The First Quere answered.

SVPPOSING heere, as a tenet vndeniable by any Catholicke, That the faithfull may with­out breach of Conscience, conclude and obser­ueVide Bonu­ [...]in. tom. 2. d. 3. q. 2. p. 8. Turrian. do iust. & iur. d. 87. dub. 2. Layman. & Becan. infrae citandos Cessations of Armes, yea constant leagues, and peace with infidells, and Hereticks: whe­reof wee see before our eyes, most warrantable presidents, euen in holy scriptures, & practice of the Saints of God; as that of AbrahamGen. 21. v. 27. with Abimeleck; of IosuaIosue, 9. v. 9.15. with the Gabbaonits; of Samuel with the Ammorrhits1. Reg. 7. v. 15.; of many faithfull kings of Iuda4. Reg. 3.2 Paralip. 16. v. 3. &. 18.3. & 36. 1. Reg. 28.29 with the Idolaters of Israel, or Sa­maritans; & of the valiant Machabees1. Maccab. 10. v. 6.44 & 12.43 & 2. Ma [...] 11. v. 15. &. 14. v. 23.24.25. (who in their time were the Champions of Religion & approued by God) with the Romanes, Spartiats, & some successors of Alexander, to whom they gaue donaries, & whose Regallity they acknow­ledged: whereof also wee haue for so many ages, the al­waies allowed practice of almost all Christian Catholick PrincesKnoul [...]s Turk. hist. & States; of the Emperour of Constantinople & Germany, the Kings of Hungary, Poland, France, the State of Venice, & many other Catholick Princes with the Turks; of the Kings of SpaineVindicia Gallicae. with the Moors of Siuill, Granado, Valentia &c; of St. Gregory the great, Pope of Rome with the Arrian LongobardsBarron. & Spond. ad an. 598.; of Charl [...]s the fift no lesse mighty then religious Emperour, & of his successours with the Lu­theransAuctar. Chro. ad an­al. Baron. ad an 1547. & Hist. Turc. in Achmat. of Germany, with Henry the 8. excommunicated, & with Denmarke, Holland, Scotland, Sueland, &c; Finally of the most Christian Kings of France with HugonotsSurius ad an. 1567.:

Supposing likewise another vndoubted truth, mantained by all Diuines, who ever yet put pen to paper, as BeacanBecan in Opuscul. Theol. de Fide Haeret. t. 7. & Lateran. Constant. Trid. apud eundem in Miscellanijs. Idem in sum. Theol [...]h eod. tit. quaest. 1. 2. 4. 5. Bonac. tom. 2. disp. 3. q. 2. pu. 8. §. 2. Turrian. de Iustitia [...] Iure. d. 87. dub. 2. aduertised (& conformable to the decrees of 3. Generall Councels) to wit, That tis not lawfull to breake contracts made with, or publick faith giuen to Hereticks, nor to fall from Cessations, or peace concluded with them, while the [Page 7] conditions are performed, and the time unexpired,); no, not even in case religion did seeme notably endamaged by their obseruation, as Molanus Layman. l. 2. tract. 3. ca. 12. con. 4 Ioa. Mol. de Fid. haereticis ser. cap. 14 and Layman expresly hold, and excellently prove hence, That no evill so great can hap­pen religion out of their obseruation as the scandall & con­sequences would arise out of the contrary position, if it were mantained & practised by Catholickes as true or conscio­nable;Verba Layma. Dico IV. Si Ca­tholici cum hae­reticis publicū foedus ineant, non potest per auctoritatem Pontificiam solvi, aut relaxari. Haec est doctrina à Ioanne Mo­lano praecipué intenta. Probatur: Licet enim, si quaedam praecisé spectentur, videlicet quod hae­retici propter Baptismū, Ecclesiasticae iurisdictioni subiecti sunt; & ob odium ac poenam ipsorum, iure compellantur ad remissionem foederis in Ecclesiae detrimentum cedentis: aut, si recusent, ipsis etiam invitis relaxatio fieri queat, per supremam Ecclesiasticam potestatem; attamen, spectatis omnibus, adeòque absoluté negari debet, id à summo Pontifice fieri posse. Quando­quidem is non habet potestatem dispensandi aut relaxandi in detrimentū Ecclèsiae; talis autem, relaxatio cederet in gravissimum Ecclesiae detrimentum: quia cúm haeretici Catholicae Fidei hostes, in omni foedere cum Catholicis inito exclusam velint Papalem relaxandi potestatem; ideo apud ipsos, & omnes nationes infideles blasphemabitur nomen Domini, & Religio Ca­tholica in contemptum veniet, & plura mala ingentia sequentur, si dicatur, nos cum Ponti­ficis nostri consensu, foedera publica, contra ius gentium, erga hostes nostros violare. Hoc au­tem tam grave malum est, ut nullum incommodum seu detrimentum Ecclesiae Catholicae, ex foederis observatione inferendum, ita magnum videri debeat sperantibus in Deo, & Christo summo Ecclesiae defensore, qui auxilium sort in tempore opportuno. Verúm haretici huius temporis Calvinistae egregié astuti sunt. Vt enim impunè ipsis liceat pacta cum Catholicis inita violare, causam praetexunt, quód Iesuitae, & alij Catholici do­ceant, fidem haereticis (quales se esse conscientia ipsis dictat) servandam esse: talibus autem, qui fidem violare parati sunt, fidem servari non oportere: cúm tamen interim fidem publicam à Catholicis violatam fuisse, nullo exemplo oftendere possint, multó minùs, quod Catholici Do­ctores in ea, quam dicunt, sententia sint, Fidem haereticis servand am non esse. Ecce enim tam Iesustae, quam alij Doctores Catholici contrarium apertè profitentur ac docent: fidem publicam haereticis datam, inviolabiliter, & sine ullo dispensationis, aut absolutionis reme­dio servandam esse, quamdiu ipsi servare parati sint. out of which doctrine these great diuines most soundly & religiously infer that even his Holinesse cannot dispense in this straight tye of fidelity:

Supposing (we say) both these tenets as they cannot but be uncontroulably admitted, our answer to the first question is, That sithence it is manifest by what is said, how a truce, league or peace with enemies of our faith, is not in it selfe unlawfull, especially where eyther the necessity or profit or advancement of the affaires of true Religion expected thence doe warrant it, and since it is no lesse cleere, how its against conscience to [Page 8] fall, contrary to promise given, from such publicke contracts, or faith engaged, since likewise none of the articles of Cessa­tion with the Lord of Inchiquyn (eyther in their owne nature, according any common or proper sense the words may have, or taken together with the circumstances of the time & condi­tion the Confederats were in at their conclusion) involves any evill, we must confesse and averre none of the said articles to be against Catholicke Religion, or iust ground for Excommunica­tion; this just ground implying in it selfe an evill (and a mor­tall evillSuar. tom. 5. de Censu. disp. 4 sect. 4. & alij omnes. or sin) according to the unanimous consent of all Divines, yea an exterior and visibleSee the Do­ctors on Bulla Coena, where they treat of ex communication against Here­tickes. Reade likewise the Di­vines in their treatises of laws and where they inquire whether interior acts of the minde may be commaunded or prohibited, or whether the sins of the heart, as wicked intentiōs &c, not sufficiēt­ly discovered in the exteriour, may be puni­shed by holy Church, as with Excommunica­tion or otherwise? and they answer negatiuely. Lay­man. l. 1. de leg. tract. 4. cap. 4. assert. 7. cites thē in great num­bers. And indeed the very Canons expresly define this truth, cap. Sicut. de Simon. & cap. Tua nos. eodem titul. sin, as they teach. And that no such evill lyeth hidden in these articles, or any thing disadvantagious to Catholicke Religion, wee are certainely per­swaded it may be evident to any that will take away the filme.

First, because there is not a word in them eyther po­sitively (as it is manifest) or negatively (if all the cir­cumstances be considered) against Religion, justice, or good life: and, which is farre more, that by the second and fifth, spe­ciall provision is made for the advancement of Faith and Ver­tue throughout all the said Lord of Iuchiquyns quarters, (a few Garrisons excepted) by free exercise of Catholicke Religion and function (yea by possession of Churches and Church li­vings, where we held them at the comencement of the trea­ty) in as ample manner as in our owne quarters. VVhich que­stionlesse is no small advantage to Religion, and which could not be acquired by warre hitherto, though the hazard cost much bloud, and many lives to the Confederats.

Secondly in regard of the then present great necessity of our affaiers: the power of the enemy so encreased in all parts of the Kingdome & particularly in Mounster; all ports, besides five or sixe, and maritime places of any consequence in the whole Iland (which are at least twenty) being in their hands; neere two parts of three of the in-land being eyther in their quiet possession or forraged by them, & under contribution; their Armies victorious, their Fleet giving lawes to us at Sea, and shutting up our Havens; two vast Kingdomes, within sixe (or twelve houres sayle, the furthest of) to backe them, to support their charges, and repayre their losses: and on the other side, the Confederats fallen to such an ebb, and sad con­dition: [Page 9] our two most flourishing Armies defeated, and brought to nothing; our quarters over-run by foure severall enemies, burnt, wasted, and for no lesse then a third part of what was ours intirely even last yeare, made now tributary: our owne forces of the Vlster army devouring what was left by the common enemie, and in hostile-wise destroying all pla­ces which by others were untoucht, and which before this crueltie were able to, and really did support the most conside­rable proportions of the charges of warre; our Exchequer hence both emptie, and altogether hopelesse to get in mo­neys from a countrey so totally exhausted, and so lamentably ruined; our expectations of great summes and helpes from beyond Seas, being turnd to winde, smoake and despayre, for any thing hath yet appeared; or if some little quantitie be come, it being feared, that it should be given for maintayning sides, and supporting factions against the Government (as we have seene in effect proved;) no common Granaries for the Publicke, and but verie small store of graine with any privat persons, in so great a dearth of corne, as Ireland hath not seene in our memorie, and so cruell a famine, which hath al­readie killed thousands of the poorer sort; and therefore no possibilitie to keepe an Armie in the field, though no other want had beene but that of bread, and if enemies were (as hi­therto) comming on us from the foure windes; lastly so much dissention, such distance, and such malignant hatred twixt our selves within the body of the Confederats, as the wi­ser sort did (not without cause) conceave to be too ominous, and to weaken us no lesse then could the strongest Armie of our enemies: an ebb so low, and a condition so sad of the Con­federates, that according humane hopes there was no like­lyhood without a Cessation with some one partie, they might subsist this Summer eyther by a defensive warre in all the Pro­vinces, or an offensive in one, and a defensive in the rest. Yet by the Cessation they might be so enabled, that according much probabilitie, Religion might be planted this season where He­resie is most insolent and powerfull of any place in the King­dome. For, if that partie of the Confederats which now op­poseth the Cessation, were obedient, & together with the for­ces of the Marquesse of Clanrickard (drawne by this Cessation [Page 10] from a Neuter to a Confederate, or at least to a sociall warre against his Maiesties enemies) and of the Lords, Taffe, Pre­ston, and Inchiquyn (nay should Inchiquyn stay at home and give no helpe, but onely forbeare annoying us) should, (we say) the foresaid Lords and forces march against the Scots and Dublin, who sees not but by the helpe of this Cessation, Faith and Religion might in many places be planted this Summer on the ruines of Heresie? And hence it is, that

Thirdly it is cleere, The Cessation is so far from disaduan­taging Religion, as there could hardly be a better way thou­ght of to further it. Whence followeth, that not onely necessi­tie (which hath bene now declared) but also vtilitie or great aduantage gotten by it for the Cause doth warrant it; since by the Articles Inchiquin himselfe, with his victorious Army, is bound to display these colours for vs, which soe many times we groaned to see against vs. More indeed then the nature of a Cessation draweth alonge with it: and (if it be taken together with the former benefit of the second & fift Article, & with the care had, that the Lord of Inchiquins Protestant party should not enioye the like benefit or liberty of either their function or Religion in our quarters) more, it is plai­ne, to the honour & profit of our Faith, then the greatest & most Catholick Kings, & Emperours performed in the like occasions.

Certainly we know, the Kinge of Spaine hath (to pass over the present peace, so longe exspected & so much spoken of) almost in our owne memory concluded a truce of twelue yea­res with the Hollanders Auctarium Chron. ad ānal. Barronij, ad an. 1 [...]9.; & yet no such libertie obtained for the Catholique Religion with in their quarters. Nay we know, That the most powerful & most vertuous Charles the fifth, Kinge of Spaine & Emperour of Germanie, though his Kingdomes were so vast, his forces both at sea & land so great, his treasures so inexhaustible, & himselfe so victori­ous, yet to prouide for the safety of his estate, rather then to hazard too much with the Heretickes of Germany Idem ad an. 1 [...]47 & 1552. was contented, to giue them, by expresse article & acte of Par­ [...]ament, the free exercise of their Religion & function (even of that Religion which was presented by the Lutherans, & is cal­led Confessio Augustana) through-out all GermanyYet libertie of Religion is the very worst of evils, most repugnant to, & destructiue of Catholick faith, and of [...] ciuil gouerne­ment, and one­ly out of meer necessiti [...] to be permitted. Be­can. in Sum. de fid. Haer. ser. c. 16. q. 4. con. 2. & 3.; by ver­tue [Page 11] of which acte (and of other such acts made by his succes­sors) the Lutheranes and Catholicks on seuerall houres vse their Rites in the same Churches in many townes of Germany &c. even to this present day. Wee know more over, that Ma­thias Caesar Knols in his Turk. hyst. in Achm. Gas­par Landorp. in the yeare 1606. articled with the protestant rebellious Hungarians, That from thenceforth it should be lan­ful for every man through-out the Kingdome of Hungary to haue the free vse of his religion & to beleeue what he would: And in the yeare 1609. for to purchase his owne peace, and safetie of his Empire,See at lar­ge in the Turk. hyst. in Ach­ma [...]. fol. 1290. the pacificatum made which the Protestant States of Mo­rauia and Au­stria: and fol. 1295. the paci­fication made with the Bohe­mians. gaue free exercise of Religion, and deliuered the Vni­uersitie of Prague to the rebellious Soctaries (on the 12. of Iuly) and seueral Churches in Austria and Morauia to the Hereticks then in armes, on the 12 of March. We know lastly, that Hen­rie the third, King of France, was constrained through the dan­gers otherwise threatning his State, to condescend to a worse peace (then any of these mentioned) with the Hugonots; at lardge set downe in Surius Surius ad an 1576.: And that Henry the Fourth seeing his flour-de-lucis throwen into a labyrinth of troubles by the same Heretiques, to prouide for the good of his King­dome by quietnes, confirmed vnto them their libertie of Reli­gion, gaue stipends to their Ministers out of the publique treasu­rie, and certaine strong holts as a pledge for performance. Yet no Censures issued against these Catholicke Princes or subiects for such agreements: no Declaration made by his Holynesse, or by the Cleargie against them; but churches open to them alwaies, & Sacraments administred. Which questionless could not be, if his Holynesse, if the Prelates of those Kingdomes, if the Cleargie and Vniuersities did thinck the adhering to such agrements were a sinne.Landorpius 1598. And though at the commen­cement of the peace twixt Mathias Caesar and the Protestants, there was some opposition at first, made by Melinus the Nun­tio Apostolique, and by the Bishopp of Vienna: yet publishd they no Excommunication, nor other Censures: which not­withstanding they should, if none could in conscience adhe­re to a peace giuing somuch power & libertie to Protestants.

Whereas therefore the Supreame Councell and Confederate Catholicks haue in a miserable condition articled more ho­nourably and securely for the faith, even in a Cessation, then Caesars and Monarks, (who commaunded mines of gould, [Page 12] and had vast Armies at their back) haue done, concluding ei­ther Cessations or peace; And whereas great vtilitie arising thence to the Catholick cause, besides the extreame necessitie of the affaires of the Kingdome, pressed your Honours to it, (either of which, to wit pro fit, or necessitie, is sufficient to make conscionable a Cessation, peace or league with Here­tiques, (as the Lord Nuncio himselfe admitteth in some of his letters to your Lordshipps:) & no man of learning hath ever yet denyed, nor can deny with reason:) And whereas like­wise, the Articles containe nothing evill of its owne nature, or present circumstances; but rather much to the aduancement of Religion and vertue: how can the said Cessation for the whole, or any part, be against Religion? (unlesse peraduenture We ad­mit, a trueth of contradictories in point of cessation & Religion?) how in it any iust ground for Excōmunication? since this ground is not, but where sinne is: & these articles are so fare from being sinfull, as no Confederate Catholicke can reiect the Cessation without mortall sinne, both that of disobedience against the Su­preme Civill power in a civill busines of so great weight, and of periurie against his Oath, which binds him to obey their or­ders; nay nor these who embraced it, can without a third mor­tall sinne, which is that of breach of fidelitie (even with Sectaries) in a matter of moment, and where the obiect implies no e­uill. Shall they then be excommunicated for not committing so many mortall sinnes? for practising the acts of vertues opposit? It is an untollerable errour to thinke it.

Neither do they weaken these our grounds, who obiect the Declaration made by the Lord Nuncio, and Congregation, against the Cessation, and before it was concluded: as though, it were unlawfull after that Declaration, which before was cons­cionable: for who sees not, but the said Declaration (as is ma­nifest in the words of it,) did presuppose unlawfullnesse in the nature of that agreement, Which was then to be made? and that therefore it was issued, to admonish the people and diuert them from it which was in it selfe thought evill (not evill by reason of any protestation, or manifestation made thereof by the Cleargie: who certainely by no meanes would confess, it was their owne declaration that made it unlawfull.) Whence further is consequent, that, since wee haue proued, it implieth [Page 13] no evil in it selfe or before the Declaration issued: so it cannot by vertue of the Declaration. Besides, this Declaration was no commaund, and therefore (in case the Prelates had a iust ground for it) could not make that vnlawfull, which before was lawfull. Moreover, it shall appeare in our answer to the next Quere, That the Cessation concluded, was not the the same against which the Declaration issued; and consequen­ly could not be made vnlawfull by it.

Neither likewise is it worth the regarding, what is unrea­sonably objected of two Counties given by the Councell, and by vertue of this Cessation to Inchiquyn, namely VVaterford and Kierry. It is manifest to all Ireland, there was nothing left him, but farre lesse by two whole Counties then he com­maunded, or had under contribution before this agreement was made. For the Confederats have gotten from him the Counties of Limericke and Tipperary: both which were who­ly over-runne at his pleasure, and contributed, lower Ormond onely excepted.

The second Quere answered,

THat by what we hitherto said, is proved, That your Ho­nours, for disannulling the said Monitorie excommuni­cation and Interdict, needed not (at least in foro poli) to have made any appeale: since they were altogether groundlesse, & hence not only unjust, but also invalid, even of their owne nature and in themselves before any appeale. Which briefly may be declared out of the two plaine errours contained in the sentence of these Censures, and in the proceedings of the Lord Nuncio and Delegates (as we humbly conceave, and with reverence to their Lordships.) One is, that in the sen­tence of Excommunication and Interdict, there is relation to the former Articles against which the Declaration was made at first; but were after mended with better in their place (as we have alreadie touched): and yet, as if the Cessa­tion had beene concluded on such reiected Articles, the Cen­sures proceede against it. VVhich is an errour in the substanc of the matter prohibited or commaunded. And consequently [Page 14] disanulling it (if there had beene no other cause) foras­much as it might be said, to concerne the Cessation actually now in being. The second is an error properly called intolle­rable (though not Iuris, but facti, not patenter expressus (accor­ding the phrase of the law) in words, but too too evident in effect, and in that which the sentence both commaunds and prohibits:) which by the consent of CanonsCap. Vene­rabilibus §. po­test, quoque de sentent. excom. in 6. & cap. Per tuas, §. Nos igi­tur, ext. cod. tit. Tol. la. c. x. Cā­didus disq. 22. a. 24. de Cens. dub. 3. ubi citat Sotum in 4. d. 22. q. 1. a. 2. Sua, in tom. 5. de Cen. disp. 4. sec. 7. n. 32. ubi etiam habet, quod quando censur [...] est sic nulla in utroque soro, nō est necessarium petere absolu­tionem ad cau­telam. Sic otiā Henriq. l. 13. de exco. c. 15. Say­rus l. 1. de Cons. cap. 16. &c. and Doctors renders the sentence of no force, yea in case it were onely an intollerable errour of fact, specially when it enjoynes the commission of sinne. 'Tis, that the said sentence and censures prohibit in effect and against the lawes of God, fidelitie in lawfull promises, Religion in sacred Oathes, and obedience to the Supreme Civill power, in matters concerning the Temporall government, and of their owne nature, and by all right depending of civill iu­risdiction, and in which (as wee have sufficiently manifested in the first Quere) no sinne is implyed: That likewise they com­maund breach of faith, periurie, and disobedience: yea (wee may boldly say it, as wee wofully feele it) Sedition, and Rebellion against the Kingdome and Confederacie. VVhence is mani­festly consequent, that the Censures were invalid even before the appeale.

But in case, we admitted these Censures to had beene valid untill the appeale, or that they would be valid and binding af­ter the ninth day (which was the last of the daies given for admonishment, and deliberation) if within the tearme pre­fixed by the law, an appeale had not beene interposed yet must we hold, that your Honours Appeale in your owne behalfe, and in the name of all the Confederate Catholickes, who did or doe adhere unto your Honours, having beene so made within due time, & after the forme of law tender'd, with ex­pression of reasonable causes therin for provoking to his Ho­lynesse, and apostles being demanded, and granted (though these apostles are no other then refutatories) must notwithstan­ding suspend the monitory or conditionall Excommunication and Interdict, with all their effects and consequences, and all other proceedings of the Censurers in pursuance of the same.

It's plaine by the sacred Canons; undoubted by the do­ [...]rine of Divines and Canonists, and cleere by the very light of reason, which God hath given intelligent Soules. Reade [Page 15] cap. Praeterea 40. ext. de appellatione, & cap. Si á Iudic. de appel­lat. in 6. [that we may passe over, to shun tediousnesse, many such places) and you shall finde nothing more plainely resol­ved in the Canons. Praeterea re­quisi [...] fuim{us}, si quis Iudex ita protulerit sen­tentiam, Nisi Sempronio in­fra viginti dies satisfeceris, te excommunica­tum, vel suspen­sum aut Inter­dictum cognos­ca [...]: Ille, inquem sertur sentetia. medio tempore appellans, ad diem statutum minime satisfe­cerit, utrum ille tali sententia ligetur, aut in­terpositione Ap­pellationis tut{us} existat? Vide tur autē nobis, quod huiusmodi sen­tentiam appel­lationis obstacu lum debeat im­pedire. VVe have beene demanded (sayes Cele­stine the III. in cap. Praeterea) in case a Iudge, pronounce sen­tence thus, If you doe not satisfie Sempronius within twentie daies, know that you are excommunicattd, suspended, or Interdicted, and he against whom the sentence is given, appealing in the meane time (that is sometime within the twentie daies) makes no satisfa­ction to Sempronius at, or before the day prefixed, whether, he (to wit, the party against whom the sentence was pronounced) hath incurred the censures, as bound by the sentence, or hath his ap­peale interposed saved him harmelesse? VVe thinke, that the in­terposing of the Appeale hinders, and takes away the force of the said sentence. And thus (sayes GlossaGlos. in verb. Impedire: & ita suspenditur sen­tentia, quaenon­dum tenet, non enim tenet nisi extante condi­tione. Ex quo autem teneret, non suspendere­tur eius effectus &c. on the word, Impe­dire) the sentence is suspended which doth yet bind, or which is not yet of force (he meanes, untill the time prefixed for admoni­tion be expired, and other conditions (if any be, as that was, in this case, of not satisfying, performed) for it is not binding untill the condition be extant. But if were once binding, its effect could not be suspended by an appeale comming after, &c. behold here our very case. Our Iudge, or Iudges, the Lord Nuncio and his foure Delegats (as they are called: though really, it be much doubted, whether the Congregation held last at Kilken­ny gave them any such delegation, to proceede with so much rigour against the whole bodie of the Kingdome, to bring so much danger upon it, and throw somuch confusion, sedition, and wickednesse into every corner, and into the very entrailes of the Confederats, and this by abuse of Ecclesiasticall Cen­sures, to bring scandall on the Church: notwithstanding) the Lord Nuncio with his foure Del [...]gats commaunded the Su­preme Councell and their adherents, who embraced the Ces­sation, to reject the said Cessation within or before nine daies after the intimation of their commaund, and likewise enjoy­ned all others of the Confederats, not to joyne with, or con­sent to this Cessation, otherwise declared the former excom­municated, and interdicted, if they fell not from it within that tearme prefixed, and the later likewise in case they transgress [...] after they had got sufficient notice of their Lordships deter­mination [Page 16] & Censures in this behalfe. The Supreme Councell interposed an appeale to his Holynesse for themselves and for all the rest unto whom the Censures might be extended, and tendered it according the forme of, and within the time pre­scribed by the Canons. Is it not then consequent, that these monitorie and conditionall Censures were by such an appeale suspended? It followeth manifestly, if the judgement of Ce­lestine was just, or the law doth not erre. In both, monitorie and conditionall Censures: in both, an appeale made before the daies of admonition, or allowed for deliberation were expired, or before the condition was in being (that is, before a new transgression of the precept after sufficient notice had thereof, no appeale being interposed, and after the daies al­lowed for appearance were once past:) therefore in both ca­ses, the appeale must have the like effect. Videtur autem nobis, quod huiusmodi sententiam appellationis obstaculum debeat impe­dire. Non enim tenet (sayes Glossa) nisi extante conditione, &c. Celestinus in [...] Praeterea. supra Glossa ibid. ut supra.

The first branch of this second Quere, and of our assertion in answering it, being thus declared; the next branch (that is, whether the effects and consequences of the Censures be likewise suspended) is of easie resolution, and the resolution of as easie proofe. For it is a knowne maxime in the Canons, That accessories doe follow the principall: cap. Dilectis filijs. Accessorium se­quitur princi­pale. de ap­pellat. and it is certaine, that the Censures we speake of, are the principall, and that the effects and consequences are but accessories. VVherefore the Censures being in themselves suspended by the appeale, the effects and consequences must be of necessitie suspended.VVhat effects and consequen­ces of excom­munication and interdict? See at full in Tolet. l. 1. And verely there is no difficultie may be moved in this point. But some controversie perhaps may arise about the third part of this Quere; where it's de­maunded, whether all other Censures or proceedings of the Lord Nuncio, Delegats, or others, in pursuance of the for­mer, on the same ground are likewise suspended or hindered by the said appeale? yet even this branch is so c [...]eered by cap. S [...]â Iudice. de appellat. in 6. that no thing more can be d [...]sired. For in this Chapter Boniface the VIII. B [...]nifac. 8. in é Si à iudice de appellat. in [...]. both determines and declares, That, an appeale once made, the Iudge from whom is no more Iudge over the appellant, and th [...]t his iurisdiction is suspended [Page 17] (understand in the case, and others thence following, where­in the appeale is made,) and that therefore, the appellant is not bound to appeare before him. If the Iudge from whom be no more Iudge, if his jurisdiction be suspended, the appeale be­ing interposed, if therefore the appellant be not to appeare before him, what is more evident then, That the said appeale is a suspension of all other proceedings or Censures issued or to be issued in pursuance of the former, or on the same ground from the Lord Nuncio and his Delegats, or any other deriving authoritie from them? for such proceedings and Censures cannot be either iustly or validly but from persons who are Iudges in the case, and whose jurisdiction is not suspended in the same cause. Hence is manifest that the Lord Nuncio's re­novation and confirmation (in his apostles refutatories) of his former sentence, his execution of the Interdict, and all other his proceedings against any of the Confederats, on this ground, and since the appeale, are unjust and invalid for what either concerns conscience, or the Canons doe determine. Which is further proved out of cap. Dilectis filijs, 55. de ap­pellat. §. Quia vero, VVhere Innocent. III. decreed against the Deane of Altisiodorum for having proceeded to the execution of an interdict notwithstanding & after an appeale made to Rome: the reason of which decree, the Pope gives in these words, Cum appel­latione ad Sedem Apostolicam interposita nihil debuerit innovari. VVhere likewise he declares for the same reason, that the Ex­communication pronounced by the Archbishop of Sein (or Senonen­sis) against the same Deane, & denunciation made, to had been of no force from the beginning, and that the said Archbishops Chanons did without guilt (notwithstanding the denunciation) communi­cate with the Deane so censured: and lastly that all proceedings at­tempted after the appeale were in themselves voyd, as he does by his Decree disannull them, yeelding for reason, that the accessory is of the same nature with the principall; which we have before touched. Can we desire any more Canons, more pertinent or fitting our purpose? It's needlesse we alleage them, though many more we have.

But because peradventure, besides these Texts of Law, the sence of Doctors may yet be expected, let the Authors seene in the opposit margentCandidus disq. 22. art. 39. dub. 4. ubi citat Lopez par. 2. tr. de clavibus, cap. 12. Pal. in 4. d. 8 q. 1. art. 4. con. 2. Sayrum lib. 1. de censur. cap. 16 n. 23. Bonac. tom. 1. tract. de censur. d. 1. q. 2. punc. 2. numer. 3. Diana P. 5. T. 3. R. 30. Silvester verb. appellat. Hieron. Rodriq. ibi. Por­tel. eod. verb. be reade, and it will be found, that [Page 18] the common doctrine of Summists, Divines, & Canonists hath hitherto beene, That a just appeale, of it selfe, and presently when tis made, devolves the cause to a higher tribunall, sus­pends the sentence given, and withall hinders the inferiour Iudge from proceeding any further. All which the Doctors comprehend in the double effect, which they say is neces­sarily annexed to a just appeale, to wit, devoluing and suspen­ding.

Now for a just appeale,Cand. supr. disq. 3. & reli­qui apud ipsum Candidus, Bonacina, Sayrus, and others commonly affirme, two onely conditions are necessa­ry. The first, that it be made with expression of sufficient, probable or likely causes, or such as the appellant thinkes bona fide, are just, probable, likely or sufficient motives for appealing; but that no other expression, or of any other cau­ses, is required. And truely with the Doctors herein, the very Canons and Glosses doe concurre cap ut debitus. verb. ex rationabili. ext. de appellat. cap. Dilectis filijs, 55. verb. Legitime eod. tit. cap. Cordi nobis, eod. tit. in 6. often in the case of the Glos. and c. Bonae memoriae. §. Praemissis ext. eod. tit.Cap. Bonae memoriae § Prae­missis, extr. de appell. Praemis­sis igitur dili­genter inspectis, praedictos Abba­tem & Mona­chos in eum sta­tum, in quo tē­pore appellatio­nis factae ex ve­risimilibus, & probabilibus ad nos legitimè in­terposite noscun­tur, (proprieta­tis parti vtrili­bet salvo iure) decernimus reducendos; ac fructus medij temporis perceptos censuimus pariter assignandes eisdem. where Innocentius III. cleerely determines, the appeale to be iust, and the causes of the appeale to be sufficient, when it is made ex probabi­libus, aut verisimilibus; that is, when they are probable, or seeming true, though indeede they be not in themselues true. It sufficeth therefore (sayes the GlosseGlossa ibid. Sufficit ergo quod sit probabilis causa appellationis, licet non sit vera vel necessaria. Talis videlicet debet esse, quod si esset probata, legitima esset: tunc valet, appellatio. further declaring this matter) that the cause of appeale seeme probable, though it be not certaine or true. It is enough it be such, as being proved, may seeme lawfull: for then the appeale is valid. The very same, in effect, is affir­med by Glossa in cap. Cordi nobis Glossa in cap. Cordi nobis de appellat. in 6. Causa rationabilis ad appellandum ab interloquutoria, vel gravamine aliquo, illa est, quae si esset vera, deberet legitima reputari aut quae si esset vera, necessario inferret appellantem fuisse gravatum. de appellat. in 6. as may be reade in the margent. The second condition necessary, and which accomplisheth a just appeale is, that it be made and tendered to the Iudge from whom before the daies prefixed [Page 19] for admonishment, or the condition be fulfilled (when the appeale is from a conditionall excommunication, censure or sentence, as that against the adherents to the Cessation was) or at least within the time limitted for entring appeales.

That both conditions haue beene observed punctually in the appeale (made by the Councell in their owne and in the name of al the rest of the Confederats) is apparant to al ha [...] reade it, who haue weighed the motives therein expressed, and noted the dates both of it, and of the sentence against which it was interposed: this hauing beene of the 27. of May. 1648. and that of the last of the same Moneth, dispatchd away presently to their Lordshipps, the Nuntio and his Delegats. But of the second condition there is no controuersy. All the question is of the first, that is. Whether the causes or motives of the appeale were sufficient? Yet even herein we see no dif­ficultie. Doubtlesse the Councell, and many thousands mo [...] of the Confederats, were perswaded bonafide, that the Nunti [...] proceeded (with due observation of his Lordship may it be sayd) vniustly, and that they had expressed before his Lord­shipp most iust motives to appeale from his Censures, and complaine to his Holinesse of such proceeding. Which bona fides alone, would suffice vs for secureing our owne conscien­ces in opposeing his sentence and in hindring (to our power) the execution of his censures and al his other proceedings on the same ground; yea though the motiues Were onely iust in the opinion of the Appellanis which is the doctrine of au­thors now cited, and must be of al Diuines; who generally teach (and it is in it self most certaine, and taught vs by natu­ral reason) That the immediat and next rule according which we must square our actions in matters of fact, and cases of con­science, is our owne proper bona fides and opinion.

However this be of our bona fides; whether we had it or no? yet doubtlesse even the Lord Nuntio and Delegats wil not deny, but the causes expressed in the appeale are probable, or likely, or such as if they can be proued to bee true, wil be thought sufficient. There is no man of iudgment hath ever yet seene, or wil see the appeale, that can, or wil denye this. And if so, how could it be reiected [...]n foro exteriori as vniust, whereas it hath the conditions prescribed by the Doctours, canons & [Page 20] Glosses for a iust appeale: the one, to had beene made in due time, and the other, to haue expressed in it motiues, which may seeme in facie Ecclesiae to be probable, likelie, or such as, being proued, Would be thought lawful. For that of bona fides, men­tioned by some of the Diuines, is not required by them but onely for secureing the interiour conscience of the Appellant, and not for any thing might concerne the exteriour tribunal; wherein iudgment is not giuen of the interiour opinion, or bona fides of the appellant, but of that Which appeares exteriourly, as of the causes expressed in the appeale, &c. which, if secundum allegata, & probata they be found true, the judge ad quem (to whom onelie, it belongs) Wil giue sentence for the appeale, Whether in the meane time the interiour opinion of the ap­pellant was a bona fides, or no. For of the interiour, God alone is judge; not the Church. And this is the reason, why the ca­nons and glosses (speakeing of the reasonablenesse and justice of the causes, which, being expressed, makes the appeale just, require onelie such motiues as seeme probable or true (though) in themselues they be not true) or such as being proued [to wit before the judg ad quem] would make the appeale lawful; and saye no­thing of the bona fides; conceauing this to be impertinent, and not belonging to the external court of iudgment, Which they doe cheefly regard.

Yet because the bona fides of the appellants may be suffi­cientlie coniectured out of the probabilitie, l [...]kelyhood, or euidence of the motiues expressed in the appeale; Who can doubt (that knowes the state of Ireland, and lookes on our condition with an indifferent eye) but the Councel and Con­federats had not onely probable motiues, but even reasons in themselues, and before the world most euidently iust, which necessitated them to make their addresse to his Holinesse, and throw themselues into his protection [though for pointe of conscience this Was needlesse) from the violent proceedings of the Lord Nuncio and his either Delegats or Subdelegats, as being (for priuate ends) opposit to the aduancement of Reli­gion and of the common Cause, destructiue of the Kingdome, and illegally thwarting the supreame Ciuil power of the confae­derats, by drawing the people (in as much as in them lye) to se­ditio and rebellion. Al which motiues & many more, your [Page 21] Honours expressed at large in your appeale: and their truth may be manifestly inferred out of our sad condition the great necessitie (the countrye stood in,) of a Cessation, and the no lesse vtilitie might be deriued from it for the Catholick Cause (as your Honou [...]s of the Councell declared in your sayed appeale, and we haue shewed in our answer to the first Quere). Vnto which motiues may yet be added (according the power for adding, your Lordshipps reserued to yourselues in your appeale) what is consequent out of them, and out of other particulars expressed in the appeale, videlicet, That your honours, and the rest of the Confederats were commanded on paine of Excommunication, and Interdict, not to adhere vnto a Cessation concluded vpon actually, and from which neither you nor they could fal without omission of most vertuous acts, fidelitie in per­formance of promises, religion in sacred oathes, and disobedience to Authoritie; nor with out commission of sinneful acts, vnfaithful­nesse in Contracts, periurie in oaths, and disobedience to Authoritie; from which likewise you could not fal without extreamely en­damadging and hazarding the Commonwealth, by reason of the streingth and multitude of enemies, which (that Cessation reiected) would on al sides come vpon vs; besides the iudgments of God would hange over vs for our persidiousnesse See both in sacred and [...]ro­phane histories the dreadful punishments that attended alwayes the breach of publick faith, and perfidiousnesse. See in the 2, of Kings. [...] how heauen pursued with vengeance the King and whole Kingdome of Israel, for hauing broken faith with the Gabaonits, though no lesse then a hundred yeares since the couenant ma­de with them (Iosue. 9.) yea and though in that couenant the Gabaonits vsed suttletie and were by profession Infidels. Were not the chosen people & Nation of God, for this breach of faith, scourged With an vniuersal samme, euen in the dayes of holy King Dauid, propter Saul and domum euis sanguinum, quia occidit Gabaonitas? And, not with standing so many thousand starued to death by this famine, was the diuine wrath appeased vntil seauen of his sonnes, who brake the league were resigned over by King Dauid to the pleasure of the offended Gabaonits, and w [...]re crucified aliue by them vpon a mount before the face of God. Et dedit eos in manus Gabaonitarum, qui crucifizerunt eos in montecoram Domino, & repropitia­tus est Deus terrae post hac. See in the 36. of Paralipom. the deplorable fate of the vnfortunate King Sedecias, and of his Kingdome, for hauing, contrary to promise made, renounced his allegiance, broken lea­gue with, and taken armes against Nabuchodonosor the Monarch of Babilon. A rege quoque Nabuchodonosor recesserut, qui adiuranerat eum per Deum. Was not his Kingdome therefore vtterly destroyed; the holy cittie razed, the Temple of God, burn'd; the miserable King depriued of those eyes, wherewith before he beheld the couenant broken; finally, his coun­tr [...]y planted with Aliens, and both himself and the remainder of his people translated to Babilon, for to leade the life of slaues in a longe captiuitie of 70. yeares? Yet Sedecias wa [...] drawen to this breach of peace, through causes no lesse specious then Nabuchod [...]nosors Idolatry in Reli­gion, and tyranny in his gouernment of the elect Nation of God. See in Gregorie Sceidius, and in Knolls Turk. hist. the formidable event of a Cessation or ten yeares truce broken [formerly concluded twixt Vladislaus the Christian Catholick King of Hungary, and Amurath the Turkish monarch) but broken by the Christian king (seene after twas published) by the perswasions and ouer much inportunitie of part [...] of the Cleargie, speciallie of Iulian the Florentin [...] Cardinal (then Leg [...]te Apostolick in the kingdome of Hungarie) who needs would dispence in the Oath enterchangeably taken by Christians and Turkes for obseruing the Cessation. Alas! how late came repentance, when the poore Hun­garians beheld their ualiant and good Vladislaus slaine before their faces in the battaile of Varna; their nobilitie slaughterd, Iulian hims [...]lf (with other authors of this misfortune) al naked, couered onely with bloud, and yeelding the ghost, their army [ever before this faithlesse dealing, victorious) totally destroyed; and their deare countrey, with so many other bord [...]ing Kingdomes of Christianity left open as a prey to the fury of Barbarians? what reproach, and what confusion, to see a Turcke obtayne a [...]ictory from Christ against Christians, when Amurath, in the heate of that battaile, obseruing his owne army put to the worst by the valour of Vladislaus, drew foorth out of his bosome the scroll of the articles of Cessation, sig­ned by the Christian King, and casting his eyes to heauen, challenged Christs Diuinitie, if he did not presently shew himself a reuenging God for that dishonour done his namely this per­fidiousnesse of Christians?.

VVhat some would faine here say (yet it is onely to say somewhat, not because they conceave it hath any colour of reason) that it belongs to the Iudge from whom, not to the appellant or others to know whether the causes of the appeale be probably or evidently iust, is answered by Glossa in cap. Cum appellationibus. de appellat. in 6. where these expresse words are, that it belongs to the Iudge Superiour to whom the ap­peale is made, to examine and judge of the lawfulnesse of the appeale: and by Glossa in cap. ut debitus. extr. de appellat, That, this depends not of the Iudge from whom, but of the truth it selfe. Whence may be inferred, That the appellant, as he really sees probability, or evidence in the causes alleaged, may accordingly addresse himselfe to the superiour Iudge, and obey no more the inferiour, to whom it no way belongs to judge of the causes (when they are such, as being proved, they would be thought reasonable) otherwise then by giving a bare answer or apostles. And this is it the Glosse intends. (For doub [...]lesse he intends not to exclude the power of the superi­our Iudge in examining and giving sentence for, or against the appeale. Yet certaine it is, that if the appellant sees the very [Page 23] superiour Iudge not to sentence aright, either in the matter of the appeale, or any other, it is lawfull to appeale further, even from him to his superiour, if any be) Glos. cap. Romana. verb. Minus legitima. de appellat, in 6. Lastly, and most directly to the purpose, by Gloss. in cap. Sollicitudinem. ext. verb. Episcopus posset. Glos. in c. So­licitudinem. ext. de appell. verb. Episcopus posset. Sod quare iudex non pot est cog­noscere de ap­pellatione ab ipso facta, sicut cognoscit an sua sit iurisdictio? Ideo non potest cognoscere de appellatione, quia cum pro­babilis causa exposita est in appellatione, iam exemptus est à iurisdictio­ne illius, & est illi suspectus & praesumptio est pro ipso, quod semper vellet iudicare pro sua iurisdictio­ne, &c. Where tis demanded, wherfore can­not the Iudge from whom an appeale is made, know (that is call in question, examine juridically, and judge) or give sentence of the same appeale? And tis answered, That therefore he cannot be a Iudge of the appeale made from him, because that a probable cause being alleaged in the appeale, the appellant is exempted from his iu­risdiction, as one suspected to him, and because it may be presumed that the Iudge in this case would give sentence in favour of his owne iurisdiction, &c.

Nay the very Text of cap. ut debitus. §. Cum autem. puts this businesse, out of all debate: where it is said,Cumautem ex rationabili causa putave­rit appellandū, coram eodē Iu­dice, causa ap­pellationis ex­posita, tali viz. quae si soret pro­bata, deberet le­gitima reputa­ri, Sùperior de appellatione co­gnoscat, &c. That it belongs to the superiour Iudge to examine and give sentence, whe­ther the causes were in themselves reasonable, or no? As for the In­feriour Iudge, the appellant is bound only to expose or alleage before him probable or re [...]sonable causes, to wit such causes, which being proved, ought to be reputed lawfull. And therfore the judge from whom hath no right to examine juridically the truth of them, since the appellant is onely bound to expose or alleage them before him, and not to prove them (for who sees not, that to be bound to alleage, and to be bound to prove, are farre diffe­rent)? And consequently he cannot hinder a just appeale, by saying, it belongs to him to know, and iudge whether it be a iust appeale, or no? or whether the causes expressed be reasona­ble or no?

Which is yet more plainely, and indeed throughly cleered (without any place left for expositions, or distinctions) by cap. Sid iudice. de appellat, in 6. where its expressely decreed by Boniface the 8.Si à iudice â quo (propter gravamē, quod tibi proponis il­latum) appel­las, ud docendii te sore gravatil & ad audien­dum revocatio­nem eiusdē gra­vaminis (si de ipso docueri (na supponit quod ad hoc non te­neris, ut infra statim) tibi ter­minus praefiga­tur. Nec coram eo (cum ipse per se id videre ha­beat) docere, nec etiam tan­quam corā Iu­dice (cū per ap­pella [...]ionem sit suspensa ipsius iurisdictio) cō­parere teneris, nisi ad hoc so lū, ut revocationē ipsam audias si eam duxerit faciendam. That for to prove you had iust, or probable causes to appeale, you are not bound to appeare or answer before the Iudge from whom you appealed in regard (sayes Boniface) that he is no more your Iudge, whereas by your appeale (especially when it is from an extraiudiciall, or à gravamine, as our appeale is) his iurisdiction is suspended. Onely one case excepted (which is not to our purpose yet) that is, when the Iudge from whom [Page 24] saniori ductus consilio, being better advised, would recall his past sentence, whereby the appellant was grieved: for onely in this case he is bound, being called, to appeare before the Iudge à quo to the end he may heare the sentence of his grievance recalled.

What can be desired more manifestly convincing? If the Iudge from whom, once the appeale is interposed from a grie­vance, and probable causes therein expressed, (that is such, as being proved, ought to be accounted probable) if he be no more Iudge, if he have no jurisdiction over the appellant, (but onely in that [...]ne case) if the appellant be not bound to appeare before him for to prove the truth or justice of his motives of appeale, how doth it belong to him to examine juridically the truth of these causes? or to sentence the ap­peale to be good or bad? or on pretext hereof, to hinder the appellant from prosecution of the appeale; or getting the benefit of an appeale? Certainely it cannot be, unlesse we admit a plaine contradiction. And certainely as yet we have not seene one Chapter, passage, or Glosse of the Law could be produced to the contrary by such as seeme to maintaine the invalidity of the appeale, though they have laboured much in heaping together citations. But all to no other purpose then either, that (as we doe grant, and never deny­ed) probable causes of the appeale are to be alleagedThis only, and no more [for what con­cerns this mat­ter) can be de­duced out of c. Pastoralis §. verum. de ap­pellat. cap. Le­gitima. eod. & Glos. § Legiti­ma. in 6. c. Ro­mana. eod. §. quod si obijciatur, & Glossa ibid. §. Vera. & Nota insuper. c. cum appellat. eod. See all this con­firmed by c. Interposita. de appellationibus. extr. where it appears sufficiently [though it be for the contrary opinion produced) that the validitie of an appeale is to be proved before the Iudge ad quem. For the case of the said Chap, is: One appealed, who expressed onely a pro­bable cause in his appeale. The question was, whether it were sufficient for the Appellant to prove before the Iudge to whom to whom, that his cause was probable, although perhaps not true? And it was resolved, that he ought to prove it to be both probable and true, unlesse he offered of his owne accord to prove this truth before the Iudge from whom, and yet was not heard: for in this case it is enough he prove before the Iudge ad quem, that the cause of his appeale was probable, though not true. In which question and answer made by the Pope, there is not a word for the Adversa­ries, but much to our purpose, as appeares by the Glosse partly, and partly by these words nisi hoc se offerens probaturum. &c. VVhence, is gathered, that he had no obligation to prove it before the Iudge à quo, but What was done by him, was of his own accord, not by any tye of the Law. At least, we may confidently say, that nothing may be inferred against us out of this Chapt. Nay this Text speakes in case the Appellant, even before he enters his appeale, doe offer to prove his allegations to be true, and not after the appeale is made: as appeares in the Glosse there, and by the Glosse of cap. Si à Iudic. verb. teneris. de appellat. in 6. & ibi per Dominic. which the common practice proveth. VVhence further is mnnifest that there is no obligation by this Chapter to prove before the I [...]dge à quo, the truth of the appeale, since questionlesse before tis given in, there can be no such obligation there­in, and before the Iudge from whom, though not their truth to be proved before him, or that when the Iudge is refused, or excepted against, or (to speake the tearmes of the Law) when there is a recusation of him, (not an appeale) that then the recusatorie exceptions are to be proved before arbiters gi­ven by the Iudge and chosen by common consent of the Plaintiffe and Defendant. It is in this case of recusation) that cap. cum speciali. de appellat. extra. and cap. Legitima. eod. tit. in 6. speake, and not in case of appeale, which is farre dif­ferent from the former.

It is true that the Iudge a quo hath so many dayes allowed him by the Canons, to consider what kind of apostles he is to give, and that in admitting or rejecting the appeale, hee doth in so much (ex animi sui opinione) out of his owne private op­nion judge of its probability or improbability; yet followeth it not hence, that he giveth any juridicall or binding sentence or judgement (of the causes) obliging (either before God or the world) the conscience of the appellant. For the giving of the apostles is nothing else but a bare answer to the appeale, which the Law permits him to give either dimissory or refu­tatory, that is either admitting or reiecting (the appeale) either right or wrong, but at his owne perill if he give not a right an­swer, and admit the appeale when it is from a just and proba­ble grievance, and hath in it expressed probable causes; the Law providing likewise for the libertie and safetie of the ap­pellant, that whatsoever answer this be, he is not bound to conforme himselfe to it (if it be to his disadvantage) since he hath once l [...]wfully appealed, or with expression of reasonable causes, and since this Iudge from whom hath no power to sum­mon him, nor to examine witnesses, nor forme any Processe concerning the lawfulnesse or unlawfulnesse of the causes expressed; which power notwithstanding, for to summon, examine, forme a processe, must be supposed in him that is the proper Iudge and can give a binding sentence of the lawful­nesse or unlawfulnesse of the appeale.

Whence followeth, That they say nothing to purpose who [Page 26] obiect, That the Lord Nuncio, and Bishops did not conceaue such pressing necessitie for concluding the cessation, or such great profit to arise thence (which are the prime reasons al­ledged in the appeale for excepting against the censures.This great op­position, and seeming alte­ration of iudg­ment in the Lord Nuncio, must be very strange to such as know that it appeares out of Letters and Messages from his Lordship to the Councell (which are in Record) how his Lordship about the first of March, when there was but a bare report of a Cessation, to be made with the Parliamentary Scots, desired the Councell that businesse [to wit the Cessation with the Scots) should goe on, for that he expected a blessing thence not onely to this, but also to other Kingdomes. Nay a little before Inchiquyn was de­clared for his Maiestie did not he approve a cessation to be made even with him? VVhat is the reason of so much desire expressed for making a Cessation with the Parliamentary Scots, rather then with Inchiquyn, or others? or why with Inchiquyn himselfe when he was for the Parliament, and not much more now when he is for the King? Neither doth the Lord Nun­cios answer seeme in any wise to satisfie, where he sayes in another of his Letters (to ex­cuse this) that his intention in his former Letters or Messages was, to have an accommoda­tion or league made with him, not a cessation: for who is it conceaves not, that a cessation of Armes with sectaries must be conscionable, (even by the Lord Nuncios owne concession) and no iust ground for Excommunication, if an accommodation or league be lawfull: since the cessation of its owne nature brings along with it lesse communication with them, or hinderance to annoy them.) but rather that it was fixed on with intention to bring in the late reiected peace, and for other consequences following that bu­sinesse; and consequently, that they conceaued no truth in the causes alleadged. For in case we did graunt their suspicions to be true before God (as they are not) yet nothing hence may be inferrd for disproouing the lawfulnesse of the appeale, in foro exteriori, (wherein onely they proceed): since they can­not denye but the causes alleadged are such as if they can be proued, they ought to be thought lawful: and since they are not to be iudges herein; as hath been now seene by so many canons, glosses, and reasons: and lastly since we are bona fide per­swaded of the probability (if not evidence) of our motives; nay though we had no bona fides interiourly, but only seemed exteriourly to have it. And verily this answer satisfieth.

Yet for a more ample satisfaction, We further saye to the first part of this obiection, that as doubtlesse it concerns more neerly the supreame Councell to know the condition of the Country, as who onely were then and are yet entrusted with the gouenment, were and are more often and more particu­larly enformed: so it belong'd (and yet belongs] to them of right to declare the abilitie or disabilitie of the Countrey for [Page 27] warre, and the necessitie & profit of either Cessation or Peace, and consequently to conclude a Cessation and peace or con­tinue warre (We meane, so farre as the general Assembly furni­sheth them with power; as in this particular of concluding the present Cessation, they haue.) Vnto which determination of theirs, and vnto al others in matters meerly ciuil, (such as this is) where manifest sinne doth not appeare [as in this businesse appeares not) the Lords Spiritual, and both Cleargies, regu­lar and secular are to obey as subiects, (bound heerunto in conscience and vnder mortal sinne, according the consent of holy Fathers, and Diuines, where the matter is of moment, and specially when it concerns the peace of the Commonwealth,See the Fathers and Expositors on Rom. 13.2. Oecumenius, Theophilactus, Augustine, Ambrose, Bernard, with Cornelius a Lapide, Omnis anima (sayes Chrysostome) potestatibus supereminentibus subdita sit: sive Apostolus sis, sive Evangelista, siue Propheta, &c. All other Fathers and Expositors together with Chrysostome vnderstanding the same passag of S. Paul, of obedience due to the Ciuill Magistrat, and due unto them even by Churchmen. VVith this sence of Fathers and Expositors all Catholicke Divines agree. See them, together with Canonists and Canons to this purpose, in great numbers with Layman. l. 1. Trac. 4. c. 13. and Becan in his Sum. Theol. de Leg. hum. c. 6. q. xi. Nay that not onely the ciuil power obli­geth thus indirectly, but also directly, by their lawes or commaunds, Victoria, Soto, Medina, and man; others mantayne. Howeuer this be, all confesse that Clearks are bound in conscience to obey the rust ordinances of the Common wealth: and vndoubted it is, that they are to be accounted iust vntil manifestly they appeare vniust. That the ciuil lawes and ciuil commaunds of the Commonwealth, or of the ciuil Authori­tie, do binde [...] consciences to their performance vnder mortal sinne, if the thing commaunded be of moment, Vasquez. teacheth d. 158. c. 4. and others with him; Suar. l. 3. c. 27. n. 4. who are cited and followed by Becan in sum. Theol. de Leg. hum. c. 6. q. 3. n. xi. & 12. and allegiance to the Crowne or Kingdome) not to resist as Iudges.

As for the second parte of the sayed objection, it cannot be more cleered then it hath beene by your Lordships in your printed answers to the Lord Nuncios propositions, and in your printed declarations in pursuance of the sayd answers in both which you declare vnto the world, and oblige your selves, not to rece [...]ue any other peace but that which hath beene agreed vpon by the last Assembly, and transmitted with the Agents, vnlesse peraduenture the Kingdome and Assem­bly shal otherwise decree for the good of the commonwealth. Vnto which decree you are by oath, as other Confederats to conforme and submit your owne judgments. And verily, [Page 28] what cou [...]d be more expected from your Lordships? you are Confederats: you tooke the oath of Association: you were thought worthy by both Estates Ecclesiasticall and Temporall in a generall Assembly, to have the Kingdome put into your hands, and the power of concluding a Cessation, residing on­ly in your brests: you were esteemed (per consequence) by the Nation, to be men of honour, wisedome, and conscience: finally, what your Honours did in this businesse was through the vehement desires of the Prouinces, and knowne necessities of the Confederats; and hath beene likewise generally ap­prooved of and receaued by al the Catholick Party in Ireland (yea with ioyes and thankes as the onely meane of their pre­servation); onely a few refractories oppose it, men (without any rashnesse, but with much griefe wee speake it) who seeme to haue the evil of proper interest before their eyes, vnconsci­onable designes in their hearts, and who haue for such vn­worthy ends sufficiently discovered themselves enemies of all publicke quiet and happinesse of the Nation.

VVhat the seditious Libellist, Author of the Vindication (who by that scurvy piece, hath nothing served, but much disserved the Nuncio) here objects against the opinion we are to hold of your integritie, and likewise against even your au­thoritie or power in signing the Cessation, where he sayes, twas only concluded by a malignant infamous, perjurd par­tie of the Supreme Councell, by others inveigled by them, and by some who officiously signed, being no members of the Councell: this forged calumny (we say) might be con­temn'd, and (in regard it is so knowne to be a meere fiction of a Libellist) not otherwise answered then that his penne had too mu [...]h gall and poyson, and his matter neither rime, nor reason. Yet to undeceive the deceived (if any be such) and to prevent or take away the Impression, which perhaps the read [...]ng or hearing of this unknowne detractor might give, or hath given some simple soules: wee thought fit to in­sert in this place, two Acts of generall Assemblies, where­by this Impost [...]ur m [...]y be confounded. The first is a De­claration m [...]de by the universall vote of the Kingdome, in the yeare 1646. 2. of February vindicating these members of the Supreme Councell from these aspersions of perjurie [Page 29] and disloyaltie (then first endevoured to be cast upon them by their Adversaries, but now revived againe from hell by the Libellist) in their negotiating (with the Marquesse of Ormond) the rejected peace. The words of the Declaration are these; And this Assembly doe hereby likewise declare that the said Councell, Committee of Instructions, and Commissioners of the Treaty have faithfully and sincerely carryed and demean­ed themselves in their said Negotiation, pursuant, and according to the trust reposed in them, and gave thereof a due, and accep­table account to this Assembly. Given at Kilkenny the second day of February 1646.

Surely this Declaration made (after exact debate of the matter) by the Lords Spirituall, Temporall, and Commons in a generall Assembly of the whole Kingdome, must be of more weight and power to perswade any reasonable crea­ture, then a passionate and obscure Libellists bare assertion. At least the new, and legall establishment of such members in their former dignitie, and government of the Kingdome, (notwithstanding all the opposition made, and labours taken by their Adversaries to brande them with some character, whereby to render them incapable) must convince any judge­ment. Is there any likelyhood, that a whole Nation, in its representative body the generall Assembly, and ever since in all its reall part [...], in all Provinces, Counties, Cities, Townes, yea and Armies, would have tyed themselves, and sworne to obey them whom they had either proved, or justly suspected, not to have discharged the trust imposed, or therefore had beene perjured, malignant, infamous?

The second, is That wherein provision was made for supplying the resident Councell with legall members,See this second Act at large in the printed E­stablishment concluded upon by the last gene­rall Assembly at Kilkenny, the [...]1. day of No­vem. An. 1647 in case of the necessarie absence of such as were nominated by the last Assembly, or of any of the just number, who are bound to reside, by vertue of which Act they have subscribed as re­sident, who were legally brought in to supply the vacant pla­ces. And for such Honourable persons, as above the num­ber of residents did vote or subscribe the Cessation, its knowne they did it not officiously, but out of their dutie to the publicke, and by the power of grand Counsellors, con­ferred on them by the last Assembly.

Wherefore, it being now cleere from first to last, both out of our solutions to al is, or may be objected against the appeale and out of our positive reasons for it, that according the pros­cript of Canons and sence of Doctours, it hath all the condi­tions of a iust appeale, and that the Lord Nuntio and Delegats are even by the law deprived of all or any power to question, examine, or iudge the reasonablenesse or iustice thereof, or to cast any obligation on vs (either before God or the world) to submit to his or their iudgment in this behalfe: it must be in­ferred by a necessary consequence out of what is formerlie said, That your Lordships Appeale doth not onely by the Canons, but also by the sence of Doctors suspend the censu­res, their effects and consequences, and al other proceedings of the Lord Nuntio, Delegats, Subdelegats (and of al and every, or any other deriving power from him or them) on the same ground. For that, as we haue formerly seene, their doc­trine is, That a just Appeale, of its owne nature, and as soone as tis interposed, hath a [...] and ech of the sayed effects.

And hence they may be fully satisfied who hetherto were perswaded, or feareful through their owne ignorance, or haue beene deluded by the disaffected, who of purpose throw scru­ples into mens consciences without law or reason, takeing oc­casion by the kinde of Apostles the Lord Nuncio granted which are refutatories, not reverentials, or dimissories, to per­swade the simple that by reason these refutatories were gran­ted, and not reverentials, the appeale can be of no force. Which erring assertion is plainely convinced by what hath beene alreadie said. For since it is manifested, that the reason­ablenesse, justice or lawfulnesse of an appeale depends not of the Iudges brest or answer unto it (which they call Ap­postles) but is to be accounted such, if the causes alleaged in it seem evident, probable, or likely, or would be thought proba­ble in case their truth might be proved: and since it is no lesse evident, that a refutatory (that is to say, a rejecting) answer proceeding either from the malice, negligence, corruption or ignorance of the Iudge, or from any other motive whatso­ever, cannot make the appeale unreasonable which before the answer was in it selfe reasonable, and contained the expre­ssion of causes either evidently or probably iust; since lastly [Page 31] it hath been proved, that a iust or lawfull appeale, of its owne nature suspends the Iudge from being any more Iudge of the appellant, from iurisdiction over him, or power to question the lawfulnesse of his appeale; how can refutatorie apostles (gi­ven by the Iudge as answer to the said appeale) have the po­wer to hinder these suspensive effects? If it be said, that the Canons, which thus deprive the Iudge are not to be under­stood of him whē he gives apostles refutatories, we must say this is a most ridiculous evasion, and meere non sence. Certainly they were not made against Iudges who give reuerencials, or dimissorie apostles. For what Iudge, who gave reverencial [...], hath ever yet beene so franticke, as to give wittingly such apostles, and yet to frame a processe against, and call in question the probabilitie of the appeale, whereas by giving such apostles he deprived himselfe of all pow;r, yea should the appeale otherwise be frivolous. Neither have they beene instituted onely against Iudges, who denie both kindes; in regard the words of the Text are not, by any proper or common sence they may have, restrained to any such limitation, nor by the adioyning Glosses or opinion of Doctors commenting there­on, but may and ought, according their proper meaning, to be understood generally in all cases of iust appeales, whether apostles be given or no, whether they be refutatories or dim [...]s­sories, Innocent. 4. in Conc. Lug. cap. Vt super. de ap­pellat in 6. Vt super appella­tione ab eius causa instructio facilior ualeat in processu haberi districtè praecipimus, quod ille à quo appellatur apostolos ap­pollanti (iuxta tenorem constitutionis nostrae super hoc ed [...]ae) tribua [...] requisitus: si veronon exhibuerit, ex tunc, si fortè in causa procedat (nisi appellationi renunciatum fuerit) eius in­validus & irritus sit processus. &c. And surely where the Canons would have onely provided against the abuse of Iudges, who give no kinde of apostles, wee finde their meaning expressed in significant tearmes, as cap. Vt super. de Appellat. 6, which may be reade in the margent

But to unmaske wholly the non-sence of this evasion, let us observe the absurditie, and contradiction which thence doth follow, For if cap. Si à Iud [...]ce. de appellat. in 6. and the like, are of no force against the Iudge, when he gives on­ly refutatories for answer to a iust appeale, then it must follow, [Page 32] that the Iudge by an uniust act (that is by giving such an ille­gall answer, or apostles refutatories, when he should have given dimissories) reapes a benefit, to wit, recovers the iurisdiction and power which before was suspended by (and from the in­stant of) the appeale interposed untill that present of recei­ving the refutatories. And if it be said, that his jurisdiction was not so suspended, untill the daies passed, which are allo­wed by the law for deliberating on the apostles; then, besides that this is against the Text, a plaine contradiction followes in the Canons and Glosses (which is) that during this in­tervall, the said Iudge from whom may call in question, exa­mine juridically, give sentence, &c of the lawfulnesse, or unlawfulnesse of the appeale, (since he is not restrained of his power, during this intervall▪) and yet all Canons and Glosses affirme the contrarie, as we have before seene. The like contradiction followes, if any confesse (as he must) that indeede the Iudge could not proceede during the inter­vall of time twixt the appeale made, and apostles given, but will neverthelesse say, that he may, presently after the apostles when they are refutatorie; here is, we say, the like contradiction, in regard that, if the appeale was at first rea­sonable and just, it remaines so alwaies notwithstanding the refutatorie apostles unjustly given; and consequently by all the foresaid Canons, Glosses, and even by naturall equitie, the Iudge cannot proceede to the execution of his sentence, and by the Canons, and Glosses, he is no Iudge, he hath no jurisdiction, he cannot examine, or call in question the causes of the appeale, neither is the appellant bound to answer his summons. Certainely if he could proceede to the execution of the sentence, he might summon him, and examine the causes of the appeale, both because, that the examination of these causes might make him alter his sentence, which was in it selfe perhaps wholly unjust, and because it is therefore said, he might proceede to this execution, in asmuch as it is supposed he lost no part of his jurisdiction by the interposi­tion of the appeale, since he gave onely refutatories. If therefore he have in this case a plenarie jurisdiction over the appellant, why cannot he summon him concerning the cau­ses of the appeale, or why is not the appellant in this case bound to obey him? It cannot be said, that the lawes exempt [Page 33] the appellant in this particular from him; for the verie prime Text which can be alleaged for this, to wit cap. Si à Iudice. de appellat. in 6. exempts him likewise in all other cases, and declares the Iudge to be no more Iudge over the appellant. And if they say, being reduced to extremities, that the Iudge á quo may call in question even the causes of the appeale, and judge them, then they engage themselves against all the Canons, Glosses, and Doctors, and against all their reasons, whereof that is insoluble which we have before produced in the Glosse of cap. Sollicitudinem. extr. de appellat. verb. Ep [...]s­copus posset: where we have seene the question propounded, why the Iudge a quo might not be a competent Iudge of the appeale, and answered, it is therefore, because that the appellant is exempt from his jurisdiction by expression of a probable cause in his appeale, as from a partie suspected, in regard the law presumes that he would still give sentence in favour of his jurisdiction, and of his former acts, or sen­tences, which all reason perswades us, he would doe. For who is that upon unjust grounds would give sentence against any, upon his just appeale give him only refutatorie apostles, would not also give sentence against him in the causes of the appeale, for maintenance of his own jurisdiction and righte­ousnesse, or perhaps in prosecution of his former ignorance, corruption, malice or spleene, if the law did enable him with power to be Iudge in this case? Whence further would fol­low, that the subiect would be often remedilesly exposed to the tyrannie of everie unjust and partiall Iudge. This very same is a reason most sufficient, and discovered unto us by the light of nature, why we must hold that it lyes not in the Iudges brest to disanull just appeales by giving refutatories (whether it be granted or denied that he is Iudge of the cau­ses.) For otherwise an ignorant, corrupt, or malicious Iudge, (notwithstanding his most illegall proceedings) might overthrow at his pleasure, the most reasonable and necessa­rie appeales in the world; innocencie might be oppressed without remedie, and all injustice and tyrannie mantayned, if (we say) the Iudge for having given refutatories might proceede to execution during the said just appeale: for the execution may be an evill irecoverable by any addresse might [Page 34] be made after, as indeed it would be in our case, were it allo­lowed. VVhich how repugnant it is to the verie law of na­ture, and to the intention and ayme of holy Canons, who doth not see?

It was this convincing reason (we may justly thinke) made Glossa in cap. Licet. de sentent. Excom. in 6. mantaine our assertion in the like case, where the Iudge gave only apostles refutatories. Which is the second argument we make use of to remove this blocke whereat some seeme to stumble, For though the words of Glossa be not the verie Text of the law, yet no man can denie but in such a businesse they are a sufficient president for us: and no man can denie (who is versed in Canons or Canonists) but this verie Glosse is next after the Text of esteeme, and of more authoritie then fortie Doctors who should maintaine the contrarie, if they produced not the expresse letter of the law to the con­trarie, or some Glosse as cleerely for the opposit assertion, as this for ours, or at least some reason convincing a naturall equitie for the adverse opinion. None of which as wee are sure they could not as yet produce, so wee are confident, they shall neuer be able hereafter to produce. The words of the foresaid Glosse are: Put the case I was convented before an Ecclesiasticall Iudge against whom I alleaged some declinatorie exception, perhaps that he was the ki [...]sman of my adversary; Glossa in cap. Licet de sent. excom. in 6. Po­ne casum, quod fui conventus coram Iudice Ecclesiastico, coram qopuro­posui aliquam exceptionem declinatoriam, fortè quod erat consanguineus adversarij mei, vel aliquam exceptionem dilatoriam posui. Iudex noluit admittere istam exceptionem, sed pronunciavit quod ea non obstante proceueret in principali, unde appellavi in scriptis & legitimè expressa causa ratio­nabili in mea appellatione & petij cum debita instantia ut daret mihi apostolos, qui de­dit refutatorios assignando mihi terminum ad procedendum coram ipso in principali, [...]ua die non comparui, Ideò tanauam contumaciam me Excommunicavit. Certum est quod si causa inserta in mea appellatione sit vera, non sum Excommunicatus. or I alleaged some dilatorie exception. The Iudge would not ad­mit my exception, but declared that notw [...]thstanding any such he would proceede in the principall. Whereupon I appealed in wri­ting, expressing a reasonable cause in my appeale, and desired with due instance that he would give me apostles. He gave me refu­tatories, prefixing withall a t [...]me to proceede before him in the principall. But I appeared not the day apointed. Wherefore he excommunicated me as contumacious. Tis certaine, that if the cause inserted in my appeale be true, I am not Excommunica­ted.

Behold heer our very case of an Appeale interposed, and onely apostles refutatories graunted; which refutatories not with standing the Glosse affirmes, It is certaine, that the appellant was not bound by the sentence of excommunication issued against him, if the causes express [...]d in his appeale were true, (that is, lawful and reasonable for appealing). How may it therefore be denyed but a iust appeale exempts the appellant from the power & jurisdiction of the Iudg from whom, though this Iudg do not admit his appeale, but onlie giue refutatories and even the worst king of refutatories, for such were the Apos­tles mention'd in this glosse? otherwise this excommunication of our Glosse would oblige the appellant. And how may it be that any wil hereafter stumble at this block of the Lord Nun­tios apostles refutatories, giuen as answer to the Councells ap­peale? or thinke, that these apostles could hinder their iust ap­peale from suspending the sentence of the Lord Nuntio, its con­sequences, and his iurisdiction in this matter?

The obiections made by the Aduersaries are al of straw: and are partly dissolued alreadie, and the rest do heer follow. One is: That the Iudg doth not giue waye to the suspensiue effect of an appeale when he giues refutatorie apostles: as appeares out of the Glosse in cap. Cordi nobis. de Appellat in 6. §. exhiberi. Al which we confesse, and is too manifest for to make any matter of dispute, by reason that the very act of giuing Refutatories is a denyal of giuing waye to the suspensiue effect of the appeale.

And therefore the Glosse very wel & truly sayes that the Iudg denyeth (in asmuch as in him lyes) to giue Waye to this suspen­siue effect when he giues refutatories. But neither doth that Glosse, nor any other, nor likewise any text of law, or Doctour saye that the Iudg by his illegal denyeing to giue waye to this suspensiue effect of a iust appeale, can hinder or take awaye in rei veritate before God or man from the appeale iustly interposed this effect annexed to it exnatura re [...] by the canons; though in­deed he doe (but vnconscionably, sinnefully, inualidly, and at his owne peril) as much as in him lyeth to hinder it. Wherefore though he giue not this waye, yet the law giueth it when the appeale is from a iust or probable grieuance. as appeares euidently out of al the fore-mentioned Glosses, Doctours and canons, and by the very light of reason.

Another obiection is formed out of c. cum speciali. de. Ap­pellationibus. 2. §. Porro. c. Romana Ecclesia. eod. tit. in 6. §. si uero. &. §. sententia quoque Glossa in cap. vt super appella­tione. eod. §. nota insuper. c. non solum. eod. cum clara Glossa. c. cum appellationibus. eod. cum Glossa. §. nota insuper. &. §. nota primo. c. licet. de senten. excom. in 6. & glossa ibi: §. nota ex hoc. whence they deduce, That what the Iudg a quo doth in prosecution of the cause, after apostles refutatorie giuen by him as answer to an appeale made from him is of such force and effect in law, That the Iudg ad quem, or to whom the ap­peale is made, cannot recal the sentence giuen by the Iudg from whom, vntil the validitie of the appeale be proued or dis­proued before him: and if disprooued, that he cannot proceed in the principal matter, but must remit the whole to the first Iudg: but if proued, that then he may absolue the appellant from al censures renued after such an appeale, and so proceed to examine the principal matter. And hence is further deduced, that when such refutatorie apostles are giuen, the appellant is not exempted from the jurisdiction of the Iudg from whom, otherwise the Iudg to whom likely would presently recal the proceedings, & al acts done by the Iudg a quo, after the appeale made from him. But this difficultie is easily cleered: for al the sayed canons & Glosse speake onely and are to be vnderstood of proceedings attempted by the Iudg from whom, after an appeale made agrauamine, concerning some emergent, or inci­dent article, not of his proceedings against the Appellant after the appeale made from a grieuance in the principal cause. Mo­reouer we saye, That even in case of an appeale from a grie­uance in onelie an emergent article, though the Iudg ad quem wil not presently recal such proceedings, vntil it apeare vnto him that the appeale was iustly made; yet the law doth suspend thē, as appeareth plainely by the often mentioned c. Si a Iudice. de Appellat. by the Glosse of cap. Licet. de senten. excom. in 6. and so many other places before rehearsed. How ever this be, though nothing be sayed in either branch of this answer but whats very true) the matter is more plaine in our ca­se: for your Honours Appeale is not a grau [...]mine interloquutorio super articulo incidenti v [...]l emergenti, but from an extraiudicial sentence in the very principal cause. Nay your appeale in effect is [Page 37] ante sententiam, because it was interposed before the fulfilling of the condition, or dayes (prefixed for deliberation) were ex­pired; and consequently (though no other cause might be produced, al the following proceedings are voyd, cap. Ad prae­sentiam. iuncta Glossa. de Appellat. extra. With many other Canons.

Zerula in Prax. Epis. verb. Appel. resp. ad quas. 19As for that with Z [...]rula in his Praxis Episcopalis seemes to say for maintayning the Iudges Iurisdiction when he giues onely Apostolos refutatorios; wee answeare, that his bare as­sertion of a practice contrarie to so many reasons, lawes, and doctors, cannot be of weight; specially when he doth not al­leadge one reason, text, or author for himselfe. Secondly, that the practise of one place, though it were iust (as this, if there had beene any such, could neuet be) binds not another. And indeed the best practisioners with vs say, the contrarie practise is vsed in Ireland. Thirdly that Zerula must be vnderstood, where, and when the Appeale is in it selfe friuolous; not where it is manifestly, or probably iust; otherwise that practise would be most vnconscionable, most corrupt, yea and against the ex­presse letter of the law, specially if you ioyne the Glosses; and consequently not to be in any wise vsed. Fourthly, That he speakes in case of an appeale made from a iudicial interloquutorie or from decrees vpon emergent or incident articles, (for in this case we confesse, That the judg from whom may proceed to the principal, as not yet suspended from his jurisdiction. Glossa in c. licet. de senten. excom. in 6.) but not when the appeale is from an extraiudicial sentence or grieuance in the very prin­cipal cause (as ours was:) in which last case the law ordaines that the Iudg a quo can proceed no further, as being suspended from his jurisdiction, cap. si a Iudice. de appellat. in 6. cap. super eo. x. eod. tit. extra. & Glossa in cap. Licet. verb. conua­lescat. de senten. excom. in 6.

To that doubt which some others moue, that the Lord Nuncio hath a power to proceede Omni appellatione remota, & consequently, that though the Appeale be iust, and the argu­ments hitherto produced, would conclude against Apostles re­futatorie giuen by ordinarie Iudges; yet when the power is so extraordinarie, they do not conuince: Wee answeare that in case the Lord Nuncio had in his Commission such a Clause [Page 38] (which is verie ordinarie in the Popes letters and Bulls) yet no power thereby is conferred on his Lordshipp, to hinder iust or probable Appeales, but onely such as are in themselues (not by his Lordshipps word or sentence) meerely friuolous, ground lesse, and against the law: as expressely may be seene in the Canons here placed in the margent,Cap. Pastora­lis. de Apel. iu­nc. Glos. verb. emendari. & cap. [...]t debitus. eod. nunc. Gloss. verb. ante sen­tentiam. & in verb. absque rationabili causa. Barthol. Lancello. Spe­cul. Menoch. March. Scac. & plures alij, cum communi Doctorum, a­pud August. Barbos. in coll. ad decretal. in dict. cap. Past­oral. n. 2. especially being ioyned with their Glosses; and as the Canonists commonly mantaine. Furthermore we saye, That if his Holinesse, ex plenitudine potes­tatis, would giue or hath giuen his Lordshipp a power aboue the canon law, and such extraordinary faculties, as that he should not be bound to admit even iust appeales; yet heerby his Holinesse neuer intended, nor could lawfully or consciona­bly intend, to hinder the appellants from opposing the executi­on of an vniust sentence giuen against them (much lesse from opposeing a sentence or censures of their owne nature inualid) when their owne consciences tels them that his Lordshipp grounds himself vpon il information, or that the obeyeing of the sentence may proue disaduantagious either to the Publike or particulars, against equitie and right. For in this, and such like cases the law of nature takes place, and allowes the appel­lant or partie aggrieued, to preserue his owne right (evē by for­ce, if no other meane be att hand) against the vniust procee­dings of a corrupt, ignorant, malicious, or il enformed Iudg; speciallie if this partie aggrieued be a Prince, state, Councell or Commonwealth, which, hath a supreame ciuil power, as our case is. Nay if his Holinesse (who is the supreame Eccle­siastical Iudg on earth, and from whom there is no appeale (in matters belonging to his judicature otherwise then from him­self to himself) did vpon il information, or for any other cause whatsoeuer, giue iudgment or pronounce censures contrary to iustice, and conscience, or which would be disaduantagious to our publick cause, or destructiue of our Commonwealth or of the liues, liberties or fortunes of the Confederats, or of the Councell and that part of the Confederats who adhere to them and to the cessation, (being incomparably the greater part of the Kingdome) there is no Catholick Diuine in the world, but must must confesse, it would be lawful to resist & oppose his Holinesse in this case, and to hinder the execu­ion of such a sentence; yea that such as are in Publick authoritie, [Page 39] would be bound in conscience, and vnder paine of a most grieuous mortal sinne, to vse their vttermost endeauours for opposeing the sayed execution, euen vi & armis, if it were necessary, and no other meane left of reconciliation, or for preser­uation of the Publick. Yet certainely we do not feare, that any such evil shal ever come immediatly from the sacred throne of our most blessed father Innocentius.

Lastly what is obiected by some, out of cap. Ad nostram, and cap. R [...]prehensibilis. de Appellat. That no appeale is allowed from a sentence giuen in a Controuersy of Faith, and consequently that your Honours appeale is against the law, since the adhering to the cessation, to be vnlawful, is an article of Faith; and the senten­ce of excommunication and other Censures were pronounced by the Nuncio, to make the Confederats religiously obserue the sayd article, that is not to adhere to, or obserue the sayed Cessa­tion: we saye, al and every branch of whats heer obiected, is so false, and so absurd, as it cannot be sufficiently admired, with what face can any broch such ignorant positions. What is more clearly, and wi [...]hout controuersie decreed in sacred canons, then that all weigh [...]y causes, and questions happening about articles of Fait [...] (which are the most weighty of all causes) are to be referred vnto the see Apostolick, & euen friuolous appeales in such controuersies be admitted, that is, though the causes of appealing in these matters appeare not to be so just or reaso­nable as are required by the canons to be in appeales interpo­sed from grieuances in other matters? see this expressely defi­ned in the canons placed in the margent,Alexāder 3. in cap. Maiores de Baptismo. Maiores Eccle­sia causus, prae­sertim articulos fidei contingen­tes ad Petri se­dem referendas intelliget, qui eum quarenti Domino, quem discipuli diceret ipsum esse, respō­disse notabit, Tu es Christus filius Dei vivi, & pro eo Domi­num exorasse ne deficiat fides eius, &c, See cap. Vt de­bitus. §. ultim. iuncta Glos, in verb. causis. de appellat. cap. Translationem de officio Lega­ti. Bellar. l. 4. de Rom. Pont. c. z. and to constantly taught by canonists, as our opposits connot produce one Au­thor for themselues. And what is more out of al doubt with both Hereticke and Catholicke Divines then that even his Holinesse, as Pope and Vicar of Christ, yea and together with his Consistorie of Cardinals and (which is more) sitting in a generall Synod of the Vniuersal Church on earth, might erre in controuersies of fact which principally depend on informations se and testimonies of m [...]n? (Reade Bellarmine 4 de Romano Pontifice, cap. 2.) And consequently what is more certaine and evident, then that it is impossible, the adhering to the Cessa­tion concluded with Inchiquin, to be wnlavfull, can be a matter or article of Faith, or as such declared by any power on earth (not [Page 40] to speake of the Lord Nuncio, who hath no power,See Bellar. l. 4. de Rom. Pont. & l. 2. de Concil. au­thorit. where he teacheth, & with him the Catholick Doctors cō­monly, that onely his Ho­lynesse is in­fallible in de­fining, or de­claring mat­ters of Faith: & that even generall Coū­cels, (much lesse Natio­nall) are of no such infal­libilitie, but may erre un­till or before his Holynesse confirme thē. Nay some ca­tholicke Doc­tors (as Bella. l. 2. de Concil. cap. 5. hath) affirme, that Nationall Synods, thogh so confirmed, are not infal­lible. no not together with his National Synod, to define or declare such articles even in capable matters, or in questionibus juris, otherwise then as a particular Doctour) since it is plaine that the ques­tion of the lawfulnesse or vnlawfulnesse of it, is a meer question of fact, and principally depending on the informations and testimonies of men? Finally what is more plaine to any kno­wing Reader of the two chapters, alleadged against vs out of the Canons by some of our Opposits, then that neither of them hath a word to that purpose, or which, by a scholer, may be vnderstood in the sence they are produced against vs. For cap. Ad nostram. speakes onely of iust corrections of persons who are by profession Regulars: as if a Religious man transgres­seth manifestly his rule, or institutions of his Order, in this case (and very iustly) no appeale is admitted (nisi tame [...] modus excedatur, sayes Glos. ibid, verb. minus) if a certaine punishmēt be prescribed by the canons, for such a transgression, & no other inflicted; for if the punishment be arbitrary, then, according Panormitan, even a Regular might appeale in case of correc­tion, yea though his crime were notorious. And as for cap. Re­prehensibilis. it makes the same sence, though it be not restrained solely to the correction of Regulars, but is more generally vn­derstood de disciplina Ecclesiastica, of the correction of al Ec­clesiasticks delinquent: from which, when it is moderat, and lawful, no appeale is admitted; but if an Ecclesiastick be vn­iustly grieued or vexed by his Superiour, it is allowed him, (and he cannot be hindered of this libertie] by al both diuine and humane lawes to appeale. See the Glosse of the sayed Chapter. verb. nec subiects.

Hence it is, that wee cannot but approve the Councels, and other Confederats practise, in not fearing, and not re­garding the Lord Nuncios or any others Excommunications and Censures, issued against them who countenance and ad­here to the said Cessation, having the doctrine of great wri­ters, and the common sence of Divines to guide vs herein, who teach that when the Censures are invalid ei­ther by reason of a just appeale, or otherwise, they are not to be cared for, but may be disobeyed and their invaliditie is to be published by those against whom they were pronun­ced. [Page 41] After which publication or notice had of their nulli­tie,Graffi. in Decis. aur. l. 4. de cea­sur. c. 3. Gabr. in 4. sent. d. 18. q. 2. col. 2. Syl. verb. Excom. cap. 15. if any will seeme to be scandalized at the neglect or con­tempt of such censures, the scandall can be no sinne in the Censured, since it is onely a scandalum Pharisaeorum, not pu­sillorum. So expressely Graffijs. And in case wee had not so many reasons, and authorities to mantaine the justice of our opposing the said censures, yet as Graffius excellently aduer­tizeth, since the Lord Nuncio and other Prelats who are of his minde, do see, that such Censures proue not health-full medi­cines, but redownd rather to the hurt of soules, (that wee may speake,Graffijs in de­cis, aur. l. 4. de Cens. c. 1. Ostiens. in cap. Rom. desent. Excom. l. 6. & ibi Ioan. Andr. columna. 4. & in cap. conct. f. eod. tit. Ias. in l. quod iussit. n. 41. & 42. ff. de re iu­dicata. for the present, according their opinion who hould the Excommunication and interdict are both valid and iust) and bring along with them on vs and all others their opposers de ath of sinne, and despaire of conscience: the Lord Nuncio and Prelats who ioyned with his Honour in pronouncing the said Censures, ought to desist from publishing any more, or further continuance of the alreddie published: in regard that Eccle­siasticall Iudges are bound to carry themselues like indulgent fathers, pious, careful of their childrens souls; and because that the power of Excommunicating was not giuen them to make it a snare of despaire, and destruction for soules, but for their preseruation, and to be a salue for restoring health.

Out of all which reasons, lawes, and doctours, we cannot imagin, but everie indifferent Iudgement will approue our opinion, and conceaue our practise in opposing the said Cen­sures to be most iust. Yet to take away all the doubts of the doubt full, and leaue noe refuge for, even the obstinat, to carp at vs, by obiecting, That, in a busines of controuersie and doubt (though indeede we see no more any doubt) we ought to obey the Commaunds of our Superiours; let them reade Diana P. 4. T. 3. R. 9, (who recites other authors) where he holds and teacheth, that when or where one iustly feares any notable inconuenience either in his life, fame, or fortunes (nay if he feared those evills to another) by following his Superiours opinion, (to wit in case the Superiour did not doubt of his owne pro­ceedings, and yet he doubted, whether the Superiour proceedes iustly or no:] in those Circumstances he cannot be obliged in conscience, to conforme himselfe to his Superiours opinion, because that accor­ding the common maxime, in doubt full things fauendum est reo [Page 42] or to him that is in possession of his libertie, and because that the sub­iect in such a case is in possession if not of his libertie, at least of his owne securitie, and right of preseruing himselfe, or another from dan­ger. Neither in this, or any other case, wherein he is not bound to obey, can he be excommunicated. Hitherto this learned Diuine, with others whome he citesAnthon. Diana. P. 4. T. 3. R. 9. San­chez in sum. tom. 2. l. 6. c. 3. n. 27. Vasques. in 1. 2. q. 19. a, 6. d. 62. c. 6. vide comp. Diae nae. verb. subditus.

And surely this very last passage were enough to quiet cons­ciences, and discharge them of scruples; but specially if it be taken together with that common tenetNauarus. c. 29, num. 280. Valentia disput. 2. q. 14. p. 4. qu os citat & sequitur Bea­can. in sum. de bon. act. int. cap. 4. q. 9. con. 2. Diana p. 2. T. 13. R. 1. P. 4. T. 4. R. 4. § ad id vero. San­chez. in sum. tom. 1. l. 1. c. 9. n. 14. & Theo­legi communi­ter, contra Pe­rez & alios paucos. of Diuines, which teacheth that its lawfull to follow any probable opinion (whē the question is, whither the act be conscionable, or no?) yea though the contrarie opinion were more safe, and more pro­bable, as the said Anthony Diana, Beacan, Vasquez with other authors cited in the margent, and with the torrent of Doctors, do teache: if likewise what Sanches, Sanchez in in sum. tom. I. l. 1. c. n. 97. Villa lobos: tom. 1. tr 51. diff. 17. n. 3. & Beroio in c. 1. n. 281. de const. & sine vlla di­stinctione. docēt Fillucius tom. 2. tr. 21. c: 4 n. 134. & Merolla tom. c. disp. 3. c. 4. dub. 1. n. 4. Sanchius in se­lect. diso. 5. n. 11 & disp. 64. n 63. & Diana P. 4. T. 4. R. 30. Vide comp. Dianae. verb. opinio probabilis. Villalobos, Fillucius, Me­rolla, and others hold, be considered, to wit, That the resolu­tion of one learned and pious auhor, doctour, or Diuine stu­dying a case, and examining the reasons pro et contra, doth ma­ke a probable opinion, how great soeuer the number be a­gainst him: if also it be considered, there are many most lear­ned, and most vertuous Diuines of both Cleargies, even great Prelates and most Illustrious & Reuerend Bishopps, knowen to be of the ablest and most vertuous men in the Kingdome, who after a long and serious debate of all the procedings, gro­unds, and reasons of this Cessacion, and of the declaracion and Censures issued against such as adhere vnto it, haue resol­ued notwithstanding, yea and with strong reasons declare euidentlie, that nothing can be found in the said Cessation against Catholick Religion, or which may be a iust ground for Excommunication. For certainely, so many sentences of such men concurring, and hauing so many reasons, which they esteeme manifestly conuincing, hauing solued the obiections which might be made to the contrarie, must at least wise ren­der this way probable, and consequently secure in Conscience. Neither doth it any wise preiudice the probabilitie of their opinion, that the lord Nuncio and Congregation declared the Cessation and the adheringe to it to be vnconscionable: for it is certaine, that neither his Lordshipps definition, nor Con­gregations assent, could giue their owne way, any other [Page 43] then extrinsecall probabilitie (even this extrinsecall probabi­litie now ceasing where the reasons to the contrarie are so ma­nifestly insoluble, and an errour (with reuerence still to their dignities) proued in their proceedings and sentence) for what concernes conscience; since they haue no power to make it an article of our beleefe, that the Cessation is against Conscience. Nay this Controuersie being wholy or principally depending on a question of fact,Vid. Bellarmin. supra. cannot by any power on earth be so defined, but that it may be lawfull to follow the contrarie opinion which defends it to be conscionable.

The third Quere answeared.

TO the third, that your Lordships printed answers to the Propositions of the Lord Nuncio, are not so short or in­satisfactorie in any pointe, as they might affoord iust ground for an Excommunication. The reasons of which resolution are apparant in our answeres to the two former Questions, & likewise hence, That the Lord Nuncio in his propositions inserted nothing, but what did meerely belong to the civill government (wherein notwithstanding if any errour could be declared to have beene committed, your Lordships were con­tent upon manifestation thereof, to amend it) or elsewhat was provided for sufficiently before those propositions were offered.

The fourth Quere answered,

THat whereas the Oath of Association tyes all the Con­federates to be dutifully obedient and observant of your Lordships just Orders, and Decrees: And whereas in our answer to the first Quere it is sufficiently proved, that the present Cessation is most just and lawfull, and by con­sequence your Orders and Decrees commaunding the Con­federats to accept and obey the Cessation must be just, it followes, that disobedience to such your Lordships com­maunds, in not adhering to the Cessation, is Perjurie.

The fifth Quere answered,

THat if it shall be found that the Excommunication and Interdict of the Lord Nuncio is against the funda­mentall lawes of the Kingdome, and which the Prelats have sworne by the Oath of Association to mantaine, it is not law­full for them to publish or countenance the said Censures contrarie to your Lordships positive orders. Neither doe wee see, how can any of the Prelats otherwise answer, if they condemne not the Oath of Association of injustice, and themselves of having done ill in taking or approving it.

The sixth Quere answered.

IT being the common sence of Divines that in an Oath lawfully taken for the good and profit of another,Bonac. to. 2. d. 4 q. 1. pun. ultim. n. 8. ci­tans Suar. c. 41. Sanch. l. 1. de Matr. dis. 32. Filluc. tra. 23. c. 9. q. 10. nu. 279. none can dispense without his privitie and consent unto whom it was sworne, but in certaine cases exprest by the authors cited in the margent; and the oath of Association be­ing in it selfe lawfull, and sworne to the Kingdome for the publicke good of the Nation, and of each Confederate in particular, certainely a dispensation cannot be given to any person or parties of the Confederates to breake the said oath, or to take away the obligation of it, without the consent of the Assembly, unto which by a speciall clause of the said oath (and this is to be well noted) the alteration or dissolution of the oath is reserved, none of the cases excepted by authors, having place in this matter. VVherefore if any other of what power soever, though it were his Holynesse, did otherwise at­tempt to dispense with any of the sworne Confederats, both the Dispenser and Dispensed would hereby transgresse the law of God, and incurre the guilt of a mortall, and most hay­nous crime, besides that such a dispensation would be of its owne nature invalid, voyde, and no way securing, for the fu­ture, the conscience of the Dispensed: and consequently this partie dispensed withall, must of necessitie as often as he maks use of such a dispensation so m [...]ny times commit a mortall sinne: the Dispenser likewise, and without question, participa­ting by his first action, of the same evils. All and everie branch, [Page 45] and particular of which resolution, followeth by necessarie inference out of the common and certaine doctrine of Clas­sicke Authors,Vid. Bonaci. tract. de legi. disp. 1. q. 2. pu. 3: prop. 2. nu. 14. & 15. ubi citat Reginal. Sanch. Sal. Valen. Tole. Vasq. Caiet. Sylv. Nava. Sotum, &c. who without controversie teach, that the obli­gation of a lawfull oath is (in a weighty matter) under mor­tall sin, and de iure divino by the law divine naturall and posi­tive, & that even his Holynesse cannot without a manifestly just cause dispense in any obligation of the law divine: and that if he should otherwise, his dispensation would be in it selfe voyde, sinfull, and no way securing the conscience of the partie dispensed withall. VVhich doctrine they make evident with many strong and perspicuous reasons (vnnecessarie to be now rehearsed) and specially declare it out of holy Scripture, 2. Cor. 13.10. where S. Paul tels, that Christ consigned his po­wer unto the Prelats of the Church non in destructionem, sed in aedificationem, not for destruction, but for edification. But who sees not, that this power would be abused for destruction, and not for edification, if on pretence of it, and without a manifestly iust cause dispensations should be granted in the law divine positive and naturall? And who is it that lookes on the Con­federats and their present condition with an unpartiall eye, but will conceive that there cannot be a iust cause for dispen­sing with them, or particulars of them in their oath of Asso­ciation, or with them in their obedience due by the said Oath to the government established. First, in regard the sole cause pretended is the Cessation made, and observed with Inchiquyn which we have notwithstanding proved to have beene law­full, necessarie, profitable, and much to the advancement of the Catholicke cause, were it obeyed by refractories, and per consequence of the glorie of God. How then could it be a iust cause for dispensing with any in the oath of Association, or in the obedience due by the said Oath to all Orders of the Su­preme Councell, or all such Orders as doe not manifestly ap­peare to be sinnefull? Secondly because such a dispensation breeds sedition, stirs rebellion, commenceth a Civill warre, and devides the Confederates into parties, throwes fire and bloud into their verie entrailes, and by their owne hands, fi­nally weakens them so by these wayes of mutuall enmities and hostilities, as hereby in reason they should be thought to be exposed as a prey to the common enemie of our Religi­on [Page 46] (specially their disabilitie when thy were entire being consi­dered) and the prime scope of their Confederacie (which is the propagation and glorie of Catholicke Religion) verie un­likely to be attained, but rather despayred of. Is there any one knowes Ireland, but should in reason have perswaded him­selfe, that all these evils should have followed such a dispensa­tion, if God did not prevent them by a miracle?S. Tho, Val. Sanch. Lessi. Suar. Tolet. Caiet. & alij quos citat & sequitur Bo­nac. tract. de Decalog. d. 3. q. 9. pu. unic. prop. 3. nu. 4. & 5. and on mi­racles we are not, according the Catholicke doctrine, to relye for it is a mortall sinne to tempt God by expectation of mira­cles. And is there any man of sence will say, that a dispensati­on which draweth along with it so much evill could either be in it selfe iust, or have a iust cause, specially where the cause pre­tended is the declining of a sin in adhering to a Cessation, where­in, or in which adhering we have manifestly proved no sinne could be committed? nay we have evinced the said Cessation could not be not adhered unto, or could not be reiected by the Councell and Confederates without most grievous and fearefull sinnes: and wee have shewed this to be the constant doctrine of the Catholicke Divines, and of the Church of God, and that when the contrarie was practised through an ig­norance and temeritie, the experience was fatall, and cost them deere. Thirdly by reason of the disesteeme it would bring upon all confederacie, & of the unsecuritie, manifest danger, & confusion it would bring vpon, and throw into all Christian states and governments: for if by such dispensations, and upon such grounds the common subject could be withdrawne from his allegeance, and with a good conscience rebell, what Prince what state, or Republicke, nay what privat man could live one day in securitie, whereas they often see before their faces such boundlesse, enraged ambition, & such cruell designes of some Prelats? (may this be spoken without disparagement to so ma­ny other great and good Prelats, who by their vertuous lives & apostolicall doctrine support States, Kingdomes, and Mo­narchies of Christianitie: as in particular severall are seene to use with us at this present, such prayse worthy endevours for the preservation of the Confederats,) If together with this example it were mantained as a Catholicke Tenet, That such Prelats or Churchmen could at their pleasure or upon such designes challenge, & assume a power of the fortunes, estates, [Page 47] Crownes, lives of Kings and Republicks by dispensing with particulars, or promiscuously with the multitude or any other in their due obedience and oathes of allegeance, what should not be hourely feared? Lastly (which is hence consequent) by reason of the aversion and hatred it would breed in all Infi­dels and sectaries against our Religion. For what Prince, State, or Common-wealth of any other Religion would admit of ours, if our doctrins of dispensations in the subjects allegeance were so destructive of all policie and good government, and so cruelly wicked? Let us therefore here and evermore stop our Christian eares from such blasphemies against the law of God and the faith of the holy Roman and universall Church in all ages to this present time. And let us leave such antichristian principles to Luther, Calvin, & such other infernall furies, who covered a great part of Europe with the bloud of Christians, by doctrine in substance not unlike this (but certainely no worse then this) and whereby they at their pleasures armed the subject against the Prince, and the people against the M [...] ­gistrate for the destruction of Christianitie and of the Church of God. Reade the Catholick Author who writt on Fox's Kalendar of Mattyrs, where he at large rehearseth the daungerous, anarchical, and bloudy principles of late Secta­ries, specially of Puritans.

The seventh and last Quere answered.

AS the present proceedings of the Lord Nuncio highly entrench (with submissive reverence to his Grace we say it) on all Supreme Governours, on the law of Nations, the ho­nour of the Confederates, and brings a scandall on our holy Mother the Catholicke Church, which contrarie to his Lord­ships proceedings teacheth and warranteth promises, leagues, contracts, Cessations, and peace made with hereticks to be re­ligiously performed (as we have seene in the second supposi­tion made in our answer to the first Q [...]ere, and in the authors there cited) and teacheth (as we have seene before) that all subjects both Laicks, and Ecclesiasticks Pri [...]sts, Fryers, Iesuits, Bishops, Archbishops, Patriarchs, Cardinals are bound under mortall sin, and eternall damnation to obey all Orders of the [Page 48] Civill Magistrate, wherein evill and sinne doth not manifestly appeare (which we have sufficiently proved, not to appeare in their orders concerning this great difference): so it must fol­low that none of either state, Temporall or Ecclesiasticall may without shipwracke of his conscience and losse of his soule, disobey the Orders of the Supreme Councell, on sole pre­tence of the present proceedings of the Lord Nuncio, these proceedings being now declared by strong and insoluble rea­sons, to be uniust, illegall, invalid, sinfull, commaunding and enforcing to most enormous and execrable sinnes of infideli­tie, perjurie, rebellion, treason, and to so many other abomi­nable crimes which streame out of these evill sources.

VVhence is apparant, how unsatisfactorie and ignorant their answer is, who to excuse their disobedience to the Coun­cell, alleage the commaunds of their spirituall Superiours, Guardians, Pryors, Provincials, Bishops, the Lord Nuncio, &c. to the contrarie: as if such commaunds or of such supe­riours, or of any else whosoever, temporall or spirituall were of more force to oblige their consciences then the commaun­dements of God, and then his law, which (according the De­claration made thereof unto us by S. Paul the Apostle, Rom. 13. and by the doctrine of the Church of God, the holy Fa­thers, and Catholicke Doctours in all ages) on paine of eter­nall damnation enjoyne both them and all such their Superi­ours whatsoever (either of the Secular or Regular Clergie) to obey the Councell in all matters where manifest sin doth not appeare. And that sinne doth not appeare in any the com­maunds of the Councell concerning the faithfull observation of this agreement made with Inchiquyn, (yea notwithstanding any Censures of the Lord Nuncio) we have more then suffi­ciently manifested, and they who make this ignorant answer confesse (in regard it could not be hitherto found, what article or part of the Cessation might be with reason maintained to be sinfull) as by their flying to this straight they are constray­ned. Otherwise certainly if they could shew any evill or sinne therein, they would rather make use of so reasonable an ex­cuse for their opposing the Decrees of the Councell then of so bad a pretext as blind obedience to the commaunds of Su­periours who are as they obliged by the law of God to be [Page 49] wholly subject to the Councell for what concernes the peace and tranquillitie of the Common-wealth. Wherefore what they call obedience to their Superiours, is no true nor ver­tuous obedience, but vitious, but sinfull, but against their con­science, but damnation to their soules (as the Apostle hath) because it implyes plaine disobedience to and transgression of the Commaunds of God, who must be obeyed before all men of the earth. Will any even of themselves denie, but their obe­dience to the commaunds of their Superiours enjoyning them rapine, theft, murther, adultery, sacrilege, &c. or enioyning them never to confesse their sins, never to pray, never to doe an act of cha­ritie, &c. would be plaine disobedience to the commaunds of God, would be damnation to their soules? Or will they denie but their foolish excuse of blind obedience to their earthly Superiours injunctions, would not in this case iustifie them either before God or men? nor likewise that other senselesse evasion, That it is not their parts to examine the Iustice of the commaunds imposed upon them by their Prelats, but simply to doe what they are bid? will not they also confesse, if wee reason with them a little further, that it is therefore they should not obey, and th [...] [...]xcuses would not serve them in such a case, because such commaunds would be against the law of God? And will not they admit their knowledge hereof to be deri­ved hence, that they see it so expressed in Scriptures, Fathers, Doctours of the Catholicke Roman Church in all ages (let it be now supposed that their Superiours should tell them the contrarie in the same case?) How therefore doe they on such mad pretences obey the commaunds of their Superiours enjoyning them to substract civill obedience from the Su­preme civill power in a matter concerning the peace & tran­quilitie of the common-wealth, and in a matter wherein their Superiours cannot shew, nor themselves can see any evill implyed? Doe not they see, it is against the expresse Law of God to substract obedience from the Civill power in this case? Do not the Scriptures, CouncellsConcil. Tol, x. c. 2. Si quis reli­giosorum, ab E­pis [...]opo usque ad extremi ordinis Clericum, sive Monachum, ge­neralia iura­menta in salutē Regiam gentis­que, aut patriae data, reperiatur violasse volun­tate profana, mox propria di­gnitute priva­tus, & loco & honore hubea­ [...]ur exclusus.. Fathers, Doctors, the pra­ctise of the Church of Christ in all ages proclayme it? They cannot be ignorant hereof: and if any of them hath beene hetherto, certainly their ignorance can be no longer invinci­ble, that is such as might not be overcome by humane indu­strie; [Page 50] nor probable, that is, which hath probable reasons to maintayne their disobedience to the Councell. For what rea­sons can be probable against the plaine sence of holy Scrip­tures, and the unanimous consent of the holy Fathers and Doctors of the Catholicke Church in all ages?Becanus in Sum. Theol. de Bonit. act. int. c. 4. q. 7. con. 4. & alij apudipsum. As for affected ignorance, grosse, vincible, or improbable, none of them ex­cuse from damnation, according the sence of all Catholicke writers. But alas, ignorance is not the cause of sinfull obstina­cie. Malice and a naturall inclination occasioneth it in verie many, a rash engagement in others, hopes of preferment to Benefices and Superioritie in others, in others a stupid feare of loosing what they had, being perswaded by experience of the former revolution, that an Excommunication the most uniust would alter the whole frame of government, and that there should be no living in Ireland for any would oppose the Lord Nuncio's designe herein, or the power of Owen ô Neyll. In others, an apprehension of shame and dis­grace, in reclay­ming an errour, & falling from this way they once resolved on. Behold the true causes of their obstinacie, and no sence of conscience. Behold the reason, why even the best and most learned amongst them, being demanded the ground of their opposition, do say commonly, That they will neither give reason, nor take reason, and when they speake their minde at full, doe now at last, onely censure the intention which the Councell and their adhernets had in concluding the Cessation, because they finde no other cause, and yet would seeme not without some cause to f [...] reiect it, which they are engaged so many un­worthy causes to oppose But who sees not in our answers to the first and second Quere, the false imposture of this last refuge? Yet by reason they make hereof more use then of any other, we bri [...]fly propose the ensuing considerations. First, that the Declaration and Censures of the Lord Nuncio, Congregati­on, and Delegats (in obedience to which they disobey the Councell) were not against such evill intentions, but against the verie substance of the articles of Cessation, as in them­selves evill & unconscionable. Tis manifest to any that please to reade and peruse the Tenour of both Decrees, which con­tayne not a word importing other sence, and therefore can­not be extended to evill intentions (though we granted such intentions to had beene) in regard a penall Decree or law is to be restrained, not extended,Bon. tract. de Legib, disp. 1. q. 1. punct. 8. prop. 2. & alij apud ipsum ibid. according the maxime of Ca­nonists. [Page 51] Wherefore this recourse of theirs to evill intentions, and their not shewing any other evill in the obiect, that is in the Cessation itselfe, or in the conclusion and observation of it, concludes an errour in the Decree or sentence of Excommu­nication, and consequently disanuls it, and leaves them no rea­sonable pretence for disobeying the Councell since their pre­tence is the supposed obligation of the Censures which even their owne answer takes away. The second is: Though it were granted that the Councell or others who negotiated th'affaire of Cessation, had such intentions at first, or upon the perfecti­on of it, yet might they have changed such evill intentions in­to good, during the nine daies given in the monitorie Decree for deliberation: and consequently if there be no other evill but of their intentions, how could the Nuncio proceede to ex­ecute his Censures since they protested in their appeale before the ninth day and in other Printed Declarations, that they had no such intention? Nay how could he proceede to this execu­tion, though they never had made any such exteriour protesta­tion, whereas without it, they might have taken away the ground of the excommunication, to wit the supposed evill in­tentions? The [...]ird, that questionlesse our Opposits will not denie, but tho [...]ands are of the Confederats who desired and embraced the Cessa [...]ion, not out of any such evill intention, but for a iust end and forth, it owne preservation. How then could such be excommunicated, since the ground of this ex­communication, to wit evill intention, is not found in them? And if these be not excommunicated, is it not plaine that none is excommunicated whose conscience tels him, that he did not adhere to the Cessation with any evill intention? How then doth the Nuncio proceeds indifferently against them all as ex­communicated persons? Nay how can he proceede against any of them as such, but onely against him or them whose naughty intentions are apparant? and whose intentions can be appa­rant to him, but either out of confession, or secundum allegata & probata by exteriour proofes? (for God alone is Iudge of the interiou [...] not the Church And who is it that was so con­victed, or confessed before him such intentions? Nay who is it was summon'd to his tribunall for such a businesse. The fourth consideration is of the strong motives and morall cer­tainties [Page 52] produced before (in our answer to the second Quere) and which we may have to perswade us, that the Supreame Councell (who are chiefly aymed at in this businesse) had no such evill intentions. VVhich, together with all hetherto said, being duely pondered by them who now seeme so adverse to us in opinion, but by them discharged a little of passion, retyring into their soules, and looking with an eye of indifferencie upon this difference, we doubt not but they will acknowledge before God, the truth of our assertions, and with how little reason, but great hazard of eternall salvation they disobey the commaunds of the Supreme Councell on pretence of the present proceedings of the Lord Nuncio; and we hope, as we most heartily desire with all our soules, that they, or at least such of them as have an affection to loyaltie, and a true zeale of Gods cause, will by their unfayned and repentant submission to the Supreme Authoritie, established by the Kingdome, make happy these Answers, (labour'd as the shortnesse of time did permit) for their conversion, and satisfaction of all good Patriots, by