CHAP. I. That Rhetorique is an Art con­sisting not onely in mooving the passions of the Iudge; but chiefely in Proofes. And that this Art is profitable.

WEE see that all men naturally are able in some sort to accuse and excuse: some by [Page 2] chance; but some by method. This method may be discovered: and to discover method is all one with teaching an Art. If this Art con­sisted in Criminations only, and the skill to stirre up the Iudges, to Anger, Envy, Feare, Pitty, or other affections; a Rhetorician in well ordered Common-wealths and States, where it is forbidden to digresse from the cause in hea­ring, could have nothing at all to say. For all these perversions of the Iudge are beside the que­stion. And that which the plea­der is to shew, and the Iudge to give sentence on, is this onely: Tis so; or not so. The rest hath beene decided already by the Law-maker; who judging of u­niversals, and future things, could not be corrupted. Besides tis an absurd thing, for a man to make crooked the ruler he meanes to use.

[Page 3]It consisteth therefore chiefly in Proofes; which are Inferences: and all Inferences being Syllo­gismes, a Logician, if he would observe the difference betweene a plaine Syllogisme and an Enthy­meme, (which is a Rhetoricall Syllogisme,) would make the best Rhetorician. For all Syllogismes, and Inferences belong properly to Logicke; Whether they in­ferre truth, or probability: & be­cause without this Art it would often come to passe, that evill men by the advantage of naturall abilities, would carry an evill cause against a good; it brings with it at least this profit, that making the pleaders even in skill, it [...] merit of the cause. Besides ordi­narily those that are Iudges, are neither patient, nor capabl [...] of long Scientificall proofes, dr [...]e from the Principles through ma­ny [Page 4] Syllogismes: and therefore had neede to be instructed by the Rhetoricall, and shorter way. Lastly, it were ridiculous, to be ashamed of being vanquished in exercises of the body; and not to be ashamed of being inferiour in the vertue of well expressing the mind.

CHAP. 2. The Definition of Rhetorique [...]

RHetorique, is that Faculty, by which wee understand what will serve our turne, con­cerning any subject, to winne be­ [...]

Of those things that beget be­leefe; some require not the helpe of Art; as Witnesses, Evidences, and the like, which wee invent not, but make use of; and some [Page 5] require Art, and are invented by us.

The beleefe, that proceedes from our invention, comes part­ly from the behaviour of the spea,+ker; partly from the passions of the hearer: but especially from the proofes of what we alledge.

Proofes, are in Rhetorique, ei­ther Examples, or Enthymemes; as in Logicke, Inductions, or Syl­logismes. For an Example is a short Induction, and an Enthy­meme a short Syllogisme; out of which are left as superfluous, that which is supposed to b [...] necessa­rily understood by the hearer; to avoid prolixity, and not to consume the time of publique businesse needlesly.

CHAP. 3. Of the severall kinds of Orati­ons: and of the Principles of Rhe­torique.

IN all Orations, the Hearer does either heare onely; or judge also.

If he heare onely, that's one kind of Oration, and is called De­monstrative.

If he judge, he must judge ei­ther of that which is to come; or of that which is past.

If of that which is to come, there's another kind of Oration, and is called Deliberative.

If of that which is past; then 'tis a third kind of Oration, called Iudiciall.

So there are three kinds of O­rations; Demonstrative, Iudiciall, Deliberative.

[Page 7]To which belong their pro­per times. To the Demonstrative, the Present. To the Iudiciall, the Past, and to the Deliberative, the time to come.

And their proper O [...]s. To the Deliberative, Exhortation and Dehortation. To the Iudiciall, Accusation and Defence. And to the Demonstrative, Praysing and Dispraysing.

And their proper ends. To the Deliberative, to proove a thing Profitable, or Vnprofitable. To the Iudiciall, Iust, or Vnjust. To the Demonstrative, Honourable, or Dishonourable.

The Principles of Rhetorique. out of which Enthymemes are to be drawne; are the common opi­nions that men have concerning Profitable, and Vnprofitable; Iust, and Vnjust, Honourable and Dis­honourable; which are the points in the severall kinds of Orations [Page 8] questionable. For as in Logicke, where certaine and infallible knowledge is the scope of our proofe, the Principles must be all infallible truthes: so in Rhetorique the Principles must be common o­pinions, such as the Iudge is al­ready possessed with: because the end of Rhetorique is victory; which consists in having gotten beleefe.

And because nothing is Profi­table, Vnprofitable, Iust, Vnjust, Honourable or Dishonourable, but what has beene don [...], or is to be done; and nothing is to be done, that is not possible: and because there be degrees of Profitable, Vnprofitable, Iust, Vnjust, Honour­able, & Dishonourable; an Ora­tor must be ready in other Prin­ciples; namely of what is done, & not done; possible & not possible, to come, and not to come: and what is Greater, & what is Lesser, both [Page 9] in generall, and particularly ap­plyed to the thing in question; as what is more and lesse general­ly, and what is more profitable, and lesse profitable, &c. particular­ly.

CHAP. 4. Of the subject of Deliberatives; and the abilities that are required of him, that will deliberate of busi­nesse of State.

IN Deliberatives there are to be considered the subject, wherein; and the ends, whereto the Oratour exhorteth, or from which he dehorteth.

The Subject is alwayes some­thing in our owne power, the knowledge whereof belongs not to Rhetorique, but for the most part to the Politiques; and may be [Page 10] referred in a manner to these five heads.

• 1. Of levying of money. To which point hee that will speake as he ought to do, ought to know before hand the revenue of the state, how much it is, and where­in it consisteth: and also how great are the necessary charges and expences of the same. This knowledge is gotten partly by a mans owne experience, partly by Relations, and accounts in writing.
• 2. Of Peace, and Warre. Con­cerning which the Councellor or Deliberator, ought to know the strength of the Common­wealth; how much it both now is, and hereafter may be; and wherein that power consisteth. Which knowledge is gotten, partly by experience, and Re­lations at home, and partly by the sight of Warres, and of their [Page 11] events abroad.
• 3. Of the safeguard of the Coun­try. Wherein he onely is able to give councell, that knowes the formes, and number, and places of the Garrisons.
• 4. Of Provision. Wherein to speake well, it is necessary for a man to know, what is sufficient to maintaine the state; what Commodities they have at home growing; what they must fetch in through need; and what they may carry out through abun­dance.
• 5. Of making Lawes. To which is necessary so much Politicall, or Civill Philosophy, as to know what are the severall kindes of Governements; and by what meanes, either from without or from within, each of those kinds is preserved, or destroyed. And this knowledge is gotten, partly by observing the severall go­vernments, [Page 12] in times past by Hi­story; and partly by observing the government of the times present, in severall Nations by Travell.

So that to him that will speake in a Counsel of State, there is ne­cessary this; History, Sight of Warres, Travell, Knowledge of the revenue, expences, forces, ha­vens, garrisons, wares, and provisi­ons in the State he lives in; and what is needefull for that State, either to export, or import.

CHAP. 5. Of the ends which the Orator in Deliberatives propoundeth, where­by to exhort, or dehort.

A An Orator in exhorting al­wayes propundeth Felicity, or some part of Felicity to be at­tained [Page 13] by the actions he exhor­teth unto: and in Dehortation the contrary.

By Felicity, is meant common­ly, Prosperity with vertue, or a continuall content of the life with surety. And the parts of it are such things as wee call good, in body, minde, or fortune; such as these that follow.

• 1. Nobility, which to a state or nation is, to have beene antient inhabitants; and to have had most antiently, and in most number, fa­mous Generalls in the Warres, or men famous for such things as fall under emulation. And to a privat man, to have beene descended law­fully of a family, which hath yeel­ded most antiently and in most number, men knowne to the world for vertue, riches, or any thing in generall estimation.
• 2. Many and good Children. Which is also publique and pri­vate. [Page 14] Publique, when there is much youth in the state indued with vertue, (namely of the body, sta­ture, beauty, strength, and dex­terity: Of the mind, valour, and temperance) Private, when a man hath many such Children, both Male and Female. The ver­tues commonly respected in Wo­men, are of the body, Beauty, and Stature; Of the mind Tempe­rance and Houswiferie without sordidnesse.
• 3. Riches. Which is, Money, Cattell, Lands, Houshould-stuffe; with the power to dispose of them.
• 4. Glory. Which is, the repu­tation of Vertue, or of the possession of such things, as all, or most men, or wise men desire.
• 5. Honour. Which is the glo­ry of benefitting, or being able to benefit others. To benefit others, is to contribute somewhat, not easily had, to another mans safety, or ri­ches. [Page 15] The parts of Honor are, Sacrifices, Monuments, Rewards, Dedication of places, Precedence, Sepulchres, Statues, publique Pen­sions, Adorations, Presents.
• 6. Health. Which is the being free from Diseases, with strength to use the body.
• 7. Beauty. Which is to diffe­rent Ages different. To Youth, strength of Body, and sweetnesse of aspect. To full men, strength of body fit for the warres, and Counte­nance sweet, with a mixture of Terror. To old men, strength enough for necessary labours, with a Countenance not displeasing.
• 8. Strength. Which is the a­bility to moove any thing at plea­sure of the Moover. To moove, is to pull, to put off, to lift, to thrust downe, to presse together.
• 9. Stature. Which is then just, when a man in heighth, breadth, & thicknes of body doth so [Page 16] exceed the most, 'as neverthelesse it be no hinderance to the quicknesse of his motion.
• 10. Good old Age. Which is, that which comes late, & with the least trouble.
• 11. Many and good Friends. Which is, to have many that will doe for his sake, that which they thinke will be for his good.
• 12. Prosperity. Which is, to have all, or the most, or the grea­test of those goods which we attri­bute to Fortune.
• 13. Vertue. Which is then to be defined, when we speake of Praise.

These are the grounds from whence we exhort.

Dehortation is from the con­traries of these.

CHAP. 6. Of the Colours, or common opinions concerning Good and Evill.

IN Deliberatives, the Princi­ples, or Elements from whence we draw our Proofes, are common Opinions concerning Good and Evill. And these Principles are either Absolute, or Comparative. And those that are Absolute, are either Disputable, or Indisputable.

The Indisputable Principles are such as these.

Good, is That, which wee love for it selfe.

And That [...] for which we love [...]omewhat else.

And That which all things de­sire.

And That to every man which his reason dictates.

[Page 18]And That, which when wee have, we are well, or satisfied.

And That which satisfies.

And the Cause or Effect of any of These.

And That which preserves a­ny of These.

And That which keepes off, or destroyes the contrary of any of These.

Also to take the Good, and re­ject the Evill, is Good.

And to take the greater Good, rather then the lesse; and the lesser Evill, rather then the grea­ter.

Further, all Vertues are Good.

And Pleasure.

And all things Beautifull.

And Iustice, Valour, Tempe­rance, Magnanimity, Magnifi­cence; and other like habits.

And Health, Beauty, Strength, &c.

And [...]ic [...].

[Page 19]And Friends.

And Honour, and Glory.

And Ability to say or doe: also Towardlines, Will, and the like.

And Whatsoever Art, or Sci­ence.

And Life.

And Whatsoever is Iust.

The Disputable Principles are such as follow.

That is Good whose contrary is Evill.

And whose contrary is good for our Enemies.

And whose contrary our Ene­mies are glad of.

And of which there cannot be too much.

And upon which much labour and cost hath beene bestowed.

And That which many desire.

And That which is praysed.

And That which even our E­nem [...]es, and evill men praise.

And What good men preferre.

[Page 20]And What we doe with advise.

And That which is Possible, is Good, (to undertake.)

And That which is Easie.

And That which depends on our owne Will.

And That which is proper for us to doe.

And What no man else can do.

And Whatsoever is Extraordi­nary.

And What is sutable.

And That which wants a little of being at an end.

And What we hope to master.

And What we are fit for.

And What evill men doe not.

And What we love to doe.

CHAP. 7. Of the Colours, or common Opinions concerning Good and Evill comparatively.

THe Colours of Good compa­ratively depend partly up­on the following Definitions of Comparatives.

• 1. More, is so much, and some­what besides.
• 2. Lesse, is that, which and somewhat else, is so much.
• 3. Greater and more in number are said onely Comparatively to Lesse, and Fewer in number.
• 4. Great and Little, Many and Few, are taken Comparatively to the Most of the same kind. So that Great and Many, is that which exceeds; Little and Few, is that which is exceeded by the Most of the same kind.

[Page 22]Partly from the precedent Definitions of Good absolutely.

Common Opinions concerning Good Comparatively then are These.

Greater Good is many, then fewer, or one of those Many.

And Greater is the kind, in which the greatest is greater then the greatest of another kind. And greater is that Good then another, whose kind is grea­ter then another's kind.

And Greater is that from which another Good followes, then the Good which followes.

And of two which exceed a third, Greater is that which ex­ceeds it most.

And that which causes the greater Good.

And that which proceeds from a greater Good.

And Greater is that which is chosen for it selfe, then that [Page 23] which is chosen from somewhat else.

And the end greater then that which is not the end.

And That whichlesse needes other things, then that which more.

And that which is indepen­dent, then that which is depen­dent of another.

And the Beginning, then not the Beginning.

[Seeing the Beginning is a greater Good, or Evill, then that which is not the Be­ginning; and the End, then that which is not the End; One may argue from this Colour both wayes, as Leo­damas against Chabrias, would have the Actor more to blame then the Advisor; and against Calli­stratus, the Advisor more then the Actor.]

[Page 24]And the Cause then not the Cause.

And That which hath a grea­ter Beginning or Cause.

And the Beginning, or Cause of a greater Good, or Evill.

And That which is scarce, grea­ter then that which is Plentifull; because harder to get.

And That which is Plentifull, then that which is Scarce; be­cause oftner is Vse.

And That which is Easy, then that which is Hard.

And That whose Contrary is greater.

And That whose Want is greater.

And Vertue then not Vertue, a greater Good. Vice, then not Vice, a greater Evill.

And greater Good, or Evill is That, the effects whereof are more Honorable, or more Shamefull.

[Page 25]And the effects of greater Ver­tues, or Vices.

And the Excesse whereof is more tolerable, a greater Good.

And those things which may with more honor be desir'd.

And the Desire of better things.

And those things whereof the Knowledge is better.

And the Knowledge of better things.

And That which wise men preferre.

And That which is in better men.

And that which better men choose.

And That which is more, then that which is lesse delightfull.

And That which is more, then that which is lesse Honorable.

And That which wee would have for our selves and Friends, a greater Good; and the contrary [Page 26] a greater Evill.

And that which is Lasting, then that which is not Lasting.

And That which is Firme, then that which is not Firme.

And what many desire, then what few.

And what the Adversary, or Iudge confesseth to be greater, is greater.

And Common then not Com­mon.

And not Common then Com­mon.

And what is more Laudable.

And That which is more Ho­nour'd, a greater Good.

And That which is more Pu­nisht, a greater Evill.

And both Good and Evill di­vided then undivided, appeare greater.

And Compounded, then sim­ple appeare greater.

And That which is done with [Page 27] Opportunity, Age, Place, Time, Meanes disadvantageous, greater then otherwise.

And That which is naturall, then that which is attained unto.

And the same part of that which is great, then of that which is lesse.

And That which is nearest to the end designed.

And That which is Good or Evill to ones selfe, then that which is simply so.

And Possible, then not Possible.

And That which comes to­wards the end of our Life.

And That which wee doe re­ally, then that which we doe for shew.

And That which wee would be, rather then what we would seeme to be.

And That which is good for more purposes, is the greater Good.

[Page 28]And That which serves us in greater necessity.

And That which is joyned with lesse trouble.

And That which is joyned with more delight.

And Of the two, that which added to a third makes the whole the greater.

And That which having wee are more sensible of.

And in every thing, That which we most esteeme.

CHAP. 8. Of the severall kinds of Govern­ments.

BEcause Hortation and Dehor­tation concerne the Com­mon-wealth, and are drawne from the Elements of Good and Evill; as wee have spoken of them already in the Abstract, so we must speake of them also in [Page 29] the concret; that is, of what is Good, or Evill to each sort of Common-wealth in speciall.

The Government of a Com­monwealth, is either Democracy, or Aristocracy, or Oligarchy or Monarchy.

Democracy is that, wherein all men with equall right, are pre­ferred to the highest Magistracy by Lot.

Aristocracy is that, wherein the highest Magistrate is chosen out of those, that had the best e­ducation, according to what the Lawes prescribe for best.

Oligarchy, is that, where the highest Magistrate is chosen for wealth.

Monarchy is that, wherein one man hath the government of all; which Government, if hee limit it by Law, is called King­dome; if by his owne will, Ty­rany.

[Page 30]The end of Democracy, or the Peoples government, is Liberty.

The end of Oligarchy, is the riches of those that governe.

The end of Aristocracy, is good Lawes, and good ordering of the City.

The end of Monarchy, or Kings, is the safety of the People, and conservation of his owne au­thority.

Good therefore, in each sort of Government is that which con­duceth to these their ends.

And because beleefe is not got­ten onely by proofes; but also from manners; the manners of each sort of Common-wealth ought to be well understood by him that undertaketh to per­swade, or disswade in matter of State. Their manners may be knowne by their designes; and their designes by their ends; and their ends by what wee see them [Page 31] take pleasure in. But of this more accurately in the Politiques.

CHAP. 9. Of the Colours of Honourable and Dishonourable.

IN a Demonstrative Oration, the subject whereof is Praise, or Dispraise; the proofes are to be drawne from the Elements of Honourable, and Dishonorable.

In this place we anticipate the second way of getting beleefe; which is from the manners of the Speaker. For Praise, whe­ther it come in as the principall businesse, or upon the by, de­pends still upon the same Prin­ciples. Which are these.

Honorable, is that, which wee love for it selfe, and is withall laudable.

[Page 32]And that Good, which plea­seth us onely because 'tis Good.

And Vertue.

Vertue is the faculty of get­ting and preserving that which is Good; and the faculy of doing many, and great things well.

The kindes of it are these.

• 1. Iustice; which is a Vertue, whereby every man obtaines what by the Law is his.
• 2. Fortitude; which is a Ver­tue by which a man carries him­selfe honorably, and according to the Lawes, in time of danger.
• 3. Temperance; which is a Ver­tue, whereby a man governes himselfe in matter of pleasure according to the Law.
• 4. Liberality; which is a Ver­tue, by which we benefit others in matter of money.
• 5. Magnanimity; which is a Vertue, by which a man is apt to [Page 33] doe great benefits.
• 6. Magnificence; which is a Vertue, by which a man is apt to be at great cost.
• 7. Prudence; which is an In­tellectuall Vertue, by which a man is able, to deliberate well concerning any Good leading to Felicity.

And Honorable, are the Causes, and Effects of things Honorable.

And the Workes of Vertue.

And the signes of Vertue.

And those actions, the reward whereof is Honor.

And the reward whereof is ra­ther Honor, than Money.

And that which we doe not for our owne sakes.

And what wee doe for our Countries good, neglecting our owne.

And those things are Honora­ble, which good of themselves, are not so to the Owner.

[Page 34]And those things which hap­pen to the dead, rather then to the living.

And what wee doe for other men, especially for Benefactors.

And bestowing of Benefits.

And the contrary of those things we are ashamed of.

And those things which men strive for earnestly, but without feare of Adversary.

And of the more Honorable, and better men, the V [...]rtues are more Honorable.

And more Honorable are the vertues that tend to other mens benefit, then those which tend to ones owne.

And Honorable are those things which are Iust.

And Revenge is Honorable.

And Victory.

And Honor.

And Monuments.

And those things which hap­pen not to the living

[Page 35]And things that excell.

And what none but we.

And Possessions we reape no profit by.

And those things which are had in honor particularly in seve­rall places.

And the signes of praise.

And to have nothing of the servile, mercenary, or Mecha­nicke.

And that which seemes Hono­rable; Namely such as follow.

Vices confining upon Vertue.

And the extremes of Vertues.

And what the Auditors think Honorable.

And that which is in estima­tion.

And that which is done accor­ding to custome.

Besides, in a Demonstrative Oration, the Orator must shew, that he whom he prayseth, did what he prayseth unconstrained­ly, [Page 36] and willingly.

And he does so, who does the same often.

Prayse, is speech, declaring the magnitude of a Vertue, Action, or Worke.

But to praise the Worke from the Vertue of the Worker, is a circular Proofe.

To Magnifie, and to Praise, dif­fer in themselves, as Felicity, and Vertue. For Prayse declares a mans Vertue; and Magnifying declares his Felicity.

Prayse, is a kind of inverted Precept. For to say, Doe it because 'tis Good, is a Precept. But to say Hee is Good because hee did it, is Prayse.

An Orator in Praysing must al­so use the formes of Amplificati­on; such as these.

He was the first that did it.

The onely man that did it.

The speciall man that did it.

[Page 37]He did it with disadvantage of Time.

He did it with little helpe.

He was the cause, that the Law ordayned Rewards and Honours for such Actions.

Further, he that will prayse a Man, must compare him with o­thers; and his actions with the actions of others; especially with such as are renowned.

And Amplification is more pro­per to a Demonstrative Oration, then to any other. For heere the Actions are confest; and the O­rators part is onely this, to con­tribute unto them Magnitude and L [...]ster.

CHAP. 10. Of Accusation and Defence, with the Definition of Injury.

IN a Iudiciall Oration, which consists in Accusation and De­fence, the thing to be prooved is, that Injury has beene done: and the heads from whence the proofes are to be drawn, are these three.

• 1. The causes that moove to Injury.
• 2. The Persons apt to doe In­jury.
• 3. The Persons obnoxious, or apt to suffer Injury.

An Injury is a voluntary offen­ding of another man contrary to the Law.

Voluntary is that which a man does with knowledge; and with­out compulsion.

[Page 39]The causes of Voluntary Acti­ons are Intemperance, and a Vici­ous disposition concerning things Disirable. As the Covetous man does against the Law out of an in­temperate desire of Money.

All Actions proceed either from the Doers disposition, or not.

Those that proceed not from the Doers disposition are such as hee does by Chance, by Compulsion, or by Naturall necessity.

Those that proceed from the Doers disposition are such as hee does by Custome, or upon Preme­ditation, or in Anger, or out of In­temperance.

By Chance are said to bee done those things, whereof neither the Cause, nor the Scope, is evident, and which are done neither Or­derly; nor alwaies, nor most commonly after the same man­ner.

By Nature are said to be done [Page 40] those things, the Causes where­of are in the Doer; and are done orderly; and alwaies, or for the most part after the same manner.

By Compulsion are done those things, which are against the Ap­petite, and Ordination of the Doer.

By Custome those Actions are said to be done the Cause where­of is this, that the Doer has done them often.

Vpon Premeditation are said to be done those things which are done for profit, as the End, or the way to the End.

In Anger are said to be done those things which are done with a purpose of Revenge.

Out of Intemperance are said to be done those things which are delightfull.

In summe, every Voluntary Action tends either to Profit, or Pleasure.

[Page 41]The Colours of Profitable are already set downe.

The Colours of that which is Pleasing follow next.

CHAP. 11. Of the Colours, or Common O­pinions concerning Pleasure.

PLeasure is a suddaine and sen­sible motion of the Soule, to­wards that which is Naturall.

Griefe is the Contrary.

Pleasant therefore is that, which is the cause of such mo­tion.

And to returne to ones owne Nature.

And Customes.

And those things that are not violent.

Vnpleasant are those things, which proceed from Necessity, [Page 42] as Cares, Study, Contentions. The contrary whereof, Ease, Remission from Labour & Care: also Play, Rest, Sleepe, are Plea­sant.

Pleasant also is that, to which we have an appetite.

Also the Appetites themselves if they bee sensuall, as Thirst, Hunger, and Lust.

Also those things to which we have an appetite upon perswasi­on and Reason.

And those things we remem­ [...]er, whether they pleased, or displeased, then, when they were present.

And the things we hope for.

And Anger.

And to be in Love.

And Revenge.

And Victory. Therefore

Also Contentious Games; as Tables, Chesse, Dice, Tennis, &c.

[Page 43]And Hunting.

And Suites in Law.

And Honor and Reputation amongst men in Honor and Re­putation.

And to Love.

And to bee Belov'd and Re­spected.

And to be Admir'd.

And to be Flatter'd.

And a Flatterer: (for hee [...]eemes both to love and Ad­mire.)

And the same thing Often.

And Change, or Variety.

And What wee returne to a­fresh.

And to Learne.

And to Admire.

And to doe Good.

And to receive Good.

And to helpe up againe one that's fallen.

And to finish that which is un­perfect.

[Page 44]And Imitation.

And Therefore the Art of Painting.

And the Art of Carving Ima­ges.

And the Art of Poetry.

And Pictures and Statues.

And other mens Dangers, so they be neere.

And to have escaped hardly.

And things of a kind please one another.

And every one himselfe.

And ones owne pleases him.

And to beare Sway.

And to be thought Wise.

And to dwell upon that which he is good at.

And ridiculous Actions, Say­ings and Persons.

CHAP. 12. Presumptions of Injury drawne from the persons that doe it: or Common opinions concerning the aptitude of Persons to doe Injury.

OF the causes which move to Injury, namely Profit and Pleasure, has beene already spo­ken Chap. 6.7.11.

It followes next to speake of the Persons, that are apt to doe Injury.

The doers of Injury are.

Such as thinke they can doe it.

And such as thinke to be un­discover'd when they have done it.

And such as thinke though they bee discover'd, they shall [Page 46] not be called in question for it.

And such as thinke though they be called in question for it, that their Mulct will bee lesse then the gaine, which either themselves or their friends re­ceive by the Injury.

Able to doe Injury are

• Such as are Eloquent.
• And such as are practis'd in businesse.
• And such as have skill in Pro­cesse.
• And such as have many Friends.
• And Rich men.
• And such as have Rich friends; or Rich servants; or Rich Part­ners.

Vndiscover'd when they have it, are.

• Such as are not apt to commit the Crimes whereof they are ac­cused: as Feeble men, Slaughter: Poore and not Beautifull men, Adultery.
• [Page 47]And such as one would thinke could not chuse but be discove­red.
• And such as doe Injuries, whereof there hath beene no Ex­ample.
• And such as have none, or many enemies.
• And such as can easily conceale what they doe.
• And such as have some body to transferre the fault upon.

They that do Injury openly are,

• Such, whose friends have beene injured.
• And such as have the Iudges for friends.
• And such as can escape their triall at Law.
• And such as can put off their triall.
• And such as can corrupt the Iudges.
• And such as can avoid the pai­ment of their fine:
• [Page 48]And such as can deferre the paiment.
• And such as cannot pay at all.
• And such as by the Injury get manifestly, much, and presently; when the fine is uncertaine, little, and to come.
• And such as get by the Injurie, money; by the penalty, shame onely.
• And such on the contrary as get honor by the Injurie, and suffer the mulct of money onely, or banishment, or the like.
• And such as have often esca­ped, or beene undiscovered.
• And such as have often attemp­ted in vaine.
• And such as consider present pleasure, more than paine to come; and so intemperate men are apt to doe Injurie.
• And such as consider pleasure to come, more then present paine: and so Temperate men [Page 49] are apt to doe Injury.
• And such as may seeme to have done it by Fortune, Nature, Necessity, or Custome; and by Errour rather then by Injustice.
• And such as have meanes to get pardon.
• And such as want Necessaries, as Poore men: or Vnnecessaries, as Rich men.
• And such as are of very good, or very bad Reputation.

CHAP. 13. Presumptions of Injury drawne from the Persons that suffer, and from the matter of the Injury.

OF those that doe Injury, and why they doe it, it has been already spoken.

Now of the Persons that suffer, and of the Matter wherein they [Page 50] suffer, the common Opinions are these.

Persons obnoxious to Injury are,

• Such as have the things that we want, either as necessary, or as delightfull.
• And such as are farre from us.
• And such as are at hand.
• And such as are unwary, and Credulous.
• And such as are Lazy.
• And such as are Modest.
• And such as have swallowed many Injuries.
• And such as wee have injured often before.
• And such as never before.
• And such as are in our danger.
• And such as are ill belov'd ge­nerally.
• And such as are envied.
• And our Friends.
• And our Enemies.
• And such as wanting friends, [Page 51] have no great ability either in speech, or action.
• And such as shall be loosers by going to Law; as Strangers, and Workemen.
• And such as have done the In­juries they suffer.
• And such as have committed a crime, or would have done, or are about to doe.
• And such as by doing them an Injurie we shal gratify our friends or superiours.
• And such, whose friendship we have newly left, and accuse.
• And such as another would do the Injury to, if we should not.
• And such as by injuring, wee get greater meanes of doing good.

The Matters, wherein men are obnoxious to Injury are,

• Those things wherein all, or most men use to deale unjustly.
• And those things which are [Page 52] easily hid, and put off into other hands, or altered.
• And those things which a man is ashamed to have suffered.
• And those things wherein pro­sequution of Injurie, may bee thought a love of contention.

CHAP. 14. Of those things which are necessary to be knowne for the Definition of Iust and Vnjust.

VVHen the fact is evident, the next inquiry is whether it be Iust, or Vnjust.

For the Definition of Iust and vnjust, we must know what Law is; that is, what the Law of Na­ture, what the Law of Nations, what the Law Civill, what writ­ten Law, and what unwritten Law is; and what Persons; that is, [Page 53] what a publique Person, or the City is; and what a private Person, or Citizen is.

Vnjust in the opinion of all men, is that which is contrary to the Law of Nature.

Vnjust in the opinion of all men of those Nations which trafficke and come together, is that which is contrary to the Law common to those Nations.

Vnjust onely in one Common-wealth, is that which is contra­ry to the Law Civill, or Law of that Common-wealth.

He that is accused to have done any thing against the Pub­lique, or a private Person, is ac­cused to doe it either ignorantly, or unwillingly, or in anger, or up­on premeditation.

And because the defendant does many times confesse the fact, but deny the unjustice; as that he tooke, but did not steale; and [Page 54] did, but not adultery, it is necessa­ry to know the Definitions of Theft, Adultery, and all other crimes.

What facts are contrary to the written Lawes, may be knowne by the Lawes themselves.

Besides written Lawes, what­soever is Iust, proceeds from E­quity, or Goodnesse.

From Goodnesse proceeds that, which we are praysed, or hono­red for.

From Equity proceed those actions, which though the writ­ten Law command not, yet be­ing interpreted reasonably, and supplyed, seemes to require at our hands.

Actions of Equity are such as these.

• Not too rigorously to punish Errors, Mischances, or Injuries.
• To pardon the faults that ad­here to Mankinde.
• [Page 55]And not to consider the Law so much, as the Law-makers mind; and not the Words so much as the meaning of the Law.
• And not to regard so much the Fact, as the intention of the Do­er; nor part of the Fact, but the Whole; nor what the Doer is, but what he has beene alwaies, or for the most part.
• And to remember better the Good received, then the Ill.
• And to endure injuries pati­ently.
• And to submit rather to the sentence of a Iudge then of the sword.
• And to the sentence of an Ar­bitrator, rather then of a Iudge.

CHAP. 15. Of the Colours, or Common O­pinions concerning Injuries, comparatively.

COmmon Opinions concerning Injuries comparatively, are such as these.

Greater is the Injury which proceeds from greater Iniquity.

And from which proceedeth greater dammage.

And of which there is no re­venge.

And for which there is no re­medy.

And by occasion of which, he that hath received the Injury, hath done some mischiefe to himselfe.

Hee does the greater Injury, that does it first, or alone, or with few.

[Page 57]And he that does it often.

Greater Injury is that, against which Lawes and Penalties were first made.

And that which is more brutall, or more approaching to the acti­ons of beasts.

And that which is done upon more premeditation.

And by which more Lawes are broken.

And which is done in the place of execution.

And which is of greatest shame to him that receives the Injury.

And which is committed a­gainst well-deservers.

And which is committed a­gainst the unwritten Law, be­cause good men should observe the Law for Iustice, and not for feare of punishment.

And which is committed a­gainst the written Law, because [Page 58] he that will doe Injury neglecting the penalty set downe in the written Law, is much more like­ly to transgresse the unwritten Law, where there is no penalty at all.

CHAP. 16. Of Proofes Inartificiall.

OF Artificiall Proofes wee have already spoken.

Inartificiall Proofes, which we invent not; but make use of, are of five sorts.

• 1. Lawes. And those are Civill, or written Law: the Law, or Cu­stome of Nations: and the univer­sall Law of Nature.
• 2. Witnesses. And those are such as concerne Matter; and such as concerne Manners. Also, they be ancient, or present.
• [Page 59]3. Evidences, or Writings.
• 4. Question, or Torture.
• 5. Oathes. And those bee ei­ther given; or taken; or both; or neither.

For Lawes, we use them thus.

• When the written Law makes against us, we appeale to the Law of Nature, alleadging,
  • That to bee greatest Iustice, which is greatest Equity.
  • That the Law of Nature is im­mutable; the written Law mu­table.
  • That the written Law is but see­ming Iustice; the Law of Nature very Iustice. And Iustice is a­mong those things which are, and not which seeme to be.
  • That the iudge ought to di­scerne betweene true and adulte­rate Iustice.
  • That they are better men that obey unwritten, then written Lawes.
  • [Page 60]That the Law against us does contradict some other Law. And when the Law has a double in­terpretation, that that is the true one, which makes for us.
  • And that the cause of the Law being abolished, the Law is no more of Validity.
• But when the written Law makes for us, and Equity for the Adversary, we must alleadge
  • That a Man may use Equity, not as a liberty to judge against the Law; but onely as a security against being forsworne, when he knowes not the Law.
  • That men seeke not Equity be­cause tis good simply, but be­cause good for them.
  • That it is the same thing not to make, and not to use the Law.
  • That as in other Arts, and namely in Physicke Fallacies are pernicious; so in a Common-wealth t'is pernitious to use pre­texts [Page 61] against the Law.
  • And that in Common-wealths well instituted, to seeme wiser then the Lawes, is prohibited.

For Witnesses, wee must use them thus.

• When we have them not, wee must stand for Presumptions, and say
  • That in Equity sentence ought to bee given according to the most probability.
  • That Presumptions, are the te­stimony of the things them­selves, and cannot be bribed.
  • That they cannot lie.
• When wee have witnesses, a­gainst him that has them not wee must say
  • That Presumptions, if they be false, cannot be pun [...]shed.
  • That if Presumptions were e­nough, witnesses were superflu­ous.

For writings, when they fa­vour [Page 62] us we must say,

• That writings are private and particular Lawes; and hee that takes away the use of Evidences abolisheth the Law.
• That since Contracts and Ne­gotiations passe by writings, hee that barres their use, dissolves humane Society.
• Against them, if they favour the Adversary we may say,
  • That since Lawes doe not bind that are fraudulently made to passe, much lesse writings.
  • And that the Iudge being to dispence iustice, ought rather to consider what is just, then what is in the Writing.
  • That Writings may be gotten by fraud or force; but Iustice by neither.
  • Th [...]t the Writing is repugnant to some Law, Civill, or Naturall; or to [...]ustice; or to Honesty.
  • That 'tis repugnant to some [Page 63] other writing before, or after.
  • That it crosses some commo­ditie of the Iudge (which must not be said directly, but implied cunningly.)

For the Torture, if the giving of it make for us, we must say,

• That 'tis the onely testimony that is certaine.
• But if it make for the Adver­sarie, we may say,
  • That men inforced by Torture speake as well that which is false, as that which is true.
  • That they who can endure, conceale the truth; and they who cannot, say that which is false to be delivered from paine.

For Oathes; he that will not put his Adversary to his Oath, may alleadge,

• That hee makes no scruple to be forsworne.
• That by swearing he will carry the cause, which not swearing he must lose.
• [Page 64]That hee had rather trust his cause in the hand of the Iudge, then of the Adversary.
• He that refus [...]th to take the Oath, may say.
  • That the matter is not worth so much.
  • That if he had beene an evill man, he had sworne, and carried his cause.
  • That to trie it by swearing for a Religious man against an irreli­gious, is as hard a match, as to set a weake man against a strong in Combat.
• He that is willing to take the Oath may pretend
  • That he had rather trust him­selfe, than his Adversarie; and that 'tis equall dealing for an ir­religious man to give, and for a religious man to take the Oath.
  • That 'tis his dutie to take the Oath, since hee has required to have sworne Iudges.
• [Page 65]Hee that offers the Oath may pretend
  • That he does piously to com­mit his cause to the Gods.
  • That he makes his Adversary himselfe Iudge.
  • That 'twere absurd for him not to sweare, that has required the Iudges to be sworne.
  • And of these are to be com­pounded the Formes wee are to use, when wee would give, and not take the Oath; or take, and not give; or both give, and take; or neither give, nor take.
• But if one have sworne contra­ry to a former Oath, he may pre­tend.
  • That he was forced.
  • That he was deceived, and that neither of these is Perjury, since Perjury is voluntary.
• But if the Adversary doe so, he may say
  • That he that stands not to what [Page 66] he hath sworne, subverteth hu­mane society.
  • And (turning to the Iudge) what reason have we to require, that you should be sworne, that judge our cause [...] when wee will not stand to that wee sweare our selves
  • And so much for Proofes inar­tificiall.

CHAP. I. The Introduction.

OF beleefe proceeding from our Invention, that part which consi­steth in proofe, is already spoken of.

The other two parts follow: whereof one ariseth from the manners of the speaker; the other from the passions of the Hearer.

The Principles, Colours, or Common Opinions, upon which a mans beleefe is grounded concer­ning the manners of him that speakes, are to bee had partly out [Page 68] of that which hath beene said before concerning Vertue, Booke 1. Chap. 9. partly out of those things which shall be said by and by concerning the Passions. For a man is beleev'd either for his Pru­dence, or for his Probity, which are Vertues; or for good will: of which among the Passions.

The Principles concerning be­leefe, arising from the passion of the Hearer, are to bee gather'd from that which shall now bee said of the severall Passions in order.

In every one of which three things are to be considered.

• 1. First, how men are affected.
• 2. Secondly, Towards whom.
• 3. Thirdly, For what.

CHAP. 2. Of Anger.

ANger is desire of revenge, joyned with greefe fo [...] that He, or some of his, is, or seemes to be neglected.

The object of Anger is al­wayes some particular, or indi­viduall thing.

In Anger there is also pleasure proceeding from the imagina [...]i­on of revenge to come.

To Neglect, is to esteeme little, or nothing: and is of three kinds.

• 1. Contempt.
• 2. Crossing.
• 3. Contumely.

Contempt, is when a man thinkes another of little worth in comparison to himselfe.

Crossing, is the hinderance of anothers mans will without de­signe [Page 70] to profit himselfe.

Contumely, is the disgracing of another for his owne pastime.

The common Opinions con­cerning Anger are there­fore such as follow.

• They are easily Angry that thinke they are neglected.
• That thinke they excell o­thers; as the Rich with the Poore, the Noble with the Ob­scure, &c.
• And such as thinke they de­serve well.
• And such as grieve to be hin­dered, opposed, or not assisted. And therefore sicke men, Poore men, Lovers, and generally all that desire, and attaine not, are Angry with those that standing by, are not moved with their wants.
• And such as having expected good, find evill.
• Those that men are Angry with, are
  • [Page 71]Such as mocke, deride, or jest at them.
  • And such as shew any kind of Contumely towards them.
  • And such as despise those things which we spend most la­bour and study upon: and the more, by how much wee seeme the lesse advanced therein.
  • And our friends, rather then those that are not our friends.
  • And such as have honoured us, if they continue not.
  • And such as requite not our courtesie.
  • And such as follow contrary courses, if they be our inferiours.
  • And our friends, if they have said, or done us evil, or not good.
  • And such as give not eare to our intreaty.
  • And such as are joyfull, or calme in our distresse.
  • And such as troubling us, are not themselves troubled.
  • [Page 72]And such as willingly heare or see our disgraces.
  • And such as neglect us in the presence of our Competitors; of those we admire, of those wee would have admire us; of those we reverence, and of those that reverence us.
  • And such as should helpe us, and neglect it.
  • And such as are in jest, when we are in earnest.
  • And such as forget us, or our Names.
  • An Orator therefore must so frame his, Iudge or Auditor, by his Oration; as to make him apt to Anger: and then make his Adversary appeare such, as men use to be Angry with all.

CHAP. 3. Of Reconciling, or Pacifying Anger.

REconciliation is the Appea­sing of Anger.

Those, to whom men are ea­sily reconciled, are

• Such, as have not offended out of Neglect.
• And such as have done it against their will.
• And such as wish done the con­trary of what they have done.
• And such as have done as much to themselves.
• And such as confesse and re­pent.
• And such as are humbled.
• And such as doe seriously the same things, that they doe seri­ously.
• And such as have done them more good heretofore, then now hurt.
• [Page 74]And such as sue to them for a­ny thing.
• And such as are not insolent, nor mockers, nor slighters of o­thers in their owne disposition.
• And generally such as are of a contrary disposition to those, whom men are usually angry withall.
• And such as they feare, or re­verence.
• And such as reverence them.
• And such as have offended in their Anger.

Reconcilable are,

• Such as are contrarily affected to those whom we have said be­fore to be easily Angry.
• And such as play, laugh, make merry, prosper, live in plenty, and in summe, all that have no cause of griefe.
• And such as have given their anger time.

Men lay downe their An­ger [Page 75] for these causes.

• Because they have beene re­venged of another.
• Because they have gotten the Victory.
• Because the Offender has suf­fered more, then they meant to inflict.
• Becau [...]e they thinke they suf­fer justly.
• And because they thinke the revenge will not be felt, or not knowne, that the revenge was theirs, and for such an injury.
• And because the Offender is dead.
• Who [...]oever therefore would asswage the Anger of his Auditor, must make himself appeare such, as men use to be reconciled unto: and beget in his Auditor such o­pinions, as make him reconcilable.

CHAP. 4. Of Love, and Friends.

TO Love, is to will well to another, for that others, not for ones owne sake.

A Friend is he that loves, and he that is beloved.

Friends one to another, are they that mutually lo [...]e [...]e an­other.

A Friend the [...]efore is he,

• That rejoyceth at [...]hers Good.
• And that grieves at his h [...]t.
• And that wishes the same with [...]s to a third, whether good, or hurt.
• And that is ene [...]y or friend to the same man.

We love them,

• That have done good to us, or ours, [...]specially if much, readi­ly, [Page 77] or in season.
• That are our Friends Friends.
• That are our Enemies Ene­mies.
• That are Liberall.
• That are Valiant.
• That are Iust.
• And that we would have love us.
• And good Companions.
• And such as can abide Iests.
• And such as breake Iests.
• And such as praise us, especi­ally for somewhat that we doubt of in our selves.
• And such as are neat.
• And such as upbraid us not with our vices, or with their own benefits.
• And such as quickly forget in­juries.
• And such as least observe our Errours.
• And such as are not of ill tongue.
• [Page 78]And those that are ignorant of our Vices.
• And such as crosse us not when we are busy, or angry.
• And such as are officious to­wards us.
• And those that are like us.
• And such as follow the same course or trade of life, where they impeach not one another.
• And such as labor for the same thing, when both may be satisfi­ed.
• And such as are not ashamed to tell us freely their faults, so it be not in contempt of us, and the faults such, as the world, rather then their owne consciences condemnes.
• And such as are ashamed to tell us of their very faults.
• And such as wee would have honour us, and not envy, but i­mitate us.
• And such as wee would doe [Page 79] good to, except with greater hurt to our selves.
• And such as continue their friendship to the dead.
• And such as speake their mind.
• And such as are not terrible.
• And such as we may relie on.

The severall kinds of friend­ship, are Society, Familiarity, Consanguinity, Affinity, &c.

The things that beget love are,

• The bestowing of Benefits. Gratis.
• The bestowing of Benefits. Vnasked.
• The bestowing of Benefits. Privately.

CHAP. 5. Of Enmity and Hatred.

THE Colours, or Common Opinions concerning Hatred are to be taken from the contrary of those, which concerne Love and Friendship.

Hatred differs from Anger

In this, that Anger regards onely what is done to ones selfe; but Hatred not.

And in this, that Anger re­gards particulars onely; the o­ther universalls also.

And in this, that Anger is cu­rable, Hatred not.

And in this, that Anger seekes the vexation, Hatred the dam­mage of ones Adversary.

That with Anger there is al­wayes joyned Griefe; with Ha­tred not alwayes.

[Page 81]That Anger may at length be satiated, but Hatred never.

Hence it appeares how the Iudge, or Auditor may be made Friend, or Enemy to us; and how our Adversary may be made ap­peare Friend or Enemy to the Iudge; and how we may answer to our Adversary, that would make us appeare Enemies to him.

CHAP. 6. Of Feare.

FEare is a trouble, or vexation of the minde, arising from the apprehension of an evill at hand, which may hurt or de­stroy.

Danger is the nearenesse of the evill feared.

The things to be Feared are

• [Page 82]Such as have power to hurt.
• And the signes of will to doe [...] us hurt, as Anger and Hatred of powerfull men.
• And Injustice joyned with power.
• And Valour provoked, joyned with power.
• And the feare of powerfull men.

The men that are to be fea­red are,

• Such as know our faults.
• And such as can doe us injury.
• And such as thinke they are injured by us.
• And such as have done us in­jury.
• And our Competitors in such things as cannot satisfie both.
• And such as are feared by more powerfull men then we are.
• And such as have destroyed greater men then we are.
• And such as use to invade their inferiors.

[Page 83]And men not passionate, but dissemblers and craftie are more to be feared then those that are hasty and free.

The things especially to be feared are

• Such, wherein if wee erre, the error can not be repaired; at least not according to ours, but our Adversaries pleasure.
• And such as admit either none, or not easie helpe.
• And such as being done, or a­bout to be done to others, make us pitty them.

They that feare not are,

• Such as expect not evill; or not now; or not this; or not from these.
• And therefore men feare little in prosperitie.
• And men feare little that think they have suffered already.

An Orator therefore that would put Feare in to the Audi­tor, [Page 84] must let him see that hee is ob [...]oxious; and that greater than he doe suffer, and have suffer'd from those, and at those times they least thought.

CHAP. 7. Of Assurance.

ASsurance is hope, arising from an imagination that the helpe is neare, or the evill a farre off.

The things therefore that beget Assurance are,

• The remotenesse of those things that are to be feared, and the nearenesse of their contra­ries.
• And the facility of great, or many helpes or remedies.
• And neither to have done; nor received Injury.
• [Page 85]And to have no Competitors, or not great ones; or if great ones, at least friends; such as we have obliged, or are obliged to.
• And that the danger is exten­ded to more, or greater than us.

Assured, or Confident are

• They that have oft escaped danger.
• And they to whom most things have succeeded well.
• And they that see their equals, or inferiors not afraid.
• And they that have where­with to make themselves feared, as wealth, strength, &c.
• And such as have done others no wrong.
• And such as thinke themselves in good termes with God-Al­mighty.
• And such as thinke they will speede well, that are gone be­fore.

CHAP. 8. Of Shame.

SHame is a perturbation of the Minde arising from the ap­prehension of Evill, past, present, or to come, to the prejudice of a Mans owne, or his friends repu­tation.

The things therefore which men are ashamed of are those Actions which proceede from Vice, as

• To throw away ones armes; to run away, signes of Cowardli­nesse.
• To deny that which is com­mitted to ones trust, a signe of Injustice.
• To have lyen with whom, where, and when we ought not, signes of Intemperance.
• To make gaine of small and [Page 87] base things; not to helpe with money whom, and how much we ought; to receive help from meaner men; to aske mony at use from such as one thinkes will borrow of him; to borrow of him that expects payment of somewhat before lent; and to redemand what one has lent, of him that one thinkes will bor­row more; and so to praise, as one may bee thought to aske, signes of Wretchednesse.
• To praise one to his face; to praise his vertues too much, and colour his vices; signes of Flat­tery.
• To be vnable to indure such labours, as men indure, that are elder, tenderer, greater in quali­ty, and of lesse strength then hee, signes of Effeminacy.
• To be beholden often to ano­ther; and to upbraid those that are beholden to him, signes of Pusillanimity.
• [Page 88]To speake and promise much of ones selfe; and to assume [...]o ones sel [...]e more then his due, signes of Arrogance.
• To want tho [...]e things which ones Equalls, all, or most of them have attained to, is also a thing to be ashamed of.
• And to su [...]fer things ignomini­ous, as to serve about anothers person; or to be imployed in his base actions.

In Actions of In [...]mperance, whether willingly, or unwil­lingly committed, there is shame: in Actions of Force; onely when they are done unwillingly.

The men before whom we are ashamed, are such as wee respect, namely,

• Those that admire us.
• And those whom wee desire should admire us.
• And those whom we admire.
• Those that contend with [...]s for honour.
• [Page 89]Those whose opinion we con­temne not.

And therefore men are most ashamed in the pre [...]ence

• Of Old and well bred men.
• Of those wee are alwayes to live with.
• Of those that [...]e not guilty of the same fault.
• Of th [...]se that doe not easily pardon.
• And of those that are apt to reveale our faults [...] such as are [...]n injured, Ba [...]biters, Scof­f [...]rs, Comick Poets.
• And of those before whom we have had alwayes good suc­cesse.
• And of those who never asked any thing of us before
• And of such as desire our Friendship.
• And of our familiars, that know none of our Crimes.
• And of such as will reveale [Page 90] our faults to any of those that are named before.

But in the presence of such, whose judgement most men de­spise, men are not ashamed.

Therefore we are ashamed also in the presence

• Of those whom we reverence,
• And of those who are concer­ned in our owne, or Ancestors, or Kinsfolkes actions or misfor­tunes, if they be shamefull.
• And of their Rivalls.
• And of those that are to live with them that know their dis­grace.

The Common Opinions con­cerning Impudence are taken from the contrary of these.

CHAP. 9. Of Grace, or Favour.

GRace, is that Vertue, by which a man is said to doe a good turne, or doe service to a man in neede; not for his owne, but for his cause to whom hee does it.

Great Grace is when the neede is great; or when they are hard, or difficult things that are con­ferr'd [...] or when the time is seaso­nable, or when he that conferr's the favour is the onely, or first man that did it.

Neede, is a desire joyned with griefe for the absence of the thing desired.

Grace therefore it is not, if it be not done to one that needs.

Whosoever therefore would prove that hee has done a Grace, [Page 92] or Favour, must shew that hee needed it to whom it was done.

Grace it is not

Which is done by Chance

Nor which is done by Ne­cessity.

Nor which has beene requi­ [...]ed.

Nor that which is done to ones Enemy.

Nor that which is a trifle.

Nor that which is naught, if the Giver know the fault.

And in this manner a man may goe over the Praedicaments, and examine a benefit, whether it be a Grace for being This, or for be­ing so Much, or for being Such, or for being Now, &c.

CHAP. 10. Of Pitty, or Compassion.

PItty is a perturbation of the mind, arising from the appre­hension of [...]urt, or trouble to a­nother that doth not deserve it, and which he thinkes may hap­pen to himselfe or his.

And because it appertaines to Pitty to thinke that he, or his may fall into the mi [...]ery he pit­ties in others, it followes that they be most compassionate

Who have passed through Misery.

And old Men.

And Weake men.

And Timorous men.

And learned men.

And such as have Parents, wife and children.

And such as thinke there bee honest men.

[Page 94]And that they are lesse Com­passionate

Who are in great despaire.

Who are in great prosperity.

And they that are Angry, for they consider not.

And they that are very Confi­dent; for they also consider not.

And they that are in the Act of contumely; for neither doe these consider.

And they that are astonished with feare.

And they that thinke no man honest.

The things to be pittied are

• Such as grieve, and withall hurt.
• Such as destroy.
• And Calamities of fortune, if they be great; as none, or few friends, deformity, weakenesse, lamenesse, &c.
• And Evill that arrives where good is expected.
• [Page 95]And after extreme Evill, a lit­tle Good.
• And through a mans life to have no good offer it selfe, or being offer'd, not to have beene able to enjoy it.

Men to be pittied are

• Such as are knowne to us, un­lesse they be so neare to us, as their hurt be our owne.
• And such as be of our owne yeares.
• Such as are like us in manners.
• Such as are of the same, or like stocke.

And our Equalls in dignity.

Those that have lately suf­fer'd, or are shortly to suffer in­jury: and those that have the markes of injury past.

And those that have the words or actions of them that be in present misery.

CHAP. II. Of Indignation.

OPposite in a manner to Pitty in good men, is Indignation, which is griefe for the prosperi­ty of a man unworthy.

With Indignation there is alwayes joyned a joy for the prosperity of a man worthy, as Pitty is alwayes with content­ment in the adversitie of them, that deserve it.

In wicked men the opposite of Pitty is

Envy; as also the companion thereof, delight in the harme of others, which the Greekes in one word have called [...]. But of these in the next Chapter.

Men conceive Indignation a­gainst others, not for their ver­tues, as Iustice, &c. For these [Page 97] make men worthy; and in Indig­nation wee thinke men unwor­thy.

But for those goods which men indued with vertue, and noble men, and hansome men are wor­thy of.

And for newly gotten power & riches, rather than for antient, and especially if by these he has gotten other goods, as by Riches, Command. The reason why we conceive greater Indignation a­gainst new then antient Riches, is, that the former seeme to pos­sesse that which is none of theirs, but the antient seeme to have but their owne. For with com­mon people, to have beene so long, is to be so by Right.

And for the bestowing of goods incongruously: as when the armes of the most valiant A­chilles, were bestowed upon the most eloquent Vlysses.

[Page 98]And for the comparison of the Inferiour with the Superiour; whether superiour in the same thing, as when one Valiant is compared with a more Valiant; or whether absolutely Superi­our, as when a good Scholler is compared with a good Man.

Apt to Indignation are,

• They that thinke themselves worthy of the greatest goods, and doe possesse them.
• And They that are good.
• And they that are ambitious.
• And such as thinke themselves deserve better what another pos­sesseth, then he that hath it.

Least apt to Indignation are

• Such as are of a poore, servile, and not ambitious Nature.
• Who they are, that Rejoyce, or Grieve not at the Adversity of him that suffers worthily, and in what occasions, may be ga­thered from the contrary of [Page 99] what has beene already said.
• Whosoever therefore would turne away the compassion of the Iudge, he must make him apt to Indignation; and shew that his adversary is unworthy of the Good, and worthy of the Evill, which happens to him.

CHAP. 12. Of Envy.

ENvy is griefe, for the pros­perity of such as our selves, arising not from any hurt, that we, but from the good that they receive.

Such as our selves I call those, that are equall to us in blood, in age, in abilities, in glory, or in meanes.

They are apt to Envy,

• That are within a little of the highest.
• [Page 100]And those that are extraordi­narily honoured for some quali­ty that is singular in them, espe­cially Wisdome or good For­tune.
• And such as would be thought Wise.
• And such as catch at glory in euery action.

And men of poore spirits: for every thing appeares great to them.

The things which men envy in others are,

• Such as bring glory.
• And goods of fortune.
• And such things as we desire for our selves.
• And things in the possession whereof wee ex [...]eed others, or they us a little.

Obnoxious to Envy are,

• Men of our owne time, of our owne Country, of our owne age, and competitors of our glory.
• [Page 101]And therefore,
• Those whom we strive with for honour.
• And those that covet the same things that we doe.
• And those that get quickely, what we hardly obtaine, or not at all.
• And those that attaine unto, or doe the things that turne to our reproach, not being done by us.
• And those that possesse what we have possessed heretofore. So Old and decayed Men Envy the young and lusty.
• And those that have bestow­ed little, are subject to be envied by such, as have bestowed much upon the same thing.

From the contraries of these may be derived the Principles concerning Ioy for other mens hurt.

He therefore that would not have his Enemy prevaile, when [Page 102] he craves pitty, or other favour; must dispose the Iudge to Envy; and make his Adversary appeare such, as are above described, to be subject to the Envy of o­thers.

CHAP. 13. Of Emulation.

EMulation is griefe arising from that our Equals possesse such goods as are had in honour, and whereof we are capable, but have them not; not because they have them, but because not wee also.

No man therefore Emulates another in things whereof him­selfe is not capable.

Apt to Emulate are,

• Such as esteeme themselves worthy of more good then they have.
• [Page 103]And Young and Magnanimous men.
• And such as already possesse the goods for which men are ho­noured: for they measure their worth by their having.
• And those that are esteemed worthy by others.
• And those whose ancestors, kindred, familiars, Nation, City, have beene eminent for some good, do Emulate others for that good.

Objects of Emulation are, for things,

• Vertues.
• And things whereby we may profit others.
• And things whereby we may please others.

For Persons,

• They that possesse such things.
• And such as many desire to be friends, or acquainted with, or like unto.
• [Page 104]And they whose praises flye abroad.

The contrary of Emulation is Contempt.

And they that Emulate such as have the goods afore mentioned, Contemne such as have them not: and thence it is, that men who live happily enough, unlesse they have the goods which men ho­nour, are neverthelesse Contem­ned.

CHAP. 14. Of the Manners of Youth.

OF Passions we have already spoken. Wee are next to speake of Manners.

Ma [...]ners are distinguished by mens Passions, Habits, Ages, and Fortunes.

What kind of Manners pro­ceed [Page 105] from Passions, and from Ver­tues & Vices, (which are Habits,) hath beene already shewed.

There remaines to be spoken of the Manners, that are peculiar to severall Ages and Fortunes.

The Ages are Youth, Middle-Age, Old Age.

And first of Youth.

Young men are,

• Violent in their desires.
• Prompt to execute their de­sires.
• Incontinent.
• Inconstant, easily forsaking what they desired before.
• Longing mightily, and soone satisfied.
• Apt to Anger, and in their An­ger Violent, and ready to exe­cute their Anger with their hands.
• Lovers of Honor, and of Victo­ry more then Money, as having not beene yet in Want.
• [Page 106]Well-natured, as having not beene acquainted with much malice.
• Full of Hope, both because they have not yet beene often frustrated, and because they have by naturall heat that disposition that other Ages have by Wine; Youth being a kind of naturall drunkennesse. Besides, Hope is of the time to come, whereof Youth hath much, but of the time past little.
• Credulous, because not yet often deceived.
• Easily deceived, because full of Hope.
• Valiant, because apt to Anger, and full of Hope; whereof this begets confidence, the other keepes off Feare.
• Bashfull, because they esti­mate the Honor of Actions by the precepts of the Law.
• Magnanimous, because not [Page 107] yet dejected by the misfortunes of humane life.
• And lovers of Honor more than of Profit, because they live more by Custome than by Reason, and by Reason wee ac­quire Profit, but Vertue by Custome.
• Lovers of their Friends and Companions.
• Apt to erre in the Excesse, ra­ther then the defect, contrary to that precept of Chilon, Ne quid nimis; for they overdoe every thing: they Love too much, and Hate too much, because thinking themselves wise, they are obsti­nate in the opinion they have once delivered.
• Doers of Injury rather for Contumely then for dammage.
• Mercifull, because measuring others by their owne Innocence, they thinke them better than they be, and therefore lesse to [Page 108] merit what they suffer; which is a cause of Pitty.
• And Lovers of Mirth, and by consequence love to jest at o­thers.

Iesting is witty Contumely.

CHAP. 15. Of the Manners of Old Men.

THe Manners of Old men are in a manner the contra­ries of those of Youth.

They determine nothing: they doe every thing lesse vehement­ly then is fit: they never say they know; but to every thing they say perhaps and peradventure; which comes to passe from that having lived long, they have of­ten mistaken and beene decei­ved.

They are peevish because [Page 109] they interpret every thing to the worst.

And suspicious through In­credulity, and Incredulous by reason of their Experi­ence.

They Love and Hate, as if they meant to continue in nei­ther.

Are of poore spirits, as having beene humbled by the chances of life.

And Covetous, as knowing how easie 'tis to lose, and hard to get.

And Timorous, as having been cooled by yeares.

And greedy of life: for good things seeme greater by the want of them.

And Lovers of themselves out of Pusillanimity.

And seeke Profit more than Honor, because they love them­selves; and Profit is among the [Page 110] goods that are not simply good, but good for ones selfe.

And without bashfulnesse, be­cause they despise seeming.

And hope little; knowing by Experience that many times good Counsell has beene fol­lowed with ill event, and because also they be timorous.

[...]nd live by Memory rather than Hope; for Memory is of the time past, whereof Old men have good store.

And are full of Talke, because they delight in their Memory.

And Vehement in their An­ger; but not stout enough to exe­cute it.

They have weake, or no de­sires, and thence seeme Tem­perate.

They are slaves to Gaine.

And live more by reason than Custome; because Reason leads to Profit, as Custome to that [Page 111] which is Honorable.

And doe Injury to indammage, and not in Contumely.

And are mercifull by Com­passion, or imagination of the same Evills in themselves; which is a kinde of Infirmity, and not Humanity, as in Young men, pro­ceeding from a good opinion of those that suffer Evill.

And full of complaint, as thinking themselves not farre from evill, because of their In­firmity.

Seeing then every man loves such men, and their discourses, which are most agreeable to their owne Manners; 'tis not hard to collect, how the Orator, and his Oration may be made acceptable to the Hearer, whe­ther Young, or Old.

CHAP. 16. Of the Manners of middle aged men.

THe Manners of Middle aged men, are hetweene those of Youth, and Old men: and there­fore,

They neither dare; nor feare too much: but both as is fit.

They neither beleeve all; nor reject all; but judge.

They seeke not onely what is Honorable, nor only what is Pro­fitable; but both.

They are neither Covetous, nor Prodigall; but in the meane.

They are neither easily An­gry; nor yet stupid: but betweene both.

They are Valiant, and with all Temperate.

And in generall, whatsoever is [Page 113] divided in Youth, and Old men, is compounded in Middle-age.

And whereof the Excesse, or Defect is in Young or Old men; the Mediocrity is in those of Middle age.

Middle age for the Body I call the time from thirty to five and thirty yeares: for the Mind the nine and fortieth, or there a­bouts.

CHAP. 17. Of the Manners of the Nobility.

OF Manners that proceede from the severall Ages wee have already spoken.

Wee are next to speake of those that rise from severall For­tunes.

The Manners of the Nobili­ty are

• [Page 114]To be Ambitious.
• To undervalue their Ancestors Equalls. For the goods of For­tune seeme the more precious for their Antiquity.
• Nobility is the Vertue of a Stock.
• And Generosity, is not to dege­nerate from the vertue of his Stock.

For as in Plants; so in the Ra­ces of Men, there is a certaine progresse; and they grow better and better to a certaine point; then change, viz. [...]ubtle wits in­to Madnesse; and stayed wits into Stupidity and Blockishnesse.

CHAP. 18. Of the Manners of the Rich.

RIch men are Contumelious and Proud. This they have [Page 115] from their Riches. For seeing e­very thing may bee had for Mo­ny, having Mony, they thinke they have all, that is good.

And Effeminate; because they have wherewithall to submini­ster to their Lust.

And Boafters of their Wealth: and speak in high termes foolish­ly. For men willingly talke of what they love and admire; and thinke others affect the same that they doe: and the truth is all sorts of men submit to the Rich.

And thinke themselves wor­thy to command, having that, by which men attaine Com­mand.

And in generall they have the Manners of Fortunate Fooles.

They doe Injury with inten­tion not to hurt, but to disgrace; and partly also through Inconti­nence.

There is a difference betweene [Page 116] New and Antient Riches: for they that are newly come to Wealth have the same faults in a greater degree: for new Riches are a kind of rudenesse and ap­prentiship of Riches.

CHAP. 19. Of the Manners of Men in Power and of such as prosper.

THe Manners of Men in Pow­er, are the same, or better then those of the Rich.

They have a greater sense of Honor then the Rich; and their Manners are more Manly.

They are more Industrious then the Rich: for Power is su­stained by Industry.

They are Grave, but with­out Austerenesse: for being in place conspicuous, they carry [Page 117] themselves the more Modestly; and have a kind of gentle and comely Gravity, which the Greekes call [...].

When they doe Injuries, they doe great ones.

The Manners of Men that prosper, are compounded of the Manners of the Nobility, the Rich, and those that are in Power; for to some of these all Prosperi­ty appertaines.

Prosperity in Children, and goods of the Body, make men desire to exceede others in the goods of Fortune.

Men that Prosper have this ill, to be more proud, and Inconsi­derate then others.

And this good; that they wor­ship God; trusting in him, for that they finde themselves to re­ceive more good then proceeds from their owne Industry.

The Mann [...]rs of Poore men, [Page 118] Obscure men, Men with out Power, and Men in Adversity, may bee collected from the Contrary of what has beene said.

CHAP. 20. Common Places, or Principles concerning what May bee Done, what Has beene Done, and what Shall be Done; or of Fact Possible, Past a [...]d Future. Also of Great and Little.

VVEe have hitherto set downe such Principles as are peculiar to severall kindes of Orations.

Now we are to speake of such Places as are Common to them all as these, Possible, Done, or Past, Future, Great, Small.

Possible is that

• The Contrary whereof is Possible.
• [Page 119]And the like whereof is Pos­sible.
• And then which some harder thing is Possible.
• And the beginning whereof is Possible.
• And the end whereof is Pos­sible.
• And the usuall consequent whereof is Possible.
• And whatsoever we desire.
• And the beginning whereof is in the power of those, whom we can either compell or perswade.
• And part whereof is Possible.
• And part of the Whole that is Possible.
• The th [...] Generall if a Parti­cular.
• And a Particular if the Gene­rall.
• And of Relatives if one the o­ther.
• And that, which without Art and Industry is Possible, is much [Page 120] more so with Art and Industry.
• And that, which is Possible to Worse, Weaker and Vnskilful­ler, men, is much more so to Bet­ter, Stronger, and more Skillfull.

The Principles concerning Im­possible are the Contraries of these

That Has beene Done.

Then which a harder thing Has beene Done.

And the Consequent whereof Has beene Done.

And that, which being Possi­ble he had a will to, and nothing hindred.

And that, which was Possible to him in his Anger.

And that, which he longed to Doe.

And that, which was before upon the point of Doing.

And whose Antecedent Has beene Done; or that, for which it uses to be Done.

[Page 121]And if that, for whose cause we doe this, then This.

The Principles concerning Not done, are the Contraries of these.

That Shall be Done.

Which some man can, and meanes to Doe.

And which some man can, and desires to Doe.

And which is in the way, and upon the point to be Done.

And the Antecedents where­of are Past.

And the Motive whereof is past.

Of Great and Small, More and Lesse, see Chap. 7. Booke 1.

CHAP. 21. Of Example, Similitude, and Fa­bles.

OF the Principles both gene­rall, & speciall from whence [Page 122] Proofes are to bee drawne, has beene already spoken.

Now follow the Proofes themselves, which are Examples, or Enthymemes.

An Example is either an Ex­ample properly so called (as some Action past:) or a Simili­tude (which also is called a Para­ble:) or a Fable (which containes some Action fained.)

An Example properly so called is this, Darius came not into Greece, till he had first subdued AEgypt. Xerxes also conquered AEgypt first; then afterwards crossed the Hellespont. We ought therefore to hinder the King of Persia from conquering AEgypt.

A Similitude, or Parable, is such as followeth. They who choose their Magistrates by Lot, are like them that choose for their Cham­pions those on whom the Lot shall fall, rather then those, [Page 123] who have the greatest strength; and for their Pilot, not him that hath skill; but him whose name is drawne out of the Vrne.

A Fable is in this manner. The Horse desiring to drive out the Stagge from their common pa­sture, tooke a man to assist him; and having received into his mouth a bridle, and a rider upon his backe, obtained his intent, but became subject to the Man. So you of Himaera, having (in hope to be revenged of yonr Ene­mies) given unto Phalaris so­veraine authority, that is to say, taken a bridle into your mouthes; if you shall also give him a guard to his person, that is, let him get up upon your backes, you become his slaves presently past reco­very.

To finde out Examples, that is, Actions done that may serve our purpose, is therefore hard, be­cause [Page 124] not in our power.

But to find Fables and Simili­tudes, is easier; because by con­versing in Philosophy a man may faine somewhat in nature like to the case in hand.

Examples, Similitudes and Fa­bles, where Enthymemes are wanting, may serve us in the be­ginning of an Oration for Indu­ctions; otherwise are to be allea­ged after Enthymemes for Testi­monies.

CHAP. 22. Of a Sentence.

A Sentence is an universall Proposition concerning those things which are to be de­sired or avoided, in the Actions, or Passions of common life. As

A wise man will not suffer [Page 125] his Children to bee over-lear­ned.

And is to an Enthymeme in Rhetorique as any Proposition is to a Syllogisme in Logicke.

And therefore a Sentence, if the reason be rendred, becomes a Conclusion; and both together make an Enthymeme.

As for Example.

To bee overlearned, besides that it begets effeminacy, pro­cures envy. Therefore hee thats wise will not suffer his Children to be overlearned.

Of Sentences there be foure sorts.

For they either require Proofes, or not: that is, are manifest, or not.

Such as are manifest, are ei­ther so assoone as they are utte­red; as

Or as soone as they are con­sidered; [Page 126] as ‘Men use to hate, whom they have [...]urt.’

Such as are not manifest are either Conclusions of Enthy­memes; as ‘He thats wise, will not suffer his Children, &c.’

Or else are Enthymematicall; that is, have in themselves the force of an Enthymeme; as ‘Mortall men ought not to carry immortall anger.’

A Sentence not Manifest ought to be either Inferr'd, or Con­firm'd.

Inferr'd thus.

Confirm'd thus.

If a reason be added to a ma­nifest Sentence, let it be short.

Sentences become not every man; but onely Old men, and such as be well versed in busi­nesse. For to heare a young man speake Sentences, is ridiculous; and to heare an ignorant man speake Sentences is absurd.

Sentences generally received, when they are for our purpose, ought not to be neglected, be­cause they passe for truthes. And yet they may be denyed, when any laudable custome, or humour may thereby be made appeare in the Denier.

The commodities of Sentences are two.

• One proceeding from the va­nity of the Hearer, who takes [Page 128] for true universally affirmed, that which he has found for true onely in some particular; and therefore a man ought to consi­der in every thing what opinion the Hearer holds.
• Another is, that Sentences doe discover the manners and dispo­sition of the speakers, so that if they be esteemed good Senten­ces he shall be esteemed a good man; and if evill, an evill man.

Thus much of Sentences; what they be; of how many sorts; how to be used; whom they be­come; and what is their profit.

CHAP. 23. Of the invention of Enthy­memes.

SEeing an Enthymeme differs from a Logicall Syllogisme, in [Page 129] that it neither concludes out of every thing, nor out of remote Principles; the Places of it, from whence a man may argue ought to be certaine, and determinate.

And because whosoever makes a Syllogisme Rhetoricall, or other, should know all, or the most part of that which is in his question; as whosoever is to advise the A­thenians in the question, whether they are to make warre or no, must know what their revenues be; what, and what kinde of power they have: and hee that will praise them, much know their actes at Salamis, Marathon, &c. it will be necessary for a good speaker to have in readinesse the choicest particulars of whatsoe­ver he foresees hee may speake of

He that is to speake extem­pore, must comprehend in his speech as much as hee can of [Page 130] what is most proper in the mat­ter in hand.

Proper I call those things which are least common to others; as, He that will praise Achilles, is not to declare such things as are common both to him and Dio­medes; as that he was a Prince, and warred against the Trojans; but such things as are proper on­ly to Achilles; as that he killed Hector and Cygnus; went to the warre young, and voluntary.

Let this therefore be one ge­nerall Place, From that which is Proper.

CHAP. 24. Of the Places of Enthymemes Ostensive.

FOrasmuch as Enthymemes ei­ther inferre truely, or seeme [Page 131] onely so to doe; and they which doe inferre indeed, bee either Ostensive; or such as bring a man to some impossibility; wee will first set downe the Places of En­thymemes Ostensive.

An Ostensive Enthymeme is, wherein a man concludes the question from somewhat gran­ted.

That Enthymeme which brings a man to an impossibility is an En­thymeme wherein from that which the Adversary maintain­eth, wee conclude that which is manifestly impossible.

All Places have beene already set downe in a manner in the pre­cedent Propositions of Good, E­vill, Iust, Vnjust, Honorable and Dishonorable: namely they have beene set downe as applied to particular Subjects, or in Con­crete.

Here they are to be set downe [Page 132] in another manner; namely in the Abstract, or Vniversall.

The first Place then let be from Contraries, which in the Concrete or Particulars is exemplified thus. If Intemperance be hurtfull, Temperance is profitable: and if Intemperance be not hurtfull; n [...]i­ther is Temperance profitable.

Another Place may bee from Cognomination or affinity of words: as in this Particular. If what is Iust be Good; then what is Iustly is well: but Iustly to die is not well: therefore not all that is Iust is Good.

A third from Relatives; as This man has Iustly Done, there [...]ore the other has Iustly suffered. But this Place sometimes deceives: for a man may suffer justly yet not from him.

A fourth from Comparison, three wayes.

From the Greater to the Lesse; [Page 133] as, He has stricken his father; and therefore this man.

From the Lesse to the Greater: as, The Gods know not all things; much lesse man.

From Equality: as, If Cap­taines be not alwayes the worse e­steemed for losing a victory; why should Sophisters?

Another from the Time: as, Philip to the Thebans: If I had required to passe through your Country with my Army before I had ayded you against the Phocae­ans, there is no doubt but you would have promised it me. It is absurd therefore to deny it me now after I have trusted you.

A Sixth from what the Adver­sary sayes of himselfe: as, I phicra­tes asked Aristophon, whether he would take a bribe to betray the Army: and he answering no; What (sayes he) is it likely that Iphicra­tes would betray the Army; and Aristophon not?

[Page 134]This Place would be ridiculous, where the Defendant were not in much more estimation then the Accuser.

A seventh from the Definition; as that of Socrates; A Spirit is ei­ther God, or the Creature of God: and therefore hee denies not that there is a God, that confesses there are Spirits.

An eighth from the distinction of an ambiguous word.

A ninth from Division: as, If all men do what they doe for one of three causes, whereof two are im­possible; and the Accuser charge not the Defendant with the third; it followes that hee has not done it.

A tenth from Induction: as, at Athens, at Thebes, at Sparta, &c. and therefore every where.

An eleventh from Authority, or precedent sentence, as that of Sappho that Death is evill, for that [Page 135] the Gods have judged it so, in ex­empting themselves from morta­lity.

A twelfth from the Conse­quence: as, 'Tis not good to be en­vied; Therefore neither to be lear­ned. 'Tis good to be wise; therefore also to be instructed.

A thirteenth from two contra­ry Consequences; as, 'Tis not good to be an Orator, because if he speake the truth, he shall displease men: if he speak falsely, he shall displease God.

Here is to be noted that some­times this argument may be re­torted: as thus, If you speake truth you shall please God; if you speake untruth you shall please men; therefore by all meanes be an Ora­tor.

A foureteenth from the quality that men have to praise one thing, and approve another: as, We ought not to warre against the Atheni­ans [Page 136] upon no precedent injury; for all men discommend injustice. Againe, We ought to warre against the Athenians; for otherwise our Liberty is at their mercy, that is, is no liberty: but the preservation of liberty is a thing that all men will approve.

A fifteenth from Proportion: as, seeing we naturalize strangers for their vertues, why should wee not banish this stranger for his vices?

A sixteenth from the similitude of Consequents: as, He that denies the immortality of the Gods, is no worse then he that has written the generation of the Gods. For the same Consequence followes of both, that sometimes there are none.

A seventeenth from that, that men change their minde: as, If when we were in banishment, wee fought to recover our [...]ountry, why should wee not sight now to retaine it?

[Page 137]An eighteenth from a fayned end: as, that Diomedes chose Vlysses to goe with him, not as more valliant then another; but as one that would partake lesse of the glory.

A nineteenth from the Cause: as if hee would inferre hee did it from this, that hee had Cause to doe it.

A twentieth from that which is Incredible, but True: as, that Lawes may neede a Law to mend them; as well as Fish bred in the salt water, may neede salting.

CHAP. 25. Of the Places of Emthymemes that lead to Impossibility.

LEt the first Place be from in­spection of Times, Actions, or Words, either of the Adversary, [Page 138] or of the speaker, or Both. Of the Adversarie; as, Hee sayes hee loves the People, and yet he was in the conspiracy of the Thirty. Of the speaker; as, He sayes I am contentious; and yet I never be­gan sute. Of Both; as, He never conferr'd any thing to the benefit of the Common-wealth, whereas I have ransomed divers Cittizens with my owne money.

A second from shewing the cause of that which seemed amisse, and serves for men of good re­putation that are accused; as, The Mother that was accused of Incest for being seene imbracing her Sonne, was absolved as soone as she made appeare; that shee imbraced him upon his arrivall from farre, by way of Saluta­tion.

A third, from rendring of the cause, as, Leodamas, to whom it was objected, that he had under [Page 139] the thirty Tyrants, defaced the Inscription (which the People had set up in a Pillar) of his Ig­nominy; answered, He had not done it; because it would have beene more to his commodity to let it stand; thereby to indeere him­selfe to the Tyrants, by the testi­mony of the Peoples hatred.

A fou [...]th from better Counsell; as, He might have done better for himselfe; therefore he did not this. But this Place deceives, when the better Counsell comes to minde after the Fact.

A fifth, from the Incompatibili­ty of the things to be done; as, they that did deliberate whether they should both mourne and sacrifice at the funerall of Leuco­thea, were told, that if they thought her a Goddesse, they ought not to mourne [...] and if they thought her a Mortall, they ought not to sacrifice.

[Page 140]A sixth (which is proper to Iudiciall Orations) from an In­ference of Error; as, if he did it not, he was not wise, therefore hee did it.

Enthymemes that leade to Im­possibility please more than Osten­sive: for they compare, and put contraries together, whereby they are the better set off, and more conspicuous to the Au­ditor.

Of all Enthymemes, they be best, which we assent to as soone as heare. For such consent plea­seth us; and makes us favoura­ble to the speaker.

CHAP. 26. Of the Places of seeming Enthy­memes.

OF seeming Enthymemes, one Place may be from the forme of speaking; as when a man has repeated divers Sentences, he brings in his conclusion, as if it follow'd necessarily, though it doe not.

A second from an ambiguous word.

A third from that which is true divided to that which is false joy­ned; as that of Orestes, It was justice that I should revenge my Fathers death; and it was justice my Mother should die for killing my Father, therefore I justly kil­led my Mother. Or from that which is true joyned to that which is false divided; as; one cup of [Page 142] Wine, and one cup of Wine, are hurtfull; therefore one cup of Wine is hurtfull.

A fourth from amplification of the Crime. For neither is the De­fendant likely to have commit­ted the Crime he amplifies; nor does the Accuser seeme, when he is Passionate, to want ground for his Accusation.

A fifth from signes; as, when a man concludes the doing of the Fact from the manner of his life.

A sixth from that which comes by Chance, as if from this that the Tyranny of Hipparchus came to be overthrowne from the love of Aristogeiton to Harmodi­us, a man should conclude, that in a free Common-wealth loving of Boyes were profitable.

A seventh from the Consequence, as, Banishment is to bee desired because a banisht man has choice [Page 143] of places to dwell in.

An eight from making that the cause which is not; as, In Demo­sthenes his governement, the war began; therefore Demosthenes governed well. With the Pelo­ponnesian warre beganne the Plague, therefore Pericles that perswaded that warre, did ill.

A ninth from the omission of some Circumstance, as, Helen did what was lawfull, when shee ran a­w [...]y with Paris, because shee had her Fathers consent to choose her owne Husband; which was true onely during the time that shee had not chosen.

A tenth from that which is pro­bable in some case, to that which is probable simply; as, Tis probable hee foresaw, that if hee did it hee should be suspected; therefore tis probable he did it not.

From this Place one may in­serre both wayes, that he did it [Page 144] not. For if he be not likely to doe it, it may be thought hee did it not: againe, if he were likely to doe it, it may be thought he did it not, for this, that he knew he should be suspected

Vpon this Place was grounded the Art, which was so much de­tested in Protagoras, of making the better cause seeme the worse; and the worse the bet­ter.

CHAP. 27. Of the wayes to answer the Argu­ments of the Adversary.

AN Argument is answered by an opposite Syllogisme, or by an Objection.

The Places of opposite Syllo­gismes, are the same with the Places of Syllogismes, or Enthy­memes: [Page 145] for a Rhetoricall Syllogisme is an Enthymeme.

The Places, of Objections are foure.

From the same, as, To the Ad­versary that proves Love to be good by an Enthymeme, may be objected, that no want is good, and yet love is want; or particularly thus; The Love of Myrrhato her Father was not good.

The second from Contraries; as, if the Adversary say A good man does good to his friends, an Objection might bee made that then, an evill man will doe also e­vill to his friends.

From Similitude, as thus, if the Adversary say all men that are injured, doe hate those that have injured them, it may be Ob­jected, that then, all men that had received benefits should love their benefactors, that is to say, be grate­full.

[Page 146]The fourth from the authority of famous men; as when a man shall say, that drunken men ought to be pardoned those acts they do in their drunkennesse, because they know not what they doe, the Objection may be, that Pitta­cus was of another mind, that ap­pointed for such acts a double pu­nishment; one for the Act, a [...]o­ther for the Drunkennesse.

And forasmuch as all Enthy­memes are drawne from Probabi­lity, or Example, or from a Signe fallible, or from a signe infallible: an Enthymeme from Probability, may be confuted Really, by shew­ing that for the most part it falls out otherwise: but Apparently or Sophistically, by shewing one­ly that it does not fall out so al­waies; whereupon the Iudge thinkes the Probability not suffi­cient to ground his sentence up­on.

[Page 147][The Reason whereof is this. That the Iudge, while hee heares the fact prooved Probable, conceives it as true. For the Vnderstanding has no Object but Truth. And there­fore by and by, when hee shall heare an Instance to the Contrary; and thereby find that hee had no necessity to thinke it true, presently chan­ges his opinion, and thinkes it false, and consequently not so much as Probable. For hee cannot at one time thinke the same thing both Probable and False: and hee that saies a thing is Probable, the meaning is, hee thinkes it True, but finds not arguments enough to prove it.]

An Enthymeme from a fallible signe, is answered, by shewing the signe to be fallible.

An Enthymeme from an Exam­ple, [Page 148] is a [...]swered, as an Enthy­meme from Probability; Really, by shewing more Examples to the contrary; Apparently, if hee bring Examples enough to make it seeme not necessary.

If the Adversary have more Ex [...]mples then wee, wee must make appeare, that they are not applicable to the Case.

An Enthymeme from an infal­lible signe, if the Proposition be true, is unanswerable.

CHAP. 28. Amplification and Extenuation are not Common Places. En­thymemes by which Argu­ments are answered, are the same with those by which the matter in question is proved, or dis­proved. Objections are not En­thymemes.

THe first, that Amplification and Extenuation are not Common Places, appeares by this, that Amplification, and Extenua­tion doe prove a fact to be great, or little; and are therefore En­thymemes, to be drawne from Common Places; and therefore are not the Places themselves.

The second, that Enthymemes, by which Arguments are answe­red, are of the same kind with those, by which the matter in [Page 150] question is proved, is manifest by this, that these inferre the op­posite, of what was proved by the other.

The third, that an Objection is no Enthymeme, is apparent by this, that an Objection is no more, but an Opin [...]on, [...]xample, or o­ther Instance, produced to make appeare, that the Adversaries Argument does not conclude.

Thus much of Examples, Sen­tences, Enthymemes, and gene­rally of all things, that belong to Argumentation; from what Places they may be drawne, or answered.

There remaines Elocution, and Disposition to be spoken of in the next Booke.

CHAP. I. Of the Originall of Elocution and Pronuntiation.

THree things being ne­cessary to an Oration, namely Proofe, Elocution and Disposition; we have done with the first, and shall speake of the other two in that which fol­lowes.

As for Action, or Pronuntia­tion, so much as is necessary for an Orator may bee fetcht out of the Booke of the Art of Poetry, in which wee have treated of the [Page 152] Action of the Stage.

For Tragaedians were the first that invented such Action, and that but of late; and it consisteth in governing well the Magnitude, Tone, and Measure of the Voice; a thing lesse subject to Art, then is either Proofe, or Elocution.

And yet there have beene Rules delivered concerning it, as farre forth as serves for Poe­try.

But Oratoricall Action has not beene hitherto reduced to Art.

And Orators in the beginning, when they saw that the Poets in barren and fayned Arguments, neverthelesse attained great Re­putation; supposing it had pro­ceeded from the choice, or con­nexion of words, fell into a Stile, by imitation of them, ap­proaching to Verse, and made choice of words.

[Page 153]But when the Poets changed their Stile, and laid by all words that were not in common use, the Orators did the same, and lighted at last upon words, and a government of the Voice and Measure proper to themselves.

Seeing therefore Pronuntiati­on, or Action are in some degree necessary also for an Orator, the Precepts thereof are to bee fetcht from the Art of Poetry.

[In the meane time this may be one generall Rule. If the Words, Tone, Greatnesse of the Voice, Gesture of the body and Countenance, seeme to proceede all from one Passi­on, then 'tis well pronounced: Otherwise not.

For when there appeare more passions then one at once, the minde of the spea­ker appeares unnaturall and distracted. Otherwise, as the [Page 154] minde of the speaker, so the minde of the Hearer al­wayes.]

CHAP. 2. Of the choise of Words and Epi­thets.

THe vertues of a Word are two; the first, that it be per­spicuous; the second, that it be decent; that is, neither above, nor below the thing signified; or neither too humble, nor too fine.

Perspicuous are all Words that be Proper.

Fine Words are those, that are borrowed or translated, from other significations; of which in the Art of Poetry.

The reason why borrowed Words please is this. Men are [Page 155] affected with Words, as they are with Men, admiring in both that which is forraigne and new.

To make a Poeme gracefull, many things helpe; but few an Oration.

For to a Poet it sufficeth with what Words he can, to set out his Poeme: but an Orator must not onely doe that; but also seeme not to doe it: for else hee will be thought to speake unnaturally, and not as he thinkes; and there­by be the lesse beleeved; where­as Beleefe is the scope of his Oration.

The Words that an Orator ought to use are of three sorts. Proper; Such as are Received, and Metaphors.

Words taken from forraigne languages, Words compounded; and Words new-coyned are sel­dome to be used.

Synonimaes belong to Poets, [Page 156] and Equivocall words to Sophi­sters.

An Orator, if hee use Proper words and Received, and good Me­taphors; shall both make his Oration beautifull, and not seeme to intend it; and shall speake per­spicuously. For in a Metaphor alone there is perspicuity, Nouity, and Sweetnesse.

Concerning Metaphors the Rules are these.

• 1. He that will make the best of a thing, let him draw his Me­taphor from somewhat that is better. As for Example, let him call a Cr [...]me, as Error. On the other side, when hee would make the worst of it, let him draw his Metaphor from some­what worse, as, calling Error, Crime.
• 2. A Metaphor ought not to be so farre fetcht, as that the Si­militude may not easily appeare.
• [Page 157]3. A Metaphor ought to bee drawne from the noblest things, as the Poets do, that choose ra­ther to say Rosy-finger'd; then Red-finger'd Aurora.

In like manner the Rule of Epithets is,

That hee that will adorne should use those of the better sort; and hee that will disgrace, should use those of the worse: as Simonides being to write an Ode in honour of the victory gotten in a Course by certaine Mules, being not well paid, called them by their name [ [...]] that sig­nifies their propinquity to Asses: but having received a greater reward, Stiles them the sonnes of swift footed Coursers.

CHAP. 3. Of the things that make an Orati­on Flat.

THe things that make an Ora­tion flat, or insipide, are foure.

• 1. Words Compounded; [and yet a Man may Compound a word, when the Composition is necessary, for want of a simple word; and easie, and [...]eldome used.]
• 2. Forraine words. As for ex­ample, such as are newly derived from the Latine; which though they were proper among them whose tongue it is, are forraine in another Language: and yet these may be used, so it be mo­derately.
• 3. Long impertinent, and o [...]ten Epithets.
• 4. Metaphors, indecent, and [Page 159] obscure. Obscure they are, when they are farre fetcht. In­decent when they are Ridiculous, as in Comoedies; or too Grave, as in Tragaedies.

CHAP. 4. Of a Similitnde.

A Similitude differs from a Metaphor onely by such Particles of Comparison, as these, As; Even as; So; Even so, &c.

A Similitude therefore is a Metaphor dilated; and a Meta­phor, is a Similitude contracted into one Word.

A Similitude does well in an Oration, so it be not too fre­quent; for 'tis Poeticall.

An example of a Similitude, is this of Pericles; that said in his Oration; that the Baeotians were [Page 160] like to so many Oakes in a Wood, that did nothing but beate one ano­ther.

Of the Purity of Language.

FOure things are necessary to make Language Pure.

• 1. The right rendring of those Particles which some antecedent Particle does require: As to a Not onely, a Not also; and then they are rendred right, when they are not suspended too long.
• 2 The use of Proper Words, ra­ther than Circumlocutions, un­lesse there be motive to make one doe it of purpose.
• 3. That there be nothing of double construction, unlesse there be cause to doe it of purpose. [Page 161] As the Prophets (of the Heathen) who speake in generall termes, to the end they may the better maintaine the truth of their Pro­phecies; which is easilier main­tained in generalls, than in parti­culars. For tis easier to divine, whether a number be even or odd, then how many; and that a thing will be, then when it will be.
• 4. Concordance of Gender, Number, and Person; as not to say Him for Her; Man for Men; Hath for Have.

In summe; a Mans Language ought to be easie for another to read, pronounce, and point.

Besides, to divers Antece­dents, let divers Relatives, or one Common to them all, be Cor­respondent: as, He saw the Co­lour; He heard the Sound; or hee perceived both Colour and Sound: but by no meanes, Hee heard, or saw both.

[Page 162]Lastly, that which is to be in­terposed by Pare [...]thesis, let it be done quickly: as, I purposed ha­ving spoken to him (to this, and this purpose) afterward to be gone. For to put it off thus; I resolved after I had spoken to him, to be gone, but the subject of my speech was to this and this purpose, is vitious.

CHAP. 6. Of the Amplitude and Tenuity of Language.

A Man shall adde Amplitude, or Dignity to his language, by such meanes as these.

• 1. By changing the Name with the Definition, as occasion shall serve. As, when the name shall be Indecent, by using the Definition; or Contrary.
• [Page 163]2 By Metaphors.
• 3. By using the Plurall Num­ber for the Singular.
• 4. By Privative Epithets.

CHAP. 7. Of the Convenien [...]e, or Decen­cie of Elocution.

ELocutions is made Decent,

• 1. By speaking Feelingly; that is with such Passion as is fit for the matter he is in; as Angerly in matter of Injury
• 2. By speaking as becomes the Person of the Speaker; as for a Gentleman to speake Eruditely.
• 3. By speaking Proportiona­bly to the matter; as of great af­faires to speake in a high, and of meine in a low stile.
• 4. By abstaining from Com­pounded, and from Out-landish words; unlesse a man speake Pas­sionately, [Page 164] and have already mo­ved, and as it were inebriated his Hearers. Or Ironically.

It conferres also to perswasion very much to use these ordinary formes of speaking, All men know; Tis confessed by all; No man will deny, and the like. For the Hearer consents, surpri­zed with the feare to be estee­med the onely Ignorant man [...]

Tis good also having used a word that signifies more than the matter requires, to ab­staine from the Pronuntiation and Countenance that to such a word belongs; that the Disproportion betweene it and the matt [...]r may the lesse ap­peare. And when a man has said too much, it will shew well to correct himselfe: For hee will get beleefe by seeming to consi­der what hee sayes.

[But in this a man must have [Page 165] a care not to be too precise in shewing of this Considera­tion. For the ostentation of Carefulnesse is an argument oftentimes of lying; as may bee observed in such as tell particularities not easily ob­served, when they would bee thought to speake more pre­cise truth then is required.]

CHAP. 8. Of two sorts of Stiles.

THere be two sorts of Stiles. The one continued or to bee comprehended at once; the other divided, or distinguished by Pe­riods.

The first sort was in use with ancient Writers; but is now out of date.

An example of this Stile is in [Page 166] the History of Herodotus; where­in there is no Period till the end of the whole History.

In the other kind of Stile, that is distinguished by Periods, a Pe­riod is such a Part as is perfect in it selfe; and has such length, as may easily be comprehended by the understanding.

This latter kind is pleasant; the former unpleasant, because this appeares finite, the o­ther infinite: in this the Hearer has alwayes somewhat set out, and terminated to him; in the other he foresees no end, and has nothing finished to him: this may easily be committed to memory, because of the measure and ca­dence (which is the cause that verses be easily remembred;) the other not.

Every sentence ought to end with the Period, and nothing to be interposed.

[Page 167]A Period is either simple, or di­vided into Parts.

Simple is that which is Indivi­sible; as, I wonder you feare not their ends, whose actions you imi­tate.

A Period divided, is that which not onely has perfection and length convenient for respirati­on, but also Parts. As, I wonder you are not afraid of their ends, see­ing you imitate their actions: where in these words, I wonder you are not afraid of their ends, is one Colon, or Part; and in these, Seeing you imitate their actions, another: and both together make the Period.

The Parts, or Members, and Periods of speech ought neither to be too long, nor too short.

Too long, are they, which are produced beyond the expectati­on of the Hearer.

Too short, are they that end [Page 168] before hee expects it.

Those that be too long, leave the Hearer behind, like him that walking, goes beyond the usuall end of the walke, and thereby outgoes him that walkes with him.

They that be too short, make the Hearer stumble; for when he lookes farre before him, the end stoppes him before he be a­ware.

A Period that is divided into Parts, is either divided only; or has also an opposition of the Parts one to another.

Divided onely is such as this; This the Senate knowes; the Con­sull sees; and yet the man lives.

A Period with opposition of Parts, called also Antithesis, and the parts Antitheta, is when con­trary Parts are put together; or also joyned by a third.

Contrary parts are put together, [Page 169] as here, The one has obtained glory, the other Riches; both by my bene­fit.

Antitheta are therefore accep­table; because not onely the Parts appeare the better for the opposi­tion; but also for that they carry with them a certaine appearance of that kind of Enthymeme, which leades to impossibility.

Parts, or Members of a Period are said to be equall, when they have altogether, or almost equall number of Syllables.

Parts or Members of a Period, are said to be like, when they be­gin, or end alike: and the more Similitudes, and the greater equa­lity there is of Syllables, the more gracefull is the Period.

CHAP. 9. Of those things that grace an Ora­tion, and make it delightfull.

FOrasmuch as there is nothing more delightfull to a man, then to finde that he apprehends and learnes easily; it necessari­ly followes, that those Words are most gratefull to the Eare, that make a man seeme to see be­fore his eies the thing signifi­ed.

And therefore forraine Words are unpleasant, because Obscure; and Plaine Words, because too Manifest, making us learne no­thing new: but Metaphors please; for they beget in us by the Genus or by some common thing to that with another, a kind of Science: as when an Old Man, is called Stubble; a man suddainely learnes [Page 171] that hee growes up, flourisheth and withers like Grasse, being put in minde of it by the quali­ties common to Stubble, and to Old men.

That which a Metaphor does, a Similitude does the same; but with lesse grace, because with more prolixity.

Such Enthymemes are the most graceful; which neither are pre­sently very Manifest, nor yet ve­rie hard to be understood; but are comprehended, while they are uttering, or presently after, though not understood be­fore.

The things that make a speech gracefull, are these; Antitheta, Metaphors, and Animation.

Of Antitheta, and Antithe­sis hath beene spoken in the pre­cedent Chapter.

Of Metaphors the most grace­full is that which is drawne from Proportion.

[Page 172][ Aristotle (in the 12. Chapter of his Poetry) defines a Me­taphor to be the translation of a name from one signification to another; whereof he makes foure kindes, 1. From the Generall to the Particular. 2. From the Particular to the Generall. 3. From one Par­ticular to another. 4. From Proportion.]

A Metaphor from Proportion is such as this, A State without Youth, is a Yeare without a Spring.

Animation is that expression which makes us seeme to see the thing before our eyes; as hee that said, The Athenians powred out their City into Sicily, mea­ning, they sent thither the grea­test Army they could make; and this is the greatest grace of an O­ration.

If therefore in the same Sen­tence [Page 173] there concurre both Meta­phor, and this Animation, and also Antithesis, it cannot choose but be very gracefull.

That an Oration is graced by Metaphor, Animation and Anti­thesis, hath beene said: but how tis graced, is to be said in the next Chapter.

CHAP. 10. In what manner an Oration is graced by the things aforesaid.

TIs graced by Animation, when the actions of living Creatures are attributed to things without life; as when the Sword is said to devoure.

Such Metaphors as these come into a Mans minde by the obser­vation of things that have simili­tude and proportion one to ano­ther. [Page 174] And the more unlike, and unproportionable the things be otherwise, the more grace hath the Metaphor.

A Metaphor without Anima­tion, adds grace then, when the Hearer finds hee learnes some­what by such use of the word.

Also Paradoxes are gracefull, so men inwardly doe beleeve them: for they have in them somewhat like to those jests that are grounded upon the simili­tude of words, which have usu­ally one sence, and in the present another; and somewhat like to those jests which are grounded upon the deceiving of a mans expectation.

And Paragrammes; that is, al­lusions of words are gracefull, if they be well placed; and in Pe­riods not too long; and with An­tithesis: for by these meanes the ambiguity is taken away.

[Page 175]And the more of these; name­ly, Metaphor, Animation, Anti­thesis, Equality of members a Pe­riod hath, the more gracefull it is.

Similitudes grace an Oration, when they containe also a Me­taphor.

And Proverbes are gracefull, because they are Metaphors or translations of words from one species to another.

And Hyperboles, because they also are Metaphors: but they are youthfull, and bewray vehe­mence; and are used with most grace by them that be angry; and for that cause are not come­ly in Old men.

CHAP. 11. Of the difference betweene the Stile to be used in Writing, and the Stile to be used in Pleading.

THe Stile that should be Read ought to be more exact and accurate.

But the Stile of a Pleader ought to be suited to Action and Pro­nuntiation.

Orations of them that Plead, passe away with the Hearing.

But those that are Written men carry about them; and are con­sidered at Leasure; and conse­quently must endure to be sifted and examined.

Written Orations appeare flat in Pleadi [...]g.

And Orations made for the Barre, when the Action is away, appeare in Reading insipide.

[Page 177]In Written Orations Repeti­tion is justly condemned.

But in Pleadings, by the helpe of Action and by some change in the Pleader, Repetition be­comes Amplification.

In Written Orations Disjun­ctives do ill; as, I came, I found him, I asked him: for they seeme superfluous, and but one thing, because they are not distinguish­ed by Action.

But in Pleadings 'tis Amplifi­cation [...] because that which is but one thing, is made to seeme ma­ny.

Of Pleadings that which is Iu­diciall ought to bee more accu­rate, then that which is before the people.

And an Oration to the People ought to be more accommodate to Action, then a Iudiciall.

And of Iudiciall Orations, that ought to bee more accurate, [Page 178] which is uttered to f [...]w Iudges; & that ought to be more accom­modate to Action, which is utte­red to Many. As in a Picture, the farther he stands off that beholds it, the lesse neede there is that the colours be fine: so in Orati­ons, the farther the Hearer stands off, the lesse neede there is for his Oration to be Elegant.

Therefore Demonstrative Ora­tions, are most proper for writing, the end whereof is to be Read.

CHAP. 12. Of the Parts of an Oration, and their Order.

THe necessary Parts of an Ora­tion are but two; Proposition, and Proofe: which are as it were the Probleme, and Demonstra­tion.

[Page 179]The Proposition is the explica­tion, or opening of the Matter to be Proved.

And Proofe is the Demonstrati­on of the Matter Propounded.

To these necessary Parts, are sometimes added two other; the Proeme, and the Epilogue, nei­ther of which are any Proofe.

So that in summe there bee foure Parts of an Oration; the Proeme, the Proposition, or (as o­thers call it) the Narration; the Proofes (which containe Confir­mation, Confutation, Amplifica­tion, and Diminution;) and the Epilogue.

CHAP. 13. Of the Proeme.

THe Proeme is the Beginning of an Oration, and as it were [Page 180] the preparing of the way before one enter into it.

In some kinds of Orations it re­sembles the Prelude of Musitians, who first Play what they list, and afterwards the [...]une they in­tended.

In other kinds it resembles the Prologue of a Play, that con­taines the Argument.

Proemes of the first sort, are most proper for Demonstrative Orations; in which a Man is free to foretell, or not, what Points he will insist upon; and for the most part 'tis better not [...] because when a man has not obliged himselfe to a certaine matter, Di­gression will seeme Variety: but if he have ingaged himselfe, Vari­ety will be accounted Digression.

In Demoustratives the matter of the Proeme consisteth in the Praise or Dispraise of some Law or Custome, or in Exhortation, or [Page 181] Dehortation; or in something that serves to incline the Hearer to the purpose

Proemes of the second kind are most proper for Iudiciall Orati­ons. For as the Prologue in a Dra­matique, and the Exordium in an Epique Poeme, setteth first in few words the Argument of the Po­eme: so in a Iudiciall Oration, the Orator ought to exhibit a Modell of his Oration, that the mind of the Hearer may not bee suspended, and for want of fore­sight erre or wander.

Whatsoever else belongs to a Proeme, is drawne from one of these foure. From the Speaker. From the Adversary. From the Hearer, Or from the Matter.

From the speaker and Adversa­ry are drawne into Proemes such Criminations and Purgations as belong not to the cause.

To the Defendant 'tis necessa­ry [Page 182] in the Proeme to answer to the accusations of his Adversary; that those being cleared, he may have a more favourable entrance to the rest of his Oration.

But to the Plaintife 'tis better to cast his Criminations all into the Epilogue, that the Iudge may the more easily remember them.

From the Hearer and from the Matter are drawne into the Pro­eme such things, as serve to make the Hearer favourable, or angry; attentive, or not attentive, as neede shall require.

And Hearers use to bee atten­tive to Persons that are reputed good; to things that are of great Consequence, or that concerne themselves, or that are strange, or that delight.

But to make the Hearer atten­tive, is not the part of the Proeme onely, but of any other part of [Page 183] the Oration, & rather of any other Part, then of the Proeme. For the Hearer is every where more re­misse then in the beginning. And therefore wheresoever there is neede, the Orator must make ap­peare both the probitie of his owne person, and that the matter in hand is of great consequence; or that it concernes the Hearer; or that it is new; or that it is delight­full.

He that will have the Hearer attentive to Him, but not to the Cause, must on the other side make it seeme that the matter is a trifle, without relation to the Hearer, common, and tedious.

That the Hearer may bee fa­vourable to the Speaker, one of two things is required; that he love him, or that he pitty him.

In Demonstrative Orations, hee that Praises, shall have the Hearer favourable, if he thinke himselfe [Page 184] or his owne manners, or course of life, or any thing hee loves, comprehended in the same Praise.

On the contrary, he that dis­praises, shall be heard favourably, if the Hearer find his enemies, or their courses, or any thing he hates involv'd in the same dispraise.

The Proeme of a Deliberative Oration is taken from the same things, from which are taken the Proemes of Iudiciall Orations. For the matter of a Delib [...]rative Oration needeth not that naturall Pro [...]me, by which is shewen what wee are to speake of; for that is already known: the Pro­eme in these, being made onely for the Speakers, or Adversaries sake; or to make the Matter ap­peare great, or little, as one would have it, and is therefore to be taken from the Persons of the Plaintife or Defendant; or [Page 185] from the Hearer, or from the Matter, as in Orations Iudiciall.

CHAP. 14. Places of Crimination and Pur­gation.

1. ONe is from the remo [...]vall of ill opinion in the Hea­rer, imprinted in him by the Ad­versary, or otherwise.

2. Another from this, That the thing done is not hurtfull, or not to him, or not so much, or not unjust, or not great, or not disho­norable.

3. A third from the Recom­pence; as, I did him harme, but withall I did him honor.

4. A fourth from the Excuse; as, It was Error, Mischance, or Constraint.

5. A fift from the Intention; [Page 186] as, One thing was done, another meant.

6. A sixth, from the Compre­hension of the Accuser; as, What I have done, the Accuser has done the same; or his, Father, Kinsman, or Friend.

7. From the Comprehension of those that are in Reputation; as, What I did, such, and such have done the same, who neverthelesse, are good men.

8. From Comparison with such as have beene fasly accused, or wrongfully suspected, and ne­verthelesse found upright.

9. From Recrimination; as, The Accuser is a man if ill life, and therefore not to be beleeved.

10. From that the Iudgement belongs to another Place, or Time; as, I have already answered, or am to answer elsewhere to this Mat­ter.

11. From Crimination of the [Page 187] Crimination; as, It serves onely to pervert Iudgement.

12. A twelfth, which is com­mon both to Crimination and Purgation; and is taken from some signe; as Teucer is not to be be­leeved because his Mother was Priam's sister. On the other side. Teucer is to be beleeved, because his Father was Priam's enemy.

13. A thirteenth, proper to Crimination onely, from Praise and Dispraise mixt; as, To praise small things, and blame great ones; or to praise in many words, and blame with effectuall ones; or to p [...]aise many things that are good, and then adde one evill, but a great one.

14. A fourteenth, common both to Crimination and Purga­tion, is taken from the interpre­tation of the fact: for he that pur­geth himselfe interpreteth the fact alwaies in the best sense, and he [Page 188] that Criminates, alwaies in the worst; as when Vlysses said Dy­omedes chose him for his compani­on, as the most able of the Greci­ans, to aid him in his exploit: but his Adversary said, He chose him for his cowardize, as the most un­likely to share with him in the Ho­nour.

CHAP. 15. Of the Narration.

THe Narration is not alwaies continued and of one Peece; but sometimes, as in Demonstra­tives, interrupted, and dispersed through the whole Oration.

For there being in an a Narra­tion something that fals not un­der Art; as namely the Actions themselves, which the Orator in­venteth not; hee must therefore [Page 189] bring in the Narration of them, where he best may. As for ex­ample, If being to praise a Man, you would make a Narration of all his Acts immediately from the beginning, and without in­terruption, you will finde it ne­cessary afterwards to repeate the same Acts againe, while from some of them you praise his Va­lour, and from others his Wis­dome; whereby your Oration shall have lesse variety, and shall lesse please.

Tis not necessary alwaies that the Narration be short. The true measure of it must be taken from the matter that is to be laid open.

In the Narration, as oft as may be, tis good to insert somewhat commendable in ones selfe, and blameable in ones Adversary: As I advised him, but hee would take no Counsell.

[Page 190]In Narrations, a man is to leave out whatsoever breeds compassi­on, or indignation in the Hearer besides the purpose; as Vlysses in Homer, relating his Travels to Alcinous, to move compassion in him, is so long in it, that it consists of divers bookes: but when he comes home, tells the same to his wife in thirty Verses, leaving out what might make her sad.

The Narration ought also to be in such words as argue the Manners; that is, some vertu­ous or vicious habit in him of whom we speake, although it be not exprest; As, setting his armes a kenbold, hee answered, &c. by which is insinuated the Pride of him that so answered.

In an Oration a man does bet­ter to shew his affection then his judgement: that is, Tis better to say, I like this, then to say, This [...] [Page 167] [...] [Page 168] [...] [Page 169] [...] [Page 170] [...] [Page 171] [...] [Page 172] [...] [Page 173] [...] [Page 174] [...] [Page 175] [...] [Page 176] [...] [Page 177] [...] [Page 178] [...] [Page 179] [...] [Page 180] [...] [Page 181] [...] [Page 182] [...] [Page 183] [...] [Page 184] [...] [Page 185] [...] [Page 186] [...] [Page 187] [...] [Page 188] [...] [Page 189] [...] [Page 190] [Page 191] is better. For by the one you would seeme wise, by the other good. But favour followes Good­nesse; whereas wisedome procures envie.

But if this Affection seeme incredible, then either a reason must be rendred, as did Anti­gone. For when shee had said, She loved her brother better than her Husband, or Children, shee added, for husband and children I may have more; but another bro­ther I cannot, my [...]arents being both dead. Or else a man must use this forme of speaking; I know this affection of mine seemes strange to you, but neverthelesse it is such. For tis nor easily belee­ved that any man has a minde to doe any thing that is not for his owne good.

Besides in a Narration, not onely the Actions themselves; but the Passions, and signes that [Page 192] accompany them, are to be dis­covered.

And in his Narration a man should make himselfe and his Adversary be considered for such, and such, as soone, and as covertly as he can.

A Narration may have neede sometimes not to be in the be­ginning.

In Deliberative Orations; that is, wheresoever the question is of things to come; a Narration, w ^ch is alwayes of things past, has no place: and yet things past may be recounted, that men may De­liberate better of the future: But that is not as Narration, but Proofe; for tis Example.

There may also be Narration in Deliberatives, in that part, where Crimination, and Praise come in: But that part is not De­liberative, but Demonstrative.

CHAP. 16. Of Proofe, or Confirmation, and Refutation.

PRoofes are to be applied to some thing Controverted.

The Controversie in Iudiciall Orations is, Whether it has beene done; whether it has beene Hurt­full; whether the matter be so great, and whether it be lust, or no.

In a question of Fact, one of the Parties of necessity is faulty (for ignorance of the Fact is no excuse) and therefore the Fact is chiefely to be insisted on.

In Demonstratives the Fact for the most part is supposed: but the Honour and Profit of the Fact are to be Proved.

In Deliberatives the question is, Whether the thing be like to be, or likely to be so Great; or whe­ther it be Iust; or whether it be [Page 194] Profitable.

Besides the application of the Proofes to the question, a man ought to observe, whether his Adversary have lyed in any point without the Cause. For tis a figne hee does the same in the Cause.

The Proofes themselves are ei­ther Examples or Enthymemes.

A Deliberative Oration, be­cause tis of things to come, requi­reth rather Examples then En­thymemes.

But a Iudiciall Orations, being of things past, which have a ne­cessity in them, and may be con­cluded Syllogistically, requireth rather Enthymemes.

Enthymemes ought not to come too thicke together: for they hinder one anothers force by confounding the Hearer.

Nor ought a man endeavour to porove every thing by Enthy­meme [Page 195] lest like some Philosophers, he collect what is knowne, from what is lesse knowne.

Nor ought a man to use Enthy­memes when he would move the Hearer to some affection: for seeing divers motions doe mutu­ally destroy or weaken one ano­ther, he will lose either the En­thymeme, or the affection that he would move.

For the same reason, a man ought not to vse Enthymemes when he would expresse Man­ners.

But whether he would move affection, or insinuate his Man­ners, he may with all use Sen­tences.

A Deliberative Oration is more difficult then a Iudiciall, because tis of the future, whereas a Iu­diciall is of that which is past, and that consequently may bee knowne; and because it has Prin­ciples, [Page 196] namely the Law; and it is easier to prove from Principles, then without.

Beesids, a Deliberative Orati­on wants those helpes of turning to the Adversary; of speaking of himselfe; of raising Passion.

He therefore that wants mat­ter in a Deliberative Oration, let him bring in some Person to praise, or dispraise.

And in Demonstratives he that has nothing to say in commenda­tion or discommendation of the principall Party, let him praise or dispraise somebody else, as his Father, or kinsman, or the very vertues or vices themselves.

He that wants not Proofes, let him not only proove strongly, but also insinuate his Manners: but he that has no Proofe, let him ne­verthelesse insinuate his manners. For a good man is as acceptable, as an exact Oration.

[Page 197]Of Proofes, those that lead to an absurdity please better then those that are direct or Ostensive; because from the comparison of Contraries, namely Truth and Falsity, the force of the Syllo­gisme does the better appeare.

Confutation is also a part of Proofe.

And he that speakes first, puts it after his owne Proofes, unlesse the Controversy containe many and different matters. And hee that speakes last puts it before.

For tis necessary to make way for his owne Oration, by remo­ving the Objections of him that spake before. For the mind ab­horres both a Man and his Orati­on that is damned before hand.

If a man desire his Manners should appeare well, (lest spea­king of himselfe he become odi­ous, or troublesome, or obnoxi­ous to obtrectation; or speaking [Page 198] of another, he seeme contumeli­ous, or Scurrilous) let him in­troduce another Person.

Last of all, lest hee cloy his Hearer with Enthymemes, let him vary them sometimes with Sen­tences; but such as have the same force. As here is an Enthymeme. If it be then the best time to make peace when the best conditions of peace may be had, then the time is now, while our Fortune is intire. And this is a Sentence of equall force to it. Wise men make peace, while their Fortune is intire.

CHAP. 17. Of Interrogations, Answers and lests.

THe times wherein tis fit to aske ones Adversary a questi­on, are chiefely foure.

• [Page 199]1. The first is, when of two Propositions that conclude an Absurdity, he has already utte­red one; and we would by Inter­rogation draw him to confesse the other.
• 2. The second, when of two Propositions that conclude an Absurdity, one is manifest of it selfe, and the other likely to bee fetcht out by a question; then the Interrogation will be seasonable; and the absurd Conclusion is pre­sently to be inferr'd, without ad­ding that Proposition which is manifest.
• 3. The third, when a man would make appeare that his Adversary does contradict himselfe.
• 4. The fourth, when a man would take from his Adversary such shifts as these, In some sort 'tis so; In some sort 'tis not so.

Out of these Cases 'tis not fit to Interrogate. For hee whose [Page 200] question succeedes not is tho [...]ght vanquished.

To Equivocall questions, a man ought to Answer fully, and not to be too breefe.

To Interrogations which wee foresee tend to draw from us an Answer contrary to our purpose, we must together with our An­swer presently give an Answer to the objection, which is implyed in the question.

And where the question exact­eth an Answer that concludeth against us, we must together with our Answer presently distin­guish.

Iests are dissolved by serious and grave discourse: and grave discourse is deluded by Iests.

The severall kinds of Iests are set downe in the Art of Poetry.

Whereof one kind is Ironia, and tends to please ones selfe.

The other is Scurrility, and [Page 201] tends to please others.

The latter of these has in it a kind of basenesse: the former may become a man of good breeding.

CHAP. 18. Of the Epilogue.

THe Epilogue must consist of one of these foure things.

Either of inclining the Iudge to favour his owne, or disfavour the Adversaries side. For then when all is said in the cause, is the best season to praise, or dispraise the Parties.

Or of Amplification or Dimi­nution. For when it appeares what is good or evill, then is the time to shew how great, or how lit­tle that good, or evill is.

Or in mooving the Iudge to Anger, Love or other Passion. [Page 202] For when tis manifest of what kind, and how great the good or evill is, then it will bee opportune to excite the Iudge.

Or of Repitition, that the Iudge may remember what has beene said.

Repetition consisteth in the matter, and the manner. For the Orator must shew, that he has performed what he promised in the beginning of his Oration, and how: Namely by comparing his Arguments one by one with his Adversaries, repeating them in the same order they were spo­ken.