Section I.

THe first Reason that I shall offer for the necessary belief of such an im­partial distribution of Justice ar one time or another, is alledg'd from the believ­ed [Page 8] Existence of a God, with a particu­lar respect to his Natural and Essential Goodness, which by a necessary conse­quence from his being acknowledg'd the World's Original Maker, must be belie­ved to be as infinitely Operative, as a­ny other of those Divine Perfections, which the Creation of the World must necessarily suggest to belong to such an infinite First Cause, and Independant Be­ing.

And for the reasonableness of this de­duction, I appeal to the Philosopher Sim­plicius, who upon the account of con­sidering God as the Cause of Causes, — [...]— [...]. Pag. (mihi) 210. & Begining of all Beginings, presently as a ne­cessary concomitant with such a conception of him, concludes him to be Goodness of Good­nesses, that is, Good to all Perfection.

Now whatsoever Being, is in any de­gree, or sense, a real Goodness in it self, must be supposed to afford a reason of that denomination, from a Good that is done according to its capacity, where there be Objects that need it, or Causes that require it.

And if the Goodness of God be such, (which no man can suspect without Bla­spheming the Divine Nature, and con­tradicting [Page 9] his own Reason) the mind of man cannot possibly suggest a doubt, but that it should express it self in the Case in hand. That is, that a God of infinite Goodness and Equity, when it is always in his Power, as to understand, so to do all that is good and right, should at some time or other, vindicate and justify the innocent Causes of Good Men; that is, should recompense and reward their un­deserved Sufferings; especially when for their adherences to vertue, they have been harassed and perplex'd by the ma­licious usages of unjust and unreasonable men. I say, if the verification of his in­finite Goodness be not to be thus expres­sed, What Cases are there, by which the reason of man can be otherwise satisfied, that that glorious Attribute hath a title to the same perfection, which the rest are presumed to have? or how otherwise, in any kind of practical Notion, can a­ny reasonable Being understand, for what end or purpose he is commanded or ob­liged to be good at all? or how can a created moral Agent be so accounted either by God or Man upon such an o­mission? To refuse to do Right & Good, when it is always in his capacity to do it, would make but an untoward Cha­racter of such a Person, by an indifferent [Page 10] Judge of what Goodness is. And there­fore to suppose God (with Epicurus) to be so wholly unconcern'd in the Govern­ment of the World, and especially at what happens amiss to good men in it, so as to take no care at all of their vindicati­ons, when they are unjustly used and op­pressed, would be reason enough, not on­ly to reproach God's infinite Goodness, but, upon a very reasonable consequence, to tempt men to question his whole Ex­istence. This is the first Reason.

Section II.

THE Second Reason is alledg'd from the Nature of Man, as God was pleased to make him a free and volunta­ry Agent, design'd to be left to the con­duct, and in the hand of his own Coun­sel; that is, because God gave him by his nature, in distinction from all other visible Creatures (who act necessarily by a soveraign Impulse, from which they can­not depart) a Power in himself to think, deliberate, and act Good or Evil at his own choise, and as he should judge fit to determine his own Mind and Actions. And the reason of this deduction is, be­cause either the same Wise God, that [Page 11] form'd him into such an arbitrary Na­ture, must have certainly provided and constituted for him some superiour Judge and common Arbiter, by the dread of whose soveraign Authority and Justice, he might ingage his mind and conscience to do what's just and good, and to whom he might be accountable for his actions whether good or evil; or it must be pre­sum'd that God made him possibly to be, the most (I may say the only) lawless, unsociable, and ungovernable part of the whole Creation. That is, that he should live (as it is manifestly seen men do, where such a Judge is neither regarded nor sufficiently considered) both to be his own folly and ruin, and the world's trouble and misfortune.

Hence Athenagoras ingeniously observes, That as it's necessary to mans nature, that having an appetite he should have meat to preserve his life; [...], &c. de Resur. P. 60. and that as he is a mortal, he should have po­sterity to preserve his spe­cies; so as he is a rational Creature, that he should have a common Judge of all his actions, and from whom he might expect a reward, and dread a punishment.

Now if such an Universal Judge, and [Page 12] Arbiter must for that reason be thus ne­cessarily supposed, then it's certain that there can none be believed to be so u­niversally qualified for it, as the same God that Originally gave man his be­ing; and who by the Title of Creator was invested with a natural Soveraign­ty over all his Creatures which he made; and especially over Man, to whom he had given such a figure of mind and being, as naturally to need his Gover­ning Dominion, more than any other Creature besides, if not only.

For none can be such a competent Judge, but a Being that is Omniscient, and so is capable of understanding all Causes, Minds, and Actions; that is of an infinite goodness, and so can love, approve, and bless all that is done well, justly, and worthily: And lastly, of an infinite power so as to be able to exe­cute all his own judiciary purposes and determinations, how and when he pleases.

No Being, that wants any of these qualifications, can possibly be a Com­petent Judge of Men and their Actions, so that Universal right and equity may be compleatly and impartially done to the whole world of such Rational and Voluntary Agents. And because God Almighty can only be qualified for such [Page 13] a Judge, what can make a Suspicion, that he should not execute that just, ne­cessary, and soveraign Office, at one time or another?

As for what concerns the committing his Judiciary Authority to soveraign hu­man Powers, it will be accounted for in the third Argument (chap. 2. sect. 3.) that is, how far thereby the Divine Care of administring universal Justice to the world, is attain'd and discharg'd.

Section III.

THe Third Reason that secures a Be­lief, that God will at one time or o­ther, undertake the vindication of all righteous persons and causes, and bring them all to a true balance of impartial Right, is from a plea, & a just appeal, (and that upon most Rational Consequences) which all that are unjustly oppressed, may make to the holy and soveraign God, in their own behalf.

First, By alledging, that the promi­scuous world of Mankind, in which good men are unavoidably subjected and exposed (for reasons which a Fu­ture World can only solve) to the ha­zard of such miscarriages, and disad­vantages, [Page 14] was naturally so disposed by God's own Original pleasure and ordina­tion, as possibly to admit and produce such unequitable effects. And therefore the evil usages of vertuous and good men in such a world, must needs, in that respect, be the consequences of such causes and occasions, which God might have prevented if he had pleased, but which themselves could not controul, when they would.

Secondly, And more particularly, good men that are so oppressed, may further alledge, that those very faculties and capacities, by which, unjust men, as men, are naturally empower'd to choose and act their evil designs against the in­nocenter part of Man-kind, were not only the Issues of Gods own Workman­ship, when he was first pleased to Cre­ate Man; but they must be still kept up in their natural Use and Operations, by his Wife and Ordinative Permission.

And from hence it is, Jud. 3. 12. that the Scri­ptures (to whom an Atheist will permit an Appeal, 2 Sam. 16. 10. to illustrate such a natural truth) do all along attribute to God, 2 Cron. 21. 16. and interest him in (with expressions, Psal. 44. 9, &c. which bear a very near alliance to Causality) the worst Actions, Lam. 2. 1, &c. which wicked men have most voluntarily, Amos 3. 6. and [Page 15] of their own evil minds, contrived and acted against Himself, his Church, and choisest Servants.

Now the summ of these thoughts is, That if there be any such thing as a righteous Cause, or if any case may be reputed a causeless oppression; if there were ever any such men as were good and vertuous, Gen. 18. 26. and that in Abraham's sence might be adjudged in God's esteem righteous persons: or if there were ever any such, Luke 1. 6. besides Zacharias and Elizabeth, that walked in all the Commandments of God blameless, that is, acceptably so: And yet if nevertheless such good and righteous Persons have been oftentimes unjustly oppressed, and sometimes have passed away their whole mortal lives, rack'd, and worryed by the undeserved malice of evil men. And then lastly, if it be considered, how much God himself was concern'd (so far as I have repre­sented the Case), who can resist a be­lief, or what good man can silence his complaint and expectation, but that Al­mighty God, who is so much more or less interested, will at one time or o­ther, order a thorough justification of his innocency, and redress his wrongs by some gracious method, and in the most proper season, which his own great [Page 16] wisdom and impartial equity, shall think fit to choose in this Life or another? This is the third Reason.

Section IV.

THis fourth Reason that supports a belief, that God will undertake, at one time or other such an Administra­tion of his Divine Justice, is alledged from that natural conscience, and innate disposition; to fear the doing of (at least) notorious Acts of Immorality, which do universally and naturally (though in different degrees) attend the minds of men. And which must either signify, that there is a vindicative hand above, which will at one time or other return their wicked Actions upon themselves in some proportionable punishment; or else it must be presum'd, that God gave them naturally and unavoidably such a Conscience only for their Delusion, and implanted in them that natural fear, to be only of something, that may pos­sibly (if there should be no other world) never come to pass. Which is a con­sequence, that no good mind can enter­tain, that hath any regard at all for the Honour of his Maker's infinite justice and goodness.

[Page 17] Now, though some men have labou­red all they can to usurp upon that na­tural temper of their minds (whether by the influence of great examples of wick­edness, or by the surprizing temptati­ons of some mighty present advantage; or upon the flattering hopes of the great­est secrecy) and may have, for a time, subdued the Authority of their Natural fear and conscience: and given them­selves leave to be engaged in some vile and villainous practices: Yet when they had once acquir'd their ends by them, and digested the success (how great so­ever) of their unjust attempts, they have been afterwards inwardly arrested and attended, with an unaccountable dread of something (they knew not per­haps distinctly what) that might befal them for what they had done: Or at least they have been pursued with such an uneasiness and disorder of mind, that they could afford themselves no true rest or contentment, and but a very small satisfaction, in their own rightful, much less, in their unjustly acquir'd enjoyments.

Now of this sad and dismal after-game of a debauch'd natural conscience, there be so many instances in divine and humane story, that its become as luxu­riant a common place, as any whatso­ever; [Page 18] and have afforded Stories for com­mon talk, and (sometimes) divertisement, as much or more than any Subject that can be named.

So that, if I should now undertake to spread my present discourse, with an Enumeration, but of some of them, (considering the Sceptical Humour of those men, whose Theistical Principles I design to controul) I should but alarm their incredulity into a fit of derisive sport. And therefore I shall only offer one or two intimations of what may be said for it by such men, whose ob­servations they have no reason to un­dervalue or suspect.

What do they think of the represen­tation of the Case by Euripides, in per­sonating the humour of an avenging conscience in Orestes, Men. [...]; O­rest. [...], &c. who being ask­ed by Menalaus, what disease it was, that destroy'd him, could answer, That it was his own mind or conscience, for the great evils that he had done? Or what did Juvenal mean, when he averred it of those Roman Emperors (that were most famously the [Page 19] greatest Tyrants) that in their unjust successes they had not e­scaped all their enemies; —Nec tamen hostes E­vasisse putes, quos diu con­scia facti Mens habet atto­nitos & surdo verbere caedit. Lib. 5. Sat. 13. for they had every one of them one in their own guilty minds, that was always their attendant scourge, and that would perpetually wound them with the severest stroaks of inward guilt? Or why did the Philosopher Simplicius say, [...]. cap. 38. That such men shall punish themselves with the most acute torments, of their own minds, which shall be more vexatious to them, than the shar­pest tortures of any bodily disease; and shall less admit of comfort or remedy? I say, what suspicion can our unbeliev­ing Opponents create to themselves, That those men, who were Heathens them­selves, should not deal fairly with the world in declaring their own Sentiments of this Case.

And then the Summ is, whence can that natural fear of crimes (where there be temptations for present profit, honour or pleasure) before they are committed, and such unsufferable reflections, unea­siness, and sometimes torments of mind, after they are perpetrated, proceed, but [Page 18] [...] [Page 19] [...] [Page 20] from an undeleble, implanted Principle in mans Nature, to revere the vindictive Power, and severe justice of a God above, to be executed upon them at one time or another; especially when 'tis consi­dered, that sometimes those wicked men could neither have them upon any other account, that can be imagined; nor could they lay them down, or escape them, when they most resolvedly endeavour'd to release their minds from those most afflictive impressions. This is the Fourth Reason.

Section V.

THis Section offers a Reason, or rather a pregnant presumption, which some Men perhaps may think fit to make use off: And tho' it be not singly of it's self suffici­ent to convince; yet in conjunction with the former Reasons it may serve to per­swade, That God Almighty doth so take notice of the Oppressed, that he will at one time or other, and by what methods he pleases, vindicate the Causes of good men, and justify their innocency.

And that is from a consideration of those mens practice, who for their causeless Sufferings, and undeserv'd Oppressions, [Page 21] having been depriv'd of all manner of re­dress from the Powers and Judicatories of men, have solemnly appeal'd to an im­partial Tribunal above; and in the deep pressures of their Souls, have implor'd some signal indications, that God design'd their Justifications in another World. Of these I shall give some few instances in­stead of the many, that might be of­fered.

The first I shall give, is from what se­veral Authors have reported, of one Lord John Thursin among the Vestogothi, who with greater Severity than Equity, com­manded a certain man to be Beheaded, who before the separation of his Head from his Body, said to that Lord, I cite thee this hour to appear before the Tri­bunal of Almighty God, to answer to him, why thou hast condemned me to Death being innocent. And immediate­ly that Great Lord, after the man was Beheaded, fell from his horse and died.

Baptista Folgoso relates it of a Genoway Captain, who condemned a Catalonian Commander to be hang'd; who Plead­ing for mercy, and finding none, thus said to the Genoway Captain; Since thou wilt needs execute upon me this most un­just sentence, having never in my life of­fended thee, or thy Nation, I appeal unto [Page 22] God the just avenger of injur'd innocence; and I desire that this instant day, thy Soul may appear with mine before Him, to yield an account for the wrong thou hast done me: And not many hours after, the Genoway Captain died.

Camerarius mentions it of a Master of the Teutonic Order, who, upon a falsely pretended Crime, had caus'd an innocent Person to be condemned to die; who be­ing lead to his Punishment, cited the Ma­ster thirteen days after to the Tribunal of Christ; and the thirteenth day being come, the Master being hayle and well, with his own mouth confessed to several persons, that he must now appear before Christs Tribunal, and that day dy'd.

Both Exnerus and Lipsius tell us of Ferdinand the Fourth King of Spain, that when Peter and John, the two Brethren of Carvaialius were suspected for the mur­der of Benavidius, and upon an unsuffi­cient proof being Convicted, the King sentenc'd them to be thrown down head­long from the top of an high Tower. They crying out that they were to die innocent­ly, and the Kings ears being shut against their just defence, they summon'd the King within thirty days to appear and answer to the high God for what he had done; and the very thirtieth day after the [Page 23] King was found dead in his Bed.

Lipsius gives us a story, from Lam­bertus Schafnaburgensis, whom he calls a famous Writer, and worthy of belief, of Burchardus Bishop of Halberstad, who entering into an unjust controversy with the Abbot of Helverden about Tithes in Saxony, which he had taken away from his Monastery; & the Abbot finding no relief from any Judicatory on Earth de­sired Frederick Count Palatine to tell the Bishop, That he appeal'd to Almighty God for Judgment, and that both of them should prepare themselves to try the Cause before the Divine Tribunal. In a little while the Abbot dy'd, and presently af­ter the Bishop; who falling from his horse, was heard to say, that he was just then snatch'd away to God's Tribunal there to be Judg'd.

To these I could have added many more of this kind, such as the famous stories of the Templar at Burdeaux, of Radulphus Duke of Austria, and the like; but then I must have exceeded the pro­portion of this Paragraph. Therefore I shall now only take notice of a passage that looks that way in the Holy Scri­ptures. And that is of Moses in the Case of Corah and his complices. It was ve­ry like an appeal to the Justice of God, [Page 24] when for his Justification he said; Num. 16. 28, 29, 30, 31, 32. If these men die the common death of all men; or if they be visited after the visitation of all men; Then hath not God sent me. God answered his Appeal, For the Earth o­pened and swallowed them up quick, &c.

Now as to the other former Instances, they may be suppos'd to have been acted from sudden Efforts of deeply oppressed Passions, and not from any known Rules to licentiate them in those practices, and so the Appealants could not have promi­sed themselves any assurance of those extraordinary events upon their provo­cations. And therefore it hath been and ought always to be questioned, whe­ther it may be allowable or lawful or­dinarily to imitate the practice of such appeals. And for this I shall not in­gage in the Controversy: My design was only to take notice of such as hap­pened, to be made use of to our pre­sent purpose, as any man shall think fit; reputing them extraordinary Cases, and unusual instances of the Divine Justice; and as Lipsius calls them, Exemp­pla mira, & supra fidem vi­deantur, sed fides Authori­bus scrip­ta. Mon. & Exem. Cap. 11. Won­derful Examples, and which might seem to exceed belief, but that they are rela­ted by Faithful Authors, and Memorials. This the Fifth.

Now these Five Sections being end­ed, [Page 25] in which I have endeavour'd to prove, that God Almighty will at one time or other, administer impartial Justice and Judgment to all Mankind, I should pre­sently make a nearer approach towards the Conclusion for a Future World's Ex­istence upon the account of this Ar­gument, were I not oblig'd to consider, whether Almighty God doth not execute such administrations of his Justice to the Good and Evil in, and with respect to, this present life. And as to that enquiry, the Second Chapter is concern'd.

Section. I.

FIrst, in this Section I am engaged to represent that universal Justice is not impartially done to all Mankind, according to the different qualifications of their Lives and Actions in this their present Existence. But if it be alledged, [Page 27] That the Notoreity of the Fact, and a more general consent in the Case, is suf­ficient to supersede the offering of any thing, that is Explanatory to confirm the Truth of it: My Answer is, That as I can't foresee what evasions my attendant Scepticks may suggest to elude the plain­est Presumptives, so I am willing (as I shall do all along) to indulge such as are already Believers, with the clearest explanations of the Case; If not the more fully to assure them, yet the more lively to represent to them, the attested Truth of their own Observation. And for that end, I shall take leave to trouble the Common Reader with some autho­ritative Testimonies. And to avoid Re­dundancy, I shall produce but two only of every sort.

First, I shall offer the Scriptural sence of the case, and that only as it's represen­ted by two Prophets of God, who by their interrogatory manner of speaking, do more strongly confirm that Matter of Fact.

As, Why does the way of the Wicked pros­per? Jer. 12. 1. wherefore are they happy, that deal Treacherously? (saith the One). And, Wherefore boldest Thou thy tongue (saith the Other) when the Wicked devoureth the man that is more Righteous than he? Hab. 1. 13. [Page 28] To which I might easily have added innumerable more, if I could have thought it necessary, or any way reasona­ble in this case, as to our Modern Theists.

Secondly, I shall subjoin the sence of two Fathers of the Christian Religion. The first is that of Athenagoras the anicent Apollogist. And he undertakes an Argu­ment for the assured belief of a future Judgment, because (saith he) We have seen many Wicked Men that have studied all their lives to do all manner of unjust things, — [...]. De resur. Mor. p. (mihi) 61. and yet never met with any Evils to afflict them here; when others of approved Vertue, have wasted away their Lives in Sorrows, Vexations, Re­proaches, and all kinds of Calamities.

The next is Salvian, who in his Book of Providence, seems to alarm the Rea­der's wonder, Si totum quod in hoc mun­do; est cu­rae & gu­bernacu­lo & indicio Dei; Cur melior multo sit Barbarorum conditio, quam nostra? Cur inter nos quoque sors bonorum durior, quam malo­rum? Cur probi jacent, improbi convalescunt? Cur iniquis po­testatibus universa succumbunt? Lib. de Prov. saying, If all things in the World do depend upon the care, and govern­ment of God, Why is the condition of the Barbarians, much better than ours that are [Page 29] Christians? Why do the Good meet a har­der portion in this Life, than those that are Wicked?

And if my sceptick Reader, to invali­date the credit of these Authorities, shall object; That such men might be condu­cted into those affirmations, only to serve the faith of the divine Revelation, for the Existence of another Life; I shall there­fore (fully to take off that exception) add the like number of Heathen Philoso­phers, who as positively as either of them have attested the same thing.

The first shall be the sence of Cicero, (though perhaps he may personate Cotta, or some other man in speaking it) who was so greatly concern'd in this case, that discoursing of the Gods, he saith, That if they have taken upon themselves any care of the world at all, it would be well with the Good, and otherwise with the Evil: But (saith he) there appears no such thing. And then the Philosopher further ingage­ing in an enquiry after it, confirms his own observation, by several instances that relate to it for it's verification. As when he saith, Cur duos Sci­piones Poenus oppres­sit? Cur Hannibal Marcel­lum in­tere­mit? &c. Nat. De­or. Why did the Carthaginian op­press the two Scipio's? Why did Hannibal prevail upon Marcellus and kill him? And then proceeds with a Catalogue of other examples of the oppressed Ver­tuous, [Page 30] and of as many more of the prosperity and success of Men extream­ly wicked.

The second that I shall alledge, shall be Simplicius, who in discourse admits a con­cession, That the Wick­ed may flourish in this Life in power, [...]. Cap. 38. 212. riches and health, and may continue in a prosperous state, even to their death, and may leave their Posterity in the like Prosperity: and that the Good and Vertu­ous may in the mean time, be harassed in the world, without any remarkable instances of Relief or Compensation.

These be the three kinds of Authori­ties, which I thought, if not absolutely necessary, yet very convenient, to be of­fer'd in this Case: For though the matter of fact be obvious enough, yet our Scep­ticks know, that upon its unquestionable concession, the weight of the whole Ar­gument depends; and therefore we must not be precarious in the least instances of proof, upon which we Argue.

But what saith the Heathen world to all this? or what influence had it upon their minds? that's now to be examined: Therefore,

Section II.

IN this second Section, I have obliged my self to represent, what a remarka­ble influence, the ordinary omission of that impartial administration of God's justice to the good and evil in this life, had upon the minds of the Heathen World it self. And the reason why I take oc­casion to do it in this place, is because I perceive, that they were especially con­trouled into whatsoever they affirm'd or doubted, concerning the Existence of a future state, from an observation of the promiscuous usage of the Good and Evil in this Life.

Now, that I may fully discharge this design (which will appear so considera­ble an improvement of the present Ar­gument) at once, I shall produce, or point at something, from the most famous Heathen Philosophers, with a transient Aspect upon the general run of the Poets, as to the case in hand.

First as to the Heathen Philosophers, I shall not here take any notice of the Sence of Plato, or his Followers; or of what they and some others have affirm'd concerning Socrates in that case. But I [Page 32] shall only make use of some such Phi­losophers, (and of those the most con­siderable) as lived since our Saviour's time; it being presum'd that they should maintain an opposition to the acknow­ledgment of a future World, in pure de­fiance to Christianity; and that because the professors of it had so positively de­clared that state, and the issues of it, as its principally rational Fundamental of all their vertuous Practices, and reso­lute Sufferings.

Now, it will appear, that as those Philosophers could not escape the Ob­servation of God's ordinary omission of his impartial justice to the Good and Evil in this life, so as oft as that consi­deration came intentively into their minds, it so stagger'd them in their Atheistical Hypothesis concerning a fu­ture World, that sometimes they were necessitated to admit the thoughts of it, though (as Minutius Foelix observes, di­midiata fide) but with a half-way, or doubtful Faith.

The first of that sort, of whom I shall take notice, shall be Seneca, who lived not many years after our Saviour's Re­surrection, and was Tutor to Nero, and whose Authority goes a great way with our modern Theists. He indeed expres­sed [Page 33] himself very frequently with a po­sitive denial of any future World at all. As when he said, To die, was not to be at all: And that there shall be as much after me, Mors est non esse. Hoc erit post me, quod ante fuit—nos quoque accen­dimur, & extinguimur. Epist. ad Luc. as there was before me: Our birth (saith he) kin­dles us into life, and our death extinguisheth us in­to nothing.

But notwithstanding, when he was to comfort Polybius, for the death of his Brother, a vertuous Person; and conside­ring how impossible it was for him to offer any sufficient reasons to support his Patience, without suggesting some­thing concerning a future World, he could then say to him, Ne ita invideris fratri tuo, quiescit tandem liber, tandem tutus, tandem est aeternus—Fruitur nun [...] aperto & libero coelo—Erras, non perdidit lucem frater tuus, sed securiorem sortitus est—Non reli­quit ille nos, sed anteces­sit, &c. De Cons. ad Polyb. cap. 28. Be not troubled for your Brother; He is safe, and that eternally: He en­joys a free and spacious Heaven; and is brought into a Glorious place by Him, who receives sepa­rated Souls into his bosom: He hath not left us, but is gone before us. And upon the same account, comforting Martia, greatly af­flicted for the Death of her Son, he could then say, Why run you to his Sepul­chre? [Page 34] he is translated to the lofty Regions, Non est, quod ad Sepul­chrum [...]ilij curras,—ad excelsa sublatus, inter felices currit animas, excipitque illum coetus sacra, Scipiones Catones (que)— De cons. ad Martiam, cap. 25. to move among the Souls of the happy, and is received in­to the sacred society of the Catoes, and Scipioes, and such excellent Men as are set free by the benefit of their Dying. Thus, as Seneca was not consistent to himself, so he stands our Theists in no such stead as hath been pretended.

The next shall be the most famous Plutarch, who lived in the time of Domitian and Nerva, but especially flourished in the days of Trajan. And, what I said of the former, I shall affirm the same of him; that is, That he fre­quently declares his good-will, to baf­fle the Faith of a future Life; otherwise how could he have once said, that The the Dead should fall into the same condition, [...], &c. Pag. (mihi) 109. in which they were before they were born: And, that as before they came into the World, it was neither good nor ill with them, so shall it be with them, when they are gone out of it. And that it shall be the same state with us after our death, as it was before we were born. And in [Page 35] his tract of Superstition, he attributes the fear and apprehension of future Pu­nishments to that cause; and he there tells us, [...]. De Super. That Death is the Boundary of Life, but Superstition extends it fur­ther, and suggests fears, that when men have passed over all the Evils of this life, they may meet with more after death, which shall never have an end.

All this the Philosopher imputes to vain and needless Superstition, as he doth in that tract very many ridiculous per­swasions. But nevertheless, though he had so often expressed his willingness to disbelieve a future World, yet to shew how impossible it was for him altoge­ther to blot out of his mind the thoughts of it, and how improbable it was to him, that the Good and Just, after all their pursuits of Vertue, and the pious im­provement of their Time and Beings, should find no other recompence, but Annihilation: I say, When he was to comfort Apollonius for the Death of his Son, (whom he had commended for his Modesty and Piety, towards the Gods, his Parents, and Friends, and for his Vertuous Life) he could then tell him, [Page 36] That If what the Ancient Poets and Phi­losophers had said of the Pious, be true, which ( [...]) was very likely to be so; that is, That after their death they shall attain to Honour in a happy place; [...], &c. That then he ought to hope well of his Son, that he now dwells with the Souls of the Pious, that he enjoys that happy state. And then he caresseth him with what Pindar spake of the Dead, and with what Plato had discours'd of the Souls im­mortality.

Now, what shall we think of the in­genuity and honesty of this Great man, (who could affirm of himself, That he had rather Plutarch were not Plutarch, than that Plutarch were not vertuous) in the managery of his Comfort to Apollonius, Did he believe another World's Existence, or no? If he did be­lieve it, with what Integrity could he so often express himself to the contra­ry? If he did not believe it, Why did he deal so insincerely with Apollonius, as to put him upon such a delusive hope in his distress? Or, if it be said, that Apollonius perhaps might have been be­fore affected with what Pindar and Plato [Page 37] had said, about a future World, but then Why did he not reprove him for his Folly, in busying his Head with such Romantick Dreams, and not rather direct him to that solid comfort, which a Stoick's Reason (as is pretended) might have afforded him? Or, Lastly, If to solve all this, it may be suggested, that whatso­ever he had said, he indeed might doubt of that States Existence, I have so far attained my End, as that I can inter­pret, That he doubted of that state, be­cause he could not avoid the force of this and other Arguments, that so co­gently demonstrated it to his mind, in despight of all his Resolution to main­tain the contrary against the Christian Cause.

To these I may add something very considerable from the Famous Emperor Marcus Antoninus, who alwaies spake very confusedly of what should become of men, when they die: As once he did concerning Alexander and his Muliteer, that they should be reduc'd ( [...]) to something, he could not tell what; [Page 38] that is, that they either should be re­ceived into the same Principles whence they came, [...]. Lib. 6. Sect. 24. or be dispers'd into Atomes: Yet when he came afterward to consi­sider, that the gods had done all things else so orderly, and with such singular Love to Mankind, he wonder'd at their neglect of one thing; that is, that they should take no Care, that Men, who had held such correspondencies with them by pious Actions and Sacred Ministrations, should, when they die, be no more, and be wholly extinguished. I say, at this Block he stumbled, and would be offering some Reasons for it, but such as were hypothetical and uncertain; and therefore begins with a ( [...]) How can it be? [...], &c. Lib. 12. Sect. 5. Gat. p. 117. or, How comes it to pass that it should be so? &c. And it's enough for my purpose, that I have attain'd this from that excellent Philosopher.

Thus I have represented how those Philosophers (by whose, if by any kind of Authority, our present Scepticks [Page 39] must pretend to Patronize their Atheism) who lived after Christianity was plan­ted in the World, were necessitated to behave themselves in the case of a future state: Which had they positively main­tain'd and published, coincidently with the Christian Faith, they foresaw, that they must have disbanded the greatest part of those their credulous Followers, who were then perswaded to oppose it. And that because those Philosophers un­derstood, that all the Practicks of the Christian Religion were so consonant to, and perfective of, right reason; so con­ducing to the Safety of all Societies, and that did oblige its Professors to be, upon that main reason, so vertuous and inno­cent, that it was necessary they should make them ridiculous in trusting to a future reward and happiness, (which they designed to laugh at, as fond and superstitious) whom they could not re­present to the World, as scandalous and offensive in their morals and practices.

And this their halting and shuffling in a matter of that importance, seems to me a greater Argument to confirm the credibility of another World's Exi­stence on this account, than if I had ci­ted a Thousand Authorities of such Phi­losophers, as positively believed and pro­fessed [Page 40] it; because thence it appears, that the reason of the thing was so prevai­lingly convincing, that it controuled their minds (as it were, whether they would or no) sometimes into a serious doubt, at other times into a seeming concession; though they were fain to retract it, as oft as the interest of their cause, and their opposition to Christiani­ty exacted it from them.

And now having dispatch'd the Philo­sophers, or these some famous ones in­stead of them all, I could have added many and great Authorities to our Pur­pose, from the Heathen Historians, though of a more ancient Date, such as one from the famous Death-bed Speech of Cyrus, to his Sons, in Xenophon; And of Veturia's Oration to her Son Martius, to be Merciful to the City of the Volsi, Recorded by Dionysius Halicarnesseus. But I omit the use that may be made of them, as unnecessary.

And then as to the Heathen Poets, (by whose Works the Ancient Philo­sophy, natural Theology, and indeed most kinds of Learning were so consi­derably preserv'd) it's obvious enough, how positively they declar'd their thoughts of a future World's Existence, and what apprehensions they had of the [Page 41] Rewards and Punishments of another Life, upon the account of the unequal Distributions in this World, to the Good and Evil. And for that purpose they described the Rewards of the Vertuous, by an Elizium; That is, by certain pleasant Fields, fitted for all advantages of Pleasure and Happiness. And thus they did, as to the Punishment of the Wicked, by a great many instances of dreadful Representations: As by such frightful Officers, grim Judges, and by some particular Examples of several se­vere punishments, such as of Tantalus, Ixion, Sisiphus, and Titius. And this ingenious way of representing the state of the Dead, was so ancient, that Dio­dorus Siculus affirms, Lib. 2. c. 4. That Orpheus re­ceived it from the old Egyptians. But the general Run of the Poets is so well known to abett our design, that it were an inexcusable redundancy, to offer at a citation of their innumerable Expres­sions to our purposes.

And thus having made use of these few instances of the Heathen World's Opinions, concerning a future Life upon the account of this Argument; let no man think that I design to approve or answer for all the imperfect Notions, or doubtful Representations, which many [Page 42] of those Philosophers (such as Plato and his Followers especially) that asser­ted the Being of a Future state, had of the manner of the Soul's Existence in it: Much less do I intend to account for the Lusory and extravagant Fancies concerning the modell'd circumstances of that State: But so long as it appears, That upon some natural convincing Reasons, and especially upon the Pro­spect of the promiscuous usage of the Good and Evil in this World, nothing could so solve the difficulties of such Observations, but that they were ne­cessitated to admit the acknowledg­ment of a Future World, I have, as far as I design'd in this case, attain'd my End.

And now, if any Sceptical Theist should go about to perplex this way of Arguing, and shall alledge, That the confus'd and unaccountable Apprehen­sions, which those Learned Heathens had of the manner, place, and other circumstances of Mens Existence in that State, and how the Rewards and Pu­nishments are there to be executed to the Good and Evil: And then to strengthen their Exception, should object to us, That the Christians themselves, who pretend the greatest assurance of the [Page 43] Future World's Existence, have express'd almost as imperfect an understanding of those mention'd Cases and Circum­stances of that Future World; and some­times have discours'd as wildly of the state of the Dead, as others had done; And then, that their Great Apostle St. Paul should affirm, That the know­ledge of those future Events, [...]. 1 Cor. 13. 12. was but as by a Riddle, at the meaning of which men, were left to guess; or, like one that sees through the imperfect medium of a Lattess: I say, if by these Alle­gations such a Sceptick should encou­rage his Denial or Suspicion of the Reality of such a World's Existence; My answer to such an Exception shall be manag'd in the next Section by its self, in which I shall offer Reasons, why God was pleas'd, that there should be such an imperfect knowledge, or such a concealment of the manner, place, and other circumstances of the state of the Dead in another World. And this I do the rather take care to explain, because it's probable, that even a Believer may sometimes stumble at the difficulty of that Solution.

Section III.

IN this Section, I shall therefore endea­vour to represent, That mens imper­fect knowledge of the state of the Dead, that is, of the place, manner, and other the precise circumstances of that State, and especially of the way and method of God's disposure of Mankind to their re­spective Rewards and Punishments in the other World, are no reasonable Argu­ments to suspect the reality of them, and much less of the State it self, in which they are to be Administred.

And this I shall do by way of an an­swer to a Cavillers exception, and it shall be thus laid. Saith he, I have no mind to be impos'd upon by a pretence of such Encouragements, as are so presumptively and generally, and therefore, obscurely, propos'd; nor be oblig'd to a Religion for an end, of the particular manner of whose enjoyment, I can have no explicit under­standing, and of which no man can give any sufficient demonstration to my mind and reason. I can't thus answer the ex­probation of my friends, nor solve my discretion to my self, for living such [Page 45] a strict and self-denying Life. That is, that when I come to die, I can't convin­cingly tell my self, or them, whither I shall go, or what shall then become of me; so that if I can receive no better ac­count of those Future Events, I am like to live as pleases my self at present, and to adhere to those thoughts, that have in­gag'd my suspicion of any Real Existence of another World at all.

In Answer to this exception thus laid, though some men, whose minds are firmly setled in the Faith of what is necessary to be believ'd concering another World, would chuse to leave such persons in their incredulity, as if there were nothing in Rational Evidence to controul their un­belief, yet I hope I have something to offer in this hard case, that may reasona­bly perswade, if not absolutely convince them, out of the Errour of their own su­spicion. And I shall attempt it upon the account of these two Reasons. The First shall be with respect to the present State of humane understandings. The second upon a moral reasonableness of Gods per­mitting, that the manner and circumstan­ces of that Future State, should be so dark­ly represented, and imperfectly under­stood.

The First Reason that I shall offer, is, [Page 46] because we may presume, that mens un­derstanding Faculties are not at present ca­pable of admitting a direct apprehension, or representation of objects, that are by their sublimity of a different Kind and Nature. And the Reason is, because those Faculties, at present, are ty'd down to so many restraints, and limitations. As First, by their natural dependance upon the outward Senses, which must first intromit those and all other Notices, before the Mind can manage its Conceptions of things. And then Secondly, because the grosness of those Corporal Organs, by which men naturally Act their intellectu­al Powers, doth render the mind too dull and unfit, to entertain such unaccommo­dable, and disproportion'd Objects, and notices of things, especially that are at such distances of Place, and Time.

And therefore it's possible our Case, as to the present understanding of that State, and of the nature of those Divine and af­ter-Dispensations in another World, if they were never so well discours'd to us by the best Reason, and the most ad­vantageous Revelation, may be like to the mans that is born Blind in respect of Light, who can never be made to frame a right conception of it in his mind, by all the definitions and descriptions, that [Page 47] can be made of it to him. For if he be told, that it comes from a body, that is seemingly not above a foot and half Di­ameter, and yet notwithstanding, that it gives Luster, Heat, and Life to all the visible World; or suppose that a man should make use of any other glorious ap­pellations of its Nature and Qualities, they would but amuse and confound the blind mans mind, and perhaps he would think, that the person came on purpose to abuse him. But then suppose that blind mans Eyes to be opened at an instant, he can then be presently satisfyed with a right concepti­on of it. Now it's as unreasonable to doubt of a Future State, because we can have nothing in our present Conceptions, that answers to it, as it's impertinent for a blind man to disbelieve the Existence of Light, because he can never be able by all the discourses that are made of it to him, to frame a right Notion of it in his mind.

And further, if this objection were rea­sonable, and should succeed, our Sceptick, might as well on that ground, take con­fidence to question the very Existence of God himself; because he doth not offer his Nature to the Knowledge of his Creatures by any direct tender of it to the apprehension of their Senses, when by the common reason of mankind [Page 48] (upon the acknowledgment of His Infi­nite Being, which none that considers the Existence of the World, can possibly re­sist) he must always be believ'd to be as near us as the Objects which we see or touch. A notion of His absolute Perfecti­ons can admit no less.

But these men should be discours'd a little further on that account, and asked, whether they do not believe, that there be innumerable things in Real Being, which they can't directly and sensible dis­cern and apprehend, because perhaps they are too fine, or too abstruse, or in other respects disproportion'd to their present Senses, and for that reason the natures of such Beings, could never come into any in­telligible cognisance? or do they not think, that there be thousands of other Beings, that are in ken of sensible perception, and have come under Philosophical disquisiti­on, and yet the most diligent enquirers into their Existencies, have been sensible how much they have faln short of the per­fect knowledge of the Natures of most of them? and are there not as many extraordinary Phoenomenas, or manifest appearances in nature, that are not un­der observ'd causations, and yet are be­lieved to be true, though how they are, or should be so effected, they cannot, with [Page 49] all their skill and industry, find out? Of this nature I account, especially Witch­crafts, and Apparitions; of whose Exi­stences we may be perfectly satisfied, by as plain and notorious matters of fact and testimonies, as by which any thing in the world was ever made any ways suffici­ently credible. And now if because some instances of that kind have been acted by knavery, and more of them suggested by fear, whereby the real facts have been sometimes put out of credit and counte­nance; If I say, for those reasons my scep­tick may take occasion to deride my ta­king notice of such things in this place, I shall admit his Scoff with so much the less dissatisfaction, as that with me, he must re­flect upon the universal Wisdom of Man­kind. And I challenge him to shew me any learned Age or Nation in the world, to whose general Opinion I may not rea­sonably appeal in this Case; only always excepted, that in every Age there might be here and there, perhaps one or two (such an one as Diagoras was among the Athenians) who might in a dogmatizing humour be singularly promoting their private Opinions against the binding Au­thority of Common Judgment.

Now as to the matter in hand, if the unequal distributions of Justice and Judg­ment, [Page 50] of Rewards and Punishments to the Good and Evil in this Life will inforce the reason of men to assent to the belief in ge­neral, that there must needs be another World to follow, wherein a Just and Ho­ly God will allow all his Creatures (that are capable of it) Impartial Right & Judg­ment; why should any man quit his faith of that State, though his senses at present, cannot give, or his understanding admit any direct information of the Manner, Measures, Place, and the other Circumstan­ces of its Existence, because they cannot; or because for good reasons they ought not? And if some men, to cure this Scruple, have been too busy and positive in their descri­ptions of the State of the Dead, I think such adventurous Conjectures have not at all added to the evidence for the cre­dibility of a Future World; but, on the contrary, they have contributed a great advantage to them, that have a design to call in question, and to deride the whole Faith of that State. Such kind of addi­tions to an Article, being like to the Mix­tures of the Author's Wit and Invention in a Serious History, which may reaso­nably bring in question the credit of all its relations; or like the commendations of a vertuous Person to excess, which may make a suspicion of Flattery in the whole [Page 51] Encomium: An Article, like a man, may be so impos'd upon by a dress, that the knowledge and belief of it may be lost in the disguise. This the First Answer.

My Second Answer to our Captious Scepticks exception, is, That as it's certain that we have not faculties in this mortal State, that are figur'd and fitted for a di­rect and sensible perception of such distant and unaccommodated Objects; so the moral Reason why GOD Almighty might be pleased, that there should be such a concealment of them, may be be­cause, that if that state, and all that is enjoyable in it, were in all points and circumstances made cognizable to us in such a manner as sensible represen­tations can make any thing to be, tho' such a kind of knowledge of them, might possibly satisfy some Mens curi­osities, yet it would be a very conside­rable hinderance to mens living vertu­ous and religious Lives with reference to their future Interest. And the rea­son is, because they being plac'd here to act, as in a state of trial and probation, for that future Reward and Happiness, up­on condition of living such kinds of Lives; if such a sensible notice, and ex­act conception of the measures, and manner of all the particular Instances [Page 52] of that Future Happiness, were allowed them in this Life, such a Discovery would probably over-balance their Souls equally poized Liberty (which can only consist with the notion of their being probationers) too much on the one hand or side. That is, it would in­cline it too much towards a necessity of acting its vertuous Purposes. To which necessity, every approach of the Mind (whencesoever it proceeds) would take away so much of the reason of all Good Actions being accountably rewardable. But of this more in my Third Argu­ment.

And now if it should be said against this, that indeed if men were put into any enjoyment of the happiness of that Future State, it might take off that free­dom of acting, and incline the Will too much on the one side of the Scale of its natural Liberty, and preponderate the Mind too much towards that deter­min'd State, which it shall enjoy in the other World; but this (saith our Scep­tick) is only a present particular know­ledge of that Future Happiness, and 'tis no more, that I enquire after.

To this I reply, That such a know­ledge would be a kind of enjoyment in its self, especially, if it be considered [Page 53] (as reasonably it ought) that the intel­lectual part of man (by which he es­sentially is, and acts himself) will be most principally concern'd in the frui­tion of that Future Bliss; when the Judgment and the Will shall be freely determin'd (that is, determine themselves) to the Embraces of that mighty Happi­ness. And therefore, tho' the Blessed shall for ever unconstrainedly choose to serve God, and to do all the Good they can in that state (& there may be occasions for it more than we can conceive) yet I think that those their vertuous Actions shall not then be made so Rewardable, as when they were acted in a state of Probation, upon an equal poize of chusing Good or Evil at their own Election; but will be rather a part of their Joy, Bliss, and Fruition. This the Second Answer.

And now having thus solv'd this grand Objection, I hope there is nothing more to be alledged to put any further stop in our way, but that we may fairly proceed to shew, how far the respiting and ad­journing of universal Justice to a future World, will administer new Reasons for a stronger demonstration of a future states Existence on that Account. But that's the business of the next Chapters adventure. Therefore,

Section I.

IN this Section I am concern'd to re­present, That if Almighty GOD should not respit the completion of his judiciary purposes for the Good and Evil to another Life, but should in this world be universally and actually justifi­ing and abetting every righteous Person and Cause; and should also as univer­sally be constantly correcting and con­founding every Evil Mans unjust adven­tures, it would certainly discontinue the natural order of those Agents, that act by necessary impulse, as often as they [Page 56] should be made use of for those judici­al executions. And that because they can­not subserve an extraordinary proceedure of the Divine Justice, unless they should be continually interrupted in the order of their natural Causations and Opera­tions.

And to make this Observation the more convincingly conspicuous, we may take measures by some few famous Cases, in which, GOD was sometimes pleas'd to exercise his absolute Domi­nion, and extraordinary Authority over those necessary Agents, for the present executions of his Justice. That is, sup­pose that all the Seas and Rivers of the Universe should be forced from their na­tural Courses (of which there be some instances) to fourd over all those good Persons in their flight from an Attach­ment, as oft as there were no other means for their escape, and that the Sun should as oft stand still, as it were necessary it should, to crown a good Cause with a compleat Conquest; or suppose, that as often as any man were ready to perish with Thirst, every hard Rock or natural mound to Waters, should be forc'd open for a River to run in dry places, to supply their present want; or that the Clouds should suspend their [Page 57] kind showers to refresh the growth of Plants; or that the Sun's enlivening warmth should be turn'd into a Flame to burn up the surface of the Earth, so oft as the Inhabitants thereof should deserve those instances of the Divine Judgment upon them: I say, if these, and a thousand such like cases as these, should so often become necessary for the completion of GOD's Favour to the Vertuous and Inno­cent, and for the just execution of His Displeasure to wicked Men in this world, the necessary Agents, which were natural­ly disposed to serve the necessities & con­veniencies of Mankind, would be found to act contradictions to their own Natures; and their orderly Causations would be so daily and hourly chang'd into miracu­lous Events, that the Universe it self would appear to be nothing else, but a scene of Prodigies, to amuse and affright Mankind.

Now, though such wonderful executi­ons of the Divine Justice, and especial Favour, may well enough consist with the world's present created order, when they are so unfrequently done, and up­on some extraordinary occasions, yet if they were constantly and fully acted, for the completion of every single Per­sons reward or punishment (which must [Page 58] be supposed, if the Arguments in my first Chapter, that GOD will certainly do it at one time or other, be true) the necessary Beings, which should be sub­servient to those ends and executions, must be so often interrupted in their na­tural motions and causations, that no­thing would follow, but the World's universal Disorder, if not its total Dis­composure.

But perhaps, things may go better a­mong the Rational Agents. But that is next to be inquir'd into. Therefore,

Section II.

IN this Second Section, we are engaged to examine the next grand inconveni­ence and disorder to the universe, as God by his own Sovereign Wisdom stated it, with respect to that part of it, which are call'd Rational and Voluntary Agents, as they are naturally and necessarily to sub­sist together in Social Communions one with another for their common welfare. And then I say, that if God Almighty should in this life universally execute those administrations of Rewards and Punish­ments to the Good and Evil, it would de­stroy the ordinary good subsistence of all [Page 59] humane Societies. For if while the dispen­sations of Gods providence are so promi­scuously dispenced to the Good and Evil, whereby they do so constantly share in one anothers blessings and misfortunes, Mankind do attain the good ends of their Social Subsistence with so much difficul­ty and hazard, as that in a thousand Ca­ses it had been better, in that very re­spect, for innumerable single persons never to have known what a world had meant, what disorders, and cross accidents, what perpetual dissolutions of a Govern­ments, and frustrations of the most mate­rial contracts, and agreed proceedings in Common Affairs, what calamitous inter­ruptions in all manner of Societies, from an Empire to a Family, must necessarily succeed? in so much that the World of Rational Beings, would presently become the only confused rout of Creatures that ever God made; and the Existence of the meanest Animal were rather to be cho­sen, than to enjoy a Being amongst them: All which inconveniencies, nothing but a respiting the Completion of God's Justice to a Future World, can possibly prevent.

And now I appeal to any Theistical mind to tell me, Whence can all this be? or how should the understanding of man, upon such a prospect of things, conjecture, [Page 60] that God should at first make a world of Rational Beings, naturally subject to so many oppressions, and unjust usages one from another, and that yet, when they happen (as they daily do in all places of the world) they should not possibly be universally redress'd, without a grea­ter inconvenience to, if not, with a certain ruin of all their present Societies, (in which it is naturally necessary they should sub­sist) but from a design of making an universal after-view of all the Actions of Men at a time, when all such mix'd so­cieties shall have their irrevocable periods, and that the good and evil shall be sepa­rated to their several distinct communi­ons, and apartments by themselves?

And by this observation will our Sa­viour's parabolical representations of the present State of Mankind, Mat. 13. 29, 49. appear highly reasonable. That is, That the Wheat and Tares (by which is meant the Good and Evil) should grow together, till the Har­vest, least a present plucking up of the one should endanger the Success, if not the very being of the other; and that the good and bad Fish should both of them be promiscuously comprehended, not only in the same Sea of the World, but in the same net of the Church toge­ther. Now let the Hectorers down of [Page 61] the beleif of another world assign me a conjecture for any other reasonable ex­pedient how to solve this doubt, and I shall then renounce the use that may be made of this observation for the necessa­ry Existence of another world.

But to all this, if an exception should be interpos'd from the sense of them, that are true believers; who (saith our Ca­viller) will be apt say, that if God Al­mighty doth for the most part respit the the executions of Justice and Judgment to a Future World, the apprehension of such a suspension would take away a great deal of the reason and incouragement, why good men should so constantly pray (as 'tis done in publick Litanies and private Devotions) for their own Justifications, and the common deliverances of the Church from its implacable Enemies. And therefore were it not better, and more reasonable for such good men to sit down in a patient acquiescence than to be so solicitous in their prayers for that which (as the Second Chapter hath assur'd us) doth so uncommonly, and uncertainly come to pass.

My answer to this exception, is, that all prayers of that nature, as for all other temporal blessings, are suppos'd to be al­ways made interpretatively, if not in direct [Page 62] words, upon some conditions, and terms of limitation. And of those conditions there be two especially to be consider'd.

First, Good men, so often as they supplicate to be delivered and justify'd, or any other way blessed in this World, do alwaies desire those Mercies at the Hand of God, upon a condition, that they may consist with the common Good and Safety of those publick So­cieties, in whose communions they enjoy their present Subsistence. That is, they desire not, that their private Satisfa­ctions and Vindications, should be pur­chased at the rate of common Ruin, or upon the terms of any destructive alterations of the communions in which they live. And that might be the rea­son, 2 Sam. 24. 17. why David desired that the Punish­ment of God might rather fall upon himself and Family, than upon the Peo­ple in general.

And as Good men would not enjoy their particular Exemptions from Op­pressions, in exchange for a common Disturbance or Mischief; so, nor would they desire their Personal Justifications, as to their private Enemies, if they must be had upon terms, which must inferr either their present, or their future Ruin: Lest a Thought of Revenge should [Page 63] tempt their innocent minds to a com­placency in their Enemies misfortunes.

And therefore that Saying, (fiat justi­tia, ruat mundus) Let Justice be done, though the whole World should perish, can­not be true Divinity, unless the meaning of it be, Let the World perish, rather than any man should do what is unjust; but it is false to desire it should perish, rather than suffer what is most un­just.

And that you have the first condition upon which a Good mans Prayers are suppos'd to be made, when he implores the present vindication of his Right and Cause.

Secondly, I answer, That when Good men pray to God for the present deli­verances and justifications of their Per­sons and Causes, they have alwaies ano­ther condition in reserve; that is, That God would grant their Petitions for their deliverances, unless a continuance in their Sufferings should tend more to their present and future Good, otherwise they can interpret and believe, that it is a mercy of God to have their Prayers in such cases deny'd. And therefore, when they perceive that their Petitions are in such instances rejected, they are ready with all submission and contentment of [Page 64] mind, to think and say, that, Had they not some way or other needed their implacable Enemies success, their Pray­ers had certainly prevented it: And that there was something defective in them­selves, which God thought fit in that manner to correct, in order to their own final Good and Happiness, or such an event had never faln out, so contrary to their Supplications.

And thus by such wise and pious re­serves they can reasonably satisfie them­selves, when they meet a disappoint­ment in their expectations of Tempo­ral Blessings, after they had prayed for them, and were deny'd.

These, and such as these, are the con­ditions upon which Good men pray for Temporal Deliverances, and their pre­sent Justifications. And, as such Prayers are sufficiently consistent with a Belief of God's respiting and adjourning the compleat executions of his justice to ano­ther World, so it's encouragement enough (and sure it's all that need be given) that when those conditions will bear it, Good men may assure themselves, that God will not, nor did ever fail to an­swer their Petitions, and grant their re­quests. And this perfectly solves the Sence of our Saviour's indefinite Pro­mise, [Page 65] with respect to Temporal Mercies, that Whatsoever you shall ask the Father in my name, John 14. 13. he will give it you.

And further, it's to be consider'd in that case, That when the reason of those Conditions hath interven'd between God and his Petitioners, though they have been denied their Supplications in kind, yet, for their encouragement still to pray, they might and ought to be­lieve, that God would grant them in some other equivalent matter and man­ner, for a compensation of all they ask'd, and were denied. Howsoever, in the mean time they can satisfie them­selves, that they have been doing their Duties, and paying the daily Homage they owed to God, and may live com­fortably under the expectation, that God will do them right in another World.

And, let it now be also especially re­mark'd, that what I have here said concern­ing the Conditions upon which Good men pray for their Temporal Deliverances and Vindications; and upon the reason of which they are so often denied their Petitions, may hold good also in the case of God's executing his Justice, as to the Rewards and Punishments of this Life: That is, That that God will so often act those measures of Providence, [Page 66] as the reasons of those two mention'd Conditions will admit it. That is, when it may be done; First, without bringing any common destruction to those com­munions, by which the World ordinari­ly subsists; and, Secondly, when such a present execution of his Justice shall on any account tend most to the concern'd person's present or future Good and Interest.

But in all other cases, where the rea­sons of these two Conditions are super­seded, the executions of the Divine Love and Justice to the Good and Evil, are so often reserv'd and respited, for his impartial retributions in another World.

Now, as this Observation may inable us to think, that there be no small num­ber of Cases, that are so reserved and respited, so it will easily, and very na­turally solve those mens doubts and enquiries, Why either all those Executi­ons are not universally done in this Life; or why there should be any part of them certainly effected; that is, why there should be alwaies so many, and sometimes such remarkable Examples and Instances of God's justifying the Persons and Causes of Good men, and of his baffling the unjust Interests and Dealings of the Evil in this World. Of [Page 67] which, as there will be alwaies so many, as may be enough to controul the pre­tensions of the Epicureans, and our pre­sent Atheists, That God takes no care of the World at all; so there may be also few enough to suppress & silence the mur­murs of those mens too-forward minds and hasty desires, who, upon a bare possi­bility, and some rare Examples of God's executing his Justice visibly in this Life, have been apt to raise their expectations even to a criminal discontent and im­patience of their own present recom­pences and justifications. When they ought to have considered the reasons of the former conditions, (as also what other reasons God may give himself, which we (perhaps) can't understand) upon which they are so often omitted, and should rather have endeavoured to wait with patience, till the season ap­proacheth, in which there shall be an impartial execution of Justice to the whole World of Good and Evil.

And this finisheth the second Section or Reason, that may be given, why God is pleased so observedly to deferr the Exe­cutions of his impartial Justice to the Good and Evil to a future World, with respect to Mankind in general, as they are ordinarily to subsist in Social Com­munions. [Page 68] But, besides this Social Con­cern of Mankind, there was somewhat offer'd, as to God's care of them in other respects. Therefore,

Section III.

IN these two remaining Sections I am concerned to represent the case more particularly, as Mankind may be divided into the two sorts of Evil and Good; and as God's just and gracious care of them both, as so distinctly and apart consi­der'd, may be sufficiently acquitted by reasonable and religious Thoughts.

Now, this Third Section first offers the case of the Evil part of Mankind: That is, of such as have wilfully and te­merariously permitted themselves to be betray'd into any state of Vice and Immorality. I say, if GOD Almighty should, in this Life, be presently con­founding every such Evil person, as soon as he begins to persist in his unjust and immoral ways; it would prove such a disparagement of the Divine Care, Equi­ty, and Goodness, as could hardly in any case be imagined or represented, upon several accounts.

[Page 69] First, Because he could not then have allow'd them such sufficient possibilities of Recovery, as were consistent with the Mercy of a Gracious GOD to Crea­tures, that were made so defectible by their own original Nature.

That is, Who can't consider, that such men have generally faln into that irre­ligious state, sometimes by the importu­nities of their own natural Passions and sensual Appetities within them, which they could not unmake, though it were in their power, with some difficulty, to have over-rul'd them; and that some­times they fell into that state of Sin, by the Temptations of the World's vari­ously-enchanting Objects without them, which they could not remove, though it was in their own power, with the same difficulty, to have controul'd and resisted them? I say, when these occasions of their falling into a state of Sin, are through­ly considered, and then how much those occasions do referr to God, as Creator and Supreme Governour of all things, What mind can reasonably entertain a suspicion, but that an infinitely good God should allow them the most equi­table possibilities of Recovery, which an adjournment of his Administration of Ju­stice to a future World can only admit?

[Page 70] And hence appears the reasonableness as well as the mercy of some Metapho­rical Expressions in the Scripture, design'd to represent this case. There we find, that the field was not presently thrown off to Bryars and Thorns, (it were against Reason and common Custom so to do) till the respite for Rain and Dressing had given a further Experiment of its unfruitfulness. Heb. 6. 7, 8. Nor was the Fig-Tree sentenc'd to be presently cut down for the first or second, and at last, not for the third years barrenness, but it was still respited, Luk. 13. 6. and husbanded, till the ordi­nary term was past, that, by a wise Hus­bandman's reasonable observation, it might be judged hopelesly unfruitful.

And as by this respiting and adjourn­ing the Divine Justice, every impenitent Sinner is made altogether inexcusable, Rom. 2. 1. [...]. so is God's love and equity universally acquitted, as having most reasonably al­low'd him all advantages for his recove­ry, which the case and nature of the thing would bear. So that I doubt not, but that Almighty GOD may as just­ly say to every unfortunate impenitent person, as he did to his unfruitful Vine­yard, Esay 5. What could I have done more, that I have not done? That is, not limiting God's Power in himself, but supposing [Page 71] him to act according to the measures and nature of men, as reasonable Creatures. This is the first reason.

Secondly, To evidence that it is rea­sonable that God should suspend his com­pleatly universal Justice to the evil part of Mankind, to a future World, is not on­ly that he might allow them a fair and equitable possibility of recovery, as to their own interest, but because such a present execution of his Justice upon them, would be highly detrimental to the common Good of the World in its several Societies. That is, if Fire should come down from Heaven, to consume every Oppressor, as oft as zealous Inno­cence might possibly cry for it; or, that God should throw away every unjust per­son from his protection, and as oft cut him down in his vengeance, as the justi­fying of every Good man's Cause might be effected by it; What great advanta­ges might the World's Societies be de­prived of, by the loss of so many Evil men, to whom God had allow'd, and ac­cepted an after-attempt for their Repen­tance and Recovery?

If there had not been such suspensions of God's Justice to such men, then had St. Matthew never been called a Saint; nor had he become so useful an instru­ment [Page 72] for the first establishment of the Christian Faith: Saint Paul had died a Persecutor of the Church and Doctrine of Christ, of which he afterward became such a successful promoter, and so stout a defender: And the Christian Religion had then been deprived of the Patronage of Constantine the Great, for the scanda­lous Sins of his Youth. And as I have instanc'd in these few, so if we had no­tice of those millions of Evil men, who on that account have been afterward useful to such like purposes, we might easily be convinced of the reasonableness of God's suspension of the administrati­ons of his Justice, upon every man, as soon as he became wicked; and who, at several seasons of their mortal Lives, have so successfully made after-attempts for their recovery to Vertue, with so much advantage to the World.

3. The third Reason to demonstrate, that it was God's design, that the suspen­sion and adjourning of his universal judg­ment to a future World (besides for the equitable possibilities of their recovery to their own benefit, and for their after­usefulness in general) is, because it can only solve a considerable doubt in his ordinary visible providence as to many of those Evil men, even while at present [Page 73] they live in a state of Sin. And that is when we see that such men do not on­ly live in a tolerable well-being in the World, but that they very frequently enjoy greater instances of a flourishing Prosperity, Psal. 73. and (as David complains) that they sometimes come in no misfor­tune like other men. And then the reason is, that with respect to a Future World, they might have an encouragement, as well as a respite to repent. That is, as if God design'd to tell them, that as he hath at present so much favour for them, as to allow them, by his general Pro­vidence, more than ordinary considera­ble Portions of Advantage in this World; so that they might from thence reasona­bly interpret, that God is not as yet made unplacable to their Persons, or would rejoice at their following unre­lievable state of misery; but that on the contrary, his mercy and goodness are alwaies most ready to admit them to his present Spiritual Blessings and future Happiness, whensoever they shall prepare themselves for their reception. And that, as▪ He hath already so much Love for them, as to permit His Sun at present to shine upon them, sometimes with a greater Benignity than upon others; and to let his Rain descend upon their Fields, [Page 74] sometimes with more refreshing showers than upon other mens; so that his mer­cy and pardon shall be as readily affor­ded them, whensoever they shall endea­vour to qualifie themselves for the Grea­ter Blessings that relate to a future Life.

But if in contradiction to all these mani­festations of God's Favour and Patience, they shall still obstinately set their hearts to do evil, Eccl. 8. 7. because sentence against an evil work is not speedily in this world executed; yet they have all the reason imagina­ble, (with the vain young man in the same wise Book) to consider, that after all their sensual enjoyments, they must all come to Judgment. And though (and because) they may escape the execution of God's Vengeance in this World, yet they cannot (if they will allow their minds a liberty of considering like men) but fear it in another.

And as by acknowledging such a re­spite our scepticks may thus reasonably extricate that doubt in providence, so such as are believers may solve another query in the Christian Religion. That is, why our Saviour should so extraordinarily engage his Disciples universal Charity to such e­vil men, even sometimes when they are their own most deadly enemies. That is, [Page 75] that he should call such a Charity, Mat. 5. 48. the nearest approach to Perfection, and an especial assimulation of the God-head; Luke 6. 14, 15. or that he should make no after-remark up­on any other Article of his own Prayer, but upon that of Forgiving Trespasses; and should make it the most indispensa­ble condition of all the pardon they them­selves can expect from Him. And then that this Charity, upon special com­mand, should oblige them to all manner of methods for their recovery, as by reprov­ing and advising them by forgiving and praying for them, and by supporting their lives with all manner of necessaries, when they want them. Now the solution of all this is, that as these acts are to be accounted very considerable instances of a good man's duty, and that he shall be rewarded for it; so we may believe, that God the rather instituted them to be so, not only from his meer preceptive authority, but that they might be expedients of his own Divine Love and Care of that part of Mankind, that needs his Pardon upon their Repentance and Amendment; I say, what can possibly solve this query, but the belief of Gods respiting and adjourning the administrations of Justice to a Future World, to express his reasonable kind­ness to the evil part of mankind in order to their recovery?

[Page 76] Now, if against this whole reason it be objected, that God sometimes permits not wicked men to live out half their natu­rall periods, but cuts them down in the midst of their time and sins; and that of this as the Scriptures have given some extraordinary instances, so common ob­servation can in every Age and Place af­ford us daily Examples.

My answer to this allegation is, first, That very many instances of that nature are of such Persons, as have been appa­rently the willful causers of the Shortning their own lives, and of depriving them­selves of that possibility of their own safe­ty, which God, as to all reasonable Crea­tures, had allow'd them. And then how is God concern'd in such fatal miscar­riages?

But in cases where God may be so far chargeable as by permitting the concur­rence of natural causes (of which per­haps they themselves were not any ways at all presumptuously and wilfully causal) to put a sudden period to such mens lives, it may be presum'd that upon a foresight of what they would afterwards do, God might permit it in mercy to their own persons, that is, from their do­ing greater evils, whereby their accounts might be at last the more pitiable. [Page 77] And then in kindness to others, that their sudden surprizes might be exempla­ry to other evil men, that survive, to take them off from too confident a pre­sumption of enjoying life, thereby to make a further delay of their repentance (in which delay they might otherwise proceed, till their neglects of it might make their conditions irremediable) if some such examples were not sometimes set before their eyes. And in this man­ner some have endeavoured to solve the Eternal punishments of the damned in Hell; That is, that they may there be executed upon the Evil, like the judici­ary punishments of Malefactors in a State, to be possibly exemplary to some new worlds of Probationers, which may as possibly succeed. In which respect, if such a solution may be allowable (which I referr to better judgments, and do but with submission mention it) why may not all such examples, as I have discours'd them, be accounted also as instances of Gods mercy to numerous others, that shall at that present time or afterward exist, rather than to think, that God should be any otherwise pleased with such sudden and severe executions of his Justice upon such single Persons.

And thus this Objection being answer­ed, [Page 78] it doth upon the consideration of the former Reasons appear most accountable, that God should respite and adjourn his universal Justice and Judgment for the sake of the Evil Part of Mankind.

But Gods regard to that Part of Man­kind, concludes not His care of the rest. Therefore,

Section IV.

IN this last Section I am concern'd to de­monstrate, That an adjournment of so great a part of GOD's universal Ju­stice to another World, doth not only acquit, but highly advance his most gra­cious care of the good and vertuous part of Mankind. And this I shall do upon several Accounts.

First, that the belief of such a Respite might keep their minds in a constant sa­tisfaction, That GOD intended to make better provisions for their Recompences, than can be had in this present world: In which, the best advantages that can possibly be attain'd, are hardly conside­rable enough to bear them up above the ordinary discouragements, which they may daily meet with for nothing else, but because they are good: And [Page 79] therefore it's there happiness to know, that when their duty calls for a submis­sion to more afflictive portions of Trou­ble, an expectation of present recom­pences would be almost a contradiction in the thing, and that because the bear­ing of the Cross doth in it self import a destitution of what might make them conveniently happy in this Life: And then, that such a consideration might put them upon a kind of benign neces­sity, to keep themselves intire and close to the desire and expectation of those adjourn'd Recompences, that can only be such, as may make them truly Bles­sed; insomuch, that should the vertuous but too commonly and ordinarily meet their justifications in this Life, and too generally be crown'd with present suc­cesses, as oft as they pray'd for it, or expected it according to the justice of their Causes, they might suspect, that GOD designed to give them their Por­tions in this world only, and that, in some displeasure, he had turn'd them off, to be content with such an unfortunate exchange.

Secondly, it's highly reasonable, that God should respite and deferr the rewards and recompences of Good and Vertuous Men to a future State; because it very [Page 80] often falls out, that it's their best in­terest, that they should not be so hap­py, as alwaies to succeed in their justest Enterprizes; nor be alwaies gratify'd with present, though desired Advantages in their secular Undertakings; and that because some tempers are not at all capa­ble of bearing a successful interest, and the best and strongest Piety hath been stagger'd and endanger'd by it. What a prodigy of miscarriage, and of a lost vertue was David once in his great prosperity, and how did the following unsuccessful passages of his life, restore him to a vertuous temper, hardly to be parallell'd? How much less than a man was he in the one, and how much more than an ordinary Saint in the other?

And this is the reason, Why some Men of eminent Piety, being sensible of the danger of too great and too successful an affluence, have voluntarily chosen to abridge themselves of their own just enjoyments; and have been cheerfully thankful, when Providence hath of­fer'd them some cross overtures in their affairs, thereby to abate and lessen in them too great a complacency in their present fruitions.

[Page 81] But upon this subject I shall enlarge my self afterwards.

The third Reason, why God might please to order an adjournment of his recompensing Mercies to the Vertuous and Good to another World is, that he might the more equitably admit them in his mercy, to the compleater degrees of them in that state. For, who can't consider, that all good men (of which none are more sensible than themselves) have their Failings, and some unavoid­able Miscarriages, even when they are endeavouring to pursue their integrity as well, and as far, as they can? And that there be many of them, who, tho' they may now be as good, as their in­firm mortal nature and circumstances will at present admit, had past some considerable Portion of their Lives, be­fore they return'd to Vertue, in an univer­sal neglect of God, and Goodness. And therefore, in both respects, GOD in his Wisdom and Justice might please to leave them unjustify'd in many cases that concern this Life, that being at pre­sent chastiz'd, and as it were, punished for their many follies, before they re­turn'd to Vertue and Goodness, and for their manifold Infirmities after they had been so recovered they might not be [Page 82] laid to their charge afterward, so as to occasion any abatements of their happi­ness in another World.

In these three Reasons is contain'd, what I had to say concerning God's care of the Vertuous Part of Mankind, for the adjourning the compleat administrations of his Divine Justice to another world. And so I have finished the design of my Third Chapter; and then all the pre­mises are Ripe for the assumption.

Section I.

THE First Reason that I offer, why those Faculties, or the Rational Mind of Man, were not given him of GOD, for the attainment of any End or Good, that relate only to his present Mortal Life, is, because the best enjoyments of this world can't allow him any real or permanent satisfaction, or rational acqui­escence: As it is supposed they should, if his Existence were to be wholly de­termin'd at the period of his mortal du­ration; or otherwise it must be belie­ved, that God Almighty had given him a more unhappy Being, than He had done to any other Creature besides, in that respect.

[Page 93] Now, as to any direct arguing for this Truth; that is, that the best Enjoy­ments of this world cannot afford the Rational Mind any such satisfaction or acquiescence, if the common Sence of Mankind can't supersede my Concern in that point, I must then referr my Reader to the Fifth Argument, that is principal­ly engaged to make good that Observa­tion. And I shall only in this Section proceed so far in that Case, as to give the Reasons, why the Mind of Man can admit no such Satisfaction from any, the best enjoyments on this side a future World, or from what relates to it in this Life.

Now, the natural Reason of all that deficiency in those Temporary Enjoy­ments, to afford the Mind of Man any such real and permanent satisfaction, is not only from the Troubles, uncertain Events, and cross Accidents that gene­rally attend them, (as universally men complain and suggest as the only reasons of their discontentment) but principally because by Divine Ordination all such Enjoyments do properly and naturally relate, not to the satisfactions of the su­periour and Rational, but of the inferiour and animal part of man's Being. For, though the superiour mind doth concern [Page 94] it self in the managery of those Enjoy­ments, for the better conveniencing mens mortal Lives, yet is that rather matter of Ministration and servile Em­ployment, than of real and satisfactory fruition.

It's true (to make good our Reason) that those enjoyments of this Life may sometimes be pleasing Entertainments for the Fancy and Imagination, and may gratifie mens Senses, corporeal Appetites, and the other Dispositions and Inclina­tions which humane Nature holds in common with sensitive Beings; but it's very rare, and impermanent, and almost unnatural, if the Rational Soul shall per­mit it self to entertain any kind of satis­faction by the fruition of any of them.

And this appears experimentally true, because the more intently any man al­lows his considering mind to balance the worth and importance of any such frui­tions, let them relate to Pleasure, Know­ledge, Honour, Profit, or Dominion, or to whatsoever else it is, that tempts to a value, and a present acceptation, espe­cially as to any real satisfaction, resul­ting from them: And the more he strives to make his intellectual Self to come in as Partner with his animal dispositions, in the perception of them for such an [Page 95] End, he will alwaies be so much the more sensible, how defective they are for the making up of any such sufficient Good, as may accommodate the nature, or natural temper, of his Rational Mind.

And therefore hence it is, that the ima­ginative Faculty, Senses and lower Ap­petites, do never entertain those present Objects so easily and acceptably to them­selves, as when men do either want, or resolvedly, wholly renounce, or but di­vert the use of their considering and reasoning Powers, from making too near an inspection into the Ends which they attain. And this may be verifi'd by some observable instances.

First on this account it is, that many great Persons do designedly deliver up their minds part, that is, the Rational conduct of their affairs, and managery of their Fortunes, to the care and reason of some prime Officers; that themselves, if they be Religiously dispos'd, might im­prove their understandings to more pro­per and satisfactory purposes; or if they be sensually inclin'd, that they might caress themselves in their Pleasures, with a greater freedom, for the satisfacti­on of the sensual and animal part of their Beings.

[Page 96] And then upon the same Reason it is, that men are so apt to applaud, and with such great delight to recount the hap­piness they did enjoy in the childish and youthful part of their time; that is, be­cause they then enjoy'd all the necessa­ries and conveniences of Living, by the benefit of other mens rational Care and Understandings; and that themselves did look no further, than the gratification of their Sences and Brutal Appetites.

And this was the cause that induced Heraclitus (as Laertius reports it of him) when the Ephesians desir'd him to un­dertake the Government of their City, De Vit. Phil Lib. 8. that he betook himself to play among the Children; intimating thereby, that it, was much easier for him to be so ingaged, than to have his mind taken up with the managery of their Publick Affairs, from whence it was not like to receive any real satisfaction, or contentment to its self, though perhaps his imagination (if he would have permitted that, as an end of his undertaking) might have been gratifi'd with the Plenty, Veneration, and splendid Title of a Governour.

Now as this unsatifaction of the Supe­riour and Rational part of Man, may thus arise from the natural propriety, that all outward Enjoyments bear to the [Page 97] Animal part of his Nature, so is that un­satisfaction much more increas'd, (which I make as an additional Reason) by the greatness of that Impropriety, which those Enjoyments of this present Life, do hold to the Rational Mind; for they are not only things indifferent to it, but such as are alien, divers, and unally'd to its natural temper; and are objects as foreign and improper to it, as those would be useless to one sense, that pro­perly belong to another. And a man may as well imagine, that his Tast should be affected with a Dish of Colours, or a Glass of shining Light; or that his Ear should be delighted with some fra­grant Perfume, as that the Rational Mind of Man, as such, should be really sa­tisfy'd with the fullest Fruition of any thing that relates only and properly to the Animal Part of himself.

And now if any man of an enqui­ring humour, should, upon this kind of arguing, ask for a Reason in Nature, why the same Person integrally consi­der'd, should be so vastly differently af­fected in himself; and how his Nature should require for his universal satisfa­ction, Objects, that bear such evident improprieties on several accounts, both among themselves, and to his own mind; [Page 98] My Answer would be, Because there is in every Man, two kinds of Selfs, viz. the Rational and Animal; each of them requiring different, and sometimes almost contrary designs, business, and objects for their several natural ends and satisfactions. And for this distinction, the Scriptural Revelation doth not on­ly give us a most plain Account, by the different notions of a spiritual and carnal Mind and State; the one refer­ring to the government of a Man's mind and life by Religion and Reason, and the other, according to the humour of his lower and animal Inclinations: But the Heathen Philosophers themselves, admitted that distinction a great way towards the same purpose, even by their Rational Discourses and Apprehensions. But I shall instance only (though I might have alledg'd▪ Heirocles and others) in one of them, and he (perhaps) remark­ably as great an Enemy to Christiani­ty, as I could have well lighted upon; and that is, Phorphyry; who affirms, That the Souls exists in the Body, [...], &c. but for a for­reign Employment, and as in a strange place: Sent. 239. (mihi) And that it is adjoin'd to a substance, that is altogether divers from it.

[Page 99] And all this said to confirm the Rea­son given, Why those Rational Facul­ties, that is, the Intellectual Mind could not be given for the sake, that is, for the ends and purposes of Man's mortal Life only, because all the present En­joyments that are celebrated, as the on­ly expedients of humane Happiness, do principally and properly relate to the satisfaction of that part of his nature, which bears an agreement with sensi­tive Beings.

Section II.

THe second Reason design'd to de­monstrate, That those Rational Fa­culties or Powers of the Soul were not given to Man for the sake, ends, and intendments of his Mortal Duration, on­ly is, because it is evident, That all the most considerable constitutions of his present Well-being, and that are in com­mon estimation most likely to become a satisfactory happiness to himself in this World; are not directly, nor at all cer­tainly placed in his power to obtain them, when he most needs them; nor can he with any assurance recal them, when he hath been depriv'd of them.

[Page 100] And then were it not a hard thing to make such a conception of a good God, that he should Place man in such a world for his whole Existence, in which there should be nothing assur'd to him as attainable by the principal Powers of his Being, which might render his life acquiescent and satisfactory to himself?

I say, who knows not, that it is not in any mans power certainly to enjoy Peace, Health, Credit, Friends, Success, Plenty, or any thing else that may make his life ca­pable of any real contentment to its self, when those faculties act their utmost for their attainment?

Let men know and study for them by their intellectual capacities, as much as they can, and chuse them as earnestly as their elective faculty can exert it self; yet the unfortunate men of the world, (which are always in one respect or other, by far the greatest part of Mankind) will tell you, that they might as well have been obliged to alter the general fixt course of nature in its Stated order, as to attain all those perquisites that must ordinarily concurr, to make up such a kind of living, as by which they may think themselves to have escaped their being more miserable, than any other [Page 101] visible Creatures whatsoever.

And therefore our wise Master, when he had advised his Disciples, not to be so­licitously concern'd about the necessaries and conveniencies of their Mortal lives, gave them this reason, Because they were no more at their dispose and command, Mat. 6. 27. than was the heightning their Stature by another Cubit. That is, that they were by Di­vine ordination not certainly in their power at all. And though it may be said, that some men do sometimes (and their number is not great) successfully ad­vance themselves in some prosperous at­tainments in their Mortal state; yet it may be presumed, that those present advan­tages have by far the most generally faln out, where there have happened Cases so effectually circumstantiated, as if they were purposely set by providence for such successes: and which were interpreta­tively little otherwise, than as it may be said, that a mans hand can take up Gold, when it's laid before him; or embrace his prosperity, when it's provided for him, as an effect of some propitiously concur­rent causes and accidents, which gave Solomon the Reason to say, That the Race was not to the Swift, nor the Battle to the Strong; neither Bread to men of Vnder­standing, nor yet Favour to men of Skill, but [Page 102] Time and Chance happens to all. That is, that those happy events did not cer­tainly come to pass according to those mens excellent qualifications, but that they proceeded from some over-ruling cause of that Time and Chance; of which expect some account at the period of this Section.

And this solves the observation why it doth so often come to pass, that the best outward materials of a pretended happiness in this world, do become the Portions of men but indifferently qualify'd in the regions of their minds, and very frequently of such, as are hardly so much as are sensible of the value of their own plenteous circumstances: or else of such as are sensually dispos'd, and then they either abuse. Them by their pride and intemperance, or else disimprove them through their own indiscretions and carelesness to their own discontent, ra­ther than the lots of such as have the largest share of intellectual endowments, or that are the greatest Friends to Worth and Vertue.

And for that reason it hath been ob­serv'd, even to a Proverb, that men of the finest and most ingenious parts have seldom acquitted themselves from the se­vere streights of Fortune, nor from very [Page 103] undecent dependencies: And that to have been said, to be as indigent as a Poet or a Philosopher, was thought as severe an exprobation of being poor, as could well be given.

It's true (to invalidate my thus rea­soning) that it is commonly affirm'd, That an exact frugality will make a man Rich; That a close retirement will pro­cure him Quietness of Life; and, That Temperance will secure his Health and long Life: And then (they'll say) that all these expedients for those considerable e­vents towards a mans easier and happier Being in this life, are all of them in the power of the rational faculties to judge, chuse, and undertake at pleasure.

My answer to this Allegation is, That those expedients do so uncertainly and contingently attain their ends, that all cases considered, it will hardly allow a mans thoughts a probability, that they e­ver should succeed according to the under­takers Expectations. And to evince this, I shall admit those three cases to a more minute examination.

As to the first of them, a strict and cunning Frugality: Let me demand of my Objecter, whether he thinks that the most anxious care can pre­vent unfaithfulness in all them, upon [Page 104] whom the industrious Frugals must be presumed more or loss to rely, on one occasion or other, for trust or imploy­ment; or can their nicest observation se­cure them from common Cheats, or se­cret frauds? or can a Box of writings or a Chest defend their Wealth from the ha­rassings of War, and all other the common accidents of humane Life? And if so, what kind of certainty can such men presume upon to encourage them in this undertaking, for their own sufficient happiness in this World?

Then as to the second, viz. Retire­ment in order to a quiet Life: Can it se­cure a man from all the effects of con­tempt, the certain attendant of a design'd privacy? Can it prevent the inconvenien­cies of being friendless, as oft as his re­lation to the Publick calls for the favour of men in power, to help him to what is right or kind? Or can it secure him from being seized upon as a prey by those who mark out the private, and the so­litary, for the execution of their mischie­vous, and sometimes bloody purposes? And then, I say, with what a strange kind of improbability, must such an ex­pedient attain its end to their satisfacti­ons.

As to the last expedient, Temperance, [Page 105] in order to the securing a mans health and long life: Is it yet determin'd, upon any general ground of reason or experi­ence, what should be the certain mea­sures of such a Temperance? Or did ever any skilful Person pretend to give any such infallible rules of it, as might be u­niversally accommodable? Or if the me­thods of a temperate life could be stated by a common measure, would they se­cure a mans health and long life, from hereditary evil constitutions, or from common contagions, or from the sud­den surprizes of Epidemick diseases? Or lastly, from such distempers, as may be occasion'd by diabolicals impressions, which may at any time, through the Di­vine permission, be as commonly acted, as instances have been given of such cases, by most credible and unsuspected relati­ons, and as they stand upon Authentick records? For which the Learned Bodi­nus may be consulted; I say, all those Cases being duly considered, who can presume to think, that God hath plac'd any mans health or long life, with any assurance in his own power, by the best use he can make of his intellectual Faculties?

And now, because I have thus un­dertaken, in favour of my Argument, to remark this last temporal Blessing, [Page 106] and Enjoyment, Health; which in most respects ought to be accounted the principal and necessary Attendant and Concomitant of all present humane Well-being; Let me a little further en­gage my Observation of the defect and insufficiency of Man's rational faculties for the attainment and preservation of it. And that not only because a mans own Understanding may be so easily defeated in finding out the expedients of its safety, but because the Reason and Skill of those Men, who have made it the study, business, and employment of their whole Lives to administer to it, do so much fall short of any certain attainment of that Happiness to Man­kind. And for this observation, I shall only remark, what that admirable Pa­tron of Learning S ^r. Francis Bacon dis­courseth concerning it, Cor­pus hu­manum maxime capax re­medii, sed vicis­sim illud remedium maxime est obnoxium errori. Pag. 266. Ars ista (praesertim quo nunc habetur modo) inter praecipue conjecturales reponenda. Pag. 267. Nam Medici traditionum & experientiae fructum Magistrati­bus destruxerunt & sustulerunt. 282. Tamen si quis ea, quae praescribere & ministrare soleant Medici, acutius introspiciat, inveniat pleraque vacillationis & inconstantiae plena, & quae extempore excogitantur, & in mentem illis veni­ant absque certo aliquo, aut praeviso curationis tramite. p. 286. De Augment. Scient. lib. 4. cap. 2. and that only in the Margin, and without interpretation, to avoid offence; for I have said all this [Page 107] upon no other design, but to improve the notion I have here undertaken upon my Reasoning for the certain Existence of a Future State.

And now having thus concluded my second Reason, let me superadd one ob­servation upon that account; that is, Suppose it should be inquir'd, that since Man hath naturally so little power over the circumstances of his own Well-be­ing in this World, by what other cause or causes are Mens present conditions conducted, or whether by none at all?

My answer is, that the acknowledg­ment of a Future World; and GOD's design, that Mens principal Happiness should be placed and expected in that State, doth most plainly and naturally answer that Enquiry; and that, without flying to stubborn Fate, or blind For­tune (as some, even great Philosophers have done) it doth perfectly solve the doubt. That is, that GOD was pleas'd to take upon himself the care of dispo­sing every Mans portion of outward things in this Life; and in that manner as he saw might best suit with every mans particular temper, and circumstan­ces, for the better attainment of his hap­piness in the other World. And then moreover, that men, upon a prospect [Page 108] of the uncertainty of their own endea­vours for any assur'd successes in this life according to their own desires, might have, as a greater reason, so more leisure and opportunity, to attend the concerns of another to come: That is, as our Sa­viour reasons, that they might not be folicitous about what they should Eat, or Drink, or put On, but should leave all those events to the wise conduct and care of a Gracious God, and then entertain them with the same indifferency and uncon­cernment, that sensitive Beings do, who subsist by the ordination of the same All­disposing Hand of God. Always conside­red, that as those Animals comply with the Divine Providence, by a natural care of themselves, and in actions to which their nature obligeth them for their own preservation; so should men make use of their Rational powers for the careful improvement of all such means, which God allows them (as he thinks fit) for the better management of their own Well­beings in this world; but still with de­ference to their principal business and design, of attaining the happiness of a following life. This the Second Reason.

Section III.

THE third Reason intended with fur­ther explanation to represent, that mans Rational Faculties, and Intellectu­al Mind, were not likely to be given him, for the sake of his mortal life only, is because it's commonly observ'd, that the more designedly, and intently, men em­ploy their minds and lives, for the at­tainment of such ends and satisfactions, as relate only to their present enjoyments; the less are they likely to escape their acting such follies and absurdities, as can­not consist with their characters of be­ing Reasonable Creatures. And that the highest wisdom such men do commonly arrive at, will in their best successes, a­mount to little more than what the na­tural discretion Brute animals themselves express, in the mannagement of their well-beings.

And therefore it were well for the happiness of most of that sort of men, who appear to live to no other purpose, but to serve the interests of their mortal durations only, that a few of thousands of them, could in the managment of their secular and sensual designs, arrive at the [Page 110] common and natural prudence of ordi­nary Brutes. So that when it is usually said, that if men live only for their own ends and sensual satisfactions in this world, that they degenerate into Beasts, they put a disparagement upon the Ho­nour of those Creatures (whom Porphy­ry contends to make, De Abst. lib. 3. as it were, co-bre­thren with us in the Rational world) and that because they regularly act their na­tural powers and faculties for their own good, agreeably to the ends for which they were made; whereas when men re­nounce the concerns of another world, they act commonly in contradiction to their own principal natures, and do de­generate, not so much into Brutes, as that they turn Fools and Sots.

And though it's a common custom to call men wise, who live at that rate, with any present success in their world­ly designs; yet it must be presum'd, that it is at best by way of comparison, that is, that they may be lesser Fools than others; or perhaps this may be done by a kind of mutual combination among such men themselves, to call one another Wise, where there is no manner of manly reason, why they should be so accounted; and perhaps all the reasons in the world, why they should be reputed otherwise, if their de­signs [Page 111] and ends, actings and discourses, were measured by the Standard of that, which is true and genuine Wisdom.

And further, to enforce the Reason why on this account it may more ma­nifestly appear, that Almighty God did not furnish Mankind with those Rational Powers on purpose for the sake only of their mortal Durations, (which must be so▪ if no World in future) is because it's obviously observ'd, that the greater Por­tions of intellectual abilities, whether complexionall or acquir'd, that those men have, who live only to their own present sensual ends; and the more solicitously they apply their minds for the attain­ment of them, without any regard at all of what's to come in a future World, so much the more remarkable are their degeneracies to folly and absurdities.

And therefore we may take notice, that such kinds of men, if they be but indifferently qualify'd in their Under­standings, and of duller Capacities, do alwaies act all their sensual Adventures, as with weaker desires, so with fewer imprudencies, and do even seem com­paratively wise and discreet in their very follies. And I shall instance in some cases, their Covetousness (when it falls out to be the present humour) is less [Page 112] solicitous; Their Amours more indiffe­rent; They drink more quietly, talk more temperately, and their Passions are more tolerable: And indeed, as in these, so in all other kinds of sensual and secu­lar regards, they act like prudent men in comparison of those Persons, that are of more lively and brisk Capacities. For their covetous humour is manag'd with more cunning and over-reaching In­trigues; Their Amours are violent and disturbing: Their Drink makes them as riotous as Bethlems; Their Passions rage and are intolerable; Their Talk is cla­mourous and provoking: And indeed in all their Sensualities, their Wit engageth them to act their several humours and inclinations, to their own greater folly and misfortune. So that in the event, many of them may be easily tempted to wish that they had been born natu­ral Fools, Brutes, Trees, or any thing, ra­ther than to have been made Intellectual Beings, so much to their own disadvan­tages.

Now, how could such Rational Crea­tures be possibly engag'd in such reproach­ful miscarriages of their Understand­ings, but that their Minds had lost their proper and natural Authority over their own Affections and Appetites, and con­sequently [Page 113] over their own Thoughts and Actions, for want of being principally concern'd for Religion and Vertue, in or­der to the happy events of a future World? For their Rational Powers being left to have nothing to be imploy'd about, but for the ends, and pretended satisfactions of this Life, it's no wonder that they should admit, if not admini­ster to, such wild excesses of Folly and Indiscretions.

So that if any unconcern'd Person of an observing humour, would but take the pains (if it were but for his diver­sion) to make an impartial Survey of the Rational World, as at any time men generally do appear to act their several parts in it, and then would but recount, as far as he can make a Prospect, the various Follies and Imprudencies which the men wholly unconcern'd for Reli­gion and another World, do daily com­mit, and habitually persist in, he could not but judge, that too great a part of it would look like one entire Scene of Fools and Mad-men. That is, should he but particularly take notice how sillily one man manageth his love of Money, another his fondness to a Woman: With what idle extravagancies a Third is treating the pride of his Heart; while [Page 114] another is tugging hard for a Feather­cap promotion: And shall then observe, how such a man's next Neighbour is, by his restless humour, storming every body out of their peace and order; while he spies another sort of cunning Men sit close together in a corner, drinking away their Health, Fortune, and Reason; with a thousand such-like idle Adven­tures, to which their unconcernedness for Religion and another World, do daily expose them.

And now, if any man should advise me, the more convincingly to make Good what I have thus so severely af­firm'd concerning so great a part of Man­kind, who will be apt to rage to see themselves thus ridiculously exposed, I could think of no other expedient, that would more effectually acquit me, than to make use of a little Burlesque, which an honest Country Droll hath promised me, to dress up some of those intellectual Fops in their proper Garbs. For some great Authors have told me, That the best way of handling an artificial Fool, is to do it in his own kind: And to laugh him into Discretion would be the best expedient to recover him from his Folly.

[Page 115] But then the Author's desire is, That it may stand in the midst of this Dis­course, but in the nature of a Parenthesis; some telling him that it's too light for the gravity of the Argument; and others again, of another opinion, perswaded him by all means to let the Fools see how the representations of their Folly doth become them, when they have read their own ridiculous Characters. And let it go at all adventures.

(The first ridiculous piece among the silly Crew, of whom my Neighbour brought me a description, was of one, whose debauch'd Imagination, for want of being concern'd for his best Interest, had betray'd his Rea­son to think, that it would be principally for his happiness, if he could but grow fa­mously Rich; and that with an especial de­sign, to raise up a succeeding Family, big enough, to make a great Show in the World. And as the most likely Expedient for the carrying on his wise Project, he imploys all his intellectuals, how he may best attain to the mighty Art of Thrift. And then to that as to his Deity, he devotes all the powers of his Soul; and sacrificeth to it, not only all that may be useful to others, but con­venient or decent for himself. And for that end, (to instance in some cases) if necessity doth but at any time hector him [Page 116] into a mind to cloath his Carcass, his de­sign (for that can only solve his discontent about the Charges of it) is to wardrup up the old Case, as part of his Stock, to be Inventoried by his Executor when he dies.

If he eats, the only Hautgoust that re­lisheth his Meat, is either that it costs him nothing, or as it best agrees with his stomach in his Pocket; for there principally laies his hunger and thirst, and the palatings he delights in.

If he rides abroad, it's generally upon an Animal, whose bones he designs to tell in for money, in the next Summ he takes Bond for. And if at any time he seems kind or civil, it's only to them, of whom he designs to make a Prize upon a fore-seen Bar­gain.

The Furniture of his House is nothing but a rubbag'd heap of Pawns and Stresses: and his Store-house is generally stock'd with nothing else but the atoning Presents of his afrighted Creditors. But if a Vote for a Tax be rumour'd, though the King's, or the Church's Safety lays at stake for want of Money, it sounds in his Ears like a Knell, or a Raven. His Religion is a Conventicle to chuse, for there he can sit or lie along, pull his Hat over his Eyes and Count, and not be interrupted with sometimes standing up, and then kneeling down, and ever and [Page 117] anon, with saying, an Amen, or a Lord have mercy upon me▪ or with the like Invasions upon his Christian Liberty. But if the Preacher in that place must have Money, then farewel to that Religion; saith he, I can discharge my Christianity at a cheaper rate at home: that is, by reading some Chapters every Sabbath night: let them be out of Genesis or Matthew, Canticles or Corinthians, that's all one to me; so they be read.

But to be sure, he hates all those Reli­gions that put men to Charge for Orna­ments, Vtensils, Repairs of Edifices, and Moses and Aarons: Nothing so abomi­nable to him: And then a Sacrament with an Offering, and a Priest in a Dress, and who must have Tithes too; and if so, that are uncrampt by a Two penny-custom: All this, saith he, is downright Idolatry and Anti­christian. And as for those days they call Ho­lidays, they are meer loss of time, and turn to no common Profit: And they are Popery too.

Now all this while, when there is any thing to be got by it, he is as poor as he can creep, and looks alwaies of such a kind of Quality, that did not some men now and then mistake him for a Conjurer, one would swear, that he were downright some Vn­der-Officer in the Common-Wealth of Beg­gars. And indeed to save Charges, he [Page 118] could find in his heart to take a turu or two with them about the Country: but to be sure, it shall be no longer, than till they come to their General Rendezvous: He knows how to make better use of his Money, than to bear a Club among those merry and generous companions.

But stay! While this Man of Gold is going on thus hastily in his wise Jour­ney for getting Money, suddenly a Fe­ver arrests him for an old Debt, ready to burn down his Souls dry Tenement; or a Dropsie opens a Flood to drown it. And then he sighs, and is troubled in Conscience, that he hath yet but enough to make some Body, but an ordinary Knight or Squire. And if he dies upon't, the last event of all his wise Endea­vours is; Octo pe­des Caesar habet. that when the joy-sorrow of his Heir hath once Serjeanted up a Pri­soner to an eight-foot Dungeon, with a Pompous Funeral; it's odds but the World will smile, that he hath gotten all that Treasure for one, that's like to know little more, than how to talk idly and swear; go gay and drink; and to turn the New House in the Country, design'd for the Seat of the Chymerical Family first into an Inn, or a Seraglio, and then per­haps into a sheet of Parchment, for the use of another Fop, that may act the Part of Father or Son.

[Page 119] Assoon as my merry Neighbour had drest up for me the former hopeful Adventurer, for a present Happiness, in his Fools Coat, he presently changeth the Scene, and dresseth up another in­tellectual Brute, of a quite contrary hu­mour, and he is as wise as Drink can make him. And the first Enterprize that his contriving Understanding puts him upon, whereby to get rid of the incumbrances of his Wit and Money, is to lead about a Hog (I mean himself) in a string from Town to Town, to make Sport for a Regiment of Boys and Tap­sters, with his frantick adventures.

But in a while, being tir'd with ma­king so much work for Constables, Justices, and Glasiers, he resolves, upon important Reasons, to take a wiser me­thod for his own greater happiness; and that is to set up for himself, and to be his own Inn-keeper at home. And for that end he furnisheth his House with all manner of Utensils for the sooping Imployment; he turns all his Apart­ments into drinking Rooms: Only he solemnly devotes his Cellar for a Chap­pel, where he and his devout drunken Assembly do constantly finish their last completorium, with their Hats off in great order, and sometimes upon their [Page 118] [...] [Page 119] [...] [Page 120] knees, if the Health be to Some-body; and in the morning they return thither again, and are as zealous as Thirst can make them, to pay their early Devoti­ons at the Tap. And in this more solemn place, as in a Repertory, he sets up all his drinking Laws and Sanctions; and at the heads of the Vessels stands up chalk'd, the only Almanack, by which he under­stands how the Year passeth, alwaies ac­counting from the famous Months of March and September.

And by this time you may imagine, that the Head-house is become one intire Inn, or indeed one nasty Trough, common to all the Swine in the Country: Where all the Year long they are swallowing down the Sun, and drinking up the Night, till the Morning discovers how all the Rooms are spread over with so many sprawling Monsters, where one hath lost his Legs, another his Eyes, and All, their Wits; so that, if a Stranger should come in, and would have but patience to stop his Nose, he cannot but think, that he had in prospect some new-fashion'd Hospi­tal, or that he had in view those im­perfect shapes which the Egyptian drun­ken Mud produceth, when it hath a while debauch'd it self with the Nile's lusty Liquor.

[Page 121] And now having a few Years constantly attended to this wise way of living, (as if he had been shut up to be fatted in a Sty) at length his body swells to the likeness, and perhaps, to the bigness of one of his large Casks, which in a short time begins to leak at so many Orifices, design'd by Art and Nature, to prevent the inundation of a Dropsy, that at last his Associates are necessitated, for fear of a common Contagion, to remove that unweildly Puddle of humours, and lodge it in a little dark Cellar under ground, where a brisk Club of little Good-Fellows of his own breeding, stave him, or (as they call it) dust him, and merrily drink him up to a drop, before they have done.)

Thus ends the long (and to some perhaps unwelcome) Parenthesis; but they may pass it over if they please; and there is no hurt done.

Now, to these two, I could have ad­ded many more such like Characters of other sorts of Fops, who are as constant­ly acting their silly Parts upon the World's Stage, but my design'd method would not admit such an Inlargement in a single Paragraph; And, perhaps, these two are too many already in some mens opinions. But if I had not thought, that I might do some considerable Good [Page 122] by such an attempt, I had certainly cho­sen to have laid them aside. That is, That when such men should see, as it were in a Glass, their own ridiculous deformities, they might bethink them­selves of putting on a wiser and more acceptable Garb of Living; and then that others, who were not yet ingaged in those Follies, might endeavour to pre­vent their appearing in the World, such Monsters of Absurdity.

And this was done, not that I thought that all men who are not concern'd for Religion and another World, do always make use of their Rational powers to so very ridiculous purposes, as such a piece of sportful Characters do represent them; yet I am assur'd, that there be always too many in the world, that do really come up even to the highest degrees of such kinds of follies, and even among them that have no cause to complain of any defect, either in their Natural, or acquir'd Rati­onal abilities.

And then as for those that do not come up to such famous and clamorous pitch­es of absurdity, in the management of their Sensual ingagements of life, I am so far satisfied, that there is no man, that resolv'dly quits his mind of all concerns for a Future World, but when he acts on­ly [Page 123] for present ends and satisfactions, as the sole happiness, which he resolves to expect, but that his practices and their events, must more or less bear a resem­blance to such describ'd follies. And though perhaps some mens actions may admit mixtures of some discretion, com­paratively of some other sensualists pro­ceedings, yet generally such men can­not but move and act beneath the dig­nity of a Rational Being; and their acti­ons will be found to be as great a con­descention from their natural humanity, as if a Prince, who exempting himself from his Governing Affairs, shall spend his time in catching Flies, and tending an Aviary, or practising the Trade of an Artificer, with such like impertinent Ad­ventures. And though some other ways of passing away the time, that are in fashion, may have gain'd a better repu­tation in common opinion, (setting aside what use may be made of them, for in­nocent divertisements) may yet in them­selves be as silly and childish as the for­mer; when right Reason, the great judge of human actions, shall arraign their im­portancies, and how far they come short of that Wisdom, to which the Grandeur of a rational Being should aspire. This the last of the three Reasons.

[Page 124] And thus I have argu'd, how those Ra­tational Faculties and mans Intellectual Mind, could not be given him for the sake, ends, and intendments only of his pre­sent life. I should now attend to what may be said to prove, that they were principally, and on the most special pur­pose given him, for the sake and con­cern of another World. But my excep­tioners have design'd other work for me, and I must first attend to them, and fair­ly acquit my self of their suggestions to the contrary of what I have endeavour'd to prove, before I can be ingaged in that main business which concerns the chief strength of my Argument.

Section I.

IN this Section we must wait upon the learned Nation, who will be apt to suggest and say, That though those Noble Faculties, when they are wholly imploy'd about the unsufficient Ends and Happiness, which worldly pro­sperity, pleasure, and a sensual way of living, can be pretended to afford, may be found so defective (as hath been re­presented) yet as they may be improv'd for the attainment of universal Learning, which hath been always accounted such a special accomplishment and satisfacti­on of the Mind, it may be one sufficient End, why Man might be furnished with [Page 126] those rational qualifications, though they were never to be concern'd at all, for what relates to a Future World.

My Answer to this seemingly great Exception is, that I shall evince that that which is reputed Learning in all its parts, can no more accommodate the natural temper of Man's rational mind, as to any real satisfaction, than the en­joyment of any other temporal Good; and that it is subject to the same defai­lancies for such an end, even in the high­est acquisitions, that humane life can pos­sibly admit.

And all this I shall endeavour to repre­sent upon the account, of two Reasons. First, from the way and manner of its attainment; Secondly, from the value and Importance of it, when it's so at­tain'd. But in the management of which Reasons, I must crave an ingenuous con­sideration from the Lovers and Students of that universal Learning for what end I do it; that is, thereby intending only to controul the Theists Pretensions, who are apt to take all occasions to invalidate the necessary belief of another World's Existence: and not at all designing to disparage the Honour, or discourage the Diligence of them, that attend to the attainment of it.

[Page 127] The first Reason, why such attain­ments of Learning could not be a suffi­cient end in its self for GOD's giving those rational Faculties to Mankind, whereby any man might allow himself the thoughts of enjoying such a sufficient Good, as might answer the temper, and satisfy the desires of his intellectual mind, without a principal regard had to his Concern in a Future World, is from the manner of his attainment of all Rational Learning.

For then we say, how can the mind of man entertain any such real satisfacti­on to its self, when it's consider'd, That so great a part of his Mortal Du­ration must be spent and worn up in the very preparative and proemial Labours towards the acquisition of any one part of that which is reputed Learning, be­fore he can be presum'd to be so much a Master of it, as to have the pleasure or satisfaction of comprehending, what is Intellectual or Rational in it. For he must first be supposed to endure the un­pleasant hardship of a kind of Cap­tive, and must be several years ty'd to the drudgery of (as it were) drag­ging about a Mill, only for the acqui­ring the little skill, how to read and speak congruously and sensibly. He must then [Page 128] incumber his head with a company of hard terms, definitions, and distinctions in an instrumental Art, which are like to give his mind as much satisfaction, as toil can administer, before he can be able to work out the distinct notions of things, or be capable to think, or discourse intelligibly of them.

And when after this he comes to a nearer approach towards any Art or Sci­ence, he must then spend some time in charging his memory with the proper Elements, and some introductive gene­ral Principles, (as Prolegomena) before he can ingage in the true understanding of it. Now what contentment or satis­faction can all those previous Labours be to a Rational Mind, any more, than the tuning a set of Viols to a musical Ear, or the confus'd noise of Axes and Hammers, and the unmethodiz'd pro­spect of a heap of Tools, and unfinish'd Materials, be to him that hath under­taken a Design for a stately Edifice? But then after our Students laborious Preface to his obtaining an entrance in­to the wide field of Learning; What true satisfaction can he possibly give his mind, when he cannot but have heard, that his whole Life (too little for the perfect attainment of any one conside­rable [Page 129] Science) must be always in a progressive motion towards the end, which he proposeth to himself; and for that Reason, he cannot but expect to live in a state of a continu'd Imperfecti­on, and to be all his daies in the ca­pacity of a Disciple.

The Sense of which, though it may sometimes be made use of, to drive fur­ther on in his Studies; yet a little time and experience will inform him, that it is no more, than a going forward to­wards something, from which he shall always find himself as far off, (if not much farther) as when he first set forth. And the reason is, because the more he knows, the more he shall still, to his great dissatisfaction, find cause to think, that there is yet much more to be learn'd and known. Every degree of his acquir'd knowledge, will be but a further disco­very of his ignorance of other things, and advance his thirst of what else is yet to be understood.

And sure it was from hence, that Antonius took occasion to represent his thoughts when he advised, [...]. Lib. 2. That a Man should drive out of his mind the Thirst of [Page 130] Books, lest he should go murmuring to his Grave; but rather be content, and give the gods thanks for the knowledge he hath a capacity ordinarily to attain.

And now, when the expectant Stu­dent hath once considered, how he hath sped in the former part of his short Existence, he may then suggest to him­self, what satisfaction he may hope for, after he hath past the Meridian of his days: That is, whether, as he grows older, he doth not rather go backward than forward in the field of Learning; and upon a nearer approach towards the period of his life, whether he finds not apparently that he is upon the retrogres­sive and losing point. I don't speak of that declension of age, when it's possible for a man to forget his own Name; but I mean, whether all along (when he should be presum'd to reap some Harvest of his propos'd satisfaction to the com­fort of his own mind) he perceives not a continued diminution in his stock of Learning; which perhaps he imputes to the streightness of his minds Repertory, that either the later notions do (as it were) run over into forgetfulness, or else being crowded together in so small a room, that they stifle and confound one another. So that, what by the im­perfections [Page 131] of his approaching age, and the frequent interruptions by infirmi­ties; What by attendancies to those af­fairs, which the necessaries and conve­niencies of Living do exact from him; and what by adhering to those Studies, to which in his Youth he had accustom'd his mind, perhaps he may live to see himself baffleable by every fresh Adven­turer, so as to bear the shame of being out-done in common Talk by any such an one, as is better acquainted with the newer methods, and later notions of his own Sciences. And this accounts for the first Reason.

The Second Reason, which I intima­ted before to represent, That the attain­ment of Learning (to such a degree as the Mind can admit in Man's short du­ration) could not be a sufficient end, why GOD Almighty should give those Rational Faculties to Mankind, for any real satisfaction of humane Life, is from an examination of what importance and value such an acquir'd Learning may be in its self, so as to answer the Mind's natural temper, and its innate desires of knowledge; And I think I may, in that respect, without offence, affirm, of all the Learning in the World, That were it not that it may be made serviceable to Re­ligion, [Page 132] and practical Goodness, in order to the Interest of another World, it would hardly deserve its own Name, especially with such a Character, as the World allows it. And by reason of the defective attainment of every part of it; no man did ever think himself, in all points, so sufficiently learned, as to allow his mind any manner of complacency, or real satisfaction, but the ignorantly­bold, and such an one, whom flattery and vulgar applause had seduc'd into such a blind opinion of himself.

And therefore it hath been alwaies reckoned among the wise and modest, to be a considerable advance of a judi­cious Understanding, for a man to think himself to know too little, or even no­thing, Dieg. (as it is reported of Socrates, that he should so affirm of himself) that is, Laer. That he knows nothing comparative of that, Lib. 2. which he cannot but be sensible is more and more yet to be understood.

What Science is it, that was ever yet believed by the judicious to be brought to any tolerable perfection? That which hath been most likely of late to gain the best improvement towards it, is Experi­mental Philosophy, especially as to those attempts that have been made, for the finding out the natures of Beings. And [Page 133] though they have offer'd at those dis­coveries with considerable success, and perhaps to a greater degree than have yet been attempted and attain'd, yet nevertheless, I am apt to believe, that they have so far faln short of any per­fect attainment, that if Six Thousand men were appointed to find out the na­ture of every single Vegetable (as they account their number) and so many Thousands more, about the numerous species or kinds of Animals, Insects, and Minerals, they might be presum'd to find so far work enough for their whole Lives, as that Basilius Valentinus, who writ of Antimony, did affirm, (as Mr. Boyle relates▪ —Nat. Hist. p. 13 it) that The shortness of Man's Life makes it impossible for one man to understand throughly, or to learn that Mineral only; in which, every day there was something behind, that was to be discovered afterward.

And what I may affirm of the great distance of that kind of Learning from Perfection, the same also may be said of all the parts of Learning whatsoever. That is, (to instance in some particu­lars) if he that designs a Happiness to his mind, by furnishing it with the best Treasures, which the Historian Learning can afford, could be sensible and secure, [Page 134] that there were such a Body of History, in which there should be nothing rela­ted, that were neither Partial nor Ro­mantick: Or, if he that aims at a great felicity, by the attainment of the best knowledge in the learned Languages, were sure, that if he were Master of any one of them, as far as Art and Study could advance him, that he should ne­ver have Thoughts of any defect in the acquisition or use of it: I say, if it might be so affirm'd of these, and all other parts of humane Learning, there might be some pretence for the mind's attainment of some sufficient satisfaction in this life, without respect to another; but when it's known to be far otherwise, it lessens the wonder of Sextus Empericus his Con­fidence, Cap. 1. when he went about to prove so industriously, that there is no Learning at all, but in uncertain opinion; and that in another place speaking of the Mathematical Sci­ence, Nam etsi forte fortunâ quisquam hoc verum asse­quatur, nescit tamen se esse acceptum, sed putet, & opi­natur. (of which one should think that the least doubt were to be made) he should assert, That he that hath attain'd to the knowledge of any Truth in it, yet that it was but by Good fortune; and that he can't certainly know whe­ther he hath attain'd it or no, but only [Page 135] may opine and think so. Or, that Cor­nelius Agrippa should assert not only the difficulty, —Tam est scien­tiarum omnium cognitio difficilis, ne dicam, impossibilis, ut prius vita tota hominis deficiat quam vel unius disciplinae minima ratio perfecte investigari possit. Proleg. de Van. Scient. but even the impossibility of attaining to the least Reason of any one Science perfectly in the whole Life of a Man.

Or, Lastly, That Sextius Romanus, (of whom we have an account in Plutarch) who had parted with his honourable For­tunes, De prob. Virt. pag. mi­hi 77. upon design to attend to the Philo­sophical Studies, Edit. Gr. & Lat. should after a while fall into so great an unsatisfaction of mind for what he had done, as to be weary of his life, and to make an attempt to cast it away.

And this dischargeth me of my Second Reason, given to evince, That the value of Learning is not such, as that either the mind of Man should have a sufficient satisfaction in its self, by the attainment of it, or that it were reason enough why GOD should give Mankind those ratio­nal faculties for that end, though they should never be concern'd for a future World.

And now I would not that any man should prejudge by these Reasons offer'd, that I intend to put any disparagement [Page 136] upon Learning, in that imperfect degree it is attainable, (as I caution'd the Reader in the beginning of this Section) or to give any discouragements to the Lovers of, or Endeavourers for it; For upon the supposal of the Existence of a Future World, and of that Religion, and the knowledge of it, that is necessarily requisite for the attainment of the hap­piness of that state, I do most heartily acknowledge, that all kinds of Learning, in the proportions to which they may be improv'd, are sufficiently and satis­factorily useful, and in themselves high­ly honourable. —Dio. Laert. Lib. 6. In vita Crat. The. And I wish the Studious of them may meet better encourage­ments in the World, than by the mea­sures of that man's unworthy Bounty, who gave Three Pounds to his Cook, a Dram to his Physician, a Talent to his Mistriss, and Three-half-pence to the Phi­losopher. And this concludes my An­swer to the first Exception.

Section II.

IN this Section, we must attend those Mens Exception, who will alledge, That those rational powers of the Soul, are necessarily useful for the conduct of [Page 137] governments, & that without which, there would not be capacities sufficient for the contrivance of expedient Laws and Or­ders; and for other the manageries of publick Affairs, to preserve National Societies in Peace and Well-fare: and that then there is another end, why GOD Almighty should furnish Mankind with those intellectual qualifications of mind, though they should never be con­cern'd for another World. To this, my first Answer is, that if our Exceptioners have any eye towards that humane Lear­ning, which we have lately discoursed upon, as if that, as such, were sufficient to influence Mens minds for the better management of Governments, they offer their exception with too great a hazard of being disbeliev'd. For the contrary hath frequently, and famously been ex­perimented to be true. And therefore Clemens Alexandrinus in­forms us, — [...]. Strom. lib. 1. That such Men, by their sophizing & Ora­tory, have serv'd frequent­ly to amuse, and steal a­way the minds of the Peo­ple, and sometimes have occasion'd a Cad­mean War, and its unfortunate Events. And for that Reason, the Philosophers and Poets have been oft-times banish'd [Page 138] from States, —Ne (que) illis so­lum tem­poribus nimis ru­dibus, necdum Graeca doctrina expolitis Philosophi ex Urbe Roma pulsi, verum etiam, Domitiano impe­rante, Senatus-consulto evecti, atque Urbe & Italia interdicti sunt. Qua tempestate Epictetus quoque Philosophus, propter id Senatus-consultum, Româ decessit. Lib. 15. Cap. 11. as Dangerous to their Peace. And thus the Romans did, (as Aulus Gellius tells us) not only when they were Rude and Impolite, but even in the learned Age of Domitian, when Epictetus himself was not excepted.

But secondly, I answer, that if our Exceptioners mean only, that those ra­tional Faculties do sometimes furnish Men with a greater natural sagacity; and which being improv'd by experi­ence and observation, may better qualify them, to contrive and act, what is most convenient for the Pece and well-Go­verning of Nations, it must be allowed as true. But then I say, that if those qualifications be not accompanied with a concern for a Future World, and with some sense of the necessity of being Good and Vertuous, as an universally acknow­ledg'd condition of obtaining the Blessing of it; and that thereby such men may have some kind of Conscience of what's Right and Good, to oblige them so to act and govern; there would be no so­ciety in the World, with which it were [Page 139] worth the holding any Communion. All such natural and acquir'd Capacitations for publick Good in such men, would presently (as it's too generally observ'd) be made use of for the more successful prosecution of private Interests and de­signs. Princes could no longer enjoy their Thrones in peace, nor the People their Social Rights in safety, than that there wanted men, that had ambition, covetousness, and power enough, to in­terrupt and invade them both: Nor would the Communion it self in the is­sue subsist, but by a state of War, with all its attendant calamities and savage­ries, and the miserable consequences of the longest and most successful Sword. Which would highly defame the Crea­tor's Wisdom and Goodness, that His most excellent creatures, beneath the Heavens, should have no better means allowed them to preserve themselves in their So­cial Communions, but by being alwaies in apparent danger to be harassed with the bloody attempts of cunning and am­bitious men, who would be perpetually contending for Soveraignty and Power. To prevent which confusions, when Prin­ces have to deal with a mutinous and seditious People, they are sometimes ne­cessitated to secure themselves, and the [Page 140] common peace, by armed force.

And therefore the great Masters of Policy have adjudg'd Religion, with re­gard to future rewards and punishments, so necessary for the safety of Govern­ments, that they have in the first place (as Mat­cheavil observes) endea­vour'd to establish the profession of it among the People. In id enim prae caeteris incumbere debent, ut verum Religionis cultum recte in­stituant & venerantur. Disp. lib. 1. cap. 12.

Which Profession of Religion (saith Plutarch) is so necessary, that the Be­lief of the gods was the first and greatest thing to be consider'd of in the con­stitution of Laws. [...], &c. Adver. Colorem. p. 1125. Thus Lycurgus provided for his Lacedaemonians, Numa for the Romans, the ancient Ion for the Athenians, and Deu­calion for the Grecians. It's possible (saith he) that a City may somewhere be found without Walls, or Learning, or Wealth, but no man ever saw a City without Tem­ples and Prayers.

Particularly for this reason, Livy ob­serves, That Numa Pompilius was necessi­tated to go an extraordinary way to work; that is, to feign that he had communion with Aegeria, and that by her command and direction, he was ob­lig'd [Page 141] to constitute a Priesthood, Dec. 1. and ap­point such Orders and Holy Rites, Lib. 1. as might advance a greater Solemnity and higher veneration of the gods.

And Matheavil offers to consideration, that when the World began to despise the Oracles of Jupiter Ammon and Apollo at Delphos, then men began to be impi­ous, and to be fit for all manner of publick distur­bances. Impii ex ea re facti sunt, & ad omnia turbamina prompti. Disp. lib. 1. cap. 15. And then he concludes, That Princes ought (if they intend to be obeyed, and to have their Kingdoms quiet) to hold their Subjects, as much as possible, inclin'd and devoted to Reli­gion.

And it should be hence suggested, that it is a disparagement to Religion, when it's alledg'd to be so far concern'd in politick designs; and that it gives too just an occasion to lewd and atheistical per­sons, to reproach and decry it, as only a contrivance of ingenious men to keep the world in order. My answer would be, that if it were true, it would give such a re­proach to the Divine Wisdom and Good­ness as nothing but a spite to the belief of a Deity, could possibly suggest it. For it must suppose, that either God could or would not (when all Beings were in his hand to [Page 142] dispose of as he thought fit) otherwise pro­vide for the worlds social subsistence and welfare, but by giving men a capa­city and a necessity to invent a lye to do it, and to put a cheat upon mankind, to attain that End.

But suppose that some men, who were no ways at all affected with the sense (and perhaps the belief) of Religion, should be the Authors of that advice to Princes, to keep the People in more peaceable Or­der; would it thence follow, that Reli­gion it self had no real foundation in it self, for that and greater Ends▪ Is it not known, that some particular Persons, and even whole parties of men, have artifi­cially contrived a Religious guise in Hy­pocrisy, thereby the better to pursue their private, or their popular designs and ends? and can any Argument be reaso­nably thence deduced, to bring the Truth of the Religion they abuse into question? But that rather the contrary must be true, for a deguise must be of something that is somewhere in real Be­ing, or there would be no kind of pre­tence for acceptance upon dissimulation. If there were no such thing as a Real Friendship in the world, what entertain­ment would a false, and a barely-preten­ded kindness obtain?

[Page 143] Now the Summ of this Section is to de­monstrate, That no acts of the Intellectual Powers can make competent expedients to preserve the World in any tolerable order, unless as founded upon the belief of another world, as it's only practical en­couragment (of which expect an account in my Third Argument, Chap. 3. Sect. 1.) whereby the Reasons or Consciences of men may be oblig'd to live innocently, and quietly, both to their Governours, and one towards another. And thus I have dispatch'd my Second Exception.

Section III.

IN this Section I must consider the last exception against my asserting, that the Rational powers could not be given to man for any end, or good attainable in this his present Life, and consequently not for the sake only of his mortal duration. And the Exception is thus suggested, that is, that those Rational Faculties may be made use of, for the Excellent Office of Contemplation, which in it self is so great a satisfaction to the mind, as that it may make him truly happy, though they were never improv'd for the concern of a Fu­ture World.

[Page 144] Now the reason why I do the rather oblige my self to take notice of this Ex­ception, is, because so great a man as A­ristotle hath in his Ethicks so solicitously contended to make Contemplation ( [...]) a self-sufficient happiness of human life in this world.

But to shew the vanity of that preten­sion, abstract from the use, that may be made of it, with respect to that state of mind and life, which do necessarily con­duce to the self-sufficient good of a Fu­ture World, I offer these several things to consideration.

First let it be inquir'd into, what such an operation of mind can, in it self, na­turally do; and then I say, that accor­dingly as men are dispos'd to either Good or Evil, so by their Contemplative Fa­culty, they may act wisely or foolishly, happily or unhappily for themselves, as they shall thinke fit to make use of it for either. For by that power of the mind, they can contemplate of God, his Word, and Works, of Religion and Vertue, and of the happy Events of both, or of any innocent thing, that may rea­sonably consist with their welfare in this or a following World. And all this may be done to the comfort and con­tentment of mens lives.

[Page 145] And then on the other side, by the same Faculty, they may contemplate or think on Things or Objects that do real­ly tend to their own misfortune and dis­quit. That is, they may thereby be projecting designs, and amassing heaps of mischief together against themselves. They may accumulatively augment their own sorrows in a fit of sadness; and at ano­ther time advance an Eutopian Joy, as idle and insignificant as a fond Dream. They can thereby serve their fruitless Love, An­ger, Fear, and the rest of their affections and passions, with imaginations, that are accountable to no manner of Use or Rea­son: And all this may be done, and a thousand times worse, to the discomfort and uneasiness of their own minds and lives, so that the faculty it self is natural­ly upon a pure indifferency, to act both for the Good or Evil of him, that ad­mits his mind to make use of it for either. Now if it shall appear, (as I shall endea­vour it) that no other Objects, upon which it may be imploy'd, but such as bear a consistency with what relates to a Future World, as it's only proper en­couragement, why it should so think or contemplate, can possibly make any ac­count for the real happiness of humane life, then what's become of the pretence [Page 146] of its self-sufficiency, without the con­cerns of such a State to come?

And if it be said, that that thinking or contemplative power, may be exerci­sed upon Objects of this present life, there­by the better to convenience a mans worldly affairs, as that, by the use of it, he may act them the more deliberately and prudently; it's granted to be true But then (if he designs any substantial happiness to himself, or satisfaction to his thoughts) those Contemplative or Thinking operations, must be acted from a mind that is generally influenc'd by the hopes or fears of the events and issues of a Future World, or it will meet the same unsatisfactions in the obtaining such ad­vantages, to which it's subject by the real enjoyment of them. Of which an ac­count hath been already given, in the first Chapter of this Argument.

And moreover, it may be also further considered, that without such a regard to what's to come in that Future State, as the same contemplative or thinking Fa­culty, when placed upon such present Ob­jects, may the better inable him for such advantageous successes in his worldly bu­siness; so also it may capacitate him the more subtlely to pursue his ends by un­due methods; it may help and inable [Page 147] him to cheat and deceive, with more artificial dexterities, as well as manage with greater prudence. And how few are there in the World, whom any other principle can restrain, from such unwar­rantable proceedures in their affairs, when so vertuous a person as Socrates should affirm of himself, That if he could believe there were no other world, he should not be affraid to do any thing that were un­just? But the case is more fully manag'd in the third Argument.

Secondly I answer, that as for Aristo­tle's way of Arguing for his notion of a present ( [...] as he calls it) self-suffi­cient Felicity, by the use and benefit of a Rational Contemplation. If I could possibly think that his Arguments were not purely romantick, and as sounded upon a supposal of somthing, which is altogether unaccountable upon any other Reasons, but such, as must be deduc'd from the believ'd acknowledgment of a Future World, I should chuse to give an attendance to every one of them. Upon what other principle could any man al­low those fits of contemplation, the appel­lations with which Aristotle adorns his no­tion, of that pretended felicity? As when [Page 148] he calls it, The most perfect Blessedness—the best of all humane Actions and Operations—and that the man that exerciseth it, — [...]—Lib. 10. Cap. 7. is the most absolutely blessed; with such like Divine expressions, which can be accom­modable to no other kind of happiness, but what is presum'd to be enjoyable in another world; or otherwise they can no where be found, but in the regions where speculative impossibilities exist.

It's true, I solemnly grant, that if our Contemplator be religiously dispos'd, and is hopefully sensible, that his Life and Actions are pleasing and acceptable to the Mighty GOD, and so bear a ten­dency to his happiness in another World; I say, I then grant and believe, that such a mans contemplation, when he is me­ditating upon the regularity of his own actions, the excellencies of GOD's Love and Favour, and is recounting the mea­sures of that Joy and Peace, Love and Society, which he shall meet withal in the other World, may attain to such a degree of his minds satisfaction, as may very nearly accord with the Philosophers high appellations of such a thinking Ope­ration.

[Page 149] But then, on the other hand, if the contemplative power be acted by a Per­son that is vitiously and immorally dis­posed, there is no peradventure, but he imploys it to his own greater infelicity. That is, he will be apt either to devour his own contentment with invidious or revengeful Thoughts, or be creating his disquiet with anxious Cares, or needless Fears, or with the like destructive Ope­rations of his Mind: Or, if we suppose it to be acted by one that is of an in­offensive and vertuous Humour (up­on which supposition I conceive the Phi­losopher did principally found his Dis­course of the contemplative Happiness) yet if that man shall resolv'dly enter­tain no thoughts at all of, or be in no manner concern'd for, the events of a Future World, it must be presum'd, that he will be most apt always to think at best, worldly, if not altogether vainly and impertinently, and in the manner of men, that are always talking idly, and to no purpose. Whereas, that Religion which relates to a Future World, will oblige him to make Conscience of his inward Thoughts, as well as of his overt Actions; and for some Reasons, and in many re­spects, it will be found his Duty to give his greater attendance to avoid those E­vils [Page 150] of his thinking Mind.

And now, how otherwise can our Ex­ceptioner imagine, that the contempla­tive Faculty, that GOD gave Mankind, should be restrained from such absurdities, or that his Thinking Mind, that is always busily at work upon one Object or ano­ther, should be able to confine it self to such only, as tend to Vertue, and his own satisfactory Good and Happiness, when his own unruly Passions and impe­tuous Appetites within him, and the loose and vain World without him, will be perpetually soliciting him to be think­ing of those other objects, that may re­ally make him unhappy, except it be from the grand encouragement of secu­ring his future and principal Interest in another World? And for a fuller de­monstration of this Truth, my Reader may respit his Thoughts till he is ingaged in the Third Argument intended for that purpose. This the last Exception.

And thus I have accounted with my Sceptick for all his three Exceptions, and I think we have lost no ground in the defence of my assertion, That the ratio­nal faculties, and intellectual mind of Man, were not given him of GOD, for the sake, ends, and intendments of his Mortal Duration only; but upon a [Page 151] more especial purpose, and principally for the sake of another World. And that is the business of the next Chapter to prove.

Section I.

IN this Section, I shall remind the Rea­der of the first Defailance of those Rational Faculties, upon which I founded my First Reason, to prove that they were not given to Man for the sake only of his mortal Life; and that was, because the enjoyments of it could not afford the mind any settled or sufficient satisfaction, though a man were most prosperously possessed of them, much less provide for him any solid contentment, through the various Turns and Exigencies of humane life. And then I also shew'd, That though such Enjoyments might for a time naturally gratifie the inferiour part of a Man's self, yet that by the impropriety and unalliance they bear to the Rational and Supream part of his Being, (which is most properly himself) they could ne­ver affect the Mind with any real or ac­commodable acquiescence, or natural satisfaction.

[Page 153] Now, to confront that defailance, it will evidently appear, That when those Rational Faculties are made use of, to judge and chuse the Interest of another World, as Man's chiefest Good; and then be actually engaged for that vertuous and religious way of living, that natu­rally tends to the obtaining the happiness of that state, they will be found experi­mentally to enjoy as much ease and sa­tisfaction to themselves, as the mind of Man is capable of in this life; and as Objects, whose completion stands at such a distance, can possibly affect it. And those faculties will then as naturally ac­quiesce in their operations, when they are so imploy'd and engag'd, as do necessary Agents, when they attain those ends, to which, by natural instinct, they were oblig'd: Or, as when the outward Sen­ses are exercis'd in their operations, about their proper Objects.

But my attending Sceptick will here except, and say, That all these are but precarious Presumptives only; and there­fore they can carry no certain Evidence for demonstration or conviction. To this Exception I shall answer, First, That the last Argument will give a fuller and more natural account of this Case, (being its most peculiar business) to which I [Page 154] must referr my Reader, to prevent my saying the same things over again.

But then, Secondly, I answer, That I shall in this place only offer one single Expedient, and it's as considerable to our purpose, as such a case can possibly bear to evince a Truth of this nature; be­cause the mind can only be convicted in its self, as to what it understands or thinks, and can't convince another, but upon the credit of its own discovery. And the Expedient is this, viz. A Solemn Appeal to the Faith, Conscience, and Ex­perience of any of those men, who have been generally observ'd to live habitual­ly in a course and state of Vertue and Piety; and that have solemnly professed themselves, by word and deed, to espouse the happiness of another World, as their principal and governing Interest; I say, to such a kind of person (be it whom my Exceptioner will, that can think and speak understandingly) I solemnly ap­peal, to declare upon his conscience, what Sense he hath had of his choice of such an Interest, and of all those Actions, and of that way of Living, which (upon the common agreement of all unprejudic'd Minds) do naturally conduce to the hap­piness of a Future World: That is, whe­ther he did ever repent himself, when his [Page 155] mind was free to judge, of the choice of that Future Interest; or that ever he continued in any dislike, or serious dissa­tisfactions of mind, about any vertuous designs or practices, which he had la­bour'd to promote and act? Or, whether he was not generally pleas'd with him­self, while he led his life strictly in that manner, and only then apt to be troubl'd, if at any time he had been surpriz'd into a neglect of his Duty, or inadvertently overcome by the strength of any Temp­tations, to omit or do any thing that might abate his hope of his future Safe­ty? Or, whether at any time, if he were afflicted with Sickness, or any other op­pressive circumstances, his mind did not then retire into its self, and find there Reasons resulting from its religious tem­per, to support his pressures with more content and patient satisfaction? I say, if such a good man's sense and judgment may be believ'd to be true, it's easie to understand what those objects are, and what manner of Enjoyments those must needs be, with which the Rational mind should be thus satisfactorily affected and pleas'd.

But my Sceptick hath yet more to except, and tells me, That all this may be nothing else but either the effect of an Enthusia­stick [Page 156] Imagination, or otherwise vitiated Fancy, whereby the man's Reason may be so disorder'd, as that himself (how ho­nest soever) should not be a competent Judge even of his own Sentiments. To this my answer is, That I grant, that there is such a possibility of a man's being him­self deceiv'd in his own thoughts; but if that were accounted at all times suffici­ent to controul every affirmative Truth that depends upon a man's Solemn disco­very of his own mind, there would want one of the most considerable Expedients, by which the World is to be kept in Peace, and regular Communion. And besides, it would be considered, that such a dis­order'd Reason as our Exceptioner men­tions, must be presum'd to carry its own symptoms with it, and so be easily disco­vered for the invalidation of the credibi­lity of what he affirms. But we offer our Exceptioner to stand to the sense and judg­ment of such an one, whose well-weigh'd understanding in the management of all other his Actions, can over-rule all man­ner of suspicion of such an uncertain imagination. But then again, replies our Caviller, Such a man's Integrity may be call'd in question, and Who knows how far Hypocrisie may be baited with Temptati­ons of Honour, Friendship, or other Worldly [Page 157] Ends, to put on all manner of taking-dis­guises of Religion, and amongst the rest this in debate? My answer to this is much the same with the former, that is, That such a false mind hath its certain Symptoms, as well as a disorder'd Rea­son, by which the dissimulation may be detected, and the affirmation may be judg'd invalid. And therefore, if we grant, That when we thus appeal to the Faith and Conscience of a Good man, concerning the inward Satisfaction of his Soul in his Religious Course, that we may possibly meet an Enthusiastick, or an Hypocrite, affirming the same thing; yet our arguing in this case runs no ha­zard at all, the largeness of our Appeal supersedes all danger of being disbelie­ved; for unless all that live piously in the World, be Enthusiasticks or Hypo­crites, that is, Fools or Knaves; we can't miscarry in this point of Proof. And though some such Good men, sometimes in a Fit of deep Melancholy, occasion'd generally by the ill-disposition of their Bodies; or by some unhappy Principles imbib'd in their Education; or else by too nice and sensible an apprehension of their own infirmities, (which for want of a clear Judgment, they can't at present solve) may for a time deprive themselves [Page 158] of the comfort of their own happy state: Yet, to be sure, the ground of their dis­comfort never arose from any unkind ap­prehensions of their being vertuous and religious, or for their choice of another World's Interest, as their principal hap­piness; but rather they were troubled from a Fear they were not good enough, or that their hopes of their future hap­piness were not so sufficiently assur'd to their thoughts, as they desir'd. And in the saddest posture of mind, we shall ever find such Good men, (we may be as­sur'd) that they will never lose their serious approbation of Vertue and Piety, and that they will be alwaies ready to declare, That a religious Conversation is incomparably preferrable to the living, in a state of Sin, though attended with all the prosperous advantages of humane Life; and if put to competition and choice, would, without any further doubt, embrace such a Conversation at all adventures.

And, Lastly, We are so secure of the Truth of all Good mens satisfactions of Mind, while they continue in their ver­tuous engagements and practices, in order to their happiness in another World, that we dare thus far appeal to most Evil men, even in their worst sensual habits, [Page 159] when they have at any time admitted their own minds to serious Thoughts, (which the worst sort of such men can­not alwaies escape) to declare, Whether they did not then think, that it were much happier for them to have lived otherwise, and in an habitual course of Vertue; and then also most heartily wish, that their Children, for whom they have the most endear'd regard, might so live?

Now, Whence can all this be, but that such religious engagements and hopes are in themselves naturally accommodable to the intellectual powers of the Soul? And that, if at any time they be reduced and over-rul'd to embrace the Objects that are proper only to the inferiour and sensual Part of Man, it will become so unnatural to the superiour mind, that there will be a kind of violence done to it; and like Animals out of their own Elements, and like Inanimates out of their proper places, it can never have any rest or true satisfaction, till its Operations be entertain'd and made use of, for the Con­cerns of Vertue and a Future World. This the First.

Section II.

IN this Section, I shall endeavour to confront the second defailance of the Rational Faculties, upon which I foun­ded a reason to evince, that they were not given, for the Sake, Ends, and In­tendments of Mans mortal life only, and that was, because all the proper Materi­als, and necessary Constitutives of mans Well-being in this world, and which are universally celebrated as such, were not by Divine ordination certainly, if at all really, placed in mens power, by the use of those faculties, to obtain them when they did most diligently seek after them, or specially need them. But to solve this defect to our present purpose, and there­by to demonstrate, that the interest and intendments of another world, were the principal End why God Almighty gave those Rational qualifications to mans Na­ture, it will appeare, that the choice of the other worlds happiness, and the actu­al performance of all such Vertuous and Religious methods, as naturally conduce to the assur'd acquisition of it, are all placed in mens capacities by the use of those intellectual powers, as sufficiently [Page 161] to understand and judge, so also as design­edly to chuse and put in practice at their own free election.

It was before suggested, that every man could not at his choice, and upon his best endeavour be certainly Rich and Healthful, live Prosperously and Peacea­bly, when he pleas'd: But no man in his Wits can question, if he allows him­self the free use of his Reasons Autho­rity (which the interest and incourage­ment of another worlds happiness can at all times admit him to, as will be made evident in the next Argument) he may live Vertuously and Religiously if he will resolve upon it, and diligently attend it? What can hinder his Pious intentions, or prevent his Vertuous resolutions, or fru­strate their consequent Happy events, but his own wilful refusal, so to live and act? he can always, in the midst of all discou­ragements, act Justly and Honestly, live Soberly and Peaceably, and do any thing else, that may dispose him for the hap­piness of another life, if he will improve the use of his choise by such Counsels, as his understanding mind can suggest to him. Of that possibility he is secure. But he cannot always act successfully in his nearest concerns for his mortal Well-be­ing, of those advantages he hath natu­rally [Page 162] no assurance. What man can be cer­tain of enjoying one hours Health more, or of Bread for another daies subsistence, or of his very Life for three moments to come? A thousand unthought of Ac­cidents may discontinue his possession of those, and all other his present enjoy­ments; and it were an unexcusable Fol­ly in him, if he did not allow his mind a liberty so to think. But all his Ene­mies, whether Devils or Men, cannot, by all the power they have, disseize him of his Vertuous purposes, and an inno­cent and religious Mind, unless he will wilfully chuse to consent to his own mischief, and designedly become his own deadly Foe and Traytor; if he turns not first his own Devil, the powers of Hell can never hurt him.

It's true, the great man may discharge him of his imployment to his undoing, and he may throw him upon his po­tent Malice and Revenge to his Ruin, but it is not in his power to deprive him of his Patience, or his Charity; of his Justice or Sobriety, or of any other vertuous or religious Qualifications, or Intendments whatsoever: Of those, GOD hath made him naturally His own Soveraign and Master, and in dan­ger of no other Being, to ravish or ex­tort them from him.

[Page 163] Upon the supposition of this Truth, it is, That all wise and good Men do account it not only unkind, but very barbarous, to reflect upon, or upbraid the Unfortunate, as to this world; that is, they don't reproach Men that are unhealthful, or contemptible, poor or deform'd, because they can't tell, whe­ther such unhappy men could ever have avoided those hard and oppressive circum­stances of their lives; but every one is ready to blame and accuse those that are impious and immoral, because they are sure, that such men must act their own miscarriages and misfortunes, in contra­diction to the use they might have made of their own understandings; and in op­position to that possibility of living other­wise which God Almighty had as cer­tainly allowed them, as that ever he had given them any Rational Minds at all, or Natural Capacities to improve it.

And if that possibility were not per­mitted them, it would be not only a disparagement to the Divine Goodness, but it would so evacuate all manner of real obligation to be good or vertuous, as that there could not be in moral con­sideration, any such thing as Vertue or Vice at all; much less any true reason of Reward or Punishment, from any Au­thoritative [Page 164] Judge or Arbiter whatsoever. And therefore as an Evil man, if he could not have voluntarily avoided his being Vitious, ought not in justice to be reputed a criminal, so neither can any one that is Vertuous, if he might not have been otherwise if he would, have any more just title to that denomination, than if one should go about to applaud the in­nocency of a Stone or Flower.

Now, if our Exceptioner should alledge, That that distinction between things in and out of our Power and Choice, de­pends only upon a Scheme of a Theolo­gy formally digested, the more specious­ly to impose upon mens credulity, as in others, so in this particular Case.

My answer is, that I shall prove the con­trary, by offering to him the sence of the Heathen Philosophers themselves, who could not escape the reasonableness and apparent necessity of allowing such a distinction.

First, Epictetus lays it down as a Prin­ciple in the first Chapter of his Enchiridion; [...], &c. cap. 1. That some things were not in our power, as Money, Glory, Dominion, &c. and some things were in our power, as Desire and Aversation, and indeed all [Page 165] our own Works or Actions. By which, he especially means such as are morally either Good or Evil, as Simplicius ex­plains his Meaning; and thence he often­times asserts, — [...], &c. Pag. (mihi) 88. That that liberty of Choice of the one and the other to be such, as no Power whatsoever, can either force it on the one hand, or restrain it on the other.

Antonius affirms the same, and posi­tively declares, That in every place and time, [...]. Lib. 7. and present case, it is put in all Mens power to deal one with another, ac­cording to what is Right and Just.

But Cicero most elegantly explains this case, and discourseth the difference between things that are not at our Com­mand, Salvos, incolumes, o­pulen­tos, &c. Justos, temperatos, sapientes, &c. Lib. 3. de Nat. Deo. Such as are to be Rich, Healthful, Safe, &c. And things that are in our power, as to be Just, Temperate, Wise, &c.

He that can't command (saith Aristo­tle) the fixt Order of the Earth, [...]. Eth. lib. 10. cap. 8. and Mo­tion of the Sea, to serve his present Interest, [Page 166] yet hath it in his power to do good and worthy things.

And now having secur'd this Point by the common consent of these famous Phi­losophers, my Reader will easily be con­vinc'd of the truth of that distinction, upon which I have endeavour'd to found the main stress of my Second Reason, why those Rational Faculties were principally, and on the most special purpose given to Mankind, for the sake, and intendments of a Future World. And that was, be­cause whatsoever is supposed to conduce to the happiness of that State, is only absolutely in the power of those facul­ties to act and attain at pleasure. Always consider'd, that herein we only differ from the sence of those Philosophers, that the proposal of that Future Happiness, is necessarily required in the mind to encou­rage and actuate it for the performance of such Religious and Vertuous underta­kings. The truth of which the next Ar­gument is designed to evince.

But my Reader is in hast to attend to my third Reason; Therefore,

Section III.

IN which I am oblig'd to take no­tice of the third Defailance of the Intellectual and Rational Faculties (men­tion'd in the Third Section of the First Chapter) when they are imploy'd and engaged in their use and opera­tions for the concerns only of Man's mortal duration. And that was because it's observ'd, when a man's Mind and Life are wholly taken up for the ends, purposes, and enjoyments of that state, without any regard at all to what re­lates to the events of a Future World, such a person will hardly escape his doing many, if not most things, that upon the account of Rational Judgment, must at best be but vain and trifling, if not (as it most generally falls out) direct­ly foolish and absurd; and alwaies be­neath the wisdom and dignity of that Reason, with which GOD hath natu­rally endow'd humane Souls.

And upon this pregnant Observation, we endeavour'd to found a Reason to prove, That those Faculties of the Ratio­nal Mind were not likely to be given to Mankind for the sake, ends, and intend­ments of their mortal Durations only; [Page 168] which must be so, if no World in Fu­ture.

Now, on the contrary, to prove, That those Faculties were given principally, and upon the most special end, for the intendments and business that relate to that Future State, it will manifestly ap­pear, That when Men do engage those Faculties in their use and operations upon such designs and purposes, and do in all things govern themselves by those measures, all their actions will be all that while the effects of genuine Wis­dom, and such as will become the Pru­dence and Dignity of a Reasonable Crea­ture. So that, by the regularity of such a Conduct, they shall never habitually continue to think, speak, or do any thing that is absurd or foolish, or of which they shall ever have cause to repent, to their own shame and sorrow. And therefore it is conclusively true, That to be Wise and Good; to live Religiously and In­telligibly; to act by the Influence of a Future States Belief, and by the Conduct of right Reason; do all, as to practice, import the same purpose, and do all re­quire the same measures and ways of living.

And here, by the way, we may ob­serve a wonderful Contrivance of Mercy [Page 169] in our Good and Wise GOD, that He should please so far to consult, not only the possibility, but even the easiness of Man's attaining his Chiefest Good and Felicity, as that the Conditionals and Methods of its attainment should be so accommodable to the Powers and Princi­ples of his Nature, that the discretion and prudence of his very mortal life should ge­nerally depend upon his designs and endea­vours to be made Happy in another World.

But if an Exception should be here offer'd against this Observation, by al­ledging, That there may perhaps be as many men, who acknowledge the Exi­stence of a future State, and that some­times do pretend to the hopes of being Blessed in that Life, that do as many absurd and foolish things as other men. My Answer is,

First, That probably some such acti­ons may but seem so, in the invidious or mistaken opinion of Worldly and Sensual Men. But then,

Secondly, If many actions of such Be­lievers should happen to be really foolish, yet they must be then presum'd to mis­carry only in their Wisdom, when they kept not to the plain Paths of Vertue, and opposed the natural Influence, which the Faith and Hopes of another World [Page 170] might have made upon their Minds and Lives. Had they been steady in their Actings for that end, they had never ceased to be Wise, as well as Good. So that mens deviation from the Rules of Religion, doth not only make them Sin­ners in Guilt, but makes them Fools in Practice and real Notion.

But, because this general and presump­tive way of Arguing may be thought unsufficient for Conviction; therefore, as before, my merry Neighbour dress'd up for me a parcel of silly Worldlings, and Sensuallists, that were adventuring for a present pretended Happiness, in their proper Sportful Garbs, such as for their Follies they deserv'd to wear: So, now let my serious Thoughts attempt a de­scription of that man's Wisdom, who hath improv'd his intellectual powers, to think and live the intent and interest of another World. Let me delineate, in short, his beauty and comeliness in eve­ry Limb, and draw up an abbreviate Plat and Scheme of his whole Life's wisdom and felicity, in every Relation he bears to Society, and in every quality and con­dition of Life, by which he is acting his particular part, with respect to his own Personal Happiness in the Scene of his Mortality.

[Page 171] First, I shall begin with him in the instances of all his Social Capacities, and that because his Prudence and Felicity is therein the more remarkably express'd and enjoyed.

And the first shall be of that, which concerns the greatest of his Social Inte­rests. And then I demand of Mankind to judge, whether the man must not be accounted Wise and Happy, who never was justly exposed to the hazard of be­ing brought upon the Stage for any Se­ditious Words, or Mutinous Practices? That never could be charg'd for running a Nation into Blood and Confusion, by endeavouring to disarm his Prince of that Sword, by which he should be able to protect his People, from acting that vio­lence upon one another, to the loss of their universal peace and safety. And that did never go about to starve the Government, and as it were, to tie up its Hands, and make it uncapable to preserve it Self, till a foreign Enemy should usurp upon the Nations Peace and Honour. Nor that ever could be accu­sed of a fordid Neutrality at any time, when his Prince's just Cause was in dis­pute. This is that wisdom, in which his Religion and a conscience of his Duty to GOD must instruct him, against all [Page 172] Temptations of discontent and froward­ness, to act the contrary.

Or, (which is next in concern for So­cial Wisdom) Is not he a wise and hap­py man, that hath chosen to bear a part in a neighbourhood of universal Peace; where, if every one were conducted by a Religious Fear of GOD, there can be no such offence given or taken as may at any time interrupt it? Where Justice acts every ones right, and Mercy pro­vides for every ones need: Where all are obliging one another with mutual Civilities and Kindness; and with a com­mon and reciprocal defence and guard of every Neighbour's Peace and Pro­prieties.

Or, (which is the last case of Social Prudence and Felicity) Is not he truly Wise, who acts his part in a Family of an Angelick Communion; That is, where nothing inhabits, but quiet, cheer­fulness, and contentment: where every one in the House is constantly acting the Offices and Duties of his proper Place and Relation: where there be no brawls, jealousies, or spightful intermed­lings; but the whole House is full of sweet joy, and mutual endearments of Respect and Love?

[Page 173] Now, if we enquire what it is, upon the account of which, we may adjudge every Member of those Societies to be so Wise and Happy as I have represen­ted them, the whole reason of it is ob­vious; for it is no more, but that every one that bears a part in such Commu­nions, would be Good, and make Reli­gion his main concern, and the Happi­ness of a Future World his principal aim and interest, and the business, with­out more ado, is done. It is nothing but mens deviations from those intend­ments and practices, that can expose any Societies to those Follies, which must ne­cessarily disorder the happy composure of all Communions.

But to come to an Examination of that Wisdom, which in a more Personal re­spect concerns Mankind. And then I demand again, whether is not that man truly Wise and Happy, who admits Tem­perance to the government of all his meals in the day, and that at night lays himself down to sleep upon a chast Pil­low: and that regulates all other his na­tural actions by a rational judgment?

And, Is not he the same, that can keep up the credit of an unsuspected fidelity, and never offended God or ver­tuous Ears, with loud Oaths and Impre­cations, [Page 174] upon a vain, yet generally an unsuccessful pretence, the better to secure it? And then, Whose peaceful and placable Soul can, upon the greatest provocations, so allay his Passions, as not to incumber his mind with any trouble­some Intrigues of Revenge; and, if pos­sible, to prevent the chargeable atten­dances, with which the Laws vexatious periods do too much afflict the conten­tious World?

And, Must not Mankind judge him Wise and Happy, that doth not perplex his mind with such anxious cares and fears, as may create in him an habitual discontent, about the measures of his pre­sent quality and manner of subsistence? That is, That can really and satisfactori­ly judge his Allotted Habitation, (of what figure soever it is) as acceptable to himself, as the Great man's splendid Palace; And be so fully content with the little Income he enjoys, as never to wish with a sigh to be Master of another man's more plentiful Fortune: And withal, who makes the most substantial assurance for the continuance and im­provement of his own; and for a Pro­vision for his Children when he's gone; of whose welfare he contentedly judgeth himself as certain, as that GOD Al­mighty [Page 175] hath pass'd His Promise for it? And there be them that have challeng'd the World to give any famous instances of the non-performance of His Word.

But, suppose our Good man to be plac'd by Providence in the Lowest or­der, and that he must labour for his daily Subsistence; Is not he as wise and Happy as his quality can admit, whose peaceful Soul and pious Content­ment can make his sweet Sleep in the night compensate for his weariness in the day; and that can take a greater pleasure in the hautgoust of his dearly­earn'd Bread, than those Sensuallists can do, when they are daily puffing over their nauseating Varieties? Whose cheer­ful dependance upon God, to provide for his Children, supersedes all manner of anxious solicitude; knowing that for their concern, he shall not be affected with those incumbrances of mind to which the Rich are subject, when they are torturing their heads with feares of having their Honours at present, and their Fortunes afterwards, shipwrack'd, to promote their Children in the World. To be short, This is the man that's so wise, that his Innocency gives him Cheer­fulness; his meekness begets him Love, and his Fidelity, Trust; whose Industry [Page 176] gains him Imployment, and his Honesty such a Friendship, as may support him till he hath ended his Labours, and ex­chang'd them for a perpetual Rest. Now that Poor man, that cherisheth a con­stant hope of another Worlds Happiness, and lives according to the expectation of it, cannot but be such an one as I have describ'd him; and then, Who lives, that is Wiser and Happier than he?

And, Doth not that man deserve the reputation of being Wise, who lives so inossensively, as stoutly to defie all man­ner of instances of shame or covert; to whom a Whisperer, or the invidious seru­tinies of the malicious, can give no con­cern; That is not solicitous, if the doors of his whole Soul stood alwaies unlock'd, or that all the moral actions of his Life lay common to every Eye; and whose innocency renders a false rumour, or a causeless accusation, so far from being a vexation to him, that he only heartily pities the follies of mens malice, and by a ready forgiveness, permits not his pas­sions to forment and arrest his sleep, or at any time to disorder the steady tem­per of his mind?

Further, Is not he a Wise and Happy man, who, when the World is alarm'd with the evil Tidings of National Distur­bances [Page 177] abroad, or that lives amidst the Broils of a divided state at home, can un­concernedly discharge his mind of all afflictive Fears, by an entire resignation of his Thoughts to God, to bring about what events he thinks fit; and then that alwaies cheerfully interprets, that all things shall be well with him in the end, whatsoever God shall please should come to pass?

Lastly, Is not he highly wise for him­self, who hath provided before-hand a Store of Contentment to support his pa­tience, when Sickness, or any kind of Misfortune shall invade his Health, or impair his Plenty? And that hath laid up such a stock of Reasons and Argu­ments, in his mind, as may be alwaies ready to relieve his unpleasant Thoughts, when he shall begin to feel his Clay-Ta­bernacle reel with age; and when his Life is grown incumber'd with the sence of all its decaying circumstances? And then, that can fearlesly make the gradual approaches of his last and necessary pe­riod, to be thought only so many steps of advance towards his everlasting Rest, and the blissful state of a following world. And finally, when he is come to the last point of his mortality, that hath no con­flicts of doubt about A Future World's [Page 178] Existence; that hath upon his Soul no such guilt, as may ruffle his Thoughts with the amazing fears of the Divine Vengeance; nor doth any Horrour sieze his steady Hope? And in the last gasp­ing moments, when the World's Factors for present Pleasures and Prosperity, are with a disordered reason uttering the broken Expressions of their last and hea­vy Farewel; then shall our Wise man be admiring his mighty Creator's Love and Goodness, with such a joy and sa­tisfaction, as shall, if not wholly remove, yet so allay all the natural Terrours of Dying, that he shall go out of the world as cheerfully as a Traveller, when he hath reach'd his home; and shall leave all his mortal affairs and enjoyments behind him, with the same unconcernedness that a Pilgrim removes from his last nights Lodging.

Thus I have drawn a resemblance to the Life, of that man's Wisdom, whose Mind and Life are govern'd by the great Interest of another World, and by the Rules of such a Conversation as natu­rally conduce to the attainment of it. And though it can't be presum'd, that he should escape all humane inadver­tencies, and casual mistakes in the ma­nagement of his habitual Vertue and [Page 179] Piety, (to which the best of men are subjected, and) which may somewhat abate the perfection of an absolute Beauty, yet those errours being no parts, but on­ly spots in the Feature, the comeliness of the representation may nevertheless not be the less acceptable, and perhaps the more graceful, because it's the most na­tural and genuine figure of a Good man on this side of a Future World.

But all this while, I have almost for­got to confront what I offer'd in the Third Section of the First Chapter, where arguing, That the Rational Faculties were not likely to be given to Mankind in their use and operations for the de­signs, business, and ends of Man's mortal Life only, because it was generally ob­serv'd, That where there was no concern at all for another World, and that men acted according to the influence of such an unconcernment, the greater propor­tion that such men had of either com­plexional or acquir'd intellectual Capa­cities, their degeneracies to Folly would most commonly appear to be so much the greater and fouler, and their actions and practices so much the more remark­ably absurd and foolish.

And now, to improve our present Ar­guing for a future World, and to show, [Page 180] That those Rational Faculties were prin­cipally, and on purpose, given on that account, we can affirm, That it is noto­riously observ'd, that as Good mens minds are advanced with more knowing quali­fications and ingenious understandings, so they do generally act their vertuous and religious Intendments, with a Wisdom incomparably above the common mea­sures of such as are qualified but with ordinary endowments, though those Per­sons should be in no degree inferiour to the most ingenious, in the uprightness of their minds and lives. For such mens knowing judicious managery of their Vertues, will not only create a bare ac­ceptableness of, but they must give a conspicuous Lustre to their lives and practices: by which they will so adorn all the exercises of their Goodness, that they cannot escape their being specially mark'd out for Love and Honour.

And therefore, such men do not only live the End, but the Honour of their Na­ture, and by their wise and unblameable conversations, they take off those preju­dices and exceptions that are daily offer'd against Religion it Self, to which the in­discretions of men of ordinary capacities may have oftentimes expos'd it. But, among all the signal Excellencies that [Page 181] attend and adorn an ingenious Piety, there is nothing more remarkable, than the wise use and disposure of Time; which like the Rational Faculties themselves, was principally given to Mankind, for the imployment of what concerns a Fu­ture World: And it's for want of that proper business, that it so often becomes uneasie and burdensome to such men, as are in no order of mind to make use of it for that especial purpose; and that sometimes to such a degree of uneasiness, that their very Lives themselves grow tiresome to their own Thoughts. So that were it not for that reason, that Time was allow'd Man principally for the sake of another World to solve the doubt, it would make one stand ama­zed to think, that Creatures endow'd with a Rational Understanding, should ever condescend to imploy it about acti­ons that are sometimes so troublesome and uneasie, and at other times so chil­dish and silly, that they bear no more to­wards manly ends, than the dancing of a bubble, or the pursuit of a Fly. Hence it is, that men unconcern'd for a Future World do sometimes swine away their Time in drink and debaucheries; while others are trifling off their precious hours in Courtships and Gallantings, in [Page 182] nicer dressings, and other sensual plea­sures: And to be sure they all must sleep away the sweet mornings, lest that se­rious season should attack their minds with the sense of their midnight foole­ries. These, and such as these, are the pitiful shifts which men unconcern'd for a Future Life are fain to busy their time away with something that is no­thing to the purpose.

Now, on the other hand, How happi­ly will men, whose minds are advanc'd in higher degrees of thinking and judg­ing understandingly, when they are really Vertuous and Good! I say, How hap­pily will those men be able to engage themselves in such a wise managery of their time, as may secure them not on­ly from finding it a burden to their own Thoughts, but from being tempted to throw it away upon such unaccounta­ble misadventures. To prevent which inconveniencies, they can ingeniously methodize their time into various Apart­ments, and successively distinct Periods, the better to alleviate the slow Progress of their hours. That is, they can set out these days and hours for Devotion; Those for the Offices of doing Good, or for secular imployments; and then some for keeping up friendship and ci­vil [Page 183] conversation; others again for inno­cent recreations and divertisement. All which wise divisions of Time, will shut out all occasions of its disimprovement to weak and silly purposes; and which being once made easie by an habituated regular observation, they shall as delight­fully reciprocate those several Duties in their proper season, as they do their Meals or times of Rest.

And then all this while, how pleasant and satisfactory will the use of time thus wisely, because religiously manag'd, be to their own Minds and Consciences? And with what a ravishing contentment will they recount such spent hours, when old Age shall allow them little else to do, but to think of what is past? But then chiefly, How will such Thoughts alle­viate the horrour of their dying Scene, when they shall go out of the World with Minds full of Hopes of the long­expected Returns of a well-spent Time and Life?

And now having dispatch'd the design and import of this Last Section, Who is it that can call in question the judgment of the Sacred Revelation, when it so of­ten declares the distinction of the Good and Evil, by the severe discrimination of Wise and Fool; or, that Repentance [Page 184] should there be describ'd by a Turning to the Wisdom of the Just; Luke 3. and that St. James should call so many Vertues of humane Conversation, even to innocent Civilities (as the Text imports) The wisdom from above? Jam. 3. 17. And Lastly, Why should any man ever dispute the conclusive Sentence of the wise Ecclesiastes, when he deter­mines, That to fear God and to keep His Commandments, is not only the principal Expedient of all humane Happiness, but that it is that, by which alone Man may live up to, and attain the end of his own nature, as he is a reasonable and arbitra­ry Creature? For, so saith the Text, This is (not the whole Duty, — [...]. Eccl. Septuag. as it's some­times interpreted, but) This is Man: Or as Aristotle, (discoursing of Vertue in his own notion) whether he thence learn'd it, — [...]. In Eth. or only in his Reason comply'd with it, maketh use of almost the same words: This is especially Man. These Premises being thus clearly stated, let us await the Conclusion.

Section I.

IN which we shall first endeavour to free the Argument from some mistaken notions of Vertue, or living Vertuously. For if we have not a right understanding of that, before we begin, it's in vain to argue for what encouragements will be sufficient, to engage men so to live. And then by living Vertuously, I here espe­cially, though not only, understand Vertue in a social respect, that is, as to mens endea­vouring to live and act one with, and to­wards another, by the strict rules of Uni­versal Justice, as in a larger sence it compre­hends Universal Goodness, in all their seve­ral Parts and Branches.

[Page 195] First, by mens living up to the rules of Universal Justice (as it's strictly to be considered), I mean the allowance of what's right and due to every man. First as to that, which is call'd Distributive Justice, which is the just performance of all relative and reciprocal Offices and Du­ties between all Superiours, (whether Natural or Politick) and their respective Subjects and Subordinates. And then as to that, which we call Commutative Justice; I understand it to be mens do­ing what's Right and Just, in all man­ner of mutual Transactions, Contracts, and intercurrent Affairs whatsoever.

And then by Universal Goodness (as Justice in a larger sence comprehends it) I understand not the acts only of doing all men Right, but of mens doing Good one to another (according to their re­spective capacities morally considered) as there is need of one anothers mutual help; whether it be for one anothers Ho­nour, Peace, Liberty, or in any other Circumstances of their Well-being. And this habit of Goodness, Sir Francis Bacon calls The greatest of all Vertues, Essay. 13. and Digni­ties of the mind; being the Character of the Deity; and without which (saith he) a man is a Busy, Mischievous, and Wretched thing.

Now the man that lives according to [Page 196] the Rules of Justice in all these accepta­tions, is the man that ought most pro­perly and especially to be denominated Vertuous. Not but that we suppose a necessary concurrence of all the other personal Vertues, as they are branch'd out particularly in Theological, and Phi­losophical Schemes. But then it is to be affirm'd of most, if not of all of them, that they do one way or other especially referr to Justice or Goodness, as I have here described them; and as that their contrary Vices do generally receive their essential notion of being Evil, because in one respect or other they make a breach upon the Rules of doing Right or Good.

Hence it is, that it's no wonder, that the Moralists have always express'd that re­gard to the notion and practice of Justice, (as it's in all respects to be considered) that whether it be, because it is so no­cessary for the happy being of all Hu­mane Societies; or whether for its atten­dance upon the menage and events of most other Vertuous actions, they have enobl'd it with the most comprehensive, and gene­ral name of Vertue. Thus Aristotle calls it, not only the best of Vertues, [...], &c. [...]. Eth. Lib. 4. Cap. 1. but observes, that it came to a Proverb, That all Vir­tues [Page 197] did exist in Justice; or as Hierocles expresseth it, that it comprehends all Ver­tues, as its Parts or Mem­bers: [...]. Hier. in Carm. Pythag. And not only the Philosophical Moralism, but even the Christian Re­ligion it self, as it referrs to all those Duties, which it enjoins to be perform'd to God and Man, is commonly express'd by the name of Righteousness or Ju­stice; He that doth Justice (or Righteousness) is Just (or Righteous,) 1 John 3. 7. and the true Pro­fessors of it, Righteous or Just; as it is promiscuous­ly rendred in our Translations, from the same word in the Original, which the Philosophers made use of.

Now, the reason why, in the first place, I offer this term of Vertue, or living vertuously, thus to consideration, is, because there hath been too com­monly a very false notion of Religion, or living Religiously: Some men placing it only in some Rites and Offices, proper to such or such a Religion; upon the performance of which, they have temp­ted one another to think themselves, if not wholly exempted, yet in some mea­sure fairly dispens'd from living vertuous­ly, as I have represented the Notion of Vertue. And this hath been observ'd, [Page 198] not only when Religions have been arti­ficially instituted by Wise men in several Heathen Nations, (of which some ac­count will be given in the following Ar­guments) but even then, when Religi­ons have been tendred to the World, by the clearest Evidence of Divine Reve­lation.

Thus did the Jews most grosly pre­varicate with God, Es. 1. 13. 14, 17, &c. by their intolerable omissions of living vertuously, that is, by the Rules of Universal Justice and Goodness, Jer. 7. 4, 8, 9, &c. as His holy Prophets so often complain. And for this did our Savi­our, in his time, so severely reprove those strict Religionists, Mat. 23. 24. the Scribes and Pharisees.

And it's observ'd, That the Wise men of almost every Age of the Church, have engaged themselves in making such complaints of the Times they lived. in. And I wish heartily, that I had not too just a cause (which gave me the chief occasion of this Section) to complain of a Religion of a later date, in which Justice and Goodness have been so won­derfully laid aside, as if they bore no part at all of the Profession of it. And the better to solve that intolerable con­tradiction to the very design of Chri­stianity, they have taught themselves a [Page 199] most scandalous distinction between Grace and Vertue; between Godliness and Ju­stice; between Saintship and all Moral Honesty, in their notion, and (as we have seen) practice of Religion, to the great disparagement and dishonour of whatsoever bears that Sacred Name. This the First.

Section II.

THis Section will represent another very dangerous prejudice, as to the manner of our stating the Argument. And it's to be done by making and an­swering an Enquiry, whether or no Al­mighty GOD will be at all concern'd, as to Rewards and Punishments, how men live and act, whether morally or immo­rally in this World. For if he be pleased to be so indifferent and unconcern'd, the Argument is void; and that be­cause a Proposal of any such things, as Rewards or Punishments, to encourage and deterr, would then be the most im­pertinent Concern of Mind that it is or­dinarily capable of.

Now, though it may be thought, that there should be but a very few, or none, [Page 200] that acknowledge a Deity, so desperate­ly inconsiderate of His Divine Honour, as to own and publish such a contra­diction to His Essential Holiness, and to that soveraign and wise Authority, which he must be presum'd to have and exercise naturally over that Rational World, which he created and made at his own choice: For it were the same thing, as to believe, That he intended to licen­tiate men in all those horrid practices and confusions, which should ever be acted and fall out to the World's end; yet it's certain, that there have been, and are opinions entertain'd, which must imply such an indifferency and uncon­cernment in God, howsoever men live and act. And I doubt not, but that they have been made use of by many, thereby to encourage their continuance in their most immoral practices and viti­ous ways of Living.

Now, the opinions which have brought forth that wretched effect in mens minds, are three, to be especially considered and rebuked.

The first which I shall take notice of, is that which doth directly and profes­sedly make God to be own'd as Author and Cause of Sin: And then, How can He be concern'd at all at that sinful acti­on, [Page 201] of which He himself should be really causal? Of which horrid and blasphe­mous opinion, Lib. 5. c. 20. cap. 34. Eusebius accounts one Flo­rinus to be the first Promoter; though Vincentius Lerinensis makes one more an­cient, and averrs Simon Magus as its first Patron. And the Fathers did charge that Heresie afterward upon Cerdon, Mar­cion, and others, as concurrent with their several Heterodoxies.

But the most remarkable Restores in this later Age, of that abominable Prin­ciple, were the late Libertines, (as the Historians and Divines of those Times call'd them) in Germany, that thereby they might go on with their intolerable Profanations and desperate Immoralities, for their thorough-work (as they call'd it) of a more perfect Reformation, with greater Liberty and Encouragement. By whose Example, and upon their Prin­ciples, we have too great a reason to sus­pect, that out late rebellious Reformers, transcrib'd too resembling a Copy, both in their minds and practices; and for whose sakes I have taken occasion to offer at this representation.

The Second Opinion that must con­sequentially inferr an indifferency and unconcernment in God, how Men act and live, as to the Rewards and Punish­ments [Page 202] of another Life; is that of an eternal and irrespective decree of some men to Salvation, with the inevitable preterition of all the rest of Mankind.

And that because that Doctrine must in consequence suppose, not that Man, but that GOD Himself should be the efficient Cause and principal Agent in all the Good and Evil Actions that are done in the World; and then, How could the one be reasonably rewardable, and the other punishable? And first, as to the Good and Vertuous Actions of them, that are so absolutely elected to Salvati­on, they cannot be suppos'd to be pro­perly their own, but God's; because they are wrought in them (as they com­monly affirm) by such an impulse of His Grace, as which they have not a Liberty in themselves to resist or de­feat.

And then, as to the sinful actions of them that are under that fatal preteri­tion, How can they be morally their own, but God's, (as Causa deficiens in ne­cessariis est efficiens) because they become unavoidable for want of that Grace, by which it was only possible for those un­happy men to have escaped and preven­ted them? And though our Opinionists dare impudently pretend, That those [Page 203] men have all of them a sufficient Grace given them, yet nevertheless they most senselesly mean, That it is sufficient in it Self only, but not as unto them, so as possibly to effect upon their best en­deavour, any advantage to themselves.

And now, How can God be reasona­bly concern'd to Reward the actions of the one, or to Punish those of the other; when neither of those actions were pro­perly and voluntarily their own; that is, when neither of those sorts of men were ever allow'd to act by a Mind that had any truly-balanc'd Liberty of choice in its self? And therefore, in such a case, the proposal of Rewards and Punishments (upon which the Reason of the Argument is founded) to encourage the Good or deterr the Evil, were as impertinent, as if a man were counsel'd to act an Ad­venture for an Estate, when he is con­firm'd in his opinion, that either he hath had a fore-decree for an undefeizible Title to it, or else of which he were assur'd to be depriv'd by an insuperable Bar, long before put in against him; I say, If he were sure, that one of those two unalterable causes were upon him, though he did not know which it was, What manner of encouragement is it, that should reasonably induce him to do any [Page 204] thing for the securing or obtaining such an Estate? And where lays the difference of that Case from this in debate, I can make no conjecture.

The Third Opinion that necessarily im­plies, That God should be indifferent and unconcern'd how men live and act, as to Rewards and Punishments, is from Mr. Hobs his Necessitation of all humane actions, from a Chain of Causes link'd together at one anothers end, to the ve­ry immediate Last that necessarily de­termin'd the Understanding so to judge, and the Will so to chuse. The unaccoun­table Sence of which, his shiftless di­stinction can never solve, as when he averrs, Levia­than. That though a Man can Do what he will, yet that he cannot Will what he will: For if the binding up the last and im­mediate Causes of the Action (that is the judgment and will of Man) to a necessity of judging and choice, (if it be not Non-sence to call it a judgment or a choice at all) can give any ratio­nal Man leave to think, that that A­ction can be an effect of true Liberty; then may the natural motion of an In­animate, and the operations of a sensi­tive Being, which do spontaneously (yet nevertheless) necessarily, (as necessity stands in opposition to rational Liberty) [Page 205] follow that impulse, which the Creator had put upon their several Natures, be pro­perly call'd an act of a free and volun­tary Agent. Now whosoever hath en­tertain'd such an opinion of the necessi­tation of all humane actions, must sup­pose, that the first Link of that Chain of Causes, that moves or knocks the next to it, and so every next successive­ly his next, till the last Cause drives the Will into a necessity of Choice; I say that first Link of Causation must be soveraignly held in the hand of God, as he is the first cause of all Motion, as well as of all Being. And then it must also be suppos'd, that none of those intermedial or secondary Causes, can break from the natural order of that train of Causations (without an extraordinary intervention of the First Causes, Will and Power) till the Acti­on, be it good or evil, be chosen and effected. So that if there be any cause of the Action that is truly voluntary, and by which it may be really deno­minated morally Good or Evil, it must be the first only: for all the other Causes are under a natural or fatal ne­cessity of acting what they do, and the Judgment and Will of Man, which should make the moral distinction, are [Page 206] under an impossibility of judging or chusing otherwise, (as Mr. Hobs as­serts) and therefore, there being no o­ther Will at liberty, by which, such an Action is to be freely chosen, if there be any morality in the Action, it must have it from the first Cause, or no where: and then what a piece of Blasphemy are we fallen upon? For it makes God not only a cause, but the only cause of all evil and immoral Actions, as such: which a bare spontaneity in the Will of Man, can no more solve, than it can make a necessary Agent, when it's any way instrumental to a mischie­vous Event, really a Criminal: so that I may be angry with the Stone that hits me, and like a Dog in rage, bite it, as well as with the person that threw it, if in both of them there were as much necessity of the Action, as is con­sistent with a natural spontaneity. And then how can GOD be concern'd in such Actions, as to Rewards and Pun­ishments, any more, than that they should be capable of Praise or Blame, [...]. Strom. lib. 1. p. 311. as Clemens Alexandrinus argues against such a necessity of acting in moral A­gents.

[Page 207] These be the three Opinions, that support the second Prejudice, or mista­ken Notion of GOD's being uncon­cern'd, how Men live and act, whether morally or immorally, as to Rewards and Punishments. But the very explain­ing of them, with a consideration had of their intolerable consequences, makes them sufficiently their own abhorrence, and confutation.

There is one erroneous Notion more, that concerns a lesser sort of People; and now my hand is in, it shall not pass unrebuk'd.

Section III.

THis Section is design'd to over-rule the last prejudice, which would al­so make void the sence of the Argu­ment, as it is stated. And that must be done by making another enquiry, Whether or no Almighty GOD (if it be granted, That He will be pleased to concern Himself; as to Rewards and Punishments, how Men live and act) intended, that men should think them­selves oblig'd to live vertuously, upon the account only of His own Sovereign Authority, and absolute Command, and [Page 208] that they should charge themselves with no other motive or reason, but only that? Or whether GOD design'd not also, in that case, as in all others, to deal with Mankind, as rational and vo­luntary Agents; that is, that they might propound to their own Minds, some considerable Interest or Happiness, up­on the encouragement of which, they should oblige themselves so to live and act? And then on the other hand, whe­ther they might not also, as reasonably propound to their own Thoughts, a Consideration of the many Inconveni­ences at present, and their certain Ru­ine in the event, to disswade and deterr themselves, from living immorally and vitiously? Now the Reason, Why I offer this case to enquiry, before I fur­ther engage in the pursuit of my Ar­gument, is, because it's known, that there be some Men, (even enough to make a party) who being resolv'd not to be otherwise perswaded, but that a proposal of Rewards to encourage Men to be Religious, and to do good, is a most dangerous approach to Popery; (the ordinary expedient, us'd by such men to affright Minds, where Reasons are wanting) and that it can import nothing less, than the Romish Merit, and I know not what.

[Page 209] And then on the other side, (say they) for men to suggest to themselves, the dread of Future Punishments, (though for that reason they are propos'd as ob­jects of the Christian Faith) is nothing else but slavish Fear, (by which they falsely represent that religious Act of mind) and that to avoid sinning on that account, can no way be accepta­ble, but rather distastful to Almighty GOD.

But these mens prejudices in this point, have yet further ends and little notions to serve. For (say they) such a propo­sal of Rewards and Punishments, do tempt men to give too much to the Creature; it hinders the Advancement of free Grace, and takes men off from bottoming them­selves upon Christ, (as they phrase it) and from rowling themselves by Faith, inconditionately upon his Merits; with many more such like humouring Noti­ons.

Now such unhappy imposures as these, have vulgar minds admitted, to the vast prejudice of Vertue, and an active Reli­gion; and all this because they would fain go to Heaven, without any incum­bring moralities, such as are the Vertues and Graces of strict Justice, Restitution and Satisfaction upon the Breach of it; [Page 210] intire Loyalty to their Princes, and Obe­dience to their Superiours of every kind; Charity to their Enemies, and doing Good to all Men as much as in them lay, and the like; And that instead of them, they may go to Christ (they think) for Sal­vation, by a shorter [...], as by the force of an imaginary Faith, or a delusive Re­liance, and the like; which will not put them upon so much trouble and charge. And now if such prejudic'd men would but consider, how much such triflings with God and their own Souls, are inconsistent with all solid Rea­son, and how foreign such Notions are to the express purpose and end of the Gospel, in which all along its Professours are oblig'd to observe all its strict rules of obedience by the speci­al command of God, John 15. 10. Rom. 2. 6, 7. Mat. 10. 42. Rev. 22. 14. up­on the hope and encou­ragement of his present Love and Bles­sing, and of his future Rewards and Re­compences; secur'd to them by so ma­ny gracious and infallible Promises, they should need no other confutation but their own shame, for dealing so irratio­nally with so plain a revelation of the express will of God, to the contrary.

And now having finished the precon­sideration of these three Prejudices or [Page 211] Mistakes, that might have been preten­ded by our apponents to call in question the right stating of the Argument in the terms it is propos'd, it may now be thought that I might bring the Argument to its final issue, upon a positive Proof, that no reasons or encouragements can be suf­ficient, to oblige men to undertake such Vertuous lives, but what relate to the concerns of another World. But this ha­sty proceedure must be justifiable in the opinion of such only, who have not con­sidered how many subterfuges are to be detected, and how many exceptions and objections are to be controul'd and an­swered, before I can make so near an approach towards the conclusion. And therefore that's the proper work of the next Chapter.

Section I.

THis Section offers the first Exception, and that is made by those who will say, that there is no Nation, how bar­barous soever, but that by their native Light, and the use of their natural Faculties, may attain to the sence and ac­knowledgment of a Dei­ty, Nulla Gens tam fera, nemo omnium tam sit im­manis, cujus mentem non imbuerit deorum opinio. Multi de diis prava senti­unt (id enim more vitioso effici solet) omnes tamen esse vim & naturam divi­nam arbitrantur. Tus. Qu. l. 1. (as Tully observes;) and then, that such a sence and acknowledg­ment, may be sufficient to over-awe such Men from acting immorally, and against the Rules of Common Ju­stice, without any apprehension of a [Page 213] Future Life to restrain them.

To this exception it's answered, that I grant it to be certain, That such a kind of People may in that manner at­tain to a notion of a Deity: but then it's very probable (where there be no additional institutions further to instruct them) that they will entertain that no­tion of his Being, with an apprehen­sion chiefly of His singular kindness and goodness to them: and that because a great part of that demonstration, which they can make for His Existence, must arise from an opinion of His being their first Maker, and constant Benefactor. And if they shall so represent the Deity to their Minds, they may as easily suggest to themselves, that he could not but indefinitely design them to be happy, when at first he made them; or that otherwise, he would never have given them the enjoyment (or rather the mis­fortune) of a Being at all.

And then they at present seeing no other way, how any Happiness may be atain'd; but by a present power and plenty, and an easy Way of living, would soon satisfy themselves, That that Deity hath given them an allow­ance, to make use of all their natural Skill and present Power to atempt any [Page 214] thing, whatsoever it be, whereby they may promote for themselves the at­tainment of such a desireable way of living.

And further, those natural Theists, knowing perhaps at present nothing to the contrary, but that that Deity hath put them originally into the same con­dition with all other Animals in gene­ral, What Arguments can they offer themselves to the contrary, but that they may as lawfully chuse to imitate the same freedom, which by a natu­ral instinct, is allowed to such Animals, who do generally preserve and please themselves, by preying upon the La­bours and Lives of one another? Is it not evident, (say they) That the most Famous of those sensible Creatures in their several Elements, viz. the Lyon, Eagle, and Leviathan, do make use of that their natural Power and Liberty to the utmost, sometimes not sparing the lives of Men, to maintain their sensu­al Greatness, Ease, and Pleasure? And do not the very Plants themselves, (say they) especially such as naturally as­pire to Grandeur, substract their Juices for growth and nourishment, from the lesser Vegetables of the Neighbourhood, though it be to the making them grow [Page 215] Feeble, Fruitless, and Die?

And then, when that suggestion is over, cannot those men, thus naturally convinc'd of a Deity, tell themselves, That they may have the same freedom in their private capacities, which the most famous Conquerors do assume to themselves in order to their publick At­chievements? And then, say they, (if they have had notice of it) How did Alexander the Great rob and destroy whole Nations to gratifie his own ambi­tion of Greater Power, and larger Do­minions? And who is it that blames him for his Usurpations, or that doth not rather applaud him, and entertain his Name and Memory with Renown, for his Success and Valour? And they will also alledge, (if it hath come to their know­ledge) That the World admires and ap­plauds the ancient Romans for their fa­mous Acquisitions; Though it's known, say they, that they advanced themselves to that greatness from first to last, by disordering the Peace, preying upon the Plenties, Si qua soret tellus, quae sulvum mitteret Aurum; Hostis erat. Petr. Arb. and destroying the defence of their neighbour Nations. And from this it is, why Se­neca observes, That Poverty was the [Page 216] Foundation and Cause of their Famous Em­pir [...] ▪ —Pau­pertatem funda­mentum & causam imperii sui. That is, (we suppose him to mean) their real or pretended want of Power, and Plenty, was thought a sufficient Rea­son to justifie them in all their Invasions and Usurpations. Epist. Lib. 13. Ex. 88.

Now, (say these natural acknowledg­ers of a Deity) sure such Conquerors as these did believe God, or gods, as well as We, (for some of them (we hear) consulted their Oracles) and that those gods allow'd them in what they did, or they durst not otherwise have adventur'd upon such methods, to advance their own Greatness and Power; and then, What should restrain us from the like Liberty in our several Capacities, to pursue our own private and particular Interests of Profits and Pleasure, by whatsoever actions we shall invade our weaker Neighbours Lives and Proprie­ties?

And so, thus far we see, That the bare acknowledgment of a Deity, with­out some other consideration had to dis­swade them from all immoral acts, to serve their own present desires and de­signs, for a prosperous Being in the World, cannot reasonably be thought a sufficient Ground and Reason.

Section II.

IN this Section we account, That that acknowledg'd Deity may, by further reasoning, be represented to mens Minds, not only as indefinitely good and kind (as before) but also as just, that is, im­partially so: and that, as his Goodness may be apprehended in conjunction with his universal Equity.

And then (say they) such a notion of a Deity may influence men into a be­lief. That he design'd, that every man should be happy, as well as any; and so that no man that hath any veneration for him, as so represented, should presume to pursue his own private Interest and Well-being otherwise than is consistent with common Justice and Equity, and with the safety of other mens Lives and Proprieties.

And in this Exception it may be fur­ther suggested, That when there is at present but such an imperfect notion of a Deity, it's possible, that in a short time there may arise men of clearer thoughts and apprehensions, Lib. 1. De Vit. Philos. who may set up for Philosophers, (as Diogenes makes mention of the Gymnosophists, Druids [Page 218] and Magi, in the several barbarous Na­tions) and may be able to form Digests, and stated Rules of Justice and Goodness, and may then suggest into Peoples minds, That the same Just Deity would certain­ly be favourable to, and reward them that shall observe those Rules; and will be displeas'd with, and severely punish the Transgressors of them. And upon this possible Supposal our Exceptioners will alledge, That there may be then a sufficient Expedient offer'd to oblige men to be Vertuous and Good, and to over­rule them from immoral practices, with­out a necessary consideration to be had of what relates to another World.

In answering this Exception, I shall contract my Reply to this latter period of it, where there only doth appear whatsoever is cogent in it. And then, I say, That whereas it's suggested, that those Philosophers might influence such mens minds into a Belief, that God will be favourable to Good men, and punish Offenders; if they mean (as they must, except they own a future State) that the executions of that Deity's favour and dis­pleasure are only to be acted in this World, then is the pretended Expedient an unsufficient Subterfuge.

[Page 219] For if that Deity should not constant­ly keep up his favourable Providence to the Vertuous, so as alwaies to answer their reasonable hopes and expectations: or if he should not as constantly rebuke and punish the Offenders, so as to secure their constant Fear of Him; Men would not be affected with the uncertain hopes of the one, nor dread of the other, so as to decline any advantageous, though the most unjust Adventure, for their present ease, profit, or pleasure.

And that God Almighty doth not ad­minister the exact Executions of His Fa­vour to the Vertuous, and of His Dis­pleasure to the Vitious in this Life, com­mon experience doth sufficiently evince: And it hath been the business of the First Argument, to demonstrate the Truth of it.

But now, suppose, that it were certain to all, as it falls out sometimes to some, that that Deity would infallibly do that work in this world, according to the merits and demerits of the one and the other; yet would the Criminals easily a­vert those fears, by considering, that either the Divine Justice would strike them with an immediate death, and (as it is the sence of a Theist) throw them in­to a present annihilation; and then they [Page 220] would judge for themselves, that such a a state of being nothing (if I may be allow'd so to call it) is a thousand times more preferrable, than to live miserably or uneasily, if those cases came at any time in competition; or if their punish­ments were to be executed by the mea­sures of some tedious calamity (the se­verest case that can be suggested) yet then they would also consider, that at hardest it would but make it eligible for them, to put a present period to their own miserable and vexatious Lives, and in one instant be reduc'd to the same quiet no­thing; which they knew a few years or days might perhaps determine for them in some very sad and more afflictive Method.

And surely Socrates might upon these considerations averr to Simia and Cebes, That if he did not think that he was go­ing into another World, [...]. Plat. Phed. the fear of dying should not have restrain'd him from doing any thing that were unjust.

And thus we see the defect of this Se­cond exception, though stated to the high­est advantage. But these are but light skir­mishes, before we engage in a war with [Page 221] others, that are pretended to be more for­midable Adversaries. Therefore,

Section III.

THis Third Section tenders us the ex­ception of them that will alledge. That God Almighty hath delegated the ex­ecutions of his Providence, in this Case, to humane Powers and Authorities, to make Laws & Edicts which may keep the World in order, and that the accountableness of mens lives and actions to their Cognizance and Umpire, for the rewarding the Ver­tuous, and punishing the Immoral, there­by to oblige all men to act well and ver­tuously, is all that the Great Creatour de­sign'd or intended for the Administration of his justice on either hand in that Case, so that there is no need of a conside­ration to be had of what concerns ano­ther world, to work that effect.

To this exception I answer, That it could not be the purpose of our Graci­ous God, in his ordering the worlds Go­vernment in the manner and method it's constituted, that Mankind might univer­sally (for it must be so, if there be any Sence in the Allegation) offer themselves sufficient reasons and encouragements [Page 222] (as to rewards and punishments) to ob­lige themselves to be Good and Vertu­ous, or restrain them from being immo­ral on that account, without a considera­tion of a future State, upon these two especial Grounds and Reasons.

First, Because, where there be the best Laws and Constitutions that ever were made and established, it must suppose all Supreme Powers and Governours to have a sufficient Prospect of the merits and demerits of every individual Person and Action, as they are to be balanc'd by the measures of all their various circum­stances: And then to be alwaies intent, curious, and constant in the performance of their rewarding and punishing Offices, for the Interests of every such single Cause and Person, as well as in Matters of general and publick import: And again, in this Case, it must be further suppos'd, That all the substituted Admi­nistrators of their Princes Laws and good Intentions, (the Work being impossible to be alwaies done in their own Per­sons) must also be as knowing and faithful in their due subadministrations: I say, If it were possible to be presum'd, that all Governments and their Subordi­nates, were design'd of God to be al­waies thus qualify'd and disposed, there [Page 223] might be a tolerable Plea and Pretence to believe, that he intended no better, or no other reasons to oblige men to be Good and Vertuous, and to restrain them from being Evil: But if common, and sometimes woeful Experience, can prove the contrary; and if the Maxims of Go­vernment, which the grand Politician Machiavil have offer'd the World, Collected by a Learned Italian, and Translated in­to English by J. B. be justifiably represented, the doubt and uncertainty is too great for a Good man to depend upon such administrations for his reward, and the former Supposals too unlikely to be True, so as to restrain an Evil man, that is either bold or cunning, from his un­justest intendments and undertakings.

Secondly, The next reason to evince, That it could not be God's Purpose, that all mens accountableness to Governours, should be their sufficient Reason to live vertuous Lives, or to deterr them from living otherwise, is, because their Laws, how well and wisely soever constituted and administred, are experimentally found to be alwaies so avoidable, by some mens Greatness, by other mens Cunning, and by most mens favourable Constructions, that it too often comes to pass, that ver­tuous persons have been so far from ob­taining [Page 224] a Reward for doing well, that they have hardly acquitted themselves by the benefit of the Laws, for their own ordinary Rights and Safety. And that on the other hand; unjust men have been so far from being so sufficiently terrify'd, as to restrain them from doing Evil, that they have oftentimes been ra­ther encourag'd to adventure upon the worst of actions, by an Observation, that it is but a small number, whom the Law rebukes and punisheth, in comparison of the multitudes of Delinquents that daily escape.

It's more than probable (they'll say) that there is never a man beheaded for Treason, or arraign'd for lesser Crimes, but that there be hundreds in the Pro­vince, who have deserved as much or more, yet of whose actions the Laws or­dinary proceedure hath taken no hold at all. And if from the great Estates that have been raised by frauds and op­pression, (where the Laws have silently pass'd them by) the men that advanc'd them and their Heirs, were inforc'd to refund to the satisfaction of the injur'd, many great men must descend into a parell equipage with their honest Neigh­bours of a meaner quality. And if eve­ry delinquent should come into the Con­gregation [Page 225] in a White Sheet, that have de­serv'd it as much as they that do, the Congregation in some places would per­haps come to too near a resemblance of a Collegiate Assemblies Complexion.

These be the Two Reasons, by which is evidenc'd the deficiency of all humane Governments and Laws for the ends pre­tended.

But now comes my Sceptick, and he offers a reasonable Enquiry to know, that if this be not, what then is the end, which Governments do obtain, so as to answer Gods Wise Intendment in their Constitutions?

My Answer to his Enquiry is, That it is without all doubt, that God Almighty obliged all Authorities, upon their Duty to him, and in his place, faithfully to endeavour the justification and protection of the Good and Vertuous, and for the punishment of evil doers (as St. Paul dis­courseth); Rom. 13. 4. but because all those per­sons, that are so entrusted to act that good to Mankind in their several Au­thoritative Capacities, are free Agents, Created with Faculties indifferently dis­pos'd to Good and Evil, and are them­selves (as all other men are) set in a probationary State for another World, & so are at choice, whether or no they will [Page 226] prepare themselves for a future Reward or Punishment, by their performing or omit­ting their respective governing Offices; therefore, as it could not but be a con­tingency, whether they would be so just and careful, so it could not but be a con­ditional intendment in God, when he first design'd their constitution.

But more closely to solve the doubt, I conceive that the absolute end, which God design'd that his deputed Authori­ties must certainly attain, and without which attainment they must of course cease to be, what they are, is, That the Nations and Communities under their respective charges, might be kept in so­cial or national subsistences, whatsoever the miscarriages of their Governments o­therwise should be in all other respects. That is, when Princes are careful so to keep up their Authorities, that the Peo­ple may not by their Seditions bring themselves at pleasure into an Anarchical and tumultuary State; which ought to be accounted the most fatal misfortune to Mankind, and of all evil, humane contin­gencies in this world, the greatest.

So that the wisdom and Goodness of God in constituting and upholding Go­vernments, is not then only to be own'd and acknowledg'd, when every single [Page 227] vertuous person, and just cause, is perfect­ly rewarded and vindicated; nor when e­very unjust man is as fully Rebuked and Punished (a work not to be expected to be compleatly done, while defectible Mortals are engaged in that management of it) but Gods mercy is then to be ac­knowledg'd, when the Peoples safety is so far provided for, that evil and licenti­ous men (though they may sometimes disturb, yet) cannot at will overturn the Established Governments under which they live, and are protected. And there­fore it is on all hands adjudg'd, that the worst Tyrannies, and the most oppressive Governments, are incomparably to be preferr'd to no Government at all; that is, when all men are left at liberty to act how and what they please: and so become (as certainly they will) their own greatest Tyrants and Oppressors; and without any controul from any o­ther expedient, but that which God him­self hath appointed for their safety and deliverance: and that is, Soveraign Au­thority, and their submission to it.

And if these solutions can't satisfy our Cavillers enquiry, when he offers any o­ther, that shall appear more sufficient to an unprejudic'd understanding to solve this observation, in which the Creators [Page 228] honour it's so much concern'd, I shall then renounce the use I make of them, as evi­dential for another world's Existence. And this solves the Third Exception.

Section IV.

THis Fourth Section is design'd to take off another exception of more dif­ficult import, and which many have thought an immoveable block in my way. And that is, that it is incouragement and reason enough for men to live good and vertuous lives, without the necessa­ry consideratien of what concerns ano­ther world, because vertue is her own sufficient reward in this life.

With this famous subterfuge I have of­ten been assaulted by some considerable persons, and such as were no enemies to the belief of another world upon other accounts, and therefore I must bespeak the Readers patience, if my stricter ex­amination of the case, in order to a thorough detection of the fallacy, shall a little longer than ordinary, detain him in this Paragraph; and my Answer and Solution will be managed by several steps.

[Page 229] 1. First I take notice, That that Opi­nion (or Saying rather) That Vertue is her own Reward, was originally put into reputation, as by the Stoicks principally, so also by some other Philosophers, on purpose to uphold the Belief of the possi­bility of Man's attainment of a sufficient Happiness in this present Life, to avoid the necessary Belief of placing it in ano­ther World. For those Wise men having tumbled about their Thoughts where to fix that sufficient Good and Happiness, and finding that those, who had plac'd it upon any present Enjoyments for a prosperous and sensual way of living, could not possibly stand their ground, against those pregnant Reasons, that every man's Experience could dictate to the contrary: So those Wise men were at last necessitated to pitch upon this Expedient of making Vertue her own Re­ward, as being subject to the least Ex­ception. Though in the sence and man­ner, how it should effect that Reward, the Philosophers were no more likely to agree, than those men, who design'd to place mens Chiefest Happiness in any other thing, whose enjoyment was de­terminable in this present World. Of which the Reader will find a full ac­count in the last Argument, Chap. 2. [Page 230] And this Philosophical Principle hath since been kept up by the Predestinarian Divines, as better consistent with their notion of irrespective Election, of which I have given some account in the First Chapter, Sect. 2. And from that kind of Divinity, I verily believe, that notion hath been inconsiderately and unwarily entertain'd even to this day, by Divines and others, of a better Mind and soberer Judgment.

2. Secondly, I answer, That as that Opinion or Saying had those unhappy Interests to serve in its First Rise and Process, so, upon a more strict Exami­nation, it cannot in it self be True. And, first, as to the nature and proper notion of a Reward; which cannot but be of something that is kindly as well as equitably bestow'd, by any Person con­cern'd to give or allow it to another: For no man can be properly said to re­ward himself; he cannot in any tolera­ble Sence be the Giver, Receiver, and Judge of the Equity of the same thing; which must be True in a strict Proprie­ty of Speaking, if Vertue may be said to be properly her (that is, the vertuous man's) own Reward.

Then, Secondly, If it be alledg'd, That Reward in that Saying ought to be ta­ken [Page 231] in a Metaphorical Sence; but nei­ther then can the notion hold good in that acceptation, to the purpose, for which that Saying was to be made use of. For to be metaphorically accepted, is as much as to say, That Vertue is her own Reward, because it becomes some­thing that is like, or resembles a Reward: but then it must be such a something, that must be suppos'd (if they will al­low the Mind to be the proper Seat of a Rational Beings happiness) to depend upon the vertuous man's opinion and imagination; that is, That he is suffi­ciently rewarded and happy, if he can think himself so, and so long as his Mind is in temper to imagine himself to be so. But then, if a man would consi­der how insecure any such vertuous per­son must needs be of keeping his mind in that good humour, upon several accounts, he would soon find cause to blush at the pretence of believing Ver­tue to be her own Reward, upon his Thinking act of its self-sufficiency. For Who knows not, but that sometimes his Minds kind temper (without any reason to be given for it) may alter by his imaginative Faculties natural disposition to change and variation: sometimes ac­cording to the present temper of the [Page 232] Body, (as in Hypocondriack Persons especially) sometimes by the Minds ina­bility at all times, to subdue the cla­mours of its unruly Affections, and lower Appetites; and very often by a vertuous man's observation of his own many de­fects and imperfections in his best in­tendments and performances? I say, when these various cases happen, What's then become of that Reward, or that which is Tropically like it? Can it give the Mind a Beatitude, without its own allow­ance or consent? Or, Can the Mind have satisfaction, and be unsatisfy'd at the same time? In short, Can that be a man's sufficient Happiness, of whose en­joyment he cannot be one hour se­cure?

Thirdly, That the weakness of the pretence of making Vertue her own sufficient Reward, without any other expectation, may yet be further disco­vered: It's observed, that the greatest Contenders for that saying, do suffici­ently demonstrate its defect, by suppo­sing a concurrence of almost all parts of humane prosperity, as necessary to support that, which they call Vertues Reward.

And to make this good, I shall here only offer the Opinion of Aristotle, (who, [Page 233] as industriously as possible, had endea­vour'd to have Mans self-sufficient Bea­titude plac'd in Vertues being her own Reward) and he tells us, that there be unfortunate cases that concern Honour, Children, Beauty, and the like; which by no means can allow the vertuous Man to be a happy Person. And then (saith he in the same place) how can he be happy that's deform'd, — [...], &c. Lib. Eth. cap. 8. ignorant, or that lives unsocially, and without Poste­rity, &c.

Now, if such a concession, and sup­posal of the necessary confluence of so many conveniences of living well and easily in the world, do not shew the unsufficiency of such a pretended self-Reward, we must disclaim every conse­quence that's most rationally inferr'd. Hence it is, That the Ingenious None facile invenies multis de millibus unum, Virtutem pretium qui putet esse sui. Ipse decor recti, facti si pramia desunt Non movet, & gratis poenitet esse probrum. Ovid. Poet had so slender an Opinion of Vertues being her own Reward, that he even derides the Humour of that presence, and tells us, that it would but teach Men to repent, that ever they had been [Page 234] Vertuous at all, if they got no more by it.

Fourthly, and lastly, I answer and grant, (to save our Pretenders Credit) That it is with that saying of Vertues being her own Reward, as it is with ma­ny other general Axioms, and common Proverbial Speeches, that are grounded upon some certain Truth, which yet in other respects, may admit several Re­strictions and Exceptions, and with which, those very Axioms may be so over-balanc'd, that there may be some­times as good ones taken from some of their very limitations.

And there may be some Axioms so equally balanc'd between true and false, that it were indifferent, if they were given either negatively or affirmatively. Upon this consideration, I do allow some Truth in the common saying, That Vertue is her own Reward, that is, the mind may sometimes by living vertu­ously receive some general satisfaction to its self, and that some Vertues may sometimes convenience a Mans credit, health, peace, and the like: but then on the other side, when it's considered, that there is no such absolute certainty in attaining those conveniences, as to make up an entire and self-sufficient [Page 235] Happiness, without any reference at all to the grand Rewards of another Life: I say, when all those Restrictions are put into the balance, I dare as positive­ly affirm, that Vertue is not her own Re­ward, as to say it is. Nay, I must say it's impossible it should be so affirm'd, if any man (as the Philosophers did) shall go about to confront the Beatitude of another World, by giving it Appel­latives, that can only be proper to the blessedness of the Beatifick Vision, or an enjoyment of the nearest Communion with GOD Himself. [...]. Eth. lib. cap. 9. [...]. Cap. 7. vid. cap. 9. For so Aristotle calls it the greatest, the most excellent, the best and divine Good: Elsewhere, he calls it the highest, most perfect, and self-sufficient Good.

And now, after all this that may be offered in disproof of that Saying, as it bears a design to exclude (though but in notion) any other kind of Happiness to stand in competition with it, I cannot but wonder, that any man of the Chri­stian Name, should go about a defence of it; or that any Divini should dare to affirm (as it hath been usually done) [Page 236] in publick, That if there were neither Heaven nor Hell, it were encouragement enough to live a religious and vertuous Life, because Vertue was her own Reward. What could be said more to the dispa­ragement of the Sacred Institution of the Gospel, whose main design is to tender the Rewards of another World, as the most reasonable and prevailing In­ducement, to engage men to live good and vertuous Lives? Of which surely St. Paul was sufficiently sensible, when he avow'd, That had they Hope only in this Life, they were of all men most miserable. 1. Cor. 15. 19. He had forgot, that Vertue was her own self-sufficient Reward, and that by which they might all have been perfectly Happy, notwithstanding their want of any such Hope.

And thus my Argument hath escaped the Danger of this Fourth Exception.

Section V.

THE Fifth and Last Exception against our [...] Proceedure upon this Argu­ment, with which our Sceptick designs to war against us, with a Weapon fetch­ed from our own Tents, is, That GOD [Page 237] Almighty made no other Proposal to the Jews, to encourage them to live ver­tously and religiously, but of Tempo­ral Blessings only; And, What (saith he) GOD himself thought might then be sufficient for his own dear People, surely should not at any time be call'd in question as insuf­ficient.

First, I answer, That it's true, that God Almighty, in the Mosaical Dispen­sation, gave the Jews no other plain and direct Promises, but of Temporal Re­wards, as they are in those cited Chap­ters more especially enumerated: Levit. 26. But then he gave them notice of some ex­press general Promises, Deut. 28. as that which he had made to Abraham, to be his God, and his great Reward, Gen. 17. in which the Blessings of a future World could be thought to be no more wholly excep­ted, than in that affirmation, when the Psalmist so confidently averr'd in gene­ral, Psal. 58. 11. That Verily there is a reward for the Righteous, doubtless there is a God that judgeth the earth: or, that he should say of himself in particular, Psal. 27. 15. I should utterly have fainted, but that I believe verily to see the goodness of God in the Land of the Living.

Now; in respect of the obscurer way of God's allowing the Jews the notices [Page 238] of another World's Rewards, (as for other reasons) St. Paul calls the Law, A shadow of good things to come; Heb. 10. that is, though the clear revelation of a future state was respitted to the Evangelical Dispensation, yet the Jews might, in that darker manner, have as much certainty of its Existence, as a shadow can evince, That the Sun is in Being, though its own body of Light were then not directly look'd upon; or, as when in a gloomy day the Sun is mantled with a Cloud, yet it may be apprehended as certainly, That the Sun is in the Horizon, and that it is Day, as if there were never an In­terposure in the Firmament: The Linea­ments of a Face, though drawn with a Cole, can assure one, that it represents such a Person, though it wants the at­tractive beauty, which the finishing strokes may afterward add to the Pi­cture.

And had there not been such a known Certainty, though in such shady repre­sentations, of another World's Rewards and Blessings, to the Ages preceeding the Messiah, Heb. 11. How could St. Paul averr of the ancient Saints of God, of whom he makes such a large Catalogue, That what they did and suffer'd for GOD and Ver­tue, was upon the encouragement of [Page 239] hoping for a better Country than Ca­naan? or, that he should say of Moses himself, That when he renounc'd the Egyptian Glories, and the present Plea­sures of Sin, he was encourag'd to it, by having his Eye upon the Recompence of Reward?

So that the manner of God's giving them the Understanding of a future World, was but accommodated to all other the parts of their whole Dispensation. Particularly to instance in the Case of their solemn Expiations, by the Blood of those Animals, which were appoin­ted for that Service: Now, as it was impossible for the Jews to believe so grosly, Heb. 10. 4. as if the Blood of Bulls and Goats (as the Apostle argues) should take away Sins: but that there was something more to come, of which that Blood was Typi­cal; so the same Thoughts we must have of them, as to a future state: It was not possible that such Persons could think, that all the Blessings which God design'd to His obedient and faithful Servants, should look no further than the Advantages of Temporal Blessings, (of which it's questionable, whether God con­stantly continued to them so vastly a greater share than he did to other Na­tions) which they could not but see, to [Page 240] be generally and promiscuously dispos'd both to the Good and Evil.

Secondly, I answer, That though God gave them no express Revelation for the Existence of the other World, yet they had the common Benefit which God allow'd to Mankind in general; That is, to be able to demonstrate the Existence of that state to themselves and others, by Rational Evidence; by which they, as well as the Heathen World, might be encourag'd to live vertuous Lives, accor­ding to the common measures of Natu­ral Religion, of which the substantial part of the Jews Dispensation did espe­cially consist.

And GOD might be pleas'd, in His sovereign Wisdom, to admit the Jews to no express revealed way of understan­ding the certain Existence of that future state, but by such an Expedient, of which the Heathen World might be capable, as well as themselves: That is, that the Gentiles might be the more reasonably invited to it, and the more readily en­tertain the Jewish Religion, when they saw, that the principal Fundamental of it did stand upon so firm a bottom as Rational Demonstration. And the reason of that might be, because the Jewish Dis­pensation had no such considerable At­testations [Page 241] to confirm its credibility, as the Gospels had; nor were all the Pre­cepts of it in themselves so universally consonant to right Reason, nor so per­fective of natural Religion, as the Gos­pels was; so that to adventure the know­ledge of a future state upon a bare Pro­posal of Revelation only, might then have put those Gentiles Minds into a Suspi­cion, That that part of the Revelation had had no better Foundation in Reason, than many other parts of the same Reveal'd Religion had. Now, it was otherwise with the Evangelick Dispensation, be­cause all the principal practick parts of its Profession were so Rational, and so agreeable to natural Religion, that had not the Article of a future World, and all that relates to it, been offer'd to Faith, and not left to Demonstration, (as the Jews in a great part might have it) the whole Christian Religion would have seem'd to a Heathen Mind, and perhaps so to some others, rather to be of Philoso­phical than of Divine Institution.

Thirdly, I answer, That it is very probable, that such a Rational way of demonstrating another World, might be also somewhat encourag'd by Tradition from the Patriarchal state of the Church, from which the Jews had many things [Page 242] in great veneration, and constant practice.

But howsoever, that knowledge of the other World reach'd their Minds, it's cer­tain, that the belief of it was a Doctrine so catholick among the Jews, that the Sadducees (whose Sect began about the time of Alexander the Great, that is, about three Centuries before Christ came) were accounted amongst them as Here­ticks, for denying the Existence of Spi­rits, the Resurrection of the Dead, and of another World. Afterward, in the early Age of Justin Martyr, Trypho the Jew, in his Dialognizing, acknowledgeth, That pious Souls, after their departures from the Bodies, — [...] Dial. cum Tryph. pag. 223. shall exist in a better place; and, that the unjust and the wick­ed shall be in a worse state, expecting the time of their Judgment. And the Author of Europae Speculum, accounting the present state of the Jews, Europ. Spec. Pag. 223. informs us, That the Belief of the end of the World, and of the final Judgment; of the restoring of Mens Bodies, and of their everlasting Happiness in the heighth of the Heavens, is Good in general. And by these An­swers, our Sceptick, I hope, will place no confidence in this Last Exception.

Section I.

IN this First Section, I shall pursue that order; that is, It shall endeavour to demonstrate, That no other Encou­ragements or Reasons (for in the case of rational Agents, they are both the same) can morally be sufficient to de­termine a Man's resolution and practice to live a Good and Vertuous Life, but such as relate to a Future World. And the Representation of it, will be found­ed upon the consideration of the very many, and otherwise, uncontroulable oppositions, difficulties, and discourage­ments, with which GOD thought fit, in His Divine Wisdom, That the possi­bility of Mans being Vertuous and Re­ligious, should be so encumber'd, That no less Reasons or Encouragements should be thought sufficient to balance his mind resolutely to grapple with them, but such as concern another World. And all this I shall endeavour to illu­strate, by giving the Reader a full pro­spect of those Encumbrances, under these Five Heads.

[Page 245] But before I can well begin to ex­plain those several cases, I must first en­deavour to obviate one great Exception; and it's offer'd by them, that will be ready to say, That there be some natu­ral dispositions to Vertue in many, if not in most Men, more or less, that may even of course, make the way of Vertue more easy and less incumber'd, without any necessary consideration had to the encouraging and obliging Con­cerns of anotehr World. Now our Ex­ceptioner means, some Mens natural Modesty, and good-Nature; other Mens placable, peaceable, honourable and ge­nerous Inclinations; and then, that such natural Tempers may in themselves fa­cilitate a Vertuous Life.

My Answer to this Exception, will be managed upon several Considerati­ons.

First, as to such Vertuous Actions, as derive from those Mens natural good Tempers, as they come up to some de­gree of necessity in acting them, and may resemble the Vertues of some Brute Animals, that act by instinct, so they may oft-times, be rather material­ly, than truly, formally Vertuous. And therefore, Divines ought to advertize such kinds of Persons, not to be over­confident [Page 246] of their being really Vertu­ous (especially upon a Religious Ac­count) from Actions, that perhaps, may be no more than the natural Ef­fects of their complexional dispositions to some particular Vertues.

Secondly, I suggest, That Men of those naturally good Qualifications, though in the beginning of their converse in the World, may readily act such Ver­tues, as relate to their complexions, yet when they come afterward to meet strong Temptations to the contrary, may find the same difficulties and dis­couragements to preserve their natural­ly good Temper, as others of a diffe­rent humour. What prodigies of a lost Modesty, of a baffl'd good Nature, and of a debauch'd Honour, have some men appear'd to be, that had the natural advantage of those Excellent Qualifica­tions?

Thirdly, I offer to consideration, That such Men, as are naturally endow'd with any of those complexional dispo­sitions to Vertue, may yet be observ'd, to have in their Tempers, some other Humours and Inclinations, which may create as great a difficulty to preserve their vertuous Conversations intire, as those Men meet withal, who have the [Page 247] task of contending with the want of such naturally good dispositions.

Fourthly▪ and Lastly, As to that more famous natural qualification of an ho­nourable temper, upon which principle In grant, that many excellently Vertuous things have been, and are acted in the World; but then I say, how easily is the Notion of true Honour lost, and what mistaken measures and disguises of it are too generally entertain'd in the world; so that, though such persons may shew a greatness of mind in some cases, yet if they have no Religious Principles in them to give them a beter conduct of their actions, how will their natural and complexional honour extravagate in­to such wild excesses, as are altogether unaccountable to any sence of Reason, or Vertue? how will some such men maintain their hardy resolutions, and natural stoutness in a Duel, perhaps on­ly for an offensive word, that would not so honourably express it in all those acts of strict justice and goodness, as I have represented the notion of vertue, and liv­ing Vertuously, in the First Chapter of this Argument, Sect. the First?

And now having acquitted my self of this exception, I shall presume upon the force of my Arguing, That the difficul­ties [Page 248] and incumbrances of being truly ver­tuous are such, that no encouragements can be sufficient to oppose and controul them, but such as may be propos'd from the concern of a Future World.

First, let a man attentively consider in his mind, the true Figure of his whole compounded self; that is, how he is in ge­neral made up of two greatly diverse, and in many respects, very incongruous parts and principles, viz. a Body and a Soul; each of which suppos'd to be naturally qualify'd with so many different capacities of acting, and which require such varie­ties of objects, about which, to exercise their operations. And then how those operations do bear a tendency to so ma­ny disagreeing ends and purposes, that a mans whole Nature seems to be a mis­cellany of Beings, or a complication of many natures in One.

And then let him further consider, that most of those Parts and Powers of his thus compounded self, such as be his Ima­ginative faculty, the affections and passi­ons of his Soul, and the various appe­tites of the Corporeal and Sensual part of his Being, are not only dispos'd to exert their several operations in a great dispari­ty to, and with one another, but most commonly in direct contrariety to his reasoning mind.

[Page 249] Now here lays the mighty difficulty of being Good and Vertuous, because it's a very hard thing to bring all those seve­ral parts of humane Nature, which are so variously multiply'd both in Soul and Body, and are so inconsistent one with another, to the Rule, Conduct, and Dominion of right Reason; insomuch, that for the gaining that power, no man can acquit his endeavour, without a kind of Tyranny upon a very great part of himself: Of which Porphyry (though a Heathen) could not but be so sensible, that speaking of the purgation (which you may also frequently have notice of, in other Philosophers) of a mans sensu­al Appetites in order to Vertue, discours­eth, that it can't be done without the Souls divorce from the Body, [...]. Sent. and its sen­sual motions: Or (as St. Paul expresseth it) without taking upon him the office (as it were) of an execu­tioner, Galat. 5. 24. and that in the hardest instance of its employment without a Crucifixion of himself in his affections and lusts.

Now, if a man had been all Soul, and that Soul all Understanding, it would have been thought no hard matter to be Vertuous and Good, and that because his understanding power would not have [Page 250] allow'd any thing to be undertaken and acted, that is contrary to its self: But when it's considered, that there be besides that faculty in humane nature, so many principles of action both in Soul and Bo­dy, that hold such a strong opposition to his reasoning Power, and will be con­stantly soliciting for satisfaction, against the interest of vertue, that man must be very credulous or unconcern'd, that can think any encouragement (even for one that would desire to be vertuous) to be sufficient to engage him to enter the lists of that war with himself, and to uphold his mind against such powerful contra­dictions to his good intendment, except it be by a proposal to himself of some attainable happiness, whose interest may appear to him far greater and more con­siderable, than any of those satisfactions, which the inferiour parts of his Nature exact and call for. And if it were not so, this absurdity must follow, That his Reason must be suppos'd to be left to act without a reason; that is, without a suf­ficient encouragement from some end or other, whose value and preference might over-rule and controul all other interests whatsoever, that are in themselves found to be less esteemable. Now I desire that any man would suggest to me, what hap­piness [Page 251] there is attainable in his Mortal life, which he may propose to himself to be so considerable, as may ingage his superiour mind to oppose the satisfacti­ons of his imagination and passions of his Soul, and the sensual appetites of his bo­dily Self, in order to Vertue. And if he can't find any thing in this world, that may affect his mind with such a value (as I have in other Arguments con­vinc'd, that there is nothing) then either he must fly to something that is beyond this present mortal State, or else it must be presum'd that God Almighty hath afforded him no sufficient encouragement to be good and vertuous at all. The summ is, That God hath designedly (as I shall represent in the next Section) made man in such a figure, and gave him such a kind of nature, that nothing can suffi­ciently encourage him to be Religious, Good, and Vertuous, but only the con­cern of another World.

2. Secondly, as a mans intendments for vertue may be thus perplexed with a mu­tinous company of his inferiour Passions, and sensual Appetites within him, so let him consider, what a kind of world it is, in which he is by Divine Ordination, socially to enjoy his Being; and then, how much therein all vertuous intenti­ons [Page 252] will be constantly encumber'd with so many differently flattering objects, that are not only foreign, but some­times contrary to the exercises of Ver­tue, without him. Which kind of objects wheresoever he lives, with whomsoever he converseth, or in whatsoever quality of life he is employ'd; will always at­tend his senses and imagination, and be soliciting his affections and sensual ap­petites for entertainment. And if ever those bewitching enchantments for a pre­sent seeming satisfaction, do but gain a preference in his fancy (which will be a hard matter for him to escape) and af­ter that shall but once come to interest his Affections, it's beyond a peradventure, but that the Supreme Part of his Soul, though it should then stand on the side or part of Vertue, would soon be wea­ried in the contest; and grow weak and imprevalent, if it hath not greater encou­ragements to enable it to undergo the con­flict with those competitours, than such as he can possibly suggest to himself, from any the best concerns of this present life.

And then, when by the treachery of his Debauch'd fancy and affections, the Rational part of his Soul shall stoop to admit an imposure upon its self, so as to [Page 253] approve and consent to what the Inferi­our parts of himself have so suggested; it's more than probable, but that all man­ner of vertues will immediately, not on­ly become nauseous to him in his opini­on, but will be represented to his mind under some reproachful characters of disparagement. That is, perhaps his mind will be over-rul'd, to think Tem­perance too unpleasant and unsociable, Fortitude too dangerous, Prudence too formal, Gratitude and Ingenuity the silly effects of an easy Nature, Justice and Honesty too nice and unthrifty; and all other kinds of Vertues too unaccommo­dable for his present Interest, Pride, or Pleasure.

And if the Rational Judgment be once thus disorder'd and prejudic'd, what can restore him to the true estimation and love of what is Good and Vertuous, in order to a Manly resistence of all those powerful Temptations, that will be dai­ly gazing upon him, to perswade him to the contrary? Surely there is no­thing else can come in balance with those potent Enemies to Vertue, so as to over-rule his mind to resist them, but a lively and a prevailing concern, for what relates to a Future World. It must be such an apprehension or none, That. [Page 254] can enable him to make an impartial Judgment of the necessity of being Good, or that can advance a sufficient rational Power in him to conquer his abus'd Imaginations and Affections; which will otherwise, in despite of all other Arguments that can be given him to the contrary, every day more and more endanger his mind, to be im­moveably affixed to the present World's delusive, and vainly admir'd Shows, and Fooleries.

3. Thirdly, The difficulty of designing and living a Vertuous Life, is yet fur­ther encreased, when it's considered, That so great a part of Humane Life is past and gone, before a Man is grown old enough to be himself; that is, be­fore his superiour mind will think it self at leisure, or indeed, be ordinarily ca­pable at all, to encounter with his na­tural Affections, and unruly Appetites within him; or with the delusions of the World's deceitful Objects without him. I say, it's a great while, before a right, and well-inform'd Reason, that should undertake Vertues Work, will be tolerably able to exercise its Autho­rity over his Affections and Actions, or of passing a right Judgment upon his own principal Good and Interest. [Page 255] And especially if it be true, (which St. Austin averrs, as the Judgment of the most learned Men of that Age) that the natural Boundary of Youth is, Circa triginta quippe annos, definie­runt etiam hujus saeculi doctissimi homines, juventutem. De Civ. lib. 22. cap. 15 when a man comes to the age of about Thir­ty Years.

And then, if all that while he allows himself such a loose conduct of his Actions, (as is ordinarily observ'd in that time of Life) in what is he like­ly to pass away this ungovernable part of his Existence, but in trifling and fol­ly, and in the ordinarily observ'd mis­adventures and miscarriages of Youth, — [...], De lib. educan. (as Plutarch fully represents them) without any sufficient Controul from his yet immature, and unperfect Mind?

And when he is thus tumbling down his youthful Precipice, if the Wisdom of Vertue stops him not, before the Meri­dian of his time be past, he is in great danger of encountring with another po­tent Enemy to Goodness. And that is, with the Dominion and insulting Autho­rity [Page 256] of a long-contracted habit of doing Evil, or, at best, of living idly and im­pertinently; which habit, if it be not timely rescinded, will strengthen it self every day more and more, like a shrunk Nerve, till it grows inflexibly stubborn against all remedy and relief, and obsti­nately set against all that Age and Ex­perience may offer in Advice for his undertaking wiser measures of Living. So that it is not ordinarily so frequent, that men do get into a state of Vertue, either when they are very young, or very old: not when they are very young, for the reasons already alledg'd; Nor yet when very old, if they have conti­nued their evil habits through the matu­rer part of their Lives; the proper sea­son, when men should recover themselves from their former habituated follies, and be rationally fix'd in the love and pra­ctice of Vertue.

It's taken notice of, That Moses took that nick of time for his recovery: Acts 7. 23. For (as the Texts inferr that observation) he was full Forty Years old when he seem'd to have begun that Mighty Work. Heb. 11. He then unloosen'd himself from the Glories of the Egyptian Court, and re­nounc'd the transient Pleasures of it, and engag'd himself into a course of Vertue; [Page 257] though he were sure then to act it in a state of great afflictions, with the then-suffering People of God. And for the performance of which (as the reason of the thing requir'd it) he plac'd his en­couragement upon the Concerns of a fu­ture World: Heb. 11. For (saith the Text) he had an Eye upon the recompence of Reward. He durst stay no longer, lest a farther adherence to his Vanity had captiv'd him beyond the relief of his reason; nor durst he adventure to trust his Soul with any less encouragement, to engage himself in that necessary Work, lest he had miscarry'd in that most important Enterprize for want of it.

It's true, I confess, that there be al­waies some good young men in the World; but then it's observ'd, that their vertue hath been (I speak not of all) but commonly contingent, or complexional; that is, either as growing upon the ad­vantage of a good Education and Disci­pline, or as upon the Stock of their own naturally-sweet and tractable Dispositi­ons. But then it hath also too often been observ'd, That afterward those pregnant and promising Hopes of a ver­tuous Life, have become abortive, when those young men have been left to act purely upon the strength of their own [Page 258] Minds and Reason. Like some Plants, which we take notice of to thrive well, while they feed only upon the nutriment which the body of the Seed afforded them, but when they come to grow upon the strength of the Ground only, after all their first vernant shewes, have wither'd away, through the weakness of a defective soil: So many young men have been commendably vertuous upon the advantage of their own good Na­ture and Education, who afterward have fail'd, when they came to live abroad in the World's wide Field.

Now, upon this whole consideration which I have made, concerning the time of Youth, What can be suppos'd to be offer'd to a young man, while he lives subject to be over-rul'd by his passions and natural appetites? Or, What Argu­ments can be presum'd to be strong enough to bring his Mind to any suffici­ent attendance to the Counsels of Ver­tue, amidst the prospect of so many en­ticing Objects, to divert him from it, but an alarm from the most serious conside­ration of the Concerns of another World? Therefore, when Solomon advertiz'd the vain young man, Eccl. 12. ver. 1. to Remember his Creator in the days of his Youth, and had told him, ver. 13. That nothing but Fearing God and [Page 259] keeping his Commandments, could make him Happy, he obligeth his attendance to that Sovereign Counsel, (as knowing that nothing else could be sufficient) upon the Concerns of another World; because (saith he) God shall bring every work into Judgment, with every secret thing, whether it be good, or whether it be evil.

4. Fourthly, Let us, after all these mention'd difficulties of being engag'd in a course of Vertue, further consider, That he that designs to live vertuously, ought also to suppose, that it is not only possible, but very probable, that he must live counter to the Examples (in one kind or another) of the greater part of Mankind: And sometimes not only to the Examples of them, with whom he chuseth to converse, but oft-times even of them upon whom he must necessarily depend: and (which adds much to the difficulty) very often to the Examples of such, whose Age, Station, Learning, and Experience had given some credit to loose and vicious practices.

Now, if a man shall but seriously in­form himself of the universally acknow­ledg'd prevalency of evil Examples, and how, (if they be too general) like a raging Torrent, they are apt to bear all that's Vertuous down before them; and [Page 260] then shall consider, how that prevalency ariseth not so much from any taking Ar­gument that there is in vicious and de­bauch'd Examples in themselves, as from that inclination that is naturally implan­ted in all men, to be govern'd by Exam­ple, rather than by any other method of Conduct; the difficulty of being ver­tuous must, on that account, be still very much encreas'd. It's known by common observation, That Orations, Sermons, dexterous Reasonings, and a di­ligent attendance to Books, (though they may very much influence, yet) are ex­perimentally found to be far less prevai­ling with the natural temper of most men, than is a constant Prospect of actual Presidents and Examples, whithersoever they tend either to Good or Evil.

And therefore, our Saviour, in his fa­mous Sermon upon the Mount, after he had prefac'd it with Eight qualifications of Mind, as necessarily requir'd in them that intended to engage in the Observa­tion of his following Precepts, begins the Sermon with that which he judg'd most considerably conducing to a Good Life, and that was, to make the Good actions of his Hearers exemplary to one another. (Mat. 5.) And as it was our Saviour's prime care to promote the Benefit of a [Page 261] good Exemplification: So it hath been ever since believ'd of such as were to be afterward the Substitutes of his Priest­hood, that they have the more remarka­bly prevail'd in their Ministerial Offices, Potior enim, est bene vi­vendi quam be­ne lo­quendi facultas. when their good Examples have given Life to their other endeavours: And, the building up of God's Church, hath then most successfully gone on, when they have wrought with both Hands, that is, both by Life and Doctrine.

Now, this whole Discourse, concerning the nature and importance of Exempli­fication, amounts to this, That if there be such a natural Prevalency in all Exam­ples to controul the Minds and Lives of men: And if there be so observably, al­waies in the World, so many such Exam­ples, as will be encouraging Vice, Im­morality, and the Universal Neglects of Religion; What an addition is it to the difficulty of mens Undertaking to live good and vertuous Lives? What Power can stem such a strong Tide? or, What encouragements can the Mind assume to its self, from any thing that this World can tender, to restrain a man from fol­lowing a common Mode (perhaps at that time most fashionable) of ill-living, for which he hath daily so many Pre­sidents before his Eyes? Surely nothing [Page 262] can inable him to bear up against so powerful an opposition to Vertue, unless he advanceth his Soul to be concern'd in what relates to another World.

5. Fifthly, and Lastly, They that de­sign to live vertuously, that is, strictly so, besides the mention'd inconvenien­cies of bad Examples, must also expect to be entertain'd (more or less) with as many discouragements, as the vitious and immoral can possibly contrive. For there is a malignant disposition in the Minds of most men that are habitually evil, which will commonly engage them either in an open Enmity, or in a secret Spite, against the Persons of the Vertu­ous: And in whatsoever other instances their Malice shall fail them, yet they will be sure to put the Actions of the Vertuous, let them be never so upright and innocent, upon the rack of all possible misconstructions for their dis­couragement.

If such Good men shall live quietly and inoffensively in the World, it must be accounted from a pusillanimity and meanness of Spirit. If in any instances they be observably grateful or ingenious, it's nothing else, but an effect of a weak and untutor'd Judgment. If they can't comply with some mens Riotism and [Page 263] Debaucheries, 'tis Penury and straitness of Soul. If they be cheerful, they are vain; if reserv'd, 'tis Sullenness. If they be generally civil and obliging in their Behaviour, it must be Flattery, Neutra­lity in publick Concerns, or base Com­pliance upon design: And then, if they keep distance, 'tis Pride and an unsociable Singularity. If the Good man shall go about to oblige such men by Kindnes­ses, they will hate him the more, be­cause he was in capacity to do them: And if upon apparent affronts and abuses he be ready to offer terms of reconci­liation, they will never forgive him the Injury (as they will account it) of his taking any notice at all of their Un­worthiness: If the common business of the World brings the Good man into Company, he hears no body commen­ded but the Thriving, and the Cunning, and no man applauded as Wise and Hap­py, but the Rich and the Successful; they are to be alwaies the best men (as they call it) of the Neighbourhood, howsoever unfurnish'd in the Region of their Minds, or how irregular and un­worthy soever in the course of their Lives. And while he is among them, if he offers to talk to purpose, no man listens to him: If he adviseth well, none [Page 264] attends his Counsel: If his indignation against such Trifles of Mankind, makes him speak a stout Word, that relates to Vertue, or another World, there's pre­sently an alarm given either for an uni­versal Sport, or a Quarrel. But if at any time a stronger temptation, and a snare laid, shall betray his vertuous Soul to comply too far with the humour of the loose Society, it shall never be forgotten to his reproach; and how soon and well soever he shall retract his Surprize, yet it shall be thought sufficient to justifie all the affronts and unkind usages that the immoral and vitious shall for ever after design and offer upon him: And it's well if his Posterity escape.

And then, a further disencourage­ment is, if he that designs to be Vertu­ous, be of Honourable Extraction, it shall be suggested to him, That his strictly manag'd Life, will lessen him in his Honour, if not degrade his Quality: If he otherwise stands in good and plen­tiful Circumstances, he must expect (in as many respects as they can) to be made a prey to the Vitious, who shall take the same pleasure to do it, and to boast of it, and shall be as little blam'd for it, as he that robs an innocent Church-man of his due, or that plun­ders [Page 265] one, that refuseth to be Disloyal in a time of Rebellion. As for that Man's share in ordinary civilities, such as keep up Societies in mutual Friendships, he shall be sure to have the least pro­portion of them; and his strict and vertuous Life, shall set a mark upon his door, and teach the common Visi­tours to pass it by, like a House infe­cted with the Plague: And at last, they shall grow so weary of his Neighbour­hood, that they will alwaies be wish­ingly enquiring (with the Evil Man in the Psalm, Psal. 41. 5.) When shall he die, and his Name perish? These, and such as these, are the discouragements, which he that intends to lead a Vertuous Life, may reasonably propound to himself to encounter with, from the evil part of the World; not that I think, that every Vertuous Man, and at all times alike, shall be assaulted with every one of them, in the manner and order that I have now represented them; yet nevertheless, we may be confident, That all Vertuous Persons (if strictly so) do meet with some of them, and some, with most of them: And they that meet with fewest, considering their other menti­on'd Incumbrances from within, and without them, will find work enough [Page 266] to bear up against them, that they may keep their minds and lives close to their Vertuous Resolutions. And then who can imagine, That they should entertain their minds with the hope of any such En­couragements, as may elsewhere balance their Reason, to over-rule so many Dis­couragements, but of those only, which they may suggest to themselves, from the favour of a Good GOD, as it re­lates especially to the hopeful concerns of another World? This the last diffi­culty: but Why did GOD permit all this? That's the business of the next Section to solve.

Section II.

HAving thus laid down the Five In­stances of the several difficulties, with which Men, that would live Ver­tuously, must expect to be incumber'd, I might now come up close to the conclu­sion, did I not foresee a Rancounter from my constantly attending Caviller: and he hath two things to object a­gainst the Representations which I have made of those Difficulties. 1. First, saith he, How can all this consist with your own Principles, and the Notion, that is [Page 267] ordinarily made of the Christian Re­ligion; of which it is affirm'd, That its Commandments are not Grievous: 1 John 5. 3. or that Our Saviour should say, That His Yoke was easy, Mat. 11. 30. and His Burden light?

First, I Answer, that though Our Sa­viour declared His Yoke to be easy, &c. yet is it a Yoke, and a Burden still; and so those Metaphorical Expressions, must suppose and import something in their proper meaning, that is severe and difficult. And though His Command­ments are not grievous, yet are they nevertheless Commandments still; that is, restraints, limitations, and boundaries of something, that Men are apt to ac­count their natural Freedom.

Secondly, I Answer, That that easi­ness and non-grievousness may be spo­ken but as comparatively of something that is harder, and more oppressive. And that is, either as to the bondages of the Mosaical Institution, or as to the Slavery and Drudgery of living under the intolerable Dominion and Tyranny of sinful Habits; which notion of easi­ness in those Two comparative Respects, doth not at all supersede what I have represented concerning the difficulties of living a Vertuous and Religious Life.

[Page 268] 3. Thirdly. The Evangelical Vertues may be represented as easy, as they are in a more general account accommodable to right Reason, and as they are in themselves more approvable to a mans natural understanding: and therefore can't be thought grievous to the su­pream part of himself, (which is especially himself, and denominates him a Man) abstractly considered, how troublesome and difficult soever the practice of them may be in a complex and compounded Notion of himself; that is, as he is made up of so many inferiour passions, inclinations, and sen­sual appetites, as I have represented the case, in the former Section.

4. Fourthly, I Answer, that His Yoke, Burden, and Commandments may be found the more easy, and less grievous with respect to those excellent disposi­tions of Mind, with which every true Disciple of CHRIST that un­dertakes a Profession of his Religion, must necessarily be suppos'd to be qua­lify'd; that is, with meekness and low­liness of heart, such a submissive and humble temper of Mind, as he there ad­viseth to, in the same period of Dis­course, as learn'd by his own Example, will make his Yoke so much the easier, [Page 269] and the practical Observance of his Commandments so much the less grie­vous to him, that designs to live a Ver­tuous and Religious Life.

5. Lastly I reply, that those fair ac­counts of the easiness of the Christian Vertues, may be founded upon the be­lief of a future world, and with respect to the great rewards of that Blessed State; for the attainment of which, no­thing ought respectively to be account­ed hard, that is possible, as the bitterest Dose is chearfully taken upon an assu­red prospect of Health, and as the Mer­chants hard adventure is made light of, upon a fore-assurance of the import of his rich floating Cargo. And this solves the first Exception.

But then Secondly, our Sceptick Dares arraign the Equity and Goodness of GOD to Mankind; and saith, That if Almighty GOD had ever seriously in­tended that Men should live Good and Vertuous Lives, upon which, His Divine Favour, and all their own Happiness, should chiefly and necessarily depend, (as it's pretended) he would never have been so unkind, as to put them upon such a way of Living, whose terms should be so hard and hazardous, and that can­not be perform'd without so many ama­zing [Page 270] difficulties, and discouragements; but would rather have oblig'd them so to live, upon conditions which might have had the same ease and security, by which other Animals attain their proper ends; from which they are in no natural dan­ger to depart, by any wilful miscarria­ges of their own.

My Answer to this bold Charge upon those glorious Attributes of God, in which he chiefly delighteth, shall be by offer­ing sufficient reasons to justify God, why he was pleased to allow Mankind the pos­sibility of being Good and Vertuous, up­on such severely difficult, and discoura­ging terms, and conditions. And the Reasons are these Five.

First, Had not man some such difficul­ties and discouragements to contend with in his attempts to be Vertuous; the very name or notion of Vertue must have been insignificant to all the purposes of its Reason, and Recommendation. If there were no enemy to conflict with, nor a­ny danger to be incountred, there could be no reasonable account given either of courage, or conquest; And if it were naturally easy, and commonly obvious, to be Learned and Knowing, what ho­nour were it to be accounted a Philoso­pher? So if the world had no enchanting [Page 271] Objects, no sensual Pleasures, no admir'd Splendour and Greatness in it, what Ver­tue were it to oppose temptations to Pride and Vanity, Revenge and Arrogancy, or to be constantly engag'd in mutual con­descentions, and in an universal practice of living peaceably and doing good? And if some parts of mans nature had no contrary propensions, and aversations; it would be no more to be Vertuous, than to Eat or Sleep; no more for a Man to be Temperate, than for a Lamb; his chastity would be no more commenda­ble, than that of a Flower, and his pea­ceable and innocent Conversation, would be just so much accountable, as that of a Tree or Stone.

So that if the matter be closely con­sidered, it must not only acquit God's Justice, that he hath permitted (of which men are too apt to complain) some dis­couraging difficulties of being Vertuous, but it would highly advance his Goodness, as that thereby he had a gracious contri­vance, how to make man possibly capa­ble of being Good and Vertuous at all. And therefore when some men shall go about, upon that account, to make their vitious lives, and their resolutions not to amend, the more excusable to themselves and others; and when others that mean [Page 272] better, shall be always murmuring and complaining at every incumbrance they meet with in the way of Vertue, both the one and the other sort of men, ought to be inform'd, that all that while they are most ungratefully arraigning and un­dervaluing one of the choicest instances of God's Infinitely Wise Love to, and Care of Mankind.

2. But then Secondly, another Reason, why God Almighty was pleas'd to per­mit those Incumbrances and Difficulties to be so great (as they are to be mea­sur'd by those five mention'd Instances) was upon a further design of his Love and Goodness to Mankind, in order to promote a greater advance of their hap­piness in another World: That is, that the will of man might by those discou­ragements be the more duly and equal­ly balanc'd in his choice of being Ver­tuous, so as to be capable of those vast Rewards and Blessings, which God de­sign'd for, and promis'd to him. And the Reason, is because upon God's pro­posal of those extraordinary returns of Reward and Blessing in another World; the very sence and expectation of them would otherwise have over-balanc'd the freedom of his choice of being Vertu­ous, too much on the one hand, towards [Page 273] a determination of his will, and a necessity of chusing, had not the greatness of those difficulties and discouragements so coun­terbalanc'd his mind and pois'd his will, for a more equal freedom in his election of Vertue: so that, had GOD Almighty been pleas'd, that the way of Vertue and Religion, should have been more easy; that is, less incumber'd with those difficulties & discouragements, it ought to be reasonably presum'd, That God would have communicated to the mind of Man, lower Apprehensions of that Future Hap­piness; and so the freedom of His Will, would have been balanc'd for a lesser stress of choice, and consequently with lesser hazard. But then it must be al­so as reasonably presum'd, That the Happiness attainable as such a Reward in the end, would have been proporti­on'd to such an easy, and less hazardous Choice. Waters are observ'd to rise to no higher pitch, than according to the ad­vance they have from the original Spring.

Therefore, I say it was a mighty in­stance of GOD's Wisdom, that he per­mitted those difficulties and incumbran­ces to be so great and numerous, that thereby he might make the hoped for Happiness, proportionable for Mans e­qually balanc'd Choice of so much Ver­tue, [Page 274] as was necessary for such an attain­ment. But then His Goodness is infinite­ly to be admir'd, that all this should be done on design, to advance him to so much the higher and nobler degrees of Happiness in another World.

Thirdly. It's very reasonable to believe, That GOD was pleas'd to permit those difficulties and discouragements, and to allow the possibility of being Vertuous, upon those hard Terms, that he him­self might act his Divine Favour to the vertuous part of Mankind, as near as possible, to the measures of Justice and E­quity, as well as of Grace and Good­ness. That is, that thereby he might make the free Donations of such extra­ordinary rewarding Blessings to the Ver­tuous, the more accountable and (as it were) the more justifiable to His own infinite Reason and Wisdom; which St. Paul 2 Thes. 5. 6. calls the Righteous Judgment of GOD; that so all His Divine Attributes, might be the better balanc'd in ma­king His Creature, Man, compleatly hap­py. And who knows not, That it is ordinary for many wise and good Men (more especially Commanders in Ar­mies) to offer such Employments to their Friends and Favourites, (whom they design to advance in Repute and [Page 275] Preferment) as have the greater trou­ble and hazard in them, for no other end, but to justify to their own minds, Discretion, in being nobly kind to such adventurers; and in which they may have more satisfaction to their generous minds, than for any manner of advan­tage, that they may receive to them­selves, by such their Friends and Favou­rites hazardous Engagements? And then, Why may not we as reasonably have the same Thoughts of a Wise and Merciful GOD, as to the case in hand? This the Third Reason.

Fourthly. GOD was so far pleas'd to permit, (I could say to order) that every Person might encounter with such oppositions, difficulties and discou­ragements; not only that His own mighty Favours to them, might appear the more reasonable to Himself; but that also (to the greater Glory and Ju­stification of His Justice and Goodness) they might approveably appear so to all His created rational Beings, When he shall come to be admired in all them that believe in that Day; 1 Thes. 1. 10. as St. Paul expres­seth it.

And first, as to those Beings that had already struggled through those diffi­culties, and conquered those incumbran­ces, [Page 276] and are arriv'd at their Reward in another World, How much will it ad­vance the Glory of an infinite Bene­factor, when they shall recount (as it's reasonably imagin'd they will) what e­very one of their Fellow Saints had done and suffered for Vertue; and what hard Adventures they had made in the time of their Probation in the former World, to keep up their Vertuous and Religi­ous Integrities? I say, How can it but advance the Glory of GOD, that all the glorify'd Saints and Angels can be able to say, That such a man is not in the blessed Place, altogether by a par­tial kindness with particular respects of his Person only, and so to have nothing to applaud, but such a meer and irre­spective Love; but that in the free donati­on of his Happiness they can observe that all other the Divine Attributes did concen­ter with His Love; and so they may have Reason, as to magnify his Wis­dom, Justice, and Equity, for the extraor­dinary measures he took to bring him to that blessed State in such a manner, so also His transcendent Love, in bestowing that blessing at all so graciously upon him? And then on the other side, those un­happy beings, who by their Cowardice had refus'd to conflict with those diffi­culties [Page 277] and discouragementr of living Ver­tuous Lives, and had thereby cheated themselves out of all those future Blessings, upon the temptations of a few vanishing Pleasures, and a little transient sensual Sa­tisfaction, I say, why may it not be thought a wise ordination in God to per­mit those incumbrances in being Vertu­ous, that when those unhappy Souls shall observe, that God had bestowed those mighty Blessings upon those that ad­her'd to their Vertuous Living, so in­cumbred, they might for ever justify his equity, that it was not for nothing, or for what was very inconsiderable, or for what was not in their own power to have done, as well as in theirs, that he was pleas'd in his free love to be­stow those mighty blessings upon the Vertuous in that happy apartment; so that in both respects, both to the Good and Evil, God's design was to have his Justice magnify'd as well as his Mercy. Therefore St. Paul 1 Thes. 1. 6. calls both those events, a Just and Righteous thing, or Act with God, &c.

5. Fifthly and Lastly, God was pleas'd that man might not go through with a Vertuous state, without those difficul­ties and incumbrances, that the Vertu­ous [Page 278] might not only enjoy the hopes and expectations of those future Blessings at present with a more advanc'd inward pleasure and value (as having pay'd so dear for them) but that they might af­terward enjoy them in the other world, with so much the greater satisfaction to their own happy minds; And that be­cause they may be sensible of something done by themselves (though it be very inconsiderable in respect of the transcen­dent superredundancy of their reward) why they should be conferr'd upon them by a Just and Merciful God. For as a happiness that comes in any degree to­wards a notion and nature of a Reward, (being therefore the more accommoda­ble to the mind of a Rational Creature) cannot but be preferrable to any kind of happiness, that is meerly and incon­ditionately gratuitous; so must the sence of the happiness, to him that hath hardly adventur'd for it, be so much the more welcome and valuable in his own sence and esteem.

Now all this was so ordered by a Wise and Good GGD, that the Vertuous might be the more rationally happy, and so the more agreeably to their own nature in the other world. This the last Reason. And thus this third and last [Page 279] Chapter being ended, it's time to attend the conclusion.

Section I.

IN this First Section I am oblig'd to give an Account of the common Evils of Mankind, to which they are naturally subjected. But, in doing this, I shall not pretend minutely to enume­rate every one of them; for that were to undertake an Office, as difficult as precisely to number the Stars or Sands. But the better to explain the Truth of the allegation, I shall only take Leave to represent some general Heads, or sorts of those common Evils, which I will presume to place, as in so many several Rooms of an Imaginary House, into which I may invite the Readers observation, that he may thereby be, (as it were) an Eye-witness [Page 289] of what I shall offer to his Belief.

1. And in the first Apartment of that House of Calamity, let me tender to his view, those Nations and Places, where all the wretched Sufferers by the Three great and astonishing Plagues and Scour­ges of Mankind, the Sword, Famine, and Pestilence (when they happen in the World) do, at the then present time, live and bear their several shares in the sad effects and consequences of such calamitous Causes.

And here our Observer cannot but take notice of so many, and such ama­zing spectacles of humane misery, that the very Prospect it self (though him­self were perfectly secure from every one of them) will hardly give him leave to think, That if he were now to chuse a Being, (though otherwise accommoda­ted with the fairest conveniencies) upon condition to be a constant Beholder of such Objects of Misery, he would not be very fond to accept it upon those terms. But certainly, those men themselves, that are at any present time sensible of those terrible occasions of humane Calamity, cannot but think it their great misfor­tune to Be at all; if there were no as­surance of a Better state to succeed, by [Page 290] the hopes of which, they might relieve the present sence of their own confus'd conditions; and, which might atone their oppressive Wishes, that they had never Been at all.

And though these great Distresses hap­pen but seldom in the World, and but at some periods of Time, yet every man is born naturally subject to them all; and knows nothing to the contrary, but that he may bear his Portion in every one of them, before any Cause or Acci­dent shall be so kind to him, as to de­termine his miserable mortal Being, to prevent them.

2. Through this extraordinarily lamen­table Apartment, let me lead our Obser­ver into a Room call'd, The Lazar; that is, a place where ordinarily all the Sick, the Languishing, and the greatly Tor­mented, lay along on Beds and Couches, groaning and complaining under the hea­vy Pressures of their present numerous Distempers:

Of which there be so many several kinds, that the Learned Physicians ac­count Four Hundred, as the proper sub­jects of their Art; besides the innumera­ble accidents upon Mens Limbs, and Sen­ses from without, which are the proper business of the Chirurgeon's Skill and Employment.

[Page 291] And of the Diseases, in which the Physicians are concern'd, besides those that are promiscuously incident to Man­kind in general, some are Hereditary, and descend from Parents, without any fault at all of the Diseased. Others there be, that are proper to their Countries, and are call'd Endemial, such as be the Bronchocele to them that live about the Alpes, the Kings-evil to the Spaniards, Consumption to the Portuguez, and Scur­vy to the Northern Nations: to all which Diseases, the afflicted might have con­tributed neither Cause nor Occasion. Then others there be, which are call'd Epidemical Diseases, with which, some­times the greatest part of a Nation is at once unexpectedly surpriz'd from the concurrence of some malignant, and sometimes, unaccountable Causes.

And now, if a Catalogue were made by those Persons, whose Calling and Imployment it is, to attend the Infirmi­ties of that part of Mankind, which at all times some where or other lay un­der their Hands and Cures, of all the several calamitous Circumstances, which such afflicted Persons, and their Families endure, it would easily satisfy any con­sidering mind, how much a non-Exi­stence were to be preferr'd to such Mens [Page 292] present Beings; if they could not be­lieve, That GOD has allowed the Af­flicted, an assurance of a better State to come.

3. From a view of these woeful Ob­jects, to whose Calamities, Mens Bodies have exposed them, I lead our Observer into a Third Room, where all that are disordered in Mind, make up a Great and miserable Society. And there the Sick and the Diseased are more numerous, and their disorders by far more afflictive and uneasy, —Morbi perniciores sunt, pluresque, quam Corpo­ris, &c. Tusc. Quest. lib. 3. than those of the Body, as the Phi­losopher observes. Now the Diseases of the Mind (as he there accounts them) are Madness of all sorts; Envy, Diog. La­er. lib. 7. de Vita Zenon. Anguish, Sorrow, anxious Cares and Fears; to which Zeno, in his enu­meration of them, adds Jealousy, and Confusion, or Perplexity of Thoughts, Emulation, and Terrours, Shame, and an unweldy Tiresomeness, or Lassitude of Mind.

With any one of which, whosoever hath his Head affected and incumber'd, will be hardly able to allow himself any considerable satifactions in the sence of his own Being, though he were otherwise accomodated, with all other [Page 293] the kindest circumstances of living: and for this, take great Plutarch's Words, thus expressing the Case. Fill thy Cof­fers with Gold and Silver, and fit thy self with all the circumstances of Pleasure; fill thy House with At­tendants, [...], &c. [...], &c. [...]. &c. Lib. de Vitiis & Virtute. and the City with Debtors, except thou canst conquer the Affecti­ons of thy Mind; except thou canst set thy self free from all its Vexatious Fears and Cares; all thy Enjoyments can no more cure thy Dis­contented Mind, than if thou gavest Wine to abate a Fever, or Honey to allay a Redundancy of Choler. All humane bo­dily Infirmities may, in comparison of the Mind's Distresses, be tolerable; that is, a Mans Reason may in some mea­sure support him under them, Prov. 18. 4. but, a Wounded Spirit who can bear? Saith Solomon.

4. Having dispatch'd my Observer from this dismal place, I shall present­ly shew him in the next apartment, an infinite number of such, as are made unhappy and unfortunate by the Evils, which Men are every day studying to bring reciprocally one upon another: and for that Reason it is, that when [Page 294] Seneca was ask'd, Quid ho­mini ina­micissi­mus? Homo. What was the greatest Enemy to Mankind? he should Answer and say, That it was Man. And surely his meaning was, Because in Man, might be found whatsoever in all other Creatures might be Offensive to the Well-Being of Mankind. The Sava­geries of the best armed, and most inra­ged Animals, the Noxious Antipa­thies, and Poisonous qualities of Plants and Minerals, and the most destructive Insects, are not more pernicious to Man­kind, than are the ill humours of men, one towards another. And herein their Barbarisms exceed those of the most mischievous Animals, —Parcit Cognatis maculis fera. Quan­do Leoni Fortior cripuit vitam Leo? quo nemore unquam Expiravit Aper majoris den­tibus Apri? Iudica Tigris agit validâ cum Tigride pacem Perpetuam. Savis inter se con­venit ursis. be­cause that those creatures do commonly suspend their Cruelties to those of the same kind; but it is otherwise in men, the objects of whose ba­ser actions and intentions, are chiefly those of the same species with them­selves.

So that if we would but count the o­pen Oppressions, secret Frauds, and all the arts of Falshood and Subtlety which are every day made use of, to invade and violate mens Rights, and Fortunes; [Page 295] And if we could take a sufficient notice, of what private insinuations, and spiteful invectives, are daily invented and acted, to undermine and blast one anothers ho­nours and reputations; and if we should then reckon the intolerable practices of revenge, as they are every where prose­cuted by the powerful interest of great men, by the vexatious methods of the Law, and by the common Malice of the world: and if to the complaints of those, were added the mournings of oppressed Widows, Parents tears, Brethrens un­natural fewds, Childrens hardships, and all other the oppressions and unkindnesses which many men endure, at the hands sometimes even of such, who by all the obligations of Duty and Gratitude, should be just and kind; I say, if all these Ca­lamities which men suffer one from a­nother, were considered and accounted; there would be cases of Misery enough to afflict and tire out all the Compassi­onate Ears and Hearts, that are at lea­sure to hear and resent them, and (if there were no other World to relieve them) to lament, that so many distressed Persons had ever been at all.

But if that which is call'd Friendship, may be presum'd to abate this severe representation; and if it be objected, that [Page 296] some Philosophers have thought that mu­tual endearment, a sufficient compensa­tion for all the mischiefs and evils, which they can otherwise receive from the rest of Mankind: I may answer with one of the wisest of them, Dio. Laer. lib. 5. De vita Arist. (as Phavo­rinus relates it of Aristotle) when he said, O my Friends, there is no Friend at all: That is (I suppose he means) if all those that are ingag'd in that excellent Society, had not in the be­ginning of it any private ends and de­signs of their own to promote by it; and if all those, which after a begun Friendship, could by no temptations become uncon­stant, or unfaithful; and if all those that undertake that profession, would steadily follow Seneca's Rules, That is, To be willing to be recipro­cally equall'd & counsell'd, En quid amicum paro? ut habeam pro quo mori possim, et habeam quem in exilium sequar, cujus me morti opponam, ut impe­diam. Epist. lib. 1. Epist. 9. and to interpose a relief for one anothers misery, even by Banishment, and Death it self; I say, if all such were only to be accoun­ted Friends, though I won't presume to affirm with the Philosopher, that there is no Friend at all; yet I think I may say, there are very few such to be found in the world, or at least not so many, that in any tolerable degree, can compensate [Page 297] for the innumerable mischiefs and misfor­tunes, that Good men, and even most men, endure, by the malice and falshood of the rest of mankind. To whom the kind mis­carriages of the truest Friends, are oft-times no small addition of trouble; That is, when their indiscreet, though sincere affections, do prove as vexatious as the hatred of an Enemy; as Seneca observes. And the truth is, it's hardly pos­sible, Saepe nihil interesse inter amicorum munera, & inimi­corum tela. Quicquid ac­cidere optant, in id horum intempestiva indulgentia im­pellit & instruit. Lib. de Ben. 2. that the excellent union of Souls, and the entire management of true Friendship, can be supposed or expected to be any where else found but among those, who are qualified with that Honest and Religious Temper of mind, to which the hopes and fears of a Future World, have raised their Souls, above all such temptations, as might in­duce them to act unfriendly or unwor­thily.

5. But if this Room be not a sufficient Prospect, to convince my Observer of the Truth of my Supposition, I will car­ry him into another Place, almost as large as the World it self, where he shall hear a mix'd company of all sorts of men, continually repining and complain­ing of the particular Evils, that insepa­rably [Page 298] accompany every different condi­tion, and quality of Life.

What shall I say of the Cares and un­easy Affairs of the Rich and Great, to support an empty show in the world? What of the Streights and Improvisions, the Contempts and Bondages of the Poor and Low, and how almost the whole species of mankind are made Drudges, and driven about like Machins, to serve the Pride, Pleasures, and Profits of a few? And if it were possible to find out a man, that had no kind of visible Misfortune upon him at present, yet are there rea­sons to be given, Ita enim foelici­tas, se, nisi tempe­ratur, premit. Sen. Epist. that his ve­ry prosperity (as the Philo­sopher Observes) may in time oppress him, and become nauseous, burdensome, and afflictive to his thoughts.

In this place it is, that the Married and the Unmarried are framing argu­ments to act their own Repentance in the state they are in at present; and when their conditions are chang'd, they are condemning themselves for believ­ing their own Arguments and Reasons why they desired it. Here the Publick and the Private, the Inhabitants of the City and Country, are arraigning their present States, by the various Opinions [Page 299] of those, who had studied to enquire and determine, whether of the two ways of living were incumbred with lesser or greater inconveniencies; and while each of them are complaining of their own present State; they wish, and perhaps attempt a change with the contrary; which when they have once done, they commonly encounter a new Tide of greater Dissatis­factions.

Hence it is, that men of several Cal­lings and Imployments, are expressing their Discontents, Quî fit, O Me­caenas, ut nemo quam si­bisortem, Seu ratio dederit, seu fors objece­rit, illâ Contentus vivat? Iaudet diversa sequentes. O fortunati Mer­catores, gravis annis Miles ait, multo jam fractus membra labo­re: Contra Mercator, &c. Hor. Sat. lib. 1. and torturing their Heads with the Opinion and Sense of their own proper incommodities, and invidiously admiring the conveniencies that others enjoy, by the contrary ways of living; as the ingenious Satyrist re­presents the Case.

So that by this natural misfortune it comes to pass, that Men are alwaies tempting themselves to make War up­on their own Contentments; and (if the Religious Concerns of a Future World do not determine them) to oppose the little satisfactions they might possibly otherwise enjoy, in the state they are [Page 300] in at present, by harassing their thoughts with the unavoidable Evils, with which every one of them is naturally born sub­ject to be incumber'd. But that which mightily adds to this kind of Unhappi­ness, is, That the more fine, modest, and ingenuous the minds of Men are, they will alwaies be the more afflictively sen­sible of their lesser Misfortunes, and the more vexatiously tyrannical to them­selves in greater. A sweet Soul is turned away from his Benefactor with a rebuking Look, and frets upon the un­kindness, while the Bold and the Immo­dest, can withstand a thousand Denials, and remembers no affronts to his discou­ragement.

This is the last room of the Afflicted, in our imaginary House of Humane Ca­lamity.

Now, if these several apartments were brought into one prospect, and that I could shew my Observer at once all those, that are at any time afflicted in their several Rooms, the World of Man­kind would look more like one common Hospital of the Miserable, than a Socie­ty of Beings, which are presumed to be Superiour in order, and the Divine Care to all other the visible parts of the Cre­ation besides.

[Page 301] But then, if it be objected, That there be many who have had the good hap to pass away a considerable part of their Lives with tolerable ease and satisfaction: That is, Suppose some young men, who in the strength and vigour of their time, are at present gratifying their sensual Appetites in the several Pleasures of their Youth: Or, suppose some others of fur­ther Progress in their space of living, who are now applauding themselves in their Skill and Success, for the attaining a more than ordinarily considerable Portion of Knowledge, Wealth, or Ho­nour. I say, Suppose that any of, or all these, should reclaim against the Truth of what I have said, yet I must tell them, they are all to consider (though nothing else should ever hap­pen to interrupt their Eutopian Happi­ness) that if they should live towards that boundary of time, which GOD and Nature hath appointed for the com­mon duration of humane Life, they all must assuredly expect (and that expecta­tion alone will be no small abatement of the Pleasure they pretend to take in any Enjoyment whatsoever, if they look no further than their present state) that a considerable portion of their days must be worn away at last, with the labour and [Page 302] sorrow, pains and weariness, contempt and uselessness, decays of Sense, and loss of Strength, and with other the many Calamities, naturally incident to old Age. Of which Stoboeus hath collected such a Description from Wise and Great men, [...], &c. Ser. 113. that no­thing could be offer'd to the Thoughts, so full of Horrour and dreadful Re­presentation. For, if their Proprieties be then too narrow, they must bear the shame of being a Burthen to the World; and if their Enjoyments be very plenti­ful, unkind Posterity will be apt to make promising Inspections into their years; and will be ready to think, and perhaps to say, (if Religion grounded upon the Hopes and Fears of a Future World pre­vents it not) that their continuance is an unhappy Obstruction to the comple­tion of their Successor's long wish'd for Fortunes. Who can without a passion behold how much a stranger a poor old Father and Mother are sometimes made to their own Estates and Circumstances? And, What imperious Proprietors will their Children be apt to make themselves, in their decaying Parents Houses and Fortunes?

[Page 303] Therefore so sensible have some whole Nations been of the wretchedness and calamities of old Age, that in mercy they would forestal Natures tedious acquit­ment of old men from their universal un­happiness, by a speedier way of exemption. [...], &c. Lib. 4. de Abst. S. 21. Of which Practice, Porphyry hath afforded us a large Account and Catalogue. The Massagetes and Der­bicians (saith he) did slay and eat up those old men whom they loved best. The Teba­rins threw them down a Precipice; The Caspians and Bactrians committed them to wild Beasts, for an hasty deliverance out of their miseries: The Scythians burnt them upon the Funeral Piles of their deceased Friends: Lib. 4. cap. 15. And the same usage had old men (as Diodorus Siculus re­ports) among the Troglodites.

Now, these Offices were very hard, and (in the Sence of men that own another World) very unwarrantable, yet the men that contrived and used them, thought, That what old men en­dured by such Expedients of release, was very short, and comparatively more ele­gible and tolerable, than to have them continued in the weariness and pains, [Page 304] scorns and sorrows, and other calami­ties, to which they knew a long old Age would have exposed their Friends. And that if they had lived it out, to its last natural period, Stultus est, qui non exiguà temporis mercede, magnae rei aleam redemit. Paucos longissima Senectus ad mortem sine injuriâ per­tulit. Ex. lib. 8. cap. 59. (as Seneca tells us) they must have done it so much to their own damage, and greater inconvenience. But by this sad Scene, in which men act their old Age, the natural Tragedy of Man's declining time is not yet fully concluded: Nor doth it determine all his mortal Infelicity. And therefore, that which makes the Case yet much harder, is, that all those men­tion'd miseries may conclude with a ter­rible conflict at last, before the uneasie Mind can ordinarily be loosen'd from its vexatious Imprisonment, or a man's decay­ing Life be discharg'd of his Ages in­tolerable Burden.

They are still to dye: And if that last Epilogue alone were truly consider'd and represented, in all its ordinarily natural circumstances, the enjoyment of such a trifling Being as is a mortal Life, would, on that very account, be thought an unequal compensation, for this last Evil of it only. But, if men could be made throughly sensible of what some dying [Page 305] Persons endure, there would be but a few, (if it were offer'd to trial, and to their choice) that would be easily per­swaded to accept of a mortal Existence, with that one severe condition; if there should be no state in Future, whose possible Happiness might balance the rea­son of their choice, to Be at all.

For, Who can be otherwise assured, but that in his bitter Agony of Dying, he may not only endure as exquisite Tortures, as may even exceed the Inven­tions of the most barbarous Tyrants, but (which is worse to a generous mind) that he may die in such circumstances, as to be made a spectacle of Contempt, by the undecent effects of a confused and disorder'd Reason: And that so, in both respects, he may go out of the World, like a Malefactor and a Fool, both at once. And surely, upon the thoughts of this last respect it was, that that Ex­cellent Author of the Religio Medici (a man not to be thought on by them that truly know him, without Love and Honour) could affirm, That he was not so much afraid of Death as asham'd there­of. Part 1. Sect. 39. It is (saith he) the very disgrace and ignominy of our Natures, that a moment can so disfigure us, that our nearest Friends, our Wife and Children, stand afraid, and start at us.

[Page 306] Now, upon the whole matter, If a poor mortal shall consider, that after all the foremention'd miseries of humane Life, this last completion of its Calamity (of whose approach he knows not, but that every next day may bring him the sad Tidings) may succeed, What possible reasonable satisfaction (if ever he seriou­sly thinks of it) can he be presum'd to allow himself in his amplest Plenties and Pleasures, Quae enim potest in vita esse jucunditas, quum dies & noctes cogitandum sit, jam jam (que) esse morien­dum? Cic. Tusc. quest. Lib. 1. if there should be no Future State, whose Belief and Hopes might at present relieve his op­pressed Thoughts, and whose after enjoyment might for ever compensate him for all the sorrowful circumstances of his former Life and Death? But I am not singular in this account of Humane Misery. Therefore,

Section II.

IN this Second Section, lest any man should suggest, that I have been too partial in the Representation of Man's Unhappiness, in favour of my Argument, I shall call in the aid of some Authori­tative Testimonies, (and those that shall [Page 307] give no suspicion of serving our cause by incompetency of Judgment) which do as fully attest the Truth of asserting the Miseries and Calamities of humane Life, as any of those former Instances may be presum'd to demonstrate it. And I am sure, that there is no subject of Discourse can be abetted with a more solemn account from the Great and Wise men of the World. But I shall li­mit my self, and offer a few Testimo­nies of some of them, enough only to avoid the censure and suspicion of im­proving a Foundation for an Argument, beyond the common Opinion of other and Wiser men.

Stobaeus accounts the Words of Ari­stotle thus, describing Man: What is Man (saith he) but an exem­plary Instance of Infirmity, [...], &c▪ the Spoil of Time, the Sport of Fortune, the Copy of Inconstancy, and a Balance toss'd up and down between Envy and Misery? And he gives elsewhere the Sence of Herodotus, — [...] Ser. 103. whom he reports to have affirm'd, That Man was nothing else, but one intire piece of Misery and Calamity. Or, — [...]. Cons. ad Apoll. as Plutarch renders it, (quoting Cantor for [Page 308] the Expression) It's not a Life, but a Punishment, and to be born is the greatest misfortune. Arrianus framing a Questi­on, what Man is, makes him a part of the Vniverse, [...]. Arr. Ep. Lib. 2. but the Disease of it, with the Evils of which he is a while to con­flict, and within a short time to die.

But, to omit the Thousands others that might be produced, I shall conclude with Seneca, who when he had given some instances of humane Infelicity, at last resolves them all into this Interro­gation; Quid opus est partes de­slere? Urgebunt nova in­commoda priusquam vete­ribus satisfeceris. Lib. Cons. ad Martian. To what purpose should I complain of it by Parts? The whole Life of Man it self is one Scene of Sorrow, in which Trou­bles follow one upon another in constant Suc­cession. And he elsewhere calls Man's whole Life, Omnis vita supplicium est. Ad Polyb. Cons. A meer Pu­nishment upon another oc­casion.

And therefore, the Ancients were so severely sensible of the Miseries of man's mortal Life, that, in favour of their de­liverance from them, they constantly celebrated Death, (though in its natu­ral [Page 309] account, the most formidable instance of amazement and terrour) with En­comiums of the kindest Representati­ons, only because it gave a period to all the rest of humane miseries. Arrianus, how careful soever to defend his Stoicism by the Rules of Patience, flies at last to the common Remedy; [...]. Ar. Ep. lib. 4. and for that end calls, Death the Haven and Refuge of all Misery. And Tully cries out, O ye immortal Gods! how sweet is that Journey, Proh dii immortales Quam obtabiliter iter illu ineundum, quam jucundur esse debet, quo confecto, nulla reliqua cura, nulla so licitudo futura sit? Tusc. qu. Lib. 1▪ (speaking of Dying) which being ended, all cares and troubles shall be deter­mined and finished? And in another place, calls Death a safe Port after the restless Voyage, and storms of Mortality; and represents it as the Refuge of a sor­rowful Life. For that end it's reported, That anciently, at a place in Spain, there was a Temple dedicated to Death, as to a common and certain Deliverer of all Mortals miseries.

But perfectly to silence all suspicion of my partiality, I appeal to the Sacred Re­velation it self, (which we must suppose to be especially concern'd for the Crea­tor's honour) and that sets forth man's [Page 310] present mortal state, under as severe re­presentations, as any Authority that can be alledg'd. Man that is born of a Wo­man (saith Job) hath but a short time to live, Job 14. 1. and is full of misery. To which his birth hath made his portion as naturally necessary, Job 5. 7. as the sparks fly upward. Solomon calls the whole natural Circle of Man's duration, Eccl. 6. 12. the days of his vanity, which he spendeth as a shadow. And he accounts all his Enjoyments (which might be presum'd to balance all the inconveniences of his Life) no more considerable, than the most superlative Vanity, Eccl. 1. [...]. and no easier than that which must be the vexation of his spirit, may be presum'd to be esteemed. No won­der then, Eccl. 4. 2. that He praised the Dead, which were already dead, more than the Living, which are yet alive.

But now let me ask my former Ob­server, whether or no, I have imposed upon his credulity, when I first asserted, That Mans natural subjection to such severe Portions of Misery and Calamity, made him (as I first suggested) the most, if not properly the only unhap­py and unfortunate Being of the whole Creation. But this must be further ex­amin'd. Therefore,

Section III.

IN this Section I shall more strictly account, how Mankind in this re­spect, are comparatively by their very nature, more unfortunate in their Beings, than all other the parts of the whole Visible Creation besides. And I shall there attack the Grand Excepti­on, which the Theists make use of, concerning Brute Animals.

First, Let our Observer in his most serious Thoughts round the whole cre­ated Universe, (the case of Brute Ani­mals I shall account for by its self) from the mighty Bodies above, to the smallest insect, that creeps under his feet: Let him strictly examine all their Natures, with the same curiosity, as if they had all the ingenious Societies in the World, to make it their whole bu­siness, to attend the notices of their se­veral orders, figures, and manners of Existence. And I am sure, the issue will be, that a mighty occasion would be given to advance Mens minds to a greater admiration of their Creator's Power and Wisdom; an abundance of Nature's Phaenomena would be solv'd▪ [Page 312] but as to instances of misery and cala­mity among those Beings, they would not be so much as once nam'd, or thought on. A Theme, which no Man ever attempted, or would adventure at, unless he design'd to teach men to dis­parage the Honour of that Great CREA­TOUR, whose perfection of Goodness and Essential Happiness, could not ad­mit a thought of making any Crea­ture naturally, that is purposely, and necessarily unhappy.

First, if our Observer designs a con­sideration of all inanimate Beings, his thoughts are presently discharg'd of all suspicion of their unhappiness.

The Heavens or Earth, or which of them it is, that is daily moved about, is not wearied with its Rapid Revolu­tion. The bright and burning Lumina­ries above, are not scorched with their own Flames: The Starrs of lesser Magnitude, are not emulous of, nor op­pressed by those of the superiour Or­ders: The Plants are not unfortunate by the Wounds they receive, when they are dismember'd or cut down; nor are the Rocks disturbed, when they are torn open for Materials to serve the Health or Fortunes of Men; nor are the several natural Causes, that act [Page 313] their Powers to serve the Universe, tir'd or incumber'd with their busy and constant Operations.

As for what concerns Brute Animals, I must assault the strongest Hold, on which our Theists principally rely, to secure their opposition to their belief of a Future State, upon the account of this Argument; and they will object and say, What necessity is there of a supposal of the real Existence of a Fu­ture State to recompense Men, after their calamitous Lives and Deaths, more than the Brute Animals, who also are naturally made subject to as many af­flictive Evils, pungent Torments, and ill Usages in their kinds; and at last, must pass out of the World, with the same ( [...]) Disorder, Convulsions, and Conflicts, as Men do?

To all which it's answered, First, that it is not true when its affirmed, that Brute Animals miseries (if in any pro­priety of speech they might be so repu­ted, in comparison of those, which men endure) are as numerous, as those of Man­kind. For upon an ordinary computa­tion it must be acknowledg'd, that they are incomparably fewer in any one kind of them, and almost none at all in most; and for those Evils, with which those few [Page 314] seem to be incumbred, the Great Creatour hath taught most of them, by a natu­ral instinct, without the trouble and ha­zard of foreign aid, or counsel, (which men must employ for their relief and health; and which oftentimes, upon mi­stake, or worse, proves their greater misfor­tunes) to find out their own Cures, and remedies; or by a sagacious fore-sight to avoid and escape their approaching dan­gers. All which Arts in Brute Animals (saith Pro­clus) are from without, Et aliunde curantur, ea videlicet conditione, qua movet ipso motor: Orba­ta scilicet ea facultate, qua aliquid seipsum ducere va­leat atque servare. Proclus de anima & daemo­ne. Ficinus interpr. and from an impulse, which they have receiv­ed from the Original of all Motion. Hence it is, that they toil not for Manufactures to cover them, nor do they use Engines fetch'd from the bottoms of Mountains for their Armature, to defend them. Their parturitions are easy, their declension to their natural period's but a very little varied from the vigour of their perfect Age. And when men are rack'd and worn up with Cares and La­bours to live in a tolerable plenty, their Tables are spred, and their Little-Ones provided for, by Natures munificence. All which advantages put the ancient Po­et Philemon, into such a fit of admirati­on [Page 315] of their Felicity, that he passionate­ly cryes out, O thrice Happy, and thrice Blessed Brute Animals, [...]. per Hert. that are free from such Calamities, as Men endure.

As for such as die for mans use, that is no more than a kind hastning them to their quiet Annihilations; a benefit, which ma­ny poor oppressed Slaves, and many o­thers, that live in calamitous conditions, and even some in their prosperous cir­cumstances, would judge an acceptable Relief, if Nature would allow it them.

But Secondly, I answer, that Brute A­nimals, in whatsoever they endure, and howsoever their Senses, and sensitive Ima­ginations may be affected, are yet whol­ly freed from all the oppressions of a re­flecting mind; which properly imports the special reason of all real Misery. From which, if Rational Agents in their Calamities, were as much exempted, they would not in most cases so much consi­der (in comparison of what they suffer by the Minds concurrence) the common Evils, to which their Natures have other­wise exposed them.

Hence it is, that Brute Animals have no discursive antecedent fears of dangers, [Page 316] before they come; nor can they be intel­lectually sensible of their own infelicities when they are upon them, nor do they sor­rowfully account them, when they are past. As for those mournful Postures, Sighs, and Out-cries, by which they express their oppressive sensations, they are not the chosen effects of any inward trouble, or conflict of mind, (as ordinarily in men) but such as necessarily result from those different figures and alterations of parts, into which they are naturally and neces­sarily cast, when any offensive impressi­ons are then upon their Bodies. And so they seem to import no more, than those Groans and Sighs, which are observed in men, when they are in no perturba­tion of mind at all, but are purely natural acts, consequent to some (sometimes unob­served) straitnes or oppression in the inward parts of their Bodies; Or as when those acts are expressed by men in a fast sleep, and their Minds are not in a capa­city to consider them. And it's like, that Brutes suffer no more by such impressi­ons upon their Senses, either in Diseases or hard Usages, than a Souldier feels smart by his wounds, in the heat and fury of the Battle, when his mind is not at leisure to reflect; Or their dying conflicts, and convulsions (as when it's said, As Dyeth [Page 317] the one, Eccle. 3. 19. so Dyeth the other) may be no more afflictive to them, than that mans are, who goeth out of the world in a Lethargick, or Apoplectick Fit.

I know that Porphyry did strongly con­tend, to have Brute Ani­mals reckon'd as fellow brethren in the Rational World, [...], &c. De Abst. lib. 3. and to be capa­ble of Reason, though in an inferiour degree to Man, and so might have the same recompence at▪ God's hand by his equitable providence, one way or o­ther, or at one time or other, as well as the afflicted part of Mankind.

And for the proof of which, he al­ledgeth the Subtilty and Wiliness of some, and the Vertues of others, such as Fortitude, Temperance, Gratitude, and the like. And then he offers to observa­tion, their skill in the fore-sight of dan­gers, and of approaching different seasons. He instanceth in their teachableness of tricks, and imitation of many humane actions, for Sport and Divertisement.

To all which it's Answered, first, That those mention'd Actions, that hold such an assimulation to those of Rational Agents, are only such as pro­ceed from a natural necessary Principle, [Page 318] which their Wise CREATOUR implanted in their several kinds in dif­ferent manners, to supply the want of an intellectual Faculty. Therefore Ne­mesius, first a Philosopher, and then a Bishop, in his Book of the Nature of Man, observes, That in Brute Animals, there is an Vnderstanding that is Na­tural, Cap. 2. § 7. but not Rational; and then gives a Reason for it: Cap. 2. § 7. num. 3. Because (saith he) every Creature of one kind, doth the same thing in one and the same manner; eve­ry Hare useth the same subtilty, every Fox the same wiliness; and every Ape is alike, an imitator of Humane Actions: But (saith he) it is not in all cases so with Man; for his Actions of Reason, are infinitely various, and of different sorts; in several individuals; and are variated by choice and freedom of Mind in the same Person.

Then Secondly, as to those Actions of Brute Animals, which are called Ver­tuous, it only proves, That they have natural Qualifications, that make resem­blances of Humane Vertues, but they are by instinct and necessary, and not of choice, nor upon any apprehension of doing Right or Good; nor from the proposal of any end, as is necessa­ry in any action, that may be call'd [Page 319] morally Vertuous, such as must be sup­pos'd to be in Rational Beings.

And lastly, as for their Dexterities and Tricks, it's certain, that they are learn'd, and done, not by any inven­tive or discoursive faculty, but by a greater natural quickness and sagacity of their Senses, which fits them for imi­tation, and mechanical direction, how to act such things; which at present become as unaccountable, and may oc­casion as much present wonder in Spe­ctators, as the nimble feats of Jugglers, because they escape the Beholder's ob­servation: And so much as Jugglers are truly reputed Conjurers, so much may those Brute Animals, for that reason, be as justly esteem'd Rational Creatures.

Now upon the whole account of what I have said in the case of Brute Ani­mals, it is so different from that of Mankind, that it can no way be imagi­ned, How it should be unjustifyable in the Soveraign Creatour, if they should meet no future Recompence for such comparatively very inconsiderable En­durances.

And, if it were granted with Por­phyry and others, That they were en­dued, in some degree, with a Rational Capacity, yet for as much as they want [Page 320] all manner of sense of a Deity, and are altogether uncapable of morally, either pleasing or offending Him; for­asmuch as they have no Faculties, by which in their Afflictions they can ei­ther dread His Justice, implore His Mer­cy, or make any Complaints to Him; how can it be supposed, That they can have any Capacities, by which they should either be expectant, or acceptive of any Rewards or Compensations from Him in a Future World?

But then as to Man, how is it possi­ble, That he being made a Creature furnished with Faculties, by which he can make Conceptions of a GOD, that can own Him for his Creatour, and can love and serve Him, and fear to offend Him; by which he can complain for a Relief, and hope for a Redress: I say, How is it possible, That such a Crea­ture as this, after all the indurances of a Calamitous Life, should at last be so forgotten and forsaken, as to have his Being shut up in an empty Nothing? What a Gratification and Pleasure would the thought of this be to every rati­onal Enemy of Mankind? And how would the Adversaries of Goodness and Good Men rejoice, if they were assu­red, that when Vertuous Persons, whom [Page 321] at present they scorn, hate, and oppress, were once gone out of the World, they should not only be in no better condi­tion than themselves, but in no other, than what their Dogs and Horses pass into when they die?

This mighty Objection, in which the willing Adversaries of a Future State placed such a Confidence, being thus solv'd, I hope I have fairly acquitted my self of the first part of my design'd Method, to promote this present Argu­ment; that is, I have endeavour'd to represent, that Man, by the Divine Or­der and Permission, was created and born subjected and exposed to bear such severe Portions of Misery and Calami­ty, that if there be no other use and end of them, but only that they should be endured, as his subjection to them is soveraignly imposed, and no provisi­on reserved in future, whereby he might enjoy a succeeding setled State of Rest, Freedom, and Compensation after them, then must Man, (as it was at first sug­gested, and since proved) be the only unfortunate Being of the whole Creation. And that the Existence of any other Created Being whatsoever (be it of a Stone, or Plant, Worm, or Fly) were rather to be chosen, if [Page 322] he had a liberty allow'd him of ma­king his Election. But concerning that, there are severer Thoughts still to fol­low. Therefore,

Section I.

IN which I shall endeavour to demon­strate that Mankind's universal Subje­ction to those foremention'd troubles, mi­series, and calamities, (without a conside­ration had of a Future Life) cannot but inferr, to a reasoning mind, very unkind Reflexions upon those Attributes of God, without which, it's impossible to form conceptions of His infinitely happy Be­ing; that is, when an understanding mind shall consider, that such a disor­der'd Effect should be produc'd by a cause of such an infinite Wisdom, which in all other His Works is so manifestly renown'd; and that the perfection of Goodness and Equity, should chuse to give a Being to any Creature, by which it may be sensible, That it is made so much the more unhappy, by the very Enjoyment of it; and that whereby it may reasonably judge it self much bet­ter, [Page 324] never to have been at all; [...]. Simplic. cap. 38. as the Wise Philosopher Simplicius offers his Opinion.

But Plutarch represents the Case, not as his private Opinion, but as true by universal suffrage; and as a notion made trite by common Dis­course; — [...]. Plutarch. Cons. Polyb. that is, that (up­on the consideration of humane Miseries) it were better for a Man never to have been, or that he should immediately die: so that, the mind of Man, will be apt to suggest, That if any one in any humane, soveraign Autho­rity, should follow such a Pattern or President; that is, if any Prince or Parent, without any other respect had to either, should out of meer Dominion and Arbitrary Power, make a Subject or Child to be unavoidably unhappy, when it was in their capacities to have prevented that misfortune; I make no question, That neither Almighty GOD, nor any created rational Being, would approve of such an use of their Power or Authority: and if it should be al­ledg'd, That the Soveraignty of GOD over His Creatures is more absolute [Page 325] than a Prince's or Parent's over his Sub­jects or Children: I must Answer, That His Divine Goodness must also be believed to have the same infinite demensions with His Dominion; and that it is dishonourable to the Divine Nature to imagine, That there should be any act of the one, which should not be compleatly consistent with the other. Upon the assurance of which, it is, that the Son of Syrach could say, We will fall into the Hands of the LORD, Eccl. 2. 18. and not into the Hands of Men: for as His Majesty is, so is His Mercy.

But, against the Inference of this dreadful Consequence, I must encounter Three grand Objections, pretended for the vindication of the Divine Attributes in this case.

First, It will be objected, That though GOD Almighty gave Man such a Being, by which, in some respects, he may live a more afflictive Life than other visible Creatures; yet nevertheless, it's to be consider'd, That GOD hath, in compen­sation, allow'd him a far larger share of many happy Advantages in this World, by which he may be sensible of enjoy­ing more Knowledge, Honour, Power, and Pleasure, than any other Creature besides can be possessed of.

[Page 326] To this Objection, my Answer is, That whatsoever that Portion be, if there be no apprehension of a future Bliss, to make such Enjoyments acceptable in their esteem and use, it's known, (as my next and last Argument will sufficiently explain the Case) that whatsoever they be, they must be such as, in their na­ture, are neither universal, satisfactory, nor certain; nor in any man's power, at choice, to obtain them, when they most passionately desire them, or most extreamly need them. And when they are possessed, they are such, as will be perpetually incumbring the Minds of Men, with so many fears, and unexpected turns and interruptions, and with so many attendant Evils, that any one of them consider'd, and felt, (as the nature of Man's mind is) may more afflictive­ly assault its notice, to the Sense of its own Infelicity, than all other the inte­gral parts of Prosperity can afford it contentment or satisfaction. So that, if it falls out, (and it's rare if it doth not) that the most prosperous man in all other respects, should be invaded either in Body or Mind, with any of those grea­ter Evils, to which his nature hath sub­jected him, all other his Enjoyments (how many and great soever) would [Page 327] appear not only inconsiderable, but oft­times nauseous to his Thoughts. First, A Fit of any violent Torment upon his Body, shall render his stately Palace, his plenteous Fortune, and his honourable Character, so unconcerning, as that a Noble man of this Nation (as I have been inform'd) should in a continued Fit of the Gout, wish an exchange of his con­dition in all those his famous circum­stances, with an healthful Porter, rather than enjoy all other the parts of his Pro­sperity with that one attendant Evil.

And then, Secondly, It's the same with any such Person, how prosperous soever in all other respects, that happens but to have his Mind affected with any disorde­red imagination, (how causeless, perhaps, or unreasonable soever) as that a great Lady of this Nation also, (as it was re­lated to me by one that knew her) who at the same time that she was discours'd by her Favourite, to be the happiest Wo­man in the World, in respect of her Youth and Beauty, Noble Extraction and For­tune; and standing at a Window in view of a poor Oyster-woman, then passing by, should be so unsensible of the great advantages of living happily, which she enjoy'd, as to say, That she could be con­tent to exchange her own present con­dition [Page 328] with that Poor womans, at all ad­ventures whatsoever. No wonder then, that the Wise Antoninus should so passio­nately express himself in our Case, as to say; [...], &c. Anton. lib. 5. What is there here that should tempt the de­sire of being any longer de­tain'd in this Life? A company of poor outward things, so transient, so apt to change? Shall such obscure senses, that are so easily de­ceived? shall a little soul, that knows not it self? shall a vain and empty Name and Glory? What shouldst thou desire, but a present Annihilation or Transition? And this (I think) sufficiently solves my first Objection.

2. The Second Objection that is pre­tended to obviate the reflection upon those Attributes of God, with respect to the abovesaid humane Infelicities, is thus laid: That is, That GOD may be so far justified in Mankind's subjection to them, as that those Evils are supposed to be inflicted upon men as punishments for their offences, and as effects of their own guilt. That is, That they have deserved them at God's Hand.

My Answer to this seemingly great Objection is, That that kind of Solution of the consequence, does rather improve [Page 329] the Reflection upon the Divine Attri­butes, and must even blaspheme the Goodness of GOD it self, upon several accounts. First, Because it must suppose, that GOD design'd to punish a Man, even in his Birth; it being an Infelicity in it self to be so born. Secondly, Because the real miseries that may attend his Infancy, Childhood, and the innocenter part of his Youth, must be reputed Pu­nishments for Offences uncommitted, and but only in possibility. And then, Third­ly, When such Calamities have befaln men of fuller Age, they could not be really accounted Punishments, that is meerly and properly so, because they come to pass generally in a promiscuous order and manner, and in most instan­ces, without any visible distinction be­tween the Good and Evil: And that Vertuous persons (who, though they be not absolutely perfect, yet perhaps not wilfully wicked) are alike concern'd in those natural Evils, and in the ordinary contingences of Calamity, Non om­nes ho­nos esse beatos, quum in omnes bonos, ea quae ille in malis numerat cadere possunt. Cic. Tusc. quest. lib. 5. as well as the obnoxious and great Offenders. Are not Good men (saith Cicero) surprized. in common Miseries as well as the Evil? Are they not as afflictively sick, poor, [Page 330] and old? And, do they not pass along in their mortal Durations, with the same severe circumstances of natural Troubles, and sad Accidents, as other men? And in many cases are they not observ'd to meet even harder usages than those that be enormously vitious? And if so, then (I say) Cannot Mankind in general be said to be subject to them, and afflicted by them, under the meer notion of Punishments? For though Pro­vidence may, and doth order them oft­times for the Punishment of Evil men, yet it is to be accounted not by a natural, but by an occasional Ordination: That is, they are Primarily the miseries of Mankind, according to their nature, and then but Secondarily, and by occasion, the Punishments of Evil men, when they happen to them. As the same Evils and Misfortunes may in like manner be oc­casionally and ordinatively the acts of God's Paternal care and love, and for the greater Advantage of Good men, when they happen to them, as those Evils may be the discipline and chastisement of his Wise Love to, and care of, them.

But then the Reason of all this must be founded upon the suppos'd Existence of a Future World. Otherwise it would be a great irregularity in Providence, if [Page 331] innocent Infants and Children, and that men of perfect age, who endeavour all they can to be Good and Vertuous, should nevertheless be made miserable, & be affli­cted in the same manner, and to the same degree that wicked and vitious men are punished for their gross offences. Which must be True in consequence, if (I say) the consideration of a Future World doth not solve the doubt.

But I shall respite the giving a suffi­cient Evidence for that Solution, to the Third Chapter. This the Second Ob­jection.

Object. 3. The Third Objection which our Theist doth chuse to lay in our way, is borrowed from some of the Christian Name, (and it must be accor­dingly answered) 1. Who have been apt to affirm, That though it can't be said, that Man's subjection to those mi­series and natural calamities, were impo­sed upon Mankind universally for their own offences, yet God may be justify'd in permitting, if not in inflicting them (without any consideration had to a Fu­ture State) for the imputed sin of ano­ther; that is, because that every man is born guilty of Adam's transgressions, and by that guilt alone, every man may be justifyably born subject to the [Page 332] unhappiness of all those mention'd Evils.

To all this objection; First I say, That our Church indeed in her confession, Art. 9. doth profess, That Original Sin is the fault and corruption of every Man, that is Natural­ly engendred of the Offspring of Adam, &c. And that therefore in every Person born into the World, it deserveth God's Wrath and Damnation. In which last words of the Article, as it's severest consequence, my Objecters may interpret, that mans natural subjection to those mention'd Evils is comprehended and understood; though the Article takes not any particu­lar notice of that consequence of Adam's Sin.

But the Tridentine Article indeed doth suppose it in express words: Si quis Adae praevaricati­onem sibi soli, & non ejus propagini—mortem & poe­nas corporis tantum,—&c. Caranza p. 910. And the Bohemi­an Confession doth enu­merate those very natu­ral calamities, as particu­larly as I have done; as being compre­hended in that menace, The day thou Ea­test thereof thou shalt surely Die. Gen. 3. 5.

But in full Answer to the Objection, I say that the Article is so far from be­ing improvable to take off the reasona­bleness of that intolerable consequence, which so much reflects upon the Divine Attributes, upon the account of Mans [Page 333] natural subjection to all those Evils; that, were it not for the consideration and sup­posal of a Future State, it will appear, that the Sense of it cannot possibly be consistent or accountable. For whatsoe­ver imputation of guilt is presum'd by it to be derived from Adam's Sin to his Posterity, certainly God never design'd thereby to be so unmerciful, as natural­ly to punish any man so severely for it, who should not afterward deserve it by his own offences, as that it may be believed, that God did but take occasion by the imputation to put Mankind under a new, Rom. 5, 16, 17, 18. and a more gracious Covenant, for high­er and nobler Interests, and upon easier, and more feisible Terms; for the better performance of which, mans natural and contingent Evils were to become design­edly instrumental, and highly servicea­ble; otherwise it would argue such an act of Revenge, as can hardly be paral­lell'd by the worst imaginary case; and that in an instance, that God hath most solemnly disclaim'd, as when he so ex­presly reproved the use of that reflecting Proverb; Ezek. 18. 1. The Fathers have eaten sowre Grapes, and the Childrens Teeth are set on edge. Thereupon he renounc'd all manner of partiality in the execution of his Divine Judgment, and positively ap­prov'd [Page 334] the equality of his own ways, up­on a Fundamental of Eternal Equity; that is, v. 20. That the Son shall not bear the Iniquity of the Father.

As for that instance which hath been made use of to justify God in the present Miseries, and even in the Eternal con­demnation of the greater part of Man­kind, for Adam's Sin, because the Sons of Traytors may be punished for their Fa­thers Offences, it holds no resemblance at all to this Case; for that's done, not that the Government doth not know, that there is an hard thing done to an inno­cent and unfortunate Heir, but out of pure politick necessity, to discourage o­thers from attempting the like Treasona­ble designs to their own, their Posteri­ties, and the Governments Ruin. Now this case is altogether different from the other; for here is only the punishment of one or a few, to prevent the undoing a numerous Many, and for a Publick Safe­ty: But there must be suppos'd such an imputation of one mans fault, as must put the whole world into a state of Mi­sery without any consideration had to their own offences. A belief of such a proceedure cannot possibly consist with the very Notion of a Supream Deity, without Reasons that might be given for [Page 335] such a Fact, from the consideration of mans designation to the happiness of a Future World; as for the better attain­ment of which, all humane miseries may be made subservient, as shall presently appear.

And thus notwithstanding the objecti­on, though the truth of the Article be assented to; yet it cannot take off the intolerable consequence upon the Divine Attributes, without a respect had to the Existence of another World. This the last Objection.

But there be other severe consequen­ces of another Nature, which must be also considered, but they are the business of the next, or Second Section.

Section II.

IN this Section I shall add several other very severe consequences, besides those that concern GOD Almighty, which are of themselves really destructive to hu­mane Nature, both as Socially, and Perso­nally considered: And which may as rea­sonably be inferr'd from Mens being Natu­rally subject to those Evils; if we should not be able to balance such unhappy [Page 336] thoughts by the assur'd belief of a Fu­ture State, which is to be the enquiry of the Third Chapter.

The first Consequence of that nature, is, That Parents would then be unac­countably cruel, who should permit a propagation of Beings, which they knew by undoubted Arguments of Discourse, and the Suffrage of universal Experience, must be born to an Inheritance (at least) of continual Toil and Trouble, if not of intolerable Misery and Calamity. Upon which observation, Clemens of Alexandria hath delivered us the Sence of an ancient Poet, [...] [...], [...].—Strom. lib. 3. who was perswaded, That Parents ought not to bring Children into the World, when they saw to what Evils they must be born: And makes men­tion of some, that thought, that the Pythagoreans, for that end, abstained from all the natural means of propagation.

Secondly, On that account it would be true, That in cases of violent Torments or languishing Diseases, an Assassinate might more properly be sent for, as a fit­ter Instrument of Relief, than a Physi­cian; a great part of whose Skill and Care would, in such Cases, be but a Tyranny to the Afflicted, except it were employed to [Page 337] hasten them to their Rest, and to facili­tate their periods for their quiet Annihi­lation.

The last Consequence (as that which I principally design to take notice of) is, That in a Thousand Cases it would then follow, That it would be every man's Duty to himself, Magna vis est in iis malis, quibus iste naturae vincitur sensus, quo mors omnimo­dis, omnibus viribus cona­tibus (que) vitatur: Et si non potuerit aliunde contingere ab ipso homine sibimet in­feratur. Aug. de Civ. lib. 19. cap. 4. to study for the readiest Euthana­sie, (as the Romans in some cases did) to ex­pedite their departures from their miserable Sations, that they might attain a lasting Repose in a nothing, rather than endure the misery of some Years torments, want, or disgrace.

Therefore Seneca speaking like a Stoick, did boldly affirm, At si inutile ministeriis est corpus, quidni oporteat educere animunm laboran­tem?—Et cum majus periculum sit male vivendi, quam cito moriendi, stultus est qui non exiguo tempo­ris mercede magnae rei ale­am non redemit. Lib. Ep. 8. Ep. 60. That if a man's Life became uneasie to him, He were a Fool if he did not drive out that troublesome Inha­bitant within him, that made him sensible of his present Vnhappiness; or that he should refuse to purchase so great an Advantage to himself, upon so small an Adventure.

[Page 338] On this account, What can be suffi­ciently said to condemn Mithridates, that he made his own Sword his Re­prieve, from being dishonourably tyed to Pompey's triumphant Chariot? Or to reproach Cato's courage, when he chose to allow himself a present Death, ra­ther than to live in the disgrace of be­ing a Trophy to Caesar's Victories? With many more Examples of that sort of men, whose Stoicism having afforded them an Allowance, it was but reasona­ble for them to make use of that Liber­ty, to set themselves free, when they were oppressed with the heavy Sense of being Unhappy.

And what Kindness these men did themselves, for ought I yet see, (if there be no Future State, nor Laws to go­vern mens actions in order to it) my Friend, when he sees me in sorrow or torment, might as innocently do it for me, as to kill a Fly, and with far grea­ter reason; and to whom I might ap­peal for my release, as it was told David, That Saul should do the Amalekite, Stand upon me and slay me, 2 Sam. 19. because my Life is yet whole in me.

This is the last of that sort of ill con­sequences, and it's the most famously considerable of them all. And therefore, [Page 339] against it, I must be attacked with seve­ral Objections, which will take up the next Section.

Section III.

IN this Third Section, I shall under­take the Answer of Three Objections, against the just Inference of this last hor­rid Consequence; that is, of mens taking a Liberty to put an end to their own Lives, as oft as they find themselves op­pressed with those Calamities, to which their natures have subjected them.

1. The First Objection is, That Men may be restrained from such destructive Attempts upon their own Lives, by a natural fear of, and a customary abhor­rency from Dying; though they had no Faith at all of another World.

2. The Second is founded upon an Observation, That persons who profes­sedly renounce the Belief of another World, do not ordinarily, and but very rarely, make use of that Expedient, to free themselves from their own afflictive states.

3. The Third Objection is, That the Heathen Philosophers have allow'd the [Page 340] World a notice of some Wise Rules, by which it's presum'd, that men may con­tentedly bear their natural and contin­gent Evils, without doing that violence to their own Lives, and also without any necessary consideration had of a future World.

Object. 1. The First Objection is, That a desire of Living and self-preservation, is as connatural to Men, as their very Be­ings, and that it is in some Sence true, what Satan said, Job 2. 4. Skin for skin, and all that a man hath, will he give for his Life. And therefore such an innate and (especially being made a) customary desire of Life, will be sufficient to hold mens hands from offering that confusion to the So­cieties of Mankind, upon every man's ta­king a Liberty to die, as oft as he is oppressed with any cross or calamity. And, so that there needs not any acknow­ledgment of a Future State, to prevent that grand inconvenience to the World.

To this I Answer, That though it be granted, that there is such a natural de­sire of Self-preservation, and that it be moreover allowed, that that desire is or­dinarily advanced by a customary fear of Dying; yet if it be reasonable in it self, because it is far easier to pass out of the World with a gentle stroke, but of [Page 341] one minute's duration, than to endure a long languishing Disease, or a tormenting Pain, or a permanent Oppression of Mind, (there being no fear of a following ac­count, for the irregularity of the Fact) it's all I pretend to in this consideration. For what is purely reasonable in its self, may in time conquer a natural, sensual, and imaginary fear, and the power of custom; and subdue the common cla­mours of mens disapprobation of the Fact, and at last, by common usage, give Laws to the World, and a Reputation to the Design: As it hath done among the Indian Women, who cheerfully, in the briskest vigour of their Age, throw them­selves into their dead Husbands Funeral flames, to prevent a following accustom'd dishonour to themselves: And as it is among the Japanesses, who customarily rip up their own Entrals, rather than ad­venture the disgrace of being respitted, till the Executioner shall do his Office. Thus is the first Objection solv'd.

Object. 2. The next Objection is, That if because, where there's no concern for a Future State, it will follow, that such an Expedient to set a miserable Person free from his present want, torment, or dis­grace, would be a reasonable attempt (as I have discours'd): If this were True [Page 342] (saith my Objector) How comes it to pass, that that irreligious sort of men; who do professedly mock at the belief of another World, should not very often, if not alwaies, act that kind piece of Friendship to themselves, when they happen to be greatly Unfortunate?

To which I Answer, that I confess there is such a sort of men in the World, that do make a scorn of all Religion, and a Future Life; and that would be thought sufficiently able to defend the Case, when once they have pick'd up two or three notable exceptions against the Holy Bible, and can cross some Catho­lick Principles of Christianity, with a few hints of the Malmsburian Divinity; or when they can get no better Argu­ments to perswade their lewd Crew to comply with them in the same contempt of God, and of all that is Sacred and Good; they can think it at present a sufficient confutation of all that can be said in their own defence, if they do but swear down the man in Black, with a thousand Oaths and Curses, and with Unmanliness e­nough, can but droll upon him with some idle stories, purposely set on foot, to make themselves merry, with the defamation of the whole Sacred Order.

[Page 343] But in the mean time these men give us no sufficient Reason to think, that they are sincere, and truly in earnest at the bottom in all this: For if they did but really believe, that there were no o­ther World, as they swear and pretend, it were Impossible that they should be so dull and silly as to chuse to be unhappy any one hour more; but that, when they are oppressed with want of money, with a baffl'd Amour, or loss of health, or when they are rotten, and creep about the town with half a Nose, or with other the like symptoms of their own debau­cheries, they should determine their mi­series at one blow; and prudently com­mit themselves to rest in a quiet annihi­lation; which they knew they might ef­fect with so much ease and speed. If some of them would but briskly go about that work, they might gain a belief from us, that they meant what they said; otherwise they must excuse us, if we think, that they either are a pack of a­bominable cowards; (of which their blustering humour is a very probable in­dication) or else that they have some un­lucky doubts of the Existence of another World creeping about their minds, that hinders the Rope, or some good old Well, from doing them a kinder Office, than [Page 344] the best friends they have in the world can otherwise do for them; if it were true, as they pretend, that there is no Future World, account, or punishment. But then the wonder is, that if that doubt, can, on the one hand, restrain them from an act so much to their present ease and deliverance; and yet that the same doubt, should not on the other hand, reclaim them from doing the most unreasonable thing in the World, that is, from living such infamous and prodigiously wicked Lives so much to their own danger of being eternally undone, if (as they doubt) there should happen to be such a thing indeed, as a following and dreadful Ac­count in another World.

But that I may throughly solve these mens Credit, I had rather tell the Ob­jecter, That I am perswaded, that after all this, most of them do really believe the being of a God, and of another World; and they do in their best thoughts ap­prove a Vertuous and Sober Life, only they are resolved to keep up their A­theistical and Hectouring humour, to shew their bravery in being Wicked: That is, they speak and act such extremities of profaneness, that they may be admir'd for a more than ordinary Greatness of Mind, and so may insult over those lit­tle [Page 345] Sinners, that chuse to creep to Hell, for a company of Low and Sneaking Transgressions.

And then, they having past away a con­siderable part of their time in that wretch­ed manner of Living, upon this and the like fashionable motives; they are at last arrested with the fatal symptoms of a de­caying and a dying State; and then they begin to whine for their own Follies, and admonish their surviving Friends, of taking wiser measures, and of making better pro­visions for themselves in another World. This solves my Second Objection.

3d. The Third and last Objection, which I must encounter, is offer'd by them that will say, that Philosophy a­lone can suggest a sufficient relief to a mind under the severest pressures of natu­ral or contingent Evils, as without such mens undertaking their deliverance, by putting a present period to their own uneasy lives, so without any considera­tion of a Future World as sufficient to prevent it.

To this it's first Answer'd, That upon the carefullest survey of Cicero's Arguments; (who I believe hath said as much, and as wisely, as can well be suggested in that Case) I find nothing that he offers that so much as pretends to any exemption from [Page 346] those natural Miseries, much less that ten­ders any thing in compensation for them; only he hath given some certain Rules, which (as it's presum'd) may direct men how better to submit to, and the more patiently to bear up against, their present misfortunes; that is, to be more wisely miserable: But nevertheless, the afflicted man endures them still; that is, notwithstanding all those Rules, he is still an unhappy man.

Secondly, I Answer, that all those di­rective Rules they give are a relief and cure by far narrower than the largeness of the distemper; that is, they are too Philoso­phical for the hundredth part of the af­flicteds capacities, to learn or understand them: And they generally purport just so much help to the miserable, as if all men that want Money, were sent to the Philosophers Stone, to cure the disease of their Purses.

Thirdly, My Answer to that pre­tence is, That I observe our Philoso­pher makes the succesfulness of those his Rules, —Sic contra, illi sunt beati, quos nul­li Metus terrènt, nullae Libidines incitant, &c. Tusc. Quest. lib. 5. to depend upon such severe qualifications of Mind and Life, and upon so many strict acts of self-denial, (such as throwing off all natural Fear, and [Page 347] the force of all sensual Appetites, and the like) that the afflicted Persons may be order'd to go about almost to unman themselves, as well as pretend an Obe­dience to all his numerous and difficult prescriptions; which nothing but the Encouragements of a Future World can possibly inable them to undertake; as my Third Argument hath evinced.

Fourthly, I Answer, That those Phi­losophers did so far believe their own notional Schemes of Patience to be un­practicable (and as a full confutation of all other their pretentions for the relief of the unfortunate) that at last they were driven to fly to the Rock of Fatal Necessity, Quid er­go expi­ationes, procura­tiones▪ que, quo perti­nent si immuta­bilia sunt Fata? Permitte mihi illam rigidam sectam tueri eorum, qui accipiunt ista, & nihil allud esse Fatum, quam aegre mentis solatium. Lib. 2. Nativ. Quest. to give any tolerable quiet to mens uneasy Minds. This Seneca pleads as the last refuge, and the only remain­ing comfort for a Sick Mind; and with­out which, all other attempts for its re­lief, were altogether unsufficient.

Now, if ever any manner of carriage could intimate a defective cause, This certainly must do it, as to our present concern; if there be no other, or no better shifts, to avert the cogency of our thus [Page 348] arguing for a Future World, on the ac­count of mens natural subjection to such miseries and calamities of humane Life, the Controversie is at an end.

What! Is there no other way to solve the Reflection upon the Divine Attri­butes, and to keep a Man from offering Violence to his own miserable Life, but by engaging him to think, that he must of necessity be Unhappy, and that an immoveable Fate hath chain'd him down to it? What can be added more to com­pleat his misery? The least hopes of Deliverance hath some Relief; but where there is none at all to be admitted, an Invitation to Patience is an additional oppression, and looks more like a re­vengeful Exprobration, than a rational Support.

But, Fifthly and Lastly, To shew how those men are necessitated to trifle in finding out a Relief for the Afflicted's Patience, (where the Concerns of ano­ther World are designedly to be laid aside) it may be observ'd, That the great Philo­sophers were so diffident of their own stated Rules, especially of their beloved Principle of Fate, that they themselves have dispoil'd the Credit of them, and proclaim'd them all to be insufficient, by allowing a speedier Remedy for all hu­mane [Page 349] Miseries; and, that is, by acqui­ting themselves of their Misfortunes and Beings all at once. Concerning this, I have already given some instances, and could have added many more great Ex­amples of that desperate Expedient; which those Philosophers mention with so much approbation, that Seneca taking occasion to speak of Cato and Scipio; of the later, Multum fuit Carthagi­nem vincere, sed amplius mortem. Ep. lib. 3. Ep. 34. he hath this expression; that It was a great thing that it could be said of him, that he con­quered Carthage; but much greater, that he had overcome himself; that is, ended his Life with his own Sword.

And then, Do not the reason of the sad mention'd intolerable consequence recurr? Doth not what I have here said suffici­ently shew, that what I before af­firm'd was true; that is, that it must ne­cessarily follow, that if there be no Fu­ture State consider'd, it's reasonable for a man to put an end to his own Life and Misery together? Or, Why should such men (in whom this last Objection had its Concern) so often chuse to make use of that Expedient, and in a Thousand Cases think it more reasonable to put an end to their wearied Lives, than to en­dure their present Miseries? This solves my Last Objection.

[Page 350] And thus all my Opponents are disap­pointed of their Design to baffle the reasonableness of all my intolerable con­sequences: Which must hold immuta­bly true, till the acknowledged Existence of a future State shall release them of their horrour, and allow them a sufficient Solution; which is the business of the Third and Last Chapter of this Argu­ment. Therefore,

Section I.

IN this First Section, I shall represent, That the Belief of a Future state, will most evidently solve all those conse­quences, that reflect upon the Honour of the Divine Attributes: And that what­soever hath been suggested to disparage GOD's Goodness and Equity on the former account, will now be found to be falsly concluding, and that ought to be renounc'd as unreasonable and im­pious; when the Gracious Intention and Wise Designs, why GOD made Man naturally subject to all those temporary Infelicities, be but once throughly exa­mined, and seriously considered. For then it will appear, That GOD made Man subject to such severe circumstan­ces of a present mortal Unhappiness, for no less end, than to serve His own most Gracious Purposes of making him per­fectly and eternally Happy in another World.

Had not GOD made him a Rational Creature, he had not been capable of understanding his Duty, and of the pro­posal of an End to oblige him to it; and had also wanted a faculty of being [Page 352] receptive of any Blessing upon the per­formance of it: Had not Man been made a voluntary Agent, he had been uncon­cern'd in all moral actions, and so unca­pable of Rewards and Punishments: And had he not been born subject to those na­tural Evils, he had wanted the best rea­sons of a Probationary state; that is, he had wanted occasions for the choice and exercise of most of those Graces and Vertuous Actions, that were requisite to make him Good, and to keep him close to his Hope, and to his dependance up­on GOD.

And, if the worst Evils he encounters be improved to those excellent ends, (which all men that love and fear God, must believe they should) they will soon be experimentally found to be instances of God's favourable Ordination and Pro­vidence, and to be not only tolerable, but highly reasonable and approveable in their kind and nature. And not only so, but the afflicted man may in time find Reasons (which he can never want, if he studies for them) so to attemper his mind, that he may be as thankful for them, as for any other of God's Graci­ous Contrivements, to further his Good and Happiness. And on that account, he may as reasonably be able to rejoice for [Page 353] a fit of trouble, as for a hit of Preferment; for a Portion of Contempt, as for the refreshment of a Meal; for the Wicked man's oppressive Malice, as for the kind effects of an affectionate Friendship; and for a day of severe persecution in an in­nocent case, more than for a successful Conquest over his most imperious and implacable Enemies.

Are they poor? (saith Salvian, speak­ing of Good men) they are pleased, and can approve their present fortune: Pauperes sunt? pauper­tati delectant: Lugent? lu­gere gestiunt: In honori sunt? honorem respuunt. Sal. de gub. des: Are they made contemptible? They can despise Honour: Are they sorrowful? They can rejoice in their Mourning: Are they infirm and sick? They can find reasons to make their Infirmities acceptable instances of Provi­dence.

How many pious men are there in the World, (and it is not God's fault, that all are not so) who living to, and hoping for the Happiness of a Future state, would not have chosen an unin­terrupted Health, nor put an end to a va­letudinary state, nor have been perfectly freed from the unkindnesses of the ma­licious, nor willingly have renounced their Portion in other humane Evils, when Experience hath once ascertain'd them, [Page 354] how much they have all sensibly proved advantageous Instruments, and Occasions of their more intire love of, and adherence to GOD and Vertue; and of their keep­ing a stricter watch upon their own minds and actions?

And then further, How many such men have there been, that would not have wish'd of their decaying Time, nor willingly have refused the inconvenien­ces of old Age, when they have con­sider'd how much thereby they have overgrown all Temptations to youthful Follies; and found time to recollect the happy issues of their own Experience; and (what is more) are improving the Advantages of their natural timely War­ning for their following Change? And, that every day, as they more and more decline, they are more and more strengthened in their satisfaction and contentment upon the present repasts, and lively hope and apprehensions of their near approaching transmigration to a Happier State.

Thus, Vita hu­mana, quae tot & tantis hujus sae­culi malis esse cogitur misera, spe futuri saeculi, sit beata sicut & salva. Aug. de Civ. Dei lib. 19. cap. 4. Though the Life of Man, as it's encumber'd and oppressed with the so many Evils of his Mortality, may justly be ac­counted [Page 355] miserable, yet upon the expecta­tion of the Happiness of a Future State, it ought to be esteemed happy and safe; as St. Austin discourseth.

But then, let it be further observed, and that very considerably to our pur­pose, That God is so far justified in ma­king and permitting Man's subjection to such Evils and Infelicities, (as I have represented them) in the Sence of them that have firmly believed, and that then, upon that Belief (which is unanswera­bly unreasonable, if they do not) are providing for the Blessed Interest of such a Future World; as that some of them have not thought their ordinarily inci­dent and natural Evils great and many enough, to secure their Vertue and Inno­cency, but in imitation of God's own natural order and method for their Good, have voluntarily contrived more to them­selves, when their Piety and Prudence have thought it needful.

And this may be justifiably verified, from the innumerous Primitive Exam­ples of Mortification; when the Saints of God have chosen severe Fastings, and a constant hard Diet; afflictive Labours, and wearisom Imployments; tedious Devotions, and the incredible Renuncia­tions of (the so much admired) Tem­poral [Page 356] Greatness, Splendor, and Pleasures of the World; that they might with lesser hazard attain the great end of a Future Bliss.

And, Lastly, For a further justifica­tion of the Divine Wisdom and Good­ness in the case of humane afflictions, the consideration of a Future World will solve one great doubt and difficul­ty. And that is, If any man should de­mand a Reason, Why GOD is pleased that some men shall meet a greater Por­tion of present Misery than others, (as at all times, by many instances, it may be pregnantly observed and verified) and that one person's Life should be very calamitous, while anothers is but tolera­bly uneasie: That some men should but taste of the Waters of Affliction, while others are plunged so deep in them, Psal. 69. 2. that the Floods run over them: That is, That some should meet but with Trou­bles, while others are necessitated to en­counter with Extremities. And then, if such extraordinarily afflicted People should sorrowfully bewail their surplus­age of Discipline, comparatively to most other Examples of Misery; and should be tempted to call in question the impar­tiality of God's Goodness and Equity, to, and over them, the Belief of the real [Page 357] Existence of a future state, solves all this great difficulty also, (which nothing else can possibly effect, to the CREA­TOUR's honour, and Man's satisfaction) and makes such an unequal distribution of present Troubles and Afflictions, as reasonable and justifiable as any other the wise effects of God's Love, and His Gracious Providence, for their eternal Good, on these Two Grounds.

First, Such extraordinarily afflicted Persons may, and ought to tell their own minds, that such unusual degrees and measures of calamity, may be more specially necessary for them in their par­ticular capacities, than for other men; and that GOD saw they needed the severer methods of His Discipline, and correcting Love, more than others. Had I had but a tolerable Plenty, (saith one under the most oppressive Poverty) I had been much worse than any man that enjoys the largest proportions of Wealth. Had I been Possessor of the least degree of that man's Honour, (saith another, labouring under the burden of the greatest dis­grace and contempt) I should never have manag'd it with the same Modesty and Vnconcernedness that he hath done. A Re­buke was sufficient to make another Good, but a pressure is hardly enough for me: [Page 358] An ordinary Discipline keeps this Man in order, but GOD thought fit to hedge up my way with Thorns, Hos. 2. to restrain some­thing in my ungovernable Temper. A lit­tle Dose secures another man's Health, but a whole course of Physick is handly enough for me.

Thus doth the devout Soul easily re­concile the different disproportions of the afflictive Evils of humane Life; and in­terprets of the several of them, that they are Arguments of God's greater love, and more especial care over his Soul; and renders his own Hope thereby the more reasonably applicable to the com­fort of his own Mind.

But then, Secondly, He may also as reasonably inform his Mind, that where there is such a redundancy of Troubles, the man that is afflicted with them, may, and ought also to his mighty comfort, believe, that as God's waies are alwaies designedly Good and Equal, so that He might send them upon a design, and on purpose to allow him a greater degree of Happiness in a better state, and a re­compence proportionable to his greater afflictions in another World. And for which he may as assuredly hope, as that he that hath improved his Talent in acting greater measures of Good, than others may [Page 359] on that account, believe himself to be an­swerably then rewarded. For as no one drop of cold Water in a cup of Chari­ty, shall not be unrewarded in the one case, so shall not one Tear that is shed in sorrow for greater afflictions, Psal. 56. 8. be unre­compensed in the other.

And if all men were sensible, how va­luable any advance of happiness were in a State of Glory, they could not but think, that whereinsoever they have hin­dred themselves, from doing all the good they can possibly do, they have acted very imprudently for their own interest; so if the men that meet more than ordina­ry afflictions in this world, did but con­sider the abundancy of their recompence in another; they would be so far from murmuring at their greater misfortunes, that they would (as our Saviour in one instant case represented it) on the contra­ry, Mat. 5. 12, 13. rejoice and be exceeding glad, for their greater reward in Heaven.

Now, as to the whole that I have said in this Case, as it will easily appear upon the belief of a Future State, that is was GOD's Gracious Design to make the enjoyment of a happiness in it, the Great End of Mans Creation; so also, that those mention'd Evils, to which his nature hath subjected him, may be improved into ma­ny [Page 360] instrumental advantages, to prepare and adapt him for it.

And therefore, Mankind ought to be so far from making any unkind reflecti­ons upon the Justice and Equity of GOD, for their natural subjections to all those Evils and present Infelicities, that they must justify, and applaud his Wisdom and Goodness, that he order'd them for such excellent Ends and Purposes.

And now, I shall once more call for the Observer of the formention'd Rooms of the calamitous of all sorts, but it is upon a new Errand; that is, not that he should stand still as a witnessing spectatour only of their Miseries, but that upon the Rea­sons which I have given, he may pass a­nother judgment upon the place; That is, that now he may not think those Rooms to be nothing else, but so many Apartments of Misery; but to be either so many Divine Laboratories, in which God design'd to re­fine the Souls of men, and to prepare them for the purer Regions of a Future Bliss; or he may judge them to be so many Sacred Oratories, in which all the oppressed may (according to GOD's Ordinative love to them) be more strongly oblig'd to be dai­ly adoring Him, and performing their constant Offices to implore His Blessing upon their several afflicted States: or last­ly, [Page 361] he may look upon them as so many Mi­litary Theatres, in which, the Afflicted may with religious courage, be contending for the lofty Prize, that God hath set in their prospect, by Faith and Hope.

And thus, I hope, I have so fully solv'd the First intolerable Consequence, that they, that shall hereafter complain of God for their subjection to their present Evils, must arraign his Love for doing them good, and reproach his Care in carrying on a design for the better securing their Future Happiness. And thus ends the so­lution of what might reflect upon the Creatours Honour.

Section II.

THis Second Section contains the solu­tion of the other mention'd Intole­rable Consequences, which the Afflicted may suggest to their own minds, from the Miseries and Calamities, to which their Nature hath subjected and expo­sed them, upon the belief of the Real Existence of a Future State, and of an e­stablish'd Happiness there enjoyable; I say all such other consequences will be easily, & naturally answered & controuled, up­on the same Reason, that the Great CRE­ATOURS Glorious Attributes have been already vindicated.

[Page 362] First, what was alledged concerning Pa­rents cruelty, in propagating Beings to be subject to the possibility and danger of so much wretchedness and calamity, is presently solv'd, by a belief of such a Future State: For Parents can then on that Ground, most reasonably propound to their own thoughts and hopes, that they shall bring forth so many Candi­dates for an everlasting happiness, and so many Rightful Heirs of a most Glori­ous Inheritance; & that as so securely set­led upon every one of them, that no Pow­er, Malice, or Contrivance whatsoever, can disseize them of it, unless they shall willfully resign up their own Right, and Title to it.

So that if they should certainly fore­know, that those their Children shall in­fallibly meet the hardest circumstances of humane life; yet considering, that Pa­rents have so much reason to believe, that the most afflictive Evils of Morta­lity, are possibly improveable for the bet­ter securing a Happy State in another World; it will be sufficient to remove the discouragement, which the menti­on'd consequence suggested to them. For upon a supposed tender of election, a good Parent would in no sence have his Children Great and Prosperous, if [Page 363] it stood in competition with his choice of having them Good and Vertuous, though they were assured, that their Chil­dren were to be incumber'd with the greatest misfortunes, to which their na­tures have subjected them.

Then Secondly, As to what hath been discours'd to justify mens putting a pre­sent period to their own uneasy lives, when they are heavily oppressed, with any of those severest Evils of their Mor­tality, though that practice would be reasonable enough, if there were no Fu­ture World (as I have shewn Reasons, Authorities, and Examples of it); yet that State being once acknowledg'd and believed, and the men that do believe it, actually ingage in the practice of those Vertuous Actions, that necessarily con­duce to the happiness of it, they would then, not only hold their hands from such destructive attempts, but rather might find sufficient Reasons to own the con­tinuance of their lives, as a Blessing in any condition.

They would then be patiently and wisely accounting with themselves, That Almighty GOD may be mercifully pleas'd to continue them still in their uneasy Lives, because (perhaps) some part of the necessary work of their great [Page 364] salvation, is yet unfinish'd; that is, that possibly they may have some portions of their lost time to redeem some Remains of their Passions still to subdue; some further Additions to be made to their Heavenly Stock; some Defects in their daily Offices to be amended; or some further Degrees of Love and Zeal for GOD, and Goodness to attain to, be­fore they die: Or they may be satis­fying themselves, by telling their own minds, That GOD in Mercy to the World, may let them still live to be further Instrumental to some Common Good. Perhaps some distressed Families and Persons would want their support, or the careless Congregations, their de­vout Amens; or (perhaps) the Church cannot yet spare any part of Her De­fence, and that if they were gone, there might be wanting some of the num­ber that uphold a sinful State.

In a word, as such Men can never want Reasons to judge honourably of GOD for their continuance in their mortal, though afflicted Lives, so they would not forgive themselves a thought of the least inconvenient usage of them­selves, that might shorten their uneasy Abode in their present Circumstances, whatsoever they are. And this is the [Page 365] last instance of solution of the menti­on'd intolerable Consequences.

Thus we see with what unconstraint, and unexceptionable coincidency; and how without any pretence of force or opposition, they are all solv'd and re­concil'd. And now what can we im­magine should offer the least Doubt or suspicion, but that the solution of these intolerable Consequences, should as naturally, and as it were of course, inferr the Truth of the design'd Con­clusion; especially, when we see all things do cohere with the same fitness and agreeableness to it, as a dislocated Bone falls into the same place, whence it was distorted, to the Patient's present Ease; or, as the scattered Materials of a Structure, when they are once fitted for a regular Frame, are presently put together, and accommodated to those Places and Positions, for which they were at first wrought and design'd? So easily, and so naturally, do all those consequences admit their solutions, from the acknowledg'd belief of a Fu­ture State. But let us attend the Con­clusion.

Section I.

IN this First Section is design'd the first Truth; And in order to a full Ex­planation of the case, it is requisite, that we first take notice, that God hath orde­red all other Beings, both sensible and in­sensible, to be carried on by a necessary and natural impulse, to the attainment of all those their proper ends, to which, by his own sole Will and sovereign Au­thority, they were at first by their na­ture unchangeably determined and affix'd. But it was other wise in GOD's design, when He created Man: For His Divine purpose, as to him, was, That he should be created with such free and self-de­termining Faculties, as by which he might be first enabled to understand and judge, and then be left at his own freedom to chuse and act for his own end, that is, his own Happiness; for nothing can be proposed as a proper and natural end to a Rational Creature, but some adjudged and chosen attainable Happiness, that [Page 375] may satisfie the importunity of his Ap­petitive Mind, and be accommodable to the measures of his Rational Nature; as Aristotle discourseth the Case in the first Book of his Ethicks.

Now, that Man might be sure to en­deavour the attainment of that his pro­per end, by the use of those his natural Faculties of judging and chusing it for himself; GOD gave him also as neces­sary an inclination, and as forcible an appetite to spur him on, to look after his own Happiness, as any other Creature had, to attain its natural end, and by as uncontroulable an instinct.

And therefore it is certain, That as there is no qualification in his Na­ture more closely adhe­rent to his very Being, Omnium certe sententia est, qui ratione quoquo modo uti possent, beatos esse omnes homines velle. Aug. de Civ. Dei lib. 10. cap. 1. nor more unexceptiona­bly universal to his whole Species, so is there no part of humane nature more predominant and authoritative. For it alwaies gives Laws to all the Fa­culties and Affections of his Soul, and commandingly governs and controuls all the designs, actions, and undertakings of his whole Life.

So that the CREATOR's powerful Will is not more sovereignly expressed [Page 376] in the natural qualifications and incli­nations of any kind of inferiour Beings to attain their natural Ends, than in this of Man's unsuperable Principle to will, desire, and act, for his own suitable Happiness.

The Stone tends not downwards, nor the Sparks mount upwards, more ne­cessarily and naturally.

Or, to make use of the words of a late Author, who saith, That It is a disposition of mind, that is so prevailingly fix'd a­gainst all attempts of lo­sing it, Virtutibus valedicere, vi­tia derelinquere, opes pro­fundere, honores contem­nere, valetudinem pessun­dare, & vitam ipsam prodi­gere possumus; sed soelicita­tis appetitus naturae adeo adhaeret, ut eam nisi & naturam excutimus, excu­tere nequeamus. Stern. Apho. de Foeli. p. 11. or departing from it, that a Man may bid a farewel to all Vertue, he may cast away all his Plen­ty, and his Honour, he may undervalue and endan­ger his Health, and at last throw away his Life; but the desire of being Happy, does so firmly adhere to his very Being, that unless he can shake off Nature it self, he can no way unloosen him­self from it. Animus hominis cupere nunquam desinit. Tusc. Quaest. His Mind can never cease to desire, saith Cicero.

An early Intimation of this natural and necessary Impulse, is observed even in his very Childhood; for no sooner doth [Page 377] the Eye of his Mind begin to open, but the first thing it looks after, is to shew its little inclinations for the choice of some­thing, in which he may be pleased.

And as by the addition of a few years, his Reason gradually improves, and be­gins to have a little Skill to understand Discourse, and to mind any plain rea­sonable Inferences, so it presently teach­eth him to knit little obvious Occurren­ces into Designs and Projections, and will be laying small Trains how to at­tain to something of a satisfaction, that is at present, agreeable to the measures of his yet imperfect Judgment and Ca­pacity.

And then afterward, when he hath at­tain'd to a compleater maturity of his reasoning Faculties, this impetuous na­tural disposition restlesly drives him on to the choice of some Undertaking or other, by which he promiseth to himself an attainment of some kind of Happiness, as the end and scope of his intendment. And as Men are variously inclin'd, and differently (perhaps though but occa­sionally) byass'd in their Opinion of this or that way of living, so doth this restless Principle (by which men are uni­versally acted) alwaies attend, and haunt their several Minds, to hurry them [Page 378] on to the search after, and the choice of something, whatsoever it is, upon which they have fix'd their opinion of being Happy by it.

And hence it is, That when that na­tural Impulse scourgeth one man into the pale Study, to pass away his time (and sometimes his Health and Fortune) in a solitary converse with Papers, for the attainment of Learning, as his pro­pos'd Happiness; and when another is call'd out by the same natural Princi­ple, to sacrifice his Peace and Quiet upon the Military Theatre, or to wind him­self into the Intrigues of publick busi­ness, upon a design of being Happy by some Applause or Honour; a Third makes use of all his Skill and Friends, to shroud himself in the most private re­tirement, and to live in a total Seclu­sion from all publick affairs, as he judg­eth it to be the best Expedient, how he may live an Easie and Happy life. And as in these, so in all other instances of like nature, men are alwaies tumbling up and down in this busie World, and do behave themselves like Messengers sent out for some lost or undiscover'd Trea­sure, who though they go a Hundred waies to find it, yet they all went out upon the same Errand, and were carried [Page 379] on by the same Impulse and Design of projecting and prosecuting something, in which they all might expect and presume a satisfaction to themselves. And all this is done by the force of their natu­ral implanted desires, and impatient ap­petites of being Happy, which GOD gave them, and which they could not at choice resist.

And this explains our meaning of the First Truth, of which we are in quest.

Section II.

THis Second Section informs us, That as by these few intimations, Man's natural over-ruling Appetite of being Happy, must needs be acknowledged; so, by a direct consequence, it must as necessarily be believed, that GOD hath not denied him some­where or other, Neque enim omnes ho­mines naturali instinctu im­mortales & beati esse velle­mus, nisi esse possumus. Aug. 4. Cont. Julian. some sufficient means, and a tender of some suitable Objects, which his ratio­nal and discursive Understanding may judge fit to be chosen, and in the enjoy­ment of which, he may be able to find out something that may be commensu­rate [Page 380] to his natural Desires, and which may answer his present endeavours for it, to his own Mind and Reason.

All which must as infallibly be gran­ted to be True, as that it cannot be be­lieved, that the All-Wise and Good GOD should create Man to be such an intole­rable Incumbrance and Infelicity to him­self; as to be alwaies by Nature rest­lesly disposed to desire, seek, and attempt that, which was never put into his power and capacity to attain. For that were to give him a desire, and to dispose him for an endeavour of something, that were impossible: Which would be so ir­rational in its self, and so reproachful to the Divine Nature, as that it cannot be supposed, that such a disposition should be intentionably implanted in him by a Good GOD, unless any man can be so prosane in his Mind, as to think that GOD intended to make Man certainly Unhappy, at the same time when He first designed to give him a Being: Or, that He should please Himself in such an act of Sovereignty and Power, which should be so greatly inconsistent with His Love and Equity.

And then afterward (which is worst of all) that the holy God should be pre­sumed to behold a poor wretch, that was [Page 381] made by his own free choice and plea­sure, and that always lays at the Foot of his own Dominion and Authority, to baf­fle himself like a Fool, and to toil like a Slave, for that which (without any fault of his own) he can never find out, or arrive as; or that after all his fruit­less labours, and lost endeavours for some unsufficient Prize, he must at last be so un­happy, as to applaud the Being of a Stone, that lodgeth quietly in the Bosome of a Mountain; or be tempted to envy so many Plants and Animals, that infalli­bly enjoy the end of their nature, with­out any observable miscarriage in their actions, and certainly without any dis­cursive and habitual sense of their own disappointment or dissatisfactions.

These are such conceptions of a Good and Holy GOD, that they can never en­ter into the Heart of any man, but his, that resolves to maintain a dispute against his Soveraign Goodness, and indeed a­gainst his Real Existence; or that loves to sport himself, in managing Satyrs a­gainst the perfectest visible piece of work, which his Infinite Power and Wisdom e­ver brought forth into Being.

And nothing but the supposal of a Fu­ture State can silence these unbecoming conceptions of the Divine Nature, as it [Page 382] will fully be made evident in the latter part of this Argument.

Now the design of this First Chapter is to evince, that infallibly there is im­planted in man by a natural and insupe­rable instinct, such a desire and appetite of being Happy. And then, that in con­sequence Almighty GOD hath either provided some where or other a Happi­ness that may answer and determine those desires, and satisfy those appetites of his nature, or else it must be presumed, that he Created him with the same infeli­city, as to his mind, as if as to his Body he had qualifyed him with a natural thirst and hunger, and then had allowed him nothing, or what should be unsufficient to satiate such importunate Appetites. A Creation of being in such circumstan­ces, would look more like an act of ab­solute Tyranny, than the effect of a Gra­cious Power and Authority.

But hath not God provided a suffici­ent means by the happy enjoyment of a mans own being in this world (as o­ther Creatures have) for the satisfaction of his natural desires and appetites, so that we shall not need to have recourse to the Existence of another World, where (we suppose) such desires may be an­swered and determined? But that Enqui­ry [Page 383] is the business of the next Chapter. Therefore,

Section I.

IN this First Section, I shall State the Measures of what can possibly be re­puted mans special happiness in this Life. And for that end let it be first considered, That all that, which God hath set in mans present view, and that most immediate­ly stands at the door of his senses (the common in-lets of objects to his affecti­ons, and the imaginative part of his mind) for his desire and entertainment; and that is agreed upon and celebrated in the world by an universal consent and suf­frage, as mans principal happiness in this life (where there is no concern for a Fu­ture State in Faith or Practice) must be at least that which may be commonly thought, and esteemed a present sufficient Well-being, or an enjoyment of it in some such degree and proportion as may ac­ceptably accommodate the natural tem­per of a mans innate desires.

Now if we strictly examine the nature of all that, which can be presum'd to make up such a present Well-being, it will be found to consist in the enjoyment of so much Knowledg, Health & Plenty, as may procure a man so much Reputation, Friend­ship, Power, Peace, & other such like accom­modations [Page 385] as may afford him, in his opi­nion, an easie and satisfactory way of Living. For nothing else can otherwise be suggested, which in any Sence may be called a present attainable Happiness, if the concern of another State be laid aside.

As for the pretence of a sufficient Happiness in this World, by Vertue's be­ing her own Reward, the folly and insuf­ficiency of it hath been examined in the Fourth Section of the Second Chapter of the Third Argument. And then, as to the Pretensions of Learning and Con­templation (as some Philosophers have contended for them) they also have been sufficiently accounted for in my Second Argument, Chap. 2. Sect. 1. & 3.

Now, as to our describ'd present En­joyment of a well-Being, allowing some circumstantial alterations in the opinion of it, according to the different humours and inclinations of Mens Minds, though the whole World admire, proclaim, and desire it, as their chiefest Happiness in this mortal Life, yet it is certain, that in its best circumstances, and most desirable successes, it could never be design'd of GOD (for whatsoever other ends he might please to allow it, of which an ac­count shall be presently endeavour'd) [Page 386] to be a Man's natural and sufficient Fe­licity, upon the warranty of these Three Reasons to the contrary.

1. The First is, That if GOD Al­mighty had intended it as Man's suffi­cient Happiness, He would either have soveraignly given it to every Man, ne­cessarily to enjoy it, or he would have put it in every man's power to attain to such a well accommodated State, and way of living at his own choice, and upon his own endeavours for it. Which so­veraign Donation, or possibility of attain­ment, must be necessarily supposed, in whatsoever it is, that is propounded to such an intellectual Agent as Man is, for the satisfaction of his Rational De­sires, and the Natural Appetites of his Mind; or those qualifications will ap­pear to be given him, not only infinite­ly to his own disadvantage, but to be his perpetual Calamity and Incum­brance.

A Desire, and not to enjoy, is upon any account a very uneasie State of Mind, but such a Desire, without any possibility of Enjoyment, is an intolera­ble Oppression.

Now, that every man cannot attain to the enjoyment of the several men­tion'd Branches and Constitutives of a [Page 387] present well-being, by his own contri­vance, and at his own choice. And then, Can any understanding Mind be so inconsiderately credulous, as once to imagine, that any such thing can be a man's proper, natural, and sufficient Hap­piness, which, when he most especially needs it, he cannot have it, and when he solemnly chooseth it, and most ear­nestly endeavours for it, he cannot as­suredly obtain it? But this Case hath been largely accounted for already. Are. 2. Chap. 1. Sect. 2.

2. But then, Secondly, Upon a supposal that some few men, by some extraordi­nary concurrent favourable hits of Pro­vidence, should be so successful in the World, as to be made rare Examples of such a Happy way of Living, with all its mention'd adjuncts and circumstan­ces (which not one of Ten Thousand ever enjoyed) yet it is certain, that even then, that successful State, (in whatsoever degree it is allowed them) could never be designed of GOD as their sufficient Happiness (which must be supposed, if no future World) because it could ne­ver be found to give their Minds any constant and settled satisfaction, when they were so possessed of it, but that [Page 388] the more, and the longer those men en­joyed it, though no interruption had ever intervened (which were a monstrous Vanity of Mind to have presum'd) the more they could not but discover its insufficiency to terminate their Desires. And to what degree soever they had rai­sed their expectations of it, before they attained it, yet they alwaies experimen­tally sound the Enjoyment of it to have come so far beneath a tolerable satisfa­ction, that it hath often proved little better than a baffle and real disappoint­ment of Mind. And further, it's obser­ved, that in the pursuit of such a pre­sent Felicity, the accession of every new Acquist does alwaies but inflame mens Appetites, and heighten their expecta­tions of some more, newer, and other At­tainments: So that, in that respect, such mens Thoughts must necessarily be sup­posed to be alwaies wandring up and down, and unweariedly fluctuating in an infinite Circle, and endless Maze, and Reciprocation of Desires and Unsatisfa­ctions, Expectations and Disappoint­ments.

And, the main Reason of all this (as Seneca well observes) is, Because there is not any thing in the World [Page 389] that is enough; Cupidi­tati nihil satis. Si desidera­bit aureis fulgen­tem vasis supelle­ctilem, & antiquis nomini­bus artificum, &c. nunquam explebis inexplebilem animum, non magis quam ullus sufficit humor ad sanandum eum, cujus desiderium non ex inopia, sed aestu ardentium viscerum oritur. De Cons. ad Alb. and that the highest Enjoyments are too strait and dispro­portion'd. For though, perhaps, they are not so for mens present ordinary use, yet they will alwaies be found to be so, for the satisfaction of the natural desires of their Minds.

And this is the very Reason, Why many Persons that enjoy the fullest Plen­ty, and in appearance to others, all they could wish for, yet may be unaccounta­bly uneasie in their own Minds, and oftentimes very unbecomingly froward in their demeanour to others, and even to them, whose fidelity, kindness and di­ligence they have cause to applaud and love: I say, all this is, because their De­sires were originally and naturally fitted for a bigger, and indeed, for another kind of Happiness, than what this World could afford them.

And upon this account it is, that Sir Francis Bacon takes notice, Cogita, quamdiu eadem feceris, mori velle, non tantum fortis, aut miser, sed etiam fastidiosus. Ess. 2. (which he bor­rowed from Seneca) that The Fastidious, [Page 390] that is, such as are tyr'd with any conside­rable continuance in their Enjoyments, are as willing to die, and leave them, as the stout, and the miserable that wants them; and that because (saith he) they have created a weariness of doing the same thing so often over and over. It's certain therefore, by a most necessary and rea­sonable consequence, that mens Appe­tites are to be satiated with some thing that is not here to be found, and there­fore that must be future, and in rever­sion, or no where at all; which would be a Reproach to the CREATOUR's Honour, in giving him such a nature, and yet depriving him of a suitable sa­tisfaction. But this hath been more ful­ly manag'd, Ar. 2. Chap. 1. Sect. 1.

The Third and Last Reason, to shew the insufficiency of all the Enjoyments with which a Man can possibly be possessed of as his present Happiness in his mortal State, must fall so much short of answering his natural impor­tunate Desires of being Happy, is, be­cause they will alwaies be (and he can­not but know it, if he considers) a pos­session of what's most unconstant and uncertain: Words that have from thence received their native Sence and Meaning, and which are never so properly expres­sed, [Page 391] as when they are used as Epithites and Adjuncts of every Temporal Enjoy­ment; and therefore, for which, nothing that's call'd a Rational Judgment, can have any kind of true satisfaction in them.

There is nothing here (saith Seneca) that is not vanishing and deceitful, Nihil non lubricum & fallax, & omni tempestate mobilius. Jactantur omnia, & in contrarium transeunt, & in tanta volutatione re­rum, ut nil cuiquam nisi­mors certum. Epist. de Con. Am. or not unconstant as Seasons; all things are tossed up and down in their interchanges, and pass into their contraries; and that in such unsteady revoluti­ons, as that a Man can call nothing Cer­tain, but his Death: Or, as he expresseth it in another place; In tanta incon­stantia turba­que rerum, nihil nisi quod praeteriit, certum est. Idem. The unconstancy of things is such, as that there is nothing Certain, but what is past.

Who is it that is certain of the con­trary, but that Flames to morrow may throw him out of his stately House or Palace, into a despicable Tent or Cot­tage; or, that a Tempest may prevent the safe arrival of his importing Trea­sure; or, that War, Rapine, and a sud­den change of Seasons, may defeat his Expectations in his fruitful Fields; that [Page 392] a malignant Distemper may empty his House of his numerous Posterity, and a Thousand Accidents may invade him in all the circumstances of his well-being? And then also, he cannot but know, that in despight of all his most powerful de­fence, he lays every day, one way or other, at the mercy of the malicious, and the spightful.

What privilege can I claim against the devouring Tyranny of the Covetous, Anne ip­se privi­legium impetra­vi ab in­vidia & avaritia, inexora­bilibus tyrannis? Quod alicui, omnibus contingens est, quod omnibus, mihi. De Art. Volun. lib. 3. 223. and the Envious (saith Neirembergius)? What may happen to any, may happen to all; what to all, to me.

And, if that man may think himself Happy, or can be cheerful, that knows a Serjeant, or an armed Party stands at his Door, upon design to arrest him; or when he understands, that his House stands amidst an infected Neighbour­hood, ready every moment to seize up­on him; then may a man be reasonably pleas'd, and happy, that considers, That all his Enjoyments are possessed with a perpetual danger of Change and Uncer­tainty. I say, Where things are thus in­secure, What considering Mind can sug­gest a Reason of being Happy by any [Page 393] the greatest Enjoyments? And surely, where right Reason can give no Judg­ment: for it, that Mind cannot be truly satisfied in it.

There is nothing in Nature truly Bles­sed, but what is exempt from fear. Non enim beatum est, nisi quod intrepidum. In­ter suspecta malè vivitur. No man lives but miserably, where all things are suspected, saith Seneca. And so are all things else, but the present Favour of GOD, and the Hopes of being Blessed in a better World, to him that lives a Vertuous and Religious Life.

These are the Three general Reasons, which I have offer'd against the possi­bility of mans being truly happy by any thing that bears the name of an outward Well-being, in it's best Circum­stances; and therefore not likely to be design'd of GOD for Man's choice, as sufficient to answer, and determine the created natural Desires of his Mind af­ter his own Happiness. But the Sen­sual hath something to say against all this, which must be considered.

Section II.

THerefore, this Second Section tells us, That the earnest Pretenders to a present possible Prosperity, and the mighty Admirers of it, will, notwith­standing all this, think and say, That they are not to be turned off from their own sence of being happy with such a dry Philosophical Lecture as this; and that instead of being convinced by these Reasons, they will with Indigna­tion and Scorn enough, mock at the Divine that preacheth them, or the Phi­losopher that disputes for them; or at the Sober and the Meek, the Just and the Charitable, that do exemplarily make use of them, to the practical Ex­probration of their Follies.

But then I am particularly obliged to take notice, That there be three sorts of such Men, (of which a great part of Mankind do appear at all times to consist) who are alwaies more ob­stinately and uncontroulably bent against these, and all other Arguments, how rea­sonable soever, that can be offered in this case: And with these Men I am willing to treat apart, and by them­selves in a closer Method.

[Page 395] And the First of those Three, are the mighty Men of Wealth, who in Contempt of the former Reasons (which they can no more answer, than be wise) are resolv'd to think of no other Happiness, but to be perpetually listing numbers to their Regiment of Credi­tours, and catalogueing more Inhabi­tants to their encreasing Territories, that they may be proclaimed Rich, and admired as Prodigies for their famous Acquisitions. For it's generally obser­ved, That Covetousness and Pride, are complicated in the same Person, and do shew themselves in all their Actions, where they may be competible. And therefore, these men will defy the Man, that dares presume to charge their Rea­son with an obligation of being just or merciful, ingenuous or humble upon the reasonable Arguments of making a safe Provision, and an undefeizable Estate for themselves, in another, and a bet­ter World.

The next silly Unattendant to the former Reasons, is the Man of Bustle and Ambition, and he wonders that a­ny man should dare, with such Argu­ments as these, to affront his humour in the present sense of his own suffici­ent Happiness. And when he is account­ing [Page 396] in a long List, the Names, Wealth, and Vertue of his Ancestors; and is relating some instances of his own Va­lour, & successful Atchievements (though it were (perhaps) but in a Duel for a vain Woman, or in Revenge for an idle Word) that Man, that shall re­fuse to aggrandize his Bravery, and to admire his Happiness upon such preten­sions, or inform him of any other sober instances of Honour, and true Fortitude, must be content for a while, to bear the Character of an ignoble and despi­cable Spirit.

The Third of that obstinate sort of Men, is the sorry Voluptuary, who, with Contempt enough of the preten­ces of both the other, blesseth himself in the opinion of his own Happiness, and thinks that there needs no other to be offered to him for his present satis­faction, than to be rock'd asleep in some sensual Pleasures; and would fain im­magine that he enjoys his Being to Pur­pose and Happiness enough, while he is gratifying his Sensual Apperites; and then laughs at all those, that shall bring Reasons to advise him to the con­trary, as a Pack of pitiful empty Fel­lows, that don't understand the Town, (as they call it) and that don't know [Page 397] what's Good Breeding; Eating, and Drinking, Gallantry, and Love.

These are the three sorts of men that almost divide the vain World between them, and that are especially presumed not to be at leisure, to attend to the examination of such general Reasons, as are alledged for the unsufficiency of all present enjoyments, or of what may be offered for the happiness of another World: And therefore, are obstinately set to resist all possible counsels, that may be given to engage them in the serious thoughts of it.

And now, that there may be nothing omitted, to oblige such men to take a full account of their own follies, I can­not but judge it very reasonable, that besides those three general imperfections, to which all temporal enjoyments are in common certainly subjected, and as so qualified, are rendred uncapable to af­ford any true happiness to such a rati­onal Creature, as can discourse its mea­sures; I say, I cannot but judge it both Necessary and Charitable, that I may make the conviction more compleat and available; that besides those three Argu­ments that may inform their reasons in general, I may particularly arrest these mens several humours, and mistaken sen­timents [Page 398] of their own happiness, with a proper remonstrance against every one of those pretended principal constitutives of humane prosperity; proving that eve­ry one of them have their proper and particular insufficiences, (besides those former general defailancies) to make a Man truly happy. And I shall give every one of them a fair Trial apart.

1. And then, as to the first admir'd In­stance of humane happiness, Wealth, let the forementioned men of Money seriously count and consider with them­selves, what it is in its self and proper nature; and in the Issue of their thoughts they must find, that it is no more, but a servant to their natural necessities, and at best, but an expedient to attain the better conveniences and decencies of their short and mortal lives: And then, what there is more than will well serve those ordinary ends, (which an indiffe­rent plenty may attain to with less trou­ble, and fewer dangers and fears) must in reason be accounted a redundant sur­plusage, either to become a prey for them, to whose trust and management it is com­mitted, or to be thrown over board, to be catch'd up by them, that perhaps nei­ther lov'd his person, nor deserved the advantage.

[Page 399] And indeed, What signifies a vast and over-grown fortune, but noise and trou­ble, when the Fruitless Splendour of it shall be considerately discounted? For if the Owner of it be Good, Vertuous, and Reli­giously qualifi'd, the burden of his Duties to GOD and Man is but so much the more encreased, and the acquitment of a good Conscience so much the more nice and difficult; and his temptations to Folly will be infinitely multiply'd. If it be said, that his plenty and greatness in the World's eye, may upon several accounts adapt him the better to assist in the con­duct of publick Government, it's true­ly affirmed: But then where lies the Hap­piness of it? Magna servitus est mag­na fortuna. Sen. ad Polyb. Cons. It is no more than to ease others of that common burden, and for the benefit of those, who know not how to be satisfied with their own good: It is but to keep tame an un­ruly multitude; and when others may sleep quietly in their retir'd privacies, to be awake to watch over Lyons and Ti­gers from devouring one another. For all which, he must expect little else, but in­gratitude; and perhaps he may be pay'd for all his Cares and Pains, with nothing else but Spite and Hatred, the usual Vul­gar Returns, for the most careful and vigilant Authorities.

[Page 400] But if that Great Man been't good; that is, first, if his humour be to put his surplusage to a Trade of further Encrease, how much is he better than some common Officer, or publick Re­ceiver of a great Revenue; by which, in time, he may gain the repute of be­ing the common Cash-keeper of the Country, and so may possibly be on all hands addressed to, to find Money, to defray the Expences of Fools and Sots with Summs, which (perhaps) his eyes may never see more, but in a little Scrole; or which his next Generation may abuse to maintain the Charges of some vain and silly way of living? Or if the mighty Man be sensually dispo­sed; that is, if he expends his redun­dant surplusage in debaucheries, how much will his house differ from a com­mon Inn and Hostage, unless it be, that it's so much a greater one? And if he hath a parcel of loose People of both Sexes in it, his abused Plenties may per­haps procure his House a more famous, but a worser Name.

[Page 401] Moved with the sence of these Vani­ties and Inconveniences thus discover'd, the Romans call'd Riches (Impedimenta) real Incumbrances, like the Cumbersome Bag­gage to a moving Ar­my. Omnia ista bona, quae nos speciosa sed fallaci vo­luptate delectant, pecunia, dignitas, potentia aliaque complura, ad quae generis humani coeca cupiditas ob­stupescit, cum labore pos­sidentur, cum invidia con­spiciuntur, eos (que) ipsos, quos ornant, premunt; plus mi­nantur, quam prosunt. Sen Lib. ad Polyb. Cons. And, for which Reason, many great Phi­losophers have rejected the Enjoyment of that, which is called Wealth, and renounc'd the name of Rich: And many Great Potentates have unladed themselves of their world­ly Greatness and Splendor, to enjoy the ease and freedom of a poor Monastick. Dio. Laer. in vita Crat. And last of all, How can that be called an Expedient of a Mans proper Happi­ness, Theb. in vita Ze­nocr. Cha­led. (such as GOD should design to answer, and satisfy his natural Desires of being happy) that cannot, in the truest sence, make the possessor really either the more Vertuous, or the Wi­ser; Tusc. Quaest. lib. 11. as the Philosopher argues? And thus we have examined the first material a Mortal's present reputed Felicity.

2. Secondly, As to the Man of Honour, What signifies that which he calls Greatness or Splendor, or an ambiti­ously design'd popular reputation in the [Page 402] World, when the nature of it is closely examined? For, it will be found to de­pend chiefly upon incompetent Judges of worth; and it seldom falls out to be the Portion of them that truly deserve it. Insomuch, that many Wise and Vertuous Persons have been so far from being am­bitiously struggling for such an Honour, that they have shunn'd and avoided it, as much as they could: And have been more really ashamed of a popular Court­ship and Applause, than other vain men have been concerned to be disappointed of them.

But then, when it hath happened, that the vulgar Vogue hath not been mista­ken, (which is very seldom) yet that acquir'd Honour must lay at the Feet of unconstant Mortals, and upon the hazard of every trivial Miscarriage, and miscon­struction of Actions; for which solici­tous Envy (it's certain Attendant) will never want a contrivement, and an op­portunity.

Besides, we see, that Worldly Honour very seldom follows either Vertue, or any other worthy qualification of Mind, but that it purely depends upon Wealth, by what indirect Acts and Arts soever attain'd, and how unworthily soever used and managed.

[Page 403] For he that hath Money, shall cer­tainly be flattered as, Valiant, Omnis enim res, Virtus, fama, Deus, divina hu­mana (que) pulchris Divitiis parent; quas qui construxerit ille Clarus erit, fortis, justus, sa­piens, etiam rex, Et quicquid volet. Hor. Lib. 2. Ser. Sat. 3 [...] Just, Wise, a Prince, and whatsoever he pleaseth to be (saith the Poet.) And with­out it, no man must ex­pect to have a greater proportion of Honour, than a Vertuous Virgin without a Dowry; a Learned Priest­hood without the Churches Patrimony; a Valiant Souldier in Age and Raggs; or a Man nobly Born without a For­tune. And this is the sorry Nature of the Second reputed Constitutive of a Man's present Prosperity.

3. Then as to the Man of Pleasure, if the nature of it be balanc'd by a considerate mind, it will be found at best, but immediately to affect the bru­tish part of Man; that is, his inferiour Appetites. And about which, his su­periour Faculties shall be concern'd in nothing more, than in discovering it's Folly and Vanity, or controuling its Successes.

And if you measure the duration of sensual Pleasure, it's gone as soon as known; and its fruition, is its end and extinction. And if it hath any repeat­ed [Page 404] Periods, the most desirable instances of it, will in time nauseate, like meat to a full Stomack, and become as tire­some as Labour, and as unapprovable, as what is old, worn, and out of fashi­on. And which is more, there are no Pleasures, which Religion and Vertue, and the sence of another World can't account for, but are generally purcha­sed at the choice of so much unworthi­ness, as to make others miserable, or at least, uneasy by them.

Therefore, the great Philosopher, though he would fain have found out a sufficient attainable Happiness in man's mortal Life, yet found Cause of all men, to call the Voluptuaries the Burden of the World; [...]. Arist. Eth. Lib. 1. Cap. 5. and the Disease of Man­kind. And Epictetus ad­viseth all Wise Men to abstain from them, if they design any after Joy, or satisfacti­on to their own Lives. — [...]. Ench. Cap 56. This is the Third and Last integral part of Man's supposed present Prosperity.

And thus I have strictly examined the several Natures, and particular Qua­lities of the three pretended Constitu­tives [Page 405] of all humane Prosperity in their proper kinds, and seriously weighed the Concomitant Defects, and Imper­fections of every one of them in par­ticular, where the Concerns of a Fu­ture State are laid aside. And now, What Understanding can be so ridicu­lously credulous, as once to believe, That any true Happiness can result from the Concurrence of such defective Causes; or that is built up of such incom­petent materials, that the possessor should applaud the Enjoyment of it, as his summary and sufficient Felicity? And then, let a [...] considering man fur­ther seriously consult the Reason of his Soul, whether it be possible for him to have such unworthy Thoughts of a most Good GOD, as that he should create a Being with Faculties capable to judge and balance the terms and nature of all the Happiness, with which he must enjoy his whole Existence, and for the obtaining of which, he is by a natural instinct to be incumber'd with the perpetual toil and sollicitations of his own Desires and Appetites; and then should afford him the Enjoyment of no other, or no better Happiness, than what is offered to him in this World, as I have truly described the nature of it.

[Page 406] But further, to evince how improba­ble it is, that the Happiness, which can only answer those desires and appetites which GOD implanted in all mens na­tures, should be lodg'd in any present enjoyment of humane Life, I shall re­mark how ridiculously the wisest men have behaved themselves in their Adven­tures to find out a way how to fix it in this World. But that's the business of the next Section.

Section III.

THis last Section discovers the disor­der'd and disagreeing apprehensions of all those Philosophers and Wise men, who endeavour'd to promote a possibi­lity for the attainment of a real Happi­ness in this present State. And, it's ob­serv'd, that even the Learned'st sort of them, like men at a loss where to fix and determine such a chiefest Good, and suf­ficient Happiness, ventured at every thing to which their humour, inclinations, and their resolved compliance with a Sect, guided their Sentiments and Ap­prehensions: Dealing in their Opinions of Man's summary and chiefest Happi­ness, [Page 407] as the old Egyptians did with the Supreme Deity, which, because they found it not among the Objects of a present sensible perception, they plac'd it in every contemptible part of the Creation, and unmanly ador'd it where they fix'd it.

But then our Opinionists distant and innumerous disagreements among them­selves, was a certain sign, that they had all lost their Mark and Standard; and were become like men, who finding no certain Path to direct their Progress, (as it is the universal fate of all Errour) wandered about, whithersoever their pri­vate Fancies, or some instant Accident determin'd their choice and motion: But still they found themselves out of the way, and the farther they went on, to look for such a present Happiness, the more their bewilder'd Minds discover'd to them the misfortune of their Mistakes.

Therefore, of the many that ever pre­tended to have succeeded in their Enqui­ries after the True Happiness of Man, few agreed in any one thing, in which it should consist. St. Austin reckons up from Marcus Varro Two Hundred Eighty eight several Opinions of Man's Chiefest Good. Aug. de Civit. Dei, lib. 19. cap. 1. And Tully accounts a great many, and those (as he averrs) according to the [Page 408] Sence of the most remarkably Learned Adventurers, to find it out.

The Epicureans placed it in Pleasure, the Stoicks in the habits of Vertue, the Peripateticks in the Acts and Exercises of it: Some of them placed it in Knowledge and Contemplation, and others in Power and Dominion, Eth. lib. 10. and many in Friendship, as Aristotle largely discourseth the Senti­ments of them. Therefore the same Ci­cero acknowledgeth, That there was never any que­stion, De nulla quaestione majo­rem esse inter summos viros dissentionem, quàm de ea, quaenam res sit summum honum. Lib. 5. de finibus. about which the most considerable sort of men had so many diffe­rent Sences, as about that, in which Man's chiefest Good and Happiness should be placed. And Stobaeus quotes the words of the Ancient Philemon, com­plaining, That the Philo­sophers had laboured away their time, [...]. Ser. 53. how they might find out the Chiefest Good, but all in vain. And while some placed it in one thing, and some in another, some in Wisdom, and some in Vertue, they did rather perplex the Notion, than find out what it was. Thus a Heathen could re­present the Case a great while ago.

[Page 409] But, among the different fond Opi­nions which the layers aside of a Future State, whether in Faith or Practice, have vainly suggested to their Thoughts, as their most satisfactory Felicity; I must not forget more strictly to examine those many mens pretensions, who have pro­jected for a Sense of being Happy, by en­deavouring to transmit something of themselves to Futurity, though it were but to keep alive their Names and Me­morials to after Ages.

And the Folly of this I shall at last the more industriously and fully endea­vour to represent, because I perceive, that in those men, with whom such a design of Happiness hath prevailed, their intendments have been generally more steadily and constantly fix'd and prose­cuted, than in any other of the former Pretensions to humane Happiness; where the thoughts of another World have been suspended and superseded.

And the Reason of this my Observa­tion, is, Because such kinds of Designs as these, are more accommodable to that natural disposition, that is generally implanted in mens Minds, to aim at something that is Future, and indeed (if possible) Immortal. And therefore it is, that those men that have in any [Page 410] kind been governed by that natural tem­per, are so much the more apt to be pleased with their own mistakes, as that their Designs do bear a nearer assimila­tion and alliance to the prosecution and attainment of the truly immortal and eternal Happiness; for which (it will ap­pear) Man was principally and designed­ly made.

And without doubt, that temper in Man's mind, towards Futurity, howso­ever it's abused to such trivial purposes, was wisely and graciously allowed by a Good GOD to him in his very Na­ture, as a great advantage for his more easie and more natural prosecution of that, which should be really his im­mortal Bliss, when he should go about that Happy Work.

Now, an instance of this natural disposition, is very often expressed in Planting, Building, Experimenting, and Writing, and in such like Intendments; even when of the benefits of such Un­dertakings, the very Projectors them­selves could not but understand, that they should either never be partakers, or but for some inconsiderable space of time. But, the Reason upon which they founded their Encouragement, was, That they found themselves like to be plea­sed [Page 411] that their Projections might remain to Futurity, as standing Remarques of their Care, and Skill, and Honour, or they know not what. And possibly, these men having before experimented (as it's frequently observed in the World) the defects of all other sensual Pleasures, they adventured upon this last Design in the wiser and declining part of their Lives, as that which did more accommodate the natural Propen­sity, that is in all men (if they did not over-rule it) towards the most substan­tial Happiness of a Future Life.

And, I believe, thus were the Thoughts of Solon governed, when he had told Croesus, the rich Lydian King (after he had shown him his vast Treasures, and asked him, Whether he did not believe him to be an Happy man, that was Master of such Wealth and Kingdoms) That no Man ought to be reputed Hap­py, till after Death. I say, Something of that nature prevailed with Solon to use that Ex­pression, — [...], &c. Eth. lib. cap. 1. as appears by the manner of Aristotle's large and industrious confutation of him in the first Book of his Ethicks. And it is supposed that Ovid turned it into [Page 412] Verse, in the behalf of Solon's perswasion. —Scilicet ultima semper Expectanda dies homini, dicique beatus. Ante obitum nemo, supremaque funera debet.

Now, as this mistaken Expedient for humane Happiness hath govern'd no in­considerable part of the vain World, and more particularly such, whose Age and Experience might have stock'd them with a sounder Judgment, so it hath been mightily endeavoured by Two sorts of men, of whom I must now especially take notice.

And, the first of those are they, whose design it is to be preparing Mo­numents of their Skill in Arts and Sciences, and in some very chargeable and laborious Experiment, thereby to sur­vive their mortalities, and to acquire an everlasting Fame to themselves, when they were gone off from their mortal Stations.

Secondly, I take notice, that there hath been others of another distant temper, who all their daies had been drudging in Gare and Toil, and constant­ly exercising all their skill, and deny­ing themselves all reasonable satisfacti­on in their own present Plenties, with a design to heap a Fortune big enough to set up a Family of their own Name in vogue and note in the World, when [Page 413] they were gone; thinking thereby to immortalize themselves in their own Posterity; and thereby creating to themselves so much the greater opinion of their own Happiness and Satisfaction, as that they had gone so far towards a perpetuation of their pretended Hap­piness: Concerning which kind of Hap­piness, the excellent Author of the Re­ligio Medici hath this Expression. Part 1. Sect. 40. This Conceit and counterfeit Subsistence in our Progenies, seems to me a meer Fallacy, unworthy the desires of a Man, that can but conceive a Thought of the next World: who in a Nobler Ambition should desire to live in his Substance in Heaven, rather than in his Name and Shadow in the Earth.

Now, as to both which Designers for any present or after Happiness, (I know not which to call it) were it not that sometimes many commendable things have been done for the benefit of those that are present and to come, so as that their doing Good might turn to some happy account to themselves in a Fu­ture State, their design is liable to as many unaccountable Exceptions, as most other the former unfortunate Contri­vances for a settled Happiness in this Life, have been subject to.

[Page 414] 1. As for the First sort of these I men­tion, who had stifled their natural Ap­petite, design'd by GOD and Nature for the better pursuance of something, by which they might be made really futurely Happy; and then would give themselves leave to think of no other Happiness, but what they might acquire by leaving some lasting Monuments of their Skill and Labours after them, What words are little enough to express the fondness of such an Intendment?

For, if we measure the substance of their Happiness, with respect to such a Futurity, (as is pretended) it can be placed no where else, but in a fond Proposal of something to their own minds, of which (supposing their de­nial of a Future State) they themselves can never have any possible sense or enjoyment, and of which at present they can have no perception, but as in a pure Romantick notion, and empty imagina­tion: And by which, they shall have just so much real Happiness, as that man can presume himself to have a suf­ficient defence in a time of Danger, who had studied to build Castles in the Air, by his extravagant Fancy.

What present real Felicity could Ovid propound to himself in his own per­ception, [Page 415] as to a future Fame (which was the only thing that he is presum'd to aim at) when he flourished his vaun­ting Epilogue to his Metamorphosis any more, than if his Name had been de­sign'd to survive but for his being the Author of such a ridiculous Story as Tom Thumb; or, as if Juvenal had na­med him among his blundering Poets; or, that his Reputation had been buried with others as considerable as himself, in a perpetual night of Oblivion and nothing?

And, What more could other the fam'd Authors of extraordinary experi­mental Inventions propound to them­selves, by the credit of their Operations, when they could not but know, that in a short time they should have far less sense of any happiness or satisfaction by them, as to their own minds, than the Worms should enjoy, who were ready to try fresh Experiments upon their Bo­dies in those natural Laboratories, their Graves?

And, if it be said, that possibly it might be some happiness to them, that they could take a certain present satis­faction in their Thoughts, that they should survive themselves in their Re­putations; My Answer is, That that [Page 416] Pleasure could be no more or greater than if the same men should, like Knights Errants, have perswaded them­selves, that they should have the ho­nour to be afterwards reputed as Kings, and Princes; and then should take a great deal of silly care to be so recor­ded in a Romantick Story.

The Happiness of them both in each respect is much the same. And then, Who but mad men could imagine it to be a Felicity so considerable, as that GOD should allow them no other, or no better enjoyment, to determine their natural desires of being Happy, but in such ridiculous Triflings of their own imaginations?

2. Then, Secondly, as for the Happi­ness of those that have all their Lives laid long Trains, to purchase large Ter­ritories, and build stately Palaces, on de­sign to perpetuate their Names in a fam'd Family after them, it is much the same with the former pretensions, and perhaps the folly of it is, in some re­spects, less accountable, if they also shall have really neglected the Concerns of their future Happiness in another World.

For, First, The Foundation of this imaginary Happiness to themselves, is not certainly True; for it's yet a Dis­pute [Page 417] among men, Whether a transmissi­on of a greatly famous Fortune can make Posterity more happy than a lower Plenty; and the wisest men have agreed upon the latter. But then, Secondly, If the Foundation of their fansied Happi­ness were in that respect really True, yet it were infinitely vain to relie upon it, and that, because it were upon a very great uncertainty and hazard, whether their own Posterity should ever inherit it, or whether any of their near Relations should ever share their amass'd Fortunes, when they die: But that their Estates might become, like a rich shipwrack, to be divided among Strangers, or perhaps among such whom they neither loved nor valued. Or, Thirdly, If it be granted, that those which they designed should enjoy them, yet it was still very uncertain, whether they would then preserve those famous Fortunes as they intended, or not ridicu­lously scatter them, as fast as themselves had gathered them together; or whe­ther otherwise they had not all their lives been providing a vast Stock, for a Sot to play the fool with, or for some unworthy Person, that shall ungrateful­ly, yet justly, deride the Gainers of it, (though perhaps his own Parents) for their ridiculous penury to themselves, to [Page 418] obtain such a fortune for him; or, Fourthly, If it shall happen that their For­tunes shall be possessed by one of an honest and worthy Mind, yet it's possi­ble, that the same Person that enjoys them, may judge himself never the bet­ter, if not much the worse for them, in many respects. That is, When he shall find himself subject to more Tempta­tions to miscarry in his Vertue, and to be involved in such incumbrances as may make his life more uneasie; and that especially if he shall be sensible, that that Estate was unworthily and unjustly got­ten, or basely & scandalously kept for him.

So that if all those silly promoters of great Estates, should within a few Years after they were committed to their little tenements under-ground, rise again, and take a prospect of what becomes of the Issue of all their pinching Fru­galities, Cares and Cunning, they would commonly see little else, but the wretch­ed effects of their own folly and mista­ken designs, and find, that the happi­ness they enjoyed upon their projections for Posterity, had all along been no­thing but one vain Dream of some­thing, that never was like to come to pass according to their own purposes and expectations. But then lastly, if all [Page 419] things had succeeded according to the measures of their own fancy and design; yet it's certain, that their own dry'd and broken Skeleton (all that is presumed to remain of themselves, if no Future State) shall no more be concerned in the Flou­rish of their succeeding Generations, than in the Grandeur of the great Mogul, or the Persian Monarch; and that it shall then be all one to them, whether their Sons be Emperours or Laqueys, or whether they be Soveraigns of the Ocean, or but Admirals of some poor Indian Ca­noo. For what is the difference to a dead Parent (for any sense he can have of it, supposing no Future State) whe­ther his Child be a Triumphant Tamber­lain, or a Captive Bajazet, a Victorious Caesar, or an unfortunate Pompey, or to have been a Slave to either of them. The drudging projectour may have Joy or Sorrow in his present Portion while he lives, and he does his duty if he provides for them that come after him, but he can't be concern'd in the Prosperity of a­ny of them, whom he leaves behind him (as Aristotle observes in his Contest with Solon's Principle); [...]. Eth. Lib. 1. cap. 10. They shall be so much nothing to himself, as is the Bliss [Page 420] of another World, which he hath neither believed, thought of, nor endeavoured for.

And now, what I have said in parti­cular of these two famous sorts of triflers, with their natural inclinations, to perpe­tuate their happiness on that account, I may say the same in general of all o­thers, who have any other ways pro­posed a design of felicity to themselves by leaving memorials of their names be­hind them.

It's true, the memory of the Righte­ous is Blessed; that is, to others, whe­ther as some additional honour to rela­tives, or as exemplary to them and o­thers, but as to themselves, they shall have no more perception of it, or of a­ny happiness by it, (laying aside the thoughts of another World) than the senseless Dust, or the cold Monument that covers them: All the most famous­ly remark'd instances of their Vertue, or wisdom, shall be no more to them, than if it were recorded, at what time, or in what Country, they had ty'd up their Garters, or turn'd to the Wall for their Natural Ease.

What real happiness could those fa­mous Aegyptians promise to themselves, that their Bones were to lie under [Page 421] the vast Pyramides as their lasting Mo­numents; more than a poor Roman Soul­dier, whose Ashes being lodged in an Urn without an Inscription, informs the World, That there was such an one bu­ried there, that was content never to be remembred more?

And thus I have accounted for some of the various sentiments of those that have studied all that's possible, to six Mans summary Felicity in something enjoyable in his present Mortal Life, or with refe­rence to futurity in the ridiculous sence I have just now represented it; and my design therein is, that it may appear, that such men have sufficiently baffled and condemned themselves by their own confusions of mind, and that by the ab­surdities of their different opinions, and their several defective methods of endea­vouring to be happy in this life, they have expresly convinced the World, that there is no kind of happiness can determine mens minds to an universal agreement, that is founded upon any thing that is proposable or enjoyable in this mortal State.

And therefore it's very reasonable, and very necessary to be believed, that if God had designed, that such an happi­ness, as might possibly have answered and [Page 422] fix'd all mens Desires and Appetites, should have been attainable in this mortal life, there would have been a proposal of some common and univer­sal Good, which all men might have plainly understood, and in which all minds should have as universally and na­turally agreed.

Thus I have discharg'd my self of the Second Head of my Discourse, to­wards the perfecting this Argument for a Future State; that is, I have endea­voured to demonstrate, That there is nothing proposed as enjoyable in Man's mortal Life, by any Objects and Ac­quisitions whatsoever, that can tolera­bly answer Man's natural Appetite of being Happy, or that can agreeably suit that Capacity that GOD gave him by Creation to enjoy it.

And this I have done by an examina­tion of every thing in the World, that is pretended for it in particular; and by shewing to what intolerable defects they are all subject in general.

Therefore it must necessarily follow, or nothing else can reconcile the mind of Man to any kind representation of God's Goodness, that he should give to all men by a necessary instinct, such an unanswe­rable desire and restless expectation of an [Page 423] Happiness, which cannot be found any where while he remains in this present State; I say, It must then necessarily follow, that there is another State to come, in which all that heartily desire it, and regularly labour for it, upon the performance of such terms as GOD re­quires, and which a found Reason may suggest as necessary for that end, may be made compleatly, and satisfactorily Happy. But that is the business of the next Chapter.

Section I.

IN this First Section, I shall plainly ma­nifest, that whatsoever may be sug­gested against the Honour of the Divine Attributes on that account, will be per­fectly solv'd by the acknowledgment of a future State. And to evidence this great Truth, and to shew how naturally all those Attributes in this case are sol­ved by the supposal of such a State, I need not here go about to advance the Happiness of it, by any conjectural Excel­lencies. The nature and measures of it are a reserve with GOD, and it were a criminal Curiosity, and a great Immo­desty, to be too inquisitive into it, as I have discours'd the case more fully in my First Argument; I shall here there­fore only offer by way of illustration, what the present universal Experience of the Vertuous and Pious can evince and verifie.

[Page 425] For, whosoever he is, that shall set his Heart to exert those natural and strong inclinations of his Mind, for the attainment of that Great end, and shall affectionately place his Thoughts and Desires, his Designs and Hopes upon it, and then shall accordingly live up to such terms and conditions, by which it is a­greed upon all common reason, that it is to be expected and attained at the Hand of GOD, (upon whose good Pleasure and free Donation it perfectly depends) I say, That man shall find such a fitness and suitableness of all those his natural qualifications to those excellent Objects, that in time he may be made sensible, that Almighty GOD might have de­nied him any other temper of mind what­soever, rather than that natural power­ful Appetite after his own Happiness; which he now observes to be so necessa­ry, to drive him on through all the ad­ventures of what he is to do and suffer, for the attainment of that future State of Bliss.

So that he shall be so far from com­plaining and objecting against God, for creating him with such a temper, and (otherwise) troublesome disposition of mind, that he shall find pregnant Rea­sons, not only to justifie, but to love and [Page 426] glorifie His Goodness, for making him such a Creature as he is, and with a mind so naturally qualify'd.

For though, while his inclinations and desires were trifling with the vain Ob­jects of this Life, and were engaged in their natural Vigour, for the attainment of a present pretended Happiness by them, they were uneasie and unquiet, as being employed about an end, for which they were not naturally disposed, yet they were once terminated upon the concerns of a Happiness to come, and then exercised about the Actions and Offices that tend to it, they will be found to all purposes so approveable, as they will appear needful to enliven his Courage against all Temptations to his own abuse, by the choice of every tri­fling Object; and to heighten his ear­nestness in the performance of all such good actions, as reasonably tend to its attainment.

And further, Such a man shall not on­ly think well of GOD, that He gave him such natural dispositions of mind, meer­ly because they adapt him for those bet­ter Enjoyments in future, but also for the present ease and complacency, which he shall find in the very use of them to that Great end, by the proemial repasts of a [Page 427] most easie, and sometimes a ravishing Expectation. That is, Such a Pious man's Desires will be qualified with Content­ment, while he is in the way, as well as be compleatly satisfied at his Journeys end. So that, as he would not refuse the Objects of his religious desires for any other whatsoever, that can be offe­red him besides, so he would not ex­change the very Comfort and present Happiness of those expectations, for the real Possession of all the Pleasures and seeming satisfactions which this World can afford him.

The summ is, If these Experiences be duly considered, What can be alledged to justifie the least unkind Thought or Opinion of GOD's Wisdom and Good­ness, in putting Man's nature into such an order, or that He implanted in him such a Disposition? When it appears, that it is so subservient for, and so suita­ble to, his Chiefest Good; that is, that it is so fitted for the use of all the me­thods of attaining it here, and that it renders him so adequately capacitated, for the better reception of it hereafter.

A faint Desire would not have encou­raged so great an Engagement, nor have been receptive of so mighty an Object.

And this solves the First Doubt which [Page 428] concerned GOD, as Creator: About which something hath been offered in my Second Argument.

Section II.

IN this Section it will appear, That the supposal of that State will also solve all those Exceptions, (which we have already discours'd) that are so ear­nestly managed against the forementio­ned Enjoyments of Wealth, Honour, and Pleasure, and all other the Accommoda­tions which God hath set in man's view, for his present entertainment.

All which, as they will then be be­lieved in themselves to be Ordinations of GOD's Great Wisdom, to preserve Man­kind in their general order and well-be­ing, during their mortal Lives; so a Good man will as easily find Reasons to account them the effects of his Love, and consi­derable Arguments of his Favour to him, whensoever he is possessed of them.

And then, the Outcries that are rai­sed by Philosophers, Poets, and some contemplative Persons against them, and the ordinary clamours of idle mens ex­perimental dissatisfactions by them, (whereby oftentimes unkind Reflections [Page 429] are made against the Providence of God, in his ordinary dispensations of them) will be found to arise from no other cause, but from their not believing, or not sufficiently considering the certainty of a Future State and Happiness, (for whose Interest they may be improved) to determine their higher desires and appetites.

For, all those Exceptions and Com­plaints would then appear to take their Original from mens promising and en­deavouring to make those present En­joyments their principal End, and sum­mary Felicity (which God did never in­tend they should, for the Reasons already given) and then finding that they came short of their expected satisfactions, have rendered them obnoxious to such unde­cent accounts and representations.

Had they believed, and made (as in reason they ought to have done) the Bliss of a Future World their Chiefest end, and proposed it to themselves, as their Supreme Happiness, and then had looked upon those outward Temporary Enjoyments, to be desired and used in a manner, and with a value answerable to their kind, and no more; that is, to serve their natural present needs, and for the conveniences and decencies of their [Page 430] mortal Lives; they would soon have found them good and acceptable in their kinds and qualities, received them at God's Hand with Thankfulness, and possessed them with ease and content­ment in all proportions.

And then, all their Complaints of their uncertainty, transiency, and unsuf­ficiency, to make men compleatly Hap­py, would soon have been confuted by such a Vertuous and Religious Mind, as is resolved on the greater aims, and that hath entertain'd the noblest designs of attaining the Bliss of a Future State: To which he knows, that all the Enjoy­ments of this Life may (one way or other) be made considerably subser­vient, notwithstanding their proclaim'd and adjudg'd imperfections.

Upon which account, when a Good man once understands they were chiefly given him, and then endeavours only to use them for that end, he will soon be sa­tisfied with their enjoyment in every different degree, and must approve GOD's Wisdom and Goodness in ma­king them, as they are, (whilst they serve those purposes) the Objects of His present Care, Desire, and Usage.

It is mens esteeming them too much their Happiness, that makes them found [Page 431] to be too little, and their using them unworthily, that makes them none at all.

And therefore would men have stu­died the true notion of their Nature, and as they are qualified in their proper kinds, and learn'd, that the uncertainty, unconstancy, and unsufficiency to com­pleat mens present satisfactions in them, were but the necessary and natural dis­positions, and inseparable qualities of all earthly Enjoyments; and then would have laboured for, received, and relyed upon them but as such, they had never understood what discontent, frustration, or disappointment had meant; nor ever had they been tempted to make such passio­nate Complaints against them, so much to the disparagement of the incompara­ble Order of the Divine Pleasure and Providence.

They then would have been no more displeased with them, because they found them so qualified, than they would think it reasonable to be angry with Horses or Doggs, because they can't speak to them, or can't keep their accounts, or will not last alwaies, as well as be at present in­strumental to their pleasure or profit in their kinds.

[Page 432] Nor would they have thought the worse of their Money, that GOD gave them as a Blessing, for many good pur­poses of Life, because it could not fur­nish their minds directly with know­ledge and discretion, nor secure their bodies from Diseases and Torments, or that it could not be its own defence against Loss and Cheats, or that it would not be a constant Possession, when them­selves threw it away, to serve their Pride, Folly, and Sensualities.

Hence it is, that when the silly Worldling is plaguing himself with his insatiate De­sires of grasping more than will proper­ly suit his needs and conveniences; and is unkindly crucifying his Mind, because of this or that disappointment of greater improvements; or for the news of some unlucky miscarriage in his Affairs: The easie Soul of him that hath fix'd his de­sign and hopes upon a future Happiness, (when such things happen to him) is as unconcern'd as a common Spectator.

And when the uncertain turns and cross contingences of the World, do keep the Good man down to a lower Fortune, he is so far from finding Reasons to mur­mur or complain, that he can frame Ar­guments in his own mind, by which he can represent his present condition to [Page 433] himself, whatsoever it is, with the same contentment and satisfaction, as if it were the issue of his own choice, and as if he had carved it out for himself, by the Rules of his own and other mens most deliberate Counsels.

And then, if at any time this Good man hath reason to foresee any approach­ing dangers, to disturb his present order, he presently atones his fears with his greater hopes: And if those dangers do really come to pass, it is but treating his mind with more lively apprehensions, and his advancing the expectations of his future Bliss to a higher pitch, and immediately he is discharg'd of the affli­ctive sense of all those interruptions of his present quiet, whatsoever they be.

So that he that hath once espoused the designs of, and fix'd his hopes upon the Happiness of a future State, will be so far from permitting himself to murmur or complain, that he will alwaies be studying to furnish his mind with Rea­sons to think, that the nature (such as it is) of all the outward Enjoyments of this Life, is most approvable, and that the manner of their dispensation is to the best purposes, for his present and future Good and Happiness.

[Page 434] And then also he may find Rea­sons to believe, that the Great GOD will one day convince the World, that His Wisdom and Goodness did in no part of His Creation, and of His con­stant course of Providence, appear more illustrious, and designedly propitious for the good of Mankind, than that by His ordination, those their present Enjoy­ments should pass in the same unconstant and unsatisfying order, as they ordina­rily do.

And that all vain men will one day be forc'd to acknowledge to their own shame, how many advantages they had received and rejected, by their admired Enjoyments universal insufficiency to give them full contentment, to have in time attended to better Counsels for their own good, and to have relied up­on more certain Hopes and Blessings, for their own happiness and satisfaction.

And, Lastly, That all Good men, to GOD's everlasting Glory, shall proclaim to all the World, that had they not been convinced by the many changes and unsatisfactions in their Temporal Enjoyments of their certain Vanity; and that they had found no reason to expect any compleat Happiness from them, they had neither loved nor valued, ho­ped [Page 435] nor endeavoured for the higher Blessings of another World, as they ought to have done: but might have lived and dyed in their own folly, and in the loss of those incomparable Provisions for their future Bliss and Happiness. And this concludes the Second Section.

Section III.

IN this Section, I shall plainly repre­sent, That those men who have really espoused the Interest of that State, and that do actually apply themselves to those methods that are designed of God for its attainment, shall not only be able to possess those Temporal Blessings contentedly and thankfully, and bear all their natural inconveniences and insuf­ficiences, patiently and cheerfully, but they shall also enjoy a very real Happi­ness from every part of them, in their own kinds, and that in such a degree of perception (though inferiour to their advanc'd expectations of a future Bliss) as other men could never be affected with, that had enjoyed them in their largest accommodations, with designs to set their minds upon them, as their prin­cipal Felicity.

[Page 436] And this will easily be acknowledg­ed, by examining again the several men­tioned constitutives and parts of all pre­sent humane Prosperity.

First, As to Wealth, (so far as a Good man is furnished with it) when thereby he finds himself enabled to do good with it; that is, to support the necessi­ties and decencies of his own Life, and in a tolerable manner to provide for those that depend upon him, and can spare any Portions of it for the relief of others, it will make him sensible of the Happiness of being Rich, and shall admit his mind to a mighty contentment in his own Plenties, whatsoever they are, such as no man can enjoy, when they are made instrumental of Splendour, Greatness, and Pleasure: — [...]. Plut. Sept. Sapien. p. 155. He shall go into his fine Habitation with Joy, because he knows it's so qualified, as Solon would have a Rich man's House; that is, Because there is nothing in it that is unjustly gotten, or kept with Fear, or spent with Repen­tance.

And, as he may thus refresh himself in the very enjoyment of his Plenties, so he may also solace himself with the fairest hopes of their Constancy, and al­low [Page 437] himself the most reasonable ex­pectations of their Encrease, that can be given. No man is truly Rich, but he that is Good and Vertuous.

And, Secondly, as to Honour, It will in despight of all his neglects of it, be a certain consequence and result of his Vertuous and Religious Actions, incom­parably above all that can be attain'd to, by the most ambitious pursuits of it on all other accounts. For he that governs his actions exactly by the conduct of that Religion, which secures his Future Happiness, cannot, must not, but alwaies do that which is civil and truly worthy, and in some respects, that which is greatly brave and noble; and that, upon the most generous occasions (when there is need) for the preservation of his KING and Country. His Principle obligeth him to do so, beyond all the advantages of Birth and Breeding, where the Con­cerns of another World are not conside­red.

Then, as to the Last general reputed Constitutive of humane Prosperity, Plea­sure; No man knows what's truly such, but the Vertuous, and the Innocent, and he that lives in the hopes of a future Bliss; he only sweetly and serenely en­joys it, when the pretended Voluptuary [Page 438] shall not possess the least shadow of true satisfaction from his sordid Sensualities. It is the Temperate that enjoys the true pleasure of his Meals, and the refresh­ment of an undisturbed sleep; and that can methodically delight in making an orderly distinction of the Night and Day, for the ends they were naturally intended: He drinks Waters out of his own Cistern, and his chaste Bed is full of sweet Love, that bounds his Desires to his own satisfaction. And if at any time, his want of Health or Plenty, or the troublesome Scene of publick Affairs, shall interrupt the delight he might have taken in his honest Enjoyments, his Religion can raise his mind to a plea­sure that is intellectual; he hath that in reserve, by which he can take such a sa­tisfaction in his Hopes, that in the midst of all his natural sorrows and saddest circumstances, he can contentedly smile upon the expected Objects of his future Happiness.

Now, from what I have been able thus to say in the instant case, we are in Reason as well as Duty, prepared to admire the Mercy of God, and the Wis­dom of His Goodness, that He hath in His Gracious Care so fully provided for Man's universal Happiness both here and [Page 439] hereafter. And this was the Design and Reason of our Saviour's Promise, Matt. 6. 33. when He assured all those that would seek the Kingdom of GOD, and His Righteous­ness; that is, that should direct their na­tural Desires of being Happy to the Bles­sedness of another World, and then should alwaies endeavour to persist in that re­ligious way of living, that tends to it, all those things, that is, all that concerns their present Happiness in this World, shall be also added to them in the Sence that I have represented it.

Thus we may be satisfied, that all that's call'd humane Prosperity in every part of it, was not given and allowed to Mankind in this World in vain: It is only the Evil and the Inconsiderate that makes it so; but Good men may, and do com­monly enjoy it to as many purposes of Happiness, as themselves would desire and wish for, with respect to that of another World. And they are not con­cerned in the Three former Arguments, to prove the insufficiency of all present Enjoyments for Man's summary Felici­ty; it was that they never aimed at; and in that they were never disappoin­ted; so it's evident, that notwithstand­ing their imperfections, though they could not make them compleatly Happy, yet [Page 440] they might, in other respects, make them really so in their kinds in this present Life.

And thus I have got over the Third part of my intended design, by which it may demonstrably appear, that the ac­knowledged Existence and Belief of a fu­ture State, doth throughly solve all Ob­jections against GOD, for giving Man naturally such an impatient inclination and desire of Happiness, and against all present Enjoyments, because their Im­perfections might render them uncapa­ble of making Man compleatly Happy in this World.