REMARKS UPON Dr. Sherlock's late Book, ENTITULED, The Case of Resistance of the Supreme Powers; Stated and Resolved, according to the Doctrine of the Holy Scriptures.
THE Case which the Title of this Book promises to Resolve, is a very plain Case, and soon resolved: for it never was made a Question, Whether Men might lawfully Resist any Legal Subordinate Powers, much less the Supreme Powers; and they [Page 2] are ordinary Readers indeed, that are to be instructed, That Resistance is unlawful in this Case.
But under the shelter and countenance of this plain and unquestioned Case, and under the covert of these Names, Sovereign, King, Prince, Authority, and the like, this Author has slily convey'd into his Book the Resolution of another Case, of a far different nature; and determines, That as well inferiour Magistrates as others, imploy'd by a Popish or Tyrannical Prince in the most illegal and outragious Acts of Violence, such as cutting of Throats, or the like, are as Irresistible as the Prince himself, (under pretence of having the Prince's Commission and Authority to do these Acts) and must be submitted to, under pain of Hell and Eternal Damnation.
I fully agree with this Author in his Resolution of the first Case, but I crave leave to dissent from him in the Resolution of the latter Case; and to enter the Reasons of my dissent.
[Page 3]But though I agree with him in his Resolution of the first Case, yet I do not in his Reasons of that Resolution, which are utterly insufficient, and betray the Cause which he seems to maintain. His Reasons why the King is Irresistible in all Cases, are such as these: Pag. 196, 197, &c. 1. That the King has a Personal Authority, antecedent to all the Laws of the Land, independent on them, and superiour to them. Which is not true; for the King is King by Law, and Irresistible by Law, and has his Authority from the Law. Indeed our Author says, That the Great Lawyer Bracton, by those very words of his, Lex facit Regem, Pag. 196. was far enough from understanding that the King receives his Sovereign Power from the Law. I confess I never was so well acquainted with Bracton, as to know what secret meanings he had, contrary to the sense of his words, and therefore cannot tell how far he was from understanding that the King receives his Sovereign Power from the Law; but I am sure he was not far from saying so; for he says it in the very next words: Attribuat igitur [Page 4] Rex Legi quod Lex attribuit ei, videlicet, Dominationem & Potestatem. He proves, that the King is under the Law, and ought to govern by Law, because he is made King by the Law, and receives his Power and Authority from the Law; and then adds what this Author is pleased to cite, Non est enim Rex, ubi dominatur Voluntas, & non Lex: He is no King who governs by Arbitrary Will, and not by Law; that is, no lawful English King, Bracton must mean; for still he may be a good outlandish and Assyrian King, and no Tyrant, though his Arbitrary Will does all. For our Author ( pag. 41.) quotes out of Dan. 5. 18, 19. That God gave Nebuchadnezzar such an Absolute Kingdom, that whom he would he slew, and whom he would he made alive; and whom he would he set up, and whom he would he pulled down. And I hope no Man tyrannizes over his People, who uses the Prerogatives which God has given him; tho' He does over Authors, who quotes what he will, and suppresses what he will, and construes them how he will, and renders [Page 5] Lex facit Regem, To govern by Law, makes a Sovereign Prince a King, and distinguishes him from a Tyrant; which will pass with none but such Ordinary Readers as he writ his Book for, and who never saw Bracton.
Chancellor Fortescue likewise says, That a Limited Monarch receives his Power a Populo efluxam, which unriddles our Author's Riddle in the same place, How the Law can make the King, when the King makes the Law? But is it such a wonderful thing, that there should be a Law to create a King, and to enable him so far in the making of Laws, as to make his Consent necessary to the Being of all future Laws? Was it not thus when the Two Houses were erected, and endowed with the like Power? For our Author says amiss, when he says, The Law has no Authority, but what it receives from the King: for the Laws are made Authoritate Parliamenti, which is by the Authority of the King, Lords, and Commons.
[Page 6]But, to lay aside Bracton and Fortescue at present, let us a little reason the matter. This Personal Authority of the King, antecedent to all the Laws of the Land, independent on them, and superiour to them: whence is it? Has He a Throne like God? Is he of Himself, and for Himself? Or has he a Personal Authority from God, antecedent to Laws, to be a King? Then shew a Revelation from God where he is named. Or has he the Natural Authority of a Father to govern his Children? Then it must be proved that he has begotten his Three Kingdoms, and all the People in all other His Majesty's Dominions? Or has he a Personal Patriarchal Authority, which is set up as a Shadow of the Authority of a Father, whereby the eldest Son is his Father by Representation? Then it must be proved, that the King is the Eldest Son of the Eldest House of all the Families of the Earth. Or were Mankind made in the day of their Creation, by Nations, and created Prince and People, as they were created Male and Female? But if none of [Page 7] these things can be said, then it remains, that a Civil Authority, that is, a mutual Consent and Contract of the Parties, first founded this Civil Relation of King and Subject, as we see it every day does of Master and Servant, which is another Civil Relation; and that the Consent of a Community or Society, is a Law, and the Foundation of all Civil Laws whatsoever, is proved beyond all Contradiction by Mr. Hooker, Eccl. Pol. Lib. 1. Cap. 10.
And as this Personal Authority of the King, which is antecedent to all the Laws of the Land, and independent on them, is airy and imaginary, and has no Foundation, but is of this Author's own making: so he has been pleased to make it very large and lawless; and though he be but a Subject, yet, like Araunah the Iebusite, he gives like a King. For it is a Personal Authority Superiour to the Laws of the Land, whereby all manner of Arbitrary Acts are binding; whereby the Prince may trample upon all the Laws, [Page 8] and in vertue whereof he still governs, in the violation of all these Laws, by which he is bound to govern: Whereas the Law of England absolutely denies that the King has any such Personal Authority. For, not to mention King Edward's Laws, Chap. 17th, De Officio Regis, which were confirmed by William the Conqueror, and sworn to by all succeeding Kings; nor to mention the Mirror, which page 8. gives us a far different account of things; nor to mention Magna Charta, which Chap. 37. says, That if any thing be procured by any person, contrary to the Liberties contained in that Charter, it shall be had of no force or effect: So that a Personal Authority, which can trample upon the Liberties of the Subject, and violate the Laws, is an Authority of no force nor effect, a void Authority, or, in other words, it is nothing. I say, not to insist upon any of these, I shall quote some passages out of my Lord Chancellor Fortescue, where he professedly handles the difference betwixt [Page 9] an Absolute Monarchy, and a Limited Monarchy; and after he has shewn the different Original of them, he thus proceeds in the 13th Chap. ‘Now you understand, most Noble Prince, the form of Institution of a Kingdom Politick, ( or limited Monarchy) whereby you may measure the Power, which the King thereof may exercise over the Law, and Subjects of the same. For such a King is made and ordained for the Defence of the Law of his Subjects, and of their Bodies and Goods, whereunto he receiveth Power of his People; so that he cannot govern his People by any other Power.’ To whom the Prince thus answer'd, in the 14th Chap. ‘You have, good Chancellor, with the clear light of your Declaration, dispelled the Clouds wherewith my Mind was darkened; so that I do most evidently see, that no Nation did ever of their own voluntary mind incorporate themselves into a Kingdom, for any other intent, but only to the end that they might enjoy [Page 10] their Lives and Fortunes (which they were afraid of losing) with greater security than before. And of this intent, should such a Nation be utterly defrauded, if then their King might spoil them of their Goods, which before was lawful for no Man to do. And yet should such a People be much more injured, if they should afterwards be Governed by foreign and strange Laws, yea, and such as they peradventure deadly hated and abhorred; and most of all, if by those Laws their Substance should be diminished, for the safegaurd whereof, as also for the security of their Persons, thcy of their own accord submitted themselves to the Governance of a King. No such Power for certain could proceed from the People themselves; and yet unless it had been from the People themselves, such a King could have had no Power at all over them.’
Now this Discourse of the Institution of a Political Kingdom was to shew the Prince of Wales, that he [Page 11] ought to study the Laws of England, and not the Civil Laws, by which an English King cannot Govern; whereof the Prince stood in doubt, Chap. 9. But now you see that Cloud is dispelled, and he is convinced by this, That a Political Kingdom cannot be govern'd by foreign and strange Laws, which had signified nothing toward his Conviction, if England were not a Political Kingdom. And I think there cannot be a plainer Comment upon those former words of Bracton ( Lex facit Regem, attribuat igitur Rex Legi quod Lex attribuit ei, videli et, Dominationem & Potestatem, &c.) than this Discourse of Fortescue is.
2. Another Reason which he gives why the King is Irresistible in all Cases, is, Because he is a Sovereign, and it is essential to Sovereignty to be irresistible in all Cases. Which is false: For the King of Poland is a Sovereign; He coins Money with his own Image and Superscription upon it, which according to our Author, p. 50. is a certain Mark of Sovereignty; and p. 51. by the very Impression on their Money it [Page 12] is evident that he is their Sovereign Lord: He stiles himself by the same Grace of God with any King in Christendom, and wears the like Crown: He assembles Dyets; he disposes of all Offices; he judges the Palatines themselves, and is full of the Marks of Sovereignty. And yet he that shall take a Polish Peny, and make such work with it as our Author does with the Roman Tribute money, Page 54, 55, &c. and out of it read Lectures either of Active or Passive Obedience in all Cases, will read amiss. For, in case he break his Coronation-Oath, they owe him no Obedience at all, of any kind; for this is one Clause in it: Quod si Sacramentum meum violavero, incoloe Regni nullam nobis obedientiam praestare tenebuntur. So that in case he violate his Oath, his Irresistibility departs from him, and he becomes like other Men.
3. A third Reason is, Because the Iewish Kings in the Old Testament, and Caesar in the New Testament, were Irresistible in all Cases. Now that is more than I know, and I [Page 13] leave it to Divines to examine, whether it was so or no, as also to enquire why the Christians of Nero's Houshold did not shew their Loyalty in defending their Master, after the Senate had pronounced, That he was Hostis Humani generis? But this I say, That if they were thus Irresistible, and if this be a good Argument here, it is a good Argument in Poland; and thither I would desire our Author to send it by the next Shipping, for the Law of the Land has furnish'd us with those which are much better.
I come now to the second Case; which, as I said before, is resolved under the covert and countenance of the former, That as well inferiour Magistrates, as others imploy'd by a Popish or Tyrannical Prince in the most Illegal and Outragious Acts of Violence, such as cutting of Throats, &c. are as Irresistible as the Prince himself, (under pretence of having the Prince's Authority to do these Acts) and must be submitted to, under pain of Hell and Eternal Damnation.
[Page 14]Now this Resolution is very false; which I shall shew, 1. By confuting all the Reasons which are brought for it; and, 2. By producing some Reasons against it.
His Reasons are, 1 st, A Personal Authority in the Prince, antecedent and superior to all Laws, which makes himself inviolable, tho he trample upon all Laws, and exercise an Arbitrary Power, and makes all others inviolable under him, who act by this Authority. But I have shewed already, that this Personal Authority is false and groundless, and that the King is inviolable by Law, and that this Prerogative is highly just and reasonable, and can never prejudice the Subject, for the King can do no wrong. And it is plain, that he cannot give such an illegal and miscalled Authority to others, if he have it not himself.
To shew that the Authority, to which we are bound to submit, is not in Laws, but in Persons, tho acting contrary to Law, he has brought this following Argument, which is the most [Page 15] laboured of any in his Book. Pag. 193, 194, 195. Nay, it is very false and absurd to say, that every Illegal, is an Vnauthoritative Act, which carries no Obligation with it. This is contrary to the Practice of all Humane Iudicatures, and the daily Experience of Men, who suffer in their Lives, Bodies and Estates, by an unjust and illegal Sentence. For the most illegal Iudgment is valid, till it be revers'd by some Superior Court; which most Illegal, but Authoritative Iudgment, derives its Authority not from the Law, but the Person of him whose Iudgment it is.
Now to use his own words, this is very false, and absurd all over. For 1 st, Legal and Authoritative are all one; and Illegal Authority is in English unlawful lawful Power. 2 dly, It is not true, That an Illegal Judgmen is valid, till it be revers'd. For the Judgment of a Man to Death in an Arbitrary way, either contrary to the Verdict of his Jury, or without a Jury, is not Authoritative nor Valid at all, no not for an hour. But, I suppose, by Illegal Iudgments, this [Page 16] Author means legal Judgments which have Error in them; and if these should not be Valid, and stand Good, till that Error be found in some Higher Court, there could not be Legal, nor Illegal, nor any Judgments at all, but all humane Judicatures must come to an end. For if Judgment cannot be given, till we have Judges who are not subject to Error; the Laws must lie by and rust, and there can be no Administration of Justice. 3 dly, The Authority of a Judgment which is Erroneous, is not from the Judges Personal Authority above the Law, nor from his mistakes beside the Law, but from that Jurisdiction and Authority which the Law has given to Courts and Judicial Proceedings which, if they be in due Course o [...] Law, are legal, and are presumed to be every way right, and as they should be, and free from Error, til [...] the contrary appears in some Highe [...] Court. But if the Judges in Westminster-Hall should use a Personal Authority superiour to Law, in judging Men to Death without a Jury, or in [Page 17] condemning a Man when his Jury acquits him, or the like, the Law having given no Authority to any such Proceedings, these Judgments would be illegal and void, and have no Authority at all.
And herein I say no more than this Author himself has said in another place. For where he professedly lays down the difference betwixt an Absolute Monarchy, and the English Constitution, pag. 208, 209. he has these words: An Absolute Monarch is under the Government of no Law but his own Will, and is not ty'd up to strict Rules and Formalities of Law in the execution of Iustice; but it is quite contrary in a Limited Monarchy, where no Man can lose his Life or Estate, without a Legal Process and Trial. But thus do men contradict themselves, who write by rote, and without considering things! and thus does their blind Passive Obedience tie us up to Impossibilities, and oblige us to lose our Lives and Estates without a Legal Process and Trial, where, even as this Author [Page 18] confesses, no man can lose them in such a way.
2 dly. Another reason why we must submit to Illegal Violence, is this: Because though they have no Legal Authority for it, Page 192. yet we have no Legal Authority to defend our selves against it. But he himself has given as full an Answer to this as can be desir'd, in these words, pag. 59. For no man can want Authority to defend his Life against him that has no Authority to take it away.
3 dly. We must submit to illegal Violence, Page 191. because the people cannot call inferiour Magistrates to an Account, page 191. But sure the People may defend themselves against the murderous Attempts of inferiour Magistrates, without pretending to call them to an Account, or sitting in Judgment upon them: And when they themselves are called to an Account for this Defence, they may give a very good Account of it, by the 24 H. 8. cap. 5.
[Page 19]4 thly. We must not defend our selves when we are persecuted to Death for our Religion contrary to the Laws of England, P. 200. because we must not defend our selves when we are thus persecuted contrary to the Laws of God and Nature, which are as sacred and inviolable as the Laws of our Countrey. Answ. I grant that the Laws of God and Nature are more sacred and inviolable than the Laws of our Countrey; but they give us no Civil Rights and Liberties, as the Laws of England have done. Every Leige-Subject of England has a Legal Property in his Life, Liberty, and Estate, in the free Exercise of the Protestant Religion established amongst us; and a Legal Possession may be Legally Defended. Now the Laws of England in Queen Maries time were against the Protestants, and stript them of this unvaluable Blessing; and therefore, tho they chose rather to observe the Laws of God and Nature, than those of their Countrey, which at that time violated [Page 20] both the other: yet withal they submitted to the Laws of their Countrey, which alone give and take away all Legal Rights and Titles, and, when all is said, are the only Measures of Civil Obedience.
5 thly. Men must not defend their Lives against a Lawless Popish Persecution, [...]age 202. when they are condemned by no Law, because they must not defend their Lives when they are condemned by a wicked persecuting Popish Law. For such a lawless Persecution has as much Authority as such a wicked persecuting Law. This is manifestly false: For a lawless Popish Persecution has no Authority at all, but has all the Authority of Heaven and Earth against it; whereas a wicked Popish persecuting Law, tho as it is wicked it cannot command our Obedience, yet as it is a Law it may dispose of our Civil Rights. If Queen Maries Laws were no Laws, because they were wicked persecuting Laws, why were they repealed? why were they not declared to be null from the [Page 21] beginning? I know the Protestants in her time, and in Queen Elizabeths time before they were repealed, disputed the validity of them, and would not allow them to be of any Force or Authority, as appears particularly from Mr. Hales Oration to Queen Elizabeth, Fox Vol. 3. p. 997, 978. But their Reasons were, because the Parliaments were not legally constituted. Queen Maries first Parliament was of no Authority, because, as his words are, the Commons had not their free Election for Knights and Burgesses: for she well knew, that if either Christian men or true English men should be elected, it was not possible that to succeed which she intended; and therefore in many places divers were chosen by force of her threats, meet to serve her malicious affections. Also divers Burgesses being orderly chosen, and lawfully returned, as in some places the people did what they could to resist her purposes, were disorderly and unlawfully put out, and others without any order of Law in their places placed. For the which cause that Parliament is [Page 22] void, as by a President of a Parliament holden at Coventry in 38 H. 6. appears, And the third Parliament he says was void, because the Writs of Summons were contrary to a Statute. Now these were needless and frivolous Exceptions, if a wicked persecuting Law were no Law, without any more ado. And I desire no greater Advantage in a Civil Question, than to reduce an Adversary to this Absurdity, of making no difference betwixt Laws and no Laws.
6 thly. That Non-Resistance of illegal Violence is the best way to secure the publick Peace and Tranquility, Page 205, 206. and the best way for every man's private defence: for self defence may involve many others in blood, and besides exposes a man's self. That is to say, when the publick Peace is violated in an high manner, the best way to secure it, is quietly to suffer it still to be broken further; a man's best defence is to die patiently, for fear of being killed; and when Murtherers are broke loose, the only way to prevent the effusion of more [Page 23] Christian Blood, is to let them alone. Now in opposition to this Doctrine I shall only remember our Author, that if there had not been a Defence made against the Irish Cut-throats in Forty One, though they had the impudence to pretend the King's Commission, there had hardly been a Protestant left, but the pestilent Northern Heresie had been throughly extirpated in that Kingdom.
7 thly. Another Reason is, Page 212. Because Non-Resistance is certainly the best way to prevent the change of a Limited into an Absolute Monarchy. Now this is so far from being true, that, on the other hand, absolute Non-Resistance, even of the most illegal Violence, does actually change the Government, and sets up an Absolute and Arbitrary Power, in the shortest way, and by the surer side. For a Prince, whom the Laws themselves have made Absolute, has thereby no more than a Right aud Title to an Absolute Subjection; but Non Resistance puts him into the actual [Page 24] Possession of it. Our Author himself has made this out beyond all contradiction; for, pag. 44. he says, That Non-Resistance is as perfect Subjection as can be paid to Sovereign Princes; and, pag. 115. he calls it, The only perfect and absolute Subjection we owe to Princes. Now the most perfect and absolute Subjection that can be paid, erects the most absolute Government that can be devised. For those words are of Eternal Truth, which we read in pag. 63. of this Book: For Authority and Subjection are Correlates; they have a mutual respect to each other, and therefore they must stand and fall together: There is no Authority, where there is no Subjection due; and there can be no Subjection due, where there is no Authority. And is not this as bright and as evident a Truth: There is no absolute Authority, where there is no absolute Subjection due; and there can be no absolute Subjection due, where there is no absolute Authority?
[Page 25]I shall now briefly run over his Scripture-proofs, so far as they concern this second Case: For if he had multiplied his Texts of Scripture, to shew that Kings are Irresistible, I should have had nothing to say to it, because the Law has made our King so; but if the Law had not made him so, all his Texts would never have done it, as I have instanced in the Kingdom of Poland. For the Scripture does not erect new Polities, as St. Chrysostom long since observed; nor does the Gospel bar or abolish any Politick Laws, as Luther's constant Position was, which Bishop Bilson thought was undeniable.
In the Old Testament his two Examples of Non-Resistance are, David, and the Iews under Ahasuerus; which are the untowardest for his purpose that he could have pitch'd upon. For as for the former of them, if the Duty of Passive Obedience may be practised by a Subject at the Head of an Army, and if to decline engaging the King's Army only when it is Six to One, [Page 26] (which always, at the least, was the odds between Saul's: Pag. 32. Forces and David's) be an Example of Nonresistance, I am sure it is such Passive Obedience, and such Nonresistance, as if it were acted over again in the Highlands of Scotland for half the time, that it was in the Wilderness of Zìph, would occasion new Sermons against Rebellion, even in the same Pulpit where the substance of this Book was preach'd.
The other, he says, was as Famous an Example of Passive Obedience as can be met with in any History; Pag. 41. and yet it amounts to no more than this, That the Iews being doomed to utter Extirpation by a Law, and delivered up as a Prey to their Enemies; thinking a Defence either unlawful or impossible (for the Scripture does not say which) did look upon themselves as lost men, till they afterwards had procured a Law, which in effect reversed the former, by publishing it to all People, That the Iews might [Page 27] stand for their Lives, to destroy, to slay, and to cause to perish all the Power of the People and Province that would assault them, both little ones, and women, and to take the spoil of them for a prey, Esth. 8. 11. upon which they made a vigorous and successful Defence against their enemies, who were so hardy as to take no warning by this Law, but continued maliciously resolved to destroy the Iews, though they were thus expresly threatned that they must do it at their utmost peril. And may not those men then be as Famous Examples of Passive Obedience, who, if the Laws were against them, would readily submit; but having the Laws on their side, shall defend themselves against the Illegal Violence of any evil disposed persons, that never were, nor ever could be, authorized to destroy them?
As for St. Peter's Case in the New Testament, it was the Resistance of Lawful Authority, Pag. 61. and therefore justly [Page 28] condemned by our Saviour. For the apprehending our Saviour was not an act of unjust and illegal violence, as our Author there says; but was done by proper Officers, by vertue of a Warrant from the Chief Priests and Elders (the Lords Spiritual and Temporal among the Iews) who were aided by the Roman Guards for fear of a rescue.
As this Author says, Page 79. Our Saviour is our Example in not resisting a Lawful Authority; but what is that to the resisting of those that have no Authority? And yet if our Saviour had practised Non-resistance towards persons having no Authority, it had not been binding to us, no more than his not appealing to Caesar hindred St. Paul of his appeal.
In a word, There is not a Case or a Text, which he has argued from, in Scripture, which he has not perverted and abused.
[Page 29]I shall answer the Arguments used in this Question, which are taken out of the Acts concerning the Militia, and which are mentioned by this Author, p. 111, 112. by giving the Reader a particular and distinct view of those Acts: whereby it will appear that we are not enslaved by those Acts, neither are the Subjects hands tied up from making a legal defence against illegal Violence.
There are three Statutes concerning the Militia. The first, 13 Car. II. cap. 6. which was an Interim or Temporary Provision till the Militia Act could be perfected, Entituled, An Act declaring the Militia to be in the King, and for the present ordering and disposing the same. The second is 14 Car. II. cap. 3. to establish the Militia; Entituled, An Act for Ordering the Forces in the several Counties of this Kingdom. And the third is an Explanatory and Supplemental Act; Entituled, An Additional Act for the better ordering of the Forces in [Page 30] the several Counties of this Kingdom; 15 Car. II. cap. 4.
The two former of those acts have the very same preamble, in these words. ‘Forasmuch as within all his Majesty's Realms and Dominions, the sole Supreme Government, Command and Disposition of the Militia, and all Forces by Sea and Land, and of all Forts and Places of Strength, is, and by the Laws of England, ever was the undoubted Right of his Majesty, and His Royal Predecessors, Kings and Queens of England; And that both, or either of the Houses of Parliament cannot, nor ought to pretend to the same; nor can, nor lawfully may raise, or levy any War Offensive or Defensive against His Majesty, His Heirs, or lawful Successors; And yet the contrary thereof bath of late years been practised almost to the Ruine and Destruction of this Kingdom; and during the late usurped Governments, many evil and Rebellious [Page 31] Principles have been instilled into the minds of the people of this Kingdom, which unless prevented, may break forth to the disturbance of the peace and quiet thereof.’
This preamble consists of five Clauses, of which the three first are concerning matter of Law, and the two last concerning matter of Fact.
In the first Clause there are these two things evidently contained. First, That the Militia is in the King by Law. Secondly, That the Militia's being in the King, is no new Power, but was ever the undoubted Right of all the Kings of England. Conclusion; Therefore, unless the people of England, were ever Slaves under all former Kings, they are not made Slaves by this Declaration.
The two next Clauses say, That both, or either of the Houses of Parliament, cannot pretend to the sole Supreme Government, Command, [Page 32] and Disposition, of the Militia, Forces, Forts, and Places of Strength.
Nor can raise or levy any War against the King; But neither is it here said, that the King can or lawfully may raise or levy any War against both, or either of the Houses of Parliament, or any of his Liege Subjects.
The two last Clauses are concerning matter of Fact; in these words, And yet the contrary thereof hath of late years been practised; That is, the Houses did pretend to the sole Supreme Government, Command, and Disposition of the Militia, Forces, Forts; and did raise and levy War against the King.
And during the late usurped Governments, many Evil and Rebellious Principles were instilled into the minds of the People; such, I suppose, as asserted the Militia to be in the Parliament, &c.
[Page 33]As to the Body of the first Act, it is all of it either repeated in the second, or else superseded by it, and therefore we are next to consider what is enacted in the 14 th. Car. 2. cap. 6. And immediately after the Preamble before recited, there are these Words. ‘Be it therefore Declared and Enacted by the King's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons in Parliament Assembled, and by the Authority of the same, That the King's most Excellent Majesty, his Heirs and Successors, shall, and may from Time to Time, as occasion shall require, issue forth several Commissions of Lieutenancy to such Persons as his Majesty, his Heirs and Successors shall think fit to be his Majesties Lieutenants for the several and respective Counties, Cities, and Places of England, and Dominion of Wales, and Town of Berwick upon Tweed; which Lieutenants shall have full Power [Page 34] and Authority to call together all such Persons at such Times, and to arm, and array them in such Manner as is hereafter expressed and declared; and to form them into Companies, Troops, and Regiments; and in case of Insurrection, Rebellion, or Invasion, them to lead, conduct, and imploy, or cause to be led, conducted, or imployed, as well within the said several Counties, Cities, and Places for which they shall be Commissionated respectively, as also into any other the Counties and Places aforesaid, For suppressing all such Insurrections and Rebellions, and repelling of Invasions as may happen to be, according as they shall from Time to Time receive Directions from his Majesty, his Heirs and Successors; And that the said respective Lieutenants shall have full Power and Authority from Time to Time, to constitute, appoint, and give Commissions to such Persons as they shall think fit to be Colonels, [Page 35] Majors, Captains, and other Commission-Officers of the said Persons so to be armed, arrayed and weaponed, and to present to his Majesty, his Heirs and Successors, the Names of such Person and Persons as they shall think fit to be Deputy-Lieutenants, and upon his Majesties Approbation of them, shall give them Deputations accordingly; always understood that his Majesty, his Heirs and Successors, have Power and Authority to direct and order otherwise, and accordingly at his and their Pleasure, may appoint and commissionate, or displace such Officers; any thing in this Act to the contrary notwithstanding: And that the said Lieutenants respectively, and in their Absence, out of the Precincts and Limits of their respective Lieutenancies, or otherwise by their Directions, the said Deputy-Lieutenants, during their said respective Deputations, or any two or more of them, shall have Power from Time to Time, [Page 36] to Train, Exercise, and put in Readiness; and also to Lead and Conduct the Persons so to be armed, arrayed and weaponed, by the Directions, and to the Intents and Purposes, as is hereafter Expressed and Declared.’
Here you see all is Regulated and Limited; and the Lieutenancy have no other Powers nor Authorities, nor can execute them but by the Directions, and to the Intents and Purposes, expressed and declared by Law.
Consequently, The Lieutenancy have no Power to raise Insurrections or Rebellions, or to assist Invasions, for that is directly contrary to the Intent and Purpose of this Act, which is, In Case of Insurrection, Rebellion or Invasion (whereby occasion shall be to draw out the Militia into Actual Service) to imploy these Forces for suppressing all such Insurrections and Rebellions, and repelling of Invasions, as it is frequently repeated in this Act.
Nor, Secondly, have they Power to act contrary to the Directions of these Acts, as for Instance, to [Page 37] search for Arms in the Houses of Persons judged to be dangerous, without a Constable or Parish-Officer; nor to search in Villages or Country-Towns (other than within the Bills of Mortality) between Sun-setting and Sun-rising; nor have the Commissioned Peers Power to imprison a Peer, where he is expresly excepted from that Penalty.
The rest of this Act is spent in charging the Quota's and Proportions of Men and Arms, in setling Pay for the Souldiers, and in declaring what Powers and Authorities shall be executed in all Cases relating to the Militia: And to the Persons concern'd we leave them, only taking notice of this Oath, which is directed by the Act to be administred to all Officers and Souldiers in the Militia, in these following Words. I A. B. do declare and believe that it is not lawful upon any pretence whatsoever to take Arms against the King; And that I do abhor that Traiterous Position, That Arms may be taken by his Authority [Page 38] against his Person, or against those that are Commissioned by Him, in pursuance of such Military Commissions. But, as I said before, neither are the People of England enslaved by this Oath. For as for the first Clause, It never was lawful upon any Pretence whatsoever to take up Arms against the King, for that, in other Words, is to levy War against Him. And as for the first part of the Position to be abhorred, That Arms may be taken by the King's Authority against his own Person, it was always Traiterous Non-sence, and fit to go along with the other Proposal in the Oxford Expedient, of inthroning the Name of a Prince, but banishing his Person 500 Miles off under Pain of Death. And so the other part of the Position, That Arms may be taken by the King's Authority against those who have received Authority from the King, in the Execution of that very Authority, is Stuff as ill put together as the other; for it makes the King's Authority to supplant [Page 39] and destroy it self. And therefore the renouncing and abhorring of such Positions can never be interpreted to be parting with our English Liberties, which having been all along preserved by our Ancestors, at a vast Expence both of Blood and Treasure, must needs be presumed to be something that was more valuable than barbarous Nonsence.
But because there are many Men, who (like Trouble-all in Bartholomew-Fair) take two or three Words under the Hand of a Magistrate to be a sufficient Warrant for any thing, and think all to be Commissions which are so called, whether they be so or no, it will be necessary to take into Consideration this last part of the Oath, and to shew, 1. What a Commission is. And, 2. Who act in Pursuance of such Commission.
1. A Commission is the Legal Appointment of a Legal Person to execute or exercise some Legal Power or Authority. And therefore the first [Page 40] thing requisite to a Persons being Commissionated, is, that he be Legally appointed. So Dr. Falkner commenting upon this Clause of the Oath, by a Commission, understands a Commission regularly granted. Book 2. chap. 1. Sect. 6. But though, as he says, that be the true Sense of the Clause, yet it is not the whole Truth. For tho a Commission may be issued in due Form of Law, and be regularly granted, yet the Incapacity or Disability of a Person to receive a Commission, or the Illegal Powers of the Commission it self, may render it void.
2. The next thing requisite to a Persons being Commissionated is, that he be a Legal Person. For First, a Person may be uncapable by Law of being Commissionated; as he that was not a Natural-born Subject of England, was uncapable of being an High-Commissioner. Or Secondly, A Person may be disabled by Law from having a Commission, by being convicted of some Offence against the Laws, which is punished by such a [Page 41] disability. Or 3 dly, Which we may likewise refer to this Head, a Person may be unqualified by Law, to execute a Commission, or act by Virtue of it, till he have perform'd some Condition required by Law: As for Instance, till he have taken his corporal Oath for the due and impartial Execution of the Trusts committed to him; or as in the Militia-Act every Lieutenaut, Deputy-Lieutenant, Officer and Souldier remains unauthorized till he have taken the Oath. For in all these Cases, where the Law says no Man shall be enabled or impowered, he is not impowered.
The third Requisite to a Person's being Commissionated, is, that he be appointed to execute or exercise some Legal Power and Authority. No Man can be commissioned to exercise Powers which are Illegal and Arbitrary, and which the Law says shall not be exercised. And therefore all such Commissions are null and void, that is, they are no Commissions. As for Instance, Letters Patents, or Commissions to erect a [Page 42] Court with such Powers and Authorities as the High Commission Court had; or because we are speaking of Military Commissions, a Commission for Proceedings by Martial-Law, contrary to the Laws and Franchises of the Land.
The next thing is to consider, when a Man acts in Pursuance of his Commission. And First, It is plain that he does not act by Virtue nor in pursuance of his Commission, who exceeds the Legal Powers and Authorities of his Commission. For in those Acts he is not authorized and impowered, but acts of his own Head. Secondly, Much less does he act in pursuance of his Commission, who acts quite contrary to the Intents and purposes of his Commission. As for Instance, he who in case of Insurrection, Rebellion or Invasion is Commissionated to lead & imploy the Militia for the suppressing such Insurrection, or Rebellion, or for repelling such Invasion, if instead of this he himself shall raise an Insurrection or Rebellion, or assist an Invasion, [Page 43] he pursues his Commission to Death, and acts in direct opposition to the end for which the Law has impowered him, and does that which he neither is, nor can possibly be authorized to do.
But because no Commission can be given, no Power can be granted, no Authority can be entrusted with any Person, but may be unfaithfully discharged, yea though men be sworn to the due and impartial Execution of it; it may be made a Question, Whether Legal Powers and Authorities which are not duly and truly and impartially executed, are Authoritative, and consequently must be submitted to?
To which it must be Answered, That a trust is inseparable from an Office or Commission, and that no Legal Power or Authority can be so cautiously regulated, but that still something that is within the Compass of that Power and Authority, must be left to the Honesty and Integrity of him that executes it. Only it is the Perfection of the English [Page 44] Laws, whereby they have preserved the Franchise of the Land, that they have left very little to the Discretion of those who are intrusted with the Execution of them, but in all Cases have secured the main. As where they have left Fines at the Will of the King, still it is Salvo Contenemento. But where the Law has expresly intrusted a Commissioner with the exercise of some Power, while he acts within the Bounds and Limits of his Authority, there he is to be submitted to, though he should exercise that Power amiss. As for instance in this Act, ‘The said respective Lieutenants and Deputies, or any three or more of them, shall have Power to hear Complaints, and examine Witnesses upon Oath, (which Oath they have hereby Power to Administer) and to give Redress according to the Merits of the Cause, in matters relating to the execution of this Act.’ Now if they do not faithfully discharge this Power, nor give Redress according to the Merits of the [Page 45] Cause, a Man must even put his Complaint in his Pocket, till he can have legal Redress elsewhere. This Act likewise inables the Lieutenants, or any two or more of their Deputies, to warrant the seizing of all Arms in the Possession of any Person, whom the said Lieutenants or any two or more of their Deputies, shall judg Dangerous to the Peace of the Kingdom. Now if they shall abuse this Power, which is for securing the Peace of the Kingdom, to the disarming the Loyalest and Best Subjects the King has; and will not restore these Arms to the Owners again, (nor they be able to recover them by Replevin) it cannot be help'd; nor indeed is it of very great Importance, because they may buy more. But, as I said before, where the Property or Liberty or Lives of the Subject are concern'd, this very Act has been careful to secure them; so as to forbid searching for Arms in the Night-time (unless within the Bills of Mortality, Cities, & Market-Towns) and every where has required [Page 46] it to be done with a Parish-Officer; whereby both the Persons and Goods of the Subject are least exposed.
It has likewise been careful to provide, ‘That neither this Act, nor any matter or thing therein contained, shall be deemed, construed or taken to extend to the giving or declaring of any Power for the transporting of any of the Subjects of this Realm, or any way compelling them to march out of this Kingdom, otherwise than by the Laws of England ought to be done.’ And yet some Men, I cannot say have deemed and taken, but I am sure have wickedly construed this Act to extend much farther, even to a Power of destroying the Liege Subjects of this Realm, and marching them out of the World, otherwise than by the Laws of England ought to be done. But this last Proviso has sufficiently confuted all such mischievous Doctrine.
Where is Arbitrariness then? It is excluded. By what Law? Even by the Imperial Law, or Law of the [Page 47] Prerogative: For though the Power of the Sword is declared in these Acts to the full, yet they have taken care to prevent all such dangerous Mistakes, as if thereby those that are Commissionated by the King had any Power of transporting his Liege Subjects, or compelling them to march out of the Kingdom; and much less have they any Power to destroy them at home, as both Magna Charta, and the Petition of Right, 3 Car. intituled, A Declaration of divers Rights and Liberties of the People to the King's most Excellent Majesty, do fully declare.
Now I would fain know wherein those who transport the King's Liege Subjects, without any Power to transport them, differ from Kidnappers? or those that destroy them, without any Power to destroy them, differ from Murderers? And surely the People of England have a Legal Right, and several Legal ways, to rescue themselves from Kidnappers and Murderers, without pretending to the Command of the Militia!
[Page 48]But though the last mentioned Proviso was twice Enacted, yet comes the Pulpit Law and utterly repeals it (as it does the 13 th of Eliz.) and says the Subjects of England must be Compelled, and shall be Compelled to march out of the Kingdom, if those that are Commissionated by the King shall think fit. For though these have no Power to Compel, yet the Subjects of England are bound in Conscience to know their Duty and their Drivers, and to supply this lack of Legal Power by the inward Impulses of their own Spiritual, and never-failing Passive Obedience; and must either go out of the Kingdom upon this Occasion, or go to the Devil for their wicked and rebellious Refusal. It likewise repeals all the Legal Limitations, which have ascertained Penalties for the several Offences committed against the Laws. As for Instance in this Act, whereas the Law says, ‘That the chief Commissioned Officer upon the place may imprison Mutineers, & [Page 49] such Souldiers as do not their Duties, and shall and may inflict for Punishment for every such offences any Pecuniary Mulct, not exceeding five Shillings; or the Penalty of Imprisonment without Bail or Mainprise, not exceeding twenty Days.’ The Doctrine of Passive Obedience makes nothing of these Legal Restrictions, and says, that Men must submit to perpetual Imprisonment, or to be hanged for such Offences, or for no Offence at all, if those that are Commissioned will have it so.
I humbly submit it to the Wisdom of our Legislators when they shall be assembled in Parliament, Whether they will endure to have all their Laws thus used, and suffer them to be put into a Bottomless Bag (as the Poets say Iupiter disposes of Lovers Vows) of a boundless and endless passive Obedience.
But because some Men have moved another Question, Who shall be Judg when there is an Insurrection, Rebellion or Invasion? and consequently, [Page 50] whether there be occasion or not, according to Law, to imploy the Militia, and to draw them forth into Actual Service? it is fit to say something to it. To which I answer, That the Law has judged already, and determined the matter to our hands; and all English-Men know as well, as if they had the Opinion of all the Judges, that going peaceably to Market, or to their Parish-Church, is neither Insurrection, Rebellion, nor Invasion. But I have long since observed, that those who would inslave Men, either under an implicit Faith, or a blind Obedience, are very pert in putting such Questions; The Scripture is the Rule of Faith, but who shall be Iudge of the sense of it? And when you have once allowed them that point of an Absolute Judg, then presently an Apple shall be an Oyster, Bread shall be Flesh and Blood and Bones, Pig shall be Pike, and a Dog shall be a Catawimple. Now, I humbly conceive, there is no need at all of constituting a Judg to resolve that [Page 51] the Barbar's Bason is not Mambrino's Helmet, when none but a Madman who is bent upon seeking Adventures, and is ready to pick Quarrels with all Mankind, will say it is.
As to the third Act concerning the Militia 15 Car. 2. c. 4. I shall only take notice of one Clause of Indemnity in these Words. ‘And it is further declared and enacted, That all and every Person and Persons which since the five and twentieth day of March, one thousand six hundred sixty and two, have acted or done any thing in the dismantling of any Cities or Towns, or demolishing of Walls and Fortifications thereof, or relating thereunto, shall be, and are hereby indempnified and saved harmless.’ Now this was long after the Militia had been declared to be in the King, & yet these Persons having exceeded their Legal Powers, stood in need of an Indemnity by Act of Parliament: which had bin vain, if the King's Command, or their own Commission would have justified them, and born them out in it.
[Page 52]I come now in the 2 d place to produce some Reasons to prove the Lawfulness of defending our selves against Illegal Violence; which is a Truth so obvious and so agreeable to the common sense of Mankind, that even those Men who set themselves to oppose it, do oftentimes assert it unawares, and give unanswerable Reasons for it. I shall therefore first set down those Concessions which the Force of Truth has extorted from this Author, and 2 dly add some other Arguments to them.
1 st. No Man wants Authority to defend his Life against him who has no Authority to take it away. p. 69. But no Man whatsoever has any just and legal Authority (that is, any Authority at all) to take it away contrary to Law. p. 190, 191. And from these premises it is easy for any Man to infer the Conclusion.
2dly. He that resists the Vsurpations of Men, does not resist the Ordinance of God, which alone is forbidden to be resisted. But Acts of Arbitrary and Illegal Violence are the Vsurpations of Men. Therefore, &c.
[Page 53]These again are our Author's Doctrines, the former p. 128. l. 15. the other p. 211. l. 11. as likewise 212. l. 22. he acknowledges, that the assuming of an Absolute and Arbitrary power in this Kingdom would be Vsurpation; tho he says at the same time that no Prince in this Kingdom ever usurped such a Power: which is notoriously false: for Richard the 2 d by name did, not to mention any other.
3 dly. A 3 d Argument which this Author furnishes us withall, is this, p. 164, 165. The Reason why we must submit to Governours, or Subordinate Magistrates, is, because they are sent by our Prince, and act by his Authority; and we must never submit to them in opposition to our Prince. Now nothing is better known in this Kingdom, than that those who commit Illegal Violence, do not act by the Princes Authority; for, as our Author says, p. 190. he himself has no just nor legal Authority to act against Law; and therefore we need not submit to them in such Acts. Nay, farther, according to this Author, we must [Page 54] never submit to them in this Case because they are in opposition to our Prince; for they act against the Peace of our Soveraign Lord the King, his Crown, and Dignity; as the Law has evermore interpreted such Acts.
4 thly. Our Author, p. 126. has these Word. Every Man has the Right of Self-Preservation, as intire under Civil Government, as he had in a state of Nature. Vnder what Government soever I live, I may still kill another Man, when I have no other way to preserve my Life from unjust Violence by private Hands. Now the Hands of subordinate Magistrates, imployed in acts of Illegal Violence, are private Hands, and armed with no manner of Authority at all; of which this is a most convincing Proof, That they may be hanged by Law for such Acts, which no Man can or ought to suffer for what he does by Authority. They are no Officers at all in such Acts, for Illegal Violence is no part of their Office.
[Page 55]This is sufficient to shew, that this Author holds so much Truth, as would have led him to his own Conviction, if he had but attended to the immediate consequences of it, instead of blending it with a great many Falshoods: and after he has answered his own Arguments, I shall desire him to do as much for these which follow.
1. No Man can authorize himself. But in acts of Illegal Violence if a subordinate Magistrate have any Authority at all, he must authorize himself. For it is a Contradiction to say the Law authorizes him to do an Illegal Act, as our Author well observes p. 195. and it is as false to say, that the King who can do no wrong, can authorize another to do it. In the great Conference of the Lords and Commons, 3 o Caroli, concerning the Contents of the Petion of Right, Ephemeris Parliam. the Law was held to be, That if the King command a Man to do Injury to another, the Command is void, & Actor fit Author, and the Actor becomes [Page 56] the Wrong-doer. That is, he acts of his own Head, and authorizes himself.
2 dly. The Illegal Violence of Subordinate Magistrates cannot be more Irresistible, only by being more Criminal than it is in other Men; for that would be to make a Man's Crime to be his Protection. But Illegal Violence done by subordinate Magistrates, is not only as inauthoritative, as if it were commited by private persons, but likewise more criminal; as being done with a face and colour of Authority, and under pretence of Law, making that partaker of their Crime, violating and blemishing the Law at once.
I might multiply such Arguments; but if this Author will please to give a full and clear Answer to these only, I here promise to be of his Opinion.