§. 1.

HE that will endeavour to make the yoke of government more easie, by setting a people loose from the restraints of positive lawes, upon pretence, The cause upon which men are mis-led to a desire of Inno­vation. they may justly use their na­tive liberty, and resume their originall pow­er, if civill constitutions, which were a­greed upon for their good, be not effectuall to that end, but prove disadvantageous to them, shall be sure to meet with many favourable Readers. Because the greater part of mankinde, as in other matters, so in this present case, are easily prevailed upon, to make a truce with conscience, and eagerly to prosecute what appeares most profitable. And the chiefest cause of our miseries is, that they do not rightly appre­bend what is truely advantageous. For States are framed upon a sinister opinion of men, they suppose most (as it doth com­monly fall out) will be dishonest, yet if they be not unwise, and suffer themselves to be carried on, as against conscience, so a­gainst interest also, a Kingdome cannot want plentifull meanes of subsisting, of flourishing. The ground of these unhappy mi­stakes, (which makes them advance publique ruine, wherein all single men will be lost, while they are vainely encouraged by deceiving hopes of being private gainers) can be no other [Page 2] but this. They rule their actions and desires but by one syllo­gisme, and looke upon the immediate consequence, which is a satisfaction of some particular ends, and serving some present turne, and have not ordinarily so much depth of understanding, as to be able to discerne the future evils, which will inevitably spring from the same fountaine. They are not capable of that good counsell of Polybius, Non tantùm praesentia spectare, sed & futura prospicere, & quis exitus inde futurus sit. The bait onely is visible to most, and accordingly the reall goods which are promised by innovation (for no government being free from all evill, therefore every proposall of change is easily bai­ted with some good) are entertained with delight, but once unwarily swallowed, they become hookes in the entralls It happens to most men, that they behold the children (as of their bodies, so) of their opinions; but the grandchildren of their tenents:

The further removed consequences (though allyed in a right line) they have not strength of reason to dis­cover. Quis (que) nascitur liber, 1. False, because all are subject by na­ture to pater­nall power, and consequently to the supreame Magistrate, to whom divine law confirmes the severall powers which Fathers re­signed up. 2. If true, it con­cludes not for them, because out naturall li­berty is restrai­ned by con­sent.

To instance in two maine principles, by which the seduced multitude hath beene tempted to catch at empty happinesse, and thereby have pulled upon themselves misery and destru­ction.

The first is a doctrine craftily instill'd into the mindes of the people, upon no other foundation then a mistake, in the mean­ing of true and profitable liberty, that the law of Nature doth justifie any attempts to shake off those bonds imposed upon them by Superiours, if inconvenient and destructive of native freedome: the fallacie of which is easily discerned by under­standing men. It is true, if we looke upon the Priviledges of Nature, (abstracting from paternall dominion) Freedome is the birth-right of mankinde, and equally common to every one, as the Aire we breath in, or the Sun which sheds his beames and lustre, as comfortably upon Beggars, as upon the Kings of the earth. This Freedome was an unlimited power to use our abi­lities, according as will did prompt. The restraint of which [Page 3] would questionlesse have beene very grievous, but that experi­ence did demonstrate, it was not so delightfull to do what ever they liked, as it was miserable, to suffer as much as it pleased o­thers to inflict. The evils which flow from want of Government. For any that was stronger then his neighbour had it in his power to hinder him from injoying the benefits of liberty; nor yet could the most powerfull man among them take any extraordinary comfort in this as yet hostile State, be­cause his minde was distracted with continuall feares, since there was not any so contemptibly weake, but that if he despi­sed his owne life, or desired to enjoy it with more uncontrolled pleasures, he might make himselfe Master of any other mans, though not by force, yet by subtilty, and watching advanta­ges, or at least a few combining might destroy the strongest, and might be tempted so to doe, for their fuller security.

This was their unhappy condition amidst feares and jealou­sies, wherein each single person look't upon the world as his enemy, and doubted (as formerly Cain, when he was excom­municated and cut off from the civill body) lest the hand of e­very man might be upon him; and to this confusion the distur­bers of this State endeavour to reduce us, not that this [...], want of order, most hatefull to God, can be pleasant to the most wicked man; but as knowing the effect of it, an insup­portable and generall calamity will quickly unite multitudes in­to a people again, and force them to restore some government; and they may hope in a new compact to gaine a greater share in the rule, then their ambition hath beene able to force from the setled Kingdome.

I will adde the unavoidable occasions of quarrell, extreamely opposite to the prime dictate of nature, the preservation of themselves, and to the meanes which conduce thereto, a peace­able injoyment of the comforts of this life. For whilest every one had right to all, no body could with safety make use of any thing; since when some would take to themselves what others delighted in, their desires and right being equall; there was no title but that of greater force, which could determine to whom it ought to belong, and this could not be knowne but by fight­ing, and this right reason abhorred, as by which men would ei­ther [Page 4] be exposed to famine in the midst of plenty, or else be for­ced daily to hazard the losse of their lives, out of a naturall de­sire of conserving them.

The sense of these calamities quickning their understandings to finde out, The remedy of those evils, ci­vill unity. easily prevailed with their wils, to entertaine a remedy of so great evils; which manifestly proceeding from division, the ready cure was to make themselves one, because no body is at variance with it selfe. There being no way to effect this naturally, they reduce themselves into a civill unitie, by placing over them one head, and by making his will the will of them all, to the end there might be no gap left open by schisme to returne to their former confusion. Because the wills of men, though the fountaines of all voluntary actions, yet are not themselves the objects of choice; (for we cannot will to be willing, (this would be infinite) but to performe what is com­manded) and so are not capable of being obliged by compacts; therefore this submission of all to the will of one; or this union of them agreed upon, is to be understood in a politique sense, and signifies the giving up of every mans particular power in­to his disposall, so that he may be inabled to force those who are unwilling upon some private ends, to be obedient for the common good; otherwise they would enjoy the benefits of others faith in observing lawes, and the advantages of their owne violations and breaches, which may probably be preven­ted, if penalties be appointed much greater then the profit which can come by their disobedience; because, as men are naturally tempted by hopes of good, so they are as naturally de­terred by a certaine expectation of greater evils.

Thus also by transferring every particular mans power into the hands of one, is not meant a reall laying downe and naturall translation of their strength, (because their nerves and sinewes are not alienable, as their money and goods) but a consent and mutuall obligation (as of all to one, whether he be King, as in a Monarchy; or some Nobles, for they are one too, as in Ari­stocracy, so of every one to each other) of not using their natu­rall power, but onely as Law shall require, that is, of not resi­sting that body in which the supreame power is placed, as like­wise [Page 5] of aiding him, or them by vertue of that promise, or of that oath, according to the nature of the contract, when be or they summon their strength.

By what is layed downe, may be discovered the weaknesse of their second principle (which hath done most mischiefe and till it be thoroughly rooted out of mens minds the seed is still left behind, from whence rebellion will spring) the falsehood whereof, I thought fit to manifest in relation to the peace and quiet of Christendome and the world in generall, it not at all concerning His Majesties case, who was so farre from offering violence, that it was the extraordinary mercy of God upon this land, that did enable him to defend his life against it, his Magazines and forts, and Ships, that is all his civill power be­ing taken from him, and an army actually raised against his per­sonall strength, (for His Majesty had not granted one commis­sion to raise a man, when they began their defensive warre) so that Lucans expression might seeme fitted to this Kingdomes misery.

The doctrine is; the law of nature will defend us, whomso­ever we kill, though the King, in our owne defence, and we are acquitted by that principall vim vi. (nay some goe higher and make it unlawfull not to resist even the highest authority, it being a sinne against nature &c. whom the examples of the holy Martyrs and of Christ himselfe doe clearly confute, though they cannot satisfy them.) I will breifely answere it, as meaning to enlarge my selfe thereon in the following dis­course.

It ceases to be lawfull, Native right re­strained by po­sitive obligati­on. after we have made our selves socia­ble parts in one body, because we voluntarily and upon agree­ment restrained our selves from making use of this native right and the renouncing this power by mutuall compact will ap­peare very consonant to sound reason, whether we looke upon the benefits insuing thereby, or the mischeifes avoyded. For it is a more probable meanes to the attaining that very end, in relation to which they plead for it, the preservation of particu­lar [Page 6] persons. Prudentiall motives for parting with some rights of nature, without power to re­sume them. Upon this condition of obliging our selves not to resist publique authority, in requitall for this submission of our private strength, we are secured by the united power of all, and the whole Kingdome becomes our guard. And it is most likely we should be lesse exposed to injuries, when that impartiall and equall measure of right, the known law, is by this meanes maintained. The evills which would flow from this licence to resume our power against contract, are infinite. Our owne feelings too fully instruct us in the sad effects, and I doubt not but the wearinesse of our present sufferings, and the expectati­on of growing mischeifes, will be powerfull beyond rhetorick to perswade us to value highly the publicke tranquillity. I am confident, if the people of this land (whose eyes have beene o­pened of late, and they are now sensible, that to continue vio­lences to His Majestie hath introduced a necessity of oppres­sing them, and that they are bound to be undone in order to the injuries to their soveraigne) were able to deliver them­selves from their defenders, we should suddainly be restored to happinesse, and it would be as hard a matter to engage them in a civill warre, when they had againe tasted the sweetnesse of plenty and quiet, as it is to perswade them to agree to peace, who challenge a legall power by the title of warre to dispose of the Kings and Subjects revenewes at pleasure.

As reason induced men to enter into such a Covenant, and to lay a mutuall obligation one upon another, not to resist authori­ty upon what ever grounds, whether of fancied, or reall inju­stice, but to submit their actions and persons to the ordinary tri­all, though it might possibly happen, that some particulars would be sentenced unjustly, because a farre more considerable good could not be obtained, unlesse by agreement patiently to submit to this possible evill, since the common peace and quiet, cannot be effectually provided for, if it shall be indulged to any, to ap­peale from the Lawes to themselves, and to judge their Judges: So honesty and religion strictly bind them to preserve their faith intire, and this contract inviolable.

The paines I have taken, to lay open, by way of introduction, to the view and examination of all that desire reall satisfaction, [Page 7] the foundation upon which rule and Subjection are built, will appeare not so delightfull, as it was necessary. And it is no o­therwise in the workes of Art, operum fastigia spectantur, latent fundamenta, passers by admire the superstructure, when that strength which supports the most elegant piles, lies deeply bu­ried in the earth, and unregarded. It were very strange, if any man should be so prodigiously weake, as to suffer himselfe to be perswaded to remove his chambers and galleries into a healthi­er aire, a pleasanter prospect and more commodious Situation; and yet the same unreasonable advice is hearkned to, concer­ning the civill frame, The foundati­on upon which States are set­led, over­throwne; if the people be made Judges of their safety, and al­lowed to use a­ny meanes which they fan­cy conducing thereto. without any consideration of the ground-workes. Populi salus suprema lex, is the Engine by which the upper roomes are torne from the foundation, and seated upon fancy onely, like Castles in the aire. For the safety of the peo­ple is really built upon governement, and this destroyed, the o­ther, non jam aedes, sed cumulus erit, will be soone swallowed in the common confusion; but this is evidently and demonstrably ruined by these principles. For government is an effect not of a peoples divided naturall powers, but as they are united and made one by civill constitution; so that when we call it supreame po­wer, we impose an improper name, and have given occasion for mistakes (yet I shall not endeavour to alter the common use of speaking, but onely to prevent a misunderstanding of it) because indeed this power is simply one, and when it doth expresse it selfe by one person or more, (according to different formes) who yet are but severall parts of one governour, there is not left in the Kingdome or Common-wealth, any civill, that is, any le­gall power, which can appeare in resistance, because all of them have bound their naturall hands by a politique agreement.

Hence it followes, those that will allow any power to Subjects against their ruler (let it be, Liberty to resist those in whom the Law places jus gladis the right of the sword, destru­ctive to the ve­ry nature of go­vernement. one man, or many united by one common forme, which is the consent of the major part, and this is not capable of division) do thereby dissolve the si­newes of government, by which they were compacted into one, and which made a multitude a people, and so breake the Common-wealth into as many peices, as they have set up oppo­sers against it. For there cannot be two powers and yet the [Page 8] Kingdome remaine one. This is that, which distinguishes Francs and England and Spaine from one another, because they have three powers legally distinct, and are the same in relation each to other, as three particular men meeting in some wildernesse, and considered as not having agreed to any Lawes of Society.

I am fully perswaded, no sober man can imagine the policy of this State is so defective, as to open a necessary way to its owne ruine, that is, to divide the Kingdome legally in it selfe; and therefore it must necessarily be granted, those that take up armes being not authorized so to do by law, are guilty of rebellion, and the consequences of it, murder and rapine. It is very easy to de­termine, whom the Law hath armed with power, because not a­ny part of the people, not the two Houses, but the King alone is sworne to protect us, which is an evident argument, he is ena­bled to effect this end, and that the necessary meanes to com­passe it, which is the posse regni, is at his disposall.

By these generalls throughly digested, and rightly applied, we shall be able to rule particular decisions.

I shall desire one thing especially may be remembred, as which hath great influence upon all cases. Though what is truly the right of any one, doth not cease to be so naturally by ano­thers sentence to the contrary; yet after positive constitutions, upon a Judges decision, he can challenge no title to it, because by his owne deed, and consent, he passeth it away in that judiciary determination. And equity and prudence both dictate, that it was a most honest and reasonable agreement, as conducing to publique peace, and the quiet of mankind, that persons publike­ly constituted and more unconcerned in the decisions, should put an end to all debates. Because otherwise the controversie was not likely to be ended, but with one of the parties; For each man out of naturall favour (the strongest corruptive of judge­ment) inclining to his owne Interest, there was nothing left but force to determine it. There cannot be a more unhappy ad­ministration of Justice, then when strength is made the measure of right, and when all Iudges are bribed, as passing sentence to their owne advantage.

§. 1.

THe following Section shall be spent in proving the propo­sition, by which the consciences of all Subjects must be di­rected.

It is unlawfull to resist him, or them, in whom the supreame authority, (that is, all the legall power of the Kingdome) is placed, and no dispensation (grounded upon what persons soe­ver, as inferiour Magistrates, or upon any cause, as the extreame abuse of this power to their oppression) can excuse such resi­stance from the sin of rebellion.

Upon this pillar not onely monarchy stands firme, but all o­ther governements are equally supported; the generall reason being applicable, according to the difference in severall formes.

In the third Section I will bring the case home to our selves by proving this assumption; The King of England hath this su­preame power, and then I shall leave it to every mans consci­ence to inferre the conclusion, therefore it is unlawfull to make resistance against their Soveraigne.

In the fourth Section, I will answer all the evasions (how plausibly soever founded) which I could meete with in the se­verall writings of those men, who though they strike at the King downe right and more immediately, yet by plaine and e­vident cousequences they destroy all civill society.

By way of conclusion, I will shew, though such a power of re­sistance, as they or any others have yet openly pleaded for, should be granted lawfull (as when in their owne defence, or when he that hath the highest authority, and is bound by the law of God and his owne oath, to administer justice equally, yet after fre­quent representations of their grievances, and most just Com­plaints of their great sufferings, affords no redresse) yet this can be no justification of the present warre against the King, nor ac­quit the Actors in it from being rebels. Because this case is e­vidently not now, as will appeare after a view taken of the cau­sas of this unnaturall, and illegall division.

[Page 10] The proposition to be proved is, It is unlawfull to resist him or them in whom the supreame authority (that is, all the legall power of the Kingdome in order to raise armes) is placed, and no dispensation (grounded upon what persons soever, as infe­riour magistrates, or upon any cause, as the extreame abuse of this power to their oppression) can excuse such resistance from the sin of Rebellion.

I make no question every man will apprehend, that by resi­stance here, Differences be­tweene not obeying against law; and hostile resistance to a lawfull Sove­raigne. is meant only hostile opposition, and not a refusall to put unjust commands (measured by divine or humane laws) in execution; for the truth is, if they are, or seeme repugnant to Gods law, (for then they are so really, in respect of those who have that apprehension; idem est esse & apparere, in this case of good and bad: because whatsoever is not of faith is sin) we must conforme our practise to that standing rule, layed downe by the Apostle, Active obedi­ence against Gods law, sin. Deo magis, quā hominibus, We ought to o­bey God rather then men, we are bound (to use Tertullians phrase) temperare majestatem Caesaris infra Deum. The reasons to the contrary for absolute & unlimited obedience have no solidity.

One is upon a false supposall, Objections to the contrary. that at our entrance into civill society, we submitted) as our wills, by which is meant not the faculty, but the effects of it, which were in our power, and which are subjected as farre as they were in our power, that is in all honest performances, for peccare non est nostri juris, so) our understanding, and consequently, though in our private o­pinion, such actions were unlawfull, yet if commanded & said by our rulers to be just, our publique judgement (which we had given them right to passe upon good or bad) did pro­nounce them honest.

A second argument is, though we thinke such actions un­lawfull upon a particular comparing them, with the measure of right and wrong, divine precept, or prohibition; yet from a more generall raeson, we thinke this thought of ours con­demning such actions, to be an errour, and so if we doe, what we thinke in our private judgement God hath forbidden, we doe contra opinionem agere, sed non contra conscientiam, practise against our opinion, not against our conscience, because that is [Page 11] swayed by this generall reason. If when rulers say such a thing ought to be done, I say, it ought not, the sence of it is, I am wiser then they. But if I grant them the more able men, I must needes thinke they are likely to make truer judgement, and so am bound to submit to the greater discretion, because in morall differences, which are not capable of demonstration, I must guide my practise by the highest probabilities of good. If sheepe knew how apt they are to goe astray, they would be content to be guided by the shepherd, and therfore governors, who are [...], are to direct us in the waies of safety. He that shall undertake to be his owne master, will have a foole to his scholler; and he that refuses to follow his guide, and fancies some private turnings, is likely to misse his way, and through many wandrings to come weary to his journeys end.

A third argument is, to challenge to our selves the judge­ment of good and evill, is the fruit of that bitter root of Adams disobedience; Eritis sicut Dij, scientes bonum & malum, was the temptation, and the sinne was, he did eate of the forbidden tree of knowledge of good and evill. He was not content to be ac­quainted with good only, submitting to (that which made actions good or bad) the command or prohibition of him, who had dominion over him, but began to examine the justice and reasonablenesse of them, and so would make himselfe like the Law-giver.

Answer. The answer hereto is easie by distinguishing those things in which God will require from every one a liberty of judging, and a conformable obedience, from things more obscure, and which will require a deeper search then ordinary understand­ings can make.

Of the first sort are the plaine and familiar truths laid downe in scripture, of which S. Paul binds us to be so confident, that though an angel from heaven should preach any other do­ctrine, we may not admit it. As likewise many morall duties easily discerned even by weake apprehensions. If this were not so, the Apostles rule could not lawfully be made use of, we must obey God rather then men; and the people would be bound to follow their blind leaders into the pit of destruction. [Page 12] For Christ tels us both shall fall into the ditch. But the Apostle allows them to whom he spake, to examine his doctrines of this nature, by the rule of their owne understanding. I speake as to them which have understanding judge ye what I say, and judge in your selves, is it comely &c. and in the verse follow­ing, doth not even nature it selfe teach you &c. This case is clearly decided in the 14 ^th to the Rom. where we learne, if we condemne our actions, though in themselves not blameable, yet to us they are sinne. v. 22, 23. Happy is he that condemneth not himselfe in that thing which he alloweth. He that doubt­eth, is damned if he eate, because he eateth not of faith; where­fore he gave a generall command in the 5. v. let every man be fully perswaded in his owne minde.

Of the latter sort are things more intricate, and which cannot without great difficulty be judged of. Being such for the most part wherein not mens honesty but their prudence is exercised. And here a submission of judgement is very rea­sonable. As in law cases to be swayed by the professors of it, or if we build a house to be directed by artists, or in a tempest to take the most probable way of escaping, by relying on the pilots steering the ship and forbidding unexperienced passen­gers to runne to the helme confusedly and alter the course, ac­cording as their ignorance & feares prompt them, upon a con­scientious madnesse, that they shall be accessary to their owne death, if they put their lives out of their owne hands, though they commit them to sea-men, whose experience hath better enabled them to avoyd the rockes and the shelves: And thus in civill government, wherein the greater part of men can have no deepe insight, to trust the managery of the publique safety, to persons wiser then themselves, and to bind one another to performe all offices in relation to this end, according as they shall be commanded by their governours, and not to rule their law-givers by disputing the unreasonablenes of what is injoin­ed. And to this captivateing of their understanding religion obligeth them; for God is not a God of sedition, of mutinye, and confusion, but of unity, order and of peace.

The case thus resolved produceth an excellent temper, in [Page 13] mans obedience; as by which we render to Caesar the things which are Caesars, and to God the things which are Gods. Be subject to every ordinance of man for the Lords sake. This binds universally, those only cases being excepted, which God expressely and evidently reserves to himselfe; and in them we must take law from the more powerfull. Feare not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soule, but rather feare him, which is able to destroy both soule and body in Hell.

This liberty of denying obedience can neither be offensive nor dangerous to authority.

First not offensive, No inconveni­encies from this doctrine rightly stated; God to be o­beyed rather then men. because magistrates can challenge no more right over our actions, then God gives them or we our selves had, before we submitted them to their commands; which was none in this supposed case, because a dishonest deed non est nostri juris is not in our power. We can no more passe away by promise Gods right to our obedience, then we can covenant to transferre and give away another mans goods or demeasnes.

Secondly it is harmelesse in the consequences, because if any out of a reall or seeming repugnance to divine precept, deny active obedience, they must confesse themselves obliged by the same conscience of observing the law of God, not to resist that authority, which he hath armed jure gladij, with the right of using the sword, probably to this end that Religion might not be a cloke for Rebellion, & that we might not dare out of the feare of God to violate the order of divine providence; by which he hath thought fit to governe the world. This is the patience of the Saints, which shall be rewarded with heaven, because they suffer, rather then doe evill for earthly considerations, as being assured, God hath forbiden them, though for prevention of their particular and undeserved misery, to disturbe the publike happinesse, by resisting that power, which Scripture tells them is from above. It oft times pleases God to make use of ill go­vernours, and their unrighteous judgement may be his just sen­tence for our former transgressions; if it be his will to scourge us by them, no smart, should tempt us to cut his rod in pie­ces.

[Page 14] Because generally men are hardly brought to entertaine a truth, which seemes disadvantageous to them, and comes in ill company, attended with affliction, Quis enim facilè credit, propter quod dolendum est? (though this should not be amongst Christians who are crucis candidati, & quibus frui fas est Diis iratis, and who ought to rejoyce in their present sufferings, as the exercise of vertue, and that way to eternall glory, which our Saviour hath chalked out both by example and precept?) I will use the greater diligence in evidencing this point by all kinde of proofes, of which the matter is capable.

If we looke backe to the law of Nature, we shall finde that the people would have had a clearer and more distinct notion of it, if common use of calling it Law had not helped to con­found their understanding, when it ought to have beene named the Right of nature; Difference be­tweene Law of Nature and Right of Na­ture. for Right and Law differ as much as Li­berty and Bonds: Jus, or right not laying any obligation, but signifying, we may equally choose to doe or not to doe without fault, whereas Lex or law determines us either to a particular performance by way of command, or a particular abstinence by way of prohibition; and therefore jus naturae, all the right of nature, which now we can innocently make use of, is that free­dome, not which any law gives us, but which no law takes away, and lawes are the severall restraints and limitations of na­tive liberty. Upon this ground I have shewed already the right of nature cannot be pleaded against positive constitution, that being a permission onely, and not an injunction, and there­fore ceasing by a subsequent obligation arising from promise and compact, when multitudes became one Civil body.

I was unwilling to weary the Reader by an unprofitable de­bate, and different stating of the originall of power. For though it be most true, that paternall authority was regall, and therefore this of Gods immediate constitution, Their owne Scheame of Government serves our turne, and justi­fies the Kings cause. and founded in nature, yet it is not much pertinent to the present decision, nor can it necessarily concerne moderne controversies betweene Rulers and People. Because it is most evident, no King at this day (and much lesse other Governours) holds his Crowne by that title, since severall paternall powers in every State are gi­ven [Page 15] up, and united in one common father, who cannot pretend a more immediate kindred to Adam, then all the rest of man­kinde. For this consideration, I thought fit to lay downe their owne Scheame of Government, and let them make what ad­vantages they can, by presenting to your apprehension a multi­tude before a people, like a heape of stones, before they are ce­mented and knit together into one building. I shall onely de­sire my adversaries would not betray so much want of ingenui­ty, as to make this favour of joyning issue upon their owne principles, a contradiction. For I thought it losse of time to insist upon their mistakes in the manner of derivation of power, when all of us agree well enough in the thing. That, after the multiplying of mankinde, there was an Anarchy is confest, one­ly they impute it to a want of all Law and Rulers, and we de­rive it more naturally from the multitude of Governours, whose wills being various, were so many distinct Lawes to those who were under them, when in every family was a Kingdome.

as Euripides describes the Cyclops: their Subjects were their owne flesh and naturall Princes, being wives and children) when there were so many absolute Princes within the compasse of a Parish, that a man had scarce roome to walke in a Territo­ry; when a Commonwealth was lodged in a Cottage, this [...] was the mother of confusion, and by reason of such a multiplicity of Kings, it was not ill stiled [...]. Though they had absolute power, yet it was confined within a narrow compasse, and if they exercised any jurisdiction, or made use of their liberty to the prejudice of neighbour States, this begot controversies, and both parties having right to be Judges in their owne causes, they made force the measure of decision, and who was strongest could not be knowne, but by the issue of the warre.

To prevent those fatall mischiefes to which they were subject, [Page 16] while they lived in this hostile State, evidently occasioned by their divided powers, a way was found out by making their individuall strengths, and the many narrow authorities (which still justled one another) one legall power, and this was placed then with great prudence in one person, to the end the cause of their sufferings might be fully taken away, and that there might not be left a possibility of relapsing into their former miseries, which proceeded from opposition between equall authorities. Thus I grant to them their owne Scheame, yet without preju­dice to that truth delivered by Cedren, who makes Adam the catholique Monarch: [...].

As reason first represented to them Monarchy, as the most perfect forme, (from which their want of government was a defection, for we may say of Anarchy, Non fuit sic ab initio) so sense confirmed it, they having happy experience of those eminent advantages peculiar to this constitution, as unity, se­crecy, and expedition. The Roman story doth approve this wisedome, by acquainting us with the fatall miscarriages, and bad successes of their Armies, when commanded by two Gene­ralls. And if we looke upon this State in peace, we shall finde by putting downe Kings they laid the feed-plot of those ma­ny miserable civill warres, with which that people was so fre­quently, so extreamely afflicted.

The forme of that Commonwealth was Democraticall; The governe­ment of Rome according to the forme, de­mocraticall; but according to the practise, an illegall Monar­chy. but if wee judge of it, not as established by Law, but according to the practice almost in all times, we must pronounce the Go­vernment an illegall Monarchy. For either some one man go­verned the Senate, and made them an instrument to oppresse the people, or else (according as it was aptest to advance his interests) siding with the people, and telling them the Nobles took too much upon them, Different judgement of the best forme of governement, oft-times the cause of sediti­on. he by their power compassed his pri­vate ends under the names of common good, & publique safety.

The truth is, the different judgement of the best State, doth de facto open a gap to sedition, because men naturally desire to live most happily, and are easily tempted to contribute their en­deavours to any change, which they fancy for the better; [Page 17] though in right it ought not to be so, notwithstanding some forme might be proposed, which were really more perfect, be­cause our faith once given to the present government, cannot be recalled; this civill union is as fast tyed as the marriage knot, we are bound to take it for better for worse. And if other­wise, States would probably be shorter liv'd then men, as ha­ving their foundation on the sands, that is, on the inconstant wills of the people, who are blowne about with every winde of contrary discourses. Fallacy in dis­courses con­cerning what kinde of go­vernement is best. But in this dispute concerning the best forme of civill society, there is a great fallacy, as yet not fully discovered. Schemes are drawne in speculation, and politique discourses are framed, which beare much resemblance with some figures of Mathematicians, which are made with much ease upon paper, and with apparence of solid demonstration, so that the Schollers not able to object against it, entertaine it for certaine knowledge. But when reduced into practice in wood or stone, the failings are presently seene, and their con­templations appeare vaine and unprofitable, because they did not take into consideration the capacity of the Subject, on which they were to worke, nor fore-saw what resistance the matter would make. This errour is committed in the compa­rison of States, and many plausible reasons are laid down for the rule of the Nobles, or of the people; which are best confuted by experience. For when it is debated, whether Monarchy be the most convenient government, the true sense of it is this, (if we judge according to the frequent practice, which in Po­litiques is made the most reasonable measure of Lawes) whe­ther the people will live more happily when Law places the supreame power in one, and nominates that person (by which no roome is left for division) or when one man being more active and crafty then his fellowes, who ought to have an e­quall share in this authority, raises a faction upon plausible pre­tences, and under colour of serving his side, perswades them to be commanded by him, and so exercises the supreame power in an illegall way: which as it is compassed by ingaging the peo­ple in misery, under colour of making them more happy, so [...] it must be kept up by as bad arts, and an Army must be main­tained, [Page 18] to make good by force, what Law cannot justifie.

I do not wonder, (for it is no strange thing, part of the peo­ple should be unwise) that some should be induced to cast off Monarchy. They are told, it is very unreasonable that one should have all the power,

They may upon the same ground perswade them to quarrell with God Almighty. Their meaning is (though they dare not speake out) there is no government good, unlesse they have a share in it. This interest of being joynt Soveraignes, makes them unable to see, or else willing to dissemble the apparent dangers which division threatens, as likewise the great disad­vantages which wait on slow proceedings, (counsels, as well as men, growing weake by age) and the unhappy miscarriages of brave undertakings, because not managed with fitting secre­cy. All these three are plainly spoken in many Governours, Faction, Delay, Opennesse.

The method whereby the peoples affections are poysoned, and wonne to a dislike of the present State, By what means so many of the people are mis­led into Rebel­lion. and by degrees, brought first to desire, then to attempt an Innovation, is this. All the defects (how unavoidable soever, by reason of secret lets and hinderances not to be fore-seene, as depending upon many circumstances, which are variable according to other mens wills, and which they have not the honesty to put the people in minde of) are with great care represented to their considerations, and much diligence is used to set before them a perfect Catalogue of what ever faults have beene committed by inferiour Magistrates and under Officers; and as they have excellent memories in repeating grievances, so they have lear­ned an art (very convenient for their ends, and for creating a misunderstanding betweene King and people, that they may manage the discontents of the Subject to advance particular de­signes) to forget the severall satisfactions given by Princes, when upon generall complaints, they are fully instructed in their Subjects sufferings.

The next worke is to assigne such a cause of these corrupti­ons [Page 19] as shall open a way to the alteration they aime at, which is, to impute them to the nature of a monarchicall government, by telling them, their happinesse is built upon a very uncertaine foundation, the will of one man, and if he be bad, they must sure­ly be miserable.

Lastly, a promise is made, of healing all their evills, and the remedy is, multitudo medicorum (the same plausibilities may be urged to perswade an entertainment of many Physicians about a sicke person, as about a distempered State, but experience ma­sters these reasons, and hath demonstrated the danger of it) they must place the Soveraigne power amongst many, to the end, if one should faile of his duty, others may supply it, if one should be willing to oppresse, others may be able to protect them. It fares with men in the distempers of State, as in those of their bo­dies; They are easily induced to make triall, of what any man tells them will do them good, and they have the strongest phan­cies to those things of which they have least experience. But the Fallacy which abuses the people is non causa pro causâ; there e­ver was and alwaies will be matter of Complaint, under what kind of regiment soever we live, and till men be absolutely per­fect, the governement cannot be so; voluntary corruptions, and naturall frail [...]ties must have an influence upon every state. This tampering with the Body to reduce it to perfect health, hath o­verthrown many excellent constitutions, and such kind of phy­sicke proves the most dangerous disease. Wherefore we must not fall out with our selves upon every distemper, and present­ly thinke of altering our naturall habit, lest we make our selves well, only as dead men are so. It may become State-doctors to take notice of Hippocrates his Aphorisme, consueta longo tempore, etiamsi deteriora, insuetis minùs molesta esse solent.

It will concerne us in prudence to take that course which will convay to us the greatest goods, and is the most probable way of avoiding the most evills. And this I conceive monarchy is most likely to effect, and I make no doubt the people would be of the same opinion, Fallacie of une­quall compari­son. if their affections had not beene craftily prevailed upon, by that miserable fallacie of unequall compari­son, betweene a King not performing his trust, and Nobles not [Page 20] failing of their duty as if the word [...] or optimacie would warrant it) whereas if they were put into a just ballance they ought to be supposed both good, Greater hores in Monarchy; greater feares in an Aristocra­cy. or both bad, and then a true judgement might be made of the mischeifes and advanta­ges; Then we should clearely discerne, we have greater hopes under a vertuous King, (suppose both good) and greater feares under a vicious nobility or Senate, (suppose both bad) And besides there is one very considerable circumstance, which ought to rule much in the decision; it is much more probable we shall have a good King, then a good nobility. (I take good in a poli­tique sense, for that only concernes the present dispute, and un­derstand it in this notion, as providing for the peoples happi­nesse.) Because his interest is the same with that of the People, which is strong State security; Kings interest the same with the peoples; that of Nobles divided from their happines. whereas that of particular No­bles, and much more of men of lower ranke, where such are ad­mitted, is divided from the publique happinesse. The Common-wealths of Greece will afford many examples of persons selling their Country, and putting the great Councell upon ill attempts, and labouring with their utmost cunning to frustrate good de­signes, because their dependance upon a forraigne Kingdome or State, was worth much more unto them, then they could hope to gaine by honest service to their Country.

First, we have greater hopes under a vertuous King: because upon supposall that both be willing to promote the peoples happinesse, Much greater happinesse in Monarchy. yet he is more able to compasse that end, by reason he hath a more united power, and the execution of what ever designes, depends but upon a single resolve, and therefore may be managed with certaine closenesse, and all convenient swift­nesse, so that good counsells shall be first discovered in the ef­fects: whereas a great body moves slowly and most times the opportunity of doing is gone by, while they are but halfe way in their deliberation.

Subjects living under good Lords or Senators (such as value the honour of being esteemed worthy patriots, above the ad­vancing their owne fortunes, or raising children, or preferring friends, subsidia dominationi, or enriching kindred, and these qualities rarely meete in the major part of an assembly) seeme [Page 21] to me to be in the same state, as children who have lost a father, and whose fortunes by his care are left to Feoffees in trust; these though extreamely honest, yet by reason of necessary particular cares, which more immediately concerne them, and because they are many, and so every one expects the rest will probably be carefull to performe this trust, and therefore he may be spa­red, and allowed to spend his time more advantageously in im­proving his owne estate, especially this performance of faith to a dead man being a very barren vertue, either the wages be­ing payd before, or else nothing allotted. He presuming upon their goodnesse, and frequent deep Protestations of loving his equall to themselves, and thinking it an unworthy thing, to set a price upon an old friends fidelity, and so leaving it to be rewar­ded onely by heaven, and the same honest care in others of their children; These I say out of reall or very plausible hinderances, are forced to neglect the childrens portions, and the poore Or­phans receive uncomfortable satisfaction. They would have beene in much better condition, though strangers in worldly af­faires, if wholely left unto themselves, because their necessities would have quickned them, whereas now their hands are tyed up from helping themselves, and all they can contribute towards making themselves Masters of their owne fortunes, is a fruitlesse impudence in vainely importunating the curators: So is it most times in the government of many, though understanding, and good men; which is a rare happinesse, and yet no security a­gainst miseries, because onus commune negligunt singuli, what be­longs to their common care, frequently miscarries by particular negligences.

Secondly, Greater mise­ries in Aristo­cracie. we have greater feares under vicious Lords or Se­nators; That is, it stands with cleare and evident reason, we should be more miserable, living under many tyrants, then un­der one. The thirty tyrants of Athens, and the Decemviri of Rome, and that state variously oppressed, sometimes by the Se­nate, sometimes by the people, and at length to prevent ruine cadens in sinum imperatorum, Monarchy a more healthy constitution. are examples of this sad truth. That which makes a people out of love with monarchy is a contem­plation of the miserable consequences of abused power, where­as [Page 22] the government by Senate is more apt to degenerate, and the oppressions under it are more intolerable.

As there are many advantages peculiar to Monarchy, so there is not any one inconvenience to which a people living under an Aristocracy (as to instance for the better understanding it, under a Parliament as it is now mistaken for the two Hou­ses, challenging absolute obedience to their Ordinances, with­out the Kings ratification, nay against his plaine denyall, by which they are null by the Law of England) are not subject in a much higher degree.

Let us suppose a Prince to be lustfull, or cruell, or covetous, or prodigall, and wasting what might be imployed on the pub­lique upon favourites. The diseases of a Senate more violent. If these vices are so grievous, when confined within one brest; to what height will our misery swell, when they shall be scattered through all parts, and be active in each corner of the Land? Their wives and daugh­ters may be safe by distance, and live out of the reach of one mans embraces: If his loose desires are so insatiable, how can they weary those of so many? Secondly, it is more easie not to incurre the hatred of one, whereas there are scarce possible wayes of complyance with so many crosse humours. One will never fall out with all, for he knowes he should have an ill match of it, whereas the whole State may suffer by cruelty ex­ercised by divided oppressors, because each man gives full reines to his revenge, as thinking it safe enough, the feares from a few persons crusht by him, being below the delight of mani­festing his power in his enemies calamity. Thirdly, the cove­tousnesse of Senators is more devouring, because we may feed one fire with lesse expence of fewell, then a hundred. And fourthly a Princes profuse spending upon favourites is infinite­ly over-ballanced by so many providing for their poore kind­red, and making friends, and purchasing dependants. This art (very necessary to all men imployed in State affaires, who are subject to various censures) of underpropping their reputation, and hiring Advocates to plead for them in their absence, must draw out very considerable summes, and be more chargeable to the people (from whom the supplies must come) then the boun­ty [Page 23] of one man, though showred downe over-plentifully upon some few privadoes. The wisest States have ever made ample allowances to enable their Prince to bestow favours according to merits, or liking, (the priviledges of every private man) it arguing a noble soule to be bountifull.

It hath beene shewed already, that Monarchy is a more healthy constitution, and that when sicke the diseases of it are lesse violent, Easie remedies for a sicke Mo­narchy. and it will easily be made to appeare, they are more curable. Good counsell, or at least age and experience hath reformed many Princes; but however our grievances are mortall, the death of one opens a way to better hopes: but the corruption of a Senate ends in dissolution. The diseases of a Senate incu­rable. Tacitus gives a full character of the distempers which are fatall to a degenerate Senate. Inter Patres plebémque certamina exarsêre, modò tur­bulenti tribuni, modò consules praevalidi; & in urbe ac foro ten­tamenta civilium bellorum. Mox è plebe infima C. Marius, & nobilium saevissimus L. Sulla victam armis libertatem in do­minationem verterunt. 2. hist. There arose hot contentions be­tweene the Nobility and Commons; now the factious Tri­bunes bore sway, then the Consuls kept them under In the City and the place of publique assembly there were frequent skirmishes, the Preface and Essayes to a civill warre. Anon Caius Marius, the meanest of the Commonalty; and Lucius Sulla, the cruellest amongst the Nobles, destroying their liberty and property by the assistance of their illegall Militia, intro­duced an absolute and unbounded government.

There be some, The miseries of a kingdome when a child governes, an ar­gument for monarchy. with whom that of Ecclesiastes prevailes, wo to thee O land, when thy King is a child, and they thinke it a strong argument against monarchy, because this calamity is not incident to a senate, they not being subject to nonage. But this place rightly understood, is a very full confirmation of the happy condition we have reason to expect under monarchy, and of the calamity and woes which probably attend an Aristo­cracy. For the cause of those miseries foretold is plainly this, A King during his infancy being not able to rule, the govern­ment is managed by the nobles. Whence we learne, that change which the people oft times with sinfull earnestnesse la­bour [Page 24] for, is to be found in the catalogue of Gods judgements, and they sue for, and by wicked arts endeavour to compasse their owne punishment. It is an argument of Gods great mer­cy to them, that he fights against them; if he were thoroughly angry, the designes of innovatours would have better successe. This truth is warranted by scripture. For the transgression of a land, many are the princes thereof: but by a man of understanding and knowledge the state thereof shall be prolonged. prov. 28. 2.

To all these corruptions a popular state is more subject, Popular forme the worst go­vernment. and the imperfections of it, are so much the greater, as it is farther distant from monarchy; the temper of it (which is unity, the soule of government) being more easily dissolved. Those which cry it most up, will be unwilling to admit it in their fa­milies, which are smaller principalities. Three things especi­ally have made it so taking with the vulgar. 1. a pretended im­partiall administration of justice; 2 ^ly. an empty name of liberty; and 3 ^ly the so much applauded equality, by which they seeme to reduce their civill constitutions to the primary lawes of na­ture, which gave to all men a common right.

Concerning the first, More equall ad­ministration of justice without reason, and a­gainst experi­ence, promised in this forme their hopes that justice should be more equally administred, are grounded upon this probability: It is very hard to corrupt a multitude into favour or respect of persons; (though some rivers have beene infected, the ocean cannot be poysoned.) A man may satisfy the interests of one or some few, but to buy injustice of so many would be no thriv­ing trade, he might more cheaply loose his cause. This is a plausible but very fallacious argument. Because experience makes it evident, that to prevent the evills of division, which the many following particular and crosse interests doe beget, one remedy is constantly made use of, which is this; some few of the more crafty citizens, who have gained credit with them, agree together in private, & order businesses at their close com­mittee, and so undiscernably lead the multitude on to what ever they call the publike good, of which they having prevailed u­pon their affections are esteemed the most competent Judges. And what is this, but to pretend to a Democracy, and be go­verned by an illegall Aristocracy? By this meanes any one of [Page 25] the Junto (for they must gratify each other mutually) is enabled to stop the course of law in a friends behalfe, and to put a shar­per edge upon the sword of justice when it strikes an enemie. These kind of men have got the Art of changing the peoples o­pinions of just and unjust, according as it is more suitable to their owne profit, and they are not so much beholding to any solid wisedome for it, as a kind of frothy eloquence, which wee may observe in their set speeches and declamations, with much cunning fitted to the capacity of their auditors. They do not at all trouble themselves to satisfy reasonable men, for they are but a few, and can stand them in little stead, where things are carried by the greater number, and reasons are not weighed, but told. The art is, to apply their harangues to that which rules weaker men, the affections (suadendo docent, non decendo suadent) and these are easily convinced, and made the measure of their judgement; the want of weight in the premi­ses being supplyed by an extraordinary love to the conclusion. It was too truly said in reference to these popular decisions.

From this fountaine arise the many debates amongst men in ci­vill affaires. For in Mathematicall knowledge, because it con­cernes not meum and tuum, there is an unanimous consent; all agree, what lines are streight, and what crooked; but the judge­ments of right and wrong, are as various as their interests dif­ferent. The objection of greater li­berty, answe­red.

Secondly, concerning liberty, it is very strange that men should so generally fall in love with a bare sound, and court a name of freedome, which duely examined, will be found to signifie nothing. They cannot meane by it a loosenesse from all lawes, because their intent is to change, not take away govern­ment; they dare not owne such a pernicious licence. And there­fore the true debate amongst men is, not whether they shall ad­mit of bonds, (that is such obligations as lawes lay upon them, these are readily embraced) but who shall impose them; the question is not an servirent, sed an uni vel pluribus, and it is commonly called liberty, to serve more masters.

The restraint of our freedome is that which is most valuable [Page 26] amongst the benefits of government. For this preserves peace between men, that their hands are tyed up from doing injuries. Though we naturally delight in a full and absolute liberty, yet the love of it is over-ballanced by feares; every one could wish to retaine it himselfe, but not upon this condition, that all others should enjoy the same freedome. Because as the contemplation of our owne liberty is pleasant, to do what we list, so there is a more sad consideration arising from the thought of others free­dome, to make us suffer, as much as they may be tempted to inflict.

Thirdly, Aequalitate ni­hil est iniquius concerning equality, if they urge, it comes nearer to the law of Nature, by the same reason they must dissolve the bonds of all government, since there can be no Magistrate, no Superiour and Inferiour, and par in parem non habet imperium; so we must indulge to every man to doe what seemeth good in his owne eyes. This argument doth not conclude for one forme above another, but equally destroyes all, and is applyed to a popular State, onely out of resemblance of some imperfections common to both, because that governement comes nearest to none, and is but few degrees removed from Anarchy and con­fusion. But the truth is, this equality which they so passionate­ly affect, is clearely against nature, who if an equality of rewards had beene intended, would have made all men equally deserve­ing. Reason doth teach us, since it is manifest, we may excell others by education and industry; greater incouragements should be allotted, in consideration of the charges of good breeding, and of the extraordinary studies, whereby men enable themselves for the honour and good of the publique. Besides this equality, though pretended to conserve, doth in truth de­stroy amity, for none are so quarrellsome, none so subject unto envy, as equals.

We may judge of the thriving of popular States, by what we observe in commons, which are alwayes poore, and bare, and if taken into one mans hands, would be improved foure­fold: we finde by experience what all should looke after, is neglected by every one, whilest each man thinkes his particular expence of time and study will not conduce much, and that they may be supplyed by others, and therefore he chooses to imploy [Page 27] them rather on his private interests much more profitably.

Seeing that the greater part of men in a popular sway, are bred up to gaine, they make profit for the most part of the rule of their actions, and so entertaine but little sense of honour. And hence this State is easily corrupted by their low affections, so that particular persons may be sometimes rich, the State can ne­ver be glorious. How can the happinesse of that Common-wealth be lasting, where the wiser and honester part being still the fewer, must be ruled by men of weake understandings, and of corrupt affections, men extreamely violent, if they be not awed, and in their feare irresolute in all their proceedings, men not capable of secrets, so that they expose themselves to all dis­advantages? Their assemblies are full of inconstancy and disor­der, it is very hard to separate tumult and multitude. The wiser oft times dare not speake, fearing the madnesse of the people. For if things should succeed ill by some secret lets, they are sure to suffer for the event, since amongst such Judges it is not e­nough to counsaile prudently, unlesse fortunately also. The States of Sparta and Athens will afford plenty of examples.

If they be not united by feare of a forraigne warre, they will quickly breake out into a domestique. They are well compa­red to the raging of the waves; their contrary humours easily raise a tempest. The united Provinces are thought by many to owe more to the Spaniards constant enmity, then to the aides of English, Scots, or French. (And yet without their assistance they had beene long since swallowed up,) and they may thank the justice of Monarchies, that these friends made them not a prey to themselves. He is a stranger in the Roman story, who knowes not how fatall Mercenaries were, when lent by a Com­monwealth. If he would not have fought with them, he had conquer'd them long ere this. The fate of Greece would have beene theirs, Graeciae civitates dum imperare singulae cupiunt, omnes imperium perdiderunt: we see how the Athenians, La­cedaemonians, Thebans, Arcadians, Phocians, Locrians, Corin­thians, Boeotians, with others, variously siding, that they might keepe the ballance even, miserably warred upon one another, [Page 28] till at last Philip tooke advantage of their discords, and made himselfe King of all.

I have beene tempted into this large digression, for the ful­ler satisfaction of the people, in whom a dislike of the present government is begot, and so a way is laid open for a change of it, upon pretence some other forme would be more advantage­ous. Which first is not true, and therefore they have not any motive for disloyalty, since they would be dishonest against Interest. And secondly, if it were true in it selfe, yet it is not so, when a State is setled under another forme, the certaine mi­series of a civill warre, and the great difficulties of setting it to­gether, when it is torne into so many pieces, will be above any hopes they can reasonably propose to themselves. And third­ly, if it could be done advantageously and safely, yet it cannot honestly. They will forfeit Heaven for that, which in all pro­bability will make them more miserable upon earth; and it were a sad purchase, if they should obtaine as much as their ambition or covetousnesse can devoure. Civill society is founded upon Justice, and supported by Religion, which obligeth us to pre­serve the faith of contracts intire. We are bound to stand to our bargaine, though it should appeare it might have beene better made. Experience shewes us, that States may live and flourish too under the worst forme of government, and they are not immortall under the best. Let the imperfections be more or lesse in this or that kinde of regiment, they cannot ab­solve the Subjects conscience; though he may have reason to preferre other Lawes, he must have so much religion to be obe­dient to those under which it pleased God to place him.

It is high time to make particular application of the former discourse, concerning the originall of government, and by a di­stinct state of it to give light to all which followes.

Non est potestas nisi à Deo, True state of government in generall, with application to that of this Kingdome. saith the Apostle, Rom. 13. There is no power but of God, that is, the right by which the Magistrate governes, and all the jurisdiction he exercises is derived from divine ordinance. This may be conveyed either immediately, as amongst the Jewes, when God designed the person, which [Page 29] now no State will pretend; or else mediante populi consens [...], the consent of the people intervening, and this two wayes, ei­ther by a free election, upon hopes from his extraordinary goodnesse; or by conquest, attended with a voluntary submis­sion, upon feares from his extraordinary power, that he may be willing to protect, who was able to injure: whether of these motives presented the person, is not certaine in the first times, but it is cleare their Empire was absolute (I exclude not the bounds of justice according to the Lawes of right reason, and equity) usually knowne by the name of [...], in which arbitria principum pro legibus erant. Though this continued long in the world, and the Easterne people enjoyed a great measure of happinesse under it, and therefore with great reason (to use the expression of Tacitus) addictè admodum regnaban­tur. they were subject most devoutly; yet the sense of some sufferings (as the fate of humane things is interwoven with a mixture of good and evill) suggested a remedy, which was to bound his power within the limits of positive Lawes. From hence proceeded the different qualifications of Regall power in severall Kingdomes. Some, though restrained by Lawes, yet were truly Monarchs, [...], being not responsable for any breaches, as supreame, though not absolute: others had the name and title of Kings only, but were subject to a superiour jurisdiction, as Theseus to the people, the Spartan Kings to the Ephori, It is not necessary to determine that question, whether the frequent debates about the not observation and the breach­es of these agreements, (which, a discontented part of the peo­ple challenging the liberty of being Judges in this case, and the King thinking he had as much right, did produce civill warres, and most unnaturall distractions) have not heretofore, and will probably hereafter make States more unhappy then they were even in their worst times, and when they suffer'd most under the abuses of one mans power, whilest there was, though some­times an unjust, yet alwayes a certaine way of ending contro­versies; when a sentence, if it did not finde, yet made a right, and res judicata pro veritate accipiebatur. To decide this, I say, is not altogether necessary, because the obligations which [Page 30] lye both on King and people have their strength from this, not that he might better governe the people in such or such a way, but because this particular government is established by the con­sent of both parties; their wills give the forme to the regi­ment, and not the conveniences of it. To come nearer home, and grant as much as reasonable men, and those which under­stand the nature of government can require. For I thinke they doe ill service to the cause, though with good affections, who out of a desire to make it more firme and stronger, place it upon any other then the naturall foundation, and that which is onely fit to support it, and take the rights which God gave to the Kings of Judah, for the measure of all regall authority, which if they were, all Kings would have equall power, but this evi­dently varyes according to different Lawes, and is more or lesse according to severall constitutions. That which is pleaded for in this discourse, as common to them and our Kings, is onely jus regni, the right of Monarchy, not to be accomptable to any inferiour jurisdiction.

I shall not deny, a Kingdome may be so constituted (but then it is no Monarchy) that upon a reall breach of such or such conditions, named in the compact, and a forfeiture being ex­pressed, the sword of Justice may be taken up by some Magi­strates, appointed by law, as the Ephori amongst the Lacedaemo­nians; or by the people, as at Rome when the last appeale did legally lye unto them, (for it did not alwayes, as when a Dicta­tor was created, he was the whole people for six moneths, and though the time of his reigne was limited, his power was not bounded, he was [...], accomptable to none for what he did in his regency, no, not when a private man again: and so under the Emperours, as appeares by the Lex Regia, quoted by Ʋlpian, which transferred all the peoples power upon him, (L. quod. D. de constit. prin.) A mistake upon this hath sedu­ced so many of the Kings Subjects into Rebellion. For because it is made appeare a State may be so established, and they are induced to beleeve, it is more reasonable it should be so establi­shed; upon these premises they conclude most inconsequently, that our State is so established, and in the strength of this fight [Page 31] against His Majestie, and did their best to kill Him, contrary to Gods ordinance, applyed to our civill constitutions, and repug­nant to their owne oath, in which they swore to be loyall in reference to His Person, and that they would defend His life with their utmost power.

That a Kingdome may be so established, a considering man will not gainsay. If the State of Venice should call their Duke King, this new name would not convey any new power into him. Election or succession cannot rule the case; for an ele­ctive Kingdome may be conferred absolutely, as will appeare in the Roman Empire, and a successive may be subject to forfei­ture, if this be exprest in the Covenant. For succession is not a new title to more right, but a legall continuance of what was first gotten.

2. That it is more reasonable so to establish a Kingdome, that the Prince shall be accomptable to a higher power, either placed in some Magistrates, or in the people, (and then by the way it is not a Monarchy, but either an Aristocracy or a popular State) though this be very false, yet if it were true, it cannot justifie this warre now undertaken as things are ordered in this Land, against the King. Because Policy is no dispensation a­gainst observing knowne Lawes, and we may not destroy our Governours out of reason of State; Machiavell must not give Law to the Gospell. If we might challenge such liberty, there were not such a thing as Justice, our oaths would be of no force against Interest; profit should be the measure of our actions, and we must conclude all right what ever was advantageous. Since then not such persons as they could better fancy, but those onely whom the Law hath consided in, and enabled to that end, can put Armes into the hands of the people, it concernes every man, as much as his soule is worth (for that will certain­ly be lost in those great sinnes of Rebellion, Perjury, and Mur­ther) sadly to examine whether to fight against the King, be not to resist the Supreame Power, to which God hath threatned damnation.

Every State hath a supereminent dominion or paramount in­terest over all particular men, and what belongs to them, and [Page 32] consequently hath full power to restraine the licence of resist­ing, for the preservation of order and publique tranquillity. That it should lay such an obligation upon all Subjects, Non-resistance to the supreame power, essenti­all to the preservation of order. there is evident reason, because what the supreame power, that is the State (in order to those things wherein supremacy consists) does, is truly the act of all, and none can have just cause of quar­rell for dislike of what they themselves doe; and moreover necessity inforces it. Because without this the essence and be­ing of a State were destroyed, which is, Order. For this cea­ses▪ if first and last be confounded, and the Citie is dissolved in­to a multitude, and that which should be one body, becomes so many independent men.

The benefits which are conveyed to us by men in authority, are described by Timothy 1.. 2. 2. and he calls them the leading of a quiet and peaceable life in all godlinesse and honesty. It is not imaginable how they should be enabled to compasse this end, except some sentence be supreame, from which it shall not be lawfull to appeale; and consequently except that power which Law armes, and which lookes to the execution of what is de­creed, be not to be resisted. For if it should be indulged to us to change our Adversary, and fall out with the Judge, and as oft as we thinke we suffer wrong by his determination, to take the freedome of righting our selves, upon this ground, that his duty is to give righteous judgement, and therefore not satisfying that trust, he is no longer a Judge, then just; his sentence ought not to be submitted to, for we are not bound to be obedient to his will, but law; if he endeavour to put it in execution by himselfe or his ma­lignant Officers; though we kill him, it is no fault, because vio­lence was offered onely to his person, not to his authority, which was none in this case, because he judged against Law, and that gives not power to its owne overthrow; it is evident this princi­ple makes our strifes and debates endlesse, all our Lawes would be writ in bloud; it breakes in sunder all the bonds with which the goodly frame of government is knit together, and robbes us of our peace under Anarchy and confusion. Out of this consi­deration the wisedome of all States hath thought it fit to secure the person or persons in whom the supreame power is seated, [Page 33] by the strictest Lawes, and most severe punishment, which can­not consist with a liberty of resistance, to the indangering his or their lives. By the Civill Law, a Souldier was cashiered, not if he did strike againe, but if he onely kept off some strokes, and held the rod of a Centurion; but if he broke it willingly, or of­fered the least violence, he was sacrificed to the Roman disci­pline, and expiated his offence by death. Certainly the people would have nourished in their breasts a greater reverence, and more awfull respects towards Majestie, if they had not beene ill catechized and taught, that Dei minister est nobis in bonum, He is the Minister of God, might be construed, the Peoples servant; and that a King is but their creature, and therefore in duty is bound to submit to his maker.

The truth is, we finde it called by Peter [...]; the people have a hand in it, this cannot be denied, but we have it in the same verse raised into a divine workemanship, The King is Des Minister, not the peoples servant, not their creature. [...], acknowledge your selves to be subject, submit to the King, or breake not order, in which he is first or supreame, for the Lords sake: 1 Pet. 2. 13. The worke is taken out of their hands, when they have contributed as much as they were able, which was to give up their divided powers, and unite them in him; their act made him the fountaine of all that pow­er which they had, and by consequence the fountaine of all ho­nour, that alwayes bearing proportion to the former; for to honour is nothing else, but to testifie by our actions an opinion of so much or so great power in any one, and therefore the same act is exprest onely in different words, Feare God, honour the King: v. 17. If they had beene changed to honour God, feare the King, they had signified the same duty. And there­fore it is said, Servants be subject to your masters with all feare: v. 18. The worke I say is taken out of the peoples hands, and God himselfe perfects it. If it had stayed there, if God had not pleased to adde to, and finish it, yet it had beene most true, that no resistance were lawfull; and evidently false, that he were universis minor, because he that hath supreame, that is, all their power, is the representative all, he is legally the whole people. But the obligation of not resisting is infinitely more weighty, if [Page 34] we consider him not onely as representing the people, but as representing God himselfe. The King Gods representative, aswell as the peoples. He hath given to him a power of a much higher nature, a part of his dominion over the life of man. The people could not agree together to dispence with Gods precept, Thou shalt not kill, nor distinguish shedding bloud with the sword of vengeance from murther. Power over the life of man, from God one­ly, not from the people. It was not possi­ble for any man to give away a greater right over his owne life then he had, Nemo plus juris ad alium transferre potest, quàm ipse habet; and he had nothing to doe in the disposall of any others, and therefore except killing a mans selfe be lawfull, the people cannot enable the Magistrate to take away their lives. Hence it followes, though that be lamentable Sophistry in ma­ny respects, Quicquid efficit tale, est magis tale, urged to main­taine a cleare contradiction, that Subjects are above him whom they have placed over them; yet if it were sound reason, it were a very impertinent argument, because it proceeds upon a false supposall, that the people should efficere talem. Because jus gladii, (to beare the sword innocently, and to cut off offen­ders without deserving greater punishment then they inflict, by transgressing against Gods knowne will, Vindicta mea, ego retribuam, Vengeance is mine, I will repay saith the Lord,) must referre to God as the author. Magistrates are [...], Gods Delegates, and not the peoples; [...], [...], Gods Ministers, his revengers, (or as it is better without a comma,) his revenging Ministers to execute wrath. It is very strange the people should be so much abused, as to be perswa­ded to take upon them Gods Prerogative, and to usurpe his language. Psal. 82. 6. We have said, ye are Gods; and to con­tradict Christ, who sayes to his unjust Judge, Thou couldest have no power to take away my life, unlesse it were given thee from above: but they state it otherwise, unlesse it were given thee from beneath, from us, and we were not so mad as to con­tract for our owne ruine.

Most of their Writers in their printed Sermons and Pamph­lets, declaime against this tame behaviour, this obligation not to resist, as an absurd and sencelesse thing, and a condition re­pugnant to mans nature, and unworthy of reasonable creatures; [Page 35] but I must tell them God was not of their opinion, who thought it fit to governe his owne people in this way: who ever was not obedient to what the highest authority did deter­mine, Gods owne people bound not to resist the supreame Ma­gistrate; there­fore this no ab­surd constitu­tion. was to die, as appeares Deut. 17. 12, 13. The man that will doe presumptuously, and will not hearken to the Priest, (that standeth to minister there before the Lord thy God) or unto the Judge, even that man shall die, and thou shalt put away the evill from Israel. God commands he should be made an example, that the people may not be tempted to Rebellion; for in the 13 verse it is said, All the people shall heare and feare, and doe no more presumptuously. It is worth our notice that here all the people are mentioned; if they had agreed together to resist not a pretended, but a reall false sentence, this conspi­racy could not turne their sedition into a just warre, it could not take off the guilt of disobedience, though the multitude of offendors might hinder the punishment; Populi salus, suprema lex, had beene but a weake plea here.

This is urged onely to prove thus much, that all their argu­ments (which have greatest influence upon the peoples affecti­ons) drawne from inconveniencies by reason of the faults of Governours (under which the Jewish Commonwealth fre­quently suffered, as appeares by the Prophets reprehensions) may as justly be made against the Jewish Government, of which God himselfe was the author. And that he forbade resistance to supreame authority is plaine moreover, the first of Joshua, v. 18. Whosoeuer he be that doth rebell against thy commande­ment, and will not hearken to thy words in all that thou comman­dest him, he shall be put to death: onely be strong and of a good courage. Hence the weakenesse of that Sophistry (which hath caused these sad distractions) is evident. For they perswade the people, it were madnesse to make such a contract, which upon supposall of bad Governours would leave them without remedy, and therefore [...]it for certaine truth they made their bargaine wiser. Whereas there is no ground for imputation of folly, for following Gods owne patterne, and yet if it were in­discretion, this doth not void the compact: They are bound to [Page 36] be honest, though they were not wise; to plead they were fooles, will not licence them to be knaves.

Lex Regni, as it is called, 1 Sam. 10. 25. the fundamentall Law of Government, (of which a Monarchy is but a species) or the right of supreame authority is most excellently described by Samuel, in the 1. Booke, 8. cap. 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17. verses. This shall be the right of the King that shall reigne over you: He will take your sonnes and appoint them for himselfe, for his cha­rets, and to be his horsemen, and some shall runne before his cha­rets. And he will appoint him Captaines over thousands, and Captaines over fifties, and will set them to eare his ground, and to reape his harvest, and to make his instruments of warre, and in­struments of his charets. And he will take your daughters to be confectionaries, and to be cookes, and to be bakers. And he will take your fields, and your vineyards, and your olive-yards, even the best of them, and give them to his servants. And he will take the tenth of your seed, and of your vineyards, and give to his offi­cers and to his servants. And he will take your men servants, and your maid servants, and your goodliest young men, and your asses, and put them to his worke. Hee will take the tenth of his sheepe, and ye shall be his servants. And ye shall cry out in that day because of your King which ye shall have chosen you, and the Lord will not heare you in that day. It is not lawfull for you to breake that yoake which ye put upon your selves, neither shall your teares prevaile with God to take it off your neckes: not­withstanding such afflictions were fore-told, their resolution is, to have a King over them, that they also may be like all the Na­tions, and that their King may judge them, and goe out before them, and fight their battailes. Sit incommodum, we acknow­ledge these are grievous inconveniences, (nam quid ferè undi­que placet, it is the fate of all governments, because managed by men, who may prove vitious, to be unavoidably subject to great calamities) verùm illud compa [...]imus commodis, we have weighed the advantages of being ruled by a King, and conceive the probable goods which are conveyed from Regall governe­ment, which are knowne by experience in other Nations, will [Page 37] over-ballance these accidentall evils, however we are resolved to venture it.

A misunderstanding this part of Scripture hath opened a way to two dangerous extreames, which are both false, and have produced unhappy consequences. From hoc erit jus regis▪ some conclude his will is his Law; and quicquid libet, licet; but this is clearely convinced in the 17 of Deuteronomy, where the duty of their King is described, from the 16 verse to the end of the chapter.

Others make it a bare prophesie of the tyrannicall abuse of power by the King which they should choose, (if so, the peo­ple had small reason to shout for joy at his Inauguration; and secondly, this was not fulfilled in Saul, for though he proved a Tyrant, yet not in all these particulars) and so they confound jus with factum. But it cannot be found in any author that ever jus was taken in this sense, Mischpat will not beare this signifi­cation. When Theeves take away mens goods or their lives, it might as properly be said, hoc est jus Latronum, this is the right which robbers have.

To finde out the true meaning, The true sence of jus Regis in Samuel. we must know, that this law was not given as a rule for him to command, but for the people to obey by; it did not excuse him from sinning, but disabled them from punishing him for his offences: and therefore it is said, when the solemnity of his Inauguration was ended, Lo­quutus est Samuel ad populum legem regni, he spake not to the King, but applyed himselfe to the people, and declared their duty. This was not what he ought to do, but what they ought to suffer, when a King swerved from that rule by which he was bound to governe. For his duty was well knowne, being laid downe many ages before by Moses, and written in the booke which Moses commanded the Levites to keepe in the side of the Arke of the Covenant, that it might be there for a testimony a­gainst transgressors: Deut. 31. 36. so that this bindes the peo­ple not to resist, though they are oppressed; wherefore the close of it is, since there is no helpe in man, they must onely cry unto the Lord: 1 Sam. 10. 18. This signification is confir­med by the Civill Law, where we are informed, jus praetor [Page 38] reddit, etìam cùm iniquè discernit; the meaning of it is explai­ned, relatione scilicet factà non ad id, quod ita praetor fecit, sed ad illud quod praetorem facere convenit: L. jus plur. D. de just. & jur. And in this sense, summum jus is sometimes summa inju­ria.

It were happy for all States, if the people were fully instru­cted in this Text, and could distinguish Potestatem imperii ab officio imperantis, the right to governe, from government ac­cording to right. For the former is obligatory and stands in full force, though he be defective in the latter.

This middle way, inter abruptam contumaciam, & deforme obsequium, neither guilty of stubborne disobedience, or servile complyance, is very safe and honest. For it acknowledges he that hath supreame authority, is subject to some lawes (for it was truly said by Harmenopulus, [...], and that of the Emperours is fit to be observed, Digna vox est majestate regnantis, legibus alligatum se principem profi­teri. Adeo de auctoritate juris nostra pendet auctoritas: & re­verâ majus imperio est, submittere legibus principatum. l. 4. c. de legibus.) But he is not subject to any Judge upon earth, be­cause he hath no superiour. This the Graecians called [...], a government not accomptable to men; and they opposed [...] such a Monarchy [...], to such Rulers as were responsable: Ambrose expresses it by non ullis ad poenam vocari legibus, tutos imperii potestate. The reason of these constitutions was grounded upon necessity, which infor­ced them to place an impunity somewhere, for avoiding con­fusion. A necessity to grant impunity to some in all governments, to avoid con­fusion. For a circle in government would be infinitely absurd, and of pernicious consequences, when Rulers are placed over us, to challenge a right to rule those Rulers. The Poët very wisely was at a stand:

But these men runne round till they are giddy, all the foundati­ons of government being moved by them, and put out of course. Because they have not setled [...], as Galen calls it, a supreame power, to whose sentence the last resort must be, [Page 39] and whose determination jus facit, that is, though it should swerve from the rule of justice, yet it must have the effect of right; it is binding to all, they cannot call him to accompt for it, and make him responsable for the wrong. His authority is a guard to his person; and though he chance to doe some things not innocently, (for he ought to be guided by the lawes of ho­nesty given to mankinde, and to observe his oath and promises) yet he must doe all safely, because he cannot be punished by any Nationall Law. This impunity makes all resistance which may any way indanger his person unlawfull. David clearely determines the case. Destroy him not, saith he to Abishai, the reason of this ne perdas is now of full force, and tyes up the hands of inferiours in every State: For who can stretch forth his hands against the Lords anointed, and be guiltlesse? 1 Sam. 26. 9. The substance of this anointment, which makes their persons sacred, and not to be touched with violence, remaines even where the Ceremony is not practised. For it is nothing else but jus regnandi, the right of supremacy, a true title to reigne over them; and therefore Cyrus a Heathen King is cal­led Gods Anointed: Es. 45. 1. though the material ceremony of powring oyle upon him, was not in use amongst the Persi­ans. It is a metaphoricall expression of supereminency, taken from that quality of oyle, which is, when it is mixed with o­ther liquours, to be uppermost.

The Fathers unanimous glosse (which certainly ought to beare greater sway in our actions, then the authority of those men, not knowne to us, but as the causes of our misery) upon Davids confession, Against thee, thee onely have I sinned; Psal. 51. 4. pleads for this impunity. Notwithstanding he had abu­sed Ʋriah's wife, and contrived the death of so gallant a man, who forgot what was dearest to him next unto the Kings ho­nour, and would not goe in unto his wife, untill the Kings ene­mies were destroyed; yet he saith, in the height of his humili­ation, he had sinned against God onely, because there was no Tribunall amongst men to which he was responsable. Our Common Law seemes to expresse it selfe in the same sense, le Roy ne fa tort, the King can doe no wrong; Though we may [Page 40] suffer undeservedly, yet no sense of injuries received can dis­pence with the obligation of not righting our selves by force.

I have done with my proofes out of the Old Testament, and I desire my readers to weigh how much is concluded, lest they should thinke the application hollow, because all Kings have not the same rights which belonged to the Kings of Israel.

First therefore it hath beene shewed, How much is concluded out of the old Te­stament to the present case. to restraine this liberty of resistance, is a wise government, because of Gods owne in­stitution; and so that temptation which hath strong influence upon many, ought to cease; that it is folly to contract to be obedient in such a way, as may leave them without remedy for great grievances.

And secondly it is evidenced, that the same power which the Judges before, and the Kings of Israel after had, is in every State somewhere, that jus consistens in impunitate delictorum, a right of not being accomptable for their actions, which fences the person or persons in whom suprema dominatio is, and secures them (as strongly as Lawes can doe) from all violence, is either in one man (so alwayes in a Monarchy) or in a certaine body, whose power though abused, must give Law (in order to non-resistance) to all inferiours.

There is a possibility of suffering very great inconveniences, without any lawfull meanes of redresse: It is an unhappy con­dition we shall live in, if he or they should be Tyrants, and take delight in our oppression. But we cannot helpe it, God out of his dominion might thus dispose of our fortunes and lives, and he declares his pleasure so to doe, and therefore we must choose the least evill, which is, not to resist, and by endeavou­ring to save our goods or bodies, to loose our soules. Certainly if we were as truly religious as we would be thought to be, we have not any cause to be troubled, though these things should happen to us. No hard Law to require from us Non-resist­ance. If our patience in submission to his precept be chargeable, we make God our debtor; all the taxes and tributes are put upon his accompt, and he will returne them in as plen­tifull measure, as if we had spent so much charitably, (and we cannot lay out our estate better.) The Magistrate is Gods re­ceiver, as well as the poore. He commands part of our reve­nues [Page 41] in him, in those he seemes to intreat: that is to pay debts, this comes nigher to a courtesie, and therefore we might better excuse our uncharitablenesse, then our resistance. But what if their cruelty extend to the farthest, and endeavour to take away our lives wrongfully?

These are justly deare to men, and much is done to draw out a few yeares, (notwithstanding our comforts are interwoven with sorrowes, our feares are oftentimes above our hopes, most of our dayes are cloudy, and over-cast with melancholyes, and the discontents arising from our wants (which are as vast and unbounded as our desires to have) are much greater then the narrow pleasures of enjoyment, which is confined to a few things, the stroaking of fortune being not so delightfull, as her blowes are grievous:) but what value ought we then to set upon eternall life? how highly ought we to prize those ever­lasting joyes, which still quicken, and still satisfie the appetite, and what should we not suffer, rather then forfeit these? This is the present case, He that by resisting saves his life, (a doubt­full good, and of no long continuance) looses that happy be­ing, to which God hath promised to such as submit to his com­mands, and he that looses his life is a great gainer, he falls a Martyr of justice, and shall be raised a Saint into glory.

The same obedience which God required of the Jewes under the Law to be shewne to their Judges and Kings, The same duty of Non-resist­ance injoyned by Christ in the Gospell. and as high a degree of patience Christ injoynes his followers under the Gospell, towards the highest powers. And there is great rea­son wee should performe this duty more cheerefully, because our Saviour hath commended persecution to all those who will live godly, and that both by precept and example. His method was, facere & docere, he began to doe and teach; and it is not much different in the end, docere & pati; to teach patience, and confirme his doctrine by his suffering: wee must take out the same lesson, for the promise is conditionall, [...], if we suffer with him, then (and not else) shall we also reigne with him, Rom. 8. 17. Rebellion in Christians is a most prodigious thing, wee having plaine and peremptory commands for obe­dience, and a certaine and ample requitall for all the charges of [Page 42] our honesty. That Heroicall speech of Socrates, [...], It is in their power to kill me, it is not in their power to hurt me, carryes in it the flame of true Religi­on; the Apostle expresses it higher, for us to die is gaine, Phil. 1. 21.

The Jewes wanted not some colours of reason to justifie their impatience in this case; The Jewes more excusa­ble in case of rebellion. for it was a strong temptation not to be willing to be cut off, when their blessings were tem­porall, the chiefe of them being length of dayes, and upon which all the rest depended, and must necessarily end with their lives. And yet they submitted to those Lawes, which entrusted their fortunes, and being in the hands of the supreame Magi­strate, Jos. 1. 18. This power in succeeding times was often a­bused to their destruction, and they gave themselves up to the slaughter, upon hopes not grounded in any set promise, but only in the free goodnesse of God, whom they thought to be a better master, then to let any man be the worse for doing him service.

But a Christian cannot have any shadow of scruple. Christians have not any colour for it. S ^t. Pe­ter failing in this duty by resisting the Magistrate in defence of his innocent Master, hath taken speciall care not to be imi­tated, and therefore informes us largely with the full extent of Christian patience. I will first lay downe the grounds for which our Saviour reprehended him, and I desire they may be serious­ly pondered by such as are more inexcusably faultie, and then I shall take his precepts into consideration. Much may be al­leadged in Peters justification, and yet all will not excuse him, Put up thy sword againe into his place, sayes Christ; if he do not, he threatens the punishment of murder to him, all they that take the sword, shall perish by the sword, Matth. 26. 52. It con­cernes them sadly to apply, who pretend resistance, but are re­ally invaders, and therefore cannot make so faire a plea. First, it was a sodaine and unexpected assault, no means of escape did appeare. Secondly, their violence armed with Swords and with Staves as against a thiefe, did evidently aime at the life of his Master; and he might not without reason suspect his owne in danger. Thirdly, he kept the lawes of that which is called [Page 43] inculpata tutela, innocent defence; he did it in the instant, not after deliberation, when he might have thought of other wayes of safetie, and he had no advantage of Weapon, and he did not kill outright, but only wounded a servant. Notwith­standing all this he is rebuked by Christ, who makes satisfaction for his offence by a miracle. And the sense of this correction made so deep an impression, that he after warned others of their duty, when they suffer in the like persecution. Let none of you suffer as a murderer, &c. yet if any man suffer as a Christian, let him not be ashamed; but let him glorifie God on this behalfe. For the time is come, that judgment must begin at the house of God. Wherefore let them that suffer according to the will of God, commit the keeping of their soules to him in well doing, as unto a faithfull creator, 1 Pet. 4. Though this might serve turne, yet he speakes more home in another place, Submit your selves to every Ordinance of man for the Lords sake, whether it be to the King as supreame, or unto Governours, as unto them that are sent by him for the punishment of evill doers, and for the praise of them that doe well. For so is the will of God, that with well doing, you may put to silence the ignorance of foolish men. As free, and not using your liberty for a cloake of maliciousnesse, but as the servants of God, &c. Feare God, honour the King. Servants be subject to your Masters with all feare, not only to the good and gentle, but also to the froward. For this is thank-worthy, if a man for conscience towards God, indure griefe, suffering wrongfully. For even hereto were you called. Because Christ al­so suffered for us, leaving us an example, that yee should follow his steps who did not sinne, neither was guile found in his mouth, 1 Pet. 2.

The case of resistance is here inforced as highly as favoura­ble circumstances can raise it, The case of re­sistance infor­ced with grea­test advanta­ges, yet con­demned. and when the most plausible limi­tations are put in, yet it is concluded unlawfull; we must sub­mit as Christ did, though we should be as innocent as he was, and though vires non deessent, wee were sure to make good our opposition; for he could have summoned an army of Angells in his defence: wee are bound to submit not only to justice, but to injuries also, and to be obedient as to good and gentle masters, [Page 44] so likewise to the froward, to bad as well as good Kings, their failing of their duty, not licensing us not to performe ours, nor dispensing with our loyalty. This is evident, because the rea­sons annexed equally inforce this duty in Subjects as in Ser­vants. Though liberty be our birthright, yet it must not be made the cloake of sin, it takes not off those bonds with which God hath tyed up our hands from fighting against the supream power. No lifting up private swords against the sword of ju­stice, ours against Gods weapon, Deus resistet, wee shall have an ill match of it.

It is well worth our observation, that though the Apostles maine worke was heaven, yet they are very sollicitous to settle our quiet upon earth, by enforcing obedience unto govern­ment. Saint Paul delivers the mind of God most fully, most plainely. He could not have expressed the duty of Subjects more punctually, if he had lived in these last and worst times, wherein his doctrine seemes a kind of tame folly; as once much learning, now much Religion hath made him mad. Our Savi­ours prophecy is fullfilled, of faith failing amongst men, they thinke it unreasonable, to be bound to submit to certaine pre­sent evills, out of hopes of future good, and to be abused by bad Magistrates, upon expectation to be righted hereafter; & chari­ty waxeth cold, it must no longer be ranked amongst Christian duties to preferre publique good to private interest, the peace of the Church, and tranquillity of the State to our owne profit or safety. No, we must stand fast in the libertie, wherewith Christ hath made us free. We are not so indiscreet to submit to any triall by law, because we may meet with corrupt Judges; patro­cinium peccati, multitudo peccantium, our number ought to make us safer then innocence can them; it is madnesse to be hanged, when we are more then those that should hang us; we may call our selves the commonwealth (for this is some where, and the lesser part hath lesse reason to challenge it to them­selves) and then Populi salus, Suprema lex, what ever condu­ces to our safety, becomes law to the Kingdome. If any malig­nant and ill affected persons object the breach of knowne lawes by us, we must tell them they are abrogated by equity, because [Page 45] if they should stand in force, they would destroy us. The truth is, these men antedate that prophecy of Christ (as they have done many besides) He shall put downe all rule, and all authority, and power. 1 Cor. 15. 24.

This is clearely done by their practise, Kings are dishonored in the feare of God, and I neede not say quid verba audio, cum facta videam, for their profest principles maintaine it. If they are not of the true religion, that is, make not the peoples opini­on their Creed, or if they do not governe to the advantage of the Saints, that is, joyne not with them in those designes which they christen Gods glory, and the great worke, the pious Reforma­tion, then because they are no longer Dei ministri in bonum, Gods ministers for their good, they are ipso facto discharged of their Magistracy; not Gods holy ones, but their owne vices have deposed them, and [...] their lawfull authority is not op­posed by them, but their persons only, they fight against the man, and not the Magistrate. This is the doctrine which hath produced such miserable things in the Christian world, to the ruine of many States, and what is more lamentable, the destru­ction of millions of soules. For upon those grounds many have beene induced to fight against God, and perished in their sin, and too many are so farre scandalized at it, that they suspect the truth of Christianity, concluding within themselves, that if we did really beleeve that Gospell, which we outwardly pro­fesse, and if we were perswaded those precepts laid downe by the Doctor of the Gentiles, ought to be the measure of our pra­ctise (for he injoynes subjection though to tyrants, for such were the Roman Emperours then, and the Kings in those times Reges gentium dominantur earum) the most wicked Magistrates, and those that tooke greatest delight in cruelty and oppression, will sooner be weary in doing injuries, then we could be in suf­fering.

Let every soule be subject unto the higher powers] [...], Paraphrase u­pon part of the 13 to the Rom. all are included, not any one can plead exemption, we may say with the Apostle, only he is excepted to whom every soule is subject. If every member should be commanded to be obedi­ent to the head, they could not lawfully oppose upon joynt con­sent, [Page 46] and ground their excuse upon a metaphisicall abstraction of the body from those of whom it is compounded. The rea­son is because the action of the body is constituted of the parti­cular acts of each member, the joyning of so many personall acts makes up the act of the civill body, and if it be a fault in any one, it doth not take of the guilt, that he sins in consort and of­fends with companie. This notion of universall speculatively distinguished from singulars is so farre from changing the mo­rall nature of actions, that the act of the body (which is crea­ted by law, and civilly compleated by the consent of a major part) may be sin, and yet many members, as the lesser part who do not contribute their votes, shall be innocent, because men are accomptable only for their personall deeds.

[...]] Let every one be subject, keepe under, in due rank and order. Now seeing that in all order there must be some first, all others must submit to this, and this non potest in ordinem cogi, ab aliquo, cannot be legally ordered by any, because there is not any upon earth, prior primo, before the first, and higher then the supreame. If he breake his order, he is responsable to him only that is above him, who is God.

These highest powers [...]. God is super deos, and orders them as he pleases. So that the wronged peo­ple must onely cry unto the Lord, as the Jewes were directed in their hard condition: And Saint Ambrosse is sensible of this obligation, repugnare non novi; dolere potero, potero flere, potero gemere, &c. aliter nec debeo nec possum resistere. Least Christi­ans should be more stiff-necked then the Jewes, who bore this heavy yoke, Saint Peter prescribes their behaviour and tells them it is a part of their calling (and unlesse they performe their vocation, they cannot make their election sure) to imitate Christ thus farre, who when he was reviled, reviled not againe, no disho­norable speeches, no reproachfull language from him, which yet falls short of the meditated malice of the pen, when he suffe­red he threatned not, no killing and slaying so much as in words, and no people can have greater innocence, and no Governour [Page 47] greater faults, but he committed himselfe to him that judgeth righteously. 1. Pet. 2.

[...] [unto the higher powers] Hereout they en­deavour to picke some advantage. for, say they, by the same Lo­gique, as we conclude impunity due to Kings, and so all resi­stance unlawfull, we must be forced to inlarge this priviledge, and communicate it to all Magistrates whatsoever, because they are higher powers also. But this immunity is overlarge by our owne confession, as repugnant to all States, and therefore seeing we cannot justifie the inference in its full latitude, we cannot reasonably collect any thing. These men strangely mistake the grounds of our deduction, their strong fancy against it, not per­mitting them to take the reason of it into due consideration, we confesse thus much is concluded for all Magistrates (such are they to whom the King delegates his authority) that it is not lawfull for any that are under them to make resistance; Lawfull to re­sist inferiour Magistrates if they oppose the supreame. as a pri­vate man may not oppose a Constable, nor a Constable a Justice of peace, nor he a Judge; So common Souldiers cannot punish a Lieutenant (except by vertue of a Commission from the Ge­nerall, and then they are above him, as being made Magistrates to execute martiall law upon him) nor he a Colonell, nor a Col­lonell the Generall, they being but private men in reference to one above them; and so Kings in Monarchies (and proportio­nably in Aristocracies those persons, in whom the supreame power is placed, which are the major part consenting) are not judicially accomptable to any, because they are the highest. Thus much Scripture evinces, the civill law confirmes, reason sug­gests, and the practise of all States hath imbraced it.

For there is no power but of God] Here is the cause of obedi­ence rendred, this right to governe, is not onely by his bare per­mission, so theft and murder are, but it is his constitution, and by vertue of this, the Apostle collects that honour is due to their persons. I have proved formerly that such power could not be, [...], unlesse it were of God; the people could not di­spense with divine precept, non occides, thou shalt not kill.

The powers that be, are [...], ordained or ordered of God. This is his ordinary providence by which he hath thought fit to [Page 48] governe the world, and we must submit to it, till he declare his will to the contrary; nothing can take off this obligation but ex­presse revelation. And we have some new Enthusiasts, who are going on to this height of fury; Methinkes it should startle all good men, to see some interpretations of obscure prophecies out of Daniell and the Apocalypse cast out to justifie the breach of plaine duties.

Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God;] Here is faire warning, take heed what ye do, you have a terrible enemy to encounter with, it is [...], a fight against God, You cannot flatter your selves with a prosperous issue, for those which resist shall receive to themselves damnation.

Lest any should be so miserably besotted with a senselesse distinction (as it is misapplied by them) of the authority from the person, as to incurre the danger of this fearfull comminati­on, Against that di­stinction of the authority from the person. he joynes them together and uses them promiscuously, and in the prosecution inforces that, by mentioning the persons, which before he had attributed to the powers. Whosoever re­sisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God, and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation; it immediately fol­lowes, For rulers [...], not [...], are not a terrour to good workes, but to the evill. Then he comes to the authority againe, wilt thou not be afraid of the power? doe that which is good and thou shalt have praise of the same; For he is the Minister of God to thee for good, there he concludes with the person.

Observe with what vehemence he repeates this duty, though fully delivered before, as if his mind misgave him concerning these rebellious times. Wherefore you must needs be subject. A necessity is laid upon us, and woe unto us, if we be not subject. we have two powerfull motives, not onely for wrath, but also for conscience sake. As for feare what the Prince may (for rebellion seldome prospers; Traitors are unfortunate gamesters, though they win at first, they are most commonly terrible loosers in the close) so what God will inflict. You have his word for it, you are damn'd if you resist.

Though Rebels should get the start by seizing his ammuniti­on, Forts, and Ships, and you have cause to thinke your loyalty [Page 49] will disadvantage you, when a King is in sight too weake; yet be wary what you doe, God oft times raises up strength to him, beyond mans expectation, and the event shewes, those which continue honest are most truly wise. The heads of the rebellion shall be brought to condigne punishment, and their memory be odious amongst all good men. 'Tis true, to be subject to pre­sent plunder is a strong temptation against duty (yet upon a ge­nerall survey ye shall find they take not much more from their enemies, God is to be reckoned of the Kings side, who will overbal­lance their grea­test forces. then they force their freinds to give; they have no great reason to brag of being savers, it hath cost them ve­ry round summes to loose their soules) But yee see how much the King indulges to this feare (I know not whether God will pardon so easily, for if feare of loosing by being honest be a good excuse for neglect of duty, hopes of gaining by playing the knaves, may as reasonably be pleaded) so unwilling is he a­ny should suffer for his sake. How often hath he beene pleased graciously to forgive, upon that easy excuse, they did not dare to be his freinds; that is, they were his enemies not out of spight and malice, but onely for their owne advantage; and he is con­tent, not any should loose for him. O let not his goodnes move you to have a hand or purse in the evills which are brought up­on him and the whole land. Betray not your bad tempers so [...]arre, that it should appeare you will do more for feare then love, lest your base natures may induce hereafter a stricter go­vernement, when experience doth demonstrate the worst ma­sters have the best servants. Let not his lenity, which doth de­serve to find friends, be the onely cause he hath so many ene­mies. If I must direct my speech as unto cowards (for you have no excuse for disloyalty, but your feares) consider with your selves, how God hath blessed his servant with three potent and successefull Armies (all of them raised with such disadvan­tages, as they clearly speake an immediate providence giving testimony to the sincerity of his many sacred protestations) beside many hopefull Seminaries in divers Countries, and thousands of gallant Gentlemen, and brave spirits in other Shires, now unfortunately situated (O tristi damnata loco) who wait for an oportunity to revenge their tame suffering hither­to, [Page 50] and the unworthy usage from fellow Subjects. If notwith­standing all this you could unreasonably flatter your selves with being the stronger side, yet you have juster and greater feares elsewhere, which ought to give Law to your cowardise, which hath betrayed your alleagiance. For what would it profit you, if you should save your houses from being plunder'd (though this is the most probable way to hazard your estates, which are forfeited to the King, cannot be escheated to them) and loose your soules, for which the whole world is but a base price? There is evident danger in fighting against the King, but the A­postle threatens certaine destruction because you fight against your owne consciences.

Their severall exceptions and corrupt glosses by which they endeavour to avoyd this plaine obligation of non resistance, I shall meet with in the fourth section.

The practise of primitive christians is a faithfull commenta­ry upon these texts. The duty not to resist proved further by the practise of the more innocent ages of the Church. And certainly their authority, (who wit­nesse to their owne disadvantage, teaching submission though to tyrants, under which they cheerefully suffered according to Christs example) ought to prevaile with us above any moderne writers, who have broached a doctrine (very seasonable for some places and occasions, but unknowne to those innocent times, when Christianity thrived upon suffering, and gained as much by patience, as it is likely to loose by stubbornnesse) that it is lawfull for inferior Magistrates, say some, (and this from the fundamentalls of government;) for the people, others, tells us, (and this from the law of nature) to right themselves by force, if the supreme Magistrate deny to do it, and so faile of that trust, which was committed to him for the good of others. These princi­ples lately taken up open a faire way for advancement of pri­vate ends, by disturbance of publique peace, either upon reall (which oft times are) or at least pretended faults in governours which shall never be wanting, whilst there are ambitious men who want preferment, and desire to have what others are pos­sest of, and make it a reasonable cause, to endeavour innovati­on, because they may be bettered by the change. In what an unhappy State do we live, if such a number (upon pretence we [Page 51] are not so well governed as we might be, that is, they have not so great a share in the government, as they could wish for, and since the greater part can never be satisfied, we cannot hope for peace and quiet) shall be enabled to force the King to recede from lawes and in the roome of those knowne and standing rules, to give us uncertaine temporary ordinances.

The Emperours were for the most part very bad, but especi­ally to the Christians they were hard masters. Though the Romans counted it the highest gallantry, to shake off the yoke when it galled them, and did oft rebell in the cause of liberty; (and it is a sad thing that this pagan bravery should be prefer­red to the tamenesse which Christ injoyned to his followers; of all good actions the murder of a tyrant is most commendable, sayes one. Euseb. Philad. dial. 2. And Buchanan thinkes it a defect in policy, that rewards are not allotted for such meritorious deeds) yet the Christians could never be tempted by their greatest sufferings to joyne in any conspiracy. Tertullian pro­fesses their innocency, and he is to be looked upon in this case, not as a single witnesse, but as one that wrote in the name of all; his Apologetique is the sence of the whole Church. We may be confident of the truth, because it was a matter of fact, and we have no reason to suspect he could be so vainly impudent as to present that in their justification, which must be evidently convinced of falsehood. He makes a bold challenge, and desires them to produce if they can one example of any Christian tak­ing part with rebells. Such as Cassius, Niger, Albinus, Clean­der, Aelius Letus, the Pretorian souldiers (who murdered Per­tinax) Stephanus, and Parthenius were. It is manifest these were not traitours out of wantonnesse, there were just grounds for heavy complaints under Domitian, Commodus and Septimi­us Severus, all bloudy tyrants. Yet the Christians were better catechised, then to thinke resistance lawfull, when they were oppressed by those whose duty it was to have protected them. Their unanimous confession is, nos judicium Dei suspicimus in imperatoribus, qui gentibus illos praefecit. I shall give you the sense of it at large. We kisse the hands which wound us; though they have not any cause to doe such things, yet there is [Page 52] too much cause why we should suffer them, we must acknow­ledge our sinns towards God, and he may punish them in what way he thinkes fit. We cannot deny, but we have deserved as great afflictions, and shall we, who are guilty be stubborne, when patience is required, though we were most innocent? The example of Christ is made our law, and in him no sin was found. We cannot suffer more, nor boast lesse demerit. If we did serioussly consider it, we could not hate the worst gover­nours, for we have no reason to be angry, because they do things to our advantage, and certaine it is, if we submit with patience, their sins further our salvation, their faults encrease our glory. What pitty is it, they should goe to Hell, for that which pro­cures us a higher place in heaven? Nay what uncharitablenesse is it in us, to cut them off in their sin, and so send them thither? And it is a sad meditation, to think that we shall follow; be­cause we could not indure their company here, we take a course to live together eternally miserable.

Cyprian inforces this meeknesse with excellent reason. God (saith he to Demetrian) is the revenger of his injur'd servants: in which this argument is implyed, Vengeance belongs unto the Lord, and except we can produce his Commission, our private justice will damne us; animam in vulnere, in our enemies wounds our soules will bleed to death: 'tis madnesse to strike, when we are certaine the blow will recoyle to our eternall de­struction. Therefore the Apostle commands, as we wish well to our selves, to recompence to no man evill for evill: Rom. 12. 17. Selfe-love is the motive why we should not hurt others. He exhorts by the naturall affection which is due to our selves, not to avenge our selves, [...], but rather to give place unto wrath: v. 19. The wisedome of God hath introduced an excellent temper in government, and such as the sence of great evils prevailed with men to esteeme very good, and con­firme it by their lawes. Private revenge unlawfull. Honorius and Theodosius tell us, judici­orum vigor, jurísque publici tutela videtur in medio constituta, ne quisquam sibi ipsi permittere valeat ultionem. That of Clau­dian is true in this sense also:

[Page 53] Injur'd men are over-passionate, and easily tempted to cruelty.

Upon these considerations God hath made revenge unlawfull, and beside this obligation of divine precept, our hands are tyed up as strongly as faith of promise can do it. This Covenant knits society, and cements the civill body. Though we do not onely fancy grievances (as the world is full of such mistakes) though we are really injured, yet it becomes injustice to right our selves. All the accompt we can give at Gods Tribunall, is one­ly this, we did not sinne first. And this plea will afford mise­rable comfort to be damn'd after another. That none might be tempted to strike, because others hands are bound up from re­turning the blow, God hath appointed a middle way to de­terre men from doing evill, for feare of suffering it in as high a degree. For Tertullian sayes true, disciplinae interest, injuriam vindicari. Metu enim ultionis omnis iniquitas refraenatur. The fountaine of our actions is the opinion we have of the good or bad, we shall receive by them; if they appeare certainly hurt­full, and that we shall suffer by so doing, we most commonly forbeare, I doe not say alwayes, because the will may thwart the understanding, else it were not free, and experience shew­eth, that sometimes a lesse good present, doth overweigh a fu­ture, though certaine greater evill. God will judge our cause, and revenge us upon wrong doers; but he performes this not immediately, but by his Magistrates. He delegates his autho­rity to them, and Saint Paul proclaimes their Commission in these words, There is no power but of God. Quicquid per offici­arios facit, per se facere videtur, what they doe are legally his acts, we have no right to reverse them by a strong hand. If an inferiour Magistrate gives false judgement, God grants a liberty of appeale to him in a higher Magistrate, if he confirme the former unjust sentence, it is lawfull to proceed by way of ap­peale, till we come to the highest; but then because God hath appointed a peaceable end of controversies, we must sit downe with the present losse, being fully assured God will judge this [Page 54] Judge; we shall have another day of hearing in Heaven, and all damages shall be amply repaid. If we did beleeve this, our un­naturall divisions would cease, that is, if we were truely Chri­stians, we would not doe as we have done, we could not resist the highest power. I have warrant to say it, Here is the pati­ence and faith of the Saints: Rev. 13. 10. they beleeved, there­fore they suffer'd.

Upon such considerations Cyprian grounds the duty, and shewes the practice of the Primitive Christians was very con­sonant. Inde est quòd nemo nostrum, quando apprehenditur, re­luctatur: nec se adversus injustam violentiam vestram, quam­vis nimius & copiosus noster sit populus, ulciscitur. For this cause not any one of us doth make resistance when you appre­hend him, nor revenge your unjust violence: Patientes facit de secuturâ ultione securitas. God is able to reward our pa­tience, and to requite all our sufferings. If we tooke delight in the misery of our persecutors, we might be abundantly com­forted. But alas we pitty them, and grieve more for their de­plorable condition, then our owne torments. God will avenge our innocent bloud more severely, then any good man can wish for. Tertullian expresses the same in his eloquent manner. Sa­tis idoneus patientiae sequester Deus est. Our goods are not taken away, they are sequestred for our benefit, and intrusted in safe hands, God keepes them for our use and will returne them with ample increase. Si injuriam deposueris penes eum, ultor est, if you will not fight, he will undertake your quarrell, and you need not doubt but your enemies will be soundly worsted; Si dolorem, me­dicus est, your wounds shall save you, Si mortem, resuscitator est, if you fall a Martyr, you shall rise a Saint. Quantum patientiae li­cet, ut Deum habeat debitorem? what cannot our sufferings doe? they make even God our debtor; he owes us heaven for our selves, and he owes us Hell for our enemies, but we breath out our soules in prayer, that he may be intreated not to pay this.

The Example of the Thebane Legion commands our imitati­on in the like cause. It is one of the noblest passages in all the ecclesiasticall story, wherein Christianity did shine forth in its full lustre, and it affords plentifull light for our direction. This [Page 55] band consisted of almost 7000 men, all Christians. when the Emperour Maximian commands the whole Army to offer Sa­crifice to false Gods, they remove their quarters, that they might avoid if it were possible this occasion of discontenting the Em­perour. He summons them to performe their parts in this de­vilish worship. They are forced to returne an humble deniall, and their resolution not to disobey God, for whose sake they had ever beene and would continue faithfull servants to him. The Emperour unsatisfied with this answer, puts them to a de­cimation; They submit with much cheerefulnesse, and dy pray­ing for their murderer. After this sad spectacle his commands are renewed, but prevaile nothing upon the remainder. Where­fore they also are butchered without the least resistance; There was no delay in their death, except from the wearinesse of the executioners. This was truly to confesse him, who was led as a sheepe to the slaughter, and like a lambe opened not his mouth, and they a flocke of his fold, were quietly devoured by rave­ning wolves. The Commander of this Regiment, Maurice could not containe his joy, when he had seene the first decima­tion gallantly suffered. How fearefull was I, sayes he to his sur­viving souldiers, (for armed men may be tempted to defend themselves) lest any of them upon colour of just resistance for selfe preservation in an innocent cause, should have strugled a­gainst this blessed slaughter. I was watchfull, and had Christs example in readinesse, who commanded his disciple to put his sword into his scabberd. Salus vestra non periclitabitur, nisi vestris armis, if you use not your weapons, I have Gods owne warrant for your safety.

Despaire it selfe could not conquer one single patience, which yet creates valour in cowards, and makes them more couragious in such extremities, because they are fearefull; Since they are likely to endeavour most to preserve life; who are most terrified with death.

It would be more wearisome to me, then delightfull, or pro­fitable to the Reader, to inlarge my proofes by that plenty of au­thorities, which offer themselves in the ancient Fathers and ma­ny Councels. The truth is, the labour is needlesse, their practise [Page 56] is so evident, that the greatest friends to Rebellion, will not betray so much ignorance as to deny it. They are forced to grant that they doe such things, as those great lights of the Church, those holy men, though infinitely more oppressed then they can pretend to, durst not venture on. Thus farre we both agree. But why durst not? Here they shew themselves; not because to resist Tyrants would have beene a wicked, but a vaine attempt; vires deerant, they were not able to go through with a Rebellion; what the Heathens admired as extraordina­ry goodnesse (many of them being converted by this religious confidence, reasonably concluding, men that approved them­selves very prudent in all other matters, Not want of strength the cause of their patience. could not be guilty of such madnesse as to die thus, unlesse they had good hopes to be recompenced in another life) these fomenters of strife call weakenesse, to the unspeakable scandall of such as have a true sense of godlinesse. It is an insufferable blemish to their inno­cence, and staines the pretious memory of those blessed Mar­tyrs. If this were indeed true, that they wanted not will, but power to destroy, we can hardly blame their persecutors, who thought it wisedome to prevent the blow by striking first: it seemed but killing the Cockatrice in the egge; they had small encouragement to cherish frozen Serpents in their bosome, who when they had recovered warmth and strength, would dart their poysonous sting at their preservers. Certainely they had an extraordinary confidence they should prevaile, else they would never so openly have discovered such principles, and in­structed States to provide better for their security hereafter, by utter disabling them to do any hurt. These men cry out against Popery, and yet professe what all good Protestants esteeme the most malignant part of Jesuitisme. If this evasion will not hold, they know not what to say for themselves, and it may clearely be convinced of falshood. For this very objection is made by the Ancients, and answered to our hands by themselves. So carefull were they that posterity might not mistake their goodnesse, and thinke it nothing else but an impotency to do evill. The Fathers speeches, which witnesse sufficient strength, if reli­gion had not tyed their hands, cannot be imputed to any over­reaching [Page 57] or lying to gaine reputation to their sufferings (as M ^r Goodwin insinuates in his Anticaval. and we shall anon take no­tice of it) our enemies would be extreamely glad to see their owne art thus credited. But we have no reason to conceive them so impudent, and we may be certaine, they were not so mad, as to face downe the Emperour, and their other potent ad­versaries (who would make great advantage of their so mani­fest untruths) by affirming what they must evidently discerne false, and could not choose but see the contrary.

Cyprian saith expressely, Quamvis nimius & copiosus noster sit populus, though we have competent forces more then enough to do the businesse, yet we wrestle not with our oppressors &c. The Theban Legion was in a posture of resistance, but they durst not lift up those hands into which the Emperour had put wea­pons, against his personall commands, though most unjust, most bloody. six thousand six hundred, and sixty six men of such extraordinary valour, as did not entertaine the least feare of death might probably have conquered (and this cruelty might have increased their party by the defection of male-con­tents) but they must certainely have made some sport for their lives, they could not have wanted that comfort, which to some tasts is beyond the pleasure of life, to die revenged. Besides had not the Emperour and his under princes known them true Christians, and beene acquainted with the tamenesse of that profession, towards the highest power, he would never have hazarded a rebellion by making so considerable an army despe­rate.

I will conclude this with Tertullian, who argues very hand­somely, after he had spoken to this sence; we are so numerous you can hardly see one another for Christians, cui, inquit, bello non idonei, non prompti fuissemus, etiam impares copiis, qui tam libenter trucidamur? Though we had not the advantage of number, Which yet you perceive we have, numeri damnum virtus pensaret, courage would supply this defect, and though fewer, since we contemne our owne lives, we might be masters of yours. We could undoe you, not if we should rebell, but if we would be idle; we do not fright you so much, as to desire [Page 58] you, to fancy us fighting against you, you were lost if we did not fight for you. What would become of you, if we should turne Separatists? Si tanta vis hominum, if such multitudes as we are should breake out from amongst you into any corner of the world, your Empire would sinke for want of strength to support it. Your Cities would seeme deserts without us &c. in that thin remainder you would have many enemies, though but few men. Even now they would rebell, if they were not awed multitudine Christianorum, paene omnium civium, by those multitudes of us, who are of some ranke, almost all of us citi­zens, and almost all the citizens are of us. Our example invites some to obedience, others feare our readinesse to be command­ed to reduce them to due subjection. In Apologetico. I may adde his other speech in the same place, vestra omnia implevi­mus, we have filled your Cities, nay castra ipsa, your very camps would be empty without us Christians. It is not possible to bring in more expresse, more clear testimonies in any matter, it is too probable, such as have made a search, are blinded with interest, and shut their eyes that they may not see this truth. I know not how to excuse Bellarmine, Alane, Ficlerus, Siman­cha, Buchanan, Hottoman, Knox, Brutus, for these were schol­lers; and therefore not so likely to be deceived themselves in such an easie truth, as upon designe to deceive others. But I have a more charitable opinion of most of those men, with whom we have to deale, though some have discovered plenty of malice, yet they are very few, of whom we can say, ad ever­tendam rempublicam sobrii accesserunt. Some are Enthusiasts, and mistake their owne fancy for the Spirit, and the greater part do this mischeife out of ignorance, drawing out of broken ci­sterns, the seditious writings of the Roman and the Reformed Jesuites, and transcribing one another, and so are taught and reach to despise dominion, and speake evill of those things which they know not.

§. 3.

I Make no question the proposition is now evident, that the supreme power in any State (let it be where it will, some­where it must be, for else it were an Anarchy, and no govern­ment) ought not to be resisted. This makes rebellion sin, as trans­gressing divine and humane lawes. In the next place, for the perfect direction of conscience, Most necessary to know the subject of Su­premacy. wee must examine, in whom the supreme power is placed; a mistake in this is as dange­rous, as an errour in the former. For as zeale, which is not ac­cording to knowledge, is impiety; for though it have the heat, it hath not the light, which is required to true devotion; so the most scrupulous obedience is but humble rebellion, if it be misplaced, and yielded to fellow Subjects against him who hath jus regnandi, the right to command them. Thus in an A­ristocracy to aide one man against the Senate, is Treason a­gainst the State, and in a Monarchy (because the constitution is different, and places the supreme power in one) to aide the Senate (of which that one is the head, and opposed to him, they are but a livelesse trunk in order to those things to which his influence is necessary, Fortescue warrants the expression, sine capite communitas non corporatur) against the Monarch and supreame Ruler, is rebellion and treason against the State. The Assumption therefore shall be,

The King of ENGLAND hath this supreame power.] when this is proved, the conscience must take law from this necessa­ry Inference, therefore it is unlawfull for Subjects to hold up armes against the King of England: Because as it is an absur­dity in speculation, so it is sinne in practice to deny the conclu­sion; there they offend against Logique, here against Religion also. For whatsoever is not of faith, that is, not of judgment, whatsoever wee doe against our owne reason, and the light of conscience, is transgression.

The matter of this discourse is of high concernment. For as things now stand, on it hang Heaven or Hell, our salvation or eternall damnation. If the King be the highest power, you are [Page 60] bound to submit to him, but if you have new Soveraignes, if your fellow Subjects are become the Lords anoynted, there may be some colour of justification. Except this be proved, you are altogether inexcusable, as appeares in the last Section, and ther­fore it will behoove you to hearken to Solomons advice; My sonne feare thou the Lord and the King, and meddle not with them that are given to change. For their calamity shall rise so­dainely, Prov. 24.. 21. 22.

Certainely unconcerned men will thinke I have undertaken no very difficult taske. The Kings Su­premacy wit­nessed by out Oath. If I can but perswade the Kings ad­versaries, they have not forsworne themselves, I shall recover them to due obedience (but I must tell them, if they were not perjur'd in taking the Oath of Supremacy (not to mention now that of Alleagiance) they are so in breaking it) The words are so expresse, that not any colourable glosse can be invented, to excuse the violation of this solemne Sacrament. I, A. B. doe utterly testifie and declare in my conscience, that the Kings high­nesse is the only supreame Governour of this Realme, and of all o­ther His Highnesse Dominions and Countries, as well in all Spi­rituall or Ecclesiasticall things, or causes, as Temporall, &c. I d [...] promise that from henceforth, I shall beare faith and true allegi­ance to the Kings Highnesse, His Heires, and lawfull Successours, and to my power shall assist and defend all jurisdictions, priviled­ges, preheminences, and authorities granted or belonging to the Kings Highnesse, His Heires, and Successours, or united and an­nexed to the Imperiall Crowne of this Realme.

So helpe me God and by the Contents of this Booke.] It hath beene replyed, That this Oath is taken in opposition to the Pope, to exclude the Supremacy usurped by him for many yeares. They speake truth, but not all the truth; for there are two parts in it. One negative, by which wee professe, that not any forraigne State, or Potentate, nor the Pope hath this power. The other positive, by which the Subject of this power is specified. The Kings Highnesse is the onely supreame Governour of this Realme, as in all Spirituall things, and causes, so likewise Temporall. Both Ecclesiasticall and Civill supremacy are here asserted to be in the King. It was not thought sufficient to tell who was not [Page 61] Supreme, but they declare also who was. When we had truly sworne the Pope out of this Kingdome, what necessity was there to make the people perjur'd? for certainely they for­sweare themselves, who solemnely testifie and declare in their conscience, That the Kings highnesse is the onely supreme Go­vernour, if the meaning of those words be onely this, that the Pope is not. It concernes us as highly as our Soules are worth, reddere juramentum domino, to performe unto the Lord our Oath, and not to lift up those hands against the King, which were layd upon the holy Gospell, in witnesse of our submission to him as the onely supreme Governour. What desperate malice is it to expose our Soules to every Musket shot? if wee fall, we perish eternally. This sad contemplation, that wee stand on the very brinke of Hell, ready to be turned into the Lake of e­verlasting woes, by every sword, every bullet, will smite our hearts, and make our armes feeble in the day of battaile; what confusion & amazement and horrour of conscience must needs seize upon all considering men? Think upon the heinousnesse of parricide, to murther a Father is a sin greater then any one is able to beare: But to spill the bloud of our Soveraigne (which they have done, who fought against him, for it is murderin Gods sight; his goodnesse in protecting his servant, doth not excuse their sin in endeavouring to destroy their King) whom God commands not to touch, and whose life we have sworn to defend with the utmost hazard of our owne, and we have desired the Lord to revenge it in our destruction, if we doe otherwise, is of a much deeper dye. For the King is Pater patriae, a com­mon Father to all without a Metaphor: what ever power Fa­thers had over, and consequently whatsoever honour as an ef­fect of this power, was due to them from their children, he hath right to challenge the same of all. And though we should joyne together, King hath pa­ternall powers from consent of the people. and call our selves the Common-wealth, we can no more lawfully dis-respect, give law to, resist upon hard usage, or say he is lesse honourable then all we, then children by agree­ment may dispense with their duty to their parents. It was our owne act which united all particular paternall powers in Him, and that these are truly transferred, and now really in Him is [Page 62] very evident, because else we should be bound to obey our Fa­thers commands, before those of the King▪ For divine precept stands in full force, Honour thy Father, &c. and therefore we musts confesse, tam pater nemo est in terris, he that begot us is not so much our Father, as the King is. It may be fit to take no­tice here, that the supreme power of a State, hath by our parti­cular deeds and common agreement, as much right over, not single persons onely, but the whole body, as every Father had over not this or that child onely, but his whole family: and as he cannot be said, though major singulis natis, yet totâ prole mi­nor, so neither a King (if this power be placed in one, which is essentiall to a Monarchy) minor universis.

Though a Monarch hath greater right, and larger power, then even all the people could bestow upon him, for he hath potestatem vitae & necis, He hath power of a higher na­ture from Gods grant. and this Fathers have not now over their children, over themselves; it can only come from him who hath dominion over his creatures, and therfore the people must looke upon him, not only as their owne, but as Gods repre­sentative; yet to say nothing of this, and to deale liberally with our adversaries, by supposing (though I cannot grant) their principles true, concerning the originall of power being in the people, I can demonstrably convince them, by most plaine and evident deductions from their owne scheame.

I tooke this method in my Answer to the Observations, that by joyning issue upon their owne grounds, I might put a quicker end to the debate. It would have required more time to shew at large, The Kings power was from God (which was proved in briefe, and there, as is this discourse, it is acknowled­ged to be restrained by His own or His Progenitors grants, po­test enim Rex vim regni minuere) and so of much higher nature then the contribution of popular Votes could raise it to; it was aboundantly sufficient, to prove that the people have not any le­gall power against the King. The former is built upon this pil­lar, nemo dat, quod non habet; the power of the Magistrate was not in the people considered severally, and before civill socie­ty, and in such a State, as the Aborigenes are described by Sa­lust, genus hominum agreste, sine legibus, sine imperio, libe­rum [Page 63] atque solutum, a multitude, not a nation, and certaine wild routs, without Laws, without Empire, free to doe or suffer wrong, and loose from all positive obligations. Not any one having jus gladii, a right to take away the life of man, it followes they could not bestow it upon another, for what is not, cannot be alienated. And therefore the supreame Magistrate hath more power then the whole people, and is vice Deus, Gods vicege­rent. Let them take heed how they call Gods minister the peoples Servant; God hath taken especiall care the Magistrate should be honoured; and respect is due, as to his, not their creature.

The latter, that the people have not any legall power a­gainst the King, is as firmely supported by another pillar, nemo habet, quod dedit. Suppose the originall of power in the peo­ple, or as they love to speake, suppose them the efficient cause of power, which cannot be but by giving to one man in a Mo­narchy, to a Senate in an Aristocracy, a right to use their divided strengths. Since therefore they cannot retaine, what they have parted with, nor have what they gave away, he which hath all their power (I may adde his owne particular besides) must needs be greater and more powerfull then they. The truth is, he is (in a Mo­narchy, and they are in an Aristocracy) the only fountaine of all power and justice. Answer to the Observat, pag. 10. This is as certaine, as that there are some governments besides Demo­cracy, for it is essentiall to them: what is that which makes Anarchy, except this, that every man hath right to doe what he will, Demonstration from the diffe­rence of formes of Regiment. in reference to any nationall Law? The only meanes to avoyd this confusion, is to resigne up this hurtfull liberty; (which is very prudently done upon choice, but necessarily up­on conquest) if it be given to one, wee call that State, Monar­chy; if to few, wee call it Optimacy; if to very many, who rule by turnes and are elected by the people, wee call it Demo­cracy. There cannot be any other ground to difference the formes of Regiment.

Hence appeares the weaknesse of those discourses, which have no other strength, then the impossibility, that the people can make one greater and more powerfull then all they (which is understood not of their naturall, (this cannot be past away [Page 64] to another) but politique strength, that is the right of using their power, this may be, and is parted with, (except the Go­vernement be a Democracy) because Quicquid efficit tale, est magis tale. The reply to the Answer to the Observations, con­fesses my argument, concluding, if it were true that the people had parted with their power, pag. 6. upon this the determina­tion of the whole controversie depends, and that it was rightly stated by me, will evidently appeare, because unlesse the peo­ple have resigned up their power, the Author can never shew how this State is a Monarchy. It doth not alter the case, that the King hath restrained himselfe from the use of this power to some purposes without their consent, as for making new lawes or raising money; for this limitation only makes such acts ille­gall, but doth not returne any power into them, whereby they may be inabled to raise an Army, or to oppose the Militia of the Kingdome against him, to compell him by strong hand to governe according to law. If the subject of this power be the people, who may meet together and lawfully determine (for though he resolve all into the two Houses, yet if he follow the consequences of his owne principle, he must goe thus high) what they fancy conducing to their own safety, wee are cleer­ly falne back into Anarchy. To avoid this confusion, the Au­thor places it in their representatives, but it will come to the same thing by undenyable deductions from his owne grounds. For the same arguments which are made against the King, e­qually conclude against the two Houses; since Quicquid effi­cit tale, Arguments brought against the King, con­clude as much for the people against the Par­liament. est magis tale, and that they are intrusted for the com­mon good, may be equally applyed to them, and then King and Lords and Commons are Voted away at the pleasure of the multitude.

The summe of his Book is, that the people retain their power, and therefore may make resistance, in case he governe not accor­ding to law, and he is responsable for such breaches; The proofe is, He is intrusted for their good, and there is a mutuall cove­nant betweene King and people, and this violated by him dis­solves the compact.

I have in this discourse punctually examined these and what [Page 65] farther grounds of scruples I could finde in the replyer, as will appeare more fully in the following Section. Being to answer so many, I would not trespasse upon the Readers patience by an exact view of his particular mistakes, which might have beene confuted with great ease, but with no great advantage to the cause, to which I have spoken more closely, and as fully as I was able.

I will discover to him one desperate consequence from his principle, which it concernes him to blush and repent for. There is a mutuall Covenant betweene King and People, and the breach of it dissolves the compact: if so, his Crowne is forfeited, and he ceases to be King de jure upon such violation, which he is now charged with, (because they could not have any colour for taking up Armes, but upon this pretence.) Therefore the plaine conclusion is, it is no want of duty in them, though they depose him, for it is no injury to take away, what he can chal­lenge no right to; his claime was by vertue of compact, which is dissolved by his not standing to conditions, and so the bar­gaine is unmade, the bonds of allegiance are broken asunder. The Houses have laboured to cleare themselves from this wick­ed doctrine, by telling us the deposition of the second Edward, and Richard was not to be numbered amongst the presidents of Parliament, and that no free Parliament ever attempted the like: and yet a private man dares publish such manifest Treason. I am perswaded that the Author, supposing a breach of covenant of His Majesties part, and then telling us such a breach dissolves the compact, was not fully apprehensive that this pernitious principle unkings his Soveraigne. When he sees his treasona­ble errour, he will finde that Logick ill managed is a more dan­gerous weapon, then a sword in the hands of mad men.

To returne to further proofes of the Kings supremacy; Kings supre­macy further proved. That which makes a State one, is the union of supreame power, and this according as it is placed in one or more persons, gives deno­mination to the forme: so that all those Acts of Parliament which confesse this a Monarchy, are so many solid testimonies of the Kings supremacy.

The Answer is, Though this be demonstrably true in an abso­lute [Page 66] Empire, yet it concludes not in a mixt Monarchy.

I am very confident a mistake of this mixt Monarchy hath engaged many well-meaning men against the King, to the over­throw of our Lawes, which the simpler part are perswaded they fight for; Honestâ voluntate rebelles sunt, there are some who contribute their forces to destroy this Kingdome in be­halfe of the Common-wealth, The true mea­ning of that which is called a mixt Monar­chy. and they are so farre deceived, as to be made unhappy instruments to advance private interests with publique hearts. And therefore it will be necessary to discover their errour, by which their unfortunate Country hath suffer'd as much, as by the saults of others.

They have not any shadow of excuse to countenance their Rebellion from this distinction, unlesse mixt Monarchy doe signifie either that the people in their diffusive body, or by their representatives have a greater, or at least an equall power with the King. The reason of which is, because inferiours by the acknowledgement of all, have not any jurisdiction over supe­riours: and equalls though they have not imperium, right to go­verne, yet if injur'd and they require satisfaction, and upon de­nyall of it, attempt to compasse it by force, they are esteemed by the Law of Reason and Nations, just enemies: whereas Sub­jects, if they make warre upon their Soveraigne, though when wronged, are worthily accompted Rebels. First, the diffusive body of the people hath not greater, nay, not equall power with the King, because they have not any legall way of expres­sing themselves. Our Lawes determine it Treason to enter into any association, or raise a Warre without the Kings consent, and much more against his expresse commands. Secondly, the re­presentative body hath not greater nor equall power with the King. The same argument overthrowes their claime, for the people cannot authorize them to doe, beyond what themselves were enabled to, therefore if actions of this nature were un­warrantable in the diffusive body, they are so in the represen­tative. Representative Body is not the People to all purposes. It may be not unfit to observe that the representative body is the people onely to some ends and purposes, whereto they were intrusted by them according to Law, and therefore no illegall ordinances, (such as all those are, which the King [Page 67] denyes to ratifie) ought to be called the Acts of the people: They are no more concerned in it, then if they should take upon them contrary to Law, to stampe and coyne money with the inscription of Senatis, populúsque Anglicanus, or to send Am­bassadors, or denounce warre against, or enter into a League of friendship with forreigne Princes, or bestow the great offices of State, or dispose of Wardships, or take to themselves a pow­er to raise Armes without His Majesties consent. Againe, be­cause they represent the people but to some purposes onely, though their principles were firme, (as they are extreamely weake) that the King is lesse then His Subjects conjunctim, and that they collectively are more honourable then He, &c. yet they bring not the conclusion home to the two Houses. Be­cause it doth not appeare, and they had no reason to take it for granted; that the two Houses (which they call the Parliament) are the people in this consideration. A Jury is the representa­tive people, (as experience teaches, and we may finde it in Sir Thomas Smith, l. 2. c. 26. The legall answer to that interroga­tory, How will you be tryed, is, Dei populique judicio, by God and my Country; and the Clerke of the Sizes replyes, Ecce tibi hi probi viri populum repraesentant) and the Sophistry would be ea­sily discovered, if we should argue they are therefore more ho­nourable, then the King. We may take notice also, that their arguments are onely capable of concluding for the House of Commons, (and if they follow the necessary consequences of them, they must maintaine the Lower is above the Upper House) for the Lords sit onely in personall capacities, being in­abled thereto by the prudence of our Lawes, which thought it reasonable they should have as great a share in the government as a negative voyce came to, because they injoyed such ample revenues, that they were likely not to agree to any thing preju­diciall to the present setled State.

I shall prove more fully in the next Section, that those who represent Subjects (and that but to some purposes, and not the King to any, for this would overthrow that fundamentall con­stitution of three distinct Estates) cannot be equall to, much lesse above their Soveraigne. And that groundlesse invention [Page 68] which denyes subordination, and introduces an unheard of co-ordination, such as creates Regnum in Regno, and rents this Country into distinct Kingdomes, shall be refuted.

Since what is called mixt Monarchy cannot give such a right as is pleaded for, that Subjects should be free to wage warre against their Prince, because this liberty makes two independent States, which are not compatible in one body, but would be as really distinct Kingdomes in England, as Spaine and France are; I will endeavour to declare the true meaning thereof. If we speake properly, there cannot be such a thing as mixtum Impe­rium, a mixt Monarchy, or mixt Aristocracy, or mixt Democra­cy. Because, if there are divers supreame powers, it is no lon­ger one State. If the supreame power be but one (that is that authority unto which Le dernier ressort de la justice, the last ap­peale must be made, and against whose sentence though unjust, we have not any legall remedy) this must be placed either in one man, who is the fountaine of all jurisdiction, and then it is a Monarchicall government, or in some Nobles, and then the Regiment is Aristocraticall, and the sentence of the major part of them becomes Law to all effects, whether concerning our goods or lives; or if the civill constitutions of a State direct us to appeale to the people, this is an absolute and true Democra­cy. By a mixt Monarchy therefore (not to quarrell about words) nothing but this can reasonably be understood, that it is not [...], or [...], wherein the will of the Prince publiquely made knowne, gives the Law, Quodcunque Principi placet, legis habet vigorem, but [...], a go­vernment not arbitrary, but restrained by positive constitutions, wherein a Prince hath limited himselfe by promise or oath, not to exercise full power. This grant is of force, because any man may either totally resigne, or diminish his rights by Covenant. Hence it is that in Monarchies all Kings have supreame power, though they have not all the same jura Regalia, their preroga­tives are larger or narrower according to their particular grants. For example, our Kings have retained to themselves the rights of coyning money, making great officers, bestowing honours, as Dukedomes, Baronies, Knighthoods, &c. pardoning all of­fences [Page 69] against the Crowne, making warre and peace, sending Ambassadors to negotiate with forraigne States, &c. and they have restrained themselves from the use of that power which makes new Lawes and repeales old, without the consent of the Lords and Commons in Parliament; as likewise from raising mo­ney upon the Subject without their consent.

Some doe aske, How are we the better, if we must suffer him to breake this Covenant as oft as he pleases? it is the same thing not to have any Lawes, and not to have provision for the obser­vance of them.

First, Difference be­tweene arbi­trary rule and government, restrained by Law, notwith­standing ho­stile resistance unlawfull, though in case of violation. I must tell you, this objection is answered by shewing there is a necessity that some body must be trusted. It is no discretion to prevent a possible mischiefe by probable incon­veniences; if you will not trust one you must trust more, that is, if you are weary of Monarchy (under which your fore-fa­thers enjoyed happy times, and experience cannot cozen you, though arguments may) you know the way to cast it off by placing so many guardians over your Prince, but have you any greater assurance then before? Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? They have as great temptations to faile their trust as he had, and it is likely being warned by such a president of deserting your naturall Prince, they may feare your inconstancy, and upon pre­tence, that you are subject to mistake; and because they suspect you may be willing, they will take such order, you shall not be able to call them to an accompt. But suppose this may not be, and that those who suppresse Tyrants (or perhaps excellent Kings under that name) may not be frighted with their owne example, to make use of their present power, to exercise a grea­ter tyranny; for it is not impossible they should grow jealous too, and tell you plainly, they have no reason to trust you. If you deny them money, here is ground of diffidence, your de­signe is to expose them to poverty, so to contempt, so to ruine. But suppose I say nothing of this, but that they will be secure amidst your jealousies, which manifestly endanger their safety; yet you will be forced at last to trust the giddy multitude, who are alwayes weary of the present government, because there are still some unavoidable defects, and these are discerned by [Page 70] sense, and they have not such depth of understanding as to fore­see greater mischiefes (which can onely be judged of by rea­son) and therefore are easily perswaded to attempt a change, so that your peace is built upon a very weake foundation; you have no better security against a civill warre, then that the greater part of the people will be discreet. If things prosper not according to their wishes, crafty men perswade them the fault lyes in those who have the managery of the publique, and if these be not removed, and honest and wise men (meaning themselves) put in their places, their miseries will daily grow upon them. A generall accusation of ill affected, malignant persons, wicked Counsellors, is cause sufficient to out their sup­posed enemies of all preferments, and put their pretended friends in their roomes. This opens a gap to all confusion; ci­vill warre, and most unnaturall distractions are the certaine issue of it. Our owne lamentable experience confirmes this sad truth. After you had obtained a perfect confirmation of all your ancient rights and liberties, with a gracious enlargement of them by new grants, and with such security as your fore-fa­thers were not acquainted with, you are frighted with the pos­sibility of a relapse. To prevent which, it was thought fit to take away the Kings power, with which our Lawes had inve­sted him, as the necessary meanes for our protection, because it was not impossible he might use it for our oppression. Ac­cordingly the Kings Navy, His Forts, Magazines, and the Armes of the Kingdome, are put into such as you would call safe hands. I doe not aske with what conscience, but with what judgement you did this? The want of prudence was as great as that of honesty, what hath beene the successe of confiding in those whom the Lawes had not intrusted? are not your suf­ferings infinitely multiplyed? are you not extreamely sicke of your remedy? The tables are quite turned, and your friends have undertaken the same bad game, and play it much worse; you onely make the stakes, and are in a probable way to loose all that you have. What one thing did you complaine of, which is not exceeded by them? your grievances are highly impro­ved, [Page 71] Magna Charta and the Petition of Right are now ma­lignant, they speake not the sense of the House, but take part with the King. To quote our good and ancient Lawes is in­terpreted a breach of Priviledges of Parliament; appeales are made to the people, the ready way to a universall confusion. And they according to private information, and mis-guided af­fections, did once passe this sentence, that to imprison with­out cause alleadged, and to deny Habeas corpus's, is no in­trenchment upon the liberty of the Subject; to bestow mens estates by whole sale, and take away their Money, Plate, or Goods, doth not destroy the property of the Subject; To scorne and revile the Booke of Common Prayer, against an Act of Parliament, which severely punishes such contempt, and to supplant our established doctrine and discipline by counte­nancing Anabaptisme and Brownisme, conduces to the holy Reformation, and will in time effect that great worke, and settle true Religion. Thus much by the way, to shew that we cannot have any absolute security; in all governments it is ne­cessary to trust some body. For if we should retaine a liberty to right our selves (not to mention the fatall mischiefes of Anarchy, and that it is probable this freedome would be fre­quently abused to our wrong, selfe-love making men partiall in their owne causes) the decision of controversies would be writ in bloud, and we should lay a fruitfull seed-plot of civill warres, contrary to the end of society, which is to preserve publique peace, though sometimes with private losse; be­cause though we suffer some things by injustice, yet we enjoy great benefits by common tranquillity, but in the ruine of the whole, the rights of single persons must be destroyed. The hazard likewise appeares much greater, by inabling those to injure us, whom the Law hath not intrusted with our pro­tection.

To answer their objection fully, who would perswade the people, there is not any differnce betweene arbitrary govern­ment, and government restrained by lawes, if Subjects may not compell their soveraigne to the observation of them.

Greater security would undoe us. For though wee suffer [Page 72] sometimes under reall greivances, yet pretended breaches of our rights (which can never be wanting, as long as ambitious persons are discontented) would have the same influence to stirre up civill dissentions, and it is a more prudent course, to oblige some to sit downe though wronged, then to open a cer­taine way for Schisme in the body by indulging a most pernici­ous freedome of righting themselves. It was wisely said by Se­neca satius est a paucis etiam justam excusationem non accipi, quàm ab omnibus aliquam tentari. For Kingdomes are many times disturbed upon meere pretences. There are such who will set their country on fire, only to warme their owne hands by it, and trouble the waters, that they may the better catch fish, that is, who will pursue private interests with hazard of pub­licke destruction. He that doubts this, let him consult histories, and he shall find, it hath beene fatall to the best Princes to have the worst Subjects. I appeale to mens consciences whether they have not read, and perhaps scene, the reigne of a most gracious Prince, a Prince eminently mercifull, and just, brand­ed with the odious name of Tyranny. And when malice it selfe cannot blemish his actions, when he is not so bad as they could pray for, (for they would have made great advantages, if they could charge him with personall vices, as unchast, intempe­rate, or negligent in performance of religious duties) yet craft hath done their businesse, and abused the peoples weaknesse so farr, as to make them active in their owne ruine, by that wicked Art of declaming against evill counsellours. Of such dangerous consequence is it, to open a way to civill warre upon pretended miscarriages in government? But grant, not fancyed, but reall injuries, Yet

It is true, the people are then not so happy as they might be; but to make use of force, as a remedy, will encrease their mi­series. It is certaine, this Kingdome never suffered so highly under the greatest tyrant, as it hath already by this unnaturall warre, and who can tell, whither it may not end in a universall destruction. If a King be forced to conquer against his will, who knows how farre he may be tempted beyond his naturall [Page 73] disposition. It is a melancholly consideration, that a peoples perversenesse may change a gentle Scepter into a rod of iron. But if Subjects prevaile, we can see no end of the warre. For­raigne nations will be powred upon this unhappy land, & there will never be wanting at home a considerable party (as long as there are either honest or discontented men) to fight for the regaining his haereditary rights, to keepe whom in awe, our fel­low Subjects will plead a necessity of being tyrants (I could wish it were not already acted upon us; first their will made ne­cessity, and then necessity makes their will the measure of right and wrong, and destroyes all law) their wants will give law to us, and imprison us upon bare suspicion of Loyalty, and seize on our estates for feare they may be honestly imployed.

Thus we see a necessity of trust, and that we are bound not only in conscience, but in prudence also, not to revenge the not performance of it, I can further make it appeare, we have ve­ry good security (as strong as humane wisedome ever invented) that we shall live happily, and therefore we have no reason to robbe our selves of those great blessings which we lately injoy­ed, peace and plenty, upon vaine feares and groundlesse jealou­sies of imaginary miseries. Our forefathers did not distrust the sound temper of this policy, and they injoyed the benefits of it in a high degree.

First, the King hath sworne to preserve our Lawes, our Li­berties, our Propriety, and our Religion; and he desires God so to prosper him and his, as he performes this Oath unto the Lord, who will require a severe accompt. Wee may make a highly probable conjecture of the sincerity of his royall heart, and the unfeignednesse of his many sacred Protestations from his miraculous successe. If God had not fought on his side, if the immediate hand of providence had not supported him, in mans judgment he had beene swallowed up.

Secondly, if he should command any illegall things, the exe­cutioners of them are responsable, and must make satisfaction to the injur'd parties. And they cannot flatter themselves with hopes of impunitie, for once in three yeares a Parliament will call them to accompt, and they have a great Democraticall ad­vantage [Page 74] for the obtaining justice. Because the Kings wants cannot be supplyed without their consent, and it is very un­likely he will deny any reasonable petitions, or reject any de­sires but such as robbe him of his honour, which is infinitely deare to him above plenty; except they endeavour to make him worse then poore, (which cannot be by demanding justice) it is most probable he will readily assent.

Thirdly, His interests are the same with the Subjects. They are not like two buckets, when one is lowest, the other is high­est, but they resemble the Head and rest of the Members, and the Head cannot thrive by a consumption of the Members. Il­legall gainings from the people are shifts rather then true po­licy; they may serve a present turne, yet are not worth the price at which they are purchased, envy and discontents; wher­as the gratitude of the Subject is a constant and cheerefull pa­trimony. When the King, like the Sunne, in consideration of what is drawne up from them, shall returne it in plentifull showres, and the blessings of a just government, which makes a Land fruitfull.

Upon these grounds wee have very good reason to promise to our selves a happy government; our hopes are much above our feares, especially after his greater experience of the unfor­tunate consequences of some miscarriages, and the strange bles­sings upon his strict observation of the certaine and knowne Lawes.

They that require fuller information in the nature of this go­vernment, may finde ample satisfaction in Stawnford, Dyer, Crompton, and Sir Edward Coke, That the King is the fountain of all justice, and consequently that the Lawes have placed the supreame power in the Crowne. I have chosen rather to shew it out of Bracton, a man worthily famous for his knowledge in the Civill and Common Law, because the booke is lesse com­mon, and I finde his authority often abused to justifie their cause. Sciendum, quòd ipse dominus Rex, qui ordinariam habet jurisdictionem & dignitatem & potestatem super omnes qui in regno suo sunt, Kings Supre­macy proved out of Bracton. habet enim omnia jura in manu sua, quae ad coro­nam & laicalem pertinent potestatem, & materialem gladium [Page 75] qui pertinet ad regni gubernaculum. Habet etiam justitiam & judicium, quae sunt jurisdictiones, ut ex jurisdictione suâ, sicut Dei minister & Vicarius tribuat unicuique quod suum fuerit. Habet enim ea quae sunt pacis, ut populus sibi traditus in pace si­leat & quiescat, & ne quis alterum verberet, vulneret, vel male tractet, ne quis alienam rem per vim & roberiam auferat vel asportet, ne quis hominem mahemiet vel occidat. Habet etiam coercionem ut delinquentes puniat & coerceat. Item habet in po­testate suâ leges & constitutiones, assisas in regno suo provisas, & approbatas, & juratas, ipse in propriâ personâ suâ observet & subditis suis faciat observari, nihil enim prodest jura con­dere, nisi sit qui juratueatur, Habet igitur Rex hujusmodi jura sive jurisdictiones in manu suâ. lib. 2. cap. 24. §. 1. And a­gaine, ea quae jurisdictionis sunt & pacis, & ea quae sunt justitiae & paci annexa, ad nullum pertinent nisi ad coronam, & dignita­tem regiam, nec à corona separari poterunt cùm faciant ipsam coronam. The english of it in briefe is this. The King hath su­preame power in all civill causes, and is super omnes, over all persons, over the body politique; all jurisdictions are in him; the materiall sword of right belongs to him, and whatsoever conduces to peace, that the people committed to his charge may lead peaceable and quiet lives. The power of holding As­sizes is derived from him, and of punishing delinquents. For Laws were vainly enacted, if there were not some body enabled to protect us by defending them, &c.

These conclusions are naturally deduced from his premises. To dispose the Militia of the Kingdome without the consent of the Soveraigne (and much more against his expresse prohi­bition) is illegall. To issue Commissions by any other autho­rity then his, for killing and slaying, or taking mens estates by force, is against the known Lawes: and to forbid the holding of Assizes (upon whatever pretence of advancing the Subjects property, by stopping the course of Justice,) is destructive of the rights both of King and Subjects.

He defines the Sword, lib. 1. cap. 8. §. 4. lest Subjects should thinke it lawfull to take it up in their owne defence without his authority, significat defensionem regni & patriae, it [Page 76] is the right to defend the Kingdome. Populi salus, the safety of the people (the pretence of which hath ingaged them in a likely way of ruine) cannot dispense with our Lawes, which have enabled onely him to protect them. It is not possi­ble to speake more home then he hath done in the fifth Para­graph. Omnis quidem sub rege, & ipse sub nullo nisi tantùm sub Deo. Parem autem non habet in regno suo, quia sic amitteret praeceptum, cum par in parem non habeat imperium. Item nec multo fortiùs superiorem nec potentiorem habere debet, quia sic esset inferior sibi subjectis, & inferiores pares esse non possunt po­tentioribus. Ipse autem Rex non debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo & sub lege, quia lex facit regem. All are under the King, and the King is under God only. He hath no equall in his Realme, (no coordination here) because then he could not com­mand all, for amongst equalls there can be no Empire. There­fore much lesse are any his superiours, or can challenge greater power, because then he would be under his Subjects, &c. The King ought not to be under man. He is under God and the Law, because the Law makes him King.

The last words (though advantage be made of them, and Fortescue is quoted to the same purpose) can afford no just ground of scruple; for he explaines himself within a few lines. Lex facit regem, signifies no more then that of the Roman Em­perours, Adeò de autoritate juris nostra pendet autoritas. l. di­gna, c. de legib. The meaning may be extended thus farre. That the people had a hand in the conveyance of their divided rights into him, and he may now challenge them by vertue of their owne agreement, and by divine right also, but as presup­posing this consent; because God doth not immediately di­spose of Kingdomes now, and conquest signifies greater force not juster title; that oft times gives possession, and a subse­quent compact creates a true right. I doe not deny, but that conquest in some cases may be a lawfull way of acquisition; the provocation may be so great, that persons and estates are for­feited to the victor; but because the will is not capable of be­ing forced, it doth not follow, he hath got a right over their goods and bodies, therefore they are His Subjects, and owe to [Page 77] him obedience. For to be subject, being a morall bond, where God doth not lay upon us any obligation, (as the duty of chil­dren towards their Parents doth not depend upon choice) it can only flow from our consent. But this consent of the people was not an adequate cause, but a necessary qualification to make him capable of receiving a larger commission from God. The Sword of Justice is blunt, the peoples agreement could not put an edge upon it to cut off offenders, this is done by the Magistrate, as Gods delegate.

That the King is sub lege, under the law, hath this sense, That he ought to governe according to those standing rules. His Majesty freely confesses this obligation, and since experi­ence hath taught him the benefits of strict observance, he will not be intreated upon what plausible pretences soever (and much lesse will he be commanded) to recede from their known and certaine direction. But if he should swerve from these rules, he is not liable to any punishment, nor compellible by strong hand; not for want of sinne, for he offends highly in that case, but for want of a superiour jurisdiction. Bracton delivers this truth plainly, wee have no legall remedy, wee can onely humbly petition His sacred Majesty, locus erit supplicationi, quod factum suum corrigat & emendet; quòd quidem si non fece­rit, satis sufficit ei ad poenam, quòd dominum expectet ultorem. Nemo quidem de factis suis praesumat disputare, multo fortiùs contra factum suum venire. If he will not hearken to our just and reasonable desires, satis sufficit, his punishment is more then enough, for he must render an accompt to him that judgeth righteously. Let not men presume to question his deeds; much lesse to undoe by force, what he shall doe though not accor­ding to right. That you may not thinke this dropt from him unwarily, he repeates it in other places, and lib. 5. tract 3. de defaltis, cap. 3. §. 3. He puts the case. That the King should doe injury, and a plea is brought against him, in whose behalfe he did it; the King being petitioned and persisting, and he rules it thus. Quo casu cùm dominus Rex super hoc fuerit interpellatus, in eadem perstiterit voluntate, quòd velit tenentem esse defensum cum injuria, cum teneatur justitiam totis viribus defensare, ex­tunc [Page 78] erit injuria ipsius domini regis, nec poterit ei necessitatem a­liquis imponere, quòd illam corrigat & emendet nisi velit, cùm superiorem non habeat nisi Deum, & satis erit illi pro poenâ quòd Deum expectet ultorem. If the King who is bound to admini­ster justice to his utmost power, will not recall the wrong he did upon a false suggestion, in this case, he injures his Subjects, but no body can force him to doe right, because he hath su­preme power; he hath no superior but God only, and it is suf­ficient that wee shall have a day of hearing hereafter at a just tribunall, where he shall be punished for doing wrong, and we amply requited for our patient suffering. In lib. 2. cap. 16. §. 3. he attributes the highest authority to the King of England. If the place be rightly understood by a wise Chancellor of this Land, whose collections from thence I shall lay downe, you may finde them in his case of the Postnati, pag. 107, 108. De chartis regiis & factis regum non debent nec possunt Justicia­rii nec privatae personae disputare; nec etiamsi in illa dubitatio o­riatur, possunt eam interpretari, & in dubiis & obscuris, vel si aliqua dictio duos contineat intellectus, domini regis erit expe­ctanda interpretatio & voluntas, cum ejus sit interpretari, cujus est concedere. The sense is, that all casus omissi, cases not deter­mined for want of foresight are in the King: so that it gives not power to him to make new or abrogate old Lawes without consent in Parliament, but the right of interpretation belongs to him, not in plaine and evident cases (for these need no declarer; to challenge a right to declare all Lawes, were in effect to make them, and then all the Subjects rights would be in their brests, and depend upon arbitrary votes) but only in new questions and, doubts which must not be resolved contrary to old Law. By this it appeares that Subjects ought not to judge of the e­quitable part of Law, and to overthrow the literall sense at plea­sure, to the praejudice of their Soveraigne. Our King hath as much right by our constitutions, as that civill Law gave the Ro­man Emperours, Inter aequitatem jus (que) interpositam interpretati­onem nobis solis et licet et oportet inspicere. l. i. c. de leg. et constit. or that other Rex solus judicat de causa a jure non definita.

Notwithstanding such expresse testimonies of the Kings su­premacy, [Page 79] yet such is the ignorance of some (these transcribing only, and onely varying the method of treason in their seditious pamphlets, as appeares by that remarkable errour borrowed out of the observations of Richard the second, being misled by Spencer; which I have met with in many of their libells) and such is the malice of others, who have searched the place in Bracton by them quoted, that his authority is cited against the King almost in all their Pamphlets which either speake Latine, or pretend to knowledge in the Lawes.

The author of the fuller answer to Doctor Ferne tells us, Bractons autho­rity abused by them. the two Houses collectim considered in a joint body, are not Subjects. p. 4. And Bracton, he sayes, will beare him out in it. Rex habet superiorem, Deum scilicet, item legem per quam factus est Rex, item Curiam suā, viz. Comites, Barones, &c. The King hath above him besides God the Law, whereby he is made King, likewise his Court of Earles, and Barons, &c. This man hath betraied either want of knowledge, or want of honesty; I suspect the latter, because he must needs un­derstand, that this was a very unfit proofe of coordination be­tween the three Estates (upon the strength of which his whole discourse hangs, and it is meerely begg'd) for this concludes a­gainst it, and makes a most absurd subordination of the Sove­raign to such a number of his Subjects, and therefore he confes­seth, hee need not goe so high. The adding. &c. as he hath above him his Court of Earles and Barons, and so forth, doth discover their unfaithfull dealing. For first, here is not the least mention of the House of Commons (which they would seeme to imply) and therefore it cannot serve their turne▪ and secondly the words following (craftily left out) shew the absurdity of it, the reason of the speech is, quia Comites dicuntur quasi socii Regis, et qui ha­bet socium, habet magistrum, & ideo si Rex fuerit sine fraeno. i. e. si­ne lege, debent ei fraenum ponere nisi ipsimet fuerint cum Rege sine fraeno, (Because Earles are quasi fellowes to the King (I may per­haps render the meaning by calling them his Peeres) and he that hath a fellow (or a Peere) hath a Master. And therefore if the King will indulge himselfe a loosenesse from all Lawes, they ought to impose those bonds upon him, except they also will cast off obedience to established Lawes. Then, he sayes, no farther remedy is left but crying to the Lord, and the Lord will returne this answer. Vocabo [Page 80] super eos gentem robustam & longinquam quae destruet eos &c. by the way he does not say that Subjects shall call in a forraigne Nation, that is treason, But the Lord will bring them in, because they would not judge their people righteously.

The distinct answer to it is, that Bracton layes not this downe as Law, but when he had taught the quite contrary, Omnis qui­dem sub eo & ipse sub nullo▪ sed sub Deo tantùm, and non habet pa­rem, and sufficit ad paenam, quod Dominum expectet ultorem. He puts this speech into the mouth of a man discontend at the a­buse of regall power, and arguing from the practise of that Age wherein he wrote, for the Rebellious Barons seized on the Mi­litia of the Kingdome, which of right appertained to Hen, third▪ as Bracton clearely delivers himselfe, ea quae sunt justiciae & paci annexa ad nullum pertinent nisi ad coronam, nec à coronà separari pot [...]runt. That he speakes it in the person of another appeares from hence; that he begins it with dicere poterit quis. some bo­dy may say The King hath done Justice, and it is well; and why hath he not the same liberty to censure him if he doe iniustice, and accordingly to require him to performe his dutie, lest he fall into the hands of the living God? He proceeds immediately to Rex autem habet superiorem, &c.

It would be very easy, for one better read in our Lawes, then I am, to shew that the King of England hath supreame right, from the nature of all Subjects lands holden of him in fee; which though it gives a perpetuall estate, Kings suprema­cie proved from the nature of all his Subjects te­nures. yet not absolute, but conditi­onall, for it depends upon the acknowledgement of superiority and is forfaitable upon a not performance of some duties, and therefore it returnes unto him. For the breach of Fidelity is losse of Fee, as appeares in Duarenus, Wesembechius, Farinaccius, Molina, Socinus, Gail, and they tell us that all Lawyers agree, that all Feuda are lost by rebellion; as also by our common Law, which according to the nature of the trespasse, varies the forfei­ture. In case of Treason, as taking up Armes against the King, (for so you may find it determined 25 Edw. 3. c. 2.) after legall conviction all their lands and tenements are absolutely in the Kings disposall; in case of felony, the King hath a yeare, a day and the wast, after which it passeth downe to the heires. It is [Page 81] very evident, that the King onely hath that high degree of pro­perty in his lands which Lawyers call alaudium or alodium. The sense is the same though the words differ; for it is not materi­all, whether with Budaeus we derive it from the privative par­ticle (a) and Laudum, which signifies, nomination, so that it de­notes praedium cujus nullus author est nisi Deus: to hold in his owne full right, without any service, any payment of rent, be­cause from God onely, or like to those of Heinault, who acknow­ledge no tenure but from God and the Sunne, Pays de Hainault tenu de dieu & du soleil. or else we may derive it from the same privative particle (a) and the Saxon Leod, or the French leud (a vassall or leigeman) and then it expresses thus much, a tenement without vassallage, without burden, to which our English Loade retaines some resemblance.

But Subjects of what degree or condition soever hold their lands ut feuda, in the nature of Fee, which implies Fealty to a superior. It is all one whether they belong to them by inheri­tance, or by purchase; for though they may sometimes be dear­ly bought, yet such is the condition of the alienation, that they cannot be conveyed without those burdens which were layed upon him who had novell Fee. So that Camden pag. 93. of his Britannia, observes very truly, that the King only hath dire­ctum dominium, this being reserved by the conouerour, who changed many of our lawes, and introduced the customes of Normandy, and instituted all our pleas in French, and passed o­ver the utile dominium only; he gave though not absolute yet perpetuall right, conditions being performed to use and enjoy such and such lands▪ The highest expression of a Subjects right which law will justify, is this, seisitus inde in dominico suo, ut de feudo. He is seized of such lands in his demaine, as of fee. Now Feudum is manifestly a derived right, and founded in him who hath supreame right, in consideration whereof all lands held by Subjects are burdened with some services, which differ accord­ing to the variety of grant from the King. Hence some tenures expire with life, others goe downe to our posterity by discent, to whom the law gives usum fructum, a right to use, injoy and make all profits, but they are properly but mesn or mesme [Page 82] Lords, as holding of an over Lord, or Lord paramount, who is the King.

The Kings supremacy is as strongly proved in, that he is our Leige Lord, Leige Lord bound to some duties, as appeares by sundry Statutes, for such an one can acknowledge no superiour, as Duarenus shewes in comment. de consuetudin. seudorum. c. 4. num. 3. And all Subjects are ho­mines ligii, leige men, and owe faith, and true alleagiance to him, as their superiour. The definition of Legeancy is set down in the great customary of Normandy, Ligeantia est ex quâ domi­no tenentur vassalli sui &c. Ligeancy is an obligation upon all Subjects to take part with their leige Lord against all men living, to aid and assist with their bodies and minds, with their advise and power, not to lift up their armes against him, nor to support in any way those who oppose him. but not under paine of forfei­ture, as Leige men are. The Lord like wise is bound to go­verne, protect, and defend his leige people (so the English are often called in Acts of Parliament) according to the rights, cu­stomes, and lawes of the Country. If Subjects breake their faith and prove disloyall, their estates and lives are expressely forfeited; and the King is enabled by law (as the fountaine of all Jurisdiction) to seize upon their goods and lands, and to de­stroy their persons. If he performe not his duty (for there is a mutuall obligation betweene leige Lord and leige men) yet notwithstanding this failing, neither his Crowne or any rights belonging to his Royall dignity are subject to forfeiture. Let them if they can produce any one law to maintaine their asser­tion. If there had beene any, it would not thus long have been concealed, for they are not accustomed to dissemble any ad­vantages by overmuch modesty. Indeed they have not any shadow of proofe or colour of reason for it; and yet upon their bare word how many thousands have hazarded their soules by assisting rebells, which are eternally lost, if they perish in their sinne? What madnesse is it to beleeve their saying, before their and your owne oathes? Is it possible you can innocently de­stroy your Soveraigne, whose life you have sworne to defend with your utmost power? Be not abused by that miserable fal­lacy drawne from the nature of a Covenant. The mistake lies here, that law hath provided to bring Subjects offending to a [Page 83] tryall, but hath not, could not question the King, and compell him to be responsable, for want of a superiour jurisdiction, All just proceedings must be per legale judicium parium, & legem terrae, by triall of Peeres and the law of the land. But the King hath no Peere, and lex terrae doth not in any case disarme the King of the sword of Justice, it is not separable from his Crowne. Therefore he is exempt from tryall, and it cannot be just to punish him unheard, uncondemned. The conditions of Kings were very miserable, if he who sweares to governe the people according to the knowne lawes, so that they see what to trust to, should himselfe be liable to their arbitrary Justice. The Premises are firme; for the Major is part of magna charta, and the Minor is as evident, as that his Subjects are not greater then he; which signifies only, that those which are under him are not his superiours. Bracton, you may remember, is fre­quent in the expression, Rex non habet parem in regno, and he is tantùm sub Deo &c. There is besides an antient monument, which shewes the manner of holding a Parliament before the Conquest, which will afford us no small light in this poynt. It is sayed to be delivered to William the Conquerour by discreet men, at his command, and to have beene approved by him; it runs thus, Rex est caput, principium & finis Parliamenti & ita non habet parem in suo gradu &c. The King is the head, the be­gining and the end of the Parliament and so he hath not any Peere or equall, but is himselfe the first degree. The 2 ^d is of Archbishops Bishops, Abbots and Priors holding by Baroney. The 3 ^d is of Proctors of the Clergy. The fourth is of Earles, Barons and other noble personages. The fifth is of Knights of the Shire. The sixt degree is of Citizens and Burgesses, and so the whole Parliament is compleated by six degrees. But we must know that though any of the five degrees besides the King, shall be absent, if they were duely summoned, Parliamentum nihilominus censetur esse plenum, the Parliament is full in law.

The latter part is as manifestly true, that Lex terrae doth not in any case disarme the King of the sword of Justice. By our constitutions Regia majestas est armis decorata and legibus ar­mata, the directive part of Law concernes the King, the penall [Page 84] doth not; Hee ought to square his actions according to this rule, but if they should swerve from it, they cannot fall within the cognizance of his Subjects. All offences are punishable as committed against Him, His Crowne and Dignity, and though the Law hath condemned them, they are pardonable by His Grace: which clearely demonstrates, He is above penall Lawes, and it is indeed an inseparable priviledge of supreame jurisdicti­ction, let it be placed where it will, in one or more persons. Naturally, (supposing men by distance absolved from paternall dominion) that is, before a positive constitution of Empire, when men were equally free, it was not unlawfull to require by strong hand satisfaction for wrong; but after an established government, this liberty was civilly restrained; and it is not in our power to right our selves but in a legall way, which is by Magistrates; and the last appeale lyes to the highest Governour, that the processe may not be infinite, but we may have some certaine and peaceable decision of all differences.

To conclude this Section, (for I shall have occasion to in­large my proofes in the next, in answer to their exceptions) we have sworne to beare true allegiance to the King, (such as have not are neverthelesse strongly obliged by divine Law, and this duty doth naturally flow from the right to governe.) I request all men to examine their consciences how they can excuse them­selves from f [...]t perjury, if they indanger his life and endeavour to destroy him. It is expressely high Treason to compasse his death. 25. Edw. 3. Though God in his great goodnesse hath restrained their malice from effecting it, yet by shooting at him, by attempting to kill him, they are lost temporally, their goods and chattels, lands and tenements, and lives, are forfeited in Law; and what is most lamentable, their soules are eternally ruined. Disloyalty to their King is disobedience to God, I need not aggravate the sinne, the Apostles eloquence is most power­full, They that resist shall receive to themselves damnation. The case is so extreamely plaine, I am amazed that the people should be so bewitched into Rebellion, contrary to Oaths and solemne Protestations, and repugnant to Christianity. For they are condemned out of their owne mouthes, unlesse that grosse non­sense [Page 85] be true, that they shot at him (as at Edge-hill) for His pre­servation, and endeavoured to kill him in his owne defence. It is miserable comfort which the doubtfull signification of [...] can afford, but sinking men catch hold of every reed. The word in the Greek is rather to be translated judgement and punishment, (the words following are peremptory) and as Piscator observes, thereby is not meant eternall damnation, but the punishment of the Magistrate in this life: Master Bridge his Answer to Do­ctor Ferne. p. 4. This calls to minde those men of whom Mi­nutius Felix saith, they did optare potiùs quàm credere, ra­ther wish then beleeve that no such thing as eternall damnation was intended. The Analogy of the place will evince, that this word [...] is like a sword with two edges, fitted not onely to kill the body, but to destroy the soule also. That it threatens punishment from the Magistrate is very true, but not all; you must needs be subject not onely for wrath, but likewise for conscience sake: v. 5. 13. c. to the Romans. You are exhor­ted not to rebell, because you may be hang'd, but lest confi­dence in numbers should answer this objection, a stronger mo­tive is used, you shall certainly be damn'd; It is probable, you may take the Gallowes in the way, but however Hell will be the end. Though you escape a shamefull death, yet you have forfeited eternall life.

§. 4.

I Will begin with a most remarkable passage in Calvins Insti­tutions, wherein are many things worth our observation, and which will conduce much to the decision of the present dispute. Neque enim si ultio domini est effraenata dominationis correctio, ideo protinus demandatam nobis arbitremur. Quibus nullum aliud quàm parendi & patiendi datum est mandatum. De privatis hominibus semper loquor. l. 4. c. 20. §. 31. If correct­ing unbridled governments be his worke, who said vengeance is mine, we must not therefore take Gods office into our hands, we cannot thinke to reforme the abuses of higher powers is committed to us, to whom is given no other commandement but to obey and [Page 86] suffer. I speake alwayes of private men. This truth clearely de­livered speakes the goodnesse of the cause, and demonstrates the unlawfulnesse of taking up Armes against the King, though their supposition were true (as it is evidently false) that His Majestie did cast off the bridle of established Lawes, whereas He doth hazard His Life and Crowne in their defence. The quarrell is, that he doth obstinately maintaine our good old cu­stomes and constitutions (such as experience hath confirmed happy and beneficiall to this Nation) and will not be over awed to make new Lawes, such as private interests would force upon Him and the Kingdome.

This is a sure ground for conscience to rely upon, and evi­dently destructive of most of their popular principles, which have poysoned the affections of the Subjects. It is not lawfull for us to correct ill Governours, because this cannot be effected without resistance, and all private men have direct precept a­gainst this; that of obedience and patience. This will speake home to the businesse, when it will after appeare, that all infe­riour Magistrates opposed to the highest, whose Delegates and Ministers they are, are but private men.

In the meane while, wee may hence discover the falshood of their principles, viz. That the law of nature will justifie all resistance against injuries, and for our owne preservation; that no people is so mad as to contract to their owne ruine, (and there­fore may resist any Magistrate, if their lives be indangered; the meaning is, if they have offended against known Lawes, which will certainly adjudge them to dye, the Magistrate shall bring them to a legall tryall at his owne perill) or to agree to be ill go­verned; and therefore since there is a mutuall compact, if Rulers performe not their duty, the contract is dissolved, and they are at liberty to right themselves, and to governe their Governours, and to fling the Pilot over-board, if he wilfully steere upon the Rocks, not by way of jurisdiction, but selfe-preservation. That the King is for the people, and Governours are appoynted for the good of those that are governed, and therefore Subjects are the more considerable men, and greater and more honourable then those who are placed over them, they bearing relation of the end, Ma­gistrates [Page 87] but of the meanes, and so the safety of the people must give Law to the Magistrate, if he will be peevish, and protect them according to old Lawes, when they fancy greater be­nefits from innovation; that Quicquid efficit tale, est magis ta­le, but according to their grounds, private men made all Ma­gistrates, (for before they constituted some forme of Regiment by pactions and agreements, they were but a multitude of men, a­mongst whome none had jurisdiction over other) the conclusion is, therefore private men are more Magistrates, and may call even the highest to accompt, and force him to be responsable for what e­ver they judge abuse of power.

The grounds upon which our seditious writers doe argue, are very contradictory in themselves, and yet all of them conclude for Rebellion.

Some (and I thinke the greater part) confesse it is unlawfull for private men to resist the Magistrate, though abusing his au­thority. These must needs acknowledge the weakenesse of those arguments (which yet they constantly presse, and which prevaile most upon the peoples affections) that it is a senselesse thing to imagine, wee can be obliged to be slaves, in case a King be guided by his Lusts, not Lawes, or not to preserve our selves against bloudy Tyrants. For their determination is con­trary, that private men for want of authority to arme them, are bound to suffer. And Calvin is expresse, lib. 3. c. 10. §. 6. nullum magis praeclarum facinus habetur, etiam apud philoso­phos, quàm liberare tyrannide patriam. Atqui voce coelestis ar­bitri apertè damnatur, qui privatus manum tyranno intulerit. They maintaine therefore, though private men sinne in resi­sting; yet if countenanced by inferior Magistrates, then it is not Rebellion, but a just Warre. These may be clearely con­vinced, if they will but consider, that inferior Magistrates are such only in respect of those who are under their jurisdiction, because to them they represent the King, but in reference to the King, they themselves are but Subjects, and can challenge not jurisdiction over him.

Some state it thus; though not private men, not yet inferior Magistrates, yet superior powers may bridle the exorbitant [Page 88] lusts of Princes by force of Armes; this wee grant, and there­fore acknowledge, that in an Aristocracy where the lawes place the supreme power in such a body of men, what is done by their authority ought not to be resisted, and if any one man take upon him regall power contrary to their constitutions he is a Traytor, and may be cut off. But this concludes nothing in a Monarchy, Res apud alios acta, aliis non praejudicat; for their error is▪ They make the two Houses the Kings superiors; who themselves disclaime it in words, and seeme to aske you, who made them supreme Ruler; for all their petitions (which are the acts of them not as single men, but as united bodies, and considered unitivè, not disjunctivè; socially, not severally) car­ry this truth in the Title, Your Majesties humble and obedient Subjects, the Lords and Commons in Parliament, &c. which acknowledges their obligation to be under him; and to say o­therwise would be of dangerous consequence, for if they be not His Subjects, they put themselves out of His protecti­on.

Some againe thinke it too grosse and absurd to maintaine, that Subjects in any capacity are above their King, and there­fore a coordination serves their turne. By which if they meane an equall right in the King and the two Houses of a negative voyce, in respect of new Lawes to be enacted, or old abroga­ted; this is granted, but will doe them no service, and indeed it overthrowes their cause. For as the King doth not pretend that he can make use of his power to make new lawes with­out their consent, so by the same reason, neither can they chal­lenge a right of taking away our old Government without the Royall assent. But if they meane by coordination, a division of Soveraignty, this is against the nature of it, and a cleare contra­diction. So that if he be our onely Soveraigne there is no such thing as coordination; if they be joynt-Soveraignes, in what a miserable condition are we English-men, who should be bound to impossibilities, to obey three masters commanding contrary things? They might as well challenge us to doe homage to them, which is and ought to be performed onely to the King, tum per id efficiamur homines solius illius cui juravimus, as the [Page 89] Civilians determine; and we cannot be duorum in solidum: l. Si ut cer. §. Si duobus D. commodati.

Some, and those the most desperate mutineers, lay such prin­ciples, as will bring in a certaine confusion: For they tell us obedience is commanded onely to good Magistrates; if men intrusted to governe according to Law faile in their duty, they cease to be Magistrates, for these are defined Dei ministri nobis in bonum, The Ministers of God for the good of the Common-wealth; so that to destroy such is to resist the men onely, and not the power; it is a warre against the person onely, and not the authority, which is none, if used against Law, because that doth not enable any to destroy it selfe, the Law cannot die le­gally; by power is not meant [...] what they may doe by strength, but [...], what they ought to doe in right.

This is the most reasonable doctrine, because coherent to it selfe throughout, but the most seditious doctrine likewise, be­cause it gives a full liberty to the people, not onely in a repre­sentative body, (and therefore in the diffusive much more, be­cause all the right that can pretend to against the King, is deri­ved from this) but to any part of them, to any private man to resume (as some expresse it) their power, or as others to make use of that power, which they never parted with to their owne inconvenience, and so all necessity of suffering, except when they have deserved it, is taken away, and Christianity is made a tame madnesse.

To returne to Calvin, whose following words are much a­bused (though I must confesse some conceive them craftily laid downe by him, in reference to the time and place when and where he lived, and that his designe was to insinuate some small colour in plausible Generalls, for that most unjustifiable action of the Citizens of Geneva, who had lately cast off their true Prince, because a Bishop of a contrary religion) after he hath informed us, that God requires all private men to obey or suffer though under Tyrants, he addes, Nam si qui nunc sint populares magistratus, &c. If there be at this time any Magistrates ap­pointed by Law, in behalfe of the people, to restraine the licenti­ousnesse of Kings, such as were the Ephori, opposed and set over [Page 90] the Lacedaemonian Kings, the Tribunes of the people which cur­bed the Roman Consuls, and the Demarchi who bridled the Se­nate at Athens, &c. upon this supposition they not onely may, but ought to reforme the abuses of government, and to doe right to the poore Commonalty whose guardians they are. This is un­denyably true, but impertinent to the present controversie, be­cause the People or Nobles cannot challenge that power in a Monarchy, with which they are invested under an Aristocrati­call or Democratical regiment, such as Athens, Rome, and Sparta were.

It is very observable by the way, that by reason the supreame power was placed in the Lacedaemonian Ephori, and Roman Tribunes, &c. their office made their persons sacred and invio­lable. They did justly challenge the same impunity, which we maintaine, belongs to Kings in a true Monarchy; for I argue not from the name, (for though the Duke of Venice were cal­led King, it would not inlarge his authority, and the Spartan Kings had onely a Royall title, but were truly Subjects as we learne from Plutarch and Polybius) but from the nature of that power wherewith the constitutions of a Realme doe invest one person. Hence appeares the unreasonablenesse of their sedi­tious invectives founded upon some inconveniences, be­cause power will probably be sooner abused, if any person may doe what he will, and not be responsable for his inju­stice. These kinde of Declamations, with which their Presses and Pulpits labour, strike equally at all government. For there is a necessity we should lie open to some possible evils from the abuse of authority, or else we cannot provide for grea­ter and certaine goods of common peace and publique tranquil­lity. It is no prudence to cure the miscarriages of government by a legall confusion, since even the worst government is lesse miserable then Anarchy.

I beleeve I can make a full discovery of those wicked Arts whereby crafty men have opened a way to the advancement of their covetous and ambitious designes at the price of publique calamity. Tib. Gracchus was excellently learned in those dam­nable [Page 91] politiques; and I desire all indifferent men to judge whe­ther the unhappy disturbers of England have not exactly mana­ged the miseries of this Kingdome according to his principles. He proposed some Lawes which might well become a reall lo­ver of his Country, Graccus his se­ditious practi­ses, their pat­terne. but his violence in the illegall establishment of them, which did evidently tend to confusion, did make it apparent, that publique pretences were taken up in order to the satisfaction of private lusts. Marcus Octavius, as his fellow Tribune had the right of a negative voice, for if one Tribune dissented, no Ordinance could be made which ought to have the power of Law. He not able to effect his ends, informes the people that this opposition betweene their equall authorities did threaten civill warre, and therefore it would concerne them as they loved their owne safety, which was the supreame Law, to decide this difference, by recalling that power which they had bestowed, to the end they might receive benefit therefrom; but which was now abused contrary to a trust reposed, to their prejudice. The issue was, he prevailed with them to depose Octavius, and he made them substitute a meane person, one of his dependants. But being sensible afterwards, that amongst all his illegall Acts, this gave most distaste, not onely to the No­bility and Gentry, who were indued with clearer understand­ings, but even to the slowly apprehending Commons, and that it proceeded from lawlesse passion to debase the highest dignity of Tribune of the people, and expose that sacred function to scorne and contempt, which ever before was justly esteemed inviolable, and such as secured the persons from being touched, hee brings these colours to excuse that most unpresidented a­ction.

‘The Authority of Tribunes is truly sacred and inviolable, but for no other cause then as particularly devoted to protect the people, and established to advance their welfare: If there­fore a person thus highly intrusted, failes in performance of duty, suffers the people for whom he serves, to be oppressed, and endeavours to abridge their power, and denyes to them the meanes of expressing their will and pleasure by his vote; (for he is but their mouth, enabled by them to declare their [Page 92] meaning.) In this case he forfeits all Prividedges and Prero­gatives due to his office, because hee thwarts those very ende which first moved the people to bestow upon him such large preeminences: for if otherwise we must be bound to sit still, while he pulls downe the Capitoll, or sets the Navy on fire, and notwithstanding any violences, or whatever exorbitan­cies of his lusts and wildest passions, tamely to obey him as our Tribune, that is such an one who by vertue of our trust for the improvement of our safety, usurpes a right to cut our throats, and is our servant to destroy us. Certainly if he en­deavour to stop that breath which created him, and to over­throw the underived authority of the people, he is no longer their Tribune. Is it not a most unreasonable thing, that a Tribune may imprison the Consull, if it conduce to the preser­vation of the State, because in that the peoples safety is con­cerned; and yet that the people cannot depose him in their own defence, and resume their power when imployed to their ruine? For as the Consul, so the Tribune likewise is the peoples creature; they live and move and have their being in their election. Againe, Regall dignity (in which the powers of all other Magistrates of what degree or ranke soever, were uni­ted and made up a personall Soveraignty) was declared sacred and holy by the most solemne and most religious Ceremonies, as approaching nearer to, and partaking much of Divinity: neverthelesse the people expell'd Tarquin, abusing his Royall power, and some personall faults were thought a sufficient reason to take away the most ancient Magistracy, and that which founded Rome it selfe. There are not in this Citie any persons more holy, more venerable, then those pure votares­ses▪ the vestall virgines, whose charge it is to preserve the eter­nall fire. But if they staine their honour, our Law buryes them alive: They cannot challenge any priviledges belong­ing to their sacred employment, because when they cease to respect the Gods, we no longer owe a reverence to them, which is paid onely in order to their service of the Gods. Can it then be reasonable to suffer the peoples enemy, to enjoy the priviledges due to their Protector? He would cut off those [Page 93] hands which hold him up. If the consent of the major part could make him Tribune, shall not the same power which did constitute be equally strong to dissolve? and much more can a greater power depose him, the concurrence even of the whole people declaring him unworthy. What is more ho­ly, what lesse to be violated, then things offered up and con­secrated to the Gods? And yet no man dares forbid the peo­ple to make use of these, or to remove them from one place to another, as oft as they shall judge it convenient so to doe. By the same reason, without dishonour to the Authority, they may discharge the person, and choose out a better habi­tation for that sacred office. That the Magistrate is separable from the man is evident, because many, when made by the people, out of a love to a retired life, or a sense of their in­firmities, and unfitnesse to manage the publique, have deposed themselves, others have intreated the people to choose more able servants. Plutarch. in the life of Tiberius, and Gajus Gracchi.’

It is needlesse to make the application. Observe the event; This illegall deed (which was justifyed only by a pretended necessity, for I know not what imminent dangers did threaten the Common-wealth, except this Bill did pasle) being ventured on by the unconsidering multitude to avoyd Civill Warre, pro­ved the ready meanes to kindle it. The flames of which so­dainely consumed the author, with many of his adherents. For one Nasica so managed Gracchus his seditious principles, that he killed him with his owne weapons. For taking advantage of the many discontents, he requires the Consull to aide the publique safety, by destroying him who had usurped a tyranni­call power. The Consul replyes with much moderation, ju­stice and prudence, ‘It did not become him to make force the measure of right, nor could he kill a common Citizen, before he were brought to a legall tryall, & condemnation had past upon him. But he promises, if the people either seduced or awed by Tiberius, should Vote any Ordinance contrary to established Lawes, he would esteeme it of no force, and would not yield to the observance of it.’ Nasica rises up in a rage, and gives the [Page 94] word to the Tumult, since then the chiefe Magistrate neglect the common safety, wee must not be wanting to our owne preservation; such as will maintain the reverence due to law­full authority, follow me. In this mutiny Tiberius falls a sacri­fice to the publique peace.—Stones and Staves were the one­ly weapons by which this popular man, and above three hun­dred of his companions were destroyed. The behaviour of Blossius a great incendiary, and an over active instrument to ad­vance wicked designes, is very remarkable. He being arraign­ed before the Consuls, confesses freely, he had executed what ever Tiberius had commanded him. Nasica askes him, what he would have done if he had beene commanded to fire the Capitoll; He replyes, Tiberius would not have commanded such a thing; others presse hard upon him to tell his resolution, in case Tiberius should have commanded it; He plainely tells them, he had then done it, being confident Tiberius would not have commanded it, except it were for the good of the people. The parallel will be defective, if there have not beene unhappy instruments who captivating their sense to an implicite saith, and beleeving not what themselves feele, but what others Vote, are active in their owne ruine in pursuance of safety, and pull upon themselves misery and destruction in obedience to those Ordinances, which tell them the Subjects happinesse is thereby advanced.

There are other circumstances fit to be taken notice of. He had provoked so many, he did not dare to be a private man a­gaine, (not any personall ambition, but only State jealousie would not permit him to lay downe his power) and therefore he so contrives his businesse, that the people may choose him Tribune the following yeare, not so much to satisfie any pri­vate desire (for he would seeme to rule only in obedience to their commands) as to provide for their good in his owne safe­ty. The way to this end was to court the Commons by all po­pular Artes. He propounded new edicts, by which the time of military service was shortned, and some yeares were cut off from the prefixed number, in which Roman Citizens were bound, when called upon to performe the duties of Warre. He [Page 95] made it lawfull to appeale from any sentence to the judgment of the people. To the Senate (in whom only before the autho­rity to administer justice did reside) he joyned an equall num­ber of the inferior Commons, so that a major part of them, with a minor part of Senators, if they made the major part of the whole, did sway all businesses. Thus, saith Plutarch, by all possible wayes, lessening and weakning the authority of the Senate by creating greater power in the people, rather out of wilfullnesse and obstinacy, then sound reason, which must needs perceive, it was voyd of all Justice, and very disadvan­tageous to the publique interest. He had some other little Artes which stood him in good stead; when the Votes of the people were to be numbred to authorize his edicts, if he per­ceived his adversaries would prevaile in number, because some of his party were absent, he would take some opportunity to picke a quarrell with his fellowes, only to divert the businesse for the present, and gaine time, and if that would not doe, he would dismisse the assembly, and command another meeting. Then would he appeare first upon the place in mourning appa­rell, and with afflicted lookes, and humble countenance, sadly requesting the people to take compassion on him, who suffered such miserable things, and feared worse only for doing them service; and desiring them to reward his faithfull endeavour by loving his poore Wife and little Children, for he gave him­selfe for a lost man, since he had reason to feare (yet the cause in which he should fall was an unspeakable comfort) that the enemies of the Common-wealth, and such as maligned their happinesse, would come upon him in the night, and force his house, and murther him. These well dissembled griefes so wrought their passions, that the abused Citizens set up Tents about his house at their owne charges, and maintained a con­stant Guard for his protection.

When such men shall make a State miserable, under pretence of improving its happinesse, and challenge to themselves a right to breake all setled constitutions, under colour of forcing upon the Kingdome new Lawes, which will be more benefi­ciall; when they shall imprison us at pleasure, that wee may [Page 96] injoy our liberties, and take away our goods to secure our pro­perty, and punish the most orthodox, conscientious, and pain­full Preachers, and impose upon Congregations factious Lectu­rers to settle true Religion; and when they have acted such high mischiefs, shall tell us, the Nobility and Gentry of the King­dome are Malignants, and delight in, and contribute their aides to advance an illegall government, who are certaine to suffer most in it, it is then time to cry out,

I have beene tempted to a large digression, because the same Artes which made Rome miserable, are visible in our calamities. I will now proceed with Calvin; after he hath very conscien­tiously instructed us in our christian duty, by saying all resi­stance is unlawfull, unlesse undertaken by the authority of Ma­gistrates, whom the Law enables to be the peoples protectors, and gives them the highest power (which can only be in an Aristocracy or popular State) he hath afforded too great an oc­casion for mistake by an ungrounded conjecture, Et quâ etiam fortè potestate, ut nunc res habent, funguntur in singulis regnis tres ordines, quum primarios conventus peragunt. And the same power, (which the Tribunes of Rome, &c. had) as things now stand, peradventure belong to the three Estates, when they hold their principall assemblies. I could wish, I were able to ex­cuse him from temporizing; yet he layes it down extream cun­ningly, perhaps, peradventure, if this chance to be otherwise, you have nothing to say for your selves; you are condemned out of his mouth, and in a poynt of such higly concerning consequences, you have no reason to change his adverbe of doubting into an assertive. I shall oppose to his perhaps, it is certainely not so in England, because our Lawes make this a Monarchicall government, and so different from that of Rome, or Athens, or Sparta, and therefore conscience hath no war­rant for resistance against him in whom the supreme power is placed.

The worke of the second section was, to prove it unlawfull for Subjects to resist him or them, in whom the supreame au­thority, that is, all the legall power of the Kingdome in order [Page 97] to raise armes is placed. I shall now shew the invalidity of their exceptions against it, by manifesting, that no dispensation grounded upon what causes soever, as indeavours to make them slaves or beggars, or to introduce another and a false reli­gion, and what else may be comprehended under the extreame abuse of this power to their oppression, or upon any persons, as inferiour magistrates, or any colour of preserving the autho­rity of the man, by fighting, and as much as in them lies, de­stroying the man in authority, or of making the power well u­sed for the good of the people, and not the person abusing that power to be the minister of God &c. can excuse such re­sistance from the sin of rebellion, and from [...] a fighting against God in despising his ordinance.

Tyrannicall abuse of power doth not make taking up armes a­gainst the supreame governour lawfull.

This truth is confest in words even by their cheife writers, Tyranny doth not dispense with the Sub­jects duty of al­leageance. though in the meane while, they make use of such arguments to prevaile on the peoples affections (and exhort them against the King in the feare of God) as clearly overthrow this ac­knowledgment. The fuller answere to Doctor Ferne saith thus, there are two kinds of tyranny, regiminis and usurpationis, that of government, though never so heavy, yet must be indured not only to the good, (sayes the Apostle 1. Pet. 2. 18.) but the froward too, and therefore I know no man that defends the ten tribes revolt from Rehoboam. p. 22. when they complained of some greiv­ances under which they had groaned in his fathers reigne, he was as indiscreete, as unjust, and told them, he would oppresse them more, and yet because he had jus regiminis, it is ingenuou­sly granted, it was unlawfull for them to Rebell.

The breife answere to Doctor Ferne, thus, we professe against resisting power, authority, though abused. He doth not hide himselfe (as ordinarily) by dividing the power from the person who is invested therewith, but concludes against resisting the men also. If those who have power to make lawes, shall make sin­full lawes, (that is prove tyrants (and so give authority to force obedience; we say here, there must be either flying or passive obedi­ence. p. 113. By the same reason, if he that hath the only power [Page 98] by lawes already made, to traine, array, and mustar, and to dis­pose of the Militia, with which he is intrusted for his Sub­jects protection and his owne safety, should put them into hands, which they cannot confide in, yet there must be no warre waged to prevent a supposed danger, there must be ei­ther flying or passive obedience.

But if one that is in authority command out of his owne will, and not by law, I resist no power, no authority at all, if I neither actively nor passively obey, no, I do not resist so much as abused authority. If you meane by not passively obey, take up armes [...] against (which you must, if you speake pertinently, and would make an application of this answer, to the justification of hostile resistance in Subjects) you do resist power and autho­rity in this case. For though you are no: obliged to yeild obe­dience, either contrary to divine praecept, or the knowne lawes of the realme, yet by making use of armes, you transgresse that law, which disables Subjects to make warre without the Princes authority, much more against his expresse command, to the manifest indangering of his royall Person. He answers, this had beene but accidentall. p. 121. and so we are told by o­thers, he might have stayed away. Those damn'd assassins and bloudy villaines, by whose hands the two French Henries fell, might have made the same plea for their execrable murders. If they had not come in their way, which they might have a­voyded by locking themselves up, or by some other meanes, they had not beene killed by them. But he implies a desire, and beseeching him not to be there, but to withdraw himselfe. If the King had as full right to be there, as in any other place within his Kingdome, they may with the same reason justify the mur­der of him, if he will not be intreated to keepe such company only as they shall allot to him, or to leave his Court, or creepe into an oven.

The Author extreamely contradicts this duty, before profes­sed in the name of all, of flying or passive obedience, and layes downe a most desperate conclusion, which dissolves all go­vernement and makes Anarchy legall. Upon suppossall that Par­liaments (taken in the onely true sense for King, and Lords, and [Page 99] Commons) should degenerate and grow tyrannicall; I confesse sayes he the condition of such a State would be very dangerous and like to come to confusion; particular men could not helpe them­selves, and the whole State (marke how he fancies a whole State, when opposed to King and Lords and all the Commons repre­sentatively; what can this State be, but such a number of parti­cular men, who he saith, cannot helpe themselves?) ought to suf­fer much before it should helpe it selfe by any wayes of resisting: but if you can suppose a Parliament so farre to degenerate, as they should all conspire together (all in Law are the major part of both Houses with the Royall assent) with the King to destroy the Kingdome (how unreasonably he expresses a supposall of being wonne to satisfie private Interests by making prejudiciall lawes to the Subject in generall, let him translate the scene into Ireland, and he may thinke the supposition very possible) and to possesse the lands and riches of the Kingdome themselves (not all, but in an unequitable proportion) in this case whether a law of nature would not allow of standing up to defend our selves, yea to reassume the power given to them (this is a cleare confession, they parted with their power) to discharge them of that power they had, and set up some other, I leave to the light of nature to judge.

Object. But you will say, this cannot be, because the higher powers must not be resisted by any.

Answ. This is not properly to resist the power, but to discharge the power, to set the power elsewhere. They daily improve their principles, and now professe plainely, what understanding men did before collect from their grounds, that it is lawfull not onely to depose a King, but even the Parliament. He is very apprehensive he hath spoken out (and it is very strange the Committee should order this doctrine to be published) I know sayes he, this will be cryed out of, as of dangerous consequence, wherefore God deliver us, (as I hope he will) for ever making use of such a principle. pag. 133, 134.

They confesse generally, they are bound to defend the Kings person; (and if they should say otherwise, we have their oathes and solemne protestations against their words) witnesse the 23 day of October (which may require an Annuall gratitude for [Page 100] the great deliverance both of Church and State in the preserva­tion of His Majesty) whether they did according to the infor­mation of their owne consciences. All the answer I can meete with carries this sense, which I will expresse in M ^r Burroughes his words; As for the Kings person, is it not the profession of the Parliament to defend it? pag. 112. and againe, why doth the Do­ctor speake of stretching forth the hand against the Lords Anointed? who endeavours it? doth not the Parliament professe the defence of the Kings person? pag 120. Hence it appeares, they know their duty, the question is, whether they performed it, who directed their Canon more especially against His sacred Majesty; which they cannot esteeme an accidentall thing, who are not ignorant of that treacherous advertisement which Blague gave in to the Earle of Essex, in what part of the battell, the King and Prince were, that they might at one blow, cut off our present happinesse and future hopes. I desire onely, that their eares would not hang in their eyes, and that men would not beleeve authority a­gainst sense. I shall onely say, most miserable is he; who con­demneth himselfe in that thing, which he allowes and practises.

Exc. Tyrant is opposed to King, and they are incompatible.

Answ. If they understand tyrant under this notion, as an usurper, this is very true, but nothing pertinent, for there is not any just scru­ple, but those may be turned out by force according to law, who come in by force against Law; as in the case of Athalia, destroy­ed by Jehoiada, whereby Joas [...] who had true title, was established in the throne. But if they meane (as they doe, if they would conclude for themselves) a King having right to governe, and proving a wicked or weake Prince, it is false that this Tyrannus cum titulo the Lords Anointed though he abuse that power (for Chrisma domini. this holy oyle onely excludes usurpation, and in­cludes a just title onely, and not either the Orthodox religion, or goodnesse, or prudence) is opposed simply to a King, but to a just or wise King. As therefore his right to the Crowne, is not founded in his divine or morall vertues, but in a lawfull successi­on, so neither can contrary vices dispense with any to depose him, or lift up their armes against him.

This will be evident, if we consider what kinde of Prince he [Page 101] was, to whom Saint Paul writing to the Romans, forbad resi­stance for conscience sake. It was Nero, in whom very happi­ly this position might be inforced to the height, and yet all their exceptions are determined invalid. Notwithstanding his Ido­latry, his oppressing his Subjects by strange cruelties, and per­secuting the Saints.

Yet the Apostle commands not to resist even him upon paine of damnation. Our (or rather Saint Pauls) adversaries seeme to object, durus hic sermo, this is a hard saying. The Law of Na­ture allowes selfe preservation; the people made Nero Empe­rour by their consent, (for usurpation can give no right) and therefore are more powerfull then he, for Quicquid efficit tale, est magis tale. The people may be without the Emperour, the Emperour cannot be without the people: It is not probable the safety of mankinde should depend upon the lust of one man, &c. I shall answer with the Civilian, who teacheth us to obey and not dispute even humane constitutions. Quod qui­dem perquàm durum est: sed ita lex scripta est. L. prospexit. D. qui & à quib. It was Gods pleasure so to order humane af­faires. Such Christian submission doth most commonly pro­duce peace and plenty in our streets, and is the mother of many goods, but if the abuse of power should bring evils upon us, they cannot be so great, so generall as civill warre would cre­ate. But suppose we suffer more in a corrupt peace, then amidst such unnaturall distractions as this miserable Country now blee­deth under: yet we ought not to be tempted to impatience, but should rather rejoyce, that God hath enabled us to stand out his fiery tryall; such afflictions if rightly understood, are bles­sings, and though we are not bound to pray for them, yet we ought to give thankes. Bad Rulers (if wee doe not imitate, whom we condemne, and neglect our duty, because they per­forme not theirs) are but unhappy instruments of our greater glory. If we did deeply consider the fruits of our patience, we should certainly pitty, and perhaps love our oppressors, as the unfortunate occasion of our higher blisse.

[Page 102] The Christians under Julian were very sensible of this duty, and confesse themselves bound to obey him in all lawfull things, and they did accordingly fight his battailes; but when a grea­ter then he did interpose, cessabat potestas minoris, they chose to serve God in the first place, and redeemed their not obedi­ence to him, by offering up their bodies willing sacrifices. For they wanted not numbers sufficient, as appeares by the Armies electing Jovianus a Christian to succeed him in the Empire, with this acclamation, Christian [...] sumus. If resistance were lawfull in any case, never men could have brought fairer pleas. Julian was an Apostate from the established true religion; he dealt with Sorcerers and Magicians, and professed against doing justice to the Christians, making sport with their injuries, and returning no other answer to their teares, and humble Petitions but such scoffes as these; It is part of your religion to be abu­sed; you forget the Galilaeans precept, Why doe you not ra­ther suffer wrongs? you must forgive all offences against you, as you hope to be forgiven; if they strike you on one cheeke, you are bound to turne the other also; if they take away your cloaks, that gives them a just title to your coates also, if at least he whom you worship have power to dispose of your goods; you are bound from going to Law, and rendring evill for evill; why doe you petition against, who are bound to pray for your Persecutors? If they take away your revenues, they advance you into the state of perfection, which requires, you should not possesse any thing, &c.

They were more persecuted by his wit then his cruelty, and yet though he did even wanton in their miseries, his barba­rous usage could not prevaile with them to neglect their cal­ling, but they committed themselves to him who judgeth righteously, and he revenged their causelesse sufferings in his destruction; for as stricken from Heaven, he cryed out, O Ga­lilaean, thou hast got the better.

It is as hard a matter to perswade men to obey, or suffer un­der bad Princes, as it is to make them (the same in practice which they are in profession) true Christians. For they are ve­ry apt to corrupt the plaine Text with false glosses, as oft as re­ligion [Page 103] runnes crosse to civill interests. Their strong desire it should be false supplyes the defects of arguments, which could not be able to stand against manifest truth, if affections had not a more powerfull influence upon humane actions, then reason. I shall therefore labour to prove what they are so unwilling to beleeve, and I will lay downe the conclusion in Calvins owne words (whom they cannot except to as a Royalist) In homine deterrimo, honoréque omni indignissimo, penes quem modò sit publica potestas, praeclaram illam & divinam potestatem residere, quam Deus justitiae ac judicii sui ministris verbo suo detulit. Proinde à subditis eadem in reverentia & dignatione habendum, quantum ad publicam obedientiam attinet, quâ optimum regem, si daretur, habituri essent. Let his vices be never so many, so great, and his merits small or none, yet by reason of his office we must esteeme his person sacred; God doth shed upon him the rayes of Divinity, by constituting him his Minister: wherefore his Subjects should looke upon him with the same reverence and awe as they would upon the best King. Instit. l. 4. c. 20. §. 25.

The Heathens went farre, Voto expetendos bonos principes, qualescunque tolerandos; But Christianity goes higher, we may pray for the best, but we must not onely suffer, but yeild chear­full and hearty obedience to the worst. If any doubt arise, let them consider the divine providence so frequently mentioned in the Scriptures, and his especiall disposing of Kingdomes. The Kings heart is in the hand of the Lord as the rivers of water, he turneth it whither soever he will: Prov. 21. 1. and Dan. 2. 21. He changeth the times and the seasons: he removeth Kings, and setteth up Kings, &c. There is a place in Jeremy very appo­site. I have made the earth, the man and beast that are upon the ground by my great power, and by my outstretched arme, and have given it unto whom it seemed meet unto me, and now have I given all these lands into the hands of Nebuchadnezzar the King of Babylon my servant, &c. and the Nation which will not put their necke under the yoke of the King of Babylon, that Nation will I punish saith the Lord with the sword, and with the famine, and with the pestilence, untill I have consumed them by his hand. Therefore hearken not yee to your Prophets, nor to your Diviners, [Page 104] nor to your Dreamers, which speake unto you saying, ye shall not serve the King of Babylon: for they prophecy a lye unto you that ye should perish. cap. 27. He was a fierce Tyrant, and yet obe­dience was enjoyned by God, because hee had a right to go­verne them. I have inlarged my selfe upon that of Samuel, Hoc jus erit Regis, this shall be the right of the King who shall reigne over you; and it amounted to this, to destroy their li­berties and property. Calvin drawes this conclusion from it; Kings could not doe so according to right, because the Law was against it, which instructed them in their duty to governe justly; but it was called jus in populum, a right over the people, to which they must needs be subject; nor was it lawfull for them to resist. l. cit. §. 26.

It is a frivolous objection (saith he) that this precept concer­ned onely the Israelites; because the command is generall, and ob­ligeth all not to resist him to whom the Kingdome of right apper­taineth. The counsell hence inferred is very good, let not us therefore breake our duty, because Kings performe not theirs. If we live under a bloudy Prince, or covetous, or intemperate, or weake, or one that persecutes the most godly professors, let us call to minde our own sins, which have deserved greater ca­stigations. Let us thinke it is Gods sword, the sword of Justice, though man commit murther with it. If we have deserved to die, and the Law passe sentence upon us, we ought not to be impatient, though we be cut off by a wicked executioner.

Exc. Many examples are alleadged out of the old Testament to co­lour this breach of duty.

Answ. We have plaine precept not to resist, and must conforme our actions to knowne rules, not the practice of others. For in­stance, Who can lift up his hands against the Lords anoynted and be guiltlesse? this implyes a command not to rebell. Let every soule be subject to the higher powers. He that resists the power, resists the ordinance of God. Submit your selves to every ordi­nance of man for the Lords sake, whether it be to the King as su­preame, or unto Governours as unto those who are sent by him, Legibus vivendum est non exemplis: Examples can onely shew what was done, not what ought to be done.

[Page 105] To answer briefly, the examples by them produced are ei­ther impertinent, as being acted upon Usurpers, or not to be drawne into a rule, because extraordinarily allowed by God, who may dispense with his owne law (but this cannot warrant our imitation, no more then the Israelites robbing the Aegypti­ans can licence Plundering, or any other illegall weakning the wicked; or Jacobs lying to his Father, can excuse want of sin­cerity and truth, when by false reports, they may probably undoe their brethren; or Jaels breaking trust in murdering Si­sera, can dispense with killing enemies, after composition made to save their lives) or lastly they were unjust. To runne over the particulars would be more tedious then profitable, be­cause they are all clearly solved by applying one of these three: They are impertinent, or extraordinary, or wicked.

Secondly, If wee should grant that it were lawfull for the Jewes to resist Tyrants in their owne defence, this comes not home to us, who are called as Saint Peter sayes, to beare the Crosse, and to follow Christs example. When wee are in dan­ger of being killed for our Religion, all that is allowed to us is, only to flye from one City to another. Wee may better submit to so high a degree of patience, in consideration our well be­ing is not provided for in this world, and despise death, be­cause the joyes of eternall life are so plainly set before us in the Gospell, whereas under the Law they were entertained with promises of temporall blessings, and it must needs goe to their hearts to loose the proposed reward of keeping the Law, length of dayes, by their due observance of it, and this upon a suspicion of a better life, rather then a confidence grounded upon any plaine promise.

Exc. 1 I have formerly shewed the practice of the primitive Chri­stians, which was so apparent, that not having so much impu­dence as to deny it; neverthelesse they have invented severall exceptions to it, which take of the glory of their innocence. I have beaten them out of their strongest fort, which was this, deerant vires, They had a good will to rebell, but wanted power onely.

Exc. 2 The Christians were but private men, and for that reason [Page 106] could not lawfully resist, but if they had beene countenanced with the authority of the Senate, questionlesse they would not have sub­mitted themselves so tamely to the slaughter.

Answ. First, these men who grant thus much are bound in consci­ence to answer their owne arguments, drawne from the law of nature, which they tell us allowes selfe defence, though with the Magistrates destruction, and taken from the chiefe topique of their invectives, that no body did contract to be ill-gover­ned, much lesse to be ruined, and therefore no obligation can lye upon them not to preserve themselves. But these and such like reasons are evidently confuted by all those Texts which bind us to suffer though wrongfully, as wee have Christ for an example, &c. Those holy men, who submitted their bodies to the flames, lookt upon martyrdome, not as a thing of choice, but of duty. They might have pleaded the law of nature, and and the injustice of their persecutors, whose office was to be a terror to the evill, and to countenance doing that which is good; but such sophistry could not prevaile upon religion, which had bound up their hands from revenging themselves upon private men, and much lesse upon the Magistrate.

Secondly, that the Senate had no authority to wage Warre against their Emperour, will be evinced from Rom. 13. 1. & 1 Pet, 2.. 13. 14. applyed to the civill constitutions of the Ro­man Empire. Submit to the King as supreme, that is, to the Roman Emperour, saith Diodati, c. all'imperator Romano, detto tal-uolta Rè dalle natione stranieri. Ʋlpian acquaints us, there was not any legall power but in him; what he determines hath the force of law he adds the reason, because the people in whom the Senate are included, by the lexregia, gave unto him the right to manage all their power. Ʋtpote cum lege Regia, quae de imperio ejus lata est, populus ei & in eum (which signifies in se, saith Theophilus) omne suum imperium & potestatem confe­rat. l. quod princ. D. de const. princ. Justinian clearely decides the case; if the Emperour shall take any cause into his cogni­zance, omnes omnino judices, let all judges whatsoever know, that this sentence is law to all effects, not only in the particular cause, but it becomes a rule to decide all like cases by. For what [Page 107] is greater, what more sacred then the Imperiall Majesty? or who is so insolent, ut regalem sensum contemnat? The sense even of the Senate was not to stand in competition with Roy­all constitutions. l. si imperial. D. de legib.

Wee may fitly observe, that some Emperours did by Acts of grace limit their legislative power, which was solely in them, and bind themselves from the use of it, without the advice of the Senate, as is to be seene, l. humanum. Cod. de legib. and may be collected from Auth. Habita quidem. C. ne fili. and di­vers other constitutions; yet this gave no power to the peo­ple, to be imployed against them, if they should not performe their duty. This grant made the Roman Empire like the King­dome of England, (for wee have a cleare and full testimony from our Common Law, that the legislative power is onely in the King, though the use of it be restrained to the consent of the Lords and Commons in Parliament, le Roy fait les leix a­vec le consent du Seigneurs & Communs, & non pas les Seig­neurs & Communs avec le consent du Roy. The King makes Lawes with the consent of the Lords and Commons, and not the Lords and Commons with the consent of the King.) or that which Virgil describes,

It is the most unreasonable thing that ever was fancyed, that Subjects assembled, should have greater authority then their King, without whose call they could not have met together, and at whose pleasure they are dissolved in Law, and bound to depart to their owne homes.

Exc. 3 The Anticavalier doth pitifully intangle himselfe with this objection, and first he tells us, he is confident Tertullian did not speake the truth, when he imputes their patience to the power of godlinesse, which prohibited resistance, and not their want of force to withstand; He might as easily have given the lye to Cyprian, to the Ecclesiasticall writers, who relate the story of the Theban Legion, and aquaint us, that the greatest part of Julians Army against the Persians consisted of Christians. But supposing, as he had good reason, this bold de­nyall [Page 108] would not give satisfaction, it not being likely his credit should goe farther then the records and evidences out of Holy Fathers and Church story, after severall fruitlesse essayes to solve it, he pitches at last upon this; That honest liberty was hid from them for some speciall ends, which since God hath revealed to this latter age, and therefore he gave to them an ex­traordinary spirit of patience and courage▪ which is inconve­nient for these dayes wherein God hath afforded a more plen­tifull light, and shewes us our liberty, and that there is no ne­cessity of being Martyrs. It is now the wickeds turne to suffer. I will set downe his words at large, for they are so strange, so­ber men might doubt the faith of a relater.

‘Certaine it is, That the frame and tenor of Gods after di­spensations did require, that such a liberty should be hid from them; or at least, that they should not make use of it; as on the contrary, the nature and purport of those dispensations which God hath now in hand, requires that this liberty should be manifested, and made known unto Christians. We know, that according to the counsell and foreknowledge of God, Antichrist was then to come into the world: as now wee know that he is about to be destroyed, and cast out of the world. Now this is a generall rule, looke what truthes were necessary to be shut up, and concealed from the Chur­ches of Christ, that Antichrist might passe by, and get up into his throne; the discovery and letting out of the same into the world, are necessary for his pulling downe, &c. But God causing a dead sleep (as it were) to fall upon those truthes which should in speciall manner have opposed him, he had the opportunity without much contradiction or noyse to steale and convey himselfe into that cathedram pestilentiae, that chaire of Papall state, which yet he possesseth. Now a­mongst many other truths which were of necessity to be layd a sleep, for the passing of this beast unto his great power and authority, and for the maintaining and safeguarding of him in the possession hereof, this is one of speciall considera­tion; That Christians may lawfully in a lawfull way, stand up to defend themselves, in case they be able, against any unlaw­full [Page 109] assaults; by what assailants, or by what pretended autho­rity soever made upon them. For had this opinion beene ti­meously enough, and substantially taught in the Church, it would certainly have caused an abortion in Antichrists birth, and so have disappoynted the Devill of his first borne. Had not the spirits, and judgments and consciences of men beene as it were cowed and marvailous [...]y imbased and kept under (and so prepared for Antichrists lure) by doctrines and te­nents, excessively advancing the power of superiors, over in­feriors, and binding Iron yokes and heavy burdens upon those that were in subjection, doubtlesse they would never have bowed downe their backs so low, as to let such a beast over them, they would never have resigned up their judgments and consciences into the hands of such a spirituall Tyrant as he. So that you see, there was a speciall necessity for the let­ting of Antichrist into the world, yea and for the continuance of him in his throane, that no such opinion as this which wee speake of, whether truth or untruth, should be taught and beleeved; I meane, which vindicateth and maintaineth the just rights and liberties, and priviledges of those that live un­der authority and subjection unto others.’

‘Whereas, now on the contrary, that time of Gods preor­dination and purpose, for the downefall of Antichrist, draw­ing neere, there is a kind of necessity, that those truths which have slept for many yeares, should now be awakened; and particularly that God should reveale and discover unto his faithfull Ministers, and other his servants the just bounds and limits of authority and power, and consequently the just and full extent of the lawfull liberties of those that live in subje­ction. Evident it is that they are the Commonalty of Christi­ans, I meane Christians of ordinary ranke and quality that shall be most active, and have the principall hand in execu­ting the judgments of God upon the Whore. Consider that place, Revel. 18▪ 4. 5,. 6. Now that this service shall be per­formed unto God by them (Christians I meane of under ranke and quality) contrary to the will, desires, or commands of those Kings and Princes under whom they live, it appeares by [Page 110] that which immediately followes,’ v. 9. pag. 30, 31,. 32. The peremptory conclusion of all is, that the lawfulnesse of Rebel­lion is now discovered to Gods Church, as the necessary meanes to ruine Antichrist; for the Kings will never be perswaded to effect this great and holy worke, and therfore the People must.

Whereas the Text saith expresly, That the ten Kings shall hate the Whore, and shall make her desolate and naked, and shall eate her flesh, and burne her with fire. For God hath put in their hearts to fulfill his will, Revel. 17. 16,. 17. Least the people should be frighted by this (as they justly ought) from making rebellious attemps against lawfull authority, because that in Gods good time will arme them, and fight joyntly the Lords battaile against the Beast, he labours to remove this scruple. I conceive, saith he, this is not meant of the persons of Kings, but of their States and Kingdomes (id est) of the generality of the peo­ple under them. Master Goodwin, pag. 32. The Kings shall hate the Beast, that is, the people shall hate their Kings, and religi­ously rebell against them in order to the destruction of Anti­christ.

The same Doctrine is delivered by Master Burroughs. There is a necessity that in these times peoples consciences should be fur­ther satisfied in their liberties then formerly, because the time is (wee hope) at hand for the pulling downe of Antichrist, and wee find by Scripture this worke at first will be by the people, Re­vel. 18. pag. 144. and for a close, pag. 145. Surely the right knowledge of these liberties God hath given the people, will much helpe forward the great things God hath to doe in this latter age.

I must confesse, my heart is filled with sorrow, when I con­sider how farre the reformed Religion is degenerated, which can be no longer pure then it continues peaceable. But alas! it is become the mother and nurse of Rebellion; it foments sedi­tion; and advances the rvine of States. What a sad thing is it that factious Preachers should so farre bewitch the people by strong delusions, as to prevaile with them to neglect plaine du­ties of subjection and obedience upon the strength of obscure prophecyes? whereas they ought to live according to precept, not predictions; many of which shall not be fulfilled but by [Page 111] the sinnes of wicked men: Blesse me O Lord from being an in­strument to bring such thy workes to passe. It is our onely safe way, not to doe evill that good may come of it. The Apostle forbids it, and the reason may be this, God hath no need of the sinfull man. Why shouldst thou cease to be good, for feare God else would not be true? Babylon will certainly fall, though wee walke uprightly; to feare God and honour the King, are no stops to the destruction of that man of sin. After such fiery spirits have engaged the Kingdome into probable wayes of ut­ter ruine and desolation; after your hands have beene imbrued in the bloud of the ancient Nobility, and you have miserably torne in pieces the brave and honest Gentry, and exposed the seduced Commons to those fatall mischiefs, which accompany the Sword, Pestilence, and Famine, and the bleeding State shall at length grow wise, and unite againe for the preservation (if it be possible) of the ruinous remainder, rather out of a wea­rinesse of the insupportable calamityes of Warre, then out of a Christian love, which would have continued unto us the bles­sings of peace; All the satisfaction which these false Prophets can give, for the unspeakable mischiefes which they have pull'd upon their unhappy Countrey, will be onely this; We were mistaken in those places of Daniel and the Revelation; The time, it seemes, is not yet come, The Saints must still expect, and Gods holy ones must waite and pray for a more happy opportunity to per­fect the great worke by Rebellion.

Exc. There is a mutuall contract betweene King and Subjects, and if He breake the Covenant, He forfeites the benefits of this agree­ment, and He not performing the duty of a King, they are relea­sed from the duty of Subjects.

Answ. The Jewes could have made this plea, grounded in the nature of a Covenant, the breach of which (though instituted by God betweene King and People, Deut. 17.) was no dispensation for them to Rebell, as was evidenced formerly. The Kings of Persia though confessedly Supreme, and not responsable to their subjects, yet tooke an oath, at their inauguration, as Zeno­phon and Diodorus Siculus informe us, and it was not lawfull for them to alter certaine lawes, as appeares in Daniell, never­thelesse [Page 112] their miscarriages in government, did not dispence with their Subjects loyalty. If a Father promise any thing to his children, they have a full right to his performance; but in case he prove dishonest, he doth not thereby loose his right to governe them, nor are they excused from their duty of honour and obedience: So there is a contract betweene Husband and Wife, the violation of which on the mans part doth not be­reave him of his dominion over the woman. I confesse, a great obligation lyes upon Kings, not only from their Oathes and promises, and agreements, but expressely from Gods law also, to governe the people committed to their charge, with justice and equity. And if they abuse their power, Gods punishment will be as high as their ingratitude. The greatest temporall fa­vour which God bestowes upon any single man, is to make him his Vicegerent, his immediate Deputy, Christum suum, his a­noynted; and the greatest blessing he hath given to mankind is government, by which he hath provided for the common good of all. Now if he turne this blessing into a curse, if he who is set over a people to punish evill doers persecute those who doe well, he must expect a fearefull judgment from the Almighty, it is pathetically exprest in Wisdom. 6. Heare there­fore O yee Kings, and understand, learne yee that be Judges of the ends of the earth. Give eare you that rule the people, and glory in the multitude of nations. For power is given you of the Lord, and soveraignty from the highest who shall try your works, and search out your counsels. Because being ministers of his king­domes, you have not judged aright, nor kept the law, nor walked after the counsell of God. Horribly and speedily shall be come upon you: for a sharpe judgment shall be to them that are in high pla­ces. For mercy will soone pardon the meanest: but mighty men shall be mightily tormented. For he which is Lord over all, shall feare no mans person: neither shall be stand in awe of any mans greatnesse, for he hath made the small and the great, and careth for all alike: but a sore triall shall come upon the mighty.

Thus much is granted, but to conclude from this obligation that a not performance induces a forfeiture of his crowne, and that we may make hostile resitance against unjust commands, [Page 113] is a very weake way of reasoning▪ For consider with your selves; is there not a mutuall duty betweene husband and wife, parents and children? Fathers must not provoke their children to wrath: but bring them up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord Eph. 6. 4. Husbands should give honour to their wives a unto the weaker vessells 1 Pet 3. 7. Suppose some fathers prove froward, some husbands unkind, yet cannot their faults dispense with the duty of children and wives. The King — Ʋrbi pater est urbique maritus is both husband and father, not to single persons, but to the Commonwealth. There are many resemblances in matrimony which will afford great light to the better understanding the duty of Subjects. The consent of the woman makes such a man her husband, so the consent of the people is now necessary to the making Kings (for conquest is but a kind of ravishing, which many times prepares the way to a wedding, as the Sabine women chose rather to be wives, then concubines, and most people preferre the condition of Sub­jects though under hard lawes to that of slaves) If we apply their arguments their Sophistry will clearely appeare. For Quicquid effic [...]t tale, est magis tale, and constituens est major con­stituto, bestowes upon women the breeches, as well as the Crowne upon the people, and unumquodque eadem potestate dissolvitur, quâ constituitur, gives the same licence to a woman to cast of the bonds of wedlock, as to subjects those of subjecti­on. As in marriage, so in monarchy there are two parties in the contract; though without a mutuall agreement there could be no covenant, yet after it is once made the dissent of the inferiour party, let it be not upon fancyed, but reall discontents, cannot dissolve the compact. Consent therefore joynd man and wife, King and people, but divine ordinance continues this union; marriages and governments both are ratified in heaven. Quae Deus conjunxit, homo ne separet, whom God hath joyned, let not man put asunder; They must take their King for better for worse. It is very observable though it was permitted to the man in some cases, to give a bill of divorce, yet this licence was never allowed to women; so fathers might abdicate their chil­dren, not they their fathers, women cannot unmarry, nor the [Page 114] people unsubject themselves. If any shall mistake with the di­sciples, if the case be so, it is good not to marry, it is good to live without a King; they ought to consider that God is wiser then they, and best knowes how to order things for the good of mankind.

That I may (if it be possible) undeceave the misled multitude; I shall grant if a people choose one man, and bestow the name of King upon him, yet if they retaine the supreame power in themselves, and expresse it by making a law that in case he shall do such and such things, he shall forfeit his right to governe, then it is very lawfull to depose him upon breach of such condi­tions. For then this state is a Democracy, and the legall pow­er is in the people. Such a case is very possible, for if the royall line in any Kingdome should faile, & there want one descended from his loynes to sit upon the throan, then, as a woman after the death of her husband is free to marry to whom she will in the Lord, so the people may make what government they please, they may call one King, and place their Ephori or De­marchi and tribunes over him. It is not materiall that this is not so wise a government, for it is not prudence, but such a consent, not the understanding, but the will of the people that consti­tutes the forme, In such a state hostile resistance against him (though called King) may be a just warre, because the law enables them to fight, and the Prince may be a rebell and Tray­tour.

Let them prove that England is no monarchy; that they are not bound to beare true alleagiance by a necessary obligation flowing from the civill constitutions of this realme; that they may lawfully kill him, whose life they have sworne to defend with their utmost power, let them produce any law which gives power to English Subjects to traine, array, muster with­out the Kings authority, that I may not say against his expresse command, and to the end they may destroy him; when they have done this and confuted their oathes of supremacy and fe­alty, and made it appeare to the world they were forsworne, I will cease to preesse them with that of S ^t Paul, you must needs be subject not only for wrath, but also for conscience. I will then [Page 115] direct my speech to the King, and indeavour to perswade him to submit to the People, under whom he governs. But since they doe not so much as pretend any law but justify their Rebellion only by (that word fatal to this Kingdome) necessity, and lay downe a Principall, sit to disturbe the peace of all nations, that when dangers threaten, lawes must give place to discretion, and the subjects birthright, liberty and property must be sacri­ficed to a few ambitious mens ragioni di stato: I thinke I am bound in charity to admonish them in what a desperate condi­tion they are. Those who resist, shall receave to themselves dam­nation. All that they gaine by mannaging the ruine of their Country, will not countervaile the losse of their soules. I re­member the saying of the Prophet. The prudent shall keepe si­lence in that time, for it is an evill time. Amos. 5. 13. But I va­lue not safety, in comparison of honest (though weake) endea­vours to do service to the publike.

Some state it thus; elective Kingdomes are subject to forfei­ture but not successive. These men give but small satisfaction, because they build upon a very unsound foundation. For suc­cession is no inlargement of right, but only a continuance of that which the first had; elective Kingdomes are not forfeitable, except there be some expresse law, which places a power in the people to rule their King, and governe their governour. It is plaine, the Roman Emperors though chosen, were absolute: and successive Kingdomes, if there be any such expresse law are forfeitable; it is as plaine, the Spartan Kings, who were hae­reditary, might be legally deposed in some cases.

The unlawfulnesse of hostile resistance against the King of England is supported by a surer foundation, viz. the knowne Lawes of this Realme strengthned by divine ordinance: the necessity of our allegiance is demonstrable from the fundamen­tall Lawes of this Kingdome. I shall onely desire my readers to consider the nature of this government, and they must evi­dently discerne, to fight against the King is Treason and Re­bellion.

I will lay downe nothing, but what sober men shall have as little reason to doubt of, as to beleeve, that the King was de­spis'd [Page 116] and scorn'd, in order to be made glorious, and that they endeavoured to kill him in order to his preservation. So at Edge-hill, but before they were more cruell, and reserved for him something worse then death, to live under their command; Instrumentum servitutis, haberent Regem, they would make him the unhappy instrument, to raise them to honours in the ruine of his good Subjects. The Duke of Normandy invaded England with a potent Army, and made himselfe King; what our Lawes were under the Danes or Saxons (by whom wee were likewise conquered) doth not much concerne us to exa­mine, (no more indeed then it doth to know the ancient Brit­tish Lawes and Priviledges, which were taken away by them, and the true owners were beaten out of their rightfull possessi­ons and inheritances) for he inverted the Government, altered the Lawes, disposed of Possessions to his Norman followers, (whose bloud runnes in the veines of our most ancient Gentry) and made all, as well English as his native Subjects, feudaries to him, so that he remained Directus dominus, Lord Paramont, or overlord in the whole Land; that we may make no scruple of this truth, the Lawes given us by him, and which we are to live by now, are written in his language. However we state his entrance, whither by the sword, or to avoid the envy of that title, by a voluntary submission of all to him, as to their So­veraigne; the conclusion cannot vary, because the duty of non-resistance arises from their owne act, they taking an oath to be his true and loyall Subjects. It is objected, If he came in by force, he may be turned out by the same title. De jure he can­not; in this case, Quod fieri non debuit, factum valet; for though conquest be a name of greater strength onely, and be not it selfe a right, yet it is the mother of it. Because when the people are in their power, for feare o [...] harder usage, they passe their consent to be his faithfull Subjects, and to be peaceably go­verned by such Lawes, as he shall, or hath given them: This subsequent Act gives him a full right to the Crowne. To speak to the present case, he for his owne security, and because it was the necessary meanes to enable him to protect his Subjects, re­taines the right to dispose the Militia of the Kingdome, which [Page 117] continued in his Successours even to this day (though now vio­lently invaded by Subjects through vertue of an Ordinance, of which no times can afford a president) and all Subjects of what condition soever, were bound to doe homage, and beare fealty to him, which was inconsistent with taking up Armes against him. That he might sweeten their subjection, Quaedam jura pactis minuit, he restraines his absolute right by compact, & be­stows some liberties & some priviledges upon the people (who commonly nec totam servitutem pati possunt, nec totam liberta­tem) and these Acts of Grace he confirmes unto them by such security as should not endanger his person nor regall authority, that is, by promise and oath, and not by giving to his Subjects legall power to un king him, if he should not performe cove­nant; knowing full well, that though hee should not really breake it, yet a pretence he did so, might upon the first oppor­tunity create a civill warre; (and therefore his Subjects had as little reason to accept, as he to offer so pernitious security, as would put both parties in farre worse condition) for if Rebel­lion should be allowed in any case, that case would be alwayes pretended, and though the Prince were just, and wise, and re­ligious, yet ambitious men to compasse their owne ends, would impute to him oppression, weakenesse, and that notwithstand­ing his exemplary practise in his publique devotions to the con­trary, he did but handsomely dissemble, and favoured a false re­ligion in his heart.

The method of that Rebellion in the reigne of Henry the third, which made France extreamely miserable, is very obser­vable. A factious party of the Nobility and Gentry, a seditious party of the Clergy, and an unfortunate party of the seduced Commonalty, entred into a holy league against their lawfull So­veraigne, upon pretence he was mis-led by evill Counsellors, and favoured the reformed doctrine, notwithstanding he was even superstitiously strict in his devotions, in conformity to what the Roman Church enjoyned. When potent Armies were raised, ready to swallow him up, yet out of a vehement desire to undeceive his people, and to discover to the whole world the ungrounded malice of his adversaries in such unrea­sonable [Page 118] imputations, he refused the honest assistance of faithfull Subjects, because Protestants, to his owne and their probable destruction.

Many of King Williams Successors did inlarge the Subjects Priviledges by divers Acts of Grace, which they swore to main­taine, but never gave them such security as should alter the na­ture of Monarchy, by granting authority to their Subjects to force them to observe promises, and to make satisfaction for true or fancyed violations.

Hence it appeares, that the originall was conquest (as it is of almost all the Kingdomes in the world) which occasionally conveyed to him full right, because they yeilded themselves, and consequently what they had to the Victor; the Lawes which he or after Princes made for the benefit of the Subject, were severall limitations of this right, and therefore where Lawes cannot be produced to the contrary, there the Kings power is absolute, and no speciall cases can be determined by the Subject to the Kings disadvantage. The moderation of his power was by his owne compact, which he could not violate without injustice, yet the breach of it could not indanger his personall safety, because he gave no jurisdiction to his Subjects to force him by strong hand to doe them right; and if he had done so, he had made himselfe in such cases their subject. What ever we can claime as due now, is by vertue of the Kings grant, and therefore it is said by Hen. 3 ^d, in his ratification of the great Charter, We have granted and given to all the free men of our Realme these liberties. 9. H. 3. The whole Land was the Conquerours, he gave part of it as a reward for their service to his Normans, and other parts to the ancient Inhabitants, and their heires after them, yet so as he altered the tenure, and made it descend with such burdens, as he pleased to lay upon them: They hold them but in fee, and therefore are bound to certaine services, and to doe such and such duties upon paine of forfei­ture; in case of Treason and Rebellion their lands are his owne againe, and returne into his disposall. If Subjects breake their Covenant and prove disloyall, all their rights are forfeited by expresse Law; if Kings breake their compact, no forfeiture [Page 119] followes: The reason of this inequality is, because the King gave Law to the Subject, the Subject did not give Law to him.

Exc. Another exception is, If a King exercising tyranny over his people, may not be resisted, he and his followers may destroy the Kingdome.

Answ. This is easily satisfied, if we consider in what condition we were when conquer'd, and how that to avoid a certaine ruine (for he might have rooted us out for his better security, and planted this Land with his native Subjects) we submitted to an onely not impossible, that is, a most extreamely improbable de­struction. For it is an unheard of madnesse, that a King should be such an enemy to his owne interests; It is in our power to kill our selves, and yet we are not affraid of our selves, because there is a naturall dearenesse implanted in us, which secures e­very one from selfe-wrong: we have as little cause to be troubled, that it is in his power to make himselfe no King, by destroying his Subjects; The King perishes in the ruine of his people, and the man onely survives, exposed to the hatred and scorne, and revenge of mankinde. Sint quibus imperes, is a strong antidote against this unreasonable feare. Secondly, no policy can give an absolute security; we must trust some body, by which a way lyes open to a possible mischiefe, but many most probable and certaine inconveniences are thereby avoi­ded. Thirdly, we have good grounds to rely upon divine pro­vidence, if we doe our duty; for the hearts of Kings are in the hand of the Lord, he will put a hooke into the nostrils of Ty­rants, and though we may be chastised for a tryall of our pati­ence, or punished for our sinnes, yet he will not permit them to bruise his children to pieces.

Exc. We are bound by the naturall affection we owe to our Country to be active in restoring it to happinesse, by removing such a curse from the land.

Answ. We must not doe evill, that good may come of it. Some re­ply, this precept obliges private men, not Magistrates; especi­ally aiming at not any particular, but the publique good; a pious intention to advance this, excuses from sin. Certainely it will [Page 120] concerue all such as meane to goe to heaven; they may as well tell us, Magistrates may lawfully steale, or commit adultery, if they sin for the Common-wealth, that is, plunder in hopes to finde letters amongst malignant goods, or lie with other mens wives, to unlocke their brests, and discover such secrets, where­by they may more easily cut their husbands throats, as being in their Catalogue of evill councellours or enemies to the State: They may aswell challenge a Priviledge to breake all the Com­mandements for the Saints advantage. If then we may not doe evill, though we propose a reall good as the fruite of sin, cer­tainely those, whom divine ordinance commands to be subject, cannot usurpe office and rule, and take upon them to judge their Judges. If revenge be unlawfull in private men acted upon pri­vate men, how much is it a higher sinne, upon the Magistrate? By whom alone Christians can right themselves, and therefore their hands are bound from being used against him.

Exc. Selfe preservation is justifiable by the law of nature.

Answ. I grant this; hands were given to men for this purpose. This right to defend our selves flowes from hence, that by an inbred affection every one is most deare to himselfe, and it doth not al­wayes presuppose a fault in those who endanger our lives. For if they set upon mee, mistaking mee for another man, who hath injur'd them, or if they are lunatique, I am no more bound na­turally to give up my life to madnesse or errour, then to the ra­venous fury of wolves or lions. It is very truely determined by the civil law in reference to nature, Jure hoc evenit, ut quod quis­que ob tutelam corporis sui fecerit, jure fecisse existimetur. L. ut vim. D. de just. & jur. But this will nothing advantage them in the present case. For by that which they call Law of nature is meant onely right of nature, which is not a command, but a per­mission onely, and therefore it may be, and indeed it is actually restrained by positive constitutions, whether divine or civill. For example, all things were common iure naturali, by the right of nature, and yet the lawes of property are now binding to us. Hence is discovered the hollownesse of their discourses upon this principle. It is the most naturall worke in the world for every thing to preserve it selfe, and therefore when a Common-wealth [Page 121] shall choose a Prince or a State officer, though they trust him with their welfare, then that act of their trust is but by positive law, and therefore cannot destroy the naturall law, which is selfe preser­vation, cum humana potestas supra jus naturae non existit, seing that no humane power is above the law of nature. So Master Bridge in his wounded conscience. p. 2. Upon the same principle he must conclude, Society, which was regulated by the pactions of men, cannot take away our native liberty. For jure naturaliomnes homines ab initioliberi nascebantur. instit. de just. & iu. t. 2. §. 5. nor can property which was established by positive agreement destroy the right of naturall community. He must needs per­ceive the weakenesse of his reasoning. The answer to it is this, Humane power is not above the law of nature peremptorily commanding to doe such a thing, and abstaine from such things (of this law Cicero spake, haec lex diffusa est in omnes, est sempi­terna, a quâ homines ne (que) per senatum, ne (que) per populum possunt so­lui & liberari. l. 3. de Rep. and Ovid makes it unalterable.

But humane power is above the law or rather the right of na­ture, which doth permit a freedome of doing or not doing ac­cording to discretion. Else no contracts could be of force, be­cause by the law of nature men were free, and the obligation is positive, as arising from promise, which it was in our power not to make, but having once made it, we have tied our hands from using native liberty. Of this permissive law Aristotle spake pol. 7. cap. 13. Homines adductos ratione multa praeter mo­res & naturam agere, si aliter agi melius esse sibi persuaserint and againe, some things of nature depend upon our choyse and cease to be of force, when we please, to part with our naturall rights, not all things. [...], Ethic l. 5. cap. 7.

Secondly it concludes it lawfull for any private man to kill the King or his owne Father, in his owne defence, which most of that side have disavowed, and therefore they must acknow­ledge [Page 122] this argument is very hollow.

For the clearer understanding of the controversy, because I take no delight in confuting, but onely in the hopes of satisfing them and I request them for their owne sakes, to weigh my rea­sons with the same moderation, and calmenesse, wherewith they are written: Selfe preservation is naturall, that is, Nature doth not forbid any man to defend himselfe, though he must thereby kill another; his destruction was not primarily intended but he was forced to make use of such unfortunate meanes, in pursuance of no dishonest end, to retaine his owne right of li­ving. But though nature doth not forbid it, yet the Gospell doth, as it restraines us of many innocent delights, if we measure them onely by naturall right. Private revenge is unanswerably pro­hibited by the Evangelicall law; Recompence to no man evill for evill; dearely beloved avenge not your selves, but rather give place unto wrath▪ [...], it is not lawfull to right your selves, to doe your selves justice. Rom. 12.

Obj. The strongest objection against it, which can be made, is, that we are not bound to love our neighbour better then our selves, there­fore we may rather Kill then be Killed. (I speake onely against private revenge that is an execution of justice not commanded by law, for we may be bound, not to part with our lives, if the Common-wealth armes us, and injoynes us to defend our selves, because the preservation of the State is concerned in our safety, in that case. Saevitia est voluisse mori—)

Ans. I deny the argument; the antecedent is very true, but the consequence infirme, because we do not love him above our selves, though We part with our lives, rather then destroy his; For we shall thereby gaine eternall life, if we doe not contrary to the rules of charity, cut him off in his sinne, which will certaine­ly damne him. If any make scruple, that themselves are sinners too, and so unprepared to dye, and therefore (as good reason they have) they may refuse to be damned, onely to leave their enemy in a possibility of being saved. These feares may easily be solved▪ Greater charity then this hath no man, then to lay down his life for his enemy, and it were very strange, if men should go to hell with as great charity, as the highest Saints are rewarded [Page 123] with heaven for. Perfect charity is the fulfilling of the law, and as effectuall as universall obedience to Christs praecepts, the con­dition of the Gospell. To resigne our lives, (that is, the capacity of serving God longer) out of conscience to obey him though against the strongest temptation, is such an heroicall act, that the excellency of it, may supply the want of duration. It is an infal­lible signe of hearty repentance, and a most certaine argument of our serious turning from all sinne. For here is not onely godly sorrow for offences past, which is the doore and entrance into Christianity, but the perfection of it also, amendment of life, which is true repentance. For we sacrifice the pleasures and pro­fits of this world, and what ever was deare unto us, while we re­mained carnall, nay we yeild up life it selfe against the most vio­lent assault, the flesh can make, to the will of God, who assures that to dye thus, is gaine, as also, whosoever will save his life, shall loose it, and whosoever will loose his life for my sake, shall finde it. For these reasons private revenge is unlawfull though upon private men, and therefore much more hath Christ disar­med us, from recompencing evill to the Magistrate, because there is some equality betweene mine and my neighbours life, but publique tranquillity, the common peace of a whole King­dome (which is destroyed by civill warre) and the life of a sin­gle man, though innocent, are very unequall. Naturally we love society below our selves, for the end of it was to convey to us such and such goods, and that which is loved in order to some­thing else, is lesse amiable; But morally and in Christianity we are bound to preferre the publique good to whatever private Interest. And the obligation is very reasonable; For if we sub­mit nature to religion, and be content to loose our lives for the present, we shall receive them hereafter with great advantage. So that charity to our neighbour and love of our selves doe sweetly kisse each other.

Exc. It is lawfull to resist in Gods behalfe, and to preserve the true Religion; and to compasse the peace of Hierusalem by disturbing that of Babylon.

Ans. Certainely never any man made great improvement of his owne religion by raising Civill Warre, and Sedition and Re­bellion [Page 124] are very unfit meanes to beget devotion in the hearts of others; this way is so unlikely to attaine to perfect godlinesse, that I am much afrayd, by the unspeakable scandall of these not-christian courses, it destroyes even common honesty a­mongst men. Since the time of these unnaturall distractions, there hath beene a generall ebbe in our devotion,

Some with Nadab and Abihu offer strange fire before the Lord, which he commanded them not; God in his good time may quench these flames, which sensibly consume both Church and State, and the unhappy incendiaries may be devoured in that fire, which themselves have kindled. Others are not at leisure to offer up the ordinary incense of prayer and thanks­giving, (though too many have been over gratefull, and when beaten in the field, they have triumph'd in the Church, and in­stituted solemne praises for the Almightyes preserving their party, in such a sense as they endeavoured to preserve their Soveraigne) If any time be spared to make their addresses to Heaven, their usuall voyce is as harsh in Gods eares as the drumme and trumpet, for he is generally invoked as the Lord of Hosts, who takes greater delight to be worshipped as the God of peace. Mutuall feares and mutuall injuries have so ex­asperated the minds of most men, that the defection from cha­rity is much more common then that from allegeance. So that how religion thrives, be you judges; I am certaine there is a great decay of godlinesse.

But to examine this colour of preservation of true Religion.]

First all the Anabaptists and Brownists and other Sectaries, who beleeve us Idolaters for using the signe of the Crosse in Baptisme, & all such as joyne with them in fighting against the booke of Common-prayer and Episcopacy, established by the fundamentall lawes of this Kingdome, are evidently ingaged in this Rebellion, not for defence of their old Religion, but to introduce a better and new Creed. Let me aske them, with what face they can hereafter object to Papists that their Reli­gion is Rebellion, who may justifie rising up in armes against [Page 125] their lawfull Soveraigne, for the Catholique cause, upon these Puritan principles. The truth is, not all Jesuites doe maintaine it, and many Papists abhorre this seditious doctrine, agreeing with Roffensis, that sicut evangelium non dat regnum, sic nec auferre potest, lib, de potest, papae in tempor. Christ came not to dispose of Kingdomes, nor to make them subject to forfeiture. The University of Paris hath very christianly determined it, seditiosum, impium, ac haereticum, quocunque quaesito colore, à quocunque subdito, vassallo aut extraneo, sacris regum ac princi­pum personis vim habere, a seditious, impious, and hereticall thing, for any Subject, Vassall, or forreigner, upon what pre­texts or colour soever, to offer violence to the sacred persons of Kings and Princes, in their censure past, June the 4 ^th, 1610.

A more dangerous tenent for turning States upside downe, and bringing all to confusion, was never invented then this, that Regnum fundatur in orthodoxa Religione, Subjects may cast from of their neck the royall yoake, if he will not submit to the yoake of Christ. Their late Pamphlets speak out and tell us plainely, the quarrel is, whether Jesus shall be King. By this meanes those who manage Christs scepter, will command the Kings, and he must lay downe his Crown before the Presby­ters. They have another principle nearely allyed to this, which hath too great influence upon their practice, Dominium funda­tur in gratiâ, only the Saints, Gods elect, have right to the creature: wicked men and reprobates doe but usurpe the por­tion of the godly, and thereby increase their owne damnati­on, for they are the true heires, for our Saviour bestowed all upon them, The meeke shall inherit the earth. When wee think they plunder, they doe but distreine upon their owne goods; it is a recovery of what was due to them by the Gospell; to measure right by lawes is but to breake evangelicall priviledges: It is not theft, but charity, to put the wicked in such a condi­tion, as that they shall have lesse to answer for. If men of these opinions be tolerated, both reason and experience shew the peace of the realme is apparently dangered.

Secondly, as it is unlawfull (and some of their owne wri­ters confesse thus much, see Master Burroughs, pag. 123.) to [Page 126] fight for Religion if the Lawes of the Land be against it, (yet this is clearely their case, for they goe the destructive way, and would root out part of the established worship, though very much hath beene indulged to tender consciences even in this case) so it is against the civill constitutions of this Realme, and consequently against divine ordinance to take up armes against their King, though he should really favour another Religion, and countenance by his practice superstitious rites; nay, though the professors of the true and setled religion should be illegally grieved. Here were an opportunity to shew their christian fortitude, to make use of their spirituall militia, faith, humility, and patience, and not to contradict their calling, and discredit the crosse of our Saviour by taking up carnall wea­pons. I wish from my soule, all such as pretend to the Refor­med Protestant Religion, had beene unblamable in this respect, and that they had rather chosen to manifest their christian, then their martiall spirit. Wherever armes have beene lifted up a­gainst their lawfull Magistrates, though they were unjustly af­flicted for the testimony of a good conscience, I cannot excuse them from resisting the ordinance of God, who would have beene glorified in their martyrdome. I am sorry to meet with objections drawne from the unwarrantable practise of some, which doe not conclude you innocent, but that others were likewise faulty. I am certaine the primitive Christians were better catechised, and wee read the same doctrine of true pati­ence in their lives as in their schooles, which taught them to take up Christs crosse, and to follow him in that yoak in which he drew; They fought not against their Arrian Emperours in defence of the Nicene Creed; no rebellion was undertaken by them under colour of preventing their consciences from being forced: which is indeed an impossible thing; we may be rob­bed of our goods, we cannot be plundered of our religion. Did not Christianity thrive upon persecutions? Sanguis martyrum, semen ecclesiae, The bloud of the Saints made their surviving brethren fruitfull in good workes. Their patience wearied the cruelty of their adversaries and gained innumerable converts, who began to suspect christianity was true, when they saw it [Page 127] so powerfull as to make the professors live with so much inno­cence, and dye with so great meekenesse, and to neglect all earthly interests in expectation of Heaven.

Exc. Though private men should not, yet Inferior Magistrates may force him who hath the Supreame power, to rule according to justice and the established Lawes.

Answ. The same reason which disables private men from righting themselves, concludes likewise against inferior Magistrates, that is, want of Jurisdiction. For if opposed to him, whose autho­rity only can alter the nature of revenge, and make it justice, (for inferior in superiorem non habet imperium) they are but pri­vate persons. It is an unreasonable, impossible thing, that men should be obliged to obey two Masters commanding contrary duties, because this would impose upon them a necessity of sinning, which must be layd upon him who was the author of that necessity; And therefore God hath appointed a conveni­ent subordination in all authorities. Ʋt sol delet minora sydera, as the lesser lights are extinguisht by the greatest Luminary, the fountaine of all light; so minor jurisdictions must give place to him who is the fountaine of justice. If God command one thing, the King another, wee must be obedient to divine ordi­nance, because wee cannot be subject to mans command for conscience sake, against him who hath the sole authority to oblige conscience. So if the King command one thing, and his Ministers, inferior Magistrates another, wee must submit to re­gall power either by obeying, or suffering, because they can challenge our obedience onely by virtue of his authority, and this cannot be set up in an hostile way against his person. Whe­ther it be reasonable to obey the Kings Officers, who can doe nothing but in his name, against the King, judge yee. Souldiers are bound to execute the commands of their Captaine, yet not if they are contradicted by their Colonell, and he must not be obeyed against an expresse order from the Generall. In thus do­ing, S ^t Augustine and reason also assure us, wee despise not the power, but choose to submit to the higher; lesser Magistrates have no just grounds of complaint, if we preferre the supreme, for in reference to the highest, their magistracy ceases, and [Page 128] they become our fellow Subjects. Let every soule be subject to the higher powers saith Saint Paul. We must obey the King, and His Officers also, as they represent the King, (for quod per officiarios facit per se facere videtur) and they must be obedient as well as wee, as they represent Subjects. Thus Nehemiah re­ceiving commission from Artaxerxes, armed his countrey-men against those who governed under the King. Saint Peter very appositely differences this duty in respect of King and Ma­gistrates. Submit your selves unto the King as Supreme, but un­to Governours as unto them, that are sent by him, and derive their power from him, and are His Ministers to execute His commands, 1 Pet. 2. 13,. 14.

Exc. It is objected, (but very impertinently) if a King command against established Lawes, and inferior Magistrates according to the Law, they ought to be obeyed.

Answ. This comes not home to the case; I grant, obedience to the Kings command against law, is unwarrantable; but this doth not conclude the lawfulnesse of hostile resistance. Wee doe our duty in submitting to His legall will, though against his Letters or words of mouth, for he hath obliged us so to doe, and by his owne grant hath restrained his right to recall and abrogate Lawes, except by advice and consent of both Houses in Parliament. If He be offended without cause, we are bound by christian and civill constitutions to submit though to His un­just wrath. If they meane to conclude their owne innocence, they must frame their Argument thus: If a King command a­gainst Law, and Magistrates resist according to Law, wee may without guilt take part with them. This is true if they resist ac­cording to Law; but this cannot be in a Monarchy; for if the Lawes grant a right of resistance in any case, when that case comes, the Monarchy is dissolved, for those who are enabled to take up armes against Him, are His equalls or colleagues at least; the union is destroyed, and they are not to be esteemed Rebels then, but just enemies, because they cease to be Subjects. They cannot vindicate themselves from Treason and Rebellion, ex­cept they can produce some Law of England which dispenses with their Alleagiance in such cases, and shew that our civill [Page 129] constitutions are so framed, as to make Bellum Civile, Bellum utrinque justum, a Civill Warre, a just Warre of both sides in the law notion, which cannot be, except there be two supreme authorities to proclaime and manage it. That this is not so, the Houses shall give testimony against themselves, for they ac­knowledge themselves in their addresses to His Majesty, His humble and loyall Subjects assembled in Parliament.

Exc. Another maine exception, and which they most triumph in, is this, (I will deliver the words of one of them, who hath ex­pressed it the most fully) As it is a Parliament, it is the highest Court of Justice in the Kingdome, therefore hath power to send for by force, those that are accused before them, that they may come to their triall, which (if I mistake not) power inferior Courts have, much more the highest. 'Tis out of doubt agreed on by all, that the Parliament hath a power to send a Serjeant at Armes to bring up such an one as is accused before them, and if they have power to send one Serjeant at Armes, then twenty, if twenty be accused, and then a hundred, then a thousand, then ten thousand, if ten thousand be accused, and so more or lesse as occa­sion serves; for there is the same reason for two as for one, for a hundred as for twenty, for a thousand as for a hundred, and take away this power from the Parliament, and 'tis no longer a Parlia­ment. But the King and His Forefathers have by Law setled these Liberties of Parliament, and therefore according to Lawes they have ae power to send for by force those that are accused to be tryed before them, which they cannot doe, unlesse they raise an Army, when the accused are kept from them by an Army. Ma­ster Bridge in his Wound. consci. pag. 6.

Answ. First, the House of Commons is no Court of justice, it hath in­deed by speciall priviledge for it's better regulation, power over it's owne members, to imprison or turne out, and this power though at any time abused against justice and equity, and con­trary to the trust reposed in them, both by King and people (as if men should be committed for delivering their opinions freely because their reason was not so happy as to concurre with the sense of the House, which may possibly be the passions of the major part; or if some should be accused and others past by, though of knowne guilt in the very same particulars, as having [Page 130] an hand in monopolies &c. and so not the cause but the person, he made the measure of right & wrong) yet this misused authority hath the effects of justice and right, & makes the act legally va­lid. But the House of Commons hath no jurisdiction over those who are without, except at most in case of breach of Priviledge; it cannot judge or condemne any, no not so much as examine up­on oath: so that the argument is, the Parliament, that is the House of Lords, as the highest Court of justice, may legally raise an ar­my, without the consent, nay against the command of the King, it concludes too without the consent, and if they please, against the expresse will of the Commons declared to the contrary. This doctrine once since this Parliament sate, would not have been so pleasing to the lower House, that they would have taken care for printing it by Order from their Committee. There was a time when one of this House professed openly, he hoped to see that skie fall too, and the Lords were put in minde, they sate but in personall capacities (whereas Knights were shires, and Bur­gesses were townes and Cities) and therefore it was thought fit to give them warning and to admonish them to take heed how they thwarted the representative Kingdome.

Secondly, by the same reason Judges of inferiour Courts, out of Parliament at least, may raise an army to fetch in delinquents; if the framers of this objection, had consulted with those Sages, they would have better instructed them in the lawes. In cases of such high consequences, it was the custome of the House of Peeres to advise with these Oracles, to take directions from them, at least to know their opinion and the reasons of it, be­cause they had employed their whole time and studies to finde out the true meaning of the lawes.

Thirdly, To discover their mistake and the inconsequence of the argument, There is the same reason for twenty as for one, and so for an hundred, for a thousand, for an army, &c.

The reason is not the same; because when a few are sent out, the administration of justice doth not indanger the common peace. But because a warre doth put the whole Kingdome in manifest perill of being ruined, therefore when either reall de­linquents, or pretended to be so, are so many, as to make the try­all doubtfull, the liberty and right of inferiour Magistrates to [Page 131] fetch them in by force, is in this case restrained by expresse lawes, which provides very prudently, that no warre shall be made, ex­cept authorized by the supreame governour. And therefore al­so the lawes permit the King to pardon all offences against his crowne and dignity, supposing he will doe it, as sometimes out of goodnesse of nature, so sometimes out of the strength of his understanding, because not mercy only, but wisedome and pru­dence may prevaile with him to forget offenders, when they are so potent, that the uncertaine punishment of nocents, (for the worst cause may prevaile, as in the case of the tribe of Benjamin, so

must be bought with the unavoydable destruction of many in­nocent and gallant persons. Wherefore Serjeants at armes and officers may be sent by the House of Peeres, and con­sequently by Judges of inferiour Courts, and ordinary Justices, to force delinquents to appearance (though their crime ought to be specified, for to call them malignants or delinquents, is no legall charge) if they be not so many, as that they make such re­sistance, as cannot be punished without an Army; for a civill warre endangers all, and begets more faults then it punishes, and therefore the lawes referre the ordering of the common-wealth to him who is supreme, least inferiour magistrates violently carried on, should out of indiscreet zeale to justice, expose the Kingdome to contributions, plunderings, and thousand reme­dilesse injuries, more greivous then those they seeke to punish.

Exc. Warre against the person of the King is not resistance of the high­er power, but warre against his authority only, Buchanan right; Non igitur hîc Paulus de iis qui magistratum gerunt, agit, sed de ipso magistratu, h. e. de functione & officio eorum qui alis praesunt, dial. de jur. reg.

Answ. This separation of the officer from the office (which hath created bella plusquam civilia, the King in this army fighting a­gainst himselfe in the opposite army) is made without all colour or shadow of reason, for though the authority of the King be some times where his person is not, yet his person cannot be where his authority is not, This is evident by the 25. Edw. 3. c. 2. [Page 132] which makes it Treason to compasse the Kings death, by which must be meant to endeavour his personall ruine, because Regall authority never dyes in England. I have shewed formerly, that by not resisting powers, is meant, not resisting persons invested with such power. For when Saint Paul hath forbid to resist the power, he explaines it by adding a reason drawne from the persons in authority, to encourage them to obedience; for Ru­lers are not a terror to good workes, and so after, for they are Gods Ministers, [...] in the masculine gender which cannot be applyed to [...], that he might leave no ground of scruple, but plainly instruct us, that honour is due to their persons, and that all resistance to their persons is sinne, because of their au­thority, Saint Peter is as cleare, Submit your selves to every Or­dinance of man for the Lords sake, whether it be to the King as Supreme, or unto Governours, as unto them that are sent by him. Deodate expresses it very fully in his Italian translation, Siate adunque suggetti ad ogni Podestà criata dagli huomini per l'a­mor del signore: al Rè, come al sourano, ed a governadori come a persone mandate da lui. That wee may not mistake he tells us, that by Power or Ordinance is meant Persons endued with power ad ogni Podestà is sayes he in his glosse upon the place, a Principi, Magistrati, Rettori created by or amongst men, dagli huomini, o fra gli huomini per la conservatione e condotta della società humana.

Jude when he condemnes despisers of dominion, and such as, [...], speake evill of dignities, v. 8. meanes to commend to us the same duty which Paul taught us out of the law, which is free from all ambiguity, and concludes for the persons. When Ananias the high Priest, whose duty was to judge after the law, commanded him to be smitten contrary to the law, he (as was supposed by them) in passion returnes ill language, and being justly rebuked by the by-standers, he con­fesses he ought not to revile the Priest, though he did evidently abuse his authority (much lesse ought he to strike againe, with pretence of honouring his authority, but not being bound to submit to his personall commands contrary to the law. I wist not brethren that he was the high Priest; for it is written, thou [Page 133] shalt not speake evill of the Ruler of thy people, Act. 23. 5. S ^t Paul was unacquainted with this subtility, which allowes to speake evill; nay, to make hostile resistance against men in authority, so they professe to honour the authority of those men. It is [...], not [...], (so Master Burroughs) his personall strength, not any legall power which is resisted, if he doe any thing against law, and this, sayes he, is not forbidden, we may resist men, though not powers, wee must not be subject to will, but to law. p. 113.

His mistake lyes in this, that he thinkes [...], power, signifies the right and honest use of authority, whereas it signifies the right to use his authority, whether well or ill, 'tis all one to us for matter of submission to it, either by obedience or patience, because no resistance can be lawfull for want of a superior ju­risdiction, by which onely wee can be enabled to call him to an accompt for his actions. The truth of this is made evident in Joh. 19. 10, 11. Pilate faith unto him, knowest thou not that [...], I have power to crucifie thee, and [...], I have power to release thee? Jesus grants it▪ and answers, [...], &c. thou couldest have no power at all a­gainst me, except it were given thee from above.

By [...], therefore are meant persons invested with autho­rity. The reason which made Paul call Magistrates by the Ab­stracts, Powers was this, he wrote to Christians living in the Roman Empire, and it was the custome of the Latine Language to call persons endued with power, potestates, by the name of powers. You may observe it in Ʋlpian, l. quid sit. D. de Aedil. edict. §. 19. and in Augustine, epist. 48. who saith, sive pote­stas veritati favens, aliquem corrigat, laudem habet ex illa, qui fuerit emendatus: sive inimica veritati in aliquem saeviat, lau­dem habet ex illà qui fuerit coronatus. Mark that, potestas ini­mica veritati, this must needs signifie a man abusing his autho­rity. And in Juvenal, An Fidenarum, Gabiorum (que) esse pote­stas, and in Suetonius, Jurisdictionem de fidei commissis quotan­nis & tantum in urbe delegari magistratibus solitam, in perpe­tuum atque etiam per provincias potestatibus delegavit. The mo­derne languages, Italian and French, which were bred out of the Latine retaine the ancient use of speaking, for potestat in [Page 134] French and podestà in Italian, expresse not the function onely, but the person which manages it. Thus anciently the Latine word for a Justice of peace, who now is called justitiarius, was justitia, as you may find in Glanv. lib. 2. cap. 6. and Roger Hovedens Annals: so our King is called in the abstract Majesty, as the Grecian Emperours, [...].

Many ridiculous consequences flow from hence, but I list not to make sport with that unhappy distinction which hath al­most ruined as flourishing and strongly temperd a Kingdome as any in the Christian world. It exposes Magistrates, and all in authority to the contempt and injuries of the baser sort of people. For when discontented, it is very obvious for them to tell them a reverence is indeed due to their function, & therfore that they setting their office aside, will take liberty only to kick their persons, and that the Magistrate is not at all affronted, though the man be soundly beaten. It is against common sense to put such a difference betweene the person and the authority of the King, for if it were reall, neither God, nor the Lawes of the Land have made any provision for the Kings safety; for His authority is not capable of receiving any benefit, and therefore it must be acknowledged by all sober and reasonable men, that His authority doth but convey such and such priviledges upon the person, who onely can be sensible of them, and conse­quently whatever is attempted against his person, is attempted against his authority likewise.

Another cavill is taken from these words in Rom. 13. For Rulers are not a terror to good workes, but to the evill; wilt thou then not be afrayd of the power, doe that which is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same. For he is the minister of God to thee for good. Their Argument is framed thus. A Magistrate is the Minister of God for our good, therefore he which is not a Minister for our good, is no Magistrate, and to resist him, is not to resist the ordinance of God, (which instituted Rulers for the peoples happinesse) but the faults and exorbitances of men, which endeavour to rob them of the blessings of divine provi­dence, orderly government, and to make them bow downe under the heavy burdens of an arbitrary sway. Their conclu­sion [Page 135] (contradictory in it selfe) is plainly this, A bad Magistrate is no Magistrate, (as being a terror to good works, and giving praise to the evill, contrary to Saint Pauls definition of Ru­lers,) and therefore no honour is due to him, no resistance is forbidden.

Answ. The example of Christ commanding them to pay tribute to Caesar, as his due, the end of which was, that he should mind their good, though he neglected that duty, and his acknow­ledgment of Pilates power, or right to judge, though he exer­cised it to the condemnation of the innocent, and Saint Pauls confession, that notwithstanding the high Priest commanded him to be smitten illegally (which in their language was abuse of will, not power) yet hee must not returne ill language, be­cause he was the Ruler, do clearly evince their argument not concluding. Saul was a bloody tyrant, hee made the Priests a sacrifice to his cruelty, yet notwithstanding he continued Gods anointed. It were easie to instance in many examples, which shew the vices of man making ill use of the power do not voyd the ordinance of God.

There are, who answer these places very piously, but, as I think, not altogether to what Saint Paul aimed at. Rulers are not a terrour to good workes, and he is the minister of God to thee for good, that is, though they oppresse, nay kill innocent men, yet they cannot hurt them; For God will recompence their sufferings, it is in bonum afflictis, though affligentibus in malum, because all things worke together for good to them that love (that is, are obedient to) God. Rom. 8.

It seemes to me more probable, that the scope of the Apostle was to inforce the duty of subjection, pressed in vers. 1. by a second reason (for he had urged before, the ordinance of God) drawn from the benefits which will be reaped from Go­vernours. And the motive is, the consideration of that happi­nesse, which wee have reason to promise our selves from the preservation of order, the end of which is publique tranquil­lity. This is enjoyed under very bad Princes, which will abun­dantly recompence some particular sufferings, whereas if wee should goe about to right our selves, when power is abused (to [Page 136] say nothing, that it would alwayes be pretended to be so by ambitious men, who have this advantage, that the common people have but weake judgments in State matters (and yet appeales are especially directed to them, and since our miseries have growne upon us, the contrivance of our calamity was ve­ry visible; the fatall arts which ruined this Kingdome were to make the meaner sort of men Judges of Policy, and women ge­nerally the Judges of Religion) and they are easily perswaded to reckon misfortunes amongst crimes, and to confound ill in­tentions with ill successe) If I say wee should take upon us to governe our Governours, because they rule not for our advan­tage, wee should pull upon our heads much greater mischiefes. Experience shewes, that Kingdomes suffer infinitely more by Civill Warre, then by the most Tyrannicall Princes: If wee call to mind the most vicious King that ever reigned in Eng­land, wee shall find, though he did injure some particulars, in­dulging to some inordinate affections against the tenor of Law, yet justice was favoured in the generall, and the greatest part of the Kingdome reaped the fruits of order. Whereas illegall en­deavours to force him to amendment, introduce a cessation of all law and justice, and the Subjects will be plundered more in one night then the greatest monopolyes and most unjustifi­able taxes of many yeares robb'd them of. The Apostles sense is expressed fully by Tacitus, Ferenda Regum ingenia, néque u­sui esse crebras mutationes. The reason why it is better for a people, though oppressed, to submit with patience even to a Tyrant, is this; if he be put to recover his owne by conquest, and prevaile, he may be tempred (as highly provoked) to rule them with a rod of iron, and to provide for future safety, by utter disabling them to hurt him: but if they get the better, their victory doth but confirme our calamity; wee cannot see any probable end of our unhappy distractions. Because for­raigne Princes will certainely afford supplies for recove­ring his just rights (for it might suddainly be their owne case, and they are bound to it in State interest; that they send not aid sooner, is, because it is for their advantage to have a neigh­bour Kingdome weakned, but not the Prince ruin'd) and it is [Page 137] very unlikely he should ever want a very considerable party at home, many out of conscience, more out of discontent and en­vy towards their fellow Subjects, prosperous treason, endea­vouring to restore their injur'd Soveraigne, to his undoubted Rights and Prerogative. So that England would be the unhap­py scene, where the tragedies of Germany would be reacted. But grant a totall extirpation, and that they shall be able to go through with their wicked designe, and not only branch, but even root Monarchy also (for this is aimed at by some, who feare it may sprout againe, if the stock be left) have wee yet at last any hopes of peace, when wee are so undone by warre, that wee have nothing left to loose but our lives? truely no, then like theeves, when once secure of their booty, we should have thousand differences in dividing the prey, all of them challen­ging preferments great as their sinnes, and setting such a price upon their wickednesse, as the estates of all honest men will not be able to pay; it is not possible, what they have got­ten can be pleasant to them, when they consider much more might be enjoyed, and sadly recollect the inequality of the re­compence to the adventure; for their lives were exposed to the danger of the law, their reputation is lost with all good men, and their soules are eternally ruin'd. They would fall out amongst themselves, who was the greatest Traytor, and never yeild precedency in mischiefes, because that is the measure of Sharing. Some would plead, they contrived, others, they acted the Treason, and thinke a subtile braine should have no priviledge above a couragious heart, it being more easie to fright the people by inventing false dangers, then to lead them on, and make them stand the brunt of true. It is beyond my skill to proportion the wages of sin, & determine, whether the slye and cunning setter or the stout thief can claim greatest share in the spoyle. But commonly the speculatively malicious men are miserably deceived of their expected requitall. For though they set the mischiefes on foot, yet their journey-men, quickly apprehending the mystery, are easily tempted to set up for themselves. It hath beene often seene, that to end such quar­rells, he that was head of the conspiracy in reference to the a­ctive [Page 138] part of it, and who had force enough to oppresse a Ty­rant, would use the same to establish himselfe their Lord and Master, and his government was so much the more rigid, se­vere, and miserable, because he was frighted with his owne example upon his predecessor.

This I conceive to be the Apostles sense, that wee must sub­mit even to bad Governours (such they were when he wrote this Epistle) not only out of honesty, but prudence also, be­cause if wee goe about to make them better, wee shall put the Kingdome, and consequently our selves, in farre worse con­dition.

After this explanation, I will reduce their Argument into forme, that I may thereby give more distinct satisfaction.

Non resistance is forbidden only to the powers ordained of God;

But powers used tyrannically are not ordained of God, therefore wee are not forbidden to resist them.

The assumption is absolutely false: For though tyranny be not the ordinance of God, yet the power (which is commanded to rule justly, but withall inabled to doe otherwise, for the use is left indifferent in respect not of the Magistrates, but Subjects duty, so that abuse doth not voyd authority, when swerving from lawes) is of divine constitution. The obligation not to resist superiour powers receives not strength from mans justice, nor is it weakned or made null by injustice. Saul was Gods anoynted, and Pilate had authority from Heaven, notwithstan­ding the extreame abuse of it. Had the Apostle meant as they endeavour to perswade the world, considering what Gover­nours the Christians then lived under, he had laid downe a do­ctrine of rebellion, whereas he labours to teach them patience.

Thus much in answer to their objections against what was delivered in the second Section; I shall now examine their ex­ceptions against what was assumed in the precedent Section,

The King of England hath Supreme power.

Exc. There is a mixture or coordination in the supremacy, and the English Monarchy is compounded of three coordinate estates.

Answ. I have shewed before, that a mixt Monarchy is a contradi­ction, [Page 139] and that by this name can only be meant, a restrained and limited Monarchy, that is, that such a King, though he have Supreme, yet hath not absolute power. By reason of this re­straint from his owne grant and positive constitutions, active obedience is not due to his illegall commands, and by reason of his supreme power and sole right to make Warre and Peace, passive obedience is necessary.

Monarchy compounded of three coordinate Estates, in plaine English, speaks this nonsense, the power which one only hath, is in three joyntly and equally.

The ground of this invention, and so much fancyed coordi­nation, which our ancient Lawyers never dreamt of, may be this. If they meane by it, that the consent of all three Estates (I will not alter the new manner of expressing this govern­ment, but only take notice by the way, that heretofore, the Parliament was taken for an Assembly of the King and the three Estates, and that in all other Kingdomes likewise there are three States, the Clergy, the Nobility, and the Commonalty, distinct from the Head) are equally required for transacting such businesses as the King hath obliged himselfe not to doe without them and that they have the right of a negative voice, wee shall indulge to them the name of coordination to two pur­poses, which are, making new, repealing old lawes, and sup­plying the Kings necessities, in such proportion as they shall think fitting. These are great democraticall advantages, but in­clude no authority of making hostile resistance against their soveraign, in case he should do contrary to the established laws, These are still in force, till abrogated by joynt consent, and bind his conscience, but he cannot be forced to put them in execution, because he hath no superior in jurisdiction; and he hath no equall in managing jus gladii, the materiall sword, which is necessary to distinguish their resistance from rebellion, and give it the title of a just warre. For except they can prove themselves not be His Subjects, I am forced to tell them, if they fight against him, they are by the law of Nations and of this land worthily reputed Rebells, and by divine law they are as­sured of damnation.

[Page 140] Thus therefore; the two Houses, or two Estates of Lords and Commons, are not bound to submit their consent to the Kings command in matter of Subsidy, or taking away any ancient Law, if they conceive it disadvantageous to the Common­wealth; Par in parem non habet imperium, in those things in which they are equall, as a rather and a sonne being joyned in commission; in this sense let them be called coordinate. Yet they are subject in all other things, and therefore may not take up armes without his consent, for this is destructive of their alleagiance.

If there be a Coordination in the supremacy, that is, if the King and Lords and Commons are joyntly the supreme governour, the Correlatum is wanting, none are left over whom they should Reigne, wee should have a Kingdome without a Sub­ject, because all may challenge a share in soveraignty.

The Parliament not sitting, they will not deny the suprema­cy to be solely in the King, and certainly by calling His great Councell together, he doth not empty himselfe of any regall power; it were very strange our lawes should be guilty of such vanity to make a uselesse coordination, for if His rivalls should make any attempts upon His Prerogatives, He can legally dis­solve them, (except when he hath past a particular grant for their continuance, and then the enlargement of their time of setting, doth not enlarge their power) and after He hath dis­mist the Assembly, (as the right to doe so is unquestionable) then He is Supreme againe, none being left to stand in compe­tition. The cleare businesse is this, all markes of supremacy are in the King, nor is it any Argument of communicating His power, that He restraines Himselfe from exercising some par­ticular acts without consent of Parliament, for it is by vertue of His owne grant, that such after acts shall not be valid. He hath not divided His legislative faculty, but tyed Himselfe from u­sing it, except by the advice and consent of the Peeres, and at the request of the Commons, their rogation must precede His ratification. I shewed this in the Roman Empire likewise, and yet none fancyed, an equality between Subjects and the King or Emperour was thereby introduced.

[Page 141] As the houtefeus of France argued from the denomination of Pares Franciae, to make them equall with the King, so our In­cendiaries from Peeres and Comites, to bring in a coordination whereas it is evident that Peeres, referres not to the King, but signifies (as the Persian [...] mentioned in Zenophon) Subjects in the same ranke of honour, and enjoying equall priviledges, one is another. And to make Comites is called by Lampridius in con­ubernium imperatoriae majestatis asciscere, our lawyers derive them from having that speciall honour to be in comitatu regis, Suetonius calls them comites peregrinationum, expeditionumque Tiberii, They were of three rankes under the Emperours, Comi­tes intra consistorium were the highest, and in the nature of privy councellours, but created by the Emperour, the fountaine of all honour, and so not similes altissimo, equall to him, though exalted above fellow Subjects.

The briefe is, the frame of governement, as it is established by our lawes, clearely condemnes their undertakings, and therefore they have laid such a foundation, as will support the building. For if they can but prove that Parliament men, and those who are stirred up to fight against their Soveraigne, are not the Kings Subjects, they have acquitted them from being Rebells.

We have seene the ground worke, and shall now take the su­perstructure into due consideration; the whole fabrick is com­prised in that exiome so frequently applied to justifie all illegall proceedings. Coordinata se invicem supplent, Coordinates ought mutually to supply each others failing, that we may not suffer whe­ther by necessary or voluntary defects, and that the Kingdome may not runne the hazard of being ruined for want of supple­mentall lawes, and therefore when the King is perverse and will not joyne with them for the common good, they have full authority without him.

This would conclude as strongly for the power of enacting lawes without the King, which the Houses have disclaimed. It is true, this legislative authority is exercised under another name, let the Authors answer for practising what themselves have ex­pressely disallowed. For it is but small satisfaction to the injur'd Subject, to tell them they challenge not a power to make stan­ding [Page 142] Lawes, but onely temporary Ordinances: That is, they will take away their estates for the present, and then their votes shall be no longer binding, was not this the reason why such Procla­mations are justly accompted grievances, as doe intrench upon the Subjects liberties or property? The Subjects are equally miserable, whither their birthright, the lawes of this land, are o­verthrowne by Royall Proclamations or Ordinances of one or both Houses.

Coordinata se invicem supplent, Coordinates supply each others failings; therefore if one refuse, the other two are enabled to doe it without him.

By the same logique, if the King and House of Lords joyne, the consent of the House of Commons is legally supplied, and they may constitute what they please without them. This is the evident doctrine of it, which yet is commanded by the House to be printed. If the King had sayd this, it had beene the grea­test breach of Parliamentary priviledges that ever had beene made. Posterity will have no reason to be thankefull to them for disputing themselves out of the right of a negative voyce, onely that they may with some small colour (making use of an accidentall advantage, the major part of those few Lords, which remaine in the House now, joyning with them) take away from the King (what is as much his by law as the crowne he weares) his right to reject any Bill, never questioned by our Ancestors, and it is very strange it should now; Sir Thomas Smith tels us quibus princeps derogatum vult, haud pluribus ver­bis utitur, quám le Roy, aut la Royne s'advisera; quaeproptereá ex­tincta penitus, abolita (que) censentur. l. 2. c. 3. descript. Ang. If the Kings deniall did not extinguish them, all those bils, which have slept for many ages, as laid downe by our knowing forefathers out of a necessary modesty and a just valuation of their Sove­raignes right, would rise up lawes to the extreame confusion of the present governement. And secondly, if his authority must be involved or swallowed up in their votes, if his part in Parlia­ment be the same with the flatterers in the comedy, Ais, aio, ne­gas, nego; if he be but a State eccho, it is manifest he hath not so great a hand in the managery of his Kingdome, as the meanest [Page 143] fellow, who hath but 40 ^l per annum freehold, for he governes by proxy, whereas the King is represented by none, and yet must not speake for himselfe and for his owne Interest, which is alto­gether the same with the publique. The greatest security the Subject hath, that equall lawes shall be preserved, is from his ne­gative voyce. The interests of the major part in the House of Commons may be opposite to the good of the Kingdome in ge­nerall. For if we reckon those many that serve for, and are (or would be, in future elections, if the power were thus enabled to effect what ever advantageous designes) of Corporations, and those few in comparison, who serve for Shires, we shall easily beleeve, the priviledges of Cities and Townes, may be inlarged by them to the great discouragement and losse of the honest far­mer and painefull husbandman; So the Burgesses for the West are so many, that upon an unanimous conspiracy amongst them­selves, and labouring some single persons, who may be easily wonne out of relation of acquaintance, friends, or kinsmen, or their inadvertency, and not fully weighing, or not understanding the consequences of it, they may easily carry by vote, what is ve­ry beneficiall to themselves, though extreamely prejudiciall to the other parts of this Kingdome.

To goe higher, it is very easy to conceive, that the major part of the lower House, may be very meane men chosen to make more profitable lawes for the poorer sort, and to keepe the Gen­try under by laying subsidies and all burdens of the Common-wealth upon them, not without a specious pretence, that they spend more in superfluities then would discharge all publique expenses, and exempting themselves from all payments, as being such, who take great paines, and worke very hard, even for neces­saries. The possibility of such a choise is apparent, because (con­sideriug how small meanes are required to a capacity of voting in the election of Parliament men (it may perhaps be more wa­rily ordered hereafter by the wisedome of that great Court, who may thinke it fit to raise 40 ^l per annum freehold to such a pro­portion as that estate was valuable at, in the first constitution, when the scarcity of money made it a competent fortune) the greater part of those which choose them are poore contry-men [Page 144] and beggarly tradesmen. Such a choise then is very possible, nei­ther is it improbable, if Parliaments shall be governed by these new principles. For the reason why such an election was never yet made, is this, such a power was never heretofore challenged, as could enable them to goe through with any such designe. If either the Lords perceived any motion from the Commons dis­advantageous to themselves, or the King thought it prejudiciall to the publique, and so necessarily unprofitable for him (as if the merchant should be discouraged, by laying too greatbur­dens upon forraigne trade, or the Clergy impoverished, by ta­king away those meanes which should make men able, and keep them honest) it was presently rejected, and so not to be stickled in further, sitting that Parliament. If some factious spirits wrought upon their discontents, and perswaded them to passe nothing, whether by granting subsidies, or consenting to new lawes, which might be beneficiall for the present State, till they received satisfaction in their desires, though such a perversnesse (which I suppose onely and doe not say it ever was) might be very unhappy for the Kingdome (for by making the King poor, it would probably put his friends upon some unwarrantable courses, whereby to supply his wants, and this would create a misunderstanding betweene him and his people, and breed ill humours, which fomented by crafty men, would breake out in such violent distempers, that there would be a necessity of cal­ling phisitians; These politique phisitians when once entertai­ned in such an extremity, will be sure so to manage the disease, that they will be paied as much as they please to demand. They will desire such offices, such commands, not for themselves, but onely in order to the recovery of their patients; The deniall of which shall put the people in danger of a relapse, and they will prescribe the wayes of prevention and make use of the impati­ence of distempered men, to compasse their owne ends) though I say, such a sullennesse would make the Kingdome miserable, yet it is their right to deny the most reasonable proposall, and there is not any legall remedy against inconveniences, which will certainely flow from hence. Neither necessity nor propte­rea quòd regnum nostrum periclitatur, which is the same with sa­ius [Page 145] populi suprema lex, can enable the King justly to provide for the Kingdomes safety, by raising money against the known Lawes: he may in this case dissolve the assembly, and onely use such meanes, as are not contrary to Law. By reason of these ne­gative voices, and the Kings right, as to call together, so to breake up that great councell, there was not any hope of new moulding this State to particular Interesses, and therefore these unequall compositions of the House of Commons had no influ­ence to the disadvantage of the Commonwealth. Yet now wee may probably suffer under them, if this new doctrine take place, That the Kings consent is past, and involved in the Lords and Commons; for the next rub of the Lords negative is remove­able by the same Logicke of Coordinata se supplent, and that the people may not perish for defect of a supplementall Law; it was essayed formerly, that they sitting in personall capacities, should not oppose what conduced to the safety of the Kingdome, repre­sented by the Commons, and those two grounds being laid, as the King and Lords are voted out of Parliament, so it is very pro­bable, the Gentry would be but very thinne in the House of Commons, upon new election hereafter, because the disposall of all would be put into their hands, whose interests are most dis­joyned from the publique tranquility, as enjoying least by the present establishment in this State. From hence it is apparent, what confusion were likely to follow, and the short experience we have had, hath already too fully acquainted us with the mi­serable consequences.

To answer distinctly to their axiome coordinates supply each others failing; if it should be understood in that sense, which they plead for, that the King failing to performe his duty, the Lords and Commons are enabled to transact businesses without him by vertue of this rule, upon the very same grounds the King and House of Commons may exclude the Lords, the King and Lords may exclude the Commons; but this be­ing destructive of the fundamentall priviledge and right of either House this onely can be meant by it in the present case, that the power of any one or two of them, is defective to some purposes expressely named in our lawes, (as for enacting new lawes, or raising money upon the Subject) without a joint con­sent of all three. This interpretation is very reasonable, but it [Page 146] concludes against them, and forthe King; for he requires no­thing, but (what our Lawes grant him, and what he alwaies ac­knowledged equally their due) a right to a negative voice in those things to which the three estates are coordinate. The use of it cannot be injurious, for a deniall to bring in a new governe­ment, doth not take away the old, it leaves us in that happinesse, which our Fathers were content with.

Exc. All other matters (wherein the exercise of His supreame po­wer is not restrained, by making their consent a necessary condi­tion, without which it cannot be actuated) he may manage sole­ly, as for instance, he may, and ought to protect His Subjects, and to make use of those meanes with which the law hath invested him to enable him to compasse that end, and these are the Militia or armes of the Kingdome.

Answ. The King though he be singulis major, yet he is universis minor. I am forced to take notice in the first place of that lamentable so­phistry, which yet hath deceived many,#& though it hath bin of­ten discovered, they still persist to abuse the people with it. The strength of all their discourses depends upon this syllogisme, the Parliament is greater then the King, (the assumption is built up­on a false foundation, The two Houses are the Parliament. Er­go, the two Houses are greater then the King.

The proposition is granted, because Parliament includes King and Lords and Commons, and his legislative power, as to the use of it, is so restrained, that it cannot be legally exercised without their consent, and this obtained in Parliament, it becomes abso­lute to those purposes, to which they passe their assent. 25. H. 8. 21. So that the onely meaning is, he can do more in Parliament, then out of it.

But the minor is absolutely false, for the King is caput Parlia­menti, and so an essentiall part of Parliament. I am ashamed to bring quotations out of the lawyers, to prove what is so mani­festly true. For if the King were not a necessary part of the Parli­ament, & the Parliament (as it is being rightly understood for the head and body) were the whole Realme, then we should have a Kingdome without any King.

Object One objection is frequently urged; there must be a Parlia­ment somewhere, for it cannot be dissolved without their consent, [Page 147] which is not yet past,but it is not at Oxford, nor no other place, Lon­don excepted, therefore it is there, and consequently the Houses are the Parliament without the King, or else His authority is in their votes.

Answ. The want of Logique hath proved as fatall to this Kingdome, as the want of conscience; I cannot determine which hath had the strongest influence in our calamities, the malice of some, or the ignorance of others. Suppose the Lords should remove their House out of the City (as they have an undoubted right so to doe, upon the agreement of the major part, and there might be some motives for it, for to say nothing else, their number would be more then doubled) where would these men place the Par­liament? If the King and Lords should legally sit in Oxford, were the House of Commons thereby excluded from being a part, or could they be concluded the whole Parliament? It is not an uni­on in respect of place, but an union of their assent and the Royall ratification, which actuates the power into a law. The Kings absence doth not destroy the being of Parliament (no more then if he should dissent being present) nor doth it forfeit his power into their disposall, as you may see 33. H. 8. c. 21. His assent by his letters patent is and ever was of as good strenght and force, as though the Kings person had beene there personally present, and had assented openly and publiquely to the same.

But what if he dissent from them and refuse to confirme their votes? Then they ought not to have the force of lawes, no more then if the King and Lords should agree on any thing the Commons contradicting it; neither is a legall establishment▪ If they say, his obstinate refusall voides the Parliament, for it is made of no use, if it may not be active, when deserted by him, and except he please to establish their ordinances; The King might as well presse the Commons to consent to what he and the Lords shall thinke fitting, because otherwise they void the Parliament, for it is of no use, if it may not be active without their assent which they resolve not to passe.

This constitution of the negative voyce in either of the three estates, was made in favour of the present governement, the goods of which were knowne by experience, that no innovati­on (the evills of which are hardly discovered before tryall) [Page 148] might be introduced without a joint consent of all three.

The whole Kingdome is greater then the King.

Answ. If they meane by whole Kingdome, both King and people▪ it is very true, but nothing pertinent, for it onely signifies that the head is not so great as it self and the rest of the body. But if they understand (as they must if they meane to conclude any thing) the body in opposition to their Soveraigne, it is false that universitas subjectorum est major Rege. The same reason which makes him above one, makes him above two, and so a­bove ten, & so ten thousands, & so ten millions of thousands; for their assembling together doth not dispense with their duty of alleagiance, many or few alters not the quality of the act, an universall revolt from a lawfull Soveraigne is equally Rebelli­on, as a particular defection of one or more Countyes.

The Orators art is much used in these unhappy times [...] and [...], misdemeanors were once raised into high Treason, and now evident treason is lessened into ne­cessary defence. That rhapsody of quotations, intituled the trea­chery, and disloyalty of Papists to their Soveraignes, &c. brings a very merry plea to take them off from being Traytors. The stat, of the 25 Edw. 3. c. 2. runnes in the singular number, if a man shall levy warre against the King, &c. it ought to be judged high Treason, therefore it extends not to the Houses, who are many and publique persons, p. 31. If he had sadly considered, how deeply conscience is ingaged in the present warre against the King, he would not have endeavoured to seduce so many in­to Rebels, and make them forfeit their soules upon such pitti­full subtilties.

If forraigners should inquire under what kind of government wee live, the answer must be, wee live over a King. Certain­ly they will much wonder at the unnecessary humility of the Houses, (they challenging to themselves superiority as the re­presentative all) and conclude them very great Courtiers, who in their addresses to the Prince, their Subject, stile themselves His Majesties most loyall and faithfull Subjects, the Lords and Commons in Parliament. They will shrewdly suspect, if Ma­jesty be His due, that Supremacy is so also: while Rome was a popular State, the supreme dignity being in the people, was ex­pressed [Page 149] by majestas populi Romani, and after when they had re­signed up their power to Emperours, it was changed into Au­gustalis Majestas, taken for the person of the Emperour. C [...]ubi & apud quem. l. cum scimus. or Imperialis majestas. C. de qua­driennii praesc. I bene à Zenone. and so Keyserlich Maiestaet at this day for the German Emperour.

The custome of petitioning him, and such humility in the title of their addresses and the preface, (suppose it should reach no further, yet it) cannot be wholely taken of by the imperi­ousnesse of the matter. Some of that side seeme to be scrupled at it, and therefore plaine scottish tells you, they hold Declarati­ons to be more sutable to the soveraignty of so supreme a Court, whose power is coordinate with Princes (wee must hold superior) then petitions.

I have proved in a former discourse, that the King is su­preme head, not in respect of single persons, but the universitas subjectorum. For this is comprehended in body politique com­pact of all sorts, and degrees of people, which is sayd to owe next to God a naturall and humble obedience, 24 H. 8. c. 12. And it is evident, that hee is not the head of this or that man, but of all the members in conjunction, of the whole body, for else he would be the head of millions of bodies, and by conse­quence have as many distinct Kingdoms, as particular Subjects. It is needlesse to multiply quotations, as the 25. H. 8. 21. This your Graces Realme recognises no superior under God, but only your Grace, or Queene Elizabeths publique declaration, that shee had next under God, the highest and supreme government and power over all Estates of the Realme of England, Ecclesiasti­call or Temporall. Camd. hist. pag. 31.

I will summe up the reasons in briefe, which prove, that the King is not minor universis. First, if the Houses are above Him, He hath no right of Empire upon them, because inferior in su­periorem non habet imperium, but this is false, for they are sub­ject by Law to His commands, when he bids them come, they are bound to come; and when he bids them goe, they are bound to go, that is when he calls them by his Writ, they ought to attend praescriptis die & loco, and he prorogues the assembly, [Page 150] or dissolves it when he thinks fitting. It is no prejudice to this right, that he was graciously pleased to restraine the exercise of it in this present Parliament without their consent, to the end those vast debts which were brought upon this Kingdome might be discharged, and in order to that, good security might be given to such persons as were willing to ingage their estates, for the benefit of the common-wealth. I will make no advan­tage by urging their abuse of trust, by which they were ena­bled to take off that great burthen, which they have made in­finitely more heavy, and whereas they might in short time have eased this State, our debts hourely grow upon us, and the Sub­jects estates are but the fuell to feed that fire which sensibly consumes this unhappy Nation. Notwithstanding, they have deceived both King and people, yet His Majesty cannot satisfie Himselfe in their Logique, and suffer Himselfe to be perswa­ded, he may lawfully reassume His right, because they doe con­trary to trust. Though the perpetuity of this Parliament was never intended, and it hath beene of most pernicious conse­quence, yet the King will not allow Himselfe any liberty (to dissolve it) against law, upon most reall good intentions. Be­cause the president is full of danger, and though in the present case it would be used for the benefit of His people, yet hereaf­ter, it probably might be abused to their greater disadvantage.

Secondly, the division of all persons in this Land is into King and Subjects, liege Lord and liege people, and therefore they must be placed in the latter ranke. It is a strange phansie to abstract the body politique from all the particulars whereof it is compacted, and to salve the Oath of Allegiance, by telling us the universe or body politique never swore alleagiance or su­premacy to the King, neither is it possible it should. Reply to an­swer to the observations, pag. 17. and again, pag. 18. (in answer to the 24. Hen. 8. cap. 12. The King is supreme head, unto whom a body politique compact of all sorts and degrees of people are bounden and owe next to God a naturall & humble obedience) wee must not understand this, that the body politique doth owe obedience, but that the severall sorts and degrees of peo­ple, of which this body is compacted and made, that they doe owe [Page 151] obedience, for to take it otherwise, were to make an absurd and im­possible construction. &c. If every particular man performe his duty of alleagiance as he stands obliged by oath, let him op­pose his met a phisicall body to the King even as he pleases. If the body politique have not sworne allegiance or supremacy, be­cause it is a body only in consideration of law, that hath neither life or motion, like other invidualls p. 17. and for the same reason doth not owe homage and obedience p. 18. How is it capable of rebelling against the Head? for it cannot fight but by the hands of particular men, and all these are tyed up by divine law, and their owne oathes.

3. They acknowledge themselves his subjects as united in Parliament; and if they should deny it, they could not challenge any benefit from his royall protection.

4. The lawes intrust him, not the Houses to protect us.

5. The Houses represent only subjects opposed to the King, who is their superiour by humane and consequently divine law, both as their naturall King and as Gods anoynted, his represen­tative.

6. There is a great difference between the reall and represen­tative all; for though it were true, (as it is not) that he were lesse then the whole people, yet this would not bring the conclusion home to the Houses. Who are the people only to such purposes as the law nominates, viz. for consenting to Lawes or Taxes upon the Subject. To all other purposes (wherein Regall power is not expresly limited) the King is the whole people, and what he doth is legally their Act. Aristotle tells us of some Kings, that had as full right over their whole realme, as a popular state can have over it selfe, and all things belonging thereto 3. pol. 14. To such an one that of the Tragaedian is truely and properly applyed.

You are the whole City, the whole Common-wealth, and therefore not responsable for any actions. This shewes the falsehood of their principles, Quicquid efficit tale, est magis tale, and constituens est major constituto, &c. for though they meane [Page 152] to make advantage of them only in this Kingdome, yet they conclude against the possibility of making any King absolute, which reason and experience have clearely confused. For a people if conquered, (their lives and all they have being then in the hand of the victor) or if in feare to be swallowed up by a more potent enemy, they may and often have very prudently consented to place all the legall power of the Kingdome in one man, that he may thereby be enabled to protect them, and where the legislative power is unrestrained, there the rule is ab­solute.

To apply this doctrine; In those things wherein the King of England is not absolute, as in the exercise of his legislative po­wer, and raising money without consent, The Houses together with him, represent the people; but in such matters, wherein he is absolute, (that is, wherein he is not restrained by lawes which are but limitations of Regall power) there he is Populus An­glicanus, legally the English Nation. For example sake, I will instance in the power of making Warre and Peace, if any take up Armes by vertue of any other then his Commission, they op­pose not the King alone, but the King and People as, People is to be understood in law, for their hands are tyed up, and all their legall strength is in the Kings disposall.

Let us examine their Argument, The whole people are above their King, therefore the Houses, because they represent them.

The Antecedent I have shewed false, because the whole peo­ple are but such a number of Subjects, who can have no colour of pretence to be above him, whom God and the law hath pla­ced over them.

The consequence is as infirme, and the reason of it fallacious, for if representatives might challenge all rights appertaining to the persons by them represented, then a Jury shall be concluded as honourable as the House of Commons, and then too because the Emperour of Germany, may challenge of the King of France or England (not superiority, for they are as supreame and inde­pendent Princes, as he is, but) praecedence, (an honour due to the antiquity of the Empire, for nations as well as persons injoy the benefit of primo geniture) his ambassadours also might sit a­bove [Page 153] those Kings, which the Court of honour guided by the law of nations, and reason would pronounce very absurd.

Againe they represent the people only to some purposes; to make warre is none of them; The King alone can declare the peoples mind in this case, they have no legall way of expressing themselves but in his Commissions, and therefore the warre is not betweene King and People, but so many particular persons exceeding the trust committed to them, against the duty of alle­giance, oppose both King and People. It is very remarkeable, that in the begining of these unhappy contrivances, some mul­titudes appearing in tumultuous wayes, what ever they desired or did was called the Act of the People, providing for their own safety. But after the sense of miseries had bettered their under­standings, to make them discerne, this unnaturall warre was not like to improve the meanes of preservation, many of them make a Covenant to live peaceably and honestly amongst themselves, so in Yorkeshire long since, and lately between Cornwall and Devonshire, and now the Houses interpose, and will not per­mit the people who were stirred up and encouraged to raise a warre against law, to make a peace according to law; let them trouble the waters as much as they please, they shall be borne out in it; but they must not thinke of setling them, till they have done fishing; This would be a breach of Priviledge. The Peo­ple are now forced to defend themselves, and their goods vio­lently taken from them, for their security; who might soone be happy againe, if their friends would be lesse carefull of their safety. It is well knowne who began to appeale to the People; withall my heart (if law must be suspended) let them arbitrate the differences. The certaine way to know their judgement, and whom they apprehend to be a reall defender of what both pretend, our lawes and propertie, and liberty, and the establi­shed religion, is to cease plundering of both sides, and leave them to their naturall inclination. That side which confesses it cannot subsist without using violence and oppression, and for­cing their estates from them, acknowledges that the people, whom they pretend to fight for, is clearly against them, and they have small reason to challenge a priviledge of breaking all [Page 154] Lawes, by vertue of that paramount Law, populi salus, when as their unwarrantable courses ventured on in order to the safe­ty of the people, doe manifestly conduce (even the People be­ing Judges, and repenting their former folly) to the poverty, slavery, and ruine of all.

It remaines, I lay downe my promised conclusion of the whole, that notwithstanding such a power of resistance, as they or any others have yet openly pleaded for, should be granted lawfull (as when in their owne defence, or when he that hath the highest authority, and is bound by the Law of God and his owne promise or oath, to administer justice equally, after fre­quent representations of their grievances, and most just com­plaints of their great sufferings affords no redresse) yet this can be no justification of the present warre against the King, nor ac­quit the Actors in it from being rebells; Because this case is e­vidently not now.

The Armes taken up against the King, were not (as is preten­ded) defensive, nor in maintenance of any thing which the Sub­ject can challenge as of right.

If we call to minde that unhappy time, This warre offensive of the Subjects part. when His Majesty (forced to preserve himselfe by flying the City, that he might be free at least by absence, from the scornes and dangers of unre­prehended, I will not say, encouraged tumults) was immediate­ly accused to have rebelled against himselfe, At Kingston upon Thames. and was furnished with an Army by Vote, when he had not so much meanes left him, as could honestly feed his family, and it was Ordered that this formidable Hoast should be apprehended by the ordinary Ministers of justice in that County; if our memories will but render a faithfull accompt of this contempt, harder to be dige­sted then the former popular fury, wee may perceive their be­haviour towards him, was a sufficient confutution of their feares of him. They told the people, they were afraid of His power, and yet answered their owne jealousies by shewing to the world, they were able to take it from Him; He was so farre from being in a condition to invade their rights, He had not wherewith to defend His owne. His inability to revenge indignities was so notorious, they durst be even wanton in a­busing [Page 155] Him. When He wooed them in that gracious Message from Windsor, His yeelding so much did but tempt them to use greater rigour. Nothing would satisfie, unlesse he would make their votes the measure of His obedience; for what priviledge had they above private Counsellors, if their advice should not sway with Him more then reason? when He requested them onely to make knowne what was wanting to the Kingdomes happinesse, and He would chearefully supply it, they thinke it losse of time to represent particular defects, but put him into such a way as will effect it, to be guided in all things as they shall direct, that is, to let them manage His Royall power, who knew better how to governe. Because He will not submit to their blanke desires, by confessing His Vote to be legally invol­ved in their Orders, nor resigne up that power which the law hath intrusted Him with, and which cannot be separated from the Crowne without dissolution of this government, and ther­fore He is obliged both in justice and honour to preserve it as the necessary meanes, whereby He is inabled to protect His people; Because, I say, He will still be King, and not part with those Rights which God and the Law gives Him, they will dispense with their duty of being Subjects, and challenge a pri­viledge to take away those Rights, which He will not, when petitioned, fairely deliver. After this, he retires to Yorke, one­ly desirous to live safely, and contented to suffer such an eclypse of glory, till such time as the abused people should recover their understandings, and these clouds should be dispelled by a cleare apprehension of His innocence, and undeserved suffe­rings. Thither the storme pursues Him, His Rents are stopped, that He might become a burthen to the Northerne people, and that they might be tempted to part with Him, with as much cheerfulnesse, as they would be rid of the poore of their Coun­ty. Commissioners were pickt out, and sent amongst them to incense the lesse knowing, and to awe the more honest party, from receiving their naked Soveraigne into their protection. The dangers they would incurre by their perverse loyalty are laid open. They will certainely be Voted high Malignants, and notorious Delinquents, if they frustrate the pretended Parlia­ments [Page 156] injustice by their charity; for to what purpose did they take his revenues from him, if others should be allowed to give Him sufficient wherewith to cloth and feed Himselfe. Though such order was taken, by seizing His demaines, He should not live amongst them as a King, yet the sweetnesse of His private and familiar conversation with them, made Him an extreamely popular Gentleman. And therefore misdoubting a generall de­fection to obedience upon tryall of so great goodnesse, which increased with their injuries, and finding the people (not able to conceale their love of His extraordinary virtues) openly be­traying an honest pity of their much wronged Master, they thought it necessary to give law to their feares, by usurping His power, and exercising it in their oppression whom unwary re­spect towards their Soveraigne had made suspected for loyall Subjects. Accordingly all His Arms (and those of the Kingdome besides, least the people should prevent their own wrongs by a timely revenge of His) are seized on, & they possesse themselves of His Forts, Castles, Townes, and Navy. After such unparalell'd usurpations, Regall power being invaded by private hands, a small Guard of honest York-shire gentlemen attend the King for His Personall safety, not knowing where their injuries would stop, for the bonds of law being once shaken off, their power to oppresse, or ruine, was as unbounded as their will; by the same justice He was kept out of Hull, they might have kept him in what Village, what House, what Prison they plea­sed. This Guard of a much smaller number then they had kept together many Moneths was scornfully Voted an Army, and Commissions are illegally issued out to raise Forces to suppresse this second Warre, made by the King upon Himselfe. The publique motive was feare of violence intended by His Maje­sty, the private encouragement to lesse forward Souldiers was the Kings inability to make the least opposition. An Army is levyed against Him upon publique pretence of His strength, and perswaded to march against Him, upon their private assu­rance of His weaknesse. Thousands are listed not to fight, but travell, and are promised to know nothing of warre besides the wages, but to injoy the security and delights of a progresse. [Page 157] After all this (to prevent effusion of bloud, and these vi­sible calamities which the wild ambition of a few men, hath pull'd upon their unhappy countrey) He twice sues for Peace▪ in those most gracious Messages from Nottingham, with offer of such large conditions, that if more should be required from Him, though when conquered, the Subjects would be loosers by it, and they would gaine that by a miserable Warre, which will much diminish the happinesse of Peace. They will not now descend to a Treaty with their King; they like His humi­lity, but are not well pleased it was not shewne sooner: onely some slender hopes are given, that their Generall shall have commission to pardon His former unwillingnesse to suffer, if He can redeeme those errors which have put them to expence and trouble, by a constant tamenesse for the future. From Nottingham he slyes to Shrewsbury (for they are conten­ted to give Him line enough, being confident they can strike Him when they please; in the meane time, 'tis good sport to see Him wearying Himselfe with fruitlesse indeavous to escape, when at last being tyred with long and vaine strivings. He must be forced to deliver Himselfe quietly into their hands.

Thus was he accused to be the assaulter, who was so long time unable to resist their violence. Ei fuit saluti, quòd vide­batur certò periturus, his apparent weaknesse did deliver him from that power which was ready to swallow him up; they had then destroyed him, if they had not beene more wanton, then conscientious.

This narration is abundantly sufficient to prove the warre to be defensive of the Kings part. But I will examine it further by the rules of Justice.

Albericus Gentilis defines warre very accurately (presup­posing the lawes of society, and excluding private Duells) pub­licorum armorum justam contentionem, a just dispute of diffe­rences by publique swords, l. 1. c. 2. de jure bel. just, negante sensu, for that which is not unjust, and in the law notion, in re­ference not to the causes, (for this is called pium bellum) but the authors waging it. Wherefore he shewes, that it cannot be but betweene independent States and Princes; Citizens or [Page 158] Subjects cannot be lawfull enemies opposed to their Prince, be­cause they want supreme authority, without which the warre is not publique, nor can it be justified. The reason is, because warre is only excused by necessity, that is, when there is no le­gall way to end controversies by prohibiting farther appeales, as amongst distinct States, or severall Princes, who acknow­ledge no superior, and are not bound to submit to any Court, and may perhaps not agree upon arbitrators, because in some cases none can be named, who are uninterressed in the decision. But I will not insist upon the injustice of Subjects making war for any cause whatever, upon the supreme power, because this was evidenced at large in the second Section, where I proved, that a liberty of resistance, doth destroy the nature of sove­raignty or supremacy, and introduces regnum in regno, civita­tem in civitate, by dividing the civill power, which can be but one, if the State or Kingdome be but one.

That of Cyprian shall be the entrance into our iniquirie, con­cerning the injustice of this present warre of the Subjects part (setting aside their duty of non-resistance by divine law apply­ed to our constitutions, and supposing an equality or indepen­dancy betweene King and Subjects) for want of a reasonable cause which might excuse those great mischiefes, as being a ne­cessary remedy to prevent greater. Homicidium quum admit­tunt singuli, crimen est, virtus vocatur, quum publicè geritur. And there is some ground in reason, that shedding though the bloud but of one man should deserve an ignominious death, and to kill thousands by publique authority should make our lives glorious. Because there is as vast a difference, as betweene the guilt of murtherers, and the gallantry of men undertaking the administration of justice with personall hazard for preservati­on of publique rights. First therefore a jurisdiction is required, where lawes are wanting to make use of force for recovery of right (which Subjects cannot have over their Prince) and this doth make justum bellum. And secondly, a sufficient cause is necessary; there must be reasonable motives, or else it cannot be pium bellum. Except wee have [...], wee commit murder with the sword of justice. The me­thod [Page 159] of the Romans was to demand their rights in a peaceable way by their Heralds, and in case restitution was denyed, then warre was proclaimed, and the cause likewise declared, (nec dederunt, nec solverunt, nec fecerunt, quas res dari, fieri, solvi oportuit, as wee find in Livy) that the world might be satis­fied in the innocence of their unwilling violence. So carefull were they to preserve their credit with mankind, whom it u­niversally concerned, that warre should not be waged upon light and unjustifiable grounds. There must be belli causa gra­vis, a sober inducement to make the warre defensive, and if this were not wanting, reall injuries having beene offered; yet if this cause were taken away, by an after readinesse to make full satisfaction, if the offended parties would not accept of re­stitution, the warre was then esteemed offensive of their part, and they became guilty before God for the causelesse effusion of so much bloud, and worthily infamous amongst all good men. Melior causa ad partem poenitentem transibat.

To apply briefly these unquestionable rules of justice to the present case: for I find that long reasons doe as little satisfie the common sort, as none at all, they having but narrow me­mories, and it being the same thing not to know, and not to re­member.

I will put but one interrogatory to such as take up Armes a­gainst the King, Why they are Rebels and Traytors, cui bono? (for that they are so, I appeale to the Judges of the Land, or referre them to the plaine and evident Law, 25. Edw. 3. Let them suppose themselves arraigned, and the Judge to aske what they can say for themselves, why sentence should not passe for their condemnation according to expresse law. Certainly they could not make a fairer plea then the Earle of Essex, who had not proceeded to offer violence to the Queene, and yet was adjudged a Traytor for appearing in Armes, only with inten­tion to remove evill Counsellors.)

The pretext is, in defence of Liberty, Lawes, Property, Pri­viledges of Parliament and Religion.

But the reall cause is, the preferment of a few ambitious per­sons, who will not permit the Lawes to have their free and [Page 160] uninterrupted course, the knowne security of the Subjects hap­pinesse, because the orderly administration of justice doth not signifie, that the King will bestow such offices upon them, as their inordinate desires aime at. He cannot doubt the truth of this, who hath read and observed the conditions without which they will not suffer peace, and to compasse which His Majesty hath left no reasonable wayes unattempted. I am con­fident, He hath offered so much to His Subjects as would con­tent honest and moderate conquerours.

Concerning Lawes, there shall not be any other measure of mens actions, besides those knowne rules. Neither Royall Pro­clamations, nor fellow Subjects Ordinances shall make the people miserable under an Arbitrary sway. Doe you desire to be as happy as your progenitors? you shall. For you shall en­joy all the same lawes by the benefits wherof they lived peace­ably, plentifully, gloriously. And besides this for a futher im­provement of your happinesse, all those new Lawes enacted this Parliament, and the severall additional favours by parting with many knowne rights, (which exceed the Acts of Grace from all His Royall Ancestors though put together) shall be confirmed to you.

Doe you desire to be as free as your Ancestors? you shall. His Majesty passionately requires the Liberty of the Subject should be restored, and will take care the people shall not loose their birth-right, by being imprisoned upon His, or, which is worse, their fellow Subjects illegall displeasure. He will con­tribute His utmost endeavours, that His owne Castles, the Bi­shops houses, and all other not long since honest habitations, may be disgaoled, and the English may be againe acquainted with the comfort of life, freedome of their persons, and of con­versation, and not be banished from their Wives and chil­dren for presuming to make the Lawes the rule of their o­bedience.

Doe you desire the establishment of your Property? you shall have it. His Majesty challenges no right to your estates, and is unwilling Subjects should claime a priviledge to take them from you, only that they may be better inabled to with­hold [Page 161] His. No pretences of unknowne dangers, or unseene ne­cessity shall justifie the violation of Lawes, which alone can se­cure your inheritances.

Doe you desire Priviledges of Parliament should suffer no diminution? They shall enjoy them in as high a way, as the Subject in the freest and most happy dayes ever challenged.

And lastly, that Religion which was sealed with the bloud of many holy Martyrs since the Reformation, and which stands established by Acts of Parliaments, and flourished in the purest times of Queene Elizabeth, which no sober man can thinke guilty of any inclination to Popery, shall be confirmed to you by an impartiall execution of all legall penaltyes appoynted a­gainst offenders.

Thus whatever can reasonably be pleaded for, is cheerfully offer'd to us, and wee are wooed to accept, what the contri­vers of our ruine pretend is fought for, Lawes, Liberty, Pro­perty, Priviledges of Parliament and Religion.

Would you have security for performance of this promised happinesse? you shall have as great as in justice you can re­quire, or in reason expect; the same security with which the modesty and wisdome of former Parliaments were fully satis­fied, and the Kingdome injoyed the benefits of their well grounded confidence.

And to compleat all, you shall have certaine provision for a Trienniall Parliament. We are restored to such a high degree of health, as our Fathers were never acquainted with, and moreo­ver such a course is taken to time this State Phisique (it was ne­ver intended Parliaments should be our constant diet) as will probably prevent future distempers.

What fury hath robb'd men of their understandings, that they cannot be perswaded to be happy! that their malice should in­crease with their calamities! that they should hate, and teare, and kill one another they know not why! For upon my soule a great part of their army would not impose upon others, nor admit themselves of the Brownists, or Anabaptists Creeds; nei­ther would they thinke this Kingdome unhappy (so they might get some honest imployment, as honourable opportunities [Page 162] would not be wanting in forraigne nations, if we had once re­covered our former reputation, with that wealth and quiet we lately injoyed) though 8 or 10 men should loose their mischiefes, and not get those offices, which they valued, above the riches, and quiet and honour of their nation.

What one thing hath His Majestie denyed them, which hee had not full right so to do? And, qui jure suo utitur, nemini in­juriam facit; except they can alleadge [...], very considera­ble injuries offerd to them, and a refusall to give satisfaction, the warre is manifestly unjust on their side; wee at the worst shall fall martyrs, and they at best will live murtherers, all the bloud which hath beene shed will be brought in upon their accompt, all those rapines and sacriledges, the robbing God, and men will lye upon their heads.

In matters of Law he hath not rejected any thing, and in mat­ters of meere grace and favour, he hath beene bountifull above all his royall Ancestors, and so extreamely tender is he in giving all content to His two Houses, that he could not prevaile with himselfe to deny, but he reserves his assent till such time, as they can shew him some reasonable motive, whereby he may be in­vited to grant.

As he hath been constant in his love and prosecution of peace, so he hath taken extraordinary paines in solliciting His Houses to cut off the unnecessary injuries of war, by laying down plun­derings and other causelesse violences committed upon Estates or persons on both sides, his Royall heart bleeding even for the unavoidable pressures the people have pull'd upon themselves. His Souldiers will rule their actions by the counsell of John the Baptist, and be content with their wages, and cheerfully hazard their lives in defence of so honest a cause, by as honest meanes. If they are not able to pay their Army, what secret moath and canker hath consumed that vast treasure? Their want of money is a great argument of the unsearcheable judgment of God, who can make them still poore, though they take a liberty to seize the wealth of the Kingdome. O that the people would but yet consider how unlikely it is the State can thrive hereafter under such Stewards!

[Page 163] He that sadly calls to mind the height of happinesse from which wee are lately falne, all past grievances being fully re­medyed, and future pressures probably prevented, and consi­ders how often His Majesty hath intreated, importuned us to accept againe of that blessed condition, may well wonder, that our calamities should yet continue, that they should hourely grow upon us. I would willingly banish from my thoughts those melancholly observations of Historians, Quos Deus vult perdere, prius dementes facit, and Quorum fortunam Deus mutare constituit, consilia corrumpit. But they have so strongly possest my fancy, that I am almost tempted to feare, such a ge­nerall losse of mens reason, is but the fatall forerunner of an u­niversall destruction.

Our condition stands thus; though the King hath not yet, nor ever will hereafter deny any thing of right, (those desires which are regulated by lawes shall be no sooner presented to Him, then granted) and though he hath indulged extreamely much of favour (more then our Fathers had the boldnesse to crave) neverthelesse wee cannot prevaile with our selves to injoy so great blessings, unlesse He will consent likewise to their other requests, some of which He may thinke He is obli­ged not to passe in justice, there being no light motives to in­duce Him to beleeve, He hath sworne against it, at His Coro­nation; and some, He cannot grant with honour, and without betraying that trust committed to Him by God and the Law for the benefit and protection of His people.

He is desired of signe the Bill for abolition of Episcopacy (that which acquainted this Land with Christianity) and to di­minish the Rights of the Church, and take away Ecclesiasticall revenues, that He may be remembred in story, as the unfortu­nate instrument to pull downe what the charity of many ages hath beene building, and to destroy many pious Monuments and glorious testimonies of our forefathers christianity, and to ruine what the devotion of our godly Ancestors hath contri­buted for the encouragement of learning and advancement of Religion.

To say nothing to the politique part, how the Ecclesiasticall [Page 164] and Civill State are so interwoven, that the foundation of the whole may thereby be shaken, and how there are very good reasons to suspect a Presbyteriall Government will prove ex­treamely prejudiciall to Monarchy; I shall speake only to the religion of this request. And first, I would willingly know, whether there be such a sinne, as wee have hitherto used to call Sacriledge (so severely punished upon the Heathens, the viola­tion of things dedicated to false Deities, being notoriously re­venged by the true God, and so extreamly abhorr'd by all good Christians in former ages) and then, whether Magistrates have any dispensation to commit Sacriledge innocently, by which private men incurre a lasting infamie, and eternall damna­tion.

Secondly, I would willingly be satisfied in this Quaere, whe­ther the King having sworne to preserve the Rights and Immu­nities of the Church intire, can innocently consent (supposing Him fully informed in the nature of that right which belongs to His Clergy, for the most religious Prince may be subject to mistake) to lessen or abrogate them, except released by the consent of that Body, to whom He is obliged? This poynt rightly stated (I shall only offer it to be seriously meditated on, without any peremptory determination) may confirme, the Lands of the Church for the future to the great improvement of our civill happinesse. For (besides that wee might reasona­bly promise to our selves a blessing from the Almighty, if wee shew our selves as carefull, to setle those Rights which tend to the advancement of his worship by a firme establishment of a certaine and honourable maintenance for his more immediate servants, as wee are justly sollicitous to secure our secular in­terests, by making provision, that no mans Rights shall be alie­nated without the owners consents) a great temptation, and that which seemes to have the strongest influence in all at­tempts of innovation, would thereby be cut off, the hopes of repairing their decayed fortunes with the spoyls of the Church, Wee shall find in stories, that most of those stormes which di­sturbed former calmes, and by which this Kingdome sundry times hath beene miserably shaken, were raised only with in­tention [Page 165] to sinke the Church by such as promised to themselves considerable shares in the wreck.

Some answer; He is equally sworne to the observation of Lawes, but these He may alter, with advice of both Houses. Thus one, I doe not conceive Him more bound to defend them by His Oath, then the rest of the Lawes enacted, any of which when the Kingdome desires should be abrogated, I hope is done without perjury. That which is commonly called the Lawyers Answer to D [...] Ferne. p. 31. This doth by no meanes take of my scruple, because His Oath to defend the Lawes enacted, is made populo Anglicano, to His people, and so (as all other promises by con­sent of the partyes to whom a right was transferred) may be, and really is forgiven by them represented in Parliament to that purpose. But this other Oath is made to such a part of His people, Clero Anglicano, and particularly taken by Him after His Oath to the whole Realme, which were needlesse, except it meant some other obligation. This seemes to prove it a di­stinct Oath, and not releasable without their consent. Upon the same grounds that these Rights are pleaded voyd, if Voted downe, notwithstanding they to whom they belonged, ex­presse not their will to part with them, the strongest security England can give is weakned and discredited, that is the in­gagement of the Kingdome to repay such sums by consent of King and Lords and Commons, which and which only is pub­lique Faith. In such a case, can the City be Voted payd, ex­cept they willingly release the debt? if they should be told, their rights are not stronger then lawes, but these are made null at the desire of the Kingdome in Parliament, they would soone apprehend their logique to be extreamely faultie, and it is pro­bable they would maintaine, that the representative Kingdome in Parliament cannot dispense with the Kings obligation to a particular body of His Subjects, in whom alone the power of releasement doth lye.

He is desired to nominate such Officers to manage the great affaires of state, as they shall confide in; that is to yeild up His undoubted right, happily enjoyed by all His Royall Proge­nitors, into their disposall, and to determine His choice by ar­bitrary [Page 166] feares. If they will confide in those, whom the lawes doe not distrust, the King hath satisfied even this request, for he will not preferre any against whom they can bring just and legall exceptions. But he thinks it no good argument to in­duce him to turne able honest Ministers (who may challenge from His accustomed goodnesse that priviledge of quàm diu se bene gesserint) meerly because others desire to have their pla­ces. They themselves would conceive it very hard usage to be put out againe upon the same title, when no legall exceptions were produced against them, and therefore they presse His Ma­jesty to secure them (when once in) by law, and yet will not permit him to be ruled by their advice out of equity▪ and to continue His favours to those men, who by a faithfull discharge of their places, have shewed themselves worthy of that trust; if it will be reasonable then, it is so now, to encourage faithfull servants by making their owne offences only, and not other mens feares, the rule by which they shall suffer. Nemo illis sic timere permisit. They might as well tell the world in plaine english (but that advantages are still made of the peoples blind­nesse) except the King will grant such preferments to us and our favorites (for let Him nominate whom He will, they will ne­ver confide, unlesse He guide His nomination by their instru­ctions, who are to approve them, and the truth is, when they have gained one, He hath reason to request them to take the other, for they will save Him the trouble of naming in vaine, and He may thereby conceale His hurtfull affection, and not expose His best friends to dishonourable repulses) except wee may be Patrons (they would once have been contented to be onely the present incumbents, and suffer Him to retaine the right to bestow them freely for the future time) wee shall never indure peace, and yet wee must be forced to cast the envy of so mi­serable a warre upon him.

All understanding and dis-interessed persons must clearely discerne, it is the same injustice, not to consent, the people should be happy, and to keep up these publique calamities, un­untill they shall be satisfied in their illegall, unreasonable pro­posalls. Though it be a more politique way, duris conditionibus [Page 167] pacem pati velle, to expresse a desire of peace, but not to admit it, but upon unequitable and unjust conditions, yet it is equally di­shonest, as to deny it downeright. They are altogether inexcu­sable, unlesse they will make such proposals, whereby it may ap­peare, they covet not anothers, but only to preserve their owne rights. Which the King freely offers to them without diminu­tion of the least title, and with unpresidented enlargements by many additionall favours in this present Parliament.

He is desired to make the Houses sharers with him in orde­ring the Militia, and to grant them a right to suppresse all for­ces but such as shall be raised by their consent.

This request is evidently destructive of that fundamentall Law, which intrusts this power in the Crowne alone to enable the King to protect His Subjects and the Lawes. The benefits of which constitution our happy Ancestors enjoyed, and the greatest pressures the English nation at any time suffered under, did spring from this fountaine, when Subjects undertooke the managery of this regall right.

Because their desire is discountenanced by Law (and being so though it were as really beneficiall, as it is truely pernicious to the peace and quiet of a State, opening a gap to civill dissenti­ons, necessarily arising from the opposite interests of consorts in power; though it might be reasonably wished, yet it cannot be innocently fought for) They endeavour to justifie it by reason of State, and plead the necessity of it, as being the onely cure of feares and jealousies.

The recovery of this Kingdome were certainely desperate, if His Majesty too should grow fearefull and jealous, who hath beene more unanswerably tempted to give admitance to these unhappy passions. For if they might seize on his power by the Law of feares, if that it is taken from him, becomes a motive to perswade him to give them right to keepe it, might not he with greater shew of reason, require an inlargement of his former power, because it is manifest (though they pretended to be a­fraid of it) it was not able to secure him from their violence. Much more might be pleaded, why he should be enabled to keepe, what the Law gives him, then they not to restore what [Page 168] they have illegally taken from him. But he contents himselfe with the ordinary meanes of safety appointed by Law, and will not make himselfe justly formidable, by giving entertainement to unjust feares, and challenging a priviledge to doe injuries, be­cause it is not impossible, he may suffer them, and may loose his owne rights, except he disable others by invading theirs. If this principle should once prevaile, peace and justice were lost to mankinde; for it would still be some-bodies turne to be afraid, and that would give them a right to greater power, which right would cease as soone as they were possest of it, and the true title to power would alwaies be in those who wanted it. There is no other way to get out of this maze and confusion, to which their wild feares inavoydably betray a State, but by prevailing with our reason, not to suspect those whom the Lawes have not suspected. For as jealousies against Law are causelesse, so they are altogether remedilesse. The fuller answer to Doctor Ferne, endeavours to excuse them by vertue of a commission from this principle, abundans cautela non nocet, but wofull experience hath evidenced the contrary; he tells us further, State jealousie hath no right hand error, none on the excesse side, the more the better. pag. 27. It is much worse then private jealousie, because this is but the misery of a family, that the unhappinesse of a Kingdom.

To summe up all, though some have gone so farre, to indulge to Subjects a liberty to take up armes in maintenance of old laws, yet no sober author can be produced, who makes it lawfull to fight against their Soveraigne for the establishment of new laws. It is not possible a strong desire of innovation should take off the guilt of so unnaturall a warre.

The King requires nothing but (what the Subject cannot de­ny without injustice, without perjury, and consequently, the guilt of all that bloud which is, or shall, or might be spilt,) his knowne legall rights, and he denies nothing which the Subject can by Law challenge, and hath indulged so much of grace, as all ages cannot paralell, and yet is still ready to consent farther, if a­ny reasons shall be produced to invite greater favours.

How will posterity hate this example, and blush at the un­worthy story of our proceedings, who have discouraged good [Page 169] Kings by these ungratefull requitalls of such eminent deservings towards his people! If we had not with our peace, and plenty, and innocence, lost our reason too, we should quickely be per­swaded to accept of so great happinesse, and not perversely hazard an ignominious death, onely to make our lives mise­rable. How are we become beasts in our understanding, as if onely capable to suffer without any apprehension of the causes or remedies.

The result of all is; life and death are set before the people, it is in their election to be againe happy, but they chose these miserable things and are active in their owne ruine. For it will come to that, if they stop not in their wild pro­gresse, The husbandmans store being consumed, the pastures un­stocked, though wee escape the sword or bullet, wee shall be devoured by famine, or else perish by plagues, or fluxes, the fa­tall productions of unholsome dyet.

It concernes us to pray unto Almighty God that he would be pleased to restore us to our wits, for if he would make us wise, wee should soone make our selves happy, by bringing the pernicious authors of these our miseries to a legall tryall; wee should then clearely see, that the preferment of a few men ought not so to sway with us, that wee should sacrifice our Li­berty and Property, and suffer the Lawes to be violated, the Protestant Religion to be dishonoured, only in order to satisfie some particular mens ambition. That indignation of the peo­ple in Virgil (ingaged in a miserable warre, to gaine that with bloud and ruine, the want whereof was no diminution to their happinesse) would too well fit the English nation,

Must wee dye like dogs, that they may live like princes! How are the oppressed commons concerned in those mens illegall gai­nings, that they should be contented to loose their estates, and lives, and soules, in prosecution of none of their owne inte­rests? They fall unlamented, unregarded, while the contrivers of these mischiefes, sit safe, exposing others to the dangers, [Page 170] grow rich, while the impoverished Kingdome is re [...]dy to sinke under the burthen of its debts, and are even wanton in our op­pressions.

Since therefore the onely ground of this unnaturall warre is, that His Majesty will not permit us to be lesse happy then our Ancestors, choosing rather to suffer so many injuries, and to ex­pose His Royall Person to the dangers of open hostility, then to wrong His Subjects and purchase safety or plenty, by ma­king such Lawes, as private interests would force upon Him and the Kingdome,

Since He denyes nothing but the abolition of our good old customes which long experience hath confirmed to be extream­ly beneficiall to this Nation.

Since they reject peace, upon pretext, it comes not accompa­nied with truth, and meane by truth not the Protestant Reli­gion as it is setled in this Kingdome and established by Act of Parliament, but some moveable Creed, the Articles whereof it shall be their priviledge to abrogate, and to make it speake new doctrines, according as they will suit best with their civill in­terests,

Since they fight, not for certaine and knowne Lawes, not for a certaine and knowne Religion, that is, not to restore, but to take away, and which is more intollerable, that they may adde as yet they know not what,

It is evident, the resistance now made is most offensive of the Subjects part, and doth unavoidable incurre the Apostles sen­tence, damnation.