TO avoid all Ambiguity and Dispute about Words, and to bring the Matter in debate to as narrow a Com­pass as I can; I shall reduce it to this Question:

Whether the Thorough Settlement of an Usurper doth entitle him to the Allegiance of the Subjects, over whom his Usurpation is throughly setled, tho the Rightful King who is out of Possession be still living, and demand their Allegiance?

The Resolution of this Question in our present Case depends first, upon the Authority of BP. Overall's Convocation-Book; secondly, upon the Reason of the thing it self.

First, the Convocation expresly determins, that there is some kind of Thorough Settlement, which is suffi­cient to give a Title, and whether it be the Thorough Settlement now described, is the Thing to be exa­mined. And for the better under­standing the Sense of the Convoca­tion, it will be convenient to give a brief Account of the first Book, so as to collect all together that con­cerns this matter; that at one view a more clear and distinct Notion may be had of it.

They declare their Chief Purpose to be to imitate the Scriptures in setting out, Ch. 1. Can. 1. and describing the Deity and Dig­nity of our Saviour Christ, by his Al­mighty Power and Universal Govern­ment of all the World, as Heir of all things and Head of his Church. Ch. 2. Can. 2. And therefore they first affirm, that he created the World, and gave the supreme Au­thority to Adam for his time, and to the rest of the Patriarchs and chief Fa­thers successively, before the Flood; or­daining, by the very Law of Nature, that their Children and Off-Spring should fear, reverence, honour and obey them. Ch. 6. Can. 6. After the Flood it was committed to Noah; who, by virtue of this Autho­rity given unto him by Almighty God, and also warranted by the Laws of Na­ture and Reason, distributed the whole World among his three Sons, and they again divided it among their Sons. But Nimrod descended of Cham, not contenting himself with the Patriar­chal or Regal mild Government, Ch. 8. Can. 8. ordain­ed of God by the Laws of Reason and Nature, became a Tyrant and Lord of Confusion. And within few Ages af­ter the Death of Noah's Sons, their Posterity becoming dissolute, batba­rous and ungovernable, cast off that Government which God had ordain­ed, and set up new Forms of divers kinds, after their own Humours and Inventions. Whereupon, it is deter­mined by the Convocation; If any one shall affirm, that the said Posterity [Page 2]of Noah's Children did well, in alter­ing either the Manner or Form of Civil Government which God had appointed; by bringing in of Tyranny or factious Po­pularity — or that it was lawful for such as then served God, upon any Pre­tence to have imitated their Examples: He doth greatly err.

Abraham with his Family being by God called out from among the wick­ed and idolatrous People of Chaldea, Ch. 8, 9, 10. Can. 10. that Supremacy of Power, which he had over his own Family, was con­tinued down to Jacob: And tho af­terwards this Authority was much weakened and diminished, during the abode of the Chilldren of Israel in Egypt; yet in Process of time, according to Jacob's Prophecy, the Scepter was bestowed on Judah. In the mean time, they were first go­verned by Moses, and then by Joshua after a mild and temperate manner. Ch. 11. Can. 11. Af­ter the Death of Joshua, they had no constant Succession of Princes, but God raised up Judges from time to time, as Occasion required, to deli­ver and to govern them: But upon the Peoples impatience and impor­tunity, God appointed Saul for their King; and lastly the Scepter came to the Tribe of Judah by David's ad­vancement to the Throne, Ch. 14. Can. 14. to which be was as truly called by God himself, as Aaron was to the Priesthood: And David 's Posterity had by God's Ordi­nance as Rightful an Interest to succeed him in his said Kingdom, as either A­aron 's Sons had to succeed him in the Priesthood; or Moses, Joshua and the rest of the Judges, notwithstanding that God himself did chuse and na­med them particularly, bad in their Go­vernments.

But after the Kingdom was thus become Hereditary, Ch. 15. Can. 15. the Kings were as much obliged, as ever, to the Ob­servation of those Laws, which God had prescribed for them to govern by; and that they might do this the better, they had their Judges and Inferiour Magistrates; which was no diminution of their Power, but they thereby ordered their Kingdoms with such a temperate and fatherly Mo­deration; as was most agreeable for the Government of God's People.

Then the Convocation shews by a brief recapitulation of the Particulars from the beginning of the World, Ch. 16. Can. 16. that Kings by Gods institution have a Paternal Authority, and that Sub­jects ow them the Obedience of Chil­dren to their Paren [...]s. Ch. 17, 18, 19. Can. 17, 18, 19. And whether the Kings or supreme Governours were nominated and appointed im­mediately by God himself, or succee­ded by an Hereditary Right, as in the Kingdom of Judah, neither the Priests nor People had any share in confer­ring upon them their Regal Authori­ty, but this was immediately and sole­ly from God. The following Chapters and Canons to the 23d. are spent in shewing and explaining the Authority of the Kings and supreme Governors among the Jews in Ecclesiastical Af­fairs and the Subjection and Duty of the Priests to them, by which they were bound not to depose or rise up against them upon any account what­soever. And then by way of Objecti­on against this Doctrin is brought the Example of Jehoiada's deposing A­thaliah; In answer to which it is said, that the Right of Succession accor­ding to Gods own appointment was in Joash, and that therefore Athaliah, though she had sate six years on the Throne, might lawfully be deposed, as being still but an Usurper, but that this ought not to be drawn into Example against a lawful King.

To obviate another Objection they observe, Ch 25. Can. 25. that the Prophets under the Old Testament did often severely re­buke their Kings, and sometimes a­nointed one King before the decease of another. Thus David was anoin­ted by Samuel, in Saul's life-time, to succeed him; and Jehu was put into actual possession of the Kingdom of [Page 3] Israel by Elizeus, and as God had commanded by the said Prophet, he killed Joram before that time his Sove­reign, but then his Subject. But these things were done by a direct and ex­press Message from God, and there­fore were to be no Precedent to the Jews themselves, (much less to o­thers) unless God sent a Prophet with the same Order and Commission.

Another Objection is wont to be made against the Authority of Kings from Jer. 1.10. Ch. 26. Can. 26. which is likewise answered.

A fourth Objection might be rai­sed from the Example of Otheniel, Ch. 27. Can. 27. and more especially from the Ex­ample of Ahud, who slew Eglon King of the Moabites, to whom the Israelites had been Eighteen years in Subjecti­on: But these are shewn to be as ex­traordinary Cases as that of Jehu was.

But still another Difficulty arises; for the Monarchical Government spo­ken of hitherto among God's own People, Ch. 28. Can. 28. was mild and temperate, but in other parts of the World, the tem­perate and fatherly Government, which Noah had prescribed unto his Off Spring, and which God himself established af­terwards amongst his own People, was soon degenerated into Tyranny, as we see by what the Scripture relates of Nimrod; or into Republicks, as amongst the Romans, who rebell'd a­gainst their Kings, and quite cast off Kingly Government; and in like manner several Forms of Govern­ment were introduced in several o­ther Nations. In this Case the Con­vocation determins; that tho it be sinful in them, who by Invasion or Rebellion invert the Order of the World, and set up degenerate Forms of Government instead of that temperate and fatherly Government, which God has ordained; yet when these Forms are thoroughly setled, as that Tyran­nical Government of Nimrod and the Bepublick of the Romans in Process of time were; they must then be submitted to: For tho they were at first introduced by very wicked Practices, yet God having vouchsa­fed to establish them, and to invest them with his own Authority, they must be obeyed as his Ordinance.

These things thus stated and clear­ed, the Convocation proceeds to the remaining course of the Jewish Hi­story, Ch. 29. Can. 29. and shews that the Jews ow­ed Allegiance to the Kings of Persia after their return from Babylon, who still continued by God's Appointment a supreme Authority over them: And ac­cordingly Jaddus the High Priest, when Alexander required him to assist him in his Wars and become Tribu­tary to him, returned this Answer; Ch. 30. Can. 30. that he had taken an Oath for his true Al­legiance to Darius, which he might not lawfully violate whilst Darius liv'd. But when Alexander 's Authority was setled amongst them, the Case was altered, Ch. 31. Can. 31. and they then owed him the same Subjection, that before they had ow­ed Darius.

After Alexander's Death the Jews became again a free People, he lea­ving behind him no Successor; Ch. 31. but they were miserably oppressed by the bordering Kings of Egypt and Syria, especially by Antiochus Epipha­nes, whose Invasion and Government was most unjust and Tyrannical; until Mattathias moved with the monstrous Cru­elty and Tyranny of the said Antiochus, made open Resistance, the Government of that Tyrant being not then either gene­rally received by Submission, or setled by Continuance. The great disorders amongst the Priests brought many and grievous Afflictions upon the Jews, both under the Government of the Grecians, and of the Maccabees; till at last Pompty took Jerusalem by the Assistance of Hircanus, who had been displaced from the High Priest­hood, Ch. 32, 33, 34. Can. 32, 33, 34. his younger Brother Aristobu­lus getting into his room: And tho Hircanus did very wickedly in taking this occasion to revenge himself of [Page 4]his Brother, by enslaving his Country; yet when the Jews had submitted to the Romans, and had yielded themselves up to their Government, they were ut­terly inexcusable in those Rebellions which they afterwards raised, and which ended in their own Destruction.

Having thus far spoken of that mild and moderate Form of Civil Government which God at first establisht through­out the World, Ch. 35. Can. 35. and afterwards pre­served (in some measure) amongst the Jews, till they by their perverse­ness and Rebellions brought utter ruin upon themselves; they say last­ly, that Christ is the universal Lord and Governor of the whole Earth, and the orders of the several particu­lar Kingdoms and Governments of it, as it may best conduce to the designs of his Wisdom and Goodness in the Government of the whole World, which is but one universal Kingdom under him.

The Substance then of what the Convocation says is this; First, Christ as Creator and Governor of the World established a mild and temperate and fatherly Government, which was to con­tinue throughout all Ages in all Parts of the World, but the Wickedness of men soon introduced other degenerate Forms either Tyrannical or Popular, and these of several Sorts and Denomi­nations, Democratical, Aristocratical, &c.

2. God calling Abraham out of Chaldea into Canaan, and choosing his Posterity for his peculiar People, continued this mild and Paternal Go­vernment amongst them, and upon all Occasions did himself appoint their chief Governors, till at last he ordained that the Government should be Hereditary, and entailed it upon David's Posterity; so that the Jews were governed all along af­ter that original Form of Paternal Government, which God instituted at the first Creation of Mankind, and then again confirm'd after the Flood; though this Form of Government was much defaced and diminished among the Jews in succeeding times, by the great Abuses that crept in a­mong them. And in this Government, First, the Power was solely from God, not depending upon the consent ei­ther of the Priests or People, nor deriving any Authority from any Act of theirs. Secondly, their Kings had supreme Authority over all Per­sons and in all Causes as well Eccle­siastical as Civil. Thirdly, their Pow­er was irresistable, and they were accountable to God only for it. But against this several things might be objected from Examples among the Jews; which they answer by shew­ing that in those instances, God's particular Warrant and Commission had been revealed, as in the Case of Ahud and Jehu; or that his Will and Command was fulfilled in their maintaining that Hereditary Suc­cession which he had appointed, by deposing an Usurper, and setting up the Rightful Heir; and this was what Jehoiada did.

3. As for other degenerate sorts of Government, though they ought not to have been introduced, yet when by never so sinful Arts and Practices, by Usurpations from a­broad, or by Factions and Rebelli­ons at home, they had any where been throughly setled, as the Go­vernments of Babylon and Egypt and Rome were, they must be submitted to; because where the Original, Pa­ternal Government was extinct, the Authority thereby devolved upon the Possessors of the supreme Pow­er in these degenerate Forms, whe­ther they were Tyrannical or Re­publican; because the supreme Go­vernour of the World would not suffer so great a Part of Mankind to be without any rightful Govern­ment for so long a time, and yet so they must be, unless he either autho­rize these degenerate Forms upon the Extinction of the Paternal Original Government, or restore it by an over­ruling Providence.

[Page 5] 4. When the Jews themselves were, by God's Judgment upon them for their Sins, placed under such degene­rate kinds of Government, they were to pay the same Submission to those Governors, that they did to their own Kings; they might not depart out of Egypt without Pharaoh's leave first obtained, unless God would have warranted them to do it by his express Direction and Command; they must not submit to Alexander, whilst Darius lived; and no Oppres­sion of the Romans was a sufficient ex­cuse for their rebelling against them.

This being the Sense of the Con­vocation, it will not be difficult to understand, what they mean by a thorough Settlement.

Their Words are these:

‘And when, Ch. 28. having attained their ungodly Desires, (whether ambiti­ous Kings by bringing any Coun­try into their Subjection, or disloyal Subjects by their Rebel­lious rising against their natural Sovereigns) they have established any of the said degenerate Forms of Government amongst their Peo­ple; the Authority either so un­justly gotten, or wrung by Force from the True and Lawful Posses­sor, being always God's Authority, (and therefore receiving no Im­peachment by the Wickedness of those that have it) is ever (when any such Alterations are throughly setled) to be reverenced and obey­ed, &c.’

These Words being an inference from the Particulars before related in this Chapter, we must judg of them from the occasion and design of the whole Chapter, and from the particular instances alledged in it. First, the design of the Chapter is to shew what Obedience is due to Kings or other supreme Magistrates, where that mild and temperate Govern­ment, which had been the Subject of the foregoing Chapters, was not re­tained, but other Forms set up in its room. For, as the rebellious Hu­mours of the People, declining from their Obedience, did in many Countries alter that temperate and fatherly Government which Noah had prescribed unto his Off-spring, and which God himself esta­blished afterwards among his own Peo­ple: So did the ambitious and insatia­ble Dispositions of sundry no less else­where impeach the same, as by the Be­ginning and Progress of the Four Mo­narchies it is most apparent. And therefore they now declare, what is to be thought of all these Aberrati­ons from the said mild and temperate Government before specified: And they determine, That Almighty God, (who for the sins of any Nation or Country al­tereth their Governments and Governors, transferreth, setteth up, and besloweth Kingdoms as it seemeth best to his Hea­venly Wisdom) having in his Wisdom suffered wicked men to introduce and establish these new Forms, we are to look upon them as his Ordinance, and therefore to pay them all that Obedience which is due to the Pa­ternal Government of his own Insti­tution. Secondly, we may learn what is meant by a Thorough Settle­ment from the particular instances here mentioned; and these are the Assyrian Monarchy, the Roman Com­monwealth, the Kingdom of Egypt, and all the Four Monarchies: When therefore any degenerate Forms of Go­vernment, or Aberrations from the mild and temperate Government before specified, are so setled, as these were, we must in Conscience yield all O­bedience to them, and not think that they have no sufficient Authori­ty, because they deviate from the first Pattern of Government prescribed by God himself, and preserved a­mongst his own People.

It is indeed said, that the Authori­ty unjustly gotten, or wrung by force from the true and lawful Possessor, is God's Authority and therefore receives no Im­peachment from the wickedness of those that have it. Which seems to sup­pose, that the true and Lawful Possessor may be still living, and may still claim the Allegiance of his Subjects, and that the Invader or Usurper keeps Possession as wickedly, that is, as much against all Human Law and Right as the first got into it: But if we observe the instances immediate­ly added, it will appear that no such thing can be concluded from this Passage. For they instance in the Kings of Egypt, who oppressed the Israelites after Joseph's Death, and in the Kings of Babylon, when they had brought the Jews into Subjecti­on, and had carried away the whole Nation into Captivity: But the Kings of Egypt after Joseph's Death had un­doubtedly as good a Right as they had before it, and the Kings of Ba­bylon had such a Right to the Alle­giance of the Jews as no other Prin­ces could pretend to, when the whole Jewish Nation were brought under Subjection to them, and their Kings themselves had made a Covenant with them, and taken an Oath to them, Ezek. 17.16. and were strict­ly commanded by God himself to serve the King of Babylon, Jer. 27. Yet these are the only Instances brought to shew that God's Authori­ty receiveth no impeachment by the wick­edness of those that have it, that is, as no wicked means in the acquiring of Power can hinder, but that after a long and uninterrupted continu­ance (as in the Four Monarchies) these Forms of Government are con­firmed by God's Authority, so nei­ther can the abuse of this Authori­ty, by Oppression and Tyranny, when any such Alterations are throughly setled, invalidate the Au­thority itself, but it is always God's Authority, and is still to be reveren­ced, and obeyed as such. And there­fore all the Severities and intolera­ble Burthens which the Jews endu­red in Egypt and in Babylon, could not warrant their taking up Arms against those Kings; so that the Jews themselves, when brought under these new Forms of Government were obliged to submit to them, and not by any Insurrections or Violence en­deavour to restore themselves to that Primary Institution of Govern­ment, which God had appointed, these having his Authority as much as that itself, when they are through­ly setled, and when there is no o­ther Objection to be made to them, but that they are irregular and cor­rupt in their Constitution, or had an ill beginning, or are oppressive and Tyrannical in their Management and Administration: If all who had a­ny Right or Interest in the former Government have submitted to the new one, and are under the Obliga­tion of Engagements and Oaths to it, (which was the Case of the Jews) they must be obedient to it, howe­ver different from the former, or how much worse soever it may be.

But the Convocation acknowledge no other settlement, 1. Mac. c. 1.2, 3. Joseph. An­tiqu. l. 12. c. 7, 8, 9.11. tho never so full to have been sufficient to debar the Jews from entring into Arms against an Usurper. For they justifie Matta­thias and his Sons in their open Resist­ance, they made against Antiochus Epiphanes, because his Government was neither generally received by Submission, nor settled by continuance. Now Antio­chus was called in by a prevalent Fa­ction, and had two years peaceable Possession of Jerusalem; for so long it was, before Mattathias took up Arms against him, that Antiochus han en­tred into Jerusalem by the Treachery of that Faction, without any opposi­tion; and it was three years longer, before it was recovered out of his Hands by Judas Maccabeus, so that he [Page 7]held it in all five years; yet because that Faction only that invited him in had submitted to him, and the con­trary Party, who had the Right on their side, were not subdued nor brought to a Compliance by this con­tinuance of his Government, it was not such a Continuance as is required to that thorough Settlment, which the Convocation mention: But tho he had for so long time been in full Possession of Jerusalem, and of their whole Country, and had, as the Con­vocation observe, spoiled the Tem­ple, and profaned it with his Idols, and exercised all the cruel and wick­ed Acts of the most absolute and ty­rannical Conqueror, he had notwith­standing no better Right still, than at his first Usurpation. So that the Convocation cannot mean a bare Pos­session, though it be never so full, by a Thorough Settlement, but such a Set­tlem [...]nt only, as both supposes Sub­mission or Continuance, and no Claim of Right in any other Person.

And that the meaning of the Con­vocation could not be, that an Usur­per by being got into full Possession, may have any Right or just Title a­gainst the true Heir, appears from what they determine about the De­posing of Athaliab after six years Pos­session: Ch. 23. For the Reason they give to justifie the Proceedings of Jehoiada therein is, that Joash their late King's Son was then their only Natural Lord and Sovereign, although Athaliah kept him for six years from the Possession of his Kingdom. It may here be object­ted that this is a peculiar case, and that this Reason would hold good only in the Kingdom of Judah, where God himself had appointed and settled the Succession of their Kings in the line of David, and that therefore Jehoia­da said to the Congregation, Behold, the King's Son shall Reign, as the Lord hath said of the Sons of David, 2. Chr. 23, 2. and the Convocation observes that he acquainted them, that it was the Lord's will that he should reign over them, and that God himself had required all that they did at their Hands. For when God has given his Promise, we must interpret no oc­currences of Providence, in contra­diction to in, and therefore we see that when the Kingdom was taken from David's Posterity, it was not done without an express Revelation: But where God has made no Promise to a King and his Successors that they shall enjoy the Kingdom, he may by his Providence take it away from them.

To this I answer, That the whole design of the Convocation is, as I have shewn, to explain the Duty of Subjects by the example of God's own People, and therefore if in this place they suppose, something so pe­culiar in the Constitution of their Go­vernment, that it could be no prece­dent to other Kingdoms this must be a manifest contradiction to their whole design: They tell us that Go­vernment in its Original, and by its first Institution was immediately from God, and was the same through­out the World, and tho it were cor­rupted in other Nations, God pre­served it amongst his own People; and yet still the same Obedience was due under those alterations from the said mild and temperate Government, at first instituted, that was to be paid under this itself, and by consequence there must be the same obligation to the Right Heir in all other Hereditary Monarchies; and therefore they call Joash here the true and natural apparent Heir to the Crown and their only natu­ral Lord and Sovereign, which would be very unfit expressions, if they did not think, that he had an unalter­able Right by the Law of Nature as well as by God's Promise. In was e­nough indeed that Jehoiada should remind the People of God's own choice of Davids Posterity to rule o­ver them, and nothing more needed [Page 8]to be said by him; and it was very fit, that this should not be omitted by the Convocation: But if this were the only Title which Joash had, it would have been improper to call him a Natural Heir, a Natural Lord and Sovereign, and it would have over­thrown all their Arguments from the P [...]ce of the Jews, if they had said th [...] Joash ought to be plac'd up­on the Throne of his Ancestors, af­ter that six years interval, only by vertue of a Divine Promise: For a Divine command concerning any of their Kings or Judges for the time of their Lives, is equivalent to a Divine Promise concerning David and his Posterity, and so it might be said by parity of Reason, that the Duty which they owed their Kings was due by vertue of a revealed command from God, and could not be the same in other Nations, where there is no such revealed Command. Thus David would not stretch forth his Hand a­gainst Saul, for this Reason, because he was the Lords anointed, that is, he was so chosen and appointed by God himself, as no King now can pretend to be: And so in all other instances, if we must argue from no example, where Gods command or promise intervenes, in vain does the Convo­cation explain the Duty of Subjects from the sacred History; and yet we must argue from no such examples, if Gods revealed will alters the case, and makes it different from Cases of the same Nature, which fall out in other Governments concerning which God has not revealed any thing.

It is true indeed when God so in­terposes as to invert the ordinary course of Government, as in the case of Ahud and Jehu, this can be no Pre­cedent for any to imitate, without the same command to authorise them, that they had, but then it was no more a Precedent to the Jews themselves, than to any other Nation. But when God only regulates the Jewish Government according to the first institution at the Creation, and settles it upon the Right of Successi­on, which is common to that with all other Hereditary Monarchies, and makes choice of the Person, to whom and to his Posterity he grants a Do­nation of the Kingdom; or when he reforms abuses, and puts things into their due course and order again, and enjoyns nothing but what with­out a Divine warrant, is of itself law­ful to be done, we may conclude that all these things are written for our instruction, and must be a Rule to all other Nations in the like Cases.

The Convocation therefore pro­ceeds all along upon this Principle, Ch. 2.6. Can. 2.6. that from the first institution of Go­vernment there is both a Natural and a Divine Right in all Sovereigns; which is Natural as it is founded on the Laws of Nature, and Divine be­cause Government is Gods Ordi­nance, and owes its Original Form and Constitution to Gods own imme­diate appointment, and therefore that when God by his express direct­ion and command afterwards settled that sort of Government, which he at first instituted to all the World, among his own People, he did not thereby make any alteration in the Duty of Subjects, or Rights of Kings, but did only oblige both to perform their several Duties in that way and manner which he had enjoyn'd them. The Children of Israel asked a King to judg them like all the Nations, 1 Sam. 8.5.20. And God chose Saul to be their King, but what ever variations there might be in some cir­cumstantials of Government, they owed just the same Duty and Subje­ction to him, which was due to Adam and Noah, &c. And according to the Convocation, every other Sovereign Prince has the very same Right that he had neither, they in asking, nor God in giving them a King made a­ny distinction between the Authority [Page 9]of their King and the Kings of other Nations; but the manner or Royal Power of their King is described to be just the same with that of the Kings round about them. God entailed the Kingdom of Judah upon David and his Seed, but the Right of Succession was still the same in that, which it is in all other Hereditary Kingdoms, only they had a Secondary Obligati­on to the performance of their Duty from an immediate and positive Com­mand, whereas others are oblig'd to the same Duties, but by Virtue only of the Law of Nature, and of the first Institution of Government. The Jews then were bound to set up Joash in that Kingdom upon two accounts, that is, both as he was their Natural Sovereign, and as he descended from David, to whom God had made a peculiar Promise, and had given the Kingdom to him and to his Posteri­ty: but the first obligation had been of itself sufficient, and those Kings who hold by no Divine Promise, but only by Right of Inheritance, have the same Right which he had, who held by a Twofold Title, because ei­ther of them had been alone suffici­ent: For a single Title is enough to convey a Right, and an Additional one can only confirm and strengthen it.

Indeed when there are two Ti­les, one may sometimes hold good, when the other fails: But then this must be, when the Titles are wholly distinct and independent one upon another, as they are not in the pre­sent Case. For God bestowed the Kingdom upon David for him and his Heirs after him to hold by Suc­cession, that is, to hold by the same Right that other Hereditary Mo­narchs hold by; so that if he by his Providence had disposed of the He­reditary Right, and caused it to fail, his Promise which was grounded up­on this Hereditary Right, or rather did suppose it, as its Object, or the Thing Promised, could now no long­er give him a Title to the Kingdom: For God by his Promise did not bar himself from disposing of the King­dom of Judah in the same manner, as he disposeth of all other Heredita­ry Kingdoms, but he promised Da­vid, that he should Rule that King­dom by an Hereditary Right, just in the same manner and by the same Tenure from himself, that other He­reditary Kings hold by. God had promised to protect the Kings of Ju­dah, and to continue the Kingdom to them, and that a peculiar Provi­dence should watch over them, but never that his Providence should not have the same Power over them, that it had over all other Kings; and therefore we find that the Kingdom of Judah did not always continue without Interruption even in David's Line, which yet it must have done, If God's Promise had been so to be understood, as that it was not to be subject to the Contingencies that o­ther Hereditary Kingdoms are liable to. And upon this Account the Con­vocation proposes the Kingdom of Judah as a Pattern to other King­doms, because the Jews had God's Warrant and Direction in such Ca­ses as happen in other Kingdoms, whereas if their Proceedings were to be no example to others, the Con­vocation had argued from a wrong Principle, and their whole first Book had been to very little purpose.

But granting that the Kingdom of Judah was by the Entail upon Davids Line exempted from the ordinary Laws of Providence, yet I shall shew, First, that it was not so exempted in the time of Joash. Secondly, that when God by his revealed Will de­posed the Kings of Judah, he so or­dered it, that the Allegiance of the Subjects would have been transferred by human Laws and Justice, without a Revelation.

First, Tho the Kingdom of Judah [Page 10]had been at first exempted from the common Laws of Providence, yet it could not be so exempted in the time of Joash. For the Promise to Davids House was conditional, and upon sup­position, that his Children kept Gods Covenant and Testimony Ps. 132.12. And when the Kings of Judah had by their Transgressions forfeited all that Right, which God had made over to them by Promise, they could no longer have any pretence to that exemption, but there is no Reason to think, but that his Posterity might have fall'n from their Right by any way, which other Kings may. For the promise being conditional, if God by his Providence conveys away the Right to other Kingdoms, and invests all those with his Authority, who are possessed of the Sovereign Power in other Nations, the Jews must have concluded in the Case of Joash and Athaliah, that since the House of David had not performed the Conditions expresly annexed to the Promise, God had taken the for­feiture of the Kingdom of Judah, and had by his Providence disposed of it so as to set up another in the Room of the Right Heir. For a conditio­nal Promise can oblige no longer, than the Conditions are performed by them, to whom it is made, and therefore there could be no need of a new Revelation to take away the Kingdom from David's Line, since the Conditions upon which the King­dom was entailed, were notoriously violated by so many of the Kings of Judah, particularly by Solomon the first Successor, 1 Kings. 9.4, 5. who, tho God had repeated to him the conditions of his Promise made to his Father Da­vid, provoked God to that Degree that Ten Tribes were taken away from his Son, and Separated from the Kingdom of Judah; and by Aha­ziah the Father of Joash, who walk­ed in the way of the House of Ahab. 2 Kings. 8.27. The Kings of Judah therefore not observing the Terms, which were enjoyned them at the making the en­tail, but transgressing that Covenant which God made with David, upon which the Throne of his Kingdom was established, 2 Chron. 7.17, 18. God could be no longer bound to continue the entail in Performance of his Promise or Covenant, but that Kingdom must be afterwards in the same State, with all other King­doms, and there could be no Reason why God should not dispose of it, in the same manner, that he disposes of any other.

Secondly, When God by his revea­led Will deposed the Kings of Judah he so ordered it, that the Allegiance of the Subjects would have been transferred by Human Law and Just­ice without any Revelation. For at last when the Scepter departed from David, tho not from Judah, tho the Kingdom was not taken from the House of David but by Revelation, yet it was taken away in such a man­ner, as to make no breach upon the Rights of Kings over their Subjects, but to transfer their Allegiance accor­ding to the ways of Right and Justice amongst men, for God had comman­ded the Kings of Judah to submit themselves to Nebuchadnezzar, and accordingly Jehoiakim became his Ser­vant three years. and afterwards when he came against the City, Jehoiakim went out to him, He and his Mother, and his Servants and his Princes, and his Offisers, 2 Kings, 24, 12. and submitted to him in the most solemn manner imaginable, and therefore the Subjects Case was just the same, that it is, when there is no Revela­tion, but only the Providence of God to transfer Allegiance: For if a King become Servant to the Conquerour, if he and his Servants, and his Prin­ces, and his Officers, all that have Right or Authority in the Govern­ment are carried away Captive, and submit and bind themselves by Oaths [Page 11]to the Conquerour, as the Kings of Judah did Ezek. 17.16. there is no doubt but the Subjects may follow their Kings Example, and become Subjects to the Conquerour, as well as he, and cannot be obliged to reserve their Allegiance to him, by vertue of that Right, which he has now re­signed: For when a King has re­signed his Crown, whether it be by God's Appointment, or upon some other Account, he has resigned his Right to the Subjects Allegiance, and they are then at liberty to submit to another Prince. And it is a good Evidence, that the Allegiance of Subjects is not transferr'd by Provi­dence without the Resignation or Death of the Rightful King, because it was not otherwise transferred by Revelation.

Obj. The Israelites had been 18 years in subjection to the Moabites, as they had been a little before 8 years to the Aramites, and they knew that it was not lawful for them of themselves to take Arms against the Kings whose Subjects they were, Ch. 27. tho indeed they were Tyrants: And therefore they cryed unto the Lord for Succour. Yet both these Nations could have no other Au­thority over them, but what was ob­tained by Conquest and a thorough Settlement.

I answer first, the Scripture says, the Anger of the Lord was hot against Israel, and he sold them into the hand of Chushan-rishathaim. Judg. 3.8. and v. 12. The Children of Israel did evil again in the sight of the Lord: and the Lord strengthned Eglon the King of Moab against Israel. From whence it is probable, that God who governed the Israelites by a more than ordinary Providence, and made frequent Declarations of his Will to them, especially in denouncing his Judgments, before any remarkable Punishment was inflicted upon the whole Nation, to give them time for Repentance; did now discover to them, that the Aramites and Moa­bites were sent by him to subdue them. For the Anger of the Lord was hot against Israel, and he sold them into the hand of Chushan-rishathaim, and he strengthened Egion the King of Moab against Israel: But if this Judg­ment were not particularly foretold and denounced; yet this they knew in general, that these Nations the Lord left to prove Israel by them, to know whether they would hearken to the Commandments of the Lord, which he commanded their Fathers by the hand of Moses v. 1. and 4. And therefore when they were vanquished and were forced to seek their Preserva­tion by subjecting themselves to their Enemies, they well knew that they had no Power nor Authority to op­pose such Kings, whom God for their sins, as he had before threat­ned, had set over them, but they cryed unto the Lord, and he raised up a Deliverer for them. Secondly, the whole Nation was in subjection 18 years to the Moabites and 8 years to the Aramites, and when they had once yielded themselves up, and were become their Subjects, no Right which any other Person had over them being prejudiced thereby, they were obliged to keep their Oaths or other Engagements of Obedience to them, and were bound to pay all Duties of Allegiance to these Kings after they had owned them for their Kings, tho they were Tyrants, that is, tho they governed them in a rigorous and tyrannical manner. For the consent of a Nation may be the means of conveying a Right to a Prince in such a Case, where no o­ther has any precedent Right to their Allegiance, tho there be no express Warrant from God for their so do­ing: so that there being at this time no King in Israel, there was no inju­ry done to any man, if the whole Nation submitted to the Conqueror.

Obj. Can. 31. ‘But the Jews generally both Priests and People were the Subjects of Alexander after his Au­thority was setled amongst them, as they had been before the Subjects of the Kings of Babylon and Persia:’ Tho it appears from History, that Darius was alive when Jaddus made a surrender of Jerusalem to Alexander, or, if he had been dead, yet he left Heirs behind him.

Answ. First, the Convocation ob­serves, that when Alexander sent to Jaddus to require him to submit to him; and send him Assistance in his Wars; Jaddus answered, that he might not yield thereunto, be­cause he had taken an Oath for his true Allegiance to Darius, Ch. 30. which he might not lawfully violate whilst Darius li­ved. And when Jaddus afterwards submitted to him, it was by reason of a Command, which he had recei­ved by Revelation from God: Joseph. Antiqu. l. 11. c. 8. For as Josephus relates, in the place refer­red to by the Convocation, Jaddus had appointed Publick Prayers and Sacrifices upon this account, and it was revealed to him in a Dream, That the People, in white, and the Priests and Jaddus himself, in their Holy Garments, should go out to meet Alexander, and make their Sub­mission to him, who no sooner saw Jaddus, but he fell down and wor­shipped God, whose name he saw written on his Mitre; and when his Followers were all amazed at it, and Parmenio asked him the Reason of that strange Action, he answered, that before his Expedition he saw in a Vision one attired as Jaddus was, who encouraged him to undertake it, and promised him success in it; and that it was not the Priest, but that God whom he served, that he worshipped. Secondly in Chap. 30. the Answer of Jaddus to Alexander, that he was bound by his Oath of Allegiance to Darius during his Life is mentioned and approved of by the Convocation, but neither in the fol­lowing Chapter nor Canon is any mention made of Jaddus, only it is said in the Canon, that both Priests and People were the Subjects of Alex­ander after his Authority was setled a­mong them, &c. Which might be true, tho Jaddus had been faulty in submitting to Alexander, whilst Da­rius was alive. Thirdly, Jaddus went out to meet Alexander, and made his Submission to him at his first Approach to Jerusalem; so that if his Example be to be followed, a City ought to surrender before it be besieged, or so much as a Sword be drawn against it: And the first sight and appearance of an Enemy is a different thing from that Thorough Settlement which the Convocation re­quires, whatsoever we understand by it. The Convocation therefore could not propose the Example of Jaddus in all Circumstances for our imitation: for either he had a Di­vine Warrant for what he did, or according to their Principle he must be highly blameable, because he did not stay till there was a Thorough Settlement, nor indeed till there was any Settlement at all, before he submitted to Alexander. But after the Death of Darius, his Authority was throughly setled; for Darius just before he expired sent such a Mes­sage to him, with his thanks for his great Courtesie and Civility to his Mother and to his Wife and Children, as can amount to no less than a bequeathing to him his King­dom, and Alexander taking one of his Daughters in Marriage, no Pre­tensions were made afterwards a­gainst his Right to the Kingdom of Persia.

Obj. ‘But God is the universal Lord and Ruler over all the World, and the whole World is his univer­sal Kingdom; in the Government whereof he ever used the Ministry of Civil Magistrates, as well in [Page 13]other Countries as amongst his own peculiar People of Israel, with­out any desert of them, but as in his heavenly Providence he thought it most convenient. I have made (saith he) the Earth, the Man and the Beasts that are upon the Ground, Jer. 27.5. and have given it to whom it pleaseth me: And again, the Prophet Daniel telleth us that God changeth the times and seasons, Dan. 4.14.12.17.32. that he hath Power and beareth Rule over the Kingdoms of men; that he taketh away Kings and setteth up Kings; and that it was the God of Heaven, who gave unto Nebuchadnezzar so great a King­dom, Dan. 2.37.5.8. Power, Strength and Glory, as then he had to rule, with Majesty and Honour a very great Empire.’

Answ. First, The Design of the Convocation here is to set forth Christ's Universal Empire over all the World, and to shew that, for all their Dignity and Greatness, he did not leave Kings at liberty to do what they list, but held himself the Helm of every Government, and used their Services in­such sort, as, were they good or bad and their Designment holy or wicked, he ever made them the Executioners of his own just Judgments, will and good Pleasure; according as he was minded either to bless on punish any Kingdom, People or Country. All which will be never the less true, tho God should not di­spose of Kingdoms merely by the e­vents and Success of things, without any regard had to Humane Law and Rights.

Secondly, The Chapters here quo­ted by them are all concerning Ne­buchadnezzar. In the first, Jeremiah prophesieth of his Victories over the Neighbour-Kings, and commands them in Gods Name to submit to him. And the two latter Chapters contain Nebuchadnezzar's Dreams and Daniel's Interpretation of them. In his second Chapter Daniel tells him, Thou, O King, art a King of Kings, for the God of Heaven hath given thee a Kingdom, Power, and Strength, and Glory, v. 37. and then proceds to de­clare, that by his Dream was signifi­ed the State of the four Monarchies. In the fourth Chapter of Daniel is related that Judgment which from God befel Nebuchadnezzar; and his Dream whereby it was foretold to him; The in ent of which was, that the living might know that the most high ru­leth in the Kingdom of Men, and giveth it to whomsoever he will, and setteth up over it the basest of men.

First then, as to the four Monar­chies; we have here no intimation that God did raise up the first Foun­ders of them, or did approve of the Settlement they made: The Assyrian Monarchy, the Convocation takes notice of, began in Nimrod, contrary to Gods express Institution, he ha­ving no Authority from God, as af­terwards Nebuchadnezzar had, to en­large his Dominions and make War against the bordering Princes. Cyrus we know indeed was Gods Anointed, and was Prophesied of by name long before his Birth, and alledg'd his Commission and Charge from God in the Proclamation which he put forth in the first year of his Reign, 2. Chron. 36.22.23. Ezr. 1.1, 2. God had declared of him, I have raised him up in Righteousness, and I will direct all his ways, Isai. 45.13. or as our Translators have noted in the Margin, I will make streight all his ways, and the Septuagint renders it, [...]. And Alexander, if we believe Josephus, was encouraged by Revelation to un­dertake his Expedition: But the Ro­man Empire had only Gods Permissi­on as far as we know, and at its rise had no further Authority than the Justice of their Arms could give them: So that this Prediction is no Evidence, whether the first Erection and Settlement of these Monarchies were approved of by God or not; [Page 14]if they were erected by his Com­mand and Appointment, or by a just Title, they were approved of by him; if by Injustice and Violence they were only made use of by him, as all other Wickedness is, to bring a­bout by an over-ruling Providence his own just and righteous Decrees.

Secondly, as to what concerns Nebuchadnezzar himself; First, all those Expressions have an immediate rela­tion to an extraordinary Case, where­in God had revealed his positive Will, commanding the several Kings mentioned by the Prophet Jeremiah to serve Nebuchadnezzar, and to put their Necks under his Yoak, and threatning them with the severest Punishments, If they would not do it, with the Sword, and with the Pestilence, and with the Famine, untill he had consumed them by Nebuchadnezzar 's Hand, Jer. 27, v. 8. and afterwards in the Book of Daniel, God takes away all his Power and Greatness to bring him to a sense of his perpetual dependence upon God, and to an awe and reverence of the Divine Majesty. Secondly, God had declared by his Prophet that he had given all the Neighbouring King­doms into the hand of Nebuchadnez­zar the King of Babylon his servant, and his Commands were in a pub­lick and solemn manner given out, and sent to all the Kings round about to charge'em that they should without a­ny Resistance or Opposition resign up themselves and their Kingdoms in sub­jection to him. And this being some years before hand with such Zeal and Earnestness publickly and solemnly declared by Jeremiah, and so notori­ously known in all the adjacent Coun­tries, Nebuchadnezzar himself could not be ignorant of it; for which rea­son he gave such strict Charge con­cerning Jeremiah, that he should be used with all manner of kindness and respect, Jer. 39.11. Afterwards Daniel in expounding his first Dream had plainly told him, that the God of Heaven had made him a King of Kings, and had given him a Kingdom, Power, and Strength, and Glory. Yet Nebu­chadnezzar ascribes all to himself, and therefore this Judgment was inflicted on him to make him sensible that all his boasted Greatness was owing to God alone, who has absolute Autho­rity over the greatest of Kings, and can advance to the height of Empire the basest of Men; and those that walk in Pride he is able to abase.

Besides what relates personally to Nebuchadnezzar, there is a further in­tention in the words, which respects all Princes in all Ages of the World. For Nebuchadnezzar is set as an Ex­ample of Gods Almighty Power, and of the frailty of all Human Greatness, to let the mighty Potentates of the Earth know, that all their Power is from God, and that he can deprive them of it, whenever he pleases.

But Thirdly, This does not prove that God will give or take away the Power of other Princes, in the same extraordinary manner, that he both raised and debased Nebuchadnezzar. For as in ancient times there were-Prophets and Workers of Miracles, so these Prophets were sometimes sent by God himself to declare, in his name, that he had bestowed King­doms or Empires upon certain per­sons, as upon Nebuchadnezzar, Cyrus, &c. And then these were no Usur­pers, because they acted by Gods Appointment, and had a right pre­cedent to any Conquest or Thorough Settlement. But there wrre in all A­ges many Usurpers too, and they had no Authority from God, nor were the People obliged to obey them, ha­ving no Command from him to do it. And as an Usurper can have no Authority for his Usurpations (for if he had they would be no Usur­pations nor he an Usurper; so the continuance of his Usurpations can­not make him theless an Usurper, but the greater and the more injurious [Page 15]Usurper. Nebuchadnezzar was no U­surper from the beginning, because he acted by Authority from God, and if concerning any Prince can be shewn such a Commission now, he is not an Usurper but a Rightful King, and we must forthwith acknowledge his Authority, without staying for a thorough setlement, but if he be at first an Usurper, he must always be so, unless he acquires a Right by some other means, than a setled and ha­bitual Injustice. The Scripture no where informs us that God authorises Usurpers, after a thorough Settlement, but on the contrary that those are no Usurpers concerning whom God by his Prophets has given assurance to the People, that himself had raised them up to the Throne.

Fourthly, All are now to be lookt upon as Usurpers, who invade the Rights of their Neighbour Princes, for the same Reason that we esteem all pretenders to Miracles and Pro­phecys no better than Cheats and Impostors. For Nebuchadnezzar had Prophecys delivered coucerning him which entitled him to the Kingdoms he possessed: For tho he sin'd in In­vading the Dominions of other Prin­ces, if he did not believe the Prophet or knew not of his own Title granted him by God himself to them, yet he did them no injury, because their Right was already transferred to him and therefore his Sin was only that of a Man, who robs another of that which is his own not knowing it to be so. But now Prophecys are ceased, as well as Miracles, and God acts by the ordinary course of his Providence as well as by the ordinary course of Nature. Miracles were necessary to awaken Mens attention, and put them upon a serious consideration of Religion, and bring them to an ac­knowledgment of the Truth of it: and so were such Revelations needful to manifest Gods infinite Power and Majesty, and to make the greatest Princes stand in awe of him; but when once these ends are served, we are left to the Moral and Divine Laws of Reason and of Scripture for our Direction in the performance of our Duty, as we are to the Physical Laws of Nature in the Provisions of Health and Life: and to conclude that every Conqueror has the same Right to our Obedience that Nebuchadnezzar had to be obeyed by the Nations, whom he had subdued, is as groundless as to think that any man, who comes with lying Wonders and confident Stories, has a Power of Miracles and a Gift of Prophecys. God many times by a wonderful Providence casts down Usurpers, when they are most setled and secure in their unjust Possessions, and it is the Glory of his Infinite Wisdom that when he suffers the World to go on in one constant Tenour, and does not interrupt wick­ed men in heir enterprises and pra­ctices, yet the still holds the Helm of Government, and the most lasting and setled Usurpations cannot in the least prejudice the execution and accom­plishment of his just and Holy De­crees: And in this he exercises his Dominion over Mankind, as he shews his Dominion over Nature by a sted­dy and constant concourse with natural Agents, notwithstanding the many seeming Irregularities that appear in the World: and we ought no more to imagine his Authority in any Usur­pers from whom we promise our selves Protection, then we may suppose a Miraculous Power in those Charms, which sometimes cure Diseases.

The Earth is the Lords and all that dwell in it, and it cannot be denied but God might if he had pleased, frequently raise up Princes as he did Nebuchadnezzar, but then he would send his Prophets to give notice of it: For we must conclude in this case, as the Convocation does in the case of Jehu, that it is unlawful to follow such extraordinary examples, except [Page 16]first that it might plainly appear that there are now any such Prophets sent ex­traordinarily from God himself, Can. 25. with sufficient and special Authority in that be­half; and that we might be assured of every such Prince as is by Usurpati­on setled in anothers Dominions, that God himself had in express words required and commanded us to submit to him by Name; as he commanded the Nations whom Nebuchadnezzar con­quered, to serve him, declaring that he had given all those Lands into the Hand of Nebuchadnezzar the King of Babylon his Servant. Jer. 27, 6. But we may observe that as Nebuchadnez­zar was raised up by God himself, so the Kings of those Nations were commanded to submit to him as well as their People, and did submit, or were subdued by him, so that the Peoples part in that Revolution was no more than what Subjects may do now, if such a thing should be brought about by Providence; for when the King has submitted himself, there is no Question to be made, but that the Subjects may do so too.

II. Having considered the Argu­ments from the Authority of the Con­vocation, I now proceed to the Ar­guments from the Reason of the Thing itself.

By an Usurper in this Question is plainly meant one who is in Pos­session of the Kingdom contrary to the Laws and Constitution of the Realm, and without any Title but that of Possession; and an Usurper In Possession is opposed to a Rightful King out of Possession, whether he be either first, actually dispossessed and driven out of his Kingdom; or secondly, have an undoubted Right to it, but has been always kept out of Possession and could never come to the enjoyment of it. But it's grant­ed that

First, If the Title be doubtful, the Subjects are at liberty to submit to the Possessor, and ought not to em­broil the Nation with Wars, and sa­crifice the Peace and Happiness of it for an Uncertainty: And in this case the Subjects are oblig'd to stand by him, to whom they have sworn Al­legiance, till a clear Title be made out against him, upon defect where­of the Oath was taken, upon supposi­tion that there was no precedent Obligation to another Prince, and therefore must oblige till it appears that his Competitor claims by an He­reditary or other antecedent Right.

Secondly, If in an Hereditary Mo­narchy, after the thorough Settle­ment of an Usurper, it should so hap­pen that the Royal Line had failed, and the Right of Succession were ex­tinct, the People might be oblig'd for their own, and for their Count­rey's sake to submit to the Usurper and after their Submission he would be­come their lawful King. For tho he could have deriv'd no Authority from his Thorough Settlement, (notwith­standing there were none surviving of the Royal Line,) and the Subjects might have yielded themselves up to the Obedience of any other Person, if they had had a convenient oppor­tunity, so as to have done it without bringing damage and mischief to the Publick by it, yet they might be ob­liged to submit to him, to prevent that Slaughter and confusion, which else would ensue, and if they should have resused to do it, they would have sinned against God, in neglect­ing the safety of themselves and of their Country, supposing neverthe­less that no Injustice would have been done to the Usurper thereby, and that he could have had no Right be­fore their Submission.

The Question therefore is, Whe­ther an Usurper who has no claim to the Crown but that of Possession, tho he be never so long and throughly setled in the Throne, can have a Right to the Allegiance of the Sub­jects, whilst their Rightful King, who [Page 17]has an Hereditary, or whatsoever o­ther undoubted Title by the Consti­tution of the Kingdom is alive, and requires them to bear Faith and Al­legiance to him?

The Sum of what can be said in the Affirmative seems to be this; That as it is shewn at large in the Convocation Book, Christ has reserved the Government of the World and the disposal of Kingdoms entirely to himself and can make or dispose Kings, as he plea­seth, notwithstanding any Claim, Right, Title or Interest, which they can chal­lenge to their Kingdoms, and as he first ruled the world by frequent Revelations and Prophecies, so since these are ceased he doth it by his Providence only for he always retains the same immediate Inspe­ction with human affairs, but now ma­nifests his Pleasure and gives out his Commands as Governor of the world by the Declarations of his Providence, that is, by the Success and Event of things; for he could not govern the World as su­preme Lord and King of it, or which is all one, he could not require our Obedience in Compliance to his disposal of Kingdoms if his Will were not some way or other discovered to us, and this being now the only way whereby he discovers it, we must acquiesce in the Events of his Pro­vidence, so as to obey Christ the Supreme Governor of the world in the Person of him, whosoever he be, whom he has set over us, making no enquiry into the Justice of the Cause, or into the means by which the Person now fully possessed of another Princes Power and Dominions, came so possessed of them. For God can take a­way and transfer any Right or Title as he pleaseth, and the Conduct of his Pro­vidence in a Thorough Settlement of the Government, is a sufficient evidence that he has transferred it, because it is the only evidence we now can have. And therefore we ought to look upon the Per­son thus setled, as invested with God's Authority, and to pay him a full and entire Allegiance, as his Vicegerent with the same Submission, and upon the same Reasons, as if he had commanded us to do it by an express and immediate Reve­lation; since his Providence is now the only Revelation, or Manifestation of his will, that we can expect, and it must be instead of all other Revelations to us.

This seems to be the full of what can be fairly offered in the Affirma­tive, and it is liable to the following Difficulties.

I. By Gods Providence must be understood either his Permission in concurring with Natural Causes to produce their Effects; or his Ap­pointment.

First, If he only suffer or permit a thing to be done, without denying his Concourse, or interposing his Almighty Power to prevent it, this by no means proves his Approbation of the Event or Success of it. For he permits all the Wickedness, that is committed in the World, and suf­fers the worst men to prosper many times in their evil Courses.

Secondly, If by Gods Providence be meant his Appointment, this may signifie, First, that he from all Eter­nity decreed to permit the Event, and designed and ordained it to ad­vance his own Glory, and to bring about some good to Mankind by it: And so the Treachery of Judas was appointed (Act. 2.23.) that is, God had decreed to suffer it to come to pass, and had ordained it, when come to pass, for the Salvation of Mankind. And there can be no doubt, but the final Issue, and ulti­mate event of all the worst Actions is ordained of God, and approved of by him; but the Case before us is of an intermediate and subordinate End, which must be judged of, whether it be good or bad, by the Nature of the thing, and not by any success or event. That all will at last conclude in some good End in the long Series and Chain of Causes and Events, which are ordained by God's Decree is most certain, but then this doth [Page 18]not prove that the intermediate Cau­ses and Events are approved of by him, but we must enquire into the Justice of the Cause, whereby we can only know, whether the Event be pleasing to him or not. Secondly, By Gods Providence as it signifies his Appointment may be meant his Will or Command: And this Will or Com­mand is either for the doing of a thing, or for our Submission and ac­quiescence in it, after it is done. His command for the doing of a thing, cannot be known before the Event, but by the Justice of the Action, or by Revelation; to neither of which the Doctor pretends. And the E­vent cannot discover to us God's com­mand to do a thing, which is already done and past, and I have in part shewn and shall more fully shew after­wards, that it can as little disco­ver to us his Approbation of the thing done, or that it is his Will that we should acquiesce and submit to it.

II. Whereas it is said, that, since God now governs the World only by his Providence, we must of Necessi­ty acquiesce in the Event of things, or else we should disobey him in not submitting to his disposal of the Go­vernments of the World. First, God governs the World so as to require no Duty or Act of Obedience now of us, but what the Laws of Nature or of Scripture enjovn: And because Reve­lations are ceased, it seems requisite, that he should have revealed it in the Scriptures, if he had required us to acquiesce in the Events of things, and to look upon the most unjust Usurper as invested with his own Authority, when he is once gotten into Possessi­on of the Throne: I say this seems necessary to have been revealed, since Natural Reason cannot dictate it to us for in Gods permission of all othersort of Injustice in the World, we never i­magine that any Right can accrue to the Injuring Person by it. Secondly, God by his Power and Wisdom so orders things, as to make the most unjust actions subservient to the Ends of Justice and Righteousness, but not to reward Usurpation with the Inve­stiture of his own Authority, or to turn wrong into right. And all that we learn from Scripture concerning God's Providence is, that we must rely upon it for Protection in the performance of our known Duty, and by consequence that we are to regard the Justice only of a Cause, not the Success of it.

III. This would make it unlawful for any Prince who is dispossessed, or excluded from the Throne, to wage War against the Usurper in defence of his own Right. For he is suppo­sed to have no longer any Right, af­ter the Usurper is in full Possession; because that Right which God gives to the Usurper, the Lawful King must be divested of, unless there can be two opposite Sovereign Authori­ties at the same time, and both from God, who severally retain the whole and entire Right at once to the same Kingdom. But we read that David waged War against Ish-bosheth who was possessed of the Kingdom of all Israel for two years, and against the Jebusites, who were in possession of Jerusalem, and he was in continual Wars, before he was fully possessed of his Kingdom, for above seven years together. And there never was any dispossest Prince, but he en­deavoured to regain his Throne if he could, and never any Prince was blamed for it.

IV. This Argument would hold as well in private as in publick Affairs, since both are alike in God's dispo­sal, and it would be as unjust for a man injuriously dispossest of his E­state, to endeavour the recovery of it by due course of Law, as it would be for a King by waging War to en­deavour the Recovery of his King­doms For in both Cases it may with equal Reason be said, that the Title is [Page 19]lost, and the Right transferred by God himself. And the Example of God's commanding the Children of Israel to spoil the Aegyptians may seem as well to justifie the one Case, as his bestowing Kingdoms in the Old Testament to justifie the other.

If it be said that there is a more pe­culiar and extraordinary Providence, which rules and disposes of Publick States and Kingdoms. First, if by a pe­culiar and extraordinary Providence be meant, that God is wont more immediately so to interpose, as to change the ordinary course of Justice, and to transfer Rights, and displace, and dispossess Rightful Kings more than he does Rightful Owners of private Estates, this seems to be groundless and disagreeable to the Methods of his Justice and to those Rules which the Scripture prescribes to us, which are the same in our Du­ties towards Kings, as in those to­wards other men; and it besides lays upon us greater Obligations to observe them: We must render to all their Dues, and particularly Tri­bute to whom Tribute is due, &c. Rom. 11.7. But we have no where the least intimation, that the Rights of Kings cease any other way than o­ther Mens do, viz. by Death, Re­signation, &c. not by a foreign In­vasion, or the Rebellion of Subjects, or by the interposition of Providence in a concurrence of unfortunate Acci­dents. And those Texts which seem most to favour this supposition have been already considered, and if they prove any thing to this purpose, they must conclude as well concerning the Properties of Subjects, as concer­ning the Prerogatives of Princes, for it is as easie a thing with the Lord, to make a poor man rich, as it can be to set up over Kingdoms the basest of Men. and the Providence of God is alike concerned in both Cases; for as he leadeth Princes away spoiled, and over­throweth the mighty; so the Taberna­cles of Robbers prosper, and they that provoke God are secure, into whose hand God bringeth abundantly, Job. 12.6.19. And thus we find Job ascribes all his Losses and Calamities to Gods afflicting hand upon him; for God having all things in his Power and at his Command, is often said to do what he does not hinder. Secondly, If by a peculiar and extraordinary Pro­vidence be meant such a Care as is answerable to the great Importance of Publick Affairs and the Govern­ment of Kingdoms, this will imply no more than that Gods Care is more concerned and more imployed about things of greater importance, than in things of less moment, that is, it manifests itself in a greater number and variety of Exigencies, and is applyed to more Circumstan­ces of Affairs: Yet, his Providence extends itself to the Hairs of our Heads, and to the falling of a Spar­row to the Ground, and is as watch­ful over the most inconsiderable and minute things in proportion to their Nature, as over the greatest matters. His Providence, his Justice, and Good­ness is over all his Works, and he may as well be supposed to convey Private Estates to the unjust Posses­sors of them, as to dispose of King­doms to Usurpers; his Providence, which permits both, gives one no better Title than the other.

Kings, 'tis true, receive their Pow­er from God and are his Vicegerents, and therefore are accountable to none but him, and can be deposed by none else; but God invests them with his Authority, by the interven­tion of subordinate means, and by the Observation of the same Laws of Justice, which ought to be observed in the Rights and Possessions of Sub­jects. Thus in the Elective Monar­chies, there is the same Justice to be observed in the Election of the King, that there is to be observed in the Election of inferiour Magistrates, [Page 20]tho, after Election, the King is ac­countable to none but God, and the inferiour Magistrates are accountable to the King: And in an Hereditary Kingdom there is the same Right of Inheritance, (in respect of the Na­ture of Right or Justice) that there is in Private Estates, tho the Inhe­ritance of Kingdoms be forfeitable to God only. For as God now makes no Kings by his express Command and immediate Designation, but ac­cording to the Methods of Law and Right amongst men, so he deposes and devests them of their Power in such a manner as does not interfere with the ordinary course of justice, The Lord shall smite them, or their day shall come to die, or they shall descend into Battel and perish, 1. Sam. 26.10.

V. Tho by the Law of Nations Foreign Princes may transact with any Conquerour as Rightful King: Yet by the Law of Nature Conquest can give no just Title, unless the Claim before Conquest were just; that is, indeed it gives no Title at all, but only recovers what before there was a just Title to. For even a just cause of War will not justifie a Conquest, unless there be a pre­cedent Right to the Dominions of the conquered Prince; as a Debt of 5 l. tho it will justifie a Suit at Law yet gives no Title to a mans whole Estate. And if a Thorough Settlement can give the Conquerour any Right, which he had not at first, it can be no less than such a Settlement as the Laws and Customs of Nations allow, which is an undisturbed and un­contested Possession for a term of years exceeding the Memory of man. Jeptha alledged against the King of the Ammonites the Prescrip­tion of 300 years, Judg. 11.26. and the time for Prescription to King­doms is generally set at 100 years: Duck de Usu & Authorit. Jur. Civil. l. 1. c. 1. S. 19. and yet the Civilians gene­tally maintain that the longest Pre­cription can give a right to none, but to those who are Possessores bonae fidei; not to those who came in by Fraud or Violence, but who thought they had a just Title, or knew of no better Claim. And if it should be granted necessary for the Peace of the World, that some certain time be fixt, when, after a quiet and unmolested Posses­sion, all Pretensions should expire: Yet men must not be allowed to judg every thing setled that is up­permost, or that can brave it for a while, for this would in reality let no­thing be setled, but would open a Gap to perpetual Disturbances and Con­fusions. For every thing that can be called a Government is setled or may appear to be so to Private Men, till it is overpowered. Thus, David fled from Jerusalem, and went whither he might, uncertain whither to go, and almost despairing of his Return; Absalom possessed himself of the City and David was so forlorn and de­spicable, that Shimei cursed him to his face, and threw stones at him, and told him withal, that Gods just Judgment was faln upon him in re­venge of the Blood which he had shed of the House of Saul, and that the Lord had delivered the Kingdom into the hand of Absalom his Son, 2. Sam. 16.8. And this seems to have been the general Opinion of all that followed Absalom in his Rebellion; and therefore Hushai chose it as the fairest Pretence to recommend him­self to him, and make him believe that he was firm to his Interest; nay but whom the Lord and this People and all the men of Israel chuse his will I be, and to him will I belong, v. 28. So that the Man after Gods own heart, and of his own designation to the Kingdom, could not be secure against this Principle; and it can hardly prove of better consequence to other Kings, if they must be looked upon as abandoned and dethroned by God himself, whenever they are forced to withdraw, and by a strong hand, are kept out of their Dominions [Page 21]And it ought to be considered, how King Charles II. could retain any Right to his Kingdoms upon this supposition; and yet he had an in­disputable Right, during his long Absence, in the Judgment not only of all the Loyal Nobility and Cler­gy and Gentry of that time, but of our Parliaments and of the whole Nation ever since his Return.

VI We find in Scripture that when God himself does dispossess Kings of their Kingdoms, Dan. 4.26.2. Chron. 33.13. he doth not always devest them of their Right but reserves it for them, and re­stores them to the Possession of it again upon their Repentance. Thus it was in the Case of Nebuchadnezzar and Manasses, and it is very reaso­nable to believe that God doth often punish Kings and Subjects too, by successful Rebellions, and by Usur­pations upon the Regal Rights and Prerogatives, without any intention to release them from the mutual Obligations of their respective Du­ties to one another. And if this has been the Case as the Scripture in­forms us it has; if Reason tells us, that such Cases may be again, since they are very agreeable to Gods Ju­stice, and Wisdom, and Goodness in governing the World; then all that the Dr. hath said for transfer­ring the Allegiance of Subjects, from the dispossessed King by Law to the Possessor of his Throne by Providence, falls to the ground.

And yet we ought to be very sure before we venture to act upon such a Principle. For it would be a migh­ty Temptation and Encouragement to ambitious men, to be always ma­king dangerous Attempts upon the Rights' and Dominions of Princes, if they could be assured, that if once their Usurpation proved so prospe­rous as to put them into a full Pos­session, they should then be secured in it by a Divine Right, and would be so far from any Obligations to make Resticution, that they would be bound to stand by it, and all the Subjects would be obliged to main­tain and defend them with their Lives and Fortunes against the dis­possessed Prince. It is not to be imagined what confusion it would breed in the World, if no restituti­on were to be made of what is got­ten by Fraud and Rapine out of Pri­vate Estates, but all were a Mans own that he could but get and keep. Men would easily flatter themselves, that they might sin first, and then repent at their leisure; if this mortifying part of Repentance were but re­mitted; but when they must restore all again or be damned, they may perhaps think fit to sit down con­tented at first. And this Doctrine would be so much the more dan­gerous to Kingdoms, as they are great­er Baits, and the Injustice is greater, and the Mischiefs more grievous.

But it may be said, that tho this Argument from success and a Tho­rough Settlement should not hold good in all Cases, yet such peculiar Circumstances may sometimes fall out, as plainly shew it to be God's doing, and command our Submissi­on and Obedience. Suppose a Prince by a Series of fatal Miscarriages, and by a strong infatuation as it were from God upon all his Counsels, undermines his own Throne, and in a short Reign loses the Hearts of a Nation at first wholly devoted to his service; suppose he alienates the affections of his greatest Dependents and Favorites, and that the Body of his People revolt from him, and that all Orders and Degrees of men conspire to renounce him, and with­out War or Bloodshed set up ano­ther in his room, in whom all their remaining hopes are placed, and whose Arms are attended by a fa­vourable and wonderful Providence; suppose that there is no Human Pro­spect of the former King's return at all, and that if he do return it must be to the ruin of the Kingdom and [Page 22]the overthrow of the true Religion; is not this a Settlement so through­ly established that we must needs be obliged to stand up in defence of it, and have we not in this case all the Assurance that can possibly be, without an express Revelation that our Allegiance is transferred?

This, I think, is the highest that the Case can be put. In answer to which, First, It must be granted that all this cannot prove more ef­fectually, that our Allegiance is trans­ferred now it is brought about by his Providence, than if it had come to pass by an express Revelation, or than if God had denounced this as a Judg­ment upon the Prince whom it is supposed to have befallen. For the utmost that can be supposed is, that Gods Providence is now the same Evidence of his Pleasure to us, that his Revelation was to those of for­mer Ages; and therefore, if when God had declared that he did send such Calamities as Judgments upon a Prince, this was no Argument to the People that they were released from their Duty of Allegiance, it can be no Argument to us now, tho the Providence be never so signal and extraordinary. Secondly, We see in the Examples before-menti­oned, that what befel those Princes was from God, and that he had dis­possessed them of their Kingdoms, and yet their Right still remained. King David was forced to fly in great hast from his own Palace, he left his Capital City and the Ark of God itself in the Enemies Power, and when Shimei cursed him, he made this Reflection upon it, that God had bid him to do it, and to make the Judgment still more signal, Absalom went in unto his Fathers Concubines in the sight of all Israel, which was direct­ly the fulfilling of that Judgment, which Nathan had pophesied, should come upon him: yet his Subjects all the while could be excused from no Duty of Allegiance to him, but were as much obliged to all instan­ces of it, as if he had been still at Je­rusalem and upon the Throne: tho Absalom's Followers interpreted it o­therwise, as has been before obser­ved, and as for the Promise made to David, they imagined that it might have been as punctually fulfilled to his seed, tho himself had been set aside, as if he had been actually dead, and probably they supposed that this was the Evil that God had threat­ned; viz. to dethrone him, and set up his Son in his room; when he told him by his Prophet; Behold, I will raise up Evil against thee out of thine own House, 2. Sam. 12.11. Manasses and Nebuchadnezzar were as great Tyrants to their Subjects, as great Enemies to the true Religion, and as great Offenders in all respects against God as any Christian King can be sup­posed to be: Yet when God caused Manasses to be carried away captive to Babylon, and Nebuchadnezzar to be driven from amongst men to eat Grass with the Beasts of the Field; he brought these Afflictions upon them, not to deprive either of them of their Kingdoms, but only to hum­ble them, and then to restore them to their Thrones. And his dealing with Nebuchadnezzar is most of all considerable in this matter, because the Judgment upon him was purpose­ly designed to the intent that the li­ving may know that the most high ru­leth in the Kingdom of men, and giveth it to whomsoever he will, and setteth up over it the basest of men, Dan. 4.17. and yet v. 26. it is told him, Thy Kingdom shall be sure unto thee, after that thou shalt have known that the Heavens do rule: and in the 31. verse. There fell a Voice from Heaven saying, O King Nebuchadnezzar, to thee it is spoken the Kingdom is departed from thee, which was taken from him for the space of seven years, until he should know that the most highest ruleth in the Kingdom of men, and giveth it to whom­soever he will, v. 32. This then be­ing [Page 23]an Example purposely set for the Admonition of Kings, and to acquaint the World that God raises them up, and deposes them as he pleases; we may from hence conclude that tho they be dispossessed by his Appointment whether secret or express, yet we can have no certainty that he has utterly rejected them; but rather that upon their Repentance, he will again restore them to the Enjoyment of their Dominions, which they have still a Right to, against any Usurper or Possessour of them. Thirdly, What Danger soever Religion may seem to be in, yet it is manifest that throughout all Ages of the Church, Religion never flourished more than in times of Persecution; and Religi­on itself forbidding us to defend it by any Disloyalty, if by any such un­seasonable and unwarrantable means Subjects undertake the Preservation of Religion, they may expect for their Reward no better than uzzah's Fate, who put forth his hand to sup­port the Ark of God, when he saw it shaking, and like to fall. God can preserve it without our help against all the Power and Stratagems of the greatest Kings, or he can turn the hearts of Kings, and of Enemies make them become its Defenders. So he turned the hearts of Nebuchadnezzar and Manasses, and there is no Rea­son to suspect, that God will not grant Princes space for Repentance, now he rules the World by his Pro­vidence, as he did in those Ages of Prophecy and Revelation.

It may be alledged that where there is an express Revelation, men must follow the directions God is pleased to give, and proceed no fur­ther than he appoints: But when we have only his Providence to guide us, we must not neglect to make use of the present occasion, but must take all the opportunities, which Provi­dence puts into our hands, as so ma­ny indications of what God expects and requires of us.

I answer, this is a plain Argument that we ought not to make God's Providence the Rule of our Actions, but his Law: Because this principle would have misled those of ancient times, contrary to Gods design and purpose in an immediate Revelation, as well as it may now make us trans­gress his revealed Will recorded in Scripture, and his Laws ingraved in our Nature, I mean the Laws of Just­ice, and of Obedience to Governors. For from hence it appears that his Providence is not a sufficient Inter­preter of his Will, in what he re­quires of us; if it were they might have rely'd upon it then, and since it is not, we must not depend upon it now. Because the Scripture is our Guide as much as an immediate Re­velation was theirs, and we have as little warrant to follow Providence, without a Revelation in Scripture for it, as they could have to follow it, without an immediate Revelation. For as Prophecys and Revelations are long since ceased, so we are no where told that God's Providence shall be instead of them to us, but the Scriptures are to us instead of all other Revelations, and we are to in­terpret God's Will by his Providence no further than they direct us to do.

And from the Scriptures we may be assured, that God by his Provi­dence often offers men opportunities of doing things, only for their Try­al, and when he gives them no license to do them. If ever any circum­stances of Providence could justifie an Action otherwise sinful, they must have been those, which David was in, when Saul was twice at his mer­cy: He was before by Gods appoint­ment anointed to succeed in the Throne, and Saul the first time came unexpectedly into his Power, the second time a deep sleep from the Lord was fain upon Saul and his whole Army; God had promised David to deliver his Enemy into his Hand, and David's Followers both [Page 24]times did not fail to put him in mind of it: So that if Providence could be at any time a sufficient warrant, Da­vid must have had as full a Commissi­on to have slain Saul, as Ahud had to kill Eglon, or John to kill Joram, and David must have concluded, that God who had before rejected Saul from be­ing King, had now actually devested him of all his Authority, and accor­ding to his Promise, had delivered Saul to him, to execute the divine Vengeance upon him: But because this would have been to act against a known Duty, he still owns Saul for his Master, and the Lords anointed, and repented of the cutting off but the Skirt of his Garment. All this probably was designed as a Tryal to David, as well as to propose him for an example of Fidelity to all Ages: and perhaps nothing can be more reasonably concluded from our late Revolution, than that we are now cal'd to the practice of that Loyalty, which we have made such high professions of.

I shall add no more, but only tran­scribe some Passages out of Dr Sher­lock's Case of Resistance to shew that the Authority of that very great Man can signifie little in this Controversie, whatever his Arguments may do.

Hitherto I had written before Dr. Sherlock's Book was published, and up­on the most impartial consideration of it, can now find no cause to change my Opinion; but having proceeded thus far, I shall, as exactly as I can, exa­mine all that relates to this matter in his Book, which I could not foresee, and have not already given an account of.

His Two first Sections, I cannot think my self much concerned about, having already given both the full State of the Case, and the plain meaning of the Convocation. One thing indeed I omitted, which he remarks in the Se­cond Section: He observes, That whereas in the 30th Chapter, it is said, P. 8. That Jaddus returned Answer to Alexander, That he might not lawfully vio­late his Oath of true Allegiance to Darius, whilst Darius lived, the Convocation in the Canon following it, takes no notice that he owed Allegiance to Darius, during the Life of that King; And it is plain, says he, that Jaddus himself could mean no more by it, than that he could not make a voluntary Dedition to A­lexander; not that he never could submit to him till Darius was dead; for when he was in Alexander 's power, he made no scruple to submit to him. But I think it is not much material, whe­ther they mention this in the Canon or no, since they set it down in the fore­going Chapter, and then approve of the Behaviour and Conduct of Jaddus in the Canon. For if this part of Jad­dus's Answer, which was the most con­siderable thing in it, had been disliked by them, it must have been excepted; but when they give a general Approba­tion of what Jaddus did, and except against no Particulars, they must be supposed to approve of it in all its Circumstances before set down in the Chapter; at least they must approve of that, which was the principal thing in Jaddus's Answer: for when the thing that Alexander required of him was to bear Arms himself against Darius, or to solicite others thereunto; and Jad­dus answered, That he might not do it, because he had taken an Oath for his true Allegiance to Darius, which he might not lawfully violate whilst Darius lived: and the Convocation in their Canon deter­mine, That if any man affirm, that having so sworn he might have done it, he doth greatly err; they can mean no less in the Canon than they expressed in the Chapter, That he might not law­fully violate his Oath of true Allegiance to Darius, whilst Darius lived. And [Page 30]the Doctor doth not deny, that they approved of these words in the sense in which Jaddus meant them; and that Jaddus meant them in the strictest sense, is evident; for the words will admit of no Latitude: and what Jad­dus afterwards did, was by an imme­diate Direction from Heaven; and therefore it can be no Argument, that Jaddus had any thoughts of submitting to Alexander, whilst Darius lived, when he sent that Message; but on the con­trary, That he was resolved not to have submitted, and ought not to have done it, unless a Revelation had war­ranted him to do it, and thereby ab­solved him from his Oath to Darius.

In his Third Section, the Doctor lays down some Propositions, upon which his whole Discourse depends; and indeed to grant him these Propo­sitions, is to give up the Cause to him; for they plainly imply, and suppose the whole Question, without any more to do.

His First Proposition is, That all Civil Power and Authority is from God: p. 10. This he rightly observes, no man will deny him, but an Atheist. But then it ought to be proved, That it is so from God, as to exclude all Humane Rights and Titles; or that God now bestows and conveys this Authority, contrary to the Rules of Law and Justice a­mongst Men, and in opposition to the Constitutions of particular Govern­ments, and the Agreement and Con­sent of the several Nations of the World. That God by his Providence doth set aside all Humane Law and Right, and doth give an extraordinary and immediate Right and Title to eve­ry Usurper, who is got into full Posses­sion of any Kingdom, because no Man can have any Authority but from God, is no Consequence, unless there be no other way for God to rule the World but in this manner: for if God may govern the World agreeably to the Methods of Right and Justice, which Reason obliges men to observe to­wards their Sovereign, and which by an Authority derived from God him­self, and settled and enacted in par­ticular Countreys, then it cannot be known, but by Revelation, that God does ever interpose to the Prejudice of Legal Right, or absolve Subjects from their Allegiance to their Natural Sovereign, by transferring his Authori­ty to an Usurper.

Prop. 2. That Civil Power and Au­thority is no otherwise from God, than as he gives his Power and Authority to some particular Person or Persons to go­vern others. Civil Power and Autho­rity is from God in its Original Insti­tution, as well as in its Application and Donation to particular Persons. But not to insist upon that: The Per­son or Persons, who are invested with it, are either qualified for the Recep­tion of this Authority from God, by a just Accession to the Throne, ac­cording to the particular Form or Constitution of the Government; or they must be appointed by Divine Revelation, which may discharge the Subjects from adhering to the Legal Constitution, in performance of their Allegiance sworn to any other Person. But the Exercise of Power may be in him, who has properly no Authority, but only a Nominal one; that is, Men are forced to call it so, though it be really nothing less, for meer Force, and External Power, gives no Right, nor is any otherwise from God, than are the Natural Powers and Force of Wild Beasts, who de­vour Men, and other Creatures, not without the Permission and Concur­rence of God's Providence; and to use the Doctor's Expression, they can­not devour a Man, whether God will or no.

But if he Governs without receiving his Personal Authority from God, he Governs without God's Authority. No doubt, of it, he Governs, when he has no Right, and ought not to Govern: for the Ex­ercise of Authority may be usurped, as well as the Ensigns of Authority, or the Jewels of the Crown; but the Right to Govern, which is bestowed by God, is not always in him, who actually Go­verns, but in him, who ought to Go­vern, tho' perhaps he does not.

Prop. 3. There are but three ways, whereby God gives this Power and Autho­rity to any Persons; either by Nature, or by an express Nomination, or by the Dis­posals of Providence. This may be granted, and yet the Disposals of Pro­vidence may be such, as are agreeable to the Rules of humane Laws and Ju­stice, and it remains to be proved, that there are any disposals of Kingdoms by God's Providence contrary to these Rules. And whereas the Doctor says, that by what bounds the Paternal and Pa­triarchal Authority was limitted, we can­not tell: I can see no Reason to make any scruple or enquiry concerning that matter, according to his Principles; for Men always had just as much Au­thority, as they could by any means at­tain to the exercise of; if they could enlarge their Dominions, all they got by fraud, or violence, or by any way whatsoever of Injustice, was the gift of Providence; and if their Patriarchal Authority would not bear them out in it, yet the Divine Authority, which up­on a full Possession, they became in­vested with, would never fail to give them an undoubted Right and Title. If they could by any means deprive their Subjects of all the Priviledges they enjoyed, and take from them all their Liberty and Property, and reduce them to the vilest Slavery, they were by God himself settled in an Absolute and Arbitrary Government. And by the same Argument the King of France has a Divine Right not only to the Prin­cipality of Orange, but to all the De­spotick Power, which his Adversa­ries say he exercises over his own Subjects; since he is throughly settled in the Possession of both.

That God made Kings only in Jewry by a particular Nomination is a mistake. Pag. 11. For he nominated Nebuchadnezzar and Cyrus as particularly, as he nominated David himself. Nor is it true, that God entailed no other Kingdom, but that of Judah; as the Doctor seems here to say. For as he entailed the Kingdom of Judah upon David's Poste­rity indefinitely, so he entailed the same Kingdom with many others upon Nebuchadnezzar, and his Son, and his Sons Son, Jer. 27.7. And God en­tailed the Kingdom of Israel first up­on Jeroboam and his Posterity, pro­mising him, that if he would keep his Statutes and Commandments, as David did, he would be with him, and build him a sure house, as he built for David, and would give Israel unto him, 1 Kings 11.38. And afterwards he entailed it upon Jehu, and his Children of the fourth Generation, 2 Kings 10.30.

There can be no doubt, but that God ruled in all the other Kingdoms of the World, as well as in Jewry, and all other Kings ruled by Gods Authority, as well as the Kings of Judah and Israel, who were advanced by his command. And therefore God sometimes interposed his immediate Command, in the ad­vancement of Kings in other Kingdoms as well as in those of Judah and Israel; and he entailed other Kingdoms, and might do so now, if he pleased: but this is no argument, that he will do it, nor that we are now to expect it, since we are left to the guidance and pro­tection of his Providence in the ordi­nary course of things, and in our obe­dience [Page 32]to the Laws of that Constitu­tion of Government under which we live, which are to determin when the Authority of Sovereigns ceases, and the Allegiance of Subjects; and we are not to think their Power and Au­thority transferred, unless it be trans­ferred legally. For God now Rules the World by no express Commands, or extraordinary Declarations of his Will, but Governs every People, by the just Laws and Constitutions of their Country: and whatever happens con­trary to these, he permits for good and wise Reasons, known only to him­self. But Subjects are not to look up­on themselves, as discharged from their Duty and Oaths of Allegiance, un­less the Laws themselves, and the Na­ture of the Constitution discharge them: for we are not at liberty to have recourse to Providence for a Dispensa­tion or Release from the most Solemn Obligations that Nature and the Laws of the Land, and our own Oaths, and God himself by his Authority in his Vicegerents, by whom these Laws are enacted, laies upon us.

But it is said, g. 12. That it makes no dif­ference in this case to distinguish between what God permits, and what he does; for this distinction does not relate to the events of things, but to the wickedness of Men; which is the only reason for this Distinction; for the Scripture never speaks of God's bare permission of any e­vents, but makes him the Author of all the good or evil, which happens either to private Persons or publick Societies. The events of all things are in his Hands, and are ordered and disposed by his Will and Counsel, as they must be, if God go verns the World: but God cannot be the Author of any wickedness, cannot inspire Men with any wicked Counsels or De­signs, nor incline their Wills to the com­mission of it; and therefore this we say, God only permits; but when it comes to Action, he over-rules their wicked De­signs to accomplish his own Counsels and Decrees, and either disappoints what they intended, or gives success to them, when he can serve the ends of his Provi­dence by their wickedness: and herein consists the unsearchable Wisdom of Pro­vidence, that God brings about his own Counsels by the free Ministries of Men: He permits Men to do wickedly, but all events, which are for the good or evil of private Men, or publick Societies, are or­dered by him, as the Prophet declares, A­mos 3.6. Shall there be evil in a City and the Lord hath not done it?

1. I answer, There is no Reason, why we should distinguish in this case between the Counsels and Designs of wicked Men; and their Actions in the execution of them; for God concurs, as much to the Physical Operations of the Mind in purposing and contriving Evil; as he does to the corporal acts in the bringing it to effect: for the Mind is as little capable of thinking as the Body is of moving without God's continual concourse, both having a ne­cessary dependance upon him in the ex­ercise of their proper Faculties. And the Resolution and Contrivance to do Evil, is the event or result of Thought and Consideration, as the success in the performance and accomplishment of the Evil designed and resolved up­on is the event of the several outward Actions, which are done in order to it: so that God concerns himself no more in the events, which proceed from the exercise of the bodily Pow­ers in bringing about ill Designs, than in those, which proceed from the Ope­rations of the Mind in the projects and contrivances of Evil: he permits both, and concurs with both, as they are the acts of Natural Causes, in the producti­on of their effects, but as they have a tendency to Evil, he concurs with nei­ther. He leaves Men a Liberty of [Page 33]Acting and Thinking, and concurs with them accordingly; he suffers them to sin, and does not take from them the use of their Natural Faculties of Bo­dy or Mind, though they employ them to ill Purposes, and about wrong Ob­jects

2. Evil, whether considered Physi­cally, or Morally, that is, as it signi­fies Affliction, or as it signifies Sin; is in the Action as well as in the Event, and therefore the words of the Pro­phet Amos are applicable to both alike. For not only the Events of all things, but the Actions of all Creatures are in Gods hands; and are ordained and dis­posed by his Will and Counsel, and by the Doctors arguing, in all Actions, as well as in all Events, there is no distinction between what God permits, and what he does, which, he says, relates only to the wickedness of Men, and therefore it does not relate to the Actions of Men, but only to the wickedness of hu­mane Actions. For God gives success, he says, to wicked Designs; when they come to Action he sets up Kings, he ad­vances them to the Throne, he gives them the Throne; Pag. 12, 13. that is, he goes along with them, and assists them in the attain­ment of the Supreme Power, and at last puts it into their hands. So that they have his concurrence, and assi­stance, as much before the settlement, as after it, and he that at last gives them the Plenitude of Power, gave them all along the opportunity and the means of attaining it. For God makes no immediate Donation of it, but be­stows it upon them by his Providence, that is, by affording them ways and means to come by it. The plain con­sequence of which must be, that God not only suffers Men by wicked means to get into Power, and then bestows his Authority upon them, but he con­duct; them in every step they take, and at last when they arrive at the Throne, he places them in it. For what God gives by Providence, he does not give all at once, but by the seve­ral degrees of success, by which it is attained; and the success of every par­ticular action must be his Gift as much as the event it self. And if every E­vent be of Gods doing, every Action must be so too, because Events pro­ceed from Actions, and are no other­wise done or brought about, than by the performance of those Actions, which are requisite to produce them; and to say that God is the Author of the Event, but not of the Action, is to say, that he is the Author of the Effect but not of the Causes Acting, whereas he cannot appoint the Effect without appointing the Cause to Act, unless the Effect could be produced without its Cause.

3. End and Event are both but re­lative Terms, the end of one sort or series of Actions may be but the begin­ing of another, and the Event or Ef­fect of one Enterprise the Cause of a­nother. For that which is an Effect in respect of its Cause, is a Cause in re­spect of its Effect; and that, which in respect of the means is the Event, is the means in respect of another Event. If then the Event of all things is from God, and therefore gives a Right; a Rebel or Usurper would have a Right to every Fort or Castle he gets into his Possession in order to his Thorough Settlement in the whole Kingdom, for that in its kind is as truly an Event as a Thorough Settlement it self is in a dif­ferent kind: for he that possesses him­self of a Castle has gained his end as much for that time, and in that parti­cular design, as he that is possessed of a Kingdom has gained his end, in the full accomplishment of his desires and designs. And when he has his wishes in this, perhaps he stops not here, but makes this End and Event only a step [Page 34]to another Enterprise upon a Neigh­bour Kingdom, and then the obtain­ing the first Kingdom is but a means to gain the latter, as the several de­grees of success were the means of ob­taining the first.

But all other Events whatsoever are as means in Gods Hands, and are made use of by him, for the bringing about the final Events of things. God there­fore does not approve of every Event so as to command us to acquiess in it, any more than of every Means, but he approves, or disallows of them, as they are either just, or unjust, good, or evil; and because the last Events of things will be perfectly good, therefore they are approved of by him; and in the mean time he orders and disposes all lesser and precedent Events, whe­ther they be good or evil, to the at­tainment of these. The evil Events God neither approves in themselves, nor gives any Right or Authority to the Persons, whom he suffers to bring them about, but whilst the Authors of them are disliked and disowned by him, he permits the Events for the sake of that good, which he has decreed to pro­duce out of them, and for that relati­on and subserviency, which they have to the last Events of things, which he has determined and ordained from E­ternity.

4. If there be no difference between what God permits, and what he does, as to the Events of things, this will justifie all Events whatsoever, as being of God's doing; and therefore Rob­beries, and all the Wickedness in the World besides, that is successful, and ends in the desired issue, must be ascri­bed to him: for these are as properly Events as any besides can be; and the success of things respect not their Na­ture, but their End; and Actions at­tain their End, not as they are of less, or greater moment, of publick or pri­vate Concernment, but because they answer the Designs of the men that perform them.

And this will make it impossible, as the Doctor says expresly, That there should be any King, who is not Rightful with respect to God: which over­throws the Distinction he makes be­tween the Kingdom of Judah, and other Kingdoms. For Athaliah must have been as Rightful Queen as Joash was Rightful King, and both must have had God's Authority alike; and so the Subjects must have been obliged to Contradictions; that is, to assist Athaliah against Joash, and Joash against Athaliah, at the same time; because she had God's Authori­ty by Providence, and he by Pro­mise; and therefore both must have been obeyed, and yet both resisted; and the Subjects must have owed Al­legiance to both, and yet they must have owed Allegiance to neither of them. Thus it would have been likewise in the Case of David him­self, to whom God first assigned the Kingdom of Judah; and Ishbosheth, who was possest of the greatest part of it for Two Years. For either Ishbosheth and Athaliah, had God's Authority, or they had not; if they had not, then it is possible there may be a King who has not God's Authority, and that there may be some Events which are only by his permission: If they had, then God must bestow Two Opposite Sovereign Authorities and Rights, at once, to Two several Princes over the same People, and to the same Kingdom; and both must be equally valid and obligatory upon the Subjects Consci­ences. For by what way soever God conveys the Authority, it is his Au­thority; and God's Authority is al­ways the same, to whomsoever, and [Page 35]in what manner soever it be con­veyed.

5. Since therefore God concurs with the Thoughts and Actions of Men, in the Means and Causes, as well as in the Ends and Events of Things; and disposes all alike, it follows, that he can be no more the Author of Evil Events, than of Evil Means, or Acti­ons, or Thoughts. But God may be said to do all that is done in the world, because nothing can be done without him; for his Providence con­curs with Men in the performance of the worst Actions, though not in the Wickedness of them. Men contrive, and practice Evil, and God concurs with them in their Actions, but only permits the Evil of them: for every Action being a positive thing, neces­sarily requires God's Concurrence, and could not be done without it; and every Action, as such, is Good: But Evil is an Accident, it is a De­fect, or a privation of Good; and therefore this proceeds from the Im­perfection and Wickedness of Man only, and needs no Cause to produce it, since it has no other Being, but the want of Rectitude and Goodness in the depraved minds of men. Thus to think is always the same Action of the mind, whatever it be that we think about; And Evil Thoughts differ from Good ones, not in the Nature of the Act, but only in the Object, which employs the Thoughts; and therefore, though God never suggests Evil Thoughts, yet he leaves the Will free to determine it self in the choice of the Evil Object, and sustains the Mind in the Exercise of its Faculty of Thinking, whatever the Object be about which it is conversant. And so in all other Actions of the Body or Mind, God concurs to the Action, not as it has such or such an Ob­ject, but as it is produced by its proper Faculty; that is, he concurs to it, as it is a Natural, not as it is a Moral Action.

6. As God permits Wickedness to come to pass, so he orders it for the Good or Evil, that is, for the Be­ward or Punishment of private Men, or publick Societies; yet still he does not approve of the Event, but of the Consequences and Effects, which his Infinite Wisdom and Pow­er produces out of it. And the E­vent gives no Right to the Persons who are permitted to bring it about. For then a Thief would have a Right to stol'n Goods, because it may be a just Punishment from God upon the Person from whom they are stol'n, to suster him to have the possession of them.

I shall not venture to say, That though God permits Wickedness in the Counsels or Designs of Men, yet when it comes to Action, he either dis­appoints what they intended, or gives Success to them, when he can serve the Ends of his Providence by their Wicked­ness. For I believe there is no wic­kedness either in Thought or Action, but God's Infinite Power and Wis­dom can over-rule it to accomplish his own Counsels and Decrees.

And the difference between Evil in the Action, and in the Design, seems to be this, That whilst it is designed and contrived in the minds of Men, it can have no such Influence towards the Production of that Good, which God causes to proceed from Evil, as it certainly shall have one way or other, when it is reduced to practice. For though Evil Thoughts are over­ruled by God, as well as Evil Acti­ons, and either suffered to proceed to Action, or hindred; and if suffer­ed, then upon this or that Occasion, [Page 36]at this or that Time, with respect to certain Persons and Accidents; yet Thoughts, as such, have no Effect, but upon the Mind it self; whereas Actions have a further Effect upon divers Objects, for the tryal of Good Men; for their Admonition or A­mendment, or for the prevention of that Sin, which they would other­wise run into; or else perhaps for the Punishment and Correction of wicked men.

And therefore there can be no E­vil in a City, and the Lord hath not done it. He concurs with wicked men by his Providence, but concurs with them, as if they were Natural, not as they are Moral Agents, by sustaining and enabling their Natural Faculties to produce their Effects; he never inclines their Minds, nor influences their Wills to Evil, but oftentimes o­ver-rules their first Intentions, and di­verts their Will, already determined and resolved upon Mischiefs, to cer­tain Objects, that the Evil may most tend to his Glory, and the good of Mankind, in the Punishment of Sin­ners, or in the Exercise of the Pa­tience, and other Vertues of Good Men.

As to the distinction of Events, P. 12. That some God only permits, and some he orders and appoints, it is grounded upon this, That he orders and appoints all that are good and just, and per­mits the contrary. But then this ap­pointment is known to us, not by God's Providence, but by his Law. For Providence appoints us to do nothing, but only concurs with Men, and assists them in the performance of what God's Laws appoint or com­mand: The most that can be said, is, That Providence may sometimes be an Indication to us, of God's Will and Command; but that can be only in Events that are miraculous and su­pernatural, when there is nothing re­pugnant in them to his Will already known and declared: For even Mira­cles wrought to carry on wicked De­signs, are to be looked upon as false, and the Impostures and Delusions only of the Devil.

2. Of that particular Providence which watches over Kingdoms, and orders the Government of them, and the difference of it from that Provi­dence, which guides and influences private Affairs, I have said enough already, and have shewn, That God, with his own Hand, immediately directs the Motions of the great Wheels of Pro­vidence, but permits none to move as they please themselves. For I take it to be a very wrong Notion of the Permission of God's Providence, that he leaves things to move, as they please themselves; No, he rules, and restrains, and limits what he only per­mits; and puts a check and stop to it, when he pleases: And by God's more immediate direction, I under­stand, not that God ever acts at a distance, or leaves any thing in the world to it self, but that he sometimes acts in a way to us more visible and remarkable; though the steddy and unobserved Influence of Providence has as much of God's immediate Pre­fence in it, as have the most extra­ordinary and miraculous Events.

The other Propositions are but Consequences of these Three, and therefore need not to be particularly examined; and if these Three only were but well proved, and not laid down, as if they were so very plain to his purpose, as to carry their own Evidence with them, P. 16. I should readily agree to all the rest, and indeed to the whole Book, as far as it con­cerns this matter, except some few [Page 37]Particulars less material to the me­rits of the Cause. But I despair of seeing these Propositions so effectual­ly proved, as to induce me to think, that by what way soever that can be thought of, P. 13. a Prince is advanced to the Throne, he is as truly placed in it by God, as if he had been expresly nomi­nated and anointed by a Prophet, at God's Command, as Saul and David were: Or that it is impossible there should be a wrong King, P. 14. unless a Man could make himself King, whether God will or no. I believe the Self-Evi­dence of these Propositions, can work in few men so much assurance as this amounts to.

The Fundamental Mistake, is, That the Doctor confounds the Exercise of Power or Authority with the Right of it; and supposes, that eve­ry one, who has the Administration of Power, has a Right to the Admi­nistration of it; which are plainly Two very different things: For the Administration or Exercise of Pow­er, is a Natural Act, and may be without that Moral Qualification, which is implied in the Right of Power or Authority. Thus in his first Proposition, That all Civil Pow­er and Authority is from God: If he mean the Exercise of all Civil Pow­er, I deny it, because it may be exercised by him who ought not to exercise it: If he mean the Right to exercise Civil Power and Autho­rity, the Proposition is true, but no­thing to the purpose. So that ei­ther his Proposition supposes the thing in Dispute, and is false; or if it be true, it is to no purpose. And the same Mistake runs through the rest of these Propositions: For if by Civil Power and Authority, he understand only the Exercise and Administrati­on of it, he supposes that which ought to be proved: if he under­stand the Right it self, though these Propositions were true, yet still they would prove nothing,

But the Doctor makes an Objection to himself, P. 15. which has great weight in it; If this be so (that no Obedience is due to the Rightful King, when another is settled in the Throne) what does a Legal Right signifie, if it do not command the Allegiance of Sub­jects?

He answers: It bars all other Humane Claims: No other Prince can challenge the Throne of Right: and Subjects are bound to maintain the Rights of such a Prince, as far as they can; That is, against all Man­kind; but not against God's disposal of Crowns: and therefore when God trans­fers the Kingdom, he transfers our Allegiance, which is due and annexed to his Authority, whether this Authority be conveyed by a Legal Succession, or by any other means.

But notwithstanding all this, the Legal Right can signifie nothing, un­less it be in that Interval of Time between the Dispossession of one Prince, and the Settlement of an­other. For if the Legal Possessor be in the Throne, his Legal Title can be of no advantage to him, because his Divine Authority would secure him, while he is in Possession, as well without it; and when an U­surper is once settled, it can then no longer be of any account to him; for though it be good against all Mankind, yet not against God in his disposal of Crowns; but when God has given away his Kingdom to an­other, the Rightful King must sub­mit, unless he may plead his Hu­mane Claim against God's Donation. Before a Settlement, indeed, he that has the Legal Right, has the Odds [Page 38]on his side. But Men are so partial in their Judgments, in all things wherein their own Interest is so nearly concerned, that every one, who were exposed to any great Danger from the Usurper, would easily perswade himself, that he might become his Subject, and that the Legal King had no longer any Right to his Allegiance, the Usur­per being, in his Opinion, settled e­nough to become invested with God's Authority: So that a Legal Title would upon these Grounds, be little more than an empty Word or Notion, and would either be of no use at all, or of little benefit, when there should be most need of it.

I shall not much trouble my self about the several Degrees of Settle­ment, P. 17. and of the Proportionable Sub­mission, which they require; since I am not yet satisfied, that any Settle­ment of an Usurper, though it be in the highest Degree, can confer any Authority upon him, or cause any Obedience of the Subjects to become due to him merely upon that ac­count. But if any Man can prove, That a thorough Settlement of an U­surper, does of it self, and upon its own Account, before the Decease or Cession of the Rightful King, and his Heirs, entitle him to the Crown, I will give him no Trouble to dispute with me about the Degrees of Set­tlement. But since the Doctor sup­poses, P. 17. That the Generality of the Nation have submitted to such a Prince, and have placed him on the Throne, and put the whole Power of the King­dom into his hands; and says expres­ly, That he is indeed King, while he administers the Regal Power; And since he has told us before, That it is impossible there should be a wrong King, I cannot see, why he should be so solicitous to define the Degrees of Submission, and not think him throughly enough settled to have Right to an intire Allegiance, while the dispossest Prince has such a formi­dable Power, as makes the Event very doubtful. For if God have once made him King, as by the Doctor's Suppo­sition he has, then by the same Sup­position, the Subjects owe him an intire Allegiance to day, though they were sure that the dispossest Prince would recover his Kingdom of him to morrow. For he that has once God's Authority, has a Right to our Allegiance from the first to the last hours he has it; why therefore may not Subjects obey him as their King now, who perhaps may not be their King a while hence? Nay, though they were certain that his Royal Au­thority were to be taken from him in never so short a time, yet this could make him have never the less Right to their Obedience, while his Authority lasts. If he be indeed King, P. 8. he must be Rightful King with respect to God; for all Kings are equally right­ful with respect to him; P. 14. and it is im­possible there should be a wrong King, unless a Man could make himself King, whether God will or no. So that if he be King, as the Doctor supposes, he is Rightful King, and may challenge the Allegiance of the Subjects by Vertue of God's Authority, whatever For­ces the dispossest Prince may yet have: and therefore either he is now thoroughly settled, or a thorough Set­tlement is not necessary to the obtain­ing God's Authority; and when he is once King, there can be no Reason, why the Allegiance of the Subjects should in any measure be abated for any Apprehensions of Danger he may be in from the late Legal Possessors Arms.

In the Fourth Section, the Do­ctor proceeds to confirm his Do­ctrine [Page 39]by Arguments, and to answer Objections.

His Arguments are, 1. From Scri­pture. 2. From Reason.

1. From Scripture. Pag. 19. His first Argu­ment is from Rom. 13. 1, 2. Let every Soul be subject to the higher Powers, for all Power is of God: The Powers that be, are ordained of God; and they that resist shall receive to themselves damna­tion. He observes, that the word [...], Power, or Authority, which is opposed to [...], as it signifies Force, is sometimes used in the same sense with it, and that these two words are sometimes used promiscu­ously in Scripture, and that therefore unless there were some distinction set down by the Apostle in express words, whereby we might know that by it in this place are to be understood only Rightful Powers, we are to under­stand the word in its full Latitude, so as to comprehend Usurpers likewise. For the Scripture neither in this nor any other place distinguishing between Lawful Kings and Unlawful, we are not to limit the signification of the words, so as to exclude Usurpers from a Right to the Duties enjoyned in the Text; or to say, that they are not ordained of God.

1. But if the various signification of words necessarily require, that there be some express limitation ad­ded, to determine them to one par­ticular sense; or if every word must be taken in the utmost Latitude of its signification, unless it be so limit­ted, we shall be at a great loss to know how to make sense of most Au­thors, or to make them consistent with themselves. For the same words often have opposite and quite contra­ry significations, as they are differ­rently used and applied by the same Authors, and yet they seldom give no­tice, when they use them in one sense and when in another, but think it suf­ficient, that the senfe be limitted and determined by the subject to which they are applied, or by the cohe­rence and connexion, which they have with the rest of the discourse. And if the Acceptation of a word be still doubtful, the most likely way to find it out, is to examine in what sense the Author most commonly uses the same word. But unless there be an evident Reason to the contrary, e­very word is to be taken in its pro­per, or in its usual sense; for there needs no Reason to be given, why a word should be understood properly, or, as it uses to be understood, but he that will understand a word in an improper, or unusual signification, is obliged to produce his Reason for it: because every word is supposed to retain its first and most genuine sense, unless it be most frequently used Metaphorically, and then it must be taken in its most usual significa­tion, unless it can be shewn, that it is applied to another meaning, than is commonly intended by it. When we read in Scripture, [...], Lak. 22.53. of the Powers of dark­ness, of the God of this World, [...], Rev. 13.2. and of the Pow­er and Seat, or Throne, and great Authority, which the Dragon gave the Beast in the Revela­tions; the words are in­telligible, though taken very impro­perly, without any express limita­tion And when St. Paul says, Let every soul be subject to the higher pow­ers, &c. We are to understand only Rightful Powers, unless it can be shewn, that any other are ordained of God. For in its primary and natural signification, and in its common use, [...] must be acknowledged to mean [Page 40]only Just and Lawful Authority, and this every Man must understand by it, unless the context determin the contrary, which it cannot do here; for here is no mention of any Pow­ers, but those, which are ordained of God. In some other places of Scrip­ture, it plainly appears from the Text it self, that the word is used improperly, and contrary to its or­dinary signification; but here the Doctor seems not to pretend any such thing, but only argues, that because it is used in an uncommon sense in some other places of Scripture, it must be taken so in this, because St. Paul makes no exception against Kings who exercise Civil Government without a Legal Title to it. Whereas we ought to conclude on the other side, that since the Apostle gives no intimation, that he uses the word in an impro­per and unusual sense, therefore we are to understand it only of those who have legal Titles, and the rest are excepted against plainly enough, because they are not mentioned, nor is the least intimation given of them; when in the other places of Scrip­ture it is manifest at first sight, that the word is applied to a different sense than that which it commonly has in Scripture, or in any other Book.

2. If the Sriptures make no di­stinction between Kings, who have a Right Title, and those that are Usurp­ers, who have only the Name and Title of Kings, it is because there needs no other distinction, than the Reason of the thing, which suffici­ently declares the difference. The Scripture had never declared any distinction of Husbands, yet the Wo­man of Samaria well enough under­stood, that there must be one, and therefore replied, that she had no Husband, though she had one, who was called so; and our Saviour an­swers her, Thou hast well said, I have no husband; for thou hast had five husbands, and he, whom thou now hast, is not thy husband: in that thou saidst truly, John 4.17, 18. And if it should now be asked any Man, who is not prepossessed with the Notion of a thorough Settlement, whether St. Paul by the higher Powers, or­dained of God, meant Rightful Kings only, or Usurpers likewise, he would scarce be able for some time to ima­gine what reason there could be to doubt, whether Rightful Kings only, were meant by those expressions, or to conceive what interest Usurpers could have in that Text. And this Dr. Sherlock seems to own, Pref. when he says, That the Apprehensions of novelty and singularity had cramped his free­dom and liberty of thinking, Pag. 3. and that his Scheme of Government may startle some Men at first, before they have well consider'd it. So that it is evident, that this Interpretation is a Novelty and Singularity, which will startle most Men, and that this Text in its most plain and obvious sense is to be understood of Rightful Kings, and if others are to be comprehended in it, this must be proved not from the words themselves but from other Reasons; for the words do not natu­rally include them; the utmost that can be said is, that they may possibly comprehend them, because they are not always used in a strict sense; but that they are not so used here is the thing to be proved: if usurped Powers are ordained of God, the Text plainly commands subjection to them, but if they be not ordained of him, it as plainly commands subjection to Rightful Kings in opposition to them. And it cannot be concluded from the different sense of the word [...] upon different occasions, that Usurp­ers are ordained of God, but it must [Page 41]be first proved, that they are ordained of him, and then and not before, it must be allowed, that the significa­tion of that word i [...] to be so extend­ed in the Text, as to be under­stood of them as well as of other Kings.

3. Besides, if this Argument from the Scriptures making no distinction between Kings, who have a Legal Title, and those who have none, prove any thing, it must prove too much, to make at all to this purpose. For the Scripture makes no distinction between Kings, who have both a Legal and a Divine Right, and those who have neither, but are Usurpers both against God and Man. Thus Abime­lech is stiled King, Judg 9. without any manner distinction, or explication, though he was set up not only by the most wicked and bloody means, but in opposition to the Authority of God himself, who then governed the People of Israel, by raising them up Judges to Deliver and to Rule over them; and for this Reason, when they would have made Gideon King, he rejected it as a thing, which would be agreat offence against God, and a notorious contempt of him. Then the men of Israel said unto Gideon, rule thou over us, both thou, and thy son, and thy sons son also: for thou hast deli­vered us from the hand of Midian. And Gideon said unto them, I will not rule over you: the Lord shall rule over you, Judg. 8.22, 23. And since that God was afterwards so displeased with the Children of Israel for de­siring a King, and said that in asking a King they had rejected him, that he should not reign over them, 1 Sam. 8.7. The People of Shechem in setting up a King of their own chusing, with­out leave from God, or asking coun­sel of him, must be guilty of a much greater affront against God: for they rejected him in a more insolent and provoking manner; not contenting themselves with those whom God used to raise up for them; and not regarding his choice, Convoc. Ch. 13. Can. 1 or expecting his pleasure in it, they presumed to chuse them a Prince of their own. Abime­lech therefore could be King by no Authority from God, but by his Per­mission only; and yet the Scripture gives the Title of King to him as well as to Saul and David, because he was in full Power, and exercised all outward Acts of Supreme Authority, though he had really no Authority, but by Force only, and fuccess in his wickedness assumed to himself the name of King. Isbbosheth likewise was set up by Abner against David, whom God had nominated, and caused to be anointed King, to reign over all Sauls Dominions, after his death: yet the Scripture says in the same words, in which it speaks of all other Kings, that Ishbosheth was made King over all Israel, and that he reign­ed two years, 2 Sam. 2.9, 10. And Athaliah is said to have reigned over the Land six years, 2 Kings 11.1. tho she had no manner of Right either from God or Man, as the Doctor him­self confesses and maintains, because Joash was alive, on whom God had entailed the Crown, as being descend­ed from David. She is notwithstand­ing said to have reigned over the land, in the same terms that are used in Scripture, concerning the most Right­ful Kings, nominated and appointed by God himself. The examples then of Abimelech, Ishbosheth, and Athaliah abundantly shew, that Usurpers, tho' they exercise the Supreme Authori­ty, and are in full Possession of it, are not therefore the ordinance of God, and that it is not impossible there should be a wrong King, unless a Man could [Page 42]make himself King, whether God will, or no: for Abimelech, and Ishbosheth were Kings, and Athaliah was Queen without any Authority at all, and yet not whether God would or no, but by his Permission. And from hence it is evident that the word King or Queen doth not always signifie in Scripture a Person invested with God's Authority, though it be used without distinction; and that the sense of the same words in particu­lar places of Scripture must be known, not always from any distinction an­nexed to them, but from the Cir­cumstances and Reasons of things; and that if this distinction between Usurpers and Rightful Kings be un­known to Scripture, yet if it be not unknown to Reason, that is sufficient to interpret this Text of St. Paul, to be meant only of lawful Powers; for the Scriptures always suppose and require that Men should bring their Reason along with them, when they read and explain them, or else they will make no more difference be­tween Kings authorised by God, and those not authorised by him, than between Legal Kings and Illegal.

4. But I cannot think that the di­stinction between Rightful Kings and Kings by Usurpation is unknown to Scripture; but rather that St. Peter has expresly declared, that it is to Rightful Kings obedience is due, when he says, submit your selves to every ordinance of Man for the Lord's sake, whether it be to the King, as su­preme, 1 Pet. 2.13. [...]. He commands them to submit themselves to every humane Ordinance, or Constitution of Government under which they lived. Or, as the Convocation quote this Text, according to the old Tran­slation, to submit themselves unto all manner of ordinance of Man. Pag. 144. I know there are different Interpretations of this Text, but this seems the most probable: for the King is here called the Ordinance of Man, not because he is made King by Men; but because the Constitution, according to which he becomes King, is an humane Con­stitution or Ordinance, and not Di­vine, as was that of the Jews. St. Pe­ter admonishes the Christians, that they ought not to overvalue them­selves upon the account of their Chri­stian Liberty, so as to imagine them­selves exempted from those Duties which are incumbent upon the rest of mankind, as Subjects to their So­vereigns, or as Servants to their Ma­sters; but to behave themselves, as free and not using their Liberty for a cloak of maliciousness, verse 16. He had told them, verse 9. that they were a chosen Generation, a Royal Priest­hood, a holy Nation, a peculiar People: which was the Character given of the Jews, Exod. 19.5, 6. and now applied by the A­postle to the Jewish converts, and lest they should have too high a con­ceit of themselves, and vainly think, as the Jews did, that because they were Gods peculiar People, they were bound to submit to no Government, but what was of God's own immedi­ate appointment, (and this was the O­pinion the Gentiles had of them, they spoke against them as evil-doers, v. 12. and accused them of disobedience to Caesar, and of Preaching another King, one Jesus, Act. 17.7.) St. Pe­ter therefore acquaints the Christians, that so was the will of God, that by subjection to all in Authority they should with well-doing put to silence the ignorance of foolish men, verse 15. in as much as tho' the Frame of all Govern­ments is not of God's appointment, yet the Anthority in every Govern­ment is from him, and therefore whoever is King according to the Le­gal Constitution of each Government, [Page 43]Obedience becomes due to him for the Lora's sake, because God makes him King, and concurs with the Humane Act, in ratifying what is done accor­ding to the Ordinance or Constitution of Man. So that St. Peter calls par­ticular Governments Man's Ordinance, because they are of Humane Contri­vance and Institution; and he says, they are to be submitted to for the Lord's sake, because whoever is im­powered to administer the Govern­ment according to the Constitution of it, has God's Authority, and in St. Paul's words, is God's Ordinance. St. Peter therefore speaking of Le­gal Powers, and St. Paul only men­tioning the higher Powers in general terms, and both saying, Obedience is due to them for the Lord's sake, both must be understood of Legal Powers; and St. Paul writing his Epistle to the Romans, after this of St. Peter, his words could need no distinction, to be understood with that limitation, which St. Peter here uses, of every Ordinance of Man, or of those Powers which are Just and Right by the Laws of Men.

For as Bishop Sanderson has accu­rately expressed it, Ad Magi­stratum Serm. 1. p. 94. Edit. ult. the truth is, the Substance of the Power of every Magi­strate, is the Ordinance of God; and that is St. Paul 's Meaning: but the Specification of the Circumstances there­to belonging, as in regard of Places, Persons, Titles, Continuance, Jurisdiction, Sub-ordination, and the rest, is (as St. Peter termeth it) an Humane Ordi­nance, introduced by Custom, or Positive Law.

5. But further, we find this Di­stinction in express words in the Old Testament: for according to the Do­ctor's Interpretation, it is impossible there should be any King, who is not Ordained of God; for he explains it of all the Powers, that at any time be, of all that are possessed of Supreme Power, however they came by it: Whereas, besides what has been said of Abimilech, and Ishba­sheth, and Athaliah, God says ex­presly of the People of Israel, They have set up Kings, but not by me; they have made Princes, and I knew it not; that is, did not approve of it, Hos. 8.4. To this the Doctor an­swers Three things, which I shall consider.

1. This is not true, P. 35. as to all the Kings of Israel, after their Separation from the Tribe of Judah: for some of the Kings were set up by God's own ap­pointment, as Jeroboam and Jehu, and their Posterity: So that this can be true only of those Kings who reigned, over Is­rael between the Posterity of Jeroboam and Jehu, and after the Kingdom was taken from the Line of Jehu.

2. One of these Kings was Baasha, 1 King. 15.27.16.2. who slew Nadab the Son of Jeroboam, and made himself King without God's express Nomination and Appointment; and yet God tells him, I exalted thee out of the dust, and made thee Prince over my People Israel; and all the o­ther Kings, who were not nominated by God, nor anointed by any Prophet, no more than Baasha was, were yet set up by God, as he was.

3. The true Answer then is this: Israel was originally a Theocracy, as well as Judah, and though God al­lowed them at their request to have Kings, yet he reserved the appointment of them to himself; and therefore as in the Kingdom of Judah he entailed the Crown on David 's Posterity; so he appointed Jeroboam to be the first King in Israel; and they ought, when that Line was cut off, to have consulted God, and received his Nomination by [Page 44]his Prophets of a New King; but in­stead of that—they submitted to any who could set themselves over them; which was a great Fault in a People, who were under the immediate Govern­ment of God: For hereby they fell out of the State of Theocracy, into the com­mon condition of the rest of the World, where Kings are set up by the Providence of God, &c.

1. To this I reply, 1. It is not pretended that the words of the Prophet can be meant of all the Kings of Israel; nor of all neither who reigned either from Nadab, the Son of Jeroboam to Jehu; or after the Posterity of Jehu.

2. For Baasha, who slew Nabab, was set up by God himself, accord­ing as God had threatned Jeroboam by the Prophet Ahijah: Moreover the Lord shall raise him up a King over Israel, who shall cut off the House of Jeroboam that day, 1 Kings 14.14. The Lord shall raise up to himself a King, [...], thereby entitleing him in a more especial manner to his Authority, and stiling him his King, the King whom he would raise up to himself to vin­dicate his Honour, and to execute his Judgments upon Jeroboam: which Prophecy is expresly said to be ful­filled in Baasha, when he killed Na­dab, and destroyed all the House of Jeroboam, 1 Kings 15.29. So that though Baasha were not directly no­minated, yet he was immediately ap­pointed by God himself; and the be­ginning of his Reign, in the destru­ction of Jeroboam's Family, was ex­actly foretold; and therefore God's exalting him out of the dust, and ma­king him Prince over his People Israel, 1 Kings 16.1. cannot be understood of his Providence, but of his Appoint­ment.

It may be objected, That God did not authorise Baasha to slay Nadab, because this is alledged against him as the Cause of his own Destruction, 1 Kings 16.7. And also by the hand of the Prophet Jehn, the Son of Hanani, came the word of the Lord against Ba­asha, and against his house, even for all the evil that he did in the sight of the Lord, in provoking him to anger with the work of his hands, in being like the house of Jeroboam, and because he killed him.

To which I answer, That by him in this Verse, cannot probably be meant Nadab, of whom there is no mention after the 31st Verse of the foregoing Chapter: Nor can it be meant of Jeroboam, who was not killed by Baasha, unless Jeroboam be said to be slain by him, not in his own Person, but because he had de­stroyed all the Family of Jeroboam: Which kind of Interpretation seems never to be admitted, where there is no evident Necessity for it, or not however when there is another more easie and natural. The words then are a Repetition of what had been before related in the first and second Verses: God had raised up Baasha, and so blessed him, that he reigned Twenty Four Years; but he was guilty of great Ingratitude to­wards God, and did that which was evil in his sight, which is expressed twice before by his walking in the ways of Jeroboam (1 Kings 15.34. and 16.2.) and here by his being like the house of Jeroboam: for this God threatens, That he will take away the Posterity of Baasha, and the posterity of his house, and will make his house like the house of Jeroboam, the Son of Ne­bat, ver. 3. Which implies, That God designed to continue Baasha and his Posterity after him in the Throne of Israel, if he had not thus provo­ked [Page 45]God with his sins. Bat in nei­ther of the Two other Verses is there the least intimation, that the killing of Nadab was imputed to Baa­sha as a sin; and here, after the Death of Baasha, God's Message for­merly sent to him by his Propher, is again repeated, and the mention of Jeroboam is added, as it had been twice before, for the further aggra­vation of his Guilt: It is said, the word of the Lord came against Baa­sha, and against his house, even for all the evil that he did in the sight of the Lord, in provoking him to an ger with the work of his hands—and because he killed him; or, as it may be translated, for which he smote him; that is, God smote Baasha for his sins: The Prophet was sent to de­nounce God's Judgments against him, and God at last took away his Life, and his sins were the Cause of it: So that the words are not to be under­stood with relation to Nadab, [...] as slain by Baasha, but to Bausha himself, as killed by God's just Judgment upon him for his sins. And with this agrees the Version of the Septuagint, [...], and concerning the smiting him: And thus Malvenda says, most understand this place of Baasha's being slain of God for his sins. Pleri (que) eum, Ba­hasam, propter quod percussit eum Domi­nus, id est, propter sua prava opera. Mal­vend. in loc. Ob hanc causam occidit eum, hoc est, filium Hanani, Pro­phetam. The Vulgar Latin renders it, ob hanc causam occidit eum; that is, God slew Baasha for the Cause abovementioned, viz. for provoking God with his sins, as Jeroboam had done; though there is a Clause added, which ap­plies the words to the Prophet Jehu, as if Baasha had killed him for deli­vering the Message; but this is omit­ted in some Copies, Sixt. Se­nens. Bib­lioth. lib. 2. in Jehu. and Sixtus Se­nensis thinks that it was only an An­notation put by some body at first in the Margin, which afterwards got into the Text.

Cajetan says, Ob hanc causam occidit e­um Jux­ta Hebrae­um habe­tur, & pro quo per­cussit eum. Pronomen eum demonstrat Jerobo­ham, cum domo ejus. Narratur enim quod Jehu Propheta manifestavit Regi Bahasae, pro quâ causâ percussit Deus Domum Jeroboam, ut vel ab ex­emplo disceret recipiscere. Cajet. in loc. the Prophet declared to Baasha the Cause for which Jero­boam's House was destroyed, that Baa­sha might take warning by his Exam­ple; and for which he smote him; that is, the Evil of the House of Jerobo­am, for which God destroyed it.

But if we should grant, that this Verse is to be understood of Baasha's killing Nadab, the meaning seems then to be, not that he sinned in killing Nadab, but that his having killed him proved the aggravation of all his o­ther sins; that when he had been rai­sed up by God purposely to destroy the House of Jeroboam, he should not­withstanding be guilty himself of the same sins, for which it was destroy­ed; and therefore no mention is made of Nadab, but of Jeroboam, the Prophet having declared, That God's Auger was kindled against him, be­cause he walked in the way of Je­roboam, which yet he knew to be so abominable before God, that he was exalted out of the Dust, and had the Kingdom given him, to reduce Israel from that sin, which Jerobo­am had led them into; and there­fore this is added at last, as the most aggravating Circumstance, that [Page 46]he should follow the Wickedness of that very Man whom he had by God's appointment slain: And the Word of the Lord came against him, for all the Evil that he did, in being like the house of Jeroboam, and because he killed him; that is, because he was the Man who had killed him for the same sins which he now became guilty of himself.

But if we should further grant, That Baasha was raised up by God's Permission only, and that he sinned in killing Nadab; yet when he had destroyed the House of Jeroboam, and there was none left who had a Right to the Kingdom, he then became Rightful King, and God made him Prince over his People Israel: So that he could not be of the Num­ber of those whom the Prophet Hosea mentions, that were made Kings, but not by God; for in those frequent Conspiracies and Murthers of the Kings of Israel, which we read of, it might often happen, that the Right Heir was alive, and exclu­ded, which alters the Case.

3. It is precarious to say, That God had reserved to himself the Nomination and Appointment of the Kings of Israel. He gave indeed the Ten Tribes to Jeroboam, and entail­ed the Crown of Israel upon his Po­sterity, in the same manner as he had entailed that of Judah upon the Line of David, on condition, That he should serve God, as David did, 1 Kings 11.38. And he settled the Kingdom upon Jehu's Posterity to the Fourth Generation, 2 Kings 10.30. But these were extraordinary Cases, and therefore can be no Evidence, That God did reserve to himself the constant designation of their Kings, though he did sometimes nominate and appoint them. God's Promise to David, and his House, was ultimately and principally to be understood of the Messiah, who was to be the Son of Da­via, and it was absolute with respect only to him; David and Solomon, &c. were Types of Christ, and the King­dom of Judah was Typical of Christ's Kingdom, and the Scepter was not to depart from Judah till the coming of Christ: So that God had a more im­mediate Care and Regard to the King­dom of Judah than to that of Israel: and yet the Entail of the Kingdom of Judah is scarce ever mentioned, but with such express Conditions annex­ed, as shew, that upon the Violation of them, it might, by the very Terms of that Promise, whenever God had plea­sed, have been taken away from them in the same manner that other King­doms are alienated and transferred: And there is no intimation, That upon the Forfeiture of their special Favour and Privilege, either Israel or Judah were to expect that God would after­wards nominate their Kings. After the sin of Jeroboam, wherewith he made Israel to sin, and at once lost God's Fa­vour both to himself and his Posteri­ty, and forfeited the Hereditary Right to the Crown; God seems to have lest the Succession of the Kings of Israel to the Care of his ordinary Providence, excepting only when he interposed up­on particular occasions, to put down one King, and set up another. For if it had been sinful for any King to ascend the Throne, without God's express Order, it is incredible that the rest of the Prophets should be so silent in a matter of so high a Nature, who re­proved and rebuked their Kings so free­ly, and so severely too upon all other occasions. A sin so notorious, and so long continued in, would probably have been taken notice of by all the [Page 47]other Prophets as well as by Hosea. The Kings then, whom this Prophet mentions, that were set up, but not by God, must be such as were set up not only without God's appointment, but without his Approbation, or Authority.

And indeed, if God had reserved to himself the Appointment of the Kings of Israel, his permitting them to Reign without his Appointment, and suffering them to settle themselves in the Kingdom by his Providence, could be no evidence that he had be­stowed upon them any Authority; because this had been contrary to that Order of Government, which God had instituted among them, and in derogation from that Prerogative, which he had determined to exercise over them; and when God has de­clared his Will in any Case, we must not conclude from any Events of Pro­vidence that he allows or authorises the contrary. Pag. 35. This we are told in the Case of Joash and Athaliah, and there is the same reason in this; for God may as well be supposed by his Providence to set aside the next Heir to the Crown of Judah, which was entailed by himself; as to forgo the Theocracy, which he had retained over the Kingdom of Israel: so that ei­ther we must say, that he confirmed Athaliah in the Throne by his Provi­dence, or else, that the Kings of Israel, whom he did not appoint, could have no Authority from him, notwithstand­ing any success or continuance of their Reigns.

It appears therefore from the Pro­phet Hosea, that the People of Israel did set up Kings, who had no Autho­rity from God, and made Princes, when God knew it not, or did not ap­prove of it, and who by consequence could be none of his Ordinance And how many or how few soever these Kings were, it cannot truly be said, that there was no Histinction to be found in Scripture between Kings, who are invested with God's Authori­ty, and those, who are not: and therefore St. Paul could not be under­stood to mean all Kings whatsoever, under the Denomination of the higher Powers, ordained of God; and since all are not set up by him, there needed no distinction in express words, to in­form us, that he meant only Lawful Kings; for if he had intended by this Precept subjection to unlawful Kings too, there would have needed a fur­ther distinction to know, what un­lawful Kings we were to obey, since the Scripture speaks of some unlawful Kings, whom we are not to obey, un­less we must obey such as are not set up by God, or those Kings can be God's Ordinance, whom he does not set up: wherefore it would have been necessary for him to have distin­guished between Usurpers, that are set up by God, and those, who are not, if he had not spoken only of Rightful Kings.

But it is urged that this sence of the Text would involve Mens Con­sciences in great perplexities; for the Titles to Crowns being oftentimes ve­ry uncertain, great skill in History and Law is required to sind out the Right Title; and after all their search the most learned Men cannot agree about it, and it is not to be ima­gined that all Mens Consciences should be concerned in such niceties, which wise and learned Men are not able to decide: especially the Titles of the Roman Emperours at that time, and after wards for many Ages together, being either stark nought, or the very best of them very doubtful, the Apostle cannot be imagined to oblige every Christian of that and of succeeding Ages to examine the Ti­tles of Princes: Pag. 20. and this the Doctor takes to be little lefs than a demon­stration, that this Precept of Sr. Paul [Page 48] cannot be understood only of subjection to Powers, that had a Legal Right.

I answer, 1. I have proved that there may be Kings, who are not God's Ordinance, and the only way we have now to distinguish Kings, that are set up by him, from those, who are not, is to enquire into the Justice of their Cause, and the Le­gality of their Titles. And St. Pe­ter speaks of the Ordinance of Man, or of human Establishment, accord­ing to which Kings are advanced to the Throne.

2. If the Title be doubtful, yet the Consciences of Subjects will not be so ensnared and perplext with niceties and difficulties, as it is ob­jected: for in such cases the Sub­jects may lawfully swear to the Pos­sessor; and are obliged to pay all Al­legiance to him, unless his Competi­tor can make it appear, that the Right is his, and not the Possessor's; and then, the Subjects not knowing this before, are guilty of no breach of Allegiance to him, but are bound, as soon as his Right becomes known to them, to yield him their Allegi­ance, having taken an Oath, or given any other assurance or proof of O­bedience to the Possessor, only out of ignorance, that any other Person could make out a clear and certain Title.

3. But granting that St. Paul had meant Usurpers as well as Lawful Powers in this Text; yet the per­plexities of Conscience would not have been much less, than it is said they must necessarily be according to the contrary exposition. For so learned a Man as Dr. Sherlock could not find out the true sence of the Text, it seems, till now, upon this occasion, and very few perhaps be­sides have been able to discover it, since the Epistle was written. Case of Resistance, p. 122. The Doctor acknowledges, that St. Chry­sostom is against him, and produces no Father, nor any other Author anci­ent or modern for his Opinion, ex­cept the Convocation, which I have shewn, says nothing to his purpose: And St. Basil says ex­presly, [...], &c. Ba­sil. Tom. 2. Constitut. Monast. c 22. p. 715. that the higher Powers mentioned by St. Paul, are such as at­tain to the Government, according to Humane Laws: and this appears to have been the sence of the Church in his time; for he sets it down as a thing certain, That the Civil Powers must receive their Authority in a Legal way; and from thence proves, that if they, that resist those, who receive their Power according to hu­mane Laws, resist the Ordinance of God, then much rather must those resist his Ordinance, who resist the Ecclesiastical Powers, which are, by Gods own more immediate Instituti­on, invested with his Authority, ac­cording to the Divine Laws. So that if Dr. Sherlock's Interpretation were true, yet it would not much have eased Mens Consciences, since it has been so little known and so lately disco­vered, and by his own Confession was by himself so lately suspected of Novelty and Singularity.

4. The Titles of the Roman Em­perours were then neither stark nought, nor very doubtful. The Titles of Claudius, and of Nero were not at all doubtful, and under one of them this Epistle was written: Claudius was saluted Emperour by the Soldi­ery, and approved of by the Senate; and Nero was adopted by Claudius, and chosen by the Army, and the choice confirmed by the Senate, and they were both owned, and submitted to by the whole Empire; which is all that could be requisite to make them [Page 49]Lawful Emperours: for it is evident beyond all dispute, that the Roman Empire was not Hereditary. Jovian. c. 1. And, when at any time the Title was doubt­ful, they might have submitted with a safe Conscience to the Possessor, as I before observed. And thus much may serve in answer to his first Argument from Scripture, out of Rom. 13.

2. He urges, That we have no exam­ple in Scripture, that any People were ever blamed for submitting to the present Powers, P. 21. whatever the Ʋsurpation were, tho' we have examples of their being condemned for refusing to submit to them. This he proves from the Prophecies of Jeremiah, and from our Saviour's Argument in his discourse with the Scribes, and Pharisees, which relies wholly on the Possession of Power; Whose Image and Superscription hath it?

I answer, that the silence of Scrip­ture is no Argument, unless it can be shewn that the Prophets at the same time that they reproved the People for their other Crimes, did not blame them for submitting to an Usurper, while the Lawful King himself had not submitted, nor was commanded by God to submit, but had a Right to their Allegiance. For in matters of History the Scriptures often give a bare Narrative, without any remark or censure at all upon it. We read of Lot's Incest, and that both Noah and he were drunken: but no Man, I sup­pose, will conclude that either Incest or Drunkenness is Lawful, because the Scripture relates only the matter of Fact, and says nothing more of it: for they are Vices notorious enough in themselves, and it was not the de­sign of the Sacred History to inveigh against Vices, but only to declare by whom, and with what circumstances they were committed: in like man­ner if there be any instance in Scrip­ture, where the Subjects abandoned their natural Sovereign, and betook themselves to the Usurper, and fought against him; a bare Narrative of this can no more prove that it is lawful, than that it is unlawful: for an Hi­storical Relation can prove nothing, but that such a thing was done, and in such a manner; but the nature of the action it self with the circum­stances of it; or some command in Scripture must discover the goodness or the wickedness of it.

But in the present case the Scrip­tures are not silent, but plainly e­nough declare, that Allegiance is on­ly due to the lawful King, tho' an U­surper be never so well settled. For St. Peter and St. Paul both declare this, as it has been just now shewn, unless we can serve two Masters; for they teach subjection to the Rightful King, which implies that it cannot be due to his mortal Enemy. And when Jehoiada charged the People by their duty to God and to the King, to submit to Joash, and to depose A­thaliah; this was a sufficient Declara­tion against Allegiance to an Usurper in prejudice to the Lawful King's Right.

But the case of the Jews under the King's of Pabylon was such, as made their Obedience to them a necessary Duty according to those Principles, which are most contrary to the Do­ctor's Opinion. For, 1. God had commanded both King and People to submit to these Kings. 2. They did submit, and take Oaths to them ac­cordingly. 3. Therefore, the Kings submitting, as well as the People, there was none who could claim their Allegiance in competition with the Kings of Babylon. And under these Circumstances, either of a Di­vine command, or of a joint consent and submission both of King and Peo­ple, no Man, who maintains the Right of an Hereditary Succession and a Le­gal Title, can with any Reason scru­ple to submit to a Foreign Con­queror. But I shall speak more par­ticularly [Page 50]to the Texts, which the Do­ctor has produced.

1. He acknowledges that the Pro­phet Jeremy 's Argument is Prophecy, P. 21. or an express command from God to sub­mit to the King of Babylon, which he says, because of the Entail, that God himself had made of the Kingdom of Judah upon David's Posterity, was necessary, though other Kingdoms which are governed only by God's Providence, ought to submit to any Conquerour, or Invader in the same manner, as the Jews did to Nebuchad­nezzar, without any Revelation to re­quire it of them, or to warrant them in so doing. I shall not repeat what has been already said in Answer to this; but shall consider here only what he further urges, viz. That this Prophecy was, P. 22. at the beginning of the four Monarchies, and that the Prophe­cy of the four Monarchies is not yet at an end; for under the fourth Monarchy the Kingdom of Christ was to be set up, and Antichrist was to appear, and the encrease and destruction of the Kingdom of Antichrist is to be accomplished by great Changes and Revolutions in hu­mane Governments; and when God has declared, that he will change Times and Scasons, remove Kings, and set up Kings, to accomplish his own wise Counsels, it justifies our necessary, and therefore inno­cent, compliances with such Revolutions, as much as if we were expresly command­ed to do so, as the Jews were by the Pro­phet Jeremiah.

To say that the Prophecy of Jere­miah was at the beginning of the four Monarchies, is a thing I confess, that I can reconcile to no account of Chronology; it had been a much less mistake to have said, that it was at the end of the first Monarchy, or at the beginning of the second: for there were but two Kings that suc­ceeded Nebuchadnezzar, in the Assyrian Monarchy, as God had declared by the same Prophet, that all Nations should serve him, and his Son, and his Son's Son, until the very time of his land came, and then many Nations should serve themselves of him, Jer. 27.7.

And the Prophecy of Daniel is only a Prediction of what should come to pass, and therefore implies no Authority from God, as has been shewn before: for if all Kingdoms, that are foretold of in Scripture, have Authority from God, then the Kingdom of Antichrist himself (as that signifies either Tem­poral or Spiritual Power) must be founded by God's Authority. For if ei­ther Prophecy, in declaring what shall come to pass, or Providence, in order­ing and appointing all Events, as the Doctor argues, or only in permitting those that are Evil, as the general Opi­nion is, does imply, That all things pro­phesied of, and accomplished accord­ingly, are of God, the Kingdom of An­tichrist must be of God's Erection, as much as any other Kingdom whatso­ever. For Antichrist is in Scripture sti­led King, P. 14. and he could not make himself King whether God will or no; and there­fore he must be constituted King by God himself, because all Events are in his hands, and the distinction between what God permits, and what he does, P. 12. does not relate to the Events of things. So that the Power of Antichrist must be the Ordinance of God, if the Four Monar­chies were so meerly for this Reason, because they were prophesied of in Scripture, and set up by God's Provi­dence in the World, especially since it is said, That Power was given unto the Beast to continue Forty and Two Months, Rev. 13.5. and that Power was given him over all Kindreds, and Tongues, and Nations, v. 7. which is as much as is said of the Four Monarchies; and yet it was the Dragon that gave him his Pow­er, and his Seat, and great Authority, v.2. In short, if a Prediction in Scripture, and Providence in the disposal of the event, necessarily implies, that God au­thorises and approves of the thing fore­told [Page 51]and brought to pass, then every thing that is prophesied of, and comes to pass, must be approved of by God; or, which is at least the same thing, it must be authorised by him; for what­ever God gives Authority to, so far he certainly approves of it: But as God foresees all things, so the most wicked Actions that have been in the World, have been foretold by him; and there­fore his Prediction of Events can no more imply his Authority, or Approba­tion, than his Fore knowledge does, and by consequence, the Four Monarchies could derive no Authority from the Prophecies of Daniel, and could be no further authorised by God, than they were just, and were erected upon the same Foundations of Righteousness, that other lawful Governments are set­led upon.

The Doctor says, P. 20. That the Four Mo­narchies were all as manifest Ʋsurpations as ever were in the World. From whence I perceive that he is not of the Opini­on of some Learned Men, who think, that Cyrus, the Founder of the Second Monarchy, was well acquainted with the Prophecy of Isaiah, Chron. Ca­rion. in which he is expresly named, and that Daniel had explained it to him. However, I do not see how consistent this is with the Account, which, as has been observed, the Scripture gives of him.

But the Doctor seems to have parti­cular Exceptions against the Roman Empire; for he says, That if we must obey such Powers as the Roman Power was, P. 21. he knows very few Powers that we may not obey; for whatever Legal Right the Roman Emperors had, who by Fear, or Flattery, or other Arts, extorted some kind of Consent from the Senate, it is plain the Romans themselves were great usurpers, and had no other Right to the greatest part of their Empire, but Con­quest and Ʋsurpation.

This is soon said; and it does not concern the matter in hand, in the least, to justifie the Romans in their Wars, though very great things have been said by some Authors in their Fraise upon that Account. But what­ever their Conquests, or their Ʋsurpati­ons were, their Usurpations could give them no Right, but were only an acci­dental means, whereby, after the Sub­mission, or Decease of those in whom the Right was, they became invested with it. And if this be not enough to give a Legal Right and Claim, there can be no such thing now in the world: which takes away the Subject of the Question; and when we are enquiring whether the Legal Right, and the Di­vine, may be in different Persons, the Doctor must deny, that there is any such thing as a Legal Right. For if there be any such thing, let any Man shew that the Romans had not such a Right, and to what Provinces they had no Le­gal Title, or that they had none to any Province at all.

What Power the Roman Emperors had, and how it was conveyed to them, appears from the Lex Re­gia, Sed & quod Principi­placuit, Legis habet vi­gorem: quum Lege Re­giâ, quae de ejus imperio lata est, populus ei & in eum omne imperium su­um, & potestatem conce­dat. Justin. Insiit. lib 1. Tit. 2. Jani Gruteri In­script. Antiq. p. 242. and from an Inscrip­tion in Gruter, where we find the Power describ'd that was renewed to Ves­pasian, and had belonged to the Emperors his Pre­decessors. And by the way we may observe, that Judea was more imme­diately under the Empe­rors themselves. For when the Romans had given up the Sovereign Power to Augustus, he made a Division of the whole Empire, reserving one part of it to himself, to be governed by Deputies sent by him; and giving the other to the People, who sent either Praetors or Consuls into the several Pro­vinces assigned them: but all the King­doms and Principalities were reserved to the Emperors share; Serabo lib. ult. in sin. and thus they continued, Strabo says, at the time of [Page 52]his Writing, which was in the Reign of Tiberius.

2. As to the Objection of the Pha­risees against Submission to the Roman Powers, it did not respect the Title of the Emperor, but their own Privile­ges and Immunities For they pretend­ed, That because they might not volun­tarily make choice of a Stranger to set over them, Deut. 17.15. for that Rea­son they might not submit to Strangers who had conquered them, and to whom they had been in subjection near an hundred years; which was a most unreasonable and absurd way of argu­ing, and fit only for Scribes and Phari­ses to use: for what could be more ri­diculous than to conclude, That because they might not chuse a Stranger their King, therefore so many years after the whole Nation had submitted and sworn to Strangers, they might not pay Tri­bute to them? Our Saviour then, when they proposed that ensnaring Question to him, whether they might pay Tri­bute or no, gives them such an Answer as determines nothing indeed concern­ing the Title of Tiberius to the Empire, which was not the thing in Question, but was owned by all as good and law­ful; but he shews them, they ought to pay Tribute to the lawful Emperors, for such Tiberius was acknowledged to be; and this he did by requiring them to shew him a peice of that Money, in which the Tribute was wont to be paid; and seeing that that had Caesar's Image and Superscription upon it, he tells them, they ought to render to Cae­sar the things which are Caesar's, and un­to God the things which are God's, Mat. 22.21. Whereby he assures them, that they were forbid by no Law of God to pay Tribute, or perform any other In­stances of Obedience to the Princes, under whom they lived, but were in this left under the common Obligations of all other Subjects; and that which they were bound to above others, con­cerned not things of this Nature, but their Obedience to God, and the Ob­servation of his Laws, so as to keep themselves from the false Worship and Idolatry of the Heathens, whilst they obeyed their Edicts, and submitted to their Government: They were obli­ged both to render unto Casar the things that are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's; to submit to Caesar in Civil Affairs, and to reserve for God his own Honour and Worship. The Title of the Emperor was not the Que­stion, but supposing him to have a Rightful Title, the Pharisees denied that Tribute ought to be paid him by the Jews, who they pretended were to be Subjects to no Strangers whatso­ever, but were exempt from his Juris­diction, how just and lawful soever it might be over all the rest of his Sub­jects: Our Saviour answers, That the Privilege and Duty which was pecu­liar to the Jewish Nation, was not such, as to require them to submit to no Fo­reign Power; but it consisted in the Worship of the True and Only God; and that all other Subjection to Caesar was lawful, but that which was repug­nant to their Duty to God: They might not pollute themselves with Ido­latry, nor worship the Heathen Gods, nor pay Divine Honours to the Empe­rors themselves, nor do any other sin­ful thing at their command: This was not Caesar's due, and therefore he could not require it of them; nor must they obey him, if he should; They must not render to Caesar that which is due only to God, nor deny him that which is his own; but must render unto Caesar that which is Caesar's, and unto God that which is God's. Our Saviour speaks not of the Legal Authority of the Em­peror's, but supposes it, as the Phari­sees themselves did, who put that insi­dious Question to him; he only deter­mines what was the Duty of the Jews under a Prince who was not of their own Nation.

[Page 57] II. The Doctor now comes to pro­duce his Arguments from Reason; by which he endeavours to shew, that hereby is given the only true Account of the Original of Government, and that upon any other Principles there can be no such thing as a Divine Right of Kings, nor can they be irresistible, but their Authority will be precarious and uncertain, so that upon his Principles only the Doctrin of Passive Obedience can be maintained. I shall first shew, That Kings are irresistible, according to the Principles contrary to his, and then consider his Objections.

1. Kings are irresistible upon the con­trary Principles. That Government was originally in the Fathers of Families, who by Nature and by God's Institution had supreme Authority over their own Children and Servants, is evident from Scripture; and how this Paternal and Patriarchal Authority was preserved a­mong God's own People, but degenerated into other Forms, among the rest of the World, has been sufficiently explained from the Convocation; which determines, That when these other Forms are so setl'd, as that there is none who can claim any Right to the Paternal or Patriarchal Au­thority; then, however Irregular or Degenerate they may be, they are throughly setled, and require our Sub­mission; it being evident that God has ratified them, when there must be ei­ther such kinds of Government or none at all over us; because it cannot be ima­gined, that he will place Societies of Men in such a condition, as to have no Lawful Government, or that none should have a Right to Rule over them: So that it is not the Consent of the People, nor Length of Time, or Prescription and Continuance of Usurpation, that gives a Right; but these are either only accidental Means of attaining to a right­ful Title, as in continued Usurpations, upon the Failure of the Royal Blood; or Conditions and Qualifications, which prepare and capacitate Men for it, as in other Cases. For when the Throne be­comes vacant either by Death or Cession in an Elective Monarchy, or by the Extinction of the whole Royal Line, in an Hereditary Kingdom, the People may, and, in most Cases, are obliged to submit to the present Possessor, by what means soever he got into Possession; and then it is not the Submission or Consent of the People, that gives the Right, but God himself, who concurs with their Act, and ratifies it. As in Matrimony, it is not the Consent of the Parties, which joyns them together, but God himself, upon their Consent, and the Contract is irrevocable, because whom God hath joyned together, no Man may put asunder. A mu­tual Consent cannot separate them, much less can either Party revoke their Con­sent, when they please; but whosoever shall put away his Wife, except it be for Fornication, and shall marry another, com­mitteth Adultery, Matth. 19.9. And if the Consent of the Parties in Matrimony be so firmly ratified by God, there is no reason to doubt but that God may so confirm the Agreement or Compact be­tween a King and People, as that no­thing but a mutual Relaxation shall be able to disingage them from the Terms of it; And he may invest the King with his own Authority, and make him as irresistible, as if he had himself nomi­nated him, and not conferred upon him his Authority by any interven­tion of Subordinate Means. I need not mention that in Ordination, and in the Sacraments, and in all the Dispen­sations of God's Grace and Authority under the Gospel, Human Acts inter­vene; from whence it is obvious to conclude, That since in things of the highest and most Spiritual Nature God requires Human Acts, and does by them confer his Grace and Power, the irresistible Authority of Kings, can be never the more doubtful or question­able, because the People's Consent and Submission is ordinarily required to the conveiance of it in the first Ere­ctions of Kingdoms; for God acts as powerfully and effectually by the Mini­steries of Men, as by an immediate Com­mand or Designation.

[Page 58] 2. The Absurdities then which he would prove to arise from the asserting a Necessity of a Legal Right in them who are now invested with God's Authority, are all upon a false Sup­position.

1. He argues, If the Authority be whol­ly derived from the People, who shall binder them from the taking it away, when they see fit? Ʋpon these Principles there can be no Hereditary Monarchy; one Gene­ration can only choose for themselves, their Posterity having as much Right to choose, as they had. And what Right had my An­cestors, three or four hundred Years ago, to choose a King for me? These are the Absurdities he would bring all Men to, who are not of his Opinion: And upon the same wrong Supposition would afterwards prove that Passive Obedience is altogether inconsistent with any but his present Principles, though he has effectually proved it upon other Prin­ciples in his Case of Resistance. And if he will now suppose that by his for­mer Principles nothing more can go to the making of a King, whether he comes in by Conquest, or Usurpation, upon Defect of a better Claim by any other, or by Compact, or an Hereditary Right, than the bare Choice and Consent of the People, this is a little too much to be granted; and yet if this be denyed, all his Inferences fall of themselves to the Ground. The thing to be proved is, That Kings have not their Authority from God, unless they be set up only by the Divine Providence, without any re­spect to Human Law and Right; which can never be proved, unless it be shewn, That God cannot or will not set up Kings in a way consistent with the Laws of Kingdoms, and with the Con­sent and voluntary Submission of Sub­jects. The Bond of Matrimony is never the sooner dissolved, because Marriages are not made in Heaven, as they say, but Men and Women are at their Liber­ty, and have a Power of choosing, whether they will marry this or that Person, or will not marry at all, God may appoint the Persons, and pre­vent or over-rule the Consent of the Parties, and he has sometimes done it: Gen. 24. He can appoint Kings, and set aside the ordinary Forms and Laws of Govern­ment; but this doth not prove, That he will always do it, nor that we are ever to expect it now; much less may we con­clude, That he cannot or will not con­cur with Human Acts intervening, and give them his own Sanction. God certainly can, and ordinarily does con­vey Power and Authority as effectually by concurring with Men, and ratifying what they do, as if he did it immediate­ly himself; unless we will say, That God does nothing but Miracles, and that sub­ordinate Causes do every thing else without him.

But to use the Doctor's own Words, God not only places a single Person in the Throne, P. 14. but entails it on his Family by Human Laws, and makes the Throne a Legal Inheritance. And after all, the only difference between the Doctor and his Adversaries is, That he says, God's Providence makes Kings by Conquest, or by Submission, and long successive Con­tinuance of Power, or by Human Laws, or against Human Laws; because if Pro­vidence did not make Kings he could not prove that it unmakes them. But those of the contrary Opinion deny neither the absolute Power of God, nor the Effects of his Providence in setting up and putting down Kings: but they suppose, that unless it be, when God declares that it is his Will to act by an Absolute Power, without any regard to the Laws of Men, he does not raise up and depose Kings in a way that is contrary to the Constitution of their Kingdoms, so as to absolve Subjects from the Allegiance, which the Laws of their Country require; but so orders and disposes things, that Kings shall as long remain invested with his Au­thority, as they have a Legal Right.

2. The Notion of a Legal Right, he says, P. 25. must ultimately resolve it self into the Authority of the People to make Kings, which it is unjust for God himself to over­rule [Page 59]and alter: For a legal Entail is no­thing more than the Authority of the Peo­ple; and if the People have such an un­controulable Authority in making Kings, be doubts they will challeng as much Au­thority to unmake them too: That is, as we were told before, no Man is bound by his Ancestors Act, and every Man too may undo what he has done him­self, when he thinks fit.

It has been already shewn, that tho' the Prerogatives of Kings, and the Constitutions of Kingdoms may be con­trived and agreed upon by Men; yet God gives Kings a Right to govern ac­cording to them, and supreme and ir­resistible Authority to enable and se­cure them in the Administration of their Kingdoms, P. 14. and entails the Thrones on their Families by Human Laws. And though God may over-rule and alter the Rights of Princes, yet his Provi­dence is no sufficient Evidence that he intends to do it: If we once knew, it were his Will, all Human Laws must forthwith give Place to it; but since his Providence is not a Declaration of his Will in this Matter, we must keep to the Observation of Human Laws, and of our Oaths grounded upon them.

But to suppose the most and the worst that can be said: If the People did set up Kings by Consent and Com­pact, this is no Argument that they may depose them. For a People, who consent to the setting a King over them, must consent to set one over them with Supreme Authority; and the Supreme Authority is that, which hath no Superiour, and there­fore cannot be resisted: For if the Supreme Authority may be resisted, then to be sure all Inferiour Autho­rity may be resisted too, and so all Government must be dissolved, for want of any sufficient Authority to manage it. It follows then, That there must be a Supreme Authori­ty somewhere in all Governments; and in a Kingdom this Supreme Au­thority must be in the King; and a People, who upon this Supposition, should make a King, must choose one, in whom they place the Supreme Au­thority, that is, who is irresistible; at least, unless they reserve to them­selves a Liberty of Resistance in cer­tain Cases, by express Agreement, which has been the Custom in King­doms where Resistance is allowed. Or however let us suppose, That the People declare their King irresistible upon their Choice of him, and estab­lish that as the Fundamental Law of their Government; suppose they ob­lige all in any Office Military or Civil, to swear, That it is unlawful upon any Pretence whatsoever to take up Arms against him, and oblige all the Clergy solemnly and frequently to declare it, would it be lawful for the People to recal this Power, because they gave it? Or is it not rather of the very Essence of this Power that it can never be recalled, because never resisted? Are other Contracts revocable by ei­ther of the Parties at pleasure, because they are entred into by Consent? Might Marriage be dissolved, when either Party pleased, if no more were required to it than the Consent of both Parties? Or is there any great­er Reason, why he that has consent­ed to be governed by an irresistible power, may recal his own Act, and resist when he thinks fit?

I do not dispute whether it be pos­sible for the People to convey a Power of Life and Death, and to establish a Sovereign Power among them; nay, I grant it is impossible for any Rightful Government to be erected by mere Consent and Compact without God's Establishment and Confirmation of it; I only shew, That though this were true, yet the Conclusion would be false, and though the People might make Kings by mutual Agreement and Contract, yet they could not unmake them.

But tho' the same Persons might not play fast and loose, as they please; yet what obligation could their Chil­drenly [Page 60]under to obey that Race of Kings which they had set up? For what Rights, says the Dr. had my Ancestors three or four hundred years ago, to choose a King for me? I answer, they had a Paternal Right, in vertue of which Children are obliged by all the lawful Acts of their Fathers in their behalf, or by the Acts of others, which are for their advantage, when they act as Parents for them. Thus Children promise by their Godfathers and God­mothers in Baptism, and when they come to Age, would be guilty of Apo­stacy, and of the breach of the most solemn Vow and Promise made in their name, if they should renounce their Baptism. In the Covenants which God has made with mankind, the Children were always obliged by their Fathers Act; thus it was in his Cove­nant with Adam, with Noah, with A­braham, and with Moses and the Chil­dren of Israel. There is nothing more plain in Scripture, than that the Chil­dren had an Interest in the Covenant made with their Fathers, and were obliged to perform the Conditions of it. And there is no difference be­tween a Covenant made with God, and one made with Man in this respect; for it is essential to a Cove­nant that there should be the Con­sent of the Parties, that enter into it; and tho' God has a Right over his Crea­tures to require what Acts of Duty and Obedience he pleases from them, yet when he is pleased to deal with them by way of Covenant, it is necessary, they should consent to the Terms of it either by themselves, or by others that represent them, and have Power to act for them, otherwise, what were breach of a voluntary Covenant, as well as of natural Duty in the Parents, would be only breach of Duty in the Children.

And no distance of time can make any alteration in this obligation, which Parents lay upon their Chil­dren, as it appears by those Covenants, which God has entred into with Man­kind. But if this could make any difference, every Father renews his obligation to the Government for himself and his Children: For if the Person immediately consenting to the setting up a King oblige his Sons to pay Allegiance to him, then for the same reason, they by their Consent and Submission in living under his Go­vernment, oblige their Children, and so on for four hundred Years, or as long as the Government continues.

There is no need further to men­tion the Obligation all men are un­der to their Country for their Pro­tection and Education from their In­fancy, and for the many Benefits they receive from the Government; it is manifest that the Act of their Pa­rents is obligation enough, if there were no other, and they must be o­bliged by their Parents Choice, as well as by their own, and are not left at liberty to deny their own Consent, if they think their Ancestors have made an ill Bargain. But when we add to this God's Authority, which is conferred upon all, that are duly ad­vanced to Sovereignty, we have the surest grounds for the Doctrin of Pas­sive Obedience, tho' God do not give his Authority in such a manner as to null or frustrate Legal Rights and Claims.

He next proceeds to consider the Objections, that may be made against his Assertion. The first is, that the dispossessed Prince ought not to attempt the Recovery of his Throne (nor any other Prince to assist him in it) which is to oppose God, and to challenge that, p. 25. which he has no longer any Right to.

He answers; By no means: The Pro­vidence of God removes Kings, and sets up Kings, but alters no Legal Rights, nor forbids those, who are dis­possessed of them, to recover their Rights when they can. While such a Prince is in the Throne it is a Declaration of God's Will, that he shall reign for some time, longer or shorter, as God pleases; and that is an obligation to Subjects to submit and obey; for Sub­mission [Page 61]is owing only to God's Authori­ty: But that one Prince is at present placed in the Throne, and the other re­moved out of it, does not prove that it is God's Will, it should always be so; and therefore does not devest the dis­possest Prince of his Legal Right and Claim, nor forbid him to endeavour to reeover his Throne, nor forbid those, who are under no obligation to the Prince in Possession, to assist the dispos­sest Prince to recover his Legal Right.

This Answer seems to suppose, that, tho' the Prince in Possession have the Exercise of the Supreme Power, and do administer God's Authority for a time; or rather, tho' God governs by him as his Instrument, while he is in Possession; yet he has no Authority inherent in himself, but acts as wick­edly, all along in withholding from the Rightful Prince his due, as he did at first in depriving him of it, and therefore may be thrust out by the Legal Prince himself, or by any others, who have made no Submis­sion to him. But this is so direct­ly contrary to all the rest of his Dis­course, that it cannot be the Dr's meaning in this place. For he, that is set up by God, P. 13. that is made King by him, that is invested with his Authori­ty, and receives his Authority from him; he, to whom God gives the Throne, and does not only permit him to take it; he, who is as truly placed in the Throne by God, as if he had been ex­presly nominated and anointed by a Pro­phet at God's Command, as Saul and David were; P. 14. he, who is rightful King with respect to God, and has the True and Rightful Authority of a King, who is God's Minister and Lieutenant, P. 15: to whom God has transferred the King­dom, and the Subjects Allegiance; this King has as full Right to his Crown as the lawful King himself could ever have; he has a Divine Right, and then the human Right, when it comes in Competition with the Divine, is nothing but a meer Formality, an empty and insignifi­cant Word, and the want of it can never in the least weaken his Title. And the Doctor thus plainly and frequently asserting almost in every Page, that God has placed the U­surper in the Throne, I am not a­ble to understand how it can be lawful for the dispossest Prince to endeavour to recover it from him, which is to endeavour to bring down whom God has exalted, and placed there with his own Right Hand. For the late Legal Possessor can have no more real Right than if he had never been King; only perhaps he may have the Honour to be called late King for distinction's sake, and to acquaint the World that he is now no longer so: But the Legal Right, which it is ac­knowledged he once had, must now be extinguished, and absorpt in the Divine Right of the present Possessor.

To justifie the King, who is sup­posed to retain a Legal Right in opposition to the Divine, in his wa­ging War for the regaining of his Throne from him, who is in possessi­on of it by a Divine Right, is plain­ly to maintain, that he may fight against God, and may insist upon the Validity of an human Claim, against the Divine Will and Command; it is to say, that God may dispose of Kingdoms as he pleases, but the Rights introduced by human Laws are still in force, notwithstanding his disposal. For though it be uncertain how long an Usurper shall continue in the Throne, this alters not the Case, since it is certain according to these Principles, that how long or how short a Time soever he is in Possession, for all that time, he has God's Authority. Suppose then it were certain that the Usurper were to be dispossessed at such a Time, it would nevertheless be as unjust to raise War against him, till that time, as if he were to remain in the Throne for his Life. For God may make Annual Kings, if he pleases, and yet their Authority will be as [Page 62]sacred and inviolable, as any Kings whatsoever: It would be no excuse for a Man, that should affront my Lord Mayor, to say that his Lord­ship was almost out of his Office; nor any excuse to Domestick Rebels, or Foreign Invaders, to alledge that the King was sick of a Mortal Di­sease; and yet there is no difference in these Cases. For a King placed in the Throne by God himself, and acting by his Authority, can have no just Competitor, all the while he en­joys it, be it a longer or a shorter Time.

The rest that follows to Page 33. is a Digression, in which whatever concerns the present Question is grounded upon this Supposition, that a legal Claim is good against God's Authority, with which the King in Possession is invested, and so must either stand or fall with it. And therefore though there be several things, which granting this to be true, are unconcluding, yet I shall pass them over. P. 33.

Another Objection is, that his O­pinion would give great Encourage­ment to daring and ambitious Men to invade their Neighbours.

He answers, that such Men need no other Encouragement, but Power to grasp at Crowns: And therefore 'tis great pity they should have any o­ther. But he says further, that if the Kingdoms of the World be disposed of by God, and no Art or Power can place any Prince on the Throne but by God's Appointment; unless they can flatter themselves, that God has ordained them to be Kings, it will check all their ambitious Attempts, which God can so easily de­feat.

But they cannot be ignorant, how easily God can defeat their Attempts, whether they know of this Doctrin, or no: They observe that Kingdoms are lost, and Kings dethroned in all Ages of the World; and when they have Power in their hands, they are apt to promise themselves Success, without the hopes of any Authori­ty, but what they can gain by the Sword. And when they are informed, that if they have but success, God will give them a Right, which will oblige all the Subjects in their De­fence against all opposition, they will be much more forward and desirous to try their Fortunes, and see what success they can meet with; and Crowns will be looked upon by bold and aspiring Men as so many Prizes proposed for the reward of Victo­ry. And to this there will be need of no great Dose of Enthusiasm, tho' Enthusiasm is no unusual thing in such Cases: For most of the ambitious Spirits have either flattered them­selves, or at least made their Follow­ers believe; that God would prosper their undertakings; that they were doing God's Work, and that he had ordained them Success in their At­tempts: Or, if they should not be so Enthusiastick, yet this would be too great Encouragement to them, that if God would permit them to have that Success, which so many others have had before them in as wicked Designs, he would be sure to crown it with his own Authority.

But to what may be alledged of this Doctrin's being inconvenient, and dangerous to Princes, he says that the contrary Doctrin is much more dangerous to Subjects, when such Revo­lutions happen. But beside that a Do­ctrin, which is dangerous to Princes, can be no security to Subjects, this is not to the Point: For if this Do­ctrin promote Wars, and occasion frequent Revolutions, it will be of worse Consequence, though the other should expose Subjects to greater dangers, under the Revolutions, which would more rarely happen. For Re­volutions cannot be brought about without the Expence of much Trea­sure, and the loss of many Lives; and it were better for Subjects to suf­fer more, so it were but seldom, than to be continually suffering, though [Page 63]not altogether in so great a de­gree.

But the Objectors do not think it a suf­ficient Confutation of the Doctrin of Non-resistance and Passive Obedience, P. 34. to say, That this puts it into the King's Power to invade the Laws and Liberties, the Lives and Fortunes of his Subjects at pleasure.

And the Reason why they think it no Confutation is, because though Passive Obedience can give no absolute Secu­rity, yet it is more for the Good and Interest of the People than the con­trary Doctrin. For it is evident from all Experience, that Civil Wars spill more Blood, and waste more Treasure, and destroy more Liberty and Proper­ty, and are every way of worse Conse­quence to the Subject, than the Reign of the worst King can be. But the present Doctrin, which the Doctor maintains, brings Mischiefs upon both King and People, which the contrary to it would prevent, and so is worse than that in its Effects and Consequences. There is no Doctrin that can secure Kingdoms from all Dan­gers and Calamities; but Passive Obedience is as effectual to that end, as the State of Human Affairs will admit, and the Divine Providence takes care of all extraordinary Cases. And when it is proved that a Doctrin is delivered in the Scriptures, and has been taught by the Catholick Church from the Apostles Times, and is the best and most beneficial to Societies, that can be taught, no good Man will dispute the Truth of it, though great Inconveniences may sometimes happen, which neither that nor any other Doctrin can pre­vent.

But if the Doctrin of Passive Obe­dience should expose Subjects to never so many and great Inconveniences, the Doctor's Notion must expose Men to the same, and much great­er. For Passive Obedience teaches only, That Kings may not be resisted by their Subjects. But the Doctor goes further, and must say, That if Kings can once get fully possessed of the Properties of their Subjects, and throughly setled in their Encroach­ments upon their Rights and Liber­ties, they have from thenceforth a Divine Right to them, and their Au­thority over their Subjects is increas­ed and extended with their Power and Usurpations; for all is the Gift of God by his Providence, after a through Settlement.

Again he objects; P. 34. But have not Py­rates and Robbers as good a Title to my Purse, as an Ʋsurper has to the Crown, which he seizes by a manifest Force and Violence? Does not the Providence of God order and dispose all these Events? And are we not bound then as much to submit to Pyrates as to Ʋsurpers? To which he answers, That the dispute is not about Human and Legal Right in either Case, but about Authority. But neither is the Objection concern­ing Human and Legal Right, but Divine Right; for the Conveyance of Autho­rity by God's Providence supposes a Right to enjoy and exercise it, and that Objection is, That Pyrates and Robbers have as good a Right to their Booty, as an Usurper's Right and Title can be to his Crown; and that the Divine Providence may as well be said to dispose of the Proper­ties of Subjects, as of the authority of Kings. For though an Indictment, may be brought against Robbers in Human Courts, yet by being in full Possession, they may by the same Reason be said to have a Divine Right to the Goods they have taken, and that they are not obliged in Consci­ence to make Restitution; by which, Usurpers are said to have a Divine Right and Authority from God to Rule the Dominions in which they have unjustly setled themselves. And, this, I think, I have already proved or if I had not, the Doctor himself has granted it. Has he forgot that he told us before, P. 12. That the Scripture never speaks of God's bare Permission of any [Page 64]Events, but makes him the Author of all the Good or Evil, which happens, either to private Persons, or Publick So­cieties? What then can his Distin­ction between Human and Legal Right and Authority signifie? I cannot but think, notwithstanding this Distincti­on, that a Purse may rather be trans­ferred by Providence, than a Kingdom; for a Purse may be lost and found, as a Kingdom can hardly be: Yet if a Man should find a Purse of Gold, I suppose it would be no Excuse for him to- say that Providence had given it him, if he should refuse to restore it to the right owner; though, in this Case, he came by it without any Fault of his, without any Expectation or Fore-sight, it was his good Luck or Fortune, or in other Words, it was the pure Act of Providence; and if Providence dispose of any Rights, it must be in such Cases where only Pro­vidence without any Human Act or Endeavour takes away from one, and gives to another. But if the Right to a thing can remain after it is lost, it must surely remain, after a Man is by Fraud or Violence deprived of it; unless it be not the Possession, but the Sin in acquiring it, which transfers the Right.

That, which he observes of Atha­liah, that she was not killed nor depo­sed before Joash was proclaimed King, and placed in the Throne, is only a Circumstance of Time, not at all ma­terial. I shall not enquire, Whether Joash had the whole Power of the King­dom in his Hands, or whether he could on the sudden be throughly setled in his Government, when Athaliah yet appeared as Queen, and cryed out Treason, not apprehending herself to­tally divested of all Power, as the Ar­gument supposes. But if it be lawful to dispossess an Usurper, it must be lawful to pay Allegiance to the Right­ful Prince, before the Dispossession of the Usurper; for it is lawful to dis­possess the Usurper for the sake of the Rightful King, and the very Act of Dispossession is the most consider­able Act of Allegiance. And for this Reason the Doctor maintains, That in all other Kingdoms it is unlawful for the Subjects, who live under the Usur­per, to dispossess him, in behalf of the Rightful King, because there is no Allegiance due to him, till he gets into Possession: But in the Case of Joash he acknowledges it was otherwise, and the Convocation justifie the whole Pro­cess of that Action: So that by the Doctor's own Principles in that Pecu­liar Case, where God himself had en­tailed the Kingdom, they might as well have deposed, and slain her first, and then have set up Joash, if it had been as convenient and easie to be done: But when the Right Heir had been six Years concealed, it could not be Safe for them, to depose the Usur­per, till be had been proclaimed and shewn to the People to give them full Satisfaction, that he was yet alive; and this way was taken, as the most Safe and Easie; not that it was upon any other Account of the least Conse­quence, which was done first. What he says besides, in answer to this Obje­ction, and of the Kingdoms of Israel and Judah, has been spoken to al­ready.

There is nothing till we come to his Sixth Argument, which has not been considered in answer to the fore­going Parts of his Discourse. For if God does not confer Sovereign Au­thority upon Usurpers; if he does not remove Kings, and set up Kings against Human Laws; if he limits his own Providence so as not to absolve Subjects from their Allegiance, du­ring their Rightful King's Life, then it is in vain to say, That those who refuse to comply, p. 37. must renounce the only Principle, whereon Passive Obedience is reasonably grounded, and consequently re­nounce the Doctrin it self; That those are bold Men, who will venture to say, in plain Contradiction to Scripture, That God cannot remove or set up Kings, and that this limits the Providence of God in [Page 65]governing Kings, and protecting Innocent and Injured Subjects. All this proves nothing, but is only the Consequence of what is supposed to be already proved.

His Sixth Argument is from the Necessity of Government, p. 38. to preserve Human Societies: p. 39. For if God will pre­serve Human Societies, we must conclude, That when he removes one King out of the Throne, he gives his Authority to him, whom he places there; for without Authority Human Societies must dis­band.

He supposes here, that every thing is just, which is necessary to the pre­servation of Human Societies; nay, that God empowers and requires Men to do every thing, that is necessary in order to that End. Which is true, if it be meant of Society in General, because nothing that is sinful, and de­rogatory from Authority, can really tend to the Peace and Preservation of Mankind. For though such Practices may give some sort of Ease and Pro­tection to particular Societies for some Time, in a particular Case; yet this is accidental, and proceeds not from the Nature of Things; and these Practices usually end in the Destru­ction or great Galamity of such Soci­eties: Or, however the Examples and the Effects are mischievous, and of pernicious Consequence to Societies in general. The Laws therefore of God and of Nature are, in General Terms, and we have no Liberty to interpret them so as to fit them to some particular Occasions, and to de­termin, that they do not oblige, when they seem in some particulars, not to serve the Ends, which they were de­signed for; because God foresaw all Inconveniencies and Emmergencies whatsoever, and yet he appointed them. We are not to measure our Duty from the Usefulness of the Practice of it, in particular Cases, but from its General Usefulness, and God can provide for extraordinary Exigencies.

But though God has appointed So­ciety, and will always preserve Soci­eties of Men and Government in the World, yet we have no Assurance that he will preserve any particular Society. How many Nations do we read of in Scripture, which God did quite root out and destroy for their Sins? and how many other Nations of the World have there been besides, whose Memo­ries are quite lost to us? The Sins of a Nation may provoke God to destroy it; and therefore it can be no good Argument that God gives Authority to every Usurper, and commands obe­dience to him, lest a particular Society should be destroyed. For God may design its Destruction, and then no sub­mission can avail to preserve it; or he may by other Means, unthought of by us, deliver it from Destruction though we do not submit.

God having instituted Society, com­mands, by consequence, every thing that is necessary to Society; but it is not necessary, because Man is a soci­able Creature, and must live under Government, that any particular Soci­ety must always continue, and that whatever is done to maintain it, is for that reason lawful. Self-preservation is a necessary Duty, implanted in our Nature; but it does not from thence follow, that all necessary Means of Self-preservation is lawful; For a Man may be obliged not to preserve him­self, but to sacrifice his Life, when the Glory of God, or the Wellfare of his Country requires it. Societies in lik manner are established by God himself in the World, and we are ob­liged to the Preservation of them; but we must preserve particular Soci­eties only by such Means, as are agree­able to the Laws of God, designed for the Benefit of Society in general. To endeavour to preserve any particular Society in such a way, as naturally tends to the Destruction of Society in general, is to act against the Nature and Institution of Society, and by consequence sinful, though the imme­diate [Page 66]Act should be never so beneficial to a particular Government.

Now for Subjects to pay Allegiance to Kings, and for both Prince and Sub­jects to perform their mutual Duties to each other, as far as they are able, is the only Security of Human Society; and to say that we owe no Allegiance to an absent Prince, because God will have Human Societies preserved, is to say, That God will have particular Societies preserved by the Violation of that, which is the alone Support and Security of Society in general, when yet we cannot be sure, whether God will have this or that particular Soci­ety preserved, or no. We must di­stinguish between the Reason of Obe­dience to Governours, and the end of it; The formal Reason of Obedience is the Ordinance of God, or the Divine Authority in him, to whom it is due; but the End of it is the Good of Soci­eties. If the Reason of Obedience were to be resolved into the End of it, the End would justifie any means what­soever by which it could be attained; but since God, who has proposed the End to us, has likewise directed us to the Means, we must make use only of such means, as he has appointed; and if at any Time they should fail of their End, as to any particular So­ciety, we must conclude, That God has some further End to serve, and that is always best which he has com­manded, not that which for the pre­sent may seem more beneficial or expe­dient. For we have an Eye only upon one Time, or Place, or Government; but he has an Universal Care and Re­gard for all Times, Places, Persons and Governments in the World, and sees their several Relations, and De­pendences, and Effects upon one ano­ther, and has provided for all Man­kind by standing Laws, and has not proposed an End only to them, and then left them to come at it as they can themselves.

The Prince's Right and the Subjects Allegiance being reciprocal and neces­sarily supposing each other (for if the Prince have a Right to any thing, it must be to the Subjects Allegiance) it is difficult to determine, what may be done by Subjects for the Preserva­tion of Government, in Cases of Ne­cessity, when both King and People are reduced to these Circumstances, that they lye under an Incapacity of actually performing those mutual Obli­gations; and what Obedience to an Usurper may be consistent with the Allegiance due to a Rightful Prince? There is some Difficulty, I say, in determining precisely in such Cases, just how far Subjects may comply, and no further. But this is nothing to the present purpose, and so I pass by all that the Doctor has said of it. It is enough for me, that the Necessity of Human Society does not imply, That God has transferred the Allegi­ance of the Subjects to an Usurper. And when all lawful Compliances have been made, if the Government be ruined, the Fault must lye only upon the Usurper and his Party.

His next Argument is, p. 43. that these Principles answer all the Ends of Govern­ment, both for the Security of the Prince and Subjects, because they secure the Prince in Possession by putting an end to all Disputes of Right and Title, and binding his Subjects to him by Duty and Conscience, and a Reverence of God's Au­thority. And they secure the Subjects by obliging them not to hazard and Ruin themselves in behalf of the Right­ful King, when he is out of the Throne.

To which it may be replyed, That there are perhaps no Principles so ill, but they may at some Times, and up­on some Occasions, give some Acci­dental Advantage and Security for a while; nor any so good as to afford a perfect and absolute Security against all Events: But those are the best and truest, which give the most constant and lasting Security. Now the Doctor's Principles seem to be fitted only for Re­volutions, and then they teach men to [Page 67]submit to the uppermost Party, as having God's Authority; but there are many Inconveniences arising from them, which more than over-ballance this Advantage. For they encourage Attempts upon the Crowns of Prin­ces, and expose Subjects to all the Miseries which usually follow from such Attempts, before a thorough Settlement, which commonly is a long Time; And after such a Settlement, they set up a Divine Authority against a Legal Right, to encounter and fight each other, and engage a Nation in a War, perhaps for many Ages; for the Rightful King may wage War for the Recovery of his Legal Right, and the Usurper, in Defence of his Posses­sory Right, which he holds in Dona­tion from God; and both may do this with a good Conscience, and the War must be just on both sides, so that nothing of Law or Equity, but the Sword only can decide it. And be­cause all that abide in their own Coun­try, must joyn and assist the Usurper against their Lawful King, he is put upon a Necessity of relying wholly upon Foreign Forces, and upon some few Subjects perhaps, p. 29. That are out of their Wits, and will follow him into Banishment, or venture being hanged at Home; and upon these Terms, if ever the Lawful King return, it must be by conquering his own Kingdom, for he can have no assistance from his Sub­jects, who must all withstand and oppose him to the utmost, till he is again setled in his Government, which cannot be but by Conquest or Mi­racle.

Now these Inconveniences are too great to be incurred for the sake of that little Ease and Quiet, which may happen from these Principles just upon the Settlement of an U­surper, before the Rightful King can recruit his Forces, and make a vigo­rous Attempt to recover his Throne; for 'tis only during that Interval, between the lawful King's Defeat, and his Reinforcement, that these Principles can be of any use to the Subjects; afterwards they expose them to all the Dangers and Miseries of a long War, of frequent Invasions, and of a foreign Conquest; and it must be remembred, that these Principles give no security to any Princes but Usurpers; for lawful Kings when they are in their Thrones, are as safe with­out them; and when they are dispos­sessed, they are not much beholding to such Principles, as will never suf­fer them to regain it, but upon the most unequal and most improbable Terms in the World.

Whereas, though that immoveable and unalterable Allegiance due only to a Legal Right and Title may expose Men to Hardships and cost some Lives, in Times of Rebellion, and Revolutions, yet this is abundantly recompensed, in that it is a constant Security at all other Times, and will, as much as it is possible, prevent Revolutions and Rebellions, and will make them less hurtful and mischievous, when they do happen. It is not pretended that this Doctrin can give a full and in­fallible Security against all accidental Calamities; but it gives all the Secu­rity that the State of this World is capable of, and all the Security we can have, besides that of God's Pro­vidence, to relv on. And we have no Reason to think that God by his Providence transfers the Allegiance of Subjects, but that he will protect them in the performance of it.

It is objected, 1. p. 44. That if this Prin­ciple of adhering to Legal Right would prevent all Revolutions of Govern­ment, it is a Demonstration against it, that it is a bad Principle, because it is against God's Prerogative of remov­ing Kings and setting up Kings.

2. It is evident that this Principle was either unknown to the World be­fore, or else that it cannot prevent the Revolutions of Government.

[Page 68] 3. Since then such Revolutions will happen, such Principles as must dissolve human Societies, when such Revolutions happen, or expose the most innocent and conscientions Men to the greatest Sufferings, without serving any good End, cannot be true

1. I answer. Though it be God's Prerogative to set up, and to re­move kings; yet we can at no time know without a Revelation that it is his Pleasure to do it, as to this or that King in particular: And therefore while the Legal Right re­mains, we may not conclude that he has transferred our Allegiance. And those who are of Opinion, that God is now pleased to depose and set up Kings in such a manner only, as is consistent with human Right and Ju­stice, derogate no more from God's Sovereign Prerogative, than those, who believe, that he has no respect to hu­man Laws in the disposal of Kingdoms. For the difference between them is not concerning God's Power; which both equally acknowledge, but con­cerning his Will only, whether he is now pleased to act according to the Absoluteness of his Power, and not rather with regard to the Laws of Men; since we have no way to know, when he has transferred any King­dom, but by the Constitution of it, or by Revelation.

2. That this Principle was, and is still known to the World, is evident, else why should the Doctor say, That his Scheme of Government may startle some Men at first, p. 3. before they have well con­sidered it? His Notion could startle no Body, if the contrary to it were unknown; it is indeed so well known, that the Doctor's Principle is new to himself, and he informs us, that he could not have got over the Difficul­ties, Pref. that lie against it, if the Convo­cation had not freed him from his Pre­judices, and given him a Liberty of thinking. But it does not follow that every Duty, which is known, is pra­ctised. Nor is it pretended, That this Principle will prevent all Revolu­tions; it is sufficient that it will pre­vent them as far as it is possible for them to be prevented. And this Di­lemma will do as good Execution a­gainst any other Opinion that can be named, as against this; for all pre­tend that their own Notions are the best Security against the Mischiefs, which they charge upon others, and therefore all may argue in the same manner against any Opinion whatsoe­ver that is contrary to their own; This Principle was unknown to the World before, or else this Principle cannot prevent Rebel­lion; it was unknown, or it cannot prevent Heresies, or Schisms, &c. And the Consequence of this is, That either this way of arguing is to no purpose, because it will serve all Cau­ses alike, tho they be Contradictions to each other; or that there is no true Principle in the World. But the plain Truth is, no Man ever pretend­ed to an Infallible Remedy to prevent all the Mischiefs of any kind; the Quack, in Physick, and of the Church of Rome itself, never pretend that their Directions will work infallible Cures, unless they be followed as well as known. This Principle would go very far towards the hindring of all Revolutions (but such as God by his Appointment and Command would have submitted to) if it were practi­sed, and, as things are now, it is the best Remedy against them.

3. But if the bare Knowledg of this Principle will not prevent Re­volutions, or if Revolutions can­not be prevented at all; it does not from thence follow, That such an immoveable and unalterable Allegiance, as is due only to a Legal Right and Title will dissolve Human Societies, when such Revolutions happen. Our present Experience teaches the contrary; for the Distinction between the Divine Authority and the Legal Right of Kings in Opposition to each other, is news [Page 69]to almost the whole Nation, some acting upon one Principle and some upon another, but all generally suppo­sing God's Authority, and the Legal Right to be in the same Person. Be­sides, the Government must be, at least in some Measure, setled, before the Doctor's Principle can take Place, or be of any use; and if the Government may be setled without it, I see no Reason, why it may not continue with­out it. For how comes that to be necessary to the being of Human Soci­ety, which is not necessary to the esta­blishment of Government, but exerts itself by several Steps and Degrees in Proportion to the Degrees of its Settlement, and never is of full Force and Efficacy till a thorough Settlement?

But our Principle exposes the most Innocent and Conscientious Men to Suffer­ings, without serving any good End by them. It must be confessed, That those Men must be exposed to Sufferings, who can neither be satisfied that the Legal Right is transferred, nor be persuaded that they may subject themselves to the Pos­sessor of the Crown, unless he had a Legal Right: But then this is not without serving any good End; for they serve the Ends of Justice and Fi­delity to the Rightful King, and act upon such Principles as are the support and preservation of Human Society, tho the Practice of them may some­times bring Accidental Inconveniences upon particular Persons and Govern­ments, which can never fall out but in extraordinary Cases, that no Principles can effectually provide against: And God can support Men under their Suf­ferings, or deliver them out of them, without their Infringement of Legal Rights, or acting against the Nature and Order of Society in General. to serve some particular occasions and Exigencies.

The Doctor's Argument from the Nature of Human Society, p. 45. by which he would prove, That the Safety and Preservation of a Nation is to be pre­ferred before the King's Right, is grounded upon the Supposition above mentioned; That any thing is lawful which is necessary for the Preservation of particular Societies; which proving a false Principle, his Argument can be of no Force. For that Allegiance is due to all Rightful Kings, is a Max­im which concerns Society in general, without which no Government can long subsist; and therefore if the Good of Society in General be to be preferred before the Good of any particular Go­vernment, tho this should be prefer­able to the King's Right, the Conse­quence would fail, because the neces­sary Relation and Connection between Allegiance and Sovereignty is founded in the Nature of Sovereignty itself, not in the Being or Constitution of any particular Kingdom; and the Obe­dience of Subjects must be fixed and permanent, not variable with the Changes and Interests in the State of Affairs, which could make all Govern­ment uncertain and precarious, and would leave every Subject at Liberty to pay or with-hold his Allegiance, when he thought fit, if the Interest of the Government, and not the Laws of it were to be the Rule of his Obe­dience. And where should we stop? Or whither would not this Argument carry us? For if we may withdraw our Allegiance from the King, because his Right is not of equal Value with the Safety of all his Subjects, then for the same Reason we may rebel against him, or we may kill him, whenever we will suppose, That this single Life and Fortunes come into competition with those of the whole Nation. But this Argument has been often brought a­gainst the Doctrin of Non-Resistance, and as often consuted. And if it were true, it would not prove that Usurpers are set up by God, but by the People: For if God sets them up, Obedience is due to them for the Sake of his Autho­rity, not upon these Considerations, which can only serve for Motives to the People to set them up, and are no Proof that God has done it. For we [Page 70]may suppose the Usurper, in possession of the Throne, to be so cruel and ty­rannical, that the People have no way to provide for their own Safety, but by deposing him, which, if God have gi­ven him his Authority, it is sinful for them to do; but, if this Argument be true, it is a Duty: So that this Argument, if it prove any thing, must prove either that Kings are not God's Ordinance, or that God's Ordinance may be resisted for the Publick Good; but Evil is never to be done, tho the greatest Good may come by it; and Obedience is due not to Conveniency but to Law; and the Laws of God and Nature have respect not to any Society in particular, but to Society in Gene­ral, and to particular Societies only so far as their Preservation may be con­sistent with the Welfare of Society in general.

The Objection which he makes a­gainst his own Doctrin is much more to the purpose, and deserves to be consi­dered. [...]. 45. He objects to himself, That This will equally serve all Revolutions of Government, whatever they be, and upon these Principles we might submit and swear to a Rump Parliament, or to another Pro­tector, or to a Committes of Safety, or whatever else you please.

The Doctor is pleased to say, That this is a great Prejudice, but no Argument; but it is very strange that a Man who has built his whole Doctrin upon the Authority of a Convocation, and durst never have asserted it, if it had not been for that Venerable Authority, should now reject the Practice of the whole Church of England at that time, and the Judgment of it both then, and ever since, as no Argument, no Objection, but only a great Prejudice; I must take Leave to say, as the Doctor does of the Sense of the Convocation, [...]. 9. that this is a good Argument from Authority, and as good Authority as can be urged to the Mem­bers of the Church of England; for if so many Years Suffering, and the great Veneration, all Good Men have for so excellent Examples to this very Day, cannot declare the Judgment of the Church of England, I know not whence we shall learn it.

But he answers, There is a vast Dif­ference between these two Cases; which is granted, or else the Objection would be needless, or none at all: But if nowtithstanding the circumstantial Dif­ference between them, they be both through Setlements, it is unanswerable, for we are concerned to consider none of those other Differences, which he reckons up, but only this of the Settle­ment of that Usurpation, the Question being not about any particular manner of Settlement, but in general of a thorough Settlement. And the Doctor must say, according to his Principles, and the whole Tenour of all the rest of his Book, that the most illegal and unnatural Usurpers, who have mur­thered the best of Kings, and excluded the right Heir, who have overthrown both Church and State, and have nei­ther National Consent nor any other Pretence of Right but the Sword, yet if they can once settle themselves in their Injustice and Violence to the ut­ter Ruine of Church and State, not­withstanding all this, have God's Au­thority as much as Saul or David ever had: And if the ancient Government be destroyed, and another erected in its Room, this is still the greater Evi­dence, that they have God's Autho­rity, because it is the fuller Proof of a thorough Settlement. But if all those Terms and Conditions are required, which the Doctor remarks were want­ing in the late Usurpations, the Provi­dence of God will be confined and li­mited almost as much, as he complains it will be, by maintaining a Legal Right. For, how can God set over Kingdoms the basest, the most unwor­thy and wicked Men, who will have no regard to Forms of Law and Govern­ment, if the Fundamental Laws of a Nation can put any Bar to his Power? and if they can, is not the Legal Right of the King a Fundamental Law, and the principal too of those Laws? No­thing [Page 71]then can make a difference be­tween one Usurper and an other, as to this matter; if both have a Tho­rough Settlement, their Authority must be the same, and the Duty of Subjects the same, to yield an entire Allegiance to them.

The only thing therefore to be con­sidered is, whether there were such a Thorough Settlement, as the Doctor maintains, does infer Gods Authority, in those Usurpations. And the Do­ctor himself has determined the point: For, P. 33. says he, no Man could have fore­seen how King Charles II. should have returned, who had a powerful Army against him; all the Plots and Conspiraces of the Royal Party were vain, and had no other effect but to bring some worthy and gal­lant Men to an unhappy end; but what they could not do, God did without them. And when it was impossible to fore­see, that King Charles could ever re­turn, when all human endeavours pro­ved in vain and to his disadvantage, when God alone could by his Providence restore him, this certainly was as full a Settlement of the Party, which kept him out of his Kingdom, as can be imagined: For if that be not setled, which God only can displace, there can be no such thing as a Settlement in the World.

But there were many alterations and changes of Government in those times: It is plain that their Government was ne­ver setled; P. 47. it was frequently changed and modelled, which was no Argument of Settlement, and which was more than that, they had not a National Consent and Sub­mission. Men who were forced submitted to force, but the Nation did not by any National Act ever own them. Yet when all those changes conduced nothing at all to the Kings Interest, but on the contrary were all fixed and centred in this, that he should not be suffered to return, this might be interpreted ra­ther to signifie, that God had determi­ned, he should never be restored; be­cause tho' they quarrelled amongst themselves, and their Frames of Go­vernment so often fell to pieces, yet still new Models were erected against him, to set him at a further distance from the Throne.

And Oliver Cromwel at least was set­led; for he was made Protector in the year, 1653. and from that time till his Death exercised all the Power of a King: He had brough the Three King­doms to an entire subjection so as to be able to crush those who would not sub­mit, whenever he pleased, P. 9. which is the description the Doctor gives of a Tho­rough Settlement; all the Bordering Nations feared his Power, or sought his Friendship, and he had a full and uninterrupted Possession for the space of five years. It was the common Theme of his Flatterers and of all the Enthusiasts of those times, That God had raised him up, and they had certainly been in the Right, if any Usurper, from a bare Possession of Power, can claim by Authority from God in pre­judice of the Rightful King.

As for what he adds to make this Case Parallel with that of the Jews un­der Antiochus Epiphanes, it has been al­ready shewn that that was a quite con­trary Case. For if the Jews had made a National Submission to Antiochus, they had injured no Body, nor excluded a­ny Right Heir by it: But a National Consent in this case could have been of no force whilst King Charles the Second, or any of the Royal Family had been alive. And by the Doctors Principles the Authority of Kings de­pends not upon any Consent of Men whatsoever, but solely and purely up­on the will of God, who puts an Usur­per in full Power and Possession of any Kingdom. If therefore God's Autho­rity remained in King Charles, a Nati­onal Consent could not have taken it away; if it did not remain, it must be in Cromwel without any National Consent.

But a National Consent would have been an Evidence of a Thorough Set­tlement: It would so; but this does not infer that no other evidence but [Page 62]that could suffice. The Doctor often says, that by what way or means so­ever an Usurper becomes fully pos­sessed of the Supreme Power, he has God's Authority. So that a National Consent and Submission may be the more regular and orderly way; but if an Usurper come to the Throne against the Consent both of King and Subjects and settle himself upon the Ruins both of the Kings Rights and the Subjects Liberties, this is no prejudice to the Title he receives from God. For if the Sovereign Authority be obtained tho' by the destruction of the Govern­ment and the desolation of the whole Kingdom, against all Laws both of God and Man, when it is once acqui­red, it is by these Principles as much the Ordinance of God, as if he had succeeded as next Heir, or had been nominated by God himself, and were the best and most Rightful King, for all Kings are Rightful with respect to God.

I have now considered all that con­cerns the point in Question in the Do­ctor's Book, the rest concerns the Obe­dience to a King de Facto by the Laws of England, not as he is Gods Vice­gerent, and invested with his Autho­rity. But before I dismiss this Questi­on, I shall shew that it was the constant Practice of the Primitive Christians to adhere to that Emperour, who had the Legal Title; and that they did not look upon the Usurpers, or, in the language of those times the Ty­rants, who were set up against them, to have any Authority or Approbation from God, tho' sometimes their Pow­er and the extent of their Dominions equalled, if not exceeded that of the Rightful Emperour.

The first Instance, I give, shall be that of the Christians, that lived under the Jews before they were subdued by Adrian. The Jews had made one Co­chebas their King, who, it is said, reigned above thirty years over them; this is certain they were a most dange­rous Enemy to the Romans for about twenty years in the Emperours Reign. Their numbers were so great and their fury so desperate that they became for­midable to the whole Empire: Dio. lib. 69. Adrian therefore chose out his best Captains to send against them, of whom Julius Severus, who was sent for out of Brit­tain, was the chief, and he durst not engage with them in a pitcht Battel, but waited fit opportunities to take them at advantage, and set upon them apart; and so in time destroyed them by degrees. But at last the victory cost Adrian very dear, and lost him great part of his Army, which made him in his Letter to the Senate omit the usual stile, Si vos liberi (que) vestri valetis, bene est: Ego quidem & exercitus valemus, Co­chebas dux Judaicae factionis nolentes si­bi Christia­nos adver­sum Roma­num mili­tem ferre subsidium omnimodis cruciatibus necat. Euseb. Chron. — Ʋltus (que) est Christianos (Hadrianos) quos illi Cocheba duce, quod sibi adversus Romanos non assentarentur, excruciabant, praecepit (que) necui Judeae introeundi Hierosolymam esset licentia, Christianis tantum civitate permissa. Oros. lib. 7. c. 13. The Christians all this while refused to give any Assistance to the Jews, under whose usurped Go­vernment they lived, against Adrian the lawful Emperour; and because they would neither assist them in the War, nor acknowledge the Justice of it, they were put to excessive Torments by Cochebas, and the Emperour in reward of their Loyalty, granted the Christi­ans liberty to inhabit Jerusalem, after he had forbid the Jews, under the greatest Penalties to come so much as in sight of it, above once a year to lament their calamity.

It will be objected here, that Coche­bas pretended to be the Messias or that Star (as his name denotes) in Balaam's Prophecy, Numb. 24.17. And that besides the Jews were to be no more a People, their destruction being de­creed by God, and foretold in the Scrip­tures.

But this could be no reason, why the Christians should deny obedience to Cochebas, if his being, as he was, in full Possession of the Government had made him the Ordinance of God. For [Page 73]tho' he had assumed to himself more than belonged to him, yet this had been no prejudice to that Right, which was truly his, and which must depend upon his Possession of the Supreme Power, not upon his behaviour, or pretensions in matters of Religion. And as long as God continued his Pow­er and Authority, which he had com­mitted to him, they would have been obliged to obey him, as God's Ordi­nance. For if his blasphemous pre­tensions did not provoke God to deny him his Authority, what could justifie the Christians in with-holding their Allegiance? Gods Authority must chal­lenge the same Duty and Reverence, in whomsoever it is placed, Jo. 19.11. in a Herod, or a Pontius Pilate, or a Cochebas: And if he had had God's Authority by usurping the Power and Title of a King, they would have submitted to his Authority at the same time, that they had confuted his Blasphemies with the Peril of their lives.

And tho' the Jews were to be ut­terly destroyed, and to be no more a Nation, the time of this was uncer­tain; but it was certain that the time was not yet come, because they had as yet a Powerful Government, and so, by these Principles, had Gods Autho­rity; and therefore the Christians would have acknowledged their Au­thority, as the Apostles did that of the Governours of Judea in their times, if these Principles were true, and there had not been this difference, that they were lawful Powers in the time of the Apostles, being set over them by the Roman Emperors, who had the Supreme Authority in Judea, as well as in other Provinces: But Cho­chebas was set up in opposition to the Lawful Powers, which only are ordain­ed of God, and for that reason no Obedience could be due to him; but the Christians chose to endure any Torments, rather than they would oppose their Lawful Sovereign in be­half of this Usurper, tho' his Power were never so great.

Ʋnde shall Cassij, & Ter- Nigri, & Albini? — de Romanis (nisi faller) id est, de non Chri­stianis. — Sed & qui nunc Sce­lestarum Partium Socij aut plausores quotidie re­velantur, post vinde­miam Pat­ricidarum racematio Superstes, &c. Tertul. Apo­log. c. 35. Sic & circa Majestatem Imperatoris in­famamur tamen nunquam Albiniani, nec Nigriani, vel Cassiani inveniri potuerunt Christiani. Sed ijdem ipsi, qui per Genios eorum impridie us (que) jurave­rant, &c. id. ad Scapulam c. 2. The next Example, I shall bring of the Primitive Christians, shall be from these famous Passages of Ter­tullian, one in his Apology, and the other in his Book ad Scapulam: He in both those places declares, and defies any Man to shew the contrary, that the Christians never sided with Avidius Cassius against Marcus Antoninus, or with Piscennius Niger Governor of Syria, or Clodius Albinus Governor of Britain, who set themselves up as Emperors in the Provinces over which they presi­ded; and upon enquiry it will be found, that these two last had as full Possession of their respective Domini­ons, as Septimius Severus the Lawful Emperour had in his part of the Em­pire.

Vulcat. Gallican. in Avid. Cassio. Avidius Cassius was soon taken off; for M. Antoninus was so well belo­ved, and so highly esteemed, that Cas­sius had never been proclaimed Empe­rour, if it had not been given out, that Antoninus was dead; And no City of note but Antioch took part with him, so that his Rebellion had little danger in it, being considerable neither for the Strength, nor for the continu­ance of it.

Onuph. Panvin. Fast. lib. 2. But Niger was in Possession of all the Eastern part of the Empire a year and some Months besides odd days; and Albinus reigned as Empe­rour in the West between three and four years.

Herodi­an. lib. 2. c. 22. When the Pretorian Bands had murthered Pertinax, they set the Em­pire to Sale, making open Proclamati­on, that he should be Emperour who would give most, and Didius Julianus outbidding Sulpicianus, was accordingly declared Emperour by them, and the Senate was forced to confirm their [Page 74]choice. But Julianus disappointed the expectations of the Soldiers in not be­ing able to make full payment for his Purchase, and was cursed by the Peo­ple, and abhorred by the Senate for so base an act. Ael. Spart. in Did. Juli­ano. And as both Senate and People had him in the highest de­gree of Detestation, so they likewise hated Severus, and all their hopes were placed in Piscennius Niger. He was renowned for all the vertues requisite to make an excellent Emperour; of great Conduct and Experience, of ex­act Discipline in Military Affairs, and of such admirable Prudence in Civil, that by his advice several Rules and Or­ders were first introduced, some by M. Antoninus and some by Commodus, and continued by succeeding Emperours, concerning the Government of the Provinces, and the Courts of Judica­cature. But Severus came behind him in these Qualifications, and was besides of a cruel disposition, which afterwards shew'd it self upon all occasions. These Vertues exceedingly recommended Ni­ger to the Esteem and Love both of the Senate, and of the People, and there could have been no Competition between him and Severus, if they had had the Dicision entirely in their own Power: For the Senate openly fa­voured him, and the People scarce ever mentioned him, but with Ap­plauses and Acclamations, calling him Princeps and Augustus.

Hero­dian. lib. 2. c. 27. &c. And he could not be less belo­ved in Syria, which was a Province of vast extent, taking in Phaenicia, and all the Countries on this side Euphra­tes. He was there saluted Emperour by his Legions, who put the Royal Purple on him, and with all the State and Solemnity, which was used on such occasions, conducted him to the Tem­ples at Antioch, to ratifie their own choice by the approbation of their Gods. Embassadors were sent to him from all Asia, and from beyond Eu­phrates and Tigris to congratulate his Accession to the Empire, and with Prof­fers of Assistance, if that were neeedful: But he dismissed them with Thanks and Rewards, saying, [...]. Herodian. lib. 2. c. 31. he had no occa­sion for help, he was already Throughly Setled in the Empire, and would reign without Blood.

Thinking himself therefore secure in the Affections of the Senate and Peo­ple of Rome, and in the full Possession of all the eastern part of the Empire, having all Asia, Ael. Spart. in Piscen. Nig. besides Greece, and Thrace and Macedon in his Power, he delayed his going to Rome, and by that means gave an opportunity to Severus then Governor of both Pannonia's to be before-hand with him. For Severus being proclaimed Emperour by his Soldiers, hastned immediately to Rome, and was declared Emperour by the Se­nate; and Julianus was put to death. And afterwards getting together all the Force he could, Severus marched into Asia against Niger, who joyned Battel with him at Cyzicum; but was overcome after a sharp Fight by the Treachery, as it was thought, of Aemi­lianus, who had the chief command in his Army: Niger making his way to Antioch, got together a vast Army, but was overthrown near the Sinus Issicús, after a long and doubtful Battel, in which as the Hero­dian. lib. 3. c. 13. Historian relates, so much Blood was spilt, that the Rivers thereabouts ran with more Blood than Water: And then flying again to An­tioch, he was taken and beheaded. And for this victory Severus had the Titles given him of Arabicus, Ael. Spart. in Severo. Adia­benicus, Parthicus, from the Principal Nations, that were interested in Ni­ger's cause; and to overcome him, was esteemed a Conquest over all those Nations.

Dio. lib. 74. But the People of Byzantium were the most considerable; for they made a most resolute defence for three years together against the Roman Forces; And the Siege of that City in all its circumstances is the most me­morable [Page 75]of any that we meet with in History.

Jul. Capitolin. in Clod. Albino. But tho Niger were thus taken out of his way, Severus could not but think himself in great Danger, as long as Clodius Albinus had so formidable an Army, and the Provinces of Britain and Gaul at his Command; and being not willing to try Battle with him, he first endeavours to ensnare him by fair Words and treacherous Promises, and sends some with Letters to him in very affectionate and insinuating Ex­pressions, desiring him to govern as Partner with him in the Empire, that by this means they might have an Op­portunity to murder him, under the Pretence of communicating some Se­cret of State to him; but Albinus was aware of the Design, and this Plot not taking, they proceeded on both sides to open Hostility.

Albinus had taken upon him the Name of Emperour at the same Time that Niger and Severus did; but Severus sa­tisfied him with giving him the Title of Caesar, till he had overcome Niger, and then grew jealous of him. For Albinus ruled as a Sovereign Prince in Britain, erecting his Statues, and stamping Coyns with his Effigies on them: And no Prince was ever more beloved by the Senate of Rome than he, of which the Hatred they bare Se­verus was one chief Cause. And as Albinus had so much the advantage of him in this respect, so he was no way inferiour in the Strength of his Army, but at Lyons gave him Battle, with that Success, that Severus fled, and fell from his Horse, and casting off his Robe was forced to hide himself, and had left Albinus an entire Victory, if Laetus had not come in with fresh For­ces, and over powered him. For Laetus stood by, expecting the Event, and had reserved himself, till he was told, That Severus was fled, hoping that the Empire might fall at last to his own share; for which Severus afterwards ordered him to be put to Death. The Issue was, that after abundance Dio. lib. 75. of Blood shed on both sides, Albinus had his Head struck off, which Severus commanded to be carried to Rome with a Letter to the Senate, upbraiding them with the Love they had for Al­binus, whose Brother and other Rela­tions, they had bestowed great Honours upon.

Herod. lib. 3. c. 23. Herodian esteems it the greatest thing in the Roman Story, for Severus at last to get himself the sole Possession of the Empire; and compar­ing it with the Victory of Caesar over Pompey, of Augustus over Anthony and Pompey's Sons, and of Sylla over Marius, he prefers this as the greater atchiev­ment.

It is evident that Piscennius Niger was fully possest of all the Eastern Part of the Empire, and had all in his Power to the Borders of Illyricum; and that Clodius Albinus had the entire Possession of Britain and Gaul; that they both exercised all Acts of Sove­reignty; that in Rome it self first Ni­ger, and afterwards Albinus was the Darling both of the People and of the Senate, and had their Hearts and their Wishes, tho not their Votes: Yet be­cause Severus had prevented them, and had the Formal and Legal Consent and Choice of the Senate, and so was the only Lawful Emperour, the Chri­stians refused to become Parties to either of the other two; which they could not have done, if they had look'd upon either of them, as invested with God's Authority; and yet this they must have been invested with, if full Possession could obtain it; For they were as fully setled in their Provinces, as Severus was at Rome; nay, more fully, because the Senate and People of Rome were zealous for their Interest, and hated Severus, and would have ta­ken the first Opportunity of joyning with either of them against him. But Severus was the Lawful Emperour, and therefore the Christians knew, That their Allegiance was due only to him, in whatever part of the Empire they lived: And they never acted against [Page 76]him, nor sided with Niger or Albinus, tho they were under their Power, and lived in the Territories which they had possessed themselves of; which were those where Christianity most flourish­ed: For Greece and all the Eastern part of the Empire were under the Domi­nion of Niger, as Britain and Gaul were under Albinus; and besides Polycrates and many famous Men in Greece, it is enough to say, That Irenaeus, the Dis­ciple of S. Polycarp, was Bishop of Lyons at that Time.

But it is needless to mention Parti­culars; this was the Doctrin and Pra­ctice of the Catholick Church in that Age, to submit to him as Emperour, who was chosen by the Senate, and therefore Lawful Emperour; not to those, who had set up, and strengthened themselves in their Usurpations, tho otherwise, their Government most de­sirable. For we must give Tertullian leave, at least, to understand a Matter of Fact of his own Time, in a case so notorious as this; since the Corre­spondence was so great between all Churches in those Days by their Com­municatory Letters, and other ways of Intelligence, that if any one Church had acted differently from the rest in a thing of so general, and so mighty concernment, so considerable a Man, as Tertullian, could not have been igno­rant of it, especially after he had in­formed himself in all Particulars neces­sary, in order to write an Apology for the whole Christian Church: And it was not in his Temper to have dis­sembled it, at least he would never have said so peremptorily, That the Christians alwaies kept themselves true to their Allegiance, which they ac­knowledged due only to the Rightful Emperours, upbraiding at the same Time the Heathens for a contrary Practice. The Heathens were of themselves too violent Enemies to need any such Advantage as this must have given them, if it could have been disproved; and Tertullian, instead of making their Apology, must have exposed the Christians to further Con­tempt and Hatred by such a Defence as must have been notoriously false in the most Tender and Important Part of it. To have told the World that the Christians never owned any other Emperour than Severus but a few Years after, while there were yet some Re­mains of these Factions, which he taxes the Heathens withal, had been a strange Apology, when the whole Em­pire could have witnessed against him, if it had been false. The Persecutors of that Time were too cunning and too cruel to be thus perswaded, or affront­ed rather, by what they must needs have known to be false, if it had been so. And not content to have said this in a General Apology, to repeat it again in his Book written to Scapula, Governour of the Province of Africk, upon the same Subject, had been to expose the Christians to the utmost Reproach and Infamy, as well as Tor­ments. And what Credit could he expect in any thing he had said be­sides, if he had plainly lyed in a thing, which was fresh in every Man's Memory? This had been not to de­fend, but to betray the Christian Re­ligion. Tertullian could not be guilty of so much Folly as to think to impose upon the World at this Rate; or of so much Baseness as to attempt it, if it had been possible: It is pretty well agreed among Learned Men, That he was no Natural; and a little Acquain­tance with his Practice and his Writ­ings would easily make one believe, That he would sooner have excepted all those Churches by Name that had acted otherwise, and have renounced their Communion; or that he would rather have separated from all the Churches in the World, than have made such an Apology as his must be, if this part of it were false.

This I have insisted upon the more, because some Men, when they have nothing else to say to those ample Te­stimonies for the Passive Obedience of the Primitive Christians out of Tertul­lian [Page 77]in this and some other Particulars, make no Scruple to deny the Matter of Fact: Which must suppose, either that he was mistaken, or that he wrote what he knew to be false: But Mista­ken he could not be in a thing so visible and notorious, especially in that Age, when the Church acted unanimously as one Body and Society of Men: And to say he falsified in things of this Na­ture, that his Enemies, to whom he directed his Apology, and all the World besides, must needs know to be false, is to take away the Credit of all History, unless Tertullian be the only Man that must not be believed, when he writes of things of his own Time, and of his own Knowledg, and with all possible Circumstances of Credibility.

The last Instance shall be that of the Christians under the Tyrants or Usurpers, Maximus and Eugenius. Onuph. Panvin. lib. Fast. 3. Maximus held his Usurpations five Years and two Daies; and Eugenius near two Years. Paul. Diacon. l. 13. And both were much superior to Theodosius in every thing, but the Goodness of his Cause; and it was by a wonderful Providence, that they were vanquished by him.

Sozom. l. 7. c. 13. Socrat. l. 5. c. 11. Theod. l. 5. c. 12. Maximus, after the Murder of Gratian, was in full Possession of the Western Empire. For Valentinian left Italy, and fled to Thessalonica with his Mother, and Probus the Praefectus Prae­torii [...] So that Maximus had the Govern­ment of all the West in his Power. S. Ambrose was at that very time per­secuted by the Empress Justina, she being an Arian; and Maximus pre­tended to make War upon her Son Va­lentinian in his behalf; yet no Ambros. epist. l. 7. ep. 56. Man was more against the Proceedings of Maximus than S. Ambrose; and in the Negotiations he twice had with him, he maintained Valentinian's Cause with all the Freedom and Courage that be­came a Christian Bishop. Bishop of Sarum's Pastoral Letter, p. 13. I know we have been told, That all the Bishops of the West, not excepting the Great S. Martin, who was called the Apostle of France, made their Applications to Maxi­mus, and followed his Court, as much, if not more than they did any Princes of that Age. But it is worth taking notice of, That these Bishops are much blamed for it by Sulpicius Severus; he says, they were notorious for their base and servile Flattery; Certe Ithacium nihil pensi, nihil sancti habuisse de­finio. Fuit enim au­dax, lo­quax, im­pudens, sumptuosus, ventri & gu [...]e pluri­mum imper­tiens. Sulpic. Sever. hist. l. 2. c. 63. and he gives such a Character of Ithacius, one of the chief of them, as I wish no other Bi­shop may ever deserve. But S. Martin was of another Id. vit. Martin. c. 23. Temper, he fre­quently refused to accept of his Invita­tions to his Table, because he had de­prived one Emperour of his Life, and ano­ther of his Kingdom, till at last, when Maximus had made the best Excuse he could, casting all the Blame upon the Soldiers; who had forced him to take upon him the Empire, and pretending that there was something more than Human in it; S. Martin did conde­scend to sit at his Table with him, and he at all times Id. hist. l. 2. c. 64. hindred him, as much as he could, from doing Mischief, and from breaking in upon the Privi­ledges of the Church; which was not owning his Authority: For, as Sulpi­cius Severus informs us, Nam etsi pro ali­aui [...]us sup­plicandum [...]egi fuit, imperavit po [...]ius quam rogavit. Id, vit. Mart. c. 23. He rather demanded than petitioned for what he asked of him. But, as the same Author represents him, Vir omni vi [...]e merito praedicandus, si ei vel Diadema non legitime, tumultu­ante milite, impositum repudiare, vel armis civilibus abstinere licuisset. Id. Dialog. c. 7. Maximus wanted nothing but a Good Title to make an excellent Emperour, and S. Martin was willing to make the best Use of him, he could, for the Benefit of the Church.

I shall not conceal, that, upon the like Occasion, S. Ambrose wrote a Let­ter to Eugenius, who had invaded the Empire after the Death of Valentinian, in which he gives him the Title of Em­perour. The Design of it was to per­swade him not to maintain the Charge of the Heathen Idolatrous Worship; for the Expences for the Publick Sa­crifices were wont to be paid out of the Emperour's Exchequer, till Theodosius [Page 78]had forbid it; and this Custom was again revived by Eugenius. He wrote to him upon this Occasion, but would not do it before, tho Eugenius had written to him, and required an Answer.

In his vero in qui­bus vos ro­gari decet, etiam me exhibere se­dulitatem potestati debitam, sicut & scri­ptum est: cui hono­rem, hono­rem, cui tributum, tributum. Nam cum privato de­tulerim cor­de intimo, quomodo non defer­rem Impe­ratori? sed, qui vobis deferre vul­iis, patimi­ni, ut defe­ramus ei, quem impe­rii vestri vultis au­ctorem pro­bari. Ambros. Epist. lib. 2. epist. 15. In this Epistle he uses him with Respect, and owns that he ought to make his Suit to him in such a Manner, as became the Place he then held, if he would have his Request granted, and says, That since we must render Ho­nour to whom Honour is due, and Tribute to whom Tribute; he, who with all his Heart rendred him what was his Due, as a Private Man, would not deny it him, now he was Emperour; or rather now he assumed to himself that Power and Authority; for he immediately adds, That if he required this Regard to be had to himself, he ought much rather to suffer it towards God, whom he would have thought to be the Author of his Empire; and he had before told him, Et si es Imperater, Deo subditus magis esse debes. Ib. That if he were an Emperour, be ought so much the rather to be subject to God. Which Expressions could not fall from him carelesly, but must be purposely de­signed, plainly enough to intimate, That he had no real Authority, or Right to the Empire. For since after the Death of Eugenius, S. Ambrose does so manifestly declare, That he never had any just Authority, we must ei­ther accuse him of Insincerity and Flat­tery, in this Epistle, or we must un­derstand him so as to make this Epistle consistent with what he has said much more clearly in other places.

He calls Eugenius, after his Death, — Quo Romanum Imperium a Barbari Latronis immanitate & ab Ʋsur­patoris in­digni solio vindicares. Ambr. ep. 58. — Contra autem Max­imus & Eugenius in inferno decentes exemplo mi­serabli, quam du­rum sit arma suis Principibus irrogare. De quibus pulchre dicitur: Vidi im­pium super­exaltatum. Super Cedros Libani & transivi, & ecce non erat Tran­sivit enim plus de caligine seculari ad lumen aeternum, & non erat impius, qui esse desivit iniquus. Id de obitu Theodos. Barbarous Robber, and base Ʋsurper; and saies that both Maximus and Euge­nius are in Hell, teaching by their Mise­rable Examples how sad a thing it is for Subjects to take up Arms against their Prince; of whom it is fitly said, I have seen the wicked exalted, and lifted up above the Cedars of Libanus, and I pas­sed by and behold, he was not for the righ­teous Man (meaning Theodosius and Gratian, whom he just before menti­oned) passed from the Darkness of this World into Light Eternal, and the wicked was not, who hath ceased to be unjust. Which must necessarily suppose, That both Maximus and Eugenius were as Guilty in the retaining, as in the ac­quiring their Unjust Possessions, and that they ceased not to be unjust till they died, and were no more in this World. It had been strangly uchari­table to have said, that they were both certainly damned, because thay had re­belled some Years before their Deaths, if afterwards they became Lawful Em­perours, and had so long space for Re­pentance: But he supposed them to live and die in continual Usurpation, and therefore to be tormented in Hell after Death, as Usurpers and Rebels.

Item (que) tandem ty­rannorum virgultis crescentibus & in im­manem syl­vam jam jamqe erumpentibus, Insula nomen Romanum, nec ta­men morem legemque tenens, quin potius abjiciens germen suae plantationis amarissimae ad Gallias, magna comitante satellitum caterva, Maximum Imperatoriis in­signibus, quae nec decenter usquam gessit; non legitime, sed ritu tyrannico initiatum mittit. Ille callida primum arte potius quam virtute finitimos quosque pagos vel pro­vincias contra Romanum statum retia perjurii, men­dacii sui facinoroso Regno adnectens, & unam alarum ad Hispaniam, alteram ad Italiam extendens, & Thro­num iniquissimi Imperii apud Treveros statuens, tanta insania in Dominos debacchatus est, ut duos Imperatores legitimos, unum Roma, alterum religiosissima vita pel­leret; nec mora, tam feralibus vallatus audaciis apud Aquileiam úrbem capite nefando caeditur, qui decorata totius orbis capita regno quodammodo dejecerat. Gild. de excid. Brit. Our Countrey-man Gildas too gives such a Description of Maximus, as makes him no better than an Usur­per from the beginning to the end of his Government; he says, he was ad­vanced against Law, without any Ti­tle, or in a Tyranical manner, that he [Page 79]strengthned himself by Lies and Per­jury, and continued his Usurpation by the Murder of Gratian, and the ba­nishment of Valentinian, and was the same unjust Usurper till his death.

Zos. lib. 4. Zo [...] indeed says, that Theodo­sius h [...]nted, that Maximus should be acknowledged Emperour, and com­manded his Statues to be set up, that he might under a shew of Kindness and Friendship have the better opportunity to ruin him; but this is against the Authority of all other Historians, and Zosimus never omits any occasion to defame the Christian Emperours, and particularly Theodosius. And besides his hatred to Christianty, which he exactly copyed from Eunapius, whose History he is is said to abridg; he is singular in other circumstances relating to this very Story.

Omne judicium quod vafra mente con­ceptum, in­juria, non jura redden­do Maxi­mus infan­dissimus Ty­rannorum credidit promulgan­dum damna­bimus nul­lus; igitur sibi lege e­jus, nullus judicio blandiatur. Theodos. cod. lib. 15. Tu. 14. De infir­mandis his, quae sub Ty­rannis aut Barbaris gesta sunt. But it is more material to ob­serve, that Theodosius declared all the Laws and Edicts of Maximus to be of no Force or Authority, and that this was no more than the Christian Empe­rours used to do in such cases. Which implies that the Christians did not think Tyrants or Usurpers received any Authority from God; for if they had, all their Acts, which had been according to natural Right and Justice, must have been valid, as being made by such as had God's Authority to en­act Laws, and decree Justice, and it would have been sinful to declare them void ab initio and of no effect. For if God had empowered them to act as Em­perours against the standing Laws and Constitutions of the Empire, he had authorized them to give out Edicts and Decrees, which must have been as ob­ligatory in Conscience, as those of the Lawful Emperours themselves, and whatever they wanted of the Forma­lity of Law, ought to have been sup­plyed by the Lawful Emperours, and not all their Acts to have been decla­red invalid, and never to have been of any Authority or Obligation. St. Ambrose was not the Bishop, that would tamely have seen Gods Autho­rity in his Vicegerents thus despised, but Theodosius would have found him the same Man that he did upon some other occasions, if this had been the Doctrin of the Church.

But it may not be unfit to observe a little more particularly of Eugenius, how well setled he was in this Usurped Power. Theod. lib. 5. c. 24. Niceph. lib. 12. c. 39. The Historians relate that the disproportion and inequality was so great between his Forces and the Forces of Theodosius, that nothing less than that Miracle, which was wrought for him, could have delivered Theodosius out of his hands. Eugenius was so confident, and so secure of suc­cess, that he said Theodosius had a mind to be destroyed; and indeed if he had not been encouraged by a Revelation, he would never have ventured a bat­tel at that disadvantage, but must have been forced to protract the War, till he could have got together a much greater strength, which the Com­manders of his Army all advised him to, but he was resolved to come to a Battel. Eugenius retired and stayed at a distance, expecting the news of the Victory, and gave Order to have Theodosius brought alive, bound, to him: And the overthrow of his Army was so unexpected to him and so in­credible, that when some of his own Soldiers, who upon a conviction that God fought against them, had gone over to Theodosius, were sent to fetch Eugenius before him, he asked them whether they had brought Theodosius along with them, not suspecting but that they came to acquaint him with the Victory, they had gained him.

Secrat. lib. 5. c. 25. Aug. Civ. Dei. lib. 5. c. 25. Eugenius had caused Valentinian to be strangled, as Secrates relates, tho' St. Augustine leaves it doubtful, whe­ther he was murthered, or died by some other Accident; [...]. Theod. lib. 5. c. 24. but in Theo­doret, [Page 80]the Emperour Theodosius, when Eugenius was brought to him, puts him in mind both of his Treason against Valentinian, and of his Rebellion and continued Usurpation afterwards, till his defeat. And not he alone, but St. Ambrose, as I have shewn, after the death of Eugenius, and, I think I may say, all Authors that have given any account of him, have esteemed him no better from the beginning to the end of his pretended Reign, than an Usur­per, who never had any Right either from God or Man.

I know of but one example in An­tiquity, that may seem to suit with the Doctors Notion, and it is that of The­ophilus of Socrat. lib. 6. c. 2. Alexandria, who at the Bat­tel between Theodosius and Maximus had sent Isidorus with Presents and with Letters to both of them, to be deli­vered to him that should come off Con­querour. This some censure him for very highly, and others think it a Calumny invented by his Enemies to defame him; but it had been so far from any Aspersion, if Maximus had been immediately to commence God's Vicegerent, if he could but have sub­dued Theodosius, that it had been no more than what all the other Bishops must soon after have done; and he ought to have been commended rather for his zeal in attending the first Designations of Providence, to pay a ready and early Obedience to the new Emperour, and his Enemies had been strangly mistaken in reporting this as one of the worst Marks of Infamy they could fasten upon him.

I shall conclude all in Doctor Sher­lock's own Words; p. 54. That we must obey and submit to our Prince, is a Duty, which the Laws of God and Nature enjoyn: And we must not suffer any Man, be he Lawyer or Divine, to perswade us that this is not our Duty: But what Prince we must obey, and to what particular Prince we must pay our Allegiance, the Law of God does not tell us, but this we must learn from the Laws of the Land.