HAving briefly touched the Vertues and Means whereby Princes are maintained • n Authority and Honor, let ſomething be ſaid of the cauſes from whence their ruine doth proceed; the cheif whereof ſeemeth to be Hate and Contempt: Hate cometh of Feare, which the more Common it is, the more Dangerous • Nulla vis imperii tanta eſt, quae prement • met • poſſit eſſe di • turna • Cic.

The cauſes of Feare are Puniſhments Impoſitions and Rigor; and therefore it behooveth a Prince not only to ſhun them, but to eſchew thoſe actions whereby he may reaſonably incur their ſuſpition. Sentias enim homines ut metuant a • t oderint, • non minus opinio • e & fama, quam certa aliqua ratione moveri. Cic.

Yet Puniſhment • Impoſition, and Cenſure are in all States neceſſary, although they ſhew and ſeem terrible, and conſequently breed a certain deſperation in Subiects, unleſs they be diſcreetly and modeſtly uſed; for extreme and frequent puniſhments taſte of cruelty; great and many Impoſts • avour of Covetouſneſs; cenſure of manners when it exceedeth the quality of offences, doth ſeem Rigor in theſe matters; therefore it behooveth the Prince to be moderate and cautelous, chiefly in Capital Puniſhment, which muſt be confined within the bounds of Juſtice. Sit apud principem parſimonia etiam viliſſimi ſanguinis. Sen.

But if for ſecuritie ſake the Prince be forced to puniſh, let the ſame be done with ſhew of great ſorrow and lothneſs: Tanquam invitus & magnocum tormento ad caſtigandum veniat. S • n.

Let all puniſhments alſo be ſlowly executed • for they that are haſtily puniſhed do ſeem to have bin willingly condemned; neither ought any Capital • Puniſhment to be inflicted but only that which is profitable to the Commonweale, and for example ſake. Non • am ut ipſi pereant, quam ut alios pereundo deterreant. Sen.

In puniſhing alſo a ſpecial reſpect muſt be had, that no ſhew of content or pleaſure be taken therein. Formarabiei eſt ſanguine & vulneribus gaudere. Sen.

Alſo in puniſhing equality muſt be obſerved, and the nature of the puniſhment according to the Cuſtom. Nec eiſdem de cauſis alii plectantur, alii ne appellentur quidem • Cic.

But in puniſhing publick offences wherei • a multitude have part, the execution ought to be otherwiſe, and as it were at an inſtant, which may haply ſeem terrible, but in effect is not. Frequens vindicta paucorum odium reprimit, omnium irritat. Sen.

Another meanes to ſatisfie a people offended is to puniſh the Miniſters of cruelty, and with their blood to waſh away the common hatred. Piaculares publici odii victimae. Plin. By this King David did appeaſe the Gibeonites.

The next cauſe of diſcontent cometh of Impoſitions under which word is comprehended all levies of mony, a matter nothing pleaſing to people, as that which they eſteem equall to their own lives. Pecunia anima & ſanguis eſt mortalibus. Plaut.

Firſt, to remove hate conceived of this cauſe, there is nothing better then publick expoſtulation of neceſſity: for what Commonwealth or Kingdom can be without Tributes? Nulla quies gentium ſine armis, nec arma ſine ſtipendiis, nec ſtipendia ſine Tributis haberi queunt, Tac.

The ſecond remedy againſt Hate for impoſitions is to make moderate Levies and rare. For as Tiberius the Emperor was wont to ſay, a Sheep ſhould be fleeced not flead. Qui nimis emungit, elicit ſanguin • m. Tac.

Thirdly, alſo to eſchew the offence of People it behoveth the Prince to have a vigilant eye on Informers, Promoters, and ſuch fiſcal Miniſters, whoſe cruelty and covetous proceedings do oftentimes occaſion great hate; but this miſchief may be, though hardly, encountred, either by chooſing honeſt Officers, or (proving otherwiſe) not only to remaine them but to uſe them as ſpunges, Exprimendi poſt qu • m biberint. Suet.

In all impoſitions or Taxations, no cruelty or force ought to be uſed, the ſecond cauſe to kindle hate: and to meet with that miſchief, nothing is better then to proceed moderately, and without extremity. Ne Boves ipſos, mox agros, poſtremò corpora ſervitio aut poenae tradant, Tac.

The fourth remedy is the Princes own parſimony, not giving ſo largely to private perſons as thereby to be forced to take from the multitude. Magnae opes no • tam multa capiendo, quam haud multa perdendo, quaerunt • r. Maecaenas •

The laſt help againſt hate is in taxation to proceed equally, indifferently, and without favor or reſpect; and that the Aſſeſſors of Taxes may be elected of the meaner ſort of people. Populus maximam fidem rerum ſuarum hab • t. Tac.

Touching Cenſure, which we numbred amongſt the cauſes whereof hate is conceived, much needeth not to be ſpoken, becauſe the ſame is diſcontinued • or rather utterly forgotten; yet doth it ſeem a thing neceſſary, being a certain obſervation and controlement of ſuch evill manners, and diſorders as were not by Law Corrigible; theſe Officers were of the Romans called Magistri pudoris & mod • ſtiae. Livi.

To the Function of Cenſures theſe two things are anciently ſubject Manners, and Exceſs; Under Manners I comprehend Wantonneſs, Drunkenneſs, Dicing, Brawling, Perjury, and all ſuch Lewdneſs as Modeſty condemneth. Theſe diſorders were anciently puniſhed by the diſcretion of • enſors in all Ages and Sexes, to the end that Idleneſs might be generally avoided. Vniverſa plebs habeat neg • tia ſua, quibus àmal • publico detineatur. Saluſt

Exceſs includeth Riotouſneſs, expence of Money, Prodigal houſekeeping, Banqueting, and Superfluitie in Apparrel, which things are the mothers of many miſcheifs. It alſo ſeemeth in ſome ſort perillous to the Prince that the Subject ſhould exceed either in Covetize or Conſuming. Nemo nimis excedat, ſive amicorum copiâ, ſine opum. Ariſt.

The puniſhment inflicted upon theſe ſorts of offenders, were either Ignom • ny, or Pecuniarie puniſhments, Cenſoris judicium d • mnato nihil affert niſ • ruborem. Tac.

The firſt and chiefeſt meanes to remove theſe inconveniences, is the Princes own example, whoſe life being well cenſured, eaſily reduceth others to order. • ita principis cenſura perpetu • . Plin.

Secondly, Thoſe diſorders may be taken away without danger, if the Cenſures doe proceed by degrees and leaſurely; for the nature of man may not ſuddenly be altered • Vitia quaedam tol • it facilius princeps, ſi eorum ſit p • ti • n • . Sen.

Theſe are the cheifeſt rules whereby to eſchew hate; but impoſſible it is for any Prince or Miniſter utterly to avoid it; for being himſelf good, he incurreth the offence of all bad folk: if he be evil, good men will hate him; this danger therefore Wiſe and Vertuous Princes have little regarded: becauſe hate may be gained as well by good as evil doing. Odia qui nimium timet, regnare neſcit. Sen.

One other means to remove this error, is, to reward the good and well deſerving Subjects; for no man can think him cruell that for love to Vertue uſeth Auſteritie: which wil appear when he beſtoweth bountif • lly on the good. Praemio & • oena Reſpublica continetur Solon.

The other Vice which indangereth the State of Princes, we call Contempt, being a certain baſe and vile conceipt, which entereth into the Subjects, ſtrangers or ſervants, of the Prince and his Proceedings; for the Authority of a King may be reſembled to the powers of mans mind, whereunto the hands, the feet, the eyes, do by conſent obey. Vires imperii in conſenſu obedientium ſunt Livi.

The cauſes of Contempt do proceed chiefly from the form of Government, Fortune, or the Princes manners; the form of Government becometh contemptible, when the Prince deſiring to be thought merciful, ruleth rather pittifully then juſtly: which manner of proceeding taketh away all reverence in the people, and in liew thereof entereth liberty, or at leaſt a certain boldneſs to offend; Facultas faciendi quod cuilibet viſum, non p • teſt comprimere ingenitam ſi • gulis hominibus pravitatem. Tac.

Alſo to be Mutable, Irreſolute, light and Inconſiderate in beſtowing the Honors and Offices of State, maketh the Prince contemptible; Qui praeſentibus fruitur, nec in longi • s conſultat • Ariſt.

But if contempt be cauſed by Fortune, or as may be ſaid more reaſonably, by deſtiny, and that thoſe fri • nds do fail who ought in duty to defend the Prince and his Authority, then is there ſmall hope to eſchew contempt. Fato obnoxia virtus. Pl • ut.

The Princes manners do breed contempt, when he yeildeth his affections to ſenſuality and ſloth, or if he incur the ſuſpition of Simplicity, Cowardiſe, or any ſuch Vice, unworthy the Dignity he beareth • Common people do ſometimes alſo diſeſteem the Prince for external and light cauſes, as deformity of perſon, ſickneſs or ſuch like. Mos vulgi eſt, fortuita & externa ad culpam trahe • e. Tac.

THE greateſt and moſt greivous calamity that can come to any State is Civil War; for therein Subjects take arms againſt their Prince or among themſelves, whereof followeth a miſery more lamentable then can be deſcribed. Non at as, non dignitas quenquam protegit, quo minus • l • pra caedibus, & caedes ſt • pris miſceantur. Tac.

The firſt cauſe of Civ • l War proceedeth of deſtiny for God in his own divine providence foreſeeth many years before, that great and mighty Empires ſhall be ruined.

The ſecond cauſe is, exceſſe, riot, and diſſolute life; for nothing breedeth Civil Fury ſo ſoon as over great happineſs; alſo pompous Apparell • banquetting and prodigall ſpending conſumeth riches, and plenty is turned into poverty; for by theſe means • re men brought into deſperation. Rapaciſſimo • uique ac perditiſſim • , non agri aut faenus ſed ſola inſtrumenta vitiorum manebunt. Tac.

Now to conſider how deſtiny might be eſchewed, were in vain: For ſuch a remedy no wit or wiſdom can deviſe; being the decree of God, no doubt it is inevitable. Ita fato placuit, nullius rei eodem ſemper loc • ſtare fortunam. Sen.

There is nothing exempt from the peril of mutation; the earth, Heavens, and whole World is thereunto ſubject. Certi • eunt cuncta temporibus; naſci debent, creſcere, extingui. Sen.

Touching the ſecond cauſes of Civil War ſome remedies may be uſed, becauſe it preceedeth of Faction, Sedition or Tyranny. I call Faction a certain aſſociation of divers perſons combined to the offence of others. It proceedeth often of private or publick diſpleaſure, and more often of ambition. Nemo eorum qui in Rep. verſantur, quo • vincat, ſed a quibus vincatur, aſpicit. Sen.

1. Factions are of two ſorts; for either they conſiſt of many or of few perſons: both be dangerous, but the former more apt to take arms; and that party which proveth weakeſt, prayeth arms of forrain forces.

2. The other faction wherein are fewer partakers, be commonly great perſonages or men of more importance than ordinary people; and that proveth moſt perillous and bloody. N • bilium factiones trah • nt adſe, & in partes, univerſum etiam populum • Ariſt.

Albeit ſome wiſe men have held opinion that factions are neceſſary, yet cannot that conceipt be reaſonably maintained, unleſs it be upon confines and in ſuch places where conſpiracy is feared, which Cato in hisprivate Family uſed. Semper contentiunculas aliquas aut diſſenſum inter ſervos callidè ſerebat, ſ •• pectam habens nimiam c • ncordiam • rum, m • tuenſque. Plut.

Factions amongſt the Nobility, are ſomtimes ſuppreſſed by forbidding colors, or unknown badges to be worn; alſo to inhibit names or watch-words of mutinies is neceſſary, which was Mecae • as counſel to Auguſtus; and Ariſtotle thinketh it fit that Laws ſhould be made againſt the Factions of Noblemen. Nobilium contentiones & part • s etiam legibus oportet prohibere conari. Ariſt.

Another cauſe of civil war, we call ſedition, which is a ſuddain commotion or aſſembly of common people againſt their Prince or his Magiſtrates: the Original of which diſorders may proceed of divers cauſes, but chiefly of oppreſſion. Imminentium periculorum remedium, ipſa peric • la arbitrari. Arist.

Again, Fear may be the occaſion of Sedition, as well in him that hath done injury, as in him that looketh to be injured, and is deſirous to prevent it before it cometh. It may proceed alſo of over-great mildneſs in Government. Non • iſeriis ſed licentia, tantum concitum turbarum, laſ • ivire magis plebem quàm ſaevire. Livi.

Sedition many times ariſeth of Poverty, or of the Artificers, whoſe Arts are grown out of uſe, and conſequently no means whereof they can live. Semper in civitat • , quibus opes nullae ſunt, bonis invident, veter • odere, n • va expetunt, odio rerum ſuarum m • tari omnia ſtudent. Sab.

Laſtly, Sedition cometh of Tyranny, Inſolency, or Mutinous diſpoſition of certain Captains, Cavaliers, or Ringleaders of the people for albeit the multitude is apt to innovation, yet doth it ſtand firm, until ſome firſt mover taketh the matter in hand. Multitudo omnis, ſicut mare, per ſe immobilis. Livi.

Of theſe Movers ſome are Ambitious, who wanting other means to aſpire, hope by practice of Sedition, to compaſs their deſigns; or elſe they are Unthrifts, who having conſumed their own, ſeek by violence to poſſeſs themſelves of other mens: Or elſe they are vain and light perſons, that without cauſe or reaſon, attempt innovation, themſelves know not for what. Non tam praemiis periculor • m, quàm ipſis periculis laeti, pro certis & olim partis, nova, ambigua, ancipitia malunt.

Thus having told the cauſes of Sedition, I wiſh the remedies were prepared. Omne malum naſcens facilè opprimitur, inveteratum fit plerumque robuſtius. Cic.

The firſt way to ſuppreſs Sedition, is Eloquence and excellent perſwaſion, which oftentimes worketh great effects among the multitude; chiefly when it proceedeth from ſome reverend and grave perſon, for his wiſdom and integrity of life honored: For the Prince himſelf is not to take this office in hand, unleſs neceſſity ſo inforce: Integra autoritas principis majoribus remediis ſervetur. Tac.

If perſwaſion cannot prevail, then force muſt compel: But before ſuch violent proceedings, uſe art and cunning either to appeaſe the people, or at leaſt to diſunite them; and rather if the Prince do offer fair and • romiſe plauſibly: Verba apud populum plurimum valent. Tac.

It is lawful alſo in ſuch caſes for Princes to uſe ſubtilty; and the ſame not prevailing, to waſh away the ſtain thereof with Clemency: For when Arms are laid down, and every one yielded, general puniſhment were needleſs. Omnium culpa fuit, paucorum ſit poena. Tac.

The laſt cauſe of Sedition we named Tyranny, which is a certain violent Government, exceeding the Laws of God and nature. The difference between Kings and Tyrants is this; the one imployeth arms in defence of Peace, the other uſeth them to terrifie thoſe of whom his cruelty hath deſerved hate: Auferre, trucidare, raper • , falſis nominibus imperium, atque ubi ſolitudinem fecerint, pacem appellant. Tac.

The quality of Tyrants is to eſteem Promooters more then good Miniſters, becauſe thoſe men are the ſcourge of infinite others. They are alſo Protectors of impious perſons, and ſtand in daily doubt of Noble and Vertuous Men. Nobilitas, opes, amiſſi g • ſtique honores, pro crimine: Et ob virtutes certiſſimum exitium. Tac.

Tyrants do alſo endeavor to ſuppreſs the knowledge of Letters and civil life, to the end all good arts ſhould be exiled, and Barbariſm introduced. Pellunt ſapientiae prof • ſſores, & omnes • onas artes in exiliu • ag • nt. Tac.

Theſe and ſuch like, be the conditions of Tyrants, who for the moſt part are depoſed and ſlain; for as Kings live long and deliver their Dominions to their Children • and Poſterity; ſo Tyrants being feared and hated of all men, cannot continue in their eſtate.

The Remedies of theſe Miſchiefs which proceed from the violence of ſuch a Prince, are Perſecution or Patience. Many generous ſpirits have uſed the firſt; perſwading themſelves rather to die, then endure the ſight of a Tyrant. Alſo the Grecians did think it a ſervice acceptable to murther the perſon of ſuch an impious Prince. Graeci • omines deorum honores tribuebant iis qui Tyrannos necaverunt. Cic.

Nevertheleſs, in Chriſtian conſideration the other courſe is to be taken: Let patience therefore incounter this miſchief; for ſeeing all Kings, as well the bad as the good be ſent by God, they muſt be indured. Res eſt gravis occidere regalem ſtirpem. Homer.

Perſecution is not onely perilous, but for the moſt part infortunate: For thereof preſent revenge is taken by that Prince that ſucceedeth. Facinoris • jus ultor eſt, quiſ • uis ſucceſſerit. Tac.

The murder of Tyrants is alſo followed with many inconveniences worſe then civil War it ſelf. Principes boni, votis expetendi, qualeſcunque tolerandi. Tac.

For as Fire, Floods, and other inevitable Plagues are neceſſarily to be ſuffered: So evil Princes in their covetouſneſs and cruelty ought to be patiently indured, becauſe their office is to command, and ſubjects muſt obey. Indigna, digna habenda ſunt, Rex quae facit. Sen.

And as it is the uſe of vulgar people to finde faults in the long raign of Princes; ſo the ambition of great Subjects is deſirous of novelty. Praeſens imperium ſubditis ſemper grave. Thucyd.

To conclude, we ſay that the beſt remedy againſt Tyranny, is Patience: For ſo long as men are, ſo long will Vices be. Regum ingenia toleranda, neque uſui crebrae mutationes. Tac.

ALL Cities and Towns of State are b • ilded either by people dwelling in or about the place where they are builded, or elſe they are made by ſtrangers: Of the firſt are Athens and Venice, of the other Alexandria and Florence.

The fortune of every City builded, and vertue of the builder, appeareth by choice of the place, and quality of Laws: for as fertile places occaſion men to be ſlothfull, unleſs by good laws they be forced to labor, ſo barrenneſs compells them to induſtry; which reaſon induceth wiſe men to plant habitations in either: Examples of the firſt are Ferrara and Rome, of the ſecond Raguſ • and Genoa.

All Laws whereby Commonwealths are governed were either made by ſome one excellent man, and at an inſtant; or elſe they were ordained at ſundry times according to ſuch accidents as befel. Example, the laws of Sparta made at the beginning Lycurgu • , the laws of Rome at ſundry times.

The government of every City in time becomes corrupt; Principality changeth into Tyranny: the Optimacy is made the government of the people; and the Popular eſtate turns to licentious diſorder; which inſtability or alteration moved ſome Lawmakers to take order that in the government of their City there ſhould be a mixture of all three, and was the cauſe that t • e policy of Sparta continued • 00 years, when the popular State of Athens endured not one hundred. Example, the laws of Sparta made by Lycurgus, and the Laws of Athens by S • lon.

Whoſo taketh in hand to frame any State or government, ought to preſuppoſe that all men are evil, and at occaſions will ſhew themſelves ſo to be. Example, the envy of the people of Rome to the Nobles, and their Inſolency towards them appeared not ſo long as the Kings governd; but the Tarquins being baniſhed, opportunity was thereby offerd that the malice of the one and the other became diſcovered.

The divers honors of the Nobility and people, the one deſiring to command, the other not to obey, are the cauſe of continual troubles, unleſs ſome third mean there be of more authority then either, to bridle the force of both. Example, The Kings in Rom • expulſed, forthwith aroſe much mutiny, and could not be ſuppreſt till the Tribum Plebis were created; whoſe authority wrought the ſame effect which the Kings had done.

Some States endeavor to enlarge their dominions, and ſome others labour only to maintain that eſtate they antiently poſſeſt. Example of the firſt was the City of Rome, of the ſecond Sparta.

All States deſiring to live at liberty, think fit that every man ſhould be permitted to accuſe any Citizen that offendeth, which manner of proceeding works two excellent effects: Firſt that the people ſhould not dare for fear of accuſing to attempt ought againſt the State; or if they do, they ſhall be preſently and without reſpect puniſhed. Secondly by liberty of accuſing, every man hath meanes to utter the offence wherewith he can charge others, which he could not; unleſs it were lawfull to take ſuch an ordinary courſe, and conſequently be driven to ways extraordinary, particular revenge, or callingin forreign forces. Example, Coriolanus and Appius, Claudius at Rome, Lucannone at Chinſi, Franciſco Valeri in Florence.

A accuſations are in every State neceſſary, ſo ſlanders are dangerous, and worthy of puniſhment; the difference betwixt accuſations and ſlanders, is, that the one is publickly performed before Magiſtrates, with good proofs and Witneſſes to maintain the truth of the accuſation; but ſlanders are as well publickly performed as diſperſed in ſecret and places of repair without Witneſs and Juſtification, ſo as every man may be ſlandered, but few are orderly accuſed. Example, Appius Claudius accuſed by L. Virginius; Furius Camillus, ſlandered by Manlius Capitoliuus.

The only meanes to ſuppreſs Slander is, to give authority to ſome perſons of repute to compel every ſlanderer to become an accuſer; and if the accuſation prove true, then to reward the accuſer, or at leaſt not to puniſh him. Example Manlius the ſlanderer of Camillus for his untrue information puniſhed.

A rule moſt certain and aſſured it is, that every Kingdom and State at the firſt well framed, or after well informed, doth take the perfection thereof from the wiſdom of ſome excellent man, who ought not to be blind though in a matter of great moment he happily uſeth ſome extraordinary violenc or proceedings; for he that employeth force to mend and not to mar, deſerves commendation. Example, Romulus, Lycurgus, Cleomenes.

There lives no man ſo ſimple or wiſe, ſo wicked or well diſpoſed, but prefers thoſe perſons that are praiſable, before thoſe that are blamable: notwithſtanding for that well near all men are beguiled in diſcerning what indeed is good, deeming that honorable which in truth is otherwiſe; they ſuffer themſelves either willingly or ignorantly to be carried into a courſe which merrits rather infamy then commendation. Example, every man wiſheth himſelf Timoleon or Ageſilaus, rather then Dionyſius or Phalaris; rather a Titus or Trajan, then Caligula or Vitellius.

Who reads Hiſtories treating of great Actions ſhall perceive that good Princes indeed are more ſecure and better defended by the love of the People, and Fidelity of Counſellers, then were they that entertained many Legions and Men of War. Example, of all thoſe Emperors which raigned after C • eſar untill Maximi • us the greateſt number were for their vices taken and ſlain, only Galba and Pertinax excepted who were good Emperors.

A Prince of great knowledge both in Armes and Wiſdom ſo firmly ſetleth the foundation of Government, as albeit his ſucceſſor be of the leſs vertue; yet may he be maintained even by the memory of his predeceſſor: but if it happen that the third Prince prove not more like the firſt then the ſecond, then all that is paſt goeth to ruine. Example, The Martial Valor of Romulus was the cauſe that Numa might governe ſafely in peace: which Tullus could not have done, had he bin unlike to Romulus; nor ſhould Bajazet Emperor of Turky have enjoyed the ſtate of his Father Mahomet and left the ſame to his poſterity, if Selim his ſon had not been more like to his Grandfather then to Bajazet his Father.

The ſucceſſion of two excellent Princes, cheifly if they be of long life, works wondrous effects: the like is ſeen in Optimacies or Popular States, where the Governors ſucceſſively elected be men of great vertue and underſtanding. Example, The firſt appeared in Philip of Macedon, and Alexander his Son, rhe ſecond in the Conſuls of Rome.

In every State where Soldiers are not, the fault thereof proceeds from the Governors. Wiſe Princes were therefore wont even in times of Peace to cauſe warlick exerciſes to be uſed; for without them the moſt warlick nations become not only ignorant in Martial knowledge, but alſo effeminate. Example, Pelopida • & Epa • i • ondas in Thebes, and King Tullus in Rome as well in peaceable as troubleſome times uſed exerciſe of Armes.

No Prince or State well adviſed, hazards his whole eſtate upon the valor of ſome few perſons, nor ought to ſtrength of ſtraight places where the Enemy is to paſs. Example, Tully King of Rome, & Metius King of Alba, condiſcended that three of their Nobility for either ſide choſen ſhould enter Combate, and that Nation which were victorious ſhould command the other. Francis the French King going to recover Lombardy, was by the Switzers attended into two or three places in the Mountains, hoping there to repulſe him, but the King taking another way, paſſed ſecurely and prevaild.

Every State well governed doth reward men of good merit, and puniſh all offenders; and if any perſon of good deſert ſhall wilfully be a delinquent, the ſame man ought notwithſtanding his former ſervice, be puniſht. Example, The ſame Horatio that in Combat gained the victory againſt the Albani, having inſolently ſlain his own ſiſter, was notwithſtanding his egregiou • Act and the freſh memory thereof, called into triall of his life, and with great difficulty obtained pardon: and Manlius who had with great glory ſaved the Capitol, for moving ſedition in Rome, was after from the ſame caſt down headlong.

Every wiſe man having performed any great ſervice to his Prince or Country, ought to be content with ſuch recompence as it ſhall pleaſe the Prince or Country to beſtow: meaſuring the ſame according to the Power of the giver, and not the merit of him that receiveth. Example, Horatius Cocles for having loſt his hand in defence of the bridge of Rome, and Mutius Scaevola ſuffering his hand to be burnt for his attempt to kill King Porſenna, were rewarded with a ſmall portion of Land; and Manlius that defended the Capitoh from the Galleys, had no greater reward then a little meaſure of meale.

Ingratitnde is a vice ſo natural and Common, as not only private perſons, but Princes and States alſo either through covetouſnes or ſuſpition are therewith infected. Example, Veſpaſian proclamed Emperor, was chiefly aided by Antonius Primus, and by his helpe prevailed againſt Vitellius; in reward of which ſervice Veſpaſian removed him from the command of his Army and gave that honor to Mutianus. Conſalvo Ferranoe having taken the Kingdom of Naples from the French, was firſt remov'd from his Command of the Caſtles and Soldiers, and in the end brought into Spain where in diſgrace he ended his life Collatinus Tarquinius who with the aide of Bru • us ſuppreſſed the Tarquins of Rome, and with him Pub • Valerius were baniſht for no other cauſe but for being of the name of Tarquin, theother becauſe he built a houſe upon mount Coelio.

All Errors that great Captains commit, are either wilfull or ignorant, towards the one and the other of which offenders to uſe greater lenity then the quality of their offences deſerves, ſeemeth neceſſary: for men of honor ſuffer nought by the infamy which evill ſervice doth bring. It is alſo to be conſidered that a great Captain being cumbred with many cares, cannot proceed in his actions couragiouſly if he ſtand in daily doubt to be puniſht for every error that hapneth. Example, Sergius and Vi • gi • ius were before Veio, the one part of the Army on the one ſide of the City, the other not far from the place. Sergius being aſſaulted by the Faliſci was not aided by Virginius, neither would he require his help, ſuch was the envy the one bare to the other; and • onſequently their offence is wilful and worthy of capital puniſhment. Likewiſe when Varro by his ignorance, received an overthrow by Hannibal at Cann • , he was nevertheleſs pardoned and honorably welcomed home by the whole Senate.

Whenſoever an inconvenience ariſeth within or without the State, it ſeems a reſolution more ſure to diſſemble the knowing thereof, then to ſeek by ſudden violence to ſuppreſs it. Example, Coſmo de Medices having gained extraordinary reputation in Florence, the Citizens imagined, that to ſuffer the ſame to increaſe, was dangerous, and therefore they baniſhed him: Which extream proceeding, ſo offended the friends of Coſm • , being the ſtronger, as they forced the Citizens to revoke him, and make him Prince of that City. The like hapned in Rome, where Caeſar for his vertue, much admired and followed, became afterwards to be feared • and they that feared, not conſidering their force to be inferior to the power of Caeſar • endeavoring to oppreſs him, were the occaſion of his greater glory.

In every Republick, an exceſſive Authority given to one or two perſons for long time, proveth dangerous, cheifly when the ſame is not reſtrained. Example, The Dictatorſhip given to Caeſar for life, was an occaſion to oppreſs the Liberties of the R • mans. The ſame effect was before that time like to follow the Decemvirat • , by ſuffering Appius Claudiu • to prolong the time of his Dignity.

The Ambition of Men is ſuch, as rarely they will obey when formerly they have commanded; neither do they willingly accept of mean Office, having before ſate in higher place: Yet the Citizens of wellgoverned States, did not refuſe as well to obey as command. Example, The victory the Romans obtained againſt the Veienti, Q. Fabius was ſlain, having the year before been Conſul: Nevertheleſs he then ſerved in meaner place under C. Manilius, and M. Fabius his own Brother then Conſul.

There is nothing more ſtrange, yet by experience proved true, That men in adverſe Fortune be much grieved, and in proſperity alſo diſcontented; which is the reaſon, that not being forced to fight for neceſſity, they will nevertheleſs contend for Ambition; and that humor doth as well poſſeſs thoſe that live aloft, as others whom Fortune holdeth down. Example, The people of Rome having by the Authority of the Tribunes obtained to make themſelves ſecure from oppreſſion of the Nobility, forthwith required, That the Honor and Office of State might be alſo imparted unto them. The like Ambition moved them to have their part of Lands by force of Lex Agragia, which was at laſt the overthrow of the Roman liberty.

It ſeemeth that people diſpleaſed with ſome Innovations hapned in the State, do ſometime without juſt Reaſons complain of thoſe that govern: Not unlike to a ſick man who deemeth that the Phyſician, not the Fever, is the cauſe of his grief. Example, The people of Rome were perſwaded that the Ambition of Conſuls was the cauſe of continual War, therefore required that no more Conſuls ſhould be • yet were they content that certain Tribunes ſhould command with like Authority, ſo was nothing altered in the Government but the Governors title, which alone did content them.

Nothing can corrupt and alter the nature of man ſo much, or ſo ſoon as the immoderate deſire of Honor • in ſo much as men of honeſt mindes and vertuous inclinations are ſometimes by Ambition, drawn to abuſe that goodneſs whereunto they are inclined. Example, Appius Claudius having lived long an enemy to the Multitude, hoping by their aid to continue his Authority of the Decemviri in Rome, became their Friend, and disfavored the factions of great men. Likewiſe Q. Fabius a man of ſingular vertue, being alſo called to that dignity by Appius ſelf, adulterated his nature and became like unto him.

Seldom or never is any people diſcontented without juſt cauſe; yet if happily they be asked whereof their offence proceedeth, many times for want of ſome fit man to pronounce their grief, they •• and ſilent. Example, The Romans at the death of Virginia, were gathered together armed upon Mount Sacr • and being asked by the Senate, for what cauſe they ſo did? no anſwer was made; until Virginio Father of the Virgin had procured, that twenty of the Tribunes might be made to be as head of the p • ople, and confer with the Senate.

A great Folly or rather meer Madneſs it ſeemeth to deſire any thing, and tell beforehand that the end and purpoſe of the deſire is evil; for thereby he ſheweth reaſon why it ought not to be granted. Example, The Romans required of the Senate that Appius and the reſt of the Decemviri ſhould be delivered into their hands, being determined to burn them all alive.

The firſt part of their requeſt ſeemed reaſonable, but the end thereof unreaſonable.

A courſe very dangerous it is in all States, by continual accuſing and puniſhing, to hold the Subject in doubt and daily fear: For he that ſtands always looking for ſome trouble, becometh careleſs and apt to attempt innovation. Example, The Dec • mviri being oppreſt, the Tribunes authoriſed in their place, endeavored daily to call in queſtion the moſt part of the Dec • mviri, and many other Citizens alſo, whereof great inconveniences aroſe, and much danger would have enſued, had not a Decree propounded by M. Duillius been made, that for one year no Roman Citizen ſhould be accuſed.

Strange it is to ſee how men in ſeeking their own ſecurity, lay the injuries which they fear u • on other men; as though it were neceſſary, either to offend or be offended. Example, The Romans among themſelves, united and ſtrong, always endeavored to offend the Nobles; and the Nobles likewiſe being perſwaded they were ſtrong, labored to oppreſs the people: Which humors were the cauſe of continual troubles.

To make eſtimation and choice of men fit to govern, the beſt courſe is to conſider in particular; otherwiſe it might be imagined • that among the Multitude or meaner people, they being the greateſt number, might be found ſome perſons of more perfection. Example, The people of Rome deſiring that the Conſulſhip might be given among them as men of moſt merit, did by all means endeavor to obtain that honor; but being come to election, and every mans vertue particularly conſidered, there could not be among the Multitude onel • one found fit for ſo great a place; and therefore the people themſelves conſented, that the dignity ſhould ſtill remain as it was.

To perſwade a Multitude to any enterpriſe, is eaſie, if that which is perſwaded, doth promiſe either profit or honor; yet oft under that external apparence li • s hid loſs or diſadvantage • Example, The Romans perſwading themſelves that the ſlow proceeding of F • bius Maximus in the War, was both chargable and cowardly, required • That the General of the Horſe might direct the War; which courſe had ruined Rome, if the wiſdom of Fabius had not been. Likewiſe when Hannibal had divers years raigned in Ital • , one M. Centenius Penula, a man of baſe birth, yet a Soldier o • ſome repute, undertook that if he with ſuch Volunti • rs as would follow him, might have authority to fight, he would within few days deliver Hannibal either alive or dead: Which offer was by the Senate accounted raſh, yet for fear to offend the people, granted; and Penula with his Soldiers was cut in pieces.

To appeaſe a Mutiny or Tumult in any Camp or City, there is no means more ſpeedy or ſucceſsful, then if ſome perſon of great quality and reſpect, preſent himſelf to the people, and by his wiſdom lay before them the damage of their Diſcords, perſwading them to Peace and Patience. Example, The faction of the • rateſchi and Arratiati in Florence; the one ready to aſſault the other. Franciſco Soderini Biſhop of V • terra in his Epiſcopal Habit, went between the parties and appeaſed them: Alſo Count Egremont by the Authority of his wiſdom and preſence, ſuppreſt a great mutiny in Antwerp between the Martiniſts and Papiſts.

A people corrupted, do rarely or never obſerve any Order or Ordinance, unleſs by force of ſome Princes power they be thereto inforced; but where the Multitude is incorrupt and religious, all things are done juſtly, and without compulſion. Example, Camillus at the victory againſt the Urienti, vowed that the tenth part of the pillage ſhould be offered to Apollo; but the Senate ſuppoſing that the people would not conſent to ſo great a Contribution, ſtudied to diſpence with that vow, and to pleaſe Apollo and the people alſo by ſome other means: Whereat the people ſhewed themſelves openly offended, and willingly gave no leſs then the ſum formerly decreed. When the Free-Cities of Germany are occaſioned to make money for any Publick Service, the Magiſtrates impoſe One or two in the hundred on every City, which done, every one is ſworn to lay down ſo much as in his own Conſcience he is able; and he with his own hand, no other witneſs being preſent, caſteth the money into a Coffer prepared for the purpoſe; which he would not, if his own Conſcience did not inforce him.

When any extraordinary occaſion happens to a City or Province, ſome prodigious voice is heard, or ſome marvellous ſights are ſeen. Before T. Gracchus General of the Roman Army was betraid by Flavius Lucanus, the Aruspices diſcovered two Serpents eating the Entrails of the Beaſts ſacrified; which done, they vaniſhed: which viſion as they divined, prognoſticated the Generals death: Likewiſe F. Savanar • la foretold the coming of King Charls the Eight into Italy: And M. Sedigitus when the Galls firſt came towards Rome, informed the Senate he heard a voice much londer then any mans, crying aloud, Galli veniunt.

The multitude of baſe people is naturally audacious and apt to innovation; yet unleſs they be directed by ſome perſons of Reputation and Wiſdom, rarely do they joyn in any action of great import. Example, The Romans when their City was taken and ſackt by the Galls, went to Veio with determination to dwell there: The Senate informed thereof, commanded that upon great pain, every Citizen ſhould return to Rome, whereat the people at firſt mocked; but when every man particularly within himſelf conſidered his own peril, all in general determined to obey the Magiſtrates.

In the employment of Men for Service, neither Age nor Fortune ought ſo much to be regarded as Vertue; for yong men having made tryal of their valor, ſoon become aged, and thereby either unapt or unable to ſerve: Therefore well-governed Commonwealths, preferred Military Vertue before any other reſpect • . Example, Valerius G • rvinus with others made Conſul the Three and twentieth year of his age, and Pompey triumphed in his youth.

No wiſe or well adviſed Prince or other State will undertake without exceſſive Forces to invade the Dominions of any other Prince, unleſs he aſſure himſelf of ſome Friends there to be a Mean, and as it were a Gate to prepare his paſſage. Example, The Romans by aid of the Sagu • tines entred Spain, the Aetoli called them into Greece, the H • diai into France: Likewiſe the Palaeologi incited the Turk to come into Thrace; and Ludovicus Sforza occaſioned Charls the French King to come into Italy.

A Republick deſirous to extend the bounds thereof, muſt endeavor to be fully furniſhed with Inhabitants, which may be done both by Love and Force: Love is gained by ſuffering ſtrangers to inhabit the City ſecurely; and Force compels people to come thither, when other Cities and Towns near at hand be demoliſhed or defaced: And impoſſible it is without this order of proceeding, to enlarge any City or make the ſame of greater power. Example, The Romans to enlarge their City demoliſhed Alba, and many other Towns, and therewith alſo entertained all ſtrangers courteouſly: So as Rome grew to ſuch greatneſs • that the City onely could arm Six hundred and forty thouſand men; but Sparta or Athens could never exceed Twenty thouſand, for that Lycurgus had inhibited the acceſs of ſtrangers.

A Commonwealth that conſumes more Treaſure in the War, then it profits in Victory, ſeems to have rather hindred then honored or inriched the State. A wiſe Captain therefore in his actions, ought as well to profit the Republick, as to gain to himſelf glory. Example, the Conſuls of Rome did ſeldom deſire Triumph, unleſs they returned from the War loaden with Gold, Silver, and other rich ſpoils fit to be delivered into the Common Treaſury.

All Foreign Wars with Princes or other States taken in hand, be either for Ambition or Deſire of glory, or elſe for neceſſity. Examples, the Romans for their Ambition conquered many Nations, with intent onely to have the obedience of the people; yet did they ſuffer them to hold poſſeſſion of their Houſes, and ſometimes they were permitted to live onely with their old Laws. Likewiſe Alexander the Great endeavored to ſuppreſs many Princes for his glory, but did not diſpoſſeſs the people, nor kill them.

Otherwiſe it is where a whole Nation • inforced by Famine or Fury of War, abandon their own dwellings, and are forced to inhabit elſwhere. Example, The G • ths and other people of the North invaded the Roman Empire, and many other Provinces, whereof their alteration of names did enſue; as Illyria now called Slavonia, England formerly named Britain.

A common conceit and ſaying it is • That Money makes the War ſtrong, and is the force and ſinews thereof; as though he who hath moſt Treaſure, be alſo moſt mighty; but experience hath apparently ſhewed the contrary. Example, After the death of Alexander, King of Macedon, a mul • itude of Galls went into Greece, and being there arived, ſent certain Ambaſſadors to the King, who ſuppoſing to make them afraid of his power, ſhewed them his treaſure, which wrought a contrary effect; for the Galls before deſirous of Peace, reſolved then to continue the War, in hope to win that mighty maſs of Money • Likewiſe Darius ſhould have vanquiſhed Alexander, and the Greeks might have conquered the Romans, if the richer Prince might ever by his Money have prevailed.

Every League made with a Prince or Republick remote, is weak and rather aideth us with Fame then Effect, and conſequently deceiveth all thoſe that in ſuch Amity repoſe Confidence. Example, The Florentines being aſſaulted by the King of Naples and the Pope, prayed aid of the French King, who being far diſtant, could not in time ſuccor them; and the Cedicini deſiring aid of the Capuani againſt the Samnits, a people of no force, were deceived.

A Prince whoſe people is well armed and trained, ſhall do better to attend his enemy at home, then by invaſion to aſſault his Countrey: But ſuch Princes whoſe Subjects are diſarmed, had need to hold the enemy aloof. Example, The Romans, and in this age the Swiſſes, being well armed, may attend the War at home; but the Carthaginians and Italians being not ſo well furniſhed, did ever uſe to ſeek the enemy.

The Plurality of Commanders in equal Authority, is for the moſt part occaſion of ſlow proceeding in the War. Example, There was at one time in Rome created four Tribuni Militares with authority of Conſuls, viz. T. Quintu • after his Conſulſhip, Cajus Furius, M. Poſthumus, and A. Cornelius Caſſus, amongſt whom aroſe ſo much diverſity and contrariety of opinion, as nothing could be done till their authority ceaſed, and M. Ae • ylius made Dictator.

A Victory obtained by any great Captain with the Authority of his Princes Commiſſion, Counſel, and Directions, ought ever to be imputed rather to the wiſdom of the Prince, then the valor of the Captain: Which made the Emperors of Rome to permit no Captains (how great ſoever his victories were) to Triumph, as before that time the Conſuls had done; and even in thoſe days a modeſt refuſal of Triumph was commended. Example, M. Fulvius having gained a great victory againſt the Tuſcans, was both by the conſent of the Senate and people of Rome, admitted to Triumph; but the refuſal of that Honor proved his greater glory.

All they that from private eſtate have aſpired to Principality, either by Force or Fraud become thereunto, unleſs the ſame be given, or by inheritance deſcended: Yet it is rarely ſeen, that Force alone prevaileth, but Fraud without Force oft times ſufficeth. Example, Agathocles by ſuch means became Prince of Syracuſa; John Galeazzo by abuſing his Uncle Barnabas, gained the Dominion of Lombardy; and Cyrus circumvented Cyaxares his Mothers Brother, and by that craft aſpired to greatneſs.

Sudden Reſolutions are always dangerous; and no leſs peril enſueth of ſlow and doubtful delays. Example, When Hieron Prince of Syracuſa died, the War even then being in great heat between the Romans and Carthaginians, they of Syracuſa conſulted, whether it were better to follow the Fortune of Rome or Carthage. In which doubt, they continued until Apollonides a chief Captain of Syracuſa laid before them • that ſo long delay would make them hated both of Romans and Carthaginians. Likewiſe the Florentin • s being by Lewis the Twelfth required to give his Army paſſage towards Naples, muſed ſo long upon anſwer, that he became their enemy, and they forced to recover his favor full dearly.

To govern a State is nothing elſe but to take ſuch order as the Subjects may not, or ought not offend; which may be done, either by removing from them all means to diſobey, or by affording them ſo great favors, as reaſonably they ought not to change their Fortune; for the mean courſe proveth dangerous. Example, the Latins being by the valor of Camillus overcome, yeelded themſelves to endure what puniſhment it pleaſed the Romans to inflict.

An ingenious and magnanimous anſwer being made unto wiſe Magiſtrates, doth oft obtain both Pardon and Grace. Example, When the Privernates had rebelled, and were by force conſtrained to return to the obedience of the Romans, they ſent certain of the City unto Rome to deſire pardon; who being brought before the Senate, one of the Senators asked the Privernates, what puniſhment themſelves did think they had deſerved: The ſame, quoth they, which men living in freedom, think they are worthy of. Whereto the Conſul thus replied, Quid ſi p • enam remittimus? Qualem nos pacem vobiſcum habituros ſperemus? The P • ivernates anſwered, Si bonam dederitis, & fidel • m & perpetuam: Si malam, haud diuturnam. Which anſwer was thought to proceed from generous men, and therefore they were not onely pardoned, but alſo honored and received into the number of the Roman Citizens.

All Caſtles, Fortreſſes, and Places of ſtrength, be made for defence either againſt the enemy or Subject: In the firſt caſe they are not neceſſary, in the ſecond dangerous. For thereby the Prince may at his pleaſure take occaſion to inſult upon the Subject • when much more ſeemly he might ſettle his eſtate upon the love and good affection of Men. Example, The Caſtle of Millan made by Duke Franciſco •• orza, incited his Heirs to become inſolent; and conſequently they became odious; which was alſo the cauſ • that ſo ſoon as that City was aſſaulted, the enemy with facility did poſſeſs it.

That Prince or Potentate which builds his Severity rather upon the truſt he hath in Fortreſſes, then the love of Men, ſhall be deceived: For no place is ſo ſtrong, as can long defend it ſelf, unleſs by the love and aid of Men it be in time of neceſſity ſuccored. Example, Pope Julio having drawn the Bentivoli out of Bologna, built there a ſtrong Caſtle; the Governor thereof robbed the people, and they therewith grieved, in a ſhort time took the Caſtle from him. So after the revolt of Genoa, Lewis the Twelfth came to the recovery thereof, and builded there the ſtrongeſt Fortification of Italy, as well for ſite as the circumſtances inexpugnable. Nevertheleſs the Citizens rebelled, and within ſixteen moneths the French were forced to yield the Caſtle and Government to Octavio Fragoſa.

To build Forts upon places of ſtrength, either for defence of our own, or to hold that which is taken from others, hath ever proved to ſmall purpoſe. Example, The Romans having ſuppreſt the Rebellion of the Latins and Privernates; albeit they were people Warlike, and lovers of Liberty; yet to keep them Subject, built there no Caſtles, nor other places fortified: And the Lacedemonians did not onely forbear to fortifie the Towns they conquered, but alſo left their cheif City of Sparta unwalled.

The neceſſity or uſe of Fortification, is onely upon Frontires or ſuch principal places where Princes make their Habitation; to the end the fury of ſudden aſſaults may be ſtaid, and time for ſuccor entertained: Otherwiſe, example, the Caſtle of Millan being made to hold the State in obedience, could not ſo do either for the houſe of Sforzi or France. Guido Ʋbaldo, Duke of Velin, driven from his Dominion by Caeſar Borgia, ſo ſoon as he recovered his Countrey, cauſed all the Forts to be demoliſhed: For by experience he found the love of Men was the ſureſt defence, and that Fortifications prevailed no leſs againſt him then for him.

The cauſes of Diviſion and Faction in every Commonweal proceed moſt commonly of Idleneſs and Peace, and that which uniteth, is Fear and War. Example, The Vejenti and Elinſci having intelligence of great contention between the Nobility and People of Rome, thought that a fit opportunity to oppreſs the one and the other: But the Romans informed of ſuch an intention, appeaſed all Domeſtick anger, and by the Valor of their Arms conducted by Gn. Manlius and M. Fabius defeated the Enemies Forces.

The means to uſurpe an eſtate disjoynted is firſt before Arms be taken, to become as it were an Arbitrator or a friend indifferent; and after Arms be taken, then to ſend moderate aid to the weak ſide, as well to entertain the War between the Factions, as alſo to conſume the ſtrength both of the one, and the other, yet in no wiſe to employ any great forces, for thereby either party may diſcover the intents to ſuppreſs them. Example, The City of Piſtoia fallen into diviſion, the Florentines took occaſion ſometimes to favor the one, and ſome times the other, that in the end both ſides weary of the War, voluntarily yeilded to their devotion. Philippo Viſcount, hoping ſundry times by occaſion of Faction to oppreſs the Fl • rentin •• , did often aſſault them with great forces, which was the cauſe that they became reunited; and conſequently the Duke deceived of his expectation

A great Wiſdom it is to refrain Opprobriousand Injurious ſpeech: for as neither the one nor the other can an • whit decreaſe the Enemies force, ſo doth it move him to greater hate, and more deſire to offend. Example, Gabides a General of the Perſians having long beſieged Amida, became weary, and preparing to abandon the enterpriſe, raiſed his Camp, which they of the City beholding, began to revile the Perſians, and from the Walls reproved them of Cowardiſe; which undiſcreet words ſo highly offended G • bides, as thereupon he reſolved to continue the ſiege, and within few daies wun the City. Tiberi • s Grac • hus appointed Captain of certain bands of men, whom for want of other Soldiers the Romans entertained, proclamed in his Camp, that no man upon pain of death ſhould contumeliouſly call any Soldier ſlave, either in earneſt or jeſt. Nam fac • tiae aſperae quando nimium ex vero traxere, acrem ſui memoriam relinquunt. Likewiſe Alexander the great having conquered well near all the Eaſt, brought his forces before Tyre, they fearing Alexanders fury, offered upon honorable conſiderations to yeild him obedience, only requiring, that neither he nor any of his forces ſhould enter the City, which motion after four Moneths Alexander accepted, and ſo ſignified by his Ambaſſador who arriving in Tyre was by the proud Citizens ſlain, whereat Alexander grew into Choler and being ready to forſake the ſiege, ſtaid his forces, and in the end ſacked the City and put the people to the ſword.

A Prince or any other State being aſſaulted by an Enemy of far more puiſſance then himſelf, ought not to refuſe any honorahle compoſitions, chiefly when they are offered • for no conditions can be ſo baſe, but ſhall in ſome ſort turn to the advantage and honor of him that accepts them. Example, Anno 1512. certain Florentines procured great forces of Spaniards to come thither, as well to repoſeſs the Medici then baniſht, as alſo to ſack the City; promiſing that ſo ſoon as the Army of Spain did come into the Florentine dominion, the faction of Medici would be ready armed to receive them. But the Spaniards being come, found no forces at all to joyn with them; and therefore wanting victual, offered compoſition. The Florentines finding the Enemy diſtreſſed grew inſolent and refuſed peace, whereof followed the loſs of Prato, and many other inconveniencies. The like happened to them of Tyre, as before.

The denial or delay of Juſtice deſired in revenge of injuries either publick or privately offered, is a thing very dangerous to every Prince or other State, for that the party injured doth oft by indirect meanes though with hazard of his country and himſelf ſeek ſatisfaction: Example, the complaint which the Galli made againſt the Fabii who ſent Ambaſſadors in favor of the Toſſani, not being heard, nor any puniſhment inflicted upon them for fighting againſt the Law of Nations, was the cauſe that the Galli were offended with the States, whereof followed the ſack of Rome; and the delay of Juſtice in Philip of Macedon, for not revenging the inceſtuous oppreſſion of Attalus to Pauſanias, was the motive to murther that King.

Whoſo endeavors the alteration of any State, muſt of neceſſity proceed with all ſeverity, and leave ſome memorable example to thoſe that ſhall impunge the Ordinance of Government newly ſettled. Example, when Junius Brutus had by his great valor baniſht the Tarquins, and ſworn the People that no King ſhould ever raign in Rome: within ſhort time after, many young Nobles, among whom was Brutus ſon, impatient of the equality of the new government, conſpired to recall the Tarquins; but Brutus thereof informed, cauſed his own ſon not only to be condemned to death, but was himſelf preſent at the execution.

As health and ſoundneſs of the hands, legs, and other outward members cannot continue life, unleſs the heart and vital ſpirits within be ſtrong and firm; ſo fortifications and Frontier-defences do not prevail, unleſs the whole Corps of the Kingdom and People be well armed: Example, when the Emperor came into • tal • , and had with ſome difficulty paſt the confines of the Venetians welnear without reſſiſtance; his army marcht to Venice, and might doubtleſs have poſſeſt the City, had it not been defended with water. Likewiſe the Engliſh in their aſſault of France, excepting a few encounters on the Frontires, found no puiſſant reſiſtance within the Realm. And Anno 1513 they forced all that State, and the King himſelf to tremble, as oft before they had done; but contrariwiſe the Romans knowing that life lay in the heart, ever held the body of their State ſtrongeſt: for the nearer the enemy approacht Rome, the better they found the Countrey armed and defended.

The deſire to command ſoveraignly is of ſo great force, as doth not only work in thoſe that are in expectation of principality, but alſo in them that have no title at all. Example, this appetite moved the wife of Ta • quinius Priſcus contrary to all natural duty to incite her husband to murder her own Father Servius, and poſſeſſe his Kingdom, as b • ing perſwaded it were much more honorable to be a Queen then to be the daughter of a King.

The violation of ancient Laws, Orders, and Cuſtoms, under which people have long time lived, is the chief an • only cauſe whereby Princes hazard their Eſtate and Royal Dignity. Example albeit the deflowring of Lucrece was the occaſion, yet was it not the cauſe that moved the • omans to take arms againſt Tarquin; for he h • ving before that fact of Sex • us his Son, governed Tyrannically, and taken from the Senate all Authority, was become odious both to the Senate, Nobility, and People, who finding themſelves well governed, never ſeek or wiſh any other liberty or alteration.

A Prince that deſires to live ſecure from conſpiracy, hath cauſe rather to fear thoſe on whom he hath beſtowed over great riches and honors, then thoſe whom he hath greatly injured; becauſe they want meanes to offend; the other have many opportunities to do it. Example, Perennius the Prime favorite of • ommodus the Emperor conſpired his death • Plantianus did the like to S • verus, and S • janus to Tiberius; for being advanced to ſo great honors, riches, and Offices as nothing remained deſirable but the Imperial title, they conſpired againſt the perſons of their Soveraigns in hope of the dignity; but in the end they endured that puniſhment which to ſuch diſloyalty and ingratitude appertaineth.

An Army which wants Experience, albeit the Captain be expert, is not greatly to be feared • neither ought an Army of well traind Soldiers to be much eſteemed, whoſe Captain is ignorant. Example, Caeſar going into Africa againſt Afranius and Petraeus whoſe army was full of old Soldiers, ſaid he feared them little, Quia ibat ad exercitum ſine duce. Contrariwiſe, when he went to P • arſalia to encounter Pompey, he ſaid, Ibo ad duce • ſine exercitu.

A Captain-General commanding an Army ought rather to governe with curteſie and mildneſs, then with over-much auſterity and ſeverity. Example, Q. and Appius Claudius being Conſuls, were appointed to govern the War. To Q. was allotted one Army which ſerved very dutifully; but Appius commanding the other with great cruelty, was by his Soldiers unwillingly obeyed. Nevertheleſs Tacitus ſeems of contrary opinion, ſaying, Plus poena quam obſequium val • t.

Therefore to reconcile theſe different Conceits, I ſay, that a General having power to command men, either they are confederates or Subjects: If confederates or voluntaries, he may not proceed to e • tream puniſhment; if Subjects, and his power abſolute, they may be governed otherwiſe • yet with ſuch reſpect, as the inſolence of the General inforce not the Soldiers to hate him.

Honor may ſometime be got as well by the loſs as gaining of victory. Every man knoweth glory is due to the Victor, and we deny not the ſame priviledge to the vanquiſhed, being able to make proof that the loſs proceeded not from his default. Neither is it diſhonorable to violate thoſe promiſes whereto the neceſſity or diſadvantage of War inforceth. And forced promiſes which concern a whole State, are not binding, and rarely or never kept, nor is the Breaker thereby to receive diſgrace. Example, Poſthumus the Conſul having made a diſhonorable peace with the Samnits, was by them with his whole Army ſent home diſarmed. Being arived at Rome, the Conſul informed the people they were not bound to perform the baſe conditions he was compelled to yield unto; albeit, he and thoſe few that promiſed, were bound to perform them. The Senate thereupon concluded to ſend him priſoner to Samno, where he conſtantly proteſted the fault to be onely his own; wherefore the people by that peace incurred no diſhonor at all: And Fortune ſo much favored Poſthumus, as the Samnites were content preſently to return him to Rome; where he became more glorious for loſing the Victory, then was Pontius at Samno for having won the victory.

Wiſe men have long obſerved • that who ſo will know what ſhall be, muſt conſider what is paſt; for all worldly things hold the ſame courſe they had at • irſt. The reaſon is, that as long as men are poſſeſt with the ſame Paſſions with former ages, conſequently of theſe doings the ſame effects enſue. Example, The Almains and French have ever bin noted for their Avarice, Pride, Fury, and Infidelity, and ſo in divers ages, experience hath proved even to this preſent: For perfidious dealing the French have given ſufficient proof, not onely in ancient times, but alſo in the time of Charls the Eighth, who promiſed to render to the Florentines the Forts of Piſa • but having divers tim •• received money, held them notwithſtanding in poſſeſſion. The Florentines found the like in the Almains • for in the Wars of the Viſconti, Dukes of Milan, they prayed aid of the Emperor, who promiſed them great forces; in conſideration whereof • he was to receive of the Florentines One hundred thouſand Crowns in hand, and as much more when his Army was arived in Italy, both which payments were performed; but as ſoon as the Emperor came to Verona, he deviſed cavillations of unkindneſs, whereupon he returned home.

A Prince deſirous to obtain any thing of another, muſt if occaſion ſo permit, urge his demand ſo earneſtly and preſs for ſo ſudden and preſent anſwer, as he who is preſt may not have leiſure to conſider how to excuſe himſelf in denial. Example▪ Pope Julio endeavored to drive out of Bologna all the Bentivoli in which action he thought the aid of the French neceſſary, and that the Venetians ſhould ſtand neutral; and by divers meſſengers did ſollicite them to that effect; but not receiving any reſolute anſwer, he thought fit with thoſe few forces he had to take his journey to Bol • gna, whereupon the Venetians advertiſed him they would remain neutral, and the French King forthwith ſent him forces as fearing the Popes indignation; likewiſe the Tuſcans having formerly deſired aid of the Samnites againſt the Romans, took Armes ſuddenly and obtained their requeſt which the Samintes had before denied.

When a multitude offendeth, all may not be puniſht, becauſe they are too many: to puniſh part and leave the reſt unpuniſht, were injurie to the ſufferers; and to thoſe that eſcape, an encouragement to offend again; therefore to eſchew all extremity, mean courſes have bin anciently uſed. Example, When all the Wives of the Romans conſpired to poyſon their Husbands, a convenient number of them were puniſht, and the reſt ſuffered to paſs▪ Likewiſe at the conſpiracy of the Bacchanals in the time of the Macedonian War, wherein many thouſands Men and Women had part, every tenth perſon only was put to death by lot; although the offence were general, by which manner of puniſhing, he that ſuffered, complaind on his fortune; and he that eſcaped, was put in feare that offending again, the ſame puniſhment might light upon himſelf, and therefore would no more offend.

A Battel or great action in Armes ought not to be enterpriſed without ſpecial Commiſſion or Command from the Prince, otherwiſe the General incurs great danger, Example▪ Papyrius the Dictator puniſht the General of the horſe in the Roman Army, for having fought without his conſent, although he had in battaile ſlain 20000 Enemies without loſs of 200 of his own, and Caeſar commended his Captain Silanus for having refrained to fight, though with great advantage he might. Alſo Count Egmont hazarded the favor of the King his Maſter for giving battel to Marſhall de Thermes, albeit he were victorious: for upon the ſucceſs of that action the loſs or or ſafety of all the Low Countries depended.

To govern without Council is not only dangerous in Ariſtocracies and Popular States, but unto independent Princes an occaſ • on of utter ruine. Example, Hieron the firſt King of Sicile in all his proceedings uſed the advice of Counſels, and lived fifty years proſperouſly in Peace, but his grandchild ſucceding, refuſing all Counſell loſt his Kingdom, and was with all his Kinsfolk and Friends cruelly ſlain.

In all Monarchies the Senate or privyCouncil is or ought to be compoſed of perſons of great dignity, or men of approved wiſdom and underſtanding. Example, In Polonia no man is Counſellor unleſs he be a Palatine, a Biſhop, a C • ſt • llan, a Captain, or ſuch a one as hath bin Ambaſſador▪ and in Turky the title of Counſellor is not given but only to the four Baſſaes. the two Cad • leſquir • s, the twelve Beglerbegs, and Kings ſon, who in his Fathers abſence, is as it were • a preſident of the Divano or Senate.

Many Princes Ancient and Modern have uſed to ſelect out of their Council, two or three or four at moſt to whom only they did impart their affairs. Example, The Emperor Auguſtus had Maec • nas and Agrippa, Julius Caeſar, Q • aedius and Cor. Balbus, whom he only truſted with his Cipher and ſecrets, being Counſellors of the Cabinet (as we now call them.)

The alteration of old Laws or introduction of new, are in all States very dangerous, notwithſtanding any appearance of profit or publick utility, which moved wiſe Governors to decree, that ancient Lawes once eſtabliſhed might never be called in queſtion. Example, The Athenians decreed that no Law ſhould be propounded to the people without the conſent of the Senate: the like uſe is obſerved in Venice where no Petition is prefered to the Senate but by advice of the Sages; and among the Locrians the Cuſtom was that whoſoever preſented any new Law to be confirmed, ſhould come with a halter about his Neck, and be therewith hanged if his requeſt were rejected; alſo Lycurgus to prevent the alteration of his Lawes, did ſweare the people of Sparta to obſerve them untill his return, and thereupon retired himſelf into voluntary exile, with intent never to returne.

When neceſſity or good reaſon moves Innovation or Abolition of Laws, a courſe more ſecure it is to do it rather by degrees then ſuddenly. Example, The Romans finding the Laws of the twelve Tables unprofitable, ſuffered them to be obſerved or neglected at diſcretion, but would not publickly ſuppreſs them for fear of calling other Laws into contempt: ſo did they continue 700 years, and were then caſſed by Ebutius the Tribune. But Agis King of Lacedemon deſirous to revive the Laws of Lycurgus, long diſcontinued, enforced all men to bring in their evidence and writings to be cancelled, to the end a new partition of Lands and Goods might be made, which ſuddain and violent proceeding proved ſo fatal, that it moved a dangerous ſedition, wherein he was depoſed and with his Mother and Friends put to death; which Example haply moved the Venetians not to attempt any thing againſt the Authority of Auguſtino Barberino their Duke: but after his death, and before the Election of Lovedono, the Signiory publiſht new Ordinances detractive from the Ducal Anthority.

Whoſo hath won to himſelf ſo great Love and Affection, as thereby to become maſter of the forces, and at his pleaſure commands the Subjects apt for Armes, may alſo without right or title aſſure himſelf of the whole Eſtate. Example, Hugh Capat a Subject to the Crown of France, being greatly honored by the Soldiers, found means thereby to prevent Charles Duke of Lorraine of the Crown, being right heire by deſcent from Charlemaine. And albeit the Families of the Paleologi, Ebrami and Turcani be of the blood Royall and Right Heires to the Turkiſh Empire, when the Ottaman Line ſhall faile; yet it is like that the cheif Baſſa having the love of the Janiſaries will uſurpe the State, becauſe the Paleologi and other Competitors be far from the Turks perſon, poor and without means to purchaſe the Soldiers favor.

A Commander General in Armes, ought upon paine of great puniſhment be enjoyned, not to imploy or retain any forces longer then the time of his Commiſſion. Example, The Dictators of Rome were in this point ſo preciſe, as never any of them dared to tranſgreſs the time prefixed, till Caeſar obtained that dignity ſhould continue in him for life: which was the cauſe of his uſurpation of the State. Alſo the Thebans commanded, that if the General of their Army did hold his forces one day longer then the time prefixt, he ſhould thereby incur danger of death: which Juſtice was executed upon Epaminondas and Pelopidas.

Baniſhment of great Lords, or Citizens of great Reputation, hath bin in divers places diverſly uſed: for in the one, they were inforced only to abſent themſelves without further infliction; in the other, Baniſhment was accompanied with Confiſcation, a courſe of great danger. Example, In Argos, Athens, Epheſus, and other Cities of Greece, the Citizens puiſſant in Friends, Vertue or Riches, were many times baniſht for envy or feare, but never or very rarely forced to abſent themſelves longer then Ten years; and that without loſs of goods, which was the cauſe that never any of them Warred againſt the Country: but Dion being baniſht Syracuſa by Dyonyſius Junior, and Coriolanus from Rome, did make mighty Wars againſt their own Country. The like was done by the Medici in Florence.

Honorable and Magnanimous men were wont, not only to enterpriſe great Acts, but alſo to ſuffer patiently al injuries which Foes or Fortune could expoſe them to: as reſolved, that no Calamity was ſo great as to make their minds abject, or to forget the dignity appertaing to perſons vertuous: Example. After the defeat of the R • man Army upon the River A •• ia, the Galli perſued the Victory even to Romes Walls: whither being come, and finding the gates open, without any ſigne of reſiſtance they entred the Streets, where all honorable Palaces were alſo unſhut, which cauſed the Galli greatly to doubt. Nevertheleſs looking into the houſes, they found in every of them a Senator ſet in a Chaire of State, and in his hand a Rod of Ivory; his perſon was alſo veſted with Robes of dignity, which Majeſtick ſpectacle did marvelouſly amate the Galli not having before that time ſeen any ſuch Reverend ſight; and therefore did not only refrain to offer violence, but highly admired the Roman Courage, cheifly in that Fortune. Nevertheleſs at length a rude Gall hapned with his hand to touch the white beard of M. Papyrius, whereat he taking great diſdain ſtruk him with his Rod, in requitall whereof the Barbarian ſlew Papyrius, and by that example all the other Senators and perſons of dignity were alſo ſlain.

Albeit the knowledge and ſtudy of Letters be both commendable and neceſſary in all well regulated States; yet if under ſo honeſt pretence, idleneſs enter, ſuch abuſes muſt ſeaſonably be foreſeen and removed. Example, When Diogenes and Carneades two excellent Philoſophers, were ſent Ambaſſadors from Athens to the Romans, many of the Nobility that before diſpoſed themſelves to Arms, allured with their Eloquence and marvellous wiſdom, began with great admiration to follow them: and in lieu of Armes, turned their endeavors to the ſtudie of Letters, which the wiſe Cato diſcerning, procured the Senate to decree that (to eſchew all inconveniences which ſo honeſt idleneſs might breed) no philoſophers ſhould from thenceforth be received into Rome.

The Honor due to Magiſtrates was anciently much regarded, and contrarywiſe all irreverent and undutifull behavior with great ſeverity puniſht. Example, The Cenſors of Rome degraded a Citizen only for having yawned loud in their preſence: and another called Vectius was ſlain in the field for not doing due reverence to a Tribune when he paſt by him It is alſo obſerved, that the ſon of Fab. Maximus when he was Cenſor, meeting his Father on horſeback, and ſeeing the Serjeants affraid to ſpeak to him to diſmount, did himſelf command him ſo to do, which Command the Father cheerfully and willingly obeyed, ſaying, Domeſtick power muſt give place to Publick Authority.

Tyrannous Princes having incurred the univerſal hate of people, found no meanes ſo meet to preſerve them from Popular fury, as to execute or deliver into their hands their own cheef Minions and intimate Counſellors. Example, Tiberius delivered to the People his favorite Seianus: Nero, Tig • llinus. Henry King of Swede committed to their fury his beſt beloved ſervant George Preſton; Caracaella cauſed all his flatterers to be ſlain that had perſwaded him to kill his brother • The like was done by Caligula, whereby he eſcaped himſelf.

A Prince that rewards or pardons a perſon that kills another Prince, albeit by that means he is aſpired to Soveraignty, ſhall thereby both incur great danger and hate, and encourage men therein to attempt the like againſt himſelf Therefore wiſe Princes have not only left ſuch ſervices quite unrecompenced, but alſo moſt ſeverely puniſhed them. Example. The Emperor Severus put all thoſe to death that conſented to the murder of Pertinax; and Alexander the great executed him that ſlew Darius, as abhorring that Subject that would lay violent hands on his Prince, notwithſtanding he were an enemy. Likewiſe Uitellius put to death all the Murderers and conſpirators againſt Galba; and Domitian executed his Secretary Epaphroditus for the Murder of Nero, although he inſtantly deſired his aid.

The vertuous and vitious examples of Princes incite Subjects to imitate the ſame Qualities; which rule never or very rarely fails. Example, Francis the Firſt King of France, and other Princes in divers ages and places, had great eſteem of Learned Men; and forthwith all the Princes, Nobles, Nobility, and Clergy, diſpoſed themſelves ſo earneſtly to ſtudy, as before that time had not been ſeen ſo many and ſo great a number of Learned Men, as well in Tongues as Sciences. Contrariwiſe, Alexander the Great, otherwiſe a Prince of great vertue, by his immoderate uſe of drinking, did draw the greateſt number of his Court and people alſo to delight in drunkenneſs. The like effect followed the exceſſive intemperance of Mithridates, King of Amaſia.

The laſt and not the leaſt conſiderable, is to obſerve how great effects Devotion and Contempt of Humane glory worketh in the mindes not onely of private perſons, but of Kings and Princes alſo, who have oft abandoned worldly Profit, Honor, and Pleaſure, to embrace the contemplative retired life. Example, Rami • us King of Aragon, Verecundus King of Spain, Charlemain Son of Carolus Martellus, Matilda Queen of France, Amurath K. of Turbay, with many others. Imperio Maximus, exemplo Major.