VVho is this mā / whom I perceyue commynge hitherwarde? It se­meth to be Plato. Let me se? It is verily Plato him selfe. What meaneth it / that he is in this wise aparailid? His garmentes be very short / and more sim­ple thā he was accustomed to were. Well, though there were some de­bate betwene vs in Sicile, yet wyll I salute him / and desire him to shew to me the state of all his affaires.

For in wyse men resteth no malice / all though diuersitie in opinions or forme of lyuinge causeth sometyme contention betwene them. Plato / thou art wel founden againe in this contray.

Gramercie A­ristippus. But yet thou hast sayde truer thā I wene thou arte ware of.

Why, I knowe the to be Plato, though thou be in this single apparaile.

Ye that I sup­pose. But thou saydest that I was wel founden: And in dede thou say­dest true after the cōmune opinion. for sens thou departiddest from Si­cile I haue ben twise in the poynt to haue died / and also twise solde for a bondeman or slaue. Wherfore thon mayst with good rayson say, that I am well founden, that haue bene so often in perile to be loste. For com­menly men do calle hym lost, which despayreth of his lyfe / or of a free man is made a slaue. But whither that opinion be true or no, we shall speke more therof hereafter. Finally Aristippus (god be thanked) I am well eskaped.

I do not a litle meruaile of this that thou tellist me. For whan I went from kinge Dio­nise, he mought not suffer, that thou moughtist be one houre from him.

[Page 2] Moreouer he regarded nothynge that was spoken, except it were by thy sentence approued. In the mor­nynge as sone as he was out of his bedde Plato was sent for. Vneth Dion and Aristomenes coulde gette of hym one houre in the daye / that thou moughtist teache them and o­ther towardely gentilmen such part of Philosophie as they desyred to lerne. Finally for the incomparable fauour that the kynge bare to the, thou were had in the courte almoste in as moche reuerence as the kinges owne person. And whan thou pas­siddest by, noble men & other of the kinges household / wold rise quicke­ly & as a storme had fallē in their nec­kes, ducke to the with theyr heddis vncouered: yet diuers in theyr min­des grutched at thy fortune, thin­kinge that the great pleasure / that the kinge had in communinge with the / withdrewe hym from heringe [Page] of other men, of whome there was a great noumbre, which had / some commune some priuate causis to treate of with hym, if they mought by thine absence haue founde opor­tunitie.

Thou sayest trouth Aristippus / & that perceiue I more clerely now, than I did before those thinges hapned vnto me. But now wyll I recite the my storie.

¶Sone after that thou haddist op­tained licence of the king to go vnto Athenes / he becam wonderful stour­die, in so moche as no man mought blame any thing / wherin he delited: nor prayse any thinge, whiche was contrary to that / that he vsed. And that sobre and gentyll maner in he­ringe sondry opinions raisoned be­fore hym / whereto of a custome he was wōt to prouoke the & me, was laide aparte / and supposinge that by heringe of sondry philosophers dis­pute and raison, he him selfe had at­tayned [Page 3] to a more perfect knowledge thā any other that spake vnto hym, began to haue all other men in con­tempte. And as it were Iupyter / who (as Homere saythe) with a wynke made all heuen to shake / he wold with a terrible countenaunce so visage them / whome he knewe wold speake theyr opinions freely, that they shulde dreede to saye any thinge / which they knewe shulde be contrary vnto his appetite. Not withstandynge on a tyme he willed me to declare in his presence the ma­iestie of a kynge, and howe moch he excelled and was aboue the astate of any other person: which request I gladly herde / thinkinge to haue had good oportunitie to warne hym of his blyndenes and foly. Therfore I began to commende the perfect y­mage or fygure of god, which was manifest in the astate of a king, who ruled hym selfe and his people for [Page] the vniuersal weale of them al. And whan I had described his auctorite and preeminence by the excellency of his vertues: prouinge that nothyng moughte be amended, but by that whiche surmounted or was better than it whiche was to be corrected / as vice by vertu, falshode by truthe, wrong by Iustice, foly by wisedom, ignoraunce by lernynge / and such o­ther lyke. Afterward I studiousely dyd sette out a Tyraunte in his pro­pre colours, who attendeth to his owne priuate commoditie.

¶Here at kynge Dionise frowned and became angry. And interrup­tynge my wordes sayd vnto me:

This is a tale of old fooles / that can not be otherwyse occupied. And I aunswered agayne, that those wor­des of his / sauored of Tyranny.

I meruaile Plato that thou spakest, so vnavisedly: I do meane, sens thou knewest wel inough kinge [Page 4] Dionise nature and disposicion / that thou perceuinge hym to be meued, woldest so sodaynly imbrayde hym of his wordes so despitefully.

Well as for that / we shal raison ther of hereafter. Finally I was wel auised what I wolde speke: but nowe wyl I tell furth my tale, what hap­ned afterward to me.

¶Syr, the kynge beinge inflamed with fury / furthwith wolde haue slaine me. But beinge intreated im­portunately by Dion and Aristome­nes he withdrewe his sentence / not withstandynge to the intente that he wolde be auenged, he gaue me to Polidis / who was thanne Ambas­sadour sente to hym from the Lace­demonians. Who hadde me with hym to Aegina, and there solde me. Nowe a littell before there was an ordinaunce made in that Countray, that if any man of Athenes came in to that Ile, he shulde immediately [Page] lose his hedde: whiche ordinaunce was made by Charmander thanne beinge capitayne of that countray / who espieng me / and knowing who I was, caused me to be apprehen­ded and brought vnto the place of Iudgement / requiringe that on me his sayd ordinaunce mought be put in execution. Whervnto I made no defence, but takynge myne aduen­ture paciently, and contemning deth as it became me / I abode my Iuge­ment. At the last one, eyther in des­pite / or of purpose to saue therby my lyfe, spekinge openly and with a loude voyce, sayde to Charmander and the Iudges: The ordinaunce if it be well perceyued, is made again men of Athenes: but Plato (that is here) is a philosopher. Which wor­des, as it hapned / were well taken & lawghed at of all them that were present. And therewith they dis­charged me of the sayde penaltie.

[Page 5] All be hit for the hostilitie that was than betwene them & Athenes they wolde not lette me freely departe, but decreed that I shulde efte soo­nes be solde. There hapned to be at that time Aniceris, which dwelleth at Cyrenas / a man well lerned, who payed for me. xx. li. and furthwith deliuering to me his seruant, whom thou beholdist here, hath sent me as thou seest home to my contray: The garmentes that I weare, he that boughte me of Polidis toke frō one of his slaues / and gaue them vnto me, whan he hadde taken from me myne apparaile that I brought out of Sicile: whiche as thou knowest was right honest and competent.

Not withstandinge neither the cru­eltie of king Dionise, nor the malici­ous decree of the Aeginites mought remoue my courage from vertu and truthe / no more than the twise sel­lynge of me, nor this vile habite of a [Page] slaue or bondman may chaūge mine astate or condicion.

¶But nowe Aristippus I wyll an­swere the to that / wherein thou se­mest to blame me of imprudence or litenes: sayinge, thou meruay leste that I wolde speake so vnauisedly / sens I knewe the nature of kynge Dionise and his disposition. Remē ­brist thou not, that my comminge in to Sicile was to beholde the won­derfull mountaines / which do sende out of the toppes of them great fla­mes of fyre and smoke, & to inserche out the naturall causis therof? And that all though the kynge sent often tymes for me / yet wolde I not come vnto hym, for as moche as thrugh all Grece he was named a Tiraunt. At the laste he sente vnto me Dion / which is a man as thou knowest of honour and grauitie almost incom­parable: who said vnto me that the kynge was incredibly meued with [Page 6] desyre to se me, for the greatte fame (as he affirmed) of wisedome and knowledge / all thoughe I my selfe knowe no suche thyng / to be in me. And moreouer the same Dion shewed me, that he supposed moch profite shuld happen to the royalme of Sicile by our metynge and com­munication / the kinge presently be­holdynge and herynge in me that, wherof he hathe so great expecta­tion: that is to saye (as I moughte vse Dions worde) vertue and wise­dome.

In dede I herde not onely Dion, but also dyuers other reporte euery thynge as thou haste spoken.

Than thou kno­west, that the kynge feruently desi­red to se me.

That is truthe.

And moreouer to speake also with me.

Ye verely.

Bycause he herde good reporte of me.

So it appereth.

Supposist thou Aristippus / that the [Page] reporte of wisedome and vertue is good in a Tyrantes opinion?

Ye as longe as he thinketh that no­thinge that is spoken or done repug­nith agaynst his affections.

What afterwarde?

He ac­compteth it but a vanitie / iudginge as sicke mē, nothing to be good, that agreeth not with the sent of his ap­petite.

Nowe in good faith though thou thy selfe hast a delicate mouthe / and thy taste distempred, yet I can the thanke: for nowe thou sayest truely. But it semeth to the, that whā Dionise sēt for me, he thā thought that wisedome and vertue were good / & that I hauing thē (as it was reported) was a good man: and therfore he desyred to se me.

Ye so it semeth.

And men do desyre to se a thinge eyther for the beautie therof / whiche cau­seth them to loue it, or for the stran­genes therof, wherby they be me­ued [Page 7] to wonder at it / or for commo­ditie that they before haue receyued by hit.

I thinke thou sayest truely.

But excepte I be de­ceyued by false myrrors, or lyke to chaungeable louers / which do mis­lyke the beautie, wherof they haue dayly fruition / perchaunce I con­tempne that in my selfe / whiche I wold prayse in an other, I am ney­therin beautie nor personage to be compared to an infinite noumbre of yonge men / which be in Greece, and also in this royalme of Sicile. Be­sides that, I am now aboue the age of fourtie yeres, and haue also tra­uailed in to dyuers contraies to seke for wisedome / wherby the forme & strength of my body is not a littell appayred. Moreouer thankes be to god, I suppose there is neyther sta­ture nor forme in my personage so ferre out of iuste measure or fascion / where at any man can fynd occasion [Page] to wonder or meruayle. And as for any commoditie that kinge Dionise hath receiued of me / before my com­minge vnto him / I can not perceyue what it shuld be / sens I neuer wrate vnto hym / nor neuer before was in his cōpani: what thinkest thou was than the cause that he desired to se me?

What els, but to the intēr that hauinge the in his presence, he mought in demaundinge of the, here that declared by thy mouth: wher­fore thou were called a wise man / & if thou diddest expresse the same in thy demenure & countenance / which helpeth moche (as I mought saye) to the ratifienge of good opinion.

What sayest thou? Doeth demeanure and countenaunce ratifie the opinion of wisedome?

Ye veryly so thynke I.

What meanest thou thereby?

For accordynge to the profession or qua­litie / wherin men haue opinion that [Page 8] wisedome doeth rest / so ought to be the forme of lyuinge / countenaunce, and gesture: which ioyned all to ge­ther maketh one hole and perfecte harmonie / whiche sendeth in to the hartes of the beholders and herers a voluptie or feruent dilectation.

I can the thanke Aristippus / thou haste nowe declared to haue ben (as I was) the disciple of So­crates. And if thou woldest extend voluptie no further (whiche thou so moche praysest) than thou haste done now / there shuld neuer be contention betwene vs, but folowinge directly the doctrine and steppes of our maister Socrates, not onely we two shulde agree in our opinions / and forme of liuinge / whiche shulde make that harmony, wherof thou spekest. For all men that knowe vs bothe by the vnitie of oure doctrine shulde be brought to insue one con­formitie of lyuinge, or at the leste co­uayte [Page] to folowe it / wherin shuld be a perfecte harmony. The hole quiar synging in one tune. Where, by the discorde of our two doctrines, men doubtinge which of vs two speketh most truely / I commendinge the vo­luptie or perfect dilectation / whiche is in knowlege / thou preferringe the voluptie of the body & sences, they be deuided in to sondry opinions: some extollynge myne admonicions as more pure and separate from the nature of beastes, and therfore ap­prochinge nere vnto diuinitie: other more sensuall and hauinge lasse ray­son, do imbrace thy persuasions, as more illecebrouse or dilectable / cal­linge thy doctrine more natural and of lasse arrogance: many there be, whiche do couayte lernynge & wise­dome / but hauynge not theyr myn­des sufficiently purged of affectes / but eyther by nature, or by yll brin­ginge vp inclininge alwaye to plea­saunte [Page 9] motions or appetites of the body they admitte them gladly.

But while they studye to folowe bothe oure doctrines: they of all o­ther do make the greattest discorde and vnperfect musike. For whanne they wold seme to extolle the dilec­tation in knowlege / they auaunce it meruaylously in theyr disputations & raisoninges: but in pursuing theyr affectis and wantō apetites they de­stroy their fyrst opinion: And vainly do inforce them to make a concorde betwene that whiche of theyr own nature be most repugnant. Whiche discorde dissolueth that harmony, wherof thou spakest: for men be­holdinge in one person suche instabi­litie, they semblably do wander in sondry opinions / nowe praysinge one and vsinge an other, as occasion hapneth. But here wyll I leue to dispute any more in this matter / lest I moughte happen to refricate the [Page] late variaunce betwene the and me / and nowe wyll I retourne agayne where I was.

¶I trowe thou saydest / that ac­cording to the profession or qualitie, wherin men haue opinion that wise dome doeth reste, so ought to be the forme of lyuinge, countenaunce / and gesture. In good say the I suppose thou sayest truely. For if Lais the harlot / in whome thou takest plea­sure in fulfyllinge thy carnall appe­tite, shulde shewe her selfe to the in fluttisshe and vile apparaile, her hed vnkempt / her face and handes soiled and imbrued with grece of the po­tage that she had eaten, and her leg­ges and fete spotted with myar / be­holdynge the with a stourdy coun­tenaunce: thou shuldest not be moch moued to imbrace and kysse her, all thoughe she spake to the wordes wanton and amorouse, and after the custome of harlots / prayse the with [Page 10] rebukes, and rebuke the with pray­ses. In likewyfe if Diogenes / who (as thou knowest) contempneth all thynge saue onely pouertie, wolde stonde in the market place with his berde cleane shauen, and his heare trussed vp in a caule of golde / and hauinge on his fingers ringes with di­amandes and rubies / and on his legges fyne hosen well garded, and shoen of the trimmest fascion, And bycause perchance it is wynter, and therfore the wether is colde / hauing a pan with hote coles standinge at his elbowe: If he wolde rebuke the people of to moch curiositie and delicate lyuinge / and prayse wylfull pouertie and apparaile, that onely seruen for necessitie, also wolde ex­horte them to contemne or despise al ryches and honour / and to imbrace paynfulnes: Thinkest not thou that they wold laugh him to scorne / and accompt hym for a dissarde or with [Page] to moche studie fallen in to a frensie?

Yes be my trouth, for it were a maruayllous foly.

And why supposest thou?

For the fresshe apparaile and riches that he sheweth / openly declareth to all men that he therin deliteth & taketh plesure. And that wherin a mā doth delite, in deliting therin he prayseth it: than is it not a great folishnes to praise & disprayse / as it were in one instante? That is to saye in vse to cō ­mende a thynge openly / and in wor­des to disprayse it expressly. And it shulde seme to the beholders, that he exhorteth mē to contemne riches / that he mought be riche onely. And that he persuadeth them to sustayne cold & other paines, that he mought take his ease & syt by the fire / whiles other men laboured. Wherfore if they regarded littell his counsaile / they were not to be blamed.

Yes, his counsayle perchaunce were [Page 11] to be consydered, whether it were expedient or no: but surely his per­sone and discretion were to be littell estemed. Nowe Aristippus, thou thinkest that kynge Dionise desyred to se me, to the intēt that he mought beholde, if in my countenaunce and forme of lyuinge I dyd expresse that thinge / wherfore he herde me com­mended. And it semeth, that therin the kynge declared hym selfe to be a very wise man, that he trusted more to the act, than to wordes or opini­on.

Ye truly he hath a sharp witte, and in that a manne mought wel praise his ymagination.

Thanne what thinkest thou Aristip­pus? If I shulde haue layde a parte myne owne aparaile, & haue bought suche as thou wearest / garded and decked with golden buttons / suppo­sest thou not that whā I cam to his presence / and that he sawe me, in such wise aparailed, he wold thinke [Page] that I wold speke of the dilectation that is felte in medlynge with fayre women and pleasant: or in the son­dry diuersities of swete sauours / & tastes of metes / that the cooke hathe wel seasoned: and in other like thin­ges, in whose effectes thou deter­minest to be perfecte felicitie? Than bicause he hath before herde the dis­pute as abundauntly therof as any mannes witte mought ymagine, he wold littell esteme my comminge / and thinke the reporte, which was made of me, to be false. But if he wold vouchefaufe to tary, than if I disputed of fortitude, temperaunce, and other lyke vertues, and there with exhorted him and other prin­ces, to abstayne and be continente / blaminge theyr auarice, lechery, & other dissolute maners / with theyr curiositie & superfluouse apparaile: Supposest thou not that he wolde lawgh at me / and in mockage bede [Page 12] me chaunge myne apparaile?

Nay, paraduenture he wolde com­maunde one to fetche for you a fur­red hoode to saue with your hone­stie.

Ah, kynge Dionise is beholding vnto the. For thou wol­dest that men shulde thinke / that he were of great modestie. But what if before that he herde me speke, he had caused me to sytte with hym at souper / and there behelde me feede errantly / perusinge all the delicate disshes: and thereto dranke stoutly of euery cuppe that was offred me: and after souper / with suche wen­ches as were presente, deuise wan­tonly / and also playe and dalie, exce­dynge the termes of honestie, but whan I behelde him do the sembla­ble, I wolde than commende sobre­nesse / and dispraise gloteny: cōmende excedingely continence, and dispraise vehemently wanton daliaunce and lechery: howe moche trowest thou [Page] wold he than sette by me?

As moch as of a good foole / that shuld make hym mery. For he wold take al thy wordes but for iapery.

I wene thou sayest truely. Nowe lette vs inserche somwhat on the o­ther parte. Whan Dion broughte me vntill hym / and that he behelde me cladde in apparaile conuenient & semely to my profession, neither seāt nor superfluous / neyther most rude, nor yet sumptuous, my countenance therto equiualent, which (be it spo­ken withoute any boste) with great study and diligence, I haue prepa­red to haue alwaye in suche a tem­perance / that it shall neuer be foun­den dissolute or lyghte / nor yet fro­ward or stourdy / thinkest thou that he had than good opinion of me? and thought that the wisedom and vertue was in me, which men had reported?

Ye vndoubtedly / and therfore he reioiced moche at [Page 13] thy commynge.

For any o­ther thinge trowest thou, than by­cause I was wise and vertuouse, as he iudged by mine apparaile & coun­tenance? And that he hoped to here of me some wisedome declared?

No truely / but euen for that cause onely.

On my faythe Aristippus thou well doest deserue the greatte giftes and benefites that thou haste receyued of kynge Dio­nise / sens thou so diligently hast af­firmed hym to be the louer of wise­dome. For in that, that he couay­ted to here it declared / he desyred it, and no man wold desyre that thing that he loueth not.

So I sup­pose.

But yet hereafter it shall appiere contrary: But for this time admitte thy persuasion of king Dionise to be true / that he fauored wisedome and vertue, and that he hoped to here it declared better by me than by other. If nowe he syt­ting [Page] & studiously applienge his eares to gyue me good audience, shulde here me commende the plesure that is in sumptuous and pleasaunt hou­sis, in rich apparaile and tapestries, in plentie of goodly and fayre con­cubines / in abundaunce of delicate meates and drinkes / and heapynge vp great treasour of money and ie­welles: thinkest not thou / that I spake contrary to his expectation / whiche he had of me by the reporte of my lyuinge, confermed by myne apparaile and countenance, as thou late affirmiddest? Thinkest thou that he wolde not haue thoughte / that eyther I had mocked hym, or flatered hym, if he hath so sharpe a witte and quicke inuencion as thou doest suppose hym to haue, and therfore haue caused me to be expelled oute of his palice, as a counterfayte dysarde or spie? Or aunswering me that of suche thinges as I commen­ded [Page 14] he had more knowlege and ex­perience than I / and therfore in vain I laboured to declare that to hym, whiche I knew moche lasse than he hym selfe dyd? Sayenge that he co­uayted to here of me, what wise­dome was, wherof he had herde so many diuers opinions: And wherin as the reporte was made vnto him, I was iustructed sufficiently, wherfore he wolde requyre me to declare that onely vnto hym / which he sup­posed I knewe better than he dyd.

It is very likely that he wold haue done so.

If thou had­dest than ben there Aristippus / wol­dest thou haue coūsailed me to haue resisted that gentyl princis request, who with suche humanitie, as thou hast herde of, so moche desyred to se me / and to here me speke?

Nay that wold I not.

Than thou woldest that I shulde satisfie his desyre?

Ye truely.

[Page] After that he had sene me, what re­mayned?

To here the speke.

Any otherwyse than he had opinion of me?

No verily.

And accordinge as myne ap­paraile / and countenance pretended, so I shuld do?

Accordynge.

Not vsurping thy profession in persuadinge to hym thinges that were dilectable, or praysinge the dis­solute forme of his lyuinge, not one­ly contrary to myne apparaile and countenaunce / but also whiche I my selfe do aborre / and haue alway re­proued openly.

No / that dis­simulation were to foule and appa­rant / and shulde haue sette hym (as thou say dest while ere) in great dis­pleasure with the / supposinge that thou haddest mocked hym.

Thā woldest thou not, that I shuld haue vsed any dissimulatiō: for thou supposest that kynge Dionise wolde haue bene therwith displeased. It [Page 15] semeth therfore that thou cōcludest / that I shulde tell hym truthe / & ac­cordinge to my profession.

Ye so god helpe me.

Thou knowest well Aristippus / that my profession hathe euer bene, That no man is happy, Alcib. [...] except he be wise and also good / & that felicitie is in wise­dome and goodnes. And contrarie wise / that they whiche be ignoraunt and yll / be vnhappy / and that igno­raunce and synne is infelicitie and misery.

I knowe well thou hast ben in that tale yet continually.

What sayest thou Aristippus / is not wisedome knowledge? Or what thynge is it els?

Why doest thou aske me that question / wherof no man maketh any doubt?

For I feared leste thou wol­dest haue sayde, that the vsinge of thinges dilectable had ben wisedom onely.

But not withoute knowlege, wherof procedeth electi­on. [Page] For than shuld I haue affirmed / that a hors / which deliteth in etyng / a dogge in hunting, a gote in lechery, did it by wisedom: wherby I shuld proue my selfe to be folisshe and ig­noraunt. Moreouer I am of that opinion, that a wyse man liueth not alway in voluptie or pleasaunt dilec­tation / but that for the more parte [...] is so affectioned. Also withoute knowlege the troubles & impedimē ­tes wherby dilectatiō is letted / may not be comprehende to be eschewed.

Well than / although in the affect of dilectation we two disagre / thou preferrynge the dilectations of the flesshe before the dilectations of the soule / I condemnyng all such af­fection do vtterli seuer it from wise­dome: yet we do agree / that know­ledge is euer in a wyse man. But what knowlege meanest thou? The knowledge of a good horse from a bad / a hole shepe from a cothed, or [Page 16] suche other lyke? Or els the know­ledge howe to buylde a fayre house, or how to sette trees, that in a littell space of time thou maist haue a faire orcharde?

That knowlege is good.

Yea and procedeth of a sharp wit / but yet it is not that knowledge that maketh hym / that hath it, to be a wise man.

I suppose not.

What sayest thou by him, that findeth the menes to gather great sommes of money / offices, or greatte possessions with littel labour: thinkest thou not him to haue that knowledge / which we calle wisedome?

It appro­cheth very nigh, but I dare nat af­firme it to be so, bycause I se dayly, that the most parte of those persons happeneth to suche thinges more by fortune than by theyr owne merites or Industry.

On my fayth I loue the Aristippus / for nowe thou sayest truely. What they / whiche [Page] from a poore astate do come to gret rule and auctorite, shal I name them all wise men?

Moche lasse thanne the other. For besides that that fortune hath also there no littel porcion, it moreouer dependeth not on the power, witte, or diligence of him, that commeth to auctoritie, but holly on the wyl of a second person / that is to say of him that promoteth him to it. Wherfore haue he moch witte or none, as he shall like or con­tent the person that maye aduaunce hym, so shall he come to auctoritie. Wherfore sens it hapneth not onely of his own study, I se no cause why to call hym a wise manne.

Thou spekest very wel and raysona­bly / but what supposest thou them to be, which in euery mater, that is meued, canne raison fetely, makyng men that do here them / wonder at their conueyance, thoughe it be som­tyme ferre from the purpose? be not [Page 17] they wise men? And that thing that they haue, is it not the very know­lege, that maketh wisedom?

No, but it is a good parte of inuen­cion, which commeth of witte. All be it bycause that whiche they do rayson is neuer certayne, it is rather opinion than wisedome, and also that maner of prompte raysonynge hapneth more of nature than study, and therfore it is more commended of vulgare persones or ignoraunte: than of them which be of a ripe and perfect iugement.

Perchance thou sayst truely: yet may it also be in them that be wise, not as wise­dome it selfe, but as a setter furthe of wisedome to hym that hereth / like as the painter hathe the very y­mage in his mynde, but whanne he wold that other men shuld perceiue it, he on a table with sondry colours paynteth it / and setteth it furth:

And yet if the paynter do not before [Page] he warketh / & in the payntynge, conceiue in his mind the hole proporci­on of the image whā it is painted, it shal lacke his ꝑfectiō. And although the freshe colours and vernishe ma­keth it pleasaunt to the eyen of the commune people, and them that be ignorant, yet to good warke men / & to them that haue beholden manye parfecte peces, and delyted therin, the imperfeccyon of the warke is shortly perceiued: euen so knowlege / wherin is wisedome / beinge ones truely hadde, if it be wel sette furthe with eloquēce and raison / it shal the better please and profite the herers. But if he that speketh / doo lacke that knowlege / howe so euer the beautye of his wordes and rayson shall content the eares of them that be ignorant, yet therof shall come to them but litell profite. And to them that haue tasted some thinge of that knowlege / the errour or lacke shall [Page 18] sone be espied. But now what sup­posest thou is the knowlege, which we haue all this while talked of? and that wherin that wisedome is / for the which kinge Dionise desyred to se me / and to here me speke, and the whiche accordynge to my pro­fession / apparaile / and countenaunce, and to the expectation that he had of me / I declared vnto hym?

I wote not Plato, therfore I praye the telle me to shorten oure commu­nication.

I am content / but yet with a condicion / that is to saye, whan I demaunde of the any que­stion / thou shalt speke euen as thou thinkest, without inforcinge any rai­son to maynteine therwith thine old opinion.

Therto I assent for this tyme, sens there be no mo here but we two, for oure seruauntes be nowe out of heringe.

Thou remembrest, that it is agreed by vs bothe, that neyther the knowynge [Page] of good catell from bad / or howe to plante well and to make a fayre or­chard / ne the deuisinge of fayre hou­ses, and buyldinges / nor the increa­singe of goodes or possessions, or the optayninge of great offices or digni­ties, or the sharpe witte and quicke­nes in raisoninge: is that knowlege / wherin is wisedome? What sayest thou to other sciences or craftes, whiche are not rehersed?

I suppose the same of them al general­ly. For of eueriche of them I haue knowen some men to be littell better than naturall fooles / and out of the feate / whiche they dayly exercised, vneth perceyuinge that / whiche we call commune rayson.

Ye, & that wars is / liuynge bestly and out of all order, whiche is the greattest & moste euident token of ignoraunce, whiche is contrarie and ennemie to knowledge. But nowe Aristippus, for as moche as longe disputation [Page 19] prouoketh tediousenes, me semeth / if we broughte in some varietie or chaunge in the order of our commu­nication, it shulde refresshe both our wittes.

What menest thou therby? Take hede that we runne not out of our matter.

No, doubt thou not therof, I shall prouide well ynough therfore. But herke I wyll tell the nowe / what I mene. We haue hetherto spoken of knowlege, wherin is Sapience: but what or wherin hit is, we yet per­ceiue not, but be nowe in sekynge.

What, and if we now vsed the way of a cunnynge paynter, whiche in makynge an ymage of a very fayre woman naked / to the intent that he wyll sette out the fygure perfaictly / & (as I mought speke like a warke­man) by prospectiue: that it maye seme to the beholders therof moste liuely / & therfore the bodi and mem­bres shuld shewe to them as rounde [Page] and fulle, as it were imbosed and wrought in tymber, metall, or stone? he makith the grounde of his warke of the depest blacke coloure that he may come by, which the more inten­tifly that a man doeth behold it / the more liueli or quicke shal the fresshly colour of the image apere to the eye / & the proportion seme more rounde, and in the forme of a body lyuinge. In semblable wise I intendynge to sette oute a parfeict figure of know­lege, if I treate fyrst of Ignoraunce / and makynge that to be well percei­ued / I suppose it shall not be incon­ueniente: but the true proportion of knowlege afterwarde, whanne I shall go aboute to declare it / shall be more apparaunt and easy to be vn­derstande / and the varietie in our cō ­munication shall make the matter more pleasant.

In good faith Plato thy deuise liketh me wonder­full well. Wherfore saye on a god­des [Page 20] name.

Is Ignorance any o­ther thing Aris. than lacke of know­lege?

No surely.

Thā nothing is so cōtrari to knowlege as ignorance.

Nothing.

Is a brute beest inferior to mākind by any thing so moch as by ignorance? For in bodily strength, long life / agilitie & swiftnes, ther be diuers bestes whi­ch fer do excede him / onely by igno­rance they be all inferiors vnto him.

Thou were wont also to say, that bestes lacked the soule that mā hath which is īmortal.

That is true. But thou must remēbre, that the soule with the body maketh the mā. For if the body lacked a soule, though it hadde life, yet were it no man but a beest. And that the figure makith not a mā / it aperith by those bestes, whi­ch be callid satiri / fauni / hipocētauri / & diuers other / which be founden in Affrike hauing som the visage / some the hole figure of mans bodi. And in [Page] the same soule, whiche maketh the man, and without it man is not, nor may be, hathe nothinge lasse in him than ignoraunce, and if a man seme to be ignoraunt, it hapneth neuer a whitte of the soule, but of the gros­nes of the body, whiche is bestiall, as of the same matter and substance that brute beastes be of: which will not lette the soule, that is of a diuine substance, to shewe the effectes and disposition of her nature, whiche is onely knowledge: the lacke wherof being caused by the obiect or lette of the bodi, is nothing but ignoraunce. Lykewise as a thicke & great cloude coueringe the sonne / wyll not lette hym to sende furthe his beames on the erthe, wherby the erthe lacketh lyght / and that lacke is called derke­nesse. Nowe laye aparte all artes & sciences, which (as thou knowest wel inough) were founden by man­nes Inuention and experience, long [Page 21] after that man was created: and set man in the same astate that he was in before the sayd artes and sciences were inuented: yet were he than a man as he is nowe, And lacketh not any thynge, wherby he is named a a man. Wherin nowe doth appere the diuersitie bytwene hym and a brute beaste? Tell me nowe as thou thinkest?

What els but in the same thinge / for the whiche beastes be surnamed brute.

Thou sayest truth: but yet leste I be decey­uid by the diuersitie of oure two vn­derstandynges: I pray the tell me in fewe wordes, what by the sayde worde, brute, is signified.

Mary agreed: I take that signifieth grose, insensate / lackynge capacitie of knowlege / finally it amounreth to as moche as ignoraunt.

By the faythe of my body thou haste made an exposition very compendi­ouse and elegant. Than be we both [Page] agreed, that ignorance makith the diuersite betwene a beast & a man. But what Ignorance I pray the? Igno­rance in building of houses, makyng of cloth, or warking of metall, or ꝑ­aduenture ignorance in grāmer, or logike, or making or versis / or els play­eng on the shalmes or the lute? Doth ignorance in any of these cause the diuersite?

It semeth nay. For thou diddest presuppose, that a man were in the same astate, that all men were in / or euer any artes or sciences were founden / & than of that thing that is not / it were foly to suppose any ig­noraunce.

Thou speakest not moche a mysse. But yet for an other cause / Ignoraunce in any of the sayd artes or sciences doeth not make the diuersitie that we nowe speake of.

For if it shuld so do / thā who so euer lacked any of the said artes or scien­ces: it shuld folowe that he were ig­noraunt, & therfore he were no man [Page 22] but a beaste. And also bees, silke­wormes, and spydars shuld not cō ­pare with vs onely, but shulde seme also to excede vs in knowlege. For as moche as without any instructor or teacher, they at the fyrst without losse of any thing / can perfectli make waxe / hony, silke and copwebbes: whiche no man can do like, nor by none inuention canne attayne to the knowlege, how it ought to be done. And as for the bee and the spynner, who so euer studiously do beholde their warke / he shall se therin suche order / that beside the office of nature he shal wōder at the equalite or iust­nes of proportion / so exactly obser­ued / that none artificer can amende it. But now Aristip. sens this is not the Ignoraunce / that any of vs both haue mente hytherto / I praye the what Ignoraunce supposest thou it is, that makith this diuersite?

I suppose hit be this, that a beaste [Page] hath not the knowlege of hym selfe and of other, in the diuersite of their kindes. For my horse knoweth not that he is a horse / no more he doeth that he is a beast and I a man: ney­ther the bee / at whose industry thou haste so moche wondred, whanne the hiue is broken: he knoweth not whether it be a man or a beaste that taketh his hony combes, & putteth hym out of his lodgyng, wheron he hath bestowed so moche labour.

Nor the spainell that is so ialouse o­uer his miaster, hath not the know­lege whether his maister be a man or elles a beaste as he is. Contrary wyse, a manne knoweth that he is a man, and knoweth also euery other beaste in his kynde.

Thou cōmest nigh to the point Aristippus. But beware that thou be not decei­ued, if after Pythagoras doctrine / whan men be deade theyr soules en­tre in to horsis / lyons / and swine.

[Page 23] And after many yeres trauaylynge they retourne agayne to be men:

Than there mought be in thy horse the soule of kynge Sardanapalus / wherby thy horse moughte knowe what thou art and hym selfe to.

Thou aduauncest me highly Plato / whan thou supposest me to ryde on a kynge, and on so greatte a king as Sardanapalus was / which reigned ouer Assyria and Babylon.

Thou art worthy to haue no worse horse Aristippus, sens by thy profession thou art demed prelate of all voluptie or wanton appetites: vnto whome moche greater princis than Sardanapalus was / haue ben knowen to be seruantes.

Mo peraduenture than of thy sower & vnpleasant vertues wolde gladly be folowers.

But nowe that I remembre me, thou nedest not to be aferd Aristippus, for thou art neuer the more deceyued. In good feythe [Page] thy horse hathe yet no more know­lege than a very horse hath in dede.

What meanest thou therby?

For whan Sardanapalus li­ued, and was kynge of Assyria / he than knewe not hym selfe. For a­bandonynge not onely the maiestie of a kyng / but also the office of a mā, he lefte the company of men / and sat continually with his concubynes a­tyred in the forme of a woman / spin­nynge in the rocke / and cared for no­thynge, but howe he mought excell all his wenches in wātonnes. Now sens he than beinge in the forme of a man / so moch forgat what he was, thinkest thou that there be in hym lasse ignorance now that he is in the fourme of a horse?

Nay in good fayth, but moche more. And because thou sayest so Plato / I haue euen the fondest horse that euer man rode on. For whan he was yonge, he was so mare wode / that no man [Page 24] mought ride him. And now that he is old, & that I pitieng him do vse to ride on him some smal iournaies: by my trouth whan we be in the brode highway, if he se. iiii. miles of, a rase of mares / he wil in spite of my tethe leue the way & go to thē whan he is not able to ren, nor bridell nor sporre may hold him. And yet whā he cō ­meth thider / sauing onely neyenge & kicking / he can do nothing. And therfor it may wel be (if Pythagoras do trine be true) that the soule of Sar­danapalꝰ is in sorel my horse. But if I knew it for certain / bi god I wold haue the fairest mares that ani wher mought be gottē for him.

Now on mi faith that is merily spokē. But in dede Arist. the said sentēce of Py­thagoras ought not to be taken as it is writtē without ani other expositiō nomore thā his mistical coūsailes called Simbola. As / cut not the fire with a sword / Lepe not ouer the balance, [Page] Taste nothinge which hath a blacke tayle, and suche other lyke, whiche thou hast often tymes herde of: but there in is a more secrete meanynge / & approchinge nere vnto rayson. As in myne opinion / by the translation of mans soule, wherof we haue spo­ken, from a man to a beast, and final­ly estsones vnto a man agayne: It may be wel vnderstand in this wise. That men beinge in the state of In­nocency haue than the figure of mā, the soule hauinge the hole preemi­nence ouer the body. But after if [...] it happen that the appetites and desy­res of the body so moch do increase, that they haue the hole possession of the body / and that the affections of the soule, that is to saye / vertues be suppressed or putte to silence / than the lyfe becommeth beastely: than loke in what beastes the sayde appe­tites be mooste vehemente: he / in whome is the semblable appetite, [Page 25] may be sayd hathe his soule in that best inclosed. As he that is lecherous and wanton, in such a horse as thou spakest of while ere. A cruel man or Tyraunt in to a tigre or lion, a glot­ton or drunkarde in to a wolfe or a swyne, and so furthe of other. And if one man happen to be possessed of many vices / than is his trāsformatiō more dyuers / and as I mought saye more monstruouse. Also beinge in that beastly astate, & the soule with her affectes beinge hyd and not she­wyng her puissance, what any other thynge is more in them thanne igno­rance? Which beinge a thing beast­ly, is as propre to them as beastly appetite. But if god so willinge af­ter longe trauailing in yll affections, the soule recouereth her myght / and vanquisht ignoraunce / makynge the body to knowe his misery, than the beastes hyde by littell and littell fal­leth a way as knowlege increaseth, [Page] and finally man resumeth his very figure and proportion lyuinge after the rule of the soule, and so continu­eth perpetually. Howe sayest thou Aristippus to this exposition?

It semeth to me to stand with good rayson: for euer me thought that Pythagoras sentence, whiche was a man of incomparable wisedome / had suche a meaninge.

Also it appereth by the sayde sentence / that Ignorance maketh a mā beast­ly, & that knowlege putteth awaye beastlynes, and restoreth a man to his dignitie.

Ye verely.

And it semeth by that, which is re­hersed that Ignorance that we calle beastly, is in that, that bestes do not know what thei thē selfes be / nor betwene them and men what is the diuersitie. Also that men knowe the diuersitie betwene them and brute beastes / it hapneth of the soule, ha­uyng preeminence ouer the bodye / [Page 26] that is to saye while the soule doeth holde the sences of the body vnder due rule & obedience.

I wote not, howe to answere the. For I haue affirmed so moche before, that I can not replie nowe with myne honestie.

For they kepynge of touche Aristippus I can well prayse the. But howe sayest thou? Haue we not of ignorance spoken for this tyme sufficiently?

Yes I sup­pose / and we haue nowe passed two myles in oure iournay: therfore re­tourne where thou leftest to speke of knowledge. For thou haste layde a good grounde on thy table to set out thyne ymage.

I se thou for­gettest nothyng that I haue spoken. Therfore lette vs assaye to expresse that Image, that is to saye, declare what is that knowlege, wherin lieth very wisedom, which peraduenture kinge Dionise hoped to finde in me / whan he first desired to se me.

THou dost remembre A­ristippus, that we be a­greed, that knowlege is contrary to Ignorance? And I suppose also they be so contrarie / that they may neuer accorde / or in any part be mingled together: but alway where the one is, the other lacketh.

Ye surely it must nedes folowe.

Than whan Ignorance is ones put away clerely / knowlege onely remayneth.

Ye so I trowe: or els I wote not what it is, that abideth / excepte I wolde calle it nothynge. And yet nowe I am aduised, that same, no­thynge / [Page 27] is Ignoraunce. For of no­thinge can be no knowlege.

Thou speakest truely / and as it bese­meth the scoler of Socrates. Now thou knowest that Ignorāce is of bestes / which therfore be named brute: & that knowlege is only pertaininge to man. And that the Ignoraunce / wherby beastes be most vnlike vnto man, is Ignoraunce of them selfes, in as moche as they knowe not / that they be beastes. Than it foloweth, that the knowlege, whiche maketh the greattest diuersitie betwene man & beast / and wherby man hath pre­eminence in dignitie ouer beastes / is the knowlege of hym selfe: wherby also he knoweth other.

Ye, supposest thou so? Doeth a man by knowynge hym selfe knowe other also?

No doubt therof, and that shalt thou se prouid in the order of our cōmunication / by the same raison that shal make him to know him [Page] selfe. But yet lefte thou be deceiued, I wyll by the waye demaunde one question of the. Thou saydest while ere Aristippus, that a beast hath not the knowlege of hym selfe and of o­ther in the diuersitie of theyr kindes, I praye the what vnderstodest thou therby? Any other than thou dyd­dest declare by the exāple of the bee and the spaynell?

None o­ther: Why, thinkest thou Plato / that I sayd not well?

Thou camest (as I said) nigh to the point, but yet thou hittest it not. For per­aduenture thy supposell may be in some part false, although thou hast not c [...]pied it. Dost thou not behold, that beastes, whiche be sauage, as they be diuers in kynde, so do they couayt to be together, and wil seuer them selfes from other? And in the acte of generation wyll accompany with none other beast, but suche as is of his owne propre kynde: notwithstanding [Page 28] that there be diuers of thē one so like an other: that vneth a man can discerne the diuersitie. As wolfes and mastyfes: foxes and cur­res, hares and conyes, and many o­ther beastes / whiche were tediouse to be rehersed. And as touchinge the bee, that we spake of, be there not diuers flies lyke vnto him? And for all that he wyll companye with none of them / nor yet suffer them (if he be of power to resiste) entre in to his hyue / but at the fyrst sighte wyll withstande hym. Moreouer all the sayd bestes, whan they perceiue a man commyng toward them / they wyll not abyde, but flee soner from hym than from any beast. Moreouer amonge an infinite nombre of people, a dogge wyl know his mai­ster / although ther were a thousand men, in personage, fascion, and co­lour of garmētes veri like vnto him. And if thou woldest saye, that the [Page] dogge doeth discerne that by sent of smellinge. Yet wold I demaunde of the agayne, howe it hapneth / that a dogge taken vp at Olinthum, and brought vnto Athenes / whiche be distant. xl. myles one place from the other, and is a very diffuse way to kepe, and littell trauayled, yet after that the dogge haue ben retained at Athenes by the space of syxe mo­nethes / whan he hath ben at libertie he hath retourned agayne home to his maisters house, howe woldest thou answere me Aristippus?

Howe elles? But euen as thou thy selfe diddest suppose that I wolde saye, that the dogge founde the way by sent specially, addynge to perad­uenture some parte of his syghte.

But perchaunce or he come to Olinthum his maister hathe for­saken the house that he dwelled in / whan he was with hym, and is re­moued in to an other house: doest [Page 29] thou not thinke, that the dogge wil go to the house, wher he left his mai­ster, and not to the house where he dwelleth?

Yes in good sayth.

And yet percase he shal fynde his maisters steppes in the strete to­warde his newe house. And notwithstandynge as sone as he espieth the other house / he passeth forthe, & goeth streight to it. But whan he cometh in, and fyndeth not his maister there, yet he layeth hym down as he were at home, trusting that his mai­ster wyll shortly come in: doeth he this by sight or by smellinge?

Thou makest me doubt Plato, whi­ther he doeth it by any of them.

What if it happen, that his master not knowing him to be ther / standynge nigh to the windowe tal­keth loude with his neighbour / so that the dogge hereth hym: thinkest thou not / that he wyl ryse sodainly / & with great hast come ioifully vntil [Page] his maister?

Yes / I haue sene that in experience.

Doth he that by sauour or by syght?

By neyther of them, but onely by heringe.

And whan he co­meth to him / he streight leapeth vp­pon hym without any smellynge.

I am yet in dout / what I may saye.

One­ly by cause thou wylte not graunte contrarye to thyne assercyon, that a beaste hathe knowledge of hym selfe and other in the diuersitie of theyr kyndes. But whatte wylte thou saye / if it shall appere vnto the / that bestes haue yet an other know­lege among them selfes thā by their sences? haste not thou sene, whanne men haue preparid them selfes to go on huntyng, and to that intent haue brought forthe theyr leshes, colers, and lyams / or elles theyr hayes and pursenettes, that the houndes espi­enge these thynges / haue reioyced [Page 30] and lept about the house / as if they knewe that they shulde go on hun­tynge? Likewyse whan they here the hunter blowe his horne / they doo all ryse, and with one voyce doo make a greatte noyse, as if they consented to goo to that solace.

And if they herde one blowe in a shalme or a trumpette / they wolde not do so.

¶The coursar / whiche is vsed to bataylle / as soone as he herethe the trumpettes blowen / he snorteth and brayeth, and takyng to him his cou­rage, he tredith hygh, & praunceth / and with suche bragges declareth him selfe redy to set furth in bataile, supposest thou, that these beastes haue this knowlege onely by the sences, wherof we haue spoken?

No, hir semethe to me nowe, that they haue an other knowledge than onely by sences, but what hir is / or wherof hir procedethe / I canne not [Page] discusse excepte I shulde name it na­turall influence, diuersely disposed more or lasse, after the grosenesse or capacitie of the body, whervnto it sloweth.

By the faythe of my body, and that definition is not to be dispreised / if thou adde thervnto the sences. But by this that thou and I haue nowe spoken / it semeth, that beastes haue knowlege of them selfes and other in the diuersitie of theyr kyndes, contrarie to thy fyrste diuision. And if it be so, than be they equal to men / and without cause we do cal them ignorant or brute.

I wote not what to saye to the.

Abide Aristippus / dispayre not / thou haste spoken more wiseliar than thou art ware of.

Tro­west thou so Plato?

Ye / and that shalt thou perceiue if thou wilt here me.

Go to than I praye the.

Lette it not be tediouse vnto the to haue some thinges repe­ted, [Page 31] which thou hast spoken.

¶Fyrst if thou remembre thy selfe, thou woldest not denie, but that wisedome was knowledge. After warde thou grauntiddest also, that Ignoraunce was none other thynge but lacke of knowlege, whiche con­cluded, that Ignoraunce could be no wisedome. And than dyddest thou raison / that the diuersitie betwene man and beast was onely ignorance. And that Ignoraunce dyddest thou suppose to be the lacke of knowlege of them selfes / and other in the diuersitie of theyr kyndes. This was ve­ry well gathered of the, in myne o­pinion. And the raison that folowed by the example that thou dyddeste putte of thy horse / the bee / and the spaynell, was not vnfitte to the pur­pose, if thou woldest haue abyden well by it. But by our mery digres­sion in to Pythagoras regeneratiōs / thou were brought from that argu­ment / [Page] soner than thou shuldest haue ben: whiche hapned vnto the / as it doeth euer to them, whiche lyke vn­to the / do folowe the concupiscence and pleasaunt affectes of the body. For lyke as they be vnstable, so the folowers & louers of them be euer in constant: as well in their opinions as in their actes. But if thou being sometyme the herer of Socrates as well as I was, haddest folowed di­rectly his doctrine / accordyng as he spake it / and also practised it by his example of lyuyng / and haddest not as a truant pycked out of his argu­mentes suche matter as thou suppo­siddest mought only maynteine thy sensuall appetite / thou shuldest haue perceyued what thou thy selfe had­dest mente, whiche thou doest not nowe / it varieth so moche from thy profession. And peraduenture the knowledge that we nowe seke for, shuld neuer haue comen betwene vs [Page 32] two in question. But it shulde haue suffised to haue told to the, what I sayde to kynge Dionise, and howe he delte with me. And thou shuldest sone haue iuged / if he had according to mi merites intreted me. But now Aristippus to thintent thou mayste take some comforte of the sedes of Socrates doctrine / which remayne in the, but they wyll not springe / in suche wyse as thou mayste see them / except I do water them with my declaration. ¶Fyrst remembre that of all that whiche bereth the name of a thynge / there be two kyndes, one hath no bodye & is euer stedfast and permanent / the other hath a body, but it is euer moueable & vncer­tein, The first, bicause it may be vn­derstāde only / it is called intelligible. The second, bicause it may be felt by sensis it is called Sensible. The way to know the fyrste is called raison, & the knowlege therof is namid vnderstāding. [Page] The way to know the. ii. is called Sense or feling / the knowlege therof is named Perceiuinge. More ouer of that which is called Intelli­gible there is the fyrst & the seconde. In the fyrste is that portion of diui­nitie, whiche is in man, wherby he is made to the image and similitude of god. In the other be noumbres and figures. Of this beastes haue no parte, neyther of the fyrste nor yet of the seconde: of the fyrst I sup­pose thou wylte graunt me, and as for the seconde experience wyl proue it? for I dare saye / thou neuer har­dest of beastes / that coude skylle of nombrynge.

I wote nere, I neuer called any yet to a reckenyng.

And though an ape or other lyke beaste / seme in takynge of thin­ges to obserue an ordre, as it were in nombrynge / yet if it be well consi­dered / it shall appere that it is by an imagination ingendred of custome, [Page 33] and not by nombrynge. I haue sene a man, whiche was borne blynde, and vsed to be ladde to thre or foure houses in the citie, whiche hath ben a great distance a sondre, at the laste by custome hathe knowen so well where they stode / that without any man or dogge leadynge, or any man tellynge hym / he hath gone directly vnto them. Wherat fyrste I mer­uayled with many other, and whan I communed with hym, I haue perceyued that he neuer obserued nom­bre, but that onely custome had set the distance of the places in his ima­gination. Like may be spoken of fi­gures. For that wherby beastes do discerne one thinge from an other / is not vnderstandynge / that is to saye though they discerne in quantite the more from the lasse, yet they vnder­stand it not, as rounde, quadraunt / or triangle / or in other lyke fygure: but the simulacre or ymage / wherby [Page] they pecyue the sayd diuersite / is onely by custome, formed & imprinted in the principal sēse, which is the hart. And whā the thing selfe is remoued out of sight / that impression that re­maineth is called imagination / who cōmittith it forthwith vnto memori, which vndouted is not only in men but also in bestis, for thei discerne the tyme present and that which is pas­sed, but the tyme to com they know not, & Memory is onely of the time passed. And therfore the bestes that thou spakest of / doo perceiue the di­uersitie of thynges by imagination & Memorie, conceiuynge & reteyninge in the harte, whiche is the principall sense or fountain of senses, the image of the thynge that is sensible. And therby the dogge perceyuethe his mayster / & fetcheth his gloue / which he hath ben before taught for to do / & goeth to the places where he hath sene his maister bene a littell before. [Page 34] But that he knoweth not whether his maister be a mā or a horse / Plato or Demosthenes, a philosopher or an oratour, it is euidēt inough. For although my dogge had abyden ten yeres continually with me, and had herde me euerye daye speake of De­mosthenes / & name hym an oratour / and herd the call me euery day Pla­to, and name me a philosopher: yet if thou woldest deliuer vnto him anithing, & byd hym c [...]ry it to the ora­tour / he wolde strayt brynge it vnto me, and not to Demosthenes. Also if I wold cast a lofe vnto my spaynell / & bid him cary it to my horse, I sup­pose he wold forthwith eate it hymself, & lye downe whā he hath done / without seking for mi horse / though he stode by him / is it not so?

Ye in good faith me thinkith thou saist truly.

And likewise mai be raisoned of al other bestes be thei neuer so wily / if their actis be depely considered.

[Page] It appereth so.

Thanne thy sayinge is not to be reproued, that a beaste lacked knowledge of hymselfe and of other.

No, as it semethe.

And that lacke of knowledge is ignorance.

Ye truely, and so sayde I also.

And that ignorance made the diuer­siue betwene man and beaste.

Ye and the same to.

Than thou wylt conclude / that man hath knowlege?

Ye that I must ne­des thou knowest well ynough.

And what callest thou that know­ledge? suppose [...]t thou it is where a manne knowethe hym selfe and o­ther?

Ye so I sayd, and thou haste also affyrmed it.

So I dydde in dede, but yet good Ari­stippus / suffer me to demaunde of the a fewe questions / we shall the sooner fynde out the knowlege that we seke for. Is it in figure & nombre that knowlege resteth?

Ye so [Page 35] it appereth.

Nay, if thou re­membre the. Perdie thou saydest thy selfe, that thy horse knewe not, that thou were a manne, or that he was a horse.

So sayde I indede.

Thou cōsiderest also, that it was agreed by vs bothe, that the figure made not the man, but it was the soule with the body / that caused the manne to be so named: and that without the soule, not withstādyng the figure of man, yet were he no mā but a brute beaste.

It muste nedes be so, I can not deny it.

Than is there somewhat more that makethe the sayde knowlege besy­des the fygure / whiche is contey­ned in the seconde part of that / whi­che we called Intelligible?

So me thinketh. But what hit is I can not remembre.

It is no mer­uayle, thy wy [...]tes be so inuolued in carnal affections, that this clene and pure doctrine canne not entre in to [Page] them without gret difficultie, & whā they be ones in, they can not longe abide / thy memorie is so occupied about wanton and beastly fantasy. But yet wyl I ones agayne reherce vnto the that, whiche thou haste so shortly forgotten. Dyd not I saye, that in the fyrste part of that, which is named Intelligible / is that porti­on of diuinitie in man, wherby he is made to the ymage and similitude of god?

Yes I remembre well that.

And is that forme printed in any other thynge than in mans soule, whiche is immutable and of one proportion and fygure?

All though it lyeth bounden in the body / as it were in a prison / conside­ringe thynges diuersely: as the sub­stance and qualities of the body suf­freth hym to take light: beinge de­ceyued by the iudgement of the sen­ces or wittes, estemynge thynges as they be sēsible & visible: where that / [Page 36] whiche the soule by hym selfe doeth consyder, is intelligible and also in­uisible.

I doubt me what I shall say. But supposest thou Pla­to, that the ymage and similitude of god is not in the body of mā as well as in the soule?

Hast thou so sone forgotten that, whiche I haue so often rehersed? That if the body of mā were without a soule, he were than but in the nombre of brute bea­stes, which haue sēces as wel as he / and some more sharp & quicker. And no man that wil affirme that god is / wyll presume (as I trowe) to saye expressely that the ymage of god is in Satires / and other beastes and fysshes / whiche haue fourme and shappe lyke vnto manne. And to speke to the meryly without repro­che vnto goddes maiestie, If that whiche is in euery mannes bodye / were the ymage of godde, Certes thanne the ymage of godde were [Page] not onely diuers, but also horrible / monstruouse, and in some part ridi­culouse: that is to say, to be laughed at. For euery man hathe not in vi­sage and personage, one proportion or figure. Some haue a playne and equall visage, some loke as they laughed / other as they wept / diuers as they were euer angri, many haue in the quantitie of theyr bodies or membres excesse or lacke. Wherfore to thynke that all these be lyke vnto god (whiche as he is the creatoure of them all / and maye make and do what he lysteth, so it agreeth with all raison [...] that he incomparably ex­celleth them all in euery perfection and consequently in beautie) it were of all other the greatest madnesse.

Thou aunswerest me rayso­nably / but nowe I pray the declare to me as plainly, howe the ymage of god is in the soule / as thou supposest.

Thou wilt not deny, that [Page 37] god is without any body / inuisible and immortal, whose forme can not be deprehended with the eyen of mortal mē / nor described by any sensible knowlege?

No truely.

And the same I trowe thou wilt confesse of the soule?

Ye verily.

Also god is in power in all and euery parte of the world: And by his prouidence all thynge is gouerned and moued. And he him selfe is of none other moued nor go­uerned / but is the fyrste incompre­hensible mouer.

I can by no raison denye it / except I wold deny, that god is / & that I maye not / sens that the order of al thing that is vi­sible / declareth that there must ne­des be one principall cause and be­ginnynge, which we call god. And also that order can not be withoute prouidence and one perpetuall go­uernance.

Yet thou sayest wel, and as it besemeth Socrates scoler. [Page] But nowe Aristippus, for as moche as god is the fyrst & principall cause. And as he is one in begynnynge / so is he euer one in gouernaunce: And therfore hauinge in hym al sufficien­cy and powar, wilt thou not graunt me, that he is of an absolute and full perfection?

Yes that must I nedes.

And is not perfection / in that it is perfect / good also?

No man wyl deny it.

Ye per aduenture the same perfection is goodnesse / sens goodnesse is alwaye complete, profitable, and withoute any lacke. And goodnesse and euyll the one is contrarie and euer re­pugnant vnto the other: Howe say­est thou? is it not so?

Ye that is true.

Thā is there euer variāce betwene them?

So it appe­reth.

But in god can neuer be variance, whiche of his nature is euer one, & may neuer suffer diuision.

I graunt the.

Than in [Page 38] god nor about god can be none euil: therfore all euyll is ferre from god.

But yet me semeth we haue spoken somwhat lasse of god than we shuld do.

What meanest thou therby?

For sens we bothe haue agreed, that he is the fyrste begyn­nynge and cause: we shuld haue al­so concluded / that all goodnesse proceded of hym / and that he was the fountayne and principall goodnesse.

I admit al to be true that thou sayest.

Than thou grauntest, that cuyll is contrarie to god?

Ye verily.

And all thynge that is yl, is contrarie to that thing / whiche is good?

Ye surely.

Those thinges that be contrarie one to an other / be they lyke in that, wherin they be cōtrarie?

No truely.

Than it semeth / that they be vnlyke?

So it appereth.

That / wherin thinges be like or vnlyke one to an nother, do we not [Page] calle it an ymage or similitude?

Yes vndoubtedly.

Hyther­to we haue well agreed. Nowe let see Aristippus, Sens thou haste confessed / that the soule is inuisible and immortalle howe sayest thou? shall it suffise that therin onely he be like vnto god and in all other thynge vnlyke or contrarye?

No: for than shulde he be in parte lyke / and in parte vnlyke: And than were hit not welle spoken to saye / that man was made to the ymage and simili­tude of god / without ioynyng ther­to distinctly & particularly in what thynge he was made to the sayd y­mage & similitude: As if one wolde saye / that in thy sonne / were thy ꝓpre image and similitude. If thou thy selfe dyddest perceyue that he were lyke to the in fauour, propor­tion of bodye and condicions, thou woldest holde the pleased and saye nothynge. But if thou beheldeste / [Page 39] that in his personage he were lyke the / but in some parte of the visage as in the nose, the eyen, or the mou­the he were vnlyke the, Also in libe­ralitie he folowed the, but in lechery he did degenerate from the: shuldest thou not than be constrayned to de­maunde of hym that spake, wherin thy sonne is lyke to the / or in what parte of hym thyne ymage shulde appere to be moste?

Nowe on my fayth Aristippus thou spea­kest very well and wysely. Lo, see, howe by oure longe cōmuning thou art drawen from thy wanton affec­tions and fantasyes / whereby the sparkis of wysedome, that thou gatist of Socrates lessons / lyke as fyre hydde vnder askes and deed cooles, whan they be remoued is found sindrynge in lytel imbres: so thyn affections beinge withdrawen wysedom doth begyn to glyter and shew / whiche if it wold abide kend [Page] lynge, & not like vnto imbres remoue & fle awai with eueri puffe of wīde, I doubte not but for the sharpnes of thy wit, of al Socrates scolers thou should [...]st be at the last one of the most wisest and excellēt. But I wil speke therof no more / lest thou shuldist suppose I did to the that I wolde not do to kīg Dionise, I mene flater the.

No no, I peciue wherabout thou goest: thou woldist with psuasion, wherin I knowe thou art meruay­lous, withdraw me if thou mough­tist frō my, pfessed opiniō / but that is now no part of our mater.

Yet I suppose thou art deceyued [...] for thou shalt finde it otherwise, or we be at an ende of our communication: but where left we? Thou didest affirme (as I remēbre) that for as moch as man was made to the image & simi­litude of god / he ought to be like vn­to god / not in part / but in all vniuersally.

In al suche lykenes as that [Page 40] which is creatid mai be most like vnto his creatour, without cōparison of equalitie. For god that is alway one may suffre no pere / or lyke in e­qualitie of substāce.

That is verily wel said Arist. Al though that was euer ment in our raisoning: for I ne­uer supposid, that thou haddist so li­tell lerning / to thinke that god made men equal vnto hym / or so ignorant that thou knewest not, what an y­mage or similitude is, in respecte of that where vnto it is wrought. By that whiche we before haue affir­med, that god is the first cause & prī ­cipal goodnes / it arguith that al thīg which is not the self god / is inferior vnto him. Wherfore the image or si­militude of god / al though it be an i­mitatiō or folowing in liknes of that whervnto it is made & resembled / yet is it inferior to god: who by the vertue of his vnitie hath euer a pre­eminence, and souerayntie. Therfore we wyll stycke no more thervppon, [Page] but now I wil assay to declare / how we may vnderstand, that the simili­tude of god is imprinted in manne: wherin the knowlege that we begā to treate of / perchaunce shall appere vnto vs. Wherfore Aristip. I praye the as thou hast done hitherto [...] here me patiently, and whan I shall de­mande of the any question, answere me simply without cauillatiō.

Contēted. But be short than I pray the [...] for me thinketh hit longe or we come to an ende of our matter.

Ye so I suppose. For as I sayd, the littell sparkes of wisedome that ap­pered in the, wyll neuer be brought to be a good fire / they be so mengled with askes of affectiō: wherby they be made so incōstant, that they will not abide the end of my raisō / wher by perchāce they mought be caused to kendel and waxe more. But sens thou hast promysed to here me patiently / I wyl go forth with this mat­ter: [Page 41] and d [...]ubte not but that I wyll make an ende / or we come to the cite.

Go to than. For I am nowe prepared to here the.

SEns we haue treted som what of god / & of mans soule (but not sufficient­li / for that wold require a moche lengar tyme, & also that bothe thou and I had our myndes more cleane pourged with prayer and pure sacrifice) Nowe lette vs see as moche as we maye be suffred / what it is / wherin they most do resemble.

☞ Fyrste all that is in god is per­petualle and immutable, and by [Page] none occasyon or for any cause may be appayred, mynysshed, or cor­rupted. That whiche is in the soule, parte is perpetualle and im­mutable / parte is not perpetualle, and is also mutable. For that the soule is Immortalle and inuisible, that is perpetualle and maye ne­uer be chaunged. But vnderstan­dynge / whiche I dydde putte to: the knowledge of that, whiche was Intelligible, and named hit a portion of dyuinitie, is not per­petualle in the soule, as hit is in godde, nor all wayes immutable: but durynge the tyme that hit is conserued by contemplacy on of the diuine maiestie, hit is perfecte and makethe mannes soule lyke vnto god. And whanne hit is ioyned vnto corporaile affectes / hit is made thanne vnperfecte / and the fourme of the soule, is in a parte [...]ecayed frome the ryghte symily­tude [Page 42] of god. But if the soule be­inge dedycate to vices / be ones fal­len frome the possession of rayson / thanne vnderstandynge is vanys­shed awaye / and the soule remay­nethe with the bodye transfour­med, as we spake of before.

And thanne that Immortalytie, whiche beynge ioyned to vnder­standynge, made the soule lyke vn­to god / beinge nowe seperate from hit, shall be to the soule confusion and tourmente.

¶The maiestie of god, in beholding wherof the sayd vnderstandyng or knowlege is conserued and kept in perfection / is all his goodnes / wher­of I haue spoken / and his prouy­dence, whiche procedethe of the same goodnesse. In beholdynge the goodnesse of Godde / manne dothe perceyue, that thereof pro­cedethe vertue. In consyderynge his prouydence, he fyndethe that [Page] nothynge is made without cause / or (as I moughte saye) at a venture: but that all thynges be made for a pourpose, profitable, and also neces­sary / and so to the respecte therof al thynges be good.

¶Nowe I wyll demaunde of the Aristippus one question. Doest thou not remembre / that thou thy selfe saydest late / that hit were not welle spoken / to saye that man was made to the image and similitude of god: if he had in him no mo thynges lyke vnto god, but only that he were inuisible and immortal? and that dyddest thou ratifie with a good and fami­liar exaumple.

It is not soo longe passed sens I spake it [...] but that I may well remembre it.

And thou dydst not deni / but that the pte Intelligible of man is a diuine sub­stance, wherein is vnderstandynge?

No, nor yet wyll I.

Than it semeth / that in vnderstan­dynge [Page 43] manne is lyke vnto god. And the same vnderstandynge is know­ledge: but is man lyke to god in any other knowlege trowest thou, than in contemplacyon of the Dyuyne maiestie?

I praye the re­herse that more playnely vnto me.

By my trouthe thou arte verye dulle in perceyuinge. I say in beholdyng perfectly the prouidence and goodnes of god: dydde I not declare to the but euen nowe / that therin was goddes maiestie?

Well, nowe I perceyue the. It se­meth veryly Plato, that therin is the knowlege, wherin as thou haste affirmed, is a portion of diuinitie.

By that same knowledge also he knoweth that vertue is good / bi­cause it procedeth of goodnes.

Ye.

Doth he not also knowe that euyll is contrary to good?

Why not.

And he knoweth that vice is contrary to vertue.

[Page]Ye that is trewe.

Thanne knowethe he that vice is ylle, by cause hit is contrarye to that whiche is good?

I agree also there to.

By the same ray­son dothe he knowe, that he whi­che is vycyouse / that is to saye, he whiche is possessed with vice is ylle: and he that is vertuouse / is good.

Ye trulye.

Thanne he that is vycyouse is contrarye and vnlyke vnto hym that is vertu­ouse.

It muste nedes be so.

In anye other thynge but that he is yll?

In none other thynge.

And he that is vertuouse / is he lyke vnto god, whiche is all goodnes [...], for any other thynge but for that he is good?

No I suppose.

Than see howe he that is vertuouse is [Page 44] lyke vnto god. And that he whi­che is possessyd with vice, is con­trarye and vnlyke vnto hym.

I muste nedes agre to thy rayson.

Nowe in consyderynge the prouydence of godde, whiche also belongethe to vnderstandynge, Order in euerye thinge is perceyued to be / whiche order lyke a streyghte lyne issueth oute of prouydence, and passethe directely throughe all thynges that be created. And therin be degrees, wherin those thynges beinge sette / one hathe preemynence ouer a no­ther in goodnes.

So it appereth.

Dyd not we calle that goodnesse whyle ere necessary and profitable?

Yes that I remem­bre.

Vnto whome / supposyst thou, be thynges profy­table?

Vnto whom els but to them / whiche doo vse them?

[Page] And to them that do vse them most / be they mooste profitable?

Ye so hit foloweth.

But if they falle frome the degrees of the sayde lyne, wherin they were ordeyned and sette / by the sayde prouidence: and chaunge theyr order, than those thynges do cesse to be necessarye one to an other / bycause they be oute of theyr ryght places, where god had ones sette them for to be necessary.

In dede so it semeth.

And where order lackethe, there is disorder.

Ye that is trewe.

Also either order is good and disorder ylle, or els contrary.

No but as thou say dest fyrst.

And that which is good is also profitable: and contrary wise that which is yll / is also vnprofitable.

Ye verily.

Than thou wylte graunte me, that order is good and profytable / and disorder is ylle and vnprofitable?

That muste I [Page 45] nedes do.

Than what sayfte thou, be not all thynges / wherin is ordre or disordre, eyther good and profitable or ylle and vnprofytable in vsynge one an nother?

Yes doubtles.

And to them that do vse them?

So it appereth.

More or lasse as they be moche or lyttell vsed?

I can not deny it.

I am very gladde Aristippus / to see howe se­riously and truely thou kepest tacke with me, sens thou dyd dest promise me / that thou woldest answere ac­cordynge as thou thoughtist, with­out leanynge to any particular opi­nion. And in that appereth in the a token of more wisedome: thanne is in all the residue of thy profession.

But nowe remembre welle what thou haste spoken: And shewe me if thou thinkest that any other crea­ture hath so moche vse of all thyn­ges that be created as manne hath, [Page] reuolue them well in thy mynde or thou speakest / consyderinge what commoditie one thynge maye haue by vsynge an other. And of howe many thynges one thynge maye re­ceyue any commoditie. Howe say­est thou, hast thou nowe well adui­sed the?

Me semeth Plato that onely man hathe the vse of all thinges that be created, and may re­ceyue of eueriche of them a commo­dite. Other thinges do vse somtime one an other / but not so generally.

Than it semeth also / that all thinges were created for hym speci­ally.

What meaneste thou therby?

For man doeth vse or maye vse / all thinge that is / but not contrarye: for the horse / the ore / or the shepe, lykewyse other thynges lyuinge, or growynge can n [...]t vse manne nor receyue of hym any thynge but for mannes propre commoditie.

Me [Page 46] thynketh thou sayest truely.

Ergo we be agreed, that Man vseth thinges mooste of all other?

Ye surely.

Than be they to hym eyther beste and mooste profy­table, or elles warste and mooste vnprofitable.

Thou speakest merualously.

Why sayst thou so, sens this is but comune raison, and (except I be de­ceyued) to euerye manne easye? but that the sayde thynges be to manne beste and moste profytable / it hap­neth of order: that they be warst & moste vnprofytable / it cōmeth of dis­ordre.

So verily hit semeth.

More ouer the preeminence that man hath, beinge in the highest degree of the lyne that we spake of, augmenteth also the qualitie / that is to say maketh the thynge that he v­seth better or wars. As by example. A fatte shepe hauynge moche wolle on his backe, for as moche as a man [Page] may be fedde with his carcaise, and clothed with his wull, is better thā a leane and poore shepe, whose wul being [...]orne al of with the brembles / the [...]arkais wyll onely fede dogges: whiche gnawynge on the boones and bowelles wyll therwith be no­urished. Lykewyse herbes in that [...] be medicinable and holsom, in [...] or restoringe helthe vnto [...], be moche better, than for that they fede catel or beastes: so that for the benefite that euery creature brin [...] vnto man / it is the better in his kinde & more profitable. But sens it semeth / that for mā, specially al thin­ges were created & that vnto hym they be eyther best and mooste pro­fitable / or els warst and most vnprofitable / I wold now knowe wherin they be vnto man good & profitable / or yll and vnprofytable.

What meanest thou? Diddest not thou declare it euen no we thy selfe, [Page 47] whā thou saydest that it hapned by order and disorder?

I can the thanke, thou art nowe of a good re­membraunce. But doest thou per­ceyue Aristippus / what I ment ther by?

Dyddest thou nat mene, that some beastes were ordayned for man to eate, some to cladde him with, some to tyl his lande for corn / other to ryde on: lykewyse her­bes and frutes, somme serue for meate and nourisshynge, diuers for medicine, stone and tymber to buyld with. And whiles they be vsed in this wise as they be ordained / there alway is order. But if they be vsed for any other purpose, or one in the place of an other, there is disorder.

Abide Aristippus, thou hast forgotten some thynge behynde the, that wyll make moch of the matter: Perdie there be some bestes / foules / and fisshes / which wyl serue to none of the purposes, which thou hast re­hersed: [Page] As serpentes / scorpions / and suche other lyke: of byrdes the Egle / the dunkyte, the Ospraye, and the Cormorant, whiche do ra­uyn and deuour that, which is necessary for mans lyuynge. Also crowes and rookes may be brought into the same company: And of fysshes that which in latine is called torpedo, or euer he commeth oute of the water mortifieth the handes of the fysiher whiles he is drawyng vp of his net. An other fysshe called Remora / all though he be very lytell in body, yet wyll he staye and reteyne a greatte shyppe beinge vnder saylle, and lette hym that he shall not passe forthe in his voyage. And dyuers other bothe fysshes and byrdes there be of semblable malyce: howe wylt thou bring them into the order that thou haste spoken of.

Mary as thou sayst Plato, I can not well telle what to saye thereto.

I [Page 48] beleue that well ynough. For thou arte so nosilled in carnall affections, that thou kepist nothyng in remem­braunce, but onely that / whiche is commodious and pleasaunte. But I wyll helpe the forthe / as well as I can. All be it I know wel inough I shall not brynge these thynges in order sufficiently. The prouidence of god is so inserutable that it can n [...]t all be comprehended by mans ima­gination / not withstandynge by my demaundynge and thyne aunswe­rynge / I truste we shall fynde therin matter competent ynough to helpe vs to that thing that we go about, that is to saye, to fynde oute know­lege / wherin wysedom lieth hydde. ¶First Aristippus thou wilt agree / that all creatures in the finall cause of their creation be good: That is to saye, hauynge respecte to that they be made for?

Ye, that haue I graunted all redy.

Therfore to that respect they can not be yl?

That is trouth. PLAT. But malice is contrarye to good, and also taketh his denomination of euyll?

That I knowe well ynough.

Than spake I not well whan I sayde that dyuers beastes fysshes, and byrdes, were of semblable malyce as they were, of whome I had spoken?

It se­meth so.

For as moch as by their creation, they be al good?

Ye for the same cause.

Of the sayd bestes, byrdes / & fishes / there be some partes / whiche by phisitions, and them that seke for the naturall pro­preties of thynges, be founden remedies agaynst dyuers sicknesses.

So it hath bene affirmed by Demo­critus, & his disciple Hippocrates. And I my self haue sene meruailes, whan suche thynges haue ben pra­ctised.

And for as moche as goodnesse came of them / thou dyd­dest [Page 49] iudge all suche thynges to be good?

Ye in good faythe.

Thou diddest therin iuge tru­ly / and as it was. But whan thou knewist any man to be stungen with a serpente / or Scorpion / whereby the man perished, diddest thou sup­pose thā, that the Scorpion or serpēt was yl, or good styl as he was whā he seruyd for a medicine / and preserued man from the dethe?

I am not so madde to suppose that to be good / whereby man is destroy­ed.

I suppose thou arte not: But sens we haue affyrmed al thing to be good in his creation / hauynge respect to the ende wherfore it was created. For as moche as the sayde beastes / byrdes / and fyshes recey­ued in theyr creation the disposici­ons before touched, whiche thou supposest to be ylle, by cause therby manne maye peryshe and dye. Let vs consyder the cause fynall, where­fore [Page] those dispositions were put by God of nature into the sayd creatu­res, wherin I wyll as briefely as I can declare to the myne opinion or sentence. Foresene alway that thou remembre, that the prouidence of god is aboue mans capacitie to comprehende holly: But I doubte nat, some part of it shal serue (as I said) to the sufficiente declaration of that thynge that we pourpose.

SHal we nede Arist. to make any playner declaration / what thing it is, for the which all other thinges lackyng the vse of raison were crea­ted?

No, for it appereth to me sufficientely, that it is man: as thou hast alredy declared.

And we [Page 50] be agreed longe agone / that man is of body & soule?

Ye no faylle therof.

And to the bodye the sences or wittes be ioyned, as vnderstanding is ioyned to the soule?

Accordynge.

Also the bodye is sensual & mortall / the soule is Intel­lectual & immortal.

So it semeth.

The fyrst is in cōmune with be­stes, & therfore it is bestly, the other is a portion of diuinitie / & therfore it is diuine and godly.

That hast thou longe agone proued: wherfore I wyl not nowe replye therin a­gayn the.

I am glad that I finde the so raisonable. But dost thou also remēbre, that I sayd, that the diuine portion, durynge the tyme that it is cōserued by contemplation of the di­uine maiestie / it is perfect & like vnto god, and whan it is ioyned vnto cor­poral affectis, it is vn [...]fecte & vanys­sheth away?

Ye I remembre it wel.

Now here me out paciētly, [Page] and we shall come shortly to an ende of this matter. Thou knowest well ynough Aristippus, that the bodye, and consequently the sences or wyt­ [...]es that do perteyne thervnto, is the habitation or vessell, whiche recey­ueth the soule. Also affectes or affec­tions al though while ere I named them corporal, yet in very dede they be first in the soule, as intencions be in the warke manne before he doeth warke: And whan the soule doeth exercyse theym / hauynge his chiefe respect to vnderstandynge / wherof we haue so moche spoken: than be they vertues. But if they beinge mixt with the sences, be all ruled by them in hauynge onely respecte to the bodye, than be they vices, and the soule by the excludyng of vnder­standynge beinge made subiect vnto the bodye, they maye than be well called corporall: as that ought to be called the goodes of the vaynquys­shour, [Page 51] whiche were the prisoners before he was taken: or the goodes of the bondmā be called the lordes. Nowe so it is that god, of whose maiestie we haue spoken, and be yet in speakynge, whan he hathe putte the soule (accompanyed with affec­tes as hir perpetuall seruauntes and ministres) into the body / as into hir propre habitation, he gyueth to hir the sences, to be as hir slaucs or drudges. And commyttynge to hir for a chiefe counsayllour vnderstan­dynge / he leaueth with her also, Free wyll to be hir Secretarye.

Nowe if she mought alwaye kepe hir habitation and company in that astate, as they were lefte vnto hir: than shuld men be as goddis. And those thynges whiche brought any anoyance to men, shulde alwaye be yll, and be made by nature in vayn. And also god shulde seme to do ylle in the ordeynynge of them. Or els [Page] that in thinges there were no proui­dence. But sens of so many men as nowe be, haue bene / and shall be in the worlde / the bodyes in the prin­cipal humours, wherof they be comp [...]cte (whiche as thou knoweste is bloud, redde coler [...]me, and blacke co [...]er called Melancoly) be of dyuers temperatures. Therfore be they in [...]ondry wyse [...]lyned in the operati­on of theyr sences or wyttes: As some to actes veneriall and highnes of courage, other more to get pos­sessions and rychesse / dyuers for eue­ry lyttell displeasure to be cruelly re­uenged. Many to employe all theyr studye and labour in yl craft and de­ceyte: other do abhorre all trauayle as well of mynde as of bodye / de [...]y­rynge onely (as the blocke whiche Iupiter dydde sende downe into the water to haue rule ouer the pad­dockes) to lyestyll and do nothyng. As soone as any of the sayde incly­nations [Page 52] be conceyued in the sences / the mynde begynneth to haue dilec­tation therin / and offreth it to vs, as it were good pleasant & profitable: than if our affectes / by whom we be meued to do any thynge, do consent to the said dilectation, and than im­mediately wyll is corrupted / so that she as false and disloyall, wryteth in the harte of man (whiche is the sou­les booke, wherein all thoughtes be wrytten) that she sayd Inclination meued and sette forthe by the sayde affectes, is profitable and good. If the soule hastily without asking coū saylle of vnderstandyng, do approue the said ꝑswasiō, bileuing wyl, without any other inuestigatiō or serch: Thā she being abandoned of vnder­stādīg, loseth hir dignite, & becōmith ministre vnto the sences / which be­fore were her slaues / who vsurping the preeminēce, & hauing the affectis & Wylle holly at their cōmandment [...] [Page] do possede the body as theyr propre mancion, leauynge nothynge to the soule, but to vse onely her powers after theyr sensuall appetites. And so Man bireft of that portion / wher in he was lyke vnto god, is become equalle or rather inferior to brute beastes, for suche causes as I before haue rehersed. Nowe Aristippus, whan Man is ones broughte vnto this astate / doest not thou suppose, that he forgetteth nowe or knoweth not what he is? or to expresse more playnly to the what I meane / Is he not ignorant / that he is transformed from a man to a beaste? And suppo­seth styl that he is like vnto god, and in the order that we spake of, supe­riour vnto al other creatures and do n [...]ator ouer them al?

Ye that is true, he beleueth so veryly.

But yet it is not so. For whan vn­derstandynge was excluded by the soule, and that she was subdued or [Page 53] maistred by the sences, than the similitude of god / whiche was in vn­derstandynge / vanysshed from hym. And whan he lefte his owne place of preeminence / and dydde partici­pate in carnalle affectes with crea­tures, which were to him inferiors, he brake the lyne of order / and loste his superioritie: and consequentely broughte hym selfe and other into disordre, whiche as we haue agreed is euylle and contrarye vnto good, and by the same rayson is ennemye vnto god / Whiche is onely good­nesse. For no man wyll denye, but that thynge / whiche is so contrarye vnto an other, that in no parte they may accorde / but be alway repoug­naunt: they be mutually ennemyes one to an other.

I sup­pose it be euen as thou sayst.

Nowe calle to thy remembrance [...] that we were agreed that al creatures were made for mā, [Page] and that he hadde the moste vse of them all. Also they all were good in the order of theyr creation / and that to man they were best & mooste profitable as long as they continued in the sayde order / And beinge in disorder they were also to manne warste, and mooste vnprofytable.

Moreouer all though some beastes, soules, and fyshes seme to haue in them a malice, wherby man may be hurt or anoyed: yet hauing respect to the cause fynalle / wherfore they were made / they were / not with­standynge necessary vnto man specy­ally.

I thanke the hartly Plato for this repetition: wherby thou haste well reuiued my remēbrāce, which was wel nygh oppressed with the abundāce of mater, wherwith thou hast as I moughte saye infar [...]id this communication.

I knowe well inoughe Aristippus, that in matter of great [Page 54] importaunce / to men that be sensu­all, hauinge their myndes ingrossed with carnall affections, there is re­quired a plaine and sensible forme of raisoning, broken nowe and thau with often repetitions: whiche all though to froward herers it semeth to make the matter tediouse, yet if they can abide it / they shal therby retain some sedes of knowlege, like as in a lande that was neuer well hus­bonded, corne wyl growe & springe in ere / whan men litle loked, for to haue goten suche frute by theyr ylle husbondry. But nowe set vp thyn eares Aristippus / and dyligentlye here the misterye of the wonderfull goodnes and prouidēce of god, whiche shall be declared in the sayde cause final: whiche I intend now to expresse & open vnto the without fur­ther delay.

Go to now Plato I haue al my hole mynde setlyd and prepared to here the, and I shall not [Page] wyllyngly let one worde that pas­seth from thy mouthe / eskape me.

Thou hast all redy graun­ted / that a counning Artifycer fore­seethe in his ymagination the figure of the thynge that he warketh, and to what effect it is wrought, which is properly called the cause finall.

And whan it is made / he delyteth in the beholdyng it. And the more perfect and excellent that the warke is / the more he therin reioycethe, and prepareth some meane to preserue it from brekynge or other destruction. But there is none Artificer to be cō ­pared vnto god, eyther in foresyght / or in care to preserue that whiche he hym selfe wrought. Nor there is a­ny mannes warkemanship lyke to his in perfection. Wherfore he most excellently reioicith in his creatures. And by cause he consyderith / that Man is the moste wonderfull of all his warkes, he reioiceth therin most [Page 55] and incomparably. Also bycause he made hym to his owne similitude, he loueth hym / accordynge to the commune prouerbe: All thynge lo­ueth that, whiche is mooste lyke to hym selfe. And therfore he is moste circumspect in the preseruation ther­of. Wherfore considerynge that by Wylle, perchaunce corrupted, as I late declared, Man mought declyne from that perfectiō, wherin he was made / and by the parte sensible in­duced to rebelle agayne his owne creatoure / thynkynge that of his owne power he hath all other crea­tures vnder his subiection / and that all that he wylleth is good / not as vnderstandynge wold instruct him, but as his affections deceyued by his sences do falsely perswade hym. This eternall and incomprehensible goodnes / whiche we calle GOL, louinge man as his image incompa­rably, hath prouyded to sytte in the [Page] waye, wherby VVYLL shall passe many sondry obstacles and lettes to cause hym to tary / that in his course he [...]all not heedling in the botomlas pit of Ignorance, while he is in the way to rebel again his maker & most mercifull lorde. These necessarye let­tes be diseses & siknessis, wherby bo­dily strēgth is abated, and therwith carnal affectis oppressid or minished / Aduersite, vexatiō & trouble wherbi stordy courage pride & ambitiō, & o­ther like malāders of the minde may be curid / or at the lest wayes refor­med. And besydes these, be other obstacles, wherby man shall be war­ [...]id of his arrogance / whan he to moche presumeth on his propre po­wer, knowlege, and industry. And therfore he wyll frely vse all thinges at his pleasure / wherin his sences haue dilectation, and his appetite moueth hym. These thynges god foreseinge (as I sayde byfore) most [Page 56] louingely and wysely prouydynge for his mooste dereste creatoure, agaynste the sayde perylle of for­gettefulnesse, like as he made manne of soule and bodye, so with thinges necessary and profitable to the body he ordaynid thynges also necessarye & profitable vnto the soule, sowinge amonge the herbis, that be holsome or plesant, other noysom and vene­mous. In the grene banke lyeth the serpente hidde / redy with his trem­bling tunge to stryke mortally them whiche doo approche hym. The scorpion woūden in the grene grasse / lyeth watching with his forked tail in a redynes to styng thē / which loke not down to their fete. The bodi infec­ted or woūded, findeth in pain & an­guishe his owne, ꝓpre ignoraunce / in that / that he so moche estemed di­lectation & plesure / which in so short a momente vanysshed awaye. Also sens a lyttell herbe / whiche is inani­mate, [Page] maye chaunge pleasure in to peyne / and helthe into syckenes / or a lyttell vile worme at one stroke may bircue hym of all dilectation and pleasure, and fylle hym with so mo­che anguysshe and dolour, that the lyfe / whiche he desyred euer to con­tinue becōmeth to hym tedious and lothesome / he shall therby not onely remembre / that he is passible / & therfore no god, but also perceyue and consyder of how lyttell importance or valour is than his strength / auctoritie / or puis [...]ance, were he neuer so myghty a champion or so puisant a kynge or Emperour. And with that remembraunce the parte sensible be­inge rebuked, vnderstandynge efte­soones resorteth vnto the soule, and helpeth her to reforme all her holle householde / settynge eftesones euery thyng in his propre place and office, as it was before free wylle was cor­rupted. And if than the soule be cir­cumspecte / [Page 57] & do restrayne VVIL of hir lybertie, compellynge hir to be subiecte and so obediente to raison, that withoute hir consente she shall dare to doo nothynge: than the craf­tye perswasions of the sencis shall no thinge auayle, but they them selfes wyll they or no, shall be constrayned to be styll drudges vnto the soule as they were ordayned. But if manne do forgette to sette Wyll vnder the gouernaunce of rayson / and with a circumspect deliberation, to appoint vnto hir limites and bondes whiche she shall not be so hardy to passe or excede. After the body is eskaped from aduersyte, or is delyuered of vehement peine and anguisshe, forth with the senses do prepare thē selfes eftsones to rebell. And affectes whi­che as wanton girles be flexible or redy to inclyne to euery motion, do prepare them with wanton counte­naunce and pleasaunt promyses to [Page] allure eftesones Wille to their appe­tite: wherby the soule shalbe ageyn in daunger to perysshe / onelasse she retaynynge still with hir vnderstan­dynge, in consyderynge hir propre state and condition, and reuoluinge what she before hadde suffred / doo put Wyll in to the prison of Drede / vnder the streyte custodie of Remē ­braunce and Rayson. And in this wyse as I haue rehersed / not onely he that suffreth, receyueth commo­dite of this wonderfull prouidence: but also other whiche doo beholde hym that sufferith, or hereth it suffi­ciently reported may and ought ther by examine the state of his owne persone / and as mortall and passible and no god / but the ymage of god by vn­derstandynge, endeuoure them selfe to kepe that in perfection, hauing in good awayte, that they lette not af­fectes become to malapert / but that the soule haue vnderstanding alway [Page 58] at her elbowe, whiche shall bydde raison correcte Wylle, if he be con­uersaunt with these affectes. And than shall man stylle remayne with­out any of the sayde transformati­ons that we before spake of: and vse euery thynge accordynge to the effecte that they were fyrste orday­ned for hym: whiche is the cause fi­nall, wherof I haue spoken / and promisyd to declare vnto the, wher­in shynethe the wonderfull prouy­dence, wherby god is best knowen. Howe sayst thou Aristippus? doest thou beare away & perceyue what I haue al this whyle spoken?

ye that I do Plato, all thoughe hit be meruayllous: but yet me semeth thou haste omitted somewhat / whi­che shulde make of all that whiche thou spakest a perfecte conclusion.

Trowest thou so? Mary I pray the telle me what lacketh, as thou doest suppose, and I wyll a­mēde [Page] that gladly / for I wold be loth that in that, whiche we go aboute / shulde be founde imperfection.

I remembre / thou haste affirmed through al thy resoning, that al [...]hinges in respecte of theyr creatyon be good / and that all was created for man: More ouer that some thyn­ges, whiche doo seme to be ylle, in very dede be not so, but be all good in theyr order of theyr creatyon.

And for profe of that thou dyddest induce by example, that aduersite / and syknesse, dyd cure or mitigate affectes and vanites of the mynde. Also that venemous herbes, serpen­tes, and wormes / whiche semed to haue in them nothynge but malyce onely, by anoyinge of menne that were sensual, folowyng theyr affec­tes, and forgettynge their state / with peyne and anguysshe, birefte them theyr pleasure, wherin they dely­ted, and made them remembre / that [Page 59] they were passible: and by that con­sideration to reforme thē selfes accordyng to their firste perfection / wher in they were ordayned. And so did­dest thou conclude / that aduersitie, syckenes, venemous herbes and be­stes were good to that respect. And therfore necessarily prouyded of god to the vse of man. Nowe for as mo­che as all men be not sensuall / nor ladde with carnall affectes or vani­ties: but some men kepynge the sen­ces in theyr propre office or duetie / also kepynge Wyll (as I moughte vse thy wordes) within the precinct prescribed to hir by vnderstandyng: nede not so sharpe a monytion, as thou haste spoken of, where aduersi­tie / syckenes, venemous matter / or bestes do as sone and greuously anoy or hurt those good menne / as them that be vicious: howe dareste thou affirme them to be good? or declare them to be a parte of prouidence, [Page] wherby the goodnesse of god is ex­pressed? These thynges considered me thynketh Plato, thy conclusion (as I sayd) is yet insufficient.

In dede Aristippus it semeth, that thou haste diligently herd me: but I feare me, that for the olde con­trouersies betwene vs thou markest more what I saye, to take me with some l [...]cke / than to beare awaye & obserue any thynge that may pro­fyte the to knowe, in as moche as my conclusion / whiche thou repro­uest is not so insufficiēt as thou doest suppose. Thou knowest that Scam­mony gyuen where nede is, and in a due and conuenient proportion, hea­leth them which be vexed with me­lancoly, but excedyng his measure / or taken where that humour doeth not abounde / in the stede of helthe bryngeth mortall sycknesse almooste incurable. The same dothe Thapsia, Agaricus, and dyuers other / which [Page 60] do pourge the body of superfluous humours. The fruites named Mil­lones and Cocombres aswageth the inordinate heate that procedethe of colere: yet in them whiche eyther by nature or occasion haue their be­lyes colde / they procure intollerable tormentes or frettinges. Mandra­gora / and the iuise of Popie, called Opium, to them whiche by some in­naturall cause be lette from slepe / do profite moche, if they be measura­bly taken: cōtrary wyse if they be taken by him that is moch fleumatike, and of nature disposed to slepe very soundly, and also the medicine exce­deth his portion / he bringethe the patient in to so depe a slepe / that he neuer awakethe. But all thoughe these thinges, whiche I haue reher­sed yf they haue not ioyned vnto them Oportunitie and measure, do brynge either damage or dethe to them whiche receyue them: yet no [Page] man do accompte them for yll: but beinge putte in the nombre of medi­cines, wherby mannes bodye is cu­red [...] they be called good.

¶Is there any thinge amonge men better or reputed more profytable than lawes: And yet was there ne­uer law made by any man so perfit, but that diuerse haue therby sustay­ned detriment, ye some that wyllingly neuer offended. Also some lawes by addyng to sondry opinions, be so inuolued or wrapped in doubtis, that they whiche ones were and ought to be open and playne to the people / whiche lyueth vnder them, and be bounde to obey them, maye not without longe debatynge and great chargis / be declared sufficiently And yet who is so moche disple­sed with any lawe, but that he wyll affirme, that lawes be good / ye & all though it happen somtime that they be yll executed.

[Page 61]¶Lyke wyse the venemous her­bes / beastes and fysshes to that ende and purpose, which I haue declarid / whervnto thei be ordeinid, be good / whiche thou doest not denye me.

And than by the examples that I haue rehersed / my conclusion in declaration of prouidence is good & suf­ficient. For if thou thynkest, that I shulde haue proued those thynges to haue ben so absolutely good / that they mought not be to ani respect il, than thou lackest that naturall wyt, whiche all this whyle I supposed hadde ben in the. For I wolde haue thought that thou haddest knowen, that nothynge is in this worlde so good / but that hit may brynge da­mage to some man. Fynally that vnder the region of the Moone is no­thīg so good that it is not mixt with some yll / but remaynyng in their ꝓ­pre degrees of order / wherof I haue spoken, one is better than an other, [Page] and be neuer yll but by disordre: and there also one is wars thā an other, by the degrees, I do meane the cau­ses wherfore they were ordeyned. As by exāple to declare it more plainly: doest thou remembre Aristippus, whan we were spekynge of order & disorder, that thou saidest, that som beastis were ordeyned for manne to [...]ate, some to cladde hym with, some to tylle his lande, other to ryde on, lykewise herbes / frutes, and trees / some to serue for nouryshyng, diuers for medicine / and other to buylde with?

Ye I do remēbre that well.

Nowe marke well A­rist. The Oxe, which tilleth the lāde, beareth befe / wherwith man is no­ryshed / & his hyde serueth to make shoen to saue mens feete from colde and other anoyance. The shepe bea­reth wolle to cladde with the body of manne commodiously. And his fleshe is good to be eaten / and where [Page 62] he lackethe puissaunce to drawe the ploughe or the wayne / in stede ther­of he goinge and lyinge on the lande with his ordure and pysse / com­passeth the grounde, and maketh it fertile and able to bere plētie of corn. Wherfore these two be sette in one degree in the lyne of order. The horse and all other beastes / whi­che be lyke to that kynde, wylle drawe or carye. And also their hy­des wylle serue to that pourpose / that the oxe hyde doeth. But theyr fleshe is not apte to be eaten of men. Wherfore they be a degree vnder the other: And soo consequentely all thynges as they be profytable more or lasse vnto man / if he doo vse them, so be they hygher or lower in degree in the sayde lyne of order.

And yf an Oxe or a shepe haue mo­che flesshe on hym and sweete, he is named therfore a good oxe or a good shepe. If a horse or a mule wyl [Page] beare a great waight, & go far iour­nayes, he is named a good horse or a good mule. And although a man aduisedly or vnaduisedly doo eate more beoffe or mutton than his sto­make wyll beare, and therwith is sicke / the oxe or the shepe ought not therfore to be called ylle. Nor if a man take awaye thy money or gar­mentes / and laye it on thyne owne horse or mule, and carye hit awaye with hym: this letteth not, but that thy horse or mule shall be called styll good. But if thou wylte ryde by poste on thyne oxe / or thy shepe, or roste thy horse or thy mule to ban­ket with thy frendes, to those pour­poses thou canste nat calle any of them good. For they be out of their propre degrees or placis in the lyne of order: and therfore they be nowe ylle. Semblably if in to thy potage / wherwith thou intendest to be nou­rished / thou doest cause to be putte [Page 63] suche herbes as do serue for violent purgations: or into thy salade chyp­pes of ooke, or of mapull, or buyl­deste thy house with stalkes of fe­nell or malowes / or couerest it with the leues of letis or beetis: these her­bes or trees so vsed doo ceasse to be good, and may to these pourposes be nowe called yll. So there is no­thynge that is perfectly good but god onely / and all other thynges the nerre they approche towarde his similitude / the more doo they drawe to that perfection / and the higher be they in the lyne of order / wherof I spake at the begynnynge.

¶This that I haue nowe sayd A­ristippus, if thou dost wel reuolue in thy mynde & consider, thou shalt not fynde that lacke in my conclusion, that thou haste obiected. But yet to satisfi the throughly, that in no part thou shalte thynke my raison vayne or vnprofitable / wylt thou see / that [Page] I shall sufficiently proue / that sycke­nes, aduersitie / matter, or bestes ve­nemous, beinge in their degrees in the lyne of order, be neuer ylle: but to that ende and pourpose that they were made for, thei be alway good?

I think, to proue that it shalbe impossible.

Perchance nay. But forgette not that I protested, that the hole prouidence and iudge­mētes of god be to man, whyle he is mortal inscrutable / & ferre aboue his imagynation or knowledge: yet of his infinite goodnes he holdeth him contented / that with due reuerence we shal measurably serche for them / only to the intent therby the more to knowe hym, honour hym, and loue hym: & after that maner do I nowe endeuour me with the helpe of his spirite to proue, that his prouidence is excellent and most to be wondred at / in that thynge wherin thou and many other do suppose that proui­dence [Page 64] lacketh.

If thou canste brynge that well to passe, I wylle than saye that the same and renome of thy wysedome / that is spronge through oute Grece, is well emplo­yed. And I wyll affirme also, that kynge Dyonise, whan he gaue the to Dolidis / was more liberall than wyse. For he hadde bene better to haue gyuen to hym sixe the beste ci­ties in Sicile, than to haue departed from suche a counsayllour.

Well I truste to verifie thy good o­pinion. But nowe alyttel while an­swere to suche questions as I wylle demaunde the.

¶Be not we agreed that man is of soule and bodye, And that the soule is immortall and intelligible, but the bodye is mortal and sensible?

Yes, no doute thereof.

We be also accorded, that all other thynges in this worlde were made chiefely for manne.

Ye so god helpe me.

And I trowe thou wylt not denye, that god is all goodnes, and that he made man vnto his own image and similitude.

No verily.

If god made any thynge to the intēt that it shulde be ylle vnto man, whi­che is his propre similitude, it shuld than seme that there shulde be some malice in god / whiche were not one­ly vntrue / but also to affirme horri­ble & vnlefull. Wherfore the contra­ry muste nedes be true, that god made euery thyng to the intent that it shulde be good vnto man: But how that may appere in such thyn­ges as thou haste rehersed, whiche seme to be ylle / theron restethe oure question. Nowe take hede Aristip­pus. The soule of man beynge im­mortall neuer dyeth or cesseth to be / but after that it is ioyned with the body / the body lyuynge / hit lyueth also / shewynge therby hir operati­ons. [Page 65] And whan lyfe departith from the body, the soule also departith immediatly notwithstandyng she afterward liueth. Than if whan she was ioyned to the bodye / she retayned the sencis and affectes in due obedi­ence, not sufferynge them to excede theyr duetie or offices, And haue vn­tylle the seperation of hir frome the body, ensued alwaye the counsayle of Vnderstanding and Rayson, and so haue contynued in the forme of a man, Surely after hir departynge frome the bodye, accordynge as by hir operation the body abounded in vertues so is she than immediately with god, whose similitude she so well hath kept, and there is promo­ted to ioye and pleasure perpetualle more or lasse after hir merites.

And that pleasure beinge intellec­tuall / shall more excede the dilecta­tions of the bodye, whiche onely be sensuall / than perfecte helthe doeth [Page] excede syckenes, or the greattest re­ioysinge of the mynde that manne mought possible haue of a sensuall motion, mought surmount the gret­test discomforte or henynesse. God desyringe that all soules moughte come to this ioye / to warne them of theyr office whome he seeth neely­gent, he sufferith the bodye, wher­with they be ioyned (as I sayde be­fore) to be touched with sondrye aflictions, to the intente that they perceyuinge howe vnable they be, the lechor to execute his bestly plea­sure in the feuer dowble tertian or [...]thyke, the proude man to aduance hym selfe aboue other, beinge infec­ted with lepry, or the lowsy sycknes callid phthuta / is, or stungen with the litle and feble scorpion / he that is cruell and fierce howe lytle he maye preuayle agayne the colike passion the stone or the goute / or the false­hode of the adder / whiche as soone [Page 66] as he hath stunge the mā, he glideth forthwith in to the hedge, & eskapith the fury of hym, which beinge hurt is not able to folowe hym: The co­uaytouse marchaunt with his shyp curtith the sees, and with his sayies and steerne presumeth to inforce the wyndes to brynge hym in to those costes from whens he may brynge home that my serable trafike / wher­on he wil cōsume al his study & wyt, and at the last leue it to be consumed by other while he is in the middes of his iornay vnder all his sayles the wynde blowynge a good koole, and hauing therwith a faire water, com­meth the fyshe called Remora / lyttel more than a gurnard / & kleuing faste to the kele of the shyppe makith hir tary, & holdeth hir styl withoute me [...]ing vntil some time risyth a pyrry and breaketh all the tackelinge, soo that the marchant is faine if he wyll saue his lyfe / to flee awaye in a bote, [Page] and retourne home agayne without money or marchaundyse. Amonge those thynges Aduersitie, or as it is more commonly called, frowarde or contrarious fortune, countreuay­leth as moch as all this, wherof we haue spoken, and procedeth to the same effecte.

But what sayest thou, if he that is sicke / hurte with venym / or vexed with fortune / do in nothyng reforme his lyuyng / but in his peynes or trouble do blaspheme god and whanne they be withdra­wen from hym he is as ylle / or per­chaunce wars than he was before, shall we than suppose that thynge to be good or profitable, wherby he not onely is not refourmed, but al­so made w [...]rs than he was erste?

I [...] aylle that thou wylte demaunde [...]ny such question. I pray the is the art of a surgion good and profitable or ylle and vnprofytable? Answere me therto.

Good & [Page 67] profitable, who wylle denye it?

And he whiche in that arte is coun­nynge and perfect, is to that respect good: and therfore is called a good surgion.

Ye that is true.

Than thou doest admitte, that a surgion is good, and that his arte is good and profytable. But is his art declared by any thynge elles but by his medicines, or instrumētes wher­with he doth cutte / perse, or canthe­rize / as necessitie of the wounde or soore doeth require?

Yes / there requireth also / that he knowe the nature and cause of the wounde or soore / and that he can well ordre his playsters and oyntementes, and also vse handsomely the sayd instrumen­tes.

O Aristippus thou arte nowe importunate / and woldest put me to more busines than nedeth, sins I rehersed that surgion, whiche in his arte is counnynge and perfecte, what meueth the to put to this ad­dition / [Page] whiche is vayne and super­fluous? as if that in hym whiche is ꝓfect / mought any thing lack, or that in perfecte, thou woldest set degrees of comparison. But admitte for the case that our surgion haue all thyng that in that arte maye be required, and also that he be thy naturall fa­ther, whiche aboue all other and with great affection loueth the, sup­pose also nowe for this tyme that in euery [...]he of thyn eyen grewe a fistu­la, wherby thou arte in icoperdie to lose thy syght, and also to haue thy visage therby defourmed. If thy fa­ther desyrynge to haue the healed, and knowynge (as thou spakeste) the nature and cause of the sayde fistula, wolde prepare suche reme­dyes as were mooste expediente to cure the: woldest thou refuse hym for thy good father, & accompt hym thyn enmy?

Nay I trowe, than were it almes to hang me.

That [Page 68] is hartily spoken Aristippus I make god a vowe: therfore I commende the. Than wylt thou loue hym bet­ter than thou dyddest before?

So ought I. For to that natural be­nefite, that I receyued of him by my generation, he addeth to moche hu­manitie and kyndenes in helpynge that I lose not my syght, wherby I shulde be depriued from all worldly comfort / and be also deformed in my visage / which blemysshe shuld cause mē that were honorable to adhorre my presence.

Thou speakest rai­sonably. And therfore see that thou chāge not herafter this good opiniō. Now thy father doeth perceyue by his coūnyng / that this disease requi­rith sharp medicines as those which be mordicatife or biting, abstersife or clensinge / or ꝑchance cantherization / that is to say, that the place corrup­ted be skorched with a hotte bour­nynge yron: whiche if thou wylte [Page] pacientlye suffre / and vse euer after suche order in dyet as thy father ap­poyntethe the / thou shalte alwaye haue thy syght sounde, and thy vi­sage sause and vndeformed, whiche shall be not to thy selfe only / but also to thy father and surgion that cu­reth the, greatte ioye and comforte. But contrary wise whan thou felest the medicine warke sharply, freting and gnawynge in the flesshe that is putrified / or els art touched with the fyre whiche is in the hote glowyng yron, wherwith he doeth cantherize the soore: If than thou doest stryue agayne thy surgion and father / that goth about to hele the / murmuryng agaynste hym with all disobedience and wordes of villany, dispising his humanitie and kyndenes, and re [...]u­synge to be cured by the sayde re­medies, eyther thou rubbest thyne eyen & remeuest the medicine frome the soore into all the syght of thyne [Page 69] eyen, or els strugglynge contemptu­ously agayne the holsome hande of thy father / doest wylfullye thraste the bournynge yron into thyn eyen: than what maruaylle is it, if that whiche thy father ordeyned to cure the, nowe by thyne impacience and disobedience, tourne to thy damage: that is to saye as well put clene oute thy sight / as also deforme thy visage for euer? whiche thynge hapnynge, mayste thou Aristippus by any ray­son / blame therfore thy surgion?

Nay in good faythe to saye truely.

What the medicine or instrumēt whiche by thyn impacience and foly thou dyddest conuert from the place where they shuld haue wrought for thy helth / and dyddest thraste them into thyn cien / wherby insued to the more grefe and peryll / shal we iuge the medicine or instrumente therfore to be ylle? And here remembre well Aristippus the cause finall, and the [Page] degree and place in the lyne of order whiche I haue byfore sufficiently declarid.

In good faythe I wyll not dissemble, I see nothynge here / that ought to be callid yll, but I my selfe / if I were in the case that thou hast nowe purposid.

If thou holde the there, we shall soone be agreed. Also if nowe thou beinge blynd / and the fistula growing eue­ry day gretter and greatter, the de­formite of thi visage more and more / thou not onely refusest to receyue a­ny medicine, but also doest murmure agaynst thy good father cursynge, hym for his medicine gyuyng, whi­ch through thyn owne foly and wilfullnes is conuerted from remedye vnto thy damage. If than thy fa­ther beholdynge the to be incurable, and also maliciouse towarde hym withoute hope of amendmente did exclude the oute of his companye, refusynge the for his sonne, supposist [Page 70] thou that for this he shulde be callid an yll father or surgeon?

No in good fayth: seinge that euery thing that he doth is with good Iustice & raison.

But he is stille good as he was before / & also that which he doth now for the due punishing of a dissobedient & vnnatural sonne, is as wel good, as that whiche he did be­fore / to the intent to cure hym of his malady / if he wold haue ben patient & suffre those medicines which were prepared to hele him.

Ye in good faythe.

Well sayde Aristip­pus. Nowe wylt thou see what I meane hereby? Is any so proprely thy father as god which is the first / the chiefe / and immediate cause of thy generation? or is any surgeon so counnynge as he, whiche seeth more plainely the original motion & cause of euery disese of the soule, that is to say of vicious affectes, than any man can see the outeward sore or skurfe [Page] of the fistula? And more perfectely knoweth the best remedye therfore / than any surgion knoweth howe to heale a smalle whelke in a chyldes fyngre.

No surely in that thou sayst truly.

Now sens ones thou hast graunted to me / that vice is yll, bycause it is contrary to vertue / whiche thou affyrmiddest to be good [...] suppose vice to be the sycknes of the soule as it is in dede: and for as mo­che as it bringeth in ignorance / whi­che is ennemie to rayson and know­lege / who be as the eyen of the soule, and if it growe moche it deformeth the soule and putteth clene away vnderstandynge / whiche is the visage, wherin (as I sayd) is the similitude of god / therfore resemble it vnto the fistula. Whiche foule & daungerous disease God as a louyng father and good surgion espyinge in the / and desyryng to heale the therof, doth his cure more spedyly and quyckely / he [Page 81] vseth sharpe medicines / touchynge the with sickenes (wherin I recken as well diseases growyng in the bo­dye, as also hurte or griefes by out­warde occasion or chaunce) or with Aduersitie, by wrongefull imprison­ment / deathe of assured frendes, to­wardly chyldren, or of a wyfe, con­stant and pacient, losse of thy princis fauour, or great authoritie / possessi­ons / or moueable rychesse, or other lyke temporall benefite. If thou suf­ferynge this paciently doest thanke­fully receyue thy fathers kyndnes & industry in curing of the / and exactly obserue the diete, wherto he doeth appoynt the: that is to say doest liue in the custome of vertue, eschuynge vicious cōmunication, yl counsayle, and flatery / which be the vnholsom and quaysy metes of the soule, wherby is ingendred the venemous hu­mour of ylle opinion, wherof com­meth vice / whiche I haue resembled [Page] vnto the fistula: thou shalt be cured and haue the sight and visage of thy soule preserued pure and clene: Con­trarye wyse if thou mourmour or grudge at the sayde remedies / este­myng thē as grefes & no medicines, blamynge or repriuynge god as vn­diserete or cruelle in the ministration of them and stryuing there agaynst / with the powar of thy sencis, vsing them dishonestly in som pleasure voluptuouse / thou tournest them from the sore / wheron they shulde warke, and with them doest thou putte out rayson and knowledge, the eyen of the soule: And than for thy folysshe­nesse, impacience, and blasphemye / God sufferinge thy soule to be both blynde with Ignoraunce, and de­fourmed with vice, sens thou haste vtterlye loste his gloryous symy­litude, he wylle frome thens forthe abiecte the, and for thyne vnkynde­nesse commytte the to perpetualle [Page 72] prisone / there to be punysshed in derkenes, where thy foule defour­med visage shall neuer be sene / to the reproche of hym, vnto whose simi­litude thou were created. Nowe Aristipp. sens thou diddest approue that whiche was done by the carnal father & surgeon to be good, bicause he did it with Iustice & raison / what saist thou to that which god orday­neth & doth who so farre excelleth in those two qualities: that the iustice executed amōg mē that be mortal / in cōparison of his Iustice / is wronge: & that which we take for raison, in re­gard of his wisdom is folishnes & fā tasi, not bicause it is nat iustice & resō that we haue: but bicause that which is in god is euer one & ꝑfect / without any diuision or mixture?

In good faith Plato, I wote not well what to say to the. Finally I am cōpelled by that argumente that thou haste made, to agree / that suche thynges [Page] whiche before semed to me to be yl, be to that respecte whiche thou hast reher [...]ed / good and profitable: that is to saye / in the refourmyng of mās soule where it is curable / and in the declaration of the Iustyce of god, where man is incurable. But what sayest thou to that which h [...]u hast so lyghtely passed ouer? I meane where the sayde diseases and afflixi­ons hapneth to hym, whiche is allredy good / and nedeth not so sharpe reformation?

Why Aristippus, supposest thou that euer any manne was so good / that in hym were ne­uer vicious affectiō? Perdic our may [...]ier Socrates, whan he was yonge, and wroughte in a Masons shoppe with his [...]ather, was not so pure from affectes as he was after that he hadde ben the herer of Anaxago­ras: by whose doctrine, and also be­inge continually vexed with pouer­tie / sondry reproches, and somtyme [Page 73] stripes of malicious & quarellyng ꝑ­sons: Also with the continual & neuer cessing brauling & chiding of his most cursed wife Xanthippa which he callid his domestical excercise / he by the gentyll vertue of pacience became a good man as he was called and ta­ken. But to the intente that thy mynde maye be satysfied, Let vs nowe admitte / that men whiche be good / or at the lefte haue suche a­bundance of vertue, and so lyttel do inclyne to vicious affectes / that hit requireth not, that they be purged with suche sharpe afflixions, as we haue spoken of. Howe sayest thou? supposist thou that vnto them the sayde afflixions be ylle and vnprofi­table?

Ye verely. And also if it were leful to speke it / me semeth that therin, god dealith not with al men indifferently.

Surely Aristippus that is not onely vnlefull to speake, but also to thynke it, hit is greatte [Page] presumption and folye. And that shall I well proue if thou wylte at­tentifely here me.

Speke on hardily.

In all the trayne of oure communication hitherto, sens we began to speke of prouidence, it hath alwaye appered, that god is father to man by creation, and lo­ueth man aboue all his creatures: But what sayest thou / Is there any more token of loue than whan the father with al his study & power endeuoreth him self to bring his sonne to great honour which if he may bring to good passe / there is nothing maye cause him so moche to reioyce?

Suerey nothynge.

And to the intent that his sonne maye be demed of all men worthy to be promotid to honoure he accustometh hym to tra­uayle either in lernynge and studye, or els in corporall exercise, the one to make him wise / the other to make hym stronge and valiaunt in bodye / [Page 74] wherby he maye declare hym selfe worthy to haue promotion. And wyse fathers the better that they loue theyr sonnes / the more diligent be they, And as I mowghte saye the more importune in kepyng them in continual exercise, thynkyng that therby the strength and delyuernesse of the bodye increacith / and if hit be in study of mynd / wyt is augmēted: lyke as contrary wyse by sluggardy & idelnes the said actiuite is apalled and the wyttes consumed: wherby men be made vnapte for the life whiche is actife or politike.

I sup­pose that hitherto thou haste sayde truely.

If the sonne be of gen­till disposition / and lyke to his fa­ther / perceyuinge his fathers honest desyre and purpose / and therwith being inflamed with desyre of glory / he wyll not onely content hym with laboure, but also if his father doo brynge hym vnto any great tourna­ment [Page] or wrastlynge, he wyll prepare hym selfe to refuse no man, whiche wyll offre to assayle him. And whan he beholdith one come agayne hym, whiche is of suche puissance / that in his syght hath vaynquished or ouer throwen men mo than a hundred / all thoughe nature somewhat tou­chethe hym with feare, yet remem­brynge that his father beholdeth hym, who hath so tawght him and gyuen hym comfort that he shall not be vaynquished excepte he wyll / and that his harte fayle hym, consyde­rynge also the pryce of the bataile or wrastlinge, whiche is honoure lasse or more after the estimation of his prowesse in vanquyshynge the moste strong and daungerouse champions, wyll he not troweste thou abyde sternely his aduersary / and receyue his assaultes ioyousely / without a­ny shrinkynge? And awayte whan his aduersaries strengthe dothe de­crese / [Page 75] or his breth failith that he than inforsynge his myght ioininge ther­vnto polycie may ouerthrowe hym. And so with moche gladenesse and commendation of all the beholdars / of whome some perauenture at the beginninge iudged hym foolehardy, he shall receyue the honoure that he hath deseruid: to his owne comforte & to the incredible ioye of his good father / who aboue all thynges wis­shed to see this conclusion?

This accordeth well / and standithe with good rayson.

Now hath he that thynge / wherfore his father broughte him vp so delygently. And the whiche he hym selfe beinge lyke to his father, of his naturall incly­nation desyred.

Ye verelye.

Hadde he it gyuen to hym for any thynge els but by cause he ap­proued hym selfe to be valiant and hardye / wherof honoure was the pryce and reward?

No I sup­pose.

Wherwith dyd he ap­proue him selfe in suche wise to haue wonne that ho [...]oure? By any other thyng than by ouerthrowing or van quishinge his puissaunte aduersary?

No truly.

Than it semeth that without a puisant aduersarye [...] his hardynes and prowesse coulde neuer haue bene proued?

No, that well appereth.

And with­out prose [...] hardynes or strength is a voice vayn and of none effect or pro­fite?

That is very trewe.

For as moche as prose is the opera­tion / whereby the sayde qualities, hardynes and strength be expressed / is it not so?

Yes verily.

Yet am I gladde, that thou art so raiso­nable: It may perchance tourne the to some commoditie. But Aristip­pus, as we remembred while ere, in those exercises whiche be commonly called games / be dyuers prices one more than an other, and they be gy­uen [Page 76] to men according to the strength that they haue employd, which is iuged by the cōparison of their strēgth whome they haue excelled: to some the fyrste game or pryce / to an other the seconde / and so in order.

And that is but rayson.

And doest thou not thynke these exercises to be good and profytable / whereby thou shalte wynne a rewarde, and also worshyppe, with comforte also vnto thy father, and increase of his loue and fauour towarde the?

Yes in good faythe.

And al­so thou woldest loue him better thā euer thou dyddeste, If often tymes he broughte the to that / whereby thou shuldest receyue suche profyte and worshyppe?

Ye I were bounde so to do.

Aristippus wotest thou where we be nowe?

What is that Plato?

We be nowe at that conclusion, the whiche thou haste soo longe gaped [Page] and loked for. That is to saye? It shall playnly appiere vnto the / that the sondry afflixions that do happen to good men, come not without pro­uidence / and the goodnesse of god / ne be ylle and vnprofytable to them that do paciently suffre them. Ther­fore I pray the Aristippus, whyle I declare to the pacience / do thou pa­ciently here me, And I shall sooner than thou wenest / sette out to thyne eye / that we two haue sought for: I meane that knowlege wherin wyse­dom is hid. And than like as the mynar / whiche after he hath founde the place where the vayne of gold lieth / labourethe busyly to dygge vp the Oore / and after cesseth not to trye it from the stones / and with contynual trauayle to fynde out the pure gold: so shalte thou ones hauyng the sayd knowledge, neuer cesse to trauaylle in the exercyse of thy lyfe, to fynde oute wysedome.

I am verye [Page 77] well contente and desyrous to here / howe thou wylte brynge to passe that meruaylous conclusion.

Thou remembreste Aristippus, that we were agreed longe agone / that for as moche as God, is perfecte­ly good, and the fountayne frome whense all goodnes procedeth: All that is ylle is contrary and ennemye to god?

Ye, I am not so shorte witted but that I remembre al that thou hast spoken, if thou in this wise doest eftesones reherse it.

That is well sayde. And thou hast not de­nyed / but that he is the fyrst mouer, and without hym nothynge is mo­ued / or done.

No I wylle not denye it.

Sens good and yll can not procede from one fountayn, god neuer moueth to ylle, nor doeth any thynge that is ylle: what sayst thou therto?

I muste nedes graunte that, excepte I wylle repugne vnto raison.

We were also agreed, [Page] that god created the serpēt, the scor­pion, the venemous fysshes and her­bes, as well as them / whiche were commodiouse and holsome: & that he made all thinge for man, whome he loued aboue all his creatures?

Ye that is truthe.

Al­so nothynge hapneth withoute him which is the first & principal mouer, either helth or sicknesse, prosperite or aduersitie / riches or pouertie / and he beareth the kais of life and deth, for he that made and dyd put the soule in to the body, hathe the power to plucke it out: supposist thou that any other hath with hym equall autho­ritie?

No. I grauntid longe agone, that as he is one in begyn­ninge / so is he euer one in gouer­naunce / and maye suffer no ptere or lyke in equalite.

That is re­membred very well of the Arystip­pus. Nowe by that we two haue gatherid / it appereth (& if thou loke [Page 78] well) that nothinge is made yll of god. And thā nede we no further argumēt, But s [...]ns god made al thīges for mā, whom he loueth / what exte­rior thinge so euer happeneth to any good man, it is good. And therfore siknesse, aduersitie, and dethe if they happen to a good man be good.

And therfore hit shulde suffise to a good man if he suffre any of the said afflixions / to thynke and say to him selfe: God whiche sente to me this, is all good, & hath in hym none yll / nor any yll procedeth of hym, and I am one of the nombre of those creatures, whome he loueth beste: wherfore this that he hath sent me / is good and not ylle, sens hit is ne­cessarye that I be therwith conten­tid / and take heede that with myne opinion I make not that yll whiche is good.

¶But although this were sufficiēt to satisfye a good man, who wolde [Page] not labour to seke any further in the prouidence of god: yet to the Ari­stippus who beinge longe nosyllyd in wordly pleasures, wilt not admit that any thynge, which is thervnto contrari, may be expedient or necessary vnto a man that is vertuous / and lacketh suche vice / whiche requi­reth sharp admonition, and therfore thou requirest a more ample & large declaration: I wyll sette out a more plaine profe in applieng my raysons to the examples & similitudes / which I haue alredy induced.

¶God who made manne vnto his ymage, and louethe hym with more feruent affection than any car­nall father loueth his childe, brin­geth vs vppe in the exercise of the commune imbecilitie or feblenesse of oure nature, as hunger / thurste / colde, werynes after labour / annoy­aunce, displeasures / whiche do hap­pen in the societie or lyuinge of men [Page 79] together, diseases wherin is no ieo­perdie / and suche other littell incom­modities / incident to mortalitie: of al the whiche no man may be quite, declaring vnto vs by Vnderstāding / that in this life we must of necessitie trauaile and suffer / therwith geuing vs cōforte / that who so euer by this exercise waxeth stronge and hardy, hereafter beinge brought where he shal proue his strength agaynst puis­saunte & mighty aduersaries / that is to saye anguisshe and peine / sharpe and perillouse sickenes / cruel aduer­sitie in any thing that fortune semeth to rule / losse of children / frendes / or fauour of princis / prisonment / or ex­ile / and like other tourmentes / and vexations of body and mynde: if he valiantli do resist and with fortitude whiche is the strengthe of the mind, do subdue and vanquisshe those ad­uersaries, he shall haue the rewarde that belongeth to good men / which [Page] no tyme can consume, no powar can minisshe / none euyll can deface. And to whette the courage of man to de­sire this ēterprise / god giueth to him this comforte, that these thynges whiche shall so sharply assayle him, be ordaynedde onelye to proue his strength, and that they be inferiours vnto hym, if he put out his strength to the vttermoste / sens god whiche louith hym aboue all his creatures / hath ordayned nothynge to the in­tent to distroy hym, but to his bene­fyte, if he doo employe his power and wyll thervnto, accordynge as he hath receyuid them.

¶Now if the soule haue in the bo­dye intire domynion and rule, And that man be in his right fascion (as I sayde longe ago) that is to saye lyke to his father: of his noble na­ture he desyrithe to wynne that in comparable price, whiche is promy­sed to them that shal be so happy to [Page 80] gette the victorye, wherfore in this wyse he armith therto his courage / ¶Fyrst he consydereth that his fa­ther is good, and that he moste ten­derly louethe hym. Also that he brought hym not vp from the fyrste tyme that he lyued, in those littell exercises of naturall infirmitie in vaine or without any purpose. But to the intente that thereby he shall fele (as it were) the sente of more greuouse afflictions, wherof they be but the shadowes, and by a lyttell laboure and sufferaunce / he shal prepare him selfe, to sustayne and contempne a more greater trauayle and pacience. He reuoluith also in his mynd, that euery man whiche in his harte desi­reth honour, couayteth some honest occupaion or labour, and is prompt and alway forward to do his office or duetie in euery perill or daungier. For / to what wyse and dylygente man is it not a peine to be ydle? And [Page] yet where idelnes is not, nedes must be labour. And where an aduersary lacketh, prowesse lieth hid & vnkno­wē. What a mā may or may not pa­ciēce declareth. The fathers bedeth theyr children to apply them ernest­ly to study or laboure / and wyll not lette them be ydle although it be ho­ly daye, and doo constrayne them to sweate and often tymes to weepe.

Where the mothers wold sette thē on theyr lappes, and kepe them atte home all the day in the shadowe for burnynge theyr white. God hath toward good men and women the mynde of a father & best doeth loue them: & therfore he vexith thē with sondry busynes, griefes, & damages, that they may therby gather a sub­stācial strēgth, sins they which be frā kid vp in Idelnes do becum vnlusty and with theyr owne burdon be shortly suffocat. It is to men no litle pleasure to be holde a yonge man [Page 81] that with a good courage receiuer [...] on his spere a wylde bore or a grea [...] harte comminge vpon him: or with­out feare abideth with his swor [...] in his hande the fyerce lyon, whic [...] commeth to assaile hym. But the [...] are not the thynges where to go [...] daynethe to tourne ones his lok [...], beinge but tryfles and onely plea­sures of mannes vanitie and litenes. For the syght whiche is worthy to haue god the beholder therof / is to se the creature, which he louith best to trye his strength with fortune or anguishe, if he be chalengid / for ther­by strength whiche is a vertue and part of that diuine portion, wherby man is lyke vnto god, is prouid, the other strength as it is of the bodye, so is hit as the bodye is, commune with bestes: and as it is more fra [...] and vncertayne than the selfe body, in lyke wyse the pryce or rewarde that it deseruith or rather lokith for, [Page] is vncertayne and also inconstant.

But looke to the other fortitude or strength, whiche is a pacient resistēce of suche thynges, whiche opinion doth set forth, with a terrible visage of damage or grefe. It thou be sicke, the humours wherof thy bodye is made do but their nature / col [...]r con­tendeth with fleume / bloudde with melancoly: the one couaiteth to van­quysshe the other: that whiche is hotte refuseth to be colde, moysture and drowthe wyll not abyde in one place, by this variaunce they haste them to theyr dissolution, If this cō ­tention be curable, hope maketh hit tollerable. And if the warste falle, dethe shall dissolue it / for it is not for aye or perpetuall.

¶Aduersitie is not so greuous, by­cause it is oute of the body, and no­thynge compelleth vs to suffre but our owne wylles. For if we were content with that whiche onely our [Page 82] nature hath gyuen vs, we shuld not be constrayned to knowe what that worde Aduersitie mente, But sens we contempne hir as nedy and my­serable / and sue to come in to the seruice of fortune / whose nature is to be alwaye mutable and euer incon­stant, nor gyueth any thyng, but len­dethe hit onely. If we receyue any thyng of hir mocky she hande what shall it greue vs to paye that agayne whiche we haue borowed? why shulde we eyther be vngentyll credi­tours / or be angrye that we can nat tourne the nature of hir that wylle not obey or folowe any mans com­maundement or counsaylle / but may be subdued with paciēce, where she can neuer be vanquysshed with rai­son? Moreouer god is content that we shall excelle hym in that that he may not suffre ylle, and we maye by sufferaunce subdue hit. For he is in more estimation that hath ouercom [Page] a puisaunt and valiant enemy, than he whiche hath none ennemye at all. Thou receyueste of thy father this comfort, that no mā lyueth so poore­ly in the worlde as he came into hit. And he hathe nede of a lyttell that measureth aboundance by natures necessitie / and not by superfluitie of ambicious desyre. Grefe shall dis­solue or elles be dissolued. Fortune hath not so sharpe a weapon that it may byte on the soule. And whome she lengest supporteth & with moste aboundance of all thynge, them for a generall rule god lytell fauoureth: sens there is no rewarde, where lac­keth merite. Contrarywise the ende of trauaylle is ease: And the father whiche beholdeth his sonne labour mightily / reioyceth therat, and pre­pareth that after his labour he may lyue pleasantly. Who, knowynge a great hepe of golde to be hydde on the toppe of a rough hylle / wolde [Page 83] not crepe vppe through thornes and brembles to fetche it? and although his visage & handis were scratched, and his body and legges greuously prycked, yet wold he not cesse vntyl he came to the toppe. And if any man whiche behelde hym thus tra­uayllynge, wold call hym wretched and foolysshe: he sayinge nothynge, wolde thynke how happy and wel­thy he shall be, whan he hath optei­ned that thynge / wherfore he labo­reth, And doeth laughe at the igno­rance or foly of them / whiche for a peyne that dureth nat longe, wyl for beare to goo with hym and to be partners of that, wherby they shall euer after be welthy.

¶Golde is a coruptible mater, and shall ones be consumed, but that tre­sure, wherfore mannes soule ought to labour / may neuer be wasted / or in any qualitie or quantite appayred or minysshed: that is to say, it shall [Page] euer be lyke good and lyke moche. Wherfore what peyne so euer be taken about the gettynge therof, it is not greuous, hauynge respect to the gayne. Nor he that trauayleth therfore maye be named myserable or wretched: sens Miserye is the pri­uacion or lacke of all maner of com­forte. For in hope of victory if thou faylle not thy selfe, comforte is redy, if thou doest not refuse it. In so mo­che as nothynge is miserable, but if thou doest so thynke it. For all For­tune is good to hym that constantly suffreth. And who was euer so for­tunate, that whan he was subdued with impacience / dydde not desyre to chāge his astate? Suffiseth it not to the that he that vanquyssheth is demed honorable, and he that is re­creant is wretched and miserable? Howe shall it be knowen / on what part thou standist without an expe­rience? If thou haue alwaye good [Page 84] wyll, strength neuer fayleth the: but if by the puisanee of fortune thou be set on thy knee / haue a good harte, for god standeth at thyn elbow / and if thou thynke on him, he wyll sette the vp and make thy strengthe dou­ble as moche as it was. Wylt thou lerne one good poynt of defence, whiche may perchance do the ease agein some daungerous assaultes?

¶Fortune hathe taken frome the that, whiche she had lent to the. Re­uolue than in in thy mynde, that ey­ther those thynges were not good in dede as they were supposed to be / or els man is in better astate thā god is hym selfe, for them / whiche we haue, god vseth not, as carnall di­lectation, plesant and deintie meatis / orient iewelles / or great treasure of moneye / these perteyne not to god. Than is it to be thought that eyther god lackith those thinges / that be good / & thā lackith in him beatitude [Page] or perfection of ioye: or els hit is a [...] argumente that those thynges [...] not good, that god wyll not vse, [...] is contented to lacke. Fynally [...] be veri goodes that be within [...] gyuen by raison. For they be sure [...] durynge / nor can not decaye or [...]she for any occasion. They that [...] without vs / lent onely by fortune [...] be good by opinion onely / And [...]ough they participate theyr name [...] the other / yet is there not [...] them the propretie or nature of [...]odnes / for they be not durable: & [...] they be oftentymes the occasion [...] euyll: Wherfore they be for the [...]ore parte with ylle men as mooste [...] for their nature. And few good [...] haue them, or they do contynue [...] a lyttell tyme with them / by the iuste ordynaunce of god leste the mo [...] vsynge of them shuld brynge di­ [...]tation into the sences, whereby they mought be prouoked to rebell. [Page 85] And Vnderstandyng / whiche is oc­cupied in cōtemplation of the diuine maiestie mought be sodaynly expel­led, And the soule lackynge counsell shulde gyue place to carnall affecti­ons and appetites. Thou remēbrest Theognides verses.

☞ Fynally there is no gretter com­forte to hym that is good, than to be sene in the companye of good men. If thou sekeste for a good carpenter or a good Smythe, as thou goeste throughe the cytie, thou harkneste where is moste hewyng or betynge with hamers, and there thou goest in and supposest to fynde hym, that thou lokest for. Semblably if thou wylt haue a good man, go loke hym [Page] out, where thou herist that sharp sic­nes raineth / or where iniustice gouerneth / wylle ruleth, great power op­presseth: there shalte thou fynde him that thy harte desyreth. Thou maist well accompt hym for a great foole, that to lyue double his naturall lyfe / wolde not abyde to be ones or twise launced in the moste tendre parte of his bodye / or wolde not begge his breade for one twelue moneth to be a kynge afterwarde duryng his life. Stonde boldly agayne sickenes and fortune, the one is natural the other is casualle / In the fyrste is necessi­tie / whiche wylle thou or no, thou muste suffre: If thou doest hit wyl­lyngely, thou knoweste the price / If thou addest to angre / thou dou­bleste thy peyne. In the seconde is no necessitie, for thou moughteste alway refuse hit, as welle whanne it was prosperous, knowynge it to be vnstable / and burdaynous / as al­so [Page 86] whanne hit is aduerse or contra­rious, consyderynge that hit was neuer [...]oo moche thyne owne / that thou haddeste anye ryghte to re­teyne hit: sens it was ordeyned for other as well as for the. And For­tune whiche is the disposer there­of / neuer made bargayne with the / that thou shuldeste stylle kepe hit: And if she dydde / brynge forthe thy recordes. She lackethe not wytnesses innumerable to proue that she hathe bene euer inconstant. Defye hir malyce: for whanne she hathe doone hir warste, yet shalte thou haue more than thou broughteste with the. And that whiche aboundeth / shall comme of thyne industrye, and not of hir false liberalitie. And if thou doest bold­lye resyste hir, thou shalte haue that aduauncemente and rychesse gyuen the of god, wherein she shall haue no powar or authorytie, [Page] whiche shalbe suche as the hundred thousande parte thereof, shall sour­mount al that euer she gaue sens she was fyrste called Fortune.

¶Nowe howe sayst thou Aristip­pus / be those thynges / whiche thou dyddest suppose to be annoyances & incommodities, iniustely sente vnto good men? or hauynge respecte to order and the cause finall, that is to say to the ende whervnto they were ordayned, whiche I haue declared / be they vnto them necessary & moste expedient?

Now in good faith thou hast brought me to that poynt, that I wote not what to say to the.

But yet kepe thy promyse / and tell to me what thou thynkist in this matter.

Me semeth by thy rai­son / that peyne and aduersitie be as expedient to them / whiche be good, as labour and busynes are to them whiche be industrious.

And wherfore? Go to Aristippus, be not [Page 87] asshamed to confesse the trouthe / though it be cōtrary to thy professi­on.

In dede thou haste almoste made me chaunge myne olde opini­on. But sens thou haste gotten me into suche a strayte, that I can nat sterte from that I haue promysed: I wyll nowe confesse / that the cause why the sayde afflixions be expediēt for good menne, is for as moche as therby they be not onely preserued styll in theyr ryght ymage or figure: but also for theyr constaunce in tra­uaylle, they shall receyue that inesti­mable rewarde, which thou saydest was ordayned for good men.

Ah good Aristip. Nowe I perceyue that the sedes which Socrates had sowen in thy minde, do begyn nowe to sprynge with this lyttell wate­rynge: whervnto if thou wylt adde to thy diligence in pluckynge vp the weedis of wanton affections / as sone as they begyn to appere in thy [Page] mynde: thou shalte shortly perceiue the frutes of wysedom (for the whi­che we do seke) spryng abundantly, with whose mooste dilectable [...]rui­tion thou shalte neuer be saciate.

¶But nowe sens we haue treated of sondry matters / syth we fyrst en­tred into cōmunication, leste hereaf­ter thou mayste repute me for one of them whiche do speke of many thin­ges and conclude vpon none, and so accompt me but for a babbler: Lette vs examine if our mater haue hitherto hanged well togyther / or if there haue ben any vayne digression / whi­che serued nothynge to the purpose that we fyrste intended: or what thynge lacketh nowe, whiche maye make to our communication a suffi­cient ende or conclusion. And I pray the thynke not the tyme tedious / that is saued from ydelnes, and we haue nowe lyttell more than two myles to ryde. And I truste soo to [Page 88] moderate my selfe / that we shall at one tyme arryue bothe at the cytie, and at the conclusion of our matter that we haue pourposed.

Shall I tell the truthe Plato, hir is lasse griefe to me to abyde the residuall though thou woldeste talke two dayes continually / than hit was at the begynnynge to abyde herynge one houre / such swetenes I fele now in thy raisonyng. Therfore do what thou wylt / for I haue both my nea­res and my mynde wyde open to re­ceyue all that thou speakest.

I am gladde therof. Therfore pre­pare nowe thy memorye redy / or yf thou haste any thyng forgotten, call it agayne with thy remembraunce.

I wyll do as thou byd­dest me, therfore saye on Plato and spare not.

THe fyrste entre into our disputation Aristippus, (if I be not forgetfull & vnlyke to that I was wonte to be) was that thou beheldest me in this pore astate and apparaylle, the occasion wherof I declared to the in the forme of a story: whiche although it semed to the to be more than in the aunswere of a Philosopher was expediente / whiche shulde vse in fewe wordes moche matter and quycke to the purpose: yet examinynge diligently eue­ry thyng therin included, it shal well appere vnto the / that nothing therof mought haue ben omitted, the wor­des whiche we spake before / with my profession beinge well ponderid.

Me thinkith thou saiest truly, nowe that I haue consyderid euery thynge depely.

But yet Aristip­pus as I doo consyder, me seemeth to that purpose that we go aboute, the argument whiche I haue made lacketh yet some what to make hir perfecte.

Trowist thou so? In good faythe I doo not perceyue hir, for as me semith thou haste touchid euery thynge hansomely.

I am glad that it doeth so well please the. But Aristipp. thou doest remembre that we were both agreed that wis­dome is knowlege?

Ye that is truth, and so haue I herde it alway defyned.

But se whyther that knowlege only maketh one to be callid a wise mā. Is not wisdom good? What sayst thou therto?

Why thynkest thou that I am suche a fole that I wyll denye it?

No so I trowe. Nowe admytte that a man knewe all that we haue hytherto [Page] talked of, concernynge the goodnes and prouidence of god, but in dede he lereth his sencis and affectis haue the rule ouer his soule / & in his actes abuseth the saide goodnes & proui­dēce. If thou pecyuiddest him to do this / woldest thou suppose him to be a good mā.

No verily.

Thou woldest say perchance that he were ill / bicause that his actes were cōtrari to good, but to his knowlege thou woldest take lyttell regarde.

In good fayth thou sayst tru­ly.

If a man named to be a tilar wolde telle the that thy house were yll tyled, and that the morter was ylle tempred, by reson that the lime was to hote, & the holes of the tyles were made to wide for the pinnes, & that the lathes were rent in the nay­ling / & thou foundest al that he saide to be true: thou woldest suppose him to be a good tylar. But if cōmyng to his own house thou shuldest fynd it [Page 90] necligētly couerid by him, his tiles & lath so set out of order, that the rayn and snow dyd bete into eueri place, wherby the beames and rafters of the house were decayid and rotten / & therby all the house in ieoperdy to fal down euery houre: woldest thou calle hym than a good tylar or no?

Nay in good fayth, I wolde calle him but a prater.

Bycause that wher he ought most, he did not practise his cūnyng, whiche he had often auāted.

Ye in good faith.

And that were but raison. Thā [...] semeth that knowlege is indifferēt to good & to yll: but although goodnes being in knowlege / maketh that knowlege to be good, yet he whiche hath that goodnes is neuer the more [...] good mā [...] except by the exercise of the same goodnes the thinge that is good apperith in his act. For that is manifest, and declareth what the mā is / knowlege is secrete and bryngeth [Page] forth no frute but by operatiō. And thou arte agreed, that wysedome is good. Wherfore no more thā knowlege of goodnesse maketh one to be named a good man, No more doth knowledge of wysedom onely cause any persone to be named a wise mā. And that was affirmed bi the in the begynnynge of our communication: where it was agreed that kyng Di­onise desyred to see me, to the intent that he moughte beholde, if in my countenaunce, speche, or forme of ly­uynge I dydde expresse that thynge, wherfore he herde me commended, whiche was nothyng but wysdom. Than if I were a wise man / it ought to be declared by operation, whiche is not in man without knowlege precedynge or goynge before / wherof procedeth election, whiche lacketh naturally in other beastes. Where­fore all though wisedome be know­lege, yet by knowledge onely none [Page 91] may be called a wise man, but ope­ration of that whiche is in know­ledge called wysedome / expressynge the wysedome, maketh the vser or exercisar therof to be iustly named a wyse man.

Now on my faith Plato thou art a wonderfull felow, for by the subtil persuasiōs brought in by induction, whiche forme of ar­guynge I knowe is moste naturalle, thou compellest me to assent alwaye to thy raison. For now me thinketh that none may be called a wise man, excepte vnto that knowlege, wherin is wysedome, he ioyneth operation: but for what pourpose I praye the haste thou brought in nowe this last conclusion?

Arte thou so dulle wytted Aristip. that all this whyle thou doest not perceyue hit? Perdie the occasion of all our long raisoning dydde ryse of that / that I assayed to proue that if I were a wyse man in dede / myn answere to kynge Dio­nyse [Page] declared me to be so, accordinge to his expectation. And therfore fyrst as rayson was / I soughte for wyse­dom And in our cōmunication it ap­pered to be in man onely, and not in beastes: & that it was in knowlege of hym selfe and other. And that knowlege was in this wise declarid. First to know his owne preeminēce and dignitie ouer al other creatures, hir was remembred that he was of bodye and soule, wherby he was man, and was made to the image & similitude of god, and that all other creatures were made onely for him and to his vse principally. The sayd similitude was expressed to be in the soule as well for that it is visible and immortal / as also in vnderstandyng, whereby she hath souerayntie and rule in the bodye, as god hath ouer all vniuersally. Moreouer that the sences / affectes / and wylle, be he seruauntes and minystres: whiche [Page 92] if she do kepe in suche obedience and order / as she receyued them, she shal euer remayne in authorytie. But if she lette them to haue more libertie than perteyneth to them, that is to say / to delyte in thynges whiche be corruptible, they wyll than conspire and rebelle agayne vnderstandynge, and driue him from the soule / & than shulde man be transformed frome the image of god vntyl a brute beest / beinge gouerned and ruled onely by sensis. ¶The seconde parte of the saide knowlege was opened bi the discription of the goodnes and prouidence of god. In describynge his goodnes, was declared his po­war, his perfection / and loue that he hath vnto man / as vnto his chylde more thā natural. In settyng out his ꝓuidēce appered his īscrutable wisedome / magnificence / prudence, & policie in his wonderfull order / wherin were his creatures in their sondrye [Page] degrees hygher or lower, as they dydde participate in goodnes more or lasse. In the toppe wherof aboue a [...]l other, Man was sette nexte vnto god, from whom order proceded.

Moreouer by the sayde prouidence hir was declared, that nothynge ke­p [...]nge his place in order / shewed to man by vnderstandynge / mought be yll vnto hym, but alway profytable, all though to the sences some thyn­ges dydde s [...]me to be yll and vnpro­fitable. And laste of all it was pro­ued in a fewe sentences, that aduersi­te was sent by god vnto a good mā, nor iniustly or cruelly, but for a good [...] [...]ion and louyngely / as of a good father / whiche with an in [...] parable charitie desyryng to ad­uaunce his sonne to perpetuall ho­ [...] and dignitie / by suche maner of exercise proueth his vertue.

¶Nowe Aristippus reuoluyng all this in thy mynde / whiche in a short [Page 93] Epilogation I haue endeuoured my selfe to reduce vnto thy remēbrance, Consyder well bothe me and kynge Dionise / as we were at that tyme, whan we were togither. Thou kno­west well that from the tyme that I was.xx.yeres old I alway cōtinued disciple of Socrates, vntyll that he dyed. Who (as thou knowist) the answere of god determyned to be of al mortall men the wysest. And that whiche I lerned of hym was wyse­dome: whiche as he euer affirmed was included in these two wordes, Knowe thy selfe. And by that doc­trine (as thou mayste remembre) he abated the presumption of dyuers, whiche supposed them selfe to be ex­cellent wyse men. Also reuoked ma­ny that were dissolute and resolued into vice, and made them to ensue vertue. And by his exaumple of ly­uynge he prouoked men to contemne fortune, and to haue onely vertue in [Page] reuerence. And also therby, laste of all, whan he was iniustely condem­ned to deth he constantly and ioyfully susteyned to haue the mortall bo­dy dissolued / that the soule mought be at reste and haue her immortal rewarde. whiche exāple giuen of hym was the corroboration of al his do­ctrine / and no lasse part of lerning vnto his scolers, but rather moch more than his oftē disputatiōs or lessons. Imagine Aristippus, that I was so studious and industrious aboute the said lerninge / that I moste curiously & (as I mought say) superstitiously obseruid euery poynt of the said do­ctrine. And that therfore all men in Grece, and also kinge Dionyse had conceyued of me an opinion, that I was a wise man. And that the same kynge sente for me, onely to that in­tent (as I sayde at the begynnynge) to see and here / whether I were ac­cordinge to his expectation.

[Page 94] ¶Consider also on the other parte, that my cōming into Sicile / was narro serue kinge Dionise, or to receyue by hym any cōmoditie / but onely to augmente wisedome by addition of knowledge. And that he desired to haue me with him for the cause that I before haue rehersid. wherfore it semith that he had nede of that, whiche by seinge & hering of me / he tru­sted to knowe, that is to saye wise­dome. For no man couayteth that thynge, whiche he all redy hath / or wherof in his owne opinion he hath no nede. Now I knew partly by cō mon report / partly by thinformatiō of Dion / which is a iuste man & an honest / that kinge Dionise was a Tyrāt, that is to sai cōmen to that dignite bi vsurpacion and violence, and not by iuste succession or lefull election. Also that he was a mā of quicke & subtile wit, but therwith he was wonder­full sensuall, vnstable, & wandring in [Page] sondrye affections. Delytinge some­tyme in voluptuous pleasures, an o­ther tyme in gatheryng of great tre­sure and rychesse, oftentymes resol­ued into a bestly rage and vengeable crueltie / Aboute the publicke weale of his countraye alwaye remysse, in his owne desyres studious and dili­gent. And all this I perceyued very well or I spake to hym any thynge. Onely I exercised my selfe with the Aristippus, Dion, and other, in su­che part of Philosophy as mought induce you vnto the layd knowlege, wherof I haue spoken, approuynge alwaye my doctrine with the forme of liuyng by the example of my mai­ster Socrates: Abydynge oportuni­tie to speake, which mought ryse of some speciall demande of kyng Dio­nise. In the meane time to suche lyte questions and problemes as he dyd pourpose, concernynge naturall cau­ses / Rhetorike / or poetry / or of the [Page 95] dueties and maners of priuate per­sons / I resolued them so as he helde hym contented / and delyted not a ly­tell in the forme of my raysonyng.

At the laste (as I haue tolde to the at the begynnynge) he required me to declare openly, the state and pre­eminence of a kynge / whiche ruled ouer other. Therat I reioyced, we­nyng to haue founde the oportunitie to speake that I so longe loked for. And than forthe with I consydered that the sentence, whiche I shulde pronounce, shulde eyther cōmende and approue me for a wyse man / as I was supposed to be: or els cōdēne that opinion that kyng Dionise and other had of me / as false and vntru, I declarynge my selfe vnworthy to haue it. I remembred also, that lyke as ignorance and knowlege / or ylle and good maye neuer accorde: no more may falsehoode and truthe be ioyned in one. And what so euer ap­pereth [Page] other wyse than it is in dede, it is other thā truthe: and that whi­che is not truthe muste nedes be fals­hod. More ouer as truthe is good / so falshod is yl. wherfore what so e­uer is other thā truthe, can nat be in a wise man, who by the consent of al mē is good. Hauing styl in my mind this cōsideratiō / I described a kinge, not ꝑchāce as he wold haue had me / but as truth & the trust that he had ī me cōpelled me. Therfore bi the said knowlege, of the which we so longe haue disputed / I set out & expressed suche a man, in whom the soule had intiere & ful auctorite ouer the sensis, & alway kept the affectis in due rule & obediēce, folowyng only the coun­sayle of Vnderstāding, & by that go­uernaunce was moste like vnto god. This man I called a kyng / although he had no more in his possession thā had Crates the Theban. And if that suche one were by the free consent of [Page 96] the people / chosen or receyued to be a principal ruler and gouernour / go­uerning thē in like maner as he doth him selfe, thā is he a gret king or Emperour / & to be had in reuerence & honor aboue any mortal mā, sauyng to god that excellēt honor, that is due to the creator & first cause of al thīg. Not only for the preeminēce giuē vnto him bi a cōmun cōsent / but also for as moch as by his knowlege / exāple / & authorite the people shal dayly re­ceiue of him an incōparable profite & benefit / being allured & prouoked by him to set their soules in the sayd a­state & authorite, as they mai also be kīges, & be euer like vnto god. More ouer this kynge by that knowledge that he hath of hym self, he also knoweth other men: for by the operatiō whiche procedeth of their affectes / he perceyueth howe farre they be remoued from their right place in the lyne of order / that is to say, leauyng [Page] knowlege and rayson / wherby they were in the highest toppe of the lyne / they descende to the places of brute beastes by participatyng with them in sensuall appetites. And than wyll he endeuour hym selfe by all good meanes to restore them agayne (if he maye) to theyr propre place in Ordre.

¶Also suche a kynge stablysshed in the sayde knowledge, can neuer be deceyued by his moste pernicious or mischeuous ennemyes / whiche be flatterers and glosers, by whome princis be deuoured alyue / and their soules vtterly consumed with moste mortall pestilence, wherwith their coūtreis and people be also in perile to be loste & destroyed. For as sone as either in their coūsailes / or in their praises & dispreises / or in their owne order of liuing / he by the said knowlege perceyueth and noteth / to what affectis they be īclined, he awaytith [Page 97] them / and by auoydinge their com­panie eskapeth their snares.

¶Finally to the intente that the ex­cellencie of suche a kynge shulde be more euident / like as I dyd sette out while ere knowlege by Ignoraunce (for euery thinge sheweth moste perfectly, and after the cōmon prouerbe of marchantis, best to the sale, whā [...]t is ioyned or cōpared with his con [...]rary) I beganne to describe a tyrāt, which in euery thing, & (as I might [...]ay) by rule / repugneth and is moste vnlike vnto the sayde kynge / whose [...]oule rulith not / but excludinge from [...]r, Knowlege and Raison, suffreth [...]ir selfe to be gouerned bi the sensis / [...]nd obeyeng to the folishe affectis le [...]th them leade hir out of hir highe [...]lace in the lyne of Order, īto a more [...]ase degree, and to be made equal or [...]nferior to beastis, and to lose the fi­gure or image of God / wherī she was [...]reated: and by that transformatiō [Page] she loseth also Vnderstandynge / soo that a Tyraunt, is wyllyngly taken in the sayde snares, whiche a kynge doeth escape, and perceyuethe not that he is deceiued, vntyll he sensibly feleth some greuous damage. And if any man experte in the sayde know­lege / of a syncere loue that he bereth towarde hym, wolde warne hym of the sayd snares, and perchaunce shewe them vnto hym, as they be layde: yet knowledge and Rayson the two eyen of the soule, beinge put oute with affections, And Vnder­standynge hir chiefe counsailour be­inge excluded, the man gyueth no credence, but rebukyng perchaunce his mooste assured frende that warned hym [...] suffreth gladly hym selfe to be taken in the snare of Hipocrisye or Dissimulation, where for lacke of li­bertie he shalbe constrained to abide all daungers, whiche moughte hap­ [...]en vnto hym. And he that is suche [Page 98] one / howe poore so euer he be, he is a Tyraunt, and if he haue rule ouer other / the more is he vnlyke vnto god, sens by god / man is made and preserued, by crueltie and ylle ex­aumple manne bothe in bodye and soule is distroyed.

¶This description kynge Dionyse mought not abyde to here, but thin­kynge the tyme loste that I hadde spente for his profyte, sayde that these were but wordes of ydell do­tardes / wherby hir semeth that he vnderstode not my wordes / for if he hadde, he wolde haue thanked me, for declarynge that thynge so playn­ly vnto hym, which he had so longe desyred to here / that is to say wyse­dom / which (as we two be agreed) consysteth in knowledge. Or elles he required some acte of me to be [...]hewed, whiche agreinge with my wordes shulde approue me to be a wise mā, acording to his first opiniō. [Page] Howe sayst thou, was it not for one of these causes, that he spake those wordes vnto me?

Yes in good faith, I suppose that veryly.

We were agreed while ere, that he had nede of me, whanne he sent for me, and therfore he desyred to se me and to speake with me: but whan I was with hym / although I ende­uored my selfe to satisfy hym of that which he had nede of / & so moch desired / yet if he did not vnderstād what I sayd, in dede my wordes were in y [...]le. I put case Aristippus / that one of the philosophers of Inde or of o­ther countrayes speakynge no greke had come vnto him / whom he wold haue required by an interpretour to haue taught hym wysedome, howe shulde he haue instructed kynge Di­onise to haue satisfied his gentyl de­syre?

Howe els but by an In­terpretour.

What yf zeno Eleates after that he had byt of his [Page 99] owne tongue, and spyt it in the face of the tyrant that tourmented him, had bene sente for to kynge Dionise, whom he wolde haue desyred to te­che hym wysedome, howe shulde zeno / whiche lacked his tongue, sa­tisfie / the request of so good a prince and so well disposed?

I knowe not howe, except it shulde be by sig­nes and tokens. Whiche were a dif­fuse way to instruct a man in so high [...] lernynge.

Yes / he mought do it sooner by wrytyng.

Ye that is truth. But I ment the answering his demande without any tarying.

Yet than perchance, he shuld also haue nede of an interpretoure, that knewe his tokens, leste kynge Dionyse, whiche had not bene vsed vnto them, shulde not vnderstonde what he ment by them. But suppo­sest thou Aristip. that any man can better īterprete an other mās sentēce / eyther spoken in a strange language, [Page] or signified by tokens, than I coulde expounde myne owne intent or mea­nynge:

Nay surely. For euery wise mā is of his owne sentence the beste expositour.

And if it be ex­pouned sufficiently in a few wordis, it is the more commendable.

Ye that is sure.

Mought I haue vsed any playner and shorter waye / than in fewer wordes than king Di­onise reproued me with to remem­bre him [...] that in his owne wordis he mought deprehende that thing that he soughte for / sens that whiche I spake before was in his owne lan­guage, and therfore he vnderstode the wordes sufficiently? and if there were ani thing which he vnderstode not, it was in the sentence.

What meanest thou therby?

Mary I wyll telle the. In the defi­nition of a kynge I instructed hym howe he mought be in the hygheste dignitie nexte vnto god / and also in [Page 100] mooste perfecte suretie, whiche was no smalle benefite of so poore a per­sone as I am to gyue to a prince.

Wherfore if the eyen of kynge Dio­nyse soule, Knowledge and Rayson, had not ben out, he shulde sone haue perceiued the sayd benefite, and like a noble manne haue gyuen to me thankes, whiche I well deserued. And in the description of a Tyraunt I warned hym of al dangers / wher­by he mought lose the sayd dignitie. In the which two declaratiōs was holly comprehended all that / for the whiche he so moch desyred to se me. And all this whyle I knewe not, but that he had ben a good manne, bycause he desyred to knowe that / whiche thou haste granted is good, that is to saye / wysedome. Nowe whan he gaue not to me condigne thākes, as my benefite deserued, but accōpted me to haue bē idle, whiles I instructed him, than it semed / that [Page] Vnderstāding was absēt & fled from the soule, & that he rulid not as a kīg but that he was rulid bi his affectiōs: Wherfore his ingratitude declared his wordes to sauour of tirāny: whiche I rehersed vnto him to thintent that he perceyuynge by my wordes in what perylle he was in / mought by the remembrynge of my fyrste in­struction concernyng a kyng, reuoke [...] vnderstandynge, and subdu­ynge the affectes, be e [...]tesones resto­red vnto his dignitie. Howe sayste thou, consyderynge well all that, whiche is before sayde, were my wordes ylle as they were spoken?

Nay, as thou haste declared them, but yet me semeth they were very sharpe.

wotest thou what makethe the to thynke so? bycause they were shorte. But thou muste consider, that he that lacketh, in that [...] he doeth lacke / he is inferior to him of whom he desireth it / wherfore [Page 103] in as moche as kyng Dionyse to haue benefite of me, became my he­rer / he was inferior vnto me. And therfore respecte ought to be alway hadde to that, whervnto the raison extendeth, and nat to the astate of the persone that hereth. And that I alwaye consydered. And therfore spake I as I dyd to kynge Dionise. Yet did I it with suche a temperāce / that if he had not bene a Tyraunt in dede / he wolde neuer haue bene dis­contented. For I dyd not calle hym a tyrant or reproched him of any ty­ranny: But only sayd that his wor­des sauored of tyranny.

¶I put the case thou gauest to me wyne oute of a vessell / and whan I had dronke of it, I wolde say that it had a sent of mustynes / it argueth not that the vessell in musty. For perchance within fyue or sixe days that sent wyll be gone, & the wyne wyll drynke clene and gentilly. And ther­fore [Page] I suppose for my wordes thou woldest not be angry. What if that kynge Dionise had desired me to te­che hym Rhetorike: And whan I herde hym declame, or saw his wri­tyng, If I fyndinge any faute in his wordes wolde warne hym in this wyse. Syr your wordes do fauour of to moche arrogance, or that they sauored of sewet and payntinge, or be lyke vnto apples of the deed so / which be delicate in colour without but within ther is nothing but coles and powder vnsauery. Reuokynge hym therby to suche rules as I had before radde vnto hym, wherby yf he wold be diligent, he shuld bringe the forme of speakynge and writing into a perfection. Supposist thou / that this maner of instruction shulde prouoke kynge Dionyse to be angry with me?

No, For hir were no rayson.

Than hath he not so sharpe a wytte [Page 102] as thou haste supposed, sens he perceyuethe not, howe moche the lernynge of wysedome, excedeth the lernynge of Rhethorike. And ther­fore he that techeth wysdom ought to be of a greater auctoritie, than he which techeth Rhetorike. And ther­fore sens thou doest cōfesse that king Dionyse in lernyng Rhetorike wold take in good worth / what so euer I wolde say, in correctyng his wordes concernynge eloquence: Howe mo­che more ought he thanne to take in good ꝑte those wordis that I spake, in correctynge his wordes, wherby he semed to refuse wysdom / whiche a lytle before he so moche couaited to here declarid? And one thīg mought haue cōtēted him: that al that I had spokē was at his desire & for his cō ­modite. Where if I had purposed to haue gotten any thinge by hym, my wytte was not so sengle, but that I knewe howe to speke wordes as [Page] well as thou, whiche shulde delyte hym. But whan he demed me to be a wyse man, he with that opinion bounde me that I coude not deceiue hym.

In good feithe and that is very well spoken. But per aduen­ture thou spakeste to soone. And if thou haddi [...]t forborne a day, two, or thre, vntill his fume had ben passed, and that he had vsed e [...]tsones with the some familiaritie: peraduenture thi wordes wold haue ben more ea­sely takē, and thervnto thou shuldist haue foūden more oportunitie.

But take one thynge with the Ari­stippus, In the office of a wise man, that worde (Peraduenture) is neuer herde spoken: [...] [...]eraduē [...] [...]re, had [...] wyste. No more than in the ende of his workes these wordes, Had I wist. For he hath alwey the thre times in remēbrance, Time pre­sent, tyme passed, and time to come. And referringe all thing to necessarie causes, or (as I sayde longe a gone) [Page 101] vnto Prouidence / reputeth nothing to Fortune. Therfore the deferringe of tyme shulde haue nothinge auay­led / but rather shulde haue ben the cause of moche damage.

How so I praye the?

Take hede / & I shall tell the. Thou hast graunted al redy, that kynge Dionyse desired to se me, to the intent that in behol­ding and hering me / he mought per­ceiue, whether I were a wise mā or no: and than desiring me to describe vnto hym the excellencie of a kinge, supposist not thou that he made that requeste vnto me for some laudable purpose?

Yes doubtles.

Thynkynge that by no question he mought either proue me more soner to be a wise mā / or els that he might lerne more wisedome.

I thinke bothe for the one & the other.

Thou hast not denied hitherto, but that wisedome, which kinge Dionyse supposed to be in me / is in the [Page] knowledge that I haue declared: what remained than to proue me to be a wise man? doest not thou remē ­bre that we were agreed while ere that hir was operation?

Yes mary do I.

And that operation was parte of that whiche kyng Di­onyse desyred to knowe, and not onely parte but also the principalle portion.

It hath hyther­to agreed so with rayson.

If I hadde holde my pecae, and sayde nothynge, after that kynge Dyo­nyse hadde spoken / what shulde haue insued of all myne instruction?

I suppose nothynge. For he wolde haue lette the departe with­out thank or damage, and that whiche thou haddest spoken shuld haue bene lyghtly forgotten.

And than his wordes hadde bene verefyed / that my wordes hadde ben ydelly spoken. But howe sayst thou / supposeste thou that he sayde [Page 104] trewely?

Naye in good fayth. For me semeth that thy des­cription of a kynge was wonderful true and necessarye, and also therin was the knowledge, wherof thou haste treated compendiously / and playnely declared. And me thinketh that the wordis that kynge Dionise spake, besemed not a kyng, but were moch rather the wordes of one that lacked that knowledge, wherin is wysdome.

Nowe I am glad Aristippus, that I fynde in the so moche conformitie in raison. Thā sens these vngentyll wordes of kyng Dionise besemed not a kyng to speke it appereth that they besemed hym that was contrary vnto a king / whiche is a Tyrant. And being the wordes of one that lacked knowlege / it accordethe also that they were the wordes of one that was ignoraunt / and Ignoraunce is mooste contra­rye to wysedome / and as I haue [Page] saide trāsformeth a man into a beast or a monstre. But what ignorance is it / that thou supposiste by the sayde wordes was declared to be in kinge Dionise?

what other but that ignorāce, wherby he knewe nat him selfe.

And what supposist thou that he was / whā he spake (as thou hast grantid) wordes that be semed a Tyrant?

what els but as thou hast rehersed.

what a Tyrant Aristippus? thou spekest nowe more playnely than I dyd. God for bede that I shulde suffre so gentyll a prince to be transformed in to suche a monstre / if I coude helpe him. But I praye the / whiche benefite woldist thou preferre / either that whiche is giuen or employd furthwith / or that whiche is lenger differred?

what question is that? That kinde­nesse or benefite that is most prompt or sonist employed, is to be chieffely ei [...]emed.

Than if furthwith & [Page 105] as sone as I perceyued the transfor­mation of gentyll kynge Dionyse, I endeuored my selfe to make hym to knowe by his owne wordes what he was, whereby if he wolde, he mought by the expellynge of Igno­rance haue ben not only restored vn­to the forme of a man: but also haue bene made a great Emperour by the well vsynge of his dignitie. Sup­posest not thou that I dydde as it be came me? and for that benefite soo soone offred, was I not worthy a great gramercy?

Yes if he wold haue so taken it. But or thou camest to hym, thou kneweste by credible reporte, that he was obstinately in­clyned to all vicious affections / and therwith impatient and cruel, wherfore whanne thou dyddest perceyue that he contemned thi doctrine, thou shuldest than haue ceassed / and not haue offred thy selfe to peryle with­out hope of benefite.

That ad­uantage [Page] onely thou hast of me Ari­stippus: for thou that doest professe pleasure, moughtest haue done so le­fully, but I that haue professed wisedome & vertue mought by no menes haue done it. For if I hadde not re­ [...] vnto hym, I hadde lefte that [...] declared, whiche he required to [...], whiche by his owne wor­ [...], as by an example in other artis or se [...]ces was playnly set out and expressed. And like wise as I knewe that he was impacient and cruell.

So more certeynely I knewe that he had no power to indamage my soule, by whose operation I was called a wyle man. And if I shulde haue holden my peace than, it shuld haue ben for feare of damage, whi­che mought happen by his impaci­ence and crueltie towarde my body, than shulde I haue proued my selfe to haue ben a foole and no wyse mā / that I had not holden my peace at [Page 106] the begynnynge / and thanne shulde kynge Dionise haue founde no cause to haue taken displeasure. But sens he desyred to know, if I were a wise manne, and for that opinion that he had in me / he fauored me, and also thou doest confesse that my descrip­tion of a kynge by his definition / and also by comparyng hym to his con­trarye / conteyned that knowledge, wherin is wysedome: nowe remai­ned nothyng but operation to proue me to be a wyse man. Wherfore cō ­temnynge or lyttell regardynge that vayne feare, to bryng kinge Dionise to knowlege, whiche he desyred / de­clared that my mynde was not sub­iecte to corporall passions, and con­sequently not to sensuall affections, which mought haue incensed or ste­red me to speake that thynge that mought haue pleased kyng Dionyse appetite, whiche was corrupte and vicious, hopyng to haue had therby [Page] preferment and singuler fauour: and herein began the operation whiche agreed with my sayde knowledge. And afterwarde by takyng libertie from me, and makyng me a slaue, he more declared mi wordis to be true, and therby had the larger example, wherby he mought the better haue knowen hym selfe. And after whan he herde (as I doubt not but that he hath) howe constantly I contemned the peryle that I was in / of my lyfe at Egina: he mought well perceyue that operation in pacience to agree with my knowlege. And therby he had fully all that knowledge of me, wherfore he desired to se me. where contrarywise, if I shuld haue holdē my peace, as well my commynge to kynge Dionise had ben frustrate and vayne, and his gentylle desyre had ben vnsatisfied, as also by my silence beinge thought (as raison was that I shulde be) to be subdued eyther [Page 108] with fere or affectiō: I shuld seme to condemne min owne doctrine, wherfore I shuld be demid vnworthi that good opiniō, that kyng Dionise had of me.

Wel Plato in such expe­rience of wysdome I wyl not folow the.

Therfore whan any aduer­sitie shall happen vnto the, as I sup­pose thou haste not fortune locked faste in a cof [...]er no more than hadde Cresus the riche kynge of Lidia / for all that he thought that all goddes and men were his frendes, and yet was he openly bourned by Cyrus, whom he litle fered, Thou shalt fele both aduersitie & grefe, & also make thy soule subiecte vnto thy sences, wherof what doth folow, thou dost yet remembre what we haue alredy discussed. Where I or any other by the said knowlege & operation ther­vnto ioyned, shalbe so armed agayn aduersitie, that what so euer the bo­dy feleth, yet the very man which is [Page] the soule fealeth no disease / or as I mought say is neuer inquieted, but is euer intiere and in his true proportion and figure: that is to say like vnto god. And also shall haue the price that he hath deserued, by vanquys­shynge of his aduersarye, that is to saye corporall disease or aduersitie.

But nowe Aristippus / sens by any thynge that hath happened I neuer fell from that place in the lyne of or­der / wherin god had set me, but my mynde was euer in one state and cō ­dicion / & there as it was at my com­ming into Sicile / there it hath hitherto euer continued, mayst thou raiso­nably say, that I was euer lost / in so moche as I was neuer transformed or out of that astate, where in a wise man ought alway to be?

No in good faith as it now semeth.

What sayst thou than by king Dio­nise? Whome instructinge to knowe him selfe I thus moche displeased, & [Page 107] in stede of thanke and prefermente hathe rewarded me with daunger and bondage?

On my faythe I thinke that he hath bothe lost him selfe / by refusynge the sayde know­lege / wherby he shulde haue ben de­lyuered from the sayde transformation, and also he hath moste folishly lost the Plato, in puttynge the from him, which by thy counsaile shuldist haue ben to hym so royall a tresure, and the same do I thinke also of Polides the ambassador, & of the Egenites.

Gramercy Aristippus for thy gentylle audience: nowe be we come to the towne / and haue made a good ende bothe of our iournaye and also of oure communication.

Farewell Plato, and for my parte I wolde not haue lacked it for the horse that I ryde on. And to say the truth it hath made me to change some what of myn olde opinion.

The nexte tyme that we [Page] [...]ete I wyl make the to change all / if thou wylt here and abide rayson.