SECTION I. Why is Hearing, of all Senses soonest prejudiced.

4. AS to the first, Aristotle layes down a certain common prin­ciple of Hearing and Speech: But doth not sufficiently declare what, or what kind of thing that is: Indeed he affirms that Voice is the principle of Hearing, as well as of Speaking, and withal saith, that the Hearing and Speaking seem to proceed from one and the same Principle. And truely the Voice is the material prin­ciple of Speech, as far as the articu­late speech is framed by the Voice; as if the same Voice were the prin­ciple by which the Hearing is stirred [Page 7] up to the act, or the Hearing had an actual being by means of the Voice, as Peter Apponensis explains the mean­ing of Aristotle.

5. But this principle will not effect our Design, for this question will re­main unsolv'd, why, where there is a Voice in Deaf men, yet there is no Hearing? and where those that are mute can frame a Voice? or brute Animals themselves, yet they can­not speak by virtue of that common Principle? And wherefore since In­fants can hear, should they not also be able to speak by the assistance of that common Principle? For the particular cause, either of the obstru­ction of Hearing, or impediment or depravation of Speaking, is on either hand to be sought in the organs: the irregularity whereof, the vitiated conformation, or solution of the conti­nuum, or the convenient influx of the a­nimal spirits being impeded by any de­fect of the organ: obstructs the opera­tion thereof. But we will see in our fol­lowing [Page 8] Discourse, whether there may not probably be some other principle found out, that depends upon the mu­tual conjunction of the nerves.

6. But the reason why New-born Babes can hear, but not presently speak, or pronounce articulate words, is, because there is more required to the framing of speech, or speaking, than to the reception of a sound, or hearing. For, the Hearing is meerly passive, and the Sound arriving at the organ of Hearing (which is the very auditory Nerve, expanded to the internal parts of the windings of the Auditorium; presuppossing a convenient disposition of the outward, as well as inward parts of the Ear) a Sound is imme­diately represented: but 'tis not the same when a Voice is uttered, the Speech is not immediately framed, or Discourse raised, nor doth it meerly consist in passion.

7. Brute Animals that have Lungs and the Aspera Arteria, are able to utter a Voice, otherwise than those [Page 9] other Creatures, that onely make a Sound or noise; but yet they cannot therefore speak.

The Dolphin, saith Aristotle, in the 4 th. Book of the History of Animals c. 9. hath Lung and the Arterie, and therefore can utter somewhat of a Voice, but yet hath not a free and vo­luble Tongue, nor Lips by which it might frame any articulate voice; therefore it only makes a noise and muttering.

8. But those that have Lips and a greater liberty of the Tongue, so as to be able to frame some one articu­late Word (as Sheep do the word [...], Oxen and Cows [...], &c.) yet they cannot frame their Voice to several articulate words; for all Brutes want that aptitude of the organs, by which articulate words are made and form­ed; though there are some brute Animals that do imitate the words and voice of Man: Of which here­after.

9. But Infants and Children, though [Page 10] they have that aptitude of organs naturally, by which an articulate Voice may be pronounced, yet the use of those organs is not then made so familiar to them, as truely to frame words: for there must be exercise, and from thence a habit contracted to speak easily and readily; just as when a man in time hath gained a habit, he sweetly playes upon a mu­sical Instrument

10. Besides, the organs of Infants are then but infirm, and by degrees arrive to perfection. when Nature, or the innate heat by little and little consumes the superfluous moisture. And so Aristotle in his last forequoted place is in the right, where he saith, that as Children cannot rule and go­vern their Limbs, so their first impo­tency and imperfection appears in the Tongue, and 'tis long before they are freed from it; which is the reason that for the most part they stammer, and speak with difficulty. And hence it is that Infants cannot properly be said [Page 11] to be mute, because there is no priva­tion, but in a subject that is capable of the habit, yet they may properly be said to be born Dumb, whose or­gans are so dispos'd from their Nati­vity, as that they have an ineptitude to speech when grown in years.

11. But this property of the or­gans, as the Tongue, Palate, Lips, Teeth and Throat, is only bestowed on Man to the end that he may get a habit of speaking any thing. Though herein also is great variety by reason of the Countreys and Kingdoms, in­somuch that all men have not a ready pronunciation of all Letters in use with other Nations: Thus the gut­tural Letters are appropriated to the Eastern people; and among them a­nother, though no guttural letter cal­led Dad (which is pronounced like ddsh) is so peculiar to the Arabians, that they can distinguish any forein Nation from their own, by the pro­nunciation thereof; though they con­verse with them never so long, and [Page 12] the Arabians are meant by those that pronounce this Letter exactly, as when they say that Mahumed was the most Eloquent of all that pronounce the let­ter Dad, that is, of the Arabians. The same is every where obvious in the European Tongues: for, it is a matter of difficulty for the French to pronounce the German G, which is pronounced like the pointed Kef of the Persians or Turks; hence it is that they cannot without difficuty pronounce the German monosyllable Tang: and so in the reft.

12. As to the reason or cause why the Hearing of all the Senses is soonest prejudic'd from the Birth, that cannot by any means be referred to any common principle of Hearing and Speaking; because such a principle cannot be judged a sufficient principle of Hearing only, or it conferrs no o­therwayes to the hearing then objecti­ve; in regard that at least it cannot possibly fall under the notion of the efficient cause, by which there is any [Page 31] perception of the Voice; therefore there must be some other reason or cause found out of the thing in questi­on, if we hold it simply true, that the Hearing is soonest injured from the Nativity.

13. But the genuine reason of the thing must be found in the winding and truely labyrinthean structure of the inward part of the Ear, which may be soon perverted or obstructed; into which the more tender Nerve hath a maeandrous passage, which also is soon affected with the smallest thing and from the filth of those humors which descend thither partly and pri­marily proceeding from the moisture of the Brain.

14. Besides the drum of the Ear may it self be more grosse from the Birth, than ordinary, or be overspread with the sinews of the Brain, or some other grosse humour; or there may be some thick membrane that may cover the auditory maeanders; but they, to whom this happens, are onely trou­bled [Page 14] with thickness of hearing, and do as it were receive the sound by the Mouth, the reason whereof shall be given in our following Discourse. And sometimes there may be some peculi­ar defect in the structure of the Ear, extending it self to the Jaws and Pa­lat of the Mouth, which is the reason that those that are Deaf use to speak thorough the nose, as Aristotle affirms in his second and fourth Problem s. 11.

SECT. II. Whether those that are Born Deaf, are Dumb also?

NOw we come to the examination of the second point, which seems to be the consequence of the former; and which is confirmed by Aristotle, in the 4. Book de Hist. Animal. c. 9. viz. That those that are born Deaf are also Dumb. And as this is didu­ced and laid down as a Proposition by Aristotle, by reason of the former As­sertion, though against reason: so it is admitted by very many, and those Physicians too, as an universal truth, without any further search into the truth of the thing or disquisition of the difference. Hence they presup­posing [Page 16] on all hands, as a thing beyond exception, That all those that are born Deaf are likewise Dumb. (as Sanctor. comm. in Art. Medic. and Ga­len Part 2. Question 41. are also of opinion) make an inquisition after the cause only of the thing supposed, or incontrovertibly true: But we will more narrowly discusse the Thesis be­fore we pry into the cause, why it often falls out to be so.

16. Indeed, if by those that are Mute we understand such whose or­gans have in themselves an ineptitude to the framing of an articulate Voice, it is an absolute mistake to maintain that all that are born Deaf, are Dumb also: for the ineptitude of organs to the framing of Speech doth not im­mediately follow the want of Hear­ing. For where deafness depends not so much upon the defect which is com­mon to the Hearing and Speaking, (which we have allowed may some­times happen) as upon the imperfe­ction rather peculiar to the very adae­quate [Page 17] organ of Hearing (of which as there are many parts, so there may be many obstructions, that may destroy the Hearing) it doth not follow there­fore that there is an immediate inabi­lity to speak.

But why rather as the Hearing is sometimes destroyed after the birth, the speech remaining perfect, so also at the very birth, or immediately af­ter, may not such a constitution of the Organs happen, whereby they may be adapted to the forming of speech, and yet be incapable of Hearing?

17. Here we must consult with ex­perience, which testifies that those that are born deaf, may learn to speak. For so Valles. Philoso. Sacr. cap. 3. reports, that one Peter Pontius a Monk of the Order of St. Benedict, and his Friend, taught those that were born deaf to speak, by no other way, than instructing them first to write, point­ing at those things with his finger that were signified by those Characters, and then putting them forward to [Page 18] that motion of the Tongue, that did correspond to the Charact­ers.

18. But if by those that are dumb we understand, such as have Or­gans fit for the forming of words, but yet understand no language, nor ever learn't such words as express the conceived sense of the mind; it is undeniably true, that many that are born Deaf, are also Dumb, who never were instructed in any Tongue, or signicative words by the forementi­oned artifice, or some such kind of means.

19. Therefore as to the cause, why those that are born Deaf are also Dumb, (at least for the generality) Albertus Magnus in his 4. Book de Anim. Tract. 2. C. 2. saith, that those that are Deaf from their Nati­vity are also Dumb, because they could learn no Idiom by the sense of Hearing, And Sanctor in Art Medic. approves of this opinion. Galen part. the 2. Questi­on 4. as also Bartholinus in the 3. [Page 19] book of his Anatomy c. 9. re­ferring the cause of deafness to the Drum of the Ear, who saith that those who from their birth are thus affect­ed, are also for the most part Dumb, because they can neither conceive in their mind, nor utter with their Tongue those words, which they ne­ver heard.

20. But Laurentius contradicts this opinion in the 11th Book of his Anatomy and the 11th Question where he saith, I do not allow of that vulgar conceit, that the reason why those that are Deaf are mute, because they can learn no language, and because Hearing is the Sense of Learning; for then saith he, if that be the only cause, why Deaf Men are Dumb;

First, Why do they breath out their sighs and groans, which are natu­rall passions with so much difficulty?

Sccondly, whether or no, might not those that are Deaf frame words and speches to express the sense and conceptions of the mind, if they could [Page 20] pronounce them, as well as those, who were the first Inventors of them.

21. But in truth we may give this answer to Laurentius his first argu­ment, that it is a fallacy, to say that Deaf Men groan and sigh with diffi­culty; because original deafness, hath no manner of communication with the parts subservient to respiration. But Laurentius his mistake seems to be grounded upon what Aristotle writes in his 4th Problem. Section 11. That deaf Men breath not without vi­olence; by which Aristotle doth not mean a violent or difficult respiration which belongs to the Lungs and Breast, but a vehement spiration or breathing through the Nostrils; whereupon he addes, that the No­strils become more large by the pas­sage of the Spirits, and thats the rea­son they cannot speak but through the Nose. And so also in the second Problem, (saith he) Those that are deaf want but little of being dumb [Page 21] and those that are dumb, speak through the Nose, for their Spirits are driven that way, because they cannot speak.

22. Now where there is a kind of ineptitude to speech in deaf Men, oc­casioned by some defect appertaining to the Palate, as well as the Organ of Hearing, they breath not without diffi­culty; and because their Spirits do bend their course more towards the Nostrils, by reason of the wideness of their passage, besides that, they breath out a kind of voice with their mouths, as Aristtole speaks concerning Ele­phants in the 4. Book de Hist. Anim. c. 9. yet that sound, they make with their Nose, resembles the hoarseness of a Trumpet.

23. To Laurentius his second ar­gument it may be replyed; although man by nature, though deaf, is arm'd with reason to make him fit for inven­tion; yet as Plato teacheth, it is not the property of a vuigar Genius to impose names upon things, much less is it in the power of every person, to [Page 22] invent an elegant speech or peculiar Tongue, to make the conceptions of the mind intelligible.

24. He that first gave creatures their names, to wit, Adam, was in his integrity, and in the supernatural state of innocency instructed with such wisdome, as transcends the capacity of prevaricated nature: The confusion of various Tongues was afterwards su­pernaturally sent by God at the build­ing of the Tower of Babel; and then the variety of Idioms did gradually proceed from the commixture of Tongues, or had some other rise by the common use and consent of men.

Yet those that are mute, can find out a way whereby to explain the sense of their mind to others, as well as if they had the faculty of speaking, which is analagous to speech, as shall be manifested in i'ts proper place.

25. But possibly some persons be­leive that if deaf men had in them that aptitude of Organs whereby they might be capeable of speaking, that [Page 23] they should use some native Language, or speech, which Nature their School-Mistress should instruct them: for since Sermocination is essential to man, as subordinate to reason, so it is not impro­bable, that where the Organs are so adapted, there must be granted exter­nal speech. To which we answer, that 'tis true the very faculty of sermocina­tion, which is subservient to them in the declaring the sense of their mind, by those significations that are set forth by words, whatsoever they be, is essen­tial to man; yet the names of things, and so consequently the Languages themselves, or the Idioms of speech are not to be learn't by nature, but by instruction, exercise and custome.

26. And really if any certain speech did depend upon nature, as eve­ry individual person of mankind hath one and the same nature: so all Nati­ons whatsoever would use one and the same Tongue. But the contrary is known experimentally. Therefore their opinion is altogether vain and [Page 24] foolish, who, being ignorant of Phi­losophy, would needs oblige them­selves and others to this persuasion, that if a Child were taught no Lan­guage in his Infancy, but left to his own conduct, he would speak Hebrew, that is, he would make use of this Language by the meer instinct of Na­ture, which is a conceit altogether inept and foolish.

27. Vallesius in the forequoted place makes a good objection to this phan­tastical opinion; saying, If Speech were connatural to men, as many other things are; it would be so, though they learnt any other Language, and con­sequently all men would understand two Tongues. For, if the Speech in which a man was first instructed doth not hinder his learning another; (since many men can speak two, three, or four Languages) much lesse can that which is natural, be impeded by that, which is acquisititious.

28. Nay rather; if one Tongue were natural to man, they could not be [Page 25] docible of all the rest; because that which is internal obstructs the exter­nall. Therefore as Nature made Man without Knowledge; that he might be capable of all Arts; it must necessarily follow, that she Created him without any Language, that he might learn them all. We also find that many men are more apt to learn other Languages, than the Hebrew; and that many Europaeans attain the true pronunciation of some Hebrew words with no small difficulty; which could not be, if the Hebrew were our natural Language; for all things do voluntarily tend to that which is natu­ral to them.

29. We conclude therefore, that they who are born absolutely Deaf, though their organs are fit for the prolation of words, which frequently happens, yet they are for the major part, Dumb; that is, they cannot pro­nounce significative words, because they could not learn any Idiom by the Ear: For it is very rarely known [Page 26] that they are taught to Speak by any such particular art as Peter Pontius made use of, which out of Vallesius we have before mentioned.

30. But in the mean time we do no way contradict, but agree with Lau­rentius, when he ascribes it to ano­ther cause, why all those that are Deaf are generally Dumb, or at least speak with difficulty, taken from the mutu­al conjunction of the Nerves. For this we lay down, as another cause why Deaf men born, are Dumb, and so re­ally dumb that they are altogether in­capable of speaking articulate Words. For that communion of the Nerves consists not in this, that because the Nerve of the fifth Conjugation which is the auditory Nerve, and the Nerves of the sixth Conjugation, which are those belonging to the Speech (or ra­ther of the seventh, for this is the Nerve of the Tongue) are mutually joyned together within themselves, before they are dispersed into their proper parts, as Peter Apponensis in [Page 27] in his Explanation of the propos'd Pro­blem, is of opinion; or because that the same Nerves are originally invest­ed with the same Tunicle, which in the judgement of others, is no lesse repugnant to it self; for the Nerves of either of the prementioned Conjuga­tions are found by a sufficient and long interval originally distant; and it cannot be said, that they have any other common Tunicle, than what all other Nerves are covered with, viz. the Pia Mennix from which far-fetcht communion of the Nerves we may also inferr, that those that are Deaf, are Blind, and those that are Blind, Dumb.

31. But that Conjugation of the Nerves is well demonstrated by Lau­rentius (which is also mentioned by Bauhinus in the third Book of his A­natomy c. 22. 60. and others,) that the Nerve of the fifth Conjugation (commonly called the auditory Nerve) hath several branches issuing from it, the larger whereof is expanded to the [Page 28] Ear and the membrane of that most exquisite sense, and carries all sorts of Sounds to the Brain, the lesser extends to the Tongue and Larynx, and is there embraced by the seventh Conju­gation.

32. And from this Communion of the vessels proceeds the sympathy be­tween the Ear, the Tongue, and La­rynx, and the very affection of those parts, are easily communicated one with the other. Hence it is, that the pulling of the Membrane of the Ear, causeth a dry Cough in the party; which Avicen takes notice of: and that is the reason, most deaf Men, at at least those, whose deafness ariseth from the ill-affection of the Nerves of the fifth pair, are Dumb, or else speak with great difficulty; that is, are not capable of framing true words, or of articulate pronunciation, by rea­son of the want of that convenient in­flux of the animal spirits; and for this cause also, it is that those that are thick of Hearing, have a kind of hoarce speech.

[Page 29] 33. In like manner, if there be any e­vil defect which usually consists in the inward structure of the Ear and the Pa­lat (which makes them speak through the Nose, as we have before mention­ed out of Aristotle) there follows a deafness and withall an impediment of Speech, the organ of speech, being vitiated, but not simply, be­cause a Language cannot then be learn't by hearing. But contraily, if the only structure of the Ear be de­fective or only that branch of the fifth pair, which is carried to the Ear be preternaturally affected; the Hearing may be hindred, or Deafness may arise; but the impediment is but by Accident; because that when Words cannot be heard or received by the Ear, they cannot be learnt.

34. But if the Hearing be preju­dic'd by the defect of the Tympanum, or by any particular Membrane that is over it, that is a peculiar Accident; for in this case there happens to be a thickness of Hearing, which is near­est [Page 30] of kin to Deafness, rather than an absolute Deafness it self. And in such cases, those that are deafish use to hearken with their Mouth, or to suck in Words and Sounds with gaping, and so to pronounce without trouble those very words, by the help of those organs subservient to Speech, which they learnt by Hearing; and such are by no means to be call'd Dumb per­sons.

35. But the Sound flows to the in­ward part of the Ear, or the very or­gan of Hearing, by the help of the little Cartilagineous Pipe, which is conveyed from the second passage of the Ear to the Mouth and Palat, being appointed to convey the Excrements of the Ear through the Mouth, like an Aquaeduct.

By the benefit of this Conduit-pipe it is, that we can exactly apprehend our own Words, when both our Ears are stopt; so also, if we hold a Stick in our Mouth, and therewith touch any musical instrument, we hear the [Page 31] sound thereof more exactly; and if you are desirous to know, whether there be any person approaching near you in the Night time, place one end of the Staff on the ground, and hold the o­ther with your Teeth, you hear then far better, though at a great di­stance.

36. By the same Pipe, when we blow our Nose, or hold our Breath, by stopping of the Ears and shutting the Mouth, we are sensible that the air finds a passage into the Ear, by which the Membrane of the tympanum is struck with the outward sound, and sometimes prejudiced thereby, if it be very violent, and by this it is that Smoakers puffing up their Cheeks ha­ving taken in the fume of Tobacco, send it out at their Ears, so as that they seem to Breath at the Ears. Therefore the Opinion of Alcmaeon is not ridiculous who held that she-Goats did Breath thorough their Ears, as Aristotle hath it in his first Book de Hist. Animal. c. 11. And [Page 32] to Physicians this conveyance doth insinuate, that masticatory Medi­cines are not to be slighted in the inward pains of the Ears.

SECT. III. Of their way of Understanding that are Born Deaf.

37. BEfore we come to the third point of what is to be dicuss'd concerning the propos'd Problem, we must Contemplate a little further on those that are Born Deaf, and see with what Knowledge they are endu­ed, since men usually gain the major part of what they know, by Hear­ing.

38. First, those persons that are Born Deaf, and have the Visive fa­culty intire, they may gain the Know­ledge of all Visible things, as visible, and may frame those universal con­ceptions [Page 34] of them by the abstraction of the Mind, as well in this case, as where the Hearing is perfect: Nay farther, and these persons as well as all other men in general may pro­ceed from things Visible by the light of the Understanding to the Know­ledge of the Invisible mysteries of the Deity; so that they are left inexcusa­ble, as well as any other persons what­soever, if they do not glorify God, and return him thanks for Benefits receiv'd: Of these the Apostle speaks Rom. 1. v. 20, 21.

39. Furthermore, if those that are Born Deaf, are also Blind, al­though they are depriv'd of the know­ledge of many things, which come within the compass of the Senses, nor can arive at the knowledge of God by the outward Book of Nature, as the other, yet they may obtain the knowledge both of God and them­selves, by those notions that are graft­ed in their minds. And it is very probable, that those whose Intellects [Page 35] are less disturbed in Contemplation by the appearance of corporeal things; the implanted Seeds that are in them of the Knowledge of Divine and im­material Beings, do easily break forth into action; as we our selves are more apt for the search and Contemplation of Divine things, the less we are di­stracted by outward objects, and the fancies that result from them.

40. Certainly it is not at all con­sentaneous to reason, that the ratio­nal Soul, or Mind is altogether un­active in such persons, and lies as it were lurking in the lethargy of a be­numm'd security, or that they do not according to their capacity incline their minds to the Knowledge of the Deity, by virtue of that innate light that is in them, as well as the Cele­stial Angels, and Divels; since the Soul is to be reckoned in the number of Intelligences (though perhaps pla­ced in the lowest rank of Intelligen­ces) and in reality is not so deeply plunged in matter or matterial fun­ctions, [Page 36] by reason of its defect of Sight and Hearing.

41. But what is to be thought of those who are born Deaf, as to their Knowledge in things that concern the Mystery of our Salvation?

These things as they are too sublime, either for Universal, Humane, or Angelical knowledge, cannot be found out, or understood by those notions implanted in the mind. And as Faith comes by Hearing, according to the A­postle, where this is wanting, it may possibly seem very agreeable to truth, that there can be no Faith, and there­fore no saving knowledge; and the consequence is undeniable, since no man can be saved without Faith.

42. Oh this is indeed a very hard saying, which shipwracks the Soul! Truly since those that are born Deaf are no more guilty of neglecting the means of their Salvation, than In­fants (concerning whom however the Sacred Pages advise us to be more charitable) what reason I wonder can [Page 37] there be, why we should think God less merciful to them, who are also born of faithful Parents, than to Infants! We will leave the disquisition of their Faith, or the manner thereof to Di­vines. Hath God therefore, who according to his Will hath elected some ont of all Mankind corrupted by the Fall, to be Vessels of mercy, and others Vessels of his wrath, strict­ly registred all those that are born deaf in the number of those that are Vessels of wrath? Yet God's Promise and Covenant belongs to these, as much as to the children of the faithful.

43. The Holy Ghost in truth is the chiefest cause of Faith, who begets it in our hearts by the preaching of the Word, and consequently by Hearing. This is the ordinary way of God which he commands us to follow; he that neglects this, is excluded from Faith by his own fault. Yet God is not wholly tied up to this one way of operation. He hath extraordinary ways which we are ignorant of, and [Page 38] he will not reveal to us. Yet God made use of peculiar means to bring St. Paul to the christian Faith, and made him of a Persecutor of the Church, become an Apostle, Acts. the 9. He proceeded after another man­ner to the conversion (at least in part) of the Eunuch of Candace the Aethio­pian Queen. Acts the 9. viz. By the reading of the Word of God.

44. And shall we judge that no persons can be saved, that live where there is no publike preaching of Gods Word, and so by consequence where the mind gains no spiritual knowledge by Hearing? May we not affirm, that by diligent reading, and co-operation of the Holy Ghost, Faith may be en­gendred in the Souls of the Godly? Now therefore if this means be with­out Hearing, why may not God ma­nifest other ways, that so at least his o­peration may not be confin'd to the hearing solely?

45. But let us examine whether there are not other means appointed by [Page 39] God, by which those that are original­ly deaf, may attain the knowledge of divine Mysteries sufficient for salvation.

There is no necessity, why speech, which is usually acquir'd by Hearing, should precede writing; but speech useth to be in the first place by reason of it's facility, for those that have all their senses perfect, are more apt to speak, than write— But where there is a defect of Hearing, they may be­gin with writing, and so by writing come to speaking, as is manifrst by the fore-cited example out of Vallesius. Now external speech is a kind Messen­ger or rather representation of the in­ternal, or of the intellect it self.

They therefore that are born Deaf may by writing inform their minds with the knowledge of those things, which must be obtained by hearing in others, whose senses are all perfect; and so they may make use of writing in leiu of speaking, which is otherwayes attained by Learning; and they as Vallesius speaks in his third chapter de [Page 40] Phil. Sacr. Do gain the knowledge of Di­vine things by the sight, which others do by hearing, which I my self (saith he) can testify, in those Scholars which my friend Peter Pontius undertook, who first taught them that were born Deaf to write, or to express the conceptions of their mind by writing, and then to speak.

46. The same reason there is for those that are born Deaf, if Dumb al­so; they may by writing understand things, although no external writing is subsequent to speech; for the speech in Man conduceth not to the gaining of knowledge to themselves; but only to communicate the Conceptions of their own mind to others. This is clear by an example taken out of Pel. Platerus who in the first book of his Observations pag. 118. reports, that a certain person who was born Deaf and Dumb, could with Chalk draw out his mind in a Table-book, which he carried continually about him, and understand what others writ there­in.

[Page 41] 47. But as writing, or the reading thereof, may serve in stead of speech, by which the Conceptions of the mind are laid open to the sight, as well as they are by speech to the Ear; so there may be other signs made imitat­ing the outward speech, and Succe­daneous to hearing; as those are which Mutes themselves always make use one in lieu of speech, and by which they conceive the Sentiments of other mens minds. For experience teacheth us, and there are also many obvious examples among us, that those that are originally Dumb, and Deaf do by cer­tain gestures, and various motions of the body as readily and clearly declare their mind, to those with whom they have been often conversant, as if they could speak, and likewise by such ge­stures of other Persons, they do abso­lutely understand the intentions of their mind also.

48. The Emperour of the Turk maintains many such Mutes in his Court; who do express the [Page 42] Conceptions of their minds one to ano­ther, and as it were interchange mutu­al discourse, by gesticulations, and va­riety of external significations, no o­therways than we that have the facul­ty of signifying our own thoughts, and conceiving those of other Persons by outward Speech. Nay the Turkish Emperour himself, and his Courtiers, take great delight with this kind of Speech shadowed out by gestures, and use to employ themselves very much in the exercise hereof, to make them perfect in it.

49. Cornelius Haga Embassadour to the Emperour of the Turks sent thi­ther by the States of the United Pro­vinces did once invite all those Mutes to a Banquet (as I observed from the re­lation given me by the most Noble and Worthy Dr. Brinkins Senator of Har­dervick) where though there was not a syllable heard yet they did exchange several discourses, as is usual at other Treats, which the Embassadour un­derstood by an Interpreter on both sides [Page 43] by whose assistance he himself did dis­course with the Mutes upon all sub­jects.

50. But those very significations of things, which Mutes make use of, proceed not from nature, but from their own institution no more, than our speech; Therefore they attain unto them by Study and exercise.

Although however most of them do shadow out some outward manner, of the things which they aim at. As when they close one hand, and move it up towards the Nostrils, thereby they signifie a Flower. Now the signifi­cations of those Mutes (which is as it were their Speech) are not like the Languages which vary among several Nations, nor are so absolutely diffe­rent.

51. And as the Mutes do by their ge­stures exactly and distinctly under­stand one another, and those Persons also that use such a kind of analogous Speech among them; so they conceive many things by the gestures, motion of the Lips, and such like things in [Page 44] those that really do speak, and some­times understand a great part of their conceptions by such outward things. So saith Platerus in the place above­mentioned: that his Father told him, that that Deaf and Dumb man (whom we discourst of a little before) when he very devoutly heard Oecolampadius Preaching, did apprehend many things from the motion of his Lips, and gestures; and so from others.

52. And there is now at this very time in the City of Gronning, such a one who being born Deaf and Dumb, constantly frequents publike Sermons, and doth as it were contemplate upon the Words of the Preacher with his eyes fixt upon him, so that he seems to receive them in at his Mouth as o­thers do by the Ear. This person when he earnestly desires to receive the Holy Sacrament, I do not at all question, but that he hath that know­ledge of those Divine things, that con­cern his Salvation, insomuch that he cannot be debarr'd from it without [Page 45] some scruple of Conscience. Although I am of opinion that he ought to be examined as to this his knowledge and Confession, which may be done, by means of his Wife, or Servant, his Interpreters, whom he alwayes hath with him, and who discourse with him very nimbly by signs, of any thing whatsoever.

53. We will subjoyn one example out of Phil. Camerarius, which is in Horae Subcisivae 1 Gent. 37- ‘We have now among us (saith he) a young Youth and a Maid born of the same Parents, and indeed of a Noble and honest Family, who have an extra­ordinary acuteness of Wit: and though Nature brought them forth Deaf and Dumb, yet they can both of them Read distinctly, Write an excellent hand, and keep Merchants Accompts. And as he dextrously perceives by a Nod what you would have him to do, and ifhe wants a Pen, will express himself by gestures; and is very cunning at all Games [Page 46] that are usually plaid among us up­on the Dice, which cannot be man­aged without great subtilty; so she very much exceeds all Maids at her Needle and curious Weaving. But among other their admirable quali­fications, which Nature hath be­stowed upon them; this is wonder­ful, that they seem to understand what any one speaks by the motion of the Lips; Wherefore they are of­ten at Church, hearing the Word Preacht. So that it will be no ab­surdity to say, that 'tis probable they take the Words in at their Eyes, they are so intent, which others use to do by the Ear. For they can at plea­sure without any suggestion, or o­ther help write the Lords Prayer, and other pious Oraisons. And can remember the Gospells appointed to be read on Holy-days as well as others, and readily Write them. And if the Holy Name of Iesus be mentioned in the Church, he, a­bove all the rest, will in a posture [Page 47] of Reverence uncover his head, and bow the knee. Thus Nature like an indulgent Mother was solicitous and studious to recompense their de­fects, that she might free her self from the injurious accusation of a cruel Step-mother.’

The Fourth SECTION, Being A DISCOURSE Concerning the REASON, AND SPEECH OF BEASTS.

54. THese things, concerning those that are born Deaf and Dumb being thus determined, we will pro­ceed [Page 49] to a further Illustration of the rest which occurr in the Problem pro­pos'd, and the Explication thereof; And the third point which Aristotle hath offered, to our meditation con­cerns the Speech of Beasts, where he lays down this, as an Assertion.

That the faculty of Speech (which presupposeth reason) is only bestowed up­on Man, and that no other Creature can Speak: Which we will take into our Consideration.

55. To speak truly, the inward Speech is no more, than the nuncius or a certain image of internal reason, which goes to the Idea of the reason exprest; whence the Graecians, and that not without reason, call rationem and sermonem, Reason and Speech by the same name [...] absolutely, i. e. Speech which the Philosophers distin­guish into [...] into in­ternal and external, and the one must necessarily accompany the other, un­lesse there be an imperfection, or de­fect in the organs. Therefore this is [Page 50] a necessary Consequence, That where there is no Reason, there can be no external Speech; and so on the con­trary.

56. And 'tis from this strict copula­tion of Reason and Speech, that [...] rational is express'd in the Arabick Version, by the word Natthack, which signifies Speaking, Gen. 2. v. 7. as its opposite [...], irrational, Chares, which signifies Mute, is so named in 2 Pet. 2. v. 2. to which the Dutch phrase answers, een stom Beest, (and our English exactly, a Dumb Beast) i. e. an irrational Creature.

Nay, the Holy Scripture calls ir­rational; dumb Creatures, or Creatures without Speech, 2 Pet. 2. v. 16. where the Ass of the Prophet Balaam is said to be [...], subjugale mutum humana voce locutum; which our English Transla­tion renders, The dumb Ass speaking with Man's Voice.

57. But here our Galen suggests a difficulty, who, whilst he seems to de­ny [Page 51] Brutes external Speech, yet he af­firms, that they have Reason, from whence external speech indisputably proceeds; so that if any Brutes have fit organs for the uttering of articu­late words, it seems that they must not be denied external speech, rea­son or ratiocination being suppos'd; For thus Galen expresseth himself in the beginning of his Book intituled Exhort. ad Art. lib. Stud. It is not yet certain, whether Beasts, which are called Brutes, are altogether void of Reason. For though peradven­ture they have not that Reason in common, with us, which is understood by the Voice, and call'd denunciative; yet certainly, they all of them have that which is taken according to the Soul, which they call Reason, capa­ble of Affections in common, as well as we, though some more, some lesse.

58. But here we must make a halt for a while, to the end that we may more exactly determine what is to be [Page 52] thought of the Reason of brute Beasts commonly so called, and also of their Speech. ‘Indeed the most profound Philosophers, PorphIndeed the most profoundyrius, Plutarch, and Galen (saith Bodin in Theatr. Nat. lib. p. 476.) have proved by almost an infinite number of Ar­guments, that Nature hath bestow­ed Reason upon Beasts.’ And ‘ Huar­tus in Scrutin. Ingen. ca. 6. There is no doubt (saith he) but that brute Animals have a Memory and Phan­tasy, and a certain Power besides, which is correspondent to the In­tellect, as an Ape resembles a Man.’

59. How many things do we meet with, concerning the Ingenuity and Reason of Brutes (of which Plutarch hath writ a peculiar Treatise, as also many things are mentioned in Gryllo) as well by Tradition from Authors, as those which are obviously known to us, which certainly seem to argue some kind of Reason, or somwhat analogous to Human Reason.

[Page 53] Prodigious things are related of the Elephant by Pliny, Aelian, Plu­tarch and others, which Lipsius hath Collected out of several Authors in his first Century ch. 50. Where a­mong many other observable things this following Story, which is almost beyond belief, yet faithfully quoted out of Acosta, and Garcias ab Horto Hist. Arom. lib. 1. c. 14. relates it also.

There was an Elephant in the City of Cochin, who wanting his food at the precise accustomed hour, com­plained, and bray'd. His Master ex­cused it by shewing him that the Brazen Vessel, which usually con­tained his food was leaky and run out, and that the occasion of this delay was, because, that it could no longer hold his Drench or Wash: And therefore commands him, if he would eat, to carry it to the Braziers to be mended. He obeys, takes it upon his Trunk and brings it to the Brazier. Who either through negligence, or [Page 54] to make sport with the Beast, did not mend it well, and stop up the Chinks. The Elephant brings it back again, his Master spying the fault, grew angry, and exclaimed both a­gainst him and the Elephant; and in fine, bids him carry the Vessel back a­gain. He doth so, and with a que­rulous tone throws it at the Brazier. He being a pleasant fellow, endea­vours to put a Cheat upon him the se­cond time, and makes, as if he did stop the holes, but did not: Yet he mist his aim; for the Elephant was so cunning, as to carry the Cauldron to the River, and there puts it into the Water and fills it, to try whether it would hold, but he found that it did run out. He being hereupon highly incensed, runs back to the Brazier, and bellowed out with a thundering voice, so that the Neighbours came about them, and among the rest the King's Vice-roy. The Brazier paci­fies the Beast with fair words (and here saith Lipsius, I know not whe­ther [Page 55] I dare proceed any further) and at last he takes the Vessel into his hands and mends it well and strongly. But the Elephant being mistrustful, carries it again to the River and fills it with Water; when he saw that it would hold, he turns himself to the standers by and shews it, calling them as witnesses to the matter of fact; and so went home.

61. Garcias adds further, who travelled into those parts, that there are some yet living, who affirm they saw it done. And he testifies, that Elephants do not only understand the Language of their own, but also those of forein Countreys, if taught them. And a little after; In summe, there is nothing wanting in this Creature to make him appear rational, but only Speech: although this also (as the same Garcias witnesseth) is by some attributed to it. Of which hereafter.

62. And lest that any one should make a doubt of what is reported con­cerning Elephants; hear Iac. Bontius [Page 56] an Author of very great credit; who was some few years past in the East-Indies, and chief Physician to the Belgian Society, and himself an Eye­witnesse thereof; who, in his Notes upon the forementioned place in Gar­cias, declares expressly, That what­soever is said of the Elephants doci­lity, is true: The same things in some measure are related by Pliny, Sca­liger, Canerarius, Lipsius and others, concerning the tractablnesse and inge­nuity of Dogs and Horses, and also of their fidelity to their Masters, which almost exceed all belief; and yet are every where made manifest by daily experience.

63. There was in Holland not ma­ny years ago, a comely Horse carried about by a fellow to be seen, being by custom brought to that which Sca­liger mentions of another in his 209 Exercitation, who did very strange things, at his masters command, or sin­gle Nod, among other things being commanded to shew him the greatest [Page 57] wencher, or drunkard, &c. in the Com­pany, he was not much out of the way, being without doubt, directed by some private sign from his Master.

64. Scaliger in his 236 Exercitati­on, reports, That he saw a Dancing Parret, who did with the gesture of his head, and by hanging down and fluttering of his wings imitate a Sa­voyard (that was a Songster) dan­cing; which he assures us a Crane did also very pleasantly.

Ionstonius in Thaumat. Natur. re­ports of another Parret, that she would say over the Apostles Creed before the Cardinal, and answer questions. Also of another that be­longed to Henry the Eighth King of England, who being fallen into the River cried out for help, and pro­mised twenty pounds to those that would save her, but being taken up, he bid them give the man a Groat.

65. I my self at present, have a little Dog at home, who not long a­go seeing the Cat licking a large La­dle [Page 58] that was hung up by the Chimney; he first leapt at her, and endeavour­ed to drive her away by barking; but she fell still to her work not minding him, by accident he finds me out a great way off from that place, runs to me, and ever and anon fawns upon me with his forefeet, and then runs towards the Cat, as it were to shew me his meaning, that I might see her, and drive her away; so that the Whelp took notice of this unworthy act of the Cat, though not used to do it, and would out of envy have her driven away. I had formerly ano­ther small Cur at Hardervick, who would very hardly be kept at home when I went abroad, insomuch that if he had slept in the Kitchin at any time longer than ordinary, being un­certain, whether I were gone out in the interim, or no; starting up of a sud­den, he would run into the Parlour, and look about for my Cloak, which as soon as he spied, he returned into the Kitchin satisfied, gathering as it were from hence, that I was in my Stu­dy, and so as yet within.

[Page 59] 66. We may daily observe, the gestures of Apes, and their imitation of Mens actions without any fraud or deceit, though not accustomed to it formerly. Oornithographer affirm that Cranes observe a kind of disci­dline in their flight, and keep a Watch or stand Sentinel. Every dayes experi­ence openly proclaims the admirable ingenuity and policy of Bees and Ants. The Spinning of Spiders, and the way they have to ensnare Flies, or trap them sometimes unawares. I omit a thousand other observations of brute Beasts, that are daily obvious to our senses, which do seem to declare that there is some Idea of Reason, or some kind of ratiocination in them.

67. I will only annex one thing which Fort. Licet. lib. 2. de Monst. c. 68. relates out of the Portugal An­nalls of Castanenda; to wit, That a certain Woman for some Crime was by Sea transported to a Desart Island, when she was set a shore there, a horrid company of Apes (which that [Page 60] place abounded with) came and stood round about her; and that there was one among them bigger, than the rest, to whom all gave place; who taking the Woman very gently by the hand led her into a vast Cave, and that he and the rest, did set be­fore her store of Apples, Nuts, and variety of Roots, and with a comple­mental Nod invited her to Eat; at length she was Ravish'd by the Beast; who continued the act a long time, in­somuch that she had two Children by him; and that she lived in this mise­rable condition for some years; till (God commiserating her case) a Por­tugal Vessel was driven thither, and the Soldiers coming a shore for Wa­ter, which they had out of a Foun­tain next adjoyning to that Cave, and by great chance the Ape being absent, the woman ran to the men, having seen none of that Sex a long time, and falling suppliantly at their feet, beseeched them to free her from that wicked and miserable servitude; they pittying her [Page 61] condition, did condescend to her in­treaties, and she came aboard of them. But behold, saith he, the Ape unexpectedly coming after her, and with strange gestures and noises cal­ling back his Consort, and yet no Con­sort: When he saw them hoise up the Sailes, he runs back with great speed, and brings one of the Children and shews it to the Mother, threatn­ing to throw it into the Sea, unlesse she would return; and did so imme­diatly; then he runs back to the Cave, and returning to the Sea-shore with the same speed shews the other, threatens, and then drowns it; and at last he himself swims after her, and was drowned.

68. As to the Speech of Brute Ani­mals; 'tis confirmed by daily experi­ence, that some of them may by cu­stom imitate in some measure an arti­culate Voice, or Humane Speech. This is a very familiar observation in the Parret, Pie, and Sterling. Plu­tarch, Pliny, Ovid, and others, testi­fie [Page 62] the same thing of the Nightingal. I my self (saith the Author) have observed (at Mersa in my native Countrey Anno 1646. at the House of the most Noble and Strenuous Gen­tleman Wilhelmus Reinerus a Clou, who was a Peer and Governour of that Ci­ty and County) in that kind of Finches, which they call a Goldfinch, and A­ristotle [...], that could imitate Man's Speech articulately and distin­ctly enough: This little Bird was so accustomed by heartng people speak frequently, that as often as she did prepare to sing, she would utter these words distinctly, Sing Manneken, sing man, but in a lower tone, as if she were hoarse; and after she had often repeated them, then she would proceed with a most sweet harmo­ny.

We have given you an account of the Parret that could rehearse the A­postolick Creed; and of the other, that falling into the River desired help and promised a reward, in the fore­going [Page 63] part of our Discourse.

69. We will not here take any no­tice of the Serpent's discourse with Eve, immediately after the Creation, Gen. 3. nor of the Speaking of Baladm's Ass, Numb. 22. and 2 Pet. 2. v. 16. because we are satisfied that the one, was done by Diabolical, and the other, by Divine operation; we will only briefly insist upon those things which the Naturalists, as Pliny, Aelian, Plu­tarch, and others, report concerning the Speech of Elephants, and of their writing too. Among which possibly we might reckon the ingeminated Words that were heard to be spoken by the Statu of Iuno Moneta, and Fortuna, as Valerius Maximus reports, but that the more inward recesses of Nature are first exactly to be discussed by us, that we may the more clearly dis­cern the illusions of Satan from the Works of Nature.

70. Concerning the peculiar Speech of Elephants, Oppian deliver­eth himself, as followeth;

Acosta affirms (who lived a long time in East-India, and did diligently examine the nature and towardness of Elephants, and receiv'd it from those who made daily observations of their nature) That in the Kingdom of Mala­bar, 'tis a general received opinion, that these Creatures do Talk one with another.

71. Nay, it is believed that they can learn Humane speech, and express their inward conceptions by familiar Words. There was (saith the same Acosta) an Elephant in the City of Cochin, who did, at his daily work in the Haven about marine affairs; who though tir'd, was however urged by [Page 65] the Praefect of that City, to draw a light Vessel, (or Pinnace) into the Sea, which he had already begun to do, but the Beast refused it, and he prest him with many fair words; and at last (not prevailing) he intreated him to do it for the King of Portugal's sake. At which (O incredible!) the Elephant being mov'd (saith Aco­sta) repeated these two Words Hoô Hoö; which signifies in the Tongue of the People of Malabar, I will, I will; and drew the Ship into the Sea with­out any further delay.

72. Garcias ab Horto in the place above mentioned, saith, That there are some People in Cochin, who affirm they saw a publike Register (called an Attestation) which did mention, That there was an Elephant there that could Speak, and did ask his Gover­nour for food, but he answered, that the Cauldron in which he boyl'd Rice for him was full of holes, &c. which story is related before by Lipsius out of Acosta,

[Page 66] 73. But let us speak something of the Writing of Elephants, which is a representation of the external speech; Pliny out of Mucianus, re­ports, that one of these Creatures learnt the Greek Letters, and Writ in that Language, Ipse ego haec scripsi & spolia Celtica dicavi.

And Philostratus, They write (saith he) and Dance, nay, to the Pipe al­so. But Aelian saith, I my self have seen an Elephant Writing the Roman Letters in a Table-book with his Trunk, and that withal, they were writ very even, not crooked; Nay, whilst he was Writing, his Eyes were earnestly fixed upon the Table-book, that you might plainly say, they were intent and accustomed to Writing.

74. Although the major part of Brutes have no articulate Voice, and so do not make use of Speech properly so called: Yet we see on all sides, that they express their inward conceptions one with another, and with Men also, by the Gestures, [Page 67] Sounds, and Noises which they make with their Bodies, and such other kind of means; even as Dumb Men use gesticulations and various motions, in lieu of Speech, whereby they dis­course very significantly among them­selves, as well as with other persons.

75. Hither is to be referred that of Philostratus in the Life of Apollonius, in his 4. Book ch. 1. concerning the Sparrow, who, as a messenger, by the raising of his chirping tone, did sig­nify to the rest, that he had found out some place, where there was good store of scattered Corn, and so did com­municate the food he had discovered to the rest of the Sparrows, who hear­ing that Voice of his, they all ma­king a sudden noise, immediately flew after him.

The like example was related to me by the most Noble and renowned Brinkins, p. m. Burgomaster of Har­dervick when living, concerning a Goose, who when she had found in any of the Fields a Stock of Corn, took her [Page 68] flight immediately to the rest of her Consorts, and making a noise among them, the whole Flock followed her, she flying foremost, and shewing the rest where their food was. We may daily observe in Dogs greater re­marques whereby they signify their inward sense to others.

76. And since it is so, what must we think of the Reason of Brutes, and their Sermocination whatsoever it be? What is there wanting to make them rational Creatures, or make them accounted to be of Humane so­ciety? Are we not bound to acknow­ledge that there is in Brutes a kind of analogical Reason or estimative facul­ty that resembles Reason, from whence their Ingenuity is derived, and by virtue whereof, they seem to be in some respects prudent.

77. And truely since we see that Brute Animals do sometimes Rave, and Dote (for Apes when Drunk, have a kind of delirium; Dogs are troubled with the Hydrophobia or [Page 69] Madness, which happens (as is re­ported) to Horses, Oxen, Asses, and Camels) it must needs also follow, that they have Wit, and the use of Reason in some measure; for na­tural Potency and Impotency are to be referred to the same subject: Hence we find, that as that analogical Rea­son is in some, more exquisite and vi­gorous, so some Brutes differ from others in Ingenuity. Prudence, Doci­lity and Stupidity. Of which Sub­ject I have variously Discoursed in Theatr. Natur. Univers. part. 2. Dis­putat. 5. s. 29. and the following Sections.

78. Yet this Reason of Brutes is absolutely different from Humane Reason in its very essence, for the for­mer is a kind of sensitive or material faculty of the Soul, to which, that which is vulgarly called Cogitative in man, or the estimative faculty it self, illustrated with Reason, from the presiding, and hypostatical union of the rational Soul with the sensitive, [Page 70] Body, doth in some measure agree: and yet this very Cogitative faculty in Man, though it be material, it is far more noble and excellent, than the Reason in any species of Brutes can be; and doth by many degrees sur­pass the Reason of Elephants; then this Reason is apprehended to transcend the Reason of Gallus Africanus, inso­much that there is herein a kind of irradiation, or a represented Image in Man, flowing from the Immortal Soul, which also by its Native and Essential Reason is capacitated to imi­tate the Coelestial Intelligencies; which bright light of Reason in Man communicates it self to the estima­tive faculty, by reason of the inti­mate connexion of the Rational Soul with the Sensitive Body, by which the whole Suppositum becomes Ratio­nal.

79. And therefore 'tis not without reason that Aristotle saith in the First Book of his Ethicks to Nicomachus, the last Chapter; That Man hath a [Page 71] twofold Reason; the one, he hath principally in himself, viz. [...] the very Mind or rational Soul: the other, that he is obedient to Parents, and that he hath Reason by participation, to wit, that which he calls in Man [...] or that part that is without the Humane Soul, as the Sensitive fa­culty; this first Reason of Man is the very Intellect it self, so call'd by Aristotle, which he saith, 3. De Anim. cap. 5. t. 20. is separable, immortal, and impassible; the latter, the passive Intellect, which he doth not affirm to be immortal and eternal, because it perisheth with the universal sensitive faculty, when the rational Soul is se­parated from the Body.

80. The former sort of Reason in Man, which is proper to the rational Soul or Mind, and is its native faculty, as the Mind of Man is an immaterial substance, not at all enveloped in matter, so that makes use of no cor­poreal organ in the exercise of its functions; but soaring above all the [Page 72] Senses, contemplates upon Divine, Immortal, and Eternal Beings; and understands those things which no Sense of the Body can conceive; and still desires that which the sensitive faculty wholly abhorrs. So that Cal­vin in the first Book of his Institutes c. 5. S. 5. reprehends those (and that not undeservedly) who being ad­dicted to preposterous subtilties would fain wrest that saying (which teach­eth that the Faculties of the Soul are organical) to a contrary sense (viz. from the sensitive faculty, to the very rational Soul) as well (saith he) to destroy the immortality of the Soul, as to rob God of his proper right: for (saith he) because the faculties of the Soul are organical: by this pretext they so link it to the Body, that it cannot subsist without it.

81. The latter Reason of Man, which is communicated to the sensi­tive or estimative faculty by partici­pation, as it is not corporeal, nor in­termixed [Page 73] with the Body (as Aristotle shews de Anim. l. 3. c. 4. text 6.) because that it is a kind of commu­nicated image, and represented as it were in the Mirror of the Mind; so nei­ther doth it use any organ in its ope­rations (according to Arist. in the fore­cited place) although 'tis busied about outward appearances, as the object of its operations, and can understand no­thing without them (as Aristotle teacheth c. 8. text 39. And in truth that which he hath in the last quoted place, belongs to this passive Intel­lect, or rather to Man, as he is of a sensitive nature, adorned with an a­ctive Intellect; that an Intelligent per­son must Contemplate upon outward Phaenomena, according to that common saying, Nihil est in Intellectu, quod non fuerat prius in sensu. Nothing can be in the Intellect, that hath not been first received by the Senses.

82. For this sensitive faculty in Man, though illustrated with Reason, understands nothing of it self, but is [Page 74] like a blank Paper, or Book, that is sus­ceptible of any inscription, 3. lib. de A­nim. 4. text 14. for it is capable of all things that are cognoscible, by virtue of that light which darted from the rational Soul, whereby it is illustrat­ed, and extends it self to all ma­terial, immaterial, individual, ab­stracted, Mortal and Eternal ob­jects.

For as it is sensitive, it perceives v. g. the Water, Fire, Flesh, Magni­tude and the like; and forms an ima­gination of them (which is also com­mon to Brutes, as well as Men) but since Flesh is one thing, and the Es­sence of Flesh another; Magnitude, is one thing, and the Essence of Mag­nitude, another; and so of the rest; it doth by another part of it self, or by it self in another capacity (viz. not as it is sensitive, but cogitative, or as it partakes of Reason, and is en­lightned by the rational Soul) distin­guish the Essence, from the things themselves, which fall under our Senses.

[Page 75] 83. But the former Reason of Man, or the genuine faculty of the rational Soul, as it is altogether immaterial, so it challengeth a Knowledge proper and natural to it self, not any way proceeding from Matter, or the Sen­ses of the Body (For there is not al­wayes one and the same, but a diffe­rent reason of the supernatural Know­ledge of Divine Mysteries, or of those things which exceed our Hu­man Capacity, and want the support of Faith) whilst in the interim it ren­ders that very Knowledge which is drawn from the Senses and inferiour Reason far more illustrious, and more clearly discerns the truth it self.

84. For this genuine faculty of the rational Soul, hath within it self the connate principles and seeds of all manner of Knowledge (which do not involve Divine Mysteries) or else is furnished with such an Understand­ing, that it can extract the truth of things out of their Womb by dis­course and ratiocination. So also the [Page 76] knowledge of God is engraven in the minds of men, yet not so, as if every man did acknowledge a Deity, or that the existence of God is as it were written in their minds so soon as Born (of which opinion Anselm and Hie­ronymus were, according to Suarez Disputation 19. S. 2. §. 3.) but that by Nature there are such principles of a Deity implanted in our minds, and such an intellectual light connate with them, that we may by the strength of our own Genius, with­out any assistance from the Senses at­tain the knowledge of the Power and Divinity of the Supreme Deity. Just as we do truly assert, that Geo­metrical truths are connate in us, though we do not originally understand the Elements of Euclid.

85. And as the dull and rude Vul­gar, who use not to abstract the Mind from the Body (and therefore have no other knowledge but what is ex­erted by the Senses, and the dictates of inferiour or cogitative Reason) [Page 77] understand and conceive the invisible things of God from the Creation of the World by Works, so that the [...] that which may be known of God (as our Version hath it) in the first to the Romans may be understood by the very Plebeians; so Philosophers and such as are conver­sant with more sublime Speculations, or have learnt to free their minds from this terrene incarceration, attain un­to the knowledge of the Deity by the inward qualifications of their minds, without being obliged to the testimo­ny of Sense.

And really those very seeds that are naturally planted in the minds of men, do sometimes so powerfully exert themselves into action, that they bind the very Consciences of the most obsti­nate, and such as deny the very di­ctates of Senses. And herein we may affirm with Calvin, in the first Book of his Institutes, c. 3. §. 1. That beyond all Controversy there is by a natural instinct, a kind of sense of the [Page 78] Divinity in the mind of Man, for God hoth endued all persons with the In­telligence of his Deity, that no man should shelter himself under the pre­text of Ignorance, who by a constant recollection of his memory, furnish­eth him with fresh instillations.

87. But as to the Reason of Brute Animals; being it depends upon the sensitive Soul, it is absolutely mate­rial, and drowned in the Body, it is altogether inseparable from it, and perisheth with the Individuum, and therefore is conversant with nothing but what is Corporeal and Mortal. The same faculty is in all the species of Brutes imployed about some certain and determinate object, to which all of them are hurried by a natural pro­pensity; and not as it is in Man, in­different to any thing. So Nature instructs Swallows to build their Nests of Clay; Beasts to get Coverts or Dens; Dogs hunt the Hare; and Cats watch for Mice; which neither the Reason of a Cow, nor an Ass prompts [Page 79] them to; nor can they by Art be brought to it.

88. And although probably some species of these Brute Animals are more freely exercised, about various objects by raciocination, than others, as we find in Elephants, Apes, Monkies, the Cynocephali, and Dogs themselves, and the like; yet they are apprehen­sive of the objects themselves no o­therwise, than under the notion of sin­gulars: For they perceive the Water, Fire, Flesh, Magnitude and the like; and then frame some fantasms of these very things; and these they, either compound or divide, and so judge or esteem of the species so receiv'd: but Flesh being one thing, and the Es­sence thereof, another; Magnitude, one thing, and the Essence thereof, another, &c. as Aristotle speaks, they cannot discern the Essence of things from the things themselves, nor can they abstract individuals from universals. So that their universal Reason consists in par­ticular and material things; and [Page 80] therefore they are incapable of Learn­ing, which is comprehended under certain Maxims and Rules.

89. Besides if it could possibly be maintain'd, that some Brute Ani­mals have a kind of Sense of Di­vinity (it is reported that that Idola­trous Religion consisting in the Wor­ship of the Sun, Moon, and Stars, did proceed from Elephants) or that some faint image or shadow of Piety may be distill'd into them, yet by that they cannot conceive any thing of God, unlesse it be by corporeal reason, and so have no Conception of God, nor can they ever be able to dis­pute concerning God by the deduction of Causes, or by the successive end, nor by conclusions drawn from the principles imprinted in their minds; but only by the singular commodity or use, or the more splendid appear­ance of the particular individual body, viz. of the Sun or Moon, and so they cannot apprehend the invisible things of God, but can only frame a concep­tion [Page 81] or imagination of the corporeal Idea of those things which proximate­ly move the Senses.

90. Undoubtedly that which is purely Incorporeal and Divine, or which is the true Essence of Divinity, which is only Religiously to be Wor­shipped, cannot fall under the appre­hension of a faculty meerly corporeal. But if there do appear in Elephants, as well the shadow of many Virtues, as a certain kind of imaginary Idea of Religion (as Lipsius hath heaped to­gether many Examples out of divers Authors to that purpose) what won­der is it, that the Celestial Bodies strike the Senses with greatest admi­ration and yet are not exquisitely ap­prehended by the Senses, that that representation of Religion whatsoever it be, should be directly apprehend­ed? And so they be believed by Plu­tarch and Aelian, to Worship the Rising Sun; and by Pliny and Aelian, the New Moon.

91. Finally, the Wisdom of Brutes [Page 82] consists only in that part wherein they also suffer a delirium; but Man's Wisdom also consists in the mind or active Intellect, in which they never dote, and herein they evidently differ from Beasts, who have not this facul­ty. So that that passage of Hippo­crates, Aphor. 6. Sect. 2. belongs on­ly to the passive Intellect, so far as it resides in the sensitive faculty; where he saith, That those who are troubled in any part of the Body, and are hardly sensible of the pain, their mind ( [...] or as Galen interprets it in his Commentary [...]) is dis­stempered, for they are deceived by a defect of the inward Senses, which Brutes have in common with Men, and stand alwayes in need of their Mini­stry, whilst tied to the fetters of the Body.

92. Therefore Men are truely said to be distinguished from Beasts by Rea­son; because Brute Animals have not any foot-steps of that Reason that is natural to the rational Soul, or the [Page 83] active Intellect; but they only have some kind of shadow of that Reason which is communicated to the sensitive faculty, or of the passive Intellect; so that they are said to have Reason Ana­logically.

93. Now as to the Speech which is apprehended to be in some Brutes, that have organs fit for the emission of an articulate Voice; what kind of Reason that may be, and how it dif­fers from Humane Speech, is the thing to be discussed: And as the speech of Parrets, Crows, and other Birds, wo are taught by Art, is no­thing else, but a certain articulate Voice without any mental understand­ing, to which they are trained up by Custome, not knowing for the most part what is signified by this or that word. So that Parret that rehearsed the Apostles Creed; did not at all un­derstand the thing signified by those words. And therefore this sort of speech, is not at all a representation of the intrinsick reason, and so conse­quently [Page 84] no true speech.

94. But if sometimes it so fall out that they seem appositely to appropri­ate the Names of things to the things themselves, or retain the signification of them, that is the work of the Me­mory, by which they do accommodate those things which they by their doci­lity have gained to particular things, as they have been accustomed to them, and according to their often repeated appellations: But their speech ex­tends no farther to other things, than Custome hath directed them. And as that Parret which fell into the Ri­ver call'd for help, and promis'd a Reward, it must necessarily be, that she had by practice learnt those words being oftentimes before in the like danger.

95. And since it is undeniable that not only Elephants, but some other Creatures, as Dogs and Horses (though these are not altogether so capable) do in some manner conceive the Speech of Man, to which they are accustom­ed, [Page 85] or understand what is meant by such and such words, as they are taught (and as they by the motion or gesture of their Masters, know what they would have) though some more exactly, than others. Is it a greater won­der for these Brutes, if they have or­gans fit for Speech, to be able by out­ward expressions (as they have learnt by Custom) to signify the single con­ceptions of their estimative faculty to others, which they frame within themselves according to the common speech they are accustomed to, than that they should by the usual gestures of the Body, and other various ways (which is also the Speech of Mutes) be able to adumbrate their inward conceptions to others? Or what won­der is it for a Parret, Pie, Crow, or Starling, to express what they in­wardly conceive or desire by an arti­culate Voice, or such as they have learnt by custom?

96. And those Creatures that have been us'd to Speech can count num­bers; [Page 86] and yet they have no formal conception of those numbers; because that cannot be done but by abstract­ing, and so consequently by the im­material faculty. For in the num­bring of any thing proposed, or the collecting a definite multitude out of unities, it is requisitely necessary that the mind have an Idea of some num­ber be known, and that it appear, how the third differs from the fourth, and the fourth from the tenth, and so on; to the end, that the number may be rightly appropriated to any multitude propos'd, according as the thing re­quires. But this does not at all come within the reach of the mate­rial faculty, with which Brutes are only endued.

97. Since therefore number is not properly form'd but by the Intellect, which Aristotle himself confesseth, 4. Phys. t. 131. it must necessarily fol­low, that the names of Number are only repeated by the Memory in [Page 87] Brutes that name it, but the Essence of Number, or difference, of the fourth, and fifth, or twentieth, is not in them.

98. As to the Writing of Inani­mate Creatures, since that Elephants use the Proboscis, as a Hand, and al­most as readily as we do (for they will take the smallest peice of Money off from the ground, and ordinarily manage a Sword like a Fencer, handle a Gun, level it and discharge, as we our selves, that have been eye-wit­nesses, can testify) it need not seem an impossibility for them to Write some Letters, whose figures they have been taught, either singly, or joynt­ly, and so reduced them into words, and perhaps by Writing to express their conception of any particular thing according to custom, as other Brutes use to notify their conceptions by gestures, or other wayes suitable to their nature.

99. But it is sufficiently apparent by what hath been said, how infinitely [Page 88] the Speech of Inanimate Creatures, and the adumbration thereof by Wri­ting, doth differ from Human Speech; whereas Man doth not appropriate this, or that word, to this, or that particular thing by custom only; but can use his Tongue volubly, and can exercise it in the expressing of any thing whatsoever, upon all emergent occasions, in a far different manner from that of Brutes: And as Mans Reason it self, or the internal Speech, doth not only aim at particular and material, but universal, abstracted, and immaterial things, which Brutes by their Reason cannot do, so the ex­ternal Speech, which is the nuncius of the internal, is assisted thereby, which indeed the Speech of Brutes cannot aspire unto.

100. So that there is, as vast a di­stance between the Reason of Inani­mate Creatures and Humane Reason, and their Speech, or the significati­on of things which is designed by Speech, and the Speech of Man, as [Page 89] there is between the Material and Im­material Faculty. And therefore we may truly conclude, that no Crea­ture is endued with the faculty of real Speech, or true Reason, but Man on­ly; but the Speech of Brutes may be said faintly to resemble the true Speech of Man, as also their Reason, Human Reason, by some kind of Analogy.