SO soon as some indispencible occasions would permit▪ I did at your instance, strictly peruse the Pamphlet, called The present Interest of England stated; as also, the Letter di­rected to Sir Thomas Osborne in answer to it, and at your re­quest, shall now give you my sense of both.

I find no Cause by the scope of the Letter, to believe other­wise of the Author, then according to his own Professions, that he really designs the Honour, Greatness, and Prospe­rity of this Natoin. An Honest, and Honourable under­taking, the perfect discovery whereof, I wish may be pur­sued, by men of leasure, and put in practice by those of Power.

I understand the Letter, to agree fully with the Pamphlet in all its Maxims, relating to our domestick Interest, not differ­ing neither from our Forrein in anything, save what re­lates to Holland, and therein likewise, not in all, but only in some particulars, but in several of them; I observe also the Author of the Pamphlet, to be by the Letter exceedingly mista­ken; [Page 2] for whereas it renders him so Byassed with affection to the Dutch, as makes him overlook the usefulness of Forreign Alliances. I cannot [...], but [...] grounds all he writes concerning Holland, upon the safety and benefit of England, insomuch as it seems strange to me▪ how a person of that Candor and Ingenuity as the [...] of the Letter must be, sh [...] so for [...] the world that the Pamphlet he answereth, pleadeth

First, For allowing all the injuries and wrongs done by the Hollanders to this Nation, (Page 5.)

Secondly, For the studying of their Interests, and loving of them, because they [...] Trades, though by being so, they take our Trade from us, (Page 5, 6.)

And Thirdly, That their Parsimonie is no good Reason for dislike of them, (Page 6.) As if all these were Arguments made use of by express words in that Book, when I do not find any expressions relating to any of these particulars, that do either in words say so much, or will in the least admit of any such Inferences or Conclusions; (although as to this Third, if there were any word to that purpose, it might be defended) For all the Arguments made use of by the Pam­phlet, against the destroying of the Hollanders, are either upon the account of Justice and Righteousness, (which establish­eth a Nation) or clearly in reference to the safety and utility of this Kingdom, both in Church and State, and not in the least, upon any particular affection to the people of that Countrey, as the Letter doth insinuate the Pamphlet; being no otherwise concerned for them, then as it is, for preserving the Bal­lance of Christendome, in opposition of Popery and Slavery.

I find the Pamphlets commendning the Dutch for their Morals, (compared with the French, &c.) to be answered by ob­jecting, that if the Author had lain but one night in any Inn of theirs, he would have been convinced of the contrary, which implyeth, that he had never done it, or at least ne­ver [Page 3] told the world he had, and yet the Book justifies his opi­nion of them in affirming his experience, from having travel­led their Countries; (Interest of England Page 30.) and truly by his general knowledge of the Netherlands, he may well be supposed to have throughly done it, and granting so much, it consequently follows, that he must then have ex­perienced their Inns, but if from Cousening, and Cheating▪ in Inns, Alehouses, and Taverns, the measures of a peoples Mo­rals, must be Calculated, I fear, some other Countries, by high reckonings, false measures, in Bottles, Pots and Cans; exceeding them, and tacitly allowed of, &c. will be found as faulty as they, and to lie (at least) equally with them, under the burden of that uncharitable Syne [...]do [...]he, of blaming the whole for a part; for I can my self by experience, so far joyn with the Pamphlet in justifying of it, as to aver, That I never trevelled in all my life, in any Countrey so cheap as in theirs, and that no private person doth other­wise, but either voluntarily, by being profuse, or carelesly in spending more then he needeth, in not keeping to his ordina­ries, but living at large; for their Rates by Land or Water, are so certain, that none can pay one more then another, and the like is in their Inns, for Ordinaries and Lodgings; in­somuch that I have often wondered their great Trade and Populousness (which in all other places makes things dear) considered, I found living there so cheap as I did. But as no number or society of men, can be said to be perfectly good, or altogether evil; so the most just and certain Rule for applauding, or condemning any Countrey, is not from a few Instances of a small part of it, but by way of Comparison with other Countries, and by that Standard, Holland cannot be found by much, so bad as Popish Countries, where the Do­ctrines of the Jesuits (which hath more or less an influence upon most of their Religion) of good Intentions, Probability, and Necessity, &c. and of their whole Church, of keeping no [Page 4] faith with Heriticks, &c. is inconsistant with honest Conver­sation, rendering them unfit, even for one anothers Society, there being no fence against such Principles.

The Cruelty at Amboina, is (I confess] to be had by all in abhorrence; but since it was before we were born, that it was acted but by a few, and disowned, and not justified at home. That King James of happy memory, and his wise and excellent Council, and Favourites, thought therefore not fit to revenge it; and that it hath since, by several trea­ties, been buried, and put in Oblivion; I question whether we ought still to remember it; but provided, that the con­stant Trade that the Popish Nations have (in all ages down to our times) driven in Massakres, and Cruel Torterings, and that with the applause, and approbation of their chief Bishop and Church, as Italy, Savoy, France and Ireland do wit­ness, may be remembered; I can be well pleased, that that single Act at Amboina, committed by a few Protestants condemned by the rest, and which is abhorred by the Principles of their Religion, may not be forgotten; and thereupon the whole designs of the Pamphlet and Letter, each severally considered, I cannot observe, that they differ in any Material Circumstance, but that both aim at the same end, the Honour, Greatness, Prosperity and safety of this Nation, unless the first is too straight laced in the Rules of Honesty and Justice; believing (that though Interest right­ly understood or mistaken, governs all the world yet) that that precept of doing to others, as we would have them to do to us, gives no latitude to any Countrey to destroy another, to the end to increase their own Trade, or greatness; for were it otherwise, nothing could be more for our security against Invasions, and the profit of England, then to destroy in time the French in their Shipping, and thereby in their Maritine Commerce, before they are overgrown in strength and Trade, in both, which from young Interlopers, they are [Page 5] in a short time too much increased, especially in our New­foundland Fishery, where they have almost eaten us out, to the unspeakable prejudice of the Western Parts! though that Trade was once our greatest Nursery for Seamen, and might have been much more improved, and is of such a Nature, as the Dutch were not capable of doing us much prejudice in, or at least as they never attempted to do us any.

The Letter reproves the Pamphlets inviting all Princes into the triple League, scoffing at it, as absurd; the League being now determined, and to evince the error, gives this account of the League: That the French King being entered Flanders, with a very powerful Army, the Kings of England, Sweden, and the States of Holland, entered into a confederacy, with de­sign to force the French to make peace upon such Tearms as should be proposed by them, (and therein wisely to prevent the grow­ing greatness of France) and at the same time the Confede­rates made Articles amongst themselves, to help one another, in Case any of them should be invaded for having made this League) either by the French King, the King of Spain, or any of their Allies, and upon the acceptance of the Articles proposed, the Confederates became their Guarranty or Sureties; for per­formance of them on both sides.

And now, this being the state of the Case, where the Absur­dity or Bull lies, in making no distinction between the Triple League, and the Guarranty of the Peace, is beyond my apprehen­sion; for the League, as is confessed being made to induce (that is to force) the French King to a Peace, (the King of Spain, who was Invaded, standing in no need of Compulsion) and the Confederacy continuing for wartanting of the said agreement (which in effect is no less then an honest and prudent League, for keeping the French, within tollerable bounds and limits) and for the assistance of each other against any that should endeavour to revenge this consederacy; the Triple League seems to me (as it is confessed by the Letter it self, at the [Page 6] lower end of Page 15.) to be still in being, and the expressi­on to be as properly used, as that of Guarranty, as being one and the same thing; for the Guarranty, aiming at the same end the League doth, and being one Article of the confede­racy, the Triple League must be still in being, as well as the Guarranty, And surely, it was the last Session of Parliament. thought so to be, when Money was desired for maintaining of it; but this, Sir, is not worth contending about; for the matter being clearly laid down by the Letter, the judgment of it is left to your self.

As I am no Statist, nor pretender to it, so it concerns not me to inquire further into the Articles agreed on by his Ma­jesty with the Swede and Dutch, then is made publick, nor in the least to attempt the Censuring any Action of State; (for that shall always be Forreign to me) but yet I pre­sume I may without offence say, it doth not appear to me, as it doth to the Author of the Letter, that the Emperor and Princes of Germany, could not have been taken into the Triple League by the Confederates, without ingaging to assist them upon occasion against the Turk; for as we find that it hath been ordinary for Princes to limit and proportion their Leagues, according to their Interests, so it is irrational to do otherwise; And it doth not follow, that because it is the Interest of the Emperour, and Princes of Germany, to enter into a League with other Princes, for keeping the French King from unjustly incroaching upon his Neighbours, that therefore those Princes, contrary to their manifest should enter into a League with them against the Turk▪ but I Honour the Author of the Letter, for the care he expresseth to have for the prevention of War to this Nation, and for the rest and quiet of the poor people of England, (Page [...])

The Pamphlet not being concerned in the complaint against those that blame the breach with Holland▪ because of the Triple League, I shall pass that over, agreeing fully [Page 7] with the Author, that self-preservation is chiefly to be pre­ferred, [...] Populi suprema lex.

The Author of the Letter, in his treating of the Interest of England, hath several Observations, and Notions, deser­ving consideration, which I shall reduce to these six heads following.

First, That our increase in power, since the time of Queen Elizabeth, (of famous memory) is not proportionable to the in­crease of the Dutch, (Page 12.)

Secondly, That the Dutch, being so powerful at Sea as they now are, may by ioyning with the French, (whenever they will agree upon it) endanger the Conquest of England; and keeping to themselves the most confiderable parts in it for Trade, being Masters at Sea, provide for their own security against the great­ness of France, (Page 12.)

Thirdly, That it is not wisdom for any Nation to have its safety depend upon the prudence of another, as in relying upon its being against the Interest of Holland to Invade England, because they may mistake their Interest, (Page 12.)

Fourthly, That a Conquest of England being made, the Dutch Government being more easie and indulging Trade, then the Arbitrary and severe Regiment of France, as also their Re­ligion concurring more with ours, then that of France, the Trading Party of England would be likelier to close with the first then the latter, and for the like Reason should Holland be ever in danger of a Conquest by the Conjunction of England with France, they would rather choose to become part of the English Government, then submit to the power of France: For that their joyning with us, and therein making it, as much our Interest to promote their Trade, as the Trade of any other Nation, may answer that Obie­ction, That their fear of our obstructing their Trade, will make them averse to us, (Page 13.)

[Page 8] Fifthly, That it is not probable, that the Dutch will ever agree to put themselves under the Dominion of the French, who will not trust them without such advantages as may compel them to observe their promises, as the other will never give them such a power, least they should make a corrupt use of it, (Page 14.)

Sixthly, That considering the Situation and Constitutions of England, a Coalition with us would prove more acceptable and advantagious to them, then any tearms they can expect from the French, and that should we get no more then the Maritine Towns, and the French all the rest of the States Dominions, we should have no cause to repent our Bargain, (Page 14.)

These Notions contain the substance of that part of the Letter, which treats of the Interest of England; the first of which I must not at present deny, because the Auxiliary assistance which we have received from France, seems to make it good; yet the Story of 88. acquaints us, that the States in thosetimes with 35. Men of War, Blocked up Dun­kirk, and the Duke of Parma's Navy in it, to the great service of England; but it is certain, that all Nations will increase, or decline more or less, according as their Interest is pursued, and their Government suted to it, which happily is the Cause why none can be said to have out-done the States of Holland (their low beginnings considered) in increase in Trade and Riches; but if augmentation in Territories, and power be a Crime, it is one that France is more guilty of then the United Netherlands, and ought therefore to be looked upon with a more jealous Eye? for the natural ad­vantages that we have of the Dutch in the Situation of our Countrey, and the greatness of it; in the goodness and num­ber of our Havens and Ports, to breed Seamen, and Har­bour Ships, are such, as appears to me to render it impossi­ble for them, ever to become our superiours at Sea ( as is suggested by the Letter, Page 11.)

[Page 9]As to the second assertion, or head, I must in that crave leave to dissent, without granting the question (which is begged) that Holland, whilst in liberty, might be under a likelyhood of agreeing with France for the Conquest of England, the thing seeming to me to be morally im­possible.

First, From their want of people, especially fit for War, their Dominions being small, and furnished much with strangers, and altogether with Traders, Circumstances which no Countrey must be under, that designs Forrein Con­quests or Invasions.

Secondly, From the Nature of their Government, in its being no more then an Vnion of several absolute Sovereign­ties, for common defence and preservation, which is a quali­ty not fit for acquisitions, in that the difficulty in satisfying every concern upon the good success of their Arms, and the many occasions that would arise from thence of differences amongst them, renders it impracticable.

Thirdly, From the impossibility of the French, and their agreement upon the Division of England; for that it is not to be imagined, but each of them would be jealous of the o­thers increase in Territories and Power, and that the States would have no more cause to presume upon their over­witting the French, in getting to themselves the most con­siderable places in it for Trade, (as is supposed by the Letter Page 12.) then the French in over-reaching them, who have always been wise enough in Treaties; For that an increase in the French Monarchy would be more dangerous to the States, then the like in the States would be to them, who are already the others overmatch, and it cannot with reason but be supposed, that in the Division of England, the French would on the one hand have an Eye at supplying themselves with that they only want, for making them uncontrollable in the world, good Havens and Ports, and also on the other [Page 10] hand, that the Dutch would never yield unto that, that would destroy them. But if England had reason to be jea­lous of France and Hollands Conjunction, in order to the Conquest of it: (as the Letter suggests) I fear with the same reason France will be jealous of Englands impatronizing Holland, as being as well unwilling to have the Dominion of the Seae so much undivided in the hands of any one Lord, as all the rest of Europe cannot check it, as we are to have the Dominion of the Land in the like kind under any other Lord or Prince▪

To the Third ascertion, I have not any thing to object in opposition, nothing being more ordinary in the world then gross mistakes in the Interest of Countries, proceeding often from passion, revenge, and disordered affections; yet this may be said in the Case, that the States were such great Masters in the knowledge of their civil Interests, that none might have been safelier trusted upon that account then they.

To the Fourth head or assertion, I have only this to answer, that as it is natural for all Rational Creatures, of two evils to choose the least, so supposing, that the States being reduced to a necessity of parting with their own Government, will have the Election of their new Lords in their own power; and taking it for granted, that they are men of some Conscience and Religion, (though some deny them to be so) I do fully agree with the Author of the Letter in his opinion, that they will in such Case choose rather the English, then the severe Government of the French, unless the consideration (in their partial opinion) of who is best able to protect their Country, do not prevail with them, to trust the French King in point of Religion; but I very much question, whether it is not ground­less to suppose, that any Nation being attacked by two great Monarchs, will have the choice of their own Masters left to themselves, by a mutual agreement betwixt those Monarchs, without which it cannot be; but I highly esteem the Author of [Page 11] the Letter, for the true sense he expresseth to have of the French Government, from which the Lord in Mercy deliver all other Countries.

The Fifth assertion, is a supposition that the Dutch will have it in their choice, to trust the French or not, and in such Case I am of opinion with the Letter, that they will never do it, Spain, Lorrain, and the Protestants of France, being a sufficient warning to them; but as Affairs now stand, I very much fear they will not have the Election of it in their own hands.

The Sixth assertion, though as most Weighty, deserveth most Consideration; yet for the first part of it, whether England admitting the Dutch to a Coalition, would be of more advantage to them then any tearms they can expect from the French. I will not dispute, but am much of be­lief, that the French Councils, considering that they want nothing to facilitate their universal design more then an Interest in the Northern Seas, where they might Harbour, and form an Navy, nourish and breed Seamen, and likewise consi­dering, that the Maritine Towns of Holland, Zealand and Friezland, would signifie nothing without Trade; but in dan­ger of being swallowed up by the Sea, for want of ability to maintain the Banks against it, nor Trade signifie any thing without liberty, they would soon find it necessary as to their Interest, to wave the French Principles for arbitrary Government, and to leave the Dutch in a great measure of freedom, relying only upon Cittadels, for keeping them dependant upon them, and forcing them upon occasion to be useful to them, as judging that the best way to serve themselves of them, least otherwise by severity, they should provoke the dispersing the Inhabitants to Emden, Bremen, Hambourg, Lubeck and Dantzic, &c. the four first being Imperial Free Cities, and the latter the same under [Page 12] Poland; for arbitrary Government, (that must be main­tained by the Sword) and the idle Callings and rude man­ners of Souldiers, which are altogether inconsistant with, and Enemies to Trade and Commerce, will always cause Traders to change bondage for liberty, or at least in hopes of better entertainment one Countrey for another, as did the subversion of the Florentine Government in that Countrey; and as they were preparing to do the like in Holland, when they feared the late Prince of Oreng's over-turning that State, for the Antipathy betwixt Merchants and Souldiers is such, that all Monarchs of Trading Countries have ever held it their Interest, to keep their great Trading Towns free from a Mercinary Militia, and it is exceeding difficult, if not Morally impossible for a Prince to advance Trade to any great height, where the people are under the awe of a standing Military power; and the French King seems to own the truth of this, in that finding the benefit of Commerce, he is even in France content that his Trading Cities should be freed from Souldiers, and more gently used then the rest of his Countrey; for so far as the Nature of his arbi­trary Government will permit, he studieth all manner of wayes to advance Trade.

As first, by totally prohibiting such Forrein Commodities, and Manufactures, as his people are capable of making, sufficient to serve his Countrey, as Train-Oyl, &c.

Secondly, By burthening others with high Customs and Impo­sitions, to the end to incourage his own Artisans and Sea­men, thereby making the Trade of England thither very prejudicial to us, our Transportations hence being inconsi­derable to our Importations thence, and as they improve in any faculty, so they either prohibit or increase their impo­sitions, upon the Importation of the Forrein-made Commo­dities of that faculty.

[Page 13]And Thirdly, as an incouragement to Trade, the French King hath lately declared the exercise of Commerce in a Gentleman, to be no prejudice to his quality, having also e­rected an Academy for breeding his Nobility to Sea Affairs▪ and teaching them the Art of Navigation, &c. All which may well Alarm England to a jealousie of their designs as most dangerous to it, and to look upon the French, as those Rivals, whom (if hatred be lawful, as the Letter in this Case seems to make it) we ought most to hate; for should they once come to Vie with us in Trade or Naval strength, we should find them to exceed all that ever went before them, in insolency, injustice, and selfishness.

And whether the second part of this Notion hath a good foundation, which asserts, That should England get but the Sea Towns alone, leaving the rest of the States Dominions, to the French, we should have no cause to repent our Bargain. I will not presume to judge, yet this I think considerable in the Case, that should the Inlands of the Vnited Provinces, and with them all the Conquered places fall to the share of the French, as by the late published Proposals in Dutch (if true) they seem to pretend unto the Latter; then having thereby the command of the Rivers of Rhine and Mase, &c. together with Sluce, and the other Garrisons which shuts up the Trade of Flanders and Brabant, they will have it in their power to render all the parts of the Seventeen Pro­vinces, which will remain to the Kings of England and Spain of no more use to them, then they please to allow of.

First, Because the Sea Towns of the Vnited Nether­lands, cannot be divided from the Inlands, from which they receive their nourishment, nor deprived of the use of their Rivers, by which they drive their Trades without utter ruine to them, and making them thereby an intollera­ble burthen to their Masters.

[Page 14] Secondly, Because the Spanish Netherlands will thereby be so invironed, or rather be leagured by the French Garrisons and Forces on all sides, as well towards Germany, Holland, and Zealand, &c. as towards France, that having no means left them, for forming or maintaining an Army, (as any that know those Countries must confess) they will always be in the French Kings devotion, and when assaulted by him, without possibility of contributing any considerable assistance to their own deliverance, or to make the Triple League of any use to them,

Thirdly, Because such will be the enervated condition of the Spanish Netherlands, that the King of Spain will be ne­cessitated, as not being able to maintain them longer then the French will permit him, either to quit them voluntarily, or (if he can obtain so much favour) to make an exchange or sale of them to the French King, who then having Flanders and Brab [...]nt, (which he hath so long thirsted after) and all the Rivers belonging to them in his own hands, will assured­ly for the advantage of himselfe, and his own Countries even in times of peace, so obstruct and hinder the Trade of the Maritine Towns of Holland, Zealand and Friezland, (if in the possession of any but himself) and in times of War totally shut them up by Land) as will restore Flanders and Brabant to their ancient Trade, and make a new Holland of them, which being in the hands of the French, will probably prove abundantly worse to England then the old, if large experience of injuries and injustices, committed in Trade by them against this Nation, may warrant a Conclusion, as by the Certifi­cate under the Lord Ambassador Hollis his hand, (which I send you here inclosed) given upon an order of his Maje­sties Privy Council, Dated the 17. April 1667. in the Case of Sir Francis Toppe, and Company, doth for one instance sufficiently appear.

[Page 15]Nay, such is the envious care of the French, that no Na­tion should get or thrive by them, that (as Mr. Samuel Fortrey, one of the Gentlemen of his Majesties Privy Chamber, re­porteth in his Book Printed 1663. and Dedicated to King Charles the second) not many years ago, they suspecting (through mistakes) that England had an advantage of them in their Trade for France, they were upon Counsels for prohibiting all Trade with England, until upon a strict examination, they found, that whereas England vented of their Commodities into France, not to above the value of Ten hundred thousand Pounds per annum; France vented of theirs to the English Six and twenty hundred thousand pounds; and then finding that they had Sixteen hundred thousand Pounds advantage in the Ballance, they soon let fall their design, though yet not without burthening English Manufactures with New Impositions, in such manner, as might much hinder the vent of them in their Countrey. And Mr. Fortrey in the aforementioned Book, doth not only recite the very Ballance of Trade it self, which he affirms was presented to the French King, to shew the advantage they have in their Trade with England; but also adds further, that hereby it may appear, how insensibly our Treasure will be exhausted, and the Nation beggered, whilst we care­lesly neglect our own Interest, and strangers abroad are dili­gent to make their advantage by us.

And it is of no little consideration, that the French should so far overvalue themselves, as to increase their Impositi­ons upon Dutch Commodities, to a degree of prohibiting▪ them, and deny to the Dutch the like power by theirs, as if they had a right to deal as they please towards other Nations, and yet none to do towards them (by way of Re­talliation) any more then they shall think fit to give them leave to do, an over weening opinion of their own greatness, [Page 16] which all Princes and States ought to be jealous of, as not knowing where their ambition will end.

And besides these things thus instanced in, we have great cause to take notice, that as the effect of the implacable hatred of the French to our Nation, they cannot forbear in their writings to express their inveterate malice against us, as that Book called le Politique de France, writ in the year 1669▪ and Dedicated to the French King, is a pregnant Testimony, where no better Epithetes are allowed us, then being without friends, without faith, without Religion, without honesty, without any justice, of defying or provoking Natures, light or unconstant to the highest degree, cruel, impatient, gluttons, proud, audatious and covetous, proper for ready execution and assaults; but uncapable of managing a War with judgment, with other such like opprobrious and reproachful expressi­ons, besides a Method propounded to be observed in order to the Conquest of England, Page 158, 159, 160, 161. e­nough to raise a lawful indignation in all true Englishmen, a­gainst such insolent slanderers, who by their impudence, endeavour to impose their own Characters upon in, con­trary to the known experience of the rest of the world.

And now Sir I have no more to add then (all Circumstances considered) my agreement with the Pamphlet in this Prin­ciple, that while France is so great as at present, it can in no kind be for the safety of England to subvert Holland and Zea­land, &c. which are properly called their out-guards or works against all Invasions, and cannot be demolished, or in the hands of the French, without laying England naked, or at least the more open to that Nation, and that nothing is more demonstrable, then that since the United Provinces cannot signifie much without freedom, they will under their own Government be of most use to all Christendome, (save France, who only wants them as a qualification for threatning, in­stead of courting their Neighbours,) in maintaining the [Page 17] general Ballance of Europe, even as it was great wisdom in the long Parliament (for the wickedest of men may have worldly prudence) to joyn with Holland in the preserving of Den­mark, as necessary for the Ballancing of Sweden, when Cromwel (in his time) in revenge of manifest affronts, and hatred had designed the ruine of the Dane.

And thus Sir, having in obedience to your Commands, given you freely my sense of the Pamphlet and Letter, with­out varying from the matter in either; as it is in them respe­ctively stated, I hope you will pardon any thing wherein I may differ with you in judgment or opinion; for I have this for my Buckler, that what I have writ is Truth, and that I aim at nothing in it, but the true Interest of the King and King­dom of England, and Protestant Religion, denying that any can have more Cordial affection for them, then my self, who am &c.