HAving by accident met with a Book full of the fallacies of these times, and yet dedicated to our late Soveraigne King Iames; and for ought I can be informed passed over in silence without the least reproofe. I thought it my duty out of that faith and loyaltie that I owe to my King and Countrey to publish its prin­ciples to the world, and by the way as I goe to give a particular answer to every one of them.

The Authors name is Albericus; what Country man I know not, but his name as also his principles seeme to speake him a stranger by birth, and a Civilian by his profession.

His Book is intituled, Three Regall disputations. Regales Dis­putationes tres. And the first is; Of the absolute power of the King. Depotestate Regis absolutae And this is the taske that I have at this time imposed upon my selfe, to debate and re­fute the absurditie of this principle; being a Tenet utterly re­pugnant and absolutely destructive to the Lawes of England, and the Liberties of the Subject.

I am not ignorant that the greatest part of the unhappie he­reticall principles of this Booke, are at this day defended by force of Armes, by such as would be called Royalists, or if you will the Kings friends; while in the meane time they sell their Birthright and inheritance for a poore messe of Pottage; and become Actors in this sad Tragedie of the ruine of their King and Countrey. But to begin with the Author, who in the very first position of his Booke, were it Orthodox in this Kingdom, would quite confound all our Lawes and Liberties.

That which pleaseth the Prince (saith he) hath the force of a Law. Quod Princi­pi placvit Le­gis habet vi­gorem pag. 5. I this is that w ^ch your Prelaticall flatterers & Parasiticall Cour­tiers perswade his Majesty; and this peece of poyson they have suckt out of such unworthy underminers of their own Liberty, as my Author is.

And this he saies, to be Page 5. a regall Law brought in by his Empire, for that the people have conferred upon him all their rule and power. That is, the people have given power to their Prince to bee a Tyrant, and tread them under feet at liberty, a principle so void of reason, that it carries not the least colour or probabality with it; but of this hereafter.

But this position Quod Principi placuit, &c. That which plea­seth the Prince hath the force of a Law. He saith, is to to be un­derstood of the Romane Emperour, Page 5, 6, 7. for his excellency above others; as also for other reasons that he renders. If this bee so Albericus, what have we that are English Subjects & live under a Muni­cipall Law to doe with that? or why diddest thou dedicate this unsound and unwarrantable peece of flattery to our King? couldest thou imagine so learned and so wise a Prince would be wrought upon to subvert the Lawes, and enslave his Subjects: who can make as good a Title by the Law to their liberty as the King to his Crowne? But Albericus well knew that the best Princes might be corrupted; and that ambition may cap­tivate the Crowne, as well as the Peasant. I even in those dayes, our Liberties were invaded by the infusion of such false Max­imes as these are; And to this houre we groane under that hea­vie burthen; my little finger shall bee heavier then my Fathers Loynes.

And though we live under a Municipall Law, which utterly denies and condemnes these flattering positions of the Civili­ans; as absolutely destructive to that freedom wee were borne under; yet my Author doth affirme that all interpeters (that is of the Civill Law) without any difficulty do attribute this pow­er to all supreame Princes. Page 7.

Now hence he raises a question who those supreame Princes are? Page 7, 8, 9. And the some of his definition of the supreame Princes may be reduced shortly to this; They are supreame Princes, who neither have, nor acknowledge any one above them but God, and to him onely are bound to render an account; who are free from all Law, whose willis a sufficien treason; & whose reason is as an absolute law. And he saies this is no barbarous Law, but the Romane Law. If so Albericus, why doe such Sycophants vent their poyson here in England. Sir, God be thanked wee have a Law of our owne, whose fundamentalls crye downe this definition as paradoxi­call to sence and reason; whose light is so great, that it neede not borrow of others to adde to its perfection.

But here wee may see that the same Doctrine is preached to [Page]our King at this day; that was to his predecessor; what else meant the long discountinance of Parliaments, the onely assu­rance we have of the continuance of our Lawes and Liberties? I and what meanes the taking up of Armes too against them? But yet to come nearer to this definition of the Civilians of an absolute Prince, what meanes that frequent expression of His Majestie in His Declarations, that he is responsible to God alone for his actions? I am certaine this is Lex Romana, the Romane Law.

But when hee had shewne what is not this supreame power, and who are not these supreame Princes, (he saith,) Page 10. That our King is amongst the other Kings, that is, the supreame Princes, who are free from the Law, which is (saith he) of an absolute power and this is not subject either to the rules of necessity, or publique Law. Then he saies that there is potestas extraordinaria & libera, an extraordinary and free power, which he saies, in England wee doe signifie by the name Regiae Praerogativae, of the Royall Prerogative. And further he sayes, That the interpreters of their Law doe com­monly write that there is a double power in a Prince; the one ordinary bound by the Law; the other extraordinary, free from the Law; and hee saies, that they define that to be the absolute power by which hee may take away another mans right, though it be great, and that with­out a cause too.

Is this that extraordinary power which we by the Law of England call the Royall Prerogative? I wonder at the mad­nesse and the ignorance of the Author, that should publish a thing so absolutely contrary to the knowne Lawes of the Realme: but I will refute him by our Law, and not by ray­ling, though he deserves no better.

First, that our King (according to their own definition) is not one of these supreame Princes, or absolute Monarches, nothing more pregnant or plainely demonstrable in our Law: For hee is under the Law, and so saies Bracton and Fleta, two of our an­cientest Law Bookes in severall places commonly knowne; so that I neede not to cite them. But Bracton goes further, Bracton de ac­quirendo rerum Domino. fol. 34. that not onely habet legem superiorem; the Law is above him, but also curiam suam viz. Comites, Barones, &c. (which can bee under­stood of no other then the Parliament,) that that likewise is a­bove him: why then if both Law & Parliament be above him, he can be no absolute Monarch according to themselves. But further by the Lawes and constitutions of this Kingdome, the Legislative power doth not reside in the King alone (for he can­not [Page]create a Law, or destroy, or disanull any Law, by his Pa­tent or Proclamation) but in the three estates joyntly together assembled in one body in Parliament; and therefore to main­taine our Prince to be an obsolute Monarch is utterly to oppose and overthrow the fundamentalls of our Lawe. But how satte this is laboured at this day, I leave it to the consciences of al ho­nest men to judge; for if the King might have power to dis­continue Parliaments as long as he pleaseth; or being called, to have a negative Voyce to all their reasonable demands, will not this bee a compendious way to bring all the Legislative power into his owne hands? But then he sais, that by this ex­traordinary or absolute power, (which he would have our Prince to have) He may take away any mans right, be it never so great. For he sayes, Page 13. That the Prince by his Empire possesses all things, that he hath an imperiall and universall dominion, though the particular and private be in the proprietor. Which in plainer English, is to tell you, that the King hath an interest and power over every mans particular property, which is as absolutely false, as can be imagined; and stands as much in opposition to our Law, as one contrary can to another, for what then would become of our Petition of Right? Or how could we say that we had right to any thing, when the King at his owne pleasure, might dispossesse us of all? this were a ready way to inslave us, and to make us hould by that base tenure of Villeinage. I do not de­nie, but that the Common wealth hath an interest paramount the property of every private man; but this is not left to the sole disposition of our Prince, but the Parliament, who may dispose of the generall interest, for the good of the Common wealth, and in such case we our selves are the free dispensers of our owne; for tis not more their power, then our owne con­sents that binds us. But thankes be to God, that every man by our Law, (let Court Parasites say what they will) hath as absolute a right in that hee enjoyes, as his Prince claimes in his Crowne, nay I may be bold to affirme (without preju­dice to the royall interest) that he hath a greater: for that the King is seised or possessed in the right of his Crowne onely; the people in their owne right. What one principle more aumen­ticke in our law then this; that the King cannot take away any mans property without his owne consent; and how is this con­sent to be purchased? why no otherwise then by Act of Parlia­ment, with whom the generall property (which is above eve­ry mans particular interest) is intrusted. And therefore those [Page]that will have the King to be an absolute Monarch over his people, must instruct him how to repeale Magna charta, and all the other Lawes made in confirmation of it, and the Subjects liberty, before they can court them into slavery.

But here it will be objected, that the lawes of this Realme doe avow and maintaine our King to be an absolute Monarch; very just, and with this difference wee shall allow him to be so; that is, as to all forraine power, authority, or jurisdiction what soever, he is an obsolute Emperor within these his dominions: in plainer language he is no dependent or tributary Prince: but is (as he is acknowledged to be by the statute of 24. H. 8. ca. 12,) Furnished with plenary, whole, and intire power, preeminence, authority, prerogative and jurisdistion, &c. So that no forraine Prince or Potentate whatsoever, can challenge or excercise the least authority in these Kingdomes; but this doth no way con­clude our Prince to be an absolute Monarch in the excercise of his jurisdiction over his people. Tis true that my Lord Coke sayes our King is an absolute King: but how? not over his peo­ple: and that is cleared by the case that he puts, which is this. Artold King of Manne sued to King H. 3. to come into Eng­land, &c. upon which my Lord Coke observes, Lib. 7. fo. 21. that seeing that Artold King of Manne, sued for a licence in this case to our King, it proveth him an absolute King, which is evident, as to any forraine power or authority whatsoever, but not to his own Subjects. For as to them, he hath but a qualified, limitted power, confined to the rules of law, & the customs of his King­dome. These things pondered on, I stand amazed at thy bra­sen, confidence Albericus, that durst affirme our King to be an absolute Monarch, and canst prove it no better, then by the daubing principles of the Civill Law: what else is this but to ar­gue a case at Common Law, upon the notions and grounds of the Civil; which were an absurdity next to madnesse. But I stand most astonished, when I consider that our Prince must be made the Patron of such dangerous absurde principles. This is that that hath so much advanced Prerogative, and depressed Liber­ty. And these times are become the sad effect and consequence of such flattering falsities.

But now having clearely evidenced it that our King is no ab­solute Monarch and so hath no power over the lives, liberties, or estates of his Subjects, more then the law alloweth. You shall now heare severall reasons given in my Author totally to oppose this opinion of absolute Monarchy, which with the fa­vour [Page]of the curteous Reader, are no way answered by the con­tra-disputant, and for my part, I thinke that absolute Monar­chy is much like Sir Tho. Mores Eutopiae, no where to be found.

And first you shall heare how one of their owne inveighes against this opinion. Sayes he, Those things that are done by this clause of supreame power, not by way of iustice; but because it so plea­sed the Prince, and no man could say to him Cur it a facis? why doe you so? It is no other then violence; which (sayes he) by a more honest title is called the supreame power. Pag. 15.

I must acknowledge it ever was, and shall be my opinion, that though Princes are stiled Gods here on earth, yet their power is so qualified, that they ought not to live according to their own will, but the rule of reason and religion; and if they passe these, let flatterers qualifie their actions as they can, more sound and honest judgements wil say, that they are but violence & tyran­ny. Againe saies the same Author, Pag. 16. Your great Governors & Coun­sellors lay snares every where in the way (that is to catch and in­trap their Prince) Your Divines they erre (and make their Prince doe the like) And your Lawyers they faune and flatter; and all per­swade their Prince that all things are lawfull for him, and that be hath free and absolute power to doe what he list. And is not this the very dialect of these times? Hath not Bristow, Digby and Cot­tington and such like perfideous Counsellors, seduced his Maje­stie from his Parliament, and perswaded him that it is lawfull for him to take up Armes against them, and to state himselfe (if possibly he may) in an absolute Monarchy? Doe not your Divines preach prerogative, in stead of Divinity, and by conse­quence detrude the Subjects liberty? And now I could wish that our great Lawyers could puill their necks out of the halter, the coller I should say. But it is sad newes, that the Ship-mony is a­gaine revived. The King must be sole Judge, (I and that in his owne case too) when the Kingdome is indangered, and so by this slight, might dive into his Subjects purses, when, and as of­ten as he himselfe pleased. Now pray what doth the negative voyce in Parliament (so stiffely defended by our Lawyres of Oxford) differ from this, if the King shal be sole Judge of the ne­cessity or conveniency of any Lawes presented unto him by his people? doe but support this ground of the Kings being Judge in his owne case, down goes all the fundamentalls of our Lawe presently. No way more exact or absolute to bring in Quod Principi placet, &c. and to obtrude the liberty of the Subject. But that you may see how farre this absolute power is laboured [Page]for at this day; they have derived this very principle, from this unreaso­nable Law of liberty, as I shall make it appeare hereafter. But now let us reason the point, and heare what is objected against this absolute power of Princes.

Sais one all Dominion or Soveraignetie is for the publique profit of the Citi­sent or Subiects, not of those that raigne or rule. Pag. 16. To this Albericus saies, that it is a false foundation in those principalities or dominions that are got by force; and not totally true in those who are induced or brought in by the people; For he saies, that due honour was given to the vertues of those Princes that were chosen.

For my part I never read or heard Albericus, Pag. 16. that a Prince who hath gained a Kingdome by Conquest, is disobliged from the rule of Reason; and Religion. The Scripture doth no where warrant (that I know of) any Prince whatsoever to be a Tyrant, which I am sure he must needs bee, that seekes his owne, not his peoples good. This is but just, that due honour should be given to the vertues of those Princes that are elected; but such as reverence them, so far, as to attribute an absolutenesse of pow­er unto them, and give them liberty to do what they list; doe dishonour God, in ascribing that power that was never given; & debase their Prince, by making him to degenerate from true Soveraignety into Tyranny.

Though Aristotle by way of Dirision faith, Pag. 16. that wee make our Princes like Physitians, whose rule or power is for the sake of those only, who are their Pati­ents. My opinion is, that Princes cannot be more properly compared or assimulated, then unto Physitians; the one is the Physitian for the body naturall, the other for the body politique. A Prince ought to purge out all ill humours; that is, ill members out of the Common wealth; hee ought to tender the lives and happinesse of his people, as much as a Physitian the life and good of his Patient. Nay, as a Physitian ought to have an eye more to the good and safety of his Patient, then his owne benefit, so ought this great Physition of the Common wealth. The Prin­ces happinesse is involved in the good of his people, & therefore they doe but teach him how to ruine himself, that instruct him to undoe his people

But Albericus reasons further, by way of admittance, what sais he if all Dominion or Power were ordained for the onely benefit of Subiects? Ergo ple­nitudo potestatis non est, is there not therefore a plenitude of power? Sir, wee doe not denie but that Princes have full power and authority to governe their people; but we doe, and shall ever deny, that they have an absolute power to Tyrannize over them.

But he saies further, that it is for the benefit and profit of Subiects' that a Prince should have this power. I marry Sir, witnesse the great utility, Pag. 16. that accrues to the Subject at this day, by the exercise of the like power. That their lives and estates should be at the sole will, beck, and command of their Soveraigne; this is for the benefit of the Subject. Pray give me [Page]leave to put you a plaine case in Law. A. gives land to B. in trust, and for the onely use of C. B. breakes the trust, and disposes of the Land at his owne pleasure; resolve me this question; is not this for the benefit of C? Such, and only such benefit accrues to the Subject, by giving of an absolute power to the Prince. But so much for this argument.

The next position that is discussed, Page 17. is, that absolutenesse of power is on­ly in God, and is not communicable to any other.

To this Albericus answers that this doth not make the Prince equall to God; Page 17. for neverthelesse he is under God, and is bound by the Lawes of God: God (saies he) is simply absolute not bound to any Law; but the Prince onely abso­lute to some respects: for though he be above the Civill Law, yet he is under the Law of God, of Nature, and of Nations.

We will allow this absolute power that you speake of, if you cane­vince us out of holy Writ (to which Princes as well as people, owe sub­jection) that ever such power was communicated to any just Prince that he might dispose of the lives, and estates, of his Subjects at his owne will and pleasure; what is this but Tyrranny? and if God (who only hath absolute power over his people) did sometimes in his wrath for the sinnes of his people, put a Tyrannicall King over them, yet this is no warrant for others to be so. God who is the only proprietor and free dis­penser of all things; and giveth what he pleaseth, and to whom and when he pleaseth what he out of his bounty doth bestow upon his mea­nest servant; he doth invest him in as pure and absolute a right, as he doth the greatest Prince in his Monarchy, and therefore it lies not in the power of his Prince to dispossesse him of it.

We have a most exact, and perfect discription of a Tyrant in the word. of God. 1 Sam. 8. where, when the people of Israel, not contented with that Governement, that God had appointed over them, asked a King of Samuell; God in his anger, and as a judgement upon the people for their sin, gave them a King to rule over them, but such a one, who (according to the discription of Samuell) would make his will his Law; for saies Sa­muell to the people, This will be the manner of the King that shall reigne over you, he will take your sonnes and appoint them for himselfe, for his Charets, &c. And he will appoint him Captaines over thousands, &c. And he will take your daughters to be confectioners, &c. And hee will take your fields and your vine­yards and give them to his servants. And he will take your servants and cattle and put them to worke, &c. Here you have a compleate delineation of a Tyrant. For marke, Samuell tells the people what he will doe, not what he ought to doe; thus, and thus he will doe saith he; and he will render no better reason for what he doth, stat pro ratione voluntas, his will is rea­son sufficient to deprive you of your substance, and to inslave you and your postetity for ever. This was the judgement of God, and therefore not to be drawne in example, or made a president for others. And there­fore [Page]let every unjust Prince take heede that (whilest hee is made the Rod and scourge of God for his peoples sinnes) hee himselfe be not at the last throwne into the fire.

But now you shall heare the duty of a good Prince set forth in Deut. 17 He shall not multiply horses to himselfe, &c. Neither shall he multiply wives, nor silver and gold. He shall write him a coppie of this Law in a Booke, &c. And it shall be with him, and hee shall reade therein all the dayes of his life, that hee may learne to feare the Lord his God, to keepe all the words of this Law, and these statutes to doe them. Now marke what followes all, That his heart be not lif­ted up above his brethren, &c. For my part I do not find here that the Kings will is a Law, or that he hath power to open, & shut the purses of his Sub­jects at his pleasure. A just Prince must not multiply silver & gold; why then doubtlesse he must not doe it upon the ruines of his Subjects. Hee must keepe this law; and I am sure this Law doth not make him law­lesse, or justifie Tyranny. And lastly his heart must not bee lifted up a­bove his brethren, that is, he must not so exalt his owne power, as to de­presse and destroy his people.

Another Argument is this, that the people did transferre this power to the King, that by it they might be more commodiously governed, Page 24. but this is not that supreame power, sic volo, sic jubeo, but an ordinary power directed by law.

To this Albericus answers, with his distinction before taken, that there is an ordinary and an extraordinary power in the Prince; and he saies, that the people sometimes by this extraordinary power (which is the supreame and absolute power) may be governed more commodiously, for he saies, That peo­ple of indomitable and rigid spirits are better governed by this extraordinary, then an ordinary power, and those Subjects are to be governed by an Iron Rod, that will not yeeld to the ferula.

Certainly Albericus when he wrote this booke, thought he had been tutering of children. I confesse that I have often read and heard that the government by Monarchy, is much to be preferred and set before Oli­garchy, Democracy, or Aristocracy|; but I never heard that tyranny might be more apt & commodious then a just and lawfull governement; neither did I ever read of any people of so savedge and barbarous a nature, who would not rather stoope to a just and legall then an unjust and tyranni­call dominion. No question it is most commodious both for King and people, that the one should have a certain positive rule by which he might governe; and the other by which he might obey. And that Prince who governs his people by the rule of justice, shall find more faithfull and loyall Subjects, then he that swayes them by the Scepter of an extraordinary and tyrannicall power.

But heare what Albericus doth determin to be tyranny. That sayes he Pag. 25. is tyrannous, which in a tyrant is wonted and ordinary; in aiust Prince extra­ordinary [Page]and casuall. To take away famous and excellent men, to expell or drive away those that are wise, to exterminate studies, to have and countenance such about him as are envious, private calumniators and accusers of others, to fol­low & delight in bloody warres, these & others of that kind, he saies to be tyran­nous. How Albericus are these tyrannous? I thought the supreame pow­er had beene unlimitted, why so it is: for he saies, that even these very actions, which imediatly before he styles tyrannous, Possunt aliquandoe­tiam esse justa, may sometimes be just.

May tyrannous actions be just? what a diametricall contradiction is this? he may as well call darkenesse, light, or light darkenesse, good, evill, or evill, good. In vaine doth he labour to make this good, by strange and tyrannous actions, (as he would have them) which are done by Princes for the good of the common wealth, neither is this malum ne­cessariun, a necessary evill, as he calls it, for whatsoever is simply tyranous, cannot be said to be just, and whatsoever is done (and in truth is so) for the common good cannot beare the infamous scandall of tyrannous. But this saying of Albericus savours more of Machavilians Politiques, then of just and legall governement, Pag. 27. That this absolute power of which he treats, and which be confesses to be at will; must be taken ta the will of a good man. A very good distinction; why then belike a prince that is an unjust and corrupt man, cannot use this supreame and arbitrary power. O yes; for immediatly af­ter he doth affirme, the Prince to be this good man; As if it were an absolute and uncontrollable consequence, that every Prince must be a good man, Whereas the Scripture holds out cleare testimony of the wickednesse & corruption of Princes. Ezek. 45.9. Job 34.30. Amos 4.1. And such was the tyranny of the Princes of Jerusalem, that in Zeph. 3.3. they are called roaring Lyons. Observe but his way of reasoning, Every Prince that is a good man hath this arbytrary power: But every Prince is a good man Therefore every Prince hath this arbitrary power. The falsest Sillogisme, and the most pure implicite contradiction that ever was. For the Major propositiō, clearely implies that every Prince is not good, the Minor con­cludes every one to be good. But here you may see the sencelesse dau­bing Sophistry of these men; who are resolved to put a good glosse, up­on the foulest actions; and rather then their Prince shall not be, what they would have him, they will most boldly affirme to be that which he is not. But woe be to you that call good evill, or evill good. I shall say no more but this. Happy England were greatnesse and goodnesse, insepera­ble concomitants.

But he steps a little neater to us, and saies Though the Prince hath a pleni­tude of power, Pag. yet the ought to use this iustly; otherwise it will be a plenitude of stormes and tempests. And he further sates: That this clause of the fullnesse of [Page]power, is under stood of a good and laudable power & not a power to ill or iniury.

What strange and unparallel'd contradictions are these? How can this stand with the former positions? that the King may doe what he list, that his will is a sufficient reason, and his reason a positive law, if the King may be said to doe that, which is unjust, ill or injurious. The do­ing of ill or injury, are not things compatible to absolute Monarchy, give me leave a little to reason the case out of Albericus himselfe. Those that have not power to doe what they list, have no absolute power. But Kings cannot doe what they list: Therefore Kings have no absolute pow­er. But here the Minor preposition will be denied, that Kings may doe what they list. To this I answer with Albericus, that Kings cannot doe wrong or injury, therefore Kings cannot doe what they list. And hence the consequence is very evident, that Kings have no absolute power.

But he doth yet approach nearer to us, in denying the opinion of some of their owne formerly delivered; for he saies, Pag. 27. That the Prince by this ple­nitude or absolutenes of power, cannot deprive his Subiects of their dominions or properties, sine causa iusta, without just cause tendered.

Why now Albericus secundumte, according to your owne argument: if Kings cannot take away their Subjects properties, but are bound to re­gulate their actions according to the rule of justice; How can Kings be said to have an absolute power? Why yes, you shall heare how, for he doth afterwards, (if what he saies would hold) make good whatso­ever he hath delivered: or indeed can deliver in the defence of this tyran­nicall, absolute Monarchy. For he saies, That of the iustnesse of this cause, this absolute Prince is the sole Judge and Arbitor. Now you know upon what foundation that principle of the Shipmony was built; that the King on­ly ought to be Judge of the imminent danger then pretended. This is that which was taught by evill Councellors, one whereof (with whom the dominion of Ireland was intrusted) was wont to say, that he had the law lockt up in scrinio pectoris, in the closset of his owne brest: which ex­pressed in plainer language speakes clearely this, that his will was a law. But he that then thought to have advanced his Soveraigne, (& by conse­quence himselfe) above law, hath sence undergone his just demerit; and the law still lives in spite of its enemies. But who would have thought that our grave fathers and sage determiners, the lex loquens, or walking Libraries of our law; should have beene so perfidious to their own prin­ciples, as to borrow grounds of the Civill law, to make up a judgement so distructive to the Common. And that that was so, give me leave to reason the case a little, I will make it evident. For first they themselves say that to bee the only discrimen or true difference betwixtabsolute (if any such thing there be) and quallified or limitted Monarchy. For say they, the first doth judge de causis, of causes; and the latter ex legibus, by [Page]the lawes. So that give but the King leave to be judge in his owne case, you presently mount him into absolute monarchy: if this were law, the King might take away any mans estate upon just cause; I and whether it were just or no, he would doe it, for he himselfe should be judge of the cause and then it would not be difficult to determine on whose side the judgement should be given. Tis an undoubted Maxime that no man can be acompetent judge in his owne case, and it is all one to give the King li­betty to take away his Subiects rights uniustly; as to say he cannot doe it, but upon iust ground, and yet to leave that to his sole sudgement, and determination. Might not the King in that case, as often as he himselfe pleased, have exhausted his Subiects treasure upon pretence of an immi­nent danger? and if he be sole Judge of the necessity, who could oppose it? But you see the absurdity and ill consequence of this principle, and therefore so I shall leave it.

But then speaking how farre the law should be obligatory to the Prince, Page 2.8. he takes these distinctions: saies he, There is Lex honestatis, the law of honesty; and Lex necessitatis, the law of necessity. The law of honesty that binds the King; that is, the King in point of honesty may if he will observe the law, if he will not he may make his will his law. The law of necessity, that bindes the Subiect, so that will he, nill he, he must sub­mit and give obedience to it.

Others he saies, say That there is the law of honesty, and the law of the pre­cept; and he saies the one doth not lesse oblige, then the other, yet there is this difference, that the law of honesty depends onely upon the will of the prince: what an absurdity is this, to say that the one doth as strongly bind as the other, and yet that the one must observe the law and the other is at his liberty, whether he will or no.

Others he saies, say That there is necessitas rei, the necessity of the thing & necessitas personae, the necessity of the person, so that though the thing may be of necessity to be done, (as for the purpose the setling of the Militia) yet that doth not necessitare the person of an absolute Prince to doe it.

What pure contradictions are these, first that Princes have Su­preame and absolute power to do what they list, and yet that they ought to do nothing, but what is just and right. That they are above the Law, and yet by the law of honesty they are bound to observe and keepe it. I thinke it is almost impossible to reconcile these differences, or to make Albericus agree with himselfe. For my part, I shall not sticke to defend that Princes by the law of necessity, are bound to submit to the Law, as well as their people; For I am sure that the divine precept doth as strong­ly oblige the greatest Monarch, as the meanest begger; and that requires that justice be done to all men, and that every man (which exempts not Princes) should doe that, which hee commands others to doe. Now it is [Page]but consonant to the rule of justice and good government, that Princes should be necessitated to observe the Law as well as their people; for if the King shall have power to make his will his law, what justice or set­led governement can be exspected. Then this beeing an act of justice to observe the Law, by that generall precept of the word of God, that ju­stice be done to all men; Princes are as strongly obliged to it as the peo­ple. Againe, if the Divine rule requireth that every man doe that which he commandeth to be done by another; why then no Prince can excuse himselfe of the necessity of subjection to that Law; which he requireth should be kept and observed by his Subjects. I am certaine it is the very letter of the Word and a principall part of justice, that every man should doe, as he would be done by; and I am confident no Prince if hee would state himselfe in the place of his Subject, could hold it just or equali, that it should lie in the brest of his Soveraigne to vassalize him at plea­sure. Now a man ought not to doe that, or to conceive it just to be done to another, which he would condemne as unjust, being done to himselfe. I never complied with that distinction of some Divines, who say the Prince to be subject to the directive, but not to the coactive or compul­sive power of the law; for though they may be exempt from the penall, yet not from the coercive power; and without controversie, whatsoe­ver God requires, of that man may exact the just and due performance. And as I have said, the word of God doth rather binde over Princes by the law of necessity, to the observance of the Law, then any way give them freedome from it, or power against it.

Besides, you shall heare how some of their own argue; frustra sint Leges positae nostro principi, nisi sit, qui ipsum in leges cogat; that is, it is in vaine to tie our Prince to the Lawes, except there should be somebody to compell him to the observation of them. And saies another, why are not the lawes also ab­rogated, with which the Prince is said to be bound, if it can never be, that hee may be compelled to keepe and observe them? Every Law carries with it a coactive necessity of observance; and as good no Law, as no power to exact the performance of the Law: But heare what a third of their owne sayes; The Lawes are the conventions or covenants betwixt the Prince and his people, & it is the nature of obligations to enforce the unwilling, & the bond and obligation being mutuall, tis but just and equall that Kings should be necessitated to observe the law as well as their people. To conclude this, give but Kings freedome from the coercive power of the Law; you make the Law as vaine and idle, as their covenants and obligations.

The last argument that I shall touch, is this; that if the people were bound by their owne Lawes, so should the Prince, if the people conferre their power upon him.

To this it is said, that this power collated by the people to the Prince, is in­terpreted [Page]of the people, of Magistrates, and of the Lawes themselves; that is, he hath power over all these, then it is said, can hee who hath the Lawes in his power, be in the power of the lawes? or can he that hath the power of the Lawes, be detayned by the power of the Lawes?

For my part Albericus I count it a flat absurdity for any man to main­taine that the people conferred a grater power or exemption upon their Prince, then they themselves had, or exercised, for though they did trans­ferre all the Legislative power to the Prince, yet it must be clogged with the same qualifications and conditions that they themselves had it. Nei­ther can it be imagined by sounder judgements, that people who had such experience of an ample liberty, would give an absolute power to their Prince, and thereby subject themselves to the bond of slavery. That the people did grant to their Prince a power of making Lawes; doth not al­low him an exemption or freedome from them. Besides as the alterati­ons of Governement in any state are dangerous, and therefore not to be attempted without mature consideration, so it hath beene alwaies the care and vigelancy of all States whatsoever upon their innovation or al­teration of Governement, to reduce themselves to a better, not a worse condition; and can we then conceive that the Nations upon the first e­lection of Princes, could be so stuped as to submit themselves to absolute Monarchy, & live under the lawless power of Tyranny? and so avoiding one extreame to fal into another much worse then the former. For my selfe, I must needes acknowledge that it is a thing so opposite and discon­sonant to the rule of reason, and that freedome that all men naturally co­vet, that I shall as soone renounce the fundamentalls of my faith, as be­leeve it. But the long continuance of the Monarchicall governement (which indeede is the most absolute of all others, if it do not exceede the sweet mixtute of legall moderation) the corruption of Princes, and the fawning principles of Court Parasites; these are they which by degrees have insinuated these absurd and false positions, and adulterated the ori­ginall constitution of so pure and happie a Dominion. Thus much a­gainst absolute Monarchy in generall.

And now after all, let us who are English Subjects, & live under the golden mean of mixt & qualified Monarchy (the most blest dominiō in the world if not corrupted through the ambition of Princes or the base seducement of evill Counsellors) blesse God for his goodnesse who hath not only dispensed and bestowed an equall portion of his bounty upon us, but hath also made us absolute proprietors of what we enjoy, so that our lives, liberties and estates, doe not depend upon, not are subiect to the sole breath or arbitrary will of our Soveraigne. And I shall conclude all with a small variation of that old verse