AMongst all the Methods and Contrivances (since the pre­sent War) to supply the Go­vernment, that none should prove ineffectual or useless, except the Fund given for establishing a Land-Bank, seems something strange when considered: For since we live in a Countrey seated under the best of Cli­mates, productive of all the Necessaries of Life, whose Native Commodities are the Foundation of the greatest Trade and Commerce under Heaven, whereby numerous Families daily ar­rive at great and plentitul Fortunes: I say, for the Proprietors of such a Canaan as this, either not to know, or if known, not to be able to establish their Interest, must argue the greatest Stupidity, or the [Page 2] least Industry imaginable. And it is plain to any intelligent Man, how the extra­ordinary Interest of Money has been like a Gangreen to many Estates, and has reduced them to a very mean con­dition; and the difficulty of mortga­ging Land is now so great, that be­sides the Legal Profits, (if the Summ to be borrowed be considerable) the Len­der must have a Present made him, be­fore he will condescend to look at the Title. This was a melancholly pro­spect to Men of good Understanding, and good Estates, and therefore it needs not remain a Mystery to so many, why the Parliament should be so fond of a Land Bank, as to refuse this Fund to the Bank of England, and give it to them, since the former is the most beneficial thing to the Landed-man that ever was projected, and the other profitable on­ly to a few Traders, who no doubt will confederate and unite their strength to oppose any Contrivance which is like­ly to advance the Interest of the Land­ed-man, [Page 3] and to lessen their own; for had the Land-Bank succeeded, it's evi­dent that the Interest of Money must in a litte time have been reduced to 3 l. per Cent. and Land consequently have risen in purchase proportionable to the fall of Money, which the monied and trading Men could not endure to think of, much less to have it brought about; for what could be more ungrateful than the thoughts of consuming dou­ble the time in their Trade, to accumu­late that Wealth, which when purcha­sed, will acquire but the same Estate of Inheritance, as what is gotten in half the time, at the rate as Land and Money goes at present: For now it's every days experience, that a few years success in Trade, renders Monied-men Masters of so much Wealth, as enables them to purchase the most considera­ble Estates in the Kingdom; so that at this rate in some few years, the Tra­ders will invade the antient Gentry, and take away their Place and Na­tion. [Page 4] These, and such like Considerati­ons, were the cause why the Land-Bank met with so little Encouragement, and so strong opposition, for when the Gentlemen of the House of Commons would by no means be induced to lay aside a Proposition, so apparently advantagious to all Landed-men in the Kingdom, then an Exchequer-Bank was invented, either to hinder the o­ther, or at least to protract time, and therefore the Projectors of it did not desist from pressing that forward, 'till it was twice cast out by a division of the House; and notwithstanding they were first beaten from their Out-works, yet they had a reserve still, hoping that if a Bill passed in favour of a Land-Bank, to get a mill-stone to be tyed about its Neck that would not fail of sinking it, by providing that the Exchequer might issue out their Bills immediately for 150000 l. and for the rest if the Bank did not raise it. And tho' this was readily consented to [Page 5] by the House of Commons, that his Majesty might have all Reserves for raising the Money, yet the consequence of this proved to be a dividing the In­terest as well as the Money, and made those who were so fond of a Bank un­der the Exchequer management, to be very little concerned whether the other had success or not; and then they who saw further into the Mill­stone than others, gave it out in a mo­dish whisper, that the Bank would ne­ver come to any thing, which discou­raged hundreds from subscribing, which no doubt was the intent of the Par­ties. Another difficulty was the re­quiring so vast a Summ as 1282000 l. before they could be a Corporation; for if the subscribing 500000 l. would have done, they would not have been obliged to ask nigh so large a Premium as they did, which (by the way) was not so extravagant as their Enemies repre­sented it to be, considering the scarcity of Money at that time, when most Men [Page 6] valued a mill'd Crown as if it had been an ancient Medal of one of their Ance­stors; neither did they themselves (whatever they pretended,) think it so, since they were of Opinion, that had it been complyed with, the Money could not have been raised; but it is an easie matter to find a stick to beat a Dog. All Scruples, tho' never so dark and nice, must be laid hold of, and all the weak Sophistry they were Masters of, must now be furbished up to attack the Land-Bank; but that imprudent and unreasonable demand (as it was call­ed) was not so bold as welcome to some, who were glad of that or any o­ther occasion to deny the Land-Bank; and had their Demands been but a fifth part of what they were, it's likely they would have been thought unreasonable, for every Mole-hill seemed a Mountain, and they were lookt upon as such as intended to raise a Rebellion rather than Money: And it was something strange, to see such an indifferency to [Page 7] those who endeavoured to bring in such a Mass of Wealth; but it could not be the Money that was disliked, but the Method of raising it; for the grand Debate was, Whether these Chimera's and Idols of Fancy, called E—Bils must do it or not, which at last being resolved in the affirmative, 5 l. per Cent. for the first payment, which (by the way) is but 25 s. per Cent. for the whole Summ) is thought sufficient, and to spare, for such as shall subscribe their Money to the Land-Bank, (less than ever was offered when the base Money was currant, which People parted with without any consideration of the Secu­rity) that one would think that Propo­sal was rather made by way of Mortifi­cation for their former extravagant De­mands, than the utmost that could be afforded on such an Occasion. And it's Observable, when this gracions Of­fer would not bring forth one Penny, (as it was not likely it should) the Commissioners were again sent for, and [Page 8] it was the Opinion of most that were present, that heard the Questions pro­posed to them, and the Answer they gave, that there would be an Agree­ment, when as the Event shewed there was nothing less intended, and that they were sent for, imagining them illiterate enough to make illegal Demands, as asking their Premium upon the Salt-Fund, or to have Guineas taken at above 22 s. at last the gracious 5 l. per Cent. is again offered, with a Ne plus ultra tacked to it, this Method served to get time, and was like throwing out a Bar­rel to a Whale to play with, whilst the Ship escapes; for by this dallying the Commissioners were diverted from thinking of any other means to raise the Money, which without doubt was the thing feared by some. And I cannot omit one Question that was asked, and not being answered to their satis­faction, (as was pretended) was then alledged the reason they could not comply with our Proposals, and that [Page 9] was, What Security we could give of raising the whole Summ? a very pretty Question, and which would without doubt put the Rogues to a Non-plus, and ought to be answered Poet Bayes his way, after a little-pausing and scratching ones Head, to say, I gad I won't tell you; for if they should have drawn out four or five of the stoutest Fellows amongst them, each worth 40 or 50000 l. and sent for a Publick Notary immediately, and went forthwith to Noverint Universi, it's ten to one they would not be satisfied, or thought the Security sufficient. I dare say they would not have taken the two Northern Crowns, nor any other brace of Princes in Europe for Security: And it was utterly impossible to com­ply with this Demand, unless that Que­stion had been put in time, that the East-India Company, (who design'd to sub­scribe part of the Money) might have prevailed with the great Mogul to give Security to raise the Summ: Yet many People are of Opinion, that the best [Page 10] Security for the Money, had been to have given such terms, as it had been the Peoples Interest to have subscribed it; but every things runs counter when a thing is predestinated to Ruine and Destruction, the Project was hatch'd under an unlucky Planet, and was born like many other foolish things in Na­ture, only that it might dye, and we ought to rejoice it fell so honoura­bly, having so many great and power­ful Enemies against it.

Another reason is given why the Land-Bank was unfortunate, and that is, because it was conceiv'd in sin, and therefore that matter ought to be examined, for if so, it is no wonder it throve no better: And to prove this 'tis alledged, That the Parliament having incorporated a Society of Men, by the Name of The Governour and Company of the Bank of England, (mark the exclu­sive Particle The) had debarred them­selves of the Power of setting up another Bank, and therefore after the Bank of [Page 11] England had advanced their Money for the publick Good, (without any con­sideration for their own Interest) and have ever since their incorporation been so useful to the Government, not only by lending their own money, but every bodies else they could lay hands on, to erect another Bank in prejudice of such a one, and upon the breach of the pub­lick Faith too, must certainly be an un­grateful and wicked Action.

Now if this be a Crime, it is not the first that Parliaments have been guilty of in that nature, having served the Church of England the same sauce be­fore, which all People must allow was by Law establish'd, and was as much the Church of England as the other is the Bank of England, taking the word The in its utmost latitude. Neither can it be denyed, but that the Church of England has been as serviceable to the Govern­ment as the Bank, and is much better calculated for so being, than this or [Page 12] any other Bank can possibly be.

And in truth, the Bank hath been ra­ther serviceable to the Subjects than the Government, for if we reflect on the Proceedings of the Bank for this last six Months, we must take the People to be in their minority, and to have chosen the Bank for their Guardians. It is well known, that the desire of living above our Fortunes, has been an Epidemical Distemper to the People of this King­dom, and especially to the Gentry: Now the cure of this Disease is totally owing to the Bank, for their Pious and Paternal Care ought never to be forgot­ten, in diligently enquiring into Mens circumstances, when they came for their Money, viz. What Family they had? what Children? what servants? and what other Necessary Expences they were obliged to support, and supplyed them not according to their own extravagant demands, but with what was conveni­ent for the Necessaries, not for the Lux­ury [Page 13] of Life. Now to do any thing a­gainst the interest of these our Spiritual and Temporal Benefactors, must argue the highest ingratitude. But the Bank may be contented to run the same Fate with the Church, since it was as much the Intent of the Legislators to have but one Faith as one Bank.

But here it will be said by the Dire­ctors of the Bank, that although the Consequence of the Toleration will be setting up as many Churches as there are different Opinions amongst Man­kind, yet the Directors of the Church of England put all other Churches under Contribution, and receive Tithes from all, like the City Council, who must be fee'd though you make use of others. To this may be said, that the Church have a Legal Right to Tithes, and can force People to pay them, which the Bank (to their Grief) have not, to force People to deposite their Money; but if the pay­ments [Page 14] of Tithes had been as voluntary as putting Money into the Bank, it had been no more unlawful to establish a Toleration than it is now.

But here perhaps they will Object, that if the Church were really as ill used as the Bank, yet that is an Ag­gravation of the Crime rather than an Excuse, which is very true; but I de­ny that either have been so ill used, or the publick Faith broke to either; for nothing passes in an Act of Parli­ment, but what is given by express words, or something necessarily im­plyed. I suppose the Bank does not pretend that another Bank is exclu­ded by express words; and it is the most unreasonable thing in Nature to make the particle The such a Mon­ster, as to carry in its belly all the Cash in the Kingdom, and to be destructive to all future Corporations and Bodies Politick. But I dare be bold to affirm, that if the Parliament [Page 15] had suspected this Particle to have im­ported but the 20th. part of what is by some suggested, they would have sent 100 Miles for a word, rather than have used it; and therefore it can be no Crime, in foro Conscientiae, to set up another Bank.

And tho' the Directors of the Bank of England were not blameable, for using all their Interest to hinder the Act from passing, yet when (notwith­standing all the opposition that could be made) the Act passed, and the King's Affairs, and the Affairs of all Europe in a great measure depending upon the Success of it, then, I say, to appear so vigorously against it, and to strain so hard as to bankrupt themselves, rather than the Land-Bank should rise, savoured rankly of Malice and Self-interest. Neither can the Directors of the Bank of England be taken by any intelligent Man to be such Patriots as they would have the World suppose them to be; but [Page 16] I will detain you no longer in the Porch, but proceed to the Objecti­ons made against the Gentlemen that proposed and prosecuted the Land-Bank.

First, That they undertook the rais­ing 2564000 l. at 7 l. per Cent. per­petual Interest, redeemable by Parlia­ment.

Secondly, That contrary to their first Proposals, they insisted upon an Extra­vagant Premium of 300000 l.

Thirdly, That they were not able to raise the Money upon the Premium they desired, nor could give any Se­curity to do it.

Fourthly, That they ruined the Cre­dit of the Bank of England.

I propose to answer these Objecti­ons, and then to shew,

First, That the Bank of England, through their Covetousness and want of Understanding, ruin'd their own Credit.

Secondly, If this Fund had been gi­ven [Page 17] either to the Bank of England, or the Exchequer alone, it could not have been so easily raised as by a Land-Bank.

Thirdly, That there is no way to restore Paper-Credit but by a New Bank.

The First Objection is, That they undertook the raising of 2564000 l. at 7 l. per Cent. perpetual Interest.

To this I Answer, That neither the Gentlemen concern'd in the Land-Bank, or any Person, or Body of Per­sons in England, did, or could under­take so great a Summ; but when Me­thods were proposed in the House of Commons for raising this Money, they offered their Opinions, that it might be raised by a Land-Bank, and that 7 l. per Cent. was sufficient En­couragement, as the Treasury and Courtiers thought it might be best raised by an Exchequer-Bank, and o­thers by different Methods; and if they were mistaken, (as I shall endeavour [Page 18] to shew they were not) it is what the Treasury were in their Exchequer-bank, and what any one else in probability would have been, considering the diffe­rent circumstances of the Kingdom when the Proposals were made, and when the Money was to be raised.

Second Objection. That they insisted upon an extravagant Premium of 300000 l.

To this I Answer, They were obliged to it.

1. By the Discouragement and Ob­structions they met with in the House of Commons, in the passing their Bill.

2. The Condition of the King­dom in relation to Money and Cre­dit was very different when the Pro­posals were made, and when the Mo­ney was to be raised, and therefore they were obliged to enlarge their Demands.

First, The Difficulties they met with in passing their Bill were these,

First, The Members of the Bank of England were excluded from subscrib­ing.

[Page 19] Secondly, They were not to be In­corporated upon a less Summ than 1282100 l. by which Discourage­ment not one in ten would subscribe 'till they were assured of being a Cor­poration, esteeming that Priviledge to be half their bargain, and fearing the Subscriptions might not amount to that Summ; whereas if the Subscribers had been qualified to be a Corporation up­on the subscribing 500000 l. that Summ had been subscribed in three days, by the Commissioners themselves, and the Members of Exeter-Exchange; and if they had been once entituled to a Corporation, there could be no doubt but the whole Money would be sub­scribed afterwards, since it would be then a greater Encouragement to come in at Par than upon 20 per Cent. Pre­mium before.

Thirdly, When they offered a Clause to their Act, to naturalize such as would subscribe 500 l. and had reasonable Assurance from the Forreigners upon [Page 20] the Exchange, that such encourage­ment would bring in 400000 l. that clause being thrown out, the stock of the Bank of England advanced, and their Wagerers upon the Ex­change offered odds against the Suc­cess of the Land Bank.

Fourthly, Their Bill was delayed so long by the opposition it found, that they could not get their Commission passed before the 4th. of May, by which means it was left in the power of the Treasury to refuse or take the fourth part of their Subscriptions in clipt Money, which was a particular hardship upon a great number of People, who avoided putting in their clipt Money upon other Funds, in hopes of subscribing it, and making their first payments with it in this Bank; and reasonably hoped since they paid to the recompence, to have their clipt Money made good to them as well as to others.

And I believe it has been every [Page 21] ones Observation, that several Gentle­men of the Bank of England, and others, Opposers of the Land-Bank, would often insult over them upon their Suc­cess in the House of Commons, and ask them what was become of their Bank, tho' now they call them Jacobites, and threaten to impeach them, for not doing what they them­selves rendered impossible for them to do.

The second Reason I gave, was, the different Circumstances of the Kingdom when the Proposals were made, and when the Money was to be raised: As,

1. Guineas were taken at 30 s. and it was not known whether the Parli­ament would bring them down or no.

2. Paper-Credit was good, and the Bank of England and the Goldsmiths paid their Bills punctually, whereas at the time this Money was to be rais­ed, both refused.

3. Tallies were equal, or better [Page 22] than Money, whereas afterwards they were 20, 30, and 40 per Cent. Discount, by which means People could make a much greater advantage of their Mo­ney, and therefore would not subscribe it upon the same terms as they thought before reasonable.

4. It was hoped at first not above 60 per Cent. would be called in, where­as afterwards by the Universal Fall of Credit, and want of Money, no one thought of paying less than the whole Summ subscribed.

5. There was an actual want of Money in Specie in the Kingdom, seven Millions in and out of the Ex­chequer being rendered useless, by which means the Commissioners saw it impossible to get the Money sub­scribed, and paid in Specie, and there­fore designed to take Tallies, good Goldsmiths Bills, and Bank Bills, and clipt Money by weight at a high rate for Subscriptions, and so asked 300000 l. Praemium, believing it [Page 23] would cost them full as much to Dis­count the several Species aforesaid for Money, which they propos'd to pay to the King.

It is to be Observed here, (1.) If the 300000 l. desired, had been granted to the Land-Bank, their bargain had not been so great as the Bank of En­gland's; for the Bank of England having 100000 l. per Ann. for 1200000 l. they gave but 12 years purchase for their Fund; besides, they had allow­ed them 4000 l. per Ann. for their Char­ges: Whereas, if 300000 l. had been deducted out of this Fund, the remain­der had been 2264000 l. which di­vided by 179000, the Interest they were to receive makes near 13 years purchase; and I believe the scarceness and goodness of Money considered, when the Bank of England was raised, and when the Land-Bank was to be raised, any one but themselves will believe that the latter deserved at least equal Encouragement; and it's pro­bable [Page 24] the Parliament would have gi­ven it, if they had forseen the Difficul­ties that have since happened.

2. That the Comissioners did not ask the 300000 l. out of the Salt-Fund, but upon the Exchequer in ge­neral, which could not be paid them but by the Consent of the Parliament, and so they left themselves to the Par­liament whether they deserved it or no.

3. At the time they asked those Tallies on the Exchequer in general, it would have cost 40 l. per Cent. to discount them, which reduced their Demands to less than 200000 l.

4. If their Terms had been com­plyed with, the greatest part of the Subscriptions would have been made in clipt Money and Plate, which would have been coined to encrease our Species of Money, and it's pro­bable would save the Nation next year near as much in the recompence for clipt Money, and Encouragement [Page 25] for bringing in the Plate as the Summ demanded.

5. The Exchequer has not borrow­ed any Money so cheap since.

The Third Objection. That they were not able to raise the Money upon the Pre­mium they asked, nor could they give any Security to do it.

This Objection justifies them in asking the Premium refused; for it is very unjust to tax them for asking too much, and yet to confess it was not enough to induce people to sub­scribe the Money. However, I offer these Reasons that it would be sub­scribed.

1. They Proposed they might open their Books for Private Subscriptions, not doubting within three days they might bring Hands for near the Summ to be raised, which was not thought fit to be granted to them, it being Object­ed it would be a Disencouragement to the real Subscriptions.

2. When they were sent for to at­tend [Page 26] the Lords Justices, and were ask­ed, What Security they could give of rais­ing the whole Summ? They Answered, That they computed the Commissioners them­selves, and the Members of Exeter-Ex­change, would subscribe 700000 l. that they believed they should be able to bring in as much more by their Interest and dequain­tance, and they thought it reasonable to sup­pose the whole Kingdom would subscribe the rest.

3. That they thought the Nature of the thing would admit of no other Security than what they offered, since it could not be expected that any num­ber of Persons would enter into Re­cognizances to raise the Summ.

4. It was solely to their Disadvan­tage if they did not subscribe to be a Corporation, since by the failure they would only entitle themselves to 7 per Cent. in the Exchequer, which no one would give 70 l. for, and therefore it is to be presumed they would take such care for their own sakes, as not [Page 27] to lose 30 per Cent. of their Money; which if they did not, it would solely redound to the advantage of the Pro­jectors of the Exchequer-Bank, who would have the Money that was sub­scribed to circulate their own Bills.

5. When they became a Corpora­tion, it cannot be doubted but the whole Money would be quickly sub­scribed, since then the advantage of subscribing would be much greater, (as I said before) and it was not in the power of the Commissioners to hinder any one from subscribing that thought it his Interest; but admitting the Subscriptions would have stopt when they were qualified to be a Cor­poration, I believe most People are of Opinion now, that 1282000 l. would better serve his Majesties occasions, than nothing, though the Arithmetick of that time was, that half was less than none.

The Fourth Objection is, That they ruin'd the Credit of the Bank of England: [Page 28] and here these worthy Patriots make bold with the Parliament, and say, they broke their Faith with them, in setting up another Bank. I Answer,

1. There are no words in the Act of Parliament, that directly or indi­rectly exclude the Parliament from setting up another Bank: The Act only incorporates a Body of Men to sue and be sued, which if it should amount to a prohibitory Clause, excludes King and Parliament ever hereafter to grant a Corporation, since every Corpora­tion, single person, or number of per­sons in England, may lawfully do what these Gentlemen pretend to have the Monopoly of.

2. The Land-Bank was excluded from discounting Bills of Exchange, lending Money upon Pawns, dealing in Bullion, &c. and every thing else, but lending upon Land, and to the Government, and therefore could pos­sibly be no disadvantage to the Bank of England, who do not pretend to lend upon Land.

[Page 29] 3. If the other Bank had taken ef­fect, it's probable the Bank of England would have had more Cash left with them than before, since it would have been the Interest of both Banks to have agreed, and then without doubt they might have divided the Goldsmiths profits between them, and so each Bank have more Deposites than the Bank of England had before.

4. If the setting up a Land-Bank would be a Disadvantage to the Bank of England, it was no injustice to esta­blish them, since the Parliament gave no Warrant to the contrary, and their bargain was great enough notwith­standing; and greater than they thought was fit to be granted to the Land-Bank, who were to raise more than double the Summ, in less time, when the Difficulties were greater, and the Coin better; they had but 7 l. per Cent. excluded from many Advantages the Bank of England had, and were ob­liged besides to lend 500000 l. per An­num, [Page 30] at 3 l. 10 s. 0 d. per Cent. Interest.

5. If the establishing the Land-Bank did encrease the Demands upon the Bank of England, it was caused by the unreasonable opposition they gave to it; which failing of the Effect they proposed, gave them that Dis­reputation that always attends those that are overcome, for the World had reason to believe they understood their own Interest best; and when they seem­ed to wind up their whole happiness in defeating the Land-Bank, and miscarri­ed, it is not to be wondered if other People thought their Condition to be worse then it was.

That the Covetousness and want of Understanding of the Bank of Eng­land was the Occasion of their loss of Credit; To prove which I shall shew,

1. That they left undone those things which they ought to do.

2. They have done those things, which they ought not to do.

1. To the first, They ought to have [Page 31] foreseen, that after the 4th. of May the Demands upon them would be greater than before, for admitting the World had as good an Opinion of their Cre­dit as ever, yet the necessity of People must call upon them for Money, for the whole Silver Species of England being sunk in a day, they might be as­sured all People would want Money for their ordinary occasions; and what­ever opinion they had of their Securi­ty, would call for it when they had demands, and therefore they ought to have made Provisions to answer them.

2. They should have called in as many of their Bills as they could, whereas they issued out Bills till the 4th. of May, and how many since they stopt their payments is best known to themselves.

3. They might have bought Gui­neas for Tallies and clipt Money, when Tallies were par, and clipt Money cur­rant, and Guineas playing between 22 s. [Page 32] and 24 s. which they were three Weeks or a Month.

4. They might have called in their 40 l. per Cent. either before or immedi­ately after the 4th. of May, and not kept Money in their Pockets which they owed to other people.

5. When they could not pay all their Demands, they might have allow­ed the difference which their Credi­tors gave to discount their Bills, since it is more reason the Debtor should pay it than the Creditor.

6. They might have allowed the Interest they received, or at least Le­gal Interest, when they were not able to pay the Principal.

To the last they Object, That they offered Tallies to any that demanded them, which was the Security they had. I An­swer,

1. It lyes upon them to prove, they ever offered any Tallies payable with­in three Months, but only such as it was worth 30 l. per Cent. to discount.

[Page 33] 2. If they had offered such Tallies, it had not been sufficient, since their Creditors did not trust the Exchequer, but them, and expected their Money upon demand, as the Bank is liable by Law to pay it, or otherwise they would rather have put their Money into the Exchequer for Tallies them­selves, and have receiv'd the Interest from the beginning, than let the Bank receive the Interest of their Money till they call for it, and then give them but part of that Security which they might have had at first, and upon such Funds as the Bank thought fit to spare, whereas themselves might have chosen their own Funds.

If these Methods would not have fully answered their Creditors, at least it would have given them the Cha­racters of honest Men, and of doing all that they were able to do.

Next I am to prove the Bank of England have done those things which they ought not to do.

[Page 34] 1. They extended their Credit be­yond 1200000 l. and by that means run in debt more than they were able to pay, whereas it is very evident the Act of Parliament designed to confine their Credit to 1200000 l. which their Fund was answerable for, by obliging them not to issue out a greater Summ upon it; not imagining that they would evade the Act, by issuing out Notes, which bound not themselves, nor was any ways Security to those that accept­ed them. For it is not to be conceiv'd the Parliament designed they should borrow any Money, but what they could give Security for, and not under the shelter of an Act of Parliament de­ceive innocent People, who do not know a Corporation is not bound, but under their Common-Seal.

2. When they had thus evaded the Act, and were afraid to be called to account by the next Parliament, to sweeten the Contrey-Gentlemen they promised to lend Money upon Land, [Page 35] to any one that offered them good-Se­curity, which I hope they have more modesty then to say they have per­formed, and by that means have justly raised the indignation of the Nobility, and Gentry against them, who hoped to be eased from the Extortion of Scri­veners and Usurers.

3. They undertook a foolish Bar­gain, to return Money for Flanders, by which they have lost a Summ best known to themselves, whereas it might have done better by the Merchants, whose Business it was, and who un­stood it better. They alledge, they did it to serve the Government, but I think it will be hard to satisfie the World, that they were contented to lose 80000 l. to save the King 20000 l. and therefore it will be rather account­ed their Folly than Zeal.

4. Within few days before the 4th. of May, they gave Bills payable upon demand for clipt Money, whereas it is probable, the same persons would [Page 36] have been contented to have taken them payable six Months after, or else they need not have given them at all.

5. By their unreasonable Oppositi­on they gave to the Land-Bank, they rendered the raising of the Summ pro­posed ineffectual, and consequently dis­abled themselves, by not receiving so much Money as was appropriated to their own use out of that Fund.

6. Q ^ry. Whether they did not address themselves to the Treasury, to have their Bills refused in the Customs? if so, it was a great diminution to their Credit.

7. To finish their ruine, they lent 200000 l. to the King, when they paid but 5 l. per Cent. of their Debts, and some say to hinder the Land-Bank Propasals from being accepted.

Here I am aware I shall be answer­ed, that they did it out of Zeal to his Majesty, and to serve the Government; this they think will justifie all their Miscarriages, and protect them for [Page 37] acting against the Rules of Justice and Prudence, therefore it ought to be exa­mined. They have served the Go­vernment, I grant it, but it was to serve themselves; a Miser would be as good a Friend; they have lent the Govern­ment Money, but upon as great Inte­rest as the Parliament allowed, and greater than they could get elsewhere.

They have lent other Peoples Mo­ney, and not their own, and at the same time refuse to pay those to whom it belongs; whereas if their Zeal for the Government had been as great as they pretended, they would have rais­ed Money in their private Capacities, and so lent what was their own, or at least given their Creditors the In­terest they receiv'd, but instead of that they keep part of their principal Mo­ney in their hands, and what they have already called in for, they pay 6 l. per Cent. to themselves, though they deny it to their Creditors.

I will put them two Questions.

[Page 38] 1. If a Man robs another of his Mo­ney, and lends it to the Government, will it justifie this Robbery?

2. Whether detaining a Mans Mo­ney from him, and lending it at Interest, without giving the Interest receiv'd, be not in foro Conseientiae as bad as taking it from him?

I believe if the Scene were changed from Grocers-Hall to Lumbard-street, we shall all be of an Opinion.

I leave with a Goldsmith 1000 l. he gives me his Note payable upon de­mand, I go to him six Months hence, and ask him for my Money, he tells me the Government was in great di­stress, and he lent them my Money; I tell him I gave him no such Com­mission, but finding my self remediless, I ask him to allow me the Interest he receives, he refuses it; I then ask him to give me his Bond, and Legal Inte­rest, he refuses that; I fancy if I should pull him by the Nose, I should be ju­stified by most of those Gentlemen that [Page 39] are of another Opinion, in the case of the Bank of England.

The next thing I have to prove, is, that if this had been given to the Ex­chequer alone, or to the Bank of Eng­land, it would not have been so easily raised as by a Land-Bank. And first for an Exchequer-Bank.

1. The Projectors themselves propose 400000 l. always to lye still to cir­culate their Bills, (which is to be used to no other purpose whatsoever) which must be wanting upon the Salt-Fund, to answer His Majesties Occasions, or else must be raised upon another; and so 400000 l. must be raised extra­ordinary, whereas the Land-Bank ask­ed but three.

2. If the Demands upon the Exche­quer should exceed the 400000 l. which it's likely they would, (every Body knowing their Stock) the Ex­chequer will be broke, and the Cre­dit of the Government sunk; whereas the Land-Bank may be able to answer [Page 40] all their Bills; or if they should not, the Government will suffer no discredit by it.

3. If the Exchequer should refuse Payment, the Creditor has no reme­dy, but upon 7 l. per Cent. which he will not value at 70 l. whereas if the Bank should refuse Payment, he would have Remedy for his whole Money.

Note, If the Exchequer-Bank should have Credit, Interest upon Land must be at 8 or 10 per Cent. For it is not to be imagined any one will lend upon Land at the usual Interest, when he can have it upon demand, with 4 l. 10 s. running Interest; and therefore such a Bank can't be of as great Ad­vantage as a Bank that would raise the Land, and lessen the Interest of Mo­ney; for an Exchequer-Bank can be of no use to any one, but such as have the management of the 400000 l. which may be made use of to lend his Majesty upon Funds, and to circulate the Tellers Notes, which some say has been a [Page 41] common practice, since they have set up the Trade of Banking.

2. That the Bank of England could not have raised this Summ as well as the Land-Bank; to illustrate which it must be examined, which way they could have proposed to raise it, and that must be either 1. By issuing out Bills upon their Credit. 2. Or by opening their Books for New Subscriptions.

As to the first: I suppose they will not pretend to say, that issuing out two Millions and a half of Bills more, pay­able upon demand, would enable them the better to answer those that were then out; and if they had opened their Books for New Subscriptions, they must have let the New Subscribers come in at Par, with their Original Stock, or not; and it is not likely they would do the former, since by the pas­sing a Bill in their Favour, their Ori­ginal 60 l. being then valued at 90 l. might have been stock-jobbed to 150 l. And the letting New Subscriptions [Page 42] come in upon equal terms, must have reduced their stock to its Original Va­lue; for no Man would buy it at more, if he could subscribe at par; and if they had opened their Books for Subscrip­tions, according to the Improved Va­lue, no one but would rather subscribe his Money to a New Fund, where he might come in upon equal terms, than adjoyn a real value with an imaginary one.

3. But admitting they would have so much Self-denial to accept Subscrip­tions at par, yet by the Money they raise they must pay their Bills that are out already, as well as the 2564000 l. whereas the Land-Bank are to pay no more than they receive.

4. Most People would rather sub­scribe to a New Bank, than one that has lost its Credit.

Therefore I infer, if it could not be raised by a Land-Bank, it could not be raised by this Fund.

The next thing I have to shew, is, [Page 43] That there is no way to restore Pa­per-Credit but by a New Bank.

I shall take it for granted, that Pa­per will never go for Money, but when I can have Money for it upon demand; for no Man will part with ready Money for a Note, or take a Note for Money upon any other Con­sideration, and therefore Paper can ne­ver be restored, unless the Bank of Eng­land and Goldsmiths pay their Notes, or else another Fund is set up that can.

1. The Bank of England if they were disposed to pay their Debts, can­not possibly do it; their Money as it became due from the Exchequer, is not enough to answer 5 per Cent. of their Debts, and they can never have any Credit till they can answer all De­mands, which must require greater Summs then they have, or can possi­bly get.

2. If they had Money enough to answer all Demands, it is probable it would be all called from them; for [Page 44] Reputation is so nice a thing, that if it▪s once blown upon, 'tis rarely reco­vered, especially in a matter that so nearly concerns us, as parting with our Money; for it will be a hard matter to induce me to trust one, that through Indiscretion or Design has deceived me.

3. It cannot be imagined that any one will bring in Money to be depo­sited with them, for that is to pay in 100 l. and get 5 l. with a Weeks trouble when I want it again.

4. The giving them a New Fund, is enabling them to cheat more People, for by the Monies that rise upon it, they must not only purchase their Fund, but answer the Bills that are out before; and if their Creditors should not be so good natur'd to stop their Demands, they must their Pay­ments. As to the Goldsmiths reviving Credit, I suppose no Man expects Re­formation from them, or that any thing will make them honest but a Catch-Pole: [Page 45] And of the Exchequer-Credit we have had an Essay already, which with what I have said of it before, is sufficient, therefore I argue, that Paper Credit can be restored by no other means, than by a New Bank, and setling a Fresh Fund of Credit.