The Sum of the controversie is this.

1. WHETHER or no all things that ever have or shall come to pass in the world, have been, or shall be effected necessarily, in respect of an irresistable Decree, by which God hath everla­stingly determined, that they should in­evitably come to pass?

2. Whether or no many things have not been done contingently, or after such a middle manner between impossibility of being, and necessity of being, that some things which have been might as well not have been, and many things which have not been might as well have been, for ought God hath decreed to the contrary?

An happy composing of this intricate Controversie will be of excellent use, not onely in guiding us safe through the briers of these prickly Disputations of Predestination, Free-will, the Cause of sin, &c. (which at this day have set Protestants, Papists, Lutherans, Arminians, Puritans, together by the ears) but over and above in easing us of many scruples and perplexing cases, which daily arise in our minds, concerning God's Special Decrees, and particular Providence, in respect of the passages of our life.

But the singular uses of this Disputation will best appear when [Page 226]it is finished; and theresore without any further Preface, I be­take my self unto it, purposing to carry such an equal eye to bre­vity and perspicuity, that the Reader shall have no just cause to say, that I am either obscure or tedious.

Opin. 1 I have already divided the main Question into two particu­lar Queries. Many Divines compleatly Reverend, both for their knowledge and practice of Religion, (and therefore deservedly of precious esteem in the Reformed Churches) have subscribed assirmatively to the first Quaerie; maintaining, that whatsoever any creature doth, Man or Beast, Plants or Inanimate Elements and Meteors; God from all eternity hath decreed, that they should necessarily do it; so that a man doth not so much as spit without a Decree: yea, they say, that there falleth not so much as a drop of rain, or ariseth a blast of wind, sine speciali Dei jussu.

Opin. 2 Contrariwise, some others of as good (though perhaps not of so great) a name as they, both for their Learning and love of Orthodox Religion, have subscribed affirmatively to the second; teaching, that as God in his wisdom hath ordered, that some things are impossible and cannot be; some things necessary, and cannot but be; so also hath he poised some things in such an equal possibility of being or not being, and left it to his creatures choice to turn the scale, that in respect of him they fall out contingently; it being as possible for his creatures to have omitted them, as to have done them.

I have a good while halted between these two opinions, I have Sceptically hovered over them, to see where I were best to light. Sometimes I have sent out my assent like Noah's Dove, but she misliking her footing, speedily withdrew her self back again, till at length she finding better entertainment amongst this second company, she hath returned now at last with an Olive branch in her mouth, with that emblem of peace, Uniting my distractions.

The Arguments by which Truth first courted, and at last ra­vished my assent, are those which both confirm the second, and confute the first opinion.

Arg. 1 The first manifestly discovers an Heathenish Error, lurking implicitely in the opposite opinion: Our Adversaries indeed do disallow it explicitly, and I know they heartily mislike it; but it [Page 3]will too evidently appear, that if that error be Paganism, their opinion is little better, which I prove thus; It was the conceit of the antient Stoicks, that all things were governed and brought to passe by an inevitable Destiny, all things falling out by a fatall necessity, in spight of men and (according to the addition of Poets) of gods also. Now do not our Opp sites in this Controversie impose a fatal Necessity on all things? yea, they go further in this point than some Stoicks; for (as it may be collected out of some of their writings) though they subjected the main Events and ends to irresistable Destiny, yet they supposed the means (by which a man might, though vainly, endeavour to crosse those ends) arbitrary in man's choice. But our Opposites impose a ne­cessity on all things whatsoever, not onely upon Ends and events, but also upon the means. For example, according to their Do­ctrine, God hath not onely decreed that I shall, or that I shall not escape this infection, but he hath also decreed that I shall, or I shall not use the means to escape it. So that all the Absurdities that dog the Stoical dream of fatal necessity at the heels, are in­separable attendants of this Opinion. For I may not onely say, If I shall die of the Infection, I shall; if I shall not die, I shall not; and therefore I need not use means to avoid it: But also, if I must use means, I must; if I must not, I must not: Seeing Gods de­cree necessitateth as much to use or omit the means, as to obtain or lose the end. For if their opinion be true, all things whatso­ever, end or means of little or great moment, come to passe necessarily and unavoidably, by reason of Gods eternal Decree.

Here they have two Evasions.

Evasio. 1 The first is this, Albeit (say they) God hath most certainly determined what shall, or what shall not be done concerning us, yet his Decree is hid from us, and we must use lawful and ordinary means, for the obtaining of such and such good Ends, keeping on the ordinary course which he hath revealed to us.

Confutatio. See the vanity of this shift; our Opposites teach, that whatso­ever God hath decreed shall be done, and whatsoever is omitted shall be undone. If therefore God hath determined that we should not use such and such means, it is impossible for us to use them; if he hath decreed that we should, it is impossible that we should omit them. And therefore it is more than ridiculous to say, that although God in his secret will hath determined, that [Page 4]we should not do such a thing, yet we are to do it, seeing his de­cree, though it be secret, yet it will have its effect, and it is abso­lutely impossible we should do that, which God hath determined we shall not do.

Evasion 2 Howsoever (say our Opposites) our opinion is far from Stoi­cism, for the Stoicks thought, that all things came inevitably to pass, by reason of an indissoluble Chain and Connexion of na­tural causes: but we teach, that all events are irresistably necessa­ry, by reason of Gods everlasting decrees, and His Omnipotency daily executing them.

ConFutation. This reason is so poor a one, and yet so much made on by some worthy men, that I am more troubled to wonder at it, than to confute it; yet that I may satisfie it distinctly, I will di­vide the opinion of the Stolcks into two particular Tenets.

1. They hold, that all things come to pass inevitably.

2. They thought the reason of this inevitablenesse of events to be an unchangeable connexion of natural causes.

Our Opposites stisly maintain the former of these Tenets. Now let the Reader observe, that the most prodigious absurdities accompanying this Stoical error, follow the first part of their opinion, though sequestred from the second. For if all things come to pass unavoidably, what need I care what I do? yea, if I shall care, I shall care whether I will or no; and a thousand the like horridconceits follow the opinion of the necessity of events, whatsoever we make to be the cause of this necessity.

It is a great point of Turkish Divinity at this day, that all things are done unavoidably, and they with our Opposites make Gods will to be the cause of this unavoidableness; and therefore they judge of Gods pleasure or displeasure by the event. Yet there is no Christian but abhorreth this Turcism, and gives it no better entertainment than Anathema Mararatha.

Its too apparent therefore, that albeit our Adversaries are true Christians, yet in this point their opinion is guilty by reason of its consequence, both of Stoicism and Turcism.

Again, if we consider the second part of the Stoicks opinion, we shall perceive, that the opinion which we confute cannot be minced, but that it will be compleat Stoicism. The Stoicks thought the connexion of causes to be the cause of the necessity of events, its true; but what did they think to be the connexion of [Page 5]causes? doubtless the eternal Laws of Nature, which they sup­posed to be a Deity. It is very probable they thought the Fates to be but Natures Laws, but whatsoever they meant by the Fates, its evident they made their decrees to be the cause of the connexion of causes. How often read we both in Philosophers and Poets of Fatorum Decreta, Parcarum Leges, &c. Yea, the word Fatum it self is as much as a Decree; as Edictum from Edicere, so Fatum from Fari. Quid aliud est Fatum quam id quod 'Deus de unoquoqut fatur? saith Minutius. Well then, to apply. Do not our Adversaries in this point suppose an inviolable linking of all things together, one necessarily following in the neck of another? Do they not make the cause of this linking to be Gods irresistable decree? Do they not defend compleat Stoicism? What part of Stoicism do they disclaim? Do they not maintain inevitable ne­cessity, Do they not teach an indissoluble connexion of all things? Do they not believe divine decrees to be the cause of this con­nexion? Certainly they must needs confess themselves Stoicks in this point, unless we will give them leave to grant the premi­ses, and deny the conclusion. I know the Stoicks had mis-conceits concerning the Deities, (as accounting those to be Deities which are not) whose decrees they made the causes of all things; but they were the common errors of Paganism, and are beside the point in hand: And truly these set aside, I see not wherein our Adversaries differ from the Stoicks. I have prosecuted this Ar­gument more copiously, because it includeth many others, I mean, all those which Scripture or Reason furnish us with, against the error of the Stoicks, and they are many; for I think verily, there are few opinions which have a greater retinue of ridiculous and erroneous consequences, than this of the un a­voidable necessity of events: Some of them may make one laugh, and some of them may make one tremble. I omit the former, because they are obvious to every mans conceit, and I would not willingly make sport of so serious a matter. Of the last sort I will specifie one in a second Argument.

Arg. 2 That opinion, which being admitted maketh God the Author of sin, is gross and erroneous, that I may say no worse, but so (I speak it with horror) doth the Opinion of our Opposites. I know they are renowned Christians, and as they abhor Stoical errors, so they hold this damnalbe doctrine, (which is worse [Page 6] See this Argu­ment confirm­ed in the An­swer to the 4th Objection. than ever any Heretick held) which transformeth God into a Devil, to be most accursed: yet so the case standeth, that as the error of fatal necessity, so this of the cause of sin, fatally followeth their opinion; which I prove thus.

They teach, That nothing is done in the world, not can be done, but what God hath decreed to be done. Now it's too cer­tain, that three quarters of the things which are done in the world are sins, therefore according to this opinion, God is the principal cause of sins, Devils and Men are but His Instruments.

Evasio. The usual Answer is, That God is the cause of all the actions that are sinful, but not of the sinfulness of the actions; of all our works, but not of our obliquities and imperfections: As one that rides upon a halting Jade is the cause of his metion, and yet not of his halting.

Confutatio. Its a hard case when they have but one frivolous distinction to keep God from sinning: Might I here (without wandring) dis­course of the nature of sin, I could prove sin it self to be an acti­on, and confute this groundless distinction that way; but I will keep my self as much to the purpose as I can, and so answer it thus, or rather confute it.

That which is a principal cause of any action, is a cause of those events which accompany that action necessarily. This Rule is most certainly true. Concomi­tants. Therefore if God by His decrees do force us to those actions which cannot be done without sin, God Him­self (I am afraid to rehearse it) must needs be guilty of sin. For example. If God decreed that Adam should unavoidably eat the forbidden fruit, seeing the eating of the fruit which he had for­bidden must needs be with a gross obliquity; I do not see how this distinction will justifie God: for Adam sinned because he ate the fruit that was forbidden; but they say, God decreed that he should eat the fruit which was forbidden, necessarily and un­avoidably. The conclusion is too blasphemous to be often re­peated.

The Reader may see how well that common distinction holdeth water; yea, if this nicety were sound, man himself might prove, that he committed no murder though he stabbed the dead party to the heart; for at his arraignment he might tell the Judge, that hedid indeed thrust his dagger into his heart, but it was not that which took away his life, but the extinction of his [Page 7] natural heat and vital spirits. Who seeth not the wild frenzie of him who should make this Apology, yet this is all our Adver­saries say for God. They say, His decree was the cause that Adam took the fruit, and put it into his mouth, and ate that which he had commanded he should not eat. Yet they say, He was not the cause of the transgression of the commandment.

The example of the halting Jade is a meer impertinency; for suppose it were (as it is not) appliable to us, who halt naturally; yet Adam, before this action, was sound; and therefore God ne­cessitating him to such an inconveniency, dealt with him as if one should drive a lusty Nag into rough passages, where he must needs break his leggs. Neither is it (as I said) appliable unto us the lame posterity of Adam, for the who rideth an horse that was lame before, although he be not a cause of the impotency which he findeth in the horse already, yet in urging him to motion, he is now a cause of the actual imperfection in the motion, and so perhaps a cause of encreasing the impotency for the future, though he were not the cause of his lameness, yet he is of his limping at that time. Let the horse stand still, and see whether he will halt or no. Marry if the horse go of himself, then the Rider is no cause of his halting, and so we may say, that all our haltings are from our selves without any instigation from God.

I know our Opposites have another shist, teaching, that God useth to punish one sin by making us to commit another; so that although we sin, He doth but punish.

Albeit I do not believe this to be true, as 'tis commonly ex­pounded, yet I abstain at this time from a farther examination of it, because it weakens not my Argument about Adam; for his sin was the first that ever he committed, and the original of all that ever followed; and therefore if Gods decree were the cause that he ate the forbidden fruit, as our Adversaries teach, its ap­parent whom they make the Author of all sin. These two Argu­ments well scanned, are sufficient to make any (not fore-stalled with pre-conceits) to be afraid of that opinion which believeth all things to come to pass necessarily, by reason of Gods irresista­ble decree, and therefore they shall suffice for the confutation of it.

Moreover, seeing it is clogged with such monstrous conse­quences, [Page 8]me-thinks our opinion should be far more amiable, which giveth no countenance to such hideous mis-shapen er­rors, as it will appear by the process of this disputation.

Now I proceed to the confirmation of our opinion, con­cerning the contingency of some events in respect of God, by two Arguments more.

Arg. 1 The first is this, That God hath decreed that all his creatures ordinarily, and for the most part, should work according to their several kinds and endowments, by which he in the Creation di­stinguished them: For illustration they may be ranked into three several forms.

1 In the lowest stand the meer natural Agents, inanimate and sensless creatures; to these God hath given certain instincts and inclinations, by which they are determinately swayed to these or these certain effects and operations, unless they are outwardly hin­dered: for heavy bodies cannot chuse but descend, fire cannot chuse but burn, &c.

2 In the second stand the Sersitive creatures, four-footed beasts, fouls, and fishes; to these God hath given sense and knowledge to discern what is good for their nature, and what is bad; and a­mongst diverse goods to prefer that which is best. He hath gi­ven them also a free appetite or a kind of sensitive will, by which they may either freely prosecute, or avoid such objects as they like or mislike; not determinately tyed to this or that certain ope­ration, as the other were. A stone cannot choose but descend, but a beast may as well go up hill as down, &c.

3 In the upper Forme are Men, reasonable Creatures, whom God hath made more voluntary than the other, by giving them greater freedom of choice, and presenting unto their more ele­vated knowledge a great variety of objects. Now then, without doubt, God distinguished thus his creatures in abilities and fa­culties, that they might operate in their several kinds, that the natural agents might work naturally, the voluntary voluntarily, as that eloquent French-man Du Vain hath well explained this point. The truth of all this no man will deny explicitely: Well then, let them hearken to the consequences of this truth, so common both in Logick and Metaphysicks, among those who handle of natural and voluntary causes. If God hath decreed that many things should be done voluntarily by his creatures, [Page 9]then also hath he decreed that many things should be done con­tingently, in respect of him; but the first is granted truth, there­fore the second should be. The connexion I prove thus. All things are done contingently in respect of God, which for ought he hath decreed might with as much possibility not be as be: But all things which are done by the crea ures voluntarily, may as well not be done, as done; therefore if he hath decreed that many things should be done voluntarily, He hath also decreed that they should be done contingently. The Minor is evident, because if the creatures may not as well omit them as do them, they do them not voluntarily but necessarily.

This Argument both confirms and explains our Opinion, shewing how and why many things come to pass contingently in respect of God; yea, it maketh it questionless, that God hath decreed that many things should be done contingently, or after such a resistable manner, that they might without frustrating His decree have been life undone: yea, we see now, that contingency it self is necessary in respect of Gods will, who will have many things done voluntarily. Otherwise to what purpose did God give his creatures wills, if he will not suffer them to use them?

See again the inconveniencies of the former opinion, which confoundeth all sorts of creatures, and makes a man to operate with no more freedom than a stock or stone. For according to our Opposites, I eat, or drink, or walk with as much necessity, as Lead sinketh down. God hath decreed that that should sink, and therefore it must; and so God hath decreed that I mast walk a mile, and therefore I must.

Evasion. 1 Here they have a starting hole, but it is so poor a one, that it doth not relieve but disgrace them. They say, That Gods decree doth not compel any mans will to any thing, that he should do such a thing whether he will or no; but he so disposeth and worketh it, that it shall desire that which God would have done. And therefore, they say, Man hath use of his will, because what­soever he doth, though necessitated to it by God, yet he doth it willingly.

Confutation. 1 This slim-slam would move any mans patience, but I will be serious. The prerogative of a voluntary Agent consisteth not in doing that which it desireth to do, or rather in desiring to do that which it doth, (for according to them, man desireth [Page 10]the thing because it is to be done, yet it is not to be done because he desireth) in freedom from coaction and violence; but in a liberty of choice to do or not to do this or that, and so in freedom from the necessity of immutability. So that still for all this shift, they make man no more voluntary than a stone. A stone hath a natural propension or kind of appetite to fall downward, yet because this appetite is restrained necessarily to this term, so that the stone must needs fall down, it cannot be said to descend voluntarily, in any propriety of speech. Is not this just a mans case accor­ding to them? A man drinks, they grant he doth it voluntarily; yet they say, his will is so restrained by Gods decree to this action, that it was not possible for him to omit it. What difference is there now betwixt the will of a man and the will of a stone, onely that God employeth a man in more actions, which altereth not the case? Surely if this be true, it was no wonder Deucalion and Pyrrha got stones turned into men so fast.

This Argument doth so intangle our opposites, that although in the Question about particular providence they are peremp­tory for the necessity of all events in respect of God; yet when they come to the question about Free-will, and more particu­larly in free-will about natural matters, as walking, sleeping, riding, &c. they speak so off and on, that one may plainly per­ceive how they have a wolf by the ears: Sometimes they do yield Free-will in such things, not considering how they contra­dict what they said before about particular Providence; some­times they yield it, they say, not so much because they yield it to be true, as because they will not contend about such petty mat­ters; a very sleeveless put off! sometimes they stiffly deny it, but they are unwilling or unable to produce any Arguments worth a rush.

Arg. 2 That opinion which makes Gods knowledge absolutely infi­nite, and most glorifieth His omnisciency, must needs be better Divinity, than that which supposeth by its consequence Gods knowledge to be but finite. Now our opinion doth the first, our opposites the second; therefore. The Minor Proposition I ju­stifie thus. An absolute infinity in knowledge must be either in respect of the number of objects, or in respect of the manner of comprehending them. Now according to their opinion, in these respects Gods knowledge is but finite. Ergo.

For the first respect, to speak exactly, it cannot make know­ledge compleatly infinite; for seeing there cannot be an exact infinite number of Objects, seeing that all things that ever were, or ever shall be, cannot be truly infinite in number; it is im­possible that any knowledge whatsoever should be properly termed infinite in this respect. Yea, seeing the vastest number, and most incomprehensible to our mortal Arithmetick, may in it self be doubled and trebled, it is an infallible truth, that any knowledge in this regard may be trebled also, and yet remain finite, if we speak not vulgarly or unlargely, but Metaphysical exquisitions. Well, come to the second Respect, here also our Opposites do much debate Gods knowledge, making it but finite, and that not of the largest sort; for while they teach, that God hath decreed how all things shall infallibly come to pass, they require indeed of God an infinite power, whereby to execute his decrees, but seeing all things shall be effected as He hath decreed they should, a finite knowledge may well serve the turn. What wonder is it if God fore-know what will be done, if he can but remember His own decrees? It requireth indeed a large memory, but not an infinite knowledge.

Suppose a man had but that power to bring to pass what he determined, it would be no strange matter if he could foretell future events: He would make a hard shift with his Hypomne­mata, Registers, and Records, and the Art of Memory, but he would remember what he had contrived should come to pass, in such and such a Country.

Wherefore in the second Respect, viz. in the manner of com­prehending of things, they make the Divine Praescience to be but finite, whilst they teach, that God knoweth how all things shall come to pass; because the same knowledge is the cause, by ver­tue of decrees, of whatsoever shall be effected in the world.

Now that our opinion attributeth unto God a knowledge exactly infinite, and makes His Praescience more wnoderful, it will plainly appear. God, say we, ab aeterno, hath ordered that such Agents as he created voluntary, should have a double liberty in their operations, viz. a liberty of contradiction, to do, or not do; as a Painter may choose whether he will work or no: and a liberty of contrariety, to do a thing after this or that manner; as a [Page 12] Painter may use what colours, in what quantity, after what fa­shion, he pleaseth.

Now then, God leaving to His creatures free liberty, to work or not to work, after this or that manner, so that so any necessity imposed upon their actions by Him; whatsoever they omit, was as possible to be done, as what they did: And yet from all eter­nity fore-knowing whatsoever his creatures would do, or not do, his fore-knowledge must needs be infinite, and most admira­ble. Infinite, I say, not in respect of the number of objects, for so, as I said before, no knowledge can be infinite: but in respect of the omnipotent and boundless manner of actual comprehending those things with an infallible fore-sight, which in respect of God were contingent, their not being being as possible as their being. And indeed this fore-sight of future contingents, is the true character and Royal prerogative of Divine knowledge: and Ergo in the 41 of Esay, God upbraideth the Pagan Deities with this priviledge peculiar to Himself, though juglingly pretended by them in their lying Oracles, vers. 21. The Lord biddeth them produce Gnatzumotheken, the strongest Arguments by which they could prove themselves Gods; and in the next verse he particularizeth, and thrice bids them tell, if they can, what shall happen in the times to come. Its worth the observing, how that there was never any sort of Diviners Artificial (I speak not of Devils, Witches, Gypsies, and such palpable Impostors) that un­dertook to fore-tell future contingents: for if you prove those things which Astrologers and Physiognomers undertake to fore­tell, to be meer contingent in respect of the Horoscope or Com­plexion, and no way to depend on them as natural causes; you have proved their Arts to be but Impostures. How much then do our Opposites dishonor God in this case, making the great mi­racle of his foresight of future contingents to be as much as no­thing? seeing they say, that albeit they are contingent in respect of us, yet they are necessary in respect of Him. When any man hath answered any of these four Arguments, then will I change my opinion. In the mean time I proceed to the vindicating of it from such exceptions and objections, as our enemies in this case make against it. The dissipating of those mists wherewith they endeavour to obscure this opinion, will not onely clear the [Page 13]truth of it, for belief; but also the sense of it, for understanding.

Object. 1 First, they say, That while we avoid their Stoicism, as we term it, we fall into flat Epicurism; for while we make so many things in the world to fall out according to the inconstant bent of vo­luntary Agents, we Deifie Chance, and make Fortune a goddess; we do in effect deny Gods providence, which they say makes all things come to pass according to a most wise and constant me­thod.

Answ. I will be as forward as any man to Anathematize him, who­soever he be, who holdeth any thing to fall out fortuito in re­spect of God: I will make it most evident, that our opinion makes no Chance in respect of God, and most sweetly illustrates Gods Providence.

1 First, There is a vast difference between Contingency and Ca­suality. Contingency is an equal possibility of being or not be­ing: Casuality is the coming to pass of an event ex improviso, beside the fore-thought, as I may say of the thing. Now it is our assertion, that many things fall out contingently in respect of God, because he imposed no necessity upon their being, but left them to the pleasure of the inferior causes, that they might as well not have been, as been. But we say withall, that no­thing falleth out accidentally or casually in respect of God, be­cause nothing cometh to pass without his most certain and un­erring foresight; he knowing from all eternity what his crea­tures would do, though he left it to their pleasure to do what they list.

In events there is a great difference between Contingency and Casuality of events in respect of men; for most things we do, we do contingently, we being not bound by any inevitable ne­cessity to do them; yet as long as we do them upon certain persuasive reasons, for certain ends, we do them not by chance. The same events yet are not after the same manner contin­gent in respect of God, as they are in respect of us; for He out of the Prerogative of His Deity fore-knoweth them; but we, by reason of our mortality, cannot have infallible foresight of them; and what foresight we have, is in a very little distance.

And indeed, if this point be punctually canvased, we shall perceive, that in that same proportion we have any knowledge [Page 14]of them, they are not contingent but necessary: for every thing, so far forth as it is in existence, or in near preparation for it, is necessary.

Contingency is the middle point between necessity and impossi­bility of being; and therefore so much as any thing inclineth to existence it is necessary. The want or neglect of the distinction between contingency and casualty, ☞ hath been a great cause of the error we confute: for our Opposites still taking fortuito and con­tingenter for Synonyma, because they would have nothing ca­sual in respect of God, therefore they would have every thing necessary; not discerning the middle path which we walk in be­tween Epicurism and Stoicism.

2 Concerning Gods Providence we teach, that although accor­ding to that ordinary course (which we call nature) which he hath prescribed for the operation of his creatures in the decree of Creation, many things fall out according to the free choice of voluntary Agents, no way by Him necessitated; yet God is still busie with a double providence. The first is universal; by this, whatsoever natural Agents do contingently, He fore-seeth most clearly, and ordereth it most wisely, according to His glory, the preservation of the Ʋniverse, and good of His creatures. The se­cond is particular; by this He puts in oft-times a miraculous finger into such contingent business as respects his Church, and oft-times so worketh the heart of the voluntary Agent, that sometimes he doth that which (if he had been left alone to him­self) he would not have done; and sometimes is secretly diverted from the doing of that, which otherwise he would most willingly, and (in all likelihood) could most easily have done.

And here our Opposites may please to observe, how our opi­nion is so far from denying particular Providence, that it onely maintaineth a Providence properly termed Particular: for that particular Providence which our Opposites so much talk of, if it be well looked into, will appear to be in no better sense particu­lar, than the Roman Church is universal.

They say, That there is not any numerical act performed by any creature, without an eternal decree from God; this they call particular providence. Alas! this is the general which concern­eth all the actions performed by all things, or at least one mixt of general and particular. As for example, Because it raineth to [Page 15]day, God so ordering that it should, is it any sense to say, This rain was by the particular providence of God, unlesse we espied extraordinary matter in it? We therefore call that universal providence, whereby God directeth whatsoever His creatures do, according to their natural propensions, for the preservation and good of the Universe. We term that particular or speciall providence, whereby God inter­posing his extraordinary power amongst the contingent af­fairs of Common-wealths, or private men, sometimes by sensible miracles and prodigies, sometimes by His secret om­nipotency, sensible onely in the Event, manifesteth His Mercy or Justice, to His own Glory, or good of His Church.

This is properly termed special providence, and in this sense it is taken by La Vosino the Italian, in his Tract, De par­ticulari Providentiâ; and by those who have wrote of that sub­ject. Well then, I will now specifie my faith concerning Gods Providence.

First, it is very probable, that petty trivial matters, such as are indifferent, not onely in respect of themselves, but also of their consequences, fall out altogether contingently, without any necessitating decree. These matters of lesser moment are of three sorts.

1. The toys and trifling vanities of voluntary Agents, such as the Italians term Badalucii, or Ballocametti: What a compa­ny of idle gestures and sporting tricks use we every day, which doubtless for ought God hath decreed, we might have as easily omitted?

2. The petty consequences of the main actions of natural Agents: for example, though the main drift and scope of the operations of the Elements and Meteors be according to the method eternally prescribed them by God; yet some parti­cular events accompanying their operations, some circum­stances questionless were not prefixed by a particular decree; as now and then it hapneth to rain when the Sun shineth, I cannot believe that there's any special decree concerning this.

Hear I would have the Reader observe how these events are not so properly called contingent, as those other are; for [Page 16]they were swayed by no decree either general or special, from the middle point between necessity and impossibility of being. But these, though they are contingent in respect of a particular decree, and may as well not be as be, for ought God hath precisely determined concerning them; yet in respect of the general method prefixed to natural Agents, they do necessarily come to pass, because their main of­fice cannot be performed without these circumstances and consequences.

3 The last sort are mixed of the two former, and include all such events as result from the contingent concourse of na­tural and voluntary Agents; as when the wind bloweth off ones hat, &c. to say that God particularly decreed such tri­fles, I think it injurious to the Majesty of His Determi­nations. But here by trifles I mean such matters (as I said before) which are indifferent, not onely in respect of themselves, but also of their consequences.

2ly. I believe, that things of greatest moment are done necessa­rily, by the immediate power of God, either by swaying men from their own proper inclinations, or by supernatural means quite crossing their enterprises. So we read in the Scripture and Church-stories, how God hath sometimes quite changed the hearts of men for some great purpose concerning his Church and glory.

3ly. I believe that the middle sort of events in the world, such as are neither trivial nor yet extraordinary, the ordinary seri­ous matters which concern Religion; Common-wealths, the temporal and spiritual good of private men, the preserva­tion from confusion, &c. Of these, I say, my belief is, that though ordinarily men and unreasonable Agents do things contingently, yet God doth so manage this contingency, daily and hourly interposing His power according to His Mercy or Justice, that very few matters of consequence are meerly contingent. For example, Because I see Marriage for the most part to be either a great curse or a great bles­sing This may so happen upon the post-fact., I am so far perswaded of the truth of the common saying, that I think that Marriages for the most part are made in heaven Sure Davids was nor, a Sam. 11.17., before they are on earth. Let a man di­ligently peruse any story, and he shall find many things [Page 17]done ordinarily according to the natural bent of particular persons, and so contingently in respect of God; and yet let him joyn all things done by all the Actors in the story to­gether, let him accurately observe how one thing followeth upon another, he shall find, that still at the last there will be something from the finger of God manifesting the glory either of His Mercy or Justice. If we read the History of the Reformation; begun by Luther and other Divines of Ger­many, we shall perceive many things done by the natural humors of men, by the guidance of Divine wisdom made admirable furtherances of the Reformation. The like may be said of Henry the 8th. his Marriage (which set most Uni­versities in Christendom a Disputing) and the dissolution of Abbeys. The like indeed may be observed in any History, especially if it concern Religion or a Christian Common­wealth; for I conceive that Gods Providence is more or less remarkable in a place proportionable to the profession of Religion. Let a man but diligently observe the prime pas­sages of his own times, let him mark how the chief Actors in them do all things according to their particular bents and private humors; yet let him more the upshot, he shall perceive, that there was some secret guide which directed all to God's glory, though men do what they list accor­ding to their own pleasure. The best Demonstration of this most usefull and delightfull truth every man might best make to himself, if he would but seriously and circumspect­ly consider the whole course of his own life, and mark how (whatsoever he hath done out of the absolute freedom of his choice) his actions have been turned and winded now and then contrary to his intent, now and then beyond it, now and then beside it; sometimes to his grief, sometimes to his comfort, always to be examples of Gods Mercy, or His Justice; he will easily perceive, how excellently the Divine Pro­vidence worketh upon Contingencies.

If men would be busied upon such contemplations, they would not shuffle away so many good hours with those waking dreams of fantastick solitary discoursings, which Charron and others have wisely taxed.

Here the Reader may see how I suppose some things ne­cessary, some things contingent, some things mixt, by reason of divers circumstances of both kinds; by no means undertaking precisely to determine how many things are done contingently, or how many necessarily, &c.

Now as we have formerly shewed how our opinion doth most exactly Blazon the Divinity of Gods infinite knowledge, by which He simply knoweth all things; so also it doth most clearly set forth the honor of His active wisdom, by which he governeth all things; for, to order all things in an harmo­nious concord to good, (whatsoever the confused distracted discord of choices in inferior causes produce) is a more glo­rious and superlative act of wisdom, than first to decree how all things shall be done according to certain platforms, and to see them effected according to them: Yea, this conceit (though it be Stoicism in it self) yet it openeth a greater overture to Epicurism than ours; for Ep curus and his fellows believed there were gods, but they imagin'd that they incumbred not themselves with the ordering of sublunary matters, but suffered matters here below to go for the most part according to the natural and eter­nal customs. Even so, if according to the opposite Tenet, God hath ab aterno prefixed an irresistible tenor and method agreeable to which all things should for ever necessarily come to passe. God might ab aeterno also, from the same instant He made His Decrees, let all things alone (according to Epicurus his conceit) For our Op­posites say, Quae Deus de­crevit sponte flu [...]nt. seeing all things must come orderly to pass, by vertue of His Decree, though he slept all the while.

Object. 2 But our Doctrine (they say) contradicteth the Scriptures; our Saviour telleth the Apostles, that the hairs of their head were numbred, that not so much as a contemptible Sparrow falleth without his Father. Therefore the pettiest matters in the world are determined by God Himself.

I remember the Marginal Note indeed in the Protestant Italian Bible upon Matth. 10.29. upon these words, [Yet not one of them falleth to the ground without your Father] saith thus, [Che nou' intra venga it decreto ela volenta sua, &c.] i. e. But so that His decree and will came between: But this gloss is impertinent. The meaning of the place is this, Not one of [Page 19]them falleth without Gods privity and permission. The scope of our Saviour was to comfort and encourage his Disciples, whom he was now sending abroad into the world as sheep among wolves; to this purpose he tells them, that the hairs of their head were numbred, &c. the number of them was known to God, without whose permission they could not lose one of them. That not so much as a Sparrow falleth without their Father, &c i. e. without the knowledge and permission of Him who was their loving Father: And therefore he bids them not to be afraid, seeing if such trifles could not be without Gods permission, doubtless God, who was their more special observer, would not suffer men to meddle with them, more than should be for His glory and their good. So that it cannot without absurdi­ty be hence concluded, that God hath made any speciall decree concerning Sparrows; for, (as St. Paul saith) Doth God take care for Oxen? so say I, Doth God take care for Sparrows? Here it is worth the observation, that the Arguments (for the most part) which our Opposites produce for the necessity of all events, and their kind of particular providence, are such which (as one saith) Aut nihil concludunt, aut nimium, conclude either not so much, or more than they would have them; being much like the garments which were made for the Moon, either too big or too little for their conclusions; for either they are drawn from particular examples, and prove nothing at all, (as when Calvin proveth that there ariseth no wind without a special de­cree from God, because he caused the South-wind to bring the Israelites Quails, and sent the tempest which caused Jonas to be cast into the Sea) or else they are deduced out of such reasons and Scriptures, which (as they handle them) prove God to be the Author of sin, and so a great deal more than they are willing they should.

Object. 3 But our opinion may seem to patronize the proud error con­cerning Free-will; for if God doth not Necessitate our Actions, but leave them to our inclinations, so that it is in our power to work or not work; we have freedom of will to do or not to do, whatsoever we do contingently.

Solution. These words [which we do contingently] are well put in; for we say many things are done contingently in respect of God, yet many we say are done by Gods special determination. But [Page 20]'tis most certainly true, that good duties, properly so called, (to which we are tied pro hoc statu) are never performed without choice and freedom. Which therefore (amongst other priviledges of Christs purchasing) are restored under the spiritual Jubilee of the Gospel, and instated on us by the holy Ghost as one special part of our Redemption. If the Son make your free, then are you free indeed. And, Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty.

In answer then to the Objection, I say, That, for our natural actions, as eating, walking, &c. I believe that ordinarily we per­form them freely and contingently in respect of God. Likewise I doubt not, but as the antient Heathens Aristides, Socrates, Cato, Fabritius) so many now a days perform many things civilly and morally good, being left alone I do not re­ject the opini­on of restrin­gent grace, if it be well ex­pounded. to their contingent educations and complexions. But for matter of grace and sal­vation, I confess, to the glory of God, that in us (being dead in sins and trespasses) dwelleth no good; That we cannot so much as think (much less do) any good, unless the holy Ghost giveth us the power both to will and to do it.

Adam before his fall The oppo­site Tenet al­loweth not A­dam Free will in his inno­cency, as I could easily prove, and is partly affirm­ed already by the third Ar­gument. was equally poised between perseve­rance and defection; but he falling by the freedom of his choice, lost those perfections which made him free: so that if his po­sterity do any thing truly good, it is from God, not from them­selves; whatsoever bad they do, it is from themselves not from God.

Here it may be noted, that we may do many things contingent­ly in respect of God, which yet we do not freely but necessarily in respect of our selves; as our sins are contingent in respect of Him, because he never imposed any necessity of sinning upon us; yet they are necessary in respect of our selves, seeing we being left to our selves cannot but sin. So many things which are contingent in respect of our nature, may be in some sort necessary in respect of our persons; as those things which our complexions, or customs and habits necessitate us to: But this is an impertinency.

Object. 4 They say moreover, that our opinion contradicteth both Scripture and Philosophy.

1. For Scripture, it is said, Act. 14. that in him we live, move, and have our being; by which words we are taught, that all our motions, of what kind soever, either natural or moral, vital or rational, are not onely guided; but also caused by God Himself.

2. Both in Logick and Metaphysicks there are divers Rules consonant to this Scripture, as [Causa causae est etiam causa causa­ti: causa secunda non agit nisi meta à prim, &c.] Therefore man doth no kind of thing but God is the first cause of it, and conse­quently whatsoever we do, we do necessarily in respect of Him.

Answ. This is one of the Arguments which proveth more than our Adversaries would have them, and by these Rules have I for­merly in the second Argument proved, that they make God the Author of sin; for if causa causae be causa causati (as doubtless it is) while they make God the cause of all those actions, which either are sins, or the causes of sins, questionless they make God (according to their own Argumentation) the cause of sins. But they have a limitation for this Rule, and say, that it holdeth in causis essentialiter subordinatis, as they say, that God is the cause of all those things which are essentially and districtly done by our wills; but sins proceeding from the depravation of our wills, are effects of a cause, not directly subordinate to God. The limita­tion is sound, but not applicable to their instance; yea, the limi­tation it self quite spoileth them: For 1. While Adam's will was yet sound, they teach, that God decreed that Adam should eat the forbidden fruit; now at that time they cannot say, but that Adam was a cause essentially subordinate to God. 2. They teach, that God is a cause not onely of our actions, but also of our vo­litions, as I may say; then these being the causes of our sins, are directly subordinate to him.

3. Let us consider not onely the subordination between God and our wills, but also between our actions and their moralities, and we shall perceive, that according to the abuse of these Rules, they make God the cause of our sins. For that Rule, Causa causae est causa causati, is infillibly true expounded thus, The cause of any effect, is the cause of all such events as necessarily follow that effect.

Now then, if (as they say) God be a necessary cause of all our particular actions, seeing our actions in reference to such and such objects must needs be sinful, it is manifest what followeth. For example: Though to take money in general be no sin, yet to take this or that money, being none of our own, is a sin. Now then, if God be a cause of this action in reference to this object (as he is if he be the cause of this particular action) it is impossible their [Page 22]Doctrine should excuse God from sin. Eating, in reference to the forbidden fruit, was a sin; but according to them, God was a prin­cipal cause of eating the forbidden fruit. Ergo.

Minor prob. They say he was the necessitating cause of this par­ticular action.

Eating was a natural action, the individuation of this eating by an unlawful object was a moral obliquity.

But God was the cause of this individual. Ergo.

The like may be said of all our sinful actions. When I have drunk sufficiently both for the necessity and comfort of nature, to drink a cup more is sin. But our Opposites teach, that I cannot take up this superfluous cup without Gods speciall determination: Ergo.

This Doctrine is enough to make ones hair stand an end, ma­king God (whatsoever they say) the cause not onely of our acti­ons, but also of our obliquities: for what are the obliquities of our actions, but the placing of them upon wrong objects? If therefore they make God the principal cause of all our particular actions, most of which are particularized by bad objects) what do these men make of God? But Recrimination is no answer.

Hitherto I have shewed (though perhaps without method, yet, I hope, not without profit) how our Opposites are wounded with their own weapons. Now I will take their weapons out of their hands, and teach them the right use of them, shewing how God is the cause of all things, onely not the cause of sin: a cause of all good things, yet so as that many good things are contingent also.

We have shewed in the third Argument how God hath ordain­ed, that all sorts of Inferior or second causes should work accord­ing to their proper kinds; that voluntary Agents should work vo­luntarily, &c. God then is the first cause that all things do work and that they do work in certain kinds: If so, then God is the cause that many things are done contingently, one of the chiefest sorts of second causes by this appointment working voluntarily, and therefore contingently, which connexion we have formerly justified. This being well understood, will instruct us not onely that it may be so, but also that it must be so. That God being the necessary cause of all good things, yet all such things are not ne­cessary effects of Him. For example, It is impossible that man should do any thing without God, therefore God is a cause ne­cessary [Page 23]to the being of all things effected by him; yet because ma­ny things done by the free choice of man, might as well have been omitted (God no ways constraining him to them) these are not necessary effects of God. The Reason of this is, because God hath decreed that man should work voluntarily, having liberty to do as well one thing as another, yet so that God giveth him the strength to do whatsoever he chooseth to do, and ability to choose what he will without limitation of his choice, ☜ (for this were else) to take it away, and to make man an involuntary Agent.) For example, God hath given thee strength of body; he hath given thee also ability to choose in what exercise thou wilt employ it; thou choosest to Ring or Dance; God then the Author of thy strength is the chief cause of these exercises, yet so, as they are contingent in respect of Him, because thou mightest have omitted them hadst thou pleased. By this we may plainly see, how God is the principal cause of all things of which he is capable to be a cause; and yet many things are contingent in respect of him. This being cleared, we may with more facility conceive, how and in what sense God is the cause of all we do, and yet we onely the cause of sin.

God sustains us when we are about our sins; even then, in Him we live, and move, and have our being, as well as when we are better busied. God giveth that strength by which we com­mit any sin, yet because he doth not necessitate or incline unto it, but we of our selves abuse it to wickedness, God hath still the part of a Creator, we onely are sinful. An example will make this clear, Suppose a King delivereth to his Subject Men, Weapons, Mony, and Warlike provision, that he may fight for his Honor against his enemies; his Subject proves a Traitor, and useth all his Soveraigns strength against himself. His Soveraign here is a cause that he hath the command, and doth the Office of a Captain, but he is no cause of his Treachery, the offence is onely the Captains, and the wrong is onely the Soveraigns. This is just the case between God and us; God hath given us many excellent faculties both of body and soul, which he intended we should use to his Glory, in obedience to his commandements, and resist His and our enemy the Devil; we most traiterously siding with Satan, have abused His gifts to His Dishonor; God did the part of a Creator, we of Rebels. A man lives intemperately, God gave him not strength [Page 24]to this purpose, he necessitated not the man to this intemperancy: Man therefore onely sinned, God is dishonoured. The King made his Subject able to rebel against him, by delivering his military furniture unto him; the verier miscreant he that did rebell against him. So God made Adam indeed able to sin, but he never intend­ed that he should sin with that ability. God then is the cause of all those things in which we sin, and yet whatsoever he doth is ex­ceeding good; he is not the cause that we intend any sin, but the cause that we are able to commit those sins we intend; and yet he intended not our abilities for sin, but for his Service. Of all our good actions he is the first cause, we are the second: of all our sins we are the proper cause, he is onely the Conditio sine qua non.

But here some man may say, That choice or election of an un­lawful object (upon which we misplace our actions) is that which maketh us sinners; now this being an act of our will, it must suppose also the concourse of God; how then doth our opinion clear the point? The same Answer abundantly sufficeth; God made Adam able to be willing to sin, but he made him not to will sin: God set before him life and death, that he did choose death it was by the strength of will given him of God; but God did not bind him to choose death, for that were (a contradiction) a necessi­tated choice.

Object. ult. Briefly, whatsoever we choose, we do it by the power by which we are voluntary Agents, yet if we choose death, God is not to be blamed, (for he made us voluntary) and therefore it was as possible for us to have chosen life. If the nature of a voluntary Agent be well observed, this point will be most evident.

The last objection is this, Gods fore-knowledge of all futures is most infallible and necessary: Ergo, All futures in respect of him fall out necessarily, otherwise it is possible God may be deceived; yea, if many things fall out contingently, Gods fore-knowledge of them can be but contingent, depending after a sort on mans free-will.

This Argument is plausible at the first view, but if it be touched it falls to shatters. It is one thing to know that a thing will neces­sarily be done, and another to know necessarily that a thing will be done. God doth necessarily and certainly foreknow all that will be done, but he doth not know that those things which shall be done voluntarily will be done necessarily: he knoweth that [Page 25]they will be done, but he knoweth withall, that they might have fallen out otherwise, for ought he had ordered to the contrary. So God necessarily knew that Adam would fall, and yet he knew that he would not fall necessarily, for it was as possible for him not to have fallen. It was the antient (and is still the true) opinion, That Gods Praescience is not the cause of Events; he fore-knoweth all things because they will be done, things are not done because he fore-knoweth them. The infalli­bility of his knowledge consisteth not in the immutability of his decreee, but in the prerogative of his Deity; it is impossible therefore that any man by his voluntary manner of working should delude Gods fore-sight; not because God doth necessitate his will to certain effects, (for this were indeed to take it away) but because his fore-knowledge is infinite.

Let our hearts therefore be never so full of Mazes and Meanders, turning and winding, yet [...], (to use the Poets language) the al-seeing Eye of God cannot but espy them long before, not because he himself contrived them (for then it were no wonder if he were [...]) but because to Him (who is every way infinite) all things cannot be but present and [...], which is the signi­ficant word of the Author to the Hebrews, signifying open, by a meta­phor or similitude drawn from a word that signifies, having the faces laid upwards, because such as lye so have their face exposed to the sight of all men.