Chap. 1. Of Philosophy in General.

THe words Sophia and Philosophia, are of kin one to another; the former being of more Ancient use then the latter. For those Men who were by the French termed Druides; by the Aegyptians, Priests; by the Per­sian, Magi, by the Indians, Gymnosophists, Brachmans and Samanei; being persons wholly emploied in the Inquisition of Truth, and reputed to excell all others in the knowledg of great and excellent things: they, by the Ancient Greeks were termed Sophoi and Sophistai, that is to say Wise-men or Sages.

And, Because this Title, seemed in it self, too much savoring of Arrogance; The term [...] Phylosophy whence derived. and many men void of all true Wisdome, did for gaine or honors sake, make profession thereof, terming themselves Sophous and Sophistas, that is to say, Wise Men or Sages: Pythagorar, both to avoid the Arrogance of that Title (for God alone is truly wise) and to distinguish himself from such men as were wise only in Name, also to declare that Wisdom is no common thing, nor within the reach of every Man; was the first that changed this Name, refusing to be called Sophos, that is to say a Wiseman or Sage, and choosing in stead thereof the Title of Phylo­sophos, a Phylosopher, or Lover of Wisedom; as we find it recorded by Cicero in the first Book of his Tusculans Questions, and by Plutarch in his Third Book of the Opinions of Phylosophers, Chap. 3.

The Novelty of this modest Title was so pleasing to learned Men of all Sects, that they chose all by common consent to be called Phylosophers, Lovers of Wisedom, rather then Sophoi or Sophistai, Wisemen or Sages. So that, if we consider the Original of the word, Sapientia and Phylosophia, Wisedom and Phylosophy, are of one and the same import.

Howbeit, The Word Sapientia, is commonly taken in a more strickt sence, so as to sig­nifie the Metaphysicks, as being reputed the most sublime and excellent of all Theoretick Sciences and consequently termed Prote Sophia, the principal part of Wisedom, and Prote Phylosophia, the most excellent Phylosophy. Whereas on the contrary side, the same word Sapientia or Wisedom is used in a larger sence by Aristotle in the sixth Book of his Ethicks written to Nichomachus, Chapter, 7. where it is attributed unto Artificer and Phydias a carver in stone and Polycletus a maker of Statues, are termed Sapientes or wise Men.

But as the word Phylosophy is sufficiently known to all men; Plato [...] Definition of Phylo­sophy. so are there very few that understand the true definition of the thing it self. For those main Definitions thereof, which go up and down among learned Men, are rather deicriptions and Encomiums, then right Definitions. Plato describing the same in his Dialogue termed Phaedo, calls it The contem­plation of Death. For, there being a twofold kind of Death, the one natural, which is a Separation of the Soul and Body; and the other such a Death as whereby the Soul continu­ing in the Body, is weaned from Earthly things, abandons vitious desires, and gives it self wholly up to the Contemplation of the most Excellent Objects: and seeing Phylosophy reacheth, this same Abstraction and Separation of the Soul from the Body, which is as it were the Prison thereof, and the Garment of Ignorance, whereby it is clouded; therefore Plato [Page 2](though Metaphorically and therefore not so fitly) defines it to be, The Meditation of Death. In the same sence, it is said to be The Separation of the soul from the Body, An Affectation of Death, and a Customary course of Dying daily. And the same Plato in his Dialogue termed Theaetetus saies that Phylosophy, is to study as much as may be to be like God. For the Operations of God being of two kinds, Viz. The knowledg of all things, and that Action whereby he Rules and Disposes all: Phylosophy makes a man capable of both these, as far as human Nature is capable. For she both reaches us to contemplate all things, and to guide our Actions by the Rules of Honor and Honesty.

That also is a common Definition of Philosophy which was used by the Stoicks and by Tully in the Second Book of his offices, Cicero his Definition. Viz. That Philosophy is the knowledg of all things divine and human. By human things understanding all things corporeal and subject to our sences; and by things divine, meaning all such things as being incorporeal are not subject to our senses, but perceptible only by the understanding. Or by the term human, such things may be understood, as tend to the Preservation and Progagation of this mortal life and civil society of mankind; and by the term divine such sublime matters as transcend vulgar Capaci­ties.

There are also certain definitions of Phylosophy extant in the writings of Aristotle, Aristotles Definition. as where in the first Book of his Metaphysicks, Chap. 1. he saies, it is the Science of Truth; and in another place (though this seems to be intended by him, as a definition of Metaphysicks on­ly) he saies that, Phylosophy is the knowledg of all things that are, not particularly, but generally considered.

Nevertheless, Phylosophy cannot be exactly de­fined. as we said before, these are not right definitions, but either Encomiums and Laudatory Elogies, or Tolerable descriptions, not containing the true kind not the differ­ence of the thing defined. Yea and the very truth is Phylosophy cannot be exactly defined because it is not Genus Ʋnivocum, and has a nature distinct from its parts. Neither is it Homonymal (for the parts thereof agree more then barely in name) but such an one as they term Ab uno ad unum. For we must not think that Phylosophy is some one science con­versant about some peculiar sort of being: but that it is the totall kind, comprehending all the Sciences in the world. For all things cannot be known by one habit of the mind, but by divers: which when they are all conjoyned, they make that perfection of knowledg, which is called Phylosophy. And therefore all the definitions of Phylosophy which are usually brought, do swerve from the perfect Law of a Definition.

Howbeit from what has been already said, Its Defini­tion. we may collect this following description: Phylosophy is an Habit of the Ʋnderstanding, consisting in Wisdom and Prudence, as that which contemplates all things, and so guides the acti­ons of a Man, as that be may attain the Summum bonum, or cheif Felicity of which he is in this Life capable. For seeing a Man is perfected by Phylosophy, and thereby qualified, it must needs be a certain quality or accidental form, by which a man is made fit to perform all the actions and Duties belonging to the human Nature. And it is such a kind of quality as is not born with us (for no man is borne a Phylosopher) but attained, being no other then an habitual ability, not of the body (for it is not the body of a man but his mind which wants perfection) but of the understanding. And therefore Phylosophy is defined to be a twofold Habit of the understanding, viz. Wisdom and Prudence, under which terms Intel­lection and science are comprehended.

We are now to consider how Phylosophy ought to be divided into its parts; The Divi­sion of Phylosophy according to the Sto­icks. which is a thing wherein Authors are not agreed. The Stoicks have divided Phylosophy, into natural, moral and rational; under natural Phylosophy, taking the phrase in a large sence, they com­prehend not only Physica or the Doctrine of Nature, properly so called, but also Metaphy­sicks and Mathematicks: by moral Phylosophy they understand that Doctrine which regul­ates the manners and actions of men; and by rational Phylosophy or Logick that which teaches us how to reason, argue, and find out the truth. And the truth of this division, they thus endeavor to prove. Seeing the happiness of a man, which Phylosophy aims at, does consist partly in the actions of virtue, and partly in the contemplation of truth, hence two parts of Phylosophy arise; the one of which instructs our Manners and actions according to the Rules of virtue, and is termed Moral Phylosophy; the other is busied in the inquisition of truth and hunting our the secret mysteries of Nature, and is termed Physica, or natural Phylosophy. And because in the search of Truth, we are very apt to mistake, a third part is necessary, to teach us the way and method of reasoning; which from Logos, reason, is called L [...]gica, Logick, or the Art of Reasoning.

But this Division of Phylosophy, The same refuted. is by very many and those very learned interpreters of the peripatetick Phylosophy, rejected, both because the word Physica is therein improperly used, and because it makes Logick a part of Phylosophy. For the intent of Phylosophers was, to include in this division such disciplines, as treat about some real kind of being, Whether L [...]gick is a part of Phylosophy the knowledg whereof denominates a man to be wise or a Phylosopher, and Logick is no such Discipline. For the Reasons of things are not the subject thereof, because compared to that which truly is, they have some sort of beeing; for in this respect they belong to Meraphysicks; nor because, or in as much as they are framed by the mind of man, for so they belong to natural Phyloso­phy; but only as instruments, profitable to denote our first conceptions, and such things as truly are. And therefore Logick is not a part of Phylosophy, but the instrument of a Phy­losopher, to guide his understanding, being invented not for its own sake, but for the better understanding of all other sciences. Which Aristotle confirmes in the first Book of his Topicks Chap. 9. Where he calls it the Handmaid of Phylosophy, yet my intent is not contentiously to wrangle with any man that shal be of the opinion of Pererius in the second Book of his Natural Phylosophy, Chap. 18. viz. That when it is disputed whether Logick be a Science or a part of Phylosophy, the Controversie is rather touching words and the manner of Expressi­on, then the thing it self; some taking the words Phylosophy and Science, in a larger, others in a more press and proper signification.

Toletus divided Phylosophy into three parts. Speculative, Active and Factive: The divi­sion of Tolet. taking the ground of his division from that Ignorance which Phylosophy cures in us, which is threefold, either of the Truth, and that part which heales this, teaching us to find out the truth, is cal­led Speculative or contemplative Phylosophy; or it is Ignorance how to act and play our parts upon the stage of this world, and that which cures this, teaching us to conform our Acti­ons to the Rule of right Reason, is called Active Phylosophy; or finally it is the Ignorance of things necessary to maintain and preserve our Lives, and that is healed by the Factive part of Phylosophy, under which is comprehended all curious mechanical Artifices. But, The said division refuted. though this division be true in respect of the principal disciplins: yet is it no good division of Phylo­sophy. For, the Factive Disciplines are not to be reckoned as a part of Phylosophy; For, they do neither contemplate things divine; nor do they regulate these actions which are pro­per to a Man; not is honesty the thing they aime at, but Profit, nor does the chief good and Felicity of a man consist in them. And who is there that dares reckon Smiths, Carpenters, Joyners, Weavers and such like Artificers, amongst Phylosophers? For they are only the Servants of civil Policy. And therefore Lucian justly derides those, which reckon Arts me­chanical as a part of Phylosophy, when speaking of one that was about to dig up a Feild, he saies, that with his Spade he would play the Phylosopher.

It is therefore to be observed, The name of disci­plin larger then of Phylosophy that the name of discipline is of larger Extent then that of Phylosophy, and that all Disciplines are not comprehended under the Notion of Phylosophy. Yet has Phylosophy obtained this peculiar dignity, that all disciplines are either a part thereof, or fruits growing and resulting there from; or an instrument provided and fitted for its Service.

I, for my part, take that to be the truest division of Phylosophy, Aristotle his divisi­on. which is delivered by Aristotle in the Second Book of his Metaphysicks, Chap. 1. and retained by all sorts of inter­preters, viz. into Speculative and Practical. The Speculative part, is that which contem­plates all beings or things, with their Principles and Affections or Qualifications, only for knowledg and truths sake: But the practical part of Phylosophy is that whose subject is the Actions of Men, which it regulates according to the Rule of right reason and Honesty; and does therefore teach us not only to know but to do also. The same confirmed first from the subject For seeing the mind which Phylo­sophy is to inform and frame, has two parts, the Intellective or understanding part, and the Appetitive or desiring part, they make a double end, and it makes two parts of Phylosophy; the Speculative, which perfects the knowing or Jntellective part of the Soul or mind, and the practical, which moderates the Appetitive part of the mind, and regulates our affections. So that the Duties of a wise man are two, to contemplate all things that are, and to performe such actions as are best, and most suitable to the Life of a man. Or more briefly, to contem­plate things divine and regulate human affairs. For, after that (to use the words of Marsilius Ficinus in the fourth Book of his Epistles) the Mind of a Phylosopher, has contemplated what is the first good or goodness it self, judging in human affaires, what things are good & what bad what filthy and unseemly, and what honest & comely; what profitable, and what unprofitable: according to the pattern thereof he disposes the affairs of men; draws them from that which [Page 4]is evil, and by this prudence of governing, he rules his own private Family, and the common-wealth, and teaches the lawes and waies of the Administration thereof. Nor was this division unknown to the Platonicks, For these are the two wings wherewith the mind of man flies up to Heaven, from whence being weighed down with Earthly Cogitations, it had before fallen: concerning which see Plato in his Dialogues cald Phaedo and Phaedrus, and Marsilius Ficinus in the first Book of his Epistles Page, 612.

The Verity of the said division is further demonstrated, Secondly the from Object. from the end and Object. But most immediatly from its end: howbeit distinct Objects do produce distinct ends. For seeing every discipline is conversant about some one thing or other: and there are two kinds of things, as is apparent in Aristotle his sixth Book of Ethicks to Nicomachus, Two kinds Chap. 3. Some things being necessary, others contingent, and of those which are necessary, some are simply eternal, ungenerated and uncorrupted; others necessarily made, Of things. which though they are not alwaies but are made; yet are they not produced by us; but by nature, working by certaine causes: Now the contin­gent are such things as may or may not be, and whose principle is in the doer and not in the thing done, which depend upon our will, in the power whereof it is, to effect them or not. Hence we gather, there are two parts of Phylosophy, one which is busied about the things necessary, and the other about things contingent. And this distinction of things, Thirdly from the end. does also produce divers Ends. For either we han­dle a matter, only that we may know it, or that besides the knowledg we may effect the same: a third cannot be assigned. For the things which alwaies are or which are made, but by Nature and not by our selves, we therefore handle, that we may know their nature. For what was ever so made, as to endeavor to effect such things as are only possible for Nature, but impossible for all the Men in the world to effect? But those things which are not alwaies, and may be effected by us, we do not handle only to know them, but that their Nature being discovered we may learn to effect them. And therefore those former disciplines, which are conversant about things, not for any operation, but for knowledg sake alone, are rightly termed speculative sciences, or sciences absolutely and properly so called. But the other disciplines, which are verst in contingent things, or such things as are subject to our will, are called disciplines or sciences (the word science improperly taken) practi­cal and operative.

Object, 1 Nor let any Man here object, that al Sciences and all arts do contemplate and spe­culate one thing or another, and direct us to the effecting somwhat or other, as Na­tural Phylosophy leads us to natural magick, the Art of healing Diseases &c. Answer. And in Geometry there are many Theorems which teach us to do somwhat, as to Raise a perpendicular upon a right line given. For al Sciences, absolutely, and in respect to their end are contemplative, and respect no action: but the other disciplines, though they are busied also in the knowledg of things: yet they do not subsist there­in, but such as are active do thereby govern their actions, and the Factive have only their work made, for their end. Nor does Geometry consider those Theoremes that it may effect any thing, but only that it may contemplate the affections of its subject, and find out the Truth: But the disciplines subject thereunto, do after­wards make use of the said Theoremes, to effect somewhat, Which when they do, they pass the bounds of the higher sciences, as may be seen in Agriculture or Husban­dry, and others.

Object, 2 Nor let that trouble us which some say, viz. That Contemplation and Action are so nearly combined, that one cannot be separated from the other. And that there­fore no true difference can be assigned in this respect, seeing Contemplation it self is an action, and that therefore the sciences while they teach us to speculate, teach us to Act. Answer what Pra­cis is. For every energy or Operation of a Man is not termed Praxis in this Case, but such as is subject to the command of the will, and seeing many Errors may hap­pen there abouts, it needs a certain habit, which being inherent in the practical un­derstanding, should be its rule as it were in acting. Now those Actions which are subject to the will are threefold. One proceeds from the will it self, as Election or choice; Threesorts of actions subject to the will. a second proceeds indeed from another power, yet is under the command of the will as the Operations of the wrathful and lustful faculties of the Soul: and and touching this we cheifly speak in this place. The third of it self, is not subject to the will, but in some respect, as the operations of the speculative understanding, [Page 5]are so far subject to the will, as they are performed at this time, and so long or so long, or according to other Circumstances. These therefore, as the former, seeing they are not simply subject to our will, do also not pertaine to this place. We may therefore well grant, that contemplation is an action, that is an act according to the inward energy or operation of the Mind: but no external act, such as that is, in re­spect whereto, one part of Phylosophy is said to speculate, another to act. For this internal action is no way different from the knowledg of the truth, as in practical Disciplines whose action differs from the knowledg of Truth, and whose end does not rest in the truth known, but besides that, proceeds to work somewhat.

And seeing as has been said before that Phylosophy has more then one single signi­fication; it is to be marked, that this name is attributed principally and primarily to the Speculative part, and consequently and in the second place to the Practical. For they are commonly termed Phylosophers, who apply themselves to the Scien­ces; and who profess themselves skilful to govern the life of man.

And this is the general division of Phylosophy: The sub­division of speculative Phylosophy afterwards each part is subdivi­ded. Aristotle in the sixth Book of his Metaphysicks Chap. 1. Divides the specula­tive part of Phylosophy into Physica, Mathematica, and Metaphysica. Which di­vision truly, was both received by the Ancients, and is this day in use, and has its reasons to support it. The same demonstra­ted. For since the diversity of Objects breeds a Distinction of sci­ences, it is manifest that there are no more nor fewer sciences, then the three aforesaid. For a being is considered two waies, Universally and Particularly. That Science which considers the whole and Universal state of Beings as beings, is Metaphysica. The other Sciences consider a being in Particular, and some sort of being. And these are two, as there is a twofold sort of beings. The one is in matter and cannot be known without matter, and this Physica considers: The other is indeed in matter, but it may be separated therefrom by our thought, and may be known distinct from the matter, which is handled by Mathematica. And therefore Metaphysica considers a being, only as it is a being: Physica, considers it as it is moveable or natural: Mathematica as it is abstracted from Matter. But, as Pererius in the first Book of his Physica, Chap. 7. Rightly saies it would not be absurd, if a Man should add a fourth Science, which should treat of spirits and substances separated from matter, which some at this day term Pneumatica. Yea it were no Absurdity to add a fift, Pneumati­ca. which should treat of such things as might be naturally known concerning God.

Again there are several sorts of Mathematical disciplines. Mathema­tical disci­plines di­vided into pure and mixt. For their subject is Quantity; which being double continual and discrete, there wil also be two Scien­ces purely Mathematical, Arithmetick and Geometry. Musick is subordinate to Arithmetick, from whence it borrows its principles, and considers Number as it is joyned with sound. This according to Aristotle in his first Posteriora is two fold, Mathematical and aconstick; but the former is truly and properly a Science, the Latter is rather to be termed an Art. Stereometria which considers the Doctrine of solid bodies is a part of Geometry. Nor is it subordinat to Geometry, because it does not consider Quantity with any Contraction, and addition of matter and sensi­ble quality; nor is it of a middle Nature between Physica and Geometria: but purely Mathematical; seeing it quite separates its subject from sensible matter. To Geo­metry, Perspective is subalternate or subordinate, which considers a line as it is vi­sible: Now Geometry and Stereometry do bring forth Sundry disciplines, which are in some sort of a middle Nature betwixt Mathematical and Physical: yet are they called Mathematical, because they use Mathematical principles, and considers all their subjects in relation to quantity. Such are: The Doctrine of the Raine-bowe, Astronomy, Cosmography, Geography, Chorography, Topography. Thence also afterward sundry Mechanical Arts do arise.

The other part of Phylosophy was the Practical. The sub­division of Practical Phylosophy But Praxis taken in a large sense, comprehends under it Poiesis and Praxis, properly so called. Now Praxis or Action differs from Poiesis or working, according to Aristotle in the sixth of his Ethicks to Nicomachus Chap. 4. and the first Book of his Magna Moralia Chap. 35. In that Action does leave no Work behind it: but Working or Poiesis is such an Opera­tion as leaves a work behind it. From this twofold signification of the word Practice, two kinds of disciplines arise, Active disciplines, and Factive disciplines. The factive are the Arts, as was said before, and do not belong to Phylosophy. But [Page 6]the active part of Phylosophy is divided into Ethica, Politica and Oeconomica.

As to the Utility of Phylosophy, The Utility and necessi­ty of Phy­losophy. though that be cheifly to be regarded in the Pra­ctical part: yet has the speculative also its profit, of which we read much every where in Authors. Two Testimonies shall suffice in this place. The first is that of Hermes Trismegistus in his Book Entitled, Of Piety and Phylosophy. He that is pious and Godly is an exact Phylosopher. For without Phylosophy it is impossible to be per­fectly religious. But he which knowes the things that are, and how they are ordered, and by whom, and for whom: he will give thanks to the cheife workmaster, as to a good Father, a loving Nurse and a faithful Steward: And he that gives thanks is Godly; and he that is Godly and Pious, shall know, both where the truth is, and what it is, and the more he learnes, the more godly will be grow. The Second is that of Scaliger, in his 307. Exercitation Sect. 3. The Searching into these subtilties, although it be not profit­able to make Windmils or watermils to grind Corn; Yet it scoureth off the rust of Ignorance from our Minds and whets and prepares it to the knowledg of other things; in a word fills it with so much splendor, that it can light it self to gain the similitude of the first work­master: who as he is fully and perfectly all things, and besides and above all things: so he will have those to be his, that are studious of the Sciences; and has made their understan­ding, Lord of all things.

Finally, The plea­sure of Phylosophy How great the pleasure is which arises from the knowledg of Phyloso­phy and cheifly the Speculative part thereof, Aristotle teaches in his first Book de Partib. Animal. Chap. 5. I shall here set down what Caebius Rhodiginus, in the se­venth Book and Chap. 30. of his Antiquae Lectiones, Cites out of Maximus Tyrius. You know, saith he, what it is that I think the Speculation of a Phylosopher doer most resemble? Viz. A manifest, clear and flying dream. For his Body remaining safe and sound, his mind runs al the world over; it is carryed from Earth to Heaven; it passes over the whole Ocean Sea; it flyes through the whole Aire; with the Sun it compasses the Earth, with the Moon it walkes the round; it joynes it self to the dance of the other stars, and comes little short of bearing a share with Jove himself, in the Mannagement of all things: O Happy Pilgrimage! O Beautyful shewes! O most true and real Dreams!

Chap. 2. Of the Nature of Physica, or Natural Phylosophy.

SEing we are to treat of Natural things, it is altogether requisite, that we declare in the first place what Discipline that is which treates of Natural things, which we cannot do more conveniently then by enquiring into the kind and subject (from whence the difference in definition of Sciences is taken) of Physica, or Natural Phylosophy.

As to its kind, The Genus or kind of Natural Phylosophy though some do ill in confounding Art and Science; yet all true Phylosophers and Peripatericks are agreed, that Physica or Phylosophy natural, is a Science: since the definition of a science does properly agree thereto. For it de­monstrates in a necessary subject the proper affections by the proper Causes: as very many demonstrations touching things natural, do witness. And so also it is called by Aristotle, in the Third of his Physicks, Chap. 4. Text, 24. and the Second of his Metaphysicks, Chap. 3. Text the Third, and the same is by him plainly proved, in the Fourth of his Metaphysicks, Chap. 5. Text the 23. And although it be reported that of old, Whether it be the knowledg of Natural things. Heraditus; Cratilus, and Pythagoras, held there was no knowledg of natural things, but only opinion; and Socrates being discouraged by the Mutability of natural things, and because he thought he had no certain knowledg of them, leav­ing the same, gave himself wholly to moral Phylosophy; Also Democritus com­plained of the deep pit of truth which had no bottom, and Empedocles of the nar­row passages of the senses: yet it seemes most probable that these Phylosophers did not deny all knowledg, but rather modestly dissembled their own knowledg, then confessed their Ignorance; seeing what we know in comparison to what we know not, is little more then nothing; and taxed their Arrogance who did vainly boast of their own Wisdome. And as for the new Sect of Academicks who did not only deny that there was any knowledg of things natural, but that there was any know­ledg of any thing, they are else where refuted. Nor let that trouble us, because in natural Phylosophy many times probable Reasons are invented. For these take not [Page 7]away from the necessity of the Sciences truth, but do often prepare and fence the way to following demonstrations, or are used to declare the principles.

We must therefore hold that Physica or Natural Phylosophy is a science and that properly so called, viz. A speculative science, as appears out of the sixth of Aristotles Metaphysicks Chap. 4. And out of the first of Metaphysicks Chap. 6. Although it be in a manner superfluous to ad the term speculative, seeing if we take the word Science properly, all Sciences are speculative: now words are not to be improperly used in Definitions.

Now as concerning the necessary truth of Physica or Natural Phylosophy, Natural Phylosophy has two sorts of propositi­ons. we must observe, that there are in this Science two sorts of Propositions; some are alwaies and simply necessary, as the fire burnes: the knowledg whereof is most properly called Science: others are necessary for the most part, concerning such things, as are in their subject, only in a certaine state, or for the most part, and when all impedi­ments are removed; as a Man is born in the ninth Month, with two hands, two Eyes, two Kidneys. For these dispositions are of a middle Nature betwixt contingent and necessary, and therefore some do call them necessary, by a Physical or natural Necessity.

Now before we speak of the subject of Physick or Natural Phylosophy, The subject thereof. some things are to be premised concerning the word subject. For this word has sundry significations. 1. A subject is that wherein there are accidents. 2. The terme subject how many waies used? A subject is that part of a proposition of which somwhat is affirmed. 3. The matter is termed a subject in respect of its forme. 4. A thing is said to be a subject in respect of some Action and Operation; and it is that about which the Artist or workman is employ­ed and whereupon he exercises his Labor. 5. That is termed a subject, which is handled in any Science. Now it is so called, because it is subjected to such accidents and affections as are demonstrated therein, as also because our knowledg is conver­sant thereabout. And in this last acceptation, we do here take the word subject: How un­derstood in the place? in which sence nevertheless, it is taken divers waies. For first in a more large signi­fication, all that is termed subject, whereof we treat in any Science, whether it be a principle, an affection and accident, or any other thing. But properly that thing or matter which is therein considered is called the subject of a Science, The pro­perties of the subject of a science which sub­ject has these Properties. First, That we know that it is in Nature alwaies and necessarily, and what the name thereof signifies. And therefore the subject is never demonstrated in its proper Science. For seeing it is the Basis and Foundation of all things delivered in the Science, if that shal be called into Question, denied, and taken away, all things that are said thereof, are denied and taken away. The Se­cond condition is, that it have proper affections or dispositions, and proper princi­ples, of all which it is the Basis and Foundation. And therefore a subject, in that Science wherein it is a subject, is not considered as inherent in any other thing; and every thing that is considered in any Science, as being inherent in some other thing, is not the subject of that Science. The third is, that it be adaequate or commensurate to the whole Science, and not wider or narrower then it, and that all things which are delivered in the Science, do pertain to the Explication thereof. Two parts thereof. Of a subject thus considered there are two parts: one is as it were the matter, and is termed the thing considered; the other is in stead of the form, and is termed the manner of consider­ing. The thing considered, may be common to many disciplines: but the manner of considering, which contracts the thing to a certain and peculiar way of considera­tion, is proper to every Science, and thereupon properly depends the distinction of Sciences.

Touching this Adaequate subject of Natural Phylosophy, The divers opinions of Phyloso­phers about the subject of Natural Phylosophy there is some difference amongst authors, most of the Greek Interpreters of Aristotle, do make the subject of this Science to be Corpus Naturale, a Natural Body; Thomas Aquinas saies it is Ens Mobile, a Moveable being; Albertus and Aegidius say it is Corpus Mobile, a move­able Body; Scotus wil have it to be, a Natural substance; Tolet makes it, a Natural Being; others say it is Nature, by nature understanding God and Angels and al Bodies, others again wil have it to be nature, meaning thereby al things pertaining to natural Bodies such as are not only the compound bodies themselves, but also their principles and affections or dispositions: others say it is Ens Mobile, a moveable being, not only, as Thomas Aquinas, understanding thereby, a moveable Body, but also the matter [Page 8]and forme: others will have it to be Corpus Naturale Mistum, a mixt natural Body: others, a Body subject to generation and corruption.

It is not worth the while to produce in this place, The true opinion. all the Arguments that are brought to justifie these several opinions. I approve only of the first opinion, which saies the subject of this Science, is a natural Body. To this opinion (as shall be said hereafter) I conceive the four following may be reduced; and most learned men con­ceive that the strife is more about words then the thing it self, and that herein lies the controversie, how the subject of this Science, the thing it self being agreed upon, should be called: whether a Natural Body, a moveable being, a Natural substance, a Natural being: and therefore these other opinions are to be reduced to the first, or are simply to be rejected, as the latter five.

The adaequate subject therefore of Natural Phylosophy is a natural Body, The adae­quate sub­ject of Physick Natural, how many waies un­derstood? in as much as it has in it Nature, that is to say a principle of motion and rest. For Natural is taken three waies. First, For that which is essential to any thing, and belongs to the very essence or being thereof: Secondly, For every thing which con­cernes the knowledg of Nature; in which sense, both the first matter and form and accidents of a Natural Body, are termed Natural: Thirdly, And properly it is taken for that which has Nature in it, that is to say, a certain internal principle of motion and rest; and so neither motion, nor matter is termed Natural, but only Bodies compounded of matter and forme. And seeing the Adaequate subject of a Science, as was said before, consists in the thing considered, and the manner of considering the same: the thing considered in this Science, is a body, and the manner of considering is, in as much as it has Nature in it, that is to say. A principle of motion and Rest. For although every Body has in it a principle of motion, and that which has in it a principle of motion is a body; yet in as much as a body may be considered, not only as it has in it a principle of motion, but in divers other respects: by this considera­tion, Natural Phylosophy is distinguished from other disciplines, which do also treat of a Body.

And that what has been said touching the subject of this Science, Confirma­tion of the Opinion propoint­ded. is true, may hence appear: in that all the porprieties of the subject of a Science do agree here­unto. For it is fore known what it is, and what the name thereof signifies, it has its proper principles matter and form; its proper affections as motion, place, time &c. nor is it in this Science, inhaerent in any other thing, and it is Adaequate or commen­surate to the whole Science. For all things delivered in Natural Phylosophy, are either the principles of a natural Body, or its affections, or its kinds and sorts. The same also is apparent from Aristotle. For as to the thing considered in this Science, that it is truly said to be a Body, appears from the Begining of his Second Book of Physicks, and his 3. de Caelo Chap. 1. and his first de Caelo: Where he tels us that the Science of Nature is conversant about Bodies, and that it considers their principles and affections.

And that the manner of considering is, in as much as the same Body has nature in it, is apparent from the begining of his Second Book of Physicks. For seeing all things are distinguished from other, by their form; and things natural differ from artificial and non-natural things, because they have the principle of their motion in themselves, but the other only by accident: doubtless, to have in it self a principle of motion, is in stead of the form, and the formal reason of the subject, whereby a Body, the thing considered in Natural Phylosophy, is differenced from all other things. The same is confirmed by Aristotle, in the Second Book of his Physicks, Chap. 7. Text 70. or 71. Where he saies: What ever things move being themselves moved, do belong to the consideration of Natural Phylosophy &c. For he teaches, that those things only are considered by a Natural Phylosopher, as his subject, which have in themselves a principle of motion. Howbeit, other things may also be con­sidered in natural Phylosophy, which have not in them a principle of motion, but it is as they are principles or Accidents to bodies Natural, but not as the proper sub­ject of the Science of Nature. Which is manifest from the 73. of the same Book, where he saies, that there are some principles Physically moving, but not Physical; that is to say not considered as the subject of Physica or natural Phylosophy, because they have not in themseles a principle of motion, The Dif­fering opi­nions Re­con [...]iled. And this is the true Opinion con­cerning the subject of this Science, to which, as was said, the following four [Page 9]Opinions must be reduced, or rejected. For seeing these Opinions contain two manner of considering the subject, the one, as it is moveable; the other, as it is Na­tural: both of them do signifie, indeed, nothing else, but Nature having in it a prin­ciple of motion. For since moveable, may be taken two waies, Movable understood two waies. as for that which hath an aptitude to motion, which is a certain affection of a natural thing; or for that which hath Nature in it, that is matter and forme, or the Principle from whence such aptitude arises: moveable cannot be taken here in the former sense, but only in the latter. Because the passion of a subject cannot be its Ratio Formalis, or formal Constitutive consideration; and with its subject it makes a thing which is acciden­tally one, and is later then its subject, of which it may also be demonstrated. Hence therefore would follow this Absurdity, that the subject, viz. A thing moveable, should in its proper Science, be demonstrated by its proper Cause, viz. Nature. And therefore, Moveable cannot be taken for a passion, but for the reason and essential degree of a Body, from which of it self motion arises. In sense it denotes nothing else, but natural, or that which hath Nature in it. Howbeit, if we shal accurately weigh the matter, the manner of considering is better and righter described by the term Natural, or that which hath Nature, then by the word Moveable. For seeing Natural includes both motion and rest, and Moveable only motion; the former is commensurate, the latter not. And therefore either we must take Moveable for Na­tural, and that which hath Nature, or we must reject it as less Proper and not com­mensurate. Since from all which hath been said it appears, that Natural, or in as much as it hath Nature in it, is the true manner of considering the subject of this Science, therefore by all means we must make the thing considered to be equal there­unto. But if we shal consider all things which are placed in the Predicament of sub­stance, we shall find nothing but Body equal thereunto. For what ever hath in it a principle of motion is a Body, And therefore it must needs be, that both Ends or Being, and substance, are taken for a Body, But a Body in as much as it hath Nature in it, is more properly said to be the subject of natural Philosophy, because to have Nature is accidental to Substance, and to Being, unless they be taken in a prickt sense for a Body. Nor is there such a proportion betwixt Substance, Being, and Natural, as ought of necessity to be, betwixt the thing considered and the manner of conside­ration. For A Being is not said to be Moveable, as it is a Being; for so every Being should be Moveable.

And if there be any that will not allow their opinion to be thus corrected, and wil endeavor to obtrude upon us, somwhat more common, or more narrow, for the sub­ject of natural Phylosophy, they are justly to be reproved. For those that wil have God himself, the Intelligences, and Angels, to be handled in Natural Phyloso­phy, as the subject thereof: truly they do absurdly and unskilfully confound things abstract and simple with bodily things and such as are overwhelmed in matter. For seeing these things are exceedingly different, how can any man assign to them one manner of consideration, which is the thing which makes a Science to be one?

Nor do those men think a right, who make Nature the subject of natural Phyloso­phy; understanding, thereby, both the principles, and affections, and Compounds. For they do not rightly use, neither the word Subject nor the word Nature. For a subject properly so called, whereof we discourse in this place, is not taken fo every thing that is handled in a Science, but for that whose conditions are such, as have been set down before, and which is distinguished from the Principles and Affections. Again, they do ill in confounding Nature and a thing Natural; which they might easily learn, out of, Aristotles second Book of Physicks Chap. 1. where the Phylosopher shews us, how Nature, Natural and according to Nature, differ one from another.

Also we approve not their opinion, who conceive that Ens Mobile a Moveable Be­ing is to be counted the subject of this Science; and by Mobile they understand al­so the matter and the form. For nothing is called moveable, but that which is the subject of motion: and nothing hath in it a principle of motion but a Body. For matter is not moved of it self, but by accident, viz. In as much as, it is a part of that Body which is moved. But if so be whatever hath any relation to motion, should be called movable al things explained in this Science, will be several sorts of its sub­ject, and therefore there will be no Principles, no Affections or adjuncts, different therefrom.

And as we have rejected their opinion, who make somwhat more common then a Natural Body, to be the subject of this Science; so can we not agree to them, who wil have the subject thereof, to be somwhat more narrow. For some make the thing considered to be, a Natural Body transitory, or subject to mutation: others, a Na­tural Body mixt. Yet they agree in the manner of consideration, which both make to be in as much as it is Movable. But they both are in an Error. As to the thing Considered; because the former reject the Heavens; the latter both the Heaven and Elements, from being sorts of the subject, and will allow them to be only Prin­ciples thereof. For things must be so handled and considered, as they are constitu­ted by Nature, Seeing therefore the Heaven and Elements are so produced by Na­ture, as not only that they should be the Principles of other things, but also, that as peculiar sorts of Bodies, they might compleat the Universe: they are to be known and handled both waies. As we see Aristotle hath also done; who explained them after the former manner in his Book of Generation and corruption; after the latter in his Books touching the Heavens: in which Books, whatever is said of the Heaven and Elements, is said without any respect to mixt Bodies. As to the manner of con­sidering, they are both out, in that they make it more large then the th [...]ng considered. For not only, things mixt and subject to mutation, but the Elements also are Mo­vable, or have in themselves a Principle of motion.

From all the Premises, The defini­tion of Na­tural Phy­losophy. let us at last infer; that, Physica or Natural Phylosophy, is the Science of Natural Bodies, or of such as have Nature in them. Whereof being now to treat, I shall chiefly follow that same Eagle-Ey'd Phylosopher Aristotle. For he did so excel in this part of Phylosophy, that though some do make him infe­rior to Plato in matters divine, (which Scaliger nevertheless denies again and again in the 365. of this Bxercitations, Sect. 3. Yet in this Science he will easily bear away the Bell. I will say nothing of the Platonists, I shal only relate what is reported of Plato. For he coming upon a time into his School, and Aristotle being not there, he cried out, The Phylosopher of Truth is absent. And another time when he was ab­sent, he said, The Mind is not come. And amongst the Peripateticks innumerable company of most Famous Men and every way most learned, Greeks, Ara­bians, and Latines have handed this Phylosophy to Posterity, and spent all their lives in explaining the same, and acknowledged it alone for the true Phyloso­phy, and have judged it worthy of so much honor, as never any other Phylosophers Physicks were thought worthy of, In the mean time, I would not detract from the diligence and Industry of others, nor would I cal any man from making a more dili­gent search into the secrets of Nature. Those who have gone before us (saith Seneca) have done much, but they have not done all. There is much work yet remaines, and much there will remain, and he that shall be born a thousand Ages hence wil not want occasion to add somwhat or other. But that Man will do it more easily, who, hath known these things aforehand: and it is easie to add to things invented.

And that I may propound a Summarie of al Natural Phylosophy, Natural Phylosophy divided into a com­mon and proper part. as in a table be­fore your Eyes; you must know, that Aristotles Interpreters have fitly divided all this Science into two parts; the former they call common, the latter Proper. In the first we are to treat of the kind it self, viz. A Body Natural commonly taken. And of all things appertaining to a Natural Body so generally considered; which Aristotle handles in his 8. Books of Natural Phylosophy cal'd Peri Physices Acroasews. In the other, we are to treat of all the sorts of Natural Bodies; which Aristotle does in all his other Books of Natural Phylosophy. A Natural body how many waies understood? Nor is this division without Reason. For, A Natural Body is taken three manner of waies. 1. Only for the common kind, in it self considered, without any consideration of the sorts. 2. For a Collection only of the sorts. 3. For both together. viz. Both for the common kind, and the Col­lection of al the species or sorts Nor are Natural Bodies only to be considered, accor­ding to the Proper affections, but also according to the common. Nor must the common affections, of the kind be attributed to the sorts, nor must such things as are proper to the sorts, be demonstrated of the kind. A Body Natural therefore taken in the first sense, is the subject of the common part; taken in the second sense, of the proper; and in the third, of the whol Science.

We must therefore in Natural Phylosophy, treat in the first place of a Body Na­tural in general, and consider its principles and common affections, which agree to al Natural Bodies, considered as such. And seeing a Natural Body is twofold, Simple [Page 11]and compound: we must first discourse of a simple natural Body, and its sorts, the Heaven and Elements, or of the world as it is a mass of al simples. After the ex­plication of simple bodies, must follow the Doctrine of a mixt body; and first in general, where its principles, viz. The four Elements and its general affections or adjuncts are to be explained. Here therefore we must treat of the Elements, and of their qualities, of Action, Mixture, Generation and corruption. Mixt bodies, see­ing they are twofold, perfectly and imperfectly mixed: in the first place we consider things imperfectly mixed; and then such as are perfectly mixed. And seeing things perfectly mixed are either similar or dissimilar: first we must treat of a body Homo­geneal, perfectly mixed; which is handled by Aristotle in the fourth of his Mereors. Afterwards the several sorts hereof are to be explained, as things dug out of the Ground, Mettals, and al the similary parts which constitute Animals and plants. Here therefore we must treat of things dug our of the Earth and of Mettals. For o­ther similar mixt things, because they exist not by themselves in nature, but are therefore only, that they may constitute Animals and Plants, we must not treat of them in any other place, save where we discourse of Plants and Living Creatures. And thus far may that part of Natural phylosophy be extended, which treats of those things which are common to things living, and things liveless. And the last place we must treat of such things as concern only things living: and so the whole doctrine of natural Phylosophy, shal end in the Explication of plants and Animals.

Chap. 3. Of the Principles of Natural things.

ALthough these two words Principle and Cause, are oftentimes confounded, Whether a Principle and Cause do differ and how? yet they are found somwhat to differ amongst Phylosophers. For a principle is commonly of a larger extent then a cause. For al that is termed a Principle out of or from which at first any thing is, or is made or known; but that a thing may be a cause it is necessary that it receive its Essence therefrom, and depend thereupon. And thus every cause indeed, is a principle, but every Principle is not a cause. For the term from whence any man sets upon the way, & the point whence a line flowes, are the Beginnings of a way and a Line, but not the cause. But passing over the sundry significations of a principle, let us now treat thereof, as it concurs to the constituti­on and generation of things Natural. In which sense, Principles are by Aristotle thus defined: Principles are such things, as are neither made of other things, nor one of an­other, but all things are made of them. And so there are three conditions of Physical Principles. First, that they be not made of other things. For if they were made of others, they should receive their Essence, from the principles of another Nature, and so themselves should not be principles. The Second, That they be not one made of another. For if one of them did constitute another and were a part of the same Essence, they should neither be First nor Simple. The Third, that all Natural things be made of them and receive their Essence from them.

Now as concerning the number of Principles there were sundry not only Opinions but Dreams also of the Ancients, The num­ber of principles is three. which because they are largly confuted by Ari­stotle in the first of his Physicks, and the most of them are now vanished: Yea and some of them are not sufficiently understood: I shal here pass over all those Opinions, and only undertake to explain that of Aristotle, as most agreeable to truth, who asserted only three principles of Natural things, viz. Matter, Forme, and Privation.

Yet this one thing I must premise, That while I establish these three principles, I do not exclude that only first Principle of all things, God, eternal, immortal, only one and indivisible, from whom and in whom are all things, but my enquiry is only after the first Natural principles of all things. For neither does Aristotle deny that all things have their dependance upon the most good and great God; as appears in the first Book of his Metaphysicks, Chap. 2. Where thus he writes: For God seems to be the Cause and principle as it were of all things. And in the fifth Probleme of the thirtieth Section. God hath given us two Organs within us, wherewith we make use of the Organs that are without: viz. To our Body the Hand, to our Soul, the Mind.

Now being to search out the number of Natural principles; we will take out [Page 12]beginning from hence, that the principles of things are contrary one unto another: which both all the ancients do seem to grant, and the thing it self argues as much. For those are called principles, which are neither made one of another, nor of any other thing, but all things are made of them. Now such things are prime contraries. For seeing they are first, they are not made of any other: and because they are contraries they are not made one of another, for one contrary cannot change into the substance of another thing which is contrary to it. Moreover experience it self does withess; that of all things that are, every thing does not act upon every thing, nor suffer from every thing, nor is every thing made of every thing, unless accidentally; but every thing acts upon its contrary, and suffers from its contrary, is made of its contrary, and dissolved into its contrary; or as Galen speaks in his first Book of Temperaments, Chap. 2. Every mutation is made by a contrary, and of a contrary, and into a con­trary.

Seeing therefore the Principles of things are contrary, they must needs be more than one: for contraries are not one, nor can one thing be contrary to it self. 1 Phys. Chap. 6. Text, 50. Nor yet can they be infinite. For so should there be no knowledg of Natural things, which depends upon the knowledg of them Principles, and Nature it self abhors infinity. Moreover, since in every kind, there is one first contrariety; and of one contrariety, two extreams: consequently in a substance there are not infinite contrarieties, but those two first and extream are to be held for principles.

Wherefore two first contrary Principles are sufficient: one from which the depar­ture is made, and which is the term from which the other, to which the Progress is made, or the term to which. Howbeit these contraries are not alone sufficient for the constitution of a thing. For as a contrary doth not make its contrary; so they alone of themselves cannot constitute a substance. For that contrary which is indu­ced, cannot be received into that which is expelled; seeing contraries do mutually resist one another; and at the end of the motion, that contrary which is expelled, ceases to be. A third principle therefore of things must be added, which is contra­ry to neither of the other two, and which one while with one, may constitute one natural thing, another while with the other may constitute another, and which may be the subject of those contraries, by turnes. For seeing in every mutation a subject is required (for an accident cannot be without a subject) as Aristotle in the first of his Physicks Chap. 7. Proves by Induction; and which in the mutation of accidents, is most of all apparent, wherein we see there is a common subject of the accidental form abolished, and of that which is bred a new: and it is manifest that there is no progress from contrary to contrary, without some subject matter: the same is to be concluded touching that substantial mutation, which happens in a natural body.

And these three principles do suffice. For both one subject is enough to suffer: and two contraies to act. For one contrary can corrupt its contrary. The princi­ples therefore are Partly contrary, which are called Form and Privation: and part­ly not contrary. For the subject which we call Matter, is apt to receive al forms. And they are all three necessary to Generation, which is nothing but a progress from the privation of one form in the matter, to the acquisition of a new form: yet every one after a peculiar manner, viz. The form as the terminus ad quem, the terme to which the motion is made; Privation, as the terme from which: the Matter, as the subject of the Mutation. Howbeit to the Constitution of a thing, two principles are only necessary viz. Matter and Form. For privation, besides that it is no substance seeing it is contrary to the form, it cannot consist therewith. Hence Simplicius up­on the first of Arisiotles Physicks, saies, To enquire after the Principles of natural things, is one thing, to enquire into the principles of mutation, is another; for of things na­tural Privation is an accidental Cause; but of Mutation it is a direct cause, or a cause by it self.

These things being thus generally spoken touching the principles of natural things, Whether there be a Materia prima, or first mat­ter. let us proceed to handle them in particular. And as to the first Matter, although that there is such a thing in Nature, was before proved: yet let us prove it again, after this manner. Whatsoever is made, is either made simply of nothing, or of somthing. Not of nothing, for that is creation and not Generation; and therefore of somthing, now that of which a thing is generated, is either only form, or the whol [Page 13]compound, or somwhat besides these. Not the two former. For in the Generati­on of a new thing the former form perishes. There is therefore somwhat else remai­ning besides the form in that thing, out of which a new substance is generated, viz the matter, which hath a privation of the thing to be generated, and which is apt to re­ceive as well that form which it now actually possesses, as that which, the former being abolished is introduced into its place. Now that this is the first subject and de­pends upon no other, is thus proved. Whatever things are changed, have a com­mon subject. Al these sublunary things are changed one into another; if not al im­mediatly, yet mediately. For things mutually sight one against another, with contrary qualities, alter one another, and throw one another from their natural state and condition. Therefore they have al a common subject. For if it were of some other thing, it would not be subject to all mutations: and if it were not common, al things could not be changed.

But what is the Essence of Matter is exceeding hard to find out, The Do­ctrine of the first matter is obscure & exceeding hard to be known. and can hardly be discerned by a direct knowledg. For as essential mutation, by which it is de­monstrated, that there is matter, was known by way of analogy from accidental mutation; even so by analogy, and a certaine bastard kind of knowledg and inspecti­on (as Plato saies) we come to the knowledg of matter. For from the knowledg of sensible matter, we are led to the knowledg of insensible: and so is matter related to form Natural, as Brass or Wood to the Form or Figure of Mercury. For even as Brass or wood, does in it self actually possess no artificial form; yet is it furnished with a power to receive al forms: even so the first matter, hath in it self, no determi­nate specifick natural forme; yet is it apt to receive all formes, howbeit herein they differ, in that the artificial matter is a body of it self existing and perfect: but the Natural matter doth not exist by it self without the form.

Now matter is considered Two maner of waies, one absolutely, Matter is considered two man­ner of waies. as it is a beeing or a certain substance: the other, repectively, as it is a principle of natural things. In the first manner of consideration, we say it is void of all formes and Qualities, Dimensions and Quantities, and we allow it a power of receiving indifferently all formes; in which respect Aristotle in the sixth of his Metaphysicks, Chap. 3. Text. 8. Describes it by the negation of all things. In the second notion we attribute unto it a power of receiving particular forms, and privation; in which signification Aristotle in the first of his Physicks Chap. 9. Text. 82. Defines it, The difini­tion of matter. that it is The first subject of every thing, of which every thing is made, being not accidently inherent, and into which it returnes when it is corrupted.

And although in its first notion, it can very hardly be known, The first matter is no notion of the brain. because of its weak and obscure Entitie, by which it comes near to a Non-beeing, and is the lowest of al beeings: yet must we not think that it is a meer fiction of our Brains. For it is undoubtedly a real being, and indeed a substance, as appears in the l. Of Aristotles Physicks Chap. 6. Text. 52. Chap. 9. Text, 79. In the Second de Anima. Chap. 1. Text. 7. In the Seventh of Metaphysicks, Chap. 2. Text 7. For of it, and form al natu­ral substances are compounded; and it is the subject of Generation, and receives the formes; and it self is in no other thing or subject. Now by substance, we do not here understand a compound substance, which is properly called substance, but a being as it is distingusht from an accident, and opposed thereunto: which is two­sold: One in act, as the forme: the Other in power, as is the matter. Nor is it an incorporeal but a corporeal substance. For seeing of it and Form al compound bo­dies do consist if both were incorporeal, there would then arise from incorporeals a corporeal compound which is absurd. Moreover seeing a body of the predicament of quantity doth alwaies presuppose a body of the predicament of substance; nor can a body of the predicament of quantity exist without a body of the predicament of substance, nor this without that: and that a body of the Predicament of substance, as shal be said, doth immediately inhere in the first matter, and altogether depend thereupon: it must therefore needs be a body pertaining to the predicament of sub­stance. And the first matter hath this its essence of it self, and as Scaliger saies in his 5. Exercitation, the matter by that essence which is proper to it self, is that which it is; and in his 17. Exercitation. The matter hath its quiddity or Somwhatness, whereby it is somwhat, and differs from other things. The first matter hath no existency of is it self.

And although the matter hath an essence and entity proper to it self, whereby it is somwhat different from the form: yet hath it of and by it self no existency, which [Page 14]is proper only to a compound, which hath it from the forme: which seeing the mat­ter hath not (which its indetermination that I may so speak witneses) it cannot be said of it self to have actual existence, which is an effect of the forme, but only by the forme, which determines it, perfects it, and makes [...]t to be this or that. The matter therefore is altogether a meer possibility, that is to say, a certain imperfect indeterminate substance, and a rudiment of all sorts of natural things, and which receives al its perfection and all its qualities from the form.

Yet this is thus to be understood, not that the matter is only a possibility to its own being, which it hath of it self by its own Essence; but to this or that sort of Being, as Scaliger saies in his 17. Exercitation. Nor is it said to be Apoios because it hath no quality, but because every forme and quality which is therein, is without and besides its Essence. For, as Scaliger saies, in his 61 Exercitation. The first matter, is one Individuum or particular being, like a lump of wax, one part whereof bears the form of a Candle, another the forme of an Image; another of a Ball, another of a Die: and the said mass may have as wel this form as that and challenges none as properly belonging to it self, yet must it of necessity have alwaies some forme or other. Nor was the matter created by God as a certain distinct sort of a natural thing, but it is rather concreate or created together with natural things, and as was said it is as it were a rudiment, Beginning and part of al natural things, nor did it ever exist without any form but only with and under the same.

Quantity doth properly follow the Nature of Matter, The first matter is unlimited. and is as old as it, nor can be separated there from, in deed or in thought. But it is only unterminated quantity I speak of, For terminated quantity doth neither follow the forme alone nor the matter alone, but both of them. For quantity of it self flows from Matter (for, by means thereof al things are termed so great or so great; and it also is the subject of all mutations. Now every thing which is changed, is divisible. Phys. 6. Chap. 3.36.) But not from the forme; for it of it self hath no muchity, is not divisible, only it is extended, and is said to be so great or so great according to the extension and quantity of the Matter. But certaine bounds both external as the Figure, and internal as certaine sorts of Quantity, do proceed from the Forme. For as it streigh­tens the Nature of the matter, and limits it to some peculiar and determinate sort of natural thing: so it limits the Quantity thereof, and imprints thereon, this or that sort and Figure of Quantity. And when we say the Matter, is unbounded, let not any one so understand us, as that the matter either is or hath ever been without cer­tain limits. Nor is it said in respect of the forme to be introduced, in which respect the seed of an Oxe, if you regard the bounds it shal receive from the form of an Oxe may be called a certain unlimited thing; but in respect of all limits, which either it hath or may have from any form whatsoever. For as the matter considered in it self, is altogether without form; yet receives all forms, nor is ever without form: even so Quantity and Dimension of matter which follows the essence thereof, hath of and by it, self no certain and determinate bound and Figure; yet is it fit to receive all, nor is it ever found without some Figure and determinate dimension. And thus unbounded and potential dimensions, are in a substance corporeal, unlimited and potential, such as is the Matter: but actual and determined, in a determined and perfect Body.

Out of the same Nature of the Matter, Theere is a two sold potentiali­ty of the matter. flowes Possibility, or Potentiality, which is an apitude or fitness to receive all Forms, and it is two fold, Ʋnivesal and Particular. Ʋniversal is the Aptitude and propensity of the matter to receive all forms without distinction, and equally respects the two opposite principles, form and Privation, that is to say all forms a like. 2 Universal For matter, to speak properly, hath no appetite to Privation, as Privation, but as another form, and privation is not desired but ano­ther form annexed thereto. And this is termed the first and indeterminate Petentia­lity, and the Appetite of the matter, which is nothing else, but the inclination of the said matter to receive any forme. For it is not rightly said, that the matter while it is furnished with this form, does covet another; nor do the changes which happen, by reason of the matter, but by reason of contrary forms, nor is there in the matter any appetite of change, but only of perfection. And every part is perfected under every form, and all the matter by all the forms; As Scaliger hath it in his 61. Exercitation.

Now this universal Possibility, or Potentiality is not the very essence of the first matter taken in the first sense; but only a certaine accident and Natural Propriety, following the Essence thereof. Now no accident is essential to a substance. And though the matter be somtimes termed a Possibility: yet by this word is not un­derstood a Quality, but its substance, which is imperfect, and as it were incom­pleat, having only a weak kind of Being: or it may be termed a potentiality, mea­ning a substance in Posse, and after this manner of speaking, Potentiality or Possi­bility is used in stead of a difference, to declare its obscure Essence, and which cannot be easily understood. And although also the matter in its first Notion is termed Apoios without Quality: yet may we allow some quality therein; but it must be such as makes no Restriction or Determination of the matter, and does not restrain it to a certain and specifick Nature, such as is an universal Potentiality. For seeing the matter is therefore said to be free from all Qualities and Forms, that it may receive all: and this universal Potentia or Aptitude, does not only not h [...]n­der but further the Reception of all Forms and Qualities; it is not to be taken from the matter. And this aptitude is as old as the matter and inseparable there­from. For seeing the matter by reason of its universal potentiality, hath an apti­tude to receive al forms; and every day by Reason of contrary Agents, some forms do perish: therefore this Appetite thereof can never be satisfied, and one form going away, it desires to be perfected by another. But this self same universal po­wer or potentiality, is as it were of the Essence of matter, according to the second acceptation. For in as much as the matter is a passive principle; this Potentiality, is as it were its form and constitutes the same. For therefore matter is termed a material principle, because it hath an aptitude to suffer, 2 Particular But a Particular Potenti­ality, is that whereby the matter respects one determinate form: and this does not follow the Essence of the Matter, but is communicated thereto by the Agent, or the form and Qualities, which fit and determine the same, to receive this or that form. So the first matter, being furnished with the form of a Dog's Seed, hath no other Particular Aptitude save that of receiving the form of a Dog. This Aptitude is ac­cidental to the matter, whether taken in the first or second sense, and separable therefrom. For when the Act comes, it perishes; and therefore neither does con­stitute its Essence, nor yet follow the same as an essential Accident. For the Mat­ter, both as it is a being, and as it is a principle of things subsists without it. For before it received, for examples sake, this Particular Form of a Lyon, the Matter was actually in being, and when it shall have laid it down, it will remain in actual being. Seeing therefore this Determinate and Particular power or Potentiality, is not one alone, but many according to the variety of Forms, and the matter may exist without any one of them: none of them constitutes its Essence, or properly follows the same: moreover nothing Definite or Determinate does constitute its Essence; or can depend thereon. Possibility indeed or potentiality as such does immediately depend upon the Essence of the Matter, and is an essential accident or adjunct thereof: but in as much as it is definite, and respects this peculiar Form, it is not from the Matter, but from the the Agent and present Form, which is a priva­tion of the Form to be introduced. And therefore it is not as old as the matter, but is separate therefrom (as hath been said) when the Act comes, it is separated. This Particular power or possibility, is only opposed to the Act, as Privation is to the Habit: the universal is not opposed thereunto. For that does not respect any pe­culiar Form: but an infinite multitude of them.

And this is the Doctrine of the Peripateticks concerning the first matter: yet not different from the Tenets of the Platonists, as we may see in Alcinous in his Book de Dectrina Platonis Chap. 8. in these words. He (viz. Plato) cals the Matter, the Re­ceptacle, Nurse, Mother, Place, and Subject of all things; and he saies that it is felt without sense, and comprehended by a bastard kind of reasoning. He wil have it to be the property of matter, to receive al Generations, and like a Nurse to cherish them also to receive all formes, seeing it self of its own nature is void of all Quality. Form and Fi­gure. Also he saies that it is sprinkled and figured with shapes, like a Picture, having of it self no Figure or Quality. Nor were it a subject fitly prepared for sundry impressions of forms, unless it were quite void of all those Qualities, which it is to receive. For we see those that would make sweet ointments of Oyl do seek for Oyl infected with no smel at all: and those who would print forms upon Wax, or Clay, de first work & smooth & polish the [Page 16]matter, til the old figures are quite blotted out. For it is fit that the universal matter, if it be to receive all forms, should not have in it self the nature of any of them, but that without all Quality and Figure, it must be the subject of [...] sorts of things. And being such as is said, it is neither a Body, nor yet incorporeal, but potentially a Body, even as Brass is potentially a Statue, because receiving the figure it may become a Sta­tue.

The other Principle of Generation is Privation. Privation and Nega­tion how they differ. That we may understand what that is, we must see how it differs from negation. For Negation is of larger extent than Privation, and is attributed to matter taken in the first sense, and denotes an universal Absence of all forms and Qualities in the matter. But such is not privati­on: (for one Privation is not opposed to all forms, but to every one a proper) but it agrees to matter taken in the second sense, and alwaies presupposes other Qualities, and is necessarily conjoyned with some form, which goes next be­fore the Form to be introduced. For the Privation of the form of Wheat, is not an universal negation of all formes in the first Matter, nor yet every other absence thereof, as for example sake, that which is in Iron: for Wheat is not generated of Iron: but that which acompanies some definite and determinate form, viz. that of the grain of Wheat. Hence Themistius upon Aristotles Postertora, writes thus; Privation is a Negation in a determined subject, and Alexander de Ales upon the Me­taphisicks; Privation essentially requires the Negation of a form with an aptitude to receive the same. And the very same Scaliger affirms in his 18. Exercitation. Privation (saies he) seems to have the Nature of a certain Being. For it is the same after a sort with that Habit, which is contrary to the Habit, whereof it is a privation. And therefore as Zabarella saies; Privation is in its own nature, the ab­sence of a form, and it is nothing, and is opposed to a form only Privatively, but in­asmuch as another form alwaies accompanies the same, in which respect the pri­vation of that thing is properly said to be some positive thing having contra­riety thereunto. What Pri­vation is? We gather therefore from the Premises; that Privation is the Absence of a form in that Matter which is immediately disposed to receive the same. Now Prvation is not of the Essence of Matter, but an accident thereof being taken in the seond sense, It is not of the Essence of Matter. being necessary, not simply, but in respect of Generation. For it concurs with other Principles to the Generation of a thing; and it is in Generati­on as it were the term from which the motion is made. For that which is generated, was not before; yet it was possible, and in generation not being goes before Being: and therefore it is called a third Principle essentially distinct from matter: and matter concurs one way to Generation: Privation another.

The third Principle of natural things we make to be the Form, which because it is the most excellent of all, The Form it requires more diligent consideration. That there is somwhat in things besides the Matter, called Form, all in a manner do grant: but what that is, whether a Substance or an Accident, all are not agreed. For there were both Phylosophers of old, and some there are at this day, who conceive there is no substantial form in the matter. Yet verily, that is the truer opinion which saies that there is in every natural thing, besides the matter, some substantial form, which is naturally before all the accidents or adjuncts, both common and proper. For the Parts of a Substance, are themselves also substances. And if things did consist only of matter, the Essence and operation of all things, would be one and the same, and there would be no true distinction betwixt them. For from ac­cidents a true diversity and distinction of Essence and Operations cannot be drawn. For the Act and essential perfection of a thing, whence its difference is taken, does belong to the same kind, wherein the thing is placed: or as Toletus saies, No imper­fect thing in any kind is pefected in that kind, save by somwhat of that kind. Since therfore Matter is an imperfect Substance, and is perfected in the compound; it must be perfected by another Substance, viz. The Form. Moreover, the diversity of Accidents and Operations, whence proceeds it? Why is the fire not cold, but hot? not by reason of the matter: for that operates nothing, makes no distinction, but is void of al Quality. Therefore we must presuppose somthing more noble than an accident. The form is of its self an in­corporeal Substance Finally, if the Form were an Accident, there would be no Generation of any thing, but only an alteration.

The Form therefore is a Substance of it self; and indeed incorporeal; of it self void of all Quantity, Demension and Division. But it participates of Quantity by [Page 17]Accident, viz. inasmuch as it is inherent in the Matter, according to the extension and division whereof, it is extended and becomes divisible. For as the matter is not, so neither is the form perfect of it self, nor constitutes any sort of natural things; but it concurs together with the matter, to make up the compound. And therefore neither the matter nor the form, hath of it self all things requisite to make the compound; but each wants the others help, and they mutually assist one another. The form wants the matter to sustain it; and therefore some call the Matter Prin­cipuum Subjectivum formae, the Principle of the form, or that Principle wherein the form resides; upon which the form depend in its making and conservation. But the matter is perfected by the form and from it receives its actual being and perfe­ction, and therefore some call the form, the formal Principle of the matter; not because it gives it its Essence, but because it perfects the same. The whol nature ther­fore of the Form consists herein, that by a real conjunction with the matter, it may give it that perfection which is proper thereunto, and so with it constitute the com­pound. And therefore it is by Aristotle in the second of his Physicks Chap. 3. Text 8. defined to be, That which makes a thing to be what it is, and in his 6. Book of Me­taphysicks Chap. 8. I cal the form that which makes a thing to be what it is, and the first Essence of a thing; and in the 6. of his Metaphy licks Chap. 11. For the form is the inward substance of a thing, from which a so the whol matter is called a Sub­stance. For the form is a simple substantial Act, with the matter making one entire compound. For this is the end of Generation; by it the matter is perfected; it is coveted by the matter; herein the matter finds it self contented; from it al acci­dents and actions flow.

But, Concerning the original of Formes, The Ori­ginal of Forms. there is a very great controversie amongst Phylosophers, which hath exercised the Brains of the most able amongst them; [...]or seems it as yet sufficiently determined whence the forms have their Original. For though Aristotle and his Expositors do say, That neither the matter is genera­ted, nor the form, but the compound yet their Intent is not, that both the matter and the form are generated at one and the same time (for the matter is not genera­ted, nor can be) or that some third thing different from these is produced; but this they would signifie: that the form is not produced by it self apart from the matter and without it, and afterward joyned thereto; but that it is produced in the matter and joyned therewith. For the compound is nothing but the matter and form joyned. Therefore we must grant that in some sort the form is made, inas­much as it is the Burt and End of Generation.

This being granted we must see Whence the forms have their original. Whence the forms pro­ceed? If you shal ask a Peripatetick or follower of Aristotle (setting aside at this time the Opinions of Anaxagoras Plato, and Avicenna) He wil tel you they are drawn out of the Aptitude or Potentiallity of the matter. I hear indeed (to use the words of Scali­ger in his 61. exercitution) the found of words; but I desire somthing to satisfie my mind: but I hear nothing. For though this expression be worn thredbare by many yet few do sufficiently explain what we are to understand thereby. But this seems to be the opinion of those who do think most rightly: What it is for forms to be drawn out of the po­wer of the matter. for forms (excepting the hu­mane Soul) to be drawn out of the power of the matter, is nothing else, but for them to be so made in a subject having a natural aptitude unto them, and existing before them both in time and nature, as that both in respect of their conservation and o­peration, they do so depend thereupon, that out of it they neither can be made, nor preserved, nor operate. For the form which is educed, is not at first produced apart from the matter, and out of it, and afterwards externally adjoyned to the matter, but it is produced in the matter. And so two things are required to the eduction of forms: First, That the Subject have a natural aptitude to the form: Secondly, That the form which is drawn forth, depend upon the matter both in their making and conservation; that is to say, that without the help of the subject, and out of it, it can neither be produced, nor preserved, nor operate. And consequently al natural forms, except the humane, do so depend upon the matter, that out of it, and with­out the assistance thereof, they cannot be.

But if any man, not content with what hath been said, shal further urge, and say, Whether the Form be made of nothing in the matter. that he acknowledges what hath been said to be true, viz. that for a form to be drawn out of the aptitude of the matter, is nothing else, but for a form to be made in the matter, and not out of the same: but shal yet enquire; whether in the matter, [Page 18]Form is made absolutely of nothing. Which Picolomineus seems to conceive in his 1. Book of Creation Chap. 7. So that the Agent affords nothing of its own Essence thereunto, but action only; or so as that the Agent does not communicate the Forme it self, but brings the Aptitude of the matter to such a Form into Act, cau­sing the Potentiality of the matter to break out into a formal Act. But whether a new Form comes out of the Essence of the old Form, is an hard question to answer.

For seeing naturally, The Ori­ginal of the forms from whence it is? nothing is made of nothing, and a Form is now in the mat­ter which was not there before, the Question wil be, whence is its Original? How the Interpreters of Aristotle do torment themselves, about this point is every where to be seen, and among the rest out of Teletus in his Comments upon the 1. of Phisicks Chap. 9. quest. 19. and upon the first de Generat. and Corrup. Chap. 3. Quest. 2. where he reckons sundry opinions of the Peripetaticks in this point. For in the first place, some mentioned by Du-Rand in his 2. B. upon the Sentences D. 18. did hold, that there did precede in the matter certain Entities, out of which afterward the Forms were made, viz. several forms out of the several Entities, and these Entities or Be­ings, they called Possibilities of Forms. Secondly, Others think, that the parts of the forms precede in the matter, but very remiss, and that afterward they are in Ge­neration vigorated and that so every form is precedent in the matter, in a weak man­ner of Being. Thirdly, Albertus Magnus held, that al forms did essentially precede in the matter, so the that Matter is a kind of habit prepossessing al forms essentially.

But Toletus acknowledges the Absurdity of these opinions, and therefore he de­termines, that there was nothing of the form in the matter, which did precede the introduction thereof; and this he proves by firm reasons which you may see in the forecited place.

Others that they may avoid these absurdities, do attribute this power to the Ef­ficient, and some with Plato make the Ideas to be the efficient Causes of the Forms: and others since have brought in the Soul of the world to that intent: Avicenna hath invented a tenth Intelligence, whom in his own language he cal's Cholchodea, & gives him this office of making forms. Fernelius with some others makes the Heaven to be the efficient cause of forms. But if that were so, Generation would not be univocal, and the form not having been in the matter, must be held to be created. Howbeit that does not please other peripetaticks. Wherefore Piccolimineus in his 2. B. of the Principles of Natural things, although he grant, that the form is in part made out of nothing, because nothing of it was before in the matter; yet he denies that it is created, because it presupposes a Subject, out of which it is educed. But Tolet. in his 1. de Gener. & Cor. sees that this answer, which was also Marsilius Ficinus his answer, wil not hold, and therefore he writes: This Doctrine does not please me. For verily if the production be of the form it self, seeing no part thereof was precedent in the matter, it must be called a Creation. And the truth is, whether the form be produced in the matter or out of it, if there were nothing thereof prece­dent, it must be a Creation; which himself acknowledges ought not to be attribu­ted to natural agents.

He therefore, to free himself from this difficulty, determines: that what is first generated and corrupted is the compound; and that the form is not produced by it self, but comproduced and made together with the production of the compound, and that the Action is first terminated upon the compound it self and consequently and as it were by accident upon the form.

But in very deed, whether the Form be made in the first or second place, or con­sequently, whether alone or with the compound, the Question remains just as it was; viz. Whence the form, which now is in the matter and before was not hath its Essence; whether it did praeexist in the matter, or was made by conversion of matter into form, or of nothing. For it does not follow that if the singer be made with the hand it is therfore made of nothing. Yea the compound should rather be said to be made consequently and in the second place, than the form. For as whiles Wood, Bricks, Morter and other things are made and compounded, an House is consequen­ly made: even so a natural compound, which is nothing else but matter and form, is made, when the Matter and Form is made. And seeing the matter is not made, what else shal shal we say is made except the Form. And therefore when he obser­ved, that he neither satisfied himself nor others; and saw that no part of the form [Page 19]did preexist in the matter, nor could a power of creating be attributed to Natural Agents; at length in his 1. de Gener. and Cor. Chap. 3. Quest. 2. He concludes: I confess this is an admirable power and Virtue, which partakes somwhat of a crea­ting power: but it is no such creating power: seeing it hath alwaies subjects to work upon. Also the Virtue of the matter is wonderful, out of the Aptitude whereof things are produced, which actually are not there. But in very truth, that virtue is not wonderful, because there is none such, but their wilfulness is wonderful, who will have that to be drawn out of the matter, which is impossible, as not being in the power either of the matter or of the Agent. For many men had rather rest upon certain principles, which cannot satisfie minds covetous of the truth, then make profession of that which is the manifest and solid truth. Which they perhaps therefore do that they may be thought good Phylosophers: whereas, doubt less, Aristotle if he had known the first and true Original of Forms, and the Creation of the world, as we do, he would have left us, a Natural Phylosophy better and more complext then he hath done.

Let us therefore to whom these things are made known out of the holy Scriptures, omitting those opinions, which endeavour to bring the Forms out of the matter, or from Heaven, or from elsewhere, determine that the Forms themselves, as also the matter, were at the beginning of the world created with the things themselves, that of them all Natural things might consist: And that the first matter cannot in­deed be generated but that by means of the Forms, all changes of generation do happen, and that the Forms are the second principle of Natural things, by which they are that which they are, and do that which they are commanded to do; that according to the Forms al Naturul thin [...]s do not only act, according to their Na­ture, that is to say, as the creator hath commanded them to act but thereby they are governed, preserved and propagated. For God commanded, that natural things should not only exist by their Forms, but propagate themselves thereby, and as he commanded it, so he gave every of them a power to do so as he comman­ded, and forthwith to encrease and multiply which command of God (that no man may bring the Forms out of Heaven) appears to have been given out before the Heaven was created. Genesis, 1. verse, 11 and 12. And God said let the Earth bring forth Grass, the Herb yeilding Seed and the Fruit tree yeilding Fruit after his kind whose Seed is in it self upon the Earth: and it was so. For the Earth brought forth Grass, and the Herb yeilding Seed after his kind and the Tree yeilding Fruit, whose Seed was in it self, after his kind: and God saw that it was good. All Natural things do therefore obey the command of the Creator, and al Forms, as in the first creation by a power put into them, do beget by promotion and propagation of themselves; they remaining nevertheless in the mean while entire; which also we see in Plants and Animals, which generate by Seed. For they when they afford Seed do afford somwhat of their matter and somwhat of their form. For the Seed of a plant while it is in the plant, is animated with the Soul of the plant. But when it is separated therefrom, that portion of the Form, which is Inherent in the Seed, and together with the matter, of the Seed Is separate from the Plant, grows into a plant like to that from whence it came. And the same holds in Animals. And therefore the Form is Potentially in the Seed; because as Scaligar saies in his 6. Exercitation, Sect. 5. The Seed is able to give the Form: it is therefore drawn out of a remote possibility, which is the first act, to a near possibility, which is the Second Act. So that the Form is in the same matter, after the same manner as, to need no helps, but to enjoy its End and to which the whol compound is ordained: which is then brought to pass, when the Form does constitute its own matter, and Alter, Labor and dispose it as if it were its House. And therefore when a living Creature is made of the Seed, the Form is not then first induced thereinto, but exists therein already being communicated by the Ingenderer, and it does only by assistance of the wombs Heat display it self; which is rather a certain arising or springing out, then a drawing out. To be short: This is common to all Forms (though to some in a more noble, others in a more inferior degree) that they can multiply themselves, are incorporeal, have of themselves no dimension or Quantity, nor do of their own Nature take up, but do fil. And if we suppose the Body of any Animal or Plant to grow never so big, yet the same Form without any Addition will fil it all: and though it be never so much lessened, the Form is no waies lesse­ned [Page 20]or impaired. But let us conclude this discourse with the words of Scaliger in his 307 Exercitation, Sect. 29. The matter is a possibility, apt to be perfected: the Form is an Act, fit to perfect. And thus we see the shallowness of mans understanding, who is so bold as to say be knows the Forms of substances. But this exquisite knowledg is hid from our Eyes: viz. How of two things, one is made. How the Form is totally in the whol and in every part of the compound. So divine a thing is the Form, that being a substance, it fils another substance so ful of it self, that of both one is made. Wherefore to search further, is the part of an overcurious and busie mind. For it is a part of Mans Wisdom, to be willingly ignorant of somethings. Yet we must not reject as falf, such things as are hard to be known. For (as Plato saies in his Dialogue called Theaetetus) they are profane who think there is nothing, but what they can feel and handle.

Chap. 4. Of Nature and the Causes.

THere are sundry Significations of the word Nature, Divers significati­ons of the Term Na­ture. which you may see in Ari­stotle, in the 5. of his Metaphysicks, Chap. 4. And in Pererius, in the 7. of his Physick, Chap. 1. In Piccolomineus, in the 2. of his Physicks, p. 249. In Fonseca, in the 5. of his Metaphysicks, Chap. 4. I shal cite only some which are most suitable to our present matter in hand. And in the first place, some cal God himself by the name of Nature. Again, others take Nature for the second Causes; in which sense Scaliger, in his 188. Exercit. and 359. Sect. 11. seems to define it to be the ordinary power of God. Thirdly, Nature signifies the whol Universe of things. Fourthly, Nature is taken for the Essence of every thing; in which sense we say that things separate from matter, as God and Angels have a Nature, that is to say an Essence. Fiftly, Natural is opposed to voluntary, so that a thing which acts without deli­beration is called Natural; and that which acts with Deliberation, Voluntary. And yet more strictly, Natural is opposed to Animate, and Nature is taken for a Faculty opposite to the knowing Faculty. For seeing the knowing Faculty respects both parts of the opposition, and is apt to do as wel this as that contrary: Nature, contrariwise, is said to be that which respects but one contrary and is only determined thereunto. Finally, in a certain middle way, betwixt these last significations, Nature is said to be the internal principle of motion; and every thing is said to be Natural which is mutable and variable. And in this place we treat of it, in this last signification: and that we may the better find out what it is, let us see how Natural things differ from things Artificial.

All things in the whol Universe are of two kinds: some are from Nature, as the Elements, Things Natural and Arti­ficial how they differ Living-Creatures and their Parts, Plants, &c. And some again are from other Causes, as Art, Counsel, Fortune, Chance. And although things Natural differ from Artificial many waies, as may be seen in Pererius, Lib. 7. Phys. Chap. 2. Yet this difference shal serve our tutn: that Natural things have an inward Princi­ple of their motion and rest: But Artificial things, as such, and of themselves, have no such principle. For whereas a Statue or Image tends downwards, it does it not as a Statue: But as consisting of Stone or Wood. Since therefore Natural things are hereby differenced from Artificial, The defi­nition of Nature. Nature is not unfitly defined to be the Prin­ciple of Motion and rest in that thing wherein it is primarily, of it self, and not by acci­dent.

But before we pass to other things, that this definition may be rightly under­stood, some things are to be hinted. And in the first place you must observe, how Nature is said to be the principle of Motion and Rest. For it is not so to be under­stood, as if Nature did effect both these together: but one after another. Nor as if there were the cause of both in every Natural thing. For every nature is not the principle of Motion and Rest. But it is thus to be understood, that all things which naturally move and rest, have this motion and rest from nature. For there are some things that alwaies rest; some which are alwaies moved; some which both rest and are moved, and yet nature is the Cause of al these. Moreover, this is not to be forgot; that every nature is not the principle of every motion, but this of that, and another of another; nor is every natural body moved with all motions. [Page 21]And by Rest we do not understand every Cessation from motion, and every priva­tion thereof: but to rest, is to remain in its Natural place. So Earth, when it comes to its place, it hath a Principle whereby it Naturally rests therein, and re­moves not therefrom unless by violence forced. And whereas in the Definition it is said, that Nature is a principle of motion and rest, in that wherein it is; thereby, Nature is separated from Art and from an external Agent, which are the Causes of a Transient operation only. Yet, I deny not but that Nature is the cause of a Tran­sient Action. For Fire heates also other things. Howbeit, Aristotle would define Nature, only by an immanent Action, because thereby it is manifestly distin­guished from Art. And if the definition of Aristotle be so explained, that Nature is the internal principle, from which every thing hath a power of acting and suffe­ring, and ceasing from both; al seeming difficulties wil be cleared up.

And because the principle of Motion is twofold, one Active, A two­sold prin­cipal of motion active and passive. IThe pas­sive what? by which the moti­on is effected, another passive, Wherein? hereuupon arises a double controversie amongst Authors. First what we are to understand by a passive Principle: Se­condly, whether Nature be both these Principles or only one of them. As to the First, a passive Principle may be understood two manner of waies, First for the passive Aptitude of things opposite which is free, and not more apt to receive of it self, one motion more then another, but is equally propense to both: Secondly, For a power already restrained, and limited, to one only of the Opposites, and Determined to one Motion, which is said to be the Natural motion of the thing. I am of the latter opinion: for from the former, this absurdity seems to follow that all violent and Artificial motions, may be called Natural; seeing the first matter is of it self a like disposed to receive all Motions.

As to the other Controversie: Nature is a principle as wel a­ctive as passive. although some have said that Nature is only an active principle, others that it is only a passive; Yet I conceive, both may well be affirmed of Nature. For to things having Nature in them, it is no less Natural to move themselves, then to be moved by themselves.

And from what hath been said it is now apparent what is Nature in things, viz. The principle of motion and rest, both active and passive. To what things the term Na­ture may be applied. It remaines that we now declare, what that is, and to what things the name of Nature is due. Aristotle gives the name of Nature both to the matter and the Form: and that not amiss, provi­ded he be rightly understood. For the Form alone primarily and of it self deserves to be called Nature: and it is a Principle of motion as well active as passive. The Form is cheifly Nature. But because the matter is indifferent and doubtful, disposed to receive contrary moti­ons, respecting no determinate motion, but al indifferently: it cannot primarily and properly be called nature. For so, as all natural things have one matter, so should there be of all but one Nature: whereas nevertheless every thing hath its own peculiar Nature. Yea, if so be the matter as well as the Form were Nature, every thing should have two Natures. Nor is it absurd to cal the Form a passive principle. For seeing, as hath been said, a passive principle, is not so called, in respect of every indeterminate motion; but only of that determinat and certain motion, which is peculiar and natural to every thing: by very good right, the Form also is called a passive principle; since from it proceeds al determination and restraint of matter to the reception of certaine determinate Motions. Now the Form is termed a passive principle, in as much as it is in the matter (for in respect of the matter every thing is said to suffer) and determinates the Nature thereof: and in as much as it is the Form, it is also termed an active principle. The matter, not­withstanding as hath been said is also called nature: not because it is nature of it self; but only potentially: or because it hath an aptitude to receive the Form, which of it self is Nature. Actually therefore the Form is nature; potentially the matter.

The whol Sum therefore of this discourse is this: One thing hath one nature, which properly and primarily is called the Form. For this of its self is the active principle in things, and in as much as it is the Form: and also the passive, in as much as it determines the doubtful nature of the matter. And therefore to be a passive principle, is in divers respects attributed both to the matter and the Form. For the matter is the Passive principle, not as it is barely the matter but in as much as it is furnished with some Form, whereby it is determined to receive some particular motion. The Form is a passive principle, not as it is the Form, but as it determines [Page 22]the doubtful nature of the Matter. And thus neither of them without the others assistance, can be called a passive principle.

From what hath been said, Whether e­very Form informing be Nature it may easily be collected, what may be determined in reference to that controversie, Whether every form in forming, is to be counted Nature, or not. The Definition, truly, of Nature doth evince: that every form in­forming, inasmuch as it is inherent in the matter, and informs the same, may right­ly be called Nature.

It is now manifest what and what kind of thing Nature is. Things natural & according to nature, how they differ. One thing must yet be added: What that thing is which hath Nature, and what that is which is according to Nature. Natural things are Substances which have nature in them, viz. A princi­ple of motion and of rest. Such are only natu al Bodies. For that thing is not called natural, which produces any thing that is natural; for so God himself should be reckoned amongst natural things. Nor is that said to be natural, which is produ­ced by naturral motion; for so the first Man and this whol world should not be na­tural. But that thing is properly natural, which hath an implanted Principle of its motion and rest. And such a definition of a natural Body, does comprehend all bodies both Celestial and sublunary. But according to nature, is of larger extent, than having Nature, or Natural; for according to nature, are not only the Sub­stances, but also their properties, and their affections or adjuncts which follow their Nature. And so much of Natur [...] may suffice to be said.

But inasmuch as nature is chiefly considered in this place, as it is referred to mo­tion, or, as they say, it hath a peculiar Causality over the motion and rest of that thing wherein it is: the Causes are now to be explained, viz. inasmuch as they have respect to motion; and we are to consider what kinds of Causes have place in things natural. What a Cause is, and how many cau­ses there are? They define a Cause to be that by the virtue or efficacy whereof any thing is made: or by which any thing is of it self produced. Now they are four: The Matter, of which a thing is made and subsists: The Form, by which a thing is that which it is, and nothing else: The Efficient, whence proceeds the Beginning of Mu­tation or Rest: The End for the sake whereof a thing is. Nor is there need to in­vent more Causes; seeing by these we can sufficiently Answer any Question, why a thing is, The Man­ners of Causes. and whereby the cause thereof is demanded. Yet there are more Modes or manners of Causes. For a Cause is neer or remote: of it self or by accident; in act or in aptitude, simple or conjunct, of which see Aristotle in his 3. of Physicks Chap. 3.

To Causes by Accident, Fortune & Chance, how they differ? Fortune and Chance are referred. For seeing some things are made alwaies or for the most part, others seldom; again some are made for some ends sake, others for none: and those which are made for an end, are made either by Election or without Election: Fortune and Chance are said to be the Causes of such things as happen seldom & without an end propounded. And herein Fortune and Chance agree, that they are both the Cause of such things, which are not alwaies or for the most part, but seldom effected, and which are undertaken for some Ends sake. Yet herein they differ, that Fortune is of things done with Ele­ction, and Chaunce of things done without Election.

Fortune therefore is the Cause by accident of these things, What For­tune is, and what Chance? which among things done by Election and for some end, do not alwaies nor frequently but seldom hap­pen. And in such a sense we may grant, that there is both Fortune and Chaunce in things. But in respect of the most great and good God, nothing happens by chaunce or by fortune.

But it is the part of a natural Phylosopher to consider all the four kinds of Cau­ses, Whether it belong to a natural Phyloso­pher to consider the Cau­ses? and by all four answer may be made to that question why or how a thing comes to be, and that physically. For it is the part of a Physitian or natural phyloso­pher, to consider the Parts and Principles of a body natural. And to him it be­longs, to explain the mutation and generation of things and their causes; and to see for what things sake, the Efficient acts, or to enquire into the end: moreover to weigh and consider what is made, or what form is introduced afterwards, to know what that is which suffers and receives the form, viz. the matter, finally to search out the efficient which introduces the form.

Howbeit we are to know, that the three Causes, Efficient, Form, and End, are in natural things many times united together, and grow into one Cause: so that the form and end, though they differ in definition, yet in number [Page 23]and subject they are one Cause: but the formal and efficient cannot be one in num­ber, yet one in kind. For the same form of an animal, is at the same time both the form and end: the form in respect of the thing Generated, inasmuch as it is an act perfecting the matter, and therewith making up the compound: but an end in respect of the Generation. For it is the Butt to which nature rends, and wherein she rests contented after it is attained. Moreover the same form is also the Effici­ent, inasmuch as the thing generated, is of the same species or sort with the, Gene­rator.

This thing also is to be noted, after what manner every cause, does concur to the Production of the Effect. The End concurs to the production of the Effect no otherwise than as it moves the Efficient to produce the same, and after the thing is effected, all the causality thereof ceases. The Efficient concurs somtimes only to the production of the Effect, and somtimes also to the conservation or preservation thereof; which latter efficiency does chiefly belong to the universal Causes, which Scaliger does excellently shew, in his 28. Exercitation. It is not (saith he) necessary, that the particular efficient Causes should be perpetuated together with their Effects: but then only to stick to them when they work. For it is enough that they give them their [...]orm, whereby not only they are, but are preserved: since out of their matter the quali­fies being driven by their contrary, the form also is forced away. Only the first Effici­tent, because he is Lord of Eternity and the world, accompanies his effects: there is no necessity that other Efficients should do so: no not the Heavens themselves, otherwise than by his favor and Indulgence. So far Scaliger

But the Matter and Form are necessary both for the Production, Constitution and Conservation of the thing.

And although there were anciently, some who thought all things were made at random and by hap hazard: yet we avouch that God and Nature do nothing in Vain. Yet we do not here introduce a simple Necessity, but only a conditional, and therefore we do not deny all Contingency in natural things.

Many things might be added touching the Causes; but all that may be said of them, belongs not to our present Purpose, also I endeavor to be as brief as may be. Only one Question we shall here discuss, viz. Whether an acci­dent can produce a Substance? Whether an accident can produce a Substance. There are about this Point Three Opinions. The first is of some late Writers who aver, that an accident by its own proper Virtue can produce a Substance? so that when Fire produces fire, that whol production intrinsecally and effectively proceeds from Heat, nor does the substantial form which is in the fire concur to the effect. The second, is the Opini­on of Scotus, Ocham, and Du-Rand, who teach, that Accidents can neither by their own proper Virtue, nor the power of substantial forms, produce a substance: but that a substance is immediately produced by a Substance. The third is the opinion of Thomas Aquinas, who avers: That accidents do not produce a substance by their own proper force, but by the power & virtue of the substantial forms, whose virtues and Instruments they are. This last opinion seems to me most probable. For that substances act mediately, any body may hereby learn, inasmuch as the things be­tween which there is action and passion, are many times, we see, in several places: whereas, nevertheless a mutual contract betwixt the Agent and Patient is necessary, and the Agent and Patient ought to be together. And that Accidents cannot of themselves produce a substance, does hence appear; in that whatsoever is in the effect, does praeexist in the efficient cause. For nothing give; that which it self hath not, either formally or eminently, as they say.

Chap. 5. Of that which is continued, and of that which is infinite.

NOthing is more intimately inherent in a natural Body than Quantity; as being of equal durance with the first Matter, and altogether inseperable therefrom, and by help whereof, all the remaining Accidents do adhere to the Matter Yea and by a Body in the predicament of Quantity, we come to the knowldg of a sub­stantial Body, which is nothing but a substance that hath three dimensions of Length, Breadth, and Thickness. For these differ one from another, like Substance and Accident. In Subject they are one. For that Body which consists of Quanti­ty, [Page 24]is not without a substantial Body: but they differ essentially, having different essences, when no man thinks of them.

Now continued Quantity is that whereof we cheifly treat in this place; What con­tinued Quantity is & how in a yield. A [...]. whose bounds are one; or whose parts are coupled with a common boundary. And there are three sorts thereof; a Line, a Surface, and a Body, each of which hath its pe­culiar Office and Peculiar bounds. For a Line is a Longitude without Latitude, the bounds of a Surface. The bounds of a Line is a point; whose Nature is to continue touch, terminate. For it begins, continues and ends a Line. The Nature also of a Line is to continue, Touch, Terminate, and also to divide. For by a Line a Surface is continued, and Terminated, and by the same, two Surfaces, do mutual­ly touch one another: Finally by means of a Line, every thing is divisible accor­ding to one dimension, A Surface. viz. Longitude. A Surface is a Quantity long and broad; by means whereof Bodies are continued, do mutually touch one another, and are divided. For by means of the Surface, a thing may be divided according to a two­fold dimension, A Body. viz. Longitude and Latitude. Finally, a Body is a Quantity, Long, broad and deep. And its Office is not to continue terminate or touch; but to fil and possess, and to be apt to be divided according to its threefold dimensions, Length, Breadth and Depth.

Thus therefore, Things possess a place only in regard of their be­ing bodily. in respect of all dimensions things are said to have Quantity and to be divisible: but in respect of a body only they possess and fil. For that two bodies cannot be together in one place, is not because they are substances: For divers incorporeal substances, may be together in one and the same place: but be­cause they have matter furnished with a threefold dimension, the Penetration whereof is impossible.

Here I must take leave to digress a little, To take up and fill do differ. and propound some things not much from our purpose, To possess or Occupy, and to fil, is for a body to be so in a place, as that another cannot be in the same place with it: and it is proper to such things as have matter of a threefold dimension. For such things do so take up the whol place, that another Body at the same time cannot be therein. But those things are said to fil, which may either many of them together, or with other bo­dies, be in a certain place, so that the Presence of one shall not hinder the presence of another. Why two bodies cannot be in one place? And therefore two bodies can never be together, nor can two hold the same place: and as the common experssion is, Penetration of Dimensions is impo­ssible. For Naturally it cannot be, that into that place which any of us fils, ano­ther Man, or any other Body, should be admitted, til we leave the same. But it is otherwise in things free from dimension and Matter, and in all Forms, substantial and accidental, which is manifestly apparent in the light of the Stars, for the lights of infin te Stars, are every where shed and spred about under the Concave of the Moon, nor d [...] the Elements at all hinder them, by whom this space is before pos­sessed, nor does the presence of the one hinder the presence of the other, nor though they are all of them in all places, are they confounded or jumbled together. The same we see in other things which give light. For if you place Looking-Glasses upon the walls of a chamber round about, and set candles in the middest of the said Chamber. They will all send their image and light into all parts of the Chamber, already ful of Aire, nor will the presence of one hinder the other, nor wil they be mixed or jumbled together: but they will all appear distinctly, in all the Glasses. So in Honey, in all parts thereof there is yellowness, and sweetness, and smel and moisture. And the same happens in substantial Forms. For both our Soul and the Soul of all living Creatures, does fil all the Body, which it informs, nor though a Body have before taken up the place, is it hindred from being in all parts of the Body. It is therefore the Property of things which have dimensions and are cor­poreal, to possess and take up: but of things free from dimensions and matter, to fil: and by how much a thing is more free, from dimensions, Matter, and bodily bulk, by so much the more it fils. Hence we see a sound fils a greater space, then a smel, and colors greater then sound; and the light of fire yet a greater, and the light of the Heavenly bodies, God is present repletively a greater then that. Finally the most good and great God being insinitly free from all dimensions and from al matter, does infinitely fil all things, yea is himself an infinite fulness, absent from nothing, included in no­thing, nor mixt with any thing; but is totally al the world over, and totally every where without this world. For though he is present with all things, yet is not [Page 25]some part of his plenitude present with one thing, another with another, but he is wholly present with all things. Finally this world is made in the Atome, indivi­sible point or Centre of his fulness. And therefore, al things void of matter, Forms of themselves are with­out Quan­tity and made visible and all forms, of themselves, have neither Quantity, nor can be divided, unless by accident, in as much as they are inherent in a body by whose dimensions they are bounded, and may be many of them together. For dimensions being taken away, the Form of any of us, may be with the Form of another, in the same place, and fil the said place, nor should the presence of one hinder the presence of another. And we see the same Form; which at first sits the Body of an infant, fil the said body without encreasing it self, when the infant is grown to a tall Person.

But let us return to Quantity: Whether that which is continu­ed be made of indivi­sible or of divisible parts? where we are fallen into that most noble question which hath exercised the wits of so many renowned Men: viz. Whether a continu­ed Body is made up of indivisible parts, or of parts divisible? And whether that which is continued may be divided infinitely? There were anciently some that held, that a continued Body was compounded of indivisible parts, as Pythagoras, De­mocritus, Leucippus, and the greatest part of those who flourished in Aristotles time, and the Stoicks themselves who in this point followed their Ringleader Zeno. But Aristotle undertakes their refutation, in the Sixt Book of his Physicks. Also they are opposed in that which is called, Of Indivisible Lines, which goes up and down under Aristotles Name, which some deny to be Aristotles Book, though according to his judgment, and collected from his publick discourses. And in this point the most excellent Phylosophers and Mathematicians do follow Aristotle. And though weighty Reasons be alledged on both sides yet shal I side with Aristotle, and that for these Reasons following.

In the first place, if that which is continued be compounded of indivisibles, as for examples sake, a Line of Points, one indivisible with another, wil either make a thing continued, or a thing contiguous, or a thing whose parts are ranked one af­ter another. But none of these can be. And therefore that which is continued is not compounded of indivisibles. Indivisibles are not continued. For continued things are those whose outmost bounds are one and the same. But the outmost bound of Indivibles is not: for every extream is distinct from that thing whose ex­tream it is. And therefore indivisibles are not continued. And for the same reason likewise they cannot be contiguous. For those things are contiguous whose ex­treams are together. The same is also thus proved. What ever touches another thing, touches it either as an whol touches an whol, so that all its parts are toge­ther with the parts of the other, or as a part touches a whol, or as a part touches a part. After these latter manners, things indivisible cannot touch one another: for that which is indivisible hath not parts, nor can it be parted. Nor yet after the for­mer manner. For every thing continued, hath parts without parts, so that one part is, seated here, another there. If therefore in the making of a Line, the points should totally touch one another, and in making a surface, the Lines should total­ly touch one another; Finally in making a Body, the surfaces should wholly touch one another: from all the points would spring one point, and from all the lines one line, and from all the surfaces one surface only. And so a thing indivisible, added to what is indivisible, makes it no greater then it was; nor does it constitute a thing continued, which consists of many parts, each of which is without the rest. Nor do indivisible parts in a thing continued, follow one another as in rank or row: for so there should come nothing of the same kind between: but between any indi­visibles, there comes somwhat else of the same kind: for betwixt two points there is a line, in which there must needs be points.

Secondly, If a Line were made of Points, or a Surface of Lines, or a Body of Sur­faces; a Line which did consist of ten points, would be longer then that which con­sists only of nine; and a Surface compounded of ten Lines should be broader then that which does consist of only nine; and a Body made up of ten Surfaces should be deeper then that which is made only of nine. But these should not so happen save for a point, a Line, a Surface. Therefore that point must have Longitude, that line Latitude, that Surface Crassitude or Depth. For in respect of that which is not long, another thing cannot be said to be longer; nor in respect of that which neither is broad nor hath breadth can another thing be said to become broader; nor in respect of that which hath neither depth nor thickness, can a thing be said to be [Page 26]thicker then another thing All which things notwithstanding are manifestly falf. Thirdly it would follow, that there are very many magnitudes, which cannot be divided into two equal portions; which is falf: seeing, it is by the Mathematicians demonstrated that every continued thing, may be divided into two equal halves, to which it hath a double proportion. For things consisting of unequal indivisi­bles, cannot be divided into equal parts.

Fourthly, It would then follow, that the Diameter of a Quadrate were equal to its side, and a greater circle equal to a less, which has the same centre: which is absurd. For if you draw lines from every point of one side of the Quadrate, as many as you can possibly, to the opposite side, they will all pass through every point of the Diameter, nor will there be any point therein, through which they wil not pass. For those lines fil all the space of the Quadrate. So it from the Centre you draw lines to all the parts of the greater Circle, they will all likewise pass through the lesser Circle, and therefore the less wil have as many points as the greater, and so they will be equal. And from these instances it appears, that a continued thing does not consist of indivisibles, and therefore that it may be divi­ded into parts perpetually divisible. For seeing it consists of such into such it must needs be resolved.

Yet we are here to observe, that a thing may be said to be indivisible two man­ner of waies: for a thing is either simply such as having no parts: or respectively, which cannot be actually divided into such parts, though it contain them, such as are the smallest things Natural. And touching the former, is our Question; viz. Whether a line, consist of points; a Surface, of Lines; a Body, of Surfaces. Moreover we must know, that when it is said a continued magnitude may be infinit­ly divided we are not to understand, that it has infinite parts actually or potential­ly, so as by continual dividing they may at length become infinite: but thus we must hold, that so many parts cannot be taken from a continued magnitude but more will remain. For we must not here admit of a real division. For since all Quantity adheres in some Natural Body, and there are Natural Bodies of the smal­lest size imaginable, there will be found a quantity actually the smallest possible. But we must thus understand it; that there cannot so smal a Quantity be assigned, but that our understanding can conceive it divisible into two parts, and again each of these into two, and so continually descending lower and lower. Again, this is to be observed, that it is rightly said, that a continued Quantity may be infinitly divided: but it cannot rightly be said that it may be divided into infinite parts. For if we say into infinite parts, we say not true: for as the continued Quantity is actually finite: so also its parts are actually finite: and are terminated by the bounds of the whol. But this is true, that a continued magnitude is apt to be divided infinitely, that is to say, in dividing you cannot come to any thing but what may be divided again. And hence it does not follow, that what is continued in magnitude has infinite parts. For every whol is estimated by such parts, as have a certain magnitude: and such in every continued thing are finite: but those parts in respect of which a continued Quantity is said to be infinitely divisible are not actually of any determinate magnitude.

Hitherto has been shewed that a continued Quantity in a Body Natural, is not compounded of indivisible parts, and therefore is infinitly divisible, although it be never actually divided into infinite parts; seeing Natural things have determinate bounds of their greatness or smalness. Touching which, seeing there is some con­troversie amongst Authors, I shal ad somwhat to what has been said, and make in­quisition into the greatest and smallest Natural things. Wherein that I may pro­ceed the better, I must premise some things.

In the First place, Although the notions of Greatest and Smallest, are transferred from Quantity to other things, as also Qualities and motions are; yet that in this place we speak properly of Natural substances. For touching them the Question is, whether they certain bounds and limits set to their Quantity. Secondly, That this Question may have a manifold sense: as a man may ask both whether there be in Nature a greatest and smallest substance, then which now can be greater or smaller: and whether Nature have set bounds of Quantity, so that she hath not of her self power, to make things bigger or lesser? Moreover, it may be further que­ston'd, First whether there be absolutely the greatest and smallest thing possible, [Page 27]in the Universe? Secondly, whether in every sort of Natural Bodies both simple and compound, and of Homogeneal mixt Bodies as wel as Heterogeneal, and of ani­mate as wel as inanimate, there are certain and set bounds of Greatness and smal­ness? Thirdly we are to observe that the terms or bounds of greatness and smalness are twofold; some intrinsecal which things receive from their own Nature: others extrinsecal, which are by others externally prescribed to things. Fourthly, That the greatest and least are so termed Positively or Negatively. Positively that is the greatest thing, which is greater then all others, and to which nothing is equal: and the least contrarily Negatively, that is greatest, then which nothing is greater, though there be somwhat equal. And that is Negatively the least, than the which nothing is lesser, though there may be somwhat as little.

These things being premised, thus we conclude. I. In the whol Universe, There is Actually in the whole uni­verse and in every sort of na­tural things, somwhat greatest & somwhat least. and in every sort of Natural things, there is actually somthing which is greatest and somthing which is least. For unless there were somwhat greatest and somwhat least, in the whol world, and in every sort of things, either positively or Negative­ly: there might be a greater then any that is never so great, and a less then any that is never so smal, and so there should be actually in Nature an infinite multitude of things. But that that cannot be, shall be hereafter demonstrated. The same does also hereby appear; Seeing all accidents do follow the substantial Form: and e­very Natural Body, hath a Form actually determined: therefore every Natural Body must also have accidents determined and a limited Quantity. And, indeed, of all Bodies Heaven is the greatest, because it containes all things: but what the smalest thing is, we cannot peradventure determine. Howbeit Aristotle in his [...]. Book of the History of living Creatures Chap. 32. Writes that in old Wax, as in wood, a white living Creature is bred, which of all Live-wights may be, coun­ted the least, the name whereof is Acari.

II. In every sort of Live-things, there are intrinsecal bounds of greatness and smalness, without which Nature cannot produce nor conserve Living things: so that no Individual or Particular Creature of that sort, may be produced and con­served, which either exceeds that term of Magnitude, or fals short thereof. For examples sake, in case the greatest Height of a Man be four Cubits, the smallest one Cubit: there can no man be generated that shall prove higher then four Cubits, or lower then one Cubit: but all shall be either of four, or of three, or of two, or of one Cubit, or of some other measure betwixt four and one. And thus does Aristotle determine in his 1. of Physicks, Chap. 4. Text 36. in the 2. de Anima, Chap. 4. Text 41. in the 4. de Gener. Animal, Chap. 4. in the 7. of Politicks, Chap 4. And Reason perswades the same. For since augmentation or growth is determi­nate: and quantity is acquired by augmentation, it self must therefore be determi­nate. And that Augmentation is definite, does hereby appear, because it is an action of the Augmenting faculty, which is determinate as all other faculties of the Form are: the instruments also are definite or determined. For the very Natural Heat is limited, and becomes every day more remiss. Yea, and is at last extin­guished. Yea, and al the other. Instruments are also limited. Nor is experience against it. For we never heard of a Dog born as big as an Elephant, nor grown to that greatness, nor of an Elephant born no greater then a Puppy-Dog. Howbeit, hard it is to set down and observe the terms, in every species. For they have sundry variations, and more in one sort, then in another. Amongst Men there is a great diversity of Magnitude; a greater amongst Dogs; but not so great amongst Cats, and Birds and other Animals.

III. But the Elements have no determinate magnitude of themselves and intrin­secally, but from without. For the Elements of themselves, if they had matter enough; and there were no outward obstacle might be augmented indefinitely. For look how much greater Bulk the sire gains, by so much the more efficacy it has, the more it resists contraries, and turnes them into its own Nature But their mag­nitude is limited by the things which contain them, and in respect of the Materia Prima, or first matter. For seeing the bulk of the first matter is finite, the Elements cannot be infinitely augmented.

IV. And Because the Elements do likewise change their Quantity, by Rarefacti­on and condensation; touching that, we are likewise to know: that of their own [...] [Page 26] [...] [Page 27] [...] [Page 30]unless upon a very weighty occasion: yet seeing the opinion of Aristotle is laden with very great difficulties, in the mean while, til some body shal answer what is brought against his opinion (for I beleeve no man has yet given a solid answer thereto) I must take the adverse side: especially since it is wel known that the very Interpre­ters of Aristotle have confessed, that the other opinion is not improbable, nor has been by any sufficiently confuted, and that there is no demonstrative Argument to the contrary; and that the opinion of Aristotle, is only probable: but not necessa­ry: and it is very wel known, that most men have been moved by Authority rather than Reason to defend the opinion of Aristotle: which one man viz. Didacus Masius does plainly confess, when in his Commentaries upon the 5. Chap. of the 4. Book of Physicks, he thus writes: But I (saies he) unless I were hindered by the Authority of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, should most willing [...]y imbrace that opinion concerning Space, which we may easily perceive, if diligently we shal weigh the foregoing Arguments and what has been said touching the Nature thereof, that it is both mo [...]e ea­sie to be understood, and has fewer objections against it. But because we must submit our understandings to Aristotle and St. Thomas, we are forced to confess, that Place is a Surface and not a Space, because these most grave Phylosophers, have so deter­mined

But that I may not seem to have done any thing without reason, The Pro­perties of Place. wherein I imitate Aristotle, I shal propound the chief proprieties of Place, and examine which do truly and properly belong thereto; that from thence it may appear, which of these opinions is most probable. Aristotle in the 4. Book of his Physicks Chap. 4. Text 30. tels us, That these are the properties of Place. 1. To contain the thing placed, or whose place it is. 2. To be no part of the thing contained, which property some joyn with the foregoing, thus: a place does so contain the thing placed, as to be no part thereof. 3. That the place be neither greater nor lesser, than the thing placed. 4. That the place is separable from the thing placed; or as some read it, that the place cannot be without some body, but may be without this body or that. 5. That all place is upwards or downwards. 6. That every body is naturally car­ried to its own place, and is disposed to rest therein. Howbeit, some joyn this with the sift. From other places, Authors gather more properties: for they ad, 7. That it is a property of Place to draw to it self the thing placed: which they would draw out of the 4. of his Physicks, Chap. 1. Text 4. 8. That the place has a faculty of generating, conserving, and perfecting the thing placed: which they draw from the 4. of his Physicks ch. 1. Text 4. Chap. 5. Text 48. 49. from the 4. de Caelo Chap. 3. Text 23, 24. from his 8. de Historia Animalium Chap. 28, 29. 9. That the place gives distinction and unity to local motion. 10. That Place is immovable, 4. Phys. Chap. 4. Text 41. 11. Out of Psellus they draw this property: that a Place is neither abolished, nor does perish, though the things which are there­in, may be abolished.

And these are the chief Properties of Place which we meet with in Authors: be­twixt which we must nevertheless distinguish. For, as to the first, second, third, fourth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, they are simply necessary to a place, nor is there much doubt concerning them. As for the rest, we must see in what sence they may be admitted, and we must enquire, what agrees with a place in it self and as it is a place, and what by accident: in which point there is no smal confusionin Authors. In the first place, How place and Scitu­ation dis­f [...]er? that is to be noted, which Scaliger does hint, in his 3. Book de re Poetica especially in the 120. Chap. nor has it been omitted by others; that we must distinguish betwixt a place simply so called, & as it is an affection of a Body natural in general; and between Ʋbi and Situs, which is not any place, but one affected with certain conditions, which they are nevertheless frequently accustomed to cal Place. Hence 'tis a common saying, that the place of light things is above, and of heavy things beneath: because in the middle of the world there are qualities by which hea­vy things are amicably cherished; and about Heaven there are qualities that cherish light things: which Qualities nevertheless do not necessarily belong unto the es­sence of place. For even the fire in the Bowels of the Earth is in a Place, though not favorable thereunto. Hence also Aristotle in his 8. B. de Historia Animalium, Chap. 19.28, 29. Probleme 15. Section 14 and Pliny every where, saies that the natures of platns and Animals are divers according to the variety of places wherein they are [Page 31]and that some places are convenient and others inconvenient.

Since therefore these are reckoned amongst the proprieties of place: that every thing is carried to its place; that the place does allure and draw to it self the thing placed; that the place has a power to generate, conserve and perfect the thing pla­ced therein: we must know, that all these properties do not agree to a place, as it is a place. For seeing a place as Toletus saies, is formally Quantity: it is not of the Essence thereof to be a Cause. For Magnitude as they say, is not the efficient of an accident; which Scaliger also intimates in his 5. Exercitation, It is not true (saies he) that bodies are preserved by their place, but by their form. And if a Place as a Place, and therefore not a proper one, should conserve: the Elements would not seek to get out of that place into their proper place. The Elements therefore are not preserved by their place; but by their Ʋbi. Scaliger in the same Exercitation, Section 5. But so far the Place is said to preserve the thing placed, inasmuch as the body there placed, does conveniently receive the Qualities of the Heavens and E­lements which are most agreeable thereunto: and inasmuch as Qualities friendly to the thing placed, are in the Subject which is about the place.

And therefore, seeing in the searching out of the nature of things, that which is by it self, must be carefully distinguished from that which is by accident: we do here understand the term Place, not in the latter, but in the former Sense: Nor do we allow of that saying, that only the Elements are in a Place. For we do not here seek after the Adjunct of some sort of natural Bodies; but our Enquiry is, what Place is in it self cousidered, and as it agrees to al natural bodies in general, and to al their sorts as a proper adjunct.

We are now in the next place to consider, Whether the Pro­perties of place do best agree to a Sur­face or a space? whether the genuine Properties of place do best agree to the Surface of a body containing, or to the Space commensu­rate with the thing placed. And that we may begin with immobility; that is a most true propriety of Place, and by Pererius his confession, though it make against himself, it is an essential Propriety thereof, even as risibility or a disposition to Laughter is an essential propriety of Mankind; and as Aegidius Romanus saies Lib. 4. Phys. 1.41. Sect. 7. the very formal being of a place. To the asserting whereof, though there were no other Reason, this might suffice, that all Men what­soever their opinion is concerning Place, do herein agree, that a Place must be im­mediable, and every one endeavors to accommodate this propriety to his Place. And verily he that takes away the immobility of Place, he takes away local moti­on and the distinction thereof. For that which is moved, of necessity leaves one place and goes into another: which could not be, if the place were moved with the thing.

From this Propriety therefore we conclude: seeing place is necessarily immo­vable, and the surface of a body containing is not immovable: that it is no Place. For suppose a Tower or a Pillar erected, or a Tree growing up in the Air, or suppose an Hill in a River, or in the Air, at every moment as the Wind blows and the River runs, their place wil be changed, which is against the Nature of Place. Yea and this great Absurdity wil hence follow: that one and the same body, fixed in one and the same space, quiet and without motion, shall have every moment a new place, and so be in an innumerabe company of places.

In this Argument the maintainers of a Surface to be Place, are variously perple­xed as we may see in Pererius Book 11. Phys. Chap. 2, 3. and Tolet. Book 4. Phys. Quest. 5. And Pererius himself demonstrates that the answers carefully sought out by Scotus and Aquinas are not satisfactory. And it wil be worth our while to con­sider whether he brings any thing more to the purpose, seeing many affirm that he has answered all Objections. Now this is the judgment of Pererius: First, he saies the word Place is used in common and vulgar acceptation for scituation and position; and 'tis commonly said a thing has this or that place, meaning that it is so or so scituated; and therefore a thing may change its place two waies, either actively or passively: Actively, when it passes out of one place into another, leaving the place wherein it was before: Passively, when the thing re­mains immovable, but the place about it is changed. He supposes therefore, that a Tower, a Pillar, or Mountain, about which ever and anon the surface of the Air or Water is changed, are not properly in the same place: yet they remain in the same place, by place intending scituation: or they remain in the same place actively; [Page 32]because these bodies themselves do not pass from place to place: yet they remain not in the same place passively; because the Surface of the Air and water compassing the said bodies, does not remain the same in number, but is ever and anon changed. This is Pererius his defence, which whether it be not contrary to al Reason and sense, let himself judg. But I would first have Pererius reconcile this proposition which is in his 11. B. ch. 3. p. 615. The Surface of the Body containing, which is of the Essence of place, is not alwaies the same in number about the same thing placed but is ever and anon varied; with that, in his 1. ch. p 607. immobility is essential to place, because it is an essential property thereof, as risibility is of a Man, and because im­mobility is used in the definition of Place, instead of an essential difference. Can Surface be of the essence of place, and yet not be immoveable which is an essential propriety of place? Again I grant, that the term place is frequently used for the Scituation and Position of a Natural Body, and allow such a speech be proper enough: Yea, and if so be a thing remains in the same Scituation, I aver against Pererius, that it remaines in the same place; for Scituation alwaies presupposes place, and it signifies the relation of the thing placed to the place. And therefore Natural bodies when they change their place, do also change their Scituation. And it is, doubtles, a great Absurdity to say, that a thing not moved with any local mo­tion should change its place. For a new place is gained only by local motion: and that which changes place, is locally moved, and by local motion, we are bronght to the knowledg of place, as may be seen in Aristotle 4. Physic. Chap. 4. Text 32. And therefore Tolet rightly saies: If I stir not, and the Surface about me be changed, it may not be granted that I am not stil in the same place. That is therefore a weak defence, which is made by distinguishing betwixt active mutation of place and pas­sive. For seeing to change place actively, is for a body to be transferred out of one place into another; to change place passively must be, for the Place to come unto and be moved to the thing placed: then which, what is more absurd? Nor is Ant. Ruvius more happy in his solution, Book, 4. Phys. Quest. 3. who confessing, that this Argument is so difficult, that in regard of the difficulty thereof, Authors have been divided, as to the manner of attributing Immobility to place; and examining and rejecting the opinions of others, he is at last forced to confess ingenuously; that it is impossible that the whol Nature of Place, should consist in a Stirface, and that Place should be immoveable; since 'tis evident, that the ambient Surface is frequent­ly varied, and that therefore place requires somwhat, in respect of which it may be immoveable. And at length he is fain to fly to this, that Particular places, are therefore immoveable, because they are parts o [...] [...]otal place, or parts of that whol space, real or imaginary, which is comprehended under the compass of the Skies. Whereby to say the truth, he so leaves Aristotle, as to joyn with them that say place is that space, which every Body fils.

Another propriety of place, is to be equal to the thing placed. But the Surface is not equal the to thing placed; and therefore it is not the place. For a Surface hath only two dimensions, but a Body three. Nor does Pererius his answer remove the difficulty: viz. That the place is equal to the thing placed, because the convex Surface of the thing placed, and the hollow Surface of the thing containing are equal. For the Question is not about the Quality of the Surfaces of a thing contai­ning and a thing contained: but touching place and the thing placed. Now Bodies are placed, and not Surfaces. And therefore it is necessary, that a place, be not only equal to the Surface of the thing placed, but to al the dimensions thereof: for otherwise the place should not be equal to the thing placed. For a Line is not said to be equal to a Surface, nor a surface to a Body; but a Line to a Line, a Sur­face to a Surface, and a Body to a Body.

I shall not compare any more proprieties of a place with a Surface. For what hath been already said, A surface does not agree to al Bodies. is more then those can answer, who wil have place to be a Surface. Yet one thing I wil add. Place is a common Adjunct of al Na­tural Bodies, and ought to agree to all. But the Surface of a Body containing, does not agree to all Bodies. Therefore it is no place. For the Highest Heaven, hath no Surface of any Body to compass the same about: The high­est Heaven is in a place. whereas it is nevertheless a Body, and is locally moved; and therefore requires a place. For whereas some think it is no absurdity to say, that the highest Heaven is in no place, nor that every Natural Body hath a place: this seems unreasonable. For that every Body [Page 33]is in a place, and that a Body cannot be without a place nor a place without a Bo­dy, is the Assertion of the gravest Phylosophers Avenroes, Johannes Grammaticus, Porphyrius, Marsilius Ficinus, and very many more both antient and late Authors. Nor does Aristotle seem to dissent in this point, in the 4. Phys. C. 1 Text 6. and 1. de Caelo, Ch. 7. T. 69. And that assertion is not void of reason in the 4. Phys. C. 7. T. 1. Everything that is, is somwhere, and that which is not, is no where, and that which is no where, is not. Natural Bodies, are real beings, and therefore they are som­where. Now there are three manner of waies, whereby a thing may be somwhere, Repletively, Definitively, Circumscriptively, or Locally. But Natural Bodies cannot Naturally be said to be any where in the two first manners. God is present re­pletively. For it belongs only to God to be Repletively any where: who as Damascrin truly writes in Book 1 Ch. 16. is totally every where, totally in all things, and totally above all things. Or as Scaliger in his 1. de Plantis; who is by all things, above all things, in all things, before all things, after all things, High, Glorious, Immense, Incomparable, Incomprehensible. Angels definitive­ly Bodies Natural Circum­scriptively or locally. And to be any where definitively, is said of Angels. And therefore Naturally bodies as such, where ever they are said to be, they are said to be there Locally: and by Reason of their Circumscript and Determinate dimensions, they are in a Circum­scribed and Determinate space. Hence Du-Rand saies wel in 4 Sect. Distinct. 44. Quest. 6. In this respect only a place is possest by the thing placed; because the thing pla­ced hath within the place, the distention of its parts. Since therefore this is essential to the thing placed, at it has Quantity, it is impossible the thing placed should be in the place, and not take the same up. And a little after: If a Body be locally in a place, it cannot be, but it must take the place up: because to take a place up, is to have in the place parts distant in position one from another and from all other Quantity: and that is nothing else, but to have Quantity. Also there is a most elegant place to be seen in Scaligers 56. Exercitation, Sect. 6. wherein he shews, how the place is necessary to the thing placed. And in very deed, motion does sufficiently teach, that the Heaven is in a place. For seeing every thing that is moved, is moved in its place, by local moti­on: and the Heaven is moved with local motion; we must by no means deny that it is in a place. Nor can local motion be imagined without a place, Yea verily, though the Heaven were without motion; yet the Heaven of its own Nature is in a place. For seeing place belongs to bodies not only because of their motion, but that Natural Bodies are in place when they stir not; what ever you will assigne to be the cause why Natural Bodies are in place, it wil be found also in the Heaven: seeing it is a Natural Body.

And whereas the Authority of Aristotle is objected, who in the 5. of his Physicks Chap. 5, Text 43. delivers this rule of knowing what Bodies are in a place and what not; viz. That Body is in a place, without which there is another Body that con­taines it: but that is not, without which there is none: this Authority does not hinder us at al. For Aristotle did build this rule upon his presupposed definition of place; which definition falling, this rule fals: and withal the argument drawn therefrom. viz. That the Heaven is not in a place; because place is the Surface of a Body containing: but without the Heavens there is no Body. For here the questi­on is beg'd: and it is more doubted whether place be a Surface, then whether the Heaven be in a place.

Seeing therefore, for these and many other Reasons, Place is a space not a surface. that Opinion which makes place to be the Surface of a Body containing, cannot possibly stand: and by confes­sion of all Peripateticks, such a thing as place there is, and it is distinct from the thing placed; I do aver, that a place is all that place long, broad, and deep, which the Body placed does Occupy and this space is a thing different from the Bodies themselves. For though you should imagine al the Bodies in the universe to be re­moved, there would remaine a space, long, broad, and deep; which nevertheless, is not at any time actually without Bodies: but the whol Universe fils this whol space, and every part of the Universe challenges a part of the whol space, equal to it self.

Now that there is such a space is apparent out of the 4. of Physicks, Whether there is such a space. Text 3. and the change of things out of one place into another shews as much. For there where Water now is, viz. In the Vessel, when that is powred out there will be Air, or some other Body of equal dimensions wil possess the same place. Nor does this happen only in respect of Surface. For unless a Vessel be emptied according to al [Page 34]dimensions; another body cannot go into it; and the thing placed fils its place ac­cording to the three dimensions. Let there be two Vessels of equal Magnitude and Capacity, in respect of their concave surface; and fil the one which shal have no­thing in it but Air, which Water: and afterward pour the same water into the o­ther, in the middest whereof a stone shal hang by a thred; the water will not all be contained, by a vessel of the same capacity and surface. What is the cause hereof? If a surface be place, what is the reason, that, seeing there are in these two Vessels equal surfaces, and consequently equal places, they do not receive a Body placed of the same size? Namely, because a place is to be defined and estimated not accor­ding to the surface, but the whol space and profundity, according to which the thing is placed. And that two bodies cannot be together, is not therefore, because of the surface of the Body containing, but because each body requires a peculiar space for it self to exist in.

And that this space is place, The pro­prieties of place agree with space does hereby also appear, in that all the genuine proprieties of place do agree thereunto; and by this opinion, those great difficul­ties are avoided, which vex other opinions. For the space containes the thing pla­ced therein, and is equal thereunto: and is never without one body or other; but it may be without this Body or that: it is immoveable, nor when any Body is re­moved, does the space wherein it was move with it: but the Body passes out of one part of this space into another. Also by this opinion, that most difficult Question, in the answering whereof, one side is much puzzled as may be seen in Pererius B. 11. Ch. The Hea­ven is in its space. 8. Tolet B. 4. Phys. Quest. 7. Colleg. Conimbr. Book, 4. Phys. Ch. 5. Quest. 2. Art. 12. viz. How the uppermost Heaven is in place, may easily be answered. For it is in its space which it occupies, as Scaliger rightly saies in his 5. Exercitation, Sect. 3.

Now what for a thing this space is, What this space is? is not very easie to determine. Yet we must not therefore deny that there is such a thing. For these are distinct Questions, whether a thing be and what it is, And if we should deny there were any thing but that the Nature whereof is perfectly known to us: we must deny against manifest reason the beings of many things, because their Essence is hid from us. Howbeit, when they who deny the uppermost Heaven to be in a place, shal explain what that same Ʋbi is, in which the upmost Heaven exists and is moved: it will be easie to explain what this space is. Or let them tel us, what is the Essence of the first mat­ter; and we shall with the same ease unfold the Nature of space. For if from a Na­tural Body I remove in my thoughts all the form, and all the adjuncts proceeding therefrom, as Aristotle himself in the 7. of his Metaphysicks, Ch. 3. Text 7. Describes it by the negation of all things: what I pray you will there remain? And shall we therefore, because we cannot sufficiently understand the Essence thereof, and can only comprehend it by a bastard kind of reasoning, cal it only an imaginary kind of thing? By no means. Even so, though our mind cannot conceive space, save by the denial of al Bodies: it does not therefore follow that it is nothing, or no­thing different from the Body. For if this and this and that and that Body, may be removed from this space; doubt less all these Bodies, wil be different from this space, and the Space from the Bodies.

Yet I shal produce what Authors think therof. Proclus held this space to be a body animate, indivisible, immovable, immaterial. Others wil have this space to be nothing real, but of it self an emptyness, or privation of a Body, which yet it can receive. O­thers say, this space is an accident, viz. A Quantity, long broad and deep: not as Epi­curus, existing by it self without any Body, but alwaies conjoyned with some Body. Jordanus Brunus Nolanus, takes it to be a fift kind of Cause. Which seems to have been an old opinion. For they relate from Albertus Magnus, that the Peripateticks did reckon place amongst the Principles of Nature: from whose opinion, Franciscus Patricius, seems not to differ, in his Book de Spatio Physico.

Among these opinions, because the three last have renowned Men for their Au­thors, I am minded to propound them according to their Authors intents. Not but that I know the Objections which those opinions also are liable unto; seeing it is much easier to overthrow Aristotles opinion of place, then to tel what space is: but to the intent that the diligent searchers of Nature, may have hereby an occasion to think of the matter. For as Aristotle wisely writes in the 2. of his Metaphysicks Ch. 1. For we are not only bound to thank them that have so writ as to satisfie us with their opinions, but them also who have spoken but superficially, for even these men also advan­tage [Page 35]us by affording matter to exercise our wits. And as Scaliger saies well▪ in his first Book of Plants, A studious Person should pass nothing over, which may offer it self as an occasion of fuller contemplation.

Julius Caesar Scaliger therefore, in his 5. Exercitation. Sect. 9. saies, that this Space is a Vacuity s [...]led with Bodies, or a Vacuum wherein is a Body, whose Nature is such, that when one Body gives place to another, there is a Vacuum or Empty space made, that the other Body may come in as Privation is a Vacuity of the Form to be introduced: and nevertheless is by Aristotle placed amongst the Princi­ples of Nature. For as Epicurus, in his Epistle to Herodotus in Diogenes Laertius, writer; If that were not, which we call emptyness or space, Natural Bodies would no have where to be, nor would any thing be moved, as now we see things are moved.

Now the last opinion save one Phyloponus did long ago stifly maintain, and some even in this Age do account it no absurdity. Nor do they conceive, that which is objected against this opinion, much to hinder the same: viz. if space it self be long, broad and deep, and another body should be placed therein, there would be penetration of dimensions. For two Bodies are not hindred to be in one place, in respect of Quantity alone; for so a Body of the Predicament of substance could not be with a Body of the Predicament of Quantity; whereas nevertheless these two are one and the same in number and subject; but because of the corporeal matter. And we must difference a Body extended and measured out, from the extension and measurement it self: whereof the former is a corporeal substance, the latter an accident: both which are nevertheless termed a body, by reason of that penury of words in this Case. Hence Johannes Grammaticus himself saies, What a Body is? that a Body is not a threefold dimension, but that substance to which the said dimension is inherent as in a subject. Nor does any remarkable absurdity follow from this opinion, viz. that an accident should pass out of one subject into another. For that passage only of a Form or adjunct out of one subject into another is impossible, whereby an ac­cident or Form being one in number, does leave its whole subject, and pass into another: but if a substantial or accidental Form, does not go out of its whol sub­ject, but remain therein, it is not absurd that it should go out of one part into ano­ther. Therefore every dimension may receive any Body, as one part of the dimension of the whol Universe, may contain also some part of the Universe in it.

Finally, Neither does that follow from this opinion, that there can be places actually infinite, or that a place can have a place, or that a place, can change its place, as it is in the 4. of Physicks Chap. 4. Text 37. For the parts of water are in water, as in their whol, and in space as in their place: which if they are finite, they have finite Spaces answerable, if infinite, they have infinite. Moreover since all the water changes place, the parts also of the water change place: yet place does not change place, nor is there a place of place. But as the whol and parts are transferred: so also the whol and parts change place: but the space which is part of the Universal space, remaines immovable. For neither a River, or Heaven or a Vessel, or any such thing is a place, but that space wherein a River, Heaven or a Vessel or any other thing is contained.

Didacus Masius out of Philoponus and other Defenders of Space, does thus de­scribe the nature thereof. The nature thereof is a body: for it consists of three di­mensions, Longitude, Latitude, and Profundity: yet is it immaterial; because it has no matter nor form. For it ought to penetrate the thing placed, according to all its dimensions: but if it were material it could not penetrate. And therefore it is also indivisible; because from it no parts can be taken away. For division can only have place in such things as consist of matter: and moreover it is separa­ [...]ed from the Bodies placed therein. For the same space in number which contains t [...]. Wine in the Flagon, the same receives Air, and when that is gone Water or some other Liquor. And therefore it receives not its individual nature from the Bodies, but of the bodies within whose sides it is contained, as the space in the Fla­gon from the Flagon; that in the Air from the Air. Moreover it is affected with no qualities; because it is neither white, nor black, nor hot, nor cold. And there­fore it seems rather a Mathematical Body, separate from all sensible matter, then a Physical and natural body. Also it penetrates al bodies which it imbraces in its Lap, yet without division, as sweetness penetrates through the whol Body of the Milk [Page 36]without dividing the same. For so it penetrates all bodies which it contains, as to fi [...] them according to all their parts and dimensions, but not so as to divide them. Finally, there is one space in the whol univers [...] and world, equal thereunto, which in divers parts receives divers Bodies. Nor when a Body is moved from place to place, does it carry its Space with it, but it passes out of one part of the Space into another, the space it self remaining wholly immovable.

Now Franciscus Petricius does thus conceive of Place. First, He s [...]ies it is a common Notion of all men; both that the [...] is space, and that it is somwhat, see­in they have coyned these Terms, Dimension, Distance, Inter [...]al, Space: and that this consent arose from their Sences. For al m [...]n do see that the Heaven is distant from the Earth, the East from the West, the Head from the Feet: and local motion and the migration of bodies out of one place into another, do teach the same thing. For where there was Water before, the water being Po [...]ed forth, Air [...]hters into its place, and water again fils the place of Air.

Now he saies this Space was before all other things produced by God the great Work-master, inasmuch as all other things stood in need thereof, and without it they could not be. And whereas it is hard to know what Space is; he saies it is no wonder: for all the Qualities of Bodies whereby they incur into our senses, are la­ter than the Bodies themselves: but Space is different from Bodies, yea and is before Bodies. For he makes Space the first of all worldly things, yea before the world it self. For if the world (saies he) should be destroied, and reduced to nothing that space in which the world is now, as in its place would remain quite empty. But it [...] will again make new Heavens and a new Earth there is space before­hand, which can contain new Heavens and a new Earth. For its being now full does not belong to the Essence of Space (no more than the form belongs to the Essence of materia p [...]ima, though it be never without some form) but a plenitude accidental ther [...]unto. For it happens by reason of the Bodies, which are al differrent therefrom. And he saies that Space is no otherwise a place, than as it affords a place for bodies to abide in, and of its own nature, before it is a place, it is a part of the universal space. And to that com [...]on objection, If Space be any thing, it is either a Substance or Accident, he answers: Space of it self, since it goes before the world, and is without the world, is no worldly thing, excepting that part thereof which contains the world, or which the world possesses with its Body but goes before al worldly things, whether bodily or not bodily, Substantial or not Substantial, and as all things are accidents to it, so is it to all things: and that this same space was unknown to the Authors of the Predicaments. And at last he de­fines Space to be an hypostatical extension, subsisting of it self, inherent in nothing, But if it must needs be of some predicament: if (saies he) that be a substance, which sustains other things, which subsists of it self, which is not inherent in any other thing, then Space is perfectly a Substance. For Space subsists of it self, it rests upon nothing, it needs nothing, to help it to be, or to sustain it but it self sustains substances, and so enables them to be, and it supports all other things in nature. Also that it is the Original of Quantity, and that it has length, breadth, depth, and all dimensions: also that it is never moved in whol or in part, but whatsoever things are moved, are moved through this space, so that it self is wholly unmoved and unmovable, What he surther writes at large see in his Book de spacto Physico. This one thing only I ad. The Quantity of a Body, is moved with the body it self whose Quantity it is: but as Aristotle himself saies, a body translated into the place of another, possesses the same place in number and nature, which that body into whose place it comes did before possess. For example sake, Water succeeds Air in the same numerical place; and so the Quantity of the Air and Water, are nume­rically different from the Quantity of the Space; since each remains in its own body, though it takes up and possesses another place. And seeing the Place is no part of the thing placed, nor any part (as has been shewed) of the ambient body, what other thing I pray you can we immagine, when both the Ambient Body, and the thing placed be removed but a Space having three dimensions of Length, Breadth, Depth? And so much for this point. Let us conclude this hard discourse with an excellent saying of Julius Caesar Scaliger in the 297. Exercitation. 'Tis ea­sier for any man to oppose the Sayings and Opinions of [...]ise men, then safely to com [...]i [...] his own Opinion to the judgment of others. Nor do I ever forget, but alwaies put my self in mind, to see, consider, remember, how weak the Eies of our minds are to pry into he [...] secret C [...]osets of Nature.

Chap. 8. Concerning Time.

A Peculiar adjunct of Essence, is that which Phylosophers cal Duration; that is, as they say, a continual tract of being, as Scaliger rightly has it, How Du­ration dif­fers from Essence & Existency? in his 350. Exerci ation Sect. 7. For Duration is the measure of the being of every thing; and in every thing, these three follow one another. Essence Existence, and Duration: which hold this order, that Essence is first, Existence next, and Duration last of al: Now Duration differs, as wel from the Essence as the Existence of a thing. And in­deed from the Essence of a thing it differs really. For there are divers things which have the same Essence, and yet have different durations. But from the existence of a thing, Duration differs not really. For it is in a manner nothing else for a thing to dure, than to exist; and it is al one for a thing to be of a short or long existency, and for a thing to have a short or a long duration. And as the extension of Quantity is to Quantity (which nevertheless do not r [...]ally differ) so is the Duration of Ex­istency to Existency it self, yet there is some difference between them. For the Nature of existency, is only this, that a thing be out of its Causes, and actually som­what; But Duration signifies the extention of a thing, in this its being, and the con­tinuation or abidance of the existency. Duration therefore properly belongs to existency, not to Quiddity, and it alwaies presupposes existency, without which it can neither be, nor be understood. Duration defined. Hence therefore Duration is not amiss defi­ned, that it is the Extension of the Existence of a thing: or the abidance of a thing in its Essence.

Now such as the Essence of things is, such is also its Measure: and as many manners as there are of a things abiding in its Essence, so many durations it has. A three­fold Dura­tion. As things therefore are threefold, so is there a threefold duration, or as some phrase it, a threefold measure of Duration; Time, Age, Eternity. For the mea­sure of the duration of things, which are no waies infinite, and which have both a Beginning and End, is Time: The measure of the duration of things, which are partly finite, viz. in respect of their beginning, and partly infinite because they have no end, is called Aevum, Age or Aeveternity. But Eternity is the measure of the dura­tion, of that which is absolutely infinite, having neither Beginning nor End. But we are now to treat of Time.

Al Men do frequently talk of Time, and are often mentioning To day, Yesterday to Morrow, and tell of daies, months and years; and in so doing they acknowledg that time is really somewhat: but what that is, very few can tel: and there have alwaies been sundry opinions about the nature of time, as may be seen in Francisc. Piccollimineus his Book de Nat. com. Affect. ch. 13. Aristotle reckons up three and re­futes them in 4. Phys. ch. 10. For some would have time to be the motion of the Hea­vens; others the greatest of the celestial Spheres, others Motion simply considered. That we [...] ay therefore find out what Time is, we must know, that time may be two waies considered; First as the internal duration of a thing which has had be­ginning, and shal have end, and is successively continued, and to say all in a word, of a thing which is movable; Secondly for the measure of the said duration by some mo [...]ion: and in this latter sense time is commonly understood by natural Phyloso­phers, who hold that time is not without motion, nor can be understood without motion. For then we understand Time, when we understand there has been mo­tion, and when we perceive no motion, we are ignorant that any time has passed: as ap­pears in such as sleep: For they when they are awaked, joyning the moment wherein they fel asleep with the moment of their waking, conceive no time to have passed between; which that Tale shews cited by Aristotle in Lib. 4. Phys. ch. 11. t. 97. Alike Story to which others relate, of three men at Athens who being drunk at a Festival, slept three daies together. For when one of them did awake the next night after that in which he first lay down, and saw the Stars stil shining, supposing that first night was not yet over, nor the Sun yet risen, he composed himself again to sleep, til at last a waking with his companions on the third day, he returned to the Feast, believing it was the next day following that night wherein he went drunk to bed. And a Story or Fable not unlike is related by Pliny in his 1 Book [Page 38]of his Natural History ch. Time is somwhat of Motion 52. of Epimenides. And dayly experience suggests the the like. Time therefore is not without motion, yea and somwhat thereof is moti­on. For Time and Motion are perceived together. For though we sit stil in the dark, and perceive no motion by any of our Senses: if we conceive any in our minds, pre­sently time presents it self therewith; and again, as often as we think of time, some motion does also therewith offer it self to our minds. Time therefore is somthing of Motion: which what it is, let us thus further search out.

Whatsoevever is moved, is moved from somwhat to somwhat, that is to say, from the term from which, to the term to which; so that between those two terms there lies a Magnitude. Now all Magnitude is continued. And therefore that mo­tion which is made continually, through a continued magnitude, must it self be con­tinued: and consequently Time also must be continued: for so great as is the mo­tion, so great is the Time: and a longer motion is performed in a longer time, a shorter in a shorter. Moreover in magnitude, there is former and latter. For eve­ry magnitude is divisible into parts, which are so disposed, that some go before, others come after. For which cause, there is proportionably somwhat which comes before, and somwhat which goes after in motion: and those parts of a moti­on are first, by which the Movable is moved over the first parts of magnitude, and those latter, by which it is moved over the last. And for the same cause, also in time there must be a former and a latter; and so motion inasmuch as it has former and latter, agrees with time, so that by the distinction of former and latter in motion, we come to the knowledg of time. For when we consider two Instances or two extreams, wherewith motion is terminated, and understand that there is a middle space betwixt these two extreams, presently we conceive time. Contrari­wife, when we conceive any thing under the notion of one Instant, and do not think of two Instances one former, the other latter: we perceive no time at all.

From what has been said we therefore gather, The De­finition of Time. A twofold number. that Time is the number of Motion in respect of former and latter. Which Definition that it may be more rightly understood and explained, these things are to be observed. In the first place, that Number is two-fold, the one Nmubring as two three &c. the other Numbred as two Stones, three Trees, four Men. The former, which is also called formal number, and wherewith we reckon, is one Ens or being of it self, viz. discreet Quantity, by cogitation abstracted from all matter, and perceptible by the mind: and it is common to all things, nor is multiplied according to the variety of things numbred. Or the word Number is taken two waies; First for Quantity discreet, or a multi­tude consisting of parts distinct one from another, or for any measure though conti­nued. Now time is not a number in the first, but in the last sense; nor is time a number wherewith we count (seeing time is a continued Quantity, number a Quan­tity discreet) but a number counted or reckoned, viz. the parts of motion recko­ned up, For we must not here pass over, that some distinguish betwixt a number nu­merable and numbred, and say that a number numerable are things, which have an aptitude to be numbred and distinguished by the understanding, although act­ually they are not numbred: but a number numbred are things, which are already actually numbred by somebody. And they say that time is a number nume­rable, or a motion, which may be distinguished, so as to have some parts going be­fore, others coming after, although there were no man actually to number the same. From whence it appears, that Time is a real thing. For the aptitude to be numbred, or the numerability, does not depend upon the numberer, but is in the time and motion it self. A number numerable is again twofold: the one which Co­heres to things which are really separate one from another: and such a number time is not: the other, consists of parts distinguished one from another, not really, but by our thoughts, as if a man should conceive some continued magnitude divided in­to certain parts; and such a number is time. For it is a flux and continual spin­ning out, of the parts of motion, which perpetually follow one another.

Moreover this also is to be observed in this place; A Mea­sure two­fold. that a Measure is twofold: one formal which is called mensurata measured, or mensurabilis mensurable; the o­ther Measuring which is called active: which others express by saying that time is the number of motion actively or passively. Formal Measure, is that which when it [Page 39]is in any subject, it makes it formally measurable; and thus every quantity, in­herent in any Subject, makes the same to be formally measurable, and this measure is as it were an accident in that thing whose measure it is. But Measure measuring, is that which as a rule measures another thing. For this is alwaies without the thing which it numbers and measures.

Hence therfore a Question arises: Whether Time be a measure or number, Time is a Measure Measured. with which being it self out of motion, we number moiton: or whether time be the measurable motion it self? And although Authors say in both senses that time is a number or measure: yet primarily and principally, Time is a formal measure, and a number which is numbred. Aristot. 1 Phys. c. 11. t. 102 and 12. t. 110. For the nature of time does not depend thereupon in that therewith we number other things; but herein it con­sists, in that it is a motion numbred according to former and latter. Moreover to be a measure ( viz. measuring or active) is a thing respective: but time is a thing ab­solute. It is not therefore essential to time to be a measure measuring. For as the essence of an Ell yard does not depend upon measuring, viz. that we should there­with measure Cloth or any other thing: but herein in that it is a stick or other ma­terial of so many or so many Foot long, to which it afterward happens that we mea­sure somwhat therewith: so the Essence of time consists herein, that it is a motion numbred, and distinguished according to former and latter, which after­ward is followed by this adjunct, viz. to become the measure of other things. So by time, which is described by the conversion of the Heavens, we measure the motions of other things; and by the parts of time, hours, daies, months, years, we measure some whol motion or other.

Nor because time is a number; Time is not a thing made. In Time two things are consi­derable. 1. Its Es­sence. 2. Affecti­on. and a number does not exist with [...]ut the Action of our mind: does it therefore follow, that time is only a feigned thing, and a notion of our Brains. For we must know that here are two things to be considered in time: First its Essence, which is a certain duration of the parts of motion; The other is its Affliction or Adjunct, which is numerability and mensurability. The former, viz. the absolute essence of time, does no waies depend upon our understanding, but it would remain though our understanding were gone. But mensurability does in some sort depend upon the operation of our mind. For seeing the parts of Time are either actually measured; or have an aptitude to be numbred: according to the Act and as they are actually numbred, they depend upon the operation of our mind, which being taken away, yet the mensurability would remain nevertheless. Nor when our Minds compares the parts of time past and future, joyns them, and reckons; does it fe [...]gn any thing which is not, but finds out the parts which were be­fore really in the motion. For as an Ell-yard, when we do not think thereof, has the Quantity of so many or so many Foot: yet the distinction and the marking them out, is the work of our mind and Art: so also Motion is of it self in nature, according to succession, without the operation of our minds; but the comparing of the parts going before and coming after, and the reckoning up the said parts, is the Action of our Mind.

We must also in this place take notice: that although time be a reall thing, Time is no perma­nent thing yet it is no permanent thing, which has its parts together actually present and perma­nent: but it is a Successive thing, which has no part actually existing, but all its parts in a continual flux and succession, so that when one is past another presently follows.

And we must also here enquire for better understanding of the definition: What that thing is whose mo­tion is un­derll [...]nd, in the de­finition of Time? what things motion it is which is meant in the said definition? And we are to know, that chiefly and principally is understood the Motion of Heaven, which is of all others most known, most regular, uniform, and perpetual: but especially the motion of the first Movable or Primum mobile, of the Sun and the Moon, by whose Motions Daies, Nights, Months and Years are described. But the common People attribute no time to the motion of the rest of the Stars; because their motions are to the vul­gar unknown. Howbeit Mathematicians, do not quite omit the same. And as the motion of Heaven is universally common to al Nations: even so al Nations use this Time. Howbeit, we must not say, that time is not at all in other Motions; for see­ing there is former and latter in every motion and it may be accordingly numbred: in every motion, also there wil be time.

Out of what hath been said another Question arises; Whether there be one time only or ma­ny? Whether there be one time or many. To which that an answer may be given, we must know. First That one may here be said to be one in Number or in Sort. Secondly, That time as hath been said is more or less principal, more principal is of the heavens, less principal and secondary, of all other motions. Thirdly, That there are two things in time, as the Schoolmen speak, the one Ma­terial which is motion, the other Formal which is number. Hence we answer to the Question, That the first and principal time, is but one in Number. For as there is every where, and in all Nations but one motion of the Heaven: so is there but one time, depending thereupon. But if time be taken absolutely, for the number of every motion, it is not one in number: but formally indeed it is one in Sort, but materially it is many being Multiplied, according to the Multiplication of motion. For as seven trees and seven Horses, do not differ as they are seven, but as they are Horses and Trees: even so, what ever motions are together, do not differ as they are numbred according to former and latter, but as they are peculiar motions. Time therefore is formally one with all, for the Nature of present, past, and future is common to all, and those things which are distinguished according to these dif­ferences of time, they are also distinguished according to time: and they which agree in any of these differences, they also agree in time although they differ other­waies.

And now there comes another Question; Whether in the defini­tion of time Rest should be added? Whether Rest should be added in the defi­nition of time? Because not only the motions of things, but also their rest, is num­bred by time, and as wel rest as motion, is in time. But no evident reason per­swades, that we should mention Quiet in the definition of time. For time is of it self the measure of motion, but of rest, by accident. For Rest because it hath not former and latter, cannot of it self be measured and numbred. For rest is measu­red by time, either as it is a privation of motion, for the measure of privation and habit is one and the same: and a thing is said to have rested so long a time, as it has not been moved, or as it should have been moved, if it had been moved all that while; or because the rest of one body is alwaies joyned with the motion of ano­ther, by means whereof, the rest is measured.

And seeing time and motion do hang so one upon another, Whether time do really dif­fer from motion? this Question must al­so be discussed: Whether time do really differ from motion. Now the sense of this Question must be first observed. For the Question is not concerning the time of the Primum Mobile or first moveable, compared with the motions of other Bodies. For hereof there is no Question, and all do grant, that the time of the motion of Heaven, differs really from the motion of other Bodies; seeing they are in several subjects; but the Question is, Whether any time compared with that motion whose number and measure it is, do really differ therefrom. And although others do think otherwise: yet theirs seems to be the truer opinion, who conceive that motion does not really differ from time. For time is nothing but motion numbred, accor­ding to priority and posteriority.

Finally, What we are to un­derstand by priority. This remaines to be explained in our definition: what is to be under­stood by fore and after or Priority and Posteriority. Touching which we are to take notice, that fore and after are not taken here absolutely, for a bare respect but as added to the subject, and concretly for the parts of motion, including such a re­spect. For priority and posteriority do in this place signifie nothing else, then the parts of motion numbred, according as they last, and one follows ano­ther.

The Parts of time are Past and Future: The parts of time. Now no part of time. Whether time gene­rate and corrupt. which parts are both distinguished and coupled by the present moment. Yet is the present moment no part of time: As a point is no part of a Line. For so is now to time, as a point is to a Line: now that which is continued is not made up of indivisible parts.

Lastly, Concerning time we must not omit to enquire whether it be in the power of time to generate or corrupt things. And although it is commonly said that time does produce and perfect some things, and corrupt other some, and the Poets common­ly say, Time consumes all things; Time is a devourer: Time is able to change all things, and that nothing is stonger then time, as may chiefly be seen in Ovid his 4. de Tristibus, Eleg. 6. Yet we breifly answer with Scaliger in his 352. Exercitati­on: That Time as time hath no Force to effect any thing. For seeing that it is Quan­tity, [Page 41]it acts nothing. And all those effects are to be ascribed to things, which are in or with Time. But Time it self is therefore said to corrupt or generate things, because the Application of Natural Agents for the corruption or Generation of any thing happens in time. And so much for Time.

Whereunto for Affinities sake, though they do not properly belong to this place, Aevum. I think fit to ad a few things touching Aevum and Eternity. The term Aevum, al­though in that signification as it is distinguished from Eternity, and comes short thereof as having a beginning; it was not used by Aristotle nor the ancient Peripa­ [...]eticks and Platonists: Yet is it at this day very much used by School divines and other noble Phylosophers, who distinguish it both from Time and Eternity, taking it for such a duration as hath had a beginning, but shall have no end, which they attribute to Angels. Now touching this same Evum or Aeveternity although there are sundry opinions of Authors: yet this shal suffice us to say in this place; that all the Nature of Aevum or Aeveternity, does consist herein, that it is the Measure of the duration of those things, which have a beginning but no end: or as some will have it, It is the duration of things which have no end but have had a beginning. Now the way to measure this Aevum wherewith we are best acquainted, is by its coexistency, as they speak, and its relation to Time. For we say the Angels have dured 5661. years, which is the Time since the worlds Creation. Hence it is manifest, that Aevum differs from time and Eternity: from time in respect of the end which Time hath, but Aevum or Aeveternity hath not; from Eternity, in respect of its begin­ning, which Evum hath, but Eternity hath not. Which Leo Hebraeus expressed in his third Dialogue of Love: The Aeveternity of Angels (saies he) is placed in the consines of Time and Eternity.

But Eternity, although there are other significations thereof: Eternity what it is yet properly it signifies a Duration which hath neither beginning nor Bnd, In which sense, we fre­quently meet with this definition thereof in Boetins: Eternity is a total and perfect possession of a boundless Life, all at once. For all the Essence of eternity consists in immutability or unchangeableness. For that which is Eternal neither begins, nor ends, nor is any way changed; but is alwaies the same, and hath its whol Essence all at once. Whence there results two proprieties of eternity, First, Proprie­ties of E­ternity. that it hath no bound, in respect of beginning or end: Secondly, that it is all at once. For though we attribute daies and years to etermity, yet we do it only for our better under­standings sake. All which Plotinus considering, in his 3. Ennead. Book 9. Ch. 2. he saies, Eternity is a life all together, alwaies wholly present, and not now one part and after another. But these things belong not to this place. I conclude therefore with Augustine, in his 12. B. de Civitate Dei, Ch. 12. Nothing lasts long which hath once an end and al the bounded spaces of all Ages, if compared to boundless eter­nity, are not to be accounted smal, but nothing at all. Six hundred Millions of years or that sum multiplied by as many, so that there were no name for the pro­duct or total Sum, yet all compared to Eternity is nothing; and if the said sum be substracted from Eternity, not once or twice, but as often as any accountants are able to substract the same, yet should they never reach to the beginning of eternity, which hath no beginning.

Chap. 9. Concerning Motion.

WE come now to a remarkable Adjunct of Natural Bodies, viz. Motion, by the knowledg of which we are brought acquainted with the greatest part of the most abstruse things in Nature; and by the guidance whereof, in a manner al the knowledg of Natural things hath been found out. Now to Question whether there is any Motion, is the part only of a contentious and froward person: since it is discerned by al our sences. And therefore Diogenes did wel, who having heard the reasons of Zeno, whereby he endeavoured to prove that there was no motion, he judged them not worth the answering, but only Rose up and walked, intima­ting that in things subject to sence, we should believe our sences. Which Aristotle also approves in his S. Physic. Chap. 3. T. 32. to say that nothing moves, and to go about to prove it, omitting our sences, is weakness of Ʋnderstanding.

But as it is most known that there is motion: so what is the Nature thereof, is suffi­ciently obscure. And therefore, that we may the better understand what motion is, we will in the first place propound Aristotle's definition of motion, and diligently consider the same: by which means we hope to attain to a good degree of knowledg touching the Nature of motion. Thus therefore Aristotle desines Motion in the 3. of his Physicks, Aristotle his defini­tion of mo­tion. Ch. 1. T. 16. Motion is the Act of that thing which is in a possibility, in as much as it is in a possibility, or of that which is moveable, in as much as it is Move­able.

In this definition first we must diligently consider the word Entelecheia (transla­ted Act) which as it is most usual in Aristotle, and every where to be found in his works; so is the signification thereof not so wel known, and many have taken pains to find out the true meaning thereof: so that it is reported of Hermolaus Barba [...]us a very learned Man, that having once attained to speak with a spirit, he desired no­thing else of him, but that he would expound what the word Entelecheia in Aristotle, did signifie.

In the first place, Endele­cheia and Entele­cheia differ we are to note that the words Endelecheia and Entelecheia are different: although some do confound them, wherein they are to blame. For as these words do herein differ, that Endelecheia is more ancient, being used by Me­nander and Plato in his Timaeus, Yea, and commonly by the people of Greece; but Enteletheia is a new word, witness Tully in the 1. of his Tusculans Questions, and by Aristotle either invented or frequently used; so they differ also in Derivation and Signification. For Endelecheia does signifie a continual and perpetual motion or agitation, so called from en cai dein cai Helam to echomenon, because it is in the sub­ject and draws and moves the same, as appears from that Greek proverb Ranis endelechousa coilainei petran, the stil falling drop hollows the stone. From Ari­stotle in his 2. de generat. & corrupt. Chap. 10. and other Greek Authors.

But Entelecheia is derived from [...]n and telos or form Enteles and Echein, Entele­cheia what it is? to have its end, to have perfection; and Entelecheia if you would render it word for word, is the having of perfection, or the possession of perfection: and Entelecheia is alwaies in Aristotle opposed to possibility or aptitude, as may be seen in the 3. of his Physick Ch. 1. T. 2. in the 5. of his Metaphysicks Ch. 2. and in his 2. de Anima. Ch. 1. T. 2. Out of which may be collected, what Entelecheia truly signifies. For seeing a thing is said to be in a possibility to be somwhat, when as yet it is not that thing which possibly it may be: Entelecheia must signifie to be really and actually that which it is said to be, and really to have attained to be such a thing, and no longer to be in a potentiality thereunto: and Entelecheia must be that which perfects and fils up the Possibility or Aptitude of a thing; and makes that the thing may now really and perfect­ly be said to be that, which before it was said to be only in way of possibility or Aptitude: And to speak all in short Entelecheia is the [...]lling up of the Potentiality or Aptitude of a thing.

This being the signification of this word (which though new to the dul multitude, yet was known to wise men to whom Aristotle wrote and not to pedants, as Scali­ger in his 307. Exercit. Sect. 39. has it) it is cheifly attributed to the substantial Form, For it is the substance and perfection of a thing, and because of it a thing is really that which it is said to be. And indeed, as Franc. Piccolhomineus saies in his 4. Ch. de Motu, Entelecheia is applied, as well to formes free from matter as to such as are joyned thereto: which opinion of his seems to be countenanced in the 3. B. of Physicks Ch. 7. Text 3. Howbeit Zabarella herein dissents from him in his Book de Mente hum. Ch. 7. who denies substances severed from matter to be pro­perly called Entelecheias: and he saies that only in one place in Aristotle, viz. 2. Me­taphys. 1.49. the supream or first intelligence is termed Entelecheia, and that not without Reason. The same word is also attributed to accidents or accidental Forms; seeing also because of the things themselves they are so called, and they sil that possibility and Aptitude which the things had to receive accidents. Yea, And as it appears out of Aristotle in his 2 de Anima, Ch. 1. T. 2. Entelecheia is not only attributed to forms, whether substantial or accidental, whence the operations pro­ceed; but also to the operations proceeding from the forms. in a word Entele­cheia, signifies all that, by meanes of which every thing, is really that which it is said to be.

But for the word Entelecheia, Aristotle often uses the word Energeia, Energ [...]ia what it sig [...]fi [...]s & whether it disser from Entele­cheia. which sig­nifies not only operation, as Zabarel conceives, who in his Book de mente humana Ch. 7. teaches that Energeia signifies only operation, and formes conjoyned with the matter, whose essence differs from operation as an accident, he denies to be called Energies; and he saies, among substantial Forms, it is only rightly attribu­ted, to those that are free from matter. Howbeit this word is attributed as wel to Forms joyned with matter, as to those without it. For Aristotle in his 9. Metaph. Ch. 6. simply opposes to be in energy, unto being in potentiality or Aptitude, and in the same place he cals the substantial Form joyned to the matter Energeia: and up and down in the same Book, he cals the substantial Forms of things, Energeias, as may be seen, cheifly in the 8. Chap. which he also does in 8. Metaph. c. 2. And in the 4. B. ch. 2 Energein signifies not only to operate, but really to be. Also, that Energeia is used to signifie the accidental Form, appears from the 3. of his Physicks, Ch. 2. T. 15, and Ch 3. T. 18. but more evidently from the 20. Metaph. Ch. 8. where he thus writes: Seeing every thing is divided into Act and Aptitude, I call the Act of that which was before only in power, Energeia, Motion.

To these Greek words, the Latin word Actus does answer, which does not, Actus or Act what it means. in this place, signifie Action only; But that, from which every thing is said to be what it is. For as Scaliger saies in his 359. Exercitation Sect. 2. we must borrow ordinary words to signisie abstruse matters: which seem harsh to Novices, and ridiculous to curious Ciceronians. Now according to Scaliger in the same place, An Act is that being, which wants nothing to make it be what it is, but has all its causes.

Now here in the definition of Motion Enteleche [...]a is taken, What E [...] ­telecheia signifies in the place. An act is twofold. neither for the perfect form, nor for the operation alone; but for a certain imperfect Act. For there is a twofold Act, one perfect, which when it comes, it expel [...] al Aptitude or potenti­ality, and leaves none of it behind: another imperfect, with which there alwaies remains somwhat of possibility; which when it is taken away, the Act is also taken away; and such an Act is Motion. For seeing that is called moveable, which may be moved: motion is the fulfiling and perfecting of that possibility, in regard of which a thing is called moveable, and makes that it hath not only a possibility of being moved, but that it is now really moved, indeed and in truth. Howbeit this Entelecheia does not take away al possibility, but only so perfects the Body move­able, that it retaines yet the possibility of being more moved, until at length it come to the utmost term of motion, to which while it is moved, it must needs have the power of motion. For truly the thing moveable, while it is in the term from which, is not yet moved; but while it is in the term to which, it is moved no longer, but now it is moved, and ceases from motion. But then it is truly said to be mo­ved, when it is now in the Act, in which before, when it was in the term from which, it was not, but only had a possibility of attaining the same; and when it yet tends to that further act, which in respect of the term from which, it hath not, but may attain. For if it had already the last term, it would be no longer moved thereunto. For which cause it is also said in the definition of Motion: that Motion is the Act of that which is in possibility. For whatsoever is moved, as may appear by the premises, is part in act and partly in possibility. In act, in respect of the Form and of that term which by motion it hath already gained, and actually pos­sesses: in possibility, in respect of that which it hath not yet obtained, and for the sake whereof it is still moved. For examples sake: Water which is in heating, is said to be moved, that is to say altered. For it hath already some degrees of heat, and has the possibility of gaining yet more, and does likewise gain them by growing warmer: and when it has attained all the degrees, it is then termed hot water; but is not said any longer to grow hot, or to be altered and moved.

Motion is there fore neither a pure act, nor a pure possibility, Motion is an imper­fect act. But a certain mid­dle and imperfect act. And in every motion are found these three things: Some of the Form, which is by motion already attained; a power of receiving that form more perfectly and in a greater measure; a Flux and Progress or Tendenay to the said Form. Finally Aristotle adds in the definition, in as much as it is in possibility, to signifie that motion is not made in respect of that Form and term, which the moveable thing hath already attained. For a thing is no longer moved for the sake of that, which it already possesses; but for the sake of that term which it has not yet attained, and which it has a power to obtain. From what hath been said, [Page 44]'tis easie to gather wherein the Essence and formality of Motion does consist.

For seeing there are in every motion two things, Two things in Motion. one the form it self flowing; the other, the flux of the form: Motion formally, is neither simply a form, nor a form flowing, but a continual acquisition of Form, and the flux thereof, partly already acquired and partly to be acquired. For to be moved, is not to have the form; but, to be moved, is to tend to the form.

Moreover, To na­tural mo­tion are required. 1 A Mover. to all Physical or Natural motion, these things are required.

I. A Mover: For every thing which is moved, is moved by some other thing. For it is impossible that the same thing in respect of the same form, should be in Act and in Possiblity: But that which moves, or introduces any form, does actually possess the same; that which is moved has only a power to receive the form. And therefore it is not the same thing which moves and is moved. Howbeit touching this Axiome we must observe, that it is only to be understood of material things and natural bodies compleat, and of the motion of the who! compound; and that the intent of Aristotle in the 7. Physick. cap. 1. when he delivered this axiome was to deduce natural motion to one first Principle, and thereby to prove that there was one first mover, by which as by a first Principle, all bodies are moved: otherwise, unless this axio [...]e be warily understood and explained, many difficulties arise, seeing not only Animals are moved by an internal force, but also the Elements by an in­ward principle are carried to their place, where not only the body of the Element is moved by its form to its place, but also the form it self tends to its place. See al­so beneath Book 2. ch. 3.

II. 2 A Mova­ble. A movable or thing moved, and hence every thing that naturally moves it self is divided into a part moving, and a part moved. Now that which moves must needs be with that which is moved, or that which primarily does move any thing, without the Intervention of any intermediate agent, ought to touch that thing which it moves, and to be very neer unto the same. For we cannot so much as imagine, how any thing can suffer from that, by which it is not touched, or how any thing can act upon that which it does not touch. For since operation follows the Essence of a thing: where the thing is not, there it's operation cannot be. For though the first mover be absent from the thing moved in respect of its substance, yet is it joyned therwith, by the Virtue which it sends forth. And thus the next mover and the thing moved, are alwaies together, and every action is caused by touching. Now motion is in the thing moved. For the Act is in that thing, whose act it is. Yet is not the action of the mover different from the act of the thing moved, but there is one act of the Agent and the Patient, For it is one and the same thing which the mover produces by acting, The A­ction of the mover and the Passion of the moved are but one motion. and which is produced in the Patient by suffering. And the Action of the mover and the passion of the moved are one only motion, not really di­stinct one from another; but only respectively, viz. in as much as the same Act, does proceed from the mover as from its Principle, and is received by the Moved, as the Patient: which is wel exprest by Aristotle in the 3. Phys. ch. 3. t. 22. For to be the Action of this in that, and of that from this, differs respectively. So that the same moti­on as it proceeds from the Agent, is an action, as it is received by the Patient, a Passion. And the heating of water by fire, is but one action: which as it proceeds from the Agent, viz. the fire, is called an Action, as it is received by the water, a Passion. And therefore Action and Passion are in one Subject. For seeing passion is in the Patient, and action really differs not from passion: the action must also needs be in the same Patient. Yet this must be observed that we spake here of a transient action: but not of an immanent action, which abides in the Agent.

III. 3 & 4 Terms of motion. The Term from which. IV. The Term to which. For seeing every motion is a kind of change; it must needs go from somwhat, which is called the term from which, to somwhat, which is called the term to which. And there are neither more nor less, than these two terms. For though one motion may have many terms to which: yet they are not the last & total, or they are not primarily intended and for themselves, or they are not intrinsecal. But in motion we are chiefly to regard the term to which. For that is it for the sake whereof the movable is moved, and from it the Unity, Distinction and Contrariety of Motion are chiefly taken. For seeing motion is a kind of continual progress from the term from which, to the term to which, and the term from which is rejected, and the term to which acquired: just­ly [Page 45]therefore the motion receives its denomination and distinction from the term to which.

V. 5 Time: For no motion is performed in an Instant, but Successively and in Time. Time. For since motion is the Act of a Being in possibility, and has no abiding Essence: of necessity the thing moved, must be partly in act, and partly in possibility: and therefore motion must be successive. For if it were all together, it were all in Act, and the thing could no longer be said to be in motion, but already mo­ved.

VI. 6 Continuity, or Unity of Motion, in respect of time, and the term to which. Continuity For the Continuity and Succession of the Motion depends chiefly, upon the Term to which the motion is made; and the motion is said to be performed successively, because the Term to which the motion tends, is successively gained. But that a motion may be one in number, three things are requisite: one movable, one term to which; and one continued time. To which a fourth may be added, the Term from which. For one motion cannot proceed from divers Terms.

What is the Nature of Motion has been explained hitherto, Motion & Mutation differ. it remains that we now shew you what are the Sorts of Motions. Where in the first place you are to take notice, that there is a difference betwixt mutation and motion. Metabole or Mutation is of larger extent, and signifies every variation of a thing, whether the terms in respect of which the thing is varied, be positive and contrary, or contra­dictary: but Kinesis or Motion properly so called, is not of so large an extent, but is conversant betwixt terms (upon which, especially the term from which its na­ture chiefly depends) which are contrary, or if mediate, yet having the nature of contraries.

Motion therefore properly so called is conversant betwixt contraries. Motion is made be­twixt con­traries. Now we term such things in this place contraries, not only which do most of all differ under the same kind: but whatsoever positive terms, by the coming of one of which another is changed, whether it be in respect of contrary qualities, or according to intention, or according to extension. Whatsoever therefore ought to be reckoned for a term of motion, must have these two conditions. First that it have a contrary in such a manner as has been said; so that the motion must pass from one contrary as the Term a quo from which, unto the other contrary as the term ad quem, to which. Moreover, that must of necessity be attained, which terminates the motion of it self, and not without the change of the Subject, which is performed by real action and passion.

From which may easily be gathered, Motions are only in Quantity, Quality & Place. that true motion is only in three Predica­ments, viz. Quantity, Quality, and Ʋbi or Place; or that in respect of that thing to which the motion tends, it may be reduced to these three Predicaments. For both the forms of these Predicaments have contrariety, and positive opposite terms; nor can their change happen without the change of the Subject.

But Generation and Corruption which are changes in the substance of a thing, Genera­tion and Corruption are not properly Motion. are not properly Motions. For that Contrariety necessary to motion, is not found in substances. Moreover, since every thing which is moved is an actual Being; but that which is generated is no actual Being (for if it were already, there were no need that it should be generated) therefore Generation cannot be a Motion. Lastly, Every motion is continued and performed in time: but generation is not per­formed in time, but in a moment, and therefore also it cannot be a Motion. For substantial forms being indivisible and not capable of more or less, cannot be suc­cessively acquired and by piecemeal.

Howbeit we must here observe, A two fold Ac­ception of Ginerati­on & Cor­ruption. that Generation and corruption are taken two waies, either only for the acquisition or loss of a substantial form, without prece­dent alteration: or for the introduction of a form, with alteration which went be­fore the same. Generation and Corruption taken in the former Sense, are no moti­ons, but are performed in an Instant: but in the latter sense they may be allowed for Motions.

Moreover, this must not be omitted neither. That Suceession in motion is considered two waies: Primarily and chiefly as was said before, in respect of the form, which seeing it may be intended and remitted, and has certain degrees, in respect of which it is capable of more and less, it therefore successively acquires those degrees, viz. one before, another after. But since the substantial form has no such degrees, it [Page 46]cannot be intended, nor remitted, nor is it successively introduced, but in an instant and all at once. Afterward there is said to be a succession in respect of the Subject, which is movable: which succession others seem to call extension. For since a thing movable is divisible, and has some parts formore others hinder: and the mo­ver acts first upon the formore parts and which are neerest it self, and afterwards upon the hinder and more remote: also in this manner we may grant that Gene­ration is made successivly. But doth these successions are considered, in motion properly so called: but the former holds more of the nature thereof: which being absent from Generation it cannot be called motion.

Moreover, it is evident, that there is no motion in Relation, Action, Passion, When, and Habit, the Predicaments so called. For those mutations which are made in them, do either not happen with the change of the subject, or not of themselves primarily, but consequently and by accident.

Motion therefore properly is only made out of one subject into another: The sorts of Motion. and there are three sorts thereof. In Quantity there is Augmentation and Diminution. For these two mutations have no common name. In Quality, there is Alteration. In Place, there is local motion from place to place.

To Motion Rest is opposed, Rest what it is. which is the Privation of Motion in that thing, which is naturally apt to be moved; and in as much as motion is made to attain rest, it may also be said to be the end and perfection of motion. So a body, when it has attai­ned its natural magnitude, ceases growing.

Rest is either natural, Rest two­fold. whose principle is internal, and to which the movable is na­turally enclined: So the Earth is naturally moved to the Centre, and rests there. Or Violent, whose Principle is external, when a body is kept by force in a place not natural thereunto; as when a stone or clod of Earth, is hung up in the Air.

Chap. 1. Of the World.

HIther to we have treated of a natural Body, as it is a General term, comprehending sundry sorts, and we have spoke of the common Principles and common adjuncts of a natural Body in general, without any consideration of the sorts: we are now to come to the several sorts of natural Bodies. And because the whol mass and heap of all Bodies natural, does make one total sum, which is called the World; before we treat of any sort of natural bodies, or of any part of the world, we must first speak of the whol; and explain what the world is, and what proprieties and adjuncts it has.

That which is by the Greeks termed Cosmos, because of its absolute and perfect Elegancy and Ornament the Latins call Mundus for the same cause: The sun­dry signifi­cations of the word Mundus which word because it signifies a thing which is absolute, perfect and comprehending in it many things orderly ranked, many things are so termed. Marsilius Ficinus on the 3. Book of Plotin. Bnead 1. makes two worlds, one intelligible, being the divine mind, the Pattern and Idea of this sensible world: the other sensible, viz. this which we behold, being the Image of the divine Pattern. Others do again divide these two worlds, and make more worlds. The first is the Archetype of Intelligible world, which is the divine mind or God himself, who contains in him the patterns and Ide­as of all things: the second is the angelical world, made up of the multitudes of Angels rank'd in their Hierarchies: the third is the Elementary, which is made up [Page 47]of Heaven and the Elements: the fourth is the great world, which contains alcrea­ted things, both corporeal and incorporeal: the fift, is the little world or Micro­cosme, which is Man.

We are in this place chiefly to treat of that world which consists of Heaven and Earth and the Bodies therein contained, and by another name is called to pan, the Universe because it comprehends al natural bodies, & to which the term Mundus or World does chiefly belong and which in regard of its order was given it by Pytha­goras as Plutarch saies in the 2. of his de placit. Phylosop. ch 7. though we may doubt hereof, because the word Cosmos is read up and down in the writings of Hermes Trismegistus. For this universe is truly Cosmos or Mundus, that is to say adorned, orderly marshalled, and beautiful. And therefore Ocellus inscribed his Book of natural things per [...]ou pantos, de universo, of the Universe, and touching these names he thus writes. I cal this whol world by the name of universe: For because it is distinguished and adorned with all things that are, therefore it has gained this name Cosmos and Pan, the world and Ʋniverse.

And as there are sundry significations of the term world, so there are sundry defi­nitions or descriptions thereof, which Franc. Piccollo nineus has collected in his Book de Mundo ch. 2. But those are of all other most pertinent and most fit for this place, which the Author of the Book de Mundo has in his 2. Chap. (for whether it be Aristotle's or Theophrastus's, or of some other Author is a question, of which see Ludovicus Vives upon Austin de Civitate Dei Lib. 4. Chap. 2. Collegium Conimbri­cense in the proaeme to Aristotles Physicks quest. 5. art. 4.) the first is this, The world is a Fabrick framed of the Heaven and Earth and the Natures in them contai­ned. The second is this, The world is the Order and Disposure of all things, which is preserved by and through God: which may thus I conceive be fitly joyned both in one. The world is that same orderly Disposure of all natural Bodies, proceeding from God and by him preserved.

The Matter therefore of the world are all natural Bodies, The worlds matter. not only simple but al­so mixt; not only liveless, but also living: yea and universally, a natural and sensible Body, as Aristotle saies in his 7. de Celo, ch. 9. t. 98. And the world is compounded of the Heaven, the four Elements, mixt bodies, inanimate and animate, mettals, things dug out of the ground, Plants, and Anima is or living Creatures.

But what is the Form of the world is not so evident, Touching the form of the world sundry O­pinions. and there are sundry opinions thereabouts. For some say God is the Form of the world; others a soul common to the whol Universe; others, the Heaven; others, its Figure; others, Order. But among these opinions, two have at this time the preheminence: the one is that which attributes a certain soul to the world for its Form: the other is that which makes or­der to be the form of the world. That the world has a soul is an old opinion, appro­ved by many most renowned men. It is countenanced by Hermes Trismegistus, Zoro­aster, and Orpheus. So in his Book called Nous pros Erme, All things (saies he) are ful of soul. And in his Book de Intellectione & sensu, he attributes a proper Sence and Intelligence unto the world. Pythagoras held the same, with Plato and his Follo­wers, who oft times cal the world a living Creature, and assign it a common soul, which every where through Land and Water, contains in it self spiritual and quickening seeds; and of it self ingenders, wherever corporeal seeds are wanting; and also cherishes the seeds left by Animals, and of a putrified Grape-kernel en­genders a various, orderly and precious Vine; which wherever there wants a gene­rator, and accidental qualities seem only the Cause of Generation, supplies the place of a generating Substance; as Marsilius Ficinus shews at large, in his 4. Book of Platonick Theologue Ch. 7.

But the Peripetaticks like not of this Opinion. For seeing no evident reason perswades the same, nor is there any necessity that it should be so; they neither attribute to the world any informing Substantial form, nor one common soul, nor do they think it sit to multiply things without great occasion. For no Action does plainly appear in the whol world, as proceeding from any peculiar soul common to the whol world: but all operations do proceed from peculiar and distinct forms. And therefore since all parts of the world have their peculiar forms, there needs no common form to knit them together; seeing without it, the several forms can perform their own operations. Moreover, if there were one form informing the world, the other forms, must either be parts thereof, or be informed thereby, [Page 48]both which are absurd. They cannot be parts; for all formes are not univocal, and differ more then in kind, nor can they make up one whol: And one form in number, cannot constitute distinct things, such as Natural things are. For since the form gives unity as wel as being: all Natural things should be termed one rather then many. And that the other formes should be informed by this, is also many waies absurd. Nor is there any reason to beleeve that this form of the world, comes upon the other forms, just as the form of a living Creature comes upon the form of a mixt Body. For if this were so, it should be more excellent and more perf [...]ct then the rest of the forms: which the Platonists nevertheless, will not grant. For the Soul of the world does not include more and more excellent faculties, then the forms and Souls of all Natural Bodies.

And therefore the Peripateticks deny that the world is one, by the unity of a Form informing; and they attribute thereunto only an unity of order of those things, which proceeding from one principle, do tend unto the same as their end, agreeing one with another and with it; because all things come from one and tend to one, The Form of the world. as J. C. Scaliger saies in his 6. Exercitation, S. 2. The Form therefore of the world is the order or orderly disposure of Natural Bodies Howbeit, we are here to observe, as Number is twofold, the one numbering, or wherewith we number, the other numbered, which is nothing but the things themselvs which reckoned: so there is a twofold order, an order ordering, which is an accident, and the mutual re­spect of the parts one to another, or as Augustin defines it in his de Civit. Dei B. 19. Ch. 13. a Disposure which among things like and unlike gives every one its place: and an order ordered, The Effici­ent cause of the world. which is nothing but the things themselves aptly disposed, and such is the world. For natural Bodies, as they are aptly disposed, and parti­cipate of the condition of one first principle, and mutually accomplish and cherish one another, do make one orderly System, which is called the world.

As to the efficient Cause of the world, though the Ep [...]cureans were so mad as to think and say that this beautiful Theatre of the world was made by a blind and fortunate concourse of Atomes: yet all sound Phylosophers agree in this, that this world depends upon the most good and great God, as the only first principle of all principles. For as Austin in his de Civit Dei B. 11. ch. 4. saies, The world it self, by its most orderly mutability and mobility, and the most beautiful Feature of all visible things, does after a sort silently proclaim both that it was made, and by none but God, nor could he made by any but him, who is unutterably and invisibly great, and unspeakably and invisibly fair. And Scaliger in his 3. Exercitation, shews that Simplicious, Philoponus, Ammonius, Avonroes, and many other renowned Men, neither fewer in number nor of less Authority, then those of the contrary foo­lish opinion, did hold that the world depended upon God, as its Efficient Cause: and at last, thus concludes. For if by his Providence all things are governed (which no man in his wits can deny) it necessarily follows, that he was the maker of al. For if he made not the world: then he received it made by another, either as borrowed, or by force, or by sale, or as a pawn, or hired, or by lawful suc­cession, or seazing upon it when empty, or by command, as a Minister, Servant and Mercenary from his Lord. All which are meer trifling and Impious Con­ceits.

As for what concernes the end of the World: The End of the world. The End moves the Agent to act. But there was nothing before the world saving God alone. Nothing therefore mo­ved God to create the world, but he himself moved himself. and therefore he cre­ated it, that he might communicate his infinite goodness. Which Augustine has neatly expressed in these words, de Civit. Dei Book 11. Ch. 21. Three things we ought cheifly to enquire concerning the Creature, who made it, by what he made it, and wherefore he made it. God said (quoth he) let there be light, and there won light, and God saw the Light that it was good. If therefore we ask who made it? it was God. If wherefore be made it? because it is good. There is no more excellent Author then God, no more efficacious Art, then the word of God, no better Cause, then that what is good might be made by the good God. Nor does Plato render any other cause, why God made the world, but because he is good. For it is the property of goodness to communicate it self. And this is the end of creating the world.

But what the End is of the world already constituted and existing, is elegantly [Page 49]taught us by Hermes Trismegistus, in his Book de Pietate & Phylosophia. First there was God, then the World, then Mankind; the world for Mankind and Mankind for God. For since every end is good, and the perfection of that thing whose end it is; and God is the ultimate and most perfect of all things: God is the end of all things. God must needs be the end of all things, and all things are for that one, which is for none but himself: and al things stand in need of God, Both to be and to be well: Man therefore was made for God, and the world for Man. But how all sorts of things are made for Man, is not so plain. For Scaliger cals them the Enemies of Truth, who will have all things to be made for the use of Man. For what profit hath Man from Fleas and Wiglice? 'Tis truly ridiculous to say, that Fleas are made to suck out the unpro­fitable blood, and Wiglice to awake us in the night, that we may fal to our pra­yers. Nor does Scaliger allow that some sorts of things were made only for varie­ties sake, and to stir us up to admiration: but he determines that God made all things for some certain end. For variety and bare ornament, is not the end, nor the Perfection of the Universe, but a way only to that perfection. For from fun­dry sorts of things orderly disposed, the perfection of the Universe does arise. Scaliger therefore himself thus resolves the matter: that Man is a little world, and as it were the Rule and measure of other living Creatures; yea and the Prince of al. But he could not be Prince unless he were such as he is, viz. In the middle: nor could he be in the middle, unless betwixt extreams. Therefore the extreams were made that he might be in the middest: and if any of the extreams, or those things seated betwixt the middle and the extreams were wanting, there would be a vacui­ty amongst the forms. Which is much more absurd, then that there should be a Vacuum without a Body. For seeing the most good God is ful of himself, and the world as the Platonists say, is Gods Statue or Standing Image: it must also beful, and have no defect either in sorts, or Quantity. And therefore if even the smallest thing were wanting in the world, the Universe would be no longer the Universe, and the world would cease to be the world, that is to say, beautiful, orderly ranckt, and perfect.

And thus far we have known the world by its Causes; it remaines that we take a view of the cheif adjuncts thereof, and discuss the controversies raised touching them. Now in the first place comes Eternity; and the question is, Whether the world be eternal. Whether this world be Eeternal or not? This question is much canvased by the disputes of many Men, and the opinions of Phylosophers concerning the same have been various; some affir­ming the world had a beginning and shall have an end; others that it had a begin­ning but shal never have an end; and others again that it never had beginning nor shal ever have end. That we may therefore disintangle our selves from so great a variety of opinions, we must first observe this: that the chief question in this place is not: whether God made the world. For though the madness of some hath been so great, that they durst say that this world was made by Chance; The World was not made by chance. yet al sound Phylosophers, do agree that God is the author of the world: and therefore the Author of the Book de Mundo, Chap. 6. saies Elegantly and Piously: It is an anci­ent saying spred amongst all Men from their Ancestors, that all things were made both of God and by God; nor can any Natural thing be sufficiently furnished to persist in safety, if it be left to its own saveguard▪ without the tuition of God. And that Aristotle him­self knew the most good and great God to be the maker of the world, and that he expressed as much in words, is the judgment of most worthy Phylosophers. Ve­rily if the world were not made by God, it must be made by it self: which is absurd. For a finite thing cannot be the first being; and every finite thing depends upon some other: nor are there many prime, infinite, eternal beings.

Here therefore the question is; Whether the world be from eternal, or were created in the beginning of Time? The most renowned Ancient Phylosophers have held, that the world had a beginning. But Aristotle held that this world hath been from all eternity, as himself witnesses, in his 1. de Caelo ch. 10. t. 102. But let not us care what thi [...] or that Phylosopher hath thought, seeing our Religion does teach us, The world is not eur­nal. that this world was made in the beginning by the most great and good God. For whom may we better beleeve when the world was made, then God himself the Author thereof.

But whether or no, setting aside divine revelation, it may be firmly proved by natural Reasons, that the world is not eternal, many do doubt▪ Iul. Caes. Scaliger [Page 50]in his 61. Exercitation S. 6. saies that Religion only does perswade him, that the world had a beginning and shal at last be consumed by fire. Yet he concludes in his 77. Exercitation, S. 5. that because God is the efficient cause of the world, it must needs have had a Beginning and not be eternal. For whatsoever is made, is after its efficient cause, and nothing that is made is of equal durance with its maker, for so it should not be made. This Argument others also use, and say that for a thing to be made and to be eternal implies a contradiction. For that which was made, somtimes was not. And they say that Eternity is the duration of God a­lone, nor can any creature be Coeternal with its Creator.

Nor are those Arguments which Aristotle and his followers bring to prove the e­ternity of the world, such as mans wit cannot answer and refute. And I conceive it is well said, that no reason brought against our Faith is true, or can be: because truth is not contrary to truth. For though things of Faith are above the order of Nature, yet they are not contrary thereunto. For even here, these who contend for the eternity of the world, do cheifly build upon two fall foundations: one, that Creation is impossible, and that even the first cause cannot produre any thing out of nothing: the other, that God acts by the necessity of his Na­ture.

Now that Creation is not impossible and that the first Cause can produce somwhat out of nothing, Creation is possible ac­cording to Phyloso­phy, may be evinced even by the light of Nature. For such as is the be­ing of a thing, such is its operation: but the immortal God, since in respect of his essence he depends upon none, and needs no outward thing, neither does he need any external thing to be presupposed in his acting. Moreover God is the cause of all things, and nothing except God hath its being of it self, but all things depend on God. And in very deed, they who deny creation, and say it is impossble God should make any thing of nothing, and yet grant that God is the Efficient cause of the world (for they must needs grant that) do contradict themselves. For if God be the efficient cause of the world: doubtless, he made it of nothing. For besides God and the world, there is nothing out of which he should produce it. Others bring more reasons to prove the same. And in truth, they who deny that God could produce somthing out of nothing. they deny God to be God, that is to say, that his power and perfection is ins [...]ite.

And that God acts freely and not compelled by his Nature, God made the world freely. and that he most free­ly produced this world, is not contrary to humane reason. For since God is a most perfect being, depending upno none, standing in need of none, self sufficient, Autexousios, Autagathos, and (which word was elegantly invented by Scaliger Exercit. 365. S. 2. Autautos, self, of himself: the wil of God cannot necessarily desire any Creature, nor can he necessarily produce any, nor can his power be com­pelled by any thing: but himself most freely wils, what by his wisdom he knows to be best: and he could, if he pleased, have made this world much sooner or later, or not at all. Yet he does alwaies, that which is best. Nor, because he made the world in the beginning, was his will therefore changed. For from eternity, it was his pleasure to produce the world, then when he produced the same. Nor must we think, as Austin speaks in his De Civitate Dei B. 11. Ch. 5. That any thing hapned accidentally to God, in that he made the world rather then, then in former times; since the former times had passed equally through infinite spaces, neither had there been any difference, why one time should be chosen rather then another. And as he saies, in the said 11. Book, Ch. 12. where he handles this argument ex­cellently; that which we now enquire after five thousand and od years, posterity may ask with the same Curiosity six hundred thousand years hence, if this mortal condition of men born and dying shal continue so long, and they retain their chil­dish infirmity. Those who were before us in the infancy of the world might move the same Question. Yea and the first man himself, the day after, or the same day he was created, might enquire why he was made no sooner. For indeed, as he saies in the same place, all the bounded spaces of Ages, if compared to boundless Eter­nity, are nothing.

As it appears from Scriptures, The world shal have an end. that the world had a beginning: so they alone per­swade us that this World shal have an End; nor is any Phylosophical reason strong enough to prove the same. For though it be true which Scaliger saies in his 61. Ex­ercitation, S. 5. and Exercit. 307. S. 20. that all things because they have not the [Page 51]cause of their being from themselves, but depend upon another, are of themselves mutable, and corruptible; but are not corrupted, because God wil not have it so: yet true it is, that the world left to it self, with that common and ordinary con­course of God which now it has, may for ever endure, nor does it of its own accord tend to corruption: but it shall end by the free command of God, viz. when he shal withdraw from it his ordinary assistance, and change it into a better condition. And so much for that Question whether the world be eternal.

Nor is it much less controverted: Whether this world be one. Whether there is but one World. For here Phyloso­phers are at great va [...]iance, as may be seen in Mirandula his Exam. vanit. doct. gent. Lib. 7. Ch. 20. For some have held the world to be but one, others that there are many worlds, and they either like or unlike one another. For some were of the opinion, that there were other worlds besides this, in some of which there is nei­ther Sun nor Moon; in others, that there is Sun and Moon greater then those in this world; and in some many Suns; also that there are some Worlds void of al Plants, Animals, and Moisture: and Metrodorus did say, that it is as absurd that there should be but one world, as that in a vast field there should grow only one Ear of Corn.

In this variety of opinions, we beleeve there is but one world: but we hold set­ting aside what may be urged from our religion, that there is no Phylosophical rea­son strong enough to prove the same. For sure enough God can and could have made more worlds: But whether or no he will make more: none can tel but him­self, seeing neither sense nor reason can inform us. For as for the reasons every where alleadged by Aristotle and others for the unity of the world; they are not such as do certainly prove the same. Which Plutarch, besides others, does shew in his Book of the Ceasing of Oracles, and Mirandula in Exam. Vanit. Doct. Gent. L. 6. Ch. 9. who at last thus concludes: truly, as it seems to me, if those other worlds pleaded for, be of several sorts, Aristotles reasons will be invalid: because the sort of Earth and water and other parts and their Nature would be different. For so the parts being of one and the same Nature would hang together and would not go out of their world; all heavy bodies would seek their own Centre, and that lighter would sly upwards, and the same may be judged of the rest, proportio­nably.

Howbeit this one world does sufficiently demonstrate the goodness of God, be­cause he made it of his own accord, not being obliged so to do; also it shews his great power, because he could make it of nothing; and exceeding great it shewes his Wisdom, because he hath made al things so admirably and with such rare skill.

And although we beleeve this world to be one; The World is perfect. yet we hold the same to be per­fect, with such a kind of perfection as a Creature is capable of. For it was made by a perfect Artist according to a perfect Pattern: nor is there any thing wanting, in the absolute perfection of the things whereof it is made up; nor in their Variety. For it containes all degrees of beings. Nor in order: for in so great a diversity of things, there appears a rare order, and all things are fitly disposed in their places: The figure of the world is sphericals all which are enclosed with the Heaven, which because it is round, the Figure or accidental form of the world, therefrom resulting, is round also. And so much of the world in General.

Chap. 2. Of the Heaven, and the Stars.

NOw the world is divided into two Regions, the Etherial and Sublumary: and be­ing to treat of the Ethereal or Celestial in the first place, those most Famous Questions present themselves, agitated by the disputes of most Famous Phyloso­phers, now for many Ages: Whether there is matter in Heaven: and if there be, Whether the Hea­ven have matter in it. Whether it is of the same Nature with that which is here below. And although as to the former question, there are scruples good store on al sides: yet that opinion seemes to me more probable which attributes matter to the Heaven and I conceive it was well said of Scaliger in his 359. Exercitation, Sect. 11. to make a Body without matter, is all one as to make a dream without sleep: or as he hath it in his 1 de plan­tis [Page 52]Bread without meal. For where ever there is quantity, Figure and Local mo­tion: there must needs be matter. For Quantity immediately follows the Nature of matter, and cannot be in any thing without it, and all forms and accidents have no quantity of themselves, but are said to have quantity, because of the Quantity of the matter wherein they are. Wherefore since we see, that the Heaven hath quantity, is of a certain Figure, and a determinate magnitude, and locally mo­ved: we must needs confess that it hath matter in it.

But what kind of matter this is, Whether the matter of the Heavens be the same with that of in­ferior Bo­dies. whether such as this of ours, or some peculiar: is so obscure a Question, that resolve which way you will, you may easily find ar­guments to maintain your Assertion. We deny that the Heaven consists of one or more of these Elements of ours, which was the opinion of very many an cient Phy­losophers: yet I conceive we should not assign it any other matter, then this first matter of ours. For there is no need to invent a new one, nor any necessity to in­introduce a new being, into the Catalogue of Nature: since what ever is attributed to the Heaven in respect of its matter, may rightly be attributed to this matter of ours. Scaliger therefore in his Exercitation, 61. does well conclude this Question: One matter differs not from another, save by the Form entring thereinto, where­by it becomes this or that. For matter as matter, includes no act in it self, and has nothing determinate, but receives all determination from the Form. Whereunto this may be added, that in Heaven there is Quantity, and some other Qualities, which are common to it and these inferior Bodies, and proceed from the first mat­ter. Which things being so the opinion of Avenroes cannot be admitted who in­vented a new simple Body not compounded of Matter and Form, and held that Heaven was a Body, that was neither pure matter, nor pure Form, nor any thing of them compounded, but a certain middle thing betwixt these, viz, A certain form consisting of it self, furnished with dimensions and apt for Local motion. For these things seem to be invented without cause, yea and hard to conceive, That there should be a thing (to use Scaligers words Exerc. 61. S. 1.) in Nature subsisting of it self, which is neither God, nor an Act, nor a power; neither informing nor in­formed; neither matter nor immaterial; neither a Body nor incorporeal; without the Predicaments, and yet having Predicamental Quantity and Qualities. Which what for a thing it can be, let himself consider. And if it could be proved, that there is a simple Body not compounded of matter and Form: verily a great foun­dation of peripatetical Phylosophy will fall to the ground. And if there were such simplicity in the Heaven: there can be perhaps no cause assigned, why it might not also be admitted in some sublunary Bodies.

Nor if we should attribute to Heaven this first matter of ours, need we to fear that the Heaven should fal and at one time or another of its own Nature come to de­struction. For according to Zabarella himself Lib. de Ortu & Interitu c. 11. who nevertheless in this point takes part with Averroes, the first matter, seeing it is a being meerly potential, and acts nothing, is no adequate Cause of Generation and corruption of things: and every action is to be ascribed to the Agent; and to mat­ter, passion only belongs. Nor is matter the subject of Corruption, save when it is with Natural Forms corruptible, from which the accidents flow, which have contrarily, or contraries also under contrary differences. Therefore we must not deny the Heavens to have matter, though they be not generated nor corrupted. For there are two offices of matter. Universally and primarily it is given [...]o all things, to sustain Quantity, and to receive motion, and the actions of Agents. For it is the first subject of Quantity, and is meerly passive, acts nothing, but only suffers: and all things naturally suffer, because they have matter. Moreover Matter is given to sublunary things, because of Generation, to which it concurs as a secondary cause, viz. In as much as it is apt to receive the Action of the Generator. The cause therefore why there is no Generation nor Corruption in the Heavens is, be­cause there is nothing contrary to Heaven, by which it may be corrupted, and be­cause it has no Particular aptitude to receive other forms, which is only opposed to act, and is really the same thing with privation. For in Heaven there is no Pri­vation of corruptiple Forms; because the Heaven hath no immediate aptitude to receive sublunary Forms, But the Form of Heaven does so dispose and bind its matter to i [...]self, that it has no Particular aptitude to receive other Forms, but only that same universal one, which is an aptitude to receive all Forms indifferently; in respect of which nevertheless unless a Particular aptitude be added, and a contrary [Page 53]agent be at hand, no Generation is made. Yea and (which I would have those to consider, who think the Heaven must perish, if it have matter) the Earth which is in the Centre of the world is safe from all Corruption nor is corup­ted, because no contrary Agent pierces so far, by which it might be corrupted. We conclude therefore; that The matter of Heaven has no particular and immediate apti­tude to receive coruptible forms; and that it has only an appetite of perfection, but not of Mutation, as Scaliger saies. For the Matter because it cannot subsist of it self, desires to be perfected by the form, whatever form it be, whether of a Man or of a Beetle, nor of its own accord does it lay down one form and take up another; but the whol vicissitude of Generation and Corruption, depends upon the Contrariety of the forms and the qualities issuing out of them, as on its principal Cause: which seeing the Heaven has not, we need not to fear, that it shal come to decay, only be­cause of its matter. Of which see more in Scaligers Exercit. 17. and 61.

Moreover that is also no Inconvenience that there should be one matter of Celestial and Sublunary things. For the difference and excellency of things proceeds not from the matter, but from the form; and the same first matter which bears the form of a Mushrome or Flea, is also the subject of ou [...] understanding, which is ve­rily a divine Substance, and more noble than Heaven it self.

Nor is it a less Controversie, What that form of Heaven is. What is the Form of Heaven Averroes and they which follow him do not allow the Heaven an informing Form, but say that it is a simple body, without composition of matter and form. But this opinion has been already rejected. But we do more rightly to attribute unto Heaven an informing Form also, since as we have shewed it consists of matter. For matter cannot sub­sist of it self, not perform those most noble actions which proceed from Heaven, besides its motion; since it is purely passive, and no action belongs thereunto. Yea and matter of it self, cannot be moved: for every thing which is moved is an actual Being.

But whether it be formally a soul or not, needs inquisition. Whether the Hea­ven has a Soul. It is indeed an old opinion of the Pythagoricks and Platonicks, that the Heaven has a soul: howbeit the contrary opinion is truer, which holds that the Heaven has no soul. For there appears no actions of any kind of living Creature therein, which can proceed from a soul; nor has it any of those Organs, which are necessary to perform the actions of a living Creature. The Heaven is not nourished: because in Heaven nothing is cor­rupted or dissolved, which needs to be restored by nourishment: nor does it feel be­cause it has no organs of feeling, nor of other sences, nor is there any end for which the Heaven should have sences: Much less can we allow an intelligent soul to the Heaven to inform the same, lest we fal into that Error which many have condemned in Origen, who taught the Stars had souls and were capable of Virtues and Vices. It is sufficient therefore to attribute to the Heaven a form which is no soul; but yet more noble than the forms of the Elements, by means of which, it is that which it is, has a certain figure, and a certain power by means of its Light and Influences of a­cting upon these lower bodies, and also motion. And this is the matter and form of Heaven by means of which it is also rightly termed a natural Body. For if it were destitute of these, a just cause could hardly be found, why it should be cal­led a natural Body. And this Body consisting of matter and form is termed Ae­the [...]eal.

Moreover the Parts of the Heaven are twofold, some quite perspicuous, Some parts of the Hea­ven per­spicuous, some not, Whether the Hea­ven is one continued Body? which are the Orbs, and are sometimes in a special manner cal'd Heaven, others are not to be pe­netrated by our fight, and shining, called Stars. Touching the Orbs certain weighty questions are moved, and in the first place we are to enquire: Whether the Heavens be one continued body, or distinguished into divers Orbs or contiguous Spheres. Now the ancients have endeavored to prove that there are many Heavens, by reason of the diversity of motions, which cannot be in a simple body: seeing every simple body, is moved with one simple motion naturally, as Aristotle tels us 1. de Celo ch. 2. t. 7. For when the ancient Astronomers and natural Phylosophers, began to ob­serve the motions of the Sun and Moon and other Stars; they observed that all the Stars did not observe the same swiftness and distance, in their motion, but that some were moved more swiftly, others more slowly, some never joyned but alwaies keeping the same distance one from another, and others again coming neerer one to another, even to a conjunction; that the Sun went alwaies in the middle of the [Page 54]Heaven, and that the other Planets declined some whiles to the North other whiles to the South. From which variety of motions they gathered; that the Heaven is not one continued Body, but is compounded of divers contiguous Orbs.

But most of the latter Writers deny, that the various motions of the Stars do rightly prove a plurality of heavenly Orbs; and they aver that this variety of mo­tions does not proceed from the number of the Orbs, but that it belongs primarily to the Stars themselves. And in very deed it is more likely, that the Stars are mo­ved of themselves with their own proper motions: and that the Heaven is a body, not hard, nor distinguished into real Orbs, wherein they stick fast and are mo [...]ed by their motion, but a body sluid like the Air, of a substance most thin and delicate where­in the Starr perform their motions. For not to speak now of refraction, of which if the Heaven were solid, there should be two, one by reason of the vapors ascending from the Earth, another by reason of the solid body of the Heaven: whereas ne­vertheless those skil'd in Opticks and Astonomy, have observed one only refracti­on which is sensible and worthy of note: the motions of the Comets, do evidently demonstrate that the Heaven is not solid. For since it is now out of Controversie (unless any wil call in question the most certain demonstrations of Astronomers) that Comets or unusual Stars (for we shal not now contend about the name) have been seen in the Region of Heaven above the Moon, and have observed peculiar motions, not like the motion of any other Star fixed or planetary; this could not be, without the penetration of Bodies if the Heaven did consist of solid Orbs: For if the body of the Comet were fixed in the orb of any sixed or planetary Star, it would alwaies keep the same distance from the said Star or Planet. Which since it does not, a peculiar Orb should be attributed to every Comet, to carry the same about: Which cannot be; since the whol Cystern of Heaven according to the ancient Do­ctrine, is possessed by the Orbs of the six'd Stars and Planets. Also the motion of of the Planets proves the same. For seeing they are somtimes neerer the Earth, somtimes further off, which the Doctrine of Paralaxes teaches, and the appearing Quantity shews; for Venus appears somtimes so great that the unwary beholders take her for a new Star; and Mars is somtimes seen equal to to Jupiter in bigness: which cannot any otherwise come to pass, save because in the fluid and penetrable body of the Heaven, the said Stars come somtimes neerer the Earth, and otherwhiles go farther from the same. And how could Mars be somtimes higher, otherwhiles lower than the Sun, if both were carried in a solid Orb?

The Premises therefore considered, The Stars are moved by a facul­ty planted in them by God. we must hold that in that same fluid, penetra­ble, most thin delicate, and invisible body of Heaven, The Stars are moved by a power and faculty implanted in them by God their Creator, without any violent and external impulse or carriage. For that God who willed and commanded, that the Stars by their Motion, should describe the Times, Daies, and Years, gave them power like­wise to Effect the same. And if the Creator could put such Power into the Ele­ments Earth and Fire, that in a most streight Line, the one should move down to the Centre, the other upwards from the Centre, why could he not give the Stars such a power as to move circularly? And therefore Cicero vainly wonders in his 2. de Natura Deorum, where this constancy comes in the Stars, this so great an agree­ment from all Eternity in such several motions, how it can be without Mind, Rea­son and Counsel. For this faculy of Motion is not quite void of reason and Coun­sel, but by the most wise Creator, it is granted to these his Forms and Instru­ments.

Mean while it hinders not, [...]y Astro­nomers re­tain the Orbs. Heaven is a most sim­ple Body. though the Circles and Orbs be retained by Astrono­mers as hypotheses. For such figures are not without cause used, to describe the motions of the Stars, as are described in the said Orbs, and Circles.

Now this Heaven is a Body most simple and most pure, of a different nature from the Elements and therefore a fift Essence so called by Aristotle: which also is true nevertheless of the Stars. It is void of all color cleer and transparent, and therefore cannot be seen. The Hea­ven [...] not colored. For though as Scaliger faies in his 66. Exercit. Sect. 1. the Hea­ven seems to be of a blewish or saphire color: yet it rather seems so, than is so in­deed. For even the Air also, though neer us it have no color, yet afar off it seems to be color'd. The Reason is, because it is thickened, not by composition of parts, but by disposition. For distance represents many parts to the sight, disposed al a­long in a visual line.

The said Heaven is unchangeable and uncorruptible (as also the parts) For there is not any body in the world, by which the Heaven or the Stars, It is un­changeable. The Hea­ven also it self works upon [...] lower bo­dies. can be affected or changed. Contrariwise, the Heaven has power to work upon these lower bodies, and does diversly affect them. For though the chief action upon these lower bo­dies, proceeds from above from the Stars: yet must not all active power be denied the Heaven it self, wherein the Stars are and are moved; seeing it also has its form, which can no waies be idle. Moreover the Heaven is the greatest of all bodies, since it imbraces all other bodies of the world in its Compass: It is the greatest of bodies. also it has a Spherical Fi­gure, because it is of all others the most capacious.

As to the Nature of the Stars, it is indeed commonly held, The Ori­ginal of the Stars. that they are the thic­ker parts of their Orbs; but the truer opinion is, that the most good and great God, did on the fourth day distribute that same primitive light, which he made the first day, into the Stars, and hence was the original of all this number of Stars. For it is absurd to think that first light returned to nothing, seeing it was good. Or if any man please to place that primitive light in the upmost region of the world, above the starry Heaven, and to make that upmost Region its mansion place; yet it must be confessed, that God the Author of the world, created the Stars them­selves ful of light upon the fourth day; whereas he created the Heaven before, upon the second day. And this light is, doubtless, a most noble substance, most excellent, most simple, than which among all bodies, nothing is more beautiful, more sweet, nothing more admirable: by which all these sublunary things are en­clined and cherished: without which this world would have no beauty: this as a­mong bodies it is most beautiful, so it is the first and chiefest Image of the wisdom, beauty, power and goodness of the most high.

Howbeit, the inmost nature and Essence of this Light, is unapproachable and unsearchable by humane wit; and therefore we cannot in this darkness of hu­mane understanding perfectly understand the nature of the Stars. For seeing the Essences even of those things which are about us in this lower world, are unknown to us; 'tis easie to see how little we can promise our selves concerning the know­ledg of things so exceedingly remote.

Very like it is, That every Star has its proper substantial sorm, and as here below, Plants and Animals do by their forms differ from the Air wherein they live, and one from a nother, so also that the Stars differ both from the Heaven and one from another, by their specifick forms, which appears even from their essential proprie­ties and Effects. For the Stars have light, the Heaven has not, and the Stars do ther­by differ one from another; and Experience shews, that these things below are dif­ferently affected by different parts.

Since therfore we cannot pierce into the knowledg of the inner form and Essence of the Stars, let us weigh and consider these proprieties and effects which flow from the form and Essence of the Stars. And there comes here chiefly to be consi­dered, Their Motion, Light and Shine, Heat and hidden Influences.

And in the first place the most wise and powerful Creator, The Mo­tion of the Stars. has placed this power in the Stars, that every one is moved with a certain motion; and he that comman­ded them to describe the times by their motion, gave them a power to move and to perform what he had commanded.

Now these Stars have a double motion. Some stars are fix'd o­thers Pla­nets. For some are moved with an equal mo­tion in such sort, as they retain alwaies the same distance one from another, and these are commonly cal'd the fix'd Stars: others have divers motions, nor are they alwaies equally distant one from another, but now are joyned, and after a while separated, one while they are neerer another while further one from another; and those Stars are called Planets.

Which being so, they make two motions of the Stars, Whether there are two moti­ons of the Stars? one whereby the fixed Stars are perpetually moved altogether, retaining the same distance one from ano­ther: the other is both differment for the motion of the fixt Stars, and thereby eve­ry Planet is moved after a peculiar manner. These motions are vulgarly termed the first and second motion, and they teach that the first motion, is that whereby the uppermost Sphere is carried about once in twenty four hours, and carries all the other Spheres with it from East to West; and the second they say is that which is proper to the rest of the Spheres, whereby they move contrary to the Primum mo­bile or first Sphere from West to East, some more swiftly, others more slowly: [Page 56]which distinction of motion we willingly allow the Astonomers, if they wil take it as an Hypothesis or supposition. Howbeit we conceive this distinction needlesly introduced into the Schools of Natural Phylosophy, and peradventure against the the Consent of Nature: and we think it no absurdity to say that all the Stars are moved from East to West, the sixed ones most swiftly, in the space of twenty four hours the rest by how much they are lower, so much the slower, and the Moon most slowly, much about the space of twenty five hours, only some minuts less.

For that seems not a sufficient Cause which they assign for their second motion, viz. Because we see the Moon or some other planet, which was joyned to some fix­ed Star, in the West or the South, after one or two daies, one or more degrees Eastward, that Star being left Westward, with which it was before conjoyned, it becomes nearer and therefore was moved from the West toward the East. For if you shall suppose all the Stars to move from East to West, and every upper Star to be swifter then the lower, there wil be the same appearance in the Heaven, and the lower which move more slowly will be left behind by the upper which are moved swiftly: which is more likely to be true then that the planets move towards the East. Let the Sun and Moon be joyned in one point Westward and let us suppose that the Sun once in twenty four hours and four minuts, and the Moon in twenty four hours, are carryed about the Heavens; when the day following, the Sun shal be returned to the same point, the Moon wil be yet distant therefore almost twelve degrees, and will at last reach it after fifty one minuts are past. And this opinion which we propose Plato seems to have favoured in his 7. de Legibus, where thus he writes concering the Sun, Moon, and other Stars. Every one of them goes round the same way, not many waies but one way: though they seem to be carried about by various and manifold waies. And that amongst them which is most swift, is not rightly judged to be most slow, and that which is most slow, most swift.

Howbeit as to the period of the Stars, and their return (as they cal it) to the same point of Heaven; it comes all to one pass, whether you hold the Stars to be moved with one motion or with two. For the Moon being departed from one point of Heaven, after twenty nine daies or near upon, she is seen in the same again, which space is called Mensis Lunaris, the Moones month. The Sun, Venus, and Mercury, return to the same place in the space of about a year: Mars in two years; Jupiter within twelve years; Saturn in the space of thirty years; the fixed Stars in the space of 48000 years, which space of time they call Plato his great year: and Plato is said to have beleeved that when so many years are past, al things in the world shal return unto their old State.

In the next place we are to consider in the Stars their Lux and Lumen, Lux, Lu­men, and Radius, how they differ. Light and Shine, then which the whol world hath nothing more pleasant, and which are rightly called by Franciscus Patricius in the fourth Book of his Panaugia, the good and great God his greatest and best Instrument. And first let us see what Lux, Lumen, and Radius are, and how they differ one from another. Some there have been and still are in that opinion, that Light is a substance and the Form of the Celestial Bo­dies; but their opinion swerves from the truth; since no substantial Form can be discerned by the sight. We must therefore hold, that Lux light is a quality and Essential propriety of a lightful body, of it self perceptible by the sight. But what is the first subject of light, or, whether all the Stars shine with their own light, The Stars shine both with their own and borrwed light. or borrow it from the Sun, herein the opinions of Phylosophers do vary. For some hold all the Stars shine with their own proper light, others hold they al bor­row their light from the Sun, and others again hold that only the Moon borrows her light of him. This is our opinion: That all the Stars do indeed receive some light from the Sun: yet that they have also some light of their own. Both which we are taught by experience. For first we may cheifly observe, it in the Moon, which in regard of her several posture to the Sunward, hath various Appearances, in regard of the Variety of light which she receives from the Sun: the same is to be seen in the rest of the Planets, which are observed to be brighter or darker in regard of their several postures to the Sun. And therefore Orpheus calls the Sun the quic­kening Eye of Heaven: Heraclitus, the Fountain of Heavenly light; the ancient Phylosophers, the Heart of Heaven; and the Platonists placed the Soul of the world in the Sun, as Marsilius Ficinus tels us in his Book de Sole Ch. 6. The latter may be observed not only in the Moon, but also in the other planets. For in the [Page 57]Ecclipse of the Moon, we see she has some light, and the same appears also after her conjunction, when we may many times see that part of her which is from the Sun, by means of her inbred light: which also any one may observe in the planets which are lower then the Sun, as Franciscus Patritius teaches, in the 7. Book of his Panaugia

From the light proceed Lumen and Rady, shine and Beams, which Franc. Pa­tritius saies are two divers things in the 3. B. of his Panaugia. The truth is, where there are Beams there is shine, but there may be shine where there are no beams or raies. For in a Chamber which looks towards the North, and is not right against the Sun, there is a shine at noon tide, but no beam or Raies. What [...] Beam or Ray is. And therefore a Ray or Beam as he there shews, is as it were a secondary Light, or a brightness ari­sing from the first light, and shooting to a right and an acuate Angle. And Lumen or shine, is as it were a third light, flowing from the first and second not diffused into Lines and Pyramids, but loosely shed abroad. First therefore there is Lux light in the lucid Body; then there is Radius a Beam which is an image of the light, diffused from the lucid body in a right Line; thirdly Lumen or shine, which diffuses it self obliquely, aside the falling of the raies into all parts of the Medium. And indeed there seems to be some difference between a Ray and shine, or at least it is one thing to represent the light as a visible object and to offer it to the sight, and another thing to Illuminate the Air. For light seen from a dark place, does not enlighten all the air, betwixt the eye and the lucid thing; and that light which enlightens the Air hardly a furlong, is seen some miles of, in the night time; yea and the Stars themselves, are seen by us at an huge distance in the night; though they do not illuminate the whol Air. Which difference causes, that there is a twofold definition of Lumen or shine. For absolutely considered, shine is the image of light, or the quality of a Lucid Body, whereby it communi­cates it self to other Natural things, affording it self to their sight, and cherishing them. But as Shine is considered in respect of other things which it inlightens, it is the act of Colours whereby they become visible.

Now concerning Lumen or shine some Controversies are agitated. Whether light is a Substance or Acci­dent? And first tou­ching the Nature thereof there hath alwaies been great dissensions amongst Phylo­sophers, which are not yet composed, so that it is dangerous to determine any thing in this point. Howbeit I shall breisly deliver, what seems probable in so obscure a matter. Now the question is whether it be a substance or an accident. For there are very many who hold that it is a substance, some corporeal, others into poreal. And they that say the Raies and shine are a substance, are chiefly moved thereunto, because the shine and Beams are diffused through the Heaven and the Air, and that in a moment; which seems improper for an accident, which passes not out of one subject into another and because falling upon adark and solid body they are reflected and leap back again. And those arguments could almost move me unless the same arguments, did make as much against all visible, yea, and sensible species or representations. For, neither are other visible species moved with the motion of the Air, and they are in a moment diffused through their whol Sphere: Yea, and some also, witness the Eccho, is reflected And therefore as oft as I think of this matter, I thus complain of the obscurity of Nature with that most learned Phylo­sopher and Physitian Hieronymus Fracastorius.

Yet if we may say what is probable, Lumen, light, or shine is an accident not a sub­stance ei­ther corpo­real or in­corporeal. that opinion seems to be truest, which does affirm that light is neither a Body nor a substance incorporeal, but an accident, and quality produced by a lucid Body in a transparent Medium whose act it is. For if the light were a body, since it is diffused through the whol Air, and is received by all the parts of the Air, there would be a penetration of Bodies. Moreover, if it were a Body, it should be moved successivly in time. For a Body cannot be moved in an instant through a Medium filled with another Body: because the middle Body through which it is moved would resist the same in its motion. But we see the light spred far and near in a moment. And that it is no incorporeal and spiritual substance is hereby apparent: in that spiritual substances fall not under our senses, or have dimensions; both which are true of Raies and Light.

That light therefore is no substance but a Quality, Whether light be a real or in­tentional accident. hath been made appear. But whether it be a real or Intentional accident as they Phrase it, is a great question amongst the expositors of Aristotle. And in the first place we must rightly under­stand the sense of this question. An intention and an intentional being, though it is commonly taken only for that which depends upon the operation of our mind, and without it, is nothing, viz. For an intelligible species which represents somwhat without the Soul to our understanding, either immediately, such as are the first notions, or mediately by the mediation of the first, such as are the second notions: yet here in a more general sense, the word Intention, signifies that which is the Image and representation of another thing without the Mind, that is to say the re­presentation of a sensible subject in the Medium; and so an intentional being is taken for every spiritual species representing a real object, whether it be sensible of intel­lectual. So the Collor which is in our Cloaths or on a tree, is called real; that which is in a Looking-Glass, and is the Image of the color in the Cloaths, and that which from the tree is shed upon the Cloaths of him that lies under it, is said to be an intentional color. And in this sense we hold, that the shine, is an intentional quality: yet that nevertheless, it is a real being, as having its own Essence, with­out the operation of our mind, yea, and that it hath a more noble office then other intentional species so called, and that it is ordained out only for representation, but also for other effectual operations. Others do thus explain the matter. That light is a spiritual quality, not principal or real, or rather material. Now there is a great difference betwixt principal or material, and spiritual Qualities. For the former are not the image of another thing; they are received in the subject suc­cessively, and are moved in time according to the motion thereof; they are not to­tally in any part of the subject; they are not many of the same sort in the same sub­ject, differing only in number, and kept unconfused and distinct. Whereas the contrary holes in spiritual Qualities; as we may see in Lumen or shine. For shine is the Image of Light; 'tis shed through the whol Air in a moment; it is not moved according to the motion of the subject. For though the Air is tossed with winds yet the shine of light is not moved thereby. Every part of the shine represents the whol lucid Body from whence it comes, and in the same part of the Air, many images of lucid Bodies or lights are kept distinct and inconfused.

A Ray or beam is divided into a right, a reflex, a fract, and a refract: and that is termed right or streight, The divi­sion of a Ray or Beam. which passes from the lucid Body, without any hin­drance of a dark Body. That is reflex, which lighting upon a thick dark Body re­bounds back. That is fract, which passes out of a thin into a gross Medium, as that which comes out of the Air into the Water. That is refract, which comes out of a thick Medium into a thin. Howbeit Scaliger opposes the terms of a reflex and fract Radius in his Exercit. 75. Sect. 10. and conceives, not without cause, that that which is commonly called reflex, should rather be termed fract: for the reflex commonly so called, is not one Beam but two; one falling on and another reboun­ding back: and that the fract, ought rather to be termed shed, or powred abroad. For that is one Ray, which is in the Water and in the Air; dissering only in the va­riety, The Hea­ven & the Stars do not there­fore heat, because they are fiery. and density of parts, being thinner in the Water, thicker in the Air.

After Lux and Lumen, Light and Shine, the Heavenly heat comes to be conside­red, and the canses thereof to be searched into. And although, not only some of the ancients, but of the latter writers also, have been of opinion, that the Heavens and Stars do therefore heat, because they are of a fiery Nature, and have in them [Page 59]Heat formally, as a Natural accident, by means whereof they again heat other things: yet that opinion is by most men rejected, and it is resolved, that the Hea­ven though it is not of its own Nature hot, hath yet a power of heating these inferi­or Bodies; and as Scaliger conceives in his 23. Exercitat. that the heat is indeed from the Stars, but not in them, but in these bodies beneath; and in the 74 Exercit. Sect. 2. that calefaction or heating does primarily and of it self belong to the Sun, without any Medium, as to a first Body, the author of Heat, but not the first subject thereof. But if any man shall hold, that the Stars are hot, not with a fiery heat, but with an heat proper to themselves, I see not by what solid reason, he can be confuted. For there is no cause why the Heaven should be void of all qualities. And Heat seems to be an individual conpanion to light. Nor need any man fear, that the Heaven should be corrupted by these inferior Bodies, if it be hot. For since the Heaven does not participate with these inferior bodies, either in the Na­ture of its Essence, or its Qualities: the inferior bodies no waies act upon the Cele­stial. Nor was Carden the first that held heat to be in the Heaven, but the Arabian Phylosophers long before, and Mirandulanus and others who followed them. For thus writes Job. Picus Mirandulanus in Astrolog. Lib. 3. Ch. 4. Heat follows light as a propriety thereof, not fiery heat, nor Aereal but Celestial; a proper quali­ty of the Heaven, as light is. I say an heat most effectual and saving, peircing althings, cherishing all things, moderating all things.

From the Premises some light arises to that Question, How Hea­ven heats these lower Bodies. how Heaven heats these lower Bodies? 'Tis commonly held that Heaven heats them, by its motion and light. But touching motion, 'tis a doubtful case. It cannot indeed be denied, that a swift motion of a solid Body, does heat the Air next unto it: since experience shews that to be true. For motion does heat by attenuating, it makes the parts of the Air thin, and so heats them; yea and if it be more vehement, turns them into fire. For the fire being, as hotter, so thinner, then the Air. If the Air be a little more atte­nuated, the Form of the Air can no longer subsist in a thin matter, but the form of Fire is introduced. But this is doubted, whether the Heavens motion, produce heat in these lower Bodies? VVhether the motion of Heaven be a cause of Heat? some holds the motion of the Heaven pierces as far as the Earth, yea and into the inmost bowels thereof, and produces heat by making the Air thin, and by grating thereupon. But contrariwise, Scaliger in his 23. Ex­ercit. saies, that he did not beleeve the Son of Roes, who said, that the Heavenly Bodies did not warm by any heat in themselves, but that through the swiftness of motion, both heat and light came from the Stars, by their motion grating upon the Air; and held that the cause of the motion of Heaven was, that the Stars might communicate their virtues to the parts here below, but not that they should heat. And indeed great cause there is to doubt, whether the Heavens motion do heat the inferior Bodies. For they who hold that the Heaven by its motion, warms these inferior Bodies, do all presuppose, that the Heaven is a solid Body, by the Cir­cumvolution whereof, the neighbouring Elements are wheeled about. But that this is false, hath been already declared. The fire has not its essential heat from Heaven. Nor can the bodies of the Stars perform that with their motion, nor does their motion reach to these lower bodies, by rea­son of their so great distance. Nor does that fire which is next the Moon, receive heat from their motion. For it hath the highest degree of heat before, by its own Form. For if it were not in the highest degree hot, it were not sire. And therefore the fire hath not its essential heat from the Heavens, but an accidental heat, as the most subtile Scaliger, in his 23. Exercitation, saies subtilly, Yea, and obscurely enough. For what heat can be added to that which is hot in the highest degree? But peradventure, that is thus to be understood. That the fire receives not essen­tial heat from the motion of the Heavens, but hath it from its own form; but it is nevertheless preserved by Heavens motion.

Now it is commonly held a clear case, that the shine is the Cause of heat: The shine is not the Cause of heat, but the beams. though that of Scaliger in his 75. Exercitation, may give occasion of doubting. Heat (saies he) is an accident bred by the Heavenly Bodies, and through the Heaven, without any affection thereof, brought to the Aire, and that not by the shine, but both with and without the shine. And indeed the Raies or Beams, rather then the shine, are the cause of Heat.

For there is not Heat, where ever there is shine, and in Winter, the Cause of the cold is not want of light; seeing in the middest of Winter, there are many times [Page 60]as clear and bright daies as in Summer, but it is the obliques of the Suns beams. And therefore when Lumen or shine, is said to be the cause of heat; the Beams or raies are to be understood.

But how the Raies or Light does heat, How the Raies or Beams do heat? Doctors are not yet agreed. Some are of the opinion that light therefore heats, because it [...]arifies and makes th [...] the Air, after the same manner as motion does; and that the doubled Raies do it in a special manner. For though the incident and single Raies, have also the power of hea­ting and attenuating: yet their force, they say, is weak; but the doubled Raies beating one against another do more strongly grate upon he Air and rarisie the same. Howbeit many do contrary wise hold with probability enough, that the light does of its own Nature produce heat, and that a Ray compounded of [...] one and a reflex, does heat more then a simple, not because two Raies Imiting one against another do grate upon the Air (for how should that great upon the Air which is no Body?) but because, that portion of light which was to go streight forward, being hindred by an Opake Body is reflected and joyned with the incident Ray, and so virture conjoyned becomes stronger then that which is dis­persed. Hence some Raies are stronger then other some to excite Heat. For those which fal perpendicularly, and reflect upon themselves, are of al others most ef­fectual: Perpendi­culer raies most effe­ctual. and those are next these most powerful who go least into oblick Augles; but the more they go oblickly from the point of incidence, the least heat they raise. For the nearer the Sun comes to our Zenith and the directer his beams [...]al upon us; so much the greater heat is caused. And it goes contrariwise in the Winter, when the Sun darts his Beams upon us oblickly.

Now it will be worth our while to enquire whether the Heavens do not also some other waies work upon these inferior Bodies. The Stars are not placed in Heaven only for ornament sake. There are some Men found [...]o filly as to dare to deny, not only other more noble actions of the Heavens upon things below, but also their power of heating; and to hold that the Stars were set set in the Heaven only for ornaments sake like Golden Spangles; of which fect of men Nicho. Frischlinus seems to have been. But away with such Barbarousness I Asclepius was long since of a better understanding, when he thus wrote to King An­mon: the good operations of the Sun, are not terminated in the Heaven and Air alone, but even in the Earth, they pierce into the deep bowels thereof: from whose Judgment, the learned Men of latter ages, have not receded, but all have taught, that Heaven acts upon these lower Bodies, and is a cause of much good to mortal Men. For nothing in the whol Universe is idle, nothing made in vain, but all things as they have their Forms; so by them they operate and act. Experience not to be contradicted does witness the same. For we see and feel, how that by the Heavenly Bodies, through the various augmentation of heat, the changes of times and seasons, and the vicissitude of generation and corruption are caused; tempests are raised; the humors of Animals, especially shelsish do encrease and lessen according as the Moon Fils or Wains. Let them go therefore, who deny the Heavens to have any virtue, Whether the Hea­ven works by influ­ence upon the inferi­or bodies. and let us consider: whether besides their light the Hea­venly Bodies do work upon things below, also by another peculiar and bidden way, which they call influence? Most indeed of those who write against Astrology, say that the light only of the Heavenly Bodies, which is variously communicated to several places according to the variety of the Heavenly motions, is of it self suffici­ent to produce all the effects, which are produced by the said Bodies. Yet we must hold the contrary, viz. That the Heaven, not only by its motion and light and the heat thereon depending, but also by certain peculiar powers, which they call influences, does act upon these lower-Bodies. For many effects proceed from Heaven, which cannot be ascribed to light. For light may be kept out, by a dark or dense Body; whereas many things are generated by the concurrency of Heaven in the profoundest Cavities of the Earth, under the Waters, whether neither the light of Heaven nor the heat produced thereby can pierce. The Hea­ven works upon things ma­terial, but does not immedi­ate'y affect the [...]oul. And verily since there are in the Load-stone and other vulgar things, rare virtues to act upon distant things, without any light: we ought not to deny the same to the Heaven, so Mag­nificent a Body.

Howbeit we must enquire how far this Influx of the Heavens extends it self, and upon what things it works. It is not to be denyed, that the Heaven acts upon all material and merely Natural things: but it is a question, whether that Celestial Influx, [Page 61]do work upon our Soul and will. All sound Phylosophers do answer that the Stars do not work directly and immediately upon our wils. For since the Heaven is a cor­poreal and material Agent, it acts only upon corporeal and material things, but our will is a power not allied to matter. Mediately nevertheless and indirectly, viz. by Mediation of the Organs of our Body, which being variously Qualified do move and provoke the Fancy and the sensible appetite, and thereby the will; the stars may encline our wil to this or that. Upon which ground 'tis also commonly said, that Mens manners follow the temperament of their Bodies. Howbeit, neither the temperament, nor the stars by the temperament do compel but only encline. For though any one through aboundance of Choler in his Body, be enclined to anger, and through flegm to idleness: yet it remaines in the liberty of his will, either to resrain or give the reines to his anger; or to give himself to labor or to take his ease. Hence we may easily know what to think of Astrology, What is to be thought of Astrolo­gical Pre­dictions? which is said to foretel fu [...]ure events, by observation of the Heavenly Bodies. It is not to be denied, that Astrologers may many times probably foretel Tempests, Rains, Barrenness and fruitfulness of the Earth, Diseases, and other such like Natural effects, which Na­turally depend upon the disposition of the sublunary matter in respect of heat cold, Moisture, Driness, and other such like qualities, and may betide sublunary Bodies. Yet Experience shews that they cannot alwaies certainly foretel such things as these.

For seeing there is requisite to these kind of effects, not only the influx of the Heavenly Bodies, which is the universal Cause, but also a certain disposition of the Earthly Globe, which affords matter to Rain and other Meteors, and also of the Matter and sublunary qualities, which are all unstable and subject to change, and cannot be sufficiently discerned by the wit of man: the judgment and progno­stication cannot alwaies be firm and certain. Much less can any thing be certainly foretold concerning human actions which depend upon the wills of Men, and tou­ching things contingent and fortuitous. For though these things depend in some measure, as hath been said, upon the temperament: yet because our temperament does not compel our wil, and the Heaven it self is not the immediate and principal Cause of the temperament, it is also hard in this Case to foretel any thing with cer­tainty.

Nor dare the sounder Astrologers themselves attribute any greater efficacy to the Stars, nor to themselves any greater ability of Prediction. Whence also Ptolomy himself, de Pred. Astronom. Lib. 7. teaches that those things only can be foretold, in the Calculation of Nativities, which depend upon the temperature, viz. That the Body of such an one is so and so, and his manners so and so, whence such and such events will follow, because the quality of the Heaven suitable to the tempe­rament, is fit to produce a good habit, or contrary thereunto. And he himself saies in terms express, that those who forerel other things, which have not Natural Causes, are cousening fellows, that abuse the people. Ptolomy therefore the Prince of Astrologinians hath set th [...]m their true bounds and limits: within which never­theless, all the Predictions which he delivers in the following Books, can hardly be contained. And the same Author also teaches in Lib. 1. That many things besides the Heaven, do concur to the Temperaments of Particular persons, and that the seed falling from the Bodies of their parents, hath the chiefest force, also that the Countrey makes a difference, and that education and Custom have no smal force to change the temperament.

The Causes of many Sympathies and Antipathies doubtless, betwixt the Hea­venly Bodies and these things below, do proceed from these hidden influences, the Inquisition whereof does belong unto another place. Mean while let us hold with that opinion of the Chaldaeans and Assyrians, recorded by Psellus, viz. That there is a Sympathy betwixt things above and things below.

As to the other adjuncts of the Stars, viz. Their Figure and quantity: The Figure of the stars is Sphaeri­cal. that their Figure is Spherical is Demonstrated. First, By the Illuminations of the Moon: Secondly, By the Ecclipses; the sight of all Men wherever inhabiting: since plain Bodies do change their Figure as often as those who look upon [...]hem from below, do change their place and Scituation.

And whereas the Stars appear flat like dishes; that comes from their over great distance, for all lines drawn from the Eye to the surface of a Sphaerical Body far [Page 62]off, appear equal to the middle or perpendicular line, drawn from the Centre of the Eye, to the Centre of the spherical body. Vitello B. 4. ch. 65.

The Stars are of two sorts, Two sorts of Stars fixed, and wandring or Plane­tary. the Planets and fixed Stars, as was said before. Those are called fix'd Stars, which are in the uppermost part of Heaven, and in their mo­tions do alwaies keep an equal distance one from another. The Planets or wan­dring Stars, are not so called, because they really wander, or are moved with an un­certain motion, but because though they hold a certian rule in their motions, yet in respect of the fixed stars, they have a more free kind of motion, and are somtimes in one, another while in another part of the Heavens.

The Planets are commonly reckoned to be but seven. The num­ber of the Planets. For though Favorinus in in Gellius B. 14. ch. 1. did doubt whether there were only seven Planets; and sup­posed there might be more, though not seen by us, in regard of their exceeding ei­ther splendor or altitude: yet because neither experience, nor reason can evince there are more, the vulgar number has been retained hitherto.

Howbeit amongst the late Astronomers Galilaeus a Florentine, has found out cer­tain new Planets, formerly not known or seen by any man, by help of his optical Tube or prospective Glass; which he observed to move about Jupiter, and cal'd them the medicean Stars (from Cosmos medices the Duke of Tuscany, so cal­led, to whom he dedicated his labors) also the Jovial Stars or Jupiter's Stars: whose number and motion he described in a Book called Siderius Nuncius: where­in he described other things by him observed in the face of the Moon, in innumera­ble fixed Stars, the Galaxy or Milky way, and cloudy Stars, worthy of conside­ration.

Astronomers at this day reckon the fixed Stars to be 1022. The num­ber of the fixed Stars but there are more in­deed and in truth. For even Pliny in his Natural History B. 2. ch. 41. saies that skilful men had reckoned 1600. remarkable for their effects and use; and those that have in our times sailed into the South parts of the world, relate that they have observed more. And therefore though we may grant to the Astronomers, that there are so many fix'd Stars which may evidently be observed, and may conducce to a astronomical Calculations: yet if any shal contend that there are indeed no more, we shal stop his mouthwith that of Austin in his 16. B. de Civitate Dei ch. 23. Whosoever (saies he) boast that they have counted and set down the total number of the Stars, the Authority of this Book (Gen. 15.) does condemn them: and that there are indeed more, the observation of the foresaid Galiaeus, does evince.

Also there is some controversie touching the order of the Planets: The Or­der of the Planets. Metrodorus Chi­us, Anaximander and Crates, as Plutarch informs us in his 2. de Placit. Phylos. ch. 15. held the Sun to be highest, next him the Moon, after her the fix'd Stars and Planets. Plato and all the Greek Phylosophers in a manner, did beleeve the Sun to be next the Moon. Ptolomy placed the Sun in the middest of the Planets, and made such an order of the Planets, as that the Moon should be lowest and next the Elements, Mercury next above her, Venus next above him, in the fourth place the Sun, in the fift Mars, in the fixt Jupiter, in the seventh Saturn, in the eighth the fixed Stars, which opinion is by most men followed. For both the observation of the Paralla­xes, and other Astronomical reasons do confirm the same.

For the greater Parallaxe a Planet has, the neerer it is to the Earth; and the les­ser parallaxe, the further from the Earth. But amongst all the Planets, the Moon has the greatest Parallaxe; Mercury somwhat a lesser; Venus yet a lesser; and the Sun the least. Whence we collect, that the Moon is neerest the Earth, Mercu­ry a little further off than she, Venus more remote than he, and the Sun more re­mote than Venus. Moreover the Moon obscures and takes out of our sight Mercury, Venus and the Sun; which could not be, if these Planets were lower.

Nevertheless, although this be certain, and the reasons aforesaid do sufficiently demonstrate, that the Moon is below Mercury and Venus: yet it is not thereby pro­ved that Venus is higher than Mercury. For suppose the Moon obscure Venus and Mercury: yet it does not hence appear, whether Mercury or Venus be next the Moon, or whether Mercury be below or above Venus. Nor do the Parallaxes de­monstrate the same. For though they teach that the Moon is next the Earth, be­cause it has the greatest parallaxe: Yet that which is vulgarly reported of the Pa­rallaxe of the Sun, Venus and Mercury, is not so certain. For latter Astronomers have observed, that Mercury has many times the same Parallaxe of the Sun, Venus [Page 63]oft times the same, and often times also a lesser. Which cause moved Tycho Brahe that most noble Astronomer, to invent a new disposition of the Planets; with which as more probable, most Astronomers at this day content themselves, til some body shal teach them better. But whatever Scituation of the Planets we shal allow, yet this remains certain, that it cannot be defended, unless we hold, as has been she­wed before, that the Heaven is no solid body, and that there are indeed no Orbs therein of which it should consist. Which if it be not allowed, but we shal include the Stars in their Orbs; there must needs be penetration of bodies, if their motions be salved; which the motions of the Sun, Venus, and Mercury do chiefly declare. And most probable it is, which also I propounded before, that there is not a dou­ble motion of the Planets, one from East to West, another from West to East, but that all the Planets are moved from East to West; since Entities or Beings are not rashly to be multiplied, and without necessity: and since it suffices that the Stars have an internal principle of their motion; 'tis needless to ad an external and vio­lent one. Aristot [...]e saies rightly in his 1. B de Celo ch. 2. when he demonstrates, that a violent motion is contrary to a natural, and that a sin plemotion suits with the celestial bodies being simple; and that as the fire is moved upwards, the Earth downwards, so the heavenly bodies are naturally moved with a circular or whee­ling Motion.

Astronomers have reduced the most considerable and visible fix'd Stars, The di­stribution of the fixed Stars into Constellati­ons. for bet­ter knowledg and memories sake, into certain figures resembling living Creatures and other things, which they cal Constellations. Which distinction of Figures and Constellations is of exceeding Antiquity and was known either before, or soon af­ter the flood; witness, not only the most ancient Poets Hesiod and Homer, but also the holy Scriptures: For in Job 9.9. mention is made of Arcturus, Orion, and the Pleiades.

Now credible it is that the Astronomers were Authors and Inventers of these constellations who were studious of the Heavenly bodies, also Sea-faring men, as appears by the Southern Constellations, found out by the Navigators of the former Age and by them named, of which Virgil was aware, when he wrote,

Also Husbandmen, who in daies of old wanting the benefit of Calendars or Al­manacks, were fain to begin their Labors, according to the appearance of certain Stars or Constellations. Whence also it happened, that some Stars have divers names, according as the Astronomers, Sailers, or Husbandmen cal'd them.

Here also is to be observed, The Con­stellations differ from the twelve Houses. that the signs of the Zodiack or Austerisms differ from the twelve houses, each of which has thirty degrees, according to which the motions of the Sun, Moon and other Planets are reckoned, being obvious to the mind, but not to the Eye-sight. But the signs of the Zodiack, are Stars visible to the Eye, reduced into certain Images, which Images, are not equal, but some greater, others lesser. For the Constellation of Virgo than Libra, and Libra than Gemini.

Now these Constellations are divided into those of the Zodiack, and those with­out the Zodiack, which are Northern or Southern. For the Zodiack is the path­way of the Planets, out of which though the Planets, excepting the Sun, do decline some whiles to the South, otherwhiles to the North, from the eccliptick which is the Sun's path: yet they never wander out of the latitude of the Zodiack which consists of sixteen degrees. The signs of the Zodiack are Aries, the Ram; Taurus the Bul; Gemini the Twins; Cancer, the Crab; Leo, the Lyon; Virgo, the Mai­den; Libra, the Ballance; Scorpio, the Scorpion; Sagitarius, the Archer; Capri­cornus, the Goat Buck; Aquarius, the Water-man; Pisces, the Fishes.

The Northern Signs are twenty one. The Bear greater and lesser; the Dragon; Bootes; Ariadne her Crown; Hercules; Cepheus; the Harp; the Swan; Cassiopeia; Perseus; Hemochus; the Serpent; Serpentarius; the Ar [...]ow; the Aeagle; the Dol­phin; the Pegasus, or Flying Horse; The little Horse; Andromeda; the Trian­gle.

The Southern signs as yet discovered are fifteen: The Whale; Orion; Eridamus River; the Hare; the Dog; The little Dog; the Ship Argo; the Hydra or Water­sha [...]e; the Cup; the Crow; the Centaure; the Woolf; the Altar; the southern Crown; and the southern Fish.

But Americus Vespacius, and they who after him have sailed the sourthern parts of the world, do aver that the southern part of the Heaven, which has been yet un­known, is adorned with many very bright and remarkable Stars: which in imitation of the Ancients they have reduced into certain Constellations, by them thus named; the Triangle; the Peacocks Tail; the Camel; the Indian Bee; the Crane; Noabs Ark; the Hornet; the Cross; Touta; The Water-snake; the Clouds; the Phaenix; the River Indus. All which Constellations, both old and new, may at this day easily be known by the Globes artificially made for the same intent.

The Stars are also divided according to their magnitude, into six Orders or Mag­nitudes; The Stars divided into tribes. and some are said to be, of the first; others of the second; others o [...] the third; others of the fourth; others of the fift; and others of the sixt magn tude: which are every where reckoned up by Astronomers. Yet this is to be observed, that the Stars which are said to be of the same magnitude, are not all really of the same Quantity or Splendor; for the Syrius or Dog star, does far outstrip all other Stars of the first magnitude.

To these heavenly bodies belongs also questionless the Galaxia or milky way: What the milky way is now it is nothing but a Circle or Zone rather of a white color, to be seen a nights in the Sky, reaching from North to South; and dividing the Heaven into two Hae­mispheres or half circles: the progress and carriage whereof Pliny in his 18. of Nat. Hist. ch. 29. has briefly described, and Manilius, more largely, in the first Book of his Astronomical Poem.

Touching the nature thereof, sundry men are of sundry minds. We, omitting the Poets fables touching Juno's milk a part whereof fel upon this region of Hea­ven, as Hercules was sucking, as Caelius Rhod ginus relates in his 6. Book [...]nt. Lect. Ch. 7. or concerning the burning of the world by Pha [...]ton; the fight of Apollo a­gainst the G [...]ants; of the way of souls; of the seat of the Heroes or semy-gods; and the opinions of others reckoned up by Aristotle in the 1 Meteor. Chap. 3. Plu [...]arch in his [...]. de plac. Philos. ch. 1. Picus Mirandula in his Exam. Van. Doct. Gen. l. 7. c. 12. we shal in this place only consider whether the Vial [...]ctea, be somwhat that is Elementary and a true meteor, Whether the Vi [...]la­ctes be a meteor? or some heavenly thing. Aristotle in the place newly alleadged, saies the vialactea is not in Heaven, but in the Air and consists of an hot and dry exhalation, gathered into that place, where are the greatest number of lar­gest Stars, being drawn up by the said Stars; so that it is s [...]t were a great Comet, and is perpetuated, by the continual and perpetual attraction of vapors, caused by the great abundance of Stars, in that place.

Nevertheless divers most noble Phylosophers and Astronomers, have rejected this opinion of Aristotle, for these reasons chiefly. First the perpetuity of the Vialactea: for seeing all meteors are somwhat disorderly made, nor is there alwaies matter enough, of the same figure, or color for meteors, nor is it alwaies carried to the same part of Heaven: the Galaxie or milky way, if it were a meteor would not be alwaies, nor of the same magnitude, figure, color; nor alwaies in the same place. Again if the Vialactea were not in the Heaven but in the Air, it would not be alwaies seen in the same place of Heaven, and about the same Stars, and would admit some parallaxe; after the same manner as Comets, which are in the Air, in this Region appear under one Star, in another Region under another. Howbeit, experience teaches the contrary, which witnesseth, that for so many ages of years the milky way has alwaies been seen, when the Sky is clear, in the same place, of the same greatness, shape and color, and in all places, about the same Stars.

Nor has the opinion of Franciscus Picolhomineus any place, who that he might some waies defend the vulgar opinion, saies that there is a twofold Galaxie or mil­ky way; the one Celelestial, which is an ab [...]ndance of shining Stars, in the eighth Sphere; the other the Effect of the former, which is an abundance of dry exhalati­ons, brought together into the shape of a Zone Girdle or Swath band, in the upper Region of the Air, apt to be inflamed, placed under the Heavenly Galaxie, and pre­served thereby; which by reason of the Light it receives from the Heavenly Viala­ctea, presents unto us the resemblance of a large white Way or Road. For though it be true that a greater company of Stars, wil more heat and raise up more vapors: yet no sufficient cause, can hence be assigned, why the Galaxie or Vialactea, should appear alwaies of the same Greatness, and Figure, and in the same place. For to [Page 65]the constitution of a meteor, there is not only required, the force of one or more Stars, but also matter, and that after a certain manner disposed: which because it is fluent and unstable, and is wonderfully changed by reason of the Influx of so many Stars, no meteor can be perpetual, constant, and alwaies return in the same measure and manner: nor does the Sun nor any other Star, yea though in the same position, or returning to the same place, raise the same tempests, nor can they cause the breeding of the same meteors, by reason of the plenty or penury, or the various disposition of the exhalation.

That opinion therefore of others is more probable, that teach, the Vialactea to be a collection of very many and very smal Stars, which they cal Sporadas, in the eighth Sphere, which because of their smalness and abundance, cannot be di­stinctly seen, so that their light being jumbled together, represents to our sight a white, or milky color. To this opinion others do also add: that this part of the Heaven is a little more compact than the rest, and by reason of its compactness comes neet to the nature of Stars, and therefore both by its own light, and by that which it receives from the other Stars, it appears more bright than the other parts of Heaven which are more thin and transparent, and is of a remarkable white­ness.

Next to the Stars we ranck Comets; Divers O­pinions of the Nature of Comets. and truly there is an extream diversity of opinions touching their Nature. Anaxagoras and Democritus held that a Comet was the gathering together of divers Planets, which because they were met in one place, by the mingling of their lights they seemed to make one Star. The Pytha­goreans taught that a Comet was a Planet distinct from the seven vulgar Planets, which commonly lies hid under the Sun-beams, and by reason of the splendor of the neighboring Sun cannot be seen: howbeit sometimes, after long Intervals, it departs from the Sun and comes into sight, which also commonly happens to Mer­cury. Hippocrates Chius and his Disciple Aeschylus, did consent with the Pythago­reans, that a Comet is a Star: yet herein they dissented, in that the former held the tail of the Comet to be a part thereof; but these latter held the tail to be va­pors lifted up on high, and neer the Comet, receiving the raies and light of the Sun, and so representing a stream of Hair. Howbeit Aristotle reckons up and refutes these opinions in his 1 Meteor. Cap. 6. Seneca in the 7. Quest. Nat. Cap. 11, 12. &c.

The Opinion of Epigenes, which Seneca relates and refutes in his 7 Book of Nat. Quest. ch. 4. &c. was, that Comets did arise, when moist and dry exhalations being shut up in one Globe, by reason of the internal Spirit and the discord of contrary bodies, were agitated and whirled about. For then that same force of the Wind going round about, did by its motion inflame whatsoever it caught, and lift it on high, and that the shining of the Fire and the Comet did so long last til there was no more fewel to seed it, which fewel ceasing the Comet ceases. The Opinion of Aristo­tle though it differ in part, does mostly agree with this. For Aristotle teaches, that a Comet does not consist of Celestial but of elementary matter, namely of pleaty of far & thick exhalations raised into the upper Region of the Air and there set on fire. Plutarch in his third de placit. Phylosoph. ch. 2. besides the opinions of the Pythago­reans, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Aristotle, Epigenes, relates also the opinion of Strato, conceiving that a Comet was the light of a Star, comprehended in a thick Cloud, as it happens in Candles: and of Heraclides Ponticus, who said that a Comet was a Cloud on high enlightened with light from above. Seneca in Lib. 7. Nat. Quest. Cap. 22. conceives that a Comet is no suddain Fire, but reckons it among the eter­nal works of nature. viz. the Stars. For he conceived there were more Planets than Fire, besides the Sun and Moon, but that the beginnings and endings of their motions were not yet known; seeing they finish their courses at vast distances of time.

Late Writers do also differ in this point. Scaliger herein consents with Aristotle, in thinking that a Comet is made of Elementary matter: but he denies that it is in­flamed. For in his 79 Exercitation thus he writes: I conceive therefore that a Co­met is a Vapor drawn by the force of some Star into the upper Region of the Air; the na­ture of which vapor is not burning, but of a mixt matter, like a fume or steam, recei­ving the Sun-beams, and therefore visible, and letting them through, and by that means railed. Cardan whom Scaliger there refutes, had said, That a Comet is a Globe in [Page 66]the Heaven inlightened by the Sun, through which the Beams being transmitted, do make as it were a tail. Because the Heaven is ful of Stars, which are not very compact, but when the Air grows dry, or for some other causes, they receive and retain light.

Bodinus in his Theatre of Nature Lib. 7. P. 217. thinks it better ingeniously to confess his ignorance, than rashly to affirm any thing in this Point, or to assent to most light opinions. Yet he in P. 221. of the said Book, seems to be almost of opi­nion, that Comets are the minds of illustrious men, which having for innumerable Ages had a great stroke on Earth, at last being about to die they perform their con­cluding triumphs, or are recalled into the starry Heaven, there to be as it were bright Stars: and that therfore, famine, popular diseases, and civil wars do follow, as if Cities and Peoples were forsaken by those most excellent Captains and Go­vernors, who did pacifie the offended Deity. Other late Writers, who teach that the Heaven is not solid, but a fluid body like the Air, hold that [...]omets are not ge­nerated below but above the Moon; some say of exhalations carried thither, o­thers of a part of the Heaven condensed, and by that means shining.

And these are the chief opinions of Phylosophers about the nature of Comets: in so great a number whereof, 'tis doubtless hard to judg which is the truest; nor wil the nature of this work, nor my design of Brevity suffer me at large to examine them all. Yet that it may appear, what we conceive to be most probable; their opinion seems to us most agreeable to truth, who hold that all Comets have been, and appeared in the Region of Heaven which is above the Moon: and if any man will call them new Stars, we shall not oppose him. Now that their abode has been in the Aethereal and not in the Elementary Region, may be gathered, chiefly by the regularity of their motion, the paralaxe, which they have had less than the Moon, as also by their equal duration. For since it has been observed that Comets have often endured a long space, and for six months together, in the same Quantity, and have alwaies had a regular motion: this can no way be attributed to a body compo­sed of exhalations. For al such kind of Meteors, are made after an irregular manner, as may among others be seen in the Clouds, in which there is nothing perpetual, la­sting, or regular. And the reasons which are brought for the contrary opinion, are but weak; and later Authors, do not without cause, call in question the observa­tions of the Ancients; seeing there is need of great diligence to observe the Paralla­xes. But whether they are bred anew by natural Causes, or are miraculosly pro­duced by God, or whether they were before out of sight, and now at last appear, it is no easie matter by sufficient reasons to determine.

Yet this one thing, I think sit to acquaint you with in this place, that even the Ancients also did take Comets to be Stars, which sometimes appear, and then a­gain become invisible, as may be manifestly seen out of Hermes Trismegistus in his B. de providentia & fato, where he thus writes There is another kind which they call Comets, which appear but for a time, and a while after become invisible neither setting, nor being dissolved, and others become evident Proclaimers of Ʋniversal Events. Now those have their place under the Circle of the Sun. When therefore somwhat shal befall the world, then they appear. And having appeared a few daies returning a­gain under the circle of the Sun they become invisible, having shewed themselves in the East.

They say that Comets signifie wars; because hot and dry exhalations, do breed yellow choler in the bodies of Men especially of Kings, which afterwards make men prone to more violent motions, wrath, brawlings and wars thereof procee­ding. Yet verily these are too remote causes of wars; the Polititians can tel us of neerer causes than these. And if wars depend hereupon, there is no need of many consultations, touching the composing of wars; we must fly to the Physitians, who by giving choler-purging medicaments may take away al wars, and pluck up by the roots all the Causes of Wars, out of the Bodies of Kings and Princes. Moreover, experience shews, that Comets have appeared, which have not been followed by any such events. This is for certain, since the Appearance or the Generation of Comets in the Heaven, is very rare and unusual, that they do undoubtedly portend somwhat, if not peradventure as Causes, yet as signs appointed by God to denounce his wrath against sinful men: whose particular signification, is nevertheless known [Page 67]only to God, and not reveal to any mortal Man. This indeed hath been found true by the Experience of all Ages.

And that after Comets great changes have happend in Enpires, so that Lucan rightly cal'd Comets, Kingdom changing Comets, and Camerarius, thus turned the old Lattin verse into Greek; Oudeis Cometes, Hostis ou cacon Pherei.

But to what regions and Provinces they portend their bad tidings, 'tis scarse pos­sible for a man to know, till the Event hath taught him.

Chap. 3. Touching the Elements, in as much as being Simple Bodies, they with the Heavens, do make up the Bulk of this World.

NOw the Bodies of the sublunary Region are two fold, simple and compound. The simple, are those which are called Elements, because the rest are made up of them. Now the term Element which the Greeks call Stoicheion, Element has a two­fold signi­fication. although it have sundry significations, yet it seems they may fitly be reduced to two principal ones, the one General, the other special. For generally it is taken for whatsoever is first in its kind and has nothing before it: in which sense 'tis defined by Aristotle in the 4. Metaph. Ch. 3. That is called an Element, out of which first inexisting in the in­dividual species, a thing is compounded into another species. Moreover in a more spe­cial signification, Elements are the immediate principles of mixt Bodies, and thus are defined by Aristotle in his 3. de Caelo. Ch. 3.1.31. The Element of Bodies is that into which the other Bodies are divided, wherein it is potentially or actually: but it self is not divisible into parts of sundry sorts. And in the signification we are here­after to treat of Elements.

And these Elements truly have a twofold office and a double consideration. Element in that lat­ter sense have a twofold Office. For their first office is, with the Heaven to make up this whol bulk of the world: and in this manner they are absolutely considered according to their essence, without any relation to mixt bodies: The Second is, to be the matter of mixt Bodies. And for the performance of both these Offices, peculiar qualities are given them by Nature. For that they might perform the former, they have heaviness and light­ness: for the latter, heat and cold, moisture and dryness; whereby they can mutu­ally work one upon another and make up a compound. Now the Elements are to be considered by us in this place, both waies.

Because the Elements do first perform that Office of theirs whereby they are car­ried to certain places in the world, and do therein naturally rest; The Ele­ments are simple bo­dies and have a simple mo­tion. we must first speak of their motion, and thence draw their Nature and number. The Elements are simple Bodies. For although, being considered as made up of matter and form, they may be termed compounds, yet in respect of mixt Bodies, they are called simple. For they are not made up of other Bodies which were before them, but them­selves are the first Bodies of themselves existing in the world, of which all the o­ther Bodies are compounded. Since therefore they are simple bodies, a simple mo­tion is due to them.

Now there are two simple motions: the Right or Streight, and the Circular. There are two simple motions. The Circular belongs to Heaven: and therefore the Streight motion we attribute to the Elements, having therein experience to justifie what we do. For we see these Ele­ments so called, and all things compounded of them, according to the Nature of the prevailing Element, go in a direct line to their proper place. Now direct motion is either to the Middle, or from the Middle; to the middle place of the world which is also the lowest, heavy things are carried; from the middle to the outmost part [Page 68]which is also the highest, Why heavy things move down­wards and light things upwards. light things are carried. For light things are such as be­ing un-hindred do alwaies move upwards, and which alwaies swim at the top: and heavy things are those, which not hindred, are alwaies carried downward, and sink to the bottom of every thing. But what the cause is why some Bodies move downwards, others move upwards, we must now enquire, and see into the end and efficient cause of this motion.

As to the End, The end of this moti­on. since Nature does nothing in vain, and all Natural things act for the sake of some good, we must not think the Elements are moved with certain mo­tions to no purpose; but we must hold that every Element is carried to its own place, as to its perfection: whence Aristotle saies well 4. de Caelo. c. 3. t. 22. For every thing to be carried to its place, is nothing else but for every thing to be carried to its own Form. For the Forms of the Elements being of al others the lowest and most ignoble, and hardly able to defend themselves sufficiently from external injuries, their proper place is added to their form as an assistant to preserve the Body there­of, which as it were an external Form, supplies what is wanting to the internal Form. To its proper place, therefore, as to its own perfection, every Element is moved. And the perfection which they receive therein, is the preservation of their, Heat, Cold, Lightness, Heaviness, and consequently of their Form.

As to the Efficient Cause of the motion of the Elements Authors do many waies va­ry. The Effici­ent Cause. Yet verily, if we shall rightly weigh the matter, and not wilfully intangle a a plain matter with difficulties, and rightly mind the sense of the question, it seems not so hard to answer thereunto. For if a man should ask, what is the efficient cause, that the Fire and Earth, actually existing by their forms, the former mounts right upwards, the letter moves downwards, unless they be by some other thing violent­ly detained; we answer simply; that the Fire by its Form is moved from the mid­dle of the world upwards, and the Earth by its form is moved to the Centre of the world downwards, for this motion is to them Natural and therfore it must also pro­ceed from Nature, or an inward principle, which is their Form, and not from an outward. For this is proper to Natural things, to have in themselves the principle of their motion, as may be seen in the 2. Physic. c. 9. t. 48. Also the form of an Ele­ment which informes it, and is its Nature, is also the principle of its motion. Also to what hath been said may be added, that as Aristotle saies in 2. Physic. c. 3. t. 37. an effect actually existing, requires a cause actually existing; and that espe­cially in effects, whose whole essence is in the present performance, as motion is: for the cause hereof being taken away, it is also taken away, nor can it ever be se­parated from its efficient cause. But the motion of the Elements is an effect actually existing. It requires therfore a cause actually existing; which can be no other then the Form. For this only alwaies actually exists with the motion: but those other causes which some do bring, as the Generator, the Remover of impediments, may be separated from motion, and while it is yet existing, they may either perish, or if they perish not, yet may they not coexist with the motion. Nor does what hath been formerly said of motion, hinder this opinion: that the Moveable is distinct from the mover; which seems not to agree to the motion of the Elements, if we hold their form to be their mover. For the Earth, when it is moved to the middle of the world, it is not moved, as having matter. For the matter in it self, is no more enclined to move upwards then downwards, but is indifferently capable of al motions; but as it hath a form, which determies and restraines the aptitude of the matter, to receive this form. And therefore seeing the matter is here the passive principle of the motion, it cannot be the active. And this doubt, truly, may be satisfied, if we distinguish betwixt an Agent with the transmutation of another thing, which is properly called an efficient, and requires alwaies a Patient diffe­rent from it self: and betwixt an Agent only (as they say) by emanation of the ef­fect, which does not by acting change another thing, but after the Nature whereof, the effect follows of its own accord, that as it were not acting; and such an agent is the Form in respect of al the accidents which are Naturally in the compound. For all accidents do of their own accord follow the form, without any motion or trans­mutation of the subject. That therefore which hath formerly been said concerning [Page 69]the distinction betwixt the moveable and the mover, is true of an Agent by transmu­tation. But an Agent by emanation is not necessarily distinguished from the Pati­ent. Howbeit, even in an immanent action, or which is produced only by emana­tion, we may observe some distinction of Agent and Patient. For the Form, as the form acts; and suffers as it is in the matter. And therefore, in the motion of the Elements, the form as the form, is the Efficient Cause of the motion; but as it is in the matter, it is moved with it. For the compound is moveable, or is the sub­ject of motion, which is distinguished from the form, in respect of the matter. For the matter also, is really distinguished from the form. And this is the true expli­cation of this Question, Dextrously propounded, which must be by no means con­founded, with other questions which border thereupon. For it is quite another question; Why an Element actually existing by its form, not hindred by any thing, tends to its own proper place, the cause whereof hath been already expressed; from this, why for examples sake, water which of it self moves downwards, Why water ever the fire moves upwards? fire being put under, begins to mount up in vapors; or, what is the Cause that a Stone which hung in the Air fastened to a string, as soon as the string is cut fals downward. For the cause of the former is the admixture of Fiery and Aery particles, which atte­nuate the water, and carry it with themselves aloft. And the cause of the latter is clearly, that which removes the Impediment.

The Elements therefore not being hindred, are moved by their forms, as the in­ternal and immediate cause, as hath been shewed: which formes as all others, can­not be perceived by sense, but are by us known and described by heaviness and lightness as accidents. For it is an usual thing to describe the hidden forms of things, which want peculiar names, by their proper adjuncts, which are better known to us.

Moreover what may be the Cause, Why the Elements are moved leasurely and by de­grees. why the Elements are moved successively and leisurely, whether only because of the resistency of the Medium, or through some other cause, comes now to be enquired. Some late writers are indeed of opinion, that there is a twofold resistency, one external, which proceeds from a ful Medium, which is the Cause that motion is slower then it would be, if it were performed in an empty space, if such there were: another internal, which proceeds from the Na­ture of the moveable, resisting the mover. Howbeit the opinion of Aristotle and Averrhoes is truer, who hold, that the Elements have only an external resistency in their motion, proceeding from the Medium; (For it being ful and corpulent, resists the mover in its motion, according as it is more or less thick) but no internal. For if there were any internal resistency, it should proceed either from the Form or the Matter. Not from the Form: for, it being the mover, does not resist its self in its own motion, but endeavors as speedily as may be, to carry the moveable to its due place. Nor from the matter. For it being meerly passive, and indifferent to receive all motions, and having no power to act, can also be no cause of resistency. All the swiftness therefore and slowness of the motion of Elements, depends upon the proportion of the Virtue and power of the mover, to the resistency of the Medi­um. For when the force of the mover is much greater, then the power of the Me­dium to resist, the motion is swift: but when the power of the mover does not much exceed the force of the Mediums resistency, there the motion is slower: but where the mover does not at al exceed the force which the Medium hath to resist, there is no motion at al. Howbeit what hath been said must be understood only of the Elements which are simple Bodies, and have an internal principle of their moti­on. For in things moved by external force, the case is otherwise for they by their proper Nature resist the mover, and according to the excess, whereby their power is overcome by the power of the mover, they are swiftly or slowly moved.

From what hath hitherto been said the Cause may easily be rendred; Why heavy and light things are moved more slow­ly in the beginning, and more swiftly at the end? why heavy and light things do move more slowly at the beginning and swifter at the end. For experience shews that an heavy thing falling from an high place, smites more strongly where it lights, then it would have done falling from a lower place. For though divers men think differently in this point: yet must we resolve, that the true cause hereof, is the abatement of the resistancy of the Medium; and the abate­ment of the resistancy proceeds from the forgoing motion, which augments the swiftness of the following motion. Now why the precedent motion augments the swiftness of that which follows, and why it abates the re [...]istency, the Cause is this. [Page 70]Every movable is swiftly and easily moved through a Medium, which is moved the same way with it; and less swiftly through a Medium that moves not; slowly through a Medium which resists the moveable, and bears the contrary way: an Argument whereof we have in sailing with or against tide. And therefore, when any heavy Body begins to tend downwards first the quiet Air resists it, the resi­stency whereof is nevertheless overcome by the heavy Body, and drives the next part of the Air downwards: this first part of the Air being driven, drives the second part of the Air, next unto it. And therefore when the heavy Body comes to this part, and finds it not resisting but going the same way and furthering it in as motion, it begins to be moved more swiftly: and the Body being thus more swiftly moved, will more vehemently force and drive the third part of the Air: and it being before driven also by the second part of the Air, wil be more swiftly moved then the se­cond, and will more strongly bear down the fourth part. When therefore the heavy Body shall reach the third part of the Air, finding it more vehemently mo­ved downwards then the second, it wil also be therein more swiftly moved; and so it will yet more forcibly bear down the fourth part, being before prest down by the third, and when it comes to it, it will be therein yet more swiftly moved, be­cause of the lesser resistency and the Mediums being moved the same way. And this swiftness of the motion wil be for the same Reason continually augmented even to the End. Heaviness and light­ness are understood two waies. But that no obscurity may remain, we must know, that Heaviness and Lightness are taken two manner of waies, Either for the first act or quality, by which a thing hath a propension to move upwards or downwards; or for the second act or operation, and impulse, by which some bodies are moved upwards, others down­wards. Which two things the School-men to distinguish, they called the former Gravitatem, the latter Gravitationem: and hence 'tis said that Gravity in the Ele­ments cannot be augmented, but Gravitation may: also, that the Elements in their own places are Gravia and Levia, heavy and light indeed, but they do not Gravi­tate nor Levitate, that is they strive not to go upwards or a [...]wnwards.

Now the next thing is, The num­ber of the Elements. that we search into the Number of the Elements, about which later writers do wonderfully differ. I shall prove that there are four in Num­ber. And to prove the same I shall not bring many reasons; seeing our very sences will easily shew us how many Elements there be. For we perceive the Water, Earth and Air which fills that vast space above the Globe of the Earth, nor in the force of Fire unknown to us. 'Tis here my mind only to produce one reason which many use. There are two direct motions, one from the middle, another to the middle. Therefore, for these two simple motions there must be two subjects which are simple Bodies, one which is absolutely heavy, which is called Earth; a­nother, which is absolutely light, called Fire. Now because 'tis the wil of Nature that the world should be one; and two contrary extreams cannot make up one com­pound; she alwaies couples the extreams by things of a middle [...]ature, and knits the last of the upper kind, with the first of the lower. And therefore in this case, a Medium is requisite. But this cannot be one only. For if that were allowed, it would possess the middle place betwixt the extreams, and so it could not be ca­pable of a direct motion. For neither should it be truly moved from the middle, nor to the middle, but it should be Capable of both these motions, and so could not be called heavy more then light. And therefore we must hold that there are two Mediums, the one of which is light and moves from the middle upwards, but is in some respect heavy; which is called Air; the other must be absolutely heavy, and tend to the middle, yet in some respect light; which is called Water. There are therefore four Elements: Fire, Air, Water, Earth. There cannot be a sift, for the same cause why there cannot be but one Medium. If any one will hold there are more then five, he will be confuted by sense and experience.

A question there is, Whether the Ele­ments are found in the world pure. Whether these Elements are found pure in the World: To which question we thus answer: If the Elements are considered absolutely in that simpli­city, which is due to their Nature, and whereby they are the Rule and standard of mixt Bodies, they are surely to be found any where pure. But if they be compared with mixt Bodies, and the question shal be; whether they exist also by themselves, out of mixed Bodies, it may be said they are found sincere and pure, not indeed with an absolute purity, of which we spake just now, but with such an one, as they are capable of, compared to mixt Bodies. Howbeit the extream are purer then the [Page 71]Middlemore. Nor do the Elements, though they are not found exactly pure, lose their Name, so as to be called mixt Bodies. Which are mixt Bo­dies? For those Bodies are only to be ter­med mixt, wherein there is so great a departure from the Nature and purity of Ele­ments, that the Name and Form being cast away; they come to be now some dif­ferent thing from the Elements, and receive a new and peculiar Name of some sort of Natural Body. But wherever there is so great an excess of one Element, that it transcends al comparison, with the rest that are joyned with it, in that the Name of Element is retained.

It now remains that we speak of the Elements in Particular, Whether there is any Elementa­ry Fire? as much as the Na­ture of this work will bear. And to begin with Fire, though many late writers endeavor to cast it from the number of Natural things, and take special pains to prove that it does not exist under the concave of the Moon: yet shall we subscribe to the remarkable consent of the chief Phylosophers, to reason strong enough, and experience it self especially seeing the Arguments brought to the contrary do all in a manner tend to prove, that this fire of ours, is no pure fire; whence notwithstan­ding it follows not, that there is no pure sire, nor that it is any where to be found: nor though all the properties of our fire do not agree to that under the Moon, does it therefore follow, that it is no true fire; seeing most of those things which are vulgarly attributed to our Fire, do agree to Fire not of it self, but acciden­tally.

For there is a great difference betwixt this Fire of ours which we daily make use of, and pure Elementary fire. For our fire of the Kitchen is not pure, How Ele­mentary Fire and Kitchen fire differ. but mixed with vapors and gross matter, and therefore it shines, it burns, it wants fuel. But that there is pure Elementary fire under the Sphere of the Moon, the great lightness thereof, and its prepetual endeavor to ascend, does argue. Fire the lightest Element. For it is of all Elements the most light and thin Body, As next in place to Heaven, so in Nature most of kin thereto, unto which also, if forced therefrom, or generated elsewhere, it tends as to its proper place, concerning which matter Scaliger in his 9. Exercitation thus writes. The Smoak which ascends, hath very much fire in it. For it ascends not be­cause of water: much lest because of the Earth. Nor does that motion proceed from the Air; for it is already in the Air. What place therefore does it seek? That place veri­ly which above the Air is due to the lightest of Bodies. And again, these are the princi­ples of that demonstration whereby 'tis proved, that the Element of Fire is under the Sphere of the Moon, viz. Bodies Natural, Motion, Place. Of these are propositions certain, True, Primitive, immediate, thus made, the Causes of this Conclusion: that the place of Fire is in the upper space under the Moon, above the Air. Every movable thing is a Body: all Fire is movable, Ergo. Other two: Every body is in a place; all Fire is a Body, Ergo. Thirdly, as many more; Every movable mover Naturally to its own space; Fire is a Body movable, Ergo. And the two last, which knock the Nail to the Head. Every space to which a Body Naturally moves, is the proper space of that Body; The Fire moves Naturally upwards, Ergo the space above, is proper to the Fire.

The exceeding lightness of the Fire is attended by exceeding rarity, Why our Kitchin fire Burns? and it hath least matter of al the Elements, and amongst natural things, it comes nearest the Nature of Form; and therefore it hath the greatest activity of al the Elements. Yet, when it is pure, and of it self, it does not burn: but that our Fire burns the Cause is; in that it is condensed, and sticks in gross matter, whence its parts being condensed and brought into a narrow compass, attain the greater force. Or as Scaliger saies in his 2. Exercitation, S. 2. it hath the power of burning from the propinquity, Multitude, Cohesion, Coagmentation and union of its parts. An argument whereof we have in a red hot Iron, wherein the force of the Fire is grea­ter, because of the condensation of parts, then it is stubble which consists of more spungy matter. The same appears if you set spirit of Wine on Fire, for you may draw your finger through the same without hurt, as also through the upper part of the flame; which in a red hot iron you cannot do. The said Elementary Fire is not of it self visible, no more than the Air, nor does it shine, unless it be received in a thick matter.

No sound Phylosopher denies that the Fire does belong to the Elements, Fire is on Element. which make up this world and constitute mixt Bodies. For although Cardan hath endea­vored to exclude the same from the number of Elements; yet is he well confuted [Page 72]by Julius Caesar Scaliger in his 9. Exercitation. For seeing, as he also teaches, in his 10. Exercitation, that heat which is a most manifest and effectual Quality is acci­dentally in many things, there must of necessity be some first subject, wherein it is primarily and essentially: For nothing is in any thing accidentally, which is not essentially in some other thing, And the first sub­ject of heat. primarily and of it self. And truly, the first sub­ject of heat is Fire, at first created by God with the other Elements, and furnished with its qualities. And there was never any time when Fire had not those qualities flowing from the Form thereof. But from the ignorance of the Creation of the world came, Not only potentially hot as Aristotle would have it. that Opinion of Aristotle, which he hath in the 1. Meteorol. cap 3. where he saies: Seeing the first Element is moved Circularly, the Bodies which are therein, alwaies that which is nearest at hand, being severed by the motion of the lower world and Body, is inflamed and causes heat. For thus we must understand the mat­ter from the beginning. That Body which is under the upper Circumduction, being it is as it were a kind of matter, and potentially hot and cold, and dry and moist, and what­ever other adjuncts follow these; such it becomes, and ariser from motion and Immobili­ty. An absurd saying, truly, and unbecoming so great a Phylosopher! For what matter I pray you can we imagine actually existing of it self, which is potentially Hot, Cold, Moist, Dry, but actually receives these qualities from Heaven? For although some that they might stick by Aristotle, have fancied a twofold heat in Fire, one Natural, which follows the proper form of Fire; the other adventitious, which the Fire receives from the motion of Heaven; yet Zabarella in his 1. B. de qual. prim. c. 8. writes well, that the words of Aristotle do not receive all this In­terpretation; for Aristotle saies, that all this matter of the lower world is potenti­ally Hot, Cold, Moist, Dry, but is made actually so by motion and immobility. Therefore he allows no heat to the Elements, besides what they receive from the motion of Heaven. Yet he himself fals into a much more absurd opinion when he writes in the fallowing Chapter: thus, If any Man shall aske whether the first qualities are sooner or later then the Forms of the Elements, we must say, they are fore more and later in several respects. For in Original and according to the order of Generation, they are doubtless sooner, as the previous dispositions are in generation before the substan­tial Form, to the eduction whereof they are directed, but they are Naturally after the same, in as much as they are accidents. For accidents are after their substances. And in as much as they are Effects, but the Forms causes, I do not mean efficient causes but final. For qualities are produced in the matter, for the sake of substantial Forms, and are directed to them as to their End, as also they are conserved in the Elements by Hea­ven, that the Elements themselves might be conserved; so that the next final cause of these Qualities, is the Constitution of the Elements; but the remote and ultimate, is the production of mixt Bodies. For the Elements are made for the mixt Bodies, and to be their matter. Thus therefore Qualities may be said to follow the Forms of the Ele­ments, in as much as the Forms are their final causes: but the qualities themselves, al­though they are preparations for the Eduction of Forms, they may not therefore be called the Causes of the Forms, but only the latter Effects; seeing accidents are Naturally later then substances. And therefore while they are together in the Elements, as Na­turally conjoyned and substantial Forms and proper qualities; yet the Forms are in the first place, and the qualities afterwards, and so they are said to follow the Forms of the Elements; especially seeing, as we said before, they are given to the Elements by Heaven, for the Eduction and preservation of their Forms. For if heat be a dispoli­tion previous to the reception of the form of Fire, into what matter I pray you is that disposition introduced, and in what matter is the Heat inherent, before the Form of Fire comes. And will the Form of Fire be idle, will it shed forth no qua­lity? Thus one absurdity being gathered infinite do follow.

Now the Fire of it self, It is a substence. is a substance most subtil, and thin, piercing through al things; which neither shines, nor is seen whilest it is p [...]re and simple without any mixture. But when it is mixt with and is inherent in other things, it makes our vulgar Kitchin Fire, which differs not Essentially from the pure Element of Fire, but herein only in that it is mixed with some Hererogeneal matter.

Thomas Fienus, Not an ac­cident. indeed, in his Apology against Sanctacruze, p. 50. holds that this Fire of ours which we use, is only an accident. But the Reasons of that opini­on are refuted in my 3. Hypomne. Phys. Ch. 1.

And since this Kitchin Fire of ours, is useful to many intents and purposes, The in­ventors of Kitchin Fire. ma­ny authors write many things touching the Inventors thereof, as may be seen in Plinies Natural History, B. 4. Ch. 12. and Book 6. Ch. 30. in Vitruvius Book 2. Ch. 1. But it is apparent by the sacrifices and by the story of Tubal-Cain, that the use thereof was known to the first Fathers of the world. Though it is not to be deni­ed, but that the other uses thereof were later known to other Nations; and new in­ventions are alwaies added; as may be seen in Gun-powder, and sundry sorts of Fireworks, made thereof.

Now what the difference is betwixt Fire as it is potentially in mixt Bodies, 'Tis either Potential, or Actual. and as it is actually hot, is not easie to explain, yet a thing necessary to be known. For Sulphur to feel to is as cold as a cold stick that hath no Brimstone in it; and a piece of Willow Wood dried is not colder to feel to then a piece of Pitch-Tree Wood. And spirit of Wine which contains much Fire in it, in coldness to feel to, is not inferior to the Wine it self. Yea in a flame which actually is hot, there is less quantity of Fire and of the smal particles thereof, then in Brimstone; since in Brimstone not set on Fire, that is united in a smal space, which is diffused in a great flame. In Gun-powder a mighty Quantity of Fiery Atomes lie hid, which is ne­vertheless cold to feel to. But the flame of the said Gun power, when it is set on Fire, burns exceedingly, though the Atomes are severed. This therefore is to be explained, why in a mixt body potentially hot, so many fiery Atomes contained and collected, do produce no actual heat; or, what it is that causes the Fire to heat.

The Former happens, because the Fire is mixt with other things, What maks the fire not to heat or to heat. and is contai­ned quiet under the dominion of a superior Form. But it heats actually, when it is separated from the rest of the Bodies, wherewith it was mixed, and being set at liberty, freely acts. Of which latter we shall now speak.

But actual Fire is variously disposed. For if it be pure, Pure fire neither shines nor, is seen. it neither shines nor is seen. Of which Scaliger in his 9. Exercitation. Meat roasted on Spits is not touched by the Fire we see, but it is touched by the Fire we see not: and it is so touched, som­times, as to be burnt to a Coal. In like manner, if a man hold his Hand over the flame, so that the flame do not touch it, yet his Haud wil burn. Fire also is per­ceived in quick Lime, when water is poured thereon, in dung when it rots, in Wa­ter, Oyl, Stones, Metal, which are heated.

Now Fire appears to the sight and not only to the touch, two manner of waies; It becomes visible two waies. two manner of waies; either in an hot Coal or Flame, as Theophrastus teaches in his Book de Igne, Now by a Coal is understood any Body red hot, that affords no flame.

But that we may rightly understand, what Flame and Inflamation is, Touching flame and Inflamati­on. we must of necessity presuppose some Principles.

The First is: That there is Fire in all Bodies, and that so as to retain its perfect Form, as I have demonstrated in Hypomnem. Phys. 3. Axioms. 1. Howbeit it is in a greater quantity in some Bodies in a lesser quantity in others.

The Second is: That actual Fire is alwaies Naturally moved. 2 And whereas it is not so in mixed Bodies, the reason is, because it is contained quietly with other things in the compound under the dominion of an higher Form. For the Forms are the bands of things.

The Third is: Fire is two manner of waies in compounds, the one as fixed, 3 in Salts and other things not inflamable, nor combustible; the other, as volatile, so that by means thereof, the Body in which it is, may be inflamed; after which manner it is in Sulphur and al Bodies that partake of Sulphur. Upon which account, those Bodies which have Fire good store in them, are easily burnt by Fire, which, as Scaliger in his 9. Exercitation, speaks, Gives back ashes to the Earth moisture to the water, and takes and keeps to it self, that which is invisible to vulgar Eyes, but can­not conceal it self from the Minds of wise men.

The Fourth is: That there is a Consent of Natural things, and things like are drawn to like. But contrary things Fly from one another Ex Hyponem. Phys. 1. cap. 1.

The Fift is: That Fire hath a great similitude and likeness to things that are apt to flame; because they consist of Fire for the most part, and Fire does easily unite it self to them.

Hence we conclude, The actua­tion of fire what it is. that the Actuation or actual breaking out of Fire, is the separation of that Fire which is potentially in mixt Bodies, from other things mix­ed therewith. I say potentially, not in respect of the First act, or the Form of Fire, which it hath really in the mixt Body, but in respect of the second act and operation thereof.

Which separation is made divers waies, The man­ners therof as was said before, with slame, and with­out flame. Without flame in putrefaction, quick Lime, hot Coals; with flame, when Bodies are set on a flaming Fire.

Of which to speak somwhat in particular, What in­ [...]amation. 5. we say: that inflamation or setting on a flame, is, the breaking out of Fire from a Body apt to flame, and containing a Sulphureous Exhalation, caused by the touch of Fire near applied. For when Fire already actuated, does touch a body inflamable, the Fire therein, is attracted by the external fire, and by reason of similitude, moves of its own ac­cord thereto, and unites it self therewith.

Now flame is Fire breaking out of an inflamable Body, What flame is. touched by actual fire, and sticking in the fume, as in a Sulphureous Exhalation, and shining therein, and mo­ved therewith. And therefore Aristotle in 1 Meteor. Ch. 4. desines flame to be the Boyling out of dry Fire and in the 4. Meteoral Cap. 9. Bu [...]ning Smoak. For slame is Fire, but not pure, joyned with a Dry and inflamable exhalation. And when it is set on fire, the fire extends much farther then the flame. And therefore, as hath been said, meat roasted on spits, is touched indeed by the sire, but not by the flame, and a mans hand held above the flame, may be burned, and paper or a can­dle may be lighted also above the flame. Howbeit sire is then only seen, where being in a great quantity, hath a certain Fuliginous matter ari [...]ing from the fewel, joyned therewith.

Now actual Fire [...] ingendred, Actual fire is bred two waies and at last breaks into flame, either by propagati­on, or by Coition, and union. The first is caused, when actual fire manifest to the sences, does touch another inflamable body, and sets it on fire, drawing out the fire which lay hid therein. The second is, when fire which lies secretly hid in mixt Bodies, is drawn out, without the contract of external fire, and being united does actually and manifestly shew it felf.

The first manner is most common, when actual fire does set on fire other infla­mable Bodies. For by reason of affinity, it is easily united to them, and draws out and unites to it self the fire in them. Galen in his B de usu respirat. calls that same inflamable Body the Root of Fire: and Theophrastus in his B. de Igne termes it the Beginning of Fire.

And because all things, Things which have sin­cere sulphur in them, easily in­flamed. are inflamed and kindled by means of Sulphur; those things that have sincere unmixt Sulphur in them; or though they have little thereof in them; yet are so disposed, that fire may easily insinuate it self into all their parts; such things I say are easily set on fire. For in the first place, if the Sulphur by much and pure, and not mixed in its smal parts with other things, but is of it self alone immediately obvious to the external fire, it is easily united thereto, be­cause of its similitude: Contrarily such Bodies as have their Sulphur, though much in Quantity, mingled in its smal parts with other things, are not easily inflamed. Whence it happens that Pitch Wood is more easily kindled then Oak wood, though 'tis a question whether there be more Fire in Pitch wood then in Oak. For in the Former, the fiery Sulphureous parts are unmixt and at hand; but in the latter the inflamable fiery parts lie deep, yet are they discovered by their effects in warming of a Stove. By reason of plenty of unmixt Sulphur, spirit of Wine does soon take flame, and the purer it is and more separated from the Flegm, the sooner it is set on fire. But this is seen most of all in Bitumen, which is exceeding Sulphureous, and containes in it a spirituous matter, of kin to fire, and therefore is soon lighted, and conceives flame even far from the Fire, as Pliny in Lib. 2. C. 105. saies, Fire leaps to it wherever it sees it. And After this manner they say Medea set Jasons Concubine on Fire, as Pliny writes in the same place. For when Medea had given to Creusa a Crown or Garland smeared with Bitumen, and perswaded her to be present at the sacrifices, the Garland smeard with Bitumen, took flame from the Fire and lighted wood, and so burnt Creusa. And I remember, when I was making Balsam of Sul­phur, and had put into a Glass Receiver, flower of Brimstone, spirit of Terpentine [Page 75]and spirit of Wine, that they might stand in digestion, and left it to the care of a cer­tain Student, to cover the mouth of the Receiver with a Glass Cover and close it up with spanish wax; some of the spanish wax being lighted and falling upon the lid, the Spirit in the Receiver was set on flame, although it was hardly a sixt part ful. Here­unto belong common Brimstone, Gun-powder, Pitch, Asphaltum, Ambar: Hence Galen relates in his 3. de Temperam Chap. 2. that a man in his daies, made a great boast of lighting a Candle after a wonderful manner, which he first put out & then appli­ed it to a wal to light it, which he made shew to be done without Fire, which though some thought it to be a magical operation; yet when it was known, that the said wall was smeared with Brimstone and liquid bitumen, the wonder ceased. Like hereunto, is that which Cardan relates in his tenth Book de Varietate Rerum, of a certain man who would light Candles not perfectly extinguished at the mouth of a certain Image, which was made on purpose and daubed with Sulphur and Bitumen or Petroleum, that so the Image might seem to vomit Fire.

Moreover, Bodies spungy and dry, though they have little sulphur in them, Why dry bodies are easiest in­slamed. yet because they are dry, and the watry parts, which otherwise do most of all hinder kindling into a Flame, are absent, the Fire easily unites it self to the sulphur which is in them, whence they come to kindle. Such bodies are, dry Wood, Torches, Straw, Stubble, dry Hay, Tow, Wool, Paper, Tutch-wood, Links.

But that some things, as Oyl, Suet, Wax, which contain store of Sulphur in them, Why vis­cous and watry bo­dies are hard to take fire. are not easily set on fire, but need store of fire to light them, as when they are boy­ling, or must have a wiek to cause them burn: the reason is, because those bodies are viscous and clammy, and not spungy, and because they stick together in their smal parts. Also, because they have a watry Substance, mixed with their smallest parts. And the mixture of watry parts, does most of all hinder Inflamation. For Water as much as any thing hinders the breaking out of flame.

For seeing Water mingled with Wood, only by the roots thereof, does render them less subject to take sire, much more wil that Water do it, which is most inti­mately mixt with the sulpur. But if a dry wiek be added to Oyl, Suet, or Wax; the flame or actual fire in the wiek, draws to it self its cozen sire mixt in the matter close by, but flowly, because it cannot do it plentifully. For that same watriness hinders, which must first be removed, that the sulphureous part may be lighted. Now this is slowly dispelled: which also while it is in doing, the fire also flies away, and so it needs new to succeed it, which it does because it is freed from the Water. And indeed in every body which feeds fire slowly, there is somwhat which resists fire. For otherwise there were no reason, why the fire should not be altogether sud­denly inflamed, as it happens in Tow or Straw. And Brimstone it self affords a ma­nifest example hereof, which does indeed soon take fire, and yet is long before it burn out, because it has in it store of acid spirit, which hinders the Inflamation.

Now the flame which we see kindled in any matter, is not alwaies the same; seeing the fire is in continual motion and flies away, a new fire comes fresh and fresh out of the thing burning. And therefore as Aristotle saies, Meteor 2. The flame never continues the same.

And whereas it is commonly said that sulphureous things, How the Fire is fed and whatever wil kin­dle, is the food of fire; that must be rightly understood. For it is not simply true, because fire is a simple body, which properly is not nourished. But in that the fire cleaves to the body inflamed, it is not because it needs food, but because through si­militude, it endeavors to draw out the fire lying hid in the body inflamed, and to u­nite it to self, and so to multiply it self. For every Nature desires to multiply it self, and there is in every thing an appetite of Infinity and Eternity, as I. C. Scaliger saies in his 9. Exercit. which is chiefly effected by union with its like. And therefore fire sticks so long at least to the body inflamed, as there is sulphur and fire therein, which failing, it s [...]es away.

Also from the Premises the difference appears between a flame, The dif­ference be­twixt bur­ning things that flame and those that do not flame. and burning coals or other things which yeild no flame. Flame, as has been said, is joyned with fuliginous vapors, and there is more fuliginous matter in a flame than in coals. For when the char-coals were made, the greatest part of the fuliginous matter flew away. And because abundance of fuliginous matter does choak the flame, yea and the fire it self, and hinders the sudden propagation thereof, of necessity the fuligi­nous vapor must have egress, whence it comes often to pass that fire lies hid in a [Page 76]close chamber, but flame arises not therefrom. But as soon as the door or window is opened, and a passage is given to the sooty vapors, it breaks forth into a flame. And because the coals themselves have yet in them some fuliginous matter, the fire consumes the coals no faster, than the fuliginous vapors can find egress. And there­fore thongh the whol furnaces of Chymists are at once filled full of coals, the fire consumes no more of the coals, than is answerable to the egress of the fuliginous vapors, and so by opening or shutting, more or fewer, greater or smaller vent-holes, a man may moderate the fire as he pleases. For no more fire is kindled than the Prohibiter wil allow. Yea and coals may be so set on fire as that they shall not consume after this manner. Take a strong pipkin or stone pot, which will endure the fire, fil it with coals, and put on the cover and lute it round about, and when the lute is dry, put the pot into the mid'st of a fire, that the whol pot may be red hot; and then the coals wil be all on fire (and if any wil not beleeve it, he may by breaking the pot be sure of it) which being done, suffer the pot being taken out of the fire to grow cold of it self, then open or break the pot, and you shal find all your coals whol. The cause whereof is because as the fire entred in through the pot sides, so it goes out the same way, but the substance of the coals cannot pass the pot sides.

Howbeit we must here observe that it is not common to all fire, What fire needs a free Air, what not. nor does it agree to fire as fire to be extinguished in a close place. For its known by Histories, that there have been lights which have burnt long in a close vessel: but this is the pro­perty of some sort of fire only, namely of that which comes out of a mixt sulphure­ous body, as Wood or the like, with fumes and exhalations. For the flame only which arises from such bodies, being shut up is extinguished. For since in a continu­al flame there is a resolution of mixt bodies, and the mixt body is resolved into other things whereof it was compounded, and a body resolved requires a larger space, than that which is close compacted, it happens, because there is no place for the fuliginous vapors which steam out, part oppresses part; and because naturally there is no penetration of dimensions, while the compound is hindred from being resolved or loosened, the cause also of the dissolution is stopped, which is the actu­al fire.

And all these things which we have said, appertain to the first manner of genera­tion of Fire, viz. when actual Fire is applied to a combustible Body, and a com­bustible or inflamable body is kindled by Fire put to it.

By this manner of Fire many things are made and prepared for the use of man: The sun­dry uses of this fire. and hence come not only the melting and never breaking Fires of Chymists and o­ther Artists, and those which are used in Kitchins, Stoves and Chambers to warm us; but also Candles, Torches, Links and Lamps. Candles, Links and Torches are made of Tallow, Wax, Pitch, Rosin, with wicks of Cotton and Cordage. Lamps are made of Oyl with Cotton, in a Glass or other Vessel. They are made to give light in dark places. Oyl of Olives, Line-seed, Ra [...]e-seed, Hemp seed, are vul­garly used; also Lamps may be maintained with spirit of Wine or other spirits. Now that which primarily and principally burns, is the Oyl or other inflamable li­quor, which the wiek draws, which is hereby apparent, in that there are some snufts that wil not consume with Fire, such as those made of the Wood Asbestum, of which Pliny speaks in his B. 19. ch. 1. and 2. and Book 36. ch. 19. and of the stone Amiantos, of which Dioscorides speaks in his 5. B. ch. 147. as also of alumen plumo­sum. But if the wiek be combustible, it is secondarily both inflamed and burnt up.

And although Water do quench Fire, Lamps burning in water. yet Lamps may be made, which burn in Water and are extinguished in Oyl; if namely the Wick be soaked in liquid Ver­nish, and put into Water and so lighted: for then it wil burn in the Water; but if Oyl be powred to it instead of Water, 'twil go out.

And that the Oyl may burn the longer, Durable Lamps. certain metallick substances must be mix­ed therewith. So if you take one pound of red Lead half a pound of Ceruss, four ounces of quick Sulphur, common Oyl two pound, and mix them all in a Mortar by the Fire side, leisurely stirring it somtimes, and then digest them Eight daies in a Glass retort, and at last distil them, you wil have an Oyl which wil last a long time in Lamps. Or thus: Take Liturige one pound, live Brimstone four ounces, Load­stone one ounce. Let al being poudred be incorporated with two pints of Oyl O­live. [Page 77]Let this mixture digest ten daies together; and let it be stirred about once a day, afterwards distil it with a retort, and use the Oyl for a Lamp. If you would use spirit of Wine for a Lamp, to make it last long, pour it upon equal parts of unslak't Lime, crude Tartar, and Brimstone, and distill it once through a retort. Or pour spirit of Wine upon equal parts of unslak'd Lime, crude Tartar, and com­mon Salt, and so distil it. Concerning the Lamp of Ammon see Plutarch in his Treatise De defectu oraculorum. Also Cardan describes perpetual Lamps in his 10. de Rerum Varietate and in his 1 de Subtil. de principiis rerum, Caput 10.

And so much touching the first manner of the Generation of Fire, Hitherto belongs the propogati­on of fire by the Sun­beams. to which if any man wil refer that also, which is caused by the Sun's beams, I shal not quarrel with him. For if the beams of the Sun be so collected in a burning Glass artificially made to that end, that meeting in a point, they set on fire a combustible body, they do the same thing that fire applied does.

Moreover, There are also other waies, On by Coi­tion and Ʋnion. by which the fire which is potentially in a mixt body (that is to say, which actually and according to the form, is really in mixt bodies, but is not liable to the sences, but lurks invisible) may be called out of the said mixt body, so as to become manifest to the Sences. Seneca in his 2 B. of Nat. Quest. num. 22. writes, That Fire may be made two waies, Which is done many waies. one way is if it be forced out, as from the striking of a Flint; another by rubbing, as when two Sticks are rubbed together a long time. But indeed there are more waies, and at least three. For Fire is made. 1. By pu [...]refaction. 2. By the flight of the Contrary. 3. By motion: to which some ad a fourth mentioned by us in the first, viz. the Sun-beams.

In the first place, 1 since in Putrefaction the Heat and fire which lurk in the mixt body exhales, and thereby become united, by putrefaction, By putre­faction. Fire is somtimes kindled. And it is known to Country-men, how hot an heap of dung wil grow, so that the straw therein wil be quite burn'd. So they relate out of Theophrastus, that a Ship laden with moist Cloaths, conceived Fire and was burnt up. Nor is it un­known that heaps and Stacks of moist Hay and Corn have been burnt up. How­beit in matter putrifying hardly can there be so great an heat raised, that the matter should flame, unless it gather strength elswhere. An example whereof Galen has in his 3. de Temperam Cap. 2. where he writes: that Pigeons dung was cast neer the window of an house in Mysia, in the middle of a most hot Summer. The dung there­fore putrifying, and being heated by the Sun, sent forth a fiery vapor, which set on Fire the boards of the Window which were smeared with Rozin, and at last burnt the whol House.

Secondly, Fire is collected and kindled by flight of its contrary; 2 a manifest exam­ple whereof we have in Quick Lime, upon which if water be poured it grows so hot, By flight of the Con­trary Why Lime grows hot when wa­is powred upon it. Theo­phrastus. that it has been seen set wood on Fire that has been by it: which comes to pass, be­cause the fiery atomes or smal particles of Fire which lie hidden in the Lime, whiles they fly from the Water contrary to their nature, come to be united together, and so to operate. Howbeit there is a dissent amongst Authors touching the Reason of this growing hot of Lime when Water is poured upon it. Theophrastus in his Book de Igne, writes thus thereof: Seeing Heat is not without moisture or exhalation, there­fore Lime burnt when Water is put to it, rather than alone. He seems to think, that Fire lies hid in the Lime, but that it is not pierced without matter; but Water being poured upon it, it is brought into act, and exhales with the vapor, Pet. Apo­nensis. and so affects the touch. Petrus Aponensis conceivs the Cause to be, that the Heat being kept in by Antiperistasis of the cold Water becomes more forcible. J. C. Sca­liger. Jul. Caes. Scaliger in his 5. Exercitation Sect 9. thus writes: In the passages of the Lime, the natural moi­sture being consumed, there lurks Fire: which flying from the Ingress of the Water, and thrusting it self into the solid parts, it collects it self, and becomes sharpened by condensa­tion: for the piece of Lime, whose half only is covered with Water, as far as it is out of the Water grows hot, receiving into self that Heat which is banisht out of the other parts. The Comentator upon Theophrastus, de Igne blames Scaliger, The Com­mentator upon The­ophrastus. because in the Lime it does not so fall out that one part receives the Water, another part the Fire. For the Water soaks through, and every where fils all the passages, nor can this Collection and densation of the Fire be made in the inner part of the Lime as in a Tower of Refuge.

And in good deed, They are examined. true it is, that some humor exhales cut of the Lime, with the Fire. But thus a cause is not shewed, why at last the fire begins to exhale with the Water, and why in other hot Bodies, water poured on does not produce the same ef­fect. Nor hath the Antiperistasis of Petrus Aponensis any place here, since experi­ence testifies that the heat is rather poured out, then that it gathers it self inwards. So also there is no such Concentration of the Fire as Scaliger imagines; for as soon as ever the Water is poured on, it pierces into all parts of the Lime.

I conceive therefore that the opinion first propounded is the truest. The Au­thors opi­nion. Namely, In the Lime there are many atomes of Fire, not so much they, which the violence of the fire could not draw out, as those which have insinuated themselves during the long time of its burning in the Kil. For Chalk is of a Spungy Body. Therefore water being poured on, it penetrates into all parts of the Lime, which the fire avoi­ding, as contrary thereunto, it exhales, and so becomes sensible. And because the Lime contains yet some moisture in it, whereby it hangs together, that unites it self to the water poured on, and leaves the Body, whereupon the Body of the chalk is dissolved and reduced to pouder.

Upon this Ground, Mixtures made to burn with water or spittle. mixtures are made which are set on fire, being wet with wa­ter, Yea, or with Spittle: viz. If a like Quantity of Ship-Pitch, Greek Pitch, Sulphur, Tartar, Niter and Petroleum be mingled together, and double the weight of all in unslak't Lime, be added, and all made up with the Yolks of Eggs, and some daies digested in Horse Dung or in Balneo. This mixture is set on fire by Rain or any other moisture. The like mixture may be made of Unslak't Lime, Sulphur, a little Gum Arabick, and Line-seed Oyl: whereof bals being made, they wil be set on fire by Water thrown on them. So, if you sill an Egg-shell half ful of unslak't Lime, and put Gum-powder on the top and stop the hole with wax: Then the said mass Thrown into cold Water, will be set on Fire.

Thirdly, 3 Fire may be raised by motion: which comes to pass, by the mutual rubbing together of two Bodies, By motion. which have Fire in them. For by rubbing and mo­tion, the Fire which did lie stil in mixt Bodies, kept in bondage by an higher form, and throughly mixt with contrary things, is moved, and so gains motion and acti­vity. And this betides more easily, if on woods now a while rub'd one upon ano­ther, Gun-powder, or Powder of Brim-stone or such like be strewed. So Pliny in his 16. B. Ch. 4. writes that the Mulberry Tree, the Bay-Tree, and the Ivy and all Trees out of which Fire is gained, are hot Trees. Spies in Camps and Shep-herds have found this Experiment, because they have not alwaies a Flint at Hand to strik Fire. They Rub therefore one piece of Wood against another, whence Fire arises, which is received on tinder, a dry Mushrom or withered leaves of Trees. But nothing excels Ivy which must be rubbed with Bay, or let the Bay Wood be rubbed with the Ivy. Also the wild Vine is approved in this case, not that which is cal'd Labrusca, but another sort, which Climbes Trees like Ivy.

Fourthly, 4 Some refer hither the manner whereby Fire is kindled by the Sun­beams, By the Sun beams. of which we speak above, in the first manner of gaining Fire. Whereof we allow every Man to Judg as he pleases. The thing is of it self manifest and wel known, that by burning Glasses and other Glasses, Wood, Paper and other dry things are set on fire. With such kind of Glasses Archimedes set on Fire the Ene­mies Gallies and burnt them up. Of which see what the Teachers of Opticks say, and Johannes Baptista Porta. Yea, and the Raies of the Sun may kindle fire without any Glasses, and experience hath shewed, that woods and bituminous Lands and Seas, have been accidentally set on Fire by the Sun's Beams.

J. C. Scaliger in the same Exercitation, Scaligar, refers to the Head the man­ner by at­tenuation of the Air: but he is confuted. Sect. 1. hath yet another manner of the generation of Fire, and conceives it may be made out of attenuated Air; where thus he writes: We must confess that out of the Air moved, smitten and attenuated heat may be caused. Which if it proceed it turns to the substance of Fire, and that by Reason of the attenuation of parts. But that this is fals, does thus appear, that Stones and the hardest Bodies smitten together, do not cause any sparkles of Fire, unless they have store of Sulphur in them. And the Sulphur which is forced out of flints may be perceived by its smel. Moreover the Air cannot be inflamed, either by rubbing or any other way, but this is the property only of mixt Sulphureous Bodies. And if the Air it self could be set on Fire, this lower Region of the Air had been long a go [Page 79]burnt up, at the burning of great woods and Cities. Aristotle truly, in his 2 de Caelo, Ch 7. Text 42. and 1. Meteor, Text 3. Writes that the Air being moved is set on fire, and that arrows by motion grow so hot, that the Leaden points have melted. But I do not believe the truth of such reports. Whether the points of darts do melt. And if the Leaden points of darts could meit, much more should bullets grow hot, that are shot out of Guns, which they do not. And Pareus, in his Apologismus Primus saies that bullets shot against an hard Stone have been presently taken up without hurting a Mans Hand. And if Leaden points of darts or Leaden bullets, did grow hot with motion, much more would wax grow hot; and yet experience hath taught us that a bullet made of wax shot out of a Gun hath not melted, but hath gone through a boord two fingers thick.

So much for the manners of the generation of Fire. Contraiwise Fire goes out, Contrari­wise, Fire goes out. especially flame, when either the inflamable matter fails, or though it be present, it is hindred from flaming, and the Fire not suffered to come out of the mixt Body.

For in the first place, when the inflamable Body fails, the flame ceases, 1 when all the Sulphur which was in the Body is consumed. So when Tallow, Wax, Either through deffect of inflamable matter. or Oyl fail, the flame dies in the Wiek and Lamp; and when the wood is quite burnt and reduced to ashes, the Fire goes out; because that which was there before, flies away, and no more follows it. For Flame is alwaies in generation and being bred it perishes immediatly, as Theophrastus speaks in his Book de Igne. For while the fire is made by consuming the fewel, when the fewel is gone the fire goes out. For the fire properly does not die or perish, but flies away: yet because it sticks so long to the inflamable Body, as long as there is any thing to be kindled and burn, when that fails, it is thought to die. This first manner of extinction, which is caused by defect of suel, is by Theophrastus in his Book de Igne called, A Corruption allmost Natural, and most properly so called.

Touching the kindling and going out of Fire, The double motion of a flame ac­cording to Galen. Galen hath an excellent place in his Book de respirat. Cap. 3. Where he writes: All flames are moved with a double motion, the one from the matter, out of which they are kindled, by which they mount aloft and spred abroad every way; the other contrary to this, is to their beginning and their Roots as it were, by which they settle and are contracted. For if you light a brand on the very top, the fire comes suddenly to the lower parts; and if after you have blown out the flame of a candle, and you shall hold another candle over the Smoak of the snuf, you shall see it presently lighted, which could not so fal out, if the fire moved only upwards. The cause of this mo­tion. And he adds that this is the cause of the said double motion, seeing (saith he) every flame is most speedily corrupted: for it is alwaies scattered by the ambient Air, therefore it is necessary that its generation should also be very quick; otherwise it would not last the least moment. Now the generation of all flame comes out of the matter, therefore it hath not without cause given it by Nature, not only a motion outwards from its proper prin­ciple, but one contrary thereunto, turning towards its own proper principle. And all flame must needs be corrupted, if it want either matter, or one of these motions. In which place of Galen, those two motions of flame, are diligently to be considered. First, The Fire is carried to the Body inflameable, and the matter, or Root, as Galen cals it, by reason of affinity, and it goes on al sides: the other is whereby the fire which is drawn out, is naturally carried upwards.

Now the waies whereby the inflameable matter being present, 2 the flame never­theless decaies, are many, which all of them have this in common, Or because of no gene­ration of new actua­ted fire. Which comes to pass again. that in the ex­tinction, the actuated fire goes away, and no more actuated fire does succeed it, from the mixt Body inflamed.

This proceeds first from suffocation; viz. when as the fire breaking out of the inflamed Body with the Smoak, finds no place to receive it. For then the fire ceases to be moved in the fume or Smoak. For seeing, as was said before, two bodies cannot be in the same place, 1 least there should be a penetration of dimensi­ons; and in the inflamation, of mixt Bodies, Either by suffocation. many exhalations go away with the Fire which fire which raised them; if they find no place to receive them, their eva­poration together with the flame is hindred, by the necessary working of universal Nature. After this manner, all things that deny place to the Fire and the exhala­tion joyned therewith, do extinguish the fire, and stifle the same: which happens when the flame and fume are so shut up, that they have no free egress, nor place to hold them.

Its also a kind of suffocation, Hereunto belongs al­so extincti­on by thick Air. when the flame is extinguished by thick Air and exhalations; which comes to pass in the quarries of metals, the pumpes of Ships, and when Beer and new Wine works. For seeing the Air is then filled with thick vapors, it cannot contain the flame with its exhalation, whence its motion must needs be stopped and choaked in its Root.

To suffocation also, Also the compressi on of the Wiek. compression may be referred, when the wiek being com­pressed, the flame of Candles is put out unless any one will refer this to the follo­wing manner, whereby fire is violently separated from its Fuel and Root as it were.

Secondly, 2 A flame is extinguished by discussion and dissipation, when the flame is pluckt away and so departs from its fuel and Root, Or by dis­cussion and dissipation before new fire can follow, and when the fire is taken away, which drew out the fire in the mixt body. After this manner Torches are blown out by Winds, and we blow out Candles and Lamps with our Breath. Why flame is both rai­sed and ex­tinguished, by blowing And seeing by the blast of ones Mouth or by Bellows, flame is raised, and the fire in Coals turns to a flame, we must enquire the cause of these dif­ferent effects. Where we are to know; if a little flame do only stick in the surface of the Body, it is soon extinguished by blowing, whereby the incendiary, and the fire into which the mixt Body is resolved, are soon taken away. But if the fire, actuated by blowing, is driven into the inner parts of the Body inflameable the fire is more and more encreased. Thus, by blast of the Mou [...]h, and of the Bellows, the fire is droven into the inner part of the Coals, and flame is raised, which when it hath taken deep root, it is not easily separated, but the fire desirous to preserve it self, alwaies goes more inward, and by that motion, more of the hidden fire is actuated. Which is manifest in Coals. Hence it appears, why as Theophrastus saies and experience teaches, Lamps do consume more Oyl, if the Wind blow upon them, then they do when the Air is stil, and torches also are sooner burnt out, when the wind blows. For seeing the flame is prepetually generated, and the Wind or other blast discusses the flame gennerated, the fire sticking close to its principle or Root, does more greedily and powerfully draw out what ever is there­in inflamable, and turnes it into flame.

Hence also a cause may be rendred, When and why the flame in the wiek, is extin­guished & blown in again. why the flame being extinguished, is again excited by blowing upon the snuf. Where you must observe that this does not al­waies happen, but somtimes only, when the snuf is large and ful of fire, like a coal. For then, as burning coals by the blast of bellows, do send forth a flame which otherwise, of themselves they would not do: so also the fire being in great quan­tity in the snuf, by blowing conceives flame. But if the snuf after the flame is blown out, have not much fire in it, and be not red hot, 'twil be in vaine to endea­vour to blow it into a flame,

This also is to be observed by the Way: Why the fire of a flame, is more po­wer fulhen that of burning coals. that the fire of a flame, is much more vehement then that of Coals, and that not without Cause. For all the strength of Fire is in motion. And experience it self witnesses the same. And therefore Gold-Smiths do most readily melt their Gold by a Lamp, the flame whereof they direct upon the Gold by blowing. And others also that work in metal, and amongst them, belfounders do rather use the fire of flame rising from wood, then Coals, and if in other melting fornaces they use Coals, they use the continual blast of bel­lows to make them flame.

There is yet a third way, Or by bin­dring the afflux of new fire. when the flame, though the matter of fire be present in an inflameable body, is extinguished, because that which is first bred, flies away; seeing flame is in perpetual motion, and new fire is hindred from coming out of the inflameable body, or the actual fire is hindred from drawing more out of the in­flameable body, or as Theoprastus speaks somwhat shuts up and stops the begin­ning. Whether sire be ex­tinguished, by presence of its con­trary. Which how it comes to pass, we are now to enquire. which how it comes to pass, must be enquired unto. Some men may refer this to the presence of that which is contrary, which when the fire perceives, it flies from it, and ceases its mo­tion. But, Seeing not only water, but also Oyl and spirit of wine, too abundant­ly poured about the flame, yea, and Ashes, Sand, and what ever covers the inflame­able body, that the Flame which cals out the lurking fire, cannot touch the same, puts out the flame; and 'tis not only contrarity that makes to the extinction of the flame. For the fire in the flame flies away, when it can no longer touch the Body inflamed. And though the Body, which interposes it self, be it self also inflame­able; [Page 81]Yet, If either by means of the great Quantity thereof, or by reason of the admistion of another Body, it cannot set that body on fire, nor change it into a flame to succed, the former flame flies away, and so no other coming in its place, the fire is extinguished. Yet, because of al things water doth most easily extinguish fire; if any one wil have it, that it puts out fire, not only by interposition of its bo­dy, but also by its contrariety which it hath to Fire, I shal not contend with him thereabout.

But how it comes to pass that some fire burns under water, Why some fire burns under the Water. is an obscure questi­on, nor that I know of, sufficiently explained by any Man. For al inflameable things wil not burn under the Water. For Rozin, Bitumen, Frankincense, Yea, and Brim-Stone it self, if being set on fire they be put into water, they are easily extinguished: and other things even when they are not on fire wil not admit of water, as Oyls, Tallows, Fats. And if these be much heated, and then water poured upon them, there arises a great sight betwixt them and the Water, and the fire flies violently away with a great noise; so that experience hath taught, that fires have been caused by pouring Water on such fat things when they boil. If therefore mixtures be made of such things so fatty, which exceedingly resist water, adding such things as do most of all cherish fire, and keep it from flying away, then those mixtures will burn even in the Water. For a part of such a mixture being inflamed, does vehemently drive the Water from it self, and therefore such things burn with a noise, and hinder the water from piercing into the burning body, and the other things do continually supply matter to the flame.

A Torch that wil not be extinguished by Rain or Wind, may thus be made. A Torch that can­not be quenched. Take Colophony and Wax of each six pound, Turpentine two pound, Tallow one pound. Mix all over the fire. And in this mixture dip Wieks to make Candles, or Cords to make links, let them boil a little and then take them out and cool, and wreath four together for one link. Which must be covered with four pound of Wax and one pound of Turpentine.

A Candle that will burn in water may thus be made. Take Wax half a pound, A Candle that will burne in water. Brim-stone, unslak't Lime, Turpentine, Salt Ammoniack, of each two ounces, Petro­leum one ounce, Camphire half an ounce. Mix them and make thereof Candles, which if they be lighted and thrown into the water will burn never­theless.

Besides the manners and waies already reckoned up, Flame is also ex­tinguished when a greater is applied to a lesser. whereby fire may be exting­uished, Theophrastus, in his B. de Igne, hath yet another, viz. When a greater fire is put to a lesser. So we see, a great Candle lighted and put to a lesser, puts the lesser out. But then the lesser flame indeed is extinguished, but the fire in the Snuf is not put out: and the sire and flame do not go away, only the lesser flame goes to the greater, because of affinity, and is thereto joyned; or the lesser flame is drawn to it by the greater.

And that we may say somwhat also of the effects and operations of fire; Of the o­perations of fire. Fire is indeed essentially one and the same, but according to the diversity of the matter wherein it is, it workes diversly. Fire is most hot in a solid and Earthy Body, saies Theophrastus: but in a thin and rare or spungy body, 'tis less hot. And Scaliger in his 9. Exercitation: Fire in Iron is most vehement by reason of its density, Why some fire is more vehement then other some? in wood less vehement, weaker in Wooll and such Paper as we use; in a flame it is so dilute that we can draw our hand through it without hurt; in Aquae-vitae, on fire the flame is so thin, that it will not burn a cloath dipt therein. Yea, And the same Scaliger in the same place saies, that the fire burns not of it self, but by accident, viz. Because of con­densation. Howbeit, It is a question obscure enough, whether fire of it self burns, and whether some fire be hotter then othersome. Cardan hath invented some causes of this thing, which may be seen in Scaliger. The opini­on of Sca­liger. Now that this question may be more rightly explained, Scaliger gives us light, in the same place, who saies the common manner and cause why fire is more vehement then fire, is the frequency of its parts, their Coherence, Propinquity, Coagmentation, Cohesion and union; for in a more compacted matter very many parts are contained in a smal place.

Andreas Libavius indeed opposes this opinion of Scaliger in his Comm. Alchym. Libavius opposes the opinion of Scaliger. Part. 1. Lib. 2. Cap. 12. And feigns I know not what intension of substances and qualities, and objects divers things of little validity against him, scarce rightly stating the Controversie. For first he saies, when stubble is loose and spred abroad, [Page 82]the fire Flams and wanders at large, and we must say its heat is less because of the dispersion of parts. Take them therefore in your hand, twist them and twind them together, yet the fire becomes no stronger: but the answer is easie. The stubble it self, whether spread abroad, or in a bund [...], does not change its Nature, but continues spungy. And therefore it stirs up the same degree of fire, save that when it lies scattered it cannot afford so joynt a Flame, seeing much Air comes be­tween, as when it is gathered together. Again, he saies, that fire burning freely in a spungy piece of Wood hath more furtherances to its action, then in an hard and solid, although you imagine both of them to be totally inflamed. The fire of loose Coals is more spirituous, and more blown through then that of hard Coals, although a greater impression seems to be made by the latter, if you touch them: yet it hath less spirit, it receives less nutriment from the Air; and because it is more shut in, it is more weak, though more lasting in regard of the strength of the matter.

But Libavius seems, Libavius his objecti­ons an­swered. not to have been well acquainted with the Nature of fire, and there are many things in these objections not agreeing with truth, also several questions are mingled together. For the question is not, what material does more easily take fire, and in which fire is most easily brought into act, and which burns most freely. For we grant that al these things are true of Spungy bodies. But the question is, in which the fire burns most, in a rare or a dense body. And we say, that fire does burn more vehemently in a compact and dense body, as experience shews. For a man may without dammage draw his finger through the flame, but if he do but touch a red hot Iron, he is burnt in a moment. Which Libavius himself confesseth when he grants, that we perceive a greater heat in hard Coals then in spun­gy, if we touch them. Now that is false, that the fire receives nourishment from the Air, since whatsoever is lighted must be in the inflamed body. But if fire be al­laied with much Air, as happens in the burning of stubble and such like things, the fire is not thereby made stronger but weaker. And Libavius confounds the en­crease of the siery parts and the stronger action of the fire depending thereupon, with the intension of the heat it self. That one fire is greater then another is out of question; and manifest also it is, that in a greater Quantity the power of acting is greater, in a less quantity lesser. For that metal which is melted by a large flame of Wood or Coals, will not be melted by the flame of a Candle. But here lies the Question, whether the heat and fire which is in a great flame, be of it self more intense then that in a smal one. Which Scaliger denies, for the causes aforesaid, and maintaines, that those parts of fire, which they call degrees, are augmented by conjunction of parts, and not by intensi­on of Virtue. Which opinion of Scaliger, though Libavius call's it a Nicety; Yet, He must needs allow of it, when he writes that the heat of Fire is as great as may be, in the smallest spark, and of it self suffers nothing to be taken from it, nor ad­mits any part of a cold body into its society. And though he addes that the recep­tive subject of them both is altered; yet will not Scaliger deny this neither. For by how much the more Fire there is in any body, so much the hotter is it; and by how much the lesser, so much the less hot. Take for an example (which Libavius himself uses) seething Water. There is in boyling hot Water much Fire, where­upon if you pour cold water, it becomes luke-warm, because of the admixture of cold water, which hath no Fire in it. In a smal piece of Iron there may be more Fire, then in a great deal of stubble.

I retain therefore the opinion of Scaliger, The Au­thors opi­nion. and hold, that one Fire is not hotter then another; but that Fire burns more strongly then Fire, comes by reason of the union of many parts; and that fire burns weakly, proceeds from the distance of the said parts. Which that we may understand more clearly, we must know, that Fire is most of all allayed by Air, which easily insinuates it self into the society thereof. Whence it follows, that in rare and porous Bodies, which containe much Air in them, Fire is more weak and dilute, and its parts are not too near. Contra­riwise, In solid bodies, into which Fire pierceth where there is little Air, the parts of the Fire do stick more one to another, and are compacted.

Howbeit from the premises it follows, Fire burns of it self and not by accident, as Scaliger Imagines. that fire burns of it self, not by accident as Scaliger would have it; contrariwise that it does not burn by accident at al. For, seeing Fire of it self is the hottest of all bodies (though we have no such Fire with us, that is pure) and in pure Fire there is a great cleaving together of the parts there­of, [Page 83]it must also of necessity burn: which also it does in Iron, and other red-hot me­tals, because the Atomes or indivisible particles of the fire do Cohere together, and are extreamly near one another, and very many are contained in a smal place, and because of their conjunction they act more effectually. Contrariwise in stubble, and other spungy Bodies, because Air is mixed with the flame; and as Scaliger in his 9 Exercitation speaks, the fire is allayed by the Air, the parts of the fire do not stick together, but are at distance, the Air coming between, therefore they can­not act so strongly. For Fire truly is the first subject of heat, and the hottest thing of all others: but that it does not allwaies Act to extremity, comes by admixture of other Bodies not so hot, especially of the Air.

The next Element to fire is the Air. For it, What place the Air holds. Its three Regions. as it declines from the carity and heat of the Fir; so it takes up a room a little more remote from Heaven, and is heavy respectively. The Air is divided into three Regions: the uppermost, the middlemost, and the lowermost. The uppermost is above the Tops of the highest mountaines. For imagine but a surface upon the tops of the Highest mountaines, that shall make the Earth exactly round, the Air above the same, to the Sphere of fire is the uppermost Region. The other are below this, which are not allwaies of a like bigness. For in Summer the lowest is greatest, which reaches as far as the reflection of the Sun beams goes; and in Winter the middle Region. For in sum­mer time when the Sun beams fal to righter Angles, they are reflected higher; but in Winter, the Beams of the Sun being very oblique are reflected sidewaies; nor do they rebound aloft. The middle Region, in respect of the two others is least hot, and therefore it is said to be cold, because the Sun beams are not reflected so far: the other two are hotter; the uppermost, because of the Vicinity of the Heaven and the siery Element; the lowest be cause of the doubled Sun beams, direct and reflex.

Howbeit the lowest Region is variously disposed, somtimes 'tis hot, otherwhiles cold, somtimes moist, otherwhiles dry, somtimes clear, otherwhiles cloudy; and the Air being in this Region variously disposed, does diversly affect our Bodies. For while we breathe, we continually draw it in, and by it the spirits in our Bodies are repaired and cherished, and our heat which in the Body needs continual fanning, is thereby preserved.

After the Air comes the Water, an heavy Element, The Water. yet somwhat lighter then the Earth. This Element is no where found pure, but is every where mixed with the Earth and ambient Air; of which the taste is an argument, seeing you can hardly sinde any Water void of taste.

The lowest place is taken up by the Earth, The Earth. which is of all Elements the most hea­vy, and most unfit for motion. It hath much matter, and is therefore thick and dark. The Earth is not found pure on the top thereof, but if it be any where pure, it is in the Centre, whither no contrary does pierce, that may corrupt it.

The Water and Earth do not make a peculiar Sphere as the rest of the Elements, The Water and the Earth do not make a peculiar sphere. nor does the water compass the Earth on all sides, but the Earth receives the water within its Cavities; and in very many places, by a singular providence of God, the Earth stands bare, for the more commodious generation and nutrition of Animals and other mixt Bodies, and it lies open to receive the Raies of the Stars. For Beauti­fulness and Commodity overcame the force of necessity, in respect whereof, the water was to have covered the whole Earth. As Scaliger saies, in his 9. Exercita­tion.

Now, How great the Earth and Water is can hardly be determined. That the compass of the whole Globe made up of Earth and water is 18000. furlongs, or 5400 German miles, and the Diameter thereof about 1718. German miles, is a thing out of question: but 'tis hard to say whether there be more Earth or Water: Yet most likely it is, that there is more Earth then Water. For neither is the greater part of the surface of the Globe of the Earth covered with Water, as appears by the true description of the said Globe: nor indeed is the quantity of the Water greater then that of the Earth; seeing by the sounding Plummet we discern that there is Earth under the Sea; and the depth of the Sea compared with the diameter of the Earth, is a thing of smal moment. Of which see Alexander Piccolhomineus in his Treatise of the Largness of the Land and Water.

And, The water with the Earth makes one Globe. that the Sea is not flat and even, but that it makes one Globe with the Earth, is proved, first by Eclipses of the Moon, in which the shadow of the Earth appears circular; and therefore argues the Body of the Earth to be so likewise; and in the next place by Navigations: For if a man sail out into the main Sea, and take notice of some House or turret on the shore, at first he sees it all, afterward, scarce half, til at last he quite lose the sight of it, because the swelling roundness of the Water interposes it self between the shore and the mans Eye; for sight goes alwaies in a right Line. And although the Earth it self be not an exact Globe, but a Globous Body, high in some places, low in other some: yet this highness and flatness bears scarce any proportion to the whole Body of the Earth; which appears by Eclipses of the Moon, wherein the shadow of the Earth appears Circular, and makes a Circular Line.

Chap. 1. Of the Elements as they are the Principles of mixt Bodies.

SInce in the Sublunary part of the World there is a perpetual Interchange of the generation and corruption of things, these must needs be some immediate Principles, of which variously mixed and tempered together, all things are generated. Then Principles are vulgarly cal'd Elements, The defi­nition of the Ele­ments. and by Aristotle 3. de Caelo, C. 3. T. 30. thus defined. The Elements of Bodies are those things into which the Bodies are resolved wherein they are actually or potentially, but they themselves cannot b [...] divided into other distinct sorts of things. And by Avicen they are defined to the same intent and purpose: That they are simple Bodies, and the first parts of the Body of [...] and other things; which cannot be divided into Bodies of different forms, of the mixture of which, the several sorts of things generated are made. Where you are to observe, that the chief Character of an Element, as it is the principle of a mixt Body, is indivisi­bility, in respect of any parts of several sorts, into which it can be divided. And therefore Galon also; when in 1. de Elem. Cap. 1. He had defined an Element to be the smallest part of that where of it is an Element, himself adds; but that which appears smallest to the sense, is not indeed alwaies the smallest in reality. For many things by their smalness cannot be discerned by the senses.

Seeing these Elements were to be the Principles of a tangible and generable body, it was necessary that they should have also certain Qualities, by which they might be known to us, might work one upon another, and might be fit to effect all kind of mixture: which what and how many they are, let us consider in the first place. For they being known, The first Qualities, why so cal­led. we shal easily afterwards know, both how many Elements there are, and what their Nature is. These qualities are commonly called the first Qualities, not because they are absolutely first, or first in dignity, or because all o­ther Qualities arise from them, but because they are originally in the first subluna­ry bodies.

Now these are their Conditions: Their Con­ditions. that they constitute the first sensible, that is to say, tangible bodies, and be their differences us they are such: that they effect the first sense, viz. the touch: that they be in all bodies subject to Generation and Corrupti­on: that they be contrary, and apt to do and suffer; for they are to be the Authors [Page 85]of Generation and Corruption: that they have none before them, whence they are termed first: that they cannot be made one of another.

Moreover, that we may search out how many such Qualities there are, How many first Quali­ties there are? we must take a view of al tangible Qualities. Aristotle, in de 2. Generat. & Corrupt. c. 2. [...]. 8. reckons up these first tangible Contrarieties; Hot, Gold; Dry, Moist; Hea­vy, Light; Hard, Soft; Clammy, Crisp; Rough, Smooth; Thick, Thin. How­beit, among these seven Oppositions of tangible Qualities; only the two first de­serve the name of first Qualities. For Heavy and light do not act one upon ano­ther. And the same may be said of the other four part of Oppositions. For nei­ther do they act or suffer one upon and from another; nor are they first Qua­lities, but arise from others, and belong rather to compound than to simple Bodies. And therefore there are only four first Qualities: Hear, Col [...], Driness, [...]. For in them al the abovesaid marks of first Qualities are to be [...]d.

These Qualities are defined by Aristole in the 2. de Gen. & Corrup ch. 2. [...] 9. The de­finition of Heat. thus: Heat is that which collects things homogoneal or of like nature. For in that [...]t se­parates things heterogeneal comes by accident. For to collect and gather together things of like nature, is to separate things of unlike nature. Now by things homagene­al, or of like nature, we must understand, not only such things as are of the same sort, but which have like temper, and may be changed into one nature: by things heterogene­al or of unlike nature, not only such things as are of a different species or four, but also such as are of a diverse temperament, nor can be reduced into one nature. For Heat alwaies endeavors to reduce things different into one Nature: which [...] it can­not do, by reason of the difference of temperaments, it only unites such things as it hath made alike, and rejects the rest as Excrements. These operations of Heat are every where to he seen, and especially in the Concoctions made in anima [...]. For the soul makes greatest use of heat as its fittest instrument to perform its actions by. For fundry meats being cast into the stomach, the Heat of the stomach reduce such as are fitting into one nature, and turns them into one mast of chyle; the other parts which are unfit, it separates as Dregs and Excrements, to be cast our by the [...]. The same does the Liver; the same do all the members. Also by the help of Heat all chemical operations are performed. For that Art by Heat se­parates [...]als; seve [...] the parts of Plants and other things, and does other won­derful works. Heat therefore is of all Qualities the most excellent; the first Instru­ment of Generation, and most efficacious in its operations.

Cold i [...] a Quality that gathers together, both things of [...], Cold de­fined. and things of unlike Na­ture. For we see now in Ice, by force of cold, several things, as Wood, Straw, Stones, Earth are congealed together; and the like cold does in other things and places; and it combines things together with one any separation of what i [...] hetero­geneal. Here we must reject the Opinion of Cardan, who would have cold to be only a [...] and privation of Heat. For Cold i [...] doubtless a positive Quality; seeing it is [...] by the Sense, and hath certain powers whereby it acts and op­poses Heat; which cannot be in a bare privation. Of which see Scaliger in his 2 [...]. Exercitation.

That is moist, which it hardly [...] in its own limits or bounds, The De­finition of Moisture [...] and Dri­ness. easily in th [...]se of another thing. That is dry, which is easily commined in its own bounds, and over not easily [...] the bounds of another thing. For we find by Experience, that the Air does of it self flow every where al about and easily accommodate it self to the sides of the thing contained; and the like [...] Water: but the Earth flows not about, but retains and keeps with in its own bounder nor does it easily accommodate it self to all the parts of the body which contains it. By Moisture therefore things are made to cleave one to another; and there [...] we see things overdried do breale: and from driness things have stability and Consistency.

Now touching these definitions, this is to be observed: that Aristotle did not de­fine the first Qualities absolutely considered, as they are in the Elementy, conside­red as simple bodies and not compounded into mixt things; but as they appertain unto them, when they go into a mixt body. Aristotle was not indeed ignorant, that the first Qualities had other effects preceding those by which he defined them; and that an Hot thing Heats, a Cold, Cools; a Moist moistens, and a Dry Dries; yet he thought not fit to constitute or make up the definitions of the first Qualities by these effects; both because these definitions would reveal nothing that was hid­den, [Page 86]but the same thing would be defined by the same; and also because the first qualities are given to the Elements by Nature, for no other occasion but that by them as the immediate instruments they might be the principles of mixt bodies. And the first operations of the first qualities are originally more principal than the second operations of the said Qualities: but in the intent of nature contriving the generation of a mixt body, they are not the principal, but the second are more principal than they. Wherefore, omitting those common operations known of themselves, which they perform both in mixt and simple bodies, Aristotle would define them by those alone which they exercise in mixt bodies.

These Qualities are divided into Active Heat and Cold; Whether the first Qualities are rightly divided into active and passive and Passive Moisture and Driness, of which division, although the opinions of Authors are various, as may be seen in Archangelus Mercenarius, p. 239. Zabarella de Qual. Elem. c. 5. Franc. Piccol. de Qual. p. 1. cap 8. yet I conceive, this ought to be our judgment. All these qualities, in respect of that univocal action, whereby each one by its first operations begets its like, and destoies its contrary, as wel in simples as in mixt bodies, do both act and suffer: yet in respect of their equivocal action, which they only exercise in mixt bodies, and whereby they produce the second qualities, and the nature of the mixt body it self, different from the nature of the Elements; two are termed active, and two passive. And in this respect, Moisture and Driness have no active power, but are only as matter which the Work-masters Heat and Cold exercise their craft upon.

Seeing these Qualities are in the Elements as in their first subjects, we may right­ly by them search out also the number of the Elements. And omitting that rea­son which was produced in the second Book foregoing, we shall thus proceed. If the Elements be alterable, they must needs be more than one: but they are altera­ble, for they must be the principles of alterable bodies, and bodies that are corrupti­ble. Therefore there cannot be one Element but many, and they endowed with contrary qualities, by which they act and suffer mutually. This reason agrees with that of Hippocrates, Lib. 7. de Nat. Hom. t. 5. where he saies: if a Man consi­sted only of one Element, he should never be pained: for there would be nothing to pain him, because he should be one thing; and, as Galen saies in his Comment, there would be no second to act upon him. For the self same body cannot suffer from it self.

Now how many Elements there are, The num­ber of the Elements. Aristotle demonstrates in his 2. de Gener. & Corrup. cap. 3. t. 16. and cap. 5. t. 34. after this manner. The Elements are there­fore called the principles of mixt bodies, because being altered and changed one by another, they constitute the said bodies. Now all alteration and mutation de­pends upon the action and passion of the first Qualities, which are four as was said before. Those simple bodies therefore which are the subject of the first Qualities, shal be the principles of mixt bodies. And that they may rightly cause mistion, 'tis necessary, Whether the first Qualities be the forms of the Ele­ments. that each may suffer from each, and that therefore it have not only one, but two first Qualities.

From the Premises therefore, thus we conclude. There are so many Elements, as there are possible combinations of the first Qualities: but they are only four; Heat and Driness; Cold and Moisture; Heat and moisture, Cold and Driness: for the other two are altogether impossible, nor can extream Heat combine with extream Cold, nor extream Driness with extream Moisture: seeing contraries cannot be in one and the same subject. So many Elements therefore there are; The Fire hot and dry; the Air, hot and moist; The Water, cold and moist; and the Earth, cold and dry.

Hereunto may also be added another reason, which Aristotle uses in his 2. de Ge­nerat. and Corrupt. Cap. 8. T. 40. So many Elements there are, as there are things of which perfectly mixt Bodies do consist. But they consist only of four: and therefore there are four Elements. For we see all perfectly mixt Bodies to have much Earth in them, and to be moved towards the Earth: but mixt Bodies are mo­ved according to the motion of the prevalent Element. And mixt Bodies because they are knit together and Co-here, and receive terms, there is also water in them, for it is the part of Water to unite and fasten: if Water and Earth, then the con­trary Elements Fire and Air, by which they are to be allaied, and wherewith to be mingled. For mixture is not made without mutual action and passion. Moreover [Page 87]all Generation is made by Heat. And therefore besides water and Earth, heat also is required to mixture: but one hot Element doth not suffice: For it would be van­quished by two cold ones. And therefore, besides Water and Earth, Fire also and Air do concur to constitute all mixt Bodies.

The number of the Elements being found out, Whether the first qualities be the forms of the Ele­ments. we must now enquire into their Essence and Nature. And since the first qualities are very intimate to the Elements, the question is; Whether the first Qualities are the substantial forms of the Elements? Or whether the Elements have other forms besides the Qualities. Not to be prolix in a plain case, briefly thus we hold; that the first qualities are not the substanti­al forms of the Elements, but accidents. A token whereof is, that the first qualities are perceived by the sense; whereas no substance can of it self be perceived by the sense; again they are found in other things as mutable accidents; and therefore in the Elements themselves they cannot any waies be substances. Howbeit the hid­den Forms of the Elements are by them Circumscribed by Authors. And there­fore Hippocrates himself, oft calls the four Elements by the Names of Hot, Cold, Moist and Dry, as Galen witnesses in his 1. De Temp. Ch. 8.

By the Qualities therefore the Elements are known to us. The quali­ties pro­ceed from the Forms. For they are in the Elements as their Proper subjects, from whose forms also they depend and have their being. For I hold not with those who deny, that the first Qualities which are in the Elements do proceed from the forms of the said Elements, by way of Emanation, but derive them all from the motion of Heaven, or the Negation there­of. For 'tis an absurd thing, that a Natural Quality should proceed from any thing but its own Form. Nor must we think that the forms of the Elements are Lazy and Heartless, and produce no Qualities, nor work no operations. For if the first proceed not from the forms, which are most intimate with the Elements; I do not see what other Qualities can proceed from them: moreover an absurd thing it is, to hold that cold comes only from the Privation of the motion of Heaven: for since it is a positive Quality, it requires also a positive Cause.

But in each Element there are two Qualities. For seeing it is necessary, Each Ele­ment hath two quali­ties. That every Element, for the more commodious generation of things and their mixtion, should be able to act upon every one, and suffer from every one: therefore each have two qualities. Now the Question in this place is; whether both Qualities do equally agree to each Element? Whether each Ele­ment hath one quality in the highest de­gree? Or whether one Element have affinity to one Quality more then another, and have one Quality primarily, the other secondarily: Moreover; Whether in each Element both the Qualities are in the highest degree, Or one only in the highest degree, and the other remiss: and it is disputed, how that place in Aristotle 2. de Gener. and Corrup. Cap. 3. T. 23. is to be understood; where Aristotle thus saies: The Earth is dry more then cold, the Water cold more then moist, the Air moist more then hot, the fire hot more then dry.

'Twere long to recount the different opinions of Authors touching this Question, and to make any certain determination is hard: yet I shall briefly propound what I conceive most probable. Now we hold, that that one quality is most intimate to the Nature of each Element and more of alliance thereto then the other: also that one is more excellent, the other less excellent, viz. That the fire, as Aristotle hath it in the place forealleadged, is most Hot and Dry; the Air most moist and hot: the Water most cold and moist; the Earth most Dry and Cold; which also sense does testifie: and that these Qualities do after this manner flow from the form of each Element. And they are in an Error, who while they are sollicitous about attributing to each Element its own Qualities, do not so much regard the forms of the Elements, as their greater or lesser distance from Heaven, and think thence to fetch the qualities. Nor is that of any great moment, which hath moved many to think the contrary: viz. That the abatement of the quality is caused by its contra­ry; whereas the Elements are most simple, and have no contrariety in them. For this is true only of mixt bodies, but not of simple Elements: and that constitution of Qualities doth proceed from the form of each one. For as this is the Nature of the Air, that without the mixture of any heavy Body it is not so light as the fire; so it is a property thereof, not to be so hot as fire.

And here is also another Question, Whether the Quali­ties where­in the Ele­ments par­take, are of several sorts. whether symbolical Qualities, for example sake the Heat in the Fire and the Heat in the Air, are of the same sort. Now the Answer is, That these Qualities are not of several sorts, and that we are not to acknowledg eight, but only four first Qualities, which in the first place our Sense it self doth witness, which judgeth all heat to be of one sort: and again when the symbo­lical Elements are changed, the Quality wherein they partake abides: and the watry coldness it self is as contrary to the heat of the Air, as to the heat of the Fire.

From what has been said may easily be collected, what is the nature of each Ele­ment. For the Fire is an Element exceedingly and primarily hot, and Dry. Both which experience does witness, wherby we are all dayly instructed that Fire is dry. For Fire can change both Air and Water. And therfore it must have Qualities con­trary to them. For transmutation happens betwixt contraries: and whereas both the Air and Water are moist, the Fire contrariwise is dry.

We must therefore reject the Paradoxical opinion of Johannes Baptista Monta­nus, who teaches that the Fire and all Elements have some moisture in them, and that whatever is continued in Nature and united, whether it be simple or compound, is continued only by humidity, and that not only in this sublunary world, but in the Heaven also. For in mixture only it is, that divers simple bodies are coupled by moisture: not simple bodies, for so they should not be simple. But the form of every simple body, as it gives the being and bounds, so it couples and contains the parts.

The Fire therefore, seeing it is Primarily and principally hot, al hot operations are therefore therein more conspicuous: The Fire compared to a King. and therfore it is neatly by Scaliger com­pared to a just King, which renders every one his due, dividing the Land amongst families: and to a prudent steward of an house that reserves to himself as much as he needs. For out of Wood, it gives ashes to the Earth, liquor to the water, vapor to the Air; and takes that to it self which is concealed from the Eies of the Vulgar, but not from the mind of the Wise. And although very many in this age seek to banish Fire out of the Universe: yet I conceive we ought not to reject the same, as hath been said before in B. 2. ch. 3.

The Air is an Element in the highest degree and primarily moist. Air is most moist and hot. The Air is hot. Now touching the heat thereof, there is great difference amongst Authors. For the Stoicks as Sene­ca, Nat. Quest. Book 2. Ch. 10. Cardan Lib. 2. de Elem. and others do hold against the Peripateticks that the Air is cold. But I must take part with the Peripateticks for the heat of the Air; seeing there are strong reasons to back that opinion For Air is produced and preserved by that which is hot: but is condensed by cold, and turned into water. Moreover the lightness of the Air is a token of its Heat, feeing Lightness follows after or accompanies Heat. Moreover, if the Air were cold, there would be no simple body hot and moist, and water should agree with Air, and therefore one of the two would be superfluous. More reasons are to be found in Authors to this purpose. But all which is said of Air in this case must be under­stood of it, as it is a pure Element. For being mingled with vapors, and affected with a strange quality, it hath oft-times a faculty of cooling, and oft-times of drying, which nevertheless agrees not thereto of it self, but by accident.

Water is an Element in the highest degree and primarily cold, Water is an Element most cold, and moist. Earth an Element most dry and cold. and moist: the Earth in the highest degree and primarily dry, also cold. Concerning these two Elements few Controversies are started. For whereas some dispute, whether the Earth or the water is primarily cold, the question may easily be determined, from what hath been said. For they which would have the Earth colder than the Water build up­on a bad foundation: viz. that all the Elementary Qualities proceed from Hea­ven, which was before rejected. And so much for the Elements.

Chap. 2. Of the Action, Passion and Mixture of the Elements.

AFter we have explained the Nature of Elements, the next thing is, that we de­clare, how mixt bodies are of them compounded. Now forasmuch as the E­lements, unless they be altered, cannot constitute mixt bodies; nor can they be altered unless they act and suffer one from another; nor can they act and suffer, unless they touch one another, as Aristotle hath it, de Generat. & Corrupt. Lib. 1. cap. 6. t. 43. we must first speak a little concerning Contact or mutual touching, Action, passion and Reaction.

Contact is chiefly twofold: one improperly so called, which they term virtu­al; whereby things incorporeal do act upon other things, or a distant body, doth by its Virtue work upon another remote body. The other is a Contact of mag­nitudes; of which there are again many fashions. For absolutely and generally al things are said to touch, which having distinct magnitude and position have their extream parts close one to another. And then there is a Physical or Natural Con­tact, of which we are now treating; and this belongs to bodies having divers mag­nitudes, whose extream parts are together: and which act and suffer one upon and from another. Or in a word: Those bodies touch with a Physical contact, whose bounds are together, and which mutually act and suffer one upon and from another. For besides these things which are common to all bodies that are said to touch one another, viz. to have magnitudes distinct, a certain position of parts their place and extream parts together; this is peculiar to Physical contact, that bodies which do thereby touch one another, do act upon and suffer from one another. Thirdly, Those bodies do touch one another, whose extream parts are together, and one on­ly acts upon another, but suffers nothing therefrom.

Contact is therefore required as a necessary condition in sublunary things. For it hath been before proved in general, that every Agent must be together with the Patient. For since by the Agents action upon the Patient, some mutation ought to be made, of necessity that must be present which changes, or at least its Virtue; and its Virtue cannot be present, unless that be present which carries it. And there­fore in every action the Patient is toucht by the Agent, or at least by that which carries its Virtue. For nothing acts upon the extream, but it acts first upon the me­dium.

Yet we must here diligently observe; that there is a double action, the one pri­mary, which immediately follows the nature of the thing; the other secondary proceeding from the primary. The primary action of the Sun is Illumination: the secondary Heating. The primary action of the Fire is to heat; the seconda­ry to melt, to harden. Now touching the primary 'tis only true, that the Agent acts not upon the extream, before it act upon the Intermedium. For the second Action, besides that that it presupposes the first, also it requires an aptitude of the subject to suffer; whence that vulgar assertion in the Phylosophck Schools, The actions of Active things, are received in a Patient and that which is disposed also, Whatever is received is received according to the disposition of the Receiver. So by the Sun light is produced, both in the Aethereal and Elementary world; but the Heat not in Heaven, but only in sublunary things. So Fire heats both Wax and Clay; yet it melts the former and hardens the latter: because the former is indis­posed to be hard, and the latter is indisposed to melt.

With the Mutual contact of the Elements is conjoyned their Action and passion. Now by action we do not here understand every action, but that only which is be­twixt the first qualities, Now among what things there might be Action, the An­cients were not agreed, as may be seen in Aristotle, de Generat. & Corrupt. Lib. 1. Cap. 7. T. 46, 47. For some held, that all action and passion was betwixt things un­like; others, that a thing did not suffer from a thing unlike, but only from its like. We with Aristotle, in the place aforesaid, Text 50. do hold the middle opinion, and do say: that every agent endeavours to make the patient like it self, and that there­fore a thing like as it is like, and according to the same quality whereby it is like, does not act upon its like: for examples sake, that which is cold, as it is cold, does [Page 90]not act upon a cold thing: nor does that which is diverse, act upon that which is altogether diverse; for Heat does not act upon heat: but contrary acts upon its contrary. And therefore those things which act one upon another, and suffer one from another, are partly like and partly unlike; like in Kind, but unlike in sort; for contraries are under the same kind, but differ in the sort.

Howbeit, What hath been said, that like does not act upon its like, must be a little more diligently weighed: because from the right understanding of this Axiom, we come to the knowledg of many things in Natural Philosophy and Phy­sick. In the first place it must be observed, that in this place, we speak of that similitude which is betwixt the first qualities; and in the next place that this si­militude is three-fold. For some things are alike, only according to the sort of quality; although in the degree, or the intention of the quality and vehemency of the action, which they cal activity, they are unlike. So every hot thing is said to be like another hot thing, and fire is said to be like lukewarm Water, and other things any waies hot. Other things are alike, both in the sort and the degree of the quality, although they differ in the vehemency of their action: thus the sire in a red hot Iron, is like that in burning wood. Other things are a like, both accor­ding to the sort of the quality, and according to the degree thereof, and according to the power of acting. So two fires, which are in matters of the same bigness, and of the same rarity or density are alike. For this must not be forgotten; that equal activity does not alwaies proceed from the same degree of quality; nor hath every heat which is alike in degree and intension, an equal faculty of heating, but often­times where there is no excess of degree, there is yet an excess of operation, either by reason of the plenty of matter, or the density thereof. For the fire which is made of a great Faggot, is not hotter or more intense then that which is made of a stick or two; but only hath a greater activity; and a dram of Pepper is not accor­ding to the degree of heat more intense, then one Pepper Corn: but only hath a greater power to act. For in a greater magnitude there is more virtue: and in much matter, much form. So the fire in a red hot Iron, is not hotter then that in stubble: but it hath a greater strength to act. For force united is more strong then that which is dispersed: and an agent the nearer it is to the Patient, the more it acts thereupon. Now the parts of a compact body are less distant from any particular point in the pa­rient, then the parts of the same Body rarified, and extended to a greater bulk. More­over, in a dense Body, there is more matter, and therefore more form, and by com­pactness of parts, there is more substance in a less space, and therefore greater force. For parts condensed are like many individuals joyned together, which act more powerfully then one. And therefore wherever there are more degrees of the same quality, whether they be collected by intension, or the magnitude of the sub­ject, or the condensation thereof, there is the greater Action.

These things thus premised, we shall deliver our opinion concerning the action of things like, What kind of action there is be­twixt like things. in these propositions. 1. Things like may act one upon another after the first manner, so that the more intense will intend the more remiss; and that which is re­miss will abate that which is intense. According to the common Axiome of Physiti­ans, which is a principle of the Art of compounding of Medicaments. For seeing action is betwixt contraries, not only the extreams do mutually act one upon ano­ther, but also the Mediums and the extreams. For even by the Medium, as a con­trary, mutation is made. For as Aristotle hath it in his 5. Phys. Cap. 1. T. 6. A Medium is in some sort an extream. And that which is remiss, is in place of the other contrary. And Aristotle himself explains what he understands by contraries, in 1. de Gener. & Corrup. Ch. 7. T. 51. Now because the Agent and the patient are the same and like in kind, but unlike in sort; and such things are contraries: it is mani­fest, that actives and passives are one contrary to another, and also Mediums. Also experience proves the same thing, which teaches us, that a hotter thing added to a less hot, makes it more hot, and contrariwise; and that lukewarm Water put into that which is boyling hot, does allay the heat thereof; and continually from the mixture of that which is intense with that which is remiss there results a com­pound, more intense then the remiss parts and more remiss then the intense.

II. Among things like, according to the second way, there is no action. For seeing according to the sort and degree, and the first act, wherein the Nature of qualities consists, and to which mutation tends, these qualities are like, and are not of dif­ferent sorts; and therefore are not contraries: therefore there can be no action be­twixt [Page 91]them. For every action is betwixt contraries, and every agent by acting endeavours to make the Patient like it self, and to give it the same Nature and Act. Moreover, since action supposeth essence, no thing which is in aptitude to be this or that, can be made actually so, but by that which is actually such. And therefore a thing hot to four degrees, though it may be intended to more degrees; yet it can­not be by any thing intended, save by that which hath above four degrees of heat in it. Also experience justifies our assertion. For suppose for examples sake, that there are two Bodies in the highest degree hot, the one greater and more compact, the other less and more spungy; the former indeed acts more vehemently, Yet can it not work upon the latter, because it hath already attained the highest degree of heat.

III. Also between things alike after the third manner, there is no action. For seeing it is rightly said by Aristotle, in is 1. de Gener. & Corrup. Cap. 7. T. 31. That the Agent doth make the Patient like it self: Betwixt things perfectly like, there can be no action. And from the premises it appears, betwixt what things there can be action and passion; which Aristotle hath briefly comprehended, in the foresaid place, where he saies: It is manifect both that contraries, and those things also which are Mediums, do mutually act and suffer, one upon and from another.

But here arises another Controversie from that which hath been said, viz. Whether there be Reaction among the Elements. That al things of the same kind, do mutually act and suffer one upon and from another; for it is hereupon disputed; Whether amongst the Elements there be a reciprocal Action and passion, Which they commonly term Reaction: or whether an agent, working by the first sensible qualities of it self, being close to the Patient and contrary thereunto, do suffer any thing likewise from the Patient. Now action is here by way of eminency ascribed to the stronger, and passion to the weaker; and that action by which the Patient acts back again upon the stronger and more potent, is termed Reaction; and the passion whereby the agent being stronger receives the action of the weaker, may be termed Re-passion.

And besides other things, which make a difficulty in this Case, which may be read in Tolet, L. 1. de Gen. & Corrupt. Ch. 7. Q. 15. Zabarella de Reactione C. 2. Franc. Piccolhomineus L. de Effect. & perpess. operant. per Nat. C. 20. Victor Trin­cavellus in Quest. de Reactione. That passage of Aristotle, in his B. de Animal. Mot. C. 3. Whatever things are of equal strength, they do not mutually act one upon another, but are overcome by exsuperancy, hath brought many into an Error: some so as quite to deny all Reaction; and others who saw it demonstrated by reason and experi­ence, that there was Reaction, so as to make them feigne false manners of Reacti­on. For some hold, that there is indeed Reaction, but that either it is not accor­ding to the same part, or not according to the same Contrariety. For if there be a certaine hot thing, which hath not an equal degree of heat in all its parts, they say it may act according to its strong parts, and resuffer according to its weak ones: but if all parts have equal Heat, then it cannot suffer any thing from the cold pati­ent, according to the same contrariety, but according to some other: as if the fire act upon Water, it suffers nothing therefrom as it is cold, yet it may suffer there­from as it is moist. Others do thus think: that Reaction is primarily indeed, and of it self, according to a diverse contrariety, but secondarily and by accident, ac­cording to the same Contrariety. Forasmuch as one quality may be corrupted primiarily by its contrary quality, and accidentally by the Corruption of that, wherewith it is Naturally in the subject: as for examples sake, the Heat of Fire while it acts upon Water as cold, of it self or primarily it resuffers not from the coldness of the Water; yet because the conjoyned driness suffers from the moisture of the Water, it is also therewith debilitated and remitted.

You may read more opinions in the Authors forementioned all which rejecting, thus we determine: that there is a Reaction; and that it is according to the same contrariety, and the same part, and of it self and primarily, And the first is taught, in the first Place, by experience. For if a Man take a piece of Ice in his Hand, both his Hand is cooled and the Ice is melted; and a red hot Iron cast into cold Water, it heats the Water, and is cooled by the Water, And Reason proves the same. For reaction being taken away, there will be no Mixture: seeing mixture cannot be made, unless the qualities of the Elements being by mutual action and passion broken and remitted and altered, be reduced to a certain temper and Con­cord. [Page 92] Aristotle saies the same, in 3. Phys. Cap. 2. Text 8.16. 1 de Gen. & Corrup. Cap. 7. T. 53. C. 10. T. 87.89. Lib. 4. de Generib. Animal. Ch. 3.

The same Experience teaches the other, which witnesses that boyling Water and Cold, which are only opposite in heat and cold, if they be mixed together, be­come tempered, and that the boyling heat allaies the coldness of the cold Water, and the cold abateth the Heat of the boyling hot Water. For unless Reaction were according to the same contrariety, there could no mixture be made. For if the Fire as hot should only act, and should not suffer; the heat and moisture of the Water would remain in the highest degree, and consequently no mixture would be made. Moreover, every contrary, Naturally and of it self, acts upon its contra­ry, as long as it is in presence. Hither tends that, Out of the 3. de Gener. Anim. That which beates is cooled by that which is heated.

The same Experience makes for the Third, and Reason teaches, that if there must be perfect mixture, all parts of the Elements must be altered, and reduced to a Mediocrity.

Experience also confirms the fourth, whereby we are taught, that hot and cold Water, which agree in moisture, and are opposite only in heat and cold, can ne­vertheless mutually act and suffer. And truly, heat is not peculiarly joyned with moisture or driness, but may consist with either: whence it is also that the Ele­ments which have affinity one to another in one of their qualities, do mutually act and suffer.

And that we may free our selves from that difficulty which hath seduced others, we are to know: that there is a twofold action, one imperfect and begun, which they cal an action without the Agents Victory, whereby the Agent does not change the whole Passive subject, but only weakens the same, and impresses some degree of a quality there into: the other perfect and compleat, which they cal an action with Victory of the Agent, whereby the Agent makes the Patient perfectly like it self. Hence, we answer, 'tis one thing to act, another thing to overcome; one thing to suffer, another thing to be overcome. And therefore, if Action be taken in the first manner, for action begun, in every Alteration, there is Reaction, and the contrary Patient reacts upon the Agent; provided it be in fitting distance and quan­tity. For even that which hath less force, before it is quite overcome and abo­lished, makes impression of some quality upon the stronger, and extinguishes some degrees of the contrary quality. But if action be taken for a perfect abolition of the other quality, there is no Reaction. For nothing can perfectly destroy a thing, and be perfectly destoied thereby. Wherefore that saying of Aristotle, be­fore alleadged in his B. de Motu Animal. c. 3. must be understood of this action, and not of the former.

And so much shall suffice to have spoken of the mutual action and passion of Ele­ments: The defini­tion of Mixture. we now come to Mixture which results therefrom, which Aristotle in his 1 De Gen. et corrup cap. 10. Thus defines: Mixture is the union of things apt to be mingled, being first altered. Now things apt to be mingled, are such as can subsist separate, by themselves, and they are only substances. Hence accidents are nei­ther said to be mingled one with another, nor with their substances; and mistion is properly of bodies, not of qualities: again, such things as are contrary, and can mutually act and suffer; finally such as can give a bulk to the mixt Body.

But here arises no light Question, Whether or no and how the Elements remain in a mixt bo­dy? How Elements remain in mixt Bodies. For seeing the things mingled ought to be altered, not corrupted; it seems the Elements remain in the mixt body, but perish not. Contrarily, seeing mixture is not only an heaping or jumbling together of the things mixed, but an Union, so that of many Natures one is made; it should seem that the Elements do perish, and that of them a certain new Nature is made: whereabouts, the opinions of Authors are various. We, rejecting the rest, will follow Avicenna, whose opinion is approved of very many most learned Physitians, and seems so evident and firm to Fernelius, that in the Second Book of his Physiology, cha. 6. he calls the contrary opinion vain and childish, Yea and monstrous, and such he accounts it, as that it stains al the Glory of that Philosopher that holds it. Now the opinion of Avicenna is, that the Ele­ments do not only remain in the Mixt Bodies, but also retain their forms perfect and entire. For in the first place, seeing Aristotle himself, in the end of his Book [Page 93]de Ortu & Interitu, defines mixture to be, The union of the things mingled, being Altered; The very Nature of mixture declares as much; Seeing things which are not preserved cannot be mingled. Nor does the word union oppose this opinion. For Ʋnion is the coupling of things which truly are, but not of things which are pe­rished. And though of many things one is made; Yet neither is it necessary that those simples should perish, nor is it a bare heaping together, but by a superior form the simples are reduced into one Body. Moreover, since action supposes an act, and in mixt Bodies the Actions of the Elements appear, it must needs be that they are actually in them. Not to speak of others, Aristotle himself, in the begin­ning of his 1. de Caelo, writes that a mixt Body is moved according to the motion of the most prevalent Element. Finally, the resolution of mixt Bodies into the Ele­ments shews the same. For mixt bodies are resolved into the Elements, and Aristotle himself holds in 1. de Gen. & Corrup. Text 84. That the things mixed may be again separated from the mixt Body. Which if it may be, they must of necessity actually exist in the mixt Bodies.

Now their opinion is altogether foolish who hold, that the Elements do not re­turn out of the mixt Body, the same in number, but the same in sort; nor is it foun­ded upon any reason, but is only invented to palliate an absurd opinion; rather it is opposite both to reason and Experience. For whereas they hold, that the Ele­ments return out of the mixt Body, by reason of the action of a like Element, whereby they recover that which they had lost in the Mixture; how I pray you in distillations and burnings, can Water and Earth be drawn out of the compound, seeing the fire by acting upon the mixt Body, introduces nothing Watry, nor any thing Earthy: Yea the action of the Fire is contrary to the Water and the Earth, but does not augment, nor perfect the same?

And that which Averroes and Zabarella do produce concerning the refraction of forms, is a meer figment, and that opinion is sufficiently refuted by the Latins, disputing against the opinion of Averroes, who hold the forms of the Elements are capable of more and less; nor have they ever brought so much as a probable reason for their opinion, but only simply affirm, that forms have certain degrees, some of which being taken away, the rest may remain.

Howbeit, not only the Concourse and action of the Elements is requisite, to pro­duce a mixt body, but the direction of a superior form must of necessity by joyned. Which thing also Scaliger acknowledged, where in his Exercitation, 307. Sect. 20. he thus writes, Ʋnless the four Elements should have a Governour or Pilot, they would vainly and to no purpose toss and be tossed. For what is it that mingles so much Earth with the rest? But there must be in every thing, one thing primarily moved. Now they cannot move themselves to any work, but in Compounds, by a more excellent form, and in things imperfectly mixt, by an external principle, they are moved to a mutual connexion.

Thus therefore we briefly express the whole Nature of mixture. In mixture the simples must first of all be divided into very smal parts; therefore things Liquid, brittle, fine, are easily mingled. The Elements being thus divided into smal por­tions according to the Nature of the mixt Body; they do by their contrary qualities mutually act one upon another, and suffer one from another; do hear, cool, moi­sten, dry one another mutually, and one acts upon another, as on a separated con­trary: for they are not as yet united. But because the force of heat and cold is greatest, therefore these things do first temper themselves, and the cold renders the heat temperate and moderate, as far as the Nature of the mixt Body to be pro­duced requires. This tempered heat does afterwards extenuate the moist and dry as the matter, that the parts of the simples may be perfectly mixed, according as the Nature of the mixt Body requires. For heat alone of it self is the Author of mixture; but cold accidentally concurs to mixtion, inasmuch as it moderates the heat.

Chap. 3. Of the Generation and Corruption of Bodies Na­tural.

BUt, inasmuch as a mixt Body and the Generation of a mixt body are either one and the same thing, or at least the one cannot be without the other; we must now treat of the Generation of a mixt Body. But, forasmuch as there are sundry sorts of generable and corruptible things, and some are simple, others mixt, we shal first speak of generation in general, viz. As it concerns every substance liable to generation and corruption; afterwards, of the sorts of generation, viz. The Trans­mutation of the Elements, the generation of mixt Bodies, and their corruption, which is putrefaction.

Now Generation as it is taken in General, The De­finition of Generati­on. Aristotle defines in his 1. de Gen. & Cor. cap. 4. t. 23. thus: Generation is the mutation of the whol, no sensible thing remai­ning, as the same subject. The Sense of which definition is this; that Generation is a substantial mutation, wherein the specifical form of a natural body being aboli­shed, a new one is produced, so that there remains not the same sensible subject of the form acquired, which was the subject of the form lost, and the whol compound is said to be corrupted, and a new one generated. For the whol, in the definition of Generation, dothnot signifie all the parts of a natural body; for the prima materia, or first matter is not corrupted: but the Integrity, Absoluteness, and perfection of a natural body, consisting in its specifick form; which is therefore by Aristotle somtimes called Totum, because it compleats and perfects the whol Essence of a thing. For as the sort of a number is taken away, when one unity is substracted, and the number of seven ceases to be seven, when one is taken from it, although the other six unities remain: so, by reason of the ultimate and specifick form of a natural body, the whol is said to be changed and to perish; so we say, an Horse is perished, though the form only be perished, the Body stil remaining.

Herein therefore consists the whol Nature of Generation and Corruption, Wherein the Nature of Genera­tion and Corruption consists. that the last and specifick form be abolished, and another arise, or be introduced, by which the compound generated may differ specifically or as another sort, from the former which was said to perish, when the form perisheth. Hence also it appears how that common speech, That Generation and Corruption is not of the form, but the matter, is to be understood. For the meaning thereof is not, as if all the parts of a natural body were corrupted, or bred a new; for the matter remains the same in all generation and corruption: but that, by the mutation of the ultimate and speci­fick form the compound it self is changed, and receives a new denomination.

Now that this is the Sense of these words, and what is to be understood by the mutation of the whole, these following words of the same definition declare: No sensible thing remaining as the same subject. By which words Aristotle intimates; that in no substantial Generation the same sensible subject can remain for both forms, viz. that which is lost and that which is gained. For though the materia prima be preserved: yet is it not sensible: which is true not only in the generation of Elements, and of mixt bodies, but even of the generation of Animals. For when a living Creature perishes, the form which is lost, is the Soul: but that which is the form of a dead Carcass, is an inanimate mixt body, or a congeries or heap of many forms, which constitute many and divers homogeneal mixt bodies; and so these two forms have not one common sensible subject. For that which was in­stead of a subject to the Soul, was the form of mixture: but the soul departing, those forms of many homogeneal mixtures do no longer supply the place of a subject, but of specifick forms, whose subject is the first matter. And although in the generation of a Carcass there comes no new form; yet it is all one, as if there came a new form. For the form of mixture in the living Creature, in respect of the whol live Creature, did hardly supply the place of a form, but rather of a Sub­ject and Matter; since in every mixt thing, the Essential parts have the same respect one to another, that every precedent inferior, is to the following superior, as Mat­ter to Form, and aptitude to Act. But when the Soul is taken away, the form of [Page 95]mixture supplies the place of the specifick form, and really performs the office of a form, and gives denomination and specifick being to the mixt body; which it did not do before, when the Soul was present.

Out of the Premises an Answer may easily be made to that Question: Whether in Genera­tion, there is a Reso­lution into the first matter. whether be­sides the first matter, any form which was before in the thing corrupted, do remain in the thing Generated; or whether in every Generation there is a Resolution into the Materia prima or first matter? For seeing things perfectly mixed, are either parts of living bodies, or other sorts of bodies natural, as precious Stones and metals; and the generation of these things is performed, not only by the Concourse, and action of the Elements, but by the direction of the upper form: again, it doth not alwaies draw and mingle simple Elements, for the formation of a body necessary to it self, but also the first mixt bodies; therefore it is not necessary, that there should be alwaies a resolution into the first Matter.

Also from the Premises all the Causes of generation may be collected. The Form of Genera­tion. The Sub­ject. The Effici­ent. The form is expressed in the definition, by substantial Mutation. The common subject of generation, is the first matter it self; and the immediate subject, are the four E­lements of sublunary things. The general and remote Efficient, is the Virtue of the Heavens: the immediate and adequate, is the Generator or Agent, viz. the forms of sublunary things. For they by the first qualities and vital heat, as their immediate Instruments, do make mixt bodies for themselves, necessary for their own preservation, and the performance of their actions.

But the first matter is not the adequate cause of generation: seeing it is a being, meerly potential, and can beget or effect nothing, but only suffer. And therefore the matter is a cause that the Generation may be made; but the Agent or Genera­tor, is the cause that it is actually made. The End of Generation, The End. is the Conserva­tion of the several sorts of Natural things. For since in the sublunary part of the world there is no perpetuity and eternity of individuals or particular things; Na­ture conserves the Eternity of every sort, by the perpetuity of Generation.

The definition of generation, agrees also to coruption, as manifestly appears out of the last words of Text 22. c. 4. Lib. 7. de Gen. et Cor. and appears from the thing it self. For the generation of one thing, is the corruption of another; as is wel said by Aristotle 1. de Gener, & Cor. c. 3. T. 17. For, since that which corrupted is not turned meerly into nothing, but the matter remains; and it cannot subsist of it self, without any form; it must be, that one compound being abolished, and one form destroied, another form should come, to constitute a new compound. Moreover, since two specifick forms cannot be in the same subject (for nothing can be at the same time under several sorts) it must needs be, that when one form comes, the other which was before in the subject, must give way. Hence also came that saying; That Nature primarily intends generation, Nature primarily intends ge­neratoon, secondari-corruption. secondarily corrup­tion. For one thing cannot be generated, unless another be corrupted. For since the intention of the Generator, is to make the Patient like it self; and this it cannot do, unless it first destroy the form therof: secondarily therefore it desires the destruction of another. And this is the Cause of the perpetuity of Generations and Corruptions; viz. Because the matter when it is robbed of one form, receives ano­ther; and when it puts on one, it puts off another. Yet it must be here observed, that the Generation of one, is not the corruption of a body of the same sort, but of another of a different sort.

Having thus explained the universal Nature of Generation, let us now speak of the sorts of Generation. The Proportion of the Elements which act one upon another is various: For somtimes one contrary only prevails in strength over an­other, so as to be able quite to abolish the same, and to turn it into its own Nature; and then there happens the generation of one simple Element. Somtimes the Ele­ments are after a sort equal, or at least their inequality is not so great, that one of them can quite destroy the other, and turn it into its own Nature; and then, by mutual action and passion they weaken one another, and making friends as it were, they grow together, into the Nature of one mixed Body. Now we shall speak in the first place, of the generation of Elements. And although, not only Enpedocles, Whether the Ele­ments can be changed one into another. and other Ancient Philosophers, but also some late writers, deny that the Ele­ments are turned one into another: yet we shall retain the common Doctrine, which is proved by reason and experience. For we see daily, that by fire other [Page 96]Elements are turned into Fire; and water, which of its own Nature is moved down­wards, when it is set over the fire, turns to Air and mounts of its own accord up­wards, which motion belongs properly to Fire and Air. Now the Reason is this: those things are apt to be changed one into another, which are contraries, and have one common subject. And such are the Elements: for they have the first matter for their common subject, and contrary qualities. And therefore they may be changed one into another. Howbeit, the Elements are changed, not in whole, but in part.

And indeed all Elements are apt to be mutually changed, and there is none of them, which may not be changed into another: for as Aristotle saies in 2. de Gen. et Cor. c. 4. T. 24. Generation in out of Contraries into Contraries, and all the Ele­ments have a Contrariety one to another, because the differences are contrary. How­beit, these Elements which agree in one quality, as fire and Air in heart, water and Air in moisture, are more easily and speedily changed one into another: but those Elements which are quite contrary and disagree in both qualities, are more hardly changed one into another. For when two things joyned together are to be chan­ged by their contraries, they resist more strongly, then when one quality only is contrary, and the other like; because by reason of that similitude, the approach of the contrary is more easie. And therefore of two contrary Elements, a Medium is sooner generated, then one of another: and we see that of Fire and Water, Air is bred. For the Medium agrees with both, in qualities.

And so much of the Generation of Elements. Mixture and the ge­neration of a mixt bo­dy, differ not really, but only in respect. Let us now come to the simple ge­neration of mixt bodies. Now the Generation of a mixt Body and Mixture, of which we spake in the foregoing Chapter, are really one and the same thing: al­though they differ in respect. For both mixture, and the Generation of a mixt Body, doth signifie a certain progress to the form of a mixt Body, which consists first in mutual alteration, caused by the action and passion of the first qualities; al­so in the action of the two active qualities upon the two passive, or in the mixture of moist with dry; Finally and chiefly, in the production of the form it self: and therefore both the generation of a mixt body consists in Mixture, and Mixture is contained in the Generation of a mixt Body. For the term union, doth not only signifie a collection of the Elements, and a placing them together; but a producti­on of one Nature, out of several things mingled.

Yet they different respect. For since both in mixture, and in the Generation of a mixt Body, the Elements are as it were the term a Quo, and the mixt Body, the term ad Quem; the term mixture, doth chiefly respect the Elements, for the mix­ture is of the Elements, and not of the mixt Body: but the term Generation respects the mixt Body it self. For that is then said to be generated, and not the Elements. Nor yet can the one be without the other; nor doth mixture in time or Nature pre­cede Generation: both consist in the production of one Nature.

Now Aristotle defines the Generation of a mixt Body, The defi­nition of the genera­tion of a mixt body. in the 4. of his Meteors Ch. 7. after this manner: Generation is a simple mutation, by the active faculties, when they have their respect, from the matter subject to every nature. Now, this is the sense of this definition: the Generation of a mixt Body, is a substantial mutation, made by the two active qualities, acting upon the two passive, as their subject matter, and ru­ling over them in such a proportion, as is necessary to draw forth the form proper to every mixt Body. For the active qualities are not alwaies in an equal propor­tion to the passive, but variously proportioned, according to the divers Natures of mixt Bodies, which require sundry temperaments. Nor is the dominion of the active qualities over the passive, so to be understood, as though in every mixt Body, the active qualities did in some degrees exceed the passive; since experience doth testifie the Contrary, which teaches, that some mixt things, are to be termed not, some cold, some moist, some dry, according to the Nature of the over-ruling qua­lity: but this dominion is only to be understood in respect of the form of the mixt Body, to be Generated. For then Namely, the active Qualities are said to rule over the passive, when the proportion of the former to the latter is such, that out of them they might produce some certain form of a mixt Body. For even that which is hot to four degrees, acts upon that which is moist to six, and there of makes a certain mixt Body.

That Question also must not be here omitted; Whether in this Case the power of the two active Qualities be equal, and their office and Dominion equal. Touching which we are to know, that both the Generation of the mixt body it self, and the alteration previous to the form, do proceed of themselves and primarily from hear, and that cold doth no other wise concur, then as it tempers and moderates the heat, and makes it fit to produce this or that mixt Body. For the Generation of a mixt Body does chiefly consist in a perfect mixture of moist and dry, suitable to the Nature of the mixt Body: but this cannot be done, save by attenuation, which makes that all the particles of the moist matter may be exactly united with the par­ticles of the dry; now extenuation of it self is caused by heat, somtimes greater and somtimes less. But cold of it self is not an instrument of generation, but ra­ther of corruption. Howbeit, in a mixt body already generated, and constituted in its essence, even cold also acts of it self, and confers thereon its perfection as it were, and aptitude to its operations. For mixt bodies are congealed and conden­sed by cold.

Lastly, after the Generation of a mixt Body, it remains that we now treat of the Natural destruction thereof, which is Putrefaction: concerning which, so great are the Controversies amongst learned Men, that some late Phylosophers and Phy­sitians have filled whole Books with disputes about putrefaction. We, though much might be said thereof, shall briefly discourse thereupon, so much as the Na­ture of our work will bear. Putrefa­ction is op­posed to the generation of mixt bodies. And seeing Putrefaction is opposed to the Generation of mixt bodies, we may easily proceed from the knowledg of Generation to the knowledg of putrefaction. It hath been already said, that the whole Nature of mixture, or of the Generation of a mixt Body, doth consist in a due conjunction of moist parts with dry, which is caused by heat, in a certain degree: and since the Cause of the Generation and conservation of a mixt Body is the same; a mixt body shall so long remain in its Natural State, as there is a due and just mixture of moist and dry, under a fitting dominion of heat: and the Destruction of a mixt Body must proceed from the separation of the moist and dry parts: which must arise from the abolition or abatement of Natural Heat. For the Natural heat diminished on abolished, can no longer retain the dry parts joyned to the moist. Now the Cause which weakens the Natural heat, is the heat of the Ambient Body, which if it be stronger, calls forth the Natural. For the Natural heat being encreased by the ambient heat, loses the proportion it ought to hold to the passive Qualities, and therefore vapors away, and leaves the mixt Body; whereof the moist and dry parts being destitute and having lost their governor as it were, they become separa­ted, and the moist parts are carried with the Heat as its conveiance, into the out­side, and so vapours away; and so comes putrefaction, which is only the destruction of a mixt Body, considered as such. I say the Natural destruction, that is, which happens according to the Laws of Nature Universal, which wil have all mixt things subject to corruption, and to be at last resolved into the Elements whereof they were made: as violent destruction of a mixt Body is when the whole is changed into one Element, as by burning, or also by overmuch cooling, as some will have it.

All this whole Nature of Putrefaction Aristotle in the 4. Meteorol. Cap. 1. hath comprehended in this definition: The defi­nition of Putrefa­ction. Putrefaction is the corruption of the proper and Natural heat, which is in every moist Body, by the Heat which is without the same, Namely, in the ambient Body. Which Definition contains all the Terms of a perfect Demonstration, and Demonstrates a proper Affection of its proper subject, by its proper Cause. Its subject The proper subject is a moist bo­dy. For nothing can putrefie, unless it be moist. And therefore all mixt Bodies putrefie, inasmuch as they are moist. The next Cause. The next positive cause is the Heat of the Am­bient Body; which is not only Air and Water, but every thing containing, which overmuch augments the internal heat, and disturbs the proportion which it bears to the rest of the Qualities. Its adjunct is the Corruption of the internal Heat, Its ad­junct. and of the substantial form it self.

From these things thus explained an answer may be made to many Questions. Why all things that putrifie become at last cold? For hence that Question may easily be answered, Why all things which putrifie be­come at last cold? Although in the beginning they were hot. The cause of the former is the corruption of the inbred heat; of the latter, both the external heat also, which encreases the internal, is the Cause; and because the internal heat, the proportion be­ing [Page 98]disturb'd which it bore to the rest of the Qualities of the mixt Body, going out, doth more shew it self to the sense. For in the mixture it was so tempered, and joyned in such a league of friendship as it were with the rest of the Qualities of the mixt Body, that it could hardly be perceived by the sense; which League being broken in the Putrefaction, it becomes more sensible, and acts more freely.

And upon this foundation depends that same distinction of Physitians, Why things putrifying, become at first moist and then dry? whereby they say, that some things are actually Hot or Cold, others potentially: and they say that Pepper, Ginger and Wine, are only potentially Hot, because they are not hot to feel to, but only when they are within the Body, and dissolved by the heat of the Stomach. For the Cause hereof is, that Pepper, Ginger and Wine, al­though they contain much heat in them; yet the same is so tempered with other Qualities, that is doth not put forth its force, while it sticks in the mixt Body abi­ding in its Natural condition. But when a man hath taken them into his Stomach, that same harmony of qualities is dissolved and disturbed by the heat of the Sto­mach, and the Heat of these mixt Bodies is called forth; which doth work more freely and strongly, (the friendship it had with the rest of the Qualities being now broke) no longer as the heat of a mixt Body, but rather as heat now separated, and left to its own Liberty.

And the Cause is the same, why things putrifying become at first more moist, and at last are quite dried up. For the moisture together with the heat vapors out, flows abroad, and goes to the outward parts; Which at last being quite dissi­pated and evaporated, the mixt Body turns to Dust and Ashes. Also hence a Rea­son may be given why mixt Bodies in hot Seasons and places do sooner putrifie then in cold; Why mixt bodies so [...] ­nest put ifie in hot sea­sons and places. and why things very hot or very cold do not easily putrifie. The Cause of the former is, that in cold times and places the heat of the Ambient (if any re­main therein.) is not so strong as to be able to cal out the internal heat: but in an hot time and place the Contrary happens. And the Reason of the latter is, because both a strong internal cold resists the heat of the Ambient, Why things very cold or hot do not so easi­ly putrifie. so that it cannot corrupt and cal out the inbred heat; and a strong internal heat doth not suffer it self to be overcome by the heat external. Nor can an external weak heat so intend an in­ternal strong one, that it can be no longer fit to conserve the mixt Body. Hence also a great Quantity is less apt to putrifie then a smal one; Why agreat Quantity is less apt to putrifie then asmal one, and that which is in moti­on then that which rests. because in a great Body there is more heat or cold, which also doth more strongly resist the external heat. Also a thing moved doth not so easily putrifie, as that which rests, because it is less subject to the action of the ambient heat.

Now from what hath been said the Nature of putrefaction is sufficiently apparent: and yet many dispute at large, whether it be only one, or there be divers sorts thereof. We, omitting tedious disputes, do acknowledg only one putrefaction, viz. That which is explained, in the foresaid definition of Aristotle. Yet we grant there is some diversity in the putrefaction of things, because of the Various Nature and constitution of the mixt Bodies which putrefie. There is only one putris acti­on. For those things do perfectly and totally putrefie, which are perfectly resolved into the Elements whereof they were made, so that all the other Elements evaporating, there remains nothing at last but Earth: and thus all those things putrefie which have much Earth in them.

But those things putrifie imperfectly and in part, which contain more moisture in them. For seeing the moisture which is more abundant in them cannot be with the heat totally drawn out: only some parts thereof, especially the more thin and subtile are drawn out, and the rest are preserved; and this is termed putrefaction according to part; the Nature whereof is nevertheless the same with that of the putrifaction before defined. For herein the internal heat is corrupted by the exter­nal. After this manner Wine putrifies, and the Humor in our Bodies; the three Elements, The Fire doth not putrifie. Air, Water, Earth, inasmuch as they are not pure, but in some mea­sure mixt with other things. The Fire alone does not putrifie, for this Cause especially, because nothing is more hot then it, which may corrupt and cal out its heat. Whether the form he abolish­ed in pu­nifaction. But whether or no in this imperfect putrefaction the form of the mixt Body do quite perish, and a new mixt thing be produced, or whether only some altera­tion be made, is a doubtful case. We answer briefly: in every true putrefaction somwhat is corrupted: but of an imperfect putrefaction there are more degrees, [Page 99]one greater another less. For somtimes the putrifaction is so light, that some particles only being corrupted, the mixt Body doth stil retain its proper form: but somtimes again it is so great, that though the whole mixt Body be not quite resolved into its Elements, yet the whole form thereof is abolished, and the said Body chan­ged into another sort. And therefore al Putrefaction is Corruption, and not Alter­ation only. For although the Blood which putrifies in the Veins, is not wholly corrupted, but only altered in part: yet those parts which are said to putrifie, are really corrupted according to their substance, and cannot return to their Na­tural state, but must be evacuated by Purgation: but the others which are not corrupted in their substance, are not properly said to putrifie, but only to be hea­ted by the putrified parts.

Chap. 4. Of Temperament and Coction.

HAving treated hitherto of the Elements, their mutual action and passion, and the Generation and Corruption of mixt Bodies: before we come to the sorts themselves of mixt Bodies, we must and some things concerning temperament and Coction.

As for what concerns temperament, Whence tempera­ment de­pends? certain it is that it depends upon the mixture of the Elements, and arises from the action and passion of the first qualities: yet what it is, is not so manifest. We, omitting the opinions of Fuchsius who not rightly, asserts in the 1 of his Just. Med. S. 3. C. 2. That a Temperament is a substance, not an accident, and of others who hold that a Temperament is a bare Relation and Harmony of Qualities, as also of others, which are by other Authors reckoned up; we hold, that a Temperament in one Quality, arising from the mutual action and passi­on of the first Qualities in mixtion. For the fight of the first Qualities, which is ne­cessary to the Generation of a mixt Body proceeds so far, till they be all refracted and abated, and having cast away certain degrees of Contrarieties, by which they were at extream variance, Friendship being made, as it were, they joyn and grow together into one Quality. And so a temperament is nothing else but one Quality of a simple Essence, which is made up of the remiss degrees of the four Qualities. For as of the remiss degrees of the Elementary forms one simple actual form doth arise, which nevertheless contains them all in its faculty: so out of the first Qua­lities there arises one moderate and actually simple Quality which potentially contains them all. But we must not say (which opinion as some learned men tell us, is ill fathered upon Avicenna) that a Temperament is a certain fift Quality, di­verse from the four first, and superadded to them; but only a middle one, arising from the others abated and conjoyned, and containing them in it.

But since the Elements are in sundry manners mixed, The diffe­rences of tempera­ments. and the first qualities are tempered together in sundry proportions; hence there arise sundry diffe­rences of temperaments. For if the Elements and Qualities concur to the mixture in strength and degrees perfectly equal, a temperament is effected, which is called Equale ad pondus, Equal in weight; Tempera­ment ad pondu [...], what it is? as if in it the degrees of the Qualities were weighed and distributed in an equal weight; also absolute equality, because com­parison is not made to any extrinsecal thing. Now this is to be understood of the equality of degrees. For the Elements cannot be mixed in equal Quantity; since the efficacy of Fire is much greater then that of Earth; and therefore if they should concur in equal portions, the Fire would not generate a mixt Body, but only Fire: and experience testifies, that all perfectly mixt Bodies do obtaine very much Earth, by Virtue whereof they become heavy. Whether there be an equal tem­perament. Though some deny that this tem­per is to be found in Nature; yet we see no firme Reason to hinder us from hol­ding, that the contrary qualities may meet in the same degree, to the consti­tution of a mixt Body. Yea and Galen saies that this is the Rule of all the rest, and that the rest cannot be known without it, in his B. de Temperam. C. 3.

There is moreover as yet another equal temperament, A tempe­rament e­qual ac­cording to justice, what it is? which is called equal ad Justi­tiam, wherein the qualities concur, not in a degree absolutely equal, but in such a manner as is most convenient to the form of the mixt bodie and to the performance of its gene­rations, and which holds a medium amongst mixt bodies of the same sort. For one mixt body of its own Nature is hotter, another colder; one moister another dryer. The temperament of a Lion is more hot then the temperament of a Fish; flesh is hotter then a never; a bone dryer then flesh. And although in this manner this tempertment may be called equal, viz., because that equality is kept therein, which is convenient to every mixt body, and according to Geometrical proportion every one hath his own: yet in respect of a temperament absolutely temperate and equal, it is termed unequal; and that body furnished therewith may be termed intemperate: although commonly that is called intemperate which is departed from the temper which Naturaly it ought to have.

Now how many sorts there are of this temperament Authors agree not. Eight sorts of tempe­raments e­qual in re­spect of justice. We hold with Galen, 1 de temp. C. 8. For when only one quality superabounds, and o­vercomes its contrary, the two rest keep equality; for examples sake, if any mixt body should have five degrees of Heat, and three of cold, and four of moisture, and as many of dry; it should be called a simple temperament. Of which there are four sorts; hot, wherein heat exceeds cold, and moisture and dryness are equal; cold, wherein cold exceeds heat, and moisture and dryness are also equal; moist, wherein moisture exceeds dryness, and heat and cold are equal; dry, wherein driness exceeds moisture, and Heat and cold are also equal. But when two Qualities exceed the other two, 'tis called a compound Temperament; of which there are againe four sorts, according to the four possible combinations of the four first Qualities; viz. Hot and moist; hot and drie; cold and moist; cold and drie. According to these differences a thing is said to be temperate or intemperate: How ma­ny waies a thing is said to be temperate, and not temperate but after several manners. For a thing is said to be so and so, absolutely or respectively. Absolutely only the Elements are hot, cold, moist, drie; seeing in them only these qualities are sincere and pure. Now by compari­son and exsuperance a thing is said to be so, which though it have all the Qualities, yet one excells the rest; so that is termed hot which hath more heat; and that cold, which hath more coldness. Now this comparison is made to four things; either to the uni­versal Nature of all mixt bodies, wherein if you can conceive any thing of an indiffe­rent temper, such as is the skin of a man, especially that on the palms of his hands and the tops of his fingers, (unto which therefore they refer the judgement of all tem­peraments;) all other things in respect thereunto will be called intemperate, and according to the Quality exceeding this Mean, they shall be called hot, cold, moist, drie; Or the comparison is made to the next kind; as if in the whole kind of Living Creatures you shall conceive some one to be temperate, as perhaps Man is; all other animals shall be called intemperate, the name being borrowed from the exceeding Quality: or comparison is made to somewhat Indifferent, in the same sort; so a young man is said to be hot, and an old man to be cold: or finally, comparison is made be­twixt divers sorts, or any obvious individualls. So a dog, in respect of a Lion is cold, in respect of a Fish hot. So Peter compared to Paul is hot: but if you compare him to another more hot, he is cold.

And this may suffice to have said in this place concerning temperaments: let us proceed now to concoction, The defi­nition of concoction which is a certain perfection and compleatment of the temperament. Now thus Aristotle (in his 4 Meteor. Ch. 2.) Defines concoction. Concoction is a perfection, by the Natural & proper Heat, made of opposite passives, which are the proper matter to each one. This definition as every orderly definition of adjuncts or accidents, hath in stead of kind the form, in stead of difference the sub­ject, with the efficient cause: all which are to be considered in this place, that we may attain the perfect knowledg of Digestion or Concoction.

The Form of Concoction is nothing but the ultimate perfection of the proper tem­perament of a thing. The form of conco­ction. For then a thing is said to be concocted, when it hath attained that perfection and compleatness, in its qualities or temperament, which it ought to have. And therefore that perfection is here to be understood which consists in Quali­ties, and not that which is Essential, proceeding from the substantial form. Which also Aristotle signifies in the 12. Sect. Prob. 7. Concoction is the alteration of the thing concocted.

The matter or subject of concoction are the two passive Qualities, The Subject. but especialy moisture. And hence it appears, that coction is an affection of a mixt bodie, as it is moist, and that it doth not belong only to the meat of living Creatures, because other things also are said to be concocted, which can never become nourishment for animals. Hence also t'is manifest, that coction belongs to a thing already engendred and constitu­ted by its own Nature. For nothing is said to be concocted, but that which is already engendred, only it hath imperfection in its temper, which must by further altera­tion be perfected; which being done the thing is said to be concocted.

As to the Efficient Cause: The Effi­cient Cause. The beginning of perfection (saith Aristotle) comes from the proper heat of the subject, although it be perfected by some outward help. The principal cause is alwaies the proper heat of the thing; although sometimes it be not sufficient, and therefore stands in need as it were of another Assistant, that the conco­ction may be thereby better and more rightly performed. So Bathes and Plaisters help the Concoction in the Stomack. So Medlars and other Fruits being gathered before they are ripe and laid up, are ripened by their own Heat: yet the Suns Heat contributes much towards their more happy ripening.

This therefore is the manner of the whole business of concoction. The Man­ner of con­coction. When as in a mixt body, already constituted by its form, there is as yet some imperfection in the tempera­ment, and the moisture is not sufficiently mastered and tempered, nor holds a just and exact proportion to the driness and other Qualities: the Natural Heat consumes and excels the superfluous moisture, and that which remains and offends not in quantity, it restrains and limits, and unites it with driness, as much as the Nature of the mixt Body requires; which action is termed coction, or concoction.

And that the Nature of concoction may be the better understood, The Ex­ternal End. Aristotle besides the internal End, which is the same with the form, adds also an External one, in these words: The end of concoction in some things is their Nature, which we call the sort as it were & Essence; in others it tends to some subject forme, when the Humidity is be­come such and so great. In which Aristotle Teaches, that the External End is twofold; either the form simply and absolutely, which End chiefly appears in the ripening of Fruits, which are then said to be ripe, when the seed is now so perfect, as that it can breed its like: or some form or disposition, to the affording some utility, which consists either in the induction of a new form, or in preparation for the convenient expulsion of things unprofitable. The former use appears in that boiling of the meat, performed in the stomack. For that is therefore ordained, that the meats taken in might by the faculty in the stomach be turned into Chylus. For such also is the Natural Concoction of flegm. The other appears in the Concoction of putrified humors in ulcers, and elsewhere in the Body of an Animal, which are then concocted and ripened, when they are so laboured by the Natural Heat, as to become apt for expulsion. For since by reason of their great corruption they cannot arrive to any perfect form and profitable to nourish the Body, they are by concoction brought to some form better at least then putrefaction. And thus Concoction doth repress Putrefaction, and puts an End thereunto, and severs the corrupt humors from the profitable, and renders them fit to be euacuated without hurt to the Body.

Things therefore are said to be concocted, when the matter of coction, which is chiefly moisture, shal be overcome by heat and bounded thereby, and have received it's fitting thickness. And therefore Urines, Dung, and all the excrements of our Bodies in like manner, being rightly digested, are a signe of Health. For they declare that the Heat hath its full power in our Bodies: and that it is so much as to be able to re­straine and duly to tame and keep in order all the humors. And for the same Cause, all things being digested become thicker and hotter. For Heat which bears the Rule in concoction, doth both Heat and Resolve the thin Parts. Which is also confirmed by Experience. For Apples, Pears, Grapes, and all other Fruits, before they grow Ripe are colder then they are afterwards: and Milk, Seed, Quittour in Ulcers, and Filth gathered in the corners of the Eyes, are thicker when concocted then before. How­beit, we must here take notice, when it is said, that things Concocted are thicker and hotter then Unconcocted, that one thing must not be compared with another of a distinct sort, or with it self after it hath changed its species; but the same sort of thing being unconcocted, must be compared with it self concocted.

To Coction is opposed Crudity, The defi­nition of Crudity. or indigestion, which is by Aristotle in 4. Me­teor. thus defined: Crudity is an imperfection of the passive Qualities, through the de­fect of proper beat in the subject. And the defect of heat is cold. From which defini­tion it is apparent, that in Crudity all things are quite contrary to what they are in Coction, saving the subject, which is one and the same. For the Form was there perfection, and here it is imperfection; there the efficient Cause was heat, here want of heat, or Coldness. And therefore those things are generally to be called Crude, which have not as yet obtained those degrees of perfection in the Quali­ties or Temperament, which they ought to have; and in which moisture abounds, and by reason of the weakness of Heat cannot be rightly mastered and Limi­ted.

Having explained the Nature of Coction and Crudity, Coction is not an univocal kind. let us now come to their Sorts. Where it is first to be observed; That Coction is not an univocal kind, but of the number of those which are called Pros Hen, to one, and that there­fore its definition doth chiefly agree to the principal and primary sort (which is the manner in defining those things which are said of some one) but a little change be­ing made, they may also be accommodated to the rest. Now the primary sort of Coction, and which can perhaps alone perfectly bear the name of Coction, is ripening, which it self also nevertheless is not equally applied to all the sorts con­tained there under. Ripening what it is? For properly Ripening is the Concoction of that Aliment which is in the Pulp of an Apple, Pear, or any other fruit. But for more easie understanding sake, Aristotle applies Maturity, or Ripeness, only to fruits; though it be common to all Animals, Plants, and Seeds when referred to Generation. Now then Matu­ration is said to be made, when the Seed which is contained in the Pulp of the fruit is so Elaborated, that it is able to beget its like. For at first, when there is as yet a superfluous moisture remaining, the Seed is not yet sit for Generation: but when the humidity shall by the Natural Heat be partly consumed, partly better ter­minated, the Seed becomes sit for Generation. Again, Figuratively, Flegm, quit­tor, and other Humors in our Bodies are said to be Ripened, when they are by the Natural Heat so digested, as either to become sit to nourish, or if they cannot nou­rish, that at least they may be disposed to Evacuation. Now, by ripening, fla­tulent things become Watry, Watry things become thin; thin things become thick. For at first the spirit, or flatulent matter is digested by heat; after­wards, the Watry Humor is further digested, and its thinner parts are resol­ved.

To Maturity or Ripeness is opposed Immaturity or Unripeness, What im­maturity is? what as Maturi­ty is also twofold: one properly so called, another siguratively. For immaturi­ty properly so called is the rawness of the nourishment which is in the Pulp of an Apple or other fruit, by Reason of the Penury or ill proportion of the Natural heat. For when the Heat is so little, or the Humor so plentiful, that the Heat cannot exactly master the moisture, there arises immaturity, and then the Seed is not fit for Generation. And therefore all unripe things are windy, waterish, and their Humors thin and cold, unfit to nourish. And afterward Figuratively, Ca­tarrhs, Spittle, Quittor in Ulcers, and Urin are termed crude. Also Milk unboi­led is termed crude or raw; as also Tiles and all Earthen Ware, is termed raw, before it is baked.

Another sort of Coction is Boyling, which Aristotle in the fourth of his Meteors Ch. 3. thus defines: Elixation or Boyling, Generally, is the Concoction of somwhat Indeterminate in an Humor, caused by a moist heat. For boyling is thus made. A fiery heat being received in a Watry moisture, doth moisten the thing to be boyled, opens its pores, and makes them Wider, and so draws the moisture of the thing to be boyled from the Centre to the Circumference; and the rest of the Humor which remains, it digests, Tames, and Terminates; and therefore boyled things have less Native moisture, and more of that which is forreigne. And for this cause, Cooks that would Roast Meats carefully, do first perboyl them, viz. that some of that Humor and Excrements which are within, may be first drawn out, so that the rest may be by roasting more easily consumed.

From the premises it appears, that those things only can be boyled which have moisture, which by the fiery heat which is in a Watry moisture may be overcome. And that those things cannot be boyled, which either are Earthy, and have in a [Page 103]manner no moisture, as Stones, Bones, &c. Or which have indeed some moisture, but which is so condensed and Joyned with an Earthy dryness, that by a moist heat it cannot be called out and Vanquished, as Woods, Metals, &c. And for this very cause, the flesh of old Animals is hardly boyled tender, in comparison of yonger; and Beef is harder to boyl then Hens-flesh: because the former are more dry, Earthy, solid and compact, and have their moisture more tenaciously fastened with their dryness, so that it cannot easily be called out by a moist heat. Also Woods, Metals &c. though improperly, are said to be boyled. For though they are not so softned as things really Boylable: yet some of their moisture is drawn forth, and communicated to the Water; which, the tast the Water receives by their boyling in it, doth witness. Also boyling is attributed to a moist Body that hath little dry­ness in it, as to milk, new Wine or Must, and other things, viz. When by boyling some parts of them do vapor away, and the remaining parts do receive some change in their temperament and tast.

To boyling is opposed imperfect boyling, Imper­fect boyling, what? which is called Inquinatio and Flac­ciditas, which is defined by Aristotle to be, The Inconcoction of that which is unde­termined in a Body, by Reason of want of Heat in the moist thing which compasseth the same about. For this Inquination or Flaccidity, is properly nothing else but a boy­ling begun, viz. when the Heat which is in the Watry moisture is indeed so great, that it can in some measure act upon the thing to be boyled: but is not so strong, that it can perfectly Boyl the same, but either by cold or overmuch moisture in the thing to be Boyled it is blunted and overcome, that it cannot perfect its work: which kind of imperfect Concoction oft happens in Aged and Sick People, whose Heat doth in some manner alter the meats, but cannot perfectly digest them.

The last sort of Concoction, is Optesis, roasting; Roasting what? Which is a Concoction caused by a dry external Heat. For if in a mixt body the abounding humor be consumed and tempered by a dry external Heat it is called a Rousting. Now roast meats are without indeed dry, but within moist with a moisture of their own, and more moist then boild meats themselves. For the dry heat withers the external parts, and straitens the pores, that the internal Humor can find no way out. Now roasting and boyling are chiefly caused by Art, and these names do chiefly belong to them, as being because Artificial best known to us. Yet the same things are also done by Nature. For the Concoction of Aliments in the bodies of Living Creatures, and especially that in the Stomach, is boyling: also the same may not unfitly, in Hot and Dry Bodies, be called roasting.

To roasting also is opposed Seminstulation, Toasting, or raw-roasting. Raw-Roa­sting. Now had roasting is caused through want of heat, which either is little of it self, or not so great that it can possibly overcome a great aboundance of Humor, and therefore it perfects not the begun roasting. And so much touching Concoctions.

Chap. 1. Of Meteors in General.

HAving spoken hitherto in General of the Elements the princi­ples of Natural Bodies, and their mixture; of the Generation of Natural Bodies and their corruption: order therefore requires, that we should now treat of the several sorts of Natural Bodies. Mixt Bo­dies two­fold. And seeing that mixt Bodies are twofold, perfectly and imper­fectly mixed; and the imperfectly mixt are the Meteors: we must now come to that part of Natural Philosophy, which all the Ancients (as Aristotle in his 1. B. Meteor. C. 1. tells us) called Meteorologia, the Doctrine of Meteors.

Later writers do here indeed raise a scruple, and some deny that a Body imper­fectly mixed and a Meteor are one and the same thing; and they say the name of Meteor is of a larger extent, since there are many Meteors which are not Bodies, such as those things which happen only as an apparition as Thunder, Lightning, Earth­quakes: others again conceive that the term Meteor is only to be given to bodies imperfectly mixed, and therefore they exclude those things as Thunder &c. which have no subsistency, out of the Number of Meteors; since all things which make up the subject of Natural Phylosophy, and are parts thereof, must be in the number of Natural Bodies. But this Controversie may easily be composed. A Body imper­fectly mixed must be somewhere explained in Natural Phylosophy, and indeed most fitly next after the Elements: and therefore tis said to be the subject of that part of Natural Phylosophy. And seeing the same affords matter for Meteors, that part of Natural Phylosophy is called Meteorologia, the Doctrine of Meteors. For though in it are also explained those things which are not Natural Bodies, as hath been said; yet those very things are either the Adjuncts or Effects of Bodies im­perfectly mixed. Hence use hath obtained, that under the term Meteor, both Bo­dies imperfectly mixed and their Adjuncts and Effects should be comprehended. And so the subject of this Doctrine is Meteoron a Meteor, A Meteor what it is? that is, Somwhat raised out of the Earth and Water by force of the Stars and the under-ground Fire, and bred for the most part a loft in the Air. For the word Meteoron in general doth signifie a thing sublime, Elevated, and hanging as it were up on high.

And by aloft or on high we understand, not the Heaven, but all that space which reaches from Earth to Heaven, which place is called upwards, or above. Yea and since Meteoron signifies somwhat Elevated and suspended on high, even those thing also which are made in the Caverns of the Earth, of exhalations there raised up, are comprehended under this Name. For all things contained under this name are not of one kind, as hath been said before. Hence some divide them into Hypostatical and Emphatical. The Diffe­rence of Meteors. They are most conveniently distinguished into three Ranks. For either the Nature of a Meteor consists in the changing of an ex­halation into some other thing, which happens in fiery Meteors, Rain and such like; or in motion, as in Winds, Earth-quakes; or in the Reflexion of Beams, as in the Rain-bow.

Most do hold the efficient Cause to be Heaven, The Effici­ent cause of meteors. and the Heaven and the Sun are the chief cause which raises exhalations: but they are not the only cause, but hear [Page 105]also concurs and the subterranean fire; and in the Generation of Metals and Mine­rals many exhalations are raised, as is known to those that search after Metals; and Winds and other Meteors are bred no less in the Winter, when the Sun beams are weak, then in the Summer.

The remote matter, are not only the four Elements, The matter especially the Earth and Water, but also mixt Bodies, out of which opposite exhalations are wont to be raised. The immediate matter is a twofold kind of exhalation, raised out of them being heated. For the Heavenly Bodies, especially the Sun, and the Subterrane­an heat do excite and raise up a twofold kind of Exhalations: whereof the one which is termed Atmis, that is a vapor, is hot and moist, raised out of the Water or moist ground, being of as it were a middle Nature betwixt the water and Air, so that it may easily be changed into either Element. For it is moist in the highest degree, but heat is therein remiss, and some degrees of coldness, or portions of Water car­ried up therewith, do remaine in it; and as Aristotle saies in the 1 Met. Ch. 3. A Vapor is as it were potentially a Water. But the other Exhalation is called a Fume, or a Smoaky Exhalation; and it is Hot and Dry, raised out of the Earth, and especially the d [...]ier parts thereof, heated and attenuated by force of the stars; of a middle Nature as it were betwixt Fire and Earth. For this Exhalation is ex­ceeding dry, and moderately hot; for it retains some degrees of the Earths cold­ness, or rather some parts of the Earth it self Elevated with it. And therefore Aristotle in the same place saies, that this Fume is potentially, as it were, Fire. Now there are chiefly two sorts of Fumes, the one of which is termed Ecphlogosis a flaming Fume, which is raised out of a Fat matter and is apt to take flame: another which is raised out of drier ground, and doth not so easily take Fire, but rather turns to Winds and Blasts. These two kinds of Exhalations though they are of a distinct Nature, and both in respect of their Heat, driness, Levity and Original differ one from another; (because a vapor is Cold, Heavy, Moist, raised out of the Wa­ter; but a Fume, Hot, Light, Dry, raised out of the Earth:) yet for the most part they are bred Joyntly, and both together, Because in most places the Earth is mixed with Water: whereupon that which of its own Nature is Heavy, by help of the other lighter, is lifted up and raised on high; although when they come to the middle Region of the Air they are separated, and the Fume is raised higher, but the vapor settles beneath. And these two Exhalations as they are commonly called are the matter of all Meteors; whence also it is that they are called Bodies imperfectly mixed; either because they do not consist of all the Elements, or be­cause in them the forms of the Elements are kept perfect and intire, and do not incorporate into the form of one mixt Body. For which Cause also such kind of Bodies cannot long last. Yet it is wont many times to happen, that Atomes also of bodies perfectly mixed are mixed with these Exhalations; yet so as that these Exhalations are not informed by the forms of perfectly mixt Bodies, but only touch the said mixt Bodies.

The place where Meteors are ingendred is chiefly the Air. The Place. For it according to the divers Regions whereinto we have shewed it is divided, doth afford place to divers Meteors, as we shall afterwards declare. For even those also which are said to be ingendred in the Earth, are properly ingendred in the Aire contained in the caverns of the Earth. Howbeit in the Sphere of Fire, and especially in the Lowest part thereof, it must not be denied, but that Fiery Meteors are generated. Also upon these, viz. the place and matter, depends the chief distinction of Meteors. For some consist of an Exhalation, others of a vapor: some are produced in the upper, others in the lower Region of the Air. We shal begin with those which arise from an Exhalation, and among them with those which are commonly termed fiery and inflamed Meteors.

Chap. 2. Of Fiery Meteors.

THe greatest part of fiery Meteors are bred in the upmost Region of the Air. For when Hot and Dry Exhalations do ascend thither and are there inflamed, sun­dry fiery Meteors are ingendred, which differ according to the various disposition of the matter, the diversity of inflammation, their magnitude, Figure, Motion and [Page 106]Duration: of which though peradventure more sorts might be reckoned up, whose Names are borrowed from the shapes which they represent in their burnings, yet I shall recount the chiefest of them. Now many reckon the Via Lactea and Comets amongst fiery Meteors, but of them we have spoken before.

Also very many fiery Meteors do arise, differing only in the posture of the matter, the multitude and shape they represent whiles they burn; which also are to be ex­plained. And that we may begin here: if an Hot and Dry Exhalation, not very thick and Fat, but subtile, stretched out in length and breadth, do take fire in the upper Region of the Air, A burning flame how ingendred. there appears a burning and shining Flame; somtimes with so much brightness, that it doth a little dispel the darkness of the night. Some cal this Meteor, Burning stubble, for it represents heaps of stubble suddenly set on Fire.

Skipping Goats so called, Skipping Goats. do appear, when the Exhalation is drawn out in length rather then in bredth, having parts not equally disposed, or distinct Masses, Joy­ned together by thin and rare Exhalations; or they have on the sid [...]s certain threds as it were and bristles annexed. For when this is inflamed, the Fire suddenly leaps, either out of the subtile and thin part of the Exhalation into another part thereof; or it runs out into the sides and those Bristles or Appendixes aforesaid, and by and by runs back again; and so it seems to dance, like Goats wantonly Skipping.

Burning Brands are, Burning brands. when the exhalation is drawn out in like manner, rather in length then breadth, having its parts nevertheless equally disposed▪ For if this be set on Fire, it represents a burning Fire-brand or Beam. And these Beams do not move to and fro as Links or Torches, but are quiet, and shine in one and the same place. A burning Spear or Dart. The burning Lance or Dart commonly so called, seems to be the same Meteor with the former. For by these Names a Meteor is designed, which is bred of an Exhalation or Fume, drawn out at length, and having parts of equal thick­ness, which being set on Fire doth burn all together, and shews the image of a Dart or spear. The bur­ning Pillar Nor doth the Perpendicular or Pyramidal Fire, so called, differ much from this, being ingendred of an Exhalation drawn out in Length, and Lighter in its upper part, Heavier in its lower. For being set on Fire in its upper and lighter part, it represents a Pillar set bolt upright; and its lower and heavier part resem­bles the Basis thereof. The Candle or Torch. Like unto this is the burning Candle or Torch, Which consists also of a dry Exhalation, drawn out in length alone, and equally thick. For this being inflamed at one end, and in some measure shining upon the other part not inflamed, it represents a burning Candle or Torch.

Running Stars, Shooting Stars. as Pliny in the 2. of his Natural History, Cap. 37. calls them: the Coursing of Stars (as Seneca Phrazes it, in the 1. Book of his Nat. Quest. Ch. 14.) Flying Stars as some cal them, and falling or shooting Stars, because they appear in the shape of falling or flying Stars, do happen two manner of waies. First of all hen an exhalation in the upmost Region of the Air, drawn out in length, is torn, distinguished and spred abroad into many particles as it were. For the first part being inflamed doth speedily communicate the Fire to the other, the Second to the Third, the Third to the Fourth, &c. After the same manner as one Candle lighted doth easily light again another newly blown out; and so it makes shew of a shooting Star. Again, when an Exhalation subsists in the middle Region of the Air, and either by Antiperistasis of the cold Air is inflamed, made lighter and so raised on high, and shews like a flying Star; or being by the coldness of a cloud compressed and Squeezed, it conceives Fire, and moves downwards, for the most part side long, and violently; and then a Star seems to fall from Heaven. Also a third manner may be added, viz. When an Exhalation drawn out in length, of equal thickness, and apt to burn, is set on Fire. For this burning all on a sudden, and the flame speedily passing from one part to another, it makes the appearance of a shooting or flying Star. For we must not give credit to the dotage of the Epi­cureans, who taught, that Stars did really fall from Heaven. For, to use the words of Seneca, in L. 1. Quest. Nat. Cap. 1. if this were true, there would have been ere now no Stars left in the Heaven. For there is no Night wherein many shoot­ing Stars appear not. And yet the Stars of Heaven appear in the same place they were in before. They are all as big as before. When many shooting Stars appear, [Page 107]they foretell Winds to follow. For they argue store of dry Exhalations which are matter for Winds: whereof Virgil in the 1. Book of his Georgicks or Hus­bandry:

The Flying Dragon is ingendred in the middle Region of the Air. The flying Dragon. Now this Meteor is made, when an Exhalation not too clammy and hot, meets with a cold Cloud, and is thereby driven back, and so either by motion or by Antipe­ristasis; in its upper part, where it is lighter, it is set on Fire, and seems to vomit Flames and Sparkles; but in its middle part where it is Thicker, and is bowed, it Represents a Belly: and in its lower part which is Narrower and Straiter, it Resembles a Taile.

In the lowest region of the Aire is ingendred the Ignis fatuus, Willy with the Wispe, or Peg with the Lanthorne. or Willie with the Wispe, near fat and moist soiles, pooles, Church-yards, places of Publique Execution where Malefactors are buried, where are store of clammy and fat Ex­halations. For they being set on Fire, either by antiperistasis of the cold Aire of the night, or by motion, do appear like burning candles, and are diversly moved according to the motion of the Air; and therefore they are called walking lights, and sometimes they seeme to go before a Man, and then again to follow him. For when such as travel in the night would come to these Fires, Why when a man fol­lowes them, they go from him, and whoft he runs from them they fol­low him. Why they lead Tra­vellers commonly into wa­ters. Helena, Castor, & Pollux. the Air be­fore them being driven by their motion, these Fires being also moved with the mo­tion of the Air do go along before and fly from them: but when they run from the said Fires; the Air behind their backs following them, the Fires do also fol­low. These Fires do many times draw Travellers out of their way, and make them fall into Ditches, Quag-mires, and Rivers: because way faring people, supposing that these Fires are Candles shining in the next Villages, do make to­wards them, and leaving the right way fall head-long into the next Rivers and Pooles they come at; Or by these Fires being generated about Watry Places, and there seeking their Nourishment, they are seduced into the said Waters. And it is hardly to be denyed, nevertheless, but that somtimes the fraudulent Illusi­ons of the Devil doth concur in the Case, Who continualy studies the Destruction of Man kind, and seeks al occasions to do harm.

Also of a light Exhalation in the same manner are Bred these Meteors called Helena, Castor and Pollux, which are wont commonly to be seene of Marirers at sea, in the time of a tempest: and if two appear, they are called Castor and Pollux; if one alone, 'tis called Helena: and one is counted unlucky, but two a signe of faire weather. For so Plinie Lib. 2. Nat. Hist. C. 37. These Stars are of grievous importance, if they come single, and drown the ships, and if they fall into the Hole, they burne them up. But if they come two together they are good Signs and tokens of a prosperous voyage, by whose coming they say the direfull and threatning Helena is chased away: and therefore they attribute this Divinity to Gastor and Pollux, and set their Images on the Ship sterne as turelary Deities whom they invoke at Sea; as may be seen in the Acts of the Apostles, Ch. 28. v. 11. But these things are taken rather from Heathenish superstitions then physical Causes. That appears more true, that when these Meteors are moved up and down with an unstable motion, they foreshew Winds and Tempests; and when in the time of a Tempest they fall down into the Ships, or stick to the Masts, they are a sign of faire wether and a Calme. For now they signifie that the blasts of the Winds and the Tempests do abate. Howbeit concerning the Star Helena, thus Cardan writes in his 2 B. of Subtilties P. 69. Of the same kind wellnear is the Star of Helen about the Mast of a Ship, which when it falls melts even Brass-Kettles, and is a certain Sign of Ship-wrack. For it happens only in grievous Tempests, and it cannot but Breed in a most gross Aire, nor be gathered in the Ship sa [...]e by great force of Winds, so as to be set on Fire, and therefore it portends immediate Destruction. The same Author in the same piece, endeavours to shew a Reason why these Stars appearing double promise safety to the Saylors, howbeit 'tis scarce of any moment.

Hitherto also pertains the Fire which is somtimes seene on Mens hairs, Fire Clea­ving to the Haires or Garments of men. and Garments, and on the Hairs of other Creatures, and upon other Things. This arises from a Subtile and Fat Exhalation; dispersed through the Air, and sticking to the Haires or Clothes of Men, or out of the sweats of Animals of an hot Constitution, or heated with vehement Motion, set on Fire by Antiperistasis, or by violent Motion. some such thing happened to Ascanius, of which Virgil in the 2 of his Aeneids.

Livie Relates such a like thing of Servius Tullius, Lib. 1. Dec. 1. And Valerius Maximus, Lib. 1. Cap. 6. Also Livie writes in his 3. Decad. Lib. 5. That when Lucius Martius was making an Oration a Flame sprung out of his Head, which he felt not, and begot him great Favour among the Soldiers standing about. Most are of Opinion that these Fires do signifie the breaking out of some great Honor or Dishonor, and that they have been alwaies taken as signs of good or bad Luck, as the Histories and Examples aforesaid do testifie. And therefore some deny that they are alwaies to be referred to Natural Causes. That is a Remarkable Passage related by Cardan; that a Certain Man came home to his House after one a Clock in the Night, and when he put off his Cloake, a Sparkle flew from the Cape thereof; and when he tooke his Cloake againe and laid it off, it Sparkled againe, so that he was double affrighted; and within 15 Daies he was by his Enemies accused of Witch-craft, and sought for, to be tormented and punished: but by the advice of his Friends He underwent a voluntary banishment.

Also from the same dry Exhalation Thunder Lightning and Thunder-bolts do a­rise. How thunder Caused. Touching Thunder there are sundry Opinons of the Ancients, as we may see in Aristotle, L. 2. Meteor. C. 9. Plutarch de placit. Phylosoph. Lib. 3. Cap. 3. Seneca in Quaest. nat. Lib. 2. Cap. 17.18. &c. Lucretius. Lib. 6. Nor are late writers of the same judgement concerning the same. For Bodinus conceives that Thunder and most other Meteors, do not arise from Natural Causes, but rather from the Power of God, or the Divel. Aristotle, whose Opinion is thought to be more probable then the Rest, doth conceive that Thunders are thus generated: When a twofold Exhalation hot and drie, is raised together, and thickned into a round Cloud in the middle Region of the Air: and the Cloud being thickned by Reason of the coldness of the place, nespecially in the upper part thereof, and the hot Exha­lation being shut up therein, and besieged on all sides by the cold, it sights with the cold, and seeking an egress, it runs this way and that way, shaking the sides thereof; or also breaking through the same it makes that noise which we call Thunder. An Example whereof is seen in Guns; when the fiery spirit, proceeding from the Coale-Sulphury Nitre, (to use the words of Scaliger in Exe. citat. 11. Sect. I.) cannot be contained in the Room it was in when it was Gun powder, it vi­olently seeks its passage, and suddenly breaks out, making a noise like Thunder. Which happens also in Wood and Chest-Nuts, when they are put into the Fire, containing in them a hot Expiration. For the said Exhalation being rarified, and not finding a place to containe it self, it breaks out of the wood and Chestnuts with a Noise.

Howbeit Chymical Operations do afford light to this Doctrine, Chymical operations declare the generation of thunder which do not only declare the Cause of Thunder more particularly & clearly; but also shew that the aforesaid Noise is caused not only by the matter shut up and seeking an Egress, but also by the sudden breaking of the Air, caused by the Motion of Bodies, mutu­ally abhorring and flying one from another. For by the aforesaid Operations it is easie to see, that as oft as a part of inflamed Sulphur is added to Nitre, a mighty Noise is Caused. Which also is to be seen in Gun-powder, and in that Preparation of Nitre, which they call Sal Pruneliae. Nor doth the common sulphur only worke this Effect: but the Sulphur also of Minerals and Metals, when Nitre is added thereto, as appears in the Calcination of Antimony with Nitre: but especi­ally in Aurum Fulminans, or Thundering Gold, so called, which being set on Fire, strikes with greater force and Noise then Gun-powder, only it moves downwards. Nor is it unknown, that of Nitre, Sulphur, Quick Lime, and Bitumen mixtures [Page 109]are made, which being sprinkled with moisture, or wet with spittle only, are set on fire. Now that force depends not on Sulphure alone, or Nitre alone, but on both mixed together. Sulphur indeed quickly takes flame, but burns slowly: but Nitre is not easily inflamed, but being once set on Fire, it burns quickly away and in a moment as it were. And therefore it is from Sulphur that Gun-powder so soon takes Fire; but that it burns up so suddenly proceeds from Nitre, and all the force thereof proceeds from the said Nitre. From whence it is not hard to judg of the Generation of Thunder. For when in the Summer time Sulphutous and Nitrous Vapors are invisibly raised up by the heat of the Sun, especially when the South­winds blow; and afterwards either by the opposite Winds, or by the coldness of the middle Region they are united and condensed, it comes to pass, that they are there inflamed, and hence proceeds the Thunder and Lightning.

Whence it appears, Thunder may also be made with­out Clouds that it is not altogether untrue that Thunder or somwhat like it may be also made without clouds. For Histories witness that Thunders have been heard the Sky being clear: and Pliny relates Lib. 2. Cap. 51. That there was a man smitten with a Thunder Bolt, on a clear day; and other have obser­ved the same. Which Thunders may wel be thought to have been bred of a spirit and a dry Exhalation, contained in the Caverns of the Earth, and breaking out with great violence. Which thing is made more credible by what Seneca relates, Quest. Nat. Lib. 2. C. 30. after this manner: Once upon a time Aetna was ful of fire: it poured forth an Ocean of burning Sand. All the daylight was darkend with dust, and the People were frighted by the suddain approach of night. At the same time tis reported there were very many Thundrings and lightnings: which were caused by the concourse of dry bodies, and not of clouds; for it is not credible there were any clouds, the Air being so burning hot.

Also concerning Lightning there is some diversity of opinions, Lightning what it is? as may be seen out of the places fore alleadged. Most retain the Opinion of Aristotle, who held that Lightning was an hot Exhalation driven out of a cloud, and set on Fire chiefly by vehement motion, and casting forth a shining Light.

And although the Thunder be before or as soon as the Lightning, Why the Lightning is seen be­fore the thunder is heard? yet the Light­ning is seen before the Thunder is heard; viz. Because the sight is quicker then the hearing, and visible representations of things are more spiritual, and more fit for sudden propagation, then audible. An example whereof we have likewise in such as cleave Trees in the Woods, where we see the blow light, before we hear the sound. And in Guns, where we First see the Fire before we hear the Report.

A Thunder-bolt differs not much from Lightening; A thunder bolt. for it is an Hot and Dry Exhalation, more compact then Lightning, suddenly breaking out of the Clouds with great force and violence. And therefore it is not alwaies dispersed in the Air, as most other fiery Meteors are, but is carried often to the Earth: both because it is darted out of the Cloud with great force and violence, as also because it consists of a matter well compact and cleaving together: yet Pliny tells us (in his Nat. Hist. Book 2. Ch. 55.) that it never sinks into the Earth above Five foot. Hence Seneca in Quest. Nat. Book 3. Ch. 57. Lightning which only shines, and the Thunder-bolt which is darted down, are made after the same manner. But the former is of less force, and hath less nutriment. And to say what I think in a word: a Thunder-bolt is Light­ning compact and Vigorated.

That these things may be explained from nearer principles: The Na­ture of the thunder-bolt decla­red from Chymical Principles. the Lightning and Thunder-bolt differ only in the disposition and plenty of the Sulphur and Nitre. For the more plentiful and subtile the Nitre is; so much more vehement is the blow: and because of the aboundance of Sulphur, there is more appearance of fire. Hence a Cause may be rendred why it lightens somtimes with Thunder and som­times without. For the reason hereof is not, because the Cloud is spungy or com­pact, somtimes stopping the passage of the Exhalation, and other whiles giving the same a free Egress: (for the Clouds are not so thick as to be able to stop in the Lightning:) but because there is somtimes good store of Nitre, other whiles but lit­tle joyned with the Sulphurous Exhalation; therefore somtimes vehement Thun­der, other whiles little or none is heard.

The Thunder-Bolt therefore is a fiery and thin Nitro Sulphureous spirit, and not a stone as the common people imagin. For the wonderful power and force of the [Page 110]Thunder-bolt, of which we shall speak anon, must not be ascribed to a stone, but to a Body much more thin and subtile. And if any man will hold, that a most solid Stone may somtimes be bred in the Clouds of Exhalations thickned and coa­gulated, and be cast down with the Thunder-bolt or Lightning as a bullet shot out of a Gun, I shall not contend with him; yet I think such a thing happens but sel­dom.

I conceive it comes more frequently to pass, that by reason of a Thunder-bolt falling upon the Earth, the same and what ever matter is apt thereto, is melted as it were by Fire, and out of that fluid matter such a stone is formed; since it is other­wise a well known thing, that Iron and other Metals may be suddenly melted with a Thunder-bolt.

The Effects of Thunder-bolts are wonderful. The effects of thunder bolts. For by it Silver hath been melted in mens Purses, and the Purses no way hurt or harmed: the sword hath been mel­ted, the Scabbard remaining intire; all the Iron hath melted and run down a Post, the Wood unhurt; the Bones in live Creatures have been mashed to pieces and the flesh not toucht; and Martia a Roman Lady had the Child in her Womb kild with a Thunder-bolt, her self unhurt, as Pliny tels us in his Hist. Nat. B. 2. Ch. 51. In a word the Thunder-bolt hurts all hard and solid things sooner then such as are light and Spungy. The Cause whereof Aristotle saies to be (3. Metor.) because it sooner goes through light and Spungy Bodies, then to be able to hurt or burn them. But in such things as are thicker, while it staies a little seeking a passage which it cannot easily find, it doth the more hurt. And why the Hogshead being broken by a Thunder-bolt the Wine stands congealed, the reason [...], because the heat of the Thunder-bolt condenses the external parts of the Wine, that the Wine stands congealed and shut up in a Skin as it were. Yet Seneca tels us that this stif-standing of the Wine doth not last above three daies, Quest. Nat. L. 2. Cap. 31. That also is to be noted concerning the wonderful power of a Thunder-bolt, which Meuererus rela­teth in Com. Meteorol. p. 140. How that a certain Minister in the way from Leipsich to Toga, was so suddainly taken out of the sight of all men by a Thunder-bolt, that he was never seen more.

Pliny tels us that the Bay-tree, Whether some things are safe from thun­der-bolts? the Sea-Calf, and an Eagle are Thunder-proofe and cannot be smit by a Thunder-bolt. B. 2. Ch. 55. Some add the Hyacinth Stone, and other coral. Yet most men Count these things but Fabulous, and late authors observe that the Laurel or Bay hath been Thunder Smitten: and Scaliger in Ex­ercit. 113. The moti­on of a thunder-bolts. disputes against the assertion of Cardan touching the Hyacinth. The motion of Thunder-bolts is commonly aslope or slanting: because the Fire of its own Nature tends upwards, and the force whereby it is cast out of the cloud drives it downwards. And hence a cause may be rendred, why Thunder-bolts do fre­quently smite high Mountains, Towers, Temples, Tall-Trees: because seeing Thunder-bolts are commonly moved aslant, the highest things are most Obvious to them, and are therefore more often hurt by them

In Winter and Summer Thunderbolts are rare; At what time of year thun­der bolts are most frequent? in the Spring and Autumn more frequent, as Pl [...]ny tels us, Lib. 2. Nat. Hist. Cap. 50. Yet later writers say they are most frequent in Summer, and seldom in the Spring and Autumn; and to their Opi­nion experience gives witness in our parts; for the hotter the weather, the more Lightnings, Thunders and Thunder-bolts we have. For in great Heats very ma­ny not Exhalations are raised a loft, fit to ingender Thunder-bolts, and through the cold of the middle Region of the Air they are shut up in Clouds, and out of them violently driven down.

As to the difference of Thunder-bolts, The diffe­rence of thunder-bolts. Pliny divides them (in 2. Book Ch. 43.) into Predicting and Brute, perswaded rather by Heathenish Superstition then any Natural Reason. That is a more convenient division of Thunder-bolts, which Seneca brings in his 2. B. of Natural Questions, Ch. 40. The kinds of Thunder-bolts (saies he) are the Borer, the dissipater, the Burner. That which bores is subtile and flamy, flies through the strairest passages, by reason of the sincere thinness and pureness of the flame. That which dissipates is conglobated, and hath mixt with it the force of a fiery and stormy spirit. And therefore that kind of Thunder-bolt returns and escapes through that hole where it entred in. The force of this Thun­der-bolt being spred far abroad breaks what it smites, but doth not pierce through it. The third kind, which burns, hath much Earthiness in it, and is more [Page 111]fiery then flaming. And therefore it leaves great marks of burning which abide in the things smitten. Indeed, No Thunder-bolt comes without Fire, but we call this properly fiery, which imprints manifest signs of burning. That which burns and makes brown, doth burn three manner of waies: for either it blasts only and hurts slightly, or it burns, or it kindles.

To the Meteors whose Nature and Generation hath been Hitherto explained, Strange Colors in the Skie, and Ga­pings. may not unconveniently be adjoyned the Phasmata so called, such as are, wide gapings in the Skies, Ditches, Bloody redness and other Colors in the Skies appea­ring. For these appear various by reason of the light of Stars or Meteors received in a thick Air, or Exhalations, differing in plenty, Density, and Position. For as a flame appears in sundry Colors, by reason of the various permistion of Fire and Smoak: even so the light of the Stars or Exhalations enflamed, according to the divers dispositions of the matter wherein it is received, doth present to our Eyes sundry Colors and Shapes. For when that which receives the light is very compact and dark, there appears somwhat that is obscure and darkish; if it be not so com­pact, there is an appearance of a Sky Color; if yet less compact, it appears purple Color'd. A Gaping. And therefore they say a Gaping in the Sky is caused two manner of wa [...]es. First, When the light of the Moon, or another Star, or of some Exhalation enflamed (which is I conceive the more frequent cause) falls into a Cloud beneath it; which is compact in the middle, and spungy in the sides. For so the thicker part in the middle, which the Light cannot pierce into, expresses a certain deep­ness remote from us a great way: but in the outmost parts through which the light passes, it seems nearer to us. For every thing that is black, dark and obscure, al­though it be as near as that which is white, yet it seems further off then it: for white things do more work upon the sight. And therefore painters also being to express a thing depressed and remote, do use a black Color or that which is near to black; but to express a thing raised and eminent, they use white. Ditches & other fi­gures and colors ap­pearing. After the same manner also Ditches are made. For in them there is only more depth, then in the foresaid Gapings. Of other Colors and Figures appearing in the Air, the Cause is the same. For according to the various disposition of Clouds in their several parts, in respect of thickness and thinness, the shapes of divers Animals are represented, of Moun­tains, &c. They say that a Caping is made after a second manner, when a thin ex­halation burns above some Cloud, and attenuates the said Cloud in the middle, more and more, so that it seems to be divided into two parts. Which being done, the Exhalation it self appears all on Fire, and the Heaven being as it were opened, seems to burn. Yet probable it is that somtimes such Prodigious Apparitions are by almighty God placed in the Sky, to Denounce some Impendent Calamity, and Experience teaches as much.

Chap. 3. Of the Winds.

AFter the Fiery Mercors, we are to treat of Winds and Earth-Quakes. Now al­though of old sundry Men have had several opinions concerning the Nature of the Winds; and that Opinion chiefly was most Famous and common, Wind is not the Air agitated. which holds that Wind is the Agitation of the Air, or as Seneca defines it, Quest. Nat. Lib. 5. Cap. 1. Flowing or agitated Air: yet that these and other Opinions are of no vali­dity, Aristotle shews in B. 2. Meteorol. Ch. 4. The man­ner of the Generati­on of Wind according to Aristo­tle. But Aristotle himself held thus con­cerning the Generation of the Winds; that all the Water which falls down in showers is totally distributed into the Earth, and the Earth hath in it self much heat and Fire; and the Sun doth not only draw that moisture which lies in the up­per parts of the Earth, but also by its heating Faculty dries the Earth it self; which Humor being drawn a loft in vapors, is driven back by the coldness of the middle Region of the Air, and agitated and moved athwart.

For the Matter of Winds, according to the Aristoteleans, The Mat­ter of Wind is an Exhalation hot and dry: of which thing they produce these signes. For in the first place Winds do very much dry. Again as Cardan saies in his 16. de Subtil. p. 792. (and experi­ence confirmes the same,) red Clouds scattered all over the Sky, or a red Moon, or the Suns setting amongst red Clouds; signifies Winds to follow; only because they [Page 112]argue that many Hot and Dry Exhalations are Elevated into the Sky. Howbeit the matter of Winds is seldom a pure Exhalation; and some winds are drier then other some, because two sorts of Exhalations, as was said before, are commonly drawn joyntly out of the Earth; and again, because they are mixed with Exhala­tions and Vapors, through which they pass: and therefore also the Qualities of several Winds are different, as shal afterwards appear, by reason of the vapors they bring with them out of the places through which they blow.

Now what should be the Cause of the Motion and Agitation of Winds, The Effi­cient cause. authors differ, as may be seen in Francise. Piccolhomineus, Lib. de Meteor. Ch. 22. Collegium Conimbric. de Meteoris, Tract. 6. C. 3. And verily here is no smal difficulty and ob­scurity. But most Men hold, that dry Exhalations being carried up to the middle Region of the Air, or thereabouts, are by the coldness thereof driven back; and because by their own Nature they are light and endeavor to mount upwards (but by the violence of the cold Air they are driven down again,) therefore they are forced to move Athwart or Cross the Air. For just as Smoak ascending out of a Chim­ney, if it meet with Wind is beaten down, and passes obliquely this way and that way al abroad: so they think it no absurdity to say, that an hot Exhalation mee­ting with the coldness of the middle Region of the Air, is driven back there­by.

Now as we do not wholly reject this opinion, Aristotles opinion ex­amined. since experience it self doth wat­ness, that after Rains Winds are raised in the neighbouring places, vapors being raised out of the Earth moistened with showers; yet some things are to be added and observed concerning the same. For first, though that same violent motion of Winds be chiefly to be attributed to Exhalations: yet the Air it self doth encrease that motion, which being moved by the Exhalations is it self agitated, and for­cibly carried this way and that way. Even as when it is moved by ones Hand, by a Whip, or Fann, we perceive it makes somwhat which resembles Wind.

Moreover, although Winds are hardly bred without an Hot and Dry Exha­lation, since rarely one kind of exhalation ascends without another: yet nothing hinders but that Cold and moist Vapors may be the matter of Winds; and expe­rience teaches us that there are many cold Winds, and many Winds moist.

Thirdly, 'Tis indeed credible, that out of the Earth moistened with showers many Exhalations do ascend; but Credible it is not, that all the matter of Winds arises from the surface of the Earth, and that the Earth within the compass of ten Foot deep, more or less, can send forth such store of Vapors as will serve to make Winds, which oftentimes out of the same Quarters do most vehemently blow, divers daies together; especially when the Earth continues moist even when the Winds do blow: but without all question the greatest part of Winds do break out of the hollow Caverns of the Earth. For in the Winter Season, when all the Surface of the Earth is hardned with Frost and Cold, yet nevertheless more and more vehement Winds are then raised, then in the Summer time; and Winds arise out of Rivers and Lakes, yea and Storms arise out of the Sea it self. And although some think it improbable, that Winds are raised out of the bottom of the Water, by the working of the Fire which is in the Bowels of the Earth, yet Mariners have oftentimes found it so to be, to their great danger and dammage. For this is that Aeolia (which Virgil describes in his 1. Book of the Travels of Aeneas,) out of which, as he saies,

Fourthly, Although I will not now dispute this point, whether Vapors and Ex­halations raised aloft, are driven back by the coldness of the middle Region: yet nevertheless certain it is, that they when they break out of the Caverns of the Earth, they are not destitute of all force and motion; and that not only an Air arises out of Pools, Floods and lakes, but even out of the Calm Sea oftentimes storms of Wind do arise. Now the Winds in the mean while do receive this force at that time, either from the multitude of Waters which break into the bowels of the Earth, and thrust forth the Air and Vapors there shut up; or from the Fire contained in [Page 113]the Caverns of the Earth, and resolving the Waters and other subject matter into Vapors: to which may be added some Huge Fragment of Earth falling down into some vast Cavern of the Earth, and thereout violently expelling the Air. Howbeit, amongst these Causes, the chief seems to be the under-ground heat; and many things argue that it is no less effectual to raise Winds, then the Heat of the Sun. For, as hath been lately said, they break out of Rivers, Lakes, and the Sea also in the Winter time, when the surface of the Earth is hard with Frost. And that same instrument which Chymists use instead of bellows to blow their Fire, doth not a little declare this business. They have a round hollow Globe of Copper, which being filled with Water and close stopped, there is a smal hole on one side or a Pipe with a smal passage: and the said Globe being filled with Water is laid on a Chasing Dish of Coals, and the foresaid Pipe is instead of bellows turned to­wards the Fire which they would blow: when the Globe grows Hot and the Wa­ter begins to rarisie, there is a perpetual Wind blowing forth, which blows the foresaid Fire like a bellows, til all the Water in the Globe be consumed. To all which causes nevertheless one seems fit to be added, viz. The contrariety of those smal particles, whereof the Exhalations which are the matte. of Winds do con­sist▪ For these particles (as appears by many Chymical operations, wherein for the same cause the Vessels are violently broken, while they abhor and fly one from ther) do raise such a violent motion.

Howbert, The motion and posture likewise of the Stars, and especially of the Planets, doth also contribute to the Generation of exhalations; which being in this or that part of Heaven constituted, or in conjunction with others, or having mutual aspects; they move somtimes this matter, somtimes that, somtimes in one place, somtimes in another, and varioutly drive and force the same.

The number of the Winds is by various Authors variously reckoned, The num­ber of Winds vul­garly ob­served. as may be seen in Aristotle, in his 2. of Meteors, Ch. 6. in the Author of the Book de Mundo dedi­cated to Alexander Ch. 4. Seneca in his Quest. Nat. L. 1. C. 16. Pliny in Hist. Nat. Lib. 2. Cap 47. Gellius, Book 2. Ch. 22. Who also differ somwhat in the Names and Situations of the Winds. Thus we shal Muster them. All grant that those are the four Cardinal or Principal Winds, which blow from the four Principal points of the Horizon, or the four corners of the World. For from the Equinoctial Sun­rise blows the East-Wind; from the Noone-sted blows the South-Wind; From the Equinoctial Sun-set, the West-Wind; and from the Pole Arctick blows the North-wind. The Ancients contented themselves with the notice of these four Winds: the Age following added four more. For, because the Sun doth not alwaies rise and set in the same place, but the Equinoctial Sun-Rise and Sun-set from whence the East and West winds blow, are different from the Solstitial Sun-Rise and Sun-set; and the Winter Sun-Rise and Sun-Set is also different from them: they ther­fore added yet four Winds more, blowing from the four points of the Interfection of the Tropicks and Horizon, or from the points of the Summer Sun-Rise and Sun-Set, and the Winter Sun-Rise and Sun-Set. For that which blows from the Sum­mer Sun-Rise, they called Caecias; That from the Winter Sun-Rise Vulturnus; that which blows from the Summer Sun-Set, Corus; that from the Winter Sun-Set, Africus. To these Posterity added yet other four, which blow from the Poles of the Zodiack, and their opposite points; or from the sides of the Poles and the Po­lar Circles, or from the points marked by them in the Horizon; so that every Car­dinal Wind came to have two collateral or side winds. And they called that be­twixt the North and the Summer Sun-Rise Thrascias; and that betwixt the South and Winter Sun Set, Libonotus; that betwixt the South and Winter Sun-Rise, Phaenicias. And this is the most usual number of Winds among Authors. The num­ber of the winds en­creased by late Navi­gators. Later Navigators have amplified the number of the Winds to thirty two. For they divide the Horizon into eight parts, to which they attribute eight Winds; which they call principal, viz those which blow from the four cardinal points of the Horizon, or corners of the World, and such as blow from the points exactly in the middle of those. To these they add eight others, holding the middle places betwixt the principal, and call them the middle or half Winds: to these they add sixteen more, which they insert in the middle space betwixt the principal and the middle, and cal them Intermediate or Quarter Winds.

I shall here recount the chief of them, which follow one another in this order, from East to South; from South to West; from West to North, and so from North to East again. From the Equinoctial Sun-Rise blows Subfolanus, the East-Wind; from the middle point betwixt the East and the South, blows Euronotus, the South-East-Wind; from the South blows Auster, the South Wind; [...] the middest be­twixt the South and West is Notozephyrus, the South West Wind. From the Equi­noctial Sun-Set blowes Zephyrus, Favonius, the West Wind: betwixt the West and North blows Thrasciozephyrus, the North-West Wind; from the North, the North Wind; and betwixt the North and East, the North East Wind.

To these if we shall add eight and insert them in the middle among the principal, (which were also used by the Ancients, and blow from the Summer and Winter Sun-Rise and Sun-Set, and which the sailers call middlewinds of half Winds,) we shal then have sixteen Winds worthy of observation. For betwixt the East and the South-East there is Vulturnus, or the East-South-East Wind; betwixt the South-East and the South there is Phaemcias, or the South-South-East Wind; betwixt the South and the South-West there is the Libonotus, the South-South West wind; betwixt the South-West and the West there is Africus, the West-South-West wind, betwixt the West and the North-West is the Caurus, Corus, or West-North-West wind; betwixt the North-West and the North blows the Circius or North-North West wind; betwixt the North and the North-East blows Boreas, Aquilo, or the North-North-East wind; betwixt the North East and the East blows the Caecias, or the East-North-East-wind.

The chief thing observeable in these Winds is the contruriety. Coatrary winds. Now those Winds are most contrary one to another which are most distant one from another in place. Now those are most distant in place which are Diametrically opposite one to ano­ther, or by a Line drawn through the Centre of the Horizon. Hence the East is opposed to the West, the South to the North; the Winter Sun-Rise to the Summer Sun-Set, the Winters Sun-Set to the Summers Sun-Rise: and therefore the Winds also which blow from these parts are opposite one to another. So the East-South-East wind is opposite to the West-North-West; the South-East wind to the North-West; the South-South-East, to the North-North-West; South-South-West to the North-North-East; the North-East to the South-West; the East-North-East wind is opposite to the West-South West wind.

And here it is to be observed, The winds blow in a certaine Method. that these winds observe a Rule in blowing. Those which are contrary, because they are Diametrically opposite, cannot blow at one and the same time, but the stronger of the two suppresses the force of its opposite: or if it happen that they blow together, it is with mighty contention and causes an hideous storme. Now, this order the winds do commonly observe, that when one fals that which is next it doth rise; or the contrary to that which ceases doth begin to blow. Moreover in contrary Lines contrary Winds do for the most part blow: concerning which see Aristotle, Lib. Meteor. 2. C. 6. Pliny in his Natural History, Book 2. Ch. 47.

Again, The tem per and [...] of the winds. Here is to be noted the Temperament and Quality of the Winds. For though they al agree in matter, and consist of an hot and dry Exhalation: yet since that is seldom raised up alone, (but that for the most part out of the Sea and the Earth watered with Rains and Snows these two Exhalations are drawn together, & afford matter to the Winds;) moreover that they pass through places Hot, Cold, Dry; therfore there is also a great difference of Winds in respect of the places from whence they arise and through which they blow. For the Winds have not only the Qualities of those places from whence they arise, but their chief qualities they have from the places through which they pass.

Hippocrates in his Book de Aere, Aqua, & Locis, divides al the Winds into Hot and Cold, because the force of these qualities is greatest: whom Aristotle following in his 2. Meteor. Cap. 6. divides all Winds into North and South Winds, even in respect of Heat and Cold also. To the Northern he adds the Western Winds, and to the Southern the Eastern. The North-Winds are the coldest of all other and Dry, for they arise from Snowy cold places, and pass through places out of the Sun [...] way and far from the Heat thereof. With these agree the West Winds. For these are cold Winds, because they pass through places not much heated by the Sun. To the North-Wind the South-wind is opposed, an hot wind, which passes [Page 115]through the Suns road, and through places heated by the Sun: in Libya indeed it is dry, because the moist vapors are there consumed by the Sun: but to us it is moist, because it comes over the Mediterranean or Mid-land Sea. The Eastern Winds are Hot and dry. For the Sun is carried long over those places through which they come.

The East-wind is Hot, Dry, temperate, Sweet, Pure, Subtile, Healthy, espe­cially in the morning: and therefore it brings no Venemeus blasts. The East-South-East because nearer the South is moist and cloudy, and therefore when it blows all things do seem to be bigger then indeed they are, as Aristotle hath it in the 26. Section of his Problems, Problem 56. The East-North-East, is inconstant and somwhat cool. It drives not the Clouds away, but draws them to it self; whence the Proverb: he draws evils to himself as the East Nor-East Wind draws the Clouds. The West wind melts the Winter Snow and Frosts, being of an Hot and moist temper, making the Herbs and flowers to grow; and therefore 'tis thought to have its Name in the Greek Zephuros, as if you would say Zoen Pheron bringing Life.

The West-South-West, is Cold, Moist, Rainy tempestuous. Hence Virgil calls it Creber Procellis, in the first of his Aeneids, ful of Storms. The West-Nor-West, is Stormy, Snowy, Hailing, Cold. Therefore it, and the North-wind, are the col­dest winds of all.

The South-wind is moist, Hot, Thundering, Pestilent, engendring Clouds and Store of Rain, making the Air thick and Cloudy.

The South-South-West is a temperate wind, Hot, Rainy, and somtimes Thun­dering.

The South-South-East wind is Hot and Moist.

Wherefore the South-wind, the South-west wind, West-South-west winds are hot, but of these the South-wind is Hottest, Hurrful and Pestilent.

The South-South west is more moist then Hot. Howbeit, consideration must be had of the Climate and the place.

The North-Nor-East wind is Cold and Dry, the Author of Cold, cutting the Clouds, straitning our Bodies and shutting their Pores: making the Humors more pure, and Purging the pestilential Air.

The North-Nor-west is the Author of Snow and Hail.

The North-wind is Cold and dry, without Rain, hurting Flowers, Fruits and budding Vines. And therefore the North-Nor-East, North and North-Nor-west winds do Purge the Air; and if they be not vehement cold, they make it clear and fair weather; but especially the North-Nor-East and the North winds; and the North-Nor-East brings Hail, and the North-wind brings Snow. And Ge­nerally all winds from the North and West are drier then from the South and East.

Hence some winds are healthy, others unhealthy. Of winds some are healthy, others un­healthy. But in general the Southern winds are of all other most unwholesome. For they cause moisture and putrefacti­on: and therefore when it blows, neither Cellars, nor Houses, nor Libraries, nor Granaries should be set open. The South-wind is more violent in the Night, the North-wind in the Day: the South-wind on the Sea, and the North-wind on the Land.

A short and moderate South-wind makes the Air clear; but a great and lasting South-wind Clouds the Air, and is wont to be more furious at the End then at the beginning: and therefore it brings more Rain at the Conclusion, then at first: but the North-Nor-East wind doth the contrary.

Those winds which come through Populous places, as Cities ful of people, and where a great Army hath been long incamped, through Stinking and Venemous places, are hurtful: but those which come through healthy places, as pleasant Meddows, woods, and along running waters, are wholsome, for they are Seaso­ned with the Steams of Flowers, Leaves and Herbs. More observations concer­ning the force of winds are to be read every where in the writings of Physitians, and in Pliny in the place fore alledged; also some things may be brought out of Aristotle touching this subject, Probl. Sect. 26.

And these are the common winds which blow every where all the world over. Provinci­al winds. There are also other winds peculiat to some places. The former are termed com­mon [Page 116]to all places, not because so many blow in all places; for there are some Re­gions where those common winds cannot come, by reason of High-Mounrains and other Causes: but because, no where there are found any more. And the latter are termed Provincial winds, because they go not beyond a certain [...] of ground and abide in the place where they were ingendred not being able to blow further: because they are bred of a smal Quantity of matter, which falling, they also do fade away. And such are commonly those winds which are called Subterrancan, which come out of Caverns of the Earth, and from Exhalations bred in those Ca­vities which are nearest the Surface of the Earth. Or because they are particles of the common winds, separated from them by the height of Mountains, deepness of Valleys. or the Heat or Cold of the Place. Of which see Seneca. Quest. Nat. B. 5. Ch. 19. Pliny in his Natural History Lib. 2. Ch. 47. Gellins Book 2. Ch. 22.

There are also universary winds, Anniver­sary winds which return every year at set times, and they are chiefly three: The Onithiai or Bird-winds, the Prodromoi or forerunners, the Etesiai or Anniversary winds Particularly so called. Bird wind. The Bird-winds called also the Rose-winds, are a sort of Westerly winds, which blow gently every year in the Spring Season, when the Swallows and other Birds returne to our Parts, and when Roses flourish. Fore run­ners. The Prodromoi or Forerunners, are Northern winds which come eight daies before the rising of the Dog-Star. so called because they proceed the Etesian winds. Etesian winds. The Etesian winds are so called from Eror Annus, as if you should say Anniversary winds Particularly so called, because they keep their course most certainly every year, two daies after the Rise of the Dog star, and blow forty da [...]es together; now they are Northern winds, pleasing and healthful to man and beast. For by their blast they moderate the Heat, break the violence of the Summer, and defend us from the violence of the hortest months. They lise at the third hour of the day, and therefore they are called sleepy winds and Dainty Nice winds by the Mariners, as Seneca tells us. Nat. Quest. Lib. 5. Ch. 11. and at night commonly they leave blowing. Authors conceive those wind; are bred by great heat, melting the Snows yet remaining on the Northern Mountains. For 'tis likely, that the Land; disburthened of the Snow and uncovered do breath ont more freely. And therefore they do not last beyond the Dog-daies; because after them all places are bared, or at least very few do continue covered with Snow.

The winds do sometimes raise great Tempests, Turbulent winds. and are exceeding turbulent; the chief whereof are Ecnephias, Typbon, and Prester. The generation of the wind Ec­nephias is thus described by Seneca in his Lib. Eenephias 5. Quest. Nat. Cap. 12. when a great inequali [...]y and dissimilitude of Bodies, sent out by the Earths vapor, doth ascend aloft, and some of these Bodies are dry, others moist, from so great a discord of Bodies fighting together, when they are gathered into a Globous Body, 'tis like that some Clouds are made hollow, and that Fislulous spaces are left in them in manner of hollow strait Pipes. In these spaces a thin spirit is intercepted, which desires a greater space, when being smitten and cust together in its narrow passage it grows hot, and so becomes wider, and cuts asunder its inclosures, and breaks out into a Wind, which is really stormy, coming down from aloft and falling vehen ent­ly and siercely upon us, and making it self way by force and sighting. This wind is called by the Greeks Eenephias, because it comes rushing Ec toon Neph [...]n, out of the Clouds.

But if the said Exhalation be divided into parts, The whid­wind and breaks either our of divers Clouds, or out of divers parts of the same Cloud, it causes a Whirl-wind. For, because the wind seeking Egress meets another, and is forced as it were out of a wide into a narrow place, it is alwaies driven to one side where it may find a passage, and makes a wheeling motion; by and by being conglobated and mixed with some part of the Cloud, it is carried Head-long and being repulsed and beaten back by the Earth carries what ever it meets with its whirling motion, aloft into the Ait; it is the chief Plague of Mariners, as Pliny saies in Lib. 2. Nat. Hist Cap. 48. bowing and breaking, not only their masts but the very Ships themselves.

But if the said Exhalation be of an hotter Nature, and by Antiperistasis or Motion be set on Fire, Prester, and carry the Flame along with it, 'tis called Prester from burning. Seneca calls it the Fiery whirl-wind, Quest. Nat. Lib. 5. C. 13. This doth not only overthrow, but buru [...]al that doth stand in its way: and herein only it differs from [Page 117]a Thunder-bolt, in that it hath more Wind, and less Flame; but in a Thunderbolt there is more Flame and less wind. And so much for Winds.

Chap. 4. Of the Earth-Quake.

ARistotle relates the differing opinion of Authors touching the Earth-Quake, (which the Greeks term Seismos.) in his 1 B. of Meteors Cap. 7. Seneca Lib. [...]. Quest. Nat. from Chap. 5. to 21. Plutarch in his 3. de Placit. Philosoph. c. 15. Pliny B. 2. Nat. Hist. c. 79. Gellius B. 2. ch. 28. from whence we may see how careful the Ancients were in sear­ching out the Cause, why that which is the only immoveable and fixed thing in the world, which substains us and all things on it self, upon which Cities are built, which some have called the foundation of the World, doth somtimes reel and stumble. We, desirous to observe Brevity, omitting the examination of other Opinions, shall only lay open the Truth.

Seeing the Earth is of it self immoveable, nor can be moved by any thing which Ex­ternally goes about the same, as winds or waters, (against the Motions and most Vehe­ment Tempests whereof the Earth hath formerly stood and doth still stand immove­able:) 'tis to be thought, that it is moved in Earth-quakes from somwhat within it self. Now in the Caverns of the Earth are included Waters and two kinds of Exhalati­ons. Now although that Gellius tels us, Lib. 2. Cap. 8. Waters are not the Cause of Earth­quakes. that the most Ancient Greeks were of Opinion, that the Earth was moved by the Floods and Violent Motions of Waters abounding in the Caverns of the Earth; (and therefore they call Neptune the Earth-shaker:) yet waters being not very apt to move, nor disposed to most swift and vi­olent Motions cannot be accounted the Cause of Earth-quakes. Which is also confirmed by what Scaliger relates in his 38 Exercitation. There is saies he in the Westerne part of the Island of Hispaniola a Mountain of huge Height, which hath many hollow Caves within it, whereinto Rivers are tumbled down with so great a noise and roaring of the waters that they are heard five Miles of, yet no Earth-quake is caused thereby. And the like Judgment we are to make of moist Vapors.

The Cause therefore of an Earth-quake must needs be hot and drie Exhalations. The true Cause. For hot and dry Spirits are fitting to raise Motions most swift, Violent and Vehement, which is also apparent from Thunder, Thunder-bolts, Winds, Whirle-winds, Storms, and Guns: and every hot thing doth of its own Nature tend upwards. Also there are o­ther Tokens hereof. For Histories bear witness, that for the most part, after an Earth­quakes a great abundance of winds and spirits have broken forth, and have cast Stones, Ashes, and other Obvious things out of the Caverns of the Earth; yea and the most Earth-quakes have not ceased till those winds included have made an Eruption: which Aristotle tels us did happen about Heraclea of Pontus, and the Island Hiera, in the 2 of his Meteors, Chap. 8. Moreover, most Earth-quakes happen, when the Sea is Calme and the Air free from winds; viz. When all the matter of Winds is contained in the Caverns of the Earth. You may finde more signs in Aristotle, in the Place foreal­ledged.

Now some hold, that these Spirits are either bred in the Caverns of the Earth by the Heat of the Sun and of the underground Fire; or that being bred without, they enter in; or that they are driven thither by the Antiperistasis of the cold Air; or that when two contrary Winds do blow at once, the one being vanquished by the other doth pass into the Caverns of the Earth which it meets with; or to avoid Vacuity, when the waters go out, the Exhalations insinuate themselves into the hollow parts of the Earth. But the first amongst these Causes is either the chief or only Cause. Now the Spirits which shake the Earth are contained in the profound Caverns thereof. For those which are in the Cavities next the Surface of the Earth, seeing they can easily find an Egress, do not move the Earth. Now these Blasts are moved, because they have no place in the Caverns of the Earth fit and large enough, or because they are pressed by the Waters which flow to and from the Sea; or because they are shut up by the Antiperistasis of cold, and gathering force, and their heat being Augmented, they are Attenuated and Rarified; which also may be performed by the Subterranean or Under-ground Fires.

From the Premises therefore it appears, that an Earth-quake is caused, when hot and drie spirits are Praeternaturally shut up in the Caverns of the Earth, and seek their way out. For, not finding the same they move this way and that way, and by their great force and violence they shake the Earth. Now the sundry manners and various fathions of Earth-quakes proceed from the greater or less Quantity of Exhalations; from the divers figures of the Caverns; from the longness or shortness of their distance from the Earth; Two man­ners of mo­tion of the Earth. from the sundry manners of the Exhalations breaking forth; which the Author of the Book de Mundo Cap. 4. and others do reckon up. Yet all of them may be refer­red to two, whereof one may be called Tremor a trembling; which is caused, when much Spirit is spread out Long-waies and Broad-waies: the other Pulsus a beating or thrusting, when the Exhalation is disposed rather long-waies. For it seeking Egress lifts up the Earth much after the same manner as the Arterie is lift up in the Diastole or widening of the pulse.

From what hath been hitherto said, it appears, that the whole Earth cannot be sha­ken at once. For the Spirits shut up in the Caverns of the Earth have no proportion (to speak of) to the whole Globe thereof, nor have so much strength in them. And there­fore, Ʋniversal Earth­quakes are not natural. if there be any universall motions of the Earth, they ought to be referred rather to the insinite power of God, then to Natural Causes. With the Earth-quake is ioyned a noise, caused by the vehement Motion of the Spirits running to and fro in the Caverns of the Earth, and smiting against the sides of the Earth; which noise somtimes goes be­fore the Earth-quake, and is a sign thereof suddenly to follow; somtimes it accompanies the same, and it is various, according to the Quality of the matter receiving, and the form of the Cavities, or passages through which it goes.

The duration of an Earth-quake is not one and the same alwaies, How long the Earth-quake lasts. but divers, according as the Earth doth more or less resist, or gives an easie or dissicult passage to the winds; or as the Spirits themselves are plentiful or scanty. For sew Spirits are sooner discussed and sooner get away, but store of Spirits abide longer; also when there is a wide passage for them to go out, they go out apace; but when the passage is shut up or is very nar­row, they get out more slowly and continue their Bustling longer. So Seneca in Nat. Quest. Lib. 6. Cap. 30. Relates that Campania trembled continually for divers daies together. And Livy in Decad. 4. Lib. 4. Writes thus: In the beginning of the year, when L. Cornelius, and Q. Minutius were Consuls, there were so many reports of Earth-quakes, that Men were weary not only of the thing it self, but of the many Solemn daies appointed because of the said Earth-quakes. And the same Author in his 4 Decad. Lib. 5. tels us, there was an Earth-quake for forty daies together; yea and Aristotle in Lib. 2. Meteor: Cap. 8. and Pliny in the 2. of Nat. Hist. Chap. 8. tels us that Earth-quakes have somtimes lasted a year or two years together, and that they have returned at certain Times and Seasons.

The Effects truly of Earth-quakes are wonderfull and horrible. The won­dersul ef­fects of Earth-Quakes. For many times, (as Seneca in Lib. 6. Nat. Quaest. Cap. 1. Speaks,) it doth not only swallow up single Houses, Families or Cities, but it overthrows whole Nations and Regions, and somtimes overwhelms them with Ruins, other-whiles covers them in a deep Gulf, not so much as leaving any appearance of them: so that the Earth is spread over most Noble Cities, not leaving any marke of their former Existence: which happens when by impulse of the Spirit the Caverns of the Earth are shaken and fall in. And somtimes indeed, the Cities and Houses are not swallowed up in the Cavities of the Earth, but the Earth raised up in a tumor, they fal down flat. Histories are full of such calamitous accidents. In the Reign of Tiberius Caesar 12. Cities of Asia were in one Night overthrown with an Earth-quake, as Pliny relates in the 2. B. of his Nat. Hist. Cap. 84. He also relates that in Crete a Mountaine was broken by an Earth-quake, Book. 7. Cap. 16. Theodoretus tells us in the 2. Book of his Eclesiast. Hist. ch. 25. how the greatest part of Nicaea was overthrown. Of the overwhelming of Helice and Buri Seneca writes in Hist. Nat Book 6. Ch. 23.26.32. And Ovid in the 15. B. of his Metamorphosis.

Many times also in the Sea a Gulf hath been opened, and the waters swallowed up, as Rivers on the Land, so that the Fishes and Ships have stood on dry ground. Contra­rywise, many times the Earth swelling on high hath not setled again, producing Moun­tains on the maine Land, and Islands in the Sea: whereupon also somtimes the Sea hath [Page 119]been raised aloft like a Mountaine, and hath afterwards fell in upon the Neighbouring Lands. Such an Earth-quake Socrates speaks of in the 2. Book of his Ecclefiastical History, Chap. 3. For the same Cause the Courses of Rivers have been somtimes chan­ged by Earth-quakes, viz. a Tumor or swelling of ground being raised up in the middest of the former Channel. Somtimes new Rivers have broken forth, the ways being opened through which the underground Waters are carryed. Somtimes Fire and Ashes are cast out by an Earth-quake: somtimes a Venemous Spirit is belched forth, which proves baneful to Man and Beast. Seneca tells in B. 6. Nat. Quest. ch. 27. of a Flock containing Six hundred Sheep, all kil'd by an Earth quake. Many other mischiefs also an Earth-quake brings with it, all which were contained in that one Earth-quake which happened under Theedosius, which is described by Euagrius in the 1 B. of his Ecclesiastick Hist. Chap. 17.

And we may wel believe, that Earth-quakes bring not only present mischiefs, and that the danger is not alwaies in the motion, but that there is as great or greater foretold by Earth-quakes; and Pliny saies wel, Lib. 2. Nat. Hist. cap. 84. that Rome was never shaken with an Earth-quake, but it was the sign of some Event to follow. And very many Histories Testifie, that the same hath happened in other places.

And therefore look what the Romans did of old, who when they felt an Earth-quake, or heard tidings thereof, they made Proclamation that the people should keep Solemn daies for that Cause, as Gellius tells us, B. 2. chap. 28. much more should we, when such Ca­lamities are present or impendent, cal upon God by Prayer. For that which the Romans feated, (as the same Gellius records, in the same place,) viz. lest by naming of one god instead of another, they should engage the People in a false Religion, and therefore they durst not in their Edict, as was the usual manner, Name or appoint to what god the People should sacrifice; that have we no need to fear, to whom that God is known, who being an­gry, the Earth trembles and the Foundations of the Hils are shaken, 2 Kings, ch. 22. ver. 8.

Chap. 5. Of the Clouds.

WE have Hitherto explained those Meteors which are bred of an Hot and Dry Ex­halation; we come now to those which are bred of a vapor in the middlemost and lowest Regions of the Air. In the middlemost Region are ingendred Clouds, Raine, Snow and Hail.

A Cloud is engendred when vapors being raised aloft, either by heat which they have received from the Sun, or other heating causes, or by hot Exhalations mixt with them, How a Cloud is ingendred. are assembled in the middle Region of the Air, so that they cannot be penetrated by the sight. For a Cloud is nothing else but a vapor raised up in the middle Region of the Air, What a Cloud is. and there compacted; which appears hereby, in that in the lower Region of the Air, when vapors and Exhalations are raised out of things which boil or burn, they represent Clouds; and because they that walking beneath see Clouds upon Mountains, when they ascend to the tops of the said Mountains, they walk through the Clouds as through Mists; and be­cause as soon as the said Exhalations are condensed they remain no longer Clouds, but turn into Rain.

Touching the Height of Clouds, Authors are at variance. The height of the Clouds. Some conceive that the Clouds are not above three miles distant from us; yea and that some of them are not above half a mile high. Others write that no Cloud is above nine miles distant from the Earth. Vitellio is of opinion, that the vapors ascend 52000, paces, or 13. German miles. Cardan in his book de Subtil. Lib. 4. p. 205. reprehends Vitellio, and avers that the highest which vapors mount is 772000 paces, or 193. German miles. Howbeit, 'tis like enough, that the height of the Clouds is not alwaies the same, but various, according to the variety of the matter, places and times: Yea, and we often see with our Eyes, that at the same time and in the same Region, one Cloud is higher then another, and that one goes above ano­ther. I my self have seen two clouds carried with contrary motions: and one moving above the other, towards the East; the other moved under the other, toward the West. Also experience shews that clouds are not so high, as some imagin. For the tops of some Mountains reach above the clouds. For the Mountains Olympus and Athos are so high that Ashes left upon their tops all the year long have neither been blown away by Winds, nor washed away with Rain. And such as have stood on the top of Vesuvius have observed that some clouds were just as high as the Mountaine, and some [Page 120]much lower. To which that agrees which Zabarella writes in his 8. Chap. de Regi­anth. Aeris. I went saith he, to the top of Venus Mount, which is the highest in the Territory of Padua, and there I found the Air clear all day long; but beneath, a bout the middle of the Mountain, I saw the Clouds, which hindred me from seeing the Valleys: and in the Evening being come down from the said Mountain, I found that there had been a great Rain that day, below, whereas it Rained not at all on the Mountains top. Francisc. Piccolhomineus de Meteor. C. 11. saies the same, how that Men living upon high Mountains, or Travailing thereupon, do see the Rains below them in the Valleys; whereas they themselves are in clear weather; and he saies the same happened to himself travelling over the Alpes and the Apen­nine Hills. And any man may observe the same in Mountanous places.

The Colors of Clouds are various, The Colors of Clouds. according to the various disposition of the matter receiving the Beams of the Stars, and especially of the Sun, which Ponta­nus thus describes.

Chap. 6. Concerning Rain.

SOme Clouds are termed barren, which are white and Transparent, and do ra­ther by agitation of the Winds turn into Air then showers: others fruitful, which being moister then the former, What Rain is and how 'tis bred? are fit to engender Rain. For Rain is no­thing but a Cloud, Cooled, Condensed, and turned to Water. And Rain is bred, when the va [...]ors which make a Cloud are yet more condensed, and turned into Water; which being heavier then the Air fals down of its own accord in drops. For Rain is made after the same manner as hot vapors upon the walls of Baths, or in the Winter in hot stoves upon Globes of Glass, Iron or Tin jugs that are cold, are turned as we see into Watry drops.

Now there is some diversity of Rains, Diversity of Rains. proceeding from the variety of the Clouds, and of their place, which is somtimes higher and somtimes lower. For when the Cloud is High, Unequal, Spungy and Barren, and few smal drops fal like Dew, they are called Psecades heat-drops. Psecades. Imber. But if the Cloud be more near and compact, and the drops fal down thicker, 'tis called Imber a shower. Finally, if the Cloud be yet thicker and suddenly condensed by a greater cold, and greater drops fall more thickly, Nimbus. 'tis called Nimbus a strong shower. Yea and somtimes whole Clouds are so condensed by a sudden cold, that the waters descend not drop by drop, but come down in streams, The Lump of a Cloud. and destroy Towns and Cities: and then they say a Lump of a Cloud is fallen down.

Also there are Prodigious Showers so called, such as we read of every where in Histories, Prodigious Rains. Tit Livius relates in Decad. 3. B. 7. that it Rained Milk, as doth Plmy also in B. 2. Nat Hist. C. 56. and Livy tels us that it Rained Blood, Decad. 3. B. 4. Decad. 4. B. 10. and Pliny in the place forecited. Also that it Rained Flesh Livy tels us in Decad. 3. B. 3. and Pliny in the foresaid place. That it Rained Stones in many places Livy relates, Dec. 1. B. 7. Dec. 3. B 1.234.6.9.10. Dec. 4. B. 5. 68. Dec. 5. B. 1, 2, 3. That it Rained Earth the same Livy informs us, Dec. 4. B. 4.57. Dec 5. B. 5. Pliny, in the forecited place writes, that it hath somtimes Rained Iron, Wooll, and Bricks. Authors telus that Fishes have somtimes fallen down in Showers of Rain: and those Frogs and worms which are seen after Rain are by Iome thought to have fallen down with the said Rain. Yea and some relate out of Avicenna that once on a time a Calf fel out of the Sky.

Most of these Prodigious Rains are to be ascribed to Superior Causes, Their Causes. viz. To God warning Men of Evils to come; and to the Devil, indeavoring by such Prodi­gies to draw men into Errors and Superstitions; yet some of them may also be [Page 121]referred to Natural Causes. True Bood and Milk cannot Naturally descend in showers; since they are bred only in living Creatures. Yet nothing hinders but somwhat like them may fall down, viz. When by the Sun-beams a vapor is drawn out of a red or white Earth, or is a loft so digested, that it may shew such a color, and being afterwards resolved into Rain may resemble Milk or Blood. And that smal Stones may be made by a great heat of store of dry Exhalations in the Air, is a matter sounding like Truth.

As for those kind of living Creatures which may otherwise be bred of Putrefaction, such as Frogs, were must hold, that either they are ingendred of some matter in the Earth moistened with showers (which seems to many men most probable) or that they lie hid in the chinks and Caverns of the Earth, and by the falling of the Rain are called out as it were and so leap forth. But incredible it is that more perfect Animals which are generated only of Seed, and great Stones should be bred in the Air: but likely it is they have been caught up by whirlwinds in one place, and thrown down in another. Now there are certain signs of Rain as of other Tempests, which would be too long to reckon up in this place, and long Catalogues of the same are set down by others. But the principal may be seen in Plinies 8. Book Nat. Hist. C. 35. And in Virgils 1. Book of Husbandry.

Chap. 7. Of Snow and Hail.

OF the same matter with Rain is Snow also made. How snow is bred? For Snow is bred of a Va­por raised to the middle Region of the Air or somwhat lower, or of a thin cloud before it is turned into Water and Rain, congealed by vehement Cold, and torne into parts or flakes, which descend like soft Wooll, somtimes greater, other whiles lesser, according to the vehemency of the Cold. Now Snow is bred in the Winter time chiefly, because the cold is then strong and vehement, so that [...]s able not only to condense vapors into clouds and Rain, but also into Ice. For Snow as Seneca saies, Quest. Nat. Lib. 4. cap. 3. is nothing but a kind of Ice bred in the Air.

Now Snow is white, because 'tis ingendred of a Spungy transparent cloud. The color of Snow why white. And that which is transparent, after it is terminated, doth next of all become white, be­cause that color is most of kin to transparency. This appears in Chrystal or Trans­parent Gl [...]ss, and clear Ice; whose surface if a man render uneven, so that it is no longer transparent, or break and grinde it into smal parts, in room of transparency whiteness is produced. It happens somtimes, that, when the lower Region of the Air is a little h [...]tter then ordinary, the Snow as it fals down doth melt when it comes there; and so, that which is Snow above, is Rain below. And therefore frequently when it Rains in Valleys, it Snows upon the high Mountains. And for the same cause on the highest Mountains, when there is no Snow to be seen on the Plain ground, there hath been Snow lying, even in the middle of the Summer. Touching the good which Snow doth to fruits and Trees, read Pliny his 2. chap. of the 17. Book of his Natural History.

Besides Rain and Snow, of Clouds also there is bred Hail. Hail what it is, and how and where Ge­nerated. For Hail is nothing but congealed Rain; and it is bred, when a Cloud is dissolved into Rain and de­scends, and in its coming down by extremity of cold 'tis congealed into little round Balls. Now Hail is congealed, not only in the middlemost, but also in the lowest Region of the Air. Which may hence be ga­thered because somtimes Chaf is found congealed in Hail stones, which Chaf as it was coming down the cold also intercepted, and shut up in the congealed Water. If the cold be remiss a certain imperfect and soft kind of Hail is bred, of a middle Nature betwixt true Hail and Snow, which they term Granula, and resembles smal Sugar-Plums, and this fals chiefly about the End of Winter. Before the falling of Hail, for the most part great and terrible sounds are heard in the Air, which are caused by the great contrest of Heat and Cold in the Clouds. Hairs, and Chaf, and other things which are somtimes enclosed in Hail-stones, have been carried a loft by the Winds, and congealed together by the Cold. many times there are strange shapes in Hail.

And whereas somtimes strange Figures are said to be seen in Hail, it is partly to be ascribed to the Fancies of Men, who looking intently upon the Snow, do conceive [Page 122]therein Sundry Images, as they do in the Clouds; and partly to the divine Power, which may imprint certain resemblances in the Snow, whereby men may be admo­nished of some faults in their life and Conversation.

Chap. 8. Of a Mist, Dew, Hoare Frost, Honey and Manna.

ALso of a Vapor some Meteors are Generated, in the lower Region of the Air, which must also be mustered. And to begin with a Mist, the Author of the Book de Mundo, What a Mist is? in his fourth Chapter thus describes [...]t: A Mist is a certain dewy exspiration, not apt to turn to Water, thicker then the Air, more spungy then a cloud. 'Tis bred either of the beginnings of a cloud being rarified, or of the Reliques of a cloud. In which words he determins that a mist is a certain vapor, thicker then the Air, thinner then a cloud, hovering over the Earth, bred of an Exhalation growing thin, which should otherwise have been the matter of a cloud; or of the thinner parts of a cloud, unfit to ingender Rain, and remaining after it. And therefore a Mist is a token of Fair weather to follow. There is also another Mist, which consists of thicker vapors, exhaling out of the Earth, which also by Reason of their thickness, and the smal heat in them, cannot be carried a lost, but settles in the lowest part of the Air; and so they cause a darkness; and if by the heat of the rising Sun they be discussed and extenuated, they intimate fair weather; but if they be drawn up all together into the Air, being there congealed by the coldness thereof they become matter of Rain.

Now Dew is made of a smal Quantity of a thin vapor, The Dew where and how ingen­dred. which because of the weak­ness of the heat reaches no further then the lowest Region of the Air, and indeed below the upper part thereof, and being by the cold of a temperate night turned into smal drops of Water, it sticks to Plants and other things. For the dew is chiefly found on the Leaves and Flowers of Plauts, especially where they are smooth and thick; and somtimes also in other parts of them, as also upon Stones. For though it fals a like upon all places below; yet either by reason of their frequent pores, and roughness, or by their heat, it is drunk up and dissipated. On high Mountains there is no Dew bred; and somtimes also it rises not above two cubits, and only the grass is moistned thereby, but things a little higher remain dry. Dew therefore differs from Rain, only in the paucity of the matter, the place where it is bred, and the weaker heat whereby it is congealed. Now Dew is Generated chiefly in the Spring and Fall: but in the Heat of Summer and Cold of Winter it is not bred. For the Heat consumes the matter; and the cold suffers not the Vapors to be raised. Also it is not Generated, but when the Sky is calme and clear; because when the Sky is troubled and agitated with winds the vapor is dispelled, and cannot be congea­led into Dew. Likewise Dew never fals but in the morning and Evening. For in the day time it is consumed by the Suns heat, and degenerates into a very thin and light Spirit, so that if an Eg-shell be filled with Dew, and the hole stopped with Wax, or other Glew, The Na­ture of dew ex­plaind by the Chy­mists. Hore-s [...]ost how ingen­dred. and it be then exposed to the Sun, the Eg-shell will mount aloft; the Dew being changed into a most thin vapor and spirit, which ascends upwards, and carries the Eg-shell with it. The Chymists teach, that Dew contains in it the most subtile part of Nitre and Volatile Salt, which is contained in the surface of the Earth, and therefore it is used to make Extracts.

Hore Frost doth not very much differ from Dew; for Hore Frost is bred, when a thin Vapor in a smal Quantity is lift up from the Earth, and cannot rise high, but by the vehement cold of the night it is congealed, before it turns to water. There­fore, look what Snow is in the middle Region of the Aire, that is Hore Frost in the lowest Region; and what is Rain above, is Dew below.

Also Honey is to reckoned as a kind of Dew, What honey is, and [...]ow it is bred? touching the generation whereof this is the common Opinion: that with the Vapors which are drawn up in the day time out of Waters and Moist places, for the most part, Hot, Fat, and subtile Exhalations are lifted up, not only out of the Earth and Water, but also out of Plants and other things, which being throughly mixed with Earthy Watery and aery parts, and concocted by the heat of the Sun in the day time, and then by the moderate cold of the Night condensed, they stick upon Plants like Dew. And [Page 123]that Honey is nothing else but a juyce, consisting of Exhalations and vapors, ming­led and digested in the Air, by the Heat of the day, and congealed by the nights Cold, and so descending in the manner of Dew.

Which opinion as it is not quite to be rejected: so it seems not satisfactory of it self. For if the Dew be easily elsewhere dissipated and discussed by the morning beams of the Sun: How comes it that Manna and Honey are not also dislipated. Also manna and Honey differ not a little from Dew; nor hath Dew of it self any Fat or Clammy parts. And therefore this also seems sit to be added: that out of Plants a certain juyce and Native Vapor doth distil or breath our, which neverthe­less is dissipated by the day-heat of the Sun: but it is at night mingled with the fal­ling Dew, which hinders it from being dissipated, and grows with it into one Nature. From whence 'tis casie to shew a Cause, why there is more Honey gathered at this or that time of year, in this or that constitution of the Air.

And therefore though all Honey is sweet of it self; yet somtimes both its Tast and Smel is changed, according to the Nature of the Plant from which it is gathered: and therefore it is somtimes Venemous, when it is gathered from venemous Plants. Whereof see Pliny Lib. 21. Nat. Hist. Cap. 13. Dioscorid. B. 2. Cap. 74. and Book 6. Cap. 8.

This same Honey is twofold, Manna called also Air-Honey, or Dew-Honey, Two sorts of honey. and which in a special manner is called Honey. For Manna is a Honey or Dewy Hu­mor, mixt of a vapor and the Subtile and Fat Exhalations of Plants. and by the temperate coldness of a clear night congealed; sticking upon Plants, Stones and other things near the Ground; which at first is more liquid, and after ward the thin­ner parts resolved it becomes harder, and having attained its consistency, it is coa­gulated into certain grains. For although some hold, and among them Christo­phorus a Vega Lib. 2. de Art. Med. Sect. 3. cap. 11. That Manna is the work of certain smal bees resembling large Gnats, from which Bees sitting in swarms upon the Trees the Manna drops down like sweat: yet most likely it is, that these smal Creatures are rather drawn thither by the sweetness of the Manna, then that they make the same. There is much bred in the East, because of the purity of the Air and a cer­tain moderation of heat and cold in those parts. 'Tis not bred in cold places: there is little bred in Italy, save in Calabria, from whence it is carried as a commodity into other parts.

Now whether that Manna wherewith the Israelites were fed fourty years in the Wilderness, was the same with this of ours, Authors vary. Vallesius in his B. Whether our manna be the same which the Israelites had. de Sacra Philosoph. chap. 57. and other later writers hold it was the same kind of thing. Many things said of that Manna of the Hebrews, Exod. 16. Numb. 11. do also agree to this of ours: yet herein that disagrees from ours, because thereof, (beaten or ground.) Cakes or Cracknels were made. For our Manna is not of such an hard­ness. But however herein all agree, that many things which hapned touching the Hebrews Manna cannot be attributed to Natural Causes, but only to the infinite power of the most good and great God.

But vulgar Honey differs little from Manna, Common honey what it is, how differing from man­na, & how generated. and the matter of both is one and the same, save that the matter of Manna is thicker, more compact and Earthy; but that of Honey more subtile and more digested. For Honey is a certain Dew, ga­thered by Bees, and receiving alteration from the little bladders they have within them, and afterwards stored up by them in little cells in manner of a pure Liquor, wherein afterwards it works like new Wine; and is by its Natural heat concocted, and grows thick, as Aristotle relates in his 5. de Histor. Animal. Cap. 22. and Pliny in Nat. Hist. L. 1. Cap. 13.

Honey is chiefly gathered by Bees both wild and domestick: Yea and Drones also and other insects, being much of the Nature of Bees, do gather Honey, out of all Herbs which have hollow flowers like Cups, and out of others wherein there is any sweetness: which is done without any detriment to the slowers. You have more of the Nature of Bees and Honey in the same place of Aristotle, and in Plinies B. 21. Nat. Hist. from chap. 5. to the 16.

Chap. 9. Of the Rain-bow, False Suns and Moons, strakes in the Sky, and Circles about the Moon.

AFter Clouds and such things as are of them ingendred, there remain to be hand­led certain things appearing in them, called Phantasmata, apparitions; such as are the Rain-bow, the Halo or bright Circle, and other like Images. And to begin with the Iris or Rain-bow, which they say hath its Name ab Eirein to tel, be­cause it foretels Rain or Fair weather, (and therefore it is by Poets termed Junos Messenger, What the Rain-bow is?) It is a bow of three colors, in a Dewy cloud, caused by the beams of the Sun or Moon opposite to the said Cloud, and therein refract and re­flexed.

And that it may be better understood what the Nature of a Rain-bow is, all the members of the definition must be weighed. The subject of a Rain-bow is a dewy vapor, or a Dewy Cloud, which is beginning to be resolved into drops or Rain; but it is not yet Rain, only it is condensed into little drops like dew or the Water which a man blows abroad out of his mouth half shut. For a continued Cloud is not the subject of a Rain-bow; but those parts thereof which do no longer hang to­gether, but being by the cold straitened and condensed are every where distant one from another, divided into very many smal drops, which are like little Looking-Glasses, and are of a middle Nature betwixt a perfect Rain and a Cloud.

Now that the Rain-bow cannot be made in any continued vapor, The subject of the Rain how. but that it may be generated in many little round Bodies, is demonstrated from the rules of Op­ticks concerning the Nature of reflection. We shall only here produce what ex­perience teaches. Let a man stand with the hind part of his Head to the Sun, and with his mouth or other Instrument let him throw water into the beams of the Sun, so that the Water may lose its continuity, and be resolved into very many very smal drops: which being performed, a Rain-bow as it were will appear in those little drops, which represent the rorid Vapor. The same may be observed when the Water is scattered by Oares, or falling violently upon a stone it is scattered into the Sun-beams. And though the rorid Cloud, which is the subject of a Rain­bow, is no longer continued; yet to us it appears continued, by Reason of the Vi­cinity of the parts, and its overgreat distance from us.

The efficient Cause of a Rain-bow, The effici­ent cause of a Rain bow are the beams of the Sun and Moon, broken and reflected in these drops. And that reflexion is altogether necessary to the ma­king of a Rain-bow, hence appears; because both the incident Raies and the re­fract do go into the part opposite to the lightsome Body, nor do they pass on to the part seen by the lightsome Body; nor to the sight, which is averse from the lightsome Body in-such as behold the Rain-bow, can they come, unless they be re­flected. Therefore in the same manner, as we see in looking-Glasses the Images of things behind us, even so the raies of the Sun or Moon are reflected in those little loo­king-Glasses.

Howbeit, 'Tis necessary that there be also refraction. For when as a Ray of the Sun or Moon comes to the first drop of the Vapor, it pierces the same being through nearness of the Sun not yet much condensed, yet so as that it is refracted. From thence going to another hindermore drop, which is thick enough, it is pre­sently reflected, if no other drop of a rorid vapor stand before the same: but if any such drop stand in the way, the beam is first refracted, and afterwards so refracted it is reflected to our sight. Also many Raies are refracted in many obvious drops; and whiles they fall in, and pierce through divers thinner drops to one thicker, in which they are reflected; then by such a like drop they are again reflected. For every Ray, as wel the incident as the reflect, is twice refract in such a drop. First, Towards a perpendicular line, when it enters the drop; because it fals out of the thinner Air into a thicker Rorid Vapor: afterward, 'tis disjoyned from the perpendicular, when it goes again out of a thick drop into the thin Air.

The Rain-bow therefore is bred, when some rorid Cloud is in making, and begins to be resolved into very many smal drops, and to be condensed into Water: [Page 125]Which drops are yet nevertheless more thin, and not quite turned into Water, so as to fall down. For if the Sun or Moone shine just opposite thereupon, the lucid beams being variously refracted in these drops, and reflected to our fight in form of a Pyramid, their light being confused and mixt with the Heat and shadow of the drops, they present unto our sight a coloured Bow.

Now most Rain-bows are caused by the Sun, few by the Moon. A Sun & a Moon Rain bow. And therefore Aristotle tells us, that in the space of fifty years there were but two Moone Rain­bows seen. For to the making of a Moon Rain-bow, besides a fitting vapour, 'tis requisite that the Moon be in the full; otherwise its beams are too weak; also that it be near the Horizon: al which do seldom sall out. In the Year 1599 foregoing, at Mid Summer, after great Thunder, Lightning, Thunder-Bolts and Rain in the Night, betwixt the North and East we saw a remarkable Rain-bow, which might compate with some Sun-Rain-bows, in the Brightness and Beauty of its Colours. Now why only the Sun and Moon make Rain-Bows, the Reason is, Why the Rain bow is made only by the Sun and Moon. because the beams of these Stars only can reach Cross the Horizon to the Clouds, and be from thence reflected; those of the Sun because they are most strong; those of the Moon because they are near at hand. But the Beams of the other Stars are either too weak or too far off. Or if they be so strong as to be able to reach cross the Diameter of the world to the Clouds: yet are they not so strong as to be reflected to our sight. For reflect Lights are weaker then those that shoot their Beams directly, according to the Rules of Opticks.

Now why only the Colours and not the Image of the Sun or Moon appears in these Looking-glasses, there is a Threefold Cause. First, Why only colors and not the im­age it self of the Sun and Moon appear. because the Cloud is not a continued Body, but resolved into very little drops or Optick Glasses. For in so smal Glasses the Images also are very small, which being afterwards re­flected are so weak, as that they appear not distinct, but confused. Againe, the Raies are of themselves weakned before they come from the Luminous Body to the sight. Finally add hereto the blackness of the Cloud. For the rorid va­pour, because it begins to be resolved into water, assumes a certain blackness and Watry Colour, which being mingled with the Light, makes that the Image of the Sun or Moon cannot distinctly appear, but rather a Colour.

Now the diversity of Colours in the Rain-bow springs from hence, The Colors of the Rain bow. because some raies enter more deeply into the dewy Vapour, and are reflected by the remoter droplets, others are reflected from meaner vapours and resting in the surface of the Cloud, by which are made divers reflexive pyramides, having bases equally distant. Now the Colours are three, red which is the upmost, or outmost, and is bred of the greater splendor, and the raies of that reflexive pyramid, whose basis is of all others nearest our sight: and therefore its Raies are also strongest. Now because the Light is bright shining, and the Water blackish, the Colour appears neither white nor black, but a reddish Colour betwixt both. The next Colour is a Leek­green; which is the middlemost in the Rain bow, this is caused by the Raies reflected from a more deep part of the vapour; and therefore it inclines more to blackness. For the Raies also themselves are weaker, because reflected from a place more remote; and that vapour because it is farther from the Sun, is more compact, and comes nearer to the Nature of Water then the former. Hitherto also the shadows do very much contribute, which are shed from the former droplets or smal glasses upon the hindermore, with which the raies reflected from the hinde­more are mingled. Of which we have an example in the colours that are in the necks of Doves, arising from the Sun-beams. For these colours are bred from the shadows that being sent from the Feathers are mingled with the Suns light. The third is the Purple, which is the internal, and arises from the Raies reflected from a place yet more remote; and for the same reasons why the Second is blacker then the First, the Third is blacker then the Second.

And although there may be more then these three Colours in a Rain-bow; yet because for the said Reasons the Blackness is more and more increased, after the third no Colour can be perceived: and not only the reflected Raies are so weak that they cannot reach to our sight; but the Light also is so darkned by the Blackness of many shadows, that it is hardly discernable by the sight. Now the fourth Colour which they call yellow, and is seen betwixt the first and second, is no new Colour, but arises from the Neighbourhood of those two. Now the [Page 126]Lunary Rain-bow is whiter then the Solar: The Moon Rain bow whiter then that of the Sun. because the Light it self of the Moon is paler then that of the Sun; again, because the shadows which are by the fore­more drops cast upon the hindermore are not so obscure and dark, as those cast by the Light of the Sun. For the shadow of a stronger Light is blacker, and con­trariwise. Add also hereto the darkness of the night. For that which is of its own Nature Blackish, if it be set by a more black thing, it appears whiter.

But why the Circumference only of a Circle appears and not the whole and en­tire Body thereof, the cause is: forasmuch as that part only of any irradiated Bo­dy is seen, from which the Raies are reflected to the same centre of sight, accor­ding to equal Angles, and of a radiated cloud nothing is seen but what is carried by Raies collected in the same point of the Axis wherein the sight is. But these do only make a bow, as the Teachers of Opticks do at large demonstrate.

Now why the Rain-bow never makes a perfect Circle, Why the Rain bow never makes a perfect Circle. but either a Semi-circle, or an Arch less then a Semi-circle; and that it is a Semi-circle when the Luminary is in the Horizon, but an Arch less then a Semi-circle, when the luminary is above the Ho­rizon; & that the Arch is so much the wider, by how much the Lummary is nearer the Horizon; and so much the lesser by how much it is nearer the Meridian; the reason thereof is, because the Centre of the lucid Body, of the sight, and of the Rain-bow, are alwaies in one and the same right line. And therefore the Centre of the Lumi­nous Body being placed in the Horizon, in the opposite part of the Horizon will be the Centre of the Rain-bow, and so there wil be a Semi-circle above the Horizon. But when the Sun is elevated above the Horizon; the Centre of the Rain-bow is on the other side depressed; and therefore that Segment of the Circle which is beneath the Horizon is greater because it contains the Centre, and that above is less. For we see only those things which are above the Horizon And by how much less of the Diameter of the Rain-bow is above the Horizon, so much the grea­ter is the Circumference of the Circle; and a Semi circle is half of the lesser Circle of any Arch whatever that is greater, which proceeds from the Refraction of the beams: because about the Sun-rise the Air and vapors are thicker, which afterwards by the directer beams of the Sun are attenuated. And therefore the Rain-bow which is seen through a thicker Medium, appears also larger. But I pass over these and o­ther things which might be said of Rain-bows, seeing they cannot be rightly ex­plained without optical demonstrations and many Diagrams, which must be here for brevities sake omitted. They may be seen in Aristotles 3. de Meteor Ch. 4, 5. the writings of optical Authors, and in the learned Treatise of Johannes Fleischerus, de Iridibus, wherein he comprehends the Doctrine of Aristotle and Vitellio concerning Rain-bows, and augments the same with necessary demonstrations.

Of kin to Rain-bows are the false Suns, Fals Suns. or other Suns placed by the true Sun. Now the Parelios or false Sun, is the Image of the Sun, received in a Cloud conti­nued, compact, equal, ready to turn to Water, in its forepart Transparent and Po­lished as it were; in its hinder part dark and terminated, and placed obliquely by the Suns side, and reflected thence to our sight. For look as if a man should set a Looking-Glass slanting by the side of any thing, he will twice see the Image of the thing: so if a Smooth cloud like a Looking-Glass be set assant beside the Sun, there will appear divers Suns. But Pliny writes that to his time there had never been seen more then three at once, Hist. Nat. B. 2. Ch. 31. Howbeit they report that six were seen at Papia, before the War. Now these false Suns seldom appear, because there is seldom found a cloud that hath such a disposition and such a Posture to the Sun.

After the same manner is caused the Paraselene or false Moon, The Parae­selene or sats Moon. which herein only differs from a Parelios, that the former is an Image of the Sun, this latter of the Moon. Now the Images of these two Stars only are reflected to us; because their Raies are the strongest. Yea and a false Moon never appears but when the Moon is in the ful, when her Light is most plentiful and strong.

Hither also are to be referred the Virgae or Rods so called, Rods, and strakes in the Sky. which are as it were certain lines and long Pillars, which appear of divers colors, in an uneven cloud, placed on one side of the Sun, arising from the beams thereof refracted. For such straks are ingendred, when an uneven cloud, which hath some parts thicker and as it were of a waterish Nature, and others thinner, is placed beside the Sun. For when the Sun-beams fall thereinto, they cannot pierce equally because of the diversity of [Page 127]the parts; nor do they appear contiguous, but rather disjoyned, and in the hinder parts, through which they penetrate, refracted; and so they represent divers colors: after the same manner as the Sun-Beams coming through chinks into a close Cham­ber, they represent lightsome Lines. Now the colors are not the same, but vari­ous according to the divers disposition of the parts wherein the Raies are received, which in thinner parts appear more light and white, in thicker more black and dark. Now these Rods or Strakes do appear for the most part, when the Sun rises or when he sets, but never at Noon tide; for then his Beams are so strong, that they easily attenuate and pierce into thickest Vapors.

Finally, There is seen in the Clouds the Halo, Hale the Circle a­bout the Sun, Moon &c. which is by the Author of the Book de Mundo thus desined, Cap. 4. Halo is a shining Circle, under the Sun, Moon, or other cl [...]ar Star, appearing just betwixt us and the Star, made by the Beams thereof there refracted. For this same Circle is made when the stronger beams of some Star fal into a cloud equally spungy, which in regard of the Spunginess can in­deed pass through, yet are refracted therein because of the thickness of the Air, and being refracted to even Angles they make a Crown. Now in the Center of the Crown the Star appears which is the cause thereof; because the straight Raies are stronger, and do more attenuate, Rarisie, and Illuminate the cloud. Now this kind of Crown appears most commonly a nights. But the vehement heat of the Sun dissipates the Vapor, and makes it more rare, so as it is unfit to refract the Sun­beams, by which means such a colored circle might arise. Now the Sky must be calm, that the Halo may be seen. For a cloud moved and variously agitated can neither retain an equal disposition of parts, nor present a certain color by the refracted Raies.

Chap. 10. Of Fountains.

BUt that we may at last finish our Doctrine of Meteors, let us speak somwhat in the last place of Fountains and of the Sea. Aristotle his opinion of the ori­ginal of Fountains. The opinion of Aristotle is com­monly known touching the original of Fountains: how that Air and Exhalations in the Caverns of the Earth do by the coldness of the place lose their heat, grow thick, and are turned into water: after the same manner as in the middle Region of the Air, of vapors condensed, Rain is ingendred; which afterwards descen­ding, and from many places gathered into one, and there flowing out become a Fountain: whose continual running is maintained by new Air daily succeeding in the Room of the former to avoid Vacuity, and afterwards changed into Water.

But in good deed if we understand this Opinion of his concerning all Rivers, it is not true. For though we should grant that some Water may be made of Vapors condensed in the Caverns of the Earth, and that this may haply give beginning to some Fountains: yet we cannot be brought to think, that so much Water is this way generated, as to supply all the Fountains and Rivers that run upon the Earth. For since it is apparent, how great a Quantity of Air is required to make a little Wa­ter, and how much space those vapors take up of which a little Rain is bred; where will there be so many and so large Caverns, wherein so many Vapors, and so much Air, can be collected for the production of so many and so great Rivers? Also a reason of the perpetual Course of Rivers can hardly be rendred according to this opinion; seeing there is not alwaies the same plenty of Vapors. Much less can a Reason be given why many Fountains Issue from the tops of the highest Moun­tains.

Let us therefore rather embrace that opinion which is the most ancient of all, The true opinion. which the Preacher in Bccles. 1. v. 7. comprehends in these words: All Rivers run into the Sea, and the Sea Flowes not over; the Rivers return to the places from whence they came, that they may flow again; And let us hold with very many most learned men, that Fountains and Rivers as they run into the Sea, so have they their Original from thence. For otherwise the continual running of Rivers cannot be made forth, not a cause be given, why the Sea receiving perpetually so many Rivers runs not over: or how Fountains come to arise from the tops of highest Mountains. And [Page 128]unless the Rivers had their Original from the Sea, Why the Sea flows not over. it could not be but the Sea must run over. For the Rivers have some proportion to the Bulk of the Sea, seeing some of them are poured with such violence and in so great plenty into the Sea, that for the space of many miles together they afford in the Continent sweet Waters to the Mariners, amidst the Sea Waters. Nor can the Sun or Winds consume so much thereof as doth flow in; but the Sea repairs its detriment which it receives in com­mon with the Rivers from the Sun and Wind, out of the Air, in the Nights. Also many Fountains have many things common with the Sea. Pliny writes in Nat. Hist. Book 2. Oh. 103. of Jupiters Fountain in Dodona, that it was alwaies dry at Noon; and from thence the Water encreased, till at Mid-night it overflowed, and after that it deceased by little and little. And he relates in the same place, How that overagainst the River Timavus there was a smal Island in the Sea, with hot Fountains in it which Ebd and flowed as the Sea. Nor doth Plato seem to have been averse to this Opinion, who in his Dialogue called Phaedo writes, that there is an hollow place in the Earth, into which all Rivers run, and out of which they run back again.

Hence also a cause may easily be rendred, Why Foun­ains arise [...]om the [...]ps of highest Hills? why Fountains arife on the highest tops of Mountains. For since the Globe of the Earth is round, and the store and weight of the Sea Water is great: it may easily by its weight thrust the water which flows through the veins of the Earth into the highest Mountains. And whereas the Fountain waters are not Salt, though the Sea is Salt, and that they have great diversity in qualities, springs from hence; because the Sea Water being strained through many turnings and Veins in the Earth, loses its saltness, and receives other qualities out of the Caverns of the Earth through which it runs and flows. Now the difference of Fountains is great; for some are used instead of drink, and others for Physick. The former are more simple, the latter more com­pound.

Metal line or Mineral Waters are those, Mineral waters what? which have in them the spirits or smal­lest particles of Minerals, Metals, and Subterranean Juyces, and differ from other ordinary potable Waters, in Smel, Tast, Color, and therefore are not used for drink, They are twofold. but only as Physick. Now these Waters are of two kinds; some have in them the very Bodies of Minerals and Mineral Juyces, such as are Salt Waters, vi­triolated Waters, Alum Waters, out of which the water being boiled away, Salt, Vitriol, and Alum are drawn; nor may they conveniently be used as baths. But some contain in them the Spirits of Metals, and therefore in regard of the very great active and penetrating Faculty which they have, they are Medicinally used, both to drink and to Bathe in; such are the hot Baths, the acid and brackish Waters.

Now whence these Waters have their faculties, Whence metalline waters have their virtue. Authors are not agreed. Some conceive they have their Virtue from the Minerals and Metals through which they flow. But this is not likely to be true. For since the Bodies of Metals are so com­pact, the Water which flows over them cannot so easily draw in their Forces; and if Mineral and Metalline Waters did thus gain their Virtues, we should have more of them. This indeed is true, that Minerals, as Vitriol, Alum, and such like, are corporeally mixed with the Water; and therefore they are separated from the Waters by boyling: Howbeit those Waters wherewith the Minerals are mixed on­ly Bodily, do not gain those Virtues which the true Mineral Waters have, out of which the Metalline Bodies cannot be separated. But Merals cannot communicate their Faculties to Waters, only by the Waters running over them.

And Experience doth witness that many springs breaking out of high Hills do bring out with them Gold, Silver, Copper, Iron, Tin, Lead, Lapis Lazuli, the Armenian Stone; and yet they have no faculty of any of those Metals which they carry and drive forth, but may be drunk as ordinary Waters.

Moreover if those Waters should gain their Virtues only by washing the Metals in their Course; the Virtues of the next Veins through which they flow had been long since exhausted: whereas nevertheless these Waters have had the same Vir­tues for many Ages together, and do still retain the same. Moreover out of those metalline Waters no Metals can be drawn forth, either by distillation, boyling or any other way.

Most likely therefore it is, that those waters take their Virtues from the first mat­ter of the Metals, which is a subtile, Fluid, and spirituous substance, not yet com­pacted nor coagulated into a solid Metalline Body. For these spirits of the Metals are mixed with the waters, and communicate all their Vartues to them. For as out of Vitriol, Sulphur, Yea and Metals themselves, by force of Fire spirits are drawn, which being mingled with water do communicate their Virtues thereunto: even so Nature also, in that great Circulatory the Earth, in the generation of Me­tals produces spirits, which being mixed with neighbouring Waters and such as run by, do bestow their Virtues upon them.

Nor doth a less difficulty occurre in searching the Cause of hot Baths. The Cause of the heat of Baths. Some at­tribute the Cause to the Suns heat, others to winds gathering hot Exhalations into one place: but without any probability. Others think they have their heat from the Lapis Calcarius or Chalk Stone so called. But neither is this probable. For the Lapis Calcarius doth not heat water unless it be first reduced into Lime by Fire. And suppose that those Stones were Calcined by the Fire under ground, yet could not that heat be perpetually continued. For after that the Lime-stone is once soaked in Water, it will afterward no more become hot.

Others therefore do more probably deduce the cause of the heat of Baths from the Fire which is in the Bowels of the Earth, and that the Waters do either run through those hot places underground, or that in the way they are joyned to the Fire and flame, or that they run so long near or over the Chanels of Fire, as to grow hot thereby; or whiles the Earth is made hot by subterranean Fires, many Vapors are from thence lift up, which at last in some wide place turn to water, and some where or other seek their way out. Which they declare by this example. Let salt water be mixed with Potters Clay, and make a round Globe of the said Clay, hollow within, whereinto put a Pipe, and stop the hole with Clay whereinto the Pipe is put; then put the Globe upon the Fire, with the Pipe from the Fire. When the Globe Waxes hot, hot Salt Water will flow out of the Globe through the Pipe.

Howbeit, some there are, who though they allow this manner of generation in many places; Yet seeing in all places where there are hot Baths there are not signs of any Subterranean Fire; and moreover there are Baths found, whose heat vanishes away, if you dig a little to find their original: wherefore they conceive it proba­ble, that some hot Baths are caused by two or more metalline Waters, which are cold to the touch, of their own Nature, but upon their meeting together they grow hot by the Repugnancy of Spirits. An example whereof is seen in spirits of Vitriol and Oyl or Salt of Tartar; also in Aquafortis and Tartar. Butter of Autimony and Spirit of Nitre: which though to the touch they are cold: yet if they are mixed they grow hot; and that in such a measure, as if suddenly you pour Oyl of Tartar upon Aqua fortis wherein Iron hath been dissolved, it will not only boyl but take flame: which also will happen, if you suddenly pour a quantity of spirit of Nitre upon Butter of Antimony so called. And therefore they conceive it rational, that when two springs consisting of a mixture of such Repugnant spirits do meet and mix together, that the water should by that means wax hot.

Now concerning the Sea, Authors are wont in the Doctrine of Meteors to handle two questions principally, one concerning the Saltness of the Sea. another tou­ching its Ebbing and flowing. The Cause of the Seas. Saltness. Touching the Seas saltness the opinions of the Anci­ents were many, which Aristotle refutes in his 2. Meteor. Cap. 3. We in this point follow Aristotle, and hold that the Sea water is not Salt of its own Nature, but that it becomes such by the admixture of some Salt thing; which also is seen in Ley. Which also may be gathered from that which Aristotle in the forecited place, and Pliny in Nat. Hist. Lib. 31. Cap. 6. deliver, how that hollow balls of Wax let down by Nets into the Sea, and empty vessels stopped, they gather into themselves fresh Water. For many Earthy Salt Exhalations do both fal into the Sea in showers, and flow thereinto with Rivers: also the Sun exhals out of the Sea the moister and sweeter parts of the Water, leaving behind the more heavy and Earthy. And therefore on the top the Sea is salter, then towards the bottom, because the Sun doth more exhale the sweet parts out of the Surface: also the Sea is salter in the Summer then in the Winter, and more in the Eastern and Southern parts then elsewhere; because in those places the Sun becams are stronger.

As to the Ebbing and flowing of the Sea, The Eb­bing and flowing of the Sea how cau­sed? there is very great difficulty, chiefly caused by the very great variety which is in the said Motion. For in some places there is no such motion, or it is scarce discernable: in other places it is so great, that vast shores lie bare, and there are places to go over dry, which were before covered with Water: in some places the motion is flow, in other places so quick, that in the space of an hour or two many miles will be covered with the Flood, and as many bared by the Ebb, so that men can hardly run fast enough to save them­selves from the fury of the Tide coming in. Nor doth this motion keep the same time in all places. For the most part, it flows six hours and Ebbs as many. Yet in some places is flows seven hours and Ebbs five: in others, it flows four hours and Ebbs eight. In which Variety nevertheless there is this regularity, that the Eb­bing and flowing together last but twelve hours. In very many places the greatest floods are at full moon; yet in some places they happen at new Moon. Touching which variety of this Motion, you may read in Cardan, Lib. 2. Subtil. p. 168. Scaliger. in Exercit. 52. Caspar Contarenus in Lib. 2. de Elementis. Collegium Conimbric. de Met. Tr. 8. Cap. 4.

Now touching the Cause of this motion there are so many several opinions, that you can hardly tel which to assent unto. Wherefore not without Cause J. C. Sca­liger in his 52 Exercit. thus writes: My common saying which I use every where, That we know nothing, is most seasonable in this disquisition touching-the Motion of the Sea. And a little after. Who will not say that Philosophy her self can but stutter in this point? When he shall see almost in the same shoars, that it is high-water at Calicut when the Moon is full, and at the shoars of the River Indus, when the Moon is new. This is a point of subtilty which thou oughtest to have searcht into, O Cardan; which if thou canst unfold unto us, I will consent that thou be counted the god of Philosophers. You will askme, what say you to the matter? I? I did nothing but expect to hear from you. But seeing you appear not in this Point, I dare no. so much as expect my self. And ther­fore if so great a Philosopher doth here confess his own Ignorance, what can we promise after him save to reckon up the opinions of some Authors.

Julius Caesar Scaliger therefore attributes the force hereof to the Moon, and di­vides half the Heaven which is turned about in twelve hours, into two Quadrants, and that during the one the Waters do follow the Moon to the middle of Heaven six hours, and as many more they fall back, being driven by the repulse of the shoars. But whether the encrease of the Sea be caused by rarefaction, or by addi­rion of new substance, he dares not determine; only he saies, the Sea Waters do follow the Moon, and that they are suspended thereby as the Iron by the Load­stone. And herein most Authors are agreed, that the Motion of the Seas Ebb and flow depends upon the Moon, and that it is terminated in twelve hours. And that because the Moon doth not alwaies rise in the same place, nor is also alwaies at the same time carried above the Horizon, therefore the Ebbing and flowing doth not observe the same time. Now that this motion depends on the Moon, besides what hath been said, this seems also to be a sign, viz. That the Flood comes every day an hour later; because the Moon returns to the same place in about the space of twenty five hours. Now Scaliger in the same place endeavors to render a Reason of that variety, of swiftness, and Cessation in some places, and of other things seen in this Motion; from the various Scituation of places, the highness and lowness of the shoars, the greatness and narrowness of the Sea, the even Plainness of its Course, or the many turnings, windings and straits, and the Nature and depth of the bottom.

Contarenus conceives, that when the Sea flows the waters are rarisied and sowel and are on all sides poured out to the shores; and that in the Ebb the Waters are condensed and contracted into themselves and so leave the shoars; and that the ra­refaction proceeds from Heat, the force of which heat depends upon the Moon. And to explain the time of this motion, he divides the Heaven into four equal parts, with the two greatest Circles, the Meridian and right Horizon, upon which when the Moon ascends towards the Meridian, the water swels and is poured abroad; for then the beams of the Moon have greatest force: but when the Moon is moved from the Meridian to the occidental Horizon, the water flows back again, and gathers it self into it self, because of the weakness of the Raies of the Moon. But why, [Page 131]when the Moon is moved from the Occidental part of the Horizon, unto that part of the Meridian which is beneath the Horizon, the Water should swel again, and afterwards decrease when the Moon goes from the Subterranean Meridian to the oriental Horizon, he faies he can find no probable cause himself, nor can see any made out by others. Also he professes the Cause is to him unknown, why in some places there is no Ebbing or flowing of the Sea.

Taurellus holds thus: The Sea disburthening it self into the inmost parts of the Earth, is the cause that the Waters with great violence flow from all the shoars round about to that Gulph or inlet. For there where the Sea empties its Waters into the Cavities of the Earth, there also it is depressed and fals, that the other Waters may from all parts creep thither, which (the Caverns of the Earth being fil­led) being gathered from all sides into one place, according to the Largness of the Sea and the force of the Waters it is raised alost, and afterward settles by de­grees, and returns to the shoars formerly forsaken, an addition also of Waters being made from the Rivers. Thus the whole bosome of the Sea is filled with Wa­ters, til the upper Cavities of the Earth being emptied they require more Water of the Sea, to swallow up after the foresaid manner.

Chap. 1. Of Earths:

AFter Meteors, we are next to discouse of Bodies perfectly mix­ed. Now Bodies perfectly mixed are of two sorts: some life­less, others living, The lifeless are Metals. For by that word all things bred in and digd out of the Earth are under­stood, as appears by the preface of Dioscorides to his Fift Book. Late Writers call them in general Minerals: be­cause the Quarries and Pits whence they are digd are termed Mines.

Now concerning the Nature of all these kind of things, Whence Minerals have their forms? this is first to be known; that many men conceive, that these Minerals and Metals con­tain nothing in them besides Elements, and that they are only simply mixt bodies: but herein they are mistaken. For their operations are of a far other Nature, then that they can be deduced from the Elements alone. And therefore Scaliger saies rightly in his Exercitation 137. Sect. 20. That every forme of a perfectly mixt Body, although it is no Soul, (as for example that of an Adamant) is a fift Nature far different from the four Elements. And in his Exercitat. 101. Sect. 14. he reprehends Cardan for beleeving, that only by the mixture of the Elements it can come to pass that the Load-stone can draw Iron. For even these things have also, that I may so speak, their Seminary forms and Virtues, put into them by God at their first Cre­ation; nor were they made after the Creation of the world, by the various conflict of the Elements, but were created by God; and by those forms they are perpetua­ted; [Page 132]and from those forms proceeds not only the forming of their Bodies, (which is no less admirable then in some plants,) and their wonderful Virtues, but also their Propagation and Perpetuation. For the form of Minerals and Metals can mul­tiply it self; and those Bodies have in their Creation a power given them by God to multiply themselves in a fitting matter and a convenient place. Which even Nitre doth teach us. For though out of Nitrous Earth the Salt be once extracted by boiling: yet out of the Mother of Nitre, as they call it, new Nitre is generated; and that not once only, but very often; which our Salt-peter men now a daies know very well. Nor was it unknown to the Ancients, as appears from Pliny, B. 31. Cap. 10. where he writes, that the froth of Nitre was made, when the Dew had fallen, the Nitre Mines being Pregnant, but having not as yet brought forth. By reason of which form it comes also to pass, that though in these Minerals there is a mutation in their external form, so that they are reduced into Pouders, or Liquors, or Glasses: yet they nevertheless easily returne into a Metalline Body; because their internal form continues safe and sound, as may be seen in Mercury, Antimony, Lead and other things. And therefore when the Question is touching the Genera­tion of Minerals and Metals; it is not enough to have recourse to those Vapors mentioned in the Doctrine of Meteors, but there is need of more determinate and Specifick principles.

Now what these are, cannot in general be wel explained. For there is great variety of Minerals, which must first be propounded. Now they are by others otherwise divided. I think fit in this place to retain the division of Albertus Mag­nus, who makes three kinds of them, Stones, Metalls, and Middle Natur'd Miner­als; by which Name he comprehends all the rest, which have a certain middle Na­ture betwixt Stones and Metals.

And that we may begin with the last kind, it contains many things under it; Earths, Stones, Sulphurs, Bitumens, and some things mixt of these, coming nearer the Nature of Metals. As for what concerns Earths, we do not thereby un­derstand the simple Element, nor yet that Earth which is every where plowed up by Husbandmen, and which is fit to sow Corn and to set Herbs in: which though it be not simple, yet it comes nearer to the Nature of the Element of Earth, then the Metalline Earths do. Although here also is great variety, and some ground partakes little or nothing, another partakes much of a Metalline Nature. Now that many grounds partake much of Minerals doth hereby appear, in that when they are burnt they send forth a Sulphureous Vapor, as Metals and Minerals are wont to do. But by earth in this place, we understand a Body digd out of the ground, which partakes of a Mineral Nature, and which (water being thrown on it) dissolves, and turns to Clay.

Among these kind of Earths the most vulgar is Argilla and Potters Clay; Potters Clay and Argilla. which is a Clammy Earth, and breaks not when it is molded, nor chops when it is dried. There is also great variety hereof, according to which the Vessels differ, which are made not only for Kitchin uses, but for other House occasions, and for the use of Gold-Smiths that melt Metals, and for Chymists. For of every kind of Clay all Vessels cannot be made, and one sort will endure the Fire better then another: also one sort wil be molded more delicate, thin and fine then another. Whence the excellency of Potters Clay is estimated.

After Argilla and the several sorts of Potters Claies comes Marga or Marle. Marga, Marle. Now this is a Fat Earth, being as it were the fatness of the ground, and the name comes from the High-Dutch, and 'tis called Steinmarck as if you would say the Marrow of Stones; and it is found shut up amongst Stones. Now there are sundry kinds thereof; Pliny reckons six, White, Red, Dove coloured, Clayish, Stoney, and Gravelly. And of each of these there are again many different sorts. 'Tis found in many parts of Germany, and among them the Marle of Rochlich is most famous; which they use in the stead of Bole-Armeniack.

To Earths also belongs Creta Chalke, by which name also Earths are understood, which are used to Polish, Clense, Rub, Paint and Colour. There are many kinds thereof, yet because it is chiefly digd up in the Island of Creta, therefore all sorts have borrowed their Name from it.

There are also many other kinds of Earth, which are used partly by Physitians, partly by other Mechanical Artists, which differ in Rarity or Spunginess, in Clam­miness, [Page 133]in colour, tast and use. And as to their Medicinal use; some binde cool and dry, as the Eretrian, Samian, Lemnian, Armenian: some with their astricti­on have a certain biting quality, either from Nitre, as the Chian, Selinusian, Ci­molian, and Pignitis, which are Abstersive or Scouring; or from Alum, as the Melian Earths, and the Clay of many Baths, which are good for the Gout and Ma­lignant Ulcers: or they have in them some quantity of Bitumen and of Sulphur. Also there are some Earths which give a black Tincture fit to make Inke, as Calcitis, Mysi, Sori, and Copperas.

The most renowned among these Earths are Terra Lemnia and Bole-Armeniack. Terra Lemnia Sigillate. The former is so called from the Island wherein it is found. Also it is called Terra Sigillata or sealed Earth, from the Seal imprinted thereupon. Galen avers that he saw with his own Eyes a certain hill near the City Ephestiades, wherein no plant grows, the soil being as it were burnt up, of a red colour, out of which the Earth is digd. Also that there were three differences thereof: that one was of a red colour, but not staining the hands, being the most excellent of all, which the Priest might only touch, as a sacred thing; and he sealed it with Diana her signet, which was the Picture of a Goat: the other was red Oker which did colour the hands of the touchers; the third was used to scour Cloathes, because of its clensing faculty. Those who at this day sail to the Island of Lemnos, do say that it is gathered in the Dog-daies in a moorish ground, that it is signed with a certain Seal and sent to the great Turk, and that therefore it is hard to come by, and not publickly sold. But these sealed Cakes have not all the markes of the old Terra Lemnia. Now the old Terra Lemnia had an excellent Faculty to resist the Plague and Malignant Dis­eases.

Bole Armeniack or Earth of Armenia was brought out of that part of Armenia which is next to Cappadocia. Bole-Ar­meniack. It was of a pale colour, would quickly be reduced to fine powder like as Chalk will, being held in the Mouth it would melt like Butter: it was drying and binding; and therefore it was used for the Dysentery, the loosness of the Belly, and spitting of Blood; for Catarrhes, and Ulcers of the Lungs: also it was good against the Plague.

Moreover there are many other Earths, Eretria, Samia, Selinusia, Chia, Cimo­lia, Pignites, Melia, Rubrica, and Sinopica, Precious Earths so called most of them from the places where they were digged. Of which see Pliny Book 35. Ch. 16. and 17.

And indeed the Ancients used such Earths as were then known to them, and were [...]rought out of neighbouring places; and seeing we have hardly now any certain notice of many of them, and the Quarries of the Ancients by injuries of time and the change of Empires are either unknown or exhausted, and every where in other places and in our Countries the like Earths are found: it is better to ascribe the Vir­tues of these Earths to the kind then the place, and to value every one according to its own Nature, and to try the Vertues of Earths by Experi­ments.

For there is in Hungaria Bolus Tockaviensis, Bolus Tockevi­enfis. which Crato in his Epistles tels us that it will melt in the louth like Butter, and hath all the signs of true Bole-Arme­niack, and is very good against Catarrhs; and he prefers it far before the Bole-Ar­meniack which we have at this day, yea before that which was brought the Empe­ror out of Turky. He saies he found by experience that it holp many of the Plague at Vienna.

Moreover there is the Terra Sigillata of Silesia, Terra sigill at a of Silesia. which is preferred before the Ferra Lemnia and the Turkish Earths which we have at this day. For it is now pro­ved by many experiments, that it hath rare Virtues against the Plague, Malignant Feavers, the bitings of Venemous Beasts, the loosness, and the Bloody flux. The Chymists call it Axungia Solis. The finder out thereof was Johannes Montanus a Silesian, who published a Writing or Treatise concerning the same, how that Gold was changed by the ordination of God and Provident Nature into a most excellent prepared Medicine, especially good against Poisons, no less then those Medica­ments which are made with great Cost of Hungarian Gold. And if that be true, I wonder why it is dissoled rather with Spirit of Vitriol then Spirit of Salt.

There is also found another about Lignitium and Gold-berg in Silefia, which the [Page 134]Chymists term Axungia Lunae: and in many other places other such Earths are found. And therefore, as I said before, these kind of Earths are not so much to be esteemed according to the places, as their own peculiar Natures. And because they have all their Virtues from Minerals and Metals, when we would judg of the Vir­tues of any sort of Earth, we must consider with what Mineral or Metal it hath affi­nity. And now we proceed to other things of this kind.

Chap. 2. Of Salts.

AS concerning Salt, there are many kinds thereof. First, There is common Salt: which again is threefold: digd Salt, Sea-Salt, and that which is boiled out of Salt Fountains. The Origi­nal of Salt Now what the original of Salt is, is not so manifest. 'Tis com­monly said to be engendred of a warty and thick Earthy Juyce mingled together. But this doth not sufficiently explain the matter, nor is the cause rendred why it is found only in some certain places. The more probable opinion and most likely is, that Salt as other minerals and Metals, was at the beginning of the World crea­ted in the Earth, wherein it stil Preserves and Multiplies it self, by a faculty placed therein by the Creator. For if the simple Elements, in so many Mutations and Vicissitudes of Sublunary things, do preserve and multiply themselves, and so re­maine entire, from the beginning of the world to this very day: I see no cause, why we should deny the same power to these Bodies. For that which was before said of Nitre, is true of common Salt. And therefore it is not bred in all places, but in those only where that spirit, (or Seminary principle, if I may so cal it,) is present; as Nitre is bred only in that Earth, in which there is the Mother of Salt-Peter. And from the principle of Salt, in the Caverns of the Earth, where there is no great store of moisture, Sal Fossilis or digd Salt is bred. And according as that matter which by the Principle and spirit of Salt is coagulated into a Body, is purer or impurer: so this digd Salt is bred purer or impurer, and some is blackish and dark colourd, othersome is white and transparent like Christal, which is called Sal Gem.

But if the said principle of Salt be mixed with much humidity and Waters sli­ding through the Caverns of the Earth; Salt Fountains, out of which Salt is boiled do thence arise. Some indeed conceive that Salt Fountains arise from the Sea. But the Sea Water doth not contain so much Salt in it as many Salt Fountains do; which experience doth teach. Nor let any man say, that the Waters while they flow through the Caverns of the Earth do exhale, and are consumed by the under­ground Heat, and that so some Fountains come to be Salter then the Sea. For if this were so, the Salt Fountains which are farther from the Sea should contain more Salt in them then those that are nearer, which nevertheless agrees not with Expe­rience. Others conceive that Salt Fountains proceed from waters which run through the Caverns of the Earth containing much digd-Salt in them. But, though this cannot be absolutely denied; yet the question is whence that ground Salt hath its Original and Durability. For if Fountains were made Salt only by their Wa­ters flowing through ground-Salt, they would not last so many Ages; but the ground Salt being melted into the Waters would be consumed, but especially those Fountains would not alwaies afford a like quantity of Salt, seeing the Salt being melted by the running by of neighbouring Waters would be washed away. Ther­fore we must of necessity add the Spirit of Salt, the primary principle of the Genera­tion of Salt.

Sea-Salt is made of the Sea water, the Hear of the Sun consuming the Watry moisture. And if the Heat of the Sun be not sufficient, it is perfected by Fire: and to make it whiter and purer, it is purged by Solution and Coagulation. There are also certain Lakes, which by the Heat of the Summers Sun, turn to Salt, whence we have the Tarentine and Phrygian Salt.

The chief use of Salt is to Season Meats, The use of Salt. and all the Spice in the world will not make meat pleasant, without Salt. It Hearts, Dries, Scours, and consumes super­sluous moisture, and therefore preserves from putrefaction. And although it de­sends from Putrefaction, yet is it not good in putrid Feavers; not only because it is Hot, but because it dries too much.

Beside Salt used in food, there is another ground-Salt, Ammonias Salt. called Armeniacus or Ammoniacus, cal'd so from Ammos the Sand, because it is found under the Sand congealed into plates, in the Cyrenaick Countrey. It was of a blackish color, and ill tasted. And therefore it is now adaies out of use; and Sal Gem is used in stead thereof. But that Sal Armeniack which is commonly now so called, and which the Chymists use, is made by Art. It is made of five parts of Mans Urine and one part of common-Salt, and half a part of the Soot of Wood, boiled together til the moisture be consumed. That which remains is sublimed, dissolved again and coa­gulated.

This Salt is extreamly volatile, and renders all fixt things volatile, and there­fore Chymists use it in the Solution and Sublimation of Metals. And in Plants and Animals, since there is found both a fixt and Volatile Salt, the Volatile is frequent­ly by the Chymists called Sal Armeniac. Concerning Salt see Pliny Lib. 31. Nat. Hist. Cap. 7. and 9. and Dioscorides, Lib. 5. Cap. 85.

Thirdly, Nitre also it self belongs to the family of Salts, Nitre or Salt Petre. and it is bred in a pe­culiar kind of the Earth, upon Walls and Rocks, where it sprouts out like white down, and therefore 'tis cal'd Sal-Petrae Salt-Petre, that is Salt of the Rock. Also they relate that it breeds of it self in Asia, for it drops down in Caves and is ga­thered and dried afterward in the Sun. The Lydian is the best, which is known to be true by its lightness and crumbling, and color almost Purple. This sort is called Aphronitrum, as if you would say, the froth of Nitre. Also it was bred of its own accord in Macedonia among the Ancients, by the Coagulation of Water, and they cal'd it Chalasticum, being white and pure, and the likest to Salt. By Art and boi­ling it is extracted out of the Nitrous Earths. Now this same Salt is of a wonder­ful Nature. For to sight it appears white; to the touch cold: yet it contains in it a Spirit exceeding Red, Hot, and extreamly apt to take flame, and perfect­ly of a Fiery Nature. All the strength of Gun-pouder proceeds from Nitre, only Brim-stone makes it speedily take fire: yet because all the Sulphur is not inflamed as it were in a moment, but successively and by parts; but Nitre after it hath once taken Fire suddenly and forcibly burns all away, (and because being set on Fire it cannot be contained in the Room wherein it was before; and besides the Nitre and Sulphur are as it were Enemies:) hence comes that same thundering force of Gun­pouder. The Chymists take Nitre wel purified before and purifie it yet further, Sal Pru­nellae. by casting into it when it is melted over the Fire divers parcels of Sulphur; and this they call Nitrum Praeparatum and Sal Prunellae, because it is of rare use in burning Feavers, especially those wherein the Tongue and Throat is inflamed, which infla­mation is called Prunella. Concerning Nitre see Pliny, in Hist. Nat. Book 31. Chap. 10.

Fourthly, Of the Family of Salts is also Alum, called by the Greeks Stupteria, Alum. because of its vehement astringency. For all sorts of Alum do Heat, Bind, purge putrid Ulcers, dry up moisture, quel proud flesh, and therefore it is used in many Medicaments ordained for Ulcers. It is found in its mines, and is extracted by boi­ling. And where Alum is bred, there commonly is found Vitriol and Sulphur. And as it is boiled it contains much fattiness in it, which cannot be separated but by mans Urin, which being poured thereon, it makes it fall to the bottom. Diosco­rides reckons three kinds thereof; Digd-Alum, Round Alum, Liquid Alum. Kinds of Alum. There are now more kinds known. The first is Alumen Rupeum or Rochae, Rock-Alum or Roche-Alum; which Greek word Rocha serves the greatest part of Europe to sig­nifie a Rock, as Scaliger saith in Exercit. 104. Sect. 6. Also they call it Ice-Alum because 'tis congealed in the form of Ice; and Roman Alum. This is most used in stead of the Natural sorts, and is made in the Roman Territory, of a certain Stone burnt. Scaliger, in the place forecited, shews all the manner of the work. Then there is Alumen Saccbarinum, made up like a Sugar-Loaf, of Roche Alum, the whites of Egs and Rose-water, for Women to beautifie their Skins. Alumen Squam­mosum or Alumen Scajolae (for Scaja and Scalia signifie a Crust or Scale, Scaliger Exercit. 104. Sect. 7.) 'tis made of a Scaly Stone, transparent like Glass, which being burnt divides into plates, and grows white like Plaster. Moreover there is a sort of Alum made of Lees of Wine, burnt in the Fire. Also Alumen Catinum, made of the Ashes of the Plant Kali or Soda. But these are rather Artificial and Compound Salts of Plants, such as Chymists do at this day make, of all sorts of [Page 136]Plants. To the kinds of Alum is referred also Lapis Amiantos, Alumen Plumosum, Fetherd-Alum; which nevertheless is not properly Alum, nor hath it the same fa­culties with other sorts of Alums. It grows in Mineral Quarries, Interwoven as it were amongst the stones; being so fixt that it will bear the Fire; whence some term it Linum Vivum. Concerning Alum see Pliny in Nat. Hist. Lib. 35. Chap 11.

Fiftly, Vitriol Amongst the Salts there is Vitriol so called from its Glassie clearness, and by the Greeks Chalcanthon, by the Latins Atramentarium Blacking, because Skins and other things were therewith died black. This kind of Salt is of an admirable, and perfectly fiery Nature, and contains in it a burning Sulphur; and therfore it performs more then other Salts, in the dissolving, colouring and generating of Metals; and the spirit thereof changes Iron into Copper. Now it contains in it two spirits, the first white, of great and known use in Physick; the other red; and in the Earth at last remains the fixed Salt. Now Vitriol is either Natural, Congealed in the Ca­verns of the Earth, or dropping therefrom; or else Artificial, which is boiled out of certain Vitrolous Stones, or out of a rusty kind of Earth, or out of an Ash­colour'd Earth, speckled with green and red Spots, which nevertheless makes no difference in the essence of the thing: even as Salt digd out of the Earth, and that boiled out of Salt Fountains differ not essentially. Other differences are rather to be observed, whence also the difference of virtues depends. For although all Vi­triol do partake of the Nature of Brass, and therefore vitriolated Water changes Iron into Copper, which is practised in Hungaria and at Goslaria: yet some par­takes more of the Nature of Brass or Copper, and other of the Nature of Iron; and therefore some is of a Blew, other of a Green Colour, and that either a deep Green or a light Green. The Blew partakes of the Nature of Copper; the Green, of Iron. And that is best which is of a deep and pleasant colour, and transparent. The Cyprian, Roman and Hungarian are commended; nor is that a base sort which is found in some parts of Silesia. The best now adaies is made by Chymists out of Copper, of a delicate Azure colour: which they term Vitriolum Veneris. There is also white Vitriol so called. Now Vitriol heats and is astringent, consumes moi­sture, contracts the flesh, dries, and preserves moist flesh from corruption. The Ancients also gave it inwardly, to kill Worms and to resist the Poison of Toad­stools. But now, as was said, a spirit is drawn out of it, which is more safely given, and hath a rare faculty to dry and resist Putrefaction; and therefore it is pro­fitably used in putrid Feavers and Pestilences. See of Vitriol, Pliny Lib. 34. Nat. Hist. Cap. 12.

Chap. 3. Of Bitumen and Sulphur.

THe Third kind of Subterraneal Bodies or Minerals we told you were Bitumen and Sulphur in their several sorts; viz. All such things as are Oyly and Fat, and are therefore easily mingled with Oyl; whether they be liquid or dry. And that somwhat may be said in general touching the original of them all; The original of Bi­tumen and sulphur. 'tis com­monly held, that these kind of bodies are bred in the bowels of the Earth, of an Hot and Dry Exhalation. But what was said before of Earths and Salts, the same must now be said of the sorts of Bitumen and Sulphure, and afterwards of Metals; that we deny not the mixture of the Elements in these things; but seeing there is no specifick Form of any Natural Body, which had not God for its author in the first Creation of the World, we must needs hold, that these things have not begun to be after the Creation of the world, by Reason of the Various concourse, Fight, and mixture of the Elements, but that they were made by almighty God at the be­ginning of the World, and that they received from the same Author this mixture which they have, with their Specifick Form, and a power to multiply themselves, and to change fitting matter into themselves. Where Bi­tumen and sulphur are generated. Whence it is, that though there are no where wanting Elements that may be mixed; yet cannot Bitumen and Sulphur be bred in all places, any more then Salts and Metals; but there only where the Specifick Form of Bitumen and Sulphur is found; which when new Bitumen and Sulphur is ingendred, is the principal Cause and Directrix of the mixture of the Elements. And therefore though we grant that such Bodies consist of Elements: yet we deny that they have their Forms from the Elements, but here also make use [Page 137]of that passage of Scaliger formerly cited, out of Exercitat. 137. Sect. 20. that every form of every perfectly mixt Body, as of an Adamant, though it be no Soul, is a fift Nature, far differing from the Elements.

And although we grant that the Matter of Bitumen and Sulphur are Elements: The matter of Sulphur and bitu­men. yet are they only the remote matter: but the immediate matter and whereof all sorts of Bitumen and Sulphur do partake, is a simple similary Body apt to take flame, and Fat, and which may in general be termed Bitumen and Sulphur, as you please: where with afterwards when the Salts concure, especially that of Nitre, Waters and other things, either Spirituous or Fluid, or Dry and Earthy Metallick Concretions, (the formative principle directing all to some certain form) thence are made sundry sorts of Bitumen and Sulphur. Now Bitumen and Sulphur are bred in the Earth, or in this Globe consisting of Earth and Water. For although some such thing somtimes falls out of the Aire: yet was it first drawn up in form of an Exhalation out of the Mines into the Air, where being coagulated it falls down again. Now when it is ingendred in the Eartus Caverns it is voided forth either into the Sea, and is there cast ashore; or it flows out of the Earth, either alone or with Fountain Waters, or it is digged up. And there is scarce any Region in the World, wherein some sort of Bitumen and Sulphur is not found. Bitumen is apt to take flame. Now aptitude to take flame is proper to al Bitumen, and after it hath once taken flame, to burn fiercely, and if Water be sparingly poured on, not to be extinguished but to burn more furiously. The Reason whereof is, because such Bituminous substances, after they conceive flame, do not only take flame on the top, as Wood and other things, but they do totally take fire and break into flame. Whence it comes to pass, that though the outer surface be wet with Water; yet the inner part which also flames receives not the wet, but rather gathering it self into it self it grows more strong, dissipates its Enemy Water, and flames more lustily. And hence also it comes to pass, that some mixtures of Bitumen do burn under the Water it self. The effects of Bitumen. And the burnings of certa in Mountains, Territories and Waters, do proceed from Bitumen and Sulphur. Now all Bituminous Bodies have the Faculty and Heating and Discussing; and therefore Fountains and Baths that have Bitumen and Sulphur in them are profitably used to dissipate cold Humors, in Palsies, Epilepsies, and such like Diseases.

And there is a great variety of such Bituminous Bodies. The dif­ference of Bitumens. Yet they are all redu­ced to two kinds, whereof one is liquid, which flows like Oyl, the other coagula­ted and condensated. And again there are many sorts of both. The Liquid, which go all under the Name of Asphaltum, are Naphtha, Petroleum, Liquid Bitumen pe­culiarly so called, or Native liquid Pitch.

And Naphtha in the first place is the liquid part of Babylonian Bitumen, Naphtha. being Hot, Dry, and of a Nature perfectly Spitituous and Fiery; which hath so much Affinity with Fire, that the flame will leap to it at a distance, and it may easily be set on Fire by the heat of the Sun. And therefore Plutarch in his Alexander, writes, that Naphtha was by some called Medeas Medicament with which she smea­red the Crown and Vail of the Daughter of Creon, and so burnt her. What if Hercules coming to the Altar to sacrifice, with a Garment smeared with Naptha, his Garment caught flame, and so he was burnt; and this was the Blood of the Centaure Nessus, of whom the Poets Fable? Of whom Ovid, Metamorph. L. 9. Fab. 3.

It is question'd amongst Authors, whether Naphtha should be called by the Name of Bitumen, or Sulphur, or Oyl. But seeing these Names are not alwaies used in the same manner, you shal not offend, whether you cal it an Oyl, viz a Native Mineral Oyl, or a most delicate Bitumen. Indeed, it is a bituminous Spirit; and it seems to be to Bitumen as spirit of Wine is to Wine, and Spirit of Turpentine to Turpentine. The most pure and excellent kind of Naphtha is white: yet they re­port that there is also found a Yellowish, and also a black sort.

By Reason of its extream aptness to take flame, 'tis hardly used about any thing: The Vir­tues of Naphtha. otherwise among all the sorts of Bitumens, it is most Hot, Dry, and piercing. And therefore it may be used as an Oyntment to discuss cold Humors, also for Cholicks sleepy Diseases, Apoplexies and Palsies. Concerning Naphtha see Dioscorides, Lib. 1. Cap. 85. and Matthiolus and others that have commented upon Diosco­rides.

Next to Naphtha is Petroleum, Petroleum. as if you would say Petrae Oleum, Oyl of the Rock, because it distils out of Rocks, with a very strong smel. It is a Bituminous Oyl not so subtile, nor so spirituous as Naphtha; and therefore it neither takes flame at a distanc, nor so suddenly. 'Tis of a various colour; the best is white; Liquid Succinum & Liquid Ambar. the worse Yellow, Red, Black. Hitherto belongs liquid Succinum and Liquid-Ambar, which are nothing but certain sorts of Petroleum. It is found in many Regions. In Italy, in the Country of Mutinum, it drops out of the Rocks, white and Red, of a very strong smel; in Sicily it swims upon their fountains, and they cal it Oleum Siculum, and use it for Lamps instead of the Oyl, and also Pliny commends it for Scabby Cattle. But it is found in very many places besides; nor must we esteem it from the place, but according to its Nature. It is al of an heating drying faculty; by reason of the thinness of its Essence it penetrates, and discusses excrementitious Humors, and therefore it is good against the Palsie, and Cold pains and Diseases of other parts, especially the Nervous parts.

In the Third place is liquid Bitumen, Liquid Bi­sumen. so called by translation of the general term to one special sort; it is thicker then Petroleum, which they mingle with Tallow, to Smear the Axletrees of Coaches and Carts. If black Pitch be mingled therewith, it serves also to Pitch Ships and is called Pissasphaltus. Now these three, Naphtha, Petroleum, and Bitumen Liquidum, seem to differ, not in original, seeing they a­gree for the most part in one Root, but in the thinness of their parts; so that the thinnest and most spirituous is termed Naphtha; the middle and Oyly sort, Petro­leum; and the thicker and more dreggy is called Bitumen Liquidum in a special manner. And the difference of these Bitumens may easily be observed in the distillation of Ambar: wherein, that which is thickest and remains at the bottom resembles the Pitchy Bitumen; the Oyl resembles the Petroleum; and the most subtile part resembles Naphtha, and like it doth also snatch the flame to it self.

Finally, Maltha. Amongst the Bitumens is Maltha, although it seems not to be meer Bi­tumen, but a Liquor thereof mixt with a Clayish slime; of which Pliny Lib. 2. Nat. Hist. Ch. 104 makes mention: in Commagenes, saith he, a City of Samosate, there is a Lake which sends forth burning slime or mud, which they cal Maltha. If it touch any solid thing, it sticks to it: Moreover, being touched, it follows them that go from it, &c. To smear and daub Walls, it serves instead of Chalk or Lime. Vitruvius tels us it was used to build the Walls of Babylon. Lib. 1. Cap. 5.

Also there are many kinds of Concrete and Coagulated Bitumen. H [...]los an­thos flows of Salt, or Sperma Ceti. The first is Halos anthos the Cream of the Sea or of Salt, commonly called Sperma Ceti; it be­ing as it were the Froathy Fatness of the Sea. It is no part of the substance of the Sea, but a certain matter that flows in from elsewhere, which may nevertheless contract somwhat from the Sea, especially saltness. Whether Halos anthos and Sperma Ceti be one and the same thing, is here no place largly to dispute. See the Commentators upon Dioscorides Book the 5. Ch. 88. Only this I must advise you of, that this Name is given a Medicine, now sufficiently known, from a false opinion, that it is the Sperme slipt out of the Womb of the Shee-Whale: whereas indeed and in truth it is a fatness of the Sea; and therefore some call it, not amiss, Am­bra alba and Succinum Marinum, white Ambar and Sea-Ambar. The rare efficacy of Sperma Ceti in dissolving Clotted Blood is known to the common people: [...]is use. it is also profitably given to attenuate thick Humors in the brest, and it is good for such as have the Tissick.

Moreover among these Bitumens is Ambra Odorata, Ambar Greece. Ambra Grisea, Ambar Greece [that is Ambar gray, or gray Amber, for Greize and Greizely signifie gray, though now obsolete.] Now the Name of Ambar is vulgarly used for all the kinds of Succinum. In a special manner the Arabians by this Name understand a certain most Odori­ferous Medicament, which the Latines call Ambarum and Ambracane. Hermolans Barbarus first cal'd it Succinum Orientale, Eastern Succinum. And although the que­stion about the Nature and Original of Ambar greece is most intricate: yet their opinion is most probable and founded upon the most Reasons, who will have it to be a kind of Bitumen. For it is a certain fat substance, most Odoriferous, found i [...] the Sea, especially in the Indian and Aethiopian Seas, or on the Sea shores, which is the best of all other, and most pretious; somtimes harder, other whiles softer, for [Page 139]the most part brittle, yet so that under the Teeth and Nailes it may be wrought and drawn out like Mastick. The colour somtimes is uniforme, and hath otherwhiles yellowish or white specks interspersed. And although it be found in the Sea, yet is it not bred in the Sea, but is a kind of Bitumen or Oyl flowing out of its fountains, and being on the top of the Sea exposed to the Air it is Condensed and Coagulated like Succinum or white and yellow Amber. And the Histories of the Indian Voy­ages do testifie that in some places of India a most noble Oyl or Balsam flows out of certaine Fountains. That same most grateful and pleasing smel springs from a most noble kind of Sulphur. Yea, Crato writes that it is Sulphur, or that there is Sulphur in Ambar Greece. The Vic­tues of Ambar Greece. It hath a rare faculty to Roborate the Animal and Vital faculties: and therefore it is good for the Brain and Heart, and makes al the senses more lively. 'Tis good for old Folks, and cold Natures; it is profitable against swounding fits and Melancholly.

After Ambar Greece, follow Succinum, yellow Ambar, Succinum or yellow Ambar. which the Greeks call Electron, the Arabians Carabe, also Ambra Citrina yellow Ambar (in way of distin­ction from the foresaid Ambar which is called Grysea or Chrysea) also Gagates and Vernix. That is now best known which is found on the shoar of Borussia by the Me­diterranean Sea, in shape of a Mass or Clod without any form or Figure, hard and solid like a Stone, somtimes pure and sincere, somtimes mixt with Herbs, Woods, little insects, a certain black vitriol, and other filth. Hence some Lumps are tran­sparent and clear, some dark: the color is also various; the smel pleasing in its kind. Being rubbed with a cloath it draws to it dry Chat and Straws, by its spi­rit going forth. Being put to the flame of a Candle it takes fire, flames and sends out much sooty Vapor.

Touching its Nature and Generation there are sundry opinions, whiles some hold it to be a vegetable, others a Mineral, others partly vegetable and partly Mineral; all which here to relate, (with the Reasons which are brought to confirm each opini­on.) and to examine the same, would be too tedious. We shal propound therefore only that opinion which is most likely to be true: viz. That Succinum or yellow Ambar is a kind of Bitumen. For it hath all the proprieties thereof, and it is got out of Mines in the Earth, in Germany, France, Italy, and it hath been found on the outside Coagulated and absolute Ambar; and within pure Naphtha or Petroleum. Also that Melanteria, Chalcitis, and other Minerals did grow to Ambar. Finally, By Chymical Art an Oyl is drawn out of it, agreeing with Petroleum. And this Bitu­men, according as it is White, Yellow, or Red, Black, Pure or Impure, so the like Succinum or Ambar is bred thereof. Now it doth nor consist only of Bitumen, but also an Aluminous, Nitrous and Vitriolated spirit do concur; and therefore in many places where there is Petroleum no Succinum is bred, because these spirits are wanting. Now, At first Succinum or Ambar is liquid, but afterwards when it is shed into the Waters, without any Exhalation of parts and evaporation, it is Coa­gulated and grows hard by means of a Nitrous, Aluminous, and Vitriolated spirit, the Saltness of the Sea also, Peradventure, Concurring. And that these are the immediate principles of Ambar or Succinum, Chymical resolution it self doth shew. For a Vitriolated, Aluminous, Salt spirit comes out with the flegm: and more­over good store of Salt sticks to the Neck of the Retort. In its Rectification, if the work be diligently plied, a white spirit ascends, like the Naphtha Babylonica, which takes flame, so that it is not safe to hold lighted Candles near the Vessels wherein Succinum or yellow Ambar is distilled. A twofold Oyl may be drawn forth. Yellow and Red answering to Petroleum. The black Feces or Dregs, if it be suffered to stil till it is dry, do grow together into a Bitumen very like that of Iudea.

It Dries and Warms; it helps the distillations of the Head, the Falling-sickness, The Vir­tues of [...]i­low ambar Apoplexy, Palsie, Mother-fits; is good for spitting of Blood and the Consumpti­on, also for the Gonorrhaea, to Facilitate Child-Birth, and to provoke Urine: the Smoak thereof is an Enemy to Venemous Beasts, and Detects such as have the Falling-sickness.

Of kin to Succinum is Gagates or Jet, so that some take it to be the same. Jet. It is also a kind of Bitumen, or a Bituminous stone, for the most part black; yet som­time of a pale or yellow colour. 'Tis soon set on Fire, smels like Bitumen. It [Page 140]detects such as have the Falling-sickness, by the Smoak thereof; and hath a soften­ing and discussing faculty.

There is yet another kind of Bitumen, Asphaltus. but more concrete, which is called by the general Name Asphaltus. It is an hard kind of Asphaltus or Bitumen, and hath no filth mixt with it. It is of a solid substance, and shines like purple when it is bro­ken. It is weighty and of a strong smel. Of this kind, that of Sodom is the best. That which is more impure doth not shine so, nor hath so strong a smel. It Dries and Heats, Discusses, Mollisies, and sodders Ulcers: it takes away fits of the Mo­ther in a Suffumigation. See Dioscorides in his 1 Book, Chap. 83. &c. and the Com­mentaries of Matthiolus and others.

Finally, To the Family of Bitumens are to be referred certain Bicuminous Earths and Stones. For it matters not much whether you cal them Earths or stones. Their first and chief Original is from Bitumen, with which as there is more or less of an Earthy and Stony matter conjoyned, so it receives this or that Name. And hence it is that in the Nature of Bitumens we meet with great difficulty, whiles Writers regarding the places where they are bred, or the outward Figure, but lit­tle considering the internal Nature, either they separate things of the same kind, or confound and Joyn together things of different kinds.

For this Bitumen of which such kinds of Earths and Stones do consist, is not sin­cere and pure Bitumen, but mixt with Earthy Juyces, Mud, Potters Clay, Veins of Metal and Stones. Terra Am­pelitis. Of this kind is Terra Ampelitis so called, which is black like Sea-Coals, and resembling Bitumen; it dissolves in Oyl, resists worms, and Dries and softens as Asphaltus doth. Some account this Ampelitis Earth and Pit-Coals to be all one, but others make a difference. If they are not just one and the same, at least they are much of kin; whence come the sundry Names of the Germans which they give these kind of Bodies, as Schwartse, Kreide, Koblerde, Steinkehlen, Bergkolen, Dorff, and Durpte. For these kinds whether of Stones or Earths, have all one Root and Mother, viz. Black Bitumen: the Particular difference proceeds from the Various manner of Concretion and Admixture of other things.

For that which the Germans cal Dorff, and Durpte, Peat and Turfe, are Bitu­minous Earths which they Cut and Dry for Fewel. It is digged in West-Frise-Land, Gelderland, Flanders, Brabant, Zeland. It is also found in Collao a Province of Peru, which Monardus describes in these words. In Collao a Province of Peru there is a place quite bare, without Tree or Grass, because the Earth is Bituminous, out of which the Indians draw a liquor, good to cure very many Diseases. The man­ner of their drawing of the said liquor is thus. They cut the Earth into Turss, which they lay in order upon poles or thick Reeds in a Sunny place, having vessels under them to receive the Liquor. For by the Heat of the Sun this Bitumen Melts, or the Juyce included in the Earth dissolves and sweats through. Afterward the Turfs remain Dry, and Robd of their Oyly Liquor, and so become sit for Fuel. But the Fire made of them is hurtful, by Reason of the thick blackness of the Smoak, and the stinking smel it makes. Yet for want of other Fuel they use the foresaid turfs. The Liquor which fals from them is good for many Diseases, especially such as proceed from cold. For it Mitigates pains, and discusses cold swellings. Wounds are cured therewith, and other Diseases for which Caranna and Tacama­baca are good. Its color is dark Red inclining to black, and its smel is strong. In Saxony, Misnia, Low-Germany, Scotland, and other places, Bituminous and Fat Turfs are found: the Germans cal them Motten.

Lithanthrax, Sea-cole or Pit-Cole. Carbo Mineralis, or Fossilis, or Carbo Lapideus, Stone-Coal, Mineral-Coal. Pit-Coal or Sea-Coal, is harder and of a stoney Nature, consisting of Bitumen and a stone making Earthy Juyce, Black, good to make Fires, especi­ally for Smiths Forges. 'Tis found in Germany, Bobemia, Scotland, in many places.

And some hath in it more Bitumen, and some more of the Stone making Juyce: and therefore some of it will easily burne, but some wil not burn, unless it be mixed with other Coals and blown with bellows.

But he that would know more concerning Bitumens, let him read the Commen­taries upon Dioscorides, especially that rare third part of Andraeas Labavius, wherein largely and learnedly he explains the History and Nature of all sorts of Bitumen.

In the next Place comes Sulphur, or Brimstone, which the Greeks call Theion; Brim-stone it is a Mineral Juyce, consisting of one part which is inflamable and sends forth a grievous smel, and of another part which is Earthy, thick, and fixed, having a vi­triolated Juyce mingled therewith. It is reputed the Agent and Father in the Ge­neration of Metals, and Coagulates the Mercury, if there be conjoyned a Metalline Spirit, and a Seminary Principle. Of which if it be destitute it destroies Metals, and consumes such things as are volatile. Now it is twofold, Native or Quick, Apuron, which hath not felt the Fire. For it is engendred pure solid and in clods, so that there needs no Fire to separate its Impurities. The Ancients de [...]ribe it to be transparent. And now adaies there is hardly any such found; but it is of an Ashy color, and when it is broken. Yellowish within. Factitious or Artificial Brim-stone stone is boyled out of the Sulphurous mine which is digged out of the Ground. Now there is some difference in the Artificial, especially in regard of Purity and colour depending thereupon, and some is yellowish, other some paler, and some encli­ning to an Ash-color.

Of Sulphur and Quick-silver is made Cinabrium Factitium, Artificial Sinoper. Of the Smoak of inflamed Sulphur received in a Glass Bell is made a sharpe Liquor, like Spirit of Vitriol. And flower of Brim-stone is the purer part thereof, being sublimated with Salt and Calcined Vitriol.

Now Brim-stone is of a digesting, discussing and drawing faculty, The Vir­tues of Brim-stone it is good for such as breath short and have an Empyema, taken in an Egg. Externally applied with Butter and Hogs-Greece, it Cures the Itch; and with Turpentine it heals the Tetter.

Neighbor to Brim-stone is Arsenick, Orpment, and Sandarach, Arsenick, Orpment and San­darach. which seem to agree in Nature and Faculties, and only to differ, because the one is more the other less digested in the Bowels of the Earth; or that one hath more or less Quick-silver and Salt mingled with the Sulphur. Some take Arsenick for the kind, and call Orpment Saffron-colour'd Arsenick; Sandarach, red Arsenick; Risagal, white Arsenick. But that which they cal white Arsenick, is now adaies known by the Name of Arsenick absolutely: viz. Orpment so often sublimed with Salt til it be­come white, and Transparent like Chrystal: the strongest of all Eating and Fret­ting Putrifying Poysons. Now Orpment is a Sulphureous Mineral Juyce, having joyned therewith a little Quick-Silver, and the Spirit of Salt. Al the kinds are cau­stick and corrosive, and Enemies of the inward parts, which they fret, and con­sume the radical moisture. Yea, it is not safe to apply Arsenick externally by Reason of its extream Venemous and Corrosive Nature. But if it be Calcined with Nitre, its volatile mercury and inflamable Sulphur are taken away, and a certain buttery Fatness remains, which is used externally for Fistula's and Ulcers hard to cure.

Hither also we must refer Antimony, Stimmi or Stibium, Antimony. which although it seems to come nearer the Nature of Metals, yet is it a Mineral Body, resembling Lead, but brittle, consisting of Sulphur, crude Arsenick and much Quick-silver of an Ear­thy Nature, but all of them volatile. And therefore it yields a stinking and hurt­ful Fume, which for the most part is Mercurial, but in some part Sulphureous and Arsenecal. Being crude applied externally it imitates the Virtues of Lead, and is binding, hinders the growing of flesh, takes away the filth of the Eyes, and cures Ulcers. It makes great work for the Chymists, who make thereof sundry purging and sweating Medicaments; of which they have written whole Books, wherewith you may consult.

Finally, Betwixt Antimony and Lead is Bismuthum, Bismu­thum. which is therefore called Ash-colour'd Lead; being a Mineral Body whitish and Livid, Hard, Brittle, con­sisting of Earthy and crude Mercury, Sulphur and Arsenick, and all of them impure and Volatile.

And that we may conclude this subject, those various kinds of Earths and Mine­rals, which we have mustered hitherto, (and if there be any other to be reckoned,) they have their original from the Roots of Minerals. For in these also there hap­pen sundry corruptions. For although Gold and other Metals now perfectly dige­sted do not putrifie, and seem incorruptible; yet in their first Original they may be corrupted. So Terra Sigillata, of which we spake before, is thought to be nothing else but the first matter of Gold, Silver, or some other Metal (for there are sundry kinds [Page 142]thereof) corrupted, viz. When the principles of Metals do not remain united, but the Sulphur and Mercury are Separated and Sublimated, and either transferred into some other place, or dispersed into the Air. So Antimony seems to be no­thing else but crude or raw Gold, corrupted before it was ripe; and Bismuthum, immature Silver corrupted.

Chap. 4. Of Stones and Jewels.

THe hardest of Minerals are Stones. And since that under this kind are compre­hended both common Stones and Precious Stones or Jewels, we must first speak somthing in General of the Generation of Stones. The Ge­ [...]tion of It is commonly held, that by the concourse and mixture of Elements, the first and Second qualities Co-opera­ting, Stones and precious Stones are produced. And though it is not to be denied, but that the Elements do concur unto their Constitution: yet the Elements alone do not suffice, and are only the remote cause of Stones and Jewels. Be the Ele­ments mixed how they can, yet the Primary agent being absent, no precious Stone is made of them.

They who would produce a nearer Cause, have made exhalations the matter of Stones: but that also is too remote, nor wil it suffice alone, [...]less it be more spe­cially determined. Avicenna therefore and Albertus Magnus, that they might come more near to the business, have held the matter of Stones to be Clay and Juyce, viz. A clammy roaping Clay, to the mixture whereof more Earth hath concurd then Water: and a juyce that been hath suckt in, and raked off from the Earth, or that hath a Tincture of some M [...]tal. This opinion others follow, and hold that Stones are made of Clay of Earth glewed together with a clammy moisture, such as are dark; and with a Transparent Liquor such as are clear and Transparent.

Yet in truth, not only Water and Earth, but all the Elements are in Stones, especially precious ones. Yea, and the Chymists think the Elements are not suf­ficient, but that as Metals so Stones and Jewels they say are made of those three principles, Mercury, Sulphur and Salt. Of which opinion I shall speak else­where.

This only we shal hint in this place; that the matter of Metals, Stones and Jewels, is very near of kin, which not only the place where they grow but many other things do witness. For examples sake, let us take Pome Garnets, out of which and Iron Tinctures are drawn so like, that it is not easie to discerne one of them from ano­ther; and a more base sort which are found in Silesta and Misnia do resemble from also in color. Also many Stones, if they are burnt, do send forth Sulphureous fumes, just as Minerals and Metals do; and of Metals Glasses are made which do ve­ry much resemble some precious Stones. And therefore Jewels and Metals seem not unsicly to be reduced to common principles: and it seems possible to reduce Jewels to some certain Metals.

Authors do stick yet more in Explaining the Efficient Cause of Stones: The effici­ent Cause. and the most have recourse herein to Heat and Cold, and savour nothing beyond the Ele­mentary qualities. And among Stones, those which they count to be made of Clay, they think are coagulated by being baked together by Heat and d [...]yeess: and such as they conceive to consist of a watry matter, they hold to be Coagulat [...]d and hard­ned by vehement cold, as Crystal. But many such dark Stones are generated [...] the midst of Waters and springs whose Coagulation cannot be made by the ba­king of heat and dryness. And they are truly too simple, who think that Cry­stals, Adamants and such like Stones, are frozen together by the Cold; since they are generated in the hottest Countries on the Surface of the Earth, both Adamants and other transparent Jewels; nor will they melt with Fire.

The Chymists hold Salt to be the Cause of Concretion and Coagulation: The true Cause of Concretion and Coa­gulation. A double Concretion against which opinion of theirs although some siercely dispute, yet is it not absolutely to be rejected; seeing many evident Documents do prove the same; and ce [...]ain it is, that many things are Coagulated and grow together in moist subjects, where neither dryness, Heat, nor cold have place. Yet, seeing there are two sorts of Concreti­on, which happen without adding or taking away any part of the matter: they [Page 143]are in no wise to be confounded, and we must speak distinctly of the distinct man­ners of Coagulation.

The former manner of Concretion is seen in Salts, as in common Salt, Vitriol, Nitre, The Con­cretion of Salt: Alum, Urin, and in the Salts made out of Plants and Animals may be seen; and it is proper to Salts, which naturally tend to such a Coagulation, and indeed under a certain Figure; as the said diversity is to be seen in Nitre, Vitriol, Alum and other things.

But because Salts have not hardness of themselves, The cause of solidity and hard­ness: but are easily broken and dis­solve in moisture, but Jewels and Stones do not only grow together, but they are solid and hard, and do not melt in moisture: this kind of Concretion or growing together is different from the former. The cause of which concretion some do al­so refer to Salt, and the hardness to the admixture of Earth therewith: But others again (& that probably enough) do hold that this Stoney hard concretion or grow­ing together of Bodies doth proceed from a Stone making spirit or Juyce, which Stone making spirit and Juyce is every where found in the Earth and in the water, but not without Salt.

And thus the immediate cause of Stones and Jewels is agreed to be a Stone making Juyce, that is to say, The Im­mediate Cause of stones and preci­ous Stones a matter of its own Nature tending to such an hardness and soli­dity. Now that several Stones and Jewels are generated, proceeds from the especial form of each. For every precious Stone hath its proper and specifick form whereby it is differenced from al other, which it obtains from, (as I may say) its Seminal prin­ciple of Generation. Which doth not proceed from the Mixture of the Elements, but, as Scaliger rightly Names it, it is a sift essence, put into this sort of Natural things by almighty God, at the first Creation of the world. Which seminal prin­ciple and Architectonick Spirit, although it doth not appear in a Body peculiarly distinct, as in most plants, nor can its Essence be sufficiently explained, yet must it not be therefore denied. For as the Willow, though it produce no Seed as other Plants do, yet it hath a Seminal principle dispersed through the whole tree, and so is propagated by a bough cut off and stuck in the ground: so the Seminal principle of Jewels and Stones lies concealed in the Stone making matter; and in this dark­ness of our Minds its essence is unknown to us, as al other forms are; and their diffe­rence is not known save by the diversity of their faculties, operations and Qualities. For upon this diversity of Forms, fit matter being Joyned thereto, depends the di­versity of colours and external shapes.

Hence the Crystal and Adamant of Hungaria and Silesia have an Hexagonal or Six-corner'd shape; the Occidental Smaragds are four Square; the Bohemian Gna­nate and the Stone Geodes have a Globous Figure; and other precious Stones have other shapes.

Now I conceive the Colours of precious Stones may chiefly be drawn from the Sulphur of Metals. For, Carbuncles, Rubies and Granats, Whence the Colour of precious stones is: do participate in their Tin­cture with Gold and Iron: The Turkois hath the Tincture of Copper. And there may by Spirit of Salt, Urine, and other liquors, Tinctures be drawn out of Metals, which do perfectly resemble the Colours of certain precious Stones. And from the same causes, viz. The forms and Mineral principles, other qualities also of Stones and Jewels, as hardness and weight. &c. As also their Virtues and properties do flow.

As to their Native place, Stones are found every where; precious Stones, The Na­tural place of precious Stones: as in many other Countries, so in Misnia, Silesia, Bohemia, and other places of Germa­ny. But the more noble precious Stones are chiefly found in the Indies. The cause whereof is diversly by divers assigned; and the most refer the same to the posture of the Sun and Stars over the Zenith. Yet since in Africa, America, and other Regions which are under the same climate, there is no such store nor such excellent precious Stones found: the cause is rather to be attributed to the Nature and disposition of the Soil, and the Seminal principle implanted therein at the Creation.

Now Stones are some vulgar, others precious, The differ­ence of stones: according to the Purity or Impu­rity of the matter whereof they consist, and the nobility of the Form. For vulgar Stones consist of a gross and impure matter, and have a more Ignoble Form: and therefore their effects are less excellent. But precious Stones consist of a more pure and Subtile matter, and have a more noble form. For the Chalk-stone, and other [Page 144]common Stones have also their sulphur, which is sufficiently discovered when they are burnt; but much thicker and impurer then the Granate or Amethyst.

Now Stones are some Spungy, Ground Unicorne others Solid. Amongst those kinds of Stones that is justly in the first place to be explained which is vulgarly taken for Unicorns Horne; and some cal it ground Ivory, others ground Horn. For in Thuringia, as also in Bohemia and other places, such Horns are found; yea, and not only horns but other bones also; which are said to be good to Sodder wounds and to heal Ul­cers. Its Ʋse But especially, experience hath taught that these Stones have no smal use in the Falling-sickness, Malignant Feavers, the Pestilence, gripings of the Belly in Infants, and the Cure of other Diseases; and therefore they are commonly given out for Unicorns Horns. How it may be known from true Ʋnicorns Horne: Howbeit they may easily be discerned from the true Unicorns Horn. For the true Unicorns Horn is hard and solid, that it can hard­ly be rasped, much less can it be beaten to pouder: nor doth it much cleave to the Tongue; But this Stone is not hard, but as it were calcined, it is easily broken and rub'd to pouder, and being put to the Tongue it sticks fast, like Terra Sigillata or Bole-Armeniack.

Touching the Generation thereof, Men are of several opinions. Some conceive they are the bones of an Unicorn overwhelmed in the Earth by a flood, or some other occasion, which remain after the flesh and softer parts have been con­sumed by Time. But this opinion is not agreeable to reason. For how should there be so great a number of Unicorns, in Thuringia, the Hercinian Forest, near Elbingroda, also about Heidelberge, Hildesheme, in Misnia, Silesia, Moravia, and in many other places? And why are these horns found in those places rather then elsewhere, where it is more likely that there are Unicorns? Moreover stones are found, which represent the Bones not of this Creature only, but of others also.

More probable therefore it is, Its imme­diate mat­ter: that these are Mineral Stones. But what is their immediate matter is not easie to tell. Some hold that it is Bitumen or corrupted Am­bar; others, as Anselmus Boetius, Lib. 2. Cap. 242. that it is Marga, or a kind of Marle; others that it is some putrified and rotten Stone. This is certain, that it is a mineral matter, not unlike some Terra Sigillata, or a Mineral Juyce mingled with some such Earth, and shaped into the Form of an Horn, Tooth, or other bone.

Nor let that same external form stumble any man. For though no man can ea­sily tel the Cause of its Conformation, though many have labored to do it; yet certain it is, that many wonderful things are shaped in the Earth. Not to speak of other things at this time, 'tis sufficiently known, how many sundry shapes are seen in Stones digged up at Islebia and elsewhere. For there are seen in those Stones sun­dry shapes of Animals and Plants; of a Frog, as Salamander, a Serpent, a Viper, an Eel, a Carp, a Gilthead, a Gudgeon; Yea, and the Pictures of Princes and re­nowned Men. And what should be the cause of these Pictures 'tis hard for any man to tel.

As to the Virtues of these Stones, 'tis certain they are very good against the Fal­ling-sickness, and Malignant Diseases, and therefore they are many times used no less succesfully then the Horn which is counted to be the Uni­corns.

Now vulgar Stones are either Porous or Solid. Spungy stones: The Porous or Spungy Stones, are the Tophus or crumbling gritty Stone, the Pumice, the Ossifragus, the Osteocolla, Stalactites, and most of those Stones which are bred in living Crea­tures.

The solid Stones are many, Solid stones: the Sand-stone, the Chalk-stone, the Flint, the Fire-stone, the Whet-stone, the Touch-stone, the Smiris wherewith they cut Glass. Sundry kinds of Marble, Alabaster, Serpent-stone, Porphyry-Stone, Free­stone, Ceraunias or Thunder-stone, the Belemnites, so called; and very many more.

Also there are other Stones of a middle Nature betwixt those common gross Stones and the Noble precious Stones: I shall only speak a little of one or two of them.

The Load-stone in the first place, is a stone sufficiently known; The Load­stone and its won­derful es­fects. and its effects are wholly wonderful, the cause whereof many learned men have hitherto labo­red to render. Now the effects of the Load-stone are either of the Stone alone, or of Iron toucht with the Stone; or of both the Stone and Iron. The simple ef­fects of the Stone are, to draw Iron to it, and to turn towards the Poles of the world. That it drew Iron was a thing not unknown to most of the Ancients: but its faculty of turning to the Poles of the world, as it is at this day very well known, so was it not known to the Ancients; nor hath any man been able as yet to make it appear, that it was known to Aristotle, Dioscorides, Theophrastus, Lucretius, Pliny, or any of the Ancients: but this Virtue was first discovered some few Ages since; although it is uncertain who was the Author or Inventor.

But what is the Cause of this motion, and whether it should be sought in Heaven or in Earth, is very obscure. But that we may search it out as much as is possible, we must presuppose this in the first place, that the Load-stone in many places doth not turn exactly to the Poles of the world but towards them, declining a little from them, in some places more, in others Iess. Which declination from the Poles of the world is altogether of great use and moment. For whereas the Ancients at Sea knew only in the day time by the Sun in what Meridian of the world they sai­led; and in the night they knew by the Stars the Elevation of the Pole, and in what Latitude of the World they were: now by the help of the Load-stone they can find in what Longitude they are: and seeing it is confessed by all the Ancient Geogra­phers, that nothing is more difficult in al Geography then to find out the Longitude of places, for which cause they do so much vary in assigning the Longitude of the most Famous Cities: by help of the Load-stone alone the Longitude of every place may most easily and exactly be found out. The Ancients indeed reckon'd their degrees of Longitude from the fortunate Isles, and there they made the begin­ning and end of the Globe of the Earth. But the late Cosmographers observing that the Pole of the Load-stone and the Pole of the world did consist in one Meri­dian, in the tenth degree beyond the fortunate Isles West-ward, about the Azores or Flandrick Islands; they make the beginning of Longitude there, not only to please themselves but moved thereto by this Natural reason, Namely because in that Meridian the Poles of the Load-stone and the Poles of the world do agree together. Now from that Beginning and Meridian, towards the East, the Declination en­creases more and more, and it is greater or lesser, according as the place is nearer to, or further from this first Meridian. In Germany, especially about Norinberge, the Declination is ten degrees; here at Wittenberge about nine. The Hollanders who have sailed into Norwey and the neighbouring places towards the East, have found the declination of the Load-stone from the Meridian to be sixteen degrees; and at Nova Zembla seventeen degrees in the more Easterly parts, provided they made their observations with exact Instruments. And it is probably asserted, that if the Hollanders should finish their Navigation towards the East, the more Easterly they went and the nearer to China, they should find the declination of the Load­stone from the Meridian so much the more abated, and they should at last come to that place towards the East, in which the Poles of the Load-stone and the world would be in one Meridian, and that there would be no deflection of the Pole of the Load-stone in the hundred and eighty degree of Longitude, opposite to the begin­ning of Longitude in the West.

Yet there is a certain learned Man who holds that the Hollanders are deceived in this point. For when they lookt upon their compasses they did not consider that the Compasses were so made, that the Iron toucht by the Load-stone was not pla­ced just under the Flower-de-luce painted upon the card, but was distant therefrom certain degrees. And therefore whiles the Hollanders lookt upon the Flower-de­luce, and saw that it pointed directly towards the North, they conceited that there was no Magnetical declination in that place; whereas the Iron toucht with the Load-stone was some degrees distant from the Flower-de luce or the true North­point. And therefore he placed the first Meridian, with the Ancients, in the for­tunate or Canary Islands, because in that place there was no declination of the Load-stone at all. In which point experience must be judg. Yet it seems to me improbable, that the Hollanders who knew very wel how to make their compasses, should be so heedless in such a Case.

But be it how it wil be, this is certain and confirmed by manyfold experience, that the Pole of the Load-stone is distant from the Poles of the world twenty three degrees or thereabouts.

And hence some do probably collect, that the declination of the Poles of the Load-stone from the Poles of the world, and the declination of the Poles of the world from the Poles of the Zodiack, is one and the same; and since the utmost de­clination of the Planets is twenty three degrees and some minutes, that doubtless therefore the declination of the Poles of the Load-stone from the Poles of the world is the same.

But doubtful it is whether the Cause of this motion of the Load-stone towards the Pole is in the Heaven or in the Earth, The Cause of the Loadstoaes turning to the Pole. and where in the Heaven, or in the Earth. Some are indeed of opinion that there are certain Mountains of Load-stone under the Pole, to which the Load-stone moves by similitude of Nature. But they can­not wel tel what or how great those Mountains are; nor are mines of Load-stone wanting in other parts of the world, but they are found in many Regions, especial­ly in Egypt.

Others say the Load-stone turnes to the Pole-Star, others that it turnes to some Stars about the Pole-Star. But the Load-Stone doth not look directly to the Pole; save in such places where the Meridian goes through the Pole of the World and the Pole of the Load-stone both at once: in al other places it de­clines.

Moreover, that which is said of the conversion of the Load-stone to the North pole, is now adaies called in question by learned Men. And some do make two opposite points in the Load-stone, whereof one turnes to the North, the other to the South, if the Stone hang moveable and free. Which though others do not whol­ly deny; yet they say that point is stronger which turns to the South then that which turns to the North, and so they hold that the Load-Stone turns rather to the South then to the North. And though there were nothing in the Load-Stone which did Naturally turn to the North; yet its turning to the South is sufficient to shew the North-Pole. For since the South-Pole is just opposite to the North, if one part of the Load-Stone or of the card touched with the Load-stone turne to the South, the other end must of necessity point to the North. Of which this is a remarkable token, that those who make compasses and Sun-Dials with magnetick Needles, do rub the Load-stone upon that end which stands to the South, and not upon the Crossend which Looks to the North; and therefore the Magnetick Needle turns primarily to the South, and the opposite part points to and shews the North.

Hence therefore some have come to be of opinion, that the Load-stone is turned towards the South; because all the Planets have their Efficacy and Operation in the South. Since they move from the East, through the South, towards the West. Yet in very deed, although it go so in our Regions: yet there are opposite places, wherein the Ecliptick declines from the Aequator towards the North, and the Planers perform their courses, from the East, through the North, towards the West. Moreover the Planets do not abide in the same place, but one in one place, another in another; moreover they do not stick fast, but pass over the whole Heaven every day. If therefore the Load-stone should look towards the Planets, it could not look towards one place, since there are divers Planets; nor would it stand still, but should be alwaies moved, following the motion of the Pla­nets.

The opinion of others is more probable who hold, that as other things tend to their own proper place: so the Load-stone unless it be hindred doth also defire alwaies the same Scituation which it had in its Native place. Wherein neverthe­less we must consult with experience, and enquire how the Load-stone is Scituate in the Mines.

But that Opinion is most probable, that the Load-stone is moved towards its own Pole in the Earth, which is distant about twenty three degrees from that point which answers to the Pole of the World: and that either the South only, or if the Load-stone have two Poles, and one part thereof turns to the North, another to the South (concerning which we must again consult with experience) yet that it chiefly tends to the South: and that it hath some affinity with its own place, or with the things that are there; and that doubtless the point to which the Load­stone [Page 147]moves must be held to be rather in Earth then in Heaven. For that same point is fixed; but the Pole of the Zodiack, or any other Star thereabouts to which the Load-stone should be moved, doth it self move and finishes its round in the space of twenty four hours; whereas the Load-stone doth perpetually turn to one point. Nor can it be perceived that the Load-stone, or the smallest Iron Wires toucht with the Load-stone do ever move upwards towards Heaven. Contrari­wise, good Authors relate that the Load-stone tends towards the Earth, which may be proved, they say, by these experiments. If you place a Needle in Aequilibrio so so that both ends are equally distant from the Earth, and then touch one end with a Load-stone; they say that end will bow towards the Earth more then the other. Also if you weigh pieces of Iron Wire, and after they are toucht with a Load-stone put them in the Scales again, you shall find that they weigh more then they did be­fore they were touched, because they encline towards the Earth. And therefore, since two Poles of the Load-stone are to be constituted in the Earth, one distant about twenty three degrees from the point just under the North-Pole of the world, towards the place now called the straits of Anian, the other in the South part op­polite, Scituate in the Meridian which passes through the Azores or Flandrick Islands, Caput Viride and Caput Corvo, or (as others will have at) which passes through the Canary Islands: in all places under this Meridian there is no declina­tion of the Load-stone, but the Needle touched by the Load-stone falls exactly with the Meridian; in all other places of the whole Earth the said Needle declines from the Meridian of the place, somtimes more, somtimes less, somtimes towards the East, otherwhile towards the West; whereof see the observations of the Hol­landers, and the Mathematical Memorials of Simon Stevinus, in the 5 Book of his Geography. But what that is to which the Load stone is moved, is hard for any man to tel: let that suffice us, which Scaliger writes in his 131. Exercitation, where there are also other things concerning the Load stone, worthy to be read: Nature (saith he) being linkt in a league of Amity to it self, hath allied all things as well those above as these here below in a perpetual band of friendship, which makes all this world to be one thing admirably disposed; so that there are not only certain degrees as it were of approach and distance in things separated: but also the Commixtures of those substan­ces, which are quite parted one from another.

Now concerning the Virtue of drawing Iron (for I do not here dispute, Why the Load stone draws Iron as Scaliger hath it in Exercit. 102. Sect. 6. whether the Load-stone draws Iron, or Iron the Load-stone; for which so ever it is, the Cause is one and the same) the Controver­sie is no less. Epicurus is said to have held, that from the Iron and Load-stone Atomes do flow, which agreeing in Figure do imbrace one another, and strike against the Bodies of the Load stone and the Iron, from whence being reflected they draw the Iron. Anaxagoras held that the Load-Stone had a Soul and therewith drew the Iron. From whom Cardan differs not much, who also avers that the Magnet or Load stone doth live; whom Scaliger op­poseth Exercitat. 102. Sect. 5. Marsilius Ficinus in Lib. 3. de Vit. Coelit. Compar. Cap. 15. fetches the Cause hereof from the Constellation of the Bear, to which both the Load-stone and Iron are subject, and both do orderly follow the Bear; but the Load-stone holds the upper degree in the propriety of the Bear, and Iron the lower; and that so the Load-stone as being in the upper order draws the Iron, which he reckons to be in the lower.

But in good earnest, if we shal diligently weigh the matter, we shal hardly find any thing more probable then that same mutual consent of things Natural. For therein well-near al learned men that have pondered the Nature of the Load-stone do consent, that the Load-stone is a kind of Iron Mine, and that Iron may be made thereof.

And here is to be observed, that the whol body of that which we cal the Load-stone, is not indeed the Loadstone, for the whole Stone doth not draw Iron; but that the substance of the Magnet is dispersed in its stone like Veins; even as other Metals are seldom bred a lone and pure, but in their Matrixes or Wombs, and therfore the Mag­hetick-stone draws the Iron only with that part, where is the Vein of the Load-stone.

From whence this also follows, that the Cause of Attraction is rather in the Load-stone then in the Iron. For the Iron is already a fixed metal: but the Load-stone is not yet fixed, and therefore it can more freely send forth its strength and spirit.

Andreas Libavius, Part. 3. Singul. Lib. 1. Chap. 12. where he treates of the at­tractive Virtue of the Load-stone, endeavours to assign yet a more special Cause, and writes that the Nature of this principle in the Load-stone is Bituminous, which is reduced and directed to a singularity with the Iron, by similitude of that conspi­racy and mixture, whereby the same principles have grown together in Iron: and that an Iron and Bituminous spirit is common to them both, but that it doth not flow so strongly nor so continually from the Iron as from the Load-stone, because of the different Coagulation or Consistency. Where we willingly grant that a certain Sulphur or Sulphurous spirit is common to the Load-stone and the Iron: which if Libavius please to cal Bitumen (for he counts Bitumen to be a thing more general then Sulphur, and that Sulphur hath its original from Bitumen) I will not contend with him about the Name; but that Bituminous or Sulphureous things only have a mutual Appetite one to another, I see not how he can prove. Nor doth hetel us, whether they mutually desire one another, by Reason of their Sulphur, or of their whole essence. But whatever is the Cause of the affinity betwixt the Load-stone and the Iron, which cannot be denied; that general Rule there laid down by Li­bavius holds true: one Nature covers another of the same sort, and like will to like, as much as it can; especially there where the Virtue arises and sticks, and appre­hends another like it self.

We must not in this place pass over the armed Load-stone, The Load­stone ar­med. whose force is much stronger then that of the unarmed. For a Load-stone unarmed will draw only a Pack-needle or a bit of Iron hardly weighing a dram or two: but if it be armed, it draws sixteen ounces or more. The Art of arming them, is this. Seek out in a Lump of a Load-stone its Poles, which may be done with the help of a Needle in a Sun-Diall; the Poles being found, let the Load-stone be polished, and reduced into such a shape as it is capable of (howbeit the long squar is the most convenient shape) yet so that the Axis reaching from the one to the other Pole may lie in the middest betwixt two parallel lines, equally distant from each of them. The sides be [...]ng formed, let also the upper and lower part be wrought and polished, as also the sides, to the ends of the Axletree. Then let two plates be framed of the best Steel, of which the one side which touches the Load-stone must be smooth and even, if the sides where the Poles are be plain; or of what shape soever they be, they must be so fitted to the sides of the Load-stone that no space may be left betwixt the Steel and the Load-stone, but the other side must be a little round, and on the lower side the plates must hang a little beneath the Load-stone; and the parts that hang under must be somewhat thicker and squarer then the rest like Pillars. The Plates being thus formed must be applied to the Poles on each side, and to keep them fast they must be bound with two round hoops of Silver or brass, which must go about the Load-stone above and beneath. Also let the upper side thereof be co­vered with a Plate of Silver or Brass, with a Ring whereby to hang up the Load­stone thus armed. When it is hung up apply unto the little Pillars of Steel which come beneath the Stone, a Plate of Steel as big as it can draw and there let it hang.

In the next place we must not forget Bezoar Stone, Bezoar Stone. whereof Many things are ex­tant in the writings of Physitians; seeing it is both precious and rare, and especial­ly commended against Poyson. Some think 'tis so called from a Persian word Pazar, or Pazan, which signifies a Goat. Others think 'tis derived from the He­brew word Bel which signifies a Lord, and Zaar which is Poyson. But an Antidote is by the Arabians called Bedsoar, and therefore they call all Medicines good against Poyson, by the general term of Bezoartick Medicaments: whence Bezoar-stone seems to be so called because of its rare vertue against Poyson.

Now Bezoar stone is not digged out of the Earth, What Be­ [...]ear is. but is bred in the belly of an Indian mountanous She-Goat, shaped somwhat like a Buck or Hart, and is there­fore by some termed the Hart-Goat. The Stones are long and round, and somtimes like Ches-Nuts or Acorns. Their colour is somtimes blackish, som­times yellowish, greenish, Ash coloured, dark Red, or blackish Green. On the outside it is smooth and slippery. It is not very hard but is easily broken. It grows together by Scales, Scale over Scale, as an Onion is made up, upon some smal Foundation, which is commonly a little Straw or Stalk; to which a certain humor cleaves. And therefore this Stone is made up of many Plates as it were, being grea­ter [Page 149]in an old, lesser in a young Goat; and all the Plates both Internal and Exter­nal are smooth and shining.

Now there are two kinds of Bezoar-stone, the one Oriental, Its kinds which is brought out of Persia, Egypt, China, Cathai, and the bordering countries, which [...]ore ex­cellent then the other; the other is occidental, which is brought out o [...] America and Peru. This Stone is very much commended against all Poysons; Its uss, it is given in malignant feavers, to expel Worms in Children, and against Melancholick Dis­eases.

Some take Lachryma Cervi, or the Harts Tear, to be Bezoar-stone. But though, Lachryma Cervi: as I said before, the word Bezoar is used by the Arabian Physitians to signifie Anti­dotes in general; and the Lachryma Cervi hath a rare Virtue against the Plague and Poysons; Yet Bezoar Stone and it are divers things. Now concerning the Lachry­ma Cervi, which he saies he keeps as a great ratity in his study, Scaliger thus writes in his Exercitat. 112. It is not bred in the Hart, before he be an hundred year old. Af­ter that age it grows at the Corner of his Eye, to the bones themselves, and becomes i [...] self a protuberant bone, of such hardness as exceeds that of the Horn it self. That part which sticks bunching out is round, of a rare brightness, of a yellow colour, not with­out some shew of black Veins. It is so smooth that you can hardly feel it, and it slips from between your Fingers, as if it could move it self. It is an excellent remedy against Poy­son. Its given to such as are taken with the Plague, with a little Wine. Whereby so great a sweat is caused, that you would think the Patients whole Body were well nigh Melted. Touching Bezoar Stone see a peculiar Treatise of Casparus Bau­hinus.

Moreover, of this kind there is Coral, Lithodendron, or Stone tree, Corel: being a Sea­shrub, which when it is taken out of the Water turns to Stone. The reason where­of is, because there is much Salt and Stone making juyce in the Plant: which the Chymical resolution thereof shews, for all the coral well near turns to Salt.

And this is the common opinion of all Authors well-near, touching the Genera­tion of Corals, who hold that Coral is soft under this Water, and afterward grows hard in the Air. Yet Beguinus in Tyrocin. Lib. 2. Cap. 10. questions the truth here­of and saies it is a Fable, and relates from the report of credible witnesses and certain experiments, that Coral is as hard in the Sea and under the Waters, as after it is drawn out into the Air.

There are three sorts thereof: Red, Black, and White. The sorts thereof: The best is the Red and that which hath many clusters. It Binds, moderately Cools; Cures the flux and vomiting of Blood, the Gonorrhaea, and Whites in Women. Its Ʋse: It helps the Falling­sickness and is a strengthener.

To this family also belongs the Stone Aetites or Eagle-stone, Eaglestone so called because 'tis believed that the Eagle carries it to her Nest to help her bringing forth of her young ones. It contains another stone within it. 'Tis found in many places: the Orien­tal ones are best. But they are found also in Saxony, Misina and Silesia. 'Tis thought to further Child-birth and to prevent abortion. To prevent abortion they tie it to the Womans Arme: to further Child-birth, to her thigh.

There are also other Stones found in Living Creatures, as the Cock-stone, the Swallow-stone, the Toad-stone, Crabs-Eyes so called, Carpe-stones, Perch­stones.

Before, Lib. 5. Chap. 2. Ami [...]n­thus. among the sorts of Alum mention was made of the stone Amianthos, which is commonly cal'd Alumen Plumosum, Fetherd Alum, and sold under that Name; but it belongs rather to this place. In daies of old it was made into Thred and Woven into Coverlids as if it had been Wooll, and thereof they made Funeral Coates for the Bodies of Kings, that the Ashes of their burnt Bodies might be thereby separated from the other Ashes. But the manner of weaving the same it at this day unknown.

Of this Family also is Haematites, the Blood-stone, The blood stone. especially good to stop bleeding.

Now come the Nobler Stones and Jewels. In the first place, the fragments of five precious Stones are known and used in the Apothecaries shops: and those Stones are the Sapphire, the Hyacinth, the Sardius, the Granate, and the Smaragd.

The Sapphire, the Sap­phire. in the first place, is of a Sky-colour, like the Heavens on a cleer day. The whiter Sapphire is called the female. It resists Poyson and strengthens. Being worn it hinders Pestilential Carbuncles from breaking forth, and laid upon a Carbuncle it extingui­shes the [...], and hinders venemous exhalations from passing thence to the Heart: being worn by a [...]ascivious Person it looseth its brightness and beauty. It hinders fleshly desires, also 'tis commended against Diseases of the Eyes, and is said to strengthen them.

The Hyacinth is of a yellowish redness, the Hya­cinth. and glisters as it were Gold, and imitates the flames of Fire. It is commended to cure the Plague, being worn in a Ring or hung about the Neck.

The Sardius, the Sardi­ [...] or Car­nealus. so called because first found at Sardis; also Carneolus, Cornelian, because in colour it resembles bloody water wherein raw flesh hath been washt. The Sardius worn is said to recreate the Mind, to drive away Fearfulness and sad Dreams; to which intent it goes into the Electuary de Gemmis. Being drunk with harsh red Wine it stops the Cour­ses, and Blood flowing from any part of the Body.

The Garnet is red, the Garnet but with some yellowishness resembling Fire, and it hath the colour of Vermilion. 'Tis said to strengthen the Heart, and resist Sadness and Melancholly.

The Smaragd is a most neat Jewel, the Sma­ragd: the most excellent of all green precious Stones, and by its pleasant Greeness it refreshes and recreates the Eyes. It is given against Poyson, and the bitings of venemous Beasts, and pestilential Feavers. Being tied to a Womans Hip 'tis said to further Child-birth; and being laid on her Belly to prevent Abortion. It is contrary to all Venereal matters, and if it touch the Skin of the Man that is in his carnal Embracements, 'tis said to break asunder. Worn in a Ring or hung about the Neck it pre­serves from the Falling-sickness.

There are also many other precious Stones and Jewels. the Ada­mant or Diamond: The Adamant or (as we say) Diamond, is so called, because it is unconquerable by Iron or by Fire. For it is the har­dest of all Jewels, transparent like Water. Rare virtues are by many attributed to the Di­amond; and it is said to be an Amulet against Poyson and Wi [...]ch-crast, frightful Dreams, and the Night-Mare; and to resist pestilential Causes.

The Carbuncle hath its name from a burning Coal: the Car­huncle: It is commonly beleevd to give light in the dark, but there is no Eye-witness thereof. And therefore learned Men conceive, that if there be any such Jewel as a Carbuncle, it is a great and a noble one.

The Ruby, the Ruby whose brightness and flaming redness shines above other stones. It resists Poy­son and putrefaction, preserves from the Plague; it drives away sadness and fearful Dreams, and exhilerates the mind.

Granates or Garnets are as it were imperfect and rude Rubies, the Gra­nate. of which we have spoken before.

The Amethyst is so called, the Ame­thyst. because it is thought to prevent Drunkenness, it is of a violet color, mixt as it were with Purple.

The Opal is an exceeding beautiful Stone, the Opal which alone hath in it all the colours of other precious Stones. For there is in the Opal, as Pliny in his 37. B. ch. 6. writes, the thin fire of the Carbuncle, the bright purple of the Amethyst, the Greenness of the Smaragd, all shining together with an incredible lustre. And therefore it cannot be counterfeited, as other pre­cious Stones may. And as it hath the colours of all other Stones, so it is thought to have all their Virtues. But it is most commended for preserving the Eye-sight, being worth.

The Topaz, the Topaz or Chryso­lite. which is now called the Chrysolite (though some difference them by the brightness of the colour) receiveth it name from its colour: for it is a Jewel transparent and of a Golden color. It is commended to strengthen the Heart and to drive away Melanchol­ly: but is especially used against the Falling-sickness, and applied to Wounds to stop the Blood.

The Beryl in its color represents the Greenness of the Sea when it is clam, the Beryl. or the colour of a watry Hyacinth. It is chiefly commended for Wounds in the Eyes, being reduced to most fine Powder.

The Crystal indeed was named by the Ancients from Ice, the Cry­stal. and therefore some have held that Crystal is made of Ice frozen together upon exceeding cold Mountains. But this is salfe. For Crystal is generated also in Cyprus, and other Mountains, where Heat is never wanting. Again it wil not melt with Fire, as those things use to do which are frozen: but the Fire reduces it into Earth and Salt. And doubtless it is coagulated by a Salt spirit or stone-making juyce. Being made into fine Powder, and given with Honey in Wine or Broth, it is said to encrease Milk by a propriety which it hath. Held under the Tongue [Page 151]it quenches thirst. A dram taken with Oyl of sweet Almonds is a present help for such as have taken Mercury Sublimate. Also it cures the bloody Flux, and the Whites in Women.

The Jasper is of many colours, and therefore they make divers kinds thereof. The Jasper That which is reddish is much commended against a Flux of Blood from the [...]se, Womb and Hemorrhoides; Yea, and it is also commended for Wounds: and credible persons report, that a Flux of Blood and the Womb Flux, which could by no means be stopped, hath been staid by a Jasper Stone bound to the Womans Thigh; as also Nose-bleeding that no other Remedies would cure, hath been stop­ped by hanging the Jasper Stone about the patients Neck. Also 'tis com­mended to cure the Falling sickness, if it be worne upon the Mouth of the Stomach.

Some few years since there hath been brought out of new Spain a Stone called La­pis Nephriticus, the Kidney-stone; which is justly counted as a kind of Jasper. The Ne­phritick Stone. Its Surface is alwaies fat, and as it were smeared with Oyl. There are sundry kinds thereof in respect of colour. For the most part it is of a whitish Green. It is com­mended against pains in the Kidneys, from whence it had its Name; and being tied to the Arm it has a wonderful Virtue, yet confirmed by experience, to break the stone and drive it out by Urine: of which later Physitians that have written of the stone, do every where speak.

The Turcoise is a Stone, not transparent, yet of a very pleasing colour, The tur­coise. being a mixture of green and blew. It is believed to strengthen the Heart and Spirits. But especially they attribute thereunto admirable Virtues to preserve a Man from falling. For if a Man be any waies in danger of a fal, and wear this stone, it pre­serves him harmless; and they say the Stone it self will break or lose its Colour and grow Pale, when the party is in danger of a fal. The same it wil do, they say, when the wearer is not well.

Lapis Lazuli so called by the Arabian Physitians, Lapis La­zuli. and by the Greeks Cuanos Lithos, is also a Stone that is not transparent, of a deep blew color adorned with Golden specks. This Stone hath a rare Virtue to purge Melancholy Humors, and therefore it helps Diseases springing from that Humor: of which see the writings of Physitians. Of Lapis Lazuli is made that most excellent blew colour, cal'd Ʋl­tramarinus, which is dearer then Gold. Also Gold is got out of the said Stone. And even this Stone alone doth teach us, Metals & Stones have the same com­mon prin­ciples. Lapis Ar­menus. that there is one common principle of Me­tals and Stones, as was said before; and that the matter of Metals doth suffer many mutations, and that thence various Minerals may be generated, each of which hath a peculiar affinity to that Metal to the generation whereof the matter was disposed: which I leave to the diligent consideration of others.

Lapis Armenus is in colour and Virtues of kin to the former. But this is not so hard as the Lapis Lazuli, nor is it adorned with specks of Gold, but with many green, blew and blackish specks.

Finally, let us conclude this our Doctrine of precious Stones with Pearls; Pearls. which are not indeed generated in the Earth, as other Jewels are, yet are as precious and Noble as they.

Now they are bred in certain Shel-fish, of that Humor whereof the Shel of the said Fish is made. The most excellent are found in the Persian Sea, and in the Re­gions of China and the East Indies: the occidental Pearls because they have not the Silver glance of the other are of less value. Now Pearls have a rare facul­ty to strengthen a Man, and to restore his Spirits; and therefore they resist Poyson, Putrefaction and Pestilential Feavers, they chear the mind, they are a Remedy for swooning, and Melancholick Diseases. They are good against a flux of Blood and loosness of the Belly, they do strengthen the Brain and Nerves. Mixt with Eye-salves they scour away the Clouds and Filth of the Eyes, and consume the dropping moisture thereof.

But so much may suffice to have spoken in brief of Stones and Jewels. You may see more in those Authors who have wrote peculiarly of this subject, as Franciscus Rueus, Georgius Agricola, John Kentmannus, Andreas Baccius, and especially Boetius, who has published an excellent History of Stones.

Chap. 5. Of Metals.

NOw concerning the generation of Metals the opinion of Authors is various. The Ari­stoteleans opinion concerning the matter of Metals. And as to the matter of Metals, the Aristoteleans do hold that as all other things digged out of the Earth are made of a Smoaky exhalation, so all metals do spring from a vaporous Exhalation, and that moisture is prevalent in them, because they may be Melted and Hammered. And they teach that Metals are generated, when a Subtertaneal Vapor included, especially in Stones, in regard of a dry Exhalation which drew it upward, is gathered into one, and Coagulated like Dew into very smal drops, which cannot be done without cold: yet with this difference; that in the Generation of Dew and Hoar-frost the foresaid driness which carried the Va­por upwards is separated: but in the generation of Metals that same separation is not made, but the dry Exhalation is contained and Coagulated with the Vapor.

Howbeit, this opinion is not to be received unless it be otherwise explained. For it supposes a matter too remote, and speakes of the generation of Metals, as if it spake of Meteors. And those who hold thus concerning the Generation of Me­tals, seem to be of his mind, who intending to speak of the Generation of Animals, should make, not Blood and Seed, but an Exhalation Dry or Moist, the principle of Living-Creatures.

The Chymists therefore do better, The opini­on of the Chymises. who having more diligently sought into the Generation and Resolution of Merals, hold their principles to be Sulphur and Mer­cury; to which later writers have, not without Cause, added Salt, or a Metalline, Copperasated, or Vitriolated Earth: and that in all these a Formative and Semin­al Faculty was at the Creation implanted by God the Creator; which as Scaliger saies Bxercit. 307. Sect. 20. is a certain fift essence far different from the four Ele­ments, and which as the principal agent makes Metals of matter thereto disposed. And therefore wherever this Sensinal Principle is wanting, no Metal can be made of any Exhalation, Dry or Moist, by the power of any efficient whatsoever.

And that the Matter-thus stands, is apparent from the Metal mines, the meltings, Probations, and resolutions of Metals, and the very Proprieties of the Metals them-selves. For in all Mines these principles are found, and out of all the Oate where-in all Metals are Generated, Sulphur is boiled. Also 'tis very well known to Chymists, that Metals may be changed into running Quick-Silver, and that of Quick-Silver Metals may be made. Yea any man may judg by his Nose and Eyes, that there is Sulphur in metals; because in the Calcinations and melting down of Copper and Iron, a greenish and reddish flame is seen, and there is a smel of Brim-stone. And most Diseases wherewith dig­gers and refiners of Metals are troubled, have their original from Sulphur and Mer­cury. The Resolution or Dissolving of Metals shews the same, which is not into Dry and moist Exhalations only, but into things of kin to Metals, retaining their own Nature and properties, in sundry alterations and external Mutations. For Lead being turned into Ceruss, although it seem to have quite put off its Nature, yet may it be melted into Lead again. Yea and Stibium doth turn again to Antimony without much ado. The specifical proprieties of Metals do argue the same, which witness; that they have not their original only from the mixture of Elements. For that which is true of the Load-stone, as Scaliger writes, that it cannot by any fa­culty of the Elements draw Iron: the same may be said of many proprieties and o­perations of Metals.

And the Mercurial matter is the chiefest in the Constitution of Elements; which being sundry waies mixed with fixt or volatile Sulphur, and a copperasated Salt or Earth, makes sundry sorts of Metals. And the Chymists do commonly call Mercury the Mother and Feminine Principle, and Sulphur the Father and Masculine princi­ple. Now wi [...]h Sulphur is mingled Vitriol or Metallick Salt; and in Sulphur there is Vitriol, and in al Vitriol, Sulphur: whence it happens, that out of both there is a Spirit drawn much a like.

But that others do think otherwise in this point, the chief cause is; inasmuch as these principles are not alwaies found in mines after the same likeness and form as they imagined. Moreover, because metals are not found every where and in all places in which Quick-Silver and Sulphur are found. And Finally, became they cannot sufficiently discerne these principles in Metals. For they think it ne­cessary, that in every Mine of Metal these principles should be found with the Me­tals, but especially that Metals ought alwaies to be found in the Veins of Mercury and Sulphur: and if Sulphur were in Metals they conceive it must needs flame.

But unless they were blinded with the darkness of Chymical Ignorance they might easily see those principles in Metallick Veins. For they do not al­waies appear under one and the same visible form and shape; though som­times they are found in the mines, in the very same shape: but somtimes they wander in the shapes of Exhalations and Spirits, somtimes they are Coagulated into the form of a Juyce, an Earth, or some other form. Yea, and the Metals themselves are found somtimes Fixed, other whiles Volatil. For Nature Generates Mercury after a Spiritual manner; to which if a Copperasated Sulphur be added, and a formative principle, it is Coagulated into a Metal. But if Sulphur and the formative Principle be wanting, it grows together into a peculiar matter and is found alone. For one of these doth not suffice to make a Metal, but all of them are requisite. And therefore in such Mines, in which one is present and the rest are wanting, Metals are not generated. But there alone Metals are bred, where a Sulphureous Vitriolated sixative Spirit is exactly mixed with Quick-Silver in a matter fit to become a Metal. Those Bodies do not make Metals, but the Spirit must of necessity be mingled most intimately. But in this formation, before they grow quire firm and Dry and come to Maturity, they are often found in the likness of a Mi­neral juyce, and unripe Metal: and at last they are Coagulated and compacted into a perfect Metal.

And they that are stumbled at the inflameable Nature of Sulphur, must know, that there is no necessity that Metals must take flame because they have Sulphur in them. Simple Water Wets, but it doth not so in compounds; Air ascends up­wards, but not in mixed Bodies. Again, they are ignorant that an inflamable and Volatile thing may so be fixed, that it shall take flame no more. For it is the property of all Sulphur to be inflamable, but not at all times: and the more it is fixed the less it conceives flame; and the more it is fixed, the less subject Metal is to burn. Hence it comes to pass, that Iron and Copper are burned, and send forth a notable slame: but Gold by reason of the sixedness of its Sulphur with­stands the violence of Fire.

From hence also, The effici­ent cause of Metals. it is easie to judg of the Efficient cause and active principle in the Generation of Metals. For they who conceive that Metals are Coagulated only by cold do discover their own simplicity of wit, or their unskilfulness in the point of Metals: seeing Metals have already an internal Cause of their Coagulation, and are dissolved by heat; cold only gives occasion of their Coagulation. But if that internal Cause of Coagulation be wanting, no external cold is sufficient to Coa­gulate the same. Which is to be seen in Quick-Silver, which no cold can congeal, and yet it is Coagulated with the Spirit of Lead. Yea, in the very Fire it self, by Cementations and other Coctions, Coagulation and sixation is made.

We ought therefore, touching the Nature and original of Metals, rather to credit the Diggers, Refiners, and Triars of Metals, and the Chymist, then idle disputers, Ignorant of the Nature of Metals, Who, out of an hatred to Chymistry, do endea­vour (by I know not what Reason) to perswade us otherwise. And therefore the most learned also of the Peripateticks, who have fearcht more deeply into the Na­ture of Metals, do in this point follow the opinion of the Chymists.

Now the Common Affections of Metals are, to be melted with heat; The Ad­juncts of Metals. to grow hard again by cold; to be hammered and beaten out, to drink in Quick Silver; to be dissolved by Aqua-Fortis.

They flow and melt by Reason of Quick-Silver: and therefore those who have most part Quick-Silver are more easily Molten; but those more hardly, in which Sulphureous dryness and Salt are most prevalent. And if there be good store of [Page 154]Mercury in Metals they become so soft, as to be melted by the very least heat; Contrariwise, such as are often burnt in the Fire, their Mercurial moisture being taken away, they become at last hardly Meltable; as also if they be steeped in Aluminous, Copperasated, and fixatory Waters.

Also malleableness depends upon the Mercurial Humidity. And those Metals may be best hammered and spred abroad by beating which have a Mercurial moi­sture most exactly mixed with a Sulphur proportionable. Contrariwise, those in which there is most of a Vitriolated Sulphur, of Salt and Metalline Earth, they are least Malleable.

Now Metals do drink in Quick-Silver, because they have one Root, and their sub­stances are of kin; as we see Oyls easily mix'd with Oyly things, and Water with things Watry.

Metals are by others otherwise divided: Difference of Metals. but they are by the Chymists usually divided into Perfect and Imperfect. And they count that perfect which is com­pleat both in Substance and Accidents, and excellently fitted for use. Such an one (Namely) as hath a subtile Mercurial Substance, a most ponderous Nature; that en­dures the Fire and all the trials thereof, without even the very least detriment; it is easily joyned with Mercury, and most easily and largly dilated. Al which marks, since they are most to be found in Gold, it is by the consent of al Nations reputed the most excellent and perfect Metal. Whereof nevertheless you may read what Mi­randulanus saies, in his Book de Auro.

Now a Question is here raised, Whether Metals differ spe­cifically or not. whether Metals differ specifically, or not. Very many Chymists hold, that they do not specifically differ, but only in degrees of perfection, and that they consist all of the same matter; have the same efficient Cause; are generated in the same place: that in Lead there is alwaies some Gold found; in some Brass there is Gold; and divers of them are commonly bred toge­ther; they are mutually changed one into another, as Iron into Copper; out of all Vitriol is made, and all are resolved into Mercury. Hence doubtless were these sayings of the Chymists: Lead is Leprous Gold: the Inner parts of Silver are Gold.

Yet, If I may speak mine own opinion, I c [...]nceive that Metals are specifically different. For though it may rightly be said that al have one and the same matter, not only generical and remote, but also immediate (in which respect they differ from other Natural things, and for which cause it is that they are turned one into another, and divers generated at once in the same place) yet have they not the same Ultimate matter; but therein they differ. Yet neither are they differen­ced only by accidents, but by a substantial specifick form, and there is one form of Gold, another of Iron, and another of Lead, which disposes and Labours that com­mon matter according to its own Nature, which appears by the effects and opera­tions. Hence it is, that though all of them are resolved into vitriol and Mercury; yet that Vitriol which is made out of Copper differs not a little from that made out of Iron.

Nor is that of any moment which some Chymists say; that Nature alwaies in­tends that which is most perfect. For this is true in every kind. In the kind of Men, Nature intends to make the perfectest man; in the kind of a Vine, the most perfect Vine; in the kind of Gold, the most perfect Gold. Yet doth it not there­fore follow that because Gold is the perfectest Metal therefore Nature alwaies in­tends to make Gold. For that is just as if a Man should say, that Nature in the kind of Animals alwaies intended a Man, who is the most perfect of al Live-Crea­tures. And if Nature alwaies intended Gold, why is there no more to be found? Now they hold that there are two perfect Metals, Gold and Silver: and four im­perfect ones.

Gold is the most perfect of all Metals, Gold what it is? consisting of the most pure Mercury, most perfectly digested and ripened, by Virtue of a most excellent and fixed ruddy Sul­phur, wherewith it is most exactly mixed and united. Hence it comes to have a yellow colour; it is most weighty of al Metals, it indures the Fire, it may be bea­ten out exceedingly thin, and it is most easily of all Metals united to Mercury. The Chymists do call it Sol, the Sun.

Silver is a perfect Metal, Silver, What? yet more inferior then Gold, consisting of a Mercury [Page 155]almost fixed, and of a white Sulphur, almost sixed also. For it is neither so hea­vy nor so fixed as Gold. And therefore although it endures the Fire after a sort, and abides in the Ashy Cement, yet doth it not endure in the Royal Cement, Anti­mony, Sulphur. Next to Gold it is beaten to the greatest thinness of any Metal. The Chymists call it Luna, the Moon.

Imperfect Metals are those which have principles not so mature and wel digested, nor so fixed and pure: whence it happens, they can neither endure the thunder of Lead, nor the Cement, nor Sulphur, but flie away in smoak and sparkles, or are changed into dross, Glass, Stones.

Now they are hard or soft. The hard are those which by Reason of their Earthy Sulphur and hardned Mercury are first red hot before they melt; the soft are those which by Reason of a moister Mercury and less digested are first melted before they are Red Hot. The hard have more Sulphur then the soft; but it is Earthy and contains more vitriolated Juyce. And therefore they are easily turned into Vitriol. Hence it comes to pass, that they suffer detriment by Fire, and will not endure the tryal of more perfect Metals, but Fly into the Air.

Now the hard Metals are two, Brass or Copper, and Iron. Brass o [...] Copper. Brass is an imperfect Metal, Hard, consisting of a little Mercury and very much impure Red Sulphur, nor perfectly ripened, for the most part but yet not perfectly sixed; being of a reddish colour. And hence, by reason of its Sulphur, it is thought to have affinity with Gold, and to contain in it the principles and Seeds of Gold; and it is believed that by digestion it may attain to some maturity and perfection. Also it hath affini­ty to Silver; seeing in the Marchasite and the Lapis Fissilis they are oftentimes found both together: and Silver and Copper being dissolved are both of a blew colour. The Chymists cal [...]t Venus.

Iron is an imperfect Metal, consisting of a little Mercury and much fixed Sulphur, Iron. being of a whitish black and Blew colour. Hence it comes to pass, that it is ex­ceeding slow in melting and bears long the force of Fire; and is readily calcined. Also it is hardly Joyned with Mercury, because there is little Mercury in it. Also it hath little Vitriol, and therefore it is of a whitish livid colour. The Chymists cal it Marr.

The soft Metals are, white Lead which is called Tinn; and Black-Lead which is called simply Lead.

Tinn or white Lead, is an imperfect Metal, soft and white, Tinn. consisting of much Mercury, less pure and fixed then in the persect Metals, but purer and more fixed then in Black-Lead, and of a white impure and unripe Sulphur. Being mixed with Gold and Lead it leaves them malleable; but being mingled with the other Metals it makes them break under the Hammer. The Chymists call it Jupiter.

Black-Lead is an imperfect Meral, Soft, of a livid colour, Lead. generated of much im­pure and undigested Mercury, and of a little Sulphur impure likewise and stinking. Hence, being used in the trial of perfected Metals it consumes the imperfect, and carries them away with it self in Smoak, or turns them into dross. It is of all Me­tals the most easily melted. The Chymists cal it Saturn.

Finally, Of kin to Merals is Quick-silver, a Mineral Liquor, Quick-Silver. of a wonderful Na­ture, for it flows like Water, and yet it wets not. It is the weightiest of all Miner­als, and wil suffer nothing to sink into it but Gold. Now it consists of a clammy Me­tallick Water, and a Sulphureous Earth, exactly mingled; and it mingles with Metals, first with Gold, then with Tinn, then with Lead, then with Silver; hard­ly with Copper and Iron. The Chymists call it Mercury; because as Mercury as­sociates himself with all the Planets, so doth Quick-silver with all Metals; and be­cause its Nature is moveable and shifting, which hath hitherto sufficiently exercised many Chymists, and is not yet sufficiently understood. And therefore hardly can we say any thing thereof in this brief discourse.

And here to conclude our Discourse of Metals, Whether the Trans­mutation of Metals be possible. we must not pass over that con­troversie concerning the transmutation of Metals. Out of which briefly to unwind our selves, seeing, as Aristotle rightly judges, it is a certain weakness of mind to [Page 156]seek for Reasons and let go Sense; I conceive the shallow Reasons of some Persons unskilful in Chymistry are no waies to be preferred before experience. Now it is a most known thing, that in Hungaria, at a Town called Smoinits, in the Mountain Carpathus, there is a Fountain, whereinto Iron being cast is turned into very good Copper. The like is done at this day in Goslaria. Nor is this performed by Natu­ral Waters only, but the same may be done by Art also. For if Iron be cast into vitriolated Water there sticks a red pouder thereto, which being melted in the Fire becomes Copper. So Quick-Silver is turned into Lead, with no great pains. Also it hath been often found true by experience, in this Age of ours, that other Metals may be turned into Gold: and it is Notoriously known, what that same Alexander Sidon, a Scotchman performedat Colenius Basil, and others places. Con­cerning which matter see the Historis of the Metallick Transmutation described by Ewaldus de Hoghelande; and the writings published by Andreas Libavius, for de­fence of Transmutatory Alchymy.

Since therefore by Experience it is sufficiently manifest; we need not dispute long of this Matter. One thing we shal briefly hint. That the Transmutation of Metals is not Simply and Barely Artificial, save as it applies things Natural to perform some certain action. Nor doth the Art proceed upon any but meerly Natural principles; and such things as Nature hath generated she doth only mix after a certain Fashion.

Chap. 1. Of the Soul in General.

SInce Method requires that we should now treat of Living and Animal Things; we must first speak of the Soul. Whether there be a Soul or no? That there is such a thing as a Soul, is manifest by the operations thereof. For we see that Li­ving things perform many operations which they cannot do when they are dead. It follows therefore that the Body it self cannot be the cause of those operations; but that there is somwhat in the Body which persorms the same. Now since every operation is a kind of transient accident, never firmly subsisting in it self; there must needs be in the Body some cause, which is the stable and constant producer of actions; which being present, life and every action is performed, and when it departs, the life ceaseth: and this cause of such like actions is termed Anima, the Soul.

As to what concerns the Essence of the Soul, I omit the sundry Opinions of the Ancients, which are reckoned up, and largely refuted by Aristotle, Lib. 1. de Anima. Marsilius Ficinus, Lib. 6.7.8. Theologiae Platonicae. And I shal retain the Definition of Aristotle in 2. de Anima, c. 1. text. 6. which is this, The Defi­nition of the Soul. The Soul is neither an acci­dent, nor a body. A Soul is the first act and perfection of a Na­tural Body, which bath an aptitude to Life; or briefly, of a Natural Body, whose parts are Organs. For the Soul is neither an accident, (seeing an accident cannot be one part of a compounded substance, such as a living Body is, nor the first principle of all actions, or make a true difference betwixt two substances;) nor a Body, for two Bodies cannot be in one place: But it is the act, or substantial form, by which a living Body is a living Body indeed; that is to say, by which it hath an inbred power and faculty to perform all the actions of Life. More may be seen touching the word Entelecheia used in this Definition, in Book 1. ch. 9. concerning Motion, where I have at large explained the genuine significa­tion of this Word.

Now a Soul is not the perfection and form of any Body, not of an Artificial, but a Natu­ral Body; nor yet of every Natural Body: For every Natural Body is not animated; but that Body only, which hath an aptitude to exercise the actions of Life, and is so disposed that the Soul may thereby, as by Instruments, exercise its actions. For here we must hold out of Aristotle, in 2 Metaphys. com. 31. That the action of an Agent does not proceed from the subject without a form, nor from the form without a subject: for otherwise the subject and its form would be actually two things. Now if so be action cannot be perfor­med by a subject without a form, nor by a form without a subject, much less can it be per­formed by Instruments without a Working cause. From whence it follows, that Action is performed by a certain compound of Matter, Form, and Instruments; so that the whol Compound may be called the Principle which acts; but the Form, the Principle where­with the act is performed, because the Compound acts by vertue of the Form; Finally, the Instruments, whereby; seeing the operation is performed through their subserviency.

Moreover, There is also another Definition of the Soul in Aristotle, in 2. de Anima, Another definition of the Soul cap. 2. text. 18. which is this: Our Soul is the Principle whereby we live, move, use our Senses, and understand.

And seeing there are many kinds of Living Creatures; we shal best come to the knowledg of their Differences, by observation of the effects and operations of the Soul; since every [Page 342]cause discovers it self by its effects, and the form by its operations. Now the proper Ener­gy of the Soul is Life, which as the second act, is evermore attended upon, and companion to the Soul as the first act. We may therefore from the distinct manners of Life constitute the distinct sorts of souls and animated things. Now a man lives, and so do other Creatures, and so do Plants, but each of these after a peculiar fashion. The life of Plants consists in Nu­trition only, and the action proper to each one, but Plants have no Senses: the life of Brutes, besides Nutrition and action, contains also sense; and each sort of Bruits hath its proper action: Finally, Man besides al these, does also understand, and make use of Reason.

There are therefore three distinct sorts of Souls: Three di­stinct sorts of Souls. all which are in Matter, and do consti­tute a living Body: Yet one of them is more loose from the matter, but another more plun­ged therein; and one can receive the spiritual and immaterial species of things, wherein consists the force of knowledg, but some cannot. Plants are nourished, and understand no­thing; Bruit Animals can understand some things; they receive immaterial species, howbeit with some conditions of the matter: For what things they perceive are here present, and at this time; seeing Sense is busied about particulars. But the rational Soul receives immaterial species or representations of things, even without all conditions of matter.

And seeing the soul is the cause of various actions, Whether the Facul­ties of the Soul differ therefrom, and how? and hath the power to perform sundry operations in living Creatures, we must consider how the powers or faculties of the Soul are related to the Soul it self. And here some hold, that the faculties of the Soul are the very Essence thereof, which according to the sundry actions whereof it is the cause, hath sundry names: others contrarywise do conceive that the faculties and powers of the soul, as all others, are qualities of the second sort, and that they are really and essentially different from the soul. And this latter Opinion is the better of the two. For the Powers and Fa­culties of the Soul are indeed only properties and inseparable accidents thereof, and essenti­ally distinct therefrom. For the Soul is a substance, but these are accidents or aptitudes and propensions to operate; which flow from the essence of the Soul, as their first cause, only by emanation, and so depend thereon, and are received without any medium, in the same animated Body, wherein the Soul is. For every power is ranked amongst the second sort of Qualities: and seeing the Powers of the Soul themselves are distinct one from another, they must also differ essentially from the Soul: For if they were the same with it, they would be the same one with another. Howbeit, it is to be observed, that the faculties are not mediate Agents, or middle causes betwixt the Soul and its operations, but only conditi­ons and aptitudes to operate: For operations proceed from the Act, and not from the po­wer; nor is it necessary that betwixt every agent and its operation there should intercede some middle agent. For so, neither could that middle agent be the cause of action, with­out another middle agent: and so there should a progress ad infinitum, without end.

These divers Souls are with their faculties so disposed, that the upper faculty does al­waies pre-suppose the lower: but the inferior may be without the superior. The Vege­tative is without the sensitive in Plants: the Vegetative and Sensitive are without the Rati­onal in Bruits: in Man all three concur. But how the Faculties are disposed in reference to the Soul in divers sorts of Living Creatures, intricate and hard Questions are agitated amongst Phylosophers.

For in the first place Enquiry is made, Whether in one living thing there is more than one Soul. Whether in every living thing there is only one Soul, or more. For some teach, That in every living Creature there is only one Soul, and that it is furnished with all the faculties of an inferior Soul; and that there are not in Man three souls, an Intelligent, a Sensitive, and a Vegetative; but one that is endued with the powers of all three, and takes its denomination from the nobler faculty: and that so the faculties which are in living Creatures of the same sort, do proceed from one sort of Soul; but those which are in living Creatures of a several sort, do arise also from a several sort of Soul; although both here and there they have the same names, and are attended by the same operations. Others do hold contrarily, That there are distinct Souls, not only in living things of several sorts; but that more also may be found in the same living Creature; and that in Man there is not only a nutritive and sensitive Faculty, but a nutritive and sensi­tive Soul, and also a rational; and that where-ever the Faculty is, there is also the Soul, to which it primarily belongs.

And although both Opinions have learned and famous Defenders; yet the first which is the commonest and most received, seems to me the more probable. For since there is one specifick-Essence, and consequently one only Form of every thing; therefore the Soul of every living thing, which is the Form, and principally constitutes the Essence thereof, can be but one. Moreover, it is not possible, that the principles of things, opposite one to ano­ther, [Page 343]and several sorts of Souls can meet together, without uniting or confounding the Effences of things; or yet be subordinate one to another; feeing they are such opposites as Logicians call Disparata, and do exclude one another out of the same subject. Moreover, it is a needless thing to multiply souls; since one soul, furnished with divers faculties may produce all the degrees of life; and a soul of an higher degree, and more noble, does include the faculties of the more ignoble and inferior; just as the number Four includes the number Three: nor is it necessary, though there are in the understanding subordinate conceptions, by reason of subordinate differences, that there should therefore be subordinate Forms, without the Understanding. For the multiplicity of universal subordinate conceptions does not multiply the Essence and Form of a thing.

Now the Principal Cause that others have erred in this point, hath been this; That they thought the vegetative power alone to be a peculiar Soul, and to constitute the sort of a Plant; and the sensitive Faculty also to be a peculiar Soul which constituted the sort of Animal: Whereas nevertheless there are many sorts both of Plants and Animals; and the Plants have different sorts amongst them, as also the Animals, and there is one specifical form of a Rose, another of a Violet, another of a Willow; though the vegetative Faculty be found in all of them: one of a Lyon, another of a Dog, another of a Wolf, although the sensitive Faculty be common to all. All Plants have indeed a nutritive and generative Fa­culty, but not that only, but withal somwhat proper, whereby a Violet differs from a Rose and a Willow. So a Wolf is nourished, does generate, and exercises its senses, but it does not these things alone, but it hath also somwhat proper to it self, whereby it differs from a Lyon and a Dog; and from the same soul in a Dog does flow the Faculty of nouri­shing, of sense, and of doing that which is proper to a Dog, whereby it differs from other Animals. Nor are there in a Dog many and divers Essences, as the Patrons of the other Opi­nion do erroneously suppose. For neither are the Vegetative and Sensitive, or the Vege­tative, Sensitive, and Rational, certain peculiar general Forms, or three Essences; but only general conceptions, arising, and constituted out of the comparison and conveniency of Li­ving thing, which do no where exist separately save in the mind; just as Beeing; Substance, Body: and therefore they do not multiply the Essence of things.

After this Question follows another: Whether the Soul be totally in the whol Body, Whether the soul be totally in the whol Body, and totally in every part. and totally in every part? or whether it be all in the whol Body, and part of it in one part, and part in another. But first that ambiguity which lutks in this Question, must be di­stinguished: For the term Whol, may here be considered in a three-fold notion; in respect of a Substance, Quantity, and Quality. The first is constituted of the parts of the Soul in the same living Creature; the second of the Subject, according to the extension whereof the Soul is extended, so as to have quantity; the third of the faculties, wherewith it is furni­shed. The School-men call the first, the Essential whol; the second, the Quantitative whol; the third, the Potestative whol.

As to the first, Inasmuch as the soul of every thing is simple, and not compounded of Essential parts, where ever it is, there it is totally, and so as that it is totally in the whol Body. For we must not allow of their Opinion, who hold, That the substance of the Soul is only in one part of the Body, which is the principal part; and that the rest of the Body is governed by powers shed out of the Soul: For thus the whol Body should not be animated, but only that part wherein the substance of the Soul is: For those Faculties whereby (ac­cording to their Opinion) the rest of the Members are governed, since they are accidents, can­not supply the room of a substantial Form. Moreover, since the Faculties are accidents, flowing from the Essence of the Soul, only by way of emanation, they cannot have a sub­ject different from their Form, not be produced in any subject, save that wherein the Soul is; and therefore where they are, there we may know the essence of the Soul to be. And therefore we conclude that the Essence of the Soul is in all parts of the animated Body, and that no part is destitute thereof.

Yet is not the Soul in its Body, in all animate things, after one and the same manner. For in Plants and some Animals, there is no principal Member, but instead of a principal Mem­ber, a certain humor is diffused through the whol Body, by means of which, chiefly, the soul is joyned to the Body: whence it is, that also the parts being pluckt from the Body do live for a season. But the case is otherwise in perfect Animals, in which we must hold that there is some principal Member, wherein the soul, as in a Root wherein it is naturally inbred as it were, may reside, and pour it self out to the other Members. And therefore that prin­cipal Member being hurt, the Animal soon dies; but not if any other be hurt; and the Mem­bers pluckt from the Body, do presently die.

Secondly, If we enquire how the Soul is in the Body, in respect of Extension and Quan­tity, the Answer is briefly this: That every form which informs the matter and is united thereto, and makes up one compound therewith, is extended according to the extension of the Matter. Concerning which thing it is nevertheless to be observed, that only Matter is of it self furnished with Quantity, and divisible; but that the Soul of it self is neither sub­ject to Quantitity, nor to Division. In the mean while, because it informs the whol Body, it is rightly said to be coextended therewith, and that where ever the body is that lives, there also the Soul is. Hence the Body is properly said to be divided, and to be made greater or lesser; and the Body of a Plant, from a smal Twig, grows to a tall Tree, a Calf to an Ox; and a Body in a Consumption grows less, and so doth a Tree whose boughs are cut off. But it is not so with the Soul; nor is that Soul which is in a smal branch, less in it self, than the Soul which is in a tall Tree; nor is the Soul of a Calf less than the Soul of an Ox, but re­maining the same, it spreads it self abroad into the additional nutriment; nor is a Plant or Animal the less by communicating it self in generation; nor when the branches of a Tree are cut off, is the Soul of the Tree the lesser; nor hath an Animal that is consumed a lesser Soul than that which is corpulent. For the Soul is joyned to the dimensions, partly as colors, partly after another manner. For it informs the measured quantitative Body, and its ple­nitude and fillingness is as great as the Body it self and the dimension thereof. And though we suppose the Body to encrease never so much, the Soul without any addition wil fil it al; and if it be diminished never so much, it wil fil no more than that little Body. Of it self therefore the Soul hath no Quantity: but in respect of dimensions whereto it is joyned, it hath such a property, that it fils no more than the Body, be it great or little. And though notwithstanding by accident its plenitude is restrained and contained: yet is it not cut in sun­der or diminished. In which particular it affords a certain resemblance of the most good and great God, who as J. Caesar Scaliger speaks, Reigns every where without place, is all with­out all, and the whol without parts.

Finally, Since divers and sundry powers do flow from the Soul; the Question is whether the Soul have all these powers together, in al the parts of the Body. We answer: That in al the parts of the Body, there are al the faculties according to their Original; and that the Soul brings al its faculties into al parts of the Body: yet peculiar saculties are only received in peculiar parts as in their subjects. For the Soul indeed is in al the parts, which is the O­riginal of al the faculties: yet such is the nature of proper accidents, that it exists from a principle or certain cause; yet they insist only in a certain Subject. Hence Scaliger Ex­ercit. 103. s. 37. You shal see some doubt, whether Memory be in all parts of the Body. Nay I tel thee, the Ʋnderstanding is in the Feet. For we have one Soul every where at­tended with its faculties, as being essential thereunto. But where there are Insiruments, there the faculty exercises its act. For if there were an Eye in the Finger, the Finger would see by that Eye, without calling any power or faculty from the Brain. For the Soul which is the same in al parts of the Body, is indeed every where furnished with the same faculties; and hath in al members the power to do whatsoever is proper to it; yet it per­forms certain actions by certain instruments; it sees by the Eye, hears by the Ears, smels by the Nostrils.

But because we are fallen upon mention of the principal part, Which is the Princi­pal part of the Body. and the foregoing Que­stion can scarce be rightly resolved, without explication of the Controversie concerning the principal member in man and other sanguine Creatures, we must not omit to handle the same. For it is one and the same Question, which is the Seat of the Soul, and which is the principal member. For the principality is to be assigned to that member wherein the soul doth chiefly reside. Now that there is one principal member Phylosophers and Paysitians agree, though they contend sharplyh which it is: and reason perswades the same. For since the soul is not the form of an homogeneal body, but of a body heterogeneal and organical, which hath many and different parts: there must of necessity be some order established a­mongst them, and we must beleeve that one of them is more worthy than another: and since as hath been said, the Hand, Foot, and other members being cut off, die presently, the rest retaining life, we must needs think that the Soul hath more affinity to one than ano­ther. But what that principal member is, the Platonists, to whom Galen and many Phy­sitians joyn, are at variance with the Aristotelians or Peripateticks.

Plato and Galen hold three chief Parts, the Liver, Heart and Brain, and they assign the principality to the Brain, because therein is the principle of Sense and motion, and the rati­nal soul hath there its residence. Contrariwise, the Peripateticks hold the Heart to be the principal monber.

But several men seem to have several respects in their assigning the principal part. Galen hath respect to the nobility of the actions; but the Aristotelians respect the Radication (that I may so speak) of the Soul it self. The Physitians count the animal faculties, so cal­led, most noble; the Peripateticks make most account of the Action of the Heart, because thereby all the rest are cherished and governed. And therefore though we may grant Phy­sitians, that there are three chief members of the Body: Yet if question be made touching the principality, and the radication of the soul, since there is only one soul in every Animal, not many, and one Animal hath only one soul and specifick form; we must hold there is one principal member, wherein it resides, as in its Castle: although it perform not all its actions therein, but act definitly and distinctly in the organs proper and ordained to every distinct action.

Now if you shal ask me which is this member, The Heart is the Principal part. I do with the Peripateticks aslign the prin­cipality to the Heart, and hold that the soul doth stick therein as in its root, from whence it is diffused into all the rest of the members. Yea and the holy Scriptures ascribe not only the radication of the Soul to the Heart, but certain other actions also which most men at­tribute unto the Brain. And indeed this is a very ancient opinion; Plato (saith Scaliger in his 1. Book de Plantis) learned these things of the wise men of Egypt, the Egyptians learn'd them of the Chaldaeans, out of whose decrees all exact literature hath flowed. For the Chaldaeans placed the Principles of all our motions in the Heart, as in their princi­ple.

Now that the Heart is the Part wherein the Soul adheres as in its root, and therefore the principal part, is many waies apparent. For that is the principal member, not wherein as in the immediate Instrument, the most noble action is exercised; but that whereon the actions of al parts whether ignoble or noble, do depend, and whereby they are governed. For the prime Agent is more noble than the secondary and Instrumental Agent. Hence that Argument of Galen is invalid, who thus concludes; that is the Principle, from whence the Nerves, Veins, and Arteries arise. For that member seems to be the fountain and seat of the faculty, from which the Instruments arise. But these three kind of Vessels have their original from three members; the Veins from the Liver, the Arteries from the Heart, the Nerves from the Brain. And therefore there are three chief members, and the most excellent is the Brain. For we must distinguish betwixt the prime and chief principle of any operati­on, and the instrumental or secondary principle. For that which is the immediate Princi­ple of an action, is not alwaies the first and most excellent. The immediate principle of sense and motion is the Brain: but yet the soul is not rooted therein.

Nor is that Argument of greater moment, that when the Brain is hurt, the operations of the sensitive Soul are hurt; to which therefore for the same cause medicaments are applied. For the first Agent cannot act without Instruments. And therefore when they are hurt, the action is taken away. And therefore, though the Heart which is the immediate Agent be wel, if the Brain which is the immediate Agent be hurt, the action is abolished: after the same manner, the Hand being hurt, although the Brain be wel, a man cannot handle or hold a thing; because the immediate Instrument of handling is hurt.

That therefore must be held to be the principal member, which governs all the actions of the whol Body; which breeds the common and most familiar Instrument of the whol Soul, viz. the spirits, but that is the Heart: which besides other tokens, is manifest from swoo­ning fits, in which sense and Motion, and all the actions in the body are taken away, through want of spirits which should flow from the heart.

Moreover, that is the principal Member, according to the unity or plurality whereof there comes to be one or more Animals. For because an Animal by means of one soul is one; by means of two, two; that member by the doubling whereof the Animal becomes double, must needs be held the seat of the Soul. Now that the Heart is such a member Aristotle tels us, Lib. 4. de Gener. Animal. cap. 4. and that truly. For experience doth teach us, that by multiplication not of the Brain but Heart, an Animal hath been made double. I wil produce some Instances collected by Schenkius, observat. Med. P. 1. Obs. 10. In a certain Town called Emaus, in the raign of the Emperor Theodosius, a Boy was born, who to the Navel was perfect, but above he was divided into two, had two breasts, two Heads with their parts and Sences. For somtimes one part would eat, and the other would abstain, one would sleep, the other wake, somtimes they would play together, laugh and weep, and beat one another. Now they lived neer upon two years. Afterwards it fel out that when one of them died, the other that remained alive died by reason of the putrefaction communi­cated from the other. Again, in the yeer 1531. there was one born, and grew to the stature [Page 346]of a perfect man, who had only two Heads and two Shoulders, so that one Head stood be­hind the other, and they were wonderfully like in favor, their Eyes and Beards were alike. They had the same appetite to meat, were hungry at the same time, had the same voyce, and both Heads had the same desire to the Wife which he had, and to evacuations. From which Stories it is apparent, that in the first who had a double Heart, all the Animal acti­ons were doubled, but in the other, though there were two Heads, yet the actions were sin­gle, and that therefore the Principality belongs to the Heart. For if Sense, Motion, and other animal actions depend primarily on the Brain, and not on the Heart, why were those actions double only in the former, in whom besides the Brain there were two hearts; and not in the latter, in whom there were only two Heads?

Chap. 2. Of the vegetative Soul.

HAving spoken thus much of the Soul in general, it remains now that we treat of the sorts of Souls. And because the vegetative Soul is common to all living Creatures, we wil begin with the consideration thereof. Now the vegetative Soul is the act or persection of an organick body, The defi­nition of the vege­tative soul The three facultie [...] thereof. The nu­tritive fa­culty. whereby it lives, is nourished, encreases, and begets it like. There are belonging to this Soul three faculties: the nourishing, growing, and ingendring faculty. The nourishing faculty tends to preserve the Individual or particular living thing; the growing faculty tends to encrease the Quantity thereof; the Generative preserves the kind or sort. For the nutritive or nourishing faculty is that which turns the food into the sub­stance of the living Body. For since the parts of a living Body are consumed by the native heat, (lest if there should be a continued resolution, the Creature should perish) the nouri­shing faculty was bestowed thereupon, to repair that which is consumed. Now this Inter­change of resolution and nutrition, lasts as long as the life: for a living Creature is nouri­shed as long it lives. Aristor. 1. de Gen. et Corrup. cap. 5. t. 41.

Now to Nutrition three things are necessary, as Aristotle teaches 2. de Anim. cap. 4. t. 49. The thing nourished, that wherewith it is nourished, and that which doth nourish: now that which nourishes is primarily the Soul, that which is nourished is the Body which contains it; that wherewith it is nourished, is the food. Now Zabarella hath thus expressed the whol nature of nutrition, in Lib. de Accret & nutrit. cap. ult. Nutrition is the aggeneration of matter to the parts in a living Body, caused by the vegetative soul through help of natural heat, out of the food which is taken in; that the matter which is steamed away may be restored, and that the living Creature may be preserved, to the end of the term appointed by nature. Scaliger thus briefly defines it: Nutrition is a natural union of the changed food.

The Principal faculties have other faculties subservient to them, Four fa­culties subservi­ent to the nutritive. which yet do not arise from the Principal. For one faculty doth not possess another: but they al depend upon, and proceed immediately from the Soul. The nutritive faculty hath four faculties sub­servient thereunto; the Attractive, Retentive, Concoctive, and Expulsive: others add the Separative, which severs things hurtful. The Attractive, is that which draws the food; the Retentive is that which retains it, til it be duly elaborated; the Concoctive, is that which alters it and makes it fit for the living Body: the Expulsive, is that which drives out superfluous matter, which is unfit for nourishment.

Now in the first age, The Aug­mentative faculty The defi­nition of augmenta­tion. not only nutrition is made, but also augmentation, and the parts which are added to the living Creature are greater than those that are consumed by the na­ [...]ural [...]at. Now Augmentatation or Growth, according to the definition of Zabarella de accret. & nutrit. cap. 25. is the motion of a living Body, whereby the whol Body and al the parts are at once extended according to al dimensions, so as to gain a greater quantity; caused by the Vegetative Soul through assistance of the natural heat from the food taken in, and converted into parts of the substance of the Body, greater than what hath been consu­med; that the living Creature may attain to that greatness which it ought to have, that it may perform al the operations of Life. For Accretion or Growth differs not from Nutriti­on in the subject thereof, matter out of which it is made, and the Efficient Cause. For the some surject is the living Body; the Matter out of which, the Food; the Efficient, the Soul▪ but they diff [...] in their form and End.

For Nutrition is [...]he [...]g generation of aliment, and belongs rather to Generation than Motion: but the form of Growth is a motion of extension, to a greater Quantity of the whol [Page 347]body and all its parts. The End also is different: For in Nutrition there is only the re­stauration of what is consumed; in growth there is an acquisition of more than is consumed. Hence Aristotle, 1. de Generat. & cor. cap. 5. text. 14. Nutrition is the same thing with Accretion or Growth; but they differ respectively: For inasmuch as that which is joyned to the Body, is potentially so much flesh, it is able to encrease the body: but inasmuch as it is potentially bare flesh, so far it is able to nourish.

Now because there are many Augmentations improperly so called, The Con­ditions of Augmen­tation. it is worth cur labor to observe out of Aristotle, Lib. 1. de Generat. & corrupt. cap. 5. t. 33. three conditions of Accretion or Growth properly so called, or three things necessary to Accretion. 1. Not only the whol Body must become greater, but also every part thereof. 2. It ought to become greater, by means of some matter coming from without. 3. That which is augmented must continue the same thing in number which it was before. In the first condition is ex­plained the proper nature of Accretion. For though some doubt (since many mutations concur in Accretion, and not only the addition of Aliment, but also extension is necessary) in what mutation the nature thereof should consist: yet their Opinion is the truer, which joyn both these mutations together, and hold that Accretion or Growth consists both in the conversion of the matter of the Aliment into the substance of the living Creature, and also in the extension of the said Creature. For Growth is caused by somwhat coming to the body, and the thing grown hath changed its place, 1. de Gener. & Cor. cap. 5. text. 25.

Now, after what manner a greater quantity is acquired in a living Creature, Authors are also at variance; Some conceive it is done by driving, and that one part drives another, and another another, after the same manner as we see it is in the Nails and Hairs: But this is not agreeable to truth. They think more rightly, who beleeve that it is done by extension, viz. When the Aliment is extended through all the parts of the body, and through all the different postures of the said parts; which comes to pass when all the Pores are filled, which being full, the parts are extended: and all the parts being extended and augmented, the whol body is also encreased; after the same manner as we see a spunge grow great, after the water hath insinuated it self into all the parts thereof. Now according to the extension of the Body, the soul is also extended: and if any man will call it being so extended, greater, let him remember, that a Form of it self is neither great nor little. Hence Scaliger, Exercit. 101. Sect. 15. The Form when it extends it self into the newly applied matter, it advan­ces it self, but is not encreased: For it does not generate a new Form. And verily he that shall call a Form greater or lesser, will abuse the patience of wise men.

Now living Creatures are not alwaies augmented, but only to a certain term of their age; the cause whereof is not in the soul: For neither it, nor its Faculties, which are proper to its Essence, are corrupted or weakened, but only the body. Nor is the cause in the natu­ral heat; for that is as strong in a yong man, as in a boy. But the impediment is in the bo­dy; viz. the bones, which are the chief part that is augmented, and according to the en­crease whereof the whol body is encreased, are more moist and soft in youth, and more apt to be extended; but in succeeding Ages they are so dried and hardened by the natural hear, that they become unapt to be extended. Although in some elderly persons the flesh and fat are many times augmented, yet that is no true growth, because the whol body is not aug­mented, but only the softer parts.

Finally, The generative Faculty is that which by the prolifick seed begets its like: The gene­rative fa­culty. The defi­nition of generation. And the Generation of a living Creature, as Aristotle defines it, de Vita et Morte, cap. 10. Is the first participation of the Vegetative Soul with heat. For living Creatures are said to beget their like, when they give out somwhat of their own matter, and their own form; which is then done when they yield their seed. For in the seed there is both the matter and form of a Dog forth coming: Nor does the seed of a Dog differ from a Dog, otherwise than as ap­titude from Act; and there is nothing added to the seed, but an expression of those Organs which were before confused, saies Scaliger in Exercit. 268. and Exercit. 6. Sect. 5. and 7. The form is in the Dogs seed, in the aptitude whereof it is said to be; because the seed is a­ble and apt to give that form which it contains in it self; or because it wants the express Instruments, which afterward the Soul frames to it self, both by altering the whol, and dis­posing the parts, and is its self the builder of its own house. And in the same Exercit. Sect. 10. Therefore a Tree generates when it produces its seed. But a Tree is not then generated, when it sprouts up out of the seed; but then the generated Tree, which was before imperfect, becomes perfect. So a Dog does not ingender when the whelp is brought forth, but when he ingenders seed: Because in the very act of copulation many have died, before [Page 348]the seed received any disposition or qualification in the Womb. Which we see more evident­ly in Plants: For the Almond Tree being dead, a planted Almond taken therefrom grows up to a Tree. Now the Soul engenders a Soul by promotion of it self; after the same man­ner truly, as in growing it insinuates it self into the new matter of the nourishment.

Now Living Creatures obtained this Faculty of propagating their kind, from their first Creation by God, when he blessed all living Creatures, saying, Encrease and multiply; and again, Let the Earth bring forth Grass, the Herb yielding seed, and the fruit Tree yielding fruit, whose seed is in it self, upon the Earth: and again, Let the Waters bring forth abundantly the moving creature that hath life, and fowl that may fly above the Earth in the open Firmament of Heaven: and again, Let the Earth bring forth the Living Creature after his kind, Cattle, and creeping things, and the Beasts of the Earth after their kind.

Howbeit the manner of the Propagation of living things is various. In Plants indeed if a branch of Willow be pluckt from the Tree, the Soul is divided by division of the matter, and abides in the branch; and therefore from the said branch stuck into the Earth, a Tree of the same sort will grow up. The same is done in other Plants by their Roots, in others by their seeds, and in others after other manners propagation is caused; as may be seen in the Writers of Husbandry. In all which nevertheless it is necessary, that the matter taken away may afford a fitting Mansion for the soul; which every part in all Plants cannot afford. For examples sake, A Willow is propagated by a bough stuck in the Earth; but a Pear-tree cannot be propagated after the same manner.

But in Animals or living creatures, although the manner of Propagation may also seem to be various, whiles some produce Egs, others living creatures: yet herein they seem al to agree, in that Animals do not generate by any part of their body pluckt off as Plants, but by seed, or somwhat which answers to seed.

For the seed which Epicurus (as Plutarch relates, de placit. Philos. Lib. 5. cap. 3.) called an Abstract of the Soul and Body, being cut off from the rest of the body, accor­ding to the division of the subject, the Soul is also divided, and some portion thereof is with the seed separated from the Animal; which being of the same species with the Soul from whence it is taken, is now become numerically different, in regard of the subject. Out of the seed, by reason of this soul, a new Animal arises, while the soul lying hid in the seed, rouses it self, and displaies its Faculties, and by operating manifests it self; and making use of the innate heat and spirits, it begins to shape al things necessary to the constitution of an Animal or livnig creature, and distinguishes, disposes, orders forms, and fashions the subject matter; that so it may have a perfect and fitting house, like to that from whence it came, and that it may have Instruments in a readiness, whereby it may put forth al its Faculties, and exercise al its natural Actions; which house it afterward possesses, after the same man­ner as it insinuates it self into the new matter of Aliment, when the Creature grows.

Howbeit, there is betwixt Plants and Animals, especially the more perfect sort, this difference; That Plants which breed seed, breed it so qualified, that it alone suffices to the production of a like Plant: but in the more perfect Animals which have Sex, the seed of neither Parent is sufficient to beget their like; but as Plato hath it, Each Sex contributes its shot to the matter of Generations; and the seed of neither Sex taken alone, but of both joyned together, and united in the Womb of the Female, is prolifick and fruitful seed.

Chap. 3. Of the Parts of Plants.

SInce therefore there are three manners of Life, and Plants live, are nourished, grow, and generate; Bruits have besides, the use of sense and local motion; and a Man besides all these, hath the use of Reason: having spoke of the Vegetative Soul, before we shall speak of the Sensitive and Rational Soul, The defi­nition of a plant. we must first treat of Plants. Now a Plant (which the Greeks call Phuton) is a Body animated and vegetative, or endowed with a nutritive and generative faculty. Where I must in the first place acquaint you with this, of which mention was made before, viz. How that many are of opinion, that all sorts of Plants have no other Faculty but the Vegetative, which is common to the whol kind, but that only the same kind is restrained by certain bounds to the proper faculty of its own sort. But this is a false Opinion: For if the case were so, there should be indeed no specifical dif­ference [Page 349]in Plants and Animals; nor should a Rose differ from an Oak, nor a Mouse from a Lyon, except in some Accidents. But thus we are to hold; That the Vegetative Soul alone does not constitute any sort of Plants; nor does the sensitive Soul constitute any sort of bruits, but only an Animal or Living creature, which is the kind comprehending Man and Beast: but the sorts of Plants and Animals do differ by their specifick forms; as namely a Rose from an Oak, a Fir-tree from a Violet, a Dog from a Wolf, and a Wolf from a Lion and a Man. And from the difference of forms proceeds this diversity of Actions, so that among Living Creatures some are more ingenious than others. And in vain it is that some anxi­ously dispute, Whether some Animals besides Man, are not Rational? whether som bruits are ratio­nal? For those actions we see in some Animals which are more ingenious than others, do not proceed from a Ratio­nal Soul, which is proper only to Man; but from the Soul that is proper to that sort of Ani­mal. For as a Rose hath one soul, a Poplar another, and therefore the Rose and the Po­plar have different operations: even so, as there is one soul of a Sheep, another of a Sow, another of a Dog, another of a Fox, another of a Lyon, another of an Elephant; so also all these sorts of Living Creatures do differ both in the structures of their bodies, and in their specifical actions. And although in some sorts of Animals actions appear sufficiently wonderful; yet the soul of Man hath only gained a proper name, and is termed Rational: the rest are for the most part destitute of proper appellations. But that we may speak now of Plants; every Plant consists of a proper soul, and of a body convenient to its sort.

We have already spoken of the Soul, it remains that we should speak of the Body. Whether there are two Sexes in Plants? But first there is a Question that presents it self: Whether the two Sexes are in Plants? To it Scaliger answers, in 1. de Plantis: There are in Plants (quoth he) the principles of Male and Female consounded, and that by an excellent design of Nature. For since Generation is made by an agent in a Patient; Nature hath put into her work, to which she had denied Motion and granted Generation, proportionable generative faculties joyned together, which may be also hence collected: Because in some Plants it is seen, that of one seed the male, of another the Female does spring up. Which is apparent in Hemp; Out of the same trunk proceeds seed, which partly grows to be Male, and partly Female.

Now some parts of Plants are necessary to the constitution of the whol Body; The Ex­crements of Plants. others are superfluous. There are some hard Excrements, as Mushroms, and Puck-fists; some soft, as tears; and of these, some remain liquid; others grow hard, as Gums.

Among the parts necessary to the constitution of the body, Their sim­ple parts. Fibres and Nerves. besides that same juyce diffu­sed through the substance of the whol body, wherewith Plants are nourished, and which answers to the blood in Animals, the most simple are, Fibres, Nerves, and Flesh. Fibres, which the Greeks call Ines (which Scaliger, de Plantis, would rather call threds or hairs; because the lobes and little roots of the Liver are called Fibrae) are those long, continued, stretched out parts, running through the whol Plant, answering to Veins, Arteries, Nerves, and Fibres in Animals; the greater and more succulent whereof are called Veins and Ribs, but the thinner and drier are called Nerves: And they are made both for the nourishments distribution into all parts of the Plant, and also for their firmness and consistency. The flesh is the remaining substance of the Plant, answering to musculous flesh in Animals. Flesh. Now the flesh is of three kinds; some is moist, such as is in Cherries, Prunes, and such like fruit; some is a little more solid, such as is the pulp of a Pear and an Apple; some is of a more compact and woody substance as it were.

Of these are made others, which themselves also are numbred amongst the simple and similar parts; viz. The Wood, the Marrow, and the Bark. Wood. The Wood in Plants called Lignum, is a body hard, that wil cleave, and consists of thin sibres: the middle part in the Wood is called the Marrow, Pith, or Heart: The Coat wove together of Fibres, Marrow. going a­bout the wood is termed Cortex, the bark; which when 'tis very thin, Bark. 'tis by a special name called Cutis, the Skin or Rind, especially in Fruits, whose flesh is alwaies covered with skin: that which is thicker is called by the general term Bark. Howbeit the Bark it self is not simple; but in most Plants there is an outer, and an in [...]er: The inner is called Liber.

As to the compound parts of Plants, some are constant, others mutable. the Com­pound parts. Root. The constant are, the Root, the Stock, the Bough, the Branch: The mutable are, the Leaves in most, the Flowers, the Fruits. The Root is the lowest part of a Plant, whose Office is, not on­ly to fasten the Plant and support it in the Earth, but also to draw its nourishment; and therefore it's compared to the Mouth in living creatures; yea, and by some the concoction of the Aliment drawn out of the Earth is ascribed to the Roots.

The Stock, the stock, stalk, trunk Branches, Boughs, twigs. Suckers. Stalk, or Trunk of a Plant, is that part which rises immediately from the Root. Which is indeed soft in Herbs, and is termed the stalk; but in Trees and woody shrub [...] 'tis hard, and termed Caudex the stock. The stalk and stock parts into branches, and the part where the branch issues is properly called a knot; the branches are divided into boughs and twigs; besides these there are suckers, or smal twigs that grow up out of the Root.

Our of the boughs and twigs spring the Leaves, Leaves, Flowers, Fruit. Flowers, and Fruits; and in some Plants tendrels, fingers, or claspers, by help whereof they rear and sustain themselves against some wall, pale, tree, &c. Parts of the Leaves are the little stalks they grow by, yet some Plants have them not, as the Indian Fig-tree.

The Flowers to Plants are as the child in the womb, Flowers. which come to perfection in the seed and fruit, or they are rather the first covering of the fruit. Now the Flowers consist of a most thin exhalation and a subtil spirit, which breaks forth when any Plant does grow wanton and big with desire of generation. For there is no emission of seed without such a spirit, nor any propagation of the soul, in Plants nor in Animals. Now the Flower includes within it self, and defends the fruit when it first breaks forth, till it becomes more firm and able to bear the injuries of the Air. For then the spirit ceasing and failing, which breaks out with the fruit, and in the act of Generation, the flower falls off. Howbeit all Plants do not blossom, nor do all that blossom bear fruit. Now the flowers are compounded of divers parts: For they consist of very thin Leaves, severally colored, shaped, and ranked in several Plants. the Cup. Then is the Cup wherein the little Leaves are planted as in their basis, and wherein they are shut as in a case. There are also threds or hairs, such as the yellow in Lil­lies and Roses; finally, there are the smal stalks by which the flowers hang.

Finally, Fruit. there is the Fruit, by which word we somtimes understand the seed; somtimes beside the seed, the flesh with the seed is after a special manner termed Fruit. For the seed is either contained in Cods, as that of beans and pease; or in Cases; or in the pulp of the fruit, as in prunes, pears, cherries. Now the Greeks term that same flesh or sub­stance which compasses the seed, Pericarpium. And of these parts do Plants consist, and some have all these parts, others not. And some have only one of them, others more. The whol substance of a Pucksist is well near all Root. Contrarywise some have no Root, as Misselto which is sustained and nourished by the Root of another Plant. Also Toad-stools have commonly no Root. A Rush hath no branches; Dodder no Leaves; the Fig-tree no flower; the Orice flower no fruit; Maiden-hair neither flower nor fruit.

Besides these parts, some Plants also have others, which grow out of an excrementious humor. Such is the moss of old Trees, the little spunges on Dogs-bryar, and other excres­cences on other Trees.

Chap. 4. Of the Differences of Plants.

NOW Plants are divided into four kinds: the divi­sion of Plants. Dendron, a Tree; Thamnos a Shrub; Phruganon a Bush, (which Gaza calls Suffrutex, though Scaliges like not that word, Exercit. 139.) and Botane an Herb. Now how these kinds differ, is not so manifest. They are commonly distinguished by their Trunk, and their continuance: but Scaliger likes not this kind of Division, Exercit. 389. For also Harts-tongue lasts all the year without any Trunk. And Lettice and Coleworts have a kind of trunk, which are Herbs. He therfore both in the place alleadged, and in his 1. de Plantis, thus distinguishes them: An Herb sends from the Root Leaves, besides those two common to all, which pre­sently issue out of the pulp of the seed changed; and in process of time a stalk, though some never have any. But in a Tree and bushy shrub these Leaves do not first come forth, but in the first place a stalk, and that one, or many; if one, either it is a great one, and that is a Tree; or a little one, and that is a shrub; or if many, then it is a bush: and it is the property of a Tree not to die and come up again; but shrubs and bushes do some con­tinue as trees, and others die and come up again, as Herbs. Thus then a tree and a shrub agree, That each hath a single trunk. But they differ in greatness, and somtimes in yearly dying. A bush differs from a tree in smalness, and therein it agrees with a shrub; but it differs from both in the multiplicity of its stems or trunks. There is no need it should last all the yeer, no more than that a shrub should. An Herb agrees with a shrub in the single­ness [Page 351]of its stem, as the Colewort; somtimes with a bush, in the multitude of its stems, as Fennel; somtimes with neither, by having no stalk.

But Scaliger seems not to have perfectly explained the whol Business; and especially there is a doubt concerning the Shrub, which he will have to be single stemmed, because he held that the shrub had but a single stem: whereas others attribute a manifold stem to the shrub, and they say that is a shrub which amongst wooden Plants is of smallest height and thickness, such as Rue, Sage, Hysop, Marsh-mallows.

In searching out the Universal Nature of Plants, we must diligently enquire into their differences: which are indeed very many, so that it is hard to omit nothing, and in the mean while, not to produce things unprofitable and superfluous. Now these differences are taken from their Original, Native place, internal form, external sigure and matter. Now since the internal forms lie hid, nor are known to the sense, they must be known from the vertues and qualities which proceed from them.

And first from the manner of propagation, which is manifold. For, first of all, some Plants spring of their own accord, in such places as are far from the resort of men, and are not capable of tillage. For the Earth hath in it the hidden seeds of Plants, from the begin­ning of the world, inserted thereinto by the Divine Benediction, and she sends them forth out of her bosom; or she receives seeds brought from elsewhere by Winds and Rains, and o­ther means, and cherishes them in her lap; which manner notwithstanding does appertain to that which follows. For in the second place, some Plants spring from others. For first some Plants are propagated by seed; some by roots, bul [...]s, boughs and branches, and some are propagated by one of these, others by more: some spring from seed alone, as Smallage, Marjoram, Henbane; others hardly or never of seed, as the Fig-tree; others late, as the Peony; others of a Root alone, as the Hop, and Acorus; others of seed and branches, as the Rosematy. And the way of propagation by branches is again threefold; For either the branch or bough plucked off, is simply stuck in the Earth; and so the Willow and Rosemary are propagated; or the branch is inserted into another trunk, which is called Grasting; or when the Suckers which arise from the Root are pulled away. Or when a branch neer the Root hath its lower half covered with Earth, the upper part remaining free. For then that branch sends out Roots into the Earth: which being done, a yeer or two after that branch is cut off from the Tree, and becomes a peculiar Plant: or of one Plant many are made. So the Dressers of Vineyards are wont to wean their Vines.

Moreover, Some Plants grow in moist places, others in dry. Those which grow in moist places, grow either in the water it self, or near the water, as on the banks, or upon Walls and Rocks, and other places, which are moistened by the appulse, or sprinkling, or vapor of the waters, as Liver-wort and Maiden-hair. Those which grow in the waters, grow either on the top, as Duck-weed, or from Roots. Also some never mount above the water, as the kinds of Alga, Sea-weed, or Ore-wood; others spring above the water, as Aquapium. Again, some grow in Brooks, others in Fountains, others in Ponds, Pools, and Lakes; some grow in the Sea, others in other places where water hath been, but now is not, as Xanthium, or Ditch-bur. Again, Land Plants do grow some on Mountains, Hills, Rocks, Walls, House-sides, upon hedges, in fields, meadows, Vineyards, Woods: others in plain places, earthy, gravelly, sandy, or clayish.

To the Native place also belongs this consideration, that some Plants are instead of ground to others which grow upon them, as to Moss and Misselto which grows upon the Oak, the Holm, the Pear-tree, the Hazel, the Linden, the Birch, the Apple-tree, the Plum-tree, the Fir, the Pine, the Elder, and Chestnut-tree.

Most indeed of the Ancients were of Opinion, That the Thrush having eaten Misselto­berties, the pulp being digested, the seed was cast out with the dung, and falling upon such Trees as the Thrush used to sit upon, from that a new Plant of Misselto sprung upon the said trees. But this conceit is not agreeable to Reason: For it is not probable, that the seed can so cleave the barks and pierce into the hard wood of a tree. And why should it not grow upon many more trees on which those birds nestle, as wel as on the foresaid? Nor hath there ever any seed been found in the maws of Thrushes that have fed upon Misselto-berrirs. Most likely therefore it is, That Misselto is like the horns which spring out of the bones of Ani­mals, and that the principles of Misselto, in a juyce Natural thereunto, being cherished by the internal heat, and assisted by the heat external, do grow together into this Plant.

Moreover, some Plants grow most speedily and attain their perfection, others very [Page 352]slowly; so that this difference is manifest in the Alder, Willow, Peach, Pitch-tree, and Oak.

Again, some last all the yeer, as Trees and Capillary Herbs; some continue not. And of these some die and grow no more, as Wheat, Barley; others grow again, as Gentian. And of these some last all the yeer, as Agrimony; and some perish within the compass of a yeer in several manners. For some last one month, others three months; some two years, others three, and others four. Again, some are perpetually green, as the Fir, the Box; in others their Leaves fall off, and grow again.

Moreover, some are fruitful, others barren; some bear flowers only, others both flow­ers and fruit; and some only once in their life, others often; and that either yearly, or every other year: and some flower in their first year; others in the second, third, and some not till their fourth yeer.

Also in their figure and other qualities partly arising from their forms, there is a great di­versity. For some are straight, others crooked, round, cornered, Turbant-fashioned, hol­low, solid, prickly, without any knot. They differ in substance, which is spungy, com­pact, soft, hard, thick, thin, fat, clammy. Some are temperate, others hot, cold, moist, dry; some are smooth, others rough, thorny, hairy, downy. The tast of some is sweet, of others bitter, biting, salt, harsh, sowr; others are void of tast. Also some Plants have tast in al their parts, others in some only. Some have no smel, others have a strong smel, others a sweet; some a vehement smel, others a weak; some smel totally, others only in some part.

There is no less variety in their colors. For though al Plants are green; yet some are more, others less green; some are of a light, others of a deep green; in some there is a whi­tish greenness, in others a yellowish, in some a reddish; some are spotted, and others have no spots.

Moreover, there is a great difference of Plants in respect of the parts whereof they con­sist. For the juyce wherewith they are nourished, and which answers to the blood in Li­ving creatures, represents water in some, milk in others, as in Spurge; in some it hath a Saffron dye, as in great Celandine; in others it represents Oyl: and therefore it differs much in color and tast. Also some juyce is wholsom, another purging, another vene­mous.

Again, The Fibres in some Plants are streight, in others oblique, smal, thick, soft, hard. The flesh is in some thick, compact; in others spungy, tastful, tastless; also it is of diffe­rent smel and color in different Plants. The Bark is fleshy, nervous, clammy, in color, tast, smel, much different: And the same differences we find in the Wood. The Matrix or Marrow, is in some solid, in others spungy.

Also there is a great difference of the Roots of Plants. You have a Root great, smal, long, short, continued, cut off; round like a Globe; single and manifold; fibrous; col­lected, spreading; deep, shallow; thick, thin; soft, hard; stiff, limber; crisped, even; streight, bending; compact, spungy; fleshy, barkish, woody; round, turbant fashioned; single, double; hairy, smooth; rough, glib; mossie, juycie, dry; consisting of scales, uni­form; crumbly, soluble, boylable, esculent; heavy, light; white, yellowish, red, black; sweet smelling, stinking; bitter, sweet. A great Root bears a great Plant; a little Root, a little Plant; a great Root bears a smal Plant, as in a Turnep; a little Root a great Plant, as in a Pine-tree: as Jul. Caesar Scaliger hath collected, and digested these differences, in 1. de Plantis.

The stems do arise some before the Leaves, others with the Leaves, in some they are per­petual, in others annual; in some streight, crooked, trailing on the ground, growing up­right, thick, thin, solid, hollow, knotty, without knots, woody, herby, round, four square, three cornered, nervous, streaked, smooth, rough.

The variety of Leaves is thus digested by Jul. Caes. Scaliger, in 1. de Plantis. In respect of shape: there are round Leaves, as in Penny-wort, or Two-penny grass; almost round, as in Bindweed, smal Celandine, Asarabacca; oblong in Hysop; plain in the greatest part of Plants; round and long in Stone-crop; with a continued edg in the Birthworts; with a crested edg in the Lawrel; a Saw-fashioned edg in the Elm; blunt teeth in Scordium; large toothed in the two Cichories; ful of bendings in the third kind of Cichory, which they call Monks-head; forked in the Caucalis or bastard Parsley; singered in Ellebore and Woolfs-bane, lobed in Fern, hair-like in Fennel. In respect of their Surface, they are rough, biting, sharp-pointed, in Borrage, Nettles, Artichoaks; they are prickly either by reason of their kind, and that continually, as the But-Thistle; or by age in a kind, as the [Page 353]Sow-Thistle. Some have for Leaves real Thorns, as the Corruda or wild Asparagus; some as it were Thorns or Prickles, as the Juniper. Many have thin leave, Purslane have thick. The Leaves of most Plants hang on by a smal stalk, which is streight or crooked, long or short. Some have no stalks, as the Lilly. Also from the places of the Plant; from the root, from the stem, from the branches; on the top; on the bottom. The Flower-de luce hath sharp-pointed Leavs, most Plants have them blunt. In respect of Quantity: they are great, little, broad, narrow; single, manifold, In point of relation and scituation, some grow thick and close together, some grow thin and far asunder. In respect of colour; they are al in a manner green, but with a vatious greenness; some few are pale-green, as a sort of O­rach; some red as another sort of Orach and Beets. Also some naturally die by sickness in the Autumn, as the Bramble, the Vine, the Apple-tree. In point of scituation; some stand bolt upright, others hang down, some are saddle-shap'd, crooked, crisped, rouled together, hol­lowed as the Lettuce; streaked, nerved, veined, with bending Gutters. And what hath been omitted in the former differences; as the soft, hard, leatherish, limber, brittle, shining, dul, woolly, hairy, smelling sweet, acid, bitter, salt, sweet, harsh, tastless, continued, with holes bored through, or holes as it were, as in St. Johns-wort. Also the dispositions of trembling, of falling, of abiding, and turning according to the Sun. Also of order; some are set in a confused manner, others are orderly placed; some alternatively do cloath the branch at equal distances, some are set just one against another, whether they be two, three, or four, com­passing the branch like a Crown. Some breed one Leaf upon another.

Flowers do some of them come out before the Leaves, as in the Peach; others after the Leaves; some come out the first year with the Plants, others the second or third yeer, and some later. Also in respect of the time of the yeer, there is great variety. For some flower in the Winter, as black Hellebore; some at the beginning, others at the end of the Spring, some in the Summer: and some flower once a yeer, others twice, others thrice. Also the scituation and place from whence Flowers grow, is not the same: for the most part, they grow out of the stock, the branch or twigs; yet somtimes from the Roots. And some flowers stick on the smal stalks, and those either long or short; Some come out of one Cup, others out of divers Cups; some come out like clusters of Grapes, others like ears of Corn, others in a round tuft, on some there are more flowers, on others fewer, and some of them have many, some few leaves. Some Flowers are fertile, others barren, and these do some of them compass the fruit, others are seated therein. Also there is a great difference in the falling off of the Flowers, some fall off more slowly, others go away in Down, some are contracted, others dried.

The same variety is in the colors, odors, tast, and shape, al which can scarce be perfecty set down.

Finally, The same variety is to be seen in the Seeds, and Fruits. For some Plants bear fruit, others not, as Harts-tongue. Of those which bear fruit, some bear much, others lit­tle; some once every year, some twice, others thrice; again some beat fruit only once in three yeers. Some bear fruit early, others late; the Mulberry Tree flowers late, its fruit comes suddenly to perfection; contrariwise the Peach-Tree soon flowers, but is long ere it bear fruit. Again some flower late, and bring forth late fruit. Some have fruit and no flower, as the Fig-Tree; some have flowers without fruit, as the Flower-de-luce; but for the most part the fruits come out of the flowers. Some have fruit of only one kind, others of divers kinds, as the Oak. Some produce fruit from their root and stem, some at their boughs, others on the boughs under the leaves, on the leaves, above the leaves; and the fruit sticks upright, or dangles, or sticks fast, or sits, or cleaves, with a stalk, without a stalk, single, double, one, divers, thick together, here and there, far asunder, rare.

The Seeds grow, some of them naked, others are shut up in some other substance. And some are contained in some humor, others in a shel or bone, others in an hollow bag, and somtimes in one fruit one seed, and somtimes many, either ranked in order, or without or­der. There is no less diversity in their figures; some are round, others oblong, some repre­sent one thing, some another. In the bags or cods wherein the seeds are contained there is the like Variety. For some of the Cods may be eaten, but the grain not, as the Ceratia or Careb fruit. Of some the pulp only is esculent, as the Cassia: some cods are not at al esculent, as of Bean, Lupines, horned Poppy; some boyled are all eaten cod and fruit, as french Beans: of some only the Surface is eaten, the skin being left, as of Pease and the Pigeons-Vetch. Also from the figure there is much difference: also from the substance of the Grains, their magnitude, figure, number, marrow, bark, color, scituation. Scaliger in 1. [Page 354] de Plantis. In fruits also, the Rind wherewith they are covered, is thin or thick, hard, boney, woody, smooth, rough; and al fruits are covered with flesh, skin, or shel. And with it they are either totally covered, or half covered, and that not after one manner. For an Acorn is covered in one manner, an Hazel Nut after another manner. Also there is great diversity of tast in fruits; yea and in one part there is one fruit, in another another. Also some fruits may be eaten, others not; and in some that which is to be eaten is within, as in Almonds; in others both the kernel may be eaten, and the pulp which doth compass the same.

Now to illustrate these differences of Plants with examples would be too redious. This as it hath been done by others; so Andreas Matthiolus a most learned Herbalist, in his Pre­face upon Dioscorides, hath both collected all this variety, and shewed how Plants differ in their native place, their roots, stalks, flowers, seeds, and fruits.

Chap. 5. Concerning the History of Plants.

FOrasmuch as that which Jul. Caes. Scaliger writes in his Exercit. 104. sect. 6. To collect out of Books such things as have been delivered by the ancients is very dangerous: the true knowledg of things is learnt of the things themselves; is both true in other things and most true in the Doctrine of Plants: they that would gain the knowledg of Plants must of necessity know the Plants themselves. And although in this Age of ours, he Art of Printing hath afforded great helps to this Intent; seeing not only the History of Plants hath been described and published by many, but also the Plants have been delineated, and painted out with elegant pictures, by many learned men, especially Tragus, Matthiolus, Fuchsius, Da­lechampius, Pena, Lobelius, Dodonaeus, Clusius, Taberno-montanus, Baubinus and others; by which it is much easier to know the Plants than by their descriptions alone: ne­vertheless Plants are best of all known by view of the Eye-sight.

And seeing in this place it is impossible, by way of compendium to reckon up al plants, much more impossible to describe the same; and that yet it is very profitable to the know­ledg of Plants, to have the knowledg of certain general heads, to which al Plants may be re­duced; I have thought good in this place to propound certain Tribes, and a method as it were of Herbarisme, with the names of the principal, and the virtues of such as are most in use. For though I know some have been extreamly sollicitous, laboring to reduce all to Dichotomies: yet how unhappily they have acquit themselves therein, the success doth shew. And therfore I have chose herein rather to imitate Lobel and others, who have distri­buted some Plants at least into certain Tribes. It wil be easie for any man to fetch the per­ty divisions and enumerations from the foresaid Authors, and there to see their Pictures and Descriptions. Only this I shal hint by the way, that many are indeed superstitious in reckoning up abundance of names and differences of Plants; but very short and bare in seeking out their virtues. It is better in my opinion, to know fewer Plants, and to under­stand their virtues withal, than to be able to reckon up the names of abundance, which ma­ny illiterate Gardeners are able to do; and to be quite ignorant of their faculties and Qualities.

Chap. 1. Of the Sensitive Soul in General.

AS the Vegetative Faculty is common to all Living things; so in all Living Creatures there is Sense, which is common both to Man and Beast. By the faculty of Sense Animals are distinguished from Non-animals, as Aristotle hath it de Juvent. & senect. cap. 1. and de sens. et sensil. cap. 1. Wherefore having treated of Souls in gene­ral, and of the Vegetative or growing Soul, and of Plants; we now come to the Sensitive Soul, and to treat of Living Creatures.

And here in the first place, The sensi­tive soul is not the specifick form of a­ny beast: as we did before concerning Plants, so we must signifie, That the Sensitive Soul is not the form of any Ani­mal, though void of reason; nor is a Horse a Horse by vertue of its principle of sense; for so a Pike-fish should be an Horse, nor would a Lyon differ from a Dog. Yet is it most manifest, that these Animals differ in their forms, and in their specifical operations depen­ding thereupon. But what those specifick forms are, is not easie to tel, but they are known by their specifical actions. Bruits are not ratio­nal: And though many bruit Beasts perform wonderful actions by their specifick forms; yet are they not such as that we should therefore hold them to be Ra­tional, and to partake of understanding. For as Scaliger, Exercitat. 317. s. 5. rightly proves, No living Creature (except Man) performs actions properly Rational. And the holy Scripture attributes Reason to Man alone, as being created after the Image of God, Ecclus 17. ver. 16, 17, 18. Psalm 32. ver. 9.

But that we may treat of the Sensitive Soul in general; The fa­culties of the sensi­tive soul: there are three faculties thereof; the knowing, desiring, and moving faculty. The knowing comprehends the external and internal senses so called: Appetite follows knowledg: finally to the thing known the living Creature moves. And seeing the knowing faculty goes before the rest, in the first place we must treat thereof, and for the same cause we must first speak of the external Senses. And here you must observe, The word sense taken two waies that the word Sense is taken two waies; somtimes for the Soul it self, or its Faculty; somtimes for the operation which proceeds from the Sensitive Soul, and is called Sensation.

Now to the performance of Sense these four things must necessarily concur. First, The Sensitive Soul: Secondly, the Organ: Thirdly, the Object: And Fourthly, the Me­dium, which comes between the Organ and the Object. For in the first place. Although Sensation is attributed to the whol Animal, Soul and Body; yet the sensitive Soul is the Pri­mary Efficient thereof, and the body is sensitive by means of the soul, which is the sensator or perceiver of things by the senses. For it is the Entelecheia or act by which a sensible Ani­mate Body perceives things without it self. And therefore a dead body void of a sensitive soul hath no longer the use of sense. Now the secondary Efficient is the Instruments of Sense, which are also necessarily required to sensation. For although the soul be essential­ly present in the whol body; yet is it no where the Author of any sense, where it hath no Organ: and although the same Essence of the Soul which is in the Eye, be also in the Foot; yet because in the Foot there are no Instruments either of seeing or of hearing, in the Foot it neither sees nor hears.

Now the Instruments of Sense (to use the words of Scaliger, Exercitat. 297. Sect. 3.) The Or­gans of the senses: are two: The Spirits which have most affinity to the Faculty; and the Members which have most affinity to the sensible Object. For the Spirits are so subtile, that they may be almost reputed immaterial. They receive the imprinted species or representations of Objects. But the Instruments are the conveighers of the Spirits. And although the Organs of the Senses consist of many parts; yet one above the rest is the chief Instrument of Sensation: which Aristotle also tels us in these words, 2 de part. animal. cap. 1. All sense is caused by means of the similar parts, because every sense is of some one certain kind of thing, and each sensitive part is accounted capable of some one sensitive kind of things.

Now the Object is that which is perceived by the Sense, viz. The sensible qualities. the Ob­jects For although the Objects of the Senses are said to be singular or several things, and corporeal substances; yet substances are not perceived by the sense, as they are substances, but as they are endued with sensible qualities, and contain in them the formal Nature of a sensible Object. For Peter (for examples sake) is seen as he is colored; is felt as he is hot, cold, &c.

Now a sensible Object is twofold; of it self, and by accident. That is sensible of it self, Sensible object twofold; which primarily affects the sense, without the intervention of any other thing, as color is perceived by the sight primarily and of it self. But that is accidentally sensible, which is not perceived of it self, but by help of some other thing wherewith it is joyned and coupled. For example sake, when we say, I see a sweet thing, meaning Milk: the whiteness of the Milk is seen only of it self, which is the proper object of the Eye; but the sweetness be­cause joyned with that whiteness, is said to be seen.

A thing sensible of it self, is again twofold; Proper and Common. The Proper is that which can be perceived by one sense, and no other; and concerning which no Error can be committed, as color by the sight, sound by the hearing, &c. But the Common is that which is not proper to one sense, but common to divers. And these are five: Magnitude, Figure, Number, Motion, Rest; as Aristotle reckons them 2. de Animal. cap. 6. text. 64. And to these general Heads may al those be referred, which others reckon up; as neerness and far­ness, which Scaliger in Exercit. 66. makes a sixt common sensible thing; Scituation, Continuity, Separation, Roughness, and Smoothness, and others which are wont to be rec­koned.

Now which way the common sensibles do affect the senses, is controverted amongst Au­thors, while some say that peculiar species are by them imprinted upon the Senses, and o­thers deny it. But their Opinion is neerer the truth, who hold, That the common Sensibles do present no peculiar species or representations to the senses; but only determine the spe­cies or representations of the proper sensibles, and add to them a peculiar manner. For be­cause the Sensitive Qualities are not perceived separated from their subjects, but together with them, the proper enters the sense with the common by one simple species or representa­tion, yet somwhat qualified: and color appears after one fashion in a square Body, after another fashion in a round. But if the common sensibles should send forth proper species, they should also do it without the proper ones. But that they do not do, which appears in transparent things, as the Air, whose figure we do not perceive by its color which is none at al, but by the containing body, rather by imagination than by sense.

Yet we do not say that the common sensible objects are perceived by accident, but by them­selves secondarily. For there are three things which belong to a sensible by accident, which do not belong to a common sensible. First, a sensible by accident acts nothing upon the outward sense, whereby it is said to be accidentally discerned, but is only joyned with that which of it self affects the sense. Again, a sensible thing by accident may be perceived of it self, by some peculiar faculty in the Perceiver, whether it be some external or internal sense, or the understanding. Finally, it may easily be perceived by its proper power.

Now seeing al action is performed by mutual touch, and the sensible object is many times far distant from the Organ of sense; the Question is, how the object affects the sense. Herein al sound Philosophers agree, That some quality is sent out of the object unto the sense. Now qualities are twofold, some real or material, others spiritual or in­tentional; as was said before in Book 2. chap. 2. and the spiritual are nothing but Pictures and Images of the sensible objects, flowing from them, pure, thin, and free from the concre­tion of matter; and that there are such spiritual qualities experience it self doth teach us. For in the Summer time, we see the cloaths of such as lie under a Tree painted green with the color of the Tree; and a cloth held beside a Glass ful of Claret, appears red; and other [Page 370]examples Scaliger brings, Exercit. 80. Sect. 8. and Exercit. 298. Sect. 3. And in general the same thing is taught by artificial Glasses, which receive the Images even of things re­mote. And the same is apparent also as to other senses. And that the Nature of sensible spiritual species or representations is quite different from that of material representations, Leo Hebraeus shews in his Dialogue de Amore, Lib. 3. by many reasons. The first is, be­cause al other qualities diffuse themselves successively and by degrees through their subject, but light penetrates suddenly and in a moment through a transparent body. Secondly, a quality when it comes changes the natural disposition of the subject; but Light makes no alteration in the transparent body, save that it enlightens the same. Thirdly, other qualites do not extend themselves through an infinite space, but light does. Fourthly, that though the efficient cause of other qualities be removed, yet there remains some impression upon the subject; but the Illuminator being removed, there is no light remaining. Fiftly, other qualities are moved with their subject; but Light is not moved when the Air or Water is moved. Sixtly, many qualities of the same sort in one subject are joyned and mixed to­gether; but many Lights are not jumbled nor confounded, but two Candles make two sha­dows, three make three shadows, &c.

The first Question therefore in this place is, Whether al the senses do receive only spiri­tual repre­sentations of things? Whether all the Senses receive spiritual re­presentations of things. Some indeed have been of opinion, that spiritual representations are not necessary in al the Senses, but only in the sight; and that al the other senses are wrought upon by material qualities issuing from their objects. But this opinion is false, and al the senses are wrought upon by their objects with spiritual species or representations. And seeing of al the senses feeling is most terrestrial and most drowned in matter, and its object seems to have most assinity with material qualities, if we shal prove that this sense is not wrought upon by real but spiritual qualities, the same wil be proved of al the rest. But heat according to their opinion, acts upon the touch materially; and therefore produces another heat therein; which nevertheless is false. For al the senses are said to perceive the same numerical object whereby they are affected; which observation is true in spiritual qualities. For although an accident or real object does also differ from a spiritual, numeri­cally, if it be considered in it self and according to its own Nature; yet as being the image thereof it resembles and represents the same, it may be termed the same numerically; and the sense perceiving the spiritual image of a thing, is said to perceive the thing it self; but not so, if it perceive a like real quality produced thereby. So he that hath seen the image of Aeneas, is said to have seen Aeneas: but he that hath seen Ascanius his Son, is never said to have seen Aeneas. The same appears from the difference betwixt a material and spiritual quality. For since the action of the first qualities is true motion, and is performed in time, and seldom produces in the Patient a quality answering in degrees to its own vertue, by reason of the resistency of contrary qualities; it would follow that sense should be performed in time and leisurely: also that the sense should seldom perceive the true degree of its object, but com­monly a lesser. But seeing it is not thus in sense, we must hold that only spiritual species or representations, which have no contrary, are perceived by sense: which opinion also Aristotle professes to hold in 2. de Anima, chap. 12. text. 121. Which also is exceeding manifest in most of the tangible qualities, which if they should act materially upon the touch, they should produce therein a real quality like themselves, and the organ of feeling should become hard by feeling an hard thing, soft by feeling a soft thing: whereas these qualities have no such activity; and no such thing is found, either in the Feeling, or any other sense.

Nevertheless you must here observe, that indeed al sensible species or representations of objects are qualities not material but spiritual, and Images or Pictures of the sensible ob­jects flowing from them, as was said in the place before alleadged; and that nevertheless there are some differences of them, and that some are drowned in the matter and cannot get out, others diffuse themselves far from the Body from which they arise, being tied to no matter. The lowest of the Senses is feeling, whose object does no where raise it self out of the matter, but being hid in the matter offers it self to the sense. So that nothing is per­ceived by the touch, but what immediately touches the sensible body. And just so it is with tasts, which never affect the sense of tasting at a distance; but whatever affects the tast must immediately touch and affect the tongue. But the visible species or Images of things, imi­tating the most noble Nature of Light, are free from matter, and at far distances are carried to the sight and affect the same, no body coming between wherein they adhere. After the same manner Sound is diffused to a long distance, and penetrates not only the Air, but also Mettals, especially those that are less solid. Betwixt these species or images, viz. The [Page 371]tangible, tasts, and visible representations, smels are as it were of a middle nature. For they for the most part, though they are not brought to the organ of smelling without a subject, as the visible species are brought to their organ; yet is there no necessity that the thing smelt should be wholly applied to the nostrils, but smelling things do send forth cer­tain vapors, which are not themselves odors properly to speak (though some Physitians do so think) but the odours are in them; nor can the species or representations of smels be car­ried without them, into distant Places.

Now as touching the original of the sensible representations, we need not vex our selves, The origi­nal of sen­sible spe­cies. nor introduce any agent sense, to form sensible species out of the objects. Such is the nature of qualities properly sensible, and this power they have, That they can multiply themselves by sending forth their Images; and al forms can multiply themselves, some both really and spiritually, some spiritually only. And if any shal ask, What way they do it? We can answer him no more than if he should ask us how or why Fire heats. The Me­diums of the senses.

Also a Medium is necessary to Sensation. For seeing the senses are only virtually affe­cted by the object, a Medium must needs come betwixt: which also Aristotle affirms, 2 de Anima, cap. 11. text. 114. We perceive all sensible objects through some Medium: And in 2. de Anim. cap. 9. t. 98. It is common to all, that a thing laid upon the Organ of Sense cannot be discerned. And al these things must concur, if Sensation be made, and that right­ly disposed to; whereof if one be absent, or be not rightly disposed, the Sensation either ceases or is vitiated.

Now wherein the Nature of Sensation consists, Authors vary; nor is the Controversie smal, Whether Sensation be meerly a Passion, and nothing but the reception of the repre­sentation of sensible things? Or whether besides the reception of the species there is any other action of the Soul concurring thereto? I spare to relate al the Opinions of others, which are at large by Authors related and confuted; only I shal set down that which seems to me most true, and this it is: The sensible species, or the object which sends forth the sensible species, is not the agent or active principle of Sensation: for Sensation is the work of the Soul, and that an immanent work, not can be attributed to any external thing, especially an accident; but it offers and represents to the sense the thing sensible as the immediate ob­ject. Nor is Sensation only Reception; which besides other things, is hereby apparent, in that very often, when the sensible species is received in the organ, there is nevertheless no sen­sation, because the soul intent upon other things does not discern the sensible appearances: but Sensation is also a kind of Action. For Action which is more noble and worthy than Pas­sion is not to be denied to the sensitive faculty, since it belongs to the vegetative faculty, and to Accidents.

Yet we are not to hold two Senses, one active, another passive, really distinct: Whether there is an active and a passive sense? but the same Soul is said to act and suffer in a different respect. For the Soul inasmuch as it judges and takes cognizance, is so far said to act; but inasmuch as the species is received in the or­gan, so far the Soul also it self, which is in the organ and informs the same, is said to suffer. Wherefore to receive the sensible species belongs to the Organ; to judg thereof when recei­ved belongs to the Soul: yet because the Soul gives the Organ power to receive the species, the man­ner of sen­sation: and is it self the cause of Reception, Passion is also ascribed thereunto. Sensation is there­fore thus made: Spiritual Representations produced by a material object, are received in an animated Organ: being so received the Soul takes cognizance of them and judges of them, and so is said to be sensible: finally, the Action is received in the Organ, and communicated to the whol.

One thing remains yet to be explained, what credit is to be given to the senses, Whether the sens­c [...]n or bo [...] [...] [...] ­ject? and whe­ther they may err about their proper objects. The Epicureans did attribute so much to the Senses, that they thought we could never be deceived, and held that al which we learn is to be measured by the Rules of the Senses, as Austin saith in his Book de Civitate Dei, B. 8. cap. 7. Whence Lucretius in his Fifth Book, conceives that the Sun and Moon, are no bigger than they appear to us. Contrariwise, the Academicks wil give no credit at al to the Senses. That we may know what to think in this point, we must observe these things following: The sense may err three manner of waies: First about the kind or common nature of its object, as taking color for sound, sound for smel. Secondly, in the sort and particular na­ture of the object, as to take white for black, bitter for sweet. Thirdly, in its application to the object; when it so apprehends some sensible thing, as if it had in it some quality which it hath not indeed; as when the tast judgeth meat to be bitter, which is not so indeed, but seems so, by reason of the bitterness of choler, wherewith the tongue is infected.

Hence therefore thus we conclude the matter: The Sense cannot err about its object, after [Page 372]the first manner: for the sight never mistakes Sound for Colour, nor the Ear Smel for Sound: but concerning the common sensibles it may be thus deceived: for it often takes that which is moved to stand stil; and that which is divided into many parts it often judges to be one continued thing. But in the second manner it is not impossible for the sense to be deceived; and that which is blew seems many times far off to be black. Finally, in the Ap­plication both of the common and proper Objects it is deceived: so a white thing sending its appearance through a red Glass, is thought to be red also: for then the sight errs not in the colour, but in the application thereof to a wrong subject; and so it is when the Sun is seen through a red Cloud; for it attributes the redness which is in the Cloud unto the Sun. And therefore concerning its proper object, the sense can be deceived only these two latter waies; about the common object all three waies. Howbeit these errors may be avoided, especi­ally in the proper objects, if these conditions be observed. First, That the Organ be right­ly constituted, and there be no fault therein. Secondly, That the medium be fitly disposed, and infected with no strange quality. Finally, That that be a fit distance betwixt the Object and the Organ.

Chap. 2. Touching the Sight.

BUt that we may now come to the external Senses themselves, Five ex­ternal Sen­ses. which in the outer part of the Body do perceive outward things which are present, we acknowledg them to be five in number. For experience shews, that there are no more Organs of Sense, nor can we find more in Man who is the most perfect of Living Creatures, nor in other Creatures any more: and so many do both suffice the use of Living Creatures, and are able to bring the Understan­ding to the knowledg of Substances. More may be seen touching the sufficiency of the Senses, proved from their End, Sight the most ex­cellent Sense. Efficient, Subject matter, and Object, in Scaligers Exercit. 297. Sect. 2.3.4. Let us now begin with the Sight: For that is the most excellent and noble of all the Senses; seeing it apprehends more things, more excellent and divers, quicker and at a greater distance than the other Senses; Scaliger Exercit. 298. Sect. 6.

Now Sight is an external Sense, Its defi­nition. perceiving and discerning the representations of things visible. And Vision or Seeing, is the apprehension of visible things by the Soul ex­ercising its sensitive faculty in the Eye. The Or­gan of sight The Organ of seeing is the Eye, receiving the visible species or shews of things like a Looking-Glass: Hence is that common saying that the Eye is the Looking-Glass of nature, and that a Looking-Glass is the Eye of Art, as Coelius Rho­diginus hath it in Ant. Lect. Lib. 3. Cap. 28. But the chief part of the Organ is the Chry­stalline humor, for the sake whereof the other parts of the Eye were by nature or­dained.

The Object of Sight, Its Object. is that which is visible. Now what that is, we are to consider. Now although many things are said to be seen; yet as to the proper object of sight, the contro­versie seems to be chiefly of Light and Color: For the best Philosophers do somtimes say, that Light is the first thing visible and that which is visible of it self: and somtimes again, they say the proper and adequate object of the sight is Color, and that all visible things are coloured. Howbeit these two Opinions are not contrary, but if they be rightly explained they include the true opinion concerning the Object of Sight: For indeed the adequate ob­ject of sight is colour, and whatsoever is seen under the notion of colour; and therefore light it self inasmuch as it is said to be seen, is comprehended under colour, and is as it were a whiteness. Howbeit, you must observe, it is one thing to be visible, another to be actual­ly seen. All colour is of its own nature actually visible, nor doth it receive its visibility from any external Cause; and though it should never be seen, yet were it visible of its own nature, saies Scaliger, Exercit. 325. Sect. 4. and that colour which is in the dark, and deep within a thing, is actually colour, yet light is required that it may be actually seen.

Now Aristotle defines colour, What Co­lour is. in his B. De sens. & sensibl. cap. 3. The extremity of that which is transparent in a terminated body, or the Extremity of a transparent thing termi­nated: which definition that it may be rightly understood, it is to be observed, that colour belongs to al things by means of perspicuity, and that transparency terminated is the Subject of colours. For transparency being condensed, so that it can be no longer seen thorough, nor transmit the Images of other things, becomes coloured, and is said to be terminated: for it prescribes bounds and limits to the Sight, and is an hinderance that other things cannot be seen which lie betwixt it and the sight; for although that same colour also which is in the middle and depth of a thing, is also colour: yet he seems rather to have defined that which [Page 373]is actually seen, and is in the Surface. For Colour is not the Surface as some ill expound A­ristotle, but in the Surface: and the extremity of a body as a body is one thing, and the extre­mity of a diaphanous or transparent body considered as such is another. Now the term or bound of a Diaphanous or transparent body is where it becomes dark.

Colour therfore hath its Original from the termination of that which is transparent: And that is two waies; first only by condensation of the transparent body, without the admixture of another body, after which manner the Stars come to be seen. Again Colour is made by the mixture of a dark body with a transparent. So Fire which is of it self transparent, if it be mixed with exhalations and fumes, appears of a red colour; and the same comes to pass in the Air and Water: for these three Elements are transparent, though in a various degree; for Fire is most of al transparent; after that the Air; Water seems to have some darkness in com­parison; but the Earth is absolutely dark. And therefore by the mixture of the earthy parts with the other Elements sundry colours arise. But in the first place, that which is trans­parent becomes white; and therfore that which is transparent, light, and whiteness, are al­most of the same nature: in like manner, Intransparency, Darkness, and Blackness are also of kin. And these are the first, simple and extream colours, which do also proceed from the first simple Bodies, and all other colours consist of a mixture of these; al the sorts where­of to reckon up in this place would be too tedious; touching which Scaliger hath many ex­cellent things in his 325. Exercitation.

Now apparent colours are made of the Species of real colours mingled with others. Apparent Colours how made And therefore when the Sun's light is mingled with the colour of Clouds, various colors do result therefrom. Therfore we conclude that colour is visible, but that illuminated or shining co­lour is only actually seen.

Whence also a Cause may be rendred why some things are not only seen themselves, but make others to be seen; and some things can be seen themselves, but cannot make other things to be seen: and others again can neither be seen themselves, nor make others to be seen. For some things have an inbred light proper to themselves; some only an adventitious or borrowed light. Such as have an inbred light can be seen without the help of other things. And such as have it plentiful and potent, as the Sun and Fire, do also make other things visible; but such as have little light in them, and so little as can only render them visible, and that but in the Night, do not at al help other things to be seen; such as are some rotten woods, Glow-Worms, and such like: but those things that have no innate light, can neither make other things visible, nor are they visible themselves, unless they be enlightened by some other thing.

Now because Light is necessary to Sight, it is worth our enquiry how it concurs thereto. How light concurs to sight. Some hold, that it is only required to illuminate the object and medium, others that it is ne­cessary also to inlighten the Organ. As to the object, it is altogether necessary that it be illuminated, that it may be actually seen; and that appears by experience. For although the whol Air which is about the Party seeing be illuminated, yet if that which is about the colour be not illuminated, the colour cannot be seen: for the colours of themselves if they be not illustrated by light, do remain sluggish as it were, so that they cannot produce an Image of themselves; and light is the act of colour, not to make it to be, but to make it visible, as Scaliger saies, Exercit. 75. S. 7. Also for the Medium light is requisite: yet is it not necessa­ry that the whol be illuminated, but only that part which is about the thing visible: and so light seems not necessary to the medium as a medium; but only in respect of the visible object therein residing. For even when we are in the dark we see those things that are in an illuminated Medium; and in the deepest wels, where no light reacheth, we see the Stars even in the day time.

As to the Organ, we avouch with Aristotle, de sens. & sensibil. Cap. 3. that as without, so within, there is no seeing without light: howbeit we hold that it is rather an inward and inbred than an external light, which the Eyes of many Creatures that shine in the night, do witness. But that an Eye which is in the thickest darkness can be illuminated and illustra­ted by a light so weak, as to be able to inlighten things close by it (as for example that which shines from rotten wood) is improbable: As also it seems impossible that a light and colour smal and weak, far distant from the Eye, can any waies inlighten the whole Air as far as to the Eye.

And because that Light is altogether necessary to sight, it is enquired, Whether Light it self be seen whether it also be seen. We answer: That Light while it is in a transparent medium is not seen, as that which, but as that wherewith; and that it is not seen of it self, but by accident; because it makes colours to be actually seen: and when we see colour, we judg that the Air is illumi­nated.

But the Medium of Sight is that which is transparent; The Me­dium of sight. and that which is seen is alwaies more darksom than the Medium. Hence we see water in the Air, and the same thing co­lored is seen in pure cleer water, and hid in that which is troubled. And therefore a thing colored may also be the Medium of Sight, provided it be not quite dark, but more transpa­rent than the visible object. So we se [...] smal creatures inclosed in Amber.

The Manner of Sight remains yet to be explained, Whether sight be caused by receiving in, or sen­ding forth. concerning which there are no smal controversies amongst the Ancients. For though herein al consent, That to cause sight the object must of necessity be joyned to the organ; yet how that is done they are not al agreed. The Platonists (for as for Plato himself, some wil have him to be of one Opinion, and some of another; and Scaliger in Exercitat. 325. Sect. 5. cites places out of his Timaeus and Meno, whereby he endeavors to prove, That Plato conceived sight to be caused by spe­cies flowing from the Object to the Eye) very many skil'd in the Opticks, and al ancient Philosophers in a manner until Aristotle, held that the Optick spirits and raies went out of the Eye to the Object, and laid hold of the same.

But this Opinion is false and corrected by Aristotle, so that those Ancients are not so much to be blamed, as they are to be chastised who contrary to the judgment of that wise Man, do stil follow those toyes. For Sight as al other Senses, is an immanent action, and therfore it must be performed in the Eyes, and not without. And seeing every agent which acts up­on another thing without it self does not receive in it self the end and fruit of its action (as the operation of heating is not received in the agent but the Patient) the fruit also of sight if it were caused by sending forth of raies, would be in the thing seen, and not in the Seer; which is absurd. For the end of sight in a Living Creature is the accommodation of its life: but in Man besides that, also the knowledg of Nature, comprehension of God, and Happi­ness. Finally, What can that be, which out of so smal an Eye-bal can be sent so suddenly to so many things as we behold, so distant? A corporeal substance, such as are the Optick spirits, cannot be shed forth in so great plenty. For there is nothing that can suffice to re­pair so many spirits; nor can it be moved in an instant from the Eye so far as to the Hea­vens: Nor can any quality of it self perform the same; but if it should do this, the soul must needs be in it. But the subject of the soul is a substance, not an accident. Yea, in general, whatever you hold goes forth and causes sight, it must do it by means of the soul. Whence it would follow, that the Air hath in it not only one soul, but the souls of many li­ving Creatures. And those very arguments and many more which are brought by Zabarella Lib. 2. de Visu, cap. 4.5. do make against that Opinion of Galen and others, who hold, That the sight goes out a certain distance, and is united with the image of the visible object, and that so sight is caused.

Let us therefore hold with Aristotle, the true manner of sight. That sight is caused by the reception of visible ima­ges into the Eyes; and that as from every point of a lightsom body into every point of a transparent Medium Light is propagated: so from every part of a colored body, an Image thereof is sent into a transparent Medium, by a right line, and received into the Eye, and dis­cerned by the sight. For even the images received do appear within the apple of the Eye; and an excellent visible object hurts the sight; and the Eye is made of so many parts, for this Receptions sake.

Chap. 3. Of the Hearing.

AFter Sight we rank Hearing; the defi­nition of hearing. What sound is. for it (after Sight) is the most excellent Sense, and seems to contend therewith in point of nobility. Now the Hearing is an external sense, which by help of the Ear perceives audible things, viz. Sounds: for the object of Hearing is Sound. Now Sound is a quality arising from the Air or Water being smitten and broken by the vehement and sudden concussion of solid bodies.

To the generation of Sound three Bodies are necessary: How sound is generated. two of which mutually strike one another, or at least one performing the office of two, in two parts. Now these bodies ought to be solid, that they may gather and condense the Air, and not having many pores. Hence Spunges, and locks or fardles of wool knockt together, do cause no sound; because being ful of many pores, the smitten Air is received by them, and so it is not broken. Besides two solid bodies, a third thing is required, which may be intercepted betwixt those two solid bodies and broken. And this is that which also Fishes hear.

The Mediums which receive sound are the Air and the Water. the Me­dium of hearing. They commonly hold, that a certain inbred air of the Ear is the chief organ of Hearing. Contrariwise other later [Page 375]Authors, since the Organ of a sense ought to be a similar part animated, do reject this Air: and hold the principal instrument of Hearing to be a certain Nerve spred out in the E [...]r. And truly the former Opinion is not so allowable as this, unless it be explained as Capi­vaccius explains it; who teaches, that as the innate heat of the Eye is luminous or light­ful; so the innate heat of the Ear is Aerial, so that it may be affected by sound, and is com­monly called, complanted Air, that is, Air bred in the Ear from the first formation; but that it is not included in any peculiar Cavity, but ingrafted and implanted in the expanded Nerve.

Here we must not pass over the Eccho, How Eccho is caused. which is a reciprocal and reflected sound from a smooth and hollow place. For as Light and visible Images lighting upon a smooth and polished body are reflected: so sounds, if they light on a smooth, even, and hollow body, whereon they are not broken, they are reflected. And as in general, that sound may be heard, it is not necessary that al the air from the place where the sound is first caused, should be continually broken, as far as to the Ears; but it is enough if the image thereof be propa­gated so far; even so an Eccho is not bred by a new breaking of the Air, for so this reci­procal sound would not be articulated: but only the image of the former sound rebounding back to us. Nor may a word be only once reflected, but divers times, viz. If the voyce bea­ten back do light upon other hollow places, one after another. So the seven Cyzician To­wers did multiply words received by them with a manifold Eccho. And Pliny relates, how in the Porch of Olympia, which they therefore termed Heptaphonon, the same word was se­ven times repeated; Nat. Hist. Lib. 36. cap. 15. And Lucretius in his Fourth Book, thus writes:

Chap. 4. Of the Smelling.

THe Smelling follows after the Sight and Hearing in point of Excellency, the Defi­nition of Smelling. Its object. the Na­ture of the smelling. which is an ex­ternal sense perceiving smels, by help of the Nose or mamillary processes therein. For the object thereof is a scent or savor.

Now touching the Nature of the Smel, the vulgar Doctrine is, that it is a quality arising in mixt bodies, from a dry savory thing by the Heat mingled with moisture. For they say smel and tast are so of kin, that al things which have tast have also smel, and every thing that hath no tast, hath no smel neither. Hence mixt things only have smels, and not the Elements, which also have no tast: for neither have al mixt things smels, but those only which have tasts. For stones have no smel, which are also void of tast; but woods, and o­ther things which have tasts, have also smels. But herein nevertheless smels and tasts differ, in that driness prevails in smels, moisture in tasts. Hence Nitre hath a stronger smel than Salt, and Salt is moister than Nitre; because in Nitre there is more driness, in Salt more moisture; and things that smel, if they are over moistened they loose their smel. For the same cause, if after a drought the Rain fals, at first a certain smel is perceived; because the dry is mingled with the moist: but the smel lasts only so long as until the driness overcomes the moisture; but if the rain continue so long, that the driness is vanquished by the Moisture, the smel also ceases.

They hold the efficient cause of smels as of al works in mixt bodies to be heat, the Effi­cient cause of smel. which in due measure and manner mixes the moist with the dry. And hence they give the cause why most things that have smel, smel strongest when they are hot; why some things smel not at al unless they be heated; and why most things smel more in the day than in the night, in the Winter than in the Summer. For when in the mixt body moisture does very much abound, or driness is not rightly mixed with the moisture; there arises either no smel, or one which is imperfect. And that therefore there is need of heat, which may either con­sume the overmuch moisture, or mingle the same with the dry parts after a due man­ner.

But seeing what Scaliger saith of Tasts, Exercit. 279. Sect. 4. That Tast no more arises from the first Qualities than Laughter, is most true of smel: they labor in vain, who en­deavor to draw smels from the first Qualities; since they are not in the power of the first Qualities, and we must have recourse to nearer principles. And the Chymists do far more probably deduce odors from Sulphur, and hold that Sulphur is the prime subject of [Page 376]smels; of which we have spoke elswhere in our Treatise of the Consent and Dissent of the Chymists with the Aristoteleans and the Galenists, chap. 11.

The differences of Smels are little known; Differences of Odors. but because the Tast and Smel are of kin, and most smels have much affinity to tasts, the names of tasts are also given to smels. Now the Tasts do follow the Nourishment, which is examined thereby by Creatures that eat the same; and therefore these savors of themselves bring no pleasure or displeasure, but only by accident, as they are signs of good or bad nourishment. Hence the greasie smel of roast­meat is delightful to the hungry. These odours are exquisitely perceived by Bruits, and therein they excel Man-kind.

Yet there is also another kind of smels which does not follow the Aliment, but is of it self pleasant or unpleasant, as the smel of Spices and many other things. And with these smels, as also the beauty of colors, Men are either only or chiefly affected: and other Li­ving Creatures how exquisitely soever they smel other scents, yet herein they are far out­gone by Man-kind; so that either they take no delight from sweet smels, or if they do, it is very imperfect and maimed, and agrees but to a few of them. Of which see Scaliger in Exercit. 303. S. 2.

From what hath been said is not hard to judg what is the true object of smelling, and after what manner smels are perceived by the sense of smelling. That Odours are the object of smelling was said before, nor does any man deny it: but how that is to be understood, is not so manifest. Heraclitus (as Aristotle saies) de sens. & sensibil. cap. 5. Many ancient Philosophers, Galen and very many Physitians are of Opinion, That the sense of smel­ling is not only affected by some spiritual image and representation, but that a certain corporeal, aerial, thin exhalation does flow out of smelling things, and is perceived by the sense. Contrariwise, the greatest part of Peripateticks are of opinion, that a naked image of the smel does spiritually flow from the odorous body, as an image from a thing visible, and is carried to the organ of smel, and thereby perceived.

The latter Opinion seems truer to us, Odors are not sub­stances. provided it be rightly explained: yet that there is some truth in the former cannot be denied, though in some part it swerve from truth. For in the first place, this must of necessity be allowed, That odours are not substances, nor any thing corporeal: For the senses do not perceive substances, but only their accidents. A­gain, this also hath been shewn before; That no sense is affected by a real or material qua­lity, The smel­ling per­ceives only an image. but only by its representation, or a spiritual and intentional quality as they cal it. And therefore we must also hold the same as to the sense of smelling, that the said sense perceives nothing corporeal, nor yet any real quality, but only the Image thereof.

Nor must we in the next place deny that somwhat does flow from and exhale out of such things as smel, and is carried in the Air. For dayly experience teaches, That odoriferous exhalations do sundry waies affect the Brain, and very often change the temper thereof, and somtimes qualifie and rectifie the same, other whiles cause heaviness of head, as Hip­pocrates hath it in his 5. Sect. of Aphorisms, Aph. 28. Yea, and this comes not to pass in the Brain only, but many times by odorous exhalations we perceive our Nostrils, Eyes, and Face to be gnawn as it were, and pained. Moreover, we see that odoriferous things by lit­tle and little do for the most part wast and consume away. And when an odoriferous thing is taken away, the smel remains many times a long while after in the Air, which cannot be done by the images alone, which do not remain when the object is removed. Al which things teach, that oftentimes there flows from odorous bodies a certain corporeal exhalati­on, which hath a power of heating, cooling, and doing other things, which cannot be effected by bare species and images. This therefore we grant, That from many things a certain odo­riferous vapor exhales, and that corporeal savory vapors do flow from things that have smel: but yet we avouch that a spiritual species is required and presupposed to cause the sense of smelling. Whether the species of smel need al­waies the carriage of a vapor. But whether or no both are alwaies necessary, and whether the species of the Odor, which is properly perceived by the sense of smelling, is alwaies joyned with some corporeal subject or vapor, without which it cannot be carried to the Organ of Smelling, is yet in doubt, and this is the main hinge of the Controversie.

We have spoke before in cap. 1. of the difference of sensible species, and have granted that odours for the most part are indeed carried to the smel with a corporeal substance: but we deny that this is alwaies necessary, and hold that the exhalation which comes from the odorous body does not alwaies reach so far as to the Nostrils, yea, and that somtimes no such thing comes from the odorous body, and that the smelling is caused by spiritual quali­ties and images, of the savors proceeding from the odoriferous body to the organ of smelling. For if that same vaporous exhalation should be alwaies joyned with smels as their carrier, [Page 377]Fishes could perceive no smels in the water, nor could be allured thereby to seek the Bait: For since the nature of odoriferous exhalations does consist in a dry subject elaborated by heat, and the nature of exhalations is such as to ascend upwards, how should those exha­lations come to the bottom of the water? or if they should come thither, how wil they re­tain their driness and the integrity of their nature in the water, since odoriferous things when wet are wont to lose their smel? Moreover, how can there be so great and so long an efflux of vapors from odoriferous things, as may suffice to fil most large spaces? The whol odoriferous things verily which are but smal many times, if they were al turned into vapors, could not fil such distances. Yea, and we see many things do smel a very long time together, and yet are not at al consumed or wasted.

From the Premises also that Question may be explained; Whether Odours nourish? Whether Odors can nourish a man? For seeing the nourishment of a body ought to be a body, and we are nourished with the same things whereof we consist; and odors are qualities; we hold that they have no power to nourish. And whereas it is said that sick persons are many times refreshed with smels, and that Democritus for his sisters sake (whom he would not draw from the Feast of the Thesmophorist) did prolong his life three daies only by smelling to hot Bread; that must not be attributed to smels, but to odoriferous vapors exhaling from the Bread, and re­creating the spirits. Nor is that true nutrition which is made by apposition of a like sub­stance, viz. Of Blood elaborated in the Liver; but only a certain cheering of the Spirits.

As to the Organ of Smelling, though al agree herein, What is the Organ of the smell? that the Nostrils are the Instrument of smelling; yet it is controverted betwixt the Physitians and Peripateticks, what is the chief Organ of smelling. For the most Peripareticks do hold the proper Organ of Smelling to be the Nerves dilated in the Nostrils. Galen holds smel to be produced in the foremost Ventricles of the Brain, in 8. de usu partium, cap. 6. de olfactus Instrumentis, cap. 4. Other Physitians say, That from the Brain neer the Cavity of the Eyes, two Channels are derived to the bored bones of the Nose, whose ends seem like teats (whence they are called the mammillary or teat-like productions) and that in them as the proper instrument odors are discerned. Which Opinion is most agreeable to truth, and the greatest part of the best Physitians do follow the same. For the Brain is not the proper Organ of any external sense, but the common, as supplying spirits into the organs of the external senses, As to the No­strils, true indeed it is, That odors are perceived by them alone, and that these are the only waies Nature hath appointed to carry smels to the Organ of Smelling: yet the perception and judgment of Odors is not in them, but in those mammillary or Teat-like productions, which are placed before the Ventricles of the Brain, as the examiners of smels. For if we at­tribute the faculty of perceiving Odors to the Nostrils alone, and the Nerves in them dilated, what should hinder us from smelling, so long as we have our Nostrils? Yet Experience shews, That when those processes are obstructed, as is wont to happen in the Coryza, the Smelling is either abated or quite taken away, without any fault in the Nostrils. More­over, if Smelling were made in the Nostrils, we should perceive smels without breathing; whereas nevertheless we find by dayly experience, that the most odoriterous things being put to our Nose, we smel nothing unless we draw our breath; the reason whereof is, because those mammillary processes are placed within the Skul, so that smels cannot come thereto save by attraction of the Air.

The Medium through which Odors are discerned, is the Air and Water. The Me­dium of smelling. As to the Air there is no doubt. But that in the Waters also smels are discerned by Fishes, this is an argu­ment, that Fishes are allured by the smel of Baits; which Aristotle proves by many exam­ples, in his Book de Histor. Animal. Lib 4. cap. 8. And so much may suffice to have said of the Sense of Smelling.

Chap. 5. Of the Tasting

THe Tast is an external Sense, by help of the Tongue discerning savors. The De­finition of tasting: Whether tast differs from fee­ling: Which sense though some consound with feeling, and make it only to be a sort of Touch: yet they are questionless in an error, and we must acknowledg the Tast to be a peculiar Sense. For although the touch is somtimes generally taken for a sensitive power, which takes cog­nizance of an object, not removed but applied to the Organ (and in this manner the Tast may be called a kind of feeling, and so it is by Aristotle in that sence called.) for it does not perceive things distant as the sight does colors, but only savors applied to the Tongue; yet [Page 378]that signification is not so proper; and the Question is, whether the Touch be the same Sense, with that power that perceives Tangible Objects: which is denied. For they differ both in the Object and Organ: for the Object of the touch is tangible Qualities, but of the Tast Savors: and the tast may be lost in the Tongue, while the Sense of Touching remains entire. And therefore their Organs are quite different; and though in the Tongue there be Touch, yet where ever there is Touch there is not Tast; but only in the Tongue; whose thin soft and spungy flesh, the like whereof is not in the whol Body, is the propes Instrument of Tasting.

The Object of Tasting is Savor. Touching the nature whereof, we pass over the Opi­nions of the Ancients, Empedocles, Democritus, Leucippus, and Anaxagoras. The Peri­pateticks do thus teach concerning Savor. No simple Body hath any savor of tast, it being on­ly an adjunct of mixt bodies, and thereto three things are requisite: an earthy driness, a wa­try moisture, and Heat which is the Author of all operations in mixt bodies: Of which we have every where frequent signs and tokens: For Water which of it self is tastless, if it be strained through some earthy dry substance, it becomes savory, as appears in Fountains, which receive divers tasts from the parts of the Earth through which they flow: and the water of Lye is bitter, because it is strained through Ashes. Howbeit the Nature of tast consists more in moist parts than in dry: and it is a quality affecting the tast, arising in mixt bodies from the permistion of a watry moisture with a dry earthiness. And seeing the mixture of moisture with driness is various; and the watry moisturejoyned with earthy dri­ness which is the subject of Tasts is various, somtimes thicker, somtimes thinner, and the Heat which is the Cause of tasts is somtimes stronger, otherwhiles weaker, hence also sundry tasts do arise which are severally reckoned up, Kinds of tasts. by several Men. Most do acknowledg chiefly se­ven simple tasts or savors; and from their commixture others may arise, or at least they may be referred to them: Sweet, Sout, Harsh, Rough, Salt, Bitter, Biting. These tasts may be considered two manner of waies, either in respect to the first Qualities Heat and Cold, or to the sense of Tasting which they affect.

The former way they are chiefly considered by Physitians, and they serve them to know the Qualities of medicaments by, and are divided into Hot and Cold. Into three Cold, Sour, Harsh, Rough; three Hot in excess, the Biting, Salt, and bitter, and one moderately hot, viz. Sweet. And thus with Physitians the Harsh and Biting tasts are the extream tasts, the former the Coldest, the latter the Hottest of all others. The Philosopher considers them rather after the latter manner, and takes not their difference from the tangible Qualities, but from the Effect whereby they work upon the tast: and thus because that tast which is most contrary to sweet is the bitter Tast, and the one is most pleasant, the other most unpleasant: therefore these two are by Philosophers counted the extream tasts, the rest are interme­diate.

The sweet Tast therefore is most pleasing to the Palat, Sweet tast arising from the mixture of a wa­try moisture with an earthy driness, made commonly by a moderate heat. Such is in Bread, Milk, ripe Grapes, Figs, Licoris, Sugar, Honey. Although in these also some degrees may be observed in heat, for some are botter than other some; and those that come neerest a me­diocrity are most fit to nourish a man.

An acid sharptast consists in a matter thin and subtile, A tart tast and arises from a weak heat, or because in the mixture there are many watry parts which cannot be overcome by the Heat, or because out of the mixt body the hottest parts, especially those that are most pure, name­ly the Aery, An harsh tast are exhaled. Such a tast is in Vinegar, Sorrel, Juyce of Lemons. An harsh tast consists in a matter indifferently thick, and ariseth from a greater degree of cold, and a weaker heat than the Sour. A rough tast If the matter be yet thicker and the Heat weaker, and the Cold stronger, it causes a rough tast, which is in some unripe Apples, in Acorns, and Galls.

A Salt Tast is in an earthy matter, Salt tast not subtile, but rather thick and earthy: and it arises from an heat exceeding mediocrity. And therefore the first subject of a Salt tast is an earthy driness, through which a watry moisture is strained, adust, so that little of the watry humor remains therein: A bitter tast the biting tast yet from a smal portion thereof a great quantity of Water may be infected. In a bitter tast Heat is commonly yet greater, and its matter drier and more earthy. Final­ly from the greatest heat arises the biting Tast, and it consists in a subtile matter: and there­fore things so tasted havea faculty of burning, penetrating, and drying; such is in Pepper, Ginger, Garlick, Onions.

Thus I say, the Peripateticks and the Galenists endeavor to deduce the kinds of tasts from the first Qualities. But as was said before from the Exercit. 297. S. 4. of Scaliger, Tasts [Page 379]do no more arise from the first Qualities than Laughter. And what lost labor it is to endea­vor to give a reason of Tasts from the first Qualities alone, is learnedly shewn by L. Grillus in a peculiar Book de Sapore amaro & dulci. The Chymists more probably draw tasts from Salts, and teach that Salt is the first subject of Tasts, and that from the several kinds of Salts proceed the sundry kinds of Tasts, of which elswhere in my Tract. de Consens. et dis­sens. Cbym. cum Aristotelicis & Galen Cap. 11.

There is no external Medium required to tast, The Me­dium of tast. but if the tast of any thing is to be discer­ned, it must be applied to the Tongue. Yet the Internal medium is a spungy or rather po­rous Skin drawn over the Tongue, and the moisture of Spittle. For to this part the Tast is first communicated, whose representation is afterwards carried through the pores of the Tongue into the flesh thereof, and is there perceived by the Soul exercising the sense of Ta­sting. And so much for the Tast.

Chap. 6. Of the Touch.

THe last external Sense and the most common of all the rest, is the Touch, The touch. which per­ceives tangible Qualities. Touching this sense, Whether there be but one Sense of Touching. no smal Questions are wont to be agi­tated. And in the first place they are wont to enquire; whether the Touch be only one Sense in number,; or whether there be one power of Feeling, as there is one of Seeing, one of Hearing, one of Smelling, one of Tasting, or more. Aristotle moves this Question in 2 de Anima Cap 11. and brings this reason of doubting. There is one Sense of one first Contrariety: and one Sense hath one proper Object, to which all that it perceives may be referred: But the Touch seems not to have one common Object, but many: for it perceives Hot, Cold, Dry, Moist, Heavy, Light; Hard, Soft; Clammy, Brittle; Rough, Smooth, Thick, Thin; which cannot be reduced to one common kind, or one common notion, ac­cording to which they are perceived by the Touch. Many being perswaded by this reason, have held divers Tasts; some two, one to perceive Hot and Cold; another to perceive Moist and Dry; others three; the two aforesaid, to which they attribute also Hard and Soft, Rough and Smooth; and a third to perceive Lightness and Heaviness: others hold that there are so many senses of Feeling, as there are differences and contratieties of tangible Qua­lities. Others have yet added more senses of touching, to perceive Pain, Pleasure, Venery, Hunger, Thirst. Others contrariwise do hold that there is one only Touch or Sense of Fee­ling, which though it hath divers Objects, yet it perceives them all under some common noti­on; just as the Sight perceives White, Black, Red, Yellow, Green, under the common noti­on of Colour.

Now although it be hard to compose this Controversie, and most learned men have held, that no certainty can be determined in this Point: yet very many have thought it most pro­bable that there is only one faculty of touching. And several men have severally endeavored to reduce the sundry differences of tangible Objects to some one common Nature. For some say, though the Object of Feeling be manifold: yet is it contained under one common kind, though it want a name. And that it is a Quality that primarily follows a body as a body, or which immediately depends upon sublunary Bodies, and necessarily accompanies the forms of the Elements, and of the bodies of them compounded. Others also attribute to tangible Qualities one manner of affecting the touch, and that they say to be a changing of the complexion of the first Qualities, and hence the sense of feeling is said to be a sense of the temperament: and that therefore the first Qualities are the chief object of feeling, and the rest pertain thereto after a secondary manner; and such things as cannot be reduced to these, are common sensible objects, which constitute no peculiar sense. Finally, others distinguish betwixt the external sensibles, such as are Hot, Cold, Moist, Dry, Hard, Soft, &c. and betwixt the internal, which are perceived in the Feeler, as Pain, Pleasure, Hun­ger, Thirst. They conceive the external are perceived by one only sense. For although they are many, yet they may be reduced to one common notion: and indeed we find by ex­perience, that he who can by touch perceive one of those contrarieties, he can also feel the other by the same part: contrariwise he that cannot feel one of them, cannot feel the other. But they hold that Hunger, Thirst, Pleasure, Pain Corporeal, are discerned by another po­wet; seeing these powers and acts are so separated, that in the part wherein the external are perceived, Hunger, Thirst, and such like are not perceived.

As to the Organ, the Organ of feeling: it is not so easie to find it in this Sense as in the rest, and there are very great Controversies hereabouts, not only among the ancient Writers, but the later also: for some hold the Flesh, others the Skin, others some other thing to be the said Organ: but we conceive the true Organ of Feeling is a Membrane. For where-ever there is a Mem­brane, there is also Feeling; and where there is no Membrane, there is no Feeling. Hence the Brain feels not save by means of the Membranes; and the Membrane which compasses the bones being removed, the bones themselves have no more feeling. Moreover, because the Touch is a Sense most common, and is given to Living Creatures in their whol Bodies, to avoid the external injuries, therefore its Organ was to be spread al the body over, and that such an one as should have no other office in the Body: for every Sense hath its proper Or­gan. But if we consider al things in the whol Body, al have peculiar offices save a Mem­brane: the Nerves carry animal Spirit, the Veins Blood, and other parts (as is known) have other uses. And therefore this office cannot be assigned to them; and there remains only the Membranes which are both similar parts, and have no other use, but are given to Living Creatures only, that they might be the immediate Instrument of Feeling.

Chap. 7 Of the Internal Senses.

HAving explained the External Senses, we come now to the Internal, which are busied about matters sensible presented by the external Senses. For this is the chief diffe­rence betwixt the internal and external Senses, That the external are immediately affected by an external object, whence also they are called External: But the internal are not mo­ved by the external sensible object immediately, but they are moved by the external Senses; and therefore they are called Internal. But as touching the Number of the internal Senses the Controversie is so great (as may be seen in Francisc. Piccolhomineus, de sens. intern. cap. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. Francisc. Toletus in Lib. 3. de Anima, cap. 3. Qu. 6. Collegium Co­nimbricense in Lib. 3. de Anima, cap. 3. quest. 1. Artic. 1, 2, 3.) that it is a hard matter for a man to disintangle himself, the inter­nal senses are three: being herein engaged. We retain the common Opinion, which is the most probable, and acknowledg three internal Senses, from the diversity of Offices and Works by them performed, viz. Common Sense, Phantasie or Imagination, and Memory.

We must by al means hold a common Sense: Common sense For since Animals do know the differences betwixt the proper objects of sundry Senses; and the external Senses cannot perform this Office; since each of them knows only its own peculiar object: of necessity we must hold there is some internal Sense, which apprehends the objects of al the external senses (whence also 'tis called the common Sense) and discerns one from another, and does know that co­lor differs from sound, sound from smel, smel from tast, tast from what is hot, that which is hot from that which is black, &c. For the chief Offices of the common Sense are, to perceive the objects of al the external Senses by help of the said Senses; to know and per­ceive that we are sensible of this or that; to know the difference betwixt the divers objects of the Senses; to judg the privation and absence of the objects, as of darkness, silence, &c. to move the Phantasie and to offer Images and representations of things thereunto. This Sense therefore is as it were the middle stickler betwixt the Senses internal and external, and receives images from the external, and communicates them to the rest of the internal. Whence it is not unfitly compared to the Centre of the Circle, wherein five Lines concur and meet together.

Besides the common Sense the Phansie must also be added. Phantasie: For since in perfect living Creatures it is not only necessary to apprehend things present, but also diligently to con­sider that which is no longer present, that they may be incited either to seek or shun the same; among the internal Senses we must also reckon Phansie, which may retain the sensi­ble representations perceived by the common Sense, or framed by it self, and diligently exa­mine the same. And although it be altogether necessary, that the Phansie be first moved by the external Sense; yet after it hath once perceived the object, and hath committed the image thereof to the memory, afterwards even in the absence of the external object, it can as often as it list review and imagine over again the same image. But of necessity the Fan­sie must first be moved by the external Sense, and we can imagine nothing which we had not before perceived by the external Senses. And though we may imagine a Mountain of Gold and the Monster called a Chimaera, which we have never totally seen; yet we have seen [Page 381]them by piece-meal; and except we had seen Gold and a Mountain we could not imagine a Golden Mountain: so unless we had seen a Lyon, a Goat, and a Dragon, we could not ima­gine the Chimaera or Monster compounded of al those Beasts.

Finally, among the internal Senses the Memory is to be reckoned: the Me­mory: For because the Fansie without knowledg cannot receive the species or representations of things; and it can­not take cognizance of many things at once: therefore there is need of a faculty, which it self does not take cognizance, yet is subservient to cognition, that is to say, which may re­ceive divers sensible representations known by the Fansie, and reserve the same, and suggest and present the same thereto again when need is. Also Experience it self does witness, that indiseases of the inner Senses, one of them may be lost and destroyed or depraved, the other remaining safe and sound: and in Feavers it often happens, that the Patients their Memory being sound, do imagine that there are Fidlers and other things in their Chambers, and seek to pick flocks and seathers or straws where there are none: and such like examples are fre­quent in the Writings of Physitians: which is an argument that the Fancy is a faculty di­stinct from the Memory.

Now some do make a twofold Memory, Sensitive and Intellective: A twofold Memory. but it is enough to say that the Memory is a Faculty common to Man and Beast. But after what manner the act of remembring is performed, is a very obscute point. They commonly hold that sensi­ble objects do imprint certain images on the Brain or Organ of Sense, even as in Wax the Picture of the Seal is imprinted, which remains after the Seal is taken away. Whence they say, such as have an hard and dry brain have an hard apprehension of things, but retain them longer; but they that have it moist and soft, do easily receive, but cannot so long and faithfully retain.

But it is (peradventure) more advised to confess that in this point we are in the dark, than to hold such things; especially if you weigh that which Scaliger hath, in his 397. Exercit. Sect. 28. against this Opinion. For if Memory be made after this manner, since it is in a manner Infinite; in what spaces can so many Images be retained? in what seats can they be so disposed and ordered, that we may draw out, rank, direct, every one apart, and al to­gether. Now why a dry Brain is more apt for Memory, Scaliger brings a new cause in the place forecited, which may there be seen.

Now there are two acts of Memory, or of the remembring Faculty: Two acts of Memory the one of which is called by the name of the Faculty, Memory; the other Remembrance. 1 Memory. Memory is desined to be the iterated apprehension of a thing formerly known; or a repetition of what hath been formerly perceived by the Senses, just as it was perceived: For examples sake, if I am asked what's the name of the King of France, I can suddenly recite the same, 2 Remem­brance. as I have somtimes heard it named. But Remembrance is to go back from one or two things retained in the Memory, til we cal to mind somwhat which we had as it were forgotten: as if a man having forgotten a name, should go over al the Letters of the Alphabet, and joyn every Con­sonant to each Vowel once, and so make single syllables, til meeting with the first syllable thereof, he come thereby to cal to mind the whol name which he had forgotten. And therefore more things are required to Remembrance than to Memory; and Memory is com­mon to the Bruits, but not Remembrance: For to Memory it is enough that we apprehend a thing again, after the same manner as we received it: but to Remembrance it is requisite, that the thing be first forgotten, and then that we hold another thing fast in Memory, where­by we are brought again to the knowledg of what we had forgotten.

Nor does it seem necessary to hold any more internal Senses. Some indeed do add the Aestimative, to discourse from that which is known to that which is unknown in particulars, or to perceive those things which the Senses could not perceive: for examples sake, when the Sheep sees only the color, bigness, and shape of the Wolf with its eyes, and yet does not for these things fly the Wolf, they conceive it necessary to add an Aestimative Faculty, whereby the Sheep discerns the enmity of the Wolf against it self, which fals not under cog­nizance of the external Senses.

But this Opinion seems not agreeable to truth: For the Faculty of Reasoning and Dis­coursing is only in Man alone; and for the apprehension of al sensible things, the Fancie alone is sufficient: nor must we hold a peculiar faculty which they cal Aestimativa, because of the enmity, pleasure, hate, or pain which Animals perceive from somethings. For these are nothing in the sensible object it self, but passions and affections following upon the per­ception of a thing, and proceeding from a certain proper natural Instinct which is granted to living Creatures to stir up the appetite, either to seek or [...]un the object. For in the per­ception of al sensible things, these three things do follow one another in order: First the [Page 382]perception of a sensible object under the proper notion of an object: Secondly, pain or pleasure arising from the said perception: Thirdly, a stirring up of the Appetite, which either seeks the object as pleasing, or shuns the same as displeasing. The two former do pertain to the same faculty, viz. The sense or Phantasie, yet with some diversity. For the Apprehension of the object under its proper notion; is the work of the Sense as Sense, and the Fancy as Fancy; and al Living Creatures do perceive the object under the notion of an object after the same manner, both with the external Senses and the Phantasie: as al Creatures discern a white color as white, none as black. But the Apprehension of the ob­ject as pleasing or displeasing, is not of the Sense as Sense, nor of the Fancy, nor do the same things seem pleasing or displeasing to al Living Creatures: but this belongs to the Senses as they are limited and determined by the proper form of every Creature; which be­cause it is for the most part unknown to us, is by some called natural lustinct. Hence the sight of a Wolf is painful to the Sheep, which yet it is not to the Lyon, but rather a delight if the Lyon be hungry.

This Question is by Zabarella thus explained. But it may to the same purpose, yet peradventure more cleerly, be thus briefly resolved. In al living Creatures there is not on­ly the Vegerative and sensitive Soul; but also as was said before a certain peculiar specifick form, whereby every Living Creature differs from others of another kind, as for Instance whereby a Lyon differs from a Man, an Horse, an Ox, &c. This in Man kind is the Rational Soul; and in Bruits also, it is a peculiar soul, which though it be not a rational soul, yet it answers to the Rational Soul in Men, and is in some more noble, in others less noble; and to this al those more noble operations, which cannot be referred to the Senses, and are different in several Creatures, are to be ascribed.

And therefore their Doctrine is not true (among whom is Piccolhomineus, de sensibus internis, ch. 11.) who hold that it is one of the Offices of the Fancy, to ad subnotions, and to judg the objects to be agreeable or disagreeable to the Creature; also that it is the princi­ple of sundry admirable works, which irrational Creatures perform, as the Swallows ma­king her nest, the Spiders weaving her web, the Bees making her Honey-comb, &c. For as in Man, to reason is not a work of the Fancy; so in Bruits it is not the work of Fancy to act such things as are proper to their kind, but of a superior faculty, whereby every Bruit is distinguished from other Bruits.

Hence that Question of some may easily be decided, whether bruit beasts are ratio­nal? Whether Bruits are Rational or no? That they are not Rational is certain, because they are not Men. Mean while as a man not by his Fantasie, but by Reason is differenced from other Living Creatures: so the soul and specisick form of every Bruit hath a proper faculty above the Fancy, whereby it differs from other Bruits. And hence there is so much variety in the actions and works of Bruits, and some are more ingenious and crafty than other some; the Fox than the Hag, Ox, or Ass; the Bee than the Fly: Of which matter he that would rightly judg, let him consider what is written of the Works of Elephants, Dogs, Silk-worms, Bees, &c. and what dayly accurs in Nature.

Chap. 8. Of the Desiring and Moving Faculty.

HAving treated of the knowing Faculty of the Sensible Soul: we are now to speak of the Apperite. And although there are sundry Apperites, and as Scaliger in Lib. 1. de Plantis, writes, the Fare is said to have an Appetite to mount alost, the Iron to joyn it self to the Load-stone, a Plant to augment its moisture, an Horse to Ven [...]ry, a Man to bles­sedness; yet here we treat only of that kind of Appertire which they commonly cal Sensi­tive; What the Appetite is which is a power of the Soul, whereby a Living Creature hath an inclination towards somthing perceived by the sense. Its object is some good thing apprehended by Sense, whe­ther it be really good, or only appear so. For the Appetite rends to an end; and every end hath in it the notion of goodness. But although the Appetite is said to seek good, and fly from evil: yet evil also belongs to the Appetite under the notion of good; for to fly evil seems to the Appetite a good thing. From the Appetite as its acts proceed the Passions and Affections so called.

The Appetite of Living Creatures is followed by their voluntary motion; The Mo­tion of li­ving Crea­tures. for unless the Creature had a power to attai [...] [...]hat the Appetite desires, it were a vain thing for it to have an Appetite; but Nature doth nothing in vain, but hath granted a saculty to Animals spri [...] ­ging [Page 383]from the Sensitive Soul, whereby they can transfer either their whol Body, or some part thereof, from place to place.

Now to cause this Motion, five things are necessary. Motion how can­sed.

I. An Object, which may excite the Creature to move, and for the sake whereof it is moved. For a Living Creature is not moved in vain: but the Appetite is stirred up by the Object as its end and good thing desired.

II. There must needs be a directing Principle by which (being in the living Creature) the first motion is made. For voluntary motion is given to living Creatures, to seek out things profitable, and to sly things hurtful; which cannot be done, unless there be some power which may know the Object, and offer the same to the Appetite, and incite the same either to seek or to shun the same. And therefore this principle ought to partake of knowledg. Moreover, because a living Creature is moved not only to things present, but absent also; it ought to perceive not only things present, but such also as are absent. But these conditions do neither suit with the nutritive Soul, nor the external Senses, nor the common Sense: but only with the Fancy. For although the mind also may direct to Motion: yet it is a more remote principle of motion, nor does it move without the Fancy; whereas nevertheless the Fancy may move without the Mind; as we see in Bruits, which though destitute of Reason, yet are they incited to motion by their Fancies.

III. To come a little neerer, the Principle of Motion and that which commands the Motion is the Appetite. For because the motion of Animals is made to follow after some things pro­fitable and convenient, and to sly some things adverse and noxious; and that to the Appetite belong the affections of Love and Hatred: of necessity in the next place the Locomotive or stirring Faculty is moved by the Appetite, so that the Appetite commands Motion.

IV. Besides the Appetite, there is need of an executive power, which may produce into act that motion which is commanded by the Appetite, and perform the same. For since Local motion is a different operation from the operation of the Appetite, and the operations of the Appetite are immanent, but motion a transient action: another power must be granted, which is the immediate cause of Local voluntary motion in Animals.

V. Finally, An Instrument is requisite by which the motion may be performed. For Experience shews, that those who have some Member maimed, although the object be at hand, and the Fancy do move the Appetite, and the Appetite command motion, yet they cannot stir, because of the unfitness of the Instrument. Now though there is some Contro­versie among Authors, what is the Instrument of Motion; yet we hold that it is a Muscle. And whereas some make anxious Inquisition, which part in a Muscle is the chief Instrument of motion, whether a Nerve or a Tendon; they seem herein to busie themselves more than they need. For, as Aristotle hath it, 2 de Part. Animal. cap. 1. The power of sense is in the similar parts, but the Actions are performed by parts dissimilar.

The voluntary motion therefore of a Living Creature is made after this manner and order. The mon­ner and order of the motion of a living Creature. In the first place an external object is offered, which as an immovable mover, being recei­ved by the external Senses and the common sense, is communicated to the Phantasie, and is thereby known what it is. Afterward more attently and punctually it is known whether it be convenient and acceptable, or hurtful and unpleasing. This knowledg is followed by Love or Hate, or an Appetite to lay hold on a thing grateful and delectable, and to avoid a thing hurtful. This Appetite in Bruits is presently followed by motion.

But in Man, before motion be made, some things do yet intervene, For the Appetite and these motions of the internal Senses are offered to the Mind, that they may be thereby ap­proved or disapproved. If they be approved, and the mind understands that the Appetite of the Senses is right, presently motion follows: but if it be rejected as false, a contention and fight arises betwixt the sensitive appetite and the rational, til the one vanquishes the other; and that which overcomes is the principle of the motion, and commands the motive faculty to move. The motive faculty being implanted in al the Muscles of the whol Body, does con­tract such Muscles as are needful: the Muscles being contracted draw the Tendons to them, the Tendons being drawn draw the Bones: finally, the Bones being moved, the Member or whol Body is transferred from place to place.

Chap. 9. Of Sleep, Waking, and Dreams.

SLeep and Waking are Affections of the Senses hither to explained. For we perceive a Man is awake, by the exercise of his external senses; and that he is asleep by their cessa­tion from operation. And therefore sleep seems to be a privation of waking: and sleep and waking belong to the same faculty, viz. the sensitive: and sleep and waking are affections of the sense, agreeing to all Animals and to them alone. And therefore things destitute of a sensitive Soul neither sleep nor wake, as Plants. Again no Living Creature doth alwaies sleep, nor alwaies wake. For because al things must necessarily be weakned in their Opera­tions, and the Spirits are consumed by the operations of the Senses; Sleep is also necessary to repair the strength and restore the Spirits. And though this be not so manifest in the more imperfect Animals, which are not furnished with all their Senses; yet manifest experience convinces that the more perfect Animals do sleep. Of which see Aristotle in his 4. de Hist. Animal, cap. 10. Pliny in Lib. 10. Nat. Hist. cap. 75.

Now Sleep is not every cessation of the Senses, the Cause of Sleep. or impotency in the exercise of the Sen­ses: for even in swouning fits also, and other Diseases, the operations of the Senses cease: but when there is an inability to operate in the first Organ of Sense. Sleep therefore is a natu­ral cessation of the common sense and the other senses, caused for the good of living Crea­tures, or as Aristotle saies in his B. De Somn. & Vigil. cap. 3. It is the Cessation of the first original of sense, as being unable. to act, of which definition see Scaliger in Exercit. 289. Now the common sense is chiefly affected in sleep; and it resting the other external senses rest also. But the other internal senses do not alwaies necessarily rest in sleep: but if they do, it is because the external rest. For if the Fancy doth somtimes not operate in sleep, that doth not therefore happen because sleep is an affection or adjunct thereof, but because there is nothing brought unto it from the external senses to busie the same.

Now what the Cause is which thus binds as it were the external senses, is worth our En­quiry. The cause whereof is nothing, but that the animal spirits do not flow from the Brain into the Organs of the Senses. But what should hinder the Influx of the spirits is somwhat obscure. Aristotle de Somno & Vigil. cap. 3. held that this was caused by ob­struction of the passage of the common sense, through which the animal spirits as a common Instrument of the Soul are sent into the Organs of all the senses. Now the obstruction he saies is caused by vapors, chiefly such as are carried out of the Stomack into the Brain. For they when the living Creature rests, whereby the Brain becomes somwhat colder, are condensed, and become more thick and heavy, and so begin to descend again, and stop the passages of the Nerves, so that the animal spirit cannot be carried into the Organs of the Senses, of which thing there are many tokens: for after meat, especially if we have eaten liberally, we become sleepy, and Persons that are drunk sleep exceedingly: contrariwise, such as have fasted long cannot sleep a nights, and most sleepy medicaments do send many vapors into the Head; or cool the Brain, that the vapors may be therein somwhat thickned, and so may stop the passages. Others contrariwise, conceive the sleep is not caused by vapors, nor by such things as stop the passages of the Nerves, but because the soul draws back the spi­rits to it self, lest by continual operation the animal faculties should be destroyed. Hence not only after Meat sleep comes; but Musick, Weariness, Darkness, and Quiet cause fleep.

But both these Opinions ought (I conceive) to be joyned together, and thus Sleep is bred. The living Creature being composed to rest, the Soul finding a kind of languishing feeble­ness, by reason of the operations of the senses all day long, dissipation of the spirits, and ab­sence of the quickening heat of the Sun, endeavors a restauration and recreation of the strength and spirits to the preservation of the living Creature in Health. And because the animal spirits have their original from the Vital, that the Vital may first be restored and re­paited, the Heart draws to it self some Heat, which is scattered into the other parts. Hence the remote members, and especially the Brain, becomes a little colder, to which the coldness of the nights Air, and the Ceasing of the bodies motion, which causes heat, do lend an helping hand: but the Heat about the Heart and parts thereabouts is encreased. The Heat there encreased raises out of the Aliment certain sweet vapors, which being carried to the Brain, by the coldness thereof are a little thickned, and begin again to descend; and slipping into the roots of the Nerves they fil and stop their passages, and are the cause, both that the vital spi­rits and Heat cannot ascend out of the lower parts into the Brain, and that the animal spirits [Page 385]cannot be distributed into the Organs of the Senses: for want of spirits all the members do hang loos, and al the operations of the external Senses do cease.

The End therefore of Sleep is to restore the strength of living Creatures. the End of Sleep. For because much spirit is consumed by motion, and the operation of the external senses, that the Crea­ture may not be endamaged in point of health, they must of necessity be restored. Scali­ger in Exercitat. 289. adds another End, in these words: Sleep was made by God, not on­ly (as is wel said) to refresh and repair the Body, but for the Liberty of the Mind. For be­cause if you regard the offices of life, when we sleep we live but the life of Plants; it was his pleasure that then we should truly live: For the Servant at that time is free, yea and becomes a Master somtimes in his Dreams. The Minds of evil men are punished in Dreams, those of good and wise men become divine, by the searching out of truth and per­formance of laudible offices. For being freed not from the Body, but from its service, they do their own work: for they move themselves, and also advance themselves to the Pat­tern of their End which they shal in time see face to face.

To Sleep, Watching is opposed, Watching. which is nothing but the Activity or Freedom of the Senses. Now a living Creature is wakened from sleep two manner of waies, either of its own accord, or being disturbed and troubled by some external Cause. The first manner is most natural, and comes to pass when the Heat which had hid it self within, for the dige­stion of the aliments, and reparation of the spirits (concoction being finished, and the spi­rits repaired) doth again break forth into the outward parts, and discusses those vapors which were an obstacle to the Spirits, that the Spirits may freely pass into the Organs of the senses. Now although somtimes the living Creature is awaked of it self, before conco­ction be finished (if sharp vapors arising from bad humors be carried into the Brain; or through some other Causes) yet this manner aforesaid is most common and natural.

Now the wakening of a man out of sleep by external things, (as if a man be rouzed by crying aloud and pulling) is caused by perception of external sensible objects. For al­though in sleep there is a defect of spirits in the Instruments of the senses: yet the Organs are not quite void of animal spirits, but there are some yet remaining in them, which are suf­ficient to perceive vehement sensible objects. Therefore the sensititive soul in sleep being stirred up and provoked by a vehement external object does begin to exercise its senses, and at first it obscurely perceives the object, but afterward that it may more clearly discern the same, it gives out a greater quantity of spirits; which seeking way to the Organ of that sense which is affected, they break through the passage of the common sense; and so way is opened to the Organs of al the Senses, and consequently the sleep ceases. Hence they who in sleep have the passages of their senses obstructed by many thick vapors, which is usual in such as are drunk; they are hardly awakened, nor can their spirits easily find their pas­sage: but those who abound not with thick vapors are easily awakened. For the same cause the first sleep is more sound and deep; because the vapors in the first concoction are more plentiful and thick, which afterward are by little and little consumed and atte­nuated.

In sleepy Dreams do happen, which are no passion of the external senses. What a Dream it. For in such as sleep (who only Dream) all the external senses are bound and tied up. Nor is a Dream a passion of the rational Soul: for Dogs and other Creatures Dream as wel as Man-kind. But a Dream is an adjunct of the internal senses, and especially of the Fancy: and it is defined to be a Phantasm or Apparition happening to such as sleep.

And because in such as Dream the Fancy is busied, and some apparition appears there­to; and we Dream not only of things which we have done in the day time, but also of things a great way off, and which we have neither seen nor heard, nor perceived by any of our senses, yea and of things never yet done, but which are hereafter to come to pass: The Question is how the Images of things absent, never perceived by our senses, and which are not yet come to pass, can be offered to our Fancy. The Epicureans held (as appears out of Lucretius, Lib. 4.) That certain thin Images do come from the outsides of visible objects, which are as it were their Skins and Barks, having the representation of the things from whence they came. And these they thought did insinuate themselves into Persons asleep, and foreshew things to come. But this Opinion hath been long ago rejected.

The conceit of Coelius Rhodiginus is not much better, who in the 27. Book of his ancient readings, Chap. 11. denies that there are any such Images flying up and down in the Air, as the Epicureans imagined: yet grants that there are certain motions which exercise and work upon us in stead of Images, and that they do proceed from the Beginnings of certain things afterwards to be said or done, the Air being first changed, which being afterwards through [Page 386]the Nostrils and Ears transmitted to the Heart, they cause us in Dreams to foresee the events of future things. And that these motions cannot at any other time make themselves sensible save in the night. But what motions can there be of things which are not? or how can things absent fifty or a hundred miles al along affect the Air? or why should not these motions affect any persons that sleep, but only such as are concerned to know the thing re­vealed?

We refer all such Dreams which are of things which we never before perceived with our Sense, or arise from causes which are not in our bodies, unto a more Divine power. Thus therefore we conceive Dreams are to be divided.

Dreams are some Natural, The Dif­ferences of Dreams. Animal Dreams. others Supernatural or Divine. The Natural are such as proceed from Natural causes. And these again are by some divided into Ammal and Na­tural peculiarly so called. Those are called Animal which are conversant about such things as have been presented to us while we were awake. For certain species or Images of sensible things are imprinted upon the internal Senses, which remain even then when the Senses work not, and when sensible objects are absent, and raise dreams. These though they do not alwaies appear to persons awake, being busied about other objects: yet in persons asleep, the Senses ceasing to operate, they again arise, and present themselves to the Fancy. These Dreams do not alwaies present things to us just as they were acted: for nothing can be imagined so foolish, absurd, and monstrous, which is not presented unto us somtimes in Dreams. For the Soul being not wrought upon by external Objects, revolves the Images of things formerly presented, and joyns this with that as each offers it self, and of many and divers things compounds one; also it wonderfully confounds the order and circumstances of things. And to this the plenty of bad vapors is a furtherance. For as bad vapors and hu­mors in persons awake, as in such as are melancholy and mad, by disturbing the Brain are a cause of absurd cogitations; so they do the same in persons asleep; so that it is rightly said, Dreams are the Ravings of persons asleep, and Ravings are the Dreams of such as are awake. Hence melancholick persons, and such as have over eaten, have absurd and terrible Dreams. And for the same cause, such as are drunk, and those that first compose themselves to sleep, have for the most part no Dreams; because there is in them so great store of vapors that their Brain is filled, and al the images overwhelmed: But towards day, and after the Meat is digested, the Dreams are more cleer, because the vapors arising from the Meat are attenuated and for the most part discussed.

But Natural Dreams are such as arise from some hidden cause in the Body, Natural Dreams. as the humors, temperaments, &c. For if such a cause be vehement, it may even in sleep also affect some ex­ternal sense, and present an image of it self to the Fancy; yet it seldom does it distinctly, but by the appearance of some other thing like to it, or joyned with the appearance of a like thing. So as Galen relates de Praesag. ex Insomniis, when a certain man dreamed that one of his Thighs was turned into a stone, a while after unexpectedly he was taken with a palsie in the same Thigh.

But to Supernatural Dreams we refer al those which are sent into us by higher and super­natural causes; Super­natural Dreams. Divine Dreams. whether it be by God, good Angels, or Devils. Such as are infused by God and good Angels, are termed Divine, of which some examples are extant in the holy Scrip­tures. For the most good and great God is wont to present to men in Dreams, either new Images of things, or so to order and joyn such as were in them before, that they may become warnings of things to come. Also the Angels are wont to excite and aptly to dispose such Images, Spirits, or Humors as are in the Body, as that they may admonish a man of some necessary and profitable thing. Diabolical Dreams. But Diabolical Dreams are caused after the same manner as the Angelical, but to a different end: For the Devil studies to do men mischief, and en­deavors even by Dreams to possess them with vain Superstitions; which the Oracles sugge­sted in Dreams do witness; some examples whereof are related by Tertullian in his Book de Anima. Coelius Rhodigin. antiq. Lect. lib. 27. cap. 14. or by ungodly and lascivious Dreams he endeavors to allure men to lusts and unlawful pleasures.

From the Premises it is apparent how even absent and future things may be presented to us in a Dream. The Platonists conceive many Dreams may be caused by the Geniuses and Spirits which they conceived did attend upon every man, and admonish them of many things; and the Divines refer them more rightly to Angels, which many think every man hath to at­tend him. But this seems fit to be added to what hath been said out of Tertullian, who in his Book de Anima thus writes; the liberality of Divine Dreams is also wont to drop down upon prophane persons, God making the Sun to shine upon the just and unjust. For even Nebuchadnezzar had a Divine Dream. And as Gods goodness vouchsafes it self to [Page 387]Heathens, so also the tentations of the Devil do follow even holy men, whom he abstains not to tempt by day, or to molest when they are asleep, if he cannot do it when they are waking.

From what hath been said it is easie to collect what we are to think of Divination by Dreams. For Dreams are either Significative, which foretel somwhat; or Nonsignificative, Touching Divination by Dreams. which foreshew nothing. Again, significative Dreams are either Theorematical, which cleerly express the Nature of the Event; or Allegorical, which express the thing foreshew­ed wrapt up in figures and Allegories. To explain these latter is not in the reach of every one; but they are the best expounders of Dreams, who can best discern the similitudes and resemblances of things: whereof the Books of Interpretations of Dreams do treat.

The Dreams infused by God and good Angels do questionless foreshew somewhat to come: but al cannot expound them, only they that have it granted them by God. Most Diabolical Dreams are vain, and sent to allure men to sin; and if any of them be true (for the Devil also can somtimes conjecture things to come, knowing them by their superior Causes or Signs) he does also by them endeavor to draw men to some false Religion. But Natural Dreams, which arise from the Constitution of our Bodies, do also afford figns thereof; and Physitians are wont to observe them; and what Dreams do argue such and such Constituti­ons of Body, is taught at large by Hippocrates, de Insomniis, and by Galen in his Treatise de praesagiis ex Insomniis: and seeing these are most frequent, it is wel said by the Preacher, Ecclesiastes 5. In the multitude of Dreams and many words there is much vanity: but fear thou God.

Chap. 10. Of the Differences of Living Creatures.

HAving spoken of the Form of Bruit Beasts, we should now speak of their Bodies. But forasmuch as Man of al Animals or living things (for we trouble not our selves whether these terms do differ, of which see Scaliger, Exercit. 216.) is the most perfect; and in eve­ry kind the more imperfect are to be judged by the most perfect: Moreover, the parts of al Animals or Living Creatures are not yet known and described; but in the description of the parts of Mans Body Anatomists have been as diligent as can be imagined: Such things as should have been said of the pirts of Living Creatures in general, must he setcht from the Hi­story of the p [...]s of Man; and such things wherein the parts of other Creatures differ from those of Man, must be taken into consideration. We shal here therefore treat rather of the differences of Ammals; where also some things wil fal in our way as touching their parts. And seeing every living Creature consists of a Soul and a Body, we wil weigh and consider the chief differences which slow both from the Soul, and from the Body, and from the whol Creature, consisting and made up of both.

And first as to the Vegetative Faculty, three things are therein considerable: Nutrition, The dif­ferences of Living Creatures in respect of the Ve­getative faculty. Augmentation, and Generation. And as for Nutrition, there is no Bruit Beast which does no [...] eat some kind of food or other: for some eat flesh, as the Wolf, Tigre, &c. some eat divers kind of things promiscuously, as Dogs; some Herbs and Corn, as Horses, Harts, &c. some feed on Worms, as very many Birds; and some on Fishes. And of these again, some hunt for their living, and prey upon other Creatures, as the Crocodile, the Lyon, the Wolf, &c. some lay up their Meat in Summer, as the Pismires; some seek their Prey night and day.

As to Generation, Bruit Beasts have doubtless a Faculty (which they received from the blessing of God at the Creation) of multiplying themselves by mediation of a certain Seed, whether it be properly so called, or analogically, in such things as are commonly said to be produced by equivocal Generation. For we find by experience that Insects and such like things, which are said to be produced by equivocal generation, are not generated in any, but only in some peculiar sort of matter. For a Beetle is not bred of any, but only of some determinate sort of Matter. Hence also it comes to pass that Beasts generated of a putrid substance, containing therein a sitting Seed, are not found to differ from other Creatures of the same name. For besides that they agree altogether in form and figure, they do moreover possess the same proprieties, and perform the same operations, and can beget their like.

For living Creatures are produced three manner of waies: A three­fold Gene­ration of Living Creatures [...] Some by a mutual Conjunction of male and female; some out of the putrid matter of a corrupted body, but containing in it a sead fit to propagate such a Creature: and some are produced both waies, viz. both by [Page 388]Copulation and by putrefaction, as Mice, Locusts, Beetles, Flies, &c.

Moreover, Bruit Creatures ingender after sundry manners; some produce live Creatures, and are therefore called Vivipara, as Does, Bitches, Dolphins, Vipers; some bring forth Eggs, out of which cherished with a bening gentle Heat, are hatched Chicken, Birds, Fi­shes: Finally, some bring forth a Worm.

Aristotle defines an Egg, What an Egg is. that thereout an Animal does exist, not from the whol, but from one part thereof only, the reft being turned into nourishment: and a Worm he defines by saying, that the whol grows up into an Animal. And so Aristotle divides an Egg into two parts; which in perfecter Creatures are manifestly different and distinct in color; but in the imperfecter sort of Creatures they are not seen distinct, but both are confounded and jumbled together into one substance. Of which part of the Egg the Creature is made.

But of what part of the Egg the Creature is made, is a controverted point. Hippocra­tes, or the Author of the Book de Natura pueri, saies, That it is made of the Yolk; Ari­stotle saies of the White. If we consult with experience we shal find it as Aristotle saics; and thus we shal find it to be: If you shal open an Egg the second, third, or fourth day after the Hen hath sat upon it, and diligently view the same; you may easily observe that the Heart is the principal Member: For it is easie to see that the rude Chick is first formed, and in it, first the Heart, which sends forth two veins; and after the generation of the yong Chick, the Membranes which are thereto subservient are evidently seen to grow together. And indeed on the eighth day, the heart is not only apparent, but together with the Veins, being of the same red color, it is manifestly seen to move and beat. On the fourth day the bodies of the Membranes being now confirmed and grown thicker, begin to be less transparent: on the seventh day by reason of their compactness, they obscure the whol Chick in a manner, or cover the same; yet the Heart is seen by its conspicuous red color, as also the Veins, and by its motion. Mean while, the Liver does not yet appear, but on the seventh day there is first seen a liquor or yellowish slimy Matter underneath the Heart, which is the beginning of the Liver growing together, and in the following daies it makes up this Body of the Liver; till which time there remains much of the Yolk, yea, when the Chickens are hatched. And in this place of the Liver for nine whol daies together, after the first formation, no blood in seen; the heart notwithstanding in the mean while be­ing ful of blood, as also a most large Vein, drawn under the heart, the whol Bodies length. By al which it appears manifest, that the Soul sticks in the Heart as in its Root, and that the Heart is the first thing which lives, and is the Creature as it were.

But of which part of the Egg the Chick is framed, and with which part it is nourished, is not so plain: yet thus the matter seems to go. Much about the middle of the Egg long­waies, where the Yolk is joyned to the White above, the second day after the Hens sitting, there is a certain whitish beginning, more compact than the rest of the White, and as it were through a glass there is the appearance of a Chicken, the head being most conspicuous, and near the Head a red point dilating and contracting it self: The daies following, from that red point a very red Vein is drawn al along the Chickens back, every day further and further; from which afterwards Veins proceed to the skins drawn about the yolk. By which it may be conjectured, that the Chick is first made of the White; and that the aliment to be turned in­to blood is made of the Yolk, and carried through the Veins to the little skins stretched a­bout the Yolk, and perfected in the Liver, which Liver hath also a similitude with the Yolk. Yet if any man shal hold, that the Yolk gives nourishment to the blood and parts nourished with blood; and the White to white parts bred of it self, and like to it self, til the Liver grow so strong as to be able to afford nourishment to al the parts, and that there­fore the place of shaping is in the confines of the White and the Yolk, I shal not contend with him thereabouts.

Howbeit some Creatures there are, which engender not only often, but bring forth ma­ny yong ones at a time, as Swine, Hares, Pidgeons, &c but some bring forth few yong at a time, and seldom also. And al for the most part by mediation of the two Sexes; nor are the Sexes confounded in any kind of Creatures, so that the male should be female, or the fe­male male; which some confidently affirm of Hares. Although it may be perhaps granted, That Hermaphrodites are more frequent in this kind of Creatures than in any others. The diffe­rence of Creatures according to the sen­sitive fa­culty. Moles.

Secondly, There is also some difference in Creatures with reference to the Sensitive Fa­culty: For every sense is not allowed to every Animal; howbeit the Feeling, as the first sense, is granted to al Creatures. And those that have only this sense and want al the rest, are called Zoophita, Plant-animals. All other Creatures have more Senses. Nor do we think fit to deny Sight to the Moles; for to what end have they Eyes if they cannot see? For [Page 389]although they have no need of sight, to see under the ground, yet they have it given them to avoid the light and the bright air; of which see Scaliger in Exercit. 244.

Howbeit, some Creatures excel in one sense, some in another; some in seeing, others in smelling; some in one are more excellent, some in another, both external and internal Senses.

Finally, there is great difference in living Creatures, The diffe­rence of Animals in respect of the Lo­comotive faculty. with reference to their faculty Loco­motive, whereby they remove from place to place: For every Creature does shift place, but some after one manner, and some after another. Some only in part, as was said of the Plant-animals, which though they are alwaies fixed in the same place, yet they contract and dilate themselves. But others move their whol bodies, some after one manner, others after another: For some Beasts go, and that either on two seet, on four, six, or more, as Spi­ders; some move themselves by swimming, as Fishes, and some that live both on Land and Water; others by flying, as Birds; some by leaping, as Grashoppers; finally, some by creeping and crawling, as Worms and Serpents, who by contraction and dilatation of their bodies do move themselves from place to place.

Moreover, in respect of their parts, there is a great variety in Animals: the diffe­rence of Creatures in respect of their parts. For as Aristotle hath it in 1. de Hist. Animal. cap. 2. Parts of Animals are the same and divers, either in form, or sort, or exuperance, or analogie, or scituation. And in the first place the parts by which they take their nourishment, and whereinto they bestow the same, are com­mon to al Creatures. For the necessity of food is common to them with Plants: which Plants indeed have from the Earth, and therefore sticking in the Earth they have nourish­ment enough. But Animals (seeing they are more perfect than Plants) they were to have more exquisite diet than such as the Earth affords. And therefore they had not only tast given them to try their meats, but also members wherewith to receive the same, and turn it into juyce fit to nourish the body, viz. The Mouth and Stomach.

Now this Aliment received is in several Animals severally changed into Nutriment pro­perly so called, or an humor which is the immediate aliment of the body, which when either by Nature it self (the heat in process of time devouring the same) or by violence (as in sick­ness and other cases) it comes to be consumed, the life is extinguished. Now this Humor, the next aliment of the body, is in some blood, in others a fatty and bloody moisture, like Sames or Blood-water running from hurts of the body; as also the part wherein this aliment is contained is in some a Vein, in others a Fibre. Hence Animals are divided into such as have blood, & such as are bloodless. In the more perfect sort of animals, intended for nobler actions, and therefore needing more heat, this Humor is red and is called Blood. Yet there is in some bloodless Animals a certain red humor which is not blood, but an excrement, as in the Pur­pura. But other Animals whose bodies are more imperfect, do also need a less perfect nou­rishment; if moist, an white; if dry, a more obscure humor: which humors having no pro­per names, they are termed Ichores, and are blood as it were newly begun to be made and im­perfect. As also in Creatures that have blood, when the blood is not wel elaborated, it puts on the nature of an Ichor as it were, as we see in Cachectical persons.

Also al Living Creatures have an Head, except the Polypus, the Poly­pus. the Ele­phant. who instead of an Head carries as it were a Hive. Limbs are wanting in some Infects; in others the fore feet are instead of fingers. The Elephant instead of hands hath his Trunk let down from his Mouth. Fishes have no necks. Most Creatures have Tails, and they are of several fashions, which Man hath not. In­stead of Teeth Birds have Bils of a boney nature, wherwith they do break their meat; instead of Nostrils they have only two holes; as also two passages instead of Ears. Moles have their Eyes obscurely buried, yet are they not without Eyes. Instead of a Tongue many Creatures have a fleshy substance in their Mouths; and many with an external sharp tool spungy and hollow do both tast and draw their meat to them. All Creatures that have Blood have Skin. There is in all Creatures having blood and heads properly so called a Brain, which on the fore side is divided into two parts. The Seeing, Hearing, and Tasting Nerves, with the other parts which make up the whol Organ of Sense, are found in al perfect Animals. And the Heart, or at least somwhat answering thereto, is in al living Creatures. There is no Lungs in Fishes; instead of members of generation, Fishes and Serpents have certain holes ordained for their seed. Most of the Guts and Bowels are to be seen in perfect li­ving Creatures; but in the imperfect they do not exactly agree with those of a Mans body, and for the most part they differ in Fishes and Serpents. Fishes instead of bones have a spine. Insects have a condition proper to themselves; for they have a cloven flesh oblique­ly directed, and somthing of a middle nature betwixt nerves and flesh, which is to them in­stead [Page 390]of Bones and Spines. Proper Spirits are given to every living Creature, which the Soul doth unmediately use to exercise sensitive actions.

Moreover there are other Differences of Animals from the places wherein they live, Difference of Living Creatures from the place where they live. Whether any Crea­tures live in the Fire and their Actions. For first, some inhabit only one Element and live thereof; in the Air the Manuco [...] [...]a; in the Water the Apua; in the Earth the Toad. But whether there are any Creatures that live in the Fire, Authors are at variance. Some hold that the Salaman­ders and Pyraustae live in the Fire, as Aristotle, Pliny, Aelian, Austin. As to Salamaders they are so far from delighting in Fire, that they are found no where but in places both cold and moist, and they put out most hot burning coals, either by their coldness or clam­miness of substance, before they can be burnt. That the Pyraustae live in the Fire Scaliger eagerly defends, Exercit. 9.23. and 194. sect. 4. But others hold there is no Animal which is not burnt and kil'd in the Fire; and that the Pyraustae indeed are bred and fostered in lit­tle holes about Furnaces, but never bide in the Fire, whereinto being cast they are burnt: which is probable. Some Living Creatures live in two Elements, and find their meat in both, as Bats or Flitter-mice, which catch Gnats in the Air, and plunder the flitch of Bacon on Earth.

All these may again be included under three kinds, Birds, Fishes, and Land Beasts. The Manucodiata (a Bird) lives only in the Air: In the Ocean of Brasile there are Sea-Geese which live only in the Water, and never fly out, of a black Colour. In Mare del Zur, towards China, there are footless Birds, which never forsake the Water. The Ostrich lives only on Land. The Hern lives on Water and Land. The Bat lives in the Air and Earth; The Swan lives, but feeds not in all three Elements.

Fishes that live in the Water and Land are the Polypus and Crabs. Those that are in two are also in three; for they are in the Air, Water and Earth, that are in the Earth and Wa­ter; for they cannot be on the Earth, but they must be also in the Air.

Of Land Creatures which Aristotle terms Peza (which word cannot easily be rendred in Latine) some live on the Land and Water, and seek their Food in both Elements, as Otters; some which are very greedy after Fish cannot endure to touch the Water, as Cats: some live only on the Earth.

Living Creatures are after another manner thus divided. By reason of their Food, some are Land Creatures, and others of the Water. Those that live in the Water, do either take in the Water, or they do not. Those Fishes take in the Water that are fen­ced with Gils. Those which take not in the Water do draw in the Air, or they do not draw it in. Those that draw in the Air and have Feet, are the Otters, Crocodiles, and such like; of those that have not Feet and draw in Air, is the Water-snake; such as of this kind have Wings, are the Cormorant, Sea-gul, &c. Those that draw not in the Air are the Urti­ca, and all Shel-fish. But of Land Creatures, all that have Blood and Lungs draw in Air; but Wasps, Bees, and all Insects do not.

Again, of Land Creatures some fly as Birds, Bees; some go only on the Ground, either with Feet or some other way.

Such as pass upon the Ground, are either Goers, or Creepers, or such as draw their Bo­dies. Goers use Feet, amongst which Leapers are reckoned: But the Creepers by twisting their long Bodies, and bearing on two sides, as four-footed Beasts on two Legs of a side, do so move themselves. Such as draw themselves, are those which put forth their former parts and draw their hinder parts after them and so win Ground.

As to their Differences in the actions of their Life and Manners, The Dif­ference of Creatures in respect of their actions. some Creatures live in Flocks and Companies, others live single and solitary, and some live both solitary and in Companies. Birds that live in Companies are Pigeons, Cranes: the solitary are all Birds that have crooked Talons, none of which live in Companies. Among Fishes the Runners, the Tuny-fish, Whitings, Makerels. Now Creatures live solitary being necessitated thereto for getting their food. For though all kinds of living Creatures do fly those of another kind and think they may live more safely with those of their own kind, being allured by likeness: yet Beasts that have Scarcity of food, and meet seldom with their Prey, as Birds with crooked Talons, cannot converse with many of their own kind: For as some that meet with plenty of food, live in Flocks, as Pigeons: so to these (and to these alone) by reason of the scarcity of their food Nature hath given both Strength of Body and Fierceness of Mind; and the scarcity of their Foot compels them to Prey upon other Creatures.

Again whether they live in Flocks or Single, some do alwaies inhabit the same Country, some do go out of one into another, and return back again.

Again of those that live in Companies some are Political, others are not, but mind only their own business. The Political are such as observe a civil Policy, which requires that [Page 391]publick works be orderly performed by all, and that there be a Communion of the Profits ac­quired; and thus do the Bees, the Pismires, the Doves; but the Sparrows observe no such Order. For though they fly in Companies, yet each one by it self seeks its own livelihood, and labors not at all for the whol Society, which the Bees and the Pismires or Ants do.

Again, some Creatures are Flesh-eaters, others feed on Grass; some are Fish-eaters, others Worm-eaters, some All-eaters that will down with any thing, some have a meat peculiar to themselves, as the Bees, of which we spake before.

Moreover, some live in the open Air under the Canopy of Heaven, others live in little holes or Nests. And some have their Nests above, others under Ground; and of those that live under Ground, some make themselves holes, others shelter themselves in furrows made to their hands. Those that live above Ground some live in Walls and Rocks; others make them­selves peculiar Houses and Nests. Again some keep themselves in their Nests all day, and at night come out to seek their food, and when it grows light they withdraw themselves into their smal Cottages: others again do what they have to do by day light, and mew themselves up when night doth come.

Again some Creatures are tame and gentle, others wild; and of the wild, some are alwaies so; but some may be and are tamed.

Living Creatures do also differ much in respect of their Voyce. For some utter a Vovce, The Dif­ference of Creatures in respect of Voyce. Sound, Voyce, Speech, how they differ. others have no Voyce at al. Those that have a Noise or Voyce given them, have it to the End to express their Passions or their Necessities. Now these three differ, Sound, Voyce, Speech. Sound is the most common of the three: for every found is not a Voyce, but only that sound which is made in Creatures, by help of the Lungs, Chest, Wesand, and chiefly the Head ther­of, which is the immediate Iustrument of the Voyce. Now some Voyces are expressed by Letters, and articulately distinct, other some cannot be expressed by Letters. The latter is simply called a Voyce, the former a Speech, which is proper to Man alone: for although brute Beasts and irrational Creatures, can by Lowing, Squeaking, Barking, Neighing, Cro­wing or any other way express their Cheerfulness, Fear, Pain, Desire: yet Man alone is a­ble to express all he feels in his mind, with a Voyce made up of Letters articulately distinct, and can communicate the same to others whom he hath been born to live with.

Howbeit, though there are many differences of Animals, Animals some per­fect, others imperfect. they may be reduced to certain kinds, as is apparent from what hath been said. Some are imperfect, others perfect: and the perfect are Land Creatures, Fishes, and Fowls. And if we were to speak of them all, we should pass from the Imperfect to the Perfect, til we came to Man, the Perfection of all Li­ving Creatures.

Among Living Creatures Zoophyta or Plant-animals hold the first place, Plant-An­nimals. because they are of a middle nature betwixt Plants and Animals, for in the shape and figure of their Bo­dy they come near to Plants, but in their sense of feeling, and a certain motion, they agree with Animals. For they have the sense of feeling, and being touched do forcibly contract themselves. And though they cannot pass from place to place: yet are they endowed with a power of contracting and dilating themselves.

Of these some stick alwaies in the Earth like Plants, The bash­ful Tree. as a Tree which grows in the Coun­try of Pudifeta, and seems to discern when things approach thereto. For when a Man or other Creature draws neer, it shrinks in its Boughs; and when they go away, it spreads them forth again; and therefore the Inhabitants cal it the Bashful Tree. The sensi­tive Herb. And Apollodorus the Scholar of Democritus writes of an Herb of like nature, which he therefore cals Aeschi­nomene; because if you put your hand to it, it would avoid the same by shrinking in its Leaves, as Scaliger Exercit. 181. sect. 28. does write.

Also some cleave perpetually to the Stones or Sands; as the Pulmo Marinus, the Sea-Nettle, the Spunges, the Holothuria or prickly Fish. Mytuli or Limpins. And some stick so long to the roots and fibres of Trees, til they attain their just growth, as the Mytuli or Limpins, which are said to grow on the Stalks of Sea-weed, and to stick exceeding fast to them at first; and ha­ving attained their ful growth and just bigness they fall from their branches: but they are not generated as other Shel-fish are of themselves.

Next, after these, and the most imperfect, are Creeping things which grow upon live Ani­mals, either without, as Crab-lice, Lice, Fleas, Ticks which trouble Dogs; A Tick. but they say that they are not bred upon them, but they catch them as they hunt in the Woods; of which see Scaliger, Exercit. 195. sect. 7. or within, and not only in their Guts, but in other parts also, for Physitians have observed that there is scarce a part in the whol Body wherin Worms do not breed.

Hereto belong those Infects and smal Animals which are bred out of the Carkasses of o­ther Creatures and out of Plants; as Wormes, Wasps, Gurgulions, Flies, Hornets, Coss-Worms, Wood-lice, Moths, Glow-Worms, Wig-lice, Hors-Flies, Grass-Worms. of kin to which are Spiders, Phalangia, Tarantulae, Scorpions, and such like.

Now among these kind of Creatures the most noble is the Bee and the Silk-worm; Bees and Silkworms the former making most sweet and useful Honey; the latter spinning Silk wherewith the great ones pride themselves.

Then follow those kind of Locusts which John the Baptist fed upon: Nor is there any need that we should interpret the word Acrides so as to signifie the tops of Trees, or any Shrub, or river Crabs; seeing we are informed likewise by ancient Authors that some Nations did feed upon Locusts, as Strabo in Lib. 16. in Descript. Arabiae; who also describes the man­ner how they caught them: and Pliny in Lib. 11. Cap. 29. who saie the Persians delight in them: and in Lib. 6. Cap. 30. that some People of Aethiopia have no other Meat but Lo­custs, which he saies they salt and dry in the Smoak to that end: and among late writers Cle­nardus in his Epistles writes, that at Fez and Morocco whol Cartloads of Locusts are day­ly set to sale.

Next to these come sundry sorts of Serpents, Frogs, Toads, Salamanders, Locusts: To which are next in name and shape certain Sea-Insects, Flies, Scolopendra, Caterpillars, Sea-Stars, and such like.

After them march the Shel-fish of two kinds, Shel-Fish Purple. for some have their shels open but twined strangely about, such as the Purple, and the Periwinkle, and an innumerable sort of Shel-fish, whose shels are shaped like Turbants or Steeples; others shut their shels like two folding doors, Oysters. Lobstars. that they cannot be opened without great force, such are Oysters and others of that kind, as Muscles, Cockles &c. of kin to which are Crabs, Lobstars, Cray-fish, the Sea-Locust and such like.

Next come the other kinds of Fishes smooth and without scales; Fish. then the scaly, the Prick­ly, the Sea, the River, the Lake-fish. Of Fishes (besides others) read Scaliger, Eaeercit. 218. and Exercitat. 223.226.

After these come your Amphibia, Creatures which live in the wa­ter and on the Land. Creatures which live partly on Land and partly on the Water, as the Tortoise, the water Salamander, the Scincus, the Crocodile, the Cordylus, The Hippopotamus or River-Horse, the Castor or Bever, the River-Crab, the Water-Moule and Rat. Amongst which there is none that is partly made like a Fish and partly like a four-footed beast save the Bever.

After Fishes Birds must be explained. Birds. Now every Animal that flies is not a Bird, but only that which hath blood in it, and is furnished with a Bil and Feathers. Hence Flies, Beetles, Bees, Hornets, and such like are no Birds; as neither the Bat or Flitter-Mouse, which is of a middle nature betwixt Birds and Mice, and may be termed the flying Mouse.

Now there are sundry differences of Birds, The Swal­low. which Scaliger hath collected in Exercit. 227. In the first place come Swallows, which fly most swiftly of all others; of which also there is some difference. These beeing commonly not fit to be eaten, neither can they them­selves in the winter find their own mear, viz. Flies and other Creatures that glide about in the Air: after the end of Summer when flies are gone, they fly from these parts of the world, Germany, France, England &c. unto the shores of the Baltick Sea, and under huge high Rocks that hang over the Sea, they hang mutually embracing one another until the Spring return, and then when the Bird-Winds blow they return each to its own Country.

After the Swallows come the Sparrows, the Mag-pies, Chaffinch, Titmouse, and the sing­ing Birds, as the Nightingale, the Lark, Goldfinch, the Linet, the Thrush, the Gnat-snapper, the Red-breast, the Bulfinch; also the prating Birds as Patrots, Black-Birds, Mag-pies, Scarlings, Jack-daws, Jays or Gays.

After these come Pigeons, both tame and wild, as the Wood-Pigeon, the Stock-Dove, the Turtle-Dove and others.

And then the kinds of Cocks and Hens, and Birds of kin to them, as the Pheasant, the Par­tridg, the Woodcock, the Quail, the Ostrich, the Peacock.

Then follow Water-fowl, both the flat-footed, as the Swan, and several sorts of Geese and Ducks, The Bittern, the Water-Crow, the Cormorant, the Sea-mew, with the flat foot; and the cloven-footed, as the Hern, the Kings-fisher, and the rest.

Then come the ravenous Birds, the Choughs, the Daws, the Crows, the kinds of Vultures and Hawks, The Aegle. the Kite, the Buzzard, the Owl; and finally the Eagle, the Queen of Birds. Conterning Birds see Scaliger in his 227. Exercitat. and those that follow.

The Bat or Flitter-mouse is of a middle nature betwixt birds and beasts, the Bat. being a winged Mouse; which is of a wonderful greatness in some places: For Scaliger writes in Exercit. 236. Sect. 3. That in Catigan an Island of Mare del Zur there are Bats as big as Eagles, which the Natives eat, and they tast like Hens. And that in Caves of Mount Atlas there are Bats as big as our Pidgeons.

And here we must not omit to speak of the Basilisk or Cockatrice. The Basi­lisk or Cockatrice Now that there is such a Serpent called a Basilisk, is apparent from the holy Scriptures, Proverbs 23. ver. 32. Esay 11. ver. 8. and 14. verse 29. and 15. verse 5. Jerem. 8. verse 7. As also from Pliny, Lib. 8. cap. 7. and Lib. 29. cap. 4. Solinus chap. 30. Lucan Book 9. Dioscorides Lib. 6. cap. ult. Galen de Theriaca ad Pisonem. Aetius Tetrab. 4. Serm. 1. cap. 33. although Authors do not accord in their Descriptions thereof.

But whether there be such a Basilisk as is hatched of the Egg of an old Cock is doubtful: Whether there be such a crea­ture as a Basilisk or Cockatrice. Many count it for a fable: But it is commonly reported that there was once such an one at Vienna in Austria, and that the Picture thereof is extant on the wall of a certain house; as also at Bafil and Zwiccavia, as George Agricola relates in his Book de Animalib. subter­raneis. But there is a remarkable story which Joh. Pincier in Lib. 5. Aenigmat. Aenigm. 23. relates from the report of Dr. Mosanus chief Physitian at Cassels: which because few (peradventure) have read that Book, I shal here transcribe word for word. A memo­rable story of a Basi­lisk or coc­katrice. At Warsovia in Poland it fel out in the Year, 1587. That the Son of a certain Sword-Cutler, and the Daughter of a neighboring Citizen, being both of them five years old apiece, with others their equals in years, not enduring to be out of action, after the manner of chil­dren they would needs pass the time in sports, and seek hiding holes where their play­fellows should not find them out. There was not far from the place where they played, a Cellar left desolate by reason the House had been burnt which stood over it thirty years be­fore; into which by help of the half-rotten stairs one might make a shift to creep down. In­to the said Cellar the two foresaid children going down, they fel down on the lower stairs and died. When Supper-time was at hand, the two Mothers each enquiring for her child could hear no tidings thereof: And therefore the Wife of the Sword-Cutler sent her Maid our, who having long sought them, at last spied them upon the stairs of the Cellar as afore­said, and presently she cried out, See where they lie. But neither of the children stirring at al, she began to suspect they were fallen asleep, and with a loud voyce called by name, somtimes the Boy, and somtimes the Girl; to see if by this means she might waken them. But when she saw (though she cried til she were hoarse) it was to no purpose, she also went down into the Cellar, thinking to awaken them by jogging and pulling: But see what fol­lows, presently also she fals down by the children and dies. Her Mistriss saw the Maid when she went down into the Cellar, and perceiving that she staid over long, al amazed she ran unto the Cellar, and sees the Maid lie on the ground with the children: Therefore she also fals to cal aloud somtimes upon the Maid, then upon the children. And when she had done thus also in vain, and none of the three did either answer or stir, she concluded they were dead. Presently a rumor flies about the Town, and the Citizens come running, but know not what to do til the Magistrates and Council of the City being made acquainted therewith, did com­mand that their bodies should be drawn out with long hooks, such as they use to pul down houses in the time of fires. They being drawn out were found swollen like Drums, their lips and tongues were swollen, their color was brown, their eyes stuck out of their eye holes as big as half Eggs. There came to behold this sad Spectacle the Palatine N. and an anci­ent man the Kings chief Physitian, named Benedictus. He conjectured that some most venemous Serpent did lurk in that desolate Cellar, by whose deadly breath the air inclosed therein was infected, and that the weak nature of man could not bear the same; and that therefore most like it was that the children and maiden were thereby killed. Also that it might be that a Basilisk or Cockatrice might there lie hid, which Naturalists say is bred of a Cocks Egg hatched by a Toad, whose venom is so powerful that whoever looks upon his eyes dies forthwith. Being demanded how the certainty might be known, he made answer, That somebody must be sent into the Cellar covered round with looking Glasses, the right sides of the Glasses being outwards: For the Basilisk if he saw but his own picture or image would presently die. There were at the same time two Malefactors which three daies after were to be executed, the one being a Polander, the other a Silesian called Jobannes Jaure­rus. To them it was proffered, That he that would go down into the Cellar and hunt out the Serpent should escape his allotted punishment. John presently accepted the condition: And therefore he was covered al his body over with Leather, and Glasses were tied before his eyes, which he could wel see through; in one hand he had an iron Rake, in the other a ligh­ted [Page 394]Link; finally, to al parts of his body before and behind Looking-glasses were fastened. Thus furnished he entred into the Cellar, more than two thousand people looking on. Af­ter he had for above an hour searched al the holes and corners of the Cellar, and could find no Serpent, he called upon them to throw him down another link into the Cellar: for there was another Cellar close by, but the way was so stopt up with rubbish that he could not get in; but he would now see to clear the way, and search there also. And as he was doing that, he chanced to turn his eyes to the left side, and unawares espied the long lookt for Beast in the shape of an Hen, lying dead in a certain hole of the wall: which when he had declared by a shout to them that were without, the Kings Doctor had him with his Rake to bring it out into the light, which he presently did before al the people. The Doctor presently judged that it was a Basilisk or Cockatrice. It was as big as an ordinary Hen, its head was like that of a Turky-cock, his Comb resembling a Crown was sprinkled partly with yellow, and partly with blue spots, and his Chotters hanging under his Throat were of the same color. His Back was starred with many eminent spots resembling Toads eyes, the colors of virulent Beasts being every where sprinkled between, but chiefly yellow: The same colors also were on the outside of his Wings: Under his Wings he was al yellow, as also under his belly, where nevertheless blue and green and other wonderful colors were intermingled. He had long Legs like the Legs of a Cock, and yellow as a Quince-Apple; before and behind these two Legs there grew out other two Legs like the Legs of a Toad in shortness and shape. His back; lower it was yellow, and in the lowest part like a Toad in color. More may be seen concerning the Basilisk, in the foresaid Book of Pincierus, and the place fore-allead­ged.

Lastly, There are four-footed Beasts, which come nearest to a Man both in the parts of their bodies, and the faculties of their souls. And among these are such as chew the Cud, that is to say, the meat which they have eaten, and is slipt into one Cavity of their stomach, they fetch it up again through their throat and chew it over again, and so transmit it into the other cavity of their stomach, better ground and prepared for further digestion: For what Nature hath denied them in the want of upper Teeth, that she makes amends for by this double chewing.

Moreover, all these Creatures have coverings given them instead of cloaths; for some have hairs, some more, some sewer; others have bristles, others wooll, and some furr. Again, some have solid, others cloven hoofs.

The lowest and most imperfect kind of these Creatures are Moles, Mice, Marmots, which Scaliger describes Exercit. 203. The more perfect are the sorts of Weezels, Hedg-hogs, Cats, Dogs (of which see Lipsius in his Centuries of Epistles, Cent. 1. ad Belgas Epist. 44.) Wolves, Sheep, Goats, Rams, Hares, Foxes, Asses, Hogs, Oxen, Apes, Harts, Bears, Elephants (of which see Scaliger, Exercit, 204. And Lipsius in Epist. miscell. Ep. 50.) Horses, Elks. Cammels, Loeprads, Rhinocerots, Unicorns, and others; finally, the King as it were of al bruit Beasts, the Lyon.

Only I must speak somwhat of the Unicorn, Whether there be such a heast as the Ʋni­corn? of which sundry men are of several minds. Ambrose Parey in the 20. B. of his Chyrurgacy, cap. 39. where he disputes largely of this matter, after he hath brought the Narrations of some Authors touching this Beast, and ob­serves that they agree not one with another, he concludes at last, That the word Ʋnicorn is not the name of a real Creature in the world existing, but only a Fiction fained at the pleasure of Painters and Writers of Natural History, for the delight of the Readers and beholders.

But in very deed this is an absurd Opinion of his; it is also a rash thing to deny that which so many learned men affirm; and also the holy Scripture it self, Job 39. verse 9. Esay, 34. verse 7. Deuter. chap. 33. ver. 17. Psalm 22. ver. 22. and Psalm 29. ver. 6, Numb. 23. ver. [...]. [...].

This rather is apparent from those manifold differing Narrations and Descriptions, there are five kinds of uni­corns. That there is not only one Creature that beats a single Horn but divers: For in the places cited, the Unicorn is made to be a Beast swift of foot, fit to be hunted; which is not true of the Rhinoceror, which is a thick beast with short Legs. Moreover, the Horn of a Rhi­nocerote is much smaller in compass than that which goes about for the Unicorns Horn. Al­so Caesar, Lib. 6. de Bello Gallico, makes mention of an Ox in the Hercynian Forrest, out of the middle of whose forehead betwixt his Ears there grows one long Horn. And indeed there are Five kinds of Beasts that are thus single-horned. the one horned Ox The Ox with one Horn in the Hercynian Forrest mentioned by Caesar; And Pliny writes that such are found in the Indies [Page 395]Lib. 8. cap. 21. Secondly, The Mo­nocerote. the same Pliny in the same place describes the Unicorn. The Rhi­nocerote. Aelian Lib. 16. de animalib. cap. 20. in the third place describes a Rhinocerote that hath one black horn in his forehead as thick as the smal of a Mans Arm, of rare vertue against poyson. Fourthly, the In­dian Ass. There is the Indian Ass, who also carries one horn in his forehead, of whom Ari­stotle speaks in 2. de Hist. anim. cap. 8. and the 3. de part. Animal. cap. 2. Aelian in Lib. 4. de animal. cap. 5. Pliny Lib. 11. cap. 37. & 41. Fiftly, Oryx The same Aristotle in the same place, and Pliny makes mention of a Beast with one Horn called Oryx. So that there is no doubt but there are Creatures that have but one Horn: only the Question is, Which of these Creatures Horns they are that are commonly given out for Unicorns Horns? For the variety of them shews, that they are not al of one Beast: and therefore it cannot be known but by the effect to be good against poyson. Aelian attributes that vertue to the Horn of the Indian Ass, rather than of the Monocerote, to be good against many Diseases and Poysons.

But touching al Animals or living Creatures, to reckon them up in this Compendium is impossible; and here again Nature is so vast of extent, that no mans wit sufficeth to take a muster thereof. And the Nature of this work makes us set Titles for Dishes before our Guests, which Scaliger taxes Pliny for in Exercitat. 107. Let the Student of Natural Philosophy consult hereof with Aristotle in his Book de Historia part. & generatione Ani­malium; Conradus Gesnerus de Animalibus; Edvardus Wottonus de differentiis Anima­lium; Rondeletius de Piscibus. And those that have written of some sorts, as Andreas Libavius in his Book de Agno vegetabili Scithiae, of the Lamb that grows in Scythia; his two Books of Silkworms; his two Books of Batrachiorum, of Frogs. Baldus Angelus Abbatius, de Viperae Natura & facultatibus: and many other Authors who have writ of Animals.

Chap. 1. Of the Rational Soul.

IT remains now that we should treat of MAN, who being the Rule and Measure of al Living Creatures, and being compared with the rest, may be said to comprehend them all, because he is furni­shed with al their faculties and endowments; with the considera­tion therefore of Man we shal conclude our Treatise of Natural Philosophy.

Now a Man (as other living Creatures) consists of a Body and a Soul. We shal speak of his Soul in the first place. the Essen­tial parts of Man. And seeing every Soul may be considered under a twofold notion; first as a Principle and one part of a Compound, or as the Form of the Body; Secondly as the Effi­cient cause of al operations: We wil treat thereof also under both respects; and in the first place we wil consider how the Rational Soul stands in reference to the Body of Man: and afterwards what operations it doth work.

No sound Philosopher denies the Rational Soul to be the form of a man. Whether the Ratio­nal Soul be the in­forming Form of a Man. But seeing there is a twofold Form, one which is called the informing Form, which is the Principle and one half of the Compound, and gives the thing its specifical being, and as a difference distin­guishes it from al other things: another which is called the assisting Form, which does not give the specifical being to a thing, but is added to a thing already constituted in its specifi­cal being, for the performance of some nobler operations, which of it self it cannot perform; (such a form as the Marriner is to the Ship, who gives not the Essence to the Saip, but is ad­joyned thereto after it is perfect in its Essence, to cause it to sail, which it could not do of it self:) The Question is, Whether the Rational soul be the informing form of a Man, and the half of his Essence? or only an assistant form, which is added to a man after he is perfect, and hath his specifick form to cause in him some more noble operation, viz. Understan­ding.

Avenrois was of Opinion that the Cogitative Faculty (by him so called and distinguished from the Fancy) was the form of a Man, and by vertue thereof a Man became a particular sort of Living Creature; but that the Rational Soul was only an assistant form. But most of the Latines hold the Rational Soul to be the true form of a Man, and one of his constituting parts; which Opinion we retain as the more true: For if the Rational Soul were not the informing form of a Man, he could not rightly be called Rational; even as a Ship, though the Sailet therein do reason, cannot be called Intelligent or Rational, which were absurd. Or thus, which is the same in effect, that whereby any thing does primarily operate, is the form of the thing to which the operation is attributed. But to Man as Man Understanding is attributed: Therefore the Intelligent Soul is the form of Mans Body. Nor does that an­swer satisfie, when they say, That the Understanding is joyned to a Man by the Phantasms or Images of the Internal Senses: For the Phantasms are to the Understanding as colors to the Eye. As therefore neither the Color, nor the Subject of colors do see; so neither the Phan­tasms, nor the subject of the Phantasms do understand; but rather are themselves under­stood. Thus therefore we conclude: That whereby one thing differs specifically from ano­ther is the form thereof. But by the Rational Soul a Man differs from alother living Crea­tures; that therefore is the form of a Man. Aristotle also seems to have been of the same mind, as appears out of the 2. de Anima, cap. 1. t. 7.8. cap 2. t. 24.25.26. cap. 4, t. 36.37. as Zabarella does shew at large in his chap. 7. de Mente Humana.

From the Explication of this Question another Question may easily be answered, Whether there be one Ratio­nal Soul in all Men. viz. Whether the Rational Soul be one in number in all men? or there be in every one a peculiar Soul? Some that hold the Rational Soul to be an assistant form, do hold that it is not mul­tiplied according to the number of Persons, but that in al Man-kind there is one only, which is the cause of Understanding in al Men. But in very deed this Opinion is many waies con­trary to the truth: For every informing Form, such as we have already shewed the Rational Soul to be, is multiplied according to the multiplication of particular persons. And if there were only one Soul in al Men, al should be but one; for they should have but one Form. Moreover, the operations, or understandings, or second acts, are multiplied in Men according to the multitude of Individuals; and my Understanding is one, and thine another, a third Mans another. Therefore the Soul the first act is manifold: For the diversity of operations depends upon the diversity of Forms. Finally, in one and the same Understanding there would be contrary operations: for one man is of one Opinion, another of another about the same thing.

And since we have averred the Rational Soul to be the Form of Man, Whether the Ratio­nal soul be immortal? here arises a Que­stion, whether or no it be immortal? or, Whether it can without perishing be separated from the Body? As for us, according to the Tenets of our Religion we hold, that our Soul is immortal; and the Immortality of the Soul is counted one of the Hinges upon which Christian Religion turns. But whether or no it may be proved by Philosophical Reasons, and what Aristotles Opinion was concerning the same, hath been carefully enquired into by many.

In the first place, A thing two waies immortal. this we must hold, as Scaliger hath it, Exercit. 61. Sect. 5. and Exercit. 307. Sect. 20. that only God is truly immortal, and incorruptible. And therefore a thing may be said to be immortal two waies; either because it cannot perish at al, because it is most simple, and hath its Essence of it self, and depends upon none; and such is only God, and in respect o [...] him al other things may be called corruptible: For although Angels and the Rational Soul, which are said to be immortal after the second way, are never actually corrup­ted, have no contrary, and are separate from their subject; yet seeing they are not without Cause, and they have not the Cause of their Essence from themselves, but are by another, [Page 404]and by another may naturally come to be no more. For every dependent may be changed by that on which it depends, if it be a voluntary principle, and at the pleasure of the first princi­ple it may be deposed from its Essence wherein it was thereby instated. Now some things are not corrupted, because the Creator wil not have them so to be, who hath created nothing in them contrary, whereby they might be corrupted, nor hath plunged them so in matter, as they can neither be, nor operate without it. And that the Soul of man is of this kind, and that it may be separated from the body without corruption, Marsilius Ficinus endeavors to prove by many Arguments, de Immortal. Anim. Lib. 5. Tolet. Lib. 3. de Anima, cap. 5. quest. 16. Franciscus Piccolhomineus Lib. 2. de Humana Mente, Colleg. Conimbri­cens. in tract. de anima separata, disp. 1. Artic. 3. and others.

We shal briefly thus determine the matter: Every thing is known by its operations, and every form discovers it self what it is by its operations. And therefore since the actions of Man are so noble that they cannot proceed from a mortal substance wholly plunged in the matter; it is plainly to be hence gathered, that the rational Soul from which they pro­ceed is immortal and separable from the matter: for the Understanding abstracts and severs things from the matter, and knows without conditions of matter, without quantity, without figure; it understands things tree from matter; it is not offended with the multitude and ve­hemency of the Objects as the Sense is; it can conceive things infinite; and although it knows very many things, it may alwaies know yet more, and can encrease a number though never so great; and not only knows a thing, but also knows it self, and understands that it under­stands what it doth understand; it can wil and refuse, hath an unsatiable appetite of eterni­ty, knowledg, happiness; which because it cannot be satisfied in this life, it is credible that it shal enjoy another condition wherein those appetites shal be satisfied; also it performs ope­rations without corporeal Instruments. See Franisc. Piccolhomineus de bumana Mente, cap. 6. Aristotle also seems to have been of this opinion, as appears in his Physicks, Lib. 7. cap. 3. text 20 1. de Anima cap. 3. text 49. cap. 4. text 64, 65, 66. 2. de Anima, cap. 2. text 21. 3. de Anima, cap. 4. t. 3.4.7.12. cap. 5. text 19.20.7. de part. animal. cap. 1.12. Me­taphys. t. 17. of which see Francisc. Piccolhom. Lib. 2. de humana mente, cap. 2. et se­quent.

Thus far we have shewed how the rational Soul is reserred to the body of man: we are now to explain the nature thereof, as it is a principle of operation. Now Aristotle expresses the nature thereof, in this respect, in Lib. 3. de Anima, when he saith; The ra­tional soul is unmix­ed. that the rational soul is unmixed. Now the Soul must be unmixed two manner of waies: first, in respect of the Objects, so that it must not have their nature in its essence, but only a power to receive them. For because it ought to know the Objects, and it knows them by receiving them, it must needs of it self be free, unaffected and unmixed, since nothing receives that which it hath already; and that which is within hinders the ingress of another. And this immixture (that I may so speak) is common to the rational Soul with the Senses, which also have not their Objects actually in themselves, but only a power to receive them: save that the senses are respe­ctively uanffected and unmixed, viz. with some sort of being, as the sight (for example sake) within colour, seeing they are not conversant about every kind of being: but the ratio­nal Soul is quite free from the natures of al other things, as being directed to al things, and its office being to understand all things.

Again, the rational Soul is after a peculiar manner free from Organs, nor mixed there­with; that is to say, when it operates by understanding or willing, it makes no use of the body, but performs those functions without it. For, inasmuch as to perform the actions which are done in and by the body there is required a certain temper of the qualities (see­ing every body any waies tempered and disposed doth not receive every thing) and conse­quently also a certain Organ; since the several parts of the body have several temperaments; and the rational Soul is not tied to any temper of the first Qualities, nor any waies affected by the qualities, not is there any proper Organ thereof in the body: we must doubtless therefore beleeve that it depends not upon the body, in respect of its operations, nor that it is after any such manner mixed therewith.

From this other immixture we may gather, what kind of operations those of the foul are. The Ope­rations of the ratio­nal soul are inor­ganical. For since in its acting it is no way mixed with the body, and the actions of the body have nothing to do with the action of the mind: it is manifest that the Understanding and the Wil are inorganical faculties, and act of themselves; so that to understand and to wil, are actions proper to the mind; nor doth the mind understand by the body, or any Organ of the body, as by a medium wherewith it acts. The Soul indeed hath need of a Phantasm; [Page 398]since the Soul while it is in the Body never understands without a Phantasm, Lib. 3. de Ani­ma, cap. 7. but it useth the same not as an Organ, but as an object; because an intelligible matter must be presented to the mind by the Senses. And therefore if any have affirmed that the actions of the mind are organical, and that the rational Soul doth use the help of the Brain, Spirits, and Senses, as corporeal Organs, that is not to be admitted save in this sence, viz. that the soul doth not understand while it is in the body, without the foregoing operation of the Organs of the body, and before its own operation: or that in subordinate operation [...] it uses an organ, and needs the brain, and spirit: but while it is in working of it self, or while it purely understands, and purely wils, it needs them not, nor doth it understand by organs, but this mind only is the subject of understanding, as also of the act of willing, which out barbarous Authors cal volition, by a new necessary and fitting word, as Scaliger saies, Exercit. 307. sect. 3. and sect. 9. and though when the Brain is hurt Reason is depra­ved: yet that is done for no other cause, but that the administring or the subordinate facul­ties, which are organical and depend upon the constitution of the Brain, are hurt.

And although the rational Soul be furnished with all those faculties which we have hi­therto attributed to the vegetative and sensitive Soul: The rati­onal Soul hath two proper fa­culties. yet hath it besides two proper and peculiar faculties, whereby it excels Plants and other Animals; the Understanding, where­by we apprehend and know things; and the Wil, whereby we are carried out to such things we understand to be good. And there is a manifest difference betwixt these faculties, see­ing it is one thing to know, another thing to desire the thing known; and these two are per­formed by a several way of working; the former by passion and reception of the species, so that the things may be carried to the mind: but the latter by following, so that the mind is carried and drawn to the object. Finally the diversity of the object severs the power of knowing from the power of willing, seeing we know things as Entia or Beings; but we de­sire them as good.

The Understanding is therefore actually none of all the other Beings that are: the diffe­rence of the under­standing. yet it can spiritually receive and know them all. And although in respect of its essence it is one and the same, as being an inorganical part of the soul, which hath no variety from the Organs: yet according to certain respects it is divided into sundry differences. And in the first place Aristotle cals one the active Understanding, another the passive, supposing that in our mind besides that which is apt to be made every thing, viz. by understanding, and which is as it were the matter, there is somwhat in the nature of a form which is apt to make all things, that is to say, actually intelligible.

But what the active Understanding or the Intellectus agens is, What the active un­derstan­ding is. is an obscure point in Phi­losophy. Very many hold that the active understanding is God, or some Angel who is as­sistant to a man. But these mens opinion seems to differ both from Aristotle and the Truth. For the Intent of Aristotle (in Lib. de anima) is to speak of the humane understanding, and he plainly in Lib. 3. de anima, chap. 5. cals the active understanding a difference in the Soul. Again, that understanding which proceeds from the Intellectus agens or active Intellective faculty is in our own power, nor doth it proceed immediately from God or any Intelligence or Angel. Moreover seeing God when he first made our understanding could put as much light into it as he pleased, there is no need that he should alwaies be assisting the same, like some Judg at the Assises, as Scaliger saies in Exercit. 307. sect. 19. But the active understan­ding is (according to the opinion of the Philosopher) a difference of our Soul not informing, which of things potentially intelligible makes things actually understood. For as to a na­tural affect there is required an agent of the same kind, and for artificial effects there is need of Art: so for the work of the mind, viz. Understanding, an agent is required, not separate from the Soul, but which is a part, or some difference of the soul.

And although this Agent Understanding seems to some unnecessary, who would have it banished out of natural Philosophy: yet it seems altogether necessary to hold an Agent Understanding, for this cause, seeing every thing that is done is done by somwhat and in somwhat, so that that by, and that wherein, do differ. Universals are made in the passive understanding, therefore there must be besides it another power to make Uni­versals. For since every Patient requires some Agent, and nothing in nature brings it self from power to act; and our understanding is constituted in a possibility actually to under­stand, and by receiving intelligible objects doth actually suffer: cleer it is, that holding a passive understanding, we must withall hold an active, and taking away the latter we deny the former. The Agent understanding therefore is for this cause necessary, that it may do or make all things, viz. as to their intellectual being, that is, that it may transfer the object from one order to another. For seting the Object or Phantasm is material, and so under an [Page 399]opposite condition to the intellective faculty, which is abstract from all matter; it cannot be by the said faculty understood, unless it be made proportionate thereunto, viz. abstra­cted and immaterial: now this cannot be done save by an abstract Virtue, and an Intelligent nature.

From whence it is apparent, that it is the Office of the active understanding to act, The Office of the a­ctive un­derstan­ding that is to draw from power to act, and of things potentially intelligible to make things actual­ly intelligible. This Office of the understanding Aristotle expresses by the analogy it bears to Art, Nature, Habit, Light. For it is as it were the eye and sight of the mind, and it is to the Phantasms, as light to colours. For it illustrates the Phantasms, being inveloped with material conditions, which like darkness do hinder their being understood, so as they may put on the nature of things intelligible, and may be diffused to the passive understan­ding: even as Colours by means of Light do send forth a Picture of themselves unto the sight: yet this illustration of the Phantasms is not performed formally, so that any quality is imprinted upon them; nor objectively only, but effectively; because the Agent under­standing like external light by imparting its Ray yet doth actively elevate the Phantasms, to the production of an Intelligible species; nor is the Agent Understanding requisite only in respect of the object, but it hath also another office, viz. in reference to the passive understan­ding, that it may produce therein the act of understanding, representing thereto an object in a species intelligible, which it performes when together with the illustrated Phantasm it produces a species of the thing to be understood, into the passive understanding.

Whence we may collect, upon what and how the Agent understanding doth act. The Sub­ject For it is requisite in respect of both action, v [...]z. that it may act upon the Phantasms, and upon the passive understanding. But it acts upon these in a different manner; for it is joyned to the Phancasms before Intellection, and indeed while they are yet in the Fancy, where illu­strating them it becomes their form, whereby they are made a moving object of the passive understanding: afterwards, the adjoyned Phantasms being illuminated, it acts upon the passive understanding, by producing therein an intelligible species or representation, and by consequent the act it self of understanding: But the Agent understanding it self as it is an Agent doth not understand; since it doth not receive the intelligible speces or notions, though it produce them, nor is in aptitude to understand; but the act of understanding is in the Passive Intellect, as in its subject. This therefore is called formally the Intellect; the other only effectively, because it makes the understanding or Intellection.

The Passive understanding is as it were the subject and matter, The pas­sive under­standing what it is. whereon the intelligible spe­cies are imprinted; and therefore 'tis called Patient and Passive, because it suffers by recei­ving the species, through means of the Phantasms. It is also called Intellectus possibilis, the possible understanding, and the mind in power; because it may be made all things, though it is actually none of them.

And here in the first place we must remember that the passive understanding is indeed in respect of the object a passive power; seeing it acts upon no other thing: but compared with the Intellection it is a power, both active, inasmuch as it works Intellection; and also passive, inasmuch as it receives the said Intellection. For an immanent action must be re­ceived in the same power by which it is produced.

Moreover we must observe how that it is to be understood that the understanding when it understands, is made all things, which in the most elegant words of Scaliger, Exercit. 307. sect. 6. thus we explain. In the first place (quoth he) I deny that the Philosopher saith, that our understanding is all things essentially or formally as they use to say. But it is all things, subjectively, even as the first matter is, which is not made the Essence of an Horse under the form of an Horse: but it remains that which it was, a certain substance, of which and the form this thing is made. But the information of the understanding is af­ter another manner: for it is not a meer possibility, as the first matter, which may be redu­ced to be actually this or that by the form. But it is our form substantial, separable, incor­ruptible, eternal; of which as a subject essentially perfect, and the species which it receives, is made the formed intellect, not another from it self; save as Caesar being learned differs from himself unlearned, by reception of accidental species. It is not therefore made the un­derstanding simply, nor is it made the species it self, but under the species. So far Sca­liger.

And so much shal suffice to have said of the first difference of the understanding: The Agent & passive Intellect do not re­ally differ. where this again is to be observed: that the Agent and passive understanding are not really and es­sentially distinguished, but only respectively; since two internal forms are not knit together by new accidents, and to the receiving and effecting of an immanent action (such as under­standing [Page 400]is) such a principle is requisite as is essentially one. And therefore we must con­clude that the Essence of the Agent and Passive Intellect is al one, and that one Understan­ding in Essence, inasmuch as it makes things intelligible, or illustrates the Phantasms, and reposits them in the Passive, is Agent; but inasmuch as it is the subject receiving the ab­stract Phantasms, it is called the Patient.

Besides the Differences reckoned up, the under­standing in habit: there are also other notions of the Understanding, as the Understanding in habit, and the Understanding in act; which indeed are not divers Understandings, but one that hath divers degrees, which Aristotle cals differences. For the Intellect in habit is that which hath the Phantasm reserved in the Phantasie; and it is in a more perfect degree than the possible Intellect: for this is in aptitude to the first act, the other is in aptitude to the second, or to the operation, and therefore is very like to him that hath science, and does not contemplate. Howbeit Zabarella seems to think otherwise in this point, Lib. de specieb. Intellect. cap. 8. after this manner; That our mind is first born rude and unfit for the knowledg of things; but afterwards by multiplied acts of Understan­ding it acquires a certain greater ability and aptitude to understand things, so that it can without any labor when it pleaseth turn to the Fancy, and presently understand a thing: and that the Understanding being furnished with this ability is called the Intellect in habit. But when the Passive Understanding does actually operate, and actually perceives the thing offered, it is called the Intellect in act.

Finally, the specu­lative and practical understan­ding: the Understanding is distinguished into Speculative and Practical; by which terms nevertheless there are neither made two faculties of understanding, nor are the diffe­rences and degrees of the same Faculty intimated; but each Faculty of the Intellect is signi­fied by the Theoretick or Speculative, the Understanding properly so called, and by the Pra­ctical the Will. For seeing the Understanding in respect of the apprehension of a thing, al­so in respect of Affirmation and Negation of that which is true or false, cannot be otherwise called than Speculative; of necessity that difference must arise in respect of a third attribute of the Practical Understanding, viz. Desiring and avoiding, which belong to the Will.

The operation of the Understanding to which al the Functions of its degrees do tend, the Ope­ration of the under­standing: is Intellection, which is not one and the same thing with the Intelligible Species, but really differs therefrom, and is more rightly defined by reception of Intelligible species (in which sense it is by Aristotle termed a kind of Passion, 3. de Anima, cap. 4.) and passing judg­ment thereon. For the Intellect exercises a twofold operation about its object; the former of which is simple Apprehension and Cognition; but the other is termed Composition and Division, and it is compound Apprehension and Judgment, which consists in Assent and Dissent. Intellecti­on is two­fold: And hence Intellection is said to be twofold; Simple when the Intellect knows that which is simple and incomplex, as they cal it: and Compound, when it knows a propo­sition true or false.

The Object of Intellection which at once moves and terminates the intellect, is a Being or thing Universally taken, comprehending things material and immaterial. To which ne­vertheless some conditions must needs be added. And in the first place Universality: For that a Being may be perceived by the Intellect, it must be abstracted from al singularities. Then Secondly, Intelligibility, or abstraction from the conditions of matter. Thirdly, Verity. This Object as it is fitted and proportioned to the Mind by the Agent Intellect, is called an Intelligible Species; as that which the Senses receive is called a Sensible Species.

Now the Intelligible Species are illuminated Phantasms, Intelligi­ble species what they are. that is to say, freed from the conditions of matter, and by the Agent Intellect imprinted upon the Passive, and consequent­ly spiritual and indivisible accidents: For a Substance is not received into the Sense, as Sca­liger would have it, Exercit. 303. Sect. 7. but only accidents. And therefore only accidents do make the Species or Image in the Intellect; amongst which are both time and place, and the finite Unity of quantity, which being removed by the operation of the Intellect it self, there remains an Universal substantial Species: As if you see a man armed and disguised; first you apprehend the Arms the disguise, and afterward having removed them you conceive the Man himself.

And since we have just now asserted, Whether or no, and how the understan­ding per­ceives par­ticulars? That such things as are offered to the Intellect, and received by it, must be separated from matter and al particular conditions, the Question is; How the Intellect understands particular things, or whether it be capable only of universals? We answer, That the Mind of Man does also know particulars. For since al knowing Fa­culties being subordinate, are so joyned that the end of one action is the beginning of ano­ther, [Page 401]and what ever is known by the Inferior Faculty is also known by the Superior; and the Senses and Fancy know particular things, the Mind also must needs know the same. And by means of this knowledg it comes to pass that a man is able to compare a singular with an universal, and that the mind can frame singular propositions, collect universals from them, and frequently correct the judgment of the Senses about singular things, viz. As oft as they (by reason of an evil disposition of the Object) do commit any error. Now the manner of knowing singulars is also by accidents; because out of the proper singular accidents we draw out a notion or phantasm proper to the single Objects; even as out of the notions proper to a sort we draw out a notion proper to the same sort.

Intellection is commonly divided into direct and reflex. It is termed direct, Under­standing Direct. when we on­ly know somwhat, and make no further enquiry, but the Species gives a stop to the Intel­lect, as when the Understanding staies at the first apprehension of a Man, an Ox, an Horse, &c. but that is termed Reflex, or doubled and reciprocal as it were, Reflex. whereby the Mind knows it self, viz. That it knows, and hath the power to know and Understand; or when we understand the Intellection it self, and the Understanding knows that it is an Understan­ding, viz. That it self is an Essence and an unmixt one, and knows that it understands, be­cause that it is able to know it understands.

And here you must observe, what it is to abstract. What it is to abstract Now Abstraction is the separa­tion of one thing from another, and the apprehension and understanding of one thing without the apprehension or understanding of others. For in Abstraction al things are not known which are in a thing, but that only which is abstracted: for examples sake; To abstract the Living Creature from the Horse, is to consider only the Nature of a living Crea­ture in general, not regarding the particular Nature of an Horse.

Finally, The Will what it is. The Will (that we may also speak briefly thereof) is the other Faculty of a Rational Soul, whereby we follow or avoid such things as are known by the Understanding; or (as Scaliger hath it, Exercit. 307. S. 3.) The Will is the Understanding extended to the having or doing what it knows. Others cal it the Rational Appetite. For as after the know­ledg of Sense there follows a Sensitive Appetite; so after the knowledg of the Mind an Ap­petite follows proper thereto, which to difference it from the former, they cal it Voluntas, the Will; and that this Rational Appetite differs from the Sensible is hereby apparent, be­cause they are frequently at enmity one against another.

The Object of the Will, is Good known by the Understanding and presented to the Wil, The ob­ject of the Will. Its actions twofold. 1. Drawn out. 2 Com­manded. and the contrary Evil: Hence it follows the Good, and shuns the Evil. The Actions of this Faculty are to Will or Desire, and to Nill or Refuse. Now the Actions of the Will are twofold; Drawn out, and Commanded. The Drawn out, are those which the Will puts forth and performs of it self, and not by the inferior powers. The Commanded are those which the Will commands and enjoyns the inferior Faculties to perform. Now the Will hath command over the Locomotive Faculty, and the Sensitive Appetite: for at the word and command of the Mind and Will we move and rest. But the command which the Will ought to have over the Sensitive Appetite is much weakened by sin, and that same har­mony disturbed betwixt the two Appetites; so that many times the Sensitive Appetite casts off the command of the Will and right Reason, and that saying becomes true: ‘ Hurry'd the Coach-man is, and the Coach away, by the Horses.’

But the Will hath no command over the Vegetative Faculty, and it acts meerly naturally, nor can we be nourished or grow according to our own will and pleasure.

Chap. 2. Of the Body of Man, and its Functions.

NOW the Soul of Man, since it is the Rule (in a manner) of al things living, as Sca­liger, Exercit. 102. Sect. 5. hath it; it must also of necessity have the most noble Body of al; which ought now to be described, as the Rule of all the rest. But since the dignity thereof, yea, and the necessity that there is of its knowledg, hath stirred up many to seek the knowledg thereof, so many Volums are written concerning the same (wherein both its parts are accurately described, and the uses of al of them laid open) that it is an impossible thing to Epitomize the same. To name a few Authors: Galen hath written many Books of this subject; of the Dissection of the Muscles, Nerves, Veins, Arteries, vocal Instruments, Womb, of the Bones, of Anatomical Administrations, 9 Books; of the use of the Parts, 17 Books, and others. Very many men of this Age have diligently written of Anatomy, [Page 402]amending and encreasing the Doctrine of Galen. And amongst them chiefly Vesalius, Fallopius, Columbus, Sylvius, Piccolhomineus, Laurentius, Platerus, Bauhinus, Casse­rius, Fabricius, Riolanus, Spigelius, and very many more, all whom to reckon up the Nature of this short work wil not permit. We shal therefore in this place only with brevity name the Parts of the Body whereby al the actions thereof are performed; the Description whereof may be seen in the Authors aforesaid, which are in the hands of every one.

Now that the parts of our Bodies may be fit to perform their actions, the dis­position of the parts of the Bo­dy wherein it consists? the Con­stitution of the simi­lar parts. the tem­perament of a Man, twofold. they must needs be rightly disposed. Now that disposition consists in three things: For since the parts of our Body are considered either as similar only, or as dissimilar and organical; in both of them Unity is required, and it is necessary that every part be one and entire. Moreover, parti­cularly in the similar parts there is required temper; in the organical composition and con­formation, necessary for the actions of the Body; which is in divers parts different, according to the diversity of the actions by them to be performed.

Now what in general a Temperament is, and what are its differences, hath been already declared in Book 3. chap. 4. But as to what concerns the Temperament of a Man, in him (as also in other Creatures, of whom he is as it were the Rule and measure) is found a two­fold Temperament; the one of a Body, considered simply as a mixt Body; the other of a living Body. For when a man dies, that temper which he had as a living body does withal vanish; yet in the Carkass til it rot the parts do for a while retain the composition and tem­per which they have from the Elements.

Concerning the Temper of a mixt Body we spake before in the Book newly cited: Each part hath a pe­culiar tem­perament. but the Temper of a living Man, which results out of a certain harmony of al his parts, although it be hot and moist, and Life consists in Heat and Moisture; yet there is a great diversity in the Parts. The Skin is the most temperate, especially that in the Hand.

Among the Hot Parts the chief is the Heart: Hot parts: after the Heart follows the Liver, the Spleen, the Flesh of the Muscles, the Kidneys, the Lungs, a Vein, an Artery, Fat and Suet.

Among Cold Parts, Cold parts the first are the Bones, then the Grisles, the Ligaments, the Tendons, the Membranes, the Arteries, the Veins, the hard Nerves.

The Moist parts are, moist parts Suet, Marrow, Brain, Spinal Marrow, Stones, Dugs, Lungs, Spleen, Kidneys, Flesh of the Muscles, Tongue, Heart, loft Nerves.

The dry are, Dry parts. Bones, Gristles, Ligaments, Tendons, Membranes, Arteries, Veins, hard Nerves.

Now this Temperament of a living Body is twofold, the in­bred Heat whereof it consists. or consists in two things; Innate, and Influent Heat. Innate Heat is in that which is the inbred hot juyce natural: For by innate heat we understand not a bare quality, but a quality with its subject. This Innate Heat consists of the inbred Spirit and original moisture: and is nothing but the Primitive Moisture filled in al parts with the implanted spirit and heat. For these three, Heat, Spi­rit, and Radical Moisture, or Natural Balsam as some cal it, are so joyned together, as that they cannot be easily separated. For this is that Body which is more Divine than the Ele­ments so called, and is a substance bearing proportion to that of the Heavenly Bodies, as Aristotle terms it in his 2. de generat. Animal. cap. 3. and by which the seeds of things are made fruitful, as the same Aristotle informs us.

This inbred heat is principally in the Spermatick Parts, the Sub­ject of the inbred heat: which are called the first Parts. But it is chiefly found in the Heart, which therefore Galen cals the Hearth or Chimney of the inbred Heat. And this innate Heat is the chief instrument of the Soul, whereby it performs and perfects al actions. At the beginning of a Mans Life, and in his yonger yeers, it is much in quantity; and as he grows older, the Radical Moisture is gradually consumed and dried up, til at last being quite spent, the Heat is also extinguished, and natural Death follows.

Now this inbred Heat is cherished and fomented by the influent Heat, What the spirits in the body are? through means of the Spirits, which are a most thin, hot, and movable body, bred of the most sincere and sub­til part of the Blood; and being joyned with the inbred Heat they are the immediate and chief Instrument of the performance of al actions, and are a cause that the faculties of the Soul exercise their operations.

'Tis commonly taught by many, they do not con­veigh the faculties: That these Spirits are the conveighers of the Faculties from the principal Parts to the rest of the Body: but this is a false Opinion. For seeing the Faculties are inseparable Properties of the Soul, and the Soul is in all the parts, it is every where furnished with its Faculties, not borrowing the same elswhere.

Now touching the Number of these Spirits, the num­ber of the Spirits: several men are of several Opinions; and some [Page 493]make one, and others more. But we have reason to hold that there are divers Spirits. For although the more subtile part of the Blood be the first matter of them all; yet they receive a diverse form in sundry parts, and are fitted for divers uses.

Now the Spirits are three, Natural, Vital, and Animal.

Touching the Natural many doubt. The Na­tural: We although we admit them into the number of Spirits, yet we acknowledg no smal difference betwixt it and the other Spirits, and that the name of Spirits does not so properly belong to them as to the others, nor that they have the same Office. Now it is generated in the Liver, and is contained in the Veins, and is the thin­ner and more spirituous part of the blood, bred of the vaporation of the blood, and affords matter to make the Vital Spirits of.

All grant a Vital Spirit, the Vital: which is generated in the left Ventricle of the Heart of the thin­ner part of the Blood, or Natural Spirit, flowing into the Heart, and first of al attenuated and elaborated in the right Ventricle; and of the Air drawn in by breathing, and by the di­latation of the Arteries. This Spirit is not only in the Heart the chief Instrument thereof, together with the inbred heat of the Heart; but also being spred abroad through the Arte­ries into the whol Body, it cherishes the inbred heat of al the parts, excites and encreases the same, and gives perfection as it were thereunto. And therefore some call it the influent Heat. Also this Spirit affords matter for the Animal Spirits.

Many indeed deny the Animal Spirit; yet we have reason to admit the same, the Ani­mal: seeing it is wrought in a peculiar Member, viz. The Brain, nor can the Vital spirit perform those uses which the Animal does, and in a partful of Vital Spirit we see sense and motion taken away for want of Animal Spirits, as in the Apoplexy, Palsey, and stupidity.

For this Spirit is the immediate Instrument of Sense and Motion; and it is generated of the putest part of the Vital Spirit, carried by the Carotick and Cervical Arteries into the Ba­sis of the Brain, and thence into the Brain it self, and mingled with Air drawn in by the fet­ching of breath.

Moreover, The Organick parts have also their proper Constitution, viz. the Con­stitution of the Or­ganick parts: A due compo­sition and connexion of the similar parts into one form and shape, fit to exercise the action. Now there is required to the composition of Organick parts; first a just number of parts compounding; secondly, the greatness fit for the said parts; thirdly, a decent conformation, which comprehends a sigure fit to perform the action, cavities and passages, and that the surface be rough or smooth, as the Nature of the part requires; fourthly, scituation and connexion with other parts.

These things whereof we have hitherto spoken being common to al parts, and necessary for al actions; we will now furthermore briefly recite how and by what parts the several actions are performed.

And seeing the Vegetative Faculty is the lowest, we wil first treat thereof. Now it con­tains under it, Nutrition, Augmentation, and Generation.

And as to Nutrition and Augmentation in the first place, seeing in them Aliment is joyned to the Body from elswhere (and the Aliment is in the first place unlike of substance) it must be elaborated by divers Concoctions, and be first made fit for the Body.

This Concoction is twofold; Private, which is performed in the several parts; A double Concoction in the body private & publick. the first Concoction and Pub­lick, which is ordained for the use of the whol body, and is performed in the stomach chiefly, and in the spleen.

The first Concoction therefore is performed in the stomach; and for the same cause a double Appetite is given to the stomach; a Natural, whereby it desires food for it self alone; and an Animal Appetite, whereby it desires food for the whol body.

For by Appetite and hunger a Man is pricked on and provoked to eat, and then the first preparation of the Meat is in the Mouth. For in the Mouth it is by the Teeth broken and ground; which for that cause (although they serve also to form the Speech) are given to a man commonly thirty two in number, in each Jaw sixteen; of which some are called Cut­ters, others Dog-teeth, others Grinders. The Cutters or foremost are four in each Jaw; the Dog-teeth two; the Grinders ten. Moreover, by the Mouths heat, and the mixture of spittle, the meat is altered. The Meat being thus broken, ground, and prepared in the Mouth, is by the Tongues motion thrust down the gaping Throat into the Stomach, which the sto­mach by help of the oblique fibres does imbrace and retain til by the Concoctive Faculty thereof and its proper heat it be turned into a Mass not unlike Barley Cream, the ma­king of Chyle. which is cal­led Chylus.

The Chyle being wrought in the stomach is sent out by the lower Orifice into the Guts, Discribu­tion of the Chyle: and is by them stil more elaborated. Now the Guts are of two sorts, the Thick and the [Page 404]thin: The thin are three, Duodenum, Jejunum, Ileon; the thick also three, Coecum, Colon, Rectum.

And seeing no Meat can be turned wholly into Nourishment, the Ex­crements of the first digestion. but hath some parts in it unprofitable to nourish the Body: Nature in this, as all other Concoctions, separates what is unprofitable, and breeds here a two-fold Excrement, the one thick, the other waterish.

The thicket Excrements are the Dung, the Dung whose expulsion is through the Belly by stool: the Guts partly by their circular and transverse fibres (with both which both their Coats are furnished) contracting themselves above the same; partly by help of the Muscles of the Belly, whereby the Belly is squeezed; and so the Excrements are forced downwards.

The thin and waterish Excrement is not presently voided forth, The thin and watry excrement. but remains mixed with the Chyle, that it being thereby made thin may the more easily pass the narrow Veins of the Mesentery and Liver.

The first Concoction being finished, The se­cond Con­coction, or blood-ma­king. the Chyle is received out of the Mesaraick Veins, (whose Orifices reach into the Guts) is altered and changed a little, and is hence carried to the Roots of Vena Porta and to the Liver.

And that the blood may be bred more pure in the Liver, after the Blood hath received some rudiment in the Mesaraick Veins, that which is therein thick and dreggy is drawn by the Spleen through the Splenick Branch of the Porta, out of the Trunk of the Mesaraick Veins before it pass to the Liver; where the Spleen alters it as much as it can and the matter will bear, and thereof breeds for it self and the ignoble parts in the Belly a thick and dreggy blood. But that which is quite excrementitious, and cannot be turned into Aliment is evacuated, partly by the Hemorrhoidal Veins and Porta's Trunk, and partly by the Splenick Arteries.

The Chyle after it hath received some rudiments of Blood in the Mesaraick Veins, and is by help of the Spleen purged from the more dreggy parts thereof, it receives the form of perfect Blood in the Liver; and is thence distributed into al the parts of the Body to nou­rish the same.

And since in every digestion Excrements are bred, Excre­ments of the second digestion. 1. Yellow Choler: 2 Ʋrine there is also in Sanguification a two­fold Excrement; yellow Choler, which is collected into the Gall-bladder, and is thence voided by the Guts, exciting them by its acrimony to purge themselves: and the serous or wheyish excrement, which is drawn through the Emulgent Veins by the Kidneys, and is transmitted through the Ureters into the Bladder, and is by it voided forth and called Urine. For the Urine is nothing else but that watry moisture in the Chyle that served to make it pass more easily, and the salt which was superfluous in the meat and unsit to nourish the Body. Which appears not only by the tast, but also because store of salt is drawn out of Urine, the watry moisture being separated.

The Blood which is distributed into the whol Body to nourish the same, The blood consists of divers parts: although it is contained under one form or shape, and is al useful to nourish the Body; yet its parts are not quite alike, but some temperate, which are peculiarly called blood; others hotter and drier, which are called Cholerick Blood; others colder and moister, which are called Fleg­matick Blood; others colder and drier, which are called Melancholy Blood; but vulgarly these parts are called, Choler, Flegm, and Melancholy.

And of these parts none is Excrementitious, but al are useful to nourish the Body; and in the Body of a sound Man there is nothing Excrementitious, but only Alimentary blood is con­tained in his Veins, and al the parts of our Bodies are nourished only with blood.

This Blood in the several parts is elaborated according to the Nature of each part, the third concoction and at length assimilated to the said parts. And seeing in that elaboration the blood undergoes some mutations, Physitians do say, that in the third Concoction the four secondary humors are generated; whereof the one follows the other, and by these mutations the blood is tur­ned into the substance of the Body. the secon­dary hu­mors. The first is called the Nameless, the second Dew, the third Glew, the fourth Cambium.

In this Concoction two Excrements are generated, the Ex­crements of the 3d Digestion. the one more gross, which is the filth that gathers about the Skin; the other more thin, which is discussed, partly by invisible tran­spiration, and partly by sweat. For the evacuation of which excrements the Skin was fur­nished with pores.

Moreover, the gene­rative fa­culty. That a man might propagate and multiply himself, he received from the Crea­tor the Faculty of Generation. Now Generation is caused by seed elaborated in the stones, unto which out of the rest of the Body the best part of blood, spirit, and heat, is transmit­ted by the Veins, Arteries, and Nerves; and is by them reduced into a white froathy body, [Page 405]ful of spirits, which is called seed and is a compendium as it were of all the Heat and Spirits in the Body.

This Seed is sent forth both by the Man and Woman: for seeing Women are furnished with the same Instruments, both to make and vent Seed; and when they are provoked by Lust they desire Copulation, and void seed: we must needs grant that they contribute seed to Generation. And their seed goes to the making up of the Child: for the male and female are not two sorts of Creatures: yet neither of their seeds is alone sufficient for Generation, but this order is appointed by the Creator, that of both their seeds as two partial causes, one principle and one total cause should arise, from which one motion (though in a certain order­ly disposition) should further the production of the Child.

The Seeds conceived in the Womb are by the inbred faculty thereof cherished, and the fa­culty lurking in the seed is stirred up, and the shape of the Organs begins to be expressed; and so conception is said to be made, and then it is termed a Conception. Now the mem­branes encompassing the Child are first formed, in which the nobler part of the seed and spi­rit is included; and they are two, one called Chorion compasses the whol Child, props up the umbilical vessels, and by their their means it totally adheres to the Womb: the other immediately compassing the Child is called Amnios; which Coats seeing in the Birth they seem to be but one, are termed the After-birth, because they come away after the Child.

Now the spermatick parts are first formed and that all at once. And afterwards every part is finished, as the dignity and necessity thereof requires. At first there appear as it were three bubbles, and innumerable threds, being the underwoof of the solid parts. These parts do afterwards receive encrease from the mothers blood. And hereupon the Creator hath ordained, that from the fourteenth yeer commonly of a Womans age, to the five and fif­tieth, there should be some superfluous blood as it were, bred in women, and afford matter for the Child in women that have conceived: or if a woman be not with Child that it should be sent unto the womb, and from thence purged away.

Since therefore the Child after it is once formed in the Seed is furnished from the mother with all things it stands in need of, there were navil vessels made, viz. a Vein, The Na­vil-vessels The Vein. The Ar­teries. two Arteries and the Ʋrachus, which about the navil grow together into one. The Vein is a branch of Vena Portae, to which it is contiguous, being the Nurse (as it were) of the Infant: the two Arteries (branches of the Ramus Iliacus) descending do spring from the Aorta; whereby arterial blood and spirit are communicated to the Infant, and by which the Infant draws breath. The Ʋrachus is carried from the bottom of the Bladder to the Navil; The Ura­chus. when the Child is born, there being no longer use of these Instruments for these intents, they grow to­gether, and perform the office of the Ligaments as it were.

Now the whol time from the Conception to the Birth is divided by Physitians into two parts; the time of formation or shaping, The time of Forma­tion. from the Conception to the time the Child begins to stir; and the time of perfection, which is from the time it begins to stir, to the time it is born: yet others divide it into three parts, viz. into the time of Formation, which Hippo­crates, de natura pueri, determines to be of Girls in forty daies, of Males in thirty: The time of Motion. the time of motion which is commonly said to be of Males in the third month, of Girls in the fourth: and thirdly, the time of birth.

Now as to the time of birth, that is various in mankind: yet experience teaches, The time of Birth. that no Child is born alive before half a yeer be past. The Child born in the seventh month may live: but no Child born in the eighth month can live according to Hippocrates; yet some hold that the eighth months Child does somtimes live. But the most orderly and frequent time of childing is the ninth month, and most Children are brought forth from the 15. of the ninth month, to the 15. of the tenth.

And although Physitians have observed that some have been born in the eleventh month and after the eleventh month: How the months are reckoned. yet such births are to be reckoned amongst rare acci­dents.

Now the months according to which the times of Child-birth are reckoned are the solar months, or months of the Sun; from which nevertheless the lunar Conjunctions (consisting of twenty nine daies and twelve minuts) do not much vary. Nor must this laborious frame of mans body be ried to such smal observances of time.

After the Natural faculty comes the Vital, being distinct from the Natural and Animal, three fa­culties in the Heart both in actions and peculiar organs, and hath its seat in the Heart. Now under the term of vital faculty divers powers are comprehended; and there are in the Heart three faculties, the Wrathful, the Breeder of spirit and vital Heat, and Pulsing faculty which is subservient hereunto.

From the wrathful faculty proceed al the passions of the mind, the wrath­ful faculty Anger, Mansuetude, Bold­ness, Fear, Hope, Dejection, Joy, Sadness, and others of this kind which follow the for­mer. Now some of these are caused materially (that I may so speak) or in way of an ef­ficient cause, by expansion of the Heat, Spirit and Blood, as Anger, Joy, and the like; some by the Concentration or gathering inward of the said Blood and Spirits, as Fear, Sad­ness, and the like: and formally they are all no other than Appetites; and these motions do follow an appetite, either of prosecuting that which delights, or of avoiding that which is hurtful; the former of which causes an expansion or spreading abroad of the Heat and Blood, and the latter causeth them to retire inwards. Now these motions cannot be made, save by agitation of the Heart and Arteries, and of fervent and spirituous Blood. Whence it is apparent why the wrathful faculty needs a very hot Bowel, and which is in continual motion.

Now the Heart is seated in the middle region of the Body, viz. in the Chest, that from it as a fountain the vital heat and spirit may readily be diffused into the whol Body. Now the Heart hath two Ventricles, the use of the Heart and its Ventricles. the right and left: the right Ventricle out of the wide mouth of the Vena cava draws in Blood by its Diastole, which it perfectly concocts and attenuates: the thinner portion whereof is transmitted into the left Ventricle of the Heart, by those holes in the partition wall betwixt the two Ventricles; which nevertheless some deny: but the remaining and greatest part passes through the Vena arteriosa into the Lungs; some part wherof is spent in nourishing the Lungs, but for the greatest part is carried through the arte­ria venosa into the left Ventricle of the Heart.

Now these things are performed by a certain wonderful and perpetual motion of the Heart, the moti­on of the Heart. whereby in the Diastole its extream parts are contracted, and the point of the Heart is drawn to the Basis, and so the Heart becomes more short, but the sides thereof are dilated: but in the Systole the Heart becomes longer, and narrower. And seeing for the breeding of spirits and Arterial blood there is need both of Air and Blood, and these two substances cannot be drawn with one motion: besides the Ventricles which draw the Blood, on each side at the Basis of the Heart there are two notable cavities, ending into the upper part of the Ventricles, which by a peculiar motion of their own do draw to themselves Air to cherish the Spirits and fan the vital Heat, which are termed the Hearts Earlets. For although others say their use is to be as it were Store-houses of the Blood and Air flowing in, and guard the Vena cava, and the Arteria venosa: yet some conceive, that by a peculiar motion they draw in Air; and Hippocrates himself, Lib. de corde, holds that they cool the Heart like a pair of Bellows. the Peri­cardium.

And that the Heart may not be hindred in its motion, it hath allotted unto it a large and membranous Mansion, which they cal Pericardium the Heart-bag, which hinders any thing from pressing upon the Heart or troubling the same in its motion.

But seeing nothing could go into or come out of the Heart unless it had been furnished with certain conveighances: the four Vessels of the Heart. therefore in the Basis of the Heart four remarkable Vessels are seen, two in the right, and as many in the left Ventricle: In the right, the Vena cava, and the Vena arteriosa; Vena cava in the left, the Arteria magna, and the Arteria venosa. The Vena cava is at the right Ventricle of the Heart, and pours Blood into the Heart, for the Gene­ration of arterial Blood and vital Spirit and the nourishment of the Lungs. Howbeit others think the Blood which is wrought in this Ventricle is also distributed through the whol Bo­dy. Vena Ar­teriosa. Arteria venosa Arteria magna: Then there is the Vena arterialis, which carries blood out of the right Ventricle to the Lungs for to nourish them, as also to become the matter of arterial Blood and vital Spirit; the Arteria venosa carries Air from without and prepared in the Lungs, and Blood brought out of the right Ventricle of the Heart by the Vena arteriosa, into the left Ventricle, and ex­pels smoaky exhalations, and distributes a portion of the vital Spirit into the Lungs. Final­ly there is the Aorta or Arteria magna, which distributes the vital Spirit and Arterial Blood bred in the left Ventricle through the whol Body: And these are (as Hippocrates saies) Pegai Phusios Anthropou, the Fountains of the Nature of Man. the Valves

And seeing these Vessels have each of them two uses (for examples sake, the Arteria ve­nalis doth not only draw Air out of the Lungs into the left Ventricle of the Heart, but it communicates vital spirit and arterial blood to the Lungs, and expels smoaky vapors) lest the substances entring the Heart should fal back the same way they came in before they have gained their perfection, or that which is shed out of the Heart might return thither again, there are eleven Valves placed in the orifices of the Vessels; three in the orifices of all the o­ther Vessels, and only two in the Arteria venosa: Of which Valves some are open outwards and shut inwards, namely those that pass the matter to the Heart; others are open within, [Page 407]shut without, being such as pass matter from the Heart. In the orifice of the Vena cava are three Valves, open outwardly, shut in wardly; contrariwise, in the orifice of the Vena Arteriosa there are as many open within, shut without: in the orifice of the Vena arteri­osa there are as many, open within shut without: in the orifice of the Arteria venosa there are two, which are open without, shut within; in the orifice of the Arteria magna are three Valves, open within shut without.

And because the Heart distributes Heat and Spirit through the Arteries into the whol Body, there are passages made to carry the same, viz. the Branches of the great Arterie, the Bran­ches of Arteria magna. which themselves also are dilated and contracted, and by the pores of the Skin draw in Air, expel smoaky vapors, and communicate to the whol body vital Spirit, Heat, and Arterial Blood; and this motion of the Heart and Arteries is termed the Pulse.

Now the Pulse consists of two motions, Systole and Diastole. Of what motions the Pulse doth con­sist. By the Diastole or dila­tation the Heart is filled, and draws Air and Blood out of the Lungs by the Arteria venosa; and the Arteries by their orifices, which end in the Skin, do draw some of the ambient Air: but by the Systole or Compression the Heart distributes vital Spirit and Heat through the whol body, by the Arteria magna, and expels fuliginous excrements to the Lungs, by the Arteria venalis: also the Arteries expel fuliginous excrements by their orifices, which action is termed adelos diapnoe, insensible Transpiration.

But because the Air, which is drawn by the Heart, was to be altered before it came thither, the chief Organ of Respirati­on. therefore the Lungs were given, and Respiration ordained. The chief Organ of respiration is the Lungs. For although the Chest and other parts do also serve for respiration: yet that motion is primarily performed by the Lungs, which have a peculiar faculty to dilate and contract themselves, as the Heart and Brain also have: which may easily be observed in the dissection of Live-anatomies. Nor is respiration a voluntary motion, Respirati­on no vo­luntary motion: so that the Lungs should dilate themselves upon the motion of the Chest, to avoid Vacuum; but the Lungs are moved by a proper power of their own, and the Lungs and Chest are moved to­gether, because they conspire both to one end. For the Lungs by an inbred faculty are di­lated: and that it might be done more conveniently, and that it might have room wherein to dilate it self, when the Lungs move, the animal faculty at the same time moves the Chest. And indeed these two motions hold proportion one to another. Nor are the Lungs disten­ded because they are filled, as a Bladder that is blown up; because Air is not from any place blown into the Lungs: but they are filled because they are dilated, after the manner of a pair of Bellows.

Now respiration consists of two Motions, Inspiration and expiration. Respira­tion made up of two motions: By Inspiration the Lungs and Chest being widened, Air is drawn in by the Mouth and Nostrils for to cool the Heart and to make vital Spirit: and by Expiration, the Lungs and Chest being compres­sed, fuliginous excrements are voided at the Mouth and Nostrils. Hence, that much Air might be attracted and retained therein, the Lungs exceed all the Bowels in greatness, and have a rare and porous substance.

And because the Air was to have an Ingress into the Lungs, the Aspe­ra Arteria: therefore was the Wesand [Aspera arteria] or Wind-pipe made; whose larger Trunk might receive Air, partly by the Mouth and partly by the Nostrils; and other branches innumerable are distributed into all the parts of the Lungs, that they might be totally replenished with Air; which Air the Ves­sels coming from the Heart to the Lungs, being large and great, do receive at their ends, and carry it into the Ventricles of the Heart.

And because a man perpetually needs to draw in the Air, the Wesand is made of solid grisly rings, that it may be kept perpetually wide and gaping.

But lest the Meat or Drink in passing over the Wind-pipe should fall thereinto, the Epi­glottis: where­by a mans life might be endangered: on the top thereof a soft and sharp-pointed Grisle is pla­ced sticking out, which they cal Epiglottis, which covers the passage of the Wind-pipe, while Meat or Drink slips over it.

Now the Chest, the Chest: since it was to be partly a defence of the vital parts and partly the In­strument of Respiration; it was to be neither quite fleshy nor quite boney. Therefore the Chest doth consist of twelve pair of Ribs, Its Ribs and Mus­cles: which that they might come and go to dilate and contract the Breast, sixty five Muscles were made, thirty two whereof distend, and as many contract the Chest.

But because there are no Ribs in the lower part of the Breast; the Midrif that there might be in that place also a part that might be distended and contracted, and might likewise separate the vital Organs from the lower Belly, a certain partition wall is interposed of a musculous or fleshy substance, which is called the Midrif, which when the Air is breathed forth [Page 408]is raised up, but being loosened it is dilated, and depressed in Inspiration or drawing in of the Air, or fetching wind. And because through the Diaphragma, neat the Back, the Gullet, the Arteria magna, and Vena Cava do pass, lest by the perpetual motion of the Diaphragma these parts should be straitened and agitated, the middle of the Dia­phragma is Membranous, and contains no fleshy substance, that though the musculous part of the Diaphragme or Midrif is moved, yet that part may not be contracted.

Having done with the Vital Function, it follows in the next place, that we enquire by what means and with what Instruments the operations of the sensitive faculty are perfor­med. And in the first place, that the Instrument of seeling which is the most common sense is a Membrane, The Skin is not the adequate instrument of feeling. hath been said already in Book 7. Chap. 6. But as to the Skin, 'tis true indeed that it is folded about the whol Body, not only that it may cloath the whol Body, and de­fend the other parts from external injuries, and that it may fasten and bind al the parts toge­ther; but also that it may be the Instrument of feeling, and may perceive external objects and injuries every way incident. And Galen rightly said 1. de temper. cap. 9. that the Skin, especially that in the hand, is the Rule of al sensible objects, and an Instrument of feeling properly fitted for so prudent a Creature as Man is. Yet nevertheless in that the Skin feels, it does it because it is Membranous, or receives fibres and lattle Nervous Mem­b [...]es from the parts beneath it.

The To gue is the Instrument of Tasting, The parts and use of the tongue whose flesh is spungy, rare and loose, covered by a most thin Membrane, common to the Mouth and Pallat, into which the Nerves of the th [...]d and fourth Conjugation are expanded. Now the Tongue hath three pair of Nerves; the former two are disseminated through the Coat thereof, and serve the Tasting Faculty: the third is spred into the Muscles of the Tongue for to move the same.

That the O [...]gans of the Smel are the Mammillary Processes, was said before in Book 7. chap. 4.

The adequate Organ of the Hearing is indeed the whol Ear. The Organ of Hear­ing, its parts and use. the im­planted air But what is the chief part in the Ear that contributes to Hearing, Authors are at great variance, while some say the implanted Air, others a certain Nerve is the immediate Instrument of Hearing. But if we shal diligently weigh the matter, these Opinions may be some waies reconciled, as was said Lib. 7. cap. 3. For it is altogether probable that a certain implanted Air or aery substance is required to cause the Sense of Hearing. For as to receive the visible Species the Organ of Sight is shining and lightsom; so also to receive sounds, 'tis credible that the Organ of Hea­ring is Aerial. But seeing the Organ of a Sense ought to be a part similar and animated, simple Air cannot be the Organ of Hearing; but it must be a certain Aery substance, bred of the most pure and Aery part of the Seed and maternal blood, such as may have affinity with the external Air, and may receive the sounds brought in. But whether this ingrafted Air be in the expanded Nerve, or in some Cavity, can hardly be determined; since Anatomy in this point affords little help, and after death we find nothing obvious to the sight. Whence also it is that that same other Question can hardly be resolved; Whether this Air be only an internal Medium, to receive and transmit sounds to the true Organ of Hearing, which is the widened end of the Auditory Nerve? or, Whether (which as the Opinion of Capivaccius) this Air it self seated in the expanded Nerve be the Organ of Hearing?

All the other parts of the Ear have each their use in Hearing. the ex­ternal Ear The external Ears by their sticking out do receive the sound, and cause it to rebound into the Auditory passage. Hence those that are crop-eared, or have their Earlaps cut off, they do not hear exactly, but perceive sounds like fluctuating Water.

From the out ward Ear or Earlap, the audi­tory pas­sage or hole. the Drum. the sound comes first into the Auditory hole, which is boney and covered with a thin Skin compact and smooth, and which sticks exceeding fast to the bone, fit to receive sounds. At the end of this hole or passage is a Membrane which they cal the Drum, made to this end, That the external Air might not slip into the Cavity of the Ear, and so disturb the Hearing.

Now this Membrane is exceeding dry that it may rightly receive sounds: for Instruments of Musick teach us, that the driest things are most apt to sound.

No man can easily tel the use of the rest of the parts of the Ear, the three little bones of the Bar viz. The Cavities, the three little bones called the Mallet, the Anvil, the stirrup; since we have no such helps here as Looking-Glasses, Optical Glasses, and such like do afford us in out explication of the Instru­ments of sight.

Somwhat we have spoken concerning the sight, the parts of the Eye, and their uses. Book 7. chap. 2. Its Instrument is the Eye; which hath many parts, each of which hath its peculiar use. The first is the Cornea Tunica, or Horny Coat of the Eye, which is transparent and void of al color, that the visible [Page 409]species may pass there-through into the Eye, and that pure and uninfected with any strange color. It is thicket than the Air, that the species coming out of the Air (a thinner Mediu [...]) into a thicker might be refracted.

Bet wixt the Horny Coat, and the Cristalline Humor, the wa [...]y humor. the watry humor is placed in the middle, transparent and void of color for the Reason aforesaid touching the Cornea. Now it is thinner than the Cornea, that here also may be a new refraction of Raies.

Next the watry humor comes the Ʋvea Tunica or Grape-skin Coat, the Ʋvea tunica. which is furnished with such a blackness as is not to be seen in al the body besides, to the end the species might become more clear, and appear better in the Cristalline humor. For weak Lights do more appear in an obscure datkish place than in a lightsom. Also this Coat seems to have another End, viz. That over much light which might enter in at the Apple of the Eye, and offend the Eye and the sight, might by this black Coat be intercepted.

In the Ʋvea or the Grape-skin Coat, the Apple of the Eye. there is an hole which is called the Apple of the Eye, being the door as it were by which the visible species do enter into the Eye. This hole (that the sight may be more perfect and distinct) is much less than the compass of the Cornea: Yet in some it is larger, in others narrower; and those that have it narrower do see more sharply, those that have it broad are weak-sighted.

Now the Pupilla or Apple of the Eye is straitened and widened, Why it wi­dens and darrows. and in a light place ap­pears narrower, in an obscure place wider: For seeing two much light hurts the sight, and a weak light is not sufficient for sight, and in an obscu [...]e place the visible object is not suffi­ciently discerned; this Window (as it were) is made in the entrance of the Eye, which may be widened and narrowed, and by widening let in so much light in an obscure place as may be sufficient for sight; and by narrowing exclude too much Light which may offend the sight.

And in regard of this Constitution of the Ʋvea Tunica, there are three natural manners of sight; one is most perfect, being constituted in an indivisible point, and whereby we discern distinctly the smallest things: The other is persect, when we see visible objects at a just di­stance, and can distinguish them though we do not discern the smallest part of every of them: The third is imperfect and confused, whereby besides things just against us (which we see per­fectly) we do also confusedly discern things on either side of us; and for this sights sake the Horny Coat is broader than the Ʋvea or Grape-skin Coat, to the intent that at one view we may behold divers things, though not al distinctly.

Now this is the Cause of this Difference. Seeing the comprehension of a visible thing is made by a Pyramid; and the certification by its Axis; and only that perpendicular Line which is called the Axis, and which is not refracted, does effectually, plainly, and distinct­ly represent the thing; but other Raies, by how much they are neerer to, or further from it, by so much the stronger or weaker they are in representing: hence doubtless it comes to pass that when the Apple of the Eye is narrower, only the perpendicular in the Pyramid of sight does enter, or with it the Raies which are nearest the Axis; when the Apple is wider, more Raies (oblique and refracted) do enter with the perpendicular.

Next the Ʋvea is the Cristalline Humor, the Cri­stalline Humor. which is not seated (as some imagine) in the Centre of the Eye, but in the fore part, and the Membrane compassing the same divides the Eye into two unequal parts, the foremost whereof is fourfold lesser than the hindermost. And as to the use and office of the Cristalline Humor, Authors do not a little vary: Whether it be the c [...]ies In­st [...] ument of sight? For some (and the greatest part) do hold that this Humor is the chief Instrument of sight, and that therein only the species are received and discerned: Others (seeing that the Glassie Hu­mor is also transparent, and much greater than the Cristalline, and placed behind the same) are of Opinion that the sight is not terminated in the Cristalline, but that the visible species passing through the Cristalline are received in the Glassie Humor, and being refracted are gathered into one point, and received by the Optick Nerve: which Opinion seems to be very probable. For seeing refraction is exceeding necessary to sight; al this furniture of the Eye, and the variety of transparent parts therein was contrived, that divers refractions might be made. And hence also the Cristalline Humor is more compact than the Watry, that a new refra­ction might be made therein.

This Cristalline Humor is seated in the fore part of the Glassie Humor, the Gsassie Humor. so called because it resembles melted Glass. Its substance is softer than the Cristalline, and less fluid than the Watro. The Quantity hereof is so great, that it takes up almost three quarters of the Ca­vities of the Eyes. Galen and many others have hitherto thought, that this Humor was made to nourish the Cristalline; but falsly: For what need was there of so great a quanti­ty of the Glaslie humor, if it were only to nourish the Cristalline? also the Cristalline Hu­mor [Page 410]might be nourished by a much readier way; nor needed so laborious a contrivance of the Glassie Humor, if it were made only for nourishment: nor is there any example in the whol Body of one part nourishing another, but they al draw their nourishment from the Veins, whether they be white or red. The Opinion therefore of others seems to be truer, who hold, That the Vitreous or Glassie Humor hath received this shape, place, and quantity, that there­in the visible Images or Raies being refracted out of the Cristalline into the Glassie, which is less compact than the Cristalline, might meet together in one point, and after that manner be offered to the sight.

The Optick Nerves arise from the hinder part of the Brain, the Optick Nerves. and going forward a long way, they are at last inserted into the Eyes. These Nerves after they are gone a little from their original are joyned together, not by sticking one to another, or crossing one another, but by an absolute Union; but soon after they are again separated, and being divided, the right goes to the right Eye, the left to the left. And some wil have the reason to be, lest visible ob­jects should appear double because there are two eyes. But seeing these Nerves are not joyned in their beginning, but on their way, it is more probable that the reason thereof is, That the Optick Spirit (when need is) might be sent totally wel near into one Eye, that so the sight may be stronger in one Eye; which comes to pass when we shut one eye, that we may see a thing more accurately with the other.

But since Sight is made right forward, if the Eyes were immovable, we should be able to see only such things as are just against us. To the end therefore the Eye might see more things and that distinctly, it is furnished with Muscles whereby it may be moved. And be­cause the Eye was not capable of al the differences of motions; such as they want are sup­plied by the motion of the Head. But that one thing seen by the two Eyes may not appear double, both the Eyes are alwaies naturally moved to the same differences of position: and therefore the Nerves by which they are moved arise from the fore part of the Spinal Marrow, joyned together in one point as it were, that so they may agree together in every motion.

There are also besides, the Eye­lids: certain outward parts ordained to assist the Sight, viz. Two Eye­lids, the upper and the lower: of which the upper is only movable; the use of which is to defend the Eyes from external injuries, as Air, Wind, Smoak, Dust. Howbeit, some add also another use, viz. To purifie the Eyes: For since sight requires a pure transparent bo­dy, and the Horny Coat is easily dimmed by reason of the moisture which sweats out of the Kernel, as also by the external Air: in the opening of the Eye they conceive the Eyelid wipes al foulness from the Cornea Tunica.

After the external Senses come the internal, of which we have spoken, Book 7. chap. 7. The immediate Instrument by which, and in which they are exercised, is the Brain, which for the performance of these Functions is furnished with a peculiar substance, the like whereof is not to be found in the whol Body again.

Now the Brain of a Man, the Brain: the substance whereof is soft and white, in respect of the bulk of his body is exceeding great; because Man-kind is more exercised in Animal actions than other living Creatures, and therefore needs great plenty of spirits, which cannot be bred but of much matter, and in a large place.

Now the Brain is made to perform the actions of the inner Senses, Its use. and of the Rational Fa­culty, and to generate Animal Spirits, which are the immediate Instrument of these acti­ons. And the Brain is moved by a Natural and peculiar motion for the better generation of Animal Spirits, and like the Heart in its Diastole it draws matter for the generation of spi­rits, and in its Systole it pours out the Spirits into the Organs of the Senses.

Now the Brain is divided into three parts. Its parts. And the first is divided by the Dura Mater into the foremost and hindermost part: The foremost, in which the Spirits are chiefly generated, is called by the name of the whol Cerebrum or the Brain: the latter Cerebellum, the Brainlet or petty Brain. Moreover the Brain is again divided by the Dura Mater into two equal parts, the Right and the Left. The Brain hath also its Ventricles and other parts, which are all most diligently described by Anatomists, nor can they be here briefly recited, nor wel understood without ocular inspection and figures.

But let us here first enquire in what part of the Brain the Animal actions are performed. In what part of the Brain the Animal functions are exer­cised. The vulgar Opinion is, That they are performed in the Ventricles: in which also they hold the Animal Spirits are generated of the Air drawn in and setching breath, and carried into the Brain by the Organ of Smelling, and of vital Spirit sent up from the Heart by the Carotick Arteries; and so they commonly hold the Ventricles of the Brain to be the Store houses as it were of the Spirits Animal. But late Anatomists having diligently weighed the Conforma­tion [Page 411]of the Brain, have left the said Opinion. For seeing nothing reaches into the Ventricles of the Brain, besides the Kernels, and that they have no passage save at the Tunnel and the kernel thereof (which by the consent of al receives flegm out of the Brain) it easily appears from hence, that those two remarkable Cavities (which are called Ventricles) were made to receive the excrements of the Brain: and that therefore they cannot also be the Shop and place of Animal Spirits. And therefore more likely it is, That the Animal Spirits are bread in the substance of the Brain it self, and that therein they are contained and perform their Functions.

Moreover, it is also controverted; Whether the princi­pal Facul­ties have different places in the Brain: Whether al the Functions which belong to the Brain are performed in one part thereof? or whether they are exercised distinctly in dis [...]inct pla­ces? Some wil indeed have it, That the Faculties have several places, and they quarter the Fancy in the fore part of the Brain, Reason in the middle, Memory behind. And this makes them think so, because one action being hurt, the rest do remain sound. Others quarter al these actions together, seeing they are exercised about the same objects: Who indeed deny not that one action may be hurt, and the rest unhurt; but they say, this does not therefore happen because they are in several places, but because each action requires a peculiar disposition in the Organ; whence it may happen, that one preternatural Dispositi­on may hurt one action more than another; as for examples sake, moisture is more hurtful to the Memory than to the Fancy. The com­mon sense in the fore pars. The Me­mory, Fan­cy, & Rea­son not di­stinguished in their seats. Ratioci­nation is performed without corporent Organs.

Now although it is hard to determine any thing in this Case, and we must needs confess as in most other things, so in this, as Scaliger hath it, Exercitat. 307. Sect. 21. We like the Wolf deluded by the Stork do lick the Glass, but cannot touch the Gruel: yet it seems most probable that the common sense is placed in the fore part of the Brain, seeing there al the external senses concur, whose Centre (as it were) the common sense is. But the other actions seem not to differ in their sears, seeing they are conversant about the same objects.

There remains the most noble and proper action of a Man, Ratiocination, or Intellection, which is performed (doubtless) without the help of any Corporeal Organs. For the Mind does not understand by the Body or any part thereof, as the Medium wherewith. The Mind of Man indeed stands in need of a Phantasm (because the Soul while it is in the Body never understands without a Phantasm) but uses the same, not as an Organ, but as an Ob­ject: For if the Intellect were tied to any Organ, by help whereof it acted, it could not un­derstand al things: but according to the determinate disposition thereof it should act and only understand some things: as the Sight by the Eye perceives only colored things, and no­thing else.

And although after this manner we cannot assign any place to the Intellect: the seat of the un­derstan­ding. yet by acci­dent and consequentially a certain seat is ascribed thereto, viz. That wherein the Imagina­tion is made. Imagination and Ratiocination are joyned together in one Seat, and Reaso­ning is said to be performed in the Brain, rather than in the Foot or Liver; because in the Brain Phantasms are offered thereunto, which it contemplates, but not in the Foot or Liver.

After the knowing Faculty of the Soul, there remains yet Appetite and local motion, the In­strument of Animal Motion. of which we spake in Book 7. chap. 8. where also it is said, That a Muscle is the Instrument of voluntary motion. And seeing there are four motions of Muscles, so that they are ei­ther contracted, or extended, or transferred, or remain bent, as Galen teaches in Lib. 1. de motu muscul. cap. 8. Yet Contraction, whereby a Muscle is drawn towards its head and proper Original, is the proper action thereof, by which the parts are turned any way as oc­casion requires. Now there is a great number of Muscles, by reason of the variety of the parts to be moved, and their sundry motions; and some move the Thighs, others the Arms and Hands, others the Back, Breast, Head, Jaws, and other Parts.

Motion flows from the same Principle that Sense does, viz. From the Brain; howbeit, Its Foun­tain. from the hinder part thereof peculiarly termed the Brainlet or Cerebellum; and the Nerves arising therefrom are more solid, and are diffused through the substance of the Muscles.

And that the Body might be transferred from place to place, the Legs. a Man hath Legs given him which are made of most strong Bones, to support the whol Body, and carry it from place to place; which that they might not be too heavy, are made hollow within.

And that a Man might stand firm and upright, and not totter as he goes, the Feet. he hath Feet joy­ned to his Legs, which are hollow in the middle, so that a Man staies himself upon four props as it were: For when a Man moves forward, he sets the former part of his Feet more firmly to the ground, and bears most upon them.

And that the Feet may be variously moved, divers articulations are made. their joyn­tings. For we go in­to low places by bending our Knee; after lying or sitting we raise our selves up: which could [Page 412]not be if our Leg and Thigh were not joynted. So we set our Foot more forward or back­ward, as the ground is up-hill or down-hill. Also the hollow part of the Foot when we go upon pointed things, or uneven bodies, laies hold on them as it were an hand; and after the same manner also we go up a ladder. And therefore the Foot (as a Hand) is divided in­to sive Toes, which when we go do fasten upon the ground like hooks; and are also the cause that we can go upon rough and uneven places as wel as those that are plain and smooth. Now in the Toes of the Feet, the great Toe is not set against the other four as in the Hand, but they are al placed on a tow after the same manner. For the Hand being the Organ of taking hold, and the Foot of walking; as in laying hold a great variety of motion, so in walking the firmness and security of support is requisite. Moreover, that the Feet might accommodate themselves to the variety of the ground whereon a Man goes; besides Toes they are compounded of divers Bones, in respect of which they are somtimes bended, som­times extended.

And because Man only of al living Creatures is endued with Reason, the Hand. he also alone hath an Instrument of laying hold or taking up, which are the Hands, the Instruments of Instru­ments, by which only he can supply himself with whatever other Creatures naturally have more than he, as to defend or cloath themselves. Now two Hands are made, that if one wil not serve to hold a thing, both may. Again, they are variously distinguished, that we may take up great things and little things, and bodies of what figure soever. Likewise against the four Fingers the Thumb is placed opposite; because whatever we handle, either we enclose it circularly with out hand, or fasten our Fingers upon it on the opposite sides.

Moreover, Speech & the useful­ness thereof. from the Motion of the Will Speech hath its original, wherewith we may conclude this our Epitomy: which as it is proper to man alone; so is it most profitable, and most highly necessary to preserve the Societies of Man-kind: For Speech was given us that we might demand of others such things as we wanted; and signifie what we had that we were willing to impart. And as Scaliger saies, in Exercitat. 256 from Aristotle: Reason is the Hand of the Ʋnderstanding; and Speech, of Reason; and the Hand, of Speech. For the Hands perform what they are commanded; the Commands obey Reason: Rea­son is the force of the Intellect.

Now the Instruments of the Voyce and Speech, the remate Instru­ments of the voyce the near or immedi­ate Insiru­ments: are some remote and common, others near and proper. The former are the Instruments of Respiration, the Lungs and the Chest, and those parts pertaining to these, the Midrif and the Intercostal Muscles; which do not frame the voyce, but afford Spirit and Air which are necessary to the formation thereof. Now the near are the Wezand, the Larynx, the Muscles which open and shut the Larynx, the recurrent Nerves, the Epiglottis and the Tongue. To which some others are subservient, as the Palat and the Ʋvula. Amongst the most immediate are the Larynx, and especially the Epiglottis, which is like the tongue of a pipe: For a pipe without a tongue is useless, nor can the voyce be framed unless the passage of the spirit or air be made narrow.

For Air and Spirit are required as matter to frame the Voyce: Instruments are necessary to drive it forth, which are the Lungs and Chest: there is need of an Instrument wherein it may be smitten, and wherein being smitten the Air may sound; which is the Larynx, whose orifice being straitened, and the Air smitten, the Voyce is caused. And because the Case so required that a man was not alwaies to speak, but when he lifted, the Larynx hath many Muscles, by which the chink of the Larynx may be widened and straitened as we please, and so sundry Voyces framed.

But because the Voyce of Man was to be articulate, to signifie the conceptions of his Mind, therefore his Tongue was framed with Muscles to move the same, wherewith being moved it variously opposes it self to the voyce issuing out of the Larynx, and so frames an arti­culate speech: to the formation whereof the Lips do also serve, which do themselves also oppose the voyce, and with their motion precede, accompany, or come after the motion of the Tongue, as the Nature of the Articulated Speech requires.