I.

BEING Naturally more than ordinarily disposed to Thought­fulness, and from the circumstan­ces of my present Solitude and Retirement further invited to it; I began one day to fall into a deep Meditation upon the Conduct of my own, and of Humane Life. What Reflections I made upon [Page 2] my own, are too peculiarly Cal­culated for my proper Circum­stances, to be of any General use, and therefore I shall not trouble you with them. But as for those past upon the conduct of Humane Life, I think they are of too general use, and withal of too Weighty Consequence, not to be Communicated. These therefore I shall think worth while to draw up into a little more orderly form than wherein they were first con­ceived, and present to your Ladyships Consideration.

II.

First then I consider that the Conduct of Human Life must be to the End of Human Life, which is the same with the End of Man, which is Happiness. This conduct therefore must be and and necessa­rily is, in Gross to Happiness. But now whereas there are two Fa­culties or Powers of Man, by the right ordering of which this Hap­piness is to be attain'd, Vnder­standing [Page 3] and Will, therefore more immediately and distinctly, this Conduct of Human Life is in or­der to the Government and exer­cise of these two Faculties, the due Regulation of which is the Im­mediate End, to which Human Life is to be Conducted. There is therefore a double conduct of Human Life, Intellectual and Moral.

III.

As to the Moral Conduct of Hu­man Life, I do not intend at pre­sent to spend any Reflections up­on it. Not because 'tis Unexcep­tionable, but because 'tis too Ob­noxious, the general Impertinence and Irregularity of it being too open and exposed, to need any. And besides 'tis a Butt, that has been Shot at so often, ever since Preaching and Writing has been in the World, that 'tis now so thick-set with holes, that there is scarce room left to fasten a new Arrow in it.

[Page 6]2. The undue and irregular method of prosecuting what is really Perfective of it.

3. The too Importunate and over-earnest pursuit after Know­ledge in General.

These are the three Cardinal Irregularities, I have observ'd in the Intellectual Conduct of Hu­man Life, and upon each of these I shall bestow a Reflection.

VII.

The business of this first Re­flection shall be to Tax the General Conduct of Human Life, for placing Learning and Know­ledge, in such things as are little or nothing Perfective of the un­derstanding. This I confess to be a Charge of more than ordinary Severity and Boldness; because it fastens an Imputation of Folly up­on the Learned Order (for with them only is my present Concern) and not only so, but also in that very thing wherein they think their Wisdom and Intellectual ac­complishment [Page 7] consists, and upon which they value themselves above the rest of Mankind. To question their Conduct in any thing else, would be but a trivial Charge, and such as they would not only readily Pardon, but Ac­knowledge; it being a common thing with Learned Men not only to own, but studiously to affect Ig­norance in things besides their Profession, as in Secular business, the common Affairs of Life, the Mysteries of Trades and the like. But to censure them as defective in that one thing they pretend to, to make that their Blind-side where they think they see clear­est; to maintain that they are not only not really wise and know­ing, but that generally they don't so much as know what true Knowledge is, and that they generally place it in such things as contribute little or nothing to the Perfection of that, whereby they really excel the Brutes, and [Page 8] would be thought to excel the Common sort of Men; this is so high, and so disobliging a charge, that I fear those who from the force of what shall be here urg'd, may be convinc'd of the Truth of it, will hard­ly forgive the Boldness of it.

VIII.

But as high a charge as it is, I question not but that it may be, and will be here made good. And that it may appear to be true, we will first of all by way of Address or Preparation, consider what antece­dent grounds of probability there are, that men should generally place Learning and Knowledge in such things as are little or nothing perfective of the rational Part; and then in the second place we will proceed directly to prove that they do so.

IX.

As to the first, your Ladyship can­not be so little acquainted either with hidden Springs, or outward Workings of humane Nature, as not [Page 9] to have observ'd that however strong and uuiversal is the desire of Knowledge, yet men are general­ly more in Love with the Fame and Reputation of it, than with the thing it self. There are indeed here and there a few humble retired Souls that are otherwise disposed, and like your Ladyship are so far from loving the Fame and Credit of knowledge before knowledge it self, that they don't love it at all, but are content to court Wisdom privately, and enjoy their own Light in the Dark. ‘For it may be they consider that be their Attainments what they will, Fame is a thing of infinite un­certainty and contingency, that it depends more upon the Hu­mours of men, or some more secret unaccountable Fate, than upon real excellency and merit, that some have the luck to be popular and cry'd up for no­thing, when in the mean while others that are really and highly [Page 10] deserving can scarce keep their Heads above Contempt; that the World is seldom just to true Merit, and that nothing is weigh'd in a falser Ballance than real excellency, whether Moral or Intellectual; and that there is little reason to expect it should ever be otherwise as long as Envy and Ignorance hold the Scales. Then again it may be they con­sider with themselves, that sup­pose true worth were secure of Reputation, yet what a poor slender good is it! For what is it to be talk'd of, or pointed at? Should a Man be never so Popular the Antipodes will never hear of him, or if they do, what is he the better for what is said of him there? And should his Fame, like the Sun, Travael round the whole Globe, besides that he is but Master of a Point when he has All, he can enjoy no more of it but just what he hears, which is inconsiderable. [Page 11] And yet as inconsiderable as it is, 'tis like to be his whole Porti­on. For as for Posthumous Glory, it comes too late to be any thing valuable. He will either not be sensible of it, or despise it. For certainly it must needs be mightily beneath the im­provements of a separate state to put any value upon the in­judicious praises of poor Mortals here below. Or suppose that a Deceas'd Spirit could take any delight in reflecting upon the Fame he has left behind him, yet 'tis to be considered that the Fashion of this world passes away, that those in whose praises he outlives himself, must also shortly dye, and that then his Fame will have a Funeral, as well as him­self.’ These perhaps, or such like Considerations, may prevail with your Ladyship and a few more thinking Persons, to have but a very cold and indifferent regard for the Reputation of Learning [Page 12] and Knowledge: But as for the generality of mankind it must be own'd that they are fond of it to a strange degree, and are more concern'd to be accounted Wise and Learned, than really to be so. Otherwise I question whether our Libraries would be so full as they are.

X.

But now, tho the generality of men be so passionately and keenly set upon the fame of being Lear­ned and Knowing, yet (so little hath Nature design'd to gratify this ambitious humour) there are but a very few that have either a Genius and inclination for Learning it self, or a capacity of attaining to it. Not an Inclination, because there is a great variety in the Specula­tive, as well as Moral inclinations of men, one being naturally dispo­sed to this sort of study, and ano­ther to that, whereas true Know­ledge whatever it be (which shall be consider'd in its due place) is of [Page 13] one determinate kind or nature in general, and consequently must require a certain peculiar frame and disposition of mind. Not a capacity, because the generality of men are known to have but indif­ferent Intellectuals, suited to the exigencies of common life, when as true knowledge (what ever it be) must be supposed to be a thing of uncommon difficulty, and the study of it a work fit only for sub­limer wits, the more elevated and Awaken'd part of Mankind.

XI.

Now put these two things to­gether, that almost all men would fain be thought Learned and Knowing, and that there is but here and there one that is Natu­rally made and fitted for true Knowledge, and then consider what is like to be the result of this Complication. Why, the Latter Few may succeed well in the search of what they were naturally quali­fied for, and having attain'd to a [Page 14] Competency of true Knowledge, such as is Perfective of the Un­derstanding, they find themselves under no Temptation to place it in any thing else, or to bring into Credit any other sort of know­ledge. Because having arrived so far, they are either wise enough to undervalue the Fame of being Learned, or else despair not of at­taining it by their Proficiency in True Knowledge. Here therefore they take up their rest.

XII.

But now what shall we do with the others? Are they to be per­swaded that they are not of a Make for the Study and attain­ment of Learning? You'll find it tough work to convince them of that. But suppose it possible that they could be made sensible that they are not like to Com­mence very Learned and Know­ing, yet all the World shall never be able to perswade them to lay aside that Natural itch of being [Page 15] so accounted. But you'll say, tho this Inclination be too Natural and inbred to be quite laid aside, yet there's hopes it may be Go­vern'd. No nor that neither. They must put in for the Prize, and 'tis in vain to disswade them from it. But they must despair of ever winning it in a fair way, being supposed not able to reach the Tree of Knowledge. True. They have therefore but one way left, and that is, to turn the Tables, and cry up something or other for Learning which they are capable of. No matter whether it deserve that name, that is, whether it be really perfective of the Rational Part or no, 'tis enough if they can reach it. For those that can't com­pass true Riches, and yet will have the Name and credit of it, are put upon the Necessity of Coyning and Counterfeiting.

XIII.

And truly this Supposition seems to me so very reasonable, [Page 16] that were experience altogether Silent in the Case, and were I utterly unacquainted with the State of Learning in the World, yet if I had a Draught given me of Human Nature, and were told how much the Ambition of being esteem'd as Learned and Knowing exceeds both the Desire and the Ability to be so, and were then ask'd what I thought would be the Intellectual Conduct of Human Life, I should without any further enquiry conclude that in all pro­bability Men would generally place Learning and Knowledge in such things as signifie little or nothing to the Perfection of the understanding.

XIV.

But from grounds of Proba­bility that they should do so, let us proceed to prove directly that they do so. Now in this Charge there is something supposed, and something asserted. The supposi­tion is that there are some things, [Page 17] the knowledge of which is little or nothing Perfective of the un­derstanding. The Assertion is, that Learning is generally placed in the knowledge of such things. The Proof of the Supposition will ingage my Pen upon the discussion of a very Gurious and weighty Question, wherein the Perfection of the understanding does consist, or what it is that is Perfective of the Understanding? Which when we have duly fix'd and stated, we shall then have a certain Measure to go by in the Proof of the Assertion.

XV.

To the Question then I answer, that the Perfection of the Under­standing, as that of the will, is either Formal or Objective. The Formal Perfection of the under­standing, as that of the will, is no other than its Exercise or Operati­on, which is Thinking and Percep­tion, as that of the other is Willing and Chusing. According to the [Page 18] vulgar Maxim, that the Perfecti­on of every thing is its Operation, which must be understood only of the Formal Perfection. The Ob­jective Perfection of the under­standing is Truth, as that of the will is Good. The Result of these two Perfections joyn'd together, is what in the understanding we call Knowledge, and what in the will we call Vertue.

XVI.

Our concern is not at present with the Formal, but with the Ob­jective Perfection of the understanding. This we have said in general to be Truth, as that of the will is Good. And thus far there is neither Dif­ficulty, nor Controversie. All there­fore that further remains to be here considerd, is, what Truth that is which is the Objective Per­fection of the understanding, or, what Truth that is, in the Know­ledge of which the Perfection of the understanding does consist,

XVII.

Now since there is so great a Proportion and Correspondence between the understanding and the will, and the Perfection of each, the first entrance we shall make upon the Resolution of this Questi­on shall be to consider, what good that is which is the Objective Per­fection of the will, or, what good that is in the desiring and embra­cing of which the Perfection of the will does consist. Which being determin'd, will afford at least a Fair Ground and Occasion, tho not an infallible Measure for the de­termination of the other.

XVIII.

Here then 'twill be necessary to premise a Consideration of the Kinds of good. The most general distribution of which I conceive to be into these two, Necessary and Contingent good. By necessary good I understand that which can­not but be good, that which is always and immutably good. And [Page 20] this comprizes under it the good of the End which is desireable for it self, commonly called Pleasant good. And the good of the Means, which has an immutable con­nexion with it, and is desirable for the other, commonly call'd Profitable Good. By Contingent good I understand that which may, or may not be good, and is good, whenever it is so, only upon a Po­sitive account, because enjoyn'd by the Will of a Competent Au­thority. This can never be the good of the End, or a self-desirable Good; nor can it be such a good of the Means as has a Natural and immutable connexion with it; but is always an Arbitrary and Muta­ble Means.

XIX.

This being briefly premised, I shall venture to assert that that good which is the Objective Per­fection of the Will is Necessary Good. Either that which is Self-desirable, as God the Universal, or [Page 21] any other particular pleasant good. Or else that which has an immuta­ble Connexion with it, as Moral good. As for Contingent good, that is no otherwise perfective of the Will, than in the force and vertue of the necessary good. For Obedience to a positive Law is no otherwise a Vertue, than as 'tis in­cluded in some general natural Law, whereof 'tis a contingent in­stance. Which is also the ground commonly assign'd by Casuists, why Human Laws oblige in Conscience. According to that of Aquinas, Lex Humana Obligat in Conscientia, quatenus participat legem aeter­nam & Naturalem. An Human Law obliges in Conscience as much as it partakes of the Eternal and Na­tural Law. That is, as far as it is founded, or relies upon the immu­table will of God and the Dictate of Natural Reason.

XX.

This is too plain to need much Proof, though not so plain but [Page 22] that it may be demonstrated. If then a Reason be demanded why the objective Perfection of the Will is only necessary, not contin­gent good, 'twill be sufficient to say, that that only is Perfective of the Will, which naturally, and of it self, makes it Happy, and wherein she can acquiesce with sa­tisfaction and delight. But this is only necessary good, that which is essentially, intrinsically, and im­mutably good, either as the End, or as having a Natural Connexion with it, either of which involves Happiness. As for contingent good, that is supposed to be of it self indifferent as to Happiness, and tho by positive Ordination it may be made a condition of it, yet still it contributes to it only as an Arbitrary Means, which has no inward goodness in it self, and whose whole Moral Excellency is deriv'd from some general Law of Reason, whereof 'tis an instance by accident, and in vertue where­of [Page 23] it obliges. Exod. 17.6. Thus Moses's stri­king the Rock, had nothing mo­rally good or perfective of the Will in it, but only as 'twas an Instance of that General Law of obeying the Divine Will in all things. Nor did the Vertue of Moses consist, pro­perly and strictly speaking, in stri­king the Rock, but in Obeying God by striking the Rock.

XXI.

By this it appears what good that is, in the desiring and embra­cing of which the Moral Perfecti­on of the Will does properly and ultimately consist. That it is Ne­cessary, not Contingent good. Whence we may take instruction how to state the Perfection of the under­standing, which we shall do by following the same Common Mea­sure. First then be it here also premised, that as in relation to the Will, all good is either Necessary or Contingent, so in relation to the Understanding, all Truth is either Necessary or Contingent. For be­sides [Page 24] the immediateness of the Opposition, which is Contradicto­ry, I further consider, that that must be the Adaequate division of Truth which is of Being, Truth being a property of Being, and such a one, as tho formally and Abstractly different (for the sub­ject must never be included in the Precise Reason of the Property) is yet Materially, and Concretely the same with it. But now Ne­cessary and Contingent is the Ade­quate Division of Being, therefore also of Truth.

XXII.

By Necessary Truth I under­stand that which cannot but be True, that which is always and immutably True. Such is God among Simple Truths, who is im­mutably what he is, and all the Divine Ideas which (as I have else­where abundantly explain'd it) are the very Essence of God, Vid. Rea­son and Re­ligion. Pag. 82. as vari­ously imitable or participable, thus or thus. Such also among Complex [Page 25] Truths are all Propositions of Eter­nal Truth, whether Absolute or Hypothetical, with all their regu­lar Inferences and Conclusions, which (as I have also elsewhere shewn) are nothing else but the Divine Ideas themselves as they respect each other according to their several immutable Habitudes and Combinations. Vid. the same Trea­tise. Pag. 203.

XXIII.

By Contingent Truth I under­stand that which may or may not be True, that whose Truth depends not upon the Essence of God. (That Ground and Pillar of all Necessary Truth) but only upon his Meer Will and free Pleasure, either decreeing or permitting. Such among Simple Truths are all Created Beings, the whole Ectypal World, and all things in it, which tho made according to the Eternal and Immutable Patterns of the Divine Ideas or Archetypal World, yet in themselves are Temporary and Mutable. Such also among [Page 26] Complex Truths are all those Pro­positions the Terms of which have no Essential or Immutable Con­nexion with each other, but are so and so combined and related, meerly by the Decree or Permis­sion of him, who is the Author of whatever is besides himself.

XXIV.

Under the First order of Truths are comprehended all those things which are the Matter of those Arts and Sciences which are built upon Stable and immoveable Foundati­ons, which depend not upon the System of the Present World, but were antecedent to it, and might have been study'd before 'twas made, and according to which the World it self was made, such as Theology, Metaphysics, Morality, Geometry, &c. together with all those unchangeable Rules and Measures of Reason and Conse­quence which are to be used about them all, which is the Subject of that Art or Science we call [Page 27] Logic. Under the second order are comprehended all Matters of Fact, all Temporary Events, all Natural or Artificial Effects, &c. Which are the Matter of all Ar­bitrary and Mutable Sciences; as History, Chronology, Knowledge of Tongues, &c. Which began with this Mundan System, and stand or fall with it.

XXV.

Now as that good which is Primely and properly Perfective of the Will is Necessary good, so following the same Proportion I shall not doubt to assert, that that Truth which is Primely and Pro­perly Perfective of the Under­standing is also Necessary Truth. And as Contingent good is no o­therwise Perfective of the Will, than in the Force and Vertue of the Necessary good (as was above Explain'd) so likewise Contingent Truth, is no otherwise Perfective of the understanding than in the Force and Vertue of Necessary [Page 28] Truth, that is, of the Divine Ideas wherein 'tis contain'd. As for Example, when I Speculate some Particular Artificial Triangle which is a Contingent Simple Truth, it is no otherwise Perfective of my Understanding than as it is beheld in its Necessary and Im­mutable Nature, or (which is all one) in the Divine Idea. And thus again when I form a Proposi­tion concerning this Triangle, by ascribing to it some Property or other, which is a Contingent Complex Truth, this again is no otherwise Perfective of my Un­derstanding than as it belongs to, and is beheld in the Nature of a Triangle in Common, which is Necessary and Immutable, being no other than an Idea, or a De­terminate Mode of the Divine Omniformity. So that at length the Perfection of the understand­ing is resolv'd into the Knowledge of Necessary Truth, which is its only Objective Perfection; that [Page 29] which is Contingent being no way perfective of it, but only in ver­tue of the other.

XXVI.

I am ( Madam) very sensible how strange and Paradoxical this way of Philosophizing will seem to those who are either unaddict­ed to Meditation in general, or not conversant in Theories of this kind, and therefore for their sakes, rather than for any inevidence of the Argument, I will give some Proof and Confirmation of it, which I will so order, that it shall be an Explanation at the same time. I will therefore first shew that 'tis so, and secondly, how and why 'tis so. That it is so I prove thus: First, I suppose that God was once when there was nothing be­sides God. Again, I suppose that as the Being of God did go before all other being in Order of time, so in Order of Nature it was ante­cedent even to the Will of Crea­ting, putting, or permitting any [Page 30] thing. Again, I suppose that there was therefore then no other Truth but necessary Truth, that is, the Divine Ideas with their se­veral Habitudes and Complicati­ons. I suppose again, that there­fore God must be consider'd as knowing then only these necessary Truths. And yet I suppose again, that God was as perfect then as he is now; and consequently, that the Divine Vnderstanding was as perfect then as now, the Nature of God requiring not only that he should be Absolutely Perfect, but that he should be so in himself. Whence I infer, that therefore the whole Perfection of the Divine Understanding is to be resolv'd in­to the sole knowledge of Necessary Truths, and that the knowledge of Contingent Truth gives no Perfecti­on to it, any otherwise than as 'tis beheld in that which is necessary, as was said before.

XXVII.

From this Process of Reasoning, [Page 31] I presume 'tis sufficiently evident, that the Objective Perfection of the Divine Vnderstanding is only Necessary Truth, which I take in the first place to be a strong ground of presumption, that the Perfecti­on of Human Vnderstanding does also consist in the same. But to make it further plain that it does so, I suppose again, that nothing were to exist but only God, and one Intelligent Being; and that this Intelligent Being had the full and perfect fruition of God. Upon this supposition I enquire, whether this Intelligent Being would be perfectly Happy or no? Without all question he would, as enjoying an All-sufficient Good. Well, if so, then he must be perfectly happy in his Vnderstanding. And yet 'tis most certain, that he could then have the knowledge of very little more than Necessary Truth; for all that he could possibly know be­sides, would be only that he him­self did exist, and that he knew [Page 32] these Necessary Truths, and that he was happy in the knowledge of them, and the like. And lest the knowledge of such Contingencies should be thought any Accumu­lation to his Happiness, we will carry our Hypothesis a little fur­ther, by supposing that this Intel­ligent Being were not to attend to any of his own Perfections, or to any of those few Contingent Truths resulting from them, but were only to Contemplate God and the Divine Ideas; and then I demand whether his understanding would be sufficiently perfected or no? 'Tis necessary to answer in the Affirmative, whence 'tis also as necessary to conclude, that the only Objective Perfection of our understanding is Necessary Truth.

XXVIII.

This I think sufficient to prove that 'tis so. I shall now briefly explain the Mode of it, by shew­ing how and why 'tis so; and I ac­count for it after this manner. [Page 33] Necessary Truth is the same with the Divine Ideas; and accordingly Plato, I remember, calls Science a Participation of Ideas, and the Divine Ideas are the very Essence of God, as 'tis variously imitable according to its Omniformity: Ne­cessary Truth therefore is no other than the Essence of God, the very Substance of the Divinity. More particularly, it is the same with the Divine [...], the second Per­son in the Holy Triad, who is [...] as Philo speaks, the Archetypal Seal, and [...] the Intellectual World, [...]. p. 3. and [...] the Archetypal Paradigme, and [...], the Idea of Ideas. Whom also the Scripture represents as the Wisdom of his Fa­ther, and as the Light of the World, and who inlightens every Man that comes into it, not only Effici­ently (as 'tis vulgarly understood) but also Formally, he himself be­ing the Truth, and the Light, in which we see all things.

XXIX.

These things ( Madam) I only hint to you, referring you for fur­ther satisfaction to your deserved­ly admired Monsieur Malebranche in his de la Recherche de la Verité, and to a Treatise of mine call'd Reason and Religion; where I have purposely treated of the Divine Ideas, and of our seeing all things in them: In which however whatever is deficient shall be supplied in ano­ther Latin Treatise of a larger compass, now under my hands, and which I shall communicate to the World e're long (if God please to continue my Life and Health) under the Title of Theoria Mundi Idealis, sive Metaphysica Platonica.

XXX.

However, lest I should be thought to proceed upon a preca­rious ground, I will here give you one short and evident Demonstra­tion that Necessary Truth is the very Essence of God, and then advance. That God is the cause [Page 35] of whatever is besides himself, or that whatever is, is either God or the ef­fect of God, is a clear and acknow­ledg'd principle. Upon which I thus argue: Necessary Truth is either God, or the Effect of God. But it is not the Effect of God, therefore it is no other than God himself.

XXXI.

That it is not the Effect of God, is evident from the many Absur­dities that would follow upon that Supposition. For first, God would be then a Necessary Agent; for if Necessary Truth be an Effect, 'tis a Necessary Effect, and a Necessary Effect must have a Necessary Cause. Again, God would not only be a Necessary Agent, but also (which is worse) an Vnintelligent Agent. The consequence is unavoidable, for if Truth be the Effect of God, then antecedently to the effecting of it, there was no Truth, and consequently no Knowledge. Again, if Necessary Truth be the Effect [Page 36] of God, then the Perfection of the Divine Understanding must be supposed to depend upon some­thing that is not God; nay, upon something Created by God. 'Twill follow again, that God has made something which he cannot de­stroy. And lastly, to add no more, if Necessary Truth be the Effect of God, then there will be something Necessary, Immutable, and Eternal, &c. besides God. The Consequences are all plain, and so are the Absurdities. The last of which appeared so great to the Excellent Monsieur Poiret, a stiff Opposer of your beloved Male­branche, and of the Ideal Philoso­phy, Cogitatio­nes Ratio­nales de Deo p. 296. that he urges this as one Ar­gument against the very being of Necessary Truth, because then there would be something Necessa­ry besides God, not considering that this Necessary Truth is really one and the same with God him­self. And this alone puts by the force of his Argument against the [Page 37] being of Necessary Truth, which however is sufficiently conclusive to the purpose we now aim at, that Necessary Truth is not the Effect of God. For if it were, then his Absurdity would come in, and there would be something Necessary besides God. Since then Necessary Truth is not the Effect of God, it remains by Ver­tue of the premised Disjunction, that it must be no other than the very Substance and Essence of the Deity.

XXXII.

I further consider, that the Essence of God is intimately and immediately united to the mind of Man; this is plain from Scripture, which tells us that in God is our Life, our Motion, and our Being. And from Philosophy, which assures us, that what pervades all things, must needs be immediately united with every thing. De la Re­cherche de la verite p. 208. And for this, you have the Authority of your excellent Malebranche, who there­fore [Page 38] calls God the Place of Spirits, as Space is the Place of Bodies.

XXXIII.

Now upon these two Supposi­tions, that Necessary Truth is the same with God himself, and that the Essence of God is immediately united to the Mind of Man, 'tis easie to Conceive how and why Necessary Truth should be the Objective Perfection of our Un­derstanding; since to make an Object Perfective of the Faculty, nothing else is requisite, than that it be its proper Good, and that it be intimately Present to it. And this will also sufficiently give us to understand that Contingent Truth cannot be the Objective Perfection of the Mind; first, because that is a Created Being, whereas God alone is our proper Good. And secondly, because 'tis without us, and cannot be immediately united to our minds, without which condi­tion, were it never so Perfective otherwise, it could contribute [Page 39] nothing to the Perfection of our Understandings.

XXXIV.

And thus have I given a full Resolution to that Curious and Important Question which the Proof of my Supposition ingaged me upon, and which is to be the Measure of what follows in this Reflection. It is plain from hence, that there are some things the Knowledge whereof is little or nothing perfective of the under­standing. For as I have shewn, 'tis not Contingent but Necessary Truth, wherein the Perfection of the Understanding does consist. Whence it follows that True Learn­ing ought to be placed in the Knowledge of Necessary Truth, in the Comprehension of those Arts and Sciences whose Foundations are not Arbitrary, but Stable and Immutable, and in understanding the Eternal and Unchangeable Laws and Measures of Reason and Consequence. He therefore is the [Page 40] truly Learned and Knowing Man, who has furnish'd his Mind with bright and clear Ideas, lodg'd them orderly and regularly in his Head, and settled the Relations and Consequences of one to ano­ther. He that is able to think clearly and distinctly (for so much a Man knows, as he distinctly understands, and no more) to judge truly and solidly, and to reason dependently and conse­quentially. In short, he that sees most of the Divine Ideas, is most familiarly conversant in the Intelli­gible World, and has the largest and the clearest view of the Field of Truth. This I hold to be Learning, and Intellectual Per­fection, and besides what Argu­ments I have alledged in behalf of this Hypothesis; it is further Confirmed by the Authority of Plato, when he makes the Happi­ness or Perfection of Man (for 'tis all one) to consist in the Contem­plation of Ideas.

XXXV.

But notwithstanding the un­questionable Certainty of the Pre­mises, this is not that Measure which the generality of the World has thought fit to proceed by. Learning is generally placed in the Knowledge of Contingent, not of Necessary Truth. For your Ladyship very well Knows that the World does not esteem him a Learned Man whose Learning has Clear'd his understanding, who is arrived to clearness and Di­stinctness of Conception, and is a thorough Master of Notion and Discourse. No, 'twill cost great Pains, great Labour of Mind, and anxiety of Thinking to arrive to this Pitch. Nor will all the Pains in the World do, unless a Man be Naturally made for it, unless he be of a Notional Complexion, and has had his Head cast in a Meta­physical Mould. Whereupon this Attainment is like to be the Lot of a very Few. This therefore [Page 42] must not be Learning, but some­thing else must, that lies more within Common reach, tho of no real Moment to the Perfection of the understanding. Such (as I have shewn) are Contingent Truths, and yet Learning is generally placed in the Knowledge of these.

XXXVI.

For first, 'tis reckon'd a notable point of Learning to understand variety of Languages. This alone gives a Man a Title to Learning without one Grain of Sense; and on the other side, let a Man be an Angel for Notion and Discourse, yet unless he can express the same thoughts in variety of words, he may go for a Rational, but will by no means be esteem'd a Learned Man. And this brings to my mind a Passage which I met with not long since in London, where being in Company with an Ingenious French Man, I ask't him of what repute M. Malebranche was with [Page 43] the Learned in France? He told me, that he was look'd upon as a great Master of Notion and Specu­lation, but as a Man of no great Learning. I ask'd him, why? Be­cause, said he, he understands but few Languages. How much that excellent Authors Talent may lie that way I am not concern'd. But whatever it be, the most Learned of them all must give me leave to say, that I would rather be Master of a Quarter of his Sense, than of all the Languages that may be form'd out of the Alphabet. But is it not a strange thing that so much Stress should be laid upon such a Triflle? For what am I the better for being able to tell what 'tis a Clock in several Languages? What does this signifie to the Per­fection of my understanding? Words are purely in order to Thought and Sense, and therefore are of no further value than as they serve as helps either to Learn, or to Communicate the other. To [Page 44] affect them therefore for them­selves, is to turn the Means into the End, than which nothing is more absurd. And yet this vain peice of Pedantry has prevail'd all the World over, and with some to that degree, that they have con­founded Ideas with Words, and have made all Science to terminate in the latter. Thus the Philoso­phers of the Nominal way, and particularly Mr. Hobbs who makes Reason to be nothing else but Sequela Nominum, a well order'd Train of Words. Never certainly was there a grosser peice of Ido­latry, nor a plainer Argument of the great degeneracy of Mankind. And tho all the Multipliers of Tongues are not Comprehended under this latter charge, yet it may concern them to consider, how great a Folly it must needs be, to place Learning in that, which is one of the greatest Curses upon Earth, and which shall utterly Cease in Heaven. 1 Cor. 13.8.

XXXVII.

Again, it passes for an extraor­dinary part of Learning to under­stand History, that is, in other words, to know what a company of silly Creatures, call'd Men, have been doing for almost this 6000 years. Now what is my under­standing the Perfecter for know­ing this? I deny not but that there are some matters of Fact, as the more remarkable Turns of Eccle­siastical History, together with the greater revolutions of the Civil World, that may be of Moment to be known, not that the knowledge of them as such is Learning, or Perfective of the understanding, but because by discovering to us the Conduct of Divine Providence they supply us with occasions of adoring and glorifying the wisdom and goodness of God. I am not therefore against the knowing these things, but only I would not have men think themselves the Wiser or more Learned for such Knowledge. [Page 46] For 'tis one thing to say that a thing deserves to be known, and another to say that 'tis Learning or Wisdom to know it. For a thing may deserve to be known, not as perfecting the understanding, but meerly as touching upon our Inte­rest. I grant therefore that it may be of Consequence to know some Historical passages, if we are any way concerned in them, and so it may to know the Clock has struck One, if I have appointed an Assig­nation at that time; but sure the bare naked Theory of the Clock's having struck one, can add but little to the stock of my Intel­lectual Perfection. The most tri­vial matter of Fact in the World is worth knowing, if I have any concern depending upon it; and the greatest without that is utterly insignificant. So that 'tis not from the perfecting of our Vnderstanding, but from the Relation they have to our Interest, that these things de­serve to be known.

XXXVIII.

This is sufficiently plain from the Measure we have premised, by which no Truth is perfective of the understanding but only Necessa­ry Truth. But to address my self more Convincingly to the great Magnifiers of History, I shall only desire their answer to this one Question. Suppose such and such Matters of Fact, on the knowledge of which they Found their title to Learning, and perhaps, glory more in the knowing them, than the Actors themselves did in the doing them. Suppose, I say, such mat­ters of Fact had never been done; suppose Fabius had never Wea­ther'd out Hannibal by Delays; nor Cyrus took Babylon by drain­ing the River into the Ditches, what loss or diminution would this have been to the Perfection of their Understandings? They cannot say it would have been any. And why then should the knowing them now they are done, be reck­on'd [Page 48] as an Intellectual Improve­ment? And yet we find that 'tis so, and that Men study these things not only for their use (for that I allow) but for their meer Theory, placing Learning in such History, which has nothing to commend it but only that it tells you such and such things were done. Of this impertinent sort is the greatest part of the Roman and Grecian History, which (had not the World Voted it for Learning) would no more concern a Man to know, than that a Bird has dropt a feather upon the Pyrenoean Mountains.

XXXIX.

Again, it goes for a Notable piece of Learning to understand Chronology, to be able to adjust the intervals and distances of Time, to know when such an Action was done, when such a Famous Man flourish'd, and who and who were contemporary, and the like. Now I deny not, but that while Men [Page 49] live in this World, they may be concern'd to have some acquaintance with these things, by reason of some interest or other that de­pends upon it. It may therefore, I say, for some purposes, be con­venient to know that. For in­stance, there is a twofold Aera (or date) of the Victory at Actium, the one reckon'd from the Fight at the Promontory of Actium, ac­cording to the account of Dio and Xiphilinus; the other from the taking of Alexandria, and the Death of Cleopatra, according to Ptolemy, Iosephus, Eusebius, and Censorinus. But however, concern­ing this may be, with respect to its usefulness, yet certainly as to any Intellectual Perfection that accrues by it, it must needs be a very unedifying Stuffage of Mind; and yet 'tis counted a great Accom­plishment and Enrichment of it.

XL.

Another thing there is which passes for wonderful Learning, [Page 50] which I cannot well reduce either to Necessary or Contingent Truth, for indeed it does not belong to Truth at all, and that is our Sophisti­cal way of Disputation. And in­deed it may well be call'd so, for as 'tis generally manag'd, 'tis no­thing but meer Quibbling and Jesting, not Arguing but Punning. For suppose the Question be, Whether he that has Faith shall be saved? No says the Opponent, If the Damn'd have Faith, then not every one that has Faith shall be saved; But the Damn'd have Faith. Therefore, &c Here 'tis plain that the Word Faith, tho it has Something in Common in both Propositions, yet according to the intire Idea signifies one thing in one Proposition, and another in another. And why then is not the whole Proceedure to be re­jected as Idle and Impertinent? As for downright Fallacy and Equivocation where there is a Manifest Ambiguity (as between [Page 51] Dog and Dog, one signifying a Celestial Sign, and the other a Terrestial Animal) this is every where despised and laught at as un­becoming both the Acumen and the Gravity of a Disputant. And we think we have sufficiently dis­charged our hands of such an Argument, by Crying out that these are Four Terms in the Syllo­gism. But now I would fain know whether it be not the same to all real purposes in the foremention'd Instance, which is after the Com­mon way of our Scholastic Dispu­tation? Is not Faith and Faith there, as much an Ambiguity as Dog and Dog here? For my part I can perceive but this only Dif­ference, that Dog and Dog have nothing in Common but the Name, whereas Faith and Faith have some Generical Part wherein they agree. But what does this Mend the Matter? For tho there be some Generical Agreement, yet take 'em according to their whole [Page 52] Ideas, that is, take the Generical part with its Contracting Difference, and 'tis plain that they signifie two different things, and conse­quently that there is really as great an Ambiguity here as there. And this we plainly Confess when we come to Distinguish. For what is a Distinction but a Pointing out of an Ambiguity? What is it else but to say, that such a thing is True in this Sense, but not in that, True in that Sense wherein the Point of the Question is not con­cern'd, but not in that wherein it is. No? why then, notwithstand­ing the Generical Agreement the Procedure is as fallacious and Im­pertinent as when the Question be­ing about Star-Dog, the Opposition is about Land-Dog. And yet (such is the inconsistency of Human Judgment) the one is counted Tri­fling, and the other Serious Ar­guing. Whereas indeed no Argu­ing can be so, but where the Terms of the Question are first Defined [Page 53] (as is done in Geometry) and then always used according to the first Stated Sense. All Disputing any otherwise than so, must necessari­ly be nothing else but meer Pun­ning, only much worse than what is in common use, because 'tis Pun­ning when a Man Pretends to be Serious. And yet this is made a considerable Part of our Academi­cal Education and Learning. And to this I add this further Remark, that 'tis reckon'd a notable Excel­lence to be able to Spin out an Argument to a great length, and he is counted the best Arguer that can thus Pun longest. Whereas indeed did a Man speak to the Purpose, Brevity would be his greatest Excellence.

XLI.

There are many other things which the unaccountable humour of the World has turn'd up for Learning, which Ignorance will never be the better for, and which Wisdom does not need. Thus 'tis [Page 54] counted Learning to have tumbled over a multitude of Books, espe­cially if great ones, and old ones, and obscure ones, but most of all, if Manuscripts; the recovery of one of which is reckon'd so much added to the Commonwealth of Learning, as they call it. A Well-read Man signifies the very same as a Learned Man in most Mens Dictionaries, and by Well-read they dont mean one that has read well, that has clear'd and improv'd his understanding by his reading, but only one that has read a great deal, tho perhaps he has puzzled and confounded his Notions by doing so. Thus again it goes for Learning, to be acquainted with Mens Opinions, especially of the Ancients, to know what this or that Philosopher held, what this or that Author says, tho perhaps he says nothing but what is either Absurd, or Obviously True. Thus for instance, what can be more Absurd than that Fancy of Empe­docles, [Page 55] that there are two Semi-circles compassing betwixt them the Earth, one whereof was com­posed of Fire, the other of Air, and that the former made the Day, and the latter Night? And yet to know this is Learning. And what again is more obviously true, than that Grave Doctrine of Aristotle, that Privation must go before the introduction of the Form in all Generation? And yet 'tis Learn­ing to know that he taught thus, tho it be a thing so plain, and so near the Surface, that a Child can't miss of it. To know the thing is nothing, because so plain and easie, but to know that Aristotle held it, that's the Learning. Nay, to instance in a matter of greater difficulty, tho I know very well, and am able to demonstrate the grounds of the Atomical Philosophy, or the Motion of the Earth, or the Circulation of the Blood, yet I shall not be admitted into the Or­der of the Learned, unless I am [Page 56] able to tell that Moscus the Phoeni­cian invented the first, and that Democritus and Leucippus after­wards improved it, and that the two latter owe their discovery to Copernicus and Harvey. So much more Learned an atchievement is it to know Opinions than things; and accordingly, those are reck­on'd the most Learned Authors, who have given the greatest Spe­cimens of this kind of Knowledge. Thus is Picus Mirandula more ad­mired for the Examination he has made of the Doctrine of the Pa­gans, than any of them were for what they deliver'd; and Plutarch has got more Credit from the History he gives of their Opinions, in the 2d Tome of his Works, than from any of his Rational and Moral Discourses. And were he not accounted Learned for the Former, I question whether the Latter (tho far more excellent than they are) would ever have given him that Title.

XLII.

Now ( Madam) what an hard and unreasonable imposition is this, that tho I am able to Think and Write never so much like an Angel my self, yet I must not be accounted a Man of Learning, unless I can tell what every whim­sical Writer has said before me! And how hard will this fall upon those, whose lot is to breathe in the last Ages of the World, who must be accountable for all the Whims and Extravagancies of so many Centuries? And yet this is made so great a part of Learning, that the Learning of most Men lies in Books rather than in Things; and among Authors, where one writes upon Things, there are twenty that writes upon Books. Nay, some have carried this odd humour on so far, that 'tis thought Learning to know the very Titles of Books, and their several Editions, with the time and place, when and where they were Printed. And I have [Page 58] met with several my self, that have valued themselves not a little upon this Mechanical faculty, tho they knew no more of what was in them, than they do of what is written in the Rolls of Destiny.

XLIII.

From this placing of Learning in the Knowledge of Books, pro­ceeds that ridiculous Vanity of Multiplying Quotations, which is also reckon'd another piece of Learning, tho they are used so unseasonably and impertinently, that there can be no other end in them, but only to shew that the Author has read such a Book. And yet 'tis no such Convincing Evidence of that neither, it being neither New nor Difficult, for a Man that's resolv'd upon it, to quote such Authors as he never Read nor Saw. And were it not too Odious, as well as Obvious a Truth, I could name to your La­diship, some of those Author-Mongers, who yet pass for Men [Page 59] of shrewd Learning, and vast Reading.

XLIV.

These, and many other such things (for 'twere endless to reckon up all) are by the Majority of the World Voted for Learning, and in these we spend our Education, our Study, and our Time, tho they are all of them Contingent Truths, that are not Perfective of the Understanding (nothing being so but only Necessary Truths, or the Divine Ideas, the Eternal [...], the Word and Wisdom of the Father) and also most of them impertinent and unconcerning ones. So that in short, the Charge of this Reflection amounts to thus much, That Learning is generally placed in the Knowledge of such things, which neither the Intel­lectual Perfection, nor any other Interest of Man is concern'd to know.

I.

IN the preceding Reflection, the Intellectual Conduct of Human Life was censured for the general Misplacing of Learning, for pla­cing it in such things as are not Perfective of the understanding. In the Present Reflection supposing it to be Free from that Fault, we shall consider it as Chargeable with [Page 61] another, namely, with an undue and irregular Method of prosecu­ting what is really perfective of it. The First was an Errour about the End; This Second is an Er­rour about the Means, which are the two hinges upon which all Prudence, and all Imprudence turns.

II.

That the Truth of this Charge may appear, we must here also propose a Measure, whereby we may proceed, as we did in the Former Reflection. And as there we took upon us to determine what that is which is Objectively perfective of the Vnderstanding, so we must here consider what is the Right Method of Prosecuting what is so. Which being stated will be a Measure to us in this, as the o­ther was in the former Reflection.

III.

I design not here a just and Par­ticular Treatise concerning The Method of Study or Inquiry after [Page 62] Truth, this Province being already Professedly undertaken, and Excel­lently adorn'd by two as great Masters of Thinking as ever were, or are like to be in the World, Cartesius and Malebranche, of both which your Ladyship is so much a Mistress, that a further under­taking of this kind would be as needless to your better informati­on, as to the Argument it self, after the Management of it un­der such Excellent hands. How­ever something I must say, it be­ing impossible to shew that wrong Methods are used in this Grand Inquest, but by predefining which is the Right. This therefore I shall do, but briefly only, and in Ge­neral.

IV.

Since therefore that Truth which is Perfective of the under­standing is Necessary Truth, and since this Necessary Truth is the same with the Divine Ideas (both which being already proved, are [Page 63] here supposed) following the thred of the same Hypothesis, I find it Necessary to affirm, that the right and indeed only Method of En­quiry after that Truth which is perfective of the understanding is by Consulting the Ideal World, where only it is, or the Divine [...], who says of himself that he is not only the Truth, but also the way.

V.

Here I suppose two things, first that this Divine [...], or Ideal World is intimately united with, and presential to the Mind. Secondly that we see and under­stand all things in him, That he is our Light and our Wisdom, the Light by which we See, and the Light which we See, that he is the very [...], the in­ward word and Substantial Con­ception of our Minds, as he is of the Father, and that in this Sense he inlightens every Man that comes into the World. This I [Page 64] need not prove now, Vide, Rea­son and Re­ligion. because I have done it professedly elsewhere, only I shall pass one necessary Remark upon the manner of our being inlighten'd by the Divine [...], who may be said to in­lighten us in a double respect, ei­ther Fundamentally and Potentially by putting us into a Capacity of Illumination, by his intimate Union and Presence with us, or else Effectually and Actually, when we attend to his Divine Light, which is always present to us, tho we are not so to it. In the Former sense he inlightens every Man, in the latter only those who duly consult him and attend to him.

VI.

For I consider, that the Divine [...], is an Inlighteness in the same Proportion as he is a Redeemer. Now he redeems us either by put­ting us in a Salvable and Recon­cilable State, which is a Redemp­tion Vniversal Incondionate and Antecedent, or by actually recon­ciling [Page 65] and Saving us, which de­pends upon, and is consequent to certain conditions, and is con­ferr'd only upon those who are qualify'd accordingly. And as his Redemption is double, so is his Illu­mination. He inlightens either by putting us in a state or possibility of Illumination by being intimately present with us, and surrounding us with his Divine Ideal Light, which is a Benefit Common to all, or by actually informing our understand­ings when we apply our selves with due Attention to his all-dif­fused Light, which is ever present to us, and to the whole Creation, and Shineth even in the Darkness, Joh. 1.5. tho the Darkness Comprehend it not.

VII.

And I was not a little glad to find the Grounds of this distincti­on in the writings of that Elevated Heathen, Hierocles, which I shall give you in the words of my own Translation. This bright Heathen Commenting upon that Mystical [Page 66] Prayer of Pythagoras, O Father Jupiter, either free all from their Manifold evils, Or else Discover to all what Daemon they use, Moves this Question, since they that know God and themselves are free from Mortal Passions; why then are not all freed, since all are sufficiently assisted with the Opportunities of this know­ledge? To which he first gives this general Answer, P. 144. Because the greatest part of Men embrace evil of their own accord, since they nei­ther see nor hear Neighbouring good. Then a little after he is more particular in his Account. Since therefore (says he) that any thing may be shewn to any one, P. 146. 'tis neces­sary that the actions of two Persons concur (for how can you shew what you have a mind should be shewn, to a Blind Man, although you offer it to him a thousand times, or how can you shew to one that sees, if you offer nothing to his Sight) both these must be present, some good proposed by him that shews, and an Eye ca­pable [Page 67] of seeing in him to whom it is to be shewn; so that from a visible object, and a Faculty of seeing, may result a Manifestation. This being so, let us suppose that all would be freed from evil, if their Maker did shew to all the knowledge of his own Nature, and what Daemon they them­selves use. But we find that all are not deliver'd from evil, it follows therefore that he does not make this discovery to all, but to those only who of their own accord endeavour to free themselves from evil, and voluntarily fix their Eye upon what is shewn by the intention of Contem­plation. And again a little after, thus every Illumination of God by the Concurrence of our vision, P. 148, becomes a Discovery.

VIII.

In all which Process, this refined Heathen supposes that God is ready on his part to inlighten all Men; nay, that he does inlighten them all so far as to put them in the way, and within the Possibili­ty [Page 68] of Illumination, which then becomes Actual and Effectual when they yield due Attention to the Divine Light. He does not in­deed descend to so much Nicety and Particularity as to ascribe this Illumination to the Divine [...], or Ideal World, but only to God in general, nor does he determine whether God does inlighten us only Efficiently, by infusing Acts or Habits of knowledge (as is more vulgarly held, than under­stood, and indeed is no way in­telligible) or Formally by being himself the very Formal Light of our Minds, and the immediate Object of our Knowledge. This I say he does not determine, nor do I cite him to this purpose, having sufficiently Explain'd and Establisht this Theory elsewhere, Reason and Religion. but only to shew his Concurrence with me in this Distinction of the double Illumination of God.

IX.

These Supposals being premised, [Page 69] First, that that Truth which is Per­fective of the understanding is Necessary Truth; then Secondly, that this Necessary Truth is the same with the Divine Ideas; then Thirdly, that the Divine [...], or Ideal World, is intimately united with, and Praesential to the Mind; then Fourthly, that we see and un­derstand all things in him, and that 'tis he that is our inlightner; and that lastly, tho he inlightens all Fundamentally and Potentially, yet this Illumination is not reduced to Act, and made Effectual, but by the intervening of some Condition on our parts, which is duly to consult and apply our selves to him. From these Premises the same Conclusion which we touch't on before, necessarily and evidently follows, that the Right and only Method of Enquiry after that Truth which is Perfective of the understanding, is to consult the Di­vine [...], or Ideal World. For this is the Region of Truth, and here [Page 70] are hid all the Treasures of Wisdom and Knowledge. Colos. 2.3. This is that great and Universal Oracle lodged in every Man's Breast, whereof the Antient Vrim and Thummim was an Expressive Type or Emblem. This is Reason, this is Conscience, this is Truth, this is that Light Within so Darkly talk'd of, by some who have by their aukward, untoward, and Vnprincipled way of representing it, discredited one of the Noblest Theorys in the World. But the thing in it self rightly understood is true, and if any shall yet call it Quakerism, or Euthusiasm, I shall only make this reply at present, that 'tis such Quakerism as makes a good part of St. Iohn's Gospel, and of St. Austin's Works. But to return, this I say is that Divine Oracle which we all may, and must con­sult, if we would inrich our minds with Truth, that Truth which is Perfective of the understanding. And this is the true Method of be­ing [Page 71] truly wise. And this is no other Method, than what is ad­vised us by this Divine [...], the Substantial Wisdom of God. Prov. 8.34. Blessed is the Man that heareth me, watch­ing daily at my Gates, waiting at the Posts of my Doors. And again says the same Substantial Wisdom, Who so is Simple, C. 9.4. let him turn in hither. And again, I am the Light of the World, he that follows me, or (as the word more properly signifies) he that consorts or keeps company with me, Joh. 8.12. walketh not in Darkness. This there­fore is via Intelligentiae, the way and Method of true Knowledge, to apply our selves to the Divine [...], to consult the Ideal World.

X.

Thus in general. If now it be further demanded how this is to be done, I answer that there are three ways of doing it, and I can think of no more. The First is by Attention. The Second is by Purity of Heart and Life. And [Page 72] the Third is by Prayer. Upon each of which I shall bestow some few Remarks, such as may rather give hints than full entertainment to your thoughts, because I Know your Ladyship loves to have something left to work out by your self in your own private Medita­tions. Which Consideration has made me all along use less Prolix­ity than the Quaintness and Weigh­tiness of my Argument would otherwise justify.

XI.

The first Method assign'd is Attention, or Application of Mind to the Intelligible World, the World of Truth. This is the same with Thinking or Speculating, which if intelligibly accounted for, will be found to be nothing else but the Conversion of the Mind to the Ideal World, or Omniformity of the Divine Essence; which as it is the First, so is it also the Directest and most Compendicus Method of Science. For this is to go di­rectly [Page 73] to the Spring-head, to the Lucid Fountain of Good, 'tis to take hold of Essential Truth naked­ly as it is in it self (as a very Con­templative Person expresses it) 'tis to fix the Eye of the Mind upon the Intellectual Sun, Tauler Ser­mon, 3. Pasch. upon him who is Substantial Truth, and the Light of the World. Which must needs be the most ready way to be inlightned. For the more heed­fully we attend to the Ideal World, the more we shall see and discover of it; and not only so, but also more clearly distinguish what we do discover. For so a man that casts a short careless glance upon the Galaxy, sees only a Confused whiteness arising from the nume­rous mixture of little Splendors, but when the same Person fixes his Eye with steadiness and delay of Application, he begins to discern something more distinctly, a new Star ever and anon arises under his inspection, not discover'd before, and still the longer and harder he [Page 74] looks, the more he discerns, till at length he has discover'd as much as he can well atttend to at once, and has satiated his Faculty with the Brightness and Multitude of Light. The Application is as Ob­vious, as the Figure is Pertinent, and therefore I shall only remark this one thing more upon this part, that this was the Method of the first Inventors of Arts and Sci­ences, who made their way into the Coasts of Learning by meer dint of Thinking; and further, that this is the very Method that has been used by the greatest Im­provers of them ever since, such as Bacon, Boyle, Descartes, Galileus, Harvey, Mersennus, Digby, Male­branche, Poiret, and (whom I name with particular Honour and Reverence) our Excellent Friend Dr. More. All these must be al­low'd, and I think are to be great Improvers of Learning, and that 'twas by this Method they did it. And I dare Prophesie, that if ever [Page 75] any extraordinary Advancement be for the future made in the World, 'twill be done by Think­ing.

XII.

This as to Thinking in General. But now as to the Order of Think­ing, if your Ladiship can be sup­posed to need any instruction about it, I cannot recommend you to a better Tutor than your Friend M. Malebranche, in his se­cond part of his sixth Book of In­quiry after Truth, P. 412. where he pur­posely describes the Method of Thinking, which you may remem­ber he reduces to these few fol­lowing Laws.

XIII.

The first Law is, that evidence be maintain'd in our Reasonings. From this Principle depends this general Law concerning the Mat­ter of our Studies, that we ought not to Reason but only of those things whereof we have clear Ideas, and by Necessary Consequence, that [Page 76] we ought always to begin with the most simple and easie things, and also to dwell long upon them, before we advance to the inquisition of things more Complex and Difficult.

XIV.

Upon the same general Princi­ple, depend the Laws concerning the manner whereby we are to proceed in the Solution of Questi­ons. The first of which Laws is this, That the state of the Question to be solved is to be most distinctly Conceived. Besides, the Ideas of the Terms ought to be distinct that they may be Compared with one another, and that the Relati­ons which are sought for may be Known.

XV.

But when the Relations of things to one another cannot be Known by immediately Compa­ring them, then the Second Law is, that we should employ our thoughts to find out one or more Middle Ideas, which we may use as a Common Mea­sure [Page 77] to Know by their help the Rela­tions that are between those things. And withal he advises that we should study to have those Ideas clear and distinct, proportionably to the Accuracy and Numerous­ness of those Relations which we endeavour to deprehend.

XVI.

But when the Questions are Dif­ficult and require a long Exami­nation, then the third Law is, that from the Matter in hand all those things should be removed whose examination is not necessary to the discovery of the sought for Truth. Because the Capacity of the Mind is not to be without reason divi­ded, but all its force is to be im­ploy'd about those things from which it may perceive Light. And all those things which can be removed, and which being re­mov'd, the Question remains in­tire; they are the things that do not belong to the Question.

XVII.

When the Question is included within a few Terms, then the Fourth Rule is, that the matter of our Meditation is to be divided by parts, and those parts to be handled singly according to their Natural Order, by beginning with the more Simple, that is, with those which include fewest Relations. And that we should not pass on to the more Complex, till the more Simple be distinctly known, and render'd Fami­liar.

XVIII.

When by Meditation these things become Familiar to us, then the Fifth Rule is, that the Ideas of all these are to be Contract­ed, and disposed in the Imagina­tion, or to be Written down in Pa­per, that they may no longer fill the Capacity of the Mind. This Rule, tho always useful, yet he makes it necessary only in the most diffi­cult Questions, which require a great Capacity of Mind. And he [Page 79] says withal, that the use of this and the following Rules, is not to be Accurately known but only in Algebra.

XIX.

When the Ideas of all things necessary to be consider'd, are clear, familiar, contract, and orderly digested in the Imagina­tion, or exprest in Paper; then the sixth Law is, That all things are to be Compared or Collated ac­cording to the Laws of Combination, alternately among one another, either by the sole Intuition of the Mind, or by the Motion of the Imagination, joyn'd with the Intuition of the Mind, or by the Calculation of the Pen joyn'd with the Attention of the Mind and of the Imagination.

XX.

If none of all those Relations which result from all those Col­lations, be that which is sought after, then again from all those Re­lations those are to be removed which are of no use to the Solution [Page 80] of the Question: And the others are to be made Familiar, to be Con­tracted, and to be orderly disposed in the Imagination, or express'd in Paper, and to be compared with each other, according to the Laws of Combination. And then we are to see whether the Compound Relation which is sought for be any one of all those Compound Relations which re­sult from those new Comparisons.

XXI.

If none of those found Relati­tions include the Solution of the Question, then again from all those Relations, the unserviceable are to be cast away, the other are to be made familiar, &c. And by pro­ceeding in this manner, the Truth or Relation sought for, be it never so Complex, will at last be found, provided we are able sufficiently to extend the Capacity of our Mind, by Contracting Ideas, and that in all our Operations we al­ways attend to the End and Scope which is to be arriv'd at. For in [Page 81] every step of this Intellectual Pro­gress, we ought to have our eye perpetually fix'd upon the State of the Question. To all which he adds one Caution more, that we should beware lest we should sit down Contented with a false Light or Appearance, and so be deceived. And that therefore our Collations in order to the finding out the Truth we look after, be so often repeated, till we can no longer with hold our assent without being Secretly Chid and reprehen­ded by a Certain Master Answer­ing from within to our Questions, that is to our Labour, Applicati­on of Mind, and desire of Heart. By which Master within this admi­rable Theorist can mean nothing else but the Divine [...], or Ideal World, that Universal Oracle of Mankind, and of all the Intelligent Creation.

This is a short view of those Laws which the Excellent M. Malebranche has given concerning [Page 82] the Method of Thinking. And I believe if an Angel had been in­gaged in the undertaking, he could not have given Better. They are all Natural, Clear, Distinct, Easie, and depending; Few enough not to burthen or Distract the Mind, and yet Many enough to inform it. And therefore I shall not be guilty of so much Presumption and Im­pertinence as to prescribe any other, thinking it sufficient to consider and Practice these. And so much for the first way of Consulting the Ideal World, which is by Think­ing.

XXIII.

The second way is by Purity of Heart and Life. This I confess has a more immediate and special influence upon the Knowledge of Spiritual and Moral Truths, ac­cording to that of our Saviour, If any Man will do his will, Joh. 7.17. he shall know of the Doctrine, &c. and that of his Prime Apostle, 1 Cor. [...].14. The Animal Man perceiveth not the things of [Page 83] God, &c. But its Efficacy is not confined here, but has a larger Sphere of activity, and serves to the discovery even of all Ideal or Necessary Truth. For as vicious­ness not only proceeds from Igno­rance, but also causes it, by besot­ting and clouding the understand­ing, so Purity of Heart and Life not only proceeds from Light and Knowledge, but also produces it, and helps the Soul to see more Clearly and Distinctly. Hence the Pythagoric and Platonic [...], the Method of Purificati­on and Purgation so much talk'd of by Perphyry, Iamblichus, Plotinus, and particularly by Hierocles in his Introduction to his Noble Comment, where he has these Words, As a Blear Eye cannot be­hold a very bright object till it be Purged, so a Soul not yet Clarify'd and refined by Vertue is not qualify'd to gaze upon the Beauty of Truth. And the same Method is no less recommended in Scripture. Wis­dom [Page 84] will not enter into a Polluted Spirit, 1 Wisd. 4. says the Wise Man. And says the Angel to Daniel, Dan. 12.10. many shall be Purify'd and made white, and none of the wicked shall under­stand, but the wise shall understand. And says the Psalmist, Psal. 119. I am wiser than the Aged because I keep thy Commandments. And to this pur­pose also is that of our Lord to be understood, He that follows me, that is, that lives after my Ex­ample, Walketh not in Darkness. Joh. 8.12. The Purity of his Heart will be a Light to his understanding.

XXIV.

But to represent his more di­stinctly, there are two ways whereby Purity of Heart serves to the acquirement of Knowledge. By Natural Efficacy, and by the Divine grace and Benediction. And first it does it by Natural Effica­cy, either by Clarifying the Me­dium, or by assisting the faculty. The former I conceive and repre­sent after this Manner. I sup­pose [Page 85] in the first place that the Soul sees through a Medium; Secondly, that this Medium is our Terrestrical Vehicle; Thirdly, that the Grosness of this Medium hin­ders the Vision of the Soul. All which I ground upon those words of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 13.12. Now we see through a Glass, darkly.

XXV.

This Supposed, it follows that whatsoever Clarifys this Medium does also help the Vision of the Soul. And this Purity does, especially that more Eminent part of it which consists in Chastity and Temperance. For first it Composes the Passions, especially that of Lust, by that the Ani­mal Spirits, and by that the Blood. For the Motion of the Passions Ferments the Spirits, and the Fer­mentation of the Spirits agitates the Blood, and by agitation raises all the feculent and drossy parts of it; and makes it like a troubled Fountain, thick and muddy. And [Page 86] this I take to be one true reason why Men in any Passion can't reason so clearly as when they are in more quiet and silence of Spirit. But now by Purity of Heart all this disturbance is allay'd and composed, the Passions are becalm'd, the Spirits fix'd, the Fountain of the Blood clears up, and so all the inner part of that Glass the Apostle speaks of, be­comes more bright and pellucid, more apt to transmit the Rays of the Ideal Light, and consequently we see more clearly through it. Tho it be still but Darkly in com­parison of what we shall do here­after.

XXVI.

But this is not all; This Purity does also Clarifie the outward part of the Glass too. First by Conse­quence, because the finer the Spi­rits and Blood are, the finer will be the Threds of the outward Veil also. Then more directly, because Temperance does refine [Page 87] and Subtilize the Texture of the Body, diminishes from its Bulk and Grossness, and unloads the Soul of a good part of that Burthen which not only presses down her Aspirations, but also hinders her Sight: And besides, it refines the the inner part too, by bringing in fresh supplies of fine Spirits. Dan. 1.15 This was that Temperance which made the Faces of Daniel, Hananiah, Mishael and Azariah look Clear and Fair, and which made them Wise too, gave a quick and deli­cate air to their Countenances, and let in the Light of the Ideal World upon their Souls. This was that Philosophical Temperance of the Pythagoreans, which (to use the Words of Dr. More Comment­ing upon that place) is the Mo­ther of that Wisdom which makes the Face to shine, and nourishes the Luciform Vehicle of the Soul.

XXVII.

And as this Purity does Clarify the Medium, so does it also Assist [Page 88] the Faculty. And this it does by the same general way whereby it clarifies the Medium, that is, by composing the Passions. For the Passions not only trouble and thicken the Medium (as was noted and explain'd before) but al [...]o di­vide and disperse the Faculty. For the more things a man desires, the more things he will be engaged to think upon, and the more things he thinks upon at once, the more Languid and Confuse will his Conception be. But now this Pu­rity by composing the Passions, contracts the Desires, and by con­tracting the Desires, it con­tracts also by consequence the Thoughts, and by this the Man is reduced to a greater Vnity, Sim­plicity, and Recollection of Mind, and having but few thoughts to divide him, he is the better inabled to think clearly and distinctly.

XXVIII.

And thus have I given a clear and distinct account how Purity [Page 89] of Heart serves to the acquire­ment of Knowledge by a Natural Efficacy. This it does also second­ly by the Divine Grace and Bene­diction. Purity of Heart is that Heavenly Lure which invites not only the Holy Spirit, but also the Divine [...], to come and dwell in the Soul, and to inrich it with his Ideal Communications. This we may be assured of from his own mouth, He that loveth me, shall be lov'd of my Father, Joh. 14.2. and I will love him, and manifest my self to him. And again, If a man love me, my Father will love him, V. 23. and we will come unto him, and make our abode with him. The pure, chaste and good Soul shall not only be loved by the Divine [...], but be also of his Council and Privacy. For this is the Spouse of the Word Eter­nal, who first assumed innocent Nature, and then assumes innocent Persons, the first by a Natural, the second by a Mystic union. This is the Beloved Disciple who has the [Page 90] priviledge to lean upon the Bosom of his Lord, and to be admitted to his more secret Communications. And therefore says the Psalmist, The secret of the Lord is with them that fear him, Psal. 25.13. and he will shew them his Covenant. And says our Lord himself, Blessed are the Pure in Heart, for they shall see God. And Concerning the Four Children that refused to defile themselves with the Portion of the Kings Meat, it is said, that God gave them Knowledge, and skill in all Learning and Wisdom; and that Daniel had understanding in all Vi­sions and Dreams. Dan. 1.17. For they were not only Pure and Temperate but Religiously so, in obedience to the Law of their God, the God of Is­rael. Which the said God rewarded with Knowledge and skill in all Learning and Wisdom in them all, but in Daniel peculiarly, with a fa­culty of interpreting Aenigmatical Dreams and Visions; as the Learn­ed Pag. 5. Dr. More observes in his excel­lent [Page 91] Comment upon that place.

XXIX.

The third and last way of con­sulting the Ideal World is by Pray­er. This is a method which the Scripture also advises us to: If any of you lack wisdom, let him ask of God, that giveth to all men liberally, and upbraideth not, Jam. 1.5. and it shall be given him. And this we know was the Method whereby the Wisest of men attain'd his unparallel'd Wisdom. 1 King. 3.9. For as Wisdom was his Choice, so the Method of his seeking and gaining, it was by Prayer. And 'tis further observable that he address'd him­self to the Divine [...], or Ideal World in particular, as you may see in that solemn Prayer of his recorded in the Book of Wisdom, give me Wisdom that sitteth by thy Throne, &c. Which I commend to your Ladyships perusal at leisure.

XXX.

And thus ( Madam) have I De­fined and by Scripture and Reason Proved, what is the Right Method [Page 92] of prosecuting that Truth which is Perfective of the understanding. This in general I have shewn to consist in Consulting the Ideal World; The manner of doing which I have also shewn to be, First, by Thinking, the Order of which is also defined, Secondly, by Purity of Heart and Life, and lastly by Prayer. This I take to be via Intelligentiae, the Way and Method of Wisdom, whose House I think is Now Built, tho not up­on Seven, yet upon Three Sub­stantial Pillars, and I should be glad if any one would be so kind as to shew me the weakness of the Ground upon which they stand.

XXXI.

And now ( Madam) I think I I need not use many words to shew that as Learning is generally placed in such things as are not Perfective of the understanding, so that what is so is generally pro­secuted by undue Methods. For 'tis but to compare the Methods in [Page 93] common use with that which we have premised and demonstrated, and you will immediately per­ceive the falseness and irregularity of them. For First, whereas the First and general Method of Wis­dom and knowledge is by con­sulting the Divine [...] or Ideal World, the World of Light, that Light which inlightens every Man that comes into this World, the generality of Students don't so much as Dream of this, nor make any such Application, but apply themselves altogether to the Ectypal World, to the World of Darkness and Obscurity. So veri­fying that complaint of God by the Prophet, My People have for­saken me the Fountain of Living Waters, and have digg'd to them­selves broken Cisterns, that will hold no Water.

XXXII.

Then again, whereas another more Particular Method is by Attention and Thinking, this is gene­rally [Page 94] so little regarded, that no sort of Men think so little for the most part as they that are ingaged in the Profess Study of Learning and Knowledge. This they don't reckon as any part of Study, nor as any Progress in the Stage of Learning, but only as a Graver way of being Idle. 'Tis then only they Study when they are hang­ing their Heads over an Old Musty Folio, and are making huge Com­mon-places, and stuffing their Me­mories with Grey Sentences, and Venerable sayings: And thus they spend their Time and their Ink, and having Scambl'd through a com­pany of Books (most of which perhaps were Written to as little purpose, as they are Read) they think themselves Learned Men, and the World is too often of their Opinion, tho they have not made themselves Masters of any Sense or Notion, nor are able to demon­strate one single Truth upon solid Principles, and in a Consequential Process.

XXXIII.

And this is the Method not on­ly of those who Misplace Learn­ing, but also of the Most of those that place it aright. For even those that place it in Ideal Truths do not generally Think for it, but Read for it, Seek it not in their Souls, but in Books. And this methinks I can never sufficiently Wonder at. Indeed as for those that place Learning not in being able to frame Clear and Distinct Con­ceptions of ones Own, but in Knowing the Opinions of Others, 'tis no wonder that they take this Method, for tho it be Not a means to the End they should pro­pose, yet, tis a Means to the End which they do propose. But the wonder is how those that place Learning as they should, in the Clear Conception of Ideal Truths, should think to find this meerly by tumbling over Books.

XXXIV.

I deny not but that Reading is [Page 96] One way of Knowing (otherwise I should not be at the Pains to write this to your Ladyship) but then, tis only by Accident that it is so, as it gives hints and occasions for Thinking. And therefore Think­ing is the only thing to be regard­ed even in Reading (for Reading as such is Nothing) and then we Read to most purpose, when we are thereby most enabled to Think. So that Thinking is the End of Reading, as Understanding is the End of Thinking. We Ought therefore to Read only in Order to Thinking. And yet this Method is generally so much inverted, that the Main Stress is laid upon Read­ing. Nothing but Read, Read, as long as Eyes and Spectacles will hold, not regarding whether the Head be Clear, so that it be full.

XXXV.

As to the particular Order in Thinking proposed by M. Male­branche, I refer your Ladyship to the same Excellent Author to [Page 97] shew you how much it is trans­gress'd. Which he does at large, and to Wonderful Satisfaction, shewing first that the School-Phi­losophers do not observe that Ge­neral Law concerning the matter of study, which is the Cause of a great many Errors in their Physio­logy. Then shewing that the se­cond part of the General Law is not observed by the Common Philosophers, and what extraordi­nary advances Cartesius made in Learning by the exact observation of it. Then he proceeds to ex­plain the Principles of Aristotle's Philosophy, where he shews that he never observed the second Branch of the General Law, and reflects upon those Errors of his Philosophy occasioned by his not doing so. But for a fuller ac­count in these things I refer you to the Author himself.

XXXVI.

Then again, whereas Purity of Heart and Life is another Method [Page 98] of arriving to the Light and Know­ledge of Ideal Truth, your Lady­ship cannot but know, and 'tis a sad as well as a true observation, that this is not only neglected a­mong that part of Mankind that sit down contentedly in Ignorance, and aspire to no greater stock of Knowledge than what they brought with them into the world, but also among the generality of those few that addict themselves to the Cultivation and Improvement of their minds. Nay these in pro­portion to their Number seem more guilty of this neglect than the other, and nothing so common as to see men of Curious and In­quisitive tempers and of famed Learning, who yet are very Cor­rupt in the Moral state of their minds, and live very ill lives. Whence some have taken occasion to represent Learning, as an Enemy to Religion, and have cry'd up Ig­norance as the Mother of Devotion. And tho the Conclusion of these men [Page 99] be notoriously weak and absurd, yet it must be confest that the Ground upon which they build it, is too true. Men famed for Learning, are oftentimes as infa­mous for Living, and many that study hard to furnish their Heads, are yet very negligent in purify­ing their Hearts, not considering that there is a Moral, as well as a Natural Communication between one and the other, and that they are concern'd to be pure in Heart and Life not only upon the Com­mon Account, in order to a happy state hereafter, but also in pursu­ance of their own particular way and end here.

XXXVII.

Then again Lastly, whereas another Method of Wisdom is Prayer, I do not find that the ge­nerality of Students do at all ap­ply themselves to this Method. Pray indeed ('tis to be hoped) they do for other things, which they think lye more out of their [Page 100] reach, but as for Learning and Knowledge, they think they can compass this well enough by their own proper Industry, and the help of good Books, without be­ing beholden to the assistance of Heaven. And this, tho they do place Learning in the knowledge of Necessary Truth. Which pro­cedure of theirs I cannot resolve into any other principle, (I mean as to those that act by any) but the meer want of knowing or con­sidering that this Necessary Truth is really the same with God him­self. For did they attentively consider that God is Truth, and that so much as they possess of Truth, so much they have of God, 'tis not to be imagined they should be so indifferent in using Prayer, or any of the other prece­ding Methods of Consulting God for his own Light.

I.

HAving pass'd over the two first Stages of the Intellectu­al Conduct of Human Life, that of the End, and that of the Means; and reflected upon the Irregulari­ties of each, by shewing how both are generally mistaken and mis­placed; I am now arrived to the Third and Last, which consists not in the choice of the Object, or of [Page 102] the Method to it (that belonging to the two former) but in the De­gree of Affection wherewith they are prosecuted. Which part of our Intellectual Conduct, as it is equal­ly Capable of being faulty, so I shall here make it my business to shew that it is actually as faulty and irregular, if not more than either of the two former. And the fault that I tax it with, is, A too impor­tunate and over-earnest Pursuit after Knowledge in General.

II.

The Charge of this Reflection is of a larger compass and extent than either of the two Preceding, those being directed against such as either misplace the Object, or else mistake the Method of Learn­ing and Knowledge; but this takes in both together, and others also not concerned in either of the former. For not only those that err in the placing of Learning, or in the method to it, but also those who are Right in both, come under [Page 103] the Censure of the Present Refle­ction, they all agree in this, in being too importunate and vehe­ment in the Pursuit of Knowledge.

III.

Now in the making out the Truth of this Charge, We must here also according to the Method observ'd in the two former Refle­ctions, first lay down a common measure of Proceeding, by stating the due Bounds of our Present Affection to, and search after Know­ledge, Or, how far it becomes man to imploy himself in the Pro­secution of Learning and Know­ledge? the due stating of which Question will be a certain direction to us in the Determination of this, whether our general Inquest after Knowledge be Immoderate or no. Now for the Determination of the first it will be necessary to draw up the true State or Hypothesis of man according to the Posture wherein he now stands. Which I shall do distinctly in these follow­ing Considerations.

IV.

First I consider, that the utmost Pitch of Knowledge man by his ut­most endeavours can arrive to in this world is very inconsiderable. God indeed has given us Reason enough to distinguish us from the Brute part of the Creation, and we may improve it so far as to distinguish our selves from One ano­ther, and so one man may deserve to be call'd Learned and Knowing in comparison of another that is either Naturally more ignorant, or more unimproved; but absolutely speaking, the most that any or all of us either know or can know here is of little or no Consideration. What we know of God is but little, for as the Apostle says, we see through a Glass, darkly; what we know of our selves perhaps is Less, and what we know of the world about us is not much. We have seen but a few of Gods works, Eccl. 43. as the wise man observes, and we under­stand yet fewer. There are almost [Page 105] an infinite number of things which we never so much as thought of, and of most things we conceive very darkly and uncertainly, and there is not one thing from the greatest to the least, which we do or can under­stand thoroughly. Those that ap­ply their whole study to any one thing, can never come to the End of that one thing, for not only every Science but every particular of it has its unmeasurable depths and recesses; and 'tis confess'd by a great inquirer into the Nature of Antimony (as 'tis related by the Honourable Mr. Boyle) that 'tis impossible for one man to understand throughly that one single Mineral only. Nat. Hist. p. 13. And if a man I cannot understand All of so little, how little must he under­stand of All! Suppose further, that all the Knowledge of the Learned were put together, 'twould weigh but Light, for what one Art or Science is there that is brought to any tolerable Perfection? And if the Common Stock be so little, [Page 106] how small a Pittance is it that must fall to every particular Man's share! And where is that Man who after all his Poring and Stu­dying, is able to answer all the Questions, I will not say which God put to Iob, Job. 38. but which may be askt him by the next Idiot he meets?

V.

'Twere an endless undertaking to represent at large the little that we know, or are capable of know­ing. Nor do I design to turn a se­cond Agrippa, and entertain your Ladyship with a long Harangue about the Vanity of Humane Sci­ences, only give me leave to touch upon two notorious instances of our Ignorance, and in that very Science which is pretended to be at the very Vertical Point of Im­provement. 'Tis Concerning the the Maximum and the Minimum Naturale, the Greatest and the Least thing in Nature. As to the first, the Question is whether the Exten­sion [Page 107] of the Universe be Finite or Infinite? If you say 'tis Positively Infinite, besides the difficulty of conceiving how any thing can be so extended, 'twill follow that God himself cannot add the least further Dimension to it. If you say 'tis Finite, suppose your self in the utmost extremities of it, and try whether it be possible for you to dis-imagin further Extension. Then as to the Second, the Questi­on is whether every, even the Least assignable Part of matter be infinitely Divisible or no? If you say yes, then 'twill unavoidably follow that the least Atom will have as many Parts as the whole World. If you say no, then you must say that Matter may be Divi­ded so long till at last you come to a Part that does not contain more other Parts, if so, then I enquire has this uncontaining Part Figure, or has it not? If not, then 'tis in­finite, Figure being only the Ter­mination of Quantity. But if it [Page 108] has, then it has more other Parts above, below and of each side, and consequently may again be divi­ded, contrary to what you sup­pos'd. So that you see here are Desperate Difficulties on both sides, say what you will you are equally baffled, and yet 'tis most certain that one only can be true, they being two opposite parts of a Contradicti­on, but which is so, is beyond the Capacity of Humane understanding to determine.

VI.

The like Difficulties we meet with when we inquire concerning Time, whether it be Infinitely divisi­ble, or only into Moments? And so again in the Business of Motion, whether there be any such thing as the Extream Degree of Swiftness and Slowness, or no? Neither of which can be defined without ma­nifest Absurdity. But 'tis superflu­ous, as well as endless, to display the particulars of our Ignorance, tho indeed when all Accompts are [Page 109] cast up, that will be found to be our best Knowledge. This only in General, our Life is so short, our Progress in Learning so slow, and Learning in it self so long and te­dious, and what we do or can know so very little, that the Pa­trons of Scepticism had much more reason to conclude from the Dis­ability of our Facculties and the slightness of our Attainments, than from the uncertainty and Instability of Truth, that there is no Know­ledge.

VII.

Secondly, I consider, that as we can here know but Little, so even that very little which we do, serves more to our Trouble and Disquiet, than to our Pleasure and Satisfacti­on. And here comes in that ex­perimental Reflection of the Wise Man, Eccles. 1.18. In much Wisdom is much Grief, and he that increases Know­ledge, increases Sorrow. This Pro­position is not true, Absolutely con­sider'd, Knowledge being the Per­fection [Page 110] of Human Nature, the Image of God, Colos. 3.10. and the Principal In­gredient of our Future Happiness; but only with relation to the pre­sent State and Posture of Man. And in this respect it is abun­dantly true. First, because the more we know, the more we shall discover of our Ignorance, (that being the chiefest thing we learn by our study) which we shall find to be of an infinitely larger Sphere than our Knowledge, and consequently shall be more troubled for what we do not know, than pleas'd with what we do. Second­ly, because the Prospect of what yet further remains to be known will inflame our Thirst after it. For Wisdom says of her self, They that Eat of me shall yet be Hungry, and they that Drink of me shall yet be Thirsty. Which tho it be a great Commendation of Wisdom, and an Argument of her Inexhaustible excellence, yet 'tis withal a great instrument of Punishment to those [Page 111] who can attain to so little of it, as cannot satisfie that thirst which it has inflamed. Thirdly, because the more a Man improves his thinking faculty, the more apt he will be to be disgusted and offended with the follies of Society; as the most delicate Touch is the soonest put to pain. There being a thou­sand impertinencies that will strike very disagreeably upon a discerning mind which won't so much as affect a grosser understanding.

VIII.

But the Principal Ground of this Assertion, and which, did not the quickness of your Ladyship's Apprenhension oblige me to Bre­vity, I could be Voluminous upon, is this. 'Tis most certain that Man is now placed in the Midst of Vani­ties and unsatisfying Objects, and and that his True good is not with­in his reach, and consequently whatever Pleasure he takes in those things that are, is purely owing to his Ignorance of their Vanity. Well, [Page 112] if so, then Vae Sapienti, woe be to the Wise Man. This is not a Place to be Wise in. There is nothing here Solid enough to endure the Test of Wisdom. The Wise Man cannot find a Paradice here, tho the Fool can. The more he knows the more he discovers the Vanity of all pretended Enjoyments, and the more he does this, the more he streightens and retrenches his De­lights, and the more he does this, the more he retires and withdraws himself from all Worldly Diversi­ons, and this sets him the more a Thinking and Musing, and this again presents to his mind a fresh and more lively Conviction of the Worlds Vanity, and this makes him again retrench his Delights, and so on in this returning Circle, till at length he finds nothing but his bare Wisdom to delight in. And a little more Thinking makes him see the Vanity of that too. And now all's gone. To dispatch this part in one word, this is the Fruit of [Page 113] being Wise, to be able to taste no­thing that's Present, nor to flatter ones self with the Prospect of what is to come, which is a state of hor­rible Privation and Sterility. This is the thorough Wise Mans Lot, and every advance in Wisdom is a step towards this Condition So true is it, that he who increases Wisdom, increases Sorrow, while in the mean time the Fool Laughs, and is Merry.

IX.

Thirdly, I Consider, that if our Knowledge could yield us more Satisfaction than it occasions Trou­ble, yet our Life is so short, and so incumber'd, that we can make but little of the enjoyment, so little, that 'tis not answerable to the meer Labour we undergo in acquiring it. All the Morning of our days is spent in the Prelimina­ries of Learning, in Learning Words and Terms of Art, wherein there is nothing but toil and drudgery, and before we can taste any of the [Page 114] Fruits of the Tree of Knowledge, before we can relish what is Intel­lectual and Rational in it, our Sun is got into the Meridian, and then it presently begins to decline and our Learning with it; our Light, our Strength, and our Time make haste to consume, nothing increa­ses now but the Shadows, that is our Ignorance and Darkness of mind, and while we consider and look about us, the Sun Sets, and all is concluded in the Darkness and Shadow of Death. But often­times the Sun is intercepted by a Cloud long before it Setts, and we live backward again, grow weak and Childish, Silly and forgetful, and unlearn faster than we learnt; or if it chance to shine bright to the last, then we improve too much, and grow too wise for our selves, and reject the greatest part of what we learnt before, as idle and insigni­ficant. So that we are under a Necessity of unlearning in a short time most of what we have so dearly [Page 115] learnt, either through forgetful­ness, or improvement of Iudgment.

Fourthly, I Consider, that there is no Necessity of our being so won­derfully Learned and Knowing here. 'Tis neither Necessary as injoin'd by God, nor as a Means to any considerable End. We can be Good, and we can be Happy without it. And as to the Interest of Commu­nities and Public Societies, 'tis Civil Prudence and Honesty, and not Learning which makes them Happy. And lest any advantage in our after State should be alledged for its Necessity, this makes it more unnecessary than any Considerati­on besides. For tho we are never so unlearned now, provided we know enough to do our Duty, and live well, we shall in a short time arrive to such a degree of Know­ledge as is requisite to our Supream Perfection, to which our Present Learning cannot add, and from which our Present Ignorance will not Diminish. I do not say this [Page 116] will be immediately upon our dis­charge from the Body, there being some reasonable Controversie about that, (which would be too great a Digression at present to pursue) tho 'tis most certain that even then there must needs be great inlarge­ments of Understanding; However 'tis most unquestionable that this our Intellectual Accomplishment can be no further off than our en­joyment of the Beatific Vision. We shall then commence instantane­ously Wise and Learned, and be fully possess'd of the Tree of Know­ledge, as well as of the Tree of Life. For then that Glass through which we now see Darkly shall be laid aside, and there shall be no o­ther but the Speculum Deitatis, the Glass of the Divinty, which is no other than the Ideal World, which shall be now more intimately united to us, and more clearly dis­play'd before us. And tho even now there shall be Degrees of Knowledge according to the vari­ous [Page 117] Participiation of the Ideal Light, yet the variety of this Dis­pensation shall not proceed by the degree of our Knowledge in this Life, but by some other Measure. For,

XI.

Fifthly, I Consider, that tho there is no necessity of our being so very Learned and Knowing, yet there is an Absolute Necessity of our being Good and Vertuous. This is Neces­sary both ways, as Commanded by God, and as a Means to our Final Perfection. And besides 'tis necessary Now, there being no other opportunity for it. If we don't know here, we may know here­after, and shall infalliably do so if we are but Good here; but if we be not good here, we shall neither be Good, Happy, nor Knowing hereafter. The Main opportunity for Know­ledge is after this Life, but the only opportunity for being good is Now. And if we take care to improve this, we are sufficiently secure of the other, and of whatever else ap­pertains [Page 118] to the Perfection of our Natures. But if this be neglected all is lost. This therefore is indis­pensably necessary, and 'tis the only thing that is so, and 'tis necessary Now, necessary not only to our Happiness in General, but also to that of our Intellectual Part in Particular. For,

XII.

Sixthly, And lastly I Consider, that thus stands the Case between God and Man. First, Man is sup­posed to be made in a State of In­nocence and Perfection, in perfect Favour and Communion with God, his true Good, and in a Capacity so to Continue. From this excel­lent state he is supposed to Fall, and by his Fall so to disable himself that he cannot by his own strength Repent and Live well, and so to provoke God, that tho he could and did Repent, yet he would not be Pardon'd and Accepted, without Satisfaction made to Divine Justice. This satisfaction Man is supposed [Page 119] not able to make, nor any other Creature for him. Whereupon God in great Mercy and Pitty is sup­posed to ordain a Mediator, his own Son, God and Man, between himself and his Laps'd Creature, who by the Sacrifice of himself should Effect two things, answerable to the double Necessity of Man, first make Repentance available, which otherwise would not have been so; and secondly Merit Grace for him that he might be able to Repent. And this is what we are to under­stand by the Restoration or Redemp­tion of Man, which thus far is Vni­versal and Inconditionate.

XIII.

But still notwithstanding all that this Mediator has done for him, Man is supposed only so far restored, as to be put in a Pardonable and Reconcilable State (for as for our being actually and immediately re­conciled by the Death of Christ, that's a silly, fond, Antinomian con­ceit, and no way consistent with [Page 120] the Great Mystery of Godliness) I say Man is yet only in a Capacity or Possibility of Pardon and Recon­ciliation, which is then, and then only reduced to act, when he actu­ally performs the Conditions of Re­conciliation, when he Believes, Re­pents and leads a good Life, with which he may, and without which he shall not be Pardon'd and Saved, notwithstanding that Christ has Dy'd for him. The design of whose Death was not to make a good Life unnecessary, but only to render it Efficacious and Available, not to procure a Priviledge of being saved without it (as some fancy) but that we might be Saved with it. If this Qualification be wanting, we shall be so far from being any thing ad­vantaged from the Redemption pur­chas'd by our Mediator, that we shall be Accountable for it, to the great aggravation both of our Guilt and Misery. It therefore highly concerns Man to improve with all diligence this short and only oppor­tunity [Page 121] of Making his Great Fortune, to adorn his mind with all Moral and Religious Perfections, and his Life with all good actions, since with this he may be Happy in all his capacities, and without it he shall not only fall into a state of unutterable Misery, but be also ac­countable for the Possibility he had of escaping it, for neglecting so great Salvation, so great an Oppor­tunity of being saved.

XIV.

These things being Premised concerning the present Hypothesis or state of Man, First, that he can there know but very little, Second­ly, that even that little Knowledge which he can attain to serves more to his Trouble than Satisfaction, and so is not only Vanity, but also Vexation of Spirit. Thirdly, that supposing it as Pleasant as may be, yet such is the shortness and in­cumbrance of his Life, that the enjoyment of it is not answerable to the Labour of acquiring it. [Page 122] Fourthly, that there is no Necessi­ty of such a deal of Learning and Knowledge, either as to this World, or to the next, and that e're long he shall have his fill of Knowledge in the Beatifick Vision of the Ideal World, one glance whereof shall instruct him more, than an Eternal poring upon all the Books in this, and undistinguish the greatest Doctor from the most ignorant Peasant. Fifthly, that there is an Absolute Necessity of his being Good and Vertuous, this being the condition not only of his Happiness in ge­neral, but also of the accomplish­ment of his Vnderstanding in par­ticular. And that Now is the only opportunity for it. Sixthly, and lastly, that the Attainment of Hap­piness and Intellectual Perfection upon this Condition was the Pur­chase of his Saviours Death, who has also Merited Grace for his as­sistance in the Performance of it. Which if he neglect, he shall not only miss of Happiness, but be [Page 123] also answerable for so Great and so Dear an opportunity of gaining it; From these Premises 'twill I think follow with no less than Mathemati­cal Evidence.

XV.

First, that Learning and Knowledge is not the thing for which God de­sign'd Man in this Station, nor consequently the End or Reason of his bestowing upon him those in­tellectual and Rational Powers which he has. For had this been the End and Design of God he would have made it more Possible for him, and withal more his In­terest and Concern, to attain it.

Secondly, 'twill follow that the End for which God intended Man here, and the Reason why he made him a Rational Creature, was that he might Live vertuously and well, so serve him here, that he might be rewarded with Happiness and perfect Knowledge hereafter; Ha­ving furnish'd him with Intellectual abilities sufficient for this, tho not [Page 124] for the other. Thirdly and lastly, 'twill follow that the Principal care and concern of Man both because of his own interest, and out of com­pliance with the Designs of God, ought to be to Live a good and regular Life, to accomplish the Moral part of his Nature, to subdue his Passions, to rectifie his Love, to study Purity of Heart and Life, in one word, to perfect Holiness in the fear of God, and (which is what we have been hitherto inquiring after) that he ought to busy him­self in the Study of Learning and Knowledge no further, than as 'tis conducive to the Interest of Religion and Vertue.

XVI.

This therefore is the Measure to be observ'd in our prosecution of Learning and Knowledge. We are to Study only that we may be good, and consequently ought to prose­cute such Knowledge only as has an aptness to make us so, that which the Apostle calls the Truth, which is after Godliness. For that's [Page 125] the only business we have to do in this World. Whatever Knowledge we prosecute besides this, or further than 'tis conducive to this end, tho it be absolutely consider'd, never so excellent and Perfective of our Ra­tional part, yet with respect to the present Posture and Station of Man, 'tis a Culpable Curiosity, and an unaccountable Vanity, and only a more Solemn and laborious way of being Idle and Impertinent.

XVII.

And this will be found (if well examin'd) to be nothing different from the censure of the Wise Preacher. And I gave my heart to to know Wisdom, says he, and I per­ceiv'd that this also is vanity and vexation of Sptrit. Not that he now first applied himself to the study of Wisdom. No, he had been inspired with that before, and and by the help of it had discover'd the vanity of all other things. But that Wisdom which saw through all other things, did not as yet per­ceive the Vanity of it self. He [Page 126] therefore now gave his Heart to Know Wisdom, that is, to reflect upon it, and Consider whether this might be excepted from his general censure, and struck out of the Scroll of vanities. And upon deep re­flection he found that it could not, and that even this also was as much a vanity as any of the rest. Now this Proposition of Solomon's cannot be understood Absolutely (Know­ledge being an undoubted Perfecti­on of Human Nature) but only with respect to the present posture of Man in this World. Neither can it be understood of all kind of Knowledge even in this Life, some kind of Knowledge being necessary to qualifie him for Happiness in the next. It must therefore Neces­sarily be understood of all that Knowledge which contributes not to that great End. So that from these two Necessary Limitations the sense of Solomon's Proposition (if it have any) must be this; that to Man in this present juncture all [Page 127] Knowledge that does not Contri­bute to the interest of his After­state, is downright Vanity and Vex­ation of Spirit.

XVIII.

For, to what purpose should we Study so much, considering that after all we are able to Know so little, considering that even that little is enough to trouble and disquiet us, considering that our Life is as much too short for the enjoying what Knowledge we have, as for compassing what we would have, and withal considering that there lies no manner of Obligation or Necessity upon us to do thus. But (which is what I would most of all inculcate) to what purpose ima­ginable should we be so busy, and vehement in the pursuit of Learn­ing, of any Learning, but what is of use to the Moral Conduct of our Life, considering these two things, First, that 'tis but to stay a little while and we shall have all that Knowledge Gratis, from the Com­munications [Page 128] of the Ideal World, which we so unsuccessfully drudge for here, to the neglect of more im­portant and concerning exercises. And Secondly, considering that there is such an absolute necessity of being Good, and of Living well, and that this short uncertain Life is the only time for it, which if neg­lected, this great work must lie undone for ever? Upon the former consideration this Studious, Bookish humour is like laying out a great Sum of Money to purchase an Estate which after one weak, drop­ping Life will of Course fall into hand. And I am sure he would be reckon'd Fool or Mad that should do so. And upon the latter, 'tis as if a Man that was Riding Post upon Business of Life and Death, should as he passes through a Wood, stand still to listen to the Singing of a Nightingale, and so forget the main and only business of his Journey.

XIX.

'Tis most certain that the two Cases here supposed, are as great instances of Folly and Impertinence as can well be conceiv'd, and yet (however it comes to pass that we are not sensible of it) 'tis certain that they are very applicable to the Intellectual Conduct of Human Life as 'tis generally managed. And tho we are all ready enough to call such men Fools as shall do as in the two mention'd instances is sup­posed, yet 'tis most certain that we do the very same or worse, that we are too much concern'd in the Ap­plication of the Parable, and that of most of us it may be truly said, Thou art the Man.

XX.

For I demand, what difference is there between him that now labours and toils for Learning and Knowledge, which in a little time he shall be easily and fully possest of, and him that dearly buys an estate which would otherwise come to [Page 130] him after a short interval? what difference is there, but only this, that he that buys the estate, tho he might have spared his Money, yet however he gets what he laid out his Money for; his expence indeed was needless, but not in vain. Where­as he that drudges in the pursuit of Knowledge, not only toils for that which in a short time he shall have with ease, and in abundance, but which after all he can't compass in any considerable measure, and so undergoes a vain as well as unne­cessary Labour. And is therefore the greater Fool.

XXI.

Again I demand, what diffe­rence is there between him who when he is imploy'd upon business of Life and Death shall alight from his Horse, and stand Idling to hear a Nightingale Singing in the Wood, and him who having an Eternity of Happiness to secure by the right ordering of his Life and Manners, and having only this Point of time [Page 131] to do it in, shall yet turn Vertuoso, and set up for Learning and Curi­osity. 'Tis true indeed the Nightin­gale Sings well, and 'twere worth while to stand still and hear him, were I disingaged from more con­cerning affairs, but not certainly when I am upon Life and Death. And so Learning and Knowledge are excellent things, and such as would deserve my Study, and my Time, had I any to spare, and were more at leisure, but not certainly when I have so great an interest as that of my final state dependi [...]g upon the good use of it. My Business now, is not to be Learned, but to be good.

XXII.

For is my Life so long, am I so over-stock'd with Time, or is my depending interest so little, or is it so easily Secured, that I can find leisure for unnecessary Curiosities? Is this Conduct agreeable to the pre­sent station and Posture of Man, whose entrance into this World, [Page 132] and whose whole stay in it, is pure­ly in order to another state? Or would any one imagin this to be the condition of Man by such a Conduct! Shall a Prisoner who has but a few days allow'd him to make a Preparation for his Trial, spend that little opportunity in Cutting and Carving, and such like Mechanical Contrivances? Or would any one imagin such a Man to be in such a Condition, near a doubt­ful Trial of Life and Death, whom coming into a Prison he finds so imploy'd? And yet is there any thing more Absurd and Imperti­nent in this, than in the present Supposition, than to have a Man who has so great a Concern upon his Hands as the Preparing for Eternity, all busy and taken up with Quadrants, and Telescopes, Furnaces, Syphons and Air-Pumps?

XXIII.

When we would expose any Signal Impertinence, we common­ly illustrate it by the Example of [Page 133] Archimedes, who was busy in making Mathematical Figures on the Sands of Syracuse while the City was taking by Marcellus, and so though there were Particular Orders given for his safety, lost his Life by his unseasonable Study. Now I confess there was imperti­nence and absurdity enough in this instance to consign it over to Poste­rity. But had Archimedes been a Christian, or otherwise assured of the great concerns of another World, I should have said, that the Main of his Impertinence did not lie here, in being Mathemati­cally imploy'd when the Enemy was taking the City, but in laying out his Thoughts and Time upon such an insignificant unconcerning Study, while he had no less a con­cern upon him than the securing his Eternal Interest. Which must be done now or never. Nothing certainly is an Impertinence, if this be not, to hunt after Learning and Knowledge in such a juncture as this.

XXIV.

Sure I am, and your Ladyship too very well knows, that many other Proceedings in the Conduct of Life are condemn'd of Vanity and Impertinence upon the very same grounds, tho not half so in­consistent with the Character of Man, nor so disagreeable to his pre­sent Posture in this World, For is not the World full of invectives, and have not the Pens of Moral Writers been all along imploy'd against those that apply themselves to Secular acquirements, spend their short and uncertain Lives, which ought to be imploy'd in the Pursuit of an infinitely higher In­terest, in gaping up and down after Honours and Preferments, in long and frequent attendances at Court, in raising Families, getting Estates and the like? These things I say and such like are condemn'd and censured not only upon the stock of their particular Viciousness, as Crimes of Ambition or Covetousness [Page 135] respectively, but for what they have in Common, as they are mis­pendings of Time, and unconcern­ing Excentrical imployments.

XXV.

But now I would fain know, whether any of these Misconducts of Life be more expensive of our Time, more remote and alien from the main business of it, more un­relating to our Grand Concern, and consequently more Impertinent, than to be busily imploy'd in the Nice­ties and Curiosities of Learning: And whether a Man that loiters away Six Weeks in Court-Attend­ances for a place of Honour, be not every whit as accountably imploy'd with respect to the End of Man in the other World, and his Business in this, as he that shall spend so much time in the Solution of a Mathe­matical Question, as M. Descrates I remember confesses of himself in one of his Epistles. And why then the Prosecution of Learning should be the only thing excepted from the [Page 136] Vanities and Impertinencies of Life I have not head enough to un­derstand.

XXVI.

And yet so it is. All other Ex­centrical unconcerning Occupati­ons are cried down meerly for be­ing so, as not according with the present Character and State of Man. This alone is not contented with the reputation of Innocence, but stands for positive merit and ex­cellence, for Praise and Commenda­tion. To say a Man is a Lover of Knowledge, and a diligent inquirer after Truth, is almost as great an Encomium as you can give him, and the time spent in the Study, tho in the search of unedifying Truth, is reckon'd almost as laudably be­stow'd as that in the Chapel, and (so inconsistent with its self is Human Judgment) 'tis Learning only that is allow'd not only to divide, but to devour the greatest part of our short Life, and is the only thing that with Credit and [Page 137] Public allowance stands in Competi­tion with Religion and the study of Vertue. Nay, by the most is pre­ferr'd before it, who would rather be counted Learned, than Pious.

XXVII.

But is not this a strenge and un­reasonable Competition? It must indeed be confess'd that the Per­fection of Man is double, of the In­tellectual as well as of the Moral Part, and that Knowledge is a very Divine Excellence. But certainly Rectitude of Will is a greater Or­nament and Perfection than Bright­ness of Vnderstanding, and to be Good is more Divine than to be Wise and Knowing, that being the Principal, perhaps only difference between an Angel and a Devil. And tho Solomon's Choice be uni­versally applauded, yet I think that of Mary is to be preferr'd before it, and (to use the Expression of the Excellent Monsieur Poiret) that 'tis better like an Infant without much reasoning to Love much, Cogitat. Ration. de Deo. p. 62 [...]. than like the [Page 138] Devil to Reason much without Love.

XXVIII.

But suppose Knowledge were a much Diviner excellence than 'tis, suppose it were more Perfective of, and Ornamental to Human Nature than the Habit and Practice of Vertue, yet still this Competition would be utterly against Reason. For 'tis to be consider'd (as I have already suggested) that the Former we can't have now in any Measure, and shall have it hereafter without Measure, but the latter we may have now (for we may Love much tho we can't know much) and can­not have it hereafter. Now the Question is, whether we ought to be more Solicitious for that Intel­lectual Perfection which we can't have here, and shall have hereafter, or for that Moral Perfection which we may have here, and cannot hereafter? And I think we need not consult an Oracle, or conjure up a Spirit to be resolv'd of this Question.

XXIX.

And this one Solitary Considera­tion (much more in Conjunction with the other parts of the Human Character) I take to be sufficient to justifie the Truth of what mea­sure we have prescribed to our In­tellectual Conduct, that we ought to prosecute Learning and Know­ledge no further than as 'tis condu­cive to the great Ends of Piety and Vertue. And consequently that when ever we study to any other Purpose, or in any other Degree than this, we are unaccountably impertinently, I may add Sinfully imploy'd. Eccles. 12.13. For this is the whole of Man, to fear God and keep his Com­mandments, the whole of Man in this Station, and consequently this ought to be the only Scope of all his Studys and Endeavours.

XXX.

And accordingly 'tis observable that the Scripture whenever it makes mention of Wisdom with any mark of Commendation, it always means by it either the very Practice [Page 140] of Religion and Vertue, or such Knowledge at least, that has a near and strong influence upon it; thereby implying that that is the only Wisdom which becomes the study of Man. Remarkable above the rest to this purpose is the 28th Chapter of Iob, where having run through several instances of Natural Knowledge, V. 12. at length says he, But where shall Wisdom be found? And where is the place of understand­ing? As much as to say that in none of the other things mention'd did consist the Wisdom of Man. Then it follows, V. 13. Man knoweth not the Price thereof, neither is it found in the Land of the Living, V. 14. The Depth saith, it is not in me, and the Sea saith it is not in me. Not in the Depths of Learning, V. 21. nor in the Recesses of Speculation, seeing it is hid from the Eyes of all Living, and kept close from the Fowls of the Air, from Men of high and Towring Notions, V. 22. and sublime Theories. Destruction and Death say, we have heard the Fame thereof [Page 141] with our Ears. As much as to say, that after this Life, and then only, unless perhaps about the hour of Death, Men begin to have a true sense and Lively Savoury Relish of this Wisdom. But in the mean time, V. 23. God understandeth the way thereof, and he knoweth the place thereof. V. 28. And unto Man he said, be­hold the Fear of the Lord that is Wisdom, and to depart from Evil, that is understanding. To Man he said. Had it been to another Crea­ture, suppose an Angel, in a state of Security and Confirmation, he would perhaps have recommended for Wisdom the Study of Nature, and the Curiosities of Philosophy, but having to do with Man, a Pro­bationary and unfixt Creature, that shall be either Happy or Miserable according as he demeans himself in this short time of Trial, the only Wisdom he advises to such a Crea­ture in such a Station, is to look well to his Moral Conduct, to study Religion and good Life.

XXXI.

And now ( Madam) since we are upon Scripture-Authority (for indeed so little has this matter been consider'd, that I have scarce any other to follow) will your Ladyship give me leave in further Confirma­tion of the Measure propos'd, to commend to your Consideration two great Scripture-Examples, both of Men Eminently Wise, and of a Learned Education. The Men I instance in are Moses and St. Paul. The latter of which professedly de­clares that he determin'd to know nothing, 1 Cor. 2. but Iesus Christ and him Crucify'd, that is, nothing but what concerns either the Faith or the Practice of Christianity. And the former complaining of the gross Ignorance of the People committed to his charge, and desiring they would become wiser, breaks out into this Passionate Wish, O that they were Wise, Deut. 32.29. that they under­stood this, that they would consider their latter End.

XXXII.

Moses had been bred a Scholar, as well as a Courtier, and was well instructed in all the Secrets of the Aegyptian Philosophy, which was then the best in the World. Besides, he was himself a wise Man, a Man that besides the advantages of Pharaoh's Court, had the Divine [...] himself for his Tutor, and convers'd personally with his maker, and therefore must needs be sup­posed to know what was true Wis­dom. But now this he does not make to consist either in the Ac­complishments of Courtly Educa­tion, or in the deep Mysteries of Philosophy, but in the considerati­on of our latter End. He wishes that his People were Wise, and to this End he does not wish that they were as Well-bred as he, or as Learned as he, but only that they understood this, this one thing, that they would consider their latter End. Which he makes the Summary and Abstract of all Wis­dom. [Page 144] Much like that of Plato, when he defines Philosophy to be, The Theory of Death.

XXXIII.

And here, if your Ladyship will dispence with a short digression, a digression from the immediate Thred of my Discourse, tho not from the general Design of it, I would upon this occasion briefly represent to you what an excellent part of Wisdom it is for man seri­ously to consider his latter end. To make this distinctly appear, I shall proceed upon these two grounds: First, That the Conside­ration of Death is the most proper exercise that a wise man can be employ'd about. And Secondly, that this is the most compendious way of making him wise that is not so.

XXXIV.

And First, it is the most proper exercise that a wise man can em­ploy himself about. For Wisdom consists in a due estimation of [Page 145] things; and then things are duly estimated, when they are measured and rated, first as they are absolute­ly in themselves; and secondly, as they stand in Relation to us. If they are great and extraordinary then they deserve to be consider'd for their own sakes; and if they nearly relate to us, then they de­serve to be consider'd for ours. And upon both these accounts, Death and its consequences are highly deserving a wise mans Thoughts and Reflections.

XXXV.

For first, they are great and ex­traordinary Transactions, barely as in themselves consider'd, and as such would deservedly ingage the most attentive consideration, even of a stander by, of any other indif­ferent Being, suppose an Angel, that can be no otherwise concerned in it, than as tis a great Event, a Noble Scene of Providence, a matter of Wonder and Curiosity. I say upon this single Account Death [Page 146] with its consequences is as fit a sub­ject for the Contemplation of a Wise man as auy in Nature.

XXXVI.

Or if there be within the Sphere of Nature things of a greater and more Bulky appearance, yet cer­tainly there is nothing wherein man is so nearly concern'd, so high­ly interessed as in Death. Since upon the manner of this depends his Eternal Happiness or Ruin. There is therefore nothing that so much deserves to be consider'd by him. Whether therefore we regard the Absolute greatness of the thing, or its Relative greatness with re­spect to us, as we are interessed and concerned in it, but especially if we weigh both, the consideration of Death is as proper an Exercise as a Wise man can be imploy'd about.

XXXVII.

And as 'tis so fit an imployment for him that is wise already, so se­condly is it the most compendious way of making him wise, truly [Page 147] wise, that is not so. For all wis­dom is in Order to Happiness, and to be truly wise, is to be Wise unto Salvation. Whatever Knowledge contributes not to this, is quite be­side the Mark, and is as the Apostle calls it, Science falsly so called. The Knowledge itself is vain, and the Study of it is impertinent.

XXXVIII.

Now the only way to Happi­ness is a good life, and consequently all wisdom being in Order to Hap­piness, that's the only wisdom that serves to the promoting of good life, according to that of Iob be­fore cited, And to man he said, be­hold the fear of the Lord that is wis­dom, and to depart from evil is un­derstanding. That therefore is the most compendious way of making a man wise, that soonest makes him good, and reduces his mind to a moral Regularity. And nothing does this so soon and so well as the serious and habitual consideration of Death. And therefore says the [Page 148] wise man, Remember Death and Corruption, and keep the Command­ments. The shortest Compendium of Holy living that ever was given. As if he had said, Many are the Precepts and Admonitions left us by wise and good men, for the mo­ral Conduct of life, but would you have a short and infallible Directory of living well? why, remember Death and Corruption; Do but re­member this, and forget all other Rules if you will, and your Duty if you can.

XXXIX.

And what is here remarked by one wise man is consented to by all. Hence those common Practises a­mong the Antients of placing Se­pulchres in their Gardens, and of using that celebrated Motto, Me­mento Mori. Hence also that Mo­dern as well as Antient Custom of putting Emblems of Mortality in Churches, and other Public places, by all which tis implied that the Consideration of Death, is the [Page 149] greatest security of a good life. As indeed it must be upon this general ground, because it does that at a Blow, which other considerations do by Parts, and gives an entire defeat to the three great Enemies of our Salvation at once. It sets us above the Temptations of the World the Flesh, and the Devib. For how can the World captivate him, who considers he is but a stranger in it, and that he must shortly leave it! How can the Flesh insnare him who has his Sepulchre always in his Eye, and reflects upon the cold lodging he shall have there! And how can the Devil prevail upon him, who remembers always he must dye, and then enter upon an unchangeable State of Happiness or Misery, ac­cording as he has either resisted or yeilded to his Temptations! Of so vast consequence is the constant Thinking upon Death above all other things that fall within the compass even of useful and Practi­cal Meditation, and so great Rea­son [Page 150] had Moses for placing the Wis­dom of Man in the Consideration of his latter End.

XL.

But to return (if being still in pursuit of my general design, I may well be said to be out of the way) I now perswade my self that from the Character I have drawn of Man and his present Circumstan­ces, together with those Reflecti­ons built upon it, and interwoven with it, and lastly from Divine Authority, the measure we have given is so well Establish'd, that if your Ladyship be not yet, you ought to be convinc'd that however Na­turally desirous we may be of Knowledge, yet that this Appetite is to be govern'd as well as those that are Sensual; that we ought to indulge it only so far as may tend to the Moralizing our Souls, and the conducting our Lives, and the fitting us for that Happiness which God has promised not to the Learned, but to the Good. And [Page 151] that if it be gratify'd to any other purpose, or in any other Measure than this, our Curiosity is imperti­nent, our study immoderate, and the Tree of Knowledge still a forbid­den Plant.

XLI.

And now ( Madam) having fix'd and Stated the Measure of our pre­sent Affection to, and Inquiry after Learning and Knowledge, which I think is Establish'd upon irrefutable Principles, I may leave it to your Ladyship to consider how much 'tis observ'd in the general Conduct of our Studies. Tis plain that 'tis not observ'd at all. For these two things are too Notorious to need any more for their Proof than only to look abroad into the World. First, that very little of that which is generally made the subject of Study has any manner of Tendency to Living well here, or Happily hereafter. And Secondly, that these very studies which have no Religious or Moral influence upon [Page 152] Life, do yet devour the greatest part of it. The Best and Most of our Time is devoted to Dry-Learn­ing, this we make the Course of our Study, the rest is only by the by, and 'tis well if what is Devotional, Practical or Divinely-relishing, can find us at leisure upon a Broken piece of a Sunday or Holiday. But the Main Current of our Life runs in Studies of another Nature, that don't so much as glance one kind Aspect upon good living, 'tis well if some of them dont hinder it. I am sure St. Austin thought so, Confess. Lib. c. 1.16. and makes it part of his Penitentials. And yet to these our youth is dedi­cated, in these we imploy our riper years; nor do we see the vanity and impertinence of it in old Age. And then when we dye, this very thing makes one great part of our Funeral Elegy, that we were so dili­gent and indefatigable in our studies, and so inquisitive in the search of Knowledge, perhaps that we pro­cured an early interment by it, when [Page 153] according to the Principles before laid down, we were as imperti­nently imploy'd all the while, as if we had been so long picking Straws in Bedlam. I say as imper­tinently, tho perhaps not so inno­cently. The Sum of all comes to this: The measure of prosecuting Learning and Knowledge is their usefullness to good Life. Conse­quently all Prosecution of it beyond or beside this End is impertinent and immoderate. This has been fully pro­ved by evident Principles. But now of this sort is the general prosecution of Learning and Knowledge, as is plain by appealing to the general Conduct of Study. The Conclusi­on therefore unovoidably follows. That the Intellectual Conduct of Human Life is justly chargeable with an immoderate and imperti­nent pursuit of Knowledge. Which was the Proposition to be made out, and I am sorry to see it so well proved.