WHatever Reproaches have been made by the Roma­nists on the one hand, of the Want of Books of Devotion in the Church of England; or by the Dissenters on the other, of a dead and lifeless Way of Preaching; I think it may be affirm'd, That there cannot, any where, be found so good a Collection of Discourses upon Mo­ral Subjects, as might be made of English Sermons, and other Trea­tises of that Nature, written by the Divines of our Church: Which [Page 2]Books are certainly, in themselves, of the greatest and most general Use of any; and do most conduce to that which is the chief Aim of Christianity, a good Life. For what­soever else its Professors, divided in­to Parties, may contend about; This they must all agree in, That we ought to be a People zealous of good Works.

Yet tho' no body can deny this; And all are forced to allow, that the Duties of a good Life ought to be practis'd; It is certain, that this which is so essential to Religion, is so far degraded by some, as not to pass for a part of it. They accor­dingly distinguish a Religious, from a Moral Man; and carry their Zeal for the Doctrinal Part of Religion so far, that they seem to lay little Stress on the Performance of those Vertues recommended by our Savi­our Christ, as the Way to Eternal Life; Which Vertues, have been commonly enough term'd Splendid Vices, in those they account not [Page 3]true Believers; And the Books writ by others, to recommend the Pra­ctice of them to the World, are look'd upon by these Men, as little more worthy of a Christian's Peru­sal, as such, than Histories or Max­ims of humane Prudence.

But others there are, who do not in this manner undervalue Morality, that yet perhaps are not less inju­rious to it; Whilst they strain the Duties of it to an impracticable Pitch; or pretend to ascend by it to something beyond, or above it: Which has been mightily the Fault of those in the Church of Rome; Who having a better Relish of Reli­gion, than to be satisfied with one consisting of nothing but idle, su­perstitious, and pompous Shows, have betaken themselves to that which they call the inward Way, or Life of Contemplation: Of which, there never has wanted great Num­bers in that Church, known in se­veral times by several Names, which distinguish'd them more than their [Page 4]Opinions. For in those, they all agreed in one common Difference from all the rest, though variously express'd: And who (whatever their Errours have been) have yet seem'd the most in earnest in the Business of Religion, of any that the Roman Church can boast of.

But however excusable these may be, in regard of their own Church (which perhaps allows them no other Way of being Religious, than that which leads them into these Mi­stakes) they yet are certainly very injurious to Christianity in the Re­presentations they make of it; by supposing, as they do, the Perfe­ction of a Christian State to consist in Contemplation; And the Duties of a social Life (for which 'tis plain Mankind were intended) to be low Matters, fit only to exercise the young Christian, not yet advanced into the spiritual State; to which when he arrives, even but to the first Degree (for they talk of three Degrees at least of it, by which Per­fection [Page 5]is to be ascended to) he then looks down upon all the Duties of the second Table, as an inferiour Dispensation, belonging to those of a lower Class: And when he is a­scended to the highest Degree, he is then got above Reason it self; be­ing first melted and brought to no­thing, and then lost and swallowed up in God. And by these, who suppose themselves thus far advan­ced, the Ʋse of Reasoning, and in­ternal Discourse, tending to fix our Affections upon God, and expressing it self in sensible Devotion; and even outward Acts of Obedience to God's Will, are look'd upon as parts of the active Life, and less perfect State of a Christian; as may be seen in di­vers Books which treat of this Mat­ter, and particularly in Santa So­phia, Treat. 1st. Ch. 1. c. 3. Which sufficiently shows of how dangerous Consequence it is to talk after this Fashion; and to erect into a Rule, or Dispensation of Life, what possi­bly the Experience of some (whose [Page 6]Circumstances, or extraordinary Il­luminations, for ends unknown (and which we have nothing to do with) may have inabled them to give a sober, and intelligible Sense of to themselves; though to others it ap­pear Jargon, Enthusiasm, or even Irreligion.

If Books of this kind (which more or less those usually are, the Papists call their spiritual Books) are want­ing in the Church of England, it is well that they are so; since they would be likely to make many more Enthusiasts than good Christians. For as the Bishop of Worcester (in his Fanaticism of the Roman Church) says very well: If once an unintelli­gible Way of Practical Religion be­come the Standard of Devotion, no Men of Sense and Reason will ever set themselves about it; but leave it to be understood by mad Men, and pra­ctis'd by Fools. Which is a Refle­ction that it were to be wish'd all would make, who may be tempted by Affectation of Novelty, Fondness [Page 7]of an Hypothesis, or any other better Reason, to build their Practical and Devotional Discourses upon Princi­ples which not only will not bear the Test, but which oblige them to lay down such Assertions in Mora­lity, as sober and well disposed Chri­stians cannot understand to be pra­cticable: Than which, I think there never was any more evidently so, than that Mankind are obliged strict­ly, as their Duty, to love with De­sire, nothing but God only; Every Degree of Desire of any Creature whatsoever, being Sin. This Asser­tion, though not altogether new, yet has been but lately brought into our Pulpits, and been pretended to be set on Foot upon a Philosophical, or Natural Ground, viz. That God, not the Creature, is the immediate, efficient Cause of our Sensations: For whatever gives us Pleasure (say they who hold this Hypothesis) has a right to our Love; but God only gives us Pleasure, therefore he only has a right to our Love.

Indeed, in a Sermon upon this Subject, Matt. xxij. 37. the Author pretends to establish his Sense of the Words upon a double Basis. 1. That God is the only Cause of our Love. 2. That he is also the only proper Ob­ject of it. But in Reference to the first, he does no more to this Pur­pose, but prove what (plainly ex­press'd) cannot be contested; viz. That we receive the Power which we have of Desiring, from God: And then asks himself several Que­stions, as, Can God act for a Crea­ture? Does not God make all things for himself? &c. Which amount only to thus much, that they signifie it is his Opinion, that God (who doubt­less made all things for himself) be­cause his own Glory was his primary End in creating all things, had not therefore Secondary, and intermediate Ends for which he made the Creatures to operate one upon another: Which is but in a ta­cit Way to beg the Question. But he confesses rightly, that the Stress [Page 9]of this Business lies in the Proof of the second Proposition. Ʋpon this Hinge (says he) the whole Weight of the Theory turns, viz. That God is the only proper Object of our Love, as being the only Cause of all our pleasing Sensations; the Creatures having no Efficiency at all to ope­rate upon us; they being only occa­sional Causes of those Sentiments which God produces in us. And on this Foundation it then is, that he asserts, that every Act that carries our Desires towards the Creature is sinful: Which Opinion if receiv'd, and follow'd, must necessarily bring in the like unintelligible Way of Pra­ctical Religion, which the Bishop of Worcester has justly censured in the Church of Rome.

But however perswaded, either the Author himself, or this great Assertor of this Hypothesis are of its Truth, or Reasonableness; As there was no need at all of interes­sing Religion, and Morality, in the Matter; so it is also very unservice­able [Page 10]to them; Since that which they would inferr from it is manifestly no just Consequence, any more than a useful, or practicable Doctrine. And a Man that had not been migh­ty fond of an Hypothesis, would never have attempted from the Pul­pit, to fortifie by Scripture, an Opi­nion so opposite to the Tenour of it; as well as to that Morality which has been so excellently preach'd to the World by the Divines of his own Church: Whose Discourses are generally, if not universally, found­ed upon this Supposition; (or at least imply it) that there may be a lawful Love of the Creatures: And being herein conform'd to right Reason, and consequently ad­apted to humane Life, they have helped to make some Opposition to that Irreligion, which by looseness of Manners on the one hand, and uncharitable Zeal on the other, has spread it self amongst us in this last Age; But must doubtless have pre­vailed further, had not more reaso­nable [Page 11]Principles of Morality been inculcated into Men, than can be grounded upon seeing all things in God, &c.

For apparently, if the practical Duties of Religion had not been better accounted for, and inforc'd, than by the so much boasted of spiri­tual Books of the Roman Church, Religion and Vertue had before this time been disputed, or ridicul'd, out of our World. And yet any of these Books of mystical Divinity, will be found as well able to support them, as some of the late practical Dis­courses of Mr. N. or as any Man's else can be, upon the Principle of our being obliged to have no Love of Desire for any of the Creatures: Which is particularly endeavour'd to be made good in the foremen­tion'd Sermon, upon the great Com­mandment of the Law, Matt. xxij. 37. Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy Heart, with all thy Soul, and with all thy Mind. Wherein the Author pretends to [Page 12]show, that all our Love is to be so intirely center'd upon God, that not any part of it is to be allow'd to the Creatures.

But least the inlarging this first Commandment to such a Magnitude, should make it seem to swallow up the second; He prevents that Obje­ction by shewing, that these Two Commandments clash not at all: The Love of God, and of our Neigh­bour, (as he says) being different Loves: For we love God with Love of Desire; and love, or should love, our Neighbour, only with Love of Benevolence. Which Distinction, in other Discourses of his, he is more large upon; and seems to believe the latter part of it confirm'd by these Words, Thou shalt love thy Neighbour as thy self.

Moses, in Levit .xix. repeating to the Children of Israel sundry Laws, and amongst others, several special Duties towards their Neighbour, thus con­cludes the last; ( ver. the 18th.) Thou shalt love thy Neighbour as thy self. [Page 13]Which Conclusion is comprehensive of all that preceded it, or that had been omitted; And in a short Rule, better teaches the Extent of what we owe to our Neighbour, than it was possible any Enumeration of Particulars could. This Duty is indeed so fully express'd herein, that we cannot conceive any Addition could be made to the Perfection of this Precept by our Blessed Saviour; Who came to teach us the whole Will of the Father, and to give us the most perfect Rule of Life that had yet been delivered to Mankind; and accordingly, Luke the 4th. ch. v. 25. being asked, Master what shall I do to inherit Eternal Life? He said, How readest thou in the Law? It being answer'd, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy Heart, and with all thy Soul, with all thy Mind, and with all thy Strength; and thy Neighbour as thy self: He replied, Thou hast answer'd right; This do, and thou shalt live. He had answer'd right, in joining together these two [Page 14]Commandments in the Law, on which all the rest of the Law and Prophets did depend, Matt. xxij. 40. And our Saviour assures him the Rule of the Law was in neither part short, or defective: For he says, This do, and thou shalt live. We are here taught, that the Love of God, and of our Neighbour, com­prises the whole of our Duty: And accordingly we are else-where also told, That Love is the fullfilling of the Law. Its Regulation therefore is certainly of the utmost Consequence to us; And the Measures of it are, That we love God with all our Heart, with all our Souls, with all our Mind, and with all our Strength; and our Neighbour as our selves.

These Precepts are joined toge­ther in the Gospel, and there is a very near Affinity between them. But they are not so joined in the Law from whence they are cited; Neither is there any Appearance that those to whom they were there given understood, or could under­stand [Page 15]by them, the Love of God and the Love of their Neighbour to be distinct Affections, differing in kind; as is affirm'd by Mr. N. Who in Pursuance of (at best) a useless Notion, would take from a great part of Mankind their only sure Retreat, when bewildered in the Maze of Opinions, endlesly conte­sted by the Men of Skill in Dispu­tation: He having done as much to perplex the plain Duties of Mora­lity, as others have done the specu­lative parts of Religion. But there appears no Ground from the Text here, to affirm that the Command of loving their Neighbour as them­selves, was (as he says it was) not only an absolute Measure, but a rela­tive Character put in on purpose to distinguish it from their Love of God, Page 165. of his Philosophical and Divine Letters: Unless that Mr. N. will say, that the Words necessarily imply so much; which is to beg the thing he contests for, and not to prove it.

Moses speaking as a Law-giver, to a Multitude that did not much re­fine in their Speculations, or distin­guish things with Philosophical Niceness, seems very plainly by this Text (as the foregoing ones make it evident) to design only to tell them how far the Love of their Neighbour ought to extend: As not only to the doing no Injury (specified in sundry Instances) but even to the bearing no Grudge; And (Finally says he) Thou shalt love thy Neighbour as thy self. That is, do him as little Harm, and as much Good, as thou desirest should be done to thy self. Whether, or no, he should be the Object of Desire, is not determined by this Pre­cept, any farther than as Love na­turally draws Desire after it. But against the Lawfulness of any Crea­ture's being desired by us, it is said by Mr. N. That as we cannot love God with a Love of Benevolence, he wanting nothing to be wished to his Perfection, and Happiness; so we [Page 17]ought not to love the Creature with a Love of Desire, they being uncapable to make any part of our Happiness. What we cannot do, we are certain we shall not: And we need little Cau­tion, not to desire what is not desi­rable, or (which is here equivalent) not pleasing to us. But though Men may possibly (in the Ignorance they are in of their own Being, and the Constitution of other things, with their mutual Relations) mi­stake, that which can make them finally happy; yet none can be sup­posed not to know what, at the pre­sent, pleases them; which is the Hap­piness, or Pleasure here intended. How little it signifies to this Matter (though the Stress of the Assertion lies in it) to say, That sensible Ob­jects are not the efficient, but occasi­onal Causes of our pleasing Sensations, will soon be consider'd. But if when we use the Word Love, we reflected what it is we mean by it, we should perhaps be more inlighten'd than by Mr. N's Definition of it, and should [Page 18]learn to distinguish better, than to call different Passions by the same Name; or confound Love, with whatever is a Concomitant of it.

When I say that I love my Child, or my Friend, I find that my Mean­ing is, that they are things I am delighted in; Their Being is a Plea­sure to me.

When I say that I love God above all, I find I would express that he is my chiefest Good, and I delight in him above all things.

Again, when I say that I love my self, I likewise mean by it that my Being is dear, and pleasing to me. To say one loves a thing, and that it is that which one has Complai­sency in, is just the same: Love be­ing only a Name given to that Dis­position, or Act of the Mind, we find in our selves towards any thing we are pleas'd with; And so far as it is simply Love, consists barely in That; and cannot be distinguish'd into different Acts of wishing well, and desiring; which are other dif­ferent [Page 19]Acts of the Mind, consequential to Love, according to the difference of the Object. To intelligent Beings that we love, our Love is follow'd with acts of Benevolence, or wishing well to the Being, and Happiness of that thing that helps to make us hap­py; and with desire of injoying that in them that delights us: And our Love to Inanimate things is follow'd with Benevolence and Well wishing to their Being, if it may be continued with their Injoyment; and with de­sire also of injoying them. But, because Benevolence appears most in Wishing Happiness to Beings capable of it; And the use of most Inanimate things which we love and desire to injoy, de­stroys them in the Injoyment; There­fore Learned Men have talk'd as if there were two sorts of Love Whereas Love is but one simple act of the Mind, always accompanied with De­sire, and Benevolence too, where the Object is capable of it. But as that Definition which Mr. N. has given us, (viz. That Love is that Original Weight, Bent or Indeavour, whereby the [Page 20]Soul stands inclin'd to, and is mov'd for­wards to Good ingeneral, or Happiness) tells as not so well what Love is, as our own Hearts can when we consult them; So perhaps an Examination of them will not only better acquaint us with the Nature of our Passions; but also direct us better to the Measures of their Regulation, than Notions concerning them deduced from the Consequences of an Hypothesis.

Let us therefore consider more par­ticularly, how by the different Objects of our Love our Hearts are affected.

When we say we love our selves Have we then only a simple Percep­tion of Pleasure, and Complaisance in our Being? Or is any thing else an­nex'd to that Pleasure as a necessary Concomitant, or Consequence of it Mr. N. says, ( Letters Philosophical and Divine, p. 165.) that our love of our selves is not love of Desire, but love of Benevolence most undoubtedly. Most undoubtedly these words of Mr. N. very much clash with what he affirms elsewhere (see his Theory and Regula­tion of Love, p. 14. and 15.) where [Page 21]having reduced or comprehended Love under Concupiscence and Bene­volence, he expresly tells us, that There is no desire without Benevolence, and no Benevolence without define. But he does not in this oppose himself on­ly, but Truth also since the desire of the continuation of our Being is truly a Desire of our Selves, a De­sire of something of our selves which we have not already: As he that having Light and Warmth enough of the Sun, desiring its Continuation, desires more of the Sun than he has already. The Continuation of our Being is necessary to our Happiness in the Beatifick Vision: And if we desire more of that Happiness by only desiring the Continuation of it, we certainly desire more of our selves, by desiring the Continuation of our Being.

Let us farther observe, how our Hearts are affected in our love of other things. Our Being, we evi­dently find stands in need of other Beings for its Support and Happi­ness; because it is not sufficient a­lone [Page 22]for either: And therefore to the Complaisance or Pleasure we have in it, we find necessarily an­nex'd a wishing to it whatever we conceive may either continue, or improve it.

As to God himself, whom Mr. N. makes the sole Object of our Desires; I wish Mr. N. had a little more ex­plain'd himself what he means by our Desiring of God. For the Perfection and Superlativeness of his Nature, makes him the Object of our Love, Desire and Benevolence, in a quite different way from Created Beings. We love God for those Excellencies of his Nature, wherein he infinitely surpasses all that is good, or desire­able in the Creature. When we are said to Desire him, I think we mean such a Communication of his Good­ness, whereby he bestows on us any Degree of Happiness: And in this sense, we shall to Eternity desire more and more of him.

But he being both Necessary and Perfect, we can therefore wish no good to him, which he has not al­ready; [Page 23]Because we cannot conceive any Addition of Good can be made to him. Our Benevolence is limi­ted by his perfect Nature, only to Acts of Joy and Complaisance in his Perfections, which is all we can do; But the doing of That declares, That if any thing could be added to his Perfection and Happiness, we should wish it. And therefore, as an Expression of that Benevolence, it is made our Duty to give him Praise, and as much as we can to Glorifie him.

Again, When we say, That we love our Children, or Friends; It is evident also from the Nature of the Object, that we not only wish to them as to our selves, whatever we conceive may tend to continue, or improve their Being; but also, that Desire of them is a necessary Con­comitant of our Love: Because we are not always present with them, whereby we should enjoy them more: And it is impossible to love the Presence, or Kindness of any [Page 24]thing, without desiring to possess it. Now, If any one will say, we ought not to be so pleased; They then deny that we ought to love: For we cannot love but what we are pleased with. It is true, that every one may apply words as they think fit; But then others ought to take care not to be imposed on by them. And if any one will either tell us, That we love things in which we find no Pleasure; Or, That being pleased with a thing, we do not yet love it; Or will call different Passions by the same Name; Or imply in the word Love, that complication of o­ther Passions inseparable, indeed, from Love, but varying according to the Objects of it; It will concern us to examine what they say, before we receive their Dictates, as Mea­sures for the Regulation of a Passion, upon the right Regulation of which depends both our Present, and Future Happiness.

Love is but one simple Act of the Mind: But whether our desiring [Page 25]of what we love, or only wishing well to it, or both, follows that act of Love; the Nature of the lov'd Object alone Determines. For if that be both capable of being a good to us, and of receiving good from us, or from any thing else, it is then certain that we wish both: If it be capable of but one, and we know it to be so, it is certain we can then wish but one. The Distinction which is made of love of Benevo­lence, and Concupiscence, (arising only from the different Natures of the Objects of our Love) is only the Mis-application of the word Love to different acts consequent to Love, but distinct from it, and de­pending on the different Nature of the Object.

But it is said, That no Creature is capable of being a Good to us. Every Man's Experience confutes this eve­ry Day, and would do so, although that were true that these Men con­tend for; which therefore cannot in the least tend to promote Piety.

It is certain, that to believe (which is evidently true) that we receive all our Good from the Hand of God; ought to be, and effectively is, the proper Ground of our Love of Him above all things. But that we do receive all our good from the Hand of God, is equally acknow­ledged whether we believe the crea­ture receives an Efficiency from God to excite pleasing Sensations in us; Or that God himself exhibiting part of his Essence to us, at the pre­sence of the Creature, is himself the immediate Author of those Pleasing Sensations: Which is the Hypothesis proposed for the Advancement of the Love of God.

But as Truth of no kind is ever advantaged by Falshood; so also, it seems a respect Due to so important, and withal, so evident a Duty as the Love of God, not needlesly to lay the stress of it upon any Doubtful, Unintelligible, or Precarious Hypo­thesis; whatever Pretences it carries with it of Piety.

Pompous Rhapsodies of the Soul's debasing her self, when she descends to set the least part of her Affections upon any thing but her Creator, (however well they may possibly be intended) are plainly but a comple­menting God with the contempt of his Works, by which we are the most effectually led to Know, Love, and Adore him. And such kind of Expressions as carry not a Relative, but Absolute Abhorrence, or Con­tempt of Injoyments the most Law­ful, seem only allowable, as unpre­meditated Raptures of Devout Minds, not the Productions of Philosophical Disquisition; and will only affect those that are truely Pious, whilst they carry a show of some Truth in the Heart of the Speaker, which they strictly have not in them­selves. For 'tis not unlikely that a lively Remorse may so turn the Stream of some Men's Affections from all sensible Pleasures, and give them so strong a Disgust for them, that the very Remembrances and [Page 28]Ideas of those Pleasures, even where allowable, may become Ungrateful: As Men have often Aversion to see or hear of Places or Persons, (other­times Dear to them) by which, or in which, they have suffer'd much. The Passions where they are strong, argue by a Logick of their own, not that of Reason, which they often and significantly enough, invert to serve their own Purpose. And when Religion is in the case (with which too many are perswaded Reason has little to do) they can easily advance this so far, as to dress out an intire System, intelligible only by Senti­ment, not to Reason; of which, perhaps some of the Mystical Di­vines are an Example. But to what Extravagance soever this may be carried, it is not therefore to be be­lieved, That he who requires the Service of the whole Man, rejects the Passions from bearing a part; whilst we suffer them neither to im­pose upon our selves, nor others, to the admitting of wrong Notions, [Page 29]Prejudicial to true Religion. And it is likely, that many People of weak Understandings, may owe most of their Religion to their Pas­sions; It being certain, that if some Men had no more Religion than they are capable of having by a Ra­tional Disquisition, it must be ex­ceeding little.

But whenever any one pretends to prescribe Measures of Duty, not suited to a Popular Audience, but such as shall challenge the strictest Attention and Scrutiny of Reason, he ought to exclude all Meta­phor and Hyperbole. For those Notions will deservedly be suspected of some Defect, which are usher'd in, or attended with Flights, not only out of the reach of common Sense, but which oppose the Expe­rience of Mankind; As all such do that have for Foundation the Crea­ture's being uncapable to procure us any good: There being none of them, perhaps, that we approach, which either does not, or may not, [Page 30]contribute to our Good, or Ill; And which truly are not in Effect al­low'd to do so, by those who deny them to be Efficient Causes. For it will be found to amount to the same thing in regard of us, and our Ob­ligation to desire them, whether they are Efficient, or Occasional Causes, of our pleasing Sensations: The proof of which last Opinion, (taken from their own Ignorance of any other way to explain the Nature of our Ideas, and Perceptions) They can hardly feel the force of; Without having a great Opinion of their own Faculties, or a very small one of the Power, and Wisdom of God. And they must also be very clear sighted, if they can discern how this Hypothesis of seeing all things in God, helps us one jot further in the Knowledge of our Ideas, and Per­ceptions; which is the thing it was Primarily pretended to be design'd for. They who advance this No­tion, do only fetch a Circuit, and then return where they were before, [Page 31]without gaining any advantage, by Derogating (as they do) from the Wisdom of God, in framing his Creatures like the Idols of the Hea­then, that have Eyes, and see not; Ears, and hear not, &c.

But we are only now concern'd, to inquire of what Use this Opi­nion is in Morality; That any one should be zealous in asserting it on that account.

The Creatures they say are occa­sional Causes of our pleasing Sensa­tions. Then, however, they are Causes of them. They deny not also, That they are such Causes as are always accompanied with the Effect, and without which the Effect is not produced. And are they not then consider'd as Goods to us, just the same as if they were efficient Causes? Or must we think a beautiful Flower has not the same Appearance, whether it be believ'd that God has lodg'd a power in the Flower to ex­cite the Idea of its Colour in us, or that he himself exhibits the Idea of [Page 32]its Colour at the presence of that Object? If the Flower is either way equally pleasing (as certainly it is) then it is also equally desireable. But the Wisdom of God cannot herein be equally admired, because it is not equally conspicuous. For if God immediately exhibits to me all my Idea's, and that I do not truly see with my Eyes, and hear with my Ears; then all that wonderful Ex­actness and curious Workmanship, in framing the Organs of Sense, seems superfluous and vain; Which is no small Reflection upon infinite Wisdom.

We are moreover told, That the whole of our Duty, and Happiness, consists in making God the sole Ob­ject of our Desires; The least spark of which sacred Fire cannot light upon the Creatures, without so far defrauding him: And that the Reason of this Duty is, because the Creatures are not the efficient Causes of our Sensa­tions. If this be so, this seems also to lay an Imputation upon the Wisdom [Page 33]and Goodness of God, who has laid the Foundation of our Duty in a Rea­son which he has concealed from us. For this great Cause why we should love him alone, ( viz. because the Crea­tures are not the efficient Causes of our Sensations) is so hidden from us by all the Art, and Contrivance, observa­ble in Nature, that if it were pur­posely design'd to be conceal'd, and we purposely intended to be misled, it could not be more so. For in Effect till this last Age, it has not been discover'd; Or at least very sparingly; And even still (as it seems) only Heads cast in Metaphysical Moulds are capable of it. This, I say, one would think were some Refle­ction upon the Divine Wisdom; Yet no less than this is said. For the whole of our Duty is placed in a right Re­gulation of our Love: The whole of that Regulation in making God the sole Object of our Desires; And having only Charity, or Benevo­lence, for his Creatures. And this Distribution is grounded on no clear [Page 34]Text of Scripture; Nor on other Foundation from Reason, than this only, That the Creatures are not the efficient Causes of our pleasing Sen­sations.

Indeed, sometimes, the Severity of some Precepts of Morality may well be thought to have been a hin­drance to the Discovery of their Truth; And this of Centring all our Affections upon God, and not per­mitting the least part of our Desires to run out after sensible Goods, car­ries at first Sight, a specious Pre­tence of being of that Nature. And doubtless, with many plain, well-meaning People, (who understood not the Metaphysical Ground of it, But endeavour'd to practise it with­out pretending to prove it) it tended to great Austerities; sometimes per­haps Useful; but most commonly Superstitious, and Pernicious to true Religion. But a late Teacher of this Doctrine, tho' he has advanced the Theory, is more favourable in the practical part, than to recommend [Page 35]by it any such Popish Mortifications and Severities: And he, with great Reason, seems to believe, that the good things of this World were gi­ven to be enjoyed by us. No Crea­ture he says, indeed, can be Loved, or Desired, without Defrauding God, and even committing the Sin of Ido­latry, Vol. III. Practical Discourse, p. 62.67. Consequently therefore, there can be no more hateful Sin to the Almighty than (feeling Cold, or Hunger) to desire Fire, or Food, as any good to us: But he tells us at the same time, That tho' the things which satisfie these Natural Cra­vings are by no means to be desired as Goods; Yet they may be securely sought for as such, and enjoyed, p. 73, 74. He whose Head is cast in a Me­taphysical Mould has, it may be, Privileges of Nature which accom­pany it, that ordinary Mortals are Strangers to; Who tho' they can conceive indeed a thing to be lov'd without being sought, or to be sought without being lov'd; Yet from [Page 36]the Frailty of their own Constitu­tions will scarce ever be perswaded in Fact that they, and this Author, being thoroughly Cold, seek for Fire, upon different Motives; Or will think that He being truly Hungry, seeks Food only upon a prudential Ac­count, and not out of any Desire that he has to the Meat; Should he tell them ever so much, That the Mind of Man, conscious of its own Digni­ty, and Innate Nobleness, ought not to debase it self to such mean Af­fections, as the Love of any Crea­ture: The Creatures being no more ca­pable to please any Faculty than to Create it; And therefore have no Pre­tence to the least Interest in our Love, Prac. D. p. 59. And it will even not be easie for him to perswade them, That he does not, in this, vi­lifie the Wisdom of his Creator, and reproach God for not having made him as he ought to have done. For Men are very seldom talk'd out of their Senses. And if they should not want the Charity to believe him [Page 37]sincere; they will yet also be very ready to conclude him unacquainted with the World, and Humane Na­ture, to judge of that of others by his own extraordinary, and Metaphy­sical Constitution.

But the Words of the Text, Matt. xxij. 37. Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy Heart, with all thy Soul, and with all thy Mind, he says, will admit of no other good Inter­pretation than that God is solely, and only, to be Loved: Since with no to­lerable Sense he can be said to Love God with all his Soul, and all his Mind, that only loves him above other things; Allowing other things at the same time a share in his Love, p. 10. The highest Sense, he thinks, that is generally put upon these Words amounts to no more than this: That God is to be the Prime, and Principal, Object of our Love, and Delight: That we are to Love him in a superlative way above all other things whatsoever, so as to lose any Good, or suffer any Evil, rather than commit the least Sin against him: [Page 38]That we are always to preferr him in our Love, chusing to obey him rather than Man, and to please him rather than satisfie our own Will, and to en­joy him rather than any Worldy or Car­nal Pleasure, p. 5, 6. But this Inter­pretation, he thinks, exhausts not the Sense of the Commandment; since no Logick, or Grammar, can bear to call the Part, though the larger Part, the whole, p. 10. But it is not the Que­stion whether Logick, or Gram­mar, will bear calling the Part the whole; but whether every Text in Scripture is to be interpreted by his Logick, and Grammar: Or whether, in some Cases, Scripture does not accommodate it self to the fashion, and figurative ways of speaking usual amongst Men; Which when rightly, not literally understood, are not con­trary to Logick, and Grammar. This it is plain the Opinion of the Divines, and other Learned Men is, That the Scripture does so accommodate it self: Because they have interpreted this Text, and not this alone, but [Page 39]others also in such a Sense. And therefore if he would put any Stress upon this Argument, he must first show that those are mistaken who think that Scripture oftentimes speaks figuratively and popularly; which is so receiv'd an Opinion, that to oppose it as he does (or else says nothing to the Purpose) without gi­ving any reason at all, in this place, for so doing, seems to argue more Arrogancy than Impartiality in the search of Truth. Now if Scripture does sometimes accommodate it self to the ordinary ways of speaking amongst Men; Why should it not be thought to do so in this Text? Where­in the common Sense of Mankind opposes any other Meaning as possi­ble, than that which is familiar to us. For it cannot be deny'd, that, in every Language, nothing is more ordinary than to say we love a Person intirely, or with all our Hearts, when we love them very much; And yet better may this be said, if we love them above all others. And as we mean [Page 40]no more than one of these two things, by these Expressions, so we design not to be understood otherwise: And this is so well known, that we are also never mistaken in them.

But it is yet more evident, that this Text is to be understood in the familiar Sense of the Words; If it be remembred that they are the In­junction of a Law-Maker ( Deut. vi. 5. from whence our Saviour cites them) to a Rude, and Illiterate Peo­ple. Now the Duty that these Words injoins, Mr. N. himself confesses, can­not be carried higher than the Inter­preters have carried it (viz. to Love God supremely, and above all things) without building in the Air; Unless his Hypothesis be received: Which unless he will say Moses delivered al­so to the Israelites, he makes him an admirable Lawgiver, to deliver to his People the most Essential of all his Laws, so as it was not, or cannot be thought, likely that one of a Hundred, if at least any one amongst them, did understand it. For I suppose it will [Page 41]not be deny'd by Mr. N. That though by the Parturiency of his own Mind, he very early light upon this Notion, and was not (as the World imagines he was) beholden to Pere Malbranche for it; That the Israelites generally were not so speculative, and philoso­phical as he, in their Natural Ge­nius; And yet less, that they either Cultivated any such Speculations in the time of Moses; Or had any Tra­dition, or receiv'd Opinion amongst them, That the Creatures were not Efficient, but Occasional Causes of their Pleasing Sensations; by which they might be enabled to understand this Command concerning loving God. not in the familiar, and conceivable Sense of the Words, but in Mr. N's Logical, and Grammatical, though otherwise Inconceivable Sense of them.

But besides that Lawgivers al­ways give their Laws in the most fa­miliar manner they can; The Incon­ceivableness also of Mr. N's Sense of the Words as a Moral Rule, is a suffi­cient [Page 42]reason in it self why Moses should not be understood according to his Explanation; Which puts a Mean­ing upon the Command that is ap­parently, and plainly impracticable: viz. That God is so wholly to be loved, that it is defrauding Him, to place the least Degree of our Love upon the Creatures; And that there­fore, though they may be sought and injoyed by us as Goods, yet they cannot be desired by us as such, with­out Sin. This Inconceivableness of any other Sense, that could (by his Auditors at least) be put upon his Words; might, I doubt not, in any other Case, plead Moses's Excuse to Mr. N. himself, for having thus transgress'd, as he thinks, against Lo­gick and Grammar, whilst he ex­press'd himself in a way, that may well be suppos'd to have been as fa­miliar and usual then, as it is now. It is to be hoped, that to many others he will not need excuse in this, wherein, (with what has a Natural Connexion, and is accordingly, out [Page 43]of Moses, joined to it by our Savi­our) he has so well comprehended the Duty of Mankind, that Christ says, This do, and thou shalt live: That is, Love the Lord thy God with all thy Soul, with all thy Heart, with all thy Mind, and with all thy Strength: And thy Neighbour as thy self.

These Commands have no Ob­scurity, or Difficulty at all to be un­derstood, if we have honest Hearts, and Heads not possess'd with an Hy­pothesis which every thing must be made to chime to. For to love any thing with all our Hearts, is in its known and usual Signification, to love it a dently. Moses joins to lo­ving God with all our Hearts, loving him also, with all our Souls, and all our Minds; That is, with all the Faculties of our reasonable Nature. And by this, we are taught not only to love him very ardently, but above all other things; As being our Creator, and great Benefactor, upon whom we depend every Moment, and from whom we receive all the [Page 44]Good that we injoy, and from whose Bounty we expect all that we hope for; As also, as being every way in himself infinitely (beyond all De­grees of Comparison) a Being the most lovely. Foolish Men (too fre­quent Experience shows) love ar­dently oftentimes, without conside­ring whether the Object of their Love be worthy of it. But to love with the Mind and the Soul, as well as the Heart, is not to love so; but to love with the Understanding, Ra­tionally, as well as Passionately. And we cannot Love God with our Souls and with our Mind, that is, with the Application of our Understandings, and with a reasonable Love, without loving him above all his Creatures; Because he is infinitely more lovely; And every ones reason, when he con­sults it, must always assent that he is so.

The Duty then that we are taught is plainly what reason requires, viz. That we love the most lovely Being above all others; And that all the [Page 45]Powers, and Faculties of our Mind, consent in this Preference of him: That we think of him (as well as we are able) as he is; and pay the high­est Tribute of Affection, and Adora­tion, to him that our Natures are ca­pable of. This is also plainly Practi­cable, and what we may know whe­ther we perform or no, by asking our selves, whether we are willing to part with any other Good for the Sake of this; (as Father, Mother, Husband, Wife, or Children, & c.) Which our Saviour tells us, whoever is not ready to part with for his Sake is not worthy of him; But that whosoever parts with any of these for the Gospel's Sake, shall receive manifold Reward, both in this Life, and in the World to come. Now if none of these were allow'd to be de­sirable to us, but to be only Objects of our Charity (as Mr. N. says they ought to be) Why should we deserve so great Reward for forsaking of them for God's Sake? And why should our Saviour, as he plainly does, con­firm [Page 46]the Desireableness of these things to us, if they were not in some Degree allow'd to be desired?

But Mr. N. says, we are command­ed to Love our Neighbour, as our selves; And that it being plain, that we do not love our selves with a Love of Desire, therefore it is plain that we ought not to love our Neigh­bour so.

Moses, in Levit. xix. from whence the above cited Text is taken, ha­ving rehears'd divers other Laws to the People, comes to tell them what they owe to their Neighbour; which he does from the 13 to the 18th. Verse; with which he thus concludes: Thou shalt not avenge, nor bear any grudge against the Children of thy People. But thou shalt love thy Neighbour as thy self. The Sense of these Words could not be mistaken by any one who was not prepossess'd with an Hypothesis, which he was willing to support from Scripture Authority. For Moses having told the People, That they should not de­fraud [Page 47]their Neighbour; That they should not mock at his Infirmities: That they should not oppress him; But judge in Righteousness, not respecting the Person of the Poor or the Rich; That they should not only not stand against the Blood of their Neighbour; But also, not hate him in their Heart; And further, That they should not only take care of his Temporal Wellfare, but also of his Spiritual; By rebuking him when he sins; And likewise, be so far from avenging themselves when injured by him, that they should not so much as bear a Grudge against him; He concludes all with that which ought to be the Spring from which all these good Offices to our Neighbour should proceed; and which in short, fully teaches us the Extent of our Duty to him: Thou shalt Love thy Neighbour as thy self. That is, plainly, That as we love our selves; and from that Principle of Love, do good to our selves; so we should also love our Neighbour, and from that Principle [Page 48]of Love to him, should do him all the good that we can: Not only barely performing towards him the outward Acts of those Duties here injoined, or any other; But per­forming them upon the same Prin­ciples of Delight, and Complaisance in his well being which we have in our own; Without which, all our Performances will be defective.

We must here consider, Moses speaking either as a Lawgiver, or as a Philosopher. If as the First, then without doubt he must be thought to have spoke so, as the People whom he spoke to could the easiliest apprehend him. And the whole Scope of his Discourse, makes the above-mentioned Sense of his Words plainly the most obvious meaning of them, viz. That as People love themselves, and upon that Principle of Love do good to themselves; So also it is their Duty to love their Neighbour; without which, they cannot discharge what they owe to him. Neither could any other Sense [Page 49]be put upon the Words of Moses, Thou shalt Love thy Neighbour as thy self; Without the Learned Distin­ction of Love of Benevolence, and Love of Concupiscence; Which it is hard to believe, That Mr. N, or any one else can think many, if any, of the Israelites were acquainted with. Tho' if he could suppose they had been so, and that Moses himself had had Regard to it; and had also Philosophiz'd as ill as the People; I wonder Mr. N. should not see that it would yet make nothing to his purpose: Since Moses is not here tel­ling them all that they lawfully may do, but all that they necessa­rily must do, not to fail in their Duty.

But if Mr. N. had rather Moses should be consider'd here, speaking as a Philosopher, according to, (and instructing the People in) the true Nature of things; as well as laying down Precepts for them to obey; It is then more evident, That the Words of Moses will not only not [Page 50]comply with the Sense He puts upon them, but also that they are opposite to it. For Moses says, Thou shalt Love thy Neighbour as thy self: That is, thou shalt take the same Complaisance, in the Being, and well Being of thy Neighbour, as in thy own. Now it is manifestly im­possible, and contradictious, that we should rejoice, and take Complai­sance, in what is no way desireable to us: Or that we should not desire that in which we rejoice, and take Complaisance. The Being therefore, and well Being of our Neighbour; must necessarily be desireable to us; and we could not otherwise love him as our selves. For it is certain, That our own Being, and well Being, are desirable to us: (Who is there that does not desire the Continuation of them?) And therefore that there is no Love without Desire, any more than without Benevolence (as is ap­parent in our Love of God) so far as the Objects of our Love admits of both.

But Love simply, as is above said, is that Disposition, or Act, of the Mind, which we find in our selves towards any thing we are pleas'd with; and consists barely in that Disposition, or Act; And cannot be distinguish'd into different Acts of wishing well, or Benevolence; And Desiring: Which are other dif­ferent Acts of the Mind, exerted ac­cording to the different Objects of our Love. We desire to injoy in eve­ry thing, that in them which delights us: And we wish well to the Being of every thing that helps to make us happy. If their Being can be continued with our Injoyment of them; that Injoyment is also neces­sarily desired by us: It being impos­sible for any Creature not to Desire whatever appears to them to make a part of their Happiness.

But now whence is it that arises either those Wars, and Violences, that are in the World amongst Men one with another; or those Tumults and Perturbations, that too frequently [Page 52]spring up in their own Breasts, when all things without them are Serene, Peaceable, and Quiet? From Desire, it is true, all these Mis­chiefs proceed: And Desire is the inexhaustible Fountain of Folly, Sin, and Misery.

Is it not therefore worthy of our greatest Application, and Endea­vours, to free our selves from so Dangerous Evils? Without doubt it is so. And this has always been the Care of the Wife: Present, as well as Future Happiness, being concern'd in it.

But we are to enquire what remedy Religion gives us to this Disease? And that we are sure can be no other than Reason prescribes; which is to pro­portion [Page 53]our Desires to the worth of things: For where they go beyond that, we are certain to be disappoin­ted, whether we miss, or obtain, what we desire. But so far as the injoy­ment of things are in their real worth answerable to our Desires; so far we are really Happy: And should we always so succeed in a constant train of our Desires, we should, ac­cording to our Capacity, be per­fectly Happy.

We cannot conceive any Being to be without Desires but God. Nor can we conceive it to be a fault for any Creature to act suitable to its Na­ture; and desire things that can be injoy'd; and will contribute to its Happiness. This I am sure Holy Writ allows us: For the Apostle tells us, That God has given us all things richly to injoy. And Moses himself, (whatever Metaphysical Notions Mr. N. puts into him) tells the People of Israel, Deut. xxvi. 11. Thou shalt rejoice in every good thing which the Lord thy God has given to thee; Thou [Page 54]and the Levite, and the Stranger that is amongst you: Which was but sui­table to the Land of Promise, flow­ing with Milk, and Honey, proposed to the Desires of that whole People. And, I think, we may say, not one of the Six hundred Thousand would have marched through the Wilder­ness, had not Moses allow'd them to desire the good things of Canaan, but told them they must desire no­thing of the Creature. But our Er­rour, and Unhappiness is, that we do not regulate our Desires aright They are not under the Govern­ment, and Direction of our Reason, and Judgment; but lead these away Captive with them in their endless Chace after whatever strikes our Imaginations with any Pleasing Idea. The best Remedy for which that Reason can prescribe, is what Reli­gion has injoyn'd us; viz. an Ar­dent Love of God above all things. For our Desires placed upon this Ob­ject will not only never be disap­pointed; But also the Love of God [Page 55]above all other things, will the most effectually secure us from any immo­derate Love of any of his Crea­tures: Because the contrariety be­tween such a Love of God, and any sinful or inordinate Love of the Creature makes them inconsistent. If therefore the Love of God, and the Interests of another life, were constantly our Ruling and Predomi­nant Passion; If in this sense (as low as it seems to Mr. N.) we did Love God with all our Heart, with all our Soul, and with all our Strength; We should not only be secure of doing our Duty, but also make the best provision that we could for our Hap­piness even here in this World. For then the disappointments we might meet with in the Love of any thing else, would never indanger the foun­dations of our Satisfaction; which, like a House built upon a Rock, could not be mov'd by any Storms or Tempests of Fortune: And we might say, with Dr. H. More, [Page 56]

Which however it may look to some like a Religious Rant, is no more than in other instances we may find Experience to have made good the truth of. For even in the Love of the things of this World, very often, one Affection, or Desire, has so much the Possession of a Man's Heart, that all others (how natural a tendency soever he has to them) do but very weakly, and super­ficially affect him in their Success, or Miscarriage: And this no Man that is either very Ambitious; very Co­vetous; very much in Love; or pos­sess'd strongly with any other Passion; can deny to be so.

The Love of God therefore as we are capable of loving him, (that is, chiefly, not solely) does effectually secure our Happiness, and conse­quently our Duty: For he desires nothing of us, but that we should be as Happy as he has made us capable of Being; And has laid no Traps, or Snares, to render us Miserable; Nor does he require impossible Per­formances from us. Yet it is true nevertheless, that the constant Com­munication that we have with sensi­ble Objects, which are apt too far to ingage our Affections, makes the Regulation of our Desires to demand our greatest Care, and Watchfulness: And too much can never be said of the Necessity of this Duty, which in general consists in desiring every thing according to its worth: And the Objects of our Desires are either Things of Temporal concern only, or of Eternal also; between which, as there cannot be in themselves, so therefore there ought not to be in our Estimation, any Comparison.

Of things Temporal which are the Objects of our Desires, They are either such as are so, from Wants of Nature; or Wants of our own making. For it is certain, That Cu­stom, and Education (to which we owe most of the Mischiefs we suffer, and usually charge upon Nature) have procur'd us very many Wants which She intended us not; And which therefore accordingly vary in different Countries, and Ages of the World: And these Wants are very many more (especially in the Civiliz'd Nations as we call them) than the Wants of Nature; viz.

They are wise who indeavour to contract their Desires to the last: But whoever says the Denial of what Nature requires, ought not to be esteem'd an Unhappiness, talks like a Disciple of Chr [...], and not of Jesus Christ; W [...] [...]llowers are so [Page 59]often exhorted to do good to all Men: Which, at least a chief part of it, consists in removing the Pains and Miseries they suffer from their Natural Wants, and Necessities: And This great part of Charity must be perform'd according to that Rule of the Apostle, Heb. xiii. 16. To do good and to communicate forget not, for with such Sacrifice God is well pleased.

And altho' when the want of those things which Nature requires, comes in competition with any good of Eternal Concernment, they may well be thought light, and be slighted in that Comparison; yet in themselves they cannot, nor ought to be so. And our Master himself, thought thus; When for the Joy that was set before him he indured the Cross, &c. But tho' it be a great part of Wisdom to contract our Desire, only to what Nature requires; Yet, as we must not seek the Satisfaction of our Na­tural Appetites, when it cannot be obtain'd without prejudice to some [Page 60]Duty which ought at that time to be preferr'd; So the gratification of Ap­petites which are not properly Na­tural, but which we have receiv'd from Custom, and Education, is not always Sinful. For besides that Cu­stom (which it may be was none of our fault) is oftentimes as strong as Nature in us; Those acquired Appe­tites are also many times no ways prejudicial to what we owe either to God, or our Neighbour; And where they are not so, their Gratification cannot be Sinful. Our Saviour, who said, This do, and thou shalt Live; assures us, That he who heartily loves God, and his Neighbour as himself, can make no mistake in his Duty dan­gerous to his Salvation: And those Mistakes which are so, only to our happy living whilst here; are suffi­ciently punish'd in the disappoint­ment they carry along with them. It is not therefore hard for a Man, if he be sincere, to know when his Desires are rightly regulated: And he will need no Casuist besides him­self, [Page 61]to tell him what, and how far, he may lawfully Love, or Desire; and what or how far he may not do so. Loves he any thing in the World to the prejudice of his Love of God, or his Neighbour; it is Sinful: Does he not do so, there is no Sin. To oppose this, would be to contra­dict those words of our Saviour. And indeed these two great Duties of the Love of God, and our Neigh­bour, imply or include each other. If, says the Apostle, (1 John iv. 20.) a man say, I love God, and hateth his Brother, he is a Liar; And v. 12. If we love one another, God dwelleth in us, and the Love of God is perfe­cted in us. Again, v. 7. Let us love one another, every one that loveth is born of God, and knoweth God: v. 8. He that loves not, knoweth not God: Chap. iii. 17. But who so has this Worlds Goods, and seeth his Brother have need, and shutteth up his Bowels of Compassion from him, how dwelleth the Love of God in him?

God is an invisible Being: And it is by his Works, that we are led both to know, and to love him. They lead us to their invisible Au­thor. And if we lov'd not the Crea­tures, it is not conceiveable how we should love God; at least, how they shuld have lov'd him, who not ha­ving the Law, yet did by Nature the things contain'd in the Law. And this, however opposite to what some tell us, seems nevertheless the sense of the above-named Apostle, who says (1 John iv. 20.) He that loveth not his Brother whom he has seen, how can he love God whom he has not seen? And I would demand of any one if they could suppose them­selves, or any other, never to have loved any Creature, what they could imagine they should love? I suppose it must be reply'd by such a one, That as he was not the Author of his own Being, and saw clearly that he could not be produced by nothing; He was thereby led to the Acknowledg­ment of a Superiour Being, to whom [Page 63]he was indebted for his own; and therefore stood obliged to love him. But Being, or Existence, barely con­sider'd, is so far from being a Good, that in the state of the Damn'd, few are so Paradoxical as not to believe it an intolerable Misery: And many, even in this World, are so unhappy, that they would much rather part with their Existence, than be eter­nally continued in the State they are in. The Author of our Being there­fore merits not our Love, unless he has given to us such a Being as we can Love. Now if none of the Ob­jects that every way surround us, were pleasing to us; How could our Beings, that have a continual Com­munication with, and necessary De­pendance upon these, be so?

But if the Objects that surround us do please us; that is, if we do love them; As it is then evident, they must be the first Objects of our Love, so from their Gratefulness, or Pleasingness to us, it is also evident, that we have both the Idea of Love, [Page 64]and are led to the Discovery of the Author of that Being, that produces what is lovely. And like as our own Existence, and that of other Beings, has assur'd us of the Existence of some Cause more Powerful than these Effects; so also the Loveliness of his Works as well assures us, that that Cause, or Author, is yet more Lovely than they, and consequently the Object the most worthy of our Love. But if none of those Beings which surround us did move our Love, we should then both be igno­rant of the Nature of the Author of all things, and of Love it self. For what should then exert it, that it should not lie for ever Dormant? And which way could we (in the state we are in) receive the Idea of Love, or Lovely? For God as Pow­erful (which is all we should know of him, consider'd barely as a Cre­ator) is no more an Object of Love than of Hate, or Fear; and is truly an Object only of Admiration. It seems therefore plain, that if any [Page 65]could be without the Love of the Creatures, they would be without the Love of God also: For as by the Existence of the Creatures, we come to know there is a Creator; so by their Loveliness it is that we come to know That of their Author, and to Love him.

But it will be said here, That we have Pleasing Sensations ('tis true) as soon as Perception; But that we have them not from the Beings which surround us, but from God. I ask, can we know this, before we know that there is a God? Or, will they say that we know there is a God as soon as ever we have Per­ception? Let it be true, that the Creatures have receiv'd no efficiency from God to excite pleasing Sensa­tions in us, and are but the occasional Causes of those we feel: Yet, does a Child in the Cradle know this? Or is this apparent so soon as it is that the Fire pleases us when we are Cold? or Meat when we are Hun­gry? No, nor is it at any time a [Page 66]self evident Truth. We must know many other Truths before we come to know this; which is a Proposi­tion containing many complex Ideas in it; and which we are not capable of framing, till we have been long acquainted with pleasing Sensations. In the mean while, it is certain, that till we can make this Discovery, we shall necessarily Love that which ap­pears to us to be the Cause of our Pleasure, as much as if it really were so; It being unavoidably by us the same thing to us: And we are ne­cessitated by God himself to that which Mr. N. says is truly Idolatry. For our Passions are not moved by the reality, but appearance of things. To the prevention of which, this Notion were it true, and receiv'd amongst Men as such, could be of no use at all, neither could it teach them not to ascend to the Love of God, by the Love of Creatures: Since it can be of use to none till they are convinc'd of it, and none are capable of being convinc'd of it, [Page 67]till sensible Objects by appearing the Causes of their Pleasing Sensations, have gotten Possession of their Love, and have as soon assur'd them that God is the Object the most worthy of their Love, as they have assured them of his Existence. It is true, when first in our infancy we feel pleasing Sensations, we are no more capable of being taught by them that there is a Superiour Invisible Being that made these things to affect us thus, who therefore ought supreamly to be lov'd; than that this Invisible Be­ing, at the Presence of these Objects, exhibits to us a part of his own Es­sence, by which these Pleasing Sen­sations are excited on occasion of those Objects without us, and that therefore he is only and solely to be loved. But tho' we are uncapable of these both alike, when first we cry for the Fire, or the Sucking-Bottle; Yet it is certain, that by the former way we are not only safe, all the time of our Ignorance, from the Sin of Idolatry, and the fatal pre-ingage­ment [Page 68]of a sinful affection; but that our love to God upon that ground is of easier deduction, and earlier ap­prehended than by the latter. So soon as we do begin to leave off judging by appearances, and are Ca­pable of being convinc'd that the Diameter of the Sun exceeds that of a Bushel; We are capable also of un­derstanding that there is a Superiour Invisible Being, the Author of those things which afford us pleasing Sen­sations, who therefore is supreamly to be loved. But if we are not ca­pable of scaping Idolatry unless we love God alone, because he imme­diately exhibits to us a part of his Essence, by which all pleasing Sen­sations are caus'd in us, I fear all Mankind (before this present Age) lived and died Idolaters, and the greatest part for the future will do so; Since I guess not One of a Thou­sand will be found capable of appre­hending, and being convinced of this new Hypothesis of seeing all things in God. And as, I think, this cannot [Page 69]be denied, so is it also more suitable to the Wisdom, and Goodness of God, that it should be true. For one must say, that the Happiness and Welfare of Mankind were ill taken care for, if it depended upon a Knowledge, which not only few are ever likely to have, but which comes too late to any for much Use to be made of it. For when sensible Ideas have ta­ken Possession of us for Twelve, or Twenty Years, they must be very ignorant of the constitution of Hu­mane Nature, that can think it pos­sible they should presently, or pro­bably they should ever, be dispossess'd by a Notion, altho' a true one.

And for this, Mr. N. is not so kind as to furnish us with any re­medy. But he whom he is suppos'd to have receiv'd this Hypothesis from, indeavours to solve the Good­ness and Wisdom of God in this Matter, and to help us out of this Difficulty, by making this Principle of our being obliged to have no Love for the Creatures, to be the very [Page 70]Ground upon which Christianity stands; Which he thus, in short, accounts for.

We must not Desire, or Love the Creatures, they being uncapable to be our Good. We yet do Love, and desire them, tho' Reason assures us of This. And our Doing thus, is the Original Sin which we bring in­to the World with us: Which makes us Children of Wrath, and liable to Damnation; Unable to please God but by a Mediator, both God and Man, who only could atone the Justice of God by the Excellency of his Sacrifice; Intercede to God by the Dignity of his Priesthood; and send us the Holy Ghost by the qua­lity of his Person.

But as this Ground of Christianity has a weak Foundation, viz. The Creature's being only occasional Causes of our Pleasing Sensations, (which is neither proved, nor would support the Superstructure that is rais'd upon it, if it could be proved) So it is to be hoped, that if we re­ject [Page 71]what so few have receiv'd, or so much as thought of, we may yet be good Christians. And those seem more than a little to indanger Chri­stianity, if not Deism also, who lay the great stress of their proof upon the Hypothesis of seeing all things in God. For in that, the whole Ar­gument for both (by which Atheists or Sceptics are propos'd to be brought over to Deism, or Christia­nity) terminates; in the Conversations Chrestiennes of Mr. Malebranche, lately Translated into English, for the in­troducing amongst us that Unintel­ligible way of Practical Religion, a­bove spoken of. And I doubt not, but if it were generally receiv'd and Preach'd by our Divines, that this Opinion of Seeing all things in God was the Basis upon which Chri­stianity was built, Scepticism would be so far from finding thereby a Cure, that it would spread it self much farther amongst us than it has yet done; And that many who find Christianity a very Reasonable Re­ligion [Page 72]in the Scriptures, would think it a very unaccountable one in a Sy­stem that (laying down That for its foundation) adds also further, That the Desire we have to the Creature, is the Punishment of Sin, not the Institution of Nature: For this Con­cupiscence is transmitted to us from our first Parent. ‘Qui voyoit claire­ment Dieu en toutes choses: Il sça­voit avec evidence, que les Corps ne pouvoient estre son bien, ni le rendre par eux mêmes heureux ou Malheu­reux en aucune maniére: Il estoit convaincu de l'opération continuelle de Dieu sur luy; Mais sa Conviction n'estoit pas sensible. Il le connoissoit sans le sentir. Au contraire il sen­toit que les Corps agissoient sur lui, quoy qu'il ne le connût pas. Il est vrai qu'estant raisonnable, il devoit suivre sa lumiére, et non pas son sen­timent; & qu'il pouvoit facilement suivre sa lumiére contre son senti­ment, sa connoisance claire contre sa sensation confuse, parce qu'il arrestoit sans peine ses sentimens, lors-qu'il le [Page 73]vouloit, à cause qu'il étoit sans con­cupiscence. Cependant s'arrêtant trop à ses sens, se laissant aller peu-à-peu à les écouter plus volontiers que Dieu même, à cause que les sens parlent toûjours agréablement, et que Dieu ne le portoit pas à l'écouter par des plaisirs prévenans qui au­roient diminué sa Liberté; vous concevez bien comment il à pû s'é­loigner de Dieu jusqu'à le perdre de vûe, pour s'unir de volonté à une Creatùre, Entr. iv. p. 106, 107.’ Who did clearly see God in all things, and evidently knew that Bodies could not be his true Good, nor properly make him in the least happy, or unhappy, and was fully convinc'd of God's continual Operation on him. But he had no sen­sible conviction: He knew this, but with­out feeling it. On the contrary, he could feel that Bodies acted on him, tho' he could not know it: Yet having Reason, he should have follow'd his Light, not his Sentiment; And could have done it; since he could stop his Sentiment when he pleas'd, being free [Page 74]from Concupiscence: However defer­ring to his senses, and suffering him­self to hearken to them more willingly than to God, by reason the senses al­ways move pleasingly, and God did not move him by pre-ingageing Pleasure, which might have lessen'd his freedom, it is easie to conceive how he came to remove himself so far from God as to lose sight of him, and to joyn himself to the Creature. The same Author also gives us an account how Adam's Posterity came to be infected; (which, it seems, was not from Adam, as is commonly taught, but from Eve) ‘à cause de l'union que les enfans ont avec leur mere, p. 110.’ By reason of the Union that Children have with their Mother. ‘Il n'y a point de fem­me qui n'ait dans le cerveau quelque trace & quelque movement d'esprits, qui la sasse penser, et qui la porte à quelque chose de sensible. Or quand l'enfant est dans le sein de sa mere, il a les mêmes traces et les mêmes émotions d'esprits que sa mere; donc en cet état il connoît et aime les [Page 75]corps, p. 111.’ And there is no Wo­man that has not some traces in her Brain, and motions of her Spirits, which carry her to something sensible. Now when the Child is in the Womb of its Mother, it has the same traces, and the same motion of the Spirits: Therefore in this estate it knows and loves Bodies, and consequently is born a Sinner. And this no holiness of the Mother can hinder; Since ‘L'amour de Dieu ne se communique pas comme l'amour des Corps: Dont la raison est, que Dieu n'est pas sensible, et qu'il n'y a point de traces dans le Cerveau, qui par l'in­stitution de la Nature representent Dieu, ni aucune des choses qui sont purement intelligibles.’

‘Une femme peut bien se represen­ter Dieu sous la forme d'un Vene­rable Vieillard: Mais lors qu'elle pen­sera à Dieu; son enfant pensera à un Vieillard: Lors qu'elle aimera Dieu, son enfant aura de l'amour pour les Vieillards, p. 112, 113.’ The Love of God does not communicate it [Page 76]self like the love of Bodies; Of which the reason is, that God is not sensible, and there are no Vestiges in the Brain, which by the institution of Nature re­present God, or anything that is purely intelligible.

So that the Children of Women who represent to themselves God in the form of a Reverend old Man, will love Old Men: And whenever the Mo­thers think upon God and love God, the Children will think upon Old Men and love Old Men. Wherefore from this Original Corruption, springs the Ne­cessity of a Mediator, who must be both God and Man, &c.

There seems to be some things in this Hypothesis very unintelligible; And also that it has Consequences in­tolerable to be admitted. But if neither of these were so; 'tis yet reason enough not to imbrace it, that it is no where either reveal'd, or prov'd; it being all but a Chain of Consequences (such as they are) de­pending upon the Supposition of our seeing all things in God. For the De­sire [Page 77]we have to the Creatures, is asserted to be the Punishment of Sin, not the Institution of Nature, because (which is a strange Reason) the De­sire of the Creatures is suppos'd Sin­ful, upon the ground of their not being the Efficient Causes of our Pleasing Sensations. And the Proof which is brought that they are not the Efficient Causes of our Pleasing Sensations is, that we see all things in God. But this Proof it self which is the Foundation of all, remains yet to be proved: For neither Pere Male­branche, nor any one else has done it; nor I think can do it. And that which might alone give just ground for this Suspicion is, That this Hy­pothesis tends to the shaking and un­settling the known Grounds of True Piety; tho' He, and a late Follower of his, would establish it upon this new, and formerly unknown Foun­dation.

But setting aside those Absurdities that this new Conceit would run us into, in Morality (which are sufficient [Page 78]Reasons for rejecting it) there are, I doubt not, some, who, if they would be at the Pains to treat it Philoso­phically, might be able to demon­strate its Weakness and Inconsistency on other Grounds, as well as those of Morality. But whether, or no, any one shall believe That a Work worth their while; This Hypothesis seems, yet at least, of moment enough to be so far inquired into, as these Papers have Undertaken: Since how unserviceable or injurious soever it really is to Piety, it has yet been Seriously and Zealously pretended to be of great Use to Religion; And that not only by a young Writer, whose Judgment may, perhaps, be thought By assed by the Affectation of Novelty; But also it is made the very Ground of Christianity, by a Man of an establish'd Character in the World for Philosophical Science. But as Christianity (whatever some are per­swaded) is a rational Religion, and needs no Inventions of Men to sup­port it; so it receives no Advantage [Page 79]by this, which it has not in the Or­thodox, and commonly receiv'd Do­ctrine of Original Sin. That serves to all the purposes this is brought in for, as well; and therefore makes this Needless; Unless it be pretended that the Opinion of Seeing all things in God, &c. is needful to give Light to, and to make the commonly receiv'd Doctrine of Original Sin intelligible; Which is, to charge this Doctrine with having wanted such Evidence before this Discovery was made, as was necessary for the making it the Foundation of Christian Religion: Which surely those cannot agree to who have made it so. And those who have not made it so, will not be concern'd in the Light pretended to be brought to it; The thing it self being no more prov'd by this Ex­planation of the manner of it, than it was before. Upon which of these two accounts, or whatever other, Mr. N. declin'd, or approv'd not the declaring this Opinion of the Creatures not being Efficient Causes [Page 80]of our Sensations, &c. to be the Ground and Basis of Christianity; Yet certainly his Subject (especially being Preached to a Country Con­gregation) obliged him, if not to ac­count for the Goodness of God in this Matter, in making us without any fault of ours, the Subjects of his Wrath; yet at least to have show'd which way we were to be brought out of that State, and by what means after we were come to the Know­ledge of the Truth, we should be made obedient to it. For if (as it is to be hoped he does) he believes God to wink at our Sins in the time of our Ignorance, before we are capable of understanding the Creatures to be only Occasional Causes of our Plea­sing Sensations; Yet we must sup­pose when Men are convinced of that Truth, they are call'd on not only to Repentance, but Amendment. And if Loving the Creatures so, as yet to be willing readily to part with them all for the Love of God, or ra­ther than offend in any thing that [Page 81]we know to be our Duty, (which is the highest Love of him that most People can conceive themselves ca­pable of,) will not hinder us from being truely Idolaters, and Sacrile­gious; Whilst being Hungry or Cold, Food or Fire are desired by us; And that we cannot Love our Children, or Friends, without looking on them as Goods Desireable to us; Me­thinks he should tell us by what means we may get rid of Appetites and Affections so offensive to God, and destructive to our Soul's Happi­ness; and should let us know whe­ther he finds this attainable by our own Natural Abilities, or whether Christ has Purchas'd the Ability of doing it for those that believe in him; Or what we are to do, or con­ceive of our selves in an Estate so deplorable. He says indeed, That could we but see how God alone acts in us, and Causes all our Sensations, whilst the Creatures stand mute and silent, like so many Ciphers in his Presence, having not the least Activity or Ope­ration [Page 82]upon us; We should quickly dis­miss the whole Creation from our Hearts, and be wholly swallow'd up by the Love of God. But as the case is, he gives us no Remedy at all. For his making no question afterwards, but that it is thus in Heaven, and that this is the Measure of Divine Love There, is so far from helping us; That it will not so much as infer (if he could prove it were so) that this ought to be the Measure of Divine Love upon Earth. But we have a better Authority than his for it, That we know not what we shall be There; Therefore cannot tell what may be added to, or chang'd in our present Faculties: And as for those of An­gels, and Arch-Angels, (which he mentions) we are yet less acquain­ted with them: And every one will not be convinc'd (tho' they did agree in Mr. N—'s Supposition concerning them) that it were more reasonable to propose or pray to be like them (at least whilst upon Earth) then it would be for the Fishes (if they were [Page 83]capable of it) to propose, or pray to God, that they might fly in the Air like Birds; or Ride Post-Horses as Men do. For it may be our Earthly Element no more admits of the first, than theirs of the last. And those must be very little considerate or se­rious in their Prayers, who will ven­ture to ask God for their sakes, to change the Order of Nature, which he has establish'd. It is certain, that if we had no Desires but after God, the several Societies of Mankind could not long hold together, nor the very Species be continued: For few would give themselves Care, and Sorrow, in the pursuit of Possessions not desireable.

But Mr. N. pretends that there are places of Scripture, besides that of his Text, which make good his Opi­nion. Scripture-Authority, is that to which Reason may safely refer it self: But it were to be wished that it were appeal'd to with more Care and Consideration than it often is; and that Men would not presently, [Page 84]because perhaps they are perswaded their Opinions are Right, back them with any Text of Scripture that they can make Chime to them, tho' they be very little, or not at all to the Purpose; as they could not often­times but discern, if they would but either regard the Scope of the Dis­course; or read to the end of it.

The first Text Mr. N. brings for his purpose, is Mat. vi. 24. No Man can serve two Masters; for either he will hate the one, and love the other; or else he will hold to the one, and de­spise the other; ye cannot serve God and Mammon. Here, Mr. N. says, We are plainly told, we cannot divide be­tween God, and the Creature: and the reason is not only because our Capacities are too narrow and scanty to be em­ploy'd upon two such vastly different Objects; but also because we cannot love either of them, but upon such a Principle as must utterly exclude the Love of the other. For we must not love any thing but what is our true Good, what can both deserve and re­ward [Page 85]our Love: And there can be but one thing that is so, and that must either be God or the Creature. If then the Creature be our Good, let us Love That, and that only; That, and not God: But if God be our True Good (as most certainly he is) then let us Love God, and God only; God, and not the Creature: For 'tis a most incon­sistent and impracticable thing to talk of Carving out our Love between both: Ye cannot serve God and Mammon. Practical Discourse, p. 64, 65. By Mammon, I suppose was never un­derstood before, any thing but Ri­ches, or those things for which Ri­ches are desired: And our Saviour here tells us, we must not set our Hearts upon these things, or make our selves Slaves, or Servants to them: That is, the Desire of them must not command us; If we com­mand it, and make it Obedient to Reason, it is then certain it does not command us, and consequently that we are not Servants to it. This is then plainly no more, but that our [Page 86]Desires after Riches, &c. must not be beyond their Worth; So as that we forget they are perishable, and uncertain Goods, such as Moth and Rust do corrupt, and the Violence and Injustice of Men may deprive us of; No longer (at best) of any value, than during our short abode in this World. For, if we do otherwise, our Reason is captivated, and we be­come truly Servants; The Servants of Mammon; And cannot be the Servants of God; Because we cannot Serve two so opposite and differing Masters. For it is from the contra­riety of their Commands, and not from the littleness of our Minds, or Capacities, that we cannot Serve God and Mammon; Since neither little nor great can obey two Masters that command Contraries; And that is true of the Apostle, His Servants ye are, to whom you obey. But our Minds, as little as they are, may love God, and the Creature; when the Love of the Creature is Sub­ordinate; And I think Mr. N. nor no [Page 87]one else, will deny, That there are many who sincerely love God, that do yet love something in the Crea­ture; And if so, whether their Love be Sinful, or no, it is evident their Capacities are not too little to love both; As it is also that our Reason is not captivated, and we thereby in­slav'd, or render'd the Servants of every thing that we love. And here is nothing at all said by our Saviour of any other degree of Love, but such as makes us the Servants of what we love. And therefore it is no more true that we are here forbid by our Saviour to love any thing but God, than that our Capacities are too little to love any two different Objects. For if Mr. N. means any thing else by to be employ'd, than To Love, when he says, That our Capa­cities are too narrow and scanty to be employ'd upon two such vastly different Objects, it is not to his purpose. But if he means by employ'd, to Love; what he affirms is then neither true in his own sence of Love, nor in that [Page 88]of the Text. For it is not true that our Capacities are too narrow to Love any two different Objects, ei­ther in the smallest degree, (which he contends for) or so as to become the Servants of them, which is what the Text says; Provided, there be no contrariety in their Commands. His first Reason therefore why we cannot divide our Love, viz. From the scan­tiness of Our Capacities, is utterly false; our Capacities being evidently not too narrow to love any two dif­ferent Objects, or even every Ob­ject which appears to us to be love­ly. And there is no reason that if we love the Creatures in some degree, as occasions of Pleasure to us (we ne­cessarily loving whatever is accom­panied with Pleasure) that That Love of the Creature should exclude the Love of God; any more than that the Love of Cherries should exclude the love of our Friend that gives them us. And if we love God, yet less does the Love of him exclude our Love of his Creatures: For we love [Page 89]them then not only for the Pleasure that they occasion us, but for the sake of their Author; and the more we Love God, the more we shall Love his Creatures.

But another Reason, besides the narrowness of our Capacities, Why we cannot divide our Love between God and the Creature, is, because we cannot love either of them, but upon such a Principle as must utterly exclude the love of the other; which is thus offer'd to be made out: We must not love any thing but what is our true Good: There can be but one thing that is so: And that must be either God, or the Creature.

What is our True Good, he tells us is that which can both Deserve and Reward our Love. But certainly whatever is a Good to us, is a True Good; since whatever pleases us, plea­ses us: And our Love, which he says is to be deserv'd and rewarded, is nothing else but that Disposition of Mind, which we find in our selves towards any thing with which we are [Page 90]pleas'd. So that to tell us, that we must not love any thing but what is our True God; Is as much as to say, that we must not be pleas'd with any thing but what Pleases us; which it is likely we are not in Danger of. And what is added of deserving and rewarding our Love, being put in as a Synonymous Expression, to explain to us what is meant by our True Good; Our True Good, does consequently tell us what is meant by deserving and rewarding our Love; They both signifying one and the same thing. There can therefore no more be made of This notable Principle, viz. That we must not love any thing but what is our True Good, that is, which can both deserve and reward our Love, then that we must not be pleased with any thing but what Pleases us; or reflect upon the Pleasure any thing causes in us, which never did cause us any Pleasure.

This, without doubt, carries much information with it; But the word True (otherwise very impertinent [Page 91]here) is Subtilty to insinuate that which should be prov'd, viz. That the Creatures are not the Essicient Causes of our Pleasing Sensations. And in the Lines following, he seru­ples not to beg the Question in more express terms; When he says, There can be but one thing that is so; viz. our True Good: And then fol­lows, and that must be either God, or the Creature; But if God be our True Good (as most certainly he is) let us Love God, and God only; God and not the Creature: For 'tis a most in­consistent and impracticable thing to carve out our Love between both: Ye cannot serve God, and Mammon. Here we see, having needlesly told us that we must not love any thing but our True Good; That is, that which pleases us; He tells us next, that there can be but one thing that is so, viz. our True Good: Which is yet more evidently false, than his first Assertion is im­pertinent. Notwithstanding, as if it were as evidently True, as it is manifestly the contrary; He offers [Page 92]not any thing at all to make it good; His Assertion only seeming to him sufficient to oppose to the daily Sense and Experience of all Man­kind. But indeed if by True Good, he did mean our chief Good; then it is true that there is but one such Good, and that is God alone, who is also the Author and Donor of all our other Good: But in this sense it is nothing to his purpose. To conclude his Demonstration, that we cannot Love God, or the Creature, but upon such a Principle as must ut­terly exclude the Love of the other; Having said we must Love nothing but our True Good; and that That can be but one thing; He tells us lastly, that that one thing must be either God or the Creature. Which Conclusion, when he has prov'd his foregoing Assertion, viz. That there can be but one thing our Good; it may be convenient for him to explain a little better; But till he has proved that there is but one thing a Good to us, this last Assertion serves for [Page 93]nothing, unless to make it more evi­dent that he has all along said no­thing to the Purpose. For his Affir­mation that we cannot Love either God, or the Creature, but upon such a Principle as must utterly exclude the Love of the other, Was of as much Authority to us as his Assertion, that there can be but one thing a Good to us: And there is no more proof offer'd by him for the one, than the other.

This, I believe, his own Observa­tion and Experience, has often offer'd to him, for the confutation of what he affirms, viz. That it is not true that all Men in the World either Love God, and God only; Or the Creature only, and God not at all: Which ought to be, according to his Principles. But the Admonition of St. John, he says, is somewhat more express to his Purpose than that of our Saviour was, 1 Joh. 11.15. Love not the World nor the things of the World: If any Man love the World, the Love of the Father is not [Page 94]in him. Here again Mr. N. ac­knowledges, that according to the common Interpretation, this is meant of the immoderate love of the World. But he says, they interpreted it so for want of Principles on which to raise a higher sense. 'Tis plain the words import more; viz. That we are not to love the World at all; That all Love of it is immoderate. And by his, former measures (before laid down) it appears how, and why, it is so. But I believe St. John will be found to explain himself much better than Mr. N. explains him. St. John says, Love not the World, nor the things of the World; If any Man love the World, the Love of the Father is not in him. Now the Question is, whether Mr. N. be in the right in understanding (as he does) by Love; every the least degree of Love: Or whether other Interpre­ters are so, in thinking that by Love, immoderate Love is meant: And I think there needs nothing more to satisfie us that the last are in the [Page 95]Right than Mr. N—'s own conces­sion, viz. That without his Hypo­thesis, this Scripture could not be understood otherwise than those In­terpreters understand it: So that unless St. John writ not to be under­stood by those he wrote to; or that the Christians to whom he wrote, had Mr. N—'s Hypothesis, it is past doubt that the other Interpreters he mentions are to be thought in the Right. But because it is believed by him, that St. John, who so much presses Love to others, had himself so little Love to Mankind, as to leave the strongest inforcement of their greatest Duty in obscurity; We will see whether, or no, there is any appea­rance that he did so; And whether Mr. N-'s Hypothesis serve to illustrate this Scripture. For that this Hypo­thesis could not be learnt from it, is apparently confess'd; Because the Hypothesis must be known (as he himself owns) before the Scripture Proof of it can be understood: And therefore our former Argument a­gainst [Page 96]this Hypothesis from the Goodness, and Wisdom of God, that would not permit a Doctrine of the consequence this is pretended to be, to be so obscure as it is, stands still good, for all this fresh pretence to Scripture Proof. But St. John (1 Joh. 11.15.) says, Love not the World, nor the things which are in the World: If any Man love the World, the Love of the Father is not in him. Now that this is meant of the sinful Pleasures of the World, or the immoderate, and consequently sinful Love of Pleasures in them­selves not sinful; what words can make Plainer than the immediately following ones, wherein the Reasons are given why we should not Love, the World, nor the things of the World? viz. ( v. 16.) Because all that is in the World, as the Lust of the Flesh, the Lust of the Eye, and the Pride of Life, is not of the Father, but is of the World: That is, pro­ceeds not from God, but from the Passions, Vanities, and Follies of cor­rupt [Page 97]and sinful Men: And we should not set our Hearts upon the World; That is, even the allowable Pleasures of it; Because ( v. 17.) The World passes away; And therefore by no means ought to be consider'd as the ultimate Good of a Being of a more induring Nature; But is indeed so far remov'd from it, as the little Du­ration of the one holds of propor­tion to the endless Duration of the other. This is what St. John says; And it seems too plain to need any other Explanation, than what he himself has given. But as if every Text in Scripture were a distinct Aphorism, it is frequently enough quoted by some, without any regard to what goes before, or to what comes after; with how much sincerity cannot be said; But certainly to the manifest bringing into Contempt those Ora­cles of Truth.

But for whatever Cause Mr. N. omitted these Reasons of St. John for our not loving the World, and the things of it; And substitured one of [Page 98]his own in the Place; viz. That the Creatures are not the Efficient, but Occasional Cause of our Pleasing Sensa­tions; He does say, That, without the knowledge of this his Hypothe­sis, we cannot know that every de­gree of Love of the Creature is sin­ful; and consequently that St. John's Reasons for inforcing the Duty he urges, were defective. But St. John tells us not that every degree of Love of the Creature is sinful: On the contrary, he says, If we love not our Brother whom we have seen, how can we love God whom we have not seen?

Therefore there is no more need of Mr. N's Opinion, to inforce what St. John teaches; than there is use of what St. John teaches to confirm Mr. N—'s Opinion. For that St. John meant not by Love every degree of Love, is evident; Both because he would contradict himself if he did, and also from the Reasons he gives why we should not love the World, and the things of the World: viz. [Page 99]Because all that is in the World is not of the Father, and passes away quickly. For he would either have given us the true Reason of This, or stopping where Mr. N. did in his Citation of him, not have misled us, by giving us Reasons, which not only reach not the matter, But which also serve to Determine us to another sense. For, as short-liv'd Flowers, tho' they ought not to imploy the continual care of our whole lives, may yet reasonably enough be found in our Gardens, and delight us in their Seasons; So the fading Good Things of this Life, tho' (for that reason) they are not to be fixed on as the Ultimate Good of Eternal Be­ings, yet there is no reason why we may not rejoice in them, as the good Gifts of God, and find all that De­light which he has joined with the lawful use of them.

But St. John says, Love not; There­fore Mr. N. says, we must not Love them at all. Our Saviour also in St. Matthew, in the Chapter above [Page 100]cited, says, Seek not: But Mr. N. says not in like manner seek not at all. On the contrary, he tells us very expresly, we may seek the good things of this World, provided we love them not. Now, if he knows a Reason why one of these places must be taken strictly according to the Letter, and not the other; he was doubtless obliged to tell it us; especially having been so indulgent to Seeking as to have given no rules of restriction to that. But our Sa­viour says, Seek not what ye shall Eat, or what ye shall Drink, or with what you shall be cloathed, for after these things do the Gentiles seek. Mr. N. must doubtless say to this that our Saviour meant by not seeking, that we should not seek immoderately, and solicitously; And so say others to what St. John says: The sense of the Discourse in both places deter­mining that to be the meaning of both. And till Mr. N. has told us why Seeking must be understood in this sense, and not Loving be under­stood [Page 101]so; he cannot surely disallow of it, if (after his example) we thus understand the words of St. John, viz. That we should not love immode­rately; that is, beyond the worth of what we love. And thus the Ad­monition of St. John is no more ex­press to his purpose than that of our Saviour, in St. Matt. was. I am sure the reason with which St. John inforces his Admonition, is expresly contrary to that with which Mr. N. inforces his interpretation of it. St. John says, Love not the World, &c. For all that is in the World, viz. the lust of the Flesh, the lust of the Eye, and the Pride of Life, is not of the Father, but is of the World. But Mr. N. says, Love not the World, &c. For all that is in the World, viz. all those Pleasures Worldly-minded Men so greedily hunt after; as the lust of the Flesh, the lust of the Eye, and the Pride of Life, are not of the World, but of the Fathe: Which seems not only to oppose St. John; But also sounds very harshly, and [Page 102]offensively to many Pious Persons; Who are apt to think it unworthy of, and mis-becoming the Majesty of the great God, who is of Purer Eyes than to behold iniquity, to be as it were at the beck of his sinful Crea­tures, to excite in them Sentiments of Delight, and Pleasure, whenever they are dispos'd to transgress against his Laws, tho' in the most gross, and erroneous Instances.

But the Author of this Hypothesis tells us, That this is that indeed which makes Sin to be so exceeding sinful, viz. That we oblige God in Virtue of that first immutable Law, or Order, which he has establish'd (that is, of exciting Sentiments of Pleasure in us upon some opera­tion of Bodies upon us) to Reward our Transgressions against him with Pleasure, and Delight. It is strange that we cannot seem sinful enough, without having a Power of forcing God to be a Partner in our Wickedness! But this is a Conse­quence of an Hypothesis whose use­lesness, [Page 103]and want of proof, are alone sufficient Causes for rejecting it. And if we will once quit what Reason and Revelation evidently and plainly tell us, to build our Religion upon the foundation of uncertain Opini­ons; where must we stop? Every Man, indeed, cannot so handsomly compose his System as P. Male­branche; But every Man has as much Authority to impose it upon others, or to be credited without Proof. The abovemention'd account of Sin, is plainly only supported upon its being a consequence of our seeing all things in God; who being the alone efficient Cause of all our Plea­sing Sensations, must necessarily be the only efficient Cause of sinful, as well as innocent Pleasures: But no Pleasure, simply as Pleasure, being evil, God is not suppos'd in this by P. Malebranche the Author of Sin, but only Man himself; Who, he says, ‘étant pecheur & par consequent indigne d'être récompensé par des sentimens agréables, oblige Dieu [Page 104]en conséquence de ses volontés im­muables, de luy faire sentir du plaisir dans le tems même qu'il l'offense. Entr. III. p. 91.’ We being Sinners, and by consequence unworthy to be recompenc'd by agreeable Senti­ments, oblige God in consequence of his immutable Will, to make us feel plea­sure in the time that we offend him. Viz. Whenever we Love or Delight in any Creature. But our seeing all things in God, upon which this No­tion of Sin, of Original Corruption, and the following account of Chri­stianity stands, remains yet to be better proved; Before we reject, for so unintelligible a fancy, what is evident and plain; What may satisfie the Wife, and what the Weak (whose Souls are Doubtless of as much value, and They as much concern'd for them) may easily comprehend.

That God has made us Reasonable Creatures, we certainly know: And it is evident also, that by virtue of our being such; we are obliged to Live by the Law of Reason; which [Page 105]whenever we transgress, we must ne­cessarily offend against God; We in­verting that Order which he has esta­blished, in making that to obey, which ought to command; and that to com­mand, which ought to obey. And that we are so prone (as Experience shews we are) to offend against this Law of Reason, is from the Unruliness of our Affections; Which being strong in us, (whilst Reason is weak and un­able to direct them) take up with the first alluring Objects, whose im­pressions making settled habits in us, it is not easie for Reason to remove them, even when it does discover their Pravity; and sets us to struggle against them. And to this loose Edu­cation, and ill Custom, greatly con­tribute: There being scarce any Vice we are capable of, which is not instill'd into us (or at least the Seeds of it) in our very Childhood, by those foolish People that usually have the Direction of it. For it is obvious that there are few Children who are not taught by their Nurses to be [Page 106]Proud, Angry, Covetous, and Re­vengeful; and principled with those Vices, even before they have Lan­guage enough to talk of them. But God made Adam a Man, and not a Child; Therefore his Reason was in its full strength as early as his Ap­petites; and he had not the unhappy Preventions which others receive. He himself therefore, and his Posterity, one would have thought, ran no very great Hazard of losing those Advan­tages his Obedience would have pro­cured them.

That Mankind did lose by Adam what they are restor'd to by Jesus Christ, we are plainly told in the Scripture: But that by his Miscar­riage, or Eve's, any one single Soul should be doom'd to Eternal Misery, or to any condition worse than not being; whether immediately, as some hold, for Adam's Sin; or by subje­cting them to a state of necessary sinning; Can neither comport with the Goodness of God, or is any where reveal'd in Scripture.

The last of these Opinions, Pere Malebranche's Hypothesis maintains; tho' he accounts for it differently from others. Children, he expresly tells us, become (through their Uni­on with their Mothers) Sinners; and are in a state of Damnation before they are born into the World. But both the Apostle and Reason assure us, that where there is no Law, there is no Transgression. And Pere Male­branche opposes this, upon no other ground offer'd by him for so doing▪ but that the conclusion he makes, viz. That Children are born Sinners, is a necessary consequence of our seeing all things in God. For God only cau­sing us Pleasure, he only has a right to our Love, and all love of the Creature is sinful. But a Child (by virtue of its union with the Mother) does, whilst in her Womb, know and love Bodies; consequently therefore is a Sinner, and shall be necessarily Damn'd, p. 114. (Tho' indeed in a Note upon that Word, he mitigates the sense of it to being eternally de­priv'd [Page 108]of the Possession of God). And that we come into the World utterly uncapable to please God, (as he ex­presly says we do) is not through any fault at all of our own, but for Eve's; Concerning whose Transgres­sion any ways influencing her Po­sterity, the Scripture yet makes no mention at all.

However, this Principle is made by Pere Malebranthe (p. 94.) the Foun­dation of Christianity. But it is cer­tain, that the New Testament tells us nothing of it: And there it is, surely, that we ought to look for the Christian Religion. What we are there told, is, That as in Adam all died, so in Christ shall all be made a­live, 1 Cor. xv. 22. That he came to abolish Death, and to bring Life and Immortality to light, 2 Tim. i. 10. That we shall be justified by Faith, without the works of the Law, Rom. iii. 28. And that for this end, God sent his Son into the World, that as many as believe in him might have Eternal Life. Yet do we then (says the Apo­stle) [Page 109] make void the Law through Faith? God forbid! yea, we establish the Law. Rom. iii. 31. But the Wis­dom of God in Christ Jesus, is ma­nifest in this, that we are hereby at once the most effectually put upon using our Endeavours to work out our Salvation with fear and trembling; And also kept from Despair, in the sense of our own weakness to per­form that Law which Adam in his more Advantageous Circumstances transgressing against, forfeited there­by Bliss and Immortality: We ha­ving not only a Promise that we shall receive from God whatever (asking as we ought) we shall ask in his Son's Name; And also of his Spirit to help our Infirmities; But to compleat all, that for the sake of Christ, our sincere, tho' imperfect. Obedience shall be accepted; Faith in him supplying its defects.

This is what the Scripture tells us of the Dispensation of God to Man­kind in the Gospel of his Son: Which is so visibly suitable to, and worthy [Page 110]of the Divine Wisdom and Good­ness, that no Inventions of Man can add any thing to it, to make it ap­pear more so. yet were our Views larger than to comprehend only the compass of our little Globe, they would probably afford us still fur­ther Matter for our Admiration. For 'tis a thought too limitted and nar­row for Women and Children now to be kept in, that this Spot of ours is all the Habitable part of the Creation. But without understand­ing the System of the World, or con­sidering what Mathematicians and Naturalists offer to convince us, that so many Regions fit for Inhabitants are not empty Desarts, and such num­berless Orbs of Light more insigni­ficant than so many Farthing Can­dles; We read, in the Scripture, of other Ranks of Intelligent Beings, besides our selves; Of whom, tho' it would be Presumption to affirm any thing beyond what is reveal'd, yet we know not what Relation may possibly be between them and us. [Page 111]The Scripture plainly intimates great Numbers of them, Superiour to us in the Dignity of their Crea­tion, to be fallen by Disobedience (like Man) from a Happier State; And also that they are Enemies to us: Whether out of Envy for what Jesus Christ had undertaken for our Re­demption, or for other Reasons, we know not. But by the small account we have of them, they seem to have set up themselves in opposition to their Maker, as thinking themselves sufficient to carve out their own Happiness; And shall find full reward of their Folly and Rebellion, when the Judgment of the great Day shall meet them.

But on Man, who after his Trans­gression saw his Nakedness, and was asham'd, the Father of Mercies has had Compassion, and has found out a Way for his Restoration: Such a Way as may well humble these Proud ones in the Imagination of their hearts; And which leaves no room to us for Boasting. For it is certain, That by [Page 112]the Works of the Law no Flesh shall be Justified, Rom. iii. 20. Faith, which would have preserved Adam in the state of Innocence, shall alone justifie his Posterity. And tho' the Wisdom of God has made Faith in his Son that which is required to Salvation, in those to whom he is reveal'd; We are told that the Just, in all Ages, have liv'd by Faith: Which is necessarily the Immutable Basis of all true Reli­gion. For without we believe not only in the Being, but also in the Veracity of God, That he Is, and that he is a Rewarder of them that di­ligently seek him, it is impossible we should love him with all our Hearts, with all our Souls, &c. which contains the whole Moral Law; Whose Obli­gations not being Arbitrary, but ari­sing from the Nature of things, must necessarily under every Dispensation be always the same: And Christ tells us expresly, He came not to de­stroy this Law, but to fulfil it. He came to give us a clearer and fairer Transcript of it; To inforce it by his [Page 113]Authority and Example; To assure us of our own Future Existence, which Reason could not; And of the great Love of God to Mankind, in accep­ting of Faith to supply the Defects of Sincere Obedience; By which we are freed from the Terrours of an offended Deity; And have hopes of being made Heirs of a glad Immor­tality; Co-heirs with Christ, the Author and Finisher of our Salvation, Who, for the Joy that was set before him, indured the Cross, and despised the Shame, and has obtain'd for him­self a Kingdom of which all true Be­lievers are the Subjects. We are re­stored by him to a more assured Felicity than that from which Adam fell, by not believing that in the Day he ate of the forbidden Fruit he should surely Die; Too little attending to the Light of his Reason; (Which would have taught him not to question the Divine Veracity) and having yet no Experience to oppose to the Solici­tations of his Appetite. And per­haps God in this Restoration of Man­kind [Page 114]by Jesus Christ (who took not on him the Nature of Angels) having herein put down the Mighty from their feats, and exalted those of Low degree, does by this Oeconomy of his Pro­vidence in our Salvation, teach all the Orders of Intellectual Beings, whom he has made free Agents (as well as Man) That as he cannot make a Being Independent on him­self for its Happiness; So the most inlightned Reason is only safe and secure, whilst it feels its weakness and dependency: Which if we be thoroughy, as we ought, sensible of, we shall necessarily love God with all our Hearts, with all our Souls, &c.

Mr. N. says these words signifie, That we must love nothing but God alone. And to confirm that his sense of them, he brings yet two other places of Scripture: The first is, james iv. 4. Ye Adulterers and Adul­teresses, know ye not that the Friend­ship of the World is Enmity with God? Whosoever therefore will be a Friend of the World, is the Enemy of [Page 115]God. He tells us here, That in St. James's account, Our Heart is so much God's Property and Peculiar, and ought so intirely to be devoted to him, that 'tis a kind of Spiritual Adultery to admit any Creature into a Partner­ship with him in our Love. It is cer­tain these are not St. James's words, and we have only Mr. N-'s Affirma­tion that this is his sense. But tho' Mr. N-'s affirming without any Proof, that all love of the Creature is here condemn'd, and said to be a kind of Spiritual Adultery, needs no other Answer but a bare Negation; And the saying without any Proof, that it is only the inordinate love of the Creature that is so call'd and con­demn'd, would be enough; Yet the context further plainly shows, that that is the meaning of St. James here, by what he calls Friendship of the World. To which let me add, that Adultery does not wholly ex­clude all other Love of any other Person; but a love that comes in competition, or invades that which [Page 116]properly belongs to the Husband. For a Woman may love her Brother, or her Child, without being an Adul­teress; it being not with that Love that is due to her Husband. The last place Mr. N. cites to prove that Love of the Creatures is Sinful, is, from St. Paul, Gal. vi. 14. The World is Crucified to me, and I unto the World. Which last words, Mr. N. says at once comprize his present con­clusion, that the Creature is not to be (in any degree) the Object of our love; with the very same ground and bottom upon which he has built it. For the Apostle here first of all supposes the World to be Crucified, that is to be a Dead, Unactive, Silent, and Quiescent thing, in respect of himself; as not being able to operate upon him, or affect his Soul with any Sentiment as an Efficient Cause: And then in consequence of that declares himself to be also Crucified to the World, p. 68. which Mr. N. ex­plains very truly (tho' not very con­formably to his Opinion) by being insensible to all its Charms: For, ac­cording [Page 117]to his Explanation, St. Paul knew very well that the World had no Charms. But whosoever will read this whole Pas­sage in St. Paul, will evidently see that it amounts to this; That there were some Men so Preach'd Christ, as yet to have regard to the favour and good liking of Men; That they might avoid Persecu­tion from some, and gain Glory from others: But St. Paul in his Preaching of the Gospel, had so intirely given up him­self to it, that he minded nothing but the Preaching of the Gospel; Going on in that Work, without any regard either to Persecution, or Vain-Glory. And thus the World was Crucified to him, and he to the World: They were as Dead things, and in this respect had no Ope­ration. St. Paul's words are, As many as desire to make a fair shew in the Flesh, they constrain you to be Circumcis'd; Only, lest they should suffer Persecution for the Cross of Christ. For neither They themselves, who are Circumcis'd, keep the Law; But de­sire to have you Circumcis'd, that they may glory in your Flesh. But God forbid that I should Glory, save in the Cross of our Lord Jesus Christ, whereby the World is Cruci­fied to me, and I unto the World. Very often it happens, that a piece of a Dis­course, or as here, even a piece of a [Page 118]Verse, serves for a Quotation, much bet­ter than the whole would do. This is so evident in this Place, that it requires some Charity to think that a Man is in earnest fearching after Truth, or believes himself, whilst he is a Writing after such a manner.

But because the Character Mr. N. bears ought to be a Warrant for his Sincerity, we must conclude, that he does think St. Paul tells the Galatians, that some would have them Circumcis'd only that they might avoid Persecution, and might Glory in their Flesh. But God forbid that he should Glory in any thing but the Cross of our Lord Jesus Christ, by which the Creatures are only the Oc­casional, not the Efficient Causes of his Pleasing Sensations; and he Dead to them. This Mr. N. it seems, does think was the Sense of what St. Paul said: But that it was not, I think common Sense will sufficiently satisfie us, without con­sulting Interpreters about it.

Theseare the Texts brought by Mr. N. to support an Opinion grounded on an Hypothesis, perhaps Demonstrably false; That has evidently no proof, but the poor one from our Ignorance, that yet is not at all help'd by this Hypothesis: Which is (therefore) as well as for the Ends [Page 119]of Morality, plainly useless. Yet all this might well be Pardon'd to any Effort of advancing our Knowledge, if it did not pretend to influence our Religion; And not only so, but to be the very Basis, and Foundation of Christianity, as it is made to be by the first Ingenious Inventor of it. Mr. N. has not, indeed, advanced that so directly: But with more Confidence a great deal, making it the ground of Morality, he falls as little short of it as is possible. And his Discourses upon this Subject being in a more Popular way, are more likely to do hurt. For certainly to perswade Men that God requires what they find impossible to perform, and op­posite to their very Constitution and Be­ing in this World, is to make Religion, and the Teachers of it, ridiculous to some; And to drive others weaker, but better-minded People into Despair; By giving them occasion to think that they do not love God as they ought. Such Effects, I fear, may be the Consequences of Mr. N's Doctrine, who teaches that we do not love God as we ought, whilst we love any Creature at all: And particu­larly in the above-cited Sermon, He posi­tively says, That the Creatures are no more our Goods, than our Gods; and that we may as well worship them, as love them. Pract. Disc. p. 62.

These Opinions of Mr. N. seem also to indanger the introducing, especially a­mongst those whose Imaginations are stronger than their Reason, a Devout way of talking; which having no sober, and intelligible sense under it, will either in­evitably by degrees beget an Insensibility to Religion, in those themselves who use it, as well as others; By thus accustoming them to handle Holy things without Fear; Or else will turn to as wild an Enthusiasm as any that has been yet seen; and which can End in nothing but Monasteries, and Hermitages; with all those Sottish and Wicked Superstitions which have accom­panied them where-ever they have been in use. And this the Author of the Christian Conversations foresaw very well must be the Consequence; Or rather conforma­bly to his Religion and Profession, might perhaps have it in his View and Design, to justifie those things by this his Hypo­thesis; which makes them not only al­lowable, but of necessary use. But how­ever that were, he concludes his Discourse of our being obliged to have no Love for any Creature, with a sincere Acknow­ledgment that if this be true (which he has concluded it is) it is then absolutely necessary to renounce the World, and be­take our selves to Woods and Desarts: [Page 121]For it is impossible to live in the daily Commerce and Conversation of the World, and love God as we ought to do. And accordingly he makes his Young Men, introduced to be Converts to Religion upon these Principles, bid Adien to the World, even to their Dearest Friends, and Relations.

For Pere Malebranche, it seems, was un­acquainted with that Distinction which Mr. N. says, ought to be made of Move­ments of the Soul, and Movements of the Body. Otherwise he might have assured his Aristarchus, that he was in a very great Mistake, to believe that the Prin­ciples before laid down, obliged him to any retreat from the World, or Renun­ciation of the Injoyments of it: Since the Movements of the Body (Mr. N. tells us) may be determin'd by those Objects which in­viron it; and by those Movements, Aristar­chus might have Ʋnited himself to those things which were the Natural or Occasional Causes of his Pleasure. (See Mr. N's Let­ters Philosophical and Divine, p. 75.) But Pere Malebranche designing his Notions to be of some use to the World pursued them, whether by just consequence they led him; and sought not for any contri­vance to make them insignificant to any other Purpose than to shew the Partu­riency [Page 122]of their Author. He therefore rea­sonably from his Principles, insists upon it, that the retreat from the World, is best for all; and necessary to most who design to lead a Christian Life; Those being much to be pitied whom God calls to live in the World for the Conversion of others.

This in a Papist, and one of a Reli­gious Order amongst them, cannot seem strange. But there can certainly be no greater Disparagement to Christian Re­ligion, than to say; That it unfits Men for Society; That we must not only li­terally become Fools for Christ's sake; but also cease to be Men. Can any Ra­tional Man, not bred up in the Bigottry of Popery, ever perswade himself that such a Religion can be from God? Or is there any appearance throughout the whole New Testament of its being so? John, indeed, who had not the power of Miracles, or a Voice from Heaven to Au­thorize his Mission, made himself be ta­ken notice of, by the remarkable Auste­rity of his Life: But he neither Preach'd it, nor propos'd himself, in that, an Ex­ample to others. He was by something extraordinary (tho' without Miracles) to draw Auditors to him, whom he might prepare to receive the Messiah. But that living in a Desart, and bidding adieu to [Page 123]Society, were not necessary to Religion, our Saviour's Example, as well as his Pre­cepts, show. He came Eating and Drink­ing, Conversing in the World like other Men: And he assures us, That he came not to destroy, but to fulfil the Law; viz. The Moral Law, which is the same with the Law of Reason; than which, Heaven and Earth, shall sooner pass away; and in which are legibly found those Duties of an active and social Life, that have so much recom­mended and eterniz'd the Memories of many Philosophers, and Lawgivers, and other great Men of Antiquity; Whose Religion Mankind would be apt to think they had reason to wish for again, if they were perswaded that Christianity were opposite to, and inconsistent with those admired and beneficial Virtues that Sup­port and Profit Society.

There is nothing more evident than that Mankind is design'd for a Sociable Life. To say that Religion unfits us for it, is to reproach the Wisdom of God as highly as it is possible; And to re­present Religion as the most mischievous thing in the World, dissolving Societies. And there could not be a greater Artifice of the Devil, or Wicked Men to bring Christianity into contempt than this. But it is to be hoped, that where the Scrip­tures [Page 124]are allow'd to be read, this can ne­ver prevail; And that those who are not in danger of being led into it by the Su­perstitions of Priest-Craft, will not be impos'd upon in it by vain Philosophy: Nor can there be any stronger Evidence, that (That Notion, of the Love of God, grounded on his Being the immediate Cause of all our Sensations) is false, than this, viz. That it Destroys all the Duties and Obligations of Social Life. This in­deed is not Mr. N's deduction from thence, But it is that of his Oracle Pere Malebranche, and that of Reason; And he will scarce be believ'd to be Sincere, that shall say he can daily see and injoy the Creatures as Goods, without desiring them as such; Or that shall deny, that if it be our Duty not to desire any Crea­ture, it must then necessarily be our Duty (as P. M. expresly says it is) to have as little communication with them as is pos­sible; and to betake our selves to Desarts. But whether it were that Mr. N. has no inclination to this way of Living, and that it is to That that we owe his Happy Invention of Seeking, and injoying the good things of the World, without lov­ing them; Or that he was afraid by owning his Opinion (that we are obliged to renounce the World and live in [Page 125]Woods) He should be suspected of fa­vouring Popish Superstition; He can scarcely be presum'd not to see that this inevitably follows from the Hypothesis he has embraced. But yet how injurious soever this Consequence is to Religion, so much is not therefore deny'd to what Per. Malebranche largely insists upon, viz. That Retirement is sometimes useful, if not necessary to a Christian Life. Those who live always in the hurry of the World, and the avocations of Worldly Business, without giving themselves time, and retreat, frequently to reflect, being no doubt very likely to enter too much into the Spirit of it; We insensibly giv­ing up our selves to, and uniting our Hearts with what we are constantly in­gaged in, and with delight apply our selves to. But if in opposition to this, any one should run into the other ex­tream, of retreating wholly from all com­merce and conversation with Men; And should give themselves the Happiness Pere Malebranche speaks of, of attending Eternity in Desarts; it is to be fear'd they would not mend the Matter. For what­ever Vices they might part with by it, they must necessarily oppose thereby, one great end that they were sent into the World for, viz. of doing good; By be­coming [Page 126]wholly useless to others: And such a one would certainly, by such a re­nunciation of all commerce with Men, be likelier to grow Wild, than improve the great Virtue of Christianity, and Or­nament of Humane Nature, Good Will, Charity, and the being Useful to others.

As for Monasteries, and Religious Hou­ses, (as they are call'd) all who are ac­quainted with them, know that they are nothing less than what is pretended; And serve only to draw in Discontented, De­vout People, with an imaginary Happi­ness. For there is constantly as much Pride, Malice, and Faction, within those Walls, as without them; And (if we may believe what is said, and has not wanted farther Evidence) very often as much li­centiousness.

In short, our Natures are so suited to a mediocrity in all things, that we can scarce exceed in any kind with Safety, To be always busy in the Affairs of the World, or always shut up from them, can­not be born: Always Company, or al­ways Solitude, are Dangerous: And so are any other Extreams.