I Perceive your very in­quisitive and search­ing Genius hath not permitted you to rest satisfied with what hath been commonly taught and received in many Questions which you think of the greatest concernment to be truly and clearly resolved: at least of much more than [Page 2]most of those which ordina­rily now adays employ the busie thoughts and pens of Men. And as they have given you some trouble and care, so I understand by you, that they are likely to give me some too. For you are pleased to believe, that I may have been not altoge­ther a stranger to thoughts about such matters; and that peradventure I may have fallen upon something either as to Matter or Me­thod, or both, which might a little contribute to your light and ease: though I [Page 3]scarcely know any man who stands in less need of it than your self. Perhaps our free and frequent mu­tual Entertainments with Discourses of such nature (the most delightful and profitable use of friendship) have given occasion to your kind opinion, and put you upon making further tryal.

Sir! I must own it to be my Perswasion also, that the Questions you proposed are all of them of impor­tance, and some of them of absolutely the greatest; and that they ought to be de­termined [Page 4]with more clear­ness, certainty, and (which is hugely considerable to short-liv'd Mortals) with more brevity than hitherto for all't I know they have been. But I cannot own myself to be the person in Parts, Health, or Leisure, so happy, as to promise you the performance of any great matter at present, whereby I might be service­able to you, and answer either your desire or ex­pectation. Nevertheless, upon your Request and Command, which go a [Page 5]great way with me, backed I acknowledge with some suspicion and presumption that something might be done, I have attempted one of them, which I have been the most impatient to be sa­tisfied in my self, as appea­ring to me of the vastest consequence, and yet de­livered, as I thought (such was my unquiet curiosity if you please) with but too much mistake, confusion, and defect in the best Wri­ters, and of greatest name: and therefore long and of­ten before I received your [Page 6]command, it had been in my thoughts. The question is, what should be the perfecti­on of our Active power or Will, of its Actions or Volitions, of its actual and habitual Inclinations, or in one word, of our Manners; and not only of ours, but of any intelligent being exi­stent, and therefore even of the Divine Nature it self; I mean of its Volitions and Decrees, not of any inclina­tions, which including some imperfection, belong not thereunto. Many in my judgment have been the [Page 7]mistakes and errors in Di­vinity and Natural Philoso­phy, but especially in Mo­rality and Politicks, for want of a right understanding in this Question; some of which I am sure, upon perusal of this, will not escape your Observation.

I have delivered what I had to say, in almost Mathe­matical Method, beginning at the most simple Notions, which are the most plain and undoubted, and then proceeding to what is more compounded; so that that which follows, generally de­pends [Page 8]upon and supposeth the knowledge of what is before. I have also endea­voured that my style be simple, short and clear, with­out any ornament or finery of words, which may dar­ken the Sense, or divert the Attention; though it be not so common, and sometimes perhaps uncouth, for a rea­son which you'l meet withal at the end of the Essay. But I did not think it this time expedient to go any further, than to point out the way of composing a System of E­thicks from these Principles; [Page 9]which I know at your leisure you can easily do your self. As for what is done, I must request the favour of you to read over the whole, which is but short, before you pass judgement of any part, for the prevention of needless dissatisfaction and scruple.

After all, I must crave leave to remember ourselves of that which we have of­ten agreed in; namely, how little the clearest and most certain knowledge of these things will signifie, without the practice; and that a ge­nerously [Page 10]honest man, whose Soul is animated and imbu­ed with Virtue, acting ac­cording to these principles from a publick and univer­salized spirit, though they lye not so neatly and order­ly in his head, is infinitely to be preferred before a meer subtle, though most successful Speculator, which talks as high as Heaven, whose Law is such love, as is hereafter described, but lives as low as earth, where according to the Jewish A­dage [...] All friend­ship is governed by self-inte­rest, [Page 11]or rather, nothing is be­loved but Self, and what ministers to its pleasure or advantage.

Though it is not to be denied neither, that naked discourse and true reason­ing is of very great use here too. For there are some men who believe all the va­rious inclinations, affections, and tempers of Mankind, to be the effect only of divers bodily tempers and exam­ples, not at all of Reason and Understanding; and that those to Vice (so cal­led) as they are more gene­ral, [Page 12]so they are more neces­sary, natural, and reasonable too, than that to what we term Virtue; which, say they, is against Nature, and so far from being reasona­ble, that it is impossible. Now these men are to be convinced, if they be capa­ble of it, or at least silenced and confuted.

Others again there are, and that of the best sort of Men, who are great lovers of truth where they can discern it; who are strange­ly affected and transported with distinct and clear un­derstanding; [Page 13]who desire to see why they should be more carried to one thing than another; who do not care to be born away blind­ly with great and swelling passions, without the gui­dance of calm Reason, seem they never so natural, and even Divinely inspired or impressed; who finally are very uneasie, slow, and dis­satisfied, while they act ig­norantly and blindly. In such persons, their approba­tion of and consent to Vir­tue will be more sincere and hearty, their bent and [Page 14]tendency to it more uni­form, firm and constant, their love more deeply rooted and embowelled, when they shall see its na­ture and practice demon­strated and deduced from the most plain and evident truths.

Nor are we finally to think that the principle or end of all our actions, the Ʋniversal Good so much insisted on in the following Essay, is such a high-flown wide notion, and so much out of the view of the ge­nerality of men, as to be of [Page 15]no use or application in hu­mane life amongst them. For contrariwise, every one may, and we see that plain ho­nest men of all ranks and sorts do propound and pur­sue it in their little sphere of action and comprehensi­on, as God himself doth in the immense revolution of his providence. He that knows no more than a Neighbors Cottage or two, may have the same general end, namely, the greatest good he understands, with him who is able to compre­hend the interest of a whole [Page 16]Nation, or of the whole World if it were possible. The poorest Vicar may un­derstand as well as the pre­tended Pastor of the Uni­versal Church, and perhaps better practice accordingly, that the only end of his Function and all his Actions, is not his own personal in­terest only, but the honour of God, the Salvation of Souls, or the good of his Church, (and how easie is it to extend his Notion to the whole world?) the faith­ful discharge of his duty and his reward altogether: [Page 17]and so the meanest Me­chanique or dullest Plow­man may be easily taught to desire by all his life, and particularly in his honest Calling, to please and serve God, to support himself and Family, to supply and benefit his Neighbours, in hopes of Gods general bles­sing upon himself here, both in Soul and Body, and of his reward hereafter. Set but a man entirely free from himself, and he will have no other bounds than the most comprehensive good he can reach. Nor indeed is there [Page 18]any thing which lies nearer the Mind of Man, and which he hath a more natu­ral inclination to believe, than that a publick good is to be preferred before a personal, supposing them both equal in respect of in­tension or degree; and why not then the most publick of all, viz. the good of the whole Universe, as it were one Corporation or Society? But I am going to prevent my self, and for­get the bounds and design of a Prefatory Epistle.

For the rest of your [Page 19]Questions (you were plea­sed to make out a score, and I doubt you may have more in your Budget) I must in­treat you to stay your sto­mach a while with this Mor­sel, and to respite an answer to them. If what I now send you be acceptable to such a diligent, I had almost said troublesome enquirer, whom as I have observed nothing less will satisfie, than the utmost a man can know and say, you may hereaf­ter command the like Essay upon some one or more of them; which I know your [Page 20]friendship and goodness will permit me to obey, when I find my self best able to serve you.

1. FIrst then be pleased to observe, That all that is in the Soul of Man, may be reduced, according to Des-Cartes, to two gene­ral things. (1.) Passion. (2.) Action. The first con­tains all sorts of Percepti­ons, viz. Sense, Memory, Imagination, Intellection, Passions, or Affections; al­though there seems to be somewhat of Action too [Page 21]in the Souls Perceptions.

2. And as for Action, there hath seem'd to be of it in the Soul, these four kinds. (1.) Dubitation. (2.) Suspension. (3.) As­sent. (4.) Volition. But I rather now think only two. (1.) Assent. (2.) Volition. For as for Dubitation, it seems to be nothing but Suspension; and Suspensi­on seems only an act of Vo­lition not to assent; and Nolition is but Volition of the absence of a thing.

3. To say nothing at this time of Assent; in Vo­lition [Page 22]may be considered four things. (1.) The fa­culty of Volition, usually called Appetite; which is but one in Man, distingui­shed by its several Objects; as when it hath for its Ob­ject sensible and corporeal good, or certain agreeable motions of the Body which cause the perception of pleasure in the Soul, it is called the Sensitive Appe­tite: But when it hath for its Object that which can be apprehended only by the rational faculty of the Soul, or that faculty where­by [Page 23]the Soul perceives Spiri­tual Objects (which are but of two sorts; either absolute, as Spiritual Substances and their Attributes, such as Per­ception and Volition, Know­ledge, & Power, and Good­ness; or Relative, as the [...] habitudes, and relations of things, such as Means & End, Likeness and Diffe­rence, and consequently E­quality and Inequality) I say, then it may be called the Rational Appetite. Though indeed that only hath been used to be so termed, which hath for its object, Bonum [Page 24]honestum, the honesty, probi­ty, rectitude of a mans acti­ons, the [...], that which ought to be done, or is according to true reason.

The second thing to be observed in Volition, is the Action; the third, An actual Inclination or Propension in the Soul; and the fourth, An Habitual Inclination. Of the first and second none doubts; and for the third, experience teacheth, that there is often this which I call an Actual Inclination of the Soul to a certain object; others a Propension, Velleity [Page 25]hankering, before there be any express Volition; that which is usually signified by such phrases; I could find in my heart to do such a thing; and that of Foelix to St. Paul, Thou hast almost per­swaded me to be a Christian. And for the fourth, this one thing evinces it, viz. That there is a great difference between men in the facili­ty, readiness, and strength to their actual inclinations, and Volitions, before they actually exist. Of this fa­cility in one man, which is not in another, there must [Page 26]be some present cause in one man which is not in another; and this I call an Habitual Inclination or Volition. It is most certain, there is something in two men ac­customed to two things with delight, when they have no actual Inclination and Volition in them; which upon the proposal of those two different ob­jects, doth produce two different or contrary actual Inclinations and Volitions, and this not only in the Mechanisms of their Bodies, by which those objects ex­cite [Page 27]corporeal passions of love or delight; but in the Soul too, and most often contracted by the frequent actual inclinations impres­sed upon the Soul by these passions, and sometimes without them. But it is enough, that it is agreed by all men, that there is an actu­al difference inherent and present in the Soul, between a Drunkard and an Ambi­tious man, even when they are asleep, or their Volition and actual inclination are employed about other things; which then appears, [Page 28]when the proper objects of their respective appetites and habitual inclinations are proposed to them.

As for all other humane Actions, which have been called imperate, or Actions commanded by, and conse­quent upon Volition, ex­cept Volition itself, (for one Volition may have for its object another Volition) such as are Attention, Con­sideration, Judgment, mo­tion of the parts of the Body, or Bodily Action, in which is Speech or Words; I meddle not at present [Page 29]with them, only suggest, that there is nothing of Mo­ral good or evil, of inherent Virtue or Vice in them: they are indeed mostwhat (though they may be dis­sembled) signs thereof, and of its degrees; nor are they so much as what in the Twenty ninth Article or Paragraph we term instru­mental or eventual Virtues or Vices, any further than they include Volition. For example, there is neither Virtue nor Vice in attenti­on or judgment, which are actions of the Mind; nor [Page 30]in Speech, Gesture, Motion, which are actions of the bo­dy; but only in the Volition or act of the Will, which commands or effects them.

4. Now of these three last, viz. Actual Volition, Actual and Habitual Incli­nation, the perfection and defect may be considered: which perfection and de­fect (of Volition for exam­ple, and so of the rest) can be only in two respects, viz. (1.) Of the Object. (2.) Of the Action.

5. And first, concerning the Object of Volition, it [Page 31]is to be noted, that at the same time it can be but one, though that one may consist of several parts which may be successively regarded. For example, a man cannot will and re­gard at the same precise time his Neighbours good and his own Reputation, as two distinct separate co-or­dinate things; but he may will them both together, as making up, or compo­sing one entire Object; like as the Eye can see but one Object at the same time painted at the bottom there­of, [Page 32]consisting of many parts; the whole it may see together confusedly, and but one point distinctly.

6. Moreover, that the only Object of Volition, and so of the rest, is bonity or good only, not evil, is ma­nifest from universal expe­rience. All which good­ness, or what is convenient, congruous, eligible, desirable, (for by all these may boni­ty or good be described) is of two kinds. (1.) That of the End, (2.) That of the Means. That of the End hath been usually called [Page 33] jucundum, delectable or pleasant good or pleasure, delight: although this very pleasure hath some further use, & is likewise a means to excite, encourage, and for­tifie the Operations of the Mind, which again mediate­ly and immediately may produce new pleasure. That of the means is called bonum utile, or profitable good to obtain the end of delectable good, of which the kinds are numerous.

7. The goodness of the means is nothing but its Conducibility to, or Cau­sality [Page 34]of the end; which in­deed is the goodness of the end in the means; it is the same: there is nothing eli­gible in the means to obtain any end, but the goodness of the end it self. Of this profitable good, bonum hone­stum, or honest good, is one sort or kind, as we shall presently understand.

8. And to add this for the present, the [...], or pulchritude and beauty of Virtue, in whatsoever it con­sists, talked of so much by Platonists, is another sort; and is only therefore good, [Page 35]because it is so congruous or delectable an object to the Mind, or some way or o­ther hath in it some causali­ty of pleasure or delight.

9. As for delectable good, which is, as hath been said, the only object of Vo­lition, it is better under­stood by every mans expe­rience, than by all the de­scriptions that can be given of it: such as Aristotle's per­fection of the Minds Ope­ration; and Eudoxus's per­fect and grateful assension and acquiescence; Plato's passion, affection, and diffu­sion [Page 36]of the mind, and the repose of the Will in some convenient good; and ma­ny others, some of which are contrary each to other: as when some say it is Mo­tion, and some say it is the Rest and Repose of the Mind. It is more to our purpose to observe, that it hath indefinite degrees, and that in three respects only and no more; viz. (1.) In Extension as to Subjects. (2.) Intension. (3.) Dura­tion. Of which (to take the extremes only) the lowest degree in the first respect is [Page 37]the good of one single Soul; the highest, that of all Spiri­tual Beings existant, usually comprehended under God, our Neighbour, and our selves: where by Neigh­bour, we understand all Ra­tional Creatures at least. We actually indeed know a most inconsiderable part of Mankind, only our own Family, Town, or Coun­trey; to whose greatest good notwithstanding if we direct our Volition, it is a sign we implicitely will that good which is absolute­ly the greatest; and that if [Page 38]any greater good were within our view and com­prehension, we should will that expresly and actually. In the second respect, we want both conceits and words for the lowest and highest degree. In the third respect, the lowest degree is that good which is mo­mentany, the highest Eternal.

10. Wherefore the grea­test delectable good abso­lutely, is that which is so in extension, intension, du­ration; or the Eternal hap­piness of the whole Ʋniverse considered as one thing, and [Page 39]as Cartes considered Moti­on in the Material world.

11. After which it is ea­sie to observe, that the greatest and first perfection of Volition in respect of the Object, is to be directed to this absolutely greatest good, or to have it for its Object: and contrariwise, the greatest defect thereof is to be directed to the least part thereof, in respect a­gain of Extension, Intension, & Duration; for example, to the smallest momentany pleasure of any one single being, which is usually, if [Page 40]not always, ones self.

12. Nor is it less mani­fest, that this is a perfection, as it is the common sense of all men: for otherwise, to illustrate rather than to prove it, God would have been equally perfect if he had not, as if he had de­termined to make the Uni­verse, and that in such a de­gree happy as it is: nay, if his nature had been such as to have been the most de­lighted with the eternal mi­sery of all his Creatures, it would have been equally his perfection to have effect­ed [Page 41]it for his own pleasure, as to have made it happy. Again, the Devil, or the most malicious, proud, re­vengeful, finally the most wicked of all Natures, is therefore the most imper­fect, because he is the most pleased with others evil.

13. It hath indeed been taught by some of those who have deduced all our Offices and duties from self­love and interest, that this perfection is not competible to any being whatsoever; at least not to men: that every nature is necessarily [Page 42]carried to its own proper good only; that it cannot be in the least moved with the good of another. But I contrariwise affirm in the first place, that this perfecti­on is a thing possible to a reasonable Nature. Next, that there is in all men, a­mong other innate appe­tites, this also of Univer­sal Beneficence. And final­ly, that there is a Capacity in our Souls of being more pleased and delighted there­with, than any single Ob­ject in the world, and con­sequently it is improveable [Page 43]to a higher degree of strength and force (which may be called generosity) than any other appetite whatsoever. All which, because it is of greatest con­sequence, is thus proved. (1.) That it is a thing pos­sible; if it be not, it is ei­ther because we cannot will anothers good, or we can­not apprehend it. Not the first of these: for the Ob­ject of Volition is precise­ly good or bonum, not pro­priety; so that if we sepa­rate them two, we shall find propriety to have no­thing [Page 44]of Eligibility in it; if there were, then there would be something of E­ligibility too in our proper and personal evil as well as good. Nor is the second true, that we cannot appre­hend anothers good. For it is most plain, that we can in our conception conjoyn pain or pleasure, good or evil, with any other Soul or Mind, as well as our own; or we can suppose the same evil we suffer in another person. Who is there who hath himself felt the tor­ment of the Stone, that doth [Page 45]not well understand the same in another, and pity him too when he hears him making grievous outcries, or giving other such signs as he did himself, when he was under the same pain? Nay, though he was never in the same condition, yet he understands him to be affected with some great evil. It is true, ordinarily we do not apprehend one anothers evil so clearly as our own; but the reason is, because the one is a mat­ter of Sense, the other of Memory, or Imagination; [Page 46]the one is usually a present Object, the other an absent: and even our own absent evil we apprehend not so well as our present. Final­ly, all the pity and com­passion and friendship we see in the world, confutes both these pretences; espe­cially where our love to any person is great, which makes us to unite it to our selves (the first and essenti­al property of love.) And consider it but as a part of our selves, and sometimes much the better (as it is in Wives and Children, and [Page 47]very dear friends) and con­sequently to be the most truly and inwardly affected with the evil or good they suffer or enjoy. And those happy Souls who have had clear and true apprehensi­ons of the most perfect and amiable Nature of God, have experienced, I doubt not, that they have infinite­ly preferred the felicity of the Divine Nature before their own, his Will before theirs; and have thought and esteemed themselves not worthy of the least re­gard in compare with him; [Page 48]and which is still most of all, could have been content to sacrifice all Being and Hap­piness to his pleasure, if it were absolutely necessary. And we see the same fre­quently amongst Men one toward another, when a common Souldier, under an apprehension of the greater worth and bravery of his Commander, expo­seth his own life to certain danger, and destruction too, to save the others. In the next place, that there is an innate appetite in all men after this perfection of be­neficence [Page 49]and doing good, without any self-respect, I appeal to Universal Expe­rience. Nor is there any man, who after he hath performed any such act, is not pleased therewith, and ready to brag of it. It is true, the gratification of this Natural Appetite, or the possession of such a good, cannot but be delightful: but even this delight spring­ing therefrom, may not be any thing of the End or Object foreseen or propo­sed, but only consequent upon the action; as it is [Page 50]true it also may be. The pleasure of doing good, may be one distinct part of the End and Effect of ones beneficence, as well as the good done to others, when one takes a view of some particular good things which constitute the whole End and Object.

Lastly, That this delight and pleasure, from this per­fection of our Volition, or from Universal Benevo­lence, and in part conse­quent Beneficence, may be greater than from any other Object; and that there is [Page 51]a Capacity in our Souls to be more delighted there­with, than any other parti­cular good, methinks is hence most evidently pro­ved, viz. Because it is cer­tainly the greatest good we can possibly possess, (grea­ter than our own happiness, as much as the whole Uni­verse is greater than our­selves) and because we are capable of seeing it to be so. Now certainly the Sense and Perception of our actu­al possession of the greatest good we are capable of; and that there neither is, [Page 52]nor can be any greater, must needs fill the Soul with the most complete intense satis­fying delight. It cannot be the Nature of the Soul to be pleased as much with thep osse ssion of any other good, as with that which only she sees clearly to be absolutely the greatest she or any other Being can ob­tain. It is plain therefore, that our duty and our in­terest, our perfection and our happiness are insepara­ble, so long as God conti­nues and preserves our na­ture such as he hath made [Page 53]it: nor can we easily con­ceive it, if at all, to be other than it is.

14. After this, I scarce­ly need mention so plain a consequence, as that if Voli­tion hath any less good for its Object than absolutely the greatest, it is a defect therein, of which there are indefinite degrees, till we come to the lowest, which is mentioned before.

15. And it is this [...], or relation of Volition & actual and habitual inclination to their Object, which is called Moral Good & Evil, Holiness [Page 54]and Sin, bonum honestum & inhonestum, Virtue and Vice, and by an hundred other Names, viz. When Voliti­on hath for its Object the greatest good, (actually or habitually known, immedi­ately or mediately) then is that Volition Morally good, honest, or virtuous: but when it hath any other les­ser delectable good for its Object, (and some good it must have) then it is Mo­rally Evil, or a Sin. Whence it appears, that Sin is a De­fect only, or a Negation: for the Defect of this [...], or [Page 55]relation of Volition to its Object (which is always de­lectable good) is only this, that it hath not for its Ob­ject the greatest good.

16. I have before just hint­ed, That this Moral Good is also a kind of bonum utile, or profitable good; that is to say, it is a means of, or hath in it some degree of Cau­sality of delectable good. For Volition of any good, hath at least a tendency to effect it, which is some degree of Causality; and in us it hath no more: like as the Nisus in Bodies to [Page 56]Motion is something, and is a tendency which hath some degree of Causality of Motion in it; as appears from this, that if you re­move the impediment only, Motion presently follows; and that there is plainly dif­ference between two Bo­dies, one of which hath, the other hath it not. But in God it always actually ef­effects it; and God by his power doth generally up­on occasion of our Voliti­on, make actually existent delectable good, or those things which cause it: and [Page 57]in this consists all the good­ness of Moral Good, or all its Eligibility, or that which makes it the Object of any Volition, or its per­fection; for by perfection I mean bonum utile, or pro­fitable good, that which doth perficere or effect de­lectable good. On the contrary, the evil of Sin, or that for which it is not eli­gible, and refusable, is the privation of a tendency to, or Causality of Delectable Good. Virtue therefore is a tendency to an infinite good, Sin a privation of it.

17. Sin then is no small or light thing, being in one respect plainly an infinite evil. For whereas our Voli­tion may and ought to have for its Object an infi­nite Delectable Good, in respect of Extension, Inten­tion, and Duration, the grea­test Eternal Felicity of the Universe, and consequent­ly tends to it, and hath some Causality thereof in it:

When this our Volition is sinful, or hath any lesser good for its Object, there is a deprivation of all this. [Page 59]In this sence that of the Schoolmen is true, That Sin is a Conversion of the Will from an Infinite Good to a Finite one.

18. But this is not all: though the Evil or Mischief of Sin immediately be pri­vative, yet often by neces­sary consequence it is posi­tive also; as when one wills any Delectable Good to himself, which cannot be effected without the posi­tive inconvenience, grief, hurt, misery of another. For example, if any one should be of such a temper, [Page 60]as to be delighted with a­nothers pain or suffering, and consequently will and desire it in order to that end, which is called pure Malice: Or if unlimited power to do what he list­eth, and consequently to do Mischief (called Tyranny) please him; or if being pleased with Superiority and Eminency in any thing, (as in Power, Riches, Know­ledge, Happiness,) in order to this his Superiority, he takes away from any person what he hath of all these; and these appetites may be [Page 61]so boundless, that they can­not be satisfyed but by an infinite mischief. As if any Being, that he might be in­finitely superiour to all in happiness, or in the possessi­on of any good, should not only take from all, all they possessed, but make all besides himself the most extreamly miserable. And there have been such Mon­sters among Men (some of the Roman Emperors, and o­thers) who have advanced very far in this prodigious wickedness. Historians re­port Tiberius to have been [Page 62]so delighted with Cruelty, that he was termed Lutum sanguine maceratum, a lump of Clay soaked in Blood; af­ter which he more thirst­ed, than strong drinks, not­withstanding that he lo­ved them so well, as to have the Name of Biberius Cal­dius Mero, instead of Tibe­rius Claudius Nero. They tell us also, that Caligula made it the diversion of his Meals, to see men racked and Beheaded; and that Nero set the City of Rome on fire, that he might have the glory of Re-building it, [Page 63]and having it called after his own Name, Neropolis. Dan­gerous certainly it is, to be­gin to lay aside a certain tenderness of others good, and to be careless what mis­chief we do to any body, so we may gratifie our own Appetites. Though our power may be short and in­sufficient, yet our Minds may be soon debauched to such a degree, as first to be content to molest or incom­mode our Neighbour, then to ruine him, then to un­do and destroy whole Fa­milies, Cities, and Nations, [Page 64]for the sake of some small paltry pleasure of our own; and at last to delight in it.

19. A second perfection of Volition we have said to be, in respect of the Acti­on, which is two fold. The first is Intension, Force, and Strength; of which it is certain there may be vari­ous degrees in the Actions of Spirits. The greatest good, viz. That of the whole Universe, ought to have the greatest strength of Volition that can be, which is no less than Infi­nite. [Page 65]And here is a neces­sary defect in all Finite Ra­tional Beings whatsoever; only God, who is Infinite in Power, Force, Action, hath this; to his Nature alone it belongs; all other Beings fall infinitely short of him; and therefore may be said too to be faulty in compare with him. In the other perfection of our Volition, viz. the having its due Object an Infinite Good, God hath made us capable of being perfectly like him­self: but here the most perfect of his Creatures are [Page 66]at an infinite distance from him. The greatest degree of this perfection, is to will the Universal good, or rather the greatest good, with all the vehemency, zeal, and force, our Minds are capable of; and con­trariwise, a great degree of the opposite defect, is to will the Universal good the most remisly: but a greater degree, not to will it at all; and the greatest of all, it seems both in respect of the Action and Object together, to will the least good with the greatest force and vehe­mency. [Page 67]Of this intension and firmness of our Voliti­on, and likewise our actu­al and habitual inclination to the Universal good, the passions of desire after, love to, and delight in so doing and being, are the causes and the effects too; and therefore signs, according to their respective degrees: and the being thus affected towards Piety, Charity, Hu­mility, Spirituality, and all other instances thereof, is that which is signified by the phrases of Virtues being na­tural to us, it being the Tem­per, [Page 68]Complexion, Constitution of our Minds; its being a li­ving and vital principle, pro­ducing fruits and effects of outward good actions. In the Scripture it is the Spirit, li­ving according to the Spirit, and being led by the Spirit, and delighting in the Law of God according to the inward man, and the new man crea­ted after God; because the Object that pleaseth is a Spiritual thing, and because it is according to the Word of God dictated by the Spi­rit of God, and from the influence or efficiency of [Page 69]Gods Spirit in us. Here may be noted, that the de­gree of the strength of our Volition and inclination to the Universal good, and in order to that of our passi­ons, ought at least to ex­ceed that which is to any other particular good, or else it will be ineffectual. Whence it may be further usefully observed, That they are not always to be deem­ed or termed good men, who in Pulpit, Church, or private Conversation, not only appear, but really are very zealous and affectio­nate [Page 70]in Religion; because they generally are of passi­onate Tempers in other matters, and may perhaps have greater affections, and consequently inclinations to other Objects. A man of a more calm and sedate temper in Religion, provi­ded that the greatest de­gree of affection he hath be directed to his duty, may be a good man; when one of a more boisterous and passionate one, whatever he is vulgarly taken for, may be indeed a bad man. The one shall more steadily and [Page 71]constantly do his duty than the other. In like manner, when a man sins delibe­rately, it is a sign of a grea­ter bent, strength, and inten­sion of the inclination of the Will to its undue Ob­ject, and of a less to Virtue; when he sins by surprize, or on a sudden, it is not so much a sign thereof. But these and many other things usually treated of in Mo­rality, may with a little consideration be easily and distinctly determined from the foregoing Conclusions, and a wary observation and [Page 72]experience of the operati­ons of our Minds.

20. The second Perfecti­on of our Volition and in­clination, in respect of the Action, is Constancy, Con­tinuance, or Duration. So that in this respect, the high­est degree is to have the Vo­lition and Inclination perpe­tually and eternally directed to the absolutely greatest good; the lowest, to have them so directed but for one moment, or the least of time. This perfection of the Action of Volition, be­longs only to God, who [Page 73]always actually so wills: (for he is always the same without any change) but of habitual inclination, may be in us and other rational Creatures. So that there are only these three gene­ral perfections of Virtue. The first, the direction of Volition and Inclination to their right Object; the se­cond, that they be with the greatest force or strength any Nature is capable of; the third, that they be the most perpetual and con­stant, or continued and last­ing; or in three words, [Page 74]Sincerity, Generosity, Con­stancy.

21. And yet there seems to be another perfection of Volition in respect of the Action; and that is, the just moderation of it to the various parts of this U­niversal good: i. e. When we will any part thereof knowingly, to will it more or less in due proportion to the share of goodness that is in it, compared with ano­ther part; and the defect contrariwise will be, to will a less good more than a grea­ter; and the greatest de­fect [Page 75]is, when we will the least part more than all the rest; for example, a mo­ment of the least pleasure to our selves, before the Eternal Felicity of God and all the world besides. And this may be, not only when any two parts are inconsist­ent one with another, as when I will to gratifie my self in that which displea­seth God, and is mischievous or hurtful to my Neigh­bour; but also when they are consistent, nay, conjoyn­ed together, and they are altogether the Object of [Page 76]my Will. Thus if a man builds an Hospital, or gives any Alms to the Poor, he knows this action will please God, benefit others, pro­cure himself Reputation; and he doth it for all these reasons; he wills all this good together as one: but here that of these which he may most will, that which he chiefly intends, is his Re­putation, and his own plea­sure therefrom, which ought to be possibly with­out compare the least re­garded, though somewhat. But in truth, this is but a [Page 77]sign of that perfection and defect of Volition, which is in respect of the Object or of the Action. For if a man wills only his own good, or only to please God, exclusively one to the other, the defect seems to be in not having the Uni­versal good, but some par­ticular good for the Object of his Volition, because both and more should be taken together: But if a man wills one good compo­sed of more parts, and wills that part most which in truth is the least good, ei­ther [Page 78]he doth it knowingly, or ignorantly: if knowing­ly, (which is most frequent, whatever pretences men may make) then the defect is in not willing the greatest good; and consequently, it is a defect in respect of the Object before-mentioned; for he cannot but know, that it tends to a lesser Good, to will a lesser more than a greater. If igno­rantly and erroneously, judging that the greater Good, which is indeed the lesser, the ignorance is either through some present defect [Page 79]in the actual Volition, or habitual inclination to the Universal good, ones Duty, Right, Honest; or it is not: if it be, it is plain where and what the defect is, viz. in the Action or Inclination before-mentioned; if it be not, then there is no defect in the present Volition at all, (whatever may have been in former Actions of the Will, by which such ig­norance may be contract­ed) but only in the Under­standing; the Volition may have for all that its due Ob­ject, viz. the greatest good.

[Page 80] 22. From these proposi­tions it follows, that the na­ture of this defect of Voli­tion or of Sin, depends not upon any Law, or upon a­ny Beings Will whatsoever, (though its existence doth, because it being only a [...], or relation, it cannot exist actually, unless the subject thereof do, namely some Will or other:) but though we suppose no other Being in the World besides one, and no antecedent Will, yet these which have been be­fore-mentioned, would be perfections and defects [Page 81]whensoever it exists. It is true, that Laws may be the signs of what is just and unjust, right and wrong; but not the efficient causes, any otherwise than a Sub­ject is the efficient cause of the existence of its proper­ty, as is but now said. These Laws also are sometimes ne­cessary & inseparable signs, sometimes in several degrees contingent and probable only, according to the knowledge and justice of the Law-maker. Those which are certainly Laws of God, who is infallibly wise, [Page 82]and immutably just, are most inseparable and cer­tain signs of what is just and right: but those which are any other Creatures, are more or less probable ones. Laws do not make, but suppose the thing just which they command. It is true also what the Apostle St. Paul saith, That where there is no Law, there is no trans­gression; because God him­self and his Volition of what is right and just are eternal: or the Apostle may mean by Law, not strictly an act of some Will [Page 83]concerning anothers Action and Will, but an obligati­on to will or do any thing; a [...], a [...]. Such there always is, whenever any will exist, being a re­lation betwen the Will and its due Object the Univer­sal good. Besides, St. Paul may mean comparatively; the Transgression or Sin is much less, where there is no express known Law.

23. Nor doth the nature of Sin or Virtue depend upon liberum arbitrium, or Free-will; for whether any Will hath power to deter­mine [Page 84]its own Volition to the greatest, or any lesser good or no; (which I do not de­ny) yet most certainly, whenever there is a directi­on thereof to a lesser good, there is a defect in that Vo­lition, come it from what cause it will; though it should be the effect of some other Being without it, which by his power was a­ble so to determine it; or suppose any Nature should be eternally and necessarily so constituted.

24. It follows likewise, that supposing it possible for [Page 85]any Being to have for the Object of his Volition the rectitude the perfection there­of, and should not place it in the willing the greatest good, but in willing some particular, or (which is most common) some personal good, as self-preservation; this very Volition would have that defect in it we call Sin, and would not be capable of any reward, i. e. any thing which should maintain or encourage such an action. If it were pos­sible for a man unfeignedly in his Conscience to judge [Page 86]it his bounden duty to de­sire and pursue always as his ultimate end, his own greatest personal good, with­out regard to God or o­thers, and accordingly should Will and Act; this would be a vitious man. And whether God may not by way of punishment for pride, &c. permit a man so to err, is not here to be de­termined: and there have been two pernicious and foolish mistakes, if not wil­ful Errors, that men might securely indulge their lusts, of some late new Modellers [Page 87]of Morality; to which a great part of the ill-nature and debauchery of the Age is to be imputed: the one, the advancing of their per­sonal good, to the place and dignity of the last end of all their actions; the other, the pitching upon no bet­ter than the preservation of life and limb, or (to enlarge their own Sence) the grea­test measures of the Conve­niencies, Comforts, and Pleasures proper to this bo­dily life. In these Opini­ons they have quite perver­ted the nature of things, [Page 88]and made Vice to be Vir­tue. Or because, according to the same mens Doctrine, every one is necessarily car­ried to his own greatest good or happiness in gene­ral, only through ignorance is oft out of the way, they have made no Vice at all, substituting in its room Fol­ly and Imprudence.

25. What hath been said of Volition, may be said of Actual and Habitual In­clination; and because Vo­lition and Actual Inclinati­on are but sometimes exi­stent in men, but Habitual [Page 89]Inclinations constant and perpetual; 'tis according to this a man is chiefly to be estimated, viz. by three things. (1.) Its direction to its right Object, the U­niversal Good. (2.) The force and strength thereof. (3.) Its constancy or fre­quency in the Soul: each of which hath degrees; so that it is easie to set down cer­tain rules for the judgment of the goodness or badness of any man. For example sake only: He is the worst man in the first respect, who is habitually inclined to, and [Page 90]in love with the meanest or least delectable good; in the second respect, who is the most vehemently inclined thereto; in the third respect, who is perpetually or con­stantly so. Contrariwise, he is the best, who hath the greatest good absolutely, or the Eternal Felicity (for by Felicity I mean the greatest degree of delight or plea­sure as to intension) of the Ʋniverse, or all Beings ex­istent for the Object of his Habitual Inclination; or who is habitually inclined thereto, and that with the [Page 91]greatest force and strength of his nature, and then con­stantly and perpetually. It is easie to see, what an in­definite number of degrees there are between these two extremes, in all the three respects. The greatest dif­ficulty is not to know these Rules of our Judgment; but to know our selves, and consequently to apply them. And since Denominatio fit à Majore, he only is to be cal­led a good man, who hath a stronger and more constant Habitual Inclination to the Universal good, than to any [Page 92]one or more particulars. And this was, or might have been, the reason why Mar­tyrdome was so highly e­steemed and magnified in the Primitiue Church. A Martyr by his suffering for his Faith, even though he was not actually Baptized, was thought to expiate all former bad life, and to be undoubtedly saved, or to obtain a most glorious and blissful condition in Hea­ven: because such his suffe­ring death, or parting with life itself, deemed the great­est personal good amongst [Page 93]men, rather than to deny that Truth which they sup­posed God had commanded to believe and profess, and consequently to disobey God, was a certain sign and argument of a stronger actual and habitual inclina­tion at that time of his death to obey God, and consequently to that which was right, just, and good, than to any other thing in the world besides. Nor may it be here amiss, to hint how easie it is to understand it possible for this Habitual Inclination, Bent, and Pro­pension [Page 94]to any certain Ob­ject, to be so forcible and strong, as to be inconsist­ent with an act of Free Will or choice about that Object: nor may a man be able to divert, suspend, or withhold his actual Voliti­on, consent, or embrace from it when it is proposed. Though by prudent contri­vance, these Habitual Incli­nations generally, (I do not say all) may also by degrees be weakned, and at last quite extinguished and de­stroyed.

26. 'Tis as easie hence [Page 95]to deduce all particular vir­tues and vices, of which we shall find many to have as yet no Names. For one way, and the most common, is by distinguishing particular delectable Good or Plea­sure (whether that particu­lar Good be in a mans self, or in another as the Sub­ject; whether it be mine or anothers; but it is usual­ly, if not always, a mans own) from its various Cau­ses or Objects. And it seems there may be six ge­neral ones (I do but now suggest, not determine.) [Page 96](1) The possession of any Good in general so esteem­ed; many things thus one­ly please. (2) The pain, mischief, evil suffering of another: Whether any Be­ing is of such a temper as to be delighted therewith, let others consider; but I see no reason why it is not possible. Now to will ones delight or pleasure from this Object or Cause, is called Malice; to be habitually in­clined thereto, Maliciousness: but the renouncing of this, or the nolition of it, or the volition of its absence, and [Page 97]instead thereof the volition of the universal Good, may be called Charity, or if there be any fitter Name. (3) The third Object causing delight to us, is power to do what one pleaseth, to make any thing consequent upon ones will; of which three de­grees; Liberty, Equality, Su­periority. Now to have pleasure arising from hence, the onely Object of our volition, is an action of pride; the onely Object of our habitual inclination, the vice thereof: To refuse it, as before, or will its absence, [Page 98]is Humility. (4) Mere A­ctivity and Life, and that exerted in all the operati­ons of our Souls; such as is, for example, mere Con­templation and Knowledge, Sense, Imagination, strong Passions, intense Volitions or Resolutions. And be­cause Knowledge may be indefinitely divided accor­ding to its Objects, here a­lone may be almost an in­finite number of particular Vices and Virtues. This Vice and contrary Virtue have no names, some kinds of it may. (5) Some cer­tain [Page 99]agreeable corporeal Motions, or Motions of our Bodies, to which our Souls are united, suaves Corporis Commotiones, as some have called them, which I know no common name to signi­fie them by, unless Titilla­tion may be allowed. These (as Cartes thinks) create pleasure to the mind, as a natural sign of the health or good constitution of the Body: and the pleasures ari­sing in the Soul from them, Plato calls [...], Pleasures which are con­veyed [Page 100]to the Soul by the Body. Of this sort are all Sensations; amongst which are those of Health, Calm­ness, and Serenity; other bodily tempers; many cor­poreal passions, such as Love, Joy, Hope, Acquiescence, &c. Nay, I may say all per­haps; for it may be that some Souls may be deligh­ted with the corporeal pas­sions of Sadness and Grief; though in these not onely the Mechanical or Corpo­real Vibrations and motions of Fibres, Nerves, and Spi­rits, delight and please; [Page 101]but also the Sense, Perce­ption, Life, and some kind of action of the Soul. So that this pleasure is mixed from two very different Objects; one Corporeal, t'other In­tellectual: and indeed, most of our pleasure or delight ariseth from several Ob­jects mixed and blended to­gether. Now to have the pleasure or delight arising from such motions of our Bodies, the entire Object of our Volition, is an act of Sensuality; and to be habi­tually enclined thereto, the Vice: But to refuse this [Page 102]Self-pleasure, or to will its absence, is Sobriety or Tem­perance, [...]. (6) The perfection of a mans na­ture, of all his Faculties, (which may be referred to the first) and amongst the rest, the Rectitude, Honesty, Probity of his Actions and Inclinations, or his Virtue, may be and is the cause of great pleasure and delight to him. Now even to have this delight; (usually cal­led the satisfaction of a good Conscience) nay let me adde, that pleasure which ariseth from hopes and as­surance [Page 103]of a reward, and from the possession of it too: I say, to have this the entire Object of our Voli­tion, Intention, Inclination, or in greater proportion to other parts of the Univer­sal Good than it ought, is a sin and vice which wants a name, as doth its opposite Virtue. Finally, (not to insist upon this distribu­tion I have made, which I brought onely for example of some general Heads) as many as there are Objects which may please or de­light us, and consequently [Page 104]correspondent Appetites, (which are numberless:) So many sorts of sins or vices may there be; they all may be reduced to some ge­neral heads, and those heads divided, and these again subdivided, &c.

27. Many other distri­butions of Virtue and Vice may be made; as from the parts of the Universal Good distinguished by its Subjects, usually comprehended un­der three, viz. God, All created or finite Beings be­sides our selves, under the name of our Neighbour, [Page 105](though we know little of any other, or what we can do to or for them besides Mankind) and lastly our selves. The Volition of the Universal Good, our last end, therefore may be resolved into three parts, viz. The love of God; The love of [...]ur Neighbour; The love of our selves: Or, Piety, Charity, and pru­dent and sober care of our own greatest concerns. And by Love, I mean not Gra­titude, but a Volition of the good of the Object be­loved, whether the good [Page 106]be an absent or present good. To will an absent good, and desire it for the person we love, can onely take place with respect to our Neighbour and our selves, not to God, who we know cannot want any thing: But to will a pre­sent good, may be to God also. We may will, ap­prove, rejoyce, delight in the infinite perfection and happiness of his nature, which he always doth and cannot but possess.

28. But these three parts of the Universal Good are [Page 107]always to be intended to­gether actually or habitual­ly, although but one of them may be first regarded. As when we actually will any good to our Neigh­bour, we ought at least ha­bitually to will it, not one­ly because thereby we do good to him, but also be­cause it pleaseth God, and it is our own perfection, and will be for our own greater good so to do; al­though that we first looked at was our Neighbours good. And these three parts are so necessarily and [Page 108]inseparably conjoyned, that we may and ought always habitually to believe, when we endeavour to effect the one, the other will necessa­rily follow. Thus, for ex­ample, to love God, the Volition of good to him, or the rejoycing in the per­fection and happiness of his Nature, hath necessarily consequent others and our own Good: Because all the happiness of Creatures depends thereon, and flows therefrom, (from his Be­ing, and from his most per­fect Nature;) and because [Page 109]it is and will be our grea­test Perfection, Comfort, Reward. So again, if we sincerely love and do good to our Neighbour, we may be sure it pleaseth God, and is best for our selves. And so Lastly, our own greatest good truly as to Intension, Extension, and Duration; or our greatest perfection and happiness, is in and by loving of God, and doing all the good we can to our Neighbour.

29. It may be further observed, that all actions and correspondent habits [Page 110]of the Will whatsoever, which do effect the Univer­sal good, have been used to be called Virtues, with­out any consideration of the end of the Action, or the ultimate Object thereof; and for distinction-sake may be called instrumental or e­ventual vertues: The o­ther sort of Volitions which have their due end, or due ultimate Object considered as such, having the name of principal or inherent Vir­tues. So, for example, to apply the mind to attention and consideration, pursuit [Page 111]after or love of the Truth, [ [...]] are accounted Virtues, because they usu­ally are the causes of good effects in the world more than hurtful ones. Such a­gain are to judge rightly and truly, especially con­cerning other men; i.e. al­ways onely according to what really appears to us from things themselves, not because we imagine so: Although the end of these actions may be no other than the pleasure and de­light a man takes in such conduct of himself in such [Page 112]temper and actions, or some personal and proper good, and therefore indeed are inherently vitious, according to our sense of Virtue and Vice. So likewise Libera­lity, or the distribution of many good things to o­thers, considered without its end; I mean, the in­ward Volition of so do­ing, or the action of the Will, of which the out­ward bodily action is a Signe and Effect onely, and belongs not to this pre­sent discourse.

[Page 113] 30. And 'tis here only, that it is generally true, that Virtus consistit in medio, i.e. there may be too much or too little of such actions and habits, both which ex­tremes do not effect the U­niversal good, but are of more ill than good conse­quence. Thus, for example, A man may attend too much sometimes and to some things, or too little; he may give too much or too little, the first of which is called prodigality, the se­cond parsimony or cove­tousness. But it is false and [Page 114]absurd to say this of Virtue as it is before defined; for there can be no excess there­in. Nay, some of these very actions may have no excess; as Justice rightly desined, and Faith.

31. Those of this sort of actions and habits are called Virtues, which are observed and believed to have more good effects than evil ones in the total sum. Insomuch that if they have very few more good than bad consequences, they are termed mean Virtues, as Frugality; if very many [Page 115]and great ones, then they are called great Virtues, such as Justice, or giving to every one his due, i.e. that to each particular, (and con­sequently to ones self also) as to quality, quantity, time, and all other respects of gi­ving it, which is most for the Universal good; Meek­ness [ [...],] or slowness to be moved to anger, or re­turning evil when provo­ked by infirmities, ill acti­ons, or injuries to our selves or others; Clemency, or an omission of part of punish­ment; Forbearance and long [Page 116]sufferance, [ [...]] a delay of punishment, or of returning evil for a long time after many injuries; Forgiveness, or an omission to punish, or return any evil for injuries at all; Bounty, Courage, Veracity, consent to the Constitution and Administration of Govern­ment, or entring into a So­ciety, where some may be on purpose set apart and appointed for finding out and improving and securing what is for the common be­nefit of that Society, and particularly for the arbitra­tion [Page 117]of all differences, which the Jews call [...] Judges or Government: and make it one of the seven Pre­cepts of the Sons of Noah, or of those whose advanta­ges of benefit to Mankind were so easily and well known, that all men who had the use of Reason and Natural light only, allowed and commanded them. But there is no greater instru­mental or eventual Virtue than Christian Faith, or to be a Believer; by which I mean, Obedience to Jesus in Gods Name, which con­sists [Page 118]of, or contains two things. (1.) An assent to all things Jesus, or those commissionated and inspi­red by him, taught and de­livered, as infallibly true. And (2.) A practising all he hath commanded. Bet­ter words than these we have not to express these two particulars by, though both indeed are doing and practising commands. For the precepts of Christian Faith contain the most sin­cere, and generous, and con­stant inherent Virtue; as also the greatest instrumen­tal [Page 119]or eventual ones. The very first part alone, or As­sent, is generally in various degrees a great instrumen­tal Virtue. Some habits a­gain there are, whose ad­vantage of good or bad effects is so uncertain, that it is disputed whether they be Virtues or not. Some at some times say they are, and others say not. For example, Facetiousness and Taciturni­ty. And for the same rea­son, it is hardly yet deter­mined, or determinable, whe­ther some dispositions and actions be Vices, or Vitious [Page 120]or no; viz. because the advantage or excess of good or bad consequences of ei­ther side is yet unknown. Such perhaps may be Scru­pulosity, or an aptitude to examine the lawfulness of every the smallest action; not in respect of the end on­ly, (for that is easily known) but of the effect, which is mostly difficult, often im­possible to know. So also Separation from some par­ticular corrupted Church. Some may think Separation, some Communion the grea­test mischief. Such indivi­dual [Page 121]actions also may be called indifferent. These for their very being such, are not by any man to be done at all; and a man is always to do that which is not indifferent, or to act be­cause he judgeth upon so much consideration as is fit to be allowed or sufficient for things of no more im­portance, that of his acti­on there may be more good than bad consequences, and more good consequences than of his omission of it, or doing any other action at that time. Those acti­ons [Page 122]also are by some term­ed indifferent, which though they are at one time in some circumstances of best effect, and therefore to be done; yet in others 'tis confessed they are not. If so, there may be a great many degrees of Indifferen­cy. Some actions may be more, some less indifferent than others, in respect of frequency and number of conveniencies or good ef­fects. Some may be for the most part of many and great good consequences and ef­fects, but seldom of any [Page 123]hurtful ones, and those but small and few. On the contrary, some may more generally be very inconveni­ent and noxious, yet some­times convenient and useful. Some lastly may be near e­qual. All which hindereth not, but that every one of these individual actions, ac­cording as with all their cir­cumstances they are judged to be of most good or bad consequences, are as much to be done or not to be done at that particular time, as if they were of that sort of actions which were per­petually [Page 124]to be done or ab­stained from. And these are the things generally a­bout which the World with an unproportionate confi­dence dissent and quarrel, and contend unto wounds and death itself.

32. Many other are the useful inferences which may be made from these few Observations, and many the Questions determined thereby. As only for in­stance sake: It is an ordi­nary Question among the Writers of Ethicks, and it may be of some impor­tance, [Page 125]whether Virtutes sunt connexae, all Virtues are con­nected? so that if there be one in any Subject, there are all. To which it is easily answered, that they are not. For it is plain, that a man may have a more strong and prevailing habi­tual inclination to his duty, to that which is just and right, to please and obey God, to the Universal good, than to some one or more certain Objects, but not than to some other. So some men especially, if ad­vanced in years, may prefer [Page 126]their duty and acting ac­cording to Conscience, be­fore any sensual pleasures; but not before Riches, Re­putation, Dignity, Power, Self-will, &c. They may have so little inclination to the former, as easily to sub­ject it to their Conscience; but so violent and impetu­ous to the latter, that they are not to be governed or commanded by their Con­science, or a judgement of, and habitual inclination to their duty. They may be, as is usually said, perhaps, Covetous, Vain-glorious, [Page 127]Ambitious, Proud, and Ob­stinate; but not Voluptuous: and on the contrary, (to speak in the received style) some may be very insensi­ble of Glory or Greatness, but furiously carried to the pleasures of Sense. And hence it appears, that the Characters which Histori­ans have given of some men, may be true, namely, that there was in them Magnae Virtutes, nec minora Vitia; great Virtues, and as great Vices. But it is as plain, that it is an ordinary mistake of some persons, who say, [Page 128]that every man hath the seeds and roots of all par­ticular Vices in his nature; if by those words they mean, an inordinate and im­moderate habitual inclination or appetite. And I know not what they can mean else, unless it be a bare capacity; but then there would be the seeds of all Virtues as well as Vices. For there may be so many sins as there are Appetites, and so many Appetites as there are Ob­jects: and there are some objects from which the Souls of some men have a [Page 129]natural aversion; and this is to be understood, not on­ly of individual objects, but also of some kinds of them, and consequently of some kinds of sins.

33. But it is a Question of much greater conse­quence, what Virtues and Vices are the greatest, and who are the most Virtuous or Vicious persons? For according to our right in­formation and judgement herein, our Opinions and Actions, our Inclinations and Behaviour, our Rewards and Punishments towards [Page 130]men, ought principally to be directed and governed. Now Vices or Sins (to take only that part) are to be estimated either according to their principle and end, or according to their effect and consequence: or they are either inherent or eventual, as hath been before said. In respect of the principle or end, there is no one kind or sort of sin universally grea­ter than another; for there may be as great an excess of [...], or self-love, in one sort as in another; and that is the greatest sin in [Page 131]this respect, in which there is a greater excess of [...], or habitual inclination to ones proper and personal good, above Universal Cha­rity, or above the habitual inclination to the Universal good. Thus there may be as great excess of [...] in sensuality, as in pride or ma­lice. I say it may be so, though more generally it is reasonably believed and supposed that there is more in these two last; and that because there are usually more and greater mischie­vous effects to others visible [Page 132]and known to him that is guilty of them, than in the first: whence one must needs have a less regard to the good of others compa­red with his own, than the other. But in respect of the effect or consequence, there is always a great dif­ference between the kinds of sins, and one is much worse than another. Thus Malice and Ambition are much greater sins than Vain­glory or Sensuality, especial­ly some kinds of it, such as the immoderate love of Bodily Exercises, Divertise­ments, [Page 133]and Pastimes. In particular, or rather indivi­dual sins or ill actions, there may be always difference both in respect of the prin­ciple and the effect. So a particular sin of Malice, & Spight, and Revenge, may be much greater and more heinous than a sin of In­temperance or Fornication, both in respect of [...], or self-love, in opposition to the good of others, and in respect of the hurtful and noxious effects and con­sequences. Sometimes a particular sin may be grea­ter [Page 134]in respect of the effect than another, but not in re­spect of the principle. Thus one act of Pride or Malice in any man, may have ma­ny more mischievous conse­quences upon it than an act of Intemperance or For­nication; but yet there may be less of the excess of [...] in that than in this; the man perhaps being ig­norant of many of the ill Consequences thereof, whereas in this he saw them and yet committed the sin. We ought to distinguish between the greatness of a [Page 135] sin and of a sinner. He is not always in Gods account (who knows the inclinati­ons of the Soul certainly) the greatest sinner, who commits the greatest sin. I mean, he is not always the most guilty of an inherent sin, who is the most guilty of the greatest eventual sin: and on the contrary, one man may be inherently, or in re­spect of the principle, more sinful and vicious in the commission of a less even­tual sin, than another in the commission of a grea­ter. Thus oft-times he [Page 136]may be a worse man, or a greater sinner inherently, who is guilty of Vain-glo­ry, (which seems to have so few more evil than good consequences upon it, and therefore to be a less Even­tual sin than Fornication or Intemperance) than he who is guilty of Fornication or Intemperance.

34. So likewise it hath been disputed, whether a­ctual inclinations and pro­pensions, or (as some call them) appetites to sin, concupiscences without con­sent of the Will, or actual [Page 137]Volition, be sinful? To which it is to be answered, that it is plain they are sin­ful. But withal, that the Wills not consenting, or rather the actual nilling and refusing them because they are sinful, is a certain sign of the Superiority or Pre­valency just at that time of its habitual inclination to that which is right and ho­nest; as the not regarding at all, and not attending whether they be sinful, and not checking them if they seem so to be, is a sign of the contrary. For there [Page 138]may be not onely divers, but contrary habitual incli­nations in the Soul at the same time. But as for mere thoughts or suggestions of what is sinful or unlawful, as of Revenge, or Lust, or Vain-glory, there can be no sin in them; And when they are assentedto, or de­lighted in, the sin is not in those thoughts, but in the actual Volition or Inclina­tion of the Will. It is not a sin, for example, for a man to have such a thought as this: Mischief thou such a man because he once mis­chieved [Page 139]you: Do such a thing, because such persons will speak well of and applaud you for such a performance: For such a thought is but an Object of my Under­standing, and proposed to my Will perhaps; it is not in my Will, in which one­ly is sin. If it were a sin barely to have such a thought, then it would be so if I had it conveyed to me by reading or hearing of such words; which no man can think. Neverthe­less, the emerging or spring­ing of such thoughts from [Page 140]our selves, is a very proba­ble sign of habitual sinful inclinations in us. For it is a sign (though not a ne­cessary one) of some cor­poreal Passion of Love, or Delight, or Desire, con­joyned to such Thoughts and Objects; or of some such bodily disposition, and perhaps mental temper, which naturally impresseth or causeth such inclinations. The spontaneous emergen­cy of certain thoughts in us, usually proceeds from such a disposition of the Body in us, as is the cause [Page 141]of delight and love to such Objects; and then those passions (if not hindered) impress on the Will actual and habitual inclinations. What is meant by sin, and sinful, hath been before laid down, viz. when the Incli­nation and Volition of the Will hath for its Object on­ly some Particular good, and not the Universal (or that which God hath com­manded by Revelation or Reason, that which plea­seth him, which is all one; because the Commands of God are, and are by all [Page 142]men taken to be an in­separable sign thereof) actually or habitually; i. e. actually perceived, or habi­tually and confusedly remem­bred. For it is of great moment to be observed, that when the Understan­ding actually takes notice of and regards, and the Will is carried to some par­ticular good only, such as is ones daily food, sleep, &c. yet the Will may by an ha­bitual memory be carried to, or have for its object the Universal good, and that which is right, just, honest: [Page 143]for the Understanding may have concluded generally from Revelation, or Reason, or the common uncontra­dicted practice of the world, that my particular use and enjoyment in such measure and seasons of such particular good things, is in such circumstances for the universal good; that it en­ables me to do more good, and consequently to please God and better my own condition: and the Will may act upon such an habi­tual Memory, without any actual perception prece­ding. [Page 144]'Tis much like a mans habitual direction of all his steps to the end of his journey, though he doth not in every step, nay per­haps in very few, actually think thereof. And as it is a certain sign of this habi­tual direction, that the man attends and is sagacious as much as the danger of go­ing out of the way requires; and that if he hath by ano­thers admonition, or any o­ther means, any suspicion that he is out of the way, he presently stops and in­quires, and endeavours to [Page 145]be satisfied whether he be in the right way or no: So it is also a sign of the habi­tual inclination of the Will to that which is right, which is for the Universal good, (of which the indubitable commands of God are a certain mark) if in any such ordinary and common acti­ons of life he be as wary and circumspect as the dan­ger and the importance, compared with other mat­ters, and the likelihood of his erring, requires: and when he hath any sufficient reason to suspect he doth or [Page 146]may err, to stop, to abstain, to consider. And this is all I have at present to return you in Answer to your first Question.

35. I have (Sir) in these Propositions made use of Scholastick terms, or such­like, which I know are not much agreeable to the hu­mour of this Age: but in truth I could not avoid it; oft-times in the most recei­ved style either there wan­ted Words, as far as I know, or they being of confused, loose, and uncertain signifi­cation, sometimes signify­ing [Page 147]one thing, and some­times another; sometimes more or less (as every one may inform themselves) they would not serve my pur­pose. And I thought it of grét pleasure and use, not only to conceive these things my self the most simply and distinctly, but also to be understood clear­ly by others of more close attention and reasoning; and therefore by your self in the first place, whose Command I very well re­member. If the Sense and Notions as they are here de­livered [Page 148]be well comprehen­ded, as I hope they may with a little use, it will be easie for men of Style, as they have occasion, to make for them, and put them in­to a more fashionable dress, and to express them by more tunable talk, for the sake of those, who either wanting Ability, or shunning Pains, or admiring Elo­quence, Fancy, and Wit, more than Truth and Di­stinctness and Usefulness of Knowledge, are content and best pleased with a general, confused, and figurative ap­prehension, [Page 149]or with a smooth, modish, and affecti­onate expression of things. Nor are they indeed to be neglected, being the gene­rality of men, who though they have little Appetite to Naked Sense, and dry Rea­son, the food of strong and sound Minds; yet will very well receive, and digest it too, for use and action, when it is garnished and sweetned in such manner, as useth to be most acceptable and grateful to them.