THere is nothing that gives Men a greater dissatisfacti­on, than to find themselves disappointed in their Expe­ctations; especially of those things in [Page 2] which they think themselves most concern'd; and therefore all, who go about to give Demonstrations in Mat­ters of Religion, and fail in the at­tempt, do not onely leave Men less Devout than they were before, but also, with great pains and industry, lay in their Minds the very Grounds and Foundations of Atheism: For the generality of Mankind, either out of laziness, or a diffidence of their being able to judge aright in Points that are not very clear, are apt rather to take things upon trust than to give themselves the trouble to ex­amine whether they be true or no. But when they find, that what a Man undertakes to give them for a De­monstration, is really none at all, they do not onely conclude they are deceived by him, but begin also to suspect, they have been ill used, by those, who first impos'd upon them a [Page 3] Notion, for which no Demonstration can be given; and from that suspici­on proceed to this other of a more dangerous consequence; That what is not demonstrable, may perhaps too not be true.

I shall, therefore in this Discourse, make use of another method, and con­tent my self with endeavouring to shew what, in my Opinion, is most probable: Demonstration being, as to Matters of Faith, absolutely unneces­sary: Because, if I can convince a Man, That the Notions I maintain are more likely to be True than False, it is not in his power not to believe them; no Man believing any thing because he has a mind to believe it, but because his Judgment is convinc'd, and he can­not choose but believe it, whether he will or no: and Belief is all that is re­quired of us in the Speculative part of Religion.

Besides, Demonstration being such an Evidence of a thing, as shows the contrary of it to be impossible; it is, if you mark it, a whimsical kind of expression to say, That a Man does but believe a thing to be so, which he is sure cannot possibly be otherwise. It is just as ingenious as if one should profess, That he hopes he shall but begin to have a thing to morrow, which he is already this day in pos­session of. Belief and Faith being as intirely swallow'd up in Demonstra­tion, as Hope is in Fruition.

My design in this Paper is, To in­duce Men to a belief of Religion, by the strength of Reason; and therefore, I am forc'd to lay aside all Argu­ments which have any dependence upon the Authority of Scripture, and must fashion my Discourse as if I had to do with those that have no Religion at all.

The first main Question, upon the clearing of which I shall endeavour to ground the Reasonableness of Men's having a Religion, or Worship of God, is this, Whether it is more probable that the World has ordered it self to be in the Form it now is, or was contriv'd to be so by some other Being of a more perfect, and more designing nature? For whether or no the World has been Created out of nothing, is not material to our purpose; Because if a supreme Intel­ligent Agent has fram'd the World to be what it is, and has made us to be what we are, we ought as much to stand in awe of it, as if it had made both us and the World out of nothing. Yet because this latter Question ought not to be totally pass'd by, I shall take the liberty to of­fer some Conceptions of mine upon it.

The chief Argument used against God Almighty's having Created the [Page 6] World, is, That no Man can imagine how a thing should be made out of nothing; and that, therefore, it is impossible, he should have made the World, because there is nothing else, out of which it could be made.

First then, I cannot choose but ob­serve, that to say, Because we are not able to imagine how a thing should be, therefore the being of that thing must be impossible, is in it self a disin­genious way of Argumentation; espe­cially in those, who at the same time declare they believe this World to be Eternal, & yet are as little able to com­prehend how it should be Eternal, as how it should be made out of nothing.

In the next place, I conceive that nothing can be properly said to en­dure, any longer than it remains just the same; for in the instant any part of it is changed, that thing as it was before, is no more in being.

In the third place, That every part of this World we live in is changed every moment; and by consequence, that this whole World is so too, be­cause the whole is nothing else but what is composed of every part; and that therefore we cannot properly say, this World has continued for many Ages, but onely that all things in this World have been changed for several Years together.

To evade which Opinion, those who maintain the Eternity of the World, are forc'd to say, That the Matter of it is not changed, but the Accidents on­ly; though this be a sort of Argument which they will not allow of in others. For when it is by the Romanists urged, in Defence of Transubstantiation in the Sacrament, That the Accidents of the Wa­fer remain, though the Substance of it be changed; they reject that as a ridiculous Notion; and yet it is not one jot more [Page 8] absurd to say, That the Accidents remain when the Matter is chang'd, than that the Matter remains when the Accidents are changed; nay of the two, the Assertors of this latter Opinion are the least ex­cusable, because they boldly attribute it to a Natural Cause, whereas the Ro­manists have the modesty at least to own it for a Mysterious Miracle.

But that the weakness of this ima­gination, of separating Accidents from Bodies may the plainlier ap­pear, let us examine a little what the meaning of the word Accident is. Accident then does not signifie a Be­ing distinct from Body or Matter, but is only a Word, whereby we express the several ways we consider of what is in a Body, or matter that is before us. For example; If we perceive a Body to have length, then we con­sider of that length as an Acci­dent of that Body; and when we [Page 9] perceive a Body to have a Smell, or Taste, then we consider of that Smell, and that Taste, as Accidents of that Body: But in none of these Considera­tions we mean, that any thing can have Length, or Smell, or Taste, but what really is Body; and when any thing, that had a Smell or Taste, has left off to have a Smell or Taste, it is, because that Part of it, which had a Smell or Taste, is no more in it. So that, upon an Examination of the whole Matter, I am apt to believe, That there can be naturally no change of Accidents, but where there is a real change of Bo­dies.

But to proceed a little further, the Question being, Whether it be more pro­bable, that the World, or that God Al­mighty has been from all Eternity? I think, I may adventure to affirm, That of two Propositions, the least probable [Page 10] is that which comes nearest to a Con­tradiction: Now nothing can come nearer to a Contradiction, Than Eter­nity, or abiding the same for ever, and a continued Changing, or not abiding the same one moment: And therefore I conclude, it is less probable, that this Changeable World should have been from all Eternity, than that some o­ther Being, of more Excellence, and greater Perfection, should be so, whose very Nature is incapable of Change.

That Being of more Excellence, and greater Perfection, I call God; and those, who out of a foolish aversion they have for the Name of God, will call it Nature, do not in any kind dif­fer from this Notion of that Being, but only change its Name, and rather shew, they have a vain mistaken Am­bition of being thought Atheists, than that they have any Reason strong e­nough [Page 11] to Convince them to be so.

The next Question I shall take into Consideration, is this, Whether, though there be a God, it is probable, that He should take a more particular Care of Mankind, than He does of Beasts and o­ther Animals? To which I have this to offer, That though there are several sorts of Animals, which give us occa­sion to imagine they have some kind of Reason in them, though not to so great a Perfection as Men have; yet since no other Animal did ever any one thing, that could give us the least cause to believe, they have a Conception of a­nother World, or of a Deity; and that no Man was ever yet born, but had a Conception, or at least, a Suspici­on of it, more or less. I say, for this Reason, it is probable, in my Opinion, That there is something nearer a-kin to the Nature of God in Men, than [Page 12] there is in any other Animals what­soever; and for that Reason, that God Almighty does take a more par­ticular Care of us, than He does of them.

If then God be Eternal, and it is pro­bable there is something in our Nature, which is a-kin to the Nature of God, it is also probable, That that Part of us ne­ver dies.

It is also probable, That what by it we are prompted most to value and esteem, as the highest Perfections, good Qualities, and Vertues, are Parts of the Essence, and Nature of God.

Now, of all good Qualities, or Ver­tues, it is Justice; which all Men do most highly esteem and value in others, though they have not all the good For­tune to practise it themselves. For Justice is that good Quality, or Vertue, which causes all other good Qualities or Ver­tues [Page 13] to be esteemed; nay, it is that Ver­tue, without which, all other Vertues become as Vices; that is, they all come to be abhorr'd.

For he who wants Justice, and has Wit, Judgment, or Valor, will for the having Wit, Judgment, or Valor, be the more abhorr'd; Because the more Wit, Judgment, or Valor he has, if he wants Justice, the more he will certain­ly become a Wicked Man: And he who wants Justice, and has Power, will for the having that Power, be the more abhorr'd; Because the more Power he has, if he wants Justice, the more he will certainly become a Wicked Man: And therefore, in my Opinion, it is a very unreasonable thing for Men, out of a Design of extolling God Almigh­ty's Power, to rob Him of Justice; the Quality without which, even Power it self must necessarily be abhorr'd. And [Page 14] pray what can be more disrespectful to God Almighty, Than to phansie that he shall punish us for doing that, which he has from all Eternity prede­stinated; that is, Compell'd us to do? It is an Act that I can hardly believe there ever yet was born a Man cruel e­nough to be guilty of, even in the depth of his Revenge; And shall we make that an Attribute of the Most Perfect, and the Most High God, which is be­neath the effect of the meanest of Pas­sions in the worst of Men? It is, in my Opinion, more reasonable to believe, That God Almighty, out of his Love to Mankind, has given us an Eternal Soul; That an Eternal Being, and Free-will, are things in their Nature in­separable one from the other; and that therefore, according to our Actions, proceeding from our Wills, God Al­mighty, in Justice, will Reward and [Page 15] Punish us in another World, for the Good and Ill Deeds we perform in this. I do not say, that the best of our Actions here, are good enough to make us deserve the utmost Joys of Heaven; we must owe them to God Al­mighty's Grace and Favour, as indeed, we owe all things else.

Neither will I take upon me to guess at the several Degrees of Joys there are in Heaven. Our dull Sences, making it as impossible for us to discourse well of those things, as it is impossible for a Man Born Blind, to talk well of Colours. Nor will I pretend to judge how long, or how much God Almighty will Pu­nish us hereafter; Because, for the same Reason that we think him to be a God of Justice, we must also con­clude him to be a God of Mercy.

This only I do verily believe, That the more we Love him, the more he [Page 16] will Love us; and the less we Love him, the worse it will be for us.

Again, if this Instinct, or Concepti­on, we have of a Deity, be the Ground of our Religion, it ought also to be the Guide of our Religion; That is, if the strongest Reason we have to be­lieve, That God Almighty does take a more particular Care of us, than He does of other Animals, is, Because there is something in our Nature, near­er a-kin to the Nature of God, than any thing that is in any other Ani­mal; I say, in all Reason, that part of us, which is nearest a-kin to the Na­ture of God, ought to be our Guide and Director, in Choosing the best Way for our Religious Worship of God.

There is also this other Consequence, which, in my Opinion, does naturally depend upon what has been said; That [Page 17] one of the greatest Crimes a Man can be guilty of, is, To force us to act or, sin against that Instinct of Religion which God Almighty has placed in our Hearts; for, if that Instinct be some­what a-kin to the Nature of God, the sinning against it must be somewhat a-kin to the Sin against the Holy Ghost.

If then it be probable, that there is a God, and that this God will Reward and Punish us hereafter, for all the Good and Ill things we act in this Life; It does highly concern every Man, to examine seriously, Which is the best Way of Worshipping and Serving this God; That is, Which is the best Reli­gion.

Now, if it be probable, that the In­stinct which we have within us, of a Deity, be a-kin to the Nature of God; That Religion is probably the best, [Page 18] whose Doctrine does most recommend to us those Things, which, by that In­stinct, we are prompted to believe are Vertues, and good Qualities: And that, I think, without exceeding the Bounds of Modesty, I may take upon me to affirm, Is the Christian Reli­gion.

And for the same Reason, it does also follow, That the Religion amongst Christians, which does most recom­mend to us Vertue, and a good Life, is, in all probability, the best Religi­on.

And here, I must leave every Man to take pains, in seeking out, and chu­sing for himself; he only being answe­rable to God Almighty for his own Soul.

I began this Discourse, as if I had to do with those, who have no Re­ligion at all: And now, addressing [Page 19] my self to Christians, I hope, they will not be offended at me, for end­ing it with the Words of our Savi­our:

Ask, and it shall be given you; Seek, and you shall find; Knock, and it shall be opened unto you.

I shall beg Leave farther, only to propose a few Questions to all those, in general, who are pleas'd to call them­selves Christians.

First, Whether there be any thing more directly opposite to the Doctrine and Practice of Jesus Christ, than to use any kind of Force upon Men, in Matters of Religion? And consequent­ly, Whether all those that practise it, (let them be of what Church, or Sect, they please) ought not justly to be call'd Antichristians?

[Page 20] Secondly, Whether there can be any thing more unmanly, more barbarous, or more ridiculous, than to go about to convince a Man's Judgment by any thing, but by Reason? It is so ridicu­lous, that Boys at School are whipped for it; who, instead of Answering an Argument with Reason, are Logger-heads enough to go to Cuffs.

And Thirdly, Whether the Practice of it, has not always been ruinous and destructive to those Countries, where it has been used, either in Monarchies, or Common-Wealths? And, Whether the contrary Practice has not always been successful to those Countries, where it has been used, either in Monarchies, or Common-Wealths?

I shall Conclude, with giving them this Friendly Advice; If they would [Page 21] be thought Men of Reason, or of a good Conscience, Let them endeavour, by their good Counsel, and good Ex­ample, to perswade others to lead such Lives, as may save their Souls: And not be perpetually quarrelling amongst themselves, and cutting one another's Throats, about those things, which they all agree, are not absolutely necessary to Salvation.