Taken out of the First Book.

MAN, Natures Minister and Interpreter, acts and un­derstands only so much of the ordering of Nature, as he hath observed by the assistance of Experience and Reason: more he neither doth, nor can apprehend.

Neither the Hand alone, nor an Understanding eft to it self, can do much. Things are performed by instruments and helps, which the [...] needs as much as the Hand. Now as [...] Instruments assist and govern the Hands mo­tion, likewise the instruments of the Understan­ding prompt and advise it.

Humane Knowledge and Power are co-incident in the same, or happen to be alike, because ignorance of the Cause renders the Effect unintelli­gible: for Nature is not overcome without submission, and that, which in Contemplation stands instead of the Cause, in Operation serves as a Rule.

As to Operation, Man can do no more but only apply or remove na­tural Bodies. The rest Nature willingly compleats.

The Mechanick, the Mathematician, the Physitian, the Chymist, and the Magician are variously concerned in natural Operations, but as it hap­pens at present their attempts are but slight, and their successes inconsi­derable.

It were an extravagancy, and a plain contradiction to expect the ac­complishment of those things, which were never yet done unless by means never yet attempted.

Even those Operations which are found out are rather to be ascribed to Chance and Experience than to Sciences; for the Sciences, which are now professed[?] amongst us, are nothing else, but an adorning and a set­ting forth of things formerly invented, not the modes of Invention or the desigments of new Operation.

The Cause and Origine almost of all the Mischiefs, that happen in Sci­ences, is this alone, that we too much admire and set up the strength and power of our understanding, and we neglect the true helps and aids thereof.

Natures subtilty far exceeds the subtilty of our Sense, or that of our Understanding; so that the delicate meditations of Mankind, their specu­lations and inventions are but foolish things, if they were narrowly sear­ched into.

As Siences commonly so called are unprofitable for the invention of Operations, so the Logick now in use is not conducible to the finding out of true Sciences.

The Logick, which we now use tends to the establishment and confir­mation of Errours, which are founded in vulgar notions rather than to a serious enquiry after Truth, therefore it is more hurtful than profitable.

A Syllogisme is not used amongst the principles of Sciences, and in medi­al axioms it is imployed in vain, for it falls much short of Natures subti­lity. It hath therefore a command over assent, not over the things them­selves.

A Syllogisme consists of Propositions, Propositions of Words, Words interpret Notions, therefore if Notions, the basis of Things be confus'd, and rashly abstracted from things, nothing will be firm that is built upon them, therefore our only assurance is in a right induction.

There is no soundness in Logical and Physical Notions, neither sub­stance, nor quality, action, passion, nor being it self, are proper Notions, much less heavy, light, thick, thin, moist, dry, generation, corruption to attract, to expel element, matter, form, &c. All these are phantasti­cal and ill designed.

The Notions of the lower Species, as a man, a dog, a dove, and the im­mediate apprehensions of our senses; namely, hot, cold, white, black, don't much deceive us, and yet nevertheless by the fluidity of matter and m [...]xture of things they are sometimes confounded. All other Notions, which men have hitherto used are aberrations, and are neither duely nor truely abstracted, and raised from the very things themselves.

The things that are already invented in Sciences, are such as most com­monly depend on vulgar Notions. If any will search into the more in­ward, and remote mysteries of Nature, he must make use of Notions and Axioms, abstracted from things in a more certain and solid manner, that the working of the Understanding may be better and surer.

There are and may be two ways of searching and finding out truth: one from Sense and perticulars leads to the most general Axioms, and out of those Principles and their unquestionable Authority judges and finds out middle Axioms. This way is much in use. The other raiseth Axioms from Sense, and perticulars by a continual and gradual ascent it proceeds at last to generals. This is a true way but not yet attempted.

The Understanding left to it self goes the former way, observing a Logical method; for the mind delights to leap to generals, that it might acquiesce there, and after a little stay it loaths Experience. But these [Page 3] evils are now at length augmented by Logick for the pomp of dispu­tations.

An Understanding left to it self, accompanied with sober, patient, and grave Wit, if not hindred by former [...], essays the other way, which is right but not successful; because when the Understanding is not directed and assisted, is but weak, and unable to overcome the obscurity of things.

Either way derives its beginning from sense and perticulars, and acqui­esces in things most general. But yet they differ very much, for the one does lightly run over experience and perticulars; the other conver­ses in them in a right and methodical manner. Again the one layes down at first, certain abstract and un profitable generals. The other rises by degrees to these things, which indeed are more known to Nature.

It can never be that Axioms framed by arguing, for finding out new Operations, should be of any value, because the subtilty of Nature doth far surprise the acuteness of disputation. But Axioms rightly abstracted in order from perticulars, do easily discover and shew forth other new per­ticulars, and therefore by that means Sciences became active.

The Axioms now in use sprang from small and slender experience, and a few common perticulars, they are for the most part made and enlarged according to their measure, so that it is no wonder, if they lead not to new perticulars. Now if by chance any instance not observed or known before, offer it self, the Axiome is salved by some friviolous distinction; whereas it is more proper, that the Axiom it self should be mended.

That humane reason, which we use in Natures assistance, we are wont to call anticipations of Nature, because it is rash and hasty. But that rea­son, which is rightly extracted out of things, we call interpretation of Na­ture.

An icipations are strong enough to gain consent, seeing that if all men were equally and conformably made, they would agree well enough a­mong themselves. To speak plainly, no right judgement can be made of our way, nor of those things which are found out agreeable unto it by anticipations, I mean by the reason now in use: because we cannot desire any one to stand to the judgement of that thing which is it self called in question.

It is no easie matter to deliver, or explain those things which we have produc'd; because things new in themselves are to be understood by the Analogy they have with old ones.

Borguas tells us of the French Expedition into Italy, that they came with chalk in their hands to mark out their Inns, and not with arms to break through them. Our design is the same, that our doctrines might be admitted by well disposed and capacious Souls, for there is no need of confutations, where we disagree in the very principles, notions, and forms of demonstration.

Their reason, who held non-comprehension, and our way do in some sort agree in the beginning, but they vastely differ and are opposite in the end, for they absolutely affirm, that nothing can be be known, but we say not much can be known in Nature, in that way as it is now handled. They by their assertion destroy the authority of Sense and Understanding, we study and give remedies to help them.

Idols, mistakes, and mis-apprehensions, which now possesse, and are deeply rooted in Mans Understanding, so besiege the minds of Men that [Page 4] Truth can hardly get admission, but if it should they would hinder and disturb the restoration of Sciences, unless Men being fore warned would arm themselves against them, as much as they could.

There are four sorts of Idols or false Images, which besiege Mens minds: we, for distinction sake, have called them first Idola Tribus. 2. Idola Spe­cus. 3. Idola Fori. 4. [...] Theatri.

The raising Notions and Axioms by true induction is doubtless a pro­per remedy to drive away and remove these Idols, yet their indication is of great use, for the doctrine of Idols conduces to the interpretation of Nature; even as the doctrine of Sophistical arguments doth to vulgar Lo­gick.

Idola [...] are founded in humane Nature it self, and in every Fami­ly and Stock of Mankind. For humane sense is safely affirm'd to be the measure of things. On the contrary, all the conceptions both of sense and reason are taken from the analogy of Man, not the analogy of the Universe. Humane Understanding is like an unequal looking-glass to the rayes of things, which mixing its own Nature with the Nature of things, doth wrest and infect it.

Idola Specus are the mis-apprehensions of every individual Man. For every one hath besides the mistakes of humane Nature in genéral, a den or indivi­dual cave, where the hight of Nature is obscured and corrupted. This hap­pens either through every Mans singularity; or through education and conversation among others, or by reading of Books and the authorities of them who are honoured and admired by every one, or through the different impressions which occur in a prepossessed and predisposed, or in a calm and equal mind, or the like: so that the Spirit of man, as it is pla­ced or qualified in every Man, is a various, a troubled, and a fortuitous thing; wherefore Heraclitus said well, that men sought after Siences in lesser worlds, and not in the great and common World.

There are also Idols or mis-apprehensions arising from the mutual con­tracts, and also ciations of Men, which by reason of humane commerce and society we call Idola Fori: For Men are associated by speech, but words are imposed according to the vulgar capacity; therefore a vitious and an improper imposition of words doth wonderfully mislead and clog the Understanding. Neither the definitions and explications, wherewith learned men are wont to defend and vindicate themselves in some things, do mend the matter for words, do plainly force the Understanding and disturb all things, they lead men into many idle controversies and foolish inventions.

Lastly there are Idols or misapprehensions, which are entered into Mens minds from divers opinions of the Philosophers, as also from the [...] Laws of demonstrations: these we call Idola Theatri. Because all the kinds of Philosophy, which have been invented and received we look upon as so many Fables produced and acted to make fictitious and seni­cal Worlds. Neither speak we of those amongst us, or only of the anci­ent Philosophers and Sects; seeing many the like Fables may be composed and made, because the causes of the different errours are for the most part common; neither do we understand this only of universal Philosophy, but also of many Principles and Axioms of Sciences which have prevailed by tradition, credulity and neglect. But of all these kinds of Idols we must speak more largely and distinctly, that so the humane intellect may take more heed.

Humane Understanding is inclinable of it self to suppose a greater order and equality in things than it finds. And whereas many things in Nature are monodical and altogether unlike, yet it appropriates to them paral­lels, correspondencies, and relatives, which are not from hence, are de­rived those Figments.

In Coelestial Bodies all things are moved by perfect Circles. In the mean time they reject Spiral and Serpentine lines, retaining yet the names: From hence it is, that the Element of Fire is introduced to make a quaternion with the other three, which are within the reach of our senses. To the Elements also, as they call them, fancy ascribes to them a double pro­portion of excess in their mutual rarefaction, and such like dreames are invented. Nor is this vanity predominant in opinions only, but also in simple notions

The Humane Understanding attracts all other things to give its suffrage and consent unto those things which once please it, either because they are received and believed, or because they delight. And though a greater strength and number of contrary instances occur, yet it doth either not observe, or contemn them, or remove, or reject them by a distinction not without great and dangerous prejudice, by which an inviolable authori­ty remains in those former conceptions. Therefore he gave a right answer, who, when a list of the Names of such as had paid there their vows for escaping the danger of Shipwrack, was shewn to him hung up in a Tem­ple, and when he was questioned whether he did not acknowledge the Deity of the gods? He in answer demanded what was become of their pi­ctures who had perished after that they had paid their Vows? There is al­most the same reason for all Superstition, as in Astrological dreams, presages, &c. Men delight in such vanities, they mind the events when they come to pass, but when they fail, which is very often, they neglect and pass them by. But this evil more subtilly invades Philosophy and Sciences, wherein that which once takes, infects and corrupts the rest, though more firm and better. But in case this delight and vanity were wanting, yet it is a proper and perpetual error in Humane Understanding, to be rather moved and stirred up by affirmatives than by negatives, although in truth it ought to be indifferent to both: Yet on the other hand the strength of a negative Instance is greater in constituting every Axiom.

Humane Understanding is for the most part moved with those things, which suddenly and at once effect and reach the mind, and wherewith the fancy is wont to be filled and puffed up. As for the rest it supposes and fancies to have them in a kind of inperceptible manner, even like those few things that possess the mind. But as to that quick running over remote and heterogeneous instances, whereby Axioms are tried as it were by fire, the Understanding is altogether slow and unable, unless severe Laws and violent commands be imposed upon it.

Humane Understanding cannot rest, but still desires more and more, though all in vain. Therefore it is not to be imagined that Heaven should hear any extream or extime parts; for it may be alwayes necessarily ur­ged, that there is something further. Again it cannot be conceived how Eternity hath run along until now, because there is a common distincti­on usually admitted, that it is infinite a parte ante & a parte pòst, which can in no wise be proved, for then it would follow that one infinite is grea­ter than another, and that an infinite consumeth and tends to a finite. The like nicety occurs through the weakness of our imagination concer­ning [Page 6] lines alwayes divisible, but this mental infinity more dangerously interposes in the invention of causes: For whereas Universals chiefly ought to be in a positive nature, as they are found out, being not real­ly causable, yet the Humane Understanding being unable to rest, still desires things more known, but whiles it tends to further things it falls back to nearer ones, viz. Final causes, which indeed arise rather from Humane Nature, than the nature of the Universe. Out of this Fountain Philosophy is strangely corrupted. But he is equally an unskilful and a slight Philosopher, who seeks out a cause in primary universals, as he who desires it not in subordinate and subaltern things.

Humane Understanding is not an Ignis fatuus a meer light, but it re­ceives an impression from the Will and the Affections, which produces the reason why it desires Sciences, for what a Man had rather have true, that he resolves to believe. Therefore he rejects difficult things, through im­patiency of inquiry; sober things, because they confine the hope; the high Mystery of Nature, because of our natural Superstition; the light of experience, because of an arrogancy and pride, least the mind should seem to converse in vile and transitory affairs, he rejects Paradoxes be­ing too much over-ruled by the mistakes of the vulgar. Lastly affe­ction qualifies and infects the Soul many wayes which cannot be con­ceived.

But the greatest hinderance of the Humane Understanding, and its most dangerous errors proceed from the dulness, unsufficiency, and decepti­ons of the senses: those things which make impressions on the senses are of a greater weight than others of a higher nature, that do not affect them: Therefore contemplation most commonly ends with the sight, insomuch that there is little or no observation made of invisible things. Therefore the actings of the Spirits shut up in sensible bodies are hid from us. And all subtil transformation, that happens in the parts of the grosser things, which we commonly stile alteration, but is in Truch a subtil metaschematism escapes also our knowledge. Nevertheless, if these two that we have named be not found out, there can be no great matter performed in the works of nature.

Again the nature of common air, and of all Bodies which in thinness surpass the air, they being many in number are almost unknown, for sense in it self is a weak and an erroneous thing, nor do the Organs conduce much to enlarge or sharpen the senses, but the truest interpretation of Nature is made by in­stances, and by fit and proper experiments, when sense judges of the ex­periment, the experiment of Nature, and of the thing it self.

The Humane intellect is by its own Nature carried on to abstracts, and those things which are unstable it fancies to be constant.

But it is better to dissect Nature than abstract her, which was done by Democritus's School. By that means he searched further than the rest into Nature. For that purpose we must rather examine matter, its schemes and transformations, its pure acts and the Law of action and motion. Forms are but the invention of mens brains, unless you will call the Laws of the act forms.

Of this kind are those false imaginations, which we call Idola Tribus, they proceed, either from the equality of the substance of the humane Spi­rits or the prepossessions, coarctations, and turbulent motions thereof, or from the inspirations of the passions, or disagreement of the senses, or the manner of impression.

Idola Specus proceed from the proper nature of every individual mind or body, as also from education, custome or other casualties, which kind though various and manifold, yet more especially we propound those which require most caution, and have greatest power to defile the Under­standing, and render it [...] contemplations of Nature and most sim­ple Bodies only disturb and impair the Understanding, but contempla­tion of Nature and of Bodies compound, and in their configuration asto­nish and dissolve the intellect, This is most evident in the School of Hencippus and Democritus compared with other Philosophy, for it so much considers the particles of things, that it almost neglects their frames: and others so amazedly behold them, that they cannot arrive to Natures sim­plicity. These contemplations therefore are to be altered and interchange­ably assumed, that the Understanding at the same time, may be made pe­netrating and capable, and those inconveniencies we speak of be avoided with the false notions proceeding from them.

Let therefore your speculative prudence be so disposed in expelling and removing the Idola Specus, which proceed either from the predominan­cy, or excess of composition and division, or from our affection to the times, or from large and small Objects. In general let every one, who studies the nature of things, chiefly suspect that which captivates his Un­derstanding, and so much the greater heed is to be taken in these opini­ons, that the Understanding may be kept equal and pure.

But Idola Fori are the most troublesome of all, which, by a confede­racy of words and names, have [...] themselves into the Under­standing. For men believe that their Reason governs words, but so it happens that words retort and reflect their power upon the Understand­ing. This hath made Philosophy and Sciences Sophistical and unactive. Now words are for the most part accommodated to vulgar capacities, and by lines most apparent to common apprehensions they divide things. But when a sharper intellect, or more diligent observation would transfer those lines, that they might be more agreeable to Nature; words make a noise: from hence it comes to pass, that the great and solemn dis­putations of learned men, often end in controversies concerning words and names, with which, according to the custome and prudence of Mathe­maticians 'twere a wiser way to begin, and to reduce them into order by definitions. And yet definitions in natural and material beings cannot re­medy this evil because they also consist of words, and words beget words, so that it is necessary to have recourse to perticular instances, and their ranks and orders, as we shall presently shew, when we come to the man­ner and reason of constituting notions and Axioms.

Mis-apprehensions forced by words upon the Understanding are of two sorts. 1. The names of things which are not: for as there are things which through inadvertency wanting a name, so are there names with­out things, through a Phantastical supposition. 2. Or the names of things which are but confused, ill determined, rashly, and unequally abstracted from things. Of the first sort are Fortune, the Primum Mobile, the Pla­netary Orbs, the Element of Fire, and such like fictions arising from vain and false speculations. This kind is easier cast out, because it is exter­minable by a continued abnegation and antiquation of such speculations. But the other sort is perplex'd and deeply rooted, proceeding from an ill and unskilful abstraction. For example sake, take any word, Humidum if you please, and let us see how its various significations agree, and we [Page 8] shall find this word Humidum to be nothing else but a confused note of divers actions enduring no constancy or reduction; for it signifies that which easily circumfunds it self about another body, and is in it self in­determinable and inconsistent, that which easily gives place on all sides, and easily divides and dissipates, and as easily collects, and reunites it self, that which easily flowes and moves, easily adheres to another body and moistens it, that which is easily reduced into a liquid, or melts, ha­ving been before consistent or solid: Therefore if you consider the pre­dication and imposition of this word taken in one sense the Flame is moist, in another sense the Air is not moist. In one sense again small dust is moist, in another glass is so. Whence it is evident, that this notion was only rashly abstracted from waters and common liquors without any due verification.

In words also there are certain degrees of pravity and error, less viti­ous are the names of some substances, especially the lowest Species well deduced, for the notion of Chalk and Clay is good, the notion of Earth bad, more vitious are the actions of Generation, Corruption, Alteration: The most vitious qualities, excépt the immediate objects of sense, are hea­vy, light, rare, dense, &c. And yet even among these it cannot be helped but some notions will be better than others, accordingly as more copious matter supplies Humane sense.

The other mistakes named Idola Theatri, are not innate, nor secretly wrought in the Understanding, but by fabulous speculations, and the perverse Laws of demonstrations plainly infused and received. But in these to undertake or endeavour a confutation is not agreeable to what we have spoken. For seeing that we neither agree in our principles nor demonstrations all disputation it taken away. But this is good luck for the Ancients, that they may preserve their reputation, for nothing is de­tracted from them, seeing the way is so questionable. Because a lame Man, as they say, in the way, out goes a Racer out of the way, for tis evident the stronger and nimbler he is, the greater is his aberration, whiles he is out of the way.

But such is our manner of inventing Sciences, that we attribute not much to the sharpness and strength of wit, and yet we almost equalize them, for even as the describing of a right line or perfect Circle much depends on the [...] and exercise of the hand, [...] it be done meerly by the hand, but if a rule or compasses be used, there is little or no such de­pendancy upon the hand: So fares it exactly with our Reason, Although there be no particular use of confutations, [...] yet we must say something of the Sects and Kinds of these Theories, and afterwards of their outward signs, because they are in a bad condition, and lastly of the causes of so much unhappiness, and so long and general a consent in error, that Truth may have an easier access, and the Humane Understanding may be more throughly purged, and rid of these mistakes.

Idola Theatri or theoretical mistakes are many, and may be more, and in time to come will be, for unless mens wits had been employed about Religion and Divinity during many Ages, and also about civil Govern­ments, especially Monarchies, they had [...] such novelties in con­templations. So that Men addicted unto them, ran the hazard of their fortunes, not only deprived of a reward, but also exposed to contempt and envy. Doubtless many more Sects of Philosophy, and Theories like to those, which once in great varieties flourished amongst the Grecians, [Page 9] had been introduced: for as upon the etherial Phoenomena's more figures of Heaven may be formed, likewise many more various opinions may be as easily founded and established upon the Phenomena's of Philosophy: Now the Fables of this Theater are like those that are acted on the poeti­cal Stage, whence it comes to pass, that Scenical and [...] narrations are more quaint and elegant than those taken out of true history, and better please the Readers.

In general either much out of little, or little out of much is assumed in­to Philosophical matter, so that on all sides, Philosophy is founded on the too narrow basis of experience, and Natural History, and determines out of fewer things than it ought; for the rational sort of Philosophers snatch from experience several vulgar things, and they to neither certain­ly found out, nor diligently examined or tried, the rest they place in me­ditation, and the exercise of wit.

There is another sort of Philosophers, who have bestowed a great deal of pains in few experiments, and from thence have presumed to draw and frame a Philosophy strangely wresting all other things thereunto.

There is also a third sort of them, who intermingle divinity, and tradi­tions of Faith and Adoration amongst whom the vanity of some has incli­ned them to seek and derive Sciences from Spirits and Demons. Therefore the stock of Errours and false Philosophy is threefold, namely Sophistical, Emperical, and Superstitious.

Of the first kind Aristotle is an evident Example. By his Logick he cor­rupted natural Philosophy made the world consist of Categories attribut­ed to the humane Soul, a most noble substance, a genus made up ofsecon­dary notions, transacted the business of dense and rare, whereby bodies under go greater or [...] dimensions or spaces by the cold distinction of act and power. He asserted only one proper motion to be in all bodies, and if they had any other, that he said was from another; many more things he affirmed according to his fancy, which he imposed upon Nature, being every where more solicitous how he might explain himself in an­swers, and make any thing positive in words, than of the internal truth of things. This plainly appears if you compare his Philosophy with others famous amongst the Grecians, for the Homoiomera of Anaxagoras, the Atoms of Lencippus, and Democritus, the Heaven and Earth of [...], the discord and concord of Empedocles, Heraclitus's resolution of Bo­dies into the adiaphorous nature of Fire, and the replication of them to density, have something of natural Philosophy in them, and a relish of na­ture and experience: whereas Aristotles Physicks are nothing but logical notions, which under a more specious name, not nominal but more real he retracts in his Metaphysicks, nor let not that move any one, that in his Books of Animals, in his Problems and other Treatises he frequently useth Experiments. For he first decreed them, neither did he rightly consult experience in establishing his Determinations and Axioms, but after he had determined them according to his pleasure, he made experience a slave to his fancies: And upon this account he is more to be blamed than his modern Followers, I mean a Sect of Scholastical Philosophers, who have altogether forsaken experiments.

But the Emperical kind of Philosophy brings forth more deformed and monstruous opinions than the Sophistical or rational, because it is not founded in the light of common notions, which though slender and su­perficial is notwithstanding in some measure universal and conducive to [Page 10] many things, but in a few narrow and obscure experiments. And there­fore to those who daily converse in such experiments, and have thereby corrupted their fancy, this Philosophy seems probable and certain, but to others incredible and vain. A notable example whereof we find in the Chymists and their opinions, but now scarcely any where else, unless in Gilberts Philosophy. However we must by no means omit a caution concerning this Philosophy, because we inwardly foresee and presage that if men awakened by our precepts, shall at last betake themselves to experience, bidding adieu to Sophistical doctrines, they will sustain some damage, through a praemature and inconsiderate haste of the understand­ing, by soaring too soon to generals and principles, which evil we ought to prevent.

But the corruption of Philosophy through superstition and intermixed Divinity extends it self further, and works much mischief, both to Philo­sophy in general and particular. For the humane understanding is no less obnoxious to the impressions of Fancy, than to the impressions of vulgar notions. For the contentious and Fallacious kind of Philosophy ensnares the Understanding, but the other kind being phantastical, swoln and Poe­tical doth rather flatter it. For there is in Man a certain ambition of the Understanding as well as in the Will, especially in sublime and elevated Wits. Of this kind you have an example amongst the Grecians, especially in Pythagoras, but joyned with gross superstition, but more danger­oufly and subtilly in Plato, and his School. This kind of evil is found in the parts of other Philosophers; by the introduction of abstract Formes, final Causes, first Causes, and frequent omitting the medial, and the like. Wherefore take great heed to this matter, for it is the worst of evils to defie errors, and to adore vain things may be well accounted the plague of the Understanding.

Some modern Men guilty of much levity, have so indulged this vanity, that they have essayed to found natural Philosophy in the first Chapter of Genesis, the Book of Job, and other places of Holy Writ, seeking the li­ving among the dead. Now this vanity is so much the more to be check'd and restrained, because by unadvised mixture of divine and humane things, not only a phantastical Philosophy is produced, but also an Heretical Religion. Therefore it is safe to give unto Faith with a sober mind, the things that are Faiths.

Hitherto our Excellent Author hath spoken of the bad authority of Philoso­phy, founded in vulgar notions, a few Experiments, or in Superstition: he examines next the depraved matter of Contemplation especially in natural Philosophy.

He proceeds next to discover to us by what means demonstrations lead us into errors and mistakes, and concludes that experience is the best demon­stration, if it be founded upon mature Experiments. He discourses afterwards of the several sorts of Philosophers among the Greeks, and takes notice of their imperfections, of their ignorance in ancient History, and in Cosmogra­phy, so that they could not be acquainted with so many experiments, as the Learned of our dayes.

Afterwards he discourseth of the causes of Errors, and of their long con­tinuance in credit in the World, that none might wonder how it comes to pass that some in these last Ages, find so many mistakes in the Learning and Wit admired in former Ages.

The first Cause of the small prosiciency in Sciences, he saith, is the streights of time, and their ignorance of former Times: for their Observation had not scope enough, nor sufficient assistance from true History, to gather right and judicious Experiments.

In the second place another Cause of great moment certainly offers it self; namely that in those times, when the wits of men and Learning flourished most or but indifferently, Natural Philosophy had the least share in humane contemplations: nevertheless this ought to be account­ed the great Mother of Sciences: for all Arts and Sciences, pluck'd away from this Root. may perhaps be polished and accommodated to use, but they will never grow. Now it is evident, that since the Christian Faith was embrac'd and encreas'd the most part of the rarest Wits applied them­selves to Divinity. To this end large rewards were propounded, and all manner of helps plentifully afforded. This study of Divinity took up the third part or period of time amongst us Europeans, and the more be­cause about that time Learning began to flourish, controversies touching Religion did wonderfully increase: but in the preceding Age, during the second period among the Romans, the chiefest meditations and studies of Philosophers were imployed and spent in Moral Philosophy, which was then the Heathens Divinity. Moreover the greatest Wits in those dayes for the most part applied themselves to Civil affairs, by reason of the Ro­man Empires greatness, which required the labours of many men. But that Age wherein Natural Philosophy seem'd chiefly to flourish among the Grecians was a parcel of time of small continuance, for even in anci­enter times, those Seven, called Wisemen, all except Thales, applied them­selves to Moral Philosophy and Politicks. And in after times, when Iso­crates had brought down Philosophy from Heaven upon Earth, Moral Philosophy prevailed further still, and diverted mens thoughts from physi­ological speculations.

That very period of time also, wherein Physick Enquiries flourished was corrupted and spoiled with contradictions, and new determinations. Wherefore Natural Philosophy in every one of those periods, being great­ly neglected or hindred, 'tis no wonder men profited so little in it, seeing they altogether minded other things.

Add moreover, that those who studied Natural Philosophy, especially in these modern times, did not wholly addict themselves thereunto, un­less perhaps you may alledge the example of some Monk in his Cell, or Nobleman in his Country House. So at length it was made but a passage and draw-bridge to other things.

This, this famous Mother of Sciences, was basely thrust down into ser­vile offices, and made a drudge to wait upon Medicine, or the Mathema­ticks; and again to wash the immature wits of young men, and give them a superficial mixture, that they might afterwards be the better qua­lified to receive of another. In the mean while let no man expect a great progress in Sciences, especially in the practical part, unless natural Philo­sophy be produced to particular Sciences, and those again reduced to Natural Philosophy: for hence it comes to pass, that Astronomy, Opticks, Musick, many Mechanichal Arts, Physick it self, and what is more wonder­ful, even Moral Philosophy, Politicks, and Logick, have for the most part no considerable depth, but languish in the surface and variety of things, because when once these particular Sciences are divided, they are no longer nourished by Natural Philosophy, which out of the Fountains [Page 12] and true contemplations of motions, rayes, sounds; texture and figurati­on of Bodies, affections, and intellectual apprehensions, communicates new strength and augmentation to them. And therefore 'tis no wonder, that Sciences grow not since they are separated from their roots. Another great and powerful cause, why Sciences are so little advanced, is this, that race cannot rightly be run, where the Goal is not rightly placed and fixed. Now the true and legitimate mark of Sciences is to enrich Mans life with new inventions and forces. But the greater number of men know nothing of this, because they are mercenary and professory, unless it happens that some Artist of a sharper wit, and ambitious of Glory, studies some new inventions, which commonly tends to his own undoing. Therefore most Men are so far from propounding to themselves the advancement of Arts and Sciences, that even out of those things that they have, they seek no more than what may be converted into professory use, gain, reputation, or the like advantages. And if any one amongst the multitude seeks know­ledge ingeniously and for it self, yet you will find he doth this rather to obtain variety of contemplations and precepts, than for the rigid and se­vere inquiry of Truth. Again suppose another more severely enquires after Truth, yet even he propounds to himself such conditions of Truth as may satisfie his mind and understanding in reference to the causes of things known long ago, not those which may give fresh pledges of ope­rations or new light to Axioms, The end therefore of Sciences being not yet rightly defined, or well assigned by any body, no wonder if Error and mistakes attend those things which are subordinate thereunto.

The Noble Author condemns next the erroneous wayes which conduct to Sciences; namely obscure Traditiòns, giddy Arguments, the windings of Chance or unclean Experience; and wonders that none yet have recommend­ed sense, and well ordered Experience, which he supposes to be partly caused by a great mistake. That the Majesty of Humane Understanding is impair­ed with long conversing in Experiments and particular things, subject to sence, and determined to matter; especially seeing these things are labo­rious in the inquiry, ignoble in the meditation, harsh in discourse, illi­beral in the practice, infinite in number, and full of subtilty.

Again the reverence of Antiquity, and the authority and consent of those who have been accounted great men in Philosophy, has detained and inchauted men from making any progress in Sciences.

As for Antiquity the opinion which men entertain of it, is idle and in­congruous to the word it self, for the old age, and great age of the world are terms equivolent to antiquity, and ought to be attributed to our times, not to the youthful age of the world, that wherein the Ancients lived.

For that Age in respect of ours was greater and ancienter, in respect of the World it self, lesser and younger: and therefore in like manner, as we expect a greater knowledge in Humane Affairs, a more mature and a riper judgement from an Old Man than from a Young Man, by reason of his Experience, and the variety and plenty of things which he hath seen, heard, observed, and understood, so also far greater matters may ratio­nally be expected from our Age, than from the ancient times, if it would but know its strength, and were willing to try and mind things, because we live in the Worlds old Age, and are stored with infinite experiments, and advanced in our noble Observations. The discoveries of other Lands [Page 13] unknown to former Ages are no small helps to our experience. Besides it is a great weakness to attribute so much to ancient Authors, for Truth is the Daughter of Time not of Authority, and the ancientest times are the young­est in respect of the World. The other cause of mens mistakes is their admi­ring the operations which can shew grey hairs, and a too great esteem of li­beral Arts and Learning already found out, which is an act of simplicity and childishness. But the greatest damage hath happened to Sciences through pusilanimity; and the smalness of those tasks, which humane Industry hath proposed to it self, and yet, what is worst of all, that pusilanimity is ac­companied with Arrogance and disdain.

Moreover Natural Philosophy in all Ages hath had a troublesome and harsh Enemy; namely Superstition, and a blind immoderate zeal of Re­ligion.

Lastly the way to all Reformed Philosophy hath been blocked up by the unskilfulness of some Divines, who were afraid least a deeper enquiry should dive into Nature beyond the bounds of Sobriety, traduce and falsly wrest those things, which are spoken of Divine Mysteries in the sa­cred Writings, against Searchers of divine Secrets: Others cunningly conceive, if the means be unknown, which they think greatly concerns Religion, all things may more easily be referred to the deity. Others from their example fear least motions and mutations in Philosophy should terminate in Religion.

Again all things in the manners and institutions of Schools, Uni­versities, Colledges; and the like places destimated for learned Men, and getting Learning, are found to be against the advancement of Scien­ces, &c.

But the greatest Obstacle in the progress of Sciences, and new under­takings thereof is discerned in the dispairing of men, and a supposed im­possibility, for even wise and grave men are wont to diffide in these things, pondering with themselves the obscurity of Nature, shortness of Life, deception of the Sences, weakness of judgement, difficulty of Ex­periments, and the like, &c.

We must take our beginnings from God, in what we are about, for the excellent nature of Good therein it manifestly from God, who is the Author of Good, and Father of Lights.

The Foundations of Experience, for we must descend to them, have hi­therto been either none at all or very weak; neither hath a sufficient System of particulars been any wayes as yet found outand congested, either in number, kind, or certainty, able to inform the understanding.

In the plenty of Mechanical Experiments, there is discovered a great want of such as assist or tend to the information of the understanding, &c.

Not onely a greater plenty of Experiments is to be sought, and procur­ed, differing in kind from what ever was yet done. But also another me­thod, order and process are to be introduc'd, for the continuing and pro­moting of Experience. For wandring Experience, guided by it self, is a meer cheat, and doth rather amaze men than inform them. But when Ex­perience proceeds regularly, orderly, and soberly, there may be some bet­ter hope of Sciences.

Seeing there is such a great number, and as it were an Army of particu­lars, but so scattered and diffused, that they disgregate and confound the understanding, we can expect no good from the skirmishes, light moti­ons, and transcursions of the understanding, unless by fit, well disposed, [Page 14] and exact Tables, there be an instruction, and co-ordination of those things which appertain to the subject of our enquiry: and the mind be ap­plyed to the preparatory and digested helps of these Tables.

But when this plenty of particulars is rightly and orderly placed be­fore our eyes we must not presently pass to the Inquisition, and Inven­tion of new particulars or operations, or if we do we must not rest in them, &c.

We must not permit the Understanding to leap or fly from particulars to remote and general Axioms, such as are called the principles of Arts and Things, or by their constant verity to prove or discuss medial Axioms.

But then Men may hope well of Sciences, when by a true Scale, and con­tinual not intermitted degrees, we ascend from particulars to lesser Axioms, then to medial, for some are higher than others; and lastly to universals; for the lowest Axioms differ not much from naked Experience, but the supressive and more general which occur, are rational and abstracted, and have no solidity. The medial therefore are those true solid and lively Axioms, wherein mens fortunes and estates are placed, and above those al­so are those more general, if not abstracted, but truely limited by these me­dial or middle Axioms.

Therefore the humane understanding needs not feathers but lead and weights to hinder its leaping and flying. But this is not yet done, when it is we may have better hope of Sciences.

Now in constituting an Axiom another form of induction contrary to what was formerly, or is now used, is found out, and that not onely to prove or invent Principles, as they call them, but also lesser and medial Axioms, ye all. For that induction, which proceeds by simple enumera­tion, is a childish thing, and concludes precariously, being exposed to the danger of a contradictory instance. And yet most commonly it gives judgement from fewer instances than it ought, or from those onely which are at hand. But that induction which would induce to the invention and demonstration of Arts and Sciences, must separate Nature by due re­jections and separations, and, after sufficient negatives, conclude upon af­firmatives, which thing is not yet done, nor so much as attempted, unless by Plato only, who indeed, to examine definitions and Ideas, doth in some measure use this form of Induction. But for the good and lawful institution of such an induction or demonstration. many things are to be used, which never yet entered into any mortal mans heart, so that greater pains is to be taken herein than was ever yet spent in a Syllogism. Now the help of this induction is not onely to be used in finding out Axioms, but also in terminating motions, for certainly in this induction our greatest hope is placed.

Far more and better things, yea and in shorter time, are to be expected from the reason, industry, direction, and intention of men, than from chance the instinct of Animals, which hitherto have given the beginning to Inventions.

This also may be brought as an encouragement, that some things which are found out, are of that kind, that before their production it could not easily come into mans mind to imagine any thing of them, for every body despised them as impossible, as the use of Guns the invention of Silk, the Seamans needle, &c.

Therefore we hope there are in Natures bosome many secrets of excel­lent use, which have no alliance nor paralellism, with the things already [Page 15] invented, but are placed out of Fancies Road, not as yet found out, which doubtless after many revolutions of Ages shall at last come forth, even as those former did. But by the way we now declare, they may speedily and suddenly be both anticipated and represented.

We must not omit another thing, which may raise up our hope. Let men reckon the infinite expence of Wit, time, and money, which they are at in things and studies of far lesser use and value; the least part whereof, were it converted to sound and solid things, would conquer all difficulty.

Had we a man among us, who would de facto answer Nature's Queries, the Invention of all Causes and Sciences would be the study but of a few years.

Some without doubt, when they have read over our History and Ta­bles of Invention, may object that something is less certain, or altoge­ther, false in our experiments, and therefore perhaps will think with himself, that our inventions are founded on false foundations, and dubious principles. But this is nothing, for such things must needs happen at first, for it is all one as though in writing or printiug some one Letter or other should be misplaced, which does not usually hinder the Reader, for such errors are easily corrected by the sence, &c.

Many things also will occur in our History and Experience, first slight and common, then base and mechanical, lastly too curious, meerly spe­culative, and of no use, which kind of things may divert and alienate the studies of men.

Now for those things which seem common, let men consider, that they themselves are wont to do no less than refer and accommodate the cau­ses of rare things to these which are frequently done, but of things daily happening they enquire not the causes, but take them for granted.

And therefore they inquire not into the causes of weight, coelestial ro­tation, heat, cold, light, hard, soft, slender, dense, liquid, concistent or solid, animate and inanimate, similar dissimilar, nor lastly Organical, but dispute and judge of other things, which happen not so frequently and familiarly by these as being evident, manifest, and received. But we, who know well enough, that no judgement can be made of rare and notable things, much less new things be brought to light without the causes of vul­gar things, and the causes of causes rightly examined and found out are for­ced necessarily to receive the most vulgar things into our History: Further­more we perceive nothing has hindred Philosophy more, than because things familiar and frequently happening do not stay and detain the contempla­tion of men, but are entertained by the by, and their causes not inquired into, so that information of unknown matters is not oftner required than attention in known things.

Now as touching the vileness and dishonesty of things, they are no less to be entertained in Natural History than the richest and most precious things, nor is Natural History thereby polluted, for the Sun does equal­ly visit Pallaces and Sinks, and yet is not defiled. Again we do not build or dedicate a Capitol or Pyramid to the Pride of men, but we found an holy Temple for the worlds pattern in humane Understanding.

Therefore we follow our Copy for whatsoever is worthy of essence is worthy of Science, which is the image of Science, but vile things subsist as well as costly ones. Moreover, as out of some putrid matters, as musk and civet, sometimes the best odours come, even so from low and sordid in­stances [Page 16] sometimes excellent light and information flowes.

Before all things we have and must speak first of this thing, viz. That we how at first setting out, and for a time, seek only lociferous not fructiferous Experiments, according to the examples of Divine Creation, which only produced Light on the first day, and bestowed a whole day upon it, not intermingling with it, in that day, any material Work. If any one therefore think these things are of no use, it is all one as if he should think Light useless, because it is indeed no solid nor mate­rial being; for we may truely affirm, that the light of simple Natures be­ing well examined and defined, is like Light which affords passage to all the secret Rooms of Operations, drawing after it all the companies and troops of Operations, and potentially comprizing the Fountains of most noble Axioms, yet in it self it is not of so great use: Thus the Elements of Let­ters of themselves and separately signifie nothing, neither are of any use, but yet are like the first matter in the composition, and preparation of e­very word. Thus the seeds of things strong in power are as to use, ex­cept in their increase of no value, and the scattered beams of Light unless they unite together, become unbeneficial to men.

Some also will doubt rather than Object, whether we speak only of Na­tural Philosophy, or else of other Sciences; namely, Logick, Ethicks and Po­liticks to be perfected according to our way. But we surely understand what we have said of all this, and as vulgar Logick, which rules things by syllogism, belongs not onely to natural, but to all Sciences. So ours, which proceeds by induction, compriseth all things; for we make an Hi­story and inventory Tables, as well of Anger, Fear, Modesty, &c. as of Politick Examples, and so of the mental motions of memory, compositi­on and division, judgement and the rest, no less than of heat and cold, or light and vegetation, &c. But as our method of interpretation after Hi­story is prepared and ordered, doth not only behold mental motions and discourses, as common Logick, but also the nature of things. So we govern the Understanding, that it may apply it self in a perfect and apt manner to the nature of things.

But that ought by no means to be doubted, whether we desire to destroy and demolish the Philosophy, Arts, and Sciences which we use, for we on the contrary willingly allow their use, cultivation, and honour; nor do we any wayes hinder, but that those which have been in credit, may nourish disputations, adorn Orations, be used in professory employments. Last­ly, like currant money, be received among men by consent. But how truely we profess this very thing, which we mention concerning our af­fection and good will towards allowed Sciences, our publick Writings, especially our Books of the Advancement of Learning declare and at­test.

It remains that we now speak somewhat cóncerning the excellency of the End. Had we before treated [...] these things, our expectations pro­bably had better succeeded, but now we are in hopes, that all prejudices being removed, these matters may perhaps be of more weight.

For though we had perfected and compleated all things, nor had called others to share in our labours, yet should we have refrained these words lest we might be thought to proclaim our own merits, but seeing the indu­stry of others is to be sharpened, and their minds to be stirred up and in­flamed, 'tis fit we put men in remembrance of some things.

First then the Introduction of noble Inventions seems to carry the grea­test [Page 17] sway amongst humane actions, as former ages also have judged; for they gave divine honor to the Inventors of things, but to those who were me­ritorious in civil affairs, as the founders of Cities and Empires, Lawgivers, [...] of their Countreys from temporal evil, Destroyers of Tyranny &c. they only decreed heroick honor. Inventions also, are the new creations, they are man's Glory, they cause him to be a God to the rest of man­kind. New inventions are of a wonderful consequence as the Art of Print­ing, Gun-powder, and the Sea mens compass. These three have changed the Face and State of affairs in the whole World. First, in Learning. Se­condly, in Warfare. Thirdly, in Navigation.

There are three sorts of ambition, the first desires to enlarge man's own power over Countries and People, this is common and ignoble, the Second, endeavours to enlarge other mens, as our Prince's Dominions, this hath more dignity, but no less desire.

But if any one endeavours to restore and inlarge [...] power and domi­nion of mankind, over the university of things, doubtless this ambition is sounder, and nobler than the other two: Now mans dominion over things consists onely in Arts and Sciences, for nature is not trusted, but by obedi­ence.

It is now high time that we propound this art it self of interpreta­ting nature, wherein though we suppose we have given most true and profitable precepts, yet we do not attribute unto it any absolute necessity or perfection, as though nothing could be done without it. For we are of opinion if men had by them a just History of Nature and Experience, and would diligently study it, and could command themselves in two things; first in putting away received opinions and notions. Secondly, in forbear­ing a while generals and subgenerals, they would by the proper and genuine strength of the understanding, without any art, light upon our form of in­terpretation; for interpretation is the true and natural work of the mind, all obstacles being first removed: But certainly our presents will make all things more ready and sure.

Nevertheless we do not affirm that nothing can be added unto them. On the contrary we, who consider the mind not only in its own faculty, but as it is united with things ought to determine, that the art of invention may grow and increase with things invented.

Taken out of the Second Book.

IT is the business and intent of humane power to produce and superinduce a new nature, and new things upon a body given to it; but it is the busi­ness and purpose of humane science, to find out the true form of this body, or the right difference, or the essence of nature, called natura naturans, or the Fountain of emanation: these words we use, be­cause they express the thing, and discover it best. Now to these works of the first rank there be two of a second and inferior sort, that are subordinate. To the first, the transformation of concrete bodies from one to another within possible li­mits. To the second, invention in all generation and motion of a Secret proceeding continued from an apparant efficient and vissible matter to a new form; as also the invention of an hidden schism of resting bodies not in motion.

Although the ways leading to the power and humane science, be near­ly allied and almost the same, nevertheless it is the safest, because of that old and pernicious custome, of spending time in abstracts to begin and raise sciences from their very foundations, which look upon the active part in order, that it might consume and determine the active part, therefore we must see to some nature to be superinduced upon another body, what precept or direction any should require for that purpose, and that in an easie and plain expression.

For example, suppose any should desire to cover over Silver with the yellow colour of Gold, or give unto it an increase of weight, with a re­gard to the Laws of matter, or to make an obscure stone become transpa­rant, or glass gluttinous, or to cause a body not vegetable to grow; we must see in such a case what direction or deduction may cheifly he de­sired, first a person would doubtless wish for something of a like Experi­ment to be shewn unto him, which might not fail in the operation, nor de­ceive in the undertaking. Secondly, he would desire some directions which might not bind him, and force him to certain mediums, and parti­cular [Page 20] ways of acting, for it may be, that he may be unable to purchase, and procure unto himself such mediums, therefore if there be any other me­diums and other methods of acting, besides that direction of producing such a nature, it may perhaps be of such things, as are in the power of the Worker; yet notwithstanding he may be excluded from the [...] of such, things by the narrowness of the Rule, so as that he shall meet with no [...]. Thirdly, he may desire, that [...] may be shewn unto him, which may not be altogether so difficult, as the operation that is in question, but that comes nearer to the practise.

Therefore it is [...], that every true and perfect Rule of working be certain, [...], and well designing, or in order to action: therefore this is the same as the invention of a true form, for the form of any nature is such, that when it is supposed the nature it self must needs follow, there­fore it is always present, wherever that nature is, it be speaks it in gene­ral and [...] it. Such is the form of a thing that when it is taken away the [...] of the thing is removed.

Therefore it is always [...] from it, when that nature is absent, and is in it alone. [...], a true form is such, that it deduceth the nature of a thing out of the Fountain of being, which is common to many, and more [...] than the nature, as they speak, than the form. Therefore the Rule of knowing a true and perfect Axiom is this, that [...] [...] [...] [...] found out which might be convertible with the nature given, and yet be [...] [...] of a more known nature, like as of a true genus. [...] [...] [...], the one active, the other speculative, are the same in effect, and what is most useful in operation is most true in speculation.

But the Rule or Axioms of transforming bodies are two fold. The [...] consider'd a body, as a troop or conjugation of simple [...], as in [...] these things do meet, that it is yellow, weighty, and of such [...] [...] [...] may be beaten thin and drawn into wire, of such a bigness that it is not vo­latile, and that it loseth nothing by fire, that it is to be run in such a man­ner, that it is to be separated and loosned by such means, and the like of the other natures or properties of Gold.

Therefore such an Axiom deduceth the thing from the forms of the sim­ple [...] or properties, for he that knows how to bring new forms and methods of yellow, of weight, of fluidity, &c. he will see and take care of their graduations and means, that all these be conjoined in one bo­dy from whence transformation into Gold may be expected. Therefore this manner of marking belongs to the primary action, for there is the same method required in bringing forth one simple nature, as many; onely man meets with more difficulty in working, when he is to joyn together many natures, which meet not of themselves unless by the ordinary and usual ways of nature; nevertheless we may affirm that the method of working, which considers the [...] natures, though in a concrete body, proceeds from those things, which in nature are constant, eternal, and universal, and open a wide door to mans ability, which as affairs are now manag'd our humane understanding can scarce comprehend or represent.

But the Second kind of Axioms, which depends from the invention of a secret proceeding, acts not by simple natures, but by concrete bodies, as they are found in natures ordinary course; for example, suppose an Inquisi­tion is made from what beginnings, how, and in what manner Gold, or any other Metal, or Stone is generated from its first matter and deform substance until it comes to a perfect mineral, likewise in what manner Herbs grow, [Page 21] form their [...] [...] of the sap in the earth, or from the seed until it riseth up to be a plant with all the succession of motion, and the divers, and continued endeavours of nature. Likewise of the ordinary genera­tion of animals from their conception to their birth, in like manner of all other bodies.

But this inquisition relates not onely to the generation of bodies, but al­so to other motions and workings of nature; for example, suppose an in­quisition be made into the universal series, and continued manner of nou­rishment, from the [...] reception of the Food, until it turns into the sub­stance of the body; likewise of the voluntary motion in animals, from the [...] impression of the fancy, and repeated endeavours of the spirits, to the movings and turnings of the Arters, or of the outward motion of the tongue, and lips, and other instruments to the giving of articulate [...]; for these things relate to concrete or collegious bodies, and in operations they are lookt upon as particular and special custom of nature, not as fun­damental, and common Laws, which constitute forms. But we must needs [...], that this method seems to be the most expedite, the most likely and [...] and more than the other primary.

[...] wise the operative part, which answers this speculative, doth [...] [...] [...], working from those things, which are commonly [...] [...] things near at hand, or from those things to other [...] [...] highest and radical operations upon nature depend [...] [...] [...] Axioms. Moreover, when man hath not the [...] [...], but onely of knowing and beholding, as in [...] [...] [...] are not within mans reach he cannot change nor alter them. [...] the inquisition of the fact it self, or of the truth of the [...] [...] [...] as the knowledge of causes and agreements, relates to the primary and universal Axioms of simple [...] as the nature of voluntary rela­tion, or the [...] [...] of the load stone, and many others; which are more common than the [...]: neither can any body hope to ter­minate the question, whether in the daily motion, the earth doth in truth come round, or the Heavens unless he understands [...] the nature of vo­luntary rotation.

The hidden proceeding, which we have mentioned, is otherwise, so that our humane understanding, as it is now wrapt up in [...], can­not easily search into it; neither do we [...] certain measures, [...], or degrees of proceeding visible in bodies, but that continued proceed­ing, which for the most part is not subject to our senses.

For example, In all generation and transformation of bodies, we must inquire what is last, and what flies away, what remains, what is added, what dilates it self, what is drawn to it, what is united, what is separated, what is continued, what is cut off, what means, what hinders, what com­mands, and what yields, and many other things.

Again, neither are we to enquire after these things in [...] and transformation of bodies, but in all other alterations and motions we are likewise to enquire, what proceeds, and what succeeds, what is most fierce, and what is most remiss, what gives the motion, what commands, and the like.

All these things are unknown to, and never handled by the Sciences, which are composed by the grossest and the unablest wits. Seeing [...] natural action is transacted by the least beginnings, or by such as are so small, that they are not to be perceived by our senses, no body can hope [Page 22] to rule or turn nature, unless he can comprehend and take notice of them in a due manner. Out of the two kinds of Axioms, which are already mentioned, Philosophy and Sciences are to be divided, (the common re­ceived words which approach the nearest to the discovery the of things, be­ing applied to our meaning) namely that the inquisition of forms, which in reason according to their own Laws are eternal and unmovable, constitutes the Metaphysicks; but the inquisition of the efficient, of the matter, of the se­cret proceeding, and hidden schismatism, all which things regard the com­mon and ordinary course of nature, not the foundamental and eternal Laws, should constitute the Physicks. Now to these are subordinate two practical Sciences, to Physick the Mechanick is subordinate, and to the Metaphysicks, the better sort of Magick, in regard of its large ways and greater command in nature.

Now that we have thus described our doctrine we must proceed to the precepts in a right and orderly manner; therefore the discovery of the in­terpretation of Nature contains chiefly two parts. The first tends to the drawing out and raising Axioms from experience; the second teacheth how to take and derive Experiments from new Axioms. The first part is divided in a threefold manner into three ministrations; into that which relates to sense, into that which relates to the memory, and to that which relates to the mind or understanding.

First we must have a Natural and Experimental History; sufficient and good, which is the foundation of the thing: It must not be feigned or contrived onely, but we must find what Nature doth, or bears.

But the Natural and Experimental History is so various and scattered that it confounds[?] and disturbs the understanding; unless it be limited and placed in a right order; therefore we must form some tables and ranks of instances in such a manner and order, that the understanding may work up­on them.

Which, when it is done, the understanding left to it self, and moving of it self, is not sufficient, but unable, for the working of Axioms, unless it be ruled and assisted; therefore in the third place a lawful and true in­duction is to be brought in, which is the Key of the Interpretati­on; we must begin at the End and proceed back-wards to the rest.

An inquisition of forms proceeds in this manner, first, upon nature giv­en, we must bring to the understanding all the instances of notes, that a­gree in the same Nature, though by different matters; Therefore such a collection is to be Historical, without any hasty contemplation or greater subtilty than ordinary, for example in the inquisition of the form of Hot.