The FIRST DISCOURSE. An Apologie for Passions against the Stoicks.

AS there is no man so temperate, but that he sometimes experi­enceth the violence of Passions, and that the disorder thereof is a fate from which very few can [...]ence themselves; so it is the Subject where­upon [Page 2] upon Philosophers have most exercised their brains, and is the part of Moral Philosophy which hath oftest been examined; But if I may speak my sense with freedom, and if I may be permitted to censure my Masters, I am of opinion, that there is no point in the whole body of Philosophy, that hath been treated of with more ostentation, and less of profit; for some of them have satisfied them­selves with having described passions unto us, and in discovering unto us their causes, and their effects, not teaching us how to go­vern them; so as they may be said to have been more careful in making us know our malady, than in applying remedies thereun­to; Others more blind, but more zealous, have confounded them with vices, and have put no difference between the motions of the sensitive appetite, and the misgovernment of the will, so as according to them, a man cannot be passionate without being crimi­nal.

Their discourses which ought to be in­structions unto virtue, have only been in­vectives against passions. They have made the malady greater than it was; and their de­sire of healing it, hath only served to make it incurable.

Others little differing from the last, have [Page 3] endeavoured to stifle Passion, and not con­sidering that man is indued with a body, from the material part, whereof the soul is not disingaged, they will heighten him to the condition of Angels. These last being the Noblest Enemies that Passion ever met withal, and who have made use of reason to grapple with her; It is fit we lend them an ear, that we may answer them, and con­fute their Error before we establish the Truth.

No man is ignorant, how that Pride hath alwaies accompanied the Sect of the Stoicks, who that they might raise up man, have laboured to abase God, and who oft-times have made their Wise-man somewhat more happy than their Iupiter. They have given him the upper hand of Fortune and Desti­ny, and will have his happiness to depend wholly upon his Will. Virtue is too modest to allow of so unjust praises; and Piety will not suffer her to agrandise her self to the prejudice of that Divinity which she adores; but the vanity of these insolent Philosophers never appeared more, than in the defiance they have given to Passion; For as she is the motion of the most incon­siderate part of our Soul. Pride hath made them eloquent in their Invectives, and Am­bition [Page 4] hath furnished them with Reasons, which are fairly entertained by such men, who are offended that they have a Body, and afflicted that they are not Angels. They say, that rest cannot consist with Passi­ons, that it is easier to destroy than to regulate them; that such Souldiers must never be made use of as spurn at the Orders of their Commanders; and that such are readier to justle reason out of doors, than to fight in her behalf; That Passions are the sickness of the Soul. Quatiator necesse est fluctuetorque [...]ui suis ma­lis tutus est, qui fortis este nisi irascitur, non potest; industrius, ni­si cupit; qui­etus, nisi ti­met; In ty­rannidi illi vivendum est in alicujus affectus veni­ [...]nti servitu­tem, Sen. l. 1. de ira, c. 1. That the very weak­est is not without danger, and that health is not wholly recovered, when any spice of the Feaver doth remain, that that man is in a very sad condition, who cannot find his safety, save in the loss thereof, who cannot be couragious, unless cholerick; who can­not be advised, without some sort of fear; and who dares undertake nothing, unless eg­ged on thereunto by his desire. Briefly, they conclude, that to be a slave to Passion, is to live under tyranny, and that a man must renounce his liberty, if he obey such insolent Masters.

These Reasons so eloquently express'd by the Stoicks, have as yet framed a wise man only in Idaea. Their Admirers have reaped nothing but Confusion; after having court­ed [Page 5] so Proud and so Austere a Virtue, they are become ridiculous to all Ages. And the wisest amongst them have found, that whilst they would go about to make so ma­ny Gods, the Product hath been so many Idols.

Sene [...]a himself, whom I look upon as the most eloquent and haughtiest Disciple of that proud Sect, forced thereunto by the weakness of Nature, and the efficacy of Reason, hath betrayed his Party, and for­going his own Maximes, confesseth that the wise man Sentiet it aque Sa­piens suspi­tiones quas­dam, &c Umbras af­fectu [...], i [...] ­sis quidem corebit. Sen. l. 1. de Ira. c. 16. sometimes feels some Commoti­ons, and that though there be in him no true Passions, yet hath he the shadows and appearances of them. He who is acquaint­ed with the humour of this Philosopher, will be satisfied with this Attestate, and he who shall well examine the Sense of his Words, will find that Saint Augustine had reason to say, the Stoicks distered from other Philosophers only in their manner of Speech, and that though their Words were more lofty, their Conceptions were not so. For they blame not all Passions, but only their Excess, and though they have had a mind to stifle them, they never could hope to do it.

To part the Soul from the Body, so to [Page 6] exempt it from these agitations, were to overthrow the Fabrick of man; As long as this illustrious Prisoner shall be obliged to the same functions, as are the souls of ir­rational Creatures, she shall be constrained to entertain Passions; And as long as she shall make use of sense, in her operations, she shall use hope. and fear, in the practical part of virtue. It is no more dishonoura­ble for the soul to fear a danger, to hope for good, or to strengthen it self against evil, than it is to see by the Organs of the Eyes, or to hear by those of the Ears; the one and the other shares of servitude, but both are necessary. It is also more easie to rule Passi­on than the Senses; Fear, Choler and Love are more capable of Reason, than is Hunger, Thirst, or Sleep. Therefore if we shall make the Senses subject to the Empire of Reason, we may well submit our Passions thereunto, and make our Fear and our Hope praise-wor­thy, as well as our Fasting and Watching me­ritorious.

Reason is the proper Utensil of man; all other things are bun as strangers to him, he may lose them without impoverishing him­self, and as long as he is master of Reason, he may still vaunt himself to be Man.

Since this is the chief of all that is good, [Page 7] we must disperse it through all the parts of man, and make even the meanest faculties of our Soul capable thereof; doubtlesly it may make for our security, if it be well husbanded. Hope, if well governed, doth encourage us to generous and difficult enter­prizes; Audacity, if well guided, makes Souldiers invincible. In fine, our most in­solent Passions may be subject to Reason, and not to employ them in the course of our life, is to render useless one of the most beautiful parts of our Soul. Virtue her self would become idle, had she no passi­ons, either to subdue or regulate. And he who shall consider their chief employment, will find they have a relation to the mana­ging of our actions. Fortitude is made use of to subjugate Fear, and this couragious vir­tue would cease to operate, if man did cease to fear. We measure our desires and hopes by Moderation, and were there no ambiti­ous Passions, no man would be moderate in his good successes. Temperance and Con­tinency bridle Sensuality, and had not Na­ture ordained pleasure in all actions, these two Virtues which go to the composure of a chaste and continent man, would be like­wise of no use. Clemency sweetens Choler, and did not this Passion animate [Page 8] Princes to revenge, the virtue whereby it is moderated would not deserve praise.

But if Passions be so much befriended by so many several virtues, they are not—thereof unthankful, for when instructed in their whole, they repay them with use, and serve them faithfully; The best part of Circum­spection is composed of Fear, which though it be accused to seek out the evil before it happen, it prepares us either quietly to un­dergo it, or happily to evade it. Hope is serviceable to Fortitude, and 'tis she that by her Promises doth encourage us to the under­taking of gallant Actions. Boldness is Va­lour's faithful Companion, and all great Con­querors owe the glory of their Generosity to this Passion. Choler maintains Justice, and animates Judges to punish the Guilty. Briefly, there is no Passion which is not ser­viceable to Virtue, when they are governed by Reason, and those who have so cried them down, make us see they never knew their use nor worth.

The SECOND DISCOURSE. What the Nature of Passions is, and in what Faculty of the Soul they reside.

GODS Greatness is so elevated, as Man cannot attain to the Knowledge thereof without abasing it, and his Unity is so simple, as it is not to be concei­ved, unless divided. Philosophers gave him different Names, to express the diversity of his Perfections; and by calling him some­times Destiny, sometimes Nature, some­times Providence, they introduced a plu­rality of Gods, and made all men Idolaters. The Soul being the Image of God, the same Philosophers did likewise divide it, and not being able to comprehend the simplici­ty of its Essence, they believed it was cor­poreal. They imagined it had parts as well [...]s the Body, and though they were more subtle, they were not less veritable. They multiplied the Cause with its Effects, and [...]aking her divers Faculties for different Na­ [...]ures, they contrary to the Law of Reason, [Page 10] gave divers forms to the same composure. But Truth, which together with Faith, came down upon earth, teacheth us that the Soul is but one in its Essence, and that it hath un­dergone several Names only, to express the variety of its operations; for when it gives life unto the body, and when by natural heat, which proceeds from the heart, as from its Center, it preserveth all the [...]arts thereof, it is called Form; Anima Se­cundum ope­ris sui officium diversis nun­cupatur nomi­nibus; dicitur nam (que) anima, dum vegetat; spiritus, dum contemplatur; sensus, dum sentit; ratio, dum discernit; memoria, dum recordatur; voluntas, dum consentit: istae non differunt in substantia, quemadmo­dum in nomi­nibus, quoni­am omnia ista Una anima est, proprieta­tates quidem diversae, sed es­sentia una. Aug. lib. De Spiritu & A­ [...]ima. when it discerns colours by the Eye, and distinguisheth of sound by the Ear, Sense. When she rai [...]eth her self a little higher, and by discoursing infers one Truth by another, she is called Understanding. When she preserves her thoughts, to employ them about her own affairs, or that she draws from forth her trea­sury, the Riches which [...]she had lock'd therein, men stile her Memory; when she loveth that which pleaseth her, or hates that which nauseates her, she is termed Will, but all her several Faculties, which differing in their employments, do notwithstanding agree in their substance, make but one Soul, and are like so many Rivulets, derived from the same Spring-Head.

Prophane Philosophy arriving at length to the knowledge of this truth, makes use of divers comparisons to express her. Now [Page 11] she represents the Soul in the Body, as an Intelligence in the Heavens, the virtue whereof is displayed through all the Spheres thereof. Anon they figure her out unto us as a Pilot, who guides his Vessel; sometimes as a King, who governs his State: But Christian Philosophy hath been more for­tunate, when coming even to the original of the soul, it hath made us know, what effects she produceth in the Body, by the very same which God produceth in the world. For though this infinite essence depends not upon the world which he hath created, and that without interessing his might, he may undo his own workmanship, yet is he shed abroad in all the parts thereof; there is no intermedium which he fills not up. He ap­plies himself to all Creatures, in their ope­rations, and without dividing his unity, or weakning his power; he gives light with the Sun, he burneth with the fire, he he refresheth with the water, and he brings forth fruit with the trees. He is as great on earth as he is in Heaven, though his effects do differ; his power is alwaies equal, and the stars which shine above our heads cost him no more than the grass which we tread under our feet. So is the soul dispersed in the body, and penetrates all the parts [Page 12] thereof; It is as noble in the hand as in the heart; and though applying her self to the disposition of the Organs, she speaks by the Mouth, seeth by the Eyes, and heareth by the Ears, yet is she but one Spirit in her Essence; and in her differing Functions, her Unity is not divided, nor her Power weak­ned. 'Tis true, that not finding the same dis­positions, in every part of the Body, she produceth not the same Effects; and in this point this Illustrious Captive is infinitely inferiour to God; for as he is infinite, and was able to make all things out of nothing, he can likewise make all things out of every Creature, and without any respect to their Inclinations make them serve his Voluntas tanti utique Conditoris rei cujusque natu­ra est; Aug. l. 21. De Civ. Dei. c. 8. Will. So we see he hath used the Fire to sweeten the pains of his Servants; that he hath used the Light to blind his Enemies; that he hath made the Flouds turn back to give passage to his Friends; and that he hath made the Earth open to swallow those that rebell against him. But the Soul, whose power is limited, cannot operate without dependance upon the Organs; and though she be spiritu­al in her Nature, yet is she corporeal in her Operations.

This is that which hath made the Philo­sophers consider her in three several estates, [Page 13] which are so different the one from the other, that if in the first, she approach near the Dignity of the Angels, in the second she is in no better condition than the Beast of the Field; and in the last, she differs not much from the Nature of Plants; for in this acceptation she hath no other em­ployment, than to nourish the Body she is in, to digest Food, to convert it into Bloud, and by a strange Metamorphosis to make one and the same Matter thicken into Flesh, stif­fen into Nerves, harden into Bones, extend into Branches, and lengthen into Grisles; she augments her Parts by nourishing them, she in time perfects her Workmanship, and by her pains brings it to its just Greatness. Solicited by Providence, she takes care to maintain the World; she thinks how to re­store what she hath received, and to pre­serve her species produceth the like. In this acception her workmanship is not more noble than that of Plants, Alba lilia iis­dem omnibus modis serun­tur quibus rosa & hoc ampliu [...] lachryma sua. Plin. c. 5. l. 21. Hist. Nat. which nourish themselves by the Influences of Heaven, grow up by the heat of the Sun, and get root downward by their Succors and Moi­sture.

In the second estate, she becomes sensi­ble, and begins to have inclinations and no­tions, she sees Objects by the Sense which [Page 14] their reports make unto the Imagination, this trusts them or commits them to memo­ry, which obligeth her self carefully to keep them, and faithfully to represent them. From the Lights of the Soul arise her desires, and from her knowledge, her love or hatred, she betakes her self to that which is agreeable unto her, shuns that which likes her not; and according to the divers qualities of good or evil which present themselves, she excites differing motions, which are called Passions: In this degree she hath nothing of more lofty than the Beasts, which discover Objects by Sense, which receive the sorts thereof in their Ima­gination, and preserve them in their Me­mory.

In the third estate, she quits the Body, and coming to her self, she entertains her self with more Truths, she treats with An­gels, and mounting by degrees even to Divinity it self, she knows perfections, and admireth greatness; she reasons upon such subjects as present themselves, she exa­mines their qualities, that she may conceive their essence, she confers the present with what is past, and from the one and the other of them draws Conjectures for what is to come.

[Page 15]The Faculty which doth all these won­ders is termed Understanding; Imagination [...]nd Sense acknowledge her for their Mi­stress, but she is not so absolute, but that [...]he dependeth upon a Soveraign, and takes [...]he Law from one, that is blind, whom she serves for a guide. This which is called Will, and which hath no other Object than good, to follow it; and evil, to shun it; [...]s so absolute as Heaven it self, bears a re­spect unto her freedom; for it never useth violence when it hath to do therewithal, [...]it husbandeth the consentment thereof with address. And its efficacious graces, which never fail in producing their Effects, may well undertake to convert, but not to force Will. Heavens Orders are alwaies observed within its Empire; the Subjects thereof may well be froward, never rebellious; and when it commands absolutely, 'tis alwaies obeyed.

True it is that motions or agitations are formed in the second acception of the soul which exercise her power; for though they hold of her, they forbear not to pre­tend to some sort of Liberty; they are ra­ther her Citizens than her Slaves, and she is rather their Judge than their Soveraign. These Passions arising from the Senses side [Page 16] alwaies with them; whenever Imagination presents them to the Understanding, he pleads in their behalf, by means of so good an Advocate they corrupt their Ma­ster, and win all their Causes. The Un­derstanding listens unto them, weigheth their Reasons, considereth their Inclinations, and lest he may grieve them, oft-times gives Sentence to their Advantage; he betrayes the Will, whereof he is the Chief Officer; he couzens his Blind Queen, and disguising the Truth, makes unfaithful Reports unto her, that he may draw unjust Command­ments from her; when she hath declared her self, Passions become Crimes, their Se­dition begins to make head, and man who before was but unruly, becomes wholly Cri­minal; for as the Motions of this inferiour part of the Soul are not free, they never begin to be vitious but when they become voluntary. As long as they are awaken­ed by Objects, solicited by the Senses, and protected by Imaginations self, they have no other Craft than what they draw from corrupted Nature; But when the Under­standing overshadowed by their obscurity, or won by their solicitations, perverts the Will, and obliges this Soveraign to take up­on her the interest of her Slaves, she makes [Page 17] them guilty of her sin, she changes their motions into rebellion, and of the insur­rection of a Beast, makes the fault of a man. It is true, that when the understand­ing keeps within the bounds of duty, and is faithful to the Will, he suppresses their seditions, and reduceth these Mutineers to obedience; she husbandeth their humours so well, as taking from them all their unru­liness, he makes rare and excellent virtues of them. In this estate they are subservient to Reason, and defend the party which they were resolved to fight against. The good or the evil that may be drawn from them binds us to consider their nature, to observe their proprieties, and to discover their original, to the end that arriving at the ex­act knowledge of them, we may make use of them in our affairs.

Passion then is nothing else, but a mo [...]i­on of the Sensitive Appetite, caused by the Imagination of an appearing or verita­ble good, or evil, which changeth the Body against the Laws of Nature. I term it motion, because it hath a respect to good or evil as the Objects thereof, and suffers it self to be born away by the qualities which she observes therein; this motion is caused by the Imagination, which being [Page 18] fill'd with sorts of things, which she hath received from all the senses, sollicits passi­ons, to discover unto her the beauties or deformities of such Objects as may move her. The sensitive appetite is so partial to her as it sooths her in all her inclinations, let her be never so little agitated, she draws after her all other passions, she raiseth tem­pests as winds do waves, and the Soul would be at quiet in her interiour part, were she not moved by this power; but she bears so great a sway in this Empire, as she there doth what she pleaseth. Nor is it requisite that the good or evil which she re­presents to the appetite be true, which rely­eth on her fidelity, and believes her councils without examining them, having no other light but what is borrowed from her, he follows hoodwink'd all the Objects which she proposeth, and let them be but cloathed with any appearance of good or evil, he impetuously either rejects or embraceth them. He behaves himself so vigorously, as he alwaies causeth alteration in the Body; for besides that his motions are violent, and that they do hardly deserve the name of Passions, when they are moderated, they have such access unto the Senses, and the Senses have so much of communication [Page 19] with the Body, as it is impossible but that their Disorders should cause an alteration therein. In brief, Passion is against the Law of Nature, because she sets upon the heart; which cannot be hurt, without resent­ment of all the parts of the Body; for they are Looking-glasses, wherein one sees all the Motions of him that animates them; And as Physitians judge of his Constitution by the beating of his Pulse, and Arteries, one may judge of the Passions wherewith [...]e is transported by the colour of his face, by the flame which sparkles in his eyes, by the shaking of his Joynts, and by all such other signs as appear in the Body, when the Heart is agitated.

Now these are the Passions which we [...]ndertake to reclaim and bring under the Empire of Reason, and by the assistance of [...]race, to change them into Virtues. [...]ome have been satisfied with describing [...]hem unto us, not shewing how to regulate [...]hem, and have employed their eloquence [...]nly in making us know our Miseries. [...] may be they believed that the knowledge [...]f our evils was sufficient to cure them, and [...]hat the desire of health obliged us to seek [...]ut remedies; but they should do well to [...]member that there be pleasing evils, of [Page 20] which these that are sick covet not to be cured.

Others have fought with passions as with so many Monsters. They have given [...] reason to destroy them, not considering that to execute the Design a man must de­stroy himself: Others knew very well that Passions making up a part of our Soul, they were not to be extirpated but by death; but they knew not that good use might be made of them, and tacitly blaming him who hath endowed us with them, they have la­boured to sweeten them, not seeking out to manage them; they imagined Passions were not otherwise requisite to virtue, save only to exercise her courage, they thought they were no otherwise useful for men, save only for trial; and that man could reap no other advantage by them, save only pati­ently to bear with them, or to oppose them with resolution; but I pretend to defend their cause by defending Gods cause, and to make it appear in the pursuit of this work, that the same Providence, which hath drawn our safety from our detriment or loss, will have us to work out our res [...] from out of the disorders of our Passions; that by his grace we may tame these wil [...] Monsters, that we may reduce these Rebel [...] [Page 21] under obedience, and that we make such Souldiers march under the Banners of Vir­tue, as have oftest fought in the behalf of Vice.

The THIRD DISCOURSE. Of the Number of Passions in Men.

TIs a strange thing that the Soul knows all things, yet knows not her self; there is nothing so hidden in Nature, which she discovers not, she is ac­quainted with all its secrets, and all that passeth through the bowels of this common Mother is apparent to her; she knows how Metals are formed, how the Elements do court, and wage war one with other, how Vapors ascend in the Air, how they thicken in the Clouds, melt into Rain, and break forth in▪ Thunder; finally, she knows of what parts her body is composed, and by a cruel piece of Art she dissects it, she takes it in pieces, that she may know the pro­perties thereof; yet notwithstanding she is ignorant of what passeth within her self; she cannot attain to the knowledge of her [Page 20] essence, which is altogether spiritual; and she hath weak conjectures of her most excel­lent qualities, because she fetches her light from the senses, and depends in her noblest operations upon the species, which the Ima­gination represents unto her: She doubts of her immortality, and to be the more se­cure thereof, she is bound to call in Faith to the succour of Reason, and to be [...]ieve through a blind [...], what she cannot with certain evidence comprehend: But of all things that are in her, there is nothing more concealed from her than [...] passi­ons; for though by their [...] they make an Impression upon the sen [...]es, yet do not the Philosophers agree upon their Subject, nor their Number. Some [...] they are framed in the Body: Some [...] they reside in the nethermost part of the Soul; others divide the Soul into two fa­culties, which they term Concupiscible and Irascible, and place the softer passions in the former, and the more rigid in the second. For they will have love and hatred, desire and eschewing, joy and sorrow, to be com­prehended in the concupiscible appetite, & that fear and boldness, hope and despair, choler and remisness reside in the irascible appetite. To make good this difference, [Page 23] they say, that the passions of the concupis­cible appetite have a regard to good and to evil, as absent, or as present; and that those of the irascible consider them as hard and difficult; that the one makes but onsets, and retreats; that the others give battel, and either win or lose the victory; that the one takes part with the Body, the other with the Understanding; that the one are remiss, and the other generous; and that consider­ing the opposition of so many contrary qua­lities, Ego enim de­libe [...]abam ut servirem do­mino meo, Ego etiam qui vol [...]bam, Ego eram qui nolebam: Ego eram nec plene volebam nec p [...]ene no­lebam, ideo contendebam, & dissipabar a me ipso, & ipsa dissipatio me invito quidem fiebat, nec ta­men offende­bat naturam mentis aliena, sed poena mea. Aug. Confess. l. 8. c. 10. it must be concluded that they cannot r [...]de in one and the same part of the Soul.

Were it not a error in morality to dispute this Maxim, and were it not rashness to contradict an opinion generally receiv'd for so many ages; I should be much inclined to believe that all these passions are lodged in one and the same appetite, which is divided by the motions thereof, as the understand­ing is divided by its opinions, or as the will is parted by love and hatred. And I would say with Saint Augustin, that these differing conceits, do not presuppose diffe­ring faculties, since one and the same man doth oftentimes desire contrary things, and preserveth the unity of his person in the variety of his desires. He experienced this [Page 24] combat in himself, when he would become a Convert; he saw his soul divided by dif­fering opinions, and wondered that having but one Will, it could form out so contra­ry resolutions. But not to engage my self in a War wherein a man purchaseth more Enemies than he reconcileth, and where both Parties think alwaies to have had the better; I will content my self to have insi­nuated my opinion, instead of staying upon the defence thereof, and not concluding any thing of the Subject where the Passions do reside, I wiil speak of their Number; and will tell you what the Philosophers have written thereof.

The Academicks thought there were but four principal Passions, Desire and Fear, Joy and Sorrow; and Hine metu­unt, cupiunt, gaudentque, dolentque. V [...]rg. Virgil who in all his works appears to be of this ancient Sect, when he describes the motions of the Soul, mentions none but these; in effect it seems these comprehend all the rest; that Despair and Aversion are ranked under Fear; that Hope, Audacity, & Choler are ranked under Desire; & that all of them together do ter­minate in Joy or Sorrow. But let them en­deavor to colour over this division, by what reasons they please, it will still be defective since it comprehendeth not Love and Ha­tred, [Page 25] which are the two first originals of our Passions; for this reason the Peripateticks did multiply them, and grounded their Number upon the divers motions of the Soul; for the Soul hath (say they) either an inclination, or an aversion to the Objects wherewith she is either pleased or displeas­ed; and this is Love or hatred; or else she shuns them, and this is Eschewing; or she draws near unto them, and this is De [...]ire; or she promiseth unto her self the fruition of what she wisheth; and this is Hope; or she cannot defend her self from the evil which she apprehends, and this is Despair; or she endeavours to withstand it, and this is Audacity; or she chears her self up to over­come them, and this is Choler. Finally, she either possesseth the good, and this is Joy; or suffereth the evil, and this is sorrow: some others that are of the like opinion, prove the diversity of Passions another way, and affirm that good and evil may be con­sidered in themselves, without any Cir­cumstances; and that from hence arise Love and Hatred; or that a man may look upon them as absent; and that then they pro­duce either Fear or Desire; or as difficult, and that then they cause Hope, Audacity, and Choler; or as impossible, and that [Page 26] then they raise despair; or in fine, as pre­sent, and that then they pour into the soul either delight or pain.

Though these reasons may content the understanding, yet do they not vanquish her; and without offence to Philosophy, a man may differ from the opinions of Plato, or Aristotle, for as it appears to me, they give several names to one and the same thing, they divide the unity of Love, and take her different effects for different Passi­ons. So after having well examined this business, I am inforced to embrace the opi­nion of Saint Augustine, and to maintain with him, that love is the only passion which doth agitate us, or hath operation in us. For all the motions which molest our soul are but so many disguised loves; our Fears and Desires, our Hopes and Despaires, our Delights and Sorrows, are Counte­nances which Love puts on according to the events of good or bad success: and as the Sea carries divers names according to the different parts of the Earth which are thereby watered, so doth Love change her name according to the different estates wherein she finds her self. But as amongst the Infidels every perfection of God hath past for a several Deity; so amongst Philo­sophers [Page 27] the different qualities of love have been taken for different Passions. And these great Masters have opinioned that as oft as Love hath changed guidance, or im­ployment, she ought also to change nature and name; but if this their reasoning were good, the soul must lose its unity as oft as it produceth different effects: and the Soul which digests Meat, and distributes the Bloud into the Veins, must not be the same which speaks by the tongue, and lissens by the Ear.

Reason therefore will have us to believe, that [...] but one Passion; and that hope and [...] and joy are the motions or proper [...] of love; and that to paint her in all her colours, we must term her, when longing after what is loved, Desire Amor ergo inhians habere quod amatur, cupiditas est; idem habens, eoque fruens, laetitia est; fu­giens quod ei adversatur, ti­mor est; id (que) cum acciderit, sentiens tristi­tia est. Aug. l. 4. De Civ. Dei, c. 7.; when possessing what is desired, Pleasure or De­light▪ when shunning what is abhorred, fear; And when after a long and bootless with­standing, inforc'd to suffer, grief or sorrow. Or to express the same thing more clearly, Amor est de­lectatio cordis per desiderium currens, & re­quiescens per gaudium. Aug. De substantia dilectionis, c. 1. ct 2. desire and eschewing, hope and fear, are the motions of Love, by which that which is agreeable is endeavoured, and the contrary shunned. Boldness and Choler, are the Combatants which are made use of to de­fend that which is loved, Joy is Loves [Page 28] triumph, despair her weakness, and sadness her defeat. Or to make use of Saint Augu­stines words, desire is the course of Love, fear is her flight, sorrow is her torment, and joy her rest; Love draws near to good by desiring it, flies from evil by fearing it, is sad by resenting sorrow, rejoiceth in tasting pleasure, but in all her different estates or acceptions she is alwaies her self, and in the variety of her effects, preserves the unity of her essence.

But if it be trne that Love causeth all our Passion, it follows that she must some­times transform her self into her contrary; and that by a Metamorphosis more incredi­ble than that of the Poets, she converts her self into Hatred, and produceth effects which will give the Lie to her Humour. For Love delights in obliging, Hate in the contrary; Love is generous, and takes plea­sure in pardoning, Hate not so, and studies nothing but revenge; Love gives life unto her enemies, Hatred endeavours the death of her most faithful friends; and it seems more easie to reconcile Vice with Virtue, than Love with Hatred. This Objection hath much of apperance, but little of soli­dity; and those who frame it, do not re­member that oft times one and the same [Page 29] cause doth produce contrary effects. That heat which makes Wax melt, dries mud and dirt; that the motion which draws us nearer Heaven, draws us the further from earth; that the inclination we have to preserve our selves, is an aversion from any thing that may destroy us. So the love of good is the hatred of evil; and the same Passion which useth sweetness to those who oblige it, useth severity to those who offend it. It imitateth Justice, which by the same moti­on punisheth sin, and recompenseth virtue. It resembles the Sun, which by the same Light makes the Eagles see, and blinds the Owles. And if it be lawful to mount up into the Heavens, it hath an influence upon God himself, which only hates a sinner, out of love unto himself: If so many good reasons cannot perswade to so manifest a truth, they ought at least prevail thus much with our adversaries, that if there be divers Passions, Love is the Soveraign thereof, and that she is so absolute in her Kingdom, as that her Subjects undertake nothing but by her directions. She is the primum Mobile which carries them about; and as she gives them motion, so she gives them rest; she by her aspect doth irritate and appease them: and her examples do prevail so much over [Page 30] all the Amor caete­ros se traducit affectus. Bern. affections of our soul, that her good­ness, or her malice renders them either good or evil.

The FOURTH DISCOURSE. Which is the most violent of all the Passions of Man?

IF the knowledge of a disease be requi­site to the cure, it is no less necessary to know the Passions, that we may the better govern them, and to know which of them doth assail us with most fury. Philo­sophers who have treated hereupon, agree not in their opinions, but are so divided upon this Subject, that reason hath not been able to reconcile their difference.

Plato hath left us in doubt, and sounding the Question to the bottom, he contents himself with saying, there are four passions which seem to surpass the rest in violence. The first is Voluptuousness, which belies its name, and which breathing forth nothing but sweetness, ceaseth not to be extream furious; and to fight against reason with more violence than doth grief or an­guish. [Page 31] The second is Choler, which being nothing else according to its definition, but a boiling of the Blood about the heart Fervor sangu­guinis circa cor. Aristo [...]., cannot be but excessively violent; and did not nature, which is careful of our preser­vation, make it die as soon as it is born, there were no mischief whereof it were not capa­ble; nor do I know whether the world were capable to defend it self against the fury thereof, or no. But let us attribute what violence we please unto it, I esteem it more reasonable than Voluptuousness; for as Lions are sooner tamed than Fish, an angry man is sooner appeased, than a voluptuous man converted; and experience teacheth us, that of these two Passions the more mild is the less tractable, and the more furious the less opinionated. The third is the desire of honour, which is so powerfully imprint­ed in the heart of man, as there is no diffi­culty which it overcomes not. 'Tis this [...]hat makes conquerors, which inspires cou­ [...]age into souldiers, which maketh Orators eloquent, and Philosophers knowing. For [...]ll these different conditions are enlivened [...]y the same desire; and though they take [...]everal ways, they aim at the same end. The fourth is the fear of death, which by its [...]requent Alarmes troubles all the quiet of [Page 32] our life. It produceth such strange effects, as the nature thereof is not to be discover'd though it be timerous, and that the shadow of an evil is sufficient to astonish it; yet doth it render men couragious, and make them seek out a certain death, to shun an uncer­tain one; it giveth strength to the vanqui­shed, and assisted by despair, it regains Bat­tels which it had lost. 'Tis hard to judge which of these two Passions is the stronger, for they have oft times triumphed over one another, and as the fear of death hath made the desire of honour be forgotten, sometimes the desire of honour hath despi­sed the fear of Death.

Though I have a noble esteem of Plato, and that his very ravings seem more noble, and more heightned to me than Aristotles Discourses, yet cannot I side with him in this; and notwithstanding all the good rea­sons he alledgeth to defend his opinion, I cannot approve thereof. For Voluptuous­ness is not so much a particular Passion, as it is the Spring-head of all those that give us any contentment, nor is it so violent, but that it may easily be repress'd by grief and anguish. Its only advantage lieth in the absence of its enemy, nor doth it corrupt men but when it findeth nothing to oppug [...] [Page 33] it, as soon as any opposition is made, it yields the victory; and experience teacheth us, that a small hurt makes us forget an ex­tream pleasure. Choler is indeed the more ardent, but it is not of durance: If [...]it turn not into hatred, the effects thereof are not to be dreaded; 'tis more sudden violence, and to express its nature, we must say, that it may well do an ill action, but it cannot conceive a mischievous design. Novissima omnium cupi­do gloriae ex­uitur. Tacit. in Agrie. The desire of glory is an eternal Passion; Age which weakneth all other, maketh this the stronger; and this malady seems to have no cure but death; yet ill success will [...]ure it; and the loss of two or three bat­ [...]els will turn it into Melancholy. Hannibal [...]fter his defeat, fed no more upon honour. [...]f he went from Kingdom to Kingdom to [...]olicit Princes to form a party against [...]he Romans, he was led thereunto rather [...]y despair, than by ambition; and this un­ [...]ortunate Commander sought not so much [...]he increase of Glory, as the preservation [...]f his Life. I know that Marius was haugh­ [...]y after his Defeat, and that being Prisoner, [...]e aspired to be Consul; his humor chan­ [...]ed not with his condition; whilst in I­ [...]ons, he dream'd of Diadems, and when [...]e had lost his liberty, he yet continued [Page 34] his design of oppressing the liberty of the Republick, but this Passion was sustained by another; when he rallied his Troops to bring them again unto the Battel; he was not so much edg'd on by Glory, as by de­spight, and who could have seen too with­in his heart, would have found there more of choler than of courage, more of hatred, than of ambition.

This Passion subsists only of Hope, and when Fortune turns her back, it becomes fearful. Alexander would have been con­tented with Greece, if he had found any resistance in Persia; one bad success would have taught him to have bounded his de­sires. That great heart to which the world seemed too little, would have confined it [...] self within his Fathers dominions, had not so many happy victories, which did even out-do hope, blown up his Ambition, and promised him the Conquest of the whole Earth.

The fear of death is a Passion only be­longing to the Vulgar; more generous people set it at nought; the more effeminat [...] sort defend themselves from it only out of hope, which is the faithful Companion of the unfortunate. And when the face of mischief enforceth her to abandon them, [Page 35] [...]he is succeeded by Despair, which in its effects exceeds the firmest Constancy of Philosophers. All these reasons oblige me to quit Plato's Opinion, that I may examine [...]hose with which Aristotle defends his. For he seemeth in some of his Writings, to maintain, that hatred is the most violent Passion wherewith we are transported. In effect Choler which but now seemed so [...]readful unto us, is but a disposition to [...]atred, and she cannot arrive at her malice [...]nless nourished by suspitions, fomented [...]y evil speeches, and entertained by pro­ [...]ess of time; but when she is once changed [...]nto hatred, there is no evil which she is [...]ot capable of. Her residence is in the [...]eart, as well as is that of Love, and seated [...] a Throne belongs to Love, she gives out [...]er Orders as a Soveraign, and employeth [...] other Passions to satisfie her fury; choler [...]urnisheth her with Weapons, Boldness [...]ghts in her behalf, Hope promiseth her [...]ood success, and Despair gives her often [...]imes the Victory; but that which passeth [...] belief is, she gathers strength from Love, [...]ough it be her Enemy, and by an effect [...]hich doth sufficiently witness her power, [...]e enforceth the mildest of all Passions, [...] be subservient to her detestable designs. [Page 36] she imitateth her motions, she marcheth in her steps, Si quaeris odio misera quem statuas modum imitare amo­rem Seneca in Medea. and misinterpreting her maximes, she will do as much harm, as the other hath done good, and leave as many marks of her Fury, as the other hath left of its good­ness. But if it be true that Copies ne­ver equal the Original, let hatred do what she can, she shall never come near the pow­er of Love; and since she is ruled by Love, Love will alwaies have the advantage over her.

There have also been some Philosophers, who have not been of Aristotles Opinion, and who attributing more to Reason than to his Authority, have perswaded them­selves that Jelousie is the most violent of all Passions; and certainly it is to be granted, that if this Opinion be not the truest, it is at least the most specious; for Jealousie is composed of Love and Hatred. And as contraries cannot lodge or habit together, without fighting, it must necessarily follow, that these two enemy-Passions make wa [...] one upon another, and that all other that are subject unto them take up arms to de­fend their interests, in so much as a jealous man finds himself seized on by Fear, and Audacity, by Hope and Despair, by Joy and Sadness, because he is struck with Love [Page 37] and hatred; likewise the Holy Scripture, the very 'simplicity whereof is eloquent, not finding any thing that can express the fury of Jealousie, Fortis ut mors dilectio, dura sicut infernus aemulatio. Caur. Cant. goes to seek out Death amongst the Sepulchres, and Hell in the Bowels of the earth, to give us a Picture thereof; according to this maxim we must conclude that the jealous are the damned of this world, and that the Passion which torments them is a punishment which equals that of the Devils. After the autho­rity of Scripture, a man must be very rash to oppose this opinion, which it seems all things conspire to make veritable; yet may it be replied upon; and the very self same reasons which it produceth for its defence, may serve to condemn it; for though Jealousie be a mixture of Love and Hatred, it follows not that she must be most violent of all our Passions; the very same whereof she is composed, would not agree together were they not sweetned. And as the Elements cannot make one and the same Body, unless their qualities be moderated, so cannot all these Passions form our jealousie unless they be tempered; and it must necessarily ensue that Love weakens hatred, that joy moderates Sor­row, and that Hope sweetens Despair. It [Page 38] hath been observed that two Passions ta­ken together, lose their force, and that serving as an Antidote one against another, they do no mischief; or if they do any, they cure it again. So in Jealousie Love is the Antidote to Hatred; the jealous man suffers little harm, because he hath many Passions, and he may boast, that by a strange destiny, he owes his welfare to the number of his Enemies.

But since after having worsted a Fals­hood a Truth must be established, let us say that according to our principles this questi­on is not hard to resolve; for as we ac­knowledge but one passion, which is Love, and that all the rest are but effects of her producing, we are bound to confess, that they borrow all their efficacy from their Cause; and that they have no other violence than what is hers. Love is a Soveraign which imprints his qualities in his Subjects; a Captain which imparts part of his Cou­rage to his Souldiers; and 'tis a Primum Mo­bile which bears about all the other heavens by its Impetuosity; insomuch as Morality ought only endeavour how to govern Love; for when this Passion shall be hand­somly ruled, all other will imitate her. And he knows well how to love, or [Page 39] how to love well, shall have no evil desires, nor vain hopes to moderate.

The FIFTH DISCOURSE. Whether there were any Passions in the state of Innocency, and whether they were of the same nature as are ours?

TIs so long since we lost our Inno­cency, as there remains nothing un­to us but a weak Idaea thereof; and did not Divine Justice punish the Fathers fault in the Children, we should likewise have lost the Sorrow for it. Every one describes the felicity of that state according to his Imagination; methinks a man may say that as many as speak thereof, guide themselves according to their inclinations; and that they place there, such pleasures as they are acquainted with, and do most desire. Some say the whole earth was one Paradise; that of the Seasons, whereof our years are composed, there was only Autumn, and the Spring: that all Trees [Page 40] had the property of Orange trees, and that they were at all times loaded with leaves, flowers, and fruit; others perswade themselves that no wind blew there, but the South-west; and that the ground un­cultivated prevented our need, and brought forth all things. I think that without maintaining these Opinions a man may say, that in this happy condition bad was not mingled with good, and that the qualities of the Elements were so well tempered, as that man did thereby receive all content­ment; and felt no Displeasure. He had no disorders to reform; no enemies to fight withal, nor mischiefs to eschew; all crea­tures conspired towards his felicity; the beasts bare respect unto his person; and it may be that even those which remained in the Forrests were not wild; as the Earth bare no Thorns, and all the parts thereof were fruitful and pleasing, so had not the Heavens any malign influences, and that Constellation which dispenseth Life and Death in nature, had no aspect which was not innocent, and favourable. If there be so little certainty touching the state of man, there is no more assurance for what regards his person; we argue according to our un­derstandings, and as in the first ages Idols [Page 41] were made of all particulars; every one shapes out a felicity for Adam, and gives him all the advantages that may be imagi­ned.

Amongst so many Opinions or Errors, I see nothing more consonant to reason then that which Saint Augustine writes concern­ing this; Absit enim ut illa beatitudo ut possit aut in loco illo non habere quod vellet, aut in suo corpore vel animo sen­tire quod nol­let. August. for though he determine nothing in particular, he resolves so well for the ge­neral, as there is none that appeals from his Opinion.

Though we cannot describe (saith he) neither the beauty of the place, where man made his residence, nor the advan­tages of his mind and body, we are bound [...]o believe he found in his habitation, whatsoever he could wish; and that he felt nothing in his body which could in­commodiate him. His constitution was ex­cellent, his health was unalterable, and if time could weaken it, he prevented that mischief, by making use of the tree of life, which repairing his forces, furnish'd him with new vigor. He was immortal, not by Nature, but by Grace; and he knew that [...]in could not bereave him of Life, without making him lose his Innocence. His Soul was no less happily constituted than was his Body; for besides that he was infused [Page 42] with all Sciences, that he knew all the Secrets of Nature, and that he was not ig­norant of any thing which could contri­bute to his Felicity; his Memory was happy, his will had alwaies good Inclina­tions, his Affections were regulated; and though he were not insensible, he was of so equal a temper, as nothing could trouble his repose. The Passions, which by their violence, do anticipate Reason, waited his Directions, and never shewed themselves till they had received Commandment from him. In fine, his Passions were no less natural than are ours, but they were more tractable; and as his Constitution made him capable of all our motions, ori­ginal Justice exempted him from all our Disorders. I know not whether I fall foul on the opinion of Divines, but forasmuch as a man may see in this darkness, I think I injure not the Truth; for if man as being composed of a Body was Mortal, and as being honoured with original Grace, Im­mortal, methinks one may consequently infer, that not being a pure Spirit, he had Passions, but that being sanctified in all the faculties of his Soul, all his Passions were innocent. To give all the force that is re­quisite to this Assertion, we must inlarge its [Page 43] Principle, and prove with Saint Augustine, that man might die, losing Original Justice; and that Immortality was rather a Grace from Heaven than a property of his Nature; for if he had been truly im­mortal, he had needed no sustenance, and if death had not been natural unto him, he had needed no priviledge to have secured him from it; since he did eat to preserve Life, it follows he might lose it; and since he was obliged to defend himself against old age, by the means of a mira­culous fruit, it follows necessarily, he might die, and that his Life as well as ours needed remedies against Death. I confess that they being better than are ours, he re­paired his strength more advantageously, and that by prolonging the course of his Life, they kept the hour of his Death far­ther off; I affirm likewise that they kept away corruption from his Body, and that they kept him in so perfect a health, as that it could not be altered; but then they must likewise grant me, that if man had not used these remedies, his natural heat had consumed his Humidum Radicale; and that old age succeeding this Disorder, he must inevitably have died. All these Maximes are to serve, as Saint Augustine is [Page 44] obliged to confess, that if the use of the tree of life were permitted unto us in the con­dition wherein we are, Nec enim corpus ejus tale erat quod dissolvi impos­sibile videre­tur, sed gustus arboris vitae corruptionem corporis pro­hibebat. Deni­que etiam post peccatum po­tuit indissolu­bilis manere, si modo per­missum esset ei edere de arbo­re vitae, Aug. l. 1 quaest. novi & veteris testam. quaest. 19. death would no longer domineer in the world, and that man, sinful as he is, would not cease to be immortal. If then Adam were capable of death, because he had a Body, and if he were incapable thereof because he had Grace, methinks by like proportion one may say, he had Passions; since his Soul was ingaged in a material Subject, but that they were tractable, for original Justice did re­press their motions, and that in this inno­cent condition, he had only just fears and rational desires.

I verily conceive there may be some Passions, the use whereof were interdicted him, and that though he were capable thereof, he was not therewithal agitated; because they would have troubled his quiet. I am easily perswaded that all evil being banished from off the earth, sadness and despair were likewise exempted from hi [...] heart; and that during so high a pitch o [...] felicity, reason was not bound to excit [...] such Passions as only belong unto the miserable; but assuredly I am confident h [...] made use of all others, and that thinkin [...] upon the Laws that were imposed upon hi [...] [Page 45] by his Soveraign Lord, he was sometimes flattered by hopes, sometimes astonished by fear, and by them both joined together kept within his duty. I doubt not likewise but that in the unhappy conference which our unwise Mother had with the Devil in the shape of a Serpent she was seized upon by as many Passions as usually People are, who consult upon any important affairs; that the Devils promises did stir up her hope, that God Almighties Threats did cause fear in her, and that the loveliness of the forbidden fruit did irritate her desire. I know not whether some other may ima­gine this Dialogue could pass without some dispute, but I know very well that Saint Augustine (with whom I believe a man can­not be mistaken) doth argue thus upon this subject [...] and that he believes so great a bickering was not made in the earthly Para­dise, without the Womans making use of all her Passions either to defend her self, or to suffer her self to be overcome. 'Tis true, this authentical man seems to be of another opinion in his Ninth Chapter of the City of God, but he who shall well exa­mine his Reasons, will find that he endea­vours not so much to exclude Passions from out the soul of Adam, as their disor­der, [Page 46] judging aright that their disorder could not accord with original Justice. Therefore I am perswaded that man had our agitations in the state of innocency, and he feared punishment, and hoped for re­ward; that as he made use of his Senses, inasmuch as they made up a part of his Bo­dy, he also used his Passions, inasmuch as they were a part of his Soul, and that in brief they did not differ from ours in na­ture, but in obedience.

The SIXTH DISCOURSE. Whether there were any Passions in our Saviour Christ, and wherein they differ'd from ours?

NOt to know that the Son of God was pleased to take upon him our nature, with all the weakness there­of; and that, set aside ignorance, and sin; (which could not correspond with the sanctity of his person; In similitudi­nem carnis peccati, Pau­lus.) he hath vouchsafed to bear our miseries, conversing with men in the likelihood of a sinner, were to be [Page 47] ignorant of all the principles of Christian Religion. Hence it came that during his term of mortal Life, it behoved him to preserve himself by nourishment; to repair his strength by rest, to suffer his Body to sleep; and to use all means which Provi­dence hath ordained for these natural mala­dies. He was subject to the injuries of time, to the unseasonableness of seasons. Men have seen him benummed with Cold, during the violence of winter, and bedewed with Sweat, during the heat of Summer: the Elements spared him not, and if they reverenced him as God, they persecuted him as man. The same Creatures which obeyed his Word, warred against his Body; the Waves which grew calm at his awa­king, had assaulted the ship wherein he was; Hunger which he had overcome in the De­ [...]arts, assailed him in Towns. And upon the Cross he tasted the Terrors of Death, from which he had delivered Lazarus. Then as [...]assions are the most natural Weaknesses [...]f man, he would not exempt himself [...]rom them, and he would have them to be [...]s well witnesses of his love unto us, as as­ [...]rances of the truth of his Incarnation. He [...]ingled his tears with those of Magdalen; [...]ough by his power he might have reme­died [Page 48] her evils, he would out of compassi­on resent them. Before the doing of a mi­racle he would undergo a weakness, and weep over a dead man, whom he went about to revive; He suffered sadness, often to seize upon his heart, and by a strange wonder, he accorded joy with sorrow in his all-blessed soul. In fine, according to the incounters of his life, he made use of Passions. He taught us that there was no­thing in man which he contemn'd since he had taken his infirmities upon him, Ipse dominus in forma servi, vitam agere dignatus hu­manam adhi­buit passiones ubi adhibendas esse judicavit: neque enim in quo verum erat hominis cor­pus, & verus hominis ani­mus, falsus erat hominis affe­ctus, August. Lib. 14. de ci­vitate dei c. 9. and that he loved well the nature of man, since he did cherish even the defects thereof. For to believe that his resentments were but ima­ginary, is in my opinion to clash against the mystery of the Incarnation, to give the lye to truth it self, and (to give Iesus Christ a bootless honor) make us doubt all the assu­rances of his love. Since he had a true body he could have no false Passions; and since he was veritably man, he ought to be veretably afflicted. A man gannot gainsay this truth without weakening our belief. If it be permitted to suffer the tears of the Son of God to pass for illusions, one may make his sorrow pass for Imposturism, and under the pretence of reverency a man may overthrow the ground-work of our souls [Page 49] welfare. But we must have a care left whilst we establish the love of the Son of God, we commit no outrage upon his Greatness, or Omnipotency, and that whilst we allow him Passions, we free them from their Disorders; for we must not believe that they were unruly, as are ours, nor that they required all those virtues to tame them as are necessary for us. He was their ab­solute Master, and they in their Birth, Pro­gress and Continuance depended upon his Will. In their Birth, because they never raised themselves, but by order from him, but alwaies waited that Reason might make them serve his Designs.

Ours for the most part do surprize us, and are so ready to be moving, that the wi­sest men cannot keep back their first moti­ons; they are so given to disorder, as the [...]east occasion sets them on fire; their sleep is so unquiet, as the least matter will awa­ken them; they are so given to war, that upon the least provocation they take up Arms, and make more spoil upon their own Territories, then would an enemies ar­my do. Their disorder proceeds not so much from their Objects as from their hu­mour; and it fares with their storms as it doth with those, who being at the bottom [Page 50] of the Sea, mount up again by their proper motion. But they caused no tempests in Ie­sus Christ, or if sometimes their waves went high, they were led on by Reason, which alwaies kept the power to appease the trou­ble she had caused. Turbavit se­metipsum. Ioan. 11. As their birth depend­ed upon his Will, so made they no Pro­gress or advancement, but by his permissi­on, and their moving proceeded alwaies from some reasonable cause.

Men betake themselves to things which merit not their Love, and have oft times strong Passions, for weak and woful Sub­jects. Imprudency seeks them in Choler; and not weighing the difference of faults, they punish a word as rigorously as they do a Murderer: their ambition is blind, their desires unruly, their sadness ridicu­lous; and who shall compare all their Passi­ons with the causes which produce them, will find them all to be unjust. A Consul made a slave be eaten by Lampreys for having broken a Glass: A Princes anger caused a Town to be drowned in the bloud of its Inhabitants; and to revenge an injury done to an Image of Brass or Marble made 7000 men, the lively Image of God, lose their lives. Sorrow hath made Idols to comfort her; Fathers not able to raise agai [...] [Page 51] their dead Children, have deified them; & through an excess of love and sorrow have built Temples unto them, after they had ta­ken them out of their Graves. In fine, all the motions of our souls are irrational; we cannot measure or bound our joy, nor our displeasures; our hatred exceeds our inju­ries; our love is more ardent than the sub­ [...]ect which sets it on fire, and we ground [...]irm hopes upon perishable things. But the Passions of the Son of God were so regu­ [...]ated, as in their motions a man might ob­serv [...] the worth of the subject which caused [...]hem to arise; he was not angry save only [...]o revenge the injuries done unto his father, [...]r punish the impieties of those who pro­ [...]haned his Temple; he had no affection [...]ve for those that did deserve it; if he saw [...]o perfection in his friends, he loved such [...]s he would place there, and loving them he [...]ade them worthy of his love: he never [...]rrowed save upon great occasion; and [...]hough the cross was a sufficient object of [...]rief, I verily believe his soul was more [...]arrowly touched with the horror of our [...]s, than with the shame or cruelty of his [...]unishment. Such regulated Passions cea­ [...]d when he pleased, and their continu­ [...]ce, was no less subject to his Em­pire, [Page 52] than was their Progress.

We are not masters of our Passions; as in their birth they set at nought our advice, they laugh at our Counsels during their course; they never stay till they be weary, and we owe not our quiet so much to their Obedience, as to their Weakness. When they are violent, our care cannot overcome them, and there are some of them so stif [...] ­necked as they will not die, but together with us, therefore we ought to suppress them in their birth, and to advise with Rea­son, whether it be to any purpose to draw Souldiers into the field, who when they have their Weapons in their hands despise the Authority of their chief Commander. The beginning of War depends oft times upon two Parties, but the end thereof de­pends alwaies upon the victory; and he is not easily brought to a peace, when he finds his Advantage lies in the continuance of War. Tristis est ani­ma mea usque ad mortem. All these rules prove false in the Passions of Iesus Christ. He did even ex­ceed therein when the Subject did deserve it, & though they were chafed, they becam [...] calm, as soon as he would have them so t [...] be. Their heat as it was reasonable, so wa [...] it as soon extinguished as kindled, so as joy did immediately succeed sadness, and on [...] [Page 53] might at the same time see pleasingness take the same place in his countenance, which Choler had possest.

It is peradventure for this reason that Saint Ierome could not resolve to call the agitations of the soul of our Saviour Iesus Christ, Passions; believing that to name them as Criminals, was to injure their inno­cence, and that there was injustice, in gi­ving the same name to things, the conditi­ons whereof were so different. But every one knows that qualities change not nature; and that the Passions of the Son of God were not less natural for being more obedi­ent than are ours. In my opinion it is a new obligation which we have to his good­ness, that he hath not despised our weak­ness; he will eternally reproach us if we desire not his glory, since he coveted our welfare; if we fight not against his enemies, since he hath overcome ours; if we shed not tears for injuries done unto him, since he hath shed his blood for our sins. And he will have just occasion to complain upon our Ingratitude, if our Passions serve not [...]o witness our Love to him, since he hath [...]mployed all his to assure us of his Charity.

The FIRST DISCOURSE. Of the corruption of Nature by Sin.

THough there be many wonder­ful things in man, which de­serve consideration, & that his qualities witness unto us, Homo Medi­um quoddam est inter peco­ra & Angelos, inferior An­gelis, superior pecoribus, ha­bens cum pe­coribus morta­litatem, ratio­nem vero cum Angelis. the greatness & power of his Crea­tor; there is nothing more remarkable in him, than his constitution; for he is compo­sed of a body and soul; he in his person u­nites Heaven and Earth; and being more monstrous than are the Centaures in the Fable, he is both Angel and Beast, as the power of God appeareth in the uniting of these two, so different parties; his wis­dome [Page 55] is no less evidently seen in the good intelligence they hold; Animal ratio­nale, mortale, August lib 9. de Civitate Dei. cap. 13. for though they had contrary inclinations, that the one should bow downward towards the earth whereof it was formed, and that the other should raise it self up towards heaven from whence it had its original, yet God did so well temper their desires, and in the diver­sity of their conditions so streightly united their wills by original justice, as the soul shared in all contentments of the body, without any injury to her self, and the bo­dy served to all the designs of the soul, without doing any violence to its self. In this happy estate, the soul commanded with mildness, the body obeyed with de­light, and whatsoever object presented it self, these two parties did always agree. But this happiness continued no longer than our first father was obedient to God; as soon as he listened to the devil, and that inticed by his promises he had took part with him, his punishment was answerable to his fault, and his disobedience was punish­ed by a general rebellion; for to boote that his creatures revolted against him, and that his subjects, that they might serve Gods justice, became his enemies, the revolt pas­sed from his condition to his person; the [Page 56] elements divided themselves in his body, and his Body mutinied against his Soul. This intestine war was the sooner kindled, between these two parties, for that their peace was not so much an effect of Nature as of Grace; the hatred which succeeded their love was so much the more violent, for that it was animated by sin, which being but a meer disorder, causeth divisions every where, and satisfieth its own fury in execu­ting the decrees of divine Justice; so as we must not wonder if the rebellion which man suffers, be so great, since it takes its rise from two so puissant principles, and that the parties which compose it are incouraged to the combat by the contrariety of their in­clinations, and by the malice of sin, which doth possess them. This mischief hath caused the greatest Saints to sigh. The A­postle of the Gentiles, finding no remedy for this malady, but death, wish'd for it as a favour, and as such a one, made suit for the most rigorous of our punishments; he in his Writings, Caro enim concupiscit adversus spiri­tum, spiritus autem adver­sus carnem. Gal. 5. hath prepared all Christians to this War, and hath made them know that a man cannot hope for peace in this life, since the body made enterprizes upon the soul, and that the soul was obliged evil­ly to intreat her Body.

[Page 57]From this great disorder the like of our Passions have ensued; for though they be the off-spring of the soul and body, & that being equally produced by these two par­ties, they should endeavour their agree­ment, yet these unnatural children, aug­ment their division, and according as they hold more of the soul or the body, take part with the one, or with the other of them, and perform no act of Obedience wherein there is not somewhat of Rebelli­on. The concupiscible appetite doth almost always hold intelligence with the body, and the irascible appetite sides always with the soul. The first engages us in de­lights, and keeps us in a shameful Idleness; the second arms us against sorrow, and en­courageth us to generous actions; in this continual bickering the soul of man is ne­ver at quiet, and man is constrained to nou­rish Vipers which do devour him.

Philosophers have indeed found this mis­chief, but they thought it lay only in the Will, and not in the Nature of man. They were perswaded, that opinion and ill bree­ding caused these disorders, and that as one evil is cured by its contrary, this might be remedied by wholsom doctrine, and good education. They founded Academies, [Page 58] wherein they disputed about the Summum bonum. They made Panegyricks in the be­half of virtue, and Invectives against vice. They declaimed against the unruliness of Passions; and measuring their abilities by their desires, they promised victory and tryumph to themselves. But not finding the original of the malady, by consequence they could never light upon the remedy; amidst the weakness they underwent, and their vain indevours, they were enforced to accuse nature, and to complain even of that soveraign Power which hath composed man of pieces, which could not be made agree. A glimpse of light would certainly have rectified them, and a Chapter of Saint Pauls would have made them know the truth; for since they agreed with us that God cannot be defective in his workman­ship, and that he is too just to require things at our hands which exceed our power, they must have concluded that our disor­der was the punishment of our sin, and that the infirmity which we lament was not an effect of our nature, but the cor­rection of Gods Justice; by thinking thus they would have endeavoured to appease him whom they had injured, and con­fessing their infirmity, they would have [Page 59] implored his assistance; but pride blinded them, and to make use of Seneca's words against himself, they would rather accuse providence, than acknowledge their own misery; and rather impute their disorder to Gods rigour, than to their own offences. They either could not, or would not com­prehend, what reason taught them before, Quod caro concupiscit ad­versus spiritum, non est praece­ders naturae hominis insti­tu [...]i, sed conse­quens paena damnati. Au­gust lib. de ve­ra Innocentia. cap. 260. that faith had published by the mouth of Saint Paul and of Saint Augustine, that the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit is not a condition of nature, but the punish­ment of sin. From what hath been said 'tis easie to infer, that since man is sinful, since his Passions have revolted, since the soul, which ought to govern them, is dark­ned, and that the will, which ought to mo­derate them, is depraved, he must of necessi­ty have recourse to grace, and beg that of mercy, which justice hath bereaved him of. The same power which formerly ac­corded our soul with our body, must now end these differences. If the condition of this miserable life be such as will not suffer us to enjoy a perfect peace, we must seek for forces wherewithal to fight; so if we cannot shun the misfortunes of war, we may hope for the advantages of the victory.

The SECOND DISCOURSE. The Nature alone is not sufficient to rule the Passions of Man.

THough the Stoicks be declared ene­mies unto Passions, and that they cannot be judged in a cause wherein they are a party, yet methinks their judg­ments have some colour of Justice, and that it is with reason that they do mix our Passi­ons with our Vices. For in the condition whereinto Sin hath reduced us, our appre­hensions are no more pure, our nature being corrupted, all the inclinations thereof must needs be out of order, and the rivers which run from a polluted Spring must needs be troubled.

I know Philosophers will not agree of this truth, and they never permit us to accuse Nature of an error, since they take her for their guide, nor that we dishonour her, all whose motions they esteem so regular. They profess to follow her in all things, and [Page 61] hold that to live happily, a man must live according to Nature. The Libertines plead this Maxim, and will excuse their disorders by a Doctrine which they understand not; for had they studied in the Stoicks Schools, they would find that those Philosophers pre­suppose that Nature was in her first purity, and that they took her not for their guide, but for that they imagined she had preser­ved her innocency. So banished they from their Sages, and even from their Disciples all those Affections, which they would have pass for natural, and by a generous, but a useless endeavour, they would have us to be as well governed in the state of sin, as in that of Original Justice.

But Christians who have learn'd by the Holy Scripture, that nature is fallen from her first purity, are bound to confess, that the Passions have revolted, and that to bring them again into subjection Reason must be assisted by Grace; for there is no man, but sees that the understanding is en­gaged in the Errour, and that it confusedly receives falshoods and truths: that the will applies it self more to appearing, than to real good; that her interests are the rules of her inclinations, and that she loves not that which is good, save that she is there­withal [Page 62] delighted; that by experience she finds, she hath lost much of her liberty; and that if sin hath not taken from her all the love she had to good, it hath left her but weak helps, and useless desires to come by it. As her forces are but small, to atchieve what is good, she hath yet smaller power to rule her Passions; and though she ap­prove not of their disorders, she knows not how to remedy them. Oft times by a strange misfortune, she foments their sedi­tion, which she ought to hinder, and that she may not afflict her Subjects, she becomes guilty of their crimes. The Christian Phi­losopher is therefore bound to employ aid from Heaven to overcome these Rebels, and confessing that his Reason is weakned, he must look for help from without himself, and beg favour from him who hath permit­ted the unruliness of Nature for the pu­nishment of Sin.

But that we may not be said to be ene­mies to the greatness of man, and that we make his disaster greater than it is, we con­fess that nature is good in her foundation, and that very sin is an excellent proof there­of; for as it is but a Non Ens, it cannot sub­sist by it self, for its preservation it must needs fasten it self to some subject that may [Page 63] uphold it, and which may impart unto it part of its essence. So evil is ingraffed up­on good, and sin is upholden by nature; which is much endamaged by so evil a guest, but doth not therefore lose all the advantages thereof. For since she con­serves her own being, she must likewise conserve unto her self some goodness, since she is not annihilated for being become cri­minal, she must amidst her misery enjoy some good fortune, and amidst her faultiness some tincture of innocence must remain. And this is it which Saint Augustine affirms in as learned as eloquent terms. Cujus recte vi­tuperatur viti­um procul du­bio Natura laudatur: nam recte vitii vitu­peratio est, quod illo de honestatur na­tura laudabilis. August. lib. 12. de Civitate Dei. cap. 1. The being of man is certainly praised, though the sin thereof be blamed, and no better reason can be given, for the blaming of sin, than by making it appear that by the contagion thereof, it dishonoureth what was honoura­ble by nature. If we consider her then in her ground-work or foundation, she hath lost nothing of her goodness; but if we look upon her, under the tyranny of sin, she hath almost lost her use, and she can make no more use of her faculties, unless freed from the enemy which possesseth her; me­thinks she may be compared to the birds that are taken in nets; they have wings but cannot fly, they love liberty but cannot re­gain [Page 64] it. So men in the state of sin, have good inclinations, but they cannot pur­sue them, they have good designes but cannot put them in execution; and more unfortunate than the aforenamed Birds they love their prison, and agree with the Tyrant that doth persecute them. In this sad condition, they have need of Grace to comfort them, and to strengthen them, if not totally to free them from the enemy which pursueth them, at least to give them liberty of operating, and to put them into a capacity of practising virtue, of contesting with vice, and of ruling their Passions.

Natura huma­na etiamsi in illa in­tegritate in qua condita est permaneret, nullo modo se­ipsam creatote suo non adju­vant servaret. Cum ergo sine Dei gratia sa­lutem non pos­set custodire guam accepit, quomodo sine Dei gratia pos­set reparare quam perdi­dit? Aug. lib. De vera Inno­centia, c. 337.This necessity which we impose upon man of receiving Grace, ought not to ap­pear so harsh, since even before his disorder he stood in need of a forreign succour; and that in his natural purity, he could not avoid sin without a supernatural aid. For he is so composed, that in all his motions he is forced to have recourse unto God; and since he is his Image, he cannot operate but by his Spirit. Though humane Nature (saith Saint Augustine) had continued in the integrity wherein God created it, yet could it not have preserved it self against Sin without Grace; and drawing a conse­quence from this first truth, he with a great [Page 65] deal of reason adds; since man without Grace, could not preserve the purity which he had received; how can he without the same recover the purity which he hath lost? he must then resolve to submit himself to his Creator, if he will assubject his Passi­ons; and he must become pious if he will be reasonable. For ought there to be any relation between our welfare and our loss? Passions did not revolt against the under­standing till that had revolted against God: there is reason to believe they will never obey the underdanding, till that be obedi­ent to God; and as our mischief hath taken [...]ts rise from our rebellion, our good must take its beginning from our assubjection.

If prophane Philosophers object unto us, [...]hat Reason was in vain allowed us to mo­derate our Passions, if she have no power [...]ver them; and that nature is a useless guide [...]f she her self have need of a Conductor, [...]e must satisfie them by experience, and [...]each them without the holy Scripture, that [...]here are disorders in man which Reason a­ [...]one cannot regulate, and that we are sub­ [...]ect unto maladies, which Nature without [...]race cannot cure.

The THIRD DISCOURSE. That the disorder of our Passions con­sidered, Grace is requisite to the Go­vernment thereof.

THose who are instructed in the my­steries of Christian Religion, con­fess that the grace which Iesus Christ hath merited for us, doth infinitely surpass that grace which Adam by his fall deprived us of. The advantages thereof are such, as do exceed all our desires; and the most ambitious of mankind, could never have wished for the good which we hope for thereby. For to boot that we are thereby raised to a pitch far above our condition, and that we are thereby promised an happi­ness equal to that of the Angels, we have Iesus Christ thereby given us for our Head▪ and we are thereby so straightly joined un­to him, as that his Father is bound to admit us for his children. But all these priviledge [...] regard rather the future than the present. [Page 67] And though we have the pledges of these gracious promises, we do not as yet enjoy all the effects thereof. The grace which purchaseth this right for us, resides in the depth of our soul, the which she sanctifieth, leaving the body engaged in sin. She be­gins the work of our salvation, but doth not finish it; she divides the two parts whereof man is composed, and giving strength unto the Spirit, she leaves the flesh in its weakness. But by a stranger miracle she parts the soul from the Spirit, and work­eth a division in their unity, for to take her aright; 'tis only the superior part of the soul which doth fully resent the effects of Grace, and which in Baptism receives the virtue of that divine character which gives us right to Heaven, as to our inheritance. Hence it is that one Apostle terms us but imperfect workmanship, and the begin­ning of a new creature. We belong unto Iesus Christ, only for what belongs unto the Soul. Ut simus initi­um aliquod Creaturae ejus▪ Iac. 1. He is the Father only of this no­ [...]le part which he hath enriched with his Merits; but the other part, which is enga­ged in the Body, and which by an unfor­tunate necessity, sees it self bound to ani­ [...]ate the disorders, and to foment the [...]assions thereof, is not altogether delive­red [Page 68] from the tyranny of sin; she groaneth under the weight of her Iron; and this glo­rious Captive, is constrained to be wail the rigour of her servitude, whilst her Sister enjoys the sweets of liberty. Concupiscen­tia carnis in baptismo di­mittitur, non ut non sit, sed ut in peccatum, nonimputetur non autem ei substantialiter manet, sicut aliquod corpus aut spiritus, sed affectio quae­dam est malae qualitatis, sicut languor. Aug. l. 1. De Nupt. & concupiscent. c. 25. For as Saint Augustine teacheth us, Baptism takes not away Concupiscence, but doth mode­rate it; and notwithstanding any strength that it giveth unto our soul, it leaves a kind of languishment, whereof the soul cannot be cured till in glory. 'Tis true that this weakness or defection is not a sin; and though it be the Spring-head from whence all the rest do derive, it cannot make us blameable, unless when by reason of our remissness we follow the motions thereof. And it cannot be said with honour to our Soul, that this disorder is in our Body, and that the Soul is not affected therewithal, save only out of pity, Non enim ca­ro sine anima concupiscit, quamvis caro concupiscere dicatur, quia carnaliter ani­ma concupis­cit. Aug lib. De perfectione bominis, c. 17. or infected but by contagion: for besides that original sin, (whereof this misgovernment is an effect) abideth in her substance, all the world knoweth that the body is capable of opera­ting by its self, and that necessarily the soul which animates it, must be that which makes it revolt; and that that which gives it life, must give it irregular motions and desires. 'Tis she that raiseth the flesh against the Spi­rit, [Page 69] and which, as not being intirely possest by grace, doth obey sin. 'Tis she that awa­kens Passions; 'tis she who through a strange infatuation, or blindness, affords them weapons wherewithal to hurt her self, and who excites the sedition wherewithal to trouble her tranquility. This is Saint Augustines Doctrine; and if we had not so great a Doctor for our warranty, all Philo­sophy would serve us for caution, since ac­cording to the principles thereof we must believe, that the body doth nothing with­out the soul, and that even then when the body seems to undertake any thing maugre the soul, it is effected by the succour which the body receiveth from the soul. Insomuch as she is the rise of the evil, and without rea­son she complains of the bodies revolt, since she is the chief therein, and that of all the faults which she imputeth to the body, the body is not the Author, but only the Con­federate.

Now as the Passions reside in that part of the soul which is infected by sin, we must not wonder if they rebel, since their Mo­ther is disobedient. And we must not once think they should be stifled by Grace, since she suffers the very power which produceth them, to remain in rebellion. All that a [Page 70] man can wish for in her guidance, is that she may moderate their aptness to rage, that she suppress their violence, and that she pre­vent their first motions. This is one of her chief employments; for when she hath ob­liged the Understanding to know God, and the Will to love him, she enlargeth her care to the inferior part of the Soul, and en­deavours to calm the Passions thereof. She goes not about to destroy them, because she very well knows, it is a work reserved for glory; but she employeth all her forces to regulate them; as she makes good use of sin, to humble her she wisely makes use of their revolt to exercise us. She propounds unto them Objects of Innocency to make them be serviceable to her virtue: and makes them (as Saint Paul saies) Mini­sters of Justice; for Christian Humility is an enemy to the vanity of the Stoicks; and knowing very well that we are not Angels, but men, she doth not in vain endeavour to destroy one part of us, but she obligeth us to make advantage of our defaults, and to manage our Passions so dexterously, a [...] that they may obey Reason, or that they wage not war against her, save only so far a [...] she may obtain the victory. I should injur [...] this Imagination, if I should render it i [...] [Page 71] other words, than doth Saint Augustine. We consider not in a pious man whether he be offended or not, In disciplina nostra non tam quaeritur utrum pius animus irascatur sed quare iras­catur, [...]ec utrum sit triftis sed unde sit tristis; nec u­trum timeat, sed quid time­at; irasci enim peccanti ut corrigatur, contristari pro afflicto [...] libe­retur, ti [...]ere periclitanti n [...] pereat, nescio utrum q [...] ­qu [...]m sana considera [...]o [...]e reprehenda [...]. Aug l. 9. De Civ. Dei. c. 5. we weigh not the mea­sure of his sorrow, but the Subject. And we labour not so much to know whether he be afraid, as to know why. For if we be angry with a Sinner, intending so to cor­rect him; if we afflict our selves with one that is in misery, out of an intention of comforting him, and if through fear we divert a man from the mischief he was a­bout to do unto himself, I do not believe there is any so severe Judg as will condemn so useful Passions; and he must necessarily want judgment, did he not defend so harm­less Affections.

Their excess is then only blameable, and Reason assisted by Grace ought to employ all her industry to moderate them. But be­cause concupiscence is the Spring-head from whence they derive, Reason must endeavor to dry it up, and use her uttermost means to obviate the wicked effects thereof, by sti­fling the cause which produceth them. The Enemy, which we undertake, is born with us, he draws his forces from ours, he grows greater as we do, and weakens as we grow old▪ We have this of obligation to old age, that it taketh from the vigor of [Page 72] concupiscence, by diminishing our bodily strength, and that by leading us to death, it likewise leadeth this Rebel insensibly thi­ther. We must notwithstanding leave all for age to do; in a business which so much imports our salvation, we ought sooner to begin a war, which ends not but with our life, and diminish our own forces, thereby to weaken those of the enemy. You are born (saith Saint Augustine) with concupis­cence; take heed lest by giving him se­conds through your negligence, Cum concu­piscentia natus es ut eam vin­cas, nolo tibi hostes adero, vincere cum quo natus es, ad studium vi­tae hujus cum illo venisti, congredere cum eo qui te­cum processit. Aug. in Psal. 57. you raise not new enemies against you; remember you have entred the course of this life ac­companied with her, and that your honour is concerned in making her die before you, who was born with you.

This victory is rather to be wished for, than hoped for; you will not find a Saint who hath destroyed this Monster, but at the cost of their life; for though they with­stand concupiscence, that they oppose the desires thereof, and that they mind not her motions, save how to hinder her, yet in this combat, they are sometimes con­quered; their advantages are not pure, and their best successes are mingled with some disgraces. To kill this enemy, they must die, and they are necessitated to wish their [Page 73] own death that they may hasten the like of this their enemy. Non concupis­cere omnino perfecti est, post concupis­centias suas non ire pug­nantis est, lu­ctan is est, la­borantis est, ub [...] fervet pug­na, qua [...]e de­speretur victo­ria, quando erit victoria, quando absor­bebitur mors. Aug. De verb. Apost. serm. 5. Perfection (as Saint Au­gustine observes) consists in having no con­cupiscence; not to follow her is to fight a­gainst her. Nevertheless by continuance of courage one may hope for victory, but cer­tainly it cannot be obtained, but when death is happily consummated by life in the Kingdom of Glory. Hence I infer, that since Grace cannot extinguish Concupis­cence, she cannot ruine Passions, and that all the assistance that man can hope for from Grace, is so handsomly to manage Passions, as that they may defend virtue and oppugn vice.

The FOURTH DISCOURSE. That opinions, and the senses do cause the disorder of our Passions.

THough sin be the original of all our mischief, and that all the miseries we undergo are the punishments [Page 74] for our faults; we seem to take pleasure in increasing them by our evil guidance, and that we invent every day new penalties, to which divine Justice had not condemned us; we are not contented to know our Pas­sions are revolted, and that without the assistance of Grace, Reason cannot regulate them; we nourish their disorder, and to make them the more insolent, we admit of Opinions which raise them up at their pleasure. For of a thousand Passions which are raised in our soul, there are not any two that take truth for their guide; and the evil which they apprehend, or the good which they desire, appear rather so to be, than that they are so indeed. To mend this dis­order, we must take cognizance of opinion, mark her birth and progress. Opinion is not so much a judgment of the understand­ing, as of the Imaginations, whereby she doth either approve of, or condemn things which the senses represent unto her. This is the most usual evil of our Life, and if it were as constant as it is common, our condition would be very sad; but it chan­geth at every moment, that which is the cause of its birth, causeth likewise the death thereof. And Imagination forsakes it with as much ease as she gave it entertain­ment. [Page 75] It taketh its rise from our senses, and from the reports of the world, so as it is no marvel if the best grounded opinion can­not subsist long, since the foundations there­of are so bad; for our senses are liars, and like inchanted glasses, they present disgui­sed Objects unto us. Their Reports are sel­dom uninteressed; and as they fasten them­selves to objects, they endeavour to engage Imagination.

When I consider the soul as a Prisoner in the body, I bewail her condition, and I wonder not if she so oft takes falshood for truth, because it entereth by the gate of the senses; this divine Spirit is inclosed in the body, not having any other cognizance save what she borroweth either from the Eyes or the Ears thereof; and these two senses which by nature seem so particularly appropriated to knowledge are such decei­vers, as their devices are for the most part but impostures; blindness is to be prefer­red before their false Lights, and they had better leave us in our ignorance than help us to such malignant and so doubtful know­ledge. They consider only the appearances of things; they stop at accidents, their weakness cannot penetrate into substances; they are like the Sun, and as they take all [Page 76] their light from him, they endeavour to imitate him in their actions. Every one thinks that this goodly Planet is extreamly useful to us when it comes about our Hori­zon; and that it affords those beauties to nature which darkness had bereft it of. But the Platonicks have found that the advan­tage we receive thereby, equals not the pre­judice it bringeth along with it; for when it discovers the earth unto us, it hides the Heavens from us; when it exposeth Lilies and Roses to our sight, it hinders us from seeing the Stars, and takes from us the sight of the most beautiful part of the world. So the senses take from us the cognizance of di­vine things to furnish us with the like of what is humane. They make us only see the appearances of objects, and hide their truth from us. We remain ignorant under these bad Masters, and our Imagination be­ing informed but by their reports, we can only conceive false opinions.

I find therefore that Nature is more severe unto us than is Religion, and that it is much more difficult to be rational than to believe aright; for though the truths which Religion proposeth unto us, are of so high a nature as our understanding cannot com­prehend them, though she demand of us a [Page 77] blind obedience, and that to believe her mysteries, we must subdue our Reason, and give the Lie to all our Senses; yet this com­mandment is not injurious; If she take from us our liberty, she preserves our ho­nour, she frees our understanding from the tyranny of our senses, she submits it to the legitimate Empire of the supream Intelli­gence, which she illustrates unto us by her light; she takes us from earth, that she may raise us up to Heaven, and takes not from us the use of Reason, save only to make us acquire the merit of Faith. But Nature in­gaging our soul in our body, makes her a slave to our senses, and obligeth her in her noblest operations, to consult with those that are blind; and to draw her light from out their darkness. Hence it is that all our knowledge is full of errour, and that truth is never without falshood, that opinions are uncertain, and that our Passi­ons which obey them, are always out of order.

The worlds report is no surer a Guide; and those who listen thereunto, are likely never to enjoy true rest; for this rumour is nothing else but the opinion of the peo­ple, which is not the truer for being the more common. That which seemeth to [Page 78] authorize it doth condemn it; and nothing ought to make it more suspected than the great number of its partakers. The nature of man is not so well regulated, as that the best things be those that please most people; ill opinions, as well as good ones, ground themselves upon the number of their appro­vers; and when we would side with any opinions, we ought not to number, but to weigh the Votes. The common people who gape after liberty, delight to live in servitude, never make use of Judgment, and in worldly affairs, which of all others ought to be the most free, they are rather led by Example than by Reason; they fol­low those who go before, and not exami­ning their Opinions, they embrace, they de­fend them; for after having recived them, they desire to divulge them; as in factions, they endeavour to engage others on their Party, and to make their malady prove contagious. In so much as Seneca's Max­ime proves true, That man is not only failing to himself, Nemo sibi tan­tum errat, sed aliis erroris causa & author est. De vita be­ata, c. 1. but unto others, and that he communicates his errors to all those that come nigh him. When our Imagination is filled with ill Opinions, she exciteth a thousand disorders in the inferior part of our soul, and raiseth up Passions according [Page 79] to her pleasure; for being blind, they can­not discern whether the good or bad which is proposed to them, be only likely or true; and abused by the Imagination, whose Em­pire they reverence, they either draw nea­rer unto, or fly further from objects; their blindness serves them for excuse, and they lay their faults upon that hath deceived them. But to prevent this disorder, the un­derstanding must keep it self in its authori­ty, it must assubject Imagination to its Laws; it must take heed lest opinion endea­vour to establish her self, and must consult with Reason to defend it self against Errour and Falshood; thus will Passions always be peaceable, and their motions being regula­ted, they will be serviceable unto virtue.

The FIFTH DISCOURSE. That there is more disorder in the pas­sions of man, than in those of Beasts.

BEfore we resolve this question, we must discuss another, and examine whether [Page 80] beasts be capable of these motions which we call Passions. For as our Adversaries confound them with vices, and as they will have all the affections of the inferiour part of our soul to be criminal; they hold that beasts are exempt from them, and that ha­ving no freedom or liberty, one cannot impute unto them either Virtue, or Sin. That they are led on by an Instinct which cannot err, and if sometimes they seem to do amiss, we must attribute it to provi­dence, which disordereth them for our pu­nishment, or which suffereth their unruli­ness, to put us in mind of our wickedness; 'tis therefore that their motions serve for plagues to all people, and that the Infidels took counsel by the flying of Birds, and the Entrails of Victims, that they might know what was to come, or what Heaven had decreed. But though Beasts be exempt from sin, and that they owe their innocency to their servitude, they are not notwith­standing insensible. All Philosophers ac­knowledge they have inclinations, and a­versions, and that according as objects give against their eyes or ears, they excite de­sire or fear in their Imaginations. In effect, the nethermost part of our soul hath such correspondency with our senses, as that [Page 81] she borrows her name from them, and is called sensitive; insomuch, as it is almost impossible, but that any thing that entreth by those passages, with any contentment or detestation, should cause either pleasure, or pain in the soul. As beasts have these two faculties, which give them feeling and life; we must necessarily conclude, That they have Passions, that they approach to what is good, out of desire, and shun what is evil, out of dislike; that they taste the one with joy, and suffer the other with sorrow. This reason is confirmed by examples; for we see every day how Horses are brought to manage through the fear of punishment, that the Spur quickens their memory, that the noise of Trumpets puts them in good humor, and that very hurts do animate their courage; Bulls fight for glory, and joining craft with strenth, dispute as hotly for the [...]eading of an Herd, as Princes do for the [...]onquest of a Kingdom: Lions in their [...]ighting covet not so much revenge as [...]onour; when they see their enemy on the [...]round, their choler is appeased, and having [...]aken up Arms only for glories sake, they [...]ontent themselves with this advantage, [...]nd gives life to what yields the victory. [...]n fine, they are netled as well by jealousie, [Page 82] as by love, they love faithfulness, punish Adultery, and wash this fault in the bloud of the guilty. It cannot then be doubted, but that beasts have Passions, and that they are agitated with those furious motions which trouble our quiet; but the difficulty is to know, whether theirs or ours be more violent, and whether they or we be less re­gulated in our motions.

Truth it self obligeth us to confess, that our advantages are prejudicial to us, and that when very Reason becomes a slave un­to our senses, it serves only to make our af­fections more unreasonable. Beasts appre­hend not evil, but when it is nigh at hand; they discern not what is to come, and do not much remember what is past; the pre­sent only can make them unhappy. But men go about to find out casualties before they happen, they seem to have a design to ha­sten their misadvantages, and that to en­large Fortunes Empire, they will prevent the evils to which she hath not yet given birth. Nemo tantum praesentibus miser est. Sen. Epist. 5. Their fear is employed both in wha [...] is pas [...], and in what is to come; and as they tremble at a missfortune which hath ceased to be, so they grow pale at a disaster, which hath yet no being.

There are but few objects wherein beas [...] [Page 83] are concerned, set aside those things which are necessary for the maintenance of their life, and you shall find they consider all other things as indifferent. But men cannot bound their desires, either [...]y reason, or necessity; they extend them too beyond what is useful, and seek out superfluities to increase their punishments: all their Passi­ons are so out of order, as that nothing can content them. Quidquid illis congesseris, non finis cupi­ditatis erit, sed gradus. Senec [...] That which ought to appease them, incenseth them; and that which is given them to satisfie their hunger, serves often times only to provoke it; so as one may not be said to lie, if he affirm, That man is only ingenuous to his own loss, and that he employs the goodness of his wit, only to make himself more unfortunate, or more faulty: Beasts are stupid, their temperature, which holds of the Earth, makes them insensible, and happily exempts them from all those evils, which hurt not the body, save in as much as they have hurt the Imagination. Bulls must be goad­ed on, to make them furious; and these heavy lumps, whose soul is but a body, do little unirritated. Elephants endure all things at their Masters hands; they think not themselves hurt unless they see their bloud; when the pain is over, their choler [Page 84] is appeased, and they become as tractable as they were before; but man is of so de­licate a constitution, as the slightest pain offends him; his blood which is of the the nature of fire, is easily moved, and be­ing once moved, it hurries fury throughout all his parts. This fury doth its greatest out­rages about the heart; for she furnisheth it with such Spirits, as oftentimes she causeth that to die which gives life to the whole body, and to revenge her self of a particular injury, she hazzards the publick welfare. To compleat this mischief, this Passion is so shy in man, as the least matter is suffici­ent to provoke it. A word troubleth it, a motion of the head offendeth it, silence sets it going; not finding any thing to entertain it, it devours her own Entrails, and by an excess of despair, turns all her rage against her self.

In fine, The life of Beasts being uniform, and nature having given them bounds nar­row enough, they have but a few Passions; almost all their motions are caused out of a fear which possesseth them, or a desire wherewith they are affected. But as the life of man is more mingled, and that in the course thereof it is subject to a thousand different inconveniences, his Passions rise [Page 85] up in a croud; and wheresoever he goes he finds subjects of Choler, and of Fear, of Pleasure, and of Sorrow. Therefore it is, that the Poets have feigned, That his soul passeth into the body of divers Creatures, and that taking all their evil qualities, he uniteth in his person the guile of Serpents, the fury of Tygers, Choler of Lions; teaching us by this Fiction, That man alone hath as many Passions as have all Beasts put together.

'Tis therefore that Philosophers pro­pound them unto us for examples, and that the Stoicks after having raised our nature to such a height of greatness, are obliged to reduce us to the condition of Beasts, and to place the happiness and rest of their wise­man in a strange kind of stupidity. Daemon [...]s au­tem ro [...]abant eum, dicen [...]es, si ejicis nos hinc, mitte no [...] in gre [...]em por­corum. Mat. 8. This sense differs not much from that of the proud Spirits, which being desirous to sit on the Throne of God, demanded leave of Jesus Christ to withdraw themselves into the bodies of Swine; and that not being able to reign with the persons of the Deity, they were contented to live with infamous Beasts. So our proud Stoicks, after having raised their wise-man, even unto Heaven, and given him Titles, unto which the ac­cursed Angels in their rebellion durst never [Page 86] pretend, they brought him down to the condition of Beasts, and not able to make him insensible, they endeavoured to make him stupid. They accuse Reason to be the cause of all disorders, they complain of the disadvantages we have by Nature, and would lose both Memory and Wisdom, that they might neither foresee the evils that are to come, nor muse of those that are past. This folly is the punishment of their vanity: Divine Justice hath permitted that understanding which had been their Idol, should become their torment; and that they should every where divulge, That since they could not live like Gods, they were resolved to live like Beasts. But not immediating their despair, we are only to implore aid from Heaven; and acknow­ledging the weakness of Reason, seek out another light to conduct us, and borrow new forces to vanquish our Passions. This is that which Christian Religion hath taught us, and that which we shall examine in the pursuit of this work.

The FIRST DISCOURSE. That there is nothing more glorious nor more hard to come by, than the Go­vernment of Passions.

NAture by a wise providence hath united Difficulty with Glory, and lest Glorious things might become too common, her plea­sure is, they should be hardly come by. There is nothing of greater lustre amongst men than the valour of Conquerors, all O­rators would have been mute, had not bat­tels bin fought, and victories bin had. But to acquire this title of honour, a man must de­spise [Page 88] death, forgo pleasures, overcome troubles; and oftentimes purchase Glory by the loss of his own life. After the va­lour of Conquerors, there is nothing more illustrious than the eloquence of Orators; she ruleth States without violence, she go­verns people without weapons, she works upon their wills with sweetness, she fights, and obtains Victories without blood-shed; but to arrive at this great height, one must overcome a thousand difficulties, accord Art and Nature together, conceive strong thoughts, express them in good words, study the humour of the People, learn the secret of forcing their liberties, and of win­ning their affections. This truth appeareth evidently in the Subject we treat of, and every one confesseth, there is nothing hard­er nor yet more honourable, than for a man to overcome his Passions. For to boot that we are not assisted by any others in this conflict; that fortune which rules as chief in all other combats, cannot favour us in this; that men partake not of glory with us, and that we do at once the office of a common Souldier, and of a Commander: there is this of anger and some difficulty in it, that we fight against a part of our selves, that our forces are divided, and that no­thing [Page 89] encourageth us in this war, but duty and integrity. Upon other occasions men are spurred on by honour and envy. Oft times choler, when it hath to do with virtue makes up the greatest part of our valour; hope and boldness assist us; and their for­ces being united, it is almost impossible to be overcome. But when we assail our Passions, our Troops are weakned by divi­sion; we operate but by one part of our selves: let virtue or worth animate our Courage with the best reason she can, our love to our enemies makes us faint-hearted, and we are afraid of a victory, which must cost us the loss of our delights. For though our Passions be irregular, and that they trouble our quiet, these cease not to make up a part of our soul; though their insolency dislike us, we cannot resolve to tear out our bowels, unless we be assisted by Grace; self-love doth betray us, and we spare rebels because they are our Allies. But that which augments the difficulty, and which makes the victory more uncertain, is the power of our enemies; for though they held no intelligence with our soul, though they should not by their cunning, divide her forces, and though she should set upon them with all her might, they are [Page 90] of such a nature as they may be weakned, and yet not overcome; they may be worst­ed, yet not routed; for they are so streight­ly joined with us, as they cannot be parted from us. Their life is bound up with ours, and by a strange fate, they cannot die un­less we die with them. So as this victory is never entire, and these Rebels are never so much quelled, but that upon the first oc­casion they will frame a new Army, and give us battel again. They are Hydra's, which thrust up as many heads as are cut off, they are so many Antaeusses who gather strength from their weakness, and who rise up the stronger, after they have been beat­en down; all the advantage which one can expect upon such unruly subjects, is to clap irons upon their hands and feet, and leave them no more power than what is requisite for the service of Reason. We must treat them as we do Gally-slaves, who draw al­waies their iron Chains after them, and who have only the use of their arms to row; or if you will deal with them more favou­rably, you must be well assured of their fidelity, and remember a Maxim which [...] approve not of save in this case, that re­conciled enemies ought alwaies to be had in suspition.

[Page 91] If the difficulty which accompanieth this combate astonish us, the glory which en­sues thereupon ought to encourage us; for the Heavens behold nothing of more Il­lustrious, nor doth the Earth bear any thing of more glorious, than a man who commands his Passions; No Crown is suf­ficient to adorn his head, all praises come short of his merit, nothing but Eternity can recompense so exalted a Virtue; the very shadows thereof are pleasing, and the truth thereof is so beautiful, that men adore the semblance. We do not revernce So­crates nor Cato, but for that they had some tincture thereof, nor do we place them in the number of the Sages, save for that they have triumphed over our weakest Passions. The glory of these great men is purer than that of Alexander or Pompey; their Victory never made Widow or Orphan, their Conquests have not laid Kingdoms waste, their Combates have nei­ther caused the shedding of bloud, nor of tears; and in the gaining of their liberty, they haveneither taken Prisoner, nor made slave; a man reads all their actions with delight, and in all the course of their harm­less life, one meets not with any objects of horrour. They are born for the worlds [Page 92] good, they have laboured for the quiet of all men; there is not any Nation that ma­lignes their happiness, nor which rejoyceth at their death. What honour can a Conque­ror hope for, who owes all his greatness to his Injustice? who is only famous for be­ing criminal; and of whom no mention would have been made in History, had he not slain Men, burnt Towns, ruined Provinces, and dispeopled whole King­doms.

Those who have only warred with their Passions, enjoy a much more real good, and these innocent Conquerors receive more glorious Praises from us. We raise them above all Monarchs; and if they have lived in the Church, we place them in Heaven when they are dead; we take their actions for examples to our selves, we borrow their weapons to fight with the ene­mies which they have vanquished, we read their lives, as Conquerors do those of the Caesars, we conform our selves to their vir­tue, and we observe the good Maximes which they have held, the innocent Wiles that they have practised, and the high de­signs which they have undertaken, that we may obtain like famous Victories. Their most-assured Maximes were, not to trust [Page 93] their own strength, to implore aid from Heaven, and to hope for more from Grace, than from Nature. If thou wilt overcome (saith Saint Augustine) presume not upon thy self, Si vis vincere, noli de te prae­sumere, sed illi assigna victo­riae gloriam qui tibi donat, ut victoriae re­feras palmam. Aug. Serm. 2. De Catechismo. but give the honour of the victory to him from whom thou expectest the Crown. Their more ordinary wills were to prevent their Passions, to take from them their strength, that they might take their courage from them, to set upon them in their birth, and not to expect till age had made them stronger. Their most memo­rable enterprizes were to over-run their E­nemies grounds, to consider their counte­nance, to mark their designs, and to cut off all Objects that could make them move. These means would succeed happily unto us, if we would make use of them, and we shall not want assistance; since all the Moral Virtues are so many faithful Allies; who fight for our liberty, and which fur­nish us with Weapons to subdue our Passi­ons.

The THIRD DISCOURSE. That there is no more miserable Slave than he who suffers himself to be guided by his Passions.

LIberty is so pleasing, and servitude so irksom, as a man may say with­out fear of exaggeration, that as the one is the chiefest of all that is good, the other is the chiefest of all that is bad; the people have fought for the preservation of the one, and to defend themselves from the other; nature seems to have perswaded them, 'tis better to die in liberty, than live in servitude. Our Ancestors were so tender in this point, as they could not endure the Roman Authority. They were the last that subjected themselves thereunto, and the first that freed themselves from it. Had not the Heavens made Iulius Caesar of purpose to conquer them, they had never been slaves to Rome; but yet they had this of consolation in their missfortune, that [Page 95] under the conduct of that great Prince, 'they revenged themselves of the Republique that had opposed them, and made her suf­fer servitude, which had made them lose their liberty. Though this evil be so tedi­ous, and the good it deprives us of so plea­sing, it is not comparable to that which the tyranny of Passions causeth in us. And it must be granted, that of as many slaves as are in the world, there is none more un­happy, than those who obey such cruel Ma­sters.

For the rest are free in their noblest part, Corpus est quod dominio fortuna tradi­dit, hoc emit, hoc vendit, in­terior illa pars mancipio dari non potest. Sen. Benefic, l. 3. c. 20. 'tis only their bodies which groan under the irons, and which feels the rigour of sla­very; their wills are not constrained; when they are commanded any thing that contra­dicts their honour, or which offends their Conscience, they may defend themselves from it by a noble refusal, and buy their li­berty with the loss of their life. But these are slaves even in the bottom of their souls, they cannot dispose either of their thoughts or their desires; they lose in this infamous servitude, that which Captives preserve in Prisons, and that which Tyrants cannot rob their enemies of.

The others may quit their Masters, and leaving their Houses, or their Territories, [Page 96] go into places of freedom, where they may breath the air of liberty: But these, though they change Countreys, change not condi­tion; they are slaves under Crowns, they serve their Passions, whilst they command their Subjects; and whithersoever they go, they drag their chains after them, and carry their Masters with them. The others long after liberty, and employ their credit to ob­tain it: If this fail them, misery opens their understanding, and necessity, which is the mother of Invention, furnisheth them with means to free themselves; but these wret­ches have so far lost theirs, as they have not so much as retained the desire thereof. They love their servitude, they kiss their Irons, and being strangely blinded, they fear the end of their imprisonment, and dread their deliverance.

The others have but one Master, and amongst so many mischiefs which afflict them, they hope to sweeten their captivity, by gaining the favor of him who commands them; they promise unto themselves, that by their assiduous service, they may regain their liberty; they flatter themselves in the thought thereof, and think that a slave who hath but one man to content, cannot be al­ways unhappy: But these have as many [Page 97] masters to serve as Passions to satisfie; Malus etiamsi regnet, servus est, nec unius hominis, fed quod gravius est, tot domi­norum, quot vitiorum. Aug. l. 4. De Civii Dei, c. 3. the end of one servitude, is the beginning of another; and when they think they have escaped a surly government, they fall under an insolent tyranny; for their change is ne­ver advantageous to them: the last Master is always more cruel than the former: Oft times they command all together, and as their designes do not agree, they divide these unhappy slaves, and force them to serve their wills, and to tear out their bow­els, to obey rather contrary, than differing Orders. Sometimes ambition & Love unite their flames to devour them, fear and hope set jointly upon them, sorrow and delight are reconciled together to afflict them, and one may say, that every Master is a Hang­man which torments them, and that every order they receive, is a new punishment un­to them. They have not one quiet hour, their Passions persecute them day & night: And these revengeful furies change all the delights of these miserable men into cruel torments.

What more deplorable thing can there be than to see Alexander possest by his am­bition, and see him lose his judgment, to satisfie this irregular Passion. For can one think he was indued with Reason, who be­gan [Page 98] his exploits, Antu putas sanum qui a Graecia pri­mum cladibus in qua erudi­tus est, incepit, qui Lacedae­moniam servi­re iubet, Athe­nas tacere. Sen Epist. 94. by the ruine of Greece, and who more unjust than the Persians, silenced the Town of Athens, made that of Lacede­mon serve, and ruinated the Country, which (to no purpose) had taught him Philoso­phy?

This very fury made him over-run the world, commit spoiles throughout all Asia, penetrate the Indies, pass the Seas, be an­gry with Nature, which by the limits thereof did bound his conquests, and force him to end his designes, where the Sun finisheth his course. Who is not affected with pity, to see Pompey, who drunk with love of a false greatness, undertakes civil and foreign Wars? Sometimes he passes into Spain to oppress Sertorius, sometimes scoures the Seas to free them from Pyrats, sometimes he flies into Asia, to fight with Mithridates. He ransacks all the Provinces of that great part of the world; makes himself Enemies, where he finds none: After so many Fights and Victories, 'tis he alone that thinks himself not great enough; and though men give him that name, he thinks he deserves it not, unless Iulius Cae­sar confess it. Who hath not compassion for this man, who was not so much the Slave, as Martyr of Ambition? For he pro­stituted [Page 99] his honour, to get power; he be­came slave to his Army, that he might be Master of the Senate; he vowed the de­struction of his Countrey, to revenge him­self of his Son in Law: Seeing no other State, against which he could exercise his cruelty, he employed it against the Repub­lick, and would merit the name of Patricide, that he might obtain that of Soveraign. He never had any motions, save those that Am­bition gave him. If he pardoned his Ene­mies, 'twas but only out of vain-glory; and if he bewailed the death of Cato and Pom­pey, it was perhaps for that the honour of his Victory was lessened. All his thoughts were ambitious. When he saw the Image of Alexander, he wept not, save only for that he had not yet shed bloud enough. Whatsoever offered it self to his Eyes, a­wakened his Passions, and Objects which would have taught others modesty, inspired him with Pride and Insolency. Briefly, Caesar commanded over his Army, and ambi­tion commanded over Caesar, she had such [...]ower over him, as the foretelling of his death did not make him change his De­ [...]ign; and doubtlesly, he would have an­ [...]wered for himself to the Soothsayers, as Agrippina answered for her Son to the A­strologers, [Page 100] Let him kill me, provided he may reign.

If servitude be so irksom in ambition, 'tis much more shameful in obscenity. It must be confest, That a man who is possest by this infamous Passion, hath neither Rea­son nor Liberty, and that being inslaved to Love, he is no more Master of himself. Did not Cleopatra govern Mark Anthony? might not this Princess boast her self to have revenged Egypt upon Italy, and to have subjected the Roman Empire, by putting him under her Laws, who governed it? This unfortunate man lived only at the pleasure of this stranger, he did nothing but by her motions; and never did slave labour so much to win the good will of his Master, as this effeminate Prince, to win the like of his proud Mistress. He gave all his Charges by her directions, and the best part of the Roman Empire, groaned under the govern­ment of a woman. He durst not overcome in the batel of Actium, and rather chose to forgo his Army than his Love. He was the first Commander that abandoned his Souldiers, and who would not make use of their courage to defeat his Enemy; but what could one expect from a man who had no more any heart, and who far enough [Page 101] from fighting, could not so much as live, if parted from Cleopatra. In brief, read the story of all the great ones, and you will find their Passions have enflamed them, and that in the height of their fortune they have made use of all the punishments that tyranny could invent, to afflict those that she oppresseth. Therefore ought all men to make use of Reason and Grace to shun the fury of these insolent Masters, eve­ry one ought to resolve in his particular, ra­ther to lose his life, than his liberty, and to prefer a glorious death before a shameful servitude. But without coming to these extreams in this Combat, a will to over­come is sufficient to be victorious; for God hath permitted, that our good fortune de­pend upon our Will together with his Grace; and that our Passions should have no further power over us, than we shall give them, since in effect experience teach­eth us that they beat us not but by our own weapons, and that they make us not their slaves, but by our own consent.

The THIRD DISCOURSE. That to govern Passions, a man must moderate them.

THough Passions be ordained for the service of virtue, and that there is not any one of them, the use where­of may not be advantageous to us, we must notwithstanding confess, that we need dexterity to govern them, and that in the state whereinto sin hath reduced our Nature, they cannot be useful to us, unless moderated; that unhappy Forefather o [...] ours, who made us to inherit his fault, hath not left us so pure a being as he had whe [...] he received it from God. The body and soul suffer pain, and as they were both guilty, so are they both punished. The un­derstanding hath its errors, the will her ir­regular inclinations, the memory her weak­ness. The body, which is the Channe [...] through which Original sin passeth into the [Page 103] soul, hath its misery, and though it be the less faulty, yet is it the more unfortunate; all that is in it is out of order; the senses are seduced by Objects, these help to abuse Imagination, which excites disorders in the inferior part of the soul, and raiseth Passions, so as they are no longer in that obedience, wherein Original Justice kept them; and though they be subject to the Empire of Reason, yet they so mutinie, as they are not to be brought within the com­pass of their duty, but by force or cunning. They are born to obey the understanding, but they easily forget their condition; and the commerce which they hold with the senses, is the cause why they oft-times pre­fer their advises at the commandments of the will. They raise themselves up with such might, as their natural motions are for the most part violent They are horses which have more of fury than of force: They are seas which are oftner troubled than calm. In fine, they are parts of our selves, which cannot serve the understand­ing till it hath allaied or tamed them.

This ought not to seem strange [...] that know what spoil sin hath [...] nature; and the very Philosopher [...] fess that virtue is an art which [...] [Page 104] learn'd, will not find it unjust that the Passi­ons be not obedient, unless governed by Reason.

To execute so great a design, a man must imitate nature and art, and consider what means they use to finish their work. Nature which doth all by the Elements, and who of these four bodies composeth all others, never employs them till she hath tempered their qualities. As they cannot suffer toge­ther, and that their natural antipathy en­gages them to fight: this wise Mother, by allaing their aversions, appeaseth their differences, and never unites them, 'till she hath weakned them. Art, which is not invented so much to perfect nature, as to imitate her, observes the same Rules, and imploys nothing in her workmanship, till it be tempered by her industry. Painting would not be so cried up, had it not found out the secret of reconciling black with white, and so pacifie the natural discord of these two colours, to compose all others thereof. The riders of the great horse have no service from their horses, till they have broke them; and that they may be useful, they must be taught to answer the Bridle and the Spur. Lions were never made use of to draw triumphant Chariots, till they [Page 105] were tamed; and Elephants bore not Towers upon their backs in fight, till they were rid of the savage humour which they brought from the Woods.

All these examples are documents for­the government of our Passions, and Reason ought to imitate nature if she will be advan­taged thereby. They mus [...] [...] be employed till moderated; and he who shall think to make them serviceable to virtue, before he hath subjugated them by grace, will ingage himself in a perillous design. In the state of innocency, when they had nothing of un­ruly in them, one might make use of them as they were born; they never surprized the will: As original Justice was as well shed throughout the body, as throughout the soul: The senses made no false reports and their advices being uninteressed, they were always conformable to the judgment of Reason. But now, that all things in man are faulty, that the Body and the Soul are equally corrupted, that the senses are sub­ject to a thousand illusions, and that Ima­gination favours their Disorders; we must have great precaution in the use of Passi­ons.

The first is to consider, what troubles their revolt hath caused in our soul, and in [Page 106] how many mischiefs these mutiniers have ingaged us, when they have only been led on by our eyes or ears: 'Tis a piece of wis­dom to reap advantage by our losses, and to become wise at our own cost. The just­est choler flies out sometimes, if not with­held by Reason [...] though her motion was lawful in its bir [...], it becomes criminal in the progress thereof. It turns a good cause into a bad one; for not having consulted with the superiour part of the soul; and thinking to punish assight fault, it commits a great one. Fear hath oft-times astonished us, for having only listned to the Senses, she maketh us look pale upon a thousand occasions, without any just cause; and sometimes she hath engaged us in real dan­gers, to make us shun those that were but imaginary. As then our Passions have de­ceived us, for our not having ask'd counsel of our Reason, we must resolve never to believe them any more, till we have exa­mined, whether that which they desire, or that which they fear, be reasonable, and whether the understanding, which sees fur­ther than our eyes, cannot discover the va­nity of our hopes or fears.

The second precaution, is, to oblige Rea­son, to watch alwaies over such subjects as [Page 107] may excite our Passions, and to consider their nature, and motions, to the end that she may never be surprized. Harms foreseen hurt but a little, and we are but seldom asto­nished at such accidents, against which we are prepared. A Pilot who sees a storm com­ing, withdraws into the Haven; or if he be too far from it, he lanch [...]th into the deep, and keeps aloof from Coasts, or Rocks. A Father who knows that his Children are mortal, and that life hath no longer term than what it hath pleased God to give, will never take on too much at their loss. A Prince who considers, that victory depends more upon Fortune than his Wisdom, and more on Chances than on the Valour of his Soul­diers, will easily be comforted though he hath been beaten: But we make not use of our understanding, & methinks, if our Passi­ons be out of order, Reason ought to be ac­cused thereof, for not having foreseen the danger, and for not having prepared our senses against their surprizals.

The third precaution is, to study the na­ture of such Passions, as we take in hand to moderate or govern. For some must be rudely dealt withal, and to reduce them to their duty, severity and violence must be made use of; others will be flattered, and [Page 108] they must be gently dealt withal to make them obedient to Reason. Though they be subjects, they are not slaves, and the under­standing which governs them, is rather their Father than their Soveraign. Others would be cozened, and though Virtue be so generous, she is tied to accommodate herself to the weakness of Passions, and to make use of wiles, when force will not prevail. Love is of this nature, we must divert it, not being able to banish it from out of our hearts, we must lay before it le­gitimate Objects, and make it virtuous by an innocent cozenage: Choler would be flattered, and who thinks to oppose this torrent by making a Dam, hath but aug­mented its Fury. Fear and Sorrow ought to be rudely dealt withal; and of these two Passions, the former is so faint-hearted, as it is not to be overcome but by force; and the second is opinionated, as it is not to be brought within rule, but by provocation. These means being well observed, the Af­fections of our soul may be sweetned. These savage Beasts become domestick, when they have lost their natural fierceness; Reason makes good use of them, and Virtue shapes no design which she executes without their mediation.

The FOURTH DISCOURSE. That in what condition soever our pas­sions be, they may be governed by Reason.

THough Nature be so liberal, she ceaseth not to be a good housewife, and to employ with profit that which she hath abundantly produced; all her parts have their use, and amongst the in­finite number of Creatures which do com­pose the world, there is not any one which hath not its use. Those which do us no ser­vice, contribute to our pleasures; the most beautiful, and most delightful serve to a­dorn the world, and the very deformed en­tertain her variety.

As shadows set off colours, ugliness gives a lustre to Beauty; and Monsters which are the defect of Nature, make her chiefest works and miracles be esteemed. There is nothing more pernicious than poison; and were not sin barren, one would [Page 110] take it for one of its production, since it seems to agree with the other, to make all men die. Yet hath it its use; Physick makes Antidotes thereof, and there are certain sicknesses which cannot be cured but by prepared poisons; use hath turned them in­to nourishment. And if there have been Princes whom poison could not kill, Beasts who bear it about in their bodies, cannot live without it; that which is pernicious to us, is so necessary to them, as they cannot be berest of it without loss of life. This is that which makes all Philosophers grant with Saint Augustine, Si Scorpionis venenum ma­lum esset, prius scorpionem perimeret; ac contra si ei ali­quo modo de­trahatur, fine dubitatione in­teriret, ergo il­lius corpori malum est a­mittere quod nostro malum est recipere, & illi bonum est habere id quo nobis bonum est cavere. Aug. l. De Moribus, c. 8. that venom is no evil, since it is natural to Scorpíons and Vipers, and that they die when they lose it, as we do when we take it.

If our Adversaries would have the moti­ons of our Soul; to pass for poisons, or mon­sters; this Reason will enforce them to confess, that they are not so absolutely e­vil, but that they may be prepared as well as poisons, and Antidotes made thereof to cure our Maladies; or to continue our health. For consider them how you please, and give them what countenance you like best to make them hideous: Reason will alwayes find a way to make use of them: and this great Steward of our good and [Page 111] bad, can so wisely husband them, that in despight of sin, which hath disordered them, she will draw advantage and glory from them.

If we look upon them in their birth, they are tractable affections, and but of weak resistance, and which by a little instruction become docile and obedient. They are children which are afrighted with words, and who for fear of a small punishment, amend their evil inclinations, and advan­tage their masters councils. They are young grafts, which an ill wind hath made crook­ed; but which are easily set aright with a little care, and which not being yet become inflexible, will be bowed contrary to their natural inclination. Neither would the Platonists have the name of the Passions given to these disorders in their birth; and knowing, that they were easily governed, they were contented to call them affections, without giving them a more injurious ti­tle.

If we consider them when they are grown older, when making use of our weakness, they have gotten new forces, and of simple Affections are become violent Passions; we must treat them in order to their proper interests, and feeding them [Page 112] with hope of pleasure or glory, draw them to what is good, and divert them from evil. For in their greatest revolt, they reserve always an inclination to virtue, and an ab­horrition to sin; they are only faulty as they are abused: Take away the Fillet where­with their eyes are blinded, and that will suffice to redress their motions, and cor­rect their errors. Sin hath not been able so far to dishonour Nature, but that she hath always kept the grounds of her inclinations; she always loves what is good, and hateth evil eternally; she pursues glory, and shuns infamy; she wisheth pleasure, and fears pain; all her motions are as natural as in­nocent. The Devil, who very well sees this disorder, is pernicious to his designs; and that this impression, which is set on by the hand of God, cannot be defaced, changeth our Passions; and not being able to corrupt them, he endeavoureth to abuse them; he propounds unto them appearing good, for what is real; he disguis [...]h sin, and puts upon it the Cloak of Virtue. And as thus hoodwink'd they cannot discern falshood from truth, they confound evil with good, and by a deplorable misfortune, they love what they ought to hate, and hate what they ought to love. Their cure consists in [Page 113] disabusing them; for how firmly soever they be tied to these disguised objects, they will flie from them as soon as they shall be made to know what is beautiful, and what is ill favoured; and following their first in­clinations, they will abhor their blindness, and will forgo the appearing good to em­brace the true one. We ought to comfort our selves in our misfortune, since that the nature of Passions is not altogether chan­ged; that since the disobedience of our Forefathers, and the hatred of his enemy, they retain notwithstanding some purity; and that in all their disorder, there is more of errour, than of malice.

If in fine, we consider them in their ex­tream violence, and in the condition where­in they throw about so much smoke and flame, as they darken Reason, and force her to give over the government of them, 'tis hard to make good use of them; for they seem to have changed condition, as having sided with sin, they deserve to carry her name, and rather to be termed troubles and commotions than Passions. They are so insolent, as they despise all counsel; in­stead of taking law from the understanding, they will give it; and of natural subjects, become insupportable Tyrants. When the [Page 114] mischief is risen to this height, 'tis very hard to remedy it; and one may be said to have made all desperate, through too long expectation; for Passions will listen no longer, and Reason is so troubled, as she can prescribe them no further rules; the waves rise up even unto Heaven; that part of man which ought always to be at quiet, is engaged in the storm, and had need of others help to appease the troubles she is a­gitated withal. Truly I do not believe, any Philosopher dare undertake to cure a man in this phrensie; remedies will make his ma­lady the worse: There is nothing but time that can lessen it; and it is to be wish'd for, that this torrent may find room enough wherein to extend in waters, and to dissipate the fury thereof. But when this tempest is appeased, when the Passions are a little cal­med, and when reason hath gotten a little light and strength, the evilness of his con­dition must be laid before him; he must be made blush for his offence, and these slavish rebels must be roundly chid; but above all, he must humble himself before God, enrich himself by his Losses, and become wise at his cost. He ought also to look, by what part the enemy hath entred; what cunning he hath used to exercise sedition, [Page 115] and debauch his subjects; thus we shall be bettered by our greatest misfortunes: We shall learn by experience, that storms may bring into the Haven; and that if there be some ways that drown men, there are some which throw them upon the Bank: But as there is no Sailor, who will run this hazard, to oblige the Heavens to do a miracle in his behalf, no man ought to expose himself to this disorder, that he may reap profits thereby; and it is better to want an uncer­tain good, than to buy it by an assured loss.

In consideration of these truths, we may affirm our condition is not so deplorable as those imagine it to be, who will excuse their sin upon their misery: Since our good fortune is in our own power, and that we sail upon a Sea, the calm or tempest where­of, depends upon our will; we may shun the Rocks the Sea hides, asswage the fury of the winds which make it go high, bring [...]ow the waves which it raiseth, and make a calm succeed a storm; or by a more lucky application, we may make those Rocks hide their heads, those Seas to bear our Vessels, [...]nd those winds to conduct them. But to [...]eave this figurative maner of speech, let us [...]ay, there are no Objects which we may not [Page 116] set at naught, no opinions which we may not correct, nor no Passions which we may not overcome. Thus our fortune is at our own disposal, the victory depends upon our own weapons, our good fortune is fa­stened to our desire, and a little courage on­ly requisite to compass all these goods.

The FIFTH DISCOURSE. What means a man must use to mode­rate his Passions.

AMongst many other means, which Reason may make use of to govern our Passions, the most ordinary seem to be those, which she hath learn'd from hunting, where men make use of beasts already tamed to take wild ones; and where to sport themselves, they use the courage of Dogs, against the rage of Wolves. So may it seem to be lawful to employ such Passions, as are most submis [...] against those which are most rebellious, and to make use of our reconciled enemies, to [Page 117] vanquish those which yet war against us. Men oppose joy to sorrow, suppress fear by hope, moderate delights by the pain which ensues thereupon. Sometimes also men consider such Passions as produce others. To drain Rivers, men endeavour to dry up the spring heads from whence they derive; and to destroy causes that they may ruine their effects. D [...]fines timere si sperare desie­ris, Sen. Ep. 5. Who ceaseth to hope, cea­seth to fear; who bounds his Desires, bounds his Hopes; and who covets not riches, will not be disquieted, nor have any fears for them. Sometimes also a man may set upon that particular Passion which bears most sway with him, that he may vanquish those that fight under the others Colours, and the Victory is had by one Blow; by the Generals death the whole Army is defeated. But though all these be specious means, and that they promise unto us, either a sound peace or a long Truce, yet are they Deceivers, and make us undertake things either unjust, impossible; or dangerous. For there is dan­ger in fortifying one enemy to destroy ano­ther, and there is no great assurance in fur­nishing a Passion with weapons, which may as well make use of them to oppose Reason, as in her behalf. 'Tis unjust to oppose the [Page 118] one against the other, Cum affectus repercùssit af­fectum, aut metus aut cu­piditas aliquid imperavit non rationis bene­ficio tunc qui­evit, sed affe­ctuum infida & mala pace, Sen. De Ira, l. 1. c. 8. since they ought to hold intelligence together. For though a Politician be permitted to make war, that peace may ensue, and to put division amongst such enemies, whose agreement may prove prejudicial to us, morality is not suffered to sow discord amongst her Subjects, under a vain hope of according them when they shall b [...] weakned. In fine, to endeavour to choak one Passion, there­by to overcome the rest which proceed from thence, is to attempt an impossibility: they may well be moderated, not destroy­ed; they proceed from the union of our soul with our body; and to take away their life, the like must be done to man who produceth them. Our Passions are much more intimate to us than are our members; a man may cut off these when they are in­fected, he cannot cut off the others when they are disobedient. Also the greatest part of these advices are given us by suspect­ed persons; these bad Reasons come from the Stoicks school, who look upon Passions as enemies to our quiet, and who endea­vour not to regulate, but to annihilate them. They are perswaded it fares with them, as with savage Beasts, which are never so well tamed, but that they always [Page 119] preserve somewhat of their first fierceness, and that to reduce the soul into perfect tranquility, they ought not to be allayed, but destroyed.

To resolve these difficulties, we must remember that Reason is King over Passi­ons; that their Government is one of her chief employments, and that she is bound to watch more particularly over those which by their motions carry others along with them: For as their revolt is followed by an universal Rebellion, their Obedience seems likewise to cause a general peace, and that they never acknowledge Reason, but when they reduce together with them­selves, all those Passions which they had rai­sed up.

One may very well sometimes oppose pleasure to grief, hope to fear, and incli­nation to aversion, but in this combate Reason must take heed, lest by weakning one Passion, she add too much strength unto another; and that whilst she would reduce a Mutinier to obedience, she do not augment the number of Rebels. When she undertakes these affairs, she must hold the Scales in her hand; and remember that God (whom she imitateth) doth all his Works by weight and measure; and [Page 120] when he tempers the qualities of the Elements, to the end that he may agree them, he doth no advantage to one whereby another is prejudiced. We may likewise well assail the Passion that masters us, and which we acknowledge to be the cause of our disorders: For it is a Familiar which possesseth us; 'tis a Tyrant which useth not his power, save in order to his own interest; and who is so much the more dangerous, as that he endeavours to become welcom. Reason is bound to oppugne him as a publick Enemy, and to employ all her might, if not to destroy him, at least to weaken him.

I see not notwithstanding how she can with security make use of other Passions to tame him; for they are too near allied unto him, to set upon him; and when men shall think to make use of them to his destruction, he will have dexterity enough to make them serve for his own preserva­tion.

But not to leave so dangerous an evil without a remedy, I should think it good to cut off the objects which nourish it, and to get the upper hand of an enemy, by starving him, whom he could not over­come [Page 121] come by force. For though our Passions are born with us, that they borrow their strength from our constitution; and that those which are the most natural, are hard­est to overcome; yet they draw their nou­rishment from exterior things; and if they be not entertained by Objects, they either die or pine away.

Ambition doth not greatly torment us in solitude; and when she sees not the great­ness of Towns, the pride of Buildings, the pomp of Triumphs, she forgets the memory of glory; and this fire not having wherewithal longer to nourish it, consumes and goes out of it self: Grief and sadness are strengthened in darkness; her obscure Chambers hung with mourning, conspire with her to afflict us.

Men who make use thereof, seem to be afraid to forget their sorrow; and that they would have all things they cast their eye upon, to call to mind their loss: If we put these sad Objects far from us, Na­ture will grow weary of weeping; and though she be irregular, by reason of sin, she will solace her self when she shall see nothing which entertains her dislike.

[Page 122]What hath been said of Sadness and Am­bition, may be affirmed of all other Passi­ons, which are not stubborn, but as being aided by our own cunning; and as we la­bour to encrease them, so to become more miserable.

The FIRST DISCOURSE. That Passions are the Seeds of Vir­tue.

SInce most men consider but the appearances of things, we must not wonder if the Stoicks have had so many admirers; and if their proud Maximes have been received with so much approba­tion and applause: For nothing of more noble or generous can be imagined, than is their Philosophy, as it appears to be. She promiseth to change men into Angels, to [Page 124] raise them above a mortal condition, and to put storms and thunder under their feet. She boasts to cure them of all their evils, and to free them from those vexatious dis­orders, which molest the Souls tranquility: all those fair promises have brought forth none effects, and these proud billows, after having made such noise, are turned to foam. Certainly we owe thanks to Pro­vidence, which hath rendered their endea­vors vain; for if they had made good their words, they had deprived us of all those aids which nature hath endowed us withal, to make us virtuous; and the inferior part of our soul hath remained without either ex­ercise or merit; Affectiones nostrae motus animorum sunt laetitia animi diffusio, tristitia animi contra­ctio, cupiditas animi progres sio: Diffunde­ris enim animo cum laetaris, contraheris a­nimo cum mo­lestaris, pro­grederis animo cum appetis, fugis animo cum metuis. Aug. super Io­an. Scim. 5. for the passions are the mo­tions thereof, they carry her whither she mindeth to go, and without loosning her from her body, they join her to the Objects which she looks after, or keep her aloof from those she desires to shun. Joy is her blooming and displaying, sorrow is her con­traction and pain, desire is her seeking, and fear her eschewing; for when we are merry, our soul dilates it self, when afflicted, she contracts her self, when we desire, she seems to advance, and when we fear, she seems to retire, insomuch, as those who will take the Passions from the soul, take away all her [Page 125] motions, and under colour of rendring her happy, make her unprofitable and unable. I know no rational man that would purchase felicity at so dear a rate, and I know no true man that would promise it upon so hard a condition: For if happiness consist in action, and if to be content, a man must taste the good which he possesseth, there is none but will avow, That Passions are ne­cessary to our soul, and that joy must per­fect the Felicity which desire hath be­gun.

Those who side with the Stoicks, will tell us peradventure, That these Philosophers condemn not such desires as arise from the love of virtue, nor the joy that accompa­nies the fruition thereof; but that they blame only those irregular wishes, that we make every day for Riches and Honour; and that consequently they blame the vain contentment which their accomplishment brings us.

This answer weakens their Maximes, and confirms ours; for it admitteth of Passions, and only forbids their excess: It admits of desires and hopes, and only rejects their disorder; and to end all in few words, It healeth the malady of our affections, and doth not destroy their nature. But the Stoicks [Page 126] were not so just, and their Philosophy had in it so much of severity, and so little of reason, as it would have a man seek out virtue, without wishing for it, possess it without relishing it, and that being as hap­py as God himself, he should be void of desire, hope or joy. In brief, it had vow­ed the death of our Passions, and yet this proud Sect did not consider, that in de­stroying them, they caused the death of all Virtues; for they are the seeds thereof, and by taking a little pain in trimming and pruning of them, they may be made advan­tageous to us.

In optimo quoque ante­quam erudias, virtutis mate­ria non virtus est, Sen. Ep. 91.Though man be not born virtuous, and that art which teacheth him to become so, be as difficult as it is glorious; he seemeth notwithstanding to know before he learneth it, that his understanding hath the princi­ples of Truth, and his will the seeds of Virtue. That as science (according to the Platonicks) is but a remembrance, or cal­ling to mind; her good habits are but na­tural inclinations. For all his Passions are budding Virtues, and if he take a little care to perfect them, they become compleat Vir­tues: Is not fear which foresees evil and shunneth it, natural wisdom? Is not Choler, which takes up arms in the behalf of good [Page 127] against the enemy thereof, a shadow of Ju­stice? Is not Desire which serves us from our selves, to join us with somewhat that is better, an Image of Charity, which takes us from the Earth to raise us up to Hea­ven? What must be added to Boldness, to make thereof true Fortitude? And what difference is there between Sorrow and Repentance, save only that the one is the meer workmanship of Nature, and the other the production of Grace? but both of them are afflicted with evil, and they oft­times mingle their tears to bewail the same sin.

In fine, There are no Passions which may not become Virtues; and as they have in­clinations to what is good, and aversions from what is evil, they need but a little Government to make them change Condi­tions.

The good Application of a mans Love is sufficient to make all his Passions inno­cent; and without taking so much pain to love aright, is only requisite to make us happy in this world. Since Virtue (faith St. Augustine) is the habit of a well governed mind, we are but to moderate our Affections, that they may be changed into Virtues; for when [Page 128] our hatred and our love, Quoniam vir­tus est habitus mentis bene composita, componendi, instituendi, at­que ordinandi sunt animi af­fectus ad id quod debent, ut in virtutes proficere pos­sint: Cum er­go prudenter, modeste, forti­ter, & juste a­mor & odium instituuntur, in virtutes exur­gunt, scilicet, prudentiam, temperantiam, fortitudinem & justitiam, Aug. lib. De Spiritu & A­nima, c. 1. which are the Spring-heads of all other Passions, shall be wisely, modestly, strongly, and justly guid­ed, they will become rare Virtues, and will be converted into wisdom, temperance, fortitude, and justice. Is it not then a bar­barous thing, to go about to strangle Pas­sions, which have such affinity with Vir­tue, and which without much labour may be raised to so noble a Condition? Is it not ingratitude to mistake the advantages which we have received from Nature? and is it not injustice to give infamous names to these innocent Subjects, which being well managed by Reason, might merit such glo­rious Titles?

'Tis then an indubitable Maxim amongst the Philosophers, That Passions are the seed of Virtues, and that they have no more noble employment, than to arm them­selves in their behalf, to fight their quarrels, and to revenge them of their enemies. As mothers are never more couragious, than in the defence of their children; the affections of our soul are never more vigorous, than when they defend their products against Vices. This praise puzzles the brains of all the Stoicks. And Seneca could not endure that Virtues Army should be composed of [Page 129] souldiers that could mutinie; he will not have us employ Passions in her service, be­cause some few have been found which have injured her authority. Certainly if all Princes were so obdurate as is this Philo­sopher, they would find few souldiers, and they must cashier all their troops, because formerly they have found some of them unfaithful. The negligence of Princes is oft-times cause why the souldiers muti­nie, and the weakness of Reason is almost alwayes the cause of the revolt of Passi­ons.

In true Philosophy the soul must be rather accused than the body, and the Soveraign rather blamed than the Subjects. Who sees not that fear is watchful for virtue, that she always mingles her self as a Spy amongst the enemies, to find out their designs; that all her reports are faithful, and that we are for the most part unhappy only for having neglected them? who knows not that hope strengthens us, and that she encourageth us to the understanding of glorious and difficult designs? who doth not confess that Boldness and Choler despise danger, suffering hardness, and setting even upon death, that they may be serviceable to Pa­tience and Fortitude? what virtues would [Page 130] not become weak, were they abandoned by Passions; how oft hath the fear of in­famy infused courage into souldiers who were seeking how shamefully to run away? how oft hath shamefastness preserved Cha­stity, and kept both maids and married wo­men within their duty, when avarice and wantonness hath endeavoured to corrupt them? how oft hath indignation encoura­ged Judges against the guilty, who were made insolent in their misdemeanor, by the protection of great ones?

Let the Stoicks then confess, that virtues owe their welfare to Passions; and let them not tell us any more that they are too gene­rous to implore aid from their slaves. But let us tell them, they are too full of acknow­ledgment, to despise such faithful friends; and that they will never make a difficulty in accepting them for their allies, when ever they will assail the common enemy, Vice. I had rather follow Aristotles opinion than Seneca's, and rather govern Passions than destroy them. This man out of an ex­cessive pride will not have Virtue to stand in need of any thing; and that the wise man who is thereof possest, way be happy, even contrary to the will of God himself; he will have his happiness to be so firmly [Page 131] grounded, that the Heavens cannot over­turn it; and to judge by his words, it seems that insolency and impiety are the first re­quisite dispositions for the acquiring of wis­dom; the other on the contrary acknow­ledgeth his weakness, useth such help as nature hath afforded him; and knowing very well that he is composed of a Soul and Body, he endeavoureth to employ them both in the exercise of virtue. Ira necessaria est, nec quid­quam sine illa expugnari po­test, nisi illa impleat ani­mum, & spiri­tum attendat. Arist. in Senec. l. 1. De Ira, c. 9. He confesseth we cannot undertake any thing of gene­rous, unless chafed by choler, and that we faint and droop when we are not irritated. But as he very well knows likewise that this Passion hath need of a bridle to hold it back, he ranks it under Reason, and makes not use thereof, as of a General, but as of a private Souldier. Let us use our Passions thus, Utendum au­tem illa est, non ut duce, sed ut milite. idem ibidem. let us teach the Stoicks, that nature hath made nothing in vain; and that since she hath endued us with fears and hopes, she intends we shall make use of them to ac­quire Virtue, and fight against Vice.

The FOURTH DISCOURSE. That Passions are the seeds of Vice.

IT were to flatter Passions, and deceive men, if after having shewed the good they are capable of doing, we should not shew the evil they can do; & our draught would be partial, if having, drawn their perfections, we should not likewise set forth their defaults. But that we may not be mistaken in so important a Subject, and whereupon our happiness seemeth to de­pend, we must know that Passions are nei­ther good nor bad, and that (to speak pro­perly) these two qualities are only found in the superior power which governs them. As that is only free, it is only good or evil, and as it is the Original of merit, it is also the Spring-head either of wickedness or goodness. But as the Sun spreads forth his light in the world, and enlightens solid bo­dies, though it penetrate them not; So [Page 133] doth the will dispence abroad wickedness and goodness, amongst the Passions, and though she do not communicate them fully unto them, yet giveth she them a slight tin­cture thereof, which is sufficient to make them either innocent or criminal.

For if we examine the qualities that they have received from nature, and if we con­sider them in that estate which pleads the use of the will, we must acknowledge that they are as well the seeds of vice as of vir­tue; and that those two contraries are so confused in them, as they are hardly to be discerned. They have an Inclination to good, Anima affectus omnium sunt vitiorum & virtutum [...] quaedam prin­cipia & com­munis materia, Aug l. De S [...] ­ritu & Aunn. c. 4. and thus they hold with virtue: They are easily seduced, soon moved, and thus they resemble vice. For we are now no longer in that happy estate of innocency, where the Passions expected their orders only from Reason, and where they never raised themselves, till they had obtained leave; they are become disloyal, and no longer acknowledging the voice of their Soveraign, they obey that first that com­mands them, and take part assoon with a Tyrant as with their legitimate Prince. This error whereinto they often fall, obligeth us to confess, that they are not much less inclinable to vice than to virtue; and that [Page 134] if we may hope for great advantages by them, we ought also to fear notable mis­chiefs from them. For the same desires which raise us up to Heaven, fasten us to the earth; that which nature hath given us to set us at liberty, casts us in prison, and claps Bolts upon us. The same hope which flatters us, abuseth us; and that which ought to sweeten our past misfortunes, pro­cureth us new ones; the same choler which bringeth the couragious to the combate, animates the faint-hearted to revenge, and what is generous in war, becomes cruel in peace.

In fine, Passions are not farther distant from vices than they are from virtue, as in the confusion of the Chaos fire was mingled with water, so is evil mingled with good in the affections of the soul; and from those fatal Mines, Iron is, as well drawn out as Gold; man ought therefore to keep himself always upon his guard, and know­ing that he carrieth about in his bosom both life and death, it behoveth him to be as circumspect in his comportments, as those who handle poyson, or who walk upon the edge of a Precipice.

But that which makes the danger the greater, is, that when these unruly Passions [Page 135] have brought forth a vice, they put them­selves in arms to defend it, and serve it with more courage, than do the innocent Passi­ons obey virtue. They are servants which are more cruel than are their Masters; Offi­cers which are more furious than the Ty­rants that set them on work; and they com­mit more of outrage upon Virtue, than doth Vice it self. All wars are occasioned by these insolent Affections, and he who shall banish love and hatred from off the earth, will find neither Murder nor Adultery there. They furnish the subject of all Tragedies; and though men accuse Poets of Fictions, they have committed more Errors than the others have invented. But they are never more prejudicial than when they meet in the person of a Prince, and when they abuse Soveraign power, to ex­ercise their fury; for then whole States groan under their tyranny, the people are opprest by their violence, and all parts con­fess that neither the Plague nor the Sword are so pernicious, as are Passions when they have got the supream power.

An unlawful love put all Greece in Arms; and the flames thereof reduced the goodli­est City of all Asia to Ashes. Jealousie be­tween Caesar and Pompey was the loss of [Page 136] the lives of more than a million of men; the world was divided in their quarrel, their ambition put arms into the hands of all peo­ple; their unjust war was the ruine of their Country, and the loss of the liberty thereof. the world doth yet bemoan this disaster; the spoils of this shipwrack are yet seen; and the States of Europe are but so many pieces which did compose the Body of that puissant Republique. Ambition when confounded with virtue, is guilty of more murders than Revenge and Choler; though this passion pretend to be generous, she is always stained with blood; what­soever delight she takes in pardoning, her greatness is grounded upon the ruine of her enemies; she is cause of more deaths than she procureth pardons; and she is the loss of more innocents, than safety of those that are guilty. She astonisheth all the world, when she is seen in the person of an Alexan­der. And it seems Nature produced him to no other end, than to teach us what am­bition can do, when assisted by fortune. He ruined all Princes who would defend their own States; he treated those as Enemies who refused to be his Subjects; he could not permit an equal in any place through which he passed: He complained of the Seas that [Page 137] stopt the current of his victories, and wisht for a new world, that he might conquer it; If his vain-glory caused so many disorders, his Choler committed no less ransack; and if by the one he revenged himself of his Enemies, he rid his hands of his Friends by the other; the least suspitions encouraged these passions to revenge, one indiscreet word provoked it; an honest freedom set it a going, and his Choler grew to be so nice, as there was as much danger in do­ing well, as in saying ill; As he was pos­sessed by all these violences, so did he o­bey them; he dipped his hands in the bloud of his Favourites; he took upon him the office of a Hangman; and that he might taste all the pleasures of revenge, he himself would be the Minister thereof, and with his own hands kill him who had saved his life.

But amongst all the cruelties whereun­to his Choler oft did perswade him, I know none more infamous than that which he exercised upon Innocent Calisthenes, his con­dition was a Sanctuary to him, and pro­fessing Phylosophy, it seemed he ought not fear the fury of Alexander; the very fault for which he was condemed, was glorious; and had it happened in the time [Page 138] of true Religion, it would have passed for an eminent virtue; for he defended the cause of his gods, and was of opinion that Temples could not be built to his Prince without provoking the gods against him; he guided himself so dexterously in so ticklish a business, as that whilst he pre­served the honour of Heaven, he flattered Alexanders humour, Intervallo opus est ut quis cre­datur Deus, semper (que) hanc gratiam mag­nis vi [...]is posteri reddunt. Ego autem seram immortalita­tem precor Re­gi, ut vita diu­turna sit aeter­na Majestas: hominem con­sequitur ali­quando, nun­quam comitta­tur Divinitas, Curt. l. 8 circa medium. and by an admirable piece of cunning, he accorded flattery with piety; for if the reasons which Quin­tus Curtius alledgeth, be true, he represent­ed unto the Macedonians, that since men could not dispose of Crowns, they ought not to dispose of Altars; that since they made not Kings, they ought not go about to make Gods; and that when humane vanity would attribute unto it self that po­wer, she could not make use thereof till af­ter the death of such as she would Dei­sie; that to receive adoration from men, one must keep far from any commerce with them, & lose his life to purchase a divinity. That Alexander was yet necessary to them, and that he ought not to mount into the Heavens, till he had conquered all the Earth. This short O [...]a [...]ion was able to have obliged the most ambitious of mankind; yet did it offend the vain-glory [Page 139] of this Prince, and so far provoked his Choler, as not many days after he caused this Philosopher to be put to death, not allowing him liberty to defend himself. This Murder drew upon him the hatred of all Greece; and as Parmenio's death had exa­sperated all the Souldiers, this of Calisthe­nes did much more all the Orators; and these men who revenge themselves with their Tongue, have spoke so oft of this ex­cess, as it is yet dishonour to him that did commit it.

All the praises that can be given to his gallant actions, are darkned by the murder of Calisthenes. Hoc est Alex­andri crimen aeternum, quod nulla virtus, nulla bellorum felicitas redi­met. Senec. quaest. Natur. l. 7. c. 23. And that I may make use of Seneca's eloquent words; this irregular proceeding is Alexander's everlasting fault, which neither his Fortune nor his Valour will ever be able to blot out. For if a man shall say he defeated the Persians in three pitcht Battels; another will say, he slew Calisthenes: If men put a valuation up­on him for having overcome Darius, the most puissant Monarch of the world, they will blame him for having killed Calisthenes. If men praise him for having carried the Bounds of his Empire to the utmost parts of the East, they will add, he was guilty of the death of Calisthenes. If finally, to end [Page 140] his Panegyrick, a man shall say he hath stained the glory of as many Princes as pre­ceded him: another will reply, his fault is greater than his valour, and that all his acti­ons of memory are sullied by Calisthenes his Blood.

This example ought to instruct and teach all Princes, that if irregular Passions are maladies in private men, they are Plagues and contagious diseases in publick Person­ages, and that, if well guided by Reason they may become glorious virtues, they may by the tyranny of our senses degene­rate into most infamous vices.

The THIRD DISCOURSE. That there are no Passions which may not be changed into Virtues.

VVE have said in our former discourses, that Passions are the seeds of Virtues, & that by having a care of husbanding them well, [Page 141] their effects were very advantageous to us. But proceeding on further, my intention is in this discourse, to teach Christians the se­cret, how they may change them into Vir­tues, and to take from them whatsoever they have of savage or monstrous. This Metamorphosis is certainly very hard, but not impossible; and if we advise with nature, she will furnish us with inventions; for this wise Mother is continually working of strange alterations.

Her power never appears to be greater, than when she alters the Elements, or Me­tals; and when she takes from them their former qualities, that she may give them others more excellent, and more noble. But she observes therein an admirable me­thod, which well deserves consideration; for though she be all-powerful, and that holding the place of God, she may act as a Soveraign, and do what she pleaseth with the Elements or Metals, yet doth she never use violence; and she seemeth rather to ac­commodate her self to their interests, than to her own inclinations; she observeth their sympathies, and worketh no alteration which is not agreeable unto them.

Thus we see she ratifies air, to change it into fire, and conduceth water to turn [Page 143] it into earth; thus we observe she purifies silver, to give it the tincture of Gold, and labours whole ages to finish without vio­lence this useful Metamorphosis.

Now as Morality is an imitation of Na­ture, her chief care ought to be employed in observing the proprieties of our Passions, and in converting them into virtues which are not contrary unto them; for he that would go about to change Choler into Mildness, or fear into generousness, would endeavour an impossibility, and would have ill success in all his labours; but that his designes may succeed well, he must study the nature of every Passion, and use all his means to turn each passion into such a virtue as it hath least aversion unto; and this ought not to seem strange, since the most rational of all men hath been of opi­nion, that in the opposition which Nature hath placed between vice and virtue, they had notwithstanding somewhat of resem­blance one with the other; for all men will confess, that prodigality hath more relati­on to liberality than avarice; and that it is not hard to reduce a prodigal man to be a liberal man; every one is bound to con­fess that Rashness sides more with Courage than with Cowardice, and that it is [Page 142] easier to make a rash man, than a Coward, couragious.

Therefore do Philosophers agree, that of the two extreams which do environ vir­tue, one of them is alwaies more favoura­ble unto her; and a little care being had will easily take her part, and defend her interest.

Following the same Maxime, we must confess that there are some passions which have more of affinity with some virtues, than with some others, and which by the help of Morality, may easily become vir­tues.

That fear which foresees dangers, Metuamus er­go ut non me­tuamus, hoc est prudenter me­tuamus, ne in­amter metua­mus, Aug. Ser. 15. De Mar­tyribus. which laboureth how to shun them, which looks far into what is to come, that it may find a remedy, may easily be changed into wis­dom, provided the distraction which ac­companieth it, and which doth most commonly abuse us in our deliberations, be taken away. That hope which makes us taste a good which we do not yet enjoy, which comforteth us in our misfortunes, and which through our present evils shews us a future happiness, may easily be con­verted into that virtue which we call Assu­rance. That Choler which punisheth faults, and arms us to revenge our friends [Page 144] injuries, differs not far from Justice; for provided it be not too violent, and that the self interests thereof leave it light enough to guide it self, it will wage war with all the wicked, and take all that are innocent into its protection.

That boldness which encourageth us to the combate, which gives assurance in dan­ger, and which makes us prefer a glorious death before a shameful retreat, will be­come exact Valour; if we suppress its incli­nation to fury, and if we mingle a little light with the too much heat thereof. Love and Hatred, Desire and Eschewing, are ra­ther Virtues, than Passions, when governed by Reason. Provided they love nothing but what is lovely, and hate nothing but what is hateful, they deserve praise rather than reproach.

Sadness and Despair, Jealousie and Envy, are indeed more cried down; they seem to be enemies to our quiet, that the Heavens have made them Ministers of their Justice, and that they supply the places of those revengeful Furies which Poets feign to punish the faulty. Yet may they be useful to Reason, if well managed, and under those hideous faces wherein they appear, they hide good meanings, which [Page 145] are of use to virtue. A good emulation may be framed out of a well-regulated En­vy. Discreet zeal may be shaped out of moderated Jealousie; without which nei­ther prophane nor sacred yet love under­takes any thing of Generous. Sorrow hath so many praises given her in the holy Scrip­ture, as it is easie to judge, that if she be not amongst the number of the virtues, she may be advantageously made use of to their service. Melior est tri­stitia iniqua parientis, quam laetitia iniqua facientis. Aug. lib. De vera In­nocentia. She loosens us from the earth; and by a despising all the contentments of the world, she makes us thirst after eternal delights; she appeaseth Gods anger; she furnisheth us with tears, wherewithal to wash away our sins and to water his Altars; She is always a faithful companion to Re­pentance; and no sin in Christian Religion was ever forgiven, before Sorrow and Repentance had obtained pardon. Despair hath but the name of terrible; but who shall well consider her effects, Ratio terro­rem prudenti­bus excutit: In peritis fit magna ex de­speratione se­curitas. Senec. quaest. nat. l. 6. c. 2. will avow 'tis a wise invention of nature which cures the greatest part of our maladies, by ta­king away from us the hope of remedy; for then we make virtue of necessity, we draw force from our weakness; we turn our fear into fury, and our desires into con­tempt; we set upon enemies whose approach [Page 146] we dare not expect; and we misprize ob­jects which we cannot abandon. Thus shall we find many men who owe their quiet more to Despair, than to hope; and who shall well examine the humour of these two Affections, will be forced to acknowledge, that the one makes us miserable by her pro­mises, the other happy by her refusals; that the one nourisheth our desires, the other causeth them to die; that the one cozeneth us, and the other disabuseth us; that we are lost by the flatteries of the one, and saved by the others affliction. This is the Reason why the greatest Poet in the world hath af­firmed, that Despair is that which raiseth up the Courage of the conquered, and which restores unto them the Victory which Hope and Rashness had berest them of.

But whatever advantage I attribute to these Passions, I confess they have their errors, and that to make them virtuous, they must be carefully cleansed. And be­cause so profitable an affair cannot be too often treated of, I shall willingly observe their chiefest enormities; to the end that di­scerning them, as in a Looking-glass, every one may be careful how to eface them. Take blindness from love, and he will be no more faulty; for it is permitted to love such [Page 147] subjects as deserve love, Amor est mo­tus cordis, qui cum se inordi­nate mov t, id est, ad ea quae non debet, cu­piditas dicitur; cum vero or­dinatus est, charitas appel­latur. Aug. lib. De Substantia Electionis, c. [...]. and there is no less injustice in denying it to personages of ex­cellency, than to grant it to deformed per­sons. Exempt errour from hatred, and ha­tred will become consonant to Reason; for it is not just to confound the sinner with his sin; and who can make this distinguish­ment, may boast to hate with justice; desire and eschewing are innocent, provided they be moderated; joy and sorrow are only blameable in their excess; and the same Reason which permits us to taste with plea­sure a good which we wish for, doth not forbid us sorrowing for an evil which we apprehend. Hope is only then unjust, when she measureth not her forces; and despair is only then faulty, when it takes its rise ra­ther from our remissness, than from our weakness. Boldness is then praise-worthy, when it grapples with a danger which it may overcome; and fear is wisdom, when it shuns a danger it cannot overcome. Choler is an act of justice, when born against sin, and provided it be not judge in its own cause, it pronounceth none but lawful de­crees. Envy is generous, provided it excite us unto virtue, and that it lay before us the good qualities of our neighbour, only so far forth as that we may imitate [Page 148] them. Jealousie is only hateful, because it hath in it too much of love; yet this fault is pardonable when not accompanied with suspition, and if the beloved cannot cure it, they are bound to endure it. But to put an end to this discourse with S. Augustine; Christians make good use of their Passions, Metuunt enim poenam aeter­nam, cupiunt vitam aeter­nam, dolent in re quia adhuc ingemescunt adoptionem fi­liorum Dei, ex­pectantes re­demptionem corporis sui; gaudent in spe, quia mors ab­sorbebitur in victoriam. Aug. l. 14. De Civ. Dei. c. 3. if they employ them for the glory of Iesus Christ, and for the salvation of their own soules. Their fears correspond with Reason, when they consider Gods judgments, and the punishment of the damned; their desire is just when they aim at the happiness of the blessed. Their sorrow is harmless when they afflict themselves for all the evils which our first Father hath left us to inherit, and when opprest with grief, they sigh after the liberty of the children of God. Their joy is a holy joy when they expect the fruition of the good which is prepared for them, and when by a firm hope they already taste the effects of their Masters promises. Metuunt pec­care, cupiunt perseverare, dolent in pec­catis, gaudent in operibus bo­n [...]. Idem ibid. Brief­ly, if they fear unbelief, if they desire per­severance, if they sorrow for their evil acti­ons, and rejoyce when they do well, they turn all their Passions into holy and glori­ous Virtues.

The FOURTH DISCOURSE. That the government of Passions is vir­tues chief employment.

MAn is brought into so happy a con­dition by sin, as his very advanta­ges reproach his misery unto him, and he is made to know his faultiness by what is most excellent in him. Those no­ble qualities which beautifie his soul, and which restore unto him the glory which he had lost, have but unpleasing employments, and are engaged in combats, which though they be difficult, cease not to be shameful. For mans most illustrious virtues, have no other employment than to make war upon vice, and the necessity he hath to make use thereof is one of the chiefest proofs of the irregularity of his nature. Prudence which serves him for a guide, advertiseth him that he walketh in darkness, and that he is in an enemies Country. Fortitude teacheth him that he ought to fight, & that [Page 150] in all the course of his life he tastes no plea­sure which is not mingled with pain; tem­perance gives him to understand, that his constitution is out of order, and that he hath delights which flatter him only, that they may destroy him.

Lastly, Justice obligeth him to believe, that not any thing which he possesseth is his, and that having a Soveraign who hath gi­ven him all that he enjoyeth, he is only the Steward to distribute them. These vir­tues do what they say, their employments answer their counsels; they act not, with­out going about to stifle some disorder, and to overcome some vicious inclinations. Pru­dence chuseth the Arms and the Enemy; temperance rejects pleasure; fortitude sets upon sorrow; justice sits President in all these combates; she takes care that the con­queror be not insolent in his victory; that the Soul take not such advantage over the Body, that in thinking to tame it, it destroy it, and that whilst it would revenge it self of a disobedient Vassal, it lose not a faithful friend. So as we must conclude, that the exercise of Virtue is a continual warfare against Vice. And that these glo­rious qualities have no more noble em­ployment than to charge upon Monsters, [Page 151] and fight with Infamous Enemies.

'Tis therefore that Saint Augustine, with all the Divines, do acknowledge that they were only given us to assist us during this miserable life, and that they are steps whereby to arrive at that height of felicity which consists in the enjoyment of the Summum bonum. For then our Pru­dence will be no more necessary, since we shall have no evils to shun; our Justice will then be superfluous, for we shall pos­sess all our riches in common. Temperance will then be useless, for we shall have no more unlawful motions to suppress. Then our Fortitude will have no employ­ment, since we shall suffer no further evils. 'Tis true, I have much ado to banish those Virtues from Heaven, Hic enim sunt virtute [...] in actu ibi in affectu; hic in opere, ibi in mercede; hic in officio, ibi in fine. Aug. Epist. which have opened us the way thither. But as nothing can be received there which is imperfect, we must say that they shall be cleansed before they get admittance thither, that they shall lose what they have of earthly, to be­come wholly heavenly, and that the glory which makes men spiritual, will make them Divine, and will take from them what they have of impurity; they shall have all their beauty, and shall have no more de­fects; they shall triumph, and fight no [Page 152] more, they shall serve for ornaments, and no longer for defence to the happy; they shall receive the recompence of their La­bours, and that wearisom exercise which held them employed whilst on earth, shall be turned to an honorable rest in Heaven. Now amongst a thousand different employ­ments which the virtues have here below, one of the most advantageous is the govern­ment of Passions. For it seems nature hath destined them to tame these savage subjects, and so reduce them under the Empire of Reason. Some have dexterity to win them, others strength to beat them down; some use threats to astonish them, others promises to allure them, and all of them together use se­veral means to arrive at the end.

Prudence never comes to handy-blows, but as she is the Queen of Moral Virtues, she contents her self with giving Orders, with providing for our souls peace, with stifling seditions in their birth, and with suppressing unruly motions which threaten her with an intestine war. If the match be already made, she endevours to break it by her dexterity, and not medling in the fight, she opposeth to every Passion that Virtue which is contrary to it, she sends succours to the weakest places▪ or to such as are most [Page 153] briefly assailed. She foresees the evils that are to come, or if she think sometimes that the Rebels are capable of Reason, she ex­horts them to obedience; and to reduce them to their duty, she lays before them their own interests; she makes them know, that all the pleasures which they seek after, are fatal to them, and that all the evils which they so fear, are honourable. Tem­perance is a little more exposed to danger; for she is obliged to come to handy-blows, and to defend her self against her enemies, which are so much the more dangerous as they are the more pleasing.

She resisteth all those Passions which flat­ter our senses, and which propound nothing unto our minds, but voluptuousness and delights; she regulates desires and hopes, she moderates love and joy, and as oft as any motions rise up with us, which promise unto us unlawful pleasures, she furnisheth us with weapons to overcome them; when she thinks her self not strong enough to vanquish them, she calls in Penance and Austerity to her aid, and with these severe virtues she defeats these dissolute enemies: fortitude takes care to govern the most vi­ [...]lent Passions, to set upon fear, sorrow, de­ [...]pair, and hatred; assoon as any danger [Page 154] troubles the peace of our soul, or that any angersome object which doth astonish us presents it self, this Heroick Virtue em­ployes all her courage to enhearten, and by a noble piece of art, she makes use of chole [...] and boldness to overcome sorrow and de­spair. If these couragious passions are not pu­issant enough to purchase an assured peace, she puts us in mind of honour, she chargeth constancy and fidelity to make our dutie [...] known unto us, and to encourage us by recompenses which are ordained for the honour of glorious and difficult actions▪ Justice enters not the Lists, but she weigh­eth the right of all parties, she prepareth crowns for the conquerors, she keeps the conquered from being oppressed, and she doth so well moderate the victory, as that she is neither cruel nor insolent; she keeps Reason in authority, she obligeth Passion to acknowledge it for their Soveraign; she makes the Body subject to the Soul, with­out enslaving it; and she submits the Soul to God, without taking from it its liber­ty. This Virtue being just, is an enemy to all disorders, and whilst she rules in chief in man, one may say, he hath no passions but such as are consonant to Rea­son; but when she is banisht, peace and tran­quility [Page 155] retire with her; during her absence man is like a State without policy, where Rebels are permitted to do what they list, where vice is honoured and virtue despised, and where every one without advising with his duty, considers onely his own Interest or Pleasure. He therefore that [...]oseth justice, loseth all the Virtues, and who possesseth her, may boast to possess them all; it may be 'tis out of this reason that a Philosopher hath affirmed, that every Virtue was a particular Justice, and that Justice was a general Virtue, which of it self was sufficient to fight against all Vice, and to regulate all Passions.

But as the multitude of Souldiers can­not be harmful when there is no confusion therein; the like of virtues cannot be pre­judicial, when disorder is banisht. And though those that our Saviour Christ hath [...]aught us, are of a much more sublime con­dition than are the moral Virtues; they conspire altogether for our felicity. We ought therefore employ them in our af­fairs, and when one alone is not sufficient to rule a Passion, we must borrow aid from the rest; and augment our Forces to overcome our Enemies. When tempe­ [...]ance cannot regulate our unjust desires; we [Page 156] may call modesty, and humility, into our assistance, who will perswade us that the glory of the world is not due to us, if we be criminal; and that it is not worthy of us if we be innocent; when fortitude can­not overcome fear or despair, we are per­mitted to have recourse unto hope, to li­sten unto her promises, and to encourage our selves to victory by calling to mind the rewards which she propoundeth unto us; when hatred and envy gnaw our hearts, and when to revenge our selvs of an injury they advise us to make use of sword and poy­son. 'Tis fit that Justice emplore the assist­ance of Charity; and that to stop the im­petuosity of these two head-strong Passi­ons, she join divine Maximes with humane; Thus Nature shaking hands with Grace to destroy sin, man will become victorious; the motions of his soul being regulated by virtue, he will enjoy perfect peace, and he will taste pleasures, which shall not come much short of those which our first Father Adam tasted in the state of Innocency.

The FIRST DISCOURSE. That to know, and win upon men, we must study their Passions.

NOt without Reason did that great King, who knew so well how to join in his own person, Piety, Poetry, and Prowess, compare the heart of man to the Depths; for they are so profound, as nothing can fill them, and the heart of man is so vast in its desires, as it is not to be sa­tisfied with whole Kingdoms. The Depths are the Depositories of the Trea­sures [Page 158] of nature; and God, to exercise ou [...] industry, or to punish our avarice, hat [...] hid riches in the bowels of the earth. S [...] likewise are all the goods of man shut u [...] within his heart; that part which hath th [...] advantage of forming thoughts, hath th [...] care to preserve them; and 'tis from thenc [...] that we do borrow them, either to perswade, or move our Auditors. But as th [...] depths are obscure places which are no [...] lightned by the light of the Sun, and wher [...] horror and night seem to sojourn, or t [...] have made their abode, so is the heart o [...] man environed with darkness, which is no [...] to be dissipated, and whatsoever it concei­veth is so hidden, as we can guess therea [...] but by weak conjectures. For words are not alwayes faithful representations of the hearts conceptions; 'tis God alone who hath the priviledge of knowing them. Hu­mane wisdom (which vaunts it self to see far into what is to come) is much troubled to discover the intentions thereof; and the greatest work a Statesman can undertake, i [...], when by his dexterity he endevours to ex­pound a dissembling heart, and there to observe such thoughts as are endevoured to be kept concealed.

I know very well that policy teacheth [Page 159] as how to arrive at this knowledg, and that he gives us rules how to sound these depths which seem to have no bottom. Men [...]udge of meanings by actions, Nulla vehe­mentior intra cogitatio est, quae nihil mo­veat in vultu. Sen. l. 1. D [...] Ira. c. 1. and read in [...]he eyes and face, the most secret moti­on [...] of the soul. One may observe their nature by their designes, and may study men so well, as that he may guess at their thoughts, and by one piece of cunning discover that which they by another seek to conceal. But of all these wayes I find [...]one more easie, Sicut aequor profunda, sic consilium in corde viri: Sed homo Sapiens exhauriet illud. Prov. c. 20. nor more certain, than that of the Passions; for they escape us against our will, they betray us by their promptness and likeness; We dayly find that it is much more hard to withhold a mans choler than his hand, and to impose silence to his sufferings, than to his mouth. They mutinie without our leave, and by [...]n Impression which they make in our countenance, they teach our enemies all that lies within our hearts. Vino tortus [...] Ira. Horat. I therefore much value that Poets Invention, who terms Passions Tortures, not only for that they torment us through their rigour, but because they force us by their vio­lence to confess the truth. A man must be very faithful to himself, if he do not de­clare himself either by hatred or vanity. [Page 160] And one must have great authority over his Passions, if he can suppress them when a skilful man undertakes to move them.

The wisest men forget their resolutions, and oft-times a praise, or a reproach, draw a truth from them, which wisdom had a long time kept concealed.

Never was a Prince a greater dissembler than was Tiberius; all his words and actions were so hidden, as a man could not disco­ver his intentions. He uttered nothing but Aenigma's, and the Senate trembled as oft as they were to treat with so close a man.

One word of Agrippina did notwithstand­ing incense him, and made him say a thing, whilst so agitated, Haec raram occulti pectoris vocem elicere, correptamque Graeco versu admonuit, ideo laedi quia non regnaret, Tacit. Annal. which doubtless he would have concealed, had he continued in his ordinary temper; for finding fault with her, he said her discontentment arose only because she did not reign; thus was the most concealed man of the world be­trayed by the heat of Passion; and did by an indiscreet answer discover the bottom of his heart. Politicians are likewise never more troubled than when they treat with a man that is reserved in his speeches, and who doth so well master his Affections, as that they appear not in his Visage, no [...] [Page 161] nor sparkle out in his words nor actions, for all the doors of his soul are shut up, and not being able to fathom this depth, they are enforced to consult with such as come near unto it, or else to believe report. But all these are uncertain ways, and who builds his belief only upon the report of others, is in danger to be deceived; for Fame is fickle, Enemies are Liars, Friends Flatterers, and those of the Houshold are interessed. Yet of as many people as ac­cost great ones, the testimony of their Domesticks is least suspitious; and as they are by their conditions bound to study their Masters humor, they are better acquainted with their inclinations; their Enemies know only their weakness; the hatred wherewith they are blinded, will not suffer them to see their virtues; and their judg­ments as being passionate, are for the most part unjust; their friends see only what is good in them, and their love makes them take faults for perfections. Their Dome­sticks are better informed than the rest, be­cause they know their inclinations, and read in those faithful Glasses, the secretest motions of their hearts; for when Princes appear in publick, they study their coun­tenance; they conceal their thoughts, [Page 162] and are ashamed to do that upon a Theater which they do in their Closets. But when they have none but their Domesticks for witnesses, they do not constrain their na­ture, but afford their Passions all the liberty they can desire.

Therefore it behoveth that they mode­rate them; lest discovering their own weaknesses, they give advantages to such as shall converse with them; and all particu­lar men ought to take the same care, if they will preserve their freedom; for if any one Passion be out of order, 'tis impossible to conceal it; and when it shall have dis­covered it self, it will be hard to keep our enemies from making use thereof to our prejudice. If women did not discover how much they are delighted with idle dis­course, they would not run so much dan­ger in their honour; but when a man shall have discovered their weakness, and shall observe that they are pleased in being prai­sed, he insinuates himself into their likings by flattery, and makes himself beloved by them, by approving of what they love. An ambitious man hath no fence against one who hath discovered his Passions; as he esteems nothing more than vain-glory, he forgoes any thing he hath, to acquire it, and [Page 163] thinks to be a greater gainer by the ex­change, wherein he parts with real goods for applause; Ut cujusque studium ex ae­tate flagrabat, aliis scorta praebere, aliis canes atque e­quos mercari, postremo, ne (que) sumptui, neque modestiae suae parcere, dum illos obnoxios fidosque sibi faceret. Salust. in Catalin. finally, all the world must con­fess, that our passions are chains, which make us slaves to all such as know how to manage them well.

When the Paricide Cataline had vowed the ruine of his Country, and had resolved to change the Roman Common-wealth into a cruel tyranny, he corrupted all the young men by accommodating himself to their desires; he appeased confederates by flattering their humor; he won their good wills, by following their inclinations; and by promising preferment to such as were ambitious, Novit quem moerore con­turbet, quem gaudio fallat, quem admira­tione seducat: omnium discu­rit mores, om­nium scrutatur affectus, & ibi quaerit causam nocendi, ubi viderit quem­quam diligen­tius occupari. D. Leo. Serm. women to such as were lascivious, and riches to the avaritious, he fra­med an Association, whereinto Pretors, Counsellors, and Senators did enter. This is also the Devils most usual cunning, & the most dangerous wile with which he useth to seduce sinners; for as he hath great lights, (though he be the Prince of darkness;) and as he knows all mens tempers, he fits all his suggestions to their desires, and pro­pounds nothing unto them which is not conformable to their inclinations. To the proud he proffers honour, he awakens the Passion which possesseth them, and [Page 164] ingageth them in unlawful ways, to com­pass pernicious designes; and endeavors to perswade them, that any whatsoever sin, is glorious, when it is committed that repu­tation may be won thereby. He sollicits the voluptuous by infamous pleasures; If he cannot commend their sins, he seeks out names to excuse them; he terms that natural which is irrational; and, as if Nature and Reason were at enmity, he counsels them to follow the former, and forsake the latter. He encourageth the furious to revenge, he gives gallant Titles to shame­ful Passions, he endeavours to make the re­sentment of an injury pass for an act of Justice; and contradicting all Maximes of Christianity, he establisheth the greatness of courage in hatred and murder. He per­swades the avaritious that there is nothing more generally sought after than Riches; that our Ancestors have reverenced it, that our Successors will honour it, that people who differ in other opinions, agree in the reputation they put hereupon; that Fa­thers wish it to their children, that children desire it from their fathers; that those who profess piety, offer thereof to God, and ap­pease his anger by presents. That poverty is infamous; that it is the contempt of rich [Page 165] men, and the punishment of the poor. In fine, this colloguing enemy undoes all men by flattering them, he gains upon their understanding by their affections, he beats them with their own weapons, and by a dangerous piece of cunning, he employes their Passions to corrupt their wills. All men ought therefore to suppress such inclinati­ons as are so prejudicial to us; and submit unruly motions to Grace, which give so much advantage over our liberty, to our most powerful enemies.

The SECOND DISCOURSE. That Arts seduce men by the means of Passions.

THe government of Passions is of such importance, and so difficult, as the better part of Sciences seem only to have been invented to regulate them. Though the mind of man makes use of them to serve their vanities, they in their first institution intended only the go­vernment [Page 166] of our affections; and Philosopher [...] made use thereof only to cure our souls with delight. Musick which doth only tickle our ears, and wherewithal our heart is not affected, save only so far as thereby to let in impurity thereinto, labour'd formerly only to suppress the disorders thereof; as it it is an harmony composed of different voices, it produced harmonious effects; and agreeing the difference between the body and the soul, it renewed their friend­ship, and made them keep perfect intelli­gence together; it calmed the fury of Passions, and by the pleasantness of its accords, it tamed such wild beasts as de­vour men when they are irritated. In these happy days Musitians were Philosopher [...]; this art which is become a slave to sensuali­ty, was Virtues servant; it employed all its industry in the service of Reason, where­as now it seduceth the soul by the senses; it did then charm affections through the ears, and by pleasing tones, which were no less powerful than words, it perswaded to good things, and kept men within their duties. Thus 'tis said that Agistus could never corrupt Clitemnestra, till he had made him be made away, who defended her Cha­stity by the sweetness of his Harp, and [Page 167] who overthrew all the designs of this un­chaste lover, by the sweet accents of his voice. History (which is more to be be­lieved than fables) teacheth us, that a player upon the Flute wrought so powerfully up­on the mind of Alexander, Alexandrum aiunt Xeno­phonto canente manum ad ar­ma misisse. Sen. l. 2. De Ira. c. 2. that when he founded with a loftier tone than ordinary, he made this Conqueror besides himself; and did so encourage him to the Combate, as he would call for his Arms to set upon his Enemie; but when he played in a softer tone, Alexander's fury grew more calm, as if it had been but a false Allarm; he re­sumed his former countenance, and was wholly intent upon him who did enchant his ears; the holy Scripture (the words whereof are Oracles) assures us that David with his harp appeas'd the evil spirit in Saul; which lost his power, when the humours which he had stirred up, were allayed by harmony. But Musick hath now no more such virtue; she who formerly did dispossess people possessed with evil spirits, doth now give them over to the Devil; or if she produce not so bad effects, she awakens our Passions, and by a strange, but true misfortune, she increaseth the malady which she intended to cure. I very well know that the Musick used in Churches holds in­telligence [Page 168] with Piety, and that by a sweet violence it frees our souls from our bodies, and raiseth them up to Heaven; but truly I suspect all other sorts of Musick; though some will have them pass for harmless, I esteem them dangerous or useless; and I should willingly say with Seneca, Doces quomo­do inter se a­cutae & graves voces conso­nent, quomodo nervorum dis­parem redden­tium sonum fi­at concordia; fac potius quo­modo animus secum meus consonet, nec consilia mea discrepent, Sen. Ep. 88. to Musiti­ans, that instead of teaching us how to tune a Lute, or to govern our Voice, they ought to teach us how to regulate our Passions; that instead of flattering our Senses, they would work upon our hearts, and inspire our souls with the detestation of Vice, and love of Virtue.

Poetry (which we may stile the Daugh­ter of Musick) did in former times imitate her Mother; and employed all her comeli­ness in encouraging men to glorious Enter­prizes; she sung the victories of Conque­rors, and by praising their Valour, made their Souldiers valiant; her very forgeries were useful; the revengeful Furies which she introduced in her works, infused fear into the wicked, and kept people in their duty: the pleasing number and cadence of her Verse was able to sweeten the most sa­vage humors, and she abused us not when she would perswade us that her Orpheus ta­med Lions, made Trees to walk, forced [Page 169] Rocks to listen unto him, and to follow him, since he produced all these effects in the heart of man, and that he banished from thence Choler and Stupidity. But this brave Art never appeared more glorious than when it got upon the Theater, and when infused with a new fury, it repre­sented the punishment of the faulty, the direful death of tyrants, and the ill success of injustice or impiety. For it infused fear into Princes, it astonished Subjects, and by sad examples taught the one Respect, the other Clemency, and to both of them, Ju­stice and Religion. Then all Comedies were as so many instructions; one looked upon the places where they were acted, as upon the Academies of Philosophers, and Auditors never departed with the dislike of Virtue. But men who corrupt the best things, did at last abuse Poetry; and did un­justly submit her unto their Passions, who had reformed them by her advice. This innocent art which had always courted vir­tue, is become a slave to vice; and wan­ton people have prophaned all her chaste decencies; making them serve uncleanness. Since these unhappy days Poetry was cried down throughout the world; Philosophers who had always been the Poets Friends, [Page 170] became their enemies, and employed all their credit to get them banish'd. In effect they corrupted all men, and fearing lest their Verses were not of power enough to authorize obsceneness, they erected Altars thereunto; and by the Incest of their Gods, they excused the Adulteries of men. I am not ignorant that true Religion hath reformed Poetry; that it hath done its ut­most to restore her to her former use, and ancient beauty: I know very well that our Poets are chaste in their Writings; and that Comedies, though they be licentious, mount not the Stage, but only to condemn Vice; the very rules imposed upon them, will not suffer them to be obscene; and by a happy necessity it behoves that those who infuse a soul into the Scene, take part al­ways with Virtue; yet it unfortunately falls out (the which I rather attribute to the disorder of Nature, than to the like o [...] Poetry) that Chastity appears not so beau­tiful in Verse as does uncleanness; and tha [...] the obedience of the Passions seems not so pleasing as their rebellion. Men betake themselves more usually to violent affecti­ons, than to such as are answerable to Rea­son; And as the Poets do express them with greater eloquence, their auditors liste [...] [Page 171] unto them with more delight. In fine, let what care soever will be had, Comedies are only Schools of Virtue for such gallant men, as can discern between appearances and truth, and who abhor Vice even then when it comes presented in Virtues Orna­ments. But if you will examine the Com­mon people, they will confess, that Stage-Poetry doth strangely move them, and that it imprints in their souls the feelings of those personages which they represent.

Rhetorick is somewhat more happy in her designs than is Poetry; and let men ob­ject what fault they will to Orators, I find them more blameless than Poets. For as their chief end is to preserve the truth, they are enforced to employ all their cunning to beat down such Passions as are contrary thereunto; and in discharging themselves of their duty, they play the part of the Physitian, curing their auditors of all their maladies; If their Choler be too much ir­ritated, they appease it; If their Courage be too much supprest, they raise it up; they make Love exceed Hatred, Piety Revenge; and repressing one motion by another, they draw a calm from out a storm. This em­ployment is so fixt to the condition of Ora­tors, as they do therein only differ from Phi­losophers; [Page 172] for these have no other design, save only to convince the understanding, they propound naked Truths unto it; and knowing that it cannot behold them with­out reverence, they take more care how to discover, than to adorn them. But Ora­tors who will work upon the soul by the senses, cloath their good Reasons in hand­som Language, tickling the Ear, that they may touch the Heart; and using Tropes and figurative Speeches, to move affection. They set upon the two parts whereof man is composed, they make use of the weak­est to subdue the stronger; and as the De­vil undid man by the means of the Wo­man, they gain Reason by the means of Passion.

By this harmless cunning, they formed Towns, governed Common-wealths, and for a long time commanded Monarchies; for they studied their inclinations, and did so handsomly handle them, as it seemed the hearts of Princes were in the hands o [...] Orators, and that Monarchy was become a slave to Eloquence; they committed not­withstanding gross faults in their govern­ment, and by having too oft excited the mo­tions of the souls inferior part, they o­verthrew the Empire of the superior; and [Page 173] could not cure the wounds which they had made, nor quench the flames which they had kindled. For thinking to flatter a Prince in his vanity, they made him insolent, and whilst they thought to move him to re­venge, they made him cruel and fierce. They could not keep the mediocrity whereof Virtue is composed, and desiring to raise up one Passion, that they might abase ano­ther, they gave it so great strength, as it was no longer in their power to assubject it to Reason. This, in my opinion, is the mis­fortune which they run into, who, that they may be pleasing unto Princes, flatter such an inclination as doth tyrannize over them; and not considering the evil that may ensue thereon, oppose that inclination, to all o­thers, and by victories make it insolent. The contrary way had been the better; for since the Passion which they ende [...]ored to raise, was most violent, they should have employ­ed all the rest to weaken it, and have made them all conspire together, to bring it low. But because eloquence is oft-times in­teressed, she neglects the good of her Audi­tors, and is not troubled though her praises wound their souls, so long as she may ob­tain what she desires. Thus did Cicero treat with Caesar; and being desirous to save a [Page 174] guilty person whose cause he pleaded, he opposed the pride of this Conqueror to his revenge; to destroy one Passion which was prejudicial only to one particular man, he awakened that which had ruined the Re­publick, and opprest the liberty of Rome. Wherein certainly he was to blame, and sinn'd against the laws of Eloquence, which was not so much invented to perswade men, as to make them virtuous, and which ought not to endeavour so much to move affections, as to re-establish Reason in her Empire. Policy seems to have better inten­tions than Rhetorick; for when she excites fear or hope in man, by pro­mises or by threats, she endeavours the wel­fare of particulars, as the publick quiet; if she sometimes punish the faulty by dread­ful punishments, 'tis but in desperate evils, and when she hath, to no purpose, tried all mild means; yet I believe she might handle Passions better than she doth, and that without violating the respects wdich is due to Soveraignty, too easie to gain the hearts of the Subjects by hopes, and to reduce them to their duties rather by love than fear. This is that which we shall consider in the following Discourse, after having concluded in this, that all Sciences are de­fective [Page 175] in the government of Passions; that to regulate them well, they must implore help from morality, & that they must consi­der the precepts she giveth us to overcome enemies, which are as opinionate as insolent.

The THIRD DISCOURSE. That Princes win upon their Subjects either by Love or Fear.

ALl Politicians agree, that recompense and punishment are the two pillars which uphold all States; and that, to the end the people may be peacefully go­verned, their hopes or their fears must be excited by promises or threats; to say truth, we never yet heard of any Republick or Monarchy, which from its beginning did not ordain honours and chastisements for Vice and Virtue. He who feared to in­struct Vice by forbidding it, and to teach subjects paricide, by punishing it, was for­ced to have recourse to this common reme­dy, and to propose recompenses, and suffer­ings [Page 176] to men, thereby to awaken their hopes or their fears. Experience shewed that to gain their good will, their Passions must be won upon, and that the lower part of their souls must be mastered, so to assubject the higher part thereof.

God himself governs the world by this harmless piece of cunning; for though, be­ing infinitely more absolute than all Kings, he may treat with the soul without the in­terposition of the senses, he rules himself according to mans condition; and knowing that they are composed of a Soul and Body, he undertakes nothing upon the former but by the means of the latter; he renounceth his own rights, that he may adapt himself to the weakness of his Creatures, and not using the power his Soveraignty affords him, he terrifieth them by threats, or com­forteth them by promises. His bare will should serve us for a Law; and the know­ledge of his intentions oblige us to form whatsoever design; notwithstanding he al­lureth us, by proposing a Paradise unto us; he terrifieth us in representing us with a Hell; and as if he were much interessed in our Souls health, or in our damnation, he employs all his Graces to purchase our love and to shun our hatred. [Page 177] when he treated with the Iews as with his subjects; when through his excessive good­ness he disdained not to own the quality of their Soveraign; when he gave them Laws by the mouth of Moses, and when he go­verned them by the wisdom of their Judges, who were but his Images, he terri­fied them many times by his Chastisements, and sent plagues and famine into their ha­bitations, to reduce them to obedience by fear. He many times also promised them to enlarge their Borders, to assist them in their Battels, and to give them advantage over their enemies, to the end that solicit­ing their hopes by his promises, he might by their Passions win their good wills. In fine, all the world confesseth, that Polititi­ans, like Orators, cannot more violently, nor yet with more sweetness win mans con­sent, than by awakening the motions of his Soul, and by dexterously insinuating them­selves into him by the hopes of Honour, or fear of punishment; but they do not agree which of these two passions ought to be employed to reduce him the more assured­ly to his duty.

Those who take part with fear, Inter Princi­pem & Subdi­tos non est a­micitia. Arist. 1. Politic. say, that this passion, being by nature servile, seems to be the portion of subjects, that this their [Page 178] relation cannot be taken from them with­out taking away their condition, and with­out reducing them into the quality of chil­dren or friends; they add, that it is in the power of the Soveraign to make himself be feared, not to make himself be loved; that punishments make greater impression upon the souls of such as obey, than rewards; that love is always voluntary, and that fear may be enforced; that contempt, which is the capital enemy to Monarchy, may proceed as well from love as from familia­rity; that fear can only produce hatred, which injureth more the reputation, than the power of Kings; that since wisdom will have us to chuse the lesser of two evils, we must resolve to lose the love of the peo­ple, to preserve their respect, and say with that ancient Author, Let him hate me, provided that he fear me. They confirm all these reasons by examples, and make it appear, that the most severe Empires have flourished the most, that punishments have always exceeded rewards, and that in the Roman Common-wealth, where they gave but an oaken Garland to such souldiers as had mounted a Breach, they made them pass the Pikes for having gone out of their Rank, or forsaken their Colours; that God [Page 179] himself (whose government ought to serve for an example to all Princes) governed his people with more severity than lenity, that he had been constrained to express himself by the voice of Thunder to work obedience to him, that he had not preser­ved his authority by the death of Rebels, and that notwithstanding whatever inclina­tion he had to Mercy, he was enforced to have recourse to Justice. Briefly, they say, So­veraignty is somewhat hateful, that Love and Majesty agree not well together, that one cannot rule over men and be beloved, that men are so jealous of their liberty, as they hate all things that obviate it, and that Princes according to the Maxime in the Gospel, Inimici homi­nis domestici ejus. Mat. 10. have no greater enemies than their Subjects.

Those who take part with love have no less specious reasons, and much more true ones; for they say that the Soveraign being the Father of his people, he is bound to treat them as his Children, that fear makes them only Masters of the Body, and that love makes them rule over the Heart. That such as fear their Masters, seek an end of their servitude, and that such as love them dream not of recovering their Liberty. That such Princes as govern with rigour, [Page 180] cannot live securely, Necesse est multos timeat, quem multi ti­ment. Senec. that of necessity those who cause fear, must themselves be subject thereto, and that they must fear their peo­ples revolt, who only obey them through constraint. Semper in au­thores redun­dat timor, nec quisquam me­tuitur, ipse se­curus. Sen. 2. De Ira. c. 13. That if nothing that is violent be of continuance, an Empire which is only grounded upon violence, cannot long sub­sist; and to answer the reasons objected un­to them, they reply that love enters much better into the heart than doth fear; that if there be angersom ways to make a man be feared, Non eo loco ubi servitutem esse velint, fi­dem speran­dam esse. Liv. 8. there be innocent Charms to make him be beloved; that in generously-minded men, recompenses make greater impressions than punishments; and that the promises of a Prince more animates his sub­jects than doth his threats; that contempt cannot arise from love, since love ariseth from valuation, and is always accompani­ed by respect; that the justest Monarchies, and not the severest, have flourished the most; and that if in the Roman Common-wealth punishments exceeded recompen­ses, it was not, for that fear made deeper impressions in the souls of men than love; but because Vice hath not so much of ugli­ness as virtue hath of beauty; and that it is not necessary to propound honour unto her, who finding all her glory within her [Page 181] self is as well satisfied with silence as a­midst all acclamations and applause. That if God dealt rigorously with his people, 'twas contrary to his inclination, and that his lenity had been greater than his seve­rity, because the latter could not purchase him all Iudaea, and the former hath submit­ted unto him the whole world. St. Paul re­presents us with the difference between these two laws, often, in the holy Scripture; the one of which hath made slaves, the o­ther hath produced children; the one of which hath fortified sin, the other hath de­stroyed the tyranny thereof. They add, that Soveraignty is not odious, since it was consecrated in the person of Jesus Christ, Pertransit be­nefaciendo & sanando om­nes oppressos à diabolo, quo­niam Deus e­rat cum illo. Act. c. 10. who desirous to serve as an example to all Kings on earth, never used his power, but in order of service to his mercy; and never did any miracle, unless to help the afflicted: In fine, that subjects did not repine at the loss of their liberty, since that being voluntary, they like it; that Princes are not the objects of fear, since they are the images of God; and that some Princes have been found e­ven among Infidels, Titus deliciae generis huma­ni. Suet ▪ in Tis. who have been their peoples delight, whilst alive, and their sor­row, when dead.

Though these answers be so pertinent, as [Page 182] they are not be gainsaid; yet methinks both the parties may be reconciled, and their difference so taken away, as that each of them should therein find their ad­vantage; for though lenity be to be prefer­red before rigour, and that a State be bet­ter grounded upon love than upon fear, there are occasions wherein a Prince ought to let his clemency give place to his severi­ty, & wherein he is obliged to quit the qua­lity of a Father, that he may exercise the like of a Judge. He ought to govern his humor according to the humor of his Sub­jects; if they be giddy-headed or proud, he must use rigour, to teach them obedience and fidelity; if troublesom, and prone to Rebellion, he must make examples, and by the punishment of a few, frighten more; if unquiet and desirous of novelty, he must punish them by keeping them in continual employment; but amidst all these punish­ments, he must not forget that he is the head of his State, that his subjects are a part of himself, and that he ought to be as sparing in punishing them as a Physitian in cutting off the Arm or Leg of a diseased person. If nothing be done in his Kingdom which en­forceth him to Rigour; if all things be peaceable, and if the people under his go­vernment [Page 183] have no other motions than his own will; Divus Nerva res olim inso­ciabi [...]es miscu­it, I [...]perium & Libertatem. Tacit. he ought to deal gently with them, afford them just liberty, which may perswade them that they are rather his chil­dren than his subjects, and that reserving to himself the marks only of Soveraignty, he permits them to gather all the fruits thereof. In brief, he ought not to use Ri­gor, but when Clemency is bootless: in his government, as well as in the like of God, mildness must precede severity, and all the world must know that he punisheth not the faulty out of his own inclination, but forc'd thereunto by necessity. The pow­er of a Prince is sufficiently dreadful by rea­son of his greatness, he need not make it o­dious by his cruelty. One word of theirs terrifies all their subjects; the punishment of one guilty person astonisheth all the rest; their anger maketh even the innocent to quake; and as a Thunderbolt does little harm, yet frightens much; so great men cannot punish a particular personage, with­out infusing terror throughout their whole Dominions. I therefore am of opinion with the wisest Politicians, That Soveraignty ought to be tempered with lenity, and that being accompanied with all qualities that may make it be feared, it ought to seek [Page 184] out all such means as may make it be belo­ved.

The FOURTH DISCOURSE. What Passions ought to reign in the power of a Prince.

ONe of the greatest Misfortunes which can befall Religion, is the liberty which men take to frame unto themselves such a Divinity as liketh them best; In the first age every one ado­red the workmanship of his own hands, and made an Idol unto himself, which had its worth from the industry of the Work­man, or from the excellency of the Materi­als; in pursuit of time, as mens spirits grew more refined, Poets made the gods sensible, and gave them all such affections as make us faulty or miserable: one might see them make love in their Writings, fight in Fables; and one might observe in them all the chief affections of those that had invented them; Philosophers not able to endure so unjust gods, formed more rational Deities, [Page 185] and proposed unto the people the Idols of their own minds; every one figured out unto himself a god according to his own in­clinations, and gave him what advantages may be imagined: Some placed him in idleness, and that they might not trouble his rest, berest him of the knowledge, or government of our affairs; some made him so good, as that he suffered all faults to go unpunisht, and dealt as favourably with the guilty as with the innocent; others made him so rigorous, as it seemed he had created man only to destroy him, and that he found no contentment but in the death of his Subjects; this disorder hath passed from Re­ligion into State-government, and accord­ing to the ages wherein men have lived, they have framed unto themselves divers Ideas of Kings personages, and have placed in their Princes such perfections only as they were acquainted withal; for in the beginning of the world, when people pre­ferred the body before the soul, they chose such Kings as were of an extraordinary sta­ture, and who were as strong as Giants: Nay, Ab humero & sursum emine­bat super om­nem populum. 1 Reg. c. 9. it seemed that God would apply him­self to this humor, when he gave Saul unto the Israelites; for the Scripture sayes, He was higher by the head than all his subjects; and [Page 186] when the Poets describe unto us their He­roes, they never fail in giving them this ad­vantage; but when time had taught us that our good resided not in the body, men be­gun to consider the mind of such men as they would make their Kings, and cast their eyes upon such as had most of government in them, or most of courage; they observed their inclinations, and knowing what power their inclinations have over their wills, they esteemed them no less than Virtues.

But Opinions do so differ upon this Subject, as a man may say that every Poli­tician fancies unto himself a Prince accord­ing to his humour, and indues him with that Passion which is most agreeable unto himself. Some have wished that their Prince had no Passion at all, and that being the Image of God, he should be raised above the Creatures, he should see all the mo­tions of the earth without any alteration o [...] spirit; but we know very well that his be­ing in a higher condition than his subjects makes him not be of another nature; and that since he is not exempt from the Dis­eases of the Body, he cannot defend himself against the passions of the soul. Others have been of opinion that he ought to have a [...] passions; that like unto the Sun and con­stellations [Page 187] he should be in a perpetual motion, and employ all his care, and all his thoughts upon the welfare of his State. Some have thought that the de­sire of glory was the most lawful Passi­on in a King, Contemptu famae, contem­ni virtutes. Ta­cit. 4. annal. and that since Fortune had endued him with all the goods she could confer upon him, he should only labour how to atchieve honour. That virtue was only preserved by this desire, and that he who valued not reputation, could not love Justice, that a Prince ought not to en­deavour the eternizing of his memory by the pomp of glorious Buildings, but by the gallantry of his actions; that setting all other things at nought, he should only study how to leave a happy memory of his reign after his death. Caetera princi­pibus statim adesse, unum insatiabiliter parandum, prosperam sui memoriam. Tacit. 4. annal. That nothing could more further him in this generous design than an insatiable desire of Glory; that Riches were the goods of particular men, but that glory was the humor of Kings; and that he might well hazard all other things to com­pass it. Others less glorious, but more ra­tional, have thought that fear ought to reign in the soul of Princes, and that as their wisdom exceeded their valour, the apprehension of danger should in them also surpass the desire of glory; for to boot [Page 188] that their fortune is exposed to a thousand mischiefs; that the greater it is, it runs the greater danger; that it is the more brittle by how much the more glorious; they are bound to prevent accidents by their watch­fulness, to withstand storms by their Con­stancy, and to forgo their own happiness, to share in the misery of their Subjects.

All these opinions are upheld by exam­ples; for there have been some Kings who have known so well how to moderate their passions, as they seemed not to have any; they have not been troubled at ill Suc­cesses, and they would receive the news of a Defeat, with the same countenance, as the tidings of Victory. The quiet of their mind was not altered by the divers functi­ons they were obliged unto; they punished faults with the same easiness as they re­warded Virtue; and whatever alteration befell their States, you should find none in them; they seemed to be raised to so high a pitch of perfection, as one might say, in the weakness of man they had the assurance of a God. Quid majus est quam in in­firmitate ho­minis, habere securitatem Dei? Sen. There have been others, whose government hath been no less happy, and who have yet been of a quite different disposition; for as their Empire was no less dear unto them than were their own bodies, [Page 189] no alteration could happen therein which might not be read in their faces; good suc­cess put them in good humor, they were af­flicted at unhappy accidents, they were touched to the quick even with evils that threatned them from afar off, and every thing that befel their State made so strong an impression in them, as they seemed to live in two bodies, and that having two lives to lose, they had two deaths to fear. I dare not blame this their restlesness, since it was occasioned by an extream love; and a body must be unjust to condemn a Prince that makes himself miserable, for no other cause, but that he may make his Subjects happy. Augustus Caesar was of this humor, and though he had endeavoured to compass so much constancy, as not to be troubled at any thing, yet could he not hear of any good or bad success which befel his Com­mon-wealth, without witnessing his resent­ment thereof by his word and actions. Var­rus his defeat cost him tears, and this acci­dent which he was not prepared for, made him say such things as I do rather impute to his affection than to his weakness, since up­on other occasions he had given so good proof of his Courage.

Their number is great who have la­boured [Page 190] after glory, and who have had no other Passion but how to acquire honour. Nothing seemed difficult unto them which bear with it the face of glory, insomuch as by an inevitable misfortune, they neglected virtue, when in obscurity; and put a valua­tion upon a glorious vice. According to their Tenets it was as lawful to overthrow a State as to found one, to oppress a Repub­lick, as to defend it; and to undertake a War against Allies, as well as against Ene­mies. Prosperum ac felix scelus virtus vocatur. Sen. Tragoed. They run after glory by unlawful wayes, and as some make fortunate faults pass for Virtues, these took glorious pieces of injustice for heroick Actions. The first Caesar held this Maxime; his ambition perswaded him that nothing was infamous that could purchase him honor, and that he ought not to consider whether an enterprise were just or unjust, provided that it might add unto his reputation, and make his Name look big in Story. Pompeius oc­cultior, non melior, Tacit. Ore probo, a [...]imo inve­recundo. Sa­lust. His Son in Law was of the same opinion, and though he had fairer pretences for his designs, his motives thereunto were no better; for under colour of preserving the Common-wealth, he in­creased his particular authority, and by a detestable piece of Art, he made use of the Senate, to establish his tyranny. There needs [Page 191] no great policy go to the observation, that so unruly a Passion is disadvantageous to States, and that this is not that which ought to precede in the soul of Princes.

I shall therefore willingly side with those who attribute this honour to the zeal of Ju­stice, and who will have the hearts of Mo­narchs animated by this harmless affection; for since the welfare of their people is the end of all their labours, the justice that must produce and preserve it, must be the scope of their desires, and they must main­tain a well grounded quiet in the variety of conditions whereof their States are com­pounded. Who is not indued with this vir­tue, knows not how to reign; and though he have all the rest, he deserves not to bear a Scepter, since he wants that which makes Kings good, and Kingdoms happy. I can­not end this Discourse without taking no­tice of the excessive obligation which we have to Divine providence, who hath given us a Prince of so pure inclinations, as he seems to have no part in this sin, which hath put our nature out of order; and who loveth Justice so passionately, as he would be therewithal adorn'd, and chose the title of just, as the only recompence of all his he­roick virtues. He might have assumed un­to [Page 192] to himself the title of happy, as well as Sylla; since the Sea hath born respect unto his endeavours, that the Alpes have humbled themselves, and their Snow dissolved to make way for his victorious forces; and that upon a thousand occasions the Ele­ments have fought in his behalf; he might have taken the title of Great, as well as A­lexander, since his Actions have exceeded our hopes, and that he hath undertaken, and effected designs which all his predeces­sors have thought unpossible: Lastly, he might have challenged the name of Victo­rious, as well as Trajan, since men may num­ber his Victories by his Battels, since his souldiers were never worsted in his pre­sence, and since good success hath alwayes accompanied his Enterprizes. But know­ing that Justice is the Virtue of Kings, he hath contented himself with the Title of Iust, and hath preferred it before those of Happy, Great, or Victorious; to teach all Monarchs, that Zeal of the publick good is the passion which chiefly ought to rule in them.

The FIRST DISCOURSE. Of the Nature, Properties, and Ef­fects of Love.

DIvinity teacheth us that there is nothing more hidden, yet nothing more known than the God whom we adore; his Es­sence fills the world, and his Immensity is such as he can produce no­thing which he encloseth not; all creatures [Page 194] are the Images of his greatness, and the proofs of his power; one cannot see them without knowing him; and they by their motions discover unto us what the Pro­phets have declared unto us in their Wri­tings; yet is there nothing more secret than he, Qui ubique est, nullibi est. he is every where, and he is no where; he makes himself to be felt, yet will not suf­fer himself to be touched; he environeth us, yet will not permit us to approach him; all people know he is, and no Philosophers know what he is. The belief that we have, that he is, is so ingraven in the very ground­works of our Essence, as to eface it, were to annihilate our selves; yet cannot our un­derstanding comprehend him; and this Sun casts about so much light as dazles the eyes that would behold him. Though love be but a Passion of our Soul, yet hath it this advantage common with the Divine Es­sence, that it is as secret, as it is publick; and that there is nothing in nature more e­vident, yet nothing more hidden. Every one speaks of Love as of the soul that pre­serves the Universe, and as the secret knot which entertains the Society of the world; our desires declare it, and a man that wish­eth, witnesses his love; our hopes divulge it, and all our Passions do discover it, yet [Page 195] is it retreated too within the bottom of our hearts; and all the marks that it giveth of its presence, are as many clouds which hide it from our understandings; men feel the power thereof, yet cannot explain its Es­sence; even they who live under its Empire, and who reverence the Laws thereof, are ignorant of its nature.

Poets who interest themselves in its greateess, Deum esse a­morem tu [...]pi­ter vitio favens finxit libido, quoque liberi­or foret, titu­lum, furori, nu­minis falsi ad­didit. Sen. in Hipolyto. will have it pass for a god; lest men may blame the violence of Love, they give it a stately name, and endeavour to ex­cuse the true fury thereof by a false Piety. The Platonicks make Love a Spirit, and at­tribute unto it so absolute a power over the Passions, as they will have even Hatred it self to obey its Will, Odium (que) pa­rit, cum jussit amor, veteres cedunt ignibus irae. Idem ibid. and will have Hatred change all her Rage into Mildness, that she may please Love. The Stoicks term Love a Fury, and judging of its nature by its effects, they cannot believe that that moti­on of our soul be well ruled, which is as direful to us as Hatred, and which hath so little government, as it most commonly of­fendeth even those whom it intendeth to oblige. The Peripateticks dare not give it any name at all, Idem est exitus odii & amoris insani. Sen. 6▪ Benefic. c. 25. for fear of being mistaken; and Aristotle, who defineth the most hidden things, contents himself with the description [Page 196] thereof, leaving us in a despair how to know a Passion which he knew not: Some­times he terms it sympathizing, sometimes an inclination, sometimes a complacency, and teacheth us by these different terms, that the nature of Love is no less obscure, than is the nature of the Soul.

Amongst so many doubts, some Philo­sophers affirm, that it is the first impression which the Bonum sensible makes in the heart of man, that 'tis a pleasing wound which man hath received from a fair Object, that it is the Beam of a Sun which warms him, that it is a Charm whose virtue is at­tractive, and that it is the first motion which carries him, either to what appears to be good, or to what truly is so. But if I may be permitted to differ from common opini­ons, that I may follow the more true, I will say that Love is all the Passions; that accor­ding to its different conditions it hath diffe­rent names, but that custom hath so pre­vailed, as in its birth it beareth the most glorious name; for when an inclination is formed in the heart, and that a pleasing ob­ject doth with delight stir up the Will, we call it Love; when it sallies forth from it self to join with what it loves, we call it Desire; when it grows more vigorous, [Page 197] and that its strength promiseth good suc­cess, we call it Hope; when it encourageth it self against the difficulties it meets with­al, we call it Choler; when it prepares to fight, and seeks out weapons to defeat its enemies, and to assist its Allies, we call it Boldness. But in all these conditions 'tis still Love; the name which Philosophers have given it in its birth, agrees not less with it in his progress; and if when but a Child, it merit so honourable a title, it de­serves it better when it is grown greater by Desires, and strengthened by Hopes. 'Tis true that Loves first condition is the rule of all the rest, and that as all rivers derive their greatness from their Spring-head, all the Passions borrow their strength from this first inclination which is termed Love; for as soon as it is taken with the beauty of an object, it kindles its desires, excites its hopes, and carries the fire into all the passions which hold of its Empire: 'tis in the Will as in a Throne, where it gives orders to its sub­jects; 'tis in the bottom of the soul as in a strong Hold, from whence it inspireth courage into its souldiers; 'tis like the heart which giveth life to all the members, and the power thereof is so great as it cannot be well expressed by any example. Kings oft [Page 198] times meet with disobedience in their sub­jects; the most valiant Commanders are sometimes forsaken by their Souldiers, and the heart cannot always disperse its spirits throughout all the members of the Body; but Love is so absolute in his dominion, as he never finds any resistance to his will; all the Passions get on foot to execute his com­mandments, and as the motion of the Moon causeth the ebbing and flowing of the Sea, so doth the motions of Love cause peace, or trouble in our soul.

Charitas Dei diffusa est in cordibus per Spiritum san­ctum, qui da­tus est nobis. Rom. 5.Now this Love, the nature whereof is so hidden, hath divers branches; and may be divided into natural and supernatural; the latter is that which God disperseth into our wills, to make us capable of loving him as our Father, and of pretending unto glory as to our inheritance; the former is that which Nature hath imprinted in our souls, to fa­sten us to those objects which are delight­ful to us; and this is divided into spiritual and sensible love; spiritual love resides in the will, and rather deserveth to be stiled a Virtue than a Passion; sensible love is in the lower part of the soul, and hath so much commerce with the Senses, from whence he borrows his name, as he always makes impression upon the Body; and this it is [Page 199] which is properly termed Passion. In fine, these two lovers are divided again into two others; the one of which is called the love of Friendship, the other the love of Interest. The first is the more noble, and he who is touched therewith, respecteth nothing but what may be advantageous to whom he loveth; Amor amici­tiae & amor concupiscentiae In quid ami­cum paro? Ut habeam possim, pro quo mori, ut habeam quem in auxilium se­quar, cujus me morti oppo­nam & impen­dam. Ep. 9. he wisheth him well, or procu­reth what is good for him; and having no consideration but honour, and his friends content, he sacrificeth himself for him, and thinks himself happy if he lose his life, to assure his friend of his affection. This noble Passion is that which hath done all the glorious actions which are observed in History; 'Tis she that hath filled Tyrants with admiration, and who hath made these enemies to Society, wish to love, and to be beloved; judging aright that Soveraigns are better guarded by their friends than by their souldiers, and that all their forces were but weak, were they not supported by the love of their Subjects. Qui amicus esse coepit, quia expedit, place­bit ei aliquod pretium contra amicitiam, si ullum in illa placet pretium praeter ipsam. The second sort of Love, which we term the love of Interest, is as common as unjust; for the greatest part of affections is grounded upon utility, or upon pleasure; those who suffer themselves to be carried away thereby, have not so much friendship as self-love, [Page 200] and if they will speak their minds, Ista quam tu describis, ne­gotiatio est, non amicitia, quae ad com­modum acce­dit, Sen. Ep. 9. they will confess that they love themselves in their friends, and that they love them not so much for any virtue, which they observe in them, as for the good they hope to reap by them; thus we may see that such like af­fections last no longer then they are either useful, or pleasing; and that the same interest which gave them life, makes them die; they betake themselves to the fortune, not to the person, and these are commerces which last no longer than they are entertained by hopes of profit or of pleasure.

Of so many sorts of love which Philoso­phy hath marked out unto us, we will here consider none but that which resides in the inferior part of the soul; let it have either virtue or interest for its foundation. And since we know the nature thereof, we will examine the qualities; the first whereof is, that it always seeks what is good, and ne­ver betakes it self to an object, which either is not good, or appears not so to be; for as nature is the workmanship of God, she can­not have strayed so much out of the way, but that she must preserve some remainder of his first inclinations, insomuch as ha­ving been destinied to enjoy the Summum bonum, she longs after it; by an error which [Page 201] may very well be excused, she fastens her self to all that hath but the likeness thereof, and by an instinct, which remains in her, though in disorder, she suffers her self to be charmed by all things which have in them any thing of beauty or of goodness. As if she had found what she seeks after, she in­discreetly betakes her self thereunto, and by a deplorable misfortune she oft-times takes a falshood for a truth; she committeth Ido­latry whilst she thinketh to perform actions of Piety; and attributing that unto the work, which is only due unto the work­man, she runs into the same error which a lover should do, who by a strange malady should forget the Mistress which he vows service to, and passionately adore her Pi­cture. This fault ought rather to be impu­ted to man, than to his love; for love being blind follows his inclination, not being able to discern between appearances and truth, he loves the good which offers it self unto him; that he may not miss of what he looks for, he betakes himself to what he finds; and is only to blame in being too faithful; but man cannot excuse his sin, since Reason is his guide, and that he may learn by her, that all those goods which are touched by the senses, or are the objects of [Page 202] the senses, are but the shadows of that which he ought to love. He must correct his love, and keep it from betaking it self to objects, which though they be indeed beau­tiful, are not the Soveraign good, or Sum­mum bonum which he seeks after. When he thinks the qualities they are endued withal may work a change in him, he might shun them as snares, and use violence upon him­self to get free from the creatures, lest they make him forget his Creator.

From this propriety of Love ariseth a se­cond, which is, that he never is at quiet, but goes always in pursuit of what he loves; for seeing so many shadows of that supream beauty which he adores, he is always in action, leaving one to take another, he seeks in all, what he cannot find in one alone; and his change is not so much a proof of his fickleness, as of their vanity; he becoms wise at his own cost; when he meets not with what he expects in the beauty which he idolatrizeth, he repents him of his fault, & betakes himself to another subject, which he is forced to forgo again, because he en­joys but one part of that universal good wherewithal he is taken; his inconstancy would last as long as his life, did not reason teach him, that what he covets is invisible, [Page 203] and that the abiding place wherein we are, is not destined for the passion, but for the hope thereof; he then sets at nothing what he so much esteemed, and considering that natural beauties are but steps whereby to raise us to supernatural beauty, he loves them with reservedness, and useth them as means whereby to purchase what he seeks after.

The powerful impression which this beauty makes upon Love, causeth Loves third propriety, which is, that he cannot live in quiet, and that being solicited by his desires, he is always busie; he is of the nature of the constellations, which are in a perpetual motion; the end of one trouble is the beginning of another; and he hath not so soon ended his first design, but he frames a second; he is like those conquerors, who egged on by ambition, prepare always for new combats, never tasting the pleasure of victory. I cannot therefore approve of the Poets invention, who have feigned Love to be the son of Idleness; Habet omnis amor vim su­am, nec potest vacare amor in anima amantis Aug. in Psal. 121. for if his genealogy be true, we must confess he is not of his mo­thers humour. That unfortunate Poet, who was Loves Martyr, and who saw himself justly persecuted for having forged Wea­pons against womens Chastity, avows that [Page 204] this passion is working; and that it is so far from being at rest, as it obligeth its par­takers to be souldiers; and that to love, a man must resolve to wage war. Hence it is that St. Augustin mixing sacred Love with prophane, makes them both equally ope­rative, and acknowledgeth that a true affe­ction cannot be idle. Ambition, which is the love of honour, is a good proof of this, since it makes such impression upon the hearts of those that are ambitious, as they have not much more rest than have the damned, and that they are always cause of more trouble to themselves, than to those whom they oppress. Avarice, which is the love of money, doth authorize this truth no less than doth Ambition, since those wretch­men which are therewithal possessed, rend up the bowels of the earth that they may not be unuseful, and seek out Hell before their death, that they may not be exempt from pain whilst alive. This propriety is so peculiar to Love, as it is not found in any o­ther of the Passions. For though our de­sires be the first rivulets that derive from this Spring-head, yet do they give us some respit; and when they are weary of seeking after a far distant good, they suffer us to take a little rest; we oft-times dry our tears, and [Page 205] if we make not peace, we conclude a truce with our sorrow; we do not always medi­tate upon revenge, and choler as so much less lasting as it hath more of impetuosity and violence. Our hatred is sometimes laid asleep, and requires a new injury to awaken it; our joys are so short, as the longest of them endure but for a moment, and they love idleness so much, as they cease to be pleasing when they begin to be operative. But Love is always in action, it tarries not till age give it strength to work, it form­eth designs as soon as it is born; though abandoned by desires and hopes, it ceaseth not to think of what it loveth, and to enter­tain it self to no purpose with the thought of good success, which it never shall enjoy. In fine, activity is so natural unto it, as the life thereof consists in motion; and as the heart, it ceaseth to live when it ceaseth to move.

From hence proceeds its fourth propriety, which is the strength which doth accom­pany it in all its designs; for though but new born, it is vigorous, if true; and giving proofs of its courage, it tameth Monsters, which it is not yet acquainted withal; it measures its strength by its desires, & thinks it self able to do whatsoever it will; it is not [Page 206] astonished with difficulties: If one pro­pound them to Love, that they may stay the careir thereof, he thinks 'tis done to try its Will, and solicited by glory it endea­voureth to overcome them: Love neither accepts of, nor makes excuses. It will try all its forces before 'twill acknowledge an im­potency, and it doth oft-times overcome enemies, which the most generous virtues durst never set upon. Hence it is that the holy Scripture compares it to death, not only for that it separateth us from our selvs, to join us to the things we love; but be­cause nothing can resist it; for of so many pains which Divine Justice hath found out, Magnum ver­bum fortis ut mors; Dilectio magnificentius exprimi non potuit fortitu­do charitatis; quis enim mor­ti resistit [...] ig­nibus, undis, ferro,, potesta­tibus, Regibus resistitur, venit una mors, quis ei resistit? ni­hil est illa for­tius, propterea viribus ejus charitas com­paratur. Aug. in Psal 121. wherewith to punish us, there is none, but death, which we may not defend our selves from. We save our selves from the in­juries of the Weather by Cloaths and Houses; we overcome the Barrenness of the Earth by our excessive labour; we cor­rect nourishments by the help of Physick; we reduce wild Beasts to our obedience by art or forces; we oft-times turn our pains in­to pleasure, and we draw advantages from the misery of our condition, which we should not have found in the state of Inno­cency. But nothing can resist death; and though Physitians have found out secrets to [Page 207] prolong our lives, Et quia ipsa charitas occi­dit quod fui­mus, ut simus quod non era­mus, facit in nobis quan­dam mortem dilectio: ipsa morti erant mortui quibus Apostolus di­cebat, mortui estis, &c. Idem ibid. yet do they in vain seek out means to defend themselves against death, which makes havock throughout the whole earth, pardons neither age nor sex; and Palaces, which are environed with so many guards, cannot keep Kings from the reach thereof: So Love finds no difficulties which it overcomes not, no pride which it lays not low, no power which it tameth not, nor no rigour which it doth not allay.

Briefly, by another propriety which is not less considerable than the former, Love charmeth troubles, mingleth pleasures with pain; and to encourage us to difficult acti­ons, finds out inventions to make them ei­ther pleasing or glorious. Hunting is rather a business than a diversion, 'tis an image of war; and men who pursue wild Beasts, seem as if they studied how to overcome their e­nemies; the Victory is therein doubtful, as well as in combates; and honour is therein purchased sometimes by the loss of life; yet all these troubles are the hunters pleasures, and their passion to this Exercise makes them term that a pastime which Reason would term a punishment. There is no­thing of delight in war, the very name there­of is odious; were it not accompanied with injustice, disorder, and fear, it would not­withstanding [Page 208] have horrors enough to asto­nish all men; death makes her self be there seen in a thousand different shapes; there is no exercise in war wherein the danger doth not exceed the glory; and it never furnish­eth souldiers with any actions which are not as bloudy as glorious; yet those that love it, make it their delight, they esteem all the deformities thereof beauties, Nullo modo sunt onerosi labores aman­tium sed etiam ipsi delectant sicut venanti­um, piscanti­um; interest ergo quid a­metur, nam in eo quod a­matur, aut non laborantur, aut labor ama­tur. Aug. and by an inclination which proceeds rather from their love than from their humour, they find delight in dangers, and taste the plea­santness of peace in the tumults of war. This it is which made St. Augustine say, That Lo­vers troubles are never troublesom, and that they never find pain in serving what they love, or if they do, they cherish it.

But we shall never make an end if we would observe all the proprieties of Love; I therefore pass on to the effects thereof, which being so many pictures of Love, will represent unto us its nature, Extasim facit amor, amato­res suo statu dimovet, sui juris esse non finit, sed in ea quae amant penitus trans­fert. Dionis. De Divin. No [...] min. c. 4. and will disco­ver unto us what it is able to do. The first of its miracles, is that which we call Exta­sie, for it frees the Soul from the Body which she inanimates, that she may join to the Object which she loveth; it parts us from our selves by a pleasing violence; and what the holy Scripture attributes to the [Page 209] Spirit of God, befals this miraculous divi­sion; so as a lover is never at home with himself; if you will find him, you must seek him in the person that he adores. Vivo autem jam non ego, vivit vero in me Christus. Gal. 2. He will have people know that contrary to the Laws of wisdom, he is always without himself; and that he hath forsaken all care of his own preservation; since he became a slave to love. The Saints draw their glory from this extasie, and truth it self, which speaks by their mouths, obligeth them to confess, that they live more in Jesus Christ, than in themselves. Now as a man must die to himself, to live in another, death accom­panieth this life; and as well sacred as pro­phane lovers cannot love unless they be bound to die. 'Tis true that this death is ad­vantageous to them, since it procures unto them a life wherewithal they are better pleased than with that which they have lost; for they live again in those that they love; by a miracle of love, they, like the Phenix, take life again from their ashes, Mortui enim estis, & vi [...]a vestra est ab­scondita cum Christo in Deo Col. 3. and recover life in the very bosom of death. He who doth not conceive this truth, cannot under­stand those words, by which S. Paul teacheth us, that we are dead unto our selves, and a­live in Jesus Christ.

This effect produceth another, which is not much less admirable; for as lovers have [Page 210] no other life than what they borrow from their love, it infallibly falls out that they transform themselves thereinto, and that ceasing to be what they were, they begin to be that which they love; they change con­dition as well as nature, and by a wonder, which would surpass all belief, were it not usual, they become like unto that which they cherish. 'Tis true that this power shines much more gloriously in divine than in prophane Love; for though Kings a­base themselves in loving their Subjects, and that they forgo their greatness, as soon as they engage themselves in friendship, yet do they not raise those up into their Throne whom they love. Jealousie (which is inse­parable from Royalty) will not suffer them to give their Crown away to him who pos­sesseth their heart. But if they should arrive at this excess, the Maxim would only be true in them, and their Subjects could not change conditions by the force of their love, for the love of greatness makes not a Soveraign, nor is a man the more accommo­dated though he love riches; the desire of health did never yet cure a sick man; & we have not found, that the bare Passion to know, hath made men wise. But divine Love hath so much power, as it raseth us up above our selves, & by a strange Metamorphosis it [Page 211] makes us be that which it makes us love; It renders the guilty innocent; it makes slaves children, changeth Demons into Angels; and that we may not diminish the virtue thereof, whilst we think to heighten it, let it suffice to say, that of men, it makes Gods.

It doth not therefore become us to com­plain of our misery, Quid enim refert natura esse quod po­test effici vo­luntate. D. Chrys. De laud. Paul. Hom. 6. and to accuse our Cre­ator, for not having equalled our condition to that of Angels; for though those pure spirits have great advantages over us, and that we hope for no other good than that which they possess, yet are we happy e­nough, since we are permitted to love God, and that we are made to hope, that our na­ture being by love transformed into his na­ture, we shall lose what we have of mortal, and perishable, to acquire what is incorrup­tible and eternal. This is the Consolation of divine Lovers, and this is the only means how to aspire, without blame, to that hap­piness, which Lucifer could not do, but with impiety. I cannot end this Discourse with­out justly reproaching those that whilst they may love God, engage their affections on the earth, or on earthly things, and de­prive themselves of that immense felicity which divine love promiseth them; for in loving of the creatures, they cannot share in [Page 212] their perfections, without doing the like in their defaults; after having laboured much they oft-times change an obscure and pea­ceable condition, into a more glorious, but a more dangerous one. So there is al­ways hazard in the love of the creatures, and the advantage that may be drawn from thence, is never so pure, but that it is ming­led with somewhat of misfortune. For what­soever passion we have for the creature, we are not sure the creature hath the like for us; yet this miraculous change, which pas­seth for the principal effect of love is made in this mutual affection, and in this cor­respondency of friendship. But we run not these hazzards in consecrating our love to God; his perfections are not accompanied with faults; and we know it cannot be dis­advantageous to us, to make a change with him. Our love is never without this ac­knowledgment, since it is rather the effect than the cause of his, and that we love not him, till he hath first loved us. He is so just as he never denies our affection the recom­pense which it deserves; he is not like those misbelieving Mistresses, who a­mongst the numbers of their Lovers, prefer him who is best behaved, before him that loveth best; in the commerce which we [Page 213] hold with him, we are sure that he that hath most charity, shall have most glory, and that in his Kingdom the most faithful lover shall be always the most honoured.

The SECOND DISCOURSE. Of the Badness of Love.

SInce there is nothing so sacred but meets with some sacrilegious person, which doth prophane it, Nihil in rerum natura tam sa­crum quod sa­crilegium non inveniat. Sen. we must not wonder if Love, which is the holiest Passion of our Soul, meet with impious persons, which corrupt it, and who contrary to its own inclination make it serve their designs; for love seeks only the Summum bonum; she is not without some sort of violence made to love her own particular good, which is but the shadow of what she desires; to a­buse it therefore, sin must disorder nature, and turn natural love into self-love, ma­king the Spring-head of good, the original of all our evil. For during the state of inno­cency, men had no love save only for good, and nature was so well temper'd with grace, as that all her inclinations were holy: In this happy condition, charity and self love [Page 214] were the same thing; and a man feared not to injure his neighbour by loving himself; but since his disobedience, his love changed Nature; he who looked upon another mans advantage and his own with the same Eye, began to separate them; and forgetting what he ought to God, he made a god of himself. He confounded all the Laws of In­noceney, and as if he alone had been in the world, he forsook the sweets of Society, he took a resolution to rule his affections by his own interests, and to love no longer any thing but what was useful and pleasing un­to him. This mischief, like poyson, disperst it self throughout the whole fabrick of Na­ture; and Reason cannot defend her self a­gainst it, without the assistance of Grace. The gallantest actions lost their lustre by this irregularity; Philosophy by all her precepts could not reform a disorder, which was rather in the bottom of Nature, than in the Will. She put some of her might to fight against this Monster, and spying a glimering of light amidst the darkness with which she was blinded, she confessed that man did not belong so much to himself as to his Country, and that he ought endeavour more the glory of the State, than the good of his own family. She thought that the love [Page 215] of our neighbour should be formed upon the love of our selves, and believed that in willing us to treat them as our selves, she had corrected all the abuse of Humane Na­ture. But this malady lying not only in the Understanding, her advice was not sufficient to cure it, so as she was enforced to confess that there was none could reform man, but he that made him. Thus shall we find no remedy for our misfortunes but by the as­sistance of Grace; and our desires have had no freedom, save since Jesus Christ came into the world to banish self-love from out our souls; for his coming had no other mo­tive, nor his Doctrine any other end, than the ruine of this dreadful Monster. He set­teth upon it throughout all his Maxims, and hardly doth any word proceed from his di­vine mouth which gives it not a mortal wound. He protests he would admit of no Disciples, who have not changed their self­love into an holy aversion; Si quis venit ad me, & non odit patrem suum, & ma­trem, & uxo­rem, & filios, & fratres, & sorores, adhuc autem & ani­mam suam, non potest meus esse disci­pulus, Luc. 14. and that he will not suffer any Subject in his Kingdom, who are not ready to lose their lives for the glory of their Soveraign. He condemns the excess of riches, and the love of ho­nour, only for that they nourish this inordi­nate Passion. and he obligeth us to love our enemies, only to teach us to hate our [Page 216] selves. Mortification and Humility, which are the ground-works of his doctrine, tend only to destroy this inordinate affection which we bear unto our Souls, or our Bo­dies. In fine, he hath appointed us charity, only to overthrow self-love, Interficiens inimicitias in semetipso. Eph. c. 2. and he died upon the Cross, only to make his enemy die, which is the cause of all our quarrels and divisions.

We ought also to confess that this evil includes all others, and that there is no disorder in the world which doth not ac­knowledge this for its original; and I am of opinion, that a man cannot only not make a good Christian of one that doth too ex­cessively love himself, but I hold that ac­cording to the laws of Policy and Morality, one cannot make a good man, nor a good Statesman, of such a man; for Justice it ab­solutely necessary in all manner of conditi­ons, and this Virtue cannot subsist with self-love. Justice will have a man endued with Reason, to prefer the inclinations of the soul before those of the body, and that he preserve all the rights of authority to the Soveraign. Self-love (which leans al­ways towards the flesh) will have the slave to govern his Master, and that the Body command over the Soul; Justice will have [Page 217] a good man not to wish for any thing which exceeds his merit, or his birth; and she in­structeth him, that to be happy and inno­cent he must prescribe bounds to his de­signs. Self-love commands us to follow our own inclinations, and to govern our desires only according to our Vanity; it flatters our Ambition, and to insinuate it self into us, it gives us leave to do what we please. Justice will have a good Statesman prefer the publick interest before that of his own house; that he be ready to lose his wealth, and to sacrifice his own person for the pre­servation of his Country; she perswades him that there is no death more glorious than that which is suffered for the defence of a mans Country; and that the Horatii and Scaevola's are famous in the Roman Hi­story, only for having sacrificed themselves to the Glory of their Common-wealth; though there be nothing more natural to a man than to love his Children, some men have been found, whom Justice hath made to lose this affection to preserve the like of good Statesmen; who solicited by this Vir­tue, have butcherd those whose fathers they were, teaching by so rigorous an example, that the love to a mans Country, ought to exceed the love to his own flesh and blood. [Page 218] A State cannot be happy wherein there [...] any doubts made of these Maxims, as oft [...] the publick interest shall give way unto th [...] particular, it shall always be near ruine, an [...] shall have no less trouble to defend it sel [...] against its subjects than against its enemies Self-love, this mean while makes a man la­bour only for his own pleasure or glory; [...] makes this the end of all his actions, an [...] doth so bind man up within himself, as [...] suffereth him not to consider the publick if he do his Country any service, it is in or­der to his own particular good; and whe [...] he seems most busie for the good of th [...] State, he wisheth the slavery thereof, [...] conspires its ruine: Marius & Scilla do wit­ness these truths; Pompey and Caesar ha [...] made us see how dangerous such Statesmen are, who love themselves better than th [...] Common-wealth; and who, so they ma [...] preserve their own power, fear not to [...] press their Countries liberty.

In Religion this unjust Passion is [...] more fatal, and Piety can never agree wi [...] Self-love. For there is no man that under­stands any thing, who will not affirm, th [...] to be godly, a man must submit himself [...] the will of God. That with like submissi [...] we ought to receive punishments and re­wards [Page 219] at his hands; that we must adore the thunder wherewith he smiteth us, and have as great respect unto his Justice as to his Mercy; that we must be cruel to our selves, to be obedient to him. That it i [...] Piety to [...]mmolate the innocent to him when he de­mands them; and that as there is no creature which owes not his being to his Power, there is none who is not bound to lose it for his Glory. Then what man is he who will submit to these truths, if he be a slave to self-love? and how shall he be faithful to God, if he be in love with himself? I con­clude then, that this inordinate affection is the undoing of Families, the ruine of States, and the loss of Religion; that to live in the world, a man must denounce war to this common enemy of Society, and that imita­ting the elements, which force their inclina­tions to exclude a vacuum, we must use vio­lence upon our desires, to overcome a Pas­sion so pernicious to Nature and Grace.

From this Spring-head of mischief flow three rivers which drown the whole world, and which cause a deluge, from the which it is very hard to save ones self; for from this inordinate love arise three other loves which poyson all souls, and which banish all Virtue from the earth. The first is the [Page] [...] [Page] [...] [Page 220] love of Beauty, which we term Incontinen­cie. The second is the love of Riches, which we call Avarice. The third is the love of Glory, which we call Ambition. These three capital enemies of mans welfare and quiet, corrupt all that belongs to him, and render him guilty in his soul, in his body, and in his goods. It is hard to say which of these three monsters is hardest to overcome; for to boot, with their natural forces, they have Auxiliaries, which they draw from our inclinations, or from our habits, and which make them so redoubted, that they are not to be overcome without a miracle. To consider them notwithstanding in them­selves, Ambition is the most haughty and the strongest; Voluptuousness, the most mild and soft; and Avarice the basest, and most opinionated.

These are fought against by divers means, and all Morality is busied in furnishing us with reasons to defend our selves against them. The Vanity of Honour hath cured some that have been thereof ambitious: Quosdam cum in consumma­tionem digui­tatis, per mil­le indignitates erexissent. For when they come to know that they labour­ed after a good which happened not to them till after death, and that from so many dangerous actions they could only expect to have their sepulchers adorn'd, or some commen­dation [Page 221] in History, they have ceased to covet an Idol, Misera subiit cogitatio ipsos laboraffe in titulum sepul­chri. Sen. De brev. vit. c. 19. which rewardeth ill the slaves that serve it; and that for a little applause which it promiseth them, obligeth them ma­ny times to shed their own bloud, or that of their neighbour. The infamy of the volup­tuous, the mischiefs which accompany them, the displeasures which follow them, and the shame which never forsakes them, have oft-times cured men to whom sin had left a little reason. Age may likewise be a cure for this; it is a disorder in nature to find a lascivious old man; and it is no less strange to see love under gray hairs, than to see those mountains whose heads are co­vered with snow, and whose bowels are full of flames. The misery of riches, the pain that is taken in accumulating them, the care in preserving them, the evils which they cause to their owners, Miser est om­nis animus vinctus amici­tia rerum tem­poralium, & dilaniatur cum eas amittit, & tunc sentit mi­seriam qua mi­ser est, & non antequam a­mittit eas. Aug. Confes. l. 4. c. 6. the ease which they afford to content unjust desires, and the sorrow caused by their loss, are considerations strong enough to make those contemn them who are not as yet become slaves thereunto. But when they shall exercise their tyranny upon the spirits, I esteem their malady incurable: Age which cures other Passions, encreaseth this. Covetous men never love riches more than when they are [Page 222] near losing them; and as love is then most sensible when it apprehends the absence of the party beloved; Avarice is most violent, when it apprehendeth the loss of its wealth. But without medling with another mans work, I shall content my self with saying, that to preserve a mans self from all these evils, he must endeavour to forgo self-love. For, as natural love causeth all the passions, inordinate love causeth all the Vices; and whosoever shall be vigilant in the weakning of this Passion by repentance and charity, shall find himself happily freed from Ava­rice, Ambition and Incontinency. But to ar­rive at this high degree of happiness, we must remember, that in whatsoever condi­tion Providence hath placed us, we are not for our selves, but for the publick; and that we must not love our selves to the prejudice of our Soveraign. We are in nature a porti­on of the Universe, in civil life a part of the State, in Religion we are the Members of Jesus Christ. In all these conditions, self­love must be sacrificed to universal love. In nature we must die to give place to those that follow us. In the State, we must con­tribute our goods and our bloud for the de­fence of our Prince; and in Religion, we must kill the old Adam, that Jesus Christ may live in us.

The THIRD DISCOURSE. Of the good Vse of Love.

MOrality considers not so much the goodness of things as the good use of them, she neglects natural per­fections, and puts a valuation only upon their rational employment; Metals are in­different to her, nor doth she consider them otherwise than earth, whose colour the Sun hath changed. Tollat malus divitias, inopes opprimuntur, judices cor­rumpuntur: Tollat bonus, pauperes pas­cuntur, oppres­si liberantur, captivi redi­muntur. Aug. Serm. 3. De S. Cyprian. But she blames the abuse, and commends the good husbanding thereof, she is troubled when wicked men abuse them to oppress the innocent, to corrupt Judges, to violate the Laws, and to seduce Women. She is well pleased when good men make use thereof to nourish the poor, cloath the naked, to set Captives at liberty, and to succour the miserable. There is no­thing more glorious than the vivacity wherewithal Nature hath endued men no­bly endued. 'Tis the key which opens unto them the Treasury of Science, be it either to acquire them, or to distribute them to o­thers; [Page 224] 'tis that which is acceptable to all companies, and 'tis a quality which is as soon beloved as seen. Yet doth not Morality esteem it otherwise than as it is well hus­banded; Celeritas in­telligendi, & acumen dispu­tandi, donum tuum est; sed inde non sacri­ficabam tibi: Itaque mihi non ad usum, sed ad perni­ciem magis valebat; nam quid mihi proderat bona tes non utenti bene? Aug. l. 4. Confes. 1. ult. and S. Augustine who acknowledg­ed it for a Grace, confesseth it hath been pernicious to him, by reason of his ill em­ployment thereof, and because he had en­tertained it amongst his errors. Love with­out all question is the holiest of all our Pas­sions, and the greatest advantage which we have received from Nature, since by the means thereof we may fasten our selves to good things, and make our souls perfect in the love thereof. 'Tis the spirit of Life, the Cement of the whole world, an innocent piece of art, by which we change conditi­on, not changing Nature; and we transform our selves into the party whom we love. 'Tis the truest and purest of all pleasures; 'tis a shadow of that happiness which the blessed enjoy. Earth would be Hell, if Love were vanisht thence; and it would be a great piece of rigour in God, if he should permit us to see handsom things, and forbid us to love them. But that we may the bet­ter govern this Passion, we must learn of Morality what Laws to prescribe unto it, and what liberty we must allow it.

[Page 225] There are three objects of our Love, God, Man, and Creatures deprived of Rea­son. Some Philosophers have doubted whe­ther we could love the first, or no; they were perswaded his greatness did rather re­quire our adoration than our love; but though this be a religious opinion, and that it merits the greater esteem since it pro­ceeds from the prophane; we cannot deny, but that we were endued with love, to unite us to God; for to boot, with our thorough sense of this inclination, to boot, that it is imprinted by Nature in the very ground­work of our wills, and that uninstructed by our Parents or our Teachers, we labour af­ter the Summumbonum: Reason teacheth us that he is the Abyss of all perfections, Deus nosteris est, quem amat id omne quod amare potest. Aug. and the Center of all love; so as a man need not fear committing any excess in loving him with all his might. He is so good as he cannot be loved so much as he ought to be; and let a man do his utmost, he is obliged to confess, that the goodness of God doth far exceed the greatness of mans Love. Such Souls as are elevated, Omnia offa mea dicent, Domine, quis fimilis tibi? Psal. 34. and approach nearer unto him, complain of their cool­ness; and wish that all the parts of their Bodies were turned into Tongues, to praise him; or into Hearts to love him. [Page 226] They are troubled, that since his greatness is so well known, his goodness is no more lo­ved; and that having so many subjects, he hath no more that love him. Modus aman­di Deum sine modo. Bern. We must not then prescribe any bounds to this Passion, when it hath respect unto God, but every one ought to make it his sole desire, and to wish that his heart were dilated, that he might infinitely love him, who is infinitely lovely; but we must take great heed, not to rob him of what doth so justly belong unto him; and we must remember, that though his goodness should not force his duty from us, we should be bound to render it unto him, in order to our own interest. For our love is never content but when it rests in God. It fears infidelity in the creatures, is never so assured of them, but that there re­mains some rational doubts; and though it should have such proofs of their good will, as that it were constrained to banish all sus­pition, yet would it fear lest death might take from it what good fortue hath given; & in one or other of these just apprehensi­ons it could not shun being miserable. But it knows very well that God is immutable, & that he never forsaketh us till we have for­saken him, it knows that God is eternal, and that death being no less distant from him [Page 227] than change, his affection cannot end, but through our infidelity.

'Tis true there are carnal souls, who complain that he is invisible, and who can­not resolve to give up their hearts to a Di­vinity which doth not content their eyes. But all things are full of him, his greatness is poured out in all the parts of the Universe; every Creature is an Image of his perfecti­ons, he seems to have made these pictures only to make himself be thereby known and loved; and if he should not have used this piece of skill, we need only consult with our own Reason to know what he is. Error cannot corrupt her, and in the souls of Pagans she hath verified Oracles. Anima licet carcere corpo­ris preffa, cum tamen resipis­cit, unum De­um nominat. Deus dedit, omnium vox est; ô Testi­monium ani­mae naturaliter Christianae: di­cens haec, non respicis Capi­tolium, sed ad Coelum, novit enim anima sedem Dei vivi. Tert. in Apol- Those very men who offered Incense unto Idols, knew very well that there was but one God; when Nature spake in their mouths, she made them speak like Christians, and they confess'd those truths, for which they persecuted the Martyrs. For as Tertullian observes, their soul was naturally Christian; when they were surprized with a danger, they implored the succour of the true God, and not that of their Iupiter: when they took an oath, they raised up their eyes towards heaven, & not towards the Capitol so as we must not complain that God is in­visible, [Page 228] but we must wish that he may be as much loved, as he is known. And more­over this complaint is no more to be admit­ted of, since the mystery of the Incarnation, where God became man, that he might treat with men; where he hath given sen­sible proofs of his presence, and where clothing himself with our nature, he hath suffered our eyes to behold his beauty, our hands to touch his body, and our ears to hear his voice. Since that happy moment he is become our Allie, and he who was our Soveraign, is become our Brother, to the end that this double quality might oblige us to love him with more ardor, and might permit us to accost him with more free­dom; we cannot then fail in the use of that love which we owe unto him, but by be­ing either too much reserved or too un­faithful. But the love we render to men may be defective in two manner of ways, and we may abuse it either in loving them too much, or not enough, as shall be shewn in the pursuit of this Discourse.

Friendship is certainly one of the chief effects of Love, and the harmlessest delight which men can take in Society. Very Bar­barians did reverence the Name thereof; those who despise the Laws of Civility, put [Page 229] an estimation upon the laws of friendship, and cannot live within their Forrests with­out having some whom they trust, who know their thoughts, who rejoyce at their good fortune, and who are afflicted when a­ny ill besals them. Thieves who intrench upon the publick liberty, who make war in time of peace, and who seem desirous to stifle that love which Nature hath placed in mankind, cease not to bear respect to friend­ship; they have a certain shadow of society amongst them; they keep their word, though with prejudice to their condition; tortures cannot sometimes make them violate their Faith; and they will rather lose their lives than betray their Companions. In fine, people subsist only by virtue hereof; Amicitia plu­rimas res con­tinet; quoquo te verteris, praesto est, ul­lo loco exclu­ditur, nunquam intempestiva, nuquam mole­sta est. Itaque non aqua, non igni, non aere (ut aiunt) plu­ribus locis uti­mur quam a­micitia. Cic. in Laeli. and who should banish friendship from off the earth, must raze Towns, and send men into Desarts. She is more powerful than the Laws, and who shall have well established her in Kingdoms, need neither tortures nor punishments to contain the wicked within their duties. But to be just she must have her bounds, to be true she must be founded up­on Piety; those who will love one another, must be united in faith, and must have the same sense of Religion; their friendship must be a study after Virtue, and they [Page 230] must labour to become better by their mu­tual communication; their souls should ra­ther be mingled than united; from this mixture a perfect community of all things must arise; their goods must be no more di­vided; and the words thine & mine (which cause whatever there is of division in the world must be totally banished; when their conditions meet together, friendship is not to be blamed; nay, the very excess thereof is to be prais'd, since being more divine than humane, & more grounded upon grace than nature, she should be freed from all those Laws which are only made for common friendship. But in the one and the other of them, the pains which accompany them must be endured, and we must remember, that as there is nothing so perfect in the world, but hath its faults, there is nothing so pleasing which hath not its dislikes. Friendship is that which sweetens life, and who is not therewithal endued, cannot hope for happiness; It is the most rational con­cord which this world can afford; and of as many pleasures as are, Ejus enim no­bis amara mors cujus dulcis e­rat vita. Aug. l. 19. De Civ. Dei. c. 8. I find none more harmless, nor more true, but it hath its in­commodity; and who begins to love, must prepare to suffer. Absence is a short death, and death is an eternal absence, which en­tayles [Page 231] upon us as much sorrow, as the pre­sence of the beloved gives satisfaction. A man who loseth his friend, loseth one half of himself, he is at once both alive & dead; and death accords not with life, save only to make him more miserable. But say they should be so fortunate in their fate, [...]go se [...]si an­mam meam & animam amici mei, unam fu­isse animam in duobus corpo­ribus. Et ideo mihi horrori erat vita, quia nolebam di­midius vivere, & ideo forte mori metue­bam, ne tutus ille moreretur quem mu [...]tum amaveram. Aug. l. 4. Co [...]. c. 6. as they should both die in one day, they could not shun the miseries which accompany life; they seem by being linkt together in affecti­on, to have given Fortune the greater hold of them, and their soul seems to be in two bodies, only that it may be the more capa­ble of grief. Aristotle therefore would not have a man to have many friends, lest he should be bound to spend his whole life in bewailing their misfortunes, or that exacting the same duty from them, he might not trouble all their joy, and make his friendship fatal. 'Tis true that these pains are pleasing, and that by a just dispen­sation of love they are always mingled with some contentment. Tears are sweet when Friendship is the cause of their shedding, if they ease him that sheds them, they com­fort him for whom they are shed; and they make them both taste of true pleasure in a common misery; thus their malady bears the cure thereof about with it, and deserves [Page 232] rather to be envied than pitied, since the sufferer and bemoaner are equally assured of their mutual fidelity.

But 'tis much the harder matter to regu­late the love between men and women, and to prescribe bounds unto a Passion which asks counsel only of it self, and which thinks it self not true, if it be not in excess. Therefore the greatest part of our Divines do blame it; Casuale est omne quod foemina est, ejus societas semper infesta, est, foedere suo magnas mole­stias praestat, & cui adhaeserit contra fas, in­sanabilem in­gerit plagam: de carbonibus scintillae dissi­liunt, de ferro rubigo intritur, morbos aspides sibilent, & mu­lier fundit concupiscentiae malum. Aug. lib. De Singu­larit. Cler. and though it be not faulty, but as it is dangerous, they forbid the use there­of, to shun the hazard. To say true, this vir­tue is never so pure, but that it hath some clouds, it easily slides from the soul into the body; and grant it could be without danger, it could never be without scandal. The age is too corrupt to judge uprightly of these communications; if they were publickly allowed of, they would serve for a cloak to irregular affections; and under pretence of friendship, every one would assume the li­berty to make Love. I know very well, there have been Saints in former ages, but they have not been exempt from calum­nies. Paulinus bare no respect to the Em­press Eudoxe, save only for that she was learned; he was enamoured of her mind, not of her body; and if he drew many times near to this fair Sun, it was that he might [Page 233] be thereby enlightned, not heated. Yet their frequent conversation caused Jealousie in young Theodosius; and an Apple as fatal as that of Paris, wrought the death of Pauli­nus, and Eudoxes banishment. I know there is no Sex amongst Souls, and that a mans mind may be found in a Womans Body. I know that Virtue undervalues not the ad­vantages of Beauty, and that she is oft-times more eloquent in the mouth of a fair Maid, than in the like of an Orator; I know there have been Muses as well as Amazons; and that men have no Endowments which wo­men possess not with as much or more of excellency. Augustus followed Livias Counsel, and consulted with her in his most important affairs, as oft as with Mecaenas, or Agrippa. Great Origen's School was o­pen as well to women as to men; he thought them no less capable of the Secrets of Lear­ning, or Mysteries of Religion, than men; so as a man may conclude, for these Rea­sons, and out of these Examples, that the conversation of women is no less profitable than pleasing, and that if there be danger in their friendships, there is therein likewise advantage.

But notwithstanding whatsoever all these discourses may perswade us, I am firmly [Page 234] of opinion, that an honest woman ought to have no other friend than her Husband; and that she gave a Divorce of friendship when she engaged herself in marriage. She must have no more Masters, nor Servants, since she hath given away her liberty, and she ought to suspect even the holiest affecti­ons, since they may serve for colors to lewd desires. Aculeus pec­cati est forma foeminea, & mortis condi­tio non aliun­de surrexit quam de mu­liebri substan­tia: Separami­ni deprecor à contagione pe­stifera. Quan­tumcunque fuerit unus­quisque longi­us ab adversis, rantum non sentit adversa. Et minus vo­luptatibus sti­mulatur, ubi non est fre­quentia volup­tatum, & minus avaritiae mo­lestias patitur, qui divitias non videt. Cyp & Aug De Singularit. Cler. Such complacencies as are found in those who are not of the same sex, are sel­dom innocent; the same discourse which entertains, works upon their wills; and love glides into the heart under the name of sutableness of disposition, and of Civility. The Malady is contracted before it be known; men are oft-times in a Fever before they feel any distemper; and poyson hath already infected the heart before we think the mouth hath swallowed it. Briefly, the danger is equal on all sides; men make strong assaults, and women weak defences. The freedom of conversation makes men more insolent, and the pleasingness thereof makes women less couragious. I shall therefore never approve of such friendships as may cause more harm than advantage, and which for vain satisfaction of the sense, hazards the souls health. We live un­der a Religion which commands us to for­go [Page 235] pleasures which are purely innocent; we are taught by a Master which commands his Disciples to pluck out such eyes, and cut off such hands as have been cause of scandal to them; we are brought up in a School where we are forbidden to look up­on the face of women; yet under pretence of a naughty custom we will have it lawful for us to win their Affections, and to contract Friendship with them, which be­ginning by irregular inclinations, are enter­tained by useless discourse, and end in cri­minal delights. Chastity runs hazzards e­nough, and needs not to have new Gins laid for her. The lustre of apparel, freedom of conversation, and that which is termed ci­vility make sufficient open war against con­tinency; there needs no addition of Wiles, or cunning to surprize her. When men shall be Angels, it shall be lawful for them to contract amity with women; when death shall have severed them from their bodies, they may without scandal converse toge­ther, and satisfie their inclinations; but as long as they shall have sense common with Beasts, and that Beauty shall make more impression on their senses than Virtue, they must imitate the Prophet, which had sen­tenced his eyes not to look upon those in­nocent [Page 236] countenances, which seemed not to infuse other than chaste thoughts. In fine, they should resolve never to approach near those malign Constellations, which burn more than they do enlighten, and which raise more tempests, than they shed light a­broad.

To remedy these evils, we must implore aid from Charity; for it is she that purifies Love, that reforms the excesses, and amends the errors thereof; she will not have it to be excessive, neither will she that it be con­fined to our own persons, or to our families; she knows that Love is disperst throughout all the world, & that when it goes from us, it passeth into our enemies; Incipit lici­tus amor conjugio, sed ad­huc carnalis est, quia com­munis cum pe­coribus. Secun­dus est amor filiorum, sed adhuc & ipse carnalis, non enim est lau­dandus qui a­mat filios, sed detestandus qui non amat fili­os suos; si ve­ro non amave­ris tuos, à ser­pentibus vince­ris. Aug. l. 15. Hom. 38. It takes its birth (saith St. Augustine) in marriage, Alius amor est propinquo­rum: jam esse videtur pro­prius hominis, si non consue­tudinis, qui tamen amat propinquos adhuc sangui­nem suum a­mat; amet ali­os qui non sunt propinqui sus­cipiat peregri­num, jam [...]ul­tum dilatatus est amor. Tan­tum autem crescit, ut à conjuge ad fi­lios, à [...]liis ad propinquos, à propinquis ad extraneos, ab extraneis ad inimicos per­veniat. Idem ibid. and en­largeth it self upon the children that pro­ceed from thence. But in this condition 'tis carnal. That Passion is not to be commen­ded amongst men, which is observed to be in Tigers, and a man cannot praise such na­tural affections in reasonable creatures, as are seen in the most savage beasts. In its progress it extends it self to our Kindred, and begins to be rational; for though he that loves his Parents, loves his Bloud, and that though his love forgo his own Person, it doth not forgo his Family, yet is his love [Page 237] more expiated than is the love of Fathers, and communicates it self to personages which are not so near unto him as are his Children; in the vigour thereof it passeth even unto strangers, it receives them into its house, it makes them share of what it hath, and not considering either their humors or their languages, their very having the as­pects of men is sufficient to make them the objects of its liberality; in this acceptation Love is well waxen, but to be perfect, it must descend even to our enemies, and in­duing us with strength to overcome our in­clinations, it obligeth us to do good to them who endeavour to do us harm. When it is arrived at this pitch, it may hope for reward; but if it stop in the middle of its Carier, it must expect nothing but punish­ment. These words comprehend all the use of this Passion, and I can add nothing thereunto which will not prove weak or useless; passing therefore forward, I come to the last Object of our Love, which is Creatures void of Reason.

I wonder that in this point all men joyn not with the Stoicks, and that their opinion passeth not for a law among all the people of the world; for they hold, that Creatures which want reason do not deserve our love, [Page 238] and that our will is given us only to tie us to God, or to man. Truly if this Maxim be a Paradox, I hold it extreamly rational; for what appearance is there that we should bestow our affection on Creatures which not knowing it, cannot be obliged to us for it, and having no obligation, cannot be con­scious of our affection? In my opinion no man can be more prodigal than is the ava­ritious man, since he engageth his affection to an insensible Metal, and that he loves without hope of being re-beloved. I think no man more irrational, than he who ties his love to the beauty of a flower, which for all its odour and splendor, is not sensible of the adoration that is given it. I cannot en­dure those extravagant men, who place all their Passions upon a Dog, or a Horse, which do them no other service than what they are carried unto, either by instinct, or by necessity. I therefore think the profit which we reap by them should be the rule of the affection we bear them; or, to speak more correctly, we must rather love ourselves in them, than them for our selves; for they are too much beneath us to deserve our love; and though some shadow of fi­delity be observed to be amongst Dogs, and some sparks of love amongst horses, yet [Page 239] both of them being void of reason, they are uncapable of friendship. To set our hearts on things insensible, is to prophane them. It is not just that the same soul, which may love the Angels, love dumb beasts; that the soul which may unite himself to God, join itself to Metals; and that it lodge in the same heart, the noblest of all spirits, with the most imperfect of all bodies. I would then make use of Gold, yet not love it; I would be Master thereof, yet not Slave thereunto; I would keep it for my occa­sions, not adore it; I would teach the whole world that it hath no valuation but what the good employment thereof bestows up­on it, and that it is no less useless in the bowels of the earth, than in the Coffers of the Avaritious.

But not to be mistaken in so important an affair, we must use some distinction, and say that the Creatures may be considered in a threefold acceptation; either as ways that lead us to our last end; and thus they ought to be loved: or as nets which stay us on the earth, and thus they ought to be shunned: or as Instruments which Divine Justice makes use of to punish us withal, and thus they ought to be reverenced: for when the Creatures lead us unto God, that they ex­press [Page 240] unto us his beauty, and that their per­fections raise us up to the consideration of him that is their fountain, there is no harm in loving them; and it were a piece of inju­stice not to acknowledge; Viditque Deus cuncta quae fe­cerat, & erant valde bona. Gen. 1. in them, him, whose Images they are; God himself hath invited us so to do; when he made them, he praised them; and having given them his approbation, he obligeth us to give them our love; yet this our love must be mode­rate, and must unite us no further to them than they may unite us to the Creator; we must look upon them as Pictures which we love not, but only for his sake whom they represent; Respondent & singula quaque eleamenta cla­mantia, & ipsis suis operibus suum demon­strantia artifi­cem. Aug lib. De Symbolo, Tract. we must consider their beauties as the shadows of the like in God, and ne­ver permit that their perfections engage us so strongly, that we reserve not freedom enough to forgo them, when our Souls health, or the glory of Jesus Christ requires it. If the Devil make use of them to seduce us, and if by the permission which he hath received from God, he employ them to tempt us: If he will make the Stars serve to make us Idolaters; if he will corrupt our in­nocence with gold; if he make our pride swell, or sooth our vanity with riches; and if by beauty he will rob us of our continen­cy, we must shun them as nets spred abroad [Page 241] in the world to surprize us: Creaturae Dei in odium factae sunt, & in ten­tationem ani­mabus homi­num, & in mul­cipulā pedibus insipientium. Sap. 14. and as things, which since the fall of man seem to have changed their inclination; since they labour now to undo him, as they formerly labour­ed for his welfare. If, in fine, they be ser­viceable to the justice of God, if through a zeal to his honour they pursue his enemies, if the earth quake underneath our feet, if the thunder roar above our heads, and if the fire and water agree to declare war unto us, we must suffer them with respect, Aliquando no [...] mundus dile­ctatione re­traxit à Deo; nunc tantis p [...]agis plenus est, ut ipse nos jam mundus mittat ad De­um. Ipsas ejus a­maritudines amamus, fugi­entem sequi­mur, perse­quentem dili­gimus, & la­benti inhaere­mus, Greg. Hom. 21. in Evang. and love them with so much ardency, as we may with less danger; for in this acceptation they have nothing of charm in them, which may flatter or abuse us; they are rather hateful than loving, they cause in us rather a fear of God than love of our selves, and by an happy effect they loosen us from the earth and raise us up to heaven; this coun­sel comprehends all that Religion teacheth us touching the use of the creatures, and whosoever shall upon occasions make use thereof, will by experience find that they are never less dangerous, than when most cruel, and that they never oblige us more than when they punish us most severely.

The FOURTH DISCOURSE. Of the Nature, Properties, and Effects of Love.

THose who judge of things by their appearances, imagine there is no­thing more contrary to man than Hatred, and that since he takes his name from Humanity, he should not tolerate a passion which breathes forth nothing but bloud, and finds no delight but in murder. Yet it is a part of his being, and if he need love, to fasten him unto objects which may preserve him; he hath need of hatred, to drive him from those that may destroy him. These two motions are so natural to all Creatures, as they subsist not but by the love of their like, and by the hatred of their contraries.

The world had been ruined ere this, had not the Elements, whereof it is composed, kept it in being, by their oppositions and accords; did not water by reason of the [Page 243] coldness thereof resist fire, fire would ere this have reduced all into ashes, and having no further fuel to nourish it, it would have consumed it self; our humors which are nothing but tempered elements preserve us by their natural Antipathies; and Choler would have dried up our whole body, were it not perpetually watered with flegm; so as the great and little world consist only by the contrariety of their parts; and if the au­thor which hath produced them, should ap­pease their difference, he would overthrow all his work, which would cease to love one another, if they ceased to hate their contraries. What is seen in Nature, is ob­served in Morality, where the soul hath her inclinations and aversions, to preserve and to defend her self, to fasten her self to things she likes, and to make her keep aloof off from what she likes not. And had not God indued her with these two Passions, she would be reduced to a necessity of suffering all the evils which assail her, not having power to oppose them, or hope to defeat them. Hatred is then as requisite as Love; we should have reason to complain of Na­ture, if having given us inclinations to what is good, she should not likewise have given us an aversion from the contrary; and if she [Page 244] had not indued our souls with as much vi­gour to shun objects which are prejudicial to her, as to draw near to these that are useful. These two inclinations differ then only in their objects, and to speak exactly, we must say, that Love and Hatred make but one and the same Passion, which chan­ges name according to their different uses; which is called Love, when it hath a liking to what is good; and Hatred, when it abhors what is evil. Leaving here the first effect of Hatred, which we have already considered, we will now examine the second, and will see what the nature, properties and effects thereof are.

Hatred in her birth is nothing else but a meer aversion in us from whatsoever is con­trary unto us. 'Tis an antipathy of our Ap­petite to a subject which displeaseth it; 'Tis the first impression which a true, or an ap­pearing evil makes in the lowest part of our soul, 'tis a wound which we have received from a displeasing object, and it is the be­ginning of that motion which our Soul makes to keep aloof off, or to defend it self from an enemy which pursues it. She hath this in common with Love, that she oft-times prevents Reason, and shapes her self in our will, not consulting with our judg­ment. [Page 245] She takes offence at divers things, which are not unpleasing in themselves; and many times one and the same object caus­eth Hatred and Love in two different per­sonages. Sometimes it so falls out, that accor­ding to the divers dispositions of our minds we like what formerly we have disliked; that which did hurt us, cures us, and becomes the remedy of the evil which it caused: she hath this of different with Love, that she is much more sensible. For Love is oft-times formed in our Souls be­fore we are aware; our friends must give us▪ notice thereof, and those whose company we keep, must teach us that we do love; we must reflect upon our selves to know this Passion in its birth, and as it is extream­ly delightful, it wounds us so pleasingly as we do not feel the hurt, till by process of time it become an incurable Ulcer. But Ha­tred discovers it self as soon as it is concei­ved, because it proceeds from an Object wherein we are only concern'd, as it hurteth us; it makes us suffer in its birth, and from the time that it possesseth us, it becomes our punishment.

It is as readily formed as Love, a mo­ment serves to produce it in our wills, not­withstanding the little care we have to en­tertain [Page 246] it; It disposeth its flames abroad in­to all the faculties of our Soul; and as the most active of all the Elements, it feeds upon whatever it encountereth; but it hath this of misfortune, that it is not so soon efa­ced as is Love; when it hath once taken root in the heart, there is no tearing of it out; time which hath produced it, preserves it; and Philosophy is defective of sufficient rea­sons, to cure a man who is affected with this troublesom malady. Religion it self is never more troubled, than when she op­pugns so opinionated a passion; & the Son of God seems to have descended upon earth, only to teach us to subdue Hatred, and to pardon our enemies. Neither did he oblige us to this duty, till he had suffered death for his enemies; he believed that to establish so strange a Doctrine, it must be confirmed by his example, authorized by his death, and signed by his own bloud. Thus did he declare war to a passion which hath this ad­vantage over other Passions, as that it end­eth not with our self; it is so dearly e­steemed of by men, as it is their sole enter­tainment. It serves to divert them when they are displeased; and though it corrode their Bowels, it gives content to their heart. I have heard of a Princess, who after [Page 247] having lost her Kingdom and her Liberty, found comfort in the hatred she bore her enemies; and confessed she was not so much possess'd with sorrow for her past happi­ness, as by her desire of revenge. We see fa­thers, who having their souls hanging upon their lips, and who being no longer able to live, do yet think how to continue their ha­tred; they leave it as an inheritance to their Children, they oblige them to eternal en­mity, and make imprecations against them, if they be ever reconciled to their enemies. In fine, this Passion is immortal, and as it resides in the bottom of the soul, it accom­panieth her whithersoever she goeth; & doth not forgo her, no not when she is loosened from the Body. This it is which the Poets (who are the most excellent Painters of our affections) would represent unto us in the persons of Eteocles and Polynices, who conti­nued their hatred after death, and who went to end the combat in Hell, which they begun on earth; this Passion lived in their bodies deprived of Sense, it passed by a se­cret contagion into their funeral Pile, and waged war in the flames which were to consume them.

But I wonder not that this Passion is so opinionated, since it is so daring; and I [Page 248] think it not strange that it continues after death, since it hath made men resolute to lose their lives for love of revenge, and that it makes them find some contentment in death, provided they see their enemies ac­company them therein. For Hatred ceases to be true when it becomes discreet, and we may say a man is not wholly possessed there­withal, when to spare his own bloud, he dares not shed the bloud of his adversary. When he hath given himself over to the tyranny thereof, he thinks he can never pur­chase the pleasures of revenge at too dear a rate. And propose whatever punishment you list unto him, he is well-pleased there­withal, provided his Passion may be satisfi­ed. Atreus wisheth to be overwhelmed un­der the ruine of his Palace, provided it fall upon his brothers head, and so cruel a death seems pleasing to him, so as he be therein accompanied by Theistes. In short, Hatred is very puissant, since all torments are endured to give it satisfaction▪ and it u­seth strange tyranny upon such as it posses­seth, since there is no fault which they are not ready to commit in obedience to it.

If the proprieties of Hatred be thus strange, the effects thereof are no less fatal. For as Love is the cause of all generous and [Page 249] gallant actions; Hatred is the rise of all base and tragical actions. And those who are advised by so bad a Counsellor, are capable of all the evil that can be imagined. Mur­der, and Paricide, are the ordinary effects of this unnatural Passion. 'Twas this, that made us see in the day-break of the world, that a man might die in the flower of his age, and that one brother was not secure in the company of another. 'Twas this, that found out weapons to dispeople the world, & to ruinate Gods goodliest workmanship. 'Twas this, that making man forget the sweetnes of his nature, taught him to mingle poyson in drinks, to shed humane bloud at Banquets, & to kill under pretence of hospi­tality; 'twas this, that first instituted that fatal art which teacheth us how to murder with method, how to kill men handsomly, and which forceth us to approve of Pari­cide, if it be done according to the laws of the world. 'Twas this, in fine, and not ava­rice, which tore up the bosom of the earth, and which sought within the bowels there­of for that cruel Metal wherewith it ex­erciseth its fury. And to describe in a few words all the evils it is cause of, it will suf­fice to say, that Anger is her first Master­piece, Envy her Counsellor, Despair her [Page 250] Officer; and that after having pronounced bloudy sentences as Judge, it self puts them in execution as Hangman. 'Tis true, that hatred never comes to these extremities, till it grow unruly; but this unruliness is almost natural thereunto; and unless Reason and Grace labour jointly how to moderate this Passion, it easily becomes excessive. The fierceness thereof is oft-times augmented by resistance; like an impetuous torrent it o­verthrows all the banks which oppose its fury, and when it's forbidden any thing, it believes it may lawfully do all things; therefore the remedy which is ordained for Love, is no less necessary for Hatred; and to heal an evil which becomes incurable by time, early withstandings must be made, lest gaining strength, it grow furious, and be the death of its Physitian, for having been negligent in its cure.

The FIFTH DISCOURSE. Of the bad use of Hatred.

THough the greatest part of effects produced by Hatred may pass for disorders; and that after having described the nature thereof, it may seem unprofitable to observe the ill use that may be made of it, yet that I may not fail in the laws that I have prescribed unto my self, I will employ all this discourse in discovering the injustice thereof, and I will make it ap­pear to all the world, that of as many A­versions as molest our quiet, there is hard­ly any one that is rational. For as all crea­tures are the workmanship of God, and bear in their Foreheads the Character of him that produced them, they have quali­ties which render them lovely; and good­ness, which is the principal object of Love, is so natural unto them, as it is not to be separated from the Essence; to cease to be good, they must cease to be; and as long as they have a subsistance in nature, we are ob­liged to confess, that there remains some [Page 252] tincture of goodness in them, which cannot be taken from them without an absolute annihilation. Thus God gave them his approbation when they were first made; he made their Panegyrick after they were cre­ated; and to oblige us to make much of them, he hath taught us by his own mouth that they were exceeding good; so as the Belief of their goodness is an Article of Faith in our Religion; whatsoever opposi­tion they may have to our humors, or our inclinations, we ought to believe that they have nothing of evil in them, and that their very qualities which hurt us, have their im­ployments, and their use; Poysons are ser­viceable for Physick; and there are certain maladies which are not to be cured but by prepared poyson; Monsters which seem to be errors of nature, or ordained by Provi­dence which cannot do amiss; they do not only contribute, by their ugliness, to heigh­ten the beauty of other creatures; but are presages, which advertise us of our misfor­tunes, and which invite us to bewail our sins; the very Devils themselves have lost nothing of their natural Advantages; and the malice of their Will hath not been a­ble to destroy the goodness of their essence; and though they are compleated in evil, [Page 253] they cease not to possess all the good which purely appertains unto their nature; Nulla pugna est sine malo, cum enim pug­natur, aut bo­num pugnat & malum, aut malum & ma­lum: aut si duo bona pugnant inter se, ipsa pugna est magnum ma­lum, Aug. l. 5. contra Iulian. c. [...]. they have yet that beauty which they did Idolatrize; they enjoy all their lights which they received at the first moment of their creation; they have yet that vigor, which makes a part of their being; and were they not restrained by the power of God, they would form thunder, raise storms, spread abroad contagions, & confound all the Ele­ments; 'tis true, that these their advantages contribute to their punishments, and that Divine Justice makes use of their En­lightnings and Beauties, to make them the more miserable; but this consideration, hinders not that their nature be not good, and that God see not in the Ground-work of their Being, Qualities which he loveth and conserveth, as he sees in the ground-work of their Wills, qualities which he detests and punisheth. Therefore 'tis that hatred seemed useless, and that to exercise it, a man must go out of this world to seek for creatures which may be the ob­ject of his indignation; for there is no­thing, neither in Heaven nor in Earth, which is not lovely; if we meet with any thing which crosses our inclinations, we must at­tribute it to our ill humor; or else we must [Page 254] blame sin for it, which having disordered our will, hath given it irrational antipathies, and forceth it to hate the workmanship of God. I know there are natural aversions between insensible creatures, and that it is no little wonder, that the worlds peace is caused by the discord of the Elements: If their bodies of which all other bodies are compounded, had not some difference amongst them, Nature could not subsist; anh 'tis Gods will that their warfare be the worlds quiet; but to boot, that their quar­rels are innocent, and that they set not up­on one another, to destroy, but to preserve themselves; their Combats are caused through their defaults, and their bad intel­ligence proceeds from their being imper­fect; for those other bodies which are more noble, and which natural Philosophers call perfectè mixta, do not wage war, they cease not to love; though they have different inclinations, and they oft-times use violence upon themselves, that they may not trouble the worlds tranquility; whence I infer, that if a man bear a dislike unto his neighbour, he ought to blame his own misery; and confess that his hatred is an evident proof of his defaults; for if he could reconcile the particular differences of others, he [Page 255] would love in them, what he should find in himself; and he could not hate that in their persons, which he should observe to be in his own; but he cannot tolerate their advantages, because he himself is not Ma­ster thereof; the bonds which Nature hath prescribed unto him, close him in within himself, and separate him from all others. If he were an universal good, he would love every particular good; and if he were indued with all the perfections that are found in all men, he would find none that would contrary him; but he is unjust because he is poor, and his aversion takes its original from his poverty; God suffers not these unfortunate divisions, his infinite love cannot be bounded; Diligis enim omnia quae sunt, & nihil odisti eorum quae fecisti Sap. c. 11. as he is the sum­mum bonum, he loves all things that bear any badge of goodness; as he gathers up within himself all these perfections, which are disperst abroad in his workmanship, he cherisheth them all together; and he hath no aversion, because he hath no de­faults. Hatred is then a weakness in our nature; a proof of our indigence; and a Passion which a man cannot with Rea­son employ against the handy-works of God.

Self-love is the secend cause of its dis­order; [Page 256] for if we were more regulate in our affections, we should be more moderate in our aversions; and not consulting with our own interests, we should hate nothing but what is truly odious; but we are so unjust, as we judge of things only by the credit we bear them; we condemn them when they displease us; we approve of them when they like us; and by a strange blindness, we esteem them good or evil, only by the satisfaction or displeasure which they cause in us; we would have them change qualities according to our humours; that like Camelions, they should assume our colours, and accommodate themselves to our desires; we would be the Center of the world, and that all crea­tures had no other inclinations, than what we have. The fairest seem ugly to us, because they are not pleasing to us; we are offended with the brightness of the Sun, because the weakness of our eyes cannot to­lerate it; the beams of Virtue dazle us, be­cause that virtue condemns our defaults, & truth (which is the second object of Love) becomes the object of our indignation, be­cause she censures our offences: there is no­thing of truly glittering, but her light; she discovers all the beauties of nature, which [Page 257] would to no use have produced so many rare Master pieces, had not truth taught us how to know them. Truth hath more lo­vers (saith St. Austin) than Hellen of Greece; Pulchrior est v [...]ritas Christi­anorum quam fuit Helena Graecorum: & pro illa fortius nostri martyres adversus Sodo­mam quam pro illa illi tyrones adversus Tro­jam dimicave­ru [...]t. Aug. 20. Hieronym. all Philosophers court her; she is the subject of all their contestations, she infuseth Jealousies into them, and they dis­pute with as much heat to possess her, as do two Rivals to enjoy a Mistress; every one seeks her out by several ways: Divines in her Fountains head, which is Divinity; Naturalists in the bowels of the earth; Al­chymists, in the bosom of Metals; Pain­ters and Poets, under Colours and Fables; yet this beauty, which causeth so much love to the whole world, ceaseth not to have enemies; she angers those she would oblige, she loseth her friends in thinking to pre­serve them; if she make her self be beloved of them by instructing them; Homines a­mant verita­tem lucentem, oderunt eam redarguentem. Aug. lib. 10 Confess. c. 28. she makes her self be hated by reprehending them; and she then becomes odious, when she ought to be most beloved. It is therefore ex­treamly dangerous to employ a Passion, which assails Virtue oftner than Vice; and which contrary to the design of him that in­dued us therewithal, undertakes good, and wages war with it, because having some shadow of evil, it crosses our interests, or [Page 258] our delights. For remedy of this evil, I would advise, to consider well the things which we hate, and to look on them on that side which may render them agreeable unto us; for as they are good in their foun­dation, we shall always find some quality in them, which will oblige us to love them; and we shall observe even in our enemies some advantages, which will force an esti­mation from us; the injuries they have done us, and whereupon we ground the ju­stice of our resentments, will furnish us with reasons to excuse them, Puer est? aetati donetur, nescit an peccet: mu­lier est? errat. Laesus est? non est injuria pati quod prior ipse feceris. Rex est? si nocentem punit, cede ju­stitiae; si in­nocentem, cede fortunae. Bonus vir est qui in­juriam fecit? noli credere. Malus est? noli mirari. Dabit poenas alteris quas debet sibi & jam sibi de­dit, quia pec­cavit. Sen. l 1▪ De Ira. c. 30. and if we will calmly examine them, we shall confess, that there is hardly any injury, which bears not with it its excuse; for (that I may make use of Seneca's words, and to confute Christians by Infidels) methinks there can no outrage be done, which may not be sweetned, when a man shall consider the motive, or the quality thereof. Hath a woman offended you? you must pardon the weakness of her sex; and remember, that she is as subject to do amiss, as to change. Is it a Child that hath injured you? you must excuse his age, which suffers him not yet to distinguish between what is good & bad. Hath your enemy used outrage to you? it may be you have obliged him so [Page 259] to do; and in this case Reason wills that you suffer your turn about, for what you have made him suffer: Is it your King that un­dertakes you? if he punish you, you must honour his Justice; if he oppress you, you must give way to his Fortune: does a good man persecute you; disabuse your self, and forgo that Error, and give him no lon­ger a quality, which his fault hath made him lose. Is it a naughty man that hath offended you? wonder not at it; effects hold of their causes; you will find some body that will revenge you; and without that wish, you are already revenged, and he is already punished, since he is faulty.

The SIXTH DISCOURSE. Of the good use of Hatred.

SInce Nature makes nothing unuse­ful, and that of so many things that she produceth, there is not any one which hath not its employment; Hatred must find out its use; and this Passion which is born in us together with Love, [Page 260] must find out some objects upon which it may innocently discharge its fury; but since nature loves her workmanship, since this common Mother bears an affection to all her Children, and that she keeps them in so good a correspondency, as that those who violate it, pass for Monsters; Hatred must likewise bear a respect unto them, and must go out of the world to find a Subject which may provoke its indignation; it must fight with the disorders of our soul, and must charge such enemies, as would destroy Virtue; yet must it take great heed lest it be deceived by appearances, and that thinking to do an act of Justice, it commit not parri­cide; for good lies oft-times hidden under the bark of evil, and things seem evil un­to us, because they are contrary to us; their contrariety is notwithstanding a per­fection; that which thwarts our humour, may agree with the humours of others; and what is not pleasing to our eyes, contribute to the beauty of the Universe; This diffe­rence of affection makes it appear, that the evil which we hate, is rather imaginary than true; and that we must rather lay the fault upon opinion, than upon nature. Sin is therefore the only object of hatred; to use it aright, we must govern our hatred [Page 261] according to Gods Example; we must de­clare war against this Monster, sin; which God hath chased out of Heaven; which he pursues upon the Earth, and which he punisheth in Hell; for this Passion is the chastisement of the greatest crimes, it is the punishment of Paricides, who defend them­selves contrary to the Justice of men: It besiegeth tyrants in their Palaces, sets up­on them in the midst of their Guards, and maugre the fortune which protects them, it exacts reason for all the violences which they have committed; Inpunita tu credis esse quae invisa sunt? aut ullum sup­plicium gravi­us existimas publico [...] Sen. l. 2. B [...]ne­fi [...]. c. 17. for they are not un­punished who are hated by all people, and sin is not without punishment, which draws publick Hatred upon the Author there­of.

But as we are not made Judges of other men, and that Gods Justice demands not an accompt of us for other mens sins, me­thinks our own sins are the only legitimate objects of our hatred; our neighbors sins may admit of some excuses; we ought to suspend our judgments, and withhold our aversions, since we know not their inten­tentions; when they are become so publick, as they can be no longer dissembled, they should rather excite compassion in us, than hatred, and should rather draw tears from [Page 262] our eyes, than reproachs from our mouths; since God excuses them, we ought not to condemn them, and since he hides them, we ought not to publish them. I should not notwithstanding blame a man, who prefer­ring Gods glory before the Creatures wel­fare, should wish that the guilty might be punished, or who not being able to tolerate them, should avoid their company, and make his indignation be thereby known; for the hatred of sin is an act of justice & the zeal which makes us detest sinners, is an effect of Charity. Perfecto [...]dio oderam illos; & inimici fa­cti sunt mihi. Psal. 138. David gave over praising of God, that he might make imprecations against the wicked; and thought to assure God of his love, by assuring him of the hatred which he bore unto his enemies; but that this aversion may be pleasing unto him, it must be perfect as was that of David; and to be perfect, Perfectum o­dium est quod nec justitia, nec scientia caret; at nec propter vitia oderis homines, nec vitia propter homines dili­gas Aug. lib. De vera Inno­cent. it must have two conditions which his had; it must hate sin, and love nature; it must detest the work of the crea­ture, and cherish the work of God; by reason of Wisdom and Justice, it must not love sin, for the mans sake; neither must it hate the man for the sins sake; with these restrictions, a man may make good use of hatred; This guilty Passion becomes inno­cent, it takes part with two excelent virtues; [Page 263] and guided by grace, it is serviceable, at once, both to justice and charity. But it is much safelier exercised against our selves; and we run much less danger in hating our own imperfections, than in hating the like of our neighbours; for self-love keeps us from exceeding therein, Qu [...]m verum est quod reg­num coelorum vim patitur, & qui vim faciunt diripiant illud? Quanta enim opus est, ut homo diligat in [...]micum, & oderit seips [...] utrumque enim jubet, qui [...]d regnum [...]-rum vocat. Aug, l. 1. De Serm. Domini in monte c. 25. and notwithstan­ding any whatsoever holy fury Charity in­spires in us, it is moderated by the incli­nation which we have to love our selves. Therefore 'tis, that the Son of God wills that the hatred of our selves be the founda­tion of his Doctrine; He receiveth no Disciples into his School, whom he teach­eth not this Maxime; he seems to have a Design to banish self-love from off the earth, and to turn this irregular affection in­to an holy Aversion; He teacheth us, that we are criminal, and that entring into the zeal of divine Justice, we should hate that which it hates, Qui amat animam suam, perdet eam; & qui odit ani­mam suam in hoc mundo, in vitam aeter­nam custodit eam Ioan. 12. and punish that, which it chastiseth. He would have us to be all [...]ce for what concerns our selves, and all fire for what concerns our friends. In fine, Hatred and Love, Aversion and Inclination, are the two virtues which we learn in his School; but he will have us husband them so, as that bestowing all love upon our neighbours, we reserve nothing but hatred [Page 264] for our selves; 'Tis true, that this Com­mandment is more rigorous in appearance, than in effect; for whatsoever severity he witnesseth, he breaths nothing but sweetnes; He hides the name of Love, under that of Hatred; Magna & mira sententia, quē ­admodum sic hominis in a­nimam suam amor ut pere­at, odium ne pereat: si ma­le amaveris tunc odisti: si bene oderis, tunc amasti. Foelices, qui oderunt custo­diendo, ne perdant aman­do. Aug tract. 41. in Ioan. and by obliging us to hate our selves, he ordaines us to love our selves well.

But all people do not agree in the manner that must be held to observe this. I am offen­ded to see that Christians do not better ex­plicate this Maxim, than prophane men do; and that they confound Seneca's Doctrine, with that of Iesus Christ: for the greatest part of Interpreters imagine, That the Son of God, presupposing that we are compo­sed of two parts, which fight one against the other, will have us to take part with the more noble, against the more ignoble; that we prefer the inclinations of the soul, before those of the body; and that living like Angels, and not like Beasts, all the ima­ginations of our hearts be rational: certain­ly had he had no other design than this, we must a vow, that he flies no higher a pitch, than does Seneca; and that banishing only the love of the body (which is the more gross, and less faulty) he should have left the love of the Soul (which is the more de­licate, [Page 265] and the more dangerous.) For this Philosopher pleads always for the Soul a­gainst the Body; Honestum ei vile est, cui corpus nimis charum est. Agatur ejus diligentissime cura: ita ta­men ut cum exigit ratio, cum dignitas, cum fides, in ignem mitten­dum sit. Sen. Ep. 14. all his gallant Maximes tend only to re-establish Reason in her Em­pire, and to give her absolute power over the Passions; He cannot endure, that a Subject should become a Soveraign; and pride which enlivens all his Doctrine, fur­nisheth him with strong reasons to oppose voluptuousness. He will have the Soul to treat her Body as her slave; that she grant unto it nothing but things necessary, and abridge it of all superfluities: Major sum, & ad majora ge­nitus, quam ut mancipium sim corporis mei: quod e­quidem non aliter aspicio quam vincu­lum aliquod libertati meae circundatum. Nunquam me caro ista com­pellet ad me­tum, nunquam ad indignam bono viro si­mulationem, nunquam in honorem hu­jus corpusculi mentiar. Sen. Ep. 65. He will have her nourish the Body, to the end, that it may be serviceable to her; He will have her love it only as a faithful servant, that she employ it to execute her designes; But he wills likewise, when Reason shall require it, she abandon it to the flames, expose it to savage beasts, and that she oblige it to un­dergo deaths as cruel as shameful. All these are bold cogitations; we must confess they proceed from a generously minded man, and that he makes good use of the vanity of the Soul, to overcome the delights of the Body; but by curing one evil, he causeth a greater, by closing up a slight wound, he opens a deeper; by chasing self-love from the Body, he drives it into the Soul; and [Page 266] to prevent a man from becoming a beast, Cum visum fu­erit, distraham cum illo socie­tatem; & nunc tamen cum haeremus, non erimus aequis partibus: Ani­mus ad se omne ejus ducet Contemptus cor­poris sui certa libertas. Idem Ibidem. he endeavours to make him a Devil: these who side with this Philosopher, are enforced to confess this Truth, and if they who hold his Maximes would examine them­selves well, they will confess, that they rather puffe up than heighten Courage: and that they inspire the soul with more of vanity, than strength, But the Doctrine of Jesus Christ produceth a clean contrary ef­fect; for it subdues the body without ma­king the soul insolent; Philosophi fu erunt Epicurei & Stoici: illi secundum car nem, isti secun dum animam viventes; sed nec isti, nec illi secundum De um viventes. Contulerunt illi cum Apostolo dum erat Athenis. Dice bat Epicureus, mihi frui carne bonum est: di cebat Stoicus, mihi frui mea mente, bonum est: dicebat Apostolus, mi hi adhaerere Deo bonum est Errat Epicu­reus, fallitur & Stoicus; Beatus enim est cujus nomen Domi­ni spes ejus. Aug. lib. De verbis Apostoli. Serm. 13. it sets at one and the same time, both upon Pride and voluptu­ousness; and whilst it ordains mortification, to submit the senses to Reason, it commands abnegation to subject the will unto God. Therefore (if it be lawful for me to explain the intentions of Jesus Christ, and to serve him as an interpreter) I believe that the Hatred which he requires from us, should pass from the Body to the soul; and that to be perfect, it should extend it self to all the disorders that sin hath wrought in us; for nature hath lost her purity; and the two parts whereof we are composed, are be­come equally criminal; the inclinations of the soul are not more innocent than are those of the body, the one and the other of them have their weaknesses; & let Philoso­phers [Page 267] say what they please, they are both corrupted; the understanding is clouded by darknesses; ignorance is natural thereun­to, it learns with difficulty, forgets easily; though truth be its object, it forgoes truth for falshood, and is enforced to acknow­ledg by the mouth of the wisest man in the world, that there are some errors, which is easilier perswaded unto than to some truths. Memory is not more happy, though she pass for a miracle of Nature, Quid enim est quod cum la­bore memini­mus, ine la­bore oblivisci­mur; cum labo­re discimus, sine labore inertes sumus? Nonne hinc apparet in quid, velut pondere suo, proclivis sit vitiosa natura, & quanta ope, ut hinc libere­tur, indigeat [...] Aug. l. 22 De Civ. Dei. c 22. that she keeps deposited all the species she is trusted withal, that she boasts to represent them without confusion, and to be the enlivened treasure of all wise men; yet since our dis­obedience she is become unfaithful, by reason of a contagion, which hath infected all the faculties of the Soul; [...]e fails us at our needs, and furnishes us rather with unuseful, than with necessary things; the Will, as most absolute, is also most crimi­nal; for, though it have so strong inclina­tions for the Summum bonum, as that sin hath not been able to eface it, yet she indif­ferently betakes her self to all objects that delight her; not listning to the advice of Reason, she follows the errors of opinion, and is guided by the report which the sen­ses make, which are ignorant and unfaith­ful [Page 268] messengers; so as man is bound to make war as well against his Soul, as his Body, and to extend his hatred to both the parts which go to his composition, since they are equally corrupted; Odit te Deus qualis es; sed amat te qua­lem vult te esse Et tu debes te odisse qualis es Aegrum enim attende: Ae­ger aegrotan­tem se odit qualis est: in­de incipit con­cordare cum medico, quia & medicus o­dit eum qua­lis est. Nam i­deo vult sanum esse, quia odit eum febrici­tantem: & est medicus febris persccu­tor, ut sit ho­minis libera­tor. Sic pecca­ta tua febres sunt animae tuae, & ideo debes eas cum Deo medico odisse. Aug. lib. De Decem Chordis. c. 8. and to obey Jesus Christ, he must fight against the darkness of his understanding, the weakness of his me­mory, the wickedness of his will, the error of his imagination, the perfidiousness of his senses, and the rebellion of all the parts of his Body. These evil qualities which spoil the workmanship of God, are the true ob­jects of our aversion; 'tis the evil we may hate with innocence, and with Justice pu­nish; 'tis the enemy we are obliged to fight with, and to overcome; for to comprehend in few words the intentions of Jesus Christ, and the obligation of Christians, we must hate in our selves all those sins which dis­order hath placed there, and which grace could not suffer there; we must destroy in our selves all that grace will have destroy'd: but very well knowing that in this combat the victory is doubtful, we must humbly intreat the Son of God, who prepares Crowns for the Victor, to endue us with Charity, to the end that thereby self-love may be diminished in us, and the detestati­on of our selves augmented.

The FIRST DISCOURSE. Of the Nature, Proprieties and Effects of Desire.

AS Good is the only Object of Love, it never changeth form, but it obligeth this Passion to undertake new Customes; she depends so absolutely upon it, as she changeth names and offices, as oft as it changeth condition; when it is pre­sent, and discovers unto her all its Beau­ties, she swims in pleasure; when it runs any hazard, she is seized on by fear; [Page 270] when it is assaulted by enemies, she takes up arms, and grows cholerick, to defend it; when it is parted from her, she is afflicted, and suffers her self to be over-born with grief; when it is absent, she consumes her self in wishes, and chargeth her desires to go find out an object, the far distance whereof causeth all her anxieties (for Desire is no­thing els but the motion of the soul towards a good which she already loveth, but doth not as yet possess; she extends her self, that she may arrive at it; she endevors to forsake her body, and to separate her self from her self, that she may join her self to what she seeks after, she forgets her own delights, that she may not think of any thing save her be­loved object; she forceth her self to over­come Nature and Fortune; and in spite of them, to render present the absent good which she desires.

By this Definition, it is easie to observe the proprieties of Desire; the first whereof is restlesness, which will not suffer the soul, which hath conceived it, to taste any true contentment; for this soul is in a violent condition; she fights with the body which she inanimates, that she may unite her self to an object which she loveth; Nature de­tains her in the one, and Love carries her to [Page 271] the other; she is divided between these two powerful Soveraigns, Desideria oc­cidunt pigrum. Prov. 21. and she feels a tor­ment little less rigorous than death. Thus have we seen men, who to free themselves thereof, have voluntarily condemned them­selves to fearful punishments; and who have esteemed all remedies pleasing, which could cure so vexatious a malady. Banish­ment is certainly one of the cruellest pu­nishments, which Justice hath invented to chastise the guilty; it separates us from all we love, and seems to be a long Death, which leaves us a little life, only to make us the more miserable. Notwithstanding we have heard of a Mother, Inventa est mulier, quae pati maluit exilium, quam desiderium. Sen. De Conso­lat. ad Helvet. c 18. who chose rather to suffer the rigor of this torment, than the violence of Desire; and who would accom­pany her son in his banishment, that she might not be necessitated to lament his ab­sence, and wish for his return. Thus Na­ture which saw that Desire was an affliction, ordained Hope to sweeten it; for whilst we are upon the earth, we make no wishes, whereof our mind doth not promise us the accomplishment; these two motions of our soul are only divided in hell, where divine Justice hath condemned her enemies to frame Desires void of hope, and to languish after a happiness which can never befall [Page 272] them. They long after the Summum bonum, & whatever hatred they conceived against that God which punisheth them, they cease not, notwithstanding, to love him naturally; and to wish they might enjoy him, though they are not permitted to hope they shall: This Desire is cause of all their sufferings; and this languishment is a more insufferable torment than the scorching flames, than the company of the Devils, and than the eterni­ty of their Prison; could they be without Desire, they should be without anguish; and all those other pains which astonish vul­gar souls, would seem supportable to them, were they not adjudged to wish a happi­ness which they cannot hope for.

But it is not in Hell only that this Passion is cruel, she afflicteth all men upon earth; and as she serveth divine Justice, as a means wherewithal to punish the guilty, she is serviceable unto mercy, as an holy piece of cunning wherewithal to exercise the inno­cent; for Gods goodness causeth them to consume in desires; they are in a disquiet which cannot end but with their lives, they strive to get free from their bodies; Desiderium habens dissol­vi & esse cum Ch [...]isto. Phil. cap. 1. they call in death into their succour; and say with the Apostle, I desire to be dissolved, and to be with Christ; Justice employs Desires to re­venge [Page 273] her self upon sinners; and by a no less severe than rational guidance, she gives them over to this Passion to torment them; Tradidit illos Deus in desi­deria cordis eorum. Rom. 1. their desires tend only to afflict them, and their soul frames unruly wishes, which failing of effects, leave them in a lan­guishment, which lasts as long as doth their life. In fine, Divinity knowing that this Passion is the cause of all our misfortunes, hath thought, that she could not describe Happiness better unto us, than in teaching us, it was the end of all Desires. Beatitudo desideriorum quies. D. Thom. Philosophy would have said, that it is the end of all our evils, and the beginning of all our good, that it makes us forget our miseries by the sweets of her delights; but Divinity which very well knows that desires are the most violent punishments which we, suffer here below, is content to say, that happiness was the period thereof, & that when we should begin to be happy, we should cease to wish; we must also confess that Desire fastens it self to all the other Passions of our soul, and that it either furnisheth them with weapons wherewithal to fight, or with strength to afflict us; for those Passions which make most havock in our hearts, would be either dead or languishing were they not animated with Desire. Love is only cruel because it [Page 274] coveteth the presence of what it loveth: Hatred gnaws not on our Bowels, save on­ly because it desireth revenge; Ambition is only angersom, because it aspires after Honour; Avarice tortures the Avaritious, only because it thirsts after riches; and all Passions are only insupportable, because they are accompanied by Desire, which like a contagious Malady is shed abroad throughout all the affections of our Soul to make us miserable.

If it be thus cruel, it is not much less shameful; and we are obliged to confess, that it is an evidence of our weakness and indigency; for we never have recourse to wishes but when our power fails us; our desires never do appear, but when we can­not effect them; they are marks of our im­potency, as well as of our love; it teacheth Kings upon earth, that their will exceeds their power, and that they would do many things which they cannot. I know that desires inheartens them to proud underta­kings, where difficulty is always mixt with glory; I know they excite their courage, and that they produce that general heat, without which nothing of gallantry is ei­ther undertaken or effected; but they like­wise teach them, that there is none but God [Page 275] alone (who is able to do what he will) that maketh not fruitless wishes; and that it ap­pertains to him to change when he pleaseth desires into effects; he rather wills than wishes; and doth rather resolve events than desire them: but amongst Princes their im­potency hinders oft-times the execution of their desires; they are enforced to make Vows, and to implore aid from Heaven, when they fail of help on earth; poor Alex­ander seeing his dear Ephestion die, could not witness his love unto him, but by his desires; He who distributed the Crowns of Kings that he had conquered, and who made Soveraigns Slaves, could not restore health unto his Favourite; the vows which he offered up to heaven for his amendment, were as much evidences of his impotency, as of his sorrow, and taught the whole world, that Princes wishes witness their weakness.

They are also publick marks in all men of hidden poverty, for every soul that de­sires is necessitous; the soul that desires for­goes her self, to seek out in another what she finds missing in her; she discovers her mise­ry by making her desires known, and tea­ches the whole world, that the felicity which she possesseth is but in appearance, [Page 276] since it satisfieth not all her desires: Great Tertullian hath therefore worthily exprest the nature of this Passion, Qni optat, honorat. Tert. De Poenitent. Desiderium honor rei desideratae, & dedecus d [...]si­deranti. when he says, it is the glory of the thing desired, and the shame of him that doth desire; for a thing must be lovely to kindle our desires, it must have charms which may draw us, and per­fections which may stay us; but for certain likewise, the will that doth desire must be indigent, and must stand in need of some­what which makes it seek out a remedy. Desire then is the honour of beauty, and the shame of the unchaste; it is the glory of Riches, and the Avaritious mans infamy; the praise of dignity, and the Ambitious mans blame; and as oft as Princes are prone to this Passion, it gives us to know, that their fortune hath more of glittering in it than of real truth; that she gives not all the contentments she promiseth, since they are constrained to descend from their Thrones, to quit their Palaces, Dixi Domino, Deus meus es tu, quoniam bonorum meo­rum non eges. Psal. 16. Deus passim in Scripturis vo­catur Sadui. id est. sibi suf­ficiens. and by shameful pro­secution to seek out a forreign good which they have not in themselves. The greatest praise which the Holy Scripture gives to God, is that, whereby they are taught that he is all-sufficient in himself; and that pos­sessing all things in the immensity of his Essence, he is not tied to wish for any thing, [Page 277] nor to forgo his repose, to seek for content­ment in his creatures; the world contri­butes nothing to his greatness: if the worlds place should be supplied by a vacuity, and that there were no Angels nor men to know and love him, his felicity would be no whit the less intire; and all the praises which we now give him, add nothing to his glory; when we offer sacrifices unto him, when we make the earth resound with the noise of his praises, when we burn Incense upon his Altars, and enrich his Temples with the spoyls of our Houses, we are bound to protest, that all our Presents are of no use to him, that he obligeth us in accepting them, and that we offer up nothing to his greatness, which we have not received from his liberality; Desire is then a mark of indi­gence, and whatsoever creature wisheth, declares its poverty.

But not to dishonour this Passion totally, we must confess it is also a proof of our dignity, for it extends it self to all things, and pretends some right to whatsoever can enter into our imagination; it seeketh out effects in the bosom of their Causes, per­swades it self it may aspire unto whatsoever may be conceived, and that it may add un­to the number of its riches, all the goods [Page 278] which as yet it doth not possess; it is humo­red with whatsoever is possible; it is of so great a reach, as it embraceth all that for­tune promiseth; and nothing hath at any time happened to the most fortunate men in the world, which it thinks not it may with some sort of Justice expect. Ecce nos reli­quimus omnia, & secuti sumus te, quid ergo erit nobis? Matth. 19. Multum dese­ruit qui vo­luntatem ha­bendi dereli­quit. A se­quentibustanta relicta sunt, quanta à non sequentibus desiderari po­tuerunt. Greg. Magn. hom. 5. in Evang. A Father of the Church hath therefore said, that the Apo­stles forgoing nothing, had yet forgone ve­ry much, since they had forgone their own desires; and that despoyling themselves of a Passion, which in their greatest poverty gave them a right to all riches, they might boast to have forsaken all things for Jesus Christ; for the heart of man hath an infinite capacity, which can only be filled with the Summum bonum; it is always empty, till it possess him that made it, whatever else of good makes it the more hungry; and not be­ing able to satisfie it, they irritate the de­sires thereof, but do not appease them; hence it is, that we cannot bound our desires, but that the accomplishment of one begets an­other, and that we run from one object to another to find him out, Infinita à con­cupiscentia ex­istente, homi­nes infinita desiderant. Arist. 1. Polit. c. 6. of whom, the rest are all but shadows.

Hence proceed all the unruly desires which gnaw upon the hearts of the greatest Monarchs; hence did Alexander's ambition [Page 279] proceed, who thought the earth too little, and who was offended, that his Conquests should be bounded by the limits of the world: hence did Croesus his avarice derive, who thought himself poor, Cumte habet anima, plenum est desiderium ejus; & jam nihii assud quod destdere­tur, exterius restat. Du n autem aliquid exterius deside­rat, manifestum est quod ie non [...]abet in­terius; quo habito nihil est quod ultra desideret. Si autem creatu­ram deside at, continuam famem habet; quia licet quod desiderat de creaturis adi­piscatur, vacua tamen rema­net, quia nihil est quod eam impleat, nisi tu, ad cujus imaginem est creata. Aug. Soliloq. c. 30. though he were the richest of all the Romans; & that he pas­sed over hideous Desarts to war against a people whose riches were their sole fault. These disorders have no other rise, than the capacity of our heart, & the infinity of our desires, which pursuing the good which solicits them, and finding none that can satisfie them, go always in search for new ones, and never prescribes any bounds unto them; for though our understandings be not sufficiently enlightned to know the su­preme truth in all his extent, and that our wills have not force enough to love the Summum bonum, as much as he is lovely, yet the one and the other of them cease not to have an infinite capacity, which all the things of the earth cannot fill: a natural truth, how elevated soever it be, serves but as a step to our understandings, whereby to raise us up yet to an higher truth; & a crea­ted good, how rare soever it be, doth only enlarge our heart, and dilate our will to make it capable of what is yet more excel­ent; so do our desires perpetualy change ob­jects, [Page 280] they despise such as they formerly va­lued, and advancing still forwards they be­come at last sensible that nothing can stop them, but he that can satisfie them. From these three proprieties which we have ex­plained, it is easie to observe the effects which our desires produce in us; or forth of us; for since they separate the soul from the body, they cause all these extasies, and ravishments, which are attributed to the ex­cess of Love; since they arise from indi­gence, they oblige us to demand, and con­sequently render us importunate to our friends; and since they suppose that our hearts are fathomless, we must not wonder if they be not satisfied with all that can be granted them, and if, after having pursued after so many different objects, they grow weary of pursuing, and seek for their rest in the Summum bonum, who is the end of all lawful desires.

The SECOND DISCOURSE. Of the bad use of Desires.

THose who would take the people for Judges in this Affair, would doubtlesly imagine, that there is no more solid, nor more harmless pleasure in the world, than to see our desires changed into effects, since it is the ordinary wish which our friends make for us; and certain­ly, if all their wishes were well regulated, nothing would be more pleasing nor more useful to us than their accomplishment, and we should have reason to think our selves happy, if after a long pursuance, we should at last accomplish them; but as they are al­most always unjust, Bonae animae male precan­tur, & si vis foelix esse, Deum ora, ne quid tibi ex his quae op­tantur, eveni­at. Senec. their success is oft­times prejudicial to us; and for my part, I am of Seneca's opinion, and hold with him, that the greatest part of our friends do in­nocently wish us ill, and make vows in our behalf, which are most pernicious to us, than the imprecations of our enemies; If [Page 282] we will be content, we must pray to God, that nothing may befall us that is wished unto us: our very Parents contribute to our misfortune through an excess of affection, and during our infancy, they draw down the anger of heaven upon us by the unjust­ness of their desires; so as we must not won­der, if when we are further advanced in years, Iam non ad­miror si omnia nos à prima pueritia mala sequntur: Inter execrationes parentum cre­vimus. Sen Ep. 60. so many misfortunes befall us, since those that love us best have been the causers of it.

There are three causes for the irregula­rity of our desires; the first is self-love, which not being able to eface out of our Souls, the inclination which we have to the Summum bonum, doth turn it aside after such good things as are perishable, and maketh them to be wish'd for, with as much ferven­cie as if they were eternal; for our heart longs always after God; though the good desires thereof be weakned, they are not quite stifled, they betake themselves to what is good; & sin hath not been able to bereave them of an inclination which is natural un­to them; but Reason which ought to rule them, being clouded with darkness, they mistake, and fasten themselves to all objects that are pleasing to them. Man seeks after a beauty which time cannot alter, which age [Page 283] cannot decay, nor death it self eface; assoon [...]s he discovers the shadow thereof in a vi­ [...]age, he awakens his desires, and thinks it [...]s the eternal beauty wherewith he ought [...]o be satisfied. He longs after a good which puts an end to all his miseries, which frees him from all his cares, and which cures him of all the evils that oppress him; when he is falsly perswaded by opinion, that Gold is a Metal which assisteth us at all our needs; which opens the gate to Honour, which facilitates the execution of our De­signs, and which makes us triumph over all difficulties; he commands his desires to purchase a good unto him, from whence he expects all his happiness: In fine, man seeks after a solid and true Glory, which serves as a recompense to virtue, and which satiates him with honour, which cannot be efaced by time, nor injured by back biters; when error hath once perswaded him, that Battels are Heroick actions, that conquests are the businesses of Soveraigns, he orders his desires to go in quest of these glorious occasions; and to undertake unjust wars, he forms designs to throw down Towns, to ruine States, Tantum mis­cere vitia de­sideriis noli. Sen Ep. 119. and to carry horror and death into all the parts of the world, that he may look big in Story. The remedy to all these [Page 284] evils is easie; and since the Will hath not lost all her good inclination, there needs no more than to clear the understanding, & to fortifie it by solid reasons, which it may op­pose to the false maxims of the world.

The second cause of the irregularity of our desires, is Imagination, which only makes use of its advantage to irritate them; for they would be regular enough, did not this embroyling power put them in disor­der. Nature seeks only how to free her self from incommodities that molest her, Ad legem Naturae rever­tamur, divitiae paratae funt: Aut gratuitum est quo egemus aut vide, pa­nem & aquam Natura desi­derat; nemo ad haec pauper est Sen. Ep. 25. she requires not magnificence in buildings; and provided they save her from being in­jured by the ayr, all their adornments are of no use to her; she wisheth not for pomp in apparel, provided they hide her naked­ness, and that they fence her body from the rigour of the Cold; she is yet in­nocent enough to blame the disorder; she seeks not after excessive pleasure, in what she eats or drinks, provided they sustain life, and allay hunger and thirst; she values not the delicacies which accompany them; but Imagination, which seems to have no other employment, since the corruption of our Nature, than to invent new delights, to de­fend us from our ancient misfortunes, adds dissoluteness to our desires, and makes our [Page 285] wishes irregular; Luxuria ebore sustineri vult, purpura vestiri, auro tegi, terrā transferre, ma­ria concludere, flumina praeci­pitare, nemora suspendere. Sen. 1. 1. Delra. c. ult. she adviseth us to enclose fields and rivers within our Parks; she ob­ligeth us to build Palaces more glorious than our temples, and greater than our fore­fathers Towns; she employes all Artificers to cloath us, she makes whole nature labour [...]o satisfie our pride, she dives into the En­trails of the earth, and into the depths of the Sea, to find out Diamonds and Pearls to deck us withal. In fine, she seeks out Delicates in food, she will have no Viands which are not exquisite; she misprizeth what is common, and will try unknown Cates; she awakens the appetite when it is asleep, she confounds the seasons to afford us pleasure, and maugre the heat of Sum­mer, she preserves Snow and Ice, to mingle with our Wine. In a word, Imagination makes us wise in our coveted delicates, she instructeth them to wish for things which they did not know; and putting our natural desires out of order, she makes them com­mit excuses, which they are only guilty of in being obedient to her. Thus our de­baucheries arise from our advantages, and we are more irregular than beasts, only in that we are more enlightned; for Aristotle, distinguishing between our desires, terms (by a strange fashion of speech) the most [Page 286] modest ones unreasonable, Arist. Ethic. c. 11. because they are common to us with Beasts, and the most insolent reasonable, because they are proper and peculiar to our selves. In my opini­on, 'tis for this cause, that Philosophers reduce us to the condition of Beasts, and that they have propounded nature unto us for example, believing her to be less irregu­lar or unruly than Reason; 'tis for the same reason, that they have divided our desires, into necessary & superfluous; and that they have affirmed the one to be bounded, the other infinite; that such as were necessary would find wherewithal to content them­selves in banishment and solitariness; and that the superfluous would not find where­withal to content themselves in Towns and Palaces. Ambitiosa non est fames, con­tenta desinere est, quo desinat non nimis cu­rat. Sen. Ep. 119. Hunger is not ambitious, she requires only meat which may appease her; all those several services, in preparing wher­of so much care is had, are the punishments of Gluttony, which seeks out means how to provoke Appetite, after it is satisfied; for she complaineth, that the Neck is not long enough to taste meats, that the stomach is not large enough to receive them, and that natural heat is not ready enough to di­gest them; she likes not wine, unless served in costly vessels; nor can she resolve to take [Page 287] it, unless prepared by a fair hand. But na­tural desires are not accompanied with all these distastes; we are almost always plea­sed with what is absolutely necessary for us. And Nature which is a good Mother, Inter reliqua, hoc nobis na­tura praestitit, praecipuum, quod necessi­tati fastidium excussit. Idem ibidem. hath mingled pleasure with necessity, for our re­freshment; let us make use then of a bene­fit, which we may number amongst the greatest; and let us believe, that she hath never more apparently obliged us, than when she hath freed all our natural desires of distaste.

The third cause of their disorder is, our not sufficiently considering the quality of the things which we desire; for we oft-times corrupt the nature of desire, & by extream violence we force it to seek out a thing which it ought to shun; We only look up­on objects, as they appear; we betake our selves indiscreetly unto them, not conside­ring their defaults; and make our desires be succeeded by sorrow, and grief to be the sequel of our delights; We wish for real evils, because they have some shadow of good; and when after a long pursuit, we possess them, they begin to be unsupporta­ble; changing opinion, we change our de­sires, and accuse Heaven of having been too easie to us in granting them; We know [Page 288] by experience, that there be Vows, which God doth doth exact at our hands, unless he be angry, and that we make wishes, the ac­complishment whereof is fatal to us; Attonitus no­vitate mali, divesque mi­serque, effuge­re optat opes, & quae modo viverat, odit. Ovid. Metam. 11. De Mida. We are like the Prince who repented his having wished for riches, and who was afflicted for having obtained them, his desire be­comes his punishment, he abhorred that which he desired, and finding himself poor in the midst of plenty, he prayed to be de­livered from an evil, which he himself had procured; Absence puts a valuation upon almost all we have of good, and their pre­sence makes us despise them; they appear great unto our Imagination when far off, Cui enim assecuto satis fuit, quod optanti nimi­um videbatur? Sen. Ep. 118. but when they draw nearer, they lose their false greatness, all their advantages vanish away, as shadows before the Sun, and we turn our valuation into disesteem, our love into hatred, and our desires into detesta­tion.

Prophane Philosophy, desirous to find out a remedy to so many evils, gives us counsel which makes us despair; for she will have us to moderate our desires, with­out reforming our Soul, she inhibits us the use of wishes, as if the mischief lay only in them, and adviseth us to wish for nothing, if we woul be happy; she builds her felicity [Page 289] in the cutting off of this Passion. She thinks to have pronounced an Oracle, when by the mouth of Seneca, Qui desideri­um iuum clau­sit, cum Jove de felicitate contendit. Sen. she says, that he who hath bounded his desires, is as happy as Iupiter: and that without increase of riches, or addition to delight. If we would find a solid contentment, we need only lessen our desires. But certainly in flattering us, she abuseth us; and promising us an Imaginary happiness, she bereaves us of the means how to come by a true one: For she leaves us in the indigency wherein sin hath plac'd us, and forbids us the use of de­sires: she leaves us with the Inclination which nature hath endowed us withal, for the Summum bonum; & will not suffer us to seek after it; she will have us to be poor, and yet to have no feeling thereof; and that to the misfortune of poverty, we add the like of insolence and pride. When we shall reign in heaven, and shall find our per­fect happiness in the fruition of the Summum bonum, we shall banish all wishes. But as long as we grovel upon earth, and that we suffer evils which inforce us to seek for remedies, we shall conceive just desires; and shall learn from religion, how to make use of them, to the glory of Iesus Christ, and salvation of our own souls.

The THIRD DISCOURSE. Of the good use of Desire.

THough there be nothing more com­mon than Desires, there is nothing more rare then the good use there­of; and of as many as make wishes, there are but very few that know how to rule them well; for this Passion is as free as Love; and as she is in her first production, she cannot endure to be constrained; she is so glorious as that she receives no Laws but from the Summum bonum; she sets not by the authority of Princes; and knowing that she holds not of their Empire, she is not affrighted at their threats, nor is she moved by their promises.

Therefore Kings, who sufficiently know the extent of their power, offer not to in­trench upon her liberty; they punish acti­ons, forbid words, but they leave thoughts and desires to his guidance, who seeing them in the bottom of the heart can eter­nally recompense, or punish them, they [Page 291] make no laws to retain them; they confess God is only able to suppress them, and that he is the only Soveraign, whose prerogative it is to say unto his Subjects, Non concupis­ces. Exod. 20. you shall not covet: They therefore are to be esteemed insolent, who undertake to reform desires unassisted by his Grace; and all the advices we can give to regulate them, do necessa­rily presuppose his assistance; but after ha­ving rendred this acknowledgment to him from whom we receive whatsoever we have of good, me thinks we may prescribe certain conditions to the use of this Passion, which may make it glorious, and useful to us.

Nature hath endowed us with desires, only to come by the good which we have not, and which is necessary for us; they are help in our need, they are the hands of our will; as those parts of the body labour for all the rest, our desires take pains for all the Passions of our Soul, and by their care ob­lige our Love and Hatred: but this ad­vantage would be prejudicial to us, if, be­ing given us to assist our poverty, we should make use thereof to increase it: Therefore before we engage our selves in the pursuit of a good, we must be well assured, whether it be great enough, or no, to inrich us; and if [Page 292] the enjoyment thereof will cause those de­sires to die, to which the want thereof gave birth; for if it do only irritate, and if in lieu of healing our evils, it make them worse, a man must be mad to continue the desire. I would then only desire those real good things which may free me from my miseries; and to the end that my Passion may be rational, I would only wish them as far forward as they ought to be wished; I would weigh their qualities, and I would fit my wishes to their merits; I would en­deavour riches, not to serve my vain-glory, but to supply my wants; I would endeavour meat for sustenance, Magnus ille est qui fictilibus sic utitur, quē ­admodum argento: nec ille minor est qui sic argent­utitur, quem admodum fi­ctilibus. Infir­mi animi est, pati non posse divitias. Sen. Ep. 5. not to provoke appe­tite; I would endeavor honour as an aid to virtue in its birth, and which hath need of some foreign help to defend it against vice; yea, I would endevor harmless pleasures, but I would shun their excess; and I would re­member that they are of the nature of those fruits that are pleasing in tast, but are harm­ful to the body; thus moderated, our de­sires would be rational; if they fix us to things on earth, necessity will serve us for excuse, Idem sentias de voluptati­bus & honori­bus. and we shall esteem the servitude glorious, which will be common to us with Saints.

We must have a care likewise to have [Page 293] only weak desires for things perishable, and to hold a hanck in such desires as may be violently taken from us. The Stoicks Philo­sophy is too austere to be listned unto, their maxims tend more to make us despair, than to instruct us; for it absolutely inhibits us the desire of such things as we may be be­reft of; and it employeth all its sophistical reasons to perswade us, that the good which we come by by our desires, Alienum est quicquid op­tando venit. Sen. cannot be a true good: Christian Philosophy which knows very well that our felicity is not within us, and that we must forgo our selves ere we fasten to the Summum bonum, blames this Maxim; but as she is not likewise ignorant that we may be bereft of other goods, she ordains us to desire them without anxiety, and to consider we are not so sure of their possession, but that it may sometimes meet with interruption; she prepars us for their loss, when she permits us to seek after them; she teacheth us that the desire of things perishable ought not to be eternal; and that we must possess, without too much of addition, what ought to be forgon with­out sorrow; she teacheth us that the goods of Fortune, and of Nature, depend upon divine Providence, which doth not give us, but lend us them; which refuseth them to [Page 294] her friends, Hoc est propo­situm Deo, o­stendere haec quae vulgus ap­petit, quae re­formidat, nec bona esse, nec mala: appare­bunt autem bona esse, si illa non nisi bonis viris tri­buerit, & mali tantum irroga­verit. Sen. De Provid. c. 5 and grants them to her enemies, and which doth so bestow them, as if they be not marks of hatred, neither are they testimonies of her love; by these good rea­sons she fairly perswades us, that they ought not to be the principal objects of our de­sires; and that to follow our Soveraigns in­tentions, we must love them with coolness, desire them with moderation, possess them with indifferency, and contentedly forgo them.

But the chief use we ought to make of so noble a Passion, is, thereby to raise us up to God, and to make thereof a glorious chain to fasten us inseparably to him; as he is the only object of Love, he is also the only ob­ject of desires; they miss of their end when they keep aloof from him; they lose them­selves, when they seek not him; and they stop in the midst of their course, when they come not full home to him. He is the Spring-head of all perfections; and as they are without mixture of default, there is no­thing in them which is not perfectly wisha­ble: we see some creatures which have certain charms which make them be desi­red; but then they have imperfections to make them be undervalued: the Sun is so full of glory and beauty, as it hath made [Page 295] Idolaters; one part of the world doth yet worship it; and Christian Religion, which is spread over the whole earth, hath not been able to dis-deceive all Infidels; yet hath its weaknesses; Clamat Sol, quid me colis ut Deum, quem vides ortu oc­casuque con­cludi? Deus nec ortum ha­bet nec occa­sum; sed il­lum deserendo magnum in­cucurristi ca­sum: Cum antem calor & splendor meus tibi differviant, quomodo me pro Deo co­lendum ducis, nisi quia De­um verum co­lere nescis? Aug. 1. De Sym­bolo. tract. 3. which teacheth Philo­sophers that it is but a creature; the light thereof is bounded, and cannot at one and the same time enlighten the two halves of the world; it suffers Eclipses, nor can it shun them; it grows faint, and sees it self obscured by a constellation, not so great nor glorious as it self; it hath benign influences, it hath also malignant ones; if it concur with the birth of man, it doth the like to his death; if it be the father of flowers it is also their Paricide; if the brightness thereof serve to light us, it doth also dazle us; if the heat thereof warm Europe, it scorcheth A­frica; so as the noblest of all constellations hath its defaults; and if it cause desire in us, it is also cause of aversions & under-valua­tions; but God hath nothing that is not love­ly, innumerable numbers of Angels see all his perfections, and are destin'd to honor them; they have immortal lovers, which adore them from the beginning of the world; men who know them, desire them; and wish death unto themselves that they may enjoy them: this Summum bonum is that [Page 296] which we ought to seek after; for him it is that our wishes were given us; our heart is sinful when it divides its love, and gives but one part thereof to him that deserves the whole; Gods abundance and mans indi­gence are the first links of alliance which we contract with him. Abyssus abys­sum invocat. Psal. 41. Deus totus de­siderabilis; ho­mo totus desi­deria. He is all, and we are nothing; He is a depth of mercy, and we are a depth of misery; He hath infinite per­fections, and we faults without number; He possesseth no greatness which is not to be wisht for, & we suffer no want which ob­liges us not to make wishes; He is all desira­ble, and we are all desire; and to express our nature aright, it will suffice to say, that we are only a meer capacity of good; there is no part of our Body, nor faculty of our Soul, which doth not oblige us to seek him; we make Inrodes in the world by our de­sires, we wander in our affections, but af­ter having considered the beauty of Hea­ven, and the riches of the Earth, we are con­strained to return again unto our selves, to fix our selves on him who is the ground­work of our being and to confess that none but God alone is able to fill the capacity of our heart. Let us draw these advantages from our misery, and let us rejoyce that Nature hath endowed us with so many de­sires, [Page 297] since they have wings which raise us up to God, and chains which fasten us to him. Upon all other occasions desires are useless, and after having made us Long, a long time, they furnish us not with what they made us hope for; they torment us whilst they possess us; and when despair causes them to die, they leave us only shame and sorrow, for having listned to so evil Councellors. I know very well that they awaken the Soul, and that they endue it with vigor to compass the good which it wishes for; but the good success of our undertakings depends not upon their efficacy; and should the things that we love cost us nothing but desires, all ambitious men would be Kings; all covetous men rich; and we should hear no Lovers com­plain of the rigors of their Mistresses, or of their infidelity; women would take their Husbands from their Graves, Mothers would cure their sick children, and captives would regain their liberty; we should do as many Miracles as make wishes, and all mischief would be banish'd from off the earth, since men can wish; but experience shews us, they are for the most part impo­tent, and that their accomplishment de­pends upon the supream providence, which [Page 298] at its pleasure can turn them into effects; those that concern our souls health, are ne­ver useless; fervency in wishing is suffici­ent to make a man good; our conversion depends only upon our will; our desire ani­mated by Grace, blots out all our sins; and though God be so great, he hath only cost them wishes that possess him; this Passion dilates our soul, Vas desiderio­rum ipsa infu­sione crescit. Chrysost. and makes us capable of the good we wish for; she extends our heart, and prepares us to receive the happiness which she procures us. In fine, she gets au­dience, of God, Apud Deum voces non fa­ciunt verba, fed desideria. Greg. Magn. makes her self be under­stood without speaking, and she hath such power in heaven, as nothing is denied to her demands; she glorified Jesus Christ and the Saints; Christ takes from them the most ancient of his Names; and before he was known by that of Saviour of the world, he was already known by that, Desideratus cunctis genti­bus. Aggaei c. 2. of the desi­red of all the people. His Prophets honou­red him with this title before he was born: He who shewed us the time of his coming, took his title from his wishes, and me­rited to be called, Vir desidero­rum. Dan c. 9. the man of Desires; His Vows did advance the Mystery of the Incarnation; the like of the Virgin did obtain the accomplishment thereof, & ours will taste the effect thereof, [Page 299] if they grow not weary in begging them at Gods hands.

The FOURTH DISCOURSE. Of the Nature, Proprieties and Effects of the good & evil use of Eschewing.

NAture would have failed us at our need, if having endued us with Love to good things, she had not furnished us with desire to seek after them. These good things which now are cause of our happiness, would cause all our punish­ments, if being permitted to love them, we should be forbidden to wish for them: the Summum bonum would only serve to make us miserable, and the virtue which it hath to attract hearts would contribute to our misery, if we wanted a capacity of atchie­ving it. We should have equal reason to complain of her charity, if having imprin­ted in our hearts the hatred of evil, she had not likewise engraven therein that Passion which we call Shunning, or Eschew­ing, to make us keep aloof from it; for we [Page 300] should see our enemy, and not have the power to defend our selves from him; we should have an aversion from vice, yet should be enforced to tolerate it; and by an unfortunate necessity, we must give lodging to a guest we should not be able to love; but Nature hath well provided for this, and her providence, which always watches over her children, hath given us a Passion which es­chews evil with as much impetuosity, as de­sire seeks after good. This keeps at distance from all that can hurt us; and following the inclinations of hatred, whereof she is either the Daughter or Slave, she flies from all objects that displease her; and fights to defend it self against her enemies: 'tis the first succour we have received against evils; 'tis the first violence, the first salley which the concupiscible appetite makes to free us from them.

Though this Passion be almost alwayes blameless, and that she cannot be made cri­minal but by surprizal; yet ceaseth she not to have her ill use, and to be every day em­ploy'd against the design of Nature. Those therefore that would make use of her, are bound to consider, whether that which they endevor to eschew, be truly so, or be but so in appearance; and whether opinion, which [Page 301] easily seizeth upon the understanding, hath not perswaded them unto falshoods instead of truths. For it is apparent, that of two things that bear the name of evil in the world, there is but one of them which may properly be said to deserve it. Sin and Punishment are the two most ordinary ob­jects of eschewing; and most men do so con­found them, Homines flagella sua do­lent, pecc [...]ta sua non dolent propter quae flagellantur. Greg. Magn. as we know not which of them is most odious. Punishment being more sensible than Sin, it is more carefully shun­ned; and there are not many people who do not love rather to be faulty than unfortu­nate. We shun the Plague, and seek out sin; we keep far from all infected places, the bad air whereof may work an alteration in our health, and we draw near to evil compa­ny which may rob us of our innocency: Religion obligeth us not withstanding to believe that Punishments are the effects of Divine Justice; that they have Beauties, which though austere, ought not to be the less pleasing; that God honours himself by punishing of his enemies, and that he finds as much satisfaction in chastening the guil­ty, as in recompencing the just. The grea­test Saints have known that our punish­ments were favours, which did no less con­tribute to the welfare of man, than to the [Page 302] glory of his Creator; they have confessed that we must adore the arm which hurts us, love the wounds because of the arm that made them; Justissima scias essa illa fulmi­na, quae per­cussi etiam co­lunt. Seuec. Consolat ad Polyb. and teach all the world that Heavens Thunders are just, since those who are therewith struck, adore them; but sin is a true evil, which hath nothing in it which is not odious; its object is a soveraign good which it offendeth; and if in the behalf of the committer, the malice thereof be boun­ded on his behalf against whom it is com­mitted, it is infinite. Sin violates all the Laws of Nature, dishonoureth men and Angels; and all the evils which we suffer are the just punishments of its disorders. 'Twas then for this dreadful evil that we were endued with aversion; and this aver­sion cannot be more justly employed, than in keeping us far from a Monster, the abode whereof will be hell, and death the eternal punishment.

Next to sin, nothing ought to be more carefully eschewed, than those that do de­fend it; and who to enlarge the Empire thereof, endeavor to make it appear lovely and glorious. Omne malum aut timore aut pudore Natu­ra perfudit. Tert. in Apol. As Nature is the pure work­manship of God, she cannot tolerate sin, and that she may banish it from the earth, she hath laden it with confusion and fear; [Page 303] it dares not appear in full day; it hides it self in darkness, and seeks out solitary places, where it hath none but such as are compli­ces with it, for witnesses. But its partakers raise it up upon a throne, and play all their cunning to win it glory; they cover it with the cloak of Virtue; and if it hath any thing of affinity with its enemy, they strive to make it pass for Virtue. They change their names, and by one and the same action committing two faults, they bereave Vir­tue of her honour, Sunt virtu [...]i­bus vitia con­finia, & perdi­tis quoque ac turpibus recti similitudo est Sic mentitur prodigus libe­ralem: cum plurimum in­tersit, utrum quis dare sciat, an servare ne­sciat. Sen. Ep. 120. that they may give it to Sin: they term Revenge greatness of Courage; Ambition, a generous Passion; Uncleanness, an innocent pleasure; and con­sequently they term Humility lowness of Spirit; the forgiving of injuries faint­heartedness; and continency, a savage hu­mor. They spread abroad these false max­ims; they turn evils into contagious disea­ses, and their errors into heresies; they se­duce simple souls, and presenting poyson in Chrystal vessels, they make it be swal­low'd down by innocent people. Those who are most couragious have much ado to defend themselves from them; the best wits suffer themselves to be perswaded by their lewd Reasons; we are therefore bound to have recourse to the succour that Nature [Page 304] hath given us, to excite this Passion, which keeps us aloof from what is evil, and fur­nisheth us with forces to fight against it.

But her chief employment ought to be a­gainst Incontinence; and the Heavens seem to have given a being to Aversion, only to rid our hands of an enemy which cannot be overcome but by Eschewing. All Passions come in to the aid of Virtue when she un­dertakes a war against Vice: Omnia in Christianorum pia certamina, sola dura sunt praelia castita­tis, ubi quoti­diana pugna & tara victoria: Gravem casti­tas fortita est inimicum, cui semper resisti­tur, & semper timetur. Nemo ergo se salsa securitate deci­piat, nec d [...] viribus suis pe­riculose prae­sumat, nec cum mulieri­bus habitans, putet conti­nentiae obtine­re triumphum. Aug. lib. De Honest. Mulier cap 2. Choler grows hot in her quarrel; Audacity furnisheth her with weapons; Hope promiseth her Victo­ry; and Joy, which always follows gene­rous actions, serves instead of Recompense: but when she is to set upon Incontinency, she dares not employ all these faithful soul­diers; and knowing very well that the ene­my, she is to fight withal, is as crafty as puis­sant, she fears lest he may seduce them, and by his cunning draw them over to his side. In truth, Choler agrees easily with Love; and Lovers quarrels serve only to re-kindle their extinct flames Hope entertains their Affections; and Joy oft-times takes its rise from their displeasures; so as Virtue can only make use of Eschewing, to defend her self; and of so many Passions which assist her in her other designs, she is only se­conded by Eschewing, in her combate a­gainst [Page 305] Impurity. But she thinks her self strong enough if succour'd therewithal; and there is no such charming Beauty, no so strong inclination, nor so dangerous oc­casion which she doth not promise her self to overcome; provided she be accompani­ed by this faithful Passion: She is the cause why Chastity reigns in the world; 'tis by reason of her wisdom that men do imitate Angels, and triumph over evil spirits in the frailty of the flesh.

But the greatest miracle which she pro­duceth, is, when being subservient to Cha­rity, she separateth us from our selves; and when preventing the violence of death, she divideth the soul from the body, for man hath no greater enemy than himself; he is the cause of all his own evils; and Christi­an Religion agrees with the Sect of the Stoicks, that man can receive no true displea­sure, save what he himself procures; he is therefore bound to keep at distance from himself, and to hold no commerce with his Body, lest it take part with the frailties thereof; he ought to shun its company, if he would preserve himself in his innocency; and by the assistance of eschewing, the soul must loosen her self from what she inani­mates. Men forbid solitariness to such as [Page 306] are affected, Lugentem ti­mentemque custodire sole­mus, ne solitu­dine male uta­tur: Nemo est ex imprudenti­bus qui relin­qui sibi debeat. Tunc quicquid aut me [...]u aut pudore celebat animus expro­mit: Tunc au­daciam acuit, libidinem irri­tat, iracundi­am instigat. Sen. Ep. 10. because it nourisheth their sor­row; and endeavour to divert them, to make them forget their displeasures. So is solita­riness forbidden unto sinners; men dare not abandon them to their own thoughts, lest they entertain themselves therewithal, and be therewith too much possest; and a thou­sand tricks are made use of to take them from themselves, lest they finish their own ruine; for 'tis well known that they take nothing but evil counsels in solitariness; that they study how to lay traps for Chasti­ty, that they meditate on Revenge, that they excite their Choler; and that losing that Shame and Fear which withheld them when in company, they give freedom to all their Passions when they are drawn a­side. To cure them of so many evils, 'tis endeavoured to part them from themselves; and to lead on this design with success, the charge is given to Eschewing; which by harmless cunning, separates the Soul from the Body, and keeps men aloof from what may hurt them.

Since then we are so much obliged to this Passion of Eschewing, and that we owe our welfare to her; it will become us to employ the rest of this Discourse in the consideration of her Proprieties, that we [Page 307] may the better know a Passion which doth us so many good Offices. She is the same to Hatred, which Desire is to Love; though she seem to consider Evil only, to the in­tent she may keep aloof from it; yet seeketh she after good in all parts; and like to Wa­termen, she turns her back towards the place where she would be: her effects are as powerful as those of Desire; and those unfortunate people who keep far from a great danger, have no less trouble in so do­ing, than those who seek after a great good fortune. As Desire calls in Hope to her succour, to compass the good which she esteems too difficult; Eschewing imployes the aid of Fear, to acquit her self of an evil which surpasseth her power. As Desire is a mark of our indigence, Eschewing is a proof of our weakness; and as in Desiring, we obtain that which we want; by Eschew­ing we overcome that which sets upon us. In fine, as Desire doth dilate our heart, and make it capable of the good which it en­deavoureth; Eschewing by a clean con­trary effect, doth close up our Soul, and shuts the door upon the Enemy which would force her. So as these two Passions are the faithful handmaids of Hatred and Love; and as Love undertaketh nothing of [Page 308] generous, without the assistance of Desire; Hatred doth nothing of memorable, un­assisted by Eschewing; and as we owe the possession of good to Desire, which sought after it; we owe our escaping of Evil, to eschewing, which hath given it the Re­pulse.

The FIRST DISCOURSE. Of the Nature, Proprieties and Effects of Hope.

THat Art which riseth from the Earth to consider the Heavens, and neglects all the Worlds beau­ties, that it may admire those of the Stars, teacheth us that the Sun changeth Influences as she changeth Houses; for though he lose nothing of Virtue in his course; though the Eclipses which rob us of his sight, take not from him that bright­ness which they hide from us, and his be­ing [Page 310] the farther off doth not diminish his heat; yet are their certain parts in the hea­vens where his aspects are more favourable, and his influences more benign; there be constellations which he cherisheth, and in which he delighteth to oblige whole Na­ture; they seem to heighten his lustre, to augment his force, and he appears never to be more powerful, than when he commu­nicates with them. Morality, which knows no other Sun than Love, confesseth that he takes new force as he takes new counte­nances; for though he be always himself, and that the different names that we give him, do not change his Essence, yet he ac­commodates himself to the apprehensions of our Soul which he employeth, and doth with them produce more extraordinary, or more common effects. He is cloudy in sorrowfulness, violent in choler, ready in desire, undertaking in boldness, calm in joy, and droops in despair; but certainly, he is never more pleasing; than in Hope. 'Tis the Throne wherein he appears with most pomp; 'tis the affection wherein he works most strongly; 'tis the Passion wherein he most smoothly flattereth us; so is it also the most generous motion of our Soul. Nature seems to have ordained it to assist great men [Page 311] in their highest enterprize; and that no­thing of memorable can be effected without the assistance of this Passion. 'Twas at her solicitation that Alexander undertook the conquest of Asia; distributing all the wealth that he had received from his father, he on­ly received her for his patrimony; and he who found the world too little, contented himself with the promises which Hope gave him. Caesar consulted only with her, when he resolved to change the state of the Ro­man Common-wealth, and to make himself master of that haughty Queen which gave Kings to all the people of the Earth; all Conquerors have been her Slaves; and Ambition which commanded over them, neither drew forth Forces, nor took advice but from Hope, which augmented their Courage.

But she is not so appropriated unto Prin­ces, Omne hac via. procedit offici­um, sic seri­mus, sic mili­tamur, sic uxo­res ducimus, sic liberos co­limus; cum omnium ho­rum incertue sit eventus. Sen. Benefic. l. 4. c. 33. as not to communicate her self unto their Subjects; for her care extends even to the meanest condition of men: she preser­veth the worlds society; and all that give her entertainments are only guided by her motions. The Husbandman doth not culti­vate the ground, Merchants put not to sea, nor do Souldiers give battel, but when so­licited by the sweets of Hope. Though she [Page 312] have no warrant, and that all her promises be uncertain, she sees a thousand people fol­low her orders, and attend her recompen­ses. She hath more subjects than all the Kings of the earth put together; and she may boast, that neither the one nor the o­ther do any thing but by her advice. 'Tis she alone that contents all men, and who in the difference of their conditions makes them expect the same success. 'Tis she that promiseth the Labourer a happy harvest, fa­vourable winds to Mariners, Victory to Souldiers, and to Parents obedient children. Every one is ready to engage himself upon her word; and that which is yet more strange, men believe her though they have tane her in a lie; she gives so many colours to her new promises, as upon the assurance thereof men form new enterprizes, Ad ea accedl­mus, de quibus bene speran­dum esse cre­dimus. Qui enim pollice­tur serenti pro­ventum, navi­ganti portum, militanti vi­ctoriam, mari­to pudicam uxorem, patri pios liberos? [...]dem ibid. and throw themselves into new dangers. The Labourer plows the ground after an ill year, and endeavoreth to overcome the ste­rility of the soil by the unwearisomness of his labour: Mariners remount their Vessels after a shipwrack, and cozened by Hope, forget the horror of Tempests, and the seas perfidiousness: Souldiers return to the fight after a defeat, by the strength of hope; they charge enemies that have beaten them, [Page 313] and promise unto themselves that Fortune will grow weary of always favouring one side. In fine, there is no so unfortunate condition, which receives not comfort from this Passion; though she be a Cheater, she will appear to be faithful; and even in her lightness she gives proofs of her constancy; for she accompanies her slave, ev'n to death; she follows Gally-slaves to the Gallies; she enters Prison with the Prisoners, she goes upon the Scaffold with the guilty, and with what bad success soever she may have paid our desires, no man can resolve to abandon her.

But as there is no advantage in the world which is not mingled with some defaults, Hope wants not hers; and if she flatter men by her sweetness, she astonisheth them by the fear which accompanieth it. For the good which she purchaseth is absent and difficult; the absence thereof disquieteth her, and the difficulty astonisheth her: She knows very well that what she seeks after, is doubtful; her very name teacheth her, that the event of her undertakings is uncer­tain; Spes incerti boni nomen est. Sen. Ep. 10. and as oft as she considers the dangers that threaten her, she grows pale, as well as fear: she seems to be of the humor of that great Commander, who always trembled [Page 314] when he began to give battel; as if he ap­prehended the hazards whereinto his cou­rage was like to throw him: she fears her own endeavour; and her boldness is the chiefest cause of her fearfulness. This Maxime is so true, as that a certain Philo­sopher was of opinion, that our apprehensi­ons sprung from our hopes; and that to cease to fear, we must cease to hope; for, though these two Passions seem to have a contrariety, and that the soul which hopeth is full of assurance, yet doth the one of them arise from the other; and, notwithstanding their ill intelligence, they go hand in hand, and seldom part; Quemadmo­dum eadem catena & cu­stodem & mi­litem copulat, sic ista quae tam dissimilia sunt, pariter incedunt, Spem metus sequitur; nec miror ista sic ire, utrum (que); pendentis ani­mi est, utrum (que); futuri expecta­tione solliciti; Sen. Ep. 5. they march together as do the prisoners with their Guards, who are fastned with the same Chain, and almost brought to the same servitude. But I won­der not that they have so much affinity, since they relate so much one to another; and that the one and the other of them is the Passion which holds a man in suspence, whom the expectation of what is to come, continually disquiets.

When she hath not this unhappiness, and that the knowledge of her strength assures her of good success in what she takes in hand, she falls into another extremity; and furnisheth our enemies with means to sur­prize [Page 315] us; for she is naturally inconsiderate, whatever good advice be given her; she hath an eye unto the good which attracts her, and considers not the evil which en­virons her; she throws her self indiscreetly into danger, and guiding her self only by appearances which deceive her, she enga­geth her liberty to satisfie her inclination. Thus we see fishes swallow the hook, Et fera & pis­cis, spe aliquo oblectante de­cipitur. Sen. Ep. 8. be­cause 'tis covered with some bait; thus we see wild beasts give against the toils, think­ing to find some prey there; and Souldiers fall into an Ambush, thinking to get some advantage. So as, Hope is a rash Counsel­lor, which in the obscurity of what's to come, sees only false lights, and discovers no apparent good, save only to throw us in­to hidden and real evils: Therefore do Polititians always distrust her advices; and those great men who govern States, do not easily believe a Passion which hath more heat than light, and more courage than wisdom. But say she should make good all that she promiseth us, and that the good fortune which she makes us expect, should not be mingled with any displeasure; yet should we have reason to complain of her; since that in feeding us with what is to come, she makes us forget what is past, and [Page 316] obligeth us to build our contentment on the the most uncertain part of our life. Memoriae mi­nimum tribuit, quisquis spei plurimum. Sen. Benef. l. 3. c. 4.

Time, which measureth all things, hath three differences; the Past, the Present, and the Future: the Present is but punctum (a point;) it runs away so fast as there is no staying of it; we are tane in a Lie whensoe­ver we speak of it: it never understands the beginning and ending of the same dis­course: when we think to make use of it for a witness, or to alledge it for an Example, it escapes our hands; we find it is no longer Present, and that it is already Past. The Future succeeds it; but it is so hidden, as the wisest men of the world cannot discover the first moments thereof; the darkness of it is so thick, as that the light of wisdom cannot dissipate it: the success of things are shut up in the Abyss thereof; and one can­not come to the knowledge of them upon smaller terms than entring into eternity: a man must be a Prophet to penetrate its se­crets; and all is there (in respect of us) so doubtful and so confused, as the days which we destine for triumph, are oft-times destin'd for our defeat; and we reserve for our Pastime, those which Heaven hath ordained for our punishment. The time Past is no more; it flies us, and we flie it; [Page 317] our wishes, which have somewhat of claim to what is to come, pretend none to this; they cannot dispose of that which hath no further a being; and that soveraign power which all things obey, will undertake no­thing upon this part of Time, save when the said power will new-mould the world; and drawing our bodies from out the dust, will render unto the present that which the past had taken from it. 'Tis true, our Memory hath some jurisdiction over it: she makes use thereof for our comfort; she calls back our good days past to recreate us; & by a harm­less piece of art she makes present happiness of our past evils; Haec est pars temporis no­stri sacra ac dedicata, om­nes humanos casus super­gresla, extra fortunae reg­num subducta; quem non ino­pia, non me­tus, non mor­borum incur­sus exagitat. Haec nec tur­bari, nec eripi potest: perpe­tua ejus & in­trepida posses­sio est. Sen. De Brevis. [...]it. c. 10. she raises our friends from their graves that we may entertain our selves with them; she converseth with the dead without horror; and maugre the ne­cessary laws of Time, she revives what is past, and restores unto us all the content­ments which Time hath bereft us of. It is likewise that part of our life which Philoso­phers love best; 'tis that over which For­tune hath no more power, and which can­not be incommodiated by Poverty, tor­mented by Fear, nor abused by Hope. 'Tis a sacred time, which accidents dare not touch; 'tis a treasure which cannot be taken from us; and Tyrants, who have power o­ver [Page 318] the remainder of our life, have none at all over that which is past: the Passion thereof is peaceful; and let the Destinies do what they please, they cannot rob us of a good which we enjoy only by remem­brance; yet Hope deprives us of these harm­less riches; and busying her self only about what is to come, she hinders us from think­ing upon what is past; she makes us poor, to enrich us; she takes from us a certainty, to feed us with uncertainty; and by an unjust extremity she draws us out of a calm, to en­gage us in a storm.

I confess that Wisdom and Religion have an eye to what is to come, but they consider it not as doth Hope; for Religion doth not ground her self upon that uncertain futurity which amuseth most men, but upon an as­sured futurity which we are promised in the holy Scriptures; she labours to compass it, she employs all her reasons to perswade us, that it ought to be the chief object of our desires; Nolite ergo soliciti esse in Crastinum. Crastinus e­nim dies soli­citus erit sibi­ipsi [...] sufficit diei malitia sua. Matth. 6. she despises that deceitful futurity which humane hope seeks after, and makes so small esteem thereof, as she will not have us to esteem it a part of our life; she forbids us to think of tomorrow, and euen con­demns the false wisdom of men, who heap up riches, and build Palaces, as if they were [Page 319] sure to live to eternity; she will not have us defer the execution of our good resolutions to that unknown time; and by a profound knowledge which she hath of the uncertain­ty of all things, she forbids us to defer our repentance, and commands us to look upon the present day as the last of our life. True wisdom considers the time to come, rather as a well-spring of evil than of good; and when she will seek into the obscurity there­of, she takes advice rather of Fear than of Hope; Quam stultum est aetatem dis­ponere [...] ne crastino qui­dem domina­mur. O quanta dementia est spes longas in­choantium! Edam, aedifi­cabo, credam, exigam, hono­res geram, tum demum lassam & plenam se­nectutem, in otium referam. Omnia mihi, crede, etiam felicibus dubia sunt: Nihil si­bi quisquam de futuro debet promittere. Sen. Ep. 101. she defies all that depends upon For­tune; and knowing that the best conjun­ctures are always doubtful, she impatiently expects the time to come; as she knows that good success is out of our power, she leaves the ordering thereof to divine Providence, and is not troubled when she sees the wisest counsels succeed ill. So that Hope is too blame to engage us in a time which is not in our disposal, and to ground all our good fortunes upon moments and hours, which peradventure the course of our life will not arrive unto. I know very well that the condition of our nature obligeth us to pre­tend some right to futurity; that there being none, but God alone, which possesseth all his good together, we must allow some­thing to the succession of Time; and that [Page 320] having so few present advantages, we may entertain our selves with those which futu­rity promiseth us; but we must not build our welfare thereupon; and 'tis a high piece of folly to forgo the present, to forget what is past, and only feed upon what is to come.

By all these good and bad effects of Hope 'tis easie to know her nature, and to make an exact definition thereof. 'Tis then a motion of the irascible appetite, which with ferven­cy seeks after an absent, difficult, possible good. She hath this of common with all Passions, that she is a motion of the Soul; but she differs from Fear, in that she consi­ders only what is good, not what is bad; from Joy, in that she looks upon an absent, not a present good; from Desire, in that she seeks not absolutely after good, but after such as is difficult. All these qualities teach us, that she may have her good and her bad uses; that if young people abuse her in their pleasures, old men make good use thereof in their affairs; and if she be pernicious to Wisdom, when she leaneth indriscreetly up­on the uncertainty of what is to come, she is useful to Religion, when she grounds her self upon Eternity. We shall see the proofs of these truths in the ensuing Discourses.

The SECOND DISCOURSE. Of the evil use of Hope.

PAssions cannot be more insolently a­bused, than when they are employed contrary to the design of Nature; or when, thwarting their principal proprie­ties, they are made to serve unworthy Ma­sters, who either by cunning, or violence, make them forgo Virtues part. I cannot therefore more evidently shew the ill use which most men make of Hope, than in letting them see that they give against her inclinations; and that diverting her from her legitimate object, they propose others unto her which are not so fit for her. For according to the reason of all Philosophers, this Passion ought to respect a good which is Absent, Difficult and Possible: whence I conclude, that the riches, honors, or plea­sures of life, cannot be her true objects, since they have only an appearance of good; and that it is Opinion, which knows not well how to name things, that hath ho­nor'd [Page 322] them with a title which they deserve not: for Reason teacheth us, that all these things have no other valuation than what either Ignorance or Falshood gives them. Aurum nomen terrae in igni relinquit, at que exinde de tor­mentis in or­namenta, de suppliciis in de­licias, de igno­miniis in ho­nores metalli refuga muta­tur. Tert. De habitu mulieb. Before such time as Avarice had rent Gold from out the entrails of the earth, and that by a thousand tortures which she had made it suffer, she had given it the colour that dazles our eyes, it past only for an useless sand. Honour depends so strongly upon O­pinion, as it is her meer workmanship: and Virtue would be thought to be very mise­rable, had she no other Recompense, than what is most commonly given to such crimes as have either good success or lustre. The Pleasures of life are not innocent e­nough, and they are too pernicious to man, to be numbred among his good things: Shame and Sorrow accompany them; Sor­row which they so carefully eschew, finds them always out, and makes them bear the punishment of all the excess which they have committed. 'Tis peradventure this which makes the Wise-man term these imaginary goods, deceitful Pictures, which are in effect nothing less than what they appear unto our senses; Umbra pictu­rae, labor fine fructu. Sap. 15. for those who judge of the workmanship of Pictures only by the eye, think they see birds flying in the ayr, [Page 323] Plains at such a length, as the eye reacheth not their extent, and Personages which stand at distance from the cloth; yet when they draw nearer, they find them but as stroaks of a Pencil which deceive their senses, and which make them see things that are not. It fares thus with all those perishable goods which Opinion hath cry'd up, and which owe all their valuation either to the weak­ness or to the ignorance of men. They are but the shadow of good, which having no­thing of solidity, cannot be the objects of Hope: the wisest men have therefore dis­mist them; and there have been Philoso­phers, who have never better known the vanity thereof than in their pomp & great­ness.

The example which Seneca gives us of this, is too useful not to be observed; he tells us, that Attaius had a secret affection to Riches; and that though he profest Philo­sophy, he thought that their goodness was answerable to their beauty, and that there was as much of sweetness in them, as of lustre: It fell out fortunately one day, that he saw a Triumph, wherein all the magnificen­ces of Rome were exposed to sight; he saw vessels of Gold and Chrystal, the work­manship thereof augmented their price; [Page 324] stately habits, the colours whereof were more precious than the stuffe; multitudes of Children and Women, whose different beauties did equally charm the eyes; slaves laden with chains, who had formerly born Crowns and Seepters: he saw all the booty of the East, and those vast treasures which so many Kings in process of so many ages had gathered together: he saw, in fine, all of rare that the Roman power had purcha­sed since her ambition gave place to her a­varice. Notwithstanding all this, this Philo­sopher found a cure for his malady, where it was thought he should have increas'd it he grew to know the vanity of riches in the midst of their triumph; for reflecting upon all that he had seen, and finding that thos [...] things were no less useless than deceitful he generously despised them; this pom [...] (saith he) could endure but some few hours one afternoon hath seen the beginning and the end thereof; Vidistinequam iutra paucas horas ille ordo quamvis lentus dispositusque transicrit? Hoc. totam vitam occupabit, totum diem occupare non potuit. Sen Ep. 100. and though the Chariot that carried all this treasure, marcht but soft­ly, they were quickly gone; what likel [...] ­hood is then that that which could not en­tertain us one whole day, should possess u [...] all our life-time; and that we should suffe [...] long punishment for a thing which is no [...] able to give a long contentment? Thus di [...] [Page 325] this Philosopher learn Virtue, where o­thers reaped nothing but Vanity; and as oft as any object presented it self before his eyes, the appearance whereof might deceive him, Quid miraris? quid stupes? Pompa est: Ostenduntur istae res, non possidentur, & dum placent transeunt. Sen. ibid. he would say, What dost thou admire (O my soul!) that which thou seest is a triumphant pomp, where we see things, but are not suffer'd to possess them; and where, whilst we are therewithal delighted, they pass away and vanish.

If riches, not being a real good, cannot be the object of our hope, whatsoever else the world promiseth us, cannot satisfie it, since they are not far enough off. For this Passion looks far into what is to come: she neglects present things, and longs after what is absent, and builds her felicity upon a happiness which is not as yet come. It seems she would teach us, that the world is not her resting place, and that all those content­ments which smooth our Senses, and which charm our eyes or ears, are not those which she seeks after. She raiseth her self up to Heaven, and pretending to Eternity, she thinks not that absent which is closed up in the un-intermitted course of Time; she, by a generosity which cannot sufficiently be praised, doth undervalue all those greatnes­ses, of which imagination may form an [Page 326] Idea, Quod oculus non vidit, nec auris audivit, nec in cor ho­minis ascendit, quae praepara­vit Deus iis qui diligunt illum. 1 Cor. 2. and aspires only to that supream hap­piness which eye hath not seen, neither ear heard, neither hath it entred into the heart of man. Those then injure her who force her to fasten her self to all that we esteem good, and to languish for Objects, which have not any one of those conditions that hers ought to have. For to boot, that her object ought to be absent, it must be diffi­cult, and such as may cause trouble to those that will seek after it. This Epithete will cause an error to arise in most minds, and men finding difficulties in the pursuit of such things as they wish for, will imagine that they deserve to be hoped for: the Co­vetous man, who crosseth the Seas, who goes to discover unknown Lands, and to seek out new maladies under new Climates, will perswade himself that riches are very well worth the wishing, since they are so hard to come by: the Ambitious man, who enjoys not one hour of content, and who finds a thousand real Hells in the imaginary Paradise which he frames unto himself, will think that Honour is the only object of Hope. But Philosophy pretends to fix dif­ficulty to greatness; she confounds the name of difficult, with that of noble and gene­rous, she blames all those that labour after [Page 327] an infamous good; and who forgetting the nobleness of their birth, have desires only after such things as are despicable. Hope is too couragious to value smoak or dirt; and she pities all those mean Souls, which take such might pains to compass riches or ho­nours. 'Tis true, they cause trouble enough to those who seek after them; but they are not the more to be wished for, for their dif­ficulty; the pain which they are accompa­nied with makes them not the more glori­ous; they resemble the punishment of the guilty, which cease not to be infamous, though severe.

In fine, all that the most part of men de­sire, is not Hopes end, because it is, for the most part, impossible. For though this pas­sion be bold, yet is she wise; she measures her strength; and though she engage her self in glorious enterprizes, she will have some assurance of success: she aspires only to what she may obtain, and she quits the pursuit as soon as she finds they surpass her power; she loves to be esteemed Reserved rather than Rash; and to confess her impotency, rather than to shew her vanity. Notwith­standing, all those that hope exceed these bounds; and bereaving this Passion of her natural wisdom, they raise their desires [Page 328] beyond their merits, and do oft-times la­bour after things equally unjust and impos­sible: a slave in Irons promiseth himself li­berty; a guilty person under the Hang­mans hand hopes yet for pardon; a man that is banisht from the Court, Spes est ulti­mum adversa­rum terum so­latium. Sen. 5. controv. 1. pretends yet to government; and you shall hardly find any so miserable, who do not indiscreetly feed themselves with some imaginary hap­piness: they perswade themselves that the heavens will do miracles for their sakes, and that they will change the order of the Uni­verse, to fulfil their desires.

But of all these mad mad men, there are none more to be pitied than old men; who seeing death already pourtray'd in their fa­ces, do yet promise unto themselves a long life; they lose every day the use of some part of their body; they see not but by art, they hear not without difficulty, they walk not without pain, and in every thing that they do, they have new proofs of their weakness, yet they hope to live; and because our fore­fathers lived many ages, they believe that in having a care of themselves, they may fence themselves against death; and after so many sins that they have committed, taste a fa­vour which hath not been granted save to such as had not as yet lost all Innocence. [Page 329] A man must renounce his judgment to con­ceive so irrational a thought, and not know the grievances which do inseparably ac­company old age; Alia genera mortis spei mixta sunt. Definit mor­bus, incendium extinguitor, ruina quos vi­debatur op­pressura, de­posuit; mare quos hauserit, eadem vi qua sorbebat, ejecit incolumes: gladium miles ab ipsa perituri cervice revoca­vit. Nihil ha­bet quod spe­ret, quem se­nectus ducit ad mortem. Sen. Ep. 30. for all sorts of death are mingled with some hope; a Feaver leaves us after a certain number of Fits, their heats lessen as they increased; the Sea throws on shore those whom it had swallowed up, and a storm hurles ships into the Haven; and a Souldier struck with pity, gives life to his conquer'd Enemy; but he whom old age leads to death, hath no more reason to hope; he is incapable of pardon; and Kings who prolong the lives of such as are condemn'd, cannot do the like to old men: their death is with less pain, but it is more certain; and as they ought not to fear death, so they ought not to hope for life. But we have sufficiently consider'd the outrages done unto Hope: let us see the good offices that may be done unto her, employing her ac­cording to her own inclinations, and our need.

The THIRD DISCOURSE. Of the good use of Hope.

CHristian Religion is wholly built up­on Hope; and as she neglects present happiness, we must not wonder if she long after a felicity to come; she con­fesseth she is not of this world, Scit se pere­grinam in ter­ris agere, inter extraneous facile inimicos inve­nire: Caete­rum genus, sedem, spem, gratiam, dig­nitatem, in coelis habere. Ters in Apol. and she thinks it not strange if sh [...] be persecuted in an enemies Countrey: she knows very well that she is called from this miserable world to another more happy; and that having nothing to possess on earth, she ought to hope for all in heaven. All Christians who are instructed in her School, do with a holy impatience expect the happy day wherein the Son of God will punish his enemies, and crown his Subjects. They think themselves already saved, because they are so in hope; and amongst so many evils that afflict them, they solace themselves in this virtue which promiseth much, but gives more: for it never confounded any body; and though she suffer such as lay claim to her to [Page 331] be persecuted, Spes non con­fundit, quia in­fundit certitu­dinem; per haue enim ipse spiritus testi­monium perhi­bet spiritui nostro quod sumus filii Dei. Bern. in Cant. 37., she inspires them with so much courage, as that far from resenting their sorrows, they cast the happiness of Angels amidst their punishments, and laugh at the cruelty of Tyrants and Hang-men: let whatsoever accidents befall them, they are always secure; and knowing that Jesus Christ is the foundation of their Hope, they look upon all the changes of the earth, with calmness of mind.

But whatsoever advantage Christians may draw from the virtue, we must con­fess that she hath nothing to do with that Passion which considers the time to come, and which seeks out a good which is possi­ble and difficult; for the one is a Christian Virtue which resides in the Will; and the other is a Passion which resides in the sensi­tive appetite; the one is a meer effect of Na­ture, the other is the pure work of Grace: the one by its one strength can extend but to some ages, the other by its proper vigor mounts even to eternity; the one, in brief, makes not good all that it promiseth, and failing in her word, leaves her lovers in con­fusion and sorrow; but the other is so faithful in her promises, as those who have sought under her banners, confess, that her recompenses surpass all their services; yet [Page 332] in these their differences nothing hinders them from agreeing: the best use of humane Hope is to assubject it to divine Hope, and to make it aspire, by her assistance, to the Possession of eternal happiness; for though Passion know no eternity, and that being engaged in the body she raiseth her self not much higher than the Senses, she hath yet some inclination to follow after Grace, and to suffer her self to be guided by her mo­tions: as she obeys Reason, she may obey Godliness; as she is useful to Moral Virtue, she may be useful to Christian Virtue; and (if it be not to give her too much ad­vantage) I should think, that as she inter meddles with Patience and Fortitude to frame Moral habits; Fortitudinem Gentilium mundana cu­piditas, fortitu­dinem Christi­anorum Dei charitas facit, quae diffusa est in cordibus nostris, non per voluntatis arbi, rium, sed per spiritum sanctum qui datus est nobis. Aug. l. l. oper. imperf. cont. Iul. she may do the like with Hope and Charity, to form super-natu­ral habits. But without engaging my self in a School-dispute, it shall suffice me to say, that if all our Passions may be sanctified by Grace, Hope being of no worse condition than the rest, may pretend unto the same fa­vour, and contribute to all the good works of a Christian.

Neither do I doubt but that the Saints have made good use thereof, and that en­lightned by Faith, they have placed all that hope in Jesus Christ, which they placed in [Page 333] their Kings, or in their gods, whilst they lived in Paganism. I doubt not but that this generous Passion which encouraged them in dangers for the glory of their Princes, did animate them amidst flames for the quarrel of the Son of God; and I am firmly of opi­nion, that as by her own forces she made them good souldiers, so assisted from above, she made them couragious Martyrs; for Nature is the ground-work of Grace; and as Faith presupposeth Reason, the fortitude of a Martyr did presuppose the hope of a man; and it behoved that Passion should work in the hearts of those generous Cham­pions, wh [...]st Grace wrought in their Wills. God makes daily use of the mouths of his Prophets to explain his Mysteries; when he discovers to them secrets to come, he makes use of their words to declare them unto his people; and he accords Nature with Grace in them, to execute his De­signes.

I therefore think that the best use a man can make of Hope, is to assubject it to three Christian virtues, which may make good use of her heat: the first is that which bears her name, and which by a harmless piece of cunning, loosens her from the earth, and gives her desires for heaven; for though [Page 334] humane Hope be so generous, yet cannot she pretend to the happiness of eternity; and though in the souls of Alexander and Caesar, she aspired to divine honours, it hath not proceeded so much from any motion of her own, as from the like of vain-glory; but when she is instructed by faith; when she knows that God hath chosen us to be his children, and that Jesus Christ hath made us his brethren, that we may be co­heirs with him, she wisheth with Humili­ty, for what the others wisht for out of Am­bition. The second Virtue which she may be serviceable unto, is Patience; which in all the evils she undergoes hath no other comfort, than what Hope furnisheth her withal; for while she fights with grief and pain, she would be a thousand times opprest by their violence, did not this glorious Passion point out unto her the Rewards which are prepared for her; and if she did not sweeten the present evil by future hap­piness which Hope promiseth her. To un­derstand this, you must know that Patience is a Virtue as mild as close; she hath nothing of lustre; and though she undertake great matters, she spares Pomp and the Theater; darkness and the desarts are pleasing unto her, and she is content to fight in his pre­fence, [Page 335] by whom she expects to be crown'd: neither is she any ways given to use vio­lence; and, though her enemies be so powerful, she defends her self by suffering, and makes us win the victory by the loss of our lives; she hardly takes the liberty to complain, and she shews so little feeling of outrages done unto her, or of her sufferings, as those who do not know her, Spes patientiae anima. unde B. Iacob. illas confundit, dum dicit, patientes estote fratres, usque ad ad­ventum Do­mini: Ecce Agricola ex­pectat pretio­sum fructum terrae &c. Iac. cap. 5. Quae quidem patientia spes almixta, aut potius innixa videtur. accuse her of stupidity. So great a coldness ought to be animated by the heat of Hope; and so mild a virtue requires the assistance of an active Passion. During all her displeasures, the recompenses which are promised her do only possess her, and in the sorrows which she suffers, she raiseth her self up to heaven upon the wings of Hope; and with the eye of Faith, seeth the happiness which is pre­pared for her.

But the chief use which we ought to make of this Pashon is, when Fortitude grapples with grief, and when she sets upon these dreadful enemies, which endeavour to triumph over her Courage. For there is this difference between Patience and Forti­tude; the first is content to suffer; the se­cond will be doing; the one, out of modesty, hides her self; the other, out of generosity, shews it self; the one expects till mischiefs [Page 336] come, the other goes to seek them out; the one is mild, the other severe; the one (to speak properly) suffers pains which she cannot shun; the other endures torments which she easily might eschew. But amongst all these differences, they have this of com­mon, that they cannot subsist without Hope: Tolle spem hominibus, nemo victus retentabit ar­ma; nemo in­feliciter exper­tus negotiatio­nem alios ap­petet quaestus: nemo naufra­gus vivet. Sen. controv. 1. 'tis the soul which gives them life, and these two beātiful virtues would not attract the eyes of men and Angels, were they not encouraged by this Passion which regards futurity. For vain-glory is not a­ble to inspire us with the contempt of sor­row; and the Sect of the Stoicks, as proud as it is, hath been able to make but few Philosophers generously suffer the violence of tortures, and the Hang-mans cruelty; but Christian Religion hath produced multi­tude of Martyrs, who have overcome Flames and Savage Beasts, Finis spei, fe­licitas aeterna. Aug. and triumphed over Pagan Emperours. Their Fortitude was grounded upon the virtue of Hope; & whilst men went about to corrupt them with promises, to affright them with threats, and to vanquish them with to [...]ments, they raised up their spirits to heaven, and con­sidered the recompenses which God pre­pares for those that serve him faithfully.

[Page 337]'Tis doubtless out of this reason that the great Apostle hath given such glorious ti­tles to hope, Quam spem sicut anchoram habemus ani­mae tutam ac firmam Heb. 6. & that he employs all his divine eloquence to express the wonderful effects thereof; for sometimes he calls it an Anchor, which stops our Vessel in the Sea, which makes us find tranquility in the midst of a storm, and which fixeth our desires on hea­ven, and not on earth; sometimes he terms it a Buckler, In omnibus sumentes scu­tum fidei, in quo possitis omnia tela ne­quissimi ignea extinguere. Eph p. 6. under the shelter whereof we beat down the blows which our enraged adversary makes against us; sometimes he calls it our Glory, and represents it unto us as an honorable title, which blotting out our shame, makes us hope, that after having been Gods enemies, we shall become his children, and that in this acception we shall share in his inheritance. By all these praises he teaches us that we have need of Hope in all manner of conditions; and that we may usefully employ her in all the occurrences of our life; that it is our security in storms, our defence in combats, Non est spes nostra de hoc saecula; ab a­more hujus saeculi vocati sumus, ut aliud saeculum spe­remus Aug. l. 3. De ve [...]b. Dom. Serm. 2. and our glory in affronts. But let us observe that she is not of this world, that she forbids us the love thereof, and that she promiseth unto us an­other more glorious and innocent, to be the object of our desires. Let us neglect such a good as is perishable, that we may [Page 338] acquire that which is eternal; let us re­member that it is hard to have pretences at the same time both to heaven and earth, and that we must set at naught the promises of the world, if we will obtain those of Jesus Christ.

The FOURTH DISCOURSE. Of the Nature, Proprieties and Effects, & of the good & evil use of Despair.

OF all the Passions of man, Despair is that which hath been most ho­nour'd, and most blam'd by Anti­quity; for she hath past for the last proof of courage in those famous men, who have made use of sword or poyson, to free them­selves from the insolence of a victorious e­nemy. Poets and Orators never appeared more eloquent, than when they describe the death of Cato; and they do so artificially disguise that furious action, that did not faith perswade us that it is an execrable at­tempt, we should take it for an Heroick acti­on. Seneca never praised Virtue so much, as [Page 339] this crime; Liquet mihi cum magno spectasse gau­dio Deos, cum vir ille, acerri­mus sui vindex gladium sacro pectori infigit, dum viscera spargit, & a­nimam manu educit Sen. De Provid. c. 2. he seems by the high Excomiums he gives it, to perswade all men to Despair; and to oblige all unfortunate people to commit Paricide; he imagines that all the gods descended into Vtica to consider this spectacle; & that they would honour a Stoick Philosopher with their presence, who not able to endure Caesars government, though he had born with the like in Pompey, plung'd his dagger into his breast, tore his entrails; and that he might taste death, rent his soul from his body with his own hands. Catoui ebrietas objecta est: ac facilius efficiet, quisqus obje­cerit, hoc cri­men hon [...]slum quam turpem Catonem Sen. De tranquil. animi. c. 15. But truly I do not wonder that Seneca would make a murder pass for a Sacrifice, since he hath approved of Drunkenness, and that he hath made it a Virtue, that he might not be constrained to blame Cato, who was accused thereof. Others have absolutely condemn'd Despair; and because some men, giving themselves over unto fury, have dipt their hands in their own bloud, they have been of opinion that this Passion ought to be banisht from out our soul; and that nothing could befal us in this life, wherein it was lawful to follow the motions thereof.

Both these opinions are equally unjust, and do violate the Sense of Nature; for let the disaster be what it please, which For­tune threatens us withal, and whatsoever [Page 340] great mishap she prepareth for us, we never may attempt against our own life: our birth and our death depend only upon our Lord God, and none but he who hath brought us into the world, can take us out of it; he hath left unto us the disposal of all the conditi­ons of our life, and hath only reserved to himself the beginning, and the end; we are born when he pleaseth, and we die when he ordaineth it: to hasten the hour of our death, is to intrench upon his rights; and he is so jealous of it, as he oft-times doth mi­racles, to teach us that it belongeth unto him. But if Despair be forbidden us upon this occasion, there are many others where­in it is permitted; and I am of opinion, that Nature did never more evidently shew her care over man, than in enduing him with a Passion which may free him from all the e­vils for which Philosophy hath no reme­dy.

For though Good be a pleasing Object and that by its charm it powerfully attracts the Will, yet it is sometimes environed with so many difficulties, that the Will cannot come nigh it; its beauty makes her languish, she consumes away in Desire, and Hope, which eggeth her on, obligeth her to do her utmost in vain: the more she hath of [Page 341] Love, the more she hath of Sorrow; and the more excellent the good which she seeks after, is, the more miserable is she; that which ought to cause her Happiness, occa­sioneth her punishment: and to speak it in few words, she is unfortunate, for that she cannot forbear loving an object which she cannot compass. This torment would last as long as her Love, did not Despair come in to her succour, and by a natural wisdom oblige her to forgo the search of an impos­sibility; and to stifle such Desires as seem only to afflict her.

As this Passion takes us off from the pur­suit of a difficult good which surpasseth our power, so are there a thousand occasions met withal in mans life, wherein she may be advantageously made use of; and there is no condition how great soever in the world which needs not her assistance. For mens powers are limited, and the greater part of their designs are impossible; Hope and Boldness which animate them, have more of heat than government; led on by these blind guides, they would throw themselves headlong into Praecipices, did not Despair withhold them, & did not she by her know­ledge of their weakness, divert them from their rash enterprizes; she is also a faith­ful [Page 342] Counsellor which never doth deceive us, and which deserves not to be blamed, if, not being sent for till our affairs be in a sad condition, she gives us more wholsome than honorable advice; we must accuse Hope, which engageth us too easily in a danger; and praise Despair, which finds a means to free us from it.

The greatest Princes are only unhappy, for not having listned unto her; for would they measure their forces before they undertake a war, they would not be enforced to make a dishonourable peace, & to take the law from their victorious enemy: but the mischief is, they never implore De­spairs assistance, but when she cannot give it them; and they never advise with this Passion, till all things be reduced to an ex­tremity: yet is she not unuseful at such a time, and her counsels cease not to be pro­fitable, though precipitate. For when Princes know that their forces are inferiour to those of their enemies, and that all the advantage lies on the enemies side, Despair wisely managed causeth them to retreat; and this Passion repairing the faults of Hope and Audacity, makes them keep their souldiers till another time, when they may assuredly promise themselves the victory [Page 343] for Despair is more cautious than couragi­ous, and aims more at the safety than glory of a Kingdom; it makes use of the evils which it hath observed, and thinks it self glorious enough, Arimus ex ipsa desperatione sumitur: igna­vissima anima­lia, quae natura ad fugam ge­nuit, ubi exitus non paret, ten­tant fugam corpore imbel­li Nullus per­nicior hostis est quam quem audacem an­gustia faciunt. Majora, aut certe paria, conatur ani­mus magnu ac perdi [...]us. Sen. Quaest. [...] atur. l. c. 59. if it can escape the fury of him that doth pursue it. 'Tis true, that when it sees all ways of safety barred up, and that it is on all sides environed by death, it chu­seth the most honourable; and recalling Hope which it had chased away, resolveth either to die or overcome. Therefore 'tis, that good Commanders do never put the vanquished to Despair; but knowing that this Passion becomes valiant when provo­ked, they make her bridges of gold, open all passages to her; and suffer this Torrent to disperse it self abroad in the open Champi­on, lest her fury swelling by resistance, over­bear such works as are opposed to her im­petuosity. Herein the nature of Despair is strange; for it ariseth from Fear; and its greatest wisdom consisteth in its timorous­ness; in the good which it offers it self, it ra­ther considereth the difficulty which may astonish, than the glory which may attract; and be it, that it be more cold, or less coura­geous than Hope, it hath not so much an eye to good, as to bad events; yet when the danger is extream, and that the mischief is [Page 344] so great as it cannot be evaded; it makes virtue of necessity, and gives battel to an enemy, which Hope it self durst not assail; it oftentimes plucks the Lawrel from out the Conquerors hand; and performing acti­ons which may pass for miracles, it exceeds Nature, it preserves mens lives in making them contemn them, and wins the victory by seeking after an honourable death.

By all these effects it is easie to judge of the nature of Despair, and to know that it is a violent motion by which the soul keeps aloof from a difficult good, which it thinks it cannot compass, and by which likewise it sometimes draws near unto it; rather to shun the evil which threatens it, than to pos­sess the difficult good; for in its birth De­spair is fearful, and hath no other design, than to divert the soul from the vain seek­ing after an impossible good; but in its pro­gress it becomes bold, and when it sees that by keeping aloof from a difficult good, it engageth it self in an infamous evil, it re­sumes courage, and employs all its power to gain a thing which it thought assuredly to have lost; so as this is not a single Passion, & to explain the nature thereof well, we must say, that she is mixt of Fear and Hope; and that, as in the beginning she is more faint-hearted [Page 345] than the former, she is in the end more generous than the latter. But at both these times she hath need of government; & that she may be serviceable to Virtue, she must shun two dangerous extreams which bear her name, and stain her glory; the one may be called Faint-heartedness, the other Foolhardiness; she falls into the former, when not knowing her own strength, she keeps at distance from a good which she might com­pass; she falls into the second, when not re­garding her own imbecility, or the great­ness of the danger, she undertakes an impos­sibilty, and engageth her self in a design which cannot have any good success. It be­longs to Reason to govern her, and to see when she may eschew without infamy, and when she may charge without rashness: if it be a lawful good, which may with Justice be expected, it must seldom or ne­ver be despaired of; upon such an occasion Opiniatrecy is commendable; and a man is not to be blamed who attempts even an im­possibility, to purchase a happiness which his duty requires him to seek after: but if that which he wisheth for, be hard to come by, and perishable, he must cure himself of his vain desires, and foolish [...]pes, by a rational Despair. But he must beware, that though [Page 346] this Passion be in Nature oft-times inno­cent, she is always guilty in relation to Grace; for nat [...]ral hope being grounded upon our proper forces, it is lawful to for­go her, to embrace Despair; and there is nothing of inconvenience, that man whose misery is so well known, do quit his designs when he cannot compass them; but super­natural hope being grounded upon divine power, we must not forgo her; and it is a capital fault to suspect God of falshood or of weakness. Those therefore who despair of their souls health, justle his highest perfe­ctions, and make themselves unworthy to receive pardon of their sins, from the time they cease to hope; for since the holy Scri­pture teacheth us, that God is good, and all­powerful, those who perswade themselves, that he either will not, or cannot save them, commit outrage against his Power and Goodness; and by one and the same fault give against his two most excellent qualities: and if we will believe St. Austin, they who despair imitate proud people, and make themselves equal with God, by lo­sing the hope of their salvation; for when they fall into despair, they imagine that Gods Mercy is not so great as their sin is, and by an injurious preferrence, they raise [Page 347] their wickedness above his goodness; Adhuc cum diffidit, & suam nequitiam comparat Dei benignitati, finem imponit virtuti Dei, dans finem in­finito, & per­fectionem au­ferens Deo, cui nihil deest, etiam quod cogitari non potest. Aug. 1. De vera & fal­sa poenitent cap. 5. they prescribe bounds to an infinite Love, and bereave him of perfections, who possesseth more than our souls can imagine.

True it is, that if Despair be faulty in re­lation to Grace, there is an excess of Hope which is not much less dangerous; and there are certain Christians in the Church, who are opinionated in their sins, only out of a confidence they have of Gods Mercy: they make use of his goodness only to in­jure him; they think not of his favours to sinners, save to abuse them; and by irratio­nal consequences, which Philosophy can­not have taught them, they conclude that they ought to be wicked, because God is good, and that we ought to offend him, be­cause he doth not punish his enemies: had not these shameless sinners lost their judg­ment together with their Piety, they would argue after another manner, and say; That since God is good, man must be obedient; that since he is prone to forgive, man ought to have a care how to offend him; and that since he loves the welfare of man, man ought to love his Honour. But certainly, if they had not these just considerations, Gods mercy should not maintain in them their foolish confidence; for to boot, that his [Page 348] Mercy agrees with his Justice, and that the one doth not intrench upon the others rights, he hath so temper'd his Promises with his Threats in the holy Scripture, Propter illos qui desperati­one periclitan­tur, proposuit indulgentiae portum; prop­ter eos vero qui spe peri­clitantur, & dilationibus illuduntur, fe­cit diem mor­tis incertum. Aug. l. 3. D [...] verb. DoM. Serm. 10. as they banish from out the soul of man both Despair and Presumption; to assure those that despair, he hath proposed Penitency unto them, the gate whereof is open to all those that repent; and to terrifie the pre­sumptuous, who through their delays de­spise his mercy, he hath made the day of death uncertain, and hath reduced them to a necessity of fearing a moment, which as being unknown, may surprize the whole world.

The FIRST DISCOURSE. Of the Nature, Proprieties and Effects of Audacity and Fear.

IF Virtues be the more to be valu­ed by reason of the difficulties which accompany them; if such as are most painful, be most beau­tiful; we must confess that among Passions, Audacity ought to be esteem­ed the most glorious, since it is the most difficult; and that it undertakes to [Page 350] fight against whatsoever is most terrible in the world; for though Hope be generous, and that she be not pleased with what is good, unless it be auster; yet doth the beau­ty thereof invite her to seek after it, and the charms thereof endue her with strength to overcome the difficulties which surround it; but Audacity wants this assistance, and considers an object which hath nothing in it of lovely, she sets upon evil, and coming in to the aid of Hope, she denounceth war to her enemies, and proposeth no other re­compense in the combat, but glory; she is of the humour of Conquerors, who leave all the booty to their Souldiers, reserving on­ly the honour to themselves.

For all those that describe her nature, a­gree in this, that she is a Passion of the Soul which goes in quest of dangers, to grapple with them; and overcome them; she may therefore be termed a natural Fortitude, and a disposition to that generous Virtue which triumphs in sorrow, and in death; as she undertakes nothing but what is difficult, she is more severe than pleasing; a certain severity may be seen in their countenances whom she inanimates, which sufficiently shews, that her delight lies in troubles, and that she hath no other pastime, than what she [Page 351] takes in overcoming Sorrows; nothing comforts her but Glory; nor doth any thing nourish her but Hope; with this weak succour she assails all her enemies, and gains almost as many victories as she fights battels.

But to afford this Discourse more light, we must know, that good and Evil are the two objects of all our Passions; Love con­siders Good, and employs Desire and Hope, to obtain it: sometimes the Good proves so hard to be come by, that Love through Despair forgoes it, thinking it a piece of wisdom, to renounce a happiness which cannot be obtained. Hatred detests Evil, and to withstand an enemy which de­clares perpetual war with it, she employs such Passions as hold of her Empire; she makes use of Fear, and of Eschewing, to keep from it; and sometimes she employs Bold­ness and Choler, to fight with it and over­come it; but as Despair would never forgo a difficult good, did not Fear perswade that the difficulties which attend it cannot be overcome; Quid sunt be­nae spei, sunt audaces Arist. lib. Ethic c. 8. Audacity would never under­take to set upon a dreadful evil, did not Hope promise her the victory; so as these two Passions cease not to be of one mind, though they have different objects: though [Page 352] the one seek after what is good, and the o­ther provoke what is evil, they both labour for the quiet of the mind, and by several ways endeavour the same end. The truth is, the condition of the one is much more sweet than is that of the other; for Hope hath only a respect to the good which she desires; if sometimes she cast her eye upon the difficulties which surround it, 'tis rather out of necessity than inclination; and if she hazard her self upon some danger, 'tis not so much out of glory, as out of profit; but boldness considers only what is evil, and by a certain confidence which accom­panies her in all her designs, promiseth her self to overcome it by her own strength. Hope doth easily engage her self; and being as light as vain, she undertakes all enterpri­zes which she judgeth to be glorious and feasible; but she would thereby reap no­thing but Confusion, did not Audacity come in to her aid; and by the greatness of that Courage which is natural to her, hap­pily execute that which her companion had rashly undertaken: Hope resembles the Trumpets which sound the Charge, but ne­ver enter into the scuffle: Audacity contra­riwise, is of the nature of those Souldiers who are silent, and keep all their forces to [Page 353] fight with the enemy: Hope promiseth all things, and gives nothing, and abuseth men with fair words, which are not always fol­low'd by good effects; but Audacity pro­miseth nothing, and performeth much; she attempts even impossibilities to make good hopes promises; and endeavours to over­come the difficulties which hinder the exe­cution thereof. In fine, she is so generous, that her designs, though they be difficult, cease not to be fortunate; and she is so accu­stomed to overcome, as the Poets, to give some colour to her victories which she wins contrary to the Laws of war, have feigned that she hath a Divinity which encourageth her, and that her Deeds are rather Miracu­lous than Natural.

But to the end that these differing quali­ties may the more evidently appear, I will add Examples to Reasons, and make it known by certain remarkable Histories, how much Daring is more considerable than Hope. No Monarch was ever more power­ful than Xerxes, and his power never ap­peared more than when he framed the de­sign of conquering Greece: his Army was composed of two millions of men, the field­room was too little to receive a Body of men, the parts whereof were monstrous; [Page 354] the earth groaned under the weight of the Engines which he caused to be carried a­bout, to batt [...]r Towns which should resist him. Alius ille vix rerum natu­ram sufficere, angusta esse classibus ma­ria, militi ca­stra, explican­dis equestribus copiis campe­stria, vix patet coelum ad e­mittenda omni m [...]nu tela. Sen. This dreadful number of Foot and Horse drained up rivers, the hail of Arrows shot from so many hands darkned the Sun: those who would flatter this Prince, said, that the Sea was not large enough to bear his shipping; and that Greece was not great enough to quarter his Troops. This mean while Leonidas seized upon the streights of Thermopilae, and intrenching himself in those mountains, resolved to give him battel with three hundred men as he should pass by. Laconas tibi oftendo in ip­fis Thermopy­larum angustiis positos, nec victoriam spe­rantes, nec re­ditum: Ille lo­cus istis se pul­chrum suturus est Sen. Ep. 12. Hope and Audacity enflamed the heart of this noble Captain, and those two Passi­ons enconraged him to an enterprize as dif­ficult as glorious: Hope laid before him the glory which he should receive in oppo­sing the common enemy of Greece, in pre­serving the liberties of his Countrey, in sa­ving the Temples from being burnt, in de­fending Towns from being pillaged, and in keeping the women from the insolence of a victorious. Barbarian she forgot not to point out unto him all the honours which the La­cedemonians would give him; the Statues which would be erected in memory of his name, the praises which should be given [Page 355] him by all the people, and the magnifique titles which Historians would give him in their Writings: it may be she would flatter him with an impossible Victory, and per­swade him that a disorder falling out in an Army wherein were many men, but few Souldiers, he might easily defeat it. But Courage, fuller of Truth than Hope, knew the greatness of the danger, and not abusing this Commander, laid open before his eyes, that though his death were certain, he was not to quit the passage which he had taken; that there was no need of conquering, but of dying; and that he should do enough for the welfare of Greece, if, by losing his life, he should make his enemies lose their resoluti­on. He gave belief to the advice of this ge­nerous Passion; Quam fortiter Leonidas mili­tes allocutus est? Sic com­militones prandete, tan­quam apud in­feros coenaturl. Sen. ibid. he resolved to stand the shock of an Army which he could not stay, and invited his souldiers to fight and die at the same time. By this example it is easie to judge, that Hope considers only the good which doth solicite her; and that Andacity respects only the evil that threatens her; that the one entertains her self only with the glory which she promiseth to her self; and that the other is only taken up with the danger which she withstands: that the one feeds her self with an imaginary pleasure, [Page 356] and that the other nourisheth her self with real pain: 'Tis true, the latter finds her contentment in her duty, and sings trium­phantly in the midst of her defeat; for though she bear not away the victory over the Persians in the person of Leonidas, she carries it sheer away over the fear of death; and she is sufficiently contented to have o­vercome the violentest of all her enemies: Non est quod me victum, te victorem cre­das, vicit fortu­na tua fortu­nam meam. Sen. De cons. sap c ^. 6. she is not troubled for being beaten by men, provided she may overcome Fortune; and good success is to her indifferent, so she may vanquish the apprehension of danger.

If it be permitted to add Fiction to Histo­ry, we shall see the divers motions of those two Passions, in the person of Iason. The purchase of the golden Fleece is the subject of his journey: Hope makes him put to sea, and promiseth him fair winds, which shall fill his sails, and bring him in despite of tempest, to the Coast of Colchis; she shews him how all Greece have their eys fixt upon him; and that she hath no Commander who in this expedition will not fight under his Ensign; that in so noble an enterprize profit is joyn'd to glory, and that the recompense which he may expect, is as rich as honorable; but Audacity which cannot flatter, lays be­fore him Souldiers which he hath to over­come, [Page 357] Monsters to tame, and a Serpent which always waketh, to surprize; yet he accepts of all these conditions, and under­takes to assail all these enemies upon confi­dence of his own forces; he is not sure to o­vercome the Bulls and Serpents which he shall meet withal; but he is very well assu­red to overcome Fear; he knows that suc­cess depends upon Fortune; but he knows also that Boldness depends only upon Cou­rage; it sufficeth him to set at naught all these Monsters, which present themselves before him under such dreadful visages, and without any further recompense, thinks himself glorious enough, if he can triumph over Fear.

By these two examples, the advantages which Audacity hath over Hope, are easily discerned; but in their oppositions some­what of resemblance may be found; and the same Causes that make us hope for good, seem to make us despise evil; for youth, which abounds in heat, imagines nothing impossible; & because her vigour gives her assurance, she easily engageth her self in dif­ficult and glorious designs; good success doth likewise feed this Passion; and when Fortune smiles upon Commanders, they do not greatly refuse to fight; though their [Page 358] forces be inferiour to those of the enemy, they perswade themselves that their very name is able to affright them; and being ac­customed to overcome, they cannot fear a misfortune which hath not yet befallen them. Power contributes no less than good success to make men bold; for when a Prince commands over a great State, when every Town furnisheth him with an Army; when the Revenues are such as will afford him to entertain them divers years; when his neighbours fear him, and that he hath no more to do to make them his subjects, but to march into the fields; he shuns not the undertakings of any war, nor ever de­spairs of Victory. But of all things in the world, nothing makes a man more bold than innocence; Qui bene se habent ad di­vina, audacio­res sunt. Arist. l. 2. Rhetoric. cap 5. for though the enemy that assails him be powerful, and that the earth fight in favour of him, he imagines that God ought to take his part, and that he who protects the innocent, being interessed in his Cause, is bound to defend him; so as he marcheth undauntedly amidst dangers, dreads no ill success; and expecting help from heaven, promiseth unto himself assu­red Victory. The one and the other of these Passions may be mistaken; and as they be­come glorious Virtues, when they are gui­ded [Page 359] by Prudence; they may degenerate in­to shameful vices, when they suffer them­selves to be governed by Indiscretion: this is that we will examine in the ensuing Dis­courses.

The SECOND DISCOURSE. Of the bad use of Audacity or Boldness.

AUdacity having no other guide than Hope, we must not wonder if she undertake enemies which she can­not vanquish; and if her desires have, for the most part, ill success; 'tis not likely that rash enterprizes should be fortunate, and that actions which are not governed by Wisdom, should be accompanied by good success: Fortune grows weary offavouring the Audacious; and having oft-times kept them out of danger, wherein they had indis­creetly engaged themselves, she forsakes them with some seeming Justice, and pu­nishes their Fool-hardiness, to remedy the like in others. All men are therefore bound to weigh well the Counsels which Hope [Page 360] giveth them, and to consider their strength, before they follow the motions of Audaci­ty; for though they be full of Gallantry, and that most souldiers confound them with the motions of Valour, they cease not not­withstanding to be fatal, and to be dayly the cause of the loss of Armies, and ruine of States. But to find the Spring-head of this evil, we must know that the Passions reside in the inferior part of the Soul, and cannot discourse; they only consider their object, and by a blind impetuosity they either draw near unto it, or keep far from it; they do not mark so much as the Circumstances which accompany it; and not comparing the difficulties with their strengths, Nec audacem quidem timo­ris absolvimus, nec prodigum quidem avari­tia liberamus Sen l. 4. Be­nefic. c. 25. they engage themselves indiscreetly in a war, or shamefully run away; their judgment is so ready, as it is almost precipitate; for after having listned to what the senses say, they advise with their inclination; and not ex­pecting orders from Reason, they bear a­way the whole man, and enforce him to follow their motions. Hence it comes, that he oft-times repents him of his designs, condemns what he formerly approved, and cannot end what he had begun.

But of all Passions, none is more unfortu­nate than Audacity; for she betakes her self [Page 361] to powerful enemies, and she grapples with Pain and Death: Fighting is her ordinary exercise, and she oft-times bathes her self in tears or bloud; she is always encompassed with dangers; and on what side soever she turns, she sees nothing but ghastly images, and fearful apparitions; this mean while she borrows no aid, nor takes no counsel, save only of Hope; and the same that hurries her into danger, is she that counsels her; she who sets her on work, is she who puts weapons into her hands; and who under vain promises engageth her in extream dif­ficulties; she also often sees the greatest part of her designs prove abortive, and reaps nothing of all her useless endeavours, but sorrow for having followed evil counsel; oft-times she discourageth her self, Audaces te­meritate pro­vecti, ante cu­piunt adire pericula quam instant? cum adsunt, ea de­fugiunt. Arist. l. 3. Eth. c. 2. and see­ing that her undertakings do exceed her strength, she suffers her self to be astonished by Fear, beat down by Despair, and consu­med by Sadness; for these Passions do al­most always succeed her; and experience teacheth us that those who at the beginning of a fight have been more couragious than men, have at the end thereof been found more fearful than Woman. The fewel of Boldness soon takes fire, but it is as soon extinguished; and as the fury of waves [Page 362] turns into foam, the violence of the Audaci­ous turns into Fearfulness; and for all the confidence they shewed in their designs, all that remains unto them, is Weaknesses, as full of shame as of guilt.

'Tis true, that Choler sometimes sides with Boldness, and furnisheth it with new forces, when the danger hath made it lose its own: but this assistance is not always sure: the souldier that engages himself in battel upon her weak succours, is in as great danger of losing the victory, as he who puts his hope in Despair; and is no more assured of conquest, than he that fights, only because he cannot retire. Desperate men have been seen to die with their weapons in their hands, and if sometimes they have revenged their deaths, they have not always preserv'd their lives: Bold men have also often been seen, who for being cholerick, have not more luckily evaded the danger whereinto they had precipitated themselves. Vides fortitu­dinis matrem esse prudenti­am, nec forti­tudinem sed temeritatem esse quemlibet ausum quem non parturivit prudentia. Bern. De con­sider. l. 1. Cholers forces are as well limited as are those of Boldness; and unless the one and the other [...] of them be guided by Prudence, they ought [...] not to expect any thing but dreadful conse­quences: that which hath happened upon one occasion, will not happen upon many others; and the Heavens are not obliged [Page 363] to give the same success to all rash enterpri­zes. Alexanders example ought not to serve for a rule to all Conquerors; he lived not long enough to be certainly imitated; the fortune which followed him in his youth, would peradventure have forsaken him in his age; his rashness would not always have been so fortunate; and if he had begun his conquest in Europe, he might not perhaps, have carried them so far as Asia; the birth of Rome would have staid the course of his victories; and she that shut up Pyrrhus in his dominions, would have driven him back in­to Macedonia.

For my part, I am of Seneca's opinion, Alexandro e­rat pro virtute soelix temeri­tas. Sen. Be­nefic l. 1▪ c. 1 3. & believe that this Prince had more courage than wisdom, and more rashness than cou­rage: in effect, his fortune did oftner pre­serve him than his valour; and if the Hea­vens had not made choice of him to pu­nish the pride of the Persians, he had been stopt in the first battel; he would not take those advantages which the greatest Com­manders do commonly make use of, when their forces are not equal to those of their enemy; he would not set upon Darius his army whilst favoured by the night, but with a piece of rashness, which deserved more blame than it hath received praises: he [Page 364] would tarry till it were day, and have th [...] Sun for witness of his victory; he though [...] he should have stoln a victory, if he shoul [...] have won it by night; and though Parmen [...] advised him to prefer his Souldiers safet [...] before the glory of Arms, he contemne [...] that advice; and to shew that he owed a [...] his advantages to Fortune, he rejected a [...] the Maxims of Prudence: I do also firml [...] believe, that his confidence hath been th [...] undoing of as many Princes as have imitated him, and that his guidance is more fatal to Conquerors, —Medias pro­rumpe procel­las, Tutela se­cure mei.— Lucan. than rocks and tempes [...] unto Mariners. I know very well, that Caesae adventur'd much, and that he could not undertake the ruine of the Roman Common wealth without having conceived a grea [...] good opinion of his good Fortune, whic [...] he was able to guide by Wrath and Virtue and we are bound to acknowledge that [...] Victories were no less the workmanship o [...] his Wisdom, than of his Fortune, he shewe [...] no Audacity but upon such occasions wher [...] advice was useless; and he boasted not o [...] his good Fortune, but to conjure down th [...] tempests, and put confidence in his Pilot: I [...] fine, he made use of Hope in all his enter­prizes, he submitted it to Prudence, and taught all Commanders, that to be valiant a man must be more wise than rash.

The THIRD DISCOURSE. Of the good use of Audacity or Boldness.

THough Passions be more faulty than i [...]ocent, and that, by reason of the irregularity of our nature, they lean more to Vice than Virtue; yet with a little help a man may make them virtuous; their inclinations are good, but their judgments precipitate; they always seek for good, and withstand evil; but this is most commonly with a little, too much ardency; they imitate such Orators as defend a good Cause with bad Reasons; or are like those unfortunate Innocents, who when tortured, and wanting perseverance, confess faults which they never committed: for in effect, they become guilty through want of Patience; and grow vicious by not being able to endure the absence of Good, nor presence of Evil. Did not Hope pursue Honours which she cannot compass, never would she bring the Ambitious to De­spair; and did not Boldness engage her self [Page 366] to fight against mischiefs which she canno [...] overcome, she would never be accused o [...] Rashness; but the fault is not without re­medy; for, if she will listen to Reason, i [...] (after having calmed the fury of her first motion) she will suffer her self to be guided by Wisdom, she will alter her nature; and of a simple Passion, she will become a glo­rious Virtue: Audacity and Fortitude con­sider the same object, and their inclinations are so like, as one may say, that Fortitude is a rational Audacity, and that Audacity is a natural Fortitude; their enemies are com­mon, and they summon all their forces to fight with them; they are agitated by the same motives, and seek the same end.

For, Fortitude, according to her truest definition, Fortitudo est scientia peri­culorum exci­piendorum, re­pellendorum, & provocando­rum. Sen. Be­nesic. l. 2. c. 34. is a Science which teacheth us ei­ther to suffer, or to beat back, or to provoke injuries: she constantly endures all the evils which Nature is subject to; she will not be dispensed withal in general Rules; and knowing that the necessity of death is a sen­tence pronounced against all men, she never appeals from it; with calmness of spirit she sees sickness approach; the first remedy which she applies to cure them, is to think that they arise from our constitution, and that they make up a part of us; contagion [Page 367] doth not astonish her; & be it either for that [...]he looks upon it as a punishment of sin, or that she considers it as an effect of Nature, she accuseth not the stars of it, and pretends not to be exempt from an evil which doth not pardon Princes: with a noble neglect she beats back all such disasters as take all their strength from error; and which do not of­fend our bodies, but as they hurt our ima­gination: she defends her self against Pover­ty, by desiring only necessary things; she despiseth Honours, considering that they are oftner the recompense of Vice, than of Virtue; she laughs at Voluptuousness, knowing that it is pleasing only in appea­rance, and that under a specious name it hi­deth shameful and real pains; she provokes sorrow, to try her courage; she seeks for calamity, as an occasion to exercise her Vir­tue; and if she had not tasted the disasters of life, she would think her self ignorant of the better half of what she ought to know: Singula vicere jam multi. ig­nem Mutius, crucem Regu­lus, venenum Socrates, exili­um Camillus, mortem ferri adactam Cato: & nos vinca­mus aliquid. Sen. F. p. 38. she hath rather a greediness than a desire after dangers, and since the evil she undergoes contributes unto her glory, she fore runs it, thinking it a point of baseness to tarry expe­cting it. In fine, she hath overcome death in its most ghastly hue; nor hath the cruelty of tyrants invented punishments over which [Page 368] Fortitude hath not triumphed. Scoevola de­rided the flames, and witnessed more con­stancy in seeing his hand burn, than his e­nemies did in beholding it: Regulus was an honour to the Rack whereon he died; So­crates turn'd his Prison into a School, his Executioners became his Disciples; and the poyson which he swallowed, made his in­nocence glorious: Camillus suffer'd banish­ment calmly; and Rome had remained cap­tive, had not this famons Exile restored un­to her her liberty. Cato slew himself, and though he suffer'd himself to be overcome by impatience, he may at least boast of ha­ving preserved his liberty. But without ma­king use of prophane examples, where Vir­tue is always mingled with Vice, we have no Martyr which hath not overcome some Tyrant, & in the severity of their sufferings given many proofs of their courage. The Ignatii have provoked wild beasts; and as if that Death had been a courtesie, they sought after it with eagerness, and endured it with pleasure: the Laurences have van­quisht the flames, and while their bodies di­stilled drop by drop upon the fire-brands their tongues reproached their Judges, and gave praises to Jesus Christ: the Clement [...] and Agathaes have wearied their Executio­ners; [Page 369] their martyrdom endured thirty years; the famousest Cities of the world have ser­ved for Theaters to their sufferings; all the earth hath been water'd with their bloud; and Heaven hath shewn a thousand miracles to prolong their lives, and to make their Triumphs more famous. But if Forti­tude encouraged by Charity hath held out all these brunts, and had the better of all these enemies, Audacity may claim to a great share in the glory; for it is she that ma­keth Martyrs; and though Grace be more powerful than Nature, yet doth she not de­spise the assistance thereof: as the soul and body conspire together to practise Virtue, Nature agrees with Grace to beat down sin. Boldness is the ground work of all glo­rious actions; and had not this noble Passion fill'd the heart of the first Christians, For­titude had not gotten such glorious victo­ries; they have so much of affinity between them, as they cannot subsist asunder: For­titude languisheth without Audacity; and Audacity without Fortitude is rash. Vir­ [...]e would be succor'd by Pasion, & Passi­ [...] guided by Virtue. Audacity is the be­ginning of Fortitude, and Fortitude is Au­ [...]cities perfection; or to speak more [...]early, Audacity is an imperfect Virtue, [Page 370] and Fortitude is an accomplisht Passion.

But to arrive at this perfection she must have three or four remarkable circumstan­ces; the first is, that she be accompanied by Justice and Prudence; for he that takes up arms to ruine his Countrey, deserves not to be stiled Couragious; his design dishonors his Passion, and his Audacity becomes faul­ty, for his not having chosen a lawful end. Let Cataline take up arms, Catalina prae­ditus fortitu­dine videbatur, sed fortitudo non erat; nam prudens non erat: mala e­nim pro bonis eligebat; tem­perans non e­rat, corruptelis enim turpissi­mis foedabatur justus non erat, nam contra patriam conju­ra [...]erat; ideo non furtitudo, sed duritia, cui fortitudi­nis nomen, ut stultos falleret, imponebat Aug. l De Sen­tentia Iacobi ad Hi [...]rom. let him encou­rage his souldiers to the battel by his exam­ples, let him be besmear'd with his own bloud mixt with that of his enemies, let him die with his sword in his hand well advanced in the scuffle, and let fury & choler be seen in his visage even after death; he shall never pass for a couragious man; his Audacity was not discreet, since trespassing against all the laws of Discretion, he had undertaken so pernicious a design: neither was it tem­perate, since he won his souldiers good will, only by satisfying their Avarice, or Un­cleanness of life: it was not just, because he had conspired against his Countrey; and it was rather an obdurateness than a greatness of courage; since to compass glory, he com­mitted Paricide. The second is, that the motive of Audacity be generous, and that the daring man expose not his life upon a [Page 371] slight consideration; for he very well knows his own worth, and not born away with vain-glory, he knows his life is precious: he hath preserved it with much care, and if he endanger it, it must be for a subject that deserves it.

There is a great deal of difference be­tween a valiant man, Magrum est discrim [...]n inter eum qui v [...]rtu­tem magni fa­cit, aut qui vitam parvi ae­stimat: Nam semet in vitae discrimen con­jicere, aut in foelicium est aut belluarum. Cic. in Caton. and one that is despe­rate; the latter seeks out death to free him­self from misery; but the other pursues it only to discharge his duty, and content his inclination: he will not then engage him­self in danger to purchase a little honor; he will not be guided by the example of the rash; he values not those Maxims which are authorized by Folly and Indiscretion; but he will go whithersoever the Trumpet summons him, and will throw himself, though single, upon a Body of Horse, if he have order so to do; he will die a thousand times rather than forgo the station given him in charge; and he will cover the place with his body which he is not able to de­fend with his sword. The third is to try his own strength, before he set upon the enemy; for Virtue is too rational to engage us in an impossibility; she exacts nothing from us, but what is in our power, and she will have us in all our enterprizes, to observe whether [Page 372] our means to be answerable to the end en­deavoured. There is nothing more glorious than conquest of the Holy Land; and if the greatness of our Monarch might beincreas'd by wishes, we would desire, that to his o­ther August Titles, that of The Deliverer of the Land of Palestine might be added; but he who should engage himself in that Design would be more rash than couragious, if be­fore putting to Sea, he had not quieted all his own Dominions, if he had not raised forces enough to fight with those of the In­fidels; and if he had not by his Intelligen­ces caused an Insurrection in the Eastern parts, thereby to work a powerful diversi­on. To boot with all these conditions, Christian Audacity ought to have two more; Omnis fortitu­do in humili­tate sita est, quia fragilis est omnis superbia Aug. in Ps 92. the first is Humility, which agrees very well with greatness of Courage, since her enemy Vain-glory, is always accompa­nied with Faint-heartedness: The second is Hatred of our selves, for he that hath not o­vercome his own inclination, Re vera fortis pugnat, qul contra se pug­nat. Aug Serm. 6. De Nativit. Domini. must not ex­pect to overcome his delights; and he who hath not warred against his own body, is but ill prepar'd to denounce war against Sorrow. Let us then use our strength a­gainst our selves, that we may employ it to purpose against our enemies, and let us van­quish [Page 373] Self-love, if we will overcome the fear of death.

The FOURTH DISCOURSE. Of the Nature, Proprieties and Effects of Fear.

THere are some Passions whose Names belie their Natures, and are nothing less inwardly than what they outwardly appear to be. The name of Hope is pleasing, but her humour is violent; and she is cause of as much evil as she pro­miseth contentment: the name of Despair is odious, but her nature corresponds with Reason; and we are obliged unto it, when it makes us forgo the pursuit of a good which we cannot compass. The name of Boldness is glorious; we no sooner hear thereof, but we conceive a greatness of cou­rage, which despiseth Pain, and seeketh out Death; but the inclination thereof is Sa­vage; and if it be not withheld by Wisdom, it engageth us in dangers which cause much mischief to us, and little glory. The name of [Page 374] Fear is contemptible; and errour hath so cried down this Passion, as 'tis taken for the mark of a Coward; but her humor is wise, and if she warn us of our misfortunes, it is to free us from them. For Nature seems to have given us two Passions to our Counsel­lors in the divers adventures of our life; Hope and Fear; the first is doubtless the more pleasing, but the second is the more faithful; the first flatters us to de­ceive us; the second frightens us to se­cure us; the first imitates those inte [...]essed Counsellors, who in all their advices have respect rather to the Fortune than Person of their Prince, Ne tum fortu­na Principis potius loquan­tur quam cum inso Tacit. 1. in Histor. and who by a dangerous flattery prefer his contentment before the welfare of his State; the second resembles those faithful State-Ministers which disco­ver a mischeif that they may cure it, and who stick not to anger their King a little, to purchase him a great deal of glory. In fine, the first is oft-times useless; and the number of what is good being small enough, she hath not many employments; and if she undertakes any thing which belongs not to her, she makes us lose our labour and our time; the second is almost always busied; and the number of evils being infinite, she is never out of exercise; she looks far into [Page 375] what is to come, and seeks out the evil which may happen, not to make us misera­ble before the time, as she is unjustly accu­sed, but to secure our happiness, and to dis­perse all the disasters which may bereave us of it.

For Fear is a natural Wisdom which oft­times frees us from danger, by making us apprehensive thereof; she spreads her self over all the actions of our life, and is no less useful to Religion than to a Common-wealth: if we will believe prophane Au­thors, 'tis she that made the gods; Primus in or­be deos fecit timor Stat. and though there be some impiety in this Maxim, a man may notwithstanding ob­serve some shadow of Truth in it; for 'tis the fear of eternal punishment which perswa­ded men they were to appease the incensed gods; 'tis she that hath made Sacrifices, builded Temples, set up Altars, and immo­lated Victimes; 'tis she that keeps the Just within their duties, and which after a fault committed makes them lift up their hands to heaven, and witness their sorrow for it. Though men talk of generosity in Religion, and boast that they are won rather by Pro­mises than by Threats; yet it must be con­fest, that Fear hath sav'd more guilty people than Hope; so is she termed in the holy [Page 376] Scripture, Male de nobis actum erat quod multa scelera legem & judicem ef­fugiunt, & scri­pta supplicia, nisi illa natu­ralia & gravia de praesentibus soiverent, & in locum poeni­tentiae timor cederet. Sen. Ep. 97. the beginning of Wisdom; that is to say, the prop of Virtue, & the founda­tion of Piety. Sin would grow insolent, were it not supprest with this Passion; & all laws would be unuseful, had not Nature im­printed Fear in the soul of offenders; she is therein engraven in characters which Time cannot deface; they apprehend the punish­ment of a secret sin; and though they know the Judges can punish only such as they come to the knowledge of, they tremble in the midst of their friends, they awake af­frighted; and this faithful Minister of Gods Justice suffers them not to find assurance, Epicuri argu­mentum, na­tura nos à sce­lere abhorrere, quod omnibus malis etiam inter tuta ti­mor est Sen. Ep. 98. neither in Towns, nor yet in Desarts, 'Tis a proof that Nature is not wholly corrupted, since there remains in it horrour for sin, and dread for the punish­ment thereof; for let a sinner hide himself in what part he pleaseth, he carries Fear about with him; and this uncorruptible Passion teacheth him, that there is a Divinity which sees our secret faults, whilst we live, and punisheth them when we are dead. Often doth she convert Libertines; and by an un­conceiveable miracle, she perswades them unto truths, which they would not have be­lieved, lest they should be obliged to fear them she stings even the most opinionated; [Page 377] and of as many as acknowledg Jesus Christ, there are few that owe not their Love to their Fear; they endeavour not to gain hea­ven, save to free themselves from hell; and they love Gods goodness only because they fear his Justice. I very well know that this resentment is not pure, and that a man who should stop at Fear would be in danger ne­ver to acquire Charity; but it is much that she opens the gate of Salvation to Infidels, and shews the way of Virtue unto sin­ners.

If she be profitable to Religion, she is no less necessary to a Common-wealth; which could not subsist by Recompenses, if it did not terrifie the guilty with Punishments: we [...]ve not now in those innocent times, wherein the people were united by friend­ship, which renders the use of Laws boot­ [...]ess; every one loved his Neighbor as him­self; and Love banished Injustice from off the earth; there was no need to inhibit Vice, nor to recommend Virtue; but since corruption hath crept into Nature, and that [...]an, out of too much love to himself, be­ [...]an to hate his Neighbor, it was necessary to [...]ave recourse unto Laws, and to reduce [...]ose by Fear, which were not to be gain'd by Love. Gallowses were erected to frigh­ten [Page 378] the guilty; punishments were invented to make death the more terrible; and that which was a tribute due to Nature, was made the chastisement for sin. All of inno­cence that remains in us, is an effect of Fear all inclination to Good, and aversion from Evil, would be razed out of our Will, did not this Passion by her threats detain them there; and all Rights, Divine and Hu­mane, would be violated, did not she pre­serve the Innocent by punishing the guilty; In fine, she is the greatest occasioner of our quiet; Timor securi­tatis mater. and though she be timorous, all Poli­ticians acknowledge her for the Mother of Security.

I know very well, that the Stoicks have cry'd her down; but what Passion hath e­ver been able to defend it self against their calumnies? they will have us banish Love from off the earth, because it makes some unclean; and consider not, that being the li­gament of Society, a man must cease to live, if he were forbidden to love: Religion is preserved only by Charity, which is a kind of love; and God would never have made men, had he not meant to make them lovers of him. The same Philosophers will stifle Desires, because they cannot moderate them; and are like to those who out of De­spair, [Page 379] kill themselves to cure a malady. They condemn Hope; and to perswade us [...]hat they possess all things, they will hope for nothing; they are of the humour of that poor Athenian, who was only rich in that [...]e was foolish, and who cared not to heap [...] wealth, because he thought all the Ships [...]n the Haven belong'd to him. They flatter [...]hemselves with a vain Soveraignty, which [...]he Wise-man claims over the world; and as [...]hey think to have gotten wisdom, they think that all her portion too belongs to [...]hem. They laugh at Fear, and to their Reasons add Reproaches, to make her con­temptible or ridiculous; they make her the enemy of our quiet; and to hear them speak of this harmless Passion, one would think they painted out a Monster to us, so dread­ful do they make her: they say, she is inge­ [...]uous for our misery; that by nature she is [...]mpatient, and that she will not tarry till the evil do happen, that she may make us suffer [...]t; that she hath a malign foresight, and which penetrates into the secrets of Futuri­ [...]y, only to make us therein to meet with our torment; that she contents not her self with present evils, but that, to oblige all the differences of Time to conspire mischief [...]gainst us, she calls to mind what is past, [Page 380] she vexes her self with what is to come, an [...] unites pains together, which all the cruelt [...] of Tyrants could not bring to a contrac [...] They add, that as she laboureth to foresta [...] our misfortunes, she takes delight in increa [...] sing them, and never representeth them un [...] to us, but when she hath made them greate [...] than they are, to astonish us; that if sh [...] threaten us with death, 'tis always with tha [...] which is most full of horrour; that if sh [...] make us apprehend a malady, 'tis alway [...] the most cruel; and that, if she make us ex [...]pect any displeasure, 'tis always the mos [...] angersom; so as we find, that she is mor [...] insupportable than the evil which she fore [...] sees; and that of all imaginable torments that which she makes us suffer is always the most rigorous; that also there are not ma­ny that would not rather once die, Nemo tam ti­midus est ut malit semper pendere quam semel cadere. Sen. Ep. 22. than al­ways fear death, and who do not prefer a violent punishment before a languishing ap­prehension.

I know not whether the Stoicks Fear be so fierce as they make it, but I know very well that there is a more moderate sort of Fear, and that this Passion in the purity of its na­ture doth more good than harm: 'tis true she seeks out evil, but 'tis that she may shun [...] it; and she is so far from delighting to in­crease [Page 381] it, that on the contrary she qualifies [...]t by anticipating it; and lessens the rigour [...]hereof by giving us notice of its arrival. Do not the Stoicks confefs with us that blows foreseen hurt not so much as do o­thers? Tela praevisa minus feriunt. and that the greatest part of our suf­ferings comes from being surprized by e­vil? wherefore do they then blame fore­sight in Fear? wherefore do they con­demn that in this Passion, which they ap­prove of in Wisdom? and wherefore do they make that pass for a fault which she hath in common with so noble a Virtue? Nature gives us to understand, that she hath not endued us with Fear to torment us, since her pleasure is not that the evil which Fear considers, be inevitable; for those who have well ponder'd the humour of Fear, confess that she is always accompanied by Hope, and that she never foresees other than such great evils from which she may defend her self; if they be common, she is so noble­minded as she deigns not to busie her self a­bout them; but leaving them to Eschewing, to be kept aloof from, she remains quiet: if they be inevitable, and such as Wisdom it self knows not how to evade, she troubles not her self with thinking how to withstand them; and knowing that useless means are [Page 382] blameable, she adviseth Sadness to bea [...] them, but if they be of such a nature, a [...] they may be overcome, she advertiseth u [...] of them; and though Audacity intrench of [...] upon her rights, she forbears to awaken her, and to crave succour from her to beat back the enemy which presents it self. Who will not judge by these conditions, that Fear is a friend to our Quiet? that she labours for our security, that being far from procuring what may dislike us, s [...]e takes notice of our mis­fortunes, only to chase them away; & gives the alarm, only that we may bear away the victory? I confess, there are evils which are so great & so sudden, as they put the soul in­to disorder, & hinder Fear from foreseeing or evading of them; the first raise astonish­ment, the second bring an agony upon us; both the one & the other of them throw us into Despair, if they be not readily repuls'd; but since there are mischiefs which Wis­dom cannot divine, and which Valour it self cannot overcome, we must not wonder if there be some which surprize Fear, and bear down a Passion, after having triumph'd over two Virtues. Mans power is limited, and though no disaster happen which he may not make use of, yet his natural weak­ness needs the assistance of Grace; and she [Page 383] must inanimate Passion, and Virtue, to make them victorious. But it may suffice us, to know that Fear is not unprofitable; and it remains that we consider, what sins she may favour in her disorder, and what Vir­tues she may be serviceable unto, if well used.

The THIRD DISCOURSE. Of the good use of Audacity or Boldness.

SInce the Nature of man is out of or­der, and that she stands in need of Grace to recover the Innocence which she hath lost, we must not wonder, if Passi­ons, not succour'd by Virtue, become cri­minal; and if by their proper inclination they degenerate into some sins. Effects are always answerable to their Causes; the fruit holds of the tree; and men, for all their free­dom, draw their humors from the Sun that lightens them, Sucque simil­lima coelo. and from the earth that nou­risheth them; whatsoever can be taken to correct their defaults, some marks thereof [Page 384] remain always; and education is never powerful enough wholly to change Nature This is evidently seen in Fear; for she lean [...] so much toward disorder, as it is very hard to stay her; and she is so giddy a humour, that she oftner sides with Vice than with Virtue; she is so unconstant, that she produ­ceth rather contrary than different effects; and she takes upon her so many several shapes, as it is hard to know her. Some­times she bereaves us of our strength, and brings us to a condition of not defending our selves; Obstupui, ste­terunt (que) comae, vox faucibus haesit. Vir. sometimes she infuseth a chilness throughout all our members; and detaining the bloud about the heart, she makes the image of Death appear in our faces; anon she takes our speech away from us, and leaves us only sighs to implore aid from our friends; —Pedibus ti­mor addidit alas. sometimes she fastens wings to our feet, and makes us overcome them by our swiftness, who overcame us by their cou­rage: sometimes she imitates Despair, and paints out the danger so hideous to us on all parts, Audacem fe­cerat ips [...] ti­mor. as she makes us resolve to change a fearful flight into an honourable resistance; she is sometimes so indiscreet, as thinking to shun an evil, she runs headlong upon it; and oftentimes out of a strange fantastical­ness, she engageth her self in a certain death, Hic rogo, non furor est, ne moriare, mori? Mart. to shun a doubtful one.

[Page 385]If her effects be extravagant, her incli­nations are not more rational; for unless she be guided by wisdom, she easily dege­nerates into hatred, despair or loathful­ness: we do not much love what we fear; and as love is so free that it cannot endure constraint; it is so noble, as it cannot to­lerate an outrage; all that doth affright it, irritates it; when men will by violence overcome it, it turneth to Aversion; and changeth all its gentleness into choler; hence it is that Tyrants have no Friends; for be­ing bound to make themselvs dreaded, they cannot make themselves be beloved; and their government being grounded upon rigour, Adjice nunc quod qui ti­metur timet; nemo potuit esse terribilis secure. Sen. Ep. 109; it cannot produce love; those who are nearest them, hate them; the praises which men give them, are false; and of so many Passions which they endeavour to ex­cite, Fear & Hatred are the only true ones▪ likewise, seeing that the mischief of their condition obligeth them to cruelty, they renounce Love, and care not though they be hated, so they be feared: God alone can accord the two Passions; it is only he that can make himself to be feared of those that love him, and loved of those that fear him; yet do Divines confess, that perfect Charity banisheth Fear; and that those who love [Page 386] him best, are those who fear him least. But though it be usual for this Passion to turn it self into Hatred, yet is she not always per­mitted so to do, and this change is a sign of her ill nature; there are some whom we ought to fear, and cannot hate, their great­ness obligeth us to respect them, and their justice forbids us to hate them; that Maje­sty which environs them, produceth fear; but the protection which we draw from thence, ought to make us love them; so as the propensity to Hatred is a disorder in Fear; and to follow her irrational inclinati­on, is to abuse this Passion.

She also easily changeth her self into De­spair; and though she march differing ways, she fals into the same praecipice; for she paints out dangers in so horrid a manner unto Hope, as she makes her [...]ose all her courage; and this generous Passion suffers her self to be so far perswaded by [...]er enemy, that keeping aloof from the g [...]od which she did pursue, they both of them turn to an infa­mous Faint-heartedness. But of all the mon­sters which fear doth produce, none is more dangerous than Slothfulness; for though this vice be not so active as others, and that her nature, which is remiss, suffers her not to frame any great designs against Virtue, yet [Page 387] is it guilty of all the outrages that are done thereunto, and seems to be found in all the counsels which are plotted to her preju­dice; it hath such an aversion to labour, as it cannot endure Innocence, because she is la­borious; and we may say, that if it be not one of her most violent enemies, it is the most dangerous & most opinionated enemy, that Innocence hath; it produceth all the sins which cover themselves with darkness; and to make them cease, it would be only requisite to kill this their Father, which gives them their birth; 'tis this that nourisheth uncleanness; and Love would have no vi­gour, were it not for it; 'tis this that enter­tains Voluptuousness; and who to amuse her, doth furnish her with shameful enter­tainments; 'tis this that authorizeth Poor­mindedness, and which diverts it from those glorious labours that make men famous. 'Tis this, in fine, which loseth States, which corrupteth Manners, which banisheth Vir­tues, and is the cause of all Vices; mean while, it assumes to it self a venerable name; and to colour its laziness, it causeth it self to be called honest Vacancy; but certainly there is a great deal of difference between the rest of Philosophers, and the idleness of the Voluptuous; the former are always a [Page 388] doing; Multum pro­dest qui docet quid sit justitia, quid fortitudo, quid mortis contemptus, quid Deorum intellectus, quantum bo­num sit bona conscientia. Er­go si tempus ad studia con [...]er as non deserueris, nec manus de­tractaveris. Sen. De Tran­qui [...]. anim. c. 3. when they seem to do least, they are most busied; and when men think they are unserviceable, they oblige the whole world to their labours. For they make Pa­negyricks on Virtue, they compose Inve­ctives against Vice, they discover the secrets of Nature, or they describe the perfections of her Author; but the later are always lan­guishing; if their mind labour, 'tis for the service of the body; if they keep from the noise of the world, 'tis that they may taste pleasure with the more freedom; and if they banish themselves from the company of men, 'tis that they may be with lewd wo­men: these wretches know how to con­ceal themselves, Otium sine li­teris mois est, & hominis vi­va sepultura, Sen. Ep. 83. but they know nat how to live; their Palaces are their Sepulchres, and their useless rest is a shameful death. The leisure-times of good men must be ratio­nal, they must not withdraw themselves to solitariness, but when they can be no longer serviceable to the State; they must leave the world, but not abandon it; they must re­member that they make a part of it; & that whither soever they retire themselves, the Publique hath always a right in them: those are not solitary, but savage, who forgo Soci­ety, because they cannot endure it; who keep far from the Court, because they cannot en­dure to see their enemies prosperity; or that [Page 389] hide themselves in obscurity, Nam' qui re & homines fugit, quem cupidi­tatum suarum infelicitas re­legavit, qui ali­os feliciores videre non po­tuit, qui v [...]lut timidum atque iners animal metu oblituit, ille non sibi vi­vit, sed ven▪ tri, somno, li­bidini. Sen. Ep. 59. because they cannot tolerate the brightness of Virtue. Rest, that it may be laudable, ought to have a just motive; and he that hath neither Oc­cupation, nor studious employment, is the Tomb of a living man. Now Fear out of a natural propensity turns her self into this infamous sin, and becomes lazy if she be not moderated: she apprehends labour; and excusing her self upon her weakness, she perswads her self there is no exercise which doth not exceed her strength; she imagi­neth difficulties in the easiest things; and to be released from an honest occupation, she makes it pass for a punishment; she finds no­thing that doth not astonish her; and the holy Scripture which knows very well the humour of fearful men, Dicit piger leo est in ie­on [...] in itineri­bus; sicut osti­um vertitur in cardine suo, ita piger in lectulo suo. Prov. 26. teacheth us that when they want pretences to hide them­selves, they go to seek them out in the Forrests, and to feign to themselves that Lions will come out of their Dens to surprize them by the way; she never parts timorousness from Sloth; & knowing what Affinity there is between these two Vices, she makes one and the same picture of them, Pigrum dejicit timor. Pro. 18. and sets them forth in the same colours.

To all these defects we may add Impru­dence, which is not much less natural to [Page 390] Fear, than Sloth; for though Natures in­tention was, to make her serviceable unto Prudence, and by her care to prevent the evils which threaten us; yet it so falls out by a mischievous irregularity, as she that ought to free us from evil, engageth us therein; and that the Passion which ought to give us counsel, hinders us from taking it; for Reason wills, that we consult as often as any important affair happens, the success whereof depends not absolutely upon our power; and the evils which Fear considers being of this nature, it seems she would move us maturely to deliberate, and to seek out the means how to defend our selves from the enemies that assail us; Pavor sapien­tiam omnem mihi expecto­rat. Terent. and yet she puts so much confusion into our mind, that she makes us incapable of consultation; and she deciphers forth dangers so dreadful to us, as banishing wisdom, she hurries us into Despair: so by two contrary effects, she obligeth us to ask counsel, and will not suffer us to receive it; she makes us know our indigence, and will not permit us to seek out a remedy. We must therefore be careful, how we make use of so strange a Passion, and which contrary to the design of Nature, offers us her light to discover the evils that are to come, and yet refuseth it [Page 391] us to shun them: Wisdom will amend this fault, and the following Discourse will shew us what means we must use to deal with Fear.

The THIRD DISCOURSE. Of the good use of Fear.

VVE must not think it strange, that Passion may be criminal since she is indifferent; & we ought not to complain that she neighbours upon Vice, since Virtues self is thereby be­sieged; for all morality confesseth, that there is no virtue which is not environed by sins, & which sees not an enemy threatning her on either side. Clemency, which may be ter­med the ornament of Princes, & happiness of States, stands in the midst between In­dulgence and Severity; let her step never so little awry, she lights upon one of these two Monsters; and assuming some one of their qualities, she unluckily loseth all her own. Fortitude, or that Valour which encou­rageth Conquerors to glorious Enterpri­zes, [Page 392] is placed between Rashness and Remis­ness; if she expose her self unadvisedly, she becomes Rash; and if she too carefully preserve her self, she is suspected to be cowardly: Liberality which wins the heart, after Power hath conquer'd the Body; is quarter'd between Avarice and Profuse­ness; if she husband her goods more care­fully than decency permits, she is accused of Avariciousness; if she indiscreetly lavish them, of Prodigality; but the Passions seem to me to be more happily quarter'd; for if they be assailed by a Vice, they have a Vir­tue to defend them; and if they prove faul­ty, they may also prove Innocent: this is evidently seen in Fear, which being ser­viceable to Sloth and Despair, may be the like to Wisdom and Shamefastness; and by means of these two may preserve all other Virtues.

Though Fear be shy, and affrightned with the evils which she discovers, yet doth she much resemble Wisdom, that a little aid may make her take her nature upon her: this Virtues chief employment, according to the judgement of all Philosophers, Prudentia prae­sentia ordinat, futura praevi­det, praeterita recordatur. Vi [...]ruv. is to consider things past, to govern things pre­sent, and to foresee things Future; but she is more taken up with what is to come, than [Page 393] with what is present, or what is past: for to boot, that the present is but a Moment, and that it comprehends but a small number of Accidents, it is sensible, and our eyes are only requisi [...]e to judg thereof; the time that is past is no longer in our power; all the wisdom of the world hath no jurisdiction over it; it is not hard to be known, and our memory (if it be not very faithless) repre­sents unto us the events which it hath pro­duced; but the time to come is as doubtful as concealed; it is environ'd with darkness which cannot be dissipated; it draws along with it a prodigious train of Adventures, which cause a thousand alterations in Indi­vidual men, and in Common-wealths; so as Futurity is the chief object of Wisdom, which considers the other differences of time, only that she may the better judge of this: she studies not what is past, save only to know what is to come; and she governs the present time, only to assure her self of the Future. Consiliari quoddam di­vinum est. Arist. Great Politicians have there­fore believed, that Wisdom was a Divine Virtue; that one could not consult the e­vent of things without assistance from hea­ven; and that to be a happy Councellour, a man must be a true Prophet: now Fear is of the nature of Wisdom; for though she call [Page 394] to mind past evils, though she busie her self about the present, her particular enter­tainment is in future evils, and she useth all her best means, either to keep them far off, or to withstand them; 'tis true, she implores help of Hope, and makes use of the courage thereof to rid her of her enemies; but she more resembles Wisdom, which after ha­ving foreseen a danger, useth the valour of Souldiers to repell it; for men are not so happy, as to possess these two Virtues both together; they require different tempers; and though they mutually assist one ano­ther, they seem to have protested never to meet in one and the same person: Wisdom is the portion of those old men that are grown white-hair'd in business, and who have spent all their lives in observing the Humours of People, the revolutions of States, and the divers changes of Fortune; Valour on the contrary, is the Portion of young men, who having more Vigour than Experience, are fitter to execute than to de­liberate; and succeed better in Combats, than in Counsels. It appertains only to the eternal Word, to be at once both Wisdom and Power; the Arm and the Idaea of his Father: but amongst the creatures these qua­lities are separated; and who hath much [Page 395] strength, hath but little knowledg; to make these two incompatible advantages meet, Heaven must do a miracle; and it is not more difficult to agree Fire & Water, than to unite Wisdom & Fortitude: It must also be confess'd, that as Fear is fuller of Advi­sedness than of Generosity, she hath like­wise more Light than Heat, and is far fitter for Counsel than for Combat. In fine, she is accused in taking things always in the worst sense, and of making evils greater than they are; She resembles (say they) those faint-hearted Spies, which Moses sent to discover the Land of Palestine; who thought by their false reports to have tur­ned the Iews from so noble a conquest: she makes a Mountain of a Mole-hill; all beasts appear Monsters to her, and she thinks all dangers which she sees, inevitable. 'Tis true, she doth almost always judge the worst; and that she may be abused, doth paint out evil in its proper deformity; but surely, in so doing, she remembreth Wisdom the more, which never adviseth of what is to come, without fore-casting all the diffi­culties that may arrive, & without preparing forces to fight with such enemies as may assail her: she doth not consider only what is done, but what may be done; when she [Page 396] sees an evil, she will know the progress thereof; and takes some little trouble to procure assured quiet. Si vis omnem solicitudinem exuere, quic­quid vereris ne eveniat, even­turum utique propone; & quodcunque illud malum est, tecum me­tire. Sen. Ep. 24 The Stoicks have no better expedient to defend themselves a­gainst an evil that threatens them, than to imagine it will happen, and to withstand it in their minds, that they may have the bet­ter of it in effect; so as by the judgment of our enemies, wisdom hath no other Maxim than Fear; and this faithful servant moves not, but as her Soveraign doth.

'Tis true that as she neighbours upon the Senses, and resides in that part of the Soul wherein combustions are framed, she al­ways apprehends trouble; and her judg­ments are almost always accompanied with commotion; but the understanding may ea­sily disabuse her; and by the brightness of its fire, may dissipate the Fogs which rise from the Imagination; it must bind her to consider such objects as she is afraid of, Tolle istam pompam sub qua lates, & stultos territas: Mors es quam nuper servus meus, quam ancilla con­tempsit. and make her the bolder by making her view the cause of her astonishment at a nearer distance; she must take away that Solemni­ty from Punishments which makes them so dreadful, and those complaints from Grief which make her so eloquent; it must teach her, that under those deceitful appea­rances, there is but a common death which [Page 397] Children have endured, which Souldiers have overcome, and which Slaves have con­temned; the most appearing torments are not always the most violent; a stopping of the Urine is more painful than being bro­ken on the wheel; one troubled with the Gout, suffers many times more pain in his bed, than an offender doth on the Rack; & a man whose head is cut off, endures not so much as he that dies of a Fever; it belongs then to the understanding to perswade fear that all those things which affright us, are not those which harm us; that the greatest appearing evils are not the most sensible, and that those which appear least, are oft­times cause of greatest pain. Thus will she be fixt against evils; and suffering her self to be guided by Reason, she will have no more apprehensions, than what shall be necessary to keep her from being surprized.

But if Fear may be serviceable to us in withstanding Vice, she may be made use of to defend Virtue; and this seems to be the chief end for which Nature hath ordained her: for Shame is nothing but a Fear of In­famy; and this innocent Passion is the pro­tectress of all Virtues: 'tis to her that Judges owe their Integrities, Souldiers their Cou­rage, and Women their Chastity: 'tis by [Page 398] her care that Piety is preserved; and all the world must confess, that not any Affection of our soul is more delectable, or useful, than is Shame. Since we owe so much unto her, 'tis reason that we ac­knowledge it, and that we give her the ho­nour she deserves; she carries the colour of Virtue, and that blush which spreads it self over her face, is a mark of her Innocence; but she is so very nice, that the least thing in the world may corrupt her; she is like those Fruits new gather'd, whose verdure is lost assoon as they are handled; she her self de­stroys her self; she is offended at the praises that are given her; and women are made to lose her by being reproached for her: If she be easie to be lost, she is as hard to be re­gain'd; for though she be of a mild nature, yet she is Stately; and being once banish'd, she is very hardly recalled. Hope doth oft­times succeed Despair; Et qui redire nescit ut periit pudor. Sen in Agamemn. Joy resumes the place which Sorrow had possest, and some­times Hatred turns to Love; but Shame never appears upon a Face, when once it is driven thence by Insolence and Impudence: as this Passion is a companion to Purity, so is she of her Disposition; the loss of either is irreparable; she so loaths Sin, as she cannot endure the sight thereof; she blushes at the [Page 399] very name of it, and she summons in all the bloud of her heart, to succour her in defence of her self against her enemy. But she is ne­ver of more might than when she fights in the defence of Virtue; for she doth such mighty things in her behalf, as she always procures her glorious victories; she obli­geth all the Passions to second her; she sets out guiltiness in so ghastly a manner to them, as she augments their hatred thereof; and so presents Innocence to them so beau­tiful as she augments their love thereof: she awakens Hope, encourageth Audacity, irri­tates Desire, and enflames Choler; so as it is a Passion that disperseth it self into all other Passions, and which endueth them with new strength to maintain Virtues quarrel: though she be timorous, she encourageth Souldiers; they are only valiant in being Ashamed; and if they despise Danger, 'tis only because they fear Infamy, one fear drives out another; and those who give not way to Valour, suffer themselves to be o­vercome by Shame: Though she be indul­gent, she makes Judges severe; and when men go about to corrupt them with bribes, or to frighten them with threats, she keeps them within their bounds by fear of Disho­nour; though she be Weak, she makes [Page 400] women couragious; Quam pecca­re pudet Cy'n­thia, tuta sat est. Propert. and whilst she dis­plays her blush upon their visages, she seat­ters a secret virtue into their hearts, which makes them triumph over those dangerous enemies that pursue them. This Sex hath no other strength than what it borrows from this innocent Passion; it preserves it self only by the fear of Infamy; and who should take this defence from it, would easily be­reave it of all its other advantages. Nature it self, which very well knows it loves Beau­ty as well as Virtue, hath perswaded it, that Shame makes it more approved of: in effect, Shamefastness is an innocent paint; women never seem fairer than when they are somewhat shamefac'd; aud there is no face, how taking soever, which re­ceiveth not a fresh lustre from the innocent blush which accompanies Shamefastness; she is so appropriated to Virtue, as men have a good opinion of all them that have her; and she defends the interests of Reason with so much fervency, that the Empire thereof would ere this have been over­thrown, if this Passion had been banished from off the earth.

For experience teacheth us, that more men abstain from sin for Shame, than for Duty; and that the Fear of Infamy hath [Page 401] more power over mens minds than the love of Innocence. The Devil therefore very well knowing that this Passion is a­verse to his designs; and that to make us lose it, our nature must be destroyed, en­deavours to perswade us that Virtue is criminal, to the end that it being thought infamous by us, Shame, which always de­fends her, may be enforced to abandon her: He thought it was easier to take from Vir­tue her estimation, than Innocence from Shame: not being able to corrupt Shame, she hath gone about to deceive her; and to make her lose her aversion to sin, he hath made her believe sin to be glorious. This Errour is so generally dispers'd throughout the whole world, as there are now adays some Virtues which are esteemed Infa­mous, and some Vices Honourable; Re­venge passeth for greatness of Courage, and forgetting of Injuries for meanness of Spi­rit; Ambition is illustrious; and because it sets upon Crowns, means to be no longer ashamed; Modesty and Humility are de­spised; and because they delight in Solita­riness and Silence, they have lost all their glory. Opiniatricy in a fault, is the mark of a stout spirit; Penitence and Change of life, an argument of Weakness; thus all [Page 402] Things are confounded, and Shame suffe­ring her self to be seduced by opinion, sides with Vice, not thinking of it, and forgoes Virtue: Itaque quod unum habe­bant in malis, honum per­dunt, peccandi verecundiam: laudant enim ea quibus eru­bescebant, & vitio glorian­tur: ideoque nec resurgere quidam ado­lescentiae licet, cum honestus turpi desidiae titulus accessit. Sen De vita beata. c 12. wicked men who hid themselves, now shew themselves upon the Stage; and being no more ashamed (which was the only good that remain'd among all their evils) they become Insolent, and boast of their misdemeanors; the way of salvati­on is block'd up unto them; and since they have given Titles of Honour to infamous things, we cannot hope that Shame should convert them, or reduce them to their du­ties. To shun this evil, this innocent Passi­on must be disabused, and giving to every Object the name that it deserves, she must be withdrawn from the error wherein she hath indiscreetly engaged her self; she must be perswaded that the humblest Virtues are most profitable; and that those Vices which are the most Honourable, are the most dan­gerous: upon these good Maximes she will side with Innocence again; and repenting for having suffer'd her self to be deceived, she will so much the more hotly pursue her enemies, by how much her hatred is aug­mented by their injurious dealing: and for that by defending Virtues interests, she shall likewise revenge her self of her own parti­cular Injuries.

The FIRST DISCOURSE. Of the Nature, Proprieties and Effects of CHOLER.

THe Virtues are so streightly uni­ted one to another, as they are not to be parted without using of violence: oft-times also they mingle one with another; and these noble habitudes are blended together, that they may make up one single Virtue. Clemency, which makes Kings reign happily, borrows [Page 404] her beauties from two or three of her com­panions; she ows her good Government to Prudence; her Mildness to Mercy; and her Glory to Generosity. Valour, which makes Conquerors triumph, holds all her riches from the liberality of all other Virtues; and he that should take from her the stateliness which she derives from Magnanimity, the address which she takes from Discretion, and the Moderation which she receives from Justice, would leave her but a vain shadow of all her real greatness. Though the passions hold not so good Intelligence as do the Virtues, yet are there some of them which never forsake one another; and there are some others which live wholly upon borrowing; and which would be poor, should the rest forgo them. Hope is of this nature, for she hath no other goods than what are given her; and were she for­saken by Desire, which eggs her on, by Fear, which holds her in, and by Audacity, which encourageth her, nothing but a bare name would remain unto her.

Choler is of the same condition; though she make so much noise, she draws all her force from the Passions which compose her; and she appears not to be couragious, [...]ve only that she is well accompanied; she [Page 405] is never raised in our souls uncalled by Sor­row; she endeavours not satisfaction for in­juries done unto her, Ira, sicut & ul­tio, doloris confessio est. Sen. De Ira. l. 3. c. 5. unless sollicited by Desire, provoked by Hope, and encouraged by Audacity; for he that is irritated, pro­miseth himself revenge of his enemy; but when he is so weak, as he cannot hope for it, his Choler turns to Sadness; and want­ing the Passions which did feed it, it loseth both Name and Nature.

From all this Discourse it is easie to ga­ther, that Choler is nothing else but a Mo­tion of the Sensitive Appetite, which seeks Revenge for an Injury. Aristotle therefore thought she was Rational, and that even in her Fury, she had some shadow of Justice; Nulli irascenti sua ira videtur injusta. Aug. l. De vera Inno­cent. c. 3.19. the truth is, she is never moved, but when she imagines she hath received some injury; and if she take up Arms, 'tis to revenge wrongs which she thinks have been done unto her; herein she is much less faulty, than Hatred; for this later wisheth evil directly unto its enemy; and without seeking any pretence or excuse for its fury, desires the ruine of the party persecuted; but the other wisheth him only punishment for his fault, and looks not upon Revenge, as an irratio­nal Excess, but as a just chastisement: the later is hardly ever pacified, but dischargeth [Page 406] its cruelty upon the Innocent, and pursues the dead even to their graves: if we may believe Poets, it descends into Hell, to tor­ment the damned there; and would mount into Heaven, if it could, there to afflict the blessed; but the other is satisfied when she is Revenged; when she thinks that the pu­nishment equals or exceeds the Injury, she is appeased, Iram saepe mi­sericordia re­troegit. Sen. l. 1 De Ira. c. 16. and by a providence of Nature, turns to Pity; she spares the fault­less, and when even the faulty become di­stressed, she loseth her desire of Revenge: I confess she grows greater when withstood; and that when she hath the better of her enemies, Haec non est ira, feritas est; nec illi verbe­ra, in ultionem petuntur, sed in voluptatem. Sen. l. 1. De Ira. c. 5. she delights in their defeat; but she seeks not that infamous content which Tyrants feel in the death of their subjects; for they seek not so much to revenge them­selves of an Injury, as to content their bru­tish Cruelty; and in punishing Innocents, are guided more by the motions of Fury, than of Choler: In fine, all the Philoso­phers have had so good an opinion of Cho­ler, as Aristotle was perswaded, Calcar est vir­tutis, hac erep­ta, inermis, a­nimus, & ad conatus mag­nos piger, in­ersque. Ar. in Sen. l. 3. De Ira. c. 3. she sided always with Virtue against Vice; that it was she that encouraged us to gallant acti­ons; and that the high enterprizes of Prin­ces were no less the effects of this Passion, than of Virtue; he believed, that all the [Page 407] disorders of our soul, which contributed to Voluptuousness, were not to be tamed but by Choler; and that the concupiscible ap­petite would pervert Reason, were it not withstood by the Irascible; one would think to hear him speak that all great men are Cholerick; that this Passion is not only the mark of a good Nature, but of an ex­cellent Courage; and that a mans mind can conceive nothing of Generous, if it be not a little irritated.

I believe, with him, that this resentment of our soul may be profitably employed in the service of Virtue, when it is moderated by Reason and Grace, but certainly it stands in more need of their guidance, than do the rest; and as it is extreamly vio­lent, so causeth it great disorders, if it be not carefully suppress'd; for let it have what in­clination it pleaseth to Good, it is too sudden to be regulated; and though it seem to love Justice and Reason, yet is yet too furious to be just or reasonable; Naturae curis debemus quod hanc furorem contraxerit, actum esset de hominibus si pertinax ira fuisset: adhuc cum brevi du­ret, quid pejus? we should be un­don, were Choler as opinionated, as it is sud­den; & the earth would be but one desart, if Passion were as lasting, as it is hot: Nature could not better shew her care she hath of our preservation, than in giving narrow bounds to the wildest of our Passions; and [Page 408] since the love she beareth us, hath obliged her to make Monsters barren, and to allot but short lives to the most furious Beasts, she was bound to affix brevity to Choler, and to allow a short term of time to so dan­gerous a Passion: nor doth her short time of duration keep her from causing much mis­chief; she employs to her utmost those moments which Nature hath given her, and in a few hours commits many out­rages: for to boot, that she troubles the minds of men, that she changes their co­lour, that she seems to play with their bloud, (making it sometimes withdraw it self to the Heart, sometimes disperse it self over the Face) that she sets the Eyes on fire, and she fills the mouth with Threats, and that she arms the Hands of as many as she meets withal, she produceth much more strange effects in the world; she hath, since its birth, changed the face thereof a thou­sand times; there is no Province wherein she hath not committed some spoils; nor is there any Kingdom which doth not bewail her violence: those ruines which have for­merly been the foundations of some goodly City, are the remainders of Choler; those Monarchies that whilome gave Laws to all the earth, and which we know only by [Page 409] Story, Aspice nobilis­simarum Civi­tatum funda­menta vix no­tabilia, has ira dejecit. Al­pice solitudi­nes per multa millia sine ha­bitatione de­sertas: has ira exhausit. Aspi­ce tot memo­riae proditos duces, mali ex­empla fati, ali­um ira in c [...] ­bili suo confo­dit, alium in­ter sacra men­sae percussit, alium filii pa­ricidio dare sanguinem jus­sit. Son. lib. 1. De Ira. c. 2. complain not so much of Fortune, as of Choler: those great Princes, whose pride is reduced to ashes, sigh in their graves; and accuse only Choler for the loss of their Lives, and ruine of their States; some of them have been assassinated in their Beds, others like Sacrifices offer'd up at the Al­tars; some have unfortunately ended their days in the midst of their Armies, when all their souldiers that environed them could not defend them from death: others have lost their lives in their Thrones; the Majesty that shines in the faces of Kings, not being able to frighten their Murderers; some have seen their own Children make attempts up­on their persons; others have seen their Bloud shed by the hands of their Slaves: but not complaining of the Paricides, they complain only of Choler; and forgetting all their particular disasters, they only con­demn this Passion, which is the plentiful and the unfortunate Spring-head there­of.

And certainly, they have reason for their complaining, since of all the disorders of our soul, there is none more savage, nor more irrational than this. I know not why Aristotle imagined it was serviceable to rea­son, and that it always moved as she did, [Page 410] unless it be that it had a design to teach us that this Passion being more Ambitiou [...] than the rest, would seem Rational in he [...] Excess; and by an execrable attempt ob­lige Reason her Soveraign, to defend he [...] Slaves injustice; for she always seeks Excu▪ ses for her faults; though she shed human [...] bloud, though she offer up Innocents in sac▪ crifice, beat down whole Towns, and bur [...] their Inhabitants under their ruines; sh [...] will be thought to be Rational: she some▪ times knows well enough the vanity of he [...] resentments, yet she without reason perse­veres in them, lest men should think she had no reason to begin; Her injustice makes he [...] opinionated; Perseveramus ne videamur coepisse sine causa; pertina­ciores nos facit iniquitas irae, & augemus; quasi argu­mentum sit juste irascendi graviter irasci. Sen. l 3. De Ira. c. 29. she grows hot upon design she will have her Excess to be an argumen [...] of her Injustice, and all the world to ima­gine, that she hath punished her enemie [...] justly, because she hath punished them se­verely. See then what she borrows of Rea­son, and how much more insolent she is in other Passions, which are blind in their un [...] ruliness, and only offend their Soveraign [...] because they know not his Authority; bu [...] this Passion doth impudently abuse her, and by a fearful tyranny employes her Sove­raign to excuse her faults, after having made use of her to commit them.

[Page 411]I therefore think, Seneca had great reason to say that she is more faulty than the vices themselves, and that she commits injustice, whereof they are not guilty. Avarice hea­peth goods together, and Choler dissipa­teth them; the former only hurts her self, and obligeth her heirs that are to succeed her; Ira patri lu­ctum, marito divortium at­tulit, magistra­tui odium, candidato re­pulsum. Sen. 3. De Ira. cap. but the latter hurts all the world; and as if she were a publick contagion, she puts divisions in Families, divorceth Marriages, and engageth Kingdoms in War: Unclean­ness seeks a shameful delight, but such as on­ly hurts the parties in fault; & Choler seeks an unjust one, which is prejudicial to Inno­cents: Envy, as malicious as she is, contents her self in wishing ill unto another; she leaves the execution thereof to Fortune; and remits to her the accomplishing of her desire, but Choler is so impatient, she cannot attend this blind Power, but preventing the rigour thereof, she takes delight in making men miserable. In fine, she is the cause of all evils, Nihil est si­multatibus gravius: has ira conciliat. Nihil est bel­lo funestius: in hoc poten­tium ira pro­rumpit. Sen. 3. De Ira. c. 5. and there is no fault committed, wherein she hath not a hand: there is no­thing more obnoxious than Duels; 'tis Choler that entertains them: there is no­thing more cruel than Murder; 'tis Choler that adviseth to it; there is nothing more fatal than war; 'tis Choler that causeth it: [Page 412] when she reigns in a soul, she stifles all o­ther Passions, and is so absolute in her ty­ranny, as she turns Love into Hatred, and Pity into Fury; for there have been Lo­vers, who in the height of their Choler have buried the same Dagger in their own bo­soms, which they had just before plunged in their Mistresses bosom, committing two real murders to revenge one imaginary in­jury; Avaritious men have been seen to be­tray their own inclinations, to content their Choler, throwing all their riches into the water, or into the fire, to obey the impetu­osity thereof; Ambitious have been known who have refused proffer'd Honours, tram­pled Diadems under foot, because Choler, which wholly possess'd their souls, had dri­ven thence the desire of Glory.

Nullam transit aetatem, nullum hominum ge­nus excipit, tam inter Graios quam Barbaros po­tens: non mi­nus pernitiosa leges metuen­tibus, quam quibus jura di­stiguit modus virium. Sen. 3. De Ira. c. 2.Nevertheless, though she be so pernicious, yet there is no Passion more common; and it seems that Nature, to punish all our faults, hath intended that she should persecute all men, as a revengeful Fury; there is no Na­tion which hath not felt her Rage; and of as many people as there are, differing in Customes, Apparel, and Language, there hath not as yet been any found exempt from this cruel Passion: We have seen whole Nations that have defended them­selves [Page 413] against Riot, favour'd by Poverty; and who have preserved their Innocence through their never knowing riches: we have seen of them that having no abiding place, have kept in perpetual motion; & ba­nish'd Sloth, for not having known the art of building houses; we have seen others, who have gone naked, and whom neither Shame, nor Necessity hath been able to instruct, to make themselves Clothes; we see some which possessing all in common, cannot dispute for a part; and who not having lost all their natural purity, are ignorant of the injustice which Avarice causeth to arise a­mongst us; but there hath not yet any been known which have been exempt from Choler; she reigns as well among people that are civiliz'd, as among Barbarians; she commands in all parts of the earth; and where she hath not yet introduced the use of Musket and Sword, she employs Bows and Arrows in her revenge.

In fine, Caetera viri [...] singulos homi­nes corrip [...] [...] Hic unus a [...] ­ctus est qui in­terdum pu [...]li­ce coucipitu [...]. Sen. 3. De Ira. cap. 2. one only Passion hath never been seen to agitate a whole Province, or to pos­sess a whole Army: Love, though it be the master of Passions, was never able to make a whole Town in love with one Woman; Helena had but a few Lovers; & of so many Captains as fought for her at the siege of [Page 414] Troy, none but her Adulterer and her Hus­band were taken with her beauty: Avarice makes not all men sordid; and if some heap up riches, other-some squander them away; all men are not troubled with Ambition; if some seek after Honours, others shun them as much; if some are forward to shew them­selves, others will hide themselves; and a­mongst so many guilty people, some are al­ways found that are Innocent; Envy is no publick Malady; and if Virtue hath her ene­mies, she hath also her admirers: but Cho­ler is a Contagion which spreads it self through a whole Town in a moment; one Oration hath made a whole Nation take up Arms, and Men, Women, and Children, a­gitated with this Passion, have been seen confusedly to kill their own Citizens, or declare war against their enemies; Subjects have revolted against their Princes, Souldi­ers have conspired against their Comman­ders; the common people have bandied a­gainst the Nobility, Children have risen up against their Parents, and all the rights of Nature have been violated at the solicita­tion of Choler.

But that which is most vexatious in this so strange malady, is, that it takes its begin­ning from all things; for though it be so [Page 415] great, and that it enlargeth it self like fire, a very small spark is sufficient to kindle it; 'tis so easie to be moved, as that which ought to appease it, doth oft-times provoke it, and what might satisfie it, offends it; a servants negligence sets it on foot, the freedom of a friend makes it stark mad, and the scoffing of an enemy engageth it in a Combat. Not­withstanding all these mischiefs, Choler would be to be born withal, if it were capa­ble of counsel; Non paulatim procedit, sed dum incipit tota est: caete­ra vitia impel­lunt animos, ira praecipitat. Sen. 3. De ira. cap. 1. but she is so violent even in her birth, as she cannot receive the advice that is given her; for she grows not by de­grees like other passions; she doth not en­crease with Time, she needs not moneths to get root in our hearts, a moment suffereth her to form her self; she marcheth not a slow pace, as doth envy, or sorrow; she is of full force at the beginning; at her birth she is at her full growth; & if other passions in their heat thrust us forward, this in her ftry doth precipitate us. As she is so sudden, we must not wonder if she be inconsiderate; and if she make us hazard our lives to revenge an injury; for she listens only to her own desires, she only follows her own motions, and she acknowledgeth no other Laws but those of her own violence; she never sets upon her enemy without discovery of her [Page 416] self; she gives him never a blow without running the hazard to receive a greater; she loseth the victory, by being too eager in the pursuit thereof, In armis ira obliviscitur Martem esse communem, venitque in a­lienam pote­statem dum non est in sua. Sen. 3. De Ira. cap. 1. and falls into the power of her enemy, because she is not in her own. Though all these evil qualities make us see clear enough, how easie it is to abuse Cho­ler, and how hard it is to make good use thereof, yet will I not forbear to pursue the order I have prescribed unto my self, and to employ the two remaining Discourses, in making appear what Vices, and what Vir­tues she may take part withal; but for the present I confess, that so violent a Passion doth not yield much to Reason, and that if we be not the more strongly assisted by Grace, to resist her, she is very hardly to be overcome.

The SECOND DISCOURSE. Of the evil use of Choler.

SInce Choler is nothing else but a Na­tural Revenge, and that the one and the other of these do boast of Justice, and greatness of Courage, I can find no better way to discover the evil use thereof, than by making the Injustice and Pusillani­mity thereof appear. For most men persist not in their disorders; but for the esteem they have thereof, and those who are in­cens'd, continue their desire of Revenge, only because they think it reasonable: the Incontinent excuse themselves upon their weakness; and if they be not blind, they approve not of a sin, which Reason & Na­ture do condemn; the Envious, and De­tractors seek pretences for their calumnies; and knowing that their fault is accompanied with unworthiness, they cunningly dis­guise it, and strive to give it some colour of Justice; but Revenge and Choler believing themselves to be grounded upon Reason, [Page 418] demean themselves insolently, and would perswade us that all their excesses are as just as courageous; mean while they have no­thing of what they think they have; Ne illud qui­dem judican­dum est, ali­quid iram ad animi magni­tudinem con­ferre, non est enim illa mag­nitudo, tumor est: tantum (que) abest à magni­tudine animi, quantū à forti­tudine audacia a fiducia inso­lentia, à seve­ritate crudeli­tas. Sen. l. 1. De Ira. c. 16. and of all the motions of our soul, there is none more unjust, nor more pusillanimous. Men imagine it is Generous, because it is useful among great ones; and perswade themselves it is Noble, because it takes up its abode in the hearts of Kings; but certainly Choler is not so much a proof of their Greatness, as of their Weakness: had not Voluptuous­ness mollified them, and had not that ten­derness which accompanies good successes made them so sensible of the least injuries they would not so easily fly out into Passi­on, they would contemn Outrages; and knowing that their own dignity raised them out of the reach of Storms, Nulla res ma­gis iracundiam alit quam lux­uria. Sen. 2 De Ira. c. 26. the [...] would laugh at the vain endevours of thos [...] that go about to offend them; but the slave [...]ry they require of their subjects, and th [...] shameful obsequiousness render'd to a [...] their desires, makes them be offended wit [...] a just liberty. They take good advice fo [...] neglect, and rational Counsels for an un [...]dermining of their Authority: they canno [...] endure a Truth: and Fortune hath mad [...] them so tender, as suspitions serve them fo [...] [Page 419] proofs to condemn the innocent: they are like to those that having not a perfect health, cannot endure a clear air, nor the light of the Sun, the least exercise disqui­eteth them; and what would be but a Di­version to one in health, doth trouble and incommodate them: thus the most part of great personages cannot bear with Fidelity in their Domesticks; Truth must be corrup­ted, if you will have them to receive it; and the temper of their minds is so weak, that sincerity in a servant is able to offend them: the remedies which men present unto them seem to them poysons; they think men aim at their Honour, while they reprehend their Faults; and let them express themselves therein, in never so mild terms, they al­ways take it for an injury. Who sees not, that this greatness is meer weakness; and that the Choler which transports them, is a mark of the infirmity which accompanies them?

Thus the holy Scripture, Non est caput nequius super caput colubri, & non est ira supra irā mu­lieris. Eccl. 35. which very well knows the original of all our disor­ders, teacheth us, that the malice of Women is not more violent than that of men, save only because their nature is more infirm, and that they have not strength enough to sustain the impetuosity of this [Page 420] Passion: for when she finds resistance, or cannot easily work her end, she presently slackens, and losing her rage, suffers her self to be guided by Reason; but when she meets with any one that gives himself over to her power, who suffers himself to be born away by her motions; and who hath not strength enough to oppose her violence, she takes the freedom to fly at all; and be­lieves that she may promise her self any thing from a slave, who can refuse her no­thing: if she possess the soul of a King, Perierunt om­nia, ubi quan­tum suadet ira, fortuna per­mittit. Sen. 3. De Ira. c. 16. who hath not courage enough to defend himself against her tyranny, she makes use of the weakness of his mind, and of the strength of his Fortune to execute all her designs; she perswades him that Revenge is glori­ous; that a Prince is never more absolute than when he is dreaded; and that of all the marks of Soveraignty, there is none more certain than the death of Enemies: then States become Tyrannies, Towns are overflown with the blood of Subjects, the number of Executioners is greater than that of the Offenders; and all things are in a de­plorable condition, because Choler abuseth the power of a Prince, who cannot resist her. What hath not she undertaken, when she hath had Kings for her slaves, and made [Page 421] use of their power to execute her Fury? What marks of Cruelty hath she left in the world, when she hath reigned in the hearts of Monarchs? What Champaigns hath she strew'd over with dead Garkases? And what Provinces hath she made desolate?

Cambyses, to satisfie his Choler, made the noses of all the Inhabitants of Syria be cut off; and judging that Death was too com­mon, and too honourable a punishment, Pepercisse il­lum judicas quod non tota capita praecidit novo genere poenae delecta­tus est. Sen 3. De Ira. c. 20. he would invent another which should be as strange as shameful. He had dealt more ig­nominiously with all the people of Ethiopia, had not a happy accident withstood the ex­ecution of so damnable a design; for he was surpriz'd by a Famine in the Desarts, which forced him to return to his own State; but before he put on this resolution, he follow'd the mad counsel of his Choler, and suffer'd the best part of his Army to perish by Fa­mine; when his souldiers wanted Victuals, they fed upon the leaves of trees, and such Herbs as the uncultivated Earth brought forth; when they were engaged in the De­sarts, and that the scorching Sands afforded them no further nourishment, they ate the Leather of their Bucklers, and all such other [...]hings as necessity enforceth men to make [...]ood of; but when they could see no end of [Page 422] this their forlorn condition, this unnatural Prince provided them a food more cruel than the Famine; he made them be decima­ted, and forced them to eat one another; his Passion govern'd in him amidst so many misfortunes; Agebat adhuc ira regem prae­cipitem; cum partem exerci­tus amisisset, partem cotre­disset; donec timuit, ne & ipse vocaretur in sortem, tum demum signum receptui dedit. Sen. 3. De Ira. c. 20. and after he had lost one part of his forces, and eaten up another, he had not resolved to retreat, had he not feared that the lot might at last have fallen upon himself, and so have made him try the ex­cess of that cruelty which he had comman­ded: but, to shew that Unworthiness is in­separable from Choler; this savage monster made exquisite Cates be carried upon the backs of his Camels, whilst his miserable souldiers committed murders to defend themselves from famine; and left posterity in dispute, who were the most to be com­miserated, those who lived in so much mise­ry, or those who died with so much cruelty. In fine, Choler never goes unaccompanied with weakness; and it sometimes a gene­rous word escape her mouth, it always pro­ceeds from a base soul; and which affects Greatness, only to cover its Baseness.

Caligula is reported to have been offen­ded with the Heavens, when their Thunder hindered his Sports; that he challenged his gods to fight with him; and that using the words of a Poet; he said to them, Either [Page 423] take me out of the world, or I will take you out of it. Into what degree of madness had his Choler thrown him? For he must not only imagine, that his gods could not hurt him, but that their fortune, as wel as that of men, depended upon his will. Ultimae enim patientiae vi sum est, eum ferre, qui Jo­vem, non fer­ret. Sen. De Ira. l. 1. c. ult. Seneca was of opi­nion, that this insolence cost him his life, and made his Subjects conspire against him; for they thought it past Patience, to to­lerate a man that could not tolerate the gods. Choler then hath nothing in it of Greatness; and even then when she seems to contemn both Heaven and Earth, she discovers her unworthiness; or if you take her Excesses for marks of her Great­ness, confess, that Riot is magnificent, be­cause it builds Thrones of Gold, decks it self with purple, cuts through mountains, turns the Channels of streams, encloses Rivers within Parks, makes Gardens in the Air, and finds inventions to remove For­rests: confess, that Avarice is a glorious crime, since it rolleth it self on Mountains of gold, it possesseth Territories as large as Provinces; and that her Earmers have more ground to cultivate, than the first Con­suls of Rome had to manage; acknowledge, that Incontinence is Courageous, since she passeth the seas to seek out what she loves, [Page 424] that she fights either to come by it, or to keep it; since women who are possess'd with this passion, despise death, to satisfie their desires; and expose themselves to the fury of their Husbands, to please their Adulte­rers: Lastly, confess, that Ambition is gene­rous, since she finds not any honour that contents her, will have all years bear her name, and that all Pens be employed in writing her praises; but certainly all these passions are pusillanimous, what shadow soever they have of Greatness, they are in truth mean and poor; and there is nothing great which bears not reason with it: or, to speak more like a Christian, there is nothing August but what is enlivened by the Grace of Jesus Christ.

But to the end you may not believe, I seek out hateful examples, to take from Choler that greatness of courage which she boasteth of, I will examine the reasons that are alledged in her defence, & consider her in a condition wherein she may challenge either praises or excuses. Ought we not to be angry when all Laws, Divine as Humane, are violated? may not one give himself o­ver to Choler, when she perswades us to re­venge our Parents? and is it not an action of Piety to be incensed against an impious [Page 425] [...]retch who prophanes Altars, and disho­ [...]ors Churches? I confess, this Passion can­not have fairer pretexts; & that she is in her glory, when she is irritated for so rational subjects; but you will find, that those who have been moved for the defence of their Countrey, will have the same resentments for the preservation of their pleasures; that they will be as angry for the loss of a horse, as for the loss of a friend; and that they will make it as great as business to correct a ser­vant, as to beat back an enemy; Non pietas I­ram movet, sed infirmitas; sicut pueri, qui tam parentibus amissis flebunt, quam nucibus: irasci pro suis non est pii ani­mi, sed infirmi. Sen. 1. De Ira. cap. 12. it is not Piety, but Weakness, that excites this Cho­ler; and since she is highly mov'd as well for a word as for a murder, we must conclude, [...]he is neither Courageous nor Rational: the greatest part, likewise, of our Revenges, are Injuries; and we run hazard of commit­ting a fault, as oft as we will be Judges in our own cause: our Interests blind us, and our Self-love perswades us, that the slightest injuries cannot be repaired, but by the death of the guilty: we are of the humour of Kings, though we be not of their condi­tion; and imagine that all the wrongs that are done to us, are as many High-treasons: we would have neither Fire nor Gallows used, save to punish our enemies; & are un­just enough, to desire to engage the Justice [Page 426] of God in our Interests: we could wish sh [...] would let no, Thunder fall, but upon th [...] heads of such as have offended us; and ou [...] of a height of impiety, we would that th [...] Heavens were always in Arms in our quar­rel.

In humarum verbum est & quidem pro justo receptum ustio; & à con­tumelia non differt nisi or­dine; qui dolo­rem regerit, tantum excu­satiùs peccat. Sen. 2. De Ira. cap. 32.But though we made no such wishes, ye [...] would our Revenge be still irrational; he [...] very name sheweth us, that she is faulty; and though she seem so pleasing to those that cherish her, there is nothing more cruel, nor more pusillanimous; for she differs from Injury, only in Time, and if he that provoketh be Faulty, he that Revengeth is not Innocent; the one begins the fault, the other ends it; the one makes the Chalenge, the other Accepts of it: & the second is not more just than the first; save that the injury he hath receiv'd, serves for a pretence to do another. Therefore is it, that our Religion forbids Revenge, as well as Injury; and very well knowing, we cannot keep the Rules of Justice in punishing our wrongs, she commands us to remit them into the hands of God; and to leave the punishment there­of to him, whose judgments are never un­just: she teacheth us, that to revenge Af­fronts done unto us, is to intrench upon his Rights; and that, as all glory is due to him, [Page 427] [...]ecause he is our Soveraign Lord; so all Re­ [...]enge belongs to him, because he is our edge: but that which is yet more admira­ [...]e in her Doctrine, and which surpasseth as [...]ell the weakness of our Vertue, as of our [...]ind, is, that she will have us lose the de­ [...]re of Revenge; and that stifling this re­ [...]entment which Nature thinks so just, we [...]ange our Hatred into Love, Orandum est pro inimicis, ut aut obtineatur ipsorum con­versio, aut in nobis divinae bonitatis inve­niatur imitatio Aug. l. De vera Innocent. and our Fury Mercy: he will have us imitate His Goodness; and that, raised to a more than [...]ortal condition, we wish well to those [...]hat do us mischief; he will have us pray to [...] for their Conversion; and that (accor­ [...]ing to the example of his only Son, who [...]btained Salvation for those that butcher'd [...]im) we ask p [...]rdon of him for our ene­mies: he reserves his highest rewards for Charity; and teacheth us, that we cannot [...]ope for forgiveness, unless we shew mercy; [...] raiseth this Virtue above all others; and [...]eversing the worlds Maxims, he will have [...] to believe, that greatness of Courage consisteth only in the forgetting of injuries; all his endevours are to blot out of our [...]ouls the memory of offences, and hatred of our enemies: to hear him speak, you would [...]hink his State were grounded on this Law only; and that we cannot claim share in his [Page 428] Glory, if we do not imitate his Clemen [...]cy.

Humane Philosophy hath not been abl [...] to attain to this degree of perfection; yet sh [...] hath observed, that Hatred was unjust, an [...] that Revenge was poorly condition'd; sh [...] hath made use of weak reasons, to perswad [...] us to rare Virtues; and when she hath no [...] been able to quite to abolish Choler, she hat [...] endeavour'd to asswage it: she hath shew' [...] us, that the world is a Republique, where [...] all men are Citizens; Sanctae partes sunt, si univer­sum venerabi­le est: Ergo & homo homini sacer est, nam hic in majore tibi urbe civis est. Sen. 2. De Ira. cap. 31. that if the body wer [...] holy, the members thereof were sacred and that, if it were forbidden to conspire a [...]gainst the State, it was not lawful to at [...]tempt any thing against a man, who mad [...] a part thereof; that it would be a strang [...] disorder, if the Eyes should fight against th [...] Hands, or that the Hands should declar [...] war against the Eyes; that Nature, whic [...] had united them in one and the same body had inanimated them with one and th [...] same spirit; and that, contributing to th [...] publick good, they should mutually assi [...] one another, lest the ruine of one part migh [...] draw on that of the whole: that, thus [...] were bound reciprocally to preserve them­selves for the welfare of the State, knowing that Society subsists only by Love, and tha [...] [Page 429] body cannot live, when the members [...]hereof are at discord. All these maximes codemn Revenge; Nature, as corrupt as she [...] teacheth us by the mouths of Philoso­ [...]hers, that Jesus Christ hath commanded us [...]othing which is not reasonable; and if we [...]eed his Grace to keep his Commandments, it is not so much an argument of their dif­ficulty, as a mark of our unruliness: as we [...]aught to adore his Justice, that punisheth [...], we ought to adore his Mercy, which for­ [...]ifieth our weakness, and acknowledge, that [...]he imposeth no Laws upon us, but that at the same time he gives us strength to ob­serve them.

The THIRD DISCOURSE. Of the good use of CHOLER.

THe Poet had reason to say, That the way to Hell lay open to all the world, and that all men were in­differently permitted to descend thither: but that to get from thence when one was once entred there, and to see the light again [Page 430] after one had been in darkness, was a favou [...] which the Heavens granted only to tho [...] Grandees that had merited it by their glo­rious labours: In voluptates & vitia descen­ditur; in res as­peras & duras subeundum est, hic impella­mus animos, illic refraene­mus. Sen. Ep. 123. there is nothing more eas [...] than to abuse Choler, and engage on [...] self in the unjust resentments of Re [...]venge; corrupt Nature hath taught u [...] these disorders; and without other instru [...]cters than our own desires, we find mean [...] every day how to content this Passion; bu [...] assuredly, there is nothing more difficul [...] than to make good use thereof, and she i [...] so hair-brain'd, as it is easier, totally to ex­tinguish her, than to regulate her, and to ba­nish her out of our soul, than to moderate her. For she is so violent, that she is not to be with-held, and so sudden, that she canno [...] be prevented; her first motions are not in our power, and being once on the wing, she hath alredy acted most part of her outrages [...] the other passions are to be dreaded in their Progress; like Scorpions which carry their poyson in their tayls, they reserve all their fury to the last; and are never more dange­rous, than when oldest: a budding hatred may be cur'd; but, being increas'd with time, it is past remedy: an Envy which is not yet throughly shap'd, may be effac'd; but when it hath gotten all its strength, the Heavens [Page 431] must work wonders, to stifle it; a love which hath not yet past from the Eyes to the Heart, and which is rather a Complacency than a Passion, is as soon quench'd as set on fire; but when 'tis once gotten into the bot­tom of our soul, that it hath brought its flames into our Will, a long time is requi­red to mortifie it; and unless Hatred, De­spite, and Jealousie come in to the aid of Reason, she will be perplex'd to triumph o­ver so puissant an enemy; but Choler hath all her forces in her Cradle, she is at full growth as soon as formed; and as if she were of the nature of Spirits, she stands not in need of Time to grow in; so as she is hard to overcome, even from the time she begins to fight; and contrary to the humour of o­ther Passions, she is more to be feared in her Cradle, than in her Saddle: she carries her poyson in her Head, as Vipers do; if you think to stifle her when she is once on foot, you augment her fury; and this monster is so wild, that the next way to appease her violence, is, to resolve to bear with her.

I should therefore counsel all those that would make her serviceable to Vertue, to prevent her birth, and to allay her before she be formed: It must be consider'd, that whatsoever it be that puts us in Choler, it [Page 432] ought not so much as to disquiet us; Nihil ex his quae tristes a­gimus, serium est, nihil mag­num: Inde vobis ira & in­sania est, quod exigua magni aestimatis. Sen 3. De Ira. c. 34. that we take offence at things, only because we know them not; that Riches and Honour attract their greatness from our ignorance; that the chances of Fortune, and our ene­mies injuries take their strength from our weakness; as for such things which waken our desires, we must perswade our selves that they are not worth the wishing for; that their loss is more advantageous to us, than their possession; that they are not what they appear to be; and that under a false shew of pleasure, they hide real griefs; we cannot yet give them the names they deserve; and out of a strange blindness we term our pu­nishments Felicities: our Troubles proceed only from our Ignorance; and we should never be surprized by Choler, if we did know, that it is Virtue which makes us rich and honourable; all the good things that Fortune can bereave us of, are not ours; though she suffer us to make use of them, she keeps the Soveraignty thereof to her self; and oft-times she takes them from us, to teach us, that she doth but lend, not give us them: as they are rather favours of her Li­berality, than effects of our Industry; 'tis fit, that after her prodigality, she should be covetous of them. In fine, all things that [Page 431] she disposeth of, are too mean for us to bu­sie our selves about; and we must not think it strange, Quod vincu­lum amoris esse debebat, seditionis at (que) odii causa est, idem velle. Sen. 3. De Ira. c. 34. that they put division between people who desire to enjoy them, and can­not endure the dividing of them.

As for unthought of Accidents, we must remember, that being in the world, we are subject to the Laws thereof: that we should be too nice, to pretend to dispensations which Kings have not obtained; that no­thing hath hapned in former ages which may not happen in this; that our fortune is not better grounded, than that of so many Monarchs who have lost their Lives & their Kingdoms in one and the same day; that our Health is no more setled than other mens; and that being compounded of the same Element, others suffer no Maladies which may not happen unto us; that our riches are not in safety, for their being well come by; that Fire may devour them, Thieves may rob us of them, Strangers may purloin them; that the power of a great Man, the Malice of a Judge, and violence of an Enemy, are accidents which may well be foreseen, but cannot always be shun­ned.

As for Injuries, if they be slight ones, we must despise them; if bitter ones, we must [Page 432] sweeten them; Non est mag­nus animus, quem incurvat injuria: Aut potentior te, ant imbecilior Jaesit, si imbe­cillior, parce illi, si potenti­or, parce tibi. Sen. l. 3. De Ira. c. 5. in fine.they will never do us much harm as they do their Authors; an [...] if they be unjust, they will be glorious [...] us: nothing doth exalt Innocence so much [...] Injustice; had not Socrates and Regulus ha [...] their Persecutors, they never had bee [...] praised; they are only Famous, for tha [...] they have been unfortunate; and they ow [...] the greatest part of their Glory to thei [...] Enemies Cruelty: Tyrants are requisite fo [...] the making of Martyrs; and the ones rigou [...] is no less necessary than the others constan [...]cie; we must not be troubled if our enemie [...] intention be unjust, Dat Ioseph sr [...]tribus mu­nera▪ quasi vel­let solvere be­neficium ven­ditionis, pro­ditionis, ejecti­onis in cister­nam: non e­nim regnasset nisi veniisset. Philo Iudae. so that their action may be advantageous to us: Ioseph was ob­liged to his Brethren, their hatred made him glorious; had he not lost his liberty▪ he had never reigned in Egypt and had he not been imprison'd, he had never sate upon the Throne: what imports it us, that men [...] designs be evil, so long as he that mana­geth them by his Providence makes them serviceable to us? And if we would not re­fuse to lose our Liberty to purchase a King­dom; wherefore should we not bear with an Injury, to gain an eternal Crown? When these Reasons often thought upon, shall have made any impression in us, it will be very hard for Choler to surprize us; she [Page 433] will be tractable in her birth, if we be pre­pared against her assaults; for her violence proceeds rather from our weakness, than her own strength; and methinks, we are fuller of Remissness, than she of Impetuosity.

With these precautions, I suppose, we may make some good use of Choler; and that Kings and Judges may advantage themselves thereby, in the behalf of Justice: she should banish out of their hearts, Fear, and Lenity, when they indiscreetly oppose themselves against the severity of the Laws: she should fill with her noble fire their minds, which suffer themselves to be cor­rupted by Promises, or terrified with Threats: In fine, she should succeed Cle­mency, and fill the mouths of Kings with such awful words, as keep Subjects in obe­dience. Thus we see, the ingenious Poet gives Iupiter some Choler, Precibusque minas regali­ter addit. Ovid. 2. Metam. as oft as he puts Thunder into his hand; teaching Sove­raigns, by this example, to have recourse to to this generous Passion, when they have in vain employed Mercy: 'tis true, that this argument is not convincing; and we must not wonder, if this prophane Poet attribute the motions of our souls to his gods, since he imputes its disorders to them; and that, after having described to us their Murders, [Page 434] he acquaints us with their Adulteries; bu [...] the holy Scripture, which was dictated b [...] the Spirit of Truth, teacheth us, that th [...] true God grows angry; and that there [...] some faults which cannot be sufficientl [...] punish'd, unless Justice borrow heart from Choler. Therefore 'tis, that the Wiseman when he represents unto us that dreadfu [...] day, Accipietarma­turam zelus il­lius, induet pro thorace justiti­am, & accipiet pro galea judi­cium certum: sumet scutum inexpugnabile aequitatem, a­cuet autem du­ram iram in lanceam, & pugnabit cum illo orbis ter­rarum contra insensatos. Sap. cap. 5. wherein God shall revenge himself o [...] his Enemies, he gives him weapons, where with to terrifie and punish them; he stin [...] him up with Zeal and Jealousie; he clothe [...] him with Justice, as with a Curass; he put Judgment upon his head, as a Corslet; h [...] puts Severity in his left hand, as a Buck [...]ler; and Choler in his right, as a Lance; an [...] makes him descend upon the earth in thi [...] furious equipage, to punish the Rebels o [...] his Kingdom. I very well know, that th [...] Prophet in this eloquent description fit [...] himself to our weakness, and his meaning [...] not to perswade us, that Gods Choler is o [...] the same nature, as is ours; nor that this pas­sion doth trouble his rest; which is not inter­rupted in hell it self, by the chastisements o [...] Devils: but we must confess, that Jesus Christ made use thereof, to revenge himsel [...] of the wrongs done to his Father, that he armed with whips and cords, those adored [Page 435] [...]ands which were to be pierced with nails; [...]hat he suffered his just anger to be seen in his Countenance; and did, in this condition, whatsoever Wise men use to do when they [...]unish Crimes, or defend Innocence.

In fine, the wisest of Kings doth not be­ [...]eve, that Kingdoms can be well govern'd without Choler; he will have Princes sen­sible of their Injuries, that the Sword which they bear be as well employ'd in punishing Offenders, as in defeating Enemies; and that they shew as much indignation when their Subjects violate their Laws, as when their Frontiers are seized on by their Neigh­bours: he is of opinion, that the Choler and Mildness of a King ought to maintain the peace of his Kingdom; and using an excellent comparison, says, The one is as the roaring of a Lion, whereat all the wild beasts of the Forrests tremble; Sicut sremitus leonis, ita & Regis ira, & sicutros super herbam, ita & hilaritas ejus. Prov. 19. the other, as the dew upon the Grass, which defends it from the heat of the Sun. But in all these just Commotions which accompany the correction of Offenders, the Prince must remember, that Punishments are Remedies, and that the Death it self which he ordains, Interim opti­mum est mise­ricordiae genus, occidere. Sen. 1. De Ira. c. 16. is a kind of mercy which he shews to the Faulty: he banisheth some, lest their con­versation may augment the number of the [Page 436] wicked: from others he takes their wealth left they abuse it; he deprives others of thei [...] liberty, for fear they would employ it a­gainst the State; he takes their life from them, when he thinks their mischief in [...]curable; and he thinks to do them a favour when he condemns them to death. H [...] therefore is obliged to divide himself, be [...]tween the relation of a Judge and a Physi [...]tian, to deal with the same person, as with one that is guilty and sick; and to mingle Mildness with Severity, left his Chole [...] prove more pernicious than profitable to his State.

If Kings are bound to be so cautious in the punishing of Rebels, private men may judge, what a hand they ought to hold over their Passions, and how mild their Choler ought to be, that it may be reasonable; for their power is not equal to that of Kings; they cannot be so highly injured, Salobrius est irae etiam juste pulsanti non a­perire penetra­le cordis, quam admittere non facie recessu­ram, & per­venturam de surculo in tra­bem. Aug. Ep. ad Profutur. and their resentment is not so excusable. I will likewise advise them to stifle a passion, the use whereof is so dangerous; and to dry up the Spring, that they may drain the Cur­rent: when it is natural to us, and makes up the chief part of our temperature, 'tis very hard to subdue it; and it is not in our power to change the Elements whereof we [Page 437] are compounded, or to mend the faults which Nature hath committed; yet this mischief is not without its Remedy; and if [...] cannot be totally cured, it may at least be much qualified; wine which sets it on fire must be cut off; and as Plato saith, One fire must not be added to another: Plato vetat igne ignem ex­citare. Sen. l. 2. De Ira. c. 20. Choler must not be nourished with delicious viands, left the mind swell according as the body is strengthened; it must be held in Exercise by moderate labour, which may diminish the heat thereof without extinguishing it, & which may turn all the fervency into scum: Pastimes will be of good use to her, provi­ded they be not excessive; & harmless plea­sures, provided they be moderate, will allay her fury; but when she is more Accidental, than Natural, and that she proceeds either from Sickness, which may have changed our Constitution, or from immoderate wat­chings which may have heated it, or from Debauchery which may have dried it up; or from those other disorders which wound both soul and body, it will be no hard mat­to drive out an enemy, which holds no In­telligence in the place; and which is only entertained in our hearts, by reason of our wretchedness.

But without seeking for so many reme­dies; [Page 438] we may boldly use Choler agains [...] our selves; and suffer this passion to punish those faults whereof we alone are guilty Self-love will hinder the excess thereo [...] well enough; and without consulting with so many Masters, the care we have of pre­serving our selves, Volo vos irasci ut non pecce­tis; quibus ha­betis irasci nisi vobis. Aug. Horn. 4. Ex. 20 will sence us from the violence of this passion; it is against our selves, that we may with Reason use her, since we have so many just motives that in­vite us to it; we must make use of her fury to satisfie Jesus Christ, who demands of us reparation for injuries done unto him, and revenge for his death: we may lawfully em­ploy her in our Repentance, without any fear, that her excess may make us lose Mild­ness, or her Violence make us forget Cha­rity: for this Virtue which punisheth faults, seems to be but Choler allay'd; and the Penitent, who makes war upon Himself, is but a man incens'd; Love and Sorrow en­courage him to Revenge; he cannot behold his sins without vexation; and believes, that without violating the Laws of Nature, or of Grace, he may be his own Judge, and his own Client, his own Witness, and his own Executioner; & that without offence to Justice, he may execute the sentence which he hath pronounced against Himself: Thrice [Page 439] happy Choler, which only offends man, to appease God; whlch by her Tears washeth away her sins; which by Self-accusing gets Absolution; and which by slight punish­ments, frees her self from the pains of Hell, and prepares for her self the Joys of Hea­ven.

The FIRST DISCOURSE. Of the Nature, Proprieties and Effects of Delight or Pleasure.

THough Hope be so much praised by men, and that of all the Passi­ons which flatter the Sense, she is one of the most Taking; yet must she give place to Pleasure, and confess that Pleasure is a Sun, whose presence de­faces all her beuty: for if she promiseth ought that is good, this other giveth it us; [Page 441] if the one hath Flowers, the other bears Fruit; and if the one content us in Word, the other makes us happy in effect. Delight is the period of all the motions of our soul; Ad summa pervenit, qui scit quo gau­deat, & qui foelicitaten [...] suam in aliena potestate non posuit. Sen. Ep. 23. and as Love is the beginning thereof, Plea­sure is the end; it stoppeth the violence of our desires, and forceth those fickle Passions to taste rest, to which they seem to pro­fess Enmity: it sweetens Choler, and takes from her that forward humour which ac­companieth her in all her designs; it pays Boldness for all her good services; and is it self the recompense of those glorious la­bours which she hath undergone to compass it; it drives away Fear, and banishes all those vain terrors which disquiet us; it kills Despair, which seems to have conspired the death of it; it banisheth Sadness at first sight, and if it retain Tears and Sighs, they are the spoils which publish the Victo­ry, and honour the Triumph thereof. Love is content, when after having tane so much pains, it can rest in Pleasure: of as many shapes as Love puts on, Non est oble­ctamentum super cordis gaudium. Eccl. c. 30. this is that it most delights in, and doth not forgo it to assume another, without violence: Love is unquiet when it Desires, and its wishes are shame­full and true proofs of its indigency; when it hopes, it is not without Fear; and those [Page 442] two keep it so faithful company, as they never leave it but it costs them their life; for Fear becomes Sadness when 'tis desti­tute of Hope; and Hope is changed into Despair, when it is parted from Fear: Love is not satisfied with Revenge; and though Revenge be sweet, yet it is accompanied with pain: In Boldness, it is cover'd with Sweat and Dirt; Glory flatters it, and threatning danger astonisheth it; in Hatred, it is tormented; and the evil which it wish­eth to its enemy, is a Viper that lies gnaw­ing upon it: in Eschewing, it wants strength; and it shuns not him that pursues it, save only because it cannot defend it self from him: in Despair, it is vanquish'd; and yield­ing up its weapons to the Conquerour, suffers it self to be led in Triumph: in Sad­ness it is miserable; and the remembrance of its fore-past happiness, serves only to aug­ment its present sorrow: but in pleasure, it is at once both Victorious, Triumphant, and Happy; all its Races are stopt, all its De­sires are accomplish'd, and all its designs at an end. And surely, we must not wonder if it be in so deep a Tranquillity, since it en­joyes the happiness it sought for, and is luckily arrived at the end of all its labours: for Pleasure is nothing else, but the enjoying [Page 443] of a pleasing Good, which renders the soul content, and which interdicts it the use of Desire, as well as that of Sadness and Fear.

This definition excludes all such delights as spring only from Remembrance, or from Hope, and which make us happy only in that which we have been, or hope to be: Memory doth not always entertain us with our misfortunes; though she be more faithful in retaining a Displeasure than a contentment; Habet praete­riti doloris re­cordatio dele­ctationem Cic. l. 5. Ep. & busies her self oftner about things which offend us, than about such as we are well pleased withall; yet doth not she forbear to represent unto us past felici­ties; and by a pleasing Remembrance thereof, sweeten our present miseries; to serve us, she triumphs over the Laws of Time; to favour us, she recalls what is no more; and seeks out in by-gon ages di­vertisments to recreate us; but let her do her utmost endeavour, she cannot beguile our soul, nor give it true contentment in enter­taining it only with a Falshood; things that are past are but so many shadows; and if they make any Impression in us, it is rather of Sorrow than of Joy; Good, when far distant from us, makes it self be desired; but when past, it makes it self to be bewailed: [Page 444] its Presence ingenders our Happiness, and its Absence causeth our Desires, or our Re­gret: Loss, and Fruition, of one and the same thing, cannot be pleasing; and let Me­mory use what cunning she can, she cannot call to our minds a good which hath no more a being, without awakening our Wishes, Omne opus leve fieri solet, cum ejus preti­um cogitatur, & spes proemii solatium fit la­boris. Hieron. in Ep. and refreshing our Sorrows. Hope is not much more favourable to us; for though she fore-run our good fortune, that she anticipate the birth thereof, and that she feeds us with a contentment which is not yet happen'd; though by an impatience which is advantageous to us, she seeks out present felicities in Futurity, and that, pre­cipitating the course of years, she advanceth our Contentment; yet a man need not be over-wise, to observe that she deceives us; and that she often makes us miserable, out of a desire of making us too soon Happy: she is found false in her Promises; and after having long expected their effects, all we reap thereby, is Shame, for having been too credulous; and Sorrow, for having grounded our happiness upon an uncertain good: Solid pleasure requires the presence of its object; and though, in Morality, the end hath so much power over our Wills, yet can it not make them happy, but by [Page 445] possession; therefore is it, that the Cove­tous and Ambitious, who forgo a present good, only to entertain themselves with a Future; and who consider not so much what they have, as what they want, cannot be esteemed happy; since in the very Frui­tion of honour or riches, they are languish­ing; and contrary to the nature of Pleasure, they seek for what they have not, and value not what they have.

By the same definition, we exclude all those sensualities, Ipsae volupta­tes in tormen­ta vertuntur. Sen. Ep. 24. which spring from Indi­gence, or which produce Sorrow; for to boot, that they are desired with so much Anxiety as doth exceed the Pleasure which they promise us; they are such enemies to our quiet, as it is impossible to taste there­of, without becoming miserable and faulty, they wound at once both the soul and the body; they weaken the one, and corrupt the other; they are Remedies worse than the Evils which they would cure; their disorder causeth always the like in our health; and their excess is so pernicious thereunto, Voluptas ver­git ad dolorem nisi modum teneat, veri autem boni aviditas tuta est. Sen. Ep. 23. that we must take them mode­rately, if we intend to receive satisfaction thereby; true Delight is never more plea­sing, than when in extreams; the greater it is the more it doth ravish us; and being agree­able [Page 446] to our nature, it never makes us more happy than when it most abundantly com­municateth it self; but Sensualities are poysons, which must be prepared, if we will reap profit thereby; and since the irregula­rity of Sin, we had need of Grace to fence our selves against their disorder: whatever Pleasure they promise us, they have so great Affinity with Sorrow, In profoso gau­dio lachrymae erumpunt. Tert. that their words and effects resemble each other: they have their Groans and their Sighs, as well as Sorrow; when they are extream, they dissolve into tears; and to shew us that they are enemies to our Nature, their excess doth oftentimes cause our death; but say they should not produce all these mischiefs? 'Twil be sufficient to undeceive us, to know that they are always follow'd by Repentance, Voluptas fra­gilis est & bre­vis, cujus sub­inde necesse est, aut nos poeniteat aut pudeat. Sen. Benif. l 7. c. 2. Sorrow, and Shame; they dare not appear in publick; and very well perceiving that they contribute not to the Glory of man, they seek out Shade, Solitariness, and Si­lence: they would blush, were they enfor­ced to shew themselves; and the confusion which would cover their faces, would trouble their contentment: Maladies are the penance of their excess; and Physiti­ans would be useless, could pleasure be re­gulated; as long as man was content with [Page 447] such fruits as the earth yielded him; and that without provoking his appetite with much-sought for Viands, he did only eat to satisfie his hunger; he had no superfluous humours to dry up, no Defluctions to di­vert, nor Fevers to cure. Abstinence was all his remedy; and the Diet that he used dreined off the source of all his diseases: but, since he hath dispeopled both Sea and Land, to nourish him; that he hath made the monsters of Nature his food; that he would know what taste Tortoises, and o­ther creeping things had, which the simpli­city of our Ancestors confounded with Serpents▪ since he would refresh Wine with Snow, accord those elements in his Body, which wage war with one another in the world; mingle Fishes with Birds, and place in one and the same Stomach, Nunc vero quam longe processerunt mala valetudi­nis? has usuras voluptatum pendimus, ul­tra modum fas­que concupita­rum Innume­rabiles esse [...] morbos mira­ris? coquos numera. Sen. Ep. 95. things to which Nature hath appointed such different habitations; sicknesses have assailed him in crowds; and the unruliness of his mind hath caused the disorders of his Body▪ the: Gout hath stung his Nerve; the Stone is formed in his Reins, the Winds have committed a thousand Outrages in his Bowels, and as if the Elements were sensi­ble of the confusion he makes of their qua­lities in his debaucheries, they for revenge [Page 448] have corrupted themselves, and (as the ut­most which hate can produce) they ruine themselves, to kill their Enemy.

In fine, by this definition, we condemn all such pleasures as Nature requireth not, unless seduced by Opinion; for her con­tentments are as regular as her Desires; and without looking after things unprofitable, she is contented with what is necessary; she wisheth for such good things only, as she cannot be without: as Necessity serves her for a Law, so doth she consult with it in all her occasions, and makes no wishes with­out the approbation thereof; hence is it, that they are not many; and that she is contented with a little: water of the Fountain sufficeth to quench her thirst; fruits of the earth sa­tisfie her hunger; Sheeps Wool furnish­eth her clothing; and before Luxury bound him to make war upon all the Creatures. I know not but that the trees did furnish her with Apparel; and those that fed her with their fruits, clothed her with their barks; but this at least I know, that in those innocent times men committed no Murders, to adorn themselves, neither acted any pranks of In­justice, to enrich themselves; nor did they violate Nature, to procure to themselves sin­ful delicacies, their houses were built with­out [Page 449] Curiosity, —Tunc ju­vat aut amnis vagi pressisse [...]ipas, cespite aut [...]udo leves duxisse somnos Excussa sylvis poma compes­cunt famem, Et fraga par­vis vulsa dume­tis cibos Faci­les [...]inistrant. Sen. in Hipol. and he that was the Contri­ver of them, was also the Carpenter and the Mason; the earth cover'd with Moss served him for a Bed; and, as he never lay down uninvited by sleep, he slept without distur­bance, and awaked with content; he knew no other Perfume than that of Flowers, which being more pure than ours, was more pleasing; he was not acquainted with the use of Coaches, his Journeys not be­ing long, he made use only of such aids as Nature had given him: War being hateful to him, and trafique useless, he per­mitted horses to enjoy their liberty, and employed not that noble Creature, which Fury and Avarice have rendered necessary to us; whithersoever he went, the earth was sufficiently fruitful to nourish and to cloath him; he found in the Desarts where­with to satisfie his desires; and that which we want in Cities, he wanted not in places uninhabited. In his happy age all delights were innocent, and no man tasted any plea­sure which was not true; but now, since they are no longer Natural, they are no longer Rational; they weaken the Body, and destroy the Soul: and experience tea­cheth us, that the use of them is as pernici­ous as the want of them is profitable.

[Page 450]But lest I be accus'd to be an enemy to Pleasure, and that I would bereave man of the remedies which Nature hath given him to sweeten his misfortunes; I will say, that the solid contentments are those of the Mind; and that man cannot be satisfied, unless the noblest part, Quaeris quid sit hominis bo­num? animus, & ratio in ani­mo perfecta. Rationale e­nim animal est homo [...]con­summatur ita­que ejus bo­num, si id ad­implevit cui natus est. Sen. Ep. 41. whereof he is com­posed, be happy; the knowledg of Truth, and practice of Virtue ought to be his chiefest Diversions; he must follow his holiest inclinations, and be more careful, in his own person, to please an Angel than a Beast; he must remember that the body is but the souls slave: and that in the choice of Pleasures, it is just that the Soveraign keep her precedency; besides, those which the soul relisheth, are the truest; and if any man be of another opinion, we must believe, that sin which hath berest him of Grace, hath likewise berest him of Reason. For the pleasures of the Senses are limited, whereas those of the soul have no bounds; the plea­sures of the body are strangers, those of the soul are natural; the former may be taken from us without any great ado, Death it self cannot bereave us of the latter; which though it rob us of our riches, cannot rob us of our virtues: the one sort are in a per­petual succession; as they hold of Time, [Page 451] they cannot hold together; Quid ex Idae Platonicis tra­ham, quod cupiditates meas compri­mat? vel ho [...] ipsum, quod omnia [...]sta quae sensibus serv [...]unt, quae nos accendunt ac irritant, ne­gat Plato ex iis esse quae ve­re sint. Igitur ista imaginaria sunt, & ad tempus aliquā faciem ferunt, nihil horu [...] stabile nec so­lidum est. Son. Ep. 58. and by a neces­sary law, those that are past, give place to them that are present; and the present to the future; so as the body never enjoys its contentment, but in part; it is poor amidst its riches, whilst it thrives well on the one side, it languisheth on the other; and by a misfortune which is inseparable from its condition, it finds no contentment, which gives satisfaction to all its senses; but those of the soul are never divided, they present themselves all at once; & the same thought which enlightens the Understanding, heats the Will, and fills the Memory: her joy is universal; one faculty is never sad whilst the other are satisfied; and, as if there were a community amongst them in their con­tentments; that which pleaseth the one, de­lighteth all the rest. In fine, Spiritual plea­sures are much more intimate than those of the Senses; for the soul is wholly filled therewithal; the blessing she eujoys, pene­trates her Essence; as she changeth into her Self that which she knows, so she transfor­meth her Self into that which she loves; and by an admirable Metamorphosis she be­comes her own Felicity; but the Senses are joyn'd to their objects only by Accident; they see the colours of things, & know not [Page 452] their Essences; they understand the sound of words, and conceive not the meaning of them; so as the body is only content in Ef­figie; its Bliss is but a shadow, and its Fe­licity is but a false appearance; but the mind is really happy, the contentment thereof is solid, and the goods it possesseth, essential.

The SECOND DISCOURSE. Of the bad use of Pleasure.

OF so many several ways that Sin hath invented to abuse Pleasure; there are four which I undertake to discover, and enter combat with, because they have been approved of by famous men; and some honest men have taken upon them their defence. The first is, Vo­luptuousness, which seems to derive her name from Pleasures Self, and pretends to be enemy to Virtue; for though there be great difference between them, and that to preserve the one, we are oft-times enfor­ced to abandon the other; yet heretofore [Page 453] there arose up a Sect of Philosophers that would reconcile them, and who out of a good intent did much injure Virtue, for finding, Apud Epicure­os [...]virtus vo­luptatum mi­nistra est, illis paret, illis de­servit, illas su­pra se videt. Primae autem partes ejus sunt ducere debet, imperare, sum­mo loco stare; hi vero jubent illam signum petere. Sen. Benif. 1.4 c 2. that the Difficulty which did ac­company her, made her odious to faint and lazy souls; and that the labour that went to the acquisition thereof, made them lose the longing after her, they strove to perswade them that she was delightsom; and that under a severe countenance she did hide a pleasing humor: upon their word, men be­gan to court her, and thinking to find Vo­luptuousness in her train, they made love to the Mistress, hoping to enjoy her Waiting­woman; but when they were aware that this Pleasure was as severe as Virtues Self; and that, remaining in the bottom of the soul, it made no impression upon the Senses; they changed their design, and made open love to Voluptuousness: In fine, a height of impudency, they would make use of Philo­sophy to authorize their Injustice; and gave a glorious name to a base Rebellion; they endeavour'd to make men believe, that Virtue did never forgo Voluptuousness, and that they were not to be parted with­out Violence: their cousenage was soon discovered, and the true Philosophers loaded them with so many Reproaches, [Page 454] that poor Epicurus could never acquit him­self of; for though his design was excusa­ble, and that he never would have proposed Voluptuousness to men, but to make them in love with Virtue; yet because the success was unhappy, he could not avoid Calum­ny; & the zeal of his adversaries confoun­ded his Opinion with his Disciples Errour: yet was not he in fault, save only in seeming to endeavour to equal Voluptuousness to Virtue; and to make the Soveraign and the Slave fit upon the same Throne; he deserved publick indignation, Qui Epicuret [...] sequitur bo­num, malae rei quaerit autho­rem, & dum ille renit blan­do nomine in­ductus, sequitur voluptatem, non quem an­dit, sed quam a [...]ulit, & vitia su a cum coepit putare similia praeceptis, in­dulget illis nontimide nec obscure. Sen De vita beata. [...]ap. 13. only for distrusting the power of Virtue; and because, to pro­cure her Lovers, he had adorn'd her with the trims of Voluptuousness; if his Opini­on, innocent as it is, hath not escaped blame, that of his Disciples is too guilty to keep me from arguing against it; 'tis enough that it is condemned by the whole world; and that the abettors thereof dare not publickly defend it; it is sufficiently punish'd since 'tis ashamed, and seeks out Obscurity, as well to hide it self, as to take its pastime: it may suffice to know, that no honest man did e­ver take upon him to defend it; and that even the most shameless amongst men took not its part, till they had forgot Rea­son.

[Page 455]The Devil perceiving that this piece of [...]unning was smelt out, and that it would [...]educe none but such souls, as not staying for Suggestions, would lose themselves of their own proper motions; bethought himself of a wile, which was so much the more dangerous, as being cover'd with a Fair Pretence: For he would perswade men, Qui virtutem suam publicari vult, non vir­tuti laborat, sed gloriae. Non vis esse justus sine glo­ria? ac saepe justus esse de­bebas cum in­famia. Sen. Ep. 113. that true pleasure consisted in Ho­nour, and that there was nothing glorious, which was not pleasing in Perfection; he made them believe, that Glory was the recompense of Virtue; that the peoples ap­probation was the Kings Happiness; that, if Conquerors did at any time endeavour to win upon the Liberty of Strangers, it was to deserve praise; and if they did them any Mischief, it was to get Honour there­by: All the great ones follow'd this Facti­on; and perswaded by Reason, which had more of shew, than of solidity, they court­ed Glory, they became her Martyrs, and engaged their lives & liberties, to purchase reputation. From this pernicious Maxime, arose a great mischief; for men preferring Honour before Virtue, divided two things, which ought to be inseparably united, and through the malice of the Devil, they be­came proud, and ceased to be virtuous; [Page 456] they ran after glorious sins, they neglected Bashful Virtues, and with an injustice which merited exemplary chastisement, they for sook a Soveraign, to court her slave: assured­ly, they were ignorant of her height of me­rit, since they sought after another recom­pense, than what they find that enjoy her and they differ much from the humour of her true lovers, who forgo Glory to pre­serve Virtue; and who are never more faithful to her, than when they are proffer'd preferment, to corrupt them, or laden with reproaches, to affrighten them: But not to engage my self, in the defence of a party so reasonable; I will argue with them that gainsay it, out of their own interests: I will make them confess, that that which men call Honour, cannot cause a true pleasure; Male agit qui Famae, non Conscientiae gratus est. Sen. Benefic. c. 42. and that he who is Rich in Glory, is Poor in Contentment: For how can he find his Happiness, in a thing he possesseth not? How can he build his Felicity upon a Good which is distributed with so much injustice; and which is often [...] given to Vice, than to Virtue: What satis­faction shall he enjoy, when his Conscience shall give the lie to his Reputation? And that he shall blame those actions, which the world doth not approve of, save only be­cause [Page 457] it knows not their motives? How [...]an he find rest in the diversity of mens o­pinions which do not agree, even in those things that are most certain; and who, ac­cording to the Passions wherewith their minds are agitated, condemn a Virtue which they have formerly valued, and value a vice which they have formerly condemn­ed? Pleasure, to be Solid, ought to be constant; and, if any glory can be the re­ward of a good action, it is not that which we expect from the people; but what we receive from our own Conscience: 'Tis then an abuse to Virtue, to place her in so frail a thing; Gloriam qui spreverit verā habebit. Livius Dec. 3. lib. 2. and to seek a happiness in Mens Mouths, which ought to reside in our Heart, is to prefer an Appearance be­fore a Truth.

Philosophers, who thought to find her in Science, seem to have gone upon better Ground; for besides, that the desire of Knowledge is more natural to us, than is that of Glory; and, that truth makes much stronger impression on our soul, than doth Honour; it is a benefit we cannot be rob'd of, as being Intrinsecal to us: Tyrants, who take our lives from us, cannot bereave us of our Knowledge; and Calumnie, which may stain our Reputation, cannot obscure [Page 458] our Understanding: We are learned i [...] despight of our enemies; these precious riches accompany us in prison, follow u [...] in Exile, and leave us not till death: We carry them with us, where-ever we go; and Fortune, which ravisheth Honour from Conquerors, which bereaves the Inconti­nent of their Voluptuosness, cannot rob [...] Philosophers of their Science. Sunt qui scire volunt tantum ut sciant; & turpis curiosi­tas est. Sunt qui scire vo­lunt, ut Scien­tiam suam vendant, & turpis quaestus est. Et sunt qui scire volunt ut sciantur ipsi, & turpis vanitas est. Et sunt qui scire volunt, ut aedificent, & charitas est. Et sunt qui sci­re volunt ut ae­disicentur, & prudentia est. Bern. in Cant. Hom. 35. But let her pretend what advantage she can over her Rivals, mans Felicity cannot consist there­in: For to boot, that she is mixt with ig­norance, that her lights are mingled with obscurities, that there is more of doubt, than of certainty, more of errour than of truth in her; she is oftentimes either unpro­fitable or faulty, in the most part of her im­ployments; for as S. Bernard says, some study out of a delight to be knowing; and this is a frivolous curiosity; others, that men may know, that they are knowing; and this is a shameful Vain-glory: Others, out of a desire to sell their knowledge; and this is a Sordid Commerce: 'Tis true, there are some that study, that they may edifie, and this is a laudable Charity; and others study to edifie themselves, and this is a discreet point of wisdom. Of all these, there are only the two last, who do not [Page 459] abuse Knowledg; since they procure her only, to employ her in the service of virtue; but in this very occasion, she hath her trou­bles, and her defects; and if she be not ac­companied with Humility, she puffes us up with Vain-glory, and Self-love. Infelix homo qui ista scit omnia, te au­tem nescit; be­atus autem qui te scit, etiamsi illa nesciat; qui vero te & illa novit, non propter illa beatior, sed propter te so­lum beatus est. Aug 5. Confes. cap. 4. After all, we must acknowledg, with the wise man, that 'tis a troublesome occupation, which God hath given men for their punishment: and that it is rather an effect of his Justice, than a mark of his Love. If the use of all these pleasures be not innocent, that of Riches is more Faulty; for let us give them what praises we please, they are enemies to Virtue; and if they be serviceable to mag­nificence and liberality, they are prejudici­al to Continence and Justice: all vices em­ploy them, to satisfie their unjust desires; and he that would take them from Avarice, Pride, and Obscenity, would reduce them to a happy incapacity of doing harm: The greatest Philosophers have likewise ac­knowledged, that they were the Ruine of Families, and loss of Estates; that the de­spising of them, was safer than their Pos­session; and that, from the time they enter into a house, they drive thence all virtue; they irritate our desires, awaken our hopes, encrease our fears, and oblige us to con­fess, [Page 460] that there is more anxiety in keeping [...] them, than in acquiring of them. In fi [...]e Rich men are of so unhappy a condition that if they will therein taste any delight they must imitate the condition of poo [...] men, Majore tor­mento pecunia possidetur quam quaeri­tur. Sen. Ep. 116. and seek for that in poverty, which they could not find out in abundance.

But where then will you place Pleasure if it be neither to be found in Voluptuous­ness nor in Glory? And where will you lodg [...] her, if she agree not well neither with know­ledg nor riches? I confess, there are Ratio­nal Delights, Lawful Honours, Modest Sci­ences, and Innocent Riches; but certainly, the common use thereof is out of order, and by a just judgment of God, every one finds his Trouble, where he seeks his Fe­licity: The Incontinent are sad amidst their Contentments: Jealousie and Suspiti­on revenge violated Chastity, and Diseases make them pay use for their infamous plea­sures; the Ambitious are the Victimes of Vanity; they have this of evil in their best Fortune; Laborat invi­dia, & quidem duplici; vides autem quam fit miser is cui invidetur, & qui invidet. Sen. Ep. 4. that they are tormented with a twofold Envy; for they cannot endure their Equals, and their Inferiours cannot abide them; They despise Honours, as soon as they enjoy them; and valuing none, but such as they have not, [...] they mingle disquiet with enjoying; and molest [Page 461] [...]n Assured Happiness, with desire of an Uncertain Contentment: the learned are not much more Happy; they are torment­ed with the Passions, which lost the first man; The Fathers fault is made the Chil­drens punishment; and the same knowledg which thrust him out of Paradise, perse­cutes them in the world; they consume all their days in learning things, either Ri­diculous or Unprofitable: They fight for defaced Letters; and the Inscription of Tombes, which is also the reward of Con­querors, causeth almost all the Dispute of Criticks; they boast themselves, that 'tis by these glorious Paths, that men mount up to Heaven; they seek for Immor­tality, and they treat with the dead, that they may reign with the Gods; they know how to Speak, not how to live; they are Learned, and not Virtuous; and through a strange blindness, Plus scire velle quam sit satis, intemperantiae genus est. Sen. Ep. 88. they see not that their knowledge being Proud, is as Boundless as Ambition; and that her desires being irre­gular, she is as Inperate as Voluptu­ousness. The Avaritious are in pain, for all their Riches; they possess them, they do not enjoy them; they worship their wealth, and dare not touch it; they teach us, that they are slaves thereunto, not masters there­of; [Page 462] and their only contentment lies i [...] hindering others from enjoying them. But left it be objected, that I discover an evi [...] without applying the remedy; I intend i [...] my next Discourse, to defend innocent and Lawful Pleasures.

The THIRD DISCOURSE. Of the good use of Pleasure.

Volupras na­tura divinum quiddam est infitum mor­talibus. Arist. 1 7. Ethic. cap. 13.THose who condemn Pleasure, must consequently condemn Nature, and accuse her of having committed faults in all her works; for this wise mother hath dispersed delight throughout all our actions; and by an admirable piece of wis­dom hath order'd, that as those which are most necessary were the meanest, they should be the most pleasing; and certainly, had she not found out this innocent Slight, the world would have perish'd long ago; and men, who are the noblest part thereof, neglecting their own preservation, would have left it for a prey to wild Beasts; for who would trouble himself with Eating, were he not invited thereunto, as well by Delight, as by Necessity? who would ever [Page 463] endure that sleep should benum his senses, take from him the use of Reason, and make him change life with the shadow of death, did not the sweetness of her poppies make this remedy as charming, as it is shameful: as Pleasure is profitable to the body, Perficit actio­nem voluptas, & in omni sen­su quaedam de­lectatio versa­tur. Arist. 1.10. Ethic. c. 41. it is no less necessary for the mind; which as am­bitious as it is, would never undertake the atchievement of Virtues, and the defeat of Vices, were not the Glory mingled with Joy; and did not these two make up the recompense of her Labours: who would toyl to overcome shameful and sinful pleasures, were they not thereunto incited by innocent delights? Who would dare to assail Death, and to fight with a Monster, which triumpheth over both the victorious and the vanquished, were not his constancy animated by the contentment which the vi­ctory promiseth him? Who were able to overcome the difficulties which accompa­ny all Sciences, were they not seasoned with Sweetness? and who would ever con­trive any famous design, were he not there­unto invited by the hope of Pleasure? But though Nature hath shed it abroad in all actions, whether necessary or difficult; she will have it be rather a help, than a motive to us; and that it serve us rather for a re­freshing [Page 464] then for a recompense: she will have us to look upon it as an Assistance which she hath given us whereby to acquire Virtue, and that we use it as a remedy found out by her to moderate our discon­tents; for mans life is full of misery; and had not the heavens sweetned them by Joy, all Passions would end in Grief or in De­spair; we should be press'd to death, under the burden of our misfortunes; and losing the hope of vanquishing our enemies, we should lose the desire of fighting with them. Rerum actio­nes undique absolutas, vo­luptas efficit, vitam etiam cajus cupidita­te incensi su­mus omnes. Arist. 1.10. Ethic. c. 4. To heighten our courage, this wise Mother solicites us by Pleasure; and equal­ly mingling it with things that are Difficult and Shameful, she obligeth us not to De­spise the one, nor to Fear the other; but whatever Contentment she propounds to us, 'tis always with this Caution, that it shall not be the end, but that it shall serve us for a pleasing means to arrive the more contentedly thereat; so that we are bound to taste of it with the same reservedness, Docetur amare meliora per a­maritudinem, ne viator ten­dens in patri­am, stabulum a [...]et pro do­ [...] Aug. as Travellers look upon the goodly Fields which lie in their way; they serve to un­weary them; they admire their largeness, praise their Fertility, value their Riches, but they stay not to gather in the crop; and knowing it is not lawful for them to enjoy [Page 465] them, they are contented with such Re­creation as thereby they receive, which whilst they do, they hasten their pace, and continue on their journey: so earthly Plea­sures may well solace us; Hoc me docu­isti ut quem­admodum medicamenta, sic alimenta sumpturus ac­cedam. Aug. 10. Confes. c. 31. but they are not totally to possess us. When Nature inter­mingled them with our actions, she meant them not for our Felicity, but our Conso­lation; and she intends not, that they should stay us on Earth, but that they should raise us to Heaven: 'Tis brutish to seek for no­thing but Delight in Eating, and to make that a Contentment, which is nothing but a Remedy: to love Sleep, because it is ac­companied with some sweetness; and to place the happiness of Life in the Image of Death, is to be void of Reason: we must take it because it is necessary, and thank di­vine Providence, Interrogas quid petam ex virtute? ipsam: nihil enim est melius, ipsa predium fui est. Aun hoc parum magnum est? Quad mihi vo­luptatem no­minas? homi­nis bonum quaero, non pecoris. Sen. De vita beatae cap. 9. which being more lucky and powerful than Physick, hath provided pleasing Remedies for us, and cures our maladies without exercising our Patience: to court Virtue only for Pleasures sake, is to be unjust, and not to value her, she is too noble to be any thing but our end; to seek out any other motive, or hope for any o­ther recompense, than the possession of her, is to injure her: Pleasure which acompanies her, is only for mean and poor souls, which [Page 466] have not courage enough to follow her, and her Difficulties; she is never more glo­rious, than when most difficult; and her faithful lovers never think her more beau­tiful than when she is crown'd with Thorns: yet doth not Nature forbid us to taste this sweetness, which accompanieth the searching after her; provided, we look upon it as a succour to our weakness; and that we take not that for a consummated felicity, which is given us only for a refresh­ment: this is, notwithstanding, the fault of all men; and so general is this disorder, that there is hardly any one who doth not seek after Pleasure, Cum salus sit causa ed [...]ndi ac bibendi, ad­jungit se tan­quam pedisse­qua periculosa jucunditas, & plerum (que) prae­ire conatur, ut ejus causa siat quod salutis causa me face­re vel dico vel volo. Aug. 10. Conf. c. 31. and despise Virtue: E­very one will make his utmost end of a mean which is not honourable, save only be­cause necessary; and all the world will have that a Passion which Nature hath placed in our Soul, only to sweeten our misfortunes, should be the height of our felicity; men now respect nothing but what delights; Glory gives place to pleasure; and virtues self, by a high injustice, hath no more lo­vers, unless she promise them delight; in­somuch as of all Passions, not any one doth more prejudice her, than joy doth: For Desires are Noble, Hopes are Generous, Audacity and Choler assail Vice; Ha­tred [Page 467] and Fear, defend themselves from it; but Joy is of a soft Nature, and suffers it self to be corrupted, when sollicited by De­lights: Other Passions are in perpetual mo­tion; and being always upon the Speed, they never fix themselves so strongly on an Object, but they may be staved off, but Joy is at rest, and making the good which she possesseth, her Center; she must be fought withal, Modo gaudi­um nostrum, fratres mei, in spe sit, ne [...]ro gaudeat quasi in re praesenti, ne haereat in via: Totum gaudium de spe futura sit. Aug. Tract. in Ioan. before she will part with it. There­fore the Son of God, knowing how hard it is to conquer this passion when it is groun­ded in a Soul, forbids us to give it entertain­ment, and counsels us to reserve it for such contentments as never shall have end: He distinguisheth his Disciples from those of the world, as well by Joy as by Love: he employs all his Reasons to perswade us, that temporal Joy cannot agree with Joy eternal; and that to be happy in Heaven, a man must be miserable on Earth; he mingles Pain with our Pleasures; sows Thorns amongst our Roses, Miscet tribu­lationes gau­diis terrenis, ut sentientes amaritudinem, discamus aeter­nam desidera­re dulcedinem. Aug. in Psal. 127. and poures Bitterness upon our Delights, to make us distaste them. He instructeth us, that Plea­sures are not only fading, but painful; and that they are not only Unprofitable, but Faulty. In fine, they are the daughters and mothers of Sorrow; and all those which [Page 468] promise us the greatest contentment, sub­sist only by the Pain which precedes them. Monarchs triumph not till after the victory; they had not defeated their enemies, Triumphat vi­ctor Impera­tor; non vicis­set nisi pugnas­set, & quanto majus est gau­dium in trium­pho, Aug. 1.8. cap. 3. had they not fought with them; and Joy mea­sureth it self so justly by Sorrow, that the beauty of the Triumph depends upon the greatness of the Combat; when it hath not been throughly disputed, the pleasure is less, and the glory is not so splendid: Ma­riners never taste the sweetness of life more than when they have escaped Shipwrack; and they are never more sensible of content­ment, than when after despair of safety, a Tempest drives them upon the shore: an only Son is never so dear to his Mother, as when he hath run great hazards, and hath cost her many a Tear; she thinks she hath been brought a bed with him, as many times as she hath wept for him; her joy ari­seth from her sorrow; and the contentment of enjoying him would not be so great, had she not fear'd to have lost him: one must be hungry before he take delight in eating; and as nothing sets forth Light better than Darkness; Edendi & bi­bendi voluptas nulla est. nisi praecedat esu­riendi & sitien­di molestia. Ide n Ibidem. so there is nothing adds more to Pleasure than the Pain that hath gon be­fore it. But out of another consequence, as necessary, & more vexatious, pleasure turns [Page 469] to Sorrow; and that wherewith we were at first delighted, in process of time, becomes painful: Too long sleep degenerates into a Lethargy; & the remedy which nature had found out to repair our strength, when it is continual, ruinates it. Excess of meat suffocates the natural heat; too violent exercise weakens our vigour; and the in­nocentest Pleasures become Punishments, when they are immoderate.

Temperance might cure us of these dis­orders, if they went no father; but expe­rience teacheth us, that what passeth for a Pleasure, in the world, is a Sin before God; and that the greatest part of our joys cause sorrow in the Saints. A Souldier rejoyceth in the murders he hath committed; and men, in this corrupt age, call that Valour, which, in more innocent times, would have been termed Cruelty. A lustful person rejoyceth in having stollen away her that he loves; and if he content his Ambition, by satisfying his Incontinence, the more sins he commits, the more pleasures he tastes: A Tyrant rejoyceth in his Usurpa­tion; and if he reaps Glory by his In­justice, he thinks himself more happy, than a Lawful Prince: A Cholerick man re­joyceth in Revenge; though to obey his [Page 470] Passion, he hath violated all the Laws of Charity; he finds Contentment in his Crime; and strangely blind, the more faulty he is, the more happy he thinks him­self; So that worldly joy is nothing else, but wickedness unpunish'd, or a glorious Sin. Saeculi laetitia est impunita nequitia. Aug. Therefore, when this passion becomes once faulty, no less than a Miracle is requi­red, to restore it to its innocence: For though such desires, as rise up contrary to the Laws of God, are unjust; and that there are punishments ordained in his king­dom, for the chastisement of irregular thoughts, yet are these but begun offences; and which have not, as yet, all their mis­chief; though fond hopes be punishable, and entertain our vanity, yet are they not always follow'd by effects; and oft-times by a fortunate Impotence, they do not all the evil which they had promised unto themselves; our boldness is fuller of in­consideration, than of wickedness; and an ill event makes it lose all its Fervour: Our Sorrows and our Griefs are not obstinate; they are healed by any, the least help, that is given them; and as they are not well pleas'd with themselves, they are easily changed to their contraries: Our Fears are slitting; the evil which caused them be­ing [Page 471] once withdrawn, they leave us at li­berty; and to conclude, in a word, there is no passion incurable, but Joy: But since it hath mingled it self with sin, Nullum quod­libet scelus co­ram Deo tam abominabile sit quam de peccat is gau­dere, atque in eis semper ja­ceae. Aug. lib. De Salutar. Docum, c. 12. and that corrupting all the Faculties of Nature, it takes delight in evil; Morality hath no remedies more to cure it with; 'Tis a great disorder, when a man glories in his sin; and that, as the Apostle sayes, he draws his Glory from his own Confusion: 'Tis a deplorable mischief, when together with Shame, he hath lost Fear; and that the punishments, ordained by the Laws, can­not hold him in to his duty; but a strange irregularity is it, when his sins have made him blind; or that he knows them not, save only to defend them; but certainly, when he takes delight in his sin, when he grounds his Felicity upon Injustice, and that he thinks himself Happy, because he is Sinful; this is the height of evil: To pu­nish this impiety, it is, that the Heavens dart forth Thunders; The Earth grows barren, for the punishment of this horrid disorder; Omnibus cri­men suum vo­lupt ati est; lae­tatur ille adul­terio, laetatur ille furto. Sen. when war is kindled in a nation, or, that the Plague hath dispeopled Cities, and turned Kingdoms into desolate places, we ought to believe, that these Judgments are the punishments of men, [Page 472] who place their contentment in their offen­ces; and who, violating all the Laws of Nature, do unjustly mingle Joy with Sin.

Now because this mischief, as great as it is, ceaseth not to be common; Si gaudes de nummo, times furem; si au­tem gaudes de Deo, quid ti­mes? ne tibi quisquam au­serat Deum? Deum tibi ne­mo ausert, si tu eum non di­miseris. Aug. in Psal. 37. and that it is very hard to taste any innocent pleasure; Iesus Christ adviseth us, to forsake all the pleasure of the world, and henceforth to ground our felicity in Heaven: He bids us, by the mouth of his Apostle, not to open the doors of our hearts, save to those pure consolations, whereof the Holy Ghost is the Spring-head; and arguing out of our own interests, he obligeth us to seek only after that Joy, which being founded on himself, cannot be molested by the inju­ries of men, nor the insolence of Fortune; For if any think to place it in our Riches, we are bound to fear the Loss thereof; if we lodg it in reputation, we shall apprehend Calumny; and, if like Beasts we put it in those infamous delights which slatter the Senses, and corrupt the Mind, we shall have as many subjects of fear, as we shall see Chances that may bereave us of them. Therefore, following St. Augustines coun­sel, (which we cannot suspect, since in the slower of his age, he had tasted the delights [Page 473] of the world;) We should take care to lessen all sinful pleasures, till such time as they may wholly end, Vincat gaudi­um in Domi­no, donec sini­atur gaudium in Saeculo; gaudium iu Domino sem­per augeatur, gaudium in faeculo semper minuatur do­nec siniatur. Aug. 1.2. De verb. Dom. Serm. 14. by our death; and to increase all innocent pleasure, till such time as they be perfectly consummated in Glory. But you will peradventure say, that our Senses are not capable of these ho­ly delights; and that Joy, which is but a Passion of the Soul, cannot raise it self up to such pure contentments; that it must have some sensible thing to busie it self a­bout; and that, whilst it is engaged in the body, 'tis an unjust thing, to propound to it the felicity of Angels: This exception is current, only, among such as think the pas­sions of men to be no nobler than those of Beasts: The affinity which they have with Reason, makes them capable of all her Be­nefits; when they are illuminated by her Lights, they may be set on fire by her Flames: When Grace sheddeth her influ­ences into that part of the soul where they reside, they labour after Eternity; and forestalling the advantages of Glory, they elevate the body, and communicate unto it Spiritual feelings: They make us say with the Prophet, My body and my Soul rejoyce in the living God; neglecting perisha­ble delights, they long after such only, as are Eternal.

The FOURTH DISCOURSE. Of the Nature, Proprieties and Effects of Grief and Sorrow.

IF Nature could not extract good out of evil, and did not her Providence turn our miseries into Felicities, we might with Reason blame her, for having made the most troublesome of our Passions, the most Common: Homo animal querulum eu­pido suis in­cumbens mise­riis. Apul. For, sadness seems to be Natural to us, and Joy a Stranger: All the parts of our body may taste Sorrow and Pain; and but very few of them are Sen­sible of pleasure; Pains come in throngs, and assail us by Troops; they agree to afflict us; and though they be at discord among themselves, they joyn in a confede­racy, to conspire our undoing; but plea­sures justle one another, when they meet, and, as if they were jealous of good for­tune, the one of them destroys the other; Our Body is the Stage, whereon they fight; the miseries thereof arise from their diffe­rences; [Page 475] and man is never more unhappy, than when he is divided by his Delights: Griefs continue long; and as if nature took pleasure in prolonging our punishment, she indues us with strength, to undergo them; and makes us only so far Couragi­ous, or so far patient, as may render us, so much the more miserable. Voluptas tune cum maxime delectat extin­guitur, nec multum loci habet, it aque cito implet, & taedio est, & post primum impetum mar­cet. Sen. De vita beata c 7. Pleasures, espe­cially those of the Body, endure but for a moment; their death is never far off; and when a man will make them of longer du­rance, by art, they occasion either tor­ment, or loathing. But to make good all these reasons, and to shew that Grief is more familiar to man than Pleasure, we need only consider the deplorable conditi­on of our life; where for one vain content­ment, we meet with a thousand real sor­rows: Scio rem non esse in nostra potestate, nec ulium affectum servire, maxi­me vero eum qui ex dolore nascitur. Sen. Consol. ad Helviam. c. 5. For these come uncalled, they pre­sent themselves of their own proper mo­tion, they are linkt one to another; and like Hydra's heads, they either never die, or after death, spring up again: But plea­sures are sought for with pain; and we are oft-times enforced to pay more for them, than they are worth: Sorrows are some­times entirely pure, and touch us to the quick, as they make us incapable of conso­lation; but pleasures are never without [Page 476] some mixture of Sorrow: They are al­ways dipt in bitterness, and, as we see no Ro [...]es which are not environed with Prickles; Proba istas quae voluptates vocantur, ubi transcenderint modum, poenas esse. Sen. Ep. 8. we taste no Delights, which are not accompanied with Torments; but that which makes the misery of our condi­tion evidently appear, is, that we are much more sensible of Pain than of Pleasure; for a slight Malady troubleth all our most solid contentments; a Fever is able to make Conquerors forget their Victories; and to blot out of their minds all the pomp of their Triumphs. Yet is it the truest of all our Passions; and, if we believe Aristotle, it makes the greatest alterations in our Souls; the rest subsist only by our ima­gination; and were it not for the in­telligence we hold with this Faculty, they would make no impression upon our Senses: Desires and Hopes are but deceitful good things; and he very well knew their nature, who termed them, the Dreams of Waking men: Love and Hatred are the di­versions of idle souls; Fear is but a shadow, and it is hard for the Effect to be true, when the Cause is imaginary; Boldness and Cho­ler form Monsters to themselves, that they may defeat them; and we must not won­der, if they so easily ingage themselves in the [Page 477] Combat, Corpus hoe animi pondus ac poena est ▪ premente illo urgetur, in vinculis est. Sen. Ep. 65. since their enemies weakness as­sures them of the victory; but grief is a real evil, which sets upon the Soul and Body both at once, and makes two wounds at one blow. I know there are some sorrows that wound only the mind, and exercise all their might upon the noblest part of man; but if they be violent, they work upon the body; and by a secret contagion, the pains of the Mistress become the diseases of the Slave; the Chains that bind them together, are so streight, that all their good and bad estate is shared between them; a contented Soul cures her body; and a sick body afflicts its soul; this noble Captive patiently en­dures all other incommodities which befall her; and, provided that her prison be ex­empted from pain, she finds reasons enough to chear up her self with: She despises the loss of Riches; and bounding her De­sires, she finds contentment in Poverty; she neglects Honour, and knowing that it only depends upon Opinion, she will not ground her happiness upon so frail a good; she pas­seth by Pleasures, and the shame which ac­companies them, lesseneth the sorrow which their loss brings her; as she is not tied to these adventious goods, she easily forgoes them; and when Fortune hath rob­bed [Page 478] her of them, she thinks her self more at Liberty, and thinks her self not the poorer; but when the body is assaulted, Quid faciet animus ut non doleat cum corpus vulne­ratur aut uri­tur, cui tanto implicatur consortio ut pati possit, non dolere non possir. Aug. De Gratia Nov. Test. quaest. 2. and that it suffers either excessive heat, or the inju­ries of the Season, or the rage of Sickness, she is constrained to sigh with it; and the Cords which fasten them together, make their miseries common; she apprehends Death, though she be Immortal; she fears wounds, though she be Invulnerable; and she resents all the evils suffer'd by the pri­son which she gives life to, though she be Spiritual.

The Stoicks Philosophy, which valueth not a glorious enterprize, unless it be im­possible, would have inderdicted the com­merce between the Soul and the Body; and in a strange madness, hath endeavour'd to separate two parts, whereof one and the same whole are compounded; O Philosophia tyrannica sunt praecepta tua: amare jubes, & fi quis amiserit quod amabat, dolere prohi­bes. Stob. Serm. 97. she forbad her Disciples the use of Tears; and break­ing the holiest of all Friendships, she would have the Soul to be insensible of the Bodies sufferings; and that whilst the Body was burning in the midst of flames, the Soul should mount up to Heaven, there to con­template the Beauty of Virtue, or the wonders of Nature. This Barbarous Philo­sophy had some Admirers, but she never [Page 479] had any true Disciples: her Counsels made them despair; all that would follow her Maxims suffer'd themselves to be miss-led by Vanity, and could not fence themselves against Grief. Since the Soul hath contra­cted so straight a society with the Body, she must suffer with it; and since she is shed abroad into all the parts thereof, she must complain with the mouth, weep with the eyes, Si egregium est hostem de­jicere, non mi­nus tamen laudabile infe­licis scire mise­reri. Val. Max. lib. 5. and sigh with the heart-Mercy was never forbidden but by tyrants; and this Virtue will be praised, as long as there be any that are miserable; yet the evils which afflict her are strangers to her; and those whom she assists, are, for the most part, to her unknown: wherefore then shall we blame the Soul, if she have compassion on her own body? Wherefore shall we accuse her of Abjectness, if she share in the sorrows that assail it, and which, not being able to hurt her in her own substance, set upon her in her Mansion-house, and revenge them­selves on her, in that thing which, of all the world she loves best? For while she is in the body, she seems to renounce her Nobi­lity; and that ceasing to be a pure spirit, she interesses her self in all the Delights, and all the Vexations of her Hoste: his health causeth contentment in her; and his sickness [Page 480] is grievous to her; the most worthy part suf­fers in the less worthy; and by a trouble­som necessity, the Soul is unhappy in the miseries of her body. Devovet ab­sentes, simula­chraque caerea fingit: Et mi­serum tenues in jecur urget acus. Ovid. in E [...]ist. They say, that Ma­gick is so powerful, that it hath found out a secret, how to torment men in their ab­sence, and to make them feel in their own persons all the cruelties which she exerci­seth upon their Images: these miserable men burn with fire, which toucheth nothing but their Picture; they feel blows which they do not receive; and the distance of place cannot free them from the fury of their enemies: Love which is as powerful, and not much less cruel than Magick, doth this Miracle every day; when it joyns two souls together, it finds a way to make their sufferings common; men cannot offend the one, but the other resents it, & each of them suffers as well in the body which it loves, as in that which it inanimates: Dolores qui dicuntur car­nis, animae sunt in carne & ex carne: quid enim ca­ro per feipsam sine anima vel dolet vel con­cupiseit? Aug. 1.14. De Civ. Dei. c. 19. Since Love and Magick work these wonders, we must not marvel, if Nature, having fastned the Soul to the Body, do make the miseries common; and if by one only wo, she makes two Parties miserable; the participa­tion of each others Good and Bad, is a con­sequence of their Marriage; and the Hea­vens must do a miracle, to give them a [Page 481] Dispensation from this necessity. The joy of Martyrs was no meer effect of Reason; when they tasted any pleasure amidst their Torments, it must needs be Grace that sweetned the rigour thereof; and he that in the fiery Furnace changed Flames into pleasing gales of Wind, must have turned their Torments into Delights; or if he did them not this favour, he did them a greater; and by making the Soul not sensible of the Bodies sufferings, he taught the whole world, that he was the Soveraign Lord of Nature. But howsoever, all Philosophers agree, that the Soul cannot be happy in a miserable body; and that she cannot endue it with life, without sharing in the miseries thereof; if her noblest part be touched with Joy, while the body languisheth with pain; that which inanimates it, must be sensible thereof; & to pay interests for the services she gets thence, she must be miserable for company: Even the Soul of Jesus Christ, thrice-happy as it was, failed not to be af­flicted; and a miracle was done in the order of Glory, that the society might not be broken, which Nature hath put between the Soul and the Body, it is then agreed up­on, that these two parts that compose man, cannot be separated in their suffering; and [Page 482] that the torment of the one, must of necessi­ty be the others punishment: they love too well to forsake one another in their afflicti­ons; and unless the violence of pain break the chains wherewith they are linked to­gether, their miseries must be common: I should moreover think, that the condition of the Soul is more deplorable, than that of the Body; for besides, that to make her subject to sufferings, be to injure her worth, and that it is a piece of Injustice to force her to feel evils, from which by Nature she is exempted; she sentenceth her self to new sufferings; and the love which she beareth to her Body, Dolet anima cum corpore, cum co [...]oco dolet ubilae­ditur corpus; dolet fola in corpore cum tristis est; do­l [...]t extra cor­pus, ut anima divitis in in­ferno; corpus antem nee ex­anime dolet, nee animatum sine anima do­ [...]. Aug. 1.21. De Civ. Dei. cap. 3. obligeth her to re­sent with sorrow the pains which it endu­reth; she together with it is sensible thereof, seeing that she is the Original of Sense; and as if this torment were not sufficient, she draws another upon her self by compassi­on, and afflicts her self with the Thought of all that which really torments it; she makes much of its maladies after she hath shared in the suffering of them; she grows sad with the conceit of them; and of a single grief makes double Martyrdom; true it is, that this Faculty hath so much commerce with the Senses, as she cannot resent their evils, without communicating her pains unto [Page 483] them; her trouble disquieteth them: and as the sufferings of the Body are cause of the like in the Soul, by a Law as just as ne­cessary, the pain of the Soul produceth the like of the Body. This feeling is in my O­pinion, true Sadness, which is nothing else but a dislike which is formed in the inferior part of the Soul, by the fight of Objects which are displeasing to her.

Very strange are the effects of so Melan­cholick a Passion; for when she is but in a mean, she makes them eloquent without Rhetorick; she teacheth them Figurative speeches, to exaggerate their Discontents: and to hear them speak, the greatest pains seem to be less, Curae leves lo­quuntur in [...]en­tes stupent. Sen. [...]aged. than what they suffer: but when she is Extream, by a clean contrary effect she astonisheth the Spirit: she inter­dicts the use of the Senses; she dries up Tears, stifles Sighes; and making men stupid, she affords Poets the liberty of feigning, that she changeth them into Rocks: when she is of long continuance, she frees us from the earth, and raiseth us up to Heaven; for it is very hard for a man in misery to covet life, when it is full of pain and Sorrow; and when the Soul hath great conflicts for a Body, which doth continualy exercise her patience. All men are not so [Page 484] poorly spirited, as was that Favorite of Au­gustus, who did so much covet life, that Torments could not make him forgo the desire thereof; [...] ci­ [...] de­ [...] e, [...] icos [...]res: [...]uper [...]ft, [...], vel [...] [...]ede­ [...]um [...]nce, susti­ne mater. who gloried in his Verses, that he would have loved Life amidst Tor­tures, that he would have been a Votary for the prolonging of it upon the Rack; and that the cruellest sufferings that might be, would have seemed swift to him; so as he might therein have found Life. I well be­lieve, that excess of pain would have made him be of another mind; and that he would have confess'd, that to die quickly, is better than to live long in pain; or had he persisted in his first Opinion, we should be bound to confess, that poorly-spirited men are more wilful, than are those that are couragious; and that the desire of Glory makes not so great impression in us, as the desire of life. But to return to my Subject, when Grief is violent, it loosneth the soul from the Body, and causeth the death of the man: for Sadness and Joy have this of resemblance in their difference, that both of them attempt upon our lives, when they are in extreams: The heart dilates it self by Joy; it opens it self to receive the good which is offer'd, & tastes it with such excess of pleasure, as it faints under the weight [Page 485] thereof, and meets with death in the midst of its Happiness: It shuts it self up by Sor­row; claps to the door upon the evil that besiegeth it; and very improvidently deli­vers it self into the hands of a Domestick enemy, to free it self from one that is a stran­ger: for its Violence causeth its anguish, and the care he takes to defend it self, augments its pain, and hastens its death. Oft-times also, its negligence makes it miserable; it suffers it self to be surpriz'd by Sorrow, for not having foreseen it; and being no longer in a condition to defend it self, when Sor­row arriveth, it is forced to give way there­unto. In fine, Sadness makes us weep, when it hath seized on our heart, it wageth war with our Eyes; — Est quaeiam flere voluptas: Expletur La­ch [...]ymis, ege­riturque dolor. Ovid. 4. Trist. it evaporateth by Sighes; it glides down by Tears, and weakens it self in the production thereof; for a man that weeps, easeth himself, and comforts himself whilst he complains; he finds somewhat of delight in his lamentations; and if they be signs of his sufferings, they are likewise the cure thereof: As Choler dischargeth it self by Railing, Sorrow be­ing more innocent, drops away by Tears, and abandons the Heart, when it gets up into the Face. Having seen its effects, it re­mains that we consider what use may be [Page 486] made thereof, and in what conditions it may become Innocent or Offensive.

The FIFTH DISCOURSE. Of the bad use of Pain and Sorrow.

THose who believe that Delight is Virtues most dangerous Enemy, will never think that Sorrow can side with Vice, and we shall have much ado to perswade them, that there be some Sadnesses which are faulty; yet we see but few of them that are innocent; and most of those that draw tears from us, are either unjust or unreasonable; Homo adest dolorisuo, nee [...]antum quantum sen­tit, sed quan­tum constituit, co afficitur Sen. Consol. ad Marc. c. 7. for man is become so esseminate, that every thing hurts him. Sin hath made him so wretched, that he numbers the privation of pleasures amongst his pains; and thinks he hath just cause to afflict himself, when he possesseth not all that he desires; the number of his evils is encreased by his abjectedness; and he that in the first ages knew no other pain, but [Page 487] Sickness and Death, now vexeth himself for Disgrace and Poverty: The witness of his Conscience is not sufficient, for his Virtue; and if he have not applause on Earth, joyned to the approbation of Hea­ven, he imagineth himself to be infamous: the riches of Nature do not satisfie his De­sires; and though he have all things that are Necessary, he thinks himself Poor if he have not somewhat that is Superfluous. Thus every one finds his Misfortune, even in his Felicity; and the happiest are so nice to please, as Fortune who tires her self out in their Service, cannot take from them pre­tences of Complaint: The best successes are accompanied with circumstances which afflict them; they are displeased with a Victory, because the Chief of the Enemy hath saved himself by flight; Potest quidem cloquentia tua quae parva funt approbare pro magnis, fed a­lio ista vires fervet fuas, nunc se tota in solatium tuum confert. Noli contra te inge­nio tuo uti, noli adesse do­lori tuo. Sen. ad Polyb. c. 37 and that to­gether with his Honour, he hath not lost both Life and Liberty: They are not pleased with the taking in of a Town, because it hath not drawn along with it the Revolt of a whole Province; and they are so ingeni­ous in causing pain unto themselves, as their desires cannot be satisfied, nor can a period be put to their complaints by the greatest Prosperity: Amongst such as these, me­thinks Sorrow is a Slave to Pleasure; and [Page 488] that to revenge her self of her Servitude, she makes her mistress sigh, and renders her miserable amidst all her Delights: These men deserve no consolation, their sufferings are too unjust to oblige Philoso­phy to find them a remedy; it is reasona­ble that their wretchlesness should be their punishment, and that they should languish in Misery, since they know not how to live happily. Plerique La­chrymas: fun­dunt ut often­dant, & toties siccos oculos habent; quoti­es spectator desuit: Adeo penitus hoc se malum fixit, ut in simulati­onem, etiam simplicissima res dolor veni­at. Sen. De Tranquil, c. 15. There are others who glory in their Misfortunes, and make the sincerest of our Passions serve their Ambition: they bewail the loss of their friends in whatso­ever Companies they come; they will have their Grief to be a mark of their Love, and that men should believe that they know how to Love well, since they know so well how to Lament; they never dry their eyes, but when they are in their Closet; they think their Tears should not be well employed, if they wanted Wit­nesses; and they teach us, that they are not sincere, since they seek out such as may ap­prove of them. Sorrow which is lodged in our hearts, accompanieth us in all places, and giveth freedom to her Sighes, and comforts her self in her Complaints in Solitary places, where nothing can di­vert her: But the sincerity thereof, makes [Page 489] [...]t not be the less unjust, since it oft-times produceth effects contrary to our desires, [...]nd makes us forget those which it en­forceth us to bewail; Nulla res citi­us venit in o­dium, quam dolor. Sen. Ep. 63. for there is nothing which we are sooner tired with, than Grief: Having nothing lovely in it, it becomes quickly odious, it wearies them that serve it; and to free themselves from it, they endeavour to quit themselves of the Love that did occasion it; they blot out of their memory the Remembrance of their friends, that they may be no longer bound to Lament them; and with an Ingratitude which always follows Immoderate Grief, they renounce Friendship to cure themselvs of Sorrow. I know very well, we are per­mitted to bewail the loss of our Friends; & that Tears are the prime duties that Na­ture hath obliged us to render them; Id agamus, ut jucunda fiat nobis amisso­rum recorda­tio. Nemo li­benter ad id redit, quod non sine tor­mento cogita­turus est. Sen. Ep. 63. but the current thereof must be quickly stopt: and calling in Reason to our assistance, we must make their memory delightful to us, if we will have it be Immortal. Men do not willingly think much upon that which tor­ments them; and when once they have gi­ven over those sad delights which Nature hath placed in Tears, they look upon them as punishments, and shun all occasions which may make them shed them.

[Page 490]But certainly of all Discontents which causelesly prejudice our Souls, methinks there is none more infamous than that of Envy; for Sorrow caused by the Privation of Pleasures, is not so unjust, but that it may have some Pretences to defend it self; if it exceed the bounds of Reason, it finds Excuses; and we see some who find not so much trouble in withstanding Sorrow, as in abstaining from Delight: They are bet­ter fitted for Fortitude, than for Tempe­rance; and may be sooner made Martyrs, than Continent. The death of Friends is a loss sufficient to be lamented; and Friend­ship is a virtue beautiful enough to have the glory thereof sought after, either by coun­terfeit or real Tears. All these Sorrows have Evil for their Object; and if their Ex­cesses be unjust, their Causes may admit of Excuse; but Envy is a Sorrow as unworthy as unjust; and look upon it on what side you please, it can neither have Pretence nor Colour: Virtut is comes invidia est, plerunque bo­nos sectatur. Cic. 4. ad He­ren. It gives against all the Virtues, and maliciously declares war with all those Noble Habits which make up the purest Glory of our Souls. I know that all Vices are Enemies to Virtue, and that they are not to be reconciled by Morality. Na­ture accords the Elements; and tempering [Page 491] their qualities, employs them in the com­posure of all her Works; but humane Wisdom, with all its cunning, cannot recon­cile the differences between Vice and Vir­tue, nor lodge them together in the same person; yet is the Hatred of other Virtues regulated; they only undertake every one its contrary Virtue; and when by an unjust Victory, they have triumphed over this no­ble Enemy, their fury is appeased, and they leave the man in some sort of quiet. Mala caetera habent termi­num: invidia aurem est ma­lum jugiter perseverans, & sine fine pec­catum: Hinc vultus minax, pallor in facie, stridor in den­tibus, manus ad caedem prompta, eti­amsi a gladio interim vacua, odio tamen furiatae men­tis armata. Cypr. ser. De Livore. Ava­rice persecutes only Liberality; Ambition pursues only Modesty; and Falshood, for all its Impudence, opposes Truth only: but Envy, more furious than all these Mon­sters, makes war against all the Virtues; & as if she were a poyson compounded of all the rest, she at the same time sets upon Cha­rity, Justice, Mercy and Humility: For if Charity make all things common, Envy ap­propriates them; and takes not so much pleasure in the enjoying of them her self, as in the bereaving others of them: if Justice give every one that which appertains to him, Envy keeps all for her self, and not willing to acknowledg any other merit than her own, she thinks all rewards are due to her; if Mercy be afflicted at other mens harms, Envy rejoyceth at them; and out of [Page 492] an Excess of Malice, makes them her Feli­city; if Humility despise Nothing, Envy finds fault with All things, and endeavours to raise her Reputation upon the Ruines of Virtue, so that she is an Universal Evil: and this detestable Mischief is composed all at once of Avarice, Nunquam e­minentia invi­dia carent: Assidua est e­minentis for­tunae comes invidia, altissi­misque semper adhaeret, Vel. Peter cul. lib. 1. Pride, and Cruelty; But though she be animated against all Vir­tues, she keeps her chief endeavors against the Noblest, and assails them with most Fervor, which have most lustre in them: she is like those troublesome Flies which betake themselves to the fairest Flowers in the Garden; or is like Thunder which chuseth out the greatest Trees, and dis­chargeth its fury upon the fairest Moun­tains: her courage appears only in the worth of the Enemy she undertakes; she will be thought generous, because she is In­solent, and she glories in the Greatness of her fault.

From this lewd quality proceeds another, which is not much less troublesome; for as she hates Virtue, she cannot endure any Virtuous person: Her Hatred perswades her to Revenge; when her Calumny can­not prevail over the Glory of the Inno­ [...]ent, she attempts their Life; after having made a tryal by Backbiting, she makes [Page 493] Murder her main Work, and sheds their Blood, whose Reputation she could not blemish: No Parricide was ever commit­ted without her counsel; and of as many Cruelties as are imputed to Hatred or Cho­ler, the most Famous are the Works of Envy.

In the beginning of the world, she armed Cains hand against his Brother; she furnish­ed him with weapons, before she had for­ced Iron from out the bowels of the Earth. In the age which succeeded next to that of Innocence, Invidia pesti­ferum malum, hominem in Daemonem convertit, per eam mors ve­nit in mun­dum, propter ipsam Abel est interemptus, David caedis periculum sub­iit, & Iudai Christum in­terfecerunt. Chrys in Hom. she taught him to commit the first Murder; and Death, which was but the punishment of sin, through her Coun­sels, became a Crime: she stirred up the Children of Iacob against their Brother Io­seph; his future glory made them Jea­lous; and that they might withstand the Designes of Heaven, they made him a Slave, whom Heaven had ordained to be a King: she set on Saul against David, and in a blind Fury perswaded him, That nothing is more pernicious to Kings, than the Greatness of their Subjects; and that the Power of a Forreigner is not so dread­ful to them, as the Worth of a Dome­stick.

But to go higher yet, and come even to [Page 494] the rise of all mischief; Invidia vitium diabolicum quo solo Dia­bolus reus est: Non enim ei dicitur ut dā ­netur, adulteri­um commisisti, furtum [...]fecisti, villam alienā rapuisti, sed homini stanti invidisti. Aug. l. 1. De Do­ctrina Christi. it was she that ani­mated the Devil against men; that inspired him with the means how to be their ruine before they were born, and to slay them in the person of their Father. If she work thus much evil to her Enemies, she is cause of no less to her self; and she is as well her own punishment, as Virtues; for she sees no prosperity which doth not afflict her: Her neighbors good fortune causeth her misery; she bewails their good success; and there needs but a happy man, to make her eter­nally wretched: She confounds the nature of good and evil, to augment her dislikes; and out of an irregularity, which is just only because it is harmful to her, she rejoyceth at mischief, and afflicts her self at that which is good: She sheds rivers of Tears, when others make Bonefires; and in publick calamities, finds occasions for her self to Rejoyce, for her self to Triumph: She is pleased with her own loss, so it draw along with it that of her Enemy; Obirascens. Fortunae invi­dus, & de se­culo querens, & in angulos se retrahens, poenae incubat suae. Sen. De Tranquil. c. 2. and it is so natural to her to do unjust things, as she buyes the pleasure of Revenge at the cost of her own life; she is angry with Fortune, complains of her own times; and when she cannot hinder her Enemies good success, Despair confines her to solitary [Page 495] places; or else entertaining her self with her own Discontents, she suffers the punish­ment due to all the faults she hath commit­ted. To comfort her self in her Misery, she flatters her self with Nobleness; and would perswade the World, That if she blame other mens Virtues, it is because she observes some Faults therein. To hear her speak, you would think that she hath de­rived her pedigree from Heaven; and that the Earth hath not Crowns nor Scepters enough to honour her: She believes that all honours are due to her, and that she is rob­ed of all the respects that are not given her. In fine, she is as Insolent, as Virtue is Modest; and her Language is as Impudent, as that of her Enemy is reserved: Invidia, quae semper sibi est inimica: nam qui invidet sibi quidem igno­miniam facit, illi autem qui invidet, glori­am parit, Chrys. sup Matth. Never­theless, there is nothing more poor and mean that her Courage; she is always in the dust; and if blind Fortune sometimes raise her up, she immediately abaseth her self, and humbleth her self, even beneath those things which she cries down: For it is an approved Maxim, that whatsoever causeth Envy, is above us: By our own judgment, we give the advantage to our Equals, when their Merit raiseth Jealousie in us. A Prince becomes a slave to his Sub­jects, when he begins to grow fearful of [Page 496] their Prosperity; he descends from his Throne, and falls from his greatness, assoon as ever he wishes for what they possess; when he conceives a Jealousie at their good Fortune, he judgeth theirs, in his opinion, to be better than his own: Therefore 'tis, that that famous man, who made himself Illustrious by his Misfortunes, Invidia parvu­lum occidit. Iob. c. 5. Sinon invideris, ma­jor eris: nam qui invidet, mi­nor est. Sen. in Proverb. and whose Innocence was exercised by so many heavy Visitations, hath observed, that Envy was the Passion of Abject Souls; and that she consumes only such poor-spirited men, as can undertake nothing of Generous: For had they a more noble Heart, and had Vir­tue given them a share of that Satisfaction that she always bears about her, they would be content with their Condition, and would not frame such Wishes, as should discover their Misery: If they observed any rare Perfection in their Equals, they would give it such Praises, as it deserves; or in a noble Emulation, strive to attain thereunto: But as the Vice which tyranniseth over them, creeps upon the Ground; they conceive none but poor desires, nay, when they force themselves to look higher, they do the more abase themselves; and we find by experience, that their appearing Greatness is but an effect of their real misery.

[Page 497]To all these mischiefs we may yet add that of Poverty, which is not Envy's least punishment; for she hath this of Common with Avarice; That her riches never con­tent her: Nostra nos sine comparatione delectent: nun­quam erit foe­lix, quem tor­quebit foelici­or. Sen. 1.3. de Ira c. 30. She hath a thousand eyes to see her Neighbours Prosperity, but is blind to see her own; she only considers such Goods as may afflict her, and weighs not those which may comfort her; she thinks she wants whatsoever another doth possess; and ingenious to her pain, she augments anothers felicity, to add unto her own misery: So as to punish the Envious, you need only leave them to their own Fury; without going about to chastise their Inso­lence, it will suffice to leave them to them­selves; and to suffer the Devil that possesses them, to take vengeance for their fault. These are the Excesses which Grief is capa­ble of, when not well guided: Let us see now, to what Vertues it may be Service­able, when she is Obedient to Reason; and that following the motions of Grace, she is afflicted for the Sins of the Wicked, or for the Miseries of Good men.

The SIXTH DISCOURSE. Of the good use of Grief.

VVE must not wonder if the Stoicks condemn grief, since they approve not of those Virtues which it produceth; and that they will have their wise man to taste so pure a Joy, as shall not be mingled with the least dislike: For they raise him above Storms, and endevor to perswade us, that he sees all Tempests formed under his feet, and is not at all therewith agitated; they assure us that upon the Sacking of a Town, or ruine of a State, he is no more moved, than is their Iupiter at the Dissolution of the World; and that placing all his Happiness in Him­self, he looks upon all the bad events of Fortune with an equal eye: If he shed some Tears upon the Tomb of his Ancestors, or chance to sigh for his perishing Countrey, his Soul is no whit moved; —Lachrymae volvuntur ina­nes? Mens im­mota manet. Virg. AE [...]eid. and he beholds all those disasters without any Disquiet. Let this severe Philosophy say what it will, I [Page 499] do not believe that her doctrine can destroy Nature; nor that she ever made a Wise man of one from whom she takes the Feel­ings of man. Wisdom is no enemy to Na­ture; and Heaven had never united the soul to the body, had it had a purpose to hinder their communication: In hoc omnis hyperbole ex­tenditur, ut ad verum menda­cio veniat. Nunquam tantum sperat quantum au­det; sed in­credib [...]lia ass [...]r­mat, ut ad cre­dibilia perve­ni [...]t. Sen [...]e­nes. 1.7. c. 23. These Philosophers when they made their proud boasts, have, in my opinion, imitated those Orators, who making Hyperboles, lead us to Truth, by Falshood; and assure us of that which is Impossible, that they may perswade us of that which is Difficult: They did (certain­ly) believe, that the mind ought to have some commerce with the Body, and that the sufferings of the one ought to cause Grief in the other; but lest the Nobler part should become slave to the less Noble, they have endeavoured to preserve her Li­berty by Rigor; and to make her insensi­ble, to the end, that she might always keep up her Soveraignty: For who could imagine that men so judicious in all things, should lose their Judgment in this; and that to defend Virtue, they should abandon Rea­son? All the Glory of their Discourse tended only to maintain the Soul in her Empire; and lest she might faint under the Weaknesses of the Body, they have [Page 500] authorised her Power by Terms, more Elo­quent than True: They conceited, that to reduce us to Reason, we must be raised a little above it; and that to afford nothing of Superfluous to our Senses, we must deny them what is Necessary. They believe then, with us, that Grief may accord with Reason, and that there are occasions, where­in not to be afflicted is to be Impious: But I know not, whether or no; we can per­swade them, that Repentance and Mercy are glorious Virtues; and that after having bewayled our own Offences, we are bound to lament our Neighbours Miseries.

Maxima est peccati poena, fecisse: nec quisquam gra­vius afficitur, quàm qui ad supplicium poenitentiae traditur. Sen. 1.3. de Ira c. 26.These Philosophers are austere, only be­cause they are too Vertuous; they con­demn not Penitency, save only because they love Fidelity; and if they blame Re­pentance, 'tis because it presupposeth a Fault: they would have us never to forsake Vertue, and that we should deal more se­verely with vitious men, than with those who desert the Discipline of War: their zeal deserves some excuse; but not being accompanied with Wisdom, it produceth an effect contrary to their intent; for it augmenteth the number of the Guilty, whilst it thinks to diminish them: it makes the weak wilful; and taking away the [Page 501] Remedy, it changeth their Infirmities into incurable Diseases. Scit Deus no­ster non sempo [...] hominem inte­grum stare, sed frequenter aut peccare corpo­re, aut vacilla­re S [...]rmon [...]: [deo Poeniten­tia viam docu­it, per quam possit & destru­cta corrigere, & lapsa repa­rare. Aug. de Poenit. Man is not so constant as the Angels, and when he loves what is good, he is not so firmly fixed thereunto, but that he may be made to forgo it; nei­ther is he so opinionated as is the Devil; and when he affects evil, he is not so strongly engaged thereto, but that he may be taken off from it. If this Inconstancy be cause of his sin, 'tis also the Remedy thereof; and if it assist to make him Guilty, it con­tributes also to the making of him Innocent: He is nauseated with sin, he is weary of Impiety, and he ows these good effects to the weakness of his Nature: Had he more Strength, he would be more Obstinate; and Grace which converts him, would find more Resistance, were he more firm in his Resolutions: Heaven makes this Defect serve for our Advantage; and its Provi­dence husbandeth our Weakness, to work our Welfare thereby; for when it hath touched the hearts of sinners, and that preventing their Will by its Grace, it makes them detest their Wickedness; they end the work of their Conversion, by the ayd of Penitence; and in Sorrow seek out means to appease divine Justice: they punish their Bodies to afflict their Souls; they [Page 502] sentence the slave to bewail the sin of his Master, because he is accessary thereunto; and knowing that all the harm, which ei­ther the Master or the Slave do to them­selves, proceeds from the too much Love they bear unto themselves; they oblige them, Non separen­tur in mercede & in poena, anima & caro, quas opera conjungit. Tert. 1. De Re­surrect. carn. cap. 15. for their own good, to hate them­selves; they oft-times punish them both with the same punishment, because their offences are Reciprocal; and do justly con­joyn those in the suffering, which were not separated in the Fault. Thus the whole man satisfieth God; and the two parts whereof he is composed, do by Sorrow find pardon for their sins. I am not igno­rant, that Libertines laugh at these duties; and that they place repentance in the num­ber of those remedies which are as shame­ful as unprofitable; Nunquam sa­p [...]entem facti sui poenitere, nunquam e­mendare quod fecerit, nec mutare consi­lium jactant Stoici. Sen. Benef. 1.4. c. 34. for, wherefore (say they) do you afflict your self for an evil that hath no more a Being? wherefore do you revive it by your Sorrow? wherefore with a greater piece of Imprudence would you change what is past, and wish in vain, that what is already done, had not been done? These bad Reasons will not divert sinners from Repentance; and if wicked men have no better weapons wherewithal to fight against Piety, they will never have [Page 503] much advantage over her: Nature autho­rizeth daily the tears we shed for misfor­tunes past; a sad remembrance draws sighs from us; and we cannot think upon the evils which we have either escaped or un­dergone, without some sense, either of De­light or Sorrow: As the time that is past, makes the more certain part of our life, so doth it likewise awaken the truest Passions, and afford us the most sensible motions: Time to come is too uncertain to vex ones self much about it; Calamitosus est animus su­turi anxius, & ante miserias miser qui futu­ro torquetur. Sen. Ep. 98. and the events which it produceth are too hidden to make any great Impression upon our desires, Time past is the source of our Sorrows; and we have reason to afflict our selves for a thing which we cannot help; if it did only threaten us, we should endeavour to defend our selves from it; and if it hung over our heads, we should employ our wisdom to divert it; but when it hath once happened, we have no more to do, but to be sorry for it; and of as many Passions as may serve to com­fort us in present evils, or such as are to come, There is none but this, from whence we can draw consolation in our past afflicti­ons. Could we recall our friends from their Graves, and revive their Ashes by our cares, we would not consume our selves in [Page 504] our bootless Sorrows; but since there is no cure for Death, and that Physick which can preserve Life, cannot restore it when it is lost; Quid luges quem suscitare non potes? non lugerem, si suscitare pos­sem. Cynic. we have so much the more reason to complain, as our loss is more certain; and our tears appear to be so much the more just, as the evil which we suffer, is the less capable of Remedy. Thus Penitence is not to be blamed, if not being able to re­medy a fault already committed, she yield her self up to Sorrow; and if finding no means how to repair her offence, she wit­ness her sensibleness thereof by sighs: she is the better grounded in this belief, for that she knows, Tears are not unprofitable for her; and that mingled with the Blood of Iesus Christ, they may wash away all her offences: Upon other occasions, they do no miracles; if they comfort the living, they do not raise up the dead again; if they assure the afflicted of our love, they do not free them from their troubles; by thinking to aid the miserable, they augment their number; and instead of euring the Malady, they serve only to make it the more contagious: But those of Repentance drown sins, save sinners, and appease Gods just anger; for he is so good, as he is paci­fied with a little Sorrow: He takes the dis­like [Page 505] of of an offence for satisfaction; and knowing that we cannot alter things that are past, he is contented with our repent­ing for them: As he reads mens hearts, and understands the Tears which flow from a real Grief: he never denies them pardon; and before his Throne it is sufficient, for an offender to get absolution, if he confess his wickedness: At the Tribunal of Judges, men oft-times confound Guilt with Inno­cence; they absolve a man who defends his sin by a Falshood; and let him but deny a Murder, of which there is no proof, he forceth the Judg to give sentence on his side; but if he yields under the violence of tortures, or is surprised in his answers, his Tears do not blot out his sins, nor will his confession preserve his life. Cum igitur poenitentia provolvit ho­minem, magis relevat: cum squalidum fa­cie, magis mundatum reddit: cum accusat, excu­sat: cum con­demnat, absol­vit. Tert. de Paenit. c. 9. In Repentance a man need but acknowledge his Fault, and he is sure to obtain pardon for it; the Laws thereof are so mild, as God forgets all the injuries done unto him, provided sinners mingle a little love with their Repentance, and that the fear of punishment be not the only motive of their Sorrow. Our own Interests do therefore oblige us to defend a Passion which is so advantageous to us; and since the hope of our Salvation is grounded upon a Vertue, which ows its [Page 506] Birth to Sorrow, we ought to uphold her cause, and to employ our best Reasons to authorize her, who doth help to justifie us.

Mercy will find no less credit among men, than Repentance; and as there is none so happy, but he may become miserable, I perswade my self, she will not want Ad­vocates: Misericordia vitium est ani­morum nimis miseriae faven­tium. Sen. 1.2. De Clem. c. 6. The Stoicks calumnies will not be able to banish her from off the Earth; the weaknesses which men impute to her, will not stain her glory: If Injustice beat down her Altars, Piety will erect others to her; and if her Temples of Stone and Marble be thrown to the ground, men will build up living and reasonable Temples to her. They accuse her of being unjust, and that she rather considers the Misfortune, than the Sin of Offenders: they blame her for bestowing Tears on persons that deserve them not; and that she would break open prisons, Bonum est de­lere de malis aliorum, & pia est illa tristitia, &, si dici po­test, beata mi­seria. Aug. ad Sebast. Ep. 145 that she might confusedly let loose from thence, as well the Guilty as the In­nocent: But whatsoever these inhumane Philosophers say, 'tis the best employment we can make of Sorrow; it is the most sanctified use of Grief; it is that feeling of the Soul, which is most Universally ap­proved of; and men must have proceeded [Page 507] from Rocks, or lived amongst Tygers, if they condemn so reasonable a Passion: She takes her Birth from Misery; she imitates her Mother; and she is so like unto her, as she her self is another Misery: She makes her self Master of the Heart by the Eyes; and coming forth by the way she entred at, she disperseth her self in Tears, and evapo­rates in sighes: Though she be accused of Weakness, she stirs our desires; and interes­sing us in the afflictions of the miserable, she endues us with strength to assist them: Af­ter she hath witnessed her fellow-feeling of them by her Sorrow, she gives them testi­mony of her power by the Effects; and giving out her Orders from the Throne where she is seated, Quid est au­tem misericor­dia, nisi alienae miseriae quae­dam in nostro corde compas­sio, qua utique si possimus, subvenire com­pellimur? Aug. 1. De Civ. Dei. c. 5. she engageth the Eyes to shed Tears for them, the Mouth to com­fort them, and the Hands to relieve them: She descends into Dungeons with Prisoners; she mounts up to the Scaffold with Malefa­factors; she assisteth the afflicted with her Counsels; she distributes her Goods a­mongst the Poor; and not seeking any o­ther motive than Misery, it sufficeth her that a man be unfortunate, to take him in­to her protection.

All these high endeavours proceed only from Sorrow; and were not Grief mingled [Page 508] with Mercy, she would not operate with so much Vigor; for Self love hath put us so much out of order, that divine Providence hath been fain to make us miserable by Pity, so to interess us in the Miseries of others; did not she touch us, we should not seek out a remedy for them; neither should we ever dream of curing a malady, which were indifferent to us; Nihil ad mise­ricordiam sic inclinat, atque proprii periculi cogitatio. Aug. ad Gal. but because Mercy is a sanctified Contagion, which makes us sensible of our Neighbours sufferings; we ayd him to comfort our selves: and we help him at his need, to free our selves from the Grief we feel.

Thus Misery teacheth us Mercy; and our own evil teacheth us to cure that of others: Who can condemn so just a Re­sentment? and who dares blame a Passion, to which we owe our Innocence? Misericordia virtus tantaest, ut sine illa, cae­tera etsi esse possint, pro­desse tamen non possint: Quamvis enim aliquis sit ca­stus & sobrius, si misericors tamen non est, misericordiam non meretur. D. Leo. in Ser. If the miserable are sacred Persons, are the mer­ciful prophane? if we respect them whom Fortune hath set upon, shall we censure those that assist them? if we admire Pati­ence, shall we despise Compassion? if Misery draw Tears from our Eyes, shall not Mercy draw Praises from our Mouths? and shall not we adore a Vertue, which Iesus Christ hath pleased to consecrate in his own Person? Before the Mystery of [Page 509] the Incarnation, he had only that mercy which delivers the unfortunate; without tasting their Misfortunes; which cures the Disease, without taking it upon her; and which comforts the afflicted, without add­ing to their number: He saw our Miseries, but had no Feeling of them; his goodness making use of his Power, succour'd the miserable, and was not afflicted with them: But since he hath vouchsafed to make him­self Man, he hath mingled his Tears with ours; he hath suffered our Sorrows to wound his Soul; and was willing to suffer our Miseries, that he might learn Mercy. We may then lawfully exercise a Vertue which Iesus Christ hath Practised; and may well become miserable, without any stain to our Honour; since the Son of God, in whose Person the least shadow of Defect cannot be found, would be sensible of his friends Afflictions, and shed Tears to be­moan them, before he would work Miracles to relieve them.

All the Philosophers do also honour this Passion; and to exalt her merit which the Stoicks have in vain laboured to debase, they give her a glorious Title, and admit her in­to the company of the Vertues; they ac­knowledg, she may be serviceable to Reason [Page 510] is all the chances of Life; Servit antem iste motus ra­tioni, quando ita praebetur Misericordia, ut Justitia conservetur: five cum indi­genti tribui­tur, five cum ignoscitur poe­nitenti, Aug. 1 9. De Civ. Dei. c. 5. and that, pro­vided she agree with Justice, a man must be [...], not to reverence her, when she helps the poor, and pardons the guilty.

From all these Discourses, 'tis easie to ga­ther, that there is no Passion in our Soul, which may not profitably be husbanded by Reason and by Grace: For to sum up, in a few words, all which hath been said in this Work; Love may be changed into a Holy Friendship, and Hatred may become a Just Indignation, Do [...]s moderated, are helps to acquite all the Virtues, and Es­chewing is Chastities chief Defence. Hope encourageth [...] gallant Actions, and De­spair diverts us from Rash Enterprizes; Fear is [...] to Wisdom, and Auda­city to [...] furious as it is, takes [...] with Justices, Innocent Joy is a fore [...]a [...] of Felicity; and Grief is a short pain which frees us from Eternal [...]orments; so as, but Welfare depends only upon the Use of the Passions; and Virtue subsists only by the good employment of our Souls Motions.