LIB. I.

COllectarium primi Libri, compen­diosa succincta (que) resumptio di­ctorum in libros Boethii de Con­solatione Philosophiae.

The gatherings of the first Book, being a compendious and succinct assumption of those things which are said in the Books of Boethius.

The first Book hath seven Meeters, and six Proses. In the first Meeter Boethius bewailes his misery, from the change of his Study, and in part from the decay of his body, and in part from the prolonging of his miserable life, speaks by Apostrophe against his friends.

Primus liber habet 7. Metra, & 6. Prosus. In Metro primo deplangit statum suae miseriae ex parte permutationis studii & ex parte defectus corporalis, & ex parte prolonga­tionis suae miserabilis vitae Apost [...]ophando contra amicos.

In Prosa prima introducit Philosophiam se super sua mise­ria consolantem, & describit dispositiones & proprietates e­jus, vestes (que) tenues, quas practica & theoretica intertexta perornavit.

In the first Prose hee brings Philosophy comforting him against his miseries, and describeth the disposition and properties of her garments, which were thin, which the Practicall and Theorick had interwoven and adorned her with.

In Metro 2. Philosophia deplangit perturbationem men­tis hominis convertendo se specialiter super Boethium.

In the second Meeter, Philosophy bewails the pertur­bation of the mind of man, turnes her selfe especially to Boethius

In prosa 2. Philosophia investigat morbum ex quibusdam signis consolando ipsum ne despereat.

In the second Prose Philosophy findes out the disease from some signs comforteth him lest he should despair.

In Metro 3. Boethius declarat per quibusdam sese quo­modo remotìs impedimentis recuperat vigorem.

In the third Meeter Boethius declares by certain things how he, the impediments removed, may recover his vigor.

In Prosa 3. ostendit quomodo Philosophiam agnoverit & qualiter de praesentia ejus admirari caepit, & quomodo sapi­enti persecutio a vulgaribus non est nova, sed cunctis prae­stantissimis viris communis.

In the third Prose hee sheweth how he knew Philoso­phy, and how hee admired her presence, and how perse­cution is a common thing from the vulgar, to the wisest and best men.

In Metro 4 Philosophia ostendit qualiter hoc de se habet ut persecutiones improbi non praevalent contra ipsum excla­mando cunctos qui timent tyrannos, sibi nectunt catenam, qua trahantur.

In the fourth Meeter Philosophy sheweth how he hath it from her, th [...]t the persecutions of wicked men may not prevail, ex [...]aimeth against him, that all that fear tyrants, knit a chain for themselves by which they are drawn.

In 4. Prosa Philosophia requirit Boethium super atten­tione pradictorum, & hortatur ipsum ad sui morbi tractati­onem. Et Boethius revelat mo [...]bum suum respondens se tur­bari ut his quae injuriose fiebant contra ipsum ex sui in exili­um r [...]legatione & meriti sui frustratione ex injust [...]s sui con­demnatione ex fame sui lasione, & tandem ex his quo [...] vide­bat generaliter injuriosa aliis inferre, & haec omnia fibi eve­nisse propter studia ipsius.

In the fourth Prose Philosophy requires of Boethius upon his attention to those things have beene said, and exhorts him to the handling of his own disease. And Boethius re­veales his disease, answers that he was troubled, that these things were done injuriously against him from the time of his banishment, and the frustration of the reward of his merits, from his unjust condemnation, and hurt of his fame: and at length out of these which hee saw generally injurious things were cast upon others: and all these came upon him by reason of his study in Philosophy.

In Metro 5. Boethius exclamat contra providentiam di­vinam, admittens quod omnia reguntur a Deo praeter actus humanas: sed si homo similis sit, cum turbato Boethio haec videbatur imo rogat Deum ut regeret actus hominum ne sit perversi praevalerent adversus bonos impune.

In the fifth Meeter Boethius exclaims against the provi­dence of God, admiting that all things are governd by God but humane actions: but if man be lighter troubled to Boe­thius these things seemed sore, but hee intreats God that he would govern humane actions, that the perverse should not s [...] prevail without punishment against good men.

In Prosa 5. ostendit quomodo Philosophia se habuit ad suam quaerimoniam, & quid ex ea cognovit, recolligit sub brevitate ea quae Boethium perturbaverant, dicens modum remedii ipsum Boethium.

In the fifth Prose he sheweth how Philosophy behaved her selfe towards his complaint, and what shee gathered out of that, and she briefly recollects what troubled Boe­thius, saying that the meanes of remedy was Boethius himselfe.

In Metro 6. Philosophia probat in omnibus ordinem esse servandum, & facit hoc tribus exemplis.

In the sixth Meeter Philosophy proves, that in all things order is to be observed, and doth this by 3. ex [...]mples.

In Prosa 6. & ultimâ, inquirit cansam radicalem infir­mitatis Boethii, & de circumstantiis gubernatoris mundi, & de principio & fine rerum, colligendo omnes infirmitates [Page 4]Boethii omnes tum esse curabiles, & dicit Philosophia sibi primo velle proponere remedia levia, praeterea gravia reser­vare donce melius conval [...]scat & roboretur.

In the sixth Prose and the last, she enquires the radicall cause of Boethius his infirmity, and of the circumstances of the governour of the world, and of the beginning and end of things, collecting all the infirmities of Boethius, and that all of them are curable, and Philosophy saith, that she would first propose to her selfe slight remedies, and af­terwards reserve the greater till he were better recovered and strengthened.

In Metro 7 & ultima, Philosophia probat per exempla quod caligo perturbationum impedit mentis intuitum, hor­tando ad fugam eorum quae catenant animam scilicet gaudi­um amorem, & spem, & dolorem, & se abjiciendo nonnun­quam potest mens talibus perpedita Philosophari.

In the seventh and last Meeter, Philosophy proveth by examples, that darkness of perturbations is an impediment to the eye of the mind, exhorting us to the abandoning of them seeing they enslave the soule, to wit, by casting a­way joy, feare, hope, and griefe; for it was impossible for the soule to convert it selfe to the study of Philosophy, when it was taken up with passions of this nature.

LIB. II.

2. Liber habet 8. Prosus, & 8. Metra. In Prosa 1. o­stendit Boethius quid Philosophia fecit post praedictam. Et Philosophia resumit unam causam doloris Boethii, i. e. de fortuna omnibus mirabilem effectum fortunae, excusans se de resumptione preterita faelicitatis Boethii: omnem opportu­nitatem medendi Boethium, & procedit ad medicamenta.

The second Book contains eight Proses, and eight Mee­ters. In the first Prose Boethius shewes what Philosophy did after which she had layd out before. And Philosophy resumeth one cause of the griefe of Boethius; to wit, con­cerning fortune discovering the admirable effect of for­tune, excusing her selfe concerning the resumption of the past felicity of Boethius: and likewise sheweth the oppor­tunity [Page 5]of curing Boethius, & proceedeth to the Medicines.

In Metro 1. Philosophia describit mores fortuna, viz. quod more rotae semper alternat se.

In the 1. Meteor Philosophy describes the conditions of fortune, to wit, that shee turns her selfe in manner of a wheele.

In Prosa 2. Philosophia in troducit fortunam ostendentem non esse dolendum de ea.

In the 2. Prose, Philosophy brings in fortune shewing, that men ought not to be grieved for her.

In Metro 2. conqueritur de inexpleta cupiditate hominum.

In the 2. Meeter, she complains of the unsatisfied cove­tousness of men.

In Prosa 3. ostendit quod fortuna multa bona Boethio contulit in enumerando ipsa bona praeterita por ordinem.

In the 3. Prose shee shews, that fortune hath conferd many good things upon Boethius, in declaring these good things in just order.

In Metro 3. Philosophia determinat ex tribus exemptis mutabilitatem mundanorum.

In the 3. Meeter Philosophy determines from 3. exam­ples, the mutability of worldly things.

In Prosa 4. Philosophia ostendit quomodo Boethius adhuc multa habuit bona fortunae ex parte Symachi soceri sui & ex parte pudicae conjugis, & ex parte filiorum, & ex his consolatur cum ostendens faelicitatem temporalem nulli posse totaliter evenire, & de quanto aliquis est faelicior tanto levi­ori adversitat [...] prosternitur; & ex hoc concludit falicita­tem fortuitum miseram & amaram, & quod in rebus fortu­itis non possit consistere vera felicitas quod etiam mors cun­ctis debetur.

In the 4. Prose Philosophy shewes, how Boethius had yet many of fortunes good things, from the part of Syma­chus his father in Law, & from the part of his modest wife, and from the part of his children, and from these she com­forts him, shewing that temporall felicity can totally happen to no man, and by how much a man is happier, by [Page 6]so much he is cast down by lighter adversity, and from this she concludes, that the chance of felicity is miserable and bitter, and that in casuall things it cannot consist, be­cause death is due to every one.

In Metro 4. Philosophia commendat viam mediocrem per similitudinemae lificii mediocriter situati.

In the 4 Meeter Philosophy commends a mean life, by the similitude of a building situate in a middle place.

In Prosa 5. ponit remedia pauciora quod fortuna non sit summopere expetenda, ostendens ignobilitatem divitiarum gemmarum agrorum vestium clientium incomparatione ad hominem, & quod homines praedicta nimium diligentes faci­unt injuriam suo conditori.

In the 5. Prose she sets down fewer remedies, that for­tune is not with too much labour to bee sought, shewing the ignoblenesse of riches, jewells, lands, garments, cli­ents, in comparison to man, and that men too much lo­ving the foresaid things, doe injury to their maker.

In Metro 5 Philosophia commendat antiquam aetatem quae multâ pace & sobrietate florebat.

In the 5. Meeter, Philosophy commends ancient age which flourished with much peace and sobriety.

In Prosa 6. Philosophia ostendit quod dignitates & pote­states non sunt magnopere appetendae quia adveniunt malis & solum possunt corpus; scilicet divitiae, vanescunt & peri­culosa.

In the 6. Prose, Philosophy shewes that dignities and powers are not very much to be desired, because they fall to the lot of the wicked, and only can blesse the body, to wit, vain riches they are and dangerous.

In Metro 6. ostendit nequitiam potentis Neronis qui ideo infamis factus fuit, quia imperator [...].

In the 6. Meeter, shee shewes the wickednesse of the mighty Nero, who therefore was made infamous because he was Emperour.

In prosa 7. Philosophia ostendit quod gloria etiam juste acqui­sita non est appetenda, quia mundo est strictus, & gentes sunt [Page 7]multae & quod una gens laudat alia damnat, & quia etiam gloria non peraurat, & quod notanter virtuosi non debent quaerere gloriam. Primo pertinet ad levitaetem arrogantia, 2. quod nihil spectat ad animam quae immortalis est & de­formis.

In the 7. Prose Philosophy shewes, that glory though justly gotten, is not to be desired, because the world is narrow, and the nations are many, and that which one commends another condemns, and because glory also is not lasting. And because by name the vertuous ought not to seek glory, first, because it pertains to the levity of ar­rogance: secondly, because it belongeth nothing to the soul which is immortall and without shape.

In Metro 7. Philosophia probat gloriam non esse quaeren­dam quod caelum latum est & terra strictissima; & addueit viros illustros quorum gloria periit, nisi hoc solum quod a pauoulis literis nominatur.

In the 7. Meeter Philosophy proves that glory is not to be sought after, because heaven is large, and the earth most strict. And he instances in Illustrious men whose glo­ry is perished, unlesse in this only, that they are named in a very few letters.

In 8. & ultimâ Prosâ Philosophia ostendit quod bonum est in fortuna sed melius in adversa quam prospera, & quod adversa fortuna ostendit amicos prospera flores nutrit.

In the 8. and last Prose Philosophy shews, what good there is in fortune, but the greatest good in the adverse, rather then in the prosperous, and the adverse fortune shewes true friends, the prosperous nourisheth a fading flower.

In Metro 8. & ultimo commendat amorem quantum fa­cit bona, sine quo cuncta ad interritum tenet & utinam ge­nus hominum amor divinus regat, tunc vere [...]alix esse posset.

In the 8. and last Meeter, shee commends love, how many good things it doth, without which all things tend to death, and wisheth that mankind were governed by divine love, then might it be truly happy.

LIB. III.

Tertius Liber habet 12. Prosas & 12. Metra. In Pro­sa 1. Boethius ostendit se esse quodammodo curatum & pa­ratum ad remedia graviora, & Philosophia haec attestatur. & promittit se velle sibi ostendere faelicitatem veram, & Bo­ethius pet it haec.

The 3 Book hath 12. Proses and 12. Meeters. In the first Boethius shewes, that he is in a maner cured, and ready for stronger medicines, and Philosophy witnesseth this, and promiseth that she will shew him true felicity: and Boethius requires this of her.

In 1. Metro Philosophia commendat ordinem quo primo dicunt nosci similia sapientiae, deinde vera, & facit hoc per exempla quatuor. 1. Agro purgando, melle gustando, imbre fugando, aere mundando.

In the 1. Meeter Philosophy commends order, by which first men say they know like things and then true, and she doth this by fowre examples. First, by clearing a field, tasting honey, avoyding a shower, and purging the ayre.

In Prosa 2. Philosophia ostendit quod omnes hominis na­turaliter appetunt pervenire ad veram beatitudinem, cujus etiam ponit definitionem & quod homines diversis erroribus abducuntur a vera felicitate, & ponit diversas opiniones cir­ca faelicitatem. Et ostendit quod quaerentes divitias velut summum bonum errant: similiter de potentia, reverentia, & celebritate, vel gloria & laetitia.

In the 2. Prose Philosophy shewes, that all men na­turally desire to come to true happiness, and sets downe the definition thereof. And that men are drawne away from true felicity by divers errours. And sets downe di­vers opinions about felicity. And shewes that those who seeke riches as their chiefe good, doe erre. In like man­ner, of power, reverence, celebrity, or glory, and mirth.

In Metro 2. Philosophia ponit quanta sit vis naturae, quod omnia sequuntur suam naturam, Leones, aviculae, [Page 9]quasi virga violenter deorsū tracta, at (que) ita caelum & omnia.

In the second Meeter, Philosophy sets down how great the force of nature is, that all things follow their nature, Lyons, Little-birds, as a young tree violently drawn down­ward, the heaven and all other things.

In 3 Prosa osteudit Philosophia quod verafaelicitas non constat in his quibus homines putant eam consistere. Notanter 1. quod non consistat in divitiis, eo quòd non faciant hominem in his sufficientem. 2. Quod conferant indigentiam. 3. Invebit contra avaros quos divitias intuenti solicitudo a [...]xios reddit, ampliota concupiscere facit, et ne habitae perdantur, pavore continuo compellit.

In the 3 Prose Philosophy shews, that true felicity con­sists not in these, in which men think she is. Namely, first, That it consists not in riches, because they make not a man sufficient. Secondly, That they confer upon him indigen­cy. Thirdly, She inveighs against the covetous, their looking of which renders them suspicious, and carefull makes them covet greater, and lest the gotten should be lost, com­pells them to fear continually.

In Metro 3 ostendit quomodo dives avarus, etiamsi om­nia habeat, attamen adhuc sitire ampliora non cessat.

In the 3 Meeter she shews, how a rich covetous man although he hath all, yet ceaseth not to thirst after great­er things.

In Prosa 4. Philosophia probat quod non conferant ho­minibus ad reverentiam. 1. Quod dignitas non adveniens non aufert honorem. 2. Quia dignitates manifestant vitia improborum. 3. Quod opinione how: num vilescant. 4 Ex temporum mutatione sordescunt et splendere desinunt, hoc ideo quod in sola opinione consistunt.

In the fourth Prose Philosophy proves, that they con­fer not to a man any thing towards reverence, 1. because dignity not comming, takes not away honour. Second­ly, because dignities manifest the vices of the wicked. Thirdly, because they waxe base in the opinion of men. Fourthly, because by the change of times they become [Page 10]sordid and leave their splendour, for this reason, because they have their consistence in opinion.

In Metro 4. Philosophia, conf [...]mat per ner onis exemplum cui bonum fuisset ad imperium non venisse.

In the fourth Meeter, Philosophy confirms it by the example of Niro, to whom it had been good not to have attained the Empire.

In Prosa 5 Philosophia, probat regnum & regni fa­miliares veram potentiam non conferre. 1. Propter pau­citatem durationis regnantium. 2. Propter parvitatem extentionis. 3. Annexum timorem. 4. Propter absentem securitatem. 5. Propter necessitatem manendi in Officio.

In the fifth Prose Philosophy proves, that a Kingdome and Familiars of it do not confer true power. First, by the small lasting of it, and of the rulers, Secondly, by rea­son of the narrownesse of its extent. Thirdly, for the fear that is annexed to it. Fourthly, for the absense of securi­ty. Fifthly, for the necessity of staying in the Office.

In Metro 5 Philosophia ostendit quomodo vera potentia sit acquirenda, viz. animos feroces domando.

In the fifth Meeter Philosophy shews, how true pow­er may be acquired by taming fierce minds.

In Prosa 6. Philosophia ostendit quod gloria mundana non facit hominem beatum. 1. Notanter quodest vana & fallax sed nec illa quae est meritis conquisita, quod sapienti de gloria non est cura, neque de eo quod illa non est ejus sed parentum, cum (que) quodamn odo nobilitate eo necessitat, ut ei filii nobilium bonos parentes sequantur ne degenerent. Ergo gloria mortalium hominum nihil aliud est quam magna animae iustatio.

In the sixt Profe Philosophy shewes that mundane glo­ry makes not a man happy. 1. Signally because it is vaine and deceitfull and not that neither which is got by merit. That a wise man hath no regard of glory. But neither that of nobility because that is not his but his parents, and necessitates him in a sort that the children of good parents should follow their steps, least they should degenerate. Therefore the glory of mortall men is nothing else than a [Page 11]great swelling of the mind.

In Metro 6. Philosophia ostendit quod omnes homines sunt aeque nobiles praeter vitiosos, Dei euim genus sumus.

In the sixt Meeter Philosophy shewes that all men are equally noble besides the vitious, for we are a kin to God.

In Prosa 7. Philosophia probat quod in voluptate non sit beatitudo eo quod multas incōmoditates includit. At (que) etiam si sic esset pecudes tunc beatificarentur. I tem faelicitas nee est in matrimonio quia inde siunt nequissimi filii qui tortores pa­rentum sunt potius quam beatificatores.

In the Seventh Prose Philosophy prooves that in vo­luptuousnesse is not beatitude, because it includes many discommodities. And if so then should beasts be beatifi­ed. Also neither is felicity in matrimony because thereby most wicked sons are begotten, which are rather tormen­tors of their Parents than makers of their happinesse.

In Metro 7. Confirmat predicta per mel & per fixuram a­pis, quia cum dulcedine pungit.

In the Seventh Meeter, shee confirmes the aforesaid by Hony and by the Sting of the Bee because it pricks with the sweetnesse.

In Prosa 8. ostendit quantis malis sunt mutiplicata pre­dicta bona. Ostendit etiam quam vilia sunt bona corporis quae in aliis anim alibut perfectiora sunt ut magnitudo forti­tudo. Quodetiam pulchritudo nimis cito perit quae in tenni cute flavescit.

In the eight Prose shee shewes with how great Evils those foresaid goods are infolded: shee also shewes how base the goods of the body are, which are more perfect in other animals, as greatnesse and streng th, and also that fairenesse too soon perisheth which waxeth yellow in the thin skin.

In Metro 8. Philosophia deplangit errores hominum quē in acquirendo minima bona sunt prudentes, sed acquirendo summum bonum abducuntur ignorantia & haec homines sectantes non adipisci posse, quae pollicentur & pro­bat quod illa quinque sufficientia, potentia, gloria, laetitia & [Page 12]reverentia sunt unum. Et ergo qui quaerit unum sine aliis non invenit quod quaerit, et de isto proponit sibi veram beatitudinō, sed prius vult Dominum invocare ut ipse eam ostendat.

In the eight Meeter, Philosophy bewaileth the error of men who in getting the least goods are prudent, but in the acquiring of the chiefe good are led away with igno­rance, and she exhorts men following her, that they can­not gain that which those things promise: & proves that those five, sufficiency, power, glory, mirth and reverence, are one. And therefore hee that seekes the one without the other finds not that which he seeks; & from that shee proposeth to her selfe true beatitude: but first shee will pray God that he will shew it.

In Metro 9. orationem optimam pro summo bono & ve­ra beatitudine cognoscenda ponit.

In the ninth Meeter, shee maketh an excellent prayer for the chiefe good, and that hee may know true beati­tude.

In Prosa 10. Philosophia probat veram beatitudinem es­se diligenter in quirendam & ostendit in quo consistit vera be­atitudo. viz in Deo, & non in aliquo extrinseco, tanquam a Deo distincto ut in accidente quod probat quadrupliciter. 1. Quod non inest Deo ab extrinseco. 2. Quod sic Deus non es­set summum bonum. 3. Quod est omnium principium. 4. Quod alias essent plura summa bona: Corollarium sequitur quod omnis beatus est Deus, item ista supradicta non sunt partes integrales beatitudinis vel membra quia Deus simplex in essentia nihilominus multa continere beatitudo videtur quae revera ad cum referuntur.

In the tenth Prose, Philosophy proveth that true felici­ty is to be earnestly sought after: and he proceeds to shew in which true happinesse doth consist, to wit, in God, and in no other externall thing that is different from God as an accident, which he confirmes with four reasons. First, because God receives it not from an externall cause. Se­condly, because, if so, God could not be himselfe the chie­fest good. Thirdly, because God is the beginning of all [Page 13]things. Fourthly, because otherewise there would bee more then one chiefest good. Hence the corollarie is, that every one that is happy is a God. Likewise those five be­fore mentioned are not the integrall parts or members of felicity, because God is a simple essence: but yet true hap­pinesse seemes to containe many things which indeed are but referred unto him.

In Metro 10 Philosophia hortatur ad illam veram bea­titudinem pervenire qua inventa habentur ominia.

In the tenth Meeter Philosophy exhorts us to the at­tainment of true happinesse, which being found all things are found.

In Prosa 11. Ostendit quod bonum est quod omnia appe­tunt & inde bonum & unumsunt reciproca & quod omnia ap­petunt esse, & permanere, ut animaliaarbores & plantae cu­jus sunt quatuor signa, scilicet certitudo loci & scitus dispo­sitio partium interionum & exteriorum, & seminis propa­gatio: inanimata etiam moventur ad sua propria loca per naturalem inclinationem, & conservare unitatem per conti­nuationem partium suarum ad invicem nituntur, quare bo­num est finis et desiderium omnium.

In the eleventh Prose he shewes that it is the true good which all doe desire, and that good and one are recipro­call; and that all things desire to bee, and to continue be­ing; as both animals, trees, and plants, which is eviden­ced by four signes, that is the certainty of place and site, the forming of the internall and externall parts, and the increase of their seed: yea inanimate creatures moove to their proper places and centers by their naturall inclinati­ons, and they endeavour to preserve unity and continuati­on of their parts one to another. Therefore that which is good, is the end and desire of all things.

In Metro 11. Philosophia ostendit modum quo possumus per venire adcognitionem veri, scilicet per retractationem ab occupationibus exterioribus & recursum ad interiora cum adjutorio doctrina.

In the eleventh Meeter Philosophy shewes the meanes [Page 14]wherby we may come to the knowledge of that which is rightly true: that is by withdrawing ones selfe from ex­ternall imployments, and by having recourse to more inward things by the helpe of learning.

In Pros▪ 12. & ultima Philosophia ostendit quibus gu­bernanculis mundus regitur, & probat mundum regi a Deo tripliciter. 1. Ex connumeratione partium diversaram. 2. Ex conservatione cunctorum. 3. Ex dispositione motuum & ex parte loci ac temporis spacii & qualitatis, & ostendit quod mundus regitur a Deo per suam bonitatem, & quod Deus omnia disponit f [...]rtiter & suaviter & quod malum nihil est, quia Deus potest omnia sed non potest malum, & dis­cursus omnes esse cognitos in rebus de quibus loquimur.

In the 12 Prose and last Philosophy shewes by whom the world is governed: and hee prooves three wayes that the world is governed by God. First from the conjuncti­on of parts of different nature. Secondly from the preser­ving them thus joyned. Thirdly from the ordering of mo­tions in respect of place, time, space, and quallity. And he shewes that the world is governd by God, by his Good­nesse, and that God disposeth of all things powerfully and pleasantly, and that evill is nothing, in that God can doe all things but evill: and that the discourses of all are known in the things of which we speake.

In Metro 12. Et ultima Philosophia hortatur ad perse­verandum in contemplatione beatitudiuis ostendens per fabu­lam Orphti Cytharistae quomodo affectus mundan [...]rum im­pedit perseverantiam in bon [...] quia faciliter recurris homo ad ca quae dilexerat.

In the twelfth and last Meeter of the 13 Booke Philo­sophy exhorts us to persever in the contemplation of hap­pinesse, shewing by the fable of Orpheus the Musitian, how that the love of worldly things hinders the perseve­ [...]nce in good, because man readily falls backe to that which he formerly loved.

LIB. IV.

Quar. lib. habet 7. Prosas & 7. Metra egregie pro­bantia quod Divinum regimen optimum est et quod hoc non videtur insipiētibus, eo quod improborum quidam florescunt, quidā justi conculcantur. Nihilominus quod mortales licet boni mysterium non plene intelligunt, id­circo Philosophia benignè ostendit hoc esse rationabile.

The fourth Booke hath seven Proses and se­ven Meeters, most egregiously proving that the Divine government is most excellent, and that this is not seene by the unwise, by reason that some bad men flourish, and just men are trod­den under foot; notwithstanding that mortalls though good, do not fully understand this myste­ry, therefore Philosophy doth benignly shew that this is reasonable.

In 1. Prosa Boethius adhuc quasi languens non plene ob­litus pristinae turbationis incipit ingemiscere cum admirati­one & intentionem Philosophiae volentis adhuc plura loqui interrumpit inquiens? Quomodo possit hoc convenire cum praemissis: scilicet ex quibus Deus optimus optime g [...]bernans omnia, quare in suo regno vitia dominarentur, et virtutes Iu­erent supplicia scelerum. Ad hoc Philosophia pulcre respondet omnino istis perversis carere est impossibile, quod in domo bene disposita vilia vasa nullo modo clarescunt, nec pretiosa sordesc [...]nt, sic virtutes semper pretiosae sunt & vitia abjecta monstrantur.

In the First Prose B [...]ethius yet as it were languishing nor fully forgetting his former troubles, begins to groan with admiration, and interrupts the intention of Philo­sophy, willing as yet to speake more, saying how can this agre [...] with the premisses; to wit, by which the best that [Page 16]excellently, governs all, wherefore in his kingdome should vice domincere and virtues suffer the punishment of wick­ednesse. To this Philosophy fairly answereth that altoge­ther, they are wanting all perverse things, this is altoge­ther impossible; in a house well ordered base vessells doe no way shine, nor are the precious sordid: so virtues are alwayes precious and vices are declared abject.

In prim [...] Metro ostendit Philosophia, quomodo possit ho­mo plene curari, atque ut intelligat praedicta viam per quā devenitur ad summum bonum: intimat scilicet, per consi­derationem creaturarum, quae gradatim ascendunt more a­vis sursum tendendo, usquedum perveniatur ad aliquid quod super omni creatura illucescat, & ita per subtilem intelligen­tiam illius supremi rectoris qui omnia temperatissime guber­nat. Tune videbit horrendos tyrannos esse exules.

In the First Meeter Philosophy shewes how a man may bee fully cured, that hee may understand the foresaid, shee intimates the way by which a man may come to the chiefe good, to wit, by the consideration of the creatures which by degrees are to bee transcended after the manner of a bird striving upwards till you come to somewhat that out shines all creatures, and so by the subtiltie of intelligence of that supreame rector who governs all things most tem­perately. Then shall hee see the horrid Tyrant to bee a Banditoe.

In Prosa 2 efficaciter curam adhibet Boethio per ratio­nes mult as probando contra vulgi opinionem, quod soli boni sunt potentes: quod volunt & possunt adipisci bonum▪ & quod mali hoc non volunt, igitur non possunt & per contrariū sunt impotentes. Nam duo sunt ex quibus actus humani procedunt, scilicet voluptas & potestas ex quorum altero nihil educi possit. Item si duo sint qui nolint unum opus fa­ [...]re & debito modo unus procedit alter non valet, puta am­bulare qui claudus est constant quod impotens est. E [...] boni sunt similes recte incedentibus motu pedum, mal [...] vero mann inten­dentibus deficiunt ab eo quia natura maxime intendit scili­ [...]et a bone & ab eo tanto sint impotentiores & miseri quanto [Page 17]numquod negligunt est me [...]ius & dicunt que boni ambu­lant tantum quod nihil viae superest: mali vero in foribus errant. Item malus homo est homo sicut homo mortuus est homo & id quod mali possunt, hoc idem est in potentia corum & ergo potentia malorum est nulla quod solum malum & hoc est nihil, quod Deus potest omnia & non potest malum. I­tem mali non sunt boni, igitur non sunt potentes quod poten­tia est [...]ona [...] item naturaliter omnes app [...]tuut omne quod po­test desiderariscil summum bonum in quo est vera beatitudo. Liquit igitur illos solos potentes qui hoc possunt adipisci sed hoc mali nequeunt quia ad beatitudinem pr [...]bra id est vitia non veniunt.

In the third Prose Philosophy useth efficaciously the cure to Boethius proving by many reasons the contrary to the vulgar opinion, that onely the good are powerfull, because they will and obtain good; And that the bad will not therefore they cannot, and by the contrary are impotent. For two things there are from which mens veiw doth proceed to wit, pleasure and power, of which the one can produce nothing. Also if there be two which will not doe the same work, and one of them proceed in a deue manner, the other, cannot, for instance walk, he that is lame is apparantly impotent. And the good are l [...]ke those that goe up right by the motion of their feet. But the evill like those who endeavour by the hard, be­cause they fail of that which nature principally intends; to wit, good, and by that they are mone impotent and mi­serable by how much the good they neglect is the better, and they say the good walk so far that there is nothing re­maining of their way, but the bad do erre even in their setting forth. Also a bad man is a man as a dead man is a man, and whatsoever a bad man can do this is no more than impotency, and therefore the power of the bad is now, because they can onely do evill and that is nothing, that God can do all things, yet cannot do evill, also the evill are not good therefore they are not powerfull be­cause power is good, Also naturally all desire all that may be desired, to wit, the cheif good in which is the cheife [Page 18]beatitude. Therefore it is plain they are onely potent who can obtain this, but this the wicked cannot, because to beatitude wickedness that is vices come not.

In Metro 2. Ostendit regulam de principibus hujus seculi si sunt mali & quomodo veraciter sint impotentes quia non possunt facere quod volunt, & quasi ligati gravibus catenis, atque etiam acerbis passionum acultis; flagellantur nee unquam tranquilli sunt, sed rabis, superbiâ, libidine, tristitia, & spe vanâ agitantur.

In the second Meeter she shews a rule concerning the po­tentates of this age, that if they be evill, how truly impo­tent they are, because they are not able to do what they would, being as it were fettered with weighty chains. They are also scourged with the sharpe pricks of their pas­sions; nor have any tranquillity, but are actuated with fury, pride, lust, sadness, and vainhope.

In 3 Prosa ostendit malis nunquam de [...]sse sua supplicia, nec bonis deesse sua praemia Nullam esse piaeminis [...] respectu bo­ni: sed boni nunquam carent bono, eo quod nemo potest [...]sse be­nus qui b [...]no caret, igitur nunquam carent praemio. Item om­nis paena est de ratione mali, quia mali nunquam volunt care­re malo, igitur nūquam carēt supplicio, supplicium [...]ui [...] sum­mum est expertem esse boni; haec autem paena quainseperabili­ter adest malis naturam vehementer inficit, & ab huma [...]â conditione dejicit. Ita quod probitate derelicta, unusquisque hominem esse desierit, nic in statum divinum transire possit, & in belluam vertitur ita avarus ut lupus, iracundus, ca­uis, fraudulentut vulpes, accidiosus asinus, inconstans, avis di­cip [...]test. Econtra cum ipsum bonum beatitudo sit bonos om­nes co ipso quo boni sunt fieri, beatot liquet, & quod beat [...] sunt cos convenit esse deo [...], quod utique summum praemium est in auferibile. Et quia praemium bonorum est fieri Deos, supplicium malorum est bestias fieri.

In the third prose she shews that evil men never want their punishments, nor good men their rewardes.

That there is no reward but in respect of good. But good men never want good. Because none can be good [Page 19]who want good, therefore they never want their reward: so likewise all punishment is in respect of evill, because evill men will never want evill, therefore they never want punishment. For it is the greatest punishment to be void of good, but this punishment which inseperably accompanies evill men very much defiles nature, and pre­cipitates from humanity, so that when goodness being re­linquished, any one ceases to be a man, nor can be changed into a divine he is transform'd into a brute, as a cove­tous man may be called a wolfe, an angry man a dogg, a deceitfull man a fox, a sluggish man an [...]sse, an inconstant man a bird: on the contrary good it selfe being a beatitude, it is cleare that all good men are made happy in that wherein they are good, and they who are happy likewise they are good, and their reward is not to be taken away: and because it is the reward of good men to be made Gods, it is the punishment of the evill to be made Beasts.

In Metro 3. Phil [...]sophia solacii causa fabulam introdu­duei Vlissis [...]ujus socii per fae [...]inam quandam qua Circe dicebatur in diversas bestias corporaliter, non mental­liter, quia sensum retin [...]bant, transformati fuerant [...]t con­cludit quod transformatio mentis per vitia, corpore manent [...] e [...]dem, pejor est quam transformatio corporis in billuam, aut pecus animâ suâ manent [...], si talis per naturam transforma­tio possibilis esset.

In the third Meeter, for comfort sake, Philosophy bring­ing the story of Ulisses, whose companions were trans­form'd by one Circe into severall beasts, corporally not mentally, because they retained sence. And she con­ [...]ludes that the transformation of the mind by vices, the body remaining the same, is worse then a corporall Metamorphoses into a beast or brute, the soul remaining. the seme if a transformation by nature could possi­ble be.

In Prosa 4. Boethius rationibut supradictis assentit ma­li sunt infalices, ta [...]en adhuc quasi stato more [...]i [...] indig na­tur [Page 20]qui serviunt in b [...]nos & vellet quod hoc ita non esse pos­s [...]t, sed potius cito auferrentur de medio. Hanc impatienti­am arguit Pihlosophia, & suo loco probare promittit quod non licet sapienti sic indig [...]ari, sed majis compati, fucimus corpotaliter [...]grotis; valde enim miseri sunt vitiosi dum cu­pit a qua volunt perfi [...]iant & miseriores quam si [...]a perfice­re non possunt, & subjungit quod mali sunt faeliciores qui puniti sunt quam qui [...]on sant puniti, & tanto insaeli­ciores quanto diuturniores, & quanto minus puniuntur▪ & quod illi sunt miseriores qui faciunt injuriam quam qui cam patiuntur. Ostendit etiam qua miseria malorum esset sine fine si or um vita esset infinita & quod malitia eorum est miseria, & addit quod malos puniri bonum est. Primo quod aliquan [...]o resipiscunt a malo; secundo quod alii viden­tes corum terrorem, declinat a malo▪ 3. quod [...]orum miseri­ae additur aliquid boni, scil. paena quae rati [...]ne justiciae bona est, & quod propter malum purgatorium vel infernum post mortem requiritur, et quod opinio vulgi contraria est opi­ [...]ni Philosophia, & quod opinioni vulgi non sit assentiendum; & ille qui facit injuria est puniendus & non cui sacta est primus igitur est inferior, atqu [...] iudices potius debenti mi­tari ut compatiantur facientibus injuriam quam eundem pa­tientibus Quia ergo ad sapientium pertinet omne odium a se repellere & cunctis velle prodesse imo debent clementer ex­pectare & provocare discholos ad panitentiam, & pl [...]s com­patihis qui inferunt injuriam, quam qui patiantur tanquam infaelicioribus op [...]rtet.

In the fourth Prose B [...]thius yields to the reasons above mentioned, that evill men are unhappy, yet still after the common custome has indignation for them because they tyrannize over the good, and would that this could not be so, but rather that they might suddenly be cut off. Phi­losophy condemns this passion and promises in it proper place to prove that it is unlawfull for a wife man▪ to be so angry but rather to suffer, as we shew in those who are bodily sick: for wicked men are very miserable even when they bring to passe what they do desire, and more misera­ble [Page 21]then if they did not effect them. And she adds that the evill are more happy who are punnisht then those who are not punisht, and by how much the more durable and less punish'd by so much they are the more miserable. And that they are more miserable who do an injury then who suffer it. Further more she shews that the affliction of the evil are infinite if thire life could be so; and that their malice is their misery, and adds that is good for them to be punished. First because some time they repent them of the evil. Secondly that some apprehending terrours do decline them from evil. Thirdly, because there is some good annex'd to their misery, viz. punishment which in respect of justice is good. And that after death there is purga­tory or hell required for evill. And that the opinion of the vulgar is contrary to the opinion of Philosophy, and that we must not be led by their opinion. The first there­fore is the inferior, and Judges ought to imitate ratherin this thing, that they may have Compassion of them that doe the injury, then on them that suffer it. Therefore they that have any relation unto wisdom, ought to repell from themselves all hatred, and to have a desire to profit all men, yea they ought to expect for and to provoke al­disobedient men to repentance, and ought to have com­passion the more on those which offer the wrong, then those that suffer it, as the more miserable

In quarto Metro Philosophia jucunde confirmat quae dixit et exclamat contra homines illos qui bellicis motibus se i [...]viom ex odio ad m [...]rtem deducunt, hoc dicens quod ne­mo debet mortem malorum desiderare quae de se quam pluri­mus sine bello appropinquat & quod juste quoque diligendi sunt boni & mali misericorditer.

In the fourth Meter Philosophy delectably confirms what she had delivered, and exclaims against such who by warlike commotions proceeding from enmity, mutal­ly kill one another saying, that no man ought to desire the death of the evill, which of it selfe without warrs, ap­proaches many; and that good men are to bee loved [Page 21]of right, and the evill out of compassion.

In Prosa 5. Boethius quafi proficiens in scientiâ plures incipit dubitationes habere quam antea habuit; & ait, per­pendo qu [...]d in bonis fortuitis est aliquid boni, eo quod expedi­ens est Rhetoribus et sapientibus & politiarum gubernatori­bus casden habire & nunc stuporem meum Deus Rector ex­aggerat qui in bonis fortuitis prosperitatem constituit & rectâ ratione mundum gubernat. Quare ergo prospera & adversa accidunt bonis & malis & quasi diceret, si essem pol­lens opibus, bonore reverendus, potentia validus &c. ut o­lim tunc modica ratio sufficeret, sed quia affligor, impatienti me vexat, & idcirco toties ad quaerendum incitor & pro consolation [...], causam husus rei desidero, & quare carceres & cruces inventae propter malos saepissime eveniant bonis: & Philosophia respo [...]dit quod sic videtur esse propter igno­rantiam scil. causa fati & divinae providentiae.

In the fifth Prose Boethius becoming a proficient in knowledg makes more doubts then formerly, and sayes I consider that in contingent goods there is some good, be­cause tis very meet for rulers and wisemen and the Gover­nors of Commonwealths to reflect on them, and now God the ruler of all augments my amazement, who in con­tingent good can place prosperity and governs the world in due order. Why then do prosperity and adversity in­differently befall good and evill men, as if he should say, were I rich, honorable, and potent, &c. as heretofore, then an indifferent reason might satisfie, but seeing I am afflict­ed, I am vexed with impatience, and for this cause have so many incitations to make my complaints, and for con­solation desire the cause of this, and why that prisons and crosses found out for the punishment of the evill, become very often the portion of good men. And Philosophy an­swers that it is ignorance. viz in the cause of fate and di­vine providence that maks it appeare so.

In 5. Metro. Phil. quasi viam praparando ad informandum B [...]thium dicit quod [...]mmu [...] est hominibus res h [...] mi­rari quarum diuig [...]rarant caus [...], sed illis s [...]iti [...] c [...]ssat stup [...]r [Page 22]& eximplum dat demotu siderum arcturo at que Ʋrsa ma­jore, quare scil. tardius movenour, & de eclipsi lunae & so­lis qua ignorantibus mira videntur, quia nemo miratur de inquietudine aquarum slante Borea Zephyro similiter de nivibus a solis solutis sic in proposito si causa cesset cessat & admiratio & durante causae ignorantia, durat admiratio.

In the fifth Meter, Philosophy by preparing the way to inform Beethins, saying that it is usuall with men to ad­mire those things whose causes they have been long igno­rant of, but that all admiration is past asloon as they are known, he instances in the motion of the constellation Arcturus viz the greater Beare why it moves so slow. And in the Eclipse of the moon and sun, which ignorant peo­ple very much admire, so likewise it falls out, why none wonder at the roughness of the waters when the North­west winde blowes, or the suns dislolving the snow, even so in this case the cause and the admiration both cease to­gether, and the admiration of the cause continues as long as the ignorance thereof.

In Prosa 6. Boethius instat propter declarationem quast­ionis superius motae scil. quare malis bona & bonis mala con­tingant. Et Philosophia praemittit ejusdem difficultatem quia subjectum hujus eiusmodi est ut una dubitatione soluta aliae innumerabiles succr [...]scant, sed tamen quoniam afflictis ista scire expedit; ideo saltem de illis pauca narrabit & ponit quod divina mentis stabilitas omnia gubernat, statuit & disponit. Pramittit etiam quod oportet scire quid sit pro­videntia, & quid fatum & tunc ad hoc quod quaritur recto ordine procedit, providentia ergo est ipsa divina ra­tio in summo omnium principe sita, vel planius hoc modo providentia est dispositio divina, sive ordinatio existens in mente divina quâ cuncta inferiora secundum statum sua naturae sunt provisa: slatum vero est dispositio inharens rebus molibus per quam providentia, omni inectit suis ordinibus, & ponit quod providentia & fatum non sunt eadem, & quod fa [...]um cum omnibus sibi subjactanti­bus a providentia dependat: diversas opiniones [Page 24]circa fatum componit. Scil. a quibus vel ex quo exer­ceatur & quod omnia quae fato subiecta sint divinae etiam providentia subjacent & none converso & hoc de circulis super cundem axem ut unum super alterum & quanto ex­primo modus quid firmius divinae providentiae adhaereat tan­to firmius a fatali mutatione servatur; deinde Philosophia comparat habitudinem fati divinae providentiae per quatuor similia comparat & quod fatum habet se ad providentiam sicut ratiocinatio ad intellectum: idquod tactum est ad id quod est a seipso, tempus ad aternitatem: & circulus ad punctum medium, postea ostendit quae sint illa quae fato dis­ponuntur [...] & quod co quae apparent in reb [...]u consusa non in­telligentibus, sunt in divinâ providentiâ & gubernatione ordinata: & qui potest ista animadvertere optimam in singu­lis inveniet rationem. Item quod indifferenter bonis & malis prospera & adversa contingunt quae non fortuito, sed sum, mo rationis libramine & ex providentia ordinatoris proce­dunt quosdam siquidem praemio, quosdam supplico; deinde dignos praecognoscit causam generalem ostendit quare ma­lis bona & bonis mala contingant, scil. quod homines quae sunt in seipsi bona vel mala nesciunt, probans per similitu­dinem medici scientis diversis corporibus diversa convenire medicamenta & quod nescientes varietatem corporum di­ver sificatorum in complexionibus curationis rationem igno­rant, probat etiam hoc ex contrario judicio dei & hominum, allegans Lucanum de judicio Deorum & Catonem deinde cau­sas speciales enarrat, quare malis bona eveniunt: & una est, b [...]ia deteriores fieri potuerunt si hoc bonum eis non evenis­set, quod autem bonis mala non eveniunt fa [...]it torum meri­tum, & ideo [...]is bona eveniunt, ut praevalens improbitas reprimeretur. Item si quidem modesti affligorentur animo fractiessent bonos reprimi & eisdem tot mala evenire hoe e­tiam quia aliqui eorum ex longa faelicitate gloriari possent, & si non his malis exercitarentur superbirent. 2. ut inde ma­lis mereantur & virtutum excitatione consirmentur. 3. ne plus metuerent quam oportet. 4. ne aliquis plus presumit quam debeat. 5. propter preiose mortis gloriam. 6 propter [Page 25]eximplum aliorum. Quod autem mala malis adveniunt nemo admiratur, sed quod eis bona eveniunt. Prima causa est ne fi­ant pojores. 2. ut emendentur. 3. ut carum miseria ma­jor existat: deinde ostendit causam quare mali malos puniant quia ita tales mals fiunt boni. Donique contra hujus rei tractationem ampliorem exclamat.

In the sixt prose Boethius is stil very sollicitous for the declaring the question above mentioned, viz. why good befalls evill men, and evill befalls good men, and Philoso­phy premises the difficulty thereof, because the subject is such that upon the solution of one doubt many more will emerge, but because tis expedient for the afflicted to know these things she will speak somthing of them, and layes down that the stability of the divine power regulates, determines, and disposeth all things. She premises farther, that tis necessary to know what is providence and fate, and then in due order proceeds to the question. Providence therefore is a divine c [...]unsell sited in the prince of allthings. Or more plainly thus, Providence is a divine disposition or ordination in the divine mind, whereby all inferiours things are considered according to the state of their nature. But fate is a disposition inherent in things moveable, wherby providence chains all things in their courses. And she layes down that providence and fate are not the same, and that fate with what ever is subordinate to it, depends on providence. And she layes down severall opinions, concerning fate of whom it is exercised. And that all things that are subject to fate are also subject to divine provi­dence, but not on the contrary. And she manifests this in circles moved one above another, as upon the same axle tree, and by how much any thing adheres the more stedfastly to divine providence, by so much the more cer­tainly it is defended from fatal mutation. Furthermore Philosophy compares the habitude of fate to divine provi­dence by 4 similies, to wit, late hath relation to provi­dence as ratiocination to the intellect, that which is made to that which is of it selfe. Time to eternity; and the cir­cle to the Center. Afterwards she demonstrates which are [Page 26]those things which are disposed by fate, and that those things which appeare confused in matters to those which understand not, are ordained in divine providence and go­vernment, and he which is able to make his observation of these things, shall find excellent reason in every one of them. In like manner that prosperity and adversity wayed indifferently to good and bad, proceeds not by fortune but with the most exact poyze of reason, from the providence of him that ordained, for as much as he knowes some wor­thy of reward, some of punishmont. Afterwards she shewe the generall reason, why good things happen to e­vill men, and evill to the good, to wit because men are ig­norant which things are good and evill in themselves, proving by the similitude of a Physition knowing that dif­ferent medicines are sutable to different constitutions, o­thers being ignorant of the variety of Bodyes diversifyed in their Complexions are ignorant of the reason of the di­versity of theirs, she also proves this from the judgment of man contrary to that of God. Alledging Lucan concern­ing the judgment of the Gods, & Cato: afterwards shelayes down especiall reasons, why good things happen to evill men, & the one is because they might have been worse, if this good had not happened. But first the evill things happen not to good men, their merit is in the cause and therefore good things happen to them that their impiety prevailing may be repressed. Likewise if certain modest men should be afficted, they would be discouraged, because good men are repressed, and evills happen to them: This so fals out because some of them would be apt to boast of the du­ration of their felicity, and were they not exercised, might grow proud. Secondly, that from thence their merits might be the greater, and by this exercise might be con­firmed in their virtues: Thirdly, that some are more fear­full then is requisite: Fourthly, because some presume more of themselves then they ought: Fiftly, for the glory of a pretious death: Sixtly, for the example of others. But why evill things happen to evill men, none admires, but that they should participate of good; the first reason is, that they [Page 27]becom not worse: the second, that there might be some a­mendment: thirdly, that their misery might be the greater. Afterward she declareth the reason, why wicked men punish those that are wicked, because so such evill men become good. Lastly, she exclaimeth on any larger hand­ling of the matter.

In Metro 6. confirmat Philosophia quae dicta sunt per si­militudinem, jucunde alloquens Boethium, ut ita recreatas ad sublimiora tenderet, & divinam commendat providentiam in regimine corporum caelestium, Elementorum temporum, generabilium & corruptibilium, ex authoritate Dei regen­tis. Ait ergo si tibi plac [...]erit pura mente summi Dei judici [...] intelligere, aspice calum, & disciplinam stellarum, & anni cursus quam varii videntur, & tamen unum non confundit alterum, sic in actibus humanis omnia recte ordinantur. In the 6. Meeter Philosophy confirmeth those things which were spoken of by a similitude, pleasantly treating with Boethius that so being refreshed, hee might tend to sublimer matters, and she commendeth the divine power in the government of the celestiall bodies, Elements, Times, Ge­nerables, and corruptibles, from the authority of God ru­ling, shee saith therefore, if thou desirest with a pure minde to understand the judgements of the most high God, re­flect on the Heaven, and the discipline of the stars, and the seasons of the yeare, how different they seeme, and never­thelesse, one confoundeth not another, so in humane acts all things are rightly dispensed.

In Prosa 7. concludit Philosophia ex pradictis quod om­nis fortuna est bona, tanquam adeo infallibiliter administrata unicuique secundum sua merita, nam iucundos renumerat, asperos exercet vel decurtat, & ostendis quod vulgi sententia sit contrarium quasi dicat ô Boethi ne sequaris vulgi opini­onem qui semper de rebus pessime censent sed attende quod mu­tua potestate sit, qualem vis fortunā fingere, et per haec tantem hortatur, fortunam suam magnanimiter tollerare, & in homi­nis potestate constitutum, formare sibi fortunam, qualem vult, concludit.

In the seventh Prose Philosophy concludeth from the premises that all fortune is good, as it were infallibly dis­tributed to every one according to his merits, for she re­wardeth the ple [...]sant, she exerciseth or taketh short the stubborn, and layeth open that it is contrary to the vulgar, as if she should say. O Boethius have a care that thou ad­here not to the opinion of the vulgar, which alwayes judg things in the worst sence. But observe that it is in thy own power to forge out thy owne fortune, and by this exhorts him at length to bear fortune with a courage, concluding it to be in the power of man to frame to himself what for­tune he pleaseth.

In Metro septimo Philosophia suadelam suam exemplo virorum fortium, qui spretis voluptatibus & spe laudis & gloria labores maximos subjere confirmat & per hoc hortatur virtute praeditos ut a proposite suo propter labores non desistāt quia difficile enim me dium tenere, & pouit tres fabulas quasi sola [...]ii causa ipsi Boethio ne nimium seriis gravetur, at (que) sic concludit ô fortes ite nunc per vias altas ad superna, si tanta fecerunt in fideles pro gloria iuani, cur vos inertes & pigri ter­ga virtutis, id est, labores respuit is? quando terrenis & car­nalibus superath praemia vobis celestia largientur.

In the seventh Meeter Philosophy confirmeth her exhor­tation by the example of Couragious men, who despising pleasures for the hope of praise and glory have undergone the greatest labours. By this she exhorteth virtuous men, that they desist not from their purpose because of labours: For it is difficult to keep a mean, it layeth down three fa­bles, as it were solacing Boethius that he might not be op­pressed with serious matters: But she concludes, ô valiant men steere your course towards heaven. If infidels have effected so great things for vain glory, why do ye slug­gards and slothfull men turn your backs, that is, refuse la­bours, seeing earthly and Carnall things being conquered, heavenly rewards shall be abundantly bestowed upon you.