EXercising my Ministry at Brackley, I came into ac­quaintance with Mr. Wil­liam Barlee, who upon the publication of his Correptory Correction, was pleased to bestow one Copy on me, desi­ring me freely to spend my thoughts up­on it: In my Answer, though I could not but Intimate how much I disliked the sharpnes of his stile, in some passages rela­ting to his adversary, yet I could not but say, that there was something in the Ar­gumentative part, unto which Mr. Pierce would scarce be able to returne a satis­factory [Page 2] Answer: Which my opinion I yet see no reason to recant. For notwith­standing all his bustle and ratlings, yet impartiall and judicious men may di­scerne, he is but like that Goth in Proco­pius, who, though he fought fiercely, had the mortall arrows sticking in his helmet, whereof he soon after fell. The Gentle­man had some part of his education a­mong the Oxford Cavaliers, who were wont to outface their defeats with bone-fires, and to ring their Bells after the greatest routs, and being a little tainted with that humour, resolves to Triumph who ever gets the victory. And indeed a Spirit of most childish insultation seems to have possessed as many, as have lift up an English pen against the Ortho­dox, in this quinquarticular controversy. Il'e instance onely in Mr. John Goodwin, who in the Preface to his Triumviri, saith, that he hath not met with any thing in the writings of any, or of all the three men contesting with him, which had in the least shaken his confidence concerning the truth of the things by him asserted, or that, for the least space of time, put him to any stand or losse in his understanding concerning them, or to seek what to Answer to any [Page 3] thing they offer or object against any of them? which lines the greatest charity must needs look upon as so much vapouring Rhetorick dropt from his pen, in the absence of Judgment and conscience: Or as an essay of the Spartanes valour, who being struck down by a mortall blow, used to stop their mouths with earth, that they might not be heard to quetch or groan, thereby to affright their fellowes, or animate their Enemies. The reader hath not yet the occasion of my calamity: Mr. Barlee resolves to under­take the Divine Philanthropie, and writes a second letter to me, desiring to borrow some books, and withall to know what I thought of his assailants reply: I had not then perused it, nor have I yet per­used it, nor shall I ever peruse it, except I can find some of the Rabbines hours, which belong neither to night nor day. But it seems I had espyed that his strange and long since exploded opinion of the positivity of sin, which made me write, that if he held sin to be positive, he must ei­ther hold it to be from God, (which is the blasphemy he chargeth upon the Calvi­nists) or else hold it to be God, which would be to bestow an Apotheosis on sin. Be­cause [Page 4] whatever positive thing is not from God, is God. This my friend, without any leave obtained or asked from me, puts in print under my name: with no ill intent, I hope, but yet some what against the rule of friendship. But having entituled me to the old, innocent, Metaphysicall maxime, that omne ens est vel primum vel a primo, how doth Mr. Pierce paratragaediate? How doth he tumble in his ugly Tropes, & rowl himselfe in his rayling eloquence? You would think he were some Tertullus, hi­red by an angry Parishioner, to accuse me before the Committee for ejection, of Ignorance, and scandall. I cannot, with­out perfect affront to my Conscience, and the rules of Christianity, returne him blasphemer for blasphemer: For though I think the forementioned blasphemy doth naturally and lineally descend from that opinion, which he first vented in his Philanthropy, and now seeks to maintain; yet I think it no way consistent, with the ingenuity of a Scholar, or of a man, to charge an adversary with that blas­phemy, which he every where disclaimes, because in my opinion such a blasphemy flowes from his principles. I know that the Lutherans are no better than infi­dells, [Page 5] if they deny the resurrection and ascension of Christ, and am pretty confi­dent that their opinion concerning the ubiquity of the humane nature, cannot consist either with the one or with the other: shall I therefore say in print, that the Brethren of that perswasion deny those two fundamentall Articles? nay rather let my right hand forget its skill, than write any thing of that nature con­cerning them. And yet this is the case of the Calvinists, they hold an absolute decree of reprobation, hence it followes, sayes Mr. Pierce, that God is the Author of sin, and that mans destruction is not of himself. They deny any such consequences can be inferr'd, and write books upon books, to shew the grounds and reasons of their denyall, sufficient one would think to stop the mouths of any calumnia­tor, though as wide as a sepulchre. Withall declaring that they refuse not to be cur­sed with the bitterest Anathema's, if they shall be found to father the least obliquity upon the most holy Law-giver. And yet Mr. Pierce finds a forehead to say they make God the Author of Sin. And is an­gry with those that will not be as hugely uncharitable as himself. This he will [Page 6] pretend to do in great affection to the most vulgar and lesse intelligent readers, whose de­liverance & liberty from the worst kind of thraldome he doth especially aime at in what he publisheth; as he tels us Pag. 5. That the vulgar may not be in danger to stumble at what was written in Latine, by men some of whose names they scarce ever heard of, whose Books they to be sure would never have bought, Mr. P. hath in great affection to their souls, translated some of the worst sayings of transmarine Divines into English. You are indeed ob­liged to do good to all, but especially to those vulgar ones of your own perswasion, and party, who are so exceedingly prejudi­ced against Mr. Calvin and others, from whom you pretend to derive your frightfull expressions, that theyl' not be in any danger of being misled by them. Therefore it would have been your wisest course to have drawn a Catalogue out of the writings of Bishop Abbot, Dr. John & Dr. Francis White, Dr. Field, Dr. Sanderson, Dr. Featley, Bishop Prideaux, who were their friends in point of Cere­monie, whose Books are most of them in English, and commonly to be had, and the Authors of them acknowledged to be men [Page 7] of great desert and piety, and so may be the more apt to do mischief by instilling these killing Doctrines into the minds of men. But what if the maintainers of the absolute decree did deserve so severe a condemnation, how come I to be con­cerned in it? why, because he cannot conceive how that argument of mine (If sin is a posi­tive entity, either God is the Author of it, or it is God,) should flow from any other foun­taine than my conceit of Gods predetermi­nation (before his prescience) of all events without exception. [...]nd yet he knows that Iesuits twenty & ten do use this Argumēt, who yet are the ablest, acutest, and most malicious opposers of the absolute decree, as stated by Calvin & others of our reform­ed writers. I have already secured him that I study no retaliation, onely I will make bold to deal with him as Alexander did with his Bucephalus, take him a little by the bridle, and turne him to the Sun, that other men may see how he layes about him, though himself will not.

First, he joynes me with that commune dei hominumque odium, Mr. Hobbs, & when he hath called me Hobbist, what can he say more, except he should call me Devill? But did I give him any reason to joyn [Page 8] me with that prodigious writer, or doth not Mr. Pierce rather do this on the same account as Ithacius, who having no other virtue but his hatred to the Priscillianists, became so wise in the end, that he set down all that differed from him for Pris­cillianists? Sulpit. Sev. lib. 2. p. 413. Both Mr. Hobbs, and Mr. Pierce say, that if God be the Author of the Action, then he is also the Author of the obliquity of the Action, and that there is no difference betwixt the sinfull act, and the sin of the act, and this he knowes I deny. And would the Reader think that I am an Hobbist for dissenting from Hobbes, and Mr. P. an Anti- Hobbist for agreeing with him? That Authour is known to be one who exceedingly scornes the parts of all that differ from him, who contradicts the old received Philosophy, who bitterly in­veighs against Presbyterians. And whe­ther these Characters doe better fit me or my adversary let others judge.

Secondly, in his title-page he makes me an example of [...], by which if he could be supposed to meane, that I were one that upon consideration of my many unworthynesses condemne my self, I must thank him for his com­mendation, [Page 9] and pray unro Christ for grace that I may abound in so noble an effect and part of repentance; but questionlesse with him I am [...] in the A­postles sense, Tit. 2.11. i. e. [...], saith Theophylast, and this is in ef­fect to call to all people to break of fami­liar converse with me, and to make me worse then an Heretick; for he was not thought self condemned till after the first and second Admonition, and that by a Bishop, saith Dr. Hammond; but he for a supposed oversight in Metaphysicks thinks meet to print me such to all the World, though I be to this day Igno­rant whether there be a Bishop in rerum naturâ, of a different opinion from me. Pref. that he might slurre mee he defiles his own conscience all over with an un­truth; (thou wilt find men obtruding new Creeds on the Church, one inserting this Ar­ticle, that God is no Spirit, another this, that God is the maker of all things reall, and so by consequence unavoideable of all the wick­ednesse in the World.) I confesse I had so much charity as to think hee intended not mee, but some other in this so high charge. But that I find him Ch. 3. p. 163. thus deli­ver himself. Mr. Hick: builds backward, [Page 10] thus he layes it down as his principle, that God is the maker of all things that are reall without exception, therefore of Davids lying with Bathshebah, therefore of his adultery. If in that sentence which Mr. Barlee hath excerped out of my letter, he can find the word reall, then I must necessarily either explain, or condemne my self; but having never used it, nor any terme synonymous, I might leave him with those words deli­vered will thunder & lightning, thou shalt not bear false witnesse. I say indeed that all things positive are either God, or from God: But is positive and reall all one? The darknesse (which he saith improperly enough, was created by God) no wise man will call positive, yet all will say that it was reall: privations are indeed ranked among entia rationis, but that is not because they do not antecedere operationem intelle­ctus; for the aire would be darke, and Barti­maeus blind, though no one thought so; but they then become entia rationis when they are conceived of otherwise than they be, as when darknesse is conceived of as if it were some positive blacknesse. But what if I had said that God is the Author of all things reall, why must this be called an article of my faith, or an obtruding a new [Page 11] article on the Church? Doth every one that gives his opinion, and brings an ar­gument to confirme it, make a new Creed? Then shall wee have more Creeds than there be sound believers. These are the two articles of my Creed, God is Holy, God is omnipotent, if any one do cor­dialy assent to these, I shall give him the right hand of fellowship, if in the ex­plication of these two divine attributes he differ from mee, I shall not make him a blasphemer, or expunge him out of the Catalogue of Christians, but charitably suppose that his error, if not too grosse, proceeds rather from want of Philoso­phy than from want of piety, and do here once for all professe before the searcher of hearts, who hates nothing more than Hypocrisy, and that severe Register within me, to which I owe more reverence than to affront it with a will­full lie, that I should be the lesse zealous in defending the privative nature of sin, if I did not think that this my assertion were the most probable way of reconciling those two Divine perfections of purity and omnipotence. I love Philosophy onely as an handmaid to Divinity: as to those Scholasticall speculations in which Theo­logy [Page 12] is not at all concerned, I matter not much what opinion men be of, nor whe­ther they be of any opinion at all. But I will not use so great severity, as to ag­gravate his so unworthy speeches, take them barely as thou findest them: Pref. I have envenomed Mr. Barlee, and inter­medled in his affairs, to such a desperate de­gree, that if I preach as is printed, my Dis­ciples of all others have need of a preser­vative: Pag. 11. I am one of the prodi­gious pair of writers: Pag. 107. cap. 3. Mr. B. safest way is to spit in my face, who betrayed him to that senselesse blasphemous inference; Pag. 154. My argument is the most horrible of all, hard to say whether more impious or more unscholarlike. Pag. 156. I must make some kind of satisfa­ction for so scandalous an attempt. Ib. my medium is a crying and a killing Doctrine. I am a malefactor, and fallen headlong in­to dangers, nay reall mischiefs, by my own wilfull precipitation of my self and others. Pag. 157. He corrects himself for talking Metaphysicks to such a Scholar as I, who seeme so great a stranger to them, that he may very well take up the Proverbiall verse.

[...].

pag. 159. The brethrens way of arguing, is the fantastick creature of the brethren. Pag. 161. I am a Beetle flying in the face of the Eagle, striking at God and his purity, by giving sin an [...], and laying my child, when I have so done, at another mans door. Pag. 162. My traiterous child hath done exactly to me, as I thought to have done un­to my brother. Pag. 164. I argue like the Libertines, and as it were out of their mouthes, Pag. 167. Mr. B. is debauched by me. Pag. 175. My apprehension is sadder than if I had thought Apotheôsis to be de­rived from [...] pono. Ib. All I have discovered is my being overflown with an [...], which could its banks have contained it, would not thus have gushed o­ver upon no occasion, when 'tis plain the effect could be no other, but to drown my credit with a yellow, as well as my cause with a blacker Jaundise. And for a conclusion I am bid to read, consider, and apply what is spoken in Mark 3.28, 29, 30. as if I had done something bordering upon the coasts of the most accursed blasphemy against the Holy Ghost. Having with the Badger bitten till his teeth meet, he lets goe; and I trow it was high time: for was there ever a man, ab orbe condito, in whom malice, [Page 14] upon so small, so no reason, raged at that tedious and importune rate and height? Hath this learned Rector been lately made free of the Cart? Doth he think he may raile by authority? Or was he ambi­tious to publish a Treatise dirty enough to transform the gilded Angel in Ivy-lane in­to a black one, able to justifie all the ugly brats of the wildest Sectaries that G. C. hath midwiv'd into the world? I utter not the words of passion, but sobriety, knowing that many a poor scold hath been duckt in the Gumble-stool, many a delu­ded Quaker cast into prison, for words in­comparably more civil and tollerable than most of those bestowed on me. Had my Antagonist been a resident in the Univer­sity, [...]. Mr. Vicecan. had been bound upon my complaint to have punisht him with banition, or at least with incarceration, or publick recantation; and yet Mr. P. who metes out all this hard measure to me, does every where complain of Mr. B's foul language against himself; not regarding that of Plutarch, which I have thrown in­to the Margin, nor that of the Apo [...]le, Rom. 2.2, 3. nor that of our Saviour, Mat. 7.34, 35. Nay, as if all this were not e­nough, he makes himself also guilty of the [Page 15] greatest Hypocrisie, by giving it out to the world, that he hath done no more than hee was in conscience and duty bound to. p. 156. and Pref. he would needs perswade me, That all he hath done is in order to my ease and safety too; and that I ought to be thank full for the diligent and impartial hand, which for some short time doth seem to hurt me. But seeing he himself had the same Phagedaenous and eating sores which he tels us were cured by good company, and good bookes, what necessity was there that mine should be touch'd with either the launce or caustick? If he had not de­lighted in such a composition, whose every line is gall and wormwood, why did he not before he thus blur'd me with his blackest ink, First, enquire whether ever I did write any such thing to Mr. B. or no? For if Mr. B. be such a lyar, as he represents him, why would he beleeve me the Author of so monstrous an Argument, upon the bare Authority of his report? 2. How did he know whether I related this Argument as from my self, and not onely as the Argument of others? Or 3. why did he not by some private letter, endeavour to purge the peccant humour, before he made the passionate adventure of calling [Page 16] it obstinate? Let's try whether wee can ghess what might move Mr. P. who saies in his Letter to Doctor Bernard, that in all his dealing with Mr. B. he was not so much as heated, so to flame against me. First; it was not sure the Argument it self; for that being used by Fathers, by School­men of all Sects, by Protestant Writers of all perswasions, particularly by the most judicious Mr. Tho. Barlow (with whom for Metaphysical Learning Mr. P. will in modesty confess himself not worthy to be named in the same day) could not deserve so severe a censure. Seeing he tells us, that he resolves to doe nothing untill the most sober, unbiassed persons shall think it publickly usefull, I shall make this request to him, that hee would procure any one sober person, to give it under his hand, that it was publickly usefull to call all those foolish and impious, who have used this Argument; or if such Epithetes belong not unto others, why to me? O­thers have de industriâ printed the Argu­ment, whereas I never thought that any thing which I wrote should have come to the Press: nay what I did write, was written in such haste, that I might well say with Jerome, Qui non ignoscit ingenio, [Page 17] ignoscat tempori: But I believe the sober men of his own perswasion, will be so far from approving his language, that they will rather let him taste of Memnons disci­pline, who hearing a mercenary Souldier, with many bold and impure reports, ex­claim against King Alexander, lent him a blow with his Launce, saying, That he had hired him to fight against Alexander, and not to raile.

Secondly; though not the Argument in self, yet my party and my Masters, with whom he doth so frequently upbraid me, might justly move his choler: Indeed I find, Mr. P. guiltie of partiality to so desperate a degree, that he makes Armi­nianism enough to a mans commendati­on, but Anti-arminianism a blasting of all graces, and an alloy to all endowments; as if it might be said of his Opinion, as Augustine speakes of Discretion, Tolle hanc, & virtus vitium erit. Once I finde him acknowledging, that Piety and Lear­ning might be found among the Absolute Predestinarians, but being now faln from his first love, he thinks meet to brand Dr. Reynolds with the suspicion of being an Hypocrite; as if because he were a man of great parts and worth, he could not be [Page 18] in earnest of that party whom he hath owned in Praying, in Preaching, in Cove­nanting: Nay those against whom he writes are the wicked, and so by him not onely thought, but also called in the Adv. to Mr. Bax: But as for those that are for the respective Decrees, and are no friends to Presbytery, they are, eo nomine, religi­ous, excellent, renowned, immortal, what not? I will instance in two or three, upon whom he bestows the greatest commenda­tions, sure not without some regret and recalcitration of his conscience. First, he blesseth the Author of an unlicensed Pamphlet, called, An Historical relation of the Judgement of some most worthy Bi­shops, holy Martyrs, and others, concerning Gods election. Divi. Phil. p. 93. ch. 3. with the honourable appellation of a most lear­ned Divine and Confessour, and seems to bewaile it, that the book is in so few mens hands; but I shall let the Reader see, that if this book had had its desert, it must have been in fewer mens hands than it is. The forementioned scurrilous Pam­phlet was reprinted Anno 1631, and li­censed by Mr. Martin, Bishop Laud's Chaplain: when Sir Humphrey Lind, and Mr. Prynne complained to Archbishop [Page 19] Abbot of this execrable Imposture, the book was called in, Bishop Laud profes­sing to his Grace, that he had given to his Chaplain such a ratling, as would make him never meddle with Arminian books or opinions more; nay at the Lords Barr he said, that he did put him out of his Chaplains place for licensing that Pam­phlet. The first Author of this book was answered by Mr. Robert Crowly, as may be seen in our University Library, 4 ^o O 5. This Crowly was a fugitive for Religion in Queen Maries dayes, an eminent laborious Preacher in the time of Qu. Eliz. He not knowing the name of Mr. P's Confessour, calls him Cerberus; but Mr. John Veron the Queens Chaplain, who was principally concern'd in the book, found out his name to be Champneys, and in a Tract of his dedicated to her Majesty, and called a De­fence of the Doctrine of Predestination, speaks thus of him [In this I comfort my self, that his tongue is known to be no slander: For the like did he most proudly attempt, in your most gracious Brother good King Ed­ward the sixth's dayes, against all the godly Preachers of that time, calling them marked Ministers of Antichrist, and men void of the Spirit of God (for none, be they never so [Page 20] godly, never so earnest and faithfull labou­rers in the Lords vineyard, have the Spirit of God, or doe know the efficacie of it but he onely) as many godly persons be able to te­stifie to his face: That he did therefore, and for many other abominable errours, which he then stoutly maintained, bear at that time a Faggot at Paul's-cross, Father Coverdale making then the Sermon there. Belike fearing now the like punish­ment, and that he should be compell'd to re­voke his Pelagian-like opinion, he durst not, for all his proud boast, set his own name to his railing and venemous bookes, nor yet suf­fer them to be sold openly or publickly in the Book-sellers shops, but cowardously suppressing both his own name, and the name of his un­wise and foolish Printer, got the whole Im­pression into his own hands, that so he might in huggermugger send them unto his private freinds abroad, whom belike he suspected to be of his affinity and damnable opinion: How­beit this could not be wrought so privily, but that within a while, some of his bookes came into my hands, whereby shortly after the Printer was known, and brought to his An­swer, whom this stout champion of Pelagius hath left in the bryars; and lest himselfe should be fain to shew a reason of his Do­ctrine, [Page 21] doth keep himself out of the way still, and dares not once shew his face: If he be able to maintain his Doctrine against my Book, let him come forth and play the man, I am ready at all times to yeeld to the truth, and unto the sincere teachers thereof] And doth this Gentleman deserve to be saluted a Confessor?

A second Aethiopian, whom he seekes to make white, is the English Tilenus; he's stiled the excellent, and this is said of him; If he be alive to undertake his own cause a­gainst Mr. Baxter, the world will find 'twill be but impar congressus: Yea he seems to complain, that he hath not the happiness to know him in the least degree. But what is there in this scribler that may deserve such Elogies? First, he casts the highest scorn upon the Tryers, making them to ask such questions of those that come before them, as in all probabilitie it never came into their thoughts to ask, which is such a piece of Impudence, as no one hath ventured to imitate him in, but that Ishmael of Cole­man-street, whose hand being against all men, hath provoked all men, even the common Pamphleter to lift up a hand a­gainst himself. Secondly; This poor fel­low makes himself an adversary, out of [Page 22] his own fancy, and driving him before him from one end of the Book to the o­ther, shootes all his arrows at this man of ugly clouts of his own framing, as if it were that venerable Synod of Dort: And does he not deserve to be call'd ex­cellent? and to bee preferred to Mr. Bax­ter?

But as to my party and Masters, I have some satisfactory things to return in way of Answer.

First; I have the thousand witnesses to attestate, that the desires of my soul are, to receive a Disciple in the name of a Di­sciple, a Prophet in the name of a Pro­phet, not as concurring with me in any o­pinion, concerning the Mint and Cum­min of Church Discipline. My cordiall affections to those Episcopal Divines, whose endeavours are to promote that in which all confess the power of Godlyness to consist, are as well known, as I my selfe am. And I challenge all the world to produce that eare that ever heard me speak the least syllable that might tend to inodiate the person, or to vilifie the parts and pains of any one Prelatist, because such.

[Page 33]2. Though that little I have read of Mr. Calvins Institutions which, is not above the fourth part, makes me fully of Salmasius his mind, who said in Epi­stola Verini, he had rather be the Au­thor of that Book, then of all that ever were made by Grotius; yet so unhappy is Mr. P. in ghessing at my Masters and the Books in which I converse, that I can sa­fely professe, as a precise and measured truth, when I sent that letter to Mr. B. I had read more in Doctor Tailor, and Doctor Hammond, then I had in all those Authors mentioned in his Title-page, upon whom he pretends to make occasio­nall reflections: And if Presbytery be a crime, I must needs say that I have learn't it from Episcopall men.

1. Is this Presbytery to say that a Pres­byter and a Bishop differ in degree one­ly, and not in order? that I learne from the late right Reverend the Primate of Ire­land, from Doctor Holland Regius Profes­sor, who so determined in Publicis Comi­tiis, in direct contradiction to Dr. Laud.

2. Is this Presbytery to hold that an ordination by Presbyters is valid? That I learne from Bishop Andrews, who or­dained a Scotchman Bishop, never made [Page 24] Priest but by Presbyters, which he would not have done, had ordination by Presby­ters seemed unto him a nullity. I learn it from Bishop Downam in his consecra­tion Sermon, Pag. 43. Who saith that the contrary opinion is proper to Pa­pists: from Doctor Forbs, who in his Ireni­cum largly proves it. Indeed among the Episcopall Divines I scarce know any contrary unto me in this, except those who drew the scheme of their opinions after that Bishop Laud was Lord of the house. And I think it no uncharitable­nesse to say, that some of later times, in making their Judgements, had very great respect unto the Stars that were culmi­nant.

3. Is this Presbytery to assert the sole power of Jurisdiction was not in the Bi­shops, & that they had no warrant to dele­gate their power unto a Lay Chancellour? This I learn from the judicious Lord Veru­lam, who saith, ‘that the first was a thing almost without example in good Govern­ment, and therefore not unlikely to have crept in, in the degenerate and corrupt times. As to the 2. the deputation of their authority. I see no perfect and sure ground for that neither; being somewhat [Page 25] different from the examples & rules of Government: we see in all Laws in the World offices of confidence and skill, cannot be put over, nor exercised by de­puties.’ In his works printed 1657. p. 239. 240.

4. Is this Presbytery to aver that after a great abuse of the Episcopall power, the civil Magistrate might take it away root and branch, and commit the whole Go­vernment of the Church unto Presbyters, at least for a season? This I learn from the learned Grotius, at whose name Mr. P. is wont to rise up in an extasie of Admira­tion, de Imperio Sum. potest. chap. 11. Nay, if this be Presbytery to maintain the grea­ter antiquity and primitivenesse of Pres­bytery then Espiscopacy, for that I need not consult David Blondell, the Lord George Digby a great stickler for our En­glish prelacy so inform's mee in his letter to Sr. K. D. Pag. 119. The Presbytery of Scotland in point of Government hath a greater resemblance then either yours or ours to the first age of Christs Church.

5. Is this Presbytery and Calvinisme to assert an absolute decree of election and reprobation, and to manifest the greatest indignation against those who giue it out [Page 26] unto the World, that those opinions ei­ther take away the liberty of the will, or make God the Author of sinne, this al­so I learn from Episcopall divines of the first magnitude. Reader, peruse their words, and then tell me whether I mistake their meaning. Dr. Abbot calls Bishop for aspersing the forementioned tenent, as if it made God the Author of sin, Elymas, and his fellow Wright on the same score, foul mouth'd dogge, and a filthy swine, who wallowing in the muck & dirt of Popish Ignorance, hath his eyes so daubed up there­with, that he seeth not his own way. Answer to the Preface. All this in a book dedica­ted to King James, who in requital of his paines bestowed on him the Bishoprick of Salisbury. Yea the forementioned Writer in his Defence against Mr. Higgons saith, That if Luther have any where in that lewd and impious manner calumniated the Church of Rome, he will not deny but that Mr. Hig­gons should have cause to stile him a foule mouth'd dog.

When the Apostate Spalatensis objected this against the same Doctrine, what words Dr. Crakanthorpe thought meet to use a­gainst him, Mr. Barlee hath already told Mr. Pierce: I shall onely adde the Book [Page 27] was dedicated to King Charles, and hath this title put to it, Defensio Ecclesiae Angli­canae; of which Church Mr. P. professeth himself a dutifull and obedient son; and that Dr. Abbot saith of that Treatise, that it was the most accurate peece of controversie that was written since the Reformation. Next let us hear the most learned and peaceable Dr. Sanderson, con. 2. ad Clerum, p. 29, 30. Sundry of the Doctors of our Church teach truly and agreeably to Scrip­tures the effectual concurrence of Gods will and power, with subordinate agents in every, and therefore even in sinfull actions; Gods free election of those whom he purposeth to save of his own grace, without any motives in or from themselves; the immutability of Gods love and grace towards the Saints E­lect, and their certaine perseverance therein to salvation; the justification of sinners by the imputed righteousnesse of Christ, apprehended and applied unto them by a lively faith, with­out the works of the Law. These are sound and true, and (if rightly understood) com­fortable, and right profitable doctrines; and yet they of the Church of Rome have the forehead, (I will not say to slander, my Text alloweth more,) to blaspheme God and his Truth, and the Ministers thereof, for teach­ing [Page 28] them; Bellarm. Gretser, Maldonate, and the Jesuites, but none more than our own English Fugitives, Bristow, Stapleton, Par­sons, Kellison, and all the rabble of that crew freely spend their mouthes in barking against us, as if we made God the author of sinne; as if we would have men sin and be damned by a fatal necessitie; sinne whether they will or no; be damned whether they de­serve it or no; as if we opened a gap to all li­centiousnesse and prophanesse; let them believe it is no matter how they live, heaven is their own cock sure; as if we cried down Good Works, and condemned Charity: Slanders loud and false, yet easily blown away with one single word, [...]; these impu­tations upon us and our doctrine are unjust, but [...], let them that misreport us know, that without repentance their damnati­on will be just. Dr. Field, B. 3. p. 117. The next Heresie which they say we are fallen into, is the Heresie of Florinus, who taught that God is the author and cause of sinne; This, saith Bellarm. Calvin, Luth. Martyr have defended in their writings; of this sin­full, and wicked, and lying report, we are sure God is not the author, but the devil. & pag. 140. Cal. Then is not worse than the Manichees, in making God the author of [Page 29] those evils which the Manichees attribute to an evil beginning, as Bellarm. is pleased to pronounce of him; but is farther from that hellish conceit than Bellarm. is from hell it selfe, if he repent not of these hellish slanders. Dr. Ward. prae. de pecca. orig. p. 148. Prodiit non ita pridem clanculum liber, quem author intitulavit, amor dei erga genus humanum, qui acriter contendit ex concessis sublap. satis evidenter inferri omnium pecca­torum hominum reproborum deum esse verum & principalem authorem. Audax assertum vel verius impudens calumnia.

I might mention more, but I forbeare, and doe earnestly desire those Episco­pall Divines, who close with us in the points of present contest, that they would bethink themselves and consider, what fa­vour they must expect from these Armini­an Ardelio's, no more than what Polyphe­mus promised Ulysses, to be last devoured. If they cannot fall down and worship the Idols which these men have set up, they must expect to be thrown into the fierie furnace; nay they are tormented in it al­ready in Augustines sense, who calls the mouth of an angry adversary by that name; for mark his word, ch. 2. p. 61. Whatever dishonours have been done unto the Protestant [Page 30] name by those of the Kirk, or Consistory, or their adherents here in England, yet the du­tifull sons of the Church of England have ever been free from any part of that guilt. This doth expunge Bishop Hall, Bishop Morton, Bishop Brownerig, whom we (as they deserve) call Fathers, out of the num­ber of the dutifull Sonnes of the Church of England: Nay he sticketh not in the Preface to the Reader, p. 6. to place them among the very unsound and unruly members of this Church. Let me take the boldness to beseech them who are of any authority in that party, as they love the truth, than which nothing ought to be more precious, as they tender the wellfare and safety of poor soules, for whom Christ dyed, that they would either plainly say, that they have all this while been mistaken, and through ignorance Preached and Printed Blasphemy, or else brand this false ac­cuser with the letter K, which when the I aw I allude to was made, was the first letter of the word Calumniator.

3. I have spent more time in reading the Authors Pro & Con about these points, than ever I intend to doe, being of o­pinion that the greatest Scholars will ne­ver [Page 31] be able fully to satisfie their own, or o­ther mens Reasons about them: Nor should this seem any wonder to us, who cannot be ignorant how many points there be in Natural Philosophy, in which a man plun­geth himself into inextricable difficulties, whether he affirm or deny them. With what confidence have I heard one young Sophister maintain, that continuum fit ex indivisibilibus? and another, that continuum non fit ex indivisibilibus? both thought themselves in the right; but men of ma­ture judgements standing by, could easily see, that neither the one, nor the other could free his Assertion from the com­mon Objections brought against it. I thank God I have not the least temptation to doubt concerning the Trinity of the Persons, nor the Hypostatical Union of the two Natures; yet I never thought my self able to vindicate those mysteries from all the subtile Arguments and niceties of unbelieving sophisters. The like I think concerning the Doctrine of Gods De­crees, and the manner of the Spirits working Grace in the hearts of the Elect, these are matters so very mysterious, and my understanding so dark, that I can scarce hope ever in this world to be freed [Page 32] from all scruples about them. Would you therefore know why I hold Absolute, Eternal, Personal Election, Efficacious de­termining Grace, and the certain infallible perseverance of all Believers; Truly be­cause I finde these opinions most agreeable to Scripture, to the communis sensus fide­lium, the instinct and impulse of the new creature in all ages; and, because I finde they doe most tend to the debasing of sin­full man, and to the exaltation of Christ my Saviour, and that free Grace of his, by which I hope to be acquitted at the last day.

To this end I will relate two Historicall passages, with which J have been much taken; the one from Father Paul (who hath filled the Christian world with his admiration) Hist: of the Counc. of Trent, lib. 2. pag. 212. he speaking of the debates in that Assembly concerning these two o­pinions, thus expresseth himself. The first opinion (which is the opinion Mr. P. so declaimes against) as it is hidden, and mystical, keeping the minde humble, and relying on God, without any confidence in it self, knowing the deformitie of sinne, and the excellencie of divine grace, so the second was plausible and popular, cherishing [Page 33] humane presumption, and making a great shew, it pleased more the preaching Fryars, then the understanding Divines, and the Courtiers thought it probable as consonant to politick reasons, it was maintained by the Bishop of Bitonto, and the Bishop of Salpi shewed himself very partiall, the defenders of this using humane reason prevailed against the others, but coming to the testimonies of the Scripture they were manifestly overcome. The other story I find in the Preface to the Parallells, drawn up, as I suppose, by Doctor Featly, and Doctor Good. Acca­cius Baron of Dona, residing some months in England, to solicite the recovery of the Palatinate, was often set upon, and much laid at by a stranger there, named Roerghest, a man deeply engaged in the Arminian party, who though he could not draw him from the truth to that side, yet cast such mists of doubts before him, that his Lordship, for better clearing, de­sired the conference of some English Di­vines versed in Controversies of this na­ture, and opportunely meeting with two at once, he demanded of them why the Divines of England so generally distasted the Doctrine broached by Arminians, their answer was, that albeit those tenents [Page 34] were plausible to corrupt reason, and set out to the best advantage by the wit and art of the Patrons thereof; yet that the sacred Scriptures, to which naturall reason must bow and stricke sail, throughly searched and im­partially scanned gave no support at all to the new modell of Gods councells framed in mans braines; and that the prime Fathers of most eminent note in the Church, above twelve hundred years ago, at the first birth of those mishapē brats dashed them against the stones, and consequently that by the same Ortho­dox ancient Church the new Revivers of those errors at this day were damnati antequàm nati, precondemned in the loines of their parents. The Baron somewhat affected with this answer, replied, certe si Arminius Pelagium refodit, merito vos Arminium defoditis. Not long after the said solici­tor came to the Baron again, hoping to make him his Proselite, the Baron ac­quainting him with the English Divines answer, he was at first so confident as to say, quid tandem Arminio cum Pelagio? But when those Divines had exhibited to the Baron a Paralell betwixt them, since printed, this confident Gentleman, though he undertook to returne forthwith a di­rect and punctuall answer, quitted the [Page 35] field, took Sea and returned into Holland, and was never heard of more. I know Mr. P. also doth very much fume to be ac­counted Pelagian, Semi-pelagian, Massil­lian, &c. But if his feet were not crooked, how came their shoes to fit him so well? I remember a saying of Doctor Sanderson, in his fifth Sermon, ad Populumi, that the Prophesies of saint Paul and saint John make it so unquestionable that Rome is the seat of Antichrist, that they who will needs be so unreasonably charitable, as to think the Pope is not Antichrist, may at least wonder by what strange chance it fell out that these Apostles should draw the picture of Anti­christ in every point and limbe so just like the Pope, and yet never think of him; Mr. P. his quick wit hath prevented me in the application, never did the stile of an un­fortunate writer belong to man, if not to him, supposing him to have no commu­nion with those old Hereticks, for he hath formed no weapon, against which I cannot furnish my self with armour from the Magazine of Austin and others, who had to do with Pelagius and his Disciples.

But it may be the party with whom he supposeth me to say a confederacy are, the Puritans, for those he cannot name with [Page 36] any patience or moderation he tells us (advertisement to Mr. Baxter) that they were defined at Hampton Court, to be prote­stants frighted out of their wits, such as are known to be painted sepulchres, having the forme onely of godlinesse, without the power of it: thought by judicious Hooker to be fit inha­bitants for a wilderness, not for a well ordered City. Such as have ever despised dominion, and spoken ill of dignities, have been for­merly boutefeus, and men of bloud, the pro­verbiall Authors & Fautors of sedition and violence in Church and state. The words of the relator of the Hampton Court confe­rence are these: Pag. 37. This and some other motions seeming to the King and Lords very idle and frivolous, occasion was taken in some by-talke, to remember a certain de­scription which Mr. Butler of Cambridge made of a Puritan, A Puritan is a protestant frayed out of his wits. And must what is said in some by-talke be called defining? If I were minded to pay Master P. in his own coine, how easily might I tell him, that the Arminians were defined by a wise King in a premeditated declaration Atheisticall sectaries, that many of them are known to have neither the forme nor the power of godlinesse, of whom judicious [Page 37] Amyraldus saith, that they can scarce be supposed ever to have felt the power of the Holy Ghost, concerning whom the fore­said King said that if they were not with speed rooted out, no other issue could be ex­pected than the curse of God, infamy through­out all the reformed Churches, and a perpe­tuall rent and distraction in the whole body of the State, concerning whom also the States themselves said, that they had created them more trouble than the King of Spain had by all his wars. And one would think the King and the States should know better how to set the saddle upon the right Horse then Master P.

Ob. These were Presbyterated Armi­nians, our English Episcopall Arminians are free from any such guilt.

Ans. Concerning them, not I, but the Viscount Falkland shall speak, who as he had more courage than to be afraid of them, so had he more ingenuity than to wrong them, in the before commended speech to the house of Commons, Pag. 3, 4.

Master Speaker, he is a great stranger in Israel who knows not that this Kingdome hath long laboured under many and great op­pressions, both in Religion and liberty, and his [Page 38] acquaintance here is not great, or his ingenuity lesse, who doth not both know and acknowledge that a great, if not a principall, cause of both these, hath been some Bishops and their ad­herents. Master Speaker, a little search will serve to find them to have been the destru­ction of unity, under pretence of uniformity, to have brought in superstition and scandall under the titles of reverence and decency; to have defiled our Church, by adorning our Churches: to have slackned the strictnes of that union which was formerly between us and those of our Religion beyond the Sea, an action as unpolitick as ungodly. And because I know the Reader will not account me tedious whilest I use the words of so elo­quent a Lord, I shall recite more passages from him to the same purpose, Pag. 9. We shall find of them to have both kindled & blown the Common fire of both Nations, to have both sent and maintained that book, of which the Author hath no doubt long since wished with Nero, utinam nefcissem lite­ras, and of which more then one Kingdome hath cause to wish, that when he writ that, he had rather burned a Library, though of the value of Ptolomies. We shall find them to have been the first and principall cause of the breach, I will not say of, but since the paci­fication [Page 39] at Barwick, we shall finde them to have been the almost sole abettors of my Lord of Strafford, whilst he was practising upon another kingdom, that manner of Go­vernment which he intended to settle in this, where he committed so many, so mighty, and so manifest enormities, as the like have not been committed by any Governour in any Go­vernment since Verres left Sicilie. And af­ter they had called him over from being De­puty of Ireland, to be in a manner Deputy of England (all things here being governed by a Juntillo, and that Juntillo governed by him) to have assisted him in the giving of such counsels, and the pursuing of such courses, as it is a hard and measuring cast, whether they were more unwise, more unjust, or more unfortunate, and which had infallibly been our destruction, if by the grace of God their share had not been as small in the subtletie of Serpents, as in the innocence of Doves. But in entitling the honest Puritanes to the mani­fold violences that have been attempted or practised in Church and State, he borrows a piece of policy from the Jesuits, who if they had prospered in blowing up the Parliament house, had intended to give it about, that that so horrid and hellish a fact was perpetrated by he knows whom. Ho­nest [Page 40] Bishop Carleton in his Examination of Mr. Montagues Appeal, saith; That albeit the Puritans disquieted the Church about their conceived Discipline, yet they never moved any quarrel about the Doctrine of our Church, and that till Montague there was no Puritan Doctrine known. Mr. Wotton saith in his answer to the Popish Atti: p. 33. Hee that makes difference between the Protestants and Puritans in matters of Faith, doth it ei­ther ignorantly or maliciously. Mr. T. Fuller 610. p. 99. We must not forget that Spala­to (I am confident I am not mistaken there­in) was the first who professing himself a Pro­testant, used the word Puritan to signifie the defenders of matters doctrinal in the English Church. Formerly the word was onely taken to denote such as dissented from the Hierarchy in Discipline and Church-government, which now was extended to brand such as were Anti-arminians in their judgement. So that by Puritanes, in all probability must be meant non-conformists. And if Mr. P. dare say, that such men as Mr. Paul Baine, Mr. Ar­thur Hildersham, Mr. Dod, and Mr. Cleaver the Decalogists; Mr. Tho. Hooker, Mr. John Ball, Mr. Tho. Shepheard, were void of the power of godlyness, or that they had not more of it than had their persecu­tors, [Page 41] he must either expect not to be belie­ved, or seek some other place than England to vent his passion in.

If by the Puritanes he meaneth the gid­dy Brownists, I have not a word to say in their excuse, but this, that the Prelaticall oppression was such, as might have made wiser people than they madde. Had they not a colourable pretext to call some of our Prelates Antichristian, whose Courts vex­ed sundry laborious Preachers, because they could not bow at the name of Jesus, when as sundry idle sots, whom they might frequently observe to stagger in the streets, were never questioned.

But the most probable ground of his fury is yet behind, my being noted by Mr. Barlee in the Margin, to be a man of his own Colledge: for doe but observe the phrases and periods of the man upon this occasion. ‘For ought I know he may be also in possession of mine own Fellow­ship, and mine own Chamber, and mine own meat and drink, and those yearly revenues which are mine own too; and for the which I may the rather expect to have some satisfaction, because it seems the Visitors made him one of my Receivers and Usufructuaries (for my [Page 42] legitimate heir or successor they could not make him) And I have reason to be glad that he is thought such a pious and learned man; because if he is pious, he will the sooner pay me my Arrears; and if he is learned, he will not object a­gainst my known and indisputable right pag. 155. and Div. Phil. p. 147. I suffered the loss of what I thought to be the plea­santest possession on earth; for being se­cretly suggested to be the Author of some bookes, which to this very day I could never hear named; and though I earnestly desired that I might hear my self accused, and know distinctly my accusation, and be heard speak for my self, yet Dr. Reynolds could not obtaine that for me.’ Thus he hath thrown his fierie darts at me, at farre the greater part of Heads and Fellows of Colledges in Oxon: at the Visitors, and at the two Houses of Parliament. But I know not how I am so little sollicitous concerning the quench­ing of these Darts, that I find my self car­ried away with a very pleasing diversion concerning two different kinds of sober distraction or melancholy; the one where­in the brain is generally and equally ill af­fected to all objects; the other, where the [Page 43] distemper is confined to some one object or other; the brain being otherwise very sound and sober upon all other objects and occasions. So Laurentius tells us of a No­ble man, that otherwise had his senses ve­ry perfect, and would discourse of any sub­ [...]ect very rationally, but was perswaded that he was glass. And Huartus tels us of a Noble mans foot-boy in Italy, that thought himself a Monarch: And Josephus Acostae tells us a sadder story of a Doctor of Di­vinity, who would affirm, that he should be a King and a Pope too; the Apostolical See being translated to those parts of America: which, together with some other frantick distempers, made him condemned to the fire for an Heretick. Farre be it from me to wish or presage any such kind of punish­ment to Mr. P. for his impudence against the supream Authority of the Nation; but I am under some temptation to think, that Mr. P. how discreet and sober soever in other matters, is fallen into some Hypo­condriacall conceits much of that nature; for what else could make him, after that he hath been known for some years, to be an Husband, and peaceably to have enjoy­ed the Rectory of Brington, to talk of an indisputable right to a Fellowship, cham­ber, [Page 44] meat, and drink, yearly revenues in Magdalene Colledge? Nay, he prints as if he had right unto two Fellowships, one for Mr. Thomas, and another for Mr. Pierce, how else am I but one of his Receivers? Let's try whether by a few questions we can make him more sober,

1. What would hee have me pay him Arrears for? the usus fructus is mine; why else am I said to be made usufructuary? An usufructuary wanteth nothing but the title; he hath jus in re, though not ad rem. Well, sith he doth so please himself in a title to yearly revenues at Magd. Coll. I shall desire him to look over his Post-predicaments once more, and there hee shall finde, that the modus habendi uxo­rem, is by Logicians called pessimus: by which they mean, that it is the most im­proper, but to a Fellow of a Colledge it is the worst on another account, because it doth evacuate and nullifie his title to all Academical enjoyments.

2. Had he not better have said nothing, than said any thing, which might look like an affirmation, that he suffered the losse of his sweetest enjoyment, for being suspect­ed to be Author of a Libel? When as we all know, that he was turned out, not by [Page 45] the Visitors, but by the Comittee of Lords and Commons, for non submission to the Authority of Parliament in visiting the University, for the doing of which a li­berty was reserved in the Articles granted by the Lord Fairfax at the surrender.

3. Is it not impudence to say, that the Visitors authorised by the two Houses, under the broad Seale of England, could not make me his legitimate successour? Let him also say, that the Honourable Judges are Murderers, or else tell us how the Parliament, which could give them power to take away mens lives, could not also give power to others to take away his Fellowship. I have all this while gratified him in his ungrounded supposition, upon which his pen did run ryot, viz. my being in his Chamber, and succeeding him in his Fellowship, but the truth is (and that Mr. P. had opportunity to know) his place was void before I was so much as Demy, nor am I in possession of the Chamber which was once his. For a conclusion, I shall desire this my Adversary to com­mune with his own heart, and impartially to enquire whether it be not envy, and not conscience, which maketh him to exclaim with so much bitterness against the late [Page 46] ejections, sequestrations, deprivations; and whether he was so much offended at those who enjoyed the places of such Heads, or Fellows of Colledges as were ejected, whilest Oxon being a Garrison was not Oxon; and whether our late sequestrations (which yet I undertake not in all things to acquit) were not more justifiable than those proceedings in the late Archb. times, when men were suspended ab officio & be­neficio, meerly for not reading the Book of Sports.

Having removed the rubbish, we may now come at the question, which is, Whe­ther moral evil, as such, be a privation? Concerning which, the termes being ex­plained, 'twill be no difficult matter to de­termine. What evill in general is, can per­haps scarce be declared by any one com­mon definition, nor hath such a definition been attempted by any but Voetius the son, in his Theol. Nat: p. 539. sometimes things very perfect and positive are called evil, as the venemous qualities in Plants, not that they are evill in themselves, but by extrin­secall denomination, in regard of their effi­ciencie, of this kind of evill we now di­spute not. And indeed nothing is pro­perly said to be evill, but that which is [Page 47] such by intrinsecal denomination, as wanting some either natural, or moral perfection that it ought to have. The most common division of evill is into evill of punishment, and evill of sin, called by Tertullian, ma­lum supplicii, and malum delicti: by Basil, [...]. Our debate is of the evill of sin, which onely can be called morall evill. The next term is the restrictive particle (as) by which we understand malum for­maliter sumptum, sin considered abstractly from that either act, habit, or faculty in which it is, and unto which it gives de­nomination. The not distinguishing be­twixt the sinfull act, and the sin of the act, is the stone at which Mr. P. hath all along stumbled. He tells me, that sin being a complexum quid in the acknowledgement of all, cannot admit of an abstraction, and yet remain the complexum that it was before abstraction, p. 164. very wisely and warily spoken; as who should say, I cannot ab­stract, but I must abstract; I cannot indeed abstract sin from a sinfull action, so as it should still remain sinfull; nor can I ab­stract whitenesse from a white wall so as that it should still remain white; for 'tis constituted white by whitenesse: But [Page 48] though it be the whitenesse that makes it white, yet it is not the whitenesse that makes it a wall; and therefore I may con­sider the whitenesse and the wall apart: The Abstract and Concrete word doe both signifie the same form, but not in the same way; because the Concrete doth in obli­quo connote that subject unto which the denominating forme agrees; but if at any time the Concrete be used with a redupli­cation, then it is all one with the Abstract, saith Smiglesius; indeed album qua album, and albedo differ little. Sinfull signifies both the subject that is sinfull, and it's sin­fulnesse, sin or sinfulness, the meer pravity and irregularitie: Bus this will not down with Mr. P. therefore he tells us, p. 83. 1. That action and quality are both acci­dents. 2. That an accident is not the sub­ject of an accident. 3. That some acci­dents are separable from their subjects of inhesion, some not, as risibility from a man. Blush all you that have any respect for Magd. Coll. to finde that one that was for some years Fellow of that Foundation, should be ignorant of that which Fresh­men of two Terms standing commonly know. May not an Accident be the imme­diate subject of inhesion to an accident, [Page 49] though onely substance can be the ultimate? If not, then the Question, An fides sit in Intellectu, an in voluntate, with six hundred more of the like nature, are at an end. Or what if the Action were but the Subject of Denomination, might not its evill bee distinct from it? Nor would this exact Gentleman, if he had to do with a Sophi­ster, escape the lash, for calling Risibilitie an Inseparable Accident, it being the most common instance of a Propriety, betwixt which, and an Inseparable Accident, there is a most grosse difference. But if hee think that the evill quality doth as neces­sarily flow from the Essence of an Action, as Risibility doth from the Essence of a man (which he must think, unlesse hee hath written ridiculous impertinencies) I conceive he hath not one man alive of his judgement. Yet at last, in a lucid inter­vall, he tells us, p. 84. He can discern a difference betwixt the Action and its quality, by which it is evil. Let him but stick to that distinction, and I'le ne'r put him to distinguish between the same evil action and it self: Nor did any one else; but he hath frequently frightfull apparitions in his own fancy, in the vanquishing whereof he takes not a little pride. Nor will I [Page 50] offend his terse eares, with such a barba­rous word as pecceity, which he tels us oc­curs not in any Author sacred or prophane. Onely I must observe how variously his pulse beats, p. 13. Sin it self is a Physicall Abstract at the grossest, of which sinful­nesse at least is an Abstract Metaphysi­cal, which admitting not any composition, can­not further be Abstracted, no not so much as in Imagination. p. 78. c. 2. Sin is a Concrete in respect of sinfulness, and doth note the same thing in one word, thot sinfull action doth in two, which I will make him to apprehend, do he what he can to the contrary: besides, not reading what I write, by shewing that a sinne and a sinfull action, or act, or motion, have the same enunciation in all propositions imagi­nable: p. 84. To prevent a [...], I give this notice to to Mr. W. that if the word wickednesse be not alwaies synonymous with sinne, yet it is so often: pag. 164. Sin is a complexum quid in the acknowledgement of all.

1. That sin is a complexum quid, is not acknowledged by all, or any; except by complexum you'll mean complexum ex ge­nere & differentlâ; for sin is an abstract word, and doth not in it's signification connote any subject.

[Page 51]2. It hath neither truth nor sense in it, that a sin, and a sinfull act, or action, or motion, have the same enunciation in all Propositions Imaginable; I can say, not to doe what a man is bound to doe is a sin; but I hope it is not a sinfull act, or action, or motion; sin may be predicated of o­riginal and habitual corruption, so cannot sinfull act, or action. Let Mr. P. explain how sin is a Physical abstract, and how it is synonymous to the word wickednesse, and yet signifieth but the same thing in one word, that sinfull action doth in two, and he shall reconcile what to me seemes not reconcileable. If I had said albedo is a concrete in respect of albedineitas, and sig­nified that in one word, which superficies alba doth in two, I should be thought at Magd. Coll. to forget my self extreamly. And to prevent a Logomachy, I further adde, that sin and sinfulness are to me sy­nonymous, and therefore perhaps I may use them promiscuously, meaning by them what the Latines doe by peccatum, pravitas, malitia, and the Greeks by [...], &c. Little probability may the Reader think wee should agree; for hee saith, p. 150, 151. That sinis so perfectly a Concrete, that unlesse it is a Concrete, it [Page 52] cannot be conceived to be a sin, no more than a concrete can be conceived not to be a concrete; but I say that sin is so perfectly an abstract, that if we conceive not of it as an abstract, we conceive not of it as sin; I am to seek what vox Abstracta is, if sin be not such.

The third term is privation: which I must the rather explain, because he tells me, Pag. 162. That I seem to make no difference between a simple Negative, and a Privative. A Privation with me, (as with all others) is the absence of a positive form, in a subject capable of such a form: Instances are commonly given of blind­ness, deafness, &c. Mr. P. indeed, seems not to know the difference between a negation, and a privation, as any Sciolist, will gather from his words, Divin. Phil. p. 111. It cannot so much as be pretended, that every sin is one­ly privative; for every privation presuppo­seth a habit, which every sin cannot doe: be­cause a man may be covetous, or cruell, who never was liberall, or compassionate, which ra­ther implies a negation, than a Privation of those virtues which he hath not lost, but never had: This is one of the convincing demonstra­tions which he tells me I had not the courage to venture upon. Must not he be very spleen bound, that would not smile at such stuffe? [Page 53] Did this disputant never peep into a Phi­losopher, to know the signification of the word privation? if he did not, why doth he venture to use a Philosophicall dia­lect? If he did, how could he make shift, not to remember, that privation is as well the absence of a form that should, or might have been in the subject, as of a form that sometime was in it? One of the three principles of naturall generation, doth de­note the absence of a form that never was in the subject, but of which the subject is onely capable, and yet sure it was wont to be called privatio: But the reader hath had too too much of these trifles: I had rather that he would take notice that there is a twofold privation, in respect of a habit: The one pure, the other not pure, the one in privari, the other in privatum esse, as Aquinas doth expresse it somewhat more roundly. The privation also which hath respect to an action is twofold, one that altogether takes away the act, the other that takes away but the rectitude of the act: the question therefore is; Whether that evil quality, or quasi quality, from which any act, or habit is denominated evil, be a privation, as I say, or a positive entity as Mr. P, saith. That it is not a positive en­tity, [Page 54] I proove by good authority, & better reasons. By authority, 1. of the Fa­thers and other ancient Christian writers, who did not write in the Scholasticall stile and strain: they with one mouth assert the meer privative nature of sin. Dionys. Areop. in his book de Divinis no­minibus frequently speaks to this purpose: [...]. Let the Reader per­use the whole discourse of that ancient, in that place, with the two Greek Scholiasts on him:

Greg. Nyssen. [...]. Oratione Catecheti­ca, pag. mihi 490. Joan. Damascenus: Orthod. fid. lib. 4. [...]. Lib. 2. [...]. Greg. Naz. Orat. ad Julianum, is of the same minde. [...]; his Scholiast Nicetas, p. 1045. Neque enim malum substantia ul­la [Page 55] est, sed boni privatio, quemadmodum & tenebrae luminis recessus: Non enim alia est mali substantia quàm virtutis abscessus. Athanasius I shall commend hereafter. A­mongst the Latines Austin and Anselm, (who have both, not obiter, but data operâ, enquired into the formalis ratio of Sin) have determined it not to be positive: Aug. toto libro de natura boni: Anselm, de concep. Virg. lib. 1. cap. 4, 5, 6. De casu diaboli, à Cap. 8. ad 11. Now though I would not erre with the Fathers, yet do I lesse distrust my self to erre, while I keep them company, and do with the more con­fidence, look an adversary in the face, when my quiver is full of their Testimonies: & 'tis in favour to the Readers purse and patience that I fill it no fuller.

Secondly, I might strengthen my opi­nion from the Schoolmen, amongst whom I have an Army to a man: as is confessed even by Arriaga. The first that ever was against me, as Faventinus thinks, was Ca­jetan, and those that assert the positivity of sin are by Rada called Cajetanistae; so that I may say to Mr. P. where was your opinion before Luther? for Luther and Cajetan are known to be contemporaries. Yet not to wrong Cajetan, he onely holds [Page 56] the essence of the sin of commission to be positive, but that the sinfullnesse of o­mission was so, he never dreamed. Do these authorities signify nothing with Mr. P? hear him: Pag. 174. If either the Schoolmen erre, or were mistaken, or were never read, who can help it? I see judge­ment often varieth with interest, and things acquire a price, not so much for what they are in themselves, as for what they are relatively to our ends and pur­poses. The Schoolmen's authority is no good money when he should take it; is currant coyne when he should pay it, I must needs say that the generall suffrage of the Schools doth signify much to me, in matters where they are not overawed by a Church Canon. But he hath a prettier evasion than this, Pag. 170. The Jesuits in waggery did purposely propagate many blasphemies, arising from the tenet of uncon­ditionall reprobation, in Protestant parts of the Christian world, that by making them odious, they might fright men from thence into the Church of Rome. If there be any Jesuits that do propagate what they ap­prehend to be blasphemy, I should think a fitter name might be given to so Devi­lish a practice than that of waggery. Who [Page 57] betrayed him into this observation? Dr. Jackson; who yet doth not bluntly say, ‘that it's the designe of the Factours for the Church of Rome to have this Do­ctrine generally embraced, or acknow­ledged by us; but inserts these words of Caution, or at least to have the World believe that it were generally acknow­ledged by us:’ Beshrew Mr. Bar: who put Mr. P. upon a necessity of reading this Author, if he can make no better use of him. The Jesuits are generally reputed very Politick; but if this be the best poli­cy they have, I should think we need not much fear their plots: For what if they should fasten the Doctrine of absolute re­probation upon the Church of England: ‘Why thence it would follow that the God of heavē were worse than an incar­nate Devil, yea thou any wicked Spirit, or the Devil himself can without stan­der be supposed to be:’ But doth he not think that men would enquire, whether that frightfull conclusion were rightly de­duced from the former principle, would they not tell those Popish factours that their Pastours teach them to confesse their sins, and to take the shame of them to themselves? Would they not bid them [Page 58] dwell at home, and take notice of their own Dominicans, who as strenuously as­sert the Doctrine of absolute reprobation as any that go by the name of Calvinists: the same Dr. Jackson saith, Pag. 3012. ‘He that would diligently peruse Aqui­nas his writings, and in particular his resolution of that Question, An detur causa praedestinationis, may finde him as strait lace't as Calvin was; one and the same girdle would be an equall & com­petent measure for both their errors: Nay the Dr. saith the Dominican's and other Schoolmen were more faulty than Zuinglius, or his followers.’

But with Mr. P. Doctor Twisse, is worse than the Jesuit's, though the Jesuit's and Dominican's are too bad, Pag. 170. Let me adde that two Papists as learned as ever did engage for upholding the Popish cause, do acquit us of this imputation the making of God the Author of sin, Suarez opus, lib. 2. cap. 2. p. 111. The Hereticks (potestants) know well that God intendeth not that which is formall in sin, nor inclineth the will of man to intend it. Vasquez, dis. 99. cap. 4. n. 22. Calvin, Zuinglius, Beza, do plainly affirm that sin as sin is not to be re­ferr'd to God as the cause thereof, both [Page 59] these Testimonies I take upon trust from D. F. Wh. P. 145. Having not the books themselves by me at the present. But to requite him for this observation out of Dr. Jackson, who attempts not the proof of it by any one example, I shall give him ano­ther: That the Popish Priests will some­times go over to the Lutherans and pre­tend a conversion, whereas their designe is onely to blow up the coals of conten­tion betwixt them and the Calvinists: And at the managing of such a designe I am sure Mr. P. hath as good a faculty as any man alive. What successe can Mr. Duree, expect in his negociations for peace, when as men of bitter Spirits from among our selves, do not stick to make the opinions of the Calvinists worse then those of the Atheists; And that the Arminians are the consin-germanes to the Jesuits, and do underhand aime at the introducing of Po­pery, I shall give him the opinion of the whole house of Commons, whose word's in a Declaration of theirs to his Majesty, are, The hearts of your subjects are perplexed, when with sorrow they behold a dayly growth and spreading of the faction of the Arimi­nians, that being, as your Majesty well knows, but a cunning way to bring in Popery, and the [Page 60] Professors of those opinions, the common di­sturbers of the Protestant Churches, and in­cendiary's of those states in which they have gotten any head, being Protestants in shew, but Jesuit's in opinion and practice. Vid. a ne­cessary introduction to the Archbish: tryall by Mr. Prinne. If he except against the house of Commons, let him learn the same from a Jesuit's letter to the Rector at Bruxells. Father Rector, &c. ‘We have now many strings to our bowes, and have strongly fortify'd our faction, and have added two Bulwarkes more; for when K. James lived, we know he was very violent against Arminianisme, and inter­rupted with his pestilent wit, and deep learning, our strong designes in Holland, now we have planted the soveraigne drug Arminianisme, which we hope will purge the Protestants from their heresy.’ This letter was seized in the Archbish: Study, and attested against him at the Lords bar: If yet there be not witnesse enough, wee'l call in the Lord Falklands speech, p. 7. ‘As Sir Tho. Moor sayes of the Casuists, their businesse was not to keep men from sinning but to inform them quam prope ad peccatum sine peccato liceat accedere; so it seemed their worke was [Page 61] to try how much of a Papist might be brought in without Popery, and to de­stroy as much as they could of the Go­spell, without bringing themselves into danger of being destroyed by the Law: Mr. Speaker, to go yet further, some of them have so industriously laboured, to deduce themselves from Rome, that they have given great suspicion, that in gratitude they desire to return thither, or at least, to meet it half way: Some have evidently laboured to bring in an English, though not a Roman Popery: I mean not the outside onely and dresse of it, but equally absolute, a blind de­pendance of the people upon the Cler­gy, and of the Clergy upon themselves: And have opposed Papacy beyond the Sea, that they might setle one beyond the water: Nay common fame is more than ordinarily false, if none of them have found a way to reconcile the opi­nions of Rome to the preferments of England, be so absolutely, directly, and cordially Papists, that it is all that 1500. per annum can do to keep them from confessing it.’ Dr. Abbot, in a Sermon be­fore the University preached at St. Peters, on Easterday, 1615. ‘Men under pretence [Page 62] of truth, and preaching against the Pu­ritan's, strike at the heart and root of faith and Religion now established a­mong us. This preaching against the Puritan's, was but the practice of Par­sons and Campian's counsell, when they came into England to seduce young Stu­dents, and when many of them were afraid to lose their places, if they should professedly be thus, the counsell they then gave them was, that they should speak freely against the Puritan's, and that should suffice: And they cannot pretend they are accounted Papists, be­cause they speak against the Puritan's; but because they are Papists indeed they speak not against them. If they do at any time speak against the Papists, they do beat a litle upon the bush, and that softly too, for fear of troubling or dis­quieting the birds which are in it. They speak of nothing but that in which one Papist will speak against another; as a­gainst aequivocation, the Popes tempo­rall authority, and the like, and perhaps against some of their blasphemous speeches; but in the point of free-will, justification, concupiscence being sin af­ter Baptism, inherent righteousnesse, [Page 63] certainty of salvation, the Papists be­yond the Sea can say they are wholly theirs, and the Recusants at home make their braggs of them, and in all things they keep themselves so near the brink, that upon all occasions they may step o­ver to them.’

From the Doctor of the Chair in Oxon I'le lead him to the University of Cam­bridge, in which I finde a Letter subscri­bed unanimously by the several Heads of Colledges, March 8. 1595. to their much honoured Chancellor, desiring from his Lordships hands some effectual remedy for the suppressing of Baro's opinions; Lest by permitting passage to these errours, the whole Body of Popery should by little and little break in upon us, to the overthrow of our Religion. And a little after these words doe occurre; Vouchsafe your Lord­ships aide and advice both to us (wholly con­senting, and agreeing in judgement) and all others of the University soundly affected, and to the suppression in time, not onely, of these errours, but even of gross Popery, like by such means in time easily to creep in among us, as we find by late experience it hath dan­gerously begun.

The Reader will pardon me (who can [Page 64] scarce pardon my self) for this excursion, occasioned through a desire to acquaint the world, what our former Worthies did think concerning the spirit and design of our English Demonstrants.

3. It were no difficult matter to com­passe about my Thesis, denying the positi­vity of sin with a cloud of witnesses, from among our Modern Divines; but that I have reasons more than enough, to con­ceive, they stand but for cyphers in Mr. P's account: Melancthon, it may be shall bee regarded; let's hear him; He wisheth that there were some one common defini­tion of sin, unto which all would stand; and, for his own part, declareth in more places than one, that he well approveth the Definition given by Anselm, that O­riginal sin is, privatio originalis justitiae de­bitae inesse. Nay, Tom. 1. p. 163. hee an­swers Mr. P's Argument. If sin be not a positive entity, then God punisheth for no­thing, by distinguishing between nihil ne­gativum, and nihil privativum, by the same token that he calls that convincing de­monstration by no better a name than Ca­villatio; hence I hamper him in this Di­lemma; either Melancthon's judgement is somewhat worth, or it is not: if not, why [Page 65] is it made so much use of by Mr. P? If it be, then down falls the positivity of sin. I confesse these horns are in themselves so blunt, that I am almost asham'd to make any use of them; but ad hominem they are sharp enough; for with such a pair he fan­cieth he hath tossed Dr. Reynolds concern­ing King James, Div. puri. p. 8. And yet this deplorable Dilemmatist, would needs be dealing again with that incomparable Doctor, quite and clean forgetting what befell the poor Frogge in Aesops Fables, that would needs be swelling against the Oxe, a second, and third time. I now inform him, that the Doctor will meddle no more with him; and indeed to under­take an Answer, would be, intemperanter abuti & otio & literis, nothing being of­fered against his Epistle, which hath weight enough in it to turne those Scales at Sedan, of which Capellus saith, that they would break with the four hundreth part of a Grain. After so many testimonies, it may seem needlesse to urge reasons unto Mr. P. who professeth, Divi. Phil. p. 100. That none of his principles appeal to reason, a­gainst the judgement of the whole ancient aod modern Church. If by the whole An­cient and Modern Church, he mean every [Page 66] Learned man that hath in any Age been of the Church, I question whether wee can finde a consent so unanimous in any point, except the twelve Articles of the Apo­stles Creed: But that sin is a privation, hath been as generally held as any one thing of this nature. Among the Fathers, I know none of a contrary minde: Some few Schoolmen, as also Dr. Field, I grant were, in reference to sins of commission; as to sins of omission, that they also should be positive is so strange, that I know not whether ever it were asserted by any, but Cerberus, alias Champneys, Mr. Dukes the Keeper of the great Ordinary at Hell in Westminster, Mr. P. and (whom I would not joyn with such company) the Reve­rend and Learned Dr. Hammond: Yet wee will also contend by Arguments arti­ficiall.

Mr. B. had used one, p. 112. in which because Mr. P. will have me equally con­cern'd, I shall suffer it, and his Answer to play a little before us.

‘If sin, as sin, be a positive entity, then it is a thing in it self good, but so it is not, therfore neither is it a positive enti­ty.’ The consequence is founded upon a very rational, and commonly received [Page 67] Maxim, that Ens & bonum convertuntur, though Mr. P. be pleased to call this, The printed Article of Mr. B's unchristian Creed, p. 151. But what doth he answer?

1. That all the force of this argument is onely to prove that sinne is good; whereas he that hath but half an eye may see, that the design of the Argument is to fright Mr. P. out of his sad opinion concerning the positivity of sinne, by bringing him to the grand absurdity, of saying sinne is good.

Secondly, he saith, That a thing priva­tive in one respect, is also positive in another; and every Sciolist can tell, that the corruption of one thing is the generation of another: Quorsum haec? If he mean, that the corruption of one thing is formally the generation of another, hee falls into so loathsome a contradiction, as would make any Sciolists stomack rise at the naming of it. If he understand the Proposition in sensu concomitantiae, then it is true, that in the ordinary course of nature, the genera­tion of one thing is the corruption of ano­ther, and the corruption of one thing the generation of another; because the matter cannot exist without a form, nor under two disparate forms: But quid haec ad Iphicli [Page 68] boves? How that which is properly, and by intrinsecal denomination privative in one respect, should be positive in another, falls not as yet under my comprehension. His examples will perhaps clear my Intel­lectuals; The darkness which God created, was not more privative of the day, than it was positive of the night; and that which is privative of life or sight may be positive of death and blindness. If his meaning bee, that from the want of light in the aire wee may as truely say it is night, as from the presence of light wee can say it is day, that is a truth but very vulgar, if he would ei­ther hint or hold forth, that the darknesse doth actuate and inform the air per modum qualitatis positivae, as the light doth, there seems to be such a darkness upon the face of his own understanding, as I had thought till now had not been incident to a man of Academical education. If darknesse be a Positive Quality, pray tell us to what spe­cies of Quality belongs it? 'tis not habi­tus, nor potentia naturalis, nor yet is it qua­litas patibilis, which never was, nor ever can be seen, felt, heard, smell't, tasted by any one. He hath not yet made himselfe noysome enough, the peccant humour still operates; A Carneadist will be glad to in­troduce [Page 69] an opinion, that Sin is good by call­ing it bonum Metaphysicum, or transcen­dentale: If so, then Mr. P. hath deserved his humble thanks, who bestows a positive Entity on sin. We poor thick-pated Mor­tals, who make it but a privation, shall merit none of his favour. Mr. B. must be taught, that the adequate subject of Me­taphysicall science is, Ens quatenus ens, reale illud, non omnimodò positivum qua­tenus est positivum. A strange sentence: Can any thing be directly contained un­der the subject of Metaphysicks, which is not positive? or can any thing be unum per se (and such is the object of every sci­ence) which is partly positive, and partly privative? but we have more either of his ignorance, or inadvertencie: Bonum in Me­taphysicks doth no more signifie good in Eng­lish, than canis the Star doth signifie the Dog which walkes about with four feet. Bonum [...]n English doth signifie good, as opposed to e­ [...]ill; but in Metaphysicks, no more but Ens [...]n ordine ad appetitum. How came Eng­lish and Metaphysicks so to fall out, that [...]hey should stand in opposition? Is it not [...]nough that it is opposed to Greek, and [...]atine, and other languages, but it must so stand as the opposite term to Meta­physicks? [Page 70] I see others besides Presbyte­rians can sometimes talk non-sense: But doth not Bonum, the affection of Ens, if it were to be rendred in English, signifie good as opposed to evill? Mr. P. sure thinks it doth, and therefore in policy he forbears to English it, onely in Latine he gives us this description: Bonum est Ens in ordine ad appetitum; and that Sin is such, Mr. B. knows by sad and minutely experience. What uncharitablenesse is this, to say that Mr. B. hath minute­ly experience, that sin as sin is the ob­ject of his appetite? Malum qua malum is not the object of any rational creatures appetite; Nor can it be the object of the rational appetite any more than falsum quâ falsum can be the object of the understan­dings assent. For a close, he tels us, that malum morale est bonum Metaphysicum; and if Mr. B. aimed at nothing but this, he hath gained nothing. Yes, he hath gained enough: For who would ascribe a tran­scendental goodnesse to moral evill, but one, who hath either lost all his Meta­physicks, or never had any to lose. See­ing you have made a shift to swallow such a Camel, wee'll try whether we can fetch it up again. May it therefore please yo [...] [Page 71] to understand, that they who describe Metaphysical goodness, per ordinem ad ap­petitum, understand it primarily with re­lation to the Divine will: And will you make sin the object of the Divine will? But Suarez will tell you, that good is not so compared to the appetite as truth is to the intellect: for Metaphysical truth, in­cludes in its formall nature and denomi­nation some conformity to the understan­ding, but so doth not goodness include a conformity to the appetite, though such a conformity be a necessary consequent of goodnesse. A thing is not therefore good, because desired, but it is therefore desired because good. Hence they expresse the nature of good by the word perfectum, and conveniens alicui; and let Mr. P. if he can, tell me how sinne bonificates any subject, or addes any perfection to that in which it is.

The second Argument used by me in the Letter, was to this effect: ‘If sin be a positive Entity, then it is either God, or from God;’ but it can be neither: ergo, Ca­jetane found himself so hard beset with this Argument, that he ventured to say, God was the Author of malum morale, but not [Page 72] of malum simpliciter sic dictum: For the absurditie of which distinction he is suffi­ciently schooled by Suarez in more places than one; but Mr. P. hath an art worth twenty of the Cardinals distinctions, he hath alwaies a whole flood of vilifying words at command; and if he meet with a hard and stubborn Argument, he soakes it in that liquor so long, till the lesse un­derstanding Reader forget that ever any such Argument was used. What Moun­taines he rowled up together to keep my Argument from being seen, I before ob­served: I will now take notice of a re­lenting pang, with which he seems to be surprised in the height of his persecutions against my Argument: Observe how it works, pag. 156. He must know that there is a medium betwixt God and his creatures, and I wonder what should aile him, that he should say there is none. Nay, if I must, there is no remedy; but till he have more authority over me, than I yet conceive him to have, I shall without fear give him my reasons, why I neither doe, nor can acknowledge any medium.

First, because I finde those that had to doe with the Manichees, and heathen Phi­losophers, building their Argument upon [Page 73] this Basis, that Omne ens est vel primum, vel à primo; and that malum is therefore not caused by God, because it is not ens, but non ens, as they commonly call that which is but a privation: e: g: [...]. Orat. contra gentes, p. 6. & De: incar. verbi, p. 37. [...]. Greg. Nys. Tom. 2. 490. [...], &c. Who is such a stranger to St. Augustin, that hath not read such sentences as these from him, de lib. arbit. lib. 1. Credimus, ex uno Deo, esse omnia quae sunt, & tamen non esse peccatorum auctorem Deum? in 1 cap. [Page 74] Joh. v. 1. Peccatum quidem non per ipsum factum est, quia peccatum nihil est. Mali author non est qui omnium quae sunt author est: quia in quantum sunt, in tantum bon [...] sunt: 83 Quaest. It would be endlesse to put together all sayings of the Ancients that are of this nature. I shall take off my Pen when I have only transcribed the re­markable determination of Aquinas, 1 ^a, 2 ^ae, q. 79. ar. 2. in corpo: actus (saith he) peccati & est ens & est actus, & ex utroque habet quod sit adeo: omne enim ens quocunque mod [...] sit oportet quod derivetur a primo ente-omnis autem actio causatur ab aliquo existente in actu, quia nihil agit, nisi secundum quod est actu; omne autem ens actu reducitur ad pri­mum actum. sc. Deum sicut in causam qu [...] est per suam essentiam actus: unde relinqui­tur quod Deus sit causa omnis actionis in quantum est actio; peccatum nominat ens & actionem cum quodam defectu. Defectus autem ille est ex causâ creatâ sc: libero arbi­trio in quantum deficit ab ordine primi agen­tis, i. e. Dei, unde defectus iste non reducitur in Deum sicut in causam; sed in liberum arbi­trium, sicut defectus claudicationis reduci­tur in tibiam curvam, sicut in causam, no [...] autem in virtutem motivā: a qua tamen causa tur quicquid est motionis in claudicatione, & secundum hoc Deus est causa actus peccati [Page 75] non tamen est causa peccati, quia non est hu­jus quod actus sit cum defectu.

Nor secondly, do I know any other way of defining what ens primum is, but this that it is such a being, which is not from any other being, and which is the cause of all the beings that are. Thirdly, this positive being of sin is it a finite and par­ticipate being? If not, how is it not God? if? How is it not from the Fountain of all essences? Fourthly, I am the more confirmed that ther's no medium betwixt Deus & creatura, because Mr. Pierce af­ter all his enquiry hath not been able to finde any. For whereas he doth tell me that the works of the Devill are a medium, he could not sure but think that I would distinguish in blasphemy, lying, &c. Be­twixt the vital act and it's deficiency and dissonance from the Law of God, the act it self I hold to bee positive, and from God; the irregularity of that act from which it is denominated blasphemy, lying, &c. I would derive onely from mans corru­ption, and the Devills temptation. If he will not take this from me, let him take it from those Gamaliels, at whose feet he'el not account it any disparage­ment to sit as a disciple. Dr. Fr. White, [Page 76] Pag. 104. ‘Defence of his Brother, whereas sin is a deficience and aberra­tion from the rule of justice, it cannot subsist alone; but even as halting must necessarily be joyned with some motion of the body, & hoarsnesse of speech with the action of speaking, so the evill of sin is conjoyned with some action, or mo­tion of the Soul, or body which hath a naturall and positive being, and where unto there hapneth a going astray from Divine Law, even as it hapneth to a lame mans naturall motion, to have halting concurring with it. Of that which is positive & naturall in sinfull actions Di­vines acknowledge God to be the Au­thor both in that he perserveth mans will and faculties, whereby he is ena­bled to his operations, and also because as the first cause he produceth together with the 2 ^d. cause all positive motion. Dr. Sand. 1 Tim. 4.4.5. Ser. Ad pop. there is a naturall (or rather transcendentall) goodnesse, honitas entis, as they call it, in every action even in that where to the greatest sin adhereth, and that goodnesse is from God, as that action is his crea­ture, but the evill that cleaveth unto it is wholy from the default of the person [Page 77] that commiteth it and not at all from God, Dr. Abbot, answer to Bishop, Pag. 124. We say, and you will say no lesse that God is the Author of all the actions in the World, yet we say that sin is wholly and onely of man himself. distinguish the accident from the sub­ject, the sin of the action from the action it self, God in the one shall be glorified & man justly condemned for the other.’ Nay what if M. Pierce, himself say that the sinfull action, so far as it is an action, is from God? He saith that every good action of man is from the special grace of God. Now seeing all the good actions that are done per gratiam viatoris be and must necessarily be on some account sin­full; concerning these actions I demand are they from God? If not, how is every good action from God? If they be, then he spits in the face of his judicious Dr. Jack. who saith exact: Col. p. 3013. To imagine there should be one cause of the act and another of his obliquity, or sinfullnesse of the act would be as grosse a solaecisme, as to a assigne, or seek after any other cause of the rotundity of a sphere, or bullet besides him that frames the one, or moulds the other, or else he must say that the action, & that in [Page 78] perfect morall goodnesse which is in it are from God but the sinfull imperfection it self is from man through Gods permission, and this he doth say 172. But then he ought not to be offended if we take the same liberty, Pag. 158. He saith God made idolaters men. And 159. men themselves are the works of God onely, which is to grant more then with truth can be granted. But thus I argue, if God be the cause of men, than of Davids child begotten by the action of Adultery, for Scripture will a­low me to call that child, so soon as borne, a man, John. 16.21. If the cause of that child, undoubtedly then the cause of the action of generation by which, as by a causality, that child was produced. Yet was he not the cause of the adulterious pravity cleaving unto that action. Quid mirum si dicaemus, deum facere singulas actio­nes quae fiunt malâ voluntate, cum fate a­mur eum facere singulas substantias quae fiunt injustâ voluntate & in honest â actione, Ans. de casu diab. c. 10. So that we are but where we were at the first setting out. For the actions in which the evill of sin is sub­jected, I'le grant to be positive, but from God as well as the creature; the evill of sin from which they are denominated sin­full, [Page 79] is but a privation and requireth no proper efficient cause at all, such as it hath man is and not God. But I have ob­structed his good nature in working, Pag. 157. He goes on further to tell me that res in Metaphysicks hath three acceptions, in the first of wich it comprehendeth entia ra­tionis, as opposed to nihil. Before he tell what the other two acceptions are, he cor­rects himself, my design is to convert and not confound him, this charity (as is more than probable) did both begin and end at home had any benefit been intended to me by it, you should have ceased sooner. For I was confunded before that politick [...] was made. For let any one tell mee how this discourse about ens rationis is here brought in: First, was it to let the World understand, that our Author knew what ens rationis meant? That's but a low design, and yet he cannot accomplish it neither, for he placeth the model of an house to be built hereafter among entia ra­tionis, & yet that is as far from being onely objective in intellectu, from not being lon­ger than it is thought on, as the East is from the West. Secondly, hath he a mind to insinuate that sin is ens rationis, if so, it must either be privatio, which is that he [Page 80] all along denieth, or a negation, against which his arguments militate with more strength, or a relatio rationis, which is af­firmed by Vasquez, but against all good reasons, as I shall soon shew him if forced to so great severity by his owning such a paradox. Thirdly, was it his businesse to intimate that all the entia rationis are so the works of men, as that God cannot be termed the cause of those actions, by which they are made? I will not torture his ingeniolum with that perplexed que­stion, whether the Divine intellect do fabricate ens rationis, but without all per­adventure, the action of the understanding, though not the imperfection is from God, are not all our notiones: 2 ^ae. in Logick, en­tia rationis, yet is the act of the understan­ding, causing them so far from not being from God, that God hath indeed a more than ordinary & common concourse to it.

The privative nature of sin may be thus further evicted. ‘If a thing be therefore sinfull because it wants some perfection that it ought to have, and cease to be sin­ful when it hath all the perfection which it ought to have, than is sin a privation; but a thing is therefore sinfull, &c.’ Ergo, the consequence of the proposition is as [Page 81] clear as the noone day light, the assum­ption also needs rather explication than confirmation, ther's not a novice but knows the old rule, bonum ex integrâ cau­sâ, malum ex quolibet defectu. To make an action good there must be a concur­rence of all the three goods, object, end, circumstances, the mere want of any of these three makes the action sinfull, be­cause the Law requires that all the three goodnesses should be in the action, & the want of that which the Law requires to to be in any subject is a sin: or else we must reject, not onely Aristotle, but the Apostle, who saith; [...]. This argument is used by Greg. Arim. a no­ble and ancient Schoolman, and largely in­sisted upon by Faventinus, the most acute Scotist. I'me not ignorant that various re­plies are made to the argument; but an­swers also are commonly given to those replies, which to transcribe would be a matter of more trouble than profit.

My fourth and last argument against the pretended positivity of sin I dispose in this enthymem, Original sin is not positive, ergo, sin as sin is not positive. The consequent (I conceive) will be yeelded sine sanguine & sudore, otherwise the old Canon, a [Page 82] quatenus ad omne valet consequentia, would soon command it, as to the antecedent. I deny not but our Protestant Divines in their disputes against the Papists, doe make a positive, as wel as a privative part of original sin; but how that terme may be understood so as not to prejudice my assertion in the least is largely shewed by Gisber. Voetius, in his accurate discourse de propagatione peccati originalis. He that calls it a privation of Gods image, saith the whole nature of it, is a sentence of Mr. John Calvin. That I may prove original sin not to be positive in the sense we now use the word positive, I must lay down this as a postulatum. That the soul is not by propa­gation, or ex traduce, (as they speak) but immediately created by God. If this postu­latum should not be granted me, I should not fear the demonstrating of it by evi­dence of Scripture, and strength of reason, to any gain sayer; but such my charity for­bids mee to think Mr. P. This supposed, I thus argue. If original sin be a thing po­sitive, 'tis either the soul it self, or some of its faculties, or some accident or adiunct agreing immediately to the faculties, me­diatly to the soul it self, but none of all these; ergo. To say with Flaccius Illy­ricus, [Page 83] that it is the soule it self, were with more than heathenish impiety to calum­niate the goodnesse of our Creator, and the like absurditie will follow if we assert it to be one of the faculties of the soul. If we say it is an accident inhering in the faculties of the soul, then it was either put into them by God, which will make God the Author of the worst of sins, or else it is caused in them by the souls presence in, and union to the body, or from some action of the soul it self: Not by any action of the soul it self for it's faculties are sinfull be­fore it put forth any one act of reason: Not from its presence in, or union to the body: for who can imagine how the soul, which is spiritual and immaterial, should be defiled by being joyned to a body? which though­full of naturall imperfections is not sin­full, and if it were sinfull could nor com­municate its sinfullnesse to the soule that informes it. But now holding origi­nal sin to be a privation in an active sub­ject, we do avoid all these inconveniences, by saying, that Adam by his first trans­gression did sin away the image of God from himself, and his posterity, who were in him, not onely as a naiurall, but as a federal head also, and so God createth [Page 84] the souls of men void of his image, and yet justly looks on them as sinners, for wanting this image, because they ought to have it, and by their own folly depri­ved themselves of it.

As for the reasons Mr. P. hath against the privative nature of sin, he hath so slipt & glided them into all the severall parts of his book, that it is allmost impossible, to refute them without committing as many tavtologies, as he useth himself in making them, I must therefore fall a picking of thē up, like so many daysies in a bare common, here and there one where I can find them; but first me thinks 'tis somewhat strange, that my aggressor should put forth a dis­course tending to prove the positivity of sin, and never consult the Schoolemen, a­mong whom the question hath been for many years agitated, or if he did consult them, then it is more strange that he should not find ingenuity to acknowledge whence he borrowed his arguments, and take notice of the solutions, so commonly and plainly given to them: Yet I confesse, sometimes our disputant hath let fall such reasons, as were never thought on by any before him, this is the happinesse, or rather, unhappinesse of some, that [Page 85] they can use and urge such mediums, which those with whom they deal had not wit, great, or litle enough to foresee: so I remember I once heard a fellow with ex­treā confidence strive to prove, that there was no necessity of repentance in order to salvation, because the gifts and callings of God are without repentance; an argument, I dare say, with which the Minister never expected to be encountred: will't thou see its parallel? look Pag. 156. unlesse Mr. Hick. will embrace the suds of a contradi­ction, he must confesse that to be positive which Christ came to destroy. The suds of a con­tradiction! A pretty similitude. But I would faine know whether Mr. P. will say there be any proper privations? If he say there be none, he must think of making our freshmen some kind of satisfaction, for robbing them of one of their post-pre­dicaments; if he say there be any, he must either let fall this sad loose way of arguing, or else shew us some one exam­ple of privation, which Christ either did not, or could not have destroyed, had he so pleased, by introducing the opposit forme into the subject, 'tis said 1 Cor. 15.26. The last Enemy that shall be de­stroyed is death. Will it hence follow, [Page 86] that death is no proper privation? The best crowers are not alway the best fighters.

A 2. argument is from habitual sins, which I confesse were a good one had it been well managed; but Mr. P. can no more use it than young David could Sauls armour; for marke the letters & syllables of the man, Pag. 161. Sins of commission be­ing riveted in a man by long custome and continuance, are commonly called habitual sins, so then Mr. H. cannot but confesse that vices are habits, as wel as virtues (there is an habit of drunkenness as well as of so briety) and that habits are qualities he cannot be ignorant if he is but able to tell his fingers; and that a habit is a thing positive his post predicaments have taught him, where a ha­bit and a privation are set as opposite termes such as do mutually necessitate each others absence.

1. What consequence is this, if I can tell my fingers I can not be ignorant that habits are qualities? Did not Mr. P. know how to tell his fingers before he knew that habits were species of qualitie? Well, but grant him (which is denied by learned Piccolominee) that habits are qualities, what's gained? Just nothing: he makes a face as if he had intended a So [...]es but [Page 87] hath so miscarried in the pursuance of his medium, that I cannot with all my skill mould his words either into a Sorites, or any other good forme of argumentation. I suppose the proposition habits are quali­ties is redundant, and that the thing he aimes at is this, that which is an habit is positive, some sins, as drunk. are habits. Er­go, the proof of the Major, because habit in the postpredicaments is set as an opposite terme to privation. This would almost make a man think, that he took the word habi­tus to be of as limited a signification in the postpredicaments as it is in the 4 ^th. pre­dicament, but that is too sad a failing to charge a Scholar with, yet he falls into one as sad; for, by making the habit of drunkennesse a fit example of habit in the postpredicament, he must set the habit of sobriety as its opposite terme, and make it a privation, which is to cut his own throat: but had his hand been sosteddy as that he had hit the marke at which he shot, I think he did not take his aime a­right; for I doubt not whether the habit be positive, but whether that vitiosity from which 'tis called an habit of drunk­nesse be a positive entity. How evil a­ctions may be said to produce evill habits, [Page 88] evill habits produce evill actions, and yet sin not be positive, see Baro. met. de nat. mali. And to remove prejudice, though he were a Scotchman, yet he was no Puritan. Ibid. There must be something posi­tive to make a man positively foul, which foulnesse suffers a privation when the man is cleansed of his filth. Would not one think that all things conspire to make the good Rector ridiculous? It must indeed be some thing positive that rendreth the sinner po­sitively foul: But how will he prove the filth of sin to be positive? Not from the Rom. 22.11. For there be not so many Chapters in that Epistle; Nor doth he of­fer any other proof: Therefore we may make the spiritual filth to consist in the want of that nitor gratiae, which either was, or should have been in the soul.

His main argument is from actual sins as lying, and blaspheming, and believing that there is no God, even in the prosecu­tion of this argument, he shews more of the Palme than of the fift. But that he may not have the same quarrel with mee that Fimbria had with Scaevola, who ap­pointed him a day, because he did not to­tum telum in se recipere I would give his argument the best advantage I can, by [Page 89] supposing his instance to be made in the very worst, and most intrinsecaly evill of all actions; that of hating God, and will shew. 1. Why such acts, are called in­trinsecaly and essentialy evill. 2. What others have answered to this objection. 3. What I conceive is to be answered ac­cording to truth. Such actions are called intrinsecally evill, both because they are evill antecedently to any positive Law, and because they are evill ex genere, & objecto, and not meerly through the want of some circumstance: for a Scholar to walke in the night season, when by the sta­tutes he is bound to be within his Col­ledge walls, is sinfull, to walke at a time allowed, in a convenient place, and to a good end, is not sinfull: but the hating of God is such an action, as no circum­stance of time, or place can make law­full.

Some to answer the objection, do make the totum complexum, odisse Deum, the very determination of the hatred to God, to be the material part of that sin, and then the formal part, they make to be the want of conformity in this action to the Law of God, and so they labor to shew, or rather to feigne, some conditions in the concur­rence [Page 90] whereof, such an act is seperated from it's pravity: Let the Reader, if he please to satisfie his curiosity, consult, Greg. valent. 2. Tom. in Tho. dis. 6. q. 9. puncto 1. Or, Bradwardine lib. 1. cap. 26. I recite not their words, because I need not their helpe, and because they seem to make impossible hypotheses, as if the hatred of God were produced by God in a stone, whereas it cannot be that there should be the hatred of God in a stone, which neither hath nor can have any knowledge; nay the beasts, though they have love and hatred, yet cannot be said to hate God, of whom they have no know­ledge, or representation. I say therefore, that the hating of God is complexum quid, and must not be spoken of, as if it were one, the vital action of hatred, is a thing positive, but the undue referring, or ter­minating of that act to such an object which is altogether lovely, that's the sin­fulnesse of the action, and not positive but privative: indeed omne esse morale est val­de jejunum & diminutum, moral good­nesse and evill are rather modi entium than entia, which made Vasquez, though otherwise a very acute Doctor, place them, as I noted before, among [Page 91] entia rationis. Yet because it belongs to the Universality of the first cause to pro­duce not onely every reall being, but al­so the reall positive modifications of be­ings. Therefore we say, that in good workes, both the workes themselves, and their rectitude are positive, and are from God; in evill workes there are also two things considerable, the workes them­selves, and their pravity; the workes themselves we doubt not are positive, and from God, as all other positive things; but their pravities adde no new entities to them, but consist in a meer privation; in those things which are to be done accord­ing to a rule, good consists in a conformi­ty to, and convenience with the rule, but evill in a difformity, or discrepance from the rule; conformity is positive, diffor­mity is privative. And in this Answer I am very much confirmed, by the sayings of Anselm, and Twisse: Thus Anselm, de­conc. Praedest. & liberi arbitrii cap. 1. God caused all things which are done, either with a just, or injust will, that is, good workes, and evill: in good workes he both causeth, that they be, and that they be good; in evill, he onely causeth that they be, not that they be evill, adding this reason of the difference, [Page 92] because to be evill is to be nothing: Dr. Twisse, vind. lib. 2. There is a twofold actual concourse of God, one of Generall in­fluence, the other of speciall grace; the con­course of generall influence is necessarily re­quired to every action, whether good, or evill; but the concourse of speciall grace, is onely required to a worke throughly good: every good work therefore needs a twofold help, one of generall influence as it is a work, an­other of speciall grace as good; but an evill work requires onely the concourse of generall influence, as it is a work, but that it be evill, no more is required than the denyall of spe­ciall grace: Thomas speak to the same purpose, 2 Senten. dist. 37. art. 2. p. 2.

A 5. thing which Mr. P. would fain have to do the office of an argument is this, if every sin be privative, than there will be no difference betwixt sins of omis­sion and sins of commission, but a diffe­rence there is betwixt them, therefore, &c. I suppose those words, Pag. 167. Would if reduced to mood and Figure appear be­fore us in such a form, as I have now re­presented, he makes no difference betwixt not blessing and cursing God, betwixt cease­ing to give almes and grinding the faces of the poor, betwixt not saving and killing an­other [Page 93] man: Answ. Sins of omission and commission are sufficiently distinguished, notwithstanding they be both made to consist in privation: Omission will be the transgressiō of an affirmative precept, com­mission the trangression of a Negative pre­cept. 2ly. They differ in respect of their immediate foundation, the fundamentum proximum of a sin of commission is some act or habit; but these are not the funda­menta proxima of a sin of omission: it vex­eth me, that I am forced to inculcate these so vulgar and obvious things, which none are ignorant of, but those who never learned the A, B, C. of Philosophy. To the same Cluster I may reduce what he hath, P. 146. Murder must have something in it of po­sitive to distinguish it in specie from all other sins: But Scotus in 2. dis. 35. will tell him that the specifical distinction of sin is taken from the different privation of different recti­tude, & Joh. Rada, will tell him that there is no reall difference betwixt Thom. & him in this: deafnesse and blindnesse are priva­tions, yet speeifically distinct, because one is the privation of the power of seeing, the other of the power of hearing: But how then are the two extreme vices distinguished. e. g. Covetousness & prodigality seing? they are [Page 94] privations but of the same habit of libera­lity. Answ. Because covetousnesse is a privation of liberality, as it puts a man up­on honest spending, prodigality is a priva­tion of liberality as it doth incline a man to avoid superfluous spending. Thus I have eked out my adversaries argument, which was somewhat short and scanty, this made him seek to peece it with a patch of Gram­mar, for so it follows, some are not onely po­sitively but superlatively evill: the jest lieth in positive and superlative I am content he should thus use his wit with out any ri­val: But I have been told that some years since there was one T. P. lived near the Schools, who would have made such clen­ches with him and given him 3. for one.

A 6. argument that he will needs presse to fight for the positivity of sin is taken from those Scriptures, which do speak of greater and lesser sins, Pag. 163. At this I would strike with my Answer, if I could find where the veine of proof did lye; if I may ghesse it lyes in this, that there can be no degrees in a privation, but this is a meer mistake: Among privations some are greater, some lesse, with relation to that forme unto which they are opposed: if the forme have degrees of intention, [Page 95] that may Physically be accounted the grea­ter privation which removes more degrees of the Form from the Subject; that the lesse which removes fewer: if we reckon morally, then we may also calculate the degrees of privation from the greater or lesse obligation, that the subject is under, to have that form, which for the present he wants.

A. 7. If sinne be a privation, how are ac­tions and operations ascribed to it? How doth the Apostle say sinne wrought in him all manner of concupiscence? Rom. 7.8.

Answ. In such speeches sin signifies not abstractly and formally; but it signifies our nature and its faculties as under corrup­tion. The faculties in which the sinfull privations are, by reason of those privati­ons doe lust against the working of the Spirit.

And now I might take my leave of Mr. P. but that I am told of no lesse than 17 cogent Arguments used by him in his Di­vine Philanthropie, which I had not the courage to venture on. When Mr. B. told him, that he durst not quote the Assem­blies Confession, he is made a lyar for that speech: If he deserve such a censure, so I am sure doth Mr. P. How could I be [Page 96] said to want courage to meddle with that which I had never read over? And which now that I have been forced to read over, hath rather exercised my patience than my courage; so far am I from looking upon them as convincing Demonstrations, that I think I should honour them sufficiently, if I but say that they are good enough for a Sophister to use when he is put to course in the Horse-fair, ex tempore. He ptetends to have proved in ample manner, That sinne hath an efficient cause, properly so call'd, being angry it seems with the say­ing of Augustin, that makes it to have a deficient, rather than an efficient, properly so call'd. Pag. 145. If man be not the efficient cause (saith our doughty Disputant) then he is either the material, or formal, or final. Rather than we will seem to be too much frighted, we will say that man is the ma­terial, or subjective cause of the action; such a material or subjective cause as evill can have: And he is the efficient cause too of the evil of the action, if by an effici­cient he meane no more than that unto which it may be ascribed. But he and I both were best not to make too much noise, least wee should awaken the youngsters to fall aboard us with such an Argument as [Page 97] this. If man be the efficient cause either of a good action or a bad action, then hee doth effect it by another action, and so we may proceed in infinitum. To let that pass: the deficient cause is reduceable to the ef­ficient; and this is to be said; Suppose the first sin of Angels to have been a proud desire to be equal unto God; the cause of this proud desire was the will of the Angel; but it was the cause of the action (in such a sense as a causality may be said to have a cause) per se, of the vitiosity of the action, it was onely the cause per acci­dens, & per concomitantiam; nor doth the vitiotsiy of the effect alway suppose a viti­osity in the cause; though it alway pre-supposeth an imperfection in the cause; and where the cause it self is vitious, its vi­tiosity is not the cause of the vitiosity of the effect; for vitiosity of it self, neither can effect, nor be effected; but the vitious cause, taking together the being, and the supervenient privation, is the cause of the vitious effect, taking it in like manner for the beeing, and the superadded privation. But if we contradict him, we must say, that God damns men for nothing. Anselm, in the place I before referred my Reader to, makes this objection, and laugheth at [Page 98] its, weaknesse, De Con. vir. c. 6. Quidam cum audiunt peccatum nihil esse solent di­cere: si peccatum nihil est, cur punit Deus hominem pro peccato, cum pro nihilo puniri nemo debeat; quibus quamvis humilis sit quaestio, tamen quia quod quaerunt, ignorant, aliquid respondendum est. What doth hee mean when he saith, that God then must punish men for nothing? If he meane that God would punish men because they have not that in their faculties, habits, actions which should be in them what absurdity is there in that? Is not the pu­nishment just, except it be for positive en­tities? How many men have been im­prisoned for not paying summes of money which they did owe? Yea I beleeve Mr. P. could well enough bear my being pu­nished for not paying him his Arrears which he (vainly enough) fancyeth to bee due to him, and yet non-payment cannot be accounted a positive entity; nor doth Mr. P. know how to place it in any predi­cament of Beeings. Siu is a punishment, but punishment is a positive entity. erg. There is a punishment of losse, which scarce e­ver any man said was positive: There is a punishment of sense, and this we say is no other way an evil or a punishment unto [Page 99] us than as it doth deprive us of some per­fection of which we are capable. The punishment of sense may be said to be po­sitive as to its foundation, not in its for­mality; that is, it is not positive, if wee consider that in which the very evill of that punishment formally consists. As to the rest of his Arguments, they are part­ly such as I have met with before, and partly such as others upon whose expressi­ons they are grounded, are more concerned in than my selfe. When Mr. P. will un­dertake to vindicate every expression that hath been used in the managing of these controversies by men of his opinion, then may I perhaps sense some kind of obliga­tion, to try whether I can justifie every thing that hath fell from Mr. W. and Mr. B. in the mean time they are of age, let them speak for themselves, if they count it needfull: if they count it not need­full, why should I spend labour about that, [...]n the doing of which I cannot take any great pleasure, and for the doing of which [...]hey will con me no great thanks. This I [...]annot but observe, that though none durst undertake Dr. Twisse in the Arminian Con­ [...]roversies, whilest he was alive, yet since his death every puny will be nibling at [Page 100] him upon all occasions, which puts me in minde of that paltry fellow in Pausanias, who being never able to get the mastery in his life time of one Theagenes a famous Wrestler, came many a night after hee was dead and scourged his Statue, which was erected in the honour of him. Paus. in Attic.

If Mr. T. P. or Mr. I. G. doe verily be­lieve Dr. Twisse to be an enemy of that Divine grace, which he pretends to have maintained, let them follow him [...], as he did those with whom hee tooke occasion to deale; and when they shall have so done, Mr. Jeanes, a person of a ve­ry scholastical head, will not long let them be without an answer. And so I leave my Combatant, resolving, if it may be, never more to come so near him, till I am told by others, that his breath smels sweeter.

Upon the review of my book J cannot but recal what I have often read from Gil­bertus Cognatus, of a man with an ulcer in his face, who passing over a Bridge where the passengers were to pay a certaine piece of mony for every malady of body found upon them, was required to pay the accustomed tribute for the ulcer in his face; but hee refusing to pay it, the Officer pulls off his [Page 101] hat, intending to keep it for a pawn; his hat being taken off, another malady appears in his bald head. Now Sir (saith the Of­ficer) I must have a double tribute of you; Nay (saith the Traveller) that you shall not, and begins to strugle with the Officer; who being too strong for him, gave him a foyl, by means whereof there was a rup­ture perceived under his coat: Now (saith the Officer to him againe) I must have a treble tribute of you. The more Mr. P. doth struggle, the more doth he discover his infirmities; yet I beleeve he will not be quiet; for they that have a bad cause will alway have the last word, if death doe not stop their mouthes. But as to my self, I think we had both been held wiser men if we had held our peace, espe­cially seeing the heat of these Epidemical controversies hath produced more Writers then (to use Plautus his similitude) an hot summer brings forth buzzing flies; and therefore, though Mr. P. through his pro­voking language, hath made a coward to fight for once, yet will he scarce draw me into the field again; for neither can I un­dergoe the judicious tryal of the Learned, nor am I willing to hazard the passionate [Page 102] censures of the ignorant; nor have I ob­served, that many have been healed by go­ing into the troubled waters, though mo­ved by the best Angels of the Church. Truth is so lovely, and beautifull, that they who embrace Falshood, will needs have it to be Truth; and because they are unwilling to be deceived, they will not be convinced that they have been deceived. If Mr. P. doe reply seriously and judici­ously, so as that I be convinced, it will be sufficient, that in a private Letter I thank him for undeceiving me, and autho­rize him to publish to the world, that I am his Proselyte. But if his Reply shall be seasoned with the salt of Momus, not of Mercury; or if it be stuffed and coloured onely with an ignorantia elenchi, defending that which is not impugned; or if he shall like the flyes, seek for, and stick onely upon a sore place, fall on the sick and weak parts of my discourse, and never attempt to charge through the main body, I shall vindicate my self only with contempt and silence. When a Noble­man of this Nation had a controversie in Law with a Brewer, who had a Garden and dwelling house bordering upon his: The [Page 103] Brewer gave it in charge to his servant to put in so many hogsheads of water more into all his Brewings, than he was wont to doe, telling him that such a supply would bear the charge of his suit with his ad­versary; which being overheard by the Nobleman, he sent presently to the Brew­er, resolving he would no longer goe to Law with him, who upon such ease and cheap termes could manage his part of the suit. I neither make my self the Noble­man, nor Mr. P. the Brewer, but yet see­ing he suffers his fancy to flye abroad so fast, seeing he hath a fluid ink-pot, as ready at hand as the Thames to the Brew­er; seeing he can print more Books in two years, than a wiser man would under­take to print in all his life; nay, seeing rather than not bee a good customer to Mercurius Politicus, he will clap a new Title to his old Works. I may well be excused if I have no mind to meddle fur­ther with him. Of all distempers I hope I shall keep my self free from the itch of disputing and writing many books: And I doubt not but wise men will count it more commendable to stand out, than to play at small games.

The God of Truth and Love, teach us to follow the truth in love, that we may grow up into him in all things, which is the head, even Christ.