CHAP. I. The Occasion and Design of this little Tract. The Original of the Word Lot.

LOtteries were never so general a Subject of Discourse, as they have been of late, since that eminent one in England in the Year 1694. Their Neighbours, obser­ving a Million Sterling speedily raised, in hopes of gaining some of the Great Bene­fits there proposed, have betaken themselves to the same Methods, of perswading Peo­ple to part with ready Mony, which no Con­sideration of any good Use to be made of it, would otherwise have been able to draw from [Page 2]them. Several Cities in Holland and the Pro­vinces adjacent, and even some little Towns have even rivalled one another in this Pro­ject; and many others it is said are like to be set on Foot, in places at a greater distance. The Few Persons, who have been Fortu­nate in the Lotteries already drawn, are so eager and full of Hope to grow Rich at a small Expence, in the many more proposed afresh, that every one hastens to bring in his Mony to those next to be drawn, with an Intention to venture all, or a considerable part of his Gains, in others to be drawn afterwards. This is observable to be con­stantly the Case, where Men are perswaded of the Integrity of the Directors; as in Hol­land particularly, where great Care and Ex­actness is used in matters of this kind. Peo­ple are there as greedy of advancing Mony, as if they lent it at a large Interest; or put it out at the Two-hundredth Penny.

All Holland being now warm in these Pro­jections, a Man comes into no Company, where these do not make a part of the Conver­sation; every one is expressing his Concern for his Loss, or his Joy for his Gain in Lot­teries, or at least his Hopes of obtaining some Benefit, in those at present on Foot. The Lists that come out daily are greedily bought up, to see whether Mens Numbers are come up; A huge Roll of Cyphers are carefully pe­rused, to observe whether there be any hopes yet left, or whether they must think of ma­king [Page 3]themselves Amends in some future Lot­tery. If the Numbers lookt for are not yet past, they cherish Hopes of a good Benefit yet to come; And though the Odds give more ground for Fear than Hope, yet every Man's Hopes are infinitely above his Fears. The first Question upon every Meeting is, How Tickets go? and every Moment we hear of the Good Luck of those who have Benefits; and the Ill Luck of those that have only Blanks. Some there are that have succeeded in every Adven­ture, and these are called the Fortunate, they have the Opinion of great Good Luck attending them, and are often envied upon this Account. Others again, who have got nothing, lament their own Ill Luck, and declare that now finding themselves to be Ʋnfortunate, they re­solve never to venture in Lotteries any more.

I happened in Company lately to hear so much of This, that I could not forbear asking some who talked at this rate, Whether they understood what they said, when they affirm­ed a Man, to have Good or Ill Luck? This Question at first surprised them much, because no Expressions are more frequent than These, not only with regard to Lotteries, but all other Plays that depend upon Chance, and a Thousand other Incidents of Humane Life. However I took upon me to maintain, that these Words had no real Sense belonging to them, but were merely Terms of course, or at least very dark and unintelligible, in the Conception of most that used them. Upon [Page 4]this the Discourse grew warm; and They, who were surprised at my Question, main­tained, that the Sense of these Words were exceeding obvious and clear, and that it was perfect Humour and Peevishness to cavil at them. The main Argument by which they supported themselves, was common Use, and Custom; and the Instances of Fortunate Per­sons produced by them they thought suffici­ent, to confirm and warrant the Expressions which a customary Way of Speaking had esta­blished. Still I maintained the contrary, by such Arguments, as the Reader will find in the Sequel of this Work. What Success I met, or ought to have met with, I forbear to say, because it is more fit, that they, who peruse this Tract, should afterwards deter­mine that Point, as They see reasonable.

This gave me the first Hint, and some Incli­nation to draw my Arguments into Form, and make them publick. I told them then, it were no hard matter to write a Book upon this Sub­ject; which might contain many Things, that deserve more serious Reflection, than Men commonly allow them. I communicated this Design afterwards to some Friends, who en­couraged me to proceed in it; and told me, that several vulgar Errours concerning things of this kind would never be more seasonably exposed than now. They perswaded me, that such a Tract could not cost me any great Pains; and that a few Days would suffice for putting my Thoughts into Writing. They assured me [Page 5]farther, that an Attempt of this Nature must needs turn to good Account, because falling in with the reigning Humour of the Time and the Country. At last I yielded, and resolved to let the World see, both my own Reasons, and the Objections they are liable to. But not intending so dry a Business as mere Criti­cism, I resolve to intersperse several things, which may both please and profit my Readers, if I can be so happy, as to make these Two Advantages meet together.

Now I will shew, that these two Words Good Luck, and Ill Luck, have in reality no Sense or Signification, as they are generally used, the different Manners whereof I will ex­amine distinctly. I will likewise shew, that several other Words, as commonly received, both in Ancient and Modern Speech, are of a very loose, and uncertain Signification. Af­ter which, to proceed to somewhat of grea­ter Consequence, I shall enquire into the Mo­tives, by which Men are so commonly prevail­ed upon, to part with their Mony so easily into Lotteries; and then in the last place, I will in­form my Reader, what Use Men ought to make of the Advantage they reap from Benefit Tick­ets, or of the Losses they sustain by Blanks.

Thus I have laid down a short Scheme of my Design. But, before I enter upon Par­ticulars, it will be proper to offer my Con­jecture, concerning the Original of the Word Lot, from whence Lottery is derived. Now this seems to be an old Saxon word, as we [Page 6]may probably conclude, from its being in use in most of the Languages in these Northern Parts of the World.

There is great reason to believe, that at the first Peopling of Europe, one and the same Nation of Asia, came along by the North of the Euxin Sea, and afterwards separated so, that one part, after having followed the Nor­thern Coast of that Sea, turned Southward, and took up all that Tract of Land from Thrace to the utmost Southern Part of Peloponnesus and the Morea; and the other Division marched Westward, and inhabited Germany. The for­mer were called Greeks, the latter Germans. Hence is that surprising Affinity, observable between the Greek, and Saxon, which was the ancient Language of the Germans; and from whence High-Dutch, Low-Dutch, and a great part of the English Tongue mani­festly come. M [...]rie. Casaub Dissert. de Ling. Saxon. This is so fully made out by a Learned Man, in his Dis­sertation upon the Saxon Tongue; that I may take the liberty of supposing it upon this oc­casion, without troubling my self to prove it after him.

Upon these Terms, it ought not to seem Strange, if I derive the word Lot from the same Original, with the Ionick word [...]; which Hesychius and the Great Etymologicon de­clare to signify the same thing. Thence comes [...] to have a Lot, instead whereof, now grown obsolete, the Greek makes use of [...]. It may perhaps be objected, that were the [Page 7] Greek Word [...] or [...], my Conjecture might carry some probability with it; but the Change of a [...] into a [...] seems too harsh and hard of Digestion. To which I answer, That these two Letters were often put for one another, even in the ancient Dialects of the Greek Tongue. Thus they of Tarentum said [...], for [...] Birds; and the Sicilians [...] while others pronounced and wrote [...]. Learned Men have derived the Latin Hortus from the Greek [...] a Garden. Mustus New from [...]. Nato to Swim from [...]; and several other Changes, of the Letters C. and T. of which G. J. Vossius hath produced In­stances, in his Treatise upon that Subject. So that without Trespassing too far upon the common Rules of Etymology, we may affirm, that Lot and [...] are not more distant, than many other Words in the several Dialects of one and the same Tongue. And Lot, as well as [...] signifies originally, that which falls to a Man by Chance.

Some perhaps may think, that instead of taking Lot for the primitive Word, I ought rather to have written Los after the German manner at this Day: But in regard Lot is u­sed in English, Danish, Flemish and French, I thought this ought to be looked upon, as the ancient, and more authentick Pronunciation. However, either way it comes to the same Thing at last; since it is certain, that in the Saxon Tongue, and its Dialects, T. and S. are often put for each other, as they were former­ly [Page 8]in the Greek. But if you please, the same Comparison will hold between [...] and Los, or [...] and Lot indifferently: Since in Derivations C. H. is frequently turned into S. as the same Vassius hath abundantly proved.

CHAP. II. The Different Significations, of which the Words Good Luck and III Luck are capable.

IF we attend to the first and most simple Idea's which this Word Good Luck awa­kens in our Mind, when we hear it; we shall find, that this Name is properly applied, to an Event, favourable to a Man, without any Care or Foresight of his own, contributing to it. Thus when a Man plays at any Game of Chance, as Dice for instance, and wins at it, this is called Good Luck, and such a one is said to be Fortunate at Play. A Man is likewise called Lucky when in Circumstances that conduce to Advancing his Interest, without any Concurrence of his own. A Merchant is said to be a Fortunate Trader, when his Ship arrives safe, or the Commodi­ties, of which his Venture consists, rise in Value, without his Management. A Gene­ral of an Army is esteemed Fortunate, when succeeding in Attempts, which were likely to have proved his Ruin, or when some unfore­seen Accident favours his Designs. These Terms are used upon a thousand like Oc­casions; [Page 9]And the Words Ill Luck and Ʋn­fortunate to denote just the contrary. Which Remark will hold in Words of the like Im­portance, in all other Languages.

It may perhaps be alledged, that I have already overthrown the whole Design of this Book, by assigning clear Idea's to Terms, which I pretend in most Mens Mouths to be thrown out at Random, without any mean­ing at all. And, were Men content to stop here, I should make no Difficulty to own my self in the wrong. But 'tis plain, that these Words are extended a great deal farther, than those most simple and obvious Idea's already instanced in. When we call a Man Fortunate, or say he hath Good Luck in any thing; this does not only mean, that some Advantages have happened to him, which were not of his own procuring; but besides, that there is somewhat attending upon, and as it were fixt to such a Person, which makes Him Successful, where any other Man would Miscarry; and yet this Success cannot be attributed to any Prudence or good Manage­ment, wherein he excels those that miss of like Success. And I shall shew by some Ex­amples, that this last Sense, is what Men commonly intend by Good Luck.

When a Man is said to be Fortunate at Play, this means, not only that he hath often won heretofore, but that he will in all likelihood win, whenever he pleases to play hereafter: Upon this Account, we are fond of Bettnig [Page 10]upon his Head, or going Partners with him, if he will suffer us to share in his Luck. They on the other Hand, who are called Ʋnfortu­nate in these Respects, we look upon, as Men that always, or at least generally, Lose; and it is usual to say, that such Men would do well to leave off Play; which yet the Men of Good Luck are permitted and encouraged to use. Now this makes it plain, that we have a dark Notion of an odd unintelligible Quali­ty, from whence it comes to pass, that some Men Win and Others Lose. And in this Sense it is, that I affirm the Words Good Luck and Ill Luck to be empty Sounds, and to signi­fie nothing at all.

Several Persons of Eminence have been esteemed Fortunate, in their Undertakings; and their former Successes have been re­ceived as Pledges of the like in all their future Attemps. A certain Principle of Good Luck hath been thought inherent in them, which could not fail of bringing every thing they took in Hand to its desired Effect. Many re­markable Examples of this kind are to be met with in Story; Some of which I will do my self the Justice to produce, that I may prevent any Suspicion of imposing upon my Reader in this Matter.

One of the most Fortunate Persons (for I shall use the vulgar Way of speaking in this and other such like Terms, till I have fully explained my self about them) that History makes mention of, is Polycrates, Tyrant of [Page 11] Samos, who was Cotemporary with Cambyses King of Persia; above five hundred Years be­fore Christ. Herodotus gives us an Account of Him, some of the most memorable Passages whereof I will very briefly relate. He, though of private Fortune and low Birth, found means, in Conjunction with his two Brothers, to possess himself of the Isle of Samos, of which He and They were likewise Tyrants, or Kings. Now it was Good Luck not to sink under so bold and desperate an Attempt; but this was only the first step of his great Fortune. The holding a little Island in Part­nership with two others, was no such mighty Matter: but, shortly after, he put one of his Brothers to Death, and the Other upon sa­ving himself by Flight, and thus was left in sole Possession of Samos. His Battles both by Sea and Land were Successful to a Wonder. He conquer'd several Islands in the Archipelago, seized the Ships of all that passed there with­out any Damage to himself; and used to say, That if they belonged to the Enemy, they were good Prize; but if they were Friends, it was in his Power to oblige them more by Restitution, than if they had never been seized at all. All this was so far from working him Mischief, that he be­came the Terrour of the Archipelago, and of all the Coasts of Greece and Asia, which lye upon that Sea.

In the mean while he entred into Alliance with Amasis King of Egypt; who, having heard the continued Successes of Polycrates, [Page 12]wrote him Word, That though all the Ad­vantages of a Prince, in Friendship with him­self, were matter of great Joy to him, yet he could not but suspect so uninterrupted a course of Happiness, when he considered how the God's en­vy Men their Prosperity. He therefore advised him to cross the Strain of this Fortune, by industriously losing something, which was particularly dear to him. Polycrates, in Com­pliance with this Advice, went on Board, and threw into the Sea a very curious Seal, engraven upon an Emerald; so that no Possi­bility appeared of his ever recovering a Seal, upon which he set an infinite Value, and which he parted with, with great Reluctancy. Yet by Good Luck so it came about, (which perhaps was an Accident scarce to be paral­lell'd) that, five or six Days after, a Fisher­man presented him with a Fish of prodigious Bigness, which he had taken in that Sea: And in the Belly of this Fish, the Seal was found. Polycrates his Good Fortune did not stop there; but there needs no more be said, to shew what Herodotus meant by calling him a Fortunate Person, which is a Title frequently applied to him, by that Historian.

And yet this very Man came to the most Ʋnfortunate End that ever was, by suffering himself to be most grosly imposed upon by Oretes, President of Lydia; who, to decoy him thither, pretended to have vast Sums of Mo­ny, which he designed to deposit in his Hands, intending afterwards to retire with him to [Page 13] Samos; where, he hoped to be out of the Reach of his enraged Master, the King of Persia, who sought his Life. Polycrates, though discouraged by his Friends, by the Oracles, and by a Dream of his Daughter which fore­told his Misfortune, yet, in despight of all, trusted himself with Oretes, who Crucified him. We may reckon this Tyrant Ʋnfortu­nate to the last Degree, not to reflect, that he could not with any Safety repose his Confi­dence in a Deputy of the King of Persia, and 'tis evident he lay not under any Necessity, nor indeed any reasonable Temptation, to leave Samos, where he knew himself safe, so long as he continued in it.

It is scarce to be imagined, that a Man should mention Good Fortune, and not think upon Alexander: Who from a petty Prince of Macedonia became Master of that huge Em­pire of the Persians, and made his Way successfully through Dangers innumerable, as every body knows. For his Story is too well understood, to need an Abridgment upon this Occasion. He might have been cut off a thousand times, in the Pursuit of his Con­quests in Asia, had his Enemies had either Cou­rage or Conduct. But He was so Fortunate, that the very things which would have ruin­ed any Other Person, only conduced to render his Good Fortune more Conspicuous: Some Instances whereof I shall just mention from the principal Historians, who wrote his Life; and those in such Events as are very extraor­dinary and surprising.

Quint. Curtius tells us, that Alexander him­self admired his own Good Fortune, when he con­sidered the Condition of those Passes, L. iii. c. 4. through which he had made his way into Cilicia; and acknowledged, how easie a Matter it had been, to have knocked them all on the head, with Stones, had his Enemies but thrown them down from the Rocks, as they were marching underneath. Contemplatus Locorum Situm, non aliàs magis dicitur admiratus esse felicitatem suam, obrui potuisse vel saxis confite­batur, si fuissent qui in subeuntes propellerent. In another Passage, speaking of Parmenio, one of Alexander's chief Commanders; He says, he durst not venture upon a Way, with which he was unacquainted, without the Directi­ons of a Guide; but depending upon his Master's Good Fortune, he ordered some of the Coun­try People to be called in, and trusted himself to Their Conduct. Ignotum iter sine duce non au­debat ingredi; Felicitati tamen Regis sui confisus, Cap. 13. Agrestes, qui duces ite­neris essent, excipi jussit. He says in another place, ‘That Alexander's Good Fortune ne­ver forsook him in times of Difficulty and Danger.’ Nec defuit illi perpetua in re­bus dubiis felicitas. He introduces Alexander, enjoyning his Men to rely upon his Good Fortune, L. iv. c. 8. c. 11. and putting great Confidence in it himself. Arrian observes, that his Good Fortune encouraged him to attempt the most hazardous and desperate things; And many other Passages both these [Page 15]Authors have to the same purpose, not ne­cessary to be insisted upon at present. These already produced prove sufficiently, that the Greek and Latin Words, which answer to Good Fortune, signifie some notional unintelli­gible thing, which was supposed to attend constantly upon Alexander, and to render him successful. Quintus Curtius says, that notwith­standing a great deal of that Success was owing to his Gallantry, yet he was indebted to Fortune for the much greater part of his Conquests, for, she seemed to be at his Disposal entirely, and to have Devoted her self to Him only, of all Mankind. Fatendum est, cum plurimum virtuti debuerit, plus debuisse Fortunae, L. x. 5. quam solus Omnium Mortalium in potestate habuit. De for­tuna Alex­and. Plutarch indeed, hath composed two Discourses, where­in he undertakes to prove the con­trary; but even there he uses the Words Fortune and Good Success in the same Sense I am speaking of. This Acceptation of the Words is no part of the thing he quarrels at; but he only takes upon him to shew, that the many Victories obtained by Alexander were truly and properly the Effect of his extra­ordinary Valour and Conduct, and not so much the Gift of his Good Fortune.

The same Author in the Life of Sylla, ob­serves, that his Enemies esteemed him a very Fortunate General; Plutarch in Sylla. and that he was so far from taking Offence at his Victories being attributed to [Page 16]his Good Fortune, that himself affected to te [...] the World, how much better he succeeded in Attempts of the greatest Hazard, than in others where all his Measures had been most prudently adjusted. After his Triumph; when he gave the People of Rome an Account of all that had befallen him in the Wars just then concluded; he was equally careful to relate all those [...]. Successes which were owing to his Good For­tune, as those other Advantages due to his Valour and Conduct. And at last ordered that the Surname of [...]. For­tunate should be given to him.

The Roman Historians have boasted greatly of the Good Fortune of Pompey; and Cicero makes use of this Argument, to dispose the People of Rome in his Favour; and to procure for him the Command of the War against Mithridates. Observe how he expresses him­self upon this Occasion: ‘It remains now, that I say something with regard to his Good Fortune, which, though no Man may presume to engage for in his own Case, yet we all may take notice of, and relate, in the Actions of Others; but his I shall do with all that Modesty and Reserve, which becomes a Subject, depending wholly upon the Divine Power and Providence. Now I am clearly of Opinion, that when Fabius Maximus, Marcellus, Scipio, Marius, and sundry other Eminent Generals, were em­ployed by the State, it was not only their [Page 17]Courage, but their Fortune, which induced the People to entrust them with the Com­mand of their Armies. For no doubt can be made, but that, besides their great Abilities, there was a certain Fortune ap­pointed by Divine Providence to attend upon some famous Men, and to Conduct them to Honour, and Renown, and uncom­mon Success in their Management of Im­portant Affairs. Now, with respect to this Person in particular, I shall so tem­per my self, as to say, not that he hath Fortune absolutely at his own Disposal; but, which is sufficient for my Purpose, that we shall do well to remember how he hath succeeded formerly, and from thence to Proportion our Hopes and Expectations, of what he is like to do hereafter.’ Re­liquum est, ut de Felicitate, quam praestare de se ipso nemo potest, Cic. pro Lege, Ma­nilia. c. xvi. memi­nisse & commemorare de altero possu­mus, sicut aequum est homini de pote­state Deorum, timidè & panca Dicamus. Ego autem sic existimo, Maximo, Marcello, Mario & caeteris Magnis Imperatoribus, non solum propter virtutem, sed etiam propter fortunam, sepius Imperia Man­data, at (que) exercitus esse commissos. Fuit enim pro­fectò quibusdam summis viris quaedam ad amplitudi­nem, & gloriam, & ad res magnas bene gerendas divinitùs Adjuncta Fortuna. De hujus autem hominis felicitate quo de nunc Agimus, hac utar Moderatione dicendi, non ut in illius potestate positam esse Fortunam, sed ut praeterita meminisse, reliqua sperare videamur.

It were easie to produce other Testimonies concerning Pompey's Good Fortune, but there is no occasion at all for them. It will be more agreeable to my present Design, to Reflect a­little upon the Ill Fortune, which befell him in the Civil War. First of all, when Caesar be­gan to oppose him, he was utterly unprovi­ded of any Means to Resist him, and under a necessity of quitting Rome and Italy, to his Ri­val, in an ignominious manner. His Army in Spain, under the Command of Afranius and Petreius, was routed by Caesar, without so much as one formal Battle. He could not hinder him from passing out of Italy into Epirus, tho' Caesar had no Fleet, to withstand His. Caesar's Troops passed twice without Opposition. He lost an Opportunity, which was put into his Hands, of defeating his Army; which might all have been cut to pieces, had he pursued the Advantage gained upon them in Epirus; And, in the Fight at Pharsalia, where there was all the likelihood in the World of his beating Caesar, he was so Ʋnfortunate, that the very thing, which in Appearance must have secured his Conquest, was the very Oc­casion of his Ruine. After this Defeat, in­stead of retreating into Mauritania, to King Juba, who would most gladly have received and assisted him with all his Forces, he un­luckily threw himself into Egypt; and was there Assassinated and Murdered, just as he was going ashore.

Caesar, on the Contrary, had nothing but [...]ood Fortune as we plainly see by his own commentaries; and even the rashest and [...]ost hazardous Undertakings prospered in his Hand. His History is universally known, and I need not insist upon Particulars. I will therefore only detain the Reader, with one single Passage, taken out of Plutarch's Book, Of the Fortune of the Romans. ‘ Ʋpon leaving Brundusium, says he, the fourth of January, he crossed the Sea successfully, his Fortune getting the better of the Wea­ther and the Season. When he had found Pompey, who was then in Epirus with his whole Army, and Master both of the Field and the Sea, though but a handful of his own Forces were with him, those under Antonius and Sabinus being not yet come up to joyn him; he boldly embarked in a small Vessel, and set Sail, without letting the Pilot know who he was, and passing in the Disguise of a Servant. A violent Storm springing up, the Pilot began to tack, and then discovering himself, he said, Go on, my Lad, and fear not; spread all thy Sails to Fortune, and take in all the Wind thou canst, for thou hast Caesar and his Fortune on board thee. Thus He was confident, that this Good Fortune sailed and travelled with him, that it encamped with him in the Army, that it fought with him in his Battles, in short that it never left him. This made the Sea calm in the roughest [Page 20]Tempest, this made Winter to him become as Summer, this made Delay and Speed equally successful in the Event, and inspi­red Cowards with Courage; Nay, which is yet more amazing, this made Pompey flee, and Ptolomy Murder his Friend, that so Pompey might fall, without Caesar having the Guilt of shedding his Son-in-law's Blood.’ They who read this Book of Plu­tarch will find, that he endeavours to repre­sent the Greatness of the Roman Empire, as an Effect of Good Fortune, no less than of Conduct or Courage.

By these Examples it is plain, and by infi­nite others it might be made appear, that it is no new thing for Men to use those Words, which in other Languages answer to Good and Ill Fortune, in a sense denoting somewhat peculiar to this or that Person, at least ac­companying him for some Time, and upon some Occasions, which succeeds or defeats what he undertakes, so as that his Prospe­rous or Disastrous Events cannot be charged upon his own Prudence, or the Want of it. Though Europe be at this Day Christian, yet the Pagan Modes of Expression continue still in use; and many Words are taken into com­mon Speech, which have scarce any Signifi­cation. For after all, what is this Je ne scay quoy, which denominates Men Fortunate or Ʋnfortunate? It can only be One of these Four things. Either First, Destiny, which some heretofore, and many even in our Days look [Page 21] [...]pon as the Cause of all that happens in the World. Or Secondly, Fortune, which is but a­nother Name for Chance. Or Thirdly, what the Heathen called a Man's Good or Evil Genius, and some Christians still term his Good or Evil Angel. Or else Lastly, God himself. Now I am positive, that no Man, without express Revelation, can be assured, that God or the Angels produce those Events, for which we can assign no natural Cause; and that Fortune and Destiny are merely imaginary things; so that this pretended Principle of Good Luck is in effect nothing at all. If a Man were with any Skill to examine those, who think they understand themselves perfectly well, when they talk of this Matter; He would soon find them at a loss to make out their own Meaning. If Socrates were alive again, who had the knack of confounding Errours, by driving Men to Absurdities with plain Questions, he would quickly gravel the great­est part of those who talk of Good and Ill Luck, by shewing them, that they do not know what it is they would be at. But it may per­haps be vain to expect, that any Man should be found in this Art of Reasoning, equal to that incomparable Philosopher. And there­fore we must content our selves with another Method of Disabusing Mankind, by proving particularly, that never a one of these Four things just now mentioned is the real Cause of Mens Good or Ill Luck, either in Lotteries or in any other Matters, which have no [Page 22]necessary Dependence upon the Skill an [...] Prudence of the Persons, who engage i [...] them.

CHAP. III. That Destiny is not the Cause of Good Luck Ill Luck.

SEveral of the ancient Heathens, and par­ticularly the Sect of the Stoicks, though every thing that happened to be the unavoid­able Effect of Destiny. And many no doub [...] at this Day tread in Their Steps; from whence it is, that we are so frequently told that No Man can avoid his Destiny, and tha [...] so many Events are charged upon I know no [...] what Fatality, which necessarily brings them to pass.

When the Stoicks heretofore were asked What they meant by Destiny? they readily gave this Answer, A certain Fram [...] or Disposition of all things mutually linked together, A Gell. L. vi. c. 2. and moving it self by eternal Successions of Causes and Effects, in such a Manner, that nothing can break the Chain, or divert its Course; so that, according to their Principles, whatever at any time came to pass could not possibly but come to pass. It were easie to shew from express Testimonies of ancient Writers, how generally this Opi­nion was received; The Reader, if he please may consult those quoted in the Margin, for [Page 23]his farther Satisfaction A Gell. L. vi. c. 2. Diog. Laert. L. vii. s. 149. J. Lips. de Constan. L. i. c. 17.. As I do [...]ot intend to enlarge upon explain­ [...]ng the Opinion, so neither do I [...]pon the Arguments used, either [...]n Defence, or in Prejudice of it. The Whole of my Design, is only [...]o shew, that They, who attributed all things [...]o such a Chain of Causes, did not under­ [...]tand themselves, nor had any Idea of what [...]hey said in the Matter.

First then. All they advanced concern­ [...]ng this Destiny was groundless, and supposed [...]nly; and that too such a Notion, as is of [...]o service towards the clearing any one Diffi­ [...]ulty in the World. For who ever told the Stoicks, that every thing is necessarily and [...]navoidably brought about, in the Manner [...]ve see it? How did they know, that Causes [...]ct with such uncontroulable Power, and that the Effects so inseparably follow them? This was not sure revealed to them from Heaven; They never pretended to such Di­vine Authority for it. It was in truth a vulgar Opinion, which They, as well as many others, espoused by Strength of Fancy. There was not any inward Sentiment of their Mind, reflecting upon the Fatality of their own Actions, that had disposed them to it. Let any Man examine his own Breast, and say, in good earnest, whether he be throughly convinced, that all the Resolutions he takes were such as he found himself necessarily de­termined to; and that he could not possibly [Page 24]have resolved otherwise. No Man, I dar [...] be consident, who speaks sincerely, is abl [...] to say this. Can we then affirm, that othe [...] Intelligent Beings, which the Stoicks, (wh [...] held an infinite Number of Gods of diffe­rent Orders) acknowledged to be in th [...] World, have no Liberty neither; but tha [...] They are dragg'd along in all they do, by th [...] same Chain of Destiny? It is evident, no Ma [...] can affirm this, without saying what he nei­ther does, nor can know. Now if such [...] Spirit as our Humane Soul be free, as we plain­ly find and feel it, at least in abundance o [...] Instances; and if there may be other Intelli­gent Substances free as well as this, then it i [...] the vainest thing in the World to talk o [...] Fatality or Destiny; when infinite Free Spi­rits do a thousand things, which it was pos­sible for them not to have done at all. Bu [...] without running the Matter so far, this i [...] most certain, that no Man can say, that he assuredly knows, that there are no free Agents or Causes in the World; and conse­quently it must be allowed that Destiny is a [...] groundless Supposition, and advanced with­out any Proof. Nay, it is the less defensible, because of no use in Philosophy: My mean­ing is, that, admitting the thing, we are ne­ver the nearer giving an account of any one natural Effect, than those who reject it; Nay These indeed give a much more probable Ac­count, upon Their Principles, than the for­mer. And if we make a Tryal now by ap­plying [Page 25]this Notion to any common Case, our own Experience will quickly demonstrate the Truth of what I say.

To keep close to my Subject; I desire to know for instance, whence it comes to pass, that the Persons who had the greatest Bene­fits in the Lotteries lately drawn, had those advantagious Lots; and that a world of Peo­ple who took out as many or more Tickets than They, got nothing? Will you think it an Answer to say, This was brought about by a Chain of necessary Causes, which dispo­sed the Benefits and Blanks, in such a certain Order? Where are these necessary Causes, which have produced this Effect? It is ridicu­lous, to assert such a thing as this without any Proof; and to give a meer Supposition for a Reason of somewhat else, and that too such a Supposition, as it is impossible to give any pro­bable appearance to. Now if I, on the other hand, averr; that this Combination of Tickets proceeds from the Motions given to them when they were mingled together, without any knowledge or design of the Persons by whom they were so mingled; this is what no Man can disprove me in. If I proceed, and say again, that such a Motion is the Effect of a free Intelligent Substance, who shakes the Boxes in which the Tickets lye, more or less, and who is guided more by Humour or Fancy than by Reason; This again is what cannot be denied me. Now then, I will say, such a one had the Great Lot, because, [Page 26]according to the Motion of the Tickets, his Number came up against that Lot; After which, there is no reason for any farther enquiry. For I ought not undertake, nor is it possible for me, to give the reason of that Motion and Order, into which the Tickets were put, without the Minglers knowing what effect it would produce; nor why they shook the Boxes, Ten times (for instance) rather than Nine or Eleven. So that the Stoick's Fatality, which some will have the Cause of good and bad Luck upon these Occa­sions, is the fondest Imagination that can be. But I have more against it still; which is, that They, who use the words Fatality and Destiny, have no Idea of what they say them­selves; and this is my Second Remark upon the particular Point now before us.

'Tis true, they give several Definitions of these things, which come at last to that al­ready mentioned. But they are such Defini­tions, as do not shew, that they have any clear and distinct, or indeed any Idea at all, of the thing they pretend to define. This will soon be seen, by examining Chrysippus his Definition in A. Gellius, whose words in the Original are these: [...]. That is, A Natural Connexion of all this Ʋniverse, where from all Eternity one thing follows another con­stantly and regularly. This Connexi­on, he says afterwards is [...]. invio­lable. A. Gellius hath paraphrased [Page 27]it thus: Sempiterna quaedam & indeclinabilis series [...]rerum & Catena, volvens semet ipsa sese, & im­plicans per aeternos Consequentiae ordines, ex qui­bus apta connexa (que) est. The rendring where­of strictly and literally, as it is difficult, so is it unnecessary, because I have given the sense of it before.

Now, in order to comprehend the Falla­cy of these Terms, we shall do well to ob­serve, that our Ideas may be reduced to Two sorts. The First are of Things which have an actual existence without us; The Other of such as our Mind forms to it self at plea­sure, and which have nothing in nature and reality, which answers to our Ideas. When I, for example, am looking upon a Tree, and consider what it is that then presents it self to my thoughts, this is an Idea of a thing really existing, whether I think upon it, or not. But now, when I form to my self an Idea of a Tree, a Mile in heighth, and bear­ing golden Apples; this is a fanciful Idea, and such as no Tree actually existing ever re­sembled. Now, when these two sorts of Ideas are to be defined, we must proceed ve­ry differently with respect to each of them. When an imaginary Idea is to be defined, you are at your own liberty; Say but what you will have it, and the Definition is just and good. But when a thing which actually exists is to be defined, by the Idea we con­ceive of it, we are not then at liberty to make this Definition what we please, because [Page 28]the existence of the thing is independent upon us: and, to make this a good Definition, it must shew, what the thing defined hath in common with the rest of the same Species, and what it hath peculiar to it self, whereby it is distin­guished from them. So that, after having heard and understood this, we can conceive the thing before us clearly, without confound­ing it with any other thing whatsoever.

Great care must be taken not to confound the Definition of an abstracted Idea, with that which describes an Idea of a thing which really exists. For else it is evident, we shall not only attribute to things existing some­what which in truth they have not; but we shall also mistake abstracted and arbitrary Ideas, for the Images of things which have an actual existence.

And this is directly the Errour of the Stoicks in the Matter now under considera­tion. They saw not any thing in Nature, which could oblige them to think, that there is an unavoidable Destiny in all Events. The Idea they have been pleased to form to them­selves of this Matter cannot be said to be co­pied after Nature, as that of a Tree is from something seen by us. It is an Idea purely notional and abstracted, such as they have tryed to frame as they could, and in which these two things are observable. First, They take it for granted without any Proof, that there is in reality such a Destiny, as they had formed in their own imagination. They con­found [Page 29]an Idea framed at pleasure, with an Idea of somewhat actually existing; and this shews, that they did not rightly understand themselves. Secondly, Setting aside the thing it self, considered as somewhat existing, o­therwise than in our own imagination, yet, if we examine the Idea, which answers to the Words I have now quoted, even thus we shall find it loose and altogether indi­stinct. Those Words, A Connexion of all things in the Ʋniverse with each other, signifie nothing particular and express upon this oc­casion; and the rest of the Definition, which follow one another from all Eternity, are every whit as dark and confused as the former. This is a blind Description of a chimerical Je ne scay quoy, which hath some affinity and rela­tion to the loose Ideas of Disposition, Con­nexion, and Consequence. It is a Picture of an unknown Entity, of which no Man hath a particular Conception, and by vertue where­of, according to the Principles of the Stoick Philosophy, every thing is necessarily brought to pass.

Plutarch, who frequently falls foul upon these Philosophers, though he seem in part to concur with their Opinion of Destiny, will furnish us with sundry and sensible Instances of Expressions, which have no determinate signification. In his Book, how Men ought to study the Poets, he tells us, that several things attributed to the Gods, are not to be under­stood of the Gods themselves, but of Destiny [Page 30]or Fortune. When Hesiod, for the purpose, forbids us to reproach any Man with his Po­verty, because this is the Disposal and Gift of the i.e. the Gods. Blessed, that exist eternally. Plutarch hath this Remark. ‘The Poet calls that the Gift of the Gods, which depends upon Fortune. He tells us, we ought not to blame those, whom Fortune hath made poor, but that Poverty is then blamable and reproach­ful, when attended with Idleness, Meanness of Spirit, Effeminacy, and Prodigality in the Person labouring under it. For the Name of Fortune being not yet commonly used, and Men being sensible, that their utmost Prudence could not obstruct the sovereign Power of a Cause acting without Rule or Method, they described this Cause by at­tributing it to the Gods.’ And afterwards, having cited some Verses of Homer, which seem to make Jupiter the Author of Evil, he adds, that by Jupiter we are to understand De­stiny or Fortune, which are Causes which we cannot comprehend, and such as have no dependence at all upon our selves. [...]. These Words shew plainly, that those Expressions are Names for two very dark Ideas, and which are little, if at all, different from Nothing.

Now, though this Observation be most true, yet men are so used to talk what they do not understand, and at the same time to fancy they understand what they say perfect­ly [Page 31]well, that the same Expressions continue still in use. To say nothing at present of Fortune, which will come under our Consi­deration by and by, we every Day hear Men expressing themselves after this manner; that such a one was brought to such a place by his Good or Ill Fate; that his Good Fate put him upon ven­turing in such a Lottery, where he got a good Be­nefit; That his Ill Destiny ordained he should put in a greater Sum than he could afford in a Lottery, where he drew nothing but Blanks. That his Good Destiny brought him a good Lot; That his Ill De­stiny kept him from winning, and a world of o­ther such like Forms of Speech in common Conversation.

If the much greater part of Men who talk thus were called upon to explain their own meaning, they would find themselves wretch­edly at a loss. For most People, in speaking, are governed more by Custom, than by Know­ledge and Consideration.

They use this Word, upon some Occasi­ons, which they find it applied to before by others, without attending to any Sense of it. I have often made the Experiment, and found, that Men, who had their good and ill Fate constantly in their Mouths, have not been able to answer me, when I asked what they meant by it. They were surprised at my enquiring what they intended by so com­mon an Expression, but yet they were not able to make me understand what they would be at, when they used it.

If we consult the Gentlemen of the French Academy, they tell us in their Dictionary, that the Philosophers gave this Name to a necessa­ry Chain of Causes, subordinate to each other, which never fail of producing their Effect; and that the Poets understood by it a Power, to which the Gods themselves are subject. This Definition is much the same with the former, only not al­together so exact. And besides, these Gentle­men had no reason to make a difference be­tween the Poets and the Philosophers, for both agreed in thinking the Gods subject to Destiny, as I could easily shew, were it ne­cessary to my purpose. I need not insist lon­ger upon this Definition, after what hath been said to That of the Stoicks. But they have given us another, whereby they seem to intend an Explication of Fate and Destiny, as they are commonly used at present. De­stiny, they tell us, is likewise taken for the par­ticular Lot of each Person, and for that Portion of Good or Evil ordinarily distributed to each Man.

One would think this Definition sufficient­ly clear, and that all I have said upon this occasion might be abundantly confuted by having recourse to it. And indeed, did it import no more than barely the Events of Things, without any regard to the Necessity of such Events, or to some unknown Cause, which determins and produces them, the Difficulty would vanish. But I assert, that in using this word, Men constantly imply in [Page 33]their Ideas of it, this Cause, and the Necessity of such Events. The Academy have put this beyond dispute, by the Examples they give; as, No Man can avoid his Destiny; This is the Fate of Great Men, or Great Common-wealths, and the like. The First of these makes ma­nifestly for me; For it is derived from the Pagan Idiom, who constantly delivered their Minds after this manner. Many Examples whereof Stobaeus hath left us in his eighth and ninth Chapters of the Collections of Na­tural Productions. The two others upon en­quiry will be found to confirm what I have said. We commonly say, 'tis the Fate of Great Men to be more esteemed when dead, than while yet living; and we plainly mean by this, not only, that this very often hap­pens, but that their being so is the Effect of I know not what Fatality, which entails En­vy upon Virtue and Merit. So again we say, it is the Fate of Great Common-wealths to fall by their own Weight, and to ruine themselves when they grow too Great; By which is inferred, that there is a certain Period, and Measure of Greatness, deter­mined by Destiny, to which when Common-wealths have once attained, all beyond that tends to their decay and undoing. Every Reader will easily recollect what he hath heard or read in Authors to this purpose.

Perhaps these Gentlemen thought Destiny and Fatality to be two distinct Things. For they define the latter, by calling it Ʋnavoid­able [Page 34]Destiny, which looks, as if they had a Notion, that there is a sort of Destiny which may be avoided. They have likewise among their Examples put Fatal Destiny. Now Fa­tal and Inevitable when applied to Destiny, are mere Epithets and Expletives, fit only for Poets when they want to make up a Verse, but otherwise of no use at all.

M. Richelet seems to know no Destiny, but that which is inevitable; For his Definition of it is, a Certain Disposition and Order of Pro­vidence, which makes things infallibly come to pass. This is in truth the Stoicks Notion put into Christian Language: And thus Lipsius hath done in his Book of Constancy: The Abbot Furetiere comes very near M. Richelet, and defines Destiny thus: A Disposition or Chain of Second Causes, ordered by Providence, which infers and produces a Necessity in the Event.

I shall not here contest these Definitions; because my Eighth Chapter will oblige me to it, where I propose to shew, that God is not the Cause of what the World call Good Luck, as is generally supposed. But besides, it is plain, that They who use these words, Desti­ny and Fatality, think as little of Providence at that instant, as if there were no such thing. These Gentlemen indeed, if we observe it strictly, have defined what the word Destiny must signify, if it signify any thing at all: but by no means what the Generality of People intend by it, when they speak it. Now there [Page 35]is a vast difference, between giving us a De­finition of that which Men should mean by a Word, and that which they generally do mean by it, in common Discourse.

It is sufficient, that from what hath gone before, I may fairly conclude, that Stoical Destiny, or Fatality signifies nothing, neither in the Books of the Ancient or Modern Wri­ters, nor in the Mouth of the Vulgar. There is no real Being in Nature, to which these Names properly belong; and no thing is more loose and fantastical, more confused and un­intelligible, than that arbitrary Idea, which Men form of it in their own Minds. A Man had much better say nothing, than affirm, that he Won or Lost in a Lottery, because it was his Good or Ill Fate to do so. I should think it much more excusable to declare I Won or Lost by Hocus pocus tempora bonus, and think the Gibberish of common Jugglers the better Sense of the Two.

CHAP. IV. That the Terms Good or Ill Fortune frequently mean nothing, no more than Chance. What Sense this last Word is capable of.

THe second Cause usually assigned for Good or Ill Luck is Fortune; or, which is but another Name for the same thing, Chance. Now I think my self able to prove, that these English words, and those which answer to [Page 36]them in other Languages, are as far from ha­ving any clear Significations as those treated of in the last Chapter. But before I reprove the modern Use of these Words, it will be proper to enquire, what Notions the ancient Greeks and Romans had of them, because from thence they are derived down to us. If They were at a loss for their own Meaning in them, it can hardly be expected, that We should under­stand them better: And we indeed are more to blame, because Religion and Time ought to have enlightned our Understandings, and taught us to speak more correctly than They did.

The word [...] in Greek, and Fortuna in Latin, signified formerly what Fortune does in English; but withal, some unknown Princi­ple, by which a thousand Things came to pass with­out any necessity of their being thus or thus. This is the Difference between Fortune and Desti­ny, that the One supposes a necessary Cause of the Effects produced by it, and the other ex­cludes it. Phys. L. 2. c. 4, 5, 6. Aristotle, whose natural Philosophy is generally founded upon the Expres­sions and Notions of the People, condemns the Philosophers, who had written before him, of a great Absur­dity, for not defining [...] Fortune, or Chance [...]; because 'tis clear, he says, beyond dispute, that Fortune or Chance produce infi­nite Effects in Nature. And though They had not thought so, yet they ought to have spo­ken [Page 37]to them, and so much the rather, because they sometimes used these Words themselves.

For his own part, he made no doubt, but that there were such things as Fortune and Chance. And this is his manner of Arguing upon them, by which he discovers the Vulgar Forms of Speech to have oftentimes lain at the bottom of his Opinions. ‘In regard we see that some things come to pass always, and others for the most part, after the same manner, this makes it plain, that Fortune is not the Cause of any of these things. That which is an Effect of Fortune cannot proceed from a necessary and regular Cause, which always, nor from such a one as generally, Acts alike. But now, since some things there are, besides these, which happen so, that all the World declare them to be the Effect of Fortune, we may plainly see, that there are such things, as Fortune and Chance. For we know very well, both that the things of this Nature are the Work of Fortune, and that what Fortune does is always of this Na­ture.’ This manner of Argument supposes the common Forms of Speaking to be the Rule of True and False; and, that a Man may con­clude from Words to Things, which, in a Phi­losopher, is a most ridiculous Imagination. For what is more common, than for the Peo­ple to entertain false Notions of Things; and for the ways of expressing themselves, suited to their Notions, to be very improper and distant from the Truth?

Afterwards he says, that ‘when any thing of Advantage happens to a Man by Acci­dent, This is such a thing as we call the Ef­fect of Fortune or Chance.’ For Example: A Man goes to a Place, whither he does not use to go; and where he should receive Mo­ney, though at that time he went not thither with any such design; if he receive Money there, we say, that he went thither, and re­ceived it, by Chance.

He pretends again, that Herein Fortune and Chance differ. Fortune is not properly concerned, except in the Actions of such Be­ings, as act upon a Principle of Choice; whereas Chance takes place in the Effects of Causes, which do not act by Choice. I know not whether this Difference were constantly observed in common Speech, but it is certain, that those Bodies were called Automata, which were thought to move of themselves.

Thus this Philosopher imagined he had de­fined the Nature of a Cause in Physicks, while he only defined the Words, by which Peo­ple used to express themselves: for he pre­tends, that Chance had a great hand in Form­ing the Universe; which is a most absurd Fancy, and more becoming a Clown or an I­deot, than a Philosopher, as we shall see by and by.

The Latins, who put no such distinction be­tween Fortuna and Casus, define them thus: ‘ Lot, Chance, Fortune, Event, what else is all this, but a thing's falling out after one [Page 39]particular manner, when it might either not have happened at all, or have happened after quite another manner than it hath done.’ Quid est aliud Sors, quid Fortuna, quid Casus, quid Eventus, nisi cum sic ali­quid accidit, sic evênit, De Div. Nat. L. 2. c. 6. ut vel non ca­dere at (que) evenire, vel aliter cadere at (que) evenire potuerit?

A Man that reads these Definitions of For­tune, would be apt to think, by some part of them, that the Ancients did mean something by it; and yet on the other hand to suspect, that they had no Notion at all of the matter. Aristotle is express that the common Way of Speaking proves Fortune and Chance to be some­thing. [...]. But if they be something, what sort of Things are they? Are they Spirits? Are they Bo­dies? Are they of some different Nature? Aristotle in his Sixth Chapter of the Second Book of Physicks, distinguishes them plainly from Spirit and i. e. Body. Nature, for these, (he says,) are the Causes of all things Essentially, and per se. These two last Causes, he owns, did at first produce the Heaven, and all the material World, but yet he says, that when all this was done, a thou­sand Things were effected by Chance after­wards. But still he does not inform us, what this pretended Cause is, considered in it self. For in truth he knew not what he meant by it him­self. And one may see he did not, by his quo­ting the common Form of Speech, explaining [Page 40]the Word by the Use of it; but never giving any Definition of Fortune. He does indeed disallow that Notion of some, who made For­tune a real Cause, but such as the Mind of Man knew nothing of, because too divine a thing for Man to comprehend it. But all that he does, is only telling us the Occasion, how this Word grew so generally into Use.

In the mean while, not to mention the Poets and their Modes of Speech, which might be accused of too great liberty in Fiction, the Temples, which in several places were dedicated to Good or Ill Fortune, seem to say, that This was generally reputed a Deity. For certainly Men must be mad to the last Degree, who shall go about to build Tem­ples, address their Prayers and Praises, and offer Sacrifices, to any but Gods; that is, such as they believe to have a divine, and much more an actual, Existence. Now This Reasoning were certainly conclusive, did Men always speak and act consistently; but as it is, they often speak Words which they do not understand, and do many Things, when they know not what they do. Tullus Hostilius built a Temple to Fear and Paleness. Others erected Temples to the Mind, to Vertue, Pallori & Pavori Liv. l. 1. c. 27. Cic. de. Nat. Deor. l. 2. Lactan. l. 1. to Honour, to Piety, to Fi­delity, to Hope, to Chastity, to Concord, to Peace, to Rest, to Safety, to Fortune, to Liberty, &c. Others again were consecrated, to to the Feaver, to the Year, the Month, to Art, [Page 41]to Poverty, to Old Age, to Death. Now I can by no means perswade my self, that the Ancients believed all these things to be things actually Existing; but they knew not what they did, when they built such Temples: and therefore the Actions of Men will give us no surer ground of arguing from them, than their Words and common Talk will.

Nay Some among them were well aware, that, when Men talked of Fortune, they talked of a thing they did not understand. Democritus says, Men formed to themselves a Phan­tome of Fortune, Euseb. Praep. Ev. l. xiv. 27. only for a Cover to their Ignorance. This Passage is likewise quoted from a Comedy of Philemon: There is no such Deity as Men call Fortune, no; no such matter; all things happen by Chance: and that which the World calls Fortune, is any thing that happens to Men, without being able to give a Reason why it should do so. So again Tully, The Causes under the Governance of Fortune are secret, for every thing must have its Cause, Cic. Top. c. 17. but whatever is effected by a hidden Cause, and by a Me­thod which we cannot account for, this is properly an Effect of Fortune. And Juvenal tells us, Sat. x. that Fortune is only a God­dess in Fiction, and of Mens making.

Fortune was never Worshipp'd by the Wise; But, set aloft by Fools, usurps the Skies.

Thus you see, by the Testimony of these Heathen Writers, that the Word Fortune signifies nothing at all, though some pre­tended, that it imports a real Existence. I shall clear this Point, by enquiring into the thing it self, when I have first produced two Passages of Christian Authors, who ex­pose and confute the Worshippers of For­tune, and were of my Opinion, that this Word signifies Nothing.

The former of these is Lactantius, who argues thus: ‘ Fortune in it self is nothing; we are not to suppose, that the Word denotes any thing of real existence, Inst. Divin. l. 3. c. 29. take it in what sense you please. Fortune is no more than an Event, which is sudden and unexpected. But the Philosophers, that they might not fail to mistake in every thing, pre­tended to be very Wise in a trifling Mat­ter. Those I mean, who change the Sex of Fortune, and will needs have it a God, and not a Goddess. The same Deity they call sometimes Nature, and sometimes For­tune, because as Cicero observes, it effects many things which we do not expect, by reason of our Ignorance in the Causes that produce them. And, not knowing the Reasons why a thing happens, Men must needs be ignorant what it is, that brings it about. The same Author in a very serious Tract, where he gives his Son Rules drawn from Philosophy, to govern him in his Behaviour, Who, says [Page 43]he, " does not know, that the Power of Fortune is great, which side soever she takes? For when she opposes us, we are certainly worsted.’

Lactantius (after some Reflections upon Cicero, which are not much to the Matter now in hand,) proceeds in this manner: ‘ Who does not know? says he, For my part I know no such thing. Let him shew me, if he can, what that Power is, what is the Favour of Fortune, and what her Opposition to us. It is by no means for the Repu­tation of a Man of Wit and Parts, to lay down a thing for granted, which, if one deny, he is not able to make out.’

The other Author, which I shall produce upon this Occasion, is De Cons. Phil. L. 1. Pros. i. Boethius, whose Style in Beauty is equal to that of Lactantius, and his Reason­ing is much before His. ‘If any one (says Philosophy, with whom Boethius is holding a Dialogue) defines an acciden­tal Event (Casum) and such as is not pro­duced by any Connexion of Causes; I as­sert, that Chance is nothing in the World, that it is an empty Word, without any Sense or Signification at all. For where can Chance find a place, in things which God keeps in a regular Method? There is no greater Truth, than that nothing can come out of nothing. Not one of the An­cients ever contradicted this Maxime, tho' they understood it, not of the Efficient, but the Material, Cause. Now, if a thing [Page 44]were produced without a Cause, that thing would come out of nothing. But, if this cannot be, then neither can there be such a thing as Chance, according to our Defi­nition of it. Well, but (replies Boethius) is there then nothing, which we can pro­perly call fortuitous or casual? Or is there somewhat to which these Names belong, tho' the Vulgar know it not? Aristotle, (says Philosophy) hath cleared this Difficulty in few words, in his Book of Physicks, and comes very near to the truth of the mat­ter. What I pray is his Resolution of the Case? (Says Boethius.) When any thing is done with a certain design, (replies Philo­sophy) and some other thing, different from that which was intended, does for other causes happen: this thing, so be­sides the Intention of the Agent, is what we call a fortuitous or casual Event. As if a Man (for instance) in digging his Ground, with a design to cultivate it, should find a Pot of Gold hidden there: We say this is casual; but yet it had a real and proper Cause; and the unforeseen and unexpect­ed Concurrence of such Causes forms that which is termed a casual Event. If He, who cultivated his Ground had not digged it; or if he who buried this Treasure had not laid it in that place, the Gold had not been found as it was. These then are the Causes of that accidental Gain, which hap­pened to the Man by this Concurrence of [Page 45]theirs, altogether foreign from the De­sign, which he proposed to himself in dig­ging his Ground.’ The Remainder of this Argument may be seen in the Original, for I cannot agree with Boethius in every Branch of it. But this proves, that if the Ancients used the words of Fortune or Chance to de­note any unknown Being, which acts without any Rule, and which is neither a Spiritual, nor a Bodily Substance, they knew not their own meaning. And yet thus I have shewed, that Aristotle used them, whatever Boethius says here to bring him off.

Let us now consider the Thing in it self; And, in order to discern what Sense these words Fortune and Chance are capable of, we must remember, that there are only Two sorts of Beings, which we know of, that can contribute to any thing that befals us. The First sort, consists of Bodies, which, acting alone, and without the interposition of any other Cause, leave no room for Fortune or Chance: Because they act by fix'd unalterable Rules of Mechanism, as all, who have the least knowledge of Mechanicks and Natural Philosophy are abundantly satisfied. The Common People indeed say, a Body falls of it self, when no Man, nor any sensible Cause, that comes under our Observation, threw it down. As when Fruit falls from a Tree, or a Tile from the Roof of a House, without any pulling, or blast of Wind, to blow it down. And it is a very usual thing, [Page 46]to say such things fell of themselves, or by Chance. But it is by no means true, that nothing interposed, and that no external Cause contributed to that Fall. The Air and the Weight of the Bodies, (not to mention several other Causes that might concur) oc­casioned their Fall. A Body would continue for ever in the same State, did not some Cause from without make an Alteration. This is an Axiom in Natural Philosophy, which I need not here go about to prove.

The second sort of Beings, are what we call Spirits, who, among several other Facul­ties belonging to them, are endued with Liberty, which they exercise upon infinite Occasions. They can at any time do or not do what they do; they can do it after this or that manner; they determine themselves in doubtful or indifferent Cases, or what they look upon to be such, by Humour and Fan­cy; Without any Other Reason, but that they have a mind to act so or so, and with­out the interposition of any thing, that should necessarily engage their Judgment, or their Will. Without troubling my Readers with a long Lecture of Metaphysicks, I appeal to every Man's own Sense and Experience, and am entirely perswaded, that all who will speak truly what they feel within themselves, in innumerable Instances of Humane Life, will agree, that what I have said, is the ve­ry Truth of the Case.

In this respect it may be said, that the free determination of a Spiritual Substance is an Effect of Chance, because it does not proceed from any necessary Cause. And, in regard Spirits act much upon Bodies, the intervening of these Operations produce somewhat casual in those Motions, which o­therwise would not be at all. We will put the case, that a Box full of Tickets (for the purpose) lyes upon a Table; Those Tickets will all remain in the same situation, till they are moved, and that which lyes uppermost, will infallibly be drawn first. Here is no Chance in all this. But if a Man shakes this Box several times, without knowing what Alteration this shaking makes in the Order of the Tickets, by the Will of that Person intervening upon this occasion, and that in a manner altogether free, Here is somewhat of Chance. It is in the Choice of that Per­son, whether he will shake the Box at all or not; whether he will shake it more or less; and to turn it as many different ways as he pleases. In shaking and turning it he is gui­ded purely by his own Humour; without knowing what Effect this will have; after all which, that Ticket which comes next to hand is taken out, without knowing to what Per­son it belongs.

This is the usual Manner of Drawing in Lotteries, and this we may call meer Chance, which makes such a Man's Ticket come up against such a Lot. By this you see, that [Page 48] Chance, in proper speaking, is Nothing; And that, when we say, Such a Hit is owing to Chance, the true meaning of it is, that this is not meerly the Mechanical Effect of the Motion of the Tickets, but that some Intel­ligent Being contributed to it, which gave its free Assistance in the thing, without knowing what would be the Consequence, or how that Change in the Tickets could be made. So that the Word is rather of a Ne­gative, than an Affirmative Importance; or the Name of a Negative rather than a Positive Idea. It denotes only thus much, that there was no Cause intervening, which did neces­sarily produce a certain and determinate Ef­fect; or that made use of its Understanding to produce that particular Effect.

The Abbot Furetiere observes, that Chance is sometimes spoken of as a Person, and denotes an Imaginary Being, to which we foolishly attribute those Effects, of whose Causes we are ignorant. I own, that sometimes Chance may have those Effects attributed to it, which have a deter­minate and necessary Cause. But when Men express themselves thus, it is from their Ig­norance, at least if they pretend to speak properly. But thus much is certain how­ever, as I have shewn, that it is an Imagina­ry Being, a Creature of our own Brain; and, that nothing less than a Poetical Li­cense will justifie our mentioning Chance as a Person; which yet is a Form of Speech so much countenanced by common use, that [Page 49]there are very few Expressions more frequent­ly to be met with.

From these Premises it evidently follows, that good Luck, which is a Consequence of this Chance, is likewise, in the common accep­tation of the Word, a pure Chimera. People pretend, that good Luck is confined and fixed to some certain Persons, and at the same time that it is the Effect of Chance, which is a manifest Contradiction. The Nature of Chance consists in its dependence upon a free Cause, determining it self by Humour and Fancy, without Order or Design; and yet they will needs have it, that good Luck is so fixed, that it shall happen to this or that parti­cular Man. Now what can be more palpably absurd, than to assert, that an Effect is, and is not, determined at the same time. Thus Chance in it self is nothing, and the good Luck which goes along with some certain Persons, is, if I may so say, somewhat less than no­thing. The First expresses a negative Idea on­ly, the Second a contradictory Idea, if it be al­lowable to call a Contradiction an Idea.

The Case is all one with the word For­tune; which is sometimes represented as a Cause, peremptorily resolved to oblige some, and to persecute others. Fortune was on Pom­pey's side before the Civil Wars, but after­wards, she forsook, and fought against him. Alexander had her at his beck till his last Sick­ness, but then he is thought Unfortunate not to escape Poysoning. In short, Ancient and [Page 50]Modern Writers both abound with Expres­sions opposite to each other, when they speak of the Constancy or Inconstancy of Fortune. The only Account whereof is, that This is a Phantome of their own forming, and that their Imagination added to, or took from it at pleasure, and as they saw occasion. We com­monly say, that Men are the Sport of Fortune; that she plays with them for her Diversion; but it were more proper to say, that Fortune is our Play-thing; since we give, and take away from her, just what we think fit.

The Gentlemen of the French Academy, after having said, that Fortune was a Goddess with the Heathens, add, that Now-a-days, though we do not own Fortune to be any thing in it self, yet most of the Expressions then in use are still continued, but that they are to be understood in a figurative Sense. If these Expressions sig­nified nothing in the Mouths of Them who erected Altars to Fortune, I vehemently su­spect, they do not signifie much more, in the Writings of Those Authors, who use them figuratively now. For indeed they are only used by a Prosopopoeia. Now in a Prosopopoeia, we are allowed indeed to speak of what we conceive, in the quality of a Person; but I have never heard nor read, that we might make a Person of a meer Nothing, or rather of that which is less than Nothing, of that which we are not able to form any, no not so much as a negative Conception of. I have never observed any thing of this kind done, [Page 51]except a Poem entituled Nothing; which is al­together founded upon an equivocal Con­struction of the Word, which is not easie, if possible, to be rendred properly.

Others, as the Abbot Furetiere in particu­lar, pretend, that by Fortune at present we are to understand Providence. These are his Words in his Dictionary: This was formerly a Heathen Goddess, and thought to be the Cause of all surprising and extraordinary Events: whereas in truth it is the Divine Providence, acting by Me­thods unknown, and far above Humane Wisdom. It is confest, that the Word Fortune ought many times to be thus understood; if we will allow it to signifie any thing in the Writings of many Men, and even of some Authors whose Eloquence and Delicacy of Expression is admired by all the World. But yet this was not the thing They meant by it, as will quickly appear, if we take out the Word Fortune, and substitute that of Providence in its stead.

I will produce some Instances to save my Reader the trouble of Search and Recollection; such as will shew, that there is no Figure in them, which admits of any rational Meaning; whether they would interpret it, as persona­ting a thing that is not, or whether they would put upon Providence the vile and scandalous Disguise of Fortune. These shall be taken out of M. Rochefoucaut's Maxims, which must be acknowledged a Master-piece in their kind. Observe how he expresses himself in his 60th [Page 52]Reflection: They that think themselves Men of Merit, esteem it a Happiness to be Ʋnfortunate, that so They and Others may look upon them as Persons considerable enough to be set as a Mark for Fortune. I can hardly think M. Furetiere would have ventur'd to say a Mark for Providence in the same sense; or that the Author of the Maxims entertained any thing like so impious a Thought, when he wrote thus.

The 64th begins thus: The Contempt of Riches was in some ancient Philosophers a secret De­sire of doing Right to their Merit, and revenging themselves upon the Injustice of Fortune; by despi­sing the same Advantages, which she would not suf­fer them to enjoy. Certainly no Man would talk of the Injustice of Providence, or of taking a Re­venge upon That.

The 458th observes, that Fortune never ap­pears so blind, as to Those whom she does no good to. Now this is not only downright Paganism in the Expression, but even in the Idea, or that which is pretended to answer to those Expressions.

And yet thus much Right ought to be done M. Furetiere, to acknowledge, that in many Passages, where the Word Fortune is to be met with, that of Providence may very properly be exchanged for it. An Instance whereof the 70th Reflection gives us, Fortune turns every thing to the advantage of those she loves. Provi­dence will stand very well there, and so make this Maxim in sense almost the same with that of St. Paul, Rom. 8.20. That all things work [Page 53]together for Good to them that love God. Though, 'tis probable, M. Rochefoucaut might not have this in his thoughts neither. But, notwith­standing this Agreement of Sense upon some Occasions, we cannot reasonably allow, that one and the same Word, should be used for so many different Purposes, as sometimes to signifie a Pagan Goddess, sometimes a meer Notion and Chimera of Mens own Brain, and at others the Wife and Good Providence of God; and that those should consequently be brought in at all turns to share the Govern­ment of the Universe with that Providence. I meddle not at present with the Absurdity of This upon a Religious Account, but am content to observe, that that Spirit of Exact­ness and Justness of Expression, which ought to govern all our Discourse, should by all means keep us from such dark, such ambi­guous, such insignificant, Forms of Speech.

Some indeed have perceived the Necessity of Reforming our Modern Idioms in this re­spect. The Author of the Penseés diverses, Pens. 48. which are sometimes annexed to M. Rochesfoucaut's Maxims is one of These. One Instance we have in these words, Fortune gives out the Parts, which each Person plays upon this Theatre of the World, blindly and humoursomely. And hence there are so many ill Actors, because so few People and fitted for their Characters. After which he adds by way of Correction, Now, to speak in Terms more be­coming Christians, Fortune here is nothing else, [Page 54]but the Providence of God, which, for Reasons un­known to Ʋs, permits this Disorder and Irregular Proceeding. Now, in this case, the Emenda­tion ought to have gone rather upon this foot, that instead, of Fortune does such things blind­ly, he should have said, Providence permits such things to be done. For it is plain, as the words lye, we can by no means understand Provi­dence by Fortune in that Passage.

What hath been said of Chance and Fortune, may be as well applied to Lot, (Sors) which signifies the same thing; only Sors is a word more familiar in Poetry than Prose. All These amount to no more than Negative Terms, as I observed before; and all they do, is to make us comprehend, that the Ef­fect then spoken of, is not the Result of a Cause which acts necessarily and is expresly determined to produce it.

CHAP. V. The Objections drawn from Lotteries, and all Games that depend upon Chance, answered; and shewed insufficient to denominate Men For­tunate, or that any Persons have Good Luck constantly going along with them.

I Am perfectly satisfied, that what hath been said of that Luck which is pretended to be the Effect of Destiny or Chance, will not admit of any substantial Reply: And am apt to promise my self, that all who read the two last Chapters heedfully, will be of my mind. But yet I am as verily perswaded, that great Numbers of People, who are not able, either to disprove me, or to establish any Notions of their own upon clear and ra­tional Grounds, will not be one whit mo­ved; but stiffly maintain it still, that, let all the World say what they please, there is such a thing as good and ill Luck in Matters de­pending upon Chance. They will think, as long as they have a Day to live, that some certain Persons are fortunate and unfortunate at Games, where Chance is thought to govern. They will perhaps confess, that they do not know indeed how to give any distinct Ac­count of this good or ill Luck; what it is, or whence it proceeds: But long Experience hath taught them, that such things are but too real and certain. They will agree, that they have not Skill enough to overthrow my Rea­sons [Page 56]sons to the contrary; but nothing shall per­swade them out of their own Senses; and the Prejudices they have entertained have to Them all the force of a Demonstration. These are a sort of Men, who, never trou­bling themselves to argue upon any Matter, go through stitch in all their Opinions, and never take them up, but with a secret Reso­lution never to quit them more, though for others infinitely better. There is no inform­ing or enlightning of them, and, when you have reasoned with them never so justly, all the answer you are to expect is that of the Country-Fellow to his Priest; You may Silence me, but you shall never Convert me.

I would not be thought to do so weak a thing, as to write this Tract in hopes of gaining these Men over; But there are O­thers content to hear Reason, and such as will be satisfied, why they think thus rather than otherwise; and yet even They find it hard to deliver themselves from the Diffi­culties objected to them, from Instances of Persons, who almost always win at Play; where all the Skill in the World is not able to make its Party good against their Luck: And Others again have so ill a Run, that they eternally lose whatever they play for. Almost every Body fancies he knows Instan­ces of these lucky or unlucky Hands; and yet I am now taking upon me to prove, that this Objection hath nothing of true weight in it, when rightly considered.

I do not deny, but a Gamester may win, at Dice, Cards, or other Games, which either turn all upon Chance, or have a mixture of Skill required, for an Hour or two, nay a whole Afternoon, or Night together. I a­gree in like manner, that there are Some, who with a very few Tickets have got more Prizes in our late Lotteries than Others who have put in ten times as much. And lastly, I am perfectly satisfied, that a great many, on the other sido, are as unaccountable Lo­sers in the Instances already mentioned. But now, because they are of different kinds, we must first distinguish rightly between them, before we can make a right Judgment in the Case.

In Cases where Chance does all, as in Dice and Lotteries, supposing Men to have obser­ved carefully, and that there be no Cheat­ing, I dare averr, that no Man was ever known to be constantly, or even a great while together, a Winner. There is no Man that hath drawn the Great Lots, or such as are of any considerable Value, in several Lotteries successively; And several, after some Benefits, depending upon the Continuance of their Good Luck, have been so far from improving their Capital, that they have paid dearly for their fond Imagination, when venturing afresh in other Lotteries. In this I appeal to what my Readers have known or heard. Now the Great Lots must needs be Somebody's; but this Somebody would be [Page 58]very much in the wrong, to think that he is therefore a Fortunate Person, that some Quality belongs to him, which shall secure him the like Advantages at other times. There must of necessity be more Losers, than Gainers; and therefore it is very foolish, to conclude a Man's self Ʋnfortunate, because he is of the more numerous and probable side. And yet the Winners are so exalted, and the Losers so enraged, that they are eternally talking of their Good or Ill Luck, without at all considering what they say.

But now, the Matter is otherwise, in Games, that require any thing of Skill. For here, supposing the Persons to understand the Game, and to mind their Play alike, and to Play fair; I dare undertake, that, though sometimes One of these may Win, and the Other Lose; yet if they Play fre­quently together, they will give out pretty near equal at last. Now you cannot call One of these Fortunate and the Other Ʋn­fortunate, because in the infinite Turns of Chance, each hath his Run of a good Hand, provided they Play often and long. The Cards may lye so, that one of them may Win an Hour, an Evening, a Week together; but then the Other will infallibly have his Turn too, though there be no Rule, or cer­tain Order observable, in the Cards or Dice, which thus wheel about to different sides.

One sensible Evidence of this we have, in the many Gamesters, who have been reputed [Page 59]wonderfully lucky Players, because used to Win for a great while together, and yet Lose vast Summs all at a clap, and dye at last miserably Poor. Now, What should be the Cause of so sudden and mighty a Change, that the Good Luck which kept them company so long should at last forsake them; and the Ill Luck, which had no Power at all over them before, should persecute and undo them, at the end of their Days? The only Account for this seems to be, that Chance may possibly be of Their side, who frequently expose themselves to it, in the whole Course, of their Lives; and this may happen from the infinite variety of Contingencies, and the prodigious Number of Men who cast them­selves continually upon them; but, though this be possible, 'tis but barely so; and scarce ever found in Fact, that the same Strain of Fortune sticks by a Man any very long time. It is possible, strictly and absolutely speaking, that a Man in Raffling may throw three Sixes twelve times together; Perhaps this may have been done some Once or Twice, since that Game was invented; and hath made the For­tune of a very few Gamesters; but we must own this to have been exceeding rare, and what no Man can reasonably promise himself. So that to talk of Good or Ill Luck going along with this or that Person, when among the in­finite Hits that depend upon Chance, at Dice or Cards particularly, he happens for some time to come off a Winner, is most ridiculous and absurd.

But still we are urged with Instances of Men that usually Win at Cards, and have never Lost considerably for many Years; so that these are concluded to be such as Good Luck is partial to and fond of; as others again are Ʋnfortunate at Play without any mixture of such Luck or any turn of the Cards in their favour. I pretend not to contest Matter of Fact, but only desire my Reader to be just in this Reflection. I observe then, that we are now speaking of Games, where though Chance does a great deal, yet Skill too does as much; for I am not mentioning those Games at present, which are purely casual. If a Man, (for the purpose) Play ill at Ombre, he will lose if he play with those that understand the Game better; provided he continue Playing any time; though he may now and then happen to Win, notwithstanding all his Blunders and ill Management. And I affirm, that in this Case, the being Master of the Game is neces­sary to make a Man Fortunate, for without that he will never have Good Luck of any long continuance.

A Lucky Player, in the vulgar Acceptation of the Word, ought to be One who Plays ill, and yet wins constantly; For, where Men Play with Skill, it is nonsense to talk of Good Luck. So that we should distinguish between a Good Gamester and a Lucky one. The For­mer is so by Art, the Second only by Chance. And yet it is certain, that, generally speak­ing, the Best Players are the most Fortunate. [Page 61]But little Notice is taken of their Skills and a great Noise made of their Fortune, and these two are often confounded with one another, of which there may be these among other Rea­sons.

• First, Because a Good Player never loses by his own Fault, whereas an Ill Player is guilty of many Slips, and these make him appear more Ʋnlucky, because they frequently expose him to lose.
• Secondly, A Good Player runs as little Risque as possibly he can, When he hath an ill Hand, and sees no likelihood of Winning, he passes.

But he acts quite otherwise, when he hath a sure Hand, or a probable Prospect of Advantage. They that are Masters of such Games as this, know that there is abundance of Good Management requisite to make the best of them; and such as are not expert at them are often at a loss to find the meaning of Good Players, and why they proceed so un­accountably as many times they seem to do. This Contrivance makes them reputed Fortu­nate, though in reality their Success is owing not so much to their Luck as to their Conduct and Skill. The Advantage is evident, especi­ally when they Win often; but their Good Play is not so Notorious, nor are any but Men of Judgment qualified easily to discern it.

Now their Luck is the thing talk'd of, be­cause Men discourse more of what they know, than of what they know nothing of. And so the masterly and prudent Gamesters, who owe their Gain chiefly to themselves, are termed Lucky and thought deeply indebted to Fortune. [Page 62]Just the Reverse of this is the Case of them who Play ill. Their Mistakes are not always so gross, that every Stander-by should be sen­sible of them; and therefore their Losses are charged upon Ill Luck rather than want of Skill. And this is an Opinion which they contribute to themselves. They are loath to pass for Ʋnskilful Players, because it is a Reflection, to engage in a Matter he does not understand; against those who know it better; for this is to make a Man's self a Cully. And to bring themselves off from the Imputation of this Weakness, they throw all their own Faults upon Ill Fortune, and are very industrious to have it believed, that nothing was overseen by Them, which could have made the Event better. And again their Adversaries Win­nings are ascribed to Their good Fortune, so to take off from that Pleasure, and sometimes from that fantastical Pride and Imaginary Honour, which some People take to them­selves upon such Success in Play.

This is the State of Good Luck in Play, and all I imagine, who peruse this Chapter atten­tively, will be convinced that it is so. So that Good Luck in this, as well as other Re­spects, is the Name of an Idea full of Contra­diction. The same may be said of Fortune, a Word that signifies almost the same thing, though it be frequently used indeed upon o­ther Occasions.

CHAP. VI. Why Good and Ill Destiny and Fortune, and some other such Terms, though they fignifie nothing real and positive, should yet continue so long in use. In what Sense the Words, Good and Ill Luck may be admitted.

BEfore I proceed to shew, that the Word Good Luck signifies nothing at all, in the common use and acceptation of it, I am under a necessity of digressing a little, to remove one Difficulty out of the Way. You will ask, it may be, how it comes to pass, that Words, so empty and insignificant as I pretend these to be, should yet obtain so generally for above two thousand Years together? Is it at all probable, that so many Countries, as distant in Opinion as in Situation; Inhabitants of Europe, Asia, and Africk, in so many different Ages, should yet conspire to speak without a Meaning? And ought not rather so general a Consent in using such Words to be taken for a certain Proof, that they have a determi­nate Idea, and clear Signification?

Now here I might content my self with saying, that, since this Objection overthrows none of those Arguments, by which I have directly proved my Opinion, what I have said is not the less true, though I should not be able to account for this so general Practice and Consent of Mankind. All Masters of Reason­ing know very well, that a Man hath done his [Page 64]Work, when he hath clearly proved the Point he undertakes; and, That once done, he is not bound to answer every Objection, that may be started against him. But my Reader will find, that at present I have no need of this Answer, being able to give some reaso­nable Account of the Original and Growth of these Expressions.

Now Three things there are, which gave occasion for inventing these Words; and These, being common to all Ages and Coun­tries, would not fail to keep them up in com­mon use, after that they were once introdu­ced into the World.

I. The First is, that many things are ob­served to happen every Day, which appear in common Esteem too irregular to be attri­buted to Providence. Virtuous Persons are subject to a thousand Disasters every Moment, and we daily hear and read of Afflicted and Ʋnfortunate Virtue. On the other hand, very vile and vicious People are in a State, which provokes our Envy, with regard to these Ad­vantages which are commonly called the Goods of Fortune. How many Instances oc­cur in every Age, of Persons highly useful to the Publick, Loved and Honoured by all that knew or dealt with them, snatched away at a Juncture, when their Country stood most in need of them; and of Others again, that are justly looked upon as Scourges and pub­lick Plagues, who live long and prosperously? These are things, which Men durst not a­scribe [Page 65]to God, whom they conceived always to be an infinitely Good and Kind Being; and hence sprung the Notion, of I know not what fatal Order and Connexion of Causes, which was the Cause of all these Disorders and past even the Divine Power to break or alter its Course. The Writings of Heathen Authors do indeed complain much of their Gods, but then they ever and anon acquaint us withal, that Calamitous Accidents are the Effects of Destiny. The ancient Poets, which are the Body of their Divinity, repre­sent the Gods to us, often lamenting that Fate which they were not able to prevent: Many Examples whereof might easily be produced, if that were necessary.

Thus Homer brings in Jupiter deploring the Decree of Destiny, that his Son Sar­pedon was ordained to be killed by Patroclus. Iliad. 2. V. 433, &c. And hence Lucian in his Dialogue, [...] makes a Cynick Phi­losopher Laugh at Jupiter, for being himself subject to that Fate, which he could not re­verse. And many other like Instances are to be met with in the eighth and ninth Chap­ters of Stobaeus's Collections of natural Things.

The most ancient Authors stopped here, and knew nothing of Fortune, from whence it comes to pass that the Greek Word which answers to it, is not to be found in Homer or Hesiod. But afterwards Fortune was joyned to Destiny, as sharing in Effects esteemed pure­ly casual, and yet impossible not to happen. [Page 66]The first occasion whereof was, probably this; that many things were observed to de­pend upon Mens Humour and Fancy, of which no other Account could be given, than merely the use of that Liberty and Choice God had given them.

We see Men daily rise to prodigious Ho­nours and Estates, who had neither more Me­rit to recommend them, nor more Prudence to acquire these, than a thousand other Peo­ple: Nay who never aspired after, or aimed at them: But all is thrown upon them, by being under some happy Circumstances which they did not foresee, or having had the luck to please some humoursome People, who were the Authors of their Advancement, without being able to give a Reason why they were so. Again, Calamitous Accidents happen, which many times cannot be charged upon any Im­prudence in the Sufferers, nor lookt upon as Chastisements for any Fault; but are purely cross Hits, occasioned by the peevish and un­accountable Humours of those they had to deal with. Now, when Mens own Senses had demonstrated such things to be the Effects of a Liberty in Man, which it was in his Power to have used after another manner; People began to imagine a Being quite of a different Nature from Destiny which they called Fortune; and to This they gave the Direction of Matters of this kind. This is a Second Reason why Words of no real Im­portance have yet continued in common use [Page 67]for above two thousand Years. And, since such Occasions as these, which first intro­duced those Words will certainly recurr as long as the World lasts, the Words them­selves in all likelihood will be continual to express them so long too.

They that take up with what Men call Fa­tality, will lay every good and evil Event, which happens, and, as they imagine, can­not but happen, at this Door. They will consider these as the Productions of an un­known Power, which nothing can withstand. Others, who cannot bear that all Mankind should be so fast bound up in the Chains of Destiny, and observe a thousand fortuitous Events every Day, will be as positive, (though as unintelligible too,) as the former; and tell you, that all this is the Work of Fortune. These are Terms now grown so very fa­miliar, that, should they be exploded, Men would think themselves straitned for necessary Expressions. They are of so great Service both in Poetry and Prose, that Rhetorick would lose one of its fairest Flowers, if De­stiny and Fortune were no more. These and other Words of like Importance carry Musick in the Sound, they strike the Ear, and help Rhyme at a dead lift, so seasonably, so agree­ably, that, though never so offensive to Reason, parted with they must not be upon any Terms. And all this is owing to Custom, which, when it hath long obtained, it is to no pur­pose to strive against.

This then might alone suffice to keep up sentless Words in Vogue, in despight of all Argument and Opposition to the contrary. But there is yet a Third Reason for it, no less powerful than the former: Which is, that some certain Passions, which Men will never divest themselves of, do naturally dispose them to these kinds of Expressions, except they very strictly guard themselves in this Point. One of these Passions is, the Pleasure Men take in complaining, and bewailing their Case, when unhappy; and in having some­what to lay their Misfortunes upon. Were all Disasters and Crosses lookt upon as the Ordinances of a Wise Providence; or as the Consequence of some Fault or Indiscretion, of our own, Mens Mouths would immediately be stopped in all their Sufferings; and that delight of bemoaning our hard Circumstances, so commonly taken, and so freely indulged, would be utterly supprest and lost. Some Heathens indeed gave the Gods hard Words, but Others scrupled the doing so; and Now, to be sure, the Impiety of Complaining against Providence directly, would never be endured. So that the Accusations (to evade this offensive Impiety) are levelled at Destiny and Fortune. These are arraigned of all the Hardships which good and worthy Men lye under, and esteem­ed the Actors of all those things, which we think it does not become God to do. As may be seen at large in Stobaeus, Ch. cv. Concerning Those, who are undeservedly miserable.

Thus, when any cross Accident befals us, we say, How hard it is to be persecuted so by ill Fortune, and were there not a Fate in it, which we cannot resist, it would never vex us. Upon every Compliment of Condo­leance these Complaints are repeated afresh; and always with the same satisfaction. Should the Persons under unhappy Circumstances be debarred solacing themselves with such Ex­pressions, they would think one of their greatest Comforts taken away from them. So usual is it for the Mind of Man to feed upon Air and Emptiness! For, after all, we may as well rail at the Emperour of Chi­na, or Japan, when under any Trouble, as at Destiny and Fortune: and the farthest King in the Indies, hath as great a hand in our Af­flictions, as either of Those, according to the vulgar Acceptation of the Words.

There is likewise another Passion, which inclines us to express our Resentments after this manner: That of Self-love, I mean, which so hardly suffers us to take the Shame of our Misfortunes, or lay them upon any Fault of our own. We please our selves in seeking for Causes without us; and when we dare not vent our Spleen upon Providence, or Men, we fall foul upon Destiny, or Fortune, and think we may say what we will against These, with­out any danger of being called to an account for it. Our good Success (if we may be be­lieved) is entirely the Effect of our own Pru­dence and Conduct. But all our Losses and [Page 70]Disappointments come from the over-ruling Power of Fate, or the unaccountable Capri­ciousness of Fortune. Nay our very Vices are charged upon these Phantoms, instead of ascribing them to the Irregularities of our own Mind or Temper.

Thus Apol. c. 1. Tertullian observes, that wicked Men attribute the disorderly Motions of their own Souls, to Destiny, or the Stars. And a Herald. in Tert. A­pol. learned Commen­tator shews, that this was the usu­al Method by which the Heathens excused themselves. Hence Lucian, in a Dialogue between Aeacus, Protesilaus, Me­nelaus and Paris, brings in Protesilaus laying his Death to Destiny rather than his own Rashness; and pretending, that Fate ordain­ed him to be the first Man that landed be­fore Troy. The same Lucian, in his Apology for Learned Men, who put themselves into the Ser­vice of Great Men, tells us, that though he would not take Sanctuary in that Excuse himself, yet it was the common Apology of People, who were at a loss for something to alledge in their own Defence. ‘Should (says he) fare ever the better, if I should own my self in the wrong, and have re­course to Fortune, or the inevitable Neces­sity of Destiny; if I should desire those tha [...] censure me to be favourable, upon a Pre­tence, that we are not Masters of our own Actions, but carried away by the Force of a higher Power, which makes us do things [Page 71]whether we will or no? Upon which Oc­casion he quotes Homer, who in many Pas­sages expresses himself to this purpose.’

Now a great part of our Studies consist­ing in the reading old Heathen Authors, the Beauty of whose Style and Fancy we just­ly admire, we are insensibly led to speak as they did; and to imitate the Bad as well as the Good, especially when inspired by the same Passions with them. Thus full of Re­sentment at our Misfortunes, and full of Self-conceit, instead of acknowledging our Faults, we cast all the Blame upon Fate or Fortune, the disorderly Proceedings whereof we give lively and very moving Descrip­tions of. Fortune, Rochf. Max. 458. Max. 502. says an ingeni­ous Person, never appears so blind, as in the Esteem of those, to whom she is not kind. And again, Fortune governs the Ʋni­verse.

A Merchant, who manages his Affairs dexterously, and gets a large Estate, imputes his Prosperity to his Prudence, but if his Ventures be rash and unsuccessful, does he lay his Losses to himself too? No. This is a Misfortune, for which he is not answerable, because many Others have traded more bold­ly, and by the Favour of Fortune found their Account in doing so.

Thus the Satisfaction Men feel in Bemoan­ing themselves, and finding out some Excuse for their own Indiscretions, did heretofore give birth to those Phantoms of Destiny and Fortune, and do still cherish and keep them up in the World. These Passions are so natu­ral, that it is scarce possible to extirpate them out of the Minds of Men. Besides all which there is yet One more, much more blameable, and equally instrumental with the former, to the continuing this unintelligible Jargon in use among us. I mean a Spirit of Envy against those whom we see successful; which, because it cannot take away from the Advantages they stand possess'd of, endea­vours to perswade our selves and others, that these Persons do not excel Them in Merit, of whom they have got the start in Riches or Advancement. We say these things are the [Page 74]Effect more of their good Fortune than their good Conduct; and magnifie their Luck with no other design so much, as thereby to low­er their commendable Qualities. This was always a reigning Disposition, and many In­stances of it are to be found in the 104th Chapter of Stobaeus, concerning those who have been undeservedly Fortunate. Attend but dili­gently to the Discourse, when any Man that hath risen greatly in the World is talk­ed of, and you shall daily find more of these ill-natur'd Examples, than a good Man would be pleased with. Reflect a little with your self upon those whom you know more than ordinarily successful, and you shall find a strong Inclination, even in your own Breast, to impute most of these Persons Happiness, more to Fortune, than to their own Prudence or Desert.

These are the Temptations Men lay un­der to take the Government of Humane Affairs out of the Hands of Providence, and give it to Destiny and Fortune. Those Chi­maera's, that have been adored for two thousand Years, even among the most learn­ed and refined Nations, sometimes in Tem­ples, but always in Mens Hearts and se­cret Thoughts: These are the Idols, to which Ignorance and Discontent, Self-love and En­vy, did ever, and do still too often, sacri­fice Piety and good Sense, Patience and Cha­rity.

But still I expect to be thought an un­reasonable [Page 75]Man for attempting to banish these Words out of Conversation; And the ra­ther, because the World know not how to dispense with the want of them; As I my self seem in effect to confess, by making so frequent use of them, in this very Discourse directed against them; Which certainly would not have been done, could I conve­niently have express'd my self without them. In return to this, I have two things to offer. The First is, that I was obliged in attacking the vulgar Signification of these Words, to take them as the Vulgar do, in order to make my self clearly understood. The Other is, that I allow these Words capable of a very good Sense, provided we confine them to Events already past. A Man, without any Absurdity or Impropriety at all, may say, that such a one hath had good or ill Luck, that he hath been Fortunate or Ʋnfortunate; but if a Man will speak sensibly and intelli­gibly, he cannot say, that any Person is, or will be, the One or the Other. This at first hearing may sound like a Paradox; but it is as certain with regard to the Importance of the Words, as it is in respect of the Truth of the thing. Solon is said to de­clare, Herodot. l. 1. that no Man could truly be called happy before his Death; because of the many Changes in Humane Affairs, and the Uncertainty of what may happen here­after, which no body can foresee or answer for. Thus it is with Words too. When [Page 76]we say, that such a one hath been fortunate, this means no more, than that some things have fallen out to his advantage; and then the Importance of the Word is confined to the Event only. This Idea in such a Case is very clear; because it agrees exactly with that which we conceive of any sort of gain­ful Events. But when we say a Man is or will be fortunate, this undertakes to point out something belonging to that Person, which causes such Advantages to happen to Him rather than to Others. And in this Sense it is, that I contend, and I think have pro­ved, the Terms of Fortunate and Good Luck to be meerly notional, and of no significance at all.

So that, upon the whole Matter, those Words are not to be used upon Some Occa­sions, if a Man would speak rationally and intelligibly; and upon Others they may be ve­ry well admitted, and have a clear and di­stinct Sense belonging to them.

CHAP. VII. That Mens Good and Bad Angel are not the Cause of their Good or Ill Luck, in Gaming and Lotteries.

MAny of the ancient Heathens were of opinion, that Each Person at hi [...] Birth had a Good and Evil Genius assigned him; and that the Good used his utmost En­deavours [Page 77]for his Benefit, while the Other la­boured as hard for his Ruine. They pre­tended too, that, if a Man won at Play, this was owing to the Influence and Power of his good Genius; So that He, whose good Genius was superiour to His with whom he engaged, would infallibly come off Conque­rour. Now, whatever Objections this Opi­nion may be liable to, thus much at least must be granted in its favour, that it is in­telligible; which the two former are not. For we find no difficulty in conceiving it possible, for an Intelligent Being of greater Power than Man, and whose Operations are invisible, to make what Changes it shall please in the Motion of certain Bodily Substances; as Cards, or Dice, or Tickets, or any thing of that kind; and all this to be done, in such a manner as we can neither perceive nor ob­struct.

And yet it must be confess'd, that this O­pinion hath no Foundation, but what They who advanced it at pleasure were pleased to give it. It is worth our Observation, how Plutarch mentions it, in his Book concerning the Fortune of the Romans: ‘ Anthony and Au­gustus visiting often, and being very fami­liar, used to divert themselves at Ball, or Dice, or with fighting of Quails and Cocks, but Anthony was always worsted. One of his Family, who pretended to Divination, is said hereupon to give him this Advice. Why, Sir, will you have any thing to do [Page 78]with this young Man? pray avoid him. You have gained more Reputation, are Superiour to him in Years, have more For­ces under your Command, are more expe­rienced in the Art of War; But your Ge­nius is afraid of his; your Fortune, though in it self great, flatters and truckles to his; and, if you do not decline him, will in time forsake you, and desert to him.’ The same Relation is repeated in Anthony's Life, and the Person who gave this Counsel said to be an Aegyptian.

The same Author in his Brutus tells us, that ‘a little before he brought his Army over into Europe, as he was sitting one Night pensive, somewhat seemed to come to his Tent, and turning about, he saw an Ap­parition of a horrible Form, which stood by him without speaking a word. Brutus had the Courage to accost it in these words, What Man, or what God art Thou? To which the Apparition replied, I am thy evil Genius, Brutus, and will meet thee at Philippi.’ He says too, that the same Form appeared to him again, the Day before the Battel fought, near that City; which presaged his Defeat and Death. I make no Reflections upon this Pas­sage; What I have quoted being sufficient to shew the Opinion of the Heathens in this Mat­ter; and several See Casp. Barth. Col­lections up­on the Itine­rary of Rutilius Furmatianus, V. 328. learned Per­sons having treated of the thing at large.

I do not find that any of the Moderns think each Man hath, not only a good, but an evil, Genius; and much less any such Genius as concerns it self in their winning or losing in Play, or Lotteries. In truth all that the Pa­gans advanced in this Matter was wholly fan­ciful and groundless; and what Plutarch re­lates of Anthony's Aegyptian, seems to be no more than a Cheat of that Aegyptian; Who had a mind to give his Master some Account, how it came to pass that he always came off with loss, when engaging in Play with Au­gustus. As for Brutus his Apparition, if I should say it was a meer Fable, I do not see how any body can disprove me.

If any one should think fit to maintain, that the good Angel, to whom God hath gi­ven the Charge of his Person, (according to the Opinion of some ancient Writers, and of some Christians in our time) is Sollicitous for his Winning, in such Cases where Chance is supposed to have place; A thousand Que­stions might be put to such a Man, which he would find himself greatly at a loss to an­swer. For instance; Admitting, that God hath entrusted each Person to the Care of a Guardian Angel, it may be demanded, how he knows, that, when he wins, this Angel is the Cause of it? Who ever told him so? or, How did he come by this Knowledge? For certainly a Man may win by the accidental concurrence of some things, which must of necessity favour some of those that are enga­ged [Page 80]in Play, or that have put Tickets into Lotteries. But that These should favour this or that Man in particular, we have no more pretence to call the Doing of an Angel, than the Effect of Chance. It may be again que­stioned, wherefore a Man's good Angel should procure him Money, and not rather a good Understanding, or Piety, or Virtue, of which many great Winners stand at least as much in need, as many great Losers? One would be glad to know too, of what Order this Angel is, that can help his Charge to Money, but not to the better Endowments of the Mind; and why he should rather chuse to furnish him with the One, than with the Other? These and many other such Enqui­ries can never receive a satisfactory Answer. And therefore Men had better say nothing, than run into a Heathen Notion, which pre­tended that Mens good Genius was the Cause [...] all their good Fortune; Because this is a [...] altogether fantastical, and clogged [...] Difficulties. So that, with­ [...] [...] farther upon this Head, I [...] to examine the Fourth pretend­ [...] [...]se of Mens good, or ill Luck.

CHAP. VIII. That God does not by any particular Determi­nations of his Divine Will, ordain Good Luck to Some, and Ill Luck to Others, in cases of Play and Lotteries.

THey who do not think fit to ascribe their Good or Ill Luck in matters depending upon Chance, to Destiny or Fortune, or to the overruling Power of their Good or Evil Genius, generally take shelter in the Providence of Al­mighty God; Who, as they imagine, does in a very particular Manner preside over, and dispose, all things where Hazard and Lots are concerned. This Opinion too is what we may conceive and understand the meaning of; and at first blush carries a Face of Piety. Whereas the first and second are altogether unintelligible, and the third is in no degree probable. And yet I am bold to say, that This hath not a much firmer Foundation than the rest, and that it does not make for the Honour of Providence, as People fondly ima­gine. But in this Argument it is fit I allow my self a larger Scope, than I have hitherto done; both in respect to that vast Number of Persons, who have entertained it; and in due reverence to the Holy Scripture, upon which it is thought to be grounded.

Now first of all it is absolutely necessary to know exactly what this Proposition imports, God is the Author of Good and Ill Luck in mat­ters [Page 82]depending upon Chance. For it is capable of Three very different Interpretations, and therefore we must carefully distinguish be­tween these, in order to be rightly under­stood.

First. It may mean, not that God inter­poses after any particular manner, in Favour of this or that Person, so as positively to de­termine the Event to his Advantage by a peremptory Decree, but only that God, ha­ving made all things, and preserving them in that Order they are in, and managing them as his Wisdom sees sit; these Casual Events like all others, are to be looked upon as an Effect of his General Providence. Thus we say commonly, that God gives us, and takes away from us, our Children, our Friends, our Estates; intending hereby not any miraculous or supernatural Operation, by which his Pro­vidence gives or takes away these things; but only that we acknowledge every thing that happens to us, to be an Effect of his Direction and Governance of the World. And in this respect God is truly said to be the Cause of every thing, excepting only the Evil of Sin, which proceeds from the voluntary deprava­tion of the Humane Nature. Thus we may, and ought to ascribe to God any Good Fortune that happens to us, whether by matters de­pending upon Chance, or any other way whatsoever: though we do not think, that he interposes after any particular or extra­ordinary manner, for the determining of them.

Secondly. This Proposition imports, that God, knowing before-hand all that happens, in every kind, and having it in his Power to hinder any part of it, would not however put a stop to, or divert the Course of Natural Causes, to hinder the good Luck thus about to happen to any Person, and that for special Reasons. Tho' we cannot positively affirm, that God had no such Reasons in his Eye, be­cause this is what we know nothing of; Nor can we affirm that he had, at least, except God should please to reveal them to us, or that we could fairly infer this by the Conse­quences of those Effects. For the purpose. The Great Lots lately drawn in England and Scotland are the Effects of Chance; in the di­sposal whereof it is possible God might have some particular Reasons inducing him to give them to Those particular Men; but it is pos­sible too, that he might not act upon any such particular Reasons. He hath not reveal­ed to us any thing of the Matter; And the Consequences of that Advantage, which some Persons gained, have not produced Effects considerable enough to incline us to think, that God had any particular Reasons for or­dering those Benefits to those that enjoy them.

Thirdly. This Proposition may signifie, that God does interpose in casual Events after so particular a manner, that he acts by an im­mediate Power and Providence in the Pro­duction of them. And this is the usual Ac­ceptation of the Words; for otherwise Men [Page 84]have no reason to say, that God presides o­ver Lots, and casual Events in any more par­ticular manner, than he does over all natu­ral Effects whatsoever. Now I am so far from denying, that God can, that I am well con­tent to allow, that he does, upon several Oc­casions, interpose after so extraordinary a manner, as to make the Lot fall upon some certain Persons, upon whom possibly it would not have fallen, without such Interposition. I shall explain my self by some Examples of this kind by and by. But the thing I contend for is, that, generally speaking, we cannot make God the immediate Author of good and ill Luck, so as that he should bring this about by any supernatural and extraordinary Ope­ration. I am aware of one Passage in the Old Testament, usually produced for Proof of the contrary Opinion; But I hope to make it clear, that it does not at all answer that purpose: when I have first laid down the Reasons, which induce me to believe, that, generally speaking, God does not direct or concern himself with the Events of this kind, more particularly than he does with those of any other kind whatsoever.

First. I averr this Opinion to be, A Sup­position taken up without any Ground; For I shall shew presently, that there is nothing in Scripture to support it. So that they who hold it have no other Refuge left, than to prove it by the Consequences of such Events.

Now these Consequences, as I said before, [Page 85]are not of such Importance, that the Finger of God should commonly be thought visible in them. If the General Good of a Nation or Kingdom, or of some Persons eminently serviceable to the Publick, were the Result of such Events, we then might probably con­clude, that God was more than ordinarily concerned to promote such good Effects. But nothing of this kind yet appears, nay we see, quite contrary, that several, upon whom these Benefits have fallen, make no other use of them, than to be more profuse and vain in their Expences, and make them either mi­nister to their Pride, or increase their Ava­rice. And can any Man of common Sense sup­pose, that God hath gone out of his Way, as it were, and wrought Miracles, for the Ad­vantage of the Vain, and the Covetous?

Secondly. If God act after a particular man­ner in Casual Events, he either does it in All, or in Some such only. If in Some only, let them be specified, and let it be proved, that such an Immediate Operation does not extend to the rest. Now this is a Point ne­ver to be decided, but by express Revela­tion, or at least by Arguments drawn from Effects worthy of so particular a Providence. Without one of these Proofs it is to no pur­pose to advance any such Distinction. Now if God preside thus over all such Events, and direct them by a positive and particular Act of his Will; it will follow from hence, that God works Miracles every Day, for the sake [Page 86]of Men, who, it is but too plain, are not worthy of them: and in Places, where we could hardly suspect, that God should take any delight in exhibiting his Presence after an extraordinary manner. They that play at Cards and Dice would at this rate engage God to declare for them by perpetual Won­ders; and the Groom-porters, and Gaming-houses would have infinitely more Miracles wrought in them, than ever the Temple it self, or any other place had, though we should take in all that stand upon Record, or were ever done under the Old and New Testa­ment. I cannot tell, whether such Conse­quences as these will go down with Others, but, for my own part, I declare freely, that there are very few things, which I find my self less disposed to believe, than, that God works Miracles of this kind every Day for Gamesters. Lotteries indeed are nothing near so frequent as Games, but it is every whit as improbable, that God should particularly in­terest himself in These, as in Those. For, if the Placing of the Tickets be not the Ef­fect of Chance, but of a particular Provi­dence; then every Ticket drawn presents us with a fresh Miracle. And as oft as Men shall take a fancy to set up new Lotteries, God will be obliged (if I may have leave to say so) to come down from Heaven, and regu­late the Order of the Tickets: He by his po­sitive Assignment will dispense the Money to some, and not to others; without any vi­sible [Page 87]reason of this difference, whether we regard the Qualifications of the Persons, or the Use they make of it. Will those that have drawn the most considerable Benefits have the Confidence to say, that their Merit was so much Superiour to Theirs, who had only Blanks, as to give them a better Title to the Favour of Heaven; or have we any reasonable Assurance, that this Success will dispose them to be more beneficent and cha­ritable for the future? This is an Enquiry which I charge upon their own Conscience to answer, and what Time must inform us in. As for what is already past, we may venture to say, boldly, that, Luke 13. as the Per­sons on whom the Tower of Siloam fell are declared by our Saviour not to have been the greatest Sinners which dwelt at Je­rusalem; so They who have gained most by the Lotteries are not better Men, than They who lost all.

Upon these Considerations it must be al­lowed me, that They, who attribute the for­tunate and unfortunate Events to particular Persons to such an immediate Providence, are in great danger of being greatly mistaken. These things may either of them be, and of­ten are, the Effects of an extraordinary Bles­sing from above. But then the Case is the same here again, with that I mentioned just now. We must not think the Persons whom we are pleased to style Fortunate or Ʋnfortu­nate, to be such, as God is obliged (if I may [Page 88]so speak) to succeed, or to defeat and dis­appoint in their Designs. For as God causes his Sun to rise on the Evil and on the Good, so does he suffer These things to happen to all sorts of Men without distinction.

After attending diligently to what hath been now said, it will be no hard matter to discover the true Importance of that Passage in Scripture, usually produced to prove, that God is the Author of all Ca­sual Events. The Lot, says Solo­mon, Prov. 16.33. is cast into the Lap; that is, into the Hollow of a Vessel ordered for that purpose; but the whole Disposing or Decision of it is of the Lord. When any thing was to be determined by Lots, they took a Ves­sel, into which each Person cast his own Mark; The Vessel was then shaken lustily, and that which came first out signified, that He whose Lot it was, ought to have the thing assigned to that Lot, if the Division of any Possessions were the Matter to be de­termined. This Circumstance is necessary to be observed, for the explaining the first Words of the Verse, though They have no relation to the Nature of Lots or Chance in general, or considered in it self. There­fore the thing we are concerned for at pre­sent, is, only to know the meaning of the last Words, The whole Disposing thereof is of the Lord.

Now these Words are capable but of Two Senses. Either they mean, that God by a [Page 89]positive and particular Act of his Will, constantly, determines this casual Event, or Lot, to some certain Side, whatever kind that Event or Lot be of; or else it intends only thus much; that Men have no Hand at all in Ordering these Productions, but they are the Result of a general Providence, with­out any extraordinary Interposition of God in this Affair. Which Mode of Expression is very agreeable to the Hebrew Forms, which are wont to ascribe to God all those things, to which Men contribute nothing, and such as depend upon, and result from, his General Providence only.

They who prefer the former Signification, oblige themselves to answer all the Obje­ctions, to which I have already proved it liable; And These, I confess, are such as I know no Answer for. Now a Man must ne­ver interpret Scripture in a Sense, which will never bear, except you first swallow down and take Absurdities for granted.

And therefore I conceive it is necessary to stick to the second. So that Solomon meant no more, but that Men have no Power in Disposing of Casual Events. And thus the Hebrews frequently express themselves. They say, for example, that the Trees which grow upon Mountains, Numb. 24.6. or in places never planted, or cultivated by Men, were planted of God. Thus Balaam, when he beheld the Line of the Israelites Camp, says, As the Valleys are they spread [Page 90]forth, as the Gardens by the River's side, as the Trees of Ligmaloes (an Aromatick Tree) which the Lord hath planted, and as Cedar-trees be­side the Waters. And the Psalmist, The Trees of the Lord are full of Sap, even the Cedars of Libanus which he hath plant­ed. Psalm 104.16. Now there is no concluding from hence, that God interposed after an extraordinary manner, for the making those Trees grow. But it was an Effect of his Providence, which at the first Creation of the World did indeed bring forth Plants by a miraculous Act of his Power; so that each kind should afterwards spring and breed of themselves; and afterwards preserved them without any new Miracle.

The same People used to call Thunder God's Voice; Psalm 104.6. By which they did not mean, that it never thundred without a Miracle; but thus aw­fully to express that terrible Noise and Com­motion, made in a Place which Men can­not reach to, and consequently the Effect of his Providence, who made all things. I do not undertake to affirm, that it did, or does never thunder, by an Effect of God's particular Interposition; but I say, that ge­nerally Thunder is bred in the Air, with­out God's intervening more particularly in this, than he does in other Natural Ef­fects. In the 29th Psalm, where we have a Poetical Description of the Effects of Thun­der, it is said, that the Voice of the Lord [Page 91]breaketh the Cedars of Libanus, that it makes the Mountains to skip like a Calf, and like a young Ʋnicorn. And yet no body thinks, that God works Miracles to throw down Trees, or to make a ratling among the Rocks. But the meaning is, that None of these things are done by Humane Pow­er, but are the Effects of a Divine Provi­dence. This Idiom once establish'd, gave occasion for the wise Men and Poets of the Hebrew Nation, to carry that Expression beyond its first Signification, and, by a Rhetorical Figure, to introduce God thun­dring in Person. Thus Job, speak­ing of Thunder, says, Job 37.2. Hear his Voice with trembling, and the Sound that go­eth out of his Mouth. Now, strictly speak­ing, God does not act more particularly in the Noise of Thunder, than in the Hum­ming of a Gnat or Fly; and this latter, if curiously attended to, is more wonderful than the former.

Thunder, when Philosophically consider­ed, is nothing else, but a violent and sud­den Concussion of the Air, caused by the quick kindling of an Exhalation of a Sul­phurous and Nitrous Composition, or some­what of that kind. Our Muskets and great Ordinance are no ill Imitation of it, and the Crack of Aurum fulminans is yet a nea­rer Resemblance of the thing. If a great quantity of Artillery were discharged, or of Aurum fulminans kindled, upon a Moun­tain, [Page 92]without the Persons below knowing any thing of the Matter, they would certain­ly think it Thundred. But a Fly or a Bee is a wonderful Creature, which Men know not how to imitate the Frame of. The Mo­tion of this little-winged Machine, the Order and Symmetry of its Parts, the Use it makes of them, the Circulation of that Inix which supplies the place of Blood, and all that we observe in it, is truly ad­mirable: and we could as easily raise the Dead, as form such an Infect as this. Were I to speak as a Philosopher, I would ra­ther say, the Flies of God, than call Thun­der the Voice or Word of God. But the Vul­gar, judging of things, by the Noise and strong Impression they make, and by their Inability to change them, are surprized and tremble at Thunder; whereas they despise a Fly, because it makes but little Noise, and they can kill it at pleasure. Upon this account Thunder is esteemed the Lord's im­mediate Doing, while Flies are pretended to breed by Chance, and to come out of Putrefaction. This is almost the same Ex­travagance, as it would be to suppose the Concurrence of some Intelligent Being ne­cessary to discharge a Canon; but to think a House well built and furnished, to be the Work of Chance. Many ingenious Per­sons have confuted this Errour so substan­tially, that I need insist no longer upon it; nor could I conveniently do so, with­out [Page 93]digressing too far from the Subject I am now upon.

The Hebrews call the Rain-bow the Bow of God, Gen. 9.12. because it ap­pears on high in the Air, and is exceed­ing beautiful in the variety of its Colours; though all this be an Effect of his general Providence. A Prism of Glass, or a Jet' d' Eau, look'd upon with our Back to the Sun, will convince us, that no Supernatural Operation is needful to form the Rain-bow, in drops of Rain.

From hence methinks I might infer, that Solomon, in saying the Disposing of the Lot is of the Lord; intends no more, than that this is one Effect of his General Providence, and such as Men themselves have no part in. So that They, who argue for a Par­ticular Providence from this Passage, in These rather than Other Matters, are led into that Mistake by their Ignorance of the Propriety of the Hebrew Lan­guage. See Grot. on Prov. 16.33. Not that I deny God up­on some Occasions to have inter­posed, as they contend; but then this was upon special and weighty Occa­sions, and such as he himself had appointed. Numb. 26.55, 56. Thus God command­ed Joshua to divide the Land of Canaan to the Israelites by Lot; Gen. 49. and I. make no doubt but God so directed those Lots, Deut. 33. that each [Page 94]Tribe should have that Portion fore-told by Jacob and Moses. And thus again in the Case of Jonah, Jonah 1. he di­scovered by drawing of Lots, Acts 1. which of the Passengers was the cause of that extraordinary Storm, which then distressed them, as we may read in the first Chapter of that Prophet.

But these are rare and extraordinary Ca­ses, such as must not be drawn into Pre­cedent, or made a general Rule; for, at this rate, every Decision by Lots would be a certain Oracle from Heaven, to which we might apply securely, and rest upon, in our Doubts and Necessities. If any Man desired to be satisfied, whether a thing be true or false, he need only take two Pie­ces of Paper, and write upon the one, This is True, and upon the other, This is False; or some Inscription to that purpose, and the first drawn would have the Force of a Revelation from Heaven. If a Man were in pain to know, whether any of the Fami­ly had stolen Goods that are missing, this were a ready and certain Method for disco­very. Take but two Tickets inscribed, the One Stolen by a Servant, the Other Not Stolen, and this would be the Answer of an O­racle; after which nothing more need be done, than to put in the Names of the whole Family, and that which comes out first gives you the Malefactor infallibly. If a Man were [Page 95]to Undertake a thing, and doubted the Suc­cess; it is but consulting this Oracle again; and, its Determination never deceiving any one, Men might have the satisfaction of ne­ver attempting any thing in vain. In short, nothing could be contrived more convenient than this, for infinite Occurrences of Hu­mane Life, were the Notion upon which it is founded just and true.

This would likewise be an Evidence of the Existence of a God, so clear and strong, as must needs stop the Mouth of every A the­ist in the World; could it be proved, that by praying to God, and drawing Lots, a Man might at any time receive a certain Answer, concerning things which no Humane Wis­dom is able to discern.

CHAP. IX. That Those, who believe God presides over Ca­sual Events in so particular a manner, think of him as the Heathen did.

AFter having proved, that there is no sufficient Ground for pretending Scrip­ture, and the Opinion of the People of God [...]ere tofore, for the belief of God's presiding [...]ver Casual Events, in a more than com­mon manner; It may not be amiss to shew, [Page 96]how this Notion borders upon an Errour of the Heathens, diffused East and West a­mong the Nations most infamous for Super­stition. So vain is the Boast of Persons thus prepossess'd, that they have more just and exalted Notions of Divine Providence, than Others who reject this Opinion.

To begin at the East. The A­rabians See Ed. Pocock's Specim. Hist. Arab. p. 329, &c., who were generally ad­dicted to Divination, made great use of Casual Decisions upon this Occasion, till forbidden to do so by Mahomet. I will give you an Example out of their own Authors. When a Man designed a long Journey, or Marriage, or any thing of consequence, he took three Arrows. Upon the first was inscribed, My Lord hath commanded me; upon a second My Lord hath forbidden me: the third had no Inscription at all. These were all put into a Quiver, and afterwards one drawn unseen. If the first was drawn, the De­sign was pursued, as approved by God. I [...] the second, the Person desisted: If the third blank Arrow, then it was put in again, and they proceeded to a second Drawing, til [...] one of the others with a Motto offered it self. To make this Ceremony the more So­lemn, a Priest before the drawing used thi [...] Prayer; Grant, O God, that that Arrow which is most for this Person's Benefit may be drawn and that he may rest in that Determination.

This was no late Custom in those Eastern Parts; for Ezekiel takes notice of the King of Babylon's using it in his Time. Ezekiel XXI. 21. The King of Babylon stood at the parting of the Way, at the head of the two Ways, to use Divinations: He made his Ar­rows bright, (or as some render it) he mingled his Arrows, he consulted with Images, he looked in the Liver. St. Jerome explains this Passage with Allusion to the Custom I am now describing. Hierom in Com. ‘ He shall stand in the way, says he, to consult the Oracle, according to the manner of his Country. He shall put his Arrows into the Quiver, and mingle them together; so that each of them shall be Inscribed with the Name of a City, and that City, whose Name is upon the Arrow first drawn, he shall Be­siege.’

The Greeks also thought they could be infor­med in future Events, by such kind of Divina­tions. ‘Thus in a Grove near Bura in Achaia, there was a Statue of Hercules, which was consulted by Lots. P [...]usin. A­chaia. L. v. 11 p. 449. He that asked Counsel of the God, makes his Vows, (says Pausanius) before the Statue; after which he takes Dice, of which there lay a great number, and throws four upon the Table. Upon each Die are certain Figures, the Explanation of which were there upon a Board: According to that Explanation, the Person either Prosecuted, or quitted his Design.’

The same Method obtained in Consulting the famous Oracle of Dodona, as is plain from this Passage in Cicero. De Div. I. [...]. ‘The Lace­demonians looked upon that as a mighty Prodigy, which happened to them, when consulting Jupiter of Dodona concer­ning the Victory they then hoped to obtain. The Ambassadors having set down the Tesse [...] in which the Lots were put, a Favorite Ape of the King of the Molossi overturned the Lots, and confounded all their Preparations for drawing. Whereupon the Prophetess of the Place told them that this was Ominous to the Lacedemonians, and that they must think, not how to vanquish the Enemy, but to secure themselves.’

At Praeneste in Italy, there was a Celebrated Oracle of Fortune, which denoted good and ill Success by Lots. The same Author acquaints us, that there was a Box of Olive Wood, in which the Lots were put, which were Dice, or somewhat like that Figure. The manner of consulting the Oracle was, to have those Dice thrown before the Statue, or else by a little Child drawing them out of the Box. Which Tul­ly makes very merry with in his second Book of Divination. What is, says he, this Lot? It is like playing at Dice, or at Even or Odd, wher [...] Chance, and not Prudence or Reason Govern What Certainty can be expected from Lots, shaken together and drawn by a Child, just as Fortune shall direct? What this Direction of Fortune was we are much in the dark; but 'tis plain [Page 99]she was consulted by this Method of Lots. Hence the Latins gave all sorts of Oracles the Name of Sortes; and they who consulted them were called Sortilegi, from whence probably the modern Word Sorcerer is derived; which signifies a Conjurer or Magician.

The Antients had one kind of Lots more, which they consulted in different manners. Sometimes they Wrote some Verses of a Fa­mous Poet upon several Tickets, which were in sense near those Answers which they expe­cted to receive from the Oracle, to be infor­med in the Matter they desired to know. These were put into a Vessel, and shaken to­gether, and that Ticket which was drawn, was received as the Answer to their Doubts. Sometimes these Verses were Written upon a Board, under certain Numbers; after which the Dice determined that Number which they were concerned in. Sometimes they opened a Book at a venture, and the first Verse they dipped upon passed for the Oracle. Thus Spartian tells us, that Adrian, while yet a pri­vate Person, opened Virgil's Aeneid, and sound those Verses, which presaged his future Advancement to the Roman Empire.

So likewise Lampridius says, that Alexan­der Severus having consulted the Sortes Virgi­lianae fell upon this among other Verses.

Another time as Heliogabalus was contriving his Death; this Verse came up in the Temple of Fortune at Praeneste.

The Christians, who, upon some occasions came little short of the Pagans in Superstition made use of the Holy Scripture to the sam purpose. St. Augustin in his I. viii. c. 2. Con­fessions, gives this Account of him­self. ‘As I was weeping in the bitterness o [...] my Soul, I heard a Voice in the next House (whether Male or Female I know not) repea [...] ­ing several times, and singing aloud, Toll [...] lege; Tolle, lege. Take up and Read. At fir [...] my Countenance changed, and I began t [...] consider, whether some Children might no [...] sing these words in play; but I could not re­collect [Page 101]that I had ever heard them do so. Then checking my Tears, I rose, and conclu­ded that it was an Admonition from God, or­dering me to take the Book, and read the Chapter that first offered it self at the open­ing. For I had heard of St. Anthony, that accidentally Reading in the Gospel, he took what he Read there as a Command Addres­sed to himself in particular. The Passage was, Go, Matt. xix. sell what thou hast and give to the Poor, and then thou shalt have treasure in Heaven, and then come and fol­low me. By this Oracle he was Converted. I went then directly to the Place where Alypius was; for there I had left St. Paul's Epistles. When I arose I took and opened them, Rom. xiii. 13. and Read the first Clause I saw, which was, Walk not in Rioting and Drunkenness, not in Chambering and Wan­tonness. I Read no further, for there was no occasion; this Passage having filled my Heart with a Light that confirmed me, and scatter'd all my dark Doubts, I shut the Book; but keeping my Finger, or leaving a Mark in the place, I told the thing to Aly­pius with great Satisfaction. He related to me what had happened to himself of the like nature; which till then I was a Stranger to. He asked to see the Passage, he did, and pau­sing upon it, he was desirous to see what followed, Rom. xiv. 1. which I had not attended to. That was, Him that is weak [Page 102]in the Faith receive ye; and this he applied to himself.’

St. Augustin indeed did not approve this Me­thod of consulting Scriptures, except in Mat­ters purely Spiritual. In a Letter to Januarius, [...] cxix. he says, ‘As for those that consult the Scripture by way of Lot, (de paginis Evangelicis sortes legunt) though it were rather to be wished, that they did thus, than that they should run to evil Spi­rits for Advice, yet I cannot be reconciled to the Custom. When the Matters of the World, and the Vanities of this present Life are concerned, Men should not wrest those Oracles which treat of Another.’

Some AD. Allen de [...]acalis, p. 369. l. 1. Learned Men have col­lected divers Passages, which evi­dently shew this to have been a common Practice among the Chri­stians for some considerable time. I shall sa­tisfie my self at present with making some few Remarks upon those produced by me here al­ready.

First, then, I observe, that this Practice of Consulting by Lot upon the casual opening of a Book, was Originally a Heathen Custom, and that there is no Foundation for it in Reason. For, whoever told the Pagans, that God would answer them in such a way, or that he would so order the Matter, that they should be sure to dip upon that critical Place, which should contain a Resolution of their Doubts? Can it be urged that this Perswasion proceeded [Page 103]from a certain Knowledge of God's particular Direction of casual Events? I shall not here repeat what hath already been delivered upon this Subject; but I am positive, that admitting the thing to be true, yet even so it is not possi­ble to prove that the Heathens could have any certain Knowledge of this kind.

It will perhaps be replyed, that they know this pretended Truth by the Event, having ob­served by abundance of Instances, that these Answers by this way of Consultation were actually fulfilled. To this I answer, that if this was a sure way of consulting the Deity, it is not sufficient that it succeeded in many In­stances; but it must never have failed in any one. If what presents it self first at the open­ing of a Book upon such a Design, must always pass for an Oracle, the Event must constant­ly answer, to justifie that Opinion, otherwise there is no depending upon it; and this will be in no better condition than the other ways of Divination, which have hit right sometimes, and by mere chance. It is no strange thing, that some out of a very great many of these prodigious Predictions should come true; and in the present case, we may the more easily conceive it possible they should do so, because the words are capable of different Constructi­ons, and may with a little Address be applied to different Events. When Men found them­selves deceived, those Answers were either for­gotten, or at least not Published to the World; but when they fell in pat to the purpose, then [Page 104]they were told at every turn, and the Memo­ry of them endeavoured to be made Eternal. Hence we meet in History with so many Exam­ples of Divinations which succeeded, and with so very few of those by which Men have been miserably deluded.

Secondly, There needs no deep Reason pre­sently to convince Men, how exceeding vain all these pretended Oracles must needs be. Let us but draw out a Scheme of Enquiries, what shall happen the next Campaign, and consult Homer and Virgil upon each of these Queries. Let us afterwards Write down these Resoluti­ons, and compare them with the Events. This is an easie and effectual way for Men to unde­ceive themselves in these Matters, and such as those People are capable of, who are not of a pitch for regular Arguing.

Thirdly, It must be allowed me, that the Christians, who instead of Heathen Poets made use of the Holy Scriptures with the same de­sign, had no express Revelation to assure them that God would answer them this way. Now it is absur'd to suppose that God will answer us by Methods, which he hath told us nothing of; nay, such as we take upon us to prescribe to him, and in doing so, tread in the Steps of Pagan Idolatry and Superstition. For not­withstanding all St. Augustin says, and tho Instances he produces, we can have no assu­rance that God answers Men after this man­ner.

I expect it will be urged, that somewhat like this happened to our Blessed Lord in the Synagogue at Naza­reth, Luke iv. xviii. on the Sabbarh day. Where when he rose up, the Book of the Prophet Esaias was presented unto him, and he opened the Book upon that Passage, The Spirit of the Lord is up­on me, &c. And, after he had shut the Book, he said, This day is this Scripture fulfilled in your Ears. Now I make no question, but it was by the direction of a particular Provi­dence, that Jesus Christ opened upon that place of the Prophet, if he did not industriously turn to it, or if it were not the Portion of Scri­pture in order to be read that day. Our Sa­viour knew, no doubt, before he went into the Synagogue what would happen to him there; for he himself had Power to order it as he pleased. So that, this example does not at all fute with the Superstitious Custom of consulting Scri­pture to learn Events which Men know no­thing of before. And Christians have no more ground to expect, that God will Answer them by the Sortes Biblicae (if I may call them so) than the Heathens had to depend upon the Verses of Homer and Virgil for Oracles and Guides in all their Difficulties.

Fourthly, To give us a full comprehension of this Vanity, we must know, that several, who used this method, did not content them­selves with consulting one single Book, but took several, one after the other. For exam­ple, The Prophets, the Evangelists, and the [Page 106]Epistles of the Apostles. If they found nothing to the purpose at their opening the Prophets, they tryed the Gospels next, and then the Epi­stles, till something offered, which they made a shift to apply to their own Circumstances. Now we may easily conceive, that they would not miss of something which they looked for, after so many Experiments; and especially, when they contented themselves with strained and unnatural Interpretations.

But perhaps you'll say, All these Consultati­ons were attended with Prayer, beseeching God, that he would discover the Truth to them, Gregory Bishop of Tours hath thus described that Ceremony. Greg. [...]r. L. iv. v. ‘The Priests first of all lay three Books upon the Altar, which are the Prophets, the Epistles of St. Paul, and the Gospels, and then they pray to God, that he will tell them what shall come to pass.’ Now I would be glad to know, who ever told these Men, that God will hear such Prayers; or, how indeed can they tell, that such imperti­nent Curiosity would not be highly offensive to him? Hath God any where obliged him­self to tell us every thing that we have an itch to know? He hath only engaged to hear those Prayers which are attended with the three conditions, exprest in these three Latin words, à bonis, bona, bonè, that is to say, such as are put up to him by good Men; such as ask good Things, Things necessary to Salvation; and such as are regularly and well offered to him, [Page 107]with a becoming confidence in his Power and Goodness. It were an easie matter to prove this by several Texts of Scripture, were it ne­cessary to my purpose. Now it is plain, that the knowledge of future Events, which Men desire to obtain by these Openings of the Bi­ble, is not any of those things, which good Men can seek, as of importance to their Eter­nal Salvation, and consequently, not any of those which God is pleased to manifest to Men upon that consideration.

These Prayers therefore are unprofitable and vain; nay, we may affirm, that they can­not be well-pleasing to God under the Gospel­state. For God expects, that Christians should refer all future Events to His disposal, that they should rely entirely upon his Providence, and receive all, even those appointments which are most calamitous and ungrateful to Flesh and Blood, with Meekness and Resigna­tion. There is but one thing in futurity which we ought to be sollicitous for, and that is, what shall become of us in the next Life. And this is a Future which depends upon the Pre­sent, I mean upon our Obedience to the Com­mands of the Gospel, which are so clear, and so well known, that we want no fresh Reve­lations to instruct us in the matter. What­ever Confusions may happen in the Country where we Live, whatever Misfortunes we may undergo in our private Capacities, all these have no necessary connexion with the Happiness or Misery which awaits us hereaf­ter. [Page 108]And this is all we need not to be inform­ed in beforehand concerning them.

I observe, in the Fifth place, That this Opi­nion of God's discovering the Truth by casual Experiments, or his presiding over these, in a particular and more immediate manner, is of very dangerous Consequence, if we persue it through all those Inferences, which naturally and necessarily result from it. For, if This be once taken for granted, it will follow, That all such determinations are to be esteemed as so many Express Answers from Heaven; and consequently, that we ought to take our Mea­sures by them, as a Rule that can never de­ceive or mislead us. And yet, since this is false, really, and at the bottom, what will be the Effect of such a Perswasion? Many things will be taken in hand, upon the Credit of these Decisions, which in process of time would turn to very ill account: Many things neglected, which are necessary to be done, up­on our being disswaded and discouraged by these Sortes: And a thousand other Inconve­niences must ensue, too obvious to need a par­ticular Enumeration; since every Man may with great ease represent them to his own thoughts.

I think then, after all this, it can be no breach of Modesty to conclude that there is nothing, either more false, or more fantasti­cal than that Opinion, which pretends the De­cisions of Lots, or casual Experiments, to be [Page 109]the Decisions of Heaven, in that sense which I have explained them in, throughout my whole Discourse upon this Argument.

CHAP. X. That those Magistrates are not to blame, who have set up Lotteries for the Bene­fit of the Poor. A Commendation of the Hollanders in general, and particularly, with regard to the Lotteries opened by Publick Order.

THere is one Inconvenience, consequent upon that Opinion which I have been hitherto disproving, purposely omitted by me. Which is, that this is to Arraign our Govern­ment for an irreverent use of the most Sacred things in the World; and for setting an ill Ex­ample to the Persons living under them, by teaching such to make use of Lots upon every trifling occasion. For in truth, according to our Adversaries Principles, every Ticket is a Miracle, and yet all the World knows, that these are drawn without any sort of Devotion. Now indeed this kind of Arguments, taken from the Practice of our Superiours, proves nothing at all, and is of greater force to over­throw the Truth, than to support and defend it. The Magistrates of these Countries do not [Page 110]take upon them to be Infallible; and their Au­thority extends not to the determining what is True or False, but what is Good or Hurtful to the Publick. Besides, since it is certain, that there are infinitely more Magistrates in an Er­ror, than there are that defend the Truth; that Infallibility, which any Man should go about to annex to their Character, would only tend to give Falshood more Credit and Coun­tenance. Besides, it is a Refuge fit for none, but such as distrust the merits of their Cause, to call in the secular Arm to their Assistance, and shelter themselves under the Authority of their Governors.

But I may upon this occasion observe to my Readers, that in defending the Truth, I have insensibly (for indeed that was no part of my design) vindicated at the same time our Go­vernors, who have allowed so many Lotte­ries of late. I understand there are some who find fault with them upon this account, and highly condemn all that take out Tickets; and all this [...]pon that poor pretence, which the foregoing Chapters have undertaken to Confute. These Persons may soon be disabu­sed, if they please to consider what hath been said; and if not, they will have the worst of it. One com [...]o [...]ie, they cannot Dragoon us into their [...] unr [...]sonable Opinion, so that there [...] create some uneasiness to [...], but [...] like to bring any mis­chief upon us.

For my part, I declare, I admire the Judg­ment of those who contrived Lotteries for the Relief of the Poor; and think no commenda­tion great enough for the Governours who have made use of them to that purpose. This is one Effect of that great Prudence, so visible in every part of their Administration. It may not be amiss to insist a little upon this Point; because what I shall say to it may be a yet far­ther Confirmation of that which hath gone before, with relation to Lotteries, and the use of them.

They that sit at the Helm, or that are con­cerned in making Laws, ought principally to be throughly acquainted with two things, in order to a succesful Discharge of their impor­tant Station. First, They should know per­fectly well, how to distinguish between what is Just and what is Ʋnjust; and Secondly, They should be well skilled in the Temper of the People under their Government. Without the First of these, it is not possible that Justice should be duly Administred; and without the Second, they will never be able to apply the general Rules of Justice seasonably and usefully to the particular Exigences of their Subjects. To treat at present of the Second only. A Lawgiver, or Magistrate, who E­nacts or Governs without understanding his Nation throughly, falls under one unavoida­ble Inconvenience, which soon discovers how ill he fills his Post: Which is, That supposing his People of a contrary disposition to what [Page 112]they really are of, he makes Laws to them impracticable; after which, either there must be an infinite number of Examples made for the breach of those Laws, whereby his Go­vernment becomes odious, and the State is not one whit the better; or else he sees his Autho­thority contemned; by which the Government is in imminent danger of being utterly Ruined. Whereas, when Laws are suited to a Peoples Temper and Capacity, and proceed upon a true knowledge, what manner of Men a Go­vernour hath to deal with, He hath the plea­sure of seeing his Laws diligently observ'd; he is seldom put upon publick punishments; and the publick enjoys quietly and comfortably all the advantages resulting from the due observation of the Laws.

This Defect I am mentioning was observable in the Common-wealth of Rome; the security whereof depended upon a supposition, that the Principal Ministers of State would be free from Ambition, Luxury, and Avarice. Now this it was most ridiculous and absurd to suppose, and the doing so, ruined that Republick in a very short time, when it was at its highest point of Elevation. The Consuls and Praetors, who usually governed large Provinces, and had a considerable Force under their Com­mand, were absolute in their Districts and Ar­mies, during the time of their Magistracy: There was no Appeal from their Judgments, at least none in favour of the Inhabitants of their Provinces; nor any superior Power to [Page 113]check or change their Proceedings. When they had ravaged and ruined all within their Jurisdiction, outraged their Wives and Daugh­ters, and murdered those that had the courage to complain of their Oppression or Avarice; all the Remedy left, was only to wait for the expiration of their Office, and then to im­peach them at Rome, with infinite expence and hazard, without any assurance of having ju­stice done, or satisfaction made. The utmost they could obtain, was the getting them ba­nished, and the Estates, of which they then stood possessed, confiscated. This punishment was uncertain, and, if compared with the ex­orbitance of their Crimes, but very small. It restrained only, such as had in their own tem­per a Principle of Virtue; the rest contemned it; and all, who had not been horribly to blame, were sure to escape it. This we may gather from Tully's Orations against Verres, one of the vilest Wretches that ever that State en­trusted. And yet it was as much as all Tully's Eloquence and Address could do, to humble him.

The Laws had provided no remedy against these disorders, because they presumed the Ma­gistrates to be Men of Probity; which yet in fact never happened, after Rome grew great. From thenceforth, the easiness of doing inju­ries with impunity, and the vast gain of a pub­lick Post, let loose the Reins to Covetousness, and tempted Men to make an ill use of this Defect in their Laws. Then they were redu­ced [Page 114]to a necessity, either of punishing most of the Intendants upon their return to Rome, which was not possible to be done; or of conniving at, and suffering under these Disorders, which the State did; for they were only the Unfortu­nate, and the insupportably wicked, that could be brought to an account.

A Powerful Monarchy, but of another na­ture, hath for several Ages proceeded upon a false Supposition, which hath done great pre­judice, and brought it several times upon the very brink of Ruin. It supposes its principal Ministers to make themselves Eunuchs for the Kingdom of Heaven's sake; but the effects have proved them to have the same inclinations with common Men. This made it necessary, either to punish an exceeding great number, or else to resolve tamely to look on, and see their Law of Continence broken; either of which methods is of ill consequence; and in­deed by this means that Government is become despicable; and several mighty Nations have, upon this provocation partly, shaken off its Yoke.

Now if we compare the Laws of Moses with the Genius of that Nation to whom they were enjoyned, we shall find, that God did plainly descend, as it were, and accommodate him­self to their present Condition and Temper; that he tolerated many things, which would not have been endured in a more spiritual People, and are accordingly forbidden to Chri­stians at this day. Our Lord, for instance, [Page 115]hath taught us, that Divorce was al­lowed them only, Mat. 19.8. because of the hard­ness of their hearts; and it is prohi­bited under the Gospel, except in one case only.

Solon is likewise commended, for studying the humour of the Athenians, before he un­dertook to make their Laws, and for erecting his Scheme upon this model, so far as the publick Good would permit. This is the ac­count Plutarch gives of him in his Life. ‘He never attempted to remedy that which might be well enough born, nor to make unneces­sary Innovations; wisely foreseeing that, if a general alteration should disorder the State, it might not be in his power to compose all again, and to form them upon the best Pat­tern. But he established such Rules, as he hoped they might be brought to, by perswa­sion or by such a compulsion as would not endanger the publick Peace; by a due mixture, (as himself called it) of Power with Justice. Hence, when he was asked af­terwards, whether his Laws at Athens were the best that could be made, he answered, They were the best that could be made for them, who were not at that time in a con­dition of complying with any better.’

If it be taken for granted, that the Members of a Common wealth are entirely moderate and liberal; and upon this supposition, you expect, that they will retrench their superfluous Ex­pences, and give that they can spare freely to [Page 116]public uses, and the maintenance of the Poor, that so lasting Provisions may be made for those who cannot support themselves; Experience will soon convince the World, how vain such a supposition is; how grosly they are deceived who take their measures by it, and how destru­ctive the consequences of such a mistake will prove. We should suppose Men to be what they commonly are; that the generality of them are more disposed to Vanity and Avarice, than to Charity and Moderation. In a certain Monarchy already mentioned, it hath been presumed, that it's principal Members would be generally Bountiful and Modest, and in pur­suance of this Notion, they were made the Depositaries and Trustees of large and many Charities, given for the Relief of Persons in Want. But these Men are commonly as proud and greedy as their Neighbours, they have converted those Charities to their own use, and left the Poor to be sustained by the Care of the Laity.

They who formed the Polity of these Pro­vinces have been careful not to split upon any such Rock. They depended upon no greater Virtues in the People, than might reasonably be expected in the present corrupt State of Mankind. They saw that if the Necessities of the Poor were left only to Generosity, there would be but very few Hospitals, and their Wants must be too slenderly provided for. They therefore have engaged the People to furnish a Stock for this purpose, not meerly by [Page 117]pressing the Doctrins of the Gospel, which have but too weak an Influence upon the Mul­titude; but by moving and falling in with some certain Passions which they might be sure to find Predominant in some Men's Minds. One of these is Vanity, or a design to distinguish and set themselves above the Meaner sort of Peo­ple. And this is commonly done by a certain Expensive way of living, which Men of Abili­ty seldom fail to indulge. And upon these Expences they have contrived to raise vast Summs of Mony, without giving any Cause of Complaint, or making any one Man uneasie, with a Fear of being reckoned among the Vulgar. When any one Marries, for Instance, there is a certain Tax laid upon his Equipage, greater or lesser, in proportion to the number of his Retinue. And since Men, upon such Occasi­ons, affect to put the best side outwards, and to make a Figure more Pompous than their In­feriours, The Poor have an advantage from this Gayety of Humour, which they would have received from very few, if Charity and their own free Disposal had determined them in giving. So it is with those that are buried in Churches, though there be Church yards for all who will make use of them, yet it is not thought Creditable for People of Condition to be laid there; and they who will be Buried in the Church, are obliged to pay a considerable Summ to the Poor. This Duty again is raised in proportion to the time of the Funeral, the [Page 118]later the Hour, the higher the Payment; and People are commonly so fond of this fantastical Honour, that they grudge no charge, when they are able to support it. Thus the Vanity of those who bury their Relations hath brought in more to the Poor, than a Discretionary Charity would ever have prevailed with them to disburst. Some other Customs of this kind there are in this Country, which evidently de­monstrate the Prudence of those who contriv­ed and brought them into Practice.

Hence it is observable, that in some great Kingdoms the settled Funds for the Poor do not amount to so much as those of one single Town in Holland; and where the few Hospi­tals, or other Houses of that nature are scarce so well endowed, as those in Amsterdam are. The Capital City of a great Kingdom hath late­ly been reduced to shut up her Grand Hospital after an infamous manner, because no longer able to pay her Debts, or maintain the Poor, which never was, and in all likelihood never will be the Case of Amsterdam, while the City and these Laws stand. All which is owing to Magistrates, whose Elevation above the com­mon People is not shewed by the Pomp or Pride, or Insolence usual in other Places; but by the Knowledg of their People, by their Skill in the Art of Governing, and by their constant Diligence to procure for this City e­very thing that can turn to the Inhabitants Advantage. Men that deserve to be made im­mortal [Page 119]in Story, and recommended as Patterns to all the World. For by this means infinite indigent Wretches would be sustained, and the Scandal and Inconveniencies of Beggars would be much abated.

The same Penetration which contrived a Method for making Men's natural Disposition to Vanity, Serviceable to the Publick, hath al­so Projected Lotteries for the Benefit of the Poor. The Expensive War so long kept up by the boundless Ambition of our Neighbours, and the vast Losses in Trade, had raised all Commodities to a most exorbitant Price. Cha­rity cooled very sensibly, and the usual Alms which formerly added to the fixed Endow­ments, sufficed for the Maintenance of the Poor, fell very far short in this time of com­mon Hardship. But what cure was to be ap­plied to that Evil? Must the Poor be left to starve for want of Sustenance? That were both a Reproach to People, Professing Christi­anity, and a Prejudice to the State. But how then should Mony be found for this Purpose? Should a new Tax be laid upon the People al­ready over-burdened with the unavoidable Expence of a long a bloody War? This would occasion great Complaints, and by re­lieving the Needs of some, reduce a great ma­ny more to Poverty.

Neither of these ways was practicable in such a Juncture, and therefore another Passion was to be managed, which is but too common, and more especially in such Places as Holland, [Page 120]where most Men live by their Industry. This is a Desire of growing Rich in its own Nature, directly opposite to Liberality. Some course must be found of making People Bountiful up­on a Principle of Covetousness, and of enga­ging them to give much to the Poor, in hopes of receiving much more themselves. This is a Project that can never fail; but the only Diffi­culty is how to form it? And yet even this is seasible. The Passions, (says an eminent Au­thor) do often give Birth to others of a Nature most contrary and distant from their own. Thus Avarice sometimes brings forth Prodigality, and Prodigality Avarice; and another Ingenious Observation the same Person hath, that Co­vetousness is sometimes the cause of quite contrary Effects. And a world of People Sacrifice all their present Possessions to doubtful and distant Hopes.

These Maxims never received so full and frequent Confirmations as they have done of late by the Lotteries set on Foot in this Coun­try. A world of People who Contribute very sparingly to the Poor, though Men of conside­rable Fortunes, which qualified them to do abundantly more, have ventured large Summs in hopes of a good Lot. And all who live by their Labour, and know not how to maintain their Families, strained hard to take our Tickets, especially in those Lotteries where they were to be had at easie Rates. This is so well known, that the Inhabitants of these Provinces need not to be told it; but I speak at present for the Information of Strangers.

Some perhaps may take it ill, that these Maxims of Mr. Rouchefoucaut are applied to them, upon a Pretence that they put into these Lotteries upon a Principle of Liberality to the Poor, for whose Benefit they were con­trived: If this be so, I am heartily glad of it, and wish there were more such generous Spirits a­mong us, and that God would both increase and reward them. But generally speaking, a prospect of Gain was undoubtedly the Mo­tive to most People, who thus disposed of their Mony. Were it needful to prove this, it might soon be done effectually, by appeal­ing to those who have the Distribution of the publick Charities. Let them only ask these Persons to lend the same Sum they have put into the Lotteries, Interest free for ten Years to the use of the Poor; and the An­swers made to such a Request will teach us what Judgment to pass upon their Liberality. But of this I shall have occasion to say more hereafter.

In the mean while, be the Principle of ad­vancing Mony what it will, still the Poor are as effectually Relieved every whit one way as another, and so the Contrivers of these Lotteries have attained their end. They that bring in their Mony do it voluntarily, without any Complaint or Mumuring against the Government; which is a thing, to which in all raising of Mony, very great regard ought to be had. And therefore no Commendation [Page 122]can be too great for those who have found out this Method for Relieving the Poor.

The generality of People do so little under­stand what it is that truly deserves Praise, or rather their Tast and judgment are so vitiated by Custom, that they are most profuse in the Commendations of those things which deserve most to be discountenanced and abhorred. And on the other hand, they despise and run down those things which merit our highest esteem. For Instance; they speak in Terms of Admiration of a subtle Politician, or a mighty Conqueror; Men, who for the most part are the Scourges and Plagues of Mankind, and such as God in the Wisdom and Justice of his angry Providence makes use of to Chastise, or to cut off a sinful People for their Wickedness. But such as find out needful Expedients for the Good of civil Society, have their Names either Buried in Silence, or mentioned in Terms that express very little Esteam: And all this, though Men see, and feel, and live by the Pro­fitable Fruits of their Providence and Pains. I will not at present stand to inquire into the Reasons of their unaccountable Proceeding. This would draw me too far from my Business. But for my own part, I had much rather be the Author of a Method for Relieving the Poor, or any way making Mankind easie and happy without hurting one single Soul; than the In­venter of new Engines, or Secrets for winning a Battle, or taking a Town. Which at last comes to this, that such a one hath been as­sisting [Page 123]to an Achievement, never to be done but by shedding a great deal of Blood, and making a great many Families very Miserable.

CHAP. XI. The Lawfulness of putting into Lotteries, provided it be not done upon a Principle of Covetousness. Directions how to judge of this.

IT may possibly be objected, that as I have stated the Case, Lotteries ought to be pro­hibited. I represent the Matter so, that few put into them out of Charity, and it is plain, Men ought not to do any thing out of Cove­tousness. So that if the Takers of Tickets act upon this Principle, they should not take out any at all. And perhaps too I may be charged with contradicting my self, in commending [...]he Persons who have set up Lotteries, because in so doing they minister to Men an Occasion of doing what they ought not to do.

I begin with the latter part of the Objection, and answer; That the Establishers of these [...]otteries are in no degree to blame, because [...]hey do not thereby compel any Man to put in [...] all, and much less to put in upon a vicious [...]rinciple. Quite contrary, they invite Men to [...]ew their Liberality, and for those who do [...]ot comply with this Invitation, the Fault is all their own. It is confess'd, this Method of [Page 124]Succouring the Poor proceeds upon a Supposi­tion, that many, nay most will contribute to it in prospect of Advantage to themselves. But to make an ill Disposition, to which our Governors are not accessary, turn to good Ac­count, never yet was thought worthy of Blame. This is bringing Light out of Dark­ness, justly esteemed an Instance of the Highest, and an Imitation of the divine Wisdom. Could we root all Covetousness out of Men's Hearts, which Ruins so many Families and Common wealths, this should be done without any Demur. But since it is not in the Power of Men to cure all that are Infected with this Vice; and since they who have to deal with Mankind, make sure reckoning of a great many Persons thus tainted; all that can be done in this case, is to try if they can pre­vail with such to contribute indirectly to some publick Good. Though it were exceedingly to be wished, yet it cannot probably be hopes or expected that the World should be cleare of this shameful Passion; and consequently we must take our Measures as becomes Me [...] who take it for granted that it shall alway continue.

Hence you plainly see, that I think it possibl [...] for Men to put in to Lotteries very innocently because I declare this possible to be done upo [...] a Principle of Charity. But this is what wi [...] require a little more enlargement. There are two sorts of Persons who may take Tickets ou [...] of Lotteries▪ Some of these may have great o [...] ­casion [Page 125]for a good Lot, as not, (or very hardly) being able in their present Circumstances to support themselves and their Families in those necessary Expences, which Decency and their Condition require. By this, I mean such Charges as cannot be avoided without expo­sing a Man's self to Contempt among People of the same Quality; for the Poet's observation in this case is most true. Juven. Sat. III.

A Man under this Hardship does not only en­dure a great deal of Uneasiness, but becomes useless to others too; by means of that Con­tempt which always attends such a strait For­tune. No doubt, a Man may Lawfully desire to be delivered out of this melancholy Condi­tion, if already under it; or to prevent his coming into it to the best of his Power, without offending against any Rules given us in the Gospel. So that they who are in danger of such a Calamity may use all prudent Methods, and lay hold upon every fair Occasion which offers, for sheltring themselves from Misery. Now these Men again may be subdivided into two sorts. Some are single Persons, and have none but themselves to take care for. Others have large Families and Dependences that challenge a Support from them. Now, who [Page 162]can find fault with these Men, but especially the latter sort, if they be desirous to live, and to leave their Families, though not in a Con­dition of Plenty and Luxury, yet in such a competent Provision as shall set them above Contempt, and the being beholding to others for a Subsistence? If then an occasion of doing this happen, where the venturing a little may bring in a great Gain, and wrong no body, no doubt they may very lawfully embrace this Opportunity. And such a one is a mutual Agreement between a number of Adventurers, (especially when countenanced by publick Authority, that there may be no indirect dealing in the Matter) that each shall put in a­certain small Sum, and all this shall be redu­ced to a few greater Sums, to be enjoyed by those that Lots shall give it to. And this is pro­perly what we call a Lottery

But then there are two Cautions necessary to be observed upon these Occasions. The first is, that no Man verture a larger Sum than the Circumstances of his Family can bear. The Reason of this is, First, That this disables him from doing other Charities, such as he hath been used to, and ought not to discontinue upon any Pretence, but an impossi­bility of keeping them up any longer. Second­ly, Because when the Sums are greater than men can well afford, their Concern for the Loss will grow too sensible. Now, besides that no Man ought to expose himself to immoderate Concerns, there are several ill Consequences [Page 127]which may attend it, that ought to restrain Men from coming under the Temptation.

Provided we keep clear of these Inconveni­encies, I see no Reason that should debar the Persons I have been describing, from putting in to Lotteries. They may wish for a great Benefit, if a Disappointment give them little or no Uneasiness, and do not hinder them in the Discharge of their Duty. I allow these Tickets are not taken out upon a Principle of Charity; but neither can they be charged with Covetousness, in regard a Benefit would come seasonably to their Circumstances, and they only seek a lawful Profit by lawful Means.

But there are others, by whom Lotteries are chiefly filled, who might put in purely out of a charitable Design, and yet do not. The Rich I mean, who have not only enough to live handsomly upon, but to support a much greater Expense, and who do actually spend a great deal, without any fear of being reduced to Want. These cannot pretend any need to in­crease their Estates; for they are qualified for unnecessary Expences already; and live at a Rate, which many of the same Quality can very well deny themselves, without any dan­ger of rendring themselves Despicable in the Eye of the World.

And yet these Men are not content with what they have, but perpetually grasping at more; and as soon as any Lottery opens, they run into it with all the eagerness imaginable. They take out vast numbers of Tickets to get [Page 128]the best Benefits; as if they designed to take the Meat out of their Mouths, who cannot afford to venture so much as themselves. And yet they take it ill, to have it thought, that Covetousness is the Motive they act upon. They tell you coolly, that they are content to hazard their Money for the sake of the Poor; but otherwise they should not have been concerned in these Lotteries. I need not in­stance in the severl Artifices used by them to cover their Avarice: The Examples of Men that act and talk at this rate, are to be met with in Holland every day. But we must pluck off this Disguise, and lay down some infallible Marks, whereby the true motives may be di­stinguished, and evidently discerned, which prevail with them to engage in these mat­ters.

Men that proceed upon a Principle of Cha­rity, do not content themselves with shewing it in one single Instance, and least of all in such a one, as exercises Charity upon a pro­spect of a very considerable advantage. They that are truly Charitable take all occasions of being so. They give freely, when they can­not hope to receive, what they give, back again; and not, when they may reasonably be suspected of proposing a great gain to them­selves by giving. They that do otherwise, are like those pretended Zealots for the Pub­lick Good; who are even boasting how much they love their Country, when such discourse may get them a good Place; but are as mute as [Page 129]Fishes, when the defence of their Country is like to prove hazardous, or to hinder their Preferment. The Zeal of these Worthy Patriots is a Zeal of Interest, and aims at their own private Advantages, and inspired by hopes of Gain. This is a sort of Traffick, where they venture boldly; they may indeed lose all, but then they may get a great deal too.

It may be said, that I wrong these Gentle­men, in supposing them to give no other proof of their Charity; besides the taking out a great many Tickets; and, that they evidence this disposition of Mind in many other Instances. Now I do not undertake to say, that they do no acts of Charity, but I say, that what they give upon other occasions bears no propor­tion to the Sum they venture in these Lot­teries. They put more in to these at one time, than they give away to the Poor in ten years; and this shews hope of Gain, and not Charity, to be the secret Spring by which they are moved.

If, as some pretend, they wished for a good Lot only that they might be more Liberal to the Poor, they would give a sensible demon­stration of that Liberality these two ways. First, They would be Liberal to their power, upon other occasions as well as this, and by what they do at present, shew us what we might expect from them hereafter, when in better Circumstances. But when we see Men of Wealth and Vanity, not give the tenth part of that to the Poor, which they squander [Page 130]away in unnecessary Expences, and never blame themselves for so unequal a distribution; this is but poor encouragement to presume, that if they were yet more Wealthy, their Alms would be greater, and their vain Ex­pences not greater in proportion too. Can any Man in his Senses believe, that they who grow giddy upon a Sum of Money, and for­get what they are, as matters go now with them, should be more Moderate, more Libe­ral, and less Extravagant and Vain, if matters were better with them? For my part, I can­not be of that Opinion, and Experience proves the direct contrary. We may have often ob­served Men's desires enlarged with their E­stnees. And their Luxury, and Profuseness, and Pride, rises daily; but it is very seldom, that any, who were not Charitable according to their ability, in meaner Circumstances, have grown so, when advanced to a higher and more plentiful Condition. How void of all Sense would it be, to imagine, that a Man who had never given any marks of his Con­duct or Courage, while he was a Lieutenant, a Captain, a Colonel, a Marshall de Camp, would signalize himself for Prudence and Gal­lantry, if he were made a General? All the World would laugh at so absurd a Fancy: To conjecture of the Future by the Past is a Max­im universally received. And yet some would fain perswade us, that the Men, who have all along betrayed a world of Avarice and In­solence, and Vanity, and Niggardliness to the [Page 131]Poor, would presently be changed into the Reverse of all this, could they obtain a Great Lot. If they spoke sincerely, or were better acquainted with themselves, they would tell you, that then they would make a greater Figure, keep their Coach (if they have none at present) buy richer Furniture, or some o­ther Follies of this kind, all much more credi­ble, than growing more Charitable to the Poor. They will do well to examine their own Breasts, and Condemn themselves, if they are guilty, in this point. I reflect upon no particular Person; and the Rich, who feel such thoughts rising in themselves, or suggested to them by others, may, if they please, distinguish them­selves from those Rich Persons, that are ac­cused of insatiable Avarice, either upon a Principle of sordid Greediness, or to satisfy the Inclinations of an excessive Pride.

But there is another evident and unanswer­able Proof of their Greediness of Gain upon this occasion. What do these Charitable Persons, who pretend to consult no other In­terest than that of the Poor, do for their sakes, when they get any considerable Lots? Are they contented to draw back their Capi­tal, and leave their clear Profits to Charitable uses? Or do they distribute themselves large­ly out of them to Persons whom they know in want? Nay, Do they so much as disburse a tenth part of what they get to these uses? I cannot tell what they do, but I have never heard so much of any of them. Now sure, as [Page 132]the Pront is publick, the Liberality should be publick. There is no Ostentation in all this; and such an Example would do more service, than Alms given in secret, which no body sees, and many suspect not to be given at all. But if there were some Ostentation mixed with it, yet is that more excusable, than the Be­haviour of those Men, who, out of a preten­ded Care to avoid the Imputation of Vain­glory, give very little openly, and yet less in private. A Man had need of all his Charity to think them Liberal; and, if he govern him­self by the outward appearance, he cannot help thinking the contrary. These are a per­verse sort of Hypocrites, that dissemble the wrong way. All their Actions visible to the World savour of Pride and Love of Money; but they are all Moderation and Bounty, when no Eye sees them: Whereas the common Hy­pocrite puts on the disguise of Modesty and Contempt of the World, while Covetousness and Vanity, which reign within, are reserved for his private and retired hours.

It may perhaps be asked, what use I would have a Rich Man make of a good Lot, when it falls to his share. I will, as well as I can, shew what I think would become him in such a Case. Now in the first place I take for granted, that he hath no need of this Benefit, and would not miss, or suffer for want of it; if it had never happened to him; and, that if he had lost the Money ventured, he would be able to live in all points as easie as before. [Page 133]Now, in such a Case, the least a Man can do, who professes to have put in to the Lottery purely out of Charity, is to give a considera­ble part of his Gains to the Poor; for other­wise it is manifest, that a Spirit of Trade and Greediness was the real Inducement to taking out his Tickets.

But, still the doubt remains, what I allow to be a considerable part. Why truly, the least I can possibly think fit to be given, is, a Tenth. Less we cannot think belongs to the Poor, out of a Sum which costs us nothing, and which is so clear Gains, that we had been never the worse, if it had not been ours at all. The Is­raelites heretofore were obliged to a much larger propotion, either to the Poor, or other Religious uses, out of the product of their Lands, which cost them a great deal of toil and charge to Cultivate. I will set down here briefly the calculation of it, lest some, not versed in these matters, should suspect I carry the thing above its due pitch. Selden of Titus, Ch. 11. After having paid the First-Fruits in Eared Corn; if a Man had gathered 6000 Measures, the Heave-Offering was at least 100. Of the remaining 5900 the first Tythe took off 590 out of the remaining 5310. A second Tythe was to be paid which consisted of 581, so that the Owners share did not exceed 4779 Measures; so that every Man paid yearly (besides the First-Fruits) more than a Sixth, and near a Fifth part of his Revenue. I make no mention of the Freewill-Offerings, nor [Page 134]of the Sin-Offerings appointed by the Law for certain Trespasses or Legal Ʋncleannesses; nor of the Duties paid to the Kings, after the Israe­lites came under a Monarchical Government. Now, if God thought fit, that Labouring Men, who oftentimes Till an ungrateful Soil, who have bad Years, and are at great Charge, as well as Pains, upon this account, might with­out any Inconvenience pay out a Fifth part of their Income, (for we cannot suppose that God designed to fleece and begger his People to en­rich the Priests and Levites,) what may we reasonably think he expects for Pious and Cha­ritable uses, out of a Gain which comes in without any Expence or Trouble at all? If God required such Liberality under the Law, what ought Men to think themselves obliged to un­der the Gospel? State the Comparison between a Husbandman that Inns Fifty Bushels of Wheat and out of them pays Ten every year; and a Rich Merchant, who upon an extraordinary occasion ventures four or five hundred Crowns (which is but a small Sum) in a Lottery designed for the Relief of the Poor; and who is not satisfied to reimburse himself, but grud­ges a Tenth part of that profit, which costs him nothing, to the use of the Poor. If that Israelitish Husbandman paid all that Tax laid upon him honestly and chearfully, because God had commanded him so to do; we must acknowledge his Liberality deserved great Commendation. And if so, Is not that Chri­stian worthy of great Reproach, who pays [Page 135]little or nothing to the Poor, out of extraor­dinary Profit, arising out of a Lottery, in­tended and contrived merely for the Benefit of the Poor? If such management as this be allowable, we must own the Christian Mora­lity much short of the Jewish; and that if Je­sus Christ did not come utterly to destroy the Moral Law, yet he came to make great a­batements, and hath very much impaired, and relaxed its most Excellent Precepts. I cannot suppose any Christian so scandalously ignorant, to put so dishonourable a construction upon the Gospel: They that have ever read the Fifth Chapter of St. Matthew cannot be guilty of so shameful and dangerous a mistake; as to think, that our Saviour gave any License to Us to be more Niggardly and Covetous, than the Law of Moses suffered the Jews to be.

Nor the ancient Jews only, but (which is more surprising) the Heathens themselves will rise in Judgment against the Avarice of Chri­stians, in this point of Liberality. Nay, what Heathens are these that will condemn us? Not only the grave and severe Philosophers, whose wife Frugality secured them from Po­verty and Anxious Fears of future Accidents; but such Merchants and Men of Trade as You, who gave Hercules the Tenth of their Profit, while you, who call your selves Christians, do not pay the true God the Twentieth part of your. I shall not trouble my Reader with Proofs of this, which he may find at leisure, [Page 136]if he please to consult that Chap. III. Dis­course of Tythes, quoted in the Margin, and the Notes upon it.

The Proposition I assign for Benefit in a Lottery, and that which a Man who needs them not should give to the Poor, is certainly the least that can be admitted. This is the Proportion of an Evil Eye, as the Hebrews exprest themselves with regard to their Heave-Offerings; that is, of a Covetous Man, who sees that Money with Discontent and Envy in another Man's Hand, which he might see in his own; though it be no inconvenience to him not to have it. This must not be called Liberality, except we will prostitute that Name to every sort of Alms, without any respect to the proportion given, and to that reserved for one's own use. But upon this occasion, They who expect to have their Liberality com­mended and approved justly, in the sense this word usually carries, must do one of these two things following.

The First Proposal I would make, shall be, to take back his own Money, which purcha­sed the Tickets, and to leave the whole clear Profit to the Poor. He that does thus is but where he was before; he gives nothing out of his own Pocket, nor diminishes his ordinary Income one whit. He only gives an unexpe­cted Gain, and such as he could not have re­pined at never receiving. Thus his Liberality will consist, only in not taking from himself, or being straitned for the sake of Charity; but in de­voting [Page 137]to the Poor a Profit, which they mini­stred an occasion to, without fingering any of it himself.

This action, when considered in it self, and compared with that Notion of Liberality laid down in the Gospel, though for the unusual­ness of the thing it may pretend to some praise; yet is it not any such extraordinary Virtue, as Men at first sight may be apt to think it. A Man loses no part of his Inheritance by it; no part of what his own Labour hath brought him in; his Capital is still in the same state as before. All the loss that can be pretended by the nicest Computation, is only the Interest of his Money for a few Months, till the Lot­tery could be drawn and payment made. And is this a thing to value a Man's self upon? Can we be thought to press a Rich Man too hard, when we urge him to thus much? Must this be reckoned among the Counsels of the Gospel, as some Men speak, which God re­quires as a mark of Perfection only?

In truth, the Gospel is so far from allow­ing Men to add to their Estates without mea­sure, that it commands us to be content with Necessaries, and to give freely of our Abun­dance; that is, so much as we can conveni­ently spare, without being reduced to such Circumstances, as would disable us from be­ing useful to the Publick. It does not indeed oblige us, upon all occasions, to empty our Purses, and give all that we do not need a­way to the Poor at once. A Man may keep [Page 138]a Stock by him, and he may increase it to the best of his power, by fair and honest means; but he ought not to spend more upon himself than serves for the purposes I have mentioned. The rest is the Poors Right, if we would not be accountable to God for our Luxury, or Avarice. And if this be so, what shall we say to them who hold all their Income close to themselves? Can we call these Men Charitable? And yet a Rich Man, who hath a good Lot, and gives it to the Poor, when his own Expences are reibmursed, is exactly this very Man's, as I have plainly shewed you.

But shall we then refuse our Commendation to a rich Man, who complies with this Advice? 'Tis plain, I am far from commending those who have not done so much, and yet think they have deserved great Praise, even for what they do. To this I answer, that I would com­mend a rich Man, who gives the whole Gain of his Lot to the Poor, and that upon these two Accounts.

First, Because we often commend Men, not acc [...]rding to what they should do, strictly considered, for few arrive to that Perfection; but according to what the Generality of Men are used to do. When some Faults are counte­nanced by Custom; as the desire of heaping up as great Treasures as possibly Men can, with­out sinful or dishonourable Methods; we commend, not only such as are entirely free from this Vice, but them too, that are less set [Page 139]upon the World than many others. Because they pass for good Men, not when compared with the Rule of their Duty, but when set a­gainst the greater part of Men, who are worse. We commend, not only those who are Liberal in the highest degree, but those too who are less greedy and more open-handed than People commonly are. In Places, and among Per­sons, where Pride and Ambition Govern, with­out any Offence to the Publick, we praise, not only the Modest and Humble, according to the Standard of the Gospel and sound Reason, but in general all those that are not insolent and extravagantly Vain. Where Debauchery is common, they who are less tainted than o­thers, are esteemed exemplary Livers. In truth, almost all the Commendations we give one another, are not, (if I may be allowed that Distinction) Absolute, but Relative. Much might be said upon this Occasion, if it were not too Foreign for my main Business.

So that they who are commended for giv­ing away some small part of their Profit, which they stood in no need of, have no great matter to brag of, nor ought they to entertain any high Opinion of their Virtue upon this account. Non est bonitas meliorem esse p [...]ssimo. A Man is not therefore good, because some body is worse than he.

The Second Reason, why I would commend such a Man, makes more for his Honor than the former. Which is, because an Action of this Nature, though considered in it self, it be [Page 140]no considerable Degree of Liberality, yet it argues a Disposition of Mind, which is indeed worthy of Commendation. When some Faults are so general, that a Man runs no risque at all, either of his Safety or Reputation in gi­ving in to them, it is praise-worthy to oppose them in some Measure, though one be not en­tirely clear of them. A Man must love Virtue very heartily, to stick to it, when he might discard it quite, without any Scandal. A Man must be throughly possessed of those Truths, which engage him to be above the World, when he gives such Proofs of contemn­ing it, as few or no body would have blamed him for not giving. No Man that hath not a very clear Notion of the Excellency of Libera­lity, could prevail with himself to part with a considerable Advantage, which came flowing in upon him at once, against the Sentiments and Practice of almost all Mankind.

Men commonly think, and in some places e­specially, that a Man can never be too Rich, either upon the account of Pomp and Great­ness, or as a Security against what may hap­pen hereafter, or upon his own and his Fami­lies account. And he that when he had at­tained a Competency, sufficient to skreen him from Poverty and Misery, should sit down quietly, and refuse Op portunites offered to him of growing unmeasurably Wealthy and Great, would be looked upon as little better than a Fool. Now to stand against this Stream by such an Instance of Liberality, as [Page 141]scarce any body else would be persuaded to, argues more Nobleness and Constancy of Mind, than is commonly to be found. This chiefly would induce me to commend those rich Men, who gave their Benefit Tickets to the Poor, especially if they were of a considerable Value.

Secondly, But a rich Man may do yet more than this, and yet not any heroick Action nei­ther, though more commendable than the former. Which is to put a considerable Sum into these Lotteries for the Poor, and devote the Principal and Profit both to their use; though his Lot should happen to be of good Value. Then indeed a Man might call it Cha­rity, when one ventures his Mony with a De­sign that the Poor shall have it all. But in re­gard I suppose the Person still to continue Rich, notwithstanding all he parts with, his Charity is not to compare with theirs, who debar themselves of some Conveniencies, and con­tribute out of their very necessary Supplies, that the Poor may be Relieved.

A great Sum given by a wealthy Man, makes a greater noise in the World, when People do not consider it in proportion to the Abilities of the Giver, but with the very sparing Contributions of others equal in Fortune. And yet when a Man of less Substance straitens himself, though the Sum be small, the Gift is greater than his, whose Plenty never feels the miss of what he gave. So that the Rich have no reason to think it an unreasonable Re­quest, [Page 142]if we should urge them to let the Poor have the Benefit of their Venture, Capital and Benefit both. But it is fit they be accosted in yet bolder Terms, and told roundly that they are obliged to this, if they expect to clear themselves of Avarice before God.

God commands Liberality to the Poor, and this Command is grounded upon that great Gospel Precept of loving our Neighbour as our selves. This being certain, can we say that he loves his Neighbour as himself, who will not for his sake forego, not only some Convenience, but something, which he suffers no manner of Loss, or real Abatement by? Is this Gospel Charity, to think we cannot live without Su­perfluities our selves, and to drive our Neigh­bour to the want of almost all the Necessaries of Life?

Every Man under Hardship, wishes ex­ceedingly to be delivered from it, and thinks a small Inconvenience ought not to hinder so good a Work. So that the Love of our selves persuades us that Charity should not boggle at a small matter for our Benefit. But this Persuasion obliges us to do as much for others, when the Case is theirs, as we think fit to be done by them for us when it is our own. If we do it not, we are Condemned by the Judg­ment of our own Breasts. Now, if a rich Man's Behaviour, who gives a very little of what he can well spare to the Poor, be measu­red by the Rule of the Gospel, without any re­gard to the wicked Practices of a degenerate [Page 143]Age; Can that Man be reputed a great Saint, who puts into a Lottery a Sum, which he will never miss, with a design of making no Profit by it, but letting Sum and Lot and all, (of what value soever) go to the use of the Poor?

This cannot be thought an overstraining of the Point, because it is no more than the Gos­pel requires. If Christ had not expected that our Superfluities should go to the Poor, nay, that we should even deny our selves for them; he would never have said, Sell what ye have, and give Alms. It is plain, that selling what we have, and distributing the Purchase to the Poor, is infinitely more than giving a very little of our Income, or Profit to the Poor, without diminishing the Fund, from whence it arises to us. Accordingly we do not find that he vouchsafed to commend those who Contri­buted to pious Uses out of their Plenty. For on a certain day, he looked and saw the rich men casting their Gifts into the Treasury at the Temple. Luke xxi. 1, 2, 3, 4. And what Reflection does he make thereupon? Does he extol their Liberality? No such mat­ter. But he saw also a certain poor widow casting in thither two mites; and he said, of a truth I say unto you, that this poor widow hath cast in more than they all; for all those have of their abundance cast in unto the Offerings of God; but she of her penury hath cast in all the living that she had.

St. Paul does not praise those that lived in Luxury and Pomp, and while they balked no [Page 144]Pleasure, gave somewhat which they scarce knew how to spend; but those that are Libe­ral, even when they are poor. Observe what Character he gives of the Christians Charity in Macedonia, to their distressed Brethren in Ju­dea. Their deep poverty abounded to the riches of their liberality. 2 Cor. viii. 2.3, 4. For to their power (I bear them record) yea, and beyond their power, they were willing of themselves; praying us with much entreaty that we would receive the gift, and take upon us the fellowship of the ministring to the Saints. And yet St. Paul does not require that Men should render themselves Objects of Charity, while they exercise it to others; but that they should part with as much as they can with any Con­venience spare. If there be a willing mind it is accepted, V. 12, 13, 14. according to that a man hath, and not according to that he hath not. For I do not mean that other men be eased, and you burdened; but by a [...] equality, that now at this time your abundance may be a supply for their want, that their abun­dance also may be a supply for your want, that there may be equality.

These Passages are too plain to need Re­marks. I shall therefore only observe, that i [...] this excellent Rule of St. Paul were duly put in practice, we should have few or no Poor among us, nor any occasion for such Projects as Lot­teries to maintain them. If each would satisfie [...] himself with a moderate Expence in living, and employ the over-plus of his Estate, or the Gains of his Industry for the Relief of them [Page 145]that are in Want; the many empty Bellies would quickly be filled, or at least we should have no Instance of People perishing for Hun­ger. They that are Incapacitated by Age, or Sickness, to sustain themselves, would find a sure Fund in the Diligence and Frugality, and Charity of their Brethren. Families would repay these good Offices in their Turn, as Oc­casion required, and then that Mark would be visible indeed, by which Christ directed us to distinguish our selves, By this shall all men know that ye are my disciples, if ye have love one to another.

But alas! we have nothing like this left in the World; and therefore since Charit [...] (ge­nerally speaking,) is not only grown Cold, but almost quite Extinct, past Hopes of kindling a­gain; we have been forced to Trick People, as it were into doing Good, and to contrive, that Avarice should do that which Charity, (had there been any left) might and ought to have done. The Collections being quire exhausted and no Care expressed to supply the Alms­box; because Charity, which came down from Heaven with Jesus Christ, is long since returned thither; there was a Necessity of man­aging Matters so, that Men should part with that Mony for their own sakes, when they would not part with for the sake of their indi­gent Brethren.

Lotteries are a sort of Ridoles, which carry a Meaning very different from their sound and outward appearance. We think our Gover­nors [Page 146]oblige us with an Opportunity of getting a great deal by Hazarding a little. But observe what lies at the bottom, and how they speak to the Men of Wealth. 'Tis as if they should say, the Funds and Collections for the Poor will no longer maintain them, by reason all Provisions are so much dearer, and all People more sparing in their Gifts, than heretofore. Of this we give the Rich notice, and Exhort them to extend their Liberality now more largely, in proportion to Men's Needs, which are more pressing. But these Men turn the deaf Ear to us, they abate nothing of their Pomp and Extravagance, to employ their Savings in Charity. Their Cloaths are Gayer, their Equipages larger, they Game and Drink, as in the Times of greatest Plenty, and they take off from their Charity to support their Vanity. What can be done with these People? We must catch them by their Avarice, and draw them into Lotteries, where in hopes of Gain to themselves, they will give to us. But yet it is to be hoped, that some generous Souls in time may be touched with these publick Ad­monitions, and do that out of a true Principle, which most do out of a false one. Some rich People sure will put in of their Abundance, and not only take nothing, but leave their own behind them. Providence may possibly out of these Stones raise up Children to Abraham; Such as may imitate the Example, not of his Faith only, but likewise of his Liberality. They will blush to enrich themselves by a Project, [Page 147]made purely for the Poor, and to fill their own Bags out of a publick Charity; and since they want not the Profit that comes in, they will leave it to them that do, and for whose Advantage entirely those Lotteries were ap­pointed.

It concerns those that are in such Circum­stances, to reflect very seriously, and enter in­to their own Consciences, and to discharge that part which both God and Men expect from Persons so well qualified to be Liberal.

CHAP. XII. A Digression concerning Liberality, wherein the Nature of this Virtue is described, and the Practice of it recommended.

AFter so frequent mention made of Libe­rality in the Chapters that went before, and so many Complaints of its being a Virtue so rarely to be met with, (especially in a State where Men subsist chiefly upon their Industry) I think it may be useful to spend a little time in describing the Nature, and endeavouring to convince my Reader of the Excellency of this Virtue. Many Men, 'tis very possible, who are perswaded that they both understand and practise it, will be surprized to find they had scarce any Idea of the thing, and that if they acted according to it, this hath hitherto been [Page 148]done without their own Knowledge. But an­other Motive to me indeed, is the Affinity of this Subject, with that of my whole Book, which turns entirely upon a Method for draw­ing in great Numbers of People to give to the Poor, so that the givers themselves are scarce sensible what design they are carrying on.

Liberality is nothing else, but that Disposi­tion of Mind, which puts us upon giving to those that are in Want, in such Proportions as our present Circumstances will allow. This is the true Notion of Liberality, if by that Word we mean a Virtue, or a commendable Quality; but it is often used indeed for a Disposition to give in such a manner, as argues the Man ra­ther Prodigal than Liberal. For there are some Cases in which we should, and others again in which we should not give; (as will appear by and by) Some Persons, whom it is Liberality to Assist, and others, whom it is Vanity or Self-interest to oblige, rather than any praise wor­thy Design. When therefore a Liberal Man is defined, Fr. Acad. one that takes delight in gi­ving. This Definition is rather accommodated to the vulgar use of the Word, which makes no just distinction between Virtue and Vice, than agreeable to their Notion, who make it their business to think and speak nicely and truly in the Matter. In order therefore to explain my self, I shall particularize the se­veral Impressions, which the Philosophical Idea of this Virtue makes upon the Minds of them [Page 149]who rightly conceive it. And these are five, which I shall examin in their Order.

I. The First of these, is the End Men propose to themselves in giving; which distinguishes Liberality from some Vices that carry some Resemblance to it. The End which a truly li­beral Man hath in view, is the doing Good by Giving, or being Serviceable to the Person to whom he gives. Now this Good and Servicea­bleness do not consist in barely pleasing the Re­ciever, but in helping him to Persevere in Virtue, and to improve in it more than he did before, For a liberal Man being of necessity a Lover of Virtue, he cannot design that to others, which he does not wish to himself: And since he would not desire to be Rich at the Expence of his Virtue, he ought not to give largly upon a Principle which hath no regard to Virtue.

It is not therefore Liberality to furnish a Debauched or Voluptuous Wretch, with means of indulging himself yet more in Sensu­ality and Extravagance. Princes and great Men are by no means Liberal, when they give profusely to their Favourites and Courtiers, that is, to servile Flatterers, who cover E­states, only that they may make an ill use of them, by living in Pride and Delicacy, and squandering all upon their Lusts. They give great Estates too to infamous Women, not with any intent to Reform them, but to main­tain them in, or to draw them over to Vice. This is not Liberality, but scandalous Extrava­gance, to Support a powerful Party, in Oppo­sition [Page 150]to found Reason and Virtue. One evi­dent Proof whereof is this; that such Per­sons, who pretend to be Liberal, oftentimes squeeze and injure the Virtuous, to Enrich their Mistresses; they fleece their honest Sub-Subjects to gratifie the Wicked. They give to none but to those who ought to be discounte­nanced and humbled; or if Decency engage them to cast some Mark of their Favor upon good Men; this is done with such a scandalous Frugality, that it is plain, Liberality is not the Principle which Governs their Distributions.

They likewise have no Right to this Chara­cter of Liberal, who are induced to give, not by any Benefit to the Receiver, but by a pros­pect of getting as much or mo [...]e again, in re­turn for what they give. This is not Libera­lity, but Trade and Trucking. Not that it is absolutely unlawful to give in hopes of a Re­quital, but it is not a Virtue to do so. They that make such Presents are more truly good Husbands than Generous. Thus when Pre­sents are made to Persons in Office or Power, to obtain their Countenance or Protection, or any other Advantage from them, Interest and not Liberality is the Motive to such Actions. The Great, who Favour such, or give them Places, with a design to oblige them to conti­nue this sort of Tribute, have likewise nothing to do with Liberality. The Case is the same with Men that have Dealings together, and get by one another, when they Feast and pay such other Civilities to each other, as are [Page 151]paid to none besides. This is a Consequence of their mutual Interest, and a way of keeping that up, not of exercising their Liberality.

Much less are they to be esteemed Liberal, who are at great Expence, not with any de­sign to do good, but meerly to gratify a vain luxurious Humour. Some such there are, who, take them out of this way, and they are scan­dalous Niggards. They rack those that deal with them, they higgle unconscionably for all they buy; they stick at nothing, though ne­ver so knavish and indirect, only to make a shew, and live great, out of their dishonest Gains. We should entertain a very wrong No­tion of Liberality, did we imagine, that they, for instance, who are hard and unmerciful to poor Men that live by their Labour, and Work for them like Slaves, and who do a hundred such barbarous things, are Liberal, because they keep a good House, and a great many Servants; because they wear rich Cloathes, or spend their Money in a great many things of this kind.

There are some Great Lords, who give no other proofs than these of their being Rich, and whom no body gets any thing from, but by sell [...]ng them what maintains their Luxury and Pride. Nay, the very Tradesmen have rea­son to be thankful, when they get their Mo­ney in any reasonable time; for abundance of your People of Quality stave off paying as long as ever they can, and some never pay at all. Such Men as these never had one single thought of giving, with an intention to do [Page 152]good. They never designed to employ their Talents in the Subsisting of an honest Family, or the encouraging a worthy useful Person, by giving such, by their Bounty, opportuni­ties of serving the Publick more effectually. And yet these Men have the confidence to pre­tend to Liberality and Generosity; because they are excessively vain and proud, and throw a­way their Money in Pomp and Superflui­ties.

By this time we may perceive, that many who think themselves Liberal, or are reputed so by the injudicious Vulgar, have not the least shadow of Title to this Virtue. The truly Liberal Man is a greater Rarity than we commonly imagine; and perhaps such a one is scarce any where to be found, except in imaginary Republicks, such as Plato and other Philosophers have given us Ideas of, and de [...]cribed their Laws and Customs according to their own exalted Notions of Perfection. The Liberal Man does upon all occasions [...]mi­tate that Etern [...]l C [...]ver of all good G [...]f [...]s, who opens has hand and sills all things liv [...]ng with plenteousness, purely for their advantage, and not at all for his own. If we be thankful, 'tis the better for us, because our Gratitude draws down new Blessings. If we be ungrateful, he is not [...]y of well doing, but suffers us long, and endeavours to Cure our Ingratitude, and to shame us out of it, by fresh Favours. But, whether we be duly sensible of his Kindness, or not; yet His Happiness, which results on­ly [Page 153]from the Excellence of his Nature, and the constant exercise of his Perfections, is not one whit the greater, or the less.

II. But it is not enough, that we consider the Motive to our Gifts and Expences, we must also have regard to the Persons, on whom they are bestowed▪ for there is a sort of People, to whom no proportion of our Gift, though never so great, can make it Liberality to give. Herein Our Liberality differs from His, who enables us to be Liberal. His Treasures are inexhaustible; and, after shedding them down Millions of Years upon the infinite Creatures, which himself Created, with no other design, than to do them good, he will still have infi­nitely more in store. He pours out several Blessings upon all Men, without any distin­ction between such as are worthy of his Love, and such as are unworthy. But our Stock is short and soon spent, and the Time of exer­cising our Bounty will quickly expire; so that we are under a necessity of chusing out some of the same Nature with our selves, to make the Objects of our Bounty and Compassion.

Now the first thing to be regarded in the Persons we are disposed to assist, is the need they have of our Assistance. Some want the very Necessaries of Life, and cannot procure them; others make a hard shift, and have much ado to live; and others again, who want nothing of a necessary supply, aim at growing Rich, and taking their Pleasure. Now the first sort have the best Title to our Liberality; the second put in the next Claim; [Page 154]and for the third, it would be not better than Profuseness, and a very mistaken Generosity, to contribute to the gratifying their desires. If Liberality be a desire to do good, those that want it most are so plainly the proper Object of it, that no Body can find any Reason for putting them by.

And yet the Practice of the World is much otherwise. They, who profess to give Instan­ces of their Liberality, betray their Ignorance what it means; by singling out such Persons as have no need of it, and so thwarting the true End of this Virtue. In the doing of Kind­nesses (says an eminent Philosopher it is a Man's Duty to help them most, who want his help most. But this is not the common way of the World.

For most Men choose to oblige those, from whom they look for the best re­turns, Cic. de off. L. 1. C. 15. though the Person have no need at all of any thing they can do for him. In collocando beneficio hoc maximé officii est, ut quis (que) maximé opis nostrae indigeat, ità ei potissimùm opitulari; quod contrà fit à pleris (que). A quo enim plurimum sperunt, etiamsi ille his non eget, tamen ei potissimùm inserviunt. ‘ Let us (says another) give that which is necessary in the first place, make that which is profitable our second care, and reserve that which is pleasant to the last.’

Primo Sene [...] de Be­nes. L. 1. C. 20. demus necessaria, deinde u­tilia, deinde jucunda. Some perhaps may desire to know, wherefore I choose to quote Heathen Philosophers, ra­ther than the Gospel, which is so very Luke xiv. ii. express to this purpose [Page 155]I do it purposely to shew, that my account of Liberality is not the Description of any Super­natural Virtue, but such as humane Reason, abstracted from Revelation, sets before, and recommends to us. It is fit to make the World sensible, that, in offending against the Gospel, they offend against Reason. For some Men are of another Opinion; they forsake Vir­tue upon a false Imagination, that it is some­what more than Humane, and not to be pra­ctised, without renouncing our own natural Notions. It were to be wished, that some able Pen would manage this Argument, and prove what Men do not seem sufficiently sensi­ble of, that we must first be Men, in order to be Christians. We see Men every day pos­sest with an odd fancy, that they are good Christians, though they do not understand what it is to be Men. These should be sent to School to the Heathens, and that would fit them for learning Christianity.

The second thing which ought to determine Liberality in the choice of proper Objects, is the Qualifications of the Persons, upon whom it is exercised. It is evident, that most good ought to be done to those who deserve most. Both because this is a Consideration founded on Equity, and because the good Offices done to worthy Men tend to the Advantage of Hu­mane Society in General. It is for the com­mon Interest of Mankind, that virtuous Per­sons should be encouraged and supported; and not lye under the danger of extreme Mi­sery [Page 156]to renounce neglected Virtue, and set an ill Example to other People. By this the Li­beral Man declares, that Virtue hath the pre­ference in his Esteem, and this preference is of mighty Efficacy towards the procuring it Love and Respect from others.

But Men, quite contrary, very often consi­der only the Assiduity with which People make their Court; as if this were a sufficient re­commendation of it self. Sometimes they scat­ter their Favours at random, upon the first they meet, or the first that Interest is made for, without any regard to their Deserts. This gave occasion (as I observ­ed Ch. vi. before) to that fantastical Notion of a blind Goddess, who distributes Riches and Honours promiscuously, without any Choice or Discrimination at all.

Now, since every one should not only do good, but do it in such a manner too, that as many as may be may find the good Effects of it, we are bound, no doubt, to give the pre­serence to those Persons, who are most useful to the Publick. Such then as have more than ordinary Understanding, and willing to Com­municate their Knowledge to the World; such as decline no pains to acquire, or to dif­fuse Wisdom, (supposing them to be Persons that stand in need of Publick or Private En­couragement, and that they are Men of vir­tuous Conversation) have an undoubted Right, before others who have not these good Quali­ties. By obliging them, we at the same time [Page 157]oblige those infinite other Persons, who reap advantage by their Labours; which they could never sustain, if cramped by extremity of Want. They that were Liberal to Erasmus heretofore, who was born to no Estate, did not only enable that Excellent Person to live comfortably, but gave him the opportunity of laying in that vast Stock of Knowledge, and composing those admirable Books, Posterity reap the Benefit of still. So that it was not Erasmus alone, but all who are enlightned by his Learning, that have reason to bless the Li­berality, and to celebrate the Praises and Me­mory of those Generous Spirits, that gave him their Assistance; and the Fruits of their Kind­ness will descend to all Ages, as long as the Works of this Great Author are in being. If Queen Christina, and her famous Chancellour Oxenstern had done nothing else, but choosing the Eminent Grotius for their Embassador, by this means qualifying him to live in good Cre­dit, and to be serviceable to the World, rather than out of a design to profit themselves by his Aderess in publick Treaties; this single act had entitled them both to immortal Thanks. And we cannot but extol their Liberality, while we continue to value the most Skilful Interpreter of Scripture, that perhaps ever liv­ed in the Christian World.

Such as these are fit Objects for Princes, and for all those, whose Fortunes put it in their power to be Liberal. [A Man cannot [Page 158]without a just indignation J. Howel, Vol. 1. §. 4. Let. viii. read the account of that Famous Lord Chancellor of England, Sir Francis Bacon, whom King James I. suffered to languish in Poverty, while he advanced worthless Fel­lows; good for nothing (if I may so speak) but to disgrace their Benefactor. This Learned Man, a little before his death, wrote a very moving Letter, ‘Imploring His Majesty's Re­lief, now in his declining Age, lest he should be reduced to Beg or Starve; and that he who desired to live only that he might Stu­dy, might not be forced to Study for a Live­lihood.’ These Expressions have been char­ged with Littleness of Soul; but I confess that Littleness seems to me chargeable, not so much upon my Lord Bacon, as upon his Master, who drove so great a Man to the necessity of mak­ing so poor a Request; and who had the In­humanity to let him dye in Circumstances so deplorable, that he had scarce enough left to Bury him.

That Prince, who was a Master of Latin, and an Author himself, tempted Men to despise Learning, by his neglect of Learned Men.] There being nothing more recommended by all Antiquity, than this kind of Liberality; and yet they who profess to read the Antients most, often practise it least. The World hath seen innumerable Instances of Stewards and Cooks, who have got great Estates in the Ser­vice of some Prelates: For some such there have been, who never did good to any but such [Page 159]Trash, or a few Chaplains of their own, who many times know little more, than to Write and Read, and Eat and Drink, and lead a saun­tring useless Life upon a good fat Prebend. And this manner of proceeding, it is to be feared, hath, in part at least, given occasion to the Laity, to shew no more regard to them that best deserve it.

There have been many Times and Places, wherein Men of Learning stood but in too much need of Lotteries to be set up fo [...] their Maintenance; and where some such Project as this seems the only way left to bring Learning into Credit again. We have few or no Maece­nas's in our days, who, like Him, support the greatest Wits of the Age, and enable them for such Compositions as those of his Favourites; which have immortalized his Memory, and been the wonder of succeeding times, from Augustus until now. At present the improve­ment of Lea [...]ning, the study of Sacred and Profane Antiquity, skill in Languages, a nice Taste and sound Judgment, zealous love of Truth, a modetate and peaceable Temper, wasting a Man's self with perpetual toil for the Instruction of Mankind; These are Qualities that turn to little account else, than merely the attracting of Envy, or the getting some little cold Recommendation. If a Man shew himself Liberal, 'tis commonly toward some wretched Declaimer, void of Judgment and true Sense; or toward some ignorant Fellow that sets up his Throat, and bawls with all [Page 160]his might, Great is Diana of the Ephesians; that is ready to murder all who do not believe all he says of this Goddess, though they excuse themselves with never so much Temper, and make no Disturbance at all: Or lastly, to­ward some fulsom Flatterer, whose Exactness and Diligence in making his Court, can only be equalled by his Neglect of those Duties his Character obliges him to. This puts me in mind of Crates the Philosopher, who makes up an account for a Licentious Fellow, by setting those whom he should have given most to, but really gave least, against them, to whom he was lavishly kind, and ought to have allowed them little or nothing. Set down, says he, Ten Pound for my Cook, and a Groat for my Phy­sician; To a Flatterer, five Tallents, To one that gave me good Advice, a little Smoak; A Talent to my Whore, and three Half-pence to my Tutor that read Philosophy to me.

But enough of Learned Men: We will now proceed to some other Objects of Libera­lity, though we should extend this to as ma­ny as is possible, yet Philosophers tell us, we should more especially do it, to such as Blood, or Friendship, or civil Engagements, or Ac­quaintance, or Religion, and such other En­dearments have more closely obliged us to. And that they ought to have the Preference upon these, if they be equal upon other Ac­counts. It is not necessary to insist upon this Consideration, because when Men give at all, they usually do it to Persons whom they have [Page 161]some of these Obligations to. It will rather be convenient to advise Men, that they would not be too nice in observing this kind of Libe­rality. A Cic. de off. L. 1. good Philosopher ob­serves very well, that Liberality must always be attended with Ju­stice; and severely condemns, as they deserve, those who injure one Man to be Bountiful to another. Such is a Prince, who squeezes his People, and regards not what burdensom Tax­es he loads them with, to get Mony for his Mistresses. Such a Conqueror that lays whole Countries Desolate, and Ruins Millions of Fa­milies, to Enrich his Officers and Souldiers. This is not Liberality, but Rapine and Rob­bery.

But the Great are not the only Persons of­fending in this Point; those of inferior Con­dition, almost every where are guilty of the same Fault. For each Man thinks it is his Duty to hold his Hand, and spare all that possibly he can, both from himself and others, that he may leave his Children Rich. And in this they think it in possible to [...]ceed, since no Estate can be too great for a Family. This is a mighty hinderance to Liberality, and the most plausible Excuse they have for refusing to give. And yet, how far soever Custom may have Corrupted Men, I will put my Reader in mind of two things, which every Father in good Condition is indispensably obliged to, and beyond which he must not go, if he will be Governed by the Rules of Virtue and sober [Page 162]Reason. First, He ought not to grudge any Expence, necessary for Educating his Children Virtuously, and improving their Understand­ings. He should get the best Masters, for For­ming them to that sort of Life he designs to six them in. It is much better and kinder, to leave them less in Mony, provided they be rich in good Sense, and good Principles; for without these Qualifications, an Estate does more hurt than good. There is no Father, who would choose to leave behind him a Spend­thrift, or a Miser, rather than a Man of Pru­dence and Conduct, who by giving and sparing in their proper Seasons, engages the Esteem and Friendship of all that know him. Second­ly, To regard somewhat of one's own, is ab­solutely necessary to supply the most moderate Expence of a Man's Condition, and to keep him above the Temptation of doing dishonest and little Things; it must be allowed very rea­sonable, for a Father to be desirous to leave his Children in such Circumstances, as may be a Guard sufficient against this Temptation. But then this Reason will not hold to the heaping up for them beyond all measure. A cer­tain Proportion, with Industry and Frugality, we know may serve to set the Owner above the Perplexities of Want: And if our own Reason did not teach us this, yet we might learn it from the many Instances of several in the same Condition, who set out with as little, and yet live very comfortably. And these are [Page 163]so many, that we can never be at a loss for them.

A Father, who discharges his part in these two points, to the best of his power, and leaves his Family enough to subsist creditably upon; Either by making out their short Fortune with their Labour, or by being good Husbands ac­cording to their Quality; He ought to set his heart at rest, and give the rest to Works of Charity and Publick use. But the mischief is, We affect to leave our Chrildren in great Plen­ty, that they may live High, and have nothing to do, but to over-look their Estates; and up­on this Principle a Man never thinks himself Rich, and consequently never in Circumstan­ces to be Liberal. This is plainly a Passion contrary both to Reason and Religion. No man ought to wish to have wherewithall to live himself an idle useless Creature; and conse­quently no man should aim at leaving his Children so. Poverty indeed hath its dangers, but nothing is so bad, that Riches and Lazi­ness will not betray a Man to. It is not only the doing no good to others, by turning a Man's hand to nothing at all, but the doing them great harm, by an ill Example; Not to mention other mischiefs of Idleness, which is justly termed the Mother of all Evils.

A Man's desires, therefore, which should be moderate for himself, must not exceed all bounds for his Children. Nay, I will ven­ture to say, that a Father, who hath just ground to suspect his Children will make [Page 164]an ill use of what he leaves them, if it be too much, is bound to provide against that Inconve­nience in his own Life time; and to bestow part of it in good uses, and to those that are in want. There is no Command of God, a Rule of Prudence, or Affection, or Charity, that enjoyns us to leave to Children of prodigal or stingy Dispositions, that which will confirm them in their Vices, while at the same time we deny to Persons in need, that which would enable them to live in Comfort, and become useful to the World.

There is likewise another Error very com­mon, and that is confining our Liberality to Persons of our own Religion, and choosing to be kind to one of our own Party, who hath nothing to recommend him, rather than to the brightest Virtue, and most valuable Qualifica­tions of any Denomination of Christians, dif­fering from our own. This shews Men acted, not so much by a Spirit of Liberality, as of Par­tiality, and Interest, and Faction. They love not the good Qualities that ought to engage us, but they are fond of a Passion like their own, and this they think can never be re­warded above its Desert. Christina's Bounty to many differing from her, at least while they sat upon the Throne of Sweden, and especial­ly to Grotius, who was no profest Lutheran, can never be too much Extolled. Many Pro­testants have sometimes tasted the Liberality of a Roman Catholick Prince and his Mini­sters. But these Examples are not frequent [Page 165]among the Laity, and yet less so with the Cler­gy. If one of them be kind to a Man of Learning and Piety of another Perswasion, he deserves immortal Praise. This argues in such a one a nobleness of Soul, above the little In­terest of his Party; and that he loves what is truly amiable, wheresover he finds it. And in regard all Societies of Christians ought to a­gree in, and indeed are purposely designed for promoting that which is good and useful to Mankind; every Man of any Society ought to encourage a Person, whom he finds capa­ble of contributing more to this End, than common Men, to what Party soever he be­longs. It cannot be pretended, that a Man's good Qualities, whom we think of an errone­ous Persuasion, are bla [...]ed by his belonging to such a Church or Society; for very often those good Qualities have little or no depen­dance upon his Errors. Very often his Excel­lencies qualifie him to do more good, than his pretended Errors can possibly do harm. We must be content to deal upon this, as we do upon other Occasions; not to require in the Objects of our Liberality, such Perfections as are scarce any where to be found among Men. ‘Since we do not live in a World absolutely Perfect and Wise in all Points, but among Men who are vasuable, if they have the Ap­pearances of Virtue; it will [...]l become us to neglect any body, who gives us any Evi­dence of his being a good Man’ Quoniam vivitur non cum perfectis hominibus, pleneque [Page 166]sapientibus, sed cum iis, in quibus praeclare agitur, Cic. de off. L. 1.15. si sunt simulachra virtutis; etiam hoc intelligendum puto, neminem omnino esse negligendum, in quo aliqua, significatio virtutis appareat.

Thirdly. The Third thing to be considered in the Exercise of Liberality, is the Value of the Gift, which must be rated according to the Substance of the Giver, and the Condition of the Receiver. A Man must not give beyond his Power, so as to incapacitate himself for the Relief of another Object, and yet much less so, as to become an Object of other Peo­ples Charity himself. 'Tis Absur'd and Ridi­culous Generosity to give away ones All, and to go to Begging. And 'tis Hypocrisie and Knavery, to give lavishly, and then to heal our Profuseness, with Robbery and Injustice.

The same Philosopher, Cic. de off. L. 1. c. 15. after ha­ving directed us to moderate our Liberality, adds very Judiciously; Many wast their Estates by giving indiscreetly ‘Now what can be more senseless, than to disable ones self from continuing to do that which he takes delight to do?’ And besides, Men are often apt to make themselves amends by Rapine for their past Prodigality: But besides, they that are over-liberal, draw Sufferings not upon themselves only, but upon their Neigh­bours too, whom not only Liberality, but Justice obliges them to take care of.

Avoid but this Extreme, and we cannot ex­ceed; because we ought to give as much as we can, without too great pinching of our selves. And therefore the Quantity and Mea­sure of our Gift ought to differ very much, according to our Circumstances, and what we can spare; though the Disposition to give, which is the true Source of Liberality, should be equal in all Circumstances. The Rich should give more in proportion to their Estates and Expences. Those that have less, and none, or but a few Children, should give more than they do, who have a numerous Family to pro­vide for. Every Man should consult his own Conscience, and examin sincerely, how much he and his can spare, and all that should go to Liberality. This both Charity and Humanity strictly require of us. For the Poor can never be supported, as they ought, if they who can afford a great deal, give but little, because Men of straiter Fortunes can never raise a Fund sufficient for this Purpose.

And yet there are two things very frequent, which are directly opposite to this Rule. For rich Men neither give in proportion to their Estates, nor to their other superfluous Expen­ces. We find by the publick Collections, that Men of moderate Fortunes are incomparably more Generous and Charitable, than those of overgrown Estates. These last commonly Con­tribute no more than others who have not a­bove half a quarter so much to do it with. And if upon extraordinary Occasions, they stretch [Page 168]a little further, though this be but seldom done neither, yet even then they give not near so much as they might very well spare. Many that make nothing of losing great Sums at Gaming, or in Trade, and Feast their Friends, without grudging any Charge, are never Thrifty, but when called upon to Relieve the Poor in their Distress. Let any Man reflect, whether he does not know such Persons as these, and I dare engage he will quickly Re­collect a great many Instances of them, with­in his own Acquaintance.

But which is still worse, this sort of Men do not (like some others that do amiss) condemn their own Proceedings, but justifie themselves, and charge those that think and act otherwise, with Singularity, and Weakness, and Superstition. There are abundance, who govern their actions by no other Rule, than the Customs of the World, and the Practice of most Rich Men; who spend as much in Vanity, and as little in Charity, as possibly they can. When they are urged to pare off some superfluous Expen­ces, and convert that Money to good uses, the Answer presently is, Who is there that does so? And because such Examples are too hard to be produced, they tell you, they must live like their Neighbours; and if they do as much as others, it is unreasonable to find fault with them. This looks as if God durst not shut them out of Heaven, for fear of turning back too great a number. They think it is with the King of Heaven, as it is with [Page 169]Kings upon Earth, who cannot spare their Subjects, and, for fear of damaging them­selves by punishing too many, are content to make but a few, of those that are guilty, Ex­amples. Whereas they should consider, that He who made all things, can, without any diminution to his own Happiness, command all his Creatures back into nothing; and in an instant produce infinite New Beings, quite different from those we now see. Examples are no where preferred before Laws, except a­mong Men only; and then too, only in dis­orderly and ill managed Governments; be­cause it cannot sometimes be otherwise, with­out bringing the State to utter Ruin. They are forced to proceed by this Rule, The more are guilty the fewer punished. But the Gospel hath told us, that our Maker takes other mea­sures, and that with Him, many are called but few are chosen. He calls all to Happiness, but he chooses those only who come to him, those Few that are worthy. So that a Man must either renounce Christianity, or he must make the Laws of God, and not the Practice of Men, the Standard of his Duty.

Our Saviour was well aware this would be the Case, Matt. xix. when he de­clared it easier for a Camel to go through the eye of a Needle, than for a rich Man to enter into the Kingdom of Heaven. Not that Riches damn Men infallibly, for an Excellent good use may be made of them; but because they are usual­ly converted to ill purposes; and Men are so [Page 170]blinded, either by Custom, or by ill Examples, that very few Rich Men make a good use of them; and very few such will suffer them­selves to be convinced or cured of their Errors. It must be confest, both, that few Rich Men are Liberal, and that few Liberal Men are Rich. This was observed by a Heathen Philosopher in his Ethicks, Aristot. Eth. Lib. iv. c. 2. where he says, ‘It is not easie for a Liberal Per­son to be Rich, because he de­lights more to give, than to receive, or to keep what he hath; for he loves not Riches for their own sakes, but values them only as a means of doing Good. Hence Men com­monly complain of Fortune, because they have least who deserve most. But this is not the Effect of Choice; for no Man can be Rich, who is not careful to gather, and to save.’

The same Author makes it one Quality of a Liberal Man, not to be over Sollicitous for his own Interest. By which he means, that a Liberal Man is content to streighten himself, that he may assist others. This was the Heathen No­tion, and it is much more the Christian. We have reason to fear, that many Heathens will rise up in Judgment against the Christians, and Con­demn those who have been better taught, but practise less in this point than they. It is however but too true, that few Rich Men can say as Pliny did of one of his Friends in a Letter to his Daughter. Plin. Epist. L [...]. 11. Ep. 4. ‘In your Fathers Life time, when you were Married, I gave him a [Page 171]hundred thousand Sisterces to Match you off. Besides this Sum which your Father promised to repay, you have a Pledge of my kindness in these matters. You may depend upon it, if you consult the Credit of your deceased Father, (that is, by paying his Debts, and ad­ministring upon his Effects,) and to engage you to this, not by promises only, but by real proofs, I freely release all that your Fa­ther owed me. Do not apprehend this Li­berality any Burden to me. My Estate is not great, my Post engages me in great Expen­ces, my Income from my Land is small and uncertain; But my good Husbandry makes amends for all this, and this is the Fund of my Liberality. But yet I must be careful not to draw it dry by being too lavish.’ Quod cessat ex reditu, frugalitate suppletur, ex quâ velut à fonte Liberalitas nostra decurrit. Quae tamen ità temperanda est, ne nimiâ profusione in­arescat. But I will present my Reader with another much nobler instance of this Virtue. In the War with Hannibal, Fabius Maximus had agreed with that General, for the release of some Roman Soldiers, not doubting but the Senate would pay their Ransom. When this could not be obtained, instead of leaving these Men in Hannibal's hands, he sent his Son to Rome, to sell the only Farm he had, consisting of Seven Acres; and with that Money he Re­deemed the Prisoners. ‘Choosing rather, says the Valer. Max. l. iv. c. 8. Ex. 1. Author, to lose his whole Estate, than to suffer the scan­dal [Page 172]of such Inhumanity to lye upon his Coun­try. Which is so much the more commen­dable [...] because it is a greater Argument of Generosity to do things beyond ones power; than to do no more than a Man can easily dispense with.’ This is a very proper and excel­lent Reflection; and this manner of expressing it hath great affinity with that descriptition which St. Paul gives of the Christians Liberality in Macedonia.

But what Character would Valerius Maximus have thought Magnificent enough, for those who Sold themselves to Redeem others, (whom they thought incapable of enduring the hardships of Slavery,) at the Expence of their own Liberty? And yet 1 Ep. ad Co­rinth. c. l. v. St. Clement tells us of some Primitive Christians who did grudge even thus much. And somewhat of this kind is related too of St. Baron. ad Ann. 431. Paulinus of Nola. But it is to little purpose, I am afraid, to set Examples of such an Heroick Virtue before the Age we live in. It were well, if Men now could be perswaded to give so much out of their E­states, as might be spared, without any sensi­ble diminution or great inconvenience to them­selves.

IV. A Fourth Qualification, necessary to be observed in our Liberality, is the manner how we give. It should be done with Chearfulness, and so, that the Receiver shall have no reason to suspect, that we look upon our Gift as a Debt upon him. When a Man gives by constraint, [Page 173]as it were, with a sort of grumbling and re­proach, he puts People out of Countenance; and, whatever their Wants are, makes it more tolerable to receive nothing, than to re­ceive it after such an upbraiding manner. ‘Let us give (says the Senec. de B [...] ­nef. l. ii. c. 1. Heathen Philosopher) with the same Spi­rit and Air with which we would be glad to receive, Sic d [...]mus, quem­admodum vellemus accipere.’

This deserves the more enlargement, be­cause it is one of the most essential Points of true Liberality. To convince Men that we give upon a Principle of Generosity, it is re­quisite, that we prevent the Requests of those that need our Assistance. We need only know their Wants; these of themselves speak loud enough in the Ears of a Liberal Man; and they who hear not this Voice, are usually deaf to the most pressing Importunities. They that are not affected with a sad Object of Poverty, when they see it before their Eyes, are com­monly proof against all Complaints. If we meet with a Man upon the Road, wounded and speechless through loss of Blood, is it fit we stay till he have recovered his Tongue, before we bind up his Wounds, and contribute to his Recovery? Does not his distress speak for it self sufficiently? The Case is the same with Want of any kind: And we should be the more forward in our Relief, because ge­nerally, they who deserve it best, are most modest and backward in asking it. The shame [Page 174]of owning a Man's Poverty; the fear of being troublesome to those whom he wishes he were in a Condition to serve; the concern of a ge­nerous Spirit, when he must be looked down up­on from above, and run the risque of being denyed; These are more than sufficient Rea­sons for saving such the shame and trouble of asking.

Seneca hath represented this matter won­derfully well, in the beginning of his Second Book De Beneficiis. And it is fit some Passa­ges should be transcribed from thence, to put those who pretend to Christian Charity to the blush, when they find how far the Pagans [...]ut did them in Generosity. ‘No good Offi­ces (says he) are more agreable, than those which are speedy and unexpected, and are only delayed by the Modesty of the Recei­vers. That is the most excellent Liberality, which gets the start of People's desires; that the next best, which follows them close at the heels. It is better to do good unasked, because a Man of Spirit cannot ask without blushing and hesitation; and when we save him this uneasiness we add greatly to the obligation.’ Gratissima sunt Beneficia parata, facilè occurentia; ubi nulla mora fuit, nisi in accipientis verecundiâ. Primum est antecedere desiderium cujus (que), proximum s [...]qui; quia cùm homini ex probo ad rogandum os concurrat, & suf­fundatur rubore; Qui hoc tormentum remittit, multiplicat munus suum. What can be more beautiful, than that passage which follows pre­sently [Page 175]after? ‘ I beg you, says he, is a hard word, never to be spoke with­out Faultering and Shame. Cap 11. We should therefore spare this to a Friend, or to any whom we would make so, by our Kind­ness. He gives late, who gives immediately upon asking. We should guess at the Desires of those in Want, and when we have found them, we should ease them of the hard Necessity of asking.’ Molestum verbum est, onerosum & demisso vultu dicendum, Rogo. Hujus facienda est gratia Amico, & cuicunque, quem amicum promerendo sis facturus. Properet licet, serò be­n [...]ficium dedit, qui rogandi dedit. Ideo divinan­da cujusque Voluntas, & cum intellecta est, ne­cessitate gravissimâ rogandi liberanda est. ‘He observes excellently well, that the Kindness which could not be had without asking, did not come freely; Cap. 1. it is partly paid for; for a Man buys nothing dear­er, than that which costs him Importunity. Non tulit gratis, qui cum rogásset accepit. Nulla res chariùs conflat, quam quae precibus empta est.’

It is observable, that what hath been al­ledged here, concerning the Duty of being beforehand with the Requests of them that need our Liberality, supposes such an effectual Prevention, as actually gives, and not barely offers the Assistance we are in a Condition to afford them. It is oftentimes as hard to accept a Kindness, when offer'd, as it would be to request it. Because one may fear that the Offer is a Matter of Ceremony and Form, and [Page 176]that the Man would not be well pleased to be taken at his word. And certain it is, that Men often make Proffers, in hopes that they will be refused. Which is very evident, by one sort of Practice, exceeding common with the false pretenders to Liberality. That I mean of declaring some time before what they in­tend to do, and so giving Men an Opportuni­ty of a civil Refusal. Which they are very se­cure of, where they do not meet with Mean­ness of Spirit, or extreme Necessity. Hence they lay hold upon the least word, that looks like a declining to accept their Kindness, and presently drop the thing. Sometimes they make such paultry Offers, as shame and con­found the Persons to whom such auk ward Com­pliments are made; and so instead of obliging, give Offence by this false show of Liberality. The truly liberal Person does not prevent those in Want by Promises and Professions, he does not ask whether he shall do any thing for them; but he does it instantly, leaves no room for Refusal, and gives what the Person shall not think it beneath him to accept.

But in regard we cannot always guess at the hard Circumstances of a worthy Man, unless he acquaint us with them. As soon as ever he hath let us into this Knowledge, we shall do well to interrupt him, and save the trouble of spending more Time and Pains in Imploring our Assistance. Those that deserve our Kind­ness, when constrained to ask it, usually be­gin with distant and general Expressions, [Page 177]which yet they who are well disposed, very easily understand. But hard-hearted People pretend themselves always in the dark; and when they have forced Men to speak so plain, that they cannot pretend Ignorance any lon­ger, they answer them in formal Terms of Civility, more disobliging than a flat Denial. So long as they can shelter themselves under a Pretence of not knowing what it is you would be at, they are ready to do whatever you would have them; but when once they are beaten off from that Refuge, then they are sorry it is not in their Power, and you must ap­ply your self some where else.

Seneca had infinitely juster and more exalted Notions of Liberality, than these dissembling pitiful spirited Wretches; for he is of Opini­on, that ‘if we have not been able to prevent those that need our Succour, we should at least interrupt their Requests, that we may not seem to have been intreated. As soon as ever we understand their Wishes, we should immediately promise, and by our ea­ger hast convince them, that could we have guess'd their Occasions, they should not have been put upon asking.’ Si non contingit prae­venire, rogantis verba intercidamus, ne rogati videamur; sed certiores facti statim pro­mittamus; facturosque nos etiam, antequam in­terpellaremur, ipsâ festinatione approbemus.

The same Philosopher warns us against an­other thing, which discovers the Counterfeit from true Liberality. Which is Men's [Page 178]being ready to promise, but as slow in perfor­mance, as possibly they can. ‘Nothing is more grievous, says he, than to ask what a Man hath obtained already.’ A Man should do what he can do upon the spot. ‘ Nihil est acerbius, quam ubi quoque cum impetrasti, rogandum est. Repraesentanda, sunt beneficia. Cap. iv. He tells you there is nothing more barbarous, than the keeping Men in Suspence;’ That some Men had rather be put out of all Hopes presently, than made to wait, Cap. v. and drawn on to along day. Nihil aeque amarum, quàm diu pondere. Aequiore quidam animo ferunt praecidi spem suam, quàm trahi. ‘Some are of so disoblig­ing a Temper, as to do nothing quickly, and at once; their Injuries come speedily, but their Kindnesses very leisurely.’ Nihil con­f [...]stim, nihil semel faciunt; Injuriae illorum prae­cipites, lenta beneficia sunt. But ‘Beneficence quickens its pace, and he that does good willingly, does it speedily. He that delayed and drilled his Friend on in tedious Expecta­tion, did not act with a good Will. He hath by this means lost two very considerable things; Time, and the Evidence of acting like a Friend. He would take time to oblige, that is, he was loath to do it at all.’ Omnis benignitas prop [...]rat, & proprium est libenter facientis, citò facere. Qui tardè & diem de die extrahens profuit, non ex animo fecit. Ita res duas perdidit, & tempus, & argumentum amicae voluntatis. Tarde velle nolentis est.

Besides, the manner of giving is a sensible demonstration of Liberality; for the very Countenance discovers whether a Man gave with Pleasure. The Gay and Pleased Look of the Liberal, shews that he acted with his own Inclination, and a heavy dissatisfied look as plainly confesses Unwillingness and Constraint; and the doing a thing meerly for the shame of not doing it. This may likewise be collected from a Man's Discourse at such a time, in which true Liberality differs exceedingly from the Dissembled. ‘We should give good Words with our good Deeds, says Seneca, and recommend our Bounty by engaging Expres­sions. So that he, whom we oblige, should blame himself for not asking sooner. Upon this occasion it will do well to mingle some kind Reproofs and Complaints; as I am concerned that you should want my Assistance so long without letting me know it, and that you asked me as if you feared a denial, or that you would apply to any but my self. I think my self very happy that you give me an Opportunity of shewing my Disposition to serve you. Hereafter you may command any thing you want. For once I forgive you this Modesty, but pray lay aside such Reserve for the future.’ Quanto melius adjicere bona verba rebus bonis, & praedicatione humana benig­naque commendare quae praestes, ut ille se castiget, qui tardior in rogando fuit? Adjicias licet fami­liarum querelam: Iraescor tibi, quòd cum aliquid desiderasses, non olim scire me voluisti, quod tam [Page 180]diligenter rogas [...]i; quòd quenquam adhibuisti: Ego verò gratulor mihi, quòd experiri animum meum libuit, postea quicquid desiderabis tuo jure exiges. Semel rusticitati tuae ignoscitur. Few Men indeed know how to give in so obliging a way as this. ‘ Most People turn ones Stomach against their Favors, by the Words and haughty Disdain that attends them. They talk and act so scornfully, that a Man thinks the obtaining his Request a bad Bargain. Plerique beneficia asperitate verborum & supercilio in odium adducunt;’ co sermone usi, eâ superbia, ut impetrâsse poeniteat. Others again mingle Censures and Reproaches with their Kind­nesses, and lose all the Merit of them this way. A Bit and a Knock, according to the English Proverb, which Seneca likewise forbis; ‘To chide a Man when you are just doing him a good Office, is great Folly. Nothing should be mingled with Favours to sowr, and render them unacceptable. If a Man deserve Re­proof, some other time should be taken Corripere cum cui cum maximo aliquid praestes, dementiae est;’ & inserere contumeliam meritis. Non sunt exasperanda beneficia, nec quidquam illis triste miscendum. Si quid erit, de quo velis ad­monere, aliud tempus eligito. But this Max [...]m is not peculiar to Seneca; St. Pauls Direction is much to the same purpose. Let every man do as he is disposed in his heart; Cor. ix. not grudgingly, or of neces­sity; for God loveth a chearful giver. All the Actions that proceed from a Principle of Vir­tue, [Page 181]and the Habit of a resolved and confirm­ed Mind, are done with Pleasure and great Alacrity; so that a Man cannot but give chearfully, when he does indeed give Libe­rally. Nay, it would be some torment to him not to give, or to find himself unable to do it.

By this we are taught what Judgment to make of them, who offer Kindnesses with a very ill Grace; for it even they who give In­decently are to be blamed; what shall we say of them, who never give at all, and when they proffer, are afraid of nothing more than being taken at their Word?

There is yet one Caution more relating to this Particular, which is, that Men ought upon several Accounts, rather to give in private than publickly. But since this extends to some certain Cases only, I shall lay down the Prin­pal Motives to it, lest otherwise publick Libera­lity should be defrauded of its just Praises. Now since the proper Inducement to the Practice of Virtue, is not that we may attract the Praise of Men, but that we may answer the Ends, for which God made us, and placed us in civil Society; 'Tis plain, that Reputation ought not to be Men's aim in their Acts of Liberality. They that proceed upon this View, have not Virtue, but Glory and Approbation; and if these could be compassed by the quite contrary Methods, would be as Zealous in the Practice of them. These Men have no Virtues, but such as are Creditable and in Fashion. Applause [Page 182]is their Idol, and therefore, as they do no good, so they boggle at no ill, which is not seen. Such were the Jews, whom Christ forbids us to imitate; When thou dost thine alms, do not sound a trumpet before thee, as the hy­pocrites do in the synagogues, Matth. vi. 2. and in the streets, that ye may have the praise of Men. For the better avoiding this Extreme, our Lord orders his Disciples rather to give privately; but that is done purely in opposition to that Hypocrisie, so common a­mong the Pharisees. Take heed that ye do not your alms before men to be seen of them, V. 1.3. otherwise ye have no reward of your Father which is in heaven. And when thou dost thine alms, let not thy left hand know what thy right hand doth: That thine alms may be in secret, and thy Father which seeth in secret, himself shall reward thee openly. Now it is sure, that the Charity and Liberality exercised after this manner, cannot be confounded with the empty Form and Pretence of Charity and Libe­rality; and our Lord therefore directs it, that it's Secrecy might clear it of Insincerity.

Upon the same account the Philosophers blamed that Liberality, which proceeds from Ostentation. ‘We may observe some, (says Tully) doing a great many things, not so much out of any Generosity in their Nature, as for the Credit of doing them, and to be thought Generous. These are the Effect of Vanity, not of good Inclination. But this acting the part of a Liberal Man, favors [Page 183]much more of a vain Humor, than of Virtue, or any commendable Principle.’ Videre etiam licet plerosque non tam naturâ liberales, quàm quadam gloriâ ductos ut benefici videantur, facere multa: quae proficisci ab ostenlatione magis, quàm à voluntate videantur. Talis autem simulatio vanitati est conjunctior, quàm aut liberalitati aut­honestats.

Since the End of giving is not only to profit, but to please and gratifie the Persons to whom we give; this is a good Reason for making our Gifts private, because the doing it openly might put the Receivers too much out of Countenance. For Instance; It often hap­pens, that Men of good Families are straitned extremely in their Fortunes, and cannot bear to ask Relief publickly; nay, scarcely to ac­cept Relief so, without great Shame and Con­cern. And therefore mere Humanity obliges one to deliver them from this Uneasiness, and to conceal our Kindness even from them­selves.

Now there are two ways of doing this. One is, giving by another Hand, and so, that they who receive it may not be sensible from whence it comes. ‘Thus the Philosopher Arcesilas is said to Visit his Friend Apolies, who lay sick at Chios, Plutarch Art of di­stinguishing between a Flatterer and a Friend. and at the same time was excessively Poor, but would not make his Conditi­on known, Arcesilas pretended to raise his Pillow, and private­ly dropped a Purse of twenty Drachmes be­hind [Page 184]it, and then went away, without taking any notice of what he had done. Apelles his Nurse, when she came to make the Bed, found the Purse, which when Apelles saw, he smiled, and said, This was one of Arcesi­las his dexterous turns. Seneca reflects very handsomly upon this Story; "What? you'll say, shall a Man be kept in Ignorance, whom he is obliged to? I answer; First, if it be for his Advantage not to know it, this adds to the Obligation. But, Secondly, I will do more for him, I will take another way of Assisting him, which may discover his Be­nefactor. Nay, lastly, though he does not know the Giver, yet I do. Quid ergo? Ille nesciat à quo acceperit?’ Primum nesciat, si hoc ipsum beneficii pars est; deinde multa alia faciam, multa tribuam, per quae intelligat & illius auctorem. Denique ille nesciat accepisse, ego sciam me dedisse. ‘But this is a poor Re­turn, it is indeed, if you put your Favours out to Interest; but if giving be your design, you must contrive to do it in that way, which is best for the Receiver. You will desire no Witness besides your own Breast. If you do, you do not delight in the doing Good, but in the being known to have done it.’ Parum est, inquis; Parum, si foenerare cogitas; sed si dares, quo genere accipienti maximè profu­turum erit, dabis: contentus cris te teste. Alio­quin non benefacere delectat, sed videri benefecisse. The rest may be seen in that Author. Whom yet I copy with delight, and insert his own O­riginal [Page 185]Expressions, because I think no ren­dring Beautiful and Significant enough for them. But there is another way of giving, without putting the Receiver out of Counte­nance. And this is by finding out somewhat for him to do, that so we may express our Liberality, not so much by way of Present, as by way of Recompence for his Trouble. We may thus consider his Pains above their strict worth, and he may receive our Generosity without blushing. This is a Course very pro­per toward those whom we employ in Labours of the Mind or Body; which require Applica­tion and Diligence. For these Services ought always to be considered, and let the Proportion be what it will, it hath the Face of a Reward, and not of a Charity. Though indeed few Acts of Charity are more truly such, or better contrived, than those which put a Man well Educated into a Way of getting his Livelihood by his Labour, and take care at the same time that he do not get it upon hard Terms. They that loiter about, and Beg, deserve to be shut up to hard Meat; but they who would fain be employed, and desire no more than to live by their Labour, deserve to be Assisted; because they are Serviceable to the Publick, to the ut­most of their Power. If their Work will not maintain them according to their Condition, they that set them on Work, should encou­rage and help them out. But alas! The Rich commonly go a contrary Course, and take uncreasonable Advantage of People's extreme [Page 186]Necessity, when they ask to be employed. They see them ready to perish, and willing to accept any Terms, rather than abandon them­selves to Beggery; and they think any price, or way enough to offer these poor laborious Wretches; nay, they think they oblige them when they employ them at Under-rates. These Men are so far from giving in secret, that they grind the Faces of the Poor openly; and all you can say of Chariry or Liberality, to Persons in extreme Distress is absolutely lost upon them.

But to return to the manner of Giving, Seneca lays down a Rule, instructing us, when it is our Duty to give publickly. ‘The Masters of Wisdom, he says, all agree in this; that some good Offices ought to be publick, and some private. Those should be publick, the receiving whereof is Creditable; as Dona­tives in War, Honours, and whatever is more valuable, by being more generally known. But then such as do not raise a Man's Character, but relieve his Weaknesses, or his Wants, or cover his Shame only, these should be managed with Secrecy.’ Praecipiunt omnes auctores sapientiae, quae dam beneficia palam danda, Cap. ix. quaedam secre­tò. Palam, quae cons [...]qui gloriosum est, ut militaria dona & honores, & quicquid aliud notitiâ pulchrius sit. Rursus, quae non producunt, nec honestiorem faciunt, sed occurcunt infirmitati, e [...]stati, igno­miniae▪ tac tò danda sunt. This Rule is chiefly calculated for Princes, and Persons of the first [Page 187]Quality, who have it in their Power to bestow such Favours, as may raise those out of the Extremity of Distress, whom they shall think worthy of their Relief. These Persons need not decline giving publickly, for fear of Ostentation; because, being in publick Posts themselves, and nicely observed by all the World, it is the greatest Scandal that can happen to them, and a thing of most pernicious Example to others for their Liberality not to be generally seen and known. There is not any Law of God or Man, which obliges them to be strait-handed in publick, or to deny that Relief before Men, which they design to bestow in secret afterwards; without letting People know whom the Persons so Relieved are beholding to. The only Case, in which this Management can be excused, is when the Presents are not answerable to the Quality of the Giver. If Princes will give no more than private Men, then indeed they are in the right to conceal their Gifts. But when they are Liberal in proportion to what should be ex­pected from that high Station and Power, then they do well to set Examples to the lower World, and to convince their People, how infinite an Esteem they have for this useful Virtue of Liberality.

The same Measures ought to be taken by private Persons, as oft as the not giving in publick, will draw upon them the Imputation of Covetousness, and encourage others to [Page 188]hold their Hand, after their Example. A Man indeed ought not Industriously to proclaim and make a Show of his Liberality, nor indeed of any good Action; but no more ought he affect Hard heartedness, and Niggardliness in Publick, for fear of having Vanity laid to his Charge by being otherwise.

V. The last Character of Liberality, con­cerns our Behaviour after the Exercise of it. This Discovers whether a Man have proceeded upon a true Principle of Beneficence, and from a Pleasure in doing good to those of the same Nature with himself, or out of Ostenta­tion. The First Rule to be observed upon this Occasion is, not to be Rigorous in requiring Thanks from the Persons obliged by us, nor so much as to suffer the Payment of them in any great Measure. For, if we are concerned at not being thanked, or pleased with fulsom Complements, it argues a desire of Praise to have lain at the bottom of our Actions. The truly Liberal Man thinks himself sufficiently paid by the Satisfaction of having done what became him. Not to mention at present the Recompence he may depend upon from our great Benefactor in Heaven, who never fails to make all such amends, as imitate the Free­dom of his Bounty. He stops their Acknow­ledgments in the middle; he declares he hath done less than he could wish, and than they who have been obliged by him, deserve. By this engaging manner, he enhances the value [Page 189]of his Kindness. ‘How Pleasant, how Grate­ful, how Obliging a thing is it to see a Man give, and not bear to be thanked for giving? Quàm dulc [...], quàm pret [...]sum est, si gratias sibi agi non passus est, Cap. vi. qui dedit!’

A Second Mark of true Liberality, is seldom to mention the Good it hath done, and in some sort to make the favour fresh by forgetting it. As he that hath received a Kindness should ne­ver forget or cease to publish it; so he that hath done one should no more speak of it, than if he knew of no such thing. ‘This is the Rule of good turns, Cap. x. The Giver should forget what he hath Given; and the Receiver should always remember what he hath Received.’ Haec beneficii inter duos Lex est. Alter statim debet oblivisci dati: Alter acceptinunquam. But they that do good only to be talked of, never let any occasion slip of making their own Pa­negyrick. If the Persons obliged by them fail in their Complements, they take care to refresh their Memory often, and sometime even re­proach their Insensibility.

Seneca says, that a Friend of Augu­stus having saved a Man's Life, Cap. xi. during the Propscription of the Triumvirate, told him of it so often, that the other at last could not forbear crying out; For God's sake deliver me up to Caesar. How long must I hear those up­brading words, You owe your Life to me? Upon which Passage Seneca Paraphraseth thus. ‘If [Page 190]you would let me remember it when I please, I would own my Life your Gift; but if I must remember it whenever you please, this very thing is Death to me. If you preser­ved me only that you might have a Man to carry about, and shew for one of your own saving, I am not at all obliged to you. When do you intend to leave off carrying me about for a Sight? Must I never be allowed to forget my ill Fortune? Istud si meo arbi­trio memini, Vitaest; si tuo, mors est.’ Nihil tibi debeo, si me servasti, ut haberes quem ostenderes. Quousque me circumducis? Quous (que) oblivisci for­tunae meae non sinis? After which he lays down these Directions, pertinent to the matter now in hand. ‘We should not make our Kindnes­ses the subject of Conversation. He that rubs up the Man he hath obliged, calls his Favour in again. He must not press, or re­fresh his Memory, except by some repeated Instance of Liberality. We should not talk of it to others. Let the Benefactor be silent, and let the Person obliged by him be left to declare his Engagements. Else that answer will be very proper, which a certain Person gave to a Man boasting how much he had done for him. Will you (says he) have the Confi­dence to prentend, that I have not discharged that Obligation? When I pray? (said he) Over and over (replyed the other) even as often, and in as many places as you have bragged of it. What need is there of mentioning these [Page 191]things? Why should you take another Man's Duty upon your self? There is one that can do this much more decently than you. And every time he speaks, your silence will be commended.’ I refer my Reader to the Au­thor for the Original Expressions; where he will find a great deal which it will not consist with my intended brevity to transplant into this Treatise.

After this I need not say, that it is a Third Mark of true Generosity, not to require any returns, except a Man be driven to such Cir­cumstances as to stand in great need of them. For otherwise, this is not Liberality, but Traf­fick and Exchange.

And hence arises a Fourth Character of a truly Liberal Mind, which is, Never to repent of the Good we have done, nor to be dissatisfied with the discharge of that Duty God and Na­ture require of us, though it should happen that we are paid with great Ingratitude; and ingrateful behaviour be in it self so very shock­ing a thing. The only cause for dissatisfaction in this case, is the injury such People do to themselves; and a Concern to see them in a Condition of Mind, so very displeasing to God, and so justly detested by Men. One proof of this is the pains taken by truly Liberal Persons to reduce these Wretches, and make them more sensible by new Favours, if they stand in need of such; and the forbearing all re­proaches, or any other way tempting them [Page 192]to suspect, that they are sorry for the good Offices done to them formerly. Though such have often met with base returns, they still persist in their Liberality; and had rather run the risque of being mistaken in a Thousand un­thankful Receivers, than omit doing good to One deserving Person. This the nearest ap­proach that Mortals can possibly make, to Him, whose Mercies are over all his Works; though much the greatest part of his Creatures never thank him as they ought. ‘If you would be like God, do good even to the un­thankful. The Sun rises upon the Evil as well as the Good; and the Seas are as open to Pirates, as to those that Sail with an ho­nest and useful Design.’ Sen. L. iv. C. 26. Si Deo [...]s imitaris da & ingratis Beneficium, Nam & secleratis Soloritur; & Pi­ratis patent maria. I could produce infinite passages of the same Author, but it is time to draw to a Conclusion, and my Reader will be better entertained by reading them in the Ori­ginal. It may perhaps be objected, that I have only quoted a Stoick, whose Virtue at the bottom was Vanity. But I answer, That if to his Precepts we add two things, which he speaks not of, great Improvement may be made of his Book. The One is, that God hath Com­manded us to apply our Minds to Virtue; the Other, that he will reward all those who do so with Eternal Happiness. Take but these two Principles along with you, and Seneca will be [Page 193]one of the best Books any Man can study. Men may, if they please, impute his Virtue to Vanity, and charge him with being guilty of it upon some occasions. I am content they should; provided they give evidence of as good Notions of their own, upon a Principle of Christianity; and act as regularly and as gene­rously as He did upon some other occasions. Let them urge, if they think fit, that he did not Practise his own Doctrine; provided a due sense of God's infinite Goodness, and the hope of immortal Happiness, prevail with them to live up to what Seneca taught. But nothing can be more ridiculous, than to betray No­tions more mean than those of Pagans, to be more Covetous, or more Proud and more Profuse than they; and at the same time to fall foul upon them, for Faults as much less than Ours, as our Means and Advantages are greater than Theirs.

CHAP. XIII. The Conclusion of this Discourse. Men's Ma­nagement of themselves in the business of Re­ligion compared with then's who put into Lot­teries.

From M. Pascal.

AFter so long a Digression upon Liberality, it is sit we come back to Lotteries once more, before we take our leave. These give a hint to one Reffection, which is perhaps of at least as great Concern, and as seasonable to some sort of Persons as all that hath been said of the true use that should be made of the Pro­fits arising from thence, and the true nature of Liberality. The Scepticks and Unbelievers, who blame none that put in to Lotteries, and who often put in themselves, would do well to proceed prudently, and act thus too with regard to the Promises of another Life, which Religion proposes to us. Mr. Pascal hath managed this Argument very ingeniously, Pensics. Ch. vii. and I cannot conclude my Book better, than by giving you his Thoughts in his own words. ‘It is certain, that either there is a God, or there is None. There can be no Medium. But which side of the Disjunction shall we incline to? Reason, you pretend, can determine nothing in the matter. [Page 195]There is a great Gulf betwixt. It is like a Play at an infinite distance, where it will be either Cross or Pile. What will you bett? By Reason (you say) you can affirm neither; by Reason too you can deny neither.’

‘Do not then find fault with them for choosing wrong, who have chosen their side already; for you cannot be sure that they have chosen amiss. No (say you) I do not blame them for choosing amiss, but for choosing at all. For he that takes Cross and he that takes Pile are both in fault; the true way had been not to bett at all.’

‘Nay, but you must bett on some side, you cannot help it. You are drawn in; and Not to bett that God is, is in effect to bett that he is not. Which side will you take now? Let us compute the Gain and the Loss that can come by taking that side, that God is. If you win, you win all; but if you lose, you lose nothing. Lay then that He is, and make no demur. Well I must lay; but perhaps I venture too much. Let that be considered then. Admitting it to be an e­qual Chance, whether you win or lose; though you could win no more than two Lives for one, it were certainly prudence to lay. But if you had a possibility of winning ten, it were very unwise not to venture your Life, where ten may be got for one, and where you have as fair a Chance for Win­ning as for Losing. But in this Case you [Page 196]may win an infinite number of Lives, and those too infinitely Happy, and you are as likely to win these as not: And what you stake is so inconsiderable in Value, and so short in duration, that it is monstrously foolish not to venture it all upon this Occasion.’

‘It is to no purpose to object, that the Gain is uncertain, but the Hazard you run certain; and that the infinite distance which there is between the Certainty you venture, and the Uncertainty of that which you may win, is a Consideration equivalent to the finite Good, which you certainly risque; and the infinite Good which you are not certain of winning. This Matter is far o­therwise. Every Man that plays, ventures a Certainty which is his, for an Uncer­tainly which only may be his. And yet he ventures a certain Finite, in hopes to win an uncertain Finite, without being thought to act unreasonably. So that here is not an infinite distance between the Certainty of the Venture, and the Un­certainty of the Gain. This is not rightly computed. I allow indeed, that there is an infinite distance between the Certain­ty of winning, and the Certainty of loosing. But the Uncertainty is proportionate to the Certainty of that which we stake ac­cording to the Proportion of the Chances for winning and losing. So that if the [Page 197]number of Chances be equal on either side, the Party plays Equal against Equal, and then the Certainty of what he ven­tures, is so far from being infinitely Dis­proportionate, that it is exactly equal to the Uncertainty of the Gain. Thus our Proposition is of infinite Force, where a Man hath really a Finite to venture, and an Infinite to win; and all this at a Play, where he stands every whit as fair for winning as losing. This is plain De­monstration, and if Men be capable of understanding any Truths, they must needs comprehend this.’

‘I own (say you again) that they who live in a good hope of Salvation, are in a very comfortable State; but then there is a terrible Counterbalance to damp this, from the fear of Hell. Very well. But who, I beseech you hath most cause to be afraid of Hell? The Man that does not know or believe there is a Hall, and is sure to be damned, if there be one; or he who lives in a certain Perswasion that there is a Hell, and in hopes of Hea­ven and Salvation, if there be any such thing?’

‘That Man, who had but a Week to live, and should imagine that the Believers in this case were not the bet­ter side, would have utterly lost all Sense and Judgment. And yet if our [Page 198]Passions did not enslave and impose upon us, One Week and a hundred Years would plainly appear to be the same thing, to Men who must die at one time or o­ther.’

‘Besides what Inconvenience shall you sustain by taking this side of the Betts? You will be a Man of exact Fidelity and Honesty, Humility and Meekness, Grati­tude and Beneficence, Sincerity and Truth. Tis true indeed; you will not abandon your self to pestilent invenomed Pleasures, to Vain-Glory, or filthy Delights. But will there be no other Satisfactions to make you amends? Yes, I do faithfully assure you, that you will be a Gainer even in this Life; and every step you advance in this way, a new Prospect will open and discover to you so great a Certainty of winning hereafter, and such Vanity and Worthlesness in the Stake you venture, that you will be sensible at last, that you have Betted for a certain and an infinite Prosit, and that what you have parted with to obtain it is a very Nothing.’

Now though M. Pascal do not indeed make use of the word Lottery in these Reflections, yet the whole Passage manifestly turns up­on the Supposition of some thing very like that. And were the thing necessary, the Thought throughout might with great ease be expressed in Terms, which have a greater [Page 199]Affinity to Lotteries. But I think it better to conclude all, with this one Admonition, to all those who are of Mr. Pascal's side al­ready, and make no doubt of Heaven and another World, and who in this Perswasion, venture, and win in Lotteries, viz. That Li­berality and Charity are absolutely necessary to Entitle them to those blessed Mansions. They who neglect these Duties, do not only run a Risque, but are infallibly certain of being excluded from the Regions of Bliss; and they who make such use of their Advantages, as they ought, (shall according to that Pro­mise of the Gospel) not sail to lay up for themselves a sure and lasting Treasure in Heaven.