Sect. 1. The rise and state of the Question, viz. Whether upon sup­posal of inability to defend our selves, it is our Interest to be under England or France, and the Zeelanders choice of the former.

HE is a Stranger to us and our Affairs, who knows not; that the late Revolutions among us, and particularly at Ʋtrechts betaking them­selves to the French for protection, were attended both with great consternation, and various deliberations, as is usual in such disasters. When therefore misery and destruction was approaching as a violent torrent, that bears down all before it; Self-preservation being the Fundamental Law of Nature; every Province, City, and almost Village, began to consider, what they should do to preserve themselves, from being drowned in the overflow­ing deluge.

Some were of opinion, that the remaining Provinces were of sufficient strength to defend themselves, and therefore lookt no further. Others were of a contrary judgment; and therefore thought it better, upon rea­sonable terms, to put our selves under a Forein Power, as Ʋtrecht had done, then to be conquered by the Sword. And herein also mens judg­ments were divided, some thinking it better to be under the French, others to be under the English. Those of Holland (as was commonly reported) were more inclinable to the former, in regard of their near approach to them in Ʋtrecht; and especially out of an opinion which many have en­tertained, That the Interest of Holland, being principally that of Trade by Sea, was more competible with that of France then England, Insomuch, that many believe, if the advice of Monsieur Pompone of the Kings sending Charte Blanche had been followed; the Cities of Holland had at that time several of them imitated the example of Ʋtrecht; those of Zealand were generally inclined to the English. But as opinions are usually both bred and brought up by Passions; so here it was manifest, That the excessive hopes of the former, made them for absolute defence; and the excessive fears of the latter, for absolute resignation. In such cases there are two ways have al­ways been found safest and best for accommodation, viz. A due examination of the Grounds of those Passions, and a just temperament or comprehension of the diversity of Opinions: Which here so happily fell out, that it was re­solved upon and declared by many in Zeeland, first, That they would use their best endeavors to defend themselves; and secondly, if they found themselves un­able, they Would then resign to the English. Hereby shewing, that they neither did through vain fears, wholly despond of their own strength; nor through flattering hopes were wholly fearless of their Enemies. They would try and use the best means they could, to stand of themselves according to their hopes; and yet also provide against the worst of their fears, which was their fall by absolute conquest.

For the manner of doing this, I shall neither accuse, nor defend it; though the Magistrate led not the Van of Consent, according to his place and dignity, Plut. l. de fort. yet he followed close in the Rear. And though it was done hastily, yet why may not a hasty Pen, sometimes be as happy as Apelles his Pencil, which in Passion being thrown on the Picture, better portrayed the Horses foaming, then all his premeditated Counsel and Art.

It is enough to me, and to my purpose, that what was done is agreeable to the true Interest of the Countrey; which I hope to make apparent in the following Discourse. But before I do that, give me leave to premise a few things, which tend to the clearing of the Matters in question.

• 1. That we only suppose this inability for the present, to satisfie the curiosity of the World, which never think their teliscope long enough, to see to the utmost end of Interest. For we shall afterwards make it apparent, that we neither are as yet come to that extremity (through Gods mercy) nor need to fear we shall be reduced to it, if we be not awanting to our selves.
• 2. It is above all to be understood, that this resolution is absolute for Self-defence, and conditional only for Resignation. It is an approved maxim which every wise man lives by, Alterius ne sis, si tuus esse possis, which holds good in Societies, whether lesser of Families, or greater of Cities, and Pro­vinces, as well as private persons. If any can be free, it is folly to think, they will be subject to another.
• 3. This resolution being conditional, upon the supposal of evident inability to defend our selves, it is not to be imagined, that it should take place upon every Danger or Alarm of War, especially so long as Holland and Freesland are able to defend themselves: States as well as Persons, may be dangerously sick, and yet recover. Differences may be accommodated with our Enemies, or assistance may be afforded us from our Friends; the Scene of War may change, the Water and Weather may be our Walls of Defence, Difficulties, Dissentions, and Distractions, may befal our Enemies: One thing or other may fall out so far to our advantage, that we may retrench our selves in safety, though we should not recover our former Greatness.
• 4. Nor can it reasonably be thought, that any will give themselves over to another, so as to part with their Religious and Civil Interests, and be in no better a capacity then a conquered people; who though they are not made absolute slaves, yet are usually sore opprest by the Conqueror. But onely to part with their Supremacy, and the Appendixes thereunto, under which they may live as free Protestant Subjects.

If any object this is not practicable, in regard of the Treaty betwixt the two Crowns of England and France.

I answer.

• 1. Who knows that, except a few of their Cabinet Coun­sel?
• 2. This supposes that they have divided the Lions Skin before he be slain, which to me is very doubtful. For although two such mighty Po­tentates, might upon rational grounds, think themselves able to master this Commonwealth, before they began the War; yet so many are the [Page]unexpected accidents, and the events of War so doubtfull, that few have bene knowne to divide the spoile, before they had won the battell, or the Country before they had triumphed in the War: lest they being frustrated of their hoped succes, should becom a scorne and contempt to the world. We have sufficient reason to thinke, that neither England will permit France, nor France England, to have these Countries entirely; and can we then thinke that they should agree upon this before hand? if others will ghues, I have the same liberty; whereby I thinke that when time (which is the revealer of secrets) brings the Treaty to light; it will appeare that the French should hold us in by Land, and the English by Sea, till they had brought us to their owne termes; of France keeping such places above as may be thought most conducible, to the inlarging his Conquests and keep­ing us under, and England by Sea, as may secure his desired Trade, and Navall expences; and that neither of them should have these Maritime Provinces entirely (for that was for the one to make the other his Master, and absolute Soveraigne at Sea, by such an accession of strength) nor yet divided; for that would be a continuall bone of contention betwixt them.
• 3. Those that suppose this repertition, generally say, that Zeeland is to be English; and if so, the objection is answered. For if each must conquer their part by their owne Armes, as many imagine; who can thinke that any will be at the expence of so much blood and treasure, besides the ha­zard of succes, for that which they can have upon honourable termes?

Or if they proceed joyntly with their Armes, to obtaine their designes; we cannot thinke the one will obstruct the other, in that which is agreed upon by them both. And this way I suppose they take; because in a joynt War the succes is common to both, and the advantage redounds to each according to their former accord; and was it otherwise here, England attacquing us onely by Sea, might get nothing by Land, and France all. Which I cannot imagine to be so agreed upon, whatsoever the issue may be. For I cannot thinke the English such fooles to fight onely for blowes, and to set up the French to their owne destruction.

But let their agreement be what it will for the places they conquer, yet it cannot bind or determine us how to dispose of our selves before we are conquered. All free States, and Cities, v. Grot. de Jare bel. & pac. l. 1. c. 3. §. 8. l. 2. c. 6. & l. 3 c. 20. §. 5. may upon what conditions they please, yeeld the Soverainty over them, and their owne subjection to whom they please. And allthough such proffers have sometimes been re­fused, in regard of Wars and other evill consequences which might attend them; yet here the acceptance is not to be doubted of, seeing this is the Helena for which they fight.

If any shall ask how this is to be effected.

I answer, Non est deliberandum de modo, priusquam constat de re. If any grant that it is to be done, it is as much as I undertake. If God in his all-wise and righteous Providence, suffer us to be brought so low, that we cannot longer withstand our enemies: let those in supreme authority take [Page]care for the manner of performance, as to the time in which, treating where­by, and conditions whereupon they will yield their Supremacy and Govern­ment. It being my work only to shew, that it is our Interest in such a case, to make choice of England rather then France, or any other Potentate what­soever.

Sect. 2. Arguments to prove the Hypothesis, the first whereof is from our Religious Concernments; wherein is shewn how great a support Religion is to a State, and how greatly it concern us to secure our Religion.

HAving now truly related Matter of Fact, and clearly stated the Questi­on, I shall proceed to prove the same, viz. That in case of inability to defend our selves, it is our Interest to be under the English rather than the French.

First in regard of Religion. Which as it is of cheifest concernment, so deserves to have the precedence of all other considerations. The very Hea­thens accounted this their cheif Interest, and therefore above all to be secured and defended. The Romans saying was Pro aris & focis, therein giving Religi­on, the preference of all their civil concernments. And if we Christians do not, the more is our sin, and the greater our shame. It is so well known how the Heathens of old, and Turks of later times have valued their several false Re­ligions; how their first Founders, Legislators, and Magistrates have made Religion, both the Basis upon which they founded their Kingdoms and Com­monwealths, and the cheif Pillars to support them; and how zealous the com­mon people have been for their Superstitions: That I cannot but wonder that Christians should be such Gallices for the true Religion and Gospel of Christ, and fear that Turks and Heathens will rise up in judgment against us, and con­demn us for our indifferency herein. But if examples would either sway us, or shame us, I need not go so far for them, our own Ancestors are abundantly sufficient. I am sure (if the History of former times deceive me not) Re­ligion was the cheif inducement to them, to begin that hazardous War with Spain. And had such an impression upon them, that they freely ventured their lives and estates for this especially; although I know there were many other grievances insisted on, to justifie that War. Had they thought that their Posterity should have made so light of Religion and Liberty, which cost them so dear (as many we see in those places over, who have so lightly parted with both in a great measure,) I perswade my self they would never have commenced such a War; but the sincerer part of them would have fled with their Families abroad, rather then have endured those miseries at home. Could they now stand up out of their Graves, how would they condemn this unfaithful generation! And how will our Children have occasion to curse us, for betraying the trust reposed in us by our Ancestors, [Page]and selling the pretious Truths of Religion at so cheape a rate, which they bought so deare.

If the true Religion which we profes, be not the Polar Star, by which those that sit at the Helme steere the Ship of the Common-wealth; what can we expect, except we be Atheists, and shut out God and his safeguard, but to suffer ship-wrack? Nay if this be not the Pearle of price to us all, which we prefer above all worldly pebles, it will be no wonder, if our enimies spoile us both of this and them. If any be of another judgement, Serres. in Lewis 11. Bussieres. Hist. Fra. l. 13. §. 9. & 24. Comin. l. 6, c. 7. & 12. Anti-Ma­chiavel, &c. and prefer the Reason of State above Religion (although in this case they are conjoyned, as I shal shew hereafter) I wish such would oberve from Lewis the 11, who first opened the pack of fraudulent polices to the Princes of Europe; what dismall ends have befallen him, and the Atheistical Poli­titians since, those of Italy especially; and what disappoyntments their designs have met withall, and see if they have any reason to treade in their steps. I am jealous (I confesse) that the atheisme and irreligion of the present age is great, which makes me larger herein then otherwise I should be: yet I hope not so great amongst us, that we should prefer Po­pish superstition before the true reformed Religion. Belial before Christ: If so, we are fitter to be our enemies asses, to be laden with their trumpe­ries, and lasht at their pleasure, than to be dealt withall by arguments to convince our Consciences.

If we duly consider that true Religion is

• 1. The Fountaine of all true Piety and Vertue here, and of eternall Felicity hereafter.
• 2. That which rightly teaches every one their duty, not onely in reference to their par­ticular practise, but publique concerns, Magistrates how to governe, and people how to obey.
• 3. That which furnisheth us with the strongest Arguments, for mutuall affection and assistance to one another, courage in dangers, hope in extremities, patience in adversitie, and perseve­rance in our duty. And
• 4. That which onely can assure a people of Gods favour and being propitious to them; and the contempt thereof on the contrary, of his displeasure and malediction; We must needs conclude, that the Magistrate in the first place as Gods Vice-gerent in Governement, and all others in their severall Stations, ought to endeavour above all things by all lawfull means to preserve, defend, and secure the same; as they tender the honour of God, the welfare of his Church, the prospe­rity of the Commonwealth, and their own and Posterities temporall and eternall happines. I shall not need to enlarge these things, in regard they are so well knowne, and approvedly verified by so many examples, out of Sacred and profane Histories: and none that I know have ever had the im­pudence to deny them in Thesi, though they dispute in Hypothesi which is the true Religion. Even Machiavel, as wicked as his writings are in many things;
  Disp. de Rep. l. 1. c. 12.
  yet asserts (as a Politician) that true Religion must above all things be regarded by those that desire to preserve themselves, and that there is no certius indicium de reip. ruina than the contempt of Religion.

And for fuller conviction let me ad, that tis not onely an acknowled­ged truth, but that which all ages of the Word have experienced, that Re­ligion is the greatest bond and tye of humane society, and therefore must needs be the maine pillar of support to a State, and the best walls of defence to a people. Hoping therefore what is said in the generall to be sufficient, I shall now descend to particulars briefly.

And herein it is well known, that the English and we (I speak of the generality of both Nations, Rulers and people) symbolise; being both of the Reformed Religion. Whereas the French are for the greatest part Pa­pists, to be sure all in power whether civill or military: it being the practise now of France, to imploy none but such in the management of affaires; so that if we be either Governed or Garrisoned by the French, we cannot exspect to be so by any, but Papists and professed enemies of our Re­ligion.

But something here will be pleaded for the French, and something allso objected against the English.

Sect. 3. The plea of France's granting us the liberty of our Religion considered.

FIrst for the French it may be argued, that the King will grant us the li­berty of our Religion.

To which I reply by way of concession, that I verily believe he will; but desire it may be further considered.

1. If he grants this liberty according to the custome of France, it will be onely to those of the reformed Religion. Now besides these, there are many others amongst us, Iews, Lutherans, Anabaptists, &c. The common-wealth consisting both of several sorts of people, and severall sorts of Religions: and what shall become of those, which the common-wealth tollerates, though not of the professed Religion of the Land?

2. But let it be further supposed, that provision be made for the liberty of those allso that dissent from the reformed Religion, or for all, and that by Articles, Edicts, or whatsoever way you please: yet we know how slightly these are usually observed, by those that have the execution of them, and how litle Governors and Soldjers regard these. For they well know, that most cannot, many dare not, others will not complaine of them; and if any doe, it will be a wearisome worke, and the remedy many times worse than the disease. So that a patient suffering is the onely solace to the sufferer and oppressed.

3. I might add, that it is a maxim with many Papists (allthough not all I confes Molanus de fide hae­reticis ser­vanda.) that no faith is to be kept with hereticks. Now all Papists accoun­ting us such, if those that Governe be of that perswasion; how litle ac­count will they make of what conditions soever are made with us; but as [Page]occasion serves, if they dare not openly breake, yet will they secretly evade, all such as serve for our support, and thinke they doe God good ser­vice. As allso their tenet of the Popes power of dispensation with all oaths, Articles, Promises and obligations though never so solemn and sacred: or if you please (for it is all one) a power to abrogate Gods laws, nul all the faith and bonds of man-kind, subvert all humaine Society, and in short ex injustitia facere Justitiam as the Canonists tell us. De tran­slat. Epis­cop. c. quanto in glossa. Now suppose we have Governors that measures consciences by ells rather than inches; who matters no more engagements dispensed with by his Holines, than we doe our Almanacks out of date. I should be glad to be informed what we could doe in the case, more then cry and complaine to God Allmighty. For I doubt they will seldome doe that, which Maximilian the first did fre­quently, Deus aeterne, nisi vigilares, quàm malè esse mundo, Morn. Myster. Iniquit, quem regimus nos ego miser venator, & ebriosus illè ac sceleratus Julius! Nay if Governors thinke themselves obliged in conscience and honour to keepe conditions; yet it is well known how generally they are influenced by their Clergy: so that in all dubious cases, and the application of generall rules to particular practises, it cannot be exspected but judgement should be given on the Pa­pists side, and that the Grandees of the Church should beare them out in it, and Jesuits and others Zelots applaude their practises.

4. The Papists must have publique places for their Worship, not only in all Cities but Villages, as we may see in the Articles propounded by the French. Now there being by far too few Churches or places for publique Worship, in most of our populous and enlarged Cities allready; it will not be possible for a great part of our Religion, to enjoy the publique Or­dinances of God; but many will run into profane courses, most grow ignorant and careles what Religion they are of, and their posterity abso­lute Papists. By which meanes the number of the Reformed decreasing, and Papists increasing; where at first there was but onely one Church for po­pery; they shall then take more, and so continue to inlarge themselves and straten us. Nor let any judge these, as onely jealousies and feares. For if they begin allready to incroach (as it is credibly reported from severall places they command) and breake Articles heerein, when not onely the commands of superiors, but common policy requires a most religious observance thereof; what shall we thinke they will doe hereafter? If they will not now out of hopes to win those to them, which yet stand out: much les will they, when there is no more hope of gaining thereby.

5. When popery is the Religion of our Governors, who have the disposall of preferments and profits, to allure men to their Religion: We shall find by wofull experience, what by education, converse, marriages, dignities and other worthy advantages; many of the ignoranter and looser sort of Protestants, will change their profession (I say not Religion for that such never had) and turne Papists. Who is such a stranger in the world as knowes not, that by such artifices they have more weakened the Pro­testants [Page]in France, than by all their wars and contests with them. In so much that of late yeares, some wise men of the Reformed Religion there, have bene so fear full of its being utterly supplanted; that they have required their children by their last will and Testament, to leave that Kingdome, and setle themselves in these Countries.

6. Let the best he supposed that any rationall man can imagine, yet will it be bad enough. For if the Papists have the Civill power to back them, allthough the wiser and better sort, it is not to be doubted will be civill; yet the the ruder sort will be intollerably insolent. And this begins to appear in some places allready, where the Popish Inhabitants are more insufferably insulting, spightfull, and injurious than the French themselves. And if they doe this so early while things are doubifull, and the issue of the War dubious; what may we expect when they are in their high Meridian of succes and glory?

7. And lastly, if any one thinkes that these are onely needles feares and groundles surmises, I shall desire them to peruse the French Embassa­dors Speech to the Emperors Council, Gremon­ville. where he will find this Argument of Religion insisted on to divert the Emperor from our assistance (which is well retorted by the ingenious Answerer thereof.) And inform themselves how fast the Jesuits and other Zealots for the Romish Religion, fall off from the House of Austria and Spaint to France; in regard of their ina­bility to carry on their designs of the Universall Popish Monarchy, and the hopes they have of France's potency to effect it. And then let them judge, if there be not sufficient ground, for all that I have said, and much more that might be said upon this Subject.

Sect. 4: Objections from the danger of losing our Religion under England; from the Kings being a Papist, designing to set up Po­pery; the increase, countenance, and tolleration of Papists, as al­so from his joyning with France against us, and Church Governe­ment by Bishops, all answered.

But now on the other hand it is by some objected against the English.

1. That the King is a Papist in heart, and designes to set up the Popish Religion.

First what the King is in his heart, and what he designes, is onely knowne to God Almighty, who is the searcher of hearts. That he is a profest protestant, is well knowne. And allthough I will not sweare for him nor any man alive, that he will not change his Religion; yet to me it seems very improbable, upon the following grounds.

1. He that would not in his minority, when under his Mothers educa­tion in France, K. Charles I. Letters. but followed his Fathers instructions, of being obedient to her in all things, excepting the matter of her Religion; I cannot thinke will now in his maturity.

2. His withstanding so many temptations wherewith he was environed so long a time together, during those many years of his exile; wherein neither the friendship of Papists, nor unkindness and hard measure he met withal from Protestants could move him; Militi­ere's Vi­ctory of the Truth, and Bp. Bramhalls Answer. makes me think him much more immovable, now he is free from those. Who that knows those times, knows not what designs the Papists had upon him? What Per­swasions and Arguments they used both by word and writing? What Pro­mises they made him of assistance to recover his Kingdoms? What Ar­guments of Interest they prest him with, which are usually more prevalent with Princes, than the intrinsick Arguments of Religion? And if he stood unshaken in all those boysterous blasts, shall we thinke he will fall in a calme?

3. His rescuing his youngest Brother the Duke of Glocester out of his Mothers hands, when her designes appeared for perverting him in his Religi­on; is an evident proofe of the realty of his Profession. If any one say it was his Interest for regaining his Kingdoms. I say.

4. And is it not his Interest also for keeping them? Did he gaine them so quickly, or are his three Kingdoms so little worth, that he should easily hazard them? Kings are wiser then to venture their Crownes upon every idle Priests pratles. If there were any stronger Arguments now then formerly, either for the Popish Religion, or from his Interest; we had some reason to be jealous that he might change.

But 5. It is apparently against his Interest, not onely in regard of the danger he might incur of losing his Crownes, but the great loss which would inevitably accrew to him by this change.

The danger we cannot imagine to be small, if we rightly consider those Kingdoms. I have had an accompt (having been a little curious in those enquiries) of 1100000 of his Subjects, that by Interest and Inclination were carried counter to the Court. Under these five Heads.

• 1. The Purchasers of Crowne and Church Lands that are now restored, and they outed.
• 2. Sol­diers and Seamen, that had fought against him by Sea and Land.
• 3. Magi­strates and Ministers, that were removed and turned out of their places.
• 4. Commonwealths Men that were Anti-monarchicall in their judgments.
• 5. Fanaticks properly so called, as Anabaptists, Fifth Monarchy Men, Quakers, &c. And though I could perhaps give as good a guess as another, at the rest of the Substantiall Protestants that are of the Episcopall perswasion, yet that needs not now. These you must thinke, however divided in their In­terests, Judgments, and Affections; and many of them, no doubt very Loyal to his Majesty; yet without all doubt would joyne against Popery, and never willingly submit themselves to that yoke of bondage. Nay, some perhaps would be glad of such an Argument, and Plea to the people, and the Dema­gogues gaine thereby no small number of Proselytes to their Party, if his Majesty was once a declared Papist.

And as his danger, you see is great, so his loss I am sure could not be [Page]small.

• 1. Of his Honour, not onely in changing that Religion he hath now so long profest, and blurring the faire copy which his Father hath set him; but in admitting the Popes Supremacy: which hath beene so Inju­rious to the dignities of Emperors, Kings, and Princes; that their com­plaints how they have beene plagued by the Popes are infinite.
• 2. Of his profit and revenues,
  Vid. Bo­din de Rep. l. 1: c. 9.
  in regard that the Peter-pence or Tenths of Livings, and other Contributions paid formerly to the Pope, are by Law annexed to the Crowne, and paid accordingly, to the King.
• 3. Of his Subjects affections, wherein his safety especially consists. For a Prince that hath the hearts of his people, hath their purses and persons at his service; and raignes more happily by their love, then all his owne power though never so great. If we therefore consider his education in, and his long profession of the protestant Religion, his honour and intrest ingaging him to per­severe therein: I should thinke no man need feare his changing it for the Popish, the fopperies whereof he hath so fully both seen and knowne.

I might ad to these, that which further satisfies me, that having been at Bruxels, Colen, and most of those places, where his Majesty during his exile did reside; I can say bona fide that in all the variety of companies and converse I was ever in, I never heard any probable grounds, from any one intelligent person, that toucht, much les stain'd his Majesties reputation in this particular. But I will not impose this upon others, though it moves me to say the more, because I am not willing to annex my name to what I have written. Not that I am ashamed to owne what I conceive to be the reall truth, which I have published in this treatise to the world, and can make good much more largely: but because I know who I am, and that my name can ad no estimation to this politicall discourse; but rather per­haps prejudice some who knowes me not, and are used to judge of writings by their authors; whereas those that will impartially search after truth, must have regard to things, not persons and to what is written, and not the writers thereof.

As for his setting up popery, I neither thinke that he will, for the fore­going reasons; nor if he would, that he can, for these following espe­cially.

• 1. The Protestant Religion is setled in all his Kingdomes by their fun­damentall lawes, which the King cannot repeale. It is true he hath the executive power of the lawes, and so can suspend the execution of penalties; but cannot rescind any one law, much lesse make new ones, without the consent of Parliament in his respective Kingdomes. And absolute Sove­raingty is not there in use. For power paramount to all lawes, carries too great a top-saile for an English bottom; wherein the Subjects liberties are shipt, as well as Coesar and his fortunes.
• 2. The lands and revenues formerly supporting the Romish Religion, which are many and great, are in the possession of the nobility and gentry for the most part; and have beene bought by them of the Crowne at the [Page]dissolution of Abbies, Monasteries, &c. And the purchases confirmed by law. And can we thinke that they will be ever induced to part with them againe? or enact any such lawes as shall tend to their owne ruine, and the utter undoing of their families? If there was so much danger and difficulty to wrest them out of the hands of the poore Votaries, (as the Histories of those times tell us) What will there be to recover them from the powerfull Nobility and Gentry? who legally possessing them will doubtless defend them, so that none shall deprive them thereof, that have not better courage and sharper Swords then they.
• 3. The great disparity in the number of Protestants and Papists. There being not one family of a hundred in England and Scotland Popish, and in many and great Parishes not a Papist. Now what greater madness can we imagine, than that his Majesty should adventure to rely upon the Papists alone, against all the Protestants of the three Nations. Though their num­bers are greater then formerly, yet are they comparatively small (as we have said) to those that profes the Reformed Religion. So that it can ne­ver enter into my braine, that such folly should enter into any Princes brest, much les one who hath suffered so much, by the former divisions of his Kingdoms.
• 4. The vast difference between a people enlightned by the Gospel, and well grounded in their Religion, and an ignorant and unprincipled people. For the generality of the common people brought up in ignorance, (as they usually are under Popery) are more subject to receive impressions from their Teachers, and so by degrees change their Profession. Whereas those who are assured from the Word of God, that they are in the right; will by no means be induced to the same. And usually the more force is used, the more obstinate they are. For a setled Conscience despises dain­ger, and defies all the terrors and torments, that their cruellest adversaries can invent. If in lesser differences of Church-government, the King hath found it so difficult, that after all the coercive Lawes, and other meanes he hath used, he tells the world, 'tis evident by the sad experience of twelve yeares, that there is very little fruit of all those forceable courses;
  Declar. March 15. 1672.
  what shall we think he is likely to gain in the greater and essential differences of Religion should he attempt any change therein? Surely not much from the Pious and sober party of Protestants; for I neither matter nor mention the ruder sort, and ignorant rable. Nay universall experience hath taught the World, that where any kind of Religion is powerfull, all force against it is weake and contemptible: and much more against the true Reformed Religion; as that wise and excellent Historian Thuanus shewes in the Preface to his History,
  The other two are Calv. to his Instit. & Causa [...] to Poly­bius.
  which is one of those three admirable Dedications, to the Crown of France, that are worthy to be read by all the Kings and Princes of Europe.

I might add to these, the genious of the English Nation, which I know to be zealous in what way of Religion soever they take, as hath been observed by severall Authors. In times of Popery so addicted thereto, that they had [Page]given most of their means to the Church, Anno 7 Edv. 1.18 Edv. 3.15 Rich. 2. if the Statute of Mortmaine had not prohibited them. In the times of Libertinisme when a Republick, the Fanaticks were so intoxicated, that it was not enough for them to push down the Pope, but they would break off all Government, for being his hornes, Polydor. Virgil. l. 17. and make every thing Antichristian that was not to their humor. When the King return'd and Episcopacy with him, that Party would not abate the three controverted Ceremonies (as a wise and moderate Bishop both foretold and lamented) for the universal Peace of the three King­doms. Surplice, Cros, and kneeling at St. Brownrig. Nay the very common rable would overflow both in drinke and de­votion; kneel at a pillar, and reele at a Post. Though I know there are as pious, sober, and serious Christians of severall perswasions (Episcopall Presbyterial and Independants) as any are in the Christian Worid: but I say this to shew, that what way soever they take, they are not easily diverted.

But as groundless jealousie, is both uncharitableness and folly; so where there is just ground; not to be jealous is stupidity. It may therefore not be amiss for our further satisfaction, to enquire into these Objectors grounds. And they are these,

• 1. The increase of Papists, at Court especially.
• 2. The Kings countenancing and intrusting them with power.
• 3. His tollerating their Religion.
• 4. Joyning with France against us.

For the 1 and 2 ^d I can say little of my own knowledge, it being many yeares since I saw either England or France. But I shall take reports u [...]on the pub­lique faith of England and Holland for this once, though it be none of the best security. 1. Therefore that Papists increase, through the Queens Court, the extraordinary correspondence with France, the dissentions of the Protestants, the Atheisme and irreligion of the Age, and other wayes and meanes which might be mentioned, is not to be wondred at; but ra­ther that there are no more. Allthough I am well assured, that their num­ber is comparatively small, and their Intrest in England and Scotland inconsi­derable to effect any change. And were they more, this will not infer the King is one.

2. And much les his countenancing and intrusting them. For who ever concluded that the French Kings for their kindnes to Protestants, (who have served them most faithfully heretofore in their wars) were Protestants? Or the States Papists, for employing the French and others in their Armies? A Papist may be a loyall subject, a wise Statesman, a fit Embassador, a good Soldjer, and merit his Princes favor, though of a different Religion.

3. Nor will the Kings indulgence of liberty to those of that Religion conclude more against our assertion, then for the States of Hollands being of all the Religions they tollerate, or for Amsterdam's being Jewes. There may be reasons of State, sometimes to connive, and sometimes to tollerate that, which we neither approve, nor would willingly allow; even as Moses did divorce to the Jewes. Or there may be Articles, promises and other engagements upon us, whereby we are forced to do that, which we would not if free: as Joshua to the Gibeonites; and our Ancestors [Page]to Papists, Anabaptists, &c. who assisted them in the defence of the Coun­trey against Spaine.

There are two things doe wonders in the world, and are the ordinary pre­texts and best apologies for the greatest [...]a [...]bitances, viz: v. grot. An Jure bel. & pac. l. 1. c. 4. §. 7. l. 2. c. 2. § 6. danger and necessi­ty. And yet where these are reall and not feigned, they are considered both by God and good men. Nature dictates, that we should hazard the hand rather then the head, and lose a part, rather then venture the whole. I have for above 20 years observed, both where I have lived, and where I have travelled; that Moderation is rather a speculative notion, than matter of pra­ctise: like a vertuous and beautifull poor Lady, that all will commend, but none will marry. Parties that are under, call for it eagerly; but when they are upmost, neglect it shamefully. Seeing then the passions of men, and iniquities of the age are so great, that I exspect nothing in Religion, but ei­ther an inquisition or tolleration; I am more for the latter, and would rather reside at Amsterdam or Constantinople then at Rome or Madrid.

But to come closer to the particular case. If his Majesty therefore had no obligation upon him to do this, or were it a liberty to Papists only, or a liberty for their worship in publick; I should grant the objection was very weighty; but it is the quite contrary. For he tells the world he was ob­liged in point of gratitude to the Papists for their service to his Father; and to the Presbyterians (who had been so instrumentall in his restoration) in point of promise allso, severall wayes made to them both before and after his returne to his Crowne; severall times declaring that he would grant in­dulgence to them and others of tender consciences And we know that if his Majesty had followed his own inclinations, they had been better performed. And now that he gives a concession of liberty, it is neither soly nor principal­ly to those of the Romish Religion, but to all others as well as they, and that with this manifest difference, that it is to the Protestants publiquely, and to Papists in their private houses onely, and this revocable at pleasure. Declar. March 15. 1672. All though some wise men are of opinion, that the King and Rulers will not onely find such ease and safety therein; but such eminent advantages ma­ny wayes, and the people generally such content, that it will scarce be revo­ked.

4. His joyning with France against us, is matter of Intrest, and not Re­ligion. And if we judge impartially, will no more conclude him a Papist, then the Emperor and King of Spaine Protestants because they joyne with us. Herein let us eye and owne the Providence of God, who changes times and seasons and makes friends become enimies, and enim [...]es Friends. Would not this have been thought incredible to our Ancestors, that France and England who raised us, should endeavour our ruine? And that Spaine and Austria who sought our destruction, should ever seek our preservation? And all this out of Intrest, (as I shall shew hereafter) those formerly to ballance Spaine's, and these now France's greatnes; and neither Religion or affection. For whosoever thinkes that Spaine and Austria have any kindness [Page]for us more than themselves, hath a faith far larger than my fancy.

There is another Objection against our closing with England for Reli­gions-sake, from their Episcopall Church-Government; which if it were not mentioned by some to the prejudice of my assertion, I should have passed over as inconsiderable. For.

1. This is onely an accidentall difference in the same Religion, and not a different kinde of Religion, as Popery is. And a difference in the exter­nall forme of Government onely; not in the substantialls and vitalls of Reli­gion. For we both agree in the same Confession of Faith, and in all the essentialls of the Reformed Religion.

2. A very great part of the King of England's Subjects are Presbyterians, as is well knowne.

3. Although Episcopacy be the Church Government, setled by Law in the three Kingdoms, yet his-Majesty indulges publique liberty to Presbyte­rians, and other Non-conformists. So that we need not doubt but he will much more to us, that Church Government which is setled amongst us.

4. New-England, and several other Plantations belonging to his Majesty of great Brittaine, have allwayes enjoyed, and still do their own Church-Governement freely; and therefore we need not feare that ours should be denied us.

5. Allthough the Church Governement of these Provinces be Presby­terian, yet as to its vitall power and administration in severall places, it hath for sundry yeares last past rather been Erastian. The Magistrates fre­quently assuming that power here, which the Bishops do there. In so much that I question whether the Presbyterians may not have more hopes, that their discipline should be raised; then feares that it should be ruined under England. Gralloe, contra A­pollodium 1646. Lucti An­tistii de Jure Ec­clesiasti­cor. l. 1665. Politike discoursen. l. 4. over Kerkelike Sacken. What crying up the Magistrates power circa sacra, and what decrying the Ministers, both by word and writing. Antistius tells us in the frontispece of his booke, that whatever right divine or humane is attributed to the Ministers or they assume to themselves, is either falsely and impiously ascribed to them, or is onely from the Rulers of the Repu­blique or city where they are setled. What applauding of Hobs's Leviathan, now translated into Latin and Dutch. What frequent interposing in Eccle­siasticall affaires, and how miserably the honest Minister in the Hague was handled, may be seen in Aitzma. Many were afraid of a storme falling up­on the. Ministers, if our enemies had not faln upon us. What crossing the Churches in the Election of their Pastors, and exercise of their Governe­ment hath been at Rotterdam, and other places, is too well knowne, and being reformed, I wish whats past might be buried in oblivion. And thus I have vindicated my first Argument from Religion, and shall endeavour to compensate my prolixity heerein, with more brevity in the rest. Con­cluding, that if we cannot defend the true reformed Religion we profes, nor will not secure it the best we can, we may call our Country Ichabod, for the glory is departed from these Netherlands.

Sect. 5. The second Argument taken from Liberty. Wherein the dif­ferent kinds, and degrees of Liberty under all sorts of Governe­ment, are declared; and the probability of our enjoying greater freedome under England than France, argued.

IT will further appeare our interest, to be under England rather than France, in regard of our Liberty. Which next to true Religion and life, is the greatest blessing bestowed on man-kind. Now for our clearer proceeding herein, we must

• 1. Shew what kind of Liberty is here meant.
• 2. Wherein it consists, and the measures thereof.
• 3. Accommodate these to the matter in hand.

For the first. We meane not here Personall Liberty: either morally con­sidered in opposition to coaction; or civilly; either in opposition to confine­ment, as we usually take it; or to slavery, as the Civilians. 2. Nor Civil Liberty, as opposed to Monarchie; Institut. l. 1. tit. 32 as the Greeke and Latin Historians fre­quently: with which Tacitus begins his Annals, Ʋrbem Romam à Principio Reges habuere, libertatem & consulatum L. Brutus instituit. For I well know, that to whomsoever we submit, this liberty is lost. Much less 3. For Licen­tiousness. For subjection to Lawes and Government, is so far from being inconsistent with liberty; that it is the onely means of its preservation. For without this; what are Kingdoms and States, but great butcheries of men, and publick robberies of propriety, where the strongest arme and longest sword sweeps away all? So boundless is mans villany; and his lusts so raging­ly restless: that we have no other choyce left us, but either be subject to Law, or slaves to licentiousness. As Tully sayes well, Pro Clu­ent. Legum ideirco omnes servi sumus, ut liberiesse possimus. But 4. That publick liberty which a people have under their Government, (of what kind soever it is) as it is taken in opposition to publick oppression. Which is of divers sorts, and different de­grees, in regard of our persons, priviledges, and proprieties. When a peo­ple are neither oppressed by usurpation, without colour of Law; nor by extortion, under pretext thereof. Which is an invaluable mercy to those that injoy it: though rightly valued by few, except those that want it. And hath been so highly praised by all sorts of writers: hat it is better to be silent, then briefe in its commendations.

Now Secondly wherein this consists, and how to measure the same, is harder to discover and determine; in regard we can meet with no guides, that have gone this way. For the Civil Law, which is copious concerning all other Dominions, is silent in this of Soveraignty; and being calculated for the Meridian of Monarchs, leaves them free to make their Subjects so, more or less at their pleasure: Historians onely relate what freedom such and such people had under such and such Rulers: and the Writers of Policy, and particular Republicks, compare the peoples liberty under the several forms of Government, and commend this or that State for the same. And these are all the helps we have: which are in the next degree to nothing [Page]We will therefore pass them all by, and freely follow our own judgment; in shewing joyntly both the nature of liberty, and the measures thereof. But we must necessarily here premise.

• 1. That though all ought to pay the homage of subjection, to that law­ful government under which they live; yet none ought so to be wedded to any forme, as to think the subjects of all others not free. Which Aristotle long since observed,
  Politic. l. 6. c. 2. V. Arni­soeus de rep. l. 2. c. 7. §. 2. n. 75.
  to be the vulgar error in Democracy. For though it well becomes a vertuous Wife, to esteem her own Husband, the best head she can have; and accordingly to be guided by him: yet if she will censure all other Wives, for meer slaves; all her neighbours round about her, will ring her a peale of indignation.
• 2. That the best way to judge of peoples liberty is by considering it in re­ference to Soveraignty. For all subjection and government being relatives; and Subject, liberty consisting, in such a manner of subjection to the Su­preme Powers, as is free and not slavish; the one is easily knowne by the other. So that if we duly consider Supremacy, we may discerne, whether the Subjects be free or no by the manner, and the degrees of their freedom, by the measure of their subjection.
• 3. That we must distinguish between actual liberty. or freedom from op­pression; and legal liberty by constitution. For freedom may be considered either in regard of morall power, or government which is the exercise thereof; and that both severally, and joyntly. For a people free by Law, may be oppressed by their Rulers; and a people not legally free, may be actually so by their Governors grace. So that actuall liberty alone, is onely under absolute Powers, legal under limited and mixed, and both under Go­vernments which proceed regularly, in the Sphere of Power wherein they are placed, and are not planetary in their motions. Having premised these things; we shall now proceed to lay down certain rules, whereby every vul­gar capacity may judge, of the nature of liberty and the degrees thereof, un­der any kind of Soveraignty whatsoever. Whether it reside in a single per­son, or in a plurality; either absolute, or limited in regard of its measure; or for the manner simple or mixed; either of two or three estates, equally or un­equally, and from whatever priority or predominant part denominated, Mo­narchy, Aristocracy, or Democracy, according to the constitution of every Nation.

And the general rule is this. The greater power in the Soveraignty, the lesser liberty in the Subjects; and the less power in the Soveraignty, the more liberty in the Subjects. It is not my present work to determine, whether of these is bet­ter for the whole. The Polititians pens have sufficiently ventilated that question; usually ascribing more strength and stability to the former, and more common prosperity to the latter; though often concluding, either through favour or fear and fl [...]ttery, that that Government under which they live, deserves above all to weare the garland I shall therefore onely say this, that seeing extreames are alwayes dangerous; a golden meane is [Page]that, which makes a golden age, both to Soveraigns and Sub­jects.

Now although I judge this rule alone, sufficient for our present purpose; yet in regard some perhaps, may be pleased with so large a prospect, as the liberty of all Nations in all ages of the world; we shall take a fuller view thereof; and the rather, because it will be of use to us hereafter, not onely in this but the following Sections. And for this end will begin at the bottom, that so ascending by degrees, we may behold both it and them the bet­ter.

1. A people under absolute power, are not truly and legally free, but onely permissively and precariously. Because their liberty is not from Law, but onely founded in their Governors favor. So that they are liable to all oppres­sion, although they are sometimes as actually free, and little oppressed, as those that live under other Governments.

And this liberty, as to the certainty thereof, is more or les according to the degrees of absolute power. Where the Rulers will, is the peoples Law; freedom is an Embryo, rather than formed: when they make Laws, whereby Subjects are at more certainty; it then becomes a foetus: and when they oblige themselves, to rule by those Laws; the child is borne, and may cry out of violence and oppression. This liberty, how small soever, and uncer­taine of life, hath yet many witnesses to avouch its name; which we find also registred in Antiquity. So that whosoever denies the same; must call all those slaves, who lived under the Eastern and Roman Empires of old, and the Turks and Persians at this day.

2. Under limited power, the people have a legall liberty, which is greater or les, according to the Laws, constitutions, or contracts, whereby the power is limited. Whether originally and antecedently; or by after condescent, be­twixt those in Supremacy and them in subjection; is not much materiall. This liberty being supported by Law, not voluntarily made by the Governors themselves, and alterable at their pleasure (as in absolute power) but neces­sarily condescended to by them that will governe, makes the subjection of a people tolerable And if the Fathers in power please to foster them, they want not for necessaries, though they abound not in superfluities. But I confes, if this freedom meet with a churlish stepfather, and hath neither guardian not friends to maintain its right; then its forced to keep private at home, and dare scarce appear in publike; which makes their present condi­tion miserable. For liberty once lamed by power, is not unlike to a labouring man, that hath his leg broken; who till it be sound, Is thereby confined to his own cottage, or cralls but abroad to beg with his crutches.

3. Those that live under a mixed power, have more or les liberty according to the temperament thereof.

If mixt of Monarchie and Acristocracy onely, the common peoples liberty is according to their Laws. And is more secured by this composition, than in a simple governement, though limited; because one is a check to the [Page]exorbitancy of the other. For though every mixt power be limited, yet every limited power is not mixt. In this Government, though the No­bility, should as Cedars shelter the undershrubs, from the storms of the superior order; yet both Historie and experience shews us, that often times (I say not allwayes) the Peeres care not to be their Princes Vassalls, that so the rest of the people may be theirs.

If mixed so that the common people have a share in the Supreme Power, they are absolutely free; and their liberty is more or les, according as their share is. Whether it be mixed of all the three kinds of Government, viz. Monarchie, Aristocracy, and Democracy; or onely of the two latter; for I never read or heard of a State compounded of the two extreames.

Now the Supreme Power consists especially (I say not onely)

• 1. In en­acting, interpreting, and repealing of Laws.
• 2. In electing and ap­pointing subordinate Magistrates and Ministers of State for Government.
• 3. In judging and determining all crimes and controversies amongst their Subjects, ultimately without appeale.
• 4. In leavying of taxes to defray publick expences.
• 5. In the power of Armes for defence of the whole.
• 6. In making War and Peace with others. So then as a people partake in these, their freedom is accordingly to be accounted of. And here liberty is come to maturity; and if she be modest, and keep within her bounds, and fall not into wanton licentiousness; ravishes the eyes of all spectators, fil­ling their mouthes with her praises, and their mindes with admiration.

But it is high time that we hasten unto the third particular proposed, which is the accommodation of these, to the subject matter we have in hand.

First then, it is well known, that there is a very vast difference in the liberty of the Subjects of these two Crowns. The common people under the King of England have 1. A part in the legislative power, which is the chief au­thority in all Governements. For the Commons make a third State in all the three Kingdoms; and have their representatives freely chosen by them­selves in all Parliaments; which are the true Conservatories of publique liberty and particular propriety. Whereas the common people in France either never had this priviledge; or if they had, have long since lost it That they had it formerly, Franco­gallioe. c. 10.11.15. Derepubl. l. 2. c. 6. §. 6. Hottoman endeavours to prove, which Arnisoeus denies, (and answers his reasons,) nor that only, but all mixture in the French Monarchy either with Princes of the Blood, Peers, or any other State whatsoever. But whatever was the Governement, under the two first lines of the Kings of France; it is generally agreed, that in the be­ginning of the third under Hugh Capet, (who cantond out France about the yeare 990) the peoples liberty was devoured by the Dukes and Earles of the Provinces, and the Monarchie allmost turned into a Toparchie, by reason of their hereditary right. Which the after Kings soone perceiving, to be too great a ballance to the Crowne, broke down by degrees; and so became the only Atlas's that have ever since sustan'd that Government. For the Assembly of the three Estates, which were the only bulwark of the [Page]publick liberty, that was left undemolished by despotical powers; if they ever had any share in the legislative, lost it long before Capets time, (for from Charles the great the Kings Edicts have past for Laws.) and be­ing discontinued in their Wars with England, and their remaining power (whatever it was) broke down by the policy of Lewis the eleventh; they were finally laid aside by Lewis the last. And although Philip the fourth fixed that Court of Judicature at Paris, that was formerly ambulatory and usually accompanied the Kings Court, which became a pattern to the rest of their Provincial Parliaments; yet both that and these have only the name and shadow; not the nature and power of the Parliaments under the Crown of England. The Members being neither chosen by the people, nor representing them; but Lawjers, that usually either purchase these places of the Crown, or pay an annual pension for the same; having no legislative power, nor indeed any other but derivative from the King, and alterable at his pleasure. They tell the Academy of Paris; Guagnin. in Ludovic. 12. se à Rege jussos promulgare leges, quas ipsi visum fuerit ferre. Apud illum authoritatem esse, &c. But these things are so well known, that I will not stand to al­ledge Authorities to prove them; although, if it were necessary, I could bring as many as would fill the page even to ostentation. But let us briesly run over the rest. Those 2. under the Crown of England have the election of Magistrates generally in Corporations, and some under Officers in the Country, which cannot be removed without due process of Law. 3. Have a share in the Judicature, by the Juries (in England) for matter of fact, together with the Kings Judges for matter of Law, and their last appeal to Parliaments. 4. The original power of raising Taxes. For the proposal and grant must come from the Commons, and the other two States only consent. 5. The liberty of bearing Arms. Whereas in France, all Promotions, Governments, Judicatures and Taxes, are in the Kings power; who permits not the vulgar use of Arms, or a standing Militia in his Kingdom; but only such as are in his pay, and thereby entirely at his devotion. So that there is no Communalty that lives more happily than that of England, nor none more miserably than the poor paisantry of France.

2. Hence we may infer a fair probability, of enjoying more liberty under the Crown of England than France. I know our freedom will not necessarily follow from the premises; for that which is legal, will depend upon such conditions, as shall be either previously agreed upon, or after consented unto: yet I leave every one to judge, which is likeliest to grant us the best; not only for our Religion, but liberty in our Persons, Priviledges and Estates; as also whose Government is most likely to de­fend the same, and make us thereby also actually free.

If it be argued, that the French King may give us more liberty than his other Subjects; and the King of England less. The reply is easie; that we reason not from the power of either, or what they can and may do; but what in all appearance they will do. Although those that hold it for a [Page]fundamental in the French Government, that whatever is conquered by them or acquired, must be incorporated with the Kingdom of France; and that this is as indispensable for the body politick, as the Salick Law is for the head; scruple much, whether the King de jure, can make us freer than the rest of his Subjects. But we neither desire to dispute the Prero­gative of Princes, much less of such a mighty Monarch; nor indeed are we of their opinion herein, and therefore take it for granted, that he as well as the King of England, may grant us as full and ample liberty, as He shall think fit in His Royal pleasure. We only profess our fears what he will do, and such as are rational and becoming men; not groundless fan­cies, or frivolous reports, which are the usual Bugbears, that affright only fearful women and children.

1. We cannot flatter our selves into hopes, that our condition should be better than either of those two Kings (which soever we submit unto) natu­ral Sujects. If it be equal, it is well; and all that we can rationally expect. And therefore we judge, that England will easier be induced to this, which is ordinary unto that Government; than France, to indulge us of extraor­dinary favour, unless we had merited such a priviledge, as to be made an ex­ception from the general rule. And that Governors under them will wil­lingly and readily maintain, that which they are accustomed unto; but very hardly such immunities, as transcend the bounds which are set to others.

2. The many examples we have before us, of such Countries as France hath gained, keeps our fears continually waking. For by whatever Title they have been acquired, we find them all generally in the same condition. Whether by right of donation, as Daulphiny and Provence, or purchase as Berry Montpelier &c. or marriage, as Bourbon, Champagne, Languedock, Bre­taigny, &c. or by conquest and powerful seizure, as Normandy, Aquitane, Poictou, Anjou, and whatsoever held on England by Charles the seventh, and Burgundy with those that depended thereon, by his son Lewis the e­leventh; all these being incorporated with France, (what ever their for­mer immunities were, and whatever lesser they still injoy) are all equally subject to all Laws, Governments, and Impositions from the Crown, with­out dispute and contradiction. And can we then be such fools, as to think, that though we come under France, yet we shall be free? But now on the contrary we know, that whatsoever accession hath been made to the Crown of England, either by mariiage as Scotland, or conquest as Ireland, that they have all their Laws, Priviledges, Governments, and Immunities remaining entirely, as inviolable from the Crown, and unalterable with­out their own consent. Nor do they only injoy these, but make Laws for supporting them, according to their particular interests; yea cross and opposite to the other, which yet are ratified by his Majesty, or at least by his Royal authority and pleasure.

3. If any have neither list nor leisure, to look into the Histories of for­mer times; the present age will furnish them sufficiently, with examples [Page]both foreign and domestick. Let them enquire of Lorraign and Flanders, how they fare with their new Masters. Or let them but pass into the ad­jacent Provinces, and inform themselves of the French Government; and then they may see as in a Glass, the face of their own future condition, And if any be resolvedly blind, that they will not see, except they be deaf also, or stop their ears; they may hear enough, (if the tenth part of re­ports be but true) to warn them sufficiently to look to themselves. But if they remain so incredulous, that all the Beacons that are fired about them, makes them not fear; and that they will believe nothing, which they themselves do not feel: I wish that experience (which wise men call the Mistress of Fools) convince them not of their folly, when it is too late; and their condition become so miserable, that its fitter to be drawn cove­red with a sorrowful veil, by some Timanthes's Pencil, than to be lively set forth in its sad colours, or described by the Pen of an impartial Histo­rian. For my part I profess that none honours the worth and gallantry of the French Nation more than my self, yet I would loth come under its power: for the reason which the Fox gives the Lion in the Fable,

—quia me vestigia terrent, Omnia te adversum spectantia, nulla retrorsum.

4. We think we have reason to be afraid not only for our persons, and purses; but even for our lives, and all those things which may make us miserable; not only in regard of the French, but our selves. For we know that a people accustomed to liberty, who have had enough given them and taken much more, when once they come to be restrained, and strictly held in by the rains of Government; are very apt to break out into mutinies and mischiefs; and like wild Colts in their first managing, rush desperate­ly into ruin, that they may throw their Riders. Yea when Conquerors think they have so harnassed the multitude, that they dare not but draw their triumphant Chariots; and doubt not but they themselves sit so fast, that they may drive them out of breath, and so tame them at their pleasure: they usually Phaëton like, set all on fire; and if they escape the popular fury by running away in the smoak, meet with his fate, to be struck wit the Thunderbolt of their Soveraigns justice. Innumerable are the examples for the confirmation of this; but we will confine our selves to our own Country; and content ourselves with two only. When Philip the fourth had beat the Flemmings, united Flanders to France, and set Governours over them; who erected Citadels in their several Towns, Garrisoned their Citics to keep them in aw, Serres in Phil. 4. and arbitrarily charged them with great con­tributions; the people that were used to Freedom, would not be brought into this yoke of bondage; but desperately revolt, massacre the French, and involve all in confusion and misery. Nor is this all; for, (though the baser sort begin, yet great men usually end such quarrels) a War fol­lowed, which cost both France and Flanders dear, in the vast expence both of blood and treasure. And when Duke d' Alva attempted the like upon our Ancestors in these Provinces, who were a free people and not used to [Page]such severity; how did the sparks of mutiny in the beginning break out into great flames at last, which set the whole Country on fire? No pen is able to express the miseries of those Times; nor Tragedy represent the things that were perpetrated. How were most mens hearts filled with fear, many with horror, and some with despair; to see their Country be­come an Aceldama; and so many thousands forced through a Red Sea of blood, to find their passage to the Land of Canaan! I conclude therefore, that if they who enjoyed less liberty than we, could so little endure Servi­tude; we shall be much less able to endure it, who have enjoyed far more freedom then they. So that we may easily foresee, without any Prophetick Spirit, what a flood of calamities is likely to break in upon us; when ever any shall break down the banks of our liberty.

Sect. 6. The third Argument which preponderates for England, is the preservation of our Estates: in regard of Souldiers vio­lence, Governors Impositions, Publick Debts by Obligation, and Revenues of the Romish Church.

WE proceed now to shew, that its better to be under England in re­gard of our Estates. Both in respect of getting them, (as I shall shew in the following Section) and the keeping those we have gotten al­ready, or by the blessing of God may get hereafter. And to this I give the precedency, because the enjoyment of Riches is the end for which, and Trade only the means by which, we labour to obtain them. Now if it can be made apparent, that we can neither get, nor keep such Estates under France, as we can under England: there are none so regardless herein (what­ever they are of Religion and Liberty) but will easily grant the truth of our Conclusion.

1. Then let us consider that except we can keep that which is our own we are never the better for it, but a great deal the worse. Had we a grant of Midas's wish, that all we touched should be turned into gold; or were we insured that all our adventures, should bring us returns as rich as the East India Companies; what should it profit us, if we could notkeep them? Nay, were we not a great deal worse than without them? What toil and anxiety is there in getting! What fears and troubles are there in keeping! and what sorrow and vexation in the parting with riches! Not that I think any civil Authority, will ever take away our Estates, except we forfeit them through misdemeanors; but when the Sword brings such a Commission, I would gladly know who dare deny it? And whether the poor man then, that hath all his money in his purse-pocket; be not both fafer in his person, and more secure of his Estate; than the rich Merchant, whose bags and warehouses are filled with his wealth? Craesus was rich even to a Proverb, yet shewing to Solon all his Treasures, Solon told him, that if any came with better iron than he wore, they would be master of all that Gold. [Page]Now in regard of plundring, depedrations, and all manner of violence by Souldiers both to our persons and estates; I think we are far more secure from the English, than French. And for this, I shall appeal to the Common experience of all ages and places where their Armies have come; which bear witness, to the great exorbitances of the latter, more than the other; in the violation both of womens chastity and mens estates, and frequent desolations by fire and sword. Yea I will make their own Historian Co­mines judge of the controversie, who having shown, how unjustly great ones govern, and the innocent people are opprest, Lib. 5.6.18. both by them and the Souldiers, whose flagitious lives, petulant carriage, and violent rapines are intollerable; professes that he mentions these things for France's sake, which of all the Principalities he had known, was most afflicted with them. Whereas on the contrary, he says England excel'd them all, in these three particulars; respect to the common good, the peoples freedom from in­jury, and the little spoil their Souldiers and Armies made in their Wars; the last whereof he repeats, and enlarges a little after in the same Chapter.

2. But we will suppose the best in all uncertainties, and therefore hope we shall escape all plundering, and violence from the Souldiers in a time of confusion; and make no doubt thereof, in a setled condition. But yet we know we shall not escape paying such Taxes, as indeed justly deter us, both in regard of their greatness, and also the arbitrarines of their Imposition. In both which we know no people in Europe more miserable than France, nor none happier in the contrary, than the Subjects of the Crown of England. Which partly occasioned that known saying of the Emperour Maximilian the first, that he was Rex regum, the King of Spain Rex ho­minum, the King of France Rex asinorum, and the King of England Rex diabolorum. For he could have nothing but what the Germain Princess consented to, Spain only what the Laws allowed him; France all that he pleased; and England nothing that pleased not the people.

As touching their greatness. 1. I willingly grant that Subjects must afford their Soveraigns assistance; and in times of extremity, and utmost dan­gers, it is hard to determine, how far their power may not lawfully be ex­tended. Secondly, I know that the grandeur of the French Court is great, Politiicke Weegscha­al. l. 3. c. 3.4. & 5. which is lately shown us in our own Language. That their Armies are often numerous; and some always necessary, both for defence of the Govern­ment from their domestick enemies, and of the Frontiers from foreign, in the adjacent Countries. And that these require vast sums to support them. Yet notwithstanding, thirdly, Moderation ought to be used, so that the com­mon people may enjoy the fruit of their labours. But to shew how far the Government of France hath been from this, would be an endless work. We should but tire our selves to read, what their own Historians have rela­ted; and be weary with the rehearsal, of the many tumults and rebellions that have arisen from their gabels. It would fill any one with sorrow to hear of the great complaints and out cries, that the people have made in former [Page]Ages; and fright us to hear those of the present: which yet their Gover­nors are so used to, that they count them but the old fa fa of France, and oppression the sin of the old World. What remorse of Conscience several of their Kings have had for their extortion, is well known to those that have read their Histories. Some in their life time as Charles the eighth; some at their death as Philip the fourth, who remitted the Taxes he had un­justly required, and commanded his Sons to ease the people. But above all Lewis the eleventh, who resolved to reform, but it was too late; and therefore charged the Dauphin against that oppression he had practised. And indeed it was highly necessary; for he had reduced the common peo­ple to such poverty, that many of the Farmers were forced, with halters a­bout their necks to draw their own Plows; except they would steal, and once for all, stretch both themselves and ropes on the Gallows. But I should not once mention any of these things, if I thought it not better for us, both to know and believe them before hand, than experience them af­terwards to our cost. For I fear if we come once under the French, there will be no end of paying contributions; until we be brought into the con­dition of the Andrians of old, Plut. in vi­ta Themi­stocl. ex Herodoto. who when Themistocles demanded money telling them he had brought two Goddesses to require it, perswasion & pow­er; answered that they had two great Goddesses also who taught them to deny it, which were poverty and impossibility. And then the Hollanders may do that living, Procopius decad. 6. lib. 6. which Saladinus the Emperor of Asia did dying; shew their winding sheets and say, These are all the rich Hollanders have left.

But should we part with some of our Estates, though it were a good share; so we were sure to enjoy the rest, it was less matter: but when we are always obnoxious to an arbitrary power, still to be squeased like Spunges at the pleasure of others; we can scarce call any thing our own, and are rather procuratores than Domini divitiarum. I know well, that some of the French Kings, Sueton. in vita Tib. Bussieres Hist. Franc. L. 15. have like good Shepherds, fleeced not flead their flocks, (accord­ing to Tiberius his saying, Boni pastoris est pecus tondere, non deglubere) espe­cially Lewis the twelfth: who therefore (as the Jesuite well observes) had no rebellion in all his raign, which is a rare blessing (as he says) and ex­traordinary in that Realm. And the great wisdom and generosity of his present Majesty, puts me out of all doubt of his elemency; but a good, a great, a wise Solomon may have a Reboboam to his son and successor, whose little singer may be heavier than his Fathers loyns. By which example in Sa­cred History, we are shown, that what ever Prince will force his Subjects to open their purses to his pleasure, shall quickly find their hearts shut; and though for the present they may supplicate, and outwardly seem to adore him (as the Indians their dieties ne noceant) yet they hate him worse than the Devil himself; and upon the first occasion tumultuously cry, every man to your Tents; whence open divisions, lawless rapines, bloody wars, and all the miserable effects that follow them, break in upon a Nation beyond con­troll. But let us be frank in conceding (as it becomes us when we speak [Page]of Kings) that there shall never arise a Rehoboam out of Lewis's race; yea that this is as impossible, as for a Vulture to rise out of the Phoenix ashes: yet we know the best of Kings may have bad Governors under them; and that they must often, both see with other eys, and hear with other ears than their own. Yea let us suppose, that we shall never pay more Tribute to the fair Lillies of France, than we have done to the Belgick Lion; except that of respect, which we acknowledge his due: yet there still remains a vast difference, betwixt a legal and a permissive exemption, and of the same payments made by publick consent, and those that are commanded by abso­lute power; though not in regard of the money, yet in regard both of the authority that requires it, which if absolute and arbitrary is alterable, al­though it should not be altered; and the different impressions which they make, and effects that follow in the minds and affections of men. For when a people know the necessities of State, and freely vote their own Contributions, they account themselves free and uninjured though the Taxations be never so great, (according to the rule, that volenti non fit in­juria:) and look upon them as a gift rather than a debt, and therefore pay them willingly, and generously bear their parting with their share, Whereas on the contrary, when they are ignorant of the grounds of such impositions, they are always jealous, that they are not so great as is pre­tended; and when they have no suffrage therein, look upon themselves as wronged and oppressed; and though they pay them, yet it is with re­luctancy; and because they must and cannot withstand it, their minds are dejected, and their spirit and courage strangely deprest, as I could shew by many examples. The difference of these two authorities, and their va­rious and different effects, is well observed by two Noble Lords, Bacon of Verulam, and Comines of Argenton; both of them famous for their wisdom, one in the Theory and the other in the Practice thereof; so that if the for­mer had had the latters Prudence, and the latter the formers Learning, no Age could have paralel'd them. That of publick consent the Learned Bacon observes, doth not so dispirit a people and diminish their Martial courage, and instances in these very Provinces, Essay (or Sermofide­lis) 29. shewing how cheerfully they have born the grean burthen of Excise, because it came from themselves and their own authority. And that of arbitrary power, is shewn of France, by that great States-man Comines Counsellor to Lewis the eleventh; whose History is so much esteemed by the French, Hist. Franc. l. 13. (as Bussieres the Jesuite tells us) that they neither envy the Greeks their Thueydides, nor the Romans their Livy or Tacitus. Wherein he so frequently inveys against these imposi­tions, and complains of the peoples miseries thereby; so freely expostu­lates with the Kings and Governors, and is so honest an Advocate for their Subjects; that I wish all Princes, would make this excellent Historian, as familiar to them, as did Charles the fifth, that great and wise Emperour. Et Bodin de rep. l. 6. c. 2. In the 18. Chapter l. 5. He saith, that neither the King of France, nor any o­ther, hath power to exact of their Subjects without their own consent; [Page]except they will tyrannically use their power contrary to all right both di­vine and humane. And chapter the seventh l. 6. that Charles the seventh, who in the English wars had introduced, this imperious way of taxing the people, without the consent of the States; had burdened both his own Conscience, and the successive Kings with great guilt, and most cruelly wounded the Kingdom, of which it was like a long time to bleed. Nor doth he only thus declame against the unlawfulness thereof, but also shews how ungrateful it is to the people, as well as injurious. And on the con­trary how readily and unanimously without tumult or contradiction even in the Kingdoms greatest poverty, the States consented and people paid to Charles the eighth. But if Princes will forget, the good advise this Hi­storian there gives them; yet I wish they would remember at least old Py­thagoras's Symbol, Sudorem ferro abstergere, tetrum facinus. Which Plutarch (as a learned man tells us) expounds, That none should take away that with the sword Gyrald. Symb. Pythagar. which others have earned with the sweat of their brows. If they will only use their own absolute power, yet let it be so attempered with equity and moderation; that the cries of the poor, and the curses of the people, may never bring Gods vengeance upon them. But if we should speak the sense of our Souls, we must needs (alas!) say, that moderation is so rare a jewel in the Crown of absolute Monarchs; and the Governors under them so used to hunt, and hawk at all game to enrich themselves: that though we may all hope to escape, yet we have more reason to fear: that if the fate of the other Provinces befal us, we shall all (as the beasts) said in the fable) meet at last at the Furriers shop. If any can flatter them­selves with fancies, that our Common-wealth shall under France, become like Plato's Republick, wherein violence and oppression shall not be known; and that their Governors will be like those in Ʋtopia, Fathers to our fortunes as much as their own: I must confess that I am not so Mercurially made; and do no more expect to see the world so happy, than to see the great Platonick year. But on the contrary, that great Impositions will be added, to the great Excise that is upon us already; whereby the number of the Poor will certainly increase, and the provisions for them daily decrease. Yea it is well, if the maintaining of the land against the water, be not negle­cted; and so our Eden be laid waste: and that our rich and pompous Cities, return not in time to their old condition, of poor and despicable Fishers Villages. However, seeing the blessing of Judah and Issachar, can never befal the same people, as Bacon observes in the forementioned place, if we and our Estates shall come under arbitrary power; then let us deface the Lion Rampant, that was the Arms of generous Judah, which our Ancestors and we have hitherto born: and set up luggish Issachar's of an Ass couchant between two burdens, that is to say the Popes trumperies, & France's tribute.

3. There is another consideration, which is of great importance to the Inhabitants of these Countries and that is concerning their Debts. For mentioning Estates, we mean not only that in our own, but also that in [Page]other mens hands. As for Private debts, we know they must needs be very many and great in places of such Merchandise; seeing the greatest part of trade is all over, and here especially, driven upon credit. Now how these will be gotten, if bad time come on, so that many remove, and more be impoverished; I leave those to consider, whose concernment it is. Con­cerning Publick debts, (which are yet more desperate, whatever change happens) they are such as are contracted, either for Service to the Com­mon-wealth, and Commodities delivered for publick uses; or for Monies up­on obligation; all which ways many thousands are greatly concerned, especially the last. There being very many, who have lent, some a good part, and others the greatest part of their Estates, upon the publick faith of the Land, Cities and Lombards of these Provinces. So that if this publick faith prove faithless like the Punick of old, a great number of Families, and (which is most deplorable) Widows and Orphans, (who being uncapable to imploy their Estates thus intrusted them) will be wholly ruined and un­done. Herein I think all that have any sense of justice and equity, will conclude with me.

1. That it is very unreasonable and unjust, that if the present Govern­ment cannot discharge these debts, or a change happens; that those who have credited the Republick, should sit down with all the loss, and others not bear their proportion.

2. That seeing they were lent to the Publick, and Obligation accordingly given; and that for publick uses, and so im­ployed, (or if other-ways converted, yet without the Creditors fault:) it is all the reason in the world, that the Publick should faithfully pay the same.

3. That if the Republick stand, care ought to be taken to satistic these Creditors: and that if a change of Government happen, the people remaining the same, are both in Law and equity liable to pay these debts. For though it is a great question how far Subjects are obliged to pay their Soveraigns; yet it was never questioned by any, but that such as are made for the Publick by the peoples tacit, and much more express consent; must be paid by the people, what ever change be made in the Government. Whether from a Monarchy to a Republick, Demosthen adv. Lep­tin. V. Disqui­sit. politic. 53. as the Com­munality of Athens paid the 100 Talents which their 30 Tyrants had bor­rowed of the Lacedemonians; and these very Provinces, that which the King of Spain was indebted to the people: Or from a Republick to a Mo­narchy; Non desinit debere pecuniam populus rege sibi imposito, quam liber debebat; est enim idem populus, & dominium retinet eorum quae populi fuerant; imò & imperium inse retinet, quanquam jam non exercendum à corpore sed à capite, &c. Grotius de jure belli & pacis, l. 2. c. 9. Sect. 8. See also Arnisaeus de rep. lib. 1. c. 5. Sect. 4. Quatenus acta Reip. obligent civitatem, and the Civilians de rebus creditis, Digest. lib. 11. tit. 1. l. 27.

All the difficulty therefore will be if a change come, how the payment of these just debts may be procured. And here we need no other Counsellors advice, than our own reason, which will inform us, that the freer any people are [Page]and the more they participate of power; the more probable it is, and also the more facile for them to obtain their rights. Now that we are likely to have more freedom under England than France, I have shewn sufficiently in the former Section. Yea common experience as well as reason hath learnt the world this lesson; that when inferiors can only pray and peti­tion, they may daily get fair promises, and perhaps be sprinkled with some Court-holy-water; but performances and payments are still the work of to morrow, and continually kept as reserves in the rear. Nor can they biing more arguments for their expedition, than Superiors have excuses for their delaying: and if at last their patience be worn as thread-bare, as their clothes with attendance; so that they become importune in request­ing; then Grandees grow deaf in hearing, and resolvedly peremptory in denying: whence both sides frequently fall to irregular proceedings; the one for recovering, and the other for defrauding them of their rights. Whereas those that can, not only request, but also legally require, that justice be done; have ground to hope, that when the touchines of times is over, and the boisterous passions of great ones are laid; some happy con­juncture of affairs may prove a prosperous gale to bring them at last, their hazardous adventures home in safety.

4. and lastly, (that I may draw this arrow to the head) I shall desire that we may consider a little of the Lands and Revenues, formerly belong­ing to the Romish Church. Which to defend our selves in our Wars with Spain, were sold to several, and are since parcelled out into many more hands. Now the very mentioning of this I should think sufficient; the difference between France and England herein, being so well known. Do we hear what the former hath already done, in all those places subject to him, and how they have set up all the Romish rable; and can we think that they will not in time recover (what ever promises they pass for the present) that which not only they themselves, but all of their Religion account their right? Can we imagine that their Bishops, Abbots, Priors, and other Superior Orders, will live like Parochials or Mendicant Friers? Who is so ignorant as knows not, that where ever the old Gentleman of Rome comes to rule, he brings with him many attendants to bear up his train; and that their pomp must be supported, though many Gentlemen thereby be ruined? Whereas on the contrary, England is by them, in the same condemnation with our selves; neither permitting his headship and dominion over them, nor his members and followers any demains among them. So that we may safely conclude, that all those that posses such Estates, as the Church of Rome doth challenge; can neither rationally hope to keep them under France, nor fear to lose them under England.

Sect. 7. The fourth Argument from Trade. This ( viz. Merchan­dise and Navigation) our chief secular interest: and friendship with England to secure the same. England and we Corrivals herein, the probability of getting more, as also enjoying the same with greater Peace under France, with other Arguments: largely debated, and the contrary evinced under England.

WE are now come to the Acropolis of the cause; Trade being the great Tower of strength, to which the Adversaries of our opinion, having deserted the former out-works, usually sly unto our refuge. We shall there­fore persue them; but orderly, first making our approaches by degrees; and them raising such batteries, and planting such reasons, as are forcible, either to beat this down, or at least make such breaches therein, as shall render it untenable for their defence; and so compel the most pertinacious of our enemies, either to submit, or to fall before us.

But before we begin this work, we must acquaint you, that when we mention Trade, we mean not every particular kind of negotiation, where­in the several sorts of Artificers and Shop-keepers are imployed; to speak of which would be both an endless, an a bootless work. Herein perhaps some might fare better with the French, the Mercers and Tailers especially; for the à la mode Monsieurs when they have money, affect to change their fashion as often as the Moon doth her face; and to wear as many ribbands on their breeches, as ordinary Pedlers bear on their backs; as if all the fortunes of France hung at their ends, and all their own happiness followed their heels. And happily Butchers and Cooks would fare better with the English, for a piece of good Beef or a Shoulder of Mutton. And we might in­stance in many others with merriment; but we have no mind to be plea­sant upon so serious a Subject. In short therefore, we mean Maritime Trade (as our Adversaries do) this being the great Diana of the Nether­lands, which brings them in their Silver Shrines.

1. Then we shall lay down this as a fundamental and undoubted Maxim, (which all I think will take for granted) that trade by Sea is the great secular interest of these Provinces, the Maritime especially, by which they most flourish, and without which they cannot subsist. Let Amsterdam and the other Cities be as rich, or richer then they are imagined; yet will they in a few years, if their Trade be obstructed, become as poor as their Neighbours at Gant, or Antwerp. For who will build at such excessive charges (where the foun­dation sometimes is half to the superstructure) or pay such rents for their habitation, and live in such expensive places, if there be not freedom of Trade? But those that can, will remove; some hither and some thither, as their interest and affection shall incline them; Essay (or Sermo fi­delis) 19. rather then spend their Ca­pitalls here. If ever Merchants were, or are in any place of the world, the vena porta (as Bacon stiles them) of any publick body, it is certainly the [Page] Belgick. If they fraight not their Ships, whereby the Marriners may be imployed; if they furnish not the Tradesmen shops, whereby they may follow their Vocations; if they lade not the poor mens backs, whereby their Families may fill their bellies; finally, if they distribute not their Merchandise through the various Seas and Rivers of the Ʋniverse: we may linger a while, but it is as impossible we should live long, as for a body de­prived of food, whose parts languish for want of nourishment, which should be brought them in the veins, by the bloods regular circulation.

2. Merchandise being our chief concernment, it will necessarily follow that that Nation that can most obstruct the same, can do us most injury. Now that England can do this more than France, or any other whatsoever, I think none will deny; if any do, there is enough said hereafter, that will make it sufficiently apparent.

3. Of all our neighbouring Nations, England being most potent by Sea, and France by Land, it will clearly follow, that a Peace with these two above all others, is our great concernment, With the former for getting, and with the latter for keeping and enjoying our Estates. But if we cannot have this from them both, which of them is to be preferred comes next in consideration.

4. This Common-wealth consisting of Maritime and Inland Provinces, the former being by far the most considerable, the friendship of England is more to be valued than that of France. And this the wisest men that this Re­publick ever had, formerly never doubted. of Prince William the First founder of this Common-wealth, laid down these three principal maximes of State, which were approved by all, as sound and rational beyond contra­diction.

• 1. To do justice to Strangers. For great Nations may be upheld by Power, but small Territories must be maintained by Justice.
• 2. To hold a fair correspondence with France. For Spain being then the grand Monarchy of Europe, and our dreadful enemy; the assistance of France was greatly ne­cessary for our supportation.
• 3. To preserve an inviolable Peace with England, In regard that this is absolutely requisite for our freedom of Commerceby Sea; and the English were our friends in affection as well as Interest, whereas the French only upon the latter account. For the greatest obstacle that stood in the way of France's greatness, was the Spanish power in these Ne­therlands; which being once broke down, they well knew they could dilate their Empire at their pleasure, as we see it now to our sorrow. It is true of later times, the Lovesteiners to free themselves, from the Headship of the Orange family; which sought (as they imagined) either an absoluteness, or at least to infringe the liberty of the Common-wealth, have been rather inclined to France and England: but they were not so blinded with passion, but that having a Peace with Spain, and being sensible of France's prevalen­cy, and raising their Fortunes upon the Spanish ruines, it was their Interest to comply with England rather than France. Which plainly appears, in that no sooner was those unhappy differences between us and England [Page]composed at Breda, but immediately the Tripple Alliance was designed and concluded upon by that great States-man de Witt the Head of their party, and Sr. William Temple, on purpose to put boundaries to the boundless am­bition of the French Nation.

5. To the reason of State already mentioned, together with the judg­ment of our greatest Politicians both in former and later times, let me add; that Terrestrial war hath always been accounted more eligible than a Na­val; yea by some our absolute interest, as the Duke of Rhoan observes. In so much that Zeeland never to this day consented unto, l' Intrest des Prine. & Est. dis­cour. 6. but absolutely protest­ed against, these Provinces making Peace with Spain. And here it is ob­servable, how our Adversaries prevaricate; in granting this Assertion, and yet preferring France. I foresee their evasion, of conceding a Land-war with a lesser Potentate, & denying it with France. But this is both easily obviated and outed; for as I am well assured, that if England had not assaulted us by Sea, France had never done it by Land; so I have reason to believe, that if he had, we should have found him sufficient work. If we had the Sea free for our inferior Provinces, the charges of a Land-war for the superior were easily borne. And we should not want men enow for our money, to fight for them with France, or any other whatsoever, so long as we should think them worth the fighting for. Nor let any wonder that I insert such a con­ditional; for I shall afterwards make it appear, how the Common-wealth may be well secured, though these Provinces should be let go or lost. And as for the inferior, they are so situated in the water, and thereby so inacces­sible; that we need not fear, what all the force of France can do, if we be re­solved to defend them. It being therefore apparent that Traffick is our principal concernment, and England of all others most able to obstruct it; we may conclude in point of interest, as Prince Maurice (I have heard) used to say, that were the English Devils, we must have peace with them.

These being the Approaches, (which I think) no sallies of our Adversa­ries can prevent; we shall now, being got nearer them, take a better view of their strength. Were we free and had our choice, whether we should war with France or England, you see our interest should carry us against France. But the case (alas!) is far otherwise with us, for they both make war upon us: by what error of policy one of them, which could best, was not taken off and diverted, if it had been possible, or whether it was im­possible, and so no error or omission in us, is not now our enquiry. But see­ing they both threaten us with destruction, upon supposition that we are unable any longer to resist them both, whether of them we should choose to be under in regard of our Trade.

This then being the Question; our Adversaries give their suffrage for France; and think themselves impregnable in this point of interest. Let us therefore impartially represent the strength of their reasons, and weigh them duly in the true ballance of interest, and then we shall find them you shall see, not only many grains but ounces too light.

1. It is better for us, say they, to be under France, because England and and we are Competitors for Trade.

It is very true, England and these Countries by their situation, genious, and interest are set for Trade: and this naturally begets an enmity between us, and a vying with one another for the same. But this was always, and will be so whilst men are men: and what will follow hence? Surely one of these things, either that we must willingly yield to them, or they to us, which is madness to imagine; or that we must fight with them for the whole, which if they mean of our selves, is the next degree to dotage, seeing we are about matches, and Peace in their trade is always the interest of a trading people; if they mean jointly with France, we shall speak to that in the following Argument, and shew what a hazard even that will be, and much more singly: or that we must compound with them for our share, that so each Nation may have, what Gods blessing may give, and their own industry may procure them. And this in my opinion will have the vote, not only of all the Cowards, but all the wise men of both Nations. But because this Argument is much insisted on, both in former times and this juncture of affairs; we will more particularly consider the same, in reference to this Common-wealth as to England absolutely without respect to France. And thereby we shall see what corrivals in Trade implies in point of Interest, whether the power be about equal, (as we shall here sup­pose England and this Common-wealths) or unequal, and in point of infe­rence. Now in regard of Interest, we shall find in my judgment, that 'tis clearly this for us as equal in power.

1. That we must vigorously defend our Trade, as that on which our temporal welfare depends.

2. That we must for this purpose, maintain a naval power, equal at least to theirs. That so we may hold them up, to the just and due terms, and bounds, of Commerce and Navigation.

3. That for this end the league of the Maritime Provinces be kept in­violable. If the band of the bunch of arrows be either cut or broken, so that they fall out of the Lions paw; he will soon have his skin pull'd over his ears. So that to make several Common-wealths of them, is but to make them so many morsels to be the easilier devoured by their enemies. And therefore I wonder at the Author of the Interest of Holland herein, who, c. 41.42. &c. asserts the power of that Province sufficient by Sea, and jointly with Ʋtrecht by Land, to wage War with all other Potentates. Seeing these Maritime Provinces entirely considered, are but the match at Sea for England. And the reasons that he gives, c. 37. are now refuted by experience. I acknowledge it also an error in policy, for Zeeland to break this bond of Amity, if possibly they can help it. But if their Enemies sword cuts this asunder, what shall they do? And this is the case only that I defend.

4. That we should rather yield to them in Punctillioes of honour; that [Page]being a Crown, this only a Common-wealth. Such I mean as the Flag; although I reckon not that any dishonour to us, seeing they have not only always challenged it, but our Ancestors also given it: and other Nations as well as we, pay the same acknowledgment to that Crown. The first time that we have ever refused it, was in the time of King James; the circumstances whereof Sr. Anthony Welden in his Court relates, and the effects both their and our Historians. It is not my design to speak of this particular, which would swell to a discourse larger then this whole Trea­tise; but only instance therein, as a known example; concluding that if they will War for it, it is our wisdom to yield it, and except we were far stronger than they, folly to fight for it.

5. Rather to dissemble lesser injuries than seek to revenge them. Which holds in all equalities of power whatsoever.

6. But if they will unjustly incroach upon us to ruine our Commerce, then to War with them. For

• 1. Our traffick being our subsistence, who ever would spoil us thereof, necessitates us to defend it, and gives us a just cause of contest,
• 2. We being a match for them in power, may in point of wisdom as well as justice, try it out with them, and leave the issue to Gods Providence; Wars being the last appeal to Heaven, when justice cannot be had on earth.
• 3. If success attends our Armies, we secure our selves at least, if we better not our condition; and if the contrary, we do but drown and die a little the sooner. A destructive peace and unsuc­cessful War are both fatal in the issue; the former being a Chronical, the later an acute disease of State. It is not so material, whether by a lingring Consumption of Peace, or by the Hectick Fevor of War, the gray hairs of Government, be brought with sorrow to the grave.

7. Yet if we can enjoy the freedom of Commerce, and fruit of our labours, upon reasonable terms; it is better to sit down contented with our share, then to War for the whole. For

• 1. What wise man ever doubted, but that Peace is the interest of a rich and trading People; if it can be had upon tollerable conditions.
• 2. Is not a competent certainty prefer­able to a greater good that is wholly hazardous and uncertain? for how often doth that happen to men, which did to the greedy and covetous dog in the Fable; who let go that he had, to catch at the shadow thereof in the water, and so lost all!

I know some that have more of Mars than Mercurie's temper, are all for fighting, and therefore I shall desire them calmly to consider, these few particulars following.

• 1. What either we or England have gotten by our former Wars, when matcht in power. I partly know what it hath cost us both, in treasure and blood: and can demonstrate that if either hath gotten, 'tis England, though not to countervail the cost. Let's but reckon (as we must if we go rightly to work) the lucrum cessens, and damnum emergens, or the profit that ceases, and loss that accrues, and vvhat vve have got, vve may put in our eye, and not see much the vvorse, [Page]

  But if any one say who can reckon that, or how?

  I shall freely acknowledge that to pounds and persons we cannot, nor no man alive; yet in the general we may, so far as to make a judgment. I have done it for my own satisfaction, and shall tell you how; that so those that are curious may satisfy themselves therein, and not take it upon my credit. By the publick Customs; the Number of ships, the Capital where­with Trade is driven; and by the riches of the Merchants. Of these, the two former are more easie and certain, wherein England hath increased: the two latter more conjectural, wherein this Republick hath the superiori­ty. But hath not gotten it by the wars, but arises from several other causes, (which I could mention) and especially from these two following, which I think will satisfy any intelligent man. As to the Capital, ours comes to be greater, in regard that as the Merchants grow rich in England, they buy land, and breed up their sons to be Country gentlemen; whereas we, especi­ally in Holland, continue the stock and our children in the Trade. Land being here at 35 and 40 years purchase, and in England at 15 or 20 ordi­narily. And that the Merchants here should be richer than there, is no wonder to me; who know so well the frugality of the one, and the pro­digality of the other.

• 2. Let it be considered how difficult and hazardous it is for equal powers, to destroy one another; and therefore how litle likelihood there is, of any thing to be gotten by contesting. Nay there are several circumstances in our situations, imployments, and people, that render absolute conquest almost impossible. We may like Cooks fight, and breath, and fight again, and crow over one another for some victories, but far from a conquest. And this we might both have seen long since in the glas of policy: which clearly shows, that such equal powers fighting for profit, is but like Nero's fishing with a golden hook, wherein more is adventured, than ever is like­ly to be gotten. We have had a Comick-tragedy, and a tragick comedy of two wars, and England the contrary; wherein our enemies indeed have been pleasant spectators, and satisfied their envious eyes, but what have either of us got, but blowes? Passion and prejudice are so prevalent in the World, and so blind the eyes of men, that often they will not see the truth, till dear-bought experience makes them even to feel it. And this we now both see, and therefore England takes this opportunity of breaking down the equality of power, and bringing us lower, that so we may truckle un­der them, and they be at rest in the bed of security.
• 3. Those that are so much for Mars, might do well to consider, the advantages and disadvantages of both Nations, for carrying on, and sub­sisting under long wars. In some things we may happily have the advantage, as in bearing the charges, number of shipping, Caping by Letters of Marque &c. And in others England, for they have a great and rich Inland Country,
  l'Intrestdes Princes. Discours 7.
  an Hand that cannot be easily diverted by a Land-war, so that as the Duke of Rhoan saith right, l' Angleterre est un grand animal, qui ne peut [Page]jamais mourir, s'il ne se tuë luimesme. We subsist wholly on Trade, and fetch all things from abroad, they have sufficiency of necessaries from their own growth at home. When Trade stands still, they have cloths for the back, and meat for the belly, better cheap for the poorer people: here not only such accommodations are far dearer than there, which can well be born when Trade flourisheth; but when that is stopt, and it can worst be endured, then are they dearest of all. Our Seamen which come most from the Nor­thern quarters about the Baltick Sea, to serve us in Navigation; when they see no hopes of gain, but only venturing their lives for the pay of the Wars, will remove and serve other Nations: whereas the King of England hath three Kingdoms to press out for his assistance, according to the custom of the Crown there, which is not practised nor indeed practicable in this Free State. And although at the first such as are prest be averse to the Wars; yet we find and feel by experience, that what through the Officers and Gentlemens caressing and encouraging them, what through company and conversing with others before-hand, this restiness is worn off by degrees; and through the principles of self defence, and some sparks of the honour of their Country, they fight well enough, whatever the cause or the quar­rel be.
• 4. I wish both Nations would well consider, whether whilst we two are so eagerly contesting for Trade, others may not carry it away. I have rea­sonably considered what Nation can bid the farest for this, in regard of their Situation, Havens, Genious, &c. the ad vantages of the Mediterranean and Baltick Seas, and let my thoughts stretch themselves as far as both the Indies: have observed the French Fleet, the darling of the King and King­dom, their hopes with the grounds of them, and the probable success there­of, as also the communication of Spain with America; and find no one Na­tion alone capacitated to carry away our Commerce; but several to have greater shares than they have at present. Yea, to speak my mind freely, I have had far further contemplations, and of a far different kind from these upon this Subject, in respect to future times. And indeed such as have often made me both very sorrowful to see the Christian world so mad and quarelsom about their Commerce, and very fearful that God would either blast it to us, by taking it away and giving it to Turks and Heathens; or not bless us with it, giving us herein our hearts desire in his wrath, and them the Gospel in exchange thereof. As I clearly see he hath done to the Jews, the generallest and greatest Merchants of the World: and as I think he threatens us Christians in several places of holy Scripture, if they be du­ly considered. But because I love not dogmatizing, or to be positive in things I am not so fully satisfied in; I shall at present say no more of this, but leave it to every good Christians consideration.

Having thus declared what corivalship implies as to equal powers, we shall now see it in unequal. And here Interest shews us,

That if we decline and become inferior in strength, if they were so inju­rious [Page]to us, that we had a just cause of War, yet must we not adventure it at fighting, but use policy to procure a Peace. And in my opinion this Piety and Wisdom is taught us by our Saviour Christ in the Gospel; for where Soldiers are alike, and no advantage of ground, &c. what is it but tempting of God & mere folly, Luc. 14.31. for ten thousand to encounter twenty thousand? Yea though the disparity was not so great; Wars being always hazardous to the weaker side, though they often be victorious: it being frequently sound (as Pyrrhus said of his warring with the Romans) that their very Victories do undo them. In such cases, old mens heads are better helps than young mens hands. To shew the refuges of weaker powers when threat­ned with Wars, would be a large discourse. I shall therefore only hint some few generals, of many which I have observed.

• 1. To gain all time possible.
• 2. Therein to break down the strongers designs, and weaken them at home as much as may be.
• 3. To raise them up enemies abroad by making them jealous of their power.
• 4. By alliance with others to bal­lance their might.
• 5. To prepare for a divertive rather than a direct War.
• 6. By proposal of Marriages, &c. to make up the breach.
• 7. By procu­ring foreign Potentates mediation, and appealing to their Arbitration.
• 8. To make the best Peace they can, when best provided with power for War. For otherwise nothing is to be expected, but either an unsafe or a short Peace, little better than a Truce or Holy-day of War.

Now all these have many particulars conteined in them. For example in the first to gain time, by sending Embassadors, and so still that as one is returning another may be sent: whereby a fair pretence of ignorance of transactions may be pleaded, and time spun out in further debates. By con­ceding one thing after another by degrees, still reserving the principal point of Interest entire, &c. And so of the rest within the bounds of honest Policy. The reason of the case is so clear, that were it not for mens pas­sions, inferiors in power would not be so ready to fight. For let them either be beaten or beat, it will redound at last to their own destruction. If the former, why should they spend their blood and treasure to make themselves more miserable? and if the latter, they do but enrage their enemies the more, who being more powerful will not for two or three Bat­tells end the War, and come to a Peace to their great dishonour. So that we may lay down this as a general rule for the weaker side, That self defence must be first for preparation, but last for execution. Of all the Princes of Europe in our age, the Duke of Lorraign hath been the cunningest game­ster, but the foulest player with stronger powers. But oh, how is he catch­ed in his own craftiness! Although I confess I could not see him and his Court (as I have done since his disaster) without great commiseration; to think that one of the ancientest Families and greatliest allyed of all Europe, should fall into that condition. Of the former age the Verinians, who [Page]being opprest by their Neighbours the Venetians, that were more power­full, would notwithstanding needs War with them; wherein though they were often victorious, yet it proved their ruine at last, for which they are stigmatized for Fools to all succeeding Generations. And many other examples might be produced, but I think them needless in so plain a case.

And thus you see what our being competitors for Trade implies as to In­terest in regard of War and Peace. Which I have been the larger upon, because I know what work fools make wise men in both Nations. I have many times been put to it for patience, and sometimes into a Paroxism of passion, to hear the sensless clamors of men. We are Competitors for Trade! It is our Interest! Our Interest! Down with the Dutch! Down with the English! Let us but consider who these are, and we shall find them. Men that have a pound of passion, for one ounce of reason. Men that never saw, or at lest not well observed both Nations. Men that ne­ver bestowed one calm hour to ballance their powers. For wise men that knew both well, was but grieved to hear, or pleasantly merry with such madness. I publickly decryed such folly in the first Wars, and had severely chastised such fools in the second, if I had not been several ways hindred. Let me say it freely (I think I have some reason, for I believe there are few men that have better viewed both Nations with their eye, to that end which I have had, nor ballanced their power with greater accuracy) that if either the King of Great Britain, or the States, or both require it: I am ready to demonstrate, that for these 20 or 30 years last past, there was no­thing of advantage rationally to be expected on either side, that can coun­tervail a War: nor as both might manage their power, likely to be, so long as both continued in that condition, for in powers about equal, all the difference is in the management thereof. And because I see what work is made in the world, if I live to see the ballance come so even again, (though I think I never shall) I do here engage, for the publick peace of Protestants, and good of both Nations, to satisfie all rational men herein, I hope even to curiosity. And shall, if God spares me life and health, defend the same, against all the State-tinkers of both Nations; although I well know, they have great store of small Tools, with which they make a ratling in their Budgets.

Let us now proceed to such inferences as our Adversaries make from this competition in Trade.

Some argue thus, the English minding Trade more than the French, they may come and live among us and carry away our Commerce.

In my apprehension, there's more fear of their Souldiers coming hither than their Merchants. But suppose more Merchants did come, would that be any worse for us? I have heard several of the greatest Merchan [...]s of both Nations say, the more in a place and better, though I confess it is not so for Shopkeepers. But for this they may rest secure, those that knovv the cheapness of living in England, in comparison of these Countries, will [Page]abundantly satisfie them that fear this. Yea I shall shew hereafter that the English would have more reason to fear, that we should come thither, and deprive them of their Trades. Yet to say the truth, I see not that either need fear, were we under the English, that either Nation should suffer hereby; seeing all have had freedom that will to remove formerly, and that hath made so small an alteration as to the ballance of Trade, that it is inconsiderable. For if I make my calculation right, there is not much difference, of the English here, and the Dutch in England.

Others argue we are Corrivals for Trade, that is the Mistress we both Court, and therefore one must marry it.

But this is but a toyish Sophism, when men will compare Commerce to a Mistress, that one only can marry. For

• 1. The world is wide enough, and the Sea large enough for both Nations to exercise their skill and in­dustry.
• 2. If we think to betroth all Trade, and ingross it to our selves alone; other Nations will come in and forbid the banes, as well as England, as I shall shew hereafter.
• 3. If we two could so happily agree, and so settle Commerce as it might perhaps be setled; we might bid fair for carrying it, or at least for retaining it betwixt us And so far as my short sight can reach, this seems to me the mark aimed at on both sides, by those who have the direction of affairs, which I do not despair to see effected.

Seeing then we are in as much danger, that I say not more, to lose that part of Trade we have, as to gain more by our contesting; I hope all rati­onal men will grant it our Interest, that England and we so compound for it, that each of us may have what Gods blessing, and justice, and equity gives to eithers industry. And this I am sure was the wisdom of former times. I have shown it already in part on our side, and could much more largely both for us and the English. In Queen Elizabeths time we were not grown up to our present greatness. In King James's time, who all the world knows was no Martial man, but in his temper as well as motto truly paci­fick, the Cautionary Towns that England possest in these Countries, were A. 1616. ransomed, and we grew up to that greatness of being an equal match for them in power at Sea. And this the English account the great error of Political Interest; although they must needs acknowledge it but fair and honest dealing. King Charles the First, that Prince of blessed and immortal memory, seeing how he grew up, not only kept a fair cor­respondency with us, but having experience how cross Parliaments were to the Court, so that no ^o War could be carried on, did by a fair correspon­dence keep friendship with us; and not only so, but married his eldest Daughter to the Prince of Orange for this reason of State amongst others. For being jealous of this Common-wealth's favouring that party in his Kingdoms, which was then called by the Court Puritans, and seeing the growing greatness of this State by Sea, did for these two reasons of State, engage the Prince and this Common-wealth by that Marriage. And this was also the reason of State in Oliver's time when Peace was made, that we must [Page]accord for our mutal Trade. How it hath been since we all know, and therefore I need not mention it. And this is the first weapon our enimies use, which you see if we measure rightly, is too short to touch, much less mortally to wound, the truth of that cause that we maintain.

Yet we must do our Adversaries right: the wiser sort of them upon the supposal of equal powers, (as we have formerly been, and which is that I have hitherto spoke of) are for peace, and judge it the Interest of both Nations; but they think our coming under France will render England so unequal and inferior a match for us, that we cannot in all humane appea­rance miss of marrying our beloved Lady Trade, and clearly carrying her from our Corrival. And I confess ingenously if there be any thing of mo­ment to be said for France, 'tis this.

2. Therefore our Adversaries are for France, because thereby we should be able to beat England out of their Trade, and so become masters of the whole, or the greatest part at least of the Sea negotiation.

Now because they so much triumph in this, though before the victory; we will examin it thorowly, and see what probability there is of obtaining the greatest part of Trade by this means.

1. We grant that England and this Republick being about an equal match at Sea; the accession of France would clearly make us an overmatch for England, if all was true which they suppose.

2. But therein is their mistake, that they take these two things for grant­ed, which are both false. First that these Maritime Provinces should entire­ly become French. And secondly that all other Nations will stand neutral; so that we shall have no more to do, but France and we entirely to deal with England alone.

Now how far this is from truth, we shall make abundantly apparent, and by ballancing of powers how little probability there is, of these their designes becoming practicable, and such as will effect their desires.

1. Hereby they suppose a War, and such a long and tedious one, as perhaps we may not live to see ended. For we cannot rationally imagine the English such tame animals, that they will easily part with their Trade: but must suppose they will set all at stake, before that jewel of the Land be lost. Now let us but calmly consider, how destructive such a War will be to our Trade, and what advantages they have above us of subsisting un­der a long War, some of which we have before mentioned; and I do believe no wise man will think this our Interest, except there was a greater likeli­hood of a sudden subduing them, then is rationally to be exspected, as we shall presently make apparent. Now on the contraty, if we come under England, there is no fear of a War with France at Sea; that Kingdom being so much inferior in maritime power to either of us, and much more to both. And should we have a Land-war with France, yet that is more eligible for us than one by Sea, in the opinion of all wise men, as we have formerly shown, and shall have occasion hereafter more fully.

2. A War with England being supposed, as it must, (for we must either say we can and will have the Trade alone or the greatest part thereof invitis Anglis, or we say nothing to the purpose) the readiest way to see what pro­bability there is for conquering them, and consequently carrying the Trade; will be first by ballancing of powers, and then by some other Considerati­tions. The former of these we shall do with respect to Zeeland, and then with respect to other Nations.

For the first it must be considered that Zeeland hath expresly decare that they will not come under France, but that if they cannot defend themselves, they will then submit to England. It is true (as I have said) it is the interest of these maritime Provinces to keep their League; but if their enemies Sword cuts it assunder, and they will not venture the loss of their Religion and Liberty under France, who shall hinder them? They are free surely to dispose of themselves as well as Ʋtrecht, or the other Provinces. For in coordinate Powers, when their confederacy is broken, either by themselves or their enimies; each are at liberty, and in their former freedom, to dispose of themselves, as they shall think fit. And though Freesland hath not declar­ed, so that if they should come to the utmost extremity, we know not but they might happily incline to England also; yet because that is uncertain, we will be liberal in granting our Adversaries even that which they cannot prove, and take to our selves only that we can, and so proceed upon infal­lible grounds.

Nor let any one here stop me, and say that in taking it for granted that Zeeland will be English, I may be mistaken, for they may beat off their enemies and defend themselves. I grant it, although by the way let me say it, I see but little likelihood of that; for of above 100 Companies they pay, there is as yet not one in their principallest Ilands (though how it comes so, becomes not me to enquire) but the thing is to me matter of admiration. But I will shew you how I reason; not from the War, that England will conquer Zeeland, nor from the Agreement betwixt the two Crownes, which yet is generally said brings us under that: but upon sup­posal that we are tired out with the War, and come to treat with our ene­mies (for I hope no man is so mad, as to think these Provinces will as Ʋtrecht, call them in, and after make what tearms we can get, but treat with them with our weapons in our hands) Zeelands not only Declaration, but Inclination carries them for England. So that which way soever we take conquest by our enemies, their disposing of us, or our own disposal of our selves, Zeeland is still English. So that upon the supposition of inabi­lity to defend our selves, we are morally certain, that Zeeland will fall to England: and our Adversaries uncertain, that Holland and Friesland will choose France. But we will grant them all they can reasonably desire, viz. that these two Provinces make such a choice, and thereupon proceed to the ballancing of Powers.

Now in Naval strength, Zeeland hath the proportion of a sixt part in [Page]this Republick; there being 5 Admiralities, wherein Amsterdam hath a double rate, we will suppose any number for a Fleet greater or less to be set out by them. For example, the States equip a Fleet of 72 Sail herein.

Yea in the last War I find in the List A. 1666. (which by the way, I won­der any Admiralities should publish, and perceive there is none now) that Zeeland, was a greater share than Friesland both in Ships and Men.

Although I know in the quota or Tax to the Publick, Friesland is more: but that is because of their greater share in the Land, which is a certain revenue, and Trade only a contingency. In strength then at Sea we see, that Zeeland, at lest ballances Friesland if not more, should that Province prove French, and this is sufficient for my present purpose.

Now let us look abroad, and we shall as clearly find, that Spain comes into the English seale. For which way soever France take, Spain must take the contrary. Nay in this case, Spain is as much concerned as England. For if France have these Provinces entirely, how shall they alone be able to bring home their American Treasure? They know to their sorrow, what they have lost formerly by the Dutch taking their Plate-fleets; and what an extraordinary charge and hazard they had to defend them. And shall we not then think, that they will rather venture to the utmost with the English; than let us intercept their Treasure, and after some years be master of their Mines? It is true, if I was led as the world is usually, to judge by news, which hath been for some months that Spain and England are breaking, all this was frivolous; but I make my measures from reasons of State, which tells me, that they will not, because they must not, and they must not, be­cause it is their mutual Interest, and it is their Interest, because otherwise they cannot ballance France, but will both in time be ruined. So then you see clearly, that upon supposition that Holland be French, it will be England and Spain against France and Holland, and so we are again ballanced.

We are thus far upon sure grounds, we shall now proceed to that which is not much less certain, if we rightly consider. And that is, that Denmark in all probability will become also our Enemies, if we take France so far for our Friends, as to make him our Master. Let us but well observe a few fundamental Maxims of State, which every Nation according to their Interest frame for their Government, and it will much help us to make a [Page]right judgment in all such cases. Now this is one of that Kingdoms, Not to suffer any one to be absolute Soveraign of Trade and Navigation if they can pos­sibly prevent it. For the revenues of that Crown mostly consisting of toll in the Sound; we cannot imagine the Danes such dullards, but they know who ever is so, will soon open that passage, and make it as free as the water it self between the North and Baltick Seas. And then the King may sit in's house at Gluckstadt, and take toll of Boats that pass in the Elve; instead of Copenhagen, and his Castle of Croneberg, where now he takes toll of all ships in the Sound.

I foresee it will be said, that Sweden will ballance Denmark, if that should be so. But see then what work this Trade will make in the world. And this is wholly uncertain: nay, Interest will rather incline to the con­trary. For though Sweden be none of the richest in Trade, yet have they their share to lose as well as the rest. And the Revenues of that Crown consisting much in Copper, (which hath occasioned their Armies spoiling all the Mines of that Metal in Germany, and wheresoever they could, on purpose to enhance their own) they know very well that pains might have been spared, if Commerce should have an absolute Monarch; and that with all the Chimistry that they can use, they shall not be able to extract silver and gold out of that Mettal, when one only Chapman comes to the market. Besides their Bremish and other Territories on this side the Baltick, will soon lye a bleeding, they know; if France's Sword comes to wound the Roman Eagle, and his race. It may be some may say the Dane dares not for fear of losing that we are indebted to him. But who knows not that it is better to lose a part, than the whole. And if blows be a way of paying of debts, we may happily have Portugal so to pay us.

3. Having thus ballance the apparent strength of both sides, we shall pro­ceed to some other considerations, concerning the same. For it is not enough to consider power absolutely, but also the management thereof; for less powers well managed, are usually prevalent above greater. And herein are many things, which in my judgment, were we an over-match for them, which you see is not so, would render our ruining their Naval power, and consequently their Traffick impracticable. As 1. Supposing we are under France, shall their whole Fleet constantly be here, and leave the French Coast naked, or shall they from thence come to joyn with us for our Sea expeditions? If the former, France is subject continually to be mole­sted and diverted from England; and if the latter to be intercepted, by reason of their situation. 2. Who shall have the direction of Naval Affairs, is to me very considerable. Whether the French alone, or conjoyntly with the Dutch; for that the latter only should be intrusted, is not to be ima­gined. The former way is liable to miscarry through unskilfulness, the latter through jealousies and dissentions. 3. Where shall Mariners be had for our Fleets? shall the French press here as in their own Kingdom? If so, I foresee, we shall soon lose our Sea-men. Or shall they only use [Page]Volunteers? Then their number will be small, because the French pay is not great. I might mention other particulars, as the French and Dutch Officers discord. The manner of payments, and from whence, &c. But these are enow to shew us, that which way soever we look there's nothing but difficulty and danger stares us in the face.

4. But we have yet that which is more momentous, and that is the situa­tion of Great Britain. For could we knock their men in the head, as easily as our Borinne's their eggs; and sink their Ships, as if they were shells; yet we cannot possibly remove the Island. Which is,

• 1. Not only nigh unto us, but over against us, so that we cannot look out, but we are upon them.
• 2. So situated, that should we bear them and their Associates, (which is not easie in equal powers) they can still manage a War destructive to us. And what good will it do any but the envious, to ruipe others, if they be ruined themselves? For with a few Ships in the Chanel, wherein they have Harbours all along, to go in and out at pleasure; they will force us continually to sail with great Convoys, or we shall be forced to fall into their hands. And the like may be said of the Northern passage by the Orcades, where a few Ships will obstruct our Trade. Now how great a prejudice this is to Traffick, I leave all knowing men to judge. For by this means. No single Ships, nor small numbers can sail. Restraint will be laid upon going out but in great Fleets, and with sufficient Con­voys. Many will be necessitated to lie idle, and at great expences to wait for their Company, whilst they could sometimes have performed their voyage. And Merchants lose particular designs, which are usually the greatest pro­fit, to such as are able rightly to manage them.
• 3. In storms and tempests we shall be frequently forced into their Harbours, and so fall as a prey into their mouths.

5. Britain and Ireland being Islands, are not easily invaded, and so di­verted by a Land War, but that they may solely attend to a Maritime, when they are once engaged therein. Whereas France being on the Continent, is subject to invasion from Spain on several sides. Which was one reason, why our Ancestors preferred the guardianship of England, before that of France.

6. Tangier in the mouth of the Streights, will be no small prejudice to our Mediterranean Trade. Which if the mould or harbour can be made firm, will prove of great concernment to the English Crown, and a strong curb to all their enemies Traffick. And here I might adde, Cadiz, and all the Coast of Spain; for if we be French, no wise man (I think) will doubt, but we shall have Spain our enemies again.

And these things I think are abundantly sufficient to dismount our Adversaries confidence, of carrying away the Trade from England, if we should come under the power of France.

3. Another grand Argument against us is, that we are more likely to enjoy Peace under France than England.

Peace (I confess) is an invaluable blessing. How many and great mise­ries doth it free us from! Bloodshed, violence to our Persons and Estates, unquietness, and almost all manner of troubles. How many and great mer­cies doth Peace bring along with it! It is both the mother that bears, and the nurse that brings up all our temporal blessings. It gives us mercies, the freedom of enjoying them, and sweetens their enjoyment. It contains liberty, plenty, equity, tranquility, pleasure, and safety. So that he was a mad man that should not chuse Peace. But I fear our coming under France, is neither the way to procure Peace, nor the means to preserve it. And that we by so doing, shall but have Ixions fate in the Fable, embrace a cloudy and tempestuous War, instead of the fair and beloved Juno of Peace.

1. Let it be considered; that if we have Peace by Land, we have War by Sea: which is to leap out of the frying-pan into the fire. It is an old and a good political axiom, Ex duobus malis minus est eligendum; Theolo­gical it was never, for in Divinity, Nullum malum est eligendum. Now if we rightly measure our Interest, we shall find a Land War much more eligible for us upon many accounts, which I need not here to mention, they be­ing easily imagined by all wise men. For should it be granted, that for the present the two Crowns accord and we have Peace: it will either be such a one as will ruine us, or cannot be lasting to be sure; but in a very few years will necessarily come to the ballance I have mentioned of Spain and England against France and Holland.

2. Let us therefore examine their grounds; that so we may see before us, and not run our selves blindfold into destruction. Which so far as I can discern are these four. The power and prevalency of his Arms. His trea­sure to maintain them. His nearness to us. And his Allies.

First for the power and prevalency of his Arms. 1. It is true his numbers are great, both in Arms and in the Kingdom of France. The great ad­vantages he hath, by the largeness, compactness, situation, and soil of his Dominions; the infinite number of Nobility and Gentry for Cavalry, and the populousness of his Cities and Provinces for Infantry, which cap­citate him above all the Princes of Europe, to enlarge his Empire; I well know, and willingly grant.

But what relates to the Kingdom of France concerns not us Netherlanders in this case further than as to his Arms and power to defend us. Now in my reason the greater power in the Soveraign, Sect. 5. the less liberty in the Subject, as we have already shown. So that the more numerous his Armies, and so much the worse. Doth not France groan under this burden, and shall we desire to do so, or help to ease them by bearing part thereof on our backs? If we be so kind, I dare engage we may have it all, and a thousand thanks from that Kingdom. Which is so wearied with it, that above one half of them (if my intelligence greatly deceive me not) would rejoyce to see it lessened, though it were with some loss to the honour of the Nation. But because I write not to be known, but to better the world, and with [Page]my bucket of water to help to quench the Flames, that threaten destruction to the Protestant Interest; I shall desire all intelligent persons to enquire of those that understand France, or have come lately thence; and then let them consider if their condition be desirable. If a numerous Army lies quartered upon us, shall we not both be kept under by them, and eaten up of them? And although they be paid in the Kings name, yet must not we find our share of the money? I never yet read or heard of any wise people, that desired their Prince so potent, for fear he should oppress them. A due Mediocrity hath always been counted best. Let any one read the Greek and Roman Historians, or any others that are wisely writ: and he shall find, if he duly observe, that the Princes Potency hath always been the peo­ples jealousie.

2. It is also true, that he hath been successful in his Arms against us, beyond most mens imaginations, and perhaps even his own hopes and ex­pectations. But if all things be rightly considered, it is no such wonder as the world makes it. Our Wars by Sea; our intestine Divisions; the cowardise of some; the corruption of many; and our multiplicity of Garrisons, whereby our Forces were so parcel'd, that fighting severally they were easily vanquished; together wi [...] several other causes which concurr'd under the hand of Divine Justice, makes it no wonderment to wise and con­siderate men. Nor is it any new thing in the world, but that which hath befallen most of the Nations in Europe, as all their Histories abundantly witness.

3. Nor will this evince our defence. For it hath often been experiment­ed, that those that have won much in a little time, have lost it again in less. How did the same French Nation under Charles the 8. over-run most part of Italy in a little time, and quickly lost it, as the many Historians of both Nations relate! And in our days, how did the Swede like lightning pass through Poland; which was quickly extinct and came to nothing! And so may this (if it please God, and we manage our work wisely) like a thunderclap and sudden flash of lightning, afright and astonish us, more than hurt us, as I shall shew hereafter.

4. If France goes on, the world grows so jealous of their greatness, that they may possible have work enough; when their hand is against every one, and every one against them; and then where shall be our peace and defence? It is known by all that know former times, how in the Roman Monarchy when they were distressed at home, they still called their Forces from abroad, and left their conquered Provinces to shift for themselves, as I might instance in Spain, France, England, and many others both Eastern and Western. And indeed it always is thus; so that should France be fal­len into by Spain, or England, or the Empire, or Italy, or other several of these joyntly, or should they fall into Civil Wars, which are more fre­quent there than any, yea I think I may say all the Kingdoms in Europe; in what condition should we then be? Truly I will tell you, I think fighting [Page]with the French, and more eager to be rid of them, then many are now to receive them. If any one say, but would you have us entertain the English? I say no, but preserve our own freedom by complying with them as I shall shew hereafter.

5. If we will espouse all the quarrels of France we may possibly have more than enow; and such as may prove our ruin, rather than safety and security. Our Marriners have their Wars by Sea, our citizens and Souldiers by Land. Our Merchants Trade to pay their money, and all to raise France to the universal Monarchy, to the ruin of the Reformed Religion, and also the greatest part of Christendom. And though now his friends be many, yet if he once comes to receive a check his enemies will be more.

6. I see no need we have to fear all his power and prevalency, if we will do our duty, and quit our selves as men for our Country. And if we do, upon our friendship with the Crown of England, we may have Souldiers enow out of those 3 Kingdoms, which are as good Infantry surely as French, by their own Historians Confession, and it is Foot we want (if any) for the defence of our Garrisons. And besides that they are not so like­ly to be remanded, as those of France; those Kingdoms being Ilands, less liable to invasion, and less likely to be engaged in foreign, or to be invol­ved in Domestick Wars.

Secondly, for his treasure, it cannot be denied to be very great. But this is rather against, than for our Adversaries. For the richer the Soveraign the poorer the subject. And I never knew any people yet, that desired to have their Prince so rich, especially when it comes out of their own pockets. I will not meddle with the dispute of the Greeks Ostracisme, nor that of Po­liticians, whether poverty or riches in the Soveraign be better for the sub­ject. A due mean wise men have allways accounted best. When neither the Prince may be jealous of his people for their Riches, nor they of him for his Treasures; but that they may mutually depend on each other, for the good of the whole. For as it is difficult to determin, what the Magi­strate may not demand, in case of necessity; so is it easie to conclude, that he ought not to impoverish his people when there is none, and make him­self rich by their ruins. That being tollerable, but this intollerable op­pression.

Nor is it imaginable, that he will make France poor, to make us rich. Nor is it credible that if they remain poor, we shall remain rich. For in all Princes there remain some jealousies of a conquered people, that they may, upon some revolution of affaires or other, revolt. And therefore it is their usual practice, by all ways possible to drain them, and draw their riches home; as the Romans into Italy, and other Conquerors their own Kingdoms; either by bringing it into their own Treasuries, or Native subjects purses, or rather both, that so they may command it upon all oc­casions.

Thirdly, for their nearness unto us, we know it too well. And if the [Page]subdued Provinces remain in their hands, shall find what it is to have such neighbors. But otherwise England is nearer us than France, and can easi­lier come to our assistance. For the French have not only a long march, but through part of the Empire, which is their enemie, and so liable to obstruction. As to the Prince of Liege (or Archbishop of Colen) Duke of Newburg and others that have permitted this passage, they may pay dear enough for it hereafter; as their subjects, are paying for it at present, even to the French themselves. Who are so weary of their Company, that I perswade my self, they will be the first that will endeavour, to drive them out, when they shall find an opportunity.

But we are not affraid of all our Adversaries weapons, and therefore will enforce their Argument, by supposing all they can desire; That France will keep these conquered Provinces, and in all probability make new acquests, by subduing of the Spanish Netherlands. So that if we be not subject to him, we shall never be at quiet, but they will continually be as Thorns in our sides.

1. And why may we not as well suppose, that if we be under him, we shall never be at rest for others? For no Potentate in Christendom hath more jealous eyes upon him, nor likelier to be continually imployed in Wars. Now what will changing help us, if we better not our condition? For we may easily foresee, that if we come under France, we shall have England and Spain against us by Sea (as we have said) and the Germans and Spanish Provinces by Land, and so shall be in the same condition, though not by the same enemies, that we are now; ground like Corn betwixt the Mil-stones. Yea it is more than probable, that knowing the ticklish con­dition and mutinous temper of the French Nation, he will bring his Wars into these Countries and their consines, and so we shall again become, the Cock-pit of War for all Europe.

2. I doubt not but he will attacque the Spanish Provinces and seek to connect them with his conquests, and then incorporate all with France. But it is uncertain what time this may require before they be all under his power. We know not the Articles between the two Crowns, nor are we sure that England and Austria will see this work. Many things may fall out, which no mans eye can foresee. The King of France is mortal and may die, and the Dauphin young and so uncapable to carry on such mighty designs. Or he may meet with a check in his enterprises, and be stopt in his further progress of glory. France is harrast, and weary of Wars, may fall to their former mutinies. The King of Spain may grow more potent. England, Sweden and the Cantons of Switzerland may think themselves con­cerned, as well as the Empire and Spain, to stop the growing greatness of France. The Spanish may divert him in Catalonia and else where. Sickness and mortallity may seize upon his Armies. Factions in his court, discon­tents in the Country, tumults in his Kingdom, and many other Accidents may happen, to call him off us, or at least necessitate him to give us rea­sonable [Page]conditions, and confine him to his own Kingdom. So that 'tis madness to avoid a present mischief, to run our selves upon certain ruine.

3. If we had the friendship of England, we might soon be in a capacity to defend our selves against France, and need not fear the power of their Arms. I do not say that we alone are able to recover at present what we have lost, without the assistance of others: But that these remaining Pro­vinces are able to defend themselves, and either let go the other, or in time possibly regain them, as we shall shew hereafter.

Fourthly, For his Allies, they need not fright us. For all friendship of the World, and especially publick, proves often times like winter brooks, which run freely when we have least need of them, but fail us in drought when we want their Water. If the fortunes of France should once decline, we should see those that now adore them, readily renounce this their idola­try, and not only confess their former fault, but help to turn the Wheel about, and bring them under whom they now exalt.

And thus we see what small grounds there are of enjoying such great Peace under France, as our Adversaries flatter themselves withal, and would perswade the World of; which will never find credit with wise men, who are used to judge by Reasons of State, and not by the vain ar­guments of fancy.

4. The fourth argument for France is, their having the upper Provinces al­ready, which are of such concernment to the Nether, that they affirm we cannot want them, and therefore we must call in France that he may have them all, that so they may be joyned under one Head.

We cannot want them say they.

• 1. For our Security, and
• 2. for our Commerce.

Let us therefore examine these things, and having so done, we shall give a release to your patience in this great Argument of our Adversaries concerning Trade.

First that we cannot want them for our Security, is apparently false. Nay upon a Politick account we had better part with them, though not in point of Honour and Religion.

1. They were a continual charge to those inferior Provinces, which yet was willingly born, in regard of their being an out Sconse to us, which many supposed sufficiently strong for our defence. Which yet others have always doubted of, and now we find they had sufficient reason. Seeing then some of them willingly deserted us, and others slightly defended themselves, and us consequently, and thus laid us open to the invasion of our enemies: if we let them go, and they suffer thereby, they may thank themselves, and we must otherwise secure our Country.

2. I wonder men should think they can secure us, when we see the con­trary by our experience. Nay indeed this was the great mistake that had like to have ruined us all. For we relying on them, was unprepared for our own defence, whereby the whole was greatly endangered. Yea so [Page]greatly, that if the French had fallen into Holland, when they came to Ʋtrecht, I tremble to think, what work they might have made amongst us.

3. It was apparent that the boundaries of the Common-wealth, was too great, and our Garrisons too many, to defend against such powerful Armies. Which at the same time are not only Masters of the Field, but able to as­sault what Places they please. This War being far different from our form­er with Spain (or less Potentates) wherein we had an Army to ballance theirs, for relief of such Garrisons as were at any time attackt by them. And this the Author of the Interest of Holland, hath long since well observ­ed, and experience now shews us. Wherein I dare be his second, against any combatants that dare encounter him.

4. Let any man but recount our Garrisons with their greatness, and com­pute what number of men is requisite for their defence; and he will soon see, whether I have not clear reason on my side. I shall not now stand to do that, though if any be obstinate, I can do it sufficiently to convince him: that though the States in times of Peace maintain 60000, and in this War above 100000 men by Land; yet were they not half enow to defend all our Garrisons, and keep an Army in the Field to relieve them. And therefore I never expected any better success of the War, than now we see; though my judgment was entertained by many with merriment, and of others with fears it might prove Prophetical. For we must either have dismantled most of the weakest, and supplied a few of most conse­quence for a strong resistance; or it was never likely it should be otherwise than it is; it being always found true by experience, that multiplicity of weak powers prove none against strong, for dum singuli pugnant, universi vincuntur. And therefore we see our enemies, had the wisdom to wave Maestricht, that was provided with men to give them work; and fell upon such places, as they either knew their money had, or their Swords could most easily conquer.

5. Many of our outmost Garrisons lying in a champaign Country, can­not be relieved, without a powerful Army of Cavalry. And these Coun­tries are very uncapable many ways both for keeping and marching great numbers of Horse. In these lower Provinces Land being so dear, and more profitable for Cows than Horses; and so many great Rivers, which cannot be past with Bridges, except we make them of Boats continually, is suf­ficient demonstration that they cannot be here. And in the upper Pro­vinces there is not forrage for such a body of Horse, as we must have if we will relieve our outmost Garrisons. And this those that know them knows. Let us from Bergen op Zoom pass along the coast of Brabant by Breda and our other Garrisons even as far as Maestricht, and from thence back to the Buss which is the greatest part of the open Country we have (for Gelderland, Ʋtrecht and Overissel are full of Rivers) and we shall find that which belongs to us, inconsiderable for this purpose; the greatest part of that Country being heath, and barren ground.

I know well that most of the Cities lie upon Rivers, but I know also and so do all of ordinary understanding, that a Fort on either side commands them, and so bars our passage by water to them.

But let us instance in one for all. I wish mine adversaries would shew us any way to relieve Maestrecht if it should be assaulted and distressed by the French. I mean that is practicable, for we are not now discoursing of Mathematical powers, which demonstrate motions as swift as the Sun's, and the plucking up Oaks with a single hair, and such like curiosities that can never be done; but of Martial powers, which are not for speculative no­tions, but practical performances.

6. Let us but consider who hath paid those great Armies we have con­stantly kept, and must pay many more both Foot, and Horse (which are much more chargeable) that we must keep, if we will defend these out-Provinces against powerful enemies; and we shall soon see that we must pay very dear for their uncertain and weak defence of us. For this pur­pose I shall satisfie the curious with inserting the proportion of Taxes which each Province pays to the Publick for the Armies and other expences: whereby it will appear that the quota of these superior Provinces, Gelder­land, Over-Issel, and Ʋtrecht (which the French now possess) is very incon­siderable, wherein also they have often been behind, and will be much less able now to pay it, being so much impoverished.

7. If they be regained, we must pay for it, they being now under our enemies. And what an infinite of blood and treasure that will cost, if our enemy will not quit them on reasonable terms in treaty, I leave any man to judge.

8. If we rightly consider, great Territories are for Kings, small only fit for Common-wealths. This we may observe in the Histories of former times, in the Grecian Republicks and their neighbour Kingdoms. For the Roman was mixt of Monarchy and Aristocracy, by the great power of their Consuls ruling as Monarchs by their turns, and especially in dangers by Dictators. Yea our own experience hath shown us this in the neighbou­ring Kingdoms. But what shall I say, many men are like the Judges Sta­tues at Thebes; have their eyes blinded and hands lamed, though not for Justice but for judgment, they can neither see nor feel before them. In 59 being then in England, in some Gentlemens Company, where there were some zealous Republicans, and I from History and observation [Page]shewing them, that in great Dominions, especially, where there are many Nobility, a Common-wealth could never stand long, that if there, it must be from the City of London managing it as Rome had done, and not as they went to work, and several other things, shewing the impracticableness of their notions, (which I have reason to remember, for I was complained of to Lambert, and was in danger of being called before the Council of State) In the year 60. some of them took me for half a Prophet, and so perhaps may some hereafter, for what I shall now say: That if we affect great Terri­tories by Land we shall lose all. It is our Sea affairs, that we are set for by our Country, made for by our genious, and fit for especially, by our im­ployment. And we may as well think to turn our Rivers, as change these things, nay, indeed, if we could, it would quickly turn to our destruction: Traffick by Sea, as I formerly have shown, being our chief secular interest.

But I foresee what will here be said, that a weak defence is better than none, and how all these Inferior Provinces be otherwise secured.

And it is very true indeed, better a weak wall, than none at all. And if we could not build a stronger, and at less charges, and with far less cost for repa­ration and defence against the violent storms of our Enemies, (for none can secure us against Heaven) we should be ashamed to have thrown down the old, which (in my judgment) is by the former Considerations levelled with the ground. For as it is folly to pull down before we consider how to build better, so we must take heed that therein we commit not those errors which many wise men (though that was none of their wisdom) have fre­quently (as I have often observed) fallen into in their building, To bestow as much in piecing and patching an old house, as would build a new one far stronger and better: and when they have built either old or new, to find several inconveni­encies therein, which a provident fore-sight might have prevented. As the ingeni­ous Mathematician Dr. Wren hath demonstrated (as I hear) in England, that they had better build S. Paul's in London anew, than repair the old. So I think I am able to demonstrate, that we had better make a new defence for these inferior Provinces, than that of the superior. But it must be well considered of l [...]st we find inconveniences therein afterwards. And as in Architecture I pleasantly play with dice and cards alone (which others do in company) making my walls of the former, and floors and covering of the latter, to see the conven [...]ences and inconveniences therein, better than in plain figures; and especially to demonstrate the same to others that will advise with me therein, and are no Mathematicians: so here I must confess I have seriously palled down and set up several defences for us, which are too long to relate. But I will briefly touch of some things, which are sufficient (I think) to silence mine Adversaries.

There are 5 or six ways of Natural Fortification and defence of a Country.

Seas for Islands, which are the best. For though they are thereby incapacitated to enlarge their Empire abroad, being by the Sea as it were confined to home, yet have they great advantages thereby, not only of [Page]Maritime Negotiation, but also security from Invasion. So that they are at small charges for maintaining Armies; which those that live on Conti­nents, must constantly do for their defence: otherwise the door stands open for the first that comes, to enter in and take possession.

Great Mountains that are unpassible for Armies, or such passes as the famous Thermopyles, which are easily defended, and these are next to Seas the best defence.

Vast Wildernesses where Armies can have no Provision to march, but what they carry along with them, as in Africa.

Peninsular Countries, which are easily retrencht within lines of securi­ty, as the famous Wall in the North of England, first made by Agricola, Nero's General there, repaired by Hadrian, and after by Severus against the Picts, the ruines whereof are still apparent. And Scotland often also against England hath thus retrencht themselves, even in our days with great safety against the English Army; which if they had had the wisdom to have kept within, they had saved themselves and the Kingdom: but their adventurous folly in forsaking them, was dearly paid for by the loss of both.

Great Rivers which cannot easily be past. As Euphrates in the East, and the Rhyne in the West, defended those Nations beyond them, from the great power of the Romans.

And lastly inundations by Water, marish and boggy grounds, &c.

I might be large in examples of all these in several Kingdoms of the World; and also in the wonderful Providence of God, who hereby sets bounds and limits to the mighty Nimrod's of the World, saying unto them by the voice of Nature as to the great Seas and Waters, hitherto shall ye go and no further: but I will confine my self to our own Country.

Now these Provinces if we consider them aright, are naturally fortified most of these ways. Not by Mountains, for we live in a level Country; nor by Desarts and barren Wildernesses, for we have a fruitful Land, like Canaan flowing with milk and honey. But all the other ways we are defen­sible; so that if we can but defend our selves by Sea, and keep that for our Commerce; we need not fear all our Enemies by Land. We have the Sea to guard us below, mighty Rivers not only within, but on both sides these Provinces to defend us: we are either Islands as Zeeland; or Penin­sular as Friesland and Groeningen together, and Holland and Ʋtrecht, by rea­son of the Sea and great Rivers that almost surround them. And let it come to the utmost extremity, we can by Water drown our Enemies, and save our selves in our Cities. So that they that talk of conquering us, must either be fools, or ignorant of the Country: and those that fear to be conquered, pusillanimous and frighted with vain bravadoes.

But we will be a little more particular, in running over briesly the several Provinces.

Zeeland consisting wholly of Islands, is thereby well fortified, and the [Page]Inhabitants so used to the Water, that they are not easily mastered therein.

Friesland and Groningen together, are almost surrounded with the North and South Seas, together with the River Emes, and scarce accessible by Land in regard of the marish or boggy grounds, if Coeverden and some other strong places on the passes be kept.

Holland will prove the greatest difficulty, and of most consequence; that Province being the Head and Heart of this Republick. For this end I must suppose that we must have part of the Province of Ʋtrecht, which we must either regain by Treaty, or by strength, let it cost what it will, both for our communication, and future safety. And then we have these two again almost environed with the North and South Seas and several branches of the Rhyme and Maes. Only one neck of ground between the Leck and South Sea of 5 or 6 miles, where a River might be cut to carry water from the former, as something higher, into the latter: from between Viana and Twael, from whence downwards the River is deep, and hath the Tyde flowing up, by Houten, Heer, Melis waert, Melaeten, and so along the low grounds to Pynenborch into the R [...] Eem to the South Sea. Which will make the whole adjacent Country being low, stagnate with water, and so defend these two Provinces from their enemies incursions. And the rest are done to our hands, by the several foldings of the Arms of those two great Rivers, the Rhyne and the Mase, whose several denominations I need not mention, nor the places where, these being sufficiently known to those that know these Countries.

But oh Ʋtrecht! Ʋtrecht! I foresee there will so much depend upon that one City, that I fear the greatest Affairs of Europe will hang, and turn upon that single hinge. I know we flatter our selves they will part with it, and I wish we may not be deceived; but I fear far other things, not so much from what I have said, as from other reasons of State. But if any will ask what those are: I say Ho-la, I am so far from publishing them, that if the shirt on my back knew the thoughts of my heart herein, it should be my first work to burn it.

But our Adversaries will fight it out to the stumps both of their strength and weapons. They say the French in the Superior Provinces hath the com­mand of our Rivers, and so will be able to ruine our Trade.

Truly I am tired with this long discourse of Trade, and therefore for a divertisement I will tell you a short and pleasant story. Upon a time King James of Great Britain, was angry with the City of London, and sent for some of the Aldermen and Common Council, whom he first chid, and then threatned that he would take away their Charters, spoil them of their Priviledges, and ruine the City, that he would. An old Fox that stood behind, perceiving the King in a passion, and the rest of the Ruffs in a silent fright, pretended deafness; and industriously that his Majesty might observe him, enquired first of one and then of ano­ther; What says his Majesty? what? Doth he say he will turn the River of [Page]Thames? The King perceiving it, would needs know what he said, and being told, burst out into laughter, and swore in his Scottish dialect he was a fause loune, and packt them away. So let me merrily ask mine Adversa­ries one after another, what? will the King of France turn the Rhyne? will he turn the Maes? Will he cut off the arms of those mighty Rivers? Or will he riveletise them into more hundred furrows than Historians tell us Cyrus did Gyndes when he went to take Babylon? Will he chastise the South Sea, and fetter it, as Xerxes did the Hellespont, making Harderwick and Hoorne as S [...]stus and Abydus of old, now the strong Castles the Turks have made in the Dardanels? Let the old rich Merchants that have more money to lose than I, fear that, I do not. And except he can, so long as we keep the mouth of the Rivers where they exonorate themselves into the Sea; let the French keep them above, and see what they can make of them.

But to be serious. I had thought our Trading had been in Ships at Sea especially, and not with Boats in Rivers. And that it is these inferior Pro­vinces, and our Sea Trassick that France aims at; though in regard of our Naval strength, he comes do [...] upon us by Land; thinking that way to carry the Country. For his [...]pping the Boats passing up and down the Rhine and Maes, there is no fear if we rightly consider, that that will ruine the French themselves more than us. In regard we can sub­sist without this, and they cannot. We have Corn in abundance from Dantsick and other places, with which we supply others in want: but they must have theirs from above, by these Rivers. How can we think that he should stop the Commerce betwixt Germany and these Countries by the Rhyne; and they not stop his Provisions at Colen and other places? Or that he intercept the Traffick by the Maes; and Leige, or at least Namurs under the Spanish, should not prohibit his supplies from France? There are two ways of dealing with Enemies. If small to beat them, if great to pine them. They dare not but leave a considerable Army in those Pro­vinces, for fear of the former; and they must be supplied from abroad, for fear of the latter. Now if they be not from us beneath, they must be by these from above; for those Provinces alone are not able to provide for them; and why then should we trouble our selves with such fantastical fears? Were it not that I thought these things sufficient, and that I have been already so prolix in this Argument; I would shew at large that those above depend on us for our Money and Commodities, more than we on them for theirs. But to do this satisfactorily, would be a large discourse, and therefore I dismiss it, at least for the present.

Our Adversaries having thus spent their Cannon upon us ineffectually, will needs try a Volly of small shot: That we must have these out-Provinces, for the quartering our Army, that so our Cities may be free from their di­sturbance in Trade.

But this reaches us not. For we have out-Garrisons enow upon the Consines of these inferior Provinces, as Sluys, Bergen op Zoom, Breda, [Page]Buss, &c. well known, that are of less Trade, and capable to quarter 100000 men if need was, as I can easily make apparent. Nor do I imagine Soul­diers prejudicial to any trading City, if they be not too numerous; but rather helpful, by the Excise they pay, the work when off the watch they cheaply perform, the spending their money with the poorer sort, and se­veral other ways which might be mentioned.

And thus you see in point of profit, or worldly Interest, that we can want the superior Provinces, (excepting the City of Ʋtrecht, and a little of the Circumjacent Country) yea had better quit them upon several accounts; and though our boundaries be less, yet if we be more compact and stronger, that will abundantly compensate our greatness: besides the vast expence which is spared thereby, not only of blood, but treasure, in maintaining constantly so great an Army as we must, if we will recover and defend them. The only advantage that I can foresee by them is, to have bad neighbours further off: but whether that will Countervail the cost, may be a question to others, but is none to me.

But if we value our honour at so high a rate, and will pay so dear for it, that if the French will not part with them upon fair terms, we will wage war for them; I heartily wish we never repent it. For I have observed that Com­mon-wealths are fitter for self defence, and Kingdoms for conquests. Which is shaddowed out by the Venetian Statue, holding a Shield in the right hand: that some unskilful Travellers condemn, as an error in the Statuary. Whose yet ambitious swerving from this Common-wealths maxim, cost them very dear: and seeing it is the nearest parallel to our case I know, I shall briefly relate it, because I think it may be useful for us. The Venetians having long warred with the Genonese at Sea, afterwards cast an ambitious eye on the Continent of Italy, and by one means or other (too long to relate) be­came Masters of many considerable places. This made them envied by their neighbouring Monarchs, who entred at Cambray A. 1508. into a league to war against them. Maximilian the Emperor, first of that name, recovered Padua, Vineentia, Verona, &c. belonging to the Empire: the Pope Ravenna, Cernia, Ariminum and Faventia: Lewis the 12. then possest of Millain in right thereof, Bergamum, Crema, Cremona and Brixia: Ferdinand the King of Spain in right of Naples, Manfredonia, Trano, Barlet and Manopoli, all of them Havens on the Adriatick: the Duke of Ferrara, Rovigo: and the Duke of Mantua, Asula: in so much that the Venetians were forced to betake themselves to the Islands and Marishes of their City. And yet in a short time by compliance with the Pope, they broke the confederacy, and by one means or other regained the rest, except those belonging to the Realm of Naples. The question is debated in the Senate, whether they should war for these or no? And wisely concluded in the negative, That although they were commodious Havens for them, yet better to part with them, than war with such a potent Prince as Spain. And let me say it freely of our selves, that had we served God, followed our Trade, and kept our selves [Page]more off the Stage of Honour, as our Ancestors did: We had less occasioned our neighbours envy, and not been reduced to those Strates we are in.

But if our Senators be of Nasica's judgement, and would have this foil for our Martial valour, and this exercise to rub of the rust, our Arms have contracted by their long rest. If our Cavalry are ambitious to have the Trumpet of Fame sound their praises, and the Infantry to have their marches beaten, through succeeding Ages and Generations. I wish that the eccho of Fame may follow them, with a clearer sound than the hoarse clamour of the People; and hope that the imbellick Bores that are ready to start at the report of a Gun, and stoop at the whistling of a Bullet, may, by having dangers familiarized to them, become (as the Fox did with the Lion) undaunted at last, and under their brave General and Commanders regain our reputation; and shall heartily pray both for our Senators prospe­rity, and Souldiers success.

The only consideration that sways with me for contesting for them, if we cannot have them otherwise, is that of Religion. If therefore this po­licy, I have pleaded should prove Apocryphal; and that our League and Alliance with them, obliges us for them recovery; or that the rules of Christian Charity require us, to adventure our own loss for their safety: God forbid that I, or a any man else should be against it; and I hope there are none so degenerate, but will contribute their best assistance both in purse and person to so good a work. If the Turks will redeem the caged birds to set them at liberty, let us much more willingly our Christian Brethren, and so committing our cause to God, pass thorow the Temple of Vertue, that we may happily come to that of Honour.

Having thus shewn the impregnableness of the truth of our cause, against the assaults of its Adversaries; and fought it out with them, in their repre­senting the Advantages of being under France, and disadvantages of being under England, and our Replying: It comes now to our turn to be Assailants, wherein we hope to obtain an absolute conquest, by shewing them the quite contrary.

Now herein we might be very large, if we would argue from all the sua­sory and dissuasory topicks; as the Honesty of being under England rather than France for the common Interest of the Protestant Religion; the Hono­rableness thereof for the common good of Christendom, whose Interest it is to oppose the greatness of France, as we shall shew hereafter: the Equity of this for assisting our Allies against France: the possibility or practicable­ness of this only, now that his Highness is both General and Stadt-holder: and also from the contrary of these if we seek to come under France. But we shall only insist upon that of Ʋtility, because that is most petswasive; and that with respect to our selves only, the most part of men being so self­ish, that they prefer their particular before the publick good.

Sect. 8. Several other Arguments and enducements to incline us rather for England, briefly mentioned. With an inference from the whole preceding discourse, that the friendship of England is to be prefered before that of France.

ALthough what is said of Religion, Liberty, Estates, and Trade, be suf­ficient to prove this hypothetical problem? yet I shall give as over measure some other enducements for England briefly.

1. The different humor and genious of the French and Dutch: which is well known to those that know them both, to be far greater than between us and the English. Which makes not only a st [...]ang [...]ness, but alienation of affection; begets a disgust and nauseating of each other; brings forth many contests and quarrels; and nourishes a continual discontent, uneasi­ness, and unquietness of life.

2. The affection which the generallity of the English and Dutch Nation have for each other. So that if the Controversies of late years, and at this present between us, had been or were refered to the body of the peo­ple in both Nations (although I well know what both their Representatives have done) I dare say, upon reasonable satisfaction for the mutual miscar­riages, which cannot but some times happen towards each other; there never had been, nor would be War betwixt us more. And that his Majesty, and the Prince of Orange would have more Voluntiers in one day to fight the French, than they have in twenty to fight each other.

3. The way of France is only Gentry and Paisantry, the former lording it over the latter, which have allways lived more miserably, than any com­mon people in Europe. In Caesars time there was nibil plebe contemptius, as he tells us, and hath continued so as Bodin acknowledges, and is so at this day we all know. C. 1. C. 10. Whereas in England and these Countries, there is a middle sort of people, that live freely and independently, on their own Lands and Farmes, that will never endure the insolency of such Lords much less to be their slaves, and least of all to be ruined by them.

4. Now that the Prince of Orange is advanced, and his party upmost, so that the Crown of England may confide more in our friendship; it is not to be doubted but through his Highness interest in his Uncles, we shall better accord hereafter, when these unhappy differences are once ended.

And thus I have done with this great Question of the times. Sufficiently, I thinke, to satisfie any rational man; though nothing is sufficient, nor will satisfie I know, such as are either so resolvedly prejudiced against the English or Princes interest that if they can but ruin them, they matter not though they ruin both themselves and the Nation; or so partially passionate for the French, that they desire them, though it be to their own destruction. For all the Arguments in the World, will never prevail against passion and prejudice: It is only experience that can convince such of their error, and make them with Damocles, when the drawn Sword is over them, desire [Page]to depart, finding they were deceived in their opinion of Happiness.

I shall therefore conclude, with a brief reflection upon some of these Arguments, and the Corollary which naturally flows from them.

That seeing England and We are of the same Religion; Both free people and affectionated to each other; Both imbarqued in the same Interest of Trade, though in different bottoms; It not only becomes us, but is our mutual concernment, that we take heed, we dash not one another to pieces, but fairly and Christianly comply with each other, for the safeguard of our Religion, preservation of the Protestant Interest, our own and others also Liberties, and the just and equitable course of Commerce; that so each Nation may happily enjoy their Religion, Liberty, Estates, and Trade, with Gods blessing on them all.

Sect. 9. That we are not yet come to that extremity, but we may still remain a Republick: in regard of our own strength, and our neighbours interest, Englands especially, that they had better lose Scotland or Ireland, than let the French have these Provinces. This War a Game at Hazard. Being engaged will go through, and Parliament probably assist therein.

WE have hitherto discoursed upon the supposal of inability to defend our selves; because it becomes wise men always, to suppose the worst condition that may probably befall them; with the consequences thereof; and accordingly to make provision, and in regard of the endless curiosity of mens minds, which are always restless under miseries, and still inqui­sitive after futurities. We shall now proceed to shew, that we are not yet (through Gods mercy towards us) come to the extremity supposed, nor reduced to those straits, that we are necessitated to take either French or English for our Masters; but that we may still remain a Republick, if we be not awanting to our selves, or through passion or precipitancy betray our own interest, and cast our selves into irrecoverable destruction. And this we shall make apparent, by shewing there is no sufficient ground for us to despair, if we either Consider our own strength, or our Neighbours Interest. Let us therefore observe the good rule in policy, which the Poet gives,

First lets take a view of our own strength, and see what grounds of encou­ragement, that will yield us. Which though sufficiently known to many, yet not so well to the multitude. Now the strength of a Nation consists especially in these things following, which I shall briefly recite, and ac­commodate to our own Country.

1. The great strength of a people consists in the situation of their Country. [Page]Now concerning this both in the general, Sect. 7. and this Land in particular, I have already spoken sufficiently for my purpose; and shewn that all these Maritime Provinces, are either Islands or Peninsular, and very defensible thereby; and also upon extremity liable to inundation, either from the Sea, or Rivers that surround them, or both.

2. In the Artificial Fortification of particular places; Cities, Castles, Forts, Passes, &c. And herein these Countries may contend with any Nation whatsoever, Kingdom, or Common-wealth that is of no greater circumference. For the Number of their Cities, and their regular Forti­fication, Art herein vying with Nature, is not to be parallel'd in the world. I need not descend to particulars, Those that desire satisfaction herein, may consult Guicciardine's description of these Netherlands.

3. In means of defence. As shipping for those Nations or Cities that lie upon the Sea, or great navigable Rivers, and Lakes, as these Provinces do, to defend their Coasts from invasion. And herein we are rather re­dundant than defective; the Number of shipping in Holland alone, being usually accounted 20000. And warlike provision of Arms and Ammuni­tion. Wherein also we abound: these Countries ever since they were a Common-wealth, having been the greatest Magazine of warlike provisions, as is well known, of any in the World.

4. In men; in regard of their Number, Courage, Skill, and Una­nimity.

As to our Numbers, they are abundantly sufficient for our defence. The Interest of Holland c. 8. from particulars, reckons the sum of that Pro­vince alone 2400000. But if there be so many in them all, it is enow. Just how many is impossible to say, or near how many in such a multitude is very difficult to guess, and harder with us than any other people, I think, in the World; in regard of the uncertainty of Seamen, the Num­ber of Strangers and Travellers in peaceable times, and the diversity of Religions, Jews, Papists, Anabaptists, &c. which baptise not their Chil­dren with us. But I know the Number of our men must needs be great; by the great Number of our Cities, these several Provinces being as it were nothing but Nests of Cities, so many being no where to be found in so small a circumference in any parts of the habitable World; by their largeness and multitude of houses, which imply the Inhabitants to be many; by the greatness of their Trade, which is the lure that draws mul­titudes to them; and by the known Christnings and burials of those only of the Reformed Religion.

As to our courage, which at present suffers an eclipse, there is more to be said then the World is aware of. And indeed I wonder none of our Hi­story Professors, have given other Nations some satisfaction herein. I have not been without some thoughts of doing it my self, having been a diligent observer how things have gone, but I want Authentick materials for such a work. I could produce very many and very honourable testi­monies, [Page]both ancient and modern of their valour, our of such Writers as give the Characters of Nations, Republicks, Geographers, and especially Historians Dion, Caesar, Tacitus, Suetonius, Florus, Orosius, &c. of old, the famous Italians, Guicciardine, Bentivoglio and Strada, with Spanish, French, English and the neighbouring Nations, even so many and such as are sufficient either to shame, or to inflame the veriest cowards, one should think, of the world into courage. But this would be too large to insert here, and may possibly de done in another dress hereafter. Nor is the success of France against us such a wonder, as many make it, as I have formerly shewn. Sect. 7. I will at present only add, that which is proper for this place, and that is that the French Armies were not only so numerous, but also trained up in the School of Mars, and ours for the most part raw and unexperienced in War. As the Fox in the Fable, the first time he saw the Lion and heard him roar, trembled; the second time, was less affraid, and the third grown wholly fearless of him: So it is with men, by being accustomed to dan­gers either at Sea or Land, they converse with them familiary, and ac­count them nothing at last. And therefore wise Commanders have always endeavoured to unlearn their Souldiers fear, by shewing them their enemies at Walls, Trenches, Passes, Rivers or other places, where they could not be come upon by them, and so harden and flesh them by degrees, before they have adventured to fight them against old and experienced ene­mies. And I doubt not, but through Gods blessing, in a little time if the Wars continue, our Belgick Lion, will not be found such a tame Lamb, and so easily torn in pieces, as our enemies may hope, and others possibly may imagin.

As for our skill superadded to courage, there is no want, for the manner of defence we are to make. For besides our able Commanders and Souldiers to defend the Posts, and Passes abroad, all our Cities abound with Seamen, and such as are skil'd to traverse their Ordnance, and desperate for sallies, if need should require.

Our unanimity, I confess, is that I most fear: and that when our Cities are threatned with danger, the Citizens should grow mutinous, and fall together by the ears, and so let in their enemies to part the fray. And yet I have reason to think they will grow wiser, by their hearing and knowing how their freinds are used by their enemies.

5. In money and food to maintain their men. And in neither of these, through Gods mercy, is there any want amongst us: If we will lay out our selves, as we ought, for the publick. Aitsma's Liewe reckons the publick incoms of Holland alone A. 1643. at eleven Millions of our money, which is eleven hundred thousand pounds Sterling: we calling every ten thousand pound Sterling a tun of gold, and ever hundred thousand a million i. e. of gilders. And besides the publick incoms of every Province, every City hath their peculiar, which in some is very considerble. But if our Com­mon Treasuries are exhausted in several places, it is no wonder: Yet if we [Page]consider the Riches of particular persons, we have enough to hold out the War, to weary our enemies out at the last, as must as they do us at the pre­sent. I will not now stand to shew the calculation of this, though if necessa­ry, I think I can do it satisfactorily, comprehending the disadvantages our enemies are under. But the late Project printed so often, of the Capitals of this Country, for raising and maintaining so numerous an Army, though the manner prescribed prove not practicable, hath in part spared my pains herein.

And for food, our Cities are generally so well furnished, that if our enemies steal not supplies from us, it is well; we need neither seek to them, nor fight with them for supplying our selves. We have Bread Corn Fish and Oyl, Butter and Cheese in abundance. And if our liquorish Dames, want their delicacies a while, no great matter: they will value peace, and pay their Souldiers the better.

Now what can be added for the sufficient defence of any Nation, to the particulars mentioned, I cannot imagin; and if my enumeration be insuf­ficient, I wish any wise man would shew wherein, and then I shall thank them. And therefore let us take courage to our selves, and not be frighted with vain fears; or scared with any vanting bravadoes; like that great Rhodomontadoe of the grand Turk, who when he heard of the long War such a great Prince as Spain, made about this small Country; said, that be­fore he would have kept such a pottering, about a few petty Provinces, he would have taken them, and hurled them into the Sea at once: though his successor kept no small pottering about the single City of Candia many years to­gether; to which some of our Cities, all things considered, seem not much inferior for strength: although I well know what a difference there is, be­twixt the defence of one City alone without a Country, and many at once contained therein.

But though this internal strength be so considerable, and with us of great­est consequence; yet this is not all; we have also an external and accidental strength, by the Interest of our Neighbours. For this end it must be well considered, that some Countries and Cities, of small strength compara­tively in themselves, are yet very strong by their situation among, and well secured by the Interest of other circumjacent Princes and States: who will not suffer, if they can possibly prevent it, accession of strength to one another, lest their own scale in the ballance of powers should become light and soon born down. What is it but this under the shadow of the Almighties Protection, that secures the smaller Republicks in Italy and the Empire? What Geneva, Stratsburg, Colen, Hamburg and the rest of the free Cities, and Hans Towns, but this? God governing the World usually, as both Comines and Cardan well observe, by the passions of men, in the ballancing of Powers; that when any one will break out into rage and Wars, others will oppose them with the like fury, and so keep the World a little quiet, otherwise the great Nimrods, and hunters after Domi­nion [Page]would soon, if let alone, destroy and devour all before them.

Now if we look about us, and see amongst whom our Land lies, and well consider their interest; this will be very apparent in our selves, not­withstanding this War that is made against us, that we are not devoted by any to destruction, but only the French, as I shall shew hereafter.

For Spain our next Neighbours on one hand, in the rest of the Provinces, they know this so well, and are so sensible of their interest herein; that they not only assist us what they can; but I dare say were it not for Eng­land, would rather break with France than see us endangered. But those two Crowns as I have already hinted, and shall more fully shew heareafter, must not, and therefore will not break.

For the Empire above us, they also are frighted with our fears; and if the Princes thereof had money to their might, would willingly, I doubt not, assist the Emperor: lest the Lillies of France should mount above the Roman Eagle. In the year 15 [...]4. when the States upon the death of Prince William, were a looking towards France for Protection, the Princes of the Empire sent Malroy to admonish them, ut à consilio Gallici patrocinii implo­randi desisterent, alioqui fore, ut Germani Principes tantam domui Austriacae & origine & foedere arctis adeo cum Imperio vinculis conjunctae factam injuriam non negligant, as Thuanus tells us, l. 80. And if they were then jealous of France, what shall we think they are now? And if then zealous for the concern­ments of Spain, shall we think they will now be wholly negligent both of theirs and their own?

And France to be sure will never see us entirely English: for so he knows, he should never be able, to ballance Englands power at Sea; which he doubtless both hopes and aims at, by the accession of strength from these Netherlands.

Nor England suffer us, if they can hinder it, to be wholly French; for this they know would clearly tend, in a little time to their destruction. This ve­ry Reason of State moved Q. Elizabeth at first to support us against Spain, rather than to have us fall into the Arms of France, by their becoming our Protectors. Which that wise Historian Thuanus faithfully relates in several places. A. 1575. she told Campaniach,—ne molestè ferat Philippus, si ipsa secu­ritatis suae causa Hollandiae & Zelandiae patrocinium suscipiat, antequam Galli perpetui Anglorum hostes cis potiantur. L. 60. A. 1576. Elisabeth a verita ne ali­orum ope destituti Belgae, ex desperatione foedus nobiscum jecerent, sique & res suas Francis committerent, eos pecunia adjuvit, &c. L. 26. A. 1577. she excuses her de­fence of us to Philip the 2. with this very Reason, ne Belgae ex desperatione per­nicio sum non solum sibi, sid vicinis, consilium caperent, externi Principis patro­cinio salute commissa. Meaning the French L. 64. And A. 1584. shews the emulation between the French and English herein. Ipsi sibi invicem suspecti e­rant. Nam Rex veterem hostem Belgii accessione Galliae imminentem reformida­bat, & Angli nostros Belgi-potentes minus aequos foederi, quod Angliae cum Bur­gundica domo intercedit, atque adeo commercio futuros verebantur. L. 80. And [Page]is angry with the Ministers of State in France, for neglecting this singular occasion, of enlarging their Empire by taking these Provinces into the French protection. And to say the truth, this was the greatest error in Po­licy by way of omission, and that of Charles the 8. concerning the King­dom of Naples of commission, that I think the Crown of France was ever guilty of. And indeed there were many of the English Nation, that judged it one of the greatest oversights that that wise Princess ever made, not to take into her hands, as she was offered, the absolut protection of these Provinces. But that is not so clear to me, nor will be so I think to others, who rightly consider the circumstances of those times; for we must not judge by the following, wherein this Common-wealth grew up beyond all expectation, under such Wars, as many feared would have been our destru­ction. But yet though she refused for several reasons both of Conscience and State (mentioned by Cambden in her Annals, A.D. 1575.) yet it plainly ap­pears by the forementioned places in Thuanus, that rather than the French should, she would have done it. And could she have foreseen, what we have known, I am apt to think she would have adventured it; although I must tell you it would have been a great venture: Spain being both so potent at that time, and spightful against her, as was quickly after perceived, by the Spanish Armado in 88. and besides the enmity of Spain, she had thereby in­cur'd the envy of France infallibly, and was uncertain not only of success in the War, but of what support of men, and money especially the Dutch should be able to contribute, for the carrying on the War, which was easily foreseen would be long and bloody.

Nor can any one think, that England is not sensible, of the danger they are in, if we be under France, that either considers the Reasons of State, or obeserved that which was obvious to every eye: and that is how the English was startled at the progress of France. What posting was made too and again? Was not the Lord Vicount of Hallifax hasted over, when they feared their approach to Ʋtrecht? And hearing it was over, was not his Grace the Duke of Buckingham, the Lord Arlington, with several other Com­missioners, posted after? At which time having the honour to wait on my Lord of Hallifax, and telling him the Town talk of the D. of Buckingham, &c. coming through the Fleet, and being gone to the Hague; he could scarce credit it, having not had the least notice thereof, they coming away in such haste, for fear the French should overrun all.

And no wonder, if we consider the Consequences thereof for England, which are so great that they had better lose either Scotland, or Ireland. And if any English think I overlash, I shall desire them first carefully to compute these several particulars, and then censure.

• 1. The loss that the King will have in his Customs, and the Kingdom in their Trade; which neither of those Nations can compensate.
• 2. The constant charges of maintaining a Navy, which that Kingdom must be at to maintain their traffick, far greater than will secure them a­gainst either of those Kingdoms.
• [Page]3. The great injuries they are always liable unto, from such potent ene­mies by Sea as the French and Dutch conjoined: more than from the other by Sea and Land.
• 4. The Wars that are likely to fall upon them in a few years both by Sea and perhaps Land also; which would prove far heavier, than either of those Kingdoms can make with them.
• 5. The hazard they run of being baffled and beat out of their Trade by such a War. It is true, this is not so easie as many of the Dutch imagine, as I have already proved; nor yet so difficult, much less impossible, as per­haps some of the English may fancy.

I shall not now stand to draw these out of their close order into an open, yet if any of the English think me weak in this, I have a Reserve, which, I think, will sufficiently secure me from being routed.

It will be said to me why then should England commence this War.

Truly let me say it freely, for I know it, that the scale of War very hardly cast that of peace, and the difference was so small, that it came upon two or three grains only. I have weighed this as exactly as I possi­bly could: first distinguishing pretexts from real causes, and then distinctly considering these one by one. There were these 5 variously discoursed of. His Majesties designing to introduce the Popish Religion; to alter the government of those Kingdoms; to revenge himself upon us, to advance the Prince of Orange; and the Interest of the Kingdom of England.

For the two first which made the loudest noise in some mens mouths, I soon found them frivolous; and only calumnies cast out by his enemies at home and abroad, to make the King odious, and his People jealous. As to that of changing Religion I have formerly shewn, and I think sufficiently, that he neither will, nor can if he would effect it.

As for the 2d. I considered the Kings years, as being past any such youth­ful and vain ambition; his being destitute of a Child that can challenge the Crown; his former miseries and sufferings by War; and his wisdom too great, to set upon a design, so wholly impracticable, especially in England and Scotland. For by the constitution of his Kingdoms, though he have the Militis for the execution of the Laws; authority without power, be­ing a vain scare crow, and insufficient to suppress the audacious exorbitances of the multitude: yet the people have the purse to ballance that power, and whence then would he pay his Armies? Nor let any one stop me with say­ing, the Long Parliament contested with his Father for the Militia; for that was only temporary, they challenging it only for that time of the danger they apprehended in the Kingdom, and not as their constant right, and not belonging to the Crown; as may be seen by those, who will rightly read their Declarations, which they published to the world concerning that War, collected and printed together by Husbands at London, 1642. And besides this, a Parliament in being though not sitting, which hath [Page]some kind of radical power; though not to be exerted, but when legally congregated. But suppose them dissolved, it being in the Kings power, to do it at his pleasure; yet hath he not the City of London on his back, and both Kingdoms about him to oppose him? especially considering that the jealousie of Popery would be taken into the quarrel. And what Ministers of State durst suggest such designs? they know well the maxim of the Commons and their practice (as the great means of preserving their freedom) is to ruine such as would infringe their Liberty. And that they are so jealous of, and zealous for their rights herein, that some of them still have the courage, and resolution to venture their own heads, to break the necks of such men and such defigns, as would prejudice their Priviledges. I have observed in the Histories of former times, and in my own time also, that there were seldom any of the noblest Stags of State, how much soever imparked in the Kings favour, and how strongly soever impaled with power; but if the Commons of England singled him out and set upon him, though he might hold them at an abay for some time, yet they still hunted him down at last. And for the King to think of making himself absolute, and govern only by an Army (like the French Kings) by an Army of French men; is so ridiculous, that I thought it not worthy of consideration. Can any man in his wits, imagine his Majesty of England so senseless, as to give his Crown and Kingdoms to the French King? For that is all one with this in effect.

As for that of Revenge, either for Chattam, or the affronts mentioned in his Declaration of this War, or both: I considered his Temper, which hath so much Clemency, that it rather inclines him to lenity than cruelty and revenge. As is abundantly apparent, not only by passing, but even forcing (as I know he did, against some adicted to the latter extreme) the Act of Indemnity or Oblivion, for those many and great injuries, he had suffered from his Subjects. And his government since, in conniving at the viola­tion of such Laws, as are thought severe in matters of Religion, and in­dulging liberty therein: which hath made some, that have sufficiently heretofore cried up Parliaments, now run into the other extreme and cry them down as fast; and instead of the Parliaments formerly, now magni­fie the Kings favour and Clemency. And yet Kings and Princes are men, and men subject to like passions with others, liable to suggestions from those about them, and tender of their honour as the apple of their eye. And therefore I will grant this might come in consideration, but not so much, I dare say, as alone to make a War.

For the Prince of Orange, there was not only near Relation and Affe­ction, but Interest also to be considered. For the Lovesteyns party having been so cross to England upon his account, and the correspondent friend­ship between us so uncertain, without his Headship; I verily believe, that if what is now done therein, had been done timously, it had wholly pre­vented this unhappy War. Yea besides the extraordinary affection which [Page]the people have for the Prince, our very Bores had this Policy, and were more than ordinary zealous for his promotion, as the best means to procure their peace.

As to the further interest of the Kingdom of England, in regard of their Trade, and Naval expences, I have expressed my thoughts before in the Preface.

It is true, this War was always intricate, and hath proved a Game at Hazard for England, beyond not only theirs, I believe, but all the worlds expectation. But yet if it be still notwithstanding cautiously played, as they may, and so far as I can possibly discern, mean to play it; they can many ways come to save their stakes, at the least, if not to win more than we imagine by the War: and was far fairer at first than France for win­ning by the game in all humane appearance, as I could manifest by many Arguments. But because that concerns them two only, and us not at all further than our sufferings, I shall wave them (at least for the present) and proceed. For I will not hearken to the curious enquiries of those who would here be asking, how I think England will play their game? for that let them look to it whom it concerns on all sides, as doubtless they will; for me to express my private thoughts, might do more hurt than good, which is the only thing I aim at: and what I think the issue will be, I shall declare hereafter in my Conjectures.

But here it will be asked, seeing it is Englands interest that we fall not into the hands of France, and that the Prince is now promoted, will they not make peace with us this Winter?

I must needs say, I fear they will not, except we should give them such terms, as I see we shall not; we thinking our condition far better, and they thinking it far worse, than really it is. For the cause of this, as of most Wars, is complex, as I have shewn; so that though two of those I assigned may be past, yet the 3 ^d of the Kingdoms interest, not. They are already too far ingaged in the War, and with France. The Kings Honour is at the stake, and the Kingdoms expectation of another issae than the last War. And besides all these, how can any wise man imagine, now that they are engaged with France, and have an advantage against us, as well as a Ha­zard from France; that if they know how to secure themselves against the latter (as I suppose they do) they will let go the former? For we must needs think they will be at a certainty on one side or the other; and not part with France's friendship, till they be sure of our satisfaction. What it is they demand, or how rightly, is not now our design to discourse, but only matter of Interest all along. And yet I can easily foresee that the dan­ger of our becoming French, will be a singular advantage to us, as an in­ducement to them, for a more easie compliance with us. But at present I see no probability of Peace, but that they will go through with the War: or continue it so long, till they have tryed their utmost to obtain their ends.

I know there are many wise men amongst us, that think the King can­not [Page]carry on this War: as there was that thought he could not begin it. The former they find themselves deceived in, and will be so in the latter also. I have discoursed this with several in Government, who argue that the King hath not money of himself to go through with the War, and that he will not convene the Parliament, or if he do they will not supply him. I grant the first, but deny the others. For if we rightly consider their defign, the Parliament must meet, and the representation that will be made thereof, and the constitution of the Parliament, they will grant him supplies; though perhaps not with that facility, that they did it with in the former War. And therefore let us neither flatter nor deceive our selves with vain hopes herein; but rather seek timely to accommodate differences, before their preparations in the Spring; for I fear the longer we delay, and the worse it will be with us.

Sect. 10. Compliance with England the only means of the Common­wealths continuation.

HAving thus declared the condition that we are in, and that there is no probability of peace; we come now to shew the consequences thereof; and what is to be done by us, to preserve our selves from ruine and destru­ction. And here to my understanding one of these three things must necessa­rily follow: That we must either continue the War against them both; or comply with them both; or with one of them alone if possibly we can. We shall first declare our thoughts concerning these briefly, and then shew with which we both may and must comply.

1. Then whether we should continue the War against them both. And herein would we do, as we might and should; it may be this were better, than to comply with either of them, especially if they will impose upon us unreasonable conditions, and much better than to comply with them both. We have strength enough, through Gods blessing, to withstand them (as I have already manifested) if we have but courage, and unani­mity; and the former of these will be got by degrees, as I have said, and our own interest, and preservation should perswade us into the latter. But truly let me say it freely, I see such a weariness in many of the War; such an unwillingness to lay out our selves, as our Ancestors did formerly, for the good of the publick; such a selfish temper, every one seeking to preserve his particular interest, and neglecting the good of the Commu­nity; and such a lothness to adventure our lives and estates in a War; that I see little probability of preserving our selves, and much less of prevalency against our Enemies. So that if this War continue I fear these Provinces will become a prey to them both. For though neither France will suffer England, nor England France to have them all, as I have shewn; yet they will part and share them betwixt them, except we prevent it by a com­pliance. [Page]And what a miserable condition we shall then be in, even worse than if we were under either of them, I have formerly declared. Seeing then we are so degenerate, and become like Issachar, which his Father stiles a Strong Ass, and says of him, that He saw that rest was good, Gen. 49.14, 15. and the land that it was pleasant; and bowed his shoulder to bear, and became a servant unto tribute: we must either take courage and be unanimous, valiantly fight­ing it out with our enemies; or for the present be contented with this cha­racter and condition. Will we then fight for our Religion, Liberty, Country, Families, Estates, Trade? or will we not? If the former, let me encourage all in the words of Joab that great General and brave Souldier wherewith he encouraged the Israelites, when he had his enemies before and behind him, Be of good courage, and let us play the men for our people and for the Cities of our God: and the Lord do that which seemeth him good. 2 Sam. 10.12. But if the rest be so good, and the Land so pleasant to us, that we will rather how our shoulders, and become servants, than shew our faces in the field to fight with our enemies, let us see what Master we should chuse, and agree with him upon the best terms we can.

2. Therefore, shall we comply with both our enemies? surely if reason, and what we can give, will satisfie them; every wise man will say Yes, that we may enjoy the many blessings God hath given us in peace. But if they will have such Cities, such vast sums of money, and such Conditions, as we cannot give them, except we be ruined thereby; who will not say, No. We must therefore consider if there be no other way practicable, to save our selves, from the devouring Sword of our Enemies.

3. There is no way therefore left us, but to comply with one of our Enemies, if we can possibly; that so we may ballance the others power, and either compel him to a peace, or be enabled to continue the War. If any one know any other way, I heartily wish he would shew it, as I think he is bound to do one way or other; for every one ought to contribute his best assistance, even by the principles of self-preservation. Eccles. 9.15, 16. And Solomon tells us, There was a poor wise man, who by his wisdom delivered the City, though no man remembred him, and infers thence, that wisdom is better than strength, though the poor mans wisdom is despised, and his words are not heard. Yet surely notwithstanding that poor man did but do his duty; though he was but poorly requited for his pains.

But I believe most will grant the way is good, but impracticable, in re­gard of the League betwixt the two Crowns, and that they will not treat asunder, &c. Well then, let us proceed to consider these things a little, and see whether we cannot level these mountains of difficulties that are be­fore us, and make our way become plain and passable.

1. With which of these our Enemies we should chuse to comply, I think I have made sufficiently apparent; in shewing it our Interest rather to be un­der England than France, and to have peace and correspondent friendship for our Sea-traffick, with the former rather than with the latter, if we [Page]cannot have it from them both. And I am sure this was the wisdom of our Ancestors, who in their low condition A.D. 1575. deliberating into whose Protection they should give themselves over, first declared the Empire, and the competition coming between the Crowns of England and France prefer'd the former upon many and weighty considerations, Cambden Annales Elisabethae A. 1575. Thuanus l. 60. Casus 20. relared by their Histori­ans; and very many of our own, which are so well known I need not men­tion them; and Boxhornius the Author of the Disquisitiones Politicae. The ci­vil Wars of France; the inveterate fend betwixt French and Dutch, those espe­cially that live upon the Confines of both Countries; the hard yoke of the French Government; the levity of that Nation; its liablness to be invaded by the Spanish; the incommodiousness of their Ports for our Ships and Navigation; made them averse to France. And on the contrary, The reformed Religion of the English, their greater likeness with us in genious and language, the nearness of the Coun­try; the multitude of their Ports; their commodiousness for our Commerce; the multiplicity of the English Manifactures and Commodities; the Country not easily invaded; strong and potent by Sea and Land; not frequently imbroyled in civil Wars; a free People; the Government temperate, and not burthensom with exactions; and the Interest of the English Nation, which if these Coun­tries were conquered, would searce be able to resist the Conqueror; clearly en­clined them for England. You see then that reasons of State, direct us to the same choice, which our Ancestors heretofore wisely made.

2. Seeing then we must chuse England, not only for the Common Inte­rest of the Protestant Religion, but for our own greatest both religious, and civil concernments. We shall now remove those obstructions that seem to block up our way to Compliance.

It is objected that the two Crowns are in a League, that neither will treat without the other, and how can we then comply with England alone?

I confess if all Statesmen were Aristides's, Plutarch. in vita Aristid. the Argument might be strong. For he having heard by command of the Athenian Senate, Themistocles's design of burning their enimies Fleet, made report, that it was very profita­ble, but no ways honest, upon which it was rejected. Or if they were all Stoicks, and held that honesty, equity, and utility were all one, and with good old Socrates cursed those that first separated these, as learned men tell us. But we see it is far otherwise now in the World; Plutarch. l. 4. Sympos. Cicer. 3. Offic. & 1. de Leg. and that the Peripateticks doctrine that honestum and utile are really distinguished, is every where pre­valent, and no where more, than amongst Politicians; which hath occa­sioned that known saying, that all States are Atheists. I do not approve any, and much less so high uncharitableness; but this I will say, that as the world goes now, all States must be considered as Gamesters. And what if I should say, that neither of the Courts are so strait laced in their Consciences, but were they assured from us of such conditions as they require, they would let the other go and get theirs as they could? Nay what if I should say, there may be none iniquity in this? If I should, I think I can prove it, for if in mutual covenants, either side do that, which is a breach; it is folly [Page]to think, that the innocent should be bound, and the peccant party free, which they may know, though others do not, as it is clear in the strongest covenant, that is in the World, I mean that of wedlock. I do not say that this is so betwixt them, but I say it may be so though we do not know it, so that either of them in such case, may conclude with us. And I am sure it is no dishonesty on our part.

But it will here be said, they will not.

Do not tell me that, I know they either of them will. And if any one asks me, how? and if I be of their Cabinet Council? I shall only smile, perceiving they do not know me. I am far from that, or having ever to do with Kings or States in that kind, or pragmatically trinketing with State affairs, it being a Rule which I live by, never to ask great men mercy. Common favour and justice I desire of men, but mercy only of my God. And yet I know this very well, and I will tell you how, and that is from their Interest; which is the compass, by which all States-men steer their course, and may be discerned by a skilful passenger, although he sit not at the helm. If any man be so ignorant of the affairs of the World, as to think that States-men trouble their heads with the Scool-mens quiddities, and haeccieties, or their consciences with Casuisticall nicities, as a late German Divine that puts the case, whether we should pray Vader onse, or Onse Vader, and learnedly concludes that custom must carry it; let him enjoy his opinion, it is very charitable, and can do no hurt. But yet I may say, that for above 20 years I have observed, that the custom of the World carries it with them, and have known few, I had almost said none, of the strictest Sect of the Pharisees; though I have some, and my charity obliges me to hope there are many, that seriously mind the weightier things of the Law, justice, righteousnes, temperance, and the World to come.

Now that this is the Interest of both the Kings, rather to deal with us apart, than jointly, as well as ours, I could many ways make apparent. But seeing it is our interest to chuse England we shall prove only that it is theirs to comply with us; omitting that of France, as superfluous to our purpose.

1. They know they cannot wholly conquer us themselves. Not only in regard of our own strength, of which I haven spoken before, but the French, which are in the Country already, and if they were not, would never permit it, as I have formerly shown sufficiently. Nay I dare say, they never designed any such thing, because they know it is impracticable: that being always true of the Greeks, [...] or things im­possible come not into consideration. I doubt not but they both intend and hope to have their share, what ever it is that is agreed upon between the two Crowns, in case of Conquest; but that they should have the whole, could never so much as be dreamt of by them.

2. They know also that it is their interest, never to suffer France have all, no nor any of these Maritime Provinces. If he have some of the su­perior, [Page]that is the utmost their interest can permit. Nay indeed he is nearer these inferior, than that will allow, if they could help it, but that's now past. What vast disadvantage it will be to the English, to let France have footing upon our Coasts, and so come to cope with them at Sea, I have formerly shown: and I know they are very sensible of it; and therefore may well infer a willingness on their parts to a compliance.

3. The Prince of Orange his interest being also theirs, cannot but sway something with them. For if it had been Gods will, those Kingdoms had continued in peace, and the succession of the Royal reign uninterrup­ted there, and the Orange family continued alive and in power here, I per­swade my self we should never have warred with one another; so I doubt not, if it please God to preserve his Highness, that they may confide more in our friendship, than they could formerly, he will be a happy Instru­ment of a better understanding between the Nations, when these unhappy quarrels come once to be composed; because this is their interest as well as ours, and it is interest that rules and reigns in the World.

And thus I have shewn you that we may, I shall now shew briefly that we must comply with them, or without a miracle of mercy we are ruined.

1. Because if the War continues, and we be too weak to make strong resistance, so that our enemies prevail; they will share the Country be­twixt them, and then we fall into the worst condition, that can possibly befal us. It is true, I foresee that several particular Persons may save themselves and their estates, by friends on the one side or the other; but I speak of the community; and it is well if the hopes many have of that, make them not more negligent for this. There are two famous Republicks in Italy, Venice and Genoa; and what is the cause of the formers flourishing so much more than the latter, which was anciently both their better and their Master? but this, that the Venetians are more intent upon the Publick, and the Genoese upon their private concernments: whereby they become obnoxious not only to many factions among themselves, but also to oppres­sions from their Neighbours. I could say more herein of our selves, than I shall at present, in regard it might create more jealousies (which are already too many) of those that are, or at least have been, in Government amongst us. But though I will accuse none, yet I must needs say, that I ascribe a great part of our present miseries to this Genoan practice; and heartily wish, this prove not fatal to us at last.

2. Because if we be not senseless we may clearly see, that France's de­sign is absolutely to conquer us: whereas England seeks only (to use their expression) their own security. And therefore in my Logick the inference is plain, that we had better part with something, than lose all, as we are like to do, if we come not to a compliance with England. To make these apparent to any wise man, would be the lighting a Torch to the Sun. Although I know the quite contrary is cast out among us by the friends of France, who would perswade us, that the French seek only to humble [Page]us, and the English to conquer us. But we know the minding of men, is but shooting at random, and that he that means to come near the truth, must have his eye upon the mark of interest, which cannot lye, as men do frequently for it. If any be so foolish, as to be enchanted with such Syrens songs, as are daily sung amongst us; and have more regard to publick news, than the interest of Nations; they may go on, I cannot hinder them: but let me tell them, that I fear they will find at last, the Poets fiction a real truth; and if they stear their own course, meet with the Seamens fate in the Fable, be sung a sleep for a time, that so they may be afterwards, with greater facility drowned and devoured.

3. Because there is no other way or humane means lest us (so far as I can discern) of the Common-wealths continuation. And this is the conclu­sion that follows clearly from the premises. For if we be unable to with­stand them both, or satisfie them both, we must either break their confe­deracy, and have the help of one of them, or the Republick will be ruined.

It will here be demanded, seeing it is both Englands interest and our own to accord, why do we not then come to a compliance.

I will tell you why. Because we judge our Condition better, and they judge it worse, than really it is; and therefore stand upon greater terms, than we will give them. We think things will go better with us in time, and they think they will grow worse. We flatter our selves with vain hopes, and rely upon Brandenburgs Assistance, Spains breaking with our enemies, the Parliament of Englands not supplying that King to carry on the War, and the like, when they know the quite contrary in all humane appearance. [...]or perhaps we are afraid to irritate France, if we should make overtures to England; and England will not give such an umbrage of jea­lousie to France, as to tamper with us, except they be first assured from us of satisfaction. But cannot the effecting this be put into the hands of his Highness and a few others as it was lately, to be privately transacted by them? Here then it is that the shooe pinches, We are a popular State, the people still think, till an enemy comes, they can defend themselves, and therefore our Governors dare not adventure to tender England such satis­faction, as (for ought I see) they will have; lest they either should not be able to perform it, or if they do, should lose themselves with the people. And therefore I foresee, the War will be continued, till we be reduced to that condition, that we shall be necessitated to give them both their de­mands, by publick transaction, or at least that way break with one of them. And on this foundation, I shall now proceed, to guess at that which I think is most likely to befal us.

Sect 11 Conjectures of future affairs. The motions of the ensuing summer likely to be quick and great. As to this Repulick, pro­bably England may get a Bridle to curb us, France the sadle to ride us, Colen a supernumerary girth, Munster a boss of the Crup­per. Our condition deplored and consolated. A caution for Eng­land, and the Orange family. The Authors fears of what will at last befal us. The Spanish Netherlands a dying. The friendship of England and France sick at heart, and cannot live long. That of Spain and England sound at heart, and will recover.

ALthough I have sometimes spent almost whole nights at gazing on the Stars, and could perhaps erect an Astrological Scheme as well as ano­ther; yet I never used that way, nor never shall for guessing at faturities; because I know it is vain to think, we cam spell Gods providence, by their mystical hieroglyphick. Yet let me say it without vanity, I do believe I have made as many conjectures, concerning Kingdoms, States and par­ticular places, as any man of my quality in Europe: not by any enthusia­stick spirit of prophecy, or by Astrology from the Stars; but reasons of State, their interest, and the fundamental maxims of their Government; sometimes out of curiosity only, and sometimes for other ends, but such as are honest I assure you, for none are either better or worse by it, but only my brothers and my self. The reason why I adventure to do this publickly now, is that I may awaken us out of our security, and that we may look about us, and see if possibly we can prevent those things, which it is very probable are coming upon us. Only I desire to do it modestly, as it becomes every Christian; and neither on the one hand to pretend to that certainty, as if we were of Gods Council; no on the other hand to fall un­der Christs rebuke for not discerning the signs of the times, Matth. 16. which are both theological and political, but I am now only treating of the latter, and to that I shall confine my discourse.

Now that we may be quickned to defend our selves, comply with En­gland, and free the Spanish Netherlands from their fears, and our selves from the neighbourhood of the French there, (this being one Reason of State, why we formerly made peace with Spain, lest we should be in con­tinual danger of annoyance from France) and also render their maintain­ing their Conquests among us more difficult, by their being kept uncon­nected with that Kingdom: I shall now proceed to the Conjectures I have made, not with an Astrological confidence, but a Christian allowance of di­vine providence, which strangely alters times and seasons, puls down one and sets up another, confounds the wisdom of the wise, brings to nought the counsels of Achitophels, and turns the great designs and preparations for War, into a happy compliance, and peace as he pleases; and all in in­finite wisdom, though we cannot discern it, the knowledge of Gods [Page]providence even when past or present, and much more when future, being to David, and therfore far more to us. Too Wonderfull for us, Psal. 139. so high that we cannot attaine unto it, and so deepe in the great waters, that the footsteps thereof are not to be traced and knowne. So that we may well say, as of old, Psal. 77. Dei sapientia, & hominum stultitia regunt mundum. First then, if we awake out of our secu­rity, and looke up in the morning of the yeare, we must needs conclude of foule weather the ensuing Summer, the skie is so red, that we may easily per­ceive it portends blood, and the lowest region is so lowring, that we may easily discerne that a tempestuous storme is a gathering; except we be so besotted, as the foolish Jewes of old, with security, that we cannot discerne, as Christ tells them, the signes of the times. Can all Europe allmost be arming, and we a sleepe in the Bed of Security, dreaming of Peace? Besides the incredible preparations of France, is not England, Sweadland, and all our Neighbors allmost up and at worke; and can we thinke they would be at that cost for a Comedy of Peace? have we not all the reason in the World, to thinke it will be to us, a Tragedy of War? Let others enjoy their opinion, and not take the alarme, till they see Hanibal ad portas; for my part, I must needs profes, I cannot, from what I observe, but conclude, that the affaires of the ensuing Summer, are like to be great, and the motions thereof quick, and such as will highly concerne us in these Countreys.

As to this Republick, which hath at this time these four declared Enimies, England, France, Colen, and Munster; I shall briefly speake my thoughts, with reference to them all.

England probably will get, a bridle to curb us. I have shewne in the Preface, what they account the Intrest of the Kingdome: We see notwith­standing the Prince of Orange his promotion, they still pursue the War; and must we not then conclude, that they seeke some thing further? Whether they will by Sea attacque our Coasts, or by marching their Armie about over Land, is not for me to determine; much les what particular places below they may fall upon, or what succes they may have. Yet I conclude they will have some hanke or other upon our Navall power, one way or other, be­fore they make Peace with us; otherwise they will continue the War the following Summer, to try their utmost to get, that which we will not give them.

France that is allready got into the Sadle, will there sit and ride us; though we flatter our selves, we shall by one means or other, shake him out of it, and off our backs. Truly I cannot but wonder often times, to heare what vaine hopes men expres and there's no contradicting them; (allthough some times I cannot conteine my selfe from smiling, or shakeing my head) that France must be content with one or two of our Cities which we can best spare, and with a confidence allmost as large, as if they was ready to run way, or resolved to march out and quit those Cities they have, at our pleasure. As if the French were such sooles, to be at that vast expence, great paines, even the King himselfe personally, and have [Page]such advantage upon us, and quit the same for a thing of nothing? For my part, I am affraid they will rather get more, then lose that they have gotten already. And I know, their designe is, to get all at last. It is true, if we com­ply with England, and so strengthen our selves by them and Spaine, we may thereby hope either to obteine better conditions by Treaty, or compel them thereunto by Force. But I am speaking of the state of the War, as now it stands.

Colen, that pretends to some of those Cities which we held about the Rhyne, that are now in the power and possession of the French, may possibly for his paines, and permission of their passage, &c. get some supernumerary girth, one place or other that may be of no great concernment to France, either for their designes upon us or the Empire, and must be contented there­with. And perhaps for some time his Counsellors may have their Pensions con­tinued from France.

Munster, that is mercinary and fights for Money, will get a bos off the crupper; French Lewis's made and minted of Dutch Ducats. For elective Princes, as Bishops, that are onely for life, seek more to enrich themselves, then to enlarge their Territories, as those doe that are hereditary.

And this is likely, so far as I can see, to prove our condition; except [...] appeare in the Tragedy, or God Almighty by some wonder­full providence, make a change in the Scene of this War. Which, I confess, is very deplorable, which way soever we look; and we are not so sensible of it now, as we shall be hereafter. I had thought here to have sit downe a little with a lamentation, but I have been so large already, that I shall wholly wave it for the present.

And yet it is a had wind that blows no good, we may make this advantage of our miseries, so long as we remain amidst our enimies, when a Peace is once concluded; that we may hold them both fair to us, and so secure our selves a little more in quiet, then we perhaps think, by being ready to close with either, to the great prejudice of the other.

And therefore let me freely insert this important and necessary Caution for England, That they take heed they do not overdo their work; and so far irritate this Republick, that out of a present prejudice and passion, and also despera­tion of their future quietness from them, they call in the French, to be re­venged of them, though it be to their own ruine.

I know many are jealous, that this whole War is onely to make the Prince of Orange a Monarch, and the two Crowns will have no more to do with the States; although I profess, I am far from thinking, that those two Kings and Kingdoms would be at all this expence of blood and treasure for that end onely, and doe believe that if that would set us in our former condition, it would soone be assented unto, not onely by the multitude, but the wiseft men amongst us, who know the extraordinary abilities and great capacities of his Highness. Therefore let me say it freely without offence, either of Him or his Enimies, that I perceive many lay this for a [Page]fundamental maxim, Better a Prince that hath power to defend us, then one whom we must onely defend. And except my eye-sight fail me, some are fast at work in preparing materials to build thereon. A word is enough to the wise, and therefore I will say no more.

Nay I will not dissemble my further fears, That if France keeps those places on the South Sea, and should get others lower, either in Holland or Frieslands, as may capacitate him to incommodate their Trade, though we should have a peace for some time with him, we shall fall into his hands at last. For the French are already so near us on every side, that they hover over us, as a Hawk over the grey, watching onely an opportunity, how they may grasp us in their talons.

If any shall here aske me, Why may we not then as well now become French?

I also shall aske such one Question, which when they satisfie me in, I also shall them. You know certainly you must die at last, (whereas here is onely uncertaine fears) and yet when you are sick, why do you take physick and use means for recovery? Is it not because you desire to live as long as you can? Doe you not account him a mad man, that will cast away his life, al­though he must lose it at the last? And rightly, because who knows what God may doe, and whether he may not recover him, though the disease be desperate?

Having spoke our thoughts concerning these united, we shall now speak of the Spanish Provinces. I have as much smattering skill in Phy­sick, I confess, as would serve me to make Charon a fraight of old Wives; yet am I far from being arrived at the confidence, which I have observed in Ʋrinal-Doctors. And yet for once, I will adventure to try the little skill I have, with those State-Mountebanks, that are so secure concerning the Spanish Netherlands. For my part, I have shak't their Water again and again, and can find nothing but symptoms of death. I shall onely premise that I shall not with an Emperical confidence tell you the time: Kingdoms and States, as well as private persons, sometimes languish out rather then live their last. But that they are so sick, that I see no hopes of their reco­very if this War continues. And I will tell you my feares for the ensuing Summer.

1. The incredible preparations that France makes this Winter, both of Men and Money, as if they would set all at stake for carrying on the following Summers Wars.

2. The Empire's Army is overmatcht with Turens. They know, that we are not in a capacity to recover the Cities we have lost, and that they can­not conquer those that remaine; so that their Armies cannot be designed either for strengthning their owne Garrisons, or forcing of ours. Except they will spend a Summers Expedition upon some inconsiderable out Garrisons, which I cannot imagin.

3. I have looked round about in Europe, where this storme should fall, [Page]and can see no place it hovers over, except those Provinces, and our selves.

4. I consider the eminent advantage France hath at present by their friendship with England; which I feare he will take.

5. Allthough I doe not thinke France will prevaile by all his endeavors with England to breake with Spaine; yet I thinke England will either be em­ployed in doing their owne worke, or not so quickly breake with France, to stop his carriere in over-running those Netherlands.

6 We shall either have the Wars continue, or a Peace. If the former as they are, though England helps not therein, (for they profes in their Decla­ration to maintaine the Treaty at Aken) yea, though they would hinder it, yet I doe not see how they can practically, if they have not prevented it before­hand by their Treaty; nor we to be sure the Wars continuing. If a Peace be concluded, we shall be forced to forsake them; this being the main ground of the quarrel. For if we would have helped France to have ruind them, we might have been quiet for some time at least; but because we had rather quench, then set our neighbors house on fire, lest ours follow in the flames: France hath fallen upon us, and shall we not then thinke that he will cudgell us into such conditions? It is true indeed, if England and we come to understand one another, and our joynt intrest better; we may succor them for some time; but that's not my supposal, of the Wars continuing as they are, which in that case implies a strange complication of diseases, which to me, who knows not their Treaty, seems incurable.

7. And where else they should have assistance to save them, if France will fall upon them, I see not. For the Empire cannot, it is well if they can save themselves. Spaine is at a great distance. May make perhaps some diver­sion in Catalonia, or some small from Millan, &c. But whats that to save those Provinces?

8. We must therefore consider if they can stand on their owne legs, so as to withstand their enimies power, and not to be throwne downe thereby. And here we shall find the number of Spanish inconsiderable; the Dutch very wavering and uncertaine: Some Popish Zealots thinking France can best carry on their designes; others betwixt hopes and feares, wishing they might see an issue; and others plainely despairing of resistance, de­siring they were over. Their Cities great and untenable, severall of them requiring allmost as many to man them well, as they have Spanish in the Countrey. If they can make good Bruxels, Antwerp, Namur, and Oostend, for some time, to see if the affaires of Europe may not alter, it is all I expect. But what shall become of the whole Countrey, and the rest of the Cities, Descriptio Lovani. Bruges, Mechlin, Gant, Lovaine, &c. Some of them as large as most Cities in Europe. Three Noblemen An. 1427. (as Guicciardine tells us) with great charges, had five of the greatest Cities on this side the Alpes measured, and found but, 18 Rods or Perches difference. Of which Lovaine and Gant, the greatest; Paris (within the Walls) and Liege alike; Colen the least. But neglecting to mention the just measure, Guicciardine tells us they [Page]are 6 Italian miles within, and above 8 without the walls. And though this be enough, yet I must needs thinke them more. For having had the curio­sity to measure one of them for all, I found it upon a warme walking within the Walls, three full hours by my watch. And besides this, Paris and Liege are most populous, Colen next, but these of the Netherlands least, so that I leave any rationall man to judge what number of men they require to maintaine them, for I will not now stand to make that calculation. Now if he takes these two great Cities, he is in the heart of Brabant and Flanders, so that all the rest will fall of themselves. I conclude therfore, that except the treaty between France and England secure them, which is unknowne to me; or that God in his all-wise Providence, make some wonderfull chang in the scene of affairs in Europe, the Spanish Netherlands are lost. Having therefore thus tolled their passing bell, we will leave them to Gods mercy, and the King of France's clemency, and hast us out of them to France and England.

And here many perhaps will thinke me litle better than madd, to cross the current opinion of Christendom; when I say that the Friendship of France and England is sick at heart, and cannot live long; and the contrary of that be­twene England and Spaine. But I matter not that, other men have their way of making their measures, and I have mine. And indeed I thought to have communicated it, but this worke having allready exceeded my in­tentions, and that would be a great digression, I would onely tell you my grounds or reasons for the present why I thinke so, and may happily make a particular discourse of the other hereafter.

How France and England came to be so great friends as to agree to commence, and carry on a War thus far against us, is not now mine enqui­ry; but to shew there is no such ground to dispaire of complianee with England, notwithstanding their present league with France, is my designe. And for this end I shall first shew that though this friendship is faire out­wardly, each for their own ends; yet that it is not so cordiall and firme, as many amongst us feare it is. And to say the truth, the consideration hereof, was the first dawning of hopes I had, for the Protestant Intrest, and the good of these Countries. Now allthough I could mention some more private expostulations, and perhaps some of their Articles, allthough I could by no means, ever procure from either side, the knowledge of them all: yet I thinke it not fit to mention these, but such things onely as are publick, and others as well as my self may know, if they use their eye­sight, and observation.

Let us then omitting all secrets and mysteries of State, which yet are the best grounds to make a judgement, when certainely knowne; we will onely mention such things as are publickly apparent, but being not con­sidered in subordination to Reasons of State, were unusefull to the most, for the end I have observed them.

When all Europe stood in doubt what England would doe, and all men on [Page]their tiptoes with expectation; to see whether War or Peace, betwixt that Kingdome and these Countries: upon the Smyrna's Fleet returne, the doubts of many were then decided. The Saturday morning early after the fight, the Fiscale sent his footman to tell me they had fought, with some generalls thereof, and that the Fleet was before the Land: I must confes, I stood amazed at Holmes's furious folly, who had orders onely to bring them up, not to commence a War, the Declaration thereof being not published; allthough to those that would not submit to such orders, it was all one in effect, though not in formalities, which are the greatest plea, that I know of, that the English have for that Action. Upon this I began to consider the Reasons of State as to England, both domestick and for­reign; For I reasoned thus, if this friendship be so firme that England will goe through with France in all their great designes, I must make other mea­sures then I had formerly done. But still finding all Reasons of State against this, and those jealousies of changing Religion and the Government in those Kingdoms frivolous, (as I have demonstrated) I found allso thereby stronger grounds of hope for the Protestant Religion and the common In­trest of Europe; and that it was onely a temporary friendship, out of some particular peake, or designe against these Provinces, which would have an end when satisfaction therein was given to that Crowne. Whilst I am busy in ballancing all the Reasons of State for those Kingdoms, and likewise for their Intrest abroad as comprehensively as I could, the Prote­stants Intrest, the Triple Alliance, the greatnes of France, the danger of England &c. comes the English Declaration of War to mine hands, but without a particular date, contrary to practise, but wisely to colour what Holmes had done. Which having diligently perused, what I desired first to see, I found last to my great satisfaction, and that is that they would support the peace made at Aix la Chappelle, (or Aken) and notwithstanding the prosecution of this War, will maintaine the true intent and scope of the said Treaty, and that in all their Alliances which they have or shall make in the progres of this War, they have and will take care, to preserve the ends thereof inviolable unles pro­voked to the contrary. Whereby I was fully confirmed in my former opinion, so that I will now proceed to relate such things which have publickly past in the management of this War, that are sufficient I thinke to enduce those that are unprejudiced, though perhaps not to convince the obstinate, to be of the same opinion with my selfe, and that the friendship of England and France is not so firme as they have feared. Premising that though all States as Gamesters must and will be cautious in their playing their parts, yet there appeared still more then ordinary jealousies of each others friendship all along, in the management of this War.

1. It is observeable that though France is the Principall in the War, yet they were so diffident of England, that they would have them first to begin it, that so they might see them certainly engaged against us.

2. When they are both engaged, they trust not one another, without [Page]great Hostages as it were on both sides; the French Squadron of Ships with the English and the Duke of Monmouth with the body of an Army with the French.

3. That body of the English, which doubtles should have remained to­gether under their owne generall Officers conjoyned with the French Armie; we know was not trusted by the French so to doe, but were mingled here and there, under the principall command of the French Generalls.

4. The Fleet wherein the English had the principall share of power and command, onely faced ours at first in point of Honour, yet attacqued them not, though they had the wind, whereby they might easily have done it at their pleasure, and also to their Advantage; but stood over againe to the English coast. Which fooles thought was want of valour, but wise men will judge it reason of State, that they might stay and observe what succes the French had by Land. And had not we fallen upon them, for Reasons of State in those circumstances and Government of these Provin­es, that are well knowne, I thinke they would have done, as litle as they could for France; to have fought us to this day.

5. After that fight, though they knew severall of our Ships were laid up, and some thousands of men called out of the Fleet, yet notwithstanding all the Summer after for many weeks, they attempted nothing against us with their Fleet. Intending doubtles to doe their owne worke, as they then saw France did theirs.

6. How the English were startled, at the French's coming to Ʋtrecht was very apparent, which we have formerly mentioned.

7. Why might not England, as well as the rest of the World, thinke that Wesel, Rijnberg, Skenker-sconse, and the rest of our strong out Garrisons might give the French sufficient worke? and the French on the contrary, who had laid their traines before hand, know that when they came to fire them, there was no feare they would mis, and they should faile of having those places? Yea why may they not designe by this meanes to breake both our powers so by Sea, that they may rise up to contend with either of us? I am sure these things are very usuall with Princes and States, and exam­ples of this kind are infinite. Why may we not then thinke that England might hereby designe to breake France's power by Land; and France Eng­lands power and ours also by Sea? How often these two Crowns have played such like games with one another formerly; when England had sooting in France, is apparent from the Histories of both Nations. But we will speake of that which more nearly concerns our selves, and within our own knowledge. In our first War with England I observed, what influence Don Alonzo, the Resident for Spaine at London, had, to fomer those jea­lousies that that Common-wealth had of this, that it was the Kings cause, which this Republick by meanes of the Orange Family had espou­ses, and what assistance Spaine, (which first publickly acknowledged that Common-weath) would afford them, &c. And when we were both en­gaged, [Page]how the Spanish drew their Forces towards our Frontiers, as if they also would fall upon us; and when we declined, withdrew them againe, to encourage us both to continue the War. And in our second War, if France had not a great hand both in contriving and continuing it, wisemen are much deceived, and the French misrepresented to the World. By what inducements they perswaded both sides to a willingnes to that War, I list not mention, nor is there much necessity thereof, they being so well knowne to severall of both Nations. What a hand they had in its continuation, we may easily per­ceive, if we recollect but what passed therein. When the English in the first Battel had bearen us, France being onely a Spectator to ballance England, be­comes our Second; and Monsieur, the Kings onely Brother, and his Lady, Englands onely Sister, were not permitted to use any publick expressions of joy by Bonefires, or otherwise for their Brother the Duke of Yorks Victory over Opdam. Their Fleet under de Duke of Bauford shall come to our as­sistance, which occasiond the dividing of the Englishe's, by which meanes and Monks precipitancy (who would needs fight contrary to the advice of the cheif and best Commanders in the Fleet, as Ascough told us in the Hague) the English are beaten by us. And to boye up England againe, a private League is made betweene the two Crownes, as I have formerly declared from an ho­nourable Author. So that these tricks of State are usuall, though not discern­ed by every eye; nor dare I censure them allwayes for sinfull, except I see manifestly foule play, because I know not the Reasons of State, which are the Grounds of their proceedings.

Having thus shewne, and I thinke sufficiently, that the friendship of Eng­land and France is sick at heart; I shall now proceed to shew, that it cannot live long; but if France goes on, will and must die quickly.

1. Englands intrest will perswade them to this, which they cannot but discerne clearly prompts them to put a stop to France's progres. If any think that they are so blinded with Passion, That to be revenged of us, they will ruin themselves: I am not of their opinion, for many Reasons, which I think I am cleare in; allthough I shall not mention them now, but onely appeale to the issue, whether they or I be in the darke and deceived.

2. The many tricks that France playes them, some whereof I have hint­ed, and severall others might be mentioned, That I know they have attempt­ed, but been disappointed in; cannot but alienate the English from them.

3. A Treaty being the game (as I have said) we shall play at, (which the sooner and better for us) I foresee plainly, that such Cards will be played, as will make it apparent, that the Pack was neither fairly shuffled nor delt, and that the French meane to play at la bete with us both; and if we continue to play, shall come to los [...]ing loadam at last: So that though the French have more of Clubs and Spades in their hands, by which they hope to win the Diamonds, we shall have more of the Hearts between us; and so perhaps save some of our stock at the stake.

4. If England come to receive satisfaction, the spirit of the Nation will [Page]turne the scales. For suppose that should be now, Lib. 6. c. 2. that Comines tells us was heretofore, (which yet is sooner said than proved) yet we must needs thinke that if France deales unfairely with them; they will not onely have a faire oc­casion to desert them, but the King and his Court, the Parliament and People will be more irritated against them, then they are now against us, (as is usuall in such cases) and be readier to joyne with us and fall upon them, then they were to joyne with them against us, for the conservation both of their Re­ligious and Civil Concernements.

5. The Necessity of keeping up the ballance between France and Spaine, will necessitate England to breake with France, or at least hold them to keepe more within their bounds, as we shall more fully shew hereafter.

6. Nay the very defence of these Countries, which we thinke they seeke to ruine, will cause them either to bring France to a peace with us, or themselves to help to defend us against them. For they will never suffer France to have them all, no nor the greatest part of these maritime Provinces, nor the strongest as Holland, if they can possibly hinder it, though they may permit them some part of the Superior, for having themselves a share of the Inferior, as I have formerly shewne. So that our intrest is so far Englands, and is the greatest security we have, next to Gods protection, and our owne strength, that we shall not be wholly overrun and brought under the French. Yea, this is so highly their concernement, that I perswade my selfe, if all the strength of the 3 Kingdoms under the Crowne of England, and all the power of Spaine with them, can hinder it, France shall never gaine them; or if he doe, never quietly posses them.

And these things I thinke are sufficient, to free us from our foolish feares of England; and to perswade us to a compliance with them, seeing we are both so greatly concerned to comply.

We shall now proceed to shew the quite contrary of the friendship be­tween Spaine and England, that it is sound at heart, and will recover. Wherein we need not be so large, because that which shews that the friendship of France and England must die, proves that of England and Spaine will live.

That this friendship is sound on the side of Spaine, none questions; this being the great motive, (though not the onely I confess) that hath kept them from breaking with France.

And that it is allso so on the side of England, I thinke is as cleare to those that considers.

• 1. Their declared intention of maintaining the Treaty at Aix la Chapelle (or Aken) in their Declaration of this War.
• 2. Allthough a provisionall clause, unles provoked to the contrary, in the close thereof, gives them a latitude of breaking with Spaine; yet notwithstanding they have been provoked severall wayes by them, as all know that have ob­served the War, yet they will not breake with them we see; which is a cleare demonstration their friendship is firmer then we imagine.
• 3. The importunities of France, which we know have been great, that [Page] England would engage with them against Spaine allso, hitherto we see, have prevailed nothing therein.
• 4. The assurance we know England hath given the Court of Spaine, both there and at Bruxels, concerning the Spanish Netherlands, makes us not doubt of their intentions; allthough we doe of France's, by reason both of their preparations and opportunities, as we have formerly shewne. But if France should fall upon them, as we have reason to feare; that will prove both our Assertions the stronglier, making the friendship of England and France die immediately, and that of Spaine and England quickly recover. And if this save not those Provinces for the present, there's nothing (so far as I see) under Heaven that can, as I have formerly said.

We perceive then the pulse of this friendship beates both strong and or­derly enough, to secure us from all feares of its dying; lets visit the patient once more, and we shall find no further need of such Physitians advise, as the Author of la France Politique, in his Avis important à l'Angleterre, pag. 471. and that the distemper was onely a fit or two of an Ague the last Spring, and therefore so far from being dangerous, that it may prove rather physicall ac­cording to the Proverb, An Ague in the Spring, is Physick for a King: And that the Body Politick of Spaine in their friendship with England is recover­ing, as well as the King of Spaine personally is recovered.

1. If we consider the Common intrest of Europe wherein the English not onely are, but allso profes themselves concerned. And for this I need not any other proofe, but the Triple Alliance Jan. 23. 1668., and the Declaration of this War, both which whosoever reads, must needs acknowledge this for truth.

2. The great Intrest of Trade which the English have in the Spanish Do­minions. The very effects the Merchants had standing out there, were com­puted at the beginning of this War, at sixteen Millions. And can we thinke the King will easily forgoe his Customs, and the Kingdome their Commerce with those Dominions? Which in my calculation, is equall with that they have with all Europe besides.

3. We know that they have lately made a peace in the West Indies, and how peremptory they are in the observance thereof; so that the Governor of Jamaica upon complaints of him, was sent prisoner to London, clapt up in the Tower, &c. And shall we thinke then, that they will breake into War at home?

4. England cannot but be sensible of the greatnes of France, and cannot be so senseles, but they must needs thinke, that it is their concernement that he grow not so great, that he become their Master allso at last? And the whole World knowes that Spaine not onely hath been now for many yeares the ballance for them; but still must be so upon the Continent, or none: The Princes of the Empire being now so divided between the Imperiall and French Crowne. What wise man therefore can thinke now that Spaine declines, but that the Empire and England are highly concernd to support them? And shall we thinke then that in stead of this, either should help forwards their downfall? For my part, were there no other reason of state, [Page]but this, I should not fear Englands breaking with Spaine; and especially now that they see what progres France hath made amongst us.

5. This hath been a fundamental Maxim in the Governement of Eng­land, to keep the ballance even betwixt the two Crownes of Spaine and France, ever since Lewis the Elevenths time, who seised on Burgundy, which was for­merly the usual Confederate with England against France. In place whereof Austria first, and after Spaine obteining the rest of the Provinces that were un­der Charles, last Duke of Burgundy, by marriage of his daughter; England after still had an eye to them in reference to France. And when the Civil Wars in these Provinces broke out, and England was jealous of France's being our Protector: Q Elisabeth would not permit it, still having respect to the House of Burgundy, as Thuanus and Cambd [...]n in the forecited places shew.

And thus you have my Conjectures, with such Reasons of State whereon they are grounded as are publick, and may therefore be publ [...]shed: I having industriously declined, all reflections on private Transactions, Treaties, and Articles whatsoever, that so no side may have any just occasion of being of­fended with my writing.

Sect. 12. France's Ambition. Crowing greatnes. The cause thereof. We and England in the fault. The Common Intrest of Europe to op­pose France particularly declared of the Empire, Spaine, England, Denmarke, and this Republick and Hans Townes. Yea of Sweden, Savoy, and Switzerland. The ballance of Europe to be kept even, and by whom.

To those that know the World, the ambition of France cannot be unknown. Lets but look a litle about us, and we shall see the French Intrest is every where driven on. To set this forth in its right-colors, would require Volums rather then Pages. We shall therfore doe as the Painter, that instead of drawing the Giant at length, drew onely his Thumb; or as Geographers that set forth great Countreys in small Maps. And for this we shall not looke far backwards to former times, but onely our owne, since France recovered of those strong Convulsions, by the Civil Wars and Dissentions in Mazarines time, in the minority of his present Majesty. And we shall find sufficient, to awaken the most part of Princes and States in Europe, to looke to themselves. The Invasion of the Spanish Netherlands; the taking the French Comte (though after restored to the Spanish) and Lorreigne, which they still keepe; the engageing a strong party of the Electors, and Princes of the Empire for their Intrest; the worke they have made in Poland and Hungary, that that Crowne might be at their disposal, and this diverted; their taking the Swede off the Triple Alliance, and obliging him to give the Emperor worke in Germany, and Brandenburgh in Prussia, with a great sum of Money; some say and Print allso 60 Tun of Gold, or 600000 l ster­ling; [Page]the endeavours they have used with Portugal to give Spaine a diversion, though that Kingdom is not in a capacity to serve their designes; the worke allso they have made in Italy; their intresting themselves in all Treaties all­most in Europe; the Pensions they allow to Ministers of State in most Princes Courts, and many other wayes they take to enlarge their Empire. Those that are desirous to see their designes, may consult the late Author of La France Politique ou ses desseins executez & à executer. And especially the ingenious discours of the Baron of Isola, in's Bouclier d'Estat & de Justice Article 6. where he shows France's aspiring to the Ʋniversal Monarchy, and by what maxims and means, they advance apace towards it; and as their ambition is great, so their pretentions are boundles. Who knows not how they pretend, not onely to the Spanish Netherlands, but the whole Empire? Des justes pre­tentions du Roy sur l'Empire, par le Sieur Aubery Advocat au Parliament, & aux conseils du Roy. Printed at Paris 1667. And there are Aubery's, or at least Advocates enow in Paris, to draw up pretensions to the Crowne of Eng­land; and so of one Kingdome and State after another, according as their Swords shall be able to pursue them.

And indeed such is the growing greatnes of that Kingdome, that it is be­come formidable to all Europe. I need not insist on this the World is suffici­ently sensible of it; but it may be worth our pains to enquire into the causes thereof.

France formerly had severall boundaries to their Ambition, which by degrees they have broken downe. Severall Dukes, on the one side that of Normandie, Comines, 1, 6. c. 3. and the English after who for 400 years together latè dominati sunt in Gallia; till Charles the 7. his time; and that of Bretagnie, till Charles the 8 gained it to the Crowne of France, by the marriage of Anne, Daughter of Francis the 2. the last Duke thereof; and on the other side the Dukes of Bungundie, till Lewis the 11. who after the death of Charles the last Duke slaine at the Battell of Nancey, seized thereon, and united it to the Crowne of France. These three Potentates kept the French Kings continually under, by their Confederations and Wars against that Kingdome. Which Bands, they having once broke, they became at liberty to get more elbow-room in the World; and become the largest, compactest, and strongest Kingdom of Europe, were it not that their owne intestine Divisions, and frequent Civil Wars hath often weakned them.

After France had arrived at this greatnes, the following Kings Charles the 8. Lewis the 12. and Francis the first, fruitlesly spent the Kingdoms strength in their Wars in Italy; till Francis and Charles the 5. became com­petitors for the Empire, and Spaine and France a fit match for each other in power. Since which time such mighty contests have been betwixt those two Kingdoms, as have filled all Europe with terror and amazement, and all Historians with their Actions. But how France hath so far prevailed, as we see at present, is partly by our owne, and partly by the English fault; we by Commission, and they by Omission, as we shall (with what bre­vity [Page]we can) make apparent, in regard it may be usefull to us both.

During the reigne of Charles the 5. and Francis aforesaid, the Reforma­tion of Religion begun, which occasioned great alterations to the Kingdom of France, and to the Kings of Spaine in these Low Countries. Wherein the Crowne of Spaine continued to prosecute their intrest, in breaking downe the power of France by all means possible, and especially by joyning with the Guisian faction which stiled themselves the Holy-League, under pretense of oppo­sing the Protestants. Those great contests which the severall factions in France clothed with the glorious mantle of Religion, are well knowne to those that are conversant in their Histories, and are particularly declared by many; but best in my judgement, on the Protestants side by Beza, the Author (though not named) of those 15 Bookes, he stiles Commentariorum de Statu Religionis & Reip. in Regno Galliae, sub Henrico. 2. Franciso 2. Carolo 9. & Henrico 3. And on the Papists by Davila in his excellent Historie of the Civil Wars of France. In which Contests, in the Reigns of the four forementioned Kings, the Successors of Francis the 1, and in the times of Henry the 4. who succeded them; the Protestants (called there Hugonots) got into their Possession, above 300 Garrisons and Forts in that Kingdome.

On the otherhand France was not asleep, or awanting to prosecute their intrest, in fomenting, promoting, and carrying on those divisions in these Low Countries; to breake downe the power of Spaine, into whose hands they had fallen by marriage (as we have said) and to remove the obstacle, which these Provinces constantly were, to their advancing their designes. For which end they continually assisted us, and whilst they pretended to fight our Battells; at our charges they really fought their owne. And lest the House of Austria so nearly allied to Spaine, should afford them further assistance, they ingage Sweden to invade the Empire, and give the Emperor worke at home, allowing A. D. 1631. Gustavus Adolphus 300000. Franks for levying an Army, and a Million yearly for paying them, (every Frank being two Shil­lings sterling) as in the years 1625. and 1635. they fathering all the Empire did on Spaine, engaged us allso in more firme and constant Leagues against them. This being the true State of those times between those two Crownes, we therein thus doubly miscarried, and erred both in our Civil and Religious Intrest.

First in that we thought we could never bring Spaine low enough, nor assist France sufficiently against them. In this blind zeale we went a great deale too far, though nothing the length that France desired: For had we listned to their suggestions, we had to this day continued our Wars with Spaine, and so have done their worke for them. What arts France used to disswade us from peace with Spaine, may be seen in their Historian Priol, De Rebus Gallicis, L. 10. as well as our owne, concerning the Treaty of Munster. But the States seeing the successes of France, of whose greatnes they now at last, and in­deed too late, became jealous; to which they were the more awakened, by the French approaches towards us in Flanders, and taking of Dunkirke, it [Page]being their owne proverb Aye le Francois pour ton Amy, non pas pour ton voisin: they resolve to take the opportunity which was put into their hands by Spaine; who despairing of peace with France, sought nothing more then to take off their confederates, the Swede, and these united Provinces espe­cially, by concluding a peace with us, and procuring one allso between the Empire and Sweden. For knowing their owne weaknes, and great worke on their hands, by the revolt of Portugall, Rebellion in Catalonia, the doubt­full condition of Naples, the frequent losses they had received, and their want of men and money to war every where; they offerd us equall condi­tiors; and we privately without the knowledge either of the French Ple­nipotentiaries, or the Mediators ( Chigie from the Pope, and Contaren from the State of Venice) except them at last, and a peace is made betwixt us at Munster, January 30. 1648. and quickly after between the Empire and Sueden at Osnaburg August the 6. in the same yeare. By which meanes Spaine was freed from our Wars, had opportunity of Prosecuting theirs against Portugall, and of creating France trouble at home by joyning with the Con­dean fact on, in the greatnes of Mazarine, and the minoritie of his pre­sent Majesty. This peace so stuck on the Cardinals stomack, that neither He nor that Kingdome have ever digested it: but because we would not war for them any longer, resolved they would war against us at last: though if we had not done that too long, they had never done this so suc­cesfully.

Secondly we help forward France's greatnes and our owne destruction, by helping to destroy the Protestant Intrest in that Kingdome. For as France had the power of Spaine to keep them in on every side; so they had allso a curb of the Protestants at home, to check them in their exorbitant designes. Who from the beginning of the Reformation under Francis the first, Henry the 2d, and Francis the 2d had growne to that strength and greatnes, that they grew formidable to the Crowne of France. And not­withstanding the Massacre of Merindel and Chabries A. D. 1545. and the 8 several civill Wars that was made against them; (by Charles the 9, and 3 by Henry the 3) the great Massacre at Paris 1572. yet God so blest them and multiplied them, that in the yeare 1560 there was reckoned above 1250 Churches of them, and by their severall capitulations with the two forementioned Kings at the end of their civill Wars, and the Conni­vance of Henry the 4 formerly Head of their party, they got 300 at least Garrisons and forts for their defense, which he used to call, the Common­wealth of Rochel, that and Montauban being their principall places of strength. From whom they obteined severall immunities, but especially that of the liberty of their Religion; which he confirmed to them by the ratification of the severall concessions of his Predecessors in the Edict of Nantes, 1598, passed in the Parliament of Paris February the 25 in the following yeare. Allthough the promulgation thereof, out of respect to Cardinal Medices was deferd, till March the 2. 1599. Which he then [Page]vehemently prest, begining his speech with a strange prodigie that had fallen out betwixt Himselfe and the Duke of Guise 26 yeares before, who being about to play at tables in the presence of many Nobles, there ap­peard drops of blood, which though once and againe wiped off, yet new still were perceived, and none knew whence; there being not any in the roome that bled; which he then declared for a sad omen of much blood, that should be shed betwixt them two, which having accordingly happend to his great grief, he desired to take away all further occasions of their civill Wars by publishing that edict &c. which may be seen in Thuanus. Lib. 122. This great King by name and merit, having fought 140 battels and skir­mishes with his owne hands, beleagured 300 Cities and forts, was no sooner shine by the dagger of that Rascally villane Ravillac, in the midst of his greatest glory and designes; But his Son and Successor Lewis the 13. confirmes the same, May the 22. 1610 wherein he acknowledges that, Experience having taught the Kings his Predecessors that the fury and violence of Armes had not onely been unprofitable to draw their subjects to the Romane Church, but was rather hurtfull: which made them have recourse by a more happy Counsel, to mildnes, granting them the exercise of the Reformed Religion they professed: in whose imitation his father (Henry the 4) had made the Edict of Nantes, to re­concile all his loving subjects: the observation whereof, had setled and assured quiet amongst them, which had ever since continued without interruption. And declares that though that Edict be perpotual and irrevocable, and by that meanes hath no need to be confirmed by any new declarations; yet to the end his subjects may be as­sured of his love and intention to have the said Edict inviolably kept (being made for the good and quiet of his subjects) therefore it is ordained by him with the advice of the Queen Regent, Princes of the blood &c. that the same be kept inviolably; and those that shall infringe it, severely punished, as troublers of the publick peace of the Kingdome, &c. Yet notwithstanding all this, the King being provoked by them, is induced, much against his inclination, to War against them whom he declared Rebels 1621. and tooke many of their cautionary Townes from them, yet this was at last composed. and they reserved Rochel and severall other places still for their defence. But afterwards, at the instigation of Cardinal Richelieu, (not out of any zeale for his Religion being called the Hugonot Cardinal, but of Policy to free France from their feares of the Protestant party at home) with much regret the King makes War against them againe 1625. and sent to the States for Twenty sayle of Men of War according to the late Treaty, which was assented unto, though with great reluctancy, and they was sent under Admiral Hauthain; which were especially instru­mentall of ruining the Protestants power at Sea, and of Rochel aftewards, and consequently all the power that party had left under the Duke of Rohan, with nere 50 places for their Protection: All their Cautionary Townes being dismantled, and they having no other shelter, but the shaddow of the Almighty, and their Kings clemency left them to flie unto for their de­fence. So that as I wish we had otherwise imployed our power, so I pray [Page](as Schookius Imperi­um mari­timum, c. 27. in our first War with England, Deum rego, fillis & nepotibus non imputet, quae a parentibus facta fuerunt) that God may not lay this sin to our charge. The Protestants having thus made their last will and Testament, whereby the Crowne became sole heir and executor of all they had, Lewis the last thereby became the greatest Monarch since Charles the Great; his pre­decessors having reduced the many Provinces dismemberd from France by Hugh Capet into one entire body, and he all the parts thereof to the entire subjection of the Crowne; and that Kingdome at liberty to look abroad, and carry on their designes where they please, having for this end gained 3 keys to their neighbor Kingdoms, Pignerol to enter Italy; Brisack Germa­ny, and Perpignan Spaine.

We have seene how we have gon against our intrest in overdoing our worke; lets now see how England have been no les guilty, in not doing their duty; wherein they have not onely been greatly awanting to themselves, but more to the Protestant intrest in Europe.

The Protestants in France having by Armes, Treaties, Concessions, and Confirmations of severall Kings, obteined that strength which we have de­clared: There could be nothing more clearly the intrest of all those of the Reformed Religion, and especially their Neighbors then to support them in their just rights; Which Queen Elizabeth and her Council so well under­stood, that though she had assisted these Provinces both with money and men considerably, whereby she had drawne upon her a War with Spaine which was very costly to her, and allso occasioned the Rebellion in Ireland, which to reduce stood Her and her Kingdom of England in 4 yeares time no les, if we take Morisons accompt, then 1198000 L. Sterling: yet she neglects not to supply Henry of Navar against the Guisian league and faction for the support of the Protestants, with 101560 franks for the Baron of of Donna to raise an Army in Germany, A. D. 1587, for his service: and 71165 besides 20000 she spent in sending 4000 men under the conduct and command of the Lord Willoughby A. 1589. and 33333 to levy an Army un­der the Prince of Anhalt, Camdeni Annales 1590. for the service, and as much money she lent Navar himselfe, the following yeare 1590 and continually upon all occa­sions supported him and the intrest of the Reformed Religion in those Kingdoms, so that she was publickly prayed for by the Hugonots as their Protectoresse.

No sooner was this great Princesse dead, whose glory yet will never dye, Lib. 129. (being accounted by her very enemies the Guisians, the most glorious that ever swayed Scepter, gloriosissima, & omnium quoe unquam sceptrum gesta­runt, foelicissima famina, as Thuanus tells us, adding many great elogiums of her, and conluding none ever was or will be like her of that sex:) and King James called in, to succeed in that Crowne: but the French, though they had underhand opposed the conjunction of those two Kingdoms all they could, having still made use of Scotland formerly in their Wars with England for a diversion to them, by setting them upon entring that King­dom [Page]at the back doore betwixt them; and as loath allso that such an ac­cession of power should accrew to their old enemies the English; yet now they are the first that come with a splendid Embassage, to welcome him to his new Crownes, This King, if he had had as much of the Lions courage, as he had of the soxes cunning and Kingcraft as he called it; how happy had it bene both for his owne family, and his Kingdoms! But as he was the occasion of the sad disasters that happend to both, as is shewne not only by the Historians, but particular Authors in the English tongue, Rushworth Welden. Osburne, &c. so I shall now briefly shew how he occasioned many and great irreparable losses to the Protestant intrest abroad, especially by his pusillanimity.

How he perswaded this Republick to a 12 yeares Truce with Spaine, and how prejudiciall it was to these Provinces, is well knowne. How earnestly he was prest to assist his son the Palsgrave, both by forreigne Princes abroad, and his Parliaments at home, I need not mention: nor how he spent more in Embassies, their traines and Treaties, then would have done his worke with men of Armes and traines of Artillery. I shall onely speak of that relating to the French Protestants, as the proper subject of my discourse.

When Lewis the 13 set upon reducing the Cautionary Townes which the Protestants had in his Kingdome, by the grants of severall Kings (as we have said) and the distressed sought to the Crowne of England for Reliefe: K. James according to his usuall custom, onely imployes Embassadors, the Lord Herbert once and againe; whom the French delayd with words, till they had done their worke. For knowing King James's temper too well, Luynes the High Constable of France, Howels Hist. of Lewis 13. A. 1621. being appointed to give Herbert au­dience, first sets a Gentleman of the Reformed Religion behind the hang­ings, that being an eare-witness of what past, might relate to the Refor­mists, what small grounds of hope they had, of having succors from the Crowne of England; and then in stead of hearkning to his Embassage, in a most insolent manner affronted both his Master and himself with me­naces: which when he could not brooke, but roundly replyed, His Master then knew what he had to doe, and offered the Constable who was chollerick thereat, the satisfaction of his Sword; the French Embassador misrepre­sents what past to K. James, and procures Herbert to be called home, and the Earle of Carlile is sent in his place, to as little purpose as before. Nor was this the worst, for the Duke of Guise obteined 8 English sayle of men of War to joyne with him against the Rochellers and them of the Religion to distres them by Sea, as the Count of Soissons did by Land (for which the Duke of Buckingham was after questioned in Parliament) and thus the greatest part of the Protestants power was broke downe, and had been wholy, but that the French had not then time by reason of the Spanish worke in the Val­tolin; so that a peace was skind over for a small time, till they had leisure to open the wound againe, and make the poore Patients bleed their last. These things caused great complaints of England every where amongst them of the Reformed Religion, and occasioned Deodate's saying, that King [Page]Jame's sins of omission, were greater then all his Predecessors sins of Commission.

Though the pacification was published at Montpellier, yet Richelieu being made Minister of State and chief Director of affaires in France, A. 1624; he made it his first worke to go on with the designe of destroying the Pro­testants power in that Kingdome; and though the King was against it at first, yet the Cardinal carried it on at last, so that afterwards he said, He had taken Rochel in spight of three Kings, meaning his owne England and Spaine. For the accomplishing this worke, the Eagle-eyed Richelieu foreseeing that England and these States might stand in his way and obstruct him, he resolves to charme us both to a compliance. For which end France makes a stricter league with these Ʋnited Provinces, affords us 1600000 franks yearly for the two next following, to be repaid the two next years after our peace with Spain, agrees for ships for their service, &c. And for England, though they knew K. James would not disturb their designes, yet not knowing what the Prince of Wales might doe, there were meanes used to ingage him, by a Match with Henriette the onely Daughter then unmarried of Henry the 4. K. Iames who was desirous to match his onely son Considerably, had for 9 or 10 year beene. Courting of Spaine to this purpose, that so with one he might have the Pala­tinate restored to the Palsgrave; and the Prince of Wales, having past through France incognito into Spaine, to make love personally to the Infanta, and see with his owne eyes if fame belied not her beauty; and being there still de­layed, but not denyed (the Spanish desiring to see all the Daughters of France first matcht, to prevent an alliance betwixt England and that Kingdome) and the busines of the Palatinate still kept in suspence; he is commanded home by his Father K. James. But having seen the Lady Henriette at a maske, in his passage through France, under the notion of an English Gentleman, and being taken with her beauty, more then the Infanta's; overtures are made of a Marriage with her, and though some in the French Council, were rather for her matching to Lorraigne (that so those Territories might be gained to France, which had been long troublesom to them) yet this reason of State, of obliging him not to interrupt their designe of ruining the Protestants, and prevent his marrying with Spaine prevailed, and in 9 moneths time a Match is concluded.

Richelieu thinking France secure of these two they most feared; falls to worke to reduce the Hugonots Cautionary Townes. Upon which Soubeze and Blankart goe for England to implore K. Charles (his Father K. Iames being then dead) his assistance. This good King thinks himselfe obliged in conscience and honour, notwithstanding his marriage with the King of France's sister, to support them. And indeed so he was, for the Ambassa­dors and Agents of the Crowne of England, had become Caution to those of the Religion, for the King of France's performance with them. He ther­fore sends 150 sayle of ships and an Army of 10000 men; under the Com­mand of the Duke of Buckingham, to take off that odium which was upon him in England, for what was formerly done under K. Iames. Who pu­blished [Page]a Manifesto in the K. of Englands name July the 21. 1627. decla­ring that though there were other grounds sufficient for a War, as the abuse of the English Merchants, their ships and goods seized on, and the extra­ordinary equipping for Sea in France; yet that the sole cause of the War, was the Crowne of France's not performing of Articles with those of the Re­formed Religion. This expedition, and the causes of its miscarriage, is writ by a learned pen Expedi­tio in Re­am Insu­lam. authore Edovardo Herbert Baronc de Cherbury. and well knowne from the moderne Histories of both Kingdoms. The French and English both proceed, the former in carrying on, the latter to prevent if possible, their designes. For which end K. Charles sent the Earle of Denbigh with another Fleet, which was able to effect nothing; and the Earle of Linzey with the last ( Buckingham being assasinated by Felton the day before he was to embarke) But before Linzey came, such stupendous workes were raised (of which Bertius hath writ a particular booke) and so pallisadoed, that the Cardinall sent to the English Admirall, that he should have a pasport with 6 of his ablest Commanders, to come a shore and view the works, and if they thought Rochel relievable, he would raise lost Rochel, upon which followed the Duke of Rohan and the rest of the Reformists compliance, the dismantling of their remaining Garri­sons (above 40 whereof Mantauban was the last) and a peace with Eng­land, and those of the Reformed Religion in France.

Since which time what mighty dessignes have been contrived, and car­ried on by the two Cardinalls, Richelieu and Mazarine, for that Kingdome abroad, whose plots they are still pursuing; is not unknowne to those that are curiously inquisitive. How the former wrought the revolt of Portugal, the Rebellion in Catalonia, the carrying on the Wars in these Countries, to bring downe Spaine; set on foot and fomented the distractions of Great Britaigne, first by the Scots, and afterwards by other means, to give Eng­land worke at home: tamperd with Wallesteyne for betraying the Impe­riall Army, for whose death he most pastionately wept, failing thereby of his hopes, of France's speedy comeing to the Empire: engaged Sweden to serve their ends in Germany; tooke Pignerol to keep Italy in aw: Lorraigne is taken; the Dukes of Savoy, Mantua, and Modena are wholly at France's service: and the Princes Electors, especially the Ecclesiasticall, rather courting the favour of that Crown, then the Imperiall This was the true State of France, at the death of Richelieu in 42 and the King his Master, who quickly followed him, May 14. 1643. the same day of the yeare his father died, and wherein he was Crowned. Which I have beene the larger in, first because tis for the most part the same now, and in seve­rall things greater than then, especially by their alliance with England, and success against these and the Spanish Netherlands: and 2. that it might ap­peare, how far they have overgrowne Spaine in power, that so the world may be awakend, and see to lop off their superfluous bowes, lest they grow in time like Nebuchadnezars tree, so great that they overshadow us all. [Page]For Mazarine succeeding Richelieu as Minister of State, who was his onely Scholler that proved his paralel, to which two Clergy-men let me say it, for it is a truth (though I know the Laity may stomack it) France owes their present greatnes; the first 5 yeares after till 48 that tumultuous Nation was ne­ver wiselier governed in the non-age of their Soveraigne: and though in the next lustre or five yeares following till 53, they had some aguish fits that shaked them in their civill wars, yet they soone recovered thereof, and have ever since growne stronger and stronger. So that it was high time for the Neighbour Nations no longer to dance after the fidle of France. And the States saw this, and therefore made peace, as I have said; but England herein offended againe, and prevaricated in the common intrest of Europe. Let me shew how briefly, because it may satisfie perhaps the curiosity of some that have wondred at it, as much as my selfe, in regard they have been ignorant of the true grounds thereof.

When Cromwel the Hanibal of the English Common-wealth, and immortal enimie and Terror to Rome, came to have the power of those three King­doms in his hands; he saw it necessary to engage those Nations and imploy his Armies in a forreigne War; for without an Army he could not maintaine the power he had got, and without imploying them he could not quietly enjoy it (Armies being like raised them) and besides this necessity of in­trest, his own inclination strongly carried him, and perhaps some extra­vagant hopes, to pull downe the Pope; for he once said to Lambert, were I as young as you, I should not doubt to knock at the gates of Rome before I died. Spaine and France both courted him, knowing what mettal his sword was made of, and his Iron-sides wore; of which competition he made his advantage, ob­teining such conditions of France, as were a wonder to all, that understood the maxims of their Government. That which most inclined him to the French, was that he judged Spaine and Austria the two strongest Hornes of An­tichrist, whose fall was come as one of his Prophets (whom I could name) in­spired him, and that France might be brought to renounce Rome; intend­ing withall to get such places in Flanders and over against the coast of Eng­land, that he might keep the Dutch in aw, and with a few of his Ships command a toll for the passage in the Channel, as the Dane did in the Sound. A League thereofore is made with France, March 23. 1657 for a yeare, and renewed the next, by Lockard his Ambassador, who for his parts and saga­city was so acceptable to Mazarine, that he had more acces to him, and busines with him, then all the Ambassadors at Paris besides. These two Cromwel, and the Cardinal the stronglier to carry on their designes, take in the King of Sweden for a third into their confederacy ( Christina having re­signed that Crowne, and wandring about like a blazing Comet) and these three Leagued together made the Triumvirate of those times.

Sweden was to pluck the plumes of the Roman Eagle, when he had clipt the wings of his Neighbours, that they might not fly upon the prey he left [Page]behind. Wherein Oliver so concerned himself, that when the Dane had got the Dutch for his second, he sent Montague to boye up Swedens sinking intrest in the Sound: and they were so neere an engagement, that they had certainly fought, had not the English espied an Advice-Yacht coming towards them, which bringing them newes of the Protectors death, they hoyst up failes, and returnd home.

France was to pull downe Spaine by Land, with his own forces, and such as the Protector could spare. Which Lockard the Embassador there com­manded. Who having beene more used to fight in the field, then play the pioneers with their spades, were not so much esteemed at first by the French: till the sight with Don John of Austria's Army which came to relieve Dun­kirke, wherein they behaved themselves with that gallantry, that Don John cryed out he was beat by raging wild beasts rather then men; and that great Soldjer the Prince of Conde hath often said since, that he never saw the like action, as was that day performed by the English Shortly after Dunkerke yielded, and was put into the English hands.

The Protector was to bring downe Spaine by Sea, which he said he would do, or he and his should live on bread and water. Intending allso to carrie on the designe, which Sidney, Rawleight and several of the wisest men of the Indies; but as she had too many irons in the fire to carry on that worke, so how he miscarried in it, is sufficiently knowne. And indeed he had broke Spaines Naval power much more then he did, allthough he did a great deale at Tenerif and elsewhere, had it not been for a small accident that happend, which was this. Admirall Blake, who still principled his seamen in those Confusions and frequent Revolutions of Government, that the Fleet served no Parties nor Persons, but the English Nation; having brought some of his great ships before Tunis, batterd down the Castle and compeld them to his termes; for which extraordinary service he expected the reward of gra­titude at least: In stead thereof, by his next Advice from England he hath a pardon sent him, for endangering, the Fleet in such an attempt without or­der, &c. Which so stuck on the stomack of that stout and sturdy Stoick, that afterwards the Spanish Fleet coming on the maine Ocean off Cadiz; He reading his Commission, and finding it onely for fighting them in the Medi­terranean, would not fall on them, though the Commanders Sollicited him, promised to answer it for him, &c. onely was willing to fight if the Spanjards begun; but though the English provoked them to it, and affron­ted them all they could, yet the wary Spanjard was wiser then to ingage, and so saved themselves; at which Oliver stormed not a litle, but Blake cared not much, the Admirall heereby crying quits with the Generall.

Thus you see what great things a little blind zeale may doe. And indeed it is not so much to be admired at in him, he having had such an enthusiasti­call heat, as all know, that knew him well; nor can we wonder so much, if his head sometimes run round, who was so continually wrapt up in [Page]such whirlepooles of affaires, as he was perpetually plunged in: though to miscarry in so great a concernment for the Protestant Intrest, was a capitall crime in him above all others; who designing to pul down the Pope, Grotius de jure bel. & pac. l. 2. c. 22. vo­luntatem implondi vaticinia, sine Dei, mandato, non essè causam bellit by bringing downe Spaine, set up France to ruine the Protestants throughout Christendome. Thus Ludit in humanis divina potentia rebus!

But these three lived not long to goe on with these designes, and in­deed it was well for the world they did not. Oliver went first, at which Ma­zarine, was secretly glad, saying when the newes was brought him as he was at play, there's then a fortunate foole gon. But this was but to trample upon a dead lion, whom he so ridiculously feared before, that his greatest Confidents made themselves privately merry therewith. Knowing how uncivily for this, he put the King of England out of France; and the Duke of Yorke allso notwithstanding his service, and the Cavalries acclamations of vive's to him, and curses of the Cardinal: Yea how after his death he fea­red his shaddow, for in the Isle of Fesant 59 at the interview of the two Kings and their Courts, where the marriage was made, and peace conclu­ded betwixt them, (which Mazarine had reserved for his owne glory) and the King of great Britaine being there received by Lewis de Haro at first with the height of a Spanish complement in the depth of the mire, and treated after with all civility: yet the Cardinal, though courted by the Duke of Or­mond, durst not speake with him, for feare of Lockard that was present at the Treatie. But though the crafty Cardinal was no coward, yet thus feare­full, and timorously was he cautious for Him, whom I know he hated above all Mortals, and that Common-wealth above all people in the world; as I can many wayes make apparent, if it was of any importance to the publick.

But to be briefe, Olivers other two Consorts followed after him quickly, and these three Conquerors, being cut of by death, who kept all Christendome in aw whilst they lived, the world had a little quiet, till France got a horseback again in Flanders.

But betwixt and that time was that great change in England by the won­derfull providence of God in the restoration of his Majesty, by which meanes the French got Dunkirke again into their hands, and were therby ca­pacitated, the better to carry on their worke against these Countries. Atwhich the French made themselves merry, and some say abusively, by having Dunkirke drawn with a purse hanging over it: The English stormed, and some swore Oliver would have sold his great nose, rather then Dunkerke. Yea this still sticks on many of their stomachs; I remember at my last being in England in 66, and seeing Clarenden House; and wondring a little why it was situated so neer the roade, which made it both unfree, and molested with dust; and critising upon some other things, the Oratory especially, that the Chancelor that was the eldest Son of the Church of England, should make his Chappel, as a wag writ of Emanuel Colledge's, so awry: Just North and South, yea verily: when I came above on the leads I was so pleased with [Page]the pleasantnes of the prospect, that I thought for that it might compare with any House I had seen, knowing no place in England except above Greenwich, that I thought comparable to it, upon which the domestick had the confidence, perceiving me a stranger, to tell me I could not thence see Dunkirke; for the Commonality had Christened it, and made Dunkirke the Godfather, calling the House after its name. But though I confess it was against the Common Intrest of Europe, that it should fall to the French againe; yet whether it was against the Intrest of the King of England, and that Kingdome, is not so cleare to me. I will onely say this, that I know a person hath weighed that so well, that I shall carry this chal­lenge for him, That if any Gentleman, English or French, pleases fairely to state this Question in hypothesi, according to the circumstances of those times, let him take which side thereof he pleases, and use what weapons he will (and I think thats very faire) and he shall not want an Antagonist, that shall fight him fairely, whether he pleases to appeare in Roman buf, or in his halfe shirt made of his owne mothers language, upon the publick Thea­ter of the World. And truly his designe is so honest, I dare be his Com­purgator, and being a litle acquainted with it, I shall tell you briefly: It is to let men see, how hard it is sometimes to discerne on which side the true intrest of State lies, (there being so many circumstances considerable, which often in the Scale of Policy, weigh heavier then that which by­standers think the maine) and therby allso to check the sawcines of every shopkeeper, who like the litle Spanish Dons, will be censuring Princes Counsels, and condemning Ministers of State, though they are ignorant of the grounds of their Actions, and much more of that which is true policy.

Having thus shewne the true State of France, and its continuall growing greatnes downe to the times of his present Majesty, who hath not onely got Dunkirke, regained Lorraigne, conquered a great part of Flanders from the Spanish but three Provinces allso entirely from the States: It will clearely fol­low to be the Common Intrest of Europe to oppose France in their future pro­gress, except they meane to follow our fate.

I had thought to have been larger heerein then I shall, in regard my paines is heerein in part prevented, by the Authour of la France Politique from page 470 to 525, or the end: And having been so long allready, I may happily hereafter, discourse this more largely in another language. I shall therefore be bries in that which remaines.

The Empire, though greatly concerned, (the French being not onely nigh them, but among them, and having got such places of the Rhyne, capa­citated to pas over all at their pleasure) yet seeme a sleepe, and are therefore to be roused; and if no words will doe it, yet let the alarmes of War raise them, and the strength of their enimies make them combine, lest fighting singly, they be all foiled. I shall not stand to particularize, but surely the Duke of Newburgh and Prince of Liege that have been most guilty in let­ting [Page]the French have passage through, and quarter in their Countries; will have the first cause to repent, except they meane to sell them to the Crowne of France; which yet may happily beat them downe in price, now they are so impoverished by them. For though Gulick belonging to Newburg be strong, the Castle especially (which was the Patterne to that of Antwerp) yet it is on dry ground, easily approachable, and in a champaigne Country and not relievable from a siege. And if that small City once be taken, all that pleasant corne Country may cry out,

And though Liege (or Luyke) be great and populous, and the desperatest people in all times, that I know in Europe; yet vana est sine viribus ira, the City hath such hills overhanging it, that it is neither strong by its situation, nor can hope of relief if they should be distressed, except it be by a con­federacy from others; and if this single City be lost, all their Country will be so quickly.

Yea not onely those on this side the Rhijne, but even all the rest will quickly find, that if the wings of the Roman Eagle be clipt, and prove too short to shaddow her young Ones; they will soone become a prey to the power of France, and will be throwne out of their nests as spurious, if they cannot stedfastly behold the rising sun, and will not receive their warmth from his beames.

Spaine is sensible enough of their concernments, knowing that not onely their Netherlands, but their Indies and Italy lie at the stake: for if France be Master of all these Provinces, they will soone be so of the Indies allso; and the Dutch fetch thence, the Spanish Gold for the French Crowne; and the Lilies of France, be the Royall flower, in all their Gardens both in Italia and Sicilia.

England, though now their Confederate, cannot but know what danger they are in for their Trade; which is the best jewel in that Crowne, and the greatest darling of that Kingdome. And therefore it is high time surely, that the Soveraigne straiten not his interest at home, by espousing any particular party; nor the subjects quarrel about Ceremonies, when the substance of Religion is so endangered; that so they may timously looke abroad, before it be too late and all be lost; and his Majesty in due time retire from France, and make himself and successors (as is much desired) the Head of all the Protestant party in Europe.

Denmark surely knows, that if the Empire fall they cannot stand: but must lose both their toll in the Sound, and what by Land the French pleases.

This Republick of all others is most immediately concerned, for he is blind that sees not, whatever some may flatter themselves, that the French intend nothing les then reducing of us to their obedience.

And when this is done, and they advance upwards in the Empire; what are Stratsburg, Colen, Aken, Breme, Hamburg, and the rest of the Hanse [Page]Townes, and free Cities, but as so many morsels, easily eaten up and de­voured?

Yea their constant friends and Allies may looke to themselves.

Sweden how they will save their Bishoprick of Breme, Pomeren, and what lies on this side the Baltick: and how they will sell their Copper, which is the Staple commodity of their owne Countrey. And in stead of the French Crownes, which is now their usuall money amongst them; when that King­dome hath no more neede of their service; they may carry their owne Cop­per coyne on their backs to pay a collation, or laden a horse when they travel, to pay for 2 or 3 good nights lodging.

Savoy knows he is at France's mercy, and therefore dances after their pipe, endeavouring to save himselfe by his devotion. But they may remember the Lamb in the Fable, who when the Wolf above quarreld him, because he troubled the water; answered that could not be so, in regard it descend­ed to him, not from him; the Wolf then said, he had reviled him 6 months before, to which the Lamb replying, he was not then borne. But thy Father then did saith He, and that's cause enough for the sons suffering.

For Switzerland, though their mountaines and Poverty may secure per­haps their Countrey: yet what shall secure their liberty, which consists in an equality amongst them? or what shall secure the. Religion of the Pro­testant Cantons? or the good pay which the Popish have long had, for their service in the Wars of France? They must then be content with what they can get, or be turned to graze on their owne mountaines.

And thus you see what necessity there is that the French be kept within bounds: and consequently. that the ballance of Europe, be both brought and held in a greater equality. For intrests changing continually with the revolution of times; and Kingdoms and Commonwealths, Cities and pla­ces, having their youth strength and old age, as well as particular persons: If lesser Powers combine not together, they singly become like the smaller fishes, easily swallowed up and devoured by the greater. Thus the league between the King of Naples, Lib. 1. Duke of Millain and Florence A. D. 1480. secured Italy against the power of the Venctians; and the Confederacy of the Italians at Venice in 95, preserved them from being all ruind by the French under Charles the 8, who had in a small time conquered severall, and got the Kingdome of Naples he came for: Lib. 2. as that wise Historian Guicciardine shews, in his excellent Historie of the Wars of Italie.

Nor let any thinke to obstruct my passage with saying, that Wars to bring downe the growing greatnes of others are unlawfull.

For though very many both Lawiers and Historians are of the opinion they are, De jure belli l. 1. c. 14. as may be seene in Gentilis, and some Divines allso, yea the whole Colledge of Sorben gave their determination for this, and the Learned Bacon Essay (or sermo fidelis) 19. saies plainely that the contrary opinion is not to be received, and many other moderne Authors concur heerein, besides the many Precedents of States that have made preventive Wars, as the Lacedemonians against the [Page] Arhenians of old, and many especially of later times; and the Arguments for it are not contemptible: yet notwithstanding I am rather of Grotius's opinion, De jure belli & pac. l. 2. c. 1. §. 17. &c. 22. §. 5. that neither our owne feares and jealousies, nor the growing greatnes of others, are sufficient causes of warring against them.

But indeed neither of these is the cause we plead, but the following, which we will maintaine jure gentium or by the law of Nations to be just and equitable.

1. Let any Kingdome or Common-wealth grow as great, as they can by Gods blessing; yet so long as they keep themselves, within the bounds of justice and equity with others; there is no just cause of breaking downe their power by War. For jealousie that we may thereby suffer, is no suffi­cient ground for us to fight them. It being with publick as wel as private safety, as Physitians say it is with our health, tollerably well, but never absolute and perfect. And therefore against such force as we may feare, we must trust the Providence of God, and use lawfull meanes cautiously to prevent dangers; our Saviour having taught all Christians to use the wisdome of the Serpent with the innocencie of the dove, and cursed be they that seperates, what Christ hath joyned together.

2. When Neighbor Nations see the growing power of any, whence they have just cause of jealousie: they ought to combine together; that so they may prevent the dangers they feare. And if any of the Confederates be unjustly invaded, they have all a just cause of War against the Agressor. As the Italians being jealous of the Venetians Power, Guicciar­dine's Hist. of Ital. l. 1. leagued themselves for their owne defence, so that though the Republick of Venice was too strong for any of them singly, yet being far too weake for them all, was kept with­in bounds, and they thereby wisely secured themselves.

3. When any Potentate that is stronger then his Neighbors aggresses any of them, the rest ought to Confederate; and if his cause be just com­pell him to accept of due satisfaction, and if he will not, his cause then becoming unjust, and much more if it was so originally, to make War against him. As the Italians did against the French, when they under Charles the 8 were invaded. And the Triple Alliance of late, when the same nation had taken the County of Burgundie, commonly called the French Comté and invaded Flanders, both which belong to the Crowne of Spaine. Thus our Neighbors allso should now allie with us, in point of honest intrest; that so we may reduce France to keepe within bounds, lest we should all be ruind by them.

I shall make these things plaine by familiar example. The ballancing of Nations is like to that of boats: they that by an even poize, might all sit safe in a boate on a rough Sea, by the rising up of some are all in danger to be drowned. In such case therefore the company perceiving, a quarrel likely to arise amongst some of them, must either agree before hand to keepe them quiet; or if the contest come suddenly, afterwards resolve to­gether, to compel those that are injurious, to keepe their place; and if [Page]they will not, throw them over-board. And this ballancing of powers, I shall defend by the Fundamentall Law of Nature selfe-preservation, and from the Law of Nations, as well as from the Word of God, and back the same by many approved examples; if any one hath a mind to contest with me heerein.

Lets see a litle how, and by whom, stronger powers must be ballanced, and I shall give a release to your patience.

1. By the Confederacy of weaker Nations that are their Neighbors, and are in danger thereby of being overcome, as we have allready shewne.

2. Or by a Neutrall Nation that reserve themselves free, to league with the weaker, when they see them injured by the stronger powers. And this was the Ancient policy of England, Memoires de Ribier T. 1. l. 2. l. 347. Memoires de du Plessis. Memoire du Duc de Sulli, T. 2. c. 4. p. 14. Ambassa­des du Cardinal Ossat part. 1. p. 180. Annales Eliz. A. 1577. since France and Spaine became the two great ballances in Europe. Which (as I have said) begun to be so under Charles the 5, and Francis the first, whom Henry the 8 of England still kept even, as the many Histories of those times shew, as well as other writers of State affaires, engraving this motto upon his Gold, Cui adhaereo, praeest. From this maxim of State Q. Elizabeth, allso his Daughter, first assisted Henry the 4, which Mornay strongly pleaded to Walsingham; and after when France was growne great, assisted these Provinces, lest they should fall into the hands of France; as we have before shewne out of the best Historians of those times, Thuanus and Cambden, the latter whereof after his declaring this reason of State in the place formentioned A. 1575, afterwards shews how this noble Heroine sate as the honourable Arbitratrix, (holding the ballance in her hands) between Spaine, France, and these Low Countries.

Sect. 13. The Conclusion of the whole Discourse.

I Have now done, and it is high time, having been much larger then I in­tended at first; allthough not so large by far, as I found, being once entred upon the Argument, I might be. And yet, I hope, it will not be tedious to the Reader. Inregard of the novelty of the matter, which though daily dis­courst of by many yet never writ of by any. And in regard of the usefulnes thereof. For though old men are apt to dote upon the brats of their brain, as well as their body: Yet, if I be not deceived, this Discourse, may through Gods blessing, prove instrumentall in begetting a better understanding between both Nations, (for which end I have published it in both Languages) by shew­ing them their concernments, it being the Chariot of Intrest which all Princes and States Jehu-like furiously drive; and allso serve to cleare up some State Controversies, that are not easily discerned by vulgar eyes, to discover the former and present state of affaires amongst us, and most parts of Europe, and give a prospect through this intricate, darke, and cloudy War, with what hopes we may have concerning its issue: And besides these things, I thinke the clearnes of stile, which I have used to deliver my minde in, may make it bes nautious to some, who are apt to mind the swadling cloths more then the Child.

I know medation betwixt men in passion is a very thankles office; and that the freedome I have used, will both please and displease many sorts of men on all sides; but yet when mens passions are allayed, I doe not doubt but they will thinke better of the honest designes of the Author. And yet I have endeavoured to give as little offence as I could possibly to any; but if any notwithstanding count me their enimie, because I tell them the truth, I cannot helpe it: for I never accoun­ted them worthy to write, that are by ast with feare, or favour and flattery. Yea, I perswade my selfe, that there is not any ingenuous man, or brave Gentleman even of the French Nation, whose designes I cheifly oppose; but they will acknowledge it lawfull for an enimie, to fight them with a pen as well as a pike, and that I am a very civil Adversary, having both fairely fought them, and with their owne wea­pons, having made use of their Authors, and not ours, throughout my discourse.

I shall not now throw downe the gantlet and make a challenge, yet if any under­take to refute me concerning the intrest of these Countries, which I thinke wor­thy answering, I shall not faile to doe it. As for my Conjectures, I both account and call them probable, and therfore being not positive and dogmaticall in them, I leave them with their Reasons to the Reader to judge. But if some passionate person thinks with railing at the French, English, or the Author hereof, and carping at some particulars to refute me; I shall tell them before hand I was never bred, to give any one ill language, and shall onely answer them with silence and contempt. Or if any well meaning scholler that hath read perhaps honest Keckermans, or some others learned Systema Politicum; I shall onely smile in my sleeve, having all­wayes accounted Booke policy alone, mere pedantry; and allthough no man va­lew's learning more then my selfe, yet he must know men as well as bookes, and the world well, that will write of these things. Yet if any will bring Reasons of State, and clearely delivered, as I thinke I have done, and fairely ventilate my opinion, I shall promise him as faire an Answer, for truth never feared a faire tryall.