I Am sorry so strict a Censurer could finde any words to commend (as hee saith) the handsome frame of a booke, whose Deductions hee doth not like: And I had rather have accompanied so great a Judge to the tryall of its Basis and Principles, then he left by him thus suddainly groping in the Darke, when every devious step hath a Precipice, yet heare the way (as layd out in that Booke) affirm'd to be both generally good, and generally bad. If hee had ruin'd its foundations, or disabled it in any one nominated Chapter or Section, wee might with greater confidence avoyd it, as a fabrike ready to fall by its owne nodd.

But what he hath not effected by the way of Censure, the Author of the Ex­ercitation Of the ex­ercitat on cōcerning usurped Powers. concerning usurped Powers hath done as little by the way of An­swer. I should not have mentioned him at all (the maine of whose booke relates to severall other Authors of a different Historicall seene) did not I finde him (as I shall here shew) contradictory both to friend and foe, to himselfe, to the Principles of the Parliaments first engagement, to this Dr. to Boxhornius, and to the learned Grotius. Besides hee pretends onely to answer two Chapters of our Author, not taking Notice of the last Additionall Chapters. But by the rules of all Logick it is no way of answering an Argument, but a kind of denying a Conclusion, if the Respondent only turne aside to prove a Proposition contrary to the deductions of the first Position asserted. For by that means hee answers no­thing of anothers, but only proves something of his owne, and so le [...]ves the Comparison of reasons still a question; which (not to scandalize the Gentle­man) is the only subject and Method of that second Chapter which he bestowes so Magisterially, and to so little purpose on our Author.

BY Civill Government our Author meanes a Publique and Ministeriall Power, ordeind sometimes and in some Places extraordinarily by God, but ordinarily now by man in his publique Necessities, to the end that nations may be conserved from Confusions and Private injuries in meo & [...]uo, and that they may in all formes act securely according to their Natures, Religion and Necessities.

The Author of the Exercitation saith, p. 10. 12. Government must be delivered by Custome or Law, But I would hee could informe Vide Ba­cons Hist. H. 7. p. 144 us by what Positive Law Nimrod and others in Heroicall seizures enterd into Government at first, and whether our Henry the seventh, entring into the Government when by Law he stood accus'd of Trea­son, could this way be own'd, or any from him to be Lawfull Go­vernours?

[Page 3] By Lawfull, the Doctor here understands that which is Legall (which relates but to private Justice and its Tribunals) so that by Lawfull Commanders he understands those onely, who legally derive their Authority continuedly from those who were originally authors of it: by which they who have Ius ad regnum succeed uninterruptedly (as Boxhornius saith) In locum ultimi, & injus primi; which Prin­ciple (tho it hath such great assertours) is of no security to pre­sent Princes and Governours, making our Obligations in oaths of Allegiance as uncertaine, as the right so specified in them is, and may shake all the Kingly Titles and Crownes in Christendom; as the Exercitation doth sufficiently by his not clearing himselfe, p. 2. Where hee saith, Princes are rightly invested with soveraignty, 1. Immediatly by God. 2. Mediatly by his committing it to the people to Elect. 3. When God by a Reservation of his Power still Exer. p. 2. in terposeth to designe the Person.

Tho this bee well said, yet it is not enough. For first it provides not for Peoples obeying a Capitall family in Genarchaship, of which our Author treats Chap. 11. parte. 2.

Secondly, what shall we say to such Governours who were not originally design'd immediatly by God, nor mediatly by such a free choice of the People as he requires, and as was scarcely ever practiz'd since Nimrods entry?

Thirdly, seeing according to him God still reserves the preroga­tive of designing Persons to Goverments, but that the publique Re­velation of his will by Prophecy and Miracles is ceas'd, what then doth that Author but allow men to undertake to change Governours and Governments by virtue of Private spirit and Revelation, which we are not able alwayes to confute, no more then others are able al­wayes to prove to us, and after this how will that Author bee ever able to prove a certaine usurpation in his sence? To avoyd these per­plexities and enquiries, our Authors, or rather St Austins Principle is safer both for Princes and people, viz. That we obey those who plenarily possesse us, and force us not to the practice of things in themselves impious. They who according to Hosea [...]. 4. Set up Kings, but not by God, are accountable for it; but doth it follow that wee of the People during that uncertainty might not obey them?

The like inconsonancies hath he to this purpose, p. 3. Where speak­ing concerning the manner of the Peoples consent to make a true [Page 4] Title in a Prince; he saith it matters not whether it be antecedent or Consequent to Possession.

For first, if it bee with the unjust dispossession of another (which hee ought Principally to have spoken to) then the Peoples subse­quent consent cannot make the intrusion Lawfull to the intruder.

Secondly, what will he say to Boxhornius, who maintains the same Cause with him, and argues that the Peoples consent, tacite or expresse, antecedent or subsequent to anothers Possession, cannot take away the right which the Heirs of a successive Prince have to Governe, tho their father might bee justly ejected? Because (saith hee) the Originall Compact was in consideration of the first blood, not of the particular persons governing. But by these loose arguments they doe but perplex one another, more then us: and for Boxhornius it is sufficient that he makes the Hollanders his Countrymen rebells still, and this King of Spaine likewise but an Vsurper, if he derive not every way a right from the first blood in compact. Wherefore according to the Statute of Henry the seventh, for obeying the King being, we suppose our governour to bee Lawfull, and then proceed to make Lawes and to conforme to them.

Our Author understands that to be Lawfull which is not so much Legall as Equitable; because it is de jure publico, of which there is no mortall Tribunall to Judge, or to receive the Pleas of such supreme dissenting Powers. So that by Lawfull commanders he understands p. 1. those who in this state of confus'd families, and uncertainty of Tra­ditionall disguis'd and interested knowledge of rights may to us (if not to themselves) be more equitably then Legally such, when they plenarily possesse, Protect, and Command us Lawfull things.

By Lawfull things our Author means things no way disconvenient with the society of mankind, nor with the Principles of the Christian p. 3. [...] 1. Religion, and therefore may lawfully be practizd by us of the People at all times, and in all Countryes. Such things as these are.

• 1. The payment of Dutyes and taxes for the present benefit of Protection. Because a litle time serves to ruine a man, especially in the Privation of all Goverment.
• 2. A right to joyne with others to oppose that which might otherwise con­found the quiet of a whole Nation, and disorder Politicall legall and Uni­versall Justice.
• [Page 5] 3. To go to the present Tribunals for conserving livelyhood, meum and tuum and all legall Iustice.
• 4. To act subordinatly in Inferiour offices and callings, so as may be for the good of our poore Neighbours, which is but a passive Obedience, as all Obedience originally it, being done only Ex Jussu Imperantis.

It is agreed by all, that in things unlawfull, the Consideration of the Persons (lawfull or unlawfull) weighs not at all; For in that Case we must obey God the supremest Magistrate rather then man.

But when Lawfull things are commanded, then three things are in Consideration.

1. Some say, that to legitimate our Obedience we must first assure our selves of the Legality of the Persons Commanding; and then we may obey them in all Lawfull things, otherwise in nothing.

2. Our Author hath asserted in severall Chapters, That in this con­fus'd state of the World, wherein Interest (which makes false Gods, and Counterfit Lawes for Heaven) makes and maintaines many Princes by the like fictions (as they who would bee own'd as the of-spring of the Gods) and Princes themselves oft not permitting the tryall of their Rights, require as much faith for Civill, as for Religious Interests, Hee asserts (I say) that such an Originall and Legall assurance being a Mo­rall impossibility, it is best and enough for our present Obedience, to informe ourselves, Whether the kingdome bee plenarily possest by those p. 1. c. 7, 8. who in present exercise immediate command over it. And if so, then we may obey them in the lawful things above specified. For hee hath shewed that all Governours are but Ministeriall for the quiet practice of the rules of Right, and that therefore, they enter not into the definition of Justice. Besides for arguments sake he saith, that a thing should be con­tinued as Civilly Lawfull, it is not alwayes necessary that it should enter, Sine dolo out vitiato principio, provided it bee not Irrationall when it is entred, or unjust as a custome: Every circumstantiall errour makes not a false Church, nor every sin an untrue beleever. Neither doth all Civill obligation or contract among People begin by mutuall Consent. But in Ui [...]e exer­c [...]. p. 4. the Cases De in rem verso, & negotiis gestis, when other mens businesses are well done for them, it is sufficient if there be Rei con [...]rectatio, a voluntary medling in the businesse of another man; as in the redemption of other mens Children from slavery, whom the Parent ought by the Law of Na­ture to Redeeme; also in the Guardienship of the Minor, which is al­wayes the state of a Common-wealth, according to an old and true [Page 6] Axiome, Respuh: semper est in curâ & tutelâ: But the Law allowes the Guardien to look after the Minors Rights at his Charges, tho he know not of it, or knowing, would not (through peevishnesse) have them so Lookt after. From whence I coherently inferre, That the protection of this supreme State - guardien like a Meritum inferres Allegiance as a De­bitum, according to Solomon, Prov. 27. 18. Hee who keeps the figtree shall eate the fruite thereof. Nay i [...] he administer the same Politicall Justice, and give the same Protection or Security, we are bound to doe more then obey him, viz. praise God for him.

All of us say, that it is sufficient in the Change of the sabbath, if that which was Morall in it remaine still: and in the Point of Mission of Mi­nisters, we say the Doctrinall Succession is sufficient, tho there were Change or Interruption of the Personall since Christs time: and what can hinder us from saying the same concerning things Civilly Lawfull (when there are civill Changes of Persons or Goverments) but im­mediate Interest, Ambition or Revenge? For this Reason Christ and his Apostles bad us not so much beware of Illegall and false Princes, as of false Prophets; because at the day of Judgement wee shall all be examined concerning the things themselves done here in the flesh, not under what Politicall Titles and formes.

3. The Censurer stands ballancing betwixt these two waies of Obedi­ence, and for want of that Christian fortitude which he speakes of, out­wardly onely pretends to a station of Neutrality, although really hee is most consonant with our Author, nor any way opposite to his publike Assertions, or to present Obedience.

Here he leaves us in the dark, by not naming those other things, which may be (for ought we know) all those other things asserted by our Au­thor. Howsoever he sufficiently acknowledgeth the present Authority, and so fals off from those of the first opinion: But how he conceives he hath liberty to pay taxes and other duties without being commanded l under­stand not.

But for assuring his Obedience in these three Generall heads (which comprehend the whole state of Subjection) he must have these five PROVISO'S, which I shall examine, only to see how far they are opposite either to Reason, or to the Book which he Censures.

The same is asserted largely by our Author, shewing how things in them­selves just and necessary, are not displeasing to God: as also how Pro­missory Oaths alwaies have tacite conditions innate to them, in regard of their uncertain futurition: That the condition of Politicall Oaths, is to obey whom God permits plenarily to possesse Kingdoms, which is the sense in which Kings themselves understand them. Though such Oaths may be violated by Princes, who at the expence of the Peoples bloud, di­spute de jure ad regnum, yet that ended, the poor People in submitting to changed Titles, violate no former Oaths. For the matter of such Oaths Sanderson praelec. 7. sec. 7. and Laws (as the Censurer himself hath taught it) is consumed to them, and as I may say, dyes to them like fire, rather by extinction, than by corruption. Otherwise all the World should be obliged to Morall impos­sibilities, which the Censurers Book of Oaths will not allow. For that were to be ever restless among our selves, till we brought God to our bent; as if we could force him to continue such Persons and Governours only, as we approve of best our selves.

‘The second Proviso gives allowance only in Cases of extreme Necessity.’ 2. Which our Author likewise asserts to be that alone which Originally makes, interprets, and finally abrogates Laws and Goverments Ministeri­all to them, and so becomes the Caesar of Caesars.

‘The third is, When he may reasonably presume, that the Power to which his Obedience is justly due, upon consideration of his present exi­gencies, 3. would (if he knew them) dispence with his present Obedience to a prevailing Power.’

Our Author asserts thus much and more (Chap. 10. p. 2.) not here con­tradicted, especially when the supposed Governour derives such an abso­lute clear right as is here pretended. This Proviso for self-Preservation, runs to the end of all the Circumstances of Subjection to a new Posses­sour; and may be (as he saith) as reasonably presumed from all right po­wers [Page 8] actually ejected, as it was reasonably practised by King Ferdinand an­tecedently to his ejection out of the Kingdom of Naples, to prevent the desolation of his Subjects. This indeed was a releasement by dispensati­on, because he then was in possession: But when Princes do (as the Ci­vill Law saith) and as in the Government of the 24 years which our Au­thor Uide. p. 1. c. 1. supposes, when Edward the fourth lived in Flanders, pati capitis dimi­nutionem, and are reduced to the station of private Persons, living in other Orbes, subject to other Magistracies; then the Law looks at them as civi­ly dead; so that the releasment then is by extinction, as the same Law saith, [...]. Death dissolves all things alike.

The Author of the Exercitation, p. 58. fals highly foule on the Dr. here, and will not allow him this Proviso, saying, Such a presumptive releasment is groundless, and highly impious, and is but his own act, & that cannot be a discharge.

The Doctor & our Author here speak not of the extremities of one par­ticular man, but of a whole Nation, in which Case Posito sed non concesso that Princes had such an inalienable right of Property in People, & that Gover­ment were for the person governing primarily, yet the presumption were good, and would discharge a man in foro interiori, though not in exteriori, where (for reasons of state) summum jus is somtimes summa injuria. I wonder What expresse Letter of the Law there was to Authorize our Saviours pul­ling Corne in another mans field, or Davids eating the shew-bread, or Sampsons killing of himselfe? whom Iosephus excus'd, because when hee saw he could live no longer but with a reproach to God, he conceivd hee might then anticipate his death. Vid. Grot. l. 2. c. 19. §. 5. de Iu: bel: & Pacis.

The exercitation p. 60. saith, The Oath of Allegiance prevents such a Presump­tion, and obliges during life to doe all that possibly may be done for such an absent Prince. Our Author chap. 9. Proves that wee are bound to doe the utmost of all our Morall not of all our Naturall endeavour, and that not during life, but during Possession, which is the scope of that Promissory Oath. Otherwise what will he say to our late Kings Oath, with the now King of Portugall, contrary to that which he took with the King of Spaine as King of Portugall? and what will he say to those Cases which our Author puts to him chap. 9. concerning those who in frontire places fall somtimes into the possession of one Prince and Allegiance, and somtimes into another quite contrary? In opposition to our Author the Exercitation delivers a strange Doctrine, affirming, That when such Enemies prevaile they can pass no Obligation upon men so reduced, as thereby to make them indebted to them for their lives, because they were unjust enemies. According to [Page 9] this, there will be no faith kept betwixt Enemies (who oft presume one as much as another of the justice of their Causes) neither were Priso­ners, releast upon their Paroles, bound to keep them, and that brave Roman releast at Carthage upon his faith to return again from Rome, did not only a sottish, but an unjust act in keeping it. But saith he in opposi­tion to our Author p. 60. a new life cannot be given, and so consequently no new Obligation, and our Author cannot really prove his life another then it was. R. When a mans life is given, it is civily, though not na­turally taken to be another: and if it be a contradiction to say a man can in no consideration be said to have a new life, because it is naturally still the same, then I am sure he contradicts the whole current of the Gospell, which tells us how we may become New Creatures, and Saint Paul, Rom. 7. did but prevaricate, when he said, It was no longer he that did such things, because the old man was dead in him; which is not to be under­stood as if the former individuall soule of Saint Paul were changed for another.

But that Author to maintaine himselfe in these streights asserts this as his Principle for all, p. 56. That peoples oaths are all absolute and irrespective, and have no implications of if's or and's, &c. From whence (notwithstand­ing his great sufferings for the Parliament) he must directly condemne their first ingagement against the King, and so he doth plainly, saying, p. 13. That it is unlawfull to resist or fight against any just Magistrate, as he understands just in Title, and yet p. 56. he calls KING CHARLES The late invasive Prince. Secondly he therby upbraids the Covenant, which provided for the preservation of the King but conditionally, in the preser­vation of Religion and Law. But indeed if wee trace him we shall finde that he knowes not what to make of the Covenant himselfe. For p. 4. where he speakes of the degrees of Vsurpation, he saith distinctively that it may be either against the Oath of Allegiance, or against Covenant which bounds it. He might trulier have said which derogates from it, because that which the King was sworne to keep, we in it (contrary to his oath and consent) swore to take away, viz. Episcopacy: Moreover p. 59. he saith the party sworne to in the Covenant, is not the King, but the people of all ranks in the three Kingdomes, who therefore, (as he inferres) carry the power of Obligation to, and releasment from it in themselves, which is a wilde extravagancy and Leads to attempt any madnesse, and to dis­solve all Government, and Allegiance, the People of private callings be­ing sworne in relation and subordination to their respective Judicatories, as himselfe (after all) confesses with some contradiction in his America [Page 10] case. p. 5. That the houses presorih'd the Covenant to the People: and if you would know, quo ju [...], he saith as impertinently in the same page, by Vertue of a Coordinate [...]anck with the King; For Coordinata f [...]se [...]nvicem supplent, and have mutually a power to act fully one for the other; As if the King legally could (in the making of Lawes and laying taxes) at sometime act, not onely his owne share, but that of both houses also; and so consequently might both houses comprehend themselves and the King, and consequently give an Oath of Allegiance in Covenant, which is an unsound argument, because it satisfies not both waies alike, and hath contradictions of Government involved in it. Our Author chap. 9. p. 2. hath shewn how impossible it is that any Promissory Oath can be absolute and irrespective, and so hath this Doctor (the Censurer) also praelecti. p. 7. §. 7. And the Exercitator at last with more contradiction confesses p. 61. That such an Oath may be indeed suspended, but not dissolved: Whereas it is a known Maxim, Obligationes non sunt inpendenti, the Obligations of See Mr A. p. 2. c. 3. sect. 2. Promises cannot be suspended: quia annus & dies debentur, we owe time, which may suspend the adimpletion of a Promise, but not its obligation. Otherwise we must allow (though he would not) reservations for se­verall allegiances for the same people, for the same actions, and the same time, which is as contradictory, as if we would have severall Centers for the same equidistant Lines in a Circle, and that in Holland they owe allegi­ance both to the States, and to the King of Spaine, and in Portugall to the King of Spaine, and to the new King.

‘The fourth Proviso of the Doctors is, when this may be without prejudicing the oppressed party in his dues, and without disabling our selves to help him in his recovery afterwards.’

This Notion is fitted only to distract people, by putting them in a way how they should do nothing in present with faith, only that they might thereby act any thing afterwards with madness; Yea, though every thing both in Religion and Nature be more favourable for Peace then for War. This is indeed a refind Chimaera, as if People could in a State live half by themselves, by their own Laws, and their own Militia, and so be taken into no plenary protection or possession, by which they may be exposed in a Moment to certain ruine. For non-obedience can expect nothing but non-protection; as King Iames in his Apology objected to Pius Quinius when he absolved his Catholique Subjects from their Allegiance, upon a pretence that he was an Hereticall, and therefore an unlawfull King: To which the King replied, That what truth soever there might be in this his [Page 11] unlawfulness, yet it was never asserted in the Church before, That Tem­porall Obedience to any temporall power was against faith and salvation of souls: a Doctrine which this Censurer doth ill now to second a Pope in against a Protestant King.

Nay, though it were true That one Prince or Power commands to the prejudice of an other ejected, yet the peoples obedience, when necessary, is not unlawfull, but in submitting their Tutela is inculpata. For it is easie to understand how we may have a right to receive what another may not have a right to give; as a Necessary alms begd and received from one who got his riches by wrong and oppression: as also in borrowing mony upon biting Usury, when a man cannot by Morall diligence get it other waies. As for the dues here mentioned, I shall speak to them in the next. Proviso.

Here I must observe that the Author of the Exercitation hath an expresse Chapter against no other Author which I know of but the Doctor in this Chap. 32 his forth Proviso, highly blaming him for giving way to the temporizing reservations of Allegiance during the intervall and prevalency of another Power: at which Power some profess themselves so much scandalized, that they cannot see how they may with a good Conscience ever go to Law in the present Courts of Justice for their debts and rights. But for their ease this Exercitation hath found out an excellent expedient for them (tho not moulded from that equity whereby Saint Paul appealed to Caesar) which is, That they may now recover their dues in those Courts, provi­ded they give not such titles to the Iudges and Officers as they should give to the Lawfull Magistrates. I wonder whether this Gentleman thinks the like exception and scruple might not have been made against their Courts du­ring the Parliaments first War with the King, when Judges and every thing else was regulated here, only by his name, and absolutely against his Will. Such another expedient for the Kingdom of Scotland would set all right in their justice too; For I beleeve the King of Scotland hither­to hath made no more Judges in Scotland then the Prince of Wales hath done in England. But the grand Case of Conscience p. 10. will tell this Gentleman (how truly let him look to it) that his expedient salves not half the difficulty; and that after he hath received that which he judges in himself is j [...]stly his own, by the might and power only of an unjust Court, yet he hath not his own: because a thing in itself just is not recovered by their help justly: For Justice and Judgment is then only just, when it de­rives from the Just Legall Magistrate, and Justice, as he saith p. 26. looks upward, as well as downward.

[Page 12] The like Note doth he recommend to the Clergy, p. 24. advising them not to preach on such unseasonable days as a wrong Magistrate shall ap­point for some Religious duty, yea, though the Parishioners were willing to heare the word of God. Surely he cannot think but they will follow Saint Pauls authority, rather then his, who enjones them to be instant both in season and out of season.

‘ The fifth Proviso is, That this submission be only to the [...], not with an acknowledgment of the [...] of the prevailing Power.’

I know not to what purpose this Criticisme is inserted to weigh against the consequence of such important Cases and Arguments, unless it be to indispose people by perplexing them. Though the difference betwixt those two Greek words, be no more then is betwixt Potentia and Potestas, or as is more Critically betwixt power and Authority, yet our Author p. 2. ch. 11. §. 9. proves that the inequality of force, or Potency is the originall ground of ruling, as well as Impotency is of subjection. For which reason Master Hobbes his supposition, That if there were two Omnipotents, neither could obey one the other, is very conclusive.

But if I shew that [...] Rom. 13. 1. signifies no more then the esta­blishment of a supreme [...], when it comes at last to be (as Saint Paul saith) [...], and without further contests actually possesses all other Powers, and that every Country hath not a Prophet to give assurance of Gods extraordinary reveal'd will, then I suppose this Proviso will sig­nifie noting.

That such is the meaning of [...], Rom. 13. is evident. Because v. 1. the Apostle speaks onely of the Powers which de facto are, and that by this very word [...]. Moreover hee interprets it clearlier. v. 3. [...], They who actually rule are a terrour to evill workes: but how? the answer is in the same verse, Because they carry or hold not the sword in vaine; which can in no sense be understand of those who have actually lost the sword; by which dispossession they are disinabled to fright any body, being in the sense of the Law Civilly dead themselves. Seing then the change of Gods Vice Roys, or of the hands which carry swords, is of his secret disposing, not by meere chance or humane contrivance, it will concerne us to submit to them (after an establishment) as to an Authority or [...], and that for Conscience sake; lest by continuall disturbance (and without assurance for the successe of more then our Morall endeavours have attain'd to) wee unnecessarily breed a publique disturbance to our owne and others destructions.

[Page 13] But if by [...] he meane a cleare right without interruption, deriv'd ab origine from some Capitall family or Compact, hee might put all the World into an endlesse suffle, before he should finde such Persons for all Kingdomes: And Princes quietly possest or (as Henry the Seventh would have it) establisht, are but little beholden to him for this doctrine of Allegiance, as little as the People are to him for his Divinity, who for want of that, which they cannot get, are by him necessitated ever to do all just things doubtingly and without faith. If hee speak as a Casuit he cannot argue Prescription for the cleare right of one against the present Possession of another. For Prescription of it selfe proves only a Comparative right, as one may bee some what better then the other, onely because ancienter. Pre­scription is but a kind of Penalty in a State, and therefore is allow'd the Opinion and effects of Right, and in a tryall makes an Excellent exception against the claime of another; as when Iept [...]a objected 300. yeares Possession to the Ammonites. The C. Law presumes that what cannot appeare to be anothers, is therefore the Possessours, & because men have so much interest in the continuall preservation of those necessary rights which truly belong to them, therefore in the sence of that Law, that thing cannot appeare to be anothers, which hath been for so many years neglected by him: & for such negligence the Law judges him worthy to be punisht with the losse of what he pretends to. This perhaps is an inconvenience to particular men, yet States allow it as an Equity to avoyd a greater inconveniency, viz. Publique dis­quiets, perpetuall controversies, and uncertainty of Properties.

But how suddainly doth all this, vanish when we argue de jure ad regna? For triall of which there is no Tribunall, coercion, or Regula juris, save that one and all of necessity. Neither can a Casuis [...] plead time against truth; nor by that Accident ever make wrong become right, or turne quantity into quality.

The Author of the Exercitation takes much paines disperstly to prove an [...] on his new sence, but so, that if he had a King to day, he would go neer to cachier him to morrow, un­lesse (after Possession) he would submit to the Peoples con­sent [Page 14] for giving him a new Title (which Henry the seventh re­fus'd) or for confirming an old Title. Hee saith all lawfull power is founded upon the Wills of those over whom it is set, p. 4. I wish hee had specified how he understands this: For tho the Senate might give Caesar an Authority over the towne of Rome, yet from that Position a man might question what right he or they could have to extend their Authority so far from Rome as this Country of ours is, contrary to the wils of those millions which they govern­ed: Moreover St Paul wrot his 13 ch. to the Romanes, with an ex­hortation to obey them there, where they (the Roman Magistrates) never entred by the free Votes of the People. They who accord­ing to Hosea 8. 4. doe set up wrong Kings are onely answerable for it, but I doubt that the rule which he gives us, p. 62. Where­by we may know when a Prince is given by God, is not in his owne in­tent sufficient. For if wee want the reveiled will of God (as Miracles and publique Prophecie now are ceas'd) I believe the authority of Gamaliel (who for ought we know had not the spirit of God) signifies very little in this Argument, viz. That if it be of God it will l [...]st. For many things which are not of Gods expresse ordination last long, and many things of Gods liking last but a little, as Iebus power. From whence hee inferres cohe­rently, p. 63. that for the present we must submissively beare those e­vills, yet three lines after hee contradicts all againe, saying we are allowed to remove them when they are befall [...]; as if a man could at the same time both carry and throw downe the same bur [...]hen. In the midst of these rounds which he runs, I wonder what fixt rules he would give for the reception of Embassadours (when they must first prove their Masters Titles) for the limits and du­ration of Empires, &c? The Lawes of Nations must and do de­termine these, and not the Municipall Lawes of any one Coun­try; But p. 53. he professeth he knowes not what the Lawes of Nati­ons or of War meane, if they derogate or vary from other humane Lawes, as they indeed doe, War beginning there where other Law ends, and reciprocally, and if he knowes not this it is nei­ther Mr Seldens not Grotius &c. faults, but his owne. For want of [Page 15] this he censures Grotius very impertinently for saying, That if one Compeer unjustly invades the others rights, he may by the Law of War lose the exercise of his own rights. This Gentleman p. 54. think­ing to mitigate the rigour of this, heightens it; For saith he, it is not necessary that his right should be lost, but that he make reparation, and according to the justice of the Scripture he ought but to make a fourefold restitution of damage. But I pray you what difference is there betwixt losing a right, and not having that without which no satisfaction can be made, nor any readmission may be obtai­ned? Princes are still little beholding to him for these Argu­ments. For after a War, and the desolation of Countries, how can an invading Prince satisfie for the reall dammages which are so many? Or for the Personall injuries or murthers of so many, of which there can be no Compensation at all?

The assertion of our Authors ninth Chapter not being this, That meere violent extrusion takes away a Soveraigns right, I have nothing to do to follow the Arguments of the Exercitation Chap. 2. as if they were positive answers to our Author; I shall only vindicate him in two places where the Exercitation would fasten Contradictions on him.

Our Author saith, that we are bound to own Princes so long Ch. 10. p. 2. sec. 3. as it pleases God to give them the power to command us, and when we see others possest of their powers, we may then say, that the King of Kings hath changed our Vice-Roy; and yet speaking of Antichrists Dominion, he saith, it can by no Pre­scription become lawfull, neither can a Christian submit himself to it without wounding his faith; which saith the Exercitation is a Contradiction.

I answer with King Iames, that we speak here only of Tem­porall Obedience in Temporall things, and as the Pope is a Se­cular Prince he may have Allegiance due to him, (upon which account severall Protestant Princes have received his Nuncios) al­though his spirituall Capacity may be denied him. Thus they who in his Country may not go to his Churches, may safely obey him in his other Laws and Courts, in which assertion there is no Contradiction.

[Page 16] Secondly, Our Author saith, that the Obedience which the Israelites owed to Nebuchadnezzar, ought not to be a generall rule for subjection, which contradicts the former Position, as the Exercitation conceives, but erroniously.

First, because they were given up as a prey to him.

Secondly, Because they were warned by Prophets so to obey, whereas we now of this Age neither have them, nor Miracles to warrant us.

Hitherto I have shewed you what consonancy there is betwixt the Censurers Positions and Provisos with our Author.

But lest so much truth might unawares do some harme, and that interests might not be changed with opinions, he laies the Book aside, and falls roughly on two Assertions, which yet he saith our Author hath not spoke openly to.

‘The first concealed opinion of our Author, or rather the Doctors uppositions. 1. own supposition is, That no Oath binds the taker further then he in­tended to bind himself thereby, and it is presumed, that no man inten­ded to bind himself to the prejudice of his own safety.’

Who can sufficiently wonder at the Doctors great errour in this assertion? Seeing the fourth Chapter in the second part of our Author is expresly & in terminis writ to prove the quite con­trary; shewing that a Promissory Oath is to be taken in the Principalls or Propounders sence; sine subticentiâ aut amphibolo­giâ. Because a Promise is a Pact for transferring somthing to another, as to a Principall, whose sence we are bound to fol­low, if our sence tells us that such or such is his sence, and no further, unless we will our selves.

As for our Ministers former Subscriptions to Episcopacy, and their swearing since to extirpate it in Covenant, our Author ch. 8. hopes Mr. Chittingworths Vindication to be sufficient.

The second tacit supposition is, that self-preservation is the first and chiefest obligation in the World.

Our Author affirmes it to be the first, as in the State of Na­ture, p. 2. c. 11. but not the chiefest for many Civill and Religi­ous Obligations which derogate from that afterwards, especially [Page 17] where the Question is directly of Christ come in the flesh. Yet he affirms p. 2. c. 11. that most civill bonds made betwixt man and man are but for better securing self-preservation: and that men bound to venture their lives, are not therefore bound to lose them. Because the Obligation is of all our Morall, not of all our Naturall endeavours: and upon this ground he saith, chap. 8 p. 2. that Souldiers most strictly sworn to a Prince, may in [...]rout take quarter: because to dye for him, is to do nothing for him, but fruitlesly to cease to do any thing at all, either for the glory of God, or for the good of our surviving Neigh­bour. Yea, this very Doctor saith, Praelec. 7. sect. 7. That Fathers may disinherit their Children, and Children their Fathers, though they swore never to do so, viz. If they seek to destroy one another; which according to him involves full forfeiture of rights, even to Publique Parents notwithstanding former Oaths of Allegi­ance.

And as if the Doctor were nere resolved to say plainly by whom it is that Princes cease to reign, he himself affirms in his Pa­per, that in the like conjuncture of Circumstances he can likewise allow himself the same Prudentialls to prevent Dan­gers which might otherwise happen to him by such changes, and yet he will not openly allow so much to others.

Which as King Iames in his Apology saith is a doctrine full of blood, unnecessarily keeping poore people either from quarter or Protection, Kingdomes from Peace, authorityes from setling; and in the search of uncertaine rights (which this Doctor makes necessary for just actions) hee makes us feele trepidation in our con­sciences, see Crownes tottering on Princes heads, finde Atheisme in our actions, and desolation in our Country.

In sine, seeing no man knowes better then hee (who is so great a Master of Reason) that if he had brought never so many more Incommoda, and those true ones, yet hee could not by that Logick have overthrowne one Positive Argument of our Author; I could therefore wish, that by answering that which was publisht so long before any chang of government [Page 18] here, hee had made his reasons more publique then his scandall. Unlesse (after so many Precepts of Christ and his Apostles, the practicall Obedience of them, and of all the rest of the World ever since) hee can shew wherein our Authors assertion of Publique Obedience, is more chargeable with Novelty, or the contempt of God, then St Austins which he wrote in the same termes, and in relation to the like changes and confusions, viz. Quid interest sub cujus imperio vivat homo moriturus, si illi qui imperant ad impia & iniqua non cogant? Nam quid intersit ad incolumitatem bonosque mores quod alij vicerunt, alij victi sunt, omninò non video. That is, What matters it under whose government hee who is dayly dying lives, if they who command force him not to the practice of impious things? For I cannot any wayes perceive what advantage it is either to our safety, or integrity of life and manners, that some are conque­rors, others are conquered. Aug. Civ. dei. l. 5. cap. 17.