THO' you have been pleas'd to assign me the Task of an Angel, and in that Re­spect have warranted me to disobey you; yet since a considerable part of that experimen­tal Knowledge which I have of Happiness is ow­ing to the Delight which I take in your vertu­ous and endearing Friendship, I think 'tis but reasonable I should endeavour to give you an Idea of that, whereof you have given me the Pos­session.

You desire to know of me wherein the great­est Happiness attainable by man in this Life does consist. And here, tho' I see my self engaged in a work already too difficult for me, yet I find it necessary to enlarge it: For since the greatest Happiness, or Summum Bonum of this Life is a Species of Happiness in general, and since it is call'd (Greatest) not because absolutely perfect and compleat; but inasmuch as it comes nearest to that which indeed is so, it will be necessary first to state the Notion of Happiness in Gene­ral, and then to define wherein that Happiness does consist which is perfect and compleat, be­fore [Page 2] I can proceed to a Resolution of your Que­stion.

By Happiness in the most general Sence of the word, I understand nothing else but an Enjoy­ment of any Good. The least Degree of Good has the same Proportion to the least Degree of Happiness as the greatest has to the greatest, and consequently as many ways as a man enjoys any Good, so many ways he may be said to be hap­py: neither will the Mixture of Evil make him forfeit his Right to this Title, unless it either equals the Good he enjoys, or exceeds it: And then indeed it does; but the Reason is, because in strictness of Speaking upon the whole Ac­count the man enjoys no Good at all: For if the Good and the Evil be equal-balanc'd, it must needs be indifferent to that man either to be or not to be, there being not the least Grain of good to determine his Choice: So that he can no more be said to be happy in that Condition, than he could before he was born. And much less, if the Evil exceeds the Good: For then he is not on­ly not happy, but absolutely and purely mise­rable: For after an exact Commensuration sup­posed between the Good and the Evil, all that remains over of the Evil is pure and simple Misery; which is the Case of the Damn'd: And when 'tis once come to this (whatever some [Page 3] Mens Metaphysicks may perswade them) I am very well satisfied, that 'tis better not to be than to be. But now on the other side, if the Good does never so little out-weigh the Evil, that Over­plus of Good is as pure and unallay'd in its Pro­portion, as if there were no such Mixture at all; and consequently the Possession of it may pro­perly be call'd Happiness.

I know the Masters of Moral Philosophy do not treat of Happiness in this Latitude; neither is it fit they should: For their Business being to point out the ultimate End of Humane Actions, it would be an impertinent thing for them to give any other Idea of Happiness than the highest: But however this does not hinder but that the General Idea of Happiness may be extended far­ther, even to the Fruition of any Good whatso­ever: Neither is there any reason to find Fault with the Latitude of this Notion, since we ac­knowledge Degrees even in Glory.

In this General Idea of Happiness two things are contain'd. One is some Good, either real or apparent, in the Fruition of which we are said to be in some measure or other happy. The other is the very Fruition it self. The first of these is usually called Objective Happiness, and the latter Formal. Some I know divide Happiness into these as distinct Species; but I think not so [Page 4] artificially: For they are both but constituent Parts, which joyntly make up one and the same Happiness: Neither of them are sufficient alone, but they are both equally necessary. That the last of these is a necessary Ingredient, I think no doubt can reasonably be made: For what would the greatest Good imaginable signifie without Fruition? And that the former is likewise ne­cessary is no less certain: For how can there be such a thing as Fruition without an Object? I grant 'tis not at all necessary that the Object be a real substantial Good; if it appear so 'tis sufficient.

From this Distinction of real and apparent Good, some have taken occasion to distinguish of Happiness likewise into two sorts, real and imaginary: But I believe upon a more narrow Scrutiny into the matter, 'twill be found, that all Happiness, according to its Proportion, is equally real; and that that which they term I­maginary, too well deserves the Name, there be­ing no such thing in Nature: For let the Ob­ject of it be never so Phantastick, yet it must still carry the Semblance and Appearance of Good (otherwise it can neither move the Appe­tite nor please it, and consequently be neither an Object of Desire nor of Fruition;) and if so, the Happiness must needs be real, because the [Page 5] Formality of the Object, tho' 'twere never so true and real good, would notwithstanding lie in the Appearance, not in the Reallity: Whether it be real or no is purely accidental: For since to be happy can be nothing else but to enjoy some­thing which I desire, the Object of my Happi­ness must needs be enjoy'd under the same For­mality as 'tis desired. Now since 'tis desired on­ly as apparently good, it must needs please me when obtained under the same Notion. So that it matters not to the Reality of my Happiness, whether the Object of it be really good, or only apprehended so, since if it were never so real, it pleases only as apparent. The Fool has his Para­dise as well as the wise man, and for the time is as happy in it; and a kind Delusion will make a Cloud as pleasing as the Queen of Heaven. And therefore I think it impossible for a man to think himself happy, and (during that Perswa­sion) not really to be so. He enjoys the Crea­ture of his own Fancy, worships the Idol of his Imagination, and the happiest man upon Earth does no more: For let the Circumstances of his Life be what they will, 'tis his Opinion only that must give the Relish. Without this Heaven it self would afford him no Content, nor the Vi­sion of God prove Beatifick. 'Tis true, the man is seated at the Spring-Head of Happiness, is sur­rounded [Page 6] with excellent Objects; but alas, it ap­pears not so to him; he is not at all affected with his Condition, but, like Adam, lies fast in a dead Sleep in the midst of Paradise.

The Sum of this Argument is this; Good is in the same manner the Object of Fruition, as 'tis of Desire; and that is not as really good in its own Nature, but as 'tis judged so by the Under­standing: And consequently, tho' it be only ap­parent, it must needs be as effectual to gratifie the Appetite as it was at first to excite it during that Appearance. So long as it keeps on its Vizor and imposes upon the Understanding, what is wanting in the thing, is made up by an obliging Imposture, and Ignorance becomes here the Mo­ther of Happiness as well as of Devotion: But if the man will dare to be wise, and too curiously examine the superficial Tinsel-Good, he unde­ceives himself to his own Cost, and, like Adam, adventuring to eat of the Tree of Knowledge, sees himself naked, and is ashamed. And for this reason I think it impossible for any man to love to be flatter'd: 'Tis true, he may delight to hear himself commended by those who indeed do flat­ter him; but the true Reason of that is, be­cause he does not apprehend that to be Flattery which indeed is so; but when he once throughly knows it, 'tis impossible he should be [Page 7] any longer delighted with it. I shall conclude this Point with this useful Reflection, That since every Man's Happiness depends wholly upon his own Opinion, the Foundation upon which all en­vious Men proceed, must needs be either false or very uncertain. False, if they think that outward Circumstances and States of Life are all the In­gredients of Happiness; but uncertain however: For since they measure the Happiness of other Men by their own Opinion, 'tis mere Chance if they do not misplace their Envy, unless they were sure the other Person was of the like Opi­nion with themselves. And now what a vain irrational thing is it to disquiet our selves into a dislike of our own Condition, merely because we mistake an other Man's?

Thus far of the Notion of Happiness in Gene­ral; I now proceed to consider that Happiness which is [...] (as Plato speaks) sound and entire, perfect and compleat. Concerning the general Notion of which, all men, I suppose, are as much agreed as they are in the Idea of a Triangle. That 'tis such a State then which a bet­ter cannot be conceiv'd: In which there is no Evil you can fear, no Good which you desire and have not: That which fully and constantly satisfies the Demand of every Appetite, and leaves no possibility for a desire of Change; or to summ [Page 8] it up in that comprehensive Expression of the Poet,

When you would always be what you are, and (as the Earl of Roscommond very significantly renders it) do Rather nothing. This I suppose is the ut­most that can be said or conceiv'd of it, and less than this will not be enough. And thus far we are all agreed. For I suppose, the many various Disputes maintained by Philosophers concerning Happiness, could not respect this general Notion of it, but only the particular causes or means whereby it might be acquired. And I find Tully concurring with me in the same Observation, Ea est beata vita (says he) quaerimus autem non quae sit, Lib. 3 de Fin. sed unde. The difficulty is not to frame a con­ception of a perfectly happy State in the general, but to define in particular wherein it consists.

But before I undertake this Province, I think it might not be amiss to remove one Prejudice, which because it has gain'd upon my self some­times in my Melancholy Retirements, I am apt to think it may be incident to other men also. It is this, Whether after so many Disputes about, so many restless endeavours after this state of perfect Happiness there be any such thing or no. Whe­ther it be not a meer Idea, as imaginary as Plato's [Page 9] Common-wealth, as fictitious as the Groves of Ely­sium. I confess, this suspicion has oftentimes overcast my mind with black thoughts, damp'd my Devotion, and as it were clipp'd the wings of my Aspiring Soul. And I happened to fall into it upon a serious reflection on the nature of Fru­ition in the several Periods and Circumstances of my life. For I observ'd according to my Narrow experience, that I never had in all my life the same thoughts of any good in the very time of the enjoying it as I had before. I have known when I have promised my self vast Satisfactions, and my imagination has presented me at a distance with a fair Landscape of Delights, yet when I drew nigh enough to grasp the alluring Happiness, like the Sensitive Plant it contracted it self at the touch, and shrink'd almost to nothing in the Frui­tion. And though after the Enjoyment is past, it seems great again upon reflection as it did before in expectation, yet should a Platonical Revolution make the same Circumstances recur, I should not think so. I found 'twas ever with me as with the Traveller, to whom the ground which is before him, and that which he has left behind him seems always more curiously embroider'd and delight­som, then that which he stands upon. So that my Happiness like the time wherein I thought to enjoy it, was always either past or to come never [Page 10] present. Methought I could often say upon a Re­collection, How happy was I at such a time! Or when I was in expectation. How happy shall I be if I compass such a design! But scarce ever, I am so. I was pretty well pleased methought while I expe­cted, while I hoped, till Fruition jogg'd me out of my pleasing slumber and I knew it was but a Dream. And this single Consideration has often made me even in the very persuit after Happiness, and full career of my Passions, to stop short on this side of Fruition, and to choose rather with Moses upon Mount Nebo to entertain my fancy with a remote Prospect of the Happy Land, then to go in and possess it, and then repine. How then shall man be happy when setting aside all the Crosses of Fortune, he will complain even of Success, and Fruition it self shall disappoint him!

And this melancholy reflection bred in me a kind of suspicion, that for all that I knew it might be so in Heaven too. That although at this di­stance I might frame to my self bright Ideas of that Region of Bliss; yet when I came to the possession of it, I should not find that perfect Happiness there which I expected, but that it would be always to come as 'tis now, and that I should seek for Heaven even in Heaven it self. That I should not fully acquiesce in my condition there, but at length de­sire a change. And that which confirm'd me the [Page 11] more in this unhappy Scepticism, was because I con­sider'd that a great number of excellent Beings who enjoy'd the very Quintessence of Bliss, who were as happy as God and Heaven could make them, grew soon uneasy and weary of their State and left their own Habitation. Which argues that their Happiness was not perfect and compleat, because otherwise they would not have desired a change, since that very desire is an imperfection. And if Happi­ness be not compleat in Heaven, sure 'tis impossi­ble to be found any where else.

Before therefore I proceed to define wherein perfect Happiness does consist, I think it necessa­ry to endeavour the removal of this Scruple which like the flaming Sword forbids entrance into Pa­radise. In order to which, I shall inquire into the true reason why these Sublunary good things when enjoy'd do neither answer our expectations, nor satisfy our Appetites. Now this must proceed either from the nature of Fruition it self, or from the imperfection of it, or from the Object of it, or from our selves. I confess, did this defect pro­ceed from the very nature of Fruition (as is sup­posed in the Objection) 'tis impossible there should be any such thing as perfect Happiness, since 'twould faint away while enjoy'd, and expire in our embra­ces. But that it cannot proceed thence, I have this to offer, Because Fruition being nothing else [Page 12] but an Application or Union of the Soul to some good or agreeable Object, it is impossible that should lessen the good enjoy'd. Indeed it may les­sen our estimation of it, but that is because we do not rightly consider the nature of things, but pro­mise our selves infinite Satisfactions in the enjoy­ment of finite Objects. We look upon things through a false Glass which magnifies the Object at a distance much beyond its just Dimensions. We represent our future enjoyments to our selves in such favourable and partial Ideas which abstract from all the inconveniencies and allays which will really in the event accompany them. And if we thus over-rate our Felicities before-hand, 'tis no won­der if they baulk our Expectations in the Fruition. But then it must be observ'd that the Fruition does not cause this Deficiency in the Object, but only dis­cover it. We have a better insight into the nature of things near at hand, then when we stood afar off, and consequently discern those defects and imperfections which like the qualities of an ill Mi­striss, lay hid all the time of Courtship, and now begin to betray themselves, when 'tis come to en­joyment. But this can never happen but where the Object is finite. An infinite Object can never be over-valued and consequently cannot frustrate our expectations.

[Page 13]And as we are not to charge Fruition with our disappointments but our selves (because we are ac­cessory to our own delusion by taking false measures of things) so neither is the Vnsatisfactoriness of any condition to be imputed to the Nature of Fruition it self, but either to the imperfection of it or to the finiteness of the Object. Let the Object be never so perfect, yet if the Fruition of it be in an imper­fect measure there will still be room for Vnsatisfa­ctoriness, as it appears in our enjoyment of God in this Life. Neither can a finite Object fully satisfy us though we enjoy it never so thoroughly. For since to a full satisfaction and acquiescence of mind 'tis required that our Faculties be always enter­tain'd and we ever enjoying: it is impossible a finite Object should afford this satisfaction, because all the good that is in it (being finite) is at length run over, and then the enjoyment is at an end. The flower is suckt dry, and we necessarily de­sire a change. Whenever therefore our enjoyment proves unsatisfying, we may conclude, that either the Object is finite, or the Fruition imperfect. But then how came the Angels to be dissatisfy'd with their Condition in the Regions of light and immor­tality, when they drank freely of the Fountain of Life proceeding out of the Throne of God, Revel. 26. with whom is fulness of Joy, and at whose Right hand are Pleasures for evermore. Here certainly there is [Page 14] no room either for the finiteness of the Object, or the imperfection of Fruition. And therefore their dissatisfaction can be imputed to no other Cause, then the Nature of Fruition in general, which is to lessen the good enjoy'd, as was suppos'd in the Objection. This I confess presses hard, and in­deed, I have but one way to extricate my self from this difficulty, and that is by supposing a State of Probation in the Angels. That they did not im­mediately upon their Creation enjoy an infinite Object, or if they did, yet that 'twas in an imper­fect measure. For should it be granted that they were at first confirm'd in Bliss and compleatly hap­py both in respect of Fruition and Object as we sup­pose they are now, I cannot conceive it possible they should be dissatisfy'd with their condition. This being repugnant to the Idea of Perfect Hap­piness.

Since then this dissatisfaction must be derived either from the imperfection of the Fruition, or the finiteness of the Object, and not from the Na­ture of Fruition in the general, to infer the possi­bility of perfect Happiness, there needs no more to be supposed then the existence of a Being full fraught with infinite inexhaustible good, and that he is able to communicate it to the full. There may be then such a thing as perfect Happiness. The possibility of which may also be farther proved [Page 15] (tho' not explicated) from those boundless De­sires, that immortal Thirst every man has after it by Nature: Concerning which I observe, that nothing does more constantly, more inseparably cleave to our Minds that this Desire of perfect and consummated Happiness: This, as Plato pa­thetically expresses it, is, [...], the most excellent end of all our Endeavours, the great Prize, the great Hope. This is the Mark every Man shoots at, and tho' we miss our Aim never so often, yet we will not, cannot give over; but like passionate Lo­vers take Resolution from a Repulse. The rest of our Passions are much at our own Disposal; yield either to Reason or Time; we either argue our selves out of them, or at least out-live them. We are not always in love with Pomp and Gran­deur, nor always dazzl'd with the glittering of Riches; and there is a Season when Pleasure it self shall court in vain: But the Desire of per­fect Happiness has no Intervals, no Vicissitudes, it out-lasts the Motion of the Pulse, and survives the Ruins of the Grave. Many Waters cannot quench it, neither can the Floods drown it: And now certainly God would never have planted such an ardent, such an importunate Appetite in our Souls, and as it were interwoven it with our very Natures had he not been able to satisfie it.

[Page 16]I come now to shew wherein this perfect Hap­piness does consist, concerning which I affirm in the first place, that it is not to be found in any thing we can enjoy in this Life. The greatest Fruition we have of God here, is imperfect, and consequently unsatisfactory. And as for all other Objects they are finite, and consequently though never so fully enjoy'd cannot afford us perfect sa­tisfaction. No, Job 28. Man knoweth not the price thereof: Neither is it to be found in the Land of the Living. The Depth saith, it is not in me, and the Sea saith, it is not in me. The Vanity of the Creature has been so copiously discours'd upon, both by Philo­sophers and Divines, and is withal so obvious to every thinking man's experience, that I need not here take an Inventory of the Creation, nor turn Ecclesiastes after Solomon. And besides, I have already anticipated this Argument in what I have said concerning Fruition. I shall only add one or two Remarks concerning the Objects of Secu­lar Happiness, which are not so commonly insisted upon, to what has been there said. The first is this, that the Objects wherein Men generally seek for Happiness here, are not only finite in their Na­ture, but also few in number. Indeed could a Man's Life be so contrived, that he should have a new Pleasure still ready at hand assoon as he was grown weary of the Old, and every day enjoy the [Page 17] Maiden-head of a fresh Delight, he might then perhaps, like Mr. Hobbs his Notion, and for a while think himself happy in this continued Suc­cession of new Acquisitions. But alas, Nature does not treat us with this Variety. The compass of our enjoyments is much shorter then that of our Lives, and there is a Periodical Circulation of our Pleasures as well as of our blood.

The Enjoyments of our Lives run in a perpetual Round like the Months in the Kalendar, but with a quicker Revolution; we dance like Fairies in a Circle, and our whole Life is but a nauseous Tautology: We rise like the Sun, and run the same Course we did the day before, and to mor­row is but the same over again: So that the grea­test Favourite of Fortune will have Reason often enough to cry out with him in Seneca, Quousque eadem? But there is another Grievance which contributes to defeat our Endeavours after per­fect Happiness in the Enjoyments of this Life. Which is, that the Objects wherein we seek it, are not only finite and few; but that they commonly prove Occasions of greater Sorrow to us than ever they afforded us Content. This may be made out several ways, as from the Labour of Getting, the [Page 18] Care of Keeping, the fear of Losing, and the like Topicks, commonly insisted on by others; but I wave these, and fix upon another Account less blown upon, and I think more material than any of the rest. It is this, that altho' the Object loses that great appearance in the Fruition which it had in the expectation, yet after it is gone it resumes it again. Now we when we lament the loss, do not take our measures from that appearance which the Object had in the enjoyment (as we should do to make our sorrow not exceed our Happiness) but from that which it has in the reflection, and con­sequently we must needs be more miserable in the loss then we were happy in the enjoyment.

From these and the like Considerations, I think it will evidently appear that this perfect Happiness is not to be found in any thing we can enjoy in this Life. Wherein then does it consist? I an­swer positively, in the full and intire Fruition of God. He (as Plato speaks) is [...], the proper and Principal End of Man, the Center of our Tendency, the Ark of our Rest. He is the Object which alone can satisfy the appe­tite of the most Capacious Soul, and stand the Test of Fruition to Eternity. And to enjoy him fully is perfect Felicity. This in general, is no more then what is deliver'd to us in Scripture, and was believ'd by many of the Heathen Philosophers. [Page 19] But the manner of this Fruition requires a more particular Consideration. Much is said by the School-men upon this Subject, whereof in the first place I shall give a short and methodical account, and then fix upon the Opinion which I best ap­prove of. The first thing that I observe, is, that 'tis generally agreed upon among them, that this Fruition of God consists in some Operation; and I think with very good reason. For as by the Ob­jective part of Perfect Happiness we understand that which is best and last, and to which all o­ther things are to be refer'd. So by the Formal part of it must be understood the best and last Ha­bitude of Man toward that best Object, so that the Happiness may both ways satisfy the Appetite, that is, as 'tis the best thing, and as 'tis the Posses­sion, use, or Fruition of that best thing: Now this Habitude whereby the best thing is perfectly possess'd must needs be some Operation, because Operation is the ultimate perfection of every Being. Which Axiom (as Caietan well observes) must not be so understood as if Operation taken by it self were more perfect then the thing which tends to it, but that every thing with its Operation is more perfect then without it.

The next thing which I observe, is, that 'tis al­so farther agreed upon among them, that this O­peration wherein our Fruition of God does con­sist, [Page 20] is an Operation of the Intellectual part, and not of the Sensitive. And this also, I take to be very reasonable. First, Because 'tis generally receiv'd that the Essence of God cannot be the Object of any of our Senses. But Secondly, Suppose it could, yet since this Operation wherein our Per­fect Happiness does consist must be the perfectest Operation, and since that of the Intellectual part is more perfect then that of the Sensitive, it fol­lows that the Operation whereby we enjoy God must be that of the Intellectual part only.

But now whereas the Intellectual part of man (as 'tis opposed to the Sensitive) is double, viz. That of the Vnderstanding, and that of the Will, there has commenced a great Controversy between the Tho­mists and the Scotists, in which Act or Operation of the Rational Soul the Fruition of God, does consist, whether in an act of the Vnderstanding, or in an act of the Will. The Thomists will have it consist purely in an act of the Vnderstanding, which is Vision. The Scotists in act of the Will, which is Love. I in­tend not here to launch out into those Voluminous Intricacies and Abstrusities, occasion'd by the ma­nagement of this Argument: It may suffice to tell you, that I think they are both in the extream, and therefore I shall take the middle way and resolve the perfect Fruition of God partly into Vision and partly into Love. These are the two arms with which [Page 21] we embrace the Divinity, and unite our Souls to the fair one and the good. These I conceive are both so essential to the perfect Fruition of God, that the Idea of it can by no means be maintained if either of them be wanting. For since God is both Supream Truth and infinite Goodness he cannot be intirely possess'd but by the most clear knowledge and the most ardent love. And besides, since the Soul is happy by her Faculties, her Happiness must consist in the most perfect Operation of each Faculty. For if Happiness did consist formally in the sole operation of the Vnderstanding (as most say) or in the sole operation of the Will (as others) the Man would not be compleatly and in all respects Happy. For how is it possible a Man should be perfectly Happy in loving the greatest good if he did not know it, or in knowing it if he did not love it? And moreover these two Ope­rations do so mutually tend to the promotion and Conservation of one another, that upon this de­pends the perpetuity and the constancy of our Happiness. For while the Blessed do [...], Face to Face contemplate the Supream Truth and the infinite Goodness, they cannot chuse but love perpetually; and while they perpetually love, they cannot chuse but perpetually contem­plate. And in this mutual reciprocation of the actions of the Soul consists the perpetuity of Heaven, the Circle of Felicity.

[Page 22]Besides this way of resolving our Fruition of God into Vision and Love, there is a Famous Opi­nion said to be broacht by Henricus Gandavensis, who upon a Supposition that God could not be so fully enjoy'd as is required to perfect Happi­ness, only by the Operations or Powers of the Soul, fancied a certain Illapse whereby the Divine Essence did fall in with and as it were penetrate the essence of the Blessed. Which Opinion he endeavours to illustrate by this Similitude. That as a piece of Iron red hot by reason of the Illapse of the fire into it appears all over like fire, so the Souls of the Blessed by this Illapse of the Divine Essence into them shall be all over Divine.

I think he has scarce any Followers in this Opi­nion, but I am sure he had a Leader. For this is no more then what Plato taught before him, as is to be seen in his Discourses about the refusion of the Souls of good men into the Anima Mundi, which is the self same in other terms with this Opinion. And the truth of what I affirm may farther appear from an expression of that great Platonist Plotinus, (viz.) that the Soul will then be Happy when it shall depart hence to God, Enn. 6. lib. 9. cap. 10. and as another and no longer her self shall become wholely his [...] having joyn'd her self to him as a Cen­ter to a Center.

[Page 23]That such an intimate Conjunction with God as is here described is possible, seems to me more then credible from the Nature of the Hypostatic Union, but whether our Fruition of God after this Life shall consist in it, none know but those Happy Souls who enjoy him, and therefore I shall determine nothing before the time. This only I observe, that should our Fruition of God consist in such an Union or rather Penetration of Essences that would not exclude but rather infer those Ope­rations of Vision and Love as necessary to Fruition, but on the other hand, there seems no such neces­sity of this Union to the Fruition, but that it may be conceiv'd intire without it. And therefore why we should multiply difficulties without cause, I see no reason. For my part I should think my self sufficiently happy in the clear Vi­sion of my Maker, nor should I desire any thing beyond the Prayer of Moses, Exod. 33.18. I beseech thee shew me thy Glory.

For what an infinite Satisfaction, Happiness, and Delight must it needs be to have a clear and intimate perception of that Primitive and Origi­nal Beauty, Perfection and Harmony whereof all that appears fair and excellent either to our Senses or Vnderstandings in this Life is but a faint imita­tion, a pale Reflection! To see him who is the Fountain of all Being, containing in himself the [Page 24] perfection, not only of all that is, but of all that is possible to be, the Alpha and Omega, the begin­ning and the ending, the first and the last, which is, and which was, Rev. 1.8. and which is to come, the Almighty! To see him of whom all Nature is the Image, of whom all the Harmony both of the visible and the invisible World is but the Eccho! To see him who (as Plato divinely and magnificently expresses it) is [...]. The immense Ocean of Beauty, which is it self by it self, with it self, uniform, always exi­sting! This certainly will affect the Soul with all the pleasing and ravishing Transports of Love and Desire, Joy and Delight, Wonder and Amaze­ment, together with a settled Acquiescence and Complacency of Spirit only less infinite then the Loveliness that causes it, and the peculiar Com­placency of him who rejoyces in his own fulness, and the Comprehensions of Eternity. We see how strangely our sence of Seeing is affected with the Harmony of Colours, and our sence of Hearing with the Harmony of Sounds, insomuch that some have been too weak for the enjoyment, and have grown mad with the Sublimate of Pleasure. And if so, what then shall we think of the Beatific Vision, the pleasure of which will so far transcend that of the other, as God who is all over Harmony and Pro­portion exceeds the sweetest Melody of Sounds and Colours, and the perception of the Mind is [Page 25] more vigorous quick and piercing then that of the Senses? This is Perfect Happiness, this is the Tree of Life which grows in the midst of the Pa­radise of God, this is Heaven, which while the Learned dispute about, the good only enjoy. But I shall not venture to Soar any longer in these Heights, I find the Aether too thin here to breath in long, and the Brightness of the Region flashes too strong upon my tender sense; I shall therefore hasten to descend from the Mount of God, lest I grow giddy with speculation and lose those Secrets which I have learnt there, the Cabala of Felicity.

And now (Sir) I come to consider your Que­stion (viz.) Wherein the greatest Happiness at­tainable by man in this Life does consist. Con­cerning which, there is as great variety of Opini­ons among Philosophers, as there is among Geo­graphers, about the Seat of Paradise. The learn­ed Varro reckons up no less then 288 several Opi­nions about it, and yet notwithstanding the num­ber of Writers who have bequeath'd Volumes upon this Subject to Posterity, they seem to have been in the dark in nothing more then in this, and (excep­ting only a few Platonists who placed Mans great­est End in the Contemplation of truth) they seem to have undertaken nothing so unhappily, as when they essay'd to write of Happiness. Some measure their Happiness by the high-tide of their Riches, as [Page 26] the Egyptians did the Fertility of the Year by the increase of the River Nile. Others place it in the Pleasures of Sence, others in Honour and Great­ness. But these and the like were Men of the com­mon Herd, low groveling Souls that either under­stood not the Dignity of Humane Nature, or else forgot that they were Men. But there were others of a Diviner Genius and Sublimer Spirit

Who had a more generous blood running in their Veins, which made them put a just value upon themselves, and scorn to place their greatest Hap­piness in that which they should blush to enjoy. And those were the Stoics and the Peripatetics who both place the greatest Happiness of this Life in the Actions of Vertue, with this only difference, that whereas the former are contented with Naked Ver­tue, the latter require some other Collateral things to the farther accomplishment of Happiness, such as are Health and Strength of Body, a Competent Lively-hood, and the like.

And this Opinion has been subscribed to by the hands of eminent Moralists in all Ages. And as it is Venerable for its Antiquity, so has it gain'd no small Authority from the Pen of a great Mo­dern Writer (Descartes) who resolves the greatest Happiness of this Life into the right use of the Will, which consists in this, that a Man have a firm and [Page 27] constant purpose always to do that which he shall judge to be best.

I confess, the Practice of Vertue is a very great instrument of Happiness, and that there is a great deal more true satisfaction and solid content to be found in a constant course of well living then in all the soft Caresses of the most studied Luxury, or the Voluptuousness of a Seraglio. And therefore I have oftentimes been exceedingly pleased in the reading of a certain Passage in that Divine Moral­ist Hierocles, where he tells you, that the Vertu­ous Man lives much more pleasantly then the Vi­cious Man. For (says he) all Pleasure is the Com­panion of Action, it has no Subsistence of its own, but accompanies us in our doing such and such things. Hence 'tis that the worser Actions are accompanied with the meaner Pleasures. So that the good Man does not only excel the wicked Man in what is good, but has also the advantage of him even in Pleasure, for whose sake alone he is wicked. For he that chuses Pleasure with Filthiness, altho for a while he be sweetly and deliciously entertain'd, yet at last through the Filthiness annexed to his enjoyment, he is brought to a painful Repentance. But now he that prefers Vertue with all her Labours and Difficulties, though at first for want of use it sits heavy upon him, yet by the Conjunction of good he alleviates the labour and at last enjoys pure and unallay'd Pleasure with his [Page 28] Vertue. So that of necessity that Life is most unhap­py, which is most wicked, and that most pleasant which is most vertuous.

Now this I readily submit to as a great truth, that the degrees of Happiness vary according to the degrees of Vertue, and consequently that that Life which is most Vertuous is most Happy with refe­rence to those that are Vicious or less Vertuous, every degree of Vertue having a proportionate degree of Happiness accompanying it, (which is all, I suppose, that excellent Author intends.) But I do not think the most Vertuous Life so the most Happy, but that it may become Happier un­less something more be comprehended in the Word (Vertue) then the Stoics, Peripatetics, and the ge­nerality of other Moralists understand by it. For with them it signifies no more but only such a firm [...] or habitude of the Will to good, where­by we are constantly disposed, notwithstanding the contrary tendency of our Passions to perform the necessary Offices of Life. This they call Mo­ral or Civil Vertue, and althongh this brings al­ways Happiness enough with it to make ample a­mends for all the difficulties which attend the pra­ctice of it: Yet I am not of Opinion that the greatest Happiness attainable by Man in this Life consists in it. But there is another and a higher sence of the Word which frequently occurs in the [Page 29] Pythagorean and Platonic Writings, (viz.) Con­templation and the Vnitive way of Religion. And this they call Divine Vertue. I allow of the di­stinction, but I would not be thought to derive it from the Principle, as if Moral Vertue were acqui­red, and this infused (for to speak ingeniously in­fused Vertue seem'd ever to me as great a Paradox in Divinity, as Occult qualities in Philosophy) but from the nobleness of the Object, the Object of the former being Moral good, and the Object of the latter God himself. The former is a State of Proficiency, the latter of Perfection. The former is a State of difficulty and contention, the latter of ease and Sincerity. The former is employ'd in mastering the Passions, and regulating the acti­ons of common life, the latter in Divine Medita­tion and the Extasies of Seraphic Love. He that has only the former is like Moses with much diffi­culty climbing up the Holy Mount, but he that has the latter is like the same Person conversing with God on the serene top of it, and shining with the Rays of Anticipated Glory. So that this latter supposes the acquisition of the former, and con­sequently has all the Happiness retaining to the o­ther, besides what it adds of its own. This is the last Stage of Humane Perfection, the utmost round of the Ladder whereby we ascend to Heaven, one Step higher is Glory. Here then will I build my [Page 30] Tabernacle, for it is good to be here. Here will I set up my Pillar of Rest, here will I fix, for why should I travail on farther in persuit of any great­er Happiness, since Man in this Station is but a lit­tle lower than the Angels, one remove from Heaven. Here certainly is the greatest Happiness as well as Perfection attainable by Man in this State of im­perfection. For since that Happiness which is ab­solutely perfect and compleat consists in the clear and intimate Vision and most ardent Love of God, hence we ought to take our Measures and conclude that to be the greatest Happiness attainable in this State, which is the greatest participation of the other. And that can be nothing else but the V­nitive way of Religion, which consists of the Con­templation and Love of God. I shall say some­thing of each of these severally, and something of the Vnitive way of Religion which is the result of both, and so shut up this Discourse.

By Contemplation in general ( [...]) we un­derstand an application of the Vnderstanding to some truth. But here in this place we take the word in a more peculiar sence, as it signifies an habitual attentive steddy application or conversi­on of the Spirit to God and his Divine Perfecti­ons. Of this the Masters of Mystic Theology com­monly make fifteen Degrees. The first is Intuiti­on of Truth, the 2 is a Retirement of all the Vi­gour [Page 31] and strength of the Faculties into the inner­most parts of the Soul, the 3 is Spiritual Silence, the 4 is Rest, the 5 is Union, the 6 is the hearing of the still Voice of God, the 7 is Spiritual Slum­ber, the 8 is Ecstacy, the 9 is Rapture, the 10 is the Corporeal Appearance of Christ and the Saints, the 11 is the Imaginary Appearance of the same, the 12 is the Intellectual Vision of God, the 13 is the Vision of God in obscurity, the 14 is an admirable Manifestation of God, the 15 is a clear and intuitive Vision of him, such as St. Austin and Tho. Aquinas attribute to S. Paul when he was rapt up into the third Heaven. Others of them reckon seaven degrees only, (viz.) Tast, Desire, Satiety, Ebriety, Security, Tranquility, but the name of the seaventh (they say) is known only to God.

I shall not stand to examine the Scale of this Division, perhaps there may be a kind of a Pytha­goric Superstition in the number. But this I think I may affirm in general that the Soul may be wound up to a most strange degree of Abstraction by a silent and steddy Contemplation of God. Plato defines Contemplation to be [...], a Solution and a Separation of the Soul from the Body. And some of the severer Platonists have been of Opinion that 'tis possible for a Man by mere intention of thought not only [Page 32] to withdraw the Soul from all commerce with the Senses, but even really to separate it from the Bo­dy, to untwist the Ligaments of his Frame, and by degrees to resolve himself into the State of the Dead. And thus the Iews express the manner of the Death of Moses, calling it Osculum Oris Dei, the Kiss of God's Mouth. That is, that he breath'd out his Soul by the mere strength and Energy of Contemplation, and expired in the Embraces of his Maker. A Happy way of Dying! How am­bitious should I be of such a conveyance, were it practicable? How passionately should I joyn with the Church in Canticles? [...], 1 Ver. 2. Let him kiss me with the Kisses of his Mouth.

But however this be determin'd, certain it is, that there are exceeding great Measures of Abstra­ction in Contemplation, so great, that sometimes whether a Man be in the Body or out of the Body, he himself can hardly tell. And consequently the Soul in these Praeludiums of Death, these Neigh­bourhoods of Separation must needs have brighter glimpses and more Beatific Ideas of God, then in a State void of these Elevations, and consequently must love him with greater Ardency. Which is the next thing I am to consider.

The love of God in general may be consider'd either as it is purely intellectual, or as it is a Passion. [Page 33] The first is when the Soul upon an apprehension of God as a good delectable and agreeable Object joyns her self to him by the Will. The latter is when the motion of the Will is accompany'd with a sensible Commotion of the Spirits, and an estu­ation of the blood. Some I know are of Opinion, that 'tis not possible for a man to be affected with this sensitive Love of God which is a Passion, be­cause there is nothing in God which falls under our imagination and consequently (the imaginati­on being the only Medium of conveyance) it can­not be propagated from the Intellectual part to the Sensitive. Whereupon they affirm that none are capable of this sensitive passionate love of God but Christians who enjoy the Mystery of the Incar­nation whereby they know God has condescended so far as to cloath himself with flesh, and to be­come like one of us. But 'tis not all the Sophistry of the old Logicians that shall work me out of the belief of what I feel and know, and rob me of the sweetest entertainment of my Life, the Passionate Love of God. Whatever some Men pretend who are strangers to all the affectionate heats of Religi­on, and therefore make their Philosophy a Plea for their indevotion, and extinguish all Holy Ar­dours with a Syllogism; yet I am firmly persua­ded that our love of God may be not only passio­nate, but even Wonderfully so, and exceeding the [Page 34] Love of Women. 'Tis an Experimental and there­fore undeniable Truth, that Passion is a great In­strument of Devotion, and accordingly we find that Men of the most warm and pathetic Tempers and Amorous Complexions (Provided they have but Consideration enough withal to fix upon the right Object) prove the greatest Votaries in Religi­on. And upon this account it is, that to heighten our Love of God in our Religious Addresses, we endeavour to excite our Passions by Music, which would be to as little purpose as the Fanatic thinks 'tis, if there were not such a thing as the Passio­nate Love of God. But then as to the Objection, I Answer with the excellent Descartes, that although in God who is the Object of our Love, we can ima­gine nothing, yet we can imagine that our Love, which consists in this, that we would unite our selves to the Object beloved, and consider our selves as it were a part of it. And the sole Idea of this very Conjunction is enough to stir up a heat about the Heart, and so kindle a very vehement Passion. To which I add, that although the Beauty or aim­ableness of God be not the same with that which we see in Corporeal Beings, and consequently can­not directly fail within the Sphere of the Imagina­tion, yet it is something Analogous to it, and that very Analogy is enough to excite a Passion. And this I think sufficient to warrant my general divi­sion [Page 35] of the Love of God into Intellectual and Sensitive.

But there is a more peculir Acceptation of the Love of God proper to this place. And it is that which we call Seraphic. By which I understand in short, that Love of God which is the effect of an intense Contemplation of him. This differs not from the other in kind, but only in degree, and that it does exceedingly, in as much as the thought­ful Contemplative Man (as I hinted before) has clearer Perceptions and livelier Impressions of the Divine Beauty, the lovely Attributes and Perfecti­ons of God, then he whose Soul is more deeply set in the Flesh, and lies groveling in the bottom of the Dungeon.

That the Nature of this Seraphic Love may be the better understood, I shall consider how many degrees there may be in the Love of God. Lib. 2. de monachii, cap. 2. And I think the Computation of Bellarmin is accurate e­nough. He makes four. The first is to Love God proportionably to his Loveliness, that is, with an infinite Love; and this degree is peculiar to God himself. The second is to Love him, not proportionably to his Loveliness, but to the ut­most Capacity of a Creature, and this degree is peculiar to Saints and Angels in Heaven. The third is to love him not proportionably to his Loveliness, nor to the utmost capacity of a Crea­ture [Page 36] absolutely consider'd, but to the utmost ca­pacity of a Mortal Creature in this Life. And this (he says) is proper to the Religious. The fourth is to love him not proportionably to his Loveliness, nor to the utmost capacity of a Crea­ture consider'd either absolutely or with respect to this Life, but only so as to love nothing equally with him or above him. That is, not to do any thing contrary to the Divine Love. And this is absolute indespensable duty, less then which will not qualify us for the enjoyment of God here­after.

Now this Seraphic Love which we here dis­course of is in the third degree: When a Man after many degrees of Abstraction from the Animal Life, many a profound and steddy Meditation upon the Excellencies of God, sees such a vast Ocean of Beau­ty and Perfection in him, that he loves him to the utmost Stretch of his Power. Cant. 2.3. When he sits under his shadow with great delight, and his fruit is sweet to his Tast. When he Consecrates and Devotes him­self wholely to him, and has no Passion for Infe­riour Objects. When he is ravish'd with the delights of his Service, and breaths out some of his Soul to him in every Prayer. When he is delighted with Anthems of Praise and Adoration more then with Marrow and Fatness, and Feasts upon a Hallelu­jah. When he melts in a Calenture of Devotion, [Page 37] and his Soul breaketh out with fervent Desire. Psal. 119. When the one thing he delights in is to converse with God in the Beauty of Holiness, and the one thing he de­sires to see him as he is in Heaven. This is Sera­phic Love, and this with Contemplation makes up that which the Mystic Divines Stile the Vnitive way of Religion. It is call'd so because it Unites us to God in the most excellent manner that we are capable of in this Life. By Union here I do not understand that which is Local or Presential, be­cause I consider God as Omnipresent. Neither do I mean a Union of Grace (as they call it) where­by we are reconciled to God, or a Union of Cha­rity whereof it is said, Jo. 4.16. he that dwelleth in Love dwelleth in God and God in him. The first of these being as common to the inanimate things as to the most Extasi'd Soul upon Earth. And the two last being common to all good men who indeed love God, but yet want the excellency of Contem­plation and the Mystic Union. The Union then which I here speak of is that which is between the Faculty and the Object. Which consists in some Habitude or Operation of one toward the other. The Faculties here are the Vnderstanding and Will, the Object God, and the Operations Contemplation and Love. The result of which two is the Mystic Vnion. Which according to this complex Notion of it that I have here delivered, is thus most ad­mirably [Page 38] represented by the excellent Bishop Tay­lour. It is (says he) a Prayer of quietness and si­lence and a Meditation extraordinary, The great Exemplar pag. 60. a Discourse without variety, a Vision and Intuition of Divine Ex­cellencies, an immediate entry into an Orb of light, and a resolution of all our Faculties into Sweetness, Affections and Starings upon the Divine Beauty. And is carried on to Extasies, Raptures, Suspensions, Ele­vations, Abstractions and Apprehensions beatifical.

I make no doubt but that many an honest Pious Soul arrives to the heavenly Canaan who is not fed with this Manna in the Wilderness. But though every one must not expect these Antepatists of Fe­licity that is vertuous, yet none else must. Para­dise was never open but to a State of Innocence. But neither is that enough. No, this Mount of God's presence is fenced not only from the profane but also from the Moderately vertuous. 'Tis the Pri­viledge of Angelical Dispositions, and the reward of eminent Piety and an excellent Religion to be admitted to these Divine Repasts, these Feasts of Love. And here I place the greatest Happiness attainable by Man in this Life, as being the near­est Approach to the State of the Blessed above, the Outer Court of Heaven.

These (Sir) are my thoughts concerning Hap­piness. I might have spun them out into a greater length, but I think a little Plot of ground thick-sown [Page 39] is better then a great Field which for the most part of it lies Fallow. I have endeavour'd to de­liver my Notions with as much perspicuity and in as good Method as I could, and so to answer all the ends of Copiousness, with the advantage of a shorter Cut. If I appear singular in any of my Notions 'tis not out of an industrious affectation of Novelty, but because in the composing of this discourse (the Meditation of a few broken hours in a Garden) I consulted more my own experi­mental Notices of things and private Reflections then the Writings of others. So that if sometimes I happen to be in the Road, and sometimes in a way by my self, 'tis no wonder. I affect neither the one nor the other, but write as I think. Which as I do at other times, so more especially when I subscribe my self