AN ANSWER TO Six Queries, PROPOSED To a Gentlewoman of the Church of ENG­LAND, by an Emissary of the Church of ROME; fitted to a Gentlewomans Capacity.

By HENRY DODWELL M. A. and some­times Fellow of Trinity Colledge near DƲBLIN.

LONDON: Printed for Benj. Took. MDCLXXXVIII.

A PREFACE.

IT is of no further concernment to acquaint the Pub­lick with the occasion of penning these Papers, than as the occasion might have an influence on the Design; and as it may be very useful to inform the Reader of the Design, that he may the better know what to expect in the Performance.

He may therefore be pleased to understand that the fol­lowing Queries were tendred to a Gentlewoman of the Com­munion of the Church of England by a Romanist, who had a design of seducing her; and that they were answered by another hand, but on such Principles, or in such a way of management, as that it did not give her the desired satis­faction. This gave occasion to some that were concerned for her, to shew the Paper to some others, in order to the inviting them to undertake it in a way that might be like­ly to prove more successful. By this means of Communica­tion it came at length to my hands, from a Person who first desired my Opinion concerning it; and then with some ear­nestness importuned me to commit my thoughts to writing. Pursuant therefore to this occasion, my Design was in the first place to shew from sound Principles, that the Church of England is able to defend her Reformation from the Errors of the Romanists, and to clear her self, as far as She is charged with that Breach of Communion which fol­lowed thereupon, without giving any advantage to the [Page] Non-Conformists to justifie either their first Separation from Ʋs, or their Eternal Subdivisions from one another. Nor was I willing to engage a Person in the Gentlewomans condition, in any Controversies that might be spared with­out Injury to the merit of the Cause; or to debate even such as could not so be spared, by such Arguments as might ex­ceed her opportunities of Enquiring, or her capacity of Judg­ing, so as to oblige her to depend on the conduct of others more Inquisitive and Judicious. But I have either waved Authorities where I could debate the Case by Arguments less liable to Dispute, and better suited to the understand­ing of a Gentlewoman; or where I have been necessitated to insist on them, I have endeavoured to make out their Credibility by such Presumptions as are easie to be under­stood, and samiliar in parallel Cases, and generally granted as most Prudent, whenever unskilful Persons find them­selves obliged to acquiesce in the conduct of Persons more skilful and judicious than themselves. And I have pur­posely avoided all Citations of Authors, even where ne­cessary, but such as were to be had, even in English, and therefore might be consulted by the Gentlewoman her self.

I confess those other Reasonings fit for Scholars, as they are more subtle, so they are withal more solid and conclu­sive. But withal I consider, 1. That those things where­in Scholars have the advantage of unlearned Persons, are principally such wherein Reading is absolutely necessary for their Historical conveyance to us. It is certainly im­possible for any to know what Doctrines were maintained in the Apostles times (and consequently what Doctrines are true, where they are supposed capable of no other Evi­dence of their being true, but because they were so main­tained) without insight into the several Histories and Au­thors of the intermediate Ages through which they are to be deduced. But for other things whose evidence of their being true, does not depend on such a conveyance, the Rea­son [Page] of the thing is a sufficient Evidence; and of this every equally rational Person, how little soever he be conver­sant in Authors, is an equally competent Judge. And of this kind are many of the things here mentioned, on which the stress of the cause depends. The prudent Rea­der will easily discern which they are, without my instan­cing. And 2. even in those things which depend on Posi­tive Revelation, and wherein the only means of our Assu­rance of them is Historical Tradition; though it be in­deed true that Persons of little Reading cannot so compe­tently assure themselves of the Writings and Opinions of former Ages, without the assistance of others more conver­sant in those Studies: Yet since it is not the way of Pru­dent rational Persons, therefore to conclude a thing to have been revealed by the Apostles, because such Authors tell us that it was so; much less because such Authors main­tained it, as their own Opinion; but first to assure them­selves of such things on which the Credibility of such Au­thors in such matters may be made clear to us, and then of those Expressions from whence they conclude such Au­thors to have given Testimony to such a thing as an Aposto­lical Tradition: It is plain that the Judgment of these things depends wholly on the Reason of the things them­selves. And therefore where Learned Men are agreed, as to their accounts of the Authors and their Expressions; and where the only remaining Dispute is, Whether such undoubted Works of such Authors be competent for the conveyance of a Tradition; and whether such Expressions, considered in all their Circumstances, come home to the Con­troversies at present debated; these are things whereof common Prudence, and a cultivated natural Judgment may as well qualifie Men to pass a Censure as the greatest Read­ing imaginable. And this seems to me the best way in af­fairs of this nature, to wave such things as were disputed among Learned Men concerning their Historical Informati­ons, [Page] and only to found my reasonings on their unanimous Concessions. And most of the Controversies betwixt Us and the Romanists are of that nature as to be capable of this way of management. Now this way of not intermed­ling in the Disputes of Learned men, but only proceeding on their unquestioned Concessions is (as most solid and satisfactory to the most accurate Learned men themselves, so) most prudent and easie for those who are unlearned. And 3. even as to those other things wherein I have indeed proceeded on popular Presumptions, yet considering that these are the only Reasons which God has fitted to the capa­cities of the greatest part of Mankind, and that God is in his Goodness concerned to give them Reasons sufficient for their direction, and that the Nature of the Things them­selves is of importance to his Government, and that it is therefore requisite that their directions be such as may not only excuse their mistakes, but secure them of the Truth it self; I say, these things being considered, there will be reason to believe, that however fallible such general Pre­sumptions may be in their own nature, yet that God in his Goodness has so ordered the matter in affairs of this nature, as that those who are guided by these Presumptions, may by the use of them be secured of the Truth it self in these Particulars.

As for the Method observed in this Discourse, it is such as I conceived most clear and comprehensive in few words, and yet withal most accurate and satisfactory to a doubting Person. For any one may be much more secure of a Conse­quence when he is first secured of all its Principles, and he can much better judge of them when he has an intire Prospect of them in the natural Order wherein they lye, and wherein they are necessary for the deduction of such a Consequence. Yet I have neither deduced my Principles too remotely, but as near as I could find them clear and in­disputable; Nor have we insisted on the Proof of those [Page] that were clear, any further than I conceived it necessary to do so from the actual Disputes concerning the Conse­quence. And I have been careful rather to prove than to confute; which I conceived to be a course, as less In­vidious to Adversaries (who should find themselves no fur­ther concerned than as the consequences of positive Truths might make them concern'd) so also more satisfactory to a Person in the Gentlewomans condition. And in the whole I am so little conscious of any design of displeasing any to whom Truth it self might not prove displeasing, as that if any Adversary shall think it worth his time to Answer what I have said, I am not my self afraid of Provocation from any thing which he can say in following my Prece­dent.

THE CONTENTS.

  • Qu. 1. WHether any one going from the Church of England, and dying a Roman Catholick, can be saved? Page 1.
  • Q. 2. Whether they be Idolaters, or No? 11.
  • Q. 3. Where was the Church of England before Luther's time? 14
  • Q. 4. Why all the Reformed Churches are not Ʋnited in One? 22
  • Q. 5. Why the Church of England doth not hold up to Confession, Fasting-days, Holy Oyl, which we our Selves commend? 26
  • Q. 6. Why was Reformation done by Act of Parliament? 29

AN ANSWER TO SIX QUERIES, &c.

Q. 1. Whether any one going from the Church of ENG­LAND, and dying a Roman Catholick, can be saved?

I. IF by the words [can be saved] be meant a possibility in regard of the MEANS, we then deny it. For we hold that such Errors are maintained in that Communion as are in their own nature destructive af Salvation.

Such are,

1. The Doctrines even of their Vid. Consid. of Pros. Con­cern. Church which oblige them to do mischief (as those concerning the Popes Supremacy over Princes in Temporals, and concerning their Duty of prosecuting Hereticks) The For the Je­suites, see the Provinc. Lett. and the Moral Theolog. of the Jesuites; and for the rest of that Communion, the Jesuites defence of themselves by way of recri­mination a­gainst others. loosness of their Casuistical Divinity, counte­nanced by such Authorities of Casuists as must needs influence such Persons as act conformably to the Principles of that Com­munion; and their generally allowing a greater Liberty to such Persons as are desirous to reconcile their Vices with their hopes of Eternity, by their licentious Applications of those two Di­stinctions of Precepts and Counsels, and of Mortal and Venial Sins, whereby they make most Duties Counsels, and most Sins only Venial. Which danger is the more considerable to an ignorant Person, who for want of Skill of her own, must in Prudence, and by the Principles of that Communion, be obliged to trust such unsecure Guides.

2. Not to mention the ill Influence of several of their Do­ctrines on the Lives of such as own them; the very imposing them as matters of Faith, the Excommunicating and Anathemati­zing [Page 2] all that deny them, the condemning Dissenters as guiity of Heresie and Schism (at least what they call Material) the inserting several of their controverted Doctrines into their Liturgies, so that they who cannot believe them, cannot veraciously joyn with them in their Devotions, are Innovations from the liberty allow­ed in the Primitive Church, wherein many (whom all own for excellent Persons and good Catholicks) never owned, nay some of them doubted of, or contradicted, such conditions of Com­munion; in sum, their unreasonable grounds of dividing Catho­lick Communion, and their Ʋncharitableness to Dissenters, are Errors dangerous to the Salvation of the Person owning and abetting them. For all will own, even the Romanists themselves, that the Crime of breaking Catholick Communion, where it is just­ly imputed, is destructive of Salvation.

3. Several Abuses of that Church (I say of the Church, not only of particular Persons in it) are so gross as that several of the most eminent and candid men of their own Communi­on have owned them for such: such as Prayer in an unknown Tongue, denying the Chalice to the Laity, Fabulous Saints and Stories still continued in the best approved Ecclesiastical Offices, Martyrs canonized for bad Causes conducing to the greatness of the Roman See, as Becket for Example: Yet by the Principles of that Com­munion, pretending to Infallibility, it is impossible that any Abuse (in defence of which their Church is engaged, as She is here) should ever be reformed, because it is impossible that a Church, so pretending to be Infallible, should ever grant any such thing to be an Abuse. And many more abuses are by the moderate Persons of their Communion owned in the Court of Rome, which yet by the power allowed to the Court over their Church, by the general consent of the Church it self, cannot possibly be reformed. Seeing therefore that the Church of Rome does thus oppose all possible Reformation of Abuses of this nature; and seeing that, whilst these Abuses are not reformed, many of them may justifie a Separation, and most of them may do it when all hopes of Reformation are professedly opposed; Catholick Peace on such terms as may, not only lawfully, but commendably, be yielded, will be impossible. And the abetting of such a Party as makes Catholick Peace on just terms impossible, must needs be an Error destructive of Salvation. This is a mischief unavoidably consequent to mistakes in a Society pretending to be Infallible.

As these Errors are thus of their own nature destructive of Salvation, so going over to that Communion from an­other, does naturally involve the Person doing so, in the actual guilt of the Errors themselves:

1. Because Communicating (according to all) does involve the Persons communicating in the guilt of such Errors, at least, as are imposed as conditions of the Communion, as these are in the Church of Rome. This needs not to be proved against the Romanists, who insist on it against Us, as much as We do against them.

2. This must especially hold in such as revolt from our Church to theirs: both because such an embracing of their Communion is more an Argument of choice and designed preference in such as leave others to come to it, than in such as are born in it, and consequently must signifie a more express approbation of the Terms of it; and because more explicite recantation of our Do­ctrines are required even from Laick Revolters, than from such as are born in it.

3. Because the Resignation of Judgment is expected more in­tire from Women and Laicks than from skilful Persons (who may in some cases be allowed the Liberty of their own Judgment even by the Principles of that Communion) so that Persons in the Gentlewomans condition, may by this means come to be Responsible not only for the dangerous Doctrines of their whole Church, but also for the Personal Errors of their Priests and parti­cular Confessors: both as they are (by the Principles of that Communion) allowed to be the Authentical Proponents of the Doctrines of their Church, to unlearned Persons (who are not them­selves qualified for judging concerning them) as their Church is of the Doctrines of Christ to the Learned; and as the same Rules of Prudence oblige them as strongly to trust their particu­lar Priests for Opinions, as they do their Church for Doctrines of Faith, where they are still presumed as uncapable of judging themselves.

II. If by this possibility of Salvation mentioned in the Questi­on, be meant only [a possibility of the EVENT] notwithstanding the dangerousness of the condition of Persons of that Commu­nion, upon account of their being of it; then the Resolution will depend on this: How far Errors of their own nature dam­native may not prove actually destructive to the Salvation of the [Page 4] particular Erroneous Person, on account of the Ignorance and Ʋnvoluntariness with which the Person comes to be engaged in such Errors? For on these accounts it may be conceived that the Errors may either not be imputed to her at all, or be impu­ted in sollow a degree as to become pardonable by the general Stipulations and promises of the Gospel for the pardoning of Sins of Inadvertency and humane frailty, which are supposed expi­able by a general Care of fulfilling the conditions of the Evan­gelical Covenant, together with a general implicite Repentance of Sins unknown as well as known.

Now of these two ways whereby an Error damnative of its own Nature may be hindred from proving actually damnative in the Event to the Erroneous Person, it is only an Invincible Igno­rance (that is, such as can be remedied by no means that are in the power of the Person who is supposed Erroneous) that can hinder all Imputation of her Error to her; and only such a degree of Vin­cible Ignorance can suffice for extenuating the Imputation so far as to render it pardonable in the way now mentioned, that is very hardly avoidable by the Person, considering the frailty to which her condition in this Life is obnoxious. So that for judging con­cerning the Condition of Revolters (which is the Gentlewomans case) the Enquiry will be, what degree of Ignorance they are capable of that may make their Errors Involuntary? that is, How far such as they are, may be capable of being Ignorant of their Duty to adhere to ours as the true Communion? And for discerning this, these following Particulars would be fit to be considered.

1. That we are all agreed (Romanists as well as Protestants) that all sorts of Persons (Ignorant as well as Learned) are obliged to adhere to the true Communion (whatever that is) in contra­distinction to others, at least, under pain of losing the Ordinary means of Salvation, and consequently that comfortable satisfaction of the security of their own condition, which they who enjoy the Ordinary means of Salvation must needs be more capable of than they who are necessitated to repose their whole confidence in Gods Extraordinary Mercies.

2. That all Persons being thus obliged by God to embrace the true Communion, the Inducements to it must be supposed sufficient for the conviction of all, and consequently suited to the capacities of all who are thus concerned to receive Conviction.

[Page 5]3. Therefore the Reasons being thus supposed sufficient for the conviction of all, there can be no pretence of Invincible Ignorance for any but such as are Ignorant of those Reasons, which can­not be supposed to be the case of Revolters.

Hence it follows, at least, that if Revolters act rationally, that is, Enquire what it is they leave, and why, and accordingly fol­low their Convictions as they ought, before their Change; they cannot be supposed capable of Invincible Ignorance. So that the on­ly imaginable pretence for rendring their Error Invincible, must be the supposed Invincibleness of those Prejudices which may hin­der a well-meaning Person, acting conscientiously, from acting rationally. Which must be either,

  • 1. Opinions conceived obligatory in Conscience, hindring the Persons embracing them from Enquiry, or following their own Convictions; of which kind many instances may be pro­duced which are favoured by the Casuists of the Roman Church: Or,
  • 2. Precipitation in passing Sentence on a partial Evidence, re­solving on some particular advantage of one Cause with­out considering its disadvantages, or the advantages of the contrary Cause, which might possibly overweigh it if im­partially considered: Or,
  • 3. An undiscernible favour to one Cause more than another, whereby we wish it rather true in regard of its greater compliance with some particular Interest or Affection, which may be thought Innocent, at least, if not commendable; which may the more likely prejudice a well-meaning Con­scientious Person, because it may indeed be Prudent in some Cases, and it is not easie for a Person acted by it to discern when it is not. But it is hard to conceive how any of these mistakes can be Invincible in Revolters.

Not the 1. for

1. There can be no reason to take up such Opinions so gratui­tously, which are so Prejudicial to all Reasoning in general.

2. There can be no reason to take them for granted as first Principles, without Enquiry, (by which means very absurd Pro­positions may be taken up by very rational Persons) where it is known that many skilful, and (as far as can be judged) Conscientious Persons do, not only question, but, deny them.

[Page 6]3. Revolters from us cannot as much as pretend any Prejudices of Education to excuse such mistakes, seeing that among Us they find them utterly discountenanced. And as they have thus nei­ther Reason, nor (among Us) Authority that may induce them to the belief of those Doctrines: So neither,

4. Can the Authority of our Adversaries be any probable in­ducement to perswade Revolters to the belief of these irrational Doctrines:

  • 1. Because the Romanists themselves are sensible of the absurdi­ty of these Doctrines, and their unserviceableness to their own Interests when they have to deal with Persons whom they desire to seduce; so that they are not likely to recom­mend such Doctrines to such Persons, as Credible, on ac­count of their own Authority. For if they should offer to perswade such as they esteem Hereticks of the unlawfulness of intermedling in Religious Disputes, or following their own Convictions in them, it would be the means to make it impossible to Proselyte such to their own Party.
  • 2. If they should be so imprudent as to perswade them of the Truth of these Doctrines so prejudicial to their own inte­rests in these Circumstances; yet the Person tempted would need no other Argument to confute them than their at­tempts to Proselyte her at the same time when they should teach her that it were unlawful to hearken to any Reasons, or to venture her own Judgment concerning them, if con­trary to what at present she believed to be true.
  • 3. Because if she must not trust her own Judgment, but rely on Authority, it would be most Just, as well as most Pru­dent, to trust the Authority of her own Party whom She has experienced, rather than her Adversaries whom She has not; and therefore it could not be reasonable to trust Adver­saries contradicting the eminent Guides of her own Party.
  • 4. Because, at least, the Authority of Adversaries cannot be presumed in Reason so great, with a Person not yet of their Communion, as to oblige her to believe, on their account, what She her self thinks Irrational: Nay, rather whilst it is questioned how far their Authority is to be trusted (as it ought, in reason, to be considered before a change) and whilst the private Judgment of the Person is trusted (as none else can be) in this debate; what in her own judgment [Page 7] seems unreasonable, would rather render the Authority su­spected if it should recommend it, than be it self believed for the Authority.

Especially considering 5. that to such a one as is not yet per­swaded of the Credibility of their Authority, this would af­ford a very prudent Argument for suspicion of their Inte­grity, when they should urge her to the belief of such things whose Truth they would not allow her liberty to examine by her own private Judgment.

Not the 2. for

1. It is hard to conceive a Person educated in the true Church so ignorant of the advantages of her own way, as to be Invincibly perswaded by those of the contrary, which upon a compleat comparison are (by the Supposals laid down in the beginning of Vid. II. 1. 2. this Discourse) so very disproportionable to them, and which may appear so by the Judgment of all who are concerned to judg concerning them.

2. The fallacy of trusting such partial Representations is so easily discovered by the most ordinary Experience and Prudence in human affairs, and so universally acknowledged in all other ordi­nary occurrences, as that it can hardly impose on any who pro­ceeds with that Caution which all acknowledg requisite in chan­ges of great and dangerous consequence, as all confess those of Religion to be.

3. Though a less advantage on one side above the other might suffice, where the Person were not pre-engaged in either; yet all confess the disturbance of a change, and the danger of ven­turing on an unexperienced way, so considerable, as that they are not to be attempted on barely Equal terms; which is a further warning for the Gentlewoman to be wary, who is tempted to change from the Principles of her Education.

4. Supposing the Person were so Ignorant as not to discern the advantages of her own Communion above any other by her own observation, yet in that Case, it is on all sides held Pru­dent to hear on both sides what can be said by them who are skilful: which if She understand, and be able to judg of by her self, She must then (by the Supposals now mentioned) see the advantage of her own side; but if She does not, and so be ne­cessitated, even in the choice of her Communion, to rely on the conduct of a Guide, it must in that Case be much more Prudent [Page 8] to trust a Guide whom She has experienced, than one whom She has not.

Not the 3. for

1. That Favour which is wholly derived from the inclination of the Affections must needs be due to that side wherein the Person is already engaged: both in Justice, as all generous Persons con­ceive themselves obliged in all Cases capable of favour, to be favourable to their old Friends rather than others; and in Pru­dence, because by this means the disturbance of a change is best prevented.

2. If any Favour may be upon reasonable and well-meaning accounts extended to one Cause above others: Either because the trial of its Truth is easier, or because its Truth (if it may be proved) may be conceived subservient to better purposes; as Mr. Cressy confesses himself favourable to the Arguments produ­ced Exomolog. Sect. 2. Ch. 16. Sect. 2. P. 162. Ed. 2. for a Judg of Controversies, because the decision of that Con­troversie alone would prevent the trouble of Enquiring into the rest: yet even so (if this Favour be taken up and managed as it ought to be by a vertuous well-meaning Person) it will not ren­der the mistake of a change Invincible. For,

  • 1. This Favour (as far as it is justifiable by reason) is to be had for the Religion wherein the Person had been educated, and of which She is actually possessed, upon the same rational accounts whereby that other Favour is conceived justifiable, and in as high a degree of obligation; both as we are bet­ter able to judg of what we know already, than we can be presumed to be of a strange Religion; and as we can be more confident in the practice of a Religion we have al­ways maintained, than we can in that which must suppose us convicted of having been formerly greatly mistaken.
  • 2. This Favour, as far as it may be conceived Prudent and Rational, can only take place there where all other things are supposed Equal, which cannot be supposed in the true way.
  • 3. This Favour ought not to hinder the Person from an En­quiry into the contrary Cause, unless the Evidence produ­ced be very certainly convictive, which also cannot be sup­posed in the way we are speaking of.
  • 4. This way of Favourable Presumption being the only way by which the generality of the Vulgar are capable to Judg, [Page 9] and there being in the true way inducements for all sorts of People; therefore it must be said that if this way be managed impartially, that is, if all the Presumptions on both sides be considered, this must bring them to the Truth.

Hence it follows, by the Principles of all Parties, that the Error of a Revolter can hardly be presumed Invincible, and conse­quently not wholly Excusable. So that for Judging concerning the Salvability of particular Persons, it only remains to be enquired further, Whether they be capable of such a degree of Vincible Igno­rance as may be expiable by a General Repentance, and the perfor­mance of all other Conditions of the Gospel in an Erroneous Communion? And the Resolution of this depends on these Enquiries:

  • 1. Whether the Erroneous Communion (the Roman for Example) embrace the Doctrine of Repentance so intirely, according to the Conditions required of it in the Gospel, as that the Repentance performed in it may be presumed such as God will accept?
  • 2. What degree of Vincible Ignorance is expiable by a General Repentance? For it is certain that all is not.
  • 3. Whether a Revolter from our Communion be capable of that degree of Vincible Ignorance which is so expiable?

The exact Discussion of these things is too large to be insisted on at present, and therefore I shall only make application to the design of the Question. I shall therefore shew that what Possibility of Salvation soever we may allow to Persons of the Roman Com­munion, yet it is no prudent ground to encourage one who is not already of it, to revolt to it. To this purpose I desire it may be considered,

1. That all the grounds we pretend to have for our Charity, are rather Negative than Positive: rather our unsatisfiedness with those Arguments which pretend to prove them actually damned, than any Positive Convictions that any of them are actually saved.

2. That our Charitable Presumptions are principally grounded on things impossible to be known by Ʋs, such as are the Ʋnco­venanted Mercies of God, and the possibility of Sincerity, and even particular Explicite Repentance of the Error in the Person; so that it is very easie for Ʋs to be mistaken in our Charity, and we pro­fessedly chuse it as a mistake (if it should prove one) more par­donable than Censoriousness.

[Page 10]3. That the Case, concerning which we Judge Charitably, is so very rare and extraordinary, as that no particular Erroneous Per­son can be very confident that it is her own: Nay, when we say, that their Errors are of their own Nature destructive of Salvati­on, and that God has not interposed any General Ordinary means for preventing their proving actually damnative in the Event, it will thence follow that there are very just fears concerning the generality of their Communion, and consequently many odds to one of the miscarriage of each particular Person, which the Gentlewoman may do well to think of seriously.

4. That the degree of Penitence which shall be accepted by God in a particular Case, upon account of his uncovenanted Mer­cy, is very hard, if not impossible, to be known by the Person con­cerned; so that even they who shall enjoy the benefit of it in the other World, yet may want the comfort of it in this; and there­fore can ground no confidence in any Practice undertaken on that Supposition.

5. That this Security is very much more hazardous, and more difficult to be Judged of, in Case of Vincible, than of Invincible Ignorance, which has been proved to be generally the condition of Persons concerned in this Enquiry.

6. That it is certainly more difficult in the Case of Revolters, than of such who have had their Education in the Roman Commu­nion.

These things I conceive sufficient to shew that our acknowledg­ment in this affair can afford no security for a Revolt, to a Person who seriously believes Us, and is desirous to be Guided by Us. But if we be considered as Adversaries, and consequently our Au­thority be considered only as cogent against our Selves, especially when taken in conjunction with other things, as they usually argue the Security of a change from our Singularity in Asserting the Salvability of our own Communion, and our Agreement even with the Romanists in owning the Salvability of theirs; whence they conclude it safer for an Ignorant Person to venture her Pra­ctice in that way, in the safety whereof we are all agreed, than in that wherein we are singular: In Answer hereunto I shall, at present, only propose these things to the Gentlewomans Con­sideration:

1. That the unreasonableness of this Argument has been sufficiently shown by others; particularly She may consult Bi­shop [Page 11] Taylor's Letter, and the Dean of Canterbury's Sermon, which On 1 Cor. III. 15. are in English, and are short and easie to be understood by her.

2. That the Supposition it self is false here. For they of the Roman Communion do as fully own the Possibility of the Salva­tion of particular Persons in our Communion, as we do in theirs, both as to the Principles whence it is deduced, (touching Invin­cible Ignorance) which are granted as well by them as by Us, and even in express Confessions, when they are pleased to speak their minds freely; of which I must needs say, they are in Policy more cautious, for fear of giving Us any encouragement to con­tinue in our own Communion. If She doubt of this, She may, if She please, consult of our English Authors (for in dealing with her I would not willingly quote any others) Mr. Richworth Dia­log. 1. §. 7. pag. 38. Ed. Paris, 1648. Mr. Cressy Exomolog. Sect. 2. Chap. 50. §. 11. pag. 396. Knot in Charity Maintained, Part I. Chap. I. §. 3, 4. compared with Mr. Chillingworth's An­swer, Ib. §. 3, 4.

3. That this Candor of ours, when compared with their reser­vedness in speaking their minds in this Case, is an Argument of our Ingenuity and fair dealing more than theirs, which is a consi­derable Argument of trust to an Ignorant Person, who finds her self obliged to trust the Authority of one of Us.

Q. 2. Whether they he Idolaters, or No?

I Must confess that I think the true Notion of Idolatry more diffi­cult than is commonly conceived, and to my Understanding not yet sufficiently explained. Nor am I willing on this occasion to engage on that Dispute, both because it would be too tedious, and because I think most of the mistakes already entertained con­cerning it to have been occasioned by its having been stated in Dis­putes with a design on some particular Adversaries. Not intending therefore to determine positively, Whether the Practices required by their Church as Conditions of her Communion be necessarily Idola­trous? I shall only, at present, recommend these things to a Per­son in the Gentlewomans Condition, whom I suppose not so capable of examining the particular merit of the Cause, and there­fore it will be the most Prudent course for such a one to Judge by general Presumptions.

1. That their Notions concerning the Saints are exactly the [Page 12] same with those of the later Heathens of the Primitive times con­cerning their Daemons then worshipped; who yet were as cer­tainly guilty of Idolatry (if the concurrent sense of Primitive Chri­stianity may be believed) as those accused of it in the Old Testa­ment, concerning whose sense we want those Records which might so fully inform us. For it might have easily been shewn, that those Daemons were confessed to be of an inferior Order, and not to require that supreme degree of Worship proper to the Supreme Being; nay, that they thought them deputed by the Su­preme Being it self to convey his influences to Ʋs, and our Pray­ers to Him.

2. That if the Heathens (notwithstanding that their Devoti­ons were designed for good Daemons) were yet deluded by Evil ones, who were by God permitted to interpose in their stead, be­cause they paid that Relative respect to Persons whom he had not declared it his pleasure to have so worshipped, and before Ima­ges where they had no security from any promise of God, that none but good Daemons should presentiate themselves; How can the Romanists be secure that they are not the same way deluded, see­ing they have as little Security from God's Word (which is the only competent means from whence they can in this Case have Security) that it is his pleasure that they should be publickly Invo­cated, and that he has given them the Office of conveying his Blessings to Us, and our Prayers to Him, and that he will per­mit none but good Spirits to presentiate themselves at their Images?

3. That if Miracles pretended to be done at such Invocations be urged as Arguments that God is pleased with them, this was pretended by the Heathens too. And it may be, if it were impar­tially Enquired into, there would not be greater and better attested Miracles for Invocation of Saints among the Romanists, than for the Invocation of Daemons among the Pagans.

4. That the same Arguments used by the Scriptures and Primi­tive Christians against the Heathen Idolatries, are applied by the Pro­testants to the Image-worship among the Papists now; and the same Answers given by the Papists now, were then also insisted on by the Pagans.

5. That as these are very shrewd Suspicions of the dangerous­ness of this Worship, so this danger is ventured on without the least necessity; there being undeniable Security from the Primitive [Page 13] Records and Revelations of Christianity, that God is pleased to accept such Prayers as are addressed to him through the Inter­cession of Christ alone, so that there can be no necessity of ha­ving also recourse unto the Saints.

6. That Image-worship is not countenanced by as much as any Venerable Authority of truly Primitive Christianity, and that the Se­cond Nicaene Council that introduced it, was put to very disin­genuous Shifts of counterfeit Authorities for it.

7. That whatever may be thought of the Worship designed by the Roman Church, yet even Mr. Thorndike himself (with whose Authority our Adversaries principally urge us in this Dis­pute) does not deny that Idolatry is practiced by the Ignoranter Persons of that Communion, which the Gentlewoman may just­ly fear, lest it should prove her own Case.

8. That the Roman Church her self cannot be altogether excu­sed from the Idolatry of her Ignorant Communicants, seeing she puts unnecessary Scandals in Ignorant persons way, and is guilty of encouraging their Ignorance and Carelesness of Judging in matters of Religion.

9. That the Practice of that Communion is generally worse and grosser than their Principles (as the Gentlewoman may in­form her self of, in that impartial account which is given of them by Sir Edwyn Sandys in his Speculum Europae) which yet is observed and countenanced by their most Eminent Guides; so that such as She cannot secure themselves from the danger of it.

10. That the Romish Church is by so much the more culpable in this Particular, because She has not been content only to coun­tenance and encourage a Practice in so great danger of proving Idolatrous, so needless in it self, so destitute of all Authority, ei­ther of Scripture or the Primitive Catholick Church (which yet does so extremely stand in need of Authority;) but She has also imposed it as a Condition of her own Communion (which She calls Catholick) so that they who are willing to Believe and Practice all that was Believed and Practised in the Primitive Church, must now be Anathematized and condemned for Hereticks for refusing to Believe or Practice any more, or to condemn those as Hereticks who do refuse it.

Q. 3. Where was the Church of England before Luther's time.

THE design of asking this Question is certainly to make our Confession of Novelty (in such Cases wherein our Ad­versaries presume our Novelty so notorious as that we our Selves cannot deny it) an Argument against Us; yet they themselves are concerned in some Cases to deny its cogency. For even they cannot deny that the deprivation of the Laity of the use of the Cup (for Example) has been lately introduced into their Church by a publick Law. If therefore it may appear that our Church is Ancient as to all intents and purposes wherein Antiquity may be available, but that the Church of Rome is not so; and that in the sense wherein the Church of England has begun since Luther, there is no reason to expect that She should have been Ancienter, and that the Justice of her Cause does not require it; and that the Antiquity upon these Suppositions confessedly allowed to the Church of Rome is no Argument for the Justice of her Cause: these things, I think, will contain a fully satisfactory Answer to the Gentlewoamns Question. I shall not at present engage on an accurate Discussion of these Heads: but shall only suggest such short Observations as may let her see how unreasonable our Adversaries confidence is in this Argument, wherein they do so usually triumph. Therefore,

1. Antiquity is indeed necessary to be pleaded for Doctrines, such especially as are pretended to belong to the Catholick Faith, and which are urged as Conditions of Communion. This is the Case wherein it is urged by Tertullian and Vincentius Lirinensis in their very rational Discourses on this Argument. And for this, I think, we may challenge the Church of Rome her self to instance in one positive Doctrine imposed by us which She her self thinks not Ancient. I am sure the Controversie is so stated commonly, that we are blamed, not for Believing any thing ancient or necessary which is not, but, for not believing some things which She be­lieves to be so. And if She her self believe all our Positives, and withal believes that nothing is so to be believed but what is An­cient; it will clearly follow that She cannot, in consistency with her own interests, deny the Antiquity of our Positive Doctrines. But for the other Doctrines superadded by them, and denied by us, which are indeed the true occasion of the present Divisions of [Page 15] Communion, we charge them with Innovation, and are very confident that they will never be able to prove them, to the sa­tisfaction of any Impartial Person, either from clear Scripture, or from genuine Antiquity of the first and purest Ages, which are the way wherein we are willing to undertake the proof of our positive Doctrines. Nay, their greatest Champions decline the trial, and complain of the defectiveness and obscurity of the Primitive Christian Writers, which they would not have reason to do if they thought them clear on their side.

These things therefore being thus supposed, That no Doctrines ought to be imposed but what are Ancient; That ours are so by our Adversaries own Confession, and that our Adversaries Doctrines are not so; and that in Judging this, the private Judgments of particular Persons are to be trusted, as the measures of their own private Practice (as it is plain that those Discourses of Tertullian and Vincentius Liri­nensis are principally designed for the satisfaction of particular Persons, which had been impertinent if the Churches Judgment had been thought Credible in her own Case, as a Judg of Contro­versies; besides that even now this Argument from Antiquity is made use of for convincing such as are supposed unsatisfied with her Authority, and therefore to whom that Authority can be no Argument) which Liberty of Private Judgment is then especially most fit to be indulged when the distance is so remote as it is now, when no Church has now those Advantages for conveying down Apostolical Tra­dition in a Historical way as She had then: These things, I say, be­ing thus supposed, it will follow that we are wrongfully Excom­municated, and therefore that we have no reason to fear that their Censures should be confirmed by God. And though I con­fess every Error in the Cause of the Churches Censures will not excuse the Censured Person for continuing out of her Communion, when the Communion may be recovered by any Submission, how inconvenient and harsh soever, if it be not sinful; yet that is the very Case here, that we are not only wrongfully Excommunica­ted, but the terms proposed for our restitution to Communion would be directly sinful, as has been shewn before. Whence it Vid. Q. I. Sect. 1. will follow that we are excusable, not only in suffering our Selves to be cast out of their Communion, but also in continuing out of it. But because this is not our whole Case, who do not only abstain from their Communion, but set up a Communion of our own, and maintain an Ecclesiastical Body Politick distinct from theirs; [Page 16] our defence herein will depend on the Justice of the Ecclesiastical Power of those Persons who govern our Ecclesiastical Assemblies. And therefore,

2. All our concernment for Antiquity here will be, that our Bishops derived their power from such as derived theirs with a power of communicating it in a continual Succession from the Apo­stles. And this we do acknowledg true concerning the Popish Bi­shops themselves, and do derive the validity of our Orders from the Antiquity of theirs without any more prejudice to our Cause than the Primitive Catholicks did suffer by acknowledging the va­lidity of Baptism administred by Hereticks. For the Succession of their Pastors is very reconcilable with a supposed Innovation in their Doctrines (and certainly themselves cannot deny that it is so, whilst they charge the Orientals with Heresie, whom yet they cannot deny to have always maintained as uninterrupted a Suc­cession of Bishops as themselves) especially considering that the In­novations we charge them with, of adding false and new Articles of Faith, not of denying the old ones, do not in the least inter­rupt or invalidate their Succession. This therefore being supposed, that the first Bishops of our English Reformation received their power from such as had derived theirs by an uninterrupted Suc­cession from the Apostles; it will follow that they were valid Bi­shops, and if so, had the power of keeping Church-Assemblies, and exercising Jurisdiction in them, both for the Government of their present Charges, and communicating their power to succeeding Generations. For nothing of this is pretended to exceed the power of a valid Bishop. The charge of Heresie it self cannot hin­der the validity of their Orders either received or communicated; though it may indeed, in the Judgment of them who believe them so, render them obnoxious to Canonical Incapacities of exe­cuting them, and to Legal Degradations, not from the Character, but from the actual Jurisdiction properly belonging to their Of­fice. But to such Canonical Incapacities and Degradations, they will not deny even validly-Ordained Persons themselves to be ob­noxious, and therefore cannot make that an Argument against the validity of our Orders. And yet even this Charge of Heresie against our Bishops is not here to be Judged by the pretences of our Adversaries, but by the merit of the Cause; and therefore is not to be taken for granted till it be proved.

That therefore which is indeed new in the Church of England, is, that though her Positive Doctrines and Orders be Ancient, yet the Profession of her Negatives, and the open Assertion of her Liberty from the Encroachments of the Roman Court, and all her other Practices grounded on these Principles, were not avowed by her Ecclesiastical Governours for several Centuries before the Refor­mation. And in Answer hereunto I shall insist on the Heads already intimated. Therefore,

1. There was no reason to expect that her opposition to these Errors should have been Ancienter, though we should suppose the Errors themselves to have been so. For there was no reason to expect that Errors should have been discovered for some Ages before the Reformation, when there was so great a want of that kind of Grammatical and Historical Learning which is only fit to qualifie a Person to Judg of Ecclesiastical Tradition; at least, they were not likely to have been discovered by such a number as had been requisite to maintain an open opposition. And if the Errors had been discovered, yet it was not easie to expect suc­cess in holding out against the Court of Rome, which was then so very powerful, and there was no reason to expect such attempts from Prudent Persons where there was no probability of success. And there was yet least reason of all to expect this opposition from Bishops then, when no Bishops were made without the Popes consent, which he was not likely to give to such as were likely to oppose him; when, after they were made, they were obliged to be true to Him by express Oaths, as well as by their Interests of peaceable continuance, or hopes of future preferment; when, at least, it was impossible to resist their Fellow Bishops, the gene­rality of whom were, in all likelihood, swayed by these Preju­dices; when they had seen mighty Princes themselves worsted in those Contests, and the extreme Severity of that Court against Dissenters; when, lastly, differing from the Church of Rome in any thing was counted Heresie, and Heresie was prosecuted with the extremest Infamy (which must needs weaken the Authority of those Opposers with others) as well as other Penalties of the Canon Law. Nor,

2. Does the Justice of our Cause require a greater Antiquity for our Negatives: For,

  • 1. Our Negatives are not pretended to be of perpetual obligati­on, but only for preventing the malignity of the contrary [Page 18] Affirmative Articles to which they are opposed. And there­fore there is no reason to expect Formal Negatives opposed to Additional Articles from the beginning, before the Addi­tional Articles themselves were thought of; nor to expect a Reformation of Abuses before there were Abuses to be Re­formed, seeing that in course of Nature these Negatives pre­suppose the contrary Affirmatives, as a pretence of Reforma­tion must also presuppose Abuses. And therefore the pre­tence of the greater Antiquity of our Adversaries Errors and Abuses is so far from prejudicing the reputation of our Ne­gatives and Reformation, as that it is indeed the best Argu­ment of their Justice and Seasonableness. For such Negatives as these, and such a Reformation, must needs have been un­warrantable, if there had not been before Errors fit to be denied, and Abuses fit to be reformed. Nor,
  • 2. Is it any Prejudice to the Justice of our Cause, that these Errors were not opposed with formal Negatives as soon as they appeared. For such Errors as these were usually first received as the Opinions of private Persons before they were countenanced by Authority; and whilst they proceeded no further, there was not that mischief in them, nor conse­quently that obligation to oppose them, as when at length they came to be so countenanced. For the Errors of Pri­vate Persons, whilst they are no more, are not conceived so to oblige us to be of their mind, as that our silence should in any Prudence be expounded as an Argument of our consent; and consequently cannot be such a provocation to us to oppose them openly in our own Defence. Nor,
  • 3. Is it necessary to expect that there should have been an open opposition of them, even as soon as countenanced by Authority. For if even in the reproof of the miscarriages of private Persons, Christianity obliges us to proceed with all possible candor and modesty; we are certainly much rather obliged to proceed so in dealing with Persons of Authority. We should give them time to reflect, and we should bear with any Personal inconveniences that are not directly sin­ful; rather than occasion those disturbances which are usu­ally to be expected from a publick opposition of them. Nor is this forbearance more agreeable to reason, than to the sentiments of those Ages who were generally possessed [Page 19] with an excessive veneration for Authority, especially Eccle­siastical; so that there is reason to believe that they would bear with such Errors as long as the Abuses were tolerable, however otherwise inconvenient.
  • 4. Therefore that which makes these Errors intolerable to pri­vate Persons in dealing with Authority (for of such I speak) is the imposing and urging them as Conditions of Communion. And this might have been shewn to have been late, not before their Errors were defined and imposed in their Councils. And therefore it was but lately that any publick opposition was to be expected, even from them who were in their Consciences perswaded that our Adversaries Doctrines were Erroneous. And,
  • 5. When they were thus imposed, yet even then private Persons were concerned, in Conscience as well as Prudence, to forbear an open opposition, when there were no hopes of doing good, nay too probable fears of prejudicing their Cause by it for the future: when upon their opposition, they must have expected to have been condemned; when being con­demned, they were to be cast out of Communion; when being Excommunicated for such a Cause, others would have been deterred by their Example, and their credit must have been impaired by the Infamy incurred by the Canon-Law then in force, and their very condemnation would for the future mightily prejudice Mens minds against the like attempts, when none could revive the like true Doctrine without the disrepute of being supposed to revive an anci­ently-condemned Heresie; and when there were no hopes of being able to preserve themselves in opposite Assemblies without Bishops to Head them, without whom they could not maintain a Succession of Priests, nor consequently of Sa­craments, and the like employments and advantages of Ec­clesiastical Assemblies; and when no Bishops were likely to countenance such a design, whilst they were held in such captivity to the Court of Rome by Oaths as well as their other Worldly Interests, and when no Persons of a free in­genuous temper were likely to attain the honour of Episcopacy.

These Reasons, with a very easie Application, may suffice to shew that in an ordinary way there was no reason to expect the [Page 20] Reformation sooner than it was. And that there was no necessi­ty sufficient to oblige God to interpose to raise Men up to it Ex­traordinarily, will appear if it be considered,

  • 6. That it is not every necessity of the Church that can oblige God to use such Extraordinary means, but only such a neces­sity as must have destroyed a Church from the Earth, that is, such a Society of Men wherein Salvation might be at­tained by the ordinary Prescriptions of the Gospel. Now the prevalency of these Errors does not oblige us to acknow­ledg that such a Church as this must have failed even in those Ages wherein these Errors are supposed to have pre­vailed for some Centuries before the Reformation: For,
    • 1. Though the Occidental Church had failed, yet Christ might have had such a Church among the several Communions of the Orientals. And I know no greater inconvenience, in this regard, in admitting the faileur of the Occidental Church, than what our Adversaries themselves are obnoxious to, in admitting the like defection in the Oriental.
    • 2. The prevailing of these Errors does not oblige us to deny an ordinary possibility of Salvation according to the Prescripti­ons of the Gospel, even in the Church of Rome it self in those Centuries before the Reformation: For,
      • 1. We do not deny all Necessaries to Salvation, even according to the ordinary Prescriptions of the Gospel, to have been taught even then in the Church of Rome. The Errors we charge them with, are not of Defect, but Adding to the Original Articles of Faith. And therefore,
      • 2. If it may appear that the sin of Adding to the Faith was not (to such as were no farther accessary to it than by continu­ing in the Communion of such as were really guilty of it) so imputable ordinarily as to hinder the Salvation of such as were not otherwise wanting to themselves in their own Endeavours; or at least not in such a degree as to oblige God to interpose in an Extraordinary way for its Ordinary prevention: this will be sufficient to shew that (supposing those Errors so dangerous as we do indeed suppose them, yet) God was not obliged to raise up, and maintain a Com­munion in opposition to them for preventing the failing of such a Church as I have spoken of, even in these Western Parts. And that this was so, may appear from these Con­siderations: [Page 21]
        • 1. That that skill in Ecclesiastical Learning, by which our first Reformers were enabled to discover these Errors, was ge­nerally wanting in the Ages before the Reformation, which might make their mistakes then much more pardonable than now.
        • 2. That the great mischief of these Errors is, not so much the believing more for matters of Faith than really was so, as the mischievous Consequence of doing so, the Divisions of the Church necessarily following hereupon, the condemning of good Catholicks for Hereticks and Schismaticks, and excluding them from Communion, and hereby making the Peace of Chri­stendom impossible on any just and tolerable terms, and Abu­ses impossible to be Reformed. Which was not so imputable in those Ages when there was no visible Communion to be condemned by joyning with that of Rome; for as for the even unjust Excommunication of particular Persons, Provi­dence is not so concerned as to interpose Extraordinarily for their Prevention. This I say on Supposition that the Walden­ses and Albigenses, &c. were such as our Adversaries repre­sent them. If they were otherwise, then among them there was a Succession, for so long, of Churches holding our Do­ctrines before Luther.
        • 3. The Prudential Reasons now given might then generally excuse private Persons, and all such as were not accessary to the guilt of introducing those Errors (who were much the greater Part, and it is only for the greater Part that Provi­dence is necessarily concerned) from the guilt of not pub­lickly Reforming them. Yet even they are not so Excusable now, when the power of the Pope is so much decried, and there are so many Churches and Church-Governours, under whose Protection they may put themselves, and with whose Communion they may joyn, in opposition to them.

3. The Antiquity allowed to their Errors on this Supposition is not sufficient to justifie their Cause. For,

1. This Antiquity is not Primitive, but only of some later Ig­norant Ages. And the Unreasonableness of presuming Doctrines to have been Primitive only, because they were actually found embraced by the Church in later Ages, and of Prescribing on that account against a new Examination of them by immediate re­course [Page 22] to the Originals, might have been shewn from the Fa­thers as well as from the Protestants.

2. The Antiquity of those Notions of theirs, whereby they confine the Catholick Church to that part of it in the Roman Com­munion (which might have been proved Fundamental to all their other Doctrines, as they are made Articles of Faith and Con­ditions of Communion) is contradicted by the Oriental Churches generally, who are as ancient, and of as Unquestionable a Succes­sion, as the Church of Rome her self, and as ancient in teaching the contrary.

3. The utmost Antiquity which we allow for their unwarran­table Doctrines, is not so great as must be acknowledged (by all that will Judg candidly) for several, which on all sides are ac­knowledged to be Heretical, I do not only mean those of the Arians, but also of those great Bodies of the Oriental Historians and Eutychians, continuing to this day divided from the Roman Church; especially if they be really guilty of those Heresies which are charged on them; and they must by Romanists be held guilty of some, for Justifying their own Practice of condemning them.

4. Some of their present Decrees (particularly those concern­ing the admission of the Apoeryphal Books into the Canon, and re­ceiving Ʋnwritten Traditions with Equal Reverence with the Writ­ten Word of God) I doubt are not more anciently imposed, as Con­ditions of Catholick Communion, than the Council of Trent it self, which was since Luther. And both of these are very considerable, and especially the latter is very Fundamental to many of their other Decrees.

Q. 4. Why all the Reformed Churches are not Ʋnited in One?

I Presume the design of this Question is not so much a Curiosity to be informed, either of the Politick Reasons which in the Course of Second Causes might have an Influence on those Divisi­ons which were occasioned by the Reformation; or of those that might move God to permit Second Causes to act according to their Natural Inclination, without the Interposition of any Extraordi­nary restraint: but only to lay hold on that Advantage from our acknowledged Divisions, which they may seem to afford to the [Page 23] Prejudice of our common Cause. I shall therefore at present on­ly propose such things to the Gentlewomans Consideration, as may let her understand the weakness of this Argument (how Po­pular soever) when they conclude us either mistaken our Selves, or, at least, unfit to Guide others in the General Reformation; be­cause we are not all agreed in all the Particulars.

To this purpose it will be at present sufficient to insist on two things: 1. That there is no reason why the Romanists should upbraid Us with this Argument, and that it is their Interest, as well as ours, to Answer it: 2. That the Argument it self is of no force as it is used by them against us.

  • 1. There is no Reason why the Romanists should upbraid Ʋs with this Argument, and they, as well as we, are obliged to Answer it. For,

1. This very Argument was by the Primitive Heathens made use of against Christianity in General, as it is now against Us; and our Adversaries would do well to consider, whether the same Answers pleadable by themselves now in behalf of those Christi­ans, and actually pleaded by the Apologists then, be not as plead­able for Us now. Nay, this multitude of Sects in Christianity is even now the great Argument of Irreligious Persons against the Truth of Religion; and I cannot believe that any Piously dispo­sed Person among them, can be pleased to allow the Argument to be of any force in either Case, rather than want an Argu­ment against Us. Yet I believe they will never be able to shew any Disparity.

2. If they speak, not of Dividing Principles, but of actual Divi­sions, they, as well as we, have such among themselves. They have Divisions betwixt the Irish Remonstrants and Anti-Remonstrants, Molinists and Jansenists, as well as Thomists and Scotists, and Je­suites, some of which Parties are Divided as well in Communion as in Opinions. If they say that these Divisions are not the faults of their Opinions, but the particular perversity of Persons, who will not stick to those Principles which might keep them Ʋnited, when their Interest inclines them otherwise: the same will be pretended by every Dividing Party. If they think it Injurious that their whole Communion should be charged with the misdemea­nors of Persons condemned by it; We all of Us plead the same, for there is no Party that does not condemn all others in those things wherein they Divide from themselves.

[Page 24]3. If they think our Differences concerning the Particulars we would have Reformed, an Argument that the whole design of a Reformation is in it self Suspicious and Uncertain; let them con­sider what themselves do or can say, when they are, in the like way of Arguing, urged by Us with the several Opinions con­cerning the Seat of Infallibility; whence our Authors conclude the Uncertainty of the thing it self. It might easily have been shewn, upon this and the like Occasions, how they do, and are obliged to, acknowledg the Unreasonableness of this way of Ar­guing. But the designed Brevity of my present Employment on­ly permits me to point at the Heads of what might be said, not to enlarge on the Particulars.

4. It might have been shewn that these Differences among them concerning the Judg of Controversies, tend Naturally, and by due Rational Consequence, to the dissolution of their Communion, a Charge which we think cannot be proved against that which we believe the Right Communion.

  • 2. Therefore, to shew directly the weakness of this Argument, Let it be considered,

1. That whatever Differences they upbraid us with, yet they can never prove that they follow by any Natural and Rational Con­sequence from the General Principles of the Reformation, though possibly they may indeed have been occasioned by that Liberty of Spirit which was absolutely requisite for undertaking a design of such a Nature; as it must on all sides be acknowledged possible that things really good may notwithstanding prove occa­sions of Evil. And how very Unjust and Unreasonable it is to charge Personal Faults upon Designs (that is in this Case the faults of Reformers upon the Reformation) all, even the Romanists them­selves, will acknowledg, in Cases wherein they are disinteressed.

2. That, this being Supposed, all that they can conclude from these Divisions of the Reformers, is only, that no one Communion of the Reformers has that advantage over the rest as that, Ante­cedently to all Enquiry into the merit of the Cause, its Word is fit to be trusted as a Guide in Controversies, to assure any of its own Truth, and of the Error of all differing from it. This, if the Gentlewoman will observe, she will find that their Arguments from this and the like Topicks, only aim at. For because they challenge such a Priviledg themselves, they fancy Us to do so too; and that our design is not to overthrow a Judg of Controversies, but [Page 25] only to translate that Title from the Pope to Luther, or some others of our eminent Reformers, which is far from our design. But this difference in Opinion does not in the least prove, but that, upon a particular Enquiry into the merit of the Cause, one Party may be found to have the advantage of the other, which is all that we pretend to.

3. That this difference of the several Parties of the Reformation in other things, is rather a very strong Presumption (for an Igno­rant Person who must conduct her self by Presumptions) that there is great reason for those things wherein they are all agreed, and indeed is a greater Argument for the Credibility of the Reforma­tion in general, than for that of the Roman Communion. For to a dis-interessed Person the Agreement of those is a more valuable Argument for the Truth of what they say, who seem most of all acted by the merit of the things, and least of all influenced by the Opinions and Authorities of a few; and there can hardly be conceived a more considerable Argument of their freedom in Judg­ment, than their actual difference in other things. What therefore the Protestants are agreed in, seems more likely to be the real sense of all that are so agreed upon an Impartial Enquiry; whereas the Romanists are generally Influenced by a few of the Court of Rome, to whom the rest do generally conceive themselves obli­ged in Conscience to conform. And this advantage of the diffe­rences of Protestants for recommending their Credibility in other things, above that of their Adversaries, to the Trust of an Igno­rant Person, will appear the more remarkable, if it be considered,

4. That they are not only agreed in general in the fitness of a Re­formation, but also in most of the Particulars to be Reformed. Indeed if they were only agreed in general, that it were fit a Reformation should be, but agreed in no Particulars; it might seem too probable a Suspicion, that it was not Truth, but Faction, and the disturbance of the Publick, that was their common design. But that is far from being the Case here.

5. The Divisions of the Protestants in Doctrine are not so irrecon­cileable as they may seem. The Harmony of Confessions shews them agreed in the Principal. As for the others, it is plain that our Church of England does not think them worth contending for, whilst she admits the several Parties into her Communion; and if other Protestants think otherwise, yet She is not Responsible for them, because She is not of their mind. The most pernici­ous [Page 26] Principles of all, which most Naturally tend to Division, and which make the differences resulting from them most impossible to be reconciled, are the differences concerning Church-Govern­ment; and in that our Church has Innovated nothing that should cause any breach, even from the Roman, much less from any other part of the Catholick Church. And most of their other Differences are no longer Irreconcilable than the Persons are likely to continue averse to Reconciliation; but these Differences about Church-Govern­ment are so derived from the nature of the Things, as that they may Cause Division among Persons otherwise well meaning, and of a Peaceable Disposition.

6. This Argument from the Divisions of Protestants, is princi­pally proper for such as are not actually engaged in any particular Communion of them, and even to them ought to have no more force than that of a Prudent Presumption, till the Person so Pre­suming might have leisure to examine Particulars. But that seems not to be the Gentlewomans Case whom I suppose to have been hitherto educated in the Church of England, and to have had suffi­cient opportunities of Informing her self concerning us. For such a one it would sure be sufficient that our Church is no way guilty of these Divisions, whatsoever may be the Case of other Protestants.

Q 5. Why the Church of England doth not hold up to Confession, Fasting-days, Holy Oyl, which we our Selves commend?

IT is a mistake that the Questionist does suppose Us to commend Holy Oyl.

However we think all the Instances here mentioned lawful and indifferent, and so to be as obnoxious to the Prudence of particu­lar Church-Governours, as other things of that nature are by all acknowledged to be; and we shall conceive our Selves secure of the Gentlewomans Communion, if She will not alter till our Adversaries prove them necessary Antecedently to Church Autho­rity, which is more than they will as much as pretend to, at least, concerning some of them.

These things therefore being thus supposed, I shall propose two things to the Gentlewomans Consideration: 1. That suppo­sing We were to blame in omitting them, yet this were no ground for Her to leave our Communion: 2. That as far as they are not imposed by our Church, there was reason for their not imposing them.

  • 1. Supposing that we were indeed to blame in omitting these Ecclesiastical Observances, yet this would be no sufficient ground to excuse the Gentle­woman for leaving our Communion. For,

1. No Indifferent thing, how imprudent or inexpedient soever (and that is the highest Charge that the Churches mistake in a matter of this na­ture, is chargeable withal, as long as the Object is supposed of its own nature Indifferent) as long as it is not sinful (and certainly it can be no Sin to submit for Peace's sake to an imprudent Constitution) can excuse a departure from a Communion that is in other regards allowable.

2. Whatever a Separation on this account might be in others, yet it is less excusable in Subjects, who are no way Responsible for as much as the Imprudences of such Constitutions, and who are certainly bound to bear with all tolerable frailties of their lawful Governours, and who are not indeed so well qualified for Judging concerning them, as neither being so well skilled in Politicks generally, nor being made acquainted with the secret Reasons of such Constitutions, which might make that, which without them might seem strange, appear highly commendable when considered with them.

3. The Gentlewomans Sex, and possibly her particular Condition, may not have those Advantages which many others (though Subjects also) have for Judging concerning them.

These Arguments are so agreeable to the Principles of our Adver­saries themselves, as that they frequently make use of them for retain­ing Persons in their own Communion. Which the Gentlewoman may be pleased to take notice of, if any of her Tempters should Question them here, where they are disserviceable to their Interests. But farther,

4. Abuses in Governours acknowledging themselves Fallible (tho they be supposed indeed to be Abuses) are much more tolerable than in those who do not; seeing there may be hopes that Governours, acknowledg­ing themselves Fallible, may in time be better informed, and may then themselves reform what is amiss, without the compulsion of their Sub­jects; which can never be expected from such as pretend to be Infallible.

5. If Abuses of this Nature be conceived a sufficient Reason for lea­ving a Communion wherein we are already, much more are they suffi­cient for hindring our access to another, wherein as yet we are not. So that this same Reason, if it should make her desert the Communion of the Church of England, would also hinder her joyning in that of Rome, in which the most Judicious and Candid Persons of that Communion will acknowledg Abuses of the like nature.

  • 2. As far as these Omissions are countenanceed by our Church, there is reason for it.

I say [as far as they are countenanced by our Church] and therefore the reason I shall give for such Omissions shall be as they are considered under that Notion: 1. Therefore, for Fasting Days, I think they are imposed with the same design of Religion in our Church as in that of Rome (for that account of Jejunium Ceoilianum, which is given by some, is not taken for the true sense of our Church by her most genuine Sons) and that our Church is conceived to have as much Authority to oblige her Subjects in Impositions of that Nature, so that I cannot look on this disuse prevailing in Practice as countenanced by our Church. If the Gentlewoman be so zealously concerned for them, I am sure She may Practice them in our Communion, as well as in that of Rome, as several others do.

2. Confession, even to a Priest, in order to his Advice and Absolution, our Church, I think, owns as much as that of Rome; though we do not make it a Sacrament, nor make it absolutely necessary, in an ordinaey way, for the remission of every particular Sin, that it be particularly confessed. That the Practice of it is at present discontinued, our Church, I think, is not the Cause. That She has not interposed her Authority to continue it, might have been excused:

  • 1. Because the thing is only of Ecclesiastical Right. For the ancientest ob­ligation to confess Sins, tho scandalous in their own nature, yet not be­come notorious (tho that differed much from the Confession which is now used in the Roman Church) was first introduced after the Per­secution by Decius, and that in opposition to the Novatians, as Socrates affirms; and this was also afterwards taken away by Nectarius Bishop of Constantinople, who ordered every one to be left to his own Consci­ence in that matter, for which other Bishops were so far from cen­suring him, that they followed him in it almost in all places, as the same Historian tells us, and that omission was vehemently pleaded for by St. Chrysostom, and obtained for no small time in the Greek Church, whatsoever it did in other places. Whence it follows that She has power, in discretion, to determine concernining its actual practice what She thinks fit.
  • 2. Farther, this being supposed, that it was in our Churches power not to Impose it, that She did act prudently in not Imposing it, but rather recommending it to the Liberty of private Devotions, will appear, if it be considered that, if She had imposed it, She must necessarily have ex­cluded all such from her Communion as had not been satisfied with it; and it had not been Prudent to have excluded Persons from her Communion for Indifferent things avoidable by her, when She was complaining of the like Tyranny in the Church of Rome, especially [Page 29] considering that it was also likely that the number was great of those who were so dissatisfied with it.

However, if the Gentlewoman be desirous to Practice it for her own Edification, I believe She may be furnished with Persons fitted for it in the Church of England.

3. As for the use of Holy Oyl in any of the pretended Sacra­ments, we do not so far condemn it, as to refuse Communion with other Churches that use it; nay, we our Selves retain it as a de­cent Ceremony of Consecration in the Coronations of our Princes. Only we again conceive it,

  • 1. A matter indifferent in it self, and not Essential to those Offices, because of the differences in the Church concerning it.
  • 2. This being supposed, our Church does no way conceive it Pru­dent to continue it; both because it was the design of the Re­formation to reduce the Sacraments to their Primitive Simplicity, that so Persons might Communicate in them on the same free terms as then; and because the Errors of those who made them Essential to the Mysteries, were of great Consequence, and very fit to be so discountenanced by a discontinuance of the Practice it self.

If by the Holy Oyl here mentioned, he meant particularly their Sacrament of Extreme Ʋnction, 1. Our Adversaries cannot prove a Sacramental Ʋnction for the first Centuries. A Miraculous one they may, but seeing themselves confess the ordinary Use of the Mira­cle to have ceased, there is no necessary reason obliging our Church to continue the external Ceremony. This is at least sufficient to shew that it is in the Churches power to continue it, or not. Which being supposed, I add, 2. That even in regard of the benefit expected by it, whether of Bodily recovery, or remission of sins, or Spiritual strength against the Agony of Death, the Gentlewoman, nor any other Sub­ject of our Church, can suffer no loss by our Church's discontinuance of it. For all these things are as certainly attainable by the means continued in our Church from Unquestionable Apostolical Tradition (as the Prayers and Absolution of the Priest and the Blessed Sacrament) as they could by the Ʋnction it self; so that I cannot perceive how a devout Person need to be concerned for the want of it, on the terms now mentioned. Especially considering, 3. That in the way it is Administred among them, to Persons past hopes of recovery, and usually past sense of their own condition, it cannot be con­ceived in any rational way, capable of Edifying the Devotion of the [Page 30] Person concerned, and no other way is suitable to the Dispensation of the Gospel. And supposing it no Sacrament, there is no reason imaginable why the Prayers of the Assistants for such a Person may not be as acceptable to God, without the observation of this external Ceremony, as with it. And as upon these concessions its Continuance must needs appear unnecessary, so, 4. It would be inexpedient to countenance the Errors consequent to the Opinion of its being a Sacrament, which are of so weighty a concernment, by continuance of a Custom which may so easily be spared. These things may suffice at present for satisfying the Gentlewoman of her little concernment for it, without engaging on the Dispute concerning its lawfulness.

Now this Fundamental Principle of our Churches Proceedings in these and the like Particulars, concerning the power of the Church for Innovating from Ancient Customs, not only by Adding new ones, but Abrogating old ones, might have been proved not only from the Principles, but from several Practices of the Roman Church her self.

Q. 6. Why was Reformation done by Act of Parliament?

REformation may be considered two ways: Either,

1. As Preached and Imposed under pain of Spiritual Censures, and of Exclusion from the Communion of the Church, and a deprivation of all the Priviledges consequent to that Communion. And this is certainly the Right of the Church, and was according­ly practiced by the Church in our English Reformation:

2. As Enacted as a Law of the Land, and consequently as urged the same way as other Laws are, under Temporal Penalties, and Exter­nal Coercion, and encouraged by Temporal Advantages. And this is undoubtedly the Right of the Secular Power. And this was all in which the Secular Power did concern it self in the Reformation.

What I can further foresee in favour of our Adversaries is, that 1. The Secular Power ought in Conscience to be herein advised by the Ecclesiasticks: and, 2. That though external obedience may be paid to the mistaken Decrees of the Secular Power following the mistaken part of the Ecclesiasticks, yet the Obligation (in Consci­ence and Right) of such Decrees must be derived from the Ju­stice of the Churches proceedings in advising the Magistrate; so that no Act of the Magistrate can make amends for any Essential defect in the proceedings of the Church. But the only Effect of the Ma­gistrates [Page 31] concurrence in that Case is, that what is already per­formed without Heresie or Schism in the Church, may be by that means setled in such a particular Commonwealth without Schism or Sedition in the State. And therefore seeing they suppose that at the Reformation the greater number of the Bishops then being, were overawed and deprived of the Liberty of their Votes by the Se­cular Magistrate, and it is the nature of all Societies to be swayed by the greater Part; therefore they may think it unreasonable to ascribe the Reformation to the Church of England, but only to a Schismatical part of it; so that the Magistrate having attempted this Reformation without warrant from the Church, they think they do well to call our Reformation it self Parliamentary.

To this therefore I Reply, 1. That the use we make of this Topick of the Magistrates concurrence, is indeed no other than to clear our Reformation from being Seditious, which is ordinari­ly charged on Us by our Adversaries, and much more ordinari­ly on the Foreign Protestants.

2. That for clearing the very proceedings of the Magistracy from being Heretical or Schismatical, to the Conscience of the Magistracy it self, it is sufficient that the Magistracy gave its Assi­stance and Protection to no other Church, but such as, at least, ac­cording to the genuine Dictate of their Conscience, was neither Heretical nor Schismatical. But this Justification of the private Con­science of the Magistracy is, I confess, a thing we are at present not so necessarily concerned for; and therefore,

3. We grant farther, that for satisfying our own Consciences of the Justice of these proceedings of the Magistracy, it is requi­site that we be satisfied that they were Advised by that part of the Clergy, whose Advice we conceive they ought to have follow­ed. So that if this may appear in the Case we are speaking of, this, and this alone, will be a sufficient Vindication of the Magi­strates proceedings to the Consciences of his Subjects.

4. Therefore the Determination of the Justice of the Advice followed by the Magistrate, may be resolved two ways: Either from the merit of the Cause; or from the Legal Authority and Right the Persons may be presumed to have to be consulted on such occasions. As for the former, it is in the present Case the princi­pal Dispute, Whether the Reformation undertaken by the Magi­strate, was right or not? and therefore very unfit to be relyed on as a Presumption to prove the Magistrates proceedings Irregular. The later therefore only is proper to be insisted on here. And it con­sists [Page 32] of two charges: That by the Laws of the Land the Magi­strate ought to have been advised by the Bishops then possessed of the several Sees; and, That in advising with the Clergy, whoever they were, he ought to have allowed them the Liberty of speak­ing their minds, and to have been swayed by the greater part. These things are conceived so necessary, as that the Magistrate not observing them, may be presumed to act as no way influenced by the Clergy. Which is the Reason why they call our Reformation, wherein they suppose them not observed, Parliamentary.

  • 1. Therefore as to the Legal Right of the Popish Clergy to advise the Secular Magistrate, two things may be Replied:

1. That this Legal Right may be forfeited by the Persons by their Personal misdemeanors, and of this forfeiture the Secular Magistrate himself is the proper Judg; and that this was exactly the Popishs Bishops Case at that time.

2. That the consideration of this Legal Right is of no use for satisfying the Consciences of their Subjects, which yet is the only use that is seasonable for this occasion.

  • 2. As for the Canonical freedom to be allowed them in advising, and the obligation of the Magistrate to follow the advice of the greater part: These Canonical Rights can only satisfie the Consciences of their own Communion, but cannot be pretended necessary to be obser­ved, where there are different Communions. For,

1. The Romanists themselves never allow that freedom to Per­sons out of their Communion, as was plain in the Council of Trent, and still appears on all occasions.

2. Especially in particular National Churches, as ours was, they themselves will not deny that the greater part may prove Hereti­cal, and therefore likely to prevail by Plurality of Votes; in which Case themselves would notwithstanding think it unequal for the Magistrate to be swayed by them.

3. This has always been the Practice of the Church, and the Catho­lick Emperors, never to allow any Canonical Right to the Assemblies and Censures of Hereticks, as Athanasius was restored first by Maxi­minus Bishop of Triers, then by Pope Julius, after that by Maximus Bishop of Jerusalem, and at last by the Emperor Jovinian, without any Canonical revocation of the Synods that had condemned him. Many Instances of the like Nature might be given.

4. The Popish Clergy had given the first Precedent of this Liber­ty themselves, in refusing to admit of the Canonical Appeal of the Protestants from the Pope to a free General Council.

FINIS.

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