THE Just Right OF MONARCHY In General, but more especially of the KINGS of SCOTLAND, as­serted against Buchannan and others.

LVCIFER might in Reason have contented himself with that share of Knowledge, Glory, and Power, which was bestowed upon him, by his Almighty, and Bountiful Soveraign. And Adam should have rested satisfied, with the Glory of having been made after the Image of God, and with the being his Lieute­nant in this lower World. But there are such strong Charms in Ambition, and Vanitie, that the one resolved to hazard [Page] all that he possessed, as being second, ra­ther than not try if he could be the first, and the other, desiring to improve his pre­sent share, forefeited those Excellencies which he enjoyed. How jealous then should frail and fallen man be, in debates with those, whom the Almighty has ap­pointed to be his Vicegerents amongst them; and to whom he has said, Ye are Gods. And how hard is it for us to Con­quer that Vice, which the one could not resist, though he was all Light, and the other though he was all Innocence?

What Nations under Heaven were so happie as we, under the Reign of King Charles the First? Secure against all Inva­sion from abroad, by the situation of our Countrey; and from all Oppression at home, by its Laws, and the gracious Con­cessions of our excellent Monarchs: But more especially in that Age, by the innat Vertues of that King, who was severe to none, but to himself; and whose Preroga­tives, no Laws could bound so much as His own Goodness did. And yet wearie with the burden of our own prosperity, we lusted after new improvements of Li­berty and Property: And after we had emptied our own Veins, and Purses, in [Page] fighting for these; all we gained, was to be Slaves, and Beggars. And having kill'd for Religion a King, who had more of it, than all who fought against him; we split our own Church into a thousand pieces, and from its murthered Body, did arise those Sectarians, like so many Worms, and Insects. But yet God Almighty desiring to try us once more, and make us for ever inexcusable, did not only deliver us from that Slavery that we had drawn up­on our selves; but because we were all Crimes, he gave us a King who was all Clemencie, and who deserves to have been Elected, if he had not been born our King: And yet after that he had also condescend­ed to all our new Extravagancies, and that by His Conduct, all Sciences flourish, and Trade is so increased, that Riches are be­come a Plague. We are now troubled with Jealousies, because we can be troubled with nothing else: And murmuring against the gentlest and best of Kings, we are tor­mented daily with Apparitions, Visions, Plots, Pamphlets and Libels. But under whom can we expect to be free from Ar­bitrary Government, when we were, and are afraid of it under King Charles the First, and King Charles the Second? And [Page] what King, or Government, can be se­cure from those, who Conspire the death of this most merciful Prince, and of this so ancient, and so well moulded Govern­ment?

Amongst the other wicked Instruments in these Rebellions, I must confess that our Countrey-men Buchannan (one of the chief Ornaments, and Reproaches of his native Countrey) the Authors of Lex Rex, Naphtali, and Ius Populi Vindicatum, have been Ring-leaders, who have endeavoured extreamly to poison this Nation by perswad­ing the People:

1. That our Monarchs derive their Rights from them.

2. That therefore since they derive their Right from the People, they are account­able to them for for their Administration, and consequently they may be suspended or deposed by them.

3. That the People may Reform with­out them, and may rise in Arms against them, if the Monarch hinder them to Re­form.

4. That the People or their Representa­tives may seclude the Lineal Successor, and raise to the Throne any of the Royal Fami­ly who doth best deserve the Royal Digni­ty.

[Page]These being all matters of Right, the plain and easie way which I resolve to take for refuting them, so as the learned and unlearned may be equally convinced, shall be first, by giving a true account of what is our present positive Law. 2. By demonstrating that as our present positive Law is inconsistent with these Principles, so these our positive Laws are excellently well founded upon the very nature of Mo­narchy, and that those Principles are in­consistent with all Monarchy: And the third Class of my Arguments shall be from the Principles of common Reason, Equity and Government, abstracting both from the positiveness of our Law, and the na­ture of our Monarchy: And in the last place I shall answer the Arguments of those Authors.

As to the first, I conceive that a Trea­tise De Iure Regni apud Scotos, should have clear'd to us what was the power of Mo­narchs by Law, and particularly what was the positive Law of Scotland as to this point; for if these points be clear by our positive Law, there is no further place for debate, since it is absolutely necessary for Mankind, especially in matters of Government, that they at last acquiesce in something that is [Page] fix'd and certain, and therefore it is very well observed by Lawyers and States-men, that before Laws be made, men ought to reason; but after they are made, they ought to obey: which makes me admire how Buchannan and the other Authors that I have named, should have adventur'd up­on a Debate in Law, not being themselves Lawyers; and should have written Books upon that Subject, without citing one Law, Civil, or Municipal, pro or con: Nor is their Veracity more to be esteemed than their Learning; for it's undenyable that Buchannan wrot this Book De Iure Regni, to perswade Scotland to raise his Patron, though a Bastard to the Crown: and the Authors of Lex Rex, Ius Populi Vindicatum, and others, were known to have written those Libels from picque against the Go­vernment, because they justly suffered un­der it.

I know that to this it may be answered, That these Statutes are but late, and were not extant in Buchanans time, and conse­quently Buchanan cannot be Redargu'd by them.

2. That these Statutes have been obtain'd from Parliaments, by the too great influ­ence of their Monarchs, and the too great [Page] Pusillanimity of Parliaments, who could not resign the Rights and Priviledges of the People, since they have no Warrand from them for that effect.

To the first of which, I answer, that my Task is not to form an Accusation a­gainst Buchanan, but against his Principles, and to demonstrat, that these Principles are not our Law, but are inconsistent with it, and it is ridiculous to think, that any such Laws should have been made, before these Treasonable Principles were once hatched and maintained, for Errors must appear before they be condemned: and by the same Argument it may be as well urged, that Arius, Nestorius, &c. were not Hereticks; because those Acts of General Councils, which condemned their Heresies, were not extant, when they first defended those opinions; and that our King had not the power of mak­ing Peace and War, till the Year 1661:

But, 2 dly, For clearing this Point, it is fit to know that our Parliaments never give Prerogatives to our Kings, but only declare what have been their Prerogatives, and particularly in these Statutes that I shall Cite, the Parliament doth not Confer any New Right upon the King, but only ac­knowledge [Page] what was Originally his Right and Prerogative from the beginning, and therefore the Parliament being the only Judges who could decide whether Buchan­nans Principles were solid, and what was Ius Regni apud Scctor. These Statutes hav­ing decided those points contraverted by him, there can be hereafter no place for Debate, and particularly as to Buchannan, his Book De jure Regni apud Scotos, it is expresly condemn'd as Slanderous, and containing several offensive Matters by the 134 Act, Parl. 8. Ia. 6. in Anno 1584. which was the first Parliament that ever sat after his Book was printed.

To the 2 d, I answer, that it being con­troverted what is the Kings Power, there can be no stronger Decision of that Con­troversie in Favours of the King than the acknowledgment of all Parties Interested, and it is strange and unsufferable to hear such as appeal to Parliaments, cry out against their Power, their Justice, and De­cisions; and why should we oppress our Kings, and raise Civil Wars, whereby we endanger so much our selves to procure powers to Parliaments, if Parliaments be such ridiculous things as we cannot trust when they are empowered by us? and if [Page] there be any force in this answer of Buchan­nans, there can be none in any of our Laws, for that strikes at the Root of all our Laws, and as I have produced a Tract of reiterat­ed Laws for many Years, so where were there ever such free unlimited Parliaments in any Nation as these whose Laws I have Cited? 2 dly, Whatever might be said, if a positive Contract betwixt the King and People were produced, clearing what were the just Limits of the Monarchy, and bounding it by clear Articles mutually agreed upon, yet it is very absurd and ex­travagant to think that when the Debate is, what is the King of Scotlands just Power and Right, and from whom he Derives it, that the Laws and repeated Acknowledge­ments of the whole Representatives of the People assembled in the Supream Court of the Nation, having no open force upon it, but enacted at several times, in many several Parliaments, under the gentlest, peaceablest, and wisest Kings that ever they had, should not be better believed than the Testimonies of three or four byass'd and disoblig'd Pedants, who understood nei­ther our Laws nor Statutes, and who can bring no clear fundamental Law; nor pro­duce no Contract nor Paction restricting [Page] the King, or bounding his Government. 3 dly, That which adds a great deal of Au­thority to this Debate, and these Statutes is, that as this is clear by our positive Law, so it is necessarly inferred from the nature of our Monarchy, and is very advantagi­ous for the Subjects of this Kingdom, which I shall clear in the second and third Arguments that I shall bring against these Treasonable Principles, nor can they be seconded by any solid Reason, as I shall make appear in answering the Arguments of those Authors.

I know that Nephthaly, the Author of Ius populi, and our late Fanatical Pam­phlets alleadge that our Parliaments since 1661 are null and unlawful, because many who have Right to sit as Members, or to Elect Members were secluded by the De­claration or Test: But my answer is, First, That these were excluded by Acts of Par­liament, which were past in Parliaments prior to their exclusion, and so they were excluded by Law, and no man can be said to be illegally excluded from his Seat in Parliament, who is excluded by a clear Sta­tute. 2 dly, If this were not a good an­swer, then the Papists might pretend that they are unjustly excluded, because they [Page] will not take the Oath of Supremacy, and because they are Papists; and how can the Fanaticks pretend to make this objection, since they by the same way excluded the Kings Loyal Subjects in the Year 1647. and 1649. &c. Or how would these Au­thors have rail'd at any Malignant for using this Argument against them, which they use now most impudently against us with far less justice, for their Parliaments were unjust upon other Heads, as being inconsistent with the fundamental Laws of the Kingdom, and so their acts of exclusi­on were null in themselves. 3 dly. All the Statutes made since 1661. are neces­sary consequences of former Laws, and so are rather renewed than new Laws. 4 ly. If this were allow'd there could be no end of controversie, for all who are excluded would still alleadge that they were unjust­ly excluded, and consequently there could be no submission to Authority, and so no Society nor Peace.

The last answer that our Dissenters make when they are driven from all their other grounds is, that they, though the lesser, are yet the sounder part of the Nation; but this shift does not only overturn Mo­narchy, but establishes Anarchy, and [Page] though they were once settl'd in their be­loved Commonwealth, this would be suf­ficient to overturn it also, for every little number of Dissenters, nay, and even the meanest Dissenter himself might pretend to be this sounder part of the Common­wealth; but God Almighty foreseeing that pride or ignorance would suggest to frail Mankind this principle, so inconsistent with all that Order and Government, whereby he was to preserve the World, he did therefore in his great Wisdom convince men by the Light of their own Reason, that in matters of common concern, which were to be determined by Debate, the greater num­ber should determine the lesser; and such as drive beyond this Principle, shall never find any certain Point at which they may rest: and by the same Reason, the Law has pronunc'd it safer to rest in what is de­cided, though it be unjust, than to cast loose the authority of Decisions, upon which the peace and quiet of the Common­wealth does depend, who would be so humble and just, as to confess that his Ad­versary has the juster side? Or who would obey if this were allow'd? And what Idea of Government or Society could [Page] a man form to himself, allowing once this principle.

It is also very observable, that those who pretend to be the sounder part, and deny obedience upon that account, are still the most insolent and irregular of all the Society, the greatest admirers of them­selves, and the greatest enemies to peace, and so the unfitest to be Judges of what is the sounder part, though they were not them­selves parties: But what pretence is there for that Plea in this case, where the foun­dations of our Monarchy, have been unani­mously acknowledg'd by many different Parliaments, in many different Ages, chosen at first from the Dictats of Reason, and confirm'd after we had in many Rebelli­ons, found how dangerous all those popu­lar pretences are, and in which we agree with the Statsmen, Lawers and Divines of all the well Govern'd Nations under Hea­ven, who are born under an hereditary Monarchy, as it is confess'd we are.

To return then to the first of those Points, I lay down as my first position, that our Monarchs derive not their Right from the People, but are absolute Monarchs, deriv­ing their Royal Authority immediatly from God Almighty; and this I shall endea­vour [Page] to prove, first from our positive Law.

By the 2. Act Par. 1. Ch. 2 d. in which it is declar'd, That His Majesty, His Heirs and Successors, have for ever, by vertue of that Royol Power which they hold from God Almighty over this Kingdom, the sole choice and appointment of Officers of State, Counsellors and Judges.

But because this Act did only assert that our Kings did hold their Royal Power from God, but did not exclude the people from being sharers in bestowing this Do­native, therefore by the 5 th Act of that same Parliament, they acknowledge the Obligation lying on them in Conscience, Honour and Gratitude, to own and assert the Royal Prerogatives of the Imperial Crown of this Kingdom, which the Kings Majesty holds from God Almighty alone; and therefore they acknowledge that the Kings Majesty only, by vertue of His Roy­al Prerogative, can make Peace and War, and Treaties with forraign Princes.

Because this last Statute did only assert that the King did hold His Imperial Crown from God alone, but did not decide from whom our Kings did only derive their Power; therefore by the 2 d· Act Par. 3 d [Page] Ch. 2 d. It is declar'd that the Estates of Par­liament considering that the Kings of this Realm, Deriving their Power from God Almighty alone, they do succeed Lineally thereto, &c. Which Statutes do in this agree with our old Law; for in the first Chapter of Reg. Magist. vers. 3. These Words are, That both in Peace and War, our Glorious King may so Govern this King­dom committed to Him by God Almigh­ty, in which He has no Superiour but God Almighty alone, which Books are ac­knowledg'd to be our Law, and are cal­led the Kings Laws by the 54 th Act Par. 3 d Iam. 1. and the 115. Act Par. 14. Iam. 3.

These our Laws both Ancient and Mo­dern, can neither be thought to be extort­ed by force, nor enacted by flattery, since in this we follow the Scripture, the Pri­mitive Church and their Councils, the Ci­vil Law and its Commentators, and the wisest Heathens, both Philosophers and Poets. As to the Scripture, God tells us, That by him Kings Reign, and that he hath anointed them Kings, and that the King is the Minister of God. David tells us, That God will give strength to his King, and deliverance to his King, and to his Anoint­ed. [Page] Daniel sayes to Nebuchadnezar, The God of Heaven hath given thee a Kingdom. And to Cyrus, God gave to Nebuchadnezar thy Father a Kingdom, and for the Ma­jesty that he gave him, all Nations trem­bled.

As to the Fathers, Augustin de Civit. Dei, l. 5. c. 21. Let us not attribute unto any other, the power of giving Kingdoms and Empyrs, but to the true God. Basil in Psal. 32. The Lord setteth up Kings and remov­eth them. Tertul: apol: contra gentes, Let Kings know, that from God only they have their Empyre, and in whose power only they are. And Ireneus having prov'd this point fully, ends thus, l. 5. c. 24. By whose Com­mand they are born men, by his likewise they are ordain'd Kings. This is also acknow­ledg'd by the Councils of Toledo 6. c. 14 of Paris 6. c. 5. vid Council aquis gran. 3. c. 1.

Amongst our late Divines, Marca the fa­mous Arch-bishop of Paris, Concord: sa­cerd: & imperij, l. 2. c. 2. n: 2. asserts, That the Royal Power is not only bestowed by God, but that it is immediatly bestow'd by God upon Kings: and Refutes Bellarm. [...]de laico c. 6. maintaining, That the Ie­suits Doctrine in this, lessens Authority, and [Page] raises Factions, and contradicts both the Design and Word of God. Duvalius de suprem. potest. Rom. Pontif. p. 1. q. 2. Asserts that Kings derive their Rights by the Laws of God and Nature, non ab ipsa Republica & hominibus; and in all this the Fanaticks and Republicans agree with the Jesuits against Monarchy.

In the Civil Law this is expresly as­serted, Cod. de vet. Cod. enucleand. Deo auctore nostrum gubernante imperium quod nobis a coelesti majestate traditum est, Nov. 6. in init. Nov. 133. in proem. in Nov. 80.85, 86. Iustinian acknowledges his Ob­ligation to care for his People, because he received the Charge of them from God; and certainly Subjects are happier, if their Kings acknowledge this, as a duty to God, than if they only think it a Charge con­fer'd on them by their People, and that they are therefore answerable to them.

That the Doctors and Commentators are of this opinion, is too clear to need Citations, vid. Arnis. cap. de Essentia Ma­jest: Granswinkel. de jur. Maj. cap. 1. & 2.

As to the Heathens, Hesiod. in Theog. verse 96. sayes [...] Kings are from God. Homer sayes their Honour is from [Page] God [...] — Iliad. 1. verse 197. Themistcus asserts, that the Regal Power came from God, Orat. 5. with whom a­grees Dion. Chrisostom Orat. 1. diotog. a­pud Stob. serm. &c. Plat. in polit. &c. But above all, Aristotle in polit. [...]. And Plutarch. Ages & Cleom. [...].

If to these Statutes and Citations it be answered, that God Almighty may indeed be the principal and chief Author of Mo­narchy, and that Monarchs may derive their Power from him, as from the Su­pream Beeing, that directs all more im­mediat Causes, and yet the People may be the immediat Electors of Monarchs, and so Kings may derive immediatly from them their Power; and thus these Statutes are not inconsistent with the principle laid down by Buchanan and others, whereby they assert, that Kings in general, and par­ticularly the Kings of Scotland, derive their Power immediatly from the People.

To this my answers are, that first, if we consider the proprietie of the Words, there can be nothing more inconsistent, than that Kings should derive their Power from God Almightie alone, and yet that [Page] they should derive it from the People, for the Word Alone, is of all other words the most exclusive. 2 dly, The design of the Parliament in that acknowledgement was to condemn, after a long Rebellion, the unhappie Principles which had kin­dled it; and amongst which, one of the chief was, that our Kings derived their Power from the People, and therefore they might qualifie, or resume what they at first gave, or might oppose all Streaches in the Power they had given, and might even punish, or depose the King when he transgressed, none of which Principles could have been sufficiently condemned, by acknowledging that, though God was the chief Author, yet the People were the immediat Electors. 3 dly, There need­ed no Act of Parliament be made for ac­knowledging God to be the chief Author, and first Fountain of every Power, for that was never contraverted amongst Chri­stians. 4 thly, That foolish glosse cannot at all consist with the Inferences deduced from that Principle in the former Statutes: for in the 2. Act, Par. 1. Char. 2. It is in­ferr'd from His Majesties holding His Roy­al Power from God alone, that therefore he hath the sole choice of his own Of­ficers [Page] of State, Privy Counsellers, and Judges; And in the 5. Act, it is inferr'd from the same Principle, that because he derives his Power from God alone, that therefore it is Treason to rise in Arms without his Consent, upon any pretext whatsoever: And in the 2. Act, Par. 3. Char. 2. It is concluded, that because our Kings derive their Power from God Almighty alone, therefore it is Treason in the People to interrupt, or divert their Succession, upon any Difference in Reli­gion, or other pretext whatsoever; whereas all this had been false, and inept Rea­soning, if the design of the Parliament had not been to acknowledge that our Kings derived not their Power from the People, for though they derived their Power from God, as the supream Beeing only, and not as the immediat bestower, and if the People were the immediat bestowers of that Power, then the People might still have pretended, that they who gave the Power, might have risen in their own Defence, when they saw the same abused, and might have diverted the Succession, when it de­scended upon a person who was an enemy to their Interest: but how false this glosse is, will appear more fully from the fol­lowing [Page] Arguments, and it is absolutely inconsistent with St. Augustins opinion, formerly cited, wherein he forbids to at­tribute the giving of Kingdoms to any o­ther but to God.

My second Argument for proving that Kings derive their Power from God alone, and not from the People, shall be from the principles of Reason. For First, The Almighties design being to manifest his Glory, in Creating a World, so vast and regular as this is, and his goodnesse in Governing it, and that Men might live peaceably in it, having both Reason and Time to Serve him, it was consequential that he should have reserved to himself the immediat dependence of the supream Power, to preclude the extravagant and restlesse multitude, from those frequent Revolutions which they would make, and Desolations which they would occasion, if they thought that the supream Power depended on them, and that they were not bound to obey them for Conscience sake; so that those expressions in Scrip­ture were very useful in this to curb our Insolencies, and to fix our restlesnesse; and it seems that Kings are in Scripture, said to be gods, to the end it might be [Page] clear that they were not made by Men· 2 dly, God Almighty being King of Kings, it was just, that as inferiour Magistrats derived their Power from the King, so Kings should derive their Power from God, who is their King; and this seems to be clear from that analogy, which runs in a Dependence, and Chain through the whole Creation. 3 dly, As this is most suitable to the principles of Reason, so it is most consonant the analogy of Law, by which it is declar'd, that no Man is master of his own Life, or Limbs, nemo est Dominus membrorum suorum; and therefore, as no Man can lawfully take away his own Life, so neither can he transfer the power of dis­posing upon it to any other Man, and consequently this Power is not derived to Kings and Princes by privat Men, but is bestowed upon them by God Almighty, who is the sole Arbiter of Life and Death, and who can only take it away, because he gave it: And if it be objected, that this last branch of the Argument, seems either to prove nothing, or else to prove that there can be no Elective Monarchies. To this it is answered, that even in E­lective Monarchies, the Nomination pro­ceeds only from the People, but the Roy­al [Page] Power from God, as we see in infe­riour Magistracies, such as Burrows Roy­al, &c. the People Elect, and so the No­mination is from them, but the power of Governing proceeds from the King, and not from the Electors, and therefore as the People who Elected the Magistrats in these Towns, cannot Depose them by their own Authority, so neither can the People Depose their King, but the pu­nishment of him belongs to God Almigh­ty. I confesse, that if the People Choose a King with expresse Condition, that they may punish him as the Lacedemonian Kings were punishable by those Magistrats, call'd the Ephori, the Kings are in that case accountable to the People, but then they are not Monarchs, having supream Power as our Kings have, and who are therefore declar'd to hold their Power immediatly from God, and not to be at all punishable by the People.

The 4 th Argument that I shall use, for proving that our Kings derive not their power from the People, shall be from the natural Origin of Monarchie, and of ours in particular, which I conceive to be that Right of Paternal Power which is stated in them; for understanding where­of, [Page] it is fit to know, that God at first created only one Man, that so his Children might be subject to him, as all Children yet are to their Parents: and therefore the Jesuitical and Fanatical Principles, that every man is born Free, and at Liberty to choose what form of Government he pleas­eth, was ever, and is most false, for every man is born a Subject to his own Parents, who, if they were not likewise subject to a Su­periour Power, might judge and punish them Capitally, lead them out to War, and do all other things that a King could do, as we see the Patriarches did in their own Families. And as long as it is known who is the Root of the Family, or who repre­sents it, there is no place for Election, and people Elect only when the memory of this is lost, and such as overcome the Heads of Families in Batle, succeed to them in their Paternal Right.

If it be answered, that the Father may by nature pretend to a power over his Children, or it may be an Elder Brother over his Cadets, yet there is no tye in nature subjecting Collaterals, as Uncles, and their descendents to those descended from the Eldest Familie. To this I reply, that 1. This power over all the Family [Page] was justly given by nature, to shun divi­sions, for else every little Family should have erected it self in a distinct Govern­ment, and the weakest had still been a Prey. 2. We see that Abraham did lead out to War, and in every thing Act as King, not only over his own Children, but all the Family, and whole Nations, are call'd the Children of Israel, the Chil­dren of Edom, &c. 3. That must be con­cluded to be establish'd by natural instinct, which all men in all Ages and Places al­low and follow; but so it is, that all Na­tions in all Places, and Times have ever al­low'd the Eldest Son of the Eldest Family to govern all descended from the Stock, without new Elections; and the Author of the late famous Moral Essayes have ad­mir'd this as one of the wisest Maxims that we have from Natural Instinct; for if the wisest, or strongest were to be choos'd, there had still been many Rivals and so much Faction and Discord, but it is still certain who is the Eldest Son, and this precludes all Debate, and prevents all Dissention: For applying this to our Case, it is fit to know, that if we believe not our Historians, then none else can prove that the People of Scotland did at first Elect a King, that being contrarie to the acknow­ledgements [Page] of our own Statutes; and all Buchannans Arguments, for restricting Kings, being founded upon the authority of our Historians, who, (as he sayes,) assert that K. Fergus was first Elected King by the People, if he be not able to prove that our Kings owe their Crowns to the Election of the People, without any inherent or previous Right, all his Arguments evanish to nothing, but on the other hand, if we consider exactly our Historians, we will find that our Kings Reign over us by this Paternal Power; and though I am not very fond of Fabulous Antiquities, yet if Tradition, or Histories can be believ'd in any thing, they should at least be believ'd against Buchannan, and those who make use of them, to restrict the power of our Kings, and by our Histories it is clear, that Gathelus having led some Forces into Egypt, he after several Victo­ries, setl'd in Portugal, call'd from him Portus Gatheli, from which an Collonie of that Race transported it self into Ireland, and another into Scotland; nor should this be accounted a Fable, since Cornelius Tacitus, in the Life of Agricola, makes the Scots to be of Spanish, and the Picts to be of German Extraction.

The Scottish Collonies finding them­selves [Page] opprest by the Brittains, and Picts, they sent over into Ireland to Ferquhard, and he sent them a considerable Supplie, under the Command of Fergus his Son, who having secur'd them against their Enemies, all the Heads of the Tribes ac­knowledged him for their King, and swore that they should never admit of any other Form of Government then Mo­narchie; and that they should never obey any except Him and his Posterity, which if they brake, they wish'd that all the Plagues and Miseries that had formerly fallen on their Predecessors, might again fall upon their Posterity, as the punish­ment of that Perjury. All which Religious Vows and Promises, Seal'd by those dread­ful Oaths voluntarly given, were graven on Marble Tables, and Consign'd for pre­servation into the custody of their Priests: and these are Boetius own words, Fol. 10. From which I observe, 1. That as our Laws assert, that our Kings derive their Power from God, and not from the People, so we ought not to believe the contrary upon the Faith of our Historians, except they were very clear, and unanimous in contradicting our Laws, whereas it ap­pears to me, that our Laws agree with our Historie, for Gathelus was not at all [Page] Elected by the People, but was himself the Son of a King, and did Conquer by his own Subjects, and Servants, and all those who are descended from his Collonies, were by Law oblidg'd to obey the Eldest Son, and Representative of that Royal Fa­mily. And Ferquhard is acknowledg'd to have been his only Successor, nor did ever any of the Scottish Tribes pretend to the Supremacie, and our Histories bear, that none of our Tribes would yield to another; and the Fatal Marble Chair that came from Spain, remaining with these who went to Ireland, does evince that the Birth-right remain'd with them; and there­fore when Fergus the Son of Ferquhard came over, he brought over with him the Marble Chair, which was the mark of Empire. And Boetius immediatly upon his arrival calls him King, and Fordon the most Ancient of our Historians, lib. 1. cap. 36. calls him, Fergusius Filius Ferardi aut Ferquhardi ex antiquarum Regium prosapia genitus, qui ambitione Regnandi stimulatus magnam sibi Iuvenum copiam assimulavit & Albionem continuo progressus est & ibidem super eos Regem primum se constituit, that is to say, he made himself the first King▪ therefore K. Iames. Basil. Doron, pag. [Page] 201. asserts, that K. Fergus made himself King and Lord as well of the whole Lands, as of the whole Inhabitants. 2. We read nothing at all of the consent of the Peo­ple, but of the Heads of the Tribes, who had no Commission from the People, each of them having by his Birth-right a Power to Command his own Tribe, and conse­quently, the Royal Power was not de­rived to Fergus from the People, but had it's Original from this Birth-right that was both in them, and Fergus, and he succed­ed in the Right of those Chiefs to Com­mand their respective Families; and Boetius brings in King Fergus, lib. 1. num. 5. Speaking of himself, as a pious Parent, as one who owes to them what a Parent owes to his Children: sunt pij Parentes in Liberos propensi, & debemus vobis quod proli genitores. And the consent given by the Chief of the Clanns, and the People did not give, but declare the former Right, as our consent now does in Acts concerning the Prerogative, and as the Vote of the Inquest does in the Service of Heirs; and thus at the Coronation of our Kings, it is still said by our Histo­rians, that such a man was declared King, communi suffragio & acclamatione. 3. This [Page] consent being only given in the Armie cannot be said to have been univer­sally by the People, nor do we read that the People did Commissionat the Armie, or that the Armie consulted the People; and in general it cannot be instanc'd, that the People did in any Nation universally consent to Election, nor is it possible all the People can meet. And in Pole, which is the only Elective Monarchie we know, the Free-holders only consent, and yet every privat Man and Woman have as great interest, according to these pretend­ed Laws of Nature, as they have: & potior est conditio negantis. Nor do we find that the Commons, and mean People have any interest in the Elections, of our Magi­strats, or Parliament Men; so that Popular freedom by Birth, and the interest of the People, in Popular Elections are but meer Cheats invented to engage the Rabble, in an aversion to the establish'd Government, when factious and insolent Spirits, who cannot submit themselves to Government, design to cheat the Multitude by fair Pre­tences, and to bribe them by Flatterie.

If it be pretended, that it is not cer­tain, whether King Fergus was eldest So [...] to Ferquhard, nor is it probable, that if he had been such, he would have preferr'd [Page] an uncertain Conquest in Scotland, to his secure Succession in Ireland. To this it is answered, that all our Histories bear, that King Ferquhard sent his Son Fergus, and when a Son is spoken of indefinitly, in such Cases, he is actually understood to be the Eldest. 2. He brought with him the Marble Chair, the mark of Empire, which would not have been allow'd to a Cadet. 3. It is said, that having settled the affairs of Scotland, he returned into Ireland to settle the differences there about the choosing of a new King, which does import that he should have been King,, if he had not prefer'd Scotland to Ireland, and the reason of this preference was, be­cause Ireland was then divided amongst many Kings, and his Predecessors had but a very small share of it at that time, and Scotland being a part of a greater Isle, he probably found in this greater Isle, a higher flight for his Hopes, and more latitude for his Ambition.

But albeit the Kings of Scotland had been originally and at first elected by the People, yet it does not at all follow neces­sarly as Buchannan, Dolman, and our other Republicans pretend, that therefore they may reject them at their pleasure, or which [Page] is all one, when they imagine that the Kings Elected by them serve not the ends for which they were designed, and that for these Reasons. 1. It cannot be de­ny'd, but that the People may consent to an Election of a Monarch without Limitatons; for from the Principles of Nature, we may learn, that whatever is in ones power may be by them transfer'd upon another; and there­fore, if the People be indew'd with a power of governing themselves, they may certainly transfer this Power upon another; and we see that all Christians, and even our Republicans allow, that men may sell themselves to be Slaves, a custome not on­ly mention'd but approv'd by God him­self, so far does consent reach beyond what is necessary for maintaining this Point. 2. If this could not be, then there could be no such thing as absolute Mo­narchies, which is against the receiv'd Opinion of all Nations, and against the Doctrine of all Authors, who, though they debate that this, or that Monarchie, in a particular Countrey is not Absolute, yet it was never contraverted by any man alive, but that the People might consent, and in many places have consented to ab­solute Monarchies; and by the famous Lex [Page] Regia, amongst the Romans, Populus ei & in eum omne Imperium suum, & Potesta­tem transtulit, instit. de jur. nat. gent. & civ. § 6. Mention'd likewise by that Fa­mous Lawyer Vlpian, l. 1. ff. de consti­tut. Princ.

3. We see this consequence to be very false in many other cases, and therefore it cannot be necessary here, for we find that a man chooses a Wife, yet it is not in his power to put her away; Cardinals choose the Pope, and Chapters the Bishop, and yet they cannot depose them; the Common Council choose Magistrats, and yet they cannot lay them aside.

4. This Reasoning is condemn'd as most fallacious, by most learn'd, and dis-interested Lawyers, and therefore it cannot be infal­lible, as is pretended: vide Arnisaeum cap. 3. num. 2. Haenon. dis. Pol. 9. num. 44. Panorm. ad cap. 4. de Cler. non residend. Zasius ad l. non ambigitur num. 3 ff. de legibus, Nor have any Lawyers differ'd from this common opinion of mankind, except some very few, who have differ'd from a Principle of Pique, rather than of Judgement.

The next thing that I am to prove in this my first Proposition, is, that Our [Page] King is an Absolute Monarch, and has the Supream Power within this his King­dome, and this I shall endeavour to prove, First, From our positive Law, 2. By se­veral Reasons deduc'd from our Funda­mental Laws and Customs. 3. From the very nature of Monarchy it self, and the Opinion of Lawyers who write upon that Subject, and who define Absolute Monarchie to be a Power that is not li­mited or restricted by coactive Law, Arnisaeus, de essentia Majest. cap. 3. num. 4.

By the 25. Act Parl. 15. Ia. 6. The Parlia­ment does acknowledge, that it cannot be deny'd, but his Majesty is a free Prince, of a Soveraign Power, having as great Liber­ties, and Prerogatives, by the Laws of this Realm, and Priziledge of his Crown, and Diadem, as any other King, Prince, or Potentat whatseever. And by the 2. Act Parl. 18. Ia. 6. The Parliament consenting to his Majesties restoring of Bishops, declare and acknowledge the ab­solutenesse of our Monarchy, in these words. The remeed whereof properly be­longs to his Majesty, whom the whole Estates, of their bound n duty, with most hearty and faithful affection, humbly and truly ac­knowledge to be a soveraign Monarch, abso­lute [Page] Prince, Iudge and Governour, over all Persons, Estates and Causes, both Spiritu­al and Temporal, within his said Re­alm.

And by the first Act of that same Par­liament. The Estates and whole Body of this present Parliament, acknowledge all with one voluntar, humble, faithful, united heart, mind, and consent his Majesties soveraign Authority, Princely Power, Royal Preroga­tive, and priviledge of his Crown, over all Persons, Estates, and Causes whatsoever, with­in his said Kingdom.

And because no Acts were ever made, giving Prerogatives, nor even declaring Prerogatives to have been due, until some special controversie did require the same, so that Possession, and not positive Law, was the true measure of the Prerogative; there­fore the Parliament doth in that same Act approve, and perpetually confirm all the Royal Prerogatives, as absolutely, amply, and freely in all respects, and considera­tions, as ever his Majesty, or any of his Royal Predecessors possessed, used, and exercised the same; and they promise that his Majesties Imperial Power, which God has so enlarg'd, shall never be in any sort impar'd, prejudg'd, or diminish­ed, [Page] but rather reverenc'd, and augment­ed as far as possibly they can.

In the preface to our Books of Law, call'd Regiam Majestatem, it is acknow­ledg'd that the King has no Superiour, except the Creator of Heaven and Earth, who Governs all. Forreign Lawyers al­so, such as Lansius de Lege Regiae, num. 49. and others do number the King of Scotland amongst the absolute Monarchs.

My second Argument for proving our King to be an absolute Monarch, shall be from my former position, wherein I hope I have prov'd sufficiently, that our Kings derive not their Right from the People; for if the King derive not his Power from the People, the Monarchy can never be limited by them, and con­sequently it must be an absolute Monar­chy; for there could be nothing more unjust, more unnatural, and more inso­lent, then that the People should pre­tend a Right to limit and restrict that Power which they never gave; and the only reason why Buchannan, and his Complices, do assert our Monarchy to be a qualified and limited Monarchy, being that the People, when they first Elected our Kings, did qualifie and restrict their [Page] Government. This position being false as appears by the absolute Oath, and origi­nal Constitution above set down, which is lessened, or qualified by no condition whatsoever, therefore the conclusion drawn from it must be false likewise.

The third Argument shall be deduced from the Nature of Monarchy, and in or­der thereto, I lay down as an uncon­troverted principle, that every thing must be constructed to be perfect in its own Nature, and no mixture is presum'd to be in any thing; but he who alledges, that the thing controverted is added against Nature, must prove the same; and there­fore since Monarchy is that Government whereby a King is Supream, the Monarch must be presum'd, neither to be oblig'd to Govern by the advice of the Nobility, (for that were to confound Monarchy with Aristocracie) nor by the advice of the People (for that were to confound it with Democracie;) and consequently if Bu­channan, and others design to prove, that our Kings are obliged to Govern, by the ad­vice either of the Nobility, or People, or are subject to be Chastised by them, they must prove, that our Kings, at their first Creation, were Elected upon these Con­ditions, [Page] the very Essence and Beeing of Monarchy, consisting in its having a Su­pream, and absolute Power. Arnisaeus c. 30. Vasquez l. 1. Contrav. c. 47. Budaeus in l. princeps. Zas. ibid. ff. de legibus, pone enim, says Arnisaeus, populum in Regem ha­bere aequalem potestatem neutrum pro summo venditari posse. When we hear of a Mo­narch, the first notion we have is, that he is subject to none; for to be a Sub­ject and a Monarch, are inconsistent; but if we hear that his Nobility, or People, or both may Depose, or punish him, we necessarly conclude by the Light of Nature, that they, and not He, are the supream Governours. Thus we see, that in allowing our King to be an absolute Monarch, we have only allow'd him to be a Monarch, and to have what natural­ly belongs to him, and that by as necessary a consequence; for as every Man is presumed to be reasonable, because reason is the Es­sence of Man, so is a King presum'd to be absolute, except these limitations where­by the Monarchy is restricted, could be prov'd by an expresse Contract.

4 thly, How is it imaginable, but that if our Predecessors had Elected our Kings upon any such Conditions, but they would have [Page] been very careful to have limited the Monarchy, and this Contract had with these conditions been recorded, where­as on the contrary we find, that albeit great care was taken to record the Oath of Allegiance made to the King, and to grave the same upon Marble Tables, con­sign'd unto the custody of their Priests, as sacred Oracles; yet none of all our Historians make the least mention of any limitations in these Oaths, or by any o­ther Contract; and to this day our Oaths of Supremacy, and Allegiance, are clog­ged and lessened by no limitations.

If it be answered, that these limitations do arise from the nature of the thing it self, there being nothing more unrea­sonable, and contrary to the nature of Government, then that a Monarch, who was design'd to be a Protector to his People, should be allow'd to destroy them. To this it is answered, that Monarchy by its nature is absolute, as has been prov'd, and consequently these pretended limitati­ons are against the nature of Monarchy, and so arise not▪ ex natura rei, nor can there any thing be more extravagant, than to assert that, that which is contrare to the nature of Monarchy, should arise from [Page] its nature, and it might be with greater reason pretended, that because the great design of men in Marriage, is to get a Help­er, that therefore they may repudiat their Wives, when they find them unsupport­able, and that the putting them away in such cases, is consistent enough with the nature of their Oath, though simple, and absolute; this cause of Divorce arising from the nature of Marriage it self: This is after Vowes to make Inquiry, and what Vow, or Oath could be useful, if the giver were to be Iudge how far he were ty'd, and if his conveniency were the measure of his Obligation. But since I shall hereafter ful­ly prove, that these limitations are as dan­gerous to the Subjects, as to the Prince, and that ten thousand times moe Murders, and other Insolencies have been committed in Civil Wars, upon the false pretence of Liberty, than ever was committed by the worst of Kings; it must necessarily follow, that those limitations ought not to be ad­mitted after an absolute Oath, for eviting inconveniencies, which at the ballance ap­pear to be of no weight.

5. It cannot be denyed, but our Kings have ever had the power of Peace and War, the calling and disolving of Parli­ments, [Page] and a negative Voice in them, the remitting of Crimes, and nomination of Judges; and therefore it must be pre­sumed, that since the Law has not limited them in those things, it has limited them in nothing; for by involving us in War, they may expose our Fortunes, our Wives and Children to the greatest of dangers; and it had been great folly to limit them in any thing, after those great Prerogatives were allowed: And though our Histories do bear, That Peace and War were ordinarly determined by the ad­vice, and consent of the Nobility, yet that does no more infer a necessity not to do otherwayes, than the ordinary stile of all our Proclamations, bearing to be with advice of our Privy Council, infers a ne­cessity upon the King to do nothing with­out their advice; and how could the con­sent of the Nobility have been necessary in the former Ages, since all their Right flowed from the King Himself, and that neither they then, nor the Parliament now, had, or have a Power equal with the King, much less above Him, as shall be fully proved in the first Conclusion, that I am to draw from this Doctrine; only to what I have said, I must here add, that [Page] it being proposed to our Predecessors, at the swearing the Oath of Allegiance to King Fergus, whether they would be go­vern'd by a King, who should have ab­solute Power, or by the Nobility, or by a Multitude? it was answered, that lest they should have many Kings in place of one, they abhorr'd to bestow the the Absolute Power either upon the Nobility, or upon the Multitude.

6. I cannot but exceedingly commend our Predecessors, for making this reason­able choice of an absolute Monarchy, for a Monarch that is subject to the impetuous caprices of the Multitude when giddie, or to the incorrigible Factiousness of Nobility when interested, is in effect no Govern­ment at all; and though a mixt Monar­chy may seem a plausible thing to Meta­phisical Spirits and School-men, yet to such as understand Government, and the World, it cannot but appear impracticable; for if the People understand that it is in their Power to check their Monarch, the desire of command is so bewitching a thing, that probably they will be at it upon all occasions; and so when the King commands one thing, the Nobility will command another, and it may be the [Page] People a third. And as it implyes a contradi­ction, that the same Persons should both command and obey: so where find we those sober and mortified men, who will obey, when they may command. Let us consider what dreadful extravagancies, and cruelties appear'd at Rome, betwixt the Tribunes of the People, and the Senat, one of six Kings had a Son, who ravish'd a Woman, and thereupon the Kings were expell'd, but every year almost produced a Civil War, wherein vast numbers of free Romans were murther'd, and in the contest betwixt Sylla and Marius, 90. Senators, 15. Consuls, 2600. Gentle­men, and 100000. others were murther'd, and after the whole Common-wealth was exhausted in the Wars betwixt Cesar and Pompey; and in the immediat succeeding War betwixt Augustus, Anthonie, and Le­pidus, wherein every man lost either a Brother, a Father, or a Son, Rome re­turn'd again to its Monarchy, and was ne­ver so happy, as under Augustus. The People of Naples complaining lately of their Taxes, put themselves under the Command of Reforming Massaniello, by whose ex­travagancies they suffer'd more in one Mo­neth, than they had done under the Spain­sh [Page] cruelty in an hundred years. But our late Reformation in Brittain seems to have been permitted by God, to let us see that mix'd Governments having power to Reform Kings, are more insufferable than Tirrany; for by it we saw that the mul­titude consists of Knaves and Fools, and both these are the worst of Governors, that the best of Kings will be thought wick­ed, when Subjects are his Judges, who resolve not to obey, and that it is impos­sible to know what is right, when every man is Judge of what is wrong. The im­practicableness likewise of this popular Su­premacy, will yet more convincingly ap­pear, if we consider that the People are to be Judges, because of their natural free­dom, for then all men should have equal right to be Reformers, and these can never meet nor consult together: And if it be answered, that the People may send their Representatives, my Reply is, that the great­est half of the Nation are neither Free­holders nor Burgesses; and yet those only are call'd the Representatives of the people; and what absurd Tricks and Cheats are us'd in choosing even those Representatives, and it may be the resolution prevails by the Vote of the greatest Fool or Knave in the [Page] Meeting; and if any one man remove by sickness or accident, at the passing of a Vote; or if any of the multitude be bryb'd or have prejudice, though on a most unjust account, that which would have been the interest of the Nation, turns to be against it, so infallible a Judge is the multitude. And I have seen in popular Elections, hun­dreds cry for a thing, and thereafter ask what was the matter.

7 ly, If the the Proceres Regni, or No­bility are to be the check upon our Kings, and to be trusted with this coercive power of calling them to an account, as Buchan­nan pretends; then I desire to know who invested them with this power, for it was never pretended that it is naturally inhe­rent in them: And if the people invested them, I desire to know by what Act the people transferr'd this power upon them, for they have no Law, nor original Con­stitution for this, as our Kings have for their Right; and passing over the dangers may arise from their having this power, because of the Factiousness, Poverty, Picques, Humors, or Ignorance that may be incident to them, it seems to me strange, why we the people should trust such to be our Checks over the King, who are His [Page] own Creatures, owing their Honours to Him, and expecting dayly from Him Im­ployments and Estates? and if they and the people differ, who is to be Judges of those Controversies? Nor can the Nobility and Commons assembled in Parliament have this coercive power, for the Reasons which I shall hereafter offer; and there­fore none has it, but the King is Supream in himself, and accountable to none, save God Almighty alone. But more of this will be found in the Sequel of this Dis­course, upon other occasions.

8 ly, Whatever proves Monarchy to be an ex­cellent Government, does by the same Rea­son prove absolute Monarchy to be the best Government; for if Monarchy be to be commended, because it prevents Divi­sions, then a limited Monarchy, which allows the people a share, is not to be com­mended, because it occasions them; if Mo­narchy be commended, because there is more expedition, secresie, and other ex­cellent Qualities to be found in it, then ab­solute Monarchy is to be commended above a limited one; because a limited Monarch must impart his secrets to the people, and must delay the noblest designs until mali­tious and factious Spirits be either gain'd or [Page] overcome: And the same anallogy of Rea­son will hold in reflecting upon all other advantages of Monarchy, the Examination whereof I dare trust to every mans own breast.

9 ly, It was fit for the People that their Kings should be above Law, because the severity of Law will not comply with that useful, tho illegal Justice which is requisit in special cases, for since summum jus is summa injuria, and since impossibile est sola innocentia vivere, we may well conclude, that absolute Monarchy is necessary to protect the guilty innocent by Remissions, to break Laws justly, in a Court of Chancery, and to crook them uprightly in our Courts by an officium nobile. For strict and rigid Law is a greater Tyrant, than absolute Monarchy.

I know that some pretend that the 25. Act 15. Par. Ia. 6. declaring the King to be an absolute Prince, is only to be interpreted in opposition to the Popes Authority, he be­ing so far absolute, only as not to be Subject to the Pope, who pretended then a Juris­diction over all Kings. But the answers to this are clear; First, This Statute is made to declare the Kings of Scotland to have Right by their Inherent Prerogative, to their exacting Customs for all Merchan­dice, [Page] because they are absolute Monarchs, which Argument had been ridiculous, if this absoluteness had only been in opposition to the Pope, nor is there any mention of the Pope in all this Statute; and what interest hath the Pope in our Customs. 2 dly, When the Kings power is by our Statutes rais'd above the Pope, it is done by de­claring him Supream, and not by declar­ing him absolute. 3 dly, All Lawyers, and States-men divide Monarchies in ab­solute and limited Monarchies, and the word Absolute, is still taken in opposition to limited, as is clear by Arnisaeus, Bodin, &c. And whereas it is pretended that these words in this Statute, acknowledging the King to be absolute, are only exprest tran­siently and enunciatively, but are not Decisive and Statutory. It is answered, that our Parliaments never give our Kings Prerogatives, but only acknowledge what our Kings have by an Inherent and Inde­pendent Right; and these words in this Sta­tute, are of all others in our Laws, exprest with most of Energy, for they are usher'd with, It cannot be deny'd, but His Majesty has as great Liberties and Prerogatives, as any Monarch whatsoever: and this acknow­ledgment is made the Foundation of His [Page] Right to exact Customs. And in true Reasoning, nothing is made the proposition of an Argument, but that which is most uncontrovertable.

I foresee that our Fanaticks and Repub­licans, will be ready to mis-represent ab­solute Monarchy, as Tyrany: But a Ty­rant is he, who has no Right to Govern; and so he may be oppos'd, as the common Enemy of all the Society. And it is ridi­culous to pretend with Hobs, That we are oblig'd to obey whoever is once in possession; for that were to invite men to Torment us, and to justifie Crimes by success. Nor can it be from this deduc'd, that since it is lawful to oppose any who are in Posses­sion, that it is therefore lawful to oppose our Monarchy: because they have (as Algernon Sidney pretends·) Vsurpt over us, a power inconsistent with our natural Liberty. And owe their Right to that Prescription, which the greatest Tyrants may maintain by force, and to that consent which they may procure by Violence, or Flattery. For to this I answer, That our Monarchs have their power establisht by Birth-right, by Consent, by Prescription, and by Law; which are all the wayes whereby any Right can be legally Establisht. But it is a gross [Page] mistake in Buchannan, and others, to con­clude a lawful King punishable as a Tyrant, because he becomes vitious: For though God may punish him as such, yet his People cannot; that were to raise the Servant above the Master, and to occasi­on a thousand Disorders to redress one. and when King Iames acknowledges, that a good King thinks Himself made for his People, and not His People for Him. That is only said with reference to the Kings, duty to God, but not with Relation to the Peoples Duty to their King. And when Trajan delivering the Sword to the Proconsul, said Pro me, si mereor, in me. Grotius observes justly, That this was spoke as a Philosopher, and not to subject himself to the others jurisdiction. And so Buchannan did most traiterously advise the Printing this on our Coin. Nor do's this Title of absolute Monarch, empower him to dispose upon our Estates. For it is fit to know, that Government is the Kings, and Property is the Subjects Birth-right. Mo­narchy is a Government, and so can include no more, than what is necessary for Govern­ment. And though the Turk or Mogul, ar­rogat to themselves, the total Property of their Subjects, in this they are Tyrants, and [Page] not Kings. And when our Statute above-mentioned, says, That our Kings have as much power as they, this is only to be un­derstood of what Right they have by the Nature of Monarchy, Rex nomen est juris­dictionis non dominij, say the Lawyers: For the Law having said, that all things were the Emperours, l: bene a Zenone. §. Sed sci­mus C. de Quadr: Praescript. The Emperor as­ked the famous Lawyer Bulgarus in what sense all was his, who is mightily prais'd for having answer'd, Omnia Rex possidet imperio singuli dominio, Accurs: in praem. ff. in Verb: Sanctioni, For what is once ours cannot be taken away without our consent: And therefore by the 5. Act, 1. Par. Ch. 2. It is declared lawful for the King to make Gari­sons, His Majesty entertaining them on His own expence. And by the Act 3. Par. 3. Ch: 2. It is declared that the people shall not be subject to free Quarter, &c. And yet right reason teacheth us, that all the Land of Scotland having been once the Kings (for the Law saith, that the King is Safitus rati­one Coronae, in all the Lands of Scotland) His Majesty is therefore presumed Proprietar of all, and every thing belongs to him, if some other cannot instruct a right which is the sense of that Law, Nemo terram nisi authoritate [Page] Regiâ possideto: And of King Malcolm Can­mor's Law, that Rex distribuit totam Terram Scotiae hominibus suis. And it therefore clear­ly follows, that the King has Dominium di­rectum, a right of Superiority, as all Superi­ors have, and that the people on whom he has bestowed these Lands, are oblig'd to con­cur in the expence with him, for the defence of it. For as if he had retain'd the Property, he would have been able with the Fruits and Rents to have defended it. So it is not agree­able to sense or reason that they to whom he has granted it, should not be oblig'd to de­fend it, especially seing all the Rights made by the King, are in Law presum'd meer Do­nations; For it cannot be deny'd but that all Lands were originally granted by the King, and so must have originally belong'd to him­self: for no person can give what is not his own; and our Law acknowledgeth, that all Lands belong to the King, except where the present Heretor can instruct a Right flowing from our King, and that he is the Fountain of Property, as well as of Justice. 2. In Law, all who are ingag'd in a Society, as to any thing that is the subject of the Society, should contribute to its preservation; and there­fore the King having the Dominium dire­ctum, and the Vassal Dominium ut ile ▪ it fol­lows, that the Vassals of the Kingdom should [Page 33] contribute towards its preservation, and the King may expect justly an equal Contributi­on towards the defraying the necessary ex­pence, and thence it was, that by our old Law, all Heretors were obliged to furnish some unum Militem, unum Sagittarium, or Equi­tem: Some a Bow-man, some a Souldier, some a Horse-man: But thereafter the King having changed these Holdings, because all betwixt 60. and 16. were obliged to come to the Field with 40. days Provision, which was all that was then necessary; it follows, that now that way of making War being al­tered, the Subjects should contribute to­wards the way that is necessary for defend­ing the Kingdom. 3. The King by His Forces protects our Persons, and by His Na­vies protects our Commerce, by His Am­bassadors manages all our publick Affairs, and by His Officers, and Judges, administrates Justice to us: And so it is just that all this should be done on our expences, and that we should defray the publick expences of the Government, and so much the rather, be­cause by a special Statute with us, it is de­clared that the King may impose what He pleases on all that is Imported, or may dis­charge us to export any thing without which we could not live; and what ever he gets [Page 34] from us, he distributes amongst us, without applying one shilling of it to his own pri­vate use.

The King, or whoever has the manage­ment of the Government, have in the opini­on of Lawyers, Dominium eminens, a Para­mount and transcendent Right over even private Estates, in case of necessity, when the common Interest cannot be otherwise maintained; and this Grotius, though no violent friend of Monarchy, doth assert ve. ry positively and clearly; and it cannot be denied that a King may take any mans Lands, and build a Garrison upon it, paying for it; and that in case of a Siege, the King may or­der whole Suburbs to be burnt down for the security of the Town: And whence is this power, save from that Paramount and Super­eminent Right that the King has over all pri­vate Estates, for the good of the whole So. ciety and Kingdom? Nor can it be denyed▪ that the King may in time of War Quarter freely; and it is in his power to declare War, when, or where he pleases: Nor do the former Statutes oppose this, for they exclude not necessity that has no Law, and is it self that Law which gave David right to eat the Shew-bread, and the Christian Emperours right to sell the Goods of the Church for [Page 35] maintaining their Armies, with consent of the Primitive Fathers; and this is so necessarily in­herent in all administration, that the very Ma­ster of a Ship has power to throw over the Goods of Passengers and Merchants in a storm, for the preservation of the Ship: And they are not enemies to the King, but to themselves, who would deny the King this power.

The third Class of Arguments that I am to use against these principles, shall be from Reason, and Experience in Fortification and Corroboration of our positive Law, and the nature of our Monarchy; for since humane Reason it self is lyable to so many Errors; and since men when they differ, are so wedded to their own Sentiments, that few are so wise as to see their own mistakes, or so ingenuous as to confess them, when they see them: Therefore prudence and necessity has obliged men to end all Debates by making Laws: and it is very great vanity and Insolence in any private men, to ballance their own private Sense against the publick Laws; that is to say, the Authoritative Sentiments, and the le­gal Sense of the Nation.

If we were then to Establish a new Mo­narchy, were it not prudent and reasonable, for us to consider what were the first Mo­tives [Page 36] which induced our Predecessors to a Monarchy, and Boethius and Lesly both tell us, that least they might be distracted by obeying too many, it was therefore fit to submit to one, if then this Reason was of force at first to make us submit to a Mo­narchy, it should still prevail with us to o­bey that Monarchy, and not gape idlely af­ter every new Model, Ne multos Reges sibi viderentur creare summam rerum aut optima­tibus, aut ipsi multitudini permittere asper­nabantur, sayes Boethius, fol: 6. Here the advantages of being Governed by Aristo­cracie, or Democracie, were expresly con­sidered and rejected; so that we have our Predecessors choice, founded on their way of Reasoning, added to the Authority of our Law; and after, we their Successors, had seen the mischiefs arising from the pre­tences of Liberty and Property, with all the advantages that seeming Devotion could add to these. Our Representatives, after two thousand years experience, and after a fresh Idaea of a long civil War, wherein these Arguments and Reasons adduced by Buchannan, were fortified and seconded by thousands of Debates: They did by many passionate Confessions, and positive Laws acknowledge, that the present Constituti­on [Page 37] of our Monarchy. is most excellent, Act 1. Par: 1. ch: 2 d. ‘That inevitable prejudices and miseries do accompany the invading the Royal Prerogative. Act 4. That all the troubles and miseries they had suffered, had sprung from these In­vasions. Act 11. That all the bondage they had groaned under, was occasioned by these Distractions. Act 2. Par. Sess: 2. Ch. 2.’ So that we have here al­so a Series of Parliaments, attesting the reasonableness of the Constitution of our Monarchy, and His Majesties Preroga­tives.

2. We must not conclude any thing un­reasonable, or unfit, because there are some inconveniencies in it; for all humane Constitutions have their own defects. But I dare say, the principles of my Adversa­ries have moe than mine; for common-wealths are not only subject to erre, because they have their passions as well as King; but they are subject to moe passions: for 1. These who Govern in Common-wealthes and Aristocrasies, have Rivals whom they fear, and against whom, upon that account, they bear Revenge, which Kings want. 2, They are not so much concerned in these, they Govern as Kings; the one considering [Page 38] the Common Interest, as a Tennent does Lands, of which he takes his present advan­tage, though he should destroy it; the other caring for it as a Proprietar does for his own Ground; the one Jading it, as a Man does a hired Horse; the other using it as a Man does his own. 3. The people are ordinarly Governed by these who are the worst of men; for these ordinarly can flatter and cheat most, and can best use the Hypocrites Vizorn: Whereas the best Men ordinarly are abstemious, modest, and love a private Life, and were there ever such Villains as Governed us in the last Age? And in this too, can we deny but our pre­tenders to Liberty and Property, are the Cheats of the Nation? Who, to be in Em­ployment, hate such as are in it, or are such as are discontented for being put out of it, or are Bankrupts, who resolve to make up their broken Fortunes by it. 4. Even good Men when they are raised to Govern, grow Insolent, of which Princes are not capable, for they are still the same. 5. Kings and Princes know they will be Charged with what they do; but the multitude knows, that the publick in general, and not any one Man will be blam­ed: and so every private Man thinks him­self [Page 39] secure, whilst he shifts it over on another; or else lessens it, by dividing it amongst ma­ny. 6. They are very subject to Factions, most Men scorning to obey their fellow Sub­jects; and when they are in Factions, who knows whom to obey; and those Factions will again subdivide in new ones, and so in infinitum; and when either prevails, they spare none, because their opposits are Enemies: But Kings pity even Rebels, remembring that they are their own. And I dare say, that moe were Murthered and Ruined in one year, of the last Reforming Age, than suffered by the great Turk, the Mogul, and the King of France in twenty years. And more severity was exercised in one year by these Reformers, than by all this Race of our Kings; these 600. years. 7. If it be said, that Kings have ill Ministers, so have Common-wealths and we observ'd in Scotland, that after we had taken from our King the Prerogative of chusing Judges and Counsellours, our Parliament did the next year, choose the greatest Block-heads, and Idiots in all the Nation, whom the Ring-leaders advanced, to the end they might Govern all themselves; to which Cheat, Kings cannot be lyable, it being their Interest to have able Mini­sters▪ [Page 40] And whereas Kings have no Interest to prefer one to another: yet in popular Governments, every one endeavours to prefer his own Relations. 8. In difficult Cases, haste and expedition requires, that one should be trusted: and even the Ro­mans behoved in great dangers, to imploy a Dictator, who was accountable to no man for any thing he did. 9. There can be no Secrecy in popular Governments, as in Monarchy, and what many must know, all may. 10. Enemies may alwayes get some in popular Governments to side with them, and upon specious pretexts, to re­tard all good Designs; and when popular men are Debating for shadows, the occasi­on slips away irrecoverably. 11. Either Common-wealths imploy no extraordinary persons, being ever jealous: or if any man become such by great Actions, or long Experience, he is presently ruined. And it is observable in this Age, that the great Zobieskie durst never undertake any great thing since he became King of Pole. And if we consider the severity of Venice against their Nobles, and their Executing Men, without citing or hearing them, and that upon meer jealousies. We must confess, that there is less Liberty there, than under [Page 41] the worst of Monarchies; nor was ever any people so miserable as Rome, during their Republick, having been ruined in every age with civil Wars, and having had no great man, who died not miserably, after many false and popular Accusations, and did not de Witt find little of that Justice which he magnified in Republicks.

But whatever may be said against the in­conveniencies arising from the passions, hu­mours, and insolencies of the Populace in Common-wealths, yet much more may be said against the allowing that Prerogative to them under a Monarchy, for that were to Distract for ever the Government be­twixt two contradictory Supream Powers, and make the People miserable in not know­ing whom to obey when they differ, and to make Government, which should defend against a Civil War, become the cause of it; for how can it be in reason expected, but that if the People know they can controle the King, ambitious, and discontented Ring-lerders, or ignorant and bigote Multitudes will be alwayes endeavouring to use this their Prerogative, since it seems alwayes glorious, and oft times advantagious to op­pose Kings, whereas on the other hand Kings cannot but be alwayes jealous of, and [Page 42] fear popular Invasions, and both these Po­wers shall like Neighbouring Princes, be alwayes endeavouring to gain advantages upon one another, and in these Contests shall be spent all the time and pains that should be bestowed in resisting the Common Enemy, which cannot but very much lessen the Love which Princes ought to have for their People, and the Respect which People ought to have for their Prince, and how can it be imagined, but that in this case the People shall alwayes groan under greater misfortunes then these which they felt be­twixt the Bruce and the Baliol, the King and Queen? Pretended Factions in the Mino­rity of K. Iames 6. and the Houses of Lan­caster and York, because the one can never end, being inherent in the nature of the Go­vernment, whereas the other are but acci­dental and temporary, All which cannot but appear very probable, as well as dreadful to those who consider the late Rebellion, wherein the People pretending that the King had violated their Liberties, they mur­der'd and pillag'd all such as were not of their Opinion, and after they had ruin'd their Prince, the People divided and fought one against another, the greater part pre­tending they ought to be obeyed, because [Page 43] of their numbers, and the lesser pretending that they were the sounder part, and had the better Cause, and it is impossible in such a case to find a Judge of Controversies. Which is another unanswerable Argument against the Peoples Supremacy, by which all they can gain is an endless Liberty of ruin­ing one another without hope of Redress. Nor can Parliaments remedy this, for we have seen opposite Parliaments Sitting at the same time Forfeiting one another, whilst the astonished Multitude stood at a Gaze, not knowing whom to obey, and praying that God would Re-establish our lawful Mo­narchy, with which, when it was Miracu­lously Restored, they were so overjoyed as men are when they are free'd from the Gal­lies, in which they had been Treated as Slaves.

And whereas these Republicans pretend that the King is but a Phisician, this shews that they design to have no King, for any man may lawfully change his Phisician, and Buchannans laying so much weight on this Argument makes me suspect much his ho­nesty, for no man can have so mean an opini­on of his Sense. And his comparing the Monarch to a Tutor is very extravagant, for no man is sworn to have such a mans [Page 44] Heirs for Tutors, but though he were a Tutor, no man can remove his Tutor at pleasure, as they say the People may re­move their King. Nor is a Tutor to be laid aside but by an Action before a Superior Judge, wherein he is to be proved to have Malversed, and therefore since there is no Superior Judge except God, and that the People are not his Superiors, it clearly follows that the People cannot lay aside their King.

A Tutor has not an inherent Right of Property as a King hath to the Government of the Nation, and to the Imperial Crown thereof, only I joyne so far with Buchan­nan in these Rhetorical expressions, that I really think the Multitude is alwayes so mad that they need a King to be their Physi­tian, and of so weak a Judgement like Mi. nors, that they need him for a Tutor, and without his assistance and protection every hypocritical Bigot, and ambitious Usurper would cheat them at his pleasure, and make them not only a Prey, but a Tool in their own Slavery.

Nor is there any force in that Argument, the King was made for the People, and not the People for the King; and therefore the People are Nobler than the King, and [Page 45] ought to be preferred to Him. For to this it is answered, that 1. The question here is not, who is more preferable, but who is the Superiour? And though one good Christian be preferable to a thousand, who are not so, yet their Interest in the Com­mon-wealth is not preferable; the wiser part is still preferable to the greater part: and yet the greater will over-rule the wiser. A Shepherd is ordained for the Flock; and yet it cannot be concluded, that a Flock of Brutes is to be preferred to any Reasonable Creature. 2. The Kings Interest and the Peoples are inseparable in the Construction of Law, which presumes, that what the King does, He does for the People, and there is none above the King, that can Judge Him, if He does otherwise. 3. Whether the Kings Power be derived from God, or from the People? Yet if it be derived from God, it is preferable, because of Gods Ordinance: Or if from the People, it is preferable, because they, by Electing Him King, have consented that it should be so, and they having Trusted Him with the publick Interest, the publick Interest is still preferable. I know that Buchannan and others, value themselves much upon the Instance of the Bruce and Ba­liol, [Page 46] in which the people did Declare, that they preferred the Bruce, because the Bali­ol had enslaved the Kingdom to the Eng­lish. And it is generally urged, that all Lawyers are clear, that if a King Alienat His Kingdom, His people may Disclaim Him. But my answers are, That if a King will Alienat His Kingdom, the Subjects are free in that case, not by their power to reassume their first Liberty; but because the King will not continue King, and they are free by His Deed, but not by their own Right. 2. Even in that case, Lawyers do irritat and annul the Deed; but dissolve not the Contraveeners Right. And as to that particular Instance, it is well known that King Robert the First, or the Bruce, as we call him, was desirous that the Parliament should threaten to choose another, if He submitted His Interest to the Popes Decisi­on, who pretended then to be the Supream Judge, over all Kings. And Iohn Major, as many other Popish Writers were still enemies to the Supremacy of Kings upon that account. But though the Bruce, to please the people, should have shunned to quarrel what they did in such a Juncture; yet that could not wrong the Monarchy, nor His Successors, as shall be proved.

[Page 47]Having thus cleared, that the Kings power is not derived from the people, even though they had Elected Him, and that He is an absolute King, both by our Laws, and the Nature of our Monarchy; and that all this is most consistent with right Reason. I come now to draw some Con­clusions from these Principles.

The first Conclusion shall be, that our Parliaments are not co-ordinat with our Kings, in the Legislative Power; but that the Legislative and Architectonick Power of making Laws (as Lawyers term it) does Solly reside in the King, the Estates of Parliament only consenting, which will furder appear by these Reasons, 1. It can­not be denyed but we had Kings long ere we had Parliaments (we never having had any Parliaments till King Kenneth the 3 ds. time, according to the Computation of the severest Re-publicans themselves; for till then we Read only of the Proceres Regni, or the Nobility, or Chiefs of Clanes, and Heads of Families, who assembled upon all occasions, to give the King advice) and therefore our Parliaments cannot pretend that they were designed as a Co-ordinate power with the King, whilst he did what was right; much less to be his Judge, [Page 48] when he did what was wrong. 2. That our Kings made Laws of old without any consent, and that these were acquiesced in by the people, is clear, not only from our Histories, which do tell us, that such Kings made such Laws, without speaking any thing of either Nobility, People or Par­liament, but even from our old Books of Statutes, wherein there is no mention made of the consent, of either the Nobility or Par­liament: The Laws at that time beginning simply, The Kings Statutes, as in all the Statutes of King William, King Alexander 2 d. and in the Statutes of King Malcolm Canmore: King David the first, and King David the 2 d. where there is not so much as mention made of the Nobility, or the Parliament, in the very beginning of the Statutes, and that at other times the No­bility were only called, and that only the Nobility did sit, is very clear from the Inscriptions of these Parliaments, such as in the Parl. K. Alexander 2 d. which bears, to have been made with the common con­sent of the Nobility, cum communi consensu Comitum suorum, without speaking of any other State. Nor do I find a word of Bur­gesses, till the Parliament of K. Robert the 3 d. in 1400. and even according to this [Page 49] late Constitution, it is undenyable that the Parliament have not even an equal power with the King, much less a power above him. 3. How can that Judicature have a Co-ordinat power with the King, when no man can sit in it but by a priviledge from the King: but so it is, that all that are Mem­bers of Parliament, sit there by a special priviledge from the King, and there is no­thing considered to capacitate them to sit, but the Force and Energie of that Privi­ledge, without respect, either to what Land they possess, or what number of People they represent. And thus the Nobility and Bi­shops, sit there, by vertue of the Kings Creation; and the King may Creat a hun­dreth Noblemen that morning that the Par­liament is to sit, though none of all the hundreth, have not one foot of Land in Scotland; and though the Barons must have some Land, else they cannot Represent any Shire; yet though a Gentleman had 5000. pounds Sterling a year, he could not sit there, except he be the Kings immediate Vassal, and holds his Lands of His Majesty in capite: So that he sits not by ver­tue of his Land, but as Capacitated by the King. And though these who Re­present the Burrows Royal are Commissi­onated [Page 50] by the people of their Burghs; yet the people who sent them, are not consi­dered in that Commission, but the power only which the King gives them to send: For though a Town had a hundreth thou­sand Inhabitants, and another only twen­ty Inhabitants: yet these 100000 could not be Re-presented in Parliament, except the King had Erected their Town in a Burgh Royal, From which I evince two things, 1. That the Parliament is the Kings Council, in which he may call any He pleases, and not as the peoples Re­presentatives only, since there are great multitudes in the Nation, Represented by none there: For tho they Represent their Constituents in Parliament, yet the power of sending Representatives, is derived from the King Originally, and flowes not from any proper Right inherent in those whose Representatives they are. 2. That Judica­ture cannot have a Co-ordinat power with the King, which He needs not Call ex­cept He pleases, and which He can Dis­solve when He pleases: and in which, when they are Met, He has a Negative Voice, which can stop all their Propo­sals, and Designs; For, if they were Co-ordinat with the King, then par in pa­rem [Page 51] non habet imperium, and it is against common Sense to think that these two can be equal, when the power of the one flows from the other; By which is likewise clear that the great principle laid down by Buchannan, viz. That the King is Singulis Major, universis Minor, greater than any one, but less than the collective Body of the Parliament taken together, is absolutely false; because he has a Negative Voice over that collective Body, and as they cannot Meet without him, so he can Dissolve them when he pleases, and I confesse it seems to me unintelligible how they can be greater than the King, by vertue of a power which they Derive from the King. 4. The Parliament is called by the Kings Council, as is clear from the Inscriptions of all our old Parliaments. Thus the Statutes of Alexander the 2. begin, Alexander By the Grace of God King of Scots did by the Com­mon Council of his Earls Decree, &c. The Statutes of K. Robert bear to be by the Common Council of his Prelats, &c. The first Statute of King Robert 2. Bears that none who is Elected to be of the Kings Council shall bring another to it who is not Elected. The 8, and 13. Parliaments of K. Ia. 1. And the 2, 3, 4, and 7. of K. Ia. 2. Bear for Inscriptions, The Parlia­ment [Page 52] or general Council of such Kings. And the 1. Act of that 8. Parliament K. Ia. 1. Bears Quo Die Dominus Rex deliberatione & consensu totius Concilij, &c. And it is against Sense to think that any mans Coun­sel can have Authority over him, for as we say Counsel is no Command. 5. The Parliament was but the Kings Baron Court, as is very clear to any man who will read the old Registers of Parliament, in which he will see that the Parliament was Fenc'd, and the Suits were called, and Absents Unlawed as in other Baron Courts, where­of many publick Records are extant, and I shall only set down that of the 8. Parlia­ment Ia. 1. The words of which Inscrip­tion are, In Parliamento octavo, vel Conci­lio generali Illustrissimi Principis, Iacobi Dei gratia Regis Scotiaetento apud Perth & incho­ato tificato & approbato, tanquam sufficienter & debite praemunito, per tres Regni Status, duo­decimo die mensis Julij Anno Domini mil­lesimo, quadringentesimo vicesimo, octavo, cum continuatione dierum & temporum, summoni­ [...]is & vocatis debito modo & more solito, E­piscopis, Abbatibus, prioribus, Comitibus, Ba­ronibus & omnibus libere tenentibus, qui te­nent in capite, de dicto Domino nostro Rege & de quolibet burgo regni, certis burgensibus, [Page 53] comparentibus omnibus illis, qui debuerunt, voluerunt & potuerunt interesse, quibusdam vero absentibus, quorum quidam fuerunt legi­time excusati, aliis per contumaciam se absen­tantibus, quorum nomina patent in rotulis sectarum, quorum quilibet adjudicatus fuit in amerciamento decem librarum ob ejus contuma­ciam. And that the King was Judge what Barons should come to the Parliament, is most clear by the 75. Act Par. 14. Ia. 2. whereby it is declared, no Free-holder un­der the sum of 20. pounds, shall come ex­cept he be specially called by the King, either by his Officer, or by Writ, and tho afterwards the King allowed two Barons of every Shire to be sent to Represent all the Barons for saving Expences, yet even after that Concession it is declared by the 78. Act Par. 6. Ia. 4. That no Free-hol­der be compelled to come, but gif our Sove­raign Lord Writ specially for them.

It being thus clear that the Parliament is the Kings Baron Court, it seems a won­der to me how it could have entered into the heart of any sober man to think that any mans Baron Court, but much lesse the Kings Baron Court, should have power and jurisdiction over him, and that it should be lawful to them, as Buchannan and these o­ther [Page 54] Authors assert, to punish him or lay him aside, all which assertions are equally im­pious and illegal.

6. When the King resolves to lessen any way his own Power, this is not done by the Authority of the three Estates, as cer­tainly it would be, if they had the power to lessen his Authority, but the King does the same from his own proper Motive, as when the King binds up his own Hands from granting Remissions in cases of fore­thought Fellony, Ia. 4. Par. 6. Act 63. And when an Act was to be made, discharg­ing the Lords of the Session to admit of pri­vat Writings from the King to stop the pro­cedure of Justice, this is not Enacted by the three Estates but only by the King, and is founded upon the Kings own Pro­mise, Act 92. Par. 6. Ia. 6. And in all Acts of Parliament the King only Sta­tutes as Legislator, and the Parliament only Advise and Consent, which shews that they are not Co-ordinat with the King, as is asserted by Buchannan and others, much lesse above him. And the Acts of Parlia­ment in the late Rebellion having run thus, Our Soveraign Lord, and the three Estates contrare to the Tenor of all the Laws that ever were made in Scotland. The Parliament [Page 55] returning to their duty, ordained that Style to be altered, and to bear as formerly, Our Soveraign Lord, with Advice and Consent, &c.

But lastly, what advantage can the peo­ple have by placing their security in the Par­liament, since they are so lyable to Passions, Errors, and Extravagancies, as well as Kings are, and have, if Buchannan be believed, betrayed the interest of the Kingdom, since K. Kenneth the seconds time, now above 700. years; and they are ordinarily led by some pragmatical Ring-leaders, who have not that interest to preserve the Kingdom that Kings have: and since the King may make so many Noble-men and Burghs Roy­al at pleasure, by whose Votes he may still prevail. What security can we have by giving them a power above the King, or how can they have it?

From all which it may clearly appear that we have had Kings long ere we had Parlia­ments, and that the Parliaments derive their power from the King; and that at first our King only called the Heads of Families, and his own Officers, as his Council, with whom he consulted, without any necessity to call any others than he pleased, there being no [Page 56] Law, Article, nor Capitulation obliging him from the beginning thereto: And our Kings were so far from having Parliaments associated with them in their Empire, that there is no mention at all of them, or of any condition relating to them in the first Insti­tution of our Kings above-related; nor were there any Parliaments in beeing at that time. But after the Feudal Law came to be in vi­gor, then our Kings looking upon the whole Kingdom as their own in property; King Malcolme Canmore did distribute all the Land of Scotland amongst his Subjects, as his Liedge-men, which is clear by the first Chapter of his Laws; and according to the Feudal Law, all the Vassals of our Kings compeared in their Head-Court, and there­in consulted what was fit for the Kingdom; but thereafter the way of making War, re­quiring Money and Property belonging to the Subject, as Government did to the King, it was necessary to have their consent for raising Money: And from this did arise the inserting the advice and consent of the three Estates in our Acts of Parliament.

From this also it is very clear that their opinion is very unsolid and ill founded, who think that Kings can do nothing without a [Page 57] special Act of Parliament, even in matters of Government. As for instance, that, he cannot restrain the licence of the Press, or require his Subjects to take a Bond for secu­ring the Peace; for these and the like being things which relate immediatly to Govern­ment, the King has as much right to regu­late these, as we have to regulate and dispose upon our Property, Government being the King's Property. 2. Though the Monar­chy had been derived from the People, yet how soon our Kings got the Monarchy, they got every thing that was necessary for the Explication and Administration of it, which as it is common sense and reason, so it is founded upon that most wise and just Ma­xime in Law, Quando aliquid conceditur, om­nia concessa videntur, sine quibus concessum ex­plicari nequit. 3. I desire to know where there is yet a Law giving the King a Nega­tive voice, a power of erecting Incorporati­ons, or a power to grant Remissions, for Crimes, or Protections for Civil Debts, and yet the people is far more concerned in these; and the King's having power to do these, and a thousand other things, doth rather oblige and warrand me to lay down a general rule, that the Kings of Scotland can do every thing that relates to Government, and is ne­cessary [Page 58] for the administration thereof, though there be no special Law or Act of Parliament for it, if the same be not contrary to the Law of God, Nature, or Nations.

The second Conclusion that we draw from these former principles, is, that Princes cannot be punished by their own Subjects, as Buchannan and our Republicans do assert, which is most clear by the former Laws, wherein it is declared, that the King is a Sove­raign and Absolute Prince, and deriving his power from God Almighty. That it is Treason to endeavour to depose, or suspend the King. Wherein our Law is founded on the nature of Monarchy; for if He be Supream, He cannot be judg'd, for no man is judg'd but by his Superior, and that which is Supream can have no Superior: and on the Principles of the Law of Nature and Nations, because saith the Law, no man can be both the person who Judgeth, and the person Judg'd; and it is still the King who Judgeth, since all other Judges do represent him, and derive their power from him, Ipse se prator cogere non potest, quia triplici officio fungi nequit su­spectum dicentis, & coac [...], & cogentis L. Ille a [...]quo ff. ad Trebell. It is a principle in all Law, that Jurisdiction and all other Man­dats cease with the power that granted it, [Page 59] and therefore as they acknowledge that a King cannot be cited till he have forfeited His just Right, so how soon he has forfeited it, all the power of the ordinary Judges in the Nation falls, and becomes extinct, and no other Judge can Judge Him, because no other Judge can sit by vertue of any o­ther Authority, till it be known that he has forfeited his, and that cannot be till the event of the Process; and if the People be Judg­es, yet they cannot assume the Government till the King has forfeited it: And why also should they be Judges, who have nei­ther knowledge nor moderation, who are acted by humor, and delight in insolence? And how shall they meet? Or who shall call them? Nor can the Parliament judge them, because they derive their right from the King, as shall be prov'd: And though they were equal, yet no equal can judge another, par in parem non habet Imperium, nemo sibi Imperare potest. No man can com­mand himself, l. si de re sua, ff. derecept. [...]r­bitr. Nemo sibi legem imponere potest, l. quid autem ff. de donat. inter virum & uxorem, and therefore the Civil Law, which is ours by A­doption, does positively assert, that Princeps legibus solutus est, the King is liable to no Law, l. princeps, ff. de legibus: For [Page 60] though He be lyable to the Directive Force of the Law, that is to say, He ought to be Governed by it as His Director: Yet He is not lyable to the Co-ercive Force of the Law, as all Lawyers that are indiffe­rent do assert, H [...]rmenopol▪ l. 1. tit. 1. Sect. 48. [...], The King is not Subject to the Law, because offending against them, he is not punisht, vid: Granswinkell. cap. 6. Arnis. cap. 4. Francisc. a victoria Relect. 3. num 4. Ziegler. de jur. Majes. cap. 1. num. 12. with whom the Fathers also agree, Ambros. in Apol. David cap. 4. Liberi sunt Reges a vin [...]ulis delictorum neque enim ullis ad poenam vocantur legibus, tuti Imperij pote­state Isiodorus 3. sent. cap. 31. populi peccan­tes Iudicem me [...]u [...]t, Reges autem solo. Dei timore, metu (que) g [...]hennae coercentur: And in this Sense, they take these words, Psal. 51. — Against thee, thee only have I sinned; and I was glad to find in Bishop Vshers Power of Prin [...]es, amongst ma­ny other Citations, that the Rabbies, and particularly Rabbi Ieremiah own [...]d that no Creature may Judge the King, but the Ho­ly and Bless [...]d God alone, in which also Hea­thens agree with Jews and Christians, Ec­phantas the Pithagorean makes it the Pri­viledge [Page 61] of God, and then of the King, to be Judg'd by none, Stobeus Sermon. 46. and Dion in Marco Aurelio tells us, that it is certain, that free Monarchs cannot be Judg'd, save by God alone, and if it were otherwise, we should see them very unsecure, for the ambition and avarice of insolent Subjects should never or seldom miss to form their Process, and why should Parties be Judges? But to demonstrate the Justice Kings and Princes are to expect from the Populace and Mobile, let us remember their Material Justice, in the usage of our Saviour, when they cryed, Crucifie him, Crucifie him; their Sentence against King CHARLES the Martyre, when they were at the hight of their pretensions to Pietie, and publick Spiritedness; their usage of de Witt, the Idolizer of them, and their Common­wealth: and if we want a true Idea of their Form of Process, we will find it in their usage of the Arch-bishop of St. Andrews and others, no L [...]bel, no Citation, no Defenses, no Sentences, no time to prepare to die: and yet all this are the Dictates of pure and devout publick Spiritedness. Bu­channans Bloody Arguments for this posi­tion are, that Tyrants have been Murther­ed with applause, and Princes would be­come [Page 62] licentious, if they were not Restrain­ed, by the just fear of being called to an account: That the Roman and Venetian Magistrates have been punish'd by the people, and that the ordinary Judges of the place have Judg'd them: and that some of our Kings, as well as these of other Nations, have been punish'd as Tyrants.

To which I answer shortly, that Incon­veniencies must not prevail with us to break our Oathes, and overturn our Laws, for nothing has so great inconveniencie in it, as this has, these being but partial, and this is a total Inconveniency. And the En­glish Lawyers agree, that a mischief is bet­ter than an inconvenience, and this should have been considered, before we swore to Monarchy: and if the people were Ele­ctors, as they never were; yet they should have reserv'd this power, or else they can­not now challenge it. But though our Law were not clear, as it is most uncontrovert­ed upon this point: Yet right Reason should perswade us to have reserv'd no such power: For as Kings may erre, so may the Judges who are to Try them: and it is more probable their Tryers will, be­cause they may be acted by Revenge, Am­bition, [Page 63] or Popularity; and there is nothing so lyable to erre as the populace.

The Romans and Venetians might have punish'd their Magistrates, because these Magistrates were not Vested with a Supream power; nor were they Soveraigns as our Monarchs are. And those Judges who Try'd them, deriv'd not their power from those Magistrates who Try'd them, as our Judges do; for the same consent, and compact by which they were made the Chief, the others were made also Magistrates, which cannot be said of absolute Monarchs, who derive not their power from the people as these do, and the Instances of Kings who have been Murder'd, are Crimes in them, who did commit them, and so should not be Rules to us. And generally the best of Kings have been worst us'd. But who can escape by innocence, when King CHARLES the Martyre fell by Malice: Such also as cry up the Murtherers of Ty­rants▪ who had no just Right, never meant to allow the Arraignment of lawful Mo­narchs, who, when they erre, have God only for their Judge; and if they fear not Him, and eternal Punishment, they will not probably fear mortal Men, and their own Subjects whom they can many wayes [Page 64] escape. 2. There is no Creature so un­reasonable, but he will use his own with discretion, though there be no Law oblig­ing him to it, nor Punishment to be inflict'd, if he do otherwayes: who burns his own House, or drowns his Lands, though he may do it? For the Law considers, that a King is either mad, and if so, he will re­spect no Law, and should not be punisht, at least he will not stand in awe for fear of it, or else he is of a sound Judg­ment, and then he needs no Law; and therefore, Why should we apprehend that a King will destroy His own Kingdom. 3. A King is also obliged by His Fame, to do things worthy of His high Trust, and things able to abide that conspicuous hight to which he is expos'd. 4. Though His people ought not to Rebel, yet no thinking man can be sure that they will not. And therefore even the greatest Tyrants fear such accidents, though they know they are not bound by these Laws, that tye Subjects. And if all these fail, yet we must reverence Gods Dispensations, and expect a redress of these unusual Emergents from his Divine Good­ness, for whose sake we suffer them; Ra­ther then expose all to ruine, by endeavour­ing a revenge, that may be so unjust, in [Page 65] the preparative, and dangerous in the e­vent.

The 3. Conclusion which I shall draw from the former principles, shall be, that as it is not lawful for Subjects to punish their Kings, so neither is it to rise in Arms against them upon what pretext soever, no not to defend their Liberty nor Religion. Which Conclusion also I shall endeavour to Esta­blish on sure foundations of Positive Law. Reason, Experience, and Scripture. As to our Positive Law, it is clear, for by the 3. Act Par. 1. Ia. 1. ‘It is declar'd Rebel­lion to rise in Arms against the Kings Person: And by the 14. Act 6. Par. K. Ia. 2. It is Treason to Re­bel against the Kings Person or Autho­rity: By the 25. Act Par. 6. Ia. 2. It is Treason to rise in fear of War against the Kings Person or his Majesty, or to lay hands upon his Person violently, whatever age they be of, or to help or supply these who commit Treason. By the 131 Act 8, Par. Ia. 6. All the Subjects are discharg­ed to Convocat for holding of Councils or other Assemblies without his Majesties expresse Warrand; and by the 12. Act 10. Par. K. Ia. 6. The entering into Leagues or Bonds without his Majesties [Page 66] special Command is declared to be Sedi­tion.’ All which Acts are prior to Bu­channans time, and consequently he was ve­ry inexcuseable in advancing this Rebellious Principle. And these Laws having excepted no case, exclude all cases and pretexts of rising in Arms against the lawful Monarch; but our unhappy Countrey-men having by a long and open Rebellion oppos'd the most devout, and most just of all Kings upon the false pretexts of Liberty, and Religion, the Parliament of this Kingdom, from a full Con­viction of the Villanies of these times, and to prevent such dangerous Cheats for the fu­ture, they did by the 5. Act, Par. 1. Char. 2. Declare it to be Treason for any number of his Majesties Subjects to rise in Arms upon a­ny pretext whatsoever, and to shew that all such Glosses as were us'd by Buchannan were absurd, and did not evacuat the first Laws, though general, the Parliament did by the 4. Act of that 1. Parliament declare that any Explanation or Glosse, that during the late Troubles hath been put upon these Acts, as that they are not to be extended against any Leagues, Councils, Conventions, Assemblies, or Meetings, made, holden, or kep't by the Subjects, for Preservation of the Kings Ma­jesty, the Religion, Laws, and Liberties of [Page 67] the Kingdom, or for the publick Good either of Kirk or Kingdom, are false and Disloyal, and contrare to the true and genuine mean­ing of these Acts. Which Statute is a clear decision against Buchannan, finding that the Statutes that were prior to his time, and all other such general Statutes made in favours of the King, did formerly strike against his Principles and Distinctions. As also to preclude all avenues to Rebellion by teach­ing, defending, or encouraging others to Rebel upon these pretexts, as the former Act declared, that actual rising in Arms was Rebellion. So by the 2. Act Sess. 2. Par. 2. Charles 2. It is declared Treason for any Subject to maintain these positions, viz. That it is lawful for Subjects upon pretence of Re­formation, or any other pretence whatsoever, to enter into Leagues, or Covenants, or to take up Arms against the King, or any Commissio­nated by him.

2. All the Arguments formerly adduc'd against the power of the Subject to punish his Person, do fully prove likewise that they have no power to rise in Arms against him. For either the collective Body of the Sub­jects are Superior to him, and if so, they may not only rise up in Arms against him, but they may punish him; but if the King [Page 68] be Superior to them, as has been formerly prov'd, then it cannot be lawful for Sub­jects to rise up in Arms against him, no more than it is to punish his Person. Nor can I see how all such as declare for a Defensive War, are not to be concluded guilty of de­signing to Murther the King, for if the King come in Person to defend his own Right, as certainly he will, and must; can it be thought they will shoot at none, least they kill him? and if they shoot, how can they se­cure his Sacred Person? and if they kill him in the Field, are they less guilty of his Murther, than these Russians who late­ly design'd it? Or doth it lessen the guilt that these design'd to kill him alone private­ly? whereas our moderate men will in face of the Sun, and with display'd Banners a­gainst God and him, kill with him all such, as being perswaded that they are obliged before God to assist him, expose their lives for their duty.

3. That dangerous, though specious Principle of defensive Arms, is inconsistent with that order of Nature which God has established, and which is absolutely necessar amongst all other humane Relations; and by the same Analogy, by which we allow Subjects to rise against their Prince, [Page 69] we may much more allow Children to rise against their Parents, Servants, against their Masters, Souldiers a­gainst their Officers, and the Rabble against their Magistrates: for the King does eminently comprehend all these relati­ons in his Soveraignty, as inferiour Branches of that Paramount, and Monarchical power. And what a glorious state should mankind be left in, if Anarchy were thus Establish­ed, and every man should be invested with power to be his own Judge? Or dares any reasonable man assert, that this is fit to be allowed in the present condition of Man­kind, for since the generality of men can scarce be contained in their Duty by the severest Laws that can be made, what can be expected from them, when they are loosed from all Law, and are encouraged to transgress against it?

If the multitude could prove that they were infallible, and that no oppression could be expected from them, some thing might be said, why we might ballance them with authority. But since both Rea­son and dolefull experience, teach us, that generally the multitude consists of Knaves and Fools, who alter not to the better by Conspiring together, nor become juster, for [Page 70] being led by such ambitious, and discontent­ed Spirits, as ordinarly lead on Rebellions. It is safer to obey those of the two fallible Governours, whom God hath set over us, and whom the Law tyes us to obey, and to whom also we are bound by the Oath of Allegiance; especially, seing thus we may probably expect, that they will be more careful of us, as being their own, than meer Strangers, who use us only for their own Ends. And at the worst in the King, we can have but an ill Master, whereas in allowing Subjects to usurp, we may fight to get our selves hundreds of Ty­rants, and these two fighting against one another, so that we shall not even know which of these Devils to obey.

The Arguments that can be adduc'd to justifie this Principle of Defensive Arms, are almost answered in the former Article, viz. That there is a mutual Obligation betwixt King and people, so that when He breaks the one, they are free from the other, and that all Government is Establisht for the advantage of the People, and thus these few Arguments peculiar to this Point, remain now only to be here solv'd. 1. That self-defence is by the Law of Nature allow'd to all, and even to Brutes▪ why then should [Page 71] men who may lose more, who deserve bet­ter, and can use self-defense more inno­cently be debar'd from it? 2. We see in Scripture, that the people deserted and oppos'd their Kings for Religion. 3. This has been allow'd with us in the instance of King Iames the third, against whom his Subjects rose in Rebellion, for Mis-govern­ing and oppressing His people, and this op­position, was first justified by God, in the success he gave to their Arms, and there­after by a special and express Act in the en­suing Parliament, which stands yet unre­peal'd.

To which I shortly answer, that as to the first of self-defense in Brutes, we must still remember, that God having design'd Go­vernment to bridle the Extravagancies of restless Mankind, he has appointed Magi­strates to be his Vicegerents and Repre­sentatives, and has entrusted them with his power, and so opposition to them is un­lawful, because it is not lawful against him; and because if it were allow'd, all would pretend to it, and so there should be no Order, nor Government. And that this may be the better observ'd, God has endowed man with Principles fitted for these ends of Order and Society, amongst which, one [Page 72] is, That the publick Safety of the whole is to be preferr'd to the Safety of any one man, or of any number of private men, who are not to be considered as the pub­lick, because that is the publick Interest, which is the Representative of the Nation, and that this Principle may be the better obey'd, he has commanded men to suffer in­juries, rather than occasion Disorders, and has promised to reward Patience and Sub­mission for his sake, with eternal Life, a Nobler Prize, than we here can contend for.

This being then Premis'd, It is answer­ed, that though Brutes may defend them­selves, because Order and the common good of Societies are not there concern'd; yet there is no reason to extend this to Men, whose self-defense against Authority occa­sions more mischief, than it can bring ad­vantage: and if this Argument hold, it would prove, that every man who is unjust­ly Condemn'd, or at least thinks so, may kill the King, or His Judge; Servants might bind their Masters, and the people of any private Town might pull down their Judge from the Bench, when they thought he opprest them. And as these must submit, because they expect Reparation from a [Page 73] higher Tribunal. So God has promised Reparation to those who suffer for his sake; and the greatness and sureness of this Re­ward, makes this no uncomfortable Do­ctrine, and this Submission is as necessary, and rather more, for mens preservation, than Resistance; and is a kind of self-de­fence, since opposition to Authority would bring a certain ruine, and confusion, in which moe would perish, than opposition by private self defence would preserve. Up­on which Christian Principles also, Ames. a Protestant and Calvinist Divine has re­solv'd that, In bonis temporalibus tenetur quisque personam publicam si [...]i ipsi praeferre, bonum enim totius pluris faciendum est quam bonum alicujus partis Cas: conscient: l. 5. cap. 7. Thes· 14. and Lex Rex confesses, p. 335. That a private man should rather suffer the King to kill him, than that he should kill the King, because he is not to prefer the Life of a private man, to the Life of a publick man.

And whereas it may be pretended, that though this opposition should not be trust­ed to any private man, yet Parliaments and the Collective Body should, and may be trusted with it. But to this I have an­swered formerly, that all Convocations without Authority from the King, and all [Page 74] rising against him are indefinitely declared unlawful, and justly, for whoever wants Authority, is but in a private capacity, none having a publick capacity, save the Magistrates. And if they be allow'd to rise, because their quarrel is just, it must be as just to allow a lesser number, if they have the same Justice in their pretexts, and we have frequently seen, that the same per­sons who magnified the multitude for their numbers, did shortly thereafter divide from them, pretending that they were the Sanior pars, or juster Party.

4. This position is against the very Na­ture, not only of Monarchy, but of all Go­vernmments; For who will obey when they may resist? And who can be Judges whether the pretences upon which Arms are taken, be lawful, or not? And there­fore since it is unlawful for Subjects to take up even Defensive Arms, until it be found that the King against whom these de­fensive Arms are taken up be a Tyrant, and an Oppressor: It clearly follows, that these Subjects must first have a power to judge and find that the King has erred, which is to declare the People to be Judges of their King; and we may be [Page 75] soon convinced that this Principle is against the Nature of all Government, if we con­sider that if it were lawful for Subjects with us to rise against the King, it should be law­ful for these in a Common-wealth, or Ari­stocracy, to rise against their Governors, since these may erre as well as Kings do; and if this were allowed, all Nations should al­wayes have one Rebellion rising out of the Ashes of another, for only they who pre­vail'd should be satisfi'd, and all the rest would certainly conclude that they might more justly oppose these Usurpers, one or moe, then the first did oppose their lawful Prince; and thus Government which is de­sign'd for the security of the State, should run in a Circle fixt upon no certain Basis, and determined by no sure Measures.

5. This Principle is dangerous for the Subjects, as well as for the King and other Governors; for if Kings be perswaded that Subjects think this opposition lawful, then they will be still jealous of them, and will be necessitated on all occasions to secure a­gainst such oppositions, and so this Doctrine tends more to make our King a Tyrant, than to make us free. And if the difference betwixt King and People, should draw both to Arms, where can we find a Judge, to [Page 76] whom both Parties will submit? So that to allow this power in the People to debate, is to allow a difference that can never end; and so what innocent man shall be able to know whom he may securely follow? And the best issue that could be expected from these debates, would be, that the one half of the Nation should ruine the other: So comfortable and just is this rebellious Do­ctrine.

6. If we consult either our own experi­ence, or History, we will find that these pretexts of Liberty, and Religion, have al­wayes been used by those who loved neither, and that they have been ordinarily used a­gainst the best of Kings, and so prove to be meer Cheats upon their parts who use them, and absolute Villanies, if we consider against whom they are used; and it cannot be o­therwayes, for the worst of men are alwayes readiest to take Arms, and the best of Kings are most inclined to suffer insolence to grow up by degrees to Rebellion: And as few or none ever took up Arms against their King, in whom even the dullest did not see other motives than a love to liberty and Religion, so when they who did take up Arms upon these pretexts, did succeed in their attempts, they became themselves greater grievances to [Page 77] the people, than these lawful Powers against whom they pretended to protect them: and when others rose against them upon the same pretexts, they did in the severest manner de­clare that to be Rebellion in others, which they contended to be lawful in themselves.

7. So dangerous is this Principle, that it has been alway [...]s us'd as a Tool to promote contrary designs, and to serve the worst of men in all the opposite sides. And thus we see that the Bigot Papists have by it over­turn'd Thrones, and disinherited and mur­dered Kings. In which the most impious of their Doctors have been admir'd and fol­low'd by the rigid Phanaticks, who did notwithstanding teach, that all Papists were to be extirpated, and unquiet Spirits in the establish'd Republicks of Rome, Venice, and Florence, have by this Principle endea­vour'd to overturn and disquiet as much their own Common-wealths, as our Repu­blicans have impiously endeavour'd to de­stroy Just Monarchy, thereby to settle an usurping Common-wealth.

8. The only pretext that can justifie the rising up in Arms, being, that it is lawful to all Creatures to defend themselves; the pretext must be dangerous, since its limits are uncertain: For how can Defensive Arms [Page 78] be distinguished from Offensive Arms? Or, whoever begun at the one, who did not proceed to the other? Or, what Subject did ever think himself secure after he had drawn his Sword against his King, without endeavouring to cut off by it that King a­gainst whom he had drawn it? The hope of Absolute Power is too sweet, and the fear of punishment too great, to be bounded, and march'd by the best of Men: And how can we expect this moderation from these who at first wanted patience to bear the lawful Yoke of Government, but because examples convince as much as reason, let us remember how when this Nation was very happy in the Year, 1638. under the Government of a most Pious and Just Prince, born in our own Kingdom, we rais'd an Army, and with it Invaded His Kingdom of England, upon the pretext that He was govern'd by wicked Counsellors, and de­sign'd to introduce Popery; and this was justified as a Defensive War, by a long tract of General Assemblies, and Parliaments: and if this be a Defensive War that is justi­fiable, what King can be secure? Or, where­in shall we seek security against Civil Wars? Or what can be more ridiculous than to pre­tend the invading Kingdoms, Murthering [Page 79] such as are Commissionated by the King, af­ter that Invasion, entering into Leagues and Covenants against him, both at home and abroad, the robbing him of his Navies and Militia, and denying him the power to choose his own Counsellors and Judges, are meer­ly Defensive; but God Almighty, to teach us how dangerous these Defensive Arms are, and how impossible it is to regulat Law­less violence, how gentle and easie soever the first beginnings are, suffered our War, which was so much justified for being meer­ly Defensive, to end in the absolute over­throw of the Monarchy, and the taking away the life of the best of Kings; and it is ve­ry remarkable, that such as have begun with the Doctrine of giving only Passive O­bedience in all things, as in refusing to pay just Taxes, to concur in securing Rebels, &c. have from that stept up to Defensive Arms, and from that to the Power of Re­forming by the Sword, and from that to the Power of Dethroning and Murthering Kings by Parliaments, and Judicatures, and from that to the Murthering and Assassinating all who differ'd from them, without any other pretext or formality whatsoever, so hard a thing it is to stop when we begin once to fall from our duty: and so easie a thing it is to [Page 80] perswade such as have allowed themselves in the first degrees of guilt, to proceed to the highest extravagancies of Villanie.

Oh! What a blindness there is in Error? And how palpably doth God desert them, who desert their duty; suffering them after they have done what they should have ab­horred, to proceed to do what they first ab­horred really? To these I must recommend the History of Hazael, who, when the Pro­phet foretold him, 2 King. 8.12, 13. That he should slay their young men with the sword, dash their children, and rip up their women with child, answered him, Am I a dog, that I should do such things; and yet he really did what he had so execrated.

The moderation likewayes of these modest pretenders to Self-defence, and Defensive Arms, will appear, by the bloody Doctrine of their great Rabbies, Buchannan not only allows but invites Subjects to Murder their King. And Lex Rex, Pag. 313. tells us, that it is a sin against Gods Command to be Pas­sively subject to an unjust Sentence, and that it is an Act of Grace and Virtue to resist the Magistrate violently, when he does him wrong: and after that horrid Civil War was ended, the Author of Naphtali doth ju­stifie [Page 81] it, pag. 16, and 17. in these words, ‘Combinations for assistance in violent op­position of the Magistrates, when the ends of Government are perverted (which must be referr'd to the discretion of them who minds Insurrection) are necessary by the Law of Nature, of Charity, and in order to Gods Glory, and for violation of this duty of delivering the oppressed from Magistrates, Judgement comes upon People.’ From which he proceeds, Pag. 18, and 19. to assert that, ‘Not only the power of self-defence, but vindicative, and reforming power is in any part of the People, against the whole, and against all Magistrates, and if they use it not, Judg­ment comes on (supposing their capaci­ty probable to bear them forth) and they shall be punish'd for their connivance, and not acting in way of vindication of Crimes, and reforming abuses.’

Before I enter upon these Arguments, which the Scripture furnishes us with against these rebellious Principles; I must crave leave to say, that Defensive Arms seem to me very clearly inconsistent with that Mor­tification, Submission, and Patience, which is recommended by our Blessed Saviour, [Page 82] in all the strain of the New Testament; and how will these people give their Coat to a Stranger, or hold up their other Cheek to him, when they will rise even in Rebel­lion against their Native Prince. 2. As the taking up of Arms is inconsistent with the temper requir'd in a Christian; so it seems a very unsuitable mean for effectuat­ing the end, for which it is design'd, since Religion being a Conviction of what we owe to God, how can that be command­ed, which should be perswaded? And how can Arms become Arguments? Or how can External Force influence immate­rial Substances, such as are the Souls of Men. And we may as well think to awake a mans Conscience by Drums, or to per­swade his Judgment by Musquets; and therefore the Apostle speaks only of Spiri­tual Arms, in this our Spiritual Warfare, The Sword of the Spirit, and the helmet of salvation, &c. But good God, how could the extravagancy of forcing the Magistrate by Arms, in Defense of Religion, enter into Mens Heads? when it is unlawful even for the Magistrate himself, to force Religi­on by Arms. And as Subjects should not be by the King forced to Religion; so if they [Page 83] use Force against the King, the pretext of Religion, tho specious, should not defend them. And therefore when the sons of Ze­bedee desired fire from heaven, upon these who oppos'd even our Saviour, he told them, that they knew not what spirit they were of.

3. It seems very derogatory to the power of Almighty God, that He should need humane assistance, and it is a lessening of the great esteem that we ought to have for the energy, force and reasonablenesse of the Christian Religion, that it needs to be forc'd upon men by Arms, as if it were not able to force its own way. This Mahomet need­ed for his Cheats, but our blessed Saviour needs not for his Divine Precepts, and there­fore when Peter offered to fight for him, our Saviour check't him, commanding him to put up his Sword, and to perswade him the more effectually, he assures him, that all these who take the Sword, shall perish by it, and that his Kingdom was not of this World, and so he needed no such worldly help, but if he pleas'd to call for legions of Angels, his Omnipotent Father would send them, and sure Angels are fitter and abler Instru­ments to carry on such a work of Refor­mation, [Page 84] than Rebellious Regiments of Horse and Dragoons. Which Divine Argument serves also to refute the Atheistical Doctrine of Buchannan, and Owen, who would per­swade us, that our Saviour did only recom­mend to his Disciples to flee from one Ci­ty to another, when they were persecuted, Because they then wanted power to resist. For tho they did want, yet our Saviour could have, by legions of Angels, defeated all the Powers upon Earth: And Tertulli­an in his Apology for the Christians, insists on their patient suffering under Persecuti­on, tho their number were sufficient to have resisted.

4. Our blessed Saviour foreseeing that Mans Corruption would in spight of Christi­anity, prompt him to resist; he therefore did command by the Apostle Paul, Rom. 13. v. 1, and 2. Let every Soul be Subject to the higher Power for there is no power but of God; the powers that be are ordained of God, whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation. In which Text, it is very remarkable that the Apostle urges this Christian duty of sub­mission, as being a mark of mans immedi­at [Page 85] dependance upon God, and as that, which when contemned brings eternal damnation. And whereas it is pretended that this Text commands only submission to Magistrats, whilst they Act Piously, and Vertuously, because only in so far they are Gods Vice­gerents, but discharges not resistence to their impious commands. It is answered that the Text has no such limitation, and we must have so much respect to the Scrip­ture, as to think that if God Almighty had design'd to allow such an opposition, he would have warranted it, in as clear Terms, as he commanded the submission, and the reason why this submission is com­manded, is not because the power is rightly us'd, but because the power is ordained of God. And we see that St. Paul himself did think that the power should be reverenc'd, even when abus'd: for when the high Priest was Injuring him, he acknowledged that he was obliged not to speak evil of the Rulers of his People, Acts 23.2. And if this place of Scripture, and the submission therein commanded, were so to be limited, we be­hoved likewise so to limit the 5. Command­ment, and not to honour our Parents, ex­cept when they are Pious, nor to obey [Page 86] them, if they vex or trouble us; and St. Paul having written this Epistle to those, who were then living under that monstruous Em­perour Caius, did clearly design, that the Christian Religion was to be admired for commanding Subjects, not only to obey good Princes, but even submitting peace­ably to Tyrants. And suitable to this Doctrine are these Texts, Heb. ch. 12. v, 9. We had Fathers of our flesh, who corrected, and chastened us, after their own pleasure, and we gave them reverence; and lest we might think that Text rather a Narration than a Command, it is told us Peter 2. v. 18. Servants be subject to your Masters with all fear, not only to the good and gentle, but also to the froward, for this is thanks-worthy, if a man for conscience toward God do endure grief And v. 20. If when ye do well, and suffer for it, ye take it patiently, this is acceptable to God, for even hereunto were ye called.

Our blessed Saviours practice, did like­wise agree most admirably with his Pre­cepts and Doctrine formerly insisted on, for though no man ever was, or can be so much injur'd as his blessed self, nor could ever any defensive Arms have been so just, as in his quarrel, yet he would not suffer a [Page 87] Sword to be drawn in it, and to discou­rage all Christians from using Arms, he told these who were offering to defend even himself with Arms, that whosoever should draw the Sword, should perish by it, and it seems that God Almighty permitted Peter to draw his Sword at that time meerly, that we might upon that occasion be for ever de­terr'd from defensive Arms, by this our Saviours Divine example and reasoning.

The last Argument I shall adduce, shall be from that most Christian Topick us'd by St. Paul, Rom. 3.8. We should not do ill that good may come of it.

And therefore since disobedience to Magistrats, but much more to Rebel against them, is discharg'd both by the Laws of God and Men: This disobedience and op­position, cannot be justifi'd by pretending that it is design'd for Reforming the Nation. And if it be answer'd, that this opposition is not in it self ill, because the design justi­fies it. It is to this reply'd, that if this answer be sufficient, then the former excel­lent Rule is of no use: For when a Ser­vant steals his Masters Money to give to the Poor; or a Son cuts his Fathers Throat, ecause he is vitious; or when Iacques Clement Stabed [Page 88] Henry the 3. and Ravilleck Henry the 4. they might have alleadg'd the same in their own defence. Nor know we a surer proof that any thing is impious, or unlawful, then when the Laws of our Nation have discharg'd it as a great Crime, they being against and contrare to no positive Law of God; but rather suitable to the same; and own'd as such by Christian Synods and Divines: and there being no necessity to inforce this going out of the Road. All which holds in this case, nor can it be imagin'd, how Reforming by Arms, can be thought necessary, since God both can without a Miracle, Turn the hearts of Kings, in whose hands they are, as Rivers of Waters. And can send de­vout Men to influence Kingdoms. And should not we rather suffer patiently as the Primitive Christians did, that his Divine Ma­jesty may be by our patience prevail'd upon, to Reform us now, as he did of old our Pre­decessors from Paganism; by our own Kings, in a Regular way than upon every notion of Bigot and Factious Ring-leaders overturn all Government, and order, Rent all Unity, and involve our native Coun­trey in Blood and Confusion. And whilst we are fighting for the Throne of Religion, [Page 89] lose the true efficacy of Piety, and Devo­tion, for what use can there be of Patience, Humility, Faith, and Hope. If we will presently repair our selves, submit to no Magistracy that differs from us, and be­lieve that Religion cannot subsist except by us.

The Fathers also of the Primitive Church have inculcated so much this Doctrine eve­ry where, both by their Doctrine and Pra­ctice, and both these are so fully known, that I shall remit this point to these Learn'd Men who have fully handled it. Only I must remember that excellent passage of St. Ambrose, who being commanded to deliver up his Church to the Arians, sayes, Volens nunquam deferâm, coactus repugnare non no­vi; dolere potero, flere potero, gem [...]re potero; adversus arma milites Gothos, Lachrymae me [...], mea arma sunt, talia enim sunt munimenta sacerdotis; aliter nec debeo nec possum resiste­re. Which Prayers and Tears are likewise call'd the only Arms of the Church by the great Nazianz: in his first Oration against Iulian, and by St. Bernard in his 221. E­pistle. But more of this is to be found, Tom. 2. Concil. Galliae pag. 533. Where it is fully prov'd that all Subjects ought [Page 90] humbly and faithfully to obey the Regal Power, as being ordained by none but God, with whom the wise Heathens agree, for Marcellus (Tacit. lib. 4. hist.) pray'd for good Princes, but obey'd bad ones; and Plinij in his Panegirick to Trojan, confesses that the gods had bestow'd on the Emperor the sole disposal of all things leaving nothing to Subjects, save the honour of obedience▪ But because these of that perswasion will be­lieve better Calvin than the Fathers, I have taken pains to consider in him these few passages, cap. 20. lib 4. Institut. §. 27. Assumptum in Regiam Maj [...]statem violare ne­fas est nunquam nobis seditiosae istae cogitatio­nes in mentem veniant tractandum, esse pro meritis Regem, §. 29. Personam sustinent voluntale Domini, cui inviolabile in Maje­statem ipso impressit, & insculpsit, §. 31. Pri­vatis hominibus nullum aliud quam parendi, & patiendi datum est mandatum. And all this Chapter doth so learnedly and judici­ally impugn this Doctrine, that it is a won­der why Calvinists should differ from Cal­vin.

The Examples adduced by our Republi­cans, of the revolt of Libra, 2 Chron. 1.21. And from Ieroboam, because he had for­saken [Page 91] the Lord God of his Fathers, and of the Ten Tribes from Rehoboam, because of Rehoboam his oppression, 1 King. 12. prove not all the lawfulness of the Subjects defe­ction from their Kings, because these de­fections are only narrated, but not allow [...]d in Scripture, and are recorded rather as in­stances of Gods vengeance upon the wic­kedness of these Princes, than as examples justified in these Revolters, and to be fol­low'd by such as read the Sacred History: In which, when Examples are propos'd by the Spirit of God for our imitation, they are still honour'd with the Divine approba­tion. And I hope my Readers will still re­member, that I design not by this Treatise to encourage Princes to wickedness by Im­punity, but only to discourage Subjects from daring to be the punishers.

The great esteem which the great Bishop Vsher has justly, even among Republicans, and Phanaticks, for Learning and Devoti­on, has prevail'd with me, to set down two Objections used by him, with his pious An­swers thereto. The first is, ‘Suppose (say they) the King, or Civil Magistrate should command us to Worship the Devil, would you wish us here to lay down our Heads [Page 92] upon the Block, and not to repel the vio­lence of such a Miscreant, to the outmost of our power: And if not, what would become of Gods Church, and his Religi­on. To which the Holy Man Answers, That even when the Worship of the De­vil was commanded by the cruel Edicts of persecuting Emperours, the Christi­ans never took up Arms against them, but used fervent Prayers, as their only refuge:’ And St. Peter animats them to this patient suffering, 1 Pet. 4.12, 13. Beloved, think it not strange concerning the fiery trial, but re­joice in as much as ye are partakers of Christs sufferings. But let none of you suffer as a mur­therer, or a thief, or as an evil-doer, or as a busie body in other mens matters. By which last words, if I durst add to so great an Au­thor as B. Vsher, the Apostle seems expresly to me to have obviated the dreadful Do­ctrine of rising in Arms upon the pretext of Religion, and the killing such as differ from them; which if the Christians did allow, they behov'd to pass for Murtherers, and to discharge them to meddle in matters of Go­vernment upon this pretext; because then they behov'd to suffer justly, as busie bo­dies. And here B. Vsher does most appo­sitly [Page 93] cite St. Augustine, in Psal. 149. The World rag'd, the Lion lifted himself up against the Lamb, but the Lamb was full stronger than the Lion: The Lion was over­come by shewing cruelty, the Lamb did over­come by suffering. And St. Ierome, Epist. 62. ‘By shedding of blood, and by suf­fering, rather then doing injuries, was the Church of Christ at first founded, it grew by Persecutions, and was crown­ed by Martyrdoms.’

The second Objection is, If mens hands be thus ty'd, no mans estate can be secure; nay, the whole frame of the Common-wealth would be in danger to be subverted, and ut­terly ruin'd. To which he answers, that the ground of this Objection is exceeding faulty, and inconsistent with the Rules of Huma­nity, and Divinity; of Humanity, because this would impower privat persons to Judge, and so should confound all Order, and in­vite all men to oppose Authority, and make Subjects Accusers, Judges, and Executio­ners too; and that in their own Cause, a­gainst their own Soveraign, and against Di­vinity, because it is contrary to the Scrip­tures, and Fathers, who command Submis­sion, Humility, and Patience. Rex est si [Page 94] nocentem punit, cede justitiae, si innocentem, cede fortunae, Seneca de Iura. lib. 2. cap. 30. If the King punish thee, when thou art guilty, submit to Justice: If when thou art innocent, submit to Fortune. And if a Hea­then could be induced by his vertue to sub­mit to blind Fortune, how much more ought a Christian to be prevail'd upon by Devo­tion to submit to the All-seeing Providence of the most wise God, who maketh all things to work joyntly for good to them that love him. And as St. Augustine piously ad­viseth, Princes are to be suffered by their People, that in the exercise of their pati­ence, temporal things may be born, and ex­ternal hop'd for.

The instance of King Iames the Third being punished by his Subjects, is so far from being an Argument able to justifie Subjects rising in Arms against their King, that this part of our History should for e­ver convince all honest men of the dangers that attend Defensive Arms: For this ex­cellent Prince was so far from being one of these Tyrants, against whom Defensive Arms are only confest to be just, that few Princes were more meek and careful of his Sub­jects. But because he imploy'd such as him­self [Page 95] had rais'd, finding that the Nobility had too often been insolent Servants to their Prince, and severe Task-masters to the People; the Nobility thinking more upon this imaginary neglect, than their own du­ty, did from Combinations proceed to Arms, and rejecting all conditions of peace, they were at last curs'd with a Victory, in which this Gentle Prince was murthered, whilst he sought to save his Sacred life in a deserted Miln. By which we may see that these De­fensive Arms so much hallowed in our late Debates, are but the Militia of Pride, Va­nity, and Ambition, and that if they be al­low'd, the best of Princes will ever fall by them.

And as to the Act 14. Par. 4. Ia. 4. Whereby it is pretended that the opposing, and even the killing K. Ia. the 3. in Battle is justi­fied, and which Act was never repelled. It is answered, First, That this Statute was made by the same Rebels who had op­posed their lawful Prince, and so was ra­ther a continuing of their Rebellion, than a justification of it. 2. That abominable Statute proceeds on the Precept of K. Ia. the 3. calling in the English, and designing to enslave the Kingdom to Forraigners, [Page 96] which was not prov'd as it ought to have been, though the pretext had been legal, as it was neither legal nor true in the least circumstance, and the Noblemen and Ba­rons are Condemn'd, without being Cit­ed or heard; though the Act be not a Statute but a Verdict, so unjust are all Re­bels, who are forc'd to maintain one Crime by another. 3. In the new Collection of our Statutes made by K Ken. and Au­thoriz'd in many subsequent Parliaments. The Dreadful and Treasonable Act is not insert, which was the best way to Rescind it, because it was, though a reproach to the Nation to have any formal Law made to Rescind the Statute, which behov'd to preserve its memory in annulling its Au­thority. 4. Many Statutes since that time are made, declaring the rising in Arms against the King and his Authority, upon any pretext whatsoever to be Treason; and expresly Rescinding all Acts and Statutes to the contrary, as Rebellious and Trea­sonable, and there needed no more Posi­tive Statutes to Rescind that Rebellious and Treasonable Combination rather than Law.

As to the 44. Act 6. Par. Ia. 2. From [Page 97] which its urged, that because that Act declares it Treason to Assault Castles, and Places where the Kings Person shall happen to be, without the Consent of the three Estates: And that it is there­fore lawful to Assault the same with the Consent of the three Estates, and consequent­ly to rise in Arms with the Consent of the three Estates is no Treason. It is answer­ed, that it being but too ordinary in the Minority of our Kings to have great Facti­ons amongst the Nobility (which shews also the danger of placeing the Supream Power in the Proceres Regni) one of the Factions ordinarly either having made the young King Prisoner, or using to As­sault the Castle where he was really pre­served. It was therefore most wisely declar­ed by this Statute, That to lay hands upon the Kings Person violently, what age the Ring be of, young or auld▪ or to Assailzy Castles, or Places where the Kings person shall happen to be, without the Consent of the three Estates, shall be punished as Treason. That is to say, that so great respect was to be had to his sacred Person, that no violence was to be offered to the Place where he was, untill the same was allowed by the three Estates. But in all the for­mer [Page 98] Laws, as well as those made in our age, it is still declared Treason to Rebel against the Kings Person, or to refuse to assist him without adding, except the same be done by the three Estates, which shews that there's nothing design'd in this Act in favours of their Authority; and that this King was Minor the time of this Act; and that he had great Troubles in his Youth, is very clear from the short characters given of our Kings, by Skeen, in the end of our Acts of Parliament.

It will (I hope) easily appear by the ballance of these Arguments, that at least the Municipal Laws of our Nation, which punish defensive Arms as Treason, should be obey'd by our Countrey-men, since, as I have oft inculcated the Laws of any Na­tion should still be obey'd, except where they are inconsistent with the Word of God, and the most that the most violent Re­publicans alive can say upon this Subject, is, that the case may be debated by pro­bable Arguments, and that neither of the Positions want their inconveniencies, so that in this, as in all other Debates, the Law of each Nation is the best Judge to decide such Controversies, and therefore such as maintain these Principles, after so [Page 99] many positive and reiterated Laws, are ob­liged for preserving the Peace of humane Society, and the Order which God has establisht, to remove from places where they cannot obey, for they will alwayes find some place where the Government will please them, and better they be dis­quieted, than the Government of the whole World should be disturb'd, but if they will stay, and oppose the Government, it must be excus'd, to Execute those who would destroy it.

Having thus glanc'd only at Answers to these Objections, because I think the Objections rather shining than strong, I shall sum up this Debate with these Re­flections, First, Buchannan, and our Repu­blican Authors, Debate all these Grounds, as if we were yet to Form the Government, under which we were to live, whereas we live under, and are sworn to a Monarchy, fixt by Law and Consent, time out of mind, and the Levellers may as well urge that no Noble­man should be Dignifi'd, nor no Gentle­man Enrich'd above, a man of good sense; and Tennents may argue that it is not rea­sonable, that they bearing Gods Image as well as the Master, should toile to feed their Lusts▪ thus Reason may be distort­ed, [Page 100] and we call that Reason and Provi­dence, which pleases us best.

2. Most of their Citations and Autho­rities, are the Sentiments of these Greeks, and Romans, who liv'd under Common­wealths, and so magnifi'd their Countrey in opposition to Usurpers, whereas our King is the Father of our Countrey, and whatever they said of their Countrey, we should say of him, and therefore these Citati­ons concerns us no more than the Law of England binds Scotsmen, they praise their own Children and Servants, for their Faith­fulness and Obedience to them, and yet they rail at us for being Faithful to our great Master, and chief Parent under God.

3. Most of the Authors cited and ad­mir'd by them, are Heathens, particularly Stoicks, who equal'd themselves not only to Kings, but to their own Gods, and against whose selfishness and pride, all Christians have justly exclaim'd, and so they are not competent Judges, nor sure Guides to Chri­stians, in the exercise of those purely Chri­stian Vertues of Humility, Submission, Self-denyal, Patience, Faith, and Relyance upon God.

4. They ballance not all the Conveni­encies and Inconveniencies of either Go­vernment, [Page 101] but magnifie the one and conceal the other; and thus it is true that Kings may be Tyrants, but so may, and usually are the Leaders of the Rabble: Cromwel was such, and Shaftsbury had been such, he was such in his Nature, and had been such in his Government; and the Distractions of a Ci­vil War, which ordinarly attend Compe­titions amongst Republicans, Destroy moe than the Lusts of any one Tyrrant can do, which made Lucan conclude, after a sad review of the continued Civil Wars, betwixt Scilla and Marcus, Caesar and Pompeij, without consider­ing what followed under the Trium viri.

5. These who debate against Magistra­cy, gratifie their own Vanity and In­solence; but such devout men as Ambrose, Augustine, Vsher and others, Debate against the Dictats of Interest, as well as Passion; which two, nothing save Grace can over­come, and there can be no surer mark of Conviction than to recide against these.

Lastly, even Buchannan repented this hor­rid Doctrine, Cambden, 10. year of Queen Elizabeths Reign, in 1567.

But forasmuch as Buchannan being trans­ported with partial affection, and with Mur­rays [Page 102] bounty, wrot in such sort that his said Books have been condemned of falsehood, by the Estates of the Realm of Scotland, to whose Credite more is to be Atributed, and he himself sighing and sorrowing, sundry times blam'd himself (as I have heard) be­fore the King, to whom he was School-master, for that he had employ'd so virulent a Pen against that well deserving Queen, and up­on his Death-bed wished that he might live so long, till by recalling the truth, he might even with his Blood, wipe away these As­pertions, which he had by his bad Tongue falsly laid upon her, but that (as he said) it would now be in vain; when he might seem to dote for Age, &c.

Idem, Anno 1582.

And not content with all this (speaking of their surprizing the King) they Com­pell'd the King against his Will, to approve of this intercepting of him by his Letters to the Queen of England, and to Decree an Assembly of the Estates, Summoned by them to be just, yet could they not enduce Bu­channan to approve of this their Fact, either by writting, or perswasion by Message, who now sorrowfully lamented, that he had al­ready undertaken the Cause of Factious people against their Princes, and soon after Died, &c.

The Right of the Succession Defended.

THe fourth Conclusion to be cleared was, that neither the People, nor Parliaments of this Kingdom, could seclude the lineall Successor, or could raise to the throne any other of the same Royal line.

For clearing whereof, I shall according to my former method, first clear what is our po­sitive Law in this case; Secondly I shall shew that this our Law is founded upon excellent reason, and lastly, I shall answer the objections.

As to the first. It is by the second Act of our last Parliament acknowledged, ‘That the Kings of this realme deriving their Royal power from God Almighty alone, do lineally succeed therto, according to the known degrees of proximitie in blood, which cannot be interrupted, suspended or diverted by any Act or Statut what­soever, and that none can attempt to alter or divert the said Succession, without in­volving the subjects of this Kingdom in Perjury and Rebellion, and without expo­sing them to all the fatal and dreadful consequences of a civil warr, DO THERE­FORE from a hearty and sincere sense of their duty Recognize, acknowledge and declare that the right to the Imperial Crown of this realme, is by the inherent [Page 2] right and the nature of Monarchy, as well as by the fundamental and unalterable laws of this realme, transmitted and devolved by a lineal Succession, according to the proxi­mity of blood. And that upon the death of the King or Queen, who actually reignes, the Subjects of this Kingdom are bound by Law, duty and alledgance to obey the nixt immediat and Lawful Heir either male or female, upon whom the right and admi­nistration of the Government is imme­diatly devolved. And that no difference in Religion, nor no Law nor Act of Parliament made, or to be made, can alter or divert the right of Succession and lineal descent of the Crown to the nearest and Lawful Heirs, according to the degrees foresaids: nor can stop or hinder them in the full, free and actuall administration of the Government according to the Laws of the Kingdom. LIKE AS OUR SOVERAIGNE LORD, with advice and consent of the saids Estates of Parliament, Do declare it is high treason in any of the Subjects of this Kingdom, by writing, speaking, or any other manner of way to endeavour the alteration, suspension or diversion of the said right of Succession, or the debarring the next Lawfull Successor from the immediat, actual, full and free [Page 3] administration of the Government, con­form to the Laws of the Kingdom. And that all such attempts or designes shall in­ferre against them the paine of treason.’

This being not only ane Act of Parlia­ment, declaring all such as shall endeavour to alter the Succession, to be punishable, as Traitors; but containing in it a Decision of this Point by the Parliament, as the Supream Judges of the nation, and ane acknowledge­ment by them, as the representatives of the people, and nation. There can be no place for questioning a point, which they have plac'd beyond all contraversie: especially seing it past so unanimously that there was not on­ly no vote given but even no argument pro­pon'd against it. And the only doubt mov'd about it was, whither any Act of Parlia­ment, or acknowledgement, was necessary, in a point which was in it self so uncontraver­ted. And which all who were not desperat fa­naticks, did conclude to be so in this nation, even after they had hear'd all the arguments that were us'd, and the Pamphlets that were written against it, in our neighbour-Kingdom.

But because so much noise has been made about this question, and that blind bigotry leads some, and humorous faction drawes others out of the common road. I conceive it [Page 4] will be fit to remember my reader of these following reasons, which will I hope clear that as this is our present positive Law, so it is esta­blished upon the fundamental constitution of our Government, upon our old Laws, upon the Laws of God, of Nature, of Nations, and particularly of the Civil Law.

As to the fundamental constitution of our Government, I did formerly remark, that our Historians tell us, that the Scots did swear alledgeance to FERGUS, who was the first of our Kings, and to his Heirs. And that they should never obey any other, but his Royal Race. Which Oath does in Law, and reason, bind them to obey the lineal Successor, according to the proximity of Blood. For ane indefinite obligation to obey the blood Royal, must be interpreted according to the proxi­mity in Blood, except the swearers had re­serv'd to themselves a power to choose any of the Royal Familie, whom they pleas'd, which is so true, that in Law, ane obliga­tion granted to any man, does in the con­struction of Law accresce to his Heirs, though they be not exprest. Qui sibi provi­det, & haeredibus providet. And Boethius tells us that after King FERGUS'S death, the Scots finding their new Kingdom infested with warrs, under the powerful influence of Picts, [Page 5] Romans, and Britans, they refus'd notwith­standing to preferre the next of the Royal Race, who was of perfect age, and a man of great merit, to the Son of King FERGUS, though ane infant; which certainly in reason they would have done, if they had not been ty'd to the lineal Successor. But lest the King­dom should be prejudg'd during the minori­ty, they enacted, that for the future, the next of the Blood Royal should alwayes in the mi­nority of our Kings administrat as Kings, till the true Heir were of perfect age. But this does not prove, as Buchannan pretends, that the people had power to advance to the Throne, any of the Royal Race: whom they judg'd most fit, for common sense may tell us, that was not to choose a King, but a Vice-Roy, or a Regent. For, though to give him the more authority, and so to enable him the more to curb factions, and oppose enimies, he was called King, yet he was but Rex fidei Commissarius, being oblidg'd to restore it to the true Heir at his majority: and so Gover­ned only in his Vice, and consequently was only his Vice-roy.

But because the Uncles, and next Heirs be­ing once admitted to this fidei Commissarie tittle, were unwilling to restore the Crown to their Nephews, and sometimes murder'd [Page 6] them: and oftetimes rais'd factions against them. Therefore the People abhorring these impieties, and weary of the distractions, and divisions, which they occasion'd, beg'd from King KENNETH the second, that these fol­lowing Laws might be made.

1. That upon the Kings death the next Heir of whatsoever age should succeed.

2. The Grand-childe either by Son or Daughter should be preferr'd.

3. That till the King arriv'd at 14 years of age, some Wise-man should be choos'd to Govern, after which, the King should enter to the free administration, and according to this constitution, some fit Person has still been choos'd Regent in the Kings minority, with­out respect to the proximity of Blood, and our Kings have been oftentimes Crown'd in the Cradle.

In conformity also to these principles, all the acknowledgements made to our Kings, run still in favours of the King, and his Heirs. As in the first Act Parl. 18. JAMES VI. and the II, III, IV. Acts Parl. 1. CHARLES II. And by our Oath of Alledgeance, we are bound to bear faithful and true alledgeance to his Majesty, his Heirs and Lawful Suc­cessors; which word LAWFUL, is insert, to cutt off the pretexts of such as should not [Page 7] succeed by Law, and the insolent arbitrarie­ness of such, as being but subjects themselves, think they may choose their King. viz. Act 1. Parl. 21. JAMES 6.

That this right of Succession according to the proximity of blood, is founded on the Law of God, is clear by ‘ Num. Chap. 27. v. 9. and 10. If a man hath no Son or Daughter, his inheritance shall descend upon his Brother’, by Num. 36. Where, God himself decides in favours of the Daughters of Zelophehad, telling us, it was a just thing, they should have the inheritance of their father. And ordaines, that if there were no Daughters, the estate should go to the Brothers. Saint Paul like­wayes concluds Rom. 8. If Sons, then Heirs, looking upon that, as a necessary conse­quence; which if it do not necessarly hold, or can be any way disappointed, all his di­vine reasoning in that Chapter falls to no­thing. And thus Ahaziah 2 Chron. 22. v. 1. was made King (though the youngest) in his Fathers stead; because sayes the text, ,,the Arabians had slain all the eldest: which clearly shews that by the Law of God, he could not have succeeded, if the eldest had been alive. We hear likewayes in Scripture, ,,God oft telling, By me Kings reigne. [Page 8] And when he gives a Kingdom to any as to Abraham, David, &c. He gives it to them and their posterity.

That this right of Succession flowes from the Law of nature, is clear; because, that is accounted to flow from the Law of na­ture, which every man finds grafted in his own heart, and which is obey'd without any other Law, and for which men neither seek nor can give another distinct reason; all which hold in this case: for who doubts when he heares of ane hereditary Monarchy, but that, the next in blood must Succeed; and for which we need no positive Law, nor does any man enquire for a further rea­son, being satisfied therein by the principles of his own heart. And from this ground it is, that though a remoter Kinsman did possess as Heir, he could by no length of time pre­scribe a valide right; since no man, as Law­yers conclude, can prescribe a right against the Law of nature: and that this principle is founded thereupon is confest ‘ l: cùm ra­tio naturalis ff. de bonis damnat: cùm ratio naturalis, quasi lex quaedam tacita, liberis parentum haereditatem adjecerit, veluti ad debitam successionem eos vocan­do: propter quod suorum haeredum nomen eis indultum est; adeo ut ne a parentibus [Page 9] quidem, ab eâ successione amoveri possint. Et §. emancipati Institut: de haered: quae ab intest. Praetor naturalem aequitatem sequutus, iis etiám bonorum possessionem contra 12 tabularum leges, & contra jus civile permittit’. Which text shewes like­wayes, that this right of nature was stron­ger than the Laws of the 12 Tables, though these were the most ancient and chief Sta­tutes of Rome. Which principle is very clear likewayes from the Parable, Math. 21. Where the Husband-men who can be pre­sum'd to understand nothing but the Law of nature, are brought in saying, ‘this is the Heir, let us kill him and seaze on his inheri­tance.’ Nor does this hold only in the Suc­cession of Children or the direct line, but in the collateral Succession of Brothers and others ‘ L. hac parte ff. unde cognati. Hac parte proconsul Naturali aequitate motus, omnibus cognatis permittit bonorum posses­sionem quos sanguinis ratio Vocat ad haere­ditatem. Vid. l. 1. ff. de grad. & l. 1. §. hoc autem ff. de bonor. possess.’ And these who are now Brothers to the present King, have been Sones to the former: and therefore what­ever has been said for Sones, is also verified in Brothers. As for instance, though his Royal Highness be only Brother to King [Page 10] CHARLES the II., yet he is Son to King CHARLES I. and therefore, as Saint Paul sayes, if a Son, then ane Heir, ex­cept he be secluded by the existence and Succession of ane elder Brother.

That this gradual Succession is founded on the Law of nations, is as clear by the Laws of the 12 Tables, and the Praetorian Law of Rome. And if we consider the Mo­narchy either old or new, we will find, that wherever the Monarchy was not elective, the degrees of succession were there exactly ob­served. And Bodinus de Republ. lib. 6 Cap. 5. asserts, that, ‘Ordo non tantum naturae & divinae sed etiam omnium ubique gentium hoc postulat.’ From all which, Pope In­nocent in c. grand. de supplend. neglig. prae­lati concludes, ‘In regnis haereditariis ca­veri non potest ne filius aut frater succedat.’ And since it is expresly determined, that the right of blood can be taken away by no posi­tive Law or Statute L. Iura Sanguinis ff. de Reg. jur. & L. 4. ff. de suis legitim. and that the power of making a Testament, can be taken away by no Law L. ita legatum ff. de conditionibus. I cannot see how the right of Succession can be taken away by a Statute: for that is the same with the right of Blood, [Page 11] and is more strongly founded upon the Law of nature, than the power of making Testa­ments.

Since then this right is founded upon the Law of God, of nature and of nations, it does clearly follow, that no Parliament can alter the same by their municipal Statutes, as our Act of Parliament has justly ob­served.

For clearing whereof, it is fit to consider, that in all powers and jurisdictions which are subordinat to one another, the Inferiour should obey, but not alter the power to which it is subordinat; and what it does contrary thereto, is null and void. And thus, if the judges of England should publish edicts contrare to Acts of Parliament, or if a Justice of Peace should ranverse a decree of the judges of West-minster, these their en­deavours would be void and ineffectual. But so it is, that by the same principle, but in ane infinitly more transcendent way, all Kings and Parliaments are subordinat to the Laws of God, the Laws of Nature, and the Laws of Nations: And therefore no Act of Parliament can be binding, to overturn what these have established.

This, as to the Law of God, is clear, not only from the general dictats of Reli­gion, [Page 12] but 28 Hen. 8. cap. 7. the Parliament uses these words, ‘For no man can dispence with Gods Laws; which we also affirme and think.’ And as to the Laws of nature, they must be acknowledged to be immutable, from the principles of reason. And the Law it self confesses that ‘naturalia quaedam jura quae apud omnes gentes peraequè observan­tur, divina quadam providentia constitu­ta semper firma, atque immutabilia per­manent § sed naturalia Institut. de Iur. Natural. & §. singulorum de rer. divis:’ And when the Law declares, that a Supream Prince is free from the obligation of Laws, Solutus legibus, which is the highest power that a Parliament can pretend to, or arrive at; Yet Lawyers still acknowledge that this does not exeem these Supream powers from being lyable to the Laws of God, na­ture and nations, Accurs: in l. Princeps ff. de Leg. Clementina pasturalis de rejudi­catâ Bart. in l. ut vim de justitiâ & jure Voet. de Statutis Sect. 5. Cap. 1. nor can the Law of nations be overturned by private Statutes, or any Supream power. And thus all Statuts to the prejudice of Ambassadours, who are secured by the Law of nations, are confess'd by all to be null, and the highest power whatsoever cannot take off the ne­cessity [Page 13] of denuncing watr before a warr can be Lawful. And Lawyers observe verie well, that these who would oppose the com­mon dictats of mankind, should be look't upon as enemies to all mankind.

My second argument shall be, that the King & Parliament can have no more power in Parliament than any absolute Monarch has in his own Kingdom: for, they are when joyn'd, but in place of the Supream power, sitting in judgement; and therefore they cannot in Law do what any other Su­pream and absolute Monarch cannot do. For all the power of Parliaments consists only in their consent, but we must not think, that our Parliaments have ane unlimited power de jure, so, as that they may forfeit or kill without a cause or decerne against the Sub­jects without citing or hearing them; or, that they can alienat any part of de King­dom; or Subject the wholl Kingdom to France or any other Forraigne Prince: all which deeds would be null in themselves, and would not hinder the partie injur'd from a due redress. For if our Parliaments had such power, we would be the greatest slaves, and live under the most arbitrary Government imaginable. But so it is, that no Monarch whosoever can take from any man what is [Page 14] due to him, by the Law of God, nature, and nations. For being himself inferiour to these he cannot overturne their statuts. Thus a Prince cannot even ex plenitudine potesta­tis legitimat a Bastard in prejudice of for­mer children though they have only but a hope of Succession l. 4. & sequen de natal. restituend. and for the same reason, it is de­clared in the same Law, that he cannot re­store a free'd man ( restituere libertum na­talibus) in prejudice of his Patron, who was to succeed, though that succession was but by a municipal Law. For clearing which question, It is fit to know that the solid lawyers who treat jus publicum, as AR­NISAEUS and others, do distinguish be­twixt such Kingdoms, as were at first con­ferr'd by the People, and wherein the Kings succeed by contract, and in these, the Laws made by King and People can exclude, or bind the Successor. And yet even here, they confess, that this proceeds not, because the Predecessor can bind the Successor, but be­cause the People renew the paction with the succeeding King. But where the Successor is to succeed ex jure regni, in hereditary Mo­narchies, there they assert positively that the Predecessor cannot prejudge the Successors right of Succession. Which they prove by two [Page 15] arguments. First, that the Predecessor has no more power, nor right, than the Successor: for the same right, that the present King has to the possession, the next in Blood has to the Succession. And all our Laws run in favours of the King, and his Heirs, and no man can tye his equal, or give him the Law, par in parem non habet dominium. The second is, that it were unjust and unequitable that the Predecessor should robbe his Successor ‘ nulla ergo (sayes Arnisaeus Cap. 7. Num. 5.) clau­sula Successori jus auferri potest, modò suc­cedat ille ex jure regni’. And Hottoman: lib. 2. de Regno Galliae asserts, that in France which is a very absolute Monarchy, ‘Ea quae jure Regio primogenito competunt, ne Testamen­to quidem patris adimi possunt.’ And thus when the King of France design'd to break the Salique Law of Succession, as in the Reigne of CHARLES the V. It was found impracti­cable by the three Estates, and when Pyr­rhus was to preferre his youngest Son to the Crown, the Epirots following the Law of Nations, and their own, refus'd him, Paus. lib. 1. In the year 1649. Also Amurat the grand Seignior, having left the Turkish Empire to Han the Tartarian, passing by his Brother Ibrahim, the wholl Officers of that State, did unanimously Cancel that [Page 16] Testament, and restore Ibrahim, the true Heir tho a silly foole.

Which shewes the opinion not only of La­wyers but of whole nations and Parliaments; ‘Tho vander Graaff, an Hollander confes­ses, that it is not Lawfull to choose any of his Sons to succeed him, in which, the gene­ral quiet of the Kingdom is much concerned. And therefore, tho the next Heir were wiser, braver, and more generally beloved; Yet the more immediat must be received, as choos'd by God, whither good or bad, and as hono­red with his Character.’ And if Kings could have inverted their Succession, and choos'd their own Successor Saint Lewis had pre­ferr'd his own third Son to Lewis his eldest, and Alfonsus King of Leon in Spaine, had pre­ferr'd his Daughters to Ferdinand his eldest Son. And Edward the VI. of England had preferr'd, and did actually preferre the Lady Iean Gray to his Sisters Mary, and Eliza­beth. And if Successions especially of such great importance, had not been fixed by im­mutable Laws of God, and nature, the various and unconstant inclinations of the present Governours, especially when shaken by the importunity of Step-mothers and Mothers, or clouded by the jealousie of flatterers, or favourits, had made the Nations whom they [Page 17] Governed, very unhappy: and therefore, God did very justly, and wisely setle this Succes­sion, that both King and People might know, that it is by him that Kings Reigne, and Kingdoms are secur'd in Peace against faction▪ and it were strange, that this should not hold in Kings, since even amongst subjects the Honour and Nobility that is bestow'd upon a Man and his Heirs, does so necessar­ly descend upon those Heirs, that the Father, or Predicessor cannot seclude the next Suc­cessor, or derogat from his right, either by renuncing, resigning, following base or meane Trades, or any other: ‘For say those Lawyers, since he derives this right from his old Progenitors, and owes it not to his Father, his Fathers deed should not prejudge him therein. Fab. Cod. 9. Tit. 28. Def. 1. Warnee; Consil. 20. Num. 7.’ And as yet the Estates of Parliament in both Nations have no legislative power, otherwayes than by assenting to what the King does; so that if the King cannot himself make a Successor, neither can they by consenting: and all that their consent could imply wold only be that, they and their Successors should not oppose his nomination, because of their consent. But that can never amount to a power of transferring the Monarchy from one branch [Page 18] to another, which would require, that the Transferrers, or bestowers had the Supream power Originally in themselves, nemo enim plus juris in alium transferre potest quàm ipse in se habet. And if the States of Parlia­ment had this power▪ Originally in them­selves to bestow, why might they not re­serve it to themselves? And so perpetuate the Government in their own hands: And this mov'd judge Ienkins in his trea­tise concerning the liberty and freedom of the subject, pag. 25. To say, that no King can be Named, or in any time made in this King­dom, by the People. A Parliament never made a King, for there were Kings before there were Parliaments, and Parliaments are summoned by the Kings writtes.

Fourthly, A King cannot in Law alienat his Crown, as is undenyable in the opinion of all Lawyers, and if he do, that deed is voyd and null, nor could he in Law consent to an Act of Parliament declaring that he should be the last King. And if such consents and Acts had been sufficient to bind Successors, many silly Kings in several parts of Europe had long since been prevail'd upon, to alter their Monarchy from Haereditarie to Elective; or to turn it in a Common-wealth; and there­fore by the same reason, they cannot con­sent [Page 19] to exclude the true Successor: For if they may exclude one they may exclude all.

5. In all Societies and Governments, but especially where there is any association of powers, as in our Parliaments, there are certain fundamentals, which like the Noble parts in the Body are absolutly necessar for its preservation; for without these, there would be no Ballance, or certainty. And thus with us, if the King and each of the Estates of Parliament had not distinct and known limits (sett by the gracious con­cessions of our Monarchs) each of them would be ready to invade one anothers Priviledges. And thus I conceive that if the Parliament should consent to alienate the half of the Kingdom, or to subject the whole to a Stranger, as in King Iohns case in England, and the Baliols in Scotland, it has been found by the respective Parliaments of both Kingdoms, that, that Statute would not oblidge the Successor. Or if the House of commons in England, or the Burrowes of Scotland should consent to any Act exclu­ding their Estate and respresentatives from the Parliament, doubtlesse that Statute ex­cluding them would not prejudge their Suc­cessors; because that Act was contrare to one of the fundamental Laws of the Nation. And [Page 20] the late Acts of Parliaments excluding Bishops, were reprobated by the ensuing Parliaments, as such; and therefore by the same rule, any Statute made excluding the legal Successor, would be null and voyd, as contrare to one of the great Fundamental Rights of the Nation. And what can be call'd more a Fundamental Right than the Succes­sion of our Monarchy? Since our Monarchy in this Isle, has ever been acknowledg'd to be hereditary. And that this acknowledgment is the great Basis whereupon most of all the positions of our Law run, and are established: such as, that the King never dyes, since the very moment in which the last King dyes, the next Successor in Blood is Legally King, and that without any expresse recognizance from the People, and all that oppose him are Rebells, His Commissions are valide, He may call Parliaments, dispose the Lands pertaining to the Crown, all men are lyable to do him homage; and hold their Rights of him and his Heirs. And generally this prin­ciple runs through all the veins of our Law. It is that, which gives life and Authority to our Statutes, but receives none from them; which are the undenyable marks and Cha­racters of a Fundamental Right in all Na­tions. But that this right of lineal Succession [Page 21] is one of the Fundamental, and unalterable Laws of the Kingdom of Scotland, is clear, by the Commission granted by the Parlia­ment for the union in Anno 1604. In which these words are, ‘his Majesty vouchsafeing, to assure them of his sincere disposition and clear meaning, no way by the foresaid Union to prejudge or hurt the Fundamental Laws, ancient Priviledges, Offices and Liberties of this Kingdom; whereby not only the Prin­cely Authority of his most Royal descent hath been these many ages maintain'd, but also his Peoples securities of their Lands and Livings, Rights, Liberties, Offices and dignities preserv'd: Whilks if they should be innovated, such confusion should ensue; as it could no more be a free Monarchy.’

6. There would many great inconvenien­cies arise, both to King and People, by the Parliaments having this power: For weak Kings might by their own simplicity, and Gentle Kings by the rebellion of their Subjects be induced to consent to such Acts, in which their Subjects would be tempted to cheat in the one case, and rebell in the other. Many Kings likewise might be wrought upon, by the importunity of their Wives, or Concubins, or by the misrepresentations of Favourits, to disinherit the true Successor; and he likewise to prevent this arbitrarienesse, would be oblid­g'd [Page 22] to enter in a faction for his own support, from his very infancy. This would likewise animate all of the Blood Royal, to compete for the Throne, and in order thereto, they would be easily induc'd to make factions in the Parliament, and to hate one another; whereas the true Successor would be ingadg'd to hate them all, and to endeavour the ruine of such as he thought more popular than him­self. Nor would the people be in better case, since they behov'd to expect upon all these accompts, constant civil warres and animo­sities, and by being unsure whom to follow, might be in great hazard by following him who had no Right. And their rights bearing to hold of the King and his Heirs, it would be dubious to the vassals, who should be their superiour, as well, as who should be their King. It is also in reason to be expected, that Scotland will ever owne the legal descent: and thus we should under different Kings of the same Race, be involv'd in new and constant civil warrs; France shall have a constant door open'd, by allyances with Scotland, to disquiet the peace of the whole Isle; and England shab loose all the endeavours it used to unite this Isle within it self. Another great absurdity and inconveniency which would follow upon the exclusion of the lineal Suc­cessor [Page 23] would be, that if he had a Son, that Son behoov'd certainly to succeed; and therefore after the next Lawful Heir were brought from abroad to Reigne, he be­hov'd to return upon the Birth of this Son; and if he dyed he would be again call'd home, and would be sent back by the Birth of another Son: which would occasion such affronts, uncertainties, divisions, factions, temptations, that I am sure, no good nor wise man could admit of such a project.

I find also, that as the debarring the Righteous Heir, is in reason, the fruitful seed of all civil warr and misery, (for who can Imagine that the Righteous Heir will depart from his Right, or that wise men will en­danger their lives and fortunes in opposi­tion to it?) so experience has demonstra­ted, how dangerous, and bloody this in­justice has prov'd. Let us remember amongst many Domestick examples, the miseries that ensu'd upon the exclusion of Mor­dredus the Son of Lothus; the destruction of the Picts for having secluded Alpinus the Righteous Heir; the warrs during the reigne of William the Conquerour; these betwixt King Stevin and Henry the II, be­twixt the Houses of Lancaster and York; betwixt the Bruce and the Baliol; the mur­ther [Page 24] of Arthur Duke of Britanny, true Heir of the Crown of England, with many other forreigne Histories, which tell us of the dreadfull michiefs arising from Pelops preferring his youngest Son to the King­dom of Micene; from Aedipus comman­ding that Polinices his youngest Son should reigne alternatly with the eldest; from Pa­risatis the Queen of Persia's preferring her youngest Son Cyrus, to her eldest Ar­taxerxes, from Aristodemus admitting his two Sons Proclus, and Euristhenes to an Equall share in the Lacedemonian Throne. The like observations are to be made in the Succession of Ptolemaeus Lagus and Ptole­maeus Phisco, In the Sons of Severus, in the Succession of Sinesandus who kill'd his Brother Suintilla Righteours Heir of Spaine, And that of Francis and Fortia Duke of Millan with thousands of others: In all which, either the usurpers or the Kingdom that obey'd them, perish'd utterly. To pre­vent which differences and mischiefs, the Hungarians would not admitte Almus the younger Brother, in exclusion of the elder Colomanus, though a silly deform'd creature, albeit Almus was preferr'd by Ladislaus (the Kings elder Brother) to both. Nor would France acquiesce in St. Lewis his prefer­ring [Page 25] CHARLES his 3 Son, to Lewis the eldest. And the English refus'd to obey Lady Iean Gray, in prejudice of Queen Marie, though a Papist and persecuter. ‘Tali & constanti veneratione nos Angli legitimos Reges prosequimur’ &c. sayes an English Historian.

7. If Parliaments had such powers as this, then our Monarchy would not be he­reditary, but elective; the very essence of ane hereditary Monarchy consisting in the right of Succession, according to the con­tingency of blood. Whereas if the Parlia­ment can preferre the next, save one, they may preferre the last of all the line: for the next save one, is no more next than the last is next. And the same reason by which they can choose a Successor (which can only be that they have a power above him) should likewayes in my opinion ju­stifie their deposing of Kings. And since the Successor has as good Right to succeed, as the present King has to Govern (for that Right of blood which makes him first, ma­kes the other next, and all these Statuts which acknowledge the present Kings Prero­gatives, acknowlege that they belong to him and his Heirs.) It followes clearly, that if the Parliament can preclude the one, they [Page 26] may exclude the other. And we saw even in the last age, that such reasons as are now urged to incapacitat the children of our last Monarch, from the hope of Succession. viz. Popery, and arbitrary Government, did embolden men to Dethrone, and Murder the Father himself who was actual King.

8. That such Acts of Parliament, alte­ring the Succession are ineffectual, and null, Is clear from this, that though such an Act of Parliament were made, it could not de­barre the true Successor: because by the Laws of all Nations, and particularly of these Kingdoms, the Right of Succession purges all defects, and removes all impediments, which can prejudge him who is to Succeed. And as Craig one of our learn'd lawyers has very well express'd it, ‘Tanta est Re­gii sanguinis praerogativa, & dignitas, ut vitium non admittat, nec se contaminari patiatur.’ And thus though he who were to succeed, had committed murther, or were declar'd a traitour formerly to the Crown for open Rebellion against the King, and Kingdom; yet he needed not be restor'd by Act of Parliament upon his comming to the Crown: But his very Right of blood would purge all these imperfections. Of which there are two reasons given by Lawyers, [Page 27] one is, that no man can be a Rebel against himself, nor can the King have a Superior. And consequently, there can be none whom he can offend. And it were absurd that he who can restore all other men, should need to be restored himself. The second reason is, because the punishment of crimes, such as confiscations, &c. Are to be inflicted by the Kings Authority, or to fall to the Kings Thesaury; and it were most absurd, that a man should exact from himself a pu­nishment. Likeas, upon this account it is, that though in the Canon Law, Bastards cannot be promov'd to sacred orders without dispensation, nor can alibi nati, that is to say, people born out of England be admitted to succeed in England, by express Act of Parliament there; Yet Agapaetus, Theo­dorus, Gelasius and many others, have been admitted to be Popes without any formal dispensation, their election clearing that im­perfection. And the Statute of alibi nati, has been oft found not to extend to the Royal line.

That the Succession to the Crown purges all defects, is clear, by many instances, both at home and abroad. The instances at home are, in England Henry the VI. Being di­sabled and attainted of high treason by Act [Page 28] of Parliament, it was found by the Judges, notwithstanding that from the moment he assum'd the Crown, he had Right to succeed without being restored. And the like was resolved by the Judges in the case of Henry the VII, As Bacon observes in his History of Henry the VII. fol. 13. And in the case of Queen Elizabeth, who was declar'd Bastard by Act of Parliament, as is clear by Cambden anno 2. Elizabeth. And though in Scotland there be no express instances of this, because though some Rebellious Ring-leaders in Scotland, have often in a privat ca­pacity been very injurious to their King; Yet their Parliaments have been ever very ten­der of attainting the blood Royal, or pre­sumptive Heirs. But Alexander Duke of Albanie, and his Succession being declared traitours, by his Brother King Iames the IV. his Son Iohn was notwithstanding called home from France upon his Uncles death, and declar'd Tutor and Governour, without any remission, or being restor'd: that employment being found to be due to him by the right of blood: therefore he had been much more declared the true Successor of the Crown if his Cousin King Iames the V. had died.

These being sufficient to establish our [Page 29] design, I shall mention only some forraigne stories.

CHARLES the VII. of France who though banish'd by Sentence of the Parlia­ment of Paris, did thereafter succeed to the Crown. And though Lewis the XII. was forfeited for taking up armes against CHAR­LES the VIII. Yet he succeeded to him without restitution. And Lewis the II. his Son being declared a Rebel, whom his Father desiring to disinherit, and to sub­stitut in his place Charles Duke of Nor­mandie, that Son had succeeded if he had not been hindered by the Nobility, who plainly told him it was impossible to exclude his Sone from the Succession.

My next task shall be to satisfy the ar­guments brought for mantaining this opinion, whereof the first is.

That God himself has authorised the in­verting the Right of Succession, by the examples of Esau, Salomon, and others.

To which I answer, that these instances which are warranted by express commands from God, are no more to be drawn into example, than the robbing of the Aegyptians ear-rings. And it's needing an express com­mand, and the expressing of that command, does evince, that otherwayes Iacob, [Page 30] nor Salomon could not have succeeded against the priviledge of birth-Right and pos­session.

The next objection, is that it is naturally imply'd in all Monarchies, that the people shall obey whilst the Prince Governs justly, As in the paction betwixt David, and the people 2 Sam. 5. Which is most suitable to the principles of justice, and Government: Since relations cannot stand by one side; so that when the King leaves off to be King, and be­comes a Tyrant, the people may consult their own security in laying him aside, as Tutors may be remov'd when they are suspect. And that this is most just when Kings are Idolaters since God is rather to be obey'd then men.

To all which it is answered, that God who loves order, and knows the extrava­gant levity, and insolence of men, espe­cially when baited by hope of prey, or pro­motion, did wisely think fit to ordain under the paine of eternal damnation, that all men should be subject to Superiour powers for conscience sake. 1 Pet. 2.13. and that whoe­ver resists the power, resists God, Rom. 13.2. reserving the punishment of Kings to himself, as being only their Superiour. And thus David, Asa, and others, committed [Page 31] crimes, but were not depos'd, nor debarr'd by the people. Nor were even the Idolatrous Kings such as Achab, Manasse, &c. judged by their subjects, nor did the Pro­phets exhort the people to rise against them, though they were opposing Gods express, and immediat will, And overturning the un­contraverted fundamentals of Religion. Nor did the Fathers of the primitive Church, ex­cite the Christians to oppose the Heathen, and Idolatrous Princes, under which they lived: and Paul commands them to pray for these Heathen Emperours. Nor was the Em­perour Basilicus depos'd for abrogating the Council of Chalcedon, as is pretended by some Republicans, but was turn'd out by the just Successor Zeno, whom he had for­merly dethron'd. Nor were Zeno or Anasta­sius degraded for their errors in Religion, or their vices by the ancient Christians: but were opprest by private faction. And sure they must think God unable to redress him­self, who without warrand, and against his expresse warrand, will usurpe so high a power. And we in this rebellious principle, owne the greatest extravagancy with which We can charge the Pope and Jesuits, and disowne not only our own Confession of faith which Article 1. Chap. 22. ‘acknowledges, [Page 32] that infidelity, or difference in Religion doth not make void the Magistrats just▪ or legal authority, nor free the People from their due obedience to him’, but contradict the best Protestant divines, as Musculus, Melancthon and others vid. libell. de vi­tand. superstit. Anno 1150. & Consil. Biden. Dec. 1. Consil. 10. & Decad. 10. Consil. 5. nor can the subterfuge us'd by Buchanan, and others satisfie, whereby they contend that the former Texts of Scripture prove on­ly that the Office, but not the Persones of Kings are Sacred: so that Parliaments or People may lay aside the Persons, though not the Office, seing the Sacred Text secures oftner the Person, than the Office as I have formerly more fully prov'de. And if this principle prevail'd as to the differences in the Theory of Religion, it would in the next step be urg'd as to the practice of Religion; and we would change our Kings, because we thought them not pious, as well as Prote­stant. And did not our Sectarians refine so far, as to think dominion founded on grace? and this opinion seems to my self more solide than the other, for certainly an impious Protestant, is a worse Governour, and less Gods Vicegerent, and image, than a de­vout Papist. And amongst Protestants, every [Page 33] Secte will reject a King, because he is not of their opinion. And thus our Covenanters, by the Act of the West-kirk Anno 1650. de­clar'd, they would disown our present Mo­narch, if he did not own the Covenant. And though a King were Protestant, yet still this pretext that he design'd to introduce Popery, would raise his People against him, if diffe­rences in Religion could Lawfully Arme sub­jects against their King, or did empower them to debar his Successor. And when this cheat prevail'd against devout King Charles the I, the Martyr of that Orthodox Faith to which he was said to be enemie, what a mad­ness is it to allow this fatall error, which was able to ruine us in the last age, and went so near to destroy us in this? This is indeed, to allow that arbitrariness against our Kings, which we would not allow in them to us.

The second Objection is, that in England the Parliament has frequently devolv'd the Crown and Government upon such as were not otherwayes to have succeeded, as in the instances of Edward the II. and Richard the III, the first of whom was most unjustly de­pos'd, for making use of Gavestoun, and the Spencers; which shewes how extrava­gant the People ar in their humours, rather than how just their power is: for besides, that we [Page 34] do not read, that these Counsellors were un­sufferable, there is no good Christian that can say, that a King can be depos'd for using ill Counsellors. And as to Richard the III. his case is so fully examined, and all the Articles brought both against him, and Edward the II. so fully answered by the learn'd Arnisaeus a Protestant Lawyer, (and who had no other interest in that debate than a love to Truth and Law) in that treatise, Quod nullâ ex cau­sâ subditis fas sit contra legitimum principem arma sumere, that we Protestants should be asham'd to bring again to the field such in­stances, upon which Arnisaeus, in answer to the 14. Article against Richard the II, viz. that he refus'd to allow the Lawes made in Parliament, does very well remark, that this was in effect to consent to their being King, and to transferre upon them the Royal power, and this will be the event of all such under­takings.

The instances of Henry the IV. and Hen­ry the VII., are of no more weight than the other two, since these were likewayes only Kings de facto, till King Henry the VII. by his marriage with the Lady Elizabeth, eldest Daughter to King Edward the IV., did by her transmit a just title to his Successor: & therefore it was not strange, that either of [Page 35] these should allow the Parliament to inter­pose, when they behov'd to owe to them the possession of the Throne. But yet Henry the VII. himself (as the Lord Bacon relates in his Historie) shunn'd to have the Parliament de­clare his title to be just, being content with these ambiguous words, viz. that the inhe­ritance of the Crown should rest, remain and abide in the King, &c. And upon this accompt it was, that the same King caus'd make a Law, that such as should serve the King for the time, being in his warrs, could not be attainted or impeach'd in their persons or Estates.

As to Henry the VIII. his procuring an Act, whereby the Parliament declares that in case he had no issue by the Lady Iean Seymour, he might dispose of the Crown to what­soever person he should in his own discretion think fit.

It is answered, that by a former Statute in the 25 year of his Reigne, he by Act of Par­liament setles the Crown upon the Heirs male of his own body, and for lack of such issue, to Lady Elizabeth, and for lack of such issue also, to the next Heirs of the King, who should for ever succeed according to the right of Succession of the Crown of England; which shewes that the Succession to the [Page 36] Crown of England is establish't by the Law of Nature, and the Fundamental Laws of England, upon the Heirs of Blood, according to the proximity of degrees; so that though that King did afterwards prevaile with the Parliament to declare this Elizabeth a Ba­stard, as he did also his Daughter Mary, by another Act, and resolve to setle the Crown, upon Henry Fitz Roy, Duke of Richmond, yet these Acts teach us how dangerous it is to leave Parliaments to the impression of Kings in the case of naming a Successor, as it is to expose Kings to the arbitrariness of Parlia­ments. But such care had God of his own Laws, that Mary succeeded notwithstan­ding She was Papist, and Elizabeth succee­ded her, though she was declar'd Bastard; the Rights of Blood prevailing over the for­malities of divorce, and the dispensations of Popes: as the strength of Nature does often prevaile over poisons. And God remov'd the Duke of Richmond by death, to prevent the unjust competition, and so little notice was taken of this; and the subsequent Act An­no 1535, that the Heirs of Blood succeeded without repealing of that Act, as ane Act in it self invalide from the beginning: for only such Acts are past by, without being repeal'd. And Blackwood pag. 45. observes very well, [Page 37] that so conscious were the Makers of these Acts, of the illegality thereof, and of their be­ing contrarie to the immutable Laws of God, Nature and Nations, that none durst produce that Kings Testament wherein he did nomi­nat a Successor, conform to the power gran­ted by these Acts, that how soon they were freed by his death from the violent oppres­sions that had forced them to alter a Succes­sor three several times, and at last to swear implicitly to whomever he should nominat, (a preparative which this age would not well bear though they cite it) they proclamed first Queen Mary their Queen though a Papist, and thereafter Queen Elizabeth, whom themselves had formerly declared a Bastard. And as in all these Acts there is nothing decla­ring the Parliaments to have power to name a Successor, but only giving a power to the King, for preventing mischiefs, that might arise upon the dubiousness of the Succession, to nominat a Successor; two of the legal Suc­cessors having been declar'd Bastards upon some niceties, not of nature, but of the Popes Bulls for divorcing their Mothers: so, this instance can only prove, that the King may nominat a Successor, and that the Par­liament may consent, not to quarrell it, (which is all that they do) but does not at all prove, [Page 38] that where the Right of Nature is clear, the Parliament may invert the same. And stran­gers who considered more the dictats of Law than of Passion, did in that age conclude, that no Statute could be valide when made con­trare to the fundamental Law of the King­dom, ‘ Arnisaeus Cap. 7. Num. 11. Henri­cus VIII. Angliae Rex Eduardum filium primò, deinde Mariam, denique Elizabe­tham suos haeredes fecerat, verùm non ali­ter ea omnia valent quàm si cum jure Regni conveniant, Vid. Curt. Tract. Feud. Par. 4. Num. 129.’

There seems greater difficulty to arise from the 13 Elizabeth c. 2. by which it is enacted, that if any persone shall affirme, that the Parliament of England has not full power to bind and Governe the Crown in point of Succession and descent, that such a persone, during the Queens life, shall be guilty of high treason.

But to this Act it is answered, that this Act does not debarre the next legal and natu­ral Successor. And these words, That the Par­liament has power to bind and Govern the Succession, must be, as all other general expres­sions in Statutes, interpreted and restricted by other uncontraverted Laws; and so the sense must be, that the Parliament are Judge [Page 39] where there are differences betwixt Compe­titors in nice and contravertable points which cannot be otherwise decided: and both this and the former Acts made in Henry the VI. time, are not general Laws but tempo­rarie Acts and personal Priviledges; and so cannot overturn the known current of Law. Quod verò contrà rationem juris receptum est, non est producendum ad consequentias. And in all these instances it is remarkable, that the restriction was made upon the desire of the Soveraigne, and not of the Subject. And if we look upon this Act as made to se­cure against Mary Queen of Scotland, and to let her know, that it was to no purpose for her to designe any thing against the Right, or Person of Queen Elizabeth, as being declar'd a Bastard, by Act of Parlia­ment in England; since her other right as next undoubted Heir by Blood to the Crown, might be altered, or Govern'd: we must acknowledge it to be only one of these Sta­tutes, which the Law sayes, are made ad terrorem & ex terrore only. Nor was there ever use made of it by Queen Elizabeth, nor her Parliaments; so fully were they convinc'd, that this pretended power was so unjust, as that it could not be justified by an Act of Parliament, being contrair to the [Page 40] Laws of God, of Nature, of Nations, and of the Fundamental Laws of both Kingdoms. But this Law being made to exclude Queen Mary, and the Scotish line, as is clear by that clause, wherein it is declared that every Person or Persones of what degree or Nation soever they be, shall during the Queens life declare or publish, that they have Right to the Crown of England during the Queens life, shall be disinabled to enjoy the Crown in Succession, inheritance, or otherwayes, after the Queens death; It therefore followes, that it was never valide: For if it had, King Iames might have there­by been excluded by that person who should have succeded next to the Scotish race. For it's undeniable, that Queen Marie did, during Queen Elizabeths life, pre­tend▪ Right to the Crown, upon the ac­count that Queen Elizabeth was declared Bastard. And therefore the calling in of King Iames after this Act, and the acknow­ledging his title, does clearly evince, that the Parliament of England knew, that they had no power to make any such Act. The words of which acknowledgement of King Iames's Right, I have thought fit to set down, as it is in the statute it self, ‘ 1. Ia. Cap. 1. That the Crown of England did [Page 41] descend upon King Iames by inherent Birthright, as being lineally, justly, and Lawfully next, and sole Heir of the Blood Royal. And to this recognition they do submit themselves, and posterities for ever, untill the last drop of their Blood be spilt. And further doth beseech his Majesty to accept of the same recognition, as the first Fruits of their Loyalty, and Faith to his Majesty, and to his Royal progeny, and posterity for ever.’

It may be also objected, that by the 8, Act. Parl. 1. Ia. 6. It is provided in Scotland, that all Kings and Princes that shall happen to reigne and bear Rule over that Kingdom, shall at the time of their Coronation, make their faithfull promise by Oath in presence of eternal God, that they shall mantaine the true Religion of Iesus Christ, the prea­ching of the Holy Word, and due and Right Administration of the Sacraments now re­ceived and preach'd within this Kingdom; from which two conclusions may be inferr'd, 1. That by that Act the Successor to the Crown may be restricted. 2. That the Suc­cessor to the Crown must be a Protestant, that being the Religion which was Professed and established the time of this Act.

To which it is answered, that this Act re­lates [Page 42] only to the Crowning of the King, and not to the Succession. Nor is a coronation ab­solutly necessar, ‘Coronatio enim magis est ad ostentationem, quàm ad necessitatem. Nec ideo Rex est quia coronatur, sed co­ronatur quia Rex est. Oldard: consil. 90. num. 7. Balbus lib. de coronat. pag 40.’ Nor do we read that any Kings were Crown'd in Scripture except Ioas. And Clovis King of France was the first, who was Crown'd in Europe. Nor are any Kings of Spaine Crown'd till this day. Neither is ane Coro­nation Oath requisit; Sisenandus being the first who in the 4. Tolletan Councel gave such an Oath amongst the Christians, as Trajan was the first amongst the heathen Emperours. And we having had no Coro­nation Oath till the Reigne of King Gregorie, which was in Anno 879, he having found the Kingdom free from all Restrictions, could not have limited his Successor, or at least could not have debarr'd him by an Oath. ‘Nullam enim poterat legem dictare poste­ris, cum par in parem non habeat impe­rium,’ as our Blackwood observes. pag. 13. (2.) There is no clause irritant in this Act debarring the Successor, or declaring the Suc­cession null in case his Successor gave not this Oath. 3. The Lawfull Successor though he were of a different Religion from his [Page 43] People (as God forbid he should be) may easily swear, that he shall mantaine the Laws presently standing. And any Parliament may legally secure the Successor from overturning their Religion or Laws, though they cannot debarre him. And though the Successor did not swear to mantaine the Laws, Yet are they in litle danger by his Succession; since all Acts of Parliament stand in force, till they be repeal'd by subsequent Parliaments▪ And the King cannot repeale an Act without the consent of Parliament. But to put this beyond all debate, the 2. Act of this cur­rent Parliament is opponed, whereby it is declared, that the Right and administra­tion of the Government is immediatly de­volv'd upon the nixt Lawfull Heir after the death of the King or Queen, and that no dif­ference in Religion, nor no Law nor Act of Parliament can stop or hinder them in the free and actual administration; which is an abrogation of the foresaid Act concer­ning the Coronation as to this point▪ for how can the administration be devolv'd im­mediatly upon the Successor, if he cannot administrat till he be Crown'd, and have sworn this Oath.

The next objection is, that since the King and Parl. may by Act of Parl. alter the Succes­sions of privat families though transmitted by [Page 44] the Right of blood, why may they not alter the Succession in the Royal family?

To which it is answered, that the reason of the difference lyes in this, that the Heirs of the Crown owe not their Succession to Parliaments: for they succeed by the Laws of God, nature, and the Fundamental Laws of the nation; whereas privat Families are Subject to Parliaments, and inferiour to them, and owe their privat Rights to a mu­nicipal Law, and so may and ought in point of Right to be regulated by them. And yet I am very clear, that a Parliament cannot arbitrarly debarr the eldest Son of a privat Family, and devolve the Succession upon the younger: and if they did so, their Acts would be null. But if this argument were good, we might as well conclude by it, that no persone born out of England, or attainted of treason could succeed to the Crown; Because he could not succeed to a privat Estate. All which and many moe instances do clearly demonstrat that the Suc­cessor to the Crown cannot be debarr'd, not the Succession to the Crown diverted by Act of Parliament.

The last objection is, that Robert the III. King of Scotland, was by ane Act of Par­liament preferr'd to David and Walter, who were [Page 45] (as he pretends) were truly the eldest lawful Sons of Robert the 2 d. because Eu­phan Daughter to the Earl of Ross was first lawful Wife to King Robert the 2 d, and she bore him David Earl of Strathern, and Walter Earl of Athol, Alexander Earl of Buchan, and Euphan who was married to James Earl of Dowglass, after whose de­ceass he married Elizabeth Muir, Daughter to Sir Adam Muir; not so much (as Bu­chanan observes) from any design to marry a second Wife, as from the great love he carried to Elizabeth Muir, whom because of her extraordinary Beauty he had lov'd very passionatly in his youth, and before he married the Earl of Rosses Daughter, and from the love which he bore to the Sons whom Elizabeth had born before that first Marriage, who were John Earl of Carrick (who thereafter succeeded to the Crown by the Title of Robert the 3 d,) and Robert Earl of Fife and Monteith, he prevail'd with the Parliament to prefer John eldest Son by Elizabeth Muir, to the two Sons which he had by the Earl of Rosses Daugh­ter, who was (as they pretend) his first lawful Wife.

In which though I might debate many nice points of Law relating to this Subject, [Page 46] yet I choose only to insist on these few convincing Answers.

1. That in a Case of so great moment Historians should be little credited, except they could have produc'd very infallible Documents; and as in general one Histo­rian may make all who succeed him err, so in this Case Boetius (who was the first) liv'd and wrot 200 years after the Marriage of King Robert the 2 d, and wrot his Histo­ry at Aberdeen, very remote from the Re­gisters and Records by which he should have instructed himself; nor did he know the importance of this point, having touch'd it only transiently, though it has been de­sign'dly press'd by Buchanan, to evince that the Parliaments of Scotland might prefer any of the Royal Line they pleas'd; and it is indeed probable that King Robert the 2 d. did for some time make no great noise of his first Marriage with Elizabeth Muir, least the meaness of the Match should have weaken'd his Interest upon his first coming to the Crown, he being himself the first of the Race of the Stewarts, and hav­ing so strong Competitors as the Earl of Dowglass, who claim'd Right to the Crown in the Right of the Baliol and the Cum­mings, as Boetius himself observes.

[Page 47]2. King Robert the 3 d. having succeeded as the eldest lawful Son, and having been receiv'd as such by that Parliament, and his Posterity by all succeeding Parliaments, the Possession of the King and the Acquiescence of the People is the most infallible proof that can be adduc'd for proving that Robert was the eldest lawful Son, nor have most Kings in Europe, or the Heads of most pri­vate Families any other proof of their be­ing the eldest and lawful Sons, save that they succeeded and were acknowledg'd as such.

3. To ballance the authority of these Historians, I shall produce the Testimonie of the Learned Sir Lewis Stewart, one of the most famous Lawyers we ever had, and who ought much more to be believ'd than Buchanan, not only because he was more disinterested, but because he founds upon Acts of Parliament and old Charters which he himself had seen in the Registers, in which Elizabeth Muir is acknowledg'd to have been the first Wife. Buchananus lib. 9. in vitam Roberti 2. affirmat Euphaniam Comitis Rossenssis filiam primam Regis Roberti 2. uxorem fuisse & eâ mortuâ, Regem super­induxisse Elizabetham Moram ex qua prius Liberos ternos mares suscepisset, & eam uxo­rem [Page 48] duxisse, ejusque liberos regno destinasse, ut postea eorum natu maximus suc [...]essit quod quam falsum sit, apparet ex archivis in car­cere Edinburgensi reconditis, ubi exstant se­parata acta duorum Parliamentorum, subscrip­ta manibus Ecclesiasticorum praesulum, nobi­lium, baronum, & aliorum statuum Parlia­menti, & eorum sigillis roborata, quibus Eli­zabetha Mora agnoscitur prima uxor, & Euphania Rosse secunda, & liberis ex Eli­zabetha Mora tanquam justis haeredibus Reg­ni, successive regnum d [...]cernitur, & post eos liberis Euphaniae Rosse nec non ibidem cartae extant plurimae, factae per Davidem secundum, eorum patruum magnum ex diversis terris, Ioanni filio primogenito, nepotis ejus Roberti, dum Euphania Rosse viverit nec non Da­vidi filio natu maximo Euphaniae Rosse quem solum filium indigitat Roberti nepotis, quod non fecisset si Elizabetha Mora non pri­us fuisset nupta Roberto ejus nepoti, nam primogenitus nunquam attribuitur notho imo ego plures quam viginti cartas in archivis in­veni, ubi etiam eas reliqui, ex quibus sole clarius elucessit, Elizabetham Moram primam fuisse uxorem, & Euphaniam Rosse secun­dam, nam extra contraversiam, liberi Eli­zabethae Morae etate grandiores erant liberis Euphaniae Rosse: which Paper I did get [Page 49] from the Lord Pitmeden, who has himself written some learn'd Observations upon this point.

4. I have my self seen an Act of Parlia­ment (found out by the industry of Sir George Mackenzie of Tarbet, now Lord Register) having the intire Seals of the Members of Parliament appended thereto, by which the Parliament do swear Allegi­ance to Robert the 2 d. the first King of the Race of the Stewarts; and after him Roberto Comiti de Carrict, filio suo natu maximo (his eldest Son) in Anno 1371, which was the first year of his Reign; and if the pretended defect be true, it was a very palpable, and a very undenyable one, and could not but have been unanswerably known to the whole Nation. And how can we imagine, that the whole Parliament would have unanimously drawn upon themselves so dreadful a Perjury, by ex­cluding the lawful Heir, against their Na­tional Oath in the Reign of K▪ Kenneth the 3 d, whereby they swore to own always the immediate Heir, or that they would have entail'd upon themselves a Civil War, by preferring even a questionable Heir, after the Miseries which they had lately then felt, in the competition betwixt the Bruce and [Page 50] the Baliol. Amongst which Seals, the Seal of Iames Earl of Dowglass is one, and how ridi­culous is it to think, that he would sit and declare a Bastard preferable to the Brother of his own Lady, and to his own Lady who would have succeeded if her Brothers had died without Succession: Which Act of Parliament does also clearly prove, that Buchanan did not at all understand matters of Fact in this part of the History, for he asserts, that after the death of Euphan Ross, the King married Elizabeth Muir, and did by Act of Parliament obtain the Crown to be settled upon Robert the 3 d, Son to the said Elizabeth Muir, upon whom he also bestow'd the Title of Carrick; all which is most false, for this Act of Parliament is dated in Anno 1371, and King Robert the 2 d. succeeded to the Crown that year, nor did Euphan Ross die till the 3 d. year after he succeeded to the Crown, and so not till the Year 1374, and yet in Anno 1371 this Act is past, designing him Heir to the Crown, and Earl of Carrick, and conse­quently he was so design'd before the death of Euphan Ross.

5. I have seen a Charter granted by King Robert the 2 d, when he was only Steward of Scotland, granted in anno 1165, [Page 51] and so long before he was King. In which Charter likewise, Iohn, thereafter King, by the name of Robert the 3 d, is a con­junct Disponer with him, under the ex­press designation of the eldest Son and Heir. Robertus Senescallus Scotiae, Comes de Strathern, & Ioannes Senescallus primogenitus & haeres ipsius Dominus Baroniae de Kyle, &c. which Charter confirms to the Abbacy of Pasley several Lands disponed to them, by Reginaldus More, Father to Sir William More of Abercorn. And I find that David Duke of Rothsay, was always in the Char­ters granted by his Father King Robert the first, called Primogenitus, and he was no Bastard, nor can this designation be given to a Bastard, as is clear by Covaruvias de Matrim. part. 2. cap. 8. §. 2. num 4. But how can it be imagined that the Monks of Pasley would have taken a Right from a person as Heir to the Crown, who was not: for this would have infer'd Treason against them, beside the annulling their Right, or who could understand better the lawfulness of a Marriage, than a body of Church-men, living in the time, and very near to the Residence of the married Persons, and in whose Conventual-Church the said King Robert and Elizabeth Muir ly buried together.

[Page 52] Item, I have seen in the Registers ano­ther Charter granted by King Robert the 2. in the first year of his Reign, with the con­sent of Iohn Earl of Carrick, primogenitus & haeres, Allano de Lavidia terrarum de Whitslet; And an other granted by the said King, 1. Iune, anno primo regni, con­firming to Paulo M ^ctire a Charter granted by the Earl of Ross, Father to Euphan, wherein the said Iohn primogenitus & haeres, is a Witness: And to shew that the said Euphan Ross was then living when he was so design'd Heir, there is a Charter to her by the King upon the very same day of the Lands of Lochleaven. As also, there is a Charter granted by King Robert the 2 d, the first year of his Reign, to Alexander his Son, and another to Iohn Kennedy of the Barrony of Dalrymple, in both which the said Iohn Earl of Carrick is call'd primo­genitus, and is Witness with the Earl of Dowglass; so that he has been design'd eldest Son and Heir, openly, uncontra­vertedly, and in all Papers, and with the consent of the second Wife and her Rela­tions.

6. In the Parliament 1372, the said Iohn Earl of Carrick is design'd to be Lieu­tenant of the Kingdom, and all the Estates [Page 53] of Parliament swear to own him in his Government, and which Statute is printed amongst the Satutes of King Robert the 2 d, Father to the said Iohn, and which must be during the Marriage with Euphan Ross, for she liv'd three years after her Husband was King, and he succeeded to the Crown anno 1371: And this also con­futes Buchanan, who asserts, that he was created Earl of Carrick after the death of Euphan Ross, and it is against all sense and reason to think that he could have been acknowledg'd during her life, if he had not been the true Apparent Heir of the Crown and a lawful Son.

7. Walter (who they pretend should have succeeded to the Crown,) having kill'd his Nephew King Iames the first, Son to King Robert the 3 d; He was not only not own'd after the death of the said King Iames, as certainly he had been if his Title had been good, and his Right so recent and demonstrable, having so many great and powerful Relations, that his Fa­ther was induc'd upon their account to marry his Mother; but yet the said Walter was by all the Parliament unanimously con­demn'd as a Traitor, for having conspir'd the death of his lawful Prince. Nor does [Page 54] Boetius justifie Walter's Title in the least, but on the contrary, magnifies the Parlia­ment for their just Sentence. As did like­wise Aeneas Silvius the Popes learned Legat, who exhorted the Parliament to condemn him.

8. How is it imaginable, that King Ro­bert who had so lately, and after a strong competition come to the Crown, would have adventur'd to make his Title yet more dis­putable, by preferring a Bastard to the true Heir, who had so many Friends by his Mother, and who being an Infant had never disoblig'd him.

9. If we will consider the opinion of the Civilians, whom we and almost all Nations follow in the Cases of Succession, we will find, that the said King Robert the 3 d was the eldest and lawful Son of King Robert the 2 d. filius legitimus, & non legitimatus. For, 1. They conclude, that a Son is prov'd to be a lawful Son by the Assertion of the Father, Alciat tract praesumpt. Reg. 2▪ prae­sumpt. 2. num. 6. and certainly the Father is the best Judge in such Cases; but so it is we have the Father owning the said Robert the 3 d. to be his eldest Son and Heir, both in Charters and Acts of Parliamnets, which are the most solemn of all Deeds. 2. Quando [Page 55] pater instituit aliquem tanquam filium suum, which holds in this Case, where the Father institutes and leaves him Heir, and the Par­liament swears Allegiance to him as the Heir, Mascard. de prob. vol, 2. conclus. 799. And in dubious Cases, the Father's naming such a man as a Son, presumes him to be a lawful Son, nominatio parentis inducit filia­tionem in dubio, l. ex facto §. si quis Roga­tus ff. ad trebell. 3. Even Fame, and the common opinion of the People, do in favours of these that are in Possession, and in ancient Cases, prove & filiationem, & legitimationem, Mascard. conclus. 792. but much more, where the Fame and common Opinion is adminiculated by other Argu­ments, fulgos consil. 128. Panorm. in cap. transmiss. qui filii sunt ligittimi. 4. When Writs are produc'd, calling a man a Son, the Law concludes him to be a lawful Son. Mascard. vol. 2. conclus. 800. num 15. all which can be easily subsum'd in our Case. In which Robert the 3 d. is nam'd not only Son, but Heir, and Allegiance sworn to him, even in the lifetime of the second Wife and her Relations sitting in Parlia­ment, and all this acquiesc'd in for many hundreds of years, and the Competitors punish'd as Traitors by the unanimous con­sent of all the Parliament.

[Page 56]I know that Buchanan does most bitter­ly inveigh against those Laws made by King Kenneth the 3 d, as Laws whereby the ancient Right of Succession was inno­vated, and whereby the Government was settled upon Children who were neither able to consult with the People, nor to de­fend them, and whereby those had the Government of the Nation conferr'd upon them who were not capable to govern themselves.

To which my answer is, That in this Buchanan's Malice contradicts his History, for his own History tells us, that the Scots swore Allegiance to Fergus and his Poste­rity; and consequently Fergus's Son ought by Law to have succeeded, and not his Brother, for his Brother was none of his Posterity, and therefore those Laws made by K. Kenneth did but renew the old Law, and the innovation introduc'd in favours of the Uncles, was a subversion of the fun­damental Law to which they had sworn. 2. That the old Law was not abrogated, but was in Being by vertue of the first Oath, appears very clear by Buchanan him­self, who confesses, that upon the death of Durstus, a wicked Prince, it was de­bated whether his Son should not succeed [Page 57] juxta sacramentum Fergusio prestitum vete­remque esse morem servandum, which ac­knowledgeth that the Succession was even in these days established by Law, by Oath, and by Custom; and after the death of Fergus the 2 d, his Son Eugenius (though a Minor) was crown'd, and his Uncle Graemus allow'd to be his Tutor. And Buchanan also brings in Bishop Kenne­dy, lib. 12. praising this Law as made by Kenneth, a most wise and glorious Prince, with advice of all his Estates of Parliament; and which rather confirms (as he says) the old Law than introduces a new one, so far did Buchanan's rage against Queen Ma­ry prevail with him, to praise and rail at the same individual Law; and it is observ­able, that it is very dangerous to recede once from fundamental Laws, for Buchanan makes not only the Succession Elective, but he makes no difference betwixt lawful Children and Bastards, and excludes not only Minors during the Uncles life, but Wo­men for ever. 3. In all Nations where the Monarchy is Hereditary, Minors succeed, and so this innovation of causing the next Male succeed for all his Life, was contrary to the nature of the Monarchy and to the Customs of all Nations, and God in Scri­pture [Page 58] gives us many instances of it: Ioas succeeded when he was seven years of Age, Iosiah when he was eight, Manasseh in twelve, and Azariah in sixteen; and yet in those days, God is said to have chosen the King, for it is said in Deut. Thou shalt set over thee, the King whom I have chosen, and consequently the choice of Minors can­not be ill, since God Almighty us'd to make such a choice. I know that Eccles. 10.16. says, Woe unto the land when thy King is a child, but the Criticks interpret this of a King that is childish, puer intellectu & moribus, or because Factions arise by the opposition to his Regents, and this incon­veniency did more necessarily attend the allowing a Regent King during Life, for both the Subjects and the true Heir rais'd Factions in that Case, whereas the Subjects only are factious in the other, and yet even they are no more factious for that short time, than they are always in Common­wealths. 4. The reason why the Minor King was to have one to supply his Non­age ceasing with his Majority, it was un­reasonable that the Remedy should have lasted beyond the Disease, and the worst effect that could have been occasion'd by the Infant King's Minority was, that the [Page 59] Kingdom should have been during that time govern'd by joynt advice of Parlia­ment, Councils, and Officers of State, which in Buchanan's opinion in other places of his History and Book De Jure Regni, is so excellent a Model, that he decrys Mo­narchy as much inferior to it. 5. It was most inconvenient to accustom any private Family to live in the quality of a King. 6. It could not but occasion many Murders, and much Faction, for the true Heir could not live peaceably under this Eclipse and Exclusion, nor could the Uncle live without making a Party to secure his pleasant Usurpation. 7. As these Divisions and Factions were the natural and necessary Effects that were to be expected from this irregular Succession, so it is very observ­able, that from King Fergus to King Ken­neth the 3 d, we had 79. Kings, amongst whom, almost the half were the most im­pious, tyranical, or lazie Kings that ever we had, according to Buchanan's character of them; so happy and wise a thing is this (so much magnified) Election of a Succes­sor by the People and their Representa­tives, to supply the defects of the lawful Heir, whereas from King Kenneth the 3 d, to King CHARLES the 2 d. inclusivè, we [Page 60] have had 31. Kings, 26. of whom have suc­ceeded by a due lineal Right, and have prov'd vertuous Princes, greater by their Merit than their Birth, as if God had de­sign'd to let us see, that though most of them succeeded whilst they were very young, yet that he can choose a fitter Suc­cessor than Parliaments can do; whereas the other 5. Kings who came to the Crown against that Law of Kenneth the 3 d▪ viz. Constantine the bald, Grimus, Mackbeath, Donal Bain, and Duncan the 2 d, were all persons who deserved very ill to be pre­ferred to the true Heir, and who, as they came to the Crown against Law, so govern'd without it: And it is very strange, that the Fanaticks, who think that every throw of the Dice is influenc'd by a special Pro­vidence, will not allow, that God does by a special Providence take care who shall be his Representative, who shall be the Pastor of his Flock, and nursing Father of his Church; let us therefore trust his Care more than our own, and hope to obtain more from him by Christian Submission, Humility and Obedience than we can by Caballing, Rebelling, and Sacrilegious-Murdering, or Excluding the true Successor.