I Had heard very often, and very much of the Animadversions upon Dr. Sherlock's Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity; but I had also heard such a Character of it, which both Friends and Foes agreed in, that I could not perswade my self to read it; For a Satyrical Wit is no diversion to a Wise Man, except in a Play, and where it hurts no Body; and I could never think, that true Divine Wisdom rests on an ill-natured and perverse Spirit. But your late Letter awakened me; for I could not but think that Book, whatever other Faults it had, must be worth reading, which you could think worth answering, and seem so impatiently to expect, when the Dean, or some body for him, should Answer it. As for the Dean, he has given Testimony to the World, that he has not been Idle all this while, but much better employed: And, to speak my Mind freely, I don't see how he is obliged to Answer, unless you think a Man bound to Answer Ballads and Lampoons; for he is as little concerned in it as you are; that, had it not been for the Title Page, and some particular Expressions, which the Dean uses, and the Animadverter furiously opposes, without understanding them, I could never have guessed against whom he had Writ. I had, a little before, read over the Vindication, and the Notions lay fresh and easie in my Mind, but as soon as I dipt into the Animadversions they were all on a sudden confounded, and put into disorder. The Animadverter Disputes earnestly, subtilly, and triumphantly, opens his whole Armory of Metaphysicks, and because they are thin, airy Weapons, which do no great Execution, he points them with Wit and Satyr, to make them pierce the deeper.

It was the Saying of a very Witty Man, that He who Writes lies down, but it is to be supposed, he forgot it when he made the Experiment himself: But I must say this for the Animadverter, That he is as fair an Adversary, upon this account as one would desire; as he spares not those who lie down before him, so he very civilly takes his turn, and lays himself as fairly open to Satyrical Wit, if the Dean, or any of his Friends, would condescend to exercise it upon him. When he ventures upon any thing like Wit, he always makes himself a Jest, and never so much insults and triumphs over an Enemy, as where he is certainly himself in the Wrong: I will not entertain you with particular Remarks of this Nature; read over his Book again, if you have the Patience, and see if this be not true.

But, Sir, as well as I love you, I'm resolved to humble you, for giving me the trouble of reading this Book, not by giving a particular Answer to the whole, which would be too unmerciful, but by convincing you, that it needed no Answer; and to let you see what a trifling Author you have either admired or feared, will prove some little Humiliation to you: But I shall do it in short, to save my self, as much as I can, the pains of Writing, and you of Reading, and therefore shall consider only the main Points of Dispute between the Animadverter and the Dean, concerning Self-Consciousness, Mutual-Consciousness, and Three eternal and infinite Minds.

He rages furiously against the Dean, according to his Custom, in a whole long Chapter, for discarding those good old Terms of Essence, Substance, Nature, &c. for his own new-invented Terms of Self-consciousness, and Mutual-consciousness; that any one who reads it, would believe, That the Dean would not allow GOD to be a real Substantial Being, or to have any Nature or Essence; whereas he no where denies, That these are very good Words, and not only useful but necessary in some cases, but yet very apt to confound us with Material and Sensible Images, when we go about to form a Notion and Idea of GOD. We know not the naked Substance or Essence of any Thing, not of Matter, much less of Spirit, and much less of an infinite and eternal Spirit; and therefore, as we can form no other Idea of Matter, but by its sensible Qualities, so we can form no Idea of a Spirit, but by such Attributes and Powers as are proper and essential to a Spirit; which is so far from being a Novelty, that it is to think and speak with all the considering part of Mankind; but let this pass, which the Dean is no more concerned in, were his Words and Sence truly and candidly represented, than the best Christian Writers, both Ancient and Modern, as were easily shewn, did I not fear the Animadverter, should he know it, would rail at them all for his sake; for there is not a more Capital Crime, than to speak any thing well of the Dean, or to say any thing that he says.

That which the Dean is more immediately concerned in, is the Idea he has endeavour'd to give us of a Trinity in Unity; and all that he positively asserts of it is, That it is a possible and intelligible Notion, and no other in Sence and Substance, than what the ancient Fathers made use of to represent this great Mystery by, though expressed in other Terms.

To prepare you to judge equally in this Cause, you must remember, That the Substance of the Article is not concerned in it; here is no Dispute about a Trinity in Unity: This the Dean asserts in as full and ample words as the Athanasian Creed it self, which some Trinitarians themselves boggle at, but without reason as he thinks; for whoever will acknowledge Three Persons in the Godhead, each of which distinctly considered is GOD, and has all the Perfections of the Divine Nature, and yet are all Three but one GOD, must, as he undertakes to prove, own the Terms and Explications of that Creed. He has been careful to preserve a Real, not a meerly Nominal, distinction of Persons, and yet asserts the Unity of the Godhead in as high terms, as ever the Schools did, even a Natural Numerical Unity; and there is no reason to suspect he dissembles his Sence, for then he might have concealed it too, having no other obligation to engage in this Cause, but a Zeal for this truly Ancient, Catholick, and Apostolick Faith. Since then here is no Innovation made in the Faith, nor any alteration of the least term in it, what is the Fault? Truly no other than what the best Writers, both Ancient and Modern, have been equally guilty of, if it can be called a Fault.

Those who are acquainted with this Controversie, know, that the great Objection against the Catholick Faith of the Trinity in Unity, is not its contradiction to any plain and express Principle of Reason, but the unconceiveabless of it: It is certain, that Three should be One, and One Three, upon different accounts, is no contradiction, and then what Principle of Reason does a Trinity in Unity contradict? But we must grant, that we have no perfect Example of any such Union in Nature, and therefore cannot frame a compleat and positive Notion and Idea of such an Union: and this some Men miscall Contradicting Reason; but if every thing, which we have no positive Idea of, must be allowed to contradict Reason, we shall find Contradictions enow; and which is worse, must be forced to believe Contradictions; for we must confess a great many things to be true, which we have no Idea of, and cannot conceive how they should be.

But yet since the unconceivableness of this Union is the great difficulty, and great Objection (though in truth it is no Objection at all to any one, who considers, how unconceivable and incomprehensible the Divine Nature is) the Ancient Fathers endeavoured to help our conception and imagination of this by some sensible Images: Such as the Co-essentiality and Union of the Sun, its Light and Splendor, of a Fountain and its Streams, a Tree and its Branches, as the Dean has observed, and as every one knows, whoever looked into the Fathers.

But these are Material Images, and may serve for Allusions, and to render the Notion of a Trinity in Unity possible and credible; when we see some faint resemblances of it in the Material World; but they cannot help us to conceive, what kind of Union there is between the Divine Persons, the Union of Matter and Spirit differing as much as Matter and Spirit do, which have no likeness or resemblance to each other.

And therefore the Dean was certainly so far in the right, to seek for some Image and resemblance of this Mysterious Union in the Unity of a Spirit: For a Mind and Spirit is the truest Image of God, that is in Nature; for God is a Spirit, and therefore it is more likely to find some Image of the Unity of the Godhead in a Spirit, than in Matter, and yet we know nothing of a Spirit, but what we feel in our Selves, and can Philosophize no farther about it; for as Mr. Lock has truly observed, we can form no Idea but either from external Impressions, or internal Sensations; and therefore we can know no more of the Unity of a Spirit neither, than what we feel.

Now whoever considers, how he knows himself to be a distinct and separate Person from all other Men, will be able to resolve it into nothing else but Internal Sensation, which the Dean, not improperly; calls Self-consciousness. The Unity of Matter consists in the Unity of its parts, and we can see, how far its Unity extends, and where it ends; for its Unity extends, as far as the continuity of its parts extends, and ends, where that ends: But we know of no extension or parts in a Spirit, and therefore the very Nature of a Spirit consisting in internal and vital Sensation, the Unity of a Spirit consists in the continuity (if I may so speak) of its Sensation: So far as a Man feels himself, or is Self-conscious, so far he is One entire Person; where this Self-conscious Sensation ends, he becomes a distinct and separate Person: For it is a Self-evident Proposition, that in an intelligent Self-conscious Being, Self can reach no farther than he feels himself. And I would desire any thinking Man to tell me, how he knows himself to be a distinct and separate Person from all other Men, but only by this, that he feels his own Thoughts, Volitions and Passions, Pains and Pleasures, but feels nothing of all this in other Men.

I have been forced to explain this more at large, to help the Animadverter to some conception of it, who I find understood not one word of it, as will appear presently. But to proceed. The Dean having thus observed, that the Unity of a single Mind or Spirit consists in such a Natural Self conscious Sensation, this led him on to that other Notion of a Mutual-consciousness, which may be between Three distinct Spirits, and make them naturally One, as much as Three can be One. For if a Natural Selfconscious Sensation makes a Spirit One with it self, why should not a natural Mutual-conscious Sensation unite Three into One? For if natural Unity extends as far as Conscious Sensation, then if Conscious Sensation extends to Three, why should not these Three be acknowledged to be naturally One? That as a natural Self-consciousness makes One natural Person, so natural Mutual-consciousness should make a naral Trinity in Unity? For my part, I believe it is much easier to cry down this representation as a Novelty, than to offer one word of Sence against it, or to make any other representation of this Mystery, with so fair and natural an appearance of Truth and Reason: For this Mutual-consciousness being a natural Sensation, is not a meer Moral, but a natural Union, not a Cabal of Gods, as a Socinian Writer Prophanely speaks, but one supream natural Deity.

This indeed forced the Dean to speak of the Three infinite and eternal Persons in the Godhead, under the Character of Three infinite and eternal Minds, for this conscious Sensation, whether Self-consciousness or Mutual-consciousness, can belong only to Minds; and if every Person in the Trinity, considered as a distinct Person, be not a distinct, infinite, and eternal Mind, there is, I confess, an end of the Dean's Notion, but then, I doubt, there will be an end of a Trinity of Persons also, and we shall have nothing left but a Trinity of Modes and Postures, and Names, not in the Unity of the Godhead, but in the Unity of one Person who is the whole Deity and Godhead. But if every distinct Person in the Godhead considered as distinct, be an infinite and eternal Mind, as it must be, if every distinct Person be GOD, unless any thing else than an infinite Mind can be GOD, though it be an usual way of speaking to call them Three eternal Minds, yet there is no Heresie in it, nor any intended by it, as will appear before we part.

Nor ought this to pass for meer Fancy and Invention; for as the Dean has shewn the Phrases and Expressions of Scripture, whereby the Union between Father, Son, and Holy Ghost is described, do naturally represent this conscious Union, and cannot well be understood without it; for that the Father should be in the Son, and the Son in the Father, so as perfectly to comprehend and be comprehended, with several like Expressions, is made very possible and intelligible by a mutual conscious Sensation, but nothing else will afford us any Conception of it.

Now suppose, That after all these fair Appearances, a spiteful Wit could start some difficulties in this Notion, (as it is not to be expected, that in a matter of so high a Nature, we should have such a perfect comprehension of it, as to leave no difficulties unexplained) ought not the Dean to have met with as fair Quarter, as other Writers have done in the same cause? Has he not given us as intelligible a representation (and it is intended for no more) of a Trinity in Unity, as the Sun, its Light and Splendor, a Tree and its Branches, a Fountain and its Streams, or a Mathematical Cube? Are not all these Accounts, much more chargeable with Tritheism or Sabellianism? are not the Sun, its Light and Splendor, as much Three, but not so much One, as Three Conscious Minds? Can there be a Trinity in Unity, unless there be a real and substantial Trinity? What work could our Animadverter have made with the Ancient Fathers, and some late Writers, had he thought fit to have treated them as he has done Dr. Sherlock? But it is in vain to expostulate, when the Man, not his Notions, is in Fault; and the only Comfort in such cases is, That Malice is as blind as Love, and so it has happened to the Animadverter, as I shall make appear.

But before I particularly answer the Animadverter's Arguments against Self-consciousness and Mutual-consciousness, and Three eternal Minds, it will be necessary to Discourse something in general concerning a Trinity in Unity, and the words whereby to express it. For a Trinity in Unity is such a distinction, and such an Union, as is peculiar to the Godhead; and though there are some faint resemblances of it in Nature, yet Nature has nothing like it, and then it is impossible we should have any words that can adaequately express it. It may help to allay the heat and virulence of Disputation among those who heartily believe a Trinity in Unity, (as I hope the Animadverter does) to discourse this matter plainly and briefly.

The Scriptures, both of the Old and New Testament, every where assure us, That there is but One GOD; and not to take notice now of the more obscure intimations of a Trinity in the Old Testament, Christ in his Gospel, and his Apostles after him, have ascribed the Name and Character and incommunicable Attributes of GOD to Three, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; we are by the Command of Christ Baptized in the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, and we are blessed in their Name, The Grace of our Lord Iesus Christ, and the Love of God, and the Communion of the Holy Ghost, be with you all Amen. Christ declares himself to be the Son of GOD, and to be One with his Father; and St. Iohn tells us, That he is that Word, which was in the beginning, and was with God, and was God. That by him all things were made, and without him was not any thing made, that was made. And the like Divine Attributes are ascribed to the Holy Spirit; and therefore, though there be One GOD, we must acknowledge, if we believe the Gospel, that there are Three, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost in the Unity of the Godhead. This is the true simplicity of the Christian Faith, to believe Father, Son, and Holy Ghost to be One GOD; that the Father is not the Son, nor the Holy Ghost; that the Son is not the Father, nor the Holy Ghost; that the Holy Ghost is not the Father nor the Son; but that the Father is God, the Son God, and the Holy Ghost God; and all Three but One God.

Now one would have thought, that the Authority of Christ and his Apostles, had been a sufficient Foundation for this Faith, without any farther enquiries; but the Devil very well knew, That the whole Oeconomy of our Salvation by Christ, and consequently the whole Christian Religion, depended on this Faith; and that the curiosity of Mankind, the weakness of their Understandings, and their vain presumption in measuring GOD himself by their narrow Conceits, might easily be managed to unsettle these Foundations; and therefore here he made some of his earliest Attempts.

The ancient Christians, before this was made a matter of Dispute, contented themselves with professing their Faith, in One God, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; but when Heresies in several Ages of the Church were broached, and some, to secure the Unity of the Godhead, made Father, Son, and Holy Ghost no more than Three different Names, belonging to Three different Appearances and Manifestations of the same One God; others (if they were not misunderstood or misrepresented) did not only distinguish, but separate Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and made Three absolute independent Gods of them, and others denied the Divinity of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, which preserved the Unity of the Godhead, by reducing the only begotten Son, and the Holy Spirit of God into the rank of Creatures: This forced the Orthodox Fathers into a Dispute, where they wanted Words adaequately to express their Sence.

The Doctrine, which they constantly affirmed and defended against Hereticks of all sorts, was this; That Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, were Three, as really distinct from one another, as Three humane Persons are, and that each of them is true and perfect God, and has all Divine Perfections in himself, and yet that all Three are essentially One, and the same eternal and infinite God. But when they came to say, what these Three are, and how they are One, by what Name to call this wonderful distinction and Unity, here Words failed them, as of necessity they must, because there is no such Distinction and Unity in Nature, and therefore no Name for it. For the Names of distinction in ordinary use do not only distinguish, but divide and separate their Subjects, and the Names of Unity signifie singularity also, which admits no number. And this has occasioned most of our cavilling Disputes, and raised all the noise and clamour about Absurdities and Contradictions in the Doctrine of the Trinity; and there is no help for this, if Men will ask such Questions, as the proper and natural signification of Words cannot reach the Mystery of, and not allow such a Theological use of Words, as a little alters their natural Signification, to accommodate them to represent some divine and supernatural Mysteries.

Thus for Example: A Person signifies a reasonable understanding Being, which actually subsists, and is distinguished from all other Beings of the same kind; but then it signifies more than this, not only a distinct, but a separate Subsistence; for so all created Persons are, not only distinct, but separate Beings, who have a compleat, absolute, independant Subsistence of their own. But when we use this Word Person in a Theological Sense, as applied to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost in the ever-blessed Trinity, we only use it in the sense of distinction, not of separation, to signifie, that each of these Holy Three has all the Perfections of infinite Mind and Understanding, distinctly, as other Persons have, but not separately, as created Persons have. And since there are Three in the Unity of the Godhead thus really distinguished from each other without a separation, I know no reason why we may not use this Word Person in this limited Sence, to signifie Three, who are as really distinct from each other, but not separated, as other Persons are: For when it is known in what sence we use the Word, when applied to the Trinity, it is trifling to dispute against Three Persons in the Godhead, from the signification of the Word Person, when applied to Creatures; and yet this is the Sum total of all the Socinian Arguments against Three Persons, and One God, and of all the Contradictions they pretend to find in it. Three Divine Persons, they say, must be Three absolute, compleat, independent Gods, because Three Humane Persons are Three compleat, absolute Men, who subsist independently on each other; and therefore it is as manifest a Contradiction, That Three Divine Persons should be but One God, as it is, that Three Humane Persons should be but One Man; which signifies nothing, if we do not use the Word Person in the same Sense (and all the World knows we do not) when applied to the Holy Trinity, as when applied to Men: For it is meer trifling to dispute against us from such a Sense of the Word, as we reject, and declare to all Men that we do reject. The most that can be made of this is, that we use an improper Word, and ought not to call Father, Son, and Holy Ghost Three Persons, because that is to make Three Gods of them, as Peter, Iames, and Iohn are Three Men: But when the importunity of Hereticks forces us to find Names for that, which nothing in created Nature can answer, if they will not give us leave, we must take leave to use the properest Names we can find, though not every way proper; and such the Name of Person is, when applied to the Persons of the Trinity: For all that this Word Person signifies, except a separate Subsistence, belongs to the Persons of the Holy Trinity. An intelligent Nature, and all personal Acts of Understanding, Volition, &c. do as distinctly belong to each Person, as to any Humane Persons; and it is this makes a Person, not a separate Subsistence, which belongs only to finite and created, not to infinite and eternal Persons: And therefore the Word Person is properly enough applied to the Three Divine Persons, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, because all that is essential to the Notion of a Person, belongs to each of them, though they do not subsist separately, as Humane Persons do.

But yet Men are very apt to judge of the Divine Persons, by what they see in Humane Persons, and to fancy these Three Persons in the Deity to be like Three Men, who have the same Humane Nature, but subsist and act separately, and are One only by a moral Consent and Unity: And therefore to prevent this Imagination, which betrays Men to down right Tritheism, others, without rejecting the Name Person, have thought fit more expresly to signifie what kind of Persons they are, by calling them Three Subsistences; that is, Three who have all the Perfections of the Godhead, and do really and distinctly subsist; for else they could not be Three Subsistences, but yet do not subsist as separate Persons, but are essentially One God: For Subsistence does not necessarily infer Separation, for Three may distinctly subsist, though essentially and inseparably united. And this is the difference between Person and Subsistence, that according to the most usual acceptation of the Word Person, which it is hard to correct, (for that Idea which in common use belongs to a Word, is apt to stick close to it,) Three Persons, signifie Three who subsist apart, and as separately as Three Men do: But Three Subsistences are Three Persons who subsist distinctly without Separation: For Subsistence necessarily signifies a distinct and real, but not a separate Subsistence; for if Three really subsist without a Separation, they are Three real Subsistences; and therefore it is in vain for the Socinians to dispute against Three Persons, that they must be Three separate Persons, unless they can prove that they cannot really subsist without a Separation, which none of them ever yet undertook; and yet all their Talk of Contradictions and Three Gods, vanishes without it.

What I have said of the Word Person, is with equal reason applicable to the Word Mind. The Animadverter objects against the Dean, That a Mind or Spirit is an absolute Being, Nature, or Substance; and I grant it is so in the common use of the Word, as apapplied to created Minds and Spirits; but so is Person also, as much as Mind; and if we allow of a Theological use of the Word Person, why not of Mind too? to signifie an intelligent Subsistence, which is a Mind too, but not a separate Mind, and therefore not such an absolute Being, Nature, and Substance, as a created Mind is. And when the Dean speaks of Three distinct infinite Minds, which are essentially and inseparably One, he could mean nothing more than three distinct intelligent, but not separate Subsistences: And he needs ask no other Pardon, but for the use of a Word, which the Schools have not consecrated.

But there is greater want of Words to express the Unity and Oneness of the Divine Nature and Essence, than the distinction of Persons. The Nicene Fathers in their Controversie with Arius, of which, (if there be occasion more hereafter,) who denied the Divinity of Christ, and made him no more than a Creature, though as perfect, and as like to God as a Creature could be, used the Word Homoousion, which was not first invented by them to serve that turn, but was used either in Words or Sence by the Anti-Nicene Fathers, as the learned Dr. Bull has proved.

But what is this Homoousion, or Sameness of Nature? This is the difficulty; for there is not any one Word to explain it by, which adequately answers the full Notion of the Divine Unity; and that is no great wonder, because there is no perfect Example in Nature of any such Unity.

They very often explain this by Examples of a Specifick Unity: That the Father and Son have the same Nature, as Abraham and Isaac have; and therefore they call Men, who have the same Specifick Nature, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , and so they do the Sun, its Light, and Splendor, the Tree and its Branches, &c. And this is in part a true representation of the Homoousiotes, or Sameness of Nature in the Persons of the Holy Trinity; for if there be not that which perfectly Answers, though it much out-does also a specifick Sameness and Unity, their Nature cannot be the same, and accordingly they prove against the Arians, that Christ cannot be the Son of God, if he be not Homoousios to his Father, because every Father begets a Son in his own Nature.

But yet we must not say, nor did they intend it so, That the Unity of Nature between Father, and Son, and Holy Spirit, is a meer specifick Sameness. For we must not make the Divine Nature a Species, which is common to more Individuals; for then the Unity of the Divine Nature is no more than a Logical Notion, which is the only Unity of a Specifick Nature; whereas God is essentially and numerically one. The Three Divine Persons are not individuals of the same Nature; for then they must have Three individual subsisting Divine Natures, which would as much make Three Gods, as Three individual subsisting Humane Natures make Three Men: The Divine Nature would then be communicated by Multiplication, as Humane Nature is, which must multiply Gods as well as Men.

Is this Sameness of Nature then one single or singular Nature, which has but one single Subsistence? This the Fathers utterly deny, as being the Heresie of Sabellius, and leaving no other Trinity of Persons in the Godhead, but a Trinity of Names. The Divine Nature is One Individual Nature (as you shall hear presently) but not One Single Nature; for one Single Nature can be but One Person, whether in God or Man.

I shall not dispute this at large now; I may find a properer place for it, but I shall only observe at present, That if there be but One only single Nature in God, the whole Trinity must be Incarnate in the Incarnation of Christ, as Sabellius asserted: For the Divine Nature was Incarnate in Christ, he was perfect God, and perfect Man, and if there was but one single subsisting Nature in all Three Persons, this one single Divine Nature was Incarnate; and therefore the Father and the Holy Ghost, who are this one single Divine Nature, as well as the Son, must be as much Incarnate as the Son was; for though it were possible to conceive Three Divine Persons in One single Divine Nature, yet it is absolutely impossible, that this One single Nature should be incarnate, and not the Divine Nature of all the Three Persons be incarnate, when it is but One single Nature in all: And it is absurd to say, that the One Divine Nature of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost is incarnate, and yet none but the Son incarnate. This is what Victorinus Afer teaches: Non oportet dicere, nec fas est dicere, unam esse Substantiam, tres esse Personas; si enim ista ipsa Substantia & egit omnia, & passa est, patripassiani & nos; absit. Bibl. Patr. Tom. 4. We ought not, says he, to say, nor is it lawful to say, that there is but One Substance, (that is, One single subsisting Nature,) and Three Persons; for if this same Substance did and suffered all, we also must be Patripassians; which God forbid; That is, we must say, That the Father suffered as well as the Son, as Sabellius taught. It is such Animadversions, and such unintelligible Notions, which make the Christian Faith ridiculed by Atheists and Hereticks.

But the great difficulty is, how to conceive One Individual Nature, which is numerically One, but is not One single Nature: And yet thus it must be, if there be a Trinity in Unity, Three real Hypostases and Subsistences in One Divine Nature; which the Counterfeit Areopagite, but an ancient and learned Writer, calls 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a Monad or Unite, which thrice subsists, or has Three Subsistences; whereas it is demonstrable, That One single Nature can subsist but once, or have but One Subsistence: And therefore the ancient Fathers owned, that Father and Son is alius & alius, and that God is solus, but non solitarius.

That I may be the better understood, and give you some imperfect Conception of this great and venerable Mystery, let us contemplate this individual Identity and Sameness of Nature, in a Man and his Image.

A Man sees his own Image in a Glass, the exact Proportion of his Body, all the Lines and Features in his Face, all his own Motions, and Postures, whether he smiles or cries, sits or stands. Now suppose this were a real, living Image, as exactly himself, both in Body and Mind, as the Image in the Glass represents his external Shape and Features: That this living Image was coeval with himself, and did subsist as necessarily as he did, and yet as much depend upon him, as the Image in the Glass does on his Face and Presence: That this Living Image did understand and will in the same Act with himself, and repeat all his Motions and Passions, and Sensations, as his Face in the Glass does: That this living Image knew himself to be but an Image, distinct from the Original, but the same with him; and that the Man whose Image it is, knew himself to be distinct from his Image, but yet the same; and that the Man and his living Image felt each other, and all that is in each other, in themselves.

Now I desire to know by what Name you would call such a living Image? You cannot deny him to be a Man, because he has Humane Nature in himself, and distinctly in himself, as compleatly and perfectly as the Man has, whose Image he is, or else he were not a compleat and perfect Image: And yet you cannot say that he is a distinct Man, or another Man, a Second Man, for he is but an Image, and the very same with the Original, and therefore they are both but One Man; naturally One, not as Two other Men are, who may be morally One, by a Consent and Agreement of Understanding and Will, but by an individual Unity and Sameness of Nature and Will: And yet you must confess them to be Two, though not Two Men, not Two Humane Natures; for the Man is not his Image, nor the Image the Man, whose Image he is: But if you will call the Man a Person, as certainly every Man is a Person, then his Image, which is the same with himself, must be a Person too, and not the same Person: So that here are Two distinct Persons subsisting in One Individual Nature, not multiplied, but repeated in its Image. There is indeed no such living Image as this in created Nature; but yet this is the true Nature of any Image, and gives us an intelligible Conception of the Unity of Nature in a plurality of Persons.

And this is the plain account of the essential Unity between God the Father, and God the Son. Christ is expresly called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the Image of God, 2 Cor. 4. 4. and Col. 1. 15. and said to be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , in the Form of God, Phil. 2. 6. and to be the brightness of his Glory, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the express Character and Image of his Person. And because there are several sorts of Images, the ancient Fathers declare what kind of Image Christ is of God the Father; That he is not a dead Picture, nor a meer Reflection in a Glass, but is a living Image of the living God. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , as Gregory Nazianzen speaks.Greg. Naz. Orat. 36. Hil. l. 11. de Trinit. Deum viventis Dei vivam imaginem, as St. Hilary tells us, that Christ is God, the living Image of the living God. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , as Damascen Damasc. l. 1. deimaginibus. speaks, That the Son is the living, natural, invariable Image of the invisible God; having the whole Father in himself, and being upon all accounts identically the same with him, excepting the Principle and Cause of Being; that is, that He is begotten eternally of the Father, but the Father is unbegotten.

But then, though he be the Son, and the begotten Image of the Father, he is not his Image meerly as other Sons are the Images of their Fathers, who, though they partake of the same specifick Nature, may be very unlike them, and are not the same; but as Gregory Nazianzen tells us in the place above-cited, Christ is the living Image of the living Father, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 : But a more invariable Image than Seth is of Adam, or any Child of his Father; for the Nature of such simple and unmixt things, as an Image is, is not to be partly like, and partly unlike, (as Children are to their Parents,) but that the whole represents the whole, as the impression does the Seal, and rather to be the same, than to be like.

But St. Gregory Nyssen gives us the most exact Description of Christ's being 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . Greg. Nyss. contra Eunom. Orat. 12. p. 345. the living Image of his Father, of his Will, and of his Goodness, which, he says, is just as if a Man saw himself in a Glass; for the Image in the Glass does in every thing conform it self to its Prototype; the Face which looks in the Glass, being the Cause of the Face which is seen there; and therefore the Image in the Glass neither moves, nor inclines it self of its own accord, but as its Prototype moves or inclines, but always moves with it. Thus we say, the Lord Christ, the Image of the invisible God, is immediately and instantly affected together with his Father. Does the Father will any thing? the Son also, who is in the Father, knows the Father's Will, or rather, is the Father's Will. Whether this be not the Dean's mutual Consciousness, which must of necessity be between a living Image and its Prototype, or that whereof it is the Image, and is the most natural and inseparable Union of all, let any Man judge.

It were easie to fill the Margin with such Quotations as these, as you who are conversant in the Fathers, very well know; but I shall only farther observe at present, that the Fathers made use of this Notion of the Son's being the living Image of God his Father, both in their Disputes against the Arians and Sabellians.

They proved from hence against the Arians, that the Son was 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , of the same Nature with his Father, which is a plain and necessary Consequence, and needs no proof; for if the Father and the Son be the same, as a Prototype and his Image, there can be no Diversity of Nature between them. Thus St. Hilary, St. Basil, St. Cyril, St. Ambrose, St. Athanasius, Greg. Nyssen, St. Austin, and all the Fathers who were concerned in the Arian Controversie, reason at large.

And thus they proved against the Sabellians, That God was not One single Person, distinguished only by Three Names; because the Son is the living subsisting Image of the Father, and the Image and the Prototype cannot be the same, but must be Two; no Man is his own Image, nor is an Image the Image of it self. This is so self-evident, and so frequently occurs in the ancient Writers, that I shall not detain you with particular Quotations at present.

This real distinction of Three in the same individual numerical Nature, the Ancients expressed by the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 : That the same One individual Nature subsists thrice, in Three real Subsistences, not by multiplying, but only by repeating it self. As a Man and his living Image would be Two real Subsistences, but not Two Men, nor Two Humane Natures, but the same Man and the same Nature subsisting twice in Two different manners, not like Two Men, but as the Prototype and the Image, which are really and distinctly Two, and yet but One Man. Thus Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are really Three, but have the same individual Nature, and are the same One God, and differ only in their manner of subsisting; That the same Divine Nature subsists originally in the Father, and subsists again in the Son, as in a living Image of the Father, and subsists a third time in the Holy Ghost by an eternal Procession from Father and Son, in eternal, living substantial Love.

In this Sence the Ancients understood the Word Subsistence, not in the Abstract, as some modern School-men do, and as the Animadverter seems to do, if I understand him, or he understands himself; but in the Concrete, for that which does really and actually subsist; which does éxstare, and is called by them Extantia and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 : And this is very intelligible, that there are Three real Subsistences, or Three that really subsist in the numerical and individual Unity of the Divine Nature. But to talk of Three Subsistences in the abstract without Three that subsist, or of One single Nature, which has Three Subsistences, when it is impossible, that in Singularity there can be more than One Subsistence, is too fine and metaphysical for me, and I envy no Man that can understand it. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 among the Greeks is, res subsistens Petav. de Trin. p. 342. & alibi. & substantiva, as Petavius proves; a subsisting and substantial thing: And St. Ambrose abhors the thoughts, that the Son should not be a Substantial Son, who gives Substance to other things; Non esse filium Ambr. l. 3. de fide, c. 7. insubstantivum, qui aliis dedit habere substantiam: And Facundus tells us, that these Words, Person, andFacundus pro defensione trium capit, c. 1. p 19. Subsistence, were used by the Fathers in opposition to the Sabellian Heresie; and therefore must signifie Three that did really and substantially subsist; as St. Hilary teaches, Non unum esse subsistentem, sed unam Hil. l. de Synod. substantiam non differentem; That there is not One who subsists, but One Substance without any diversity; that is, in three different Subsistencies.

There could not have been more proper Words thought on to represent a Trinity in Unity, than Three Subsistencies in One individual Nature, which differ in nothing from each other, but in their different manner of Subsistence. For it is certain here are Three different kinds of Subsistence, which are not to be found in any One thing in the World besides. Nothing else has any more than one real Subsistence; for every Being in Nature besides is singular, or has but One single Subsistence. Every Man and Angel is a single particular Creature, subsists singly and separately by it self, and is singly One; but if there be a Trinity in Unity, the same Divine Nature must subsist wholly, entirely, and substantially in Three, but in a different manner to make them Three. And it is as certain, that the Father and the Son, though they have the very same Nature, yet subsist in a very different manner, the Father as Original Mind, the Son as the perfect, living, substantial Image of the Father, which is as different as the Subsistence of the Prototype and the Image; and every one will grant, that a Man and his Image, though it were a living substantial Image, have a very different Subsistence; for the Image has its whole Subsistence in dependance on its Prototype; the Man subsists by himself, and gives Subsistence to his Image; and the same we must conceive of the Subsistence of the Holy Spirit, though we have not so apt a Similitude to represent it by.

And if we must call the Three in the Holy Trinity, by any other Name than Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, Three Subsistences is liable to the least Cavil, and does most properly express their general Character; for they are but One Divinity, or One Divine Nature subsisting wholly and entirely Three times, without multiplication, as a Man is not multiplied but repeated in his Image. All other Names in their proper and usual Sence, signifie an absolute, compleat, independent Being, such as Nature, Essence, Substance, God: And therefore though each Divine Person have a natural, essential, substantial Subsistence, and be true and real God; yet we must not say, that there are Three Divine Natures, Essences, Substances, or Three Gods; because though the whole Divine Nature, Essence, subsists in Three, yet it is but one and the same in all; and tho' God be the most absolute, compleat, independant Being, and the Son be God, and the Holy Ghost God, yet neither the Son, nor the Holy Ghost can be said to be an absolute, compleat, independant God, because Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are but One God; neither of which subsist absolutely, compleatly, independently; that is, without each other; which is all that is meant by an absolute, compleat, independent Subsistence, that they can subsist apart without each other; but the Father can no more subsist without the Son, than the Son without the Father; nor the Holy Spirit without Father and Son; nor Father and Son without the Holy Spirit; as a natural and necessary Image cannot subsist without its Prototype, nor the Prototype without its Image, which is essential to it; so that they are but One absolute, compleat, independent Deity, though the Three Divine Subsistences in the Godhead subsist in a mutual respect, and a relative dependance on each other.

And this, I suppose, is what the Schools mean, when they call the Three Divine Persons, Three Relations, or Three Relatives; for there must be Three real subsisting Relatives, if there be Three Relations; for One Subsistence cannot be the Subject of Three Relations, no more than one and the same Man can be related to himself as Father and Son. But then the Father, and Son, and Holy Spirit are such Relations, as there is no Example of in created Nature; for their Relation to each other is not a meer external Respect and Denomination, such as absolute independant Beings have to each other, but their very Nature and Subsistence, as Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, is relative. Though the Father be eternal original Mind, yet it is essential to this eternal Mind to beget his own living substantial Image; and therefore this eternal Mind is naturally and essentially related to his Image: And I need not tell you, that the very Nature and Subsistence of an Image is wholly relative; a natural and essential Image subsists as necessarily as the Prototype, but its Nature is wholly relative. Thus Father, Son, and Holy Ghost have the same common Nature; not common as a generical or specifick Nature, which is only a logical Notion, but as One individual Nature, really and actually subsisting in each, without any other difference than their different manner of Subsistence, and their different Relations, as a Man and his living Image, have the same individual Nature common to both, and differ only in their manner of Subsistence and Relations; that is, as the Prototype and its living Image differ. And this I think gives us an intelligible account of a Trinity in Unity in the most Orthodox Language of Fathers and Schools.

This shews us, that the Son, and Holy Spirit, are not Divine Emanations from the Father, as is represented in the Platonick Triad: For though the eternal Generation and Procession be such Mysteries, as we cannot comprehend, nor frame any Idea or Conception of, yet we know that an Image is not an Emanation, but a Reflextion; and therefore is wholly and entirely the same with the Prototype, which no Emanation can be; for the whole cannot be an Emanation: An Emanation indeed is of the same Substance, and is specifically the same; and in this Sence Homoousios; but it multiplies Natures and Substances, and is not individually and identically the same as the Prototype and its Image; and therefore the Fathers declare, That the eternal Generation of the Son is not by Abscission and Passion, but think the aptest Representation of it in Nature, (though that is very different) is by Splendor and Brightness, or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the out-shining of the Deity; and when they call the Holy Spirit 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , it is not in the Sence of Emanation, but of the mysterious Procession.

This also shews us, That this Holy Trinity is not Three Divine Attributes, such as Wisdom, Power, and Goodness; for they are all Three the very same with each other, the same Wisdom, Goodness, and Power, and therefore not Three Parts or Attributes of the same Deity, but each is the whole, as a Prototype, and its living Image is.

And this shews, That though the Son be true and perfect God, as the Father is, yet the Son can never be a Father, because his Nature and Subsistence as a Son is wholly relative; and a Son, whose Nature and Subsistence is relative, is necessarily and essentially a Son, but can never be a Father, no more than the Image can beget its Prototype.

And this gives a plain Account, why our Saviour calls God, not only his Father, but his God, and the only true God, and acknowledges, That he receives all from his Father, and, That his Father is greater than he is; though he have the very same Nature, and with respect to his Nature is equal in Power and Glory; for this is the true difference between the Prototype and the Image, though their Nature be the same. Had a Man a living substantial Image, perfectly the same with himself, as God has, the Image must thus speak of his Prototype, as the Son of God speaks of his Father. He must acknowledge that the Prototype is his Man, for he is only the Image of the Man; and were there only One Man in the World, as there is but One God, he must acknowledge the Prototype to be the only true Man; for though the living Image would be a true Man also, yet he is not originally Man, but Man of Man, a Man only by Relation and Participation with its Prototype; and therefore the Prototype is greater than its Image, and the Image receives all from the Prototype, depends on it, and subsists and lives in and by it, as the Son acknowledges, That he lives by the Father, Iohn 6. 57. This is manifestly the Language of Scripture and Fathers concerning the Son of God, his living and substantial Image; and I hope you see, That this is proper and peculiar only to a living subsisting Image; and can be applied to nothing else, but is the only proper way that we can speak of such an Image, or that such an Image can speak of it self; this is intelligible, though the Mystery of this eternal living Image is inconceivable.

This I suppose is what the Dean meant; when he said, That Some tolerable Account might be given of the Terms and Distinctions of the Schools; and I believe you begin to see, That this representation I have now made of this Venerable Mystery, will contribute very much to the better Understanding both of the Fathers and of the Schools, as may appear more hereafter; but at present I shall only shew you, That this is the true representation of the Dean's Notion of a Trinity in Unity.

The Dean does professedly Teach, That the Three Persons or Subsistences in the ever blessed Trinity, are Three real Substantial Subsistences, each of which has entirely all the Perfections of the Divine Nature; Divine Wisdom, Power, and Goodness; and therefore each of them is eternal, infinite Mind, as distinct from each other, as any other Three Persons; and this I believe he will no more Recant, than he will renounce a Trinity; for all the Wit of Man can't find a Medium between a Substantial Trinity, and a Trinity of Names, or a Trinity of meer Modes, Respects, and Relations in the same single Essence, which is no Trinity at all. And if the Son, as you heard, be the living Image of his Father's Nature, Essence and Perfections, the Divine Nature, though it be not multiplied, yet is repeated in the Son, and does as really and distinctly subsist in the Son, as it does in the Father; as had a Man a living Image, his Image would be as substantially and really Man, as the Prototype is, or as the Man himself, whose Image it is, though the Man and his Image, which are really and substantially Two, are not Two Men, but One Man. And thus the Dean might very safely say, That there are Three in the Godhead, each of which is a distinct, infinite, eternal Mind; and though Custom has not made the form of Expression Orthodox, yet there is no Heretical Sence in it, to call them Three infinite and eternal Minds, with respect to their Nature and real Subsistence, to distinguish them from meer Names, and Logical Notions, if at the same time it be declared, That they are individually and numerically One: As it would be no Mortal Crime against Logick and common Sence to say, That a Man and his Living Image are Two distinct Men, with respect to the real and actual Subsistence of Humane Nature distinctly in each of them, though the Image is not another Man, but the same with its Prototype.

This is the distinction which the Dean makes between the Three Divine Persons, which yet could not be Three, were they not Three Self-conscious Subsistencies; for there cannot be Three in a knowing and intelligent Nature, without knowing themselves and their distinction from each other; That the Father knows himself to be the Father, and not the Son, and the Son knows himself to be the Son, and not the Father. This every Man feels in himself to be a real and natural distinction of one Person from another, and the Scripture is express in it, that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are thus distinguished; and this the Dean thought, and as far as I can yet see, with great Reason, to be the most easie and sensible representation of a real and natural Trinity.

As for the Unity of these three Divine Persons, the Dean expresly Teaches, That they are essentially and numerically One. And as the most sensible Representation of this, he places their Unity in Mutual consciousness, that they have as Conscious a Sensation of each other in themselves as they have of themselves: And he is certainly so far in the right, that this is essential to their Unity; That Three intelligent Subsistences cannot be One without this Mutual consciousness, and that this Mutual consciousness cannot be in Three, which are not essentially and numerically One. The Scripture plainly enough Teaches this very Unity between Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, as he has proved at large; and if this either be, or prove, or necessarily supposes an essential Unity, as inseparable from it, and essential to it, here is an intelligible Notion of a natural Trinity in Unity, without any Contradiction, Absurdity, or Confusion of Subsistences, which is all the Dean intended. But the Animadverter and his Socinian Seconds, or rather Leaders, represent the Dean's Notion, as if he made the Three Divine Persons, as absolute, compleat, independent Persons, as Three Men are, and that they are united only by Mutual consciousness, and then they can fansie nothing but an Unity of Knowledge, or a Moral Unity and consent of Wills: But this is either a mistake, or a wilful misrepresentation, as every one may see with half an Eye, who considers the whole Notion together.

The Dean indeed, the better to convey this Notion of the natural Unity of Mutual consciousness to our Minds, supposes a Case, which he knew very well, never was, nor ever could be, which is very allowable in all Writers, within the compass of decency, when we want some sensible Images to frameVindic. of Trin. p. 49. our Conceptions by: And therefore says, That if there were Three created Spirits so united, as to be conscious to each others Thoughts and Passions, as they are to their own, he can see no Reason why we might not say, That Three such Persons are numerically One. Though he knew, That Three such particular, separate Natures never could be thus united, but in them we might the better conceive, what kind of Union it was he meant. But from hence to conclude, That the Dean owns no other Unity in the Divine Nature, than what Mutual-consciousness would make between Three particular, absolute, compleat, separate Natures, is, I'm sure, false-reasoning, and looks like very foul Play. The Dean asserts, That these Three Divine Persons are thus Mutually Conscious to each other, and that this Mutual-consciousness is an essential Unity, and that those, who are thus Mutually Conscious are numerically One; but then he Teaches, that there are no other Three in the World that are thus Mutually Conscious, and that these Three are not, and cannot be for this very reason, Three particular, separate, subsisting Natures, but Three Subsistences in one individual, numerical Nature: An Unity of Nature, and mutual consciousness may be distinguished, but are inseparable: There can be no Unity of Nature between Three intelligent Subsistences without Mutualconsciousness; and there can be no Mutual-consciousness but in the same individual Nature; but yet, if we must distinguish as far as we can apprehend these matters, Mutual-consciousness is much more essential to the Unity of Three intelligent Subsistences than any other Notion of Unity: For I cannot see, but that if it were possible, That three created Spirits, who are not only Three distinct Subsistences, but have Three particular, separate Natures, should be thus united by Mutual-consciousness, it would destroy the individuation of their Natures, though the individuation of their Subsistences or Persons would be preserved by Self-consciousness: And, were it possible, the same individual Nature should be repeated in its Image, without this Mutual-consciousness, it would divide this One Nature, and make the Man and his living Image, as much Two Men, as any Two Men in the World; But then the Image would cease to be an Image, how exact soever, upon other Accounts, the Likeness or Sameness were; for the Image does not only represent and resemble the Prototype, but moves and acts with it.

And this is that very Mutual-consciousness wherein the Dean places the essential and numerical Unity of the Holy Trinity; such a Mutual-consciousness as must be between the Prototype and its living Image. I shall not trouble you with transcribing out of the Vindication, but referr you to some places to consult at your leisure.

He always represents the Son, as the living Substantial Image of God the Father; and the eternalVindic. p. 130, 131, &c. Generation by God's reflex Knowledge of himself; and in this places the numerical Identity and Sameness of Nature between Father and Son, as there is between the Prototype and its Image; and the Holy Spirit, whom the Fathers represent, as God's eternal Love of himself in his own Image, has all the same Divine Perfections repeated in eternal and substanstial Love: That yet this numerical Identity and Unity of Nature cannot be understood without this Mutual-consciousness, which makes them One Energy and Power, and is their mutual In-being in each other.

That this Mutual-consciousness proves the perfectP. 122, 123, &c. equality of all Three Persons in the Unity of theP. 81. Godhead, as having the very same Perfections, without destroying the Prerogative of the Father, or the Subordination of the Son, and the Holy Spirit: As a living Image is in Nature equal with the Prototype, but Subordinate.

That this gives an Account of the Modi subsistendi, or of the real and actual Subsistence of the same individual, numerical Nature in Three, but in a different manner; had these things been duly considered and compared, we should not have heard soP. 83. much noise and clamour about Mutual-consciousness, as if it made Three absolute, compleat, independent Gods, when it is impossible to conceive a more close and intimate Union in Nature.

But there is one formidable Objection against all this, or rather against the Dean for it, that he pretends by this means to make the Notion of a Trinity in Unity as intelligible as the Notion of God: which is intolerable Vanity and Presumption to pretend to explain Mysteries. But does the Dean pretend, That his Explication leaves nothing Mysterious in the Doctrine of the Trinity in Unity? Nothing, which we cannot comprehend? That, as the Ancients used to speak, this is no longer a wonderful distinction, and a wonderful Union? This I confess had been very vain and presumptuous: But are there no Mysteries in the Divine Nature, because the Notion of One God is an intelligible Notion? If there be, there may be Mysteries, very incomprehensible Mysteries in the Trinity still, how intelligible soever the Notion be: The intelligibleness of any Notion, whether it be true or false, consists in the terms in which it is conceived; that they convey a distinct Idea to our Minds of something possible, not which we can fully comprehend, but which we can understand without confusion or contradiction; and this does great Service to Religion to deliver Mysteries from absurdity and contradiction, though they are very incomprehensible still.

The Notion of Eternity (for Example) is very Intelligible, to be without any Cause, without Beginning, and without End; there is no contradiction in this, and it is demonstrable, that something must be Eternal; and yet nothing can be more incomprehensible than Eternity: Our Thoughts are presently lost, when we endeavour to conceive an eternal Being: And thus an eternal Image of an eternal Being, begotten without Beginning, is as intelligible, as an eternal Being is; for if it be necessary and essential to an eternal Being, to have a living, substantial Image, thought can't divide their Existence; and it is as certain, if there be such an eternal living Image, that this eternal Being, and his eternal Image are Two, as the Prototype and the Image; and yet as essentially One, and as intimately conscious to each other, as you have heard, they must necessarily be; this is intelligible, but yet a very incomprehensible Mystery; for who can conceive an eternal Generation, which has no beginning? the Divine Nature repeated in its Image without multiplication? a Distinction without Separation, and an Unity without Singularity, and without Confusion? If these be not Mysteries enow for the Animadverter, though the Dean's intelligible Notion were admitted, he is as much too fond of Mysteries, as other Men are too much afraid of them; for whether he knows it or no, there is a very great difference between a Mystery, and Contradiction or Nonsence.

I believe by this time you are less Fond than you were, of an Answer to the Animadverter's Arguments, which some Men, who have despised his Wit and Railery, have yet thought unanswerable; but I will be as good as my Word, especially since a short Answer will serve.

In his third Chapter he Attacks the Dean's NotionAnimad. c. 3. of Self-consciousness, but he stumbles at the Threshold, and runs on furiously as a Man does who runs headlong, and is never able to recover himself. He says, It is evident, the Dean assigns Self-consciousness as the formal reason of Personality, in all Persons universally, whether Finite or Infinite, Create or uncreate; Pag. 70. and therefore he undertakes to prove, That Selfconsciousness is not the formal Reason of Personality, either in Finite or Infinite Persons.

The Dean says not one word about the formal Reason of Personality, nor is at all concern'd what it is. He only says, That the Unity of a Spirit with it self, and its distinct and separate Subsistence from all Vindic. p. 48. oher created Spirits, consists in Self-consciousness. So that if that be one distinct, separate Mind, which is conscious only to it self, which feels all that is in it self, and nothing else, and those be two distinct separate Minds, each of which is thus conscious to it self, but not to each other, the Dean has gained his Point, and the Animadverter has lost all his Arguments and Wit, whatever becomes of the formal Reason of Personality.

The Dean did not enquire what makes a Mind, or Spirit, or if you please a Person, but what makes a Mind or Spirit, or Person One, and either distinguishes, or separates it from all other Minds, and Spirits, and Persons; and if this be what he means by the formal Reason of Personality, I do affirm, That Selfconsciousness is this formal Reason; and that for the very Reason he urges against it, That wheresoever the formal Reason of Personality is, there is Personality, and wheresoever Personality is, there is the formal Reason of Personality: For wheresoever there is a Person, there is Self-consciousness; that is, every Person is conscious to it self, and there can be no Person without it; and wheresoever there is Self-consciousness, there is by Nature a Person, unless its natural Personality be swallowed up in a Supernatural Union to a Superior Person, of which more presently.

And yet to see what meer Mortals the nicest Scholastick Wits are, who can spend Days and Years in picking Straws, and splitting Hairs, this great Leviathan, the Witty, the Subtle, the Good-natur'd Animadverter, knows not the difference between the formal Reason and such a natural Property as the Logicians call proprium quarto modo, which belongs to the whole kind, only to the kind, and always to the kind; for such Properties do exist convertibly, and One mutually and essentially infers the other, which is his account of the formal Reason; and thus Risibility is the formal Reason of Humanity, which makes well for the Animadverter to prove him to be a Man, though he is seldom in so good a Humour as to laugh without grinning, which belongs to another Species.

But since he is pleased to let that pass for the formal Reason of Personality, which is convertible with it, I hope Self-consciousness may escape pretty well, and pass for the formal Reason of Personality. But let us hear his Arguments against it.

1. The first is worth its weight in Gold, and yetPage 71. will not much enrich the Buyer, that according to the natural Order of things, Self-consciousness in Persons pre-supposes their Personality, and therefore is not, cannot be the reason of it. Now suppose a Man should reason thus: Actual Knowledge pre-supposes a Mind, and therefore Knowledge in its Principle is not, and cannot be the formal Reason of a Mind; would the Animadverter for this Reason deny, that the Principle of Knowledge is the formal Reason of a Mind, that which makes and constitutes a Mind, because there can be no actual Knowledge before there is a Mind? and yet the Argument is the very same; for if Knowledge in its Principle, may be the Nature or formal Reason of a knowing Being, or of a Mind, though there can be no one act of Knowledge, till there is a Mind, then Self-knowledge, or Self-sensation, or Self-consciousness, may be the formal Reason of Personality, though there must be a Person, before there can be any actual Self-consciousness; that is to say, there must be a self (which in this Dispute is all that can be meant by Person) before this Self can feel it Self, and by this Self-feeling distinguish Himself from all other Selfs. I could not but smile to see how gravely this wise Animadverter proves, That there must be a Person, before there can be any Action proceeding from a Person, and summons the whole Posse of Metaphysicks to prove it: But I hope notwithstanding this, that Self-consciousness in the Abstract (as the Dean uses it, and as every one but such an Animadverter would understand it) is as capable of being the formal Reason of a Person, as Rationality is of a reasonable Nature, though there must be a reasonable Creature before he can reason, as there must be a Selfconscious Nature before there can be actual Self-consciousness.

But I have something more to say to our Animadverter before I leave his Demonstration, as he calls it; For as Sophistical as his Argument is, the Foundation of it is false, and absurdly unphilosophical: He says, That Personality is the Ground and Principle of all Action, wheresoever it is. For where there is a Suppositum, whether it be Rational (which is another Word for Person) or not, still it is the whole Suppositum, that Acts. That it is the Person that acts is certain; but where did he learn, That Personality is the Principle of all Action? I was always taught otherwise, That Natura est principium motus & quietis: Nature is the Principle of Motion and Rest, and therefore of all Action: And is there no difference between Nature and Personality? Is there no difference between being a reasonable Creature, and being Peter or Iohn? or do Peter or Iohn perform the Actions of a reasonable Creature, by Vertue of their being such distinct and particular Persons, or by their being Men, by the Powers of Humane Nature, which are common to all? Men are not distinguished from each other, nor act and subsist separately by Humane Nature; and therefore neither Humane Nature, nor any of the Powers or Actions of Humane Nature distinguish Men into particular Persons, or are the Reason of Personality; but that which limits Nature, makes it particular, and a particular subsisting rational Nature is a Person, is one with it self, and distinguished and separated from all others: So that we must not seek for any formal Constituent Principle of Personality (in a strict and proper Notion) as we do of Nature, but see in finite Beings, where Nature ends, and what are the utmost Bounds of it, and that distinguishes a common Nature into Persons. Now a rational Nature extends as far as Sensation and Consciousness, and where that ends, there are the Bounds of Nature, and that makes a particular Person, which feels all that is in himself, and nothing else; and this is the Dean's Self-consciousness, which sets Bounds to Nature, and by that makes a Person, which is one with it self, and separated from all others, and therefore in this Dispute is neither to be considered as a Power, nor as an Action of Nature, neither direct nor reflex, but as the Bounds of it, which makes a particular subsisting rational Nature, which we call a Person. For it is plain, that as far as Sensation and Consciousness extends, a Spirit is One, where that ends, common Nature divides, and subsists in Particulars.

I cannot but think how this Animadverter must look, when he reads over this Argument again, especially his Triumphant Conclusion: This I look upon as a Demonstration of the Point; and I leave it to our Author (who is better a great deal at scorning the Schools, than at confuting them) to answer and overthrow it at his leisure.

2. His second Argument, I confess, looks like something solid and substantial, but proves a meer airy vanishing Spectrum, when you come near to handle it. It is this: The Humanity, or Humane Nature of Christ is perfectly conscious to its self of all the internal Acts, whether of Knowledge, Volition, Passion, or Desire, (which is One of the Passions) that pass in it, or belong to it; and yet the Humanity, or Humane Nature of Christ is not a Person, and consequently Self-consciousness is not the formal Reason of Personality; for as much as it may be in that, which is no Person. Now indeed had the Dean expresly taught. That Self-consciousness is the formal Reason of Personality, here had been One supernatural Exception against it, which does not alter the Reason of natural Unions; and yet is no greater Objection against Self-consoiousness, than against the most approved Definition of a Person: For if with Boethius, you define a Person to be substantia individua naturae rationabilis; an individual Substance of a rational Nature, the Humane Nature of Christ, which is an individual Substance of a rational Nature, and yet no Person is an equal Objection against it; and let the Animadverter try, how, according to this Definition, he can keep off the Assertion of Nestorius, that there are Two distinct Persons in Christ: And if Self-consciousness escape as well as any other formal Reason of Personality, I believe the Dean desires no more; and yet he needs not this, for he no where makes Self-consciousness the formal Reason of Personality, but only of the Unity and Distinction of a Mind or Spirit; and I hope he will grant the Humane Nature of Christ to be One, and to be distinct and separated by Self-consciousness, from all other particular Humane Natures, or Persons.

The short Answer is this: That Self-consciousness makes a Mind or Spirit one with it self, and distinguishes or separates it from all other Minds or Spirits, and such a distinct and separate Self-conscious Mind is a natural Person, unless its own natural Personality be swallowed up in a Personal Union to a Superiour Mind. For this is the Account the Dean gives of a personal Union, when Two Natures are united into One Person, they must be so united, that the Superiour Nature have the Government of the wholeVindic. p. 268. Person, which is necessary to make them One Agent, without which there cannot be One Person; and that there be One Consciousness in the whole: Of which more presently.

3. His third Argument is draw out to a great length, but may be answered in a few Words, becuse it proceeds upon the same Mistake, and is nothing to the purpose. It is taken from the Soul of Man in a State Anim. p. 73▪ of Separation from the Body; that the Soul in a separate State is conscious to it self of all its own internal Acts or Motions—and yet the Soul in such a State is not a Person. And therefore Self-consciousness is not the formal Reason of Personality. But whether the Soul be a Person or no Person, in the Body or out of the Body, is nothing at all to the present Controversie: If the Soul and all other Spirits are naturally One with themselves, and separated from all other Souls and Spirits by Self-consciousness; this is all the Dean desires, and all that his Hypothesis needs. And the Animadverter may philosophize as he pleases about Personalities. The Truth is, to do him right, he is a very notable Man, if he can draw you into a School-question, for he can make a shift to read and transcribe, but he hates a 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 -Men at his Heart, which is none of his Talent, for it requires thinking; put him out of his way, and he is undone, which makes him so angry at the Dean for not speaking the School-Language, nor confining himself to known Terms of Art, which he has a great deal to say of, whether he understands them or not: and because the Dean would not do this himself, he has done it for him, and put his Notions into School-Terms, and made Self-consciousness the formal Reason of Personality, and on my Word has disputed very notably against it, and it is pity Three such dead-doing Arguments should be lost for want of the formal Reason of Personality; and yet there is no help for it, he must begin all again, and try how he can prove, that the Unity of a Mind, and its distinction from all other Minds, does not consist in Selfconsciousness; and if he can prove this, then the Dean is a lost Man for ever, and must be contented to follow his Triumphant Chariot.

But yet, whether this Question of the Soul's being a Person, or no Person, serve the purpose of the present Dispute or not, it abundantly serves the Animadverter's charitable purpose (which is the only purpose of his writing this Book) to expose the Dean; and therefore though the Matter is not worth disputing, I shall make some short Reflections on it.

The Dean has upon another occasion asserted, That a Soul without a vital Union to a Humane Body is a Person: In opposition to this the Animadverter asserts, That the Soul of Man is not a Person, neither Anim. p. 74. in its Conjunction with the Body, nor its Separation from it.

The Foundation of his Arguments, such as they are, is a very unphilosophical and senceless Mistake, that because Man consists of Soul and Body (which he very undeniably proves from the Athanasian Creed) therefore the Personality too must be divided between the Soul and Body, that the Soul is but part of the Person, as it is part of the Man, and then the Soul neither in nor out of the Body, can be the Person, because a part can't be the whole, Quod erat demonstrandum.

Now I readily grant, That the Person of a Man, as it is used in common Speech to signifie a Man, must include both Soul and Body, as the constituent Parts of a Humane Person; but when we enquire into the strict Notion of Personality, that must be a simple uncompounded thing, as indivisible as self is, which cannot consist of Parts, which may be separated from each other, that one part of the Person may live and the other die; for though there are Two Natures, there is but One Person, and the same One Person cannot both live and die at the same time.

This is a very pleasant Notion, if well considered, of the two parts of Personality, as there are two Parts of a Man, Soul and Body; for unless there be two Personalities as well as two Natures, the two Natures cannot be two Parts of the one Humane Personality, as they are the Parts of a Man: It is impossible to prove from Two Natures, that there are Two Parts of Personality, unless each Nature has a Personality of its own, the Personality of the Body, and the Personality of the Soul, united into the One Personality of the Man; for nothing can be a part of Personality, which has nothing of Personality it self.

Will the Animadverter then venture to attribute any Personality to the Body, as he must do, if he makes it part of the Personality? This will be a little worse than (what he so rares the Dean for) calling a Beast a Person, tho▪ the Dean gave notice of the impropriety of the Expression, and used it only by way of allusion and accommodation, the better to represent the Union of Two Natures into One Person, which are Two Persons, or something as like Two Persons as their Natures will permit, when they subsist apart. And I should have thought such a severe Censurer should have been more Cautious than to have attributed any part of Personality to the Body in the same Chapter, wherein he so civilly Schools the Dean for seeming to attribute Personality to a Beast, when Personality belongs only to a reasonable Nature, and Beasts have no Reason; which is more than he knows, (for why may not Beasts have some Reason, as well as some Men have such brutish Passions) and more than as Wise Men as himself think to be true; for there are various degrees of Reason; and where ever there is a conscious Life, there must be some degree of it, and that entitles them to as much share in Personality as they have in Reason; but no Man will pretend, that a Humane Body, though united to a reasonable Soul, has any Reason, or any Sence either, though, by its Vital Union to the Soul, the Soul feels all the Impressions made on the Body.

And this brings us to a fair State, and an easie decision of this Question; for if Personality belongs only to a reasonable Nature, it is certain, that the Soul makes or constitutes the Person; or, if I may so speak, is the Center of Personality, whatever else be vitally united to it, and by such a vital Union is incorporated into the same Person. If there be but one principle of Reason, Sensation, and a conscious Life, that is the Person; for a Person is the individual Substance of a Rational Nature.

But is not a Humane Body part of the Person to whom it belongs? Answ. It is part of the Man, and in that Sence part of the Person, but no part of the Personality; that is, it does not make the Person, but is taken into the Person by a vital Union, and so becomes part of the Man, and part of the Person, as belonging to it.

I am of opinion, notwithstanding the Animadverter's Animus & Anima, that there is but one Soul or Mind, or Spirit in Man, which performs all the Offices of a Rational and Animal Life, which understands, reasons, wills, and feels all the Impressions of the Body, whether Pain or Pleasure, though with respect to such different Offices and Powers, it may be of some use, both in Philosophy and Divinity, to call it by different Names. Now, if all Life, Reason, Sensation, be only in the Soul, there must be the whole Personality, though the Soul, when united to a Body, is not the whole Person; for the Person reaches as far as the Self-conscious Life does by a Vital Union, but the Personality is whole and entire in the Principle of a Rational Life, and is neither more nor less a Person, though by vital Unions, or a dissolution of them, more or less may belong to the Person: We may find some resemblance of this in Works of Art: Whether you add or take away some Wheels from a Clock, it is the same Clock still, while there is the same Spring of Motion, though it communicates Motion to more or fewer Wheels. And thus the Body becomes One Person with the Soul, neither by an hypostatical Union, which is the swallowing up a natural Personality in its Union with a superior Person, which can never be between two Beings, one of which by Nature is no Person, as the Body it self is not, and cannot be: Nor by the Body being joyned with the Soul, as one part, joyntly concurring with another, to the composition of the whole Person; which is the Animadverter's way, and a very absurd one, as you have already heard, to talk of a compounded Personality; but there is another way which he never thought of, and that is, by a vital Union, which makes the Body part of it self, without adding to its own Personality, by making all bodily Sensations its own. And thus, though the Soul be an entire Person, a Man, when united to a BodyAnimad. p. 75. is not an imperfect, accidental Compound, which, he says, Philosophy calls unum per accidens, a thing made up of two such Beings as cannot perfectly coalesce and unite into One; for his own beloved Philosophy never called things vitally united, unum per accidens, and I would desire him to inform us, how two things can more perfectly coalesce than in One Life.

However, by the power of Metaphysicks he can prove, That if the Soul be an entire Person, a Man must be an imperfect accidental compound: For a compleat Being (as every Person essentially is) having received the utmost degree of Subsistence, which its Nature can give it, if it comes afterward to be compounded with another Being, whether compleat or incompleat, it must necessarily make such a loose unnatural Union and Composition.

I do not wonder he is so fond of School-Terms, for they serve him very often instead of Sence; but before I particularly consider them, by his good leave, I must ask him a Question or two: Whether the Divine 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or Word before the Incarnation were a compleat Being, as he must be, if he be the second Person in the Trinity, for every Person, he says, is essentially a compleat Being; and then, whether he will have the Humane Nature a compleat or incompleat Being, the Question is, Whether the Personal Union of the Humane Nature to the Divine Word, be necessarily such a loose unnatural Union and Composition. To say, That this is not a natural Union, is to say, That the Divine and Humane Nature are not united into One Person in Christ; for I take a Union of Natures to be a natural Union, by what Power soever it be done; at least so far, that there is no natural repugnancy to such an Union, for then no Power could do it; and therefore, according to this bold assertion, either the Hypostatical Union must be loose and unnatural, or if the Divine and Humane Nature be perfectly united into One Person, then the Union of two compleat Beings does not necessarily make such a loose unnatural Union and Composition.

But to quit these School-Terms, and to speak what we understand our selves, and what others may understand; the Soul may be a compleat and perfect Person, and not a perfect Man; and therefore, notwithstanding it is a compleat Being, may require a vital Union to a Humane Body, to perfect its Nature: That is a perfect Humane Person, which has entirely in it self all the Powers which are essential to a Humane Person, such as Understanding, Will, and Sensation, which are as entire and perfect in the Soul without the Body, as with it, though some of them either cannot act at all, or at least not so perfectly, without a vital Union to the Body, which conveys external Impressions, and by them excites internal Sensations in the Soul.

To represent this plainly, let us consider a Soul vitally united to a Body, but to such a Body whose Organs are so indisposed for Sensation, that the Man can neither See nor Hear, nor Taste, nor Smell; but only just lives and breathes, you will not say, this is a perfect Man; but the Animadverter himself will acknowledge him to be a perfect Person, compounded of Body and Soul; but if a compleat Person may not be a compleat and perfect Man, then the formal Reason of Personality, and the natural Perfection of a Man are two things; and though the vital Union of Soul and Body make a perfect Man, yet the whole entire Personality must be in the Soul, if a Man be a perfect Person, who is united to a Body, which is worse than none: For where there is a perfect Humane Person, there must be the radical Principle of all Humane Actions, which can be no where but in the Soul, when the Body is unfit for all the Actions of a Rational or Sensitive Life, which is a much more imperfect State than to be out of the Body, if we believe, that the Soul lives and acts when separated from the Body. Something in the Shape and Figure of a Man, without the natural Powers of Reason and Sensation, would very improperly be called a Man, or a Humane Person; and therefore we must confess, that the Soul, which under all these natural Impediments of acting, has still these natural Powers to be the Person, or there can be none. The Soul is the Person, the Body only the Organ or Instrument, which, at least in this state of Union, is necessary to the exercise of our natural Powers, both of Reason and Sensation; but whatever change there be in the Body, the Person is the same still, which could not be, were the Body part of the Person, for then the change of the Body would be a partial Change of the Person too; and yet our Bodies are in a perpetual Flux, and change every day; some Atoms fly away, and others are united to us; that we are no more the same for a Month or a Year, than a River is, whose Waters perpetually flow and change their place; and yet we feel our selves to be the same Persons still; and therefore certainly these fluid Atoms, of which our Bodies are composed, are no part of our Personality, though they belong to our Persons, while they are vitally united to our Souls. Suppose it were possible, that the Souls of Iohn and Peter could change Bodies, that the Soul of Iohn should be vitally united to the Body of Peter, and the Soul of Peter vitally united to the Body of Iohn, I would ask the Animadverter, whether he thinks, that such a change of Bodies would make any change in their Persons? Whether Iohn would not as much feel himself to be Iohn, and Peter to be Peter as ever they did? I believe, indeed, an innocent, good-natured Soul would not be willing to venture a Change of Bodies with every Body, for fear of some Moral Infection, but the natural Person would be the same; for nothing makes any Body ours, but a vital Union, and whose Body soever it was before, it becomes our own, when our Soul informs it, and feels the Impressions of it. Now, if the Soul be the Person, when united to the Body, it can't lose its Personality by going out of it; nay, if the Soul can subsist in separation from the Body, and live, and perform all the Actions of a Rational Nature, it must be a Person, if an individual subsisting Rational Nature is a Person, and if it be not, I would know what to call it. But this Animadverter is a very Wagg, and Banters the poor Dean most unmercifully, and demonstrates beyond all contradiction, that The Soul, in a State of Separation, can't be a Person, because it is neither the same Person, which the Man himself was while he was living, and Animad. p. 76. in the Body, nor another Person; and therefore it can be no Person. The wording of this is very observable, and worthy of the Wit and Subtilty of its Author: If the Soul in such a State (of Separation) be a Person, it is either the same Person which the Man himself was, while he was Living, and in the Body: Pray, what is this Person, which he calls the Man himself, which lives in the Body? I hope, it is not the Body that lives in the Body, and then I know no Man himself, nor Person, that lives in the Body, but only the Soul; and if it be the same Soul that lives out of the Body, that lives in it, it is the same Person, the same Man himself in a state of Separation, which lived in the Body. And what does he mean by the same Person, which the Man himself was, while living? For does the Man and his Person die? Then the Man is not Immortal, and if the Man and his Person live, when the Body dies, then the Soul is the Man and the Person, and the very same Person out of the Body that it was in it. So St. Paul thought, when, speaking of himself, and his being taken up into the Third Heavens, he thus expresses it. I knew a Man in Christ fourteen years ago, (whether in the body, I cannot tell, or whether out of the body, I cannot tell, God knoweth) such an one caught up into the third Heavens, 2 Cor. 12. 2. but whether in the Body, or out of the Body, which he did not know, yet he knew himself to be the same Man, and the same Person that ever he was.

But the Animadverter very learnedly proves, That the Soul out of the Body cannot be the same Person with the Man, because the Soul is not the Soul and Body too, as the Man is when the Soul and Body are united; which is well observed, That the Soul is not the Body, nor a part the whole: but yet if the Personality be not compounded of Soul and Body, the Soul may be the whole and same Person in the Body, and out of it.

There is no need then to say, That the Soul in a State of Separation is another Person, than the Man himself is while Soul and Body are united; though this would serve the Dean's purpose as well, if the Soul be but a Person, and be a distinct Person by Self-consciousness: And should the Dean prove cross, and say this, the Animadverter could not help himself; for as for his absurd Consequence, viz. That it is One Person that lives well or ill in this World, to wit, the Man himself while he was personally in the Body, which (by the way) is down-right Nonsence, if the Person of the Man be Soul and Body, though we confess the Body belongs to his Person, when united to his Soul, for the personal Presence of the Man in the Body, must distinguish the Person of the Man from the Body, in which he is personally present, and supposes, that the same Man at other times may not be personally present in the Body; however he thinks it a great Absurdity, That One Person should live well or ill in this World and another Person pass out of the Body into Heaven or Hell, there to be rewarded or punished, (at least till the Resurrection) (and I suppose at longest too, unless it can be another Person when reunited to the Body, as well as when separated from it) for what that other Person had done well or ill upon Earth.

Well, let this be as absurd as it will, the Animadverter must say it, or say something as absurd, unless he will allow a Soul in a State of Separation to be the same Person that it was in the Body, or deny the intermediate Rewards and Punishments of good and bad Men till the Resurrection. For if the Soul be a Person, and not the same, then one Person sins and another suffers. If a Man be a Person, and the Soul no Person, then the Person sins, and that which is no Person suffers: If a Man be a whole Person; and the Soul only part of the Person, then the whole Sins, and a part suffers for the whole. Let him choose which he thinks looks most agreeable to the Principles of Reason and Divinity.

But does this profound Philosopher indeed think, that the Body either sins or suffers? The Soul sins in and by the Body, and feels Pain or Pleasure from bodily Impressions; and therefore as the Body may be made the Instrument of Vertue or Vice, so it may be the Instrument of Rewards and Punishments; but Vertue or Vice is seated only in the Soul, and it is the Soul only that can be happy or miserable, rewarded or punished, in or out of the Body, and therefore there is no danger, that one should sin, and another suffer, though the Soul sins in the Body, and suffers out of it.

But it is worth observing how notably he winds up his Argument. If it be intolerably absurd (as no doubt it is) That the Soul in the other World should not be responsible for what the Man himself in Person had done in this: What then? One would expect the Conclusion should be, then the Soul is the Man himself in Person. But this he durst not say, because it was to un-say all he had said; and he durst not say the contrary, for that is the Absurdity he is exposing, that One, who is not the Man himself, should suffer for what the Man himself did: and therefore he lets them both slip, and is very glad to get rid of them, and concludes safely; Then it is altogether as absurd and intolerable, for any one to represent and speak of these things under such Terms and Notions, as must necessarily throw all Discourse and Reasoning about them into Paradox and Confusion; which is to bilk a Conclusion, and to pay a reckoning by running out at the Back-door. He adds: And indeed to me the Soul's thus changing its State forwards and backwards from one manner of subsisting to another, looks very odd and unnatural. What does he mean by this? That it is odd and unnatural, that the Soul should live in the Body and out of the Body, and then return into the Body again? And is not this so? Does not the Soul first live in the Body, and after what we call Death, live out of the Body, and shall it not be reunited to the Body again at the Resurrection? And how does this change the Soul's manner of subsisting, any more than the Body changes its manner of subsisting, when it is naked and cloathed? To live in the Body and out of the Body, are Two different States of Life, but the Soul subsists still in the same manner, for it owes not its Subsistence to the Body, and can neither subsist more nor less in or out of the Body; for I know no degrees of Subsistence in the Soul, though there are of Life and Action; what is, is, and what subsists continues to be.

But that which is so odd and unnatural is, that from an incompleat State in the Body, it should pass to a personal and compleat State out of the Body (which State is yet praeternatural to it) and then fall back into an incompleat State again by its re-union to the Body at the Resurrection (which yet one would think, should rather improve our principal Parts, in all respects, not meerly relating to the Animal Life, as the bare Subsistence of them, I am sure, does not.)

It is hard to guess the meaning of such Gypsie-Cant, and therefore I hope you and he will pardon me if I mistake, for I will do my best. By the Soul's incompleat State in the Body, I suppose, he means, That the Soul in the Body is an incompleat Person, and by the personal compleat State out of the Body, that the Soul is a compleat Person out of the Body; this indeed sounds somewhat odd and unnatural; but does he know any Man who says, that the Soul is an incompleat Person in the Body, and a compleat Person out of the Body? or who calls this the incompleat and the compleat State of the Soul? Those who affirm the Soul to be the Person, say, That it is the same Person in the Body, and out of it, but that it lives in different States in the Body and out of it; and that its State in this mortal Body, is the most imperfect State a reasonable Soul can live in; That the State of the Soul in separation from the Body, is to good Men a more perfect and compleat, because a more happy State, and therefore not praeternatural, which can never be a more happy State; and that the re-union of the Soul to an immortal spiritual Body at the Resurrection, is the most compleat and perfect State of all: So that here is no such unnatural change as he dreams of, from an incompleat to a compleat praeternatural State (which is Nonsence) and then back again to an incompleat State at the Resurrection, which so turned his own Stomach, (though not very squeamish) that he was glad to qualifie it with a Parenthesis, which I defie any Man to make Sence of: But the natural progress of the Soul in this lapsed State is from a less perfect to a more perfect, and from that to the most perfect State of Life; which to me is proof enough that the Soul is the Person, and fitted by Nature to live in all these different States, or it is impossible to prove Peter or Iohn to be the same Men in these different States.

At length the Animadverter grew sensible,Animad. p. 48. that it sounds very absurdly to say, That the Soul in a State of Separation is but part of the Person, when it subsists by it self, not in any Compound, and feels it self to be the same, and lives and acts in a more perfect and happy State, than when it lived in a mortal Body, and therefore he fences against these Two Objections (which are stronger, when they are put into one) as well as he can.

He says, the Soul in a State of Separation is but part of the Person, the whole of which is a compound of Soul and Body, because of its essential relation to a Compound. But what is this Compound which the Soul is essentially related to? not the Body I hope, for the Body is no more the Compound, than the Soul: Is it then the Man? and where is this Man that the Soul is essentially related to? Does he then mean, that it is essential to the Soul to live in an earthly Body? Then it cannot live in a State of Separation. If it be of the Essence of the Soul to live in the Body, it is evident, That it can never live out of it; and if it be not essential, then the Soul may be a whole entire Person, when it subsists separate from the Body. But the Soul by its original Designation is related to the Body; What? so that it cannot live without it, and never should live without it? if not, this original Designation, does not prove an essential Relation: But it has a natural Aptitude to be an Ingredient in the Constitution of a Compound. What does he mean by the Soul's being an Ingredient in a Compound? Is the Soul and Body mixed and blended together to make a Man? Is it the same thing to be a part of the whole, and to be an Ingredient in a Compound? Well, but the Soul has a natural Aptitude to live in a Body; and so it has to live out of the Body; and what then? then the Soul, which is the same Person still, is naturally fitted to live in different States; and then its Relation to an earthly Body is not essential to it, whatever strong Appetite and Inclination, as he says, it retains to return and be re-united to the Body; which, whoever says it, no Man can know; and if it be true of sensual Souls, who were wholly immersed in Sense, is demonstratively false of all holy and pure Spirits, who are in a great measure weaned from this Body, while they live in it, and rejoyce at their Deliverance when they escape safe out of it, who, with St. Paul, desire to be absent from the Body, and to be present with the Lord. Holy Souls indeed in a State of Separation do earnestly desire the Completion of their Happiness in the Resurrection of their Bodies, but not to be re-united to these vile, earthly, corruptible Bodies, but to glorified, immortal, incorruptible Bodies, when Christ shall at his Appearance change our vile Bodies, and make them like to his own most glorious Body; which though they had every individual Atome, which belonged to them before, are yet in their Nature and Constitution no more the same Bodies, than Earth and Heaven are the same. But the Spirits of just Men made perfect are in a more perfect State of Life and Happiness out of these Bodies than they enjoyed in them, and therefore are more perfect Persons too, are more perfectly themselves, and enjoy themselves more perfectly, and therefore are in a State more agreeable to the Perfection of their Natures (and that I take to be a natural State) than living in these Bodies.

The Animadverter will not allow this to be a natural, but Supernatural Perfection, which relates only to the Consummation of their Graces, and not to the manner of their Subsistence. But is not the Perfection of our Graces, the Perfection of Humane Nature? And is not the Perfection of Nature, a natural Perfection? And if the Soul be more perfect in a State of Separation, is not this a more perfect manner of Subsistence? This might have shamed the Animadverter had he had a little more Consideration and less Confidence, to deny the Personality of the Soul, which can subsist and act, and be more perfect and happy out of the Body; which shews, that to be in the Body, or out of it, does not concern the Personality, but the different States wherein the same Person lives.

To proceed▪ The Dean had upon another occasion said, That all the Sufferings and Actions of the Body are attributed to the Man, though the Soul is the Person, because it is the Superiour and Governing Power, and constitutes the Person. This I should have thought very true and safe, but the Animadverter has made very tragical Work with it. He says, That this provesPag. 79. the quite contrary, That the Man himself, to whom these personal Acts are ascribed, must indeed be the Person, and that for the same Reason also the Soul cannot be so. But does the Dean any where deny, That the Man, as consisting of Soul and Body, is a Humane Person? or, when united to a Body, affirm, that the Soul is the whole Person? He says indeed, That the Soul is the seat of Personality, the only Principle of Reason, Sensation, and a Conscious life, which consequently in a State of Separation is the Person, and when united to the Body constitutes the Person, and therefore may both be the Person, and constitute the Person. When a Body is vitally united to a Soul, Soul and Body are but One Person, because they are but One voluntary Agent, and have but One Conscious Life; but it is the Soul constitutes the Person, as being the Principle of all personal Acts, Sensations and Passions which the Body is only the Instrument of, but being a vital Instrument is united to the Person, and becomes One Person with the Soul; for the Person reaches as far as the same Conscious Life does; but it is only this vital Union to the Soul, which receives the Body into the Unity of the same Person, not as part of the Person, but as an animated Instrument of Life and Action, which as it were, cements Soul and Body into One Person. A Soul vitally united to a Body, is an embodied Person, in a State of Separation it is the same Person still, but without a Body, which makes a great change in its Sensations, and manner of acting, but no more changes the Person, than the Man would be changed cloathed or uncloathed, were his Cloths as vitally united to his Body, as his Body is to his Soul. This is plain Sence; and if the Animadverter knows not how to reduce it to Terms of Art, I cannot help it. The Soul, I grant, as he wisely observes, Cannot constitute the Pag. 80. Person efficiently, by Creation or Generation, nor formally as a constituent part, for the Soul is not properly part of the Person, but the Soul constitutes an embodied Person, by living and acting in the Body, which unites Soul and Body into one Life, and that makes one embodied Person, or Soul and Body one Man. And now, as for those Questions, which, with so much Triumph and Scorn he asks the Dean, I leave to himself to Answer them, and to you to laugh at them. The rest of this Chapter is nothing but Ignorance and Raving, and has been answered already.

If you will Pardon this long excursion about the Personality of the Soul, which is nothing at all to the present Controversie, having given you this one sufficient taste of the Wit and Philosophy of the Animadverter and his great exactness in speaking and reasoning, I promise you to let pass an hundred other Absurdities and Fooleries, and to make shorter Work with him, without letting slip any Argument, when I can find it.

The Title of his Fourth Chapter is an Answer toAnim. Chap. 4. p. 90. it self, and proves, That it is nothing to the purpose. For he undertakes to prove, That Self-consciousness is not the formal Reason of Personality in the Three Persons of the blessed Trinity, nor does the Dean say it is. The Question is only this, whether Three Self-consciousnesses do not prove Three Persons, each of which is thus Self-conscious to himself, to be really distinct from each other? Whether Three Persons who feel themselves to be themselves, and not to be each other, are not Three really distinct Persons? This mistake has been so fully exposed already, that I need say no more of it; for the Mistake is the same, and the Answer is the same, when applied to finite or infinite Persons.

To keep my Word with you, I shall take no notice at present of his Nine Considerations, which are ushered in with a kind of Mathematical Pomp, as if we were to expect nothing less than demonstration; when I see what end they serve, they shall be examined. But now for his Arguments, which will be answered in almost as few Lines, as they take up Pages in the Animadversions; for when the Question is mistaken, all Arguments are lost.

Arg. 1. No Personal Act can be the formal Reason Pag. 94. of Personality in the Person whose Act it is (nor, I suppose, in the Person whose Act it is not) But Self-consciousness is a Personal Act, and therefore cannot be the formal Reason, &c. This Argument we have met with, and answered before; The Dean neither considered Self-consciousness as a personal Act, nor assigned it as the formal Reason of Personality; and yet if we consider Self-consciousness as a Personal Act, though it cannot make the Person, yet it distinguishes one Person from another; by this actual Self-consciousness every Person feels himself to be himself, and not to be another.

Arg. 2. Proceeds upon the same mistake, as to the formal reason of Personality, but has some peculiar Absurdities of its own; for he proves, That Selfconsciousness can't make a Person, because it can't make the Relations, which distinct Persons stand in to each other. That Self consciousness can't make a Father, because it can't beget a Son: For this is the Summ of his Argument, That the Three Persons in the Trinity are related to each other, as Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; and therefore Self-consciousness, which is an absolute and irrelative thing cannot be the formal Reason of Personality, because it is not the formal Reason of these Relations: As if (let the formal Reason of Personality be what it will) the fundamentum relationis, or the foundation of the Relation between Persons, and the formal Reason of Personality were the same thing: Does that which makes Iohn a Person, make him a Father, or that which makes Peter a Person, make him a Son?

This, I suppose, will be acknowledged very absurd in Humane Persons, where every Person has a distinct absolute Nature to be the subject of these Relations, for then the Personality and the Relation must differ; but it is otherwise with the Persons of the Trinity, whose Personalities are meer Relations. But with the Animadverter's good leave, this makes no difference: In what Sence the Divine Persons are Relatives or Relations, I have already explained; That they subsist relatively to each other, as the whole Subsistence of the Image is relative to its Prototype; but the same Divine Nature which subsists distinctly in each of them, is a compleat, absolute Nature, and Self-consciousness may distinguish the same Nature into different Persons, though they subsist in relation to each other: For has the Person and his Relation the same Notion and formal Reason? Is the Father his Paternity, the Son his Filiation, and the Holy Ghost his Procession? if not, then the formal Reason of Personality in the Father and Son, differs from the Foundation of the Relation between Father and Son; and Self-consciousness might be the formal Reason of the Personality, though not of the Relation.

But, have each of these Three Persons, who, as he says, are purely Relative, a Self-consciousness of their own, that the Father knows himself to be the Father, and not the Son; and the Son knows himself to be the Son, and not the Father, &c. This distinguishes the Persons, and proves them to be really distinct, which is all the Dean desires.

Arg. 3. His next Argument is just as much to thePag. 101. purpose as the former. If Self-consciousness be the formal Reason of Personality in the Three Divine Persons, then there is no repugnancy in the Nature and Reason of the thing it self, but that there might be Three Thousand Persons in the Deity, as well as Three. Now, had the Dean said, That Self-consciousness made the Trinity, this had been a notable Argument, but, I hope, Self-consciousness may distinguish the Three Persons in the Trinity, and prove them to be Three really distinct Persons, though there be but Three, and not Three Thousand Persons in the Godhead. Though it be not repugnant to the Nature of Selfconsciousness, it may be repugnant to the Nature of the Deity, that there should be more than Three Persons in the Godhead. Self-consciousness proves the distinction, though it does not limit the number of Persons, which no Man ever dreamt of, and none but an ingenious Blunderer, whose subtilty is too great for his Understanding, could ever have thought of.

And yet this Argument is as very a Non-sequitur as ever I met with; for suppose Self-consciousness were the formal Reason of Personality, how does it follow, that there may be Three Thousand Persons in the Deity; for does the formal Reason of Personality make or limit the number of Persons? The Nature of the thing, and the Will of the Maker may, but whatever be the formal Reason of Personality, there can be no more Persons than Nature will admit; and if the eternal, uncreated Nature will admit but of Three Persons, it is impossible that Self-consciousness, tho' it were the formal Reason of Personality could make more; for there can be no more when the Divine Nature will admit but of Three Self-Conscious Persons, though a created Nature will admit of as many as God pleases to make. In short, that which naturally distinguishes Three Persons from each other, would distinguish Three Thousand, if there were so many; but does not prove, That there may be Three Thousand Persons in the Godhead; for though it is no contradiction to the distinction of Persons, by Self-consciousness, that there should be Three Thousand, yet it may be a contradiction to the Perfection of the Divine Nature, because every Divine Person is eternal, and whatever is eternal doth necessarily exist; and therefore if there be but Three Divine Persons, Father, Son and Holy Ghost, there never can be, nor ever could have been more.

Arg. 4. His fourth and last Argument is a great Master-piece of profound Reason and Judgment. If Three distinct Self-consciousnesses formally constitute Pag. 104. Three distinct Personalities, then Three distinct Selfcomplacencies will constitute Three distinct Personalities too. He might as well have added Self-Love, and Self-Displeasure, and Self-Condemnation, and as many Selfs as he could think of, only the Danger then was, That the Personality should alter with the Judgment or Passion, that the Person should not be the same, when he is pleased and displeased, when he applauds and acquits, or condemns himself. Had he added Self-conscious to all this; as a Self-conscious complacency (for then it is the same thing, whether Self or any other Being be the object of the complacency) a Self-conscious Love, or Fear, or Hatred, or Desire, every one of these Acts would prove a distinct Person, because they are the Acts of Self-consciousness, which distinguish one Person from another, as every Act of Reason proves a reasonable Creature, because it is the exercise of Rationality; but yet no Man will say, that it is every Act, but the principle of Reason, which makes a reasonable Creature; and no more does any particular Act, but the principle of Self-consciousness, distinguish between Self-conscious Persons, much less such Acts as may be separated from the Person, as, I doubt, Self-complacency is from Damned Spirits, or if he will not allow Souls to be Persons, as it will be from Damned Men. He has drawn this Argument out to such a length, and has so many pretty Remarks, that I have much ado to keep my word with you, but let him go like a wrangling Wit as he is, and I'll go on.

As Self-consciousness makes a Person one with it self, and distinguishes it from all other Persons, so the Dean apprehends, That a natural Mutual-consciousness makes Three Persons as naturally One, as it is possible for Three to be One; and that is the Unity of the Godhead, not the Unity of One Person, but the Unity of Three, or a Trinity in Unity: And this is his next Attempt, to prove, That the Unity of Three Divine Persons in the Godhead can't consist in Mutual-consciousness. He proceeds upon the same mistake, and therefore the same Answer will serve: By Self-consciousness he understood, as you have seen, the acts of Self-consciousness, and then the act Supposing a Person could not be the formal Reason of Personality; and thus by Mutualconsciousness he understands the Acts of Mutual-consciousness, which supposes the Unity of Nature, and therefore cannot be the cause or reason of it; now, though I know not of what use that Dispute is, about the Priority of Being, and the first Modes and Affections of it to any Act of Knowledge, or any other Acts; especially when we speak of the Divine Nature, which we know has no Modes and Affections, no Priority so much as in Conception, if we conceive aright of him, between his Being, and a pure and simple Act; yet I will not put the Animadverter out of his way, when there is no need of it, an easie obvious distinction between the Principle and the Act answers all: A Self-conscious Principle, without which we can't conceive a Mind, makes a Mind one with it self, and distinguishes it from all other Minds, and by the Acts of Self-consciousness, which suppose the Principle, every Mind feels it self to be One, and distinguished from all others: And thus the natural Principle of Mutual-consciousness between Three Persons unites them inseparably in One Nature, and the Acts of Mutual-consciousness are the Acts of Unity, whereby they know and feel themselves to be essentially in each other, and therefore to be essentially One: Just as we consider Reason, either as the Principle or as the Act, the first constitutes a reasonable Nature, the second is the actual exercise of Reason; and thus all his Arguments vanish like Smoak, rise in a dark Cloud, but immediately disperse and are seen no more, till they return, as such Vapours use to do, in Thunder and Lightning, or some threatning Storm.

1. His first Argument is this. No Act of Knowledge Pag. 107. can be the formal Reason of an Unity of Nature in the Persons of the blessed Trinity: But an Act of Mutual-consciousness is an Act of Knowledge. Ergo. Nothing will satisfie the Animadverter but formal Reasons, whereas the Dean no where asserts, That Mutual-consciousness is the formal Reason of this Unity, but that Three Persons, who are thus Mutuallyconscious to each other, must be essentially One; nor does the Dean place this Unity in an Act of Mutual-consciousness, which signifies the Principle as well as the Act, and then Mutual-consciousness (if it were no more than Knowledge, of which presently) must not be considered as an Act of Knowledge.

Arg. 2. If Unity of Nature in the Divine Persons be the Cause, Reason, or Principle of Mutual-consciousness in the said Persons, then their Mutual-consciousness is not the Cause or Reason of the Unity of their Nature; but the former is true, and therefore the latter is so too.

If by this he means, That these Divine Persons could not be thus Mutually conscious, except they were essentially One, it is true, but nothing to the purpose, for they may be thus essentially One by Mutual-consciousness, or Mutual-consciousness may be essential to this Unity, though they could not be thus actually conscious to each other, unless they were thus united, as to have and to feel each other in themselves. If by the Unity of Nature in the Divine Persons, he means the Sameness and Homoousiotes of Nature; this I grant is a necessary Foundation for Mutual-consciousness, without which they could not be One, nor mutually conscious to each other; but I deny that it is the immediate Cause, Reason, or Principle of Mutual-consciousness: The ancient Fathers were very sensible, That when the same Nature subsisted distinctly in Three distinct Persons, the meer Sameness and Homoousiotes of Nature could not make this essential Unity; and therefore they added, their Perichoresis or the mutual In-being of these Divine Persons in each other, which the Dean calls Mutual-consciousness, which is the only natural Union and In-being of Minds.

He proves, That Unity of Nature is the Cause and Principle of Mutual-consciousness, because Mutualconsciousness is an essential Property equally belonging to all the Three Persons, and therefore as all Properties and internal Attributes do, must issue and result from the Essence and Nature, and therefore can have no antecedent causal influx upon the same Nature, so as to constitute either the Being or the Unity of it. Now, I grant, That Mutual-consciousness does equally belong to all Three Persons, for they are all mutually-conscious to each other, and I grant, that it is essential to the Divine Nature, as to subsist in Three distinct Persons, so in Three mutually-conscious Persons; but yet Mutual-consciousness belongs not immediately to Nature but to Persons, and is that intimate Union of Persons which consists in feeling each other in themselves.

The Dean will leave the Animadverter to Philosophize by himself concerning antecedent causal influxes on the Divine Nature, to constitute the Being or the Unity of it; He pretends to no such Knowledge of Created Nature, much less of an eternal, self-originated, simple, uncompounded Nature: It contents him to know what is essential, not absolutely to the Unity of the Divine Nature, but to the Unity in Trinity, and if Mutual-consciousness be essential to this Unity, that the Three Divine Persons are thus united, and cannot be One without it, he will contend no farther with any Man about it. And it is certain, This is essential to his Notion of an identical and numerical Unity of Nature in the Divine Persons, when the same individual Nature is repeated in its living Image, for it is essential to the Notion of a living Image, not only perfectly to represent the Nature, but to feel all the Motions of the Prototype, to live, and move, and act with it, as the Face in the Glass answers all the Features and Motions of the Face it represents.

But the Animadverter mistakes the whole Matter, as is evident from what follows: The Divine Nature or Essence being one and the same in all the Three Persons, there is upon this account, one and the same Knowledge in them also; and they are not One in Nature, by Vertue of their Mutual-Consciousness; but are therefore mutually-conscious, because the perfect Unity and Identity of their Nature makes them so.

If by one and the same Knowledge, he means knowing the same things, this I grant is owing to the Sameness of Nature, but is not Mutual-consciousness; for Three Persons, who have the same Nature, may know the same things, without feeling each others Thoughts and Knowledge in themselves: If by one and the same Knowledge he means, That the Knowledge of the Divine Nature in Three Persons, is but One individual Act, as the Knowledge of One single Person is, this destroys the distinction of Persons, which cannot be distinct without distinct personal Acts, as Knowledge is, and destroys Mutual-consciousness; for there is no place for Mutual-consciousness, or Mutual-Knowledge, where there is but One single Act of Knowledge: If by one and the same Knowledge he means what Gregory Nyssen calls, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , One motion and disposition of the good will, which passes through the whole Trinity 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , without any distance of time, or propagating the Motion from one to t'other, but is distinctly in them all by one Sensation, like One Thought in One numerical Mind; this is that very Mutual-consciousness the Dean means, and is essential, not to the Unity of the Divine Nature absolutely considered, but as repeated in its Image: Three such distinct Subsistences of the same individual Nature, are by Mutual-consciousness essentially One; and thus he may take his Risibility again; for he is undone if he parts with it.

3. Arg. To affirm Mutual-consciousness to be the cause of the Union of the Three Divine Persons in the same Nature, is to confound the Union and Communion of the said Persons together.

To affirm, That the Three Divine Persons are essentially One by Mutual-consciousness is not to affirm, that Mutual-consciousness is the Cause of the Union, but that Persons thus united, whatever makes this Union, are essentially One: The Union of the Father and Son in the same Nature, is by eternal Generation, or the Father's begetting a Son in his own Likeness, not without but within himself, and the Union of the Holy Ghost, with Father and Son, is by his eternal Procession from Father and Son, without Separation, or going out of either; but this In-being of these Divine Persons in each other is their Mutualconsciousness; for they are in one another, as Minds, not as Bodies, and we know no other natural Union or In being of Minds, but this natural intimate Consciousness to each other.

But his Argument consists in confounding the Union and Communion of these Divine Persons; for it seems their Communion consists in this Mutual-consciousness; and if their Union consists in it too, then their Union and Communion is the same: And what if it be? Can he tell of any Communion between Persons essentially One (excepting such personal Acts as are peculiarly ascribed to each in the Oeconomy of our Salvation, which are not the Communion of Mutual-consciousness) distinct from their essential Unity. In separate Persons, who have no natural Union, Unity and Communion are Two things; for where there is no natural Union, Communion can only signifie a Moral or Political Union; but all Communion is Union; and where the Union is natural, Union and Communion must be the same: For Persons which are essentially One, which is the most perfect Union, can admit of no lower Degrees of Union, which are only Imitations of Nature, to supply the want of natural Unity. So that the Animadverter has unawares proved the essential Union of the Divine Persons to consist in Mutual-consciousness; for if their Communion consists in it, as he grants, then their Union must.

But he has made a very false Representation both of Mutual-consciousness, and of the Communion of the Divine Persons with each other. For to prove Mutual-consciousness to be Communion, he says, That all Acts of several Persons upon one another (as all that are Mutual must be) are properly Acts of Communion, by which the said Persons have an Intercourse amongst themselves, as acting interchangeably one upon the other; which may be true of separate Persons, and of all other Mutual Acts, excepting Mutual-consciousness: But Persons, though distinct, yet not separate, but essentially One by Mutual-consciousness, do not act upon each other (which must signifie an external Impression, which one Person makes upon the other, and that supposes them to be separate Persons) but see, and know, and feel each other in themselves, as every single individual Mind feels its own Thoughts and Passions. Had the Dean made such a Separation between the Divine Persons, as this loose Description of Communion infers, what tragical Exclamations should we have heard?

But this severe Censurer of other Men ought to have been more cautious than to have said, That all Acts of several Persons upon one another, are Acts of Communion, which makes Boys in a State of Communion with each other at Boxing; and a match at Scolding another State of Communion; that had the Dean but been pleased to have returned Mutual Acts, he and the Animadverter might long before this, have been in very strict Communion with each other.

After all this huffing and swaggering, this notable Dispute issues in a meer Metaphysical Subtlety about the natural Order of our Conceptions of things. The Animadverter grants all that the Dean says, and all that he has need to say in order to form a Notion of a Trinity in Unity. In the Dispute about Selfconsciousness, he no where denies, but in all his Arguments supposes, that every individual Person has a Self-consciousness of its own, and that every such Self-conscious Person is thereby one with it self, and distinguish'd from all other Persons; but he will not allow Self-consciousness to be the formal Reason of Personality, which the Dean no where says it is; and as for Mutual-consciousness, he allows the Three Divine Persons, to be thus mutually-conscious; and that this Mutual-Consciousness may suppose an Union of Nature (the Dean would have said Unity of Nature, though an Union of Persons; for Unity is Oneness, Union is a Conjunction of more than One; and therefore there can be no Union of Nature, unless there be a number of Natures united into One, but there is an Union of Persons in the Unity of Nature) and that Mutual-consciousness may result from this Union, and upon the same account may infer and prove it, but it can never give or cause it; for their Essence and Personality (what but One Personality, as One Essence in Three?) must still go before their Mutual-consciousness, since the Three Persons must be really One in Nature before they can know themselves to be so. To be so? How is that? To be One? That they must be One, before they can know themselves to be One? What is that to the purpose? Can they be One before they are Mutually-conscious, even in the order of conceiving it? Can they be One before they are in one another? Or is there any other mutual In-being of Minds, but Mutual-consciousness?

But what confounded work does this make with the pure, simple, uncompounded, eternal Nature of God to prove a Priority or Posteriority of Being, or Causality in the Divine Nature from the order of our Conceptions? When we certainly know, that the Divine Nature is eternal, and therefore has nothing before, nor after in it; that it has no Parts or Composition, and therefore nothing in order of Nature before or after, nothing that can be conceived as a Cause or Effect, is it not demonstrable, that all such Conceptions, reduced into such exact Order and Method, are false, because there is nothing in the Divine nature, that answers to them? And though the imperfection of our Knowledge makes it necessary to distinguish the Divine Nature into different Conceptions, as far as we can know any thing of God, and can form distinct Notions, which we can view by Parts; Is this a Reason to frame Ideas of Priority and Posteriority, of Causes and Effects, of formal Reasons and essential Properties, when we know there is no such thing in God, and can form no distinct Conceptions of them? Is it not a wise Dispute, whether Essence, Subsistence, Personality, the distinction of Persons, or the Unity of Nature, Self-consciousness, and Mutual-consciousness, be first or last, which is the Cause, and which the Effect; when we know that the Divine Nature did eternally subsist in Three Self-conscious, and mutually-conscious Persons, and have no other Conception of their Distinction and Unity?

But let those distinguish and methodize their Conceptions into unconceivable Confusion, that please; if Self-consciousness necessarily results from, and infers and proves a distinction of Persons, and Mutual-consciousness supposes, results from, infers, and proves, the Union of the Divine Persons in the essential Unity of the Godhead, it will satisfie the Dean without disputing the formal Reasons of Personality and Union: For this proves a Trinity in Unity, and gives us as intelligible a Notion of it, as we have of Three distinct Self-conscious Persons, which are mutually conscious to each other, which either makes or proves an essential Distinction and Unity; and to dispute about the Cause of Self-consciousness or Mutual-consciousness, is to dispute about the naked Essences, or essential Properties of things, which the Dean rejectedVindic. p. 8. from the beginning, as without the Compass of Humane Knowledge.

4. His fourth and last Argument discards the Notion Pag. 100. of Self-consciousness and Mutual-consciousness, not only as new and suspicious, but as wholly needless in this Subject. Why so? Pray what hurt have these seemingly innocent Words done? Are they not English? Do they signifie nothing? Or can't he understand them? The last is the truth of the Case, and it is a hard case, that the Dean must be bound, at the peril of having a great scolding Book writ against him, to furnish the Animadverter with Understanding, if he venture upon any Terms, which he can't find in some Orthodox Schoolmen, for Peter Lombard will not pass muster with him.

But the Sum of all is, That nothing can be signified by these Words (Self-consciousness and Mutual consciousness) which is not fully, clearly, and abundantly signified by that one plain Word, and known Attribute, the Divine Omniscience. Now suppose this; Why may not that One Comprehensive Attribute of Omniscience very properly receive different Names, according to its different Objects, as the several Arts and Sciences do? If, as he says, by this Omniscience every Divine Person knows himself, and the same Person, by the very same Omniscience knows all that is known by the other Two Persons, and the other Two Persons by the same knows all that is known by him; yet to know himself and to know whatever others know, though it may belong to the same Omniscience is not the same Knowledge, because it has not the same Object; for Self and Others, are as distinct Objects as Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are distinct Persons; and therefore this Knowledge may be distinguished by different Names, as it is by different Objects.

And since, as he confesses, the general Notion of Omniscience does not distinguish Persons as Selfconsciousness does, nor Unite them into One, as Mutual-consciousness does, these Terms were necessary to express something, which Omniscience does not express, viz. wherein these Divine Persons are distinguished, and wherein they are One.

But, after all, this is a Mistake; for though Selfconsciousness and Mutual consciousness may in some Sence be called Knowledge, yet they are of a different Kind and Species from what we strictly call Knowledge, that is, they differ as Speculation and Sensation. Self-Knowledge properly signifies to contemplate our own Natures in their Idea, to draw our own Image and Picture as like the Original as we can, and to view our selves in it: But Self-consciousness is an intellectual Self-Sensation, when we feel our selves, and all the Thoughts, Knowledge, Volitions, Passions of our Minds, and know what is Self, and what belongs to Self by feeling it: He, who knows not the difference between intellectual Sence and Knowledge, is as unfit to meddle in this Controversie, as a Blind-Man is to dispute of Colours. Thus the Mutual-consciousness of Three Persons is not their mutual Knowledge of each other, though they know each other as perfectly as they know themselves, but their Mutual-Sensation and feeling each other in themselves, which makes them naturally One. An omniscient Being knows all things, but feels himself; and Omniscience, as the Animadverter observes, belongs to Nature, but Mutual-consciousness to Persons, which might have satisfied him, That there is a great difference between Omniscience, and Self-consciousness, and Mutual-consciousness; between knowing all things, whether the Object be Self, or any other Being, and feeling himself and other Persons in himself.

This is sufficient to justifie the Dean's Notion of Self-consciousness and Mutual-consciousness, and a little more fully to explain it, which, it seems, he thought, that every one, who was acquainted with the workings of his own Mind, must have understood without a Comment: And, I hope, if the Animadverter think fit to try his skill again, we shall hear no more of his formal Reasons of Personality and Union, but that he will be pleased to speak to the true point, whether a Self-conscious Person be not one with himself, and distinguished from all other Persons, and whether he does not feel himself to be thus One, and thus distinguished by Self-consciousness; and whether Three Divine Persons, who are thus Mutually-conscious to each other, be not naturally and essentially United into One Supream Being, or One God. All other Disputes are beside the Question; for if this hold true, then we have a natural Distinction, and a natural Unity between these Three Divine Persons, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; and that is a natural Trinity in Unity, without the least appearance of Absurdity or Contradiction, or impossibility in its Notion.

Hitherto, though the Assault has been furious and insulting, we have met with no heavier Charge, (excepting some usual Complements) than Ignorance in Philosophy and Metaphysicks, and Scholastick Terms, and where that Charge falls, I will now leave you to judge; but this is but the beginning of Sorrow: Tritheism follows next, which is a terrible Accusation, though I do heartily thank the Animadverter, that he has been so civil to the Dean, as not to chargeAnim. Chap. 5. p. 118. this upon him, as his Opinion, but as the consequence of his Principles, which I believe will prove no more than the Animadverter's Ignorance, not the Dean's Heresie.

Before I Answer his Arguments, it will be necessary briefly to state this Matter in Controversie; for the Sting of all his Arguments consists in forcing such a Sence on the Dean's Words, as he never intended.

The only thing that needs any Excuse or Apology is the Phrase of Three eternal and infinite Minds; the Fault of which is, That it is an unusual way of Speaking, and gives advantage to an ignorant or cavilling Adversary to affix some uncouth and Heretical Sence on it. What led the Dean to this, I observed before, viz. His explication of the distinction of the Three Divine Persons by Self-consciousness, and of their essential Unity by Mutual-consciousness; now since Self-consciousness and Mutual-consciousness can be in nothing but Minds, he thought the fairest and easiest representation of this Matter, was to consider them under the Notion and Character of Minds; for every Man can feel in himself, that a Mind is distinguished from all other Minds by Self-consciousness, and if there may be, and is, such a Mutual-consciousness between Three, as the Dean describes, they must be as naturally and essentially One, as Three can be One, and we must seek for no other Unity in Trinity, than what is reconcilable with a real Trinity, or a real distinction between Three.

But had the Dean been aware, what kind of Men he should have had to do with, such as have no regard to the plain and manifest Sence of an Author, if they can but pick a Quarrel with his words, he might easily have prevented all this, without having injured his main Argument: If instead of Three eternal and infinite Minds, he had but said, Three eternal, infinite, knowing, intelligent Persons, he had kept the Orthodox Language, and yet expressed all that he intended by Three Minds; for a knowing intelligent Person is a Mind, if Knowledge can be only in a Mind; and then Three such intelligent Persons may be distinguished from each other by Self-consciousness, and united in One Godhead by Mutual-consciousness. This is the Account the Dean himself gives, what he means by a Mind, That a Mind is an intelligent Person, Vindic. p. 66. and that every intelligent Person is a Mind, and therefore thought it as innocent in this Sence, to say, That there are Three eternal and infinite Minds, as to say, That there are Three eternal and infinite Persons; and I believe it will appear, That excepting the unusualness of the Expression, the objection of Tritheism will equally lie against both, with this difference, That it is more easily Answered by considering the Powers and Properties of a Mind. And in this Sence only he affirms, That to say, they are Three Persons, and not Three distinct infinite Minds, that is, not Three distinct intelligent Persons, is both Heresie and Nonsence; it is Nonsence to Talk of a Person, who is not an intelligent Person, that is, as he explains it, a Mind, which contradicts the Notion both of a Person and Mind; and to say, That there are Three Persons, but not Three intelligent Persons, is Heresie, even the Heresie of Sabellius; for there is no Medium between a Trinity of intelligent Persons, and a Trinity of Names; for Powers and Faculties, and Modes, will prove no more, when distinguished from intelligent Persons: And it is evident, That this is all he intended by it, by the opposition he makes between Three Minds and Three intelligent Persons, and Three Powers and Faculties of the same Being; for Faculties are not Persons, no more than Memory, Will, and Understanding, are Three Persons in One Man: And he proves, That the received Catholick Notion of a Person is such a Being as has Understanding, and Will, and Power of Action, from the Arguments universally urged against the Socinians, to prove the Holy Ghost to be a Person, and not meerly a Divine Power, because all the Properties of a Person belong to him, such as Understanding, Will, Affections and Actions. So that the Dean does not charge those with Heresie and Nonsence, who barely refuse to use these Terms of Three eternal and infinite Minds, which, it may be, no body ever so expresly used before him, and which he will not contend about; but the Heresie and Nonsence is to assert Three distinct Divine Persons, who are not Three distinct, eternal, infinite, intelligent Persons, and he has Authority and Reason enough to call this both Heresie and Nonsence.

This is a sufficient Answer to that Charge the Animadverter draws up against the Dean, That he calls the Three Divine Persons Three eternal and infinite Minds, by which he understands no more than Three intelligent Persons; and if He thinks an intelligent Person to be a Mind, let the Animadverter confute him, if he can; and if he means no more by Three Minds than Three intelligent Persons, (as it is evident he could mean no more) how inconvenient soever this expression may be thought, let the Animadverter try his Skill to make Tritheism of Three Minds, and excuse Three intelligent Persons from the same Charge. And now let us consider his Arguments, which he shews with great Pomp in Mode and Figure.

Arg. 1. Three distinct infinite Minds or Spirits, Pag. 119. are Three distinct Gods. But the Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity are not Three distinct Gods. And therefore the Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity, are not Three distinct infinite Minds or Spirits.

Now let us but change the Term of Minds into Intelligent Persons, and it is the very Argument the Socinians urge to confute the Doctrine of Three Divine Persons, or to charge it with Tritheism, and runs thus:

Three distinct, infinite, intelligent Persons, are Three distinct Gods. But there are not Three distinct Gods. And therefore there are not Three distinct, infinite, intelligent Persons in the Godhead; and consequently to assert Three such distinct Persons is to assert Three Gods.

His proof of the Major Proposition will serve as well for an eternal, infinite, intelligent Person, as for an eternal infinite Mind. For God and eternal, infinite, intelligent Person, are Terms as equipollent and convertible, as God and infinite Mind or Spirit. God being as truly and properly an infinite, intelligent Person, as an infinite Mind or Spirit, and an infinite, intelligent Person being as truly and properly God, as an infinite Mind.

If the Animadverter think fit to Answer, That One God, and One infinite Mind are convertible Terms, but One God, and One infinite, intelligent Person are not convertible Terms, because there are Three such infinite Persons in the Godhead, and but One infinite Mind; the reply is easie, That the bare Terms, from which he argues, do not prove this distinction; For though in the Doctrine of the Trinity, custom has more reconciled us to the Term Person than Mind; yet, setting aside this Dispute, all Mankind understand the same thing by an infinite Mind, and an infinite intelligent Person; it is plain the Socinians do, and hence conclude, That there is but One Person in the Godhead, because God is but One infinite Mind. Whether there be One or Three infinite Minds, or infinite intelligent Persons in the Unity of the Godhead, is a Dispute of a higher Nature, and can't be determined by Convertible Terms; for though the ancient Philosophers and Poets (as he Learnedly proves, what every School-Boy knows) did acknolwedge God to be a Mind or Spirit, that is, an understanding, intelligent, immaterial Being, yet most of them by Mind understood no more than One single Mind, or One single Intelligent Person, and he might have known, that Plato, to whom he appeals, though he acknowledged God to be a Mind, yet he owned Three such Minds in the Unity of the Godhead. And therefore could not think, That One God, and One infinite Mind, were equipollent and convertible Terms; because he asserted Three infinite Minds to be but One God.

But since the Animadverter has only made God, and infinite Mind or Spirit, equipollent and convertible Terms, we may allow him this, and still deny his Major Proposition, that therefore Three distinct infinite Minds or Spirits, are Three distinct Gods; for though God is an infinite Mind, and an infinite Mind is God, it does not follow that Three infinite Minds are Three distinct Gods, no more than Three infinite intelligent Persons are Three distinct Gods; but only as it is expressed in the Athanasian Creed, That we are compelled by the Christian Verity to acknowledge every Person by himself ( 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , singly, distinctly) to be God and Lord, and yet are forbidden by the Catholick Religion to say, there be Three Gods or Three Lords. If God be an infinite Mind, and there be Three infinite Minds, it must follow, That each of these Three infinite Minds, distinctly, and by himself considered, is God, not that these Three are Three distinct Gods, but One God.

Indeed the Animadverter's Argument from Convertibility and Commensuration, that whatsoever may be affirmed or denied of the One, may with equal Truth and Propriety be affirmed and denied of the other, proves all that the Dean would desire, viz. that every distinct Person in the Godhead is distinctly by himself an infinite Mind, because he is distinctly by himself God, and God is infinite Mind, and therefore every Person, who is God, is infinite Mind; for no Person can, by himself be God, who has not by himself all the Perfections that belong to the Idea of God: So that here are Three Persons in the Godhead, each of which by himself is infinite Mind. And therefore, though it may be improper, in an absolute Sence to say, there are Three eternal and infinite Minds, when we acknowledge this infinite Mind is, and eternally was essentially and inseparably One; yet we must say, that this One infinite Mind is essentially distinguished into Three infinite intelligent Persons, whom, in any other case, we should call Three Minds, and are as much Three as is consistent with the essential Unity of the Godhead; and this is reason enough to consider the distinction of Persons, and the Unity of the Godhead, as we would the Distinction and Unity of Three Minds; and then this One eternal infinite Mind, may be distinguished into Three intelligent Persons▪ by Three Self consciousnesses, and be essentially One by a natural Mutual-consciousness, which is all the Dean intended, or had occasion to assert. And if this be all he means by the Godhead, and infinite Mind, which is common to all Three Persons, the Dean readily agrees with him, and in this Sence will no more say, that there are Three infinite Minds, than that there are Three Gods.

The Animadverter was aware of this, That the same Objection of Three Gods, would as well lie against Three Persons as against Three Minds; and let us consider how he avoids the blow. The difference he makes between them is this, That Three infinite Minds or Spirits are Three absolute, simple Beings, or Essences, and so stand distinguished from one another by their whole Beings or Natures. The Sum of which is no more but this, That Three distinct Minds are Three distinct Gods, because they are distinguished; but if notwithstanding their distinction, they are essentially and inseparably One, they are not Three distinct Gods, but a real Trinity of Divine Persons in the Unity of the Godhead, which all Men must own, who believe a Trinity in Unity. But are not Three infinite intelligent Persons, as much Three absolute, simple Beings and Essences, as Three Minds? No! by no means! The Divine Persons are Three Relatives, (or One simple Being or Essence under Three distinct Relations) and consequently differ from one another, not wholly, and by all that is in them, but only by some Mode or Respect peculiar to each, and upon that account causing their Destinction. This is perfect Gibberish, which I am certain he understands not one Word of himself; But let us examine it.

The Divine Persons, he says, are Three Relatives; very right; for Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are Three, and are related to each other. But what are Three Relatives? that comes in by way of Parenthesis, One simple Being, or Essence under Three distinct Relations. That these Three Persons, thus related to each other, are One simple Being, or Essence we readily grant, for they were from eternity inseparably united in One infinite Essence, or One Supream God; but the Question still remains, what these Three Persons are, into which this One Being, or Essence, is distinguished by these Three distinct Relations? Three Relatives are not Three Relations, but Three things related to each other; What then, are these Three Persons in the Unity of the Divine Essence? Three Relations, Three Modes, Three Respects, without some Being, which tho' essentially One, is really and substantially Three, is Nonsence in Logick; for there must be as many real, substantial Relatives and Correlates, as there are Relations, unless the Relation between Father and Son can subsist without a real Father and Son. The Person then of the Father, the Person of the Son, and the Person of the Holy Ghost, are not the Relations between Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, but real, substantial Persons, thus related to each other: And if these are Three intelligent Persons, let him make, if he can, Three Gods of Three Minds, and excuse Three real intelligent Persons from the same Charge. But the Truth is, to prevent the Charge of making Three Gods, he distinguishes the Three Divine Persons, into Three Logical Relations, or Modes of Subsistence; and if we will be contented with a Trinity of Modes, he is for us; but this looks very like renouncing a Trinity of Persons, to secure the Unity of the Godhead; and I fear will prove no better when thoroughly examined.

In what Sence the Three Divine Persons are Three Relatives, or Three Relations, I have explained above; their Nature is compleat and absolute, if the Divine Nature be so, but their Subsistence is Relative, as it must of Necessity be, when the same individual Nature is repeated, and subsists distinctly in Three, If it be essential to the Father to be a Father, he subsists with a necessary Relation to his Son; if it be essential to the Son to be a Son, the perfect living Image of the Father, his Subsistence is wholly Relative, as the Subsistence of an Image is, which depends upon the Prototype. And therefore though each Divine Person be eternal and infinite Mind, and with respect to their Three real Subsistences, may be called Three infinite eternal Minds, (as the Dean ventured to call them) yet these Three are not Three absolute simple Beings or Essences, which stand distinguished from one another by their whole Beings or Natures, but One absolute eternal Mind repeated in Three Relative Subsistences without multiplication: As a Man and his living Image, though each of them have distinctly Humane Nature, and upon that account might be called Two Men, yet they have but One compleat, absolute Humane Nature, though it be repeated in the Image, and are but One Man in Two Persons, or Two Humane Subsistences.

Had the Dean indeed made Three compleat, absolute, eternal Minds, he had been justly chargeable with making Three Gods, but the same eternal and infinite Mind repeated in Three Subsistences, necessarily and essentially related to each other, are but One eternal God.

2. His second Argument is this.

Three distinct Minds or Spirits, are Three distinct Substances.

But the Three Persons in the Blessed Trinity, are not Three distinct Substances.

And therefore they are not Three distinct Minds or Spirits.

The Dean does not pretend to know any thing of the Substance of a Mind, much less of God, who is an infinite Mind: He is contented to know, That a Mind is a thinking and understanding Being; and though Understanding, and Being, and Nature, or Substance, may be distinguished in finite, created Minds, yet St. Austin has taught him, that in God,

Ideo Ipsa mirabilis simplicitas commendatur quia non ibi, (in Trinitate) aliud est esse, aliud intelligere, vel siquid aliud de dei natura dicitur. Anima verò quia est, etiam dum non intelligit, aliud est quidem esse, aliud est quod intelligit. Aug. Evod. Ep. 102.

Proinde in unum Deum Patrem & Filium & Spiritum Sanctum credamus, ita ut nec filius credatur esse qui pater est, nec pater qui filius est, nec pater nec filius, qui utrius que spiritus est—Sed haec tria aequalia esse, & coaeterna, & omnino esse una natura. Ibid.