BY your last I perceive, that You and Others you have conversed with in the Country, are strangely amused with the Conventions called by the Prince of Orange, in both Kingdoms, not knowing by what Authority they are cal­led, or what their Nature and Power can be, seeing they are alien from all the Courts and Judicatures of the King­doms, without any mention of them, or warrant for them in Law, and thereby they can be capable to do no­thing Authoritatively, or warrantably: You do suppose that I being upon the place can be able to give you a bet­ter account of them then doth occur to your Apprehensi­on: I am very willing to satisfie your desire in a matter of so great and common a Concern, as far as my Reach can go: For these Conventions can most properly expli­cate their own Power.

I shall endeavour to clear to you, what the Nature of these Conventions are, and what Power I conceive them to have, and by what Warrant they are called.

You must then consider, that in all Common-wealths constitute by Men, there must be two Contracts and [Page 2]Agreements, Express, or Tacit, by Word, or Deed; One amongst these Families who unite themselves into one Bo­dy Politick, whereby they are incorporate, and become one People, and for distinctions sake this may be called the Popular Contract: The other is between the Soveraign Power and the Body Politick, which two makes up the Common-wealth, and settle the Government of it in such Person or Persons, and with such Powers as they agree; this may be called the Rectoral Contract, by which the Soveraign Power is to govern and protect the People in all their Rights, and whereby they become Subjects ob­liged to Obey.

The Popular Contract must have been entered by the Fathers of the Families incorporated, for before the E­rections of Common-wealths there was no other Govern­ment amongst Men, but the Patriarchal Government of the Fathers of Families, over their Wives of sp [...]ing and Servants, which was no less extensive while the Fathers lived, during so many hundred of years, than many civil Societies that now be, and comprehended all Authority, Sacred, Civil, and Criminal, and contained not only Power over the Familes, but also an obligation imposed of God to exercise these Powers, whereof their Fathers could not lawfully exoner themselves, and lay that Bur­den or any part of it upon others, unless there had been a Divine Institution allowing it, and though the precise time of that Institution be not expressed in Scripture, as neither is the Institution of Sacrifices, yet both of them are acknowledged in Scripture, and the Institution of a Publick Judgment, and of Civil Powers, are clear from the 13th Chapter of the Romans, The Powers that be are ordained of God, and he that resisteth the Power resisteth the Ordinance or Institution of God. The Jewes (who of all Nations had the clearest Records of time) did attribute the Institution of a Publick Judgment to the Precepts or [Page 3]Laws of God delivered to Noah, and by his Posterity pro­pagated thorow the World; by which, they judged all in their Territories that were not Israelites; whereof you may have a full account by the learned Treatise of Mr. Sel­den.

The Divine Institution of a Publick Judgment which is the Original of both the forementioned Contracts, is in God's Wisdom and Goodness so sufficient and full, that thereby not only all things clear by the Law of God, or the consistent Laws of Men could be effectuated, but all doubtful things that could be controverted within the Common-wealth might be determined, without necessity of any Sedition, Tumult, or Intestine War, and conse­quently private Judgment behoved so far to cede to that Publick Judgment, as to submit to it, even when Erroni­ous, if the matter were dubious, seeing God did not appoint Infallible Judges which yet cannot be extended to things clearly contrary to the Agreement and Constitu­tion of Common-wealths, otherwise all Contracts be­twixt Soveraign and Subject, and all Constitutions and Goverments thence arising were Elusory, making Sove­raigns only punishable by God for the breach of them, but stating no Right of Exaction in the People insnared by them, instead of Subjects to become Slaves: Seeing Soveraigns might securely take their Lives, Liberties, and Goods at their Pleasure, which no considering un­byassed Person can imagine to have been the purpose of God in Instituting a Publick Judgment, God did Insti­tute the Power of this Publick Judgment, but not the Persons that were to exercise it, or the manner how it was to be exercised, but left these free to be constituted by Men; and therefore St. Peter calls it a humane Con­stitution or Creation.

From this Divine Institution arose Civil Societies in Common-wealths, the Powers and Duties of Soveraigns and Subjects, and the just measures of Soveraignty and Liberty, and the Constitution of Common-wealths, by the fore-named Contracts.

The Popular Contract is always in Nature, and some­times in Time, anterior to the Rectoral One: By it the Fathers of Families engaged each to others for themselves, and their Families, to keep Commerce together, and to concur in Defence and Vindication of their Rights, by the direction of the Soveraign Power that should be agreed to be set over them, by the Suffrage of the plurality of the Fathers of these Families, who before could not be obliged by a Plurality, but only by their own Consent; ninety nine could not engage the hundredth person, thô all met and conferred together, till they agreed that the plurality should be as effectual as the whole, whether it were one plurality, or several pluralities of several States; for it cannot be presumed that these who were Noble and Rich, would agree to have no more than an equal Suffrage with meaner Citizens; unless some great neces­sity or advantage could induce them; nor that the Poor that could not bear Burden in the Common-wealth, should be admitted as Citizens, nor Servants, nor even Sons in their Fathers Families, during their Lives, thô by him they did then enjoy Priviledges, and after all of them succeeded to him as Citizens; yet by making them equal in Power with himself, he should have lost his Pa­ternal Power of Governing them: And there may be, and have been many other Restrictions and Qualifications of Citizens; all the rest, tho' Sbjects, being but Incolae, or Inhabitants: Citizens have always some share in the Government, either by their proper Birth right, or by being represented by Election. All the Kingdoms of [Page 5]Christendom, after the Fewdal Right prevailed, gave none share in the Government, but those that had the Right of considerable Lands within the Limits of the Common-wealth, whether belonging to singer Persons, or to Incorporations, except in Denmark or Sueden; and Laws were made, and Taxes imposed by Emperours and Kings, with the Advice and Consent of the Plurality of all these in one Assembly, or of diverse States in separate Assemblies; of the Prelates of the Church, for Church-Lands; and of the other Barons, for the Temporal Lands; and of Delegates, representing Incorporations, for the Lands belonging to them in common; but after­wards the Barons being multiplied, the minor Barons were all allowed to be represented by Commissioners E­lected by them.

The Sovereign Power was at first stated in Kings and Princes, who were very many, every considerable City making a several Common-wealth; whereof multitudes are mentioned in Scripture: These Princes were Leaders of their Armies, and Judges of their Controversies, in their own Persons, without Deputation, till the Com­mon-wealths swelled to that greatness. That as Jethro advised Moses, they found it necessary to have subordi­nate Deputies for smaller Matters, and afterwards even for the greater, without appeal to themselves, who o­therwise would be overwhelmed with Affairs Civil and Military; yet so that the Malversation of these subor­dinate, might be punished by the Soveraign Power, or by such as were delegated for that purpose.

In the diffusive Kingdoms of the Assyrians, Babyloni­ans, Persians, and Medes, their Kings could hardly be restrained, because their Subjects could not Convein as in the lesser Common-wealths; and many of them were not united by Popular Contracts, and so were not one Body Politick.

The Excesses of Monarchs gave the rise to Aristocracy, where the Soveraign Power was in the Plurality of more Per­sons; and Democracy, where the Power was in so great a number, that they could not deliberate together; that what was said ought to be heard by all: Yea, all these former came for the most part to be regulated by general Laws, to be made with the Advice and Consent of others; then these that were in the Soveraign Power.

In the Athenian Democracy the People could not deli­berate, but in those things that were advised by their Prae­consultores, whose Advice, but not their Consent, was required.

The Romans in their Popular Estate, could make no Laws, unless they were con veined by a Senatorian Magi­strate, or Tribune of the People, and in most things the Authority of the Senate behoved to proceed.

All the Kings in Christendom by a long tract of time made no general Laws, but by consent of their Estates, being conveined by themselves, or their Deputies; tho' some have pretended that they were only called to give their Advice: But the constant stile of their Laws, and their frequent Declarations evince, that not only their Advice, but their Consent was necessary.

I crave your Pardon that I have so long continued in Generals: But you will find it was necessary for resolving your Doubts. These Conventions then of the two King­doms, are Representatives of the Body Politick of the re­spective Kingdoms, such as might have been before these Bodies Politick, entered in a Rectoral Contract with the first of the Kings of the Race that now Reigneth, and they are no Judicial or Authoritive Judicatures; and I suppose, will claim no Power to make Laws, to judge Persons, or to impose Taxes: Neither are they any of [Page 7]the Judicatures of the Common-wealth, deriving Autho­rity from a Soveraign Power; but do proceed by the Judgment of Discretion, not as they are Subjects or Parts of the Common-wealth; but as they are the Parties Con­tracters with their Kings, and their Race; as to which Contract they were, and must be considered as unsubor­dinate; for they were not Subjects in that Contract, nor their Kings Sovereigns, but by and after that Contract; and therefore they have the same native and inherent Right to deliberate, and resolve how far they were ob­liged by that Contract, and how far the present King hath observed or violated the same: and therewith, the Constitution of the Kingdoms, and the Laws and Li­berties of the Subject, and what they may justly and warrantably declare thereupon, in this extraordinary Conjuncture; wherein the Body of the Nation hath arisen against the Actings of the King, having volunta­rily concurred with the Prince of Orange, who upon the Invitation of many, as the sence of the most, came with an Army to encourage them to appear for themselves; which they did, before any Act of Hosti­lity by him, or his coming near to the Places where they rose in Arms, and declared for him, upon the Grounds of his Declaration: So that even his Army, tho' far the stronger, would not assist the King in that Cause, but the most of them joyned with the Prince. So that the King being left to his liberty, removed be­yond Sea, sheltering himself under the Wings of the most eminent Oppressor of Protestants. I hope this will give you light to consider what is the nature of these Conventions.

The next Point is, What Power these Conventions have, and what they can warrantably do. I have shewn you what I think they should not do; now I shall tell [Page 8]you what I think they may do. 1. They are the Re­presentatives of a Body Politick, which by the Popular Contract uniting therein, may judge who are Mem­bers of the Meeting, and by the Plurality of the Lords, and of the Commons of England, in their distinct As­semblies, may over-rule the minor part of those who meet, sufficient intimation being made to all, or of the Estates of Scotland, in their meeting joyntly.

Secondly, They may resolve whether the Constitu­tion of the Kingdom, and the Rectoral Contract, whence it arose, be violated on the King's part, and may agree upon the several violations. I shall not insist on all, but shall give some eminent examples; as first, They may declare, whether the King hath violated the Constitution, by assuming a Dispensing Power over the Laws of the Nation, and that his Judges in his view, if not by his in­stigation, have by a solemn Sentence declared, That he may dispense with Law, even in the Case of Propriety, accruing to a private Person, from a Statute of Parlia­ment: And that those Judges who dis-assented, were thereupon immediately removed; yea, the same hath been fully and publickly declared, by his Publick De­claration in Scotland, That He is an Absolute Monarch, to whom Obedience is due in all things, without reserve. By these the Constitution of both Kingdoms is totally overturned, for they are beyond question Legal Monar­chies, Regulated by Laws made by the Consent of the Representatives of the Kingdoms assembled in Parlia­ment. And if these Sentences and Declarations were ef­fectual, they would be Arbitrary Monarchies, governa­ble without the necessity of any general Law, with, or without the Consent of the Houses, or States of Parlia­ment; which is a greater violation of the Constitution, then if the Monarchy had been turned into an Aristo­cracy [Page 9]or Democracy, for there is far less importance in the Persons that Govern, than in the Power of Gover­ning.

Thirdly, There is nothing more contrary to the Go­vernment of England, than to overturn the Constituti­on of the Parliament, by manifest corruption of the Ele­ction of Members to serve therein, in overturning the Constitution of the Cities and Burroughs, in annulling the Charters of some upon pretended Malversation of these in the Magistracy, tho' it was not in the Power of the Incorporation to restrain them; so that the Magi­strates themselves were only punishable; that if they were removed, the Incorporation might name others. And by seducing and threatning those who had Power to Elect in the Counties, Cities, and Burroughs, if they did not first give assurance to Elect such Deputies, as would consent to take away the Test and Penal Laws against Papists. Hence many of the Cities, and Bur­roughs, seeing what became of their Neighbours, did thorough fear deliver up their Charters without Senten­ces; and such whose Charters were taken away, had new ones, of Persons to be in their Magistracy and Coun­cil, wholly depending on the King; that the House of Commons, whereof the far greatest part consists of the Deputies of Cities and Burroughs, might be packed at the King's pleasure, and the whole House in danger to be corrupted by these prepossessions; never attempted by any King of England, and destructive of the Consti­tution of Parliament, and to the Security of the Sub­jects.

Fourthly, There is nothing more contrary to the Con­stitution of England, than to be governed by the Sword, and Martial Law; yet the King raised and kept a stand­ing Army of a great strength, which did bear down the King­dom, [Page 10]until the Prince of Orange put them in capacity to Rise for their Vindication, and many Persons were Exe­cuted by Martial Law.

Fifthly, As the former Violations were of the very Constitution, so the most important Law of the King­doms, for securing the Religion therein Established by Law, was openly and atrociously violated; by which Law Papists were made incapable of all Publick Trust, Ecclesiastick, Civil, or Military; and yet not only they were put in Vacancies; but Protestants frequently put out, that they might be put in, and none left in Pub­lick Trust, who being required, would not give assu­rance to concur in abolishing the Penal Laws against Papists; whereby at once the Law excluding Papists was acknowledged as needing a Repeal, and yet was commonly and knowingly broken without the same.

Sixthly, The Violations of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Scotland (designed as a leading Preparative to England) were yet more gross and palpable: First, by an Act of the Parliament holden in the Year 1685, the King was declared an absolute Monarch, to whom O­bedience is due without reserve; which could not fail if it were effectual to overturn the Constitution and Go­vernment of that Kingdom, from being a legal Monar­chy, regulated by Laws, made by the Consent of the Estates in Parliament, into a Despotick or Arbitrary Mo­narchy, wherein the King might command all things to be done at pleasure, even though they were in themselves unlawful, there being nothing reserved. But the most be­nign Construction could not bring it lower, then to im­port Active Obedience in all things that were not in themselves unlawful; so that if the whole Parliament were commanded to resign the Parliamentary power in the Kings hands, that there should never be another, it [Page 11]were no less lawful to them to do so, then to consent to that Act, which was obtained of them, which no man can think could proceed upon any other Ground, then that they were all in Terrour to be reached for their Lives and Fortunes by Converse with these who had been in Rebellions, whereof there were known and dreadful Examples. Or if a Corporation or City should be com­manded to resign their Charters, or Priviledges; or if all, or any of the Subjects should be commanded to re­sign their Estates or Dignities in the King's Hand, and become Tenants at Will: They might lawfully do these things, though they were very Inconvenient, and there­fore by that Act they were bound to Obey.

May not then a Convention of the Estates of that Kingdom consider and resolve, whether such an Act were in the Power of a Parliament, or if it were in itself simply null, without the necessity of a Repeal upon this Consideration, that the Parliamentary Power is founded upon the Constitution of the Kingdom, and therefore every part of it is a Fundamental Law, and a part of the Rectoral Contract betwixt the King and the body Politick of the Kingdom, which contract was not with the Parlia­ment, and therefore could not be changed without the consent of the parties who entered in it by a more special Warrant, then that general one of the Deputies for Shires or Burroughs. Is there any so impudent as to pretend that the States could effectually resign in the King's hands all the Lands of the Kingdom? Or that he with their Concurrence could alienate the Kingdom, or subjugate it to become a Province subordinate to another Kingdom; or could they turn it to a Democracie? In a legal regu­lated Monarchy no general Command can be given, but what is warranted by a general Law, though Commands may be given severalty in every Cotroversie; for though [Page 12]it be said that Subjects ought to obey their Sovereigns in all things lawful; it is only to be understood of what is lawful by the Constitution, and Laws made thereupon, and not that which is licit, not being prohibited by God, otherwise it were applicable to no Government, but that which is Despotick, and could command all the Services the Subjects were capable to do, and all their Goods and Estates. It is a Childish pretence from the command in the Gospel, to Wives to obey their Husbands; Children their Parents, in all things, to extend it to all Monarchs, unless Natural Affections betwixt Parents and Children, and the Incommunicable Affection betwixt Husband and Wife were infused in Soveraigns and Subjects, and though they could, these general Commands are only in relation to the Domestick Society, and the Government thereof, and not to the property of the Wife and Children, nor could the Husband thereby command the Wife to become a Slave, he remaining free, or to renounce her Joynture.

There is another Act procured by the King when Duke, for taking a Test, which is very good as to the Religi­on, and for excluding Papists; but there is thereto ad­jected an Oath, Declaring it unlawful for Subjects upon a­ny Pretence whatsever to Convocate, Convene, or Assemble in any Councils, Conventions, or Assemblies, to Treat, Con­sult, or Determine in any Matter of State, Civil, or Eccle­siastick, without His Majesties Command, or Express Li­cence had thereto. This overthrows all the Ordinary Judicatures, Civil, or Ecclesiastick in the Kingdom, which meet by a Warrant of Law, without necessity of a special Command or Licence; and thereby doth evident­ly and heavily encroach upon the Constitution of the Kingdom. There follows another Clause in the said Act, declaring, That there is no Obligation to endeavour to alter the Government as it is now Established in Church [Page 13]and State, which was not only imposed on these in Pub­lick Offices, and upon Members of Parliament, but up­on all those who had Vote in Elections of Members to Parliament, whereby many were excluded, conceiving themselves obliged to endeavour some alterations in the Government, either by Divine Right, or by Oaths, they were commanded to take, both by King Charles the first, and second, being personally present in Parliament, and with the consent of the Estates, and though there had been no such hindrance, it was an alteration of the Con­stitution, whereby all Freeholders of the King of any considerable Land, Estate, had a Share in the Go­vernment, by their Birth right, in being capable to E­lect, and to be Elected Members of Parliament. And when this King came to the Crown, he did extend this Oath by an Act of his first Parliament to all Landed-men, whatever the Tenor or Extent of their Lands were, they be­ing Protestants, whereby Papists were excepted. Might not this Meeting of the Estates consider and resolve whe­ther these parts of that Act were beyond the ordinary Parliamentary Power, and a Violation of the Constitu­tion, and so null without Repeal: In all the Zeal against Popery, no King or Parliament did by any Act exclude the Electors in Shires or Burroughs, nor was there a­ny such thing in England, though their Test was only made for preservation of the Protestant Religion, and ex­cluding Papists from Publick Trust; albeit in both King­doms Papists are excluded by Desuetude.

Seventhly, In both Kingdoms Justice run in the Chan­nel of the Ordinary Judicatures Established by Law, that nothings can be done amiss, for which there are not some persons accountable; yet by an Act of the Parliament of Scotland, held by this King when Commissioner for his Brother, it is declared, That all Government and Juris­diction [Page 14]doth Originally reside in the King, and that the Offi­ces and Jurisdiction bestowed by him are not privative of his Jurisdiction; and therefore in a dutiful and humble Recogni­zance of His Majesties Royal Right and Prerogative as to this Point, it is declared, That notwithstanding these Ju­risdictions and Offices, His Majesty may by himself or any Commissioned by him, take Cognizance and Decision of any Ca­ses or Causes he pleases. Enervating the Power of the Or­dinary Judicatures, and giving ground to pick out Com­missioners for every Cause, as the Parties are favoured, which breeds a general distrust in the Nation, and was the ground of making the Officers of the Army, Sheriffs, and Justices, who acted not only with, but without, and contrary to the Ordinary Judges, and Justices, though they had neither Skill nor Will to do Justice, but did commit these Insolencies under that pretence, which are mentioned in the Prince's Declaration for Scotland: May not then the Meeting of the Estates in Scotland resolve whether this Act be a Violation of the Constitution? and if so, whether it be void in it self without a Repeal? These of that Nation who are acquainted with the matter of Fact, might shew many more Encroachments upon the Constitution and Laws of that Kingdom; but I only men­tion some of these I read in publick printed Records.

If these and such Violations be found, the next point is, what that Meeting may do thereupon, whether they may not declare themselves free of Subjection to the Violator, or any of his Race begotten since these Violations: Upon this Consideration, that the Rectoral Contract betwixt him and the Body Politick of these Kingdoms represented in these Conventions, doth by the Nature of a Mutual Con­tract necessarily imply, that if the one Party violate his part of the Mutual Engagements, the other Party hath two Remedies, he may at his Option cither force the [Page 15]Failer to perform, or declare himself for ever free of that Contract; as to the Failer, it is true, that by the Law or Custom of some Common wealths, if the Failer purge the Failure while his Party is in Suit, he may be reinstated, which is not by the Nature of a Mutual Contract, and therefore 'tis never pretended in the Mutual Contracts of Kings and States; and though sometimes Subjects after such Violations have declared themselves willing to con­tinue in subjection, that was an Act of Favour, not of Ju­stice or Debt: But after a Dispensing Power above Law is assumed and asserted, nothing can be said or done which it cannot as easily surmount, as it hath the Laws made, and Oaths already taken, even though the Dis­pensing Power itself should be disclaimed; it can as easi­ly dispence with that Disclamation, as what was either Law, or promised before: If then these Meetings shall declare themselves, and the Body Politick free, Can they in Justice but declare, the Crown to be devolved upon the Princess of Orange, and in Justice, Gratitude, and Re­muneration, they, cannot but declare, that the Matrimo­nial Crown belongs to the Prince of Orange, during all the days of his Life, for it is inconsistent with Royalty to be for less time then Life, and so to see a King of Britain re­lapse into a Prince of Orange again, and how Incongruous and Ungrateful were it to force him, who hath delivered Britain to leave it, or staying there to become a Subject to his Wife; for though a Queen in possession superindu­cing a Husband may justly be strictly dealt with, as Phi­lip of Spain by Treaty, was excluded from any Act of the Government, with Queen Mary, tho' he had the Title of King, which he was to leave after her Death, even tho' his Child by her should succeed: It imports nothing to this Case, where the Princess was first a Wife, and then a Queen, Married to the nearest Male to the Crown, and [Page 16]the Case being so contingent and unlikely, 'tis not to be thought the Princess of Denmark will grudge at it, for if he had not come, neither of the three were like to have enjoyed the Crown. When Ferdinand of Arragon mar­ried the Queen of Castile, he assum'd the Matrimonial Crown of Castile, both in her Life, and after her Death, tho' he had Children by her. The Courtesie both of Scotland and England, gives the survivancy of the Estate of Wives Inheritance to their Husbands, during their Life; and tho' Custom hath restricted it to the Case of a Child born in the Marriage, without requiring that Child to survive the Marriage; which might have im­ported a rational Consideration, to prefer the surviving Child in the Mother's Inheritance to her Husband; yet that not being required, there is no ground to extend it to Soveraigns.

These Conventions have yet a further Power and Use: That seeing the ordinary Parliamentary Power can alter nothing in the Constitution, without a further Warrant from the Body Politick; these Meetings may give War­rant to establish a Liberty of Conscience in a just latitude, as the Parliament shall judge reasonable; and may also give Warrant for an Act to exclude a Popish Successor, wherein the Sovereign Power shall also concur. These Acts will be Irrepealable, and Unalterable, without the like Warrant of the Body Politick, being convened with the consent of the King, for the time; which will give very much ease to the minds of good People, and also give much security against Popery. The House of Commons past several Votes to exclude a Popish Successor, which came not to perfection, and was not designed to exclude the apparent Heir of the Crown, being Popish, and born; in which case it is dublious whether it could be done with­out consent of that apparent Heir. But there can be no que­stion [Page 17]that it may be done by the King and Parliament, war­ranted by these Conventions, tho' it exclude Collaterals, & Heirs not yet existent. Albeit Queen Mary and Elizabeth were excluded to succeed to the Crown by their Father, and a Parliament, yet they both succeeded, and neither they nor the Parliament, found the necessity of a Repeal, in respect these Acts were in themselves void, as changing the course of Succession, by an ordinary Parliamentary Power. Likewise, these Meetings may give Warrant to Unite the two Kingdoms, which the ordinary Parliamen­tary Power could not reach to, unless it were confirmed or consented to after the Act made, by the Body Politick, for the Uniting of the Kingdoms is certainly an alterati­on of both, making two Politick Bodys one, and ma­king one Crown for two; but can well be done, if these Two Conventions give Warrant for it. And there appears a general inclination, as well as conveni­ency in both Nations, more than ever before.

I shall not be much difficulted now to shew, by what Authority these Conventions are called: The Meetings of the ordinary Judicatures are determined by Law and Custom, and any other way of Meeting is declared Ille­gal. But there is no determination of the Calling or Meeting of these extraordinary Conventions; and therefore whatever way they meet, they are valid, o­therwise they are not possible; and yet they are in ma­ny Cases undeniably necessary; as if the Race of the Kings should fail, or that a King should be a Child, or become fatuous, or furious, or should absolutely desert, or renounce the Kingdom. In none of these Cases could there be a Parliament called, till first there were a Pro­tector or Regent named, which only could be made by such Conventions; but a Protector where there is a King of Age and Discretion, is without Rule or Example; [Page 18]and therefore these Conventions must either declared themselves Free, or they must remain the King's Subjects, and be obedient to all his Commands, according to Law; they cannot mids the matter. Can any have so good an Interest to call these Conventions, as the Prince of Orange who is the nearest Male, and the Husband of the nearest Female to the Crown, who hath put the Kingdoms in Capacity to hold such Meetings, and de­clare their just Rights?

It is like some upon real Affection to the Prince, and others upon that Pretence, but upon intention to shake the Monarchy, and to make way for a Common-wealth, may make use of some Matters of Fact that have hapned in either Kingdom prejudicial to the Lineal Succession, which cannot infer a Right against the frequent Declara­rations of Kings and Parliaments, nor is like to be ac­ceptable to the Prince, not only from his Affection to so Excellent a Princess, but from his Declaration in which he has set her Interest before his own.

I hope I shall not need to give you further trouble, seeing the Event by the Conventions Resolutions will quickly appear, and cannot admit of delay; and there­fore shall only add, that I am