Sect. I.

I. For the First. The word [...] here rendred to Judg, hath several Significa­tions in Scripture.

1. In General to pass Judgment, that is, to affirm or deny, any Pro­position or Sentence thought of. This is the most ordinary Sense, and every where occurs, 1 Cor. 11. 13. Judg in your selves, [ [...].] Is it comely for a Woman to Pray with her Head uncovered. And the same in 1 Cor. 10. 15. I speak as to Wise-Men, Judg you what I say: i. e. Pass your Judgment, give your Opinion after Consideration, of what I am now about to propose unto you: And where this word [...] is thus used in the Septu­agints [Page 8] Translation of the Old Testa­ment, it may Answer to the Hebrew words [...], and other words.

2. More particularly, To pass Judg­ment concerning the Actions or Quali­ties of a Person, either of his Vertues or Faults, Good or Bad: And this is as often met withal; and so it is, three or four times presently after one another, in 1 Cor. 4. 3, 4, 5. But with me it is a very small thing, that I should be judged of you, or of Mans Judgment: Yea, I judg not mine own self: That is, As for yours, or any Mans Judgment concern­ing my Faithfulness in my Stewardship, of the Mysteries of the Gospel (of which in the two former Verses) whether I am, or am not Faithful, I make a little ac­count of it. Their Judgments upon many Accounts, it may be, being but little, if any probable signs of the Truth. Nay, I pass not Judgment concerning this thing Universally my self; I, it may be forgetting, or not seeing many things in my self: But the Lord is he that doth always, and hath right to Judg, who is All-knowing and Just, as it is in Verse 5.

[Page 9]3. More particularly yet: It signi­fies to pass Judgment concerning a Per­sons Innocency or Merit, that he is In­nocent: That is, an Acquitting and Absolving him, so is the Sense: To Judg the Cause of the Poor and Needy. Spoken of Jehoiakim's Father. And, To Judg the Fatherless and Oppressed, that the Man of the Earth may no more Oppress, Psalm. 10. 18. Here, and in such like the Septuagints word is [...], answering to the Hebrew, [...] and [...].

4. On the contrary, it oft-times signi­fies to pass Sentence or Judgment con­cerning a Persons Fault, or Guilt, or Punishment he deserves, that he is Guil­ty, and deserves Punishment; that is, to Condemn or Accuse. For in both this is done, in the one as a Judg, in the other as a Witness: And therefore it signifies the same with its Compound, [...], to Condemn. This is also a most frequent Sense of this word, both in the New and Old Testament, as Rom. 14. 3, 4. Let not him that eateth, de­spise him that eateth not: And let not him that eateth not, judg him that eateth. [Page 10] That is, As he that did Eat, and was so well informed in his Liberty, of the good Effects of it, as to put no Distinction between Meats, upon the Account of a­ny Divine Command, but only his own Prudence, was not to despise the other for his Ignorance: So he also who did make such Distinctions, was not to condemn the other of Unconscientious­ness or Prophaneness; that is, Neglect or Contempt of his Duty commanded by God's Revelation. And in verse 4. is the same Sense, Who art thou that Judgest? that is, Condemnest another Mans Servant. Where, by the way, you must take Condemnation in the Sense I shall by and by limit, as also understand it here between private Per­sons, and with this Circumstance, that it was before the Christian Jews had time to inform themselves well, and to understand the Reasons of this Liber­ty; and to get rid of their Inclinati­ons, to believe still the Mosaical Law, to be observed even under the Messias's Government: But that by the Bye.

And to go no further, ver. 10. still [Page 11] of the same Chapter, Why dost thou judg, or why dost thou set at nought thy Brother? That is, surely, Why dost thou so judg thy Brother, as after Judg­ment to contemn him, and to despise him? But such a Judgment must be, that he is Faulty, or Ignorant, and that is to condemn him. Now which of these Senses the word [...] here hath, I shall by and by tell you, when I more explicately and distinctly inform you, what Judgment it is that is here for­bidden.

Sect. II.

To give you yet a more distinct No­tion of the General Sense of this word [...], it is to be observed, that it con­sists of two Parts. The First is the In­ward Action. The Second, the Sig­nification of it.

The First, Is to pass Judgment only in a Mans thoughts, silently in ones own Breast.

The Second, Is to signifie this our Inward Judgment to others, by Words [Page 12] and Speech, or any other convenient Sign. I observe this principally, be­cause it may be permitted and lauda­ble oft-times to do the First, when it is not to do the Last. A Man may, nay ought often to give Judgment concern­ing things and Persons; when he may, and ought not for many Reasons to sig­nifie it. Such as are the Circumstances of the Persons Faults, who may be a Su­periour, a Governour, a Friend, one o­therwise very Wise and Innocent, or one either through Bashfulness, or Wrathfulness, not able to bear it, or many the like: So the Circumstances of Company, either that there are any, or too many, or such as will make more ill use of such a Judgment of ours, may make it reasonable and just, to abstain from making known our Judg­ment. And many still, other Circum­stances may there be, for these are but to give Instance.

Sect. I.

1. Too great a Proneness and Readi­ness to pass Judgment, concerning o­thers in any Respect; which is always concerning their Qualities of Power, or Knowledg and Wisdom, or their Good­ness, or their Actions hence proceed­ing. I say, too great an one; for all passing of Judgment is not here prohi­bited, as I shall hereafter mention. Now this too great a Proneness or Inclinati­on, is Various according to Persons, [Page 16] and must be determined by every Mans Prudence, when it is so. In some Men it may be much their Calling, their Business, it may be what is committed to their Care, for very excellent Uses and Purposes to observe and give Judgment of others. And therefore they are to bend and incline themselves to get so much Readiness and Aptness, or Quickness, to observe and judg, as may make them best able to discharge that Trust. Such are all kind of Governours, who have the Care of others Qualities and Manners; Ma­gistrates, Ministers, those who have the Education of Youth, Masters of Families. All these will do ill if they do not take notice, and judg concern­ing the Tempers, and Behaviours of their Subjects, People, Youth, Chil­dren and Servants, as much as they can, without too much Neglect of them­selves, or other worse Effects. Again, There are some that observe others to very good Use and Purpose: what is Good, they are prone to imitate; what is Bad, to shun and avoid: and this that [Page 17] they may clearly apprehend Virtue and Vice; which oft-times we better see in others, than in our selves. What is usually signified by the Proverb, That Standers-by see more than Gamesters. Men oft-times would neither be so Sen­sible of their own Virtue nor Vice, Good or Ill-Qualities, if they did not observe them in others. When they see a Man practising any Virtue, cr using any good Quality of Prudence, Diligence, any Instance of Power right­ly and well, and especially when com­mended or thought well of, or having some other Advantage; it makes them well pleased with themselves in these things, if they have them, or to en­deavour to obtain them, if they want them. And so Vices often appear to us more and more ugly and nasty in o­thers, than in our selves: Such as is Intemperance, Pride, Oppression, &c. And what may the Observer say, Am I like such a Person? I did not think I had been so Foolish, so Contemptible, Base, or Vile a thing before. These Men too are so far from neglecting [Page 18] themselves thereby (the common Mis­chief of our concerning our selves so much with others) that they mind them­selves hereby the more, and to better purpose.

But now on the other hand, but few Men are Governours of others at least of many: many also observe and take notice of others good Qualities, and are thereby excited to affectation of be­ing Superiour, consequently to envy Detraction and Contempt. And you shall see them judg and speak often of the most considerable Men, and the most considerable Qualities in them, with Abatement and Diminution; which as it may not sometimes, so it most-what proceeds from the above-named Prin­ciples. They'll take notice too, more surely of their Imperfections, and be apt to be moved to be well-pleased there­with, from the former Principles still; and consequently to multiply and mag­nifie them. Now it were a great deal better for Men of such a temper, to withdraw their Eyes from abroad, and to turn them home-ward, unless they [Page 19] could or would make better use of their Observation; and readiness in such Men to Observe and Judg others is too much, and therefore here forbidden. Others again there be, who may and do take notice and observe what others do, and are generally with Approbation, and be ready to imitate every thing, and it may be the worst things most. Those who you shall ordinarily here say, that such Persons do so or so, that they may excuse themselves; these it were better for them to neglect and take no notice of other Men, and not to mind what o­thers do. It is much better for those Men to mind what they themselves should do, than what others do. Here again a little proneness to mind or judg what others are or do, is too much.

Sect. II.

2. The Second thing I conceive may be here forbidden, is too great a Prone­ness to pass Judgment on the worst side, to attribute some Imperfections to o­thers, to accuse and condemn them. [Page 20] And this may be, though our Judgment be not false, (which is another Particular forbidden) but never so true; nor do we yet consider or attend to the Princi­ple from whence it proceeds, but only to the effect which is consequent; and here again as in the former Particular, the Degree forbidden is various. Some Persons may and ought to take notice of, Judg and Condemn other Mens im­perfections and faults (but always be sure, with as accurate truth as they can, with Prudence and Charity) more of­ten and frequently, others rarely or little. Those as I said in the former Particular, who are Governours of others so far forth as they do and ought to undertake that Office, so much ought they to take notice, observe, judg, con­demn, yea, reprove and correct (but always with Prudence and Charity, of which more hereafter) their Infirmities or Misdemeanours. Those also who do it out of no worse end, nor find no worse effect, than the good one of freeing themselves from too general and confu­sed admiration of other Mens Persons, [Page 21] and consequently Approbation, imita­tion of all they do, though many things weakly and amiss; finding themselves first without Self-flattery, able to Judg from other Reasons than Examples.

Those also who having a desire to be more exquisitely and accurately perfect and good, mark the Imperfections or Miscarriages of Men, and that of the best and most considerable, that they may prevent and amend them in them­selves, and be more accurate Patterns and Examples of Accomplishment and Virtue. Not out of Pride or Affecta­tion to be Superiour to all others; but out of a great desire of perfecting them­selves, and out of Charity to others.

Such Persons of such a Temper, though very rarely I doubt, we may sometimes meet withal. So likewise when Persons, Estates, or Qualities are of great concernment, and influence to us and others, to the Publick, and this presently and on a sudden; and our Judgment might tend to prevent any mischief there-from, which defer­red would be too late in such Cases, [Page 22] Sufficiency and Tendency to judg or believe rather on the worst side, is to be preferred. The contrary would be too pernicious or hurtful Security. Such as these, I say, and Men in such cases, are to be allowed more frequently, to employ themselves in observing and judging other Mens Imperfections or Faults, in their Temper or Conduct. But these on the other hand, who may experience not else-where better effects of this their Observation and Judg­ment, than an occasion and temptation for, and a gratification of their Pride, Self-love, Envy, Affectation of Supe­riority, Malice, Ill-will, Revenge, or the like; so far forth as they experi­ence this so much to them is it Prohi­bited.

And in general, it may be delivered as one pretty general sign, when we may do this too much (there seldom being a better effect than this, a bad one) viz. When thereby we are indisposed and hindred to take notice of, and approve of the good qualities and laudable that are in the same Persons, and conse­quently [Page 23] judg of them in general very unjustly, and are according unreason­ably affected towards them, undervalu­ing, contemning, hating them; that is, the qualities in them when we ought not, or more than we ought: And this we may see, I doubt, too frequent and common an effect, of this Judging and Condemning Persons; in so much that there are very few but may be hence concluded to be too much inclined and prone thereto, and to do it but too much. Where you hear one or once commended, and his good qualities ob­served, you may hear many, and many times dispraised, and his Faults and Im­perfections quoted; at least oftner than they are really in proportion to their good Qualities and Actions, or oftner than they should be signified and made known.

Sect. III.

3. The third thing I conceive may be here forbidden, is ones Judging with­out any Reason at all, but only ones [Page 24] Will and Inclination, or without suffi­cient Reason, the best he could or ought to have had all Circumstances consider­ed; that is, rashness or temerity in Judging, and when it is on the worst side, to condemn any Person, it is now usually called rash Censure. Of the first of these there is no Degrees or Dif­ferences, but it is perpetually in all Persons at all times forbidden. For if there appear no Reason at all to us, why we should judg one or t'other way, we are to suspend our Judgment. That which is usually exprest by saying, we do not know, we cannot tell, it may, or it may not be so indeed; (if we ap­prehend the possibility) but whether it be or be not, we are Ignorant. In our Judgments concerning some things, we may sometimes follow our Inclinations both without and contrary to some smal­ler Reasons; but then they must be ve­ry strong, such as are natural and born with us, and which we cannot oppress or hinder by our wills though we would, and we do not find they proceed from a­ny Insincerity, any secret desire or incli­nation [Page 25] to gratifie any Lust, but that we are possest with a serious and upright unmixed desire to know the truth in or­der to Goodness: And this, indeed, seems to be a sign of great reason for that Judgment, viz. Of this inclina­tion being Impressed by God, and con­sequently he being Good, that it is true and useful. Such are Mens strong in­clinations notwithstanding all appear­ance of reason (though but such, and and real deceits) to the contrary, which may be brought by Cavilling men, to believe God's Existence, his Justice to punish and reward, Immortality of Souls, distinction of Actions right and wrong, universal Goodness our great per­fection, and ultimate Self-love, contrary to the truth of our Senses, &c. these God hath anticipated us withal. But in our Judgments concerning Persons, no such inclination is to be followed by no means, which notwithstanding is extra­ordinary frequent, but always from some secret passion of hatred, displea­sure against the Person, not for any rea­son, but some bodily temper which is [Page 26] called Antipathy, and oft-times past offences, &c. Of the other, viz. Judg­ing without sufficient reason, there is variety; that which may be sufficient reason to one Man, or at one time in one thing, may not be to another. One Man may be more capable and able to examine a thing further than another; and yet both, may be, ought to pass their Judgment: As if one Friend should for very good ends, ask the judg­ment of some other, concerning the Qualities or Actions of a third. So sometimes the time for Deliberation or Information, may be necessarily shorter in one affair than in another; and yet the Judgment is then to be passed too, and not neglected: And so the Judg­ment concerning one thing of less mo­ment (and yet enough to deserve and require our Opinion too) may be with less reason or probability, than another of greater Importance. And here this rash Judgment is not to be allowed on either side, as well to the advantage as disadvantage of the Person, concerning his good or his ill-qualities or actions. [Page 27] We are not to judg Men better than they are, as well as not worse; and consequently falsly and foolishly admire and approve of what they say or do with­out reason, only because we will, and as we say we imagine so; not with that sufficient Reason as we ought to have: Though the extream of Judging Men rashly better than they are, being less frequent or hurtful, I suppose the other is here principally intended, viz. The Judging Men rashly worse than they are, and censuring them.

This Imperfection very often pro­ceeds from Ultimate, and therefore In­ordinate Self-pleasing our selves by meer Activity of this kind. We must be passing Judgment of every thing we see, or that appears to us, and as soon and as fast as may be; we cannot stay so long as to call to mind, or examine Reasons. This is too troublesome to most, and would spoil the pleasure of it: Oft-times Men make it their Di­version but imprudently chosen, to be at any rate wantonly Judging and Di­scoursing of Persons in general. Often­times [Page 28] also the Cause or Principle is Self-pleasing again, by the exercise and sense of our ability and sufficiency of Wit or Understanding; we much pleasing our selves that we can observe what others do and judg, and discern whether they are good or bad, do well or ill, especially what the most consi­derable Men do; and here most, because it is a sign of a greater Comparative ability, that we see Imperfections and Defects, even in the Wiser and Better sort of Men, which they do not (as we think) see in themselves. The first of these Causes is more ordinary, the second in those most often, who really are of considerable ability. These are more innocent Causes as not arguing so much of Self-Love, in opposition to the good of others or to Charity; as the other of Malice, Hatred, Revenge, Pride, Affectation of Superiority, and thence secret Envy which are but too frequent.

Sect. IV.

4. The Fourth thing forbidden is false Judgment, which although it may be more hurtful in effect, yet it may be and often is more innocent in the prin­ciple or end, than the former. For a Man may often judg false and out of Charity and Duty too, and with as suf­ficient reason as he could find or ob­serve. But yet a Man having first seen he may or ought to pass his Judgment, ought to adhibit the greatest care that it be true: This is a great instance of Ju­stice which as every Man at all times is bound to, so then especially when he undertakes to be a Judg.

The most general Instances of rash and false Judgment concerning Persons, Qualities and Actions, and perhaps which comprehend all others, are these:

1. When we Judg imperfections, defects, faults, of any kind or sort to be in Men, when they are not.

2. When we Judg those to be much greater imperfections, than indeed they [Page 30] are compared with others, we mistake in the quality. The first again is, First, Either when we judg Imperfections to be in Men one or more, when either there is none, or not so many. When we mistake in respect of the Number. Se­condly, When we Judg more of that which is; a greater Degree and a great­er Constancy of these Imperfections, which really are in the Persons, to be in the Persons, than there is, we mi­stake in the Degree and in the Continu­ation or Duration: And thus on the contrary also, we often judg as rashly and falsly of our selves, or any we fa­vour, or who are Friends to us.

We judg perfections and good qua­lities to be in our selves and them, and more of these Perfections in number, and them to be greater, and more of each of them in Degree and Frequency, or Constancy, than indeed there is; when all this is a mistake, and oft a silly or wilful one, and on the contrary judg ours and our Friends Imperfections and and their degrees of Intention and Fre­quency fewer, and the Imperfections [Page 31] less than indeed they are; and we to that purpose conceal, connive at, for­get them willingly, even to our own Consciences and our best Friends, and this out of ultimate and foolish mistaken Self-love. A thing often to be observed in sick and dying Persons, very back­ward to take notice of their sins and faults, and the degrees of them, and to reckon them up all, and to make a frank acknowledgment to their own Consciences or their Friends. A sign too of no very great degree of Repen­tance, or a Conversion from sin. In the first, we multiply and magnifie the Imperfections, Infirmities, Defects, ill-Qualities of others: Here the good ones. Surely much the better extream as to its Effects (as it seems) even when it proceeds from ultimate Self-love, as well as the other extream (which is too often) and not out of Charity.

A more particular and very useful Instance of the First General is, when we Judg the Actions of Men to pro­ceed from worse Principles, Ends, De­signs and Qualities in them, than in­deed [Page 32] they do. A thing the more dili­gently and carefully to be avoided, be­cause of very mischievous and evil consequences, and yet extraordinary frequent and easie to be fallen into. Thus often we accuse and condemn Men of Covetousness, Pride, Uncon­scientiousness, or the like, from some actions which really were the effects much of a wise and discreet Virtue, and had very little mixture if any of these Vices.

A thing very often, especially hap­pening in refusal or denying, the Cra­vings and Desires of others.

Thus we accuse Men often of great Wilfulness, when it is Weakness, of Wickedness or Evil-disposition of Will, when it is Ignorance and Imprudence; of deliberate Mischievousness, when it is a sudden Surprize. How often shall you hear Men fiercely accuse one ano­ther of Malice, Hatred, Revenge, Pride, than the first of which nothing more devilish and worse, can be thought or said of a Man, (though I wish it were not so often true) when there is no such [Page 33] matter, but an impartial and upright Justice; that is, Charity to the Pub­lick, or at worst ignorance, mistake, Mens not attending, forgetfulness or the like. This is very often seen in the behaviour of Sects and Parties one towards ano­ther: Where the Inconsistency of Opi­nions with good Conscience, is often fiercely affirmed too universally, before it is known what Advantages they have had for Information. Though I ac­knowledg too, there may be oft very sufficient signs for a very probable Judgment: This rash and false Judg­ment in these or the like Instances be­ing so mischievous, and yet frequent, is (as I said, when it is on the false side) diligently to be avoided; and rather let the defect, the rashness, and the mis­take, be on the other hand; which usu­ally argues much of Wisdom and Cha­rity, good Nature, and a great free­dom from ultimate and inordinate Self­love, and especially when it is towards Adversaries: And therefore it is a love­ly and amiable thing, it is called good Interpretation and Candour. When [Page 34] one judgeth most favourably, and put­teth the best sense and meaning upon Actions and external appearances, when there is equal probability on both sides, or there is none at all of either appear­ing; and when it is constrain'd to judg worse, it is with pity: According to that invaluable 13th Chap. of the first Epistle to the Corinthians, to be written in the most deep and lasting Characters in our Souls, and to be read every morn­ing, nay, as oft as may be, verse 5. Charity as it beareth all things, so it be­lieveth and hopeth all things.

Sect. V.

5. The Fifth thing forbidden, is, too great a Proneness and Aptness to pro­nounce, to declare and make known our Judgment and Opinion concerning others, especially on the bad side: To be always talking thereof, though to no visible good effect, nor out of any good Principle. And to be in pain as it were till they have delivered themselves, and this usually comes too from the Inordi­nate [Page 35] love of Activity, of doing some­what, of Restlesness, which is called Busibodiness; and sometimes from the other worse Qualities so often mention­ed, Malice, Pride, Envy, Revenge, &c. and mostly from a mixture of more of them together: With all which too, as in all other Actions of Men insincere, (as most are I doubt) some small mix­ture sometimes there may be of Justice, that is, of a kind of common Charity. This too great Proneness or Inclination considered without its Principle or End, (as I have told you before) admits of Variety. Some Men ought to have more, as all Governours and Overseers of others Manners, or in general of their good Qualities. Those also that find the good effects of good Instructi­on, Self-amendment, kindly and lauda­ble Emulations, Pity, an endeavour for the good of the faulty, and of others, to amend or prevent the same else-where. Others on the contrary who are private Persons, in a private Capacity or Con­dition, apt to gratifie thereby their En­vy, Pride, Hatred, Contempt of o­thers, [Page 36] Self-conceit, affectation of Superi­ority, will have seldomer sufficient rea­sons to pass or declare their Judgment; and when they have, the good effects are not so considerable in them as in the former Persons: Consequently they must nourish a lesser Proneness and Inclination thereto. These Men also who find they can better discern, choose, govern, and Instruct themselves in all Circumstances, of declaring their O­pinion concerning Persons, such as I have before mentioned, of the Persons judged, the Persons before whom, &c. These also may be more free, and allow themselves more of this Proneness. Those on the contrary, who may and ought to observe themselves forgetful, unable to take notice, or discern the fittest Circum­stances; or not to be able to moderate or govern themselves when they do, but what they have in their mind it must come out; those who are thus dull and weak, ought to lay aside this Prone­ness and Inclination, to subjugate or weaken it so far forth, and to betake themselves more to mind their own af­fairs immediately.

In General (of which more hereaf­ter) the declaration of this our Judg­ment, must always be done with all the signs, and with the best effects we can of Charity, in doing Good, and con­sequently Self-denial. Charity, I say, sometimes more immediately respecting the Person of whom we judg, some­times our selves, it may be, (as in the case of sin, when we ought to vindicate our selves) sometimes some others, By­standers, sometimes altogether: Be sure let there not appear any the least sign of doing it out of ultimate respect to our selves in any kind, nor let the effect be only such with a neglect of, or in opposition to the good of the Person, or others. And a great many signs there are of this, which may better come in in another place.

Sect. VI.

6. And lastly. And above all is here forbidden, the undue end of our Judg­ing others, viz. Self-pleasing ulti­mately, and that several ways, by others [Page 38] hurt or mischief, positive or privative: These are, Malice, Hatred, Pride, En­vy, Revenge, Flattery and base Fear, Busibodiness, Curiosity, &c. This is that which is here principally intended; this mainly advis'd against by our Savi­our; as also judging on the worst side, suspecting, accusing, condemning Per­sons out of the foresaid Principles. As appears by the reason subjoyned both in this and the next Verse, [ Judg not] is here taken in the sense in which [ that you be not judged] is: But by that is meant suspected, accused, condemned by others, principally out of the former Principles. For if it were meant of the Judgment of the good side, the a­voiding of that would be no motive not to judg, because it would not seem an evil to the Person judging. I say, principally: Moreover, I have mention­ed the defect of being too prone in ge­neral to pass Judgment, though it may happen on the good side; and so to de­clare ones Judgment, and to judg rash­ly or falsly, though still on the good side on this occasion, as belonging to [Page 39] our Judgments, to suggest unto you, that they might be occasionally forbid­den too, and are Defects, Infirmities. All the forementioned Particulars, if they can be supposed to proceed not from these bad Principles, but from good, viz. Charity, though impru­dent and mistaken; though they may be immediately hurtful and do mis­chief, yet they are not vicious, faul­ty, wicked. But more of this when we come to the Causes of these forbid­den Judgings here, especially of rash and false ones.

Sect. I.

BUt what Judgments are here not forbidden, though they may be apt to be mistaken for those which are. And in general these two, viz.

1. Not an observing or judging out [Page 40] of Charity, a sincere and unmixed Cha­rity. For sometimes, surely, we may exercise our Charity both in good and bad Judgments. The principal thing here forbidden, is passing our Judg­ment out of bad Principles, such as are Ultimate Selfishness, Malice, Ha­tred, Pride, Envy, &c. But then the contrary cannot be forbidden to pass Judgment out of a good one, and the only good one, viz. Charity, or Good­will, unless all Principles of a Mans actions were forbidden.

Sect. II.

Nor, Secondly, Is it ever forbidden to a Person, when there are more good effects of his doing this, than of his omission: Nay, then contrary-wise he is commanded to do it. The first respects our Principles or End: The se­cond our Prudence or the Effect. The first of these may be without the second, viz. A Man may give his Judgment and Opinion concerning Persons and Actions, out of Charity and very good [Page 41] Intentions of doing the most good unli­mitedly in general, whether it be parti­cularly applied to our selves or others, or both; and yet, as far as we see, the effects of it may be bad. A Man may both in­wardly and outwardly commend and discommend Persons unseasonably with a very good meaning, through want of Information. And so the second may be without the first too; that is, There may be very good effects and conse­quences of a Mans passing and pro­nouncing his Judgment, when the prin­ciple may be bad enough. A Man may approve or condemn what is truly good or bad in others, and consequent­ly dispose himself and others to an imi­tation of the one, and an eschewing of the other, especially if he be a Per­son of some esteem; and yet he may do the first out of fear or flattery, or because it is like some-what in himself, not because it is a quality or thing real­ly profitable to the World, and there­fore would have it more propagated. And the second out of Envy, Hatred, &c. not because it is a thing mischievous [Page 42] and hurtful to the Person himself, to others, or displeasing to God Almighty.

In summ, whensoever it doth appear to any Man that it would be worse if he did not pass his Judgment, that there would be worse consequences thereof than if he did, any where to others as well as himself, considering himself but as any other Person, just in the same Circumstances; and to do it for this very reason and cause, this com­mon Good; this, I say, is not here pro­hibited.

Sect. III.

Thirdly, But more particularly there­fore in the first place, it is not univer­sally prohibited here to pass Judgment. In the Cases and Circumstances I have formerly mentioned, and innumerable more (if we descend to particulars) it is not. It is much permitted, nay, enjoyned to Governours, somewhat less to private Persons. Laudable it is in Men to have regard to, and observe the qualities and actions generally of those [Page 43] that are their Superiors, to compare their own with, and see their defect, and to be excited to Amendment and Imitation: To look at, and to judg their own faults in others, if thereby they find them­selves disposed to see them more clearly in themselves, and to be put in mind of them. Laudable it is to observe good qualities in others that we may rejoyce in them, and be glad to see any thing good in the World, and be able to encourage it by a discreet Observation and Commendation thereof. Conse­quently we are not commanded to be negligent, and utterly careless of what other Men are or do: For this is con­trary to the former generals of Charity and Prudence, we should then be pro­hibited both those. Out of Prudence and Charity to our Neighbour, both good and bad Men, and to our selves too, we are obliged to take notice of them what they are and do; to encourage and help, or to rejoyce in what is good, to check, hinder, and prevent what is bad and mischievous in the World, by our pity and just endeavours. We are not sure­ly [Page 44] to say with Cain, Am I my Brothers keeper? Yes, we are all so, that is, we should be so: We are not like Brutes, to live only within our own Skins, to care for no Body but our selves, and inhumanly to say, What care we what others do? We'll look after our selves; let them be good or bad we matter not, we think it best always to mind our selves; we see Men busie themselves too much about others matters. In the first of which thou art bad and wicked, being only selfish; in the other mistaken and imprudent. Thou art always to have regard to the common good in all thou art and dost, and there­fore when thou appliest thy self to mind thy self, and to do good to thy self, it must always be to fit thy self to do most good in general, it must have that for the end. Thou art also often (and thy own prudence must determine, for it may be too often) to step out and see what others do and are, and concern thy self charitably and prudently for thy Neighbours, and to please and serve God consequently; there is a time when [Page 45] this is best. Besides, indeed thou mindest thy own self to best purpose and effect, when thou disposest thy self to be of this charitable and prudent Temper; which may sometimes be best done by use and exercise.

Sect. IV.

Fourthly, Nor in the next place is it prohibited universally to pass Judgment on the worst side, to Accuse or Con­demn; for it is permitted to the Over­seers of others Manners, and Instructors, and Teachers of good Manners; and to Friends, whose care and industry for the good of those whom they thus judg it will excite; to those that would free themselves from too partial an admiration of Persons; to those who have a mind and design to be more ac­curately good, in things of more great and publick Concernment; and in many other Circumstances, which every ones private prudence must determine. Much less still is the contrary command­ed or indulged, viz. To judg that good [Page 44] [...] [Page 45] [...] [Page 46] and laudable which is bad and to be condemned, to judg falsly on the best and favourable side: for to judg falsly is ever forbidden, and to judg accord­ing to Truth when we do judg, is always commanded and enjoyned. We are not neither to think well of all Persons, and all in Persons, to praise, speak well of all things. We may and ought, when Charity and Prudence are the reasons of our using our Judgments, to think of things as they are, to think that bad or faulty which is so, as near as we can be informed, and to say so too; as it follows in the next particular.

Sect. V.

Fifthly, Nor in the next place is it here universally forbidden to declare and make known our Judgments, and that on the worst side. But there are many Circumstances in which it is of much better effect so to do. Some­times to reprove (always with Charity and Discretion to be sure) the Guilty or Faulty, and to let him know our [Page 47] Opinion concerning any Actions, or Temper, or Quality in him, may be of excellent use, and be a means to amend the Persons, and to prevent the like for the future. Sometimes to admonish others, lest they imitate or do the like; we may make known our Judgment to them, especially when the faulty Per­son is Incorrigible, or to prevent some fraud, or hurt or mischief that other­wise might be done by one to another: We are not always to hold our Tongue, nor conceal all signs of our Opinions, be Meal-mouth'd for fear of displea­sure, or the like causes; which as it may be in the effect very mischievous, so it proceeds usually from Treachery or Cowardize. Much less still is it com­manded or permitted here to signifie a contrary Judgment, to what we really have in our Breasts; to speak or otherwise so to behave our selves as if we thought well of, approved and liked that which we do not: To do this out of the self­end of preventing any evil, or procu­ring any good from a Person, is called Flattery. We are not to say, That [Page 48] evil is good, or darkness light. We are not either for fear or favour, to Com­mend and Praise what in our Judgment and Conscience we condemn. But when we think our selves obliged to declare, and make known our Opinion and Judgment concerning any Person or Actions, it must always be with Truth, although it be to disapprove or condemn. But then to be sure, let this be always done with a sincere inward Charity, and all the just signs of it, and of freedom from any Self-design, and e­specially that which is in such a case most ordinary and suspected, viz. from Pride and Imperiousness, and therefore with Modesty, with great Discretion and Prudence; that is, a discerning and fore-seeing when it may, and when it may not be of good use and effect to do or not do it: Of which hereafter under another Head.

Here is to be noted, that as these Actions of Judgment are not prohibi­ted, so not all Inclinations thereto.

Sect. I.

TO Instance in some of the Causes of these prohibited Judgments here, those especially which are more Proper, Immediate, Frequent, and most in our own power to prevent.

We must run them over again. And First, Of too much Proneness to judg in general the Causes some of them may be:

1. Too much Idleness: By which I mean not a Man's doing nothing (for that cannot be, every Body is always employ'd, his Thoughts are always taken up about somewhat) but a Mans not having any destined or set-purposed-Employment, which one should always chuse, as that in which he can best [Page 50] serve God and the World, do most good in his Generation. A neither de­signing nor purposing to pursue always, (or at least but when any extraordinary occasion happens) any particular, nor his General calling, as is usually distin­guished; neither that which he with some others employ themselves about, nor that which all Men should, such as Reflection upon ones own Actions, the end, design, the event or effect of them; the having respect to the pleasing of God, and doing good some way or other to our Neighbour, to the Publick, and the performance of some general Du­ties to God and our Neighbour, which all are constantly obliged to perform. Men's not having, I say, constantly such designed, purposed, and set-em­ployment, gives their Mind leave, lets them at liberty to wander about any where, to be employed about any thing that shall from any cause be thrust upon them, or shall occur. Now this is far more usually others Persons and Actions than themselves; partly because they are far more the object of our External [Page 51] Senses, which affect Men generally more strongly and frequently than any thing from within themselves; and then what we have proposed or objected to us, we naturally and laudably are prone to be judging somewhat or other concerning them, or appertaining to them. But Men that have any set con­stant Calling to employ themselves in, and besides perform their general Du­ties to God, their Neighbour and them­selves, are not so much at leasure to mind and attend to what others are and do, and consequently to judg. Just for Example, as Idle wandring Beggars, who, as we say, are never out of their way, and have no certainly designed Place or Business, turn to every By-House to see who dwells there. They look upon, observe, talk to or talk of every Passenger they meet; when the Man that hath some designed Affair or Business, with certain time and place in his Journey, hardly observes or minds, or but very little and passingly, the Company upon the Rode, nor any way diverts or stops himself: Such was [Page 52] the fault of the younger Widdows which Saint Paul bids Timothy to ad­vise: They learnt to be Idle, wandring about from House to House; and then, They were Tatlers and Busiebodies, speak­ing things which they ought not, 1 Tim. 5. 13. This is a privative Cause.

Sect. II.

Secondly, The Love of Activity meerly, ultimately, to no better end but only to please themselves therein. Themselves are too little a Sphere, there is more variety of things to be observed and judged in all others who they know, than only in themselves; whence they do it with greater life and vigour, Men think it a dull thing (and that's their only reason) to mind principally themselves, and things appertaining to them, and it may be the same things too for the most part, to live in a round; not always, but so much as is for most Men most expedient. And then when Men do observe or take notice of others Persons, qualities, and actions, they will [Page 53] be passing Judgment, because there is more of Action, than in suspending, doubting, or meerly observing. That seems to be a slow dull thing too in compare with a Mans briskly and smart­ly, and uninterruptedly passing Judg­ment. Besides that, suspending, doubt­ing, being Ignorant, argue an imper­fection, and this fault may have the name of Busibodiness, viz. When out of love of being Busie, meerly to be always doing somewhat, and that with vigour and smartness, Men employ their Thoughts in Observing and Judging other Mens, either Qualities or Acti­ons: Not out of any Neighbourly or Charitable Principle; not because they see a great deal of good they may do by it, and therefore would do it accor­dingly; that is, not out of Reason, Prudence, Charity. Men oft-times Bussle and are Busie in the World, and they know no other Reason but that they love to be so; and nothing more often occurs about which they may be so, than what other Men are or do.

Sect. III.

Thirdly, The third cause is some­times Curiosity; that is, a Mans plea­sing himself meerly and ultimately, in knowing something he did not know before, and being very much conceit­ed of himself there, for not directing his knowledg to those things which are most profitable, which he can make best use of, do most good withal, nor attending to them. Hence it comes to pass that Men are not content to mind, and know themselves or their own minds (if it was less difficult than it is;) nor yet things more nearly Rela­ting to themselves, which is more easie: But they are also more inquisitive into, and desirous to know the Affairs of others, what they are and do, and ob­serve them, and consequently to pass Judgment of them; which is a sign to them, but oft a very false one, that they do know: Because we use to do so, and should do so, viz. Pass Judg­ment only of things we do know. If [Page 55] we should not pass Judgment, but doubt or suspend, we should seem to our selves to be Ignorant; which we would not do because we will ultimately, and please our selves not to be so. To doubt, or to suspend ones Judgment because one does not know, is but very rare and in few Tempers; but it should be always and is to be preferred before Knowledg, because it is a better thing, a greater excellency to withhold a Mans Judg­ment, where there is no Reason seen, where one doth not know or see (the Connexion of what he affirms and does) the Truth it self, than it is to know the Truth it self. The one is but a perfection of our Understanding, t'other a great virtue of our Wills, and we shall be the wiser the more we thus judg, and accordingly behave our selves: I say, rather to say and think we do not know when we indeed do not, then to know though never so certainly.

Sect. IV.

Fourthly, A fourth cause may be an Instance or Branch of Pride; that is, to please our selves too much meerly, either that we have, or are reputed to have, an ability and sufficiency to un­derstand, and direct others and their affairs too, better than they themselves can: When 'tis only so conceitedly by us, and we know not others Cir­cumstances; or were we in them we would do the like or worse; or if we had this ability, perhaps we had better be without it; whilst it makes us less able to understand and direct our selves, by using our minds to Wander abroad, and to attend to others, and depriving us of the opportunities of Self-refle­ction. It is very often seen, that those who are extraordinary forward not out of some sence of Duty to give Coun­sel, Advice, or Judgment of other Mens Concerns, are very negligent and careless, and unapt to follow the very same, when it is as useful and pro­fitable for themselves.

Sect. V.

Secondly, For some of the Causes of too great a Proneness to judg on the worst side, whether truly or falsly, (but not therefore, or because they are true or false) in our selves, they are all either Ignorance, or some Ill-dispositi­on of Will.

1. Ignorance, viz. Of the bad ef­fects or consequences of this our too great Proneness, which Ignorance may proceed from Ill-dispositions of Will, either on set purpose, or designed then when we judg; and we wilfully shut our Eyes, and do not attend to what might better inform us; or it may be contracted before. But it may pro­ceed too sometimes, even from Love and Charity. So we see sometimes Persons much desirous of their Rela­tions, or others Good and Well-fare, very apt always to suspect the worse of them, and to observe their Beginning, bad Inclinations, and to think them so; but not so much to take notice of [Page 58] the contrary good ones in them; and this partly that they might timely pre­vent any evil that may happen to them thereby. And so may it be in publick Affairs, and of very great and univer­sal Concernment especially, and yet soon out of our power; nay, so we see it in our selves sometimes. Some Men being too apt to look upon their Faults and Imperfections, and to magnifie them, and to take no notice of what's good in themselves, and consequently to judg falsly concerning themselves on the worst side: Though this is but rare in compare with the other extream, and proceeds from an imprudent and ignorant love, not attending that they ought, and may do themselves as much good by their being pleased with, and encouraged by, and thankful for the good they have; as by being afraid of, removing, and preventing any evil fal­len upon them, or that may fall upon them: and not considering still that it's best be sure, all things considered, to judg always according to Reason and Truth; not to trouble and perplex our [Page 59] selves with vain fears and endeavours, and for other good effects thereof.

Sect. VI.

Sixthly, But I doubt the far more usual Causes of too great Proneness to judg on the worst side, are ill-dispositi­ons of Will in general, Self-love and Self-pleasing ultimately in various In­stances, such as are more particularly Self-pleasing by:

1. Hatred of, or Malice (an habi­tual Hatred) against any Person in general: Than which there is nothing in the World more detestable, because the most Mischievous, and it is the greatest degeneracy from, the most op­posite and contrary to, the most excel­lent perfection in the World, which is Goodness, and is usually attributed to the Devil; that is, the worst of Be­ings. This is when a Man pleaseth himself ultimately in doing mischief to, in vexing and hurting another Man, other Persons. It is easie to see, how this disposeth a Man to the greatest rea­diness [Page 60] to judg any thing bad in the Per­son to whom he is thus affected. For if we thus please our selves in doing Mis­chief, we shall endeavour that we may still please our selves, so to do; and that we may so do, we'll represent Per­sons as bad as we can, as great evils (whether true or false, it matters not) as we can. This, I say, manifestly is a Cause in us of being mischievously affected, and of doing what we can to them: And this again, is a Cause to such Persons of Pleasures and Delight. He therefore that wills the End, viz. Pleasing himself by the mischief of o­thers, will will the Means thereto; and that's one, viz. Judging them as great Evils as we can. It is like a Man's dressing up another Person in ugly or contemptible Habit, that he might please himself in hating or con­temning him; whereas the Person's true and natural Make or Features, was more beautiful and comely than his own. But this is so truly a hateful disposition, that I would be willing ra­ther to think there is no such thing [Page 61] amongst Men, what-ever there may be amongst the Infernal Spirits, or else­where in the World.

2. Though in the second place, Re­venge comes somewhat near it; that is, to please ones self in doing evil to ano­ther Man, meerly because he hath done evil to him; which is a very unreasonable thing. For why should there be more mischief in the World, because there hath been some already? Clear contra­ry, the more there hath been, the less there should be. I know oft-times there is a mixture of Justice and Self­defence, to prevent the like for the fu­ture, but oft-times too there is more pretended than there is; and when there is a love to Justice and a just and reasonable Defence, it is a Cloak to hide much of the other too, or a Pill that hath much of that Poyson in it. We have the more need to be Skilful and Subtle in the discovery of the sin­cerity of our Hearts; that is, the ends or designs that move our Wills.

Now it is here likewise manifest, that to judg a Person as bad and as imper­fect [Page 62] as we can, will augment, whetten and sharpen our Revenge, and conse­quently if we be so wickedly disposed, our Pleasure and Delight too; and as before, he that wills the End wills the Means thereto, when he sees it is so: In revenge too, is often mixed the affectation of Superiority.

3. Somewhat less a bad Cause, but bad enough too, is Pride, or a Self-plea­sing ultimately in the instances of our power: And here more particularly,

(1.) Self-pleasing in our Superiority to others in any thing, a branch of Pride, i. e. to be Ultimately and more than ought pleased therewith, inordi­nately and immoderately. A very mis­chievous Temper and Appetite. I do not see that any degree thereof is allow­able, or that it doth any good more than the gratification of the proud Person. To affect to be Superiour in some ex­cellent and useful Quality, may be an occasion sometimes of a Man's excelling therein, and consequently of some good effect: But it is not because he affects Superiority, that is not the precise [Page 63] Cause, but because that Superiority happens to be in an excellent thing. And yet more particularly.

(2.) Envy a kind of this affectation of Superiority, not the passion so much; that is, a desire of depriving others of any Good they possess which we have not; (as is to be understood too, in the fore-going cause of Hatred and Re­venge) but the cause or principle of our being prone to this Passion; that is, pleasing our selves ultimately, that we have some good things which others have not, and being very glad they have them not, and sorry and grieved if they have them: And this makes us to will both that it should seem so to us, and that it really should be so. That it should seem so; and therefore we wilfully judg it is so, that others are in general much Inferiour to us in any good thing, or less Superiour at least than indeed they are, and therefore par­ticularly that they are guilty or defe­ctive, where we are not, that they are such or such. We would have others not better, or as bad, or worse than our [Page 64] selves, and are much pleased it is so, and therefore we make it to seem so to our selves, and wilfully judg it so, when it may be it is not in our power really to make it so. For the same reason Envy also makes us to will it should be so indeed, and to endeavour it as much as we can: and therefore particularly, so far as we esteem, honour, love; re­ward good things, that they should not be honoured, beloved, rewarded, or the like, and consequently that they should not seem to others to merit it; and con­sequently both to judg and make known our Judgment very greedily and readi­ly that they do not, to bear witness against them. It is called Detraction, when a Man from this or such like Prin­ciple, is judged not to have some good Quality that he hath really; and Slan­der when he is judged to have some bad one, which he is free from. A con­trary temper to that wise Admonition of the Wise-man, Prov. 24. 17. Re­joyce not when thine Enemy falleth, and let not thy heart be glad when he stum­bleth.

[Page 65](3.) Contempt, this hath an effect contrary to admiration: Admiration of any Person in general and confu­sedly, causeth a Man to judg all things in or any way belonging to that Person excellent, and to attribute more to him than he hath. Contempt in general of a Person, on the contrary, causeth us to judg all things appertaining to the Person contemned, mean or small, or to attribute to him many and greater Im­perfections than indeed are in him, in some such manner ordinarily signified. Tush, there is no great matter in such a Person, indeed he may be so or so: But that's a small thing if he be; nay, there is nothing laudable in him, what's matter what he saith or doth? He is weak, silly, wilful, &c. Whereas we ought not thus confusedly to pass Judg­ment, but more distinctly; if there be any thing contemptible, yet there may be other things very considerable. Men also may please themselves meerly in contempt of another, as a Mark or Sign (to themselves, though it may be to no Body else) of their own Superi­ority, [Page 66] and being better; and that they may more contemn and consequently please themselves, (as it was before in hatred) make him appear to themselves, and judg him much more contemptible than he is. Both these last particulars are contrary to the Apostolical Pre­cept, in that excellent Chapter, Rom. 12. 10. In honour preferring one another. Be we rather inclin'd to judg others better than our selves, and to give unto them the signs thereof, rather, I say, than assume them to our selves, even when equal probability of both sides, or some (it may be) advantage of our own: for the more excellent effect only sometimes of checking and controuling, and subduing, and bring­ing under Command, that unreasona­ble and inordinate Self-love. These three are Branches of Pride.

(4.) A fourth cause is Flattery in Judging: That is, when a Man pleaseth himself ultimately, in pleasing any one that is an Adversary or Enemy to the Person concerning whom he gives Judgment, and consequently is well [Page 67] pleased to hear of his Faults or Imperfe­ctions. A Man may use out of Flattery so often to tell his Judgment to the dis­advantage of a Person, that at last he may unawars come to believe it himself; and partly that his Flattery may not at any time be discovered, oblige himself to believe it, and perswade himself that that is true, which before he did but say was so, though he thought the con­trary. And here it may be observed, that as too great a proneness to judg on the worst side, doth proceed from these Causes mentioned: So it is a most ordinary thing for the passing, and espe­cially declaring ones Judgment and Opinion on the advantagious side, i. e. That a Man hath more of some good thing than indeed he hath, to proceed from some of the same Causes too, viz. Hatred, Envy, Indignation. For Ex­ample, That a Man hath more Reve­nue, Treasure, Honour, Power, Ease, Pleasure, than indeed he hath, only to expose him more to the Envy or Indignation of others. And in gene­ral, Men judg thus in a thing which [Page 68] they account a reward to him who they think doth not, or they would not have him either to merit or receive it, most commonly it is an easie thing from Cir­cumstances, to discern from what Prin­ciples such Judgment proceeds: But some may be so cunning as to conceal or dissemble.

Sect. VII.

Seventhly, For the Causes of rash Judgment and Censure, they must be the same with those of the two for­mer particulars. The Causes of rash Judgment in general, Idleness, Busi­bodiness, Activity, Curiosity, Pride, and of rash Censure or Judgment, with­out Reason, but a Mans own Will on the worst side as such; are among o­thers, Hatred, Revenge, Pride, Affe­ctation of Superiority, Envy, Con­tempt, Flattery. To which we may add Anger and Wrath, which if a Man be not very careful, disposeth us to as much uncharitable and unreasonable Judging as the former, and a Man is [Page 69] seldom or never to trust his Judgment of any Person after that fierce and con­founding Passion, but refer it to ano­ther time, when calmness and freedom from Passion, gives him more ability to see the Truth, and more impartiality to judg. And now all these Causes, me­thinks, are so Unreasonable, Inhumane, and Unchristian, when thus nakedly re­presented, that they cannot but stir up in Souls not quite degenerate, or cor­rupted, dead, and sensless of what's good, many of these very Passions a­gainst themselves, and seem the ugliest Objects that can be beheld. These are those which compose a Devil more, and are more essential to him than any other shape.

Sect. VIII.

IV. The Causes some of them of false Judging as false, or of falsity, er­rour of Judgment concerning Persons, whether on the good or bad side, may, as in all other false Judgments, be re­duced to two within us in General.

[Page 70]1. Defect in our Understanding which here in this case is but one, viz. Igno­rance, in a large sense, viz. the Absence, or want of Apprehension, or of the actu­al Knowledg of something which would influence our Judgments.

2. In our Will, a meer inclination to any certain false Judgment, whether it be from Custom and Use, or from the Love, and for the sake of any certain Object.

In this particular case of false Judg­ments, some of the most frequent Causes more or less remotely, and some way or other reducible to these two, are these:

Sect. IX.

(1.) In general; meer Ignorance of the truth of things, where there is no defect of Will. So a Man may judg an action in respect of the effect and principle of it, to be well or ill done, when it is the contrary; and it was the case of the Jewish and Gentile Christians, passing Judgment of one [Page 71] anothers Eating, and abstaining from certain Meats, and observing or not ob­serving some certain Days and Times, and consequently imposing them upon one another from their own private Opinions; not as determined by their rightful Superiours or Governours, Rom. 14. Some of them through Ig­norance judged, that those who took the Liberty to eat forbidden Meats, contrary to the Mosaical Law (which they thought was still even under the Messias to be observ'd) did an evil Acti­on, and out of an evil Principle too possibly, viz. Prophaneness, or want of that respect for God's Commands which they ought: And this probably too, because they found in themselves that if they should do so, it would pro­ceed from such a Principle (which will be a second Cause presently to be na­med.) The other Gentile Christians judged right concerning the action of abstaining from Meats, that it was not right; and the Non-observation of, or Liberty from the Jewish Law was a Christian priviledg, or it did not be­long [Page 72] to the Christian Religion: But possibly too they might (if they did not) judg wrong, concerning the Prin­ciple of these Jewish Christians, viz. That it was out of Superstition or Pride, that the Gentiles might not be in all things equalized to themselves, and that the Ancient Constitutions of their Religion might seem more consi­derable. From hence also (more par­ticularly) it proceeds, that even very Honest and Just Persons (though much oftner in the World, it proceeds from ultimate Self-love or a mixture of it) judg themselves Comparatively more Superiour to others in good qualities, and truly more valuable than they are, viz. They know and observe more their own Perfections and good Qualities, their Number, their Nature, the de­grees of their worth and excellency from their effects, than they do those of others. They can tell better all the Good qualities they have in them­selves, than what are in others; many of which, or but few, they may ever have had occasion to observe: They [Page 73] may also, and do see, and take notice of all the uses and good effects of any Perfection which is in themselves, ha­ving frequent occasion to observe them; but hardly of any of that which is in another; when he possibly could quote as many more of his. And hence (a little further) it comes to pass, that every one extols and crys up his own Art though never so trivial, and pre­fers it before others, really believing what he saith. Hence also it is, toge­ther with some Rashness and Precipitan­cy in inferring, that Men judg others too generally and too confidently to be Ill or Good qualified Persons; to have more of Defects or Perfection compa­ratively each with other, than they re­ally have; that they have (for) such or such ill qualities and imperfecti­ons (which may be true) but none or much fewer good quallities to balance them, than indeed they have; and than they themselves would have known, if they had had some other opportuni­ties of knowing them: They have had only occasion or means to know the [Page 74] defects and Ill qualities, and not the Good, and so perhaps on the contrary; and yet they do not observe so much, nor reflect upon it, nor attend unto this Caution. Now Men ought to pass Judgment first distinctly, that at such or such a time, in such or such a perfor­mance or action, there appeared to them such defect or commendable quality, and then from thence according to the de­gree of probability or likelihood in the Consequence (which if the observati­on be but once, is oft but very small) if there be just occasion, to infer and conclude concerning the Qualities of the Person in general, as to number, de­gree, and constancy; which men common­ly do allin a clutter together confusedly. There have been Men known, who have not only once but often appeared very mean and defecttive, (especially in some Circumstances, as in Publick, in Con­versation after Action, in haste or with expedition) and yet have at that time been much more valuable, but could not shew it; and generally in other Cir­cumstances of Life, they have much [Page 75] exceeded those who have appeared much better at certain times.

It most often requires a pretty long Conversation, especially to more slow Observers and Reasoners, to know and pass a general Judgment truly concern­ing a Person: That which is usually signified by the Proverb, Of eating a Bushel of Salt with a Man, before one chuseth him for a Friend.

This is the reason ordinarily (to give no unuseful Instance) that Men are of­ten judged in general better or worse than they are by their Discourses and [...]ooks. If a Person hath wrote a Book in which there hath appeared somewhat considerable of Piety or Vertue, or Judgment, or Wit, or o­ther Good quality, he is generally thought more such in more things, and more constantly than he is, whereas there is set down his Thoughts and Inclina­tions which are more rare; whence also greater expectations from him in his Discourse, Conversation, Employment, than are reasonable; and sometimes upon their observed failure, greater [Page 76] contempt and under-valuing of him; sometimes (as when the Judger fol­lows common Opinion and Testimony, as most do) an undue admiration and approbation of all he saith and doth. The like on the contrary; when Men for some too light or satyrical, or ob­scure Speech or Book, are judged more careless, trivial, ill-natured, or confu­sed in more things, and more constantly than indeed they are. All which seems much like as if Men should from one handsom or crooked-finger of a Person, judg confidently concerning the Beau­ty or Deformity of his whole Body.

Sect. X.

(2.) More particularly; an Opinion or Judgment too universal and unlim­ted, that all other Men are like our selves: Which as it is true sometimes, so it is often false. This comes from actu­al Ignorance, or non-attention of this Rule's not being Universal; and that other signs of Mens Qualities and Tem­pers are to be adhibited and made use [Page 77] of, and that there is great variety in Men. So oft-times we judg such an Action to proceed from such a Reason, or such a Principle, or such a Temper in a Man, (suppose from Self-interest ultimately, Pride, or Covetousness,) because it doth so in our selves, or at least we are strongly inclined thereto; never taking any other account of any other Circumstances (such as his for­mer Temper, manner of Life, Actions in the like case, &c.) which might give us sufficient reason to believe and judg the contrary. The same Action may proceed from several Principles, Ends, and Purposes: And very different and contrary Actions (especially in divers Persons) may proceed, and full often do from one and the same general Prin­ciple, and due End. So Men are apt to judge other Mens inclinations like their own, and that some things please others as much as themselves; and o­ther things are distastful, tedious, and burthensome, because they are so to themselves. So many judg that the Gratification of many inordinate Ap­petites [Page 78] or Lusts in us, are extraordina­rily pleasant to all Men, say they what they will, and Virtue and Religion is a dry sapless thing to all Men; nothing of Pleasure or Delight to all those that profess it, but that it is taken up or pretended to, for some other particular Ends, and that they would be other­wise if they dared, and would be glad to be rid of the burthen, or freed from the confinement thereof; and that therefore they are Hypocrites: And from the same cause are frequent false Judgments on the Good side, and Per­sons and Actions are often judged bet­ter than they are, which is the better extream. In so much that very oft very Good-minded Men cannot believe that Men are so wicked as they are, that they are so Selfish, Unjust, Frau­dulent and Deceitful, Perjurious, Fil­thy, and Sensual, Impious and Athei­stical, as indeed they are, and so are as often cozened in their dealign with them, and oft-times give their Com­mendation and their Charity where they are not deserved.

This is so general a Cause of Errour in our Judgments concerning Persons, that we extend it to God Himself, and it takes place very frequently in our judgments concerning God Himself. So Men judg Him not so much to love Holiness, to hate or disapprove of Sin and Vice, and consequently that He will not so much take care to reward the one, or severely to punish the other: No, He'll be Kind and Merciful, and let them alone, and Indulge them to take their pleasure as they will, or at least He will not be so hard to Torment or Punish them for what's past; and all this because they are so disposed them­selves, and they for their parts are very indifferent to Virtue or Vice, and would let Men alone to please them­selves therein; they see no great rea­son why they should trouble themselves or others there-about. Like those wicked Persons, Psal. 50. 21. These things hast thou done, and I kept silence: Thou thoughtest that I was altogether such a one as thy self, but I will reprove thee, and set them in order before thine eyes.

Thus some Men think God Envious as it were, and if not delighted, yet content with His Creatures misery for His own Pleasure ultimately. They think Him Arbitrary, and Pleasing Him­self ultimately in the exercise of His Power, and this because they themselves are so, or at least inclin'd to be so. And one, yet further, Reason of this, is Men's ultimate Self-love, whereby they are inclin'd to, and do actually judg many things in themselves good Qualities and Perfections which are not, and conse­quently attribute them to God, whom all Men naturally judg to possess all Perfection: Which is true, supposing the Perfection doth not necessarily in­fer or involve some Imperfection: A thing which is of great use to be taken notice of.

The same hath been one reason of some Men▪s (the Heathens at least) Idololatrical making Images, and cor­poreal Representations of God in Hu­mane shape; viz. They have judged God in this respect in Form and Shape like themselves, and this out of Self­love, [Page 81] together with a natural Prone­ness to conjoyn things, which use to be in our Perceptions and Judgments conjoyned: Such as is a rational Soul and Spirit joyned with a Body of Hu­mane shape, for which cause among o­thers, Angels and Cherubims are so pictured. This is observed by Cicero, in the Person of Velleius the Epecurean, Lib. 1. de natura Deorum. Quod ve­ro sine corpore ullo vult [Plato] Deum esse, ut Graeci dicunt [...], id quale esse possit intelligi non potest, careat enim sensu, careat prudentia, careat voluptate necesse est, quae omnia Deorum notione comprehendimus, i. e. Plato's Opinion, That God hath no Body, cannot be under­stood: For then He must want Sense, Pru­dence, Pleasure, which we comprehend in the notion of the Gods. And again, Quod si Omnium animantium formam vincit Hominis figura, Deus autem ani­mans est; ea profecto figura est quae Pul­cherrima sit Omnium. Quoniamque Deos Beatissimos esse constat, beatus autem esse sine virtute nemo potest, nec Virtus sine ratione constare, nec ratio usquam in­esse [Page 82] nisi in hominis figurâ, hominis esse speciè Deos confitendum est. To this purpose: That if Humane shape be bet­ter than that of any other Animal, and God be an Animal, then He must needs have the best and the most Beautiful. And because God is a most happy Beeing, and He cannot be Happy without Virtue, nor have Virtue without Reason, nor can Rea­son be any where but in a Humane shape, therefore God is of that shape too. So Cotta, the Academick, in his reply to Velleius: Homini homine nihil Pulcrius videri, blandam enim conciliatricem esse naturam & lenam sui, i. e. Man, in­deed, thinks nothing more Beautiful than himself; so Nature flatters it self. He­rodotus in his Clio, relating that the Per­sians made no Statues, nor Temples, nor Altars to their Gods, but that they counted them Fools who did so; gives this Reason in his Opinion, viz. Be­cause they did not think the Gods to be [...], sprung from Men, and consequently (I suppose) not of their shape, as the Greeks did. Whether this Prone­ness to judg God like our selves out of [Page 83] Self-love, use and custom of concei­ving and judging, hath been the cause of making Images, and corporal Re­presentations of God, or something in God by Humane shape, among Christi­ans or no: Yet, I think, there is but too much Reason to believe, that the judging God like Mens-selves, hath been but too much the effect of it, e­specially among the Vulgar: I am sure it hath a very great natural ten­dency thereto. And the effect (it is probable) would have been much more, if it had not been hindred by the Chri­stian Doctrine, (which notwithstanding some have kept those in Ignorance of, who have in this respect most need of it) and especially by the Admonitions and just reproaches of those whom these Patrons of Images as fastuously, as fool­ishly, and falsly call Hereticks. A custom and usage so sottish and childish, that never any who had their Religion from the True God, or who had any notion of His Spiritual and Infinite Nature either among Jews or Heathens, pre­tended any sufficient reason for, (as the [Page 84] instruction of the Vulgar, &c.) or did not contemn and deride it, until some Chri­stians in the times of the greatest Igno­rance and Corruption of Manners, within some few Hundreds of years, introduced it into the Christian Church. But to return from this Digression.

In Opinions and Perswasions: Some even of the better natured Persons oft judg, that Men cannot be of such a perswasion but out of some ill disposi­tion of Will, and such a particular one too, viz. Self-interest; that is, it is for some designed good to themselves (besides the being in the Truth) so to be perswaded; and this because they find themselves inclin'd thereto, and if they were of such perswasions it would be from such Causes: Not considering want of Information, Ineptitude to ap­prehend things any other way but as they have been accustomed, a great usage of themselves so to conceive and judg, may be the causes of such really [...]alse Opinions of theirs. Nor do I see it a thing but very generally to be de­termined, how far a true Lover of the [Page 85] Truth, or an Honest-man in this par­ticular, may err and mistake. Though I think too on the other hand, very oft­times other Causes of false perswasions are alledged, besides some naughty dis­position of Will, when it is not so, or but in small measure, and this alone hath the greatest Influence indeed.

Sect. XI.

(3.) Too general a belief of every Testimony or Report, whether in Talk or Books, which proceeds oft-times a­gain from meer actual Ignorance, or Non-attention, that most Reports are most-what very fallible signs of what's true, and sometimes none at all: That there are much better Proofs of things sometimes from contrary Testimonies of better Persons, sometimes from o­ther things. This proceeds also from love of Activity and Curiosity, of Knowing and Judging some-what new and fresh, and some-times from the worser Principles so often named. All Testimonies are more or less signs of [Page 86] what's true, according as the Persons are more wise and knowing, or more veracious willing and careful to say no more than they know: Now how many Actions of Persons reported to be done with certain Circumstances, and from certain Principles and Reasons, by those who neither do, nor can know any thing of them: Or if they do, yet through temerity, rashness, and precipitancy, cu­riosity, suspition, envy, flattery, or some other disposition of Will, do so either invent or change, by adding or detracting or substituting, that some­times none at all, most-what but little, rarely very much of what they say is true and to be believed. But yet what more ordinary than for Men to believe all without stick or scruple. The fur­ther too still Reports go, through the more Persons they pass, they are still the more uncertain, because still the more alteration; and as it rarely hap­pens for Persons who observe things by their own sense or reason, to report them just as they observed them, through forgetfulness or rashness: (Besides that [Page 87] they might not discern some Circum­stances.) So it is as rare and seldom for the same things to be convey'd from any one to another exactly, without some alteration. I believe that the more Cautious and Wise, cannot but have observed, that in almost all Reports and Testimonies concerning Persons, their Actions, Principles, Qualities, or Tempers, either the things are quite false, or but some general part of them true. The more Cautious and Dis­creet, Honest, and lovers of Truth we observe Men to be; the more we may in their Reports and Testimonies con­cerning Persons, either on the Good or Bad side, defer to them of our Belief and Judgment of the truth of what they say; and these in any degree con­siderable, are but too few. A good short Memorandum of this particular is that excellent Precept, [...]. Remember to unbelieve or disbelieve, i. e. Either to suspend thy Belief, or to believe the thing to be false.

Sect. XII.

(4.) A fourth Cause of our false Judgment on either the Good or Bad­side, is our attention to, and taking notice of, or observing only either the good or bad Actions or Qualities, Per­fections or Imperfections of Men, to­gether with their Effects and Conse­quences; and not both. Whence it comes to pass, that those Persons in whom we attend to nothing or little but what is Good, (which is still the better extreme) we judg much better than in­deed they are; and thus it is usually in our Judgments of our Selves or our Friends, or those we love and favour: But on the contrary, those in whom we attend to, or observe what is bad or im­perfect only, their bad qualities or acti­ons, the bad effects and consequences of these; and not at all or but little of what is Good, we judg them much worse than they are: Judg them to have done a great many and very bad actions, to have a great many and very bad qua­lities; [Page 89] but none or very few good. This as it is the most mischievous, so it is the more frequent extream. Men being now so far from that Humane and Christian temper of universal Kindness and Good-will, that they are but very few they care for, or to whom they are disposed friendly, in comparison of those they do not. This again may sometimes proceed from meer necessary Ignorance and want of Information. For sometimes a Man may have seen, or otherwise known much Good by a Man, and none or little bad; either be­cause the Man wanted his proper Tem­ptation, or through dissimulation of his temper and inclination, or for other reasons: And on the contrary, a Man by himself or others, may know many bad things by a Person, and little Good; when he may have much in him which he had never the opportunity to observe, or the Means otherwise to know. But it most-what proceeds from some undue disposition of Will, and when a Man is partially, not justly affected to Persons, and as he [Page 90] ought; he is either pleased or displea­sed with Persons, more than in gene­ral he might observe them to deserve or merit. Thus you shall but too often see (to give Instances of that side which is most to be avoided) that Men will take more notice of, and better remem­ber one bad Action in a Person, than twenty good ones; and consequently this shall procure him more Disreputa­tion or Disesteem, than they shall honour or good-will: So ungrateful and ill­natur'd a thing, is but too much of the World: Whereas we should say, such or such a thing indeed, at such a time is amiss, bad or evil; but then 'twas but once, or seldom perhaps; nay, I know it is oftner otherwise, and he hath such or such good qualities, there he is to be commended, that is or was well done. And this should be done not to sooth Men up, or to make them con­tent and so well-pleased with them­selves, notwithstanding many ill Acti­ons, Vices, and Imperfections, as not to endeavour to prevent, reform and amend them too; but to encourage [Page 91] them so to do; since they have so much Good in them already: And to make ones Counsel or Reproof more effectu­al; since this ready taking notice and approbation of what's Good in them, is an Argument of an impartial Love, Charity, and Kindness to them in the Person exhorting or reproving. And here I'le only add by the way, because it is a thing of frequent and great use in Humane life, that it is the same kind of Cause of our false Judgment of the Goodness or Evilness of things, viz. We only observe and attend to either the Conveniencies or Inconveniencies, the Good or Bad effects of things, but not to both together; which is oft from meer Ignorance, oftner from some Pas­sion. We may observe it every where in publick Constitutions, in Domestick, Private and Personal affairs. Whence oft-times we hurry and haste to mend things for the worse, and are discontent, ill at ease, make our selves unhappy, repine, murmur, and unthankful to God unjustly, and without reason; and yet after some experience of the [Page 92] contrary Inconveniences we are running back again, with many other mischie­vous and hurtful Consequences. Oft­times too on the other hand, we will not stir to mend things, taking notice only of their Conveniencies, and not of their-Inconveniencies, which might without greater be redressed. The first generally is the defect of those who affect Novelty: The second of those who affect Antiquity, i. e. Who inor­dinately and immoderately love them; either absolutely for themselves with­out reference to any good use or effect, or more than what they can really con­tribute to any such good use, doth de­serve. The first is commonly the tem­per of Young-Men; the second of Old: In the one being an immoderate appetite of Activity; in the other of Ease.

Sect. XIII.

(5.) A fifth Cause is want of a pre­valent love of Truth. Men most-what in their Judgments and Discourse con­cerning [Page 93] Persons (nor is it much less in things, witness the generality of Books) look more at other things, lit­tle or not at all at the truth of what they judg or say; they take little heed whe­ther it be really true or no, and there­fore seldom examine, suspend, or pro­nounce doubtfully, or according only to appearing probability. It is true, they say, and think things to be true, very confidently and strongly, but this not because they see the truth of what they affirm, but because they would have it true. Not because their Un­derstanding and Perception goes before their Judgment, and their natural affe­ction to Truth makes them so judg, but some other disposition of will; such as I have so often named, Activity, Cu­riosity, Pride, Hatred, Envy, Anger, Contempt, Flattery, &c. Whereas we should be very careful to possess our Minds with such a serious love of the Truth, that we may have a constant reverend regard thereto in all our Judg­ments and Speeches concerning others. And this we should do without much [Page 94] trouble, if we used our selves thereto, and did but use to check our selves, and ask the Question, and pause a little whether we know it to be true or no. We should love not only to speak truth with our Neighbour, but of our Neigh­bour too. We should look upon Truth as a most Sacred thing, ever to be in­violable and to be the main, if not the only perfection of our Judgments; without which we had better have none at all. We had better be utterly Ig­norant, and never judg at all, than do it erroneously: For by that means our Actions and Resolutions are determi­ned and directed amiss, and are mis­chievously made use of. For were it not much better that we were ignorant, and passed no Judgment at all of Per­sons, either of the quantity or quality of their Perfections and Imperfections, than by being mistaken therein some­times to neglect or punish the Innocent and Well-deserving, and to be Benefi­cent and bestow good things upon those that ill deserve, and make ill use of them. In few words, Men judg falsly [Page 95] because they will not judg truly, or are not pleased therewith, or at least but little and in such degree only that it is not effectual. For it is not every degree of love to the Truth, that will secure a Man from false Judgments of things, and here of Persons: But it must be a greater degree of Love there­to, than to the thing which at any par­ticular time may be a temptation to the contrary. And if we would be always secure, we must have a stronger Affection thereto than to any other Object, which may occur in our Lives, more than to the favour or good-will of the Greatest or Best, more than to Mischievousness, Superiority, either in Reputation for, or Possession of any Good thing, more than to Power or Greatness, more than to Gain or Riches, finally any other good Advantage or Interest. We must look upon our up­rightness or truth of our Judgments or Opinions, as a far greater proper Good, a richer and more excellent Possession than all these; whereby we do more Good than by all these without it. And [Page 96] consequently be more shamed and afraid to be Erroneous, and live in Falshood and a Lye, than any other evil or hurt­ful thing to us, except Vice and Sin.

We must in a general sense, Buy the Truth, and sell it not: That is, prefer it before all other things that are incon­sistent with it, and cause us to part with it, also Wisdom, Instruction, and Understanding, the means to obtain it, Prov. 23. 23. If we do not do thus, if we be not thus tempered and disposed, if we do not judg this a greater good; we shall have our Judgments affected, strengthened, bent, and determined by our love to other things in all Mat­ters, where there is not apparent demon­stration, but only high degrees of Pro­bability; as it is almost in all affairs of Humane life. Nay, even in these a Man may wilfully blind and confound himself, or divert his attention; and if not make himself judg false, yet at least hinder himself from clearly seeing and judging truly, and make himself doubt as it were; saying, when a thing cannot be denied, Truly, I do not [Page 97] know, or the like; and in such a man­ner shuffle and contrive to bring himself at least to suspension and doubt and confusion. Every Man hath some de­gree of love to Truth naturally, some more, some less, more than sometimes to more, sometimes fewer other things; and accordingly they are more likely, more often to judg truly. But it is and must be a greater degree than to all o­ther things universally and constantly, that will always secure from all preju­dices of his will.

Sect. XIV.

(6.) The sixth Cause I shall name is our Passions, both those of the Con­cupiscible and Irascible appetite, as they are usually called: Or more plain­ly, those that have good, and those that have evil for their immediate Object. Such as are the simple ones of Love, Hatred, Joy, and Grief, and Desire: And others compounded of these, as Revenge, Anger, Hope, Fear, &c. These all in every Case, cause us to [Page 98] judg to the advantage, and in favour of themselves; that is, so as they may be preserved and maintained, the Instances of which are every-where, and innume­rable. Thus for Example: Love cau­seth us to attribute to the Object be­loved things that are lovely, whereby the Passion is maintained or encreased; and hatred on the contrary, to attri­bute, or ascribe, or adjudg to the Ob­ject hated those things that are hate­ful and evil, for its own preservation or encrease, whereby it is kept up or augmented, and made more keen and fierce: And all this without any re­gard to the truth or falshood of what is judged. So likewise what we desire, we will think it is good Positively or Privatively. In desire properly so cal­led, or where the good we desire, is a possession of some good thing, we most readily judg the good thing a great Good, and consequently its Possession. In Anger and Revenge, where the good thing desired is a removal of some evil or grievous thing to us, by doing evil to it (which obtains in Inanimate things, but [Page 99] principally to Persons) we are extraordi­narily prone and forc'd to judg this re­moval a greater good, and in order there­to the evil to be removed a mighty evil. And therefore more particularly in Per­sons to whom we are thus affected or passionated, we judg many kinds and degrees of evil or bad things to be in them, many or all, perhaps more than indeed there are, which are seldome but very confusedly apprehended, and sig­nified usually by some name, to which our passions of Anger, Hatred, or the like have been joyned, (as that of some Sect or Party) whereby still these our Passions are gratified; that is, sup­ported, maintained, nay, augmented and boyled up to the greatest degree of Agitation and Violence. And those Mens judgments thus from Passions, whereby they are maintained and in­creased, though they may happen to be true; yet it appears by Experience, that they are more generally false. Their happening to be true, sometimes makes Men oft-times justifie and think well of such passionate Judgments; [Page 100] whereas the truth was not at all seen by them, nor was it the Reason or Cause therefore of their Judgments.

These Passions thus byass, and warp, and determine our Judgments three Ways among others.

1. By bringing to mind and furnish­ing our Invention only with those things which maintain or increase them, and which are true; and keeping out the contrary, hindring those from ap­pearing which may abate or extinguish them, which are as true too. We all may have often observed how much we have presently to say for a Person whom we love, how plentifully and readily our Invention is furnished; What long Orations we can make in his behalf and praise; How many excellent Qualities, and in what great Degree, appear to us in him, and we attribute to him. All which grant to be true. But we have nothing to say against him, nothing to his disadvantage, nothing that is bad, imperfect, or faulty in him appears, or comes to our mind; when as much might as truly there have been said too. [Page 101] And so on the contrary (the worse or at least the more frequent extream) in a Person whom we hate, are revengeful­ly and wrathfully affected to, with whom we are angry: Then how many Faults in him, or Imperfections crow'd presently into our Minds? All his past bad Actions and Qualities remembred, his present observed, nay, his future too foretold; and altogether flie about im­mediately in our Fancies; and we could give a Catalogue sometimes of many hours long, and make large Declama­tions against him; the Man hath been this and that, and t'other, all which we'll grant to be true too: But then, how barren are our Inventions for him, we have nothing or very little to say to commend him. This would be a ve­ry dry Theme for us. We remember, or take notice of nothing considerable in him: Whereas it may be here is as much, and as true to be said by any other Person who is Calm and Reason­able, not thus possessed by these Pas­sions against him; nay, and we our selves can do it when we are out of [Page 102] that Passion, when the Man is not al­tered (except it be in that one particu­lar for which we are angry with him) he is the same still, he is no better nor worse, when we are, and when we are not so affected to him; 'tis we only al­ter and change. And so in particular Actions, how easily can we, by how many Arguments, commend, justifie, or excuse any Action of our Friends, and with as many discommend or aggravate that of our conceited Adversary, whom we are in hatred with, or bear grudge against, or are wrathful and angry with? Hence therefore we give false Judgments concerning Persons quali­ties or actions; judging them much bet­ter or worse than they are; we having only Arguments and Proofs on one side brought to our Mind, by our passions, and those on the other kept out by them. Which is like, as if corrupted or bribed Officers should permit no Witnesses to come into, or appear in the presence of the Judg, but those that shall serve for that side or the Cause that they are bribed for: And yet often our Mind [Page 103] and Reason, the Judg, not attending and taking notice of this Bribery and Partiality of these Officers, the Passi­ons (though it might and should) may think it very truly judged; at least as it ought according to the Evidence that it had; and set down, and be content, and think all was well done, and truly they were very honest and sincere in their Judgments. This is one of the most slie and close Cheats and Tricks we by our Passions put upon our Reasons. The more had we need here to be cau­tious, and now more especially when the Deceit and Cozenage is discovered. And both on this and the two following, as well as other accounts, it is a special Maxim of Wisdom, not to trust those Judgments, where Passions have gone before Reason: But do one of these three things. Either, 1. Be calm and and have no Passions at all. Or, 2. If thou wilt for Invention-sake have any, then passionate thy self equally on both sides. Or, 3. Raise up in thy self a greater and commanding passion for Truth, which will make all the Evi­dence [Page 104] and Proof thou hast in thy keep­ing, appear equally on all sides. But here I may prevent what is to be said in another Head.

2. And very briefly: Our Passions cause us to judg in favour of them­selves, bringing into our Minds what is true on one side, and keeping back what is so on the other, but also by thrusting into them more than is true: And therefore we observe in our Friends and in our Enemies, (that is, to whom we are so) more vir­tues or faults, fine or foul things, and more of them too than any Body else not alike prejudiced can see, or than in­deed there are. And,

3. When things, on both sides do come to our Minds, as especially when suggested by another, who would dis­course or defend the Person we are pas­sionated for or against; I say, when this is, by thrusting them on one side away again, or turning a Man from them, or causing one wilfully not to at­tend to them; or if that cannot be, not to the Proof and Evidence that is in them; [Page 105] nay, not to be able, it confounding and agitating our Minds, and drawing their force another way: And so it is by every days Experience observed, that he that is under the passions of Ha­tred and Anger against any thing or Person, will not attend to what can be said or proposed in their Commendati­ons or Defence; nor will nor can oft­times apprehend the Proof or Conse­quence thereof. So on the other hand, Timidity, or Fear, or Scruple to judg amiss concerning Persons, especially on the bad side, may cause many not to judg according to the best probability that doth appear to them, without any prejudice from any Person, or ill dispo­sition of Will: But this is an effect of Passions, more visible and more to be observed by the Person himself mis­judging, than the former, and there­fore in that respect more easie to be pre­vented. And here we see manifestly one of the principal mischiefs of Pas­sions, as there are also very good use of them; and how much therefore it concerns us to govern them well.

Sect. XV.

(7.) Another Cause of false Judg­ment either on the good or bad part, may be all Appetites whatsoever, be­sides those which have Truth and uni­versal Justice for their Objects. By which Justice, I mean, nothing else but such a love of, and desire to do Good to each particular, as is most consistent with, or productive, or effective of the greatest Good of the whole; that, al­ways with regard to, measured and mo­derated by this. I say, all Appetites besides those; not only those which cause it on the bad side, as Malice, Pride, Envy, Revenge, (which two last seem mixed of the two former) and others which have been formerly men­tion'd; but those also which cause it on the favourable side, as in Flattery, when a Man by passing his Judgment before another concerning himself, or his Friend, desires to please him, and to gain his good opinion and favour; nay, partial and imprudent Cha­rity [Page 107] it self may be the Cause. As when a Man having no Self-end (more than the pleasure of the Action) in giving his Judgment concerning a Person to whom he hath a strong inclination to do good, but without that due actual heed to, or fore-sight of the Hurt or Evil that may come of this his Benefi­cence to him, or to others else-where, or at some other time, that is, partially or imprudently, judgeth him more de­serving than in truth he is.

To give particular Instances of false Judgments from these Causes would be endless; only one may be observed for Example, which is frequent and of consequence.

Contradicting the Judgment of others, passing Judgments contrary to those of others; and oft-times the more, by how much the Number or Reputation of those others are the greater. When we see one praised or dispraised by them, contrariwise to dispraise or praise ei­ther in general, or quoting particulars, and multiplying and magnifying of them. Generally this is out of Pride, [Page 108] that we might Equalize, or be Superi­our to others in our Invention, or Dis­cretion, or Honesty, the Abilities which fit us for Judging; that we might not at least seem to our selves or others, to be inferiour in those Qua­lities; that others might not seem as if they were only able and fit to do it.

In all which there is affectation of Superiority, Vain-glory, and Ostenta­tion, Envy; which are several Bran­ches of Pride. And this we see not only among the Vulgar, and in ordina­ry Conversation, but among the Learn­ed; who often when any Author is generally commended (and it may be too much) set themselves to multiply and magnifie his Faults and Defects, but to diminish his commendable Qua­lities, by concealing or extenuating them. And on the contrary, when an Author is now out-done, and thought to be much exceeded by another, and therefore comparatively undervalued, they endeavour to multiply and mag­nifie what is Good and Deserving in [Page 109] him; but to neglect, conceal, or les­sen what is Bad and Defective: And consequently by this unobserved pre­judice, they give false Judgments con­cerning them. I know these Instances may proceed from a careful Veracity and Justice, because Men commonly both praise and dispraise excessively, and their Judgments may be true; but it is more rare even to have any thing thereof, but much more rare still to see this without some mixture of the other Causes.

And here we may just take notice of one reason of the aptness of Men to re­criminate, to accuse their Accusers though never so Just and Modest; or presently to quote their Infirmities and Faults, viz. Men know that by posses­sing the Person to whom they are ac­cused with Hatred, Envy, Anger, &c. against him who accuseth them, they shall cause him to judg confusedly, and in general the Accuser a bad or silly Person, and consequently all that ap­pertains to him, and consequently his Testimony; and that therefore it is not [Page 110] to be believed. We see this design most-what to take effect with the Vul­gar, where there is almost always Re­venge too.

Sect. XVI.

The Causes of the Fifth prohibited Judgment, viz. Too great a Prone­ness to declare and make known our Judgments, may be and usually are the same now often mentioned in some of the former, viz. Idleness, ultimate Self-pleasing by Activity, Curiosity, Vain-conceit of ones own sufficiency and ability to judg of others, fancied Reputation therefor; also by Hatred, Revenge, Pride, affectation of Superi­ority, Envy, Contempt, Anger, Flat­tery: And Persons who are too prone thus to do on the worst side out of such Principles, especially now named, one or more of them, and are frequent and busie in doing of it, are those who are called properly Tale-bearers; concern­ing whom you have so many Advise­ments in the Book of the Proverbs, and [Page 111] of the mischievousness of their Em­ployment, as Prov. 26. 20, 22. and 16. 28. and 11. 13.

Sect. XVII.

Lastly, For the Causes of Mens pas­sing Judgment in Thought and Speech, concerning Persons on the worst side, out of such bad Principles as are afore­named; I have no other now to name, but only the corruption of their Na­tures, and inclinations thereof when born into this World, by some certain Causes, and this improved and increa­sed by too constant an ill usage of them­selves, their wilful compliance there­with; few taking care to correct and amend by the Grace of God, what is bad and amiss in themselves, their na­tural Degeneracy and Corruption, their Inordinacy and Immoderacy of appetite, but swimming down with the Stream, and doing that which is most easie.

Sect. I.

THe Fifth is the mischievous Effects or Consequences, which are so many Reasons, and should be so many Motives to beware and to abstain there­from. We shall observe some of these in each particular prohibited Judgment distinctly.

I. Of too great a proneness to judg others in general, the ill effects are these:

1. The first is, That too great a Proneness, and Practice accordingly, to observe and judg others, causeth us to neglect our own Affairs. The more our Eyes are abroad, the less at home; for they cannot be in two places. We [Page 113] cannot mind two things at once so different and distant. And it is every where by Experience seen, that those who little take notice of what others are and do, are usually more attentive to their own Business, and what imme­diately belongs to themselves. The time that is spent in Reflection upon others Actions and Principles, would otherwise most-what (if we are not very dull for want of Variety) have been converted to the observation of our own. Such shamefully neglect oft­times to purpose, or set apart their own Actions, what they will, what they will not do; and their own Principles, out of what End, and for what Reason, and the execution of their purposed Actions, that they even forget to do what they themselves had purposed and designed, because they are busie and employed in gazing at others. Wisdom is before him that hath understanding, but the eyes of a Fool are in the ends of the Earth, Prov. 17. 24. The sense may be, That a Man of understanding re­gards and looks at more often his own [Page 114] wisdome, to see where he acts wisely, out of foresight of, and in order to good Ends; but a Fool's thoughts are ro­ving, and employed about things far from him, the most remote and imper­tinent; that is, of Persons and Acti­ons (among others) which he can lit­tle make use of in comparison. As the Man that looks at his own next steps, employs himself generally to better Purpose, than he that gazes at the Horizon, or bounds of the Heavens. Now the further ill Consequences of thus doing, is this, that we transfer our Observation and Judgment there, where we can make less good Use, if any; and from thence, where we could have used it to much better purpose for the most part.

For, 1. Thou canst not so well know that, concerning which thou judgest in another Man, as in thy self, thy Judg­ment will be the less certain, and con­sequently the Effects of it less certainly good. All our Judgments concerning others, are concerning their Qualities or Actions, and of their Actions some­times [Page 115] whether they have been at all, sometimes out of what Principle, some­times to what effect or good purpose, whether they should have been done. Now, no Man can tell so well what Qualities are in another Man, as what are in himself: No man can so well tell the Principles of another Mans acti­ons, his end, intention, and design, as those of himself; every Man may know his own Heart better than ano­ther Mans. No Man can be so sure of what is done by any Man, as the Per­son himself. And lastly, It is but rare that any Man of these great Talkers or Judgers, know the Circumstances of any Mans condition, and consequently what can or ought to be done by such a Person, so well as he himself; and surely he doth or may (unless it is be­cause he is an idle Busie-body, or worse) know the circumstances of his own Acti­ons, better than he can those of another Man, and consequently what is fittest to be done in his owne Case, better than in another Mans. Why then doth he not busie himself there? viz. At Home. [Page 116] (I speak not universally, but for the most part:) For sometimes in some Cases a Man may know other Mens Affairs better than they themselves, and than their own Affairs, and give their Judgment with Modesty, and out of Friendship. Yet how frequent is it for Men, and the most Ignorant and Sottish, most peremptorily and confi­dently to judg what others who are tru­ly Wise ought to do, what would be fittest and of best effect for them to do, to direct or find fault; where it is apparent they know little of the Cir­cumstances of their Condition or Af­fairs, and these cannot reasonably be thought to be such strangers to their own Business and Affairs as not to know more, and to know better what they have to do, and ought to do; yea, and are as good to do it too. But that's an­other Consideration.

2. But then, Secondly, If thy Judg­ment be as certain, and if another did indeed such a bad Action, or out of such a bad Principle, or hath any bad Quality; it may be you can contribute [Page 117] little to the preventing the like for the future, or to his amendment or help, it may be none at all, if distant, though thou would'st, he is out of thy reach, thou canst not let him know thy Judg­ment, or he'll not care for it if he do; but in thy self thou mayst do much, prevent the next time, otherwise dis­pose thy self, nor do, nor be so any more, mind thy own Faults or Infirmi­ties. Thou art without Comparison, more in thine own power to direct, alter, or change thy self, than ano­ther Man is, and yet thou art very busie about him, and negligent of thy self. Which is like as if one should be very sollicitous concerning another Travel­ling-ma [...] [...]way, and diligently observe whether he went right, or in a bad way (it may be to direct him too if he went wrong, it may be only to gratifie Curiosity, or to laugh at him) when he could not, or would not come at him to direct him; and in the mean time he never minded his own, and so perchance falls into a Slough, or Ditch, or wanders into a wrong one: Or as [Page 118] if thou shouldst be careful of another Mans Health, or Legs, or Eyes, which it is little in thy power to use when they are never so perfect, and neglect thy own which thou canst use at thy pleasure, and it may be have more need of being looked after, and are worse than thy Neighbours. Or to use part of our Saviours own Comparison here, to be peering into thy Neighbours Eye, and taking notice of a Mote there, when thy own Eye hath the same, if not a Beam: When (as our Saviour al­so Himself intimates here) if thou pul­ledst out thy own mote or beam first, thou might'st use thy own sight to help thy Neighbour; but if thou should'st pull out that of thy Neig [...]urs, it may be thou canst not assure he shall so well use his clearness.

2. Another evil consequence of too great a Proneness, and too frequent Judgment of others, (or it then is so) is most-what an Usurpation of anothers right, (or of that which for another to have, would do most good) a taking from another what is his due, it is a [Page 119] piece of Injustice. For generally those who give Judgment concerning others, would oblige them both to judg as they judg, and do so too, to do accordingly. They are apt to impose their Judg­ments; and this by all the power they have, and therefore will Inflict what evil lies in their power if they do not; which may be at least Ill-opinion, disgrace, or Ill-speaking-of, even in the meanest Person. They are seldom content themselves to pass their Judgment, but they would have Persons of whom they judg, to Judg as they do, and do as they would have them, or think sit they should; and are Angry, or Ill­pleased if they do not: And here they would take away their Liberty of judg­ing in their own Affairs, in acting accord­ing to their own Judgment; they would deprive them of making use of their own Examination and Prudence, and then of determining themselves. But is not this every Mans Right in respect of private Persons? Is it not better the Judgment and Determination of a Man's own Actions for Example should [Page 120] rest in himself? It is true, I may give my Judgment when desired, or asked, or where the defect of Ignorance or In­firmity is manifest out of Friendship; but then with deferrence to the Persons own Judgment and Determination at last. And this not carelesly and as be­ing displeased, because he follows not me; but with an acknowledgment of his Right, and an Acquiescence there­in. Every Man is a Prince and su­pream Moderatour to himself under God, in abundance of his Actions, most of his External, such as Dome­stick ones, and Personal especially; and of his Internal, as his willing, designing, Intentions, Opinions, and Judgments; and it is most for the Publick, or Uni­versal good, it should be so. And Men should be left to the exercise and use of their own Prudence and Liberty in many things, though they should not so well use it altogether as they might: The one may be a greater good, than the other an evil. Besides, It is most likely, every Person should best know the Circumstances of his own, especi­ally [Page 121] more private Actions, and conse­quently what's fittest to be done, or not done: Or if any did better know some­times, and were better and more virtu­ous to direct; yet, How should it be known when? And who would not pre­tend to it? So that there would be no­thing but Confusion, and every one would be every ones Lord and Master. And yet, I dare say, it is to be ob­serv'd, a most frequent piece of Inju­stice and Tyranny, and running through all sorts of Men, and lodged even in the Beggars brest. Men are not con­tent Men should be Judges in any of their own affairs, even Private and Per­sonal; but they will be judging, di­recting, reproving, urging, and for­cing as much as they can, them to be, and do as they would have them, lord­ing and domineering over others; not seasonably, modestly, and friendly ad­vising only. This gratifies and increa­seth Pride in us also, and this is that in part which the Apostle reproves, in Rom. 14. 4. Who art thou that judgest another Man's servant? Why wouldst [Page 122] thou be Governour of another Man, and needs have and force him, compel him to judg and do as thou judgest; or else would'st hate him, despise and blame him in words too, (I suppose) if he did not, when-as in this case, he is only subject to God?

Sect. II.

II. The evil Consequences of too much Proneness to judg on the worst side, (I speak as to the effect only, though the Principle be not bad).

1. That it leads a Man to false Judg­ments, and to judg Persons worse than they are.

2. That it consequently disposeth a Man to Contemn, Undervalue; nay, Hate a Person more than he deserves. Whence,

3. It begets Suspicions, and belief in others, that this his Judgment comes from the worst principles, of Self-love, Hatred, Revenge, Pride, Envy, Con­tempt, &c. when it really may not be so. Whence

4. It disposeth and gives occasion, and is but too often an effectual temp­tation, both in those whom he thus judgeth and others, to contempt, ha­tred, and revenge toward him, and that by observing and marking, ma­king known and publishing his Faults and Infirmities too, which really are so; which otherwise they neither would nor should have done; nay, by adding thereto, increasing their number and greatness, and judging him worse than he is, as the former had done by his Neighbour; whence further hatred and contempt reciprocally from them to him, and more than he deserves too; hence again, it may be Hatred and Re­venge stirred up in him again, against them. So that now, behold what a crowd and heap of Mischief there is on all hands, instead of mutual Cha­rity and Beneficence. Part of this is the Motive, our Saviour Himself here subjoyns to His Command, to abstain from Judging, viz. With what Judg­ment ye judg, ye shall be judged; and with what measure ye mete, it shall be [Page 124] measured to you again. That is, If you judg Men otherwise than you ought, they'll do so by you again, they'll pay you in your own Coyn; Men do not use to be behind with one another in these requitals: I conceive, That ye be not judged, is meant of Men; and so in the next Verse, [ Ye shall be judged,] and not of God. For God will not judg Men otherwise than is Right, and as ought to be; and therefore not as Men, who judg one another otherwise than they ought. By the way, this Reason of our Saviours, was an Adage or Wise-saying among the Jews. So in the Jerusalem Targum, or Chaldee Para­phrase, [...] i. e. [...] With the same measure a Man mea­sures, shall it be measured to him again whether good or bad, Gen. 38. 24. And again, [...] i. e. Measure for measure. So they feign Judah to have spoken to himself, when Thamar his Daughter being condemned by him to be burnt, for playing the Harlot, she produced the Signet, Brace­lets [Page 125] and Staff, which he had given her, and bid him discern whose those were, as a punishment for him, who had frau­dulently asked his Father Jacob the same question concerning Josephs Coat, whom he with his Brethren had thrown into the Pit, and made his Father be­lieve he was torn with wild Beasts. This by the bye.

Sect. III.

III. The ill-Consequences of rash Judgment, especially of Censure, are:

1. That it disposeth, useth, and ha­bituateth a Man thereto, both in his Judgment concerning Persons, and eve­ry where else.

2. It renders a Mans Testimony very inconsiderable. For who will much heed what that Man judgeth, who is known to judg any-how, without any regard to Reason for what he judgeth, and consequently any sign of truth. It is time ill spent to give such inconsi­derate, and rash, slight precipitate Per­sons but the hearing only.

[Page 126]3. It gives occasion to Men, of An­ger, Wrath, Hatred, Contempt; they always suspecting such unreasonable Judgments to come from worse Princi­ples than meer Vanity and Wilfulness, viz. from Malice or Envy against them; at least concluding, and truly, that there wanted the Care and Love to their Neighbours they should have had: For Men so well affected one to ano­ther, will rarely judg without Reason, to each others disadvantage. Besides, what ever the Principle be, the very ill effect will make Men ordinarily angry enough.

Sect. IV.

IV. The ill Consequences of false Judgment, are,

1. A Man's own Discredit and Dis­reputation, for carelessness, preju­dice, inability and weakness, to judg right and true; whence also a Man in­validates his Testimony and Witness, and even then when he may judg well and true. He that more often judgeth [Page 127] false than true, gives reason to any Man never to believe him meerly upon the account of his Testimony; and therefore not even then when he may judg true. For it is more probable (considering meerly the Persons Testi­mony) that he that hath more often judged falsly than truly before, doth judg amiss now.

2. The distribution of the Good or Evil that are in ones power, reward, or punishment, (those of private Men I mean) such as are Praise or Dispraise, charity of Alms, or Chastisement, good or bad Word, taking or commending to any Employment or Office gainful or creditable, or refusing or discom­mending. I say, the distribution of these to ill purpose, viz. Good things to the Bad, or less deserving and neglectful, or Bad to the Good and Well-deserving.

Sect. V.

V. The ill Consequences or mischie­vous Effects of too much proneness, or rashness, in declaring ones Judg­ment [Page 128] unseasonably, or doing it when it ought not, Are,

1. It renders a Man contemptible, or some-what distastful; Either because he hath not Discretion to distinguish be­tween times, and to discern when it is seasonable and of good effect, and when not, and it is better to refrain, to hold ones tongue: Or, because he cannot govern himself, he cannot contain his inclinations, whether from meer Tal­kativeness and Busie-bodiness, or from some other worse Principle, he is Im­potent: Or, lastly, Because he will not, but out of hatred, Revenge, Wrath, or Envy, or Flattery, or the like, he chuseth▪ to do it, and readily takes all such occasions of mischieving another, by possessing others with an ill or mean Opinion, and by stirring up the same passions and affections in them against the Person, which were in himself.

2. Drawing others from their own Affairs or Business, whether it be the Persons concerned in the Judgment, or others. Such Tatlers are like idle Per­sons, who will not work themselves, not [Page 129] mind their own Business, nor let others mind theirs: But with their stories con­cerning others wantonly divert them, or concerning themselves fright them or accuse them, and force them to neg­lect their work to answer them, defend themselves, or get them away.

3. Therefore mutual suspicion, di­strust, hatred, animosities, slightings, envyings, contempts, or foolish esteem, vain trust, (if the Judgment be on the Advantageous side) too great and too general one of another: Nothing more ordinary than for Men upon the Whis­per, or Report of some ill quality, a­ction, imperfection or infirmity of ano­ther, to conceive presently too bad an opinion in general of him, and too be too wrathfully, contemptuously, or envi­ously in general affected towards him. And it were far better generally, that Men were ignorant of one anothers faults and defects, than upon the occa­sion of their discovery, to be so un­charitable and unjust, as they usually are. Besides, these hasty Tatlers give no time for a Persons Amendment usu­ally, [Page 130] if he hath been faulty once. But this effect is more certain, when that which is reported concerning any one, particularly respects him to whom it is told: As when it is said, I believe he is so or so ill affected towards you, or hath done this or that against you, to your prejudice. For Men here are pre­sently more Passionate, and sooner in­flam'd, as being in their own case, they are more sensible and fond of their own good; and this too much and beyond Reason, what ought to be, otherwise the Effect would not be bad.

There are few who have so much Charity and Humility, as to acknow­ledg their fault or infirmity, when tru­ly and out of good intent, or at least with no bad one, it hath been observed, spoken of, and mention'd by another; or heartily to forgive, when it hath falsly, foolishly, or maliciously been done. It is better therefore generally (and these things are but so to be taken) to give Persons no such occasions of an­ger, hatred, contempt and envy, by especially the declaration of a Mans [Page 131] Judgment, or of what he knows of o­thers to their disadvantage, but to be very sparing in so doing; and in gene­ral never to do it out of any worse Prin­ciple, than a general Charity to Men, and consequently love to what is just and right; out of no selfishness, no ha­tred or contempt of the Person in ge­neral, but of love rather to him; out of hatred or contempt of the particular Vice, or Imperfection only; and one would be glad it were otherwise. And then as to our Prudence never to do it, but when seeing the necessity thereof, we are in Wisdom as well as Charity, obliged to it. Be not a Witness against thy Neighbour without cause, i. e. With­out some foreseen so good an effect, as ought to be a cause thereof, Prov. 24. 28. And, ver. 17. Rejoyce not when thine Enemy falleth: Nor let thy Heart be glad when he stumbleth. And hither­to is referr'd the telling stories to one Person, of what another Person hath said of him, or done towards him be­hind his back, and again to the latter, what the former hath said of him. If [Page 132] this be frequent, it is usually out of Talkativeness, Busibodiness, Hatred, or Flattery, either to do a Person an ill turn, by ill disposing his Neighbour towards him, setting him against him; or to do ones self a good turn, by get­ting the favour of the Person to whom we report, as seeming so much con­cern'd for his Credit and good Reputa­tion, or other Good. Though this may be done too sometimes out of a hearty sincere Charity and Prudence, without any ultimate Self-end.

Where no Wood is (saith the Wise­man) there the Fire goeth out: So where there is no Tale-bearer, the strife ceaseth, Prov. 26. 20. As Wood is usually conceived the cause of Fire, so such Stories or Reports, whether true or false of one to another, are the cause of Strife and Contention. And, ver. 22. The words of a Tale-bearer are as Wounds, and go down into the innermost parts of the Belly. That is, Usually the stories of such Persons affect deeply their Minds to whom they are told, with keen, smart, violent, and piercing [Page 133] Passions of Vexation, Anger, Revenge. And, Prov. 16. 28. A froward Man sendeth forth strife, and a Whisperer se­parateth chief Friends. Such a Person by his frequent stories, if he be belie­ved, puts Enmity not only between Strangers, but Friends; not Friends only, but chief Friends; for so proba­bly the Hebrew word [...] may there signifie, it otherwise signifying Excel­lency and Superiority. A great many sayings you have in the Proverbs of the like nature.

Sect. VI.

VI. The ill Consequences of judg­ing out of Hatred, Revenge, Pride, En­vy, Anger, Contempt, &c. Are,

1. The increase of these Passions, and their Principles in our selves by use, and in others by our example, which in the degree, or so far forth as they habitually possess our Souls, ren­der us unworthy of Life or Beeing. For so far forth we do as much Mis­chief as in us lies; and surely as far as [Page 134] we see, 'twere better than in that re­spect that we were out of the World. And although Self-love and Fear, may oft-times restrain and hinder us from being the Authors of such Mischief to our Neighbour, whereby we may be Obnoxious to humane Laws; yet there may be as much of these in our Hearts, as may render us detestable to God, whose Knowledg and Punishment we can neither conceal our selves from, nor escape. But there are infinite Mis­chiefs which we are capable of doing one to another, which humane Laws cannot take notice of: In so much that a Place, Company, or Society, may be weary of us, and yet cannot tell how to be rid of us. These dispositi­ons make us like Dragons and Basilisks, that where ever we come, we kill, and and do mischief with our very Breaths and Eyes. These are the Frenzie, the Plague of our Souls, which make every Body very reasonably shun and run away from us. Finally, some make themselves hereby Enemies both to God and Men, and fit company only [Page 135] for the Infernal Spirits, whom we are most like; and by their being as bad as our selves, their company will be a ve­ry sutable punishment for us. Further, one of the worst mischiefs of such Prin­ciples and Tempers is, that by our ex­ample we infect others, and make others like our selves; we make to our selves company of the like nature to us, and to one another: We propagate it, we give occasion to, and stir up the same Lusts and wicked Inclinations in others; we help to make them more common and ordinary, and therefore the less shameful, and the less suspected and be­lieved, to be so bad as they are.

2. It exposeth us to the Hatred, An­ger, Revenge, and Contempt of others. If these Qualities in us when but suspe­cted (as in our Judgment sometimes of the worst side) were the occasion there­of, how much more when they but too evidently appear to be the principles of our Judgments? All prejudices of Judgment concerning others from ulti­mate Self-love, render us generally con­temned or hated more or [...] less, accord­ing [Page 136] to the degree thereof that appears; at least pitied by the Best and Wisest. No­thing generally more hated than Hatred it self, Ill-nature, Malignity, Pride, of which unreasonable and unjust Con­tempt is one sort. I say, it exposeth to their hatred and contempt sometimes justly, when they judg truly of us, most-what unjustly and more than we deserve. Men seldom observe due mea­sures in these Passions, sometimes by way of Justice, most what by way of Imitation, or mixture of both: And now when we are thus affected to Men our selves, and they by our Example, and out of Justice, or Ill-nature, or both, are so affected to us again, and to one another: How innumerable are the Mischiefs which are consequent? viz. Just all that we see in the World, Men are properly the Causes and Au­thors of one to another. All Mens mischievous Wills and Intentions one towards another, proceed from want of Charity, from Hatred in themselves, or from the same ill Qualities in others really, or supposed and presumed; [Page 137] either because Men hate one another when it is not deservedly, or when it is.

3. But a more particular mischief of our judging others out of Hatred, is, their judging by way of Revenge untruly of us in general, of our Qua­lities, Principles, or Actions: Whence our Example in any thing that is Good in us, is rendred ineffectual, all our Actions though never so good, are ei­ther not taken notice of, neglected, or interpreted in the worse sense; that is, those that come from never so good Principles, and are very natural signs thereof, will be deemed Signs of bad, or meer Signs and Hypocritical. It is true, this will often happen thróugh Persons ill-nature, and aptness there­fore to judg on the worst side, when there is no occasion or cause on our part given, and then we being not able to help it at all, or not without loss of time better spent, may do well to glance a little Pity, and so neglect and take no further notice: But when we our selves are the Cause, or give the [Page 138] occasion by our uncharitable, or im­prudent Judgments of others, we can­not spend time better than by removing them, to take away the prejudice against the example of any thing that is Good in our selves.

Sect. VII.

And thus we have run through some of the most considerable mischievous Effects and Consequences, of these pro­hibited Judgments by our Saviour; the avoiding of all which ought to be so many Motives to the practising of this Negative Duty: Nor ought the con­trary good Effects of abstaining there­from to do less, viz. The minding our own Affairs, the employing our selves about our own Business, the keeping at Home, and applying our selves to our own proper Works and Callings, the more accurate care of our own Princi­ples and Prudence, Hearts and Actions which we can best know and direct, mind and make use of; and not only minding our own Affairs, but permit­ting [Page 139] others to mind theirs, and to be Masters of their own Principles and Actions, to examine, judg, and deter­mine themselves, we only interposing our friendly Advice and neighbourly Counsel, when asked or desired; or when we see our Neighbour fails in his Prudence or Power in a matter of more considerable moment to him, than our time is to our selves or others; then in­deed not to be too intent to our own Business, and through Surliness or Carelessness of our Neighbours con­cern, to refuse, or not to mind, but to knock off a little from our own Business, and lend a helping-hand; like as all Men are so good natur'd, as to leave their Shops, and Trades, or Employ­ments a while, to quench a Fire in ano­ther Man's House, though there should be no danger to themselves, or to give a Lift to their Neighbours Horse or Ass.

But otherwise not to be busie in med­dling, or tyrannical in imposing on other Men in their own Affairs, and usurping their Right. Moreover the [Page 140] securing of our selves from a disadvan­tageous false Judgment, and an unrea­sonable contempt undervaluing, nay, it may be hatred of Persons, to which that disposeth us: However, from a be­ing suspected guilty of the worst of Principles of our Judgments, and con­sequently from giving occasion and temptation to others of dislike, Hatred, Contempt, Anger, or Revenge against us, and that by an unreasonable seve­rity in their judging of us, observing and proclaiming of our Faults and In­firmities; nay, and more and greater than we were ever so unhappy as to be guilty of, or overtaken with; which otherwise they would have taken no no­tice of, conceal'd neighbourly, or ex­cused. And then securing our selves from reciprocal Anger and Wrath in our selves, against their so unjust and ill principled Judgments, to which not­withstanding we our selves gave a need­less occasion, whence all manner of Mischief and mutual Injuries; Thy se­curing therefore of the Innocencie and Peace, mutual Good-will and Benefi­cence of each other.

Again; the prevention of foolish, blind, unreasonable, precipitate and rash Judgments. The preservation of the credit of our Testimony, and put­ting our selves thereby in a capacity of, sometimes to the ease and conveniency of our Neighbours, determining or as­sisting to determine the Controversies or Differences between them. The preservation at least of the Credit and Opinion of our unprejudiced Charity, and care of our Neighbours Credit and Reputation; of the want of which we give but too just Suspicion, by our rash and inconsiderate Judgments, when on the worst side. Further still, the pre­vention of Discredit and Disreputation to our selves, for our Carelesness, Inabi­lity, or Weakness to judg, or for our wilful prejudices by our false Judg­ments; when we were able to judg bet­ter, that is, truly; nay, when it is a thing always one of the most in our Power of any thing in the World. For who cannot judg, and say, that he knows not, if he be Ignorant, and hath no probability more on one, than to­ther [Page 142] side, or that it appears and seems to him, indeed, more probable? In which he needs never to be mistaken, al­though the thing may prove contrary to what appeared to him?

Further, The securing us from the Breach of the material part, at least of the Ninth Commandment, viz. Of bear­ing false Witness against our Neighbour.

Moreover, principally the Just and Beneficial disposing of our Kindnesses and Favours, and the with-holding them according to the degrees of each ones Merit or Demerit, the prudent and profitable dispensing our Praise or Dispraise, Good or Bad word, Re­commendation or Refusal, Charity or Chastisement: Not to squander a­way foolishly, nay, to ill purpose, what Good is in our power to bestow, and to with-hold it as unseasonably, when it would be to good Effect laid out.

Further still; the prevention of our own being slighted or contemned, for want of Discretion, or Self-govern­ment in the use of our Tongue and Conversation, for unprofitable or hurt­ful [Page 143] Talkativeness and Busie-bodiness, and of being grudged at for worse Prin­ciples (suspected or real) of our unsea­sonable and lavish Declaration of our Judgments. But more considerable much is the prevention of mutual Ani­mosities, Grudges, Ill-will, Discords, Contentions, Strifes between Men, usually arising from the suspicion, or certain knowledg of one anothers ill words, actions, affections, and dispo­sitions to, and concerning each other. Which if they had been concealed, and not too hastily been told or discovered, might have been repented of, and the Persons of another mind, and so no need of giving warning thereof to the Persons concern'd, and Charity and Peace had been still preserv'd and main­tain'd. The Humility and Forgiveness of the World, is too little to bear the know­ledg of Mens few faults and miscarri­ages one to another, and therefore they had not need be multiplied. The prevention therefore of all the mischiefs of Tale-bearing. Yet further, the not drawing of others from their better [Page 144] Employments, by disturbing them with false, untrue, or at least useless and tri­vial judgments and Reports concerning them; which although they are easily neglected, passed over, and slighted by those that are wiser and better, and well provided in the World; yet they very sensibly touch, and much affect those who are not so; of whose Good we ought, as good Neighbours and Christi­ans, to be justly tender. Finally, and above all, the prevention of the Increase and Improvement in our selves (by using our selves to the wicked Principles of Judging, so often named) of those hellish, wicked, and base Dispositions in us, to name them now and no more, those of Hatred, Malice, Revenge, Pride, Envy, Contempt, Anger and Wrath, Flattery; which if we have any degree of wise Self-love, we shall more endeavour to secure our selves from, than from the most loathsome, tormenting, and killing Diseases of our Bodies. The prevention conse­quently of exposing our selves to the Hatred and Contempt of others, but [Page 145] too justly deserved, and of the loss of all the benefits of mutual Good-will, Friendship, and kind and loving Con­versation. And lastly, The rendring our Example effectual; that if there be any thing Good in us, it might not be at all lost and do no Good; nay, our good Example be turned into a bad one by Mens unjust, (but by us occasioned and provoked) bad Interpretations of what we are, and do.

All these things and many more, which might be observed, of the like nature, those Mischiefs of doing con­trary to our Duty, and the advantages and good Effects of the Practice of it in this particular of our Judgments concerning others, ought reasonably to make us careful of our Principles and Prudence therein, more than ordi­nary, viz. That we be not too Prone to judg others; much less to Judg them on the worst side; to observe, accuse, and condemn them, even in our Hearts; not to judg rashly, and without all Rea­son, but our Wills; not to be Inconsi­derate; not to judg falsly, but always [Page 146] when we judg, to do it exactly, ac­cording to Truth as near as we can; not to babble out our Judgments at any rate, not to be too prone to do that, but to do it out of Charity always, and with Discretion and Prudence; never lastly to pass our Judgments out of the worst of Dispositions, Self-pleasing by Activity, Curiosity, Hatred, Pride, Revenge, Envy, affectation of Superi­ority, Contempt, Anger, Flattery, &c.

Sect. I.

WE are now come to the Remedies or Means to prevent those pro­hibited Judgings, of which one of the most General, And

1. Shall be to remember and attend to the great number of mischievous Effects and Consequences thereof, and then to the Causes of them. The [Page 147] first will dispose our Wills to be averse there-from, The second will direct us to some means to effect our Wills. The first will make us willing to abstain there­from. The second able. Call to mind therefore, and think of, as oft as thou may'st be in danger, how much of that time spent in observing and judging of others, might have been spent in Self­examination, reflection and attention to thy own Business and Affairs. How idly and unprofitably, to say no worse, I employ my self there, in comparison to what I might do, if my thoughts were more at Home. How much more uprightly and prudently might I carry, and demean my self in all my Actions. Again, how troublesome and importu­nate it makes one Man to another, to be too frequently Checking, Control­ling, Determining them in their own Affairs, to be Tyrannical and Injuring. How unreasonable and mischievous it is to be disposed to Hate, Under-value, or Contemn Persons, more than in im­partial Judgments they deserve, and to be consequently the Causes of our [Page 148] selves being Under-valued, Hated, Con­temned there-for, and more than we de­serve. Again, the being occasions and causes of Sin and Trouble, both to our selves and others in the World. How foolish is it to expose our selves to just censure for Folly, Rashness, Inconsidera­tions, Weakness, Indiscretion and Partiality, and to be neglected justly, and not to be fit to do any good to o­thers by our Testimony? The bearing false Witness against our Neighbour, how should it pinch and wring us, and hurt us, as much as if we nip'd or cut our own Fingers, or gashed our own Flesh? What a pitiable thing is it, and mischievous, to see a Man mistakenly to stroke the Bad, and strike the Good, because he thinks well of the one, and ill of the other; just clean contrary to what should be▪ and like Mad-men out of their Wits? Why should any Man call upon himself Contempt, Hatred, Anger, or Revenge, for his weak, imprudent, peevish, or ill-natured Tatling his Opinion of others? How hateful a thing is it, to be the Cause of [Page 149] Hatred, Animosities, Grudgings, Ill­wills, Discords, Contentions, Wrang­lings and Brawlings, and mischievous Actions between Men, to set the World on Fire, to be a Fire-brand? Consi­der, can any Man who wisely loves himself and the World, for the good of which he is made, endure, to be the Author of mischief only, to be bet­ter out of the World than in, conse­quently to see himself a constant Judg to condemn, and Executioner too by his Hatred, Malice, Ill-nature, Enmi­ty, Envy and Spite, Revenge, Anger, Pride, affectation of Superiorioty in Judging, to be a Pest and Bane to the World, and to improve these most Noxious qualities in himself, by Ex­ercise and Use, and in others by the imitation of his example, and to banish kind and friendly Conversation? Is it not also brutish enough, and a sign a Man hath no Mind to get any Good quality, wherein he may be an useful Example to others? Or if he hath, he cares not whether any be the better for it or no?

Consider, and attend to these and such like things, especially at those times when you may have most need, when you find your selves most prone to offend in this kind, or when upon Re­flection on your selves at any time you find you have so done. And as we shall do well thus to learn and inform our selves in, and remember and call to mind these, or some of these ill Ef­fects, both when we are about to do amiss in this kind, and when we have done so, to prevent the like for the future, by getting our Minds against it; so that we may know how to do it, it will be useful to take notice of, and remember the Causes that we may re­move them.

Shun we therefore and avoid Idle­ness; let us chuse and mind some Cal­ling of our own in particular, nor let us neglect our general Calling of ser­ving God, Self-examination and Re­flection, occasional doing Good and Be­nificence. Have we a care of Busie­bodiness, and meerly to be doing and talking, for doing and talking sake, [Page 151] but always for some further good end. And so likewise have we a care of Cu­riosity, or a humour and desire to ob­serve and know every thing, though most Remote from us, and Impertinent to any good use or design we put it to, meerly for the observation and knowledg sake; and it is no matter where the things be never so small and trivial, and in others (as they will be for most part) too, so it will gratifie that Humour in us, and that is all we care for. Secure we our selves from this Childish temper, and if we desire to observe and know things, let them be Profitable and of Concernment, and those which we may make best use of, and that is, be sure, what is in our selves. Let us have a care also of that particu­lar branch of Pride, viz. Affectation to know and direct others in their own Affairs and Actions.

But most Industriously let us eschew and flee the gratification of our selves, by the hatred of others and revenge. Far be this from us, and Pride and foolish af­fectation of Superiority, and therefore [Page 152] envy, fury wrath and anger against Persons in general, as also Contempt, the most common Causes of Detraction and Slander. Let them not come near us, nor enter in the least within any the doors of our Breasts. Flattery too and ultimate base fear of any ones dis­pleasure, or seeking of their favour, we must also despise and scorn, which doth so much betray us oft-times to Judgments on the worst side of some, that we might please others; let us be sure to inform our selves as well as we can, when we judg concerning others, and not do it ignorantly. And more particularly, let us have a care we do not too generally conclude all Persons like our selves, nor suffer our selves to be abused by publick Report or Testi­mony, and judg all true what we so re­ceive; make always an allowance one way or another; at least most generally suspect and doubt till further Examina­tion, if it be worth the while. Let us have a care of that kind of Partiality, whereby we observe and take notice but of one sort of Qualities or Actions [Page 153] in Men, none but their Good, or none but their Bad, as they are our Friends, or Foes, as we are well or ill affected towards them; but let us be free and indifferent to see both Faults and Im­perfections in our Friends, and Virtue, and what's good and laudable in our Enemies. Let us stir up and maintain always in our Minds a strong habitual love of the Truth, which will be by and by a more particular Instruction. Hardly any thing of more good effect in this business, than the government of our Passions, to remove, calm, quiet them, if you intend to pass any consi­derable Judgment as to Truth, viz. Love, Hatred, Admiration, Contempt, Revenge, Anger, and the l [...]e; suffer we not our Minds and Memories to be Brib'd by these, to admit only what can be said on one side, and not of an­other; nay, more than can or onght to be said, and to thrust upon us what is not true, and thrust out again what is or may be true, because against them; suffer we not our Minds to be ruffled and confused by them, and not to be [Page 154] able, and willing not to attend to the evidence of what we would not have to be True, or would have to be False, though never so manifest: For what can be expected from us of Truth and Ju­stice in our judgments concerning o­thers, when we are so affected? And lastly, Let us seriously endeavour to Reform, Correct, Amend the Corrup­tions and bad Inclinations of our Na­ture, that ultimate Selfishness, seeking our own selves without any regard to the good of others, nay, with an ex­press contempt thereof, and by their mischief or hurt; as if their good were not Good, as well as mine; hence con­sequently Hatred, Malice, Revenge, Pride, affectation of Superiority, En­vy, Contempt, causless Anger, Flat­tery: Seek we, I say, to cure our Na­ture by Observation, Caution, Endea­vour, and God's Assistance. Thus if we take but heed to, and remember these and all other which are the Causes of our too busie, disadvantageous, rash, selfish, false, malicious, proud, envi­ours, wrathful, contemptuous, flatter­ing [Page 155] Judgments of others, and remove them, we shall certainly prevent the Effect.

But more particularly, I shall recom­mend to you some Remedies, which follow.

Sect. II.

2. And therefore secondly, But more particularly possess we our Hearts and Minds throughly, with an universal Charity and Benignity to all, with a proneness and readiness to do Good any where, but only where we see (and there­fore in some Circumstances, as where the thing concerns many, and is not so soon known, to consider and delibe­rate) it will be necessarily the cause of a greater Evil; which will in general ex­traordinarily secure us. Nor let us suffer our selves to be beaten from this temper of Mind by any ill carriage, misdemeanor, folly or injury of others. Let us still retain a true love of Bene­volence for the Person, whatever our Keenness be against the Vice or Imper­fection. [Page 156] Say still with thy self, what pity it is Persons should be so much their own and others Enemies, as to be guilty of any voluntary Wickedness; but if it be an Imperfection out of their power, then more need still to be pitied and relieved by us, if we be not em­ployed in things of greater concern­ment. This will dispose us to dimi­nish, abate, or connive at, and look off the Infirmities or Imperfections of o­thers, and therefore either judg favour­ably, or not at all; except, where (as I have oft said) our mutual, Christian, common and universal Charity and Prudence, obligeth and stirreth us up, provoketh us to do otherwise.

Sect. III.

3. Rivet soundly into thy Mind the love of Truth; let nothing whatsoe­ver cause thee to be out of the Truth, scorn to feign, judg rashly or falsly concerning the worst disposed and affe­cted Man towards thee, i. e. Contemn this Quality, but not out of a haughty [Page 157] Pride. i. e. Ultimately, because it is thine own Imperfection: But out of an universal common Charity, i. e. Be­cause of all the Mischief, it is the cause of both to thy self and others. And, indeed, there is some reason why here thou shouldst less do this; because if he be faulty and imperfect indeed, there is but too much true already, why shouldst thou make an addition?

Sect. IV.

4. And yet more particularly, ask thy self again and again, (especially in Judgments of more Concern and Im­portance) whether or no thou be sure that thy Judgment be true: Stay not till another ask thee how thou knowest. For then for thy Credit and Reputati­on, lest thou shouldst seem to have said any thing rashly or untrue, or out of bad Principles, thou'lt be tempted to invent somewhat falsly, and to feign and al­ledg somewhat, it may be, true, but insufficient, and yet perswade thy self, or at least seems to him that asks thee, [Page 158] that it is good proof. But do this pri­vately, or tacitly thy self, when thy Credit may not prejudice thee against the Truth, but engage thee to it. And if it happen thou shouldst have over­shot thy self, be most ready to Retract it, and acknowledg so much. Ask thy self I say, how thou provest it. And when thou doest, suppose, thy self be­fore the most impartial person, who hath no particular respect to any person or persons, that is inconsistent with Truth and Justice, one that loves thee and the person thou judgest, and every body else; (and some such it may be thou mayest have known in the World, be sure God is so) whether thou thinkest he would admit of the proof and evidence for what thou affirmest or sayest as suffi­cient. Then again, suppose thy self in the same case with the Person thou judgest, and he in thine to judg thee: Whether wouldst thou be content he should judg so of thee, as thou dost of him now? Whether dost thou think that if he had thy Proof only for what he said concerning thee, thou wouldst [Page 159] think it sufficient, and aquiesce, and grant that he had good Reason for what he said? If thou shouldst be afraid to remit the censure of thy Judgment to an impartial Person, who neither ho­ped nor feared any thing from thee, and was above that, but thou shouldst su­spect he would not judg as thou dost, if it were but for a small Wager, if thou wonldst not be content thy Bro­ther should judg of thee in the same manner, and for the like reasons (and be sure either thou dost not rashly say, and fiercely thou wouldst, when if it come to be done thou wouldst not) if thou shouldst find this I say; this sure would put a check to thy Judgment, and make thee somewhat ashamed there­of: But if thou didst it in the greatest sincerity, then thou mightest and wouldest proceed to judg with more confidence and freedom, because thou findest thy self free from any ill Prin­ciples; and yet more particularly that thou mayst try thy own sincerity.

Sect. V.

5. Ask thy self whether thou would'st not have true, what thou judg­est concerning others, whether thou would'st as willingly it should be false; nay, suppose it be on the worst side, thou art rather inclin'd it should not be true, or that thou art (considering that absolutely without any further respect) sorry it is true, and wouldst alter the case if it were in thy power. These things will principally serve to secure us from rash and false Judgments, espe­cially those of the worst side.

Sect. VI.

6. Use thy self much to dwell at Home, that is, to make thy self, or something more immediately apper­taining to thee, the Object of thy Ob­servation; and particularly then when thou dost judg another, or art about to do it, cast a quick eye back upon thy self, whether thou, it may be, art not [Page 161] guilty of that which thou condemnest in another, or would'st not be if thou wert in their Circumstances, it may be more; for assuredly it is a very ordina­ry thing. As for example, It is most frequent to judg and condemn others for Pride and Covetousness, out of Pride and Covetousness; or reflect whe­ther thou art not guilty of as bad. Thus doing will oft-times find us more and better work at Home in our selves, and so consequently will keep us from using our Observation and Judgment abroad, which then is too much, when it might be better employed nearer hand in our own selves. This will also re­strain us from judging falsly and rashly, and pronouncing our Judgment with­out necessary ends of Charity. For we are generally inclin'd to be asham'd, when we attend to it, to do that in ano­ther's case, which we would not have done in our own. Now when we ob­serve our own Faults or Imperfections, we find we are not very willing (at least not gladly be sure) to look upon them, we are loth to acknowledg them, [Page 162] or judg our selves guilty of them, we shift, we apologize, excuse, or if we can, deny; be sure we'll have Rea­son and Truth evident (for the most part of us, I except some discontented Persons with themselves) before we conclude against our selves: Why then should we not so do by others, as we do by our selves? I know no Reason but it is as just in one, as in the other case.

Sect. VII.

7. Have a special care of all Passi­ons in Judgments, especially of An­ger, the most boysterous and rude one. Let these not precede, but always fol­low Reason, that so they do not bribe, or prejudice, or deceive even Reason it self, as I have heretofore more particularly told you how they may, and then that they do not confound it. Passions, they either prejudice or blind our Judgments. The experience of this is so frequent, that there is none but may have obser­ved the numerous miscarriages of Judg­ments from hence. And in order to [Page 163] this means, let us keep our Minds so­ber and calm towards others, have a care of using them to be affected with Passions immediately before Reason upon every occasion. Some you may observe, whose Minds are like Tinder, or Gun-powder, which take fire always at every spark. And in order hereto again, use we Temperance and Sobriety, with moderate exercise, not too violent, fierce, and active, that our bodily temper may be less subject to them, less confus'd, dull, and yet fierce. Too much Drink especially, and violent and fre­quent bodily Exercise and Action dis­pose much to Confusion, and Passions, and rash Actions, and consequently to blind rash Judgments. We most-what see such Persons more Talkative, Med­ling, Opinionative, and Peremptory, and rudely and carelesly, or Proudly and Huffingly say any thing of others, though never so innocent and their Bet­ters, and very uncivilly sullying their Names with their foul Breath. This will secure you from rash and false Judg­ments.

Sect. VIII.

8. More particularly, be sparing most to give thy Judgment concerning a Per­son thou findest thy self inclin'd to hate or be angry with: Suspect thy self, re­frain, for thou wilt be prejudic'd even undiscernedly to thy self. Or if Cir­cumstances should necessarily require thy Judgment, remember how thou art affected, set thy self to shake off that prejudice; say all thou canst for the Person first in thy thoughts, and be passionated against those Passions and the Prejudice of them, that thou should'st thereby be so cozen'd and de­ceiv'd thy self, and so unjust to others. This will give check always to the bad Principles of our Judgments so often named, and prevent also many rash and false Judgments.

Sect. IX.

9. Discourse more of Things than Persons. Thus we have suggested to [Page 165] you some remedies to prevent or amend the Miscarriages in our judging con­cerning others. I desire you would re­member and make use of them, and try their Efficacies, and consequently pre­vent the many great and frequent Mis­chiefs, of which they are the Causes, and contribute considerably to the Peace and Innocency of the World.

Sect. I.

WE are now in the last place to ob­serve to you some few Rules to be made use of in our Judging others, viz. generally, and for the most part. For it is rare that any rule of Prudence, or the using any certain Means to ob­tain our due End of Universal Charity, is Universal and never to be receded from.

1. Which cannot be too often named, [Page 166] and the most general is: Pass and de­clare all thy Judgments out of Chari­ty; that is, because thou seest it better so to do, and more good effects of it, than not to do it; not to thy self only, but any where. Out of Charity, I say, in general to do more Good than thou seest Harm, let it light where it will, where ever thou seest it. Which part of Good effects may sometimes be more particularly received to thy self, as to expel thy too much Indifferency and Coldness to the Good or Hurt of others, to the love of Truth and Good­ness, to use and exercise the good go­vernment and direction of thy Judg­ment, of which as a Superiour in some sort thou mayest have more need, as of a necessary quality for thy place and duty, to imitate what's Good, shun what thou observest Bad in others, &c. Part of these good effects to the Per­son himself judged, to encourage him in any good Quality or Action, to check or restrain him from what's bad, to advise him of his Errour or Fault, which but by a discreet and seasonable [Page 167] Judgment of him from some other Per­son he would not have taken notice of. Men would want considerable ad­vantages to the knowledg and minding of their Faults and Duties, Perfections and Imperfections, if they were, and did what they listed, and no body ca­red or dared to observe, and pass their Judgments concerning them. It is better they should know that others, and that wiser than themselves are Ob­servers and Spectators. And lastly, Part of them to others, to encourage them to follow or imitate if they be com­mended, or to restrain them from Imi­tation, or being drawn away, if we dis­approve and discommend. We may see it for the good of others oft frankly and chearfully to speak well of, and com­mend in their hearing, and to reprove or disallow according to the greatness of the Fault or Imperfection. And we may in some cases think our selves reasona­bly too cold and indifferent or dull in observing and saying nothing of what's Good or Bad in others. I say, let all our Judgments be with the fore-sight [Page 168] of, and being affected with all those or the like Good effects, which we may see may follow. And then be sure we may conclude, that such Judging out of such a Principle will please God too. And then you have all the par­ticulars of your one general due End of all your Actions, viz. The greatest Good of the whole Universe. Here therefore I exclude ultimate Self-love, that it be not to gratifie our selves on­ly any of these ways before mention'd, by Activity, Curiosity, Hatred, Re­venge, Anger, Pride, Affectation of Superiority, Envy, Contempt, Flatte­ry, &c.

I exclude also all Ill-will or Con­tempt against the Person, but only a­gainst the Vice and Imperfection of him; nay, I affirm we ought always to have a love of benevolence to the Per­son. The Charity I speak of, must be an Universal and Unlimited one to the whole, and therefore must comprehend and take in every particular we see, and consequently the Person himself guilty of any Fault or Imperfection. Now, [Page 169] because Men are oft apt to deceive themselves and others by their confi­dent pretences, some Signs when we do judg out of Charity, are these:

1. More readiness and willingness to judg every where on the Good side than on the Bad. This is a sign we would have no Evil in the World if we could, not without an absolute necessi­ty for a greater Good, and consequent­ly of a most unlimited and universal Charity.

2. An excusing others, and saying all we can justly and truly for them, and that such an Action, which oft pro­ceeds from some bad Principle, it might in such a Person proceed from Igno­rance, he might be mistaken, he might think so or so, or he might do it by Surprize, or the forces of Temptation, the Temptation might be strong, and consequently not argue a very small de­gree of Goodness; and if it be in mat­ter of Prudence, that the Person might consider well, and otherwise than we do, or it may prove otherwise than we judg. In all which, as we are to shew [Page 170] our Charity thus by excusing or les­sening what we ought; so we are too to shew it by a modest disapprobation of what's Imperfect or Faulty in them sometimes, and not through Idleness, Laziness, Coldness, or Flattery, and fear to Displease for the present, betray the faulty Person, or others, into too good an Opinion of themselves, and to be content willingly to be no better. This thus excusing is a sign, I say, that a Man would willingly have as little, and as few Faults in the World any where, as might be, and consequently of a very universal Charity.

3. A third sign is a frequent Judg­ing of our selves, especially on the worst side; that is, observing and con­demning our selves for our own Faults, and acknowledging our own Imperfe­ctions. The observation, judging and acknowledging our own Faults and Im­perfections, doth not use (I speak for the most part, these not being universal Signs) to proceed from any hatred of our selves, is very consistent with mens love to themselves; for we do not see [Page 171] men hate themselves so forwardly; they [...]ove themselves, and all they do most­what proceeds therefrom. Wherefore [...]t is more likely that such persons Judg­ments concerning others, might pro­ceed from a love of the persons judged too, and of others in general; they deal by them, as they deal by them­selves, and no worse▪ But when we see men forward to observe and judg others, and never to mind themselves, it is a sign this proceeds from busibodiness, or curiosity, or some worse Principle: For if it proceeded from any charity to the person, why should they not be as kind to themselves? Cannot they see it will do them as much good to judg themselves, as it will do others to judg them? And so likewise, Is it likely Men should see any more good come on't to the World to judg others, than to judg themselves? Is it not rather suspected, nay, manifest to Men, that there would be much better Conse­quences, if Men more betook themselves to observe and judg themselves than others, at least equal? If therefore it [Page 172] proceeds out of Charity to the World to observe and judg others, why should not the same move us to do so by our selves?

4. A fourth sign is, when our Judg­ment is passed with Calmness and Mo­desty. These are, first, Signs of the ab­sence of all bad and unallowable Prin­ciples, and therefore of the presence of a Good one (for some there must be.) Calmness is a sign of, or rather is the absence of Passions, and more particularly of Anger, Revenge, Ha­tred, of our Activity, Curiosity, and Busie-bodiness, and consequently of Rashness, and other Prejudices. By Modesty, I mean, a not Inordinately, and Immoderately affecting, nor assu­ming to ones self any instances of his Perfection or Excellency, and among others, Superiority, great Merits, whe­ther truly or falsly. This therefore where and when it is, is a sign that the Person's judgment comes not from Im­periousness, Pride, Affectation of Su­periority, Envy, one kind of that (for the more we depress others, the more [Page 173] we make our selves superiour to them) Contempt; nay, nor from flattery. For Fear, affectation of Friendship or Fa­vour, is a thing that the modest Man is free from too. Now by how much these are signs of the absence of our bad Principles, the several instances of Selfishness, so much are they the signs of the presence of a good one (for some there is always) viz. of Charity.

Sect. II.

2. A second general Rule, which hath been before mentioned in other places, is always to judg truly. Here I would have it set down as a short Rule to be easily remembred, and always ready at hand: But because I have al­ready spoken so much of this, I shall now add no more.

Sect. III.

3. Have a care of all Passions, but especially of Anger before Judgment. This hath been also mention'd before [Page 174] in the Means. Always judg before, and if the Case require it, that is, if there is no way of removing the Evil but by a desire of inflicting another less, then let thy Anger follow a clear and calm Judgment: Some Reasons in brief are, because thou art in great danger of being prejudic'd, and that indiscern­ably, to judg rashly or falsly; and then thou dost no good to the person judged, if he hear, or hear of thy Judgment. For he'l be prejudic'd against thy Jugdment, as being rash, or coming from pride, or ill-will against him; wherefore he'l think he ought not, or on purpose, and out of displeasure against thee, he will not believe what thou thinkest and say­est concerning him; He will have no regard thereto. Nor will others be the better, for thou givest a bad example. Nor dost thou inform them; for they will not trust thy Judgment, nor take thy Word and Testimony then; they'l think thou art partial, not an upright Judg. I say, this will be, when they see thee judg with fierce passions with­out, and before any reason assigned. [Page 175] Otherwise, I confess, when a thing first calmly appears true, and of concern­ment to be judged and believed, and no other way will do but that way; then to appear warm, and not too in­different.

Sect. IV.

4. Declare not thy Judgment, when thou thy self art guilty. One reason is, because that, as hath been before said, the Person concern'd and others, will think it proceeds not from any Charity, but from Selfishness, Ill-will, Pride, and so consequently they pre­sently flie out against thee, and are displeased at thee for that, and take no notice of thy Judgment, whether true or false. There passions are more mo­ved with, and they more attend to the principle of thy Judgment, than the truth of it. The reason of which is again, that Men being ultimate Self­lovers, and Proud, would have reason to love themselves as much as may be; whence they are more apt far presently [Page 176] to take more notice of others Faults than their own; and consequently when any one passeth Judgment con­cerning them more presently to look at the fault, than the truth of his Judg­ment. This is the reason we see every one flie presently in the face of the guil­ty Judger, and ask him whether he be not as bad, and least of all bears his Judgment or Censure; viz. They think it here more than ordinarily manifest, that it proceeds not out of Love to them (for why then think they, should he not love himself as well); but out of Envy, Pride, or the like. Every Man will say to such a Man, Physician heal thy self. That he is an unskilful or unfaithful Physician, that hath some by-end, who goes about, or undertakes to cure that in another Man, which he cannot or will not in himself.

Let us see thee Mend thy self first, say they, and then we'll believe indeed, [Page 177] thou seest reason to judg another for it, and mayst do it out of Charity.

Sect. V.

5. Or if thou dost judg when guilty, resolve to be Innocent for the future, and condemn thy self in the first place, because more ready to take notice of thy own faults than of others. This will give Men more assurance of thy Circumspection, and Wisdom, and Charity, and consequently make them more attend to thy Judgment, and be­lieve it according to its Truth. When thou seest (for Example) any Person commit any thing which offends thee, and for which thou art ready to blame or reproach him, and hearest others do so: Before thou passest thy Judgment, reflect upon thy self sincerely; say to thy self, Am not I guilty of the same in some degree or other, and cannot or will not see that in my self, which now I am about severely to reprehend in an­other, and it may be deservedly in re­spect of the Offender, only it would [Page 178] come better out of my mouth, if I my self were first Innocent or Penitent? Don't I see at least a Beam in my Bro­ther's eye, when I have as great an one or the same in my own? There are Five Reasons among others, why a Man should first or equally take notice of his own faults, accuse and condemn himself.

1. Every Man ought to love himself sure as well as his Neighbour, as he would do another Person of the same qualities; and if it be good his Neigh­bours faults should be observed and judged, that he might be advised and amended, sure it is good his own should too.

2. A Man gives a very good Exam­ple to others, that they should do so by themselves too; which is a thing so ve­ry rare, and yet of such extraordinary use and benefit.

3. He renders his own Judgment concerning others, when he doth pass it, more effectual, by giving to understand it proceeds not from Imperiousness, Do­mineering, Envy, Peevishness, or Bu­siebodiness, but from a wise Charity, [Page 179] out of a prudent Love, he doth by o­thers as by himself, he spares not him­self.

4. Every one knoweth most certainly the truth of his Judgment concerning himself.

5. Here Mens care and zeal will be more successfully employed certainly; for every Man hath it more in his own power to mend and reform what he ob­serves and condemns in himself, than what he condemns in others.

Sect. VI.

6. For the most part it is most safe, that is, of more certain good effect not to declare thy judgment than to do it. And therefore when at any time, or in any particular case thou seest no ad­vantage of good consequence or effects on either side to pass Judgment or hold thy Tongue, rather chuse to refrain; do it not till thou seest some consider­able advantage. And one reason is, because a Man may (for the most part I say) pass his Judgment at another [Page 180] time, may have opportunities enough to do it; but he cannot recal it when passed, he cannot undo what he hath done, Nescit vox missa reverti. And yet the practice of Men is generally clean contrary; that is, if there be not something to affright or deter them, they seldome refrain to spend their cen­sures very freely.

Sect. VII.

7. Be more cautious and sparing in sometimes passing sometimes decla­ring thy Judgment in these following Cases.

(1.) Concerning thy Superiours, espe­cially on the worst side; and that be­cause, 1. As to their Principles they being far from our Observation, and there be­ing few or very uncertain signs thereof (for the most part) our Judgments here will be very uncertain. And

2. As to their actual prudence and fore-sight in matters concerning their Office, it is for the same reason to us [...], but yet far more likely (to [Page 181] compare it with that of their Inferiours or other private Persons) to be more and better than what is in them. For they make it more their Business to at­tend to what is most for the general good of those who are under their care, when Inferiours look only or principal­ly at themselves. And then they ge­nerally have better information what is so. And truly, it seems likely that if there were as much assurance of the Integrity of Governors, or their sin­cere love to the publick Good, as there is of their knowledg, the Judgments of wise and honest Men would general­ly with reason be for their honour and advantage; though with rash and proud Men, of which always are too many, the most manifest Integrity and Wisdom will not be sufficient to pro­cure them Truth and Justice.

3. The contempt or undervaluing of them and their Authority (which follow upon our Judgment) is of much worse effect than that of private Per­sons, as generally Laws, publick Ad­vices and Sentiments, and Examples [Page 182] too sometimes are of more use than pri­vate Opinions and Examples: They being, I say, generally better, of more comprehensive and certain good effect, as done by a greater and more generous Charity, with more of a publick Spi­rit, and more Prudence and Wisdom: Private Persons, especially still the more Vulgar, are generally more Self­ish and Foolish.

(2.) Be more sparing in declaring thy Judgment concerning Friends. For if thy Judgment be on the good hand, it will be suspected Flattery or general­ly Self-love. And therefore it is gene­rally, when any one commends his Friend, allowed for him, nay, expected he should interpose his excuse, that it is said by him who might be suspected Partial, and more apt to speak some­what beyond the Truth. But if thy Judgment be on the worst side, thou wilt be esteemed Ungrateful, and were it never so true, yet it should not have been said by thee; and therefore in such Cases too we see Men Apologize and make an Excuse, and alledg some more [Page 183] than ordinary reason, that obligeth them to pass such a Judgment on their very Friend.

(3.) Be more sparing in doing it of thine Enemy: the reason is, because thy Judgment will be suspected and be­lieved to proceed from Hatred and Ill­will; I say, be more sparing and cau­tious in these, and such like Cases. I do not say, but that sometimes there may be sufficient reasons to do it; but then there is more than ordinary Pru­dence to be used in such manner as I have now Instanc'd, to prevent or re­move the hinderance of its good effect.

Nay, I advise rather to take occasion to pass thy Judgment on the good side here; that is, to commend him and speak well of him for what thou know­est good and commendable in him; for then thy Judgment is believed, and con­sequently of better effect to those who hear it for encouragement to Imitation. Thou givest also a good Example to others of thy Unprejudicedness, and being above and untoucht by busie Pas­sions of Hatred, Ill-will, or Revenge, [Page 184] and of being such a generous lover of Truth and Goodness, as not to conceal, but willingly take notice of, and ap­prove what is really in the Person lau­dable, though thine Adversary, it may be too altogether undeserved and with­out reason.

And lastly too, By this exercise and use thou really dost procure and con­firm in thy self this Generosity, and Manliness, and Christianness (for no­thing more commended in Christian Religion) of Temper, and subduest Selfishness and the rabble of it's Slaves, those inordinate and immoderate Appe­tites and Passions, makest them sneak and dare not to appear.

(4.) Be more sparing and cautious in declaring thy Judgment concerning a Person generally Innocent or well Disposed, but once or rarely overta­ken; and that because it is most likely that he will do so no more, or mend without thy judging him to himself or others. Nor is there much danger of others imitating him in one single or very rare Action, when they know he [Page 185] generally doth the contrary; (only in­deed if one should observe it who knows not the Man, he may be informed that the Man was surprized and useth not so to do) and then what needed the trou­ble or shame or discredit that thou ga­vest him, it was unnecessary: And no evil of Pain or Punishment must be ad­mitted, but where it is necessary for a greater good. And then it is an usual sign to others of some ill nature and Pride, that is pleased too much in o­thers Faults or Infirmities; when Men are so ready to judg the first; and consequently is of bad Example to them, and prejudicial to ones self. Or if thou dost see reason to take notice of such Fault or Infirmity, let it be very shortly, and presently seconded with a Commendation of him for his general past Innocency or freedom there-from; and that thou doub [...]est not but that he himself the most disapproves of it, and will not readily do so again. All which are signs of freedom from any Selfish­ness, of Charity and Prudence, and consequently the more likely to have [Page 186] good effect on the Person concern'd, and others too.

(5.) Be sparing in declaring thy Judgment of wrathful and bashful Per­sons, either to themselves or others. One reason is, because the wrathful and angry Man will not and cannot bear it through Pride, and the bashful through Shame, that is, Fear. To the wrathful Man it is at least to himself in­effectual; for he'll the more justifie or defend himself, and do or be the same thing again out of Revenge and Pride; it will give him occasion of wrath and attempting Mischief; he'll turn and rent thee. I say, this for the most part (as all other Directions of this kind): For sometimes it may be requisite for his and others Good, first calmly and softly (signs of Good-will to him by doing him good) afterwards shortly and smartly (that is, out of real Benevo­lence still, but by some pain or evil to him) to pass Judgment concerning any Principle or Action of his, let him take it how he will, and but too impatiently.

And as for the bashful Person, it is [Page 187] too great a punishment for him; less would have done: And always do as little evil as thou canst: A private Hint to him would have been sufficient. Be not a Witness against thy Neighbour with­out a cause, and deceive not with thy Lips, saith the Wiseman, Prov. 24. 28. That is, Do not pass nor make known thy Judgment either privately or publickly, without sufficient reason.

(6.) Be sparing in declaring thy Judgment on the worst side before much Company; especially Persons whose Favour or good Opinion is more consi­derable, and who are in no great dan­ger of Imitation.

One reason is, because most-what less Discredit or Disgrace would have sufficed to the Mending or Correcting of the Person; if it had been before but one or two, either before the Per­son himself concern'd, or from whom it might have been conveyed to him. The Faults or Imperfections had need be great or frequent, and the Person or Persons very confident and presumptu­ous, obstinate and conceited, and a [Page 188] danger of some general Infection, when they are so much published and made known.

(7.) Be sparing in declaring thy Judgment on the worst side before Ene­mies, or Adversaries, or ill-disposed.

One reason is, because they are, or are in danger of being prejudiced and partial in their Judgments, concerning the Person to whom they are ill-affected already; and thou by thy Judgment confirmest and increasest this their Par­tiality. They are but too ready to catch at and take notice of any thing spoken disadvantagiously, and to add to it too and aggravate it; and thou art not to give them the occasion if there be no greater good to be had thereby, not with a less Inconveniency to be pro­cur'd. Those too that are of an ill Temper, and apt to be Envious and Proud, will make ill use thereof, and gratifie and augment those Vices in themselves, and afterwards be general­ly contemptuous and ill-affected to­wards the Person thou discommendest. It is more safely done, and very profita­bly [Page 189] oft-times before Persons of a be­nign and generous Temper, and those who are Discreet, who make from thence profitable Observation of the Causes the mischievous Effects of the Defects, Infirmities, Faults and Vices of Humane Nature, to Direct, Govern, and Moderate themselves, to Advise and Counsel others with Reason, and even the Person himself whose faults are noted, if it comes fairly in their way: Not to contemn or dispise the Person in general, much less to hate him. Some­times this may be done unawares, but oft-times it proceeds from an ill will to the Person judged; and therefore from an intent and design to exasperate and incense his Adversaries against him more; knowing they are apt easily to take fire. Oft-times it comes more from Flattery, to pick Thanks and in­gratiate ones-self with him who is ene­my to the Person judged, whom they judg they please hereby, being willing to hear of the others Faults and In­firmities, to gratifie his Hatred or Pride, or that he may have wherewithal to [Page 190] justifie his being so dispos'd against him, that he might seem to be his Enemy with more Reason. If it be not thus, yet oft-times this will be suspected; a Man will incur the suspicion of an un­generous Revenge, or Hatred, or Ill­will, or Flattery, or at least the accusa­tion of Imprudence.

That's the 7th Rule, Be more spa­ring in thy Judgment, 1. Concerning Superiors. 2. Friends. 3. Enemies. 4. Once or rarely Surprized. 5. To and of wrathful and bashful Persons. 6. Before much Company. 7. Be­fore Enemies or Ill-dispos'd.

Sect. VIII.

8. Be apt and inclin'd rather to de­fer thy Judgment concerning others till thou art desired; and that either by the Person himself, or others who may be much necessarily concern'd to know an­other Persons Qualities or Conditions; and then not to refuse it. Some Rea­sons are, because that hereby thou ac­customest and usest thy self to Self-go­vernment [Page 191] and Direction, to Act for cer­tain Ends, and by certain Rules, par­ticularly thou causest thy self to refrain thy self, and to be free and averse from Busie-bodiness, and impertinent and profitable medling with other Mens Matters, and other bad Principles of Judgment, partly by meer disuse, part­ly by attending to this Rule, and the good effects of it: Again, thy Judg­ment is then more likely to be true. Further, Thou securest thy self also from suspicion of Prejudice, and con­sequently thy Judgment is more heeded, and it being more likely to be true, may be of good use to the Person desiring, and the other concerning whom it is de­sired if known, to advise and forewarn them of some Fault or Imperfection to be reformed or get rid of, which other­wise would not have been minded or believed. Further, Thou doest a very good turn for, and gratifiest him that inquires of thee. It may be also an occasion of a good Turn and of a Kind­ness to the other Person thou passest thy Judgment of, to remove some unjust [Page 192] Suspicions or Opinions concerning him. It may be he was believed or suspected worse than he was. Thou mayst recti­fie some Mistakes.

Sect. IX.

9. Thou mayst then more freely and frequently declare thy Judgment con­cerning one to another, or to more; when thou seest them deficient in Abili­ty or Wisdom, to take care of them­selves; and particularly when they are actually Ignorant of something in ano­ther Person, which may be of great concernment to them; or are deceived in their Opinion concerning him, whence some great Detriment or Dammage may arise from one to the other.

Thus for Example: If a Man knows or reasonably suspects a Man to be False and Faithless, to be Fraudulent, or to be Poor and Insufficient, who yet would be bargaining with, or borrowing of another, or getting some interest in his Person or Estate, of which he may be [Page 193] Ignorant; or to perswade to some Acti­ons and Opinions which may be childish, foolish, or hurtful; a Man may advise the Persons concerned, and give them his Judgment then unasked, not out out of any Ill-will to the one; but of Good-will to and Care of the other: For a Man ought to be a Friend to every Man, and a Brother, and not permit if he can any one to be dammaged or mischieved, and to keep him from the commission of a Sin. A Man may oft-times meet with Persons in the World who are innocent too and sim­ple, of no great prudence and fore­sight, who are also rash and precipitate, or dull and inapprehensive, who there­fore may be easily impos'd upon by o­thers, and made a Prey of by them. Here it is a prudent piece of Charity to advise and fore-warn and to discover the Designs and Qualities of those who would and do abuse their Simplicity, and imprudent well-meaning Honesty.

Some Reasons of this are the same with the former. It is an exercise of [Page 194] Virtue and Prudence in our selves. It is an act of more than ordinary Chari­ty to the Person in danger to be decei­ved, to lend him thus the use of thine Eyes for his safety and good. It is a very seasonable making use of thy Judg­ing; that is, it will do most good now, when at another time perhaps it would do none atall, or not so much. Here in this case when a Man desires thy Opinion or Judgment, thou removest his Solici­tude, and satisfiest him perhaps, if he be Ignorant thou informest him; where­as if thou givest thy Judgment unask­ed, before thou art desired, and where the Man is sufficient himself, thou wilt do them no kindness, nor will they so much mind thee, nor thank thee for it; for it may be they have none, or not such need of thy Judgment just then; and thou wilt be more suspected too of Busie-bodiness or Ill-will. So also where thou art not desired by one Per­son to give thy Judgment concerning ano [...]her Person, but unasked because of the Persons Insufficiency, out of [Page 195] Charity thou doest it, the effects most-what are very good, and if there­fore thou doest it, thou art no less prudent than charitable. And these are the most considerable Rules I have now thought of, for the Mannagement and Government of our selves in judg­ing others; which in very few words for Memory sake, I will reckon up again.

1. Be sure it be never inconsistent with Charity, but always done out of the prospect of some good end.

2. With the exactest truth.

3. Beware of all Passions before Judgment.

4. Declare not thy Judgment when thou thy self art guilty. Or

5. If thou dost, first accuse and con­demn thy self.

6. It is better and safer generally, not to declare thy Judgment of Persons.

7. Be sparing in judging and decla­ring thy Judgment on the worst side concerning Superiors, Friends, Ene­mies, Surprized, Wrathful and Bash­ful Persons, before much Company, [Page 196] before Enemies and Ill-disposed.

8. Defer thy Judging much, till thou art desired or asked.

9. Interpose it to them whom thou seest defective in their Ability or Care for themselves. Many more by Expe­rience may be taken notice of and ob­served.

Sect. X.

10. I have nothing more to do in this Argument now, but only to re­mind you of the two general things I intended and aimed at in this Discourse principally to recommend to you, and that is Charity and Prudence, in a busi­ness that is very frequent, and takes up a very considerable part of our Lives. For it is very obvious and easie to observe, that a great part of our Actions of Life, are the thinking and judging, and talking and discoursing of other Persons, their Qualities and Actions. The Charity is in the last of the six Particulars. The contrary [Page 197] of which I here think principally pro­hibited, which was to judg out of any nltimate Selfishness, and therefore not out of Busi-bodiness, Hatred, Revenge, Pride, Affectation of Superiority, Envy, Contempt, Anger, Flattery, or the like. But if this bad Principle be prohibited, than if ever Judging be permitted in any Case (as sure it is) the contrary of Charity is command­ed; for one of those Ends and Prin­ciples must be our Prudence, is con­cern'd in the other five prohibited Judgments, viz. to be too prone to judg in general, to be too much inclined to judg on the worst side, to judg rash­ly, to judge falsly, to be too forward in declaring our Judgments. All the Causes, Consequences, Remedies and Rules I have mention'd, are but more particulary Motives and Incentives to our Charity, or Directions for our Prudence. And now therefore I hear­tily exhort you to the Practice of what hath been spoken. That you would adorn this part of your Con­versation with the two most excellent [Page 198] Ornaments, not only of our Souls, but of the Divine Nature it self. For our Charity and Prudence are but lit­tle imitations of God's infinite Wis­dom and Goodness. How beautiful, lovely, and pleasant a thing it is to see each one discreetly tender of his Neighbours good Name, Repu­tution, Interest, or Concern? How lovely a thing is generous Love? And what a reverend thing is un­affected Prudence in all our Con­versation, and particularly here? What unhandsome things are Rash­ness and Falsehood? How ugly and contemptible Selfishness, Hatred, Ma­lice, Pride, Envy, Contemptuous­ness, unguided Anger, Busie-bodi­ness, vain Curiosity, Flattery? &c.

Finally, remember we are Chri­stians, and who it is, viz. Our Master and Saviour Himself, who hath here expresly forbidden these things ( Judg not that ye be not judg­ed.) The same our Master and Sa­viour [Page 199] send down His gracious In­fluence to help us, to do what He hath taught and commanded us,