THE Seriousness you yet retain in your looks, and the po­sture we found you in at our entrance, makes me fear these two Gentlemen and I are un­seasonable [Page 2] intruders, that are so un­happy as to disturb your Meditati­ons.

Instead of doing that, you will much promote them, if you please to accompany me in them: For the subject that busied my thoughts is both so abstruse and so important, that it needs more than one to consider it, and deserves that He should be a far better con­siderer than I, who therefore must think my self far less fit for that task than you.

I will punish the flattery of these last words, by declining to make any Return to it.

And I, Gentlemen, to prevent the loss of time and words between you, shall without farther Ceremony ask Sophronius, what his thoughts were employed about when we came in.

I was then musing upon a [Page 3] Subject, that was newly proposed to me by our common Friend Arno­biut, who would needs have my opi­nion, Whether, and if at all, how far, we may employ our reasonings a­bout things that are above our Rea­son, as Christians grant some my­steries of their Religion to be.

If, by things above Reason, be meant only those, that are undis­coverable by Reason without Reve­lation; I should not hesitate to say, that there may be divers things of that kind: For the free Decrees of God, and his determinations con­cerning the Government of the World, and the future state of man­kind (to name now no others) are things which no humane Reason can pry into, but must owe the funda­mental discovery it makes of them, to the Revelation of him, whose purposes they are.

But if, by things above Reason, be meant such, as though delivered in words, free from darkness and Am­biguity, are not to be conceived, [Page 4] and comprehended by our Rational Faculty, I shall freely confess, that I scarce know what to say upon so unusual and sublime a subject.

For my part, Gentlemen, I think it were very requisite to be sure in the first place, that the sub­ject of our Discourses is not Chime­rical, but that we can really know, that there are things we cannot comprehend, though they be pro­posed to us in expressions no less clear than such, as would suffice to make other things intelligible to us.

Your cautiousness, Pyro­cles, must not be rejected by me, who when, before you came in, I was putting my thoughts into some order, judg'd it unfit to consider, either how one might know what things were to be look'd on as above Reason, how far we may discourse of them, or whether or no any su­pernaturally revealed Propositions, such as Divines call Articles of Faith, [Page 5] ought to be reckoned among them, till I should have first seriously en­quir'd, whether in general we ought to admit any such Objects of our Contemplation, as these, and the like Questions suppose.

I hope then that this being the first thing you purposed to en­quire into, we may, without too much boldness, desire to know what came into your mind about it.

If I had brought my con­siderations to an issue upon that sub­ject, I should with less reluctancy acquaint you with them; but I since I have yet made but an imper­fect progress in my enquiry, instead of delivering any positive opinion upon so abstruse a subject, I shall on­ly tell you, that as far as I could yet discern, it seemed to me that among the Objects, our reason may con­template there are some whose Na­ture we cannot comprehend, others whose Attributes or Actions are such, as that we cannot understand [Page 6] how they should belong to the Sub­ject, or else that we cannot conceive how they should consist with some acknowledged Truth.

So that if I apprehend you right, you do not only admit some things to be above Reason, but make no less than three sorts of them.

If you will needs have two of them to be coincident, I shall not much contend, but I think the num­ber you have named may, without any great inconvenience, be admit­ted: For by things above Reason, I here understand (not false or ab­surd ones, but) such, as though the In­tellect sees sufficient cause (whether on the score of Experience, Au­thentick Testimony, or Mathema­tical Demonstration) to assent to; yet it finds it self reduc'd when 'tis conversant about them, to be so with a notable and peculiar disadvantage: And this disadvantage does usually proceed either from the nature of the thing proposed, which is such, [Page 7] that we cannot sufficiently compre­hend it, or from our not being able to conceive the manner of its exist­ing and operating; or from this, that it involves some notion or pro­position, that we see not how to re­concile with some other thing, that we are perswaded to be a truth. The first of these three sorts of things, may, for brevity and distinction sake be called Incomprehensible, the se­cond Inexplicable, and the third Un­sociable. But for fear lest the short­ness I have used in my expressions, may have kept them from being so clear, I shall somewhat more expli­citly reckon up the three sorts of things that seem to me above Rea­son.

The first consists of those whose Nature is not distinctly and ade­quately comprehensible by us: To which sort perhaps we may refer all those intellectual Beings (if it be granted that there are such) as are by nature of a higher order than hu­mane Souls. To which sort some [...] the Angels (at least of the good [Page 8] ones) may probably belong; but more than probably we may refer to this Head, the Divine Author of Nature, and of our Souls, Almigh­ty God, whose perfections are so boundless, and his Nature so very singular, that 'tis no less weakness than presumption to imagine, that such finite Beings as our Souls, can frame full and adequate Idea's of them: We may indeed know by the consideration of his works, and particularly those parts of them that we our selves are, both That he is, and in a great measure What he is not; but to understand throughly What he is, is a task too great for any but his own infinite Intellect: And therefore I think we may truly call this immense Object, in the newly declared sence, supra-Intel­lectual.

I suppose I may now ask what is the second sort of Things above Reason?

It consists of such, as [Page 9] though we cannot deny that they are, yet we cannot clearly and sa­tisfactorily conceive, how they can be such as we acknowledge they are. As how Matter can be infinitely, (or which is all one, in our present dis­course, indefinitely) divisible: And how there should be such an incom­mensurableness betwixt the Side and Diagonal of a Square, that no mea­sure, how small soever, can ade­quatly measure both the one and the other.

That Matter is endlesly divisible, is not only the assertion of Aristotle and the Schools, but generally em­braced by those rigid Reasoners, Geometricians themselves; and may be farther confirm'd by the other in­stance of the Side and Diagonal of a Square, whose incommensurable­ness is believed upon no less firm a proof, than a demonstration of Eu­clid, and was so known a truth a­mong the Ancients, that Plato is said to have pronounced him rather a Beast than a Man, that was a stran­ger to it. And yet if continued [Page 10] quantity be not divisible without stop, how can we conceive but that there may be found some determi­nate part of the side of a Square, which being often enough repeat­ed, would exactly measure the Di­agonal too. But though Mathema­tical Demonstrations assure us, that these things are so, yet those that have strained their Brains, have not been able clearly to conceive how it should be possible, that a Line (for instance) of not a quarter of an inch long, should be still divisible into lesser and lesser portions, without ever coming to an end of those sub­divisions; or how among the innu­merable differing partitions into ali­quot parts, that may be made of the side of a Square, not one of those parts can be found exactly to mea­sure so short a Line as the Diagonal may be.

There is yet behind, So­phronius, the third sort of those things, which, according to you, surpass our Reason.

I shall name that too, Eu­genius, as soon as I have premised that some of the Reasons that mo­ved me to refer some instances to this head, do not so peculiarly be­long to those instances, but that they may be applicable to others, which 'twas thought convenient to refer to the second or first of the foregoing Heads: And this being once inti­mated, I shall proceed to tell you, that the third sort of things that seem to surpass our Reason, consists of those, to which the Rules and Axioms and Notions, whereby we judge of the truth and falshood of ordinary, or other things, seem not to agree.

This third sort being such as are incumbred with Difficulties or Ob­jections, that cannot directly and satisfactorily be removed by them that acquiesce in the received Rules of subordinate Sciences, and do rea­son but at the common rate, such Objects of Contemplation as this third sort consists of, having some­thing belonging to them, that seems [Page 12] not reconcilable with some very manifest, or at least acknowledged Truths.

This it may here suffice to make out by a couple of Instances, the one of a Moral, the other of a Ma­thematical Nature: And first, that Man has a free will, in reference at least to civil matters, is the general confession of Mankind: All the Laws that forbid and punish Mur­der, Adultery, Theft, and other Crimes, being founded on a Sup­position, that men have a power to forbear committing them, and the sense men have of their being pos­sest of this power over their own actions, is great enough to make Malefactors acknowledg their pu­nishments to be just, being no less condemned by their own Conscien­ces, than by their Judges.

And yet (some Socinians, and some few others excepted) the ge­nerality of Mankind, whether Chri­stians, Jews, Mahometans, or Heathens, ascribe to God an infalli­ble Prescience of humane Actions, [Page 13] which is supposed by the belief of Prophecies, and the recourse to O­racles, by one or other of which two ways the Embracers of the se­veral Religions newly mentioned, have endeavoured and expected to receive the informations of future things, and such as depend upon the Actings of men. But how a certain fore-knowledg can be had of contingent things, and such as depend upon the free will of man, is that which many great wits that have solicitously tryed, have found themselves unable clearly to com­prehend, nor is it much to be ad­mired that they should be puzled to conceive how an infinitely per­fect Being should want Prescience, or that their will should want that liberty, whereof they feel in them­selves the almost perpetual exer­cise.

The other instance I promised you, Euge. is afforded me by Geo­metricians: For these (you know) teach the divisibility of Quantity in infinitum or without stop, to be [Page 14] Mathematically demonstrable. Give me leave then to propose to you a strait line of three foot long divided into two parts, the one double to the other. I suppose then, that ac­cording to their doctrine a line of two foot is divisible into infinite parts, or it is not: If you say it is not, you contradict the demonstra­tions of the Geometricians; if you say that it is, then you must confess either that the line of one foot is di­visible into as many parts as the line of two foot, though the one be but half the other, or else that the infi­nite parts, into which the line of one foot is granted to be divisible, is exceeded in number by the parts, into which the line of two foot is divisible, and consequently that the line of two foot has a multitude of parts greater than infinite. Which Reasonings may let us see that we may be reduced either to reject In­ferences legitimately drawn from manifest or granted Truths, or to admit conclusions that appear ab­surd; if we will have all the com­mon [Page 15] Rules whereby we judge of o­ther things to be applicable to In­finites.

And now, Gentlemen, having acquainted you with what sorts of things seem to be above Reason, I must, to prevent mistakes, desire you to take along with you this Ad­vertisement: That though the no­bleness and difficulty of so unculti­vated a Subject, inclined me to of­fer something towards the elucida­ting of it, by sorting those things into three kinds; yet I shall not, and need not in this Conference, insist on them severally, or lay any stress on this partition. For though I have above intimated, that a Propo­sition may speak of somewhat that is supra-intellectual, or else contain somewhat which we cannot con­ceive how it may be true, or lastly teach us somewhat for a truth, that we cannot reconcile with some o­ther thing, that we are convinced is true; yet if but any one of these have true Instances belonging to it, That may suffice for my main pur­pose [Page 16] in this place, where I need only shew in general, that there may be things that surpassour Reason, at least so far, that they are not to be judg­ed of by the same measures and rules, by which men are wont to judge of ordinary things, for which reason I shall often give them one common name, calling them Pri­viledg'd Things.

Methinks that to manifest the Imperfections of our Reason, in reference to what you call Privi­ledg'd Things, you need not have recourse to the unfathomable Abys­ses of the Divine Nature, since for ought I know, Pyrocles, as well as I, may be non-plus'd by an instance that came into my mind de Compo­sitione continui.

Since Sophronius has not thought fit to give us any of the Ar­guments of the contending party's, I shall be glad to know what diffi­culty occurr'd to you.

Suppose a great Circle di­vided [Page 17] into its three hundred and six­ty degrees, and suppose that as great a number as you please or can conceive, of strait lines, be drawn from the several designable parts of some one of these degrees, to the Centre, 'tis manifest that the degrees being equal, as many lines may be drawn from any, and so from every one of the others, as from that degree which was pitch­ed upon.

Then suppose a Circular Arch, equal to the assumed degree, to be further bent into the circumference of a little circle, having the same Centre with a great one, it follows from the nature of a Circle, and has been geometrically demonstra­ted, that the semi-diameters of a Circle how many soever they be, can no where touch one another but in the Centre. Whence 'tis e­vident, that all the lines that are drawn from the circumference to the Centre of the greater Circle▪ must pass by differing points of the circumference of the smaller, (for [Page 18] else they would touch one another before they arrive at the Centre) and consequently that as many lines soever as can even mentally be drawn from the several points of the circumference of the great Cir­cle to the common Centre of both Circles, must all pass through dif­ferent points of the little Circle, and thereby divide it into as many parts (proportionably smaller) as the greater Circle is divided into: So that here the circumference of the lesser Circle presents us with a curve line, which was not possibly divisible into more parts than an Arch of one degree, or the three hundred and sixtieth part of the Circumference of the greater Cir­cle, and yet without being length­ned, becomes divisible into as ma­ny parts as the whole circumfe­rence of the same greater Circle. And though we should suppose the circumference of the internal Cir­cle not to exceed one inch, and that of the exterior Circle to exceed the circumference of the Terrestrial [Page 19] Globe, or even of the Firmament it self, yet still the demonstration would hold, and all the lines drawn from this vast Circle, would find distinct points in the lesser, to pass through to their common Centre.

Though I will not pre­tend to confirm what Sophronius has been proving, by adding Argu­ments a priori; yet I shall venture to say, that I think it very agreea­ble both to the nature of God and to that of man, that what he has endeavoured to prove true should be so; for we men mistake and flat­ter Humane Nature too much, when we think our faculties of Un­derstanding so unlimited, both in point of capacity and of extent, and so free and unprepossest, as many Philosophers seem to suppose: For, whatever our self-love may incline us to imagine, we are really but created and finite Beings (and that probably of none of the highest or [...]ders of intellectual Creatures) and we come into the world, but such, as it pleased the Almighty and most [Page 20] free Author of our Nature to make us. And from this dependency and limitedness of our Natures, it fol­lows not only that we may be (for I now dispute not whether we are) born with certain congenit Notions and Impressions and Appetites or Tendencies of Mind; but also that the means or measures which are furnished us to employ in the searching or judging of Truth, are but such as are proportionable to Gods designs in creating us, and therefore may probably be suppo­sed not to be capable of reaching to all kinds, or if you please of Truths, many of which may be unnecessary for us to know here, and some may be reserved, partly to make us sen­sible of the imperfections of our Natures, and partly to make us as­pire to that condition, wherein our faculties shall be much enlarged and heightned. It seems not therefore unreasonable to think, both that God has made our faculties so limi­ted, that in our present mortal con­dition there should be some Objects [Page 21] beyond the comprehension of our Intellects (that is) that some of his creatures should not be able perfect­ly to understand some others, & yet that he has given us light enough to perceive that we cannot attain to a clear and full knowledge of them.

I think, Sophronius, that I now understand what you mean by Things above reason, or as you (not unfitly) stiled them, priviledg­ed things: But I presume you need not be told, that to explain the sence of a Proposition, and to make out the truth of it, (unless in common Notions, or things evident by their own light) are always two things, and oftentimes two very distant ones.

I need not scruple, Pyro­cles, to grant the truth of what you say, but I must not so easily admit your application of it; for among the examples, I have been propo­sing, there are some at least, that do not only declare what I mean by things above reason, but are instan­ces, [Page 22] and consequently may be proofs that such things there are. And to those I could have added others, if I had thought it unlikely, that in the progress of our Conference, there may be occasions offered of mentioning them more opportune­ly.

I have long thought that the wit of man, was able to lay a fine varnish upon any thing that it would recommend; but I have not till now found Reason set a work to degrade it self, as if it were a noble exercise of its power to establish its own impotency: And indeed 'tis strange to me, how you would have our Reason comprehend and reach things, that you your sel [...] confess to be above Reason, which is methinks, as if we were told that we may see things with our eye [...] that are invisible.

I do not think, that 'ti [...] to degrade the understanding, to refuse to idolize it, and 'tis not a [...] injury to Reason, to think it a li [...]mited faculty, but an injury to th [...] [Page 23] Author of it, to think man's un­derstanding infinite, like his. And if what I proposed be well ground­ed, I assign Reason its most noble and genuine Exercise, which is to close with discovered Truths, in whose embraces the perfection of the Intellect too much consists, to suffer that perfective action to be justly disparaging to it: And a sin­cere understanding is to give, or refuse its assent to propositions ac­cording as they are or are not true, not according as we could or could not wish they were so; and me­thinks it were somewhat strange, that Impartiality should be made a disparagement in a Judge. But, Pyrocles, leaving the reflection with which you usher'd in your Objecti­on, I shall now consider the Argu­ment it self, which being the weightiest that can be framed a­gainst the opinion you oppose, I shall beg leave to offer some consi­derations, wherein I shall endea­vour to answer it both by proving my Opinion by experience, and by [Page 24] shewing that experience not to be disagreeable to Reason.

I shall very willingly lis­ten to what you have to say on such a subject.

I shall then in the first place alledge the experience of ma­ny persons, and divers of them great Wits, who have perplexed themselves to reconcile, I say, not the Grace of God, but even his Pre­science to the liberty of mans will, even in bare moral actions: And I have found partly by their Wri­tings, and by discourse with some of them, that the most towring and subtle sort of Speculators, Meta­physicians, and Mathematicians, perchance after much racking of their brains, confess themselves quite baffled by the unconquerable difficulties they met with, not only in such abstruse subjects, as the na­ture of God, or of the humane Soul, but in the nature of what belongs in common to the most obvious Bo­dies in the world, and even to the least portions of them: You will ea­sily [Page 25] guess that I have my eye on that famous controversie, Whether or no a continued quantity (which e­very body, as having length, bredth, depth, must be allowed to have) be made up of Indivisibles. Of the perplexing difficulties of this Con­troversie, I might give you divers confessions, or complaints made by a sort of men too much accustomed to bold assertions and subtle Argu­ments, to be much disposed to make acknowledgments of that kind: But I shall content my self with the te­stimony which one of the more fa­mous modern Schoolmen gives both of himself and other learned men, and which if I well remem­ber, he thus expresses. Aggredi­mur comtinus compositionem, Ovied contr. 17. Phys. cujus hu­jusque non separata difficultas omnium Doctorum male ingenia vexavit, ne­que ullus fuit qui illam non pene insu­perabilem agnoscat. Hanc plerique terminorum obscuritate, illorumque replicatis & implicatis distinctioni­bus, & subdistinctionibus obtenebrant, ne aperté capiantur desperantes rem [Page 26] posse alio modo tractari neque rationis lucem sustinere, sed necessario confu­sionis tenebris obtegendum, ne argu­mentorum evidentiâ detegatur.

And though he had not been thus candid in his confession, yet what he says might be easily concluded by him, that shall duly weigh with how great, though not equal force of Arguments, each of the conten­ding parties imputes to the opinion it opposes, great and intolerable absurdities as contained in it, or le­gitimately deducible from it.

I have not the vanity to think that the weakness of my Rea­son ought to make another diffident of the strength of his: But as to my self, what Sophronius has been say­ing cannot but be confirm'd by se­veral tryals, wherein having exert­ed the small abilities I had to clear up to my self some of the difficul­ties about Infinites: I perceived to my trouble, that my speculations satisfied me of nothing so much, as the disproportionateness of those abstruse subjects to my reason. But, [Page 27] Sophronius, may it not be well ob­jected, that though the Instances you have given, have not been hi­therto cleared by the light of Rea­son; yet 'tis probable they may be so hereafter, considering how great progress is, from time to time, made in the discoveries of Nature, in this learned Age of ours.

In answer to this questi­on, Eugenius, give me leave to tell you first, that you allow my past discourse to hold good for ought yet appears to the contrary: Whence it will follow, that your Objection is grounded upon a hope, or at most a Conjecture about which I need not therefore trouble my self, till some new discoveries about the things in question, engage me to a new consideration of them. But in the mean while, give me leave to represent to you in the second place, that though I am very willing to believe, as well as I both desire and hope it, that this inquisitive Age we live in, will produce discoveries that will explicate divers of the [Page 28] more hidden mysteries of Nature, yet I expect that these discoveries will chiefly concern those things, which either we are ignorant of for want of a competent History of Nature, or we mistake by reason of erroneous Prepossessions, or for want of freedom and attention in our speculations. But I have not the like expectations as to all Meta­physical difficulties, (if I may so call them) wherein neither matters of Fact, nor the Hypothesis of sub­ordinate parts of Learning, are wont much to avail. But however it be, as to other abstruse Objects, I am very apt to think, that there are some things relating to that in­finite and most Monadical Being (if I may so speak) that we call God, which will still remain incom­prehensible even to Philosophical understandings. And I can scarce allow my self to hope to see those Obstacles surmounted, that pro­ceed not from any Personal infir­mity, or evitable faults, but from the limited nature of the Intellect: [Page 29] And to these two considerations, Eugenius, I shall in answer to your question, add this also: That as mens inquisitiveness may hereafter extricate some of those grand diffi­culties, that have hitherto perplex­ed Philosophers; so it may possibly lead them to discover new difficul­ties more capable than the first, of baffling humane understandings. For even among the things where­with we are already conversant, there are divers which we think we know, only because we never with due attention, tryed whether we can frame such Ideas of them, as are clear and worthy for a rational seeker and lover of truth to acqui­esce in. This the great intricacy that considering men find, in the notions commonly receiv'd of space, time, motion, &c. and the difficul­ties of framing perspicuous and sa­tisfactory apprehensions even of such obvious things, may render highly probable. We see also that the Angle of Contact, the Doctrine of Asymptotes, and that of surd num­bers [Page 30] and incommensurable Lines, all which trouble not common Ac­comptants and Surveyors, (who though they deal so much in num­bers and lines, seldom take notice of any of them) perplex the great­est Mathematicians, and some of them so much, that they can ra­ther demonstrate, that such affecti­ons belong to them, than they can conceive how they can do so: All which may render it probable, that mens growing curiosity is not more likely to find the solutions of some difficulties, than to take no­tice of other things, that may prove more insuperable than they.

This conjecture of yours, Sophronius, is not a little favoured by the Rota Aristotelica; for though the motion of a Cart-wheel is so obvious and seems so plain a thing, that the Carman himself never looks upon it with wonder; yet after Aristotle had taken notice of the difficulty that occurr'd about it, this trivial Phaenomenon has per­plex'd divers great Wits, not only [Page 31] Schoolmen, but Mathematicians, and continues yet to do so, there being some circumstances in the progressive motion and rotation of the circumference of a Wheel, and its Nave, or of two points assigned, the one in the former, and the o­ther in the latter, that have appear­ed too subtle (and even to modern) Writers, so hard to be conceived and reconciled to some plain and granted Truths, that some of them have given over the solution of the attending difficulties as desperate, which perchance, Pyrocles, would not think strange, if I had time to insist on the intricacies that are to be met with in a speculation, that seems so easie as to be despicable.

Your Instance, Timotheus, must be acknowledged a very preg­nant one, if you are certain that a better account cannot be given of the Rota Aristotelica, than is wont to be in the Schools, by those Peri­pateticks that either frankly con­fess the difficulties to be insoluble, or less ingenuously pretend to give [Page 32] solutions of them, that suppose things not to be proved, or perhaps so much as understood (as Rarefa­ction and Condensation strictly so called) or lose the question and per­haps themselves, by running up the dispute into that most obscure and perplexing Controversie de compo­sitione continui.

I am content to forbear pressing any further at present an Objection; much of whose force depends on future contingents, and I shall the rather dismiss the proof drawn from experience, that I may the sooner put you in mind of your having promised us another Argu­ment to the same purpose, by ma­nifesting the opinion to be agreea­ble to Reason.

I understand your plea­sure, Eugenius, and shall endeavour to comply with it, but the difficul­ty and intricateness of the Subject of our discourse, obliges me to do it by steps; and for fear we should want time for more necessary things, I will not now stay to exa­mine [Page 33] whether all the things that hitherto have appeared above Rea­son, be impenetrable to us, because of an essential disability of our un­derstandings, proceeding from the imperfection and limitedness of their nature, or only because of some other impediment, such as may be especially the condition of the soul in this life, or the infirmi­ties resulting from its state of union with a gross and mortal body.

Forbearing then to discourse how this came into my mind, and what thoughts I had upon it, I shall pro­ceed in my considerations; and to clear the way for those that are to follow, I shall in the first place ob­serve to you, that whatever be thought of the faculty in abstracto, yet Reason operates according to certain Notions or Ideas, and cer­tain Axiomes and Propositions, by which as by Prototypes or Models, and Rules and Measures, it con­ceives things, and makes estimates and judgments of them. And in­deed when we say that such a thing [Page 34] is consonant to Reason, or repug­nant to it, we usually mean that it is either immediately or mediate­ly deducible from, or at least con­sistent with, or contradictory to one or other of those standard No­tions or Rules.

And this being premis'd, I con­sider in the next place, that if these Rules and Notions be such, as are abstracted only from finite things, or are congruous but to them; they may prove useless or deceitful to us, when we go about to stretch them beyond their measure, and apply them to the infinite God, or to things that involve an Infiniteness either in multitude, magnitude, or littleness.

To illustrate and confirm this no­tion, give me leave to represent in the third place, that in my opinion all the things that we naturally do know or can know, may be divided into these two sorts: The one such as we may know without a Medium▪ and the other such as we cannot at­tain to, but by the intervention of [Page 35] a Medium, or by a discursive act. To the first belong such Notions as are supposed to be connate, or if you please innate, such as that Two contradictories cannot be both together true. The whole is greater than a­ny part of it; Every (entire) num­ber is either even or odd, &c. And also those other Truths, that are assented to upon their own account without needing any medium to prove them; because that as soon as, by perspicuous terms, or fit ex­amples, they are clearly proposed to the understanding, they discover themselves to be true so manifestly by their own light, that they need not be assisted by any intervening Proposition, to make the Intellect acquiesce in them; of which kind are some of Euclids Axioms, as that, If to equal things equal things be added, the totals will be equal; and that two right lines cannot include a space. To the second sort of things knowable by us, belong all that we acquire the knowledge of by Ratio­cinations, wherein by the help of [Page 36] intervening Propositions or Medi­ums, we deduce one thing from a­nother, or conclude affirmatively or negatively one thing of another. This being supposed, and we being conscious to our selves, if it were but upon the score of our own infir­mities and imperfections, that we are not Authors of our own nature; for ought we know it may be true, and all the experience we have hi­therto had, leads us to think it is true, that the measures suggested to us either by sensations, the re­sults of sensible observation, or the other instruments of knowledge, are such as fully reach but to finite things or Beings, and therefore are not safely applicable to others. And divers of those very Principles that we think very general, may be (if I may so speak) but gradual notions of truth, and but limited and re­spective, not absolute and univer­sal.

And here give me leave, as a far­ther consideration, to take notice to you, that though perfect Syllogism [Page 37] be counted the best and most regu­lar forms that our Ratiocinations can assume, yet even the laws of these are grounded on the doctrine of Proportions: For even between things equal there may be a propor­tion (namely that of equality) upon which ground I suppose it is, that Mathematical Demonstrations have been publickly proposed of the grand Syllogistical Rules. And in consequence of this, I shall add that Geometricians will tell you, that there is no proportion betwixt a fi­nite line and an infinite, Rationem habere inter se quantita­tes dicuntur quae possunt multiplica­tae, sese mu­tuo superare. because the former can never be so often taken, as to exceed the latter, which ac [...]cording to Euclid's definition of Proportion, it should be capable to do. Definit. 5. Of which Premises the use I would make is to perswade you, Elem. V. that since the understanding ope­rates but by the Notions and Truths 'tis furnished with, Euclidis. and these are its instruments by proportion to which it takes measures, and makes judgments of other things; these Instruments may be too dispropor­tionate [Page 38] to some Objects to be secure­ly employed to determine divers particulars about them: So the eye being an instrument which the un­derstanding employs to estimate distances, we cannot by that safely take the bredth of the Ocean, be­cause our sight cannot reach far e­nough to discover how far so vast an object extends it self. And not only the common instruments of Surveyors that would serve to mea­sure the height of an house or a stee­ple, or even a Mountain, cannot e­nable them to take the distance of the Moon; but, when Astronomers do, by supposition, take a chain that reaches to the Centre of the Earth, (and therefore is by the Moderns judged to be near four thousand miles long) even then I say, though by the help of this and the Paral­laxes, they may tolerably well mea­sure the distance of some of the neerer Planets, especially the Moon [...] yet with all their great industry [...] they cannot by the same way (o [...] perhaps any other yet known) wit [...] [Page 39] any thing tolerable acurateness, measure the distance of the fixed Stars; the Semidiameter of the Earth, bearing no sensible propor­tion to that of so vast a Sphere as the Firmament, whose distance makes the Parallaxes vanish, it being as to sence all one, whether at so great a remove, a Star be observ'd from the Centre, or from the surface of the Earth.

In a matter so abstruse, a little Illustration by examples, may be very proper and welcome.

'Tis scarce possible to find very apposite examples, to illustrate things of a kind so abstruse and he­teroclite as those may well be sup­pos'd, that do surpass our Rea­son.

But yet some assistance may be borrowed from what we may ob­serve in that other faculty of the mind, which is most of kin to the Intellect, I mean the Imagination: For when, for instance, I think of a Triangle or a Square, I find in my fancy an intuitive Idea (if I may so [Page 40] call it) of those figures that is a Pi­cture clear and distinct, as if a fi­gure of three sides or four equal sides, and Angles were placed be­fore my eyes.

But if I would fancy a myriagon, or a figure consisting of ten thou­sand equal sides, my Imagination is overpowered with so great a mul­titude of them, and frames but a confused Idea of a Polygon with a very great many sides: For if (to speak suitably to what the excel­lent Des Cartes has well observed in the like case) a man should endea­vour to frame Ideas of a Myriagon or a Chiliagon, they would be both so confused, that his Imagination would not be able clearly to discri­minate them, though the one has ten times as many sides as the other. So if you would imagine an Atome, of which perhaps ten thousand would scarce make up the bulk of one of the light particles of dust, that seem to play in the Sunbeams when they are shot into a darkned place, so extraordinary a littleness [Page 41] not having fallen under any of our Senses, cannot truly be represented in our imagination. So when we speak of Gods Primity (if I may so call it) Omnipotence, and some o­ther of his infinite Attributes and Perfections, we have some conce­ptions of the things we speak of, but may very well discern them to be but inadequate ones: And though divers Propositions relating to things above Reason, seem clear enough to ordinary Wits, yet he that shall with a competent mea­sure of attention, curiosity, and skill, consider and examine them; shall find that either their parts are inconsistent with one another, or they involve contradictions to some acknowledged or manifest Truths, or they are veil'd over with dark­ness and incumbered with difficul­ties, from whence we are not able to rescue them. Thus when the side and Diagonal of a Square are proposed, we have clear and di­stinct Ideas of each of them apart, and when they are compared, we [Page 42] may have a conception of their in­commensurableness. But yet this negative notion, if it be throughly considered, and far enough pursu­ed, clearly contains that of a strait lines being divisible in infinitum; and that divisibility is incumbred with so many difficulties, and is so hard to be reconciled to some con­fessed dictates of Reason, that (as we have seen already) Philosophers and Geometricians that are con­vinc'd of the truth, are to this day labouring to extricate themselves out of those perplexing intrica­cies.

I will not trouble you with the puzling, if not insuperable difficul­ties, that incumber the doctrine of Eternity, as 'tis wont to be propo­sed in the Schools of Divines and Philosophers, lest you should al­ledge that these difficulties spring rather from the bold assumptions and groundless subtleties of the Schoolmen, than from the nature of the thing it self: But I will pro­pose somewhat that cannot be [Page 43] denyed, which is, that some sub­stance or other, whether, as I be­lieve, God, or as the Peripateticks say, the World, or as the Epicure­ans contend, Matter, never had a beginning, that is, has been for e­ver. But when we speak of an e­ternity à parte ante (as they call it) we do not speak of a thing where­of we have no conception at all, as will appear to a considering person, and yet this general notion we have is such, that when we come atten­tively to examine it, by the same ways by which we judge of almost all other things, the Intellect is non-plus'd: For we must conceive, that the time efflux'd since Adam (or any other man as remote from us as he is said to have been) began to live, bears no more proportion to the duration of God, or of Mat­ter, than to those few minutes I have imployed about mentioning this instance. Nay if we would be Aristotelians, the same thing may be said as to those men, that lived many thousand millions of years [Page 44] before the time we reckon that A­dam began to live in: For each of these times being finite and measu­rable by a determinate number of years, can bear no proportion to that infinite number of years (or somewhat that is equivalent) which must be allowed to a duration that never had a beginning. And as there are some things whose nature and consequences pose our Facul­ties, so there are others, whereof though we have a notion, yet the modus operandi is beyond our com­prehension; I do not mean only the true and certain modus operandi, but even an intelligible one. As, though divers learned men, especially Car­tesians, and that upon a Philoso­phical account, assert, that God created the world; yet how a sub­stance could be made out of no­thing (as they, and the generality of Christians confessedly hold) I fear we cannot conceive. And though all Philosophers, very few excepted, believe God to be the Maker of the World (out of pre­existent [Page 45] matter) yet how he could make it but by locally moving the parts of the Matter it was to consist of, and how an incorporeal sub­stance can move a body, which it may pass through without resist­ance, is that which I fear will be found hardly explicable: For if it be said, that the Soul, being an im­material substance, can never the less move the Limbs of the humane Body rightly dispos'd, I shall an­swer that it does not appear that the rational Soul doth give any mo­tion to the parts of the Body, but only guide or regulate that which she finds in them already.

May it not then be ra­tionally said, that by making ob­servations of such things that are the proper Objects of our faculties, and by making legitimate deducti­ons from such observations, and from our other knowledges whe­ther innate or acquired, we may come to be certain, that some things are, and so have general and dark Ideas of them, when at the same [Page 46] time we are at a loss to conceive how they can be such, or how they can operate and perform what they do, supposing the Truth and suffi­ciency of some other things we are convinced of. To be short, nega­tive apprehensions we may have of some priviledged things, and posi­tive, but indistinct apprehensions we may have of others, and that is enough to make us in some sort understand our selves, and one ano­ther, when we speak of them, though yet when we sufficiently consider what we say, we may find that our words are not accompa­nied with clear, distinct, and sym­metrical conceptions, of those ab­struse and perplexing things we speak of. And since, as hath been already shewn, we find by expe­rience, that we are unable suffici­ently to comprehend things, that by clear and legitimate consequen­ces may be evinc'd to be, why should not this cogently argue, that some of our conceptions may be of things, to which somewhat belongs [Page 47] that transcends our Reason, and surpasses our comprehension? And if I would play the Logician with Pyrocles, I would tell him that his Objection destroys his Opinion: For since he talks to us of what is incomprehensible, that term must or must not be attended with some suitable Idea: If it be not, let him consider, whether in his own Phrase he speaks sence and not like a Par­rot; but if it be, let him then con­fess, that one may have some kind of Idea of a thing incomprehensi­ble. But, Pyrocles, whether or no you think I prevaricate in this, you will not, I hope, suspect me of doing it, in adding that when na­tural Theology had taught men, (as well Philosophers as others) to believe God to be an infinitely per­fect Being, we ought not to say that they had no Idea of such a Being, because they had not a clear and ad­equate one. And since Aristotle discourses ex professo and prolixly enough, de infinito, and cites the ancienter Philosophers for having [Page 48] done so before him, and since (be­sides his Commentators and Fol­lowers) Democritus, Epicurus, fol­lowed by Gassendus and other late Philosophers, maintain either that the world is boundless, or that space (real or imaginary) is not finite in extent, or that the world consists of Atoms infinite in number; I hope you will not put such an affront up­on all these great persons, as to think they said they knew not what, when they discoursed de infinito, as they must have done, if they spake without Ideas of the things they spake of, though it may be justly supposed, that the Subject being infinite, the Ideas they framed of it, could not be comprehensive and accurate.

So that according to you, Sophronius, it may be said, that by reason we do not properly perceive Things above Reason, but only per­ceive that they are above Reason, there being a dark and peculiar kind of Impression made upon the understanding, while it sets it self [Page 49] to contemplate such confounding Objects, by which peculiarity of impression, as by a distinct and un­wonted kind of internal sensation, the understanding is brought to di­stinguish this sort of things (name­ly) transcendent or priviledg'd ones from others, and discern them to be disproportionate to the powers with which it uses throughly to penetrate Subjects, that are not im­pervious to it. As when the Eye looks into a deep Sea, though it may pierce a little way into it, yet when it would look deeper, it dis­covers nothing but somewhat which is dark and indistinct, which affects the sensory so differingly from what other more genuine ob­jects are wont to do, that by it we easily discern, that our sight fails us in the way before it arrives at the bottom, and consequently that there may be many things conceal'd there, that our sight is unable to reach.

I guess, Gentlemen, by the silence you seem to conspire in, [Page 50] after so long a debate, that you have now said as much as at present you think fit to say for and against this Proposition, that there are Things above our Reason.

I shall not, for my part, cross your Observation, Timotheus, but instead of adding any new proofs, shall only desire you to look back upon those I have present­ed you already, and to let me re­mind you, that of the two Argu­ments by which I attempted to shew that there are some things above Reason, the first and chiefest was suggested by Experience, and the other which was drawn from the nature of things and of man, was brought as 'twere, ex abundanti, to illustrate and confirm the former, and give occasion to some hints a­bout priviledg'd Subjects. And therefore though I hope what has been discours'd by these Gentlemen and me, may be able to perswade Pyrocles, that the acknowledgment that some things are above Reason may fairly comply with the di­ctates [Page 51] of it, yet whatever he thinks of the cogency of our discourse, the truth of the main conclusion may be sufficiently evinc'd by our first Argument drawn from experi­ence: For if we really find, that there are things which our Reason cannot comprehend, then whether the account these Gentlemen and I have given, why our faculties are insufficient, for these things be good or not; yet still some true ac­count or other there must be of that insufficiency. And as we should very thankfully receive from Pyro­cles, any better account than what we have propounded, so if he can­not assign any better, I hope he will joyn with us in looking upon this, as very agreeable to our Hypothe­sis; since hereby some things must appear to us so sublime and ab­struse, that not only we find we are not able to comprehend them, but that we are unable to discern so much as upon what account it is that they cannot be comprehended by us.

I am not averse, Sophroni­us, from your Paradox about gra­dual notions, and I am the more in clin'd to think, that some of the Axioms and Rules that are reputed to be very general, are not to be in differently extended to all Subject and cases whatsoever; when I con­sider the differing apprehension that the mind may frame of the same object, as well according to the vigour or (if I may so call it rank of the understanding, as ac­cording to the differing informati­on 'tis furnished with: For if on [...] should propose to a child, for in [...]stance, of four or five years old the demonstration of the one hu [...]dred and seventeenth Propositio [...] of Euclid's tenth Book, wherein [...] proves the side and Diagonal [...] a Square to be incommensur [...]ble, thongh possibly he may be [...]ble to read the words that expre [...] the Theorem, and though he ha [...] eyes to see the Scheme imploy [...] for the demonstration, yet if [...] should spend a whole year about [...] [Page 53] you would never be able to make him understand it, because 'tis quite above the reach of a Childs capaci­ty: And if one should stay till he be grown a man, yet supposing him to have never learned Geome­try, though he may easily know what you mean by two incommen­surable lines, yet all the reason he has attained to in his virile age, would but indispose him to attain to that demonstration; for all the experience he may have had of lines, will but have suggested to him as a manifest and general truth, that of any two strait lines we may by measuring find how ma­ny Feet, Inches, or other determi­nate measure, the one exceeds the other. And though one that has been orderly instructed in all that long train of Propositions, that in Euclid's Elements precede the one hundred and seventeenth of the tenth Book, will be also able to ar­rive at an evidence of this truth, that those two Lines are incommensu­rable; yet (as Sophronius formerly [Page 54] noted) how it should be possible that two short Lines being propo­sed, whereof each by it self is easi­ly measurable among those innu­merable multitudes of parts into which each of them may be men­tally divided, there should not be any one capable of exactly measu­ring both, is that which even a Geometrician that knows it is true is not well able to conceive. But Gentlemen, that you may not ac­cuse my digression, I shall urge these comparisons no further, my scope in mentioning them being to observe to you, that for ought w [...] know to the contrary, such a diffe [...]rence of intellectual Abilities as i [...] but gradual in Children and Men [...] may be essential in differing rank [...] of Intellectual Beings. And so [...] may be, that some of those Axiom that we think general, may, whe [...] we apply them to things whereo [...] they are not the true and prope [...] measures, lead us into error, thoug [...] perhaps Intellects of an higher o [...]der may unriddle those difficulti [...] [Page 55] that confound us men, which con­jecture I should confirm by some things that would be readily grant­ed me by Christians, if I thought it proper to play the Divine in a discourse purely Philosophical.

You, Gentlemen, have taken the liberty to make long dis­courses, and I shall not much blame you for it, because 'tis a thing as more easily, so more speedily done, to propose difficulties than to solve them; yet methinks amongst you all, you have left one part of my Objection unanswer'd, not to say untouch'd.

I suppose, Pyrocles, you mean what you said about discern­ing invisible things with the Eye, but I purposely forbore to take no­tice of that, because I foresaw it might be more seasonably done, after some other points had been clear'd: Wherefore give me leave now to represent to you, as a Co­rollary from the foregoing discour­ses, that nothing hinders but that we may reasonably suppose, that [Page 56] the great and free Author of hu­mane nature, God, so framed the nature of Man, as to have furnish'd his Intellective Faculty with a light, whereby it cannot only make esti­mates of the power of a multitude of other things, but also judge of its own nature and power, and dis­cern some at least of the limits be­yond which it cannot safely exercise its act of particularly and perem­ptorily judging and defining. And now that God, who (as I said) is a most free Agent, may have given the mind of Man such a limited nature, accompanied with such a measure of light, you will not I presume deny but the question is, you will tell me, whether he hath done so? But I hope what has been formerly discoursed by these Gen­tlemen and me, has put that almost quite out of question. However, I shall now invite you to observe with me, that the Rational Soul does not only pass judgments about things without her, but about her self, and what passes within her: [Page 57] She searches out and contemplates her own spirituality and union with the Body. The Intellect judges wherein its own nature consists, and whether or no it self be a di­stinct faculty from the Will; and to come yet closer to the point, be pleased to consider, that Logick and Metaphysicks are the works of the Humane Intellect, which by fra­ming those disciplines, manifests, that it does not only judge of Ra­tiocinations, but of the very Prin­ciples and Laws of Reasoning, and teaches what things are necessary to the obtaining of an Evidence and Certainty, and what kind of Me­diums they are from whence you must not expect any demonstrative Arguments, concerning such or such a subject. To these things it is agreeable, that if we will com­pare the bodily Eye with the Un­derstanding, which is the Eye of the Mind, we must allow this dif­ference, that the Intellect is as well a Looking-glass as a Sensory, since it does not only see other things but [Page 58] it self too, and can discern its own blemishes or bad conformation, or whatever other infirmitiesit labours under. Upon which consideration, we may justifie the boldness of our excellent Verulam, who when he sets forth the four sorts of Idols (as he calls them) that mislead the stu­diers of Philosophy, makes one of them to be Idola Tribûs, by which he means those Notions, that tho' radicated in the very nature of mankind, are yet apt to mislead us, which may confirm what I was say­ing before, that the Soul, when duly excited, is furnished with a light, that may enable her to judge even of divers of those original No­tions, by which she is wont to judge of other things. To be short, the Soul upon tryal may find by an in­ward sence, that some things sur­pass her forces, as a blind man that were set to lift up a rock would quickly find it too unweildy to be manag'd by him, and the utmost exercise of his strength would but convince him of the insufficiency [Page 59] of it, to surmount so great a weight or resistance; so that we do not pretend that the Eye of the Mind should see Invisibles, but only that it shall discern the limits of that Sphere of Activity, within which Nature hath bounded it, and con­sequently that some Objects are dis­proportionate to it. And I remem­ber that Aristotle himself says, that the eye sees both light and darkness, which expression, though some­what odd, may be defended by say­ing, that though since darkness is a Privation, not a Being, it cannot properly be the object of sight, yet it may be perceived by means of the Eye, by the very differing affection which that Organ resents, when it is imprest on by luminous or en­lightned Objects, and when it is made useless to us by darkness.

What you have said, Sophronius, has in great part pre­vented one thing that might be said to strengthen Pyrocles his objection, namely, that whereas when we see with our bodily eyes, there is be­sides [Page 60] the outward Organ an inter­nal and rational faculty, that per­ceives by the help of the eye, that which is not directly the object of sight in the Eye of the Mind, the Intellect, there is but one faculty to perceive and judge: For accord­ing to your notion, it may be well answered, that the Intellect being capable by its proper light, to judge of it self and its own acts as well as of other things, there is no need of two Principles, the one to perceive and the other to judge, since one is sufficient for both those purposes.

When I have time to re­flect on all that I have heard alledg'd amongst you, Gentlemen, I shall consider how far your Arguments ought to obtain my assent: But in the mean while I must tell you, that they will scarce have all the success I presume you desire, unless you add somewhat to free me from what yet sticks with me of a scruple, that is much of the nature of that which I formerly proposed, being this; How we can justifie our presuming to [Page 61] discourse at all of things transcending Reason? For I cannot understand how a man that admits your opi­nions, can intelligibly speak (and to speak otherwise mis-becomes a rational creature) of what is infi­nite or any thing that surpasses our reason; since when we discourse of such things, either our words are, or are not accompanied with clear and distinct Ideas or concepti­ons of the things we speak of: If they be not, what do we other than speak nonsence, or (as hath been already said) like Parrots entertain our Hearers with words, that we our selves do not understand; and if they be, then we do in effect com­prehend those things, which yet you would have me think to be on some account or other, Incomprehensible.

I acknowledge this diffi­culty, Pyrocles, to be a great one; but yet I think it not so great as that it ought to interdict us all discour­sing of things above Reason: And this would perhaps appear probable enough, if, as your objection bor­rows [Page 62] much of what you have for­merly alledg'd, so I may be allowed, as well to repeat some things as pro­pose others, in making answer to it.

I for my part shall not only give you my consent to do so, but make it my request that you would do it, for when I look back upon our conference, methinks I plainly perceive that partly the ob­jections of Pyrocles, and partly some (I fear impertinent) interpositions of mine, have kept your discourse from being so methodical as other­wise you would have made it, and therefore to be reminded of some of the chief points of your doctrine, as well as to connect them with those you shall judge fit to strength­en or illustrate them, may much conduce to make us both under­stand it more clearly, and remem­ber it better.

I am much of your mind, Timotheus, but though my inter­positions have been far more fre­quent and much less pertinent than yours, yet I am not troubled that [Page 63] the method of our conference has been so much disturb'd; because I think such a free way of discoursing, wherein emergent thoughts if they be considerable, are permitted to appear as they arise in the mind, is more useful than a nice method in a debate about an uncultivated and highly important subject, in which I think we should aim at first rather to inquire than to resolve, and to procure as many hints and conside­rations as we can, in order to our fuller information against our next meeting, without suppressing any that is true or useful, only because it agrees not so well with a regular method, as it does with the design of our conference.

Without reflecting upon either of those Gentlemen that have been pleased to accuse themselves, I shall readily comply with the mo­tion made by Timotheus, and after having proposed some distinctions make application of them.

And the better to clear this mat­ter in reference to Pyrocles's objecti­on, [Page 64] I shall first take the liberty to make some distinctions of the No­tions or conceptions of the Mind, and for brevity sake give names to those I have now occasion to em­ploy. I consider then, that whether the conceptions or Ideas we have of things be simple or compounded, they may be distinguished into such as are particular or distinct, and such as are only general, dark, and confus'd, or indistinct: So when a Navigator to unknown Countries first gets a sight of Land, though he may be satisfied that it is Land, yet he has but a very dark and confus'd picture of it made in his eye, and cannot descry whether or no the shore be rocky, or what Creeks or Harbours (if any) it have in it▪ much less whether the Coast be well inhabited, and if it be, what kind of buildings it has; all which he may plainly and distinctly see upon his going ashore. And this mention of the Sea puts me in mind to point at another distinction, which is that of some things we [Page 65] have an adequate, of others, but an inadequate conception; as if we sup­pose the Navigator I was speaking of, should look towards the main Sea, though he might see a good way distinctly, yet at length it would appear so darkly and confu­sedly to him, that at the verge of the sensible Horizon, his sight would make him judge that the Sea and Sky come together, and yet he would conclude that the utmost part of the Sea he could descry, was but a part of the Ocean, which may, for ought he knows, reach to a vast extent beyond the visible Ho­rizon.

To our confused, and often also to our inadequate conceptions, be­long many of those that may be called Negative, which we are wont to imploy when we speak of Privations or Negations, as Blind­ness, Ignorance, Death, &c. We have a positive Idea of things that are square and round, and black and white, and in short of other things, whose shapes and colours make [Page 66] them the objects of our sight: Bu [...] when we say, for instance, that [...] Spirit or an Atome is invisible [...] those words are attended with a ne [...]gative conception, which is com [...]monly but dark and confused be [...]cause 'tis indefinite, and remove [...] or lays aside those marks, by whic [...] we are wont clearly to perceive an [...] distinguish visible substances: An [...] when we say that such a thing [...] impossible, we have some kind o [...] conception of what we speak of, b [...] 'tis a very obscure and indistinc [...] one at best, exhibiting only a gene [...]ral and very confused representat [...]on of some ways, whereby on [...] might think the thing likely to b [...] effected if it were at all perform [...]ble, accompanied with a percept [...]on of the insufficiency of tho [...] ways. There is yet another diff [...]rence in the notions we have [...] things, which though not wont [...] be observed, is too important to [...] here pretermitted, and it is thi [...] That of some things we have [...]knowledg, that for want of a fit [...] [Page 67] term may be called primary or di­rect, and of some other things the knowledge we have is acquired but by inferring it from some more known or clearer truth; and so may be called inferr'd or illative knowledge. As when a Geome­trician defines to me an Hyperbole, I quickly gain a clear and distinct Idea of it, but when he proves to me that this Hyperbole may have such a relation to a strait line which he calls Asymptote, that this line being continued still comes nearer and nearer to the prolonged side of the Hyperbole, and yet how far so­ever both be drawn, 'twill never come to touch it, his subtil demon­strations present me with an infer'd or illative truth, at which we ar­riv'd not but by the help of a train of ratiocinations, and on which if we exercise our imagination, we shall find this factitious truth, if we may so call it, accompanied but with a very dim and confused Idea. To the foregoing distinctions, give me leave to add but this one more, [Page 68] which belongs chiefly to the not [...]ons we have of true or false propos [...]tions, namely, that of our concept [...]ons of things, some are Symmetrici [...] (if I may so call them) or every wa [...] consistent, by which I mean th [...] that have these two qualification [...] the one that all the parts are consi [...]ent among themselves, and the [...]ther that the entire Idea is consi [...]ent with all other truths; and so [...] are Chymerical or Asymmetrical, [...] which I understand those that a [...] either self-destroying by the contr [...]riety of the parts themselves th [...] are made up of, as if one sho [...] talk of a triangular square, or a [...] shiny night; or being extravaga [...] lead to some manifest absurdit [...] that may be legitimately inferr [...] from them, or into inextrica [...] difficulties, or involve a real rep [...]nancy to some acknowledg'd tru [...] or rule of Reason.

To what I have hitherto said [...] must add these two observation▪ The First, that the mind of Ma [...] so framed, that when she is [...] [Page 69] instructed and is not wanting to her self, she can perceive a want of light in her self for some purposes, or of clearness and completeness in the best Idaeas she is able to frame of some things, and on this account can so far take notice of the extent and imperfection of her own facul­ties, as to discern that some objects are disproportionate to her; As when we attentively consider the dimensions of space, or (if the Car­tesians judge aright, that body is nothing but extended substance) those of the Universe, we may by tryal perceive that we cannot con­ceive them so great, but that they may be yet greater, or if you please may exceed the bounds, how re­mote soever, which our former conception presum'd to assign them; which may be illustrated by what happens to the eye, when it looks upon the main Sea; since we easi­ly grow sensible that how far soever we can discover it, yet our sight falls far short of the extent of that vast object. And 'tis by the sense [Page 70] which the mind has of her own l [...]mitedness and imperfection on cer [...]tain occasions, that I think we ma [...] estimate what things ought no [...] and what ought to be looked upo [...] as Things above Reason; for by th [...] Term, I would not have you thin [...] I mean such things as our ration [...] faculty cannot at all reach to, [...] has not any kind of perception [...] for of such things we cannot in pa [...]ticular either speak or think li [...] men: But my meaning is this, th [...] whereas the rational Soul is consc [...]ous to her own acts, and feels, th [...] she knows divers sorts of thin [...] truly and clearly; and thereby ju [...]ly concludes them to be within [...] compass of her faculties; when [...] contemplates some few things th [...] seem to be of another order, she [...] convinc'd that however she stra [...] her power, she has no such Ide [...] or perception of them, as she [...] or may have of those objects th [...] are not disproportionate to her [...]culties: And this is my first Obse [...]vation.

[Page 71] The other thing that I was to ob­serve about the nature of the Mind is, that 'tis so constituted, that its faculty of drawing consequences from known truths, is of greater extent than its power of framing clear and distinct Idaeas of things; so that by subtle or successive infe­rences, it may attain to a clear con­viction that some things are, of whose nature and properties (or at least of some of them) it can frame no clear and satisfactory concepti­ons. And that men should be bet­ter able to infer propositions about divers things, than to penetrate their nature, needs the less be won­dred at, both because 'tis oftentimes sufficient for our uses to know that such things are, though that know­ledge be not accompanied with a clear and distinct Idaea; and because oftentimes the Rules (such as, what­ever is produced must have a cause; and, from Truth, nothing rightly fol­lows but Truth) are clear and easie that enable the Mind to infer con­clusions about things, whose nature [Page 72] is very dark, and abstruse.

I know, Sophronius, that you have not laid down these preli­minary distinctions and remarks without designing to make use of them, which the little time that now remains to manage our confe­rence in, calls upon you to proceed to do.

I was just going to say, Eugenius, that after what I have premised, I hope it may now be sea­sonable to apply the newly deliver­ed Notions to the three sorts of things that I formerly represented as being in some sence above reason. For I consider, that there are some objects of so immense and peculiar a nature, that (if I may so speak) by an easie view of the mind, that is without any subtle and laborious disquisition, the Soul discerns, and as it were feels the Object to be dis­proportionate to her powers: And accordingly if she thinks sit to try, she quickly finds her self unable to frame conceptions of them fit to be acquiesc'd in, and this sort of Ob­jects [Page 73] I do upon that account call in­conceivable, or (on some occasions) supra-intellectual.

But when by attentively consi­dering the attributes and operati­ons of things, we sometimes find that a thing hath some property be­longing to it, or doth perform somewhat, which by reflecting on the beings and ways of working that we know already, we cannot discern to be reducible to them or derivable from them, we then con­clude this property or this opera­tion to be inexplicable; that is, such as that it cannot so much as in a ge­neral way be intelligibly accounted for, and this makes the second sort of our things above Reason. But this is not all, for the Rational Soul that is already furnished with in­nate, or at least primitive Idaeas and Rules of true and false, when she comes to examine certain things and make successive inferences a­bout them, she finds (sometimes to her wonder as well as trouble) that she cannot avoid admitting some [Page 74] consequences as true & good which she is not able to reconcile to some other manifest Truth or acknow­ledged Proposition: And whereas other Truths are so harmonious, that there is no disagreement be­tween any two of them, the Hete­roclite Truths I speak of appear not symmetrical with the rest of the body of Truths, and we see not how we can at once embrace these and the rest, without admitting that grand absurdity which subverts the very foundation of our reasonings, That Contradictories may both be true. As in the controversie about the endless divisibility of a strait line, since 'tis manifest that a line of three foot for instance is thrice as long as a line of one foot, so that the short­er line is but the third part of the longer, it would follow that a part of a line may contain as many parts as a whole, since each of them is divisible into infinite parts, which seems repugnant to common sence, and to contradict one of those com­mon Notions in Euclid, whereon [Page 75] Geometry it self is built. Upon which account I have ventured to call this third sort of things above Reason Asymmetrical or Unsociable, of which eminent instances are af­forded us by those controversies (such as that of the compositio conti­nui) wherein which side soever of the question you take, you will be unable directly and truly to answer the objections that may be urged to show that you contradict some primitive or some other acknow­ledged truth.

These, Eugenius, are some of the considerations by which I have been induced to distinguish the things that to me seem to over­match our Reason, into three kinds. For of those things I have stil'd Un­conceivable, our Idaeas are but such as a moderate attention suffices to make the mind sensible that she wants either light or extent enough to have a clear and full comprehen­sion of them: And those things that I have called Inexplicable, are those which we cannot perceive to de- [Page 76] upon the Idaeas we are furnished with, and to resemble in their man­ner of working any of the Agents whose nature we are acquainted with: And lastly, those things which I have named Unsociable, are such as have Notions belonging to them, or have conclusions deduci­ble from them, that are (for ought we can discern) either incongruous to our primitive Idaeas, or when they are driven home, inconsistent with the manifest Rules we are fur­nished with, to judge of True and False.

I presume, Sophronius, that by sorting things above Reason into three kinds, you do not intend to deny but that 'tis possible one object may in differing regards be refer­red to more than one of these sorts.

You apprehend me very right, Eugenius, and the truth of what you say may sufficiently ap­pear in that noblest of Objects, God.

We owe so much to God, the most perfect of Beings, [Page 77] not only for other blessings, but for those very Intellects that enable us to contemplate him, that I shall be very glad to learn any thing that may increase my wonder and vene­ration for an Object, to whom I can never pay enough of either.

You speak like your self, Timotheus, and I wish I were as able as I ought to be willing, to satisfie your desire: But since we are now discoursing like Philosophers, not Divines, I shall proceed to speak of that gloriousest of Objects, But as his Nature or some of his Attributes afford me instances to the purpose, for which I presum'd to mention him. When God therefore made the World out of nothing, or (if Pyrocles will not admit the Creati­on) when he discerns the secretest thoughts and intentions of the Mind, when he unites an immate­rial Spirit to a humane Body, and maintains, perhaps for very many years, that unparallel'd union with all the wonderful conditions he has annex'd to it; when, I say, he doth [Page 78] these and many other things, that I must not now stay to mention, he supplies us with instances of things that are Inexplicable: For such ope­rations are not reducible to any of the ways of working known to us; since our own Minds can but modi­fy themselves by divers manners of thinking; and as for things with­out us, all that one body can do to another by acting on it, is to com­municate local motion to it, and thereby produce in it the natural consequences of such motion; in all which there is no action like any of those I just now ascrib'd to God. And if we consider that the praescience of those future events that we call contingent, being a perfection, is not to be denyed to God; who is by all acknowledged the perfectest of Beings and that yet the greatest Wits that have la­boured to reconcile this infallible praecognition with the liberty of mans will, have been reduced to maintain some thing or other, that thwarts some acknowledged truth [Page 79] or dictate of Reason: If we duly consider this (I say) it will afford us an instance of truths, whose consistency and whose symmetry with the body of other truths, our Reason cannot discern, and which therefore ought to be referred to that sort of things above Reason, that I call Unsociable. And now I come to the third sort of these things which is that I formerly men­tion'd, first under the name of In­comprehensible or supra-intellectual: which Title, whether or no it be­longs to any other Object, (which I will not now enquire) doth cer­tainly belong to God, whose Nature comprehending all perfections in their utmost possible degrees, is not like to be comprehensible by our minds, who altogether want divers of those perfections, and have but moderate measures, (not to call them shadows) of the rest. We are indeed born with, or at least have a power and divers occasions to frame an Idaea of a Being infinitely perfect, and by this Idaea we may [Page 80] sufficiently discriminate the Origi­nal of it, God, from all other Ob­jects whatsoever. But then, when we come to consider attentively & minutely what is contained in the notion of Omnipotence, Omnisci­ence, Eternity, and those other divine Attributes that are all united in that great confluence and abys [...] of perfections, God; we may be [...] sure to find, that our faculties are exceedingly surmounted by the vastness and gloriousness of that unlimited and unparallel'd object [...] about which, as we can discove [...] that it exists, and that it possesse [...] all the perfection we can conceive [...] so we may at the same time discern [...] that it must have degrees of perfecti­on, which because of the inferiority of our Nature, we are not able to conceive.

And yet this discovery of God [...] Incomprehensibleness may be mad [...] without subtle disquisitions, an [...] without trains of consequences [...] though not without due attention [...] by a direct view of the Mind (if [...] [Page 81] may so term it;) who finds her self upon tryal as unable fully to measure the divine perfections as the dimensions of space, which we can conceive to be greater and greater, without ever being able to deter­mine any extent beyond whose li­mits they cannot reach.

I suspected Sophron. by the tenour of your Discourse that the last Questions these Gen­tlemen asked you, diverted you from saying somewhat more than you did by way of application of your preceding Discourse.

I was then indeed a­bout to make, as I now shall, this use of what I had been saying; that I readily acknowledge that 'tis an arrogance to talk of infinite or of priviledg'd things, with the same confidence, or to pretend to do it with the same clearness, wherewith knowing men may speak of things unquestionably within the compass of our Intel­lect: But that this need not hinder us from speaking, nor doth [Page 82] disable us from speaking rational­ly of priviledg'd things themselves. For all the notions that are allow­able are not of the same sort or order; and if none were to be ad­mitted but those that enable us to comprehend the Object, that is, which give us a clear and distinct knowledge of all that it contains or that belongs to it, I must con­fess that we have no good Notions of priviledg'd things in particular▪ but then I must add, that I fear we have few or none even of ma­ny things that we think our selves very knowing in. And when we speak of things as being above Rea­son, though we have no clear, di­stinct and adequate Notion o [...] them, yet we may have a general confus'd and inadequate Notion of them, which may suffice to make us discriminate their respective Ob­jects from all else, and from one another; as may be observ'd in se­veral, Idaeas that are negatively fram'd, such as those we have o [...] invisible, incomprehensible, and [Page 83] in others which I formerly call'd Inferr'd; because they accompa­ny the remote Inferences whereby one truth is concluded from ano­ther: as when Geometricians infer from some propositions in Euclid that any strait line may be divided farther and farther without stop. For of this and some other propo­sitions about priviledg'd things, we are not quite destitute of allowa­ble Notions; as may appear by some of the admirably ingenious Speculations of Mathematicians a­bout the Affections of surd Num­bers, and about incommensurable Magnitudes; about some of which we have no such clear and symme­trical Conceptions as we have of many other things, that are of a nearer and more intelligible order. And on this occasion I shall not scru­ple to acknowledge, that partly by my own Experience, and part­ly by the Confessions of others, and by their unsuccesful Attempts, I am induc'd to think that God, who is a most free Agent, having [Page 84] been pleas'd to make Intelligent Be­ings, may perhaps have made them of differing Ranks, or Orders, where­of Men may not be of the Princi­pal; and that whether there be such Orders or no, he hath at least made us Men, of a limited nature (in general) and of a bounded Ca­pacity. Congruously to this I think also, that he hath furnished man either with certain innate Ideas or Models and Principles, or with a Faculty or Power and Disposition easily to frame them, as it meets with occasions (which readily oc­cur) to excite them: But because that (as I lately noted) God intend­ed the mind of Man but of a limi­ted Capacity, his Understanding is so constituted that the inbred or easily acquir'd Idaeas and primitive Axioms wherewith it is furnish­ed, and by Relation or Analogy whereunto it judges of all other Notions, and Propositions, do not extend to all knowable Objects whatsoever; but reach only to such as have a sufficient Affinity, [Page 85] or bear some proportion to those Primary Idaeas and Rules of Truth, which are sufficient if duly im­prov'd, to help us to the attain­ment, though not of the perfect knowledge of truth's of the high­est Orders, yet to the Competent Knowledge of as much truth as God thought fit to allow our minds in their present (and perchance laps'd) Condition, or state of Uni­on with their mortal Bodies.

Your Opinion, Sophron. if I apprehend it aright, contains two very differing Assertions; one that it is allowable to contemplate and even to discourse of things a­bove Reason, since we may have some Conceptions of them, though they be but very dim and imper­fect: and the other, that we ought not to look upon, or speak of such Objects as things that we compre­hend, or have even such a measure of knowledge of, as we have of things that are not priviledg'd. For of these we are not to speak but with a peculiar Wari­ness, [Page 86] and modest Diffidence.

You have express'd my thoughts Eugen. since I Intend not to injoyn silence, or disswade Curiosity, but yet forbid presump­tion, in reference to priviledg'd things.

And truly Sophron. I see no Reason to repine at the li­mits which your late Discourse hath in imitation of the Author of nature himself, assign'd to human Knowledg. For the number of priviledg'd things is altogether in­considerable in comparison of the multitude of other things, to which our knowledge may be improv'd to reach; and which it far more concerns us to know well, than it doth to resolve puzling Questions about things incomprehensible; there being within the compass of those truths, enough to employ, and reward our Curiosity without straining and tiring our Reason a­bout Objects that transcend it. And yet even about these, some disqui­sitions may be allow'd us, for an [Page 87] object that on the account of some of its properties may be a privi­ledg'd one; may have divers o­ther things belonging to it, that do not surpass our Reason, and whose knowledge may therefore be at­tain'd, by the due employment of it.

Thus we usefully study the na­ture of Bodies, which make up the Object of the Excellent Science of Natural Philosophy; though the true Notion of Body in general be a thing so difficult to frame, that the best of our Modern Philoso­phers can by no means agree about it. Which I do not wonder at; because if we pursue the notion of a Body to the uttermost; 'twill lead us to the perplexing controversie, De compositione continui, and there you will not deny, but that the under­standing will be left in the dark. Thus Surveyors, Carpenters, Ar­chitects, and many others know divers Affections of the square Fi­gure that are of great use to them in their respective Employments, [Page 88] though that property of the square, that its side and diagonal are incom­mensurable, be unknown to most of them; and if they were told of it, and would prosecute the Speculation, would involve them in exceeding great and probably insuperable difficulties.

To confirm what you have been telling us, Timoth. I shall venture to add, that even a­bout priviledg'd things, our inqui­ries, if modestly and discreetly manag'd, may not only be allow­able but sometimes profitable. For even of such Subjects a studious search may bring us to know more than we did, though not so much as we would, nor enough to be ac­quiesc'd in. So that such enquiries may probably teach us, to know the Objects better, and our selves better too; by giving us such a sensible discovery of the insuffici­ency of our Understandings to comprehend all sorts of things, as may be very useful, though not pleasing, and may richly recom­pence [Page 89] us, for the pains that end­ed in so instructive a disappoint­ment. And let me add to the per­tinent instances that have been mention'd, the noblest that can be given; I mean the Contemplati­on of God himself. For he hath so ordered all things, that 'tis scarce possible for us, to be destitute of an Idaea of him, which will at least represent him as an existent Being, and more perfect than any other Being; and yet when we come with sufficient Application of mind to pry into the wonderful Attri­butes of this most singular and a­dorable Being, we are, as was lately observ'd, sure to find our selves unable to comprehend so un­bounded an Object. Which yet ought not to discourage us from so noble a Study, since we are allow'd the great contentment and honour to make further and further dis­coveries of the excellentest of Ob­jects, by that very immensity of his perfections, that makes it impos­sible for us to reach to the bounds [Page 90] of his Excellency, or rather to disco­ver that it has any bounds at all.

But, Gentlemen, I perceive I have been so transported by the men­tion of this vast and divine Subject, in whose Contemplation 'tis so ea­sie, and so pleasant to lose ones self, that I have forgot the notice Eugen. gave me, a pretty while since, that the time allotted for our present conference was then near expiring. And therefore I shall leave you to pick out of the Ex­cursions to which your interpositi­ons tempted (not to say oblig'd) me, the Applications, that I in­tended to make more methodically of the distinctions I laid down. And I am the less troubled to be hindred from proposing to you my thoughts about the way of distin­guishing priviledg'd things from others, because we have a dome­stick Monitor, or a kind of an inter­nal Criterium always at hand to help us. For I think it may well be said, that the wise Author of Nature has endued the Under­standing [Page 91] with such a quick, though internal, Sensation (if I may so call it) that when due attention is not wanting, it can feelingly discern between other Objects, and those that are disproportionate to its a­bility. As even in Beasts, the eye is so fram'd (according to the institution of Nature) that if it be obverted to the bright noon-day-Sun, there needs no Monitor, but the operation of the same Sun, to make it wink; (and perhaps water) and thereby discover it self to be dazled and overpowr'd by the disproportionate Object.

I confess your Discourses, Gentlemen, have made an unex­pected Impression upon me; but whether that will amount to a Conviction will scarce appear till our next Conference. Only thus much I shall tell you now, that it would much facilitate our agree­ment in Opinion, if you did not contend for altogether so much; but would be pleas'd to leave it undertermin'd, whether Man's in­tellectual [Page 92] Faculty it self is unca­pable by the help of any degree of light, to discover and know those things, which you call above Reason? and would content your selves to say, That there are some things belonging to these Subjects, which we must confess we have less clear and distinct Notions of, than we have even of the difficult­est of those things, that are ac­knowledg'd not to surpass our Rea­son: And that if we will take upon us, to determine positively and par­ticularly about these transcendent things, we must employ ways of Reasoning, congruous to their pe­culiar natures.

I shall readily consent not to expect your final Resolution, before our next meeting, having no cause to fear that time, will be unfriendly to her Daughter Truth.

And in the mean while, Pyrocles, I am glad to find by the last part of what you just now said, that you seem to be no longer in­dispos'd to admit some things, that [Page 93] (at least in our present state) do some way or other surpass our Reason. For I think that instead of exalting that faculty, we in­jure and defraud it, if we do not freely allow it, as much enjoy­ment of Truth as we are able to procure it: And consequently if Geometry, or Revelation, or Ex­perience, assure us of divers things of which we can know but That they are, and what they do, not, what they are, and how they act, we must neither refuse, nor neglect the study of such Truths, any more than we would refuse to look into any other Objects, than those that we can look through; And there­fore to enrich the Intellect as much as we are able, we must enter­tain, not only those Truths, that we can comprehend, but those also, how sublime soever, that we can have any certain, though but a ve­ry imperfect Knowledge of, Espe­cially since those remote and ab­struse Subjects may be as much more noble as more dark than o­thers, [Page 94] and thereby render an im­perfect Discovery of them, more desirable, than a far clearer one of Inferior things.

I Was very glad, Gen­tlemen, to learn this morning of Sophro­nius some things, whence 'twas easie to conclude, that by the Discourse you had with [Page 2] him last night, he has made it al­lowable for me to demand, and ra­tional for you to grant, nay to prof­fer me, a Dispensation of the Task you imposed on me at our last mee­ting. For tho' he spake with the mo­desty that became him of your Con­ference, and gave me, but a hasty and imperfect Account of what pass'd between you; yet I think I may presume, that by his Discourse Pyrocles himself was at least inclin'd, and you two, Gentlemen, fully per­swaded to admit, that there are Things above Reason; which was the main point about which you expected at our last Congress that I should entertain you, at our then next, or now present meeting.

I deny not, that Sophro­nius's Considerations were preva­lent on Timotheus and me; and have, I hope, made a good im­pression on Pyrocles himself; but that ought not to hinder us from coming, as we now do, to claim your promise of entertaining us a­bout things above Reason. And if [Page 3] you will needs be dispens'd with from repeating those Considerati­ons that Sophronius has employed already, (tho' I doubt not but by repeating them, you would both strengthen and advance them;) we will not be rigid Exactors of our Right: but yet we must not remit your Task, tho' we are con­tent to change it. For I question not but these Gentlemen will consent with me, to discharge you of your promise of discoursing of the Arguments that may infer some things to be above Reason, if you will please to afford us your Thoughts, about the ways of avoid­ing to be imposed on by our selves or others, when such sublime Sub­jects are treated or discours'd of.

Tho' in the recital of your Conference, Sophronius did but touch on several Subjects where­on it would be proper for me to insist, in the Discourse you seem to expect from me; yet I am apt to fear, that he has so prevented me in what I should say, that he [Page 4] has left little or nothing for me to do, but to make Repetitions of what you have heard already much better express'd: which will be an Employment far enough from being grateful, either to you or me.

Your Modesty, Sir, is not like to defeat our Curiosity; and that you may not think your self hardly used, or condemned to bear Repetitions; be pleased to take notice, both that, what we desire as a Favor, we might claim as a Compensation, and that the things we expect from you now, are not Arguments to make out that there are things above Reason, but that you would afford us some ‘ Rules and Directions how to re­gulate the Ratiocinations we make; and estimate those we meet with, about such Transcen­dent Subjects.’

I hope Eugenius, you do not in earnest think me so vain as to pretend to frame a Logick a­bout things above Logick; or ma­gisterially [Page 5] to deliver Rules about things that are as Anomalous, as they are either Remote or Abstruse. Besides that all you have said, do's not exempt me from a fear, that by reason of Sophronius's omitting divers points of his Discourse, and my imperfect Remembrance of those he transiently and summari­ly mention'd, he has anticipated much of what were otherwise proper for me to say. But yet be­cause 'tis possible that his thoughts and mine, may have lead us, to have made some Reflections that are not at all the same; and that even when others happen to be co­incident, it may be not altoge­ther useless, that I should endea­vour to inlarge some things that he has but hinted, and illustrate or vindicate some others that will not be prejudic'd by being cleared, or confirm'd; and above all this, be­cause I would shew you, that I am willing to comply with you some­what to the hazard of my Discre­tion, I shall not refuse to offer you [Page 6] some, not Rules, but Advices; provided you freely interrupt me, when I begin to trouble you with the Repetition of any thing that you have, tho' I have not heard before; and provided too, that you look not on these Advices so much as directions to find the truth in such abstruse matters, as Cautions that may chance to as­sist you to avoid some Errors and Mistakes.

We are not so scrupu­lous but that we shall upon your own terms gladly receive your thoughts, whatever names you please to give them.

I shall then without fur­ther preamble comply with your Commands, and propose as my