I must confesse 'tis no way pleasing to mee to dispute the power of a KING, for had I fortunes of my owne, so far as those would reach, I would nere urge property against my Soveraignes Commands, and no man ought to complaine of my grievance but my selfe, and if I were content to lose that which the Subjects Liberty calls Meum, I hope 'tis no prejudice to that it calls Tuum: But when I looke upon the generall cause (as at this time) tis otherwise; therefore now I hold every man bound to lay particular cases aside, and sacrifice his best endeavours, for a timely composure of these generall and unseasonable distractions, and the best way I could think on is this, viz. Nei­ther for private ends on the one side, to flatter the King, by giving him more power then the Law hath settled in him; nor for by-respects on the o­ther side, to abate of the Kings due, and give it to the Parliament; but with Allegiance to the one, and submission to the other (as neer as I can) give both their right.

And truely I cannot be made sensible that I have done otherwise, onely 'twas my misfor­tune to fall under the misapprehension of divers, [Page 6] who (from an Argument I used in the former Impressure) have raifed a consequence as dan­gerous, as the Subject of discourse was nice.

The Accusation against me is, that I did im­plicitely hold it lawfull to Depose a KING: the ground of their Accusation is this:

In the former Impression, Fol. 13. this obje­ction was urged, viz. The KING hath the King­dome by way of Trust, now by Law a Trust can­not be Countermanded; therefore Sir John Ho­thams keeping of Hull against the Kings Com­mand was illegall.

To which my Answer was thus, viz. I doe confesse that by Law a Trust cannot be Counter­manded; but yet I shall take a difference between the Trust of a private mans estate, and the trust of a Kingdome, and if that difference should not hold, I shewed the mischiefe that would ensue, for then our case were in short but thus:

We have intrusted the King with the whole Kingdome, and this trust cannot be in any part countermanded by us againe, and if so, then the Kings estate is as good as absolutly his owne (I meane) for his commanding power, though not for his disposing power; and if so, then we can­not make use of our own staff, when we are in feare of being beaten by a forraigne Force, because by that means, that is, by the Kings Commanding Power, the Parliament; that is, the whole King­dome may be bound to the peace.

But now some will here object that we ought [Page 7] not to have such a thought of the King, as to thinke that he would by his commanding power bind us to the peace, when a forraigne Force is comming against us.

To this I answer, that 'twere poor policy for him to do it, but that tis no dishonour to the King for me to suppose, that some Traiterously minded Fa­vorite, may at such a time perswade him to use his Commanding power, pretending some advan­tage to the Crowne (as all Traytors doe) when nothing is more intended then their own Trayter­ous ends; therefore twas the wisdome of our An­cesters the Law makers, to keepe the power out of his hands, not so much for feare what he would do of himself, as what others might possibly per­swade him to do.

I must confesse I might have answered the ob­jection, with the authority of Parliament who did imploy Sir John Hotham, but not imagining any would draw that consequence (they accuse me with) from the differenc I answered with, I wa­ved that answer I might have given from the pow­er which the Parliament have above the Law, If the Law had bin so, that in case of the trust of the Kingdom, it could not be in any part counter­manded.

But truely I cannot have any ground in that dif­ference for that conclusion: For I took the dif­ference in answer of an objection, concerning a particular place, as Hull, not concerning the whole Kingdom; and though it may be lawfull in that [Page 8] particular case (by reason of some great mischiefe or inconvenience which might otherwise ensue) yet it may not be lawfull in the generall; for who knowes not but the Law will rather suffer a parti­cular inconvenience then a generall mischief.

Besides, I meant not an absolute and perpetuall Countermand of that particular place neither; for that were utterly to extinguish and take away the Kings Right for ever; but I meant a temporary Countermand onely, that was, as long as (in the judgement of that Great Counsell the PARLIA­MENT) the urgency of the necessity did require it: and many things we find are and may be done for a certain time, which cannot be done for ever; as in case of the Peers of the Realme, 'tis the Birth­right of a Baron to Vote in the House of Lords in time of Parliament; yet we see and find it adjudged, that a Baron or an Earl or any Peer of the Land, may be disabled to sit during his life, or during such a time, but yet his heirs cannot be disabled so long as their veines are filled with Noble blood.

Besides, I meant that that temporary Counter­mand can never be done but by the Parliament nei­ther; and if they should not have power to do it being the Kingdom representative, then the King had more power then the Kingdom, which is ab­surd saith Fox, Vol. primum. Fol. 879.

And thus I have explained my self, sufficiently I hope to prevent farther mistakes, and to shew that for my part, I shall for ever pray that the Crown may stand as firm upon His Majesties Head as ever [Page 9] 'twas, and may it long continue there, and for ever to his Posterity after him.

And yet I fear there are many fiery zealous spi­rits who imbrace the tenet, and are glad to find any premisses from whence they may but with some co­lour draw their conclusion: nay and such as may have honest hearts too, and be earnestly desirous of a Reformation, only the zeal of their houses may eat them up; but for such as do hold the opinion, I am sure they have no incouragement from the Par­liament, neither can any thing that the Parliament hath done be any ground for their uulawfull hopes, and from me they shall have no more fuell to en­crease their flames then this, viz. 'Tis against the Common Lawes of England to Depose a King, a thing that was held damnable by no lesse then two Acts of Parliament, the one in Edward the seconds time, the other in Edward the thirds time.

Had I had the gift of foretelling the divers ob­jections and conclusions, that would have been rai­sed (by the severall Readers) from my Arguments, I would have laid them so, that no Conventi­cling Tubman should have made my words his text, raising from thence so damn'd a Doctrine; but that was impossible, and therefore seeing I could not then avoyd it, let me now labour to cleer my selfe by striving to convince others that hugg the tenet, which I shall do by two Arguments:

First, from the Common Law of England, which sayes the KING can do no wrong, the reason is good, because all his active Offices are disposed of, [Page 10] and he never executes none of them Himself, and therefore what ever wrong is done, 'tis done by his Officers, and they are to answer for it, and there­fore the Parliament layes the fault upon his Evill Councellors, not upon the King himself: now then I say, if the King can do no wrong, then you must allow that he does none; and if so, how then can any man hold it lawfull to Depose him; surely you will not be so unjust as to hold that he may be depo­sed without a cause, and suppose a cause you cannot, for the Law will not allow of such a supposition.

Again, 'tis a rule in Law, that unumquod (que) liga­men eo ligamine disolvitur quo ligatum fuit, now that Ligamen of institution or ordinance of Royall Dig­nity (as you say your self) was not only humane but partly divine, for as you say jure Coronae, the King was mans appointed, so you likewise say, that jure personae, he was God Anointed; now if it be so that he be as well Divine as Humane, how then can Hu­mane Laws undoe any more then what human Au­thority did at first institute? now according to this argument if you Depose a King, you must thwar [...] that rule in Law, and contra principium negantem non est disputandum.

The next argument is from Gods Law, which is the better way for weak man, either to humble him­self under the affliction God layes upon him, or stoutly to his power oppose him; surely you will grant that to stand on tiptoes against God, is not the safest way; why then for arguments sake, let us sup­ponere quod non est supponendum, admit that a King [Page 11] himself be as bad as bad may be; or which is most usuall, admit that he be drawne and perswaded by his Councellors to do that which is illegall, and to the great prejudice of his Subjects, why now is not this a scourge layed by God upon the Kingdom, to suffer the King to be thus perswaded and possest? Surely yes, why then do you think it the best way to Depose that King presently, as if you would have the Land flow with milke and hony in despight of God? or as if God did not know whether he sent him when he first bestowed him upon this King­dom at his Birth; or whose child he should be when he first fram'd him in the womb; in my opinion (I am sure I my self am) you may be zealous against the Cavaliers, and yet not envy the King, and cer­tainly you may worship God aright without cruci­fying his Son, you may honour God and not dis­honour the King.

Again, if God punish a Son with a sharpe and cruell father, were it fit for that son (thinking to en­joy a greater liberty then before) to kill his father, and so Depose him as I may say (for every man is a King in his own family) as if God could not whipp him with another lash: apply it to your selves.

Yet mistake me not, I blame you not for your good affections, and for being assistant to the Parli­ament, but rather for commendation tell you, that if any thing can be meritorons (in my opinion) that is, onely this caveat I give to the vulgars (for knowing and learned men▪ I hope will not entertain a thought of it) that their private hopes or inward [Page 12] thought reach not beyond the intent of the Parlia­ment, for feare lest their honest endeavoures should faile (notwithstanding your large contributions) by reason of your unjust intents. You do well to stand for your Mother Englands right, yet take heed you destroy not your Fathers the Kings; for Gods command of obedience to your Parents, doth not except against the honour you owe your Fa­ther.

And thus I have discharged my owne conscience concerning that point, whether I have pleased o­thers or not I know not, and indeed care not; I could never yet studie to please the roving fancies of the giddy multitude any farther then truth and that little knowledge I have would guide me; no, though the greatest recompence of a glorious, but fading world, were by my own thoughts presented to me.

And now seeing I am upon publishing an additi­on, I shall correct some of the chiefest faults of the last impression, so passe by the rest being but faults of the presse.

The chiefest was indeed occasioned by my own neglect in leaving a whole leafe out of the Printers copy, and it was this:

In the 7. leafe of the first impression there was an objection raised; but the answer was omitted, the ob­jection was this:

Some that endeavour to destroy the trust, and maintaine that the King hath his right to Hull, et per consequens, to all the Kingdome by discent, do urge [Page 13] the place in Calvins case, where tis said the King holds the Kingdome of England by Birth-right in­herent by discent from the blood Royall, whereup­on succession doth attend.

To which objection I answer, that those words whereupon succession doth attend, is a direct com­ment upon that place; for the King is the Heire ap­parent of King James his Father, now being so, he is capax coronae, that is, he is his Fathers successor too; and so he holds the Kingdome by succession: now the successor is the Heir of the Kingdom, Dan. fol. 28. not the heire of the King onely, and that is the reason tis usually said, To the King, his heirs and successors, where the word heirs is first named, be­cause he is first heire to the King, by title of discent before he can be heir to the Kingdome, that is, be­fore he can be his successor; so that there is a diffe­rence between Haereditas and successio, for they signi­fie two severall capacities, the first signifie his na­turall capacity as he is King jure personae, that is, as Gods Anointed, the other signifying his politique capacity, or his jus corona, that is, as he is mans appointed.

Bracton speaking of the King and his Oath, and how that he swears to administer Justice to all his Subjects, to the utmost of his power; goe; forward and sayes, Et ad hoc creatus est & electus, which two words, creatus & electus, do fully prove the former Distinction; that is, they prove him to be Gods Anointed, jure personae, and Mans appointed, jure co­ronae; Bracton, cap. 9.

[Page 14] I finde the same Distinction made good too, out of holy Writ; Saul and David were both Anointed by Samuel, but yet the peoples consent was so ne­cessary, that they had not the Crown till they con­sented to it, for David was twenty yeers without the Crown after he was anointed, and the text saith, Saul fought a Battle before his creation, 1. Sam. 11. 5. and yet he was anointed before the Battle: so that the word creation in that text, justifies what Fortescue sayes, Fol. 31. the intent of the people is the primum vivens, having within it blood, that is to say, politique provision for the utility and wealth of the same people, which it imparteth aswell to the head (that is) the King, as to the Members.

There are some that have gotten a new objection, which is not without some ground I must confesse, and 'tis this; 'Tis said in Calvins case, Cook Lib. 7. Fol. 13. A. that before any judiciall or municipall Laws were, Kings did dare jura of themselves, and decide causes according to naturall equity, and were not ty'd to any rule; or formality of Law, and yet they were Kings, and then say they could not have any politique capacity, for that being but fictio ju­ris, can be no ancienter then the Law whose fiction it was.

To which I answer, that the very place my Lo: Cook there cites for his proof is a sufficient com­ment upon that place, for he there quotes Fort. cap. 12. & 13. which very places are quoted in the for­mer impression of this book, Fol 10. by which you may see that he spake of other Kingdomes, not of [Page 15] Kingdom of England, who raised themselves into a Body, and so got the start of other Nations.

Many other things I should also correct of the former impressions, but I cannot in regard I am forced to print this addition by it selfe; otherwayes I should have corrected them all, and have brought the additions in their right places; but that Printers must now be pleased, who like Players touch nought but what will take: Newly revived, is quite forgoten with them, nay and with the Stationers too, but when they cheat a Puisne with a new cover upon an old book, with leafes pasted together to conceal an aged blott, never Printed but once be­fore, is not for their turn, they abhorre the beast, yet est natura hominum novitatis avida is their Creed though the Beasts language: An ingenious Statio­ner told me 'twould not sell without a new Title, (which made me change the dresse of this addition) yet he may be none of those that can find no eares for a Sermon at the second preaching unlesse the text be changed.

And thus I am willing to submit to an inconve­nience for their profits, rather then my words should be made the ground of Arguments so ter­rible as to shake a Crown, and so maliciously envi­ous and irreligous, as to strike at Royall Dignity.