SINCE Persons who are possess'd with too great an Opinion of the Power of France, and are igno­rant of the Reasons that oblige that Crown to wish to see an End of the War, may be apt to imagine that the Conditions of Peace, which were proposed in Sweden by the Count d'Avaux, ought not to have been so disdainfully rejected; it may not be amiss to shew how Captious and Unjust those Conditions are, and how ne­cessary it is to look upon them as a Snare which we ought to be very cautious of falling into.

'Tis certain, that they leave France in a Condition to Break the Treaty, which it would make with the Allies, upon the first favourable Occasion that should present it self; which I hope to prove very plainly in the Sequel of this Discourse: And it cannot be doubted but that our Enemies will be ready to renew the War, after the Term of some few [Page 2]Years, and to push on their Arms with so much the more fury, as they shall then find fewer Obstacles to their De­signs, if they are not reduc'd to such Restitutions as shall give us Security that they shall not dare again to violate their Words.

I may say, That if their Ambition could have suffered any Bounds, Anno 1659. the Treaty of the Pyrenees had remain'd inviolated: For it did, indeed, give France very considerable Advan­tages. The quitting them, Thionville, Montmedy, and Dam­villiers, laid the Archbishoprick of Treves, and the Dutchy of Luxemburgh open to them: That of Avenne, Phillippe­ville, Landrecy, Quesnoy, Arras, Graveline, and many other Places in the Low-Countries, put them in a Condition to push on their Conquests farther that way; and the other, of Roussillon and Conflans, opened them a Door to attack Spain it self. The Minority of the King, the Weakness of the Ministry which the Factions of Don Jean of Austria had disjoynted, and the War which then broke out between England and Holland, were sufficient Reasons for a Rupture; and the Imaginary Rights of the Queen of France upon Bra­bant, 1667. served for a Pretence. The Storm then fell upon the Low-Countries, and the French carried Terrour and Desola­tion thorough all those Parts. 1667. Aeth, Tournay, Douay, Oude­narde, Alost, Armentieres, Bergues, Furnes, Dixmude, Cour­tray, and L'Isle, receiv'd the Laws of the Conqueror; who seeing that the English and Dutch, after they had Agreed, were entered into an Alliance with Sweden to oppose that Torrent, judg'd it convenient to consent to a Peace; by virtue of which, he kept the Places that he had taken in the Low-Countries, and was content to restore to the Spaniards the Franche Conté which he had seiz'd, 1668. during the Winter, after a very weak Resistance.

This Treaty, 1668. which was that of Aix la Chapelle, was no more Sacred to France than that of the Pyrenees. It could not digest the Hollanders having stopt the Progress of its Arms, and to put them out of a Condition to traverse its Designs for the future, it was resolved to carry the War into their Country. The French found a Way to gain Intelli­gence [Page 3]in the very Bosom of their Republick; they brought the Elector of Cologne, and the Bishop of Minister into their Interest; they seiz'd upon Lorrain for Precaution, Anno 1670. to leave nothing behind them that might disturb them. In a word, the King of England was persuaded to joyn with them, upon Condition that he should have the Maritime Places of Holland and Zealand: But by a stroak of their Ordinary Policy, they made no Conquests but in the Inland Coun­tries, whese they were to keep what they got them­selves.

I shall not stay to describe the prodigious Success which this Invasion of the French had, 1672. in so favourable a Conjun­cture. Every Body knows, that in less than Five Weeks they made themselves Masters of more than Forty Cities. But the Face of Affairs being changed by the Diversion that was given by the Emperor, Spain, and the Elector of Brandenburgh, and by the Resolution that was taken to put at the Head of the Armies of Holland, the Prince who now governs us, they found themselves oblig'd to abandon all that they had taken from that Republick, to possess themselves of other Places in the Spanish Low-Countries, which they could more easily keep. In effect, they made there so great a Progress, 1675, 1676, 1677. that King Charles II. forced by the Murmurings of his People, resolved at last to oppose them, and to send his Forces into Flanders. A Pass, which might have procured reasonable Conditions of Peace for the Allies, if France had not found means to d [...]sunite them in the Assembly of Ni­meguen, and to conclude there a particular Treaty with Holland, which was quickly followed by a general one; 1678, 1679. by which, besides almost all the Places that were Conquer'd before the Peace of Aix la Chapelle, the French kept Condé, Valenciennes, Cambray, St. Omer, Ypres, and all the Franche-Conté.

But this was not enough to satisfie their Ambition. The Conjuncture was so favourable, that it gave them much higher Expectations. King Charles II. was in their Interest, the United Provinces weakened, and Spain in a very low Condition. The Elector of Brandenburgh, and some other [Page 4] Princes of the Empire, were discontented; the Emperor taken up with the Revolts in Hungary, and expecting every day all the Turkish Force upon his Hands. The Occasion was too inviting to be neglected; and therefore France took this Opportunity to seize upon Strasbourg, Anno 1681, (a Place which may be justly stiled the principal Key of the Empire,) to buy Casal of the Duke of Mantua, to block up Luxemburgh, to enter into the Low-Countries, and there to raise vast Contri­butions; which, for all that, did not prevent their Burning and Plundering; 1682, 1683. and besides all this, by the Trick of establishing Chambers at Metz, Brisas, and Besarçon, they usurp'd all the Fiefs of the Empire which they found convenient for them, all along the Rhine, and the Moselle, under the Pre­tence of Re-union, making the next Places always Dependen­cies upon those which they had last taken.

It cannot but be said, that so many Hostilities committed in the midst of Peace, gave the Character of an unmea­sured Ambition: And yet what followed, is yet more odious. France could not conceal its Joy, when it saw the Turks before Vienna: It was in hopes, that after the Taking of that Important Place, the Princes of Germany must be forced to confess, that no other Power than that of France was ca­pable of saving the Empire; and that, upon Condition that they would Elect the Dauphin King of the Romans, they might find there a Succour able to support them. France promis'd it self easily to oblige the Turks to a Retreat, and that their Troups being numerous, fresh and experienced, would not find it a difficult matter to conquer an Army that was composed of raw, new-rais'd Men, and diminished by near the one half, by the fatigues of a long Siege. Thus, after having used all their Endeavours to arm the Turks and Teckely against the Emperor; and after having brought them even to Vienna by their Counsels, and by large Supplies of Money, they had projected to have broken all the Treaties they had concluded with them; and France would have made it self a Way to the Empire, by driving them out of Germany. 'Tis no wonder then, that in such Circumstances the raising of the Siege of Vienna caused that shameful Un­easiness [Page 5]which they could not forbear shewing there so publickly, Anno 1684. and which was hardly sweetned by the Taking of Luxemburgh, with which they were forced then to be content.

This last Conquest was enough to open the Eyes of those that were most blind, and to persuade the Emperor to an Ac­commodation with the Turks; who being discouraged by their Losses, began to desire Peace: And therefore the French, fearing that all the Forces of the Empire would be united against them, consented to the Truce of Twenty Years; 1684. by virtue of which, they kept provisionally all that they had usurped since the Peace of Nimeguen.

This Truce held no longer than was necessary to put them in a Condition to break it; and an Occasion quickly pre­sented it self. James II. succeeded to the Throne of England, notwithstanding his publick Profession of a Religion that was condemned by the Laws of the Kingdom; and France engag'd him in a Secret Treaty; the Design of which, was the Conquest of Holland. It was in order to this, that they endeavoured to put the Electorate of Cologne into the hands of the Cardinal of Furstenburg; that so, being Masters of the Places which that Cardinal would have been in Possession of upon the Rhine, and seizing upon the rest, before the Princes of Germany had Time to recollect themselves, they might make use of that River to carry their Ammunition and Provisions to the very Frontiers of Holland.

'Tis very plain, that Holland being once conquered, the Spanish Low-Countries could not avoid the Yoke of the Con­queror; who, on the other side, having brought the Four Electors of the Rhine to his Devotion, had but a Fifth to gain, to make the Dauphin be Elected King of the Re­mans: Besides, it was time to make a Diversion in Favour of the Turks, who were under a great Consternation at the Taking of Belgrade: And it was upon this Condition only that they offered to continue the War against the Em­peror. France had an Army very Numerous and well Disciplin'd, Experienc'd Generals, and Magazines well Furnished, and wanted none of those Reasons of Interest, [Page 6]which seem to be the only ones they regard, to determine them to break the Truce.

'Tis no very great wonder then, Anno 1688. that they resolved upon the Siege of Philipsburgh. 'Tis true, that the Advice they had a little after, That the Prince of Orange prepared to make a Descent upon England, should have obliged them to send an Army upon the Frontiers of Holland, rather than to at­tack the Emperor. This had been indeed the way to hinder a Revolution which seemed to be the only Turn which could deliver Europe from the Slavery into which it was just a fal­ling. But looking upon the Project of the Descent as a Chy­merical Thing, or at least imagining that the Success of it could not possibly be so sudden, or so prosperous as it was, they continued to carry Desolation into the Empire. The Taking of Philipsburgh, was follow'd by that of Heydelberg, Manheim, Frankendal, and Mayence; and they abandoned all the Palatinate, and the Circles of the Upper Rhine to Fire and Plunder.

This is too fair a Field to enlarge upon the Cruelties that are always the miserable Consequences of the French Inva­sions. 'Twas a small Matter that this Rupture carried with it all the imaginable Characters of Breach of Faith; That it was the Breaking of a Truce which France it self had sought, and from which it drew great Advantages; That it was broken, to raise the Hopes of the Enemies of Chri­stianity, and to take the Opportunity of the Absence of the Imperial Troups which were employed in Hungary: They joyned to the Indignity of an Alliance made with the Infi­dels, and to the Injustice of the Rupture, all the Excesses that Violence could inspire: Fire, Sword, Profanation, and all that could be expected from the unlimited Licentiousness of the Soldiery, were employed to Ravage Countries, where they found no Resistance. There was no Consideration had of Age, or of Sex; no Distincteon for any Dignity Ecclesia­stick or Secular, and no Regard to Things or Places conse­crated to the Service of God. They reduced Cities to Ashes, which had voluntarily opened their Gates, and to which the Dauphin had promised all good Treatment, in Considera­tion [Page 7]of the large Contributions they had just pay'd. They burnt a vast number of Towns, Villages, and Castles; and after having exhausted, by a thousand Extortions, a Coun­trey of above Forty Leagues in extent, they ruin'd it totally by a general Ravage, for no other Reasons but to deprive the Armies of the Allies, which were then assembling, of the Means of Subsisting, 'Twas now that wretched Incen­diaries had the Confidence to commit all sorts of Sacrilege, to violate the Ashes of Princes, pillage Altars, burn Churches, pull down Palaces; and push on their Licentiousness to such Extremities that could not be of any Advantage to those that authorised them, but must be attributed to nothing else but a blind Desire of Ruining and Destroying. But 'tis need­less to enter into the Particulars of these Cruelties, since the Examples of them are yet fresh; and the Recital can give but a very imperfect Idea of them. I shall only remark, That the Excesses we here mention, were not such as were done during the heat of Action, but in cool Blood. The Orders of the Court were express in them, the Generals prefided at their Execution, and if there were any who seemed to be less Vigorous, from the Horror of the Action, they were punish'd severely for an Example.

If we follow the Conduct of Erance, through the whole course of this War, we shall discover every where the Marks of its Breach of Faith. The happy Success which generally followed their Designs, could not hinder them from pur­suing their End, by Means that were very Infamous What Artifices have they not used at Rome, and with the Princes of that Communion, to represent this War as a War of Re­ligion, which they engaged in barely for the Interest of King James? What have they not done, to divide the Allies? They have done what they could to form a Neu­tral Party in Germany, and to engage some Soveraigns to with-hold their Troups, and even to make some Motions that should give Jealousie to their Neighbours. They have endeavoured to take Advantage of the Circumstance of the Ninth Electorate to oblige the Princes that oppose it, to en­gage themselves; promising to support their Pretensions, if [Page 8]they would make a Diversion in favour of France. They have left nothing untryed to blind the Duke of Savoy by ad­vantageous Offers, and while they played so many Engines in the several Courts, they caused Conditions of Peace for the Emperor and the Empire to be proposed at Ratisbonne, with a Design to draw them off from the rest of the Allies; and to leave nothing unattempted, Endeavours were used at the same time to dispose Holland to a particular Accommodation. Anno 1693. The Secretary Du Pile, was dispatched to manage this Nego­tiation, the Success of which they hoped to facilitate, by some notable Enterprize in Brabant. Our King was the only Party that they thought it was in vain to lay such Snares for, and it was for this Reason that they believed their surest way to get him off their Hands, was to hire some Villains to assas­sinate him; 1692. who being found out, discovered those that set them at work, and have left such Stains upon their Memory as nothing will ever be able to wash off.

'Tis certain, that the Method of France is to employ open force against those who are unable to resist; to use artifice with those who 'tis probable may be seduced, and to have recourse to Poyson and Assassination against such as it despairs to reach by Force or Artifice. How can we depend upon any Alliance made with them? They know they owe all their Success to the Diversion that is given by the Turks; They assure them by the most Sacred Promises, that they will never abandon them, and that they will never make a Peace without comprising them in it, and yet at the same time, they propose Conditions of Peace to the Emperor, and insinuate to him, that if he will accept of them, he may make his Market as he pleases with the Turks; and that ha­ving no other Enemies but them, he may triumph over them as he thinks fit. I need not infer after such an Example, that the Allies have little reason to confide in the Promises of France, till they shall see it reduced to such a Temper that it shall not be in its power to break them.

'Tis true France proposes at present, Conditions of a gene­ral Peace; but 'tis not till they have seen all their Endeavours and their Projects eluded on every side; 'tis not till they have [Page 9]found those unmoveable whom they hoped to have engaged in Separate Treaties. And since the Offers that are now made would leave Germany and the Low-Countries exposed to their Invasions, we ought to look upon them as an Artifice, the End of which, is to make those Ambitious Designs succeed the more surely, which are not yet out of their View.

'Tis very plain, that there is nothing but what we have reason to fear, if France gets advanta­geously out of this Present War; and that after the Proof they have had of their Forces, they will treat their Neighbours hereafter with much more State than they have already done. This is cer­tain, they have done Things which they could scarce think themselves capable of doing; and therefore we have more reason to tremble than ever, if we do not make use of the Present League, to reduce them into their just Bounds. Experience has but too plainly convinced us, That there was need of no less than all the Powers that are united in the Present War, to make Head against France. But who can assure us, that it shall be possible to unite them a second time? Can so many Cir­cumstances that met together to give birth to the League, concurr afresh to form a new one? Every one knows, that to produce and confirm this U­nion, it was necessary that all the Allies were con­vinced of the Injustice of the French Proceedings: That every one of them in particular had expe­rienced their unhappy Effects, and that one Com­mon Danger had put them into an indispensible Ne­cessity [Page 10]of Defending themselves. And how many Incidents have been necessary since? The Retreat of King James, the happy Revolution that followed it, and the Reduction of Ireland, have been the Degrees by which the Nation has been put in a state to act with Vigour against the Common Enemy. It was not enough to be governed by a Prince that would not be discouraged by Difficul­ties, nor disturbed by Dangers, who Commands his Armies in Person, and animates them by his Example. The state of Affairs required, besides this, that this Prince should have Credit enough in Germany, to oppose, with Success, the Intrigues of France there, and that he should be at the Head of the Forces of a Powerful Republick both by Sea and Land. And sure there will need no great Pains to prove, That since we cannot promise our selves a like Conjuncture hereafter, 'tis absolutely necessary to make the best Use of it while we have it.

To this may be added, That some Years of Re­pose, would give France the Means of making a stronger Party in Germany and the Northern Courts; so that it would not fail to make use of the first Re­volution that should arrive in Europe, to renew the War. No body is ignorant, that 'tis their Policy not to Disarm in time of Peace, and that the Re­venue of that Crown is always the same; which gives it infinite Advantage, when it attacks those who are used to Disband at the End of a War; and which keep up their Armies by Taxes, which are presently interrupted by Peace. Besides this, [Page 11]the King of France is Absolute in his Government: His Frontier-Towns are extremely strong, and in such a Situation, as to Command all the neigh­bouring Countreys; so that he is always ready to make Invasions, and out of danger of having them made on him, and the unquiet Genius of that Na­tion, together with the Care that is taken to form it to Slavery, requires frequent Wars abroad. Be­sides, that Crown is so far from having the Hap­piness and the Repose of its Subjects in view, that its main study is to keep them Low. The Cl [...]rgy can no longer vaunt of any Prerogative; the King is as Absolute over the Spirituality, as he is over the Temporality: All depends upon his good Pleasure, which is now become the only Law of the State. The Nobility have lost all their Privi­leges; they are reduced to a necessity of cringing Servily to an Intendant of a Province; and have no other way to aspire to any Distinction, but by low and unbecoming Submissions. The People groan under the most severe Oppression that can be imagined. The Parliament, which was for­merly a Mediator between the Soveraign and the Subjects, and maintained the Laws and Liberties of the Kingdom, by a wise Temperament between the Authority of the one, and the Obedience of the other, is now become nothing but an Engine to authorize the Injustice and the Oppressions of the Court. So that there is nothing on the side of France, which doth not give Apprehensions of a new Rupture, if by a Treaty of Peace it remains in a Condition to insult its Neighbours whenever it [Page 12]shall have a mind to it. But this Fear will be yet doubled, if we consider the necessity there would be of the Powers of Europe Uniting a second time, and the Obstacles that would either prevent or re­tard their Union. The Emperor, it may be, would be still employed with the War against the Turk, and without doubt would be weaken'd by the Disunion of the Princes of Germany, with whom France will have had the time to resume its usual Intrigues.

Add to this, That nothing can be concluded in the Empire, before a Resolution taken in the Dyet; and Experience plainly shews to how many De­lays and Contests those sorts of Resolutions are subject. Spain would be as much as nothing, especially as to the Low-Countries, which it would be then impossible to save. Holland would be drained by the Present War, discouraged by the Success of it, and little disposed to enter upon ano­ther: Besides that, the Conquest of the Low-Countries, which the French would be able to possess themselves of, before the Allies could re­assemble their Forces, would put that Republick under the Discretion of the Conqueror: It would be no longer practicable for England to send Suc­cours to those that were ready to be Oppress'd, because the French would have in their Power all the Ports of Flanders; and Holland would not dare to admit us into Theirs. We should not be in a Capacity of medling with the Affairs Abroad, and it may be, not capable of making any considerable Effort for our own Preservation.

The only Remedy for all these Evils, but that a forrowfull and uncertain One, would be to remain Armed in time of Peace, as if it were in the Heat of War; otherwise France would break through all, at the first Shock, and making use of the ad­vantage of the Surprize, would make in a very little time, such a Progress as would render it Mi­stress of the Fate of Europe. We should be then exposed to the inevitable Loss of our Commerce, and to the Danger of falling under the Arms of France, if we did not even in Peace keep on foot a strong Army at Land, and a great Fleet at Sea; and after having neglected to make such a temporary Expence as might procure us a solid Repose, we should find no other way to save us from utter Ruine, but the making our Taxes perpetual, and I believe every Englishman will conclude, that this is an Extremity with which the Expence we are now forced to be at, will not bear the least Comparison.

After what has been said concerning the Conduct of France and its infraction of former Treaties, it may very well be concluded, that if that which is now offer'd be not sufficient for the Security of the Allies, the Design is only to disarm them, and to put them out of a Condition to oppose themselves to New Usurpations. The only thing to be done therefore is to shew in particular the Injustice of the Offers of France, and how very wide they are from what the Allies may reasonably Expect.

When I speak of the Conditions offer'd by France, I mean those which the Count d'Avaux proposed in Sueden; for I do not conceive the least regard [Page 14]ought to be had to a Project of Peace lately come from Suisserland, or to some others that run about without Name, and without Authority, because they are not to be considered, but as the Produ­ction of some particular Persons, who had a mind to see what Judgment the Publick would make of their Schemes.

To begin then, by what regards the Empire, it must be granted, that it is its Interest rather to con­tinue the War to the last Extremity, than to yield Strasbourg to France. Indeed this Place being ex­actly well fortified, and of a great Circumference, having Alsace behind it, which is a Country fertile, and capable of entertaining at all times a numerous Army, and being situated in the middle of the Rhine, 'tis visible enough that 'tis quite of another Importance than Fribourg, and Philipsbourg, which they offer for an Equivalent.

To speak the Truth, 'tis ridiculous to compre­hend Philipsbourg in this Equivalent; for by what Right doth France pretend to dispose of a Place to which it hath no manner of Title, and to offer it in compensation to the Empire, to which it doth without Controversie belong? I know very well, that the French besieg'd it; and took it in the Year 1688, but 'twas by the most palpable Injustice, and without having the least Pretence for a Rupture; and I must confess, That if it be lawfull for Chri­stians to usurp the Lands of their Neighbours whilst they repose themselves upon the Faith of Treaties, and after having possessed their Places it be sufficient to restore some, of them in order to [Page 15]keep the most important, then France may make a Merit of the Restitution of Philipsbourg; but what Law, either Divine or Humane, did ever Authorize a Title of Acquisition so unjust? I may add, That Philipsbourg without Strasbourg, is of no considera­tion, since it is a Place locked within the Land of the Empire, unhealthy by its situation, and that cannot contain at most above a Garrison of 3 or 4000 Men, whereas upon Strasbourg alone depends the Preservation or Loss of three Circles of the Empire, to wit, Suabe, Franconia, and the Circle of the Ʋpper Rhine, that is to say, a third part of Germany; for France having an easie communicati­on with Strasbourg by the Means of Phaltzbourg and Lorrain, would be in possession of a Passage al­ways open, and at the same time of a very consi­derable Place of Arms, and of a Magazine sufficient for the greatest Enterprizes.

Now the past Conduct of that Crown having shew'd us how much its Invasions ought to be ap­prehended even in the midst of Peace, I leave every one to judge whether upon the first Stir it could raise in the Empire, we should not see the French fall upon Ʋlm, all the Countrey being open from Strasbourg quite to that Place; and if France were once Mistress of Ʋlm, which is at the Head of the Danube, very easie to fortifie, and in the middle of a fertile Country, what would become of Suabe, Franconia, and all the Ʋpper Germany? It must not be forgot here, that whatever re-establishment may be pretended for the Duke of Lorrain, he must expect to see himself the Slave of France, if it keeps [Page 16] Strasbourg. The Suissers too, are no less interessed in the Restitution of this Place, which cuts off their Communication with Germany, on the side of the Ʋpper Rhine, and commands that River from Basle to Philipsbourg. 'Tis true, the French offer to demolish the Works of Huningen and Fort Louis, which are beyond the Rhine in regard to France: But who doth not see that this Offer only tends to pay Appearances to save Realities? For if France keep the Works which it hath built on its own side, how can we hinder their raising again such Works as are under the Cannon of those which they still design to keep? We know that they have Men ready, and would quickly find Money and all other Necessaries for such a Work, so that at most this would but be a Business of about Six Months. Complaints would be made without doubt, against this, as a formal Contravention to the Treaty. But this would not much trouble them; and since it was not thought convenient to break with them when they possessed themselves of Strasbourg, much less would it be likely to be done upon such a Sub­ject as this.

France would have enter'd into the Equivalent for Strasbourg the Restitution it offers to make of Mont-Royal and Tarbach to be dismantled. But besides that it can have no pretence in the World to keep those Places, and that they are of no great Consequence to that Crown, because they are too remote, and are a great deal beyond Treves, which must be restored to the Elector of that Name; with what Confidence can Places belonging to the Elector [Page 17]of Treves be proposed to the Empire in Compensa­tion for Strasbourg? The Business is to secure Fran­conia and Suabe which the yielding of Strasbourg would expose to certain Ruine, and France offers to demolish two Places upon the Moselle, which it has no Right to keep, and which would signi­sie very little to the French; for in keeping, as they pretend to do, Luxembourg, Saar Louis, Hom­bourg, and Bitch, and remaining in possession of Thionville that commands the Moselle, they will be Masters of all the Electorate of Treves, as far as Coblentz, as soon as they shall think fit to renew the War.

All the Equivalent for Strasbourg then, is reduced to Fribourg, which was yielded to France by the Treaty of Nimeguen, and is offered to be restored in the Condition it is in at present. But is there the least Comparison between Strasbourg and a Place that is shut in with Mountains and Forests? which too is of very little Consequence to Germa­ny, because it cannot open the French a way to pierce further into the Country, and during this War, it hath been enough to guard some Passes that are near it to render it altogether unprofi­table to our Enemies.

Strasbourg is of such Importance to the Allies, that 'tis scarce possible to imagine an Equivalent that can procure them so great a Security as the Restitution of that Place would give them. 'Tis certain, that though France could resolve to [Page 18]joyn Brisac to Fribourg, it would yet be far enough from making a Just Compensation.

Since then, the Safety of Germany depends upon the Restitution of Strasbourg; that this Place doth, without Controversie belong to the Empire; that it hath not been yielded by any Treaty; and that France hath usurped it since the Peace of Ni­meguen, in the most unjust manner in the World: 'Tis as clear as the day, that that Crown ought to restore it without any Regret, supposing it resolves no more to trouble the Repose of its Neighbour for the future.

I know very well, that the Count d' Avaux, in the Memorial that he presented in Sueden, con­tends, That Strasbourg is necessary for the Security of France, and that his Master ought not to be pressed to the Restitution of a Place that would make the Emperor in a Condition to carry the War into that Countrey. But if it be necessary that some Body must run this Risque, is it not more reasonable that it should be rather the Authors of the Violence, than they that have suffered by it? Is it not just, that it should rather be a Crown that hath so often attack'd its Neighbours without any Pretence, than Princes who have taken up Arms only for their lawful Defence?

But I must add, That France would still have a Frontier good enough not to apprehend any Inva­sion; whereas, on the side of Germany, all is open, [Page 19]from Strasbourg to the Danube. Besides, an Offen­sive War is incompatible with the Constitution of the Empire; because, to resolve upon it, there must be the Consent of many Princes whose Interests are different, and among whom France hath always found Means to make her self Friends. In fine, 'Tis certain, that though Germany were perfectly United, yet it must have, for the attacking of France, the Help of all those Princes who are Con­federates in this Present War: And 'tis easily seen, that such a League would be morally impossible. The Necessity of Self-Preservation, and the Sense of an impending Ruine, could scarce bring so many Soveraigns into the same Interests: And what Appearance is there, that they would enter into it again, barely out of a Motive of Revenge or Ambition? But though the Soveraigns should seem disposed, can it be thought that the People would contribute to it? and that they would be brought to deprive themselves of the Sweets of Peace, and the Advantages of Commerce, to be­gin a War purely Offensive? Can we imagine, that they would consent to drain themselves by Taxes, who have borne them hitherto only to save themselves and their Country from utter Ruine? It must be only Kings, who by a long Train of Violences are arrived to an Arbitrary Power, that can promise themselves such Marks of Obedience from their Subjects: It must be only People who are under a Despotick Government, who can, without murmuring, suffer their Soveraign to reduce them to the last Extremities of Misery, [Page 20]in order to seize upon what doth not belong to him, and to render the Nation odious to its Neigh­bours by unjust Enterprizes: And by conse­quence, 'tis only France from whence we can expect such Projects; and we have all the reason in the World to believe, that 'tis in their Designs, if they refuse to restore those Places, that are ne­cessary to execute them.

With regard to the Reunited Countries, France offers to submit her self to the Decision of Commissio­ners, and to the Arbitrage of the Republick of Venice. But since it hath seiz'd upon them so unjustly, and by its own Authority, it ought to begin by Re­stitution, to put Things into their former state. 'Tis not just, that the Advantage of Possession should remain to those who have usurped it; it ought to return to those who have lost it by Tricks and Violence.

To this I shall add, That I can never persuade my self, that France would submit to the Judg­ment of Arbitrators, if it should not be for her own Interest; or that she would make a Scruple of Keeping a Countrey, which no body could force her to Restore.

'Tis certain, that by making a Peace upon the Conditions that the French propose, they would be Masters of all the Places which cover the Fiefs that are reunited, which would by consequence be at their Discretion; and being then stronger, [Page 21]and more formidable than ever, they might keep those Fiefs without apprehending that any would dare to Begin the War, to oblige them to Resti­tution.

It would be no more difficult for them, a se­cond time to dispossess the Duke of Lorrain; for who would take Arms for the Interests of that Prince? Would the Empire? But the French, by passing the Rhine at Strasbourg, would be able to carry the War into the Heart of Germany. Would Spain, or Holland? But would they have Cou­rage to declare against a Power which is capable of resisting so many Allies? 'Tis visible, that if by the Treaty of Peace the French keep Luxembourg, Brisac, Huninguen, Phaltzbourg, Strasbourg, Fort-Louis, and Landau, the Countrey they would re­store to the Duke of Lorrain, would be en­closed in their own, and by consequence at their disposal.

And yet they push their Pretensions further: They would keep Saar Louis, Bitch, Hombourg, and Longuy, which are the only Places that would remain to the Duke for the Security of his Person; and they renounce the Four Ways of Half a League in breadth, stipulated by the Fourteenth Article of the Treaty of Nimeguen, no otherwise but by reserving a free Passage for their Troupes thorough Lorrain. But they have their Reasons for this manner of proceeding. They may have a mind to make a new Invasion upon the Empire, or the [Page 22] Low-Countries; and it would be their Interest to leave nothing behind them, and then the Duke of Lorrain is dispossest again, and may be obliged to give up his Countrey for Lands of a like value in the Centre of the Kingdom.

'Tis in vain that France should found it self up­on the Treaty of Nimeguen for what respects Lor­rain, because the late Duke never accepted the Of­fers that were made him by this Treaty; and France having violated it in so odious a manner, ought not to be admitted to draw any Advantage from it. It is yet more ridiculous to alledge the Treaties which they made the Old Duke of Lor­rain, Charles III. sign, while he was possessed with an implacable Hatred against his Relations, and blinded by his foolish Amours; those Treaties can­not be to the Prejudice of the present Duke, who demands to be re-established in the Possessions of his Ancestres which lawfully belong to him.

France offers to the Elector Palatin what it has taken from him during this War. But what will it restore to that Prince? Heaps of Ashes for strong and rich Cities, horrid Desarts for a Coun­try fertile and well cultivated; and instead of Sub­jects whom Industry and Commerce had enriched, an infinite Number of poor Wretches, who must be a Charge to their Soveraign, and force him of Ne­cessity to support them in their Misery. Is it Just that after having carried Fire and Sword through all the Countrey of this Elector, without [Page 23]having the least Pretence for that Cruelty, there should be no thoughts of any Satisfaction for so considerable Losses? But we shall cease to wonder at it, if we consider that at a time when 'tis so much the Interest of France to manage the King of Sueden, who is acknowledged as Mediator by all the Parties interessed in the War, the French King not only offers him the Dutchy of Deux Ponts, without giving any Account of the Revenues he has drawn from it, during its Usurpation, but also continues to ruine that Dutchy by Ex­tortions, which will for a great while render it un­profitable to the Prince to whom he ought to re­store it.

The Renunciation of the pretended Rights of the Dutchess of Orbeans upon the Palatinate, ought to be accounted for nothing. For since France hath insisted upon them, though they had been renoun­ced by the Contract of Marriage with that Prin­cess, and by the Acquittance they gave of the Pay­ment of her Portion, 'tis certain that a Second Renunciation would not be more inviolable than the former. I might prove that the Palatin Prin­cesses have no Pretensions upon the States of their Family, nor upon what depends on them, as long as there are Palatin Princes and Dukes of Bavaria in the World, because the one and the other descend from Stephen Count Palatin of the Rhine, Author of a famous Constitution in this behalf, which hath been constantly observed ever since in that Family. But 'tis not my Design to engage in a [Page 24]Dispute that would carry me too far from my pre­sent Business.

With regard to the Duke of Savoy, I shall con­tent my self by saying, that if the Allies will keep a Prince in their Interests, who has so generously embrac'd them, 'tis but just that besides the Resti­tution of what he has lost, they should procure him the Surrender of Pignerol; because if France keep that Place, she will be sure hold that Duke in an entire Dependance.

France offers to renounce its Pretensions to the Low Countries, in favour of the Elector of Bavaria, upon condition that the Emperor do the same on his part: But we are not to build upon any thing that is called Renunciation or Promise. We must talk only of Restitution. I had rather France would re­store us Some, then promise us All. We know very well, that that Crown which hath broken all pre­cedent Treaties when its Interest required it, will not change its Maxims if we conclude a Peace, that should leave it in a Condition to attempt what it pleases; and since we cannot find Guarrantees capa­ble of punishing it for its Infractions, nor Oaths more sacred than those it hath already violated, 'tis plain, that there is but one way of convincing us of the sincerity of its Intentions, and that is, to make us a Barrier in the Low Countries, and upon the Rhine, that may prevent all our Fears; if it consent to that, the Peace may be quickly made; if it refuse, there is no safety for us, but in the con­tinuing of the War.

The same thing may be said, in regard of the Renouncing the Succession to the Kingdom of Spain. That of the late Queen was as solemn as could be wished: It was confirmed by Oath: It was made, not by the Queen alone, but by the King her Husband, for Himself and Successors, and yet they would now declare it Null and Void, under Pre­tence that it was not in the Power of the late Queen to do it in Prejudice to the Dauphin; and therefore we may assure our selves, that though the King of France and the Dauphin should now consent to a new Renunciation, it would signifie just nothing, without obtaining such Restitutions as should put it out of their Power to break their Words.

As to what regards the King of Spain, France con­sents to restore him all that she hath taken in Cata­lonia; and indeed, it is not so much their Interest to keep their Conquests on that side. Their prin­cipal Design is to make themselves Masters of the Low-Countries; and 'tis for that reason, that they will not consent to make us a Barrier there sufficient to secure us, but limit their Offers to the Restitution of Mons, Namurr, and Charleroy.

I do not see what Reason that Crown can alledge for the keeping of Luxembourg, a Place which indi­sputably belongs to Spain, and which France seized on by open Force since the Treaty of Nimeguen, that is to say, in full Peace. and by the most bare-fac'd Violence in the World. Will they say, That this Important Place was yielded them at least for Twenty Years by the Truce? But there is a great deal of [Page 26]difference between a forced and provisional Cession, and a free and perpetual one: Besides, France having violated the Treaty of Truce, should not in reason be permitted to enjoy any thing from it. Will they say, That Luxembourg is necessary for them, for the Security of their Frontier? This they are ashamed to plead; since in the last War they could not break into France that way, though it were then in the Hands of Spain. In effect, France having Thionville to cover the Moselle; Verdun and Sedan to cover the Meuse; Longuy and Montmedy between those two Rivers; and Metz more within, to serve for a Place of Rendezvous; 'tis evident, that it is in no Appre­hensions from any thing of this nature; and there­fore, if they will be sincere, they must confess, that they will keep Luxembourg, because it covers the Electorates of Treves and Cologne, the Dutchies of Juliers and Limbourg, and a part of the Bishoprick of Liege; because it gives 'em a great Circuit of Ground; and because its Situation is such, that it facilitates the Succours which the Low-Countries might receive from Germany. One may truly say, That the Dutchy of Luxembourg is more Important to the King of Spain, than Half the Low-Countries; and it cannot be imagined, that France is sincere in the Offers of Peace, when in so Capital an Article it says nothing of Restitution, no not so much as of an Equivalent.

They do consent, indeed, to give one to the Bi­shop of Liege, in the open Countrey of Luxembourg, for the Cities of Dinant and Bouillon. But how can [Page 27]they offer for two such important Places, only a part of an open Countrey, which too belongs to the King of Spain. Besides, by the Treaty of Ni­meguen, France engaged it self to restore Dinant, upon Condition that Charlemont should be yielded up to that Crown. This Condition was perfor­med; and yet it did not hinder the French from keeping both the one and the other. They cannot therefore now refuse to restore Dinant, after ha­ving detained it so unjustly, and if they pretend to keep it by a Treaty of Peace, it cannot be but with the Design to remain Masters of the Meuse, and to besiege Namur, when the Conjuncture will permit.

'Tis out of all dispute, That to give us any sort of security on that side, we must have a double, and even a triple Barrier; or else the taking of Namur, or that of Mons, will carry the Enemy again into the Heart of the Low-Countries, and make the Conquest of them only the more easie. We have seen the French take those two Places in a time when we had considerable Armies in Brabant, and when Diversions were made in our favour on the side of Germany, Italy, and Catalonia. How then would it be possible to save them if France should make a new Rupture, after it had disarmed the Allies by a Treaty of Peace? We may assure our selves, that after the manner they now attack Places, one single Campaign would be enough to render the loss of the Low-Countries inevitable, and that the French would be Masters of them, before the League (which must be form'd to make Head a­gainst [Page 28]them,) could be in a Condition to resist them. 'Tis therefore absolutely necessary, that Mons and Namur be covered by other Places, that may sustain the first Efforts of France; and after the Experi­ence we have had of the Forces of that Crown, we must see that there ought to be a better Bar­rier for the Low-Countries, then that which was fixed on by the Treaty of Nimeguen.

I shall not insist upon the Conditions that are of­fer'd to England and Holland, because they consist only in the renewing of the Treaties of Commerce. I shall only say, that the great Interest of these two Nations, is, the re-establishment of a good Barrier in Flanders, and Brabant. 'Tis a Truth of which none can doubt, that the Conquest of the Low-Countries would put France into a Condition of giving Laws to all Europe, and 'tis another Truth, that is no less Evident, that nothing can hinder the French from making this Conquest up­on the first Occasion, if we accept of the Condi­tions of Peace which they now offer us. The greatest of our Interests then is here concerned, least France's being in Possession of the Ports of the Spanish Netherlands, and keeping the Hollanders in Slavery, or at least in an indispensible Necessity of remaining in a good Union with that Crown, the French should become absolute Masters of Our Com­merce; least they should oppress Germany, Spain, and Italy; whilst we being shut up in our Island, and out of all Communication with the Continent, should be Spectators of that Revolution, without being able to hinder it.

'Tis visible therefore, that the Safety of England depends upon the Preservation of the Low-Countries. But what shall we say of the Glory of the Nation? 'Tis certain, that if we procure an advantagious Peace for the Allies, by continuing the War with the same Vigour that we have shewn hitherto, England will have the Honour of having saved Eu­rope from Chains, and will remain the Arbiter of its Destiny.

'Tis the general Interest of all Christendom to re­settle the House of Austria in a sort of equality with France. This Equilibrium is necessary for the Secu­rity of the People, and even for that of the Sove­raigns too. But 'tis the particular Interest of Eng­land to re-establish this Equality, that she may have the Ballance in her hand, and turn it to which side she pleases. This is the only Means we can make use of, not only to maintain the Empire of the Sea, which we have regain'd the possession of in so glorious a manner, but even to enable us to decide the Successs of Wars, and the Conditions of Treaties for the future. The Nation begins already to recover in Europe the Rank which she ought to hold. Our Fleets are Mistresses of the two Seas; the Security of our Commerce is perfe­ctly re-establish'd; we have seen the French redu­ced to a necessity of letting their Maritime Towns in the Ocean be burnt, while their Fleet is shut up, and as it were imprisoned in a Port of the Mediter­ranean, to avoid the being attack'd by ours. We have begun to stop the Progress of their Arms in [Page 30]the Low-Countries, and the taking of Huy is not of so little Importance, but that it opens a Way to greater Conquests, in giving us Opportunity to draw off a great part of our Garrisons from Liege and Mastritcht. Besides, we may, without Flatte­ry, say, that we have a numerous Army upon the Rhine, and may expect Great Things from the Prince that Commands it. The Duke of Savoy will be able to make a more considerable Diversion on that side, than he hath hitherto done, because he will Act in Concert with our Fleet; and 'tis to be hoped that the Turks, discouraged by their Losses, and being convinced that France would sa­crifice them, will at length, by making an Accom­modation with the Emperor, prevent the Danger they would be in, if they should be the last in ma­king a Peace. Add to all this, the Extremity to which France finds her self now reduced. They are forced to abandon to us the Two Seas. They are under an Impossibility of augmenting their For­ces by Land. Their Commerce is absolutely ruin'd; their Subjects discontented; and their Troups ill pay'd. In a word, if the Allies will but make the best of this Conjuncture, it seems most certain, that they must quickly obtain reasonable Conditi­ons of PEACE, and that Europe may thereby Enjoy a Solid and a Durable Repose.