover of this sicknesse, you shall recover whether you take Physick or not. Again, if it be decreed you shall not recover, you shall not recover, whether you take Physick or not: Therefore it is to no purpose to take Physick. This argument is justly termed fluggish, faith Cicero, because by the same reason, all action may be taken away from life.

The Dominative reason, [...]; of this already in the life of Diodorus.

The vailed reason, [...]: Of this, and Electra, and the Horned reason, [...], in the life of Eubulides.

The Crocodilite, so named from this Aegyptian fable: [...]oxop [...]t. in Apthe. A wo­man sitting by the side of Nilus, a Crocodile snatched away her child, promising to restore him, if she would answer truly to what he asked; which was, Whether he mean [...] to restore him or not. She answered, Not to restore him, and challeng'd his promise, as having said the truth. He replyed, that if he should let her have him, she had not told true.

The reciprocall reasons, [...], such was that of Agell. 5. 10. Protago­ras the Sophist, against Euathlus, a rich young man, his disciple, who promised him a great summe of mony for teaching him, [Page 58] whereof halfe he paid in hand, the other halfe was to be paid the first that he should plead before the Judges, and carry the cause. Having learned long, and attained a great perfection in Rhetorick, he forbore to pl [...]ad in publi [...]k [...], that he might de­fraud Protagoras. Protagoras sues him, and the cause comming to hearing, begins thus: Know, foolish young man, that which way soe­ver the Cause goes, whether for thee or against thee, thou must pay what I demand. If against thee, it will be given me by judgment; if for thee, thou must pay it according to our agreement. E [...]athlus answers: I might have been intrapped by your subtlety, if I did not plead my selfe, but had employ'd some other to plead for me. Now I r [...]ioyce doubly in the victory, that I shall be too hard for you, not only in cause, but in argu­ment. Know therefore, my most wise Master, that which way soever the cause go, either with me, or against me, I will not pay what you demand. If it go with me, the judgment will acquit me; if against me, you are to have nothing by our agreement. The Judges not able to determine it, dismist them both.

Oay [...]. The nullity, [...], used by Ulysses, who called himselfe [...], no body, when he hurt Polypheme, whence it came to be so named.

The defective reason, [...], mentioned by Laertius in Zenone: The mower, [...], by Lucian: The bald, [...], by Laertius in Eubulide: The occult, [...], by La­ertius in Eubulide: The negative, [...], by Laertius in Chry­sippo, and by Epictetus. But of these enough.

CHAP. XXXIII.
Of Method.

THere are two kinds of disputation: Cic. Off [...]. 2. One, when the truth it selfe is subtlely polished in the dispute: The other, when every expression is accommodated to the vulgar opinion; for, we must use popular and usuall words, when we speak of po­pular opinions, which Panaetius in the like manner hath done.

Cic. de [...]in. 3. The first way was peculiar to the Stoicks, short, acute, and spinous, called likewise Logick, most worthy of Philosophy; for this useth definitions, divisions, and the lights which they af­ford, as likewise similitudes, dissimilitudes, and the nice acute distinction of them.

The vulgar way of dispute is likewise two-fold: One by con­tinued oration: The other by question and answer; the first cal­led Senec. [...]pist. 14. 90. Analytick, or Cic. de sin. 2. Rhetoricall; the other Senec. Ep. 14. 90. Topick, or Cic. de sin. 2. Dialecticall. Cic. ibid. Though the first be delightfull, yet the latter is more commo­dious, when we insist on particulars, and understand what eve­ry man granteth, what every man denyeth, what we would have concluded from concessions, and brought to an end. For, [Page 59] when a [...] is [...] [...]n like [...] it beats ma­ny things along with it; yet we can hold nothing, we cannot stop the [...]apid [...] Cic. de nat. deor. 2. The other [...] concluding as Zeno used, more shortly and narrowly, [...] re­prehension. As a River in its course, cannot at all, or very [...]rdly be corrupted, but water shut up, [...]: So by [...], the faults of the oppo [...] are carried quite away; in [...] speech, they are not easily defend [...] [...] [...]

But each of these methods hath a severall use, the [...] pro­per for exposition of A [...]s and Sci [...]nces, the oth [...] for [...]

THE SECOND PART.

CHAP. I.
ETHICK, and the parts thereof.

Laert, THE Morall part of Philosophy is divided into these pla­ces; Of appetite, Of good and ill; Of passions, Of Virtue, of the End; Of the first aestimation, of Actions, Offices, exhortations and de­hortations.

Thus distinguisheth Chrysippus, Archidemus, Zeno of Tarsis, A­pollodorus, Diogenes (the Babylonians) Antipater▪ and Possidonius. But Zeno the Cittiean, and Cleanthes, as being more antient, were lesse accurate in their manner of treating upon these things.

CHAP. II.
Of Appetite.

THE consideration of Ethick, beginneth properly from Appetite. Stob. eclog. Ethic. Appetite is moved by Phantasie of an Office, for it is the impulsion of the soul to somthing.

Appetite in rationall and irrationall Creatures is different; [...] is not rationall appetite, but a species of rationall appetite. Rational appetite is defined an impulsion of the intellect to the doing of somthing. [...] is a species of practick appetite, being an impulsion of the Intellect to somthing future. Hence appetite is taken four waies, for rationall and irrationall inclination, and for rationall and irrationall aversion. To these may be added the [Page 60] habit of Appetition, which is likewise called appetite, the Ori­gine of all appetitive acts.

Of practick appetite there are many species, of which are

  • 1. [...], a Designation.
  • 2. [...], an appetite before appetite.
  • 3. [...], an action before action.
  • 4. [...], an appetite to somthing now existent.
  • 5. [...], a will by ratiocination,
  • 6. [...] a Will before Will.
  • 7. [...], an appetite joined with reason.
  • 8. [...], a spontaneous Will.

CHAP. III.
Of first naturall Appetite.

Laert. THe first appetite of a living creature is to preserve it self, this being from the beginning proper to it by nature, as Chrysippus in his first Book of Ends, who affirmes that the care of our selves, and consciousnesse thereof, is the first property of all living Crea­tures. For, Nature producing a living Creature, intended either to alienate it from it self, or to commend unto its own care; but the first is not likely; it followeth therefore, that Nature com­mendeth to every thing the preservation of it selfe, whereby it repulseth whatsoever is hurtfull, and pursueth what is convenient.

Cic. de sin. 3. As soon therefore as a living Creature cometh into the World, it is conciliated to it self; commended to the con [...]erva­tion of it self and its own state, and to the election of such things as may preserve its state, but alienated from destruction, and from all such things as may destroy it. This is manifest in as much as before the accession of pleasure or grief, young creatures de­sire those things which conduce to their wellfare, and refuse the contrary, which would not be, if they did not love their own state, and fear destruction. Neither could they desire any thing without having some sense of themselves, whereby they love themselves, and what belongs to them. Hence it is manifest, that the principle of this love is derived from themselves.

Laert. Whereas some must hold the first appetite of a living crea­ture to be that of pleasure, that is false. Cic. sin 3. The greater part of Stoicks conceive that Pleasure is not to be placed amongst the na­turall principles of love to our selves, for if nature had so ordered it, many dishonest things would have followed. Laert. Pleasure is an after-accession, when as Nature enquiring by it self into it self, receiveth those things which are agreeable to its constitution, af­ter [Page 61] which manner living creatures are exhilarated, and plants sprout forth. Nature hath thus far made no difference betwixt plants and living creatures, that whereas plants are ordered without appetite or sense, there is in living creatures, something according to the nature of plants: But, there being over and a­bove in living creatures, an innate appetite, whereby they go to those things that are proper for them, the naturall part in them is governed by the appetitive.

Cic. [...]in. 3. That we naturally love those things which are first propo­sed unto us by nature, may be argued from hence, in that there is no man, if both were put to his choice, but had rather have all his limbs able and sound, rather then uselesse and imperfect. These comprehensions we conceive fit to be acquired for their own sake, because they have in themselves something, as it were, complex, including Truth. This is discernable in young ones, whom we see delighted, though it nothing concernes them, if they themselves finde out any thing by reason. Even the Arts we conceive to be assumed for themselves, aswell because in these there is something worthy assumption, as because they consist of knowledge, and contain somethings constituted by reason and power.

CHAP. IV.
Of Appetites consequent to the first.

Cic. de [...]in. 3. THus according to the first innate principles of Nature, those things which are according to nature being expetible in themselves, their contraries avoidable in themselves, the first office is to conserve it selfe in the state of nature, the next, to ob­tain those things which are according to nature.

Here beginneth good to be first understood, for it is the first conciliation of man to things according to nature. This Good, as soon as man receiveth intelligence or notion thereof, and seeth the order and concord of Offices, he esteemeth far above those things which he formerly loved, and by rationall knowledge collecteth, that herein is placed the chief good of man, laudable and expetible in it selfe. To this chiefe good, which consisteth in homologie or convenience, all honest actions having reference, honesty it selfe, which is reckoned amongst the good, though it rise afterward, is notwithstanding alone expetible in its own power and dignity. But, of those which are the first objects of nature, none is expetible in it selfe.

Now whereas offices proceed from the first naturall objects, they must necessarily be referred to the same; so as all Offices tend to the fulfilling of the first naturall appetites; yet, not so, [Page 62] as if therein consisted the ultimate good. Honest action is in the first conciliation of nature, for it is consequent, and ariseth as we said afterward; yet, it is according to nature, and much more allective then all that go before it.

And seeing that all offices proceed from the first naturall ap­petites, even wisdome it selfe must be derived from thence like­wise. But as it often happens, that he who is recommended to another, more esteemeth him to whom he is recommended, then the person which recommended him: so it is not strange, that we being recommended to wisdome by the first naturall appetite, afterwards more esteem that wisdome, then those things whereby we arrived at it. And as our limbs are given to us for a certain reason of living, so the appetition of the soul is given, not for every kinde of life, but for one certain form of living; so likewise reason and perfect reason. For, as action is proper to a Player, motion to a Dancer; yet, not any, but one certain kinde: so the life that is to be acted, is in one certain kinde, not in any, which kinde we call convenient and consentaneous. Wisdome is not like the art of a Pilot, or a Physician; but rather to that Action we mentioned, and to Dancing, that the extream, that is, the effection of the Art be in the Art it selfe, and not ex­trinsecall. There is another similitude betwixt Wisdome and these Arts, for in them are those things which are done rightly; yet, are not all the parts whereof they consist contained therein. Things done rightly, or Rectitudes, contain all numbers of ver­tue; for, only wisdome is wholly converted into it selfe, which is not in other Arts. But, improperly is the Art of a Pilot and a Physician, compared with the ultimate of Wisdome: For, wis­dome includeth Fortitude and Justice, and judgeth all things that happen to man to be below it, which happen [...]th not in o­ther Arts: but, none can hold these vertues which we last men­tioned, unlesse he affirm, there is nothing that is different, but honest and dishonest.

CHAP. V.
Of Good and III.

HItherto of Appetites, we come next to their Objects. Stob. Things (according to Zeno) are whatsoever participate of Essence. Of things, some are good, some ill, some indifferent.

Cic. de sin. 3. Good is severall waies defined by the Stoicks▪ but their defi­nitions tend all to one end. Sext. Empir. [...]yrrh. 3. 20. Good is profit, or that which diffe­reth not from profit. Profit is vertue, and vertuous action, not different from profit is [...] vertuous man, and a friend. For ver­tue being a quodammodotative Hegemonick, and vertuous acti­on [Page 63] being an operation according to vertue, is plainly profit. A vertuous man and a friend is not different from profit; for pro­fit is a part of Vertuous, as being the Hegemoniack thereof. Now the wholes are neither the same with their parts, for a man is not a hand, nor different from their parts, for they subsist not without parts; wherefore the whole is not different from its parts, and consequently, a vertuous man being the whole, in respect of his Hegemoniack, which is profit, is not different from profit.

Good is by some defined that which is expetible in it selfe; by others, that which assisteth to felicity, or compleateth it: by Cic. de finib. 3. Diogenes, that which is absolute by nature; [or, Laer [...] that which is perfect, according to the nature of a rationall creature.] The consequent thereof is a beneficient motion, or state absolute in nature.

Whereas things are known, either by use, or conjunction, or similitude, or collation, by this fourth kinde is the knowledge of good; for when from those things which are according to na­ture, the minde ascendeth by collation of reason, then it attain­eth the notion of good.

Cic [...]de finib. 3. Good is known and named, not by accession, increase, or comparison with other things, but by its proper power. For as Hony, though it be most sweet, yet, in its proper kinde of tast, not comparative to any other, we perceive it to be sweet: So this good of which we speak, is that which is most to be esteem­ed, but that estimation consisteth in the kinde, not the magni­tude. For, estimation being neither amongst the good nor ill, whatsoever you apply it to, it will remain in its kinde. Different therefore is the proper estimation of vertue, which consisteth in the kinde, not in increase.

Laert. Stob. To Good belongeth all vertue, as Prudence, Justice, Tempe­rance, Fortitude, and whatsoever participates of those, as ver­tuous actions and persons. Laert. Accessions hereto are joy, cheerful­nesse, and the like.

Laert. Stob. Ills are the contrary vices, as Imprudence, Injustice, Intem­perance, Pusillanimity, and whatsoever participates of vice, as vicious actions and persons. Laert. The accessions hereunto are dis­content, affliction, and the like.

Stob: Of Goods, some, as we have said, are Vertues, others not-ver­tues, as, Joy, Hope, and the like. In like manner of Ills, some are Vices, as those already mentioned; others not-vices, as Griefe and Fear.

Again, Stob. of Goods, some are continuall in all the vertuous, and at all times; such is all vertue, sounde sence, wise appetition, and the like. Others are intermissive, as joy, hope, and prudent counsell, which are not in all the wise, nor at all times.

In like manner of Ills, some are continuall in all, and alwaies [Page 64] in the imprudent, as all vice, and imprudent sence, and impru­dent appetite: Others intermissive, as griefe, fear, and impru­dent answer, which are not alwaies in the wicked, nor at all times.

Laert. Stob. Sext. Empir. Pyrth. hypot. 3. 21. Again, of Good there are three kinds: The first from which pro­fit commeth, as from its first cause, such is vertue: The second, by which profit commeth, as vertue, and vertuous action: The third that which may profit, as vertue, and vertuous actions, and a vertuous man, and a friend, and the Gods, and good Demons. Sext. Empir. Thus the second signification includeth the first, and the third, both the first and second.

Laert. Stob. In like manner of Ills, there are three kinds: First, that from which hurt originally proceedeth, as vice: Secondly, that by which hurt commeth, as vicious actions: Lastly, and most large­ly, whatsoever is able [...]o hurt.

Laert. Stob. Sext. Empir. Pyrrh. hyp. 3. 23. Again, of Goods, some are in the Soul, as vertue, and vertuous actions: some without the Soul, as a true friend, a good Country, and the like: some neither within nor without the soul: as good and vertuous men.

Laert. Stob. In like manner of Ills, some are within the Soul, as vices, and vicious actions; some without the Soul, as, imprudent friends, e­nemies, and the like; some neither within nor without the Soul, as wicked men, and all that participate of vice.

Laert. Stob. Of goods within the Soul, some are habits, some affections, some neither habits nor affections. The vertues themselves are affecti­ons, their studies habits, nor affections, their acts neither habits nor affections.

Laert. Stob. In like manner of Ills, some are affections, as vices; some ha­bits only, as infirmities of minde, and the like; some neither ha­bits nor affections, as vicious actions.

Laert. Stob. Cic. de finib. 3. Again, of Goods, some are finall, some efficient, some both fi­nall and efficient. A friend, and the benefits arising from him, are efficient goods. Fortitude, magnanimity, liberty, delectation, joy, tranquillity, and all vertuous actions are finall goods. Both efficient and finall (as all vertues) as they perfect felicity, they are efficient, as they constitute it as parts thereof, finall.

Laert. Stob. In like manner of Ills, some are finall, some efficient, some both. A friend, and the dammages incurred by him, are effi­cient. Fear, basenesse, servitude, stupidity, frowardnesse, griefe, and all vicious actions, are finall: participant of (are vices) as they procure misfortune they are efficient, as they constitute it as parts thereof, finall.

Stob. Again, of goods, some are expetible in themselves, not desired for the sake of any other: Others are preparatory to some other, called effectively expetible. The expetible in themselves are (according to Diogenes) of two kinds: 1. Ultimately expetible, as Beatitude. 2. Those which have in them the cause of being expetible, as every good hath.

[Page 65] Again, of goods some are necessary to Bea [...]titude, as all Vertues and their Acts, others not-necessary, as Joy, delectation, and study. In like manner of Ills, some are necessary to Infelicity, as all the Vices and their Acts, others not-necessary thereunto, as, all passi­ons and infirmities of the soul, and the like.

Stob. Again, of goods, some consist in motion, as Joy [...] delectation and the like; some in affection, as quiet imperturbation; Of those which consist in affection, some are likewise in habit, as the Ver­tues; others in affection only as the former. Neither consist the Vertues only in habits, but other Acts likewise, changed by a Vertuous man, in a manner, into Vertue. Of these goods which are in habit, are those we call studies, as love of Learning, and the like. For these arts by their affinity with Vertue lead directly to our chief end.

Again, Stob. of goods some are absolute, as Science, others relative, as honour, be [...]evolence, friendship, and the like.

Stob. Science is a certain infallible comprehension by reason. It is ta­ken three waies. First, for a System of Sciences conjoined toge­ther in a good man; Secondly, for a System of artificiall Sciences, having a certainty. Lastly, for a demonstrative infallible habit of phantasies by reason.

Stob. Friendship, is a community of life and consent of studies. The kinds thereof are six.

  • 1. [...] a friendship amongst known persons.
  • 2. [...], amongst Familiars.
  • 3. [...], amongst those of the same age.
  • 4. [...], towards strangers.
  • 5. [...], amongst kinred.
  • 6. [...], from Love.

Laert. Stob. Again of goods, some are simple, as knowlege, others mixt, as, [...], a good use of Children conformable to nature, [...], a good use of old age conformable to nature, [...], a good use of life conformable to Nature.

Exemption from grief, [...], and conservation of order, [...] are the same with, as the mind is with prudence, and communion with goodnesse; yet are otherwise referred, which is observable likewise in the other Vertues. Hence are the same distinctions appliable to ill.

Laert. Stob. Every good is beneficiall, opportune, conducible, usefull, commen­dable, fair, helpfull, eligible, just.

Beneficiall, [...], as conferring that whereby we receive benefit.

Opportune, [...], as comprising that whereof we stand in need.

Conducible, [...], as, resolving into it self the means, as the gaine acquired by traffick exceeds the charge.

Usefull, [...], as conducing to our profit.

Commendable, [...], from the use.

[Page 66] Fair, [...], as proportioned to the necessities of the receiver.

Helpfull, [...], as it relieves us.

Eligible, [...], as being in reason to be preferred.

Iust, [...], as being conformable to Law.

Stob. On the contrary, every ill is unbeneficiall, importune, incon­ducible, unusefull, uncommendable, foul, un [...]elpful, avoidable, and unjust.

Laert. Perfect good, is called [...], fair, because it is absolute in all numbers required of Nature, and perfectly proportionate.

Laert. Of fair, (or honest) there are four species, Iust, valiant, tempe­rate, knowing; in these are honest actions consummated.

Laert. Likewise of [...], foul (or dishonest) are four species, unjust, cowardly, dissolute, foolish.

Laert▪ Honest, is called [...], fair, first, because it renders those who are endued therewith worthy of praise; Secondly, because it is most suitable to its proper work; Thirdly, because it is an orna­ment; we say, a wise man is only good and fair.

Laert. Only that which is good is fair or honest: so Hecato in his third Book of Good; and Chrysipp [...]s of Fair. This is Vertue, and what participates thereof, which is all one, as to say, that, whatsoever is good is honest likewise, and reciprocally whatsoever is honest is good.

Cic. de sin. 3. That what is honest only is good, is proved thus. Whatsoever is good is laudable, whatsoever is laudable is honest; therefore whatsoever is good is honest. Again, there is no good which is not expetible, nothing expetible which is not pleasant and amia­ble, therefore approveable, therefore laudable, therefore honest. Again, no man can glory in a life that is miserable or not happy, therefore to glory is proper to the happy, but to glory relateth onely to that which is honest, therefore honest life is happy. And as he who is laudable, hath some eminent mark of renown & glory, for which he is justly stiled happy, the same may be said of the life of such a man, whence if a happy life consist in honesty, only that which is honest is to be esteemed good. Moreover, what man can be termed constant, firm, magnanimous, unlesse wee grant that paine is not an ill? For, hee who reckoneth death a­mongst the Ills cannot but fear it; so no man in any thing can neglect and contemn that which he accounteth ill. This being granted, the next assumption is this, he who is magnanimous and valiant, despiseth, as if they were nothing, all things that can arrive to man, whence it followeth, that nothing is ill which is not dishonest, and this sublime, excellent magnanimous person, ac­counting all humane things below him, confideth in himself and his own life past and future, knowing that no ill can happen to a wise man. Whereby wee see that what is honest only is good, which is to live happily and honestly.

[Page 67] Cie. ibid. On the other side, nothing is good, but what is honest; for, who is, or ever was so fervently covetous, and of such disordi­nate affections, that the same things, for the attainment whereof he would perpetrate any wickednesse, he had not much attain'd unto (setting aside all punishment) without all that wicked means? What advantage or fruit do we aim at, in desiring to know those things which are hidden from us, how they are moved, and by what causes agitated in heaven? Who is so sa­vage, so obdurate to naturall studies, that he abhorres things worthy knowledge, receives them without pleasure or some be­nefit, and values them at nothing? Who is there, that when he heareth of the actions, speeches, counsels of magnanimous per­sons, eminent in all vertue, is not affected with any pleasure? Who is there, that being instituted in an honest family, and in­genuously educated, is not offended at dishonesty, though it bring no hurt to him? Who is there, that lookes without trouble upon such as live impurely and flagitiously? Who doth not hate fordid, vain, light, frivolous persons? If dishonesty were not in it selfe avoidable, why should men, when they are in the dark, or in a Wildernesse, abstain from any thing that is evill; but, that the very deformity and dishonesty thereof de­terrs them? Nothing therefore is more clear, then that honest things are expetible in themselves, and dishonest things avoida­ble in themselves.

Hence it followeth, that what is honest, is more estimable then those mean things which accrue by it. And when we say, that folly, temerity, injustice, and intemperance are avoidable, in respect of those things which are consequent to them, it con­tradicts not the former assertion, that what is dishonest only is ill, because they relate not to the hurt of the body, but, to dis­honest actions which proceed from vice.

Laert. All good is equall, and every good is highly expetible, and admits neither increase, nor decrease. Cic. de fin. 3. Here commeth in a great controversy betwixt the Stoicks and the Peripateticks, which though Carneades affirm to be only verball, Cicero holdeth to be more in things then words.

Cic. ibid. The Peripateticks hold, that all goods are requisite to hap­py life; the Stoicks, that whatsoever is worthy estimation, com­pre [...]iendeth happy life. Those holding pain to be an ill, it fol­lowes, that a wise man cannot be happy upon the rack. These, who account not pains among the ills, hold, that a wise man continueth happy in the midst of torments: For, if some bear those pains with greater courage for their Country, or some lighter cause, opinion, not nature increaseth or diminisheth the power of the pain. Again, the Peripateticks asserting three kinds of good, affirm a man to be so much the more happy, the fuller he is of externall corporeall goods; or, in the Stoicks expression, [Page 68] he who hath most corporeall estimables, is most happy, for as much as by them, Beatitude is compleated. On the contrary, the Stoicks hold, that those goods which they call of nature, make not by their frequency a life more happy, or are more ex­petible, or more estimable: For then wisdome being expetible, and health expetible, both together would be more expetible then wisdome alone; whereas either being worthy estimation, both are not more worthy of estimation then wisdome alone. For the Stoicks, who hold health to be estimable, but place it not amongst the goods, hold likewise, that no estimation is to be preferred before vertue. From this, the Peripateticks dissent, asserting, that an honest action without pain, is more expetible, then the same action with pain; the Stoicks otherwise. For, as a Taper is darkened by the light of the Sun, and as a drop of wa­ter is lost in the vastnesse of the Aegean Sea, and as in the riches of Croesus the accession of one farthing, and one step in the way between this and India; so in that end of all good which the Stoicks assert, all the estimation of corporeall things must ne­cessarily be obscured, overwhelmed, and perish, by the splen­dour and magnitude of vertue. And as opportunity [...], is not made any thing greater by production of time, for whatso­ever is opportune hath its measure; so right affection, [...], and the good it selfe placed in it, that it be conformable to na­ture, admitteth no accession of encrease. For as that opportu­nity, to those of which we speak, are not made greater by pro­duction of time, for which reason the Stoicks conceive, that a happy life is not more to be desired, if it be long, then if it be short; and they use this simile: As it is the praise of a shoe to fit the foot, neither are many shoes preferred before two, nor the greater before the lesse: So in those things, whose good is confined to opportunity and convenience, neither are the more to be preferred before the fewer, nor the lon­ger before the shorter. Nor do they argue acutely, who say, if long health be more to be esteemed then short, then likewise a long use of wisdome, more then a short; they understand not, that the estimation of health is judged by space, that of vertue by opportunity; as if they should say likewise, a good death, or a good labour to a woman in travell, is better long then short: So that they see not, that some things are more esteemed for their shortnesse, others for their length.

CHAP. VI.
Of Eupathies.

Cic. Tusc. q [...]aest. lib. 4. AS soon as any object is presented to us, which seemeth good, Nature [ as we said] drives us on to the acquisition thereof, which, being done constantly and prudently, is called Will; imprudently and excessively, Desire.

Cic. ibid. Moreover, while we are so moved, that we are in some good, that happeneth also two waies, when the Soul is moved quietly and constantly according to reason, this is called Joy; when vainly and excessively, Pleasure.

Cic. ibid. In like manner, as we desire good things by nature, so by nature we decline the ill: This declination, if done according to reason, is called Caution, if without reason, Fear. Cic. ibid. Laert. Caution is only in a wise man, of fear he is not capable.

Hence it appeareth, that there are three kinds of good affections of the minde, called Laert. Eupathies, or Cic. Constancies; Ioy, Caution, Will.

1. Laert. Ioy is contrary to pleasure, as being a rationall elevation of the minde.

2. Caution is contrary to fear, as being a rationall declination of ill.

3. Will is contrary to desire, as being a rationall appetite.

These are the primarie Eupathies; and as under the primary passions are comprehended many subordinate passions; so are there secondary Eupathies subordinate to those.

Under Ioy are 1. Delectation: 2. Cheerfulnesse: 3. Aequanimity.

Under Caution, 1. Respect: 2. Cleernesse.

Under Will are, 1. Benevolence: 2. Salutation: 3. Charity.

Notwithstanding that Eupathies and passions are contrary; Cic. Tusc. q [...]aest. yet are there but three Eupathies, though there are foure passions; for, there is no Eupathie contrary to Grief.

CHAP. VII.
Of Passions.

Laer [...]. FRom falsities proceedeth a perversitie of Intellect, hence spring up severall passions, and causes of disorder.

Laert. Zeno defineth passion, a praeternaturall motion of the Soul, (or as Tusc. quaest. 4. Cicero renders it, a commotion of the Soul, a [...]erse from right reason, against Nature.) Others more briefly, a more vehement appe­tite. More vehement they call that, which recedeth from the constancy of Nature, Laert. and is contrary to nature; wherefore all passion is an excessive stupide desire.

[Page 70] Cic. ibid. The kinds of passion arise from two opinionated goods, and two opinionated evils, so they are four. From the good, desire and plea­sure; pleasure from present good, desire from future, from the ill, fear, and grief, fear, from the future, grief, from the present, for these things, whose coming we fear, when they do come, grieve us. Pleasure and desire arise from an opinion of good things, desire is fervently transported to that which seemeth good, pleasure rejoyceth when wee have obtained what we de­sire. Thus Stob. desire and fear go formost, that to apparent good, this to apparent ill, pleasure and grief follows; pleasure, when we attain what wee desire, [...], &c. so supply the▪ Text. griefe, when wee incurre what wee fear.

C [...]. ibid. All passions arise from Iudgement and Opinion, whence they are more strictly defined, (that it may appear not only how vici­ous they are, but also that they are in our power) thus;

Cic. Grief is a fresh opinion of present ill, wherein it seemeth fit that the mind be contracted and dejected, or Stob. a contraction of the soul caused by [...]pinion of present ill.

Cic. Pleasure is a fresh opinion of present good, wherein it seemeth good that the mind be exalted, or Laert. an irrational elevation of mind to somthing that seemeth eligible.

Cic. Fear is an opinion of imminent ill, which seemeth to be in­tolerable; or a contraction of the soul disobedient to reason, cau­sed by expectation of ill.

Cic. Desire is an opinion of good to come, that if it were present, it were fit for our use, or Stob. an appetite disobedient to Reason, caused by the opinion of consequent good.

These four are, as Hecato saith, primary passions, under each of which there are subordinate passions, severall species belong­ing to their proper genus.

Under Grief are these kinds,

Laert. Cic. Envy, [...], invidentia; a grief at the prosperity of others, Cicer. which doeth no hurt to him that envieth, [...]lut. Cont. Stoic. for some men desire to see their neighbours suppress'd, that themselves might be ad­vanced above them. For if a man grieve at the prosperity of ano­ther whereby he is dammaged, hee is not properly said to envy, as that of Hector to Agamemnon; but he who is nothing dam­mag'd by the prosperity of another, yet grieveth thereat, truly envieth.

Cic. Aemulation, [...] (not here taken for the imitation of Vertue, for that is laudable) a grief that another man enjoyeth that which we desire and want, or as Laertius, a grief for another's felicity, which we wish to our selves, and an aemulation thereof as greater then our own.

Laert. Iealousie, [...], obtrectation, a grief lest another enjoy what we ( Cic. love and) possesse.

Laert. Compassion, [...] misericordia, a grief for the misery another [Page 71] suffers undeservedly, Cic. for no man compassionates the punish­ment of a parricide or Traytor.

Laert. Cic. Anguish, [...], anger, an oppressive grief.

Cic. Stob. Mourning, [...], Luctus, grief for the death of a friend that was dear to us.

Cic. Wailing, Moeror, a grief accompany'd with Tears.

Cic. Laert. Trouble, [...], aerumna, a laborious piercing grief.

Cic. Sorrow, Dolo [...], a vexatious grief, perhaps the same which in Sto­baeus is termed [...], a grief with conflict of Spirit.

Cic. Lamentation, [...], a grief with thoughtfulnesse, Laert. proceeding from and encreasing by consideration and discourse.

Cic. Molestia, a permanent grief.

Cic. Affliction, a grief with corporeall torment.

Ci [...]. Desperation, a grief without any hope of amendment.

Laert. [...], an urgent grief attended by difficulty.

Stob. [...], a grief taking away the voice.

Laert. [...], an irrationall grief corroding, and hindring us from enjoying the present.

Under Pleasure are,

Cic Laert. whe [...]ce supply Stobaeus where (pleasure being omit­ted) these are applyed to a wrong head. Malevolence, [...], a Pleasure at anothers Ill, without any good to our selves. This hath no reall subsistence; for no good man was ever known to rejoyce at the harm of another.

Cic. Laert. Delectation, [...] a pleasure affecting and soothing the mind by the Ear, and in like manner by the eye, touch, smell or tast, which are all of one kind.

Cic. Iactation, a boasting Pleasure, with insolent behaviour.

Laert. [...], quasi [...], an inclination of the mind to dissolutenesse.

Laert. [...], the dissolution of Vertue.

Stob. [...], a pleasure from things not expected.

Stob. [...], a Pleasure caused by sight, without deceit.

Under Fear, are

Laert. Stob. Dread, [...], a fear causing [...].

Laert Stob. Sloth, [...] Pigritia, a fear of future action, or susception of labour.

Laert. Stob. Shame, [...], a fear of ignominy.

Laert. [...], a fear of some unusuall phantasie.

Laert. [...], a fear with losse, or trepidation of voice.

Laert. [...], a fear of somthing uncertain, or a fear of offending or falling.

Stob. [...], a fear of Gods or Demons.

Stob. [...], a fear of some grievous thing.

Cic. Terrour, a fear, which by striking the mind causeth rednesse, palenesse, trembling, or gnashing of the teeth.

Cic. Timor, a fear of approaching ill.

Cic. Pavor, a fear thrusting the mind out of its place.

Cic. Examinatio, a fear consequent, and as it were companion to Pavor.

[Page 72] Cic. Conturbatio, a fear, which disperseth all our thoughts.

Cic. Formido, a permanent fear.

Stob. The Passions subordinate to desire, are generally two, Anger and Love.

Laert. Cic. Anger is a desire of taking revenge upon those by whom wee conceive our selves wronged.

Stob. The species thereof are,

Laert. [...], or as Cicero, [...] excandescentia, anger beginning.

Laert. [...], anger encreasing.

Cic. Stob. [...], [...]odium, anger inveterate.

Cic. Stob. [...] & [...] are confounded by Laertius. [...], inimicitia, anger watching the occasion of revenge.

Stob. [...], anger breaking forth into action.

Laert. [...], a desire, whereby we wish ill to another, with conti­nuall progression.

Cic. Malice, Discordia, a bitter anger, with utmost hatred, conceived in the Heart.

Laert. [...], a desire conversant in difference of opinions.

Stob. Love is an impulsion of good wil for apparent beauty, Laert. where­by it is distinguished from the love of the vertuous, which is a voluntary susception of labour for true beauty. The species of Love are,

Laert. Cic. [...], indigentia, an (inexpleble) desire, of that which wee want, and being separated from it, in vain incline to it.

Stob. [...], desiderium, a desire to see that which is not present. They Cic. distinguish these two thus; Desire is of those things which are said, or praedicated of any thing which they call Categoremes, as to have riches, to take honours; Indigence is of the things them­selves, as of honours, of money.

Stob. [...], desire of conversation of that which is absent.

Stob. [...], desire of Pleasure.

Stob. [...], desire of Riches.

Stob. [...], desire of glory.

Stob. In all these passions there is opinion. Laert. Cic. Opinion is a weake assent. Laert. Hence passions, (as Chrysippus in his Book of passions affirmes) are Judgements; for Avarice is an opinion, or false judgement that money is good; drunkennesse, and intemperance, are the like. Stob. Opinion is likewise sudden from the contractive motion of an unreasonable elation of mind, unresonable and prae­ternaturall, in as much as it is not obedient to reason. For every passion is violent, wherefore oftentimes, though we see in those that are transported by passion, the inconvenience thereof; yet notwithstanding the same persons that condemn it, are carried away by it, as by a head-strong horse, and therefore properly may use that saying:

Against my Iudgement Nature forceth me, Meaning by judgement the knowledge of right things for man is carried beyond nature by passion, to transgresse naturall reason and right.

[Page 73] Stob. All those who are led by passion, are diverted from reason, but in another manner then those who are deceived. For the de­ceived, as for example, They who think Atomes to be the prin­ciples of all things, when they come to know that they are not, change their judgement: but, those that are in passion, although that they are taught not to grieve, or fear, or give way to any passion in the Soule; yet, they do not put them off, but are led on by their passions, untill they come to be subject to their ty­rannicall sway.

CHAP. VIII.
Of Sicknesse and Infirmities.

Cic. Tusc. quaest. 4. THE fountain of all passions is Intemperance, which is a totall defection from the minde, and from right reason, so averse from the prescription of reason, that the appetites of the Soul can by no means be ruled, or contained. As therefore Temperance allayeth appetites, and causeth them to obey right reason, and preserveth the considerate judgments of the minde; so Intemperan [...]e, the enemy thereto, enflameth, troubleth, and enciteth the state of the Soul. Thus griefes, and fears, and the rest of the passions, all arise from this. For, as when the blood is corrupt, or flegme, or choler aboundeth, sicknesses and infirmi­ties arise in the body: so the disorder of ill opinions, and their repugnance to one another, devesteth the Soule of health, a [...]d troubleth it with diseases.

Laert. Stob. Cic. By passions the minde becommeth indisposed, and as it were sick. Sicknesse of minde, [...], is an opinion and desire of that which seemeth greatly expetible; but, is not such, as love of women, of wine, of mony. These [...], have likewise their contraries in the other extream, as hatred of women, of wine, of men.

Laert. Stob. Cic. This sicknesse of minde happening with imbecillity, is called [...], infirmity. For, as in the body there are infirmities, as Gouts, Convulsions, and the like; so are there inFirmities in the minde, as love of glory, love of pleasure. And as in bodies, there is a propensity to some particular diseases; so in the minde, there is a proclivity [...], or, [...], to some particular pas­sions, as [...], propensity to envy, [...], propensity to unmer­cifulnesse, and the like.

Cic. Tusc. quaest. 4. In this place, much pains hath been taken by the Stoicks, chiefly by Chrysippus, to compare the sicknesses of the minde with those of the body.

Passion (for as much as opinions are inconstantly and turbu­lently [Page 74] tossed up and down) is alwaies in motion, and when this fervour and concitation of the minde is inveterate, and, as it were, setled in the veines and marrow, then ariseth sicknesse and infirmity, and those aversions which are contrary to those infirmities and diseases. These differ only intentionally, but re­ally are the same, arising from desire and pleasure; for, when mony is desired, and reason not immediately apply'd, as a So­cratick medicine, to cure that desire, the evill spreadeth through the veines, and cleaveth to the bowells, and becommeth sick­nesse and infirmity, which when they grow inveterate, cannot be plucked away. The name of this sicknesse is avarice. In like manner arise other sicknesses, as, desire of glory, desire of wo­men, [...], and the rest of sicknesses and infirmities. Their contraries arise from fear, as, hatred of women, [...], hatred of mankinde, inhospitality, all which are infirmities of the minde, arising from fear of those things which they flie and shun.

Infirmity of minde is defined, a vehement opinion, inherent, and wholly implanted in us, of a thing not to be desired, as if it were exceedingly to be desired. That which ariseth from aver­sion, is defined a vehement opinion, inherent, and throughly implanted in us, of a thing that ought not to be shunn'd, as if it ought to be shunned. This opinion is a judging our selves to know what we have not.

Under Infirmity are these species, Love of mony, of honour, of women, of curious meats, and the like. Love of mony, Avarice, is a vehement opinion, inherent, and throughly implanted in us, as if it were exceedingly to be desired. In the like manner are all the rest defined.

Aversions are defined thus, Inhospitality is a vehement opi­nion, inherent, and throughly implanted in us, that guests ought to be shunned. In like manner is defined hatred of women­kinde, such as was that of Hippolitus; and of man-kinde, as that of Timon.

As some are more prone to one sicknesse then to another; so are some more inclinable to fear, others, to other passions; in some is anxiety, whereby they are anxious; in others choler, which differeth from anger; for it is one thing to be chol [...]rick, another to be angry, as anxiety differs from griefe; for all are not anxious who are sometimes grieved, nor are all that are anxious grieved alwaies: as there is a difference betwixt ebriety and e­briosity, and it is one thing to be a lover, another to be amorous.

This propensity of severall persons to severall sicknesses, is called, from an analogy to the body, Infirmity, whereby is un­derstood a propensity to be sick: but in good things, because some are more apt to some goods then to others, it is stiled Facility, in ill things Proclivity, implying a lapsion; in neuters it hath the former name.

[Page 75] As there is sicknesse, infirmity, and defect in the body, so in the minde. Sicknesse is the corruption of the whole body. Infir­mity is sicknesse with some weaknesse. Defect is, when the parts of the body disagree with one another, whence ariseth pravity, distortion, deformity of the limbs; so that those two, sicknesse and infirmity, arise from the confusion and trouble of the health of the whole body; defect is seen in perfect health. But, in the minde, sicknesse is not distinguish'd from infirmity, but by co­gitation only.

Vitiosity is a habit or affection, inconstant in it selfe, and oft differing in the whole course of life; so that in one by corruption of opinions, is bred sicknesse and infirmity; in the other, incon­stancy and repugnance. For, every vi [...]e hath not disagreeing parts, as of them who are not far from wisdome, that affection is different from it selfe, as being unwise, but not distorted nor depraved.

Sicknesses and infirmities are parts of vitiosity; but, whether passions are parts thereof also, it is a question. For vices are per­manent affections, passions are moving affections, so that they cannot be parts of permanent affections.

And as in all things the Soul resembleth the Body, so in good likewise. In the body, the chie [...]est are beauty, strength, health, foundnesse, agility; so likewise in the minde. And as the good temper of the body is, when those things whereof we consist a­gree well among themselves: so the health of the Soule is, when the judgments and opinions thereof agree. This is the vertue of the Soul, which some affirm to be Temperance; others, a Soule obedient to the precepts of Temperance, and obsequious there­unto, not having any speciousnesse of her own. But, whether one or other, it is only in a wiseman; yet, there is one kinde of health of the soul, which is common also to the unwise, when by the care of Physicians, the distemper of the minde is removed.

And as there is in the body an apt figure of the limbs, toge­ther with a sweetnesse of colour, which is called Beauty; so in the soule, equality, and constancy of opinions, and judgments fol­lowing vertue, with a certain firmnesse and stability; or, inclu­ding the very power of vertue, is called Beauty.

Likewise, correspondent to the powers, nerves, and efficacity of the body, in the same termes are named the powers of the Soul. Agility of body is called quicknesse, the same commenda­tion is ascribed to wit, in respect, that the Soul overrunneth ma­ny things in a short time.

Only there is this difference betwixt Soules and bodies: Strong soules cannot be assaulted by diseases, strong bodies may [...] but, the offensions of bodies may happen without any fault, those of the Soule cannot, all whose sicknesses and passions pro­ceed from contempt of reason, and therefore are in men only; [Page 76] for, though beasts do somethings like this, yet, they fall not into passions.

Betwixt acute and obtuse persons, there is this difference, the ingenious, as Corinthian Brasse rusteth, slowly falling into sick­nesse, and more quickly got out of it: the dull do not so, neither doth the soul of an ingenious person fall into every sicknesse and passion; for, there are not many things extreamly savage and cruell, and some also have a shew of humanity, as compassion, griefe, fear.

But, the infirmities and sicknesses of the minde are lesse easi­ly rooted out, then those great vices which are contrary to the vertues; for, the sicknesses remaining, the vices may be taken away, because the sicknesses are no sooner healed, then the vices are removed.

CHAP. IX.
Of Vertue and Vice.

Laert. VErtue is a convenient affection of the Soul, throughout all life.

Of vertues there are three kinds: The first generall, taken for any perfection of a thing, as of a Statue: The second are Stob. Scien­ces, or contemplative, which, according to Hecaton, consist in spe­culation, as Prudence and Iustice. Stob. The third not-sciences, or not-contemplative, which are considered as consequent to the specu­lative; as, health, strength, hope, joy, and the like. Health is conse­quent to Temperance, a theoretick vertue, as strength to the building of an Arch. They are called not-contemplative, because they require no assent, but are by after-accession, and common even to the wicked, as health and strength.

Vice is the contrary to vertue, for Laert. Stob. the rationall creature is perverted sometimes by the perswasion of exteriour things, sometimes by the counsell of those with whom he converseth, contrary to nature, who gives us inclinations unperverted.

Of vices therefore there are two kinds: The first Laert. ignorance of those things whereof vertues are the knowledge; as, impru­dence, intemperance, injustice: The second not-ignorances; as, pusillanimity, imbecillity.

Laert. Panaetius asserteth two vertues, Theoretick and Practick: o­thers three, Rationall, Naturall, Morall. Pessidonius foure; Clean­thes, Chrysippus, and Antipater more; Apollodorus one only, Pru­dence.

Laert. Of vertues, some are primary, others subordinate. The prima­ry are foure, Prudence, Temperance, Fortitude, Iustice; the first con­versant in offices, the second in appetite, the third in tolerance, the fourth in distribution.

[Page 77] Laert. Prudence is the Science of things that are to be done, and not to be done, and neuter, or the knowledge of good, bad and neu­ter in civill life. Stob. The Vertues subordinate to Prudence are five.

[...], Laert. Stob. The Science of things that are to be done, how thy may be done beneficially.

[...], Stob. The Science of comprehending things to be effected.

[...], Stob. The Science of finding out our office.

[...], Stob. The Science of attaining the scope in every thing.

[...], Stob. The Science of finding out the issues of things.

Stob. by whom correct Lae [...]tius, who [...]pplies this de­finition to Tem­perance. Temperance, is the Science of things expetible, avoidable and neuter. Under Temperance are these species.

[...], Stob. the Science of time and order for the weldoing of things.

[...], Stob. the Science of honest and dishonest motions.

[...], Stob. the Science of avoiding just blame.

Stob. Fortitude, is the Science of things grievous, not grievous and neuter, the species under it these.

[...], Stob. a Science tenacious of right reason.

[...], Stob. a Science persisting in right judgement.

[...], Stob. a Science whereby we trust that no ill shall happen to us.

[...], Stob. Laert. the Science of overcoming those things which happen to the good and bad.

[...], Stob. a Science of the Soule which renders her invin­cible.

[...], Stob. the Science of going through to the attainment of that which we propose to our selves.

Stob. Iustice is the Science of distributing to every one according to his desert; under Justice are four subordinate vertues.

[...], Stob. The Science of worshiping the gods.

[...], the Science of well-doing.

[...], the Science of equality in community.

[...], the Science of contracting honestly with others.

Laert. In like manner of Vices, some are [...], others subordinate to the primary. The primary vices are, Imprudence, Intemperante, Pusillanimity, Injustice.

Stob. [...] ▪ so supply the Text. Imprudence is the ignorance of things good, ill and neuter; and the ignorance of things to be done, not to be done, and neuter.

Intemperance is the ignorance of things expetible, avoidable and neuter.

Pusillanimity is the ignorance of things grievous, not grievous and neuter.

Injustice is the ignorance of distributing to every one according to his deserts.

[Page 78] Stob. The subbordinate vices to these are correspondent to the se­condary vertues, as, [...], which are defined answerably to their opposite vertues.

Stob. These vertues are perfect, and consist in contemplation; but, there are other vertues, which are not arts, but faculties; con­sisting in exercise, as, health of the Soul, integrity and strength thereof, and pulchritude. For, as the health of the body is a good temperature of hot, cold, dry, and moist; so the health of the soul is a good temperature of the doctrines in the soul. And as the strength of the body consisteth in a tension of the nerves; so the strength of the soul in a proper extension▪ thereof to judg­ment and action. And as the beauty of the body is a symmetry of all the parts to one another, and to the whole: so the beauty of the soule is the symmetry of the reason and parts thereof, to the whole, and to one another.

Stob. All those vertues which are Sciences and Arts; have com­mon theorems, and the same end, wherefore they are (as [...]lut. repugn. Stoic. Zeno saith) inseparable, connexed to one another, as Chrysippus, Apol­lodorus and Hecaton affirm. He who hath one, hath all (saith Plut. repugn. Stoic. Chrysippus) and he who doth according to one, doth according to all. He who hath vertue, is not only contemplative, but also practick of those things which are to be done. Things which are to be done are either expetible, tolerable, distributible, or re­tainable; so that whosoever doth one thing wisely, doth another justly, another constantly, another temperately; and so is both wise, magnanimous, just, and temperate.

Stob. Notwithstanding, these vertues differ from one another by their heads: For, the heads of prudence are, to contemplate and do well, that which is to be done in the first place, and in the second, to contemplate what things are to be avoided, as ob­structive to that which is to be done. The proper head of tem­perance is to compose our own appetites in the first place, and to consider them; in the second, those under the subordinate vertues, as being obstructive and divertive of appetites. The heads of Fortitude [...] the first place, to consider all that we are to undergo; in the second, other subordinate vertues. The heads of justice are in the first place, to consider what every one deserves, in the second, the rest. For all vertues consider the things that belong to all, and the subordinate to one ano­ther. Whence Panaetius saith, it is in vertue as in many Archers, who shoot at one mark distinguished by divers colours: every one aims at the mark, but one proposes to himselfe the white line, another the black, and so of the rest. For, as these place their ultimat end in hitting the mark, but every one proposes to himselfe a severall manner of hitting: so all vertues have Beatitude, which is placed conformably to nature for their end, but severall persons pursue it severall waies.

[Page 79] Stob. As vertues are inseparable, so are they the same substanti­ally with the supream part of the soul, in which respect all vertue is said to be a body, for the Intellect and Soul are a body, for the soul is a warm spirit innate in us. Therefore our soul is a living creature, for it hath life and sence, especially the su­pream part thereof, called the Intellect. Wherefore all vertue is a living creature, because it is essentially the Intellect. And therefore [...], for that expression is consequent to this assertion.

Stob. Between vertue and vice there is no medium (contrary to the Peripateticks, who assert a mean progression betwixt vertue and vice) for all men have a naturall appetite to good: and as a stick is either straight or crooked, so man must be either just or unjust; but cannot be either more or lesse just or unjust.

Ldert. That vertue may be learned, is asserted by Chrysippus, in his first book of the End, and by Cleanthes, and Possidonius in his Ex­hortations, and Hecaton, because men of bad are made good

Stob. That it may be lost is likewise affirmed by C [...]rysippus, deny'd by Cleanthes. The first [...]aith, it may be lost by drunkennesse or madnesse: the other, that it cannot be lost, by reason of the firm comprehensions of the soul.

L [...]e [...] Vertue is in it selfe vertue, and not for hope or fear of any externall thing. It is expetible in it selfe, for which reason, when we do any thing amisse, we are ashamed, as knowing that only to be good, which is honest.

Lae [...]. In vertue consisteth Felicity, for the end of vertue is to live convenient to nature. Every vertue is able to make a man live convenient to nature: for, man hath naturall inclinations for the finding out of Offices, for the composure of Appetites, for tolerance and distribution. Vertue therefore is selfe-sufficient to Beatitude, as Zeno, Chrysippus, and Hecaton assert. For if, [...]aith he, magnanimity, as conceiving all things to be below it selfe, is selfe-sufficient, and that be a part of vertue, vertue it selfe, which despiseth all things that obstruct her, must also be selfe-sufficient to Beatitude. But Panaetius and Possidonius deny, that vertue is selfe-sufficient, affirming, that it requireth the assi­stance of health, strength, and necessaries; yet, they hold, that vertue is alwaies used, as Cleanthes affirms, for it cannot be lost, and is alwaies practised by a perfect minde which is good.

Laert Justice is not by nature, but by prescription, as law and right reason: Thus Chrysippus in his book of honest.

Stub. Vertue hath many attributes, it is called

  • 1. [...], a good, because it leadeth us to right life.
  • 2. [...], because it is approved without any controversy, as being most excellent.
  • 3. [...], because it is worthy of much study.
  • 4. [...], because it may justly be praised.
  • [Page 80] 5. [...], because it inviteth those who desire it.
  • 6. [...], because it conduceth to goodnesse of life.
  • 7. [...], because it is usefull.
  • 8. [...], because it is rightly expetible.
  • 9. [...], because being present it profiteth, being absent, it it doth not.
  • 10. [...], because it hath an use that exceeds the labour.
  • 11. [...], because it is alone sufficient to him that hath it.
  • 12. [...], because it takes away all want.
  • 13. [...], because it is common in use, and extendeth to all the uses of life.

CHAP. X.
Of the End.

St [...]b. THe end is that, for whose sake all offices are done, but it self is not done for the sake of any: or that to which all things done conveniently in life are referred, it selfe is referred to no­thing.

Stob. The end is taken three waies: First, for the finall good, which consisteth in rationall conversation: Secondly, for the scope, which is convenient life, in relation thereto: Lastly, for the ultimate of expetibles, unto which all the rest are referred.

Stob. Scope and end differ; for scope is the proposed body, which they who pursue Beatitude aim at. Felicity is proposed as the scope, but the end is the attainment of that felicity. If a man throw a spear or an arrow at any thing, he must do all things that he may take his aim aright, and yet so, as to do all things whereby he may hit: So when we say, it is the ultimate end of man to obtain the principles of nature, we imply in like manner, he must do all things necessary to taking aim, and all things like­wise to the hitting of the mark; but, this is the last, the chiefe good in life, that as to be selected, notdesired.

Reason being given to rationall creatures, for the most per­fect direction, to live according to reason, is in them to live ac­cording to nature, that being the Artificer of Appetite. Hence Stob. Zeno first (in his discourse of human nature) affirmes, that the end is, to live conformably, that is, to live according to one reason concordantly, as on the contrary, savage Beasts that are alwaies at difference, live miserably.

The followers of Zeno, Stob. conceiving his expression not full e­nough, enlarged it. First, Cleanthes his successor, added, to na­ture, making it up thus, The End is to live conformably to Nature, which is to live according to vertue: for nature leads us to vertue. [Page 81] Thus Cleanthes in his book of Pleasure, and Possidonius, and Heca­ton in his book of Ends.

St [...]. Chry [...]ippus, to make the expression of Cleanthes more clear, expounds it thus, To live according to expert knowledge of things which happen naturally: For our natures are parts of the Universe, our end therefore is to live conformably to nature, which Chry­sippus, in his first book of Ends, expounds, both our own proper human nature, and likewise the common nature of the Uni­verse. But Cleanthes allowes only common nature to be follow­ed, and not the particular. To live according to this knowledge, is all one, as to live according to vertue, not doing any thing forbidden by our common Law. Right Reason, which is cur­rent amongst all, being the very same that is in God, the Go­vernour of all. The vertue therefore, and beatitude of a happy man, is, when all things are ordered according to the correspon­dence of a mans Genius, with the will of him who governs the Universe.

Stob. Diogenes defineth the end, A good use of reason, in the election and refusall of naturall things, choosing those that are according to na­ture, and refusing those that are repugnant to nature. So likewise Antipater.

Archidemus defineth it, To live, performing compleatly all offices, choosing of those things which are according to nature, the greatest and most principall, and not to be able to transgresse them.

Panaetius, to live according to the appetites given us by nature.

Possidonius, to live contemplating the truth and order of the Uni­verse.

Ci [...]de fin [...] 4. Thus by living according to nature, the Stoicks understand three things: First, to live according to the knowledge of those things which happen by nature. This is Zeno's end, to live con­venient to nature. Secondly, to live, preserving all, or the grea­ter part of mean offices. This exposition differeth from the for­mer; for that is a Rectitude, proper only to a wise man, this is the office of a progressive, not perfect person, which may like­wise be to the foolish. The third is, to live in enjoyment of all, or the greater part of those things which are according to na­ture. This is not constituted in our action, for it consisteth of that kinde of life which enjoyeth vertue, and of those things which are according to nature, and are not in our power.

Cic. de fi [...]. 2. The chiefe good therefore, is to live suitably to the know­ledge of those things which arrive by nature, elective of those which are according to nature, and rejective of those which are contrary to nature. Philo. Iud mel [...]. This is to live conveniently and conforma­bly to nature, when the soul entring into the path of vertue, walketh by the steps and guidance of right reason, and follow­eth God. That which in other arts is artificiall, is here epige­matick and consequent.

[Page 82] Stob. This end is Beatitude. Beatitude, by Zeno. is defined a good course of life, which definition is used likewise by Cleanthes and Chrysippus, and all their followers, who affirm Beatitude to be no­thing but happy life.

Fair and good, and Vertue, and that which participates of Vertue are equivalent termes, whence it followes that Stob. Beatitude is all one with living according to Vertue. Cic. And as Good, and Virtue admit no degrees of increase or diminution, neither doth the ul­timate end of all good and Virtue increase or diminish. For, as they who are drowned, are no more able to breath, though they are nearer the top of the water then they who are in the bottom; nor a little whelp, the time of whose sight approacheth, see any more then one that is newly litter'd; so he, who hath made some little progresse in Vertue, is no lesse in misery then he who hath made none.

CHAP. XI.
Of Indifferents.

OF things as we have said, some are good, some ill, some in­different. Cic. dc finib. 3. To deny this difference of things, would be to confound all life, as Aristo doth, neither could there be any functi­on or act of wisdom, since that, if amongst those things which ap­pertain to life there were no difference, no election were re­quisite.

Good and ill, as we said, are these things which are honest or dishonest. Of these hitherto. Betwixt both these, there are some things which conferre nothing to happy or unhappy life, called Indifferents. Laert. To profit is a motion or state proceeding from Vertue; To hurt is a motion or state proceeding from Vice; but Indifferents neither profit nor hurt, such are life, health, pleasure, Beauty, Strength, riches, honour, Nobility, and their contraries; death, sicknesse, grief, deformity, imbecillity, poverty, dishonour, meannesse and the like. Thus Hecaton in his seventh Book of Ends, and Apollodorus in his Ethicks, and Chrysip­pus. These therefore are not goods, but indifferents. For, as the property of Heat is to warm, not to cool, so is it of good to profit, not to hurt. But health and wealth doe not hurt more then they profit, therefore health and wealth are not goods. Again, that which we may use ill as well as well, is not good; but health and wealth may be used ill as well as well, therefore health and wealth are not goods. Yet P [...]ssidonus reckons these a­mongst goods. But Hecaton in his 19 th of Good, and Chrysippus of Pleasure, will not allow Pleasure a good: For pleasures are dishonest, but nothing dishonest is good.

[Page 83] Cic de finib. 3 Moreover, Riches, as Diogenes con ceiveth, have not only this power that they guide to Pleasure and good health, but that they comprise them. They do not the same in Vertue nor in o­ther arts, whereto mony may be a guide, but it cannot contain them. Thus if Pleasure or health were good, riches likewise should be numbred amongst the good, but if wisdom be good, it followeth not that riches likewise be good, nor that any thing which is not reckoned amongst the good, not that which is good can be contained by any thing which is not amongst the good. And also for this reason, because Sciences and comprehensions of things, by which Arts are produced, move appetition; but riches are not reckoned among the good, it [...]olloweth that no Art can be contained in Riches, and much l [...]sse any Vertue, for Vertue requireth far more study and exercise then Art, and compriseth the firmnesse, stability, and constancy of all life, which Art doth not.

Sext. Empir. Pyrrh. hyp. 3. 22. whence supply Laertius and Stob [...]us. Things are said to be indifferent in three respects; First, if they move neither appetite nor aversion, as, if the starres be of e­ven number, or to have even or uneven hairs on our head, to stretch out the finger this way or that way, to take up straw and the like. Secondly, things are said to be indifferent which move appetite and aversion equally, not one more then the other; as in two pieces of Silver of equall value, no way different, which to him who comes to make choice of either, are indifferent. There is an appetition to the election of one, but not more of this then of that. The third kind of indifferents are those which are neither good nor ill, expetible nor avoidable, conducing neither to hap­pinesse nor unhappinesse. In this sense all things are called in­different, which are betwixt Vertue and Vice, as health, wealth, strength, glory, and the like; for we may be happy without these, though their use hath some relation to happinesse, their abuse to unhappinesse. In this sense whatsoever we may somtimes use wel, other times ill, is indifferent, which kind appertaineth chiefly to Ethick.

Stob. Again, of Indifferents some are Naturall, and move appe­tite, as health, strength, soundnesse of sense and the like; some Praeternaturall which move avertion, as sicknesse, infirmity, and the like; some Neuter, which move neither appetite nor aversion, as the constitution of the soul and body, one capable of receiving Phantasies, the other wounds.

Stob. Of naturall and praeternaturall indifferents, some are primary, others by participation. Primary naturall Indifferents are motions or affections convenient with reason, as health and strength. Par­ticipant are those by which that motion or affection is communi­cated, as a healthfull body, [...]ound sense. Stob. Praeternaturall Indiffe­rents are the contrary to these.

CHAP. XII.
Of Estimation.

Laert. EStimation [...], is a certain concurrence with convenient life, which concernes all good. Stob. Estimation is two-fold; one, a mediate power or use concurring with life according to nature; such we call health or wealth, as far as they conduce to life, ac­cording to nature. The other is the valuation of the Estimator, imposed by him who is skilfull in such things.

Stob. Again, Estimation is taken three waies: First, for absolute do­nation: Secondly, for return of approbation: Thirdly, as Antipater calls it, Elective, by which, when some things are proposed, we rather choose these then those; as health before sicknesse, life be­fore death, and riches before poverty. In like manner, disestima­tion is taken three waies, the termes only changed to the contra­ry. Donation according to Diogenes, is a judgment, that a thing is according to nature, or conferreth use thereto. Approbation is in in man, not in things. Election only in the goood, not the indiffe­rent.

Laert. Stob. Sext. Empir. Pyrrb. hyp: 3. 24. Hence followeth another distinction of indifferents, whereof some are preserred, some rejected, some neither preferred nor re­jected. Preferred are those, which though they are indifferents, have neverthelesse a sufficient reason why they are to be had in estimation, as health, soundnesse of sense, exemption from griefe, glory, and the like. Rejected are those, which are not worthy a­ny estimation, as poverty, sicknesse, and the like. Neuter are those, which are neither preferred nor rejected, as to extend or contract the finger.

These termes preferred, [...], and rejected, [...], were invented by Zeno, upon this ground: Cic. de fin. 3. As when we speak of the Court, no man [...]aith, the King himselfe is preferred to dignity, but those who are in some honour, next and second to him in rank: so when we speak of life, we call not those things which are in the first place, the preferred or promoted, but those which are in the second: and so likewise in the rejected. Now forasmuch as good hath the first place, it followes, that what is preferred, is neither good nor ill. [No good is reckoned amongst the preferred, because that hath the greatest estimation; but the preferred having the second estimation, approacheth somewhat to the nature of good. It is called preferred, not that it condu­ceth to Beatitude, but in respect of the rejected.] We define it thus: an Indifferent with mean estimation; for it could not be, that nothing should be left in mean things, that is according to, or contrary to nature, neither being left, that nothing should be placed in them, which is sufficiently estimable, this being gran­ted, [Page 85] that there is not somthing preferred. Rightly therefore this distinction is made, and may more fully be explained by this smile. As if we should suppose our ultimate end, to be so to cast the dy that it may chance right, the dy that shall be so to cast as to fall right, must have some thing preposed and preferred to­wards its end; and on the other side the contrary, yet the pre­position of the dy, nothing conduceth to that end; to those which are preferred, relate indeed to the end, but nothing pertain to the power and nature thereof.

Laert Stob. Of the preferred some are in the Soul, as ingenuity, art, pro­gression and the like; some in the body, as life, health, strength, a­bility, soundnesse, beauty: some externall, as riches, honour, no­bility and the like.

Laert. Stob. In like manner of the rejected, some are in the Soul, as he be­tude, ignorance; some in the body, as death, sicknesse, infirmity, maim, deformity. Some externall, as poverty, dishonour and meannesse.

Likewise of the Neuter, some are in the Soul, as imagination, assent; some in the body, as whitenesse, blacknesse, some externall, which having no estimation or use, are of little value.

Those which are preferred in the Soul, conduce more to living according to Nature, and are of more worth then those of the body, or the externall, as to have a good disposition of mind, is better then to have a good disposition of body.

Stob. Again, of the preferred, some are preferred for themselves, as ingenuity, countenance, state, notion, and the like; some for o­thers, because they effect somthing, as Riches, and Nobility; some both for themselves and others, as health, strength, soundnesse▪ ability: for themselves, as being according to Nature; for others as affording no small benefit.

Cic. de finib. 3. As concerning Reputation, [...], Chrysippus and Diogenes af­firm, that being separated from utility, we should not so much as stretch out our finger for it. But those who followed them, not able to withstand Carneades, affirmed Reputation to be preferred for it selfe, and that it was proper for an ingenuous man freely educated, to desire to be well spoken of by his Parents, kinred, and good men, and that for the thing it self, not for the use there­of, adding, that as we provide for Children, though to be born after our death; so we must provide for future reputation after death, even for its own sake separated from all use.

Stob. In like manner of the rejected, some are rejected for themselves, some for others, some both for themselves and others, which appears by the rule of Contraries.

CHAP. XIII.
Of Actions and Offices.

OF those Actions which proceed from appetite, some are offices, some praeter-offices, some neuter.

Laert. Cic. de [...]nib. 3. Office is that which is preferred, and hath a good reason for the doing thereof, as being convenient to life; or, as others, Of­fice is whatsoever reason requireth to be done, as, to honour our Brethren, Parents, Country, to relieve our friends. Zeno first gave it this name, [...], Office, [...]. It is an action conformable to the dictates of nature, and extends even to plants, and irrationall living creatures, for offices may even be observed in those.

Praeter-office is an action, which reason requireth that we do not, as, to neglect our Parents, to contemn our Brethren, to dis­agree with our Friends, to despise our Country, and the like.

Neuter are those actions which reason neither requireth nor forbiddeth, as the taking up of a straw.

Stob. Of Offices, some are perfect, called [...], Rectitudes, acti­ons done according to vertue; as, to do wisely, to do justly: O­thers not-rectitudes, actions which have not a perfect office, but a mediate; as, to marry, to go an Embassy, to discourse, and the like.

Of rectitudes, some are in things requisite, others not: Of the first kinde are, to be wise, temperate, and the like: of the second, those which are not requisite to the being such. In like manner are praeter-offices divided.

Again, of Offices some are ordinary, as, to have a care of our selves, of our limbs, and the like: Some extraordinary, as, to maim our selves, throw away our goods. Accordingly is it of praeter-offices.

Again, of O [...]fices, some are continuall, as, to live vertuously: some intermassi [...]e, as, to question, answer, walk, and the like. Accordingly it is of praeter-o [...]fices.

Cic de sin. 3. Office is a mean thing, placed neither amongst the good, nor their contraries; for, there is something in this approvable, so as a right reason may be given for it, as done approvably. That which is so done is office. And forasmuch as in those things which are neither vertues nor vices, there is somthing which may be of use, it is not to be taken away. Again, it is manifest, that a wise man doth something in these mean things; he therefore, when he doth it, judgeth that it is his office so to do; but, a wise­man is never deceived in judgment, therefore there is an office in mean things. Again, we see there is something which we call a thing rightly done, or a Rectitude, but that is a perfect office; [Page 87] therefore there is an inchoat office; as, if it be a Rectitude justly to restore a depositum, to restore a depositum must be a simple restitution without the additionall terme, is an office.

Cic. de finib. 3. And since it is not to be doubted, but that in mean things, some are to be performed, others rejected, whatsoever is done in that manner, is comprehended in common office, whence it is manifest, that all men by nature lov [...]ng themselves, as well the foolish as the wise, will take those things which are according to nature, and reject the contrary. This is therefore one com­mon office of the wise and unwise, conversant in mean things.

All offices proceeding from these, it is justly said, that to these are referred all our thoughts, even the forsaking of life, or con­tinuing in it. In whom most things are according to nature, the office of that person is to remain in life, in whom there are, or are foreseen to be more things contrary to nature, his of­fice is to forsake life, although he be happy, and of a fool to con­ [...]tinue in life, although he be miserable; for that good, and that [...]ll, as we have often said, are things that follow afterwards. The first principles of naturall appetite, fall under the judgement and election of a wise man, and is as it were the matter subje­cted to wisdome. Thus the reason of continuing in life, or for­saking it, is to be measured by all those things we mentioned. For, neither are they who enjoy vertue, obliged to continue in life, nor they who live without vertue to die, and it is often the office of a wise man, to part with his life, even when he is most happy, if it may be done opportunely, which is to live conveni­ently to nature. This they hold, that to live happily, depends on opportunity; for wisdome commandeth, that a wise man, if it be required, should part with his life. Wherefore vice not ha­ving power to bring a cause of voluntary death, it is manifest, that the office even of fooles, who are likewise wretched, is to continue in life, if they are in the greater part of those things, which we hold to be according to nature. And forasmuch as going out of life and continuing in it be alike miserable, neither doth continuance make his life more to be avoided. We say not therefore without cause, that they who enjoy most naturalls, should continue in life.

Hitherto it appertaines to know, that the love of Parents to­wards their Children is the effect of nature, from which begin­ning, we may track all mankinde, as proceeding from thence. First, by the figure and parts of the body, which declare, that nature carefully provided for procreation. Neither can these two agree, that nature orders procreation, and takes no care that those which are procreated should be loved: For even in beasts the power of nature may be seen, whose care when we behold in bringing up of their young, me thinks we hear the [Page 88] very voice of nature her selfe. Wherefore as it is manifest, that we abhor pain by nature, so it is likewise apparent, that we a [...]e dr [...]ven by nature to love those we have begotten.

Hence ariseth a common naturall commendation of men a­mongst men, that it behooveth a man not to seem alienate from man, for this very reason, because he is man. For, as among the parts of the body, some are made only for themselves, as the eyes and ears; others assist towards the use of the other parts, as the thighes and hands: so though some huge beasts are born only for themselves; yet, that [...]hell fish which is called patula prima, and the pinnoteres, so named from keeping its shell, which shut­teth it selfe up so close, as if it taught others to look to them­selves: as also Ants, Bees, Storks, do something for the sake of others. Much neerer is the conjunction of mankinde, so that we are inclined by nature to Conventions, Counsells, Cities.

Cic. offic. 1. Whatsoever is produced upon the earth, is created for the use of man; but, men are generated for men that they may profit one another. In this we ought to follow nature our leader, and to bring forth common benefit to the publick, by mutuall offices, by giving, by receiving, by arts, by en­deavours, and by faculties, to unite the society of man with man.

Cic. de sin. 3. The world is governed by the power of God; it is as it were, a common City of men and Gods, and each of us is a part of the world, whence it followeth by nature, that we should prefer the common benefit before our own. For as Lawes prefer the safety of the generall before that of any particular; so a good and wise man conformable to Law, not ignorant of civill office, taketh more care for the benefit of the gene­rall, then of any particular, or of his own. Nor is he who be­traies his Country more to be condemned, then he who de­serts the common benefit or safety. Whence it followeth, that he is to be commended who undergoeth death for the Common-wealth, and teacheth us, that our Country is dea­rer to us then our selves. And because that speech is esteemed inhuman and wicked of those who affirm, they care not when they are dead if all the earth were set on fire; it is certainly true, that we are likewise to provide for those who shall hereaf­ter be, even for their own sake. From this affection of the soul, whence proceed Wills and commendations of dying persons, as also, forasmuch as no man will live solitary in a desart, even with the greatest abundance or plenty, it is easily understood, that we are born for conjunction, congregation, or naturall com­munity, we are impelled by nature to benefit others the most that we can. All these are offices, chiefly by teaching and communi­cating the reasons of prudence, so that it is not easie to finde one, who will not communicate to some other what he knoweth him­selfe. [Page 89] Thus we are not only inclined to learn, but also to teach. And as it is given to Bulls by Nature, to fight even with Lyons, for their heifers with great force & impetuosity; so they who abound in wealth, and are able to do it (as is related of Hercules and Bacchus) are incited by nature to preserve mankind. Likewise, when Iupiter is stil'd Op [...]imus and Maximus, Salutaris, [...]hospitalis, Stator, we hereby expresse that the safety of mankind is under his tuition. But we cannot expect, if we our selves are vile, abject, and neglected amongst our selves, that we should be dear to the immortall Gods, and loved of them. As therefore wee make use of our limbs, before that we have learnt for what cause of utility we have them, so are we conjoined and consociated amongst our selves by Nature to civill community, which if it were o­therwise, neither would there be any room for Justice or good­nesse.

Yet though there are mutuall Chains betwixt man and man, man hath no common right with beasts, [ g Laert. by reason of our dissi­militude, as both Chrysippus and Possidonius assirm] for all other things saith Chrysippus, were made for men and the Gods, but they for community and society one with another, so that men may make use of Beasts for their benefit without doing any wrong.

Moreover, since the nature of man is such, that there is a cer­tain civill right betwixt him and all mankind, he who preserveth that right, is just, who transgresseth it, unjust. But as in a Thea­ter, though it be common, that room which a man possesseth, is justly said to be his place; so this civill right in a City and the World doth not repugne to the propriety of particular per­sons.

In order to the conservation of all society, conjunction, and dear [...]sse betwixt man and man, emoluments and detriments [...] and [...], which benefit or hurt must be common a­mongst them, and not only common but equall. Convenients and Inconvenients, [...] and [...], must be common, but not equall. Those which benefit or hurt, are either good or ill, and therefore must necessarily be equall; convenient and in­convenient are ranked amongst the preferred and rejected, and therefore cannot be equall: Emoluments and detriments are common, but rectitudes and sins not common.

Herein Friendship is requisite, as being one of those things which benefit. Some affirm, that a good man ought to be as much concern'd for his friend as for himself; others, that every man ought to be most concern'd for himself. Yet these latter confesse, that it is contrary to Justice, whereunto we are born, to take a­way any thing from another, and assume it to our selves.

Neither can friendship be contracted, nor Justice performed [Page 90] for private respects and advantages, for then these advantages might overthrow and pervert them. But neither could Justice or friendship be at all, unlesse they were expetible in themselves. Justice is by Nature; it is contrary to a wise man, not only to do an injury, but even to hurt. Neither can it be right to injure those who are our friends, or have deserved well of us; Equity cannot be separated from Utility; whatsoever is equall and just, is like­wise honest, and reciprocally; whatsoever is honest, is equal and just.

Cic. offi [...]. lib. 1. and again, lib. 3. Panaetius, who discoursed most accurately of Offices, propo­seth three kinds wherein men use to deliberate or consult of Offi­ces. First, when they doubt, whether that of which the question is, be honest or dishonest. Secondly, whether it be profitable or unprofitable. Thirdly, if that which hath the shew of honesty be repugnant to that which seems profitable.

Laert. Next the Gods, we are to reverence our Parents and Brethren. Sext. Empir. Pyrrh. hypot. 3. 25. As concerning the buriall of Parents, Chrysippus saith, it ought to be done in the most simple manner. For the body, as the Nails, teeth, or hair, thereof nothing pertaineth to us, and therefore ought not to be used with any curiosity or respect. Flesh, if it bee usefull, ought to be converted into aliment (though it were a part of our own body, as the foot) as is proper to it; if uselesse, put under ground, or thrown into some remote place, without more respect then wee have of our nailes or haire when cut off.

Cic. de offic. lib. 3. Concerning the Office of the Buyer, and the Seller, Diogenes the Babylonian, and Antipatet his Disciple differ. Antipater holds that all must be laid open, that the Buyer be not ignorant of any thing that the Seller knoweth; Diogenes that the Seller as far as is appointed by civill Law, ought only to tell the faults, and to conceal the rest, for as much as he in [...]elling desireth to sell to his best advantage.

Hecaton in his sixth Book of Offices, is full of these questions, as whether a good man in a dearth may give over house-keeping. He dis­putes it on both sides, but concludes that the office is directed ra­ther by profit then humanity.

He question [...], whether if at Sea, a Ship be to be disburthen'd by the casting out of somthing, we should rather cast over-board a horse of great price, or a slave worth little. In this case, private interest leads one way, humanity another.

If a [...]ool in a shipwrack catch hold of a plank, may a wise man wrest it from him if he can? He saith, hee may not, for it is injurious. What may the Master of the Shippe? May not he take his own? No; no more then h [...] may throw a Passenger out of the Ship, because it is his own, into the Sea. For untill they come to the place to which they are bound, the Ship is not the Masters, but the Passengers.

[Page 91] What if two Shipwra [...]k'd persons light upon one plank, and both pl [...]k at it, should one give it over to the other? yes; but to him, who, it is more expedient, should live, either for his own sake or the Com­mon-wealth. But what if these be alike in both? There will be no contention, but either as it were by lot, or mication with the fingers ( giuoco della mora) one will give place to the other.

What if a Father rob Temples, undermine the publick treasury, should the Son reveal it to the Magistrates? It were a great wickednesse. On the contrary, he ought to defend his Father, if he be called into question. But is not our Country before all Offices? yes, but it is for the good of our Country to have Citizens pious to their Parents.

What if a Father should aim at possession of the [...]yranny, on endeavour to betray his Country, shall the Son keep his Cou [...]sell? He shall beseech him not to do it. If that prevail not, he shall accuse him, yea, threaten; and lastly, if the matter shall tend to the destruction of the Country, he shall preferre the safety of the Country before that of his Father.

If a wise man receive Counterfeit money for good, if afterwards hee know it to be counterfeit money, may he pay it where he ows anything for good? Diogenes saith he may, [...] may not.

If a man sell Wine that will not last, and know it to be such, ought hee to declare it or no? Diogenes thinks he is not obliged, Antipater con­ceives a good man must. These are as it were cases of Contro­versie amongst the Stoicks.

CHAP. XIV.
Of Praeteroffices.

St [...]b. As every perfect Office in a rational Creature is a Rectitude, and alwaies compleat in all numbers; so every Praeter-office in a rationall creature is a sin. A sin is that which is done contrary to right reason, or in which somthing of Of [...]ice is omit­ted by a rationall Creature. [...]lut. de re­pugn.. Stoic. A good deed is the command of the Law. Sin the prohibition of the Law. Hence it is that the Law forbiddeth fools and mad men many things, but prescribeth them nothing, because they are not capable of doing any thing wel.

S [...]b. All sinns are impiety, as being a resisting of the will of the Gods. The Gods love Vertue and its works; they hate vice and its works. Every sin therefore displeaseth them, and consequent­ly is impiety.

[...]lut. de re­pugn. Stoic. All sins are equall (so Chrysippus in the first of his morall questions, and Persieus, and Zeno) though not alike, for they flow from one fountain, as it were of vice, and the judgment is the [Page 92] same in all, but by the externall object by which that judgment is made, they are rendred unlike. That they are equall is evident from this: If there be not one truth more truth then another, nor one falshood more falshood then another, neither is one deceit more deceit then another, nor one sin more sin then another. He who is distant from Canobus a hundred furlongs, and he who is distant but one furlong, are both alike not at Canobus: so he who sins more, and he who lesse, are both alike not in the right way.

Yet, though sins are equall, there are some differences in them, forasmuch as some proceed from an obdurat incurable af­fection, others from an affection not obdurat nor incurable. And though every lie is equally a lie, yet all men do not lie e­qually; but, every sin is equally sin, for every sin consisteth in lying. Thus Chrysippus, Persaeus, and Zeno: But Heraclides of Tar­sis, friend to Antipater, and Athenodor [...]s hold, that sins are une­quall.

CHAP. XV.
Of wise or vertuous Persons. Paradoxes.

THere are (according to Zeno) two kinds of men, the wise or vertuous, and the vicious. The wise make use of vertue through the whole course of their life, the vicious of vice.

Sen [...]. Of the wise there are two sorts, one in perfection consum­mate; the other in progression, procedent: Of the first are these following paradoxes to be understood; Cic. in Laert. not that the Stoicks positively affirm there ever was such a one in nature (for Quintil. lib. 12. Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus were great and venerable persons, yet, did not attain the height of human nature) but, that such a one might possibly be.

Laert. A wise man is void of passion, for he cannot fall. There is ano­ther kinde of person void of passion likewise, a wicked man that is obdurate and inflexible.

Laert: A wise man is void of pride, honour and dishonour are alike to him. There is another kinde of person void of pride, a wic­ked man, equally inclinable to dishonour as to honour.

Laert. Stob. A wise man is austere, for he neither speaketh for complai­sance, nor admitteth any thing spoken in that kinde. There is another sort of austere persons, which resemble [...]oure wine, not fit for drinking, but for medicines only.

Laert. A wise man is sincere, for he taketh care, that he be not thought better then he is, by reason of some specious show, and withall to expresse whatsoever good he hath, without any Rhe­toricall glosse.

[Page 93] Laert. Plut. de repugn. Stoic. citing Chrysippus. A wise man is not pragmaticall; for he declines the doing of [...] ­ny thing that is beyond his office.

Laert. St [...]b A wise man is [...]ver drunk, although he drink wine▪ for he ne­ver sinneth, but doth all things according to Vertue [...]

Laert. A wise man is never mad, yet somtime [...] strange phantasies may occurre to him through melancholy or deliration, not according to the reason of eligibles, but praeternaturall.

[...] A wise man is never grieved; for grief, according to Apollodo­rus, is an irrationall contraction of the Soul.

Laert. A wise man is divine: for he hath God with himself; but [...] wicked man is an Atheist. An Atheist is taken two waies, for him who is an Enemy to the Gods, and for him, who believeth there are no Gods: which all wicked men do not. Stob. A wicked man is impious, because he doth all things according to Vice, as the good according to Vertue; and he who hath one vice hath all. He is an Enemy to the Gods, for emnity is the discord of life, as amity is the concord. The wicked differs from the Gods in his course of life, and therefore is an Enemy to them, for they account all their Enemies who are contrary to them. The wicked are contrary to the good, God is good, therefore the wicked are Enemies to God.

Laert. A wise man is religious, for he is skilfull in all divine rites. Re­ligion is the Science of divine worship. Hee sacrificeth to the Gods, and is pure, detesting all sin, holy and just in Divine things.

Laert. A wise man only is a Priest, skillfull in Sacrifices, busi­nesse of the Temple, expiations, and other things proper to the Gods.

Stob. A wise man only is a Prophet, endued with the Science of those signs which are communicated by Gods or Demons which belong to humane life. In him therefore are all kinds of vaticination, as well by dreams, birds, and other things.

Laert. A wise man reverenceth and loveth his Parents and Brethren, next the Gods. He hath likewise an innate love of his Children, which the vicious hath not.

Laert. A wise man ought to apply himself to some office in the Commonwealth (according to Chrysippus) unlesse otherwise diverted; For he will encourage Vertue, and suppresse Vice, Stob. especially in those Com­monwealths which are far from perfection. Hee ought to make Laws, instruct men, prescribe rules. To which is opposite, study of popularity, specious deceit, prescription of things unprofitable, which are not competible to a wise man.

Laert. Cic. de finib. 3. A wise man ought to marry (as Zeno in his Common-wealth) that he may have Children.

Laert. A wise man doth not opiniona'e or think; but believe or know, for he never assents to any falsity. y s [...]cb Ignorance is an infirm assent; he thinks all firmly. There are two kinds of opinion, one an [Page 94] assent to things not comprehended, the other a weak beliefe. Neither of these are in a wise man, for he never assented with­out comprehension, and then alwaies firmly, for nothing is hid­den from him, otherwise he might have a false opinion. There­fore he is never diffident. Faith is proper to a wise man, for it is a firm existimation. A Science is a firm habit, therefore a wic­ked man doth neither know nor believe.

Laert Cic. de finib. lib. 3. A wise man must imitate the Cynicks: for Cynicisme is the nea­rest way for vertue, as Apollodorus in his Ethick: Stob. Others say, a wise man ought to continue in that Sect, if he have been thereof; but if he have not, to enter into it.

Laert. A wise man may upon occasion eat mans flesh. Of this already a­mongst the Offices.

Laert. Cicer. Paradox. A wise man only is free, the wicked are slaves; for liberty is the power of doing according to our own judgment. Servitude is a privation of the power of doing according to our own judg­ment. There is another kinde of servitude which consisteth in subjection, a third in being possess'd and subjected, to which is opposed vicious domination.

Laert. A wise man only is a King: For Monarchy is a principality sub­ordinate to none, which only consists in the wise, as Chrysippus in his treatise, That Zeno used words properly. For (saith he) a Prince must know both good and bad, which none of the wicked knoweth. Stob. Dominion and the kinds thereof, Monarchy, Magistracy, Generalship, Admiralty, and the like, are only pro­per to a wise man; therefore the wise only command, though not actually, yet potentially.

Laert. A wise man only is proper to be a Magistrate, Iudge, and Oratour; but not any of the wicked.

Laert. A wise man is void of sin; for he cannot fall into errour.

Laert. A wise man is innoce [...]t, and uninjurious, for he cannot hurt ei­ther himselfe or others, Stob. nor receive, nor do any injury: For, injury is a hurtfull injustice, which is not competible to a wise man, although he may be unjustly assaulted: for he having with­in himselfe all good and vertue, is not capable of vice or harme.

Laert. Stob. A wise man is not mercifull, nor pardons any, remitting no­thing of the punishments inflicted by Law, as knowing them to be proportioned to, not exceeding the offence, and that who­soever sinneth, sinneth out of his own wickednesse. A wise man therefore is not benign, for he who is benign, mitigates the ri­gour of Justice, and conceives the punishments inflicted by Law to be greater then they ought: But, a wise man knoweth the Law to be good, or a right reason, commanding what is to be done, and what not.

[...] A wise man nothing wonders at those things which seem Parado­xall, as Charon's Cave, the ebbing and flowing of the Sea, and hot springs, and ebullitions of fire.

[Page 95] Laert. A wise man will not live in a desart, for he is communicative by nature, and practick, and will undertake exercise to streng­then his body.

Laert. A wise man will pray, requesting good things of the Gods, as Possidonius affirmes, in his first of Offices, and Hecaton in his thir­teenth of Paradoxes.

Laert. Stob. A wise man only is a friend: Friendship is only amongst the wise, for in them only is an unanimity as to things that concern life and community, so as our friends may make use of them as freely, as we our selves. Unanimity is the Science of common good. A friend is expetible in himselfe. Plenty of friends is a good: but, amongst the wicked, there is no friendship; for friend­ship being reall and not faigned, it is impossible it should consist without faith and constancy. But, in the wicked, there is infi­delity, and inconstancy, and hostility, and therefore not friend­ship, but some externall connexions, whereby necessity or opi­nion ties them together.

Laert. A wise man doth all things well, as we say, all Pipes play the Ismenian tune well. Stob. He doth all things wisely, temperately, prudently, modestly, and according to the other vertues, throughout the whole course of his life. A wicked man doth all amisse, sinning in the whole course of his life, inconstant by na­ture, often grieved by his own ill actions, wretched and trou­bled, for as much as he is vexed at the thing done, so much is he angry at himselfe for being the Author of it.

La [...]t. Cic. Tuse. qu [...]st. 4. A wise man lo [...]eth ( Cic. de [...]in. 3. ( [...]vertuously) those, whose beauty expresse their inward vertue. Thus Zeno, Chrysippus, and Apollodorus affirm. For love is an impulsion of benevolence, raised from beauty, which love is not of conjunction, but of friendship. For this reason, Zeno, though he were in love with Thrasonides, a young woman that was in his power, yet, suppress'd his affection be­cause she was averse from him. This Chrysippus calls the love of friendship, it is no way discommendable, for beauty is the flower of vertue.

Laert. A wise man upon [...]casion will die voluntarily for his Country and friends; or, in case he seized by some excessive pain, losse of his senses, or incurable diseases.

Stob. A wise man is [...], fo [...] he compasseth that which is propo­sed; [...], for he is every way augmented; [...], for he hath attained the just height of wisdome; [...], for he is invincible, and insuperable. The wicked are the contrary.

Stob. A wise man profiteth the wise, and is mutually profited by all the wise, though not friends or acquaintance, for betwixt them there is a concord and community of goods, and he who benefiteth another, benefiteth likewise himselfe. A wicked man neither conferreth nor receiveth benefits; for one is to move towards vertue, the other is to be moved towards vertue.

[Page 96] Stob. A wise man is a good O [...]conomist, skilfull to 'acquire wealth. Oeconomist is a habit active, and contemplative in the businesse of a family, Oeconomy is the ordering of expences, works, and possessions; the Science of acquisition is a reason whereby wealth is attained, which some account in indifferents, others in good. But no wicked man is a good Oeconomist, since only a wise man knoweth from whence, how, and how far gain may be a [...]quired.

Stob. A wise man only is perfect, for he wanteth no vertue; a wic­ked man is imperfect, for he hath no vertue. Therefore the wise are alwaies happy, the wicked miserable; which happi­nesse, according to Chrysippus, differs nothing from that of God, nor is l [...]sse expetible. The wicked partake of no good, because vertue and that which partakes thereof is good, and those things which are convenient and requisite are proper only to the wise, as the contraries to the wicked.

Stob. A wise man is only rich; for good is true riches, and ill true poverty: a wicked man is poor, not having the means to become rich.

Stob. A wise man is only obedient; the wicked can neither obey nor command.

Stob. A wise man only is honourable; for honour is the reward of vertue, the wicked wanting this, are justly dishonourable.

Stob. A wise man only is ingenuous and noble, according to some of the Stoicks; but, others deny it, referring these not to nature, but institution only, according to the proverb, Custome is a second Nature. So that ingenuity is an habit of nature or insti­tution apt to vertue; Nobility is a habit of descent or institution, apt to vertue.

Stob. A wise man is pleasing, p [...]rswasive, opportune, and sincere; for he is expert in every thing, affable in conversation, and helpfull to the publick: The wicked are the contrary.

Stob. A wise man is the best Physician, for he hath considered his con­stitution, and those things which are requisite for his health.

Stob, A wise man may lawfully part with his life, the wicked cannot, because in their life they never acquire vertue, nor eschew vice. But life and death are limited by offices, and their contraries.

Stob. A wise man will accept of Empire, and [...]ohabit with Princes; but not unlesse he porceive it may be done without danger, and to much advantage.

Stob. A wise man never lyeth; for he who speaketh a falshood is not properly said to lie, unlesse it be with intent to deceive. A lie may be used many waies without assent, as in War against ene­mies, or in the like necessity.

Stob. A wise man neither deceiveth, nor is deceived, for he never sin­neth, he useth not his sight, hearing, or any other sense ill. He is not suspicious, nor repenteth, for both these are proper to [Page 97] fallacious assent. He can no way be chang'd or erre, or opinio­nate.

Stob. A wise man only (though not all wise men) is happy in Children, in old age, in death.

Stob. A wise man doth nothing contrary to his appetite, for all such things are done with a privation, and nothing adverse unfore­seen happeneth to him. Stob. But in the primitive time, there was some wise man that did not desire or will any thing, because that those things which were then present, were not sufficient to be required by him.

Stob. A wise man is meek, for meeknesse is a habit whereby things are done meekly, not breaking forth into Anger.

Stob. A wise man is peacefull and modest. Modesty is the Science of de­cent motion; tranquillity the order of natural motions. The con­trary to these are seen in the wicked.

Stob. A wise man is free from all Calumny; he calumniates none, and is not calumniated by any; for Calumny is a lying imputation of fained friends, to which the wise are not liable, for they are true friends; the wicked are, for they are feigned.

Stob. A wise man delayeth [...] bing, for delay is an omission of Office through slothfulnesse, of which Hesiod,

Nothing deferre a year, a month, a day,
He fights aginst himself that doth delay.

Stob. A wise man can only incite, and be incited to Vertue, a fool can­not, for he neglecteth praecepts, and goeth no further then the words, not proceeding to Action. A wicked man is not desirous to hear or learn, as not being capable by reason of his imprudence of what is rightly said; whence it followeth, that he can neither be incited nor incite to Vertue. He that is capable to be incited, or to incite, must be prepared by Philosophy, which is not com­petible to a wicked man, for he who diligently heareth Philoso­pher, is not prepared to Philosophy, but [...]e who expresseth their doctrine in their life and actions. This no wicked man can do, for he is prepossess'd by Vice. If he should be incited, Vice would pull him ba [...]k; but none that is vicious incited to Vertue, as none sick to health.

Stob. Every wicked man is an exile, wanting Law and Country, for both these are good. That a City or Country is good, Cleant [...]es proveth thus. If there be a habitation, where those, who fly for succour, find justice, it is good, but a City is such a habitation, therefore a City is good. A City is taken three waies; for a habitation, for a convention of men, and for both. In the two latter significati­ons it is called good.

Stob. Every wicked man is r [...]stick, for rusticity is ignorance of Laws and civill manners. A wicked man refuseth to live according to Law, and is hurtfull as a savage Beast.

[Page 98] Stob. A wicked man is tyrannical, cruell, violent, and in [...]urious, when­soever he gets an occasion.

Stob. A wicked man is ungratefull, not obliging nor requiting; for he doth nothing by Friendship.

Stob: A wicked man is not perseverant, for perseverance is the Science of obtaining our purpose, not being deterred by labour.

Stob. A wicked man is not capable of the right of donation. Donation is the good bestowing of estimation, but nothing that is good is competible to the wicked.

Stob. E [...]ery wicked man is delighted with his wickednesse, which wee may perceive not so much by his discourse, as actions, which showes that he is carried on to wickednesse.

THE THIRD PART.

CHAP. I.
PHYSICK, and the parts thereof.

Laert PHYSICK is divided into these places; Of Bodies, Of Princi­ples, Of Elements, Of Gods, of Place, Of Vacuum: thus especi­ally; but generally into three places; Of the world, Of Elements, Aitiologick of Causes.

That concerning the VVorld is divided into two parts; whereof one, Contemplation, is common also to the Mathematicks, con­cerning fixed stars and Planets; as whether the Sun be of the same magnitude as he appears to be, and whether the Moon be so likewise; of their periods and the like; The other contemplati­on proper only to Physick, to enquire into the essence of these; whether the Sun and Stars consist of matter and form; whether generate or ingenerate, whether animate or inanimate, whether corruptible or incorruptible, whether govern'd by Providence or the like.

The place concerning Causes is likewise twofold; whereof one, Contemplation, is common also to medicinall disquisitions, whereby they enquire concerning the principall part of the soul, and those things which are produced in the Soul & seed, and the like. The other is likewise usurped by the Mathematicks, as, in what manner we see, what is the cause of the visuall pha [...]tasie; [Page 99] How are made Clouds, Thunder, Rainbows, Halo's, Comets and the like.

CHAP. II.
Of Bodies.

Senec. Epist. 89. NAturall Philosophy brancheth into two parts, of Corpore­alls and Incorporealls.

A body is that which doeth or sufficeth [...]. It is the sense with essence or substance, and finite: Flut. [...] Stoic. whatsoever is, is a body, for whatsoever is, either doeth or suffereth.

Laert. Principles are Bodies void of form. Elements are bodies endued with form. Flut. plac. phil. 1. 11. Causes are corpor [...]all, because they are spirits.

Plut. con [...]. Stoic. Qualities are Corpor [...]all, for they are spirits, and aeriall in­tentions, which affect the parts of all things, generated with form and figure.

Plut. cont. Stoic. Ter [...]l▪ d [...] anima [...]. Vertues, Vices, Arts, M [...]mory, [...]ha [...]tasies, Affections, Ap­petitions, Assents, are bodies, existing in the Supream part of the Soul.

Sen. Ep. 113. The Soul is a Body, because it maketh us to be living Crea­tures.

Plut. Night and day are bodies.

L [...]ert. Voice is a body, for it maket [...] that which is heard; in a word, whatsoever is, is a body and a subject, ( Orig. for the Stoi [...]ks take away intellectuall substances, affirming all things that are, to be comprehended by sense) onely differences are not sub­sistent.

L [...]ert. A solid body (according to Apollodorus) is divisible three waies, into length, breadth, and depth.

A superficies is the terme of a body, or that which hath onely length and breadth, but no depth; thus Possidonius.

A line is the terme of a Superficies, or a length without breadth, that which hath length only▪

A point is the terme of a line, or th [...] least mark. Stob. Phys. 17 A body is divisible into infinite, yet it consisteth not of infi­nite bodies.

CHAP. III.
Of Principles.

S [...]nec▪ E [...] ▪ 29. THe place concerning bodies is divided into two degrees, into those which produce, and those which are produced, the first Principles, the second Elements.

[Page 100] Laert. [...]Principles and Elements differ: Principles are ingenerate, incorruptible: Elements shall perish by conflagration. Moreo­ver, Principles are bodies, and void of form; Elements have forme.

Laert. There are two principles of all things, the Agent, and the Patient: The Patient is a substance void of quality, called Mat­ter: the Agent is the reason which is [...] the Matter, God.

Sen. Ep. 65. Matter is sluggish, a thing ready for all things, but will cease if none move it. The Caus [...], that is, the Reason, [...]formeth m [...]t­ter, and moldeth it which way he pleaseth, out of which he produceth various wo [...]ks. There must▪ therefore be something out of which a thing is made, and also by which it [...]s made. This is the Cause, that Matter. Ibid. The Cause or active Reason is God.

Cic. In the Agent there is power, in the Patient a certain matter [or capacity,] and in both, both; for matter it selfe could not [...], if it were not kept together by a power, nor that power without some matter; for there is nothing, which is not com­pelled to be somewhere.

La [...]tant. 7. 3. Both [...], God and the World, the Artist and his work, they comp [...]ehend within this terme, Nature, as if nature were▪ God mixed through the World. [...] Sometimes they call that na­tur [...] which containeth the World, sometimes that which gene­rateth and produceth things upon the earth.

The Agent is, as we said, called the Cause. St [...]b. Phys [...]. 1. 16. A Cause, ac­cording to Zeno, is that, by which there is an effect, which is not a Cause 30 or,) as [...] the reason of the effect; or, as P [...]ss [...]donius, the first Author of a thing. A Cause is a body, a not Cause a Categorem. It is impossible that the cause being assign­ed, the effect should not be present, which is to be understood thus. The Soule is the [...]ause through which we live, Prudence the Cause by which we are wise. It is impossible, that he who hath a Soule should not live, or he who hath Prudence should not be wise.

CHAP. IV.
Of Matter.

Laert THe substance of all [ Stob. Phys. 14. qualitative] beings is first Matter, according to Zeno and [...]hrysippu [...], in his first of Physicks.

Laert. Matter is that of which every thing is made, it hath two names, [...] Substance, and [...] ▪ Matter. Substance is of all things in generall, Matter of particulars.

Laert. Universall matter is [ Sword [...] Phys. 14. according to Zeno, wholly eternall,] not admitting, as Chrysippus▪ saith, enc [...]ase or de [...]rease.

[Page 101] Laert. Particular matter admitteth augmentation, and diminution, Stob. Phys. 14. for it remaineth not alwaies the same, but is separated and mixed, so that, according to Chrysippus, its parts perish by sepa­ration, and exist by mutuall mistion. But those who call fire, aire, water, and earth, Matter, assert not a thing void of forme, but of a body.

Stob. Phys. 14. Matter is a body, [ Laert. and finite.] Possidonius saith, that the substance and matter of the Universe is void of quality and form, in as much as it hath not a certain figure and quality in it selfe; but it is alwaies seen in some figure and quality. But, the substantiall nature of the Universe, differs from matter intenti­onally only.

[...]. Matter is passible, for if it were immutable, things could not be generated of it. Hence it followeth, that it is divisible into infinite; yet, it selfe, as Chrysippus saith, it not infinite, for no­thing that is divisible is infinite, but matter is continuous.

St [...]b. Phys. 14. Through this matter, Zeno affirmeth, that the reason of the World, which some call Fate, is diffused as feed.

CHAP. V.
Of the World.

OF this matter was made the World. The World hath seve­rall appellations, [...], the World, [...], the [...]ll; [...], the Whole. Laert. [...], World, is taken three waies: First, for God him­selfe, who is properly qualified with all Essence, incorruptible, and ingenerate, who framed the Universe after a certain period of time, who resolved all nature into himselfe, and again gene­rated it out of himselfe. Secondly for the starry Ornament: and thirdly that which consists of both.

Laert. The All, [...], is one way taken, as Apollodorus saith, for the World, and another way for the System of the World, and the vacuity beyond it. The World is finito, the v [...]uity infinite.

Stob. Ph [...]s. cap. 24. Thus likewise they distinguish betwixt [...], and [...]: [...], includeth also an infinite vacuity, in which the world is: [...], signifies the world without that vacuity, which neither is increased nor diminished; but its parts are sometimes ex­tended, sometimes contracted. It began from the earth as its center, for the center is the beginning of a Circle.

Laert. The world is that which is properly qualited with the es­sence of all things; or, as Stob. c. 24. Chrysippus and Laert. `Possidonius define it, a System of Heaven and Earth, and of the natures therein con­tained; or a System of God and Men, and of all things that were made for them.

[...] dei. cap. 10. The world was made by God, for if (saith Chrysippus) there [Page 102] be any thing which produceth such things, as Man, though in­dued with reason, cannot produce, that (doubtlesse) is greater and stronger, and wiser then man. But a Man cannot make the Celestiall things, therefore that which made them, transcendeth man, in Art, Counsell, Prudence, and Power, and what can that be but God?

Cic. de nat. 2. The World was made for those animate [...]ssences which have the use of Reason, these are the Gods and men, then whom no­thing is better. Lactant de ira dei cap. 13. All things of which it consisteth, and which it produceth within it selfe, are accommodated to the use of Man.

The World was made in this manner; Laert. God in the beginning being alone by himself, converted all substance (which according to Zeno was fire) first into air, then into Water. And as in the Plant the seed is contained; so God, who is the prolisick reason of the World, left such a [...]eed in the humidity, as might afford easie and apt matter for the generation of those things that were to be produced.

Laert. Stob. Phys. cap. 20. Zeno addeth, that one part tending downward, was con­densed into Earth, another part remained partly water, and partly, being exhal'd, air, of a particle of which air flashed out fire.

Stob. Phys. cap. 20. Cleanthes describeth it in this manner. The Univ [...]rse being set on fire, the midle part thereof first setled downwards, then the next parts by little and little were quenched. Thus the Universe being wet, the extream fire, (the midle part opposing it) sprang upward, and began the costitution of the World, and the revo­lution of this constitution shall never end. For as the parts of eve­ry thing are at certain times produced of Seed; so the parts of the Universe (amongst which are living Creatures and Plants) are produced in their seasons; and as some reasons of the parts are mixed together in the seed, which being composed, are again dissolved, so of one are all things made; and again▪ of one is all compounded by an equall and perp [...]tuall revolution.

Laert. The World is One, of the same corporeall substance, and of a Sphaericall figure, for this is of all figures most apt for moti­on. Thus Zeno, Chrysippus, P [...]ssidonius, and others.

Laert. The World is feared in an infinite incorporeall vacuity, which is beyond it, circumfused about it, Plu Pl. [...] hil. 2. 9. into which the world shall be dissolved by conflagration. The World is finite, the va­cuity infinite, yet [...]ut. Pl. [...]h [...]. 2. 9. P [...]ssidonius saith, it is no more then will suffice for the resolution of the World, when it shall p [...]rish. [...]lut. contra. Stoic. By this argument they consute the motion of Atomes downward; intro­duced by Epicure, for in that which is infinite, there are no locall differences of high or low.

The world is not heavy, because the whole fabrick thereof consisteth of heavy and light Elements, and, being placed in the midst, whither such bodies tend, it keepeth its place.

[Page 103] Laert. In the World there is no vacuity, but it is compleatly one, for that necessitates a conspiration and harmony, betwixt Ce­lestialls and Terrestrialls.

The World only is P [...]ut. contr [...]. Stoic. self-sufficient, because it alone hath all in it self, whereof it standeth in no need. Of it self it is nourish­ed and augmented, whereas the parts are transmuted and con­verted into one another.

The World is a Plut. cont. Stoic. perfect body, the parts of the World are not perfect; because they are respective to the whole, and not of themselves. The Universe is by Nature apt to move it self in all parts, to contain, preserve, and not break, dissolve and burn it self, the Universe sending and moving the same point, and the parts thereof having the same motion from the Nature of the body. Like it is that this first motion is naturally proper to all Bodies, namely, to encline towards the midst of the World, considering the World moveth so in regard of it self; and the parts likewise, in that they are parts of the whole.

Laert. The World is a living Creature, rationall, animate and in­tellectuall (so Chrysippus, Apollodorus and P [...]ssidonius) and hath an animate sensible essence. For a living Creature is more excellent then that which is not a living Creature; but nothing is more ex­cellent then the World, therefore the World is a living Crea­ture. That it is animate is manifest from our Soul, which is a piece therof taken out of it. (but Boethius denies that the world is a living Creature) Laert. The mind, or Providence passeth through eve­ry part thereof, as the Soul doth in us, but in, some parts more, in others lesse; through some permeating, as a habit, as in the bones and Nerves, through some as a mind, as through the prin­cipall (Hegemonick) part. In like manner the whole World is an animate rationall Creature, the Hegemonicall part thereof is the Aether, as Antipater the Tyrian in his eighth Book of the World. But Chrysippus in his first of Providence, and P [...]ssidonius, of the Gods, affirm, that Heaven is the Hegemonick of the World; Cleanthes, the Sunne. But Chrysippus in the same Book (differing from what he said before) affirmeth it to be the purest part of the Aether, which they call the first God, sensibly, because it passeth through all in the air, and through all living Creatures and Plants, but through the Earth as a habit.

Laert. The World, according to the greater part of St [...]i [...]ks, is cor­rup [...]ible, for it is generated in the same manner as things compre­hensible by sense. Again, if the parts thereof be corruptible, the whole is also corruptible; but the parts of the World are cor­ruptible, for they are dayly changed into one another, therefore the whole it selfe is corruptible. And again, if any thing admit any change into the worse, it is corrup­tible; but the World doth, for it admitteth ex [...]iccation, and inun­dation; therefore, &c.

[Page 104] [...] lud. de immortal. mun­di. The World shall perish by fire, caused by the power of fire which is in all things, which, after a long time, consuming all the moisture, shall resolve all things into it self. The Moon, Stars, and Sun, Plut. com▪ not. saith Cleanthes, shall perish, but God shall assimilate all things to himself, and resolve all into himself. Numen. [...] Eujeb. This opinion of the generall conflagration of the World, was held by the first and most antient of this Sect, Zeno, Cleanthes and Chrysippus.

Plut. com. not. This fire is the Seed of the World; after the conflagration it diffuseth it self even into the Vacuity that was beyond the World. Afterwards, by order of the same reason which made the World, it shall withdraw and contract itself towards the generation of a new World, yet not be quite extinguished, but so as that some portion thereof remain, for as much as it is the cause of motion.

But Phi. Iud. Boethius, P [...]ssidonius, and Cic. Stob. Panaetius deny this conflagrati­on, of the World, conceiving rather that the VVorld is eternall, to whom likewise Diogenes the Babylonian assents.

CHAP. VI.
Of Elements.

Laert. GOd having converted, as we said, all matter into moisture, and prepared it for the generation of future things, in the next place, produced the foure Elements, Fire, VVater, Air, and Earth. Of these discourseth Zeno in his Book of the Uni­verse, and Chrysippus in his first of Physicks, and Archedemus of E­lements.

Laert. Element is that, of which generated things are first made, and into which they are resolved. The foure Elements are matter or substance endued with quality. Fire is hot, water moist, Aire cold, Earth dry; yet not so, but that in Aire, t [...]ere is part of the same quality, for in the highest it is fire, which is called Aether, in which is generated the first sphear of Planets, next Air, then Water, the basis of all, Earth, being pla­ced in the midst of all.

c Of the four Elements, two are light, Fire and Air, the other two, Earth and water, heavy, which properly tend to the centre, but the centre it self is no way heavy.

CHAP. VII.
Of Fire.

Stob. THE first Element is that of Fire, which, as all bodies tend to the middle, enclineth, as much as the lightnesse of its Nature permits, to the centre of the world, by a circular moti­on round about it.

Stob. There are (according to Zeno) two kinds of fire, one arti­ficiall, requisite to the use of life, which converteth nutriment into it self; the other inartificiall (so De Nat. deor: 2. Cicero renders [...]) by which all things grow, and are preserved; Cic. de Nat. deor. 2. for whatsoever is nourished and groweth, compriseth within it self the power of heat. This fire is diffused through all the parts of the World, and they are all sustained by it. That it is in the Earth appeareth by Seeds and Roots, which spring up and grow by the tempera­ment of this heat. That it is in Water appeareth, forasmuch as Water is susceptible of greater cold, as by freezing. It is conse­quently in air also; that being a vapour extracted from Water, and supply'd by motion of the heat which is in the Water. But primarily, and originally, it is in the Element of fire, a Nature absolutely hot, which dispenseth salutary▪ vitall heat to all other things. Stob. Phys. p. 47. This is Nature, saith Zeno, and the Soul: Of fire consist the Sun, Moon, and Starrs.

CHAP. VIII.
Of the Starres.

Cicer. Nat. deor. 2. IN the aether are generated the Starrs, of the noblest and purest part thereof, without admixtion of any other Nature wholly hot and pellucid, animate creatures indued with sense and In­tellect.

Stob. Phys. Possidonius defineth a Star, a divine body, consisting of sethe­ricall fire, splendid and fiery, never resting, but alwaies moving circularly.

Cic. nat. [...]cor. That the Starrs are wholly fiery, Cleanthes proveth by the testimony of two senses, touch and sight. For the Lustre of the Sun is brighter then of any fire, seeing that it shines so far and wide, to so vast a world; and such is its touch, that it not onely warmeth, but oftentimes burneth, neither of which it would do if it were not fiery.

Now (saith he) the Sun being fiery, is either like that fire which is requisite to the use of life, or unto that which is contain­ed [Page 106] in the bodies of living creatures; but this our fire, which the use of life requireth, is a consumer of all things, disturbeth and dispatcheth all things. On the contrary, the other is corpo­reall, vitall, and salutary, it conserveth all things, it nourisheth, en [...]reaseth, sustaineth, and affecteth with sense; therefore, saith he, there's no question to which of these fires the Sun is like, for he causeth all things to flourish and sprout up, according to their severall kinds: Wherefore the fire of the Sun being like those fires which are in the bodies of living creatures, the Sun must be a living creature also, and so must be likewise the rest of the Starres in the celestiall fire, which is called Aether or Heaven.

Cic. nat. deor. 2. For seeing that of living creatures, one kinde is generated in the earth, other kinds in the water, others in the aire, it were absurd to think, that in that part which is most apt for generati­on of living creatures, no living creature is generated. The Starrs possesse the Aether, which being most rare, and in perpe­tuall agitation and vigour, it is necessary the living creature that is generated in it be endued with most acute sense, quic­kest mobility. The starrs therefore have sense and intelligence, whence it followeth, that they are to be reputed Gods. For we say, that they who live in the purest aire are much more acute and understanding, then those who live in a thick climate: The diet likewise is thought to conduce not a little to the sharpening of the understanding. Whence it is probable, the starrs are en­dued with most excellent understanding, forasmuch as they dwell in the aetheriall part of the world, and are nourished with exhalations from the Sea and Earth, extenuated by a long di­stance.

The sense and intellect of the Starrs is chiefly manifest from their order and constancy, for nothing can be moved by propor­tion and number without providence, in which nothing is te­merarious, nothing various, nothing casuall. But the order of Starrs, and constancy throughout all eternity, cometh neither from Nature, for that is void of Reason, nor from Fortune, which affecteth variety, and disalloweth constancy.

Again, all things are moved either naturally, or violently, or voluntarily. Those which move naturally, are carried either by their weight downward, or by their lightnesse upwards, neither of which is proper to the Starres, for their motion is circular. Neither can it be said, that they are moved violently against their own nature; for what power can be greater? it remaineth therefore, that their motion be voluntary.

Cic. No fire can subsist without some aliment, Laert. the starres there­fore are nourished by the vapours of the earth.

Stob. Of Starrs (according to C [...]rysippus) there are two sorts, both which are by nature divine, animate, and providentiall, the [Page 107] fixed and the Erratick. The multitude of the fixed is incompre­hensible; the Erratick are lower then the fixed. The fixed are all ranked in one superficies, as is manifest to the sight; the er­ratick in severall. The sphear of fixed starrs includeth that of the erratick. The highest of the erratick, and next to the fixed starres, is the sphear of Sa [...]urn, next, that of Iupiter, after which, that of Mars, then that of Mercury, then that of Venus, then that of the Sun, and lastly that of the Moon, which being neerest the air, seemeth therefore aeriall, and hath greatest influence upon terrestriall bodies.

Cic. de Nat. deor. 2. Saturn, [...], finisheth his course in almost thirty years; Iupiter, [...], in twelve; Mars, [...], in twenty foure Months wanting six daies; Mercury, [...], in a year; Venus, [...], (low­est of the five Planets) in a year.

Stob. The Sun and the Moon are properly called [...], Starrs; but [...] and [...] differ; for every [...] is [...], but not the contrary.

Stob. The rising of a star, Chrysippus defineth, its advancement a­bove the earth; and the setting thereof its occultation under the earth. The same starrs at the same time, rise to some, and set to others. The apparition of a star, [...], is its rising toge­ther with the Sun; and the setting thereof, is its setting with the Sun: for setting is taken two waies, in opposition to rising, and in opposition to apparition. As the apparition of the Dog [...] star is its rising together with the Sun, and its setting is its occultation under the earth together with the Sun. The same is said of the Pleiades.

CHAP. IX.
Of the Sun.

Cic. nat. deor. 2. NExt Venus (the lowest Planet) is the Sun, the Sto. p. 56, 57. chiefe of all that consist of this aetheriall fire. The Sun is defined by Cleanthes and Chrysippus, an intellectuall Taper, gather'd and kindled from the vapours of the Sea. Laert. Possidonius defineth the Sun a most pure fire, greater then the earth, of a sphaericall fi­gure (as Stob. p. 57. Cleanthes also affirmes) answerable to that of the world.

Laert. That the Sun is fiery, is manifest in that it hath all the opera­tions of fire, Cic. and forasmuch as he is fire, it followeth that hee must be nourished. [...]tob. p. 56, Laert. The Sun is nourished by exhalations from the great Ocean.

Stob. According to the expansion of this subjected aliment, saith Cleanthes, in his motion from Tropick to Tropick. He moveth in a spirall line, from the Aequinoctiall towards the North, and to­wards the South. Stob. p. 5 [...]. Zeno saith, he hath two motions, one with [Page 108] the World from East to VVest, the other contrary, through the Signes.

Laert. That the Sun is greater then the Earth, appeareth in that it enlightneth, not only all the Earth, but Heaven also. Again, the shadow of the Earth being conicall, argues the Sun to be greater then the Earth. Again, it is visible every where by reason of its magnitude.

Laert. The Sun is Eclipsed by interposition of the Moon betwixt us and that part of the Sun which is toward us (as Zeno in his book of the Universe.) For meeting the Sun, and coming under him, she seemeth to darken his light, and afterwards to disclose it a­gain, as will appear in a basin of water.

CHAP. X.
of the Moon.

Stob. phys. p. 59. IN the lowest part of the aether is the Moon: The Moon (ac­cording to Zeno) is an intellectuall, wise, igneous, Star con­sisting of artificiall fire. Cleanthes saith, she is of a fiery substance, and [...] a dirty figure. Physiol. Stoic. 2 13. Lipsius for [...], dirty, substitutes [...], is if of the same figure, as a nat or cap. But perhaps there needs no alteration, for they Laert. affirmed, as she is nearer to the Earth then the Sun, so is she of a more terrene Nature. plut. plac. 2. 25 Stob p 59. Possido­nius and most of the Stoicks affirm, she is mixt of fire and air, [...] l. plac. p hil. 2. 30. by reason of which diversity of substance she is not subject to cor­ruption. St. p. 60. To this mixtion of air in her composition, they impute likewise those spots which are seen in her face. pl. ph. 2. 26. She is greater then the Earth, as well as the Sun is, and Spnaericall as the Sun, yet apeareth in various figures, the full-Moon, first quarter, New-Moon, last quarter.

Stob. p. 59. Chrysippus saith, she is a fire collected after the Sun, from the exhalation of fresh Waters, for which cause she is likewise nourished by them, as Laert: Possidonius also asserteth.

Laert. Her motion is spiral; Stob. p. 5 [...]. Zeno saith, she hath two motions, as the one with the World from East to West, the other contrary through the signes. Stob. p. 59. The period of her course is called a Mont [...]; [...], is likewise that part of the Moon which appeareth to us, for one halfe of her is alwaies turned towards us.

The Moon is Eclipsed when she falleth into the shadow of the earth. For although every month she is opposite to the Sun, yet she is then only eclipsed when she is fullest, by reason of the obliquity of her course, whereby her latitude is varied towards the north and south. When therefore she happens to be neer the Ecliptick, and opposite to the Sun, she is eclipsed; which hap­pens (as Possidonius saith) in Libra and Scorpio, and in Aries and [Page 109] Taurus. Thus Laertius, but Possidonius seemes to have been igno­rant of, or not to have considered the motion of the Nodes of the Moon (commonly called Caput & Cauda draconis) whereby the restitution or period of Eclipses is made in ninteen yeeres, ( [...]) which was the ground of Meton's period, and of the Cycle of the Moon, in the Julian Calender.

CHAP. XI.
Of Aire.

Stob. NExt the sphear of the Moon (saith Chrysippus) is the element of Aires interposed betwixt the Sea and Heaven ( Cicer. spheri­call in figure) Laert. consecrated by the name of Cic. Iuno, Sister and Wife of Iupiter, who is the Aether▪ betwixt these there is a neer conjunction.

Stob. Phys. The Aire is divided into three regions, the highest, the mid­dle, and the lowest. The highest region is the hottest and dryest, and rarest, by reason of the vicinity of the eternall fires. The lowest and neerest to the earth is thick and caliginous; because it receiveth terrene exhalations. The middle region is more tem­perate then the higher and lower, as to siccity and rarity, but colder then both. This, wherein the clouds and winds are gene­rated, is, according to Possidonius, forty furlongs above the earth. Next to it is the pure and liquid aire of untroubled light. From the turbulent part to the Moon is twenty hundred thousand furlongs.

Laert. To the aire is attributed the primitive cold.

Laert. As concerning things in the Aire. Winter is the rigour of the aire, next above the earth, occasion'd by the remotenesse of the Sun, and is the coldest of the seasons of the year. Spring is the season succeeding Winter, preceding Summer, and is a good temperature of the air, occasion'd by approach of the Sun. Sum­mer is that season of the year, when the aire above the earth is warmed, by the Suns accesse towards the north. Autumne that season of the year which followeth Summer, and precedeth Winter, is made by the return of the Sun from us.

Laert. Winter commeth, when the aire is predominant in thick­nesse, and is forced upward: Summer, when the fire is predomi­nant, and driven downward.

Plut. plac. Phil. 3. 7. Winde is a fluxion of the aire, having severall names, from the variety of places; as for example: That which bloweth from the darknesse of the night, and Sun-setting, is called Zephy­rus; from the East and Sun-rising, Apeliotes; from the North, Boreas; from the South Lybs. Laert. It is occasion'd by the Sun's exte­nuation of the vapours.

[Page 110] Laert. The Rainbow is a reflection of the Sun's beams from a humid cloude: or, as Possidonius, an apparition of part of the Sun or Moon in a cloud, dewy, concave, and continuous to the phanta­sy, as in a looking-glasse, the representation of a Circle.

Laert. Comets are fires subsisting of thick air, carried up to the aetheriall place.

Laert. [...] is an accension of suddain fire, swiftly carried through the air, appearing length-waies.

Laert. Rain is a conversion of clouds into water, when either from the Earth, or from the Sea, by the power of the Sun, the hu­mour is drawn upwards ineffectually.

Laert. Frost is congealed rain.

Laert. Hail is a concrete cloud, dispersed by the winde.

Laert. Snow is humidity, from a concrete cloud, according to Pos­sidonius.

Laert. Lightning is an accension of clouds, which are driven by the winds upon one another, and broken, according to Zeno.

Laert. plut. plac. p hil. 3. 3. Stob. p. 65. Thunder is a noise occasion'd by the collision of clouds.

Laert. Thunderbolt is a strong inflammation, rushing upon the earth with great violence, when the clouds by impulsion of the winds are broken against one another. Some define it a conversion of fiery inflamed aire, violently rushing down.

Laert. Typho is a violent Thunder, thrust down with a great force of winde, or a smoaking winde, which rusheth down upon the breaking of the cloud.

Prester is a cloud inclosed with fire by winde in the concavi­ties of the earth: There are many kinds thereof, Earthquakes, C [...]asma's, and the like.

CHAP. XII.
Of Water and Earth.

THat part of the world (saith Stob. Chrysippus) which is the most solid support of nature, as bones are in a living creature, is called the earth: About this the water is evenly diffused. The earth hath some uneven parts arising out of the water, called Islands, or, if of large extent, Continents, from the ignorance of man, who knowes not, that even those are Islands, in respect of the great Ocean.

The earth is in the midst, being in the nature of a Center, Plu [...]. plac. Phil. 3. 9. Laert one and finite, Plut. plac. [...]hil: [...]. 10. sphericall in figure. The water is likewise sphericall, having the same center with the earth.

The earth hath five Zones, one northern, beyond the Artick Circle, uninhabitable through extremity of cold: another tempe­rate; a third not habitable by reason of extream heat, whence [Page 111] it is called Torrid; a fourth temperate, a fift southern, not habi­table by reason of cold. Cleomed. But Possidonius conceiveth the Climate under the Equinoctiall to be temperate; for, saith he, under the Tropicks where the Sun dwells longest, the places are habitable, and why not then under the Aequator? Again, the night being equall to the day, affordeth leisure enough for refrigeration, which is assisted likewise by showers and winds.

Stob. The generation of the world began from the earth, as from the Center; for the Center is the beginning of a sphear.

Plut. plac. Phil. 5. 26. Plants have not any soul at all, but spring up of themselves, as it were by chance.

CHAP. XIII.
Of Mistion and Temperament.

CHrysippus asserteth a Stob. Phys. 20. Spirit moving it selfe to it selfe, and from it selfe, or a spirit moving it selfe backwards and for­wards. He calleth it spirit, as being moved aire, answering in some proportion to the Aether, so that it both meets in one; and this motion is only according to those who think, that all na­ture receiveth mutation, solution, composition, and the like.

Composition, mixtion, temperament, and confusion are different. Composition is a contract of bodies, whose superficies are con­tiguous to one another, as in heaps of grain or sand. Mixtion is of two or more bodies, whose qualities are diffused through the whole, as we see in fire, and red hot iron, and in our own [...]oules; for every where there is a diffusion through entire bodies, so as one body doth passe through another. Temperament is of two or more humid bodies, whose qualities are diffused through the whole. Mixtion is also common to drie bodies, as to fire and iron, to the soul and the body, temperament only to the humid. For qualities appear from the temperament of severall humid things, as of wine, honey, water, vinegar, and the like; that in such temperament, the qualities of the things tempered re­main, is evident from this, that oftentimes they are by some art separated from one another. For, if we put a spunge dipped in oyle into wine mixt with water, the water, separating it selfe from the wine, will gather to the spunge. Lastly, confusion is the transmutation of two or more qualities into another of a different nature, as in composition of Unguents and Medicines.

CHAP. XIV.
Of Generation and Corruption.

Stob. Phys. POssidonius asserteth foure species of generation and corrup­tion, of things that are into things that are (for that of things that are not, and of things that are not he rejected, conceiving there is none such.) Of transmutations into things that are, one is by division, another by alteration, a third by confusion, a fourth of the whole by resolution. Of these, alteration concern­eth the substance, the other three are of the qualities which in­here in the substance. According to these are generations made. But the substance it selfe is neither augmented nor diminished by apposition or detraction, but is only altered as happeneth to numbers and measures. But in things properly qualited, as Dion and Theon, there is augmentation and diminution, wherefore the quality of each remaineth from the generation untill the corruption thereof, in plants and living creatures which are ca­pable of corruption. In things properly qualited, he asserted two susceptible parts; one, according to the substance, another according to the quality: This, as we have often said, admit­teth augmentation and diminution. Neither is the thing pro­perly qualited, and the substance out of which it is, all one, nor divers, but only, not all one, because the substance is a part, and occupateth the same place; but things that are divers have di­stinct places, and are not consider'd in part. That as to the thing properly qualited, and as to the substance, it is not the same, Mnesarchus affirmeth to be evident, because it is necessary, that to the same happen the same things. For if, for example, a man having formed a horse, should break it, and make a dog, we would presently, beholding it, say, this was not before, but it is now: So are the qualited and the substance divers. Neither is it likely that we should all be the same as to substance; for it often happens, that the substance is preexistent to the generation, as the substance of Socrates was, before Socrates was; and after the corruption and death of Socrates, the substance remaineth, though Socrates himselfe be not.

CHAP. XV.
Of Motion.

Stob. MOtion (according to Chrysippus) is a mutation of parts, either in whole or in parts, or an excession out of place, either in whole or in part, or a change according to place, or [Page 113] figure. Iaculation is a vehement motion from on high. Rest is partly a privation of motion in a body, partly the same habit of a body before and after. There are two first motions, right and oblique; from the mixtion of these ariseth great variety of motions.

Stob. Zeno affirmes the parts of all things consisting by themselves are moved towards the midle of the whole, and likewise of the World it self; wherefore it is rightly said, that all parts of the World tend to the midle thereof, and principally the heavy, and that there is the same cause of the rest of the World in the infi­nite vacuity, and of the rest of the Earth, in the World, in the midst of which it is constituted as a point. All bodies have not gravity, as air, and fire; yet these in some manner tend to the midst of the World.

CHAP. XVI.
Of Living Creatures.

Plu [...]. Pl. Ph. OF animate Creatures there are two kinds (for Plants as wee said have no souls) some are appetitive and concupiscible, others rationall. The Soul, according to Zeno, Antipater and P [...]ssidonius, is a hot spirit, for hereby we breath and move. Clean­thes saith, we live so long as that heat holdeth.

Every soul hath sense and is a spirit innate in us, wherefore it is a body, and shall not continue after death; yet is it by Na­ture corruptible, notwithstanding, that it is a part of the Soul of the Universe which is incorruptible: Yet some hold, that the lesse firm Souls, such as are those of the unlearned, perish at the disso­lution of the body; the stronger, as those of the wise and virtuous, shall last even untill the generall conflagration.

Laert. Pl [...]t. plac. phil. 4. 4. The Soul hath eight parts, whereof five are the Sences, the sixth generative, the seventh Vocall, the eighth Hegemonick.

Plut. plac. phil. 4. 4. The Supream or Hegemonick part of the Soul, is that which maketh Phantasies, assent, sense, appetite. This Supreme part is called Ratiocination; Plut. plac. phil. 4. 4. it is seated in the Heart, some say in the Head, as in its sphear.

Plut. plac. phil. 4. 21. From the Hegemonick issue and are extended to the body the seven other parts, which it guideth by their proper Organs, as a fish its claws.

Sense is an apprehension by the Sensitive Organ, or a compre­hension. Sense is taken many waies; For the faculty, habit, act, phantasie, whereby the sensible object is comprehended, and the Hegemonick parts of the Soul are called Sense. Again, the Senso­ries are intelligent spirits, diffused from the Hegemonick to the Organs. Plut. plac. phil. 4. 21. The senses are Sight, Hearing, Smell, [...]ast, Touch.

Plut. plac. phil 4. 21. Sight is a spirit extended from the Hegemonick part to the [Page 114] Eies. Sight is made by contraction of that light which is between the eye and the object into a Cone, according to Chrysippus. Apol­lodorus saith, that part of the Air which is Conicall is next the sight, the Base next the Object; so as that which is seen is point­ed out to by the Air as by a stick.

Colour is the first figuration or habit of matter.

Darknesse is visible, for from the sight there issueth a splendor which passeth round about that darknesse. Neither is the sight deceived, for it truly sees that it is dark. Chrysippus saith, that we see according to the intention of the mediate air, which is struck by the visuall spirit, which passeth from the Hegemonick to the apple of the eye, and, after that blow, falleth upon the ear next, extending it self in a Conicall figure. Again, from the eye are emitted fiery raies, not black or dusky, and therefore darknesse is visible.

Plut. Pl. Ph. 4. 21. Hearing is a spirit extended from the Hegemonick part to the Ears. Hearing is made when the Air betwixt the speaker and hearer is verberated in a circulation, and at last by agitation, passeth in at the Ears, as the circles that are made in a pond, by casting in a stone.

Plac. phil. 4. 21. Smelling, is a spirit extended from the Hegemonick to the nostrils.

Plut. ibid. Tasting is a spirit extended from the Hegemonick to the Tongue.

Plut. ibid. Touching is a spirit, extended from the Hegemonick part to the superficies, so that it perceiveth that which is obliged to it.

Plut. ibid. The sixt part of the Soul is the Generative, which is a spirit from the Hegemonick to the Parastatae; of this part, see Laertius from [...], &c. to [...], and Plu [...]arch de Philosoph. Plac. lib. 5. cap. 4, 5, 9, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 23.

Plut. ibid. The seventh and last part of the Soul, is that which Zeno calls vocall, commonly called the Voice. It is a spirit proceeding from the Hegemonick part to the throat, tongue, and other pro­per Instruments of speech. Plut. Pl. ph. 4. 19. Voice is Air, not composed of little pieces, but whole and continuous, having no vacuity in it. This Air being struck by the wind, spreadeth into circles infinitely, untill the Air round about it be filled like the Water in a pond by throwing in of a stone, only the Water moves spherically, the Air circularly. Voice is a body, for it acteth, it striketh upon, and leaveth an impression in our Ear, as a seal in Wax. Again, whatsoever moveth and disturbeth some affection is a body; Har­mony moveth with delight, discord disturbeth. Again, whatso­ever is moved is a body, but Voice is moved and reverberated from smooth places, as a ball against a Wall. So in the Aegyptian Pyramids, one Voice is redoubled four or five times.

CHAP. XVII.
Of God.

HItherto of the Material principle, and that which is produ­ced of it; we come now to the other principle, the Agent, God.

Cic. nat. [...]eor. lib. 2. This question they divide into four parts; first, that there are Gods; secondly, what they are; thirdly, that they order the world; fourthly, that they take care of humane affairs.

Cleanthes saith, Cic. ibid. that the notions of God are imprinted in the minds of men from four causes. First, from Divination, for the Gods afford us signes of future things, wherein if there be any mistake, it is not from their part, but from the errour of humane conjecture. The second is from the multitude of good things wee receive by the temperature of Heaven, the fertility of the Earth, and abundance of other benefits. The third from the Terrour of Thunder, Tempest Rain, Snow, Hail, Devastation, Pestilence, Earthquakes, and somtimes groanings, showers of stones and blood, Portents, Prodigies, Comets and the like; with which men are affrighted into a belief, that there is a heavenly divine power. The fourth and greatest cause is the aequability of the motion and revolution of Heaven, the Sun, Moon and starres, their distinctions, variety, beauty, order, the very sight whereof declares that they were not made by chance.

That there are Gods Chrysippus proveth thus▪ Cic. ibid. If there is some­thing in Nature, which the mind, reason, power, and faculties of man could not make, that which did make it is better then Man; but Celestiall things, and all those, whose order is sempi­ternal, could not be made by Man; there is therefore somthing which made them, which is better then Man, and what is that but God? For if there are no Gods, what can there be in Nature better then Man, for in him only is reason, then which nothing is more excellent? But for a man to think that there is nothing in the World better then himself, is a foolish arrogance. Therefore there is somthing better, and consequently there is a God.

Cic. ibid. Zeno more concisely thus; That which is rationall is better then that which is irrationall, but nothing is better then the World, therefore the World is rationall. In like manner may be proved that the World is wise, that it is happy, that it is eter­nall, for all these are better then the want of these; But there is nothing better then the World; whence it followeth that the World is God.

Again, he argues thus. No part of an insensible thing hath sense; but the parts of the World have sense, therefore the World hath sense.

[Page 116] He proceedeth to urge this more strictly: Nothing, saith he, that is void of minde and reason, can of it selfe generate that which is animate and rationall; but the world generates ani­mate and rationall creatures, therefore the world is animate and rationall.

Likewise, according to his custome, he concludeth his argu­ment with a similitude: IF out of an Olive-tree should come har­monious Pipes, that made Musick, you would not doubt, but that the science of Musick were in the Olive-tree. What if a Plain-tree should bear Musicall instruments, you would think there were musick in those Plain-trees: Why then should we not judge the world to be animate and wise, that produceth out of it selfe animate and wise creatures.

There is nothing besides the world which wanteth nothing, and which is perfect and compleat in all its numbers and parts: for as the cover, saith Chrysippus, was made for the shield's sake, and the scabberd for the swords; so besides the world, all other things were made for the sake of something else. Fruites of the earth were made for living creatures, living irrationall creatures for the use of man, horses for carriage, oxen for tillage, dogs for hunting and defence; but, man himselfe was made to con­template and imitate the world. Not that he is at all perfect, but only a part of that which is perfect. But the world it selfe, forasmuch as it comprehendeth all things, neither is there any thing which is not in it, is every way perfect. What therefore can be wanting to that which is best? But, there is nothing bet­ter then the minde and reason, therefore these cannot be wan­ting to the world.

Chrysippus addeth this comparison: As all things are best in the most perfect and mature creatures, as in a Horse better then in a Colt, in a Dog better then in a Whelp, in a Man better then in a Child: So that which is best in all the world, must be in that which is perfect and absolute; but, then the world, no­thing is more perfect, nothing better then vertue, therefore the world hath proper vertue. The nature of man is not perfect; yet, in man there is vertue, how much more then in the world? The world therefore hath vertue, therefore it is wise, and con­sequently God.

Plut. Pl. Ph. 1. 6. Thus the notion and apprehension men have of God, is, first, by conceiving the beauty of those things which are obje­cted to their eyes, for no beautifull thing hath been made by chance and adventure, but composed and framed by some inge­nious and operative art. Now that the heaven is beautifull, ap­peareth by the form, colour, and bignesse thereof, by the va­riety also of starres disposed therein. Moreover, the world is round in manner of a ball, which figure of all others, is princi­pall and most perfect, for it alone resembleth all the parts; for [Page 117] being round it selfe, it hath the parts also round.

As to the second part of the question, Laert. God is an immortall being, rationall, perfect, or intellectuall in Beatitude, voide of all evill, provident over the world, and things in the world, not of human form, maker of all, and as it were father of all.

Plut. Pl. Ph. 1▪ 6. They define God a spirit full of intelligence, of a [...]ie [...]y na­ture, having no proper form, but transforming himselfe into whatsoever he pleaseth, and resembling all things.

We understand by God, saith Antipater, a living nature or substance, happy, incorruptible, doing good to mankinde. All [...] men acknowledge the Gods immortall. They who deprive the Gods of beneficence, have an imperfect notion of them, as th [...]y likewise, who think they are subject to generation and corrup­tion.

Pl. contrad. Stoic. Yet, are there some Gods, saith Chrysippus, generative and mortall, as well as there are others ingenerate: Stob. [...]The world, starres, and earth are Gods, but the supream God is the aethe [...]i­all minde, Iupiter.] The sun, moon, and other such like Gods were begotten; but Iupiter is eternall. Other Gods use a certain nourishment, whereby they are maintained equally; but Iupiter and the world after another sort then the generated, which shall be consumed by fire. Iupiter groweth continually, untill such time as all things be consumed in him, death being the separa­tion of the soul and body; for seeing that the soul of the world never departeth at all, but augmenteth continnally, untill it have consumed all the matter within it selfe, we cannot say that the world dieth.

Laert. The substance of God, Zeno affirmes to be the whole World and Heaven, so also Chrysippus in his 11 th of the Gods, and Possi­donius in his first of the Gods. But Antipater in his 7 th of the world, affirmes his substance to be a [...]riall. Boethius in his book of nature, saith, the substance of God is the sphear of fixed stars. Sometimes they call him a nature containing the world, some­times a nature producing all upon earth.

As concerning the third part of the question, they affirm, that Pl [...]l. God is an operative artificiall fire, methodically ordering and effecting the generation of the world, comprehending in him­selfe all prolifick reason, by which every thing is produced ac­cording to Fate. God is a Spirit, diffused through the whole world, having severall denominations, according to the severall parts of the matter through which he spreadeth, and the Laert. seve­rall effects of his power shewn therein. They call him [...], as [...], by whom all things are: [...], as the author [...], of life. Minerva, as diffused through the aether; Iuno, as through the aire; Vulcan, as through the Perhaps i [...] should [...]e a [...], though Ae [...]hylus as­cribe this t [...] Vulcan. [...] artificiall fire; Neptune, as through the water; Ceres, as through the earth. In like manner the res [...] of his names were imposed, with respect to some proper­ty. [Page 118] Cic. This place was first discoursed upon by [...] Zeno [...], after whom, Cleanthes and Chrysippus dilated more largely upon it.

Cic. By this Providence, the World, and all parts of the World, were in the beginning constituted, and are in all time ordered. This disputation they divided into three parts: The first, from the same reason that teacheth us there are Gods, inferreth, that the World is ordered by them, seeing that there is nothing higher or more excellent, then this administration. The second, from that reason which teacheth us, that all things are subjected to an understanding nature, and exquisitely ordered by it, inferreth, that it is generated of animate principles. The third place is de­rived from admiration of celestiall and terrestriall things. Upon these, Cicero discourseth at large, according to the opinion of the Stoicks.

As to the fourth part of the question in generall concerning the Gods, that they have a particular providentiall care of man-kinde, it is manifest, in that whatsoever is in this world was made for the use of man, and is conducible thereunto; and if for the whole fpecies, they must consequently have the same care of particulars, which they expresse by many portents, and all those fignes whereupon the art of Divination depends. There was never any great person without some divine inspiration. But we must not argue from hence, that if the corn or vine­yard of any man be hurt by a Tempest, or Fortune deprive him of any of the conveniencies of life, that he to whom this hath happened, may be judged to be hated or neglected of God. The Gods take care of great things, the little they neglect; but to great persons all things have alwaies a happy issue.

Agel. lib. 6. cap. 1. Chrysippus in his fourth Book of Providence saith, there is no­thing more ignorant, nothing more sordid then those persons, who think, good might have been without ill. For, Good and Ill being contraries, it is necessary, that both consist together mu­tually, sustaining one another, as it were by opposition. For, how could we understand Iustice, unlesse there were Injuries? What is Justice, but a privation of Injustice? How can Fortitude be understood, but by opposition to Fear? How Continence, but from Intemperance? How Prudence, if there were not Imprudence? Why do not these fooles desire that Truth might be without Fal­shood? Such are good and ill, happinesse and misery, griefe and plea­sure; one is ty'd to the other, as Plato sayes, by their contrary ends.

Agel. ibid. Here followeth the question, whether that Providence which framed the world and mankinde, did make likewise those corporeall infirmities and sicknesses which men suffer. Chrysippus affirmeth it was not the intent of Nature to make men obnoxious to sicknesse: For this agreeth not with the Author of Nature, and Parent of all good things; but he having genera­ted [Page 119] many great things, most apt and usefull, other things also, incommodious to those which he made, were aggenerated toge­ther with them, coherent to them, made, not by Nature, but certain necessary consequence, [...] As, saith he, when Nature framed the bodies of Men, more subtle reason & the bene­fit of the World, would have required that the head should have been made of the smallest and thin bones; but this utility would have been followed by another extrinsecall inconvenience of greater consequence, that the head would be too weakly defen­ded, and broken with the least blow. Sicknesses therefore and diseases are engendred whilst health is engendred. In like manner saith he, whilst Vertue is begotten in Man, by the counsell of Na­ture, vices like wise are begotten by contrary affinity.

CHAP. XVIII.
Of Nature.

Plut. plac. 1. 28. Lae [...]. NExt Iupiter, Possidonius placeth Nature. By Nature they somtimes, understand that which containeth the World, somtimes, that which produceth things upon Earth; both which, as we said, is to be understood of God. For that Nature which containeth and preserveth the World, hath perfect sence and rea­son, which power is the Soul of the World, the mind and divine Wisdom. Lactant. lib. 7. Cap. 3. Thus under the terme of Nature, they comprehend both God and the World, affirming that the one cannot be with­out the other, as if Nature were God permeating through the World, God the mind of the World, the World the body of God. Flut. This Chrysippus calleth Common-Nature in distinction from particular Nature.

Laert. Nature is defined by Zeno an artificial fire, proceeding in the way of generation, which is the fiery spirit, the Artist of formes; by others, a habit receiving motion from it self, according to pro­lifick reason, and effecting and containing those things which sub­sist by it, in certain definite times, producing all things, from which it self is distinct by Nature, proposing to it self these two ends, Utility and Pleasure, as is manifest from the porduction of man.

CHAP. XIX.
Of Fate.

Stob. 1. 9. Plut. THe third from Iupiter (according to Possidonius) is Fate, for Iupiter is first, next Nature, then Fate.

Plut. Pl. Ph. 1. 28. They call Fate a concatenation of Causes, that is, an order and connexion which cannot be transgressed.

Fate is a cause depending on Laws, and ordering by Laws, or a reason; by which the World is ordered.

Laert. Fate is, according to Zeno, the motive power of matter, dis­posing so and so, not much diftering from Nature and Pro­vidence.

Stob. Panaetius assirmeth Fate to be God.

Stob. Chrysippus desineth Fate a spirituall power, governing the World orderly; or, Agel. a sempiternall and indeclinable series and chain of things, it self, rolling and implicating it self by eternall orders of consequence, of which it is adapted and connected; or, as Chrysippus again in his Book of Definitions hath it, Stob. The reason of the World, or Law of all things in the World, governed by Providence; or the reason why things past have been, the present are, the future shall be. For Reason, he useth Truth, Cause, Na­ture, Necessity, and other termes, as attributed to the same thing in different respects. Fate from the severall distributions thereof, is called Clotho, Lachesis and Atropos. Lachesis, as it dispenseth to e­very one, as it were by lot; Atropos, as it is an immutable dispen­sation, from all eternity; Clotho, in allusion to the resemblance it hath with spinning and twisting of Threads.

[...]l. Fl. Ph. 1. 27. Necessity is a cause invincible, most violent, and inforcing all things. pl. ph. 1. 29. Fortune is a Cause unknown and hidden to humane rea­son. For some things come by Necessity, others by Fate, some by deliberate Counsel, others by Fortune, some by Casualty.

pl. ph. 1. 27. But Fate, being a connexion of Causes interlaced and linked or­derly, compriseth also that cause proceedeth from us.

Laert. That all things are done by Fate, is asserted by Zeno in his Book of Fate, and Possidonius in his second Book of Fate, and Boe­thus in his 11th of Fate. Which Cic. de Fato. Chrysippus proves thus. If there is any motion without a cause, then every axiom is not either true or false, for that which hath not efficient causes, will be nei­ther true nor false; but every axiom is either true or false, therefore there is no motion without a cause. And if so, then all things that are done, are done by precedent causes, and if so, all things are done by Fate. That all axioms are either true or false, Cicero saith, he labour'd much to prove, whereby he takes away, [Page 121] Possibles, indeterminates, and other distinctions of the Academicks, of which see Alcinous, Chap. 26.

Cic. de fate. In answer to the sluggish reason, if it be your fate to die of this sicknesse, you shall die whether you have a Physician or no; and if it be your fate to recover, you shall recover whether you have a Physitian or not. Chrysippus saith, that in things some are simple, some conjunct. Simple is thus, Socrates shall die on such a day; for whether he do any thing or not, it is appointed he should die on such a day. But if it be destin'd thus, Laius shall have a son Oedipus, it cannot be said, whether he accompany with a woman or not, for it is a conjunct thing, and confatall, as he termes it, because it is destin'd that Laius shall lie with his wife, and that he shall get Oedipus of her. As if we should say, Milo shall wrastle at the Olympick Games, and another should infer, then he shall wrastle whether he have an adversary or no, he were mistaken; for that he shall wrastle is a conjunct thing, because there is no wrastling without an adversary. Thus are refelled all sophismes of this kinde (you shall recover whe­ther you have a Physician or not) for it is no lesse determined by fate that you shall have a Physician, than that you shall recover. They are confatall.

Thus there being two opinions of the old Philosophers; one, that all things are so done by Fate, that Fate inferreth a power of Necessitie, as Democritus, Heraclitus, Empedocles, and Aristotle held; the other, that the motions of our souls were voluntary without any Fate: Chrysippus, as an honourable Arbitratour, took the middle way betwixt these, but inclining most to those who conceived the motions of our souls free from necessitie. The Antients, who held all things to be done by Fate, said, it was by a violence and necessitie; those who were of the con­trary opinion, denyed, that Fate had any thing to do with our assent, and that there was no necessitie imposed upon assents. They argued thus: If all things are done by Fate, all things are done by an antecedent cause, and if appetite, then likewise those things which follow appetite, therefore assents also. But, if the cause of appetite is not in us, neither is the appetite it selfe in our power, and if so, neither those things which are effected by appetite are in our power, and consequently neither assents nor actions are in our power; whence it followeth, that neither praise can be just, nor dispraise, nor honour, nor pu­nishment; but this is false, therefore all things are not done by Fate.

But Chrysippus not allowing this necessity, yet maintaining that nothing happened without precedent causes, distinguisheth thus. Of Causes, saith he, some are perfect and principall, others as­sistant and immediate. When we say, all things are done by Fate, from antecedent causes, we understand not the perfect [Page 122] and principall causes, but the assistent and immediate. He there­fore answers the former objection thus: If all things are done by Fate, it followeth, that all things be done by antecedent causes, but not by the principall and perfect, but by the assistent and immediate, which though they be not in our power, it fol­loweth not, that the appetite likewise is in our power. This Ar­gument therefore concludes well against those who joyne ne­cessity with Fate, but nothing against those who assert antece­dent causes not perfect nor principall. What assent is, and how it commeth to be in our power, we have already shewn in the Logick.

Hence it followeth, that Agell. 6. 2. notwithstanding that all things are necessarily coacted and connected by Fate, with a certain prin­cipall reason; yet (saith Chrysippus) our mindes are so obnoxious to Fate, as their property and quality is. For, if at the first by nature they were formed soundly and profitably, all that power which commeth upon them extrinsecally from Fate, they trans­mit easily and inoffensively; but, if they are harsh, ignorant, and rude, not supported by any helps of good art, although they are pressed by little or no conflict of fatall incommodity, yet by their own unluckinesse, and voluntary impulsion, they rush into continuall sins and errours, which thing maketh that this na­turall and necessary consequence of things, which is called Fate, be by this reason. For it is. as it were, fatall, and consequent in its kinde, that wicked minds should not be without sins and errours, an instance whereof he bringeth not unapposite. As, saith he, a rolling stone, if you turn it down a steep place, you first give it the cause and beginning of its precipitation, but af­terwards it rolleth headlong of it selfe; not that you make it do so any longer, but because its figure, and the volubility of its form is such. In like manner, order, and reason, and necessitie, moveth the beginnings of causes; but the impetuousnesse of our thoughts and mindes, and our own actions, are guided by every mans private will and minde. Thence continueth he, the Py­thagoreans say, ‘Men of their own accord their ills procure.’ As conceiving that all ills proceed from themselves, and ac­cording to their own appetites when they sin and offend, and ac­cording to their own minde and signe.

For this reason he denyeth, that we ought to suffer and hear such wicked, or idle, or noxious, or impudent persons, who be­ing taken in some fault and wickednesse, have recourse to the necessity of Fate, as to a Sanctuary, affirming that they have done wickedly, is not to be attributed to their temerity, but to Fate.

CHAP. XX.
Of Not-Bodies, or Incorporealls; and first of Dicibles.

HItherto of Bodies, we come next to the second place of Phy­sick, concerning Not-Bodies, or Incorporealls. Incorporeall is that which may be, but is not contained in bodies. Sext. Emper: Of those there are four kinds, Dicibles, Vacuum, place, and Time.

Dicible is that which consisteth according to rationall phan­tasy, a mean betwixt notion and thing. Of this already in the Logick.

CHAP. XXI.
of Vacuum and Place.

THe second incorporeall is Vacuum, which is the solitude or vacuity of a body. In the world there is no vacuum, neither in the whole nor in any part: Beyond it there is an infinite vacu­ity, into which the world shall be resolved. Of this already in the Chapter concerning the world.

Next is Place: Place is that which is fully occupated by the body; or, as Chrysippus defines it, that which is or may be occu­pated by one or more things. Thus it differs from vacuity, which hath no body, and from space, which is occupated but in part, as a vessell halfe full of wine.

CHAP. XXII.
Of Time.

LAst of the Incorporealls is Time. Time is, according to ma­ny of the Stoicks, the motion of it selfe, not of heaven, and had no beginning of generation. Chrysippus saith, that Time is the measure of slownesse or swiftnesse. Zeno defined it the intervall of motion, and measure of slownesse and swiftnesse, according to which, all things were and are.

Possidonius saith, that some are wholly infinite, as all Time; some only in part, as the past and future; for they are joyned to­gether by the present. He defined Time the intervall of motion, or the measure of swiftnesse and slownesse, one part of it being present, the other future, the present connected to the future by something like a point. It is called [...] attributed to the least part of Time that falleth under sense, subsisting according to the difference of past and future.

[Page 124] Chrysippus saith, that Time is the intervall of motion, the measure of swiftnesse and slownesse; a consequent intervall to the worlds motion, according to which all things are, and are moved, unlosse rather there be a two-fold Time, as the Earth and Sea, and Vacuity and Universe, have the same names with their parts. And as vacuity is every way infinite, so Time is both waies infinite, for the present and future have no end. He like­wise asserts, that no entire present is Time, for continuous things being divided into infinite, Time likewise admitteth of the same division; so that no Time is properly present, but so called, after a lesse accurate manner. The present only is subsistent, unlesse it be understood as of Categorems; as, walking is attributed to him that walketh, but not to him that sitteth or lyeth. Thus much for the STOICALL PHILOSOPHY.

CLEANTHES

CAP. I.
His Life

CLeanthes was of Assus an Aeolian City (forti­fied, Laert. as Stralo describes it, both by Nature and Art) sonne of Phanias. He was first ac­cording to Antisthenes a wrastler, and come­ing to Athens, having no more then four Drachms, he apply'd himself first to Crates, then to Zene, whom he heard constantly, and persevered in his Philosophy and Opinions. He was much commended for his laboriousnesse, in as much as being poor, he went by night to the Gardens to draw water, and in the day time studied Philosophy. Hence he was called [...] The drawer of Water.

Being cited to the Court to give an account how he lived, be­ing so healthfull and lusty, hee produced the Gardener, under whom he drew water, and a woman for whom he ground meal, to witnesse how he subsisted. The Areopagites wondring hereat, allotted him 10. minae, which Zeno would not suffer him to accept. Antigonus gave him 3000. minae. On a time leading some young men to a spectacle, the wind blew back his Cloak, and discovered that he had no Coat; whereupon the Athenians much applauded him, and, as Demetrius the Magnesian [...]aith, bestowed a Coat upon him.

Antigonus, Laert. Flut. who was his Auditor, asked him why he drew wa­ter, he answer'd, Do I only draw water? Do I not also dig and water the ground, and all for the sake of Philosophy? For Zeno brought him up to this, and bad him bring him an obolus gained by his labour. Upon a time he brought in his gains before all his Disciples, saying, Cleanthes, If he would, could maintain another Cleanthes; but they who have wherewithall to maintain themselves, would be supply'd by others; yet study philosophy nothing the more diligently. Hence Cleanthes was called a second Hercules. He was very laborious, but dull and slow.

[Page 126] He used to write the dictates of Zeno in shells, and the shoul­der-blades of Oxen, for want of money to buy paper. He was his auditor 19. years.

For these reasons, though Zeno had many other eminent Dis­ciples, yet he succeeded him in the School.

CHAP. II.
His Apophthegmes.

Laert. HIs Fellow-Disciples derided him, he took it patiently, and being called Asse, answered, he onely could bear Zeno's burthen.

Another time being reproached as timerous, therefore, saith he, I sin little.

Preferring his own Poverty before the plenty of the rich; whilst they, saith he, Play at Ball, I manure a hard barren soil.

He often chid himself, being all alone, which Aristo overhea­ring; whom, saith he, do you chide, he smiling, answered, a grey­headed old fellow without wit.

To one that said Arcesilaus abrogated the offices of life; peace, saith he, dispraise him not, for though he take away offices in discourse, he commends them in his actions; To whom Arcesilaus saying, I cannot endure flattery; I do indeed flatter, replies Clean­thes, when I say, you speak one thing and do another.

To one that asked what he should teach his Son, he answer'd in the words of Electra; ‘Peace, peace, a little step.’

A Lacedemonian saying, that labour was good, hee laughed, answering, ‘My son, thou of a gen'rous race art come.’

Disputing with a young man, he asked him whether hee did feel; the other answers he did, he replyed, why then do I not feel that you feel?

Sosythius the Poet saying in the publick Theatre when Cleanthes was present;

Those whom Cleanthes madnesse leads away; hee sate still, not changing his countenance; whereupon the Auditors applauding him, turned out Sosythius, who afterwards coming to Cleanthes, told him he was sorry that he had reproached him; Cleanthes an­swer'd, it were unsit I should behold unconcerned Bacchus and Her­cules derided by the Poets, and be angry' at a little word against my self.

[Page 127] He compared the Peripateticks to Lutes, that make good Mu­sick, but hear it not themselves.

Holding according to Zeno that the mind may be discerned in the countenance, some merry young men brought an effeminate youth to him rustically cloathed, desiring his opinion of that mans disposition. He bad him depart, which the other going to do, sneezed; Cleanthes presently cryed out, I have found out the man, he is effeminate.

To one that was all alone talking to himself, you discourse saith he, with a man that is not ill.

To one that was reproach'd him with his age, I would be gone, saith he, but when I consider that I am in health, fit to write and study, I ra­ber choose to stay.

Cic de Fini [...]. lib. 2. Cleanthes bad those who came to hear him, to fancy pleasure painted in a Tablet, richly habited and adorned, sitting upon a Throne, the Vertues standing about her, as her handmaids, do­ing nothing else but wait on her commands, and whispering in her ear (if it can be phancied of a picture) to bid her take heed of doing any thing imprudently, that may offend the minds of men, or any thing that may occasion grief.

Stob. Ser. 116. He said, whosoever sweareth, at the same time sweareth truly, or forsweareth himself: if he intend to do that which hee sweareth, though he do it not, he sweareth truly; if he intend it not he is forsworn.

Set. 126. One observing him silent, said to him, why do you hold your peace, it is pleasant to talk to friends; It is indeed, answer'd Cle­anthes, but the more pleasant it is, the more we ought to allow them the freedom of it.

Set. 210. Hee said that unlearned men differed from Beasts in their figure.

Set. 212. Being demanded why amongst the Antients, when there were fewest Philosophers, there were more eminent then at this time; he answer'd, because then they minded the thing it self, now only in words.

To one that asked him, Ser. 229. how a man might be rich, he answe­red, by being poor in desire.

CHAP. III.
His Writings.

HEE left behind him (saith Laertius) these excellent Books.

  • Of time.
  • Of Zeno's Philosophy.
  • Explications of Heraclitus, 3.
  • [Page 128] Of Sense 4.
  • Of Art.
  • To Democritus.
  • To Aristarchus.
  • To Erillus.
  • Of Appetite 2.
  • Archaeology.
  • Of God.
  • Of Gyants.
  • Of Hymenealls:
  • Of a Poet.
  • Of Office 3.
  • Of right consultation.
  • Of Gratitude.
  • Protreptick.
  • Of Vertues.
  • Of Ingenuity.
  • Of Gorgippus.
  • Of Envy.
  • Of Love.
  • Of Liberty.
  • The Art of Love
  • Of Honour.
  • Of Glory.
  • The Politiek [...]
  • Of Counsell.
  • Of Laws.
  • Of Iudging.
  • Of the reason of living.
  • Of speech 3.
  • Of the End.
  • Of honest things.
  • Of Actions.
  • Of Science.
  • Of a Kingdom.
  • Of Friendship.
  • Of a Symposium.
  • That the vertue of man and woman is the same.
  • That a wise man may use Sophismes.
  • Of Chria's.
  • Dissertations 2.
  • Of Pleasure.
  • Of Properties.
  • Of Inexplicables.
  • Of Dialectick.
  • Of Tropes.
  • Of Categoremes.
  • [Page 129] Besides these, are mention'd
  • Laert vit. Zen.
    Of Atoms.
  • Of Brasse.
  • Athen. deign.
    Of Sumptions.
  • Fabulous Traditions.
  • Cic. de fin. 1. 4.
    The Art of Rhetorick.

CHAP. IV.
His Death.

HE lived according to Laertius 80. years, according to Lucian, 99. The occasion of his death this, being troubled with a fore­nesse of his gumms ( Stobaeus saith, an Ulcer under his Tongue) he was enjoyned by the Physitians to fast two daies, which he did, and was wel; then they told him he might eat again, but he would not, saying, he was now gone a great way on his journey; Stob. would you have me, [...]aith he, having past over the greatest part of my life, return back again, and begin it anew? Laert. Having fasted two daies more hee died.

In Epi [...]et. Simplicius saith, he saw an exquisite statue of Cleanthes in Assus, an example of the magnificence of the Romance Senate, dedicated to his honour.

CHRYSIPPVS.

CHAP. I.
His Life.

CHrysippus was of Soli, Laert. (a City of Cilicia, after­wards called Pompeiopolis.) his Father was of Tarsis, named Apollonius, or, as Suidas, Apollo­nides, who came and lived at Soli, which per­haps gave Laertius, and from him Suidas, occa­sion to doubt whether Chrysippus himself were not of Tarsis.

He first exercised in the Hippodrome. Hecaton saith, that having wasted his Patrimony in the Kings service, hee applyed himself to Philosophy. Coming to Athens, he heard, as some affirm Zeno, or rather (as Diocles and others) Cleanthes, from whom whilst he was yet alive he dissented. He was an eminent Philosopher, inge­nious and acute in every thing; so that in most opinions he differ'd from Zeno and Cleanthes, to whom he would only say, tell me the Doctrines and let me alone for proofes. If at any time he crossed Cleanthes in dispute, he was afterwards sorry for it, often saying,

Of happinesse in all I am possesses'd,
But in Cleanthes; there alone unbless'd.

He was so famous for Dialectick, that it was a common speech, If the Gods themselves would use Dialectick, they would make use only of the Chrysippean. But he was more plentifull in matter then free in expression.

He was infinitely studious and industrious, as appeareth from the multitude of his Books. An old woman that waited on him said, that he wrote every day 500. Paragraphs.

When any question'd him in private, he answer'd meekly and freely; but assoon as any company came, he grew eager and liti­gious, saying,

Brother, there hangs a cloud before your eyes,
Cast quite away this madnesse, and be wise.

[Page 131] When he drunk at Feasts he lay very still, only shaked his legs; whereupon his woman said, Chrysippus's legs only are drunk.

He had so good an opinion of himselfe, that to one who asked him to whom he should commend his son, he answered, To me; for if I knew any better, I would hear Philosophy of him my selfe; Whence it was said of him,

He is inspir'd by Jove,
The rest like shadowes move.

As also that,

Had not Chrysippus been,
No Stoa we had seen.

Arcesilaus and Lacydes (as Sotion saith) coming into the Aca­demy, Laert. he studyed Philosophy with them, whence he disputed against Custome, and for Custome, and of Magnitude and Multi­tude, using the arguments of the Academicks.

Laert. He was a great despiser of honours, for of all his writings, he dedicates none to any King. Stob. He was content with little, for Laert. he lived without any other attendants then one old woman; and when Ptolomy wrote to Cleanthes, desiring he would come to him, or send some one of his Disciples, Sphoerus went, but Chry­sippus refused.

Having sent for Aristocreon and Philocrates, his sisters sons, he first taught in the Lyceum in the open air, as Demetrius writes.

CHAP. II.
His Apophthegmes.

Laert. TO one that blamed him for not hearing Aristo as many did; If I should follow many, saith he, I should not study Phi­losophy.

To a Dialectick assaulting Cleanthes with sophismes: Leave, saith he, diverting an aged person from serious things; propound those to us that are young.

Stob. He said, meditation is the fountain of discourse. Stob. Ser. 44. He said, drunkennesse is a lesser madnesse.

Ser. 40. He said, a wise man grieveth, but is not troubled, for his minde yields not to it.

Ser. 71. To one that said to him, your friend revileth you behinde your back: Blame him not, saith he, for he might do it before my face.

Ibid. To a wicked man that cast many aspersions upon him: You have done well, saith he, not to omit any thing that is in your selfe.

Ibid. Being told that some spoke ill of him; It is no matter, saith he, I will live so, that they shall not be believed.

[Page 132] Ser. 116. He said, there is a difference between swearing true, and swearing truly, and betwixt swearing false and forswearing. That which is sworn, at the time that it is sworn must necessari­ly be either true or false, seeing that the form of swearing is an Axiom: But he that sweareth, at the same time that he swea­reth is not necessarily perjur'd, or sweareth true, because the time is not yet arived that must determine his oath. For as a man is said to have covenanted truely or falsely, not when the covenant is made, but when the time whereby it is limited is come: so a man is said to swear truly or falsely, when the time comes wherein he promised to make good his oath.

Ser. 151. Being demanded why he did not undertake the government of the Commonwealth; Because, saith he, If I govern ill, I shall displease the Gods; if well, the people.

Ser. 249. He said, he who hath arrived at perfection dischargeth all offices, omitting none, yet his life is not happy, for Beatitude is a post-accession thereto, when as the mean actions acquire a constancy, habit, and peculiar confirmation.

CHAP. III.
His Writings.

BEcause, saith Laertius, his writings were very celebrious, we shall give an account of them digested according to their subjects: They were these.

  • Of the Logicall place, Theses.
  • Logick.
  • Philosophick Commentaries.
  • Dialectick definitions, to Metrodorus, 6.
  • Of Dialectick names, to Zeno 1.
  • Dialectick art, to Aristagoras 1.
  • Of connex Probables, to Dioscorides 4.
The first order of the Logicall place of things.
  • Of Axioms 1.
  • Of not-simple Axioms 1.
  • Of Connex, to Athenades 2.
  • Of Negatives, to Aristagoras 3.
  • Of Catagoreuticks, to Athenodorus 1.
  • Of things spoken by privation, to Thearus 1.
  • Of best Axioms, to Dion 3.
  • Of Indefinites 4.
  • Of things spoken according to Time 2.
  • Of perfect Axioms 2.
The second order.
  • [Page 133]Of true disjunct, to Gorgippides 1.
  • Of true connex, to Gorgippides 4.
  • Division, to Gorgippides 1.
  • Of Consequents I.
  • Of that which is for three, to Gorgippides 1.
  • Of Possibles, to Clitus 4.
  • Of Significations, against Philo 1.
  • What are false 1.
The third order.
  • Of Precepts 2.
  • Of Interrogations 2.
  • Of Percontation 4.
  • Epitome of Interrogation and Percontation [...].
  • Epitome of Answers 1.
  • Of Question 2.
  • Of Answer 4.
The fourth order.
  • Of Categorems, to Metrodorus 10.
  • Of right and supine, to Philarchus [...].
  • Of Conjunctions, to Apollonides 1.
  • To Pasylus, of Categorems 4.
The fifth order.
  • Of the five cases 1.
  • Of expressions defined according to the subject 1.
  • Of Assimilation, to Stesagoras 2.
  • Of Appellatives, 2.
Of the Logicall place concerning words, and their reasons, the first order.
  • Of singular and plurall expressions 6.
  • Of Words, to Sosigenes and Alexander 5.
  • Of the anomaly of Words; to Dion 4.
  • Of Sorites pertaining to voice 3.
  • Of Soloecismes, to Dionysius 1.
  • Of unusuall speech 1.
  • Words, to Dionysius 1.
The second order.
  • Of the elements of speech 5.
  • Of the syntax of things said 4.
  • Of the syntax and elements of speech, to Philip 3.
  • [Page 134] Of the elements of speech, to Nicias 1.
  • Of relative speech 1.
The third order.
  • Of not-dividents 2.
  • Of Amphibolies, to Apollas 4.
  • Of Tropicall Amphibolies 1.
  • Of connex Tropicall Amphibolies 2.
  • Upon Panthoedus, of Amphibolies 2.
  • Introduction to Amphiboly 5.
  • Epitome of Amphibolies, to Epicrates 1.
  • Connex to the Introduction of Amphibolies 2.
Of Logicall place concerning Reasons and Moods, the first order.
  • The Art of Reasons and Moods, to Dioscorides 5.
  • Of Reasons 3.
  • Of the composition of Moods, to Stesagoras 2.
  • Comparison of tropicall Axioms 1.
  • Of reciprocall Reasons and connex 1.
  • To Agatho, or of sequent problems 1.
  • Of Inferences, to Aristagoras 1.
  • Of placing the same reason in diverse Moods 1.
  • Against those who oppose that the same reason may be plated in syllogistick and not syllogistick Moods 2.
  • Against those who oppose the reduction of Syllogismes 3.
  • Against Philo's book of Moods, to Timostratus 1.
  • Logicall conjuncts, to Timocrates and Philomathes.
  • Upon Reasons and Moods 1.
The second order.
  • Of conclusive Reasons, to Zeno 1.
  • Of first indemonstrable Syllogismes, to Zeno 1.
  • Of Reduction of Syllogismes 1.
  • Of redundant Syllogismes, to Pasylus 2.
  • Theorems of Soloecismes 1.
  • Syllogistick Introductions, to Zeno 1.
  • Introductions to Moods, to Zeno 3.
  • Of Syllogismes false in figure 5.
  • Syllogistick reasons by reduction in indemonstrables 1.
  • Tropicall Questions to Zeno and Philomathes (suspected to be spurious) 1.
The third order.
  • Of coincident reasons, to Athenades 1. spurious.
  • Coincident reasons as to the medium 3. spurious.
  • Of Aminius's disjunctions 1.
  • [Page 135]The fourth Order.
  • Of Hypotheses to Meleager 3.
  • Hypothetick reasons in Law, to Meleager 1.
  • Hypothetick Reasons for introduction 2.
  • Hypothetick reasons of Theorems 2.
  • Solution of Hedyllus's Hypotheticks 2.
  • Solution of Alexander's Hypotheticks 3. Spurious.
  • Of expositions, to Leodamas 1.
The fift order.
  • Of introduction to the lying reason, to Aristocreon 1.
  • Lying reasons to the Introduction 1.
  • Of the lying reason, to Aristocreon 6.
The sixt order.
  • Against those who think true and false are one, 1.
  • Against those who dissolve the lying Reason by distinction 2:
  • Demonstration, that infinites are not to be divided 1.
  • Upon that which hath been said against the division of infi­nites, to Pasylus 3.
  • Solutions according to the Antients, to Dioscorides 1.
  • Of the solution of the lying reason to Aristocreon 3.
  • Solution of Hedyllus' s Hypotheticks, to Aristocreon and Apollas.
The seventh Order.
  • Against those who say the lying reason hath false sumpti­ons 1.
  • Of the negative, to Aristocreon 2.
  • Negative Reasons, to Gymnasias 1.
  • Of the diminutive reason, to Stesagoras 2.
  • Of opinionative and quiescent reasons, to Onetor 2.
  • Of the veiled reason, to Aristobulus 2.
  • Of the occult reason, to Athenades 1.
The eighth Order.
  • Of the Nullity, to Menecrates 8.
  • Of reasons consisting of indefinite and definite, to Pasylus 2.
  • Of the Nullity to Epicrates 1.
The ninth Order.
  • Of Sophismes to Heraclides and Pollis 2.
  • Of insoluble dialectick reasons to Dioscorides 5.
  • Against Arcesilaus's method, to Sphaerus 1.
The tenth order.
  • Against Custom, to Metrodorus 6.
  • [Page 136] Of the Logicall place; besides these four differences, there are dispersed, not containing in the body of Logical Questions, 39.
  • Of the Ethick Place, for direction of morall notions, the First Order.
  • Description of speech, to Theoporus 1.
  • Morall Theses 1.
  • Probable sumptions for Doctrines, to Philomathes 3.
  • Definitions of civill person, to Metrodorus 2.
  • Definitions of wicked persons, to Metrodorus 2.
  • Definitions of mean persons, to Metrodorus 2.
  • Generall Definitions, to Metrodorus 7.
  • Definitions of other arts, to Metrodorus 2.
The second Order.
  • Of things like, to Aristocles 3.
  • Of Definitions, to Metrodorus 7.
The third Order.
  • Of things not rightly objected against Definitions, to Laoda­mas 7.
  • Probables for Definitions, to Dioscorides.
  • Of Species and Genus, to Gorgippides 2.
  • Of Divisions 1.
  • Of Contraries, to Dionysius 2.
  • Probables for Divisions, genus's and species.
  • Of Contraries 1.
The fourth Order.
  • Of Etymologicks, to Diocles 6
  • Etymologicks, to Diocles 4.
The fift Order.
  • Of Proverbs, to Zenodotus 2.
  • Of Poems, to Philomathes 1.
  • How Poems must be heard 2.
  • Against Criticks, to Diodorus 1.
Of the morall place of common speeches, accor­ding to Arts and Vertue: The first Order.
  • Against Rescriptions, to Timonax 1.
  • How we think and speak singulars 1.
  • Of notions, to Laodamas 2.
  • Of Suspition, to Pythonax 2.
  • [Page 137] Demonstrations that a wise man doth not opinionate 1.
  • Of Comprehension and Science, and ignorance 4.
  • Of Speech 2.
  • Of the use of Speech, to Leptines.
The second Order.
  • That the Antients approved Dialectick with Demonstration, to
  • Zeno 2.
  • Of Dialectick; to Aristocreon 4.
  • Upon the objections against Dialectick 3.
  • Of Rhetorick, to Dioscorides 4.
The third Order.
  • Of habitude, to Cleon 3.
  • Of art and sloth, to Aristocreon 4.
  • Of the difference of Vertues, to Diodorus.
  • What vertues are 1.
  • Of vertues, to Pollis.
Of the morall place concerning Good and Ill; the first Order.
  • Of Honesty and pleasure, to Aristocreon 10.
  • Demonstration, that Pleasure is not the chief end 4.
  • Demonstration, that pleasure is not good 4,
  • Of those which are said********

Thus concludes the seventh Book of Laertius, and who seeth not that the last of these titles is defective, and moreover that the rest of the Orders, concerning this place of Good and Ill, (whereof this is but the first) are wanting. Doubtlesse the end of this book is imperfect, and wanteth, if not the lives of any Stoicall Philo­sophers, who succeeded Chrysippus (whereof he mentions Zeno and others else where) yet at least a considerable part of his Cata­logue, containing the rest of his Ethick writings and all his Phy­sick, many of which are elsewhere cited even by Laertius himself, which as the learned Casau [...]on had observed, he would not have ascribed to Laertius's neglect that Chrysippus's book of Lawes is not mentioned. Of his Ethick writings, besides those here named, were these,

  • Ael. 14. 4.
    Of Laws.
  • Athen. deipn. 4. & 11.
    Introduction to the consideration of things good or ill.
  • Deipn. 4. & 8.
    Of Honest.
  • Deipn. 6.
    Of Consent.
  • Athen Deipn. 7.
    Of things expetible in themselves.
  • Ath. Deipn. 4.
    Of things not expetible in themselves.
  • Laert. vit. Zen. Pl. Rep. Stoic.
    Of Politick.
  • Laert. Zen. Pl. Rep.
    Of ends.
  • [Page 138]
    Laert. vit. Zen.
    Of Passions.
  • Laert.
    Of Ethick questions.
  • Plut. rep. Laert.
    Of lives, whereof Plutarch cites the 4 th book.
  • Laert.
    That Zeno used names properly.
  • Plut. repug. Laert.
    Of Iustice, the first book cited by La [...]rtius.
  • Laert.
    Of Life and Transaction.
  • Plut. rep.
    Of Offices.
  • Plut. repugn.
    Demonstration of Iustice.
  • Plut. repugn.
    Protrepticks.
  • Plut. repug. & de com. not.
    Of the End.
  • Plut. repug.
    Of a Common-wealth.
  • Plut. repug.
    Of the office of a Iudge.
  • Plut. repug.
    Of Good.
  • Plut. repug.
    Of Habits.
To Physick belong these.
  • Laert.
    Physicks
  • Laert.
    Of the Soul, the 12 th book cited by Laertius.
  • Laert.
    Of Providence, the first book cited.
  • Plut. repug. Laert.
    Of the Gods.
  • Plut. rep. Laert.
    Of Fate.
  • Laert.
    Of Divination.
  • Laert.
    Of the Philosophy of the Antients.
  • Plut. rep.
    In calumniation of the Senses.
  • Plut. rep. & com. not.
    Of Jupiter.
  • Plut. repug.
    Of Nature.
  • Plut. rep.
    Physicall Theses.
  • Plut. rep.
    Of Substance.
  • Plut. rep.
    Of Motion.
  • Plut. com. not.
    Physicall questions, the third book cited.
  • Plut. com. not. & Laert.
    Of Vacuity.
  • Laert.
    Epistles.

The number of all his writings, according to Laertius, was 705. He wrote so much, that he had often occasion to treat upon the same subject, and setting down whatsoever came into his minde, he often corrected and enlarged it by the testimonies of others; whence having in one book inserted all Euripides's Me­dea, one having the book in his hand, answer'd another that asked him what book it was, It is Chrysippus's Medea. And Apol­lodorus the Athenian, in his collection of Doctrines, asserting, that Epicurus had written many books upon his own strength, with­out using the testimonies of others, and that he therein far excee­ded Chrysippus, addes these words; For if a man should take out of Chrysippus's writings all that belongs to other men, he would leave the paper blank.

Seneca gives this censure of him: De Benef. 1. 3. He is most subtle and acute, penetrating into the depth of truth. He speaks to the thing that is [Page 139] to be done, and useth no more words then are necessary to the understanding thereof; but addes, that his Sen de Benef. 1. 4. acutenesse being too fine, is many times blunted, and retorted upon it selfe; even when he seemes to have done something, he only pricks, not pierceth.

Laert. Some there are who inveigh against him, as one that wrote many obscene things, not sit to be spoken, as in his Commentary of the antient Physiologists, what he writes concerning Iupiter and Iuno is obscenely feigned, delivering that in 600 Paragraphs, which the most impudent person would not have committed to writing; for, say they, he hath related the story most unhand­somly, and though he prais'd it as naturall, yet it becommeth Curtezans rather then Gods.

Moreover what he saith of those that writ of Tables is false, not to be found neither in Polemo, nor Hipsicrates, nor Antigonus, but forged by himselfe.

In his book of a Commonwealth, he allowes marriage with a mother and a daughter, and repeats the same in the beginning of his book, Concerning things expetible in themselves.

In his third book of Iustice, extending to a thousand Para­graphs, he advised to feed upon the very dead.

In his second book of Life and Transaction, he affirmeth, a wise man ought to take care to provide himselfe food; but to what end must he provide himselfe food? for Livelyhood? Life is an indifferent. For Pleasure? Pleasure also is indifferent. For Vertue? that is selfe- sufficient for Beatitude. Such kinds of acquisition of wealth are very ridiculous. If they proceed from a King, there is a necessitie of complying with him; if from a friend, that friendship is veniall; if from wisdome, that wisdome is merce­nary. For these things, saith Laertius, some have inveigh'd a­gainst him.

CHAP. IV.
His death.

HE died, according to Apollodorus, in the 143 d Olympiad, (so supply Laertius, in whom the centenary number is wan­ting by Suidas) having lived 73 years.

The manner of his death is differently related; Hermippus af­firmes, that being in the Odaeum (a kinde of publick Theatre at Athens) his Disciples called him away to Sacrifice, and thereup­on taking a draught of wine, he was immediately seiz'd by a Vertigo, of which at the end of five daies he died. Others report, he died of excessive laughter: Seeing an Asseeafigs, he bad his woman offer it some wine, and thereat fell into such extremity of laughter, that it killed him.

[Page 140] As to his person, he was very little, saith Laertius, as appea­reth by his Statue in the Ceramick, which is almost hid by the horse that stands next it, whence Carneades called him [...], hid by a horse. The posture of this Statue, Cicero saith, was sitting, and stretching forth his hand. Pausanias saith, it was set up in the Gymnasium, called Ptolomaean from the Founder, not far from the Forum.

Laertius reckons foure more of this name.

The first, a Physician, to whom Erasistratus acknowledgeth himselfe beholding for many things.

The Second, his sonne, Physician to Ptolomy, who, upon the calumnies of some that maligned him, was publickly punished and beaten with rods.

The third, Disciple to Erasistratus.

The fourth, a writer of Georgicks.

ZENO.

Sui [...]as. ZENO was of Tarsis, or, according to others, of Siodn, his Father named Dioscorides. He was Disciple to Chrysippus, and his successor in the School. Laert. [...] Zen. He wrote few bookes, but left behinde him many Disciples.

DIOGENES.

DIOGENES was born at Seleucia, [...]aert. vit. Diog. he was sirnamed the Baby­lonian, from the vicinity of that place. He was Disciple of Chrysippus, and is stiled by Cicero an eminent and serious Stoick. De ira. 3. 38. Seneca relates, that discoursing earnestly concerning anger, a foolish young man standing by, spat in his face, which he took meekly and discreetly, saying, I am not angry, but am in doubt whether I ought to be so or not. He was one of the three that was sent from Athens on Embassy to Rome; of which already in the life of Car [...]eades, who learn'd Dialectick of him. Cicero saith, he lived to a great age. Amongst other things, he wrote a treatise of Divina [...]ion.

ANTIPATER.

Laert. ANTIPATER was of Sidon, Disciple to De Offic. 3. Diogenes the Baby­lonian [...] Cicero calls him a most acute person; Senecae, one of the great authors of the Stoicall Sect. Plut. de Gar­rul. He declined to dispute with Carneades, but filled his bookes with confutations of him, whence he was called [...], the clamorous penman. Cit. Ac. quaest. 4. He dispu­ted much against those who asserted nothing. Besides other things, he writ two books of Divination. Cic. de divin. l. 1. Cicero, at the latter end of his second book of Offices, saith, he then was lately dead at Athens.

PANAETIUS.

Strab. l. 14. PANAETIUS was of Rhodes, his Ancestours eminent for Mar­tiall affairs and exercises. He was Cic. de Divin. lib. 1. Disciple to Antipater, intimate friend to Plut. Apoph. [...]. Scipio Africanus, whom he accompanyed in his journey to Alexandria. Cicero calls him, Acad. [...]. 4. almost Prince of the Stoicks, a person extreamly inigenous and grave, worthy the famili­arity of Scipio and Laelius.

[Page 142] He was a great admirer of Plato, Cic. Tuse. quaest. lib. 1. whom every where he cal­leth, divine, most wise, most holy, the Homer of Philosophers. But his opinion of the immortality of the Soul he approved not, arguing thus; Whatsoever is generated dieth; but soules are generated, as is manifest from the likenesse of those that are begotten to their Parents, not only in body, but disposition. His other argument was, There is nothing that is grieved or pained but is subject to be sick; whatsoever is subject to sicknesse is likewise subject to death; souls are subject to griefe, therefore they are subject to death.

He alone rejected Astrologicall predictions, Cic. de divinat. lib. 2. De divin. l 1. and receded from the Stoicks, as to Divination; yet, would not positivly affirm there was no such art, but only that he doubted it.

He wrote three books of Offices, much commended by Cicero.

Lipsius conjectures he died old, because Cicero affirmeth out of Posidonius, that he lived thirty years after he had written his Bookes of offices.

POSIDONIUS.

POSIDONIUS was born at Apamea in Syria. Strab. lib. 14. Cic. Tusc. qu. l. 2. He lived at Rhodes, and there managed civill affairs, and taught Philosophy. Pom­pey in his return from Syria, went to Rhodes purposely to hear him, and coming to his dore, forbad the Lictor to knock as was the custome, but he (saith Pliny) to whom the East and West had submitted, himselfe submitted his Fases at this Gate. But under­standing that he was very sick of a great pain in his, joynts he re­solved only to give him a visit. At his first coming and salutation, he told him with much respect, that he was extreamly sorry he could not hear him. Posidonius answer'd, You may; for no corporeall pain shall make me frustrate the coming of so great a person: And thereupon he discoursed seriously and copiously upon this sub­ject, as he lay in his bed, That nothing is good, but what is honest. And as often as his pain took him, he would say, Pain, it is to no pur­pose; though thou art troublesome, I will never acknowledge thou art ill.

He made a Sphear, Cic. de [...]. Deor. lib. 2. wherein were all the conversions of the Sun, Moon, and Planets exactly as they moved in the Heavens every day and night.

Of his writings are cited by Cicero, De divinat. five Bookes of Divination; as also five bookes of the nature of the Gods.

Thus far we have a continued succession of the Stoick Philoso­phers, the last School, according to Laertius's disposition, of thsoe that were descended from Thales.

FINIS.
2   52  
3   53  
4   54 Pisistratus died having raigned 17 years; Arist. Polit. 5.
Lxiii   55  
2   56  
3   57  
4   58  
Lxiv Miltiades. H [...]l. 7. 59  
2   60  
3   61  
4   62  
Lxv   63 Darius begun his reign.  
2   64  
3   65  
4   66  
Lxvi   67  
2   68  
3   69  
4   70  
Lxvii   71  
2   72  
3   73  
4   74  
Lxviii Lysagoras Marm. 75  
2   76  
3   77  
4   78  
Lxix Acestorides 11. Hal. 5. 79  
2   80  
3   81  
4   82  
Lxx Myrus Hal. 5. 83 Anaxagoras born. Laert by compute.
2   84  
3   85  
4   86 Pythagoras died. Euseb.
Lxxi Hipparchus Hal. 6. 87  
2 Pithocritus. Marm. 88  
3   89  
4   90  
Lxxii Diognetus. Hal. 6. 91 The Marathonian fight.
2 Hybrilides. Hal. 7. Paus. 92  
3 Phanippus. Plut. Aristie. 93  
4   94  
Lxxiii Archises. Hal. 8. 95  
2   96  
3 Aristides. Marm. 97 Darius died. Xerxes succeeded.
4 Philocrates. Marm. 98  
Lxxiv Leostratus. Hal. 8. 99  
2 Nicodemus. Hal. 8. 100  
3   101  
4   112  
Lxxv Calliades. Marm. 103 Xerxes crost the Hellespont: the [...]ight at S [...]la­mis [...] Anaxagoras went to Athens.
2 Xantippus Marm. 104  
3 Timosthenes Marm. 105  
4 Adimantus Marm. 106  
Lxxvi Phaedon. Diod. Sic. 107  
2 Dromoclides 108  
3 Ace [...]orides 109  
[Page]4 Menon 110  
lxxvii Chares 111  
2 Praxiergus 112  
3 Demotion 113  
4 Apsephion 114 Socrates born.
lxxviii Theagenides 115 A stone fell down from Heaven at Aegos Potamus; foretold by Anaxagoras.
2 Lysistratus 116  
3 Lysanias 117  
4 Lysitheus 118  
lxxix Archedemides 119  
2 Tlepolemus 120  
3 Conon 121  
4 Euippus 122  
lxxx Phrasiclides 123  
2 Philocles 124  
3 Bion 125  
4 Mnesithides 126  
lxxxi Callias 1. 127  
2 Sosistratus 128  
3 Ariston 129  
4 Lysicrates 130  
lxxxii Chaerephanes Hal, 131 Xenophon born about this time.
2 Antidotus 132  
3 Euthidemus 133 Anaxagoras (having profest Philosophy 30 years at Athens) condemn'd and ba­nish'd; collected from Laert.
4 Pedicus 134  
lxxxiii Philiscus Hal 135  
2 Timarchides 136  
3 Callimachus 137  
4 Lysimachides 138  
lxxxiv Praxiteles 139  
2 Lysanias 140  
3 Diphilus 141  
4 Timocles 142  
lxxxv Murichides 143  
2 Glaucides 144  
3 Theodorus 145  
4 Euthemenes 146  
lxxxvi Nausimachus 147  
2 Antilochides 148  
3 Achares 149  
4 Apseudas P [...]ol. 150  
lxxxvii Pythodorus T [...]uc. 151  
2 Euthidemus Athen. 5. 152 1 Year of the Peloponnesian war: Thucid. lib. 2
3 Apollodo [...]us. Athen [...] 5. 153 2
4 Epaminondas 154 3
lxxxviii Diotimus 155 4 Anaxagoras died, by compute from Laert
2 Euclides 156 5
3 Euthydemus 157 6
4 Stratocles 158 7
lxxxix Isarchus 159 8 The sight at Delium, wherein Socrates & Xenopho [...] fought. The Clouds of Aristophanes acted.
2 Amynias 160 9 The Clouds of Aristophanes acted the second time.
3 Alcaeus 161 10
4 Ariston 162 11 The time of Xenophon's symposium
xc Aristophilus 163 12
2 Archias 164 13
3 Antipho [...] 165 14
4 E [...]phemus 166 15
xci Aristomnestus 167 16
2 Chabrias 168 17
3 Pisander 169 18
4 Cleocritus 170 19
xcii Callias 171 20
2 Theopompus 172 21 Thucydidesy ends his history; Xenophon begins where he left.
3 Glaucippus 173 22
4 Diocles 174 23
xciii Euctemon Marm. 175 24
2 Antigenes Marm. 176 25 The first ascent of Cyrus into Asia. Marm.
3 Callias Marm. 177 26 Dionysius made K of S [...]ac [...]e. diod. the fight
4 Alexias 178 27 at Argi [...]; the 10 Captains put to death.
xciv Pythodorus Athen. 179 The thirty Tyrants. Theramenes put to death.
2 Euclides 180  
3 Micon 181  
4 Exenaetus 182 The ascent of Cyrus into Asia against his brother: his death. Xenophon retreats with the army. The [...]0 Tyrants put down.
xcv Laches 183  
2 Aristocrates 184 Socrates put to death. Thimbro sent into Asia against Tissaphernes by the Lacedaemonians; and of Xeno­phons retreat
3 Ithicles 185  
4 Lysiades 186  
xcvi Phormio 187 Agesilaus goes into Asia against the Persian. ( [...].
2 Diophaneus 188 Age [...]laus called home; fights with the Boetians at Co­ [...]onon reaedisies the walls of Athens.
3 Eubulides 189  
4 Demostratus 190  
xcvii Philocles 191  
2 Nicoteles 192  
3 Demostratus 193  
4 Antipa [...]er 194  
cxviii Pyrrhio 195  
2 Theodorus 196  
3 Mystichides 197  
4 Dexitheus 198  
xcix Diotrephes 199 Aristotle born. Laert
2 Phanostratus 200  
3 Menander 201  
4 Demophilus 202  
c Pytheus Marm 203  
2 Nico Hal. 204  
3 Nausinicus Hal 205  
4 Calleas Hal. 206  
ci Chariander 207  
2 Hippoda [...]us 208  
3 Socratides 209  
4 Asteius Paus. 210  
cii Alcisthenes. Hal. 211  
2 Phrasiclides Marm. 212  
3 Discinetus Paus. 213  
4 Lycistratus 214  
ciii Nausigenes Marm. 215  
2 Polyzelus Hal. 216  
3 Cephisodorus Hal. 217  
4 Chion 218  
civ Timocrates Hal. 219  
2 Cariclides 220  
3 Molon. Hal. dinar. 221  
4 Nicophemus 222  
cv Callimedes 223 Xenophon died. Laert.
[Page]2 Eucharistus 224  
3 Cephisodotus 225  
4 Agathocles Paus. Mar. 226  
cvi Elpines 227  
2 Callistratus Marm. 228  
3 Diotimus 229  
4 E [...]demus 230  
cvii Aristodemus 231  
2 Thessalus 232  
3 Apollodorus 233  
4 Callimachus Athen. 234 Plato died 82 years old. Athen. lib. 5.
cviii Theophilus. Paus. Ath. 235  
2 Themistocles 236  
3 Archias 237  
4 E [...]bulus 238 Aristotle went to Mitelene. Laert.
cix Liz [...]scus 239  
2 Pithodorus 240 Aristotle went to King Philip [...] Alexander being 15 years old. Laert.
3 Sosigenes 241  
4 Nicomachus 242  
cx Theophrastus 243  
2 Lysimachides 244  
3 Charonidas 245  
4 Phrynichus 246  
cxi Pythodorus Arr. 247  
2 Euaenetus 248 Aristotle teacheth in the Ly [...]um 13 years.
3 Ctesicles 249  
4 Nicocrates 250  
cxii Niceratus 251  
2 Aristophanes Arr. 252  
3 Aristopho [...] Ar. 253  
4 Cephisophon 254  
cxiii Euthycritus 255  
2 Hegemon Hal. Ar. 256  
3 Cremes 257  
4 Anticles 258  
cxiv Hegesias Arr. 259  
2 Cephisodorus 260  
3 Philocles Laert. 261 Aristotle went to Chalcis, and died there near 63 years old. Laert. Theophrastus succeeded.
4 Archippus Laert 262  
cxv Neaechmus Hal. 263  
2 Apollodorus 264  
3 Archippus 265  
4 Demogenes 166  
cxvi Democlides 267  
2 P [...]axibulus 268  
3 Nicodorus 268 Pol [...]mo president of the Academy.
4 Theophrastus 269  
cxvii Polemo 270  
2 Simonides 271  
3 Hieromnemon 272  
4 Demetr [...]us Phalerens 273  
cxviii Carinus 274  
2 Anaxicrates 275  
3 Co [...]aebus 276  
4 Xenippus 277  
cxix Phericles Hal. 278  
2 Leostratus 279  
3 Nicocles 280  
4 Calliarchus 281  
cxx Hegemachus Laert. 282  
2 Euctemon 283  
3 Mnesidemus 284  
4 Antiphanes 285  
cxxi Nicias 286  
2 Nicostratus 287  
3 Olympiodorus 288  
4 Philippus 289  
cxxii   290  
2   291  
3   292  
4   293  
cxxiii   294  
2   295  
3   296  
cxxiv   297  
2   298  
3   299  
4   300  
cxxv   301  
2   302  
3   303  
4   304  
cxxvi   305  
2   306  
3   307  
4   308  
cxxvii Pytharatus Cic. 309  
2   310  
3   311  
4   312  
cxxviii   313  
2   314  
3   315  
4   316  
cxxix Diognetus Marm. 317  
2   318  
3   319  
4   320  
cxxx   321  
2   322  
3   323  
4   324  
cxxxi   325  
2   326  
3   327  
4   328  
cxxxii   329  
2   330  
3   331  
4   332  
cxxxiii   333  
2   334  
3   335  
[Page]4   336  
cxxxiv   337  
2   338  
3   339  
4   340 Lacydes president of the Academy 26 years Laert.
cxxxv   341  
2   342  
3   343  
4   344  
cxxxvi   345  
2   346  
3   347  
4   348  
cxxxvii   349  
2   350  
3   351  
4   352  
Lxxxviii   353  
2   354  
3   355  
4   356  
cxxxix   357  
2   358  
3   359  
4   360  
cxl   361  
2   362  
3   363  
4   364  
cxli   365 Lacydes resignes the school to Euander and Telecles. Laert.
2   366  
3   367  
4   368  
clxii   369  
2   370  
3   371  
4   372 [...]rineades [...]orn.

THE TABLE,

The first Part;
Containing those on whom the attribute of wise was conferr'd.

  • TALES Chap. 1. His Country and Parents pag. 1
  • 2 The time of his birth 2
  • 3 His travells 4
  • 4 How he lived at Miletus ibd
  • 5 The attribute of wise conferred on him 6
  • 6 Of his Philosophy ibid
  • Sect. 1. That water is the principle of all things 9
  • Sect. 2. Of God 11
  • Sect. 3. Of Daemons 12
  • Sect. 4. Of the soul ibid
  • Sect. 5. Of the World 14
  • 7 Of his Geometry 15
  • Sect. 1. Propositions invented by him 16
  • Sect. 2. Of his taking the height of the Pyramid 18
  • 8 Of his Astronomy ibid
  • Sect. 1. Of the Celestiall sphears 19
  • Sect. 2. Of the Sun, Moon, and Stars ibid
  • Sect. 3. Of Eclipses 20
  • Sect. 4. Of the year 22
  • Sect. 5. His Astrologicall prediction ibid
  • 9 His morall sentences 23
  • 10 His iudgement in civill affairs 25
  • 11 His writings 26
  • 12 His auditors and schollers 28
  • 13 His death 29
  • SOLON Chap. 1. His Pa [...]ents, Country and condition 30
  • 5 How by his means the Athenians took Salamis, Cyrrha, and the Thracian Cher­sonesus 31
  • 3 How he composed differences at home, and was made Archon 34
  • 4 What alterations he made during [...] government, and first of the Sisachthia 37
  • 5 How he divided the people into Classes, and erected Cour [...]s of Iudicature 39
  • 6 His lawes 41
  • 7 Of the Axes and Cyrtes, Senators Oath and other institutions of Solon 51
  • 8 How he entertained Anacharsis: his Travells to Aegypt, Cyrus, Miletus, Del­phi, Corinth, and Creet 50
  • [Page]9 The attribute of wise conferred on him; his morall sentences 53
  • 10 How he opposed Pisistratus, and reprehended Thespis 55
  • 11 How he travelled to Lydia and Cili [...]ia 58
  • 12 His death 6 [...]
  • 13 His writings 63
  • CHILON chap. 1. his life 69
  • 2 His morall sentences, precepts, and verses 71
  • 3 His death and writings 72
  • PITTACUS chap. 1. his life 73
  • 2 His morall sentences, precepts, and verses 81
  • 3 His death, brother, wife, son, writings 75
  • BIAS chap. 1. His life 79
  • 2 His morall sentences, precepts, and verses 77
  • 3 His death and writings 82
  • CLEOBULUS chap. 1. his life, death, and writings 85
  • 2 His morall sentences, precepts and verses 86
  • PERIANDER chap. 1. His Country, Ancestors and Parents 89
  • 2 The time of his birth, reign, and the change of his disposition 91
  • 3 Of his being placed in the number of the Seven sages: his sentences and wri­tings 93
  • 4 The story of Arion 95
  • 5 Of his wife 96
  • 6 Of his Children ibid
  • 7 His death 99
  • Sociades his (collection of the) precepts of the seaven Sophoi. 101
  • Ausonius his play of the seven Sophoi 103
  • ANACHARSIS Chap. 1. His life and writings 109
  • His Apophthegmes 111
  • MYSON 113
  • EPIMENIDES 114
  • PHERECYDES 119

The Second Part.
Containing the Jonick Philosophers.

  • ANAXIMANDER Chap. 1. Of his life 1
  • 2 His opinions 2
  • ANAXIMENES Chap. 1. His life 6
  • 2 His opinions
  • ANAXAGORAS Chap. His Country, time, and study of Philosophy 9
  • 2 His opinions Sect. 1. Of the first principle of things 10
  • Sect. 2. Of the Heavens 11
  • Sect. 3. Of meteors 12
  • Sect. 4. Of the Earth 13
  • Sect. 5. Of living Creatures ibid
  • 3 His predictions 14
  • 4 His Schollers and Auditors 15
  • 5 His triall, death, sentences, and writings 16
  • ARCHELAUS 19

The third Part.
Containing the Socratick Philosphers.

  • SOCRATES Chap. 1. His Country, Parents, and time of birth 1
  • 2 His first education 3
  • 3 His masters 4
  • 4 His school and manner of teaching 5
  • 5 Of his Philosophy 6
  • Sect. 1. His Metaphysicks 8
  • Sect. 2. His Ethicks 9
  • Sect. 3. Oeconomicks 17
  • Sect. 4. His Politicks ibid
  • Of his Daemon 19
  • 7 His military actions 24
  • 9 How he carried himself in the Democracy and the Oligarchy 26
  • 9 His falling out with all the Sophists, and with Anytus 30
  • 10 His triall 33
  • 11 His imprisonment 38
  • 12 The time and manner of his death 40
  • 13 What happened after his death 46
  • 14 Of his person and virtues 48
  • 15 His wives and children 51
  • [Page] 16 His scholers and Auditors 54
  • 17 His writings 57
  • Socrates his Epistles 59
  • The Clouds of Aristophanes 67
  • XENOPHON Chap. 1. His Country, Parents, and following Socrates 95
  • 2 Upon what occasion he followed Cyrus into Asia 96
  • 3 How he brought off the Grecian Army 97
  • 4 End of the retreat 101
  • 5 His following of Agesilaus and banishment 103
  • 6 How he lived at Scilluns and at Corinth 104
  • 7 His death, person and virtues 107
  • 8 His writings 108
  • Xenophons Epistles 110
  • AESCHINES Chap. 1. His life 115
  • 2 His writings 116
  • CRITO 118
  • SIMON ibid
  • GLAUCON 119
  • SIMMIAS ibid
  • CEBES ibid
FINIS.

Errata.

MAny errors have escaped the press by reason of the Authors absence, as pag. 1. lin. 15. from whence it is derived to us. p. 2. l. 4. a very great anachronisme. l. 9. [...] p. 4. his time [...] travell; He went to Creet. p. 28. l. 18. fer his birth. p. 29. l. 9. my wave washt grove. p. 39. l. 3. [...]udicature; l. 23. a silent unexpressed consent. p. 41. l. 6. with Minors. p. 63. l. 4. the checkerd cloister. [...]. 21. Dion Chrysos [...]ome; Aristides Lycurgus. p. 69. l. 5. in Stobeus, Pages. p. 74. l. 42. as the ground. [...]. 114. l. 9. other Do [...]es: others Agiasarchus: Apollonius, Bolus, Laertius and Suidas name his [...]nother Bla [...]a, Plutarch Balta; supposed a Nymph. p. 119. l. 34. that suits not: In the second part; p. 14. l 24. the ninty third Olympiad. p. 19. l. 43. These five, Thales, &c. In the third part, p. 1. l. 26. lived 70. yeares. p. 29. l. 42. your heard. p. 59. l. 6. What I writ before. l. 7. greater overtures. l. 9. [...]ver [...] to you. p. 68. l. 30. well, my good. p. 73. l. 26. fer [...]ent vowes. p. 75. l. 25. I thought that [...]ove. p. 78. l. 17. the thing that I demand. p. 79. l. 17. and Lysinna. l. 34. within your selfe. p. 8 [...]. l. 30. dele why. p. 82 l. 16. come and I. p. 83. l. 2. of folly or. p. 85. l. 41. Illoye sooles. p. 92. l. 34. rules all heaven. p. 105. l. 19. to Diana. In the margent, p. 17. the words perhaps are inverted, and for [...] [...] read [...] p. 27. both the Interpreters. p. 110 for [...].

  • Spargapithes.
  • Lycus.
  • Gnurus.
    • Anacharsis
    • Saulius, or Caduida.
    • Indathyrsus.

Part. 2. pag. 9. Laert: perhaps, [...] Part. 3. p. 63. for [...].

THE TABLE.

The fourth Part.
Containing the Cyrenaick, Megarick, Eleack and Eretriack Sects.

  • ARISTIPPUS. Chap. 1. His Country and Parents 1
  • II. How he went to Athens and heard Socrates 2
  • III. How he went to Aegina ibid
  • IV. His instituion of a Sect 3
  • Sect. 1. Of Iudgment and Iudicatories 4
  • Sect. 2. Of the End or chief Good 4
  • Sect. 3. Of Vertue 5
  • V. How he went to Dionysius's Court ibid
  • VI. His Aemulators 6
  • VII. His Apophthegms 8
  • VIII. His Writings 11
  • IX. His Death 12
  • X. His Disciples & successors 14
  • HEGESIAS. Chap. I. His L [...]fe. 15
  • II. His Philosophy ibid
  • ANNICERIS. Chap. I. His Life 17
  • II. His Philosophy ibid
  • THEODORUS. Chap. I. His Life 19
  • II. His Philosophy 20
  • III. His Death, Writings, &c. 21
  • BION. Chap. I. His Life 22
  • II. His Apopthegms 23
  • III. His Death 24
  • EUCLID. Chap. I. His Country and Master [...] 27
  • II. His institution of a Sect ibid
  • III. His Apophthegms, Writings 28
  • EUBULIDES 29
  • ALEXINUS 31
  • EUPHANTUS 32
  • APOLLONIUS CRONUS ibid
  • DIODORUS. Chap. I. His Life ibid
  • II. His Philosophy 33
  • ICHTHIAS 34
  • CLINOMACHUS ibid
  • STILPO. Chap. I. His Life 35
  • III. His Philosophy 36
  • III. His Disciples 37
  • IV. His death, writings 38
  • PHAEDO 39
  • PISTHENES 40
  • [Page]Chap. Pag.
  • MENEDEMUS, Chap. I. His Country, Parent [...] ibid
  • II. His School and Philosophy 41
  • III. His manner of living ibid
  • IV. His Civill Employment 43
  • V. His Vertues and Apophthgmes 44
  • VI. His Departure from Eretria, and Death 46

The Fifth Part.
Containing the Academick Philosophers.

  • PLATO, Chap. I. His Country, Parents and time [...]
  • II. His first Education, Exercises, and studies 6
  • III. His Masters in Philosophy, and his Travels to that end 7
  • IV. What Authors he follow'd 10
  • V. His School 13
  • VI. How he instituted a Sect 14
  • Sect. 1. Ethick 15
  • Sect. 2. Physick ibid
  • Sect. 3. Dialectick 16
  • VII His Inventions 17
  • VIII. His Distinctions 19
  • IX. His three voyages to Sicily 25
  • X. His Authority in Civill Affairs 34
  • XI. His Vertues and Morall Sentences 37
  • XII. His [...]ill and Death 40
  • XIII. His Disciples and Friends 42
  • XIV. His Aemulators and Detractors 43
  • XV His Writings 45

The Doctrine of Plato delivered by ALCINOVS.

  • Chap. I. Of Philosophy, and how a Philosopher must be qualify'd pag. 56
  • II. That contemplation is to be preferred before Action 57
  • III. The three parts of Philosophy ibid

DIALECTICK.

  • IV. Of the Iudiciary part 58
  • V. The Elements and office of Dialectick 60
  • VI. Of Propositions and argumentations 6 [...]
  • VII. Of THEORETCK Philosophy 6 [...]
  • VIII. Of first matter 66
  • IX. Of Idaeas 67
  • X. Of God 6 [...]
  • XI. Of Qualities 70
  • XII. Of the Causes, generation, Elements, and order of the World ibid
  • XIII. Of the convenience of Figures, with the Elements and World 72
  • XIV. of the Soul of the World, the sphears and Starres 73

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